samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Boston Fed’s statistical modeling suggests that a $ increase in the price of a barrel of oil will shave roughly four-tenths of a percentage point off the rate of economic growth over two years, and cause the unemployment rate to be roughly two-tenths of a percentage point higher than it would be absent the oil shock. While this is certainly not enough to completely stop the recovery, it does imply a slowing down of its pace. Oil is not the only commodity to experience price increases of late. A variety of agricultural prices have also increased. For example, Figure 3 shows the movement of wheat prices over the last decade. Droughts in Russia, flooding in Australia, and increased demand in emerging markets have all placed upward pressure on wheat prices. As with oil prices, higher food prices appear to be responding to supply and demand features of this market – and these types of price changes cannot be offset by monetary policy. It goes without saying that monetary policy cannot alter the supply of oil from volatile parts of the world, nor weather conditions in countries that are major exporters of agricultural products. Monetary policy can have a role in insuring that relative price changes do not alter inflation expectations. Rising inflation expectations could make it difficult to achieve a moderate and acceptable inflation rate over the medium term. Historical experience with supply shocks Supply shocks are not unique to this period.

Consequently, longer-term inflation expectations became unmoored, and nominal wages and prices spiraled upward as workers sought compensation for past price increases and as firms responded to accelerating labor costs with further increases in prices. That wage-price spiral was eventually arrested by the Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker, but only at the cost of a severe recession in the early 1980s. Since then the Federal Reserve has remained determined to avoid these mistakes and to keep inflation low and stable.” [http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110411a.htm]  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 15 shows two measures of inflation expectations, plotted alongside oil price movements. The red line shows what professional forecasters expected inflation to average over the next 10 years, at various points in time. Their expectations have declined somewhat over the past 20 years, but what is striking is the relative stability of their inflation expectations. In addition, there was no significant reaction to the oil price shock that we experienced in 2008. The chart also shows a second measure of inflation expectations – the University of Michigan Survey (the green line), which asks respondents about their expectations for inflation over the next 5 to 10 years.6 Again these expectations are not very responsive to movements in oil prices, and have remained quite stable over the past two decades. It is worth noting that countries can be affected quite differently by supply shocks. As Figure 16 shows, the importance of food in the “basket” of goods purchased by consumers can vary greatly by country.
Jan F Qvigstad: Writing central bank and monetary history – what are the issues? Welcome remarks by Mr Jan F Qvigstad, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a workshop co-organised by The Graduate Institute, Geneva and Norges Bank, Oslo, 30 October 2008. *  *  *  Dear participants, It is a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you to the first workshop in Norges Bank’s Bicentenary Project. In particular I want to express a warm welcome to those of you who have travelled far. Norges Bank and the Graduate Institute here in Geneva are privileged to host a workshop with such a distinguished group of international experts in central bank and monetary history from academic institutions and from the central bank community all over Europe and from the US. The financial crisis that was unleashed in the US more than a year ago went into uncharted waters on 15 September this year. Since then G7, IMF and governments all over the world have taken active policy measures that hopefully will steer the financial world into smoother water, although the real economy probably will be in dire straits the next year or two. It might seem strange, and a bit of an intellectual escapism in this situation, to gather here in Geneva to discuss economics in a hundred year perspective.

Stefan Ingves: Financial stability is important for us all Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 15 March 2012. *  *  *  Today, I would like to give you a few examples from Sweden and abroad to illustrate why financial stability affects us all, not least in our role as consumers. It can easily happen that discussions of bank regulations, not least at the EU level, can be considered difficult to understand. This is partly because the discussions are often technical, and partly because they can seem abstract. I would like to demonstrate how the political framework for financial stability very strongly affects Swedish banking customers – in other words, almost all households. Crises cost society enormous amounts As financial crises are very costly for the citizens of a society, we should try to avoid them at almost any price. The financial system forms the cornerstone of a modern economy. Its basic functions are converting savings to investments, managing risks and mediating payments, functions that we all constantly come into contact with every day, in one way or another. A functioning financial system is also necessary for the repo rate, which is to say monetary policy, to have an impact. A modern society cannot do without the functions of the financial system. Without the financial sector, Sweden would grind to a halt. But the system also entails risks. Banks are dependent on confidence, are highly leveraged and are thus vulnerable.
If we strip out back payments made by firms to fill pension deficits, the labour share shows greater signs of falling, if only gradually, over time (Chart 12). 8 9 10  IMF (2017). IMF (2017). IMF (2017). 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  A more stripped-down measure of the labour share, which better tracks workers’ purchasing power, is wages and salaries (Chart 12). That measure has fallen by around 1 percentage point since 1990. This picture is more striking still if we look at different cohorts. For workers aged over 55, their share of income has doubled from 4% in the early 1990s to 8% today. For workers aged 16-34, their wage share has fallen from 15% to 12% over the same period. The “lost decade” for young people has been particularly pronounced. Finally, aggregate movements in the labour share can obscure important pay dynamics at the sectoral level. Different sectors of the economy are affected to differing degrees by changes in the form of employment, technology, unionisation and company concentration. As I discuss below, these sectoral data provide a clearer picture of the significant impact of slow-moving structural factors on workers’ pay power. (a)  Job Market Flows  The quickest way to secure a pay rise is by moving job. That is quite sobering if, like me, you have never moved job.

With workers fearful of unemployment – and employers having less need to attract workers given the large pool of unemployed – voluntary job moves plummeted, falling from around 1% of the working population pre-crisis to a low of around 0.5% in 2009. As the economy and jobs market has recovered, and job insecurity has fallen, more people have voluntarily moved jobs to secure a higher wage. Job-to-job flows today are back to their pre-crisis averages. In this tightening market, the pay growth of “twisters” has picked up markedly, from a little under 4% in the  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  aftermath of the crisis to over 7% now. 11  Through the direct (batting average) channel, this has in turn  boosted aggregate pay growth. More surprising, however, is how little impact strong employment has had on those not moving job. Wage growth for “stickers” has flat-lined at around 2%. Despite a tightening labour market, companies have so far not felt compelled to pay-up to any significant degree to retain workers. The indirect, or behavioural, channel for pay pressures has largely been missing during the recent jobs recovery. This may be a sign that stickers’ pay is behaving differently than in the past. Chart 15 plots two empirical Phillips curves – one for twisters, the other for stickers. The twisters’ Phillips curve is behaving relatively similarly to the past, with pay broadly as expected given the tightness in the jobs market.
With regard to our exchange rate policy, the Bank of Thailand has used the managed floating approach for some time now. Our principle is to let the exchange rate reflect the fundamentals of the economy relative to our trading partners and competitors. In the short run, international price competitiveness depends on 2 things: 1. the appreciation of the Thai baht vis-à-vis a basket of currencies of our trading partners and competitors; and 2. the increase in production cost of a Thai company relative to that of our trading partners and competitors. For example, given the same appreciation path of two competing currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar, if production cost of a Thai company rises beyond that of its foreign competitors, then it loses price competitiveness. Generally, production cost rises with inflation. And so, keeping inflation low helps to lower relative cost increase for Thai exporters and boosts their price competitiveness. The exchange rate that the Bank of Thailand manages is that which represents price competitiveness; it is called the real effective exchange rate. Let me give you a specific example: It is well known that even though the baht has gained against the US dollar, it has been appreciating in line with regional currencies. From the beginning of 2007 to early March 2008, the real effective exchange rate of China has  BIS Review 33/2008  3  appreciated by roughly 8 per cent while India has gained by 5.4 per cent.

In Thailand, there is an acute problem of skill mismatch; that is, skills produced through formal schooling are found to be different from those which firms find useful. Ladies and Gentlemen, Japan’s direct investment here has contributed to skill improvement for Thai businesses and workforce, mostly through learning by doing, training and other knowledge transfers. But beyond that, to reduce mismatch in demand and production of skills, Japanese firms can play a direct and beneficial role. The solution is to break down the barrier between work and school early on. Firms can get involved in training vocational students while potential workers can get a glimpse of what’s really needed out there in the real world. If done well, I think it gives incentive for firms to invest in training these students because it gives them the opportunity to identify and select the best workers before they enter the workforce. To the students, there are potential gains as an incentive as well. With the opportunity to be trained by the best and getting to know its corporate culture first-hand, student trainees are more likely to compete for limited hires by improving their performance. This sort of apprenticeship program has long been practiced in Germany, and has been shown to reduce skill mismatch in the workplace as well as improve firms’ profitability. Practiced here, it could also reinforce mutual understanding between Thai workers and the ways Japanese firms do business. That said, human capital development takes vast and continuous effort over a long period of time.
The government tried on several occasions in the first decade after WWII to turn Norges Bank into a subordinated agency. If the history of Norges Bank was written in a vacuum with no international references, one might have thought that this was unique for Norway. Not so, similar developments were observed in many countries who previously subscribed to the gold standard. Political control over central banks was tightened in many countries with one notable exception, the Bundesbank in West Germany which was established as the most independent central bank in the post-WWII period (Sejersted, 1994). 3 Norges Bank was in fact not as dependent as believed. The truth may lie somewhere in between. Recent research on the role of Norges Bank during the first decade after WWII (Ecklund, 2008) 4 suggests that Norges Bank maintained a relatively high degree of operational independence in this period. Norges Bank’s independence was gradually restored. In 1986 Norges Bank was granted instrument autonomy and started to set short-term interest rates to sustain the prevailing fixed exchange rate regime. The current inflation targeting regime was introduced in March 2001 and Norges Bank now sets short-term interest rates aimed at keeping inflation around 2.5% over time. Greater independence demands adequate accountability. Along with greater degree of autonomy and independence Norges Bank has become more open and transparent in its monetary policy communication. Increased openness by Norges Bank is not only a way of achieving accountability to its constituents, but is also instrumental to enhance policy effectiveness.

And, once it is recognized that there is only one central bank in each country, it is also clear that a strong international perspective on central bank history and monetary history is needed in order to trace the origin of ideas and how monetary policy views and practices have developed over time as well as across different countries. The key responsibilities of central banks are to promote price stability and financial stability. This fall, policy makers around the world have struggled to implement policy measures to bring the international financial markets back into a more normal mode of operation. In this pursuit we are constantly reminded of the importance of having a solid understanding of economic history and developments as a backdrop to designing the right policy for the current situation. This fall, international experts like you are in greater demand than ever to help bring about this level of understanding, and many of you appear frequently in debates on these issues in policy workshops and conferences as well as in the media. Against this backdrop we see this workshop as one of many arenas where policy makers and academic experts can exchange ideas and views on what has been characterized as the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The escalation of the financial crisis on 15 September was a consequence of an abrupt loss of confidence and credibility in the financial markets.
In many ways, Asia has maximised its comparative advantage with international trade as a major source of growth over several decades. Economies were transformed from being driven by the traditional commodity based sector, to one that was driven by the manufacturing sector that produced goods for the increasingly affluent domestic markets and for the export market. This strategy and economic transformation in Asia has also been facilitated by the steady inflow of foreign direct investment into the region. Given the region's competitively-priced factors of production, combined with pro-business economic policies, global producers relocated their production bases to Asia. In terms of robustness, this model has survived several global slowdowns. Even in the face of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, the affected countries recovered rapidly and resumed strong growth. The fundamental strength of the Asian economies has also been its economic flexibility to adjust to changing conditions. The challenge before us now is whether Asia, going forward, will rise to the new challenges that is being presented by the rapidly changing global environment in the aftermath of the current global economic and financial crisis. BIS Review 129/2009  1  While Asian financial systems have shown a high degree of resilience during this global financial crisis, most Asian economies have been markedly affected by the economic spillover effects of the crisis. By the second half of 2008, what was a “localised” financial crisis had spread to the rest of the world.

However, the financial reforms and development of the financial systems in Asia during this decade since the Asian crisis have, to a significant extent, insulated our financial systems from these developments. However, the openness of the Asian economies have resulted in a significantly slower growth with economic contraction occurring in several countries. In the immediate future, several favourable factors will support growth in Asia. Strong fundamentals, pro-growth policies and structural factors will support an early recovery. This is also being reinforced by greater regional integration. Going forward into the future, the global shifts taking place calls for a new economic model, one that would leverage on regional strengths, address the current and future risks and recognise the new global opportunities. In the context of these developments, this conference will be discussing these issues and the new directions that are likely to emerge for Asia. Also important are the lessons that we can draw from the European experience. The agenda is for us to discuss the alternative economic models for the future, including the financial aspects and the role of policies and the international institutions. It is hoped that this will contribute to an increased appreciation and understanding of Asia and its changing role in the global economy. In closing, I would like to once again thank you for your participation in this conference. The bringing together of speakers from Europe and Asia to discuss these important issues is likely to result in stimulating discussions. I wish you a successful and productive conference.
The USD 700 billion worth of stimulus package, which was prepared in September 2008 to enable the government to assume bad debts of US financial institutions and which was considered the biggest state intervention in recent years, was pending at the US House of Representatives for a long time due to the harsh reaction from the public. In the meantime, there was a negative reaction from the public towards the excessively high salaries of banking sector managers, who frequently was urged a readjustment to the remunerations of managerial staff. Furthermore, new arrangements were brought onto the agenda for stricter supervision and to restrict the activities of the financial sector. In addition to these developments, views related to inefficient functioning of public institutions in charge of supervising the financial sector, primarily the Federal Reserve, in the pre-crisis period, raised intense criticism on these institutions, too. Meanwhile, under the name of financial protectionism there have been advocates of the discourse that international banks should halt their functions abroad and instead lend to the corporate sector experiencing difficulty in finding funds at home. On the heels of “Denial” and “Anger”, the global crisis entered the third and most disturbing stage in the final quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. We can define the common public feeling that prevailed in the whole world in this period as “panic” and “fear of collapse”.

If inflation undershoots the target at the same time as resource utilization is lower than normal, should it not be possible to keep the repo rate lower and thus have inflation closer to the target during the forecast period and more quickly return resource utilisation to a normal level? As I have described, I think there are fairly convincing reasons for the repo rate path described in the September Monetary Policy Update. The Swedish economy is strong and to attain the target a couple of years ahead we need only to start easing up on the accelerator. Because this is exactly what we are doing. The repo rate is being raised from an extremely low level and the repo rate path implies that we will have a negative real interest rate for a good time to come. This cannot be regarded as a contractionary policy – we are not slamming on the brakes. I have expressed some concern at recent meetings over what a lower repo rate path might entail. One view that I have put forward on several occasions is that monetary policy must manage risk. In this context it may be important not to treat the forecast period as separate and independent, but to try to take into account how decisions made now might affect developments beyond the forecast horizon. Of course it becomes more difficult to comment with any great certainty on what will happen the further ahead one tries to look.
This includes wider representation from non-bank payment service providers and user groups such as consumers, merchants and government agencies. The NPAC now comprises a Steering Committee, a User Consultative Group and a Service Provider Consultative Group. The consultative groups serve to promote dialogue, encourage alignment and canvass new ideas to improve payment solutions. This provides important inputs to focus on the strategic and tactical priorities for the development of the payment systems in Malaysia. Continued support from all stakeholders necessary to ensure the successful migration to PIN verification Before I end my speech, allow me to take this opportunity to commend the industry on its efforts to achieve a smooth transition from signature to PIN verification of payment card transactions. Collectively, we shall achieve our targets to migrate users to PIN verification by 1 July 2017. We have seen tremendous commitment and intensified efforts by banks to meet these targets and I am pleased to note that we are near completing the replacement of all active payment cards and POS terminals with PIN functionalities. We have been clear that there will be no extension to the deadline of 1 July 2017 for turning off signature verification. By that date, only PIN will be accepted for domestic payment card transactions, so it is important that in the next 40 days, we should not be complacent and no effort is spared to encourage the migration to PIN. From the latest data we have, the PIN bypass rate has now been reduced to 10% in April.

The sea and what the sea gives us has been part of the economic base for everyone who has settled along the Norwegian coast. Lighthouses, seamarks and lifeboats have made the lives of seafarers safer, but they have also helped to improve the prosperity of those who live near the coast. The first lifeboats, such as the RS 14 Stavanger, did not stay in port and wait for the alarm to sound. The lifeboats accompanied the fishing fleet out to sea, ready to respond in the event of a storm. Sometimes it was a question of life or death and lifeboat crews rescued people in danger of drowning, while at others the lifeboats were just needed to tow in a group of boats to calmer waters where they could be safe until the storm blew over. Because of the lifeboats, fishermen were able to stay out at sea longer, boosting their earnings and their ability to provide for their families. It is almost a year and a half since we launched the first two denominations in the new banknote series. The new 100-krone and 200-krone banknotes seem to have been well-received, and their production and distribution and the exchange of old banknotes have been on schedule. I am confident that the launch of the next two denominations will proceed just as smoothly. As I have touched upon, the main purpose of the banknote project is to have banknotes that are even more secure than previous banknote series.