samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We wanted to build on our strengths as a money market and treasury centre to become the debt hub for Asia. At the same time, in other respects we hoped to emulate Zurich. We could become the premier international asset management centre for Asia. After all, our well-respected regulatory, legal and accounting systems and stable socio-economic conditions had already made Singapore a location of choice for private wealth. After five years of promotion and development, we have achieved some encouraging results. The debt market has grown more than 3-fold since 1998. We have attracted some foreign issuers, and our own corporates have tapped international markets from here. However, we remain largely a market with domestic focus. We therefore need to do more to make our markets deeper, more liquid and internationally established. The prospects are good. Asian countries are now cooperating more closely to develop domestic bond markets. As corporates in our region expand their businesses to take advantage of the recovery, they will need more funding. We also see a clear trend towards more derivative products being structured here as investors look for better yields or protection. All these factors will help us to continue to grow our debt markets in size and sophistication as a major debt hub. In the equity market, the global trend five years ago seemed to be towards cross-border alliances and linkages. This has generally not worked out, except to a limited extent in Europe. Indeed, the last few years have been very difficult for stock markets world-wide.

It will also improve the working of capital markets, so that the businesses can raise the capital they need more conveniently and at lower cost. Asian countries are now making greater efforts in regional financial cooperation. When these succeed, they will hopefully spur countries to go further. They recently launched a USD Asian Bond Fund. Although this did not lead to any big bang, it underscored the interest among Asian economies to develop their capital markets. In consultation with the private sector, regional central banks are now working on a local currency ABF. As a financial centre, Singapore is well placed to seize opportunities as regional markets integrate. We will pursue a two-pronged strategy. First, we will actively participate in regional initiatives with the objective of making Singapore a key “interchange” in regional financial flows. Within ASEAN and ASEAN+3, Singapore is leading initiatives to strengthen capital market capacity-building efforts and foster greater cross-border collaboration among regional capital markets. We are advocating the adoption of international capital market standards and practices in ASEAN as an essential market foundation. We are realistic that the regional market will take some time to develop and accept that we cannot force the pace. But we need to stay engaged and strengthen our linkages with the major economies and emerging regions, to offer high value-added activities and secure our place as a key node in the region. On our own, we are already working to establish exchange linkages with major markets to enlarge market coverage out of Singapore.
In the analysis of potential future paths, we have to distinguish between policy rates and market rates. Market rates, in general, respond faster to changes in the economic situation and outlook than policy rates. The low inflation environment, subdued economic outlook and downside risks that prevail all warrant the continuation of a very accommodative monetary policy with low interest rates. Given the fragile state of the global economy, a premature increase in policy rates would carry the risk of choking off the recovery. In Switzerland, specifically, the subdued inflation outlook (chart 17), the highly valued currency and the fact that a recurrence of financial market tensions cannot be excluded warrant a continuation of the minimum exchange rate policy. In the current situation, the minimum exchange rate remains an essential instrument for preventing an undesirable tightening in monetary conditions should the upward pressure on the Swiss franc intensify again. Market rates are still determined by the current cyclical weakness of the global economy. Once the global economy gets back on a stronger and broader-based growth path and uncertainty wanes, rates should return to more normal levels. For Switzerland, this would mean that safe haven forces would become less relevant, removing some of the additional negative pressures on domestic interest rates. Conclusion In sum, given that we expect a slow, but continued improvement of the world economy, market rates are set to gradually recover to more normal levels over time.

Third, financial stability may be in danger when strong action by central banks during a crisis leads market participants to rely excessively on central banks as a backstop in case of negative shocks. This is the moral hazard problem.9 Taken together, these channels underline the risks the current “low-for-long”-situation presents for financial stability. These risks have to be acknowledged and acted upon. The fact that it is possible for these risks to exist while monetary policy is responding appropriately to the macroeconomic situation perfectly illustrates the Tinbergen principle – the number of instruments must equal the number of policy goals.10 In the current environment, the interest rate cannot be the instrument of choice for addressing financial stability risks. The answer is to give more weight to what are known as macroprudential instruments implemented as a complement to, and along-side a monetary policy that remains firmly focused on price stability. These instruments directly target the risk-taking behaviour underlying financial stability risks. This is exactly the approach chosen in Switzerland with the activation of the countercyclical capital buffer. By forcing banks to build up additional capital in the current phase of strong credit growth, the regulators aim at improving the capacity of the banking system to bear losses in the event that the identified risks materialise, while also limiting the further build-up of these risks. Outlook We are now in a position to derive the implications of our analysis for the interest rate outlook.
Our last speech for this event will be held by Mr. Cristian Popa, Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Romania, showing you just where we, as central bank and as economy, stand in the preparation of the introduction of inflation targeting. What I do want to mention is the current debate on the appropriateness of adopting inflation targeting in Romania. I am very happy that monetary policy steals the spotlight from football, at least temporarily. Some acknowledged Romanian economists claim that inflation targeting is not needed since future euro adoption requires fulfilling the grueling conditions of the ERM-II framework. In line with this argument, the exchange rate might prove to be a better choice for a nominal anchor. Given the soon to be completed capital account liberalization, I believe that exchange rate management would be very difficult outside a currency board. Although I am confident about our option, I respect all disagreeing opinions. For those retaining their doubts about the benefits of inflation targeting, there is one more argument, courtesy not of a renowned economist, but of the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. When asked why he, an enlightened scientist, kept a horse-shoe on display in his house, his prompt answer was that “it helps non-believers too”. Likewise, provided that the National Bank of Romania has convinced enough people of its commitments, non-believers should also enjoy the benefits of this policy change. Ladies and gentlemen, let me now introduce Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor of Bank of England and member of the Monetary Policy Committee.

12  Some US equity markets recently reached record highs, both the FTSE 250 and the S&P 500 have gained over 40% from their March lows, and sterling 3m and USD 3m LIBOR rates have come in 70bps and 81bps respectively from their crisis highs 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  I would at this stage identify a number of areas that will likely merit further consideration in a comprehensive, evidence based, analysis of how stress evolved over the initial phase of the COVID crisis and whether and how market dysfunction could have been prevented without huge central bank intervention. Market liquidity broke down very quickly in dealer intermediated corporate bond markets and EME asset markets. This, bluntly, was no great surprise. The potential illiquidity of these markets under stress has been well known to regulatory authorities and market participants for some time.13  These markets are now very large. The global stock of non-financial corporate bonds at the end of 2019 reached an all-time high of $ trillion, with the stock of emerging market corporate debt around $ We need to examine the extent to which their illiquidity contributed to pressure on asset prices and liquidity elsewhere, given the desire of many of the holders of these assets to shift their portfolios to more defensive positions and to increase cash holdings.
It might also have the advantage of fostering an overall assessment of financial data needs for all governmental purposes. However, there would also be some substantial disadvantages to running comprehensive financial data collection through a separate independent agency established for this purpose. A new agency would entail additional budget costs because the agency would likely need to replicate many of the activities of the regulatory agencies in order to determine what data are needed. More importantly, because it would not be involved directly in supervision or market monitoring, such an agency would be hampered in its ability to understand the types of information needed to effectively monitor systemic risks and conduct macro-prudential supervision. Data collection and analysis are not done in a vacuum; an agency’s duties will inevitably reflect the priorities, experience, and interests of the collecting entity. Even regular arms-length consultations among agencies might not be effective, because detailed appreciation of the regulatory context within which financial activities that generate data and risks is needed. The separation of data collection and regulation could also dilute accountability if supervisors did not have authority to shape the form and scope of reporting requirements by regulated entities in accordance with supervisory needs. An alternative organizational approach would be available if the Congress creates a council of financial regulators to monitor systemic risks and help coordinate responses to emerging threats, such as that contemplated in a number of legislative proposals.

Let me also remind you of the political troubles that are observed in some countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The factors I have noted are factors that have added to the uncertainty for the outlook for inflation and growth worldwide and in the euro area. Let me also point out the following. Once again, we are observing an increase in food and energy and other commodity prices. This is adding to the risk of upward pressures of inflation. At the same time, it is a dampener on growth. These are real factors that I believe have raised the uncertainty for the outlook both for inflation and for growth. Q. How do you see the inflation and growth outlook? We constantly monitor developments in the outlook for growth and inflation. Our mandate is to maintain price stability over the medium term. We always try to balance the upside and downside risks of deviating from our mandate, so with new developments we always revaluate the situation. The developments since the March projection staff exercise give me reason to believe that the near-term pressures on inflation are elevated. In the near-term, the risks are to the upside. That said, we continue to observe that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. I do not think we have evidence of inflation pressures persisting beyond the near term. Over the longer term I see price stability being maintained in line with our mandate.
4 The Report is celebrating its 10th anniversary and also contains an article on how central banks need to adapt their analysis and find new approaches to meet the challenges of operating in a constantly changing financial landscape. This is a task that is as exciting as it is important. Thank you. 4  6  Financial Stability Report 2007:2 will be published on 4 December 2007. BIS Review 136/2007

Moreover, its effects will be reinforced by tighter financial conditions and possible negative spill-overs to growth in the UK’s major trading partners. In sum, the material slowing in growth that the MPC had identified as a risk associated with the referendum now looks likely to be our central forecast. Using reports from our nationwide network of agents, private survey evidence, and hard data, in the coming weeks we will estimate the extent of the deceleration as we formulate our August projections. 3. Policies in an uncertain world  When uncertainty is high, policymakers should have three objectives. First, conduct a sober, objective assessment of the outlook and the risks to it. Second, develop and communicate a plan to reduce those risks and to seize new opportunities. And third, do no harm, by  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  minimising any possible confusion about the commitment to core macroeconomic policy frameworks themselves. In Tim Geithner’s famous dictum, “plan beats no plan.” And in my experience, a plan that is clearly articulated and transparently executed is best of all. A plan for the UK’s current challenges would include a comprehensive strategy for engaging with the EU and the rest of the world – including clarifying the UK’s future trading arrangements, calibrating its openness to migration, ensuring the continuity of capital flows, and confirming the appropriate regulatory framework for the UK financial system. The impact of concrete progress towards these objectives would be amplified by an overarching, positive and animating narrative for growth in a post-Brexit world.
Carmen’s influence on the profession is also reflected by the fact that she has coined a number of terms that have since become part of economists’ vocabulary. Every student of international macroeconomics learns about ‘twin crises’ – situations in which banking and  Page 2/4  currency crises occur simultaneously. The term goes back to a paper written by Carmen and Graciela Kaminsky, which demonstrated that these two types of crises often go hand-in-hand and reinforce each other. Another well-known term coined in Carmen’s work is ‘debt intolerance’, which refers to the tendency of emerging market governments to default at relatively low levels of debt. Carmen’s research is distinguished by her extensive efforts in collecting and compiling historical datasets. This is best exemplified by her famous book ‘This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly’, co-authored with Ken Rogoff, who by the way gave the Karl Brunner Lecture in 2016. Based on a vast dataset covering several centuries, the book documents the way in which financial crises have repeated themselves over and over again in history, often following similar patterns. Even when the signs of an impending crisis are there for anyone to see, people usually find good reasons why ‘this time is different’. Such a failure to learn from history often turns out to be the breeding ground for the next crisis. With their book, Carmen and Ken accomplished the seemingly impossible task of writing an international bestseller consisting mostly of economic data and analysis.

To this end, under the regulations, the resolution plans for these institutions should ensure the continuity of their critical functions under any circumstances. Thus, in general, these plans envisage business reorganisation, restructuring or segregation measures if the institution reaches the point of non-viability and they provide for the availability of a sufficient minimum volume of own funds and eligible liabilities (the aforementioned MREL), that enable losses to be absorbed and the institution’s capital base to be shored up, if necessary. 5/10  Indeed, the degree of stringency ultimately adopted in respect of the MREL requirement may determine the relative size of the two groups of banks indicated, i.e. those that may be wound up and those that may be resolved. In particular, demanding MREL requirements that were to entail the need for susceptible banks subject to resolution to issue large volumes of eligible liabilities on the markets might not be assumable by certain types of banks. This might be the case for banks pursuing a traditional retail banking model, funded essentially by capital and through the raising of deposits, and with little tradition of participation in the capital markets. What is involved is a potentially numerous group of banks, not necessarily very small in size. Consider that, in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 70% of significant institutions are not listed on the markets, almost 60% have never issued convertible instruments and almost one-quarter of them do not finance themselves with subordinated debt.
% Total  1990  1995  2002  7222  67  63  USA  1222  12  11  UE15  44  39  38  Developing countries  28  33  37  Asia  13  19  20  Industrialized world  countries  Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics  Global capital flows keep growing at an even higher rate, the share of global FDI in the global GDP increased from 8% in 1989 to 22.1% in 2003, whereas foreign assets as percentage of the GDP increased from 62.6% of the GDP to 186.1% of the GDP, respectively. Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that outsourcing and off-shoring entail increased competitiveness of enterprises, which raise their employment level abroad in subsidiary companies and intensify their expansion on foreign markets, thus being forced to create workplaces, often much better paid and requiring higher qualifications also in parent undertakings. Thus, the growth of employment abroad is accompanied by the same at home. 10 An analysis of the impact of off-shoring services to India in the years 2000 – 2003 on the US labour market shows that, for example, jobs for programmers of low value added were lost in favour of India; however the total employment in the IT services industry grew rapidly. 11 As it has been observed, the role of trade and capital links among enterprises in various countries strengthened over the recent years.

In conclusion, allow me to reiterate the importance of the effective participation of all stakeholders involved in each stage of claims management to ensure high claims service standards and fair treatment of customers. Both insurers and loss adjusters must play their respective roles in value-adding to the claims management process for the effective functioning and positive image of the insurance industry in the long term. 2  BIS Review 53/2010
Further institutional developments have since followed. Thus, without going into the details of the organisation of macroprudential regulation and supervision in the euro area, the member countries are moving ahead with the creation of national macroprudential authorities, while the ECB has been assigned responsibilities in European regulation. The institutional form of the national macroprudential authorities depends on the specific characteristics of each country, although, on the recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board, their common feature has to be the major role played in one way or another by the central banks. Challenges for the banking sector posed by changes in international regulation and supervision Let me conclude by looking at the challenges for the banking sector derived from the major changes in banking regulation and supervision in the international sphere. I shall briefly describe the basic matters being discussed by the Financial Stability Board, or, as we all call it, the FSB. In November 2008, the G20 agreed on an ambitious “action plan” and asked the FSB to overhaul international financial regulation, a reform which was to go to the root of the crisis and pave the way for a sounder and safer financial system allowing sustainable financing of economic growth. The task has been both extensive and intensive. A substantial portion of the reforms needed to fulfil the mandate from the G20 have already been agreed, particularly with regard to the banking industry.

Details on our proposal can be found on the website of the Bank for International Settlements, and the Committee has invited public comment on the approach through the end of this year. In recommending this revision, the Committee seeks to ensure that risk management systems distinguish between losses that can be anticipated versus those that cannot. Moreover, the new framework would include explicit incentives for banks to address each kind of loss appropriately ensuring strong incentives for banks to provision properly against expected losses. Since the proposal would require only modest revisions to the text of CP3 and would not alter the underlying system and data requirements for banks wishing to adopt an advanced approach to credit risk, we expect that the revised treatment will conform closely to the work that banks have already completed to prepare for implementation. The work plan to improve the framework discussed during our last meeting identified several areas in addition to this important EL-UL issue. We think that this work plan is perfectly compatible with the original time schedule to implement the New Accord by yearend 2006. Other issues ahead: complexity Beyond the “EL/UL” issue, the Committee has put at the top of its work plan for the next few months several other credit-risk related issues that emerged in consultations. Of these matters, I’d especially like to highlight three, namely complexity, conservatism, and competition. Certainly, the complexity of the proposals continues to draw the public’s attention.