samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Initially, these employees could of course be recruited from the existing national supervisors. Also the staff of the EOFS would have to cooperate with the national supervisors. I also want to stress that the EOFS should be an independent agency. This independence is important to achieve a division of labor and power. It should not be part of the European Commission and not of the ECB. One possible solution is therefore that EOFS is established directly by the EU countries and with an obligation to report to the European Parliament. My proposal is therefore quite different from the existing CEBS-structure which is part of the Lamfalussy regulatory framework in the EU. Although some of the EOFS’s tasks would overlap with those of CEBS, the focus is different. CEBS’s main tasks are to advice the EU-Commission, to enhance supervisory co-operation and to contribute to convergence of Member States' supervisory practices. CEBS is therefore a regulator and not a supervisory agency. The EOFS would be much more of a supervisor with as main task to produce coherent assessments of the risks and vulnerabilities of cross-border banking groups. In my view and to start out with, the EOFS need not have formal powers, with the exception that it should have the right to require cross-border banks to submit information. Formal supervision could still rest with the national supervisors according to the existing home-host arrangements and potential sanctions be decided by the national supervisors. In this respect, the EOFS should be limited to suggesting actions to the national supervisors.

In addition, the home country will get an explicit EU-mandate to take the interest of the other relevant countries into account in its assessments and decisions but it is not clear how this will work in practice. There is also an accountability problem with this solution. National authorities are both appointed by and accountable to the national governments and in extension to the national electorate. It may be difficult for a host country to hold the authorities in a home country responsible for a specific decision, even if its main effect is in the host country. A fourth possibility is the pan-European solution where both the mandate and responsibility for supervision are transferred from the national level to the EU-level. This would imply the creation of a European FSA, as well as granting the ECB a role as Lender of Last Resort for cross-border banks. This solution raises a number of difficult political considerations. It basically means handing over a part of the sovereignty to the EU-level. Also, at present the EU has no supra-national taxing power, so some other formula on burden sharing would have to be found. Presumably the political obstacles for this solution are large. At least in the short run, this fourth solution is not realistic. Another approach With this background, I draw three conclusions. First, the present situation with a growth of crossborder banks – with some clear examples in the European region – combined with national responsibility for supervision and financial stability is not satisfactory.
BIS Review 9/2010  13  Figure 13 Nominal exchange rate and NDF position 700  10  650  9  600  8  550  7  500  6  450  5  400  4  Jan.09  Mar.09  May 09  Jul.09  Sep.09  Nov.09  NDF position (billions of $  NER $ Source: Central Bank of Chile. Table 3 Inflation (annual change, percent) 2008  2009 (f)  2010 (f)  2011 (f) 2.7  Average CPI inflation December CPI inflation CPI inflation in around 2 years (*)  8.7 7.1  1.6 -1.4  1.0 2.5  Average CPIX inflation December CPIX inflation CPIX inflation in around 2 years (*)  8.4 8.6  2.8 -1.5  0.3 1.9  2.5  Average CPIX1 inflation December CPIX1 inflation CPIX1 inflation in around 2 years (*)  7.8 7.7  2.8 -0.6  0.8 2.1  2.6  3.0  3.0  3.0  (f) Forecast. (*) Inflation forecast to the fourth quarter of 2011. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

12 As key financial centres globally, each with their respective strengths, there are  tremendous opportunities for Shanghai and Singapore to complement each other, including in the BRI, capital market connectivity, RMB internationalisation, and FinTech innovation. This would pave the way for broader and deeper collaboration, progressing Shanghai-Singapore financial cooperation to greater heights. mandarin: 让上海与新加坡的金融合作蓬勃发展,再创新高峰! 4/5  Expressing this aspiration in  BIS central bankers' speeches  13 These are some ideas for everyone to consider. I am sure our strong panel of speakers will provide even greater insights during the discussions later. I wish you a fruitful day ahead at the forum. Thank you. 1 Source: Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce (SMCC) 2 Source: Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce (SMCC) 3 The Bond Indices, designed by CFETS and BOC, track the movements of the Chinese bond market and can be  used by investors to benchmark their Chinese bond portfolio performance. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
  Growth in Agro-processing has been supported in part by the last two maize bumper harvests, 2010 (2.8 million mt of maize) and (3.0 million mt of maize 2011).   Strong construction activities have stimulated strong demand for manufacture of construction materials particularly cement and cement-related products.   Total cement output by the country’s three manufacturing plants (Lafarge Zambia Plc, Oriental Quarries and Zambezi Portland Plc) rose by 37.9% to 1,126,728 mt in 2010 from 817,223.0 mt in 2009. Further, during the first half of 2011 cement output at 617,115.2 mt was 36.0% higher than the 453,791.0 mt produced in the corresponding half of 2010. C.  Multi-facility economic zones    Zambia’s goal catalyzing industrial and economic development through increased activity in the manufacturing sector has led the country to embark on the development of Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) in selected parts of the country. Among the MFEZs are: –  The Chambishi MFEZ (construction is advanced) being developed in partnership with the Chinese government with a commitment of over US $ billion;  –  Two Lusaka MFEZs (preparatory phases) and one industrial park. One of the Lusaka MFEZs, the Lusaka South, will be developed in cooperation with a Malaysian firm at an estimated cost of US $ billion;  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  –   Solwezi (Lumwana) (preparatory phase). The MFEZs are expected to significantly contribute to employment creation in the country.

Manufacturing activity is slowing after a robust showing throughout 2021. The travel-related and domestic consumer-facing sectors are strong, as domestic mobility indicators have returned to pre-COVID levels. It is estimated that domestic economic output has reached close to its pre-pandemic trajectory (i.e., the present level of GDP envisaged in January 2020). Singapore’s GDP growth is likely to come in between 3 and 4% this year, which would bring the average pace of expansion over 2021-22 to around 5.5%. This outlook is strongly predicated on the prospects for Singapore’s three main final demand markets – China, ASEAN-5 and the US. [2] Growth will be led by the domestic-oriented and travel-related sectors, while the contribution of the trade-related sectors could retract from last year. Ongoing costs pass-through Core inflation rose to 3.8% y-o-y in Q2, reflecting both imported cost-push and broader demand-pull pressures. Core inflation is expected to remain elevated this quarter, as previous global cost shocks continue to transmit through the domestic economy. With domestic demand picking-up amid a tight labour market, consumer services inflation is likely to feature more prominently. Several results from the econometric work done by the Economic Policy Group in MAS are notable:  First, global food and energy shocks impact headline inflation within one quarter of the shock and continue to pass through to final prices for at least the next six months. Second, domestic cost increases as proxied by wages in the services sector pass through moderately to prices mainly within the following quarter.
From a medium-term perspective, and even when conditions are established that will free up the flow of credit from the banking sector to the  4  BIS Review 52/2009  real economy, it cannot be expected that rates of expansion will rise again to the heights of recent years. The de-leveraging process underway in the banking sector, and in the economy in general, is not a passing fad, but rather a means of achieving lower and more sustainable debt positions. One way of making up for the lower rates of credit expansion, and thus countering the foreseeable narrowing of net interest margins, would be to diversify banking activity into new business segments. In principle, diversification is a positive thing, but it must be undertaken with caution. Experience shows that both in Spain and internationally, only on limited occasions can an institution's sound knowledge of its core business be directly transferred to activities that lie further afield. Accordingly, those in charge of institutions should show prudence and avoid what can be termed contrived diversification processes and carefully assess their entry into unfamiliar market segments in which they lack experience. Second, in the short term bad debts will keep rising and so the pressure on loan loss provisions will continue to be high. It is true that the reduction in interest rates will bring relief for households and firms and help to limit the impact of the rise in bad debts, but the contractionary phase of the cycle will foreseeably last some quarters.

The recent forecasts by various international organisations indicate that, in fact, we are in a very serious worldwide recession, from which neither the euro area nor the Spanish economy have been spared. In general, according to the available forecasts for developed countries, the problems will be acute in 2009, although it is expected that at some point during 2010, taking into account the current high uncertainty any forecasting exercise entails, an incipient recovery may become discernible. The Spanish banking system, as is inevitable when faced with a global financial crisis, has not been immune. Nevertheless, the impact has been no less than in other banking systems, where public authorities have had to take control of very large institutions, as I have said. This better relative performance can be explained by at least two factors. Firstly, the business model of Spanish credit institutions is based on traditional retail banking and is founded on long-term relationships with customers and creditors. This type of banking model has enabled credit institutions to acquire in-depth knowledge of their customers, reducing the perverse effects linked to asymmetrical information present in any banking business model. Similarly, since it does not use asset securitisation as a risk transfer mechanism but only as a means of obtaining liquidity, the origination and acquisition of complex structured products has been avoided, which have proved to be substantially opaque and the cause of hefty losses for many institutions in various countries.
Initially we had hoped Islamic banks might be able to use our normal reserves accounts, by agreeing to forgo any interest paid – as many observant Muslim customers do on their retail bank deposits. But on further investigation this proved unworkable: reserves accounts were too intimately bound up with the concept of interest, given their core role in implementing monetary policy. And the disparity in return offered to Islamic and non-Islamic banks at higher levels of Bank Rate would have left a decidedly uneven playing field. Work therefore commenced in 2015 to assess the feasibility of establishing a standalone noninterest based facility. Recognising the limits of the Bank’s knowledge of Islamic finance, we drew 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  on the expertise of fellow central bankers across the Middle East and Asia, including those from Bahrain, Malaysia and the UAE. In light of that research, we triaged a number of potential models to gauge which might fit best with the specificities of the UK market, legal and regulatory environment. We consulted publically on those options in 2016, and again in 2017 to fine tune our intended approach.18 Today, after a long and comprehensive process, I’m pleased to announce that the Alternative Liquidity Facility will be open for business from the first quarter of 2021.

The rate of return on the deposit (6) is based on the rate of return on the portfolio backing it, net of hedging and other operational costs; and on maturity the return from the fund is paid over to participating banks, and the principal amount is returned or rolled over. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10
Without a credible monetary policy, the króna would undoubtedly have depreciated by more than it actually did last year, which could have undermined financial stability. In other respects the authorities – in particular the Financial Supervisory Authority and the Central Bank – responded with even closer monitoring of the banks’ position, not least their financing, liquidity and risk management. The Bank remained especially alert until autumn 2006 and strengthened its contingency plans at the same time. The banks were very well aware of this close monitoring and cooperated fully. At the beginning of 2006 a Memorandum of Understanding on contingencies, which had been under preparation for some time, was signed between the government ministries responsible for financial markets, the Central Bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority, and a contingency exercise was held which actually had been planned well in advance. The Central Bank kept a close watch on market developments and the views of foreign commentators. Along with other government authorities and the Financial Supervisory Authority it communicated a wealth of information and held numerous meetings with foreign analysts and media in spring 2006, in Iceland and abroad. At the beginning of 2006 the Central Bank announced a decision to boost its foreign reserves. This was done later in the year with an international issue of five-year Treasury Eurobonds. The proceeds were deposited in the Central Bank, more than doubling the reserves from the equivalent of 7% of GDP to almost 15%. The proceeds from the loan will not be used for other purposes.

I met with government officials to discuss the Commonwealth’s economic plan and pandemic recovery. I also heard from executives about how the banking sector is faring. And I met with leaders of cooperativas to hear about what they're doing to help residents improve their access to credit and financial services. I took a short flight here from San Juan after a full day of engagements yesterday, and I spent the earlier part of this morning at the Aeronautical and Aerospace Institute of Puerto Rico, where I learned about this growing industry. Needless to say, the views from the ground and the air have been delightful. The U.S. economy has experienced a tremendous rebound since the darkest days at the onset of the pandemic. But now, inflation is sky-high, and it is the number one danger to the overall health and stability of a well-functioning economy. The war in Ukraine and the recent lockdowns in China, on top of the ongoing supply challenges and demand shifts, have led to inflation rates we have not seen in four decades. The priority for monetary policy is clear. The Federal Reserve is strongly committed to bringing inflation back down to our 2 percent longer-run goal. Price stability is absolutely essential for the economy to achieve its potential and sustain maximum employment over the medium term. I want to be clear: this is not an easy task. We must be resolute, and we cannot fall short.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Thailand’s financial challenges in global capital markets Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Thailand Focus 2012 “Positioning Thailand for the next growth phase”, Bangkok, 29 August 2012. *  *  *  It’s an honor to speak before you today at the Thailand Focus conference. This morning you heard Finance Minister Kittiratt Na Ranong speak on Thailand’s competitiveness and fiscal policy. Later on in the conference, other distinguished speakers will discuss Thailand’s investment opportunities in greater detail. To complement the picture, I will speak on monetary policy to complete your views on the investment opportunities and prospects of the Thai economy. As international investors, I believe you need to have a firm understanding of the country’s policy direction – something that is sorely needed in the current uncertain global economic environment. So today I will share with you my thinking on the monetary policy options going forward in light of my assessment of the global economy and the risks to the Thai economy. The organizer of this conference, President Charamporn, has kindly asked me to talk about “Financial Challenges in Global Capital Markets”. This is an especially relevant topic because, this year, the key challenge for Thailand is the challenge of weathering the financial and economic turmoil from the euro crisis. More than one year ago, I had the honor of giving a talk here. Some of you who were in attendance may recall that I labeled 2011 “the year of rebalancing” for monetary policy.

Reforming the international monetary and financial system and preserving monetary and financial stability in financially integrated small and open economies Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, panel comments in the 50th Anniversary Conference of the Central Bank of Malta, Valletta, 4 May 2018. Let me begin by congratulating all at the Central Bank of Malta on the Bank’s 50th anniversary and thank Governor Vella for the invitation to speak at this conference. I spoke in a Central Bank of Malta conference here in Valetta around the middle of the 1990s. At that time Iceland had more or less fully liberalised its capital account and had a pegged exchange rate. Malta also had a pegged exchange rate but still had some capital controls. The world has changed since then and our understanding of it even more. We in Iceland went towards a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting, while you entered monetary union. Overall, we have both done well, but our road in Iceland has been bumpier. The heading of this panel is Challenges facing central banks after the financial crisis. That is a big menu. For my introductory remarks I choose two related issues that have been high on my mind for years, both as a policy maker in a small, open and financially integrated economy and during my tenure at the BIS.
As I was able to explain to you here before the summer, the change in cycle in Spain had started before the episode of financial turmoil, making itself felt mainly in the real estate sector, which set in train a correction of the excesses that had built up during the long expansionary phase. These excesses had largely arisen owing to the global environment of financial laxity and undervaluation of risk, and to monetary and financial conditions that were particularly accommodative for Spain following EMU membership. These conditions were based on interest rates that held at low levels over a very extensive period and which were conducive to rapid indebtedness by households and by firms, mainly those related to the real estate sector. In any event, the adjustment of the real estate sector began slowly, mirroring the gradualism with which the determinants of residential investment changed. Hence, as the change in monetary policy stance that began in late 2005 progressively passed through to household and corporate borrowing costs and as the overpricing of housing became more patent, the dynamism of the sector eased off. However, this gradual pattern was altered when the international financial crisis raised credit risk premiums across the board, blocked a most significant part of banks' wholesale funding mechanisms and spread uncertainty and mistrust, most particularly in respect of economies subject to real estate adjustments. Against this background, the demand for housing fell off  BIS Review 122/2008  3  drastically, when the production of houses was still at a very high volume.

The far-reaching changes in the Spanish economy in recent decades have equipped it with the wherewithal to overcome this difficult stage and to subsequently resume a path of sustained growth, allowing convergence to continue. But if these factors are to operate, the authorities and all agents must face up to the current circumstances and make the required efforts, and economic policies must prevent any slippage and enable the factors conducive to the resumption of sustained growth to come into play. Naturally, I shall focus today on the diagnosis of the situation of the Spanish economy and on its economic policy implications. But these would both be incomplete without some, albeit brief, reference to the deterioration of the international setting and to the economic outlook in the euro area which, as you know, will determine monetary policy developments. Last year, the growth of the world economy reached 5%. The forecasts available for this year, however, place the figure below 4%, with scarcely any scope for the start of a recovery in 2009. Moreover, any recovery will be moderate, slow and subject to a degree of uncertainty fuelled, among other developments, by a rise in major inflationary pressures in most economies. In my view, there are three basic factors behind this deterioration of the global economic situation. The first is the adverse behaviour of the US economy, weighted down by the continuing decline in its real estate sector, which is depressing household and investor confidence.
However, as we look forward to the opportunities before us, we must be aware of the risks that lie ahead. As benign as the environment may seem, banks must not become complacent. Banks should be prepared for whatever surprises lie ahead. At the same time, banks must also safeguard their reputations. More can be done and we look forward to seeing ABS working with industry in bringing about good and fair consumer outcomes. On this note, let me wish everyone a good year ahead and a pleasant evening. Thank you. BIS Review 74/2007  3

They highlight the tendencies of economists to be self-referential and analyze how the social perception of the finance industry is largely negative nowadays, and the more so since the financial crisis. In that respect, the paper focuses on the United States, but there is little doubt that France probably is no exception to that rule either. After the 2007–2008 crisis, some first steps have been taken to change incentives in the financial industry. And even more should be done in that direction in the coming years. At the same time, economists should also adopt a more critical view on the financial industry practices and judge them as impartially as possible. But what can we say about economists themselves? Are they really too self-referential and do they tend to overestimate their role in society? On a personal note – as a policymaker and central banker – I do believe it is possible that central bank governors may pay the cost of the so-called “superiority” of economists (for instance when they are too sure of their econometric models). How will we proceed in this conference today? In-depth discussion of papers will be left to participants. However, I would like to mention the potential role that the Foundation can play to help address some important issues. First, economic analysis is definitely needed in order to sharpen policy makers’ understanding of the world. At the same time, policy makers should continuously challenge the alleged “superiority” of economists with the complexity of the real world.