samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, this will count for nothing if directors do not and cannot adapt to the dynamic nature of the banking and economic environments. It is for this reason that Bank Negara Malaysia, in collaboration with Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia, introduced in 2008 the Financial Institutions’ Directors Education Programme or better known as the FIDE programme. Since its inception, the FIDE Programme now offered under the ICLIF Centre for Governance and Leadership has  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  provided customised training on corporate governance practices to more than 500 directors of financial institutions in Malaysia. This programme has had an important role in catalysing positive changes in how boards and senior management function and interact, thereby improving the overall quality of financial institutions’ governance. It is also through this programme that a directors’ network has emerged, enabling peer learning, and the sharing and exchange of experiences among financial institutions directors. Role of stakeholders In elevating the standards of corporate governance in the financial services industry, shareholders play an important role to engage boards and hold them to account. Demands for improvements in corporate governance could be driven by the institutional investors and minority shareholders. But for this to happen, they require relevant information on the financial institutions performance and operations. In this context, the Bank has outlined proposals in the Financial Sector Blueprint to require periodic audits of corporate and Shariah governance to help investors better understand whether disclosed governance arrangements are reflected in actual practice.

•  Trade between ASEAN and China is at a record $ billion. •  This large and growing cross border trade will fuel greater RMB trade settlement activity in Singapore over time. The RMB clearing bank will be an important channel for RMB liquidity to circulate between Singapore and China. 4. Singapore’s deep and liquid capital markets will be able to support RMB financing needs in the region. We have already seen companies here issuing RMB-denominated bonds. The Singapore Exchange has announced that it is ready to quote, trade, clear and settle RMB-denominated securities. We can expect the range of RMB-denominated product offerings to expand, as regional corporates raise RMB financing through bond issuances and equity listings, to tap on the strong investor base in the region. 5. There will also be strong and growing demand for RMB trade services. There is a critical mass of international trading companies based in Singapore that will demand such services. With the new RMB clearing arrangements, we can expect financial institutions based in Singapore to reach out to local and regional corporates and investors, and encourage greater participation in the offshore RMB market. 6. MAS is delighted to have ICBC Singapore as our RMB clearing bank. ICBC Singapore has considerable experience in RMB business and is well placed to launch a reliable and efficient RMB clearing service. With the QFB privileges it now enjoys, ICBC is committed to growing its business in Singapore.
Inflation is predicted to fall back to the target around the middle of next year, although this will depend on exchange rate developments. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The second relates to deleveraging, or reduction of debt levels. Public and private debt levels are on a declining path, as can be seen from Figure 8. In the case of businesses in particular, a significant part of this takes the form of debt restructuring and write-downs. That, along with the resolution process of the failed banks, will reduce Iceland’s net external debt to a sustainable level over time (see Figure 9). This is a good thing, of course, but the deleveraging process has two short- to medium-term side effects that must be managed. The first one relates the negative effect of deleveraging on domestic demand. The second relates to its negative effect on the exchange rate, as economic entities with foreign debt, little or no foreign-currency income, and no access to foreign credit are forced to repay foreign debt faster than is optimal for them and the economy. This is part of our balance of payments problem. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  That brings me to the third challenge, which is to break out of Iceland’s balance of payments crisis and lift the capital controls. Through fiscal consolidation and reinforcement of its FX reserves (see Figure 10a), Iceland has seen a steep drop in the perceived risk of the sovereign as reflected in CDS spreads.

This picture is broadly mirrored when turning from returns to labour to returns to capital. In the 1950s gross profitability of the financial sector relative to capital employed was broadly in line with the rest of the economy (Chart 16). But since then, and in particular over the past decade, returns to capital have far outpaced those at an economy-wide level. Chart 17 plots UK banks’ return on equity capital (ROE) since 1920 (Alessandri and Haldane (2009)). Although conceptually a different measure of returns to capital, the broad message is the same. Trends in ROE are clearly divided into two periods. In the period up until around 1970, ROE in banking was around 7% with a low variance. In other words, returns to finance broadly mimicked those in the economy as whole, in line with the gamble payoffs in Chart 6. But the 1970s mark a regime shift, with the ROE in banking roughly trebling to over 20%, again in line with gamble payoffs. Excess returns accumulated to capital as well as labour. These returns were by no means unique to UK banks. Chart 18 plots ROEs for major internationally active banks in the US and Europe during this century. Two features are striking. First, the level of ROEs was consistently at or above 20% and on a rising trend up until the crisis. This is roughly double ROEs in the non-financial sector over the period. Second, the degree of cross-country similarity in these ROE profiles is striking. This, too, is no coincidence.
But recent data on the housing sector indicates that the recovery has stalled (Chart 20). As with consumption, we are unlikely to see the typical surge of housing starts and residential investment that was a key feature of most past recoveries. There is already an unusually large volume of vacant homes for rent and for sale (Chart 21). More are likely to come onto the market in the months ahead due to the large volume of mortgage loans currently in the foreclosure process. For the government sector, large federal budget deficits are a constraint and fiscal policy is slowly shifting from an expansive policy back toward restraint. At the state and local level, the constraints are even more binding, as budgetary gaps will need to be addressed by spending cuts and tax increases (Chart 22). Exports rebounded sharply over the second half of 2009, particularly to the emerging world (Chart 23). However, domestic demand in Europe and Japan – important export markets for the United States – remains very weak. This suggests that the U.S. trade balance is likely to change little over the next year or two, and, thus, will be relatively neutral in terms of its impact on growth. Only business fixed investment is in a position to be a true locomotive of growth. Profits have stayed high relative to investment, and corporate balance sheets are awash with cash (Charts 24 and 25). However, even here, the growth impulse is likely to be weak.

Second, the “storm broke out”: after the default of Lehman Brothers, it became evident that such standard measures were no longer sufficient to achieve price stability in the euro area. We therefore provided enhanced credit support and, later on, non-standard credit operations in the light of the increased liquidity demands from the banking system. To avoid potential collateral shortages when satisfying this increased demand, we expanded the range of assets against 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  which banks can draw liquidity from the Eurosystem. But at the same time, we followed the principle of risk equivalence with the assets accepted under the pre-crisis rules. Let me give you a concrete example: since 2012, several national central banks of the euro area, including the one hosting this conference, have accepted additional bank loans as collateral. To ensure risk equivalence, haircuts on these assets were higher than those used in regular operations. This brings me to the third phase of the crisis, the “crosswinds”: in recent years the continued decline in inflation rates in the euro area called for additional non-standard measures – I am referring, of course, to the asset purchase programmes. This type of liquidity provision was a novelty for the Eurosystem, although the instrument of outright purchases has been envisaged as one of the legal and operational tools of the Eurosystem since its inception. Accordingly, additional risk control frameworks needed to be developed to keep the financial risks in check given the significant rise in exposures.
So it is natural and indeed understandable that bankers harbour grievances and misgivings towards bank regulation and supervisors. And this is why the topic I am going to talk about is a very attractive theme to them. They would like to hear from a supervisor speaking on a subject that they can normally only discuss privately amongst themselves. 4. First of all, let me give you the good news! As I see it, there are two ways to get rid of bank supervisors, one fast track and the other a slow track. Let me start with the fast track! 5. If you can find a clock or time machine that would allow you to dial back time to 100 years or so ago, then you would find yourself in a happy world where there was little or even no banking supervision. Contrary to common belief, banking supervision as a profession or industry (or, as some bankers would no doubt have it, a “black art”) does not have a very long history. Until the Roosevelt New Deal era 1933 Banking Act in the USA, no depositor in an American bank could have been assured of clear supervisory oversight, following a century of uncertainty about state and national authority over banks and the issue of bank notes. In the UK, the first statutorily-backed regulatory regime was put in place only in 1979. Prior to that time, the Bank of England had exerted only informal authority, including through the venerable “Governor’s eyebrow”.

Chart 8 indicates, however, that much of that is attributable to the substantial fall in imports associated with the collapse in domestic demand, rather than a rise in exports (although to the extent that there was excess demand before the crisis – as Chart 4 suggests – part of that decline in imports will be warranted). Moreover, the necessary sectoral reallocation of resources is harder to achieve in a currency union than in a country with its own currency, as the exchange rate is not free to adjust to expedite the necessary adjustments in prices and quantities. Absent a supply-side miracle to  2  As productivity tends to rise faster in manufacturing than services, unit labour costs on average rise faster in non-tradables than tradables. But, as Chart 7 makes clear, the gap was much greater in Spain than Germany. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  raise productivity in the periphery, the necessary reversal in the movements in relative unit labour costs needs instead to come about through wage and price adjustment, which may require a sustained period of spare capacity in the periphery together with excess demand in the core. There is, however, an inherent asymmetry, noted long ago by Keynes, that when credit flows dry up, adjustment is compulsory for the debtor but only voluntary for the creditor. Moreover, not only does the creditor lack the urgent need to adjust, they may also feel that the debtor ought to bear more of the burden of adjustment on moral grounds.
On the other hand, the Bank will allow flexibility on its Net Domestic Assets, whenever unexpected negative developments emerge in the financial system. Moreover, the Central Bank will resort to use short-term interest rates  BIS Review 35/2001  3  efficiently as a monetary policy instrument through reducing Net Domestic Assets, should disinflation process be endangered by foreign exchange movements. Dear Shareholders, Distinguished Guests and Valuable Press Members, Now let me go into some details of the Draft-Law Amending the Central Bank Act, which will have a greater impact on the macro-economic policies in Turkey in the medium- and long-term. As you know, the Draft-Law, which has already been approved by the Planning and Budget Commission at the Parliament, will be debated in the Parliament’s General Assembly, probably today. The Draft-Law was prepared by taking account of economic developments of the last 31 years since the enactment of the Central Bank Act No: 1211 on 14 January 1970, and the central banking norms agreed by the European Union. According to the Draft-Law, ensuring price stability becomes the primary objective of the Central Bank. The Central Bank will have the exclusive power and responsibility in designing and pursuing its monetary policy. The new Law will enable the Bank to choose and to use its monetary policy and instruments independently. If the Draft-Law is ratified in the Parliament just as adopted in the Commission, a Monetary Policy Committee will be established.

However, from Q4 this year we will make adjustments to our approach to the composition of this portfolio in order to incentivise companies to take actions contributing to an orderly transition to a net–zero economy. Given the relatively small scale of these holdings – in the context of sterling and global capital markets – we hope this change will by example influence how larger investors take account of climate risks in their own asset allocation decisions. Some may worry this change moves us away from central banks’ core responsibilities, into territory best left for governments. However, the case for taking this action is clear, it is in line with the change in the MPC’s remit I described earlier, and far from impeding the effective execution of our policy objectives, it may well contribute to a future outcome that delivers a more stable monetary and financial system. Conclusion I have spoken about the relevance of climate change and the transition to a net-zero economy to central banks. It is about faithfully executing our mission for monetary and financial stability, taking into account those structural shifts on the horizon. That brings with it several analytical challenges and demands new ways of thinking – we welcome this. But it is clear that the biggest component of the journey to net-zero rests not with central banks, but with government, through the delivery of sector-level climate policy pathways – without these the real economy cannot adjust effectively.
•  A strong Europe is all the more necessary in a multipolar world, as a “balancing power.” By 2050, the divide will no longer be between emerging and advanced economies, but rather between who was prepared and who wasn’t. Ideas to enhance European economic governance are not new. Mobilization and implementation have proved tricky however: this is what I would like to focus my remarks on speaking of the motivations (I) and then of the concrete tasks of a Euro area Finance Minister (II). I. Why we need a “full coordination” institution in the Euro area  We know there is deep political resistance to sharing fiscal resources and sovereignty, as well as Euroscepticism. The sad example of the refugee crisis illustrates how European countries so far have displayed little solidarity to find a common solution. This is why we need to make the economic case for a stronger governance of the euro area: it is not a theological issue and not solely a political one either. This discussion is not about “more Brussels”, it is very concretely about more growth and jobs in Europe. Clearly, monetary policy cannot be a substitute for economic policy coordination or the lack of reforms. For that reason alone central bankers need to take part in this debate, while taking action will obviously be a decision for political leaders. This is also why our focus should be on the Eurozone economic governance. We should not fear different speeds in Europe.

Similarly, an economic slowdown cum banking crisis has severe effects on output and employment. But today we need not resort to those stories. The US has been accumulating a current-account deficit for quite some time that sooner or later would have to be corrected via deceleration and depreciation. But the financial crises that got in the picture will make adjustments much more expensive. BIS Review 124/2008  1  Global imbalances By the late 1990s, the US current account deficit began to soar: From 140 billion dollars in 1997 – equivalent to 1.7% of GDP – it climbed to 739 billion dollars in 2007, that is, 5.3% of GDP (figure 1). A first glance at the data requires screening the regional savings and investment balances to see how current-account deficits are distributed around the world. What we see is a dramatic fall in savings – both private and public – in the United States, but also a major increase in surpluses in Asia. This reflects increased savings in China, but also a post-crisis dramatic reduction in investment in the rest of Asia. 1 The recession of 2001 brought a slight relapse, but growth resumed briefly. Fiscal policy was of little help, although the fact that the international interest rate was so low – as opposed to the mid-1980s' twin deficits experience – is an indication that the cause of the deficit was not the drop in US saving , but rather Asia’s surplus.
And more broadly, following the 2008 financial crisis debt deflation has been the dog that hasn’t barked (Chart 4).8 But we shouldn’t rest too easy – there are several reasons why the dog might have just been sleeping, and central banks need to be vigilant against the risk that recent low inflation stirs it from its slumber. 2. Global factors and domestic inflation  Low global inflation matters for the UK because we are an open economy. Around one-third of the goods and services consumed by UK households are imported, creating a direct channel from global influences to UK prices. And the UK’s exports are around 30% of GDP, opening an indirect channel through which global activity affects costs and prices in the UK through demand for our products. The importance of these channels has waxed and waned over decades, with changes to both the degree of global integration and the conduct of monetary policy. Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates prevailing until the early 1970s relatively closed financial and goods markets may have contributed to lower cross-country co-movements between inflation rates (Chart 5 (a) – see annex). After Bretton Woods collapsed, countries’ inflation rates became more highly correlated across the advanced world as they lacked the strong nominal anchors necessary to manage global cost shocks and subsequent attempts at disinflations (Chart 5 (b) – see annex).9 That situation persisted until the early 1990s ushered in the era of Inflation Targeting (Chart 5 (c) – see annex).

John Gieve: Stability and change Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Engineering Employers’ Federation North West, Warrington, 20 July 2006. *  *  *  I am delighted to be here today. The Bank of England has long connections with this region. We first set up offices in Manchester and Liverpool back in 1820s. That was a time when North West of England was a key hub in an emerging international economy, with the Port of Liverpool providing the gateway for industry in Lancashire and Cheshire to trade with the rest of the world, particularly textiles. The structure of the economy in the North West has of course changed markedly since those days and the region is now more associated with the aerospace, defence and pharmaceuticals industries than with textiles. Here as elsewhere, recent years have been a time of rapid change in the structure of industry and the economy. We may have been talking about globalisation for years but that doesn’t mean it is complete; in fact it is still gathering momentum. Macroeconomic stability: a platform for change In the face of that rate of change, it may seem paradoxical that among central banks the last 10 years have been known as the “Great Stability”. The UK is an example of that. Since 1992, when an explicit target for inflation was first introduced here, inflation has been stable and very close to its target.
Exports and domestic private sector spending therefore make up over 90% of the demand for the output of the business sector in the UK with public sector procurement and capital spending accounting for less than 10% of the total. So while the global economy continues to perform strongly and as long as private sector demand is still growing at a reasonable rate, UK plc should be well-placed to cope with the squeeze on public spending flowing from the October Spending Review (OSR). Alongside the recovery in overseas markets, domestic demand in the UK economy has also bounced back following the sharp declines seen in late 2008 and early 2009. In cash terms, domestic spending in the UK economy by consumers, government and business grew by 6.8% in the year to the second quarter of 2010. As I pointed out in a speech last month, this is relatively strong demand growth by comparison with the decade prior to the financial crisis, when the growth of domestic demand in money terms averaged 5.8%. 3 These data do not suggest that lack of demand is the main problem currently facing the private sector in the UK. We may see some slowdown in demand early next year as the fiscal measures announced in the Budget and the spending review take effect and consumers adjust to a higher rate of VAT. But this variability in the growth rate should not be confused with a genuine double dip which is still a remote possibility in my view.

According to the draft agreement, the legal spending commitments attached to the projects included in Next Generation EU shall be made, at the latest, by 31 December 2023, and the related payments will have to be made effective, at the latest, by end-2026. More specifically, 70% of the transfers should be committed during the 2021-2022 two-year period, with a country-based distribution factor that depends on the unemployment rate in 2015-2019, population and the country’s per capita income. The remaining 30% must be committed before end-2023, and the distribution factor will be adapted to incorporate more directly the heterogeneous impact of the health crisis. Thus, the unemployment rate will be replaced by a variable that will weight, in equal portions, the decline in GDP in 2020 and the cumulative decline in GDP in 2020-2021. In sum, the fund will enable, at least in part, a balance to be struck between the potential and real financial divergences among the European partners. This is because it will benefit from the positive externalities arising from joint action and it will serve to engineer a coordinated exit from the crisis, based on common budgetary instruments. The financing of the fund through Community debt will benefit from the favourable low-interest-rate environment and will prevent this new debt being assumed by Member States individually, under conditions which, in some cases, would be foreseeably more unfavourable than those 4  which are expected to be applied to this pooled instrument.