samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As with the other denominations, we are once again providing information in print and online, and we have of course updated our ‘Swiss Banknotes’ app. The new 100-franc note will be issued starting next Thursday, 12 September 2019, at our counters in Berne and Zurich and at the SNB’s agencies. For logistical reasons, it will take a few days before the new notes are available country-wide. And now, having unveiled the new 100-franc note, I’d like to show you the entire set. Here it is: the complete ninth series, inspired by ‘The many facets of Switzerland’. The vibrant colours and the aesthetically pleasing and intricate design of the series are particularly striking. Switzerland’s many facets are showcased using core design elements such as the hand, the globe, a Swiss location and an object, which are easily recognisable and recur throughout the banknote series. The theme of each note is illustrated via a hand gesture. On the 50-franc note, the hand is holding a dandelion, whose seeds are carried away on the wind. On the 10-franc note, a conductor’s hand sets the tempo for the orchestra. The shimmering globe reflects how Switzerland sees itself as part of an interconnected world. In the sequence of notes from 1000 francs to 10 francs, the earth rotates once on its axis and passes through one full day. The places depicted on the back of the notes are emblematic of various locations in Switzerland. Together, the six notes illustrate the diversity of our country.

In particular, according to the European Commission, the eurozone, - a destination for more than half of Poland’s exports - is expected to grow at 2.1 percent in 2006 and 1.8 percent in 2007, which is significantly above a eurozone average growth rate in the years 2002-2005 when it stood at 1.2 percent per annum. There are numerous risks to these forecasts and the balance of risks is slanted to the downside. The International Monetary Fund in its World Economic Outlook published in April 2006 3 mentioned four risks: high and volatile oil prices, tightening in financial market conditions, rising global imbalances and an avian flu pandemic. Let me now comment briefly on three of the risks, and I will address the fourth - financial markets conditions a little later. So far high oil prices have had a remarkably small impact on world growth and world inflation in comparison with previous oil price shocks. For example, in one of the recent speeches 4 titled “Has oil lost ability to shock?” David Walton, member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, analyzes five episodes in which oil prices have risen significantly and tries to uncover the reasons for the relatively benign outcome on this occasion. He comes up with two key conclusions: (1) this time the shock has taken longer to unfold and the economy is less dependent on oil; (2) both monetary policy conduct and monetary policy framework focused on stabilizing inflation have anchored inflation expectations well and prevented the second round effects, ie.
The first is addressing the immediate short run concerns emanating from various shocks; and the second is implementing structural reforms to ensure that financial stability becomes embedded in the underlying structure of the economy in the long run. In terms of challenges, the former essentially concerns the challenge of maintaining economic stability through appropriate policy settings and actions to offset the various shocks hitting the economy at any given point in time. The latter, on the other hand, focuses on strengthening the institutional framework for monetary policy and financial supervision as well as fostering financial system development that improves the ability of the system to absorb shocks by itself in a way that minimizes the impact on the real economy without the need for policy intervention. Let me now discuss some specific challenges to monetary and financial stability in emerging markets from both the short and the long run perspectives. For short-run stabilization, it is clear that one of the important challenges at present is how to contain financial vulnerabilities that accompany an influx of short-term capital. In coping with capital flows, lowering interest rates to reduce the relative attractiveness of the country to capital inflows may be a first appropriate way to ensure price stability. But, in most cases, fast appreciation may not subside as exchange rates tend to behave more like asset prices than relative goods prices.

In this context, an expanded asset purchase programme was then launched. On March 9th, the Eurosystem began purchasing public sector securities in the secondary market along the curve from 2 to 30 years, being mindful of being market neutral. Purchases of securities at negative yield are permissible, as long as the yield is above the deposit facility rate. Marketable securities purchased under this program will be made available for securities lending. This programme is intended to stimulate the economy through different channels. The first one is the portfolio rebalancing channel, in which the fall in yields on safe government bonds induces investors to buy riskier assets, thereby stimulating the economy. Since the launch of the programme yields have dropped not only for the assets purchased but also for bank and corporate bonds and equity prices have continued to rise. A second channel works through lowering and flattening the yield curve. The purchase programme will continue until the end of September 2016 and beyond if we do not see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation. This reinforces the guidance that interest rates will remain low for an extended period of time. A third channel is related to increasing credit supply. If the Euro-system buys assets from non-banks or institutions, then these funds will reappear as deposits in the banking system. 6  Andrade and Le Bihan, 2013, Inattentive professional forecasters, Journal of Monetary Economics, volume 60, p. 967–982.
A prolonged period of even lower interest rates would increase the risk that debt and asset prices will be driven up to levels that are unsustainable over time. We thus obtain a smoother interest rate path when we also give weight to the other two criteria. The criteria and loss function reflect the Bank’s reaction pattern in the period following the financial crisis. We are responding to new insight and lessons learned. The loss function is a mathematical illustration and must be regarded as a simplified representation of the more extensive assessments underlying interest rate decisions. Interest rate setting is based on the Executive Board’s assessment, not a model calculation. Mathematics and models can, however, clarify the alternatives. There is considerable uncertainty as to the effect of low interest rates over extended periods on risk-taking behaviour and the buildup of financial imbalances. 7 In this regard, we are in quite uncharted waters. How financial imbalances build up is not explicitly considered in the analytical apparatus. Work is in progress both in Norway and internationally to further develop the economic models used in monetary policy analysis. As we gain new insight and gather experience, our assessments of economic relationships may change. This will also influence the formulation of our models. 7  Monetary Policy Report 1/12, box on pages 15–16, Norges Bank, and “Norges Bank’s new monetary policy loss function – further discussion”, Snorre Evjen and Thea B. Kloster, Norges Bank Staff Memo 11/2012.

At the same time, the increased levels of non-resident investments in Malaysian financial assets had pushed non-resident holdings of Malaysian government bonds to rise to the height of 33.6% in May 2013. These heights came with costs, heightened risks and vulnerabilities. From the Taper Tantrum in 2013 onwards, our markets went through several bouts of volatility. These were largely driven by volatile portfolio flows. During the Taper Tantrum in 2013 itself, we saw outflows of USD19.1 billion and a depreciation of 9.7% of the ringgit against the US dollar. Despite this, our capacity, capability and resilience in managing these sizable and volatile financial flows have been fortified in a number of ways. Our economic fundamentals have remained healthy and our financial market is more diversified and well-developed. This enhanced the ability of the financial system to absorb capital inflows and outflows, thereby minimising disruptions while ensuring that these flows can be effectively intermediated to support real economic activity. Malaysia’s exchange rate regime has also accorded the necessary flexibility for the exchange rate to adjust to the changing conditions. This has provided a good balance between flexibility and stability. Our ability to manage domestic liquidity has also improved significantly, supported by a wider range of instruments to conduct monetary operations and strengthened surveillance systems. Pervasive impact of the offshore markets However, one noticeable observation over the years was that, for each episode of volatility we faced, the subsequent calm would see an even larger build-up of risks.
Even so, nonbank lenders may be captive to perceptions of their investors (who may be less informed and more skittish), resulting in preemptive reductions in exposures to some bank counterparties and contributing to market freezes in spite of lenders’ own analysis. 8  The leverage ratio creates a direct cost only if it is binding but banks also appear to take into account the possibility of it binding in the future and how it might be treated in stress tests. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  illustrates is that interbank trade increases the aggregate size of the balance sheet of the banking sector. Suppose, instead, that a nonbank that is currently lending to Bank A would lend to Bank B. As a result Bank A would have fewer reserves and deposits, so its balance sheet would decrease in size. Bank B would have additional reserves and its balance sheet would increase in size, just as in the above example. However the size of the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector would not change, as shown in the lower part of Figure 4. The two sets of transactions achieve the same movement of reserves from Bank A to Bank B, but if there is a cost associated with the size of banks’ balance sheets, then the second option would likely be preferred. The three parties would be expected to find a way to share the surplus generated by the lower balance sheet cost.

What are the fiscal implications of large central bank balance sheets? 23 More research on these topics seems highly desirable. Conclusion To conclude, I want to congratulate Ulrich for an excellent paper that should be required reading in central banks that are thinking about their monetary policy implementation frameworks. Ulrich provides a unique blend of academic and practitioner insight from which I learned a lot. I do believe that there remain some important unanswered questions when it comes to evaluating monetary policy implementation frameworks. Ulrich’s paper starts us on the right path and hopefully the broader research community can start to work on some of these important issues. References Bank of England (2013). “Liquidity Insurance at the Bank of England: Developments in the Sterling Monetary Framework.” Carlson, Mark, Burcu Duygan-Bump, and William Nelson (2015). “Why Do We Need Both Liquidity Regulations and a Lender of Last Resort? A Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending during the 2007–09 U.S. Financial Crisis.” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015–011. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Eisenbach, Thomas, Andrew Haughwout, Beverly Hirtle, Anna Kovner, David Lucca, and Matthew Plosser (2015). “Supervising Large, Complex Financial Institutions: What Do Supervisors Do?,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 729, May. Federal Reserve (2007). Press Release August 17, 2007. Goodfriend, Marvin and Jeffrey M. Lacker (1999).“Limited Commitment and Central Bank Lending.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly,Volume 85/4, Fall. Keister, Todd (2016). “Bailouts and Financial Fragility.” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 83: 704–736. Tarullo, Daniel K. (2014).
This potential trend, of course, would also depend on accounting standard and a regulation on fair valuations, which itself is still under much debate. Thus, strengthening of risk management and supervision is important. Indeed, the importance of this is highlighted by the rebound in many regional stock markets as well as upward pressure on the currencies. I have also observed from some reports that, within the many financial centres, the recent return generated by FX traders have been strong, while hedge funds, thought to have seen end of days, are starting to come back to life. We may be heading in for a sporadic period of increased risk-appetite. At the same time, many corporate borrowers, particularly the large conglomerates which used to fund from global market, may switch to domestic market, due to retrenchment of international debt market, as well as still heightened risk-aversion and retrenchment of global banks. This would be at the same time as increasing issuance of local sovereign debt to finance stimulus package. In the early stage of recovery, risk of crowing-out may not yet be high, but even at this stage, the investment portfolio of local financial firms may shift significantly, and may likely see increasing concentration risk due to increased exposure to major conglomerate which used to source overseas funds. But as momentum of recovery gathers pace, competition for funds and risk of crowding-out rises. Therefore, even abstracting from challenges of reshaping regulatory framework, managing the risks from the current market environment is demanding.

However, this, in turn, raises some concern on how to justify “rare circumstance”. Again, implementation is a challenge, and no doubt you would have valuable discussions here. As for the efforts to mitigate procyclicality, various models have been proposed for the buildup of reserves and capital buffer. Each model has its pros and cons. On the capital side, there are proposals to increase capital charge for securitisation product and market risk, as well as harmonising the definition of capital. We agree that the banks’ capital buffers need to be improved both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, timing of implementation of guideline on definition of capital is quite crucial, and must be carefully considered. On the provisioning side, the current discussion is on which approach to be used as an alternative to the incurred loss model. The Bank of Thailand supports the principle of expected loss and dynamic provisioning, although it will be technically challenging to implement. As a regulator,  BIS Review 146/2009  5  we need to weight the balance on pros and cons of various models proposed as well as consider if it fits the national context. Turning now to the third dimension where a balanced approach is required. The balance in relationship and responsibility of home and host regulators, and a balanced voice of emerging markets on cross-border systemic risk. This is all the more important now, as regulatory reform across countries can create regulatory gaps and un-level playing-filed, that could cause instability down the road.
This guideline is unlikely to stand in the way of market development, as the $ is not a currency commonly used for transactions abroad, and non-resident entities would in any case wish to swap or convert the $ proceeds into a currency of their choice for overseas use. With this liberalisation, the following will now be possible. a. First, MAS will exempt all individuals and non-financial entities, which includes corporate treasury centres, from the $ lending restrictions of the non-internationalisation policy. This recognises that such entities are not usually the prime drivers of destabilizing currency speculation. b. Second, for non-resident financial entities that continue to be governed by the $ policy, we will lift restrictions in the following financial activities: i. Asset swaps, cross-currency swaps and cross-currency repos can now be transacted freely. MAS had hitherto treated such transactions as forms of $ lending. It will no longer do so. ii. Securities Borrowing and Lending (SBL) – Financial institutions in Singapore may now lend any amount $ securities in exchange for both $ or foreign currencydenominated collateral. MAS will lift the requirement that any lending of $ securities exceeding $ million has to be fully collaterised by $ collateral. BIS Review 19/2002  3  iii. $ FX options – Financial institutions may also freely transact $ FX options with nonresident entities. FIs no longer need to maintain documentary proof showing that $ FX option transactions with non-resident entities are for hedging purposes. iv.

Yet upside risks persist here, stemming mainly from the possibility of further increases in oil prices – given the instability of the market – and from the potential emergence of second-round affects in a more buoyant economic setting. But the fact that the level of output is still below potential provides leeway for the recovery to continue for some time without generating excessive inflationary pressures. In any event, the European Central bank will remain watchful so as to prevent risks to price stability in the medium term from materialising. The Spanish economy Throughout last year and in early 2006, the expansionary cycle of the Spanish economy continued and intensified, in contrast to the difficulties experienced in the euro area as a whole in emerging from the phase of low growth currently in train. Spanish GDP increased by 3.4% in 2005, while employment advanced at an equally high rate of 3.1%. In both cases, these rates were several tenths of a point up on the previous year's figures. Moreover, 2005 saw the publication of the new Spanish National Accounts base 2000 figures, which meant a considerable upward revision of economic growth since 1995 and, especially, since 2000. These new estimates reflect more appropriately the dynamism of the population and of employment these past few years, and they show a more buoyant economy more closely in step with the expansionary behaviour seen in other economic variables such as credit or tax revenue.
8  BIS Review 67/2007  One positive aspect is that institutions are raising finance especially by resorting to medium-term resources, which are more stable than those that might be obtained on the interbank market. Insofar as the secondary markets are sufficiently liquid, subordinated debt or preference share issues can contribute to greater market discipline. Moreover, asset securitisations allow a portion of risks to be transferred towards other investors, thereby contributing to better risk management. Despite the challenges ahead for Spanish institutions, their resilience was heightened in 2006. Profits – the first line of defence against potential problems – not only increased notably but were also sound. This was reflected in the main income statement margins which, combined with moderate growth in operating expenses, contributed to the favourable dynamics of earnings last year. The return on equity increased once again, maintaining, as earlier indicated, a wide spread over long-term government bond yields. The solvency of Spanish institutions held stable in 2006, with the attendant ratio comfortably above regulatory requirements. This came about, moreover, in a setting in which the sharp growth of activity exerted upward pressure on capital requirements. Earnings in 2006 and solvency levels thus attested to the sound position of Spanish institutions. And this was further corroborated by the available market indicators, by the stress tests conducted during the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) and, subsequently, by the loss distribution method, which shows that, even in a highly unfavourable scenario, any losses generated would be amply covered by the capital in the system.

Presentation of the 2020 Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) Press conference, Friday 28 May 2021  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France Chairman of the ACPR  Ladies and Gentlemen, It gives me great pleasure to be with you again for the presentation of the 2020 Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR – Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority), in the company of the new Vice-Chairman, Jean-Paul Faugère, Dominique Laboureix, Secretary General of the ACPR, and Alain Ménéménis, President of the Sanctions Committee. I would first like to pay tribute to the staff at the ACPR – more than 1,050 men and women whose professionalism is exemplary and recognised – who have worked especially hard, both on-site and remotely, to monitor closely the effects of the economic crisis on financial stability. Exactly a year ago, when we were just at the start of the Covid crisis, I pointed out to you, in this exact same setting, how vigilant we were being and how confident I was, both in the competence of our supervisor and in the resilience of the financial system. Looking back, we haven’t done too badly at all: at this stage, the financial risks are, on the whole, under control, thanks to resilient financial institutions with solid fundamentals (I).