samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At this point in my speech, I would like to underline that price stability has not yet been achieved in Turkey. As I have just mentioned, significant distance has been covered in the fight against inflation. However, it is a fact that inflation is still relatively high in Turkey compared to fellow developing countries. The process of the fight against inflation still continues. Within this framework, there are certain factors that need to be paid attention to, for price stability to be achieved in the upcoming period. The first one of these is ensuring that the increase in domestic demand continues to materialize in a controlled fashion. The second factor I would like to emphasize is avoiding reform fatigue. Several structural reforms have been made in the Turkish economy up until now. Yet there are still more reforms pending. . It should be remembered that maintaining the reforms made up to this point is not sufficient to attain positive outcomes from them, but making new reforms is also equally important. The third factor that requires attention within the framework of achieving price stability is the susceptibility of established economic balances to expectations. Therefore, developments that may adversely affect expectations should not be allowed to occur. The last factor that should be taken into consideration in this respect is the fact that since policymakers, both agricultural, cannot control them and energy prices may at times have adverse effects on the course of inflation.

Süreyya Serdengeçti: Basic changes in the Turkish economy - problems and solutions Opening speech by Mr Süreyya Serdengeçti, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, on the occasion of the 73rd Shareholders’ Ordinary General Meeting of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 12 April 2005. *  *  *  Esteemed Shareholders, Distinguished Guests and Dear Members of the Press; Welcome to the 73rd Shareholders’ Ordinary General Meeting of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Before I begin my speech, I would like to share with you the happiness that we have this year been able to achieve the single digit inflation figures that we have wished for many years and the Turkish lira has once again gained credibility. The main framework of my speech will cover the process that has brought us up to this point and what we need to do in order to achieve and maintain price stability. In other words, leaving aside the shallow evaluations stuck in the triangle of FX rates-exchange ratesinterest rates-stock market rates; the core of my speech today will focus on apart the basic changes in the economy, deep-rooted problems and the ways out of these problems. The Turkish economy has faced a problem of almost 30-years of high and chronic inflation. During this period, many programs have been implemented to push down inflation.
This is not normal, but today there is no other alternative but to continuously expand controlling powers. Since there is little hope for self-regulation, we believe it right to move towards more systemic efforts in order to limit risks for customers. We would like to, so to say, coordinate the fundamental principles with the market community. The first principle is product governance, that is, product life cycle management. We discussed this topic yesterday at the International Financial Congress. We are now drafting a relevant 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  consultation paper and will publish it soon to discuss it with the financial community. The idea of such product governance is that, before offering new products or services in the market, a company should identify the target audience and its needs, inherent risks for customers, and test new products before their launch. The second fundamental principle is the assessment of the customer value of a financial product. In our opinion, a high-quality financial product should conform to consumers’ reasonable expectations. I firmly believe that if market participants focus on the customer value of a product, this will promote effective competition in the market. Unfortunately, not all financial products offered in the market today conform to the customer value principle. As an example, let’s look at recent statistics on housing equity holders’ insurance and insurance in general.

“Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 108(S1), pages 59–75. Rachel, Lukasz & Smith, Thomas D., 2017. “Are Low Real Interest Rates Here to Stay?” International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(3), pages 1-42. World Bank, 2016. “Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality”. World Bank Group report. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
The price of fresh salmon remains at the same level as in the last half of the 1990s. Exports of fish and fish products increased by 3.9 per cent from the second quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2001. Due to international developments, the uncertainties and the downside risks are now greater for many export industries. The krone has appreciated recently measured against our trading partners (trade-weighted exchange rate index). This partly reflects more than 20 per cent appreciation against the Swedish krone since spring 2000. Measured by the trade-weighted exchange rate index, the krone is now about 2 per cent weaker than in 1990 and on a par with the level in 1994-95. So far this year, the volume of traditional merchandise exports have increased more than in the same period last year, but growth is levelling off. The exposure of Norwegian exports in the ICT sector, where the international downturn has been most severe, is limited. Norway’s manufacturing output has declined somewhat this year, but less than in other countries. On the other hand, Norwegian manufacturing industry did not experience the upswing in 1999 and 2000. The business sentiment indicator does not suggest a severe decline. The order situation is still satisfactory in many industries. This does not necessarily mean that the turnaround will not occur in Norway as well. A sharp fall in share prices, tighter borrowing terms and an imbalance in international credit markets may quickly affect investment, prices, profitability and expectations.

Financial institutions should provide easy access to funds to reduce cost of doing business. The multiple drivers of informality should be tackled through integrated policy packages that promote a gradual transition to formal activities. Ladies and gentlemen, this is the challenge I give all stakeholders that are involved in skills development, youth empowerment and development of MSMEs. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
This trend began already in the mid-1990s, but it accelerated in the years preceding the crisis6 (see Figure 9). 4  Giavazzi, Francesco and Mishkin, Frederic: An evaluation of Swedish monetary policy between 1995 and 2005, Riksdag Committee on Finance, November 2006. 5  See for example Svante Öberg: Potential GDP, resource utilisation and monetary policy, Sveriges Riksbank, 7 October 2010. 6  Giavazzi and Mishkin (op. cit.) said that one reason why inflation had been low in the period 2002–2004 was that the Riksbank, since 2002, had begun to take house prices into account. However, in later papers Mishkin wrote that one lesson from the crisis is that that there are stronger reasons for monetary policy to counteract credit-driven asset price bubbles, see for example Mishkin, Frederic: Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis, October 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  A comparison with a simple Taylor rule7 also indicates that the repo rate should have been significantly higher. A Taylor rule can indicate whether the level of the repo is reasonable. Based on inflation measured in terms of the CPIF or the HICP8 and the GDP gaps I presented earlier, the repo rate, according to the Taylor rule, should have been around 7 per cent in the third quarter of 2008. I now believe, as I said earlier, that the presented positive GDP gaps are exaggerated.

This meant that interest rates in several countries that had previously had a higher interest rate than Germany were reduced to a common euro level. In these countries, this contributed to a dramatic expansion of credit, rapid growth and a high level of inflation. In addition, regulation and supervision of the financial markets were national processes, despite that fact that the operations concerned were crossborder. However, it did not become apparent that this situation was untenable until the spring of 2010 in connection with the crisis in public finances in Europe. Each country certainly believed that they had good reasons for conducting their particular choice of monetary policy. But for the world as a whole, which in itself is a closed economy in which overall monetary policy affects growth and inflation, monetary policy became too expansionary. This resulted in strong GDP growth and rapidly increasing prices for crude oil and other commodities, as well as a rapid credit expansion and rising asset prices, above all for housing in certain regions. This ultimately led to the financial crisis when the housingprice bubble burst. Now, you may say that it is rather pointless to criticise something with hindsight. It is easy to say now what should have been done then. However, my point is not to criticise what was done but to learn from history. Even today, we can see the same pattern: that is an expansionary monetary policy for the world as a whole, strong growth and rising energy and commodity prices.
For example, if the level of output in the UK economy were to return to pre-Covid levels in 2023, rather than 2022 in the MPC’s central case, this would lower inflation by around 60 basis points at the two-year horizon, leaving it comfortably below its 2% target. In summary, then, historically low rates of inflation driven by disinflationary demand and supply-side forces have been given further impetus by the Covid crisis. This provides reasonable grounds for believing  inflation, in the UK and globally, could remain low in the period ahead. Indeed, there are reasons to think there are significant downside risks to the inflation outlook, as the MPC’s fan charts illustrate clearly. 12 12  Evans et al (2015). 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  11  A Higher Inflation Equilibrium Inflation-targeting requires a judgement on future inflation, not an extrapolation of the past. That is pertinent at present because there are several good reasons why future inflation trends may not match the past. The Covid shock is fundamentally different from the global financial crisis. And some of the forces acting on inflation in future, both cyclical and structural, may reverse direction. Let me discuss these factors in turn. (a) The Covid Crisis and the Output Gap The restrictions needed to contain the spread of Covid have had a profound impact on both demand and supply in the economy.

17  18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  18  Chart 15: Global Dependency Ratios  160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060  0  World Middle-income countries  High-income countries Low-income countries  Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division Note: Dependency ratio is population aged 0-19 or 65+ per 100 aged 20-64  A second supply-side effect working in the same direction is globalisation. The world witnessed many decades of under-interrupted growth in world trade and global value chains after the Second World War, much of it associated with the rising role of China in the world economy. 19 On average since 1983, global trade volumes have risen by around 5½ % per year, roughly double the rate of growth of the world economy. The Covid crisis has decisively broken those trends. Global trade volumes collapsed by around 15% at the peak of the Covid crisis, compared to a fall in global activity of around 9% (Chart 16). The crisis saw the fracturing of some global value chains, in part as a result of countries prioritising domestic over international supply of some goods and services.
In the context of these fundamental and far reaching changes, less attention has however been accorded to the necessary changes to the human capital development that is required for the effective participation and performance in this new financial landscape. Indeed, the talent required also needs to be transformed. These changes have also precipitated a revisit and review of education systems around the world over to address the current discontent that the education has not kept up with the changing human capital requirements of the financial services industry. The World Economic Forum has projected that “staggering” talent gaps will arise in large parts of the world by 2020, and this will have a bearing on national competitiveness while organisations compete for talent on an unprecedented scale. Managing talent has consequently become significantly more challenging and needs to be addressed with talent development. The objective is to harness the full potential of the workforce. This is particularly urgent for Asia as it emerges as an important growth centre in the global economy. With Asia’s financial services industry poised to grow rapidly, this growth must be supported by the development of capabilities among the financial industry professionals. Going forward, the investment in this core pillar will be a defining factor in the performance and the capacity of the industry to reinvent and transform and thus enhance its resilience and sustainability. The path forward needs to be guided by a strategic response to the forces that are shaping the new talent landscape.

We have little experience to go by in this area Would people use stablecoins to a limited extent, as one of a number of forms of money depending on convenience, in much the same way we use cash and commercial bank money now?15  Or would stable coins, or one particular stablecoin, become dominant, substituting for other forms of money not just for payments but also as a store of value? There is certainly the possibility with stablecoins linked to large technology and social media platforms, that it could become mainstream for people to move from holding all or much of the money now in ‘current accounts’ at banks to holding it in ‘stablecoin’ in virtual ‘wallets’ provided by non-banks. There is some experience of the ‘E money providers’ that create, issue and transfer electronic money that can be used for internet transactions. These are regulated and have to back the e-money they issue one for one with deposits in commercial banks. But while they are used by many, they have not become systemic. But they are relatively expensive for merchants and can be used only for internet transactions whereas stable-coin developers intend them to be used for all transactions. 15  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  In such a world, and depending how and whether stablecoins were backed with other financial assets, the supply of credit to the real economy through the banking system could become weaker or indeed disappear.
There is a parallel presumption in favour of freedom of capital movements, and much greater openness around the world to foreign investment. BIS Review 47/2001  1  Among other things on the supply-side, there is a shared emphasis on the need to direct public spending to developing human resources through education and training, to effective health care, and affordable social safety nets. There has been a global trend to privatisation through which governments have increasingly returned essentially commercial activities, in which they have no necessary comparative advantage, to market disciplines. And there is a common recognition of the need for reforms in labour and product markets designed to remove unnecessary regulation, and to reduce distortions, which impede the efficient allocation of resources. But broad agreement on the principles, does not make them any easier to apply in practice. This is evident from the imbalances which have built up within and between the major industrial countries in recent years. It is uncertainty as to how those imbalances are likely to be corrected that underlies much of the current concern about the prospects for the global economy. The major uncertainty relates to the situation in the United States which has experienced a period of exceptionally strong economic growth with relatively low inflation until quite recently. Briefly – and no doubt oversimply – this very strong performance is widely seen as driven largely by exceptional productivity gains, as the application of new information and communications technologies spread through the economy.

But the intention – the international commitment to macro-economic stability – is clear. Acceptance of the aim of macro-economic stability served to bring into sharper focus the structural, supply side, of the economy – that is the whole raft of influences that can affect the underlying growth rate of capacity and thus the growth rate of aggregate demand that can be sustained. And here, too, there has been a strengthening international presumption in favour of open markets and free competition – both domestically and internationally – with a continuing strong presumption against predatory trade or exchange rate manipulation. The justification is that undistorted competition contributes to potential global economic growth through increased efficiency and the more effective allocation of productive resources. Faster growth in turn provides a more favourable context for addressing social concerns, including the issue of poverty. The international presumption in favour of free markets in itself is somewhat remarkable, given that, at the micro-economic level, increased competition invariably constitutes a threat to established producers – and their employees – who might well be tempted to urge protection in one form or another on their national governments. Consumers, who benefit from such competition, tend to be less vocal or well organised. The threat of protectionism is never, therefore, far away. But in fact the presumption in favour of competition has proved encouragingly robust. And that is not just in relation to international trade.
35 For example, Albertazzi, Becker and Boucinha (2018) show evidence of the portfolio rebalancing channel from the ECB’s asset purchase programme. 30  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  New, highly granular data are also coming on stream on payment, credit and banking flows. Some of these have been used to help predict, or track, movements in economic activity. They have had some success. For example, in the US a dataset of over 12 billion credit and debit card transactions over a 34 month period 36  has recently been used to analyse consumption patterns by age, firm size, metropolitan area and sector. In time, it is possible these sorts of data could help to create a real-time map of financial and activity flows across the economy, in much the same way as is already done for flows of traffic or information or weather. Once mapped, there would then be scope to model and, through policy, modify these flows. This is an idea I 37  first talked about six years ago. Today, it looks closer than ever to being within our grasp. These are all areas where DAFM could contribute importantly to efforts to improve the quality and timeliness of data on the macro-economy and financial system. As is well-recognised, the scope for improvements in 38  the quality of National Accounts data is considerable. And those measurement challenges will only  become greater as we move towards an increasingly digital and service-oriented economy.

Inflation and Monetary Policy Outlook  Now, I would like to present our inflation and output gap forecasts based on the outlook I have described so far. When forming our forecasts, we assumed that the tight monetary policy stance will be sustained for a while; and consequently, annualized loan growth rate will hover around 15 percent and the Turkish lira will display a mild appreciation trend. Accordingly, inflation is expected to be, with 70 percent probability, between 5.1 and 7.9 percent with a mid-point of 6.5 percent at the end of 2012, and between 3.3 and 6.9 percent with a mid-point of 5.1 percent at the end of 2013. We expect inflation to stabilize around 5 percent in the medium term (Chart 17). Chart 17. Inflation and Output Gap Forecasts  * Shaded region indicates the 70 percent confidence interval for the forecast. Overall, although demand and cost conditions have not changed notably since the publication of the October Report, we revised our inflation forecasts for end-2012 upwards due to higher initial point (the initial point referring to the latest inflation data before the forecast period) resulting from higher-than-expected inflation during the past three months. As elaborated on in the Report as well, cumulative increases in the exchange rate and commodity prices coupled with soaring unprocessed food prices and the developments in administered prices pushed inflation to high levels in 2011. We estimate that inflation will remain flat in the first quarter and exhibit a gradual downtrend starting from the second quarter (Chart 17).