samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
nov.14 Nov.  88 92 96 00 04 08 12  Monedas emergentes (1)  RER  Chilean peso  1994-2013 average  Multilateral dollar (2)  1999-2013 average  (1) An increase denotes depreciation against US dollar. Index is based on weighted average of currencies  of Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Rep. Korea, Czech Rep., Indonesia and Poland. WEO weights as of October 2014. (2) Dollar index. (3) December 2014 figure includes information up to 11 December. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg and the IMF. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 9  CPI inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  CPIEFE inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  10  10 10  10  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  -2  -2 -2  -2  -4  -4 -4  -4 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Sep.2014 Report  Dec.2014 Report  (*) Gray area, as from the fourth quarter of 2014, shows forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).

Oil prices have increased sevenfold since 1999; industrial metals have increased threefold since 2001. Similarly, the extraordinary gold bull market at the end of the seventies occurred in the context of rising oil and commodity prices. This parallelism, however, is not perfect. The average correlation between weekly price changes of gold and oil throughout the last 20 years is a mere 0.1. For metals, the correlation with gold is slightly higher but remains below 0.2. Both correlations have varied heavily within the period; currently, they are clearly on the high side (Graph 1). Graph 1: Correlation between gold, metals and oil prices Gold - Metals (GSCI)  Gold - Oil (Brent)  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2  0  -0.2 Correlation of weekly price changes over a 1-year period -0.4 01.01.1983  01.01.1988  01.01.1993  01.01.1998  01.01.2003  Despite similarities in price movements, the gold market has a number of distinct features relative to other commodity markets. Arguably, the most important distinction is the fact that the ratio of available supply to annual production is much higher for gold than for other commodities. A significant proportion of the estimated 160,000 tonnes of all gold worldwide available in the form of jewellery, bars, coins, etc. (sixty times the annual mine production) could be brought to market at relatively low cost.
But there are also changes in various trends in the Swedish labour market following the financial crisis that may have contributed to the low prices and wages – an increasing number of people entering the labour force, compensation rates in the social insurance systems falling and employees’ negotiating power appearing to have weakened. Developments since the financial crisis 2008–2009 thus indicate that inflation and resource utilisation are not governed solely by short-term changes in demand. Structural changes and more trend-like changes also play a role. We therefore need to give more consideration to such changes in the monetary policy analysis. In addition, I have illustrated that the flatter Phillips curve, that is, the weaker covariation between unemployment and wages, does not necessarily mean that the impact of monetary policy has declined. Monetary policy affects demand and resource utilisation through many different channels. Unemployment is one channel, but labour force participation, employment, and job vacancies are some examples of other channels through which monetary policy can have an impact. 25 The term “unconventional” may be a little misleading in the sense that, for instance, purchases of government bonds do not go beyond the bounds of what central banks normally do when conducting monetary policy. 22 [24]  Thirdly, changes in trends are often difficult to detect immediately and are difficult to assess. One consequence of this is that central banks should act more cautiously and rely more on historical correlations that are more certain.

The period following the financial crisis 2008-2009 has to a large extent been concerned with how the labour market might be affected by the rapid development in information and communication technology, especially the so-called digitalisation, which makes it possible to automate an increasing number of work tasks – both routine tasks and some more advanced ones. The increasingly rapid globalisation process, which will probably involve greater labour mobility between countries and regions, has also attracted attention. At the same time, we are moving towards a population structure with an ageing population and we have large migration flows around the world. It is difficult to know exactly how this will affect the labour market and the way it functions. I do not intend to speculate on this, but instead discuss some changes that appear to be a trend that has taken place over the past ten years. Trends on the labour market following the financial crisis Over the past ten years there has been an almost trend rise in both labour force participation – the proportion of the population of working age in the labour force – and the employment rate – the number of employed as a percentage of the working age population. This is an essentially positive development, as it reflects the fact that an increasing number of people have the opportunity to get a job and that more people have got a job.
We must, as part of the comprehensive suite of financial services that we offer to global investors and borrowers. Shariah-compliant financial instruments allow issuers to tap a new source of funds and liquidity. But the development of an Islamic financial services market does not just serve indigenous Muslim populations. Malaysia, for instance, has successfully launched global sukuk, or Islamic bonds, to tap liquidity from investors in both Asia and the Middle East. Other issuers of global sukuks have also stopped by Singapore on their road shows to tap Singapore’s investor pool. It may not be too long before we have a Singapore corporate issuing a sukuk to raise funds from global investors. We are also seeing already private fund managers in Asia and the Middle East working together. Recently, for instance, ARA Asset Management based in Singapore had worked in partnership with Dubai Islamic Bank to launch a $ 450 million Islamic Far Eastern Real Estate Fund with underlying assets located in Asia. Fourth and finally, we can do more to foster people-to-people interaction in the financial sector. For instance, Asian central banks including the Monetary Authority of Singapore have participated actively in Middle East finance and central banking seminars to share our perspectives on issues of mutual interest. Tomorrow there will be a seminar organised jointly by the Islamic Financial Services Board and Islamic Development Bank tomorrow in Kuala Lumpur on developing a 10-year master plan for the Islamic financial services industry globally.

Increasingly, wealthy investors the world over are looking to spread the risks and enhance the overall returns on their investment portfolios. We are seeing this search for diversification and improved returns on investment amongst sophisticated investors from the Middle East and Asia. It provides an opportunity for markets in Asia and the Middle East which can offer wealthy investors with higher expected returns at acceptable risk. The demand side of the financial equation in our two regions is equally compelling. First, there are unprecedented demand for funds to finance infrastructure projects, across the region. In Southeast Asia alone, about $ 461 billion is expected to be spent over the next 15 years to upgrade infrastructure. This is not even looking at China and India. Likewise in the Middle East - the reconstruction of Iraq and Qatar’s infrastructural plans are each expected to cost $ 100 billion. Second, besides infrastructure finance, we are seeing huge growth potential in the consumer finance sector in our two regions. It is driven by a rapidly expanding middle-class, who want better housing, cars and other big-ticket items like middle classes anywhere else in the world. For instance, India’s “consuming class” will rise from the current 30% of households to 40% by 2010. Similarly in China, the “middle class” is set to double over the next 5 years. Facilitating greater financial flows between Asia and Middle East Financial services are therefore growing rapidly in Asia and the Middle East.
Krugman, Paul (2014b), Apologizing to Japan. The Opinion Pages, The New York Times, October 30. Malmqvist, Peter (2014), Låg ränta bäddar för överhettning. (Low repo rate paves the way for overheating) Svenska Dagbladet Opinion, 19 July. Mian, Atif and Sufi, Amir (2014), House of Debt. University of Chicago Press. Mitelman, Henrik (2014), Nu blir Ingves börsens bästis. (Now Ingves is the stock market’s best friend) Dagens industri newspaper, 29 October. Münchau, Wolfgang (2014), What central banks should do to deal with bubbles. Column, Financial Times, July 13. OECD (2011), OECD Economic Outlook, No. 89, May 2011. Schularick, Moritz and Taylor Alan M. (2012), Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870–2008. American Economic Review 102(2). Smets, Frank (2013), Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely interlinked? Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2013:3. Jubilee issue. Stein, Jeremy C. (2013), Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses. Speech at “Restoring Household Financial Stability after the Great Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter”, research symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Summers, Lawrence (2014), Washington Must Not Settle for Secular Stagnation. Financial Times, 5 January. Svenska Dagbladet (2014a), Krugman har fel om svensk bubbla. (Krugman is wrong about a Swedish bubble) Interview with Lars Svensson, SvD Näringsliv (business section of Svenska Dagbladet newspaper), 14 January. Svenska Dagbladet (2014b), ”Nollränta är som att kasta bensin på en brasa”.

•  Through the work of our business line specialists, we are developing a better understanding of the businesses you all are engaged in, including improving the dialogue with the front office and getting to know those business leaders. This has given us a much improved window into your strategies – into how you are thinking about the changes you will make and need to make in the face of increased regulation, increased regulatory pressure, competition and future economic growth. Areas where work remains Of course, there are many more areas where progress is being made, but those are the ones that I would highlight for you today. And, while I tend to be a “glass half-full” kind of person, I am also a realist and recognize the tough road ahead to continue implementing the kinds of changes needed across the system to achieve the end state of a more resilient, better managed and less complex financial system. In this regard, I’d highlight four areas where additional work is needed across firms and supervisors/regulators: 1. Resolution planning  2. Coordinating supervision across global organizations  3. Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (AML/BSA) compliance  4. Culture of firms and the system  1. Resolution planning  I noted earlier that resolution planning was an area where progress had been made – and it has.
Hamad Al-Sayari: Financing a changing world Speech by His Excellency Hamad Al-Sayari, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, at the Euromoney Saudi Arabia Conference 2007: Financing a Changing World, Riyadh, 8-9 May 2007. *  *  *  I am pleased to be here today at this international gathering of experts who share a common interest in the economic development of Saudi Arabia. The theme of this Conference is "Financing a Changing World" and I intend to share with you my views on the role that the Saudi Banks and the Capital Market are playing in this regard. This gives me an opportunity to recap the important contribution of our banks and our growing capital market in channeling the financial flows to and from the Kingdom. I will also outline the future direction and challenges in this regard. In recent years, international fund flows have been affected by different phenomenon, including rising imbalances in trade balances originating from the export dominated economies in Asia, the pace of economic growth in developed economies in Europe and North America, and the volatile energy and commodity prices affecting all countries. Addressing the impact of these global phenomenon are causing significant challenges to the economies of all countries. For the Gulf region including Saudi Arabia, a major challenge is to ensure that the increased financial flows into the region are channeled efficiently to the most productive sectors of the economy and to profitable enterprises and projects.

It is gratifying that SAMA has achieved its objectives of its monetary policy. The average inflation rate has remained at less than 1 percent over the last 20 years, and these stable conditions have contributed to sustained economic growth of 3% over the period. The exchange rate of the Riyal has also been maintained over the period of Rls. 3.75 per US Dollar, while the rates of exchange against other major currencies have moved within manageable limits. These positive indicators together with the uninterrupted full convertibility of the Riyal since 1961 and no restrictions on payments from and to the Kingdom, have created a stable business environment for the private sector as also for the inflow of capital for domestic investment. Since its establishment in 1952, a major responsibility of SAMA has been to maintain financial stability and promote growth of the national banking industry. As far as SAMA's objective of maintaining a stable financial system, its achievements have been equally remarkable. SAMA has followed prudent policies aimed at creating a sound, stable, and efficient financial system. Such a system has been characterized by freedom of capital flows, open investment climate, availability of ample liquidity, competitive environment and a modern payment system. Over this long period, sound laws and regulations and timely supervisory actions have ensured that Saudi Banks have stayed strong with adequate capital, efficient management, fit and proper directors and managers and sound internal control systems.
Andrew G Haldane: Whose recovery? Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, in Port Talbot, Wales, 30 June 2016. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. The views are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Bank of England. I would like to thank Mauricio Armellini, Christine Boykiw, Mark Carney, Ian Derrick, Chris Duffy, Jeremy Franklin, Emma Hardaker-Jones, Steve Hicks, Dena Jacobs, Arpad Morotz, Ben Nelson, Lizzie Peck, Alice Pugh, Lee Robinson, Mark Robson, Arthur Turrell and Sebastian Walsh from the Bank and Elaine Chamberlain, Alan Newman and Phil Wales from the ONS for contributions and comments. It is a great pleasure to be here in Port Talbot. I want to discuss the UK’s economic fortunes. The past few weeks have been dominated by the run-up to the EU referendum vote and its aftermath. This has generated considerable uncertainty about the economy, about policy and about politics – a heady cocktail. I will come to those uncertainties, and their implications for monetary policy, at the end. But I wanted to start by assessing the UK’s economic recovery so far, as this provides important context for what happens next. Last year I visited Nottingham on one of my regular regional visits. As with today’s, these visits are crucial for helping the Bank of England make sense of the economy. My first stop was a lunch for local business people.

This suggests these gains have come principally from rises in property and pension wealth. In other words, the gains have been skewed towards those in society who own their own home or who have sizable pension pots. That skewed wealth picture is confirmed if we look at measures of median, as opposed to mean, wealth using household-level data (Chart 10). Since 2006, average net household wealth has risen by around 25%, from £ to £ Over the same period, median household wealth has increased more modestly, by around 15%, from £ to £ Overall, then, although the aggregate data suggest a fairly robust recovery, a drill-down paints a more nuanced picture. The rising economic tide has not lifted all boats. Indeed, a sizable fraction of households have seen no recovery in their disposable incomes, a rise in job insecurity and at best modest rises in their wealth. For them, the “recovery puzzle” may not be  5  Gallie D et al (2016). 6  Gregg and Gardiner (2015)  7  Gallie, Felstead, Green and Inanc (2016)  8  Citizens Advice (2016). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  so puzzling. These data also suggest that distributional factors may be important when understanding “whose recovery”. Let me now turn to those. Disaggregating the jigsaw There are a number of ways in which the economic jigsaw can be rearranged to provide a different picture of the UK’s economic fortunes.
Any shock could lead banks to fail through a domino effect. The superstructure of complex transactions within the financial sector (in derivatives for example) greatly increased this interconnectedness. The time-series aspect is the pro-cyclical behaviour of risk-taking in the financial system that I described earlier. Optimism feeds on itself until the occasional setback changes the mood to one of pessimism. And individuals are reluctant to accept that success may not be the  BIS Review 32/2009  3  result of superior wisdom, which should naturally be reflected in compensation, but the shortrun outcome of a risky strategy. To deal with the “cross-section” problems we need to reduce the exposure of the system to domino effects. For some, especially over-the-counter, markets this could be achieved by increasing the role of central counterparty clearing houses. Much good work on this is going on, led by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. But a clearing house should not be an excuse for allowing flawed financial instruments, such as many of the mortgage-backed securities, to be treated as high quality assets. We also need to improve the regulation of the liquidity of banks. After the crisis began, the most striking feature of the regulatory system, as embodied in the Basel arrangements and implemented in the UK, was the absence of any effective regulation of liquidity. The FSA is acting to remedy the situation, and the Bank is in active discussion with FSA about how such regulation should best be implemented.

The period during which inflation undershot the target thereby became gradually more prolonged. In mid-2014, inflation had been continuously below target since 2010, and periodically quite far below (see Figure 1). Once inflation had undershot the target for a while, inflation expectations also began to fall, including long-term expectations. Thus, economic agents did not expect inflation to meet the target even five years ahead (see Figure 2). In wage formation as well, there were signs that the inflation target was beginning to be of less significance. In other words, a risk began to build up that the role of the inflation target as benchmark for price-setting and wage formation would begin to weaken – that the nominal anchor that has been an important part of the favourable developments in Sweden since the early-1990s crisis would begin to slip. As the basic premise of inflation targeting policy is to anchor long-term inflation expectations at the target, this development made it urgent to bring inflation back up towards 2 per cent fairly rapidly. It was therefore clear that the Riksbank needed to focus entirely on the task of maintaining confidence in the inflation target. Consequently, there was no longer any scope for conducting a policy that “leans against the wind”. As a result, the Riksbank cut the policy rate quite rapidly down to –0.50 per cent and also began to purchase substantial volumes of government bonds, particularly in relation to the size of the sovereign debt.
Compared to our framework for things like capital, liquidity and accountability, the regulatory framework for operational resilience is thoroughly under-developed not only here in the UK but also internationally. This matters more than it used to for a number of reasons, but let me pick out two. First, the emergence of cyber-attacks is a clear and present danger to the financial system which our forebears simply did not have to worry about. And second, as more and more of us access banks and insurance companies digitally, with a major programme of bank branch closures in full swing, and in the age of social media where problems become very visible very quickly, operational failures hurt more than they used to. For the same reasons the Treasury Select Committee is rightly taking a strong interest in this topic. 1  £ as at year-end 2017 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  We therefore published during the summer – jointly between the PRA, FCA and Bank as supervisor of market infrastructure – a discussion paper proposing a new framework for thinking about these issues. The central idea is a simple one: how much operational disruption to key business services should firms, the PRA, the FCA, and the wider Bank of England be prepared to tolerate? We call this ‘impact tolerance’. The focus of our future policy will be on the continuity of the business services that a firm’s customers and the wider economy rely upon.

Preventative mitigation is obviously very important, but having impact tolerance means acknowledging that disruptive events will happen, and that firms need to be able to recover within their set tolerance. I’m talking about planning for scenarios that are severe but plausible – we expect firms to be resilient against a wide range of scenarios, but not against Armageddon. I think it likely that the ordering of these impact tolerances between firms and the PRA will often be the opposite way round from capital. On capital, inserting the public interest means that as a general matter we will require firms to hold more capital than they would if left to their own devices – hence, a battleground. For operational resilience, a firm is likely to experience significant private costs – for instance, impact on their profits or damage to their brand – before their safety and soundness is at risk. The exception to this may be a subset of operations whose failure might pose a systemic risk to financial stability. But in most cases, I think interests are likely to be aligned – we all just need to get better at managing this set of risks, as some recent events have illustrated all too painfully. In this context, I will expand briefly on the PRA’s particular focus in this important area. Our general statutory objective is safety and soundness, with policyholder protection on the insurance side and a secondary objective to facilitate competition.