samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Bank’s response to the Commission’s call for evidence is http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/regframework/detailed available at answers010216.pdf  12  The 8.5% minimum is composed of 6% common international standard agreed under Basel III plus the 2.5% pillar 2a requirement that reflects shortcomings in risk measures. See footnote 3. 13  We plan only for only the systemic part of the banking system to have a 5% buffer. In line with Basel standards, smaller banks will be subject to a buffer only half the size. That reflects the difference in economic costs between a big – systemic – bank coming close to or actually failing and a small bank doing so. 14  This will take effect by supplementing baseline capital requirements with the countercyclical capital buffer rate on UK exposures. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We’ll be looking for the evidence that borrowers might have overstretched; that asset prices could be vulnerable to reversal; and that economic imbalances exist that could correct. Assessing risks isn’t the same as “calling the cycle”. We shouldn’t be asking whether a downturn or a bad event is destined to happen. We are not looking for irrefutable proof. Capital buffers should be based on whether the evidence says there is a threat that could materialise in future, not whether it is going to.

(c) From 2014 , the chart shows common equity Tier 1 capital ratios as reported by banks. Table 1 Average Tier 1 capital requirements across UK systemic banks Tier 1 Capital Requirements  %RWA  % Total Assets (leverage)  Minimum requirements (no less than 75% CET1)  8.5%  3%  Pillar 1  6%  Pillar 2a (reflecting shortcomings in risk measures)  2.5%  Baseline capital buffers (CET1)  10  5%  Capital conservation buffer  2.5%  Additional buffers for systemic importance  2.5%  0.75%  Total Tier 1 baseline requirements  13.5%  3.75%  + UK countercyclical buffer rate at standard risk level  1%  0.35%  BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Baker, M and Wurgler, J (2013), ‘Do strict capital requirements raise the cost of capital? Bank regulation and the low risk anomaly’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 19018, May. Bank of England (2015), ‘Supplement to the December 2015 Financial Stability Report: The framework of capital requirements for UK banks’, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2015/fsrsupp.pdf Bank of England (2015), ‘Stress testing the UK banking system: 2015 results’ available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/ speech883.pdf. Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority, ‘The Failure of HBoS plc’ http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/ publications/reports/hbos.pdf. Bank of England (2016), ‘Bank of England response to the European Commission Call for Evidence on the EU Regulatory Framework for Financial Services’, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/regframework/detail edanswers010216.pdf.
And the DWF currently offers a 12-month swap option, as well as the standard 30-day facility. In summary, by providing liquidity insurance the Bank aims effectively to give essentially sound banks and others time to address the problems created by stress, and for the authorities to develop remedial plans, without creating perverse incentives or exposing itself to risk. Given those aims, banks must avail themselves of these facilities. We believe, for example, that all qualifying banks and building societies should sign up for the Discount Window Facility; that they should pre-position with us a range of eligible collateral, so that they avoid operational stumbles when they seek to use the Window; that they should use it regularly in meaningful size as part of testing and making a reality of their contingency plans; and that they should share those plans with the Bank, which, amongst other things, would help us assess applications to draw. In that way, the DWF can truly help to underpin the system’s liquidity in the future. 19  See Tucker PMWT (2008), “The Structure of Regulation: Lessons from the Crisis of 2007”, a speech to the LSE’s Financial Markets Group Conference; and the Committee on the Global Financial System, Paper No. 31 (July 2008), “Central bank operations in response to the financial turmoil”, CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements. 20  The SLS was introduced in April 2008 and was open until end-January 2009.

To this end, the Bank of Albania will continue to work diligently for: the prudent regulation and supervision of the banking activity; the financial market and payment system development; the promotion of the financial stability of the country, as well as for bolstering the financial education and inclusion of the public. Although the challenges facing ahead are not few and far in between, I am convinced that the banking industry will continue to remain a trusted partner to Albanian enterprises and households. In conclusion, I would like to stress out that the Bank of Albania supports and encourages the structural reforms. This agenda of reforms has now found a stable anchor in the process of negotiations undertaken in the framework of the European Union membership. The continuous investment on reforms, which boost and encourage the macroeconomic stability of the country, the improvement of the business climate, the increase of efficiency and competitiveness, the improvement of human and institutional capacities, as well as the comprehensive development of infrastructure, is the one and only path toward a faster economic and social progress. 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Data releases on inflation and economic activity since the inception of the cycle of rate cutting and the favorable course of risk indicators have vindicated these preemptive monetary policy decisions and strengthened the impact of policy decisions on expectations, gradually bringing market interest rates down to historically low levels (Figure 13). The Central Bank assesses that the decline in market interest rates is also attributable to policy rate reductions, as well as maintaining flexibility in interest rate decisions in favor of a downward bias and the recovery in risk perceptions in the second quarter of 2009. The downward trend in market interest rates also reverberated on medium term real interest rates causing real market interest rates to go down compared to the first quarter and to follow a course below the levels of the pre-crisis period (Figure 14). Notwithstanding the fact that a decline in real interest rates in periods of stagnation is an anticipated change in healthy economies, I would like to underline that this has never been witnessed in the Turkish economy before. In this regard, the current level of real interest rates is considered to be a favorable development as it verifies that the Turkish economy is on the path of normalization.

Forecasts for Annual Growth 2009  2010  Previous Forecast  New Forecast  Previous Forecast  New Forecast  World  -1,3  -1,4  1,9  2,5  Developed Countries  -3,8  -3,8  0,0  0,6  USA  -2,8  -2,6  0,0  0,8  Eurozone  -4,2  -4,8  -0,4  -0,3  Developing Countries 1,6  1,5  4,0  4,7  IMF  OECD All OECD Members  -4,3  -4,1  -0,1  0,7  USA  -4,0  -2,8  0,0  0,9  Eurozone  -4,1  -4,8  -0,3  0,0  World  -2,1  -2,6  1,9  2,1  USA  -2,7  -2,6  1,8  2,1  Eurozone  -3,4  -4,4  0,3  0,4  Consensus Forecasts *  Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April and IMF World Economic Outlook Update, July. OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report, March and OECD Economic Outlook, 2009/I, June. *Consensus Forecasts, April and Consensus Forecasts, July. In sum, assessing domestic and external demand developments together, revised forecasts for medium-term inflation are based on a framework where aggregate demand conditions would support disinflation for a long period of time. Distinguished Guests, Despite the realization that recovery in the global economy will be slow, increasing perceptions regarding the worst part of the crisis being over caused a rebound in commodity prices.
That said, the studies that do exist tentatively support the conclusion that macro-prudential policy can be effective in the euro area. Assetside measures like LTV, LTI and DTI in particular have been found to be effective in dampening real estate booms. 10 As this was the sector at the heart of the crisis in several euro area countries, this is encouraging. Further research in this area is essential to help us better understand the impact and transmission channels of macro-prudential policies. Questions of effectiveness aside, where the SSM represents a major step forward in macroprudential policy, is in creating some centralisation of macro-prudential decision-making. The SSM Regulation gives the ECB the power to apply stricter macro-prudential measures than national authorities if it deems necessary. This allows us to take an integrated view of macroprudential policy – spillovers, arbitrage effects – and provides a safeguard against inaction bias at the national level. Moreover, the important role of the ECB Governing Council in macro-prudential decisionmaking allows for interactions between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy to be internalised and synergies to be exploited. To give just one example, several of the nonstandard measures we have adopted during the crisis, such as changes in collateral haircuts or reserve requirements, might in certain cases overlap with macro-prudential measures like liquidity ratios and margin requirements. This suggests that macro-prudential policies can support us in fulfilling our mandate. Conclusion Let me conclude. Since the launch of the euro, we have become more interconnected.

Naturally, we wish to avoid this. But at the same time, I think it is important to begin to take action. In the long run, it is no sustainable for debts to continue increasing at the same pace as today. So why does the Riksbank care about household indebtedness? The Riksbank is concerned about household indebtedness partly because international confidence in the Swedish housing and mortgage markets are necessary conditions for our financial system to function smoothly. Financial developments in turn are linked to developments in the real economy. The indebtedness of Swedish households can thus affect the Riksbank’s conditions to carry out its statutory tasks, price stability and financial stability. It is therefore important that the Riksbank continues to follow developments, analyses and highlights risks linked to household indebtedness. 8  See Barclays 2012. (Over-promising? Encumbrance at European Banks, Barclays Capital Equity Research. 9  See Financial Stability Report 2013:2, Sveriges Riksbank. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Fisher P G F (2009), “The Bank of England’s Balance Sheet: Monetary Policy and Liquidity Provision during the Financial crisis” speech available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech413.pdf. Tucker, P M W (2009), “The Repertoire of official sector interventions in the financial system: last resort lending, market-making, and capital”, speech, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech390.pdf. Sayers, R.S., (1976) “The Bank of England 1891–1944”, Volumes 1 and 2, Cambridge University Press. 9  See: “Discussion paper on non-bank lending”, HMT published on the 12 January, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/non_bank_lending_discussionpaper.pdf. BIS Review 23/2010  7  8  BIS Review 23/2010  BIS Review 23/2010  9

And also worthy of note is our work, together with the Ministry of Finance, on the initiative for the pension savings formation model through Individual pension capital. By our estimate, the work on this project is now quite advanced. We have undertaken a few rounds of both departmental and expert discussions. I very much hope that these changes will be accepted, as they will provide citizens with better quality of life, and generate a long-term source of funding for the economy, which is vital for investment development. And the last thing I wanted to mention, which I believe to be particularly important – when working on scenarios, on forecasts, on the budget – is our interaction with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development in preparing a firmly grounded medium-term macroeconomic forecast. Because this forecast provides direction not only for the budget, but also for businesses in our economy and economic subjects, and I hope that this work will also help to ensure consistency of views on macroeconomics and economic policy, because this is also very important. In the last two years we really have been consistently working together, and in our opinion this work has indeed paid off. And to wrap up I would like to extend my thanks once again to all the 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  staff of the Ministry of Finance for the constructive cooperation that we have developed, for your high professionalism, and for your responsible and involved attitude to work.
As a national agenda, I would like to propose that this forum debates and considers the feasibility of setting a realistic target date, perhaps by the year 2010, for a full implementation of a national e-payment roadmap that specifically outlines the strategies and realignments of the business processes and operating practices, for the nation to be fully engaged in making the migration a success. Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me now move on to the third key point mentioned earlier on the commercial interfaces, whereby the underlying business models and pricing mechanisms for electronic payments, should take into account the need for an incentive structure that promotes the increased use of e-payments. In recent years, several notable developments in e-payments in Malaysia have taken place. Following its introduction in 2000, the Inter-Bank GIRO system, an electronic credit transfer system, had recorded on annual average increase in transactions of 160% in terms of volume and nearly 200% in terms of value between 2003 and 2004. The credit card is also becoming a popular means of payment card, with the total value and volume of increasing annually by 15 and 20 percent respectively. The growing acceptance of Internet banking as a convenient delivery channel for accessing banking services has translated into a significant growth of Internet banking subscribers, which today comprise two thirds of the total internet subscribers.

In this regard, a comprehensive review of the industry-wide related issues involving payment instruments and systems needs to be undertaken to make Malaysia more competitive, with a view to promoting the more efficient payment systems and addressing the commercial hurdles. In order to further improve the growth and promote the e-payments, the payments industry may wish to consider establishing a Payment System Association to deal with the industry-wide issues involving electronic payments. A Payment System Association would be able to address the lack of common technology standards between service providers to promote interoperability, and the lack of a collective forum to identify, understand and manage the spectrum of stakeholders' interests and expectations. I should add that this idea is not new, as payment associations are already in existence in several other countries. Ladies and Gentlemen The future landscape of the payment industry is one that will continuously evolve with market innovations, resulting in enhanced services that offer improvement in efficiency and cost savings compared to traditional payment methods. Bank Negara Malaysia will continue to play the role of a facilitator to spearhead the development and improvement of the payments system infrastructure and to promote a conducive enabling environment for such developments to take place. In this respect, Bank Negara Malaysia has taken several initiatives to promote greater use of electronic payments by the public sector and in bringing about a mindset change amongst the users.
Notes: Data for the United Kingdom and the United States are derived from nominal bond yields deflated using inflation swaps. The Germany/EA figures are based on nominal Bund yield deflated using euro-area inflation swaps (as a proxy for the euro-area risk free rate). The measure of inflation used is RPI for the United Kingdom and CPI for the United States and the euro area. Data are to close of business 9 February 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  25  Chart 15: Population growth Annual percentage change 3  2  2050  2040  2030  2020  2010  2000  1990  1980  1970  1960  1950  1940  1930  1920  1910  1900  1890  1880  1870  1860  1850  1840  1830  1  0  Source: United Nations population projections (http://esa.un.org/wpp/) for 1950 onwards; The Maddison-Project (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm) prior to 1950. Chart 16: Business expenditure on Research & Development South Korea  Japan  China  United States  United Kingdom  France  R&D Expenditure as a % of GDP  3.5 3.0  Germany  2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0  1981  1985  1989  1993  1997  2001  2005  2009  2013  0.5  Source: OECD.

Concluding remarks In closing, I would like to return to our decision of 15 January. Discontinuing the minimum exchange rate and reducing interest rates further are monetary policy measures for which there are no better alternatives. As I outlined previously, since the introduction of the minimum exchange rate in September 2011, the international currency relationships have changed fundamentally. In view of this development, a minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro was no longer sustainable. Over the long term, adhering to the minimum exchange rate would have jeopardised the SNB’s ability to conduct monetary policy and fulfil its mandate in future. This would have saddled the Swiss economy with longer-term costs that would have been out of all proportion to the benefits of continuing to enforce the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. With the international low interest rate environment, monetary policy faces big challenges. Overall, the Swiss franc is significantly overvalued. Negative interest helps to make investments in Swiss francs less attractive and thereby correct this overvaluation over time. The SNB will continue to take account of the exchange rate situation, and its impact on inflation and economic developments, in formulating its monetary policy. It will therefore remain active in the foreign exchange market, as necessary, in order to influence monetary conditions. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
But the lesson that if you want better options to deal with a failing financial institution they need to be put in place beforehand applies more widely than banks. 1 2  RLF would not be available to any firm subject to an insolvency or administration procedure. See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/money/eligiblecollateral.aspx 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  So we need also to think about whether resolution is necessary in other parts of the financial sector, particularly systemically important insurance companies and CCPs. These did not fail in the last crisis. But they may pose similar problems in a future episode of stress. Insurance companies are very different animals to banks. Insurer failure is more likely to be in much slower motion and solvent run-off may present a credible solution. However we need to think carefully about whether we can rely wholly on that and what, if any, systemic risks could arise from insolvency of a major insurance company. Given the relatively small amount of debt in insurance companies relative to policy liabilities, who should bear the losses in resolution? And what tools are needed to allocate them? The answers to these questions are not yet fully apparent, though in my view, the case is probably made for a resolution regime for insurers, if only as a precaution should it turn out that run-off is not enough. CCPs CCPs are also very different to banks.

Ten years on: Lessons from Northern Rock  Speech given by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Committee  Single Resolution Board Annual Conference, Brussels Friday 29 September 2017  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  th  This month marks the 10 anniversary of the failure of Northern Rock. The failure of a middle size British mortgage bank was followed by the collapse of much bigger and globally systemic banks. But the picture of the queues forming outside the branches of Northern Rock remains for many the picture of the start of the financial crisis. Prior to September 2007, I knew of the existence of bank runs from economic history books, the experience of developing and emerging economies and the film of Mary Poppins. Seeing one happen in London brought home that it is never different “this time”. The fundamental basis of the financial system is trust. And trust, if not properly managed and protected, can disappear instantaneously. And once that happened, the UK had no effective way of managing the failure of a bank. And no way to avoid the taxpayer having to step in to stop such a failure leading to the loss of critical services to the economy and contagion to other banks.