28  It is difficult to say, definitively, whether these strategies  have improved the efficiency with which asset markets function, given that fundamentals are unobservable. But that is not an unreasonable conjecture. A second strand has assessed how central bank communications affect professional forecasters. The evidence suggests they have a good understanding of how monetary policy behaves. 29  Central bank  communications have been crucial to that understanding. For example, this improved after the Fed began giving press conferences in 2011. 30  And central bank communications have been found to contain  information that can help predict future policy decisions. 31  A related literature has looked at the impact of monetary frameworks and communications strategies in shaping inflation expectations and in influencing inflation dynamics. Generally speaking, this points towards the announcement of formal inflation targets having helped anchor the inflation expectations of financial market participants, companies and consumers around these targets. 32  A third strand has looked at the role of the media in intermediating central bank messages. Studies have examined the factors that influence how the media intermediate central bank messages. 33  There is mixed  evidence on how well the media performs this task. There is evidence the media leads to a better understanding of the ECB’s monetary policy. 34  But in the US and Germany, there is evidence the media may  sometimes impair communication and bias opinion.

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