samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The annual overall inflation at 16.8% was also 6.1 percentage points below the end-February 2003 inflation outturn of 22.9%. Broad money •  Preliminary data indicate that broad money (M3)1 growth slowed down to 1.4% (8.4% in December 2003) to K4,530.7 billion in January 2004 from K4,467.9 billion in December 2003. This growth was 1.0 percentage points lower than the 2.4% recorded during the corresponding period in 2003, but was 0.4 percentage points above the programmed money supply growth of 1.0% for the month. •  The growth in broad money during the period under review was largely on account of the increase in net foreign assets of the banking system, which increased by 2.9% to K2,364.9 billion. •  Year-on-year broad money growth on the other hand declined by 1.2 percentage points to 22.2% in January 2004 from 23.4% in December 2003. Domestic credit •  1  Preliminary data show that growth in domestic credit slowed down to 2.3% (3.1% in December 2003) to K4,310.9 billion in January 2004 from K4,215.1 billion in December  Broad money is here defined to include currency outside banks, demand deposits at Bank of Zambia and commercial banks, local currency savings and time deposits, and foreign currency deposits. BIS Review 27/2004  1  2003. This was mainly attributed to the decline in borrowing by the public sector to negative 4.0% from 22.5%.

In this regard, a month has been provided for commercial banks’ training ending 5 May 2004. All banks are reminded to ensure that they submit names of nominated officers to the Assistant Director - Payment Systems as soon as possible to enable the training to start according to schedule. Piloting of the RTGS system •  The piloting of the system is scheduled to commence on 27 April 2004. It is therefore cardinal that the entire industry moves in unison on this project. As indicated to commercial banks at the last meeting, the training of both Bank of Zambia and commercial banks staff and the execution of the pilot project have been arranged close to each other to enable the quick and effective transfer of acquired skills to staff’s “desks” or operational areas. Therefore, the need for all banks to move at the same pace cannot be over emphasised. Counterfeits •  We would like to alert you all that there are people trying to encash counterfeit notes and as banks you are the most vulnerable. It is therefore incumbent upon all of your members of staff to be vigilant when handling incoming cash. The incidence of the counterfeits is suspected to affect other locations beyond Lusaka as such even your outlying areas must be alerted. You should urgently report such cases to the Zambia Police Service.
Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., and A. Taylor (2013): “When Credit Bites Back”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Supplement to 45(2). Kashyap, A. K., Tsomocos, D. P., and A. P. Vardoulakis (2014): “A programme for improving macroprudential regulation”, published in Macroprudentialism, edited by Dirk Schoenmaker, CEPR Press. http://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/macroprudentialism_VoxEU_0.pdf  14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  Knight, F. H. (1921): Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Korinek, A., and A. Simsek (2016): “Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage”, American Economic Review, 106(3), 699-738. Miles, D., Yang, L., and G. Marcheggiano (2013), “Optimal Bank Capital”, Economic Journal, 123, 1-37. Modigliani, F., and M. Miller (1958): “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment”, American Economic Review, 48(3), 2. Rosengren, E. S. (2011): “Defining Financial Stability, and Some Policy Implications of Applying the Definition”, Keynote Remarks at the Stanford Finance Forum, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 3 June. 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  1  Recognising this, others have started to take stock on progress on macroprudential frameworks. The most notable contribution to this effort is a recent report to the G20 by the IMF, the FSB and the BIS (IMF-FSB-BIS, 2016). 2 The basis of many of the ideas in this section stems from Kashyap et al (2014). 3 James Carville, strategist for Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign, coined the phrase ‘The economy, stupid’. 4 See Rosengren (2011).

Retail price inflation (on the Government’s target measure) has averaged 2.7% over this period, and has in fact been marginally below the 2½% target for much of the past two years. Short- -term interest rates – which went up to 12% (and tentatively even to 15%) before we left the ERM in 1992 have been stable at 6% for the best part of a year. Helped by a decline in inflationary expectations, UK 10 year Government bond yields have fallen, to around 4¾% which, apart from a brief period at the beginning of 1999, is the lowest they’ve been for nearly 40 years. They are now just about as low as in any major industrial country with the exception of Japan. And the number of people in work has recently been at an all-time high in the UK as a whole - and close to its high point in Scotland; while the rate of unemployment, on a claimant count basis, is at a 25-year low, both in the UK as a whole and in this country. The question remains – can we keep it up? The answer to that question depends on developments both at home and abroad, but let me comment first on the international situation which is currently the focus of a great deal of attention.
Currently there are more than seven million underemployed part-time workers across the euro area – those who would like to work more hours but cannot – an increase of around one million since the crisis. This may have important implications for inflation dynamics. While the main objective for workers in permanent work is typically higher wages, those in temporary or part-time positions may pursue objectives other than wage increases, such as fulltime employment or an increase in hours worked. Or if they do seek higher wages, they may be less likely to benefit from union representation and thus have less bargaining power. An increase in temporary or part-time employment as a share of total employment may therefore lead to less pressure on wage inflation. Recent estimates by ECB staff – which you can see on the right-hand side of slide 4 – suggest that broader measures of labour market slack, including the unemployed, underemployed and those marginally attached to the labour force currently affect around 18% of the extended euro area labour force.10 This broader measure of slack also appears to be less sensitive to GDP growth than traditional measures: it has declined rather less than the reductions in the unemployment rate over the course of the recovery – a broader version of Okun’s, law if you will. And our analysis suggests that this might help explain why underlying inflation has been so sluggish recently.

17 There is another feature to this collaboration here, which is to bring start-ups together with venture capital and other investors. tryb is an investor in promising technology start-ups that are building the financial infrastructure platforms of the future for ASEAN. tryb is currently in the process of raising $ million in long-term funding. The Marvelstone Group too, has been investing in FinTech start-ups and linking them up with their network of business and specialist expertise. Further MAS initiatives to grow VC activity 18 MAS is working with the VC industry to grow the funding landscape for start-ups in Singapore and the region. The role VCs play in stimulating economic dynamism has been a recurring theme in discussions of the Committee on the Future Economy (CFE). 19 There are two key prongs in MAS’ approach. 20 First, MAS is reviewing its regulatory regime for VC managers. Specifically, MAS is looking to significantly simplify and shorten the authorisation process for new VC managers. Further, to the extent that there are contractual safeguards to provide sufficient protection to a VC’s sophisticated investor base, MAS is also looking to exempt VC managers from business conduct requirements that are currently applied to asset managers in general. MAS will be doing a public consultation on its proposals in January next year, and targets to introduce changes by July 2017.
Therefore, it is vital to have a well thought-out strategy for the timing and manner with which structural reforms are instigated. To conclude, the central theme running through the paper is to point to the intricacy of achieving monetary and financial stability while at the same time maintaining the delicate balance of short run stabilization efforts and long run structural reforms. This is perhaps the toughest challenge for emerging market. But despite the challenge, the overall direction of change in emerging market economies to date is fundamentally reassuring. Much has been achieved in term of strengthening the monetary framework and financial system development. Thank you. BIS Review 89/2007  7

Chart 7: Percent of population with at least an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) (2015)  Chart 8: Unemployment rates (2016)  Source: ONS Annual Population Survey; Bank calculations. Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics; Bank calculations. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  18  Chart 9: Youth (16-24) unemployment rates (2016)  Chart 10: Working age mortality rates, males (2014)  Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics; Bank calculations. Source: ONS Mortality Figures for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland; Bank calculations. Chart 11a: Real GDP per head growth (2008 to 2014)  Chart 11b: Scenario - Real GDP per head growth (2008 to 2014), without monetary stimulus  Source: ONS; Bank calculations. Source: ONS; Bank calculations. Notes: See footnote 16. 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  19  Chart 12a: Change in unemployment rates (2008 to 2016)  Chart 12b: Scenario – Change in unemployment (2008 to 2016), without monetary stimulus  Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics; Bank calculations. Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics; Bank calculations. Notes: See footnote 16. Chart 13a: Growth in median net wealth (2006/8 to 2012/4)  Chart 13b: Scenario - Growth in median net wealth (2006/8 to 2012/4), without monetary stimulus  Source: ONS Wealth and Asset Survey; Bank calculations. Source: ONS Wealth and Asset Survey; Bank calculations. Notes: See footnote 16.
The Bank of Russia sought to pursue a balanced policy in developing the banking sector. On the one hand, we helped banks adjust to the new conditions and eased banking regulation, on the other hand, we stuck to the policy of resolution of the banking system and countering fictitious transactions. Our key objective is to have a sustainable, capitalised financial system capable of funding the economic growth. In 2015, the banking system accumulated capital, household deposits recovered, and lending to the real sector grew slightly. In the first half of the year, the banking system suffered losses, but returned to profits by the year end. Profit stood at 192 billion rubles in 2015, and 234 billion rubles in the first five months of 2016. In 2016, we expect profit to be about 500 billion rubles. To develop the banking regulation, the Bank of Russia continued to introduce international standards, including Basel regulations, implemented compensatory measures to ease the adjustment of the banking system to the new environment, and introduced its own regulatory measures which take account of the specific risks of the Russian banking system. We continued to pursue a sequential policy of banking sector resolution. Unfortunately, the pace of licence revocation was high. Here we seek to occupy a more proactive position in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  supervision, and take early warning and preventive measures. For this purpose we improve our internal procedures. Thus, we decided to establish a risk assessment service.

It aims to help people find out more about the notes and coins they use every day. On this occasion, though, there’s something new. The highlight today is the brand new ten euro note. It’s the first time it has been on public display since it was unveiled to the media just two days ago at the ECB in Frankfurt. That means you’ll be one of the first to see this new note before it starts circulating on 23 September this year. The new ten euro is part of what we call the Europa series of banknotes. It’s named after the figure from Greek mythology whose portrait is included in the hologram and the watermark on the notes. Take a closer look at those two security features in the exhibition, as well as the distinctive emerald number, which changes colour from green to deep blue when you tilt the note. They’re all examples of how we have used advanced technologies to make the notes even more secure. The security features will keep us well ahead of counterfeiters – and justify the confidence that the people of the euro area have in their money. There’s a lot more to be seen in this exhibition, which I hope you will all find as interesting and entertaining as I did. So without further ado, allow me to declare it open. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Andrés, López-Salido and Nelson (2004) incorporate imperfect substitutability between short- and long-term bonds. Here the lack of a secondary market for long bonds is the source of the friction. In this model, base money expansion by a central bank can relieve portfolio constraints and lead to an increase in demand for long bonds, thereby raising their prices. Much of this literature is still in its infancy and there is some way to go before it can be combined within an applied, quantitative model that policy makers can use. But the central message I take from this work is that there are a number of channels through which monetary policy is likely to be able to influence the economy at the zero bound. Unfortunately, the financial crisis meant that we had to put these insights into practice. When doing so at the Bank, we placed weight on three key channels of monetary transmission: the impact of imperfect substitutability and the portfolio rebalancing channel on relative prices, the role of financial market liquidity, and the importance of expectations. All three channels were important in the design of the Committee’s asset purchase programme. Let me take them in turn. Channels of transmission To date, the Bank has purchased £ billion of assets financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, the vast majority of which have been relatively long maturity gilts. The central objective underlying those gilts purchases was to inject a substantial amount of additional money into the economy.

One year on from reaching the effective lower bound of interest rates and starting a policy of quantitative easing, there is still much for academics and policy makers to learn. I hope today’s conference will mark another step in that collaboration. References Andres, J, Lopez-Salido, D J and Nelson, E (2004), “Tobin’s imperfect substitution in optimising general equilibrium”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 36, No. 5, pages 665–90. Bernanke, B S, Reinhart, V R and Sack, B P (2004), “Monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound: an empirical assessment”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Issue 2, pages 1–78. Brunnermeier, M K and Pedersen, L H (2009), “Market liquidity and funding liquidity”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22(6), pages 2201–38. BIS Review 29/2010  7  Duffie, D, Gârleanu, N and Pedersen, L H (2007), “Valuation in over-the-counter markets”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 20. Del Negro, M, Eggertsson, G, Ferrero, A and Kiyotaki, N (2009), “The great escape? A quantitative evaluation of the Fed’s non-standard policies”, Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Princeton University. Eggertsson, G and Woodford, M (2003), “The zero bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 212–219. Fisher, P (2010), “The corporate sector and the Bank of England’s Asset Purchases”, Association of Corporate Treasurers Winter Paper. Gertler, M and Kiyotaki, N (2009), “Financial intermediation and credit policy in business cycle analysis”. Manuscript, New York University and Princeton University.
This prevented him from steering the ship towards the sirens himself, and the crew were prevented from hearing him when he would later succumb to temptation and order the ship to be steered towards the sirens’ island. The story cannot be directly transferred to economic management, but the concept of “tying oneself to the mast” is used in promoting mechanisms that prevent short-term objectives from taking precedence over long-term objectives. Precluding the possibility of breaking a promise makes the promise more credible. Ensuring accountability for promises made through reporting and review can be a mechanism that ties us to the mast. A central bank’s most important task is to ensure a stable value of money. The value of money relies on responsible economic policies. For a central bank to be able to keep its word and deliver a stable value of money, it must have the backing of the political authorities. Otherwise, the central bank will not be able to keep its word. In the long term, the instruments available to the central bank allow it to deliver only the promise of a stable value of money. Earlier, this promise was kept by regulating the amount of money issued. Today, the instrument is the interest rate. The central bank cannot steer real wages, the labour supply, employment or the level of unemployment in the long term. But it can contribute to curbing short-term cyclical fluctuations if price stability is firmly anchored. Throughout history central banks have attempted to bind themselves to the mast in different ways.

Indeed, in mitigating inflationary pressures, an exchange rate appreciation restrains the MPR adjustments that could result from only the closing of the output gap. One working assumption we use in our projections is that the real exchange rate will change little into the long term. Any movements away from its trend are possible in a floating regime. Its potential financial effects on aggregate output and inflation will be definitely considered by the Board as an input for its future decisions. As we have demonstrated in the past, our monetary policy is highly flexible. It has contributed enormously to the good standing the Chilean economy enjoys today, in an environment of stable prices and restored employment and output. Now I will review the main features of the macroeconomic conditions we believe are the most likely for the next two years and its implications for inflation and monetary policy. Macroeconomic scenario The first closing of second-quarter National Accounts showed GDP growth at 6.5% y-o-y. In terms of velocity, the second quarter ended with an annualized quarterly variation of around 20% (figure 3). Domestic demand also grew above forecasts, driven by increased private consumption and a strong rebound of investment. Such dynamism has responded to not only temporary factors but also to more persistent ones. Among the temporary factors, what stands out is the immediate repair of the damages caused by the catastrophe of 27-F and the reversal of the dramatic contraction of domestic demand during 2009, associated to the then high levels of uncertainty.
Public investment in infrastructure, as a source of potential growth, has been put on hold. I do hope that the political instability will not drag on for a long time and that an acceptable solution will be reached among all stakeholders in society soon. Monetary policy Ladies and Gentlemen, let me turn to my last subject, that of monetary policy. 8. The MPC’s ultimate mandate is to safeguard the macroeconomic and financial stability of the country. In the last few years, the Bank of Thailand has maintained an accommodative monetary policy stance. Mindful of imminent downside risks to growth, the policy rate was cut three times in the MPC meetings of May and November 2013, and again in March 2014. In these three meetings, the MPC were of the view that the reductions of policy interest rate were necessary to ensure sufficient support to the domestic economy. The current real policy interest rate, which is now in a negative territory, aims to help alleviate the financial burden on households and corporations, allowing them to withstand short-term shocks. 9. However, as the current policy interest rate is already low, further easing would not be without concerns. In the last meeting in April 2014, the MPC decided to maintain the policy at 2.00 percent. The rationales behind this decision were that the current monetary policy stance was accommodative enough to support the economy as the prolonged political uncertainties were the main cause for risk to growth, not the financial conditions.

Ladies and Gentlemen, looking at the more medium-term prospects, I am convinced that the underlying fundamentals that have been attracting international investors to Thailand over the years are still in place. The country’s overall macroeconomic fundamentals remain  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  sound against the back-drop of a healthy banking system, low and well-anchored inflation, and the government’s relatively strong financial position. A flexible exchange rate and our strong position in terms of international reserves provide ample cushioning for the central bank to be able to manage capital flow volatility. These solid fundamentals command trust from investors and credit rating agencies. Recently, Moody reaffirmed Thailand’s stable credit outlook citing that “in many respects, Thailand’s credit metrics remain well positioned compared with its immediate rating peers”. 6. Having said this, we cannot take things for granted. In fact, many problems point toward a need for structural reform. The MPC, in its last meeting, expressed concern over a number of structural issues, which, if not addressed, could restrain the country’s potential growth in the long run. These problems include fiscal sustainability, inequality in terms of both income distribution and access to education and health care, as well as supply bottlenecks such as a labor shortage. These problems cannot be solved by monetary policy, but require a concerted effort from all stakeholders. 7. In addition, as we are all aware, the prospect of the Thai economy is largely clouded by political uncertainty, which continues to impair the ability of the government to steer the economy forward.
The policymaker could point out the assumptions embedded in the rapid rise in asset prices and question the accuracy of the assumptions. Obviously, the policymaker might be ridiculed by true believers about the lack of understanding about the important nature of the innovation. But I suspect that over time, a proactive central bank that laid out the risks clearly would gradually gain credibility with market participants. Use of the bully pulpit would allow the central bank to signal its concern. This might shift the risk/reward trade-off by raising the risks that the talk might foreshadow more forceful action. That, by itself, could temper behavior. Announcement effects can be very powerful, especially when they can be followed by changes in policy. The second set of tools includes those that are macroprudential in nature. I would define macroprudential tools as regulatory and supervisory actions that are not applied on a firmspecific basis. These include tools designed to temper demand or increase supply in the asset subject to the bubble or to increase the ability of skeptics to take the other side of the market in which the bubble may be occurring. For example, to counteract a housing bubble,  8  This argument has been made by many others. See, for example, Frederic Mishkin. How Should We Respond to Asset Bubbles? May 15, 2008. 9  An example of a sustained rise in asset prices that was not a bubble is the bull market in U.S. equities that began in the 1950s.

Sharp fluctuations in market rates are a possibility. This is a fact banks must bear in mind when managing interest rate risks. BIS Review 86/2005  3