samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 71/2002  7  Nevertheless, there is also general agreement on the fact that the gap, in terms of average GDP per capita, between the accession countries and the euro area, although diminishing, remains still quite significant. The size of the gap, combined recently with a rather limited growth differential between the two groups of countries, suggests that the process of real convergence will be very gradual and will have to continue much beyond the tentative dates for EU accession. Although differences in income levels are not incompatible with EU and even EMU membership, it is extremely important for accession countries to increase real convergence. Indeed, real convergence is essential to create economic cohesion within EMU and promote integration between Members States, thereby helping to minimize the risk and the effects of asymmetric shocks, in the best interest of accession countries themselves. Let me stress seven points of particular relevance for the Eurosystem, and for accession countries themselves on the road towards achieving catching-up and convergence with the EU. •  Firstly, we should never forget that nominal convergence must be sustainable and therefore not only constitutes an objective that must be met at a given point of time but rather a goal that must be achieved continuously. Strict compliance with the Maastricht criteria will be key for joining the euro area.

This has influenced the integration pattern on the various segments of the financial market. European Union has modified the way in which financial institutions organise their daily business in the euro area: It is true that financial integration in Europe started before January 1999, as banks and non-financial companies included, in their strategies, the setting up of the Single European Market, which occurred ten years ago. The expansion of their operations abroad has been notably the driving force. To illustrate that point, we can look at the stock of foreign assets held by companies. In the case of France, this stock has more than tripled between 1992 and 2000, from EUR bios 131 to EUR bios 465. As a result, non-financial companies gradually introduced more competition into the banking system, as they funded their expansion through non-domestic bond or commercial paper issues, or by centralizing their financing. As an example 40% of the external financial resources borrowed by French medium and large companies are being redistributed to their own subsidiaries, and 10 to 15% 1 consists of commercial paper and bond issuance (figure as at end 2001) . 1  Source : Banque de France – Central balance sheet data -  BIS Review 71/2002  1  1.2  These changes, and on top of them the introduction of the euro, have influenced the integration pattern on the money market, on the bond markets, on the derivatives markets and on the equity markets. Integration is certainly –and naturally– most developed on the money market.
12 Morningstar, 2021, Global Sustainable Fund Flows: Q4 2020 in Review. 13 The Business Times, 2021, ESG magnates pour money into China and its Asian peers. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches

For example, it is fairly easy to assess adherence to the best practice recommendation to implement a fails charge when a seller fails to deliver a Treasury security, or to use a payment-versus-payment settlement mechanism for FX transactions. In contrast, best practices that propose broad principles can be implemented differently across institutions and have outcomes that do not lend themselves to easy measurement. For instance, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which an individual market participant behaves in a manner that supports market liquidity or whether market participants as a group apply this recommendation consistently. Nonetheless, such principle-based best practices can be quite powerful in motivating market participants to think carefully about their internal policies and procedures and consider whether they are consistent with broader principles. Both types of best practices are important. Successful best practices are almost always developed using a collaborative and inclusive approach. Ideally, with respect to financial markets, the process should include a wide range of market participants, including dealers, banks, buy-side firms, and market infrastructures, representing different areas of expertise, including the core business lines, legal, compliance, operations, technology, and custody. A public consultation process may be helpful in further enhancing the development process.
Having competent staff to deliver high quality products and services is critical to building customer confidence and goodwill, driving customer satisfaction, enhancing reputation and ultimately realising individual institutions' corporate vision and strategic goals. It is therefore, in the best interest of banking institutions to strengthen further the competence and professionalism of staff in the industry. In this regard, financial institutions can of course adopt the measure of “buying talent” from the market. This may however, risk in high compensations that are not commensurate with the value added. The more desirable option is the building, developing and maintaining a pipeline of talent from within the company. Let me turn to Malaysia's experience in human capital development for the financial services industry. In Malaysia, structured and comprehensive approach to human capital development has been a key part of our efforts for the development and advancement of the industry. The programmes by ICLIF, which is now in its 6th year of operations, provide programmes in leadership development for the senior management level in the financial services industry. The programmes carried out by the Institute of Bankers Malaysia, the training arm of the banking industry, have also been recently reviewed to meet the new demands of the financial sector. In addition, dialogue between the industry and other education providers including institutions of higher learning have taken place to promote well equipped supply of talent.

Further information can be found online here: http://www.tnongroup.com/ 2 See Mark Carney https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/50-note-character-selection-announcement 1  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  It turns out the same thinking can be applied to a company’s workforce. Instead of equity capital you have human capital, and instead of investing in financial assets you are investing in people. A diverse portfolio makes a company more resilient, and so too does a diverse workforce - delivering better outcomes for individuals, communities and the company. As we look ahead, changes in society mean the workforce of the future will be markedly different from that of today. Recent surveys have found that just short of half of 18-24 year olds identify as something other than exclusively heterosexual or homosexual3, and a similar proportion of Millennials view gender as a spectrum4. These individuals are in and entering the workforce now. If we are to reflect the society we serve and in so doing attract the best talent, we need to make sure they know that they can bring their whole selves to work: that they belong. So the case for a diverse workforce is clear5. What many of us struggle with is how to attract, develop and maintain such a workforce. Unfortunately, diversity does not, in our experience, emerge organically at the workplace. It needs to be nurtured from recruitment to development and promotion. And it must be underpinned by an inclusive work environment for it to be sustainable.
The double-digit deficits in the years before the crisis have been replaced by sizeable surpluses from 2009 to this day. Iceland had significant fiscal surpluses in the years leading up to the crisis. As expected, the crisis had a big impact on government finances: through the direct fiscal costs of the banking crisis, the loss of tax revenue, and higher unemployment expenditures as the economy went into recession. This impact was big as can be seen on Figure 6 showing the direct and indirect impact of selected banking crises on government debt and fiscal balance. But yours was bigger! A deficit on the central government amounting to 8% of GDP opened up in 2009. It had to be financed domestically. Capital controls helped in that respect. To build confidence and open external market access, a medium-term fiscal consolidation plan was implemented as a part of the programme with the IMF. In 2009, automatic stabilisers were mostly allowed to do their work, but in 2010 a phased deficit reduction plan set in, with a primary surplus targeted for 2012 and an overall surplus for 2014. This fiscal consolidation was sizeable in international comparison, as can be seen from Figure 7, but it did not derail the recovery that began around the middle of 2010. It helped that monetary policy could be relaxed over the course of 2010, as the closure of loopholes in the capital controls in late 2009 contributed to the stabilisation of the exchange rate.

This is a balance of payments problem, as 94% of the claims on these banks are foreign and only 6% domestic, whereas 41% of the assets are domestic, including 21% in krónur (See Figure 11). Taking into account the part of these assets that are already financed in foreign currency, we get the result that unfinanced domestic assets that could revert to foreign residents with the unwinding of these estates will amount to 25% of GDP (see Figure 12). When considering the complication that this creates for Iceland, you should bear in mind that it is partly because the resolution of the third-largest bankruptcy in the history of mankind is taking place in one of the smallest countries in Europe. Therefore, potential outflows amounting to 40% of GDP might seek a speedy exit if we were to lift the capital controls tomorrow. If our relatively large FX reserves (30% of GDP) were our first line of defence, they would be wiped out completely, and then the exchange rate would give way, with potentially serious consequences for economic and financial stability in Iceland. We are currently working hard on solutions to this problem, and such solutions do exist. From a logical standpoint, the solution must take the form of either a significant reduction before early exit or a secure longer-term holding period before the controls are lifted. I am coming towards the end of my talk and will have to leave discussion of the lessons learned for the Q&A session.
For this part, I will refer back to work conducted by the Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) in 2010 when it examined the extent to which the market infrastructure for repos added to the uncertainty or instability evident in some repo markets. I will take up two issues identified in the related report published by the CPSS 2 and which can be considered relevant for the smooth functioning of euro money markets, i.e. the role of market infrastructures in providing adequate protection against counterparty risk as well as the efficient use of collateral. In so doing, I will also discuss some tensions which have emerged recently relating to a particular development at market infrastructure level, where it is important to quickly address the underlying issues in order to move forward. 1. Secured and unsecured money markets: developments in the euro area  Well-functioning money markets are an essential component of the financial system. When money markets do not function, financial stability and the transmission of monetary policy are at risk, with potentially severe adverse consequences for the real economy. Deep and liquid money markets insure banks against liquidity risk, a risk that arises naturally in banking, where maturity mismatch is the nature of the business. Unsecured money markets exert a useful disciplinary effect on banks. Money markets also are the starting point for the redistribution of the liquidity provided by central banks and hence the starting point for the transmission of monetary policy.

This combination – a more robust and resilient LIBOR for transactions that require a reference rate with a bank credit risk component and the development of an alternative reference rate for transactions like interest rate derivatives that don’t – will strengthen our financial system and help undo some of the damage caused by earlier transgressions. But this is only a necessary and not a sufficient set of conditions. To achieve the outcome desired, financial institutions also need to have in place the appropriate incentives and controls. Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
This can prove very demanding, particularly since data quality management in micro data is a very cumbersome process. Let me be clear here: micro data per se do not ensure highquality statistics. But it is true that if you have micro data you can check the quality of the data, pinpoint where the problems are and potentially revise them. In the case of aggregate data, you may not have the adequate means at hand to check their quality and correct them. An important issue for ensuring data quality is the proper identification of economic agents. In a complex and globalised world (and in particular in a monetary union where domestic transactions correspond to an area larger than your own country), the identification of counterparts to maintain high-quality statistics is simply essential. Since the European National Central Banks can only properly pursue their functions by previously identifying the financial corporations under their scrutiny and the non-financial counterparts of financial  2  market transactions, they have created their own register: the Register of Institutions and Affiliates Database, (RIAD). A key step forward to ensure there is adequate identification of agents at the European level would be to enhance cooperation in this field between the European Statistical System and the Eurosystem. This could be done, for example, by integrating their reference data directories (such as the ESCB’s RIAD and the ESS’s Euro Group Register).

We will continue to invest heavily in our people, especially our young, and equip the next generation with the right skills and cutting edge knowledge. We will continue to welcome global talent. To enhance Singapore’s magnetic pull, we are developing Singapore into a truly global city – a “cool” and “happening” place, with social and cultural vibrancy, good educational institutions, clean, green and safe environment and iconic international sporting events like F1 Grand Prix. But the strongest pull in this magnet is economic growth. Without economic opportunities, talent will not come or stay. What of the future? We did not foresee the Asian Financial Crisis coming in May 1997. Despite keeping a close watch, we may still miss something or misinterpret a blip on the radar screen. This is why I have emphasised the importance of maintaining the virtuous cycle of good governance and talent to generate growth. This is the best strategy to face whatever challenges ahead. Sustaining this virtuous cycle must be the task of all Singaporeans. Let me now say a few words about how I see the role of the SICC in Singapore’s future development. Given the diverse markets in which SICC members operate, your chamber can play an important role in helping our companies internationalise and seize global opportunities. The SICC can help your members move into new areas of growth like the Middle East. I am glad to note that more links and collaboration are being forged between SICC and your counterparts in the Middle East.
In fact, a CBDC's potential contribution to boosting the strategic autonomy of the European Union, by offering a fast and efficient alternative to other payment providers, is one of the key reasons why the Eurosystem is assessing the issuance of a digital euro. But it is not the only one. The role of the euro as monetary anchor is not only being put to the test by these new developments, but also, and probably more importantly, by the natural evolution of society. The increasing digitalisation of every aspect of our daily lives is reducing the use of cash as a means of payment. Should it reach the point where cash is hardly used, the convertibility of central bank money and private money would be put at risk, affecting people's confidence in the latter. We believe that having a digital euro to ensure convertibility between these two types of money would underpin and protect the integrity of the euro as a unit of account. A digital euro could also foster innovation, increase the efficiency of payments, and reduce our current reliance on non-European payment solutions and technologies. I think the benefits of issuing digital central bank money for retail use are clear, but we cannot forget the other side of the coin. CBDCs come, indeed, with a number of challenges. The technical or operational ones, such as setting up a whole new payment infrastructure, giving digital access to central bank money to every citizen and delving into the intricacies of retail payments are obvious difficulties to surmount.

Yet, MiCA stands out from other legislative initiatives in how it tackles stablecoins, of which it distinguishes two types: electronic money (e-money) tokens and asset-referenced tokens. E-money tokens purport to maintain a stable value by referencing to the value of one official currency. As such, they are considered electronic money. Their issuers are limited to credit institutions and electronic money institutions, which must comply with MiCA and the existing provisions in this field. Asset-referenced tokens, on the other hand, are a different kind of animal. These cryptoassets are not e-money tokens and purport to maintain a stable value by referencing to any other value or right, or a combination of both, including one or more official currencies. The composition and administration of the underlying reserve assets thus become key elements and, consequently, MiCA extensively addresses the conditions which should guide their management. As such, the reserve assets may only be invested in highly liquid financial instruments with minimal concentration, credit and market risk. Moreover, MiCA requires that the reserve be managed in such a manner that the liquidity risks associated with the permanent redemption rights of the holders are addressed, and that the risks associated with the assets referenced by the asset-referenced tokens are covered. Finally, in order to protect the interests of token-holders, the reserve will have to be operationally segregated from the issuer's estate. Despite the significant progress achieved, MiCA is unfortunately facing what I hope proves to be one last delay in its adoption process.
[17] Finally, the negative interest rate policy also reinforces our targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTROs). [18] Under the TLTROs, banks can refinance with the ECB at very favourable conditions: under the second and third wave of that programme (TLTRO II and III), borrowing rates in the TLTROs can be as low as the deposit facility rate (which is negative) if lending volume targets are met. Accordingly, the presence of negative rates provides a strong incentive for banks to participate in the TLTROs, which support credit provision to the real economy at attractive conditions. The transmission of asset purchases to the yield curve Let me now turn to large-scale asset purchases, including our own asset purchase programme (APP). There is a wide array of studies quantifying the effects of various forms of asset purchases on financial markets and macroeconomic variables. Results vary regarding the quantitative impact but there is a broad consensus that central bank asset purchases lead to a flattening of the curve, since the yields of longerterm bonds tend to decline by more than those of short-term bonds. A first look at the stylised facts using the same approach that I outlined earlier confirms this pattern for the euro area. Extracting a quantitative easing factor from high-frequency interest rates and other financial market data confirms that news about ECB asset purchases had yield compression and flattening effects on the term structure, as shown in Chart 6.

[23] One way in which the portfolio rebalancing channel may affect bond yields is through a direct impact on demand and supply conditions in the maturity segment in which we purchase. For instance, buying a French eight-year bond decreases the supply of that bond available in the market. For given demand, this drives up the price of the bond and compresses its yield. Securities of similar maturity are close substitutes, so their yield would also be affected, but those with very short and much longer maturities would not be greatly affected. This is why this channel is often referred to as the “local supply channel”. Another way in which the portfolio rebalancing channel is set in motion is through duration extraction. [24] The formalisation of this idea is based on prominent work by Vayanos and Vila (2009). [25] Let me just give you the basic mechanism. Going back to my previous example, under the duration extraction channel, the purchase of a French bond not only affects demand and supply locally but also reduces the aggregate risk to be borne by market participants. This leads price-sensitive investors to re-adjust their bond portfolio across maturities given their overall risk-bearing capacity. In terms of asset pricing terminology, central bank bond purchases decrease the market price of duration risk (the expected excess return on a long-  term bond per unit of risk). As I explained earlier, excess returns constitute the term premium component of long-term bond yields, so term premia and overall bond yields decline.