samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The future member states, which previously had been among Europe’s most closed economies, were transformed in a few years to the most open economies in Europe - foreign trade corresponds to more than 130 per cent of GDP in Hungary and the Czech Republic, more than countries of an equivalent size in the EU, such as Austria and Sweden. The EU became completely dominant in trade, while Russia and the former Soviet republics shrank to become a relatively small trading partner. The countries’ share of the old EU countries’ trade rose quickly. For Sweden the eight new member states have been the trading partners that have always increased their share steadily from the beginning of the 1990s - through the Asian crisis and the bursting of the IT bubble - and that today comprise 5 per cent of Sweden’s foreign trade, i.e. on a par with France and more than double China’s share. All indications suggest that the trend will both continue and deepen. The proportion of intermediate goods (components) produced in the new member states on behalf of Western companies is becoming an increasingly large part of trade, as is the proportion of goods with higher technological content from the new member states. Mobility for goods has gone hand in hand with mobility for capital. Several studies of the balance of earnings and costs associated with enlargement (e.g. from the European Commission and the independent institution CEPR) have high-lighted increased investment as one of the most significant advantages of EU entry.

William C Dudley: The US economic outlook and implications for monetary policy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Leadership Forum, Somerset, New Jersey, 15 January 2016. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to join you again at the Economic Leadership Forum. I would like to thank John McWeeney of the New Jersey Bankers Association and Rutgers University for the invitation to be here today. Northern New Jersey is a vital part of the New York Fed’s district, and I don’t just say that because I live here. My staff and I actively maintain ties with local community, business and banking leaders, and we always benefit from opportunities to hear about what is on your mind. I am particularly delighted to see that community banks are well represented here today. The Federal Reserve understands the importance of a vibrant community banking sector and the crucial role community banks play in supporting the activities of local businesses and households. While protecting the safety and soundness of the financial system is an important part of the Federal Reserve’s mandate, I believe that the regulation of community banks should be appropriately calibrated to reflect the lower degree of risk they pose to the financial system relative to larger banks. In other words, community banks should not be subject to the same set of regulations that are applied to the most systemically important banking organizations.
The Chilean economy was closed to international trade and capital flows, interest rates were regulated, credit was restricted, and banking activity was largely controlled by the State. In the second half of the 1970s the banking sector was privatized and liberalized. However, this was not accompanied by adequate regulation and supervision; and a relatively small financial system built major vulnerabilities. When macro policy missteps and external shocks hit in 1982, the banking sector was not just a weak link, but amplified them into the deepest economic and financial crisis in a generation. The Chilean financial crisis of the 1980s and the origins of the subordinated debt Financial crises are abrupt, costly and protracted affairs, and the Chilean financial crisis of the early eighties was no exception. This crisis is often quoted as one of the top 25 most severe financial crises in modern history. In 1981, annual output growth went from positive 9% in the first quarter,   I thank the comments and suggestions in preparing this speech to Solange Berstein and Mauricio Calani. Page 1 of 5  Central Bank of Chile March 2019  to 0% in the fourth quarter, and to minus 14% in 1982. That same year, unemployment reached a record of 25%, and businesses all over the country were seriously hampered, ultimately affecting their payment compliance. Banking profitability went quickly to negative territory and the delinquency rate quadrupled to 15% of the total portfolio, putting several banks solvency and operations at risk.

In any event, it is important to stress that facing the challenge of population ageing (which is not exclusive to Spain, but is proving particularly acute in our country) will call for the adoption of a multidisciplinary strategy to encourage the participation of elderly workers, to adapt migratory policy to the needs of the labour market and to boost the birth rate. Despite strong job creation during the recovery, the unemployment rate remains very high, and its persistence (in particular among specific groups, such as the lesser skilled) raises the risk of it becoming structural. In this respect, the high skills mismatch between the employed and unemployed calls for active employment policies to boost the employability of each socio-demographic group, using those instruments which, further to appropriate assessment, have proven most effective. Furthermore, the number of temporary employees as a proportion of total employees stands in excess of 27% and there is some evidence of new temporary contracts being of shorter duration in the recent period; in addition to the social difficulties that generates, human capital accumulation is also impaired. Reducing the incidence of temporary employment would call for boosting the attractiveness of permanent hires. Thirdly, I wish to refer to productivity. The Spanish economy has continuously posted very weak figures for this variable in recent decades, and this has prevented a greater degree of real convergence with our European partners. Improving the dynamics of this variable is crucial for raising the economy’s potential growth in the long term, and the well-being of our citizens.
This quadrant [slide 4] shows four categories of possible shocks linked to the transition. They can have a positive versus negative impact on supply, and a positive versus negative impact on demand respectively. They are not mutually exclusive, and may combine or succeed one another. Their stand-alone probability is hard to assess at this stage, but there are reasons to believe that the upper-left one (the negative supply shock) is slightly more probable than the  Page 5 sur 8 others. However, given the large range of shocks, their sources and macroeconomic effects – which could include a positive scenario of large green private capex v – [slide 5], we must continue our modelling, in line with our first commitment in relation to the ECB’s climate agenda: we committed in July 2022 to “assess the macroeconomic impact of climate change and mitigation policies on inflation and the real economy”. vi  But being uncertain about the combined macroeconomic effects does not mean being passive or inert on action now. What we can already derive from these scenarios is a set of four firm convictions and prescriptions. 1. A shock that is global and certain >>> an orderly transition - First, climate transition entails structural changes to the global economy that are both universal and certain, with an overall and possibly negative supply shock that will generate frictions and costs in terms of the necessary reallocation of production factors.

Page 7 sur 8  The impacts of the climate transition could last throughout the decarbonisation of our economy. If we looked through it, we would overburden fiscal policy in cushioning these shocks. 3. Market alignment >>> signalling through Central Banks’ operations - Third, appropriate market incentives are necessary. This is where carbon pricing is needed, as I mentioned earlier, to align firms’ behaviour and private financing, but also (and maybe primarily) a fair pricing of climate risk on financial markets. This is where central bank operations and their greening have a key role to play, giving the right market signals and inducing changes. With Christine Lagarde, we at the ECB are already implementing a greening of our corporate sector purchase programme, as well as adapting our collateral framework. 4. Funding green investments >>> solvable through blended finance - Last but not least, if these conditions are met, the question as to how to finance investments is solvable. Different estimates have been computed, and their amounts may look impressive especially when presented in gross and absolute terms, for instance around EUR 500 billion per year in the EU until 2050. viii. However, when you consider net and relative financing needs, which represent between 2% and 3% of current GDP be it for the EU or France ix  Page 8 sur 8 according to the reports quoted, this turns out to be manageable.
Do some policy options make it easier to lift the controls than others? Which comes first, lifting the controls or deciding the currency issue? At what exchange rate should so-called offshore krónur be converted if Iceland establishes a currency board or adopts another currency unilaterally? Is it possible that capital account liberalisation will wait until – or even beyond – accession to the EU? These questions are not easy to answer, and exhaustive answers are beyond the scope of this report, but a few points can be made nonetheless. The most desirable option must be to lift the controls before deciding the currency issue. First of all, Iceland needs to lift them – for its own sake and due to international obligations – and the process has already begun. Second, it appears clear that either the controls must be lifted before Iceland adopts another currency or establishes a currency board, or onshore and offshore krónur must be converted at the same exchange rate. Any other course could be considered default, with severe repercussions for Iceland’s future access to foreign credit markets. Third, the EU regulatory framework assumes that capital controls will be lifted prior to membership. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  If liberalisation proves so difficult that Iceland cannot achieve it without outside assistance – which hopefully will not be the case – the most straightforward solution would be to refer the problem to the EEA, as free movement of capital is provided for in the EEA Agreement.

Depending on the resolution there and the progress of the EU accession negotiations, the problem could be resolved in connection with the accession process itself. At this point, it is unclear what form such outside assistance would take, but the more it takes the form of declarations concerning limits to exchange rate fluctuations backed by credibility and strong ability to intervene in the foreign exchange market, and the less it takes the form of offering loans, the better. On the other hand, it appears inevitable that, if Iceland joins the euro area, it would be necessary to convert all krónur at the same exchange rate, for the same reasons as with a currency board or unilateral adoption of another currency. Although the interaction between the capital controls and Iceland’s currency options is complex in many respects, this is not true to the same extent of prudential rules restricting the international activities of domestic financial institutions. For instance, it would be safe to relax such rules if Iceland were a member of the euro area and its financial institutions could carry out a large share of its cross-border business in its home currency. This would be even more true if the EU framework for cross-border banking were reformed so as to provide for EU supervision of banks operating throughout the region, a pan-European deposit insurance scheme, and intervention in distressed financial institutions by a joint EU body.
Progress on climate related disclosures Third, in 2020, the quantity and quality of climate disclosures was in its infancy. We had recognised the need for it to move from the static to the strategic, for it to be forwardlooking and for it to be comparable across firms. Now, mandatory disclosures for large corporates under the TCFD are a reality in the UK, and are driving the right conversations around board tables. Here at the Bank we are soon to publish our fourth TCFD-aligned report, overcoming challenges with each new report. And internationally the ISSB is due to build on the work of the TCFD by publishing its first global standards on climate later this year – in a fraction of the time usually taken. I have very little doubt that in the future we will look back at the ISSB's work as a fundamental building block of comparable global green markets. The growth of green finance Fourth, we have seen and continue to see growth in the green finance market. The share of green finance in total finance has steadily increased, reflecting burgeoning investor demand and the financial system's ability to innovate.3 That poses new challenges, including greenwashing, and markets regulators like the FCA are responding accordingly. But it's not only green products we need to see growth in. More fundamentally, we need to see an increase in transition finance projects that help business deliver long-term emissions reductions – greening our future economy, not just investing in the currently green.

Sarah Breeden: Climate action - approaching a tipping point? Speech by Ms Sarah Breeden, Executive Director for Financial Stability Strategy and Risk of the Bank of England, at Chapter Zero's fourth anniversary dinner, hosted by the Global Association of Risk Professionals, London, 18 April 2023. *** Firstly, thank you Chapter Zero and GARP for hosting me today, and for the opportunity to reflect on our collective progress in the transition to net zero. It is timely to do so. The latest IPCC synthesis reportOpens in a new window provides yet another stark warning of the impact that climate change will have on our planet. We are now a third of the way through the decisive decade; a decade where we will need to cut global emissions by over 40%, if we hope to limit warming to 1.5C.1 And yet global CO2 emissions continue to rise.2 For us to meet this challenge, we need to collaborate and to take individual responsibility for the role we each play. For the Government, it is to set out the pathway to net zero. For each of you here today – and the firms you represent – it is to apply those pathways in boardroom decisions; decisions that will not only help facilitate an orderly transition, but also help ensure the long-term relevance and value of the companies you lead. For the finance sector, it is to support and enable that transition.
And our balance sheet tools must evolve alongside it towards a “future normal”:   On the financial stability side, the experience of the Covid crisis, and the turbulent “dash for cash” that took place in financial markets in March 2020, when exceptionally high demand for cash led to a breakdown in the functioning of core financial markets, has raised questions of whether central banks need new tools for dealing with market dysfunction.12 (I will come back to this question later in the context of the impact that our QE purchases had).   On the monetary policy side, the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee, which is responsible for deciding what monetary policy actions to take, has asked us to start “internal technical preparations to deliver the option of a tiered system of reserve remuneration that could be ready to be implemented, should it be judged appropriate, alongside a negative Bank Rate”.13    Looking further ahead central banks around the world are grappling with the question of whether to provide the public with electronic money, or Central Bank Digital Currency, and the challenges and opportunities that such a decision could throw up in a possible “future normal”.14  Set out in Mark Carney’s speech ‘The UK at the heart of a renewed globalisation’ I described the evolution of these tools in my 2018 speech “Finding the right balance”. As set out in Andrew Hauser’s speech “From Lender of Last Resort to Market Maker of Last Resort via the dash for cash”.

The depreciation of the RMB, alongside a pullback of foreign funds from the region, triggered downward pressures on the region’s currencies. Since the RMB move on 11 August, Emerging Asia currencies have depreciated by an average of 3.2% against the US Dollar, with some falling by as much as 7%. 2  While markets seem to have calmed somewhat, a sense of uncertainty prevails and the risk of renewed volatility remains. What is happening? Financial markets are essentially coming to terms with four significant “re-pricings”. •  First, the stock markets in China are adjusting downwards from unsustainably high levels. •  Second, the RMB has become de-coupled from the US Dollar and is moving towards a more market-determined exchange rate. •  Third, oil and commodity prices have eased considerably this year, marking the end of what some have called a “super-cycle”. 1  Emerging Asia economies refer to China, India, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 2  Excluding the Hong Kong Dollar. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  Fourth, the effects of an impending interest rate hike in the US – the first after seven years of extremely easy monetary policy – are being priced in across Asian markets. These are not necessarily unwelcome developments. The correction in China’s stock market is not surprising given the stretched valuations that had developed over the preceding year.
Some of the most important recent changes in the payment landscape have been catalysed by regulatory intervention, for example the development of the Faster Payments Scheme (FPS). 5 In the past, regulatory intervention in retail payments has been targeted, addressing specific problems as and when they have emerged. Going forward however, the Payments Systems Regulator (PSR) which launched in 2015 is likely to create a new dynamic by stimulating a greater focus on competition and innovation in payment systems. Alongside this new regulatory focus, the pace of technological change in payments has picked up sharply. Recent years have seen huge growth in demand for payments services that can be accessed in real time, at any time (“24x7x365”), in a wide variety of locations through mobile phones and tablets. The software on these devices also makes growing use of so-called Application Programming Interfaces or “APIs” which allow the seamless integration of payment into websites, and offer new ways to utilise payments data to improve services to customers. The “electronification” of payments and rise of mobile banking has enabled non-banks to deliver services using existing payments infrastructure and made it possible for challenger banks to grow without having to build an extensive branch network. The emergence of various forms of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) poses much more profound challenges because it enables verification of payments to be decentralised, removing the need for a trusted third party.

From today’s vantage point, it is easy to forget how revolutionary the introduction of RTGS was back in 1996. Before RTGS, all interbank payments were subject to some element of settlement risk – the risk that a bank would fail between the time it promised to make a payment, and the time it delivered on that promise. By allowing banks to settle high value transactions between each other, electronically, in real time, RTGS eliminated settlement risk on the largest payments flows – the ones most likely to threaten financial stability by bringing down the system if they failed. But that is not the only innovation that RTGS has delivered over the years. As the financial system has evolved, RTGS has been regularly updated, introducing a raft of new functions and risk mitigants to respond to changing demands. Today, we are announcing that the Bank has completed, or agreed steps that will complete, all the actions in response to the Deloitte report 4 published in March last year following the RTGS outage in October 2014. Looking forward, as we celebrate RTGS’ twentieth birthday during 2016, it is again time to ask fundamental questions about the shape of the Bank’s settlement operations. The way payments are made has changed dramatically in recent years, reflecting changes in the needs of households and companies, changes in technology, and an evolving regulatory landscape. The range of payment providers is growing rapidly.
Compared with the June projections, the ranges projected for real GDP growth have been adjusted slightly downwards. For 2005, this mainly reflects slight downward revisions of past data, while for 2006 this reflects the projected effects on disposable income of increases in oil prices. This outlook for economic activity is subject to a number of downward risks, relating mainly to higher oil prices, low consumer confidence and concerns about global imbalances. In particular, the potential further dampening impact of oil prices on the outlook for growth is being monitored very closely. Oil prices have continued to rise, increasing considerably since the beginning of the year, and developments in futures prices suggest that market participants expect the current tightness in oil markets to persist. Obviously, the situation has been further complicated by the tragic effects of Hurricane Katrina. All our thoughts are with the people of the city of New Orleans and all affected neighbouring areas and we are touched by the wave of global solidarity helping them to cope with  1/3  their immediate needs. At the same time, it remains difficult to assess the full extent of the damage and the period of time necessary for its repair. Normally, despite the significant wealth destruction resulting from such storms, the economic impact at the national level is limited to the short term and is increasingly offset by the positive impacts of rebuilding activity.

More fundamentally, the main risks to the inflation outlook stem from potential second-round effects in wage and price-setting behaviour triggered by ongoing oil price rises. In this respect, it is essential that the social partners continue to meet their responsibilities. Against this background, we will continue to monitor inflation expectations very closely. Particular vigilance is required in order to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well-anchored in the euro area. Turning to the monetary analysis, money and credit have continued to grow robustly in the euro area over the last few months, mainly driven by the prevailing low level of interest rates. In particular, the growth of mortgage borrowing remains very strong. In this context, price dynamics in housing markets need to be monitored closely. The liquidity situation in the euro area remains ample by all plausible measures, indicating risks to price stability over medium to longer horizons. In conclusion, oil price developments have again led to upward revisions of inflation projections for the year ahead. At the same time, medium-term domestic inflationary pressures still remain contained, while the balance of risks to the baseline inflation scenario is tilted to the upside. Cross-checking the economic analysis with the monetary analysis confirms the need for particular vigilance in order to keep medium-term inflation expectations firmly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. By achieving this, monetary policy is making a significant contribution towards economic growth and job creation in the euro area.