samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Benefits for the non-participating Member States The SSM is open to the participation of all EU member States, including those that have not adopted the euro and perhaps many will do so. How will those states that do not participate in the SSM be affected by Banking Union? It is important to stress here that the playing field really will be level. There will be no disadvantage for banks in countries like Britain that stay out of the SSM. Banking Union will benefit all Member States that are part of the single financial market. And as the leading provider of financial services in Europe, I can see only advantages for Britain from its creation. First, Banking Union will facilitate the completion of the single financial market by simplifying supervisory and regulatory practices, which will facilitate wider market access for banks and investors across Europe. Second, Banking Union will reduce the scope for coordination failures between national supervisors, which will in turn allow for more effective implementation of the single rulebook and convergence of supervisory practices. In this way, the presence of the SSM can be seen as reinforcing the coordination function of the European Banking Authority. The SSM will operate in full compliance with EBA guidance and actively contribute to its work. Third, Banking Union will enhance financial stability in the Europe – and this, more than anything, is what is required for the single market in financial services to thrive.

This would bring huge potential benefits for all Member States in terms of enhancing financing for the real economy, managing risks and pooling the resources of investors from European and elsewhere. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusion Let me now conclude. What we are aiming for in Banking Union is to create a system that is truly European and not just an inter-governmental framework for national authorities. We have seen that a Banking Union would have made a real difference during the crisis – and for this reason, there is no pressing reason to carry on with national arrangements that have not functioned effectively. I believe that this message has made its way into the SSM legislation. The elements are there for a truly European approach to supervision. And I hope that it will also translate into a strong Single Resolution Mechanism, to be launched as soon as possible. The SSM and the Single Resolution Mechanism are complements and we need progress on both these fronts. As Victor Hugo once remarked, “you can resist an invading army; you cannot resist an idea whose time is come.” I believe that Banking Union is just such an idea. But it now depends on us – as policymakers, as commentators, as citizens – how it is turned into reality. If we are anything less than wholly ambitious, then we will have learned nothing from this crisis. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Finally, I would add that we, at the National Bank, have learned a lot from the mistakes that economic policy-makers have done in the past. But, as confirmed by the history of our institution, monetary independence is perhaps the decision that best helped us to contribute to the improvement of the efficiency of the economic policies, and thus improve the living standard generally, in a state-making, institutional, economic and practical way. Long live this great anniversary! BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

At the Green Swan Conference, we have a diverse and inclusive assembly comprising some of the best minds and influential figures. I am confident that the conversations we will have over these two days will add impetus to what we can do together in the fight against climate change during this “critical decade”. Thank you, and I wish you all a fruitful conference. [1] Examples include the Sustainable and Responsible Investment Guide for Central Banks’ Portfolio Management and the subsequent update in a progress report. [2] International Network for Sustainable Financial Policy Insights, Research and Exchange (INSPIRE). © 2022, Government of Singapore.
Output, meanwhile, grew 5.7 percent y-o-y in the third quarter of 2012, flat from the previous quarter, but more than expected. The Economic Expectations Survey (EES) of August – available at the closing of the previous Monetary Policy Report – forecast 4.6 percent growth for said quarter. The greater increase was due to better performance in general. However, output’s velocity of expansion dropped from 8.3 to 5.7 percent annualized. In the baseline scenario, the Board estimates that GDP will grow 5.5 percent this year. This projection is higher than the ceiling we estimated in September, with a similar revision as has been made in private forecasts. Still, both our forecasts and private ones have experienced sustained upward revisions in the past year (figure 2). On the domestic spending side, third quarter growth (i.e. 8.0 percent y-o-y) largely surpassed second-quarter figures, however swollen by some specific factors. While every component of expenditure posted higher increases, the large increase in machinery and equipment investment is worth noting: 19.9 percent y-o-y. The acceleration of domestic spending amplified the negative current account balance, which in the third quarter went to 2.9 percent of the GDP accumulated in the last year. The baseline scenario assumes that the deficit will end the year 2012 at 3.8 percent of GDP, exceeding September’s forecast of 3.2 percent. Meanwhile, the national financial system has operated normally in a context of strong investment and favorable external credit conditions.

Household credit has continued to grow  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  in tandem with disposable income, although the increase in loans by non-bank suppliers – with a higher penetration in lower-income households – has been smaller than in previous periods. Corporate debt has grown somewhat above GDP, driven by strong local banking credit and external financing via bonds, in a context of favorable financing conditions in international markets. In turn, the banking system keeps robust indicators, with capital significantly above regulatory levels, a more diversified external funding base, and a stable liquidity position. Toward 2013, the Board estimates that GDP growth will be within the range of 4.25 to 5.25 percent. This range is above the one foreseen in September. In this scenario, domestic demand will increase 5.7 percent y-o-y, further amplifying the current account deficit to 4.6 percent of GDP. This projection supposes that macroeconomic conditions facing the Chilean economy will remain fairly unchanged in the near future, and that the economy will grow in line with trend rates, which the Board continues to estimate around 5 percent (table 1). Internationally, the baseline scenario foresees that in 2013 and 2014 the world economy and Chile’s trading partners will grow by averages of 3.6% and 3.8%, respectively, not far from those of 2011–2012. Important differences remain between the performances of the developed world and the emerging world. The recession in the Eurozone has settled and is expected to last some more time.
Rather than having to impose hefty fines on a financial institution after a major incident or lapse in controls, we prefer that such incidents not happen in the first place. This means that we will not be apologetic about being intrusive and probing in our supervision work, and ML/FT risks will continue to be a key thematic area of focus. 15 The NRA exercise has noted that the controls adopted by banks are generally strong, but there is scope to strengthen the control processes especially in the areas of trade finance and correspondent banking. For example, during some of our inspections, we found that some banks did not screen all the key items in trade documents, and there were also inadequate controls when processing related party client transactions. We are looking to arrange roundtable sessions to share best practices in these two areas. 16 Apart from strengthening control frameworks and processes, the human factor is just as important. We have noted instances where banks have good systems and processes in place, but line departments did not implement the measures properly. Some of the common reasons include inadequate risk awareness, mis-communication across departments, and lack of management oversight. There is therefore a need to invest in the human capabilities, and not just rely on system capabilities in our AML/CFT efforts. 17 One of the more topical issues relating to supervision is that of tax crimes. Singapore designated serious tax crimes as money laundering predicate offences in the middle of last year.

Ong Chong Tee: Combating financial crime – international and national efforts Keynote address by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the ABS Financial Crime Seminar, Singapore, 2 July 2014. *  *  *  1 Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me here this morning. The annual ABS Financial Crime Seminar has become a key event on Singapore’s antimoney laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) calendar. It is a good opportunity for our banking industry at large to take stock of the current challenges and trends, as well as to discuss priorities. As the diverse programme of this conference shows, money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) is a complex global issue, and I am heartened to see the number of experienced professionals and experts gathered here today to share perspectives and insights. The international environment 2 Financial crime is a serious global threat. According to some UN estimates, the amount of money laundered globally is between 2% and 5% of global GDP annually, or to put this in US dollar terms, between $ billion and $ trillion a year. The challenge before us – as is often noted – is that the fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism is never done.
In other words, the conversion window in Shanghai serves a supplementary rather than the main source of RMB funds for trade settlement purpose. In order to further promote the steady development of the RMB market in Hong Kong, the following refinement measures will take effect from January next year: (1)  Participating AIs can square their positions with the Clearing Bank when there is a shortfall of RMB arising from conversions with customers for cross-border trade settlement transactions. In other words, Participating AIs should first utilise the RMB trade proceeds purchased from their customers to satisfy requests for RMB conversions for trade settlement transactions before purchasing RMB through the Clearing Bank in Shanghai. (2)  Participating AIs can only purchase RMB through the Clearing Bank in Shanghai for their customers in relation to trade transactions due for payments to the Mainland within three months. The HKMA and the PBoC estimate that the demand for RMB conversion in Shanghai would be within RMB 4 billion in the first quarter of 2011. The volume of conversion will be assessed and appropriately adjusted after the first quarter taking into consideration the actual circumstances. (3)  In order to maintain a steady supply of RMB, the HKMA will, as a standing arrangement, provide RMB funds of RMB 20 billion through its currency swap arrangement with the PBoC, for cross-border RMB trade settlements.

Norman T L Chan: Latest developments of renminbi business in Hong Kong Briefing by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, on the latest developments of renminbi (RMB) business in Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, 23 December 2010. *  *  *  Good afternoon. Today I would like to provide an update on the latest developments of renminbi (RMB) business in Hong Kong. With the strong support from the Central Government and the relevant Mainland authorities, the development of RMB business in Hong Kong has been encouraging this year. Significant growth and progress have been seen in various areas, including cross-border trade settlement, deposits, bond issuance and the introduction of financial products in the second half of this year. The total amount of RMB deposits increased markedly from RMB 60 billion at the end of last year to RMB 220 billion in October and RMB 280 billion in November this year. Of these deposits, those from personal customers amounted to RMB 120 billion, with a total of 2.2 million accounts and an average deposit size of RMB 54,000. Deposits from corporate clients amounted to RMB 160 billion at the end of November, with 117,000 accounts and an average deposit size of RMB 1.3 million.
At the onset of the crisis, it was not clear that the pandemic would not lead to a slowdown. This can, however, be explained in retrospect. Interest rates have remained low and support measures have significantly cushioned the impact of the crisis on the income of households and companies. Data released since the publication of our report in June show that the price momentum is continuing unabated. Second, it is to be expected that the global low interest rate environment will remain unchanged for some time to come. One reason is that the structural factors behind the downward trend in interest rate levels over the past decade, such as the ageing of the population and the decline in productivity growth, are still in play. Another reason is the expansionary monetary policy pursued by central banks in the advanced economies. Such policy continues to be necessary in order to counteract the impact of the coronavirus crisis. It is therefore to be expected that interest rates will remain low for some time yet, which means that incentives for increased risk-taking will remain in place. 13 This could prolong the period in which growth in mortgage volume and residential property prices is higher than can be explained by fundamental factors. Moreover, the longer the current cycle lasts, the more likely it is that memories of past crises fade and that market participants increasingly disregard the risks in question. Against this backdrop, it is important to continue to closely monitor developments on the mortgage and real estate markets.

The recent fall in oil prices will ease the pressure on firms’ input costs allowing them to restore profit margins without an increase in output prices. Nevertheless, according to surveys, businesses are more likely to raise prices than during the NICE decade. And in their own survey, the Bank’s Agents found that half of those (largely manufacturing) firms which had experienced some erosion of margins were now intending to raise prices. 2  2  Not so bad: not of the same order but also desirable. Speech at the Eden Project, Cornwall, October 2004. BIS Review 94/2006  A change in oil prices does not in itself tell us where overall inflation is headed in the medium term. For that, we need to look at the balance between money spending and potential supply. The growth of total money spending in the economy has picked up in recent quarters – nominal domestic demand rose by 6% in the year to Q2. And the growth rate of broad money and credit in the economy is now higher than at any point since 1990. There is, however, great uncertainty about potential supply. The possibility of continuing migration from the new member countries of the European Union and elsewhere is likely to increase the potential labour force available to UK employers. And it appears that more people of pensionable age are choosing to continue to work.
Although every month we carry out exercises in which we try to measure the impact of macroeconomic changes on our own baseline scenario, we do not yet have a final and complete revision of such scenario which may allow us to estimate, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the expected growth for 2009. However, it is not hard to guess that such growth shall be below the 2-3% range we estimated in January. The exact figure remains to be seen. Anyway, a useful background could be the change in the projections of the analysts who answered the Economic Expectations Survey carried out by the Bank or the last issue of Consensus Forecasts. In these projections, the expected growth for this year went, respectively, from 2% and 1.9% in December to 0.2% and 0.0% in March. Actions taken by the Central Bank during the crisis Since the beginning of the crisis, halfway through 2007, the actions taken by the Central Bank have been focused on three fields: •  Accumulation of reserves. •  Supply of peso and dollar liquidity. •  Monetary easing. In the first half of last year there was an unusual strengthening of the peso, within a context in which there were great risks of deterioration of the international financial environment, such as it actually happened. At the same time, inflationary pressures had been relatively limited during the first quarter. In this scenario, the Bank’s Board decided to strengthen our international liquidity position by accumulating 8 billion dollars over an eight-month period.

An essential characteristic of the Chilean economy is that it has very few distortions in its price-setting mechanism. This results in increases in international prices of goods being transmitted quickly to local prices, while in many other countries this is avoided by explicit price controls or massive fiscal subsidies5 (Figure 3). The most critical phase in this process began in May 2008. After a period with stable monthly inflation figures in the first quarter of last year, large and unexpected inflation rises began taking place. As we then noted, propagation effects were being generated on a higher scale than expected and they could prevent inflation from reaching its target of 3% within the policy horizon of two years. Inflation expectations also started to rise. Both unwanted second-round effects and increased expectations demanded a fast and determined response by the monetary policy aiming at mainstreaming the inflation path to reach its target. This was essential to prevent inflationary persistence from generating a wage/price spiral which would have been harder to revert, if no early measures were adopted. In fact, output costs would have been even harsher, if inflation had been allowed to persist. But the world has changed, and it has done so in a radical way. What was expected to be a mere global economic slowdown, gradually turned into a severe drop in output. Consequently, commodities’ prices began to plunge with unusual strength. After having reached almost 150 dollars halfway through 2008, the oil barrel tumbled down to 40 dollars in December.
Meanwhile, if a vaccine is available sooner, herd immunity could be achieved more quickly in the country, lifting some supply-side restrictions and leading to a faster and more robust recovery in expectations and demand. To the extent that the recovery of supply is the dominant factor in these scenarios, the monetary policy trajectory may not be significantly altered from the central scenario. But if there is a scenario in which weak investment is more persistent, either because of uncertainty and/or because of the sequels of the pandemic, the reduced demand could ease the medium-term pressures on inflation. This would result the MPR being held at its technical minimum for longer, and the possibility of deepening the use of unconventional measures. The economy is going through a complex recovery process that faces the challenges of both the pandemic and the political climate following the social crisis that broke out just over a year ago. The central scenario assumes that the latter will follow the institutional path approved by Congress. However, if new political and social tensions materialize that call this path into question, the negative impact on the economy may go beyond what the CBC may be able to neutralize with its traditional and unconventional toolkit. Let us bear in mind that the government, businesses, households, and financial institutions have withstood the pressures of the last 15 months by making extensive use of the buffers accumulated in previous years, which has deteriorated their equity position.

On the contrary, the prices of copper and financial assets reflect a positive evolution. Meanwhile, the financial situation of companies, affected by falls in profits and greater indebtedness, could restrict the capacity to undertake new projects (Figure 11). Add to this the still high uncertainty about the evolution of the sanitary conditions, the rate of growth and its composition, as well as the fears of a recurrence of episodes of violence such as those at the end of 2019, as noted in our November Business Perceptions Report. The measures adopted to stimulate credit to companies found a favorable response in the financial sector, which has helped to mitigate the impact of the crisis. Thus, by mid-year, record levels of granted new credit and restructuring of others were achieved under the FOGAPE lines implemented with government guarantee plus the CBC’s Conditional Facility Conditional on Increased Lending (FCIC). In the last few months, the activity in the commercial portfolio has been reduced, coinciding with decline in the financing needs of the companies, as the gradual reopening of businesses has increased the cash flows. Thus, as per the Business Perceptions Report, more than half of those who had already obtained a loan do not report additional credit requirements. Meanwhile, our Bank Lending Survey for the third quarter shows fewer applications for working capital. This couples with the weak demand for funds for investment purposes that the survey has been showing for several quarters, in line with the lag of that part of expenditure.