samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We cannot have a system where the private sector enjoys the profits of excessive risk-taking while leaving the public sector on the hook for the losses. The post-crisis reforms  The ways in which firms organise themselves, and the tools by which we apply our supervisory judgements, are shaped by global regulatory standards. And in those standards, there has been a revolution. Responding to the emergency of the 2008 crisis, governments set the direction of travel and parameters for regulators to act. We took our mandates, assessed the system accordingly, and set in train a series of unprecedented changes to deliver financial stability. Key to this effort was more effective co-ordination between national regulators and co-operation through international bodies. For banks, this was the right response to the financial crisis, which showed that the standards we had been using were woefully inadequate. The toolkit we have today is miles ahead of what the authorities had as queues grew outside Northern Rock branches – for example the UK has led the way in developing a resolution regime so that we can intervene to manage the orderly failure of a firm. At the same time, UK banks have increased their equity capital by approximately £ since the end of 2008 and now hold more than £ of high-quality liquid assets, four times the level they held before the financial crisis. Governments, regulators and firms together have transformed the banking system.

The revolution is over. Long live the revolution! Speech given by Sam Woods, Deputy Governor, Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer, Prudential Regulation Authority  At the City Banquet, Mansion House, London 26 October 2016  I am grateful to Alex Holmes, Chris Faint, Kayleigh Guinan, Richard Newman and the PRA Executive Directors for their assistance in preparing this speech. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  My Lord Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen  Let me begin by saying that it is a great privilege to be here tonight, and a great honour to lead the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) within the Bank of England. Tonight I am going to start with a word you don’t usually hear from a regulator. My theme is revolution. Not a political revolution, but a prudential revolution, a revolution that has occupied your minds – and our speeches – since 2008. Before I come onto that, Lord Mayor, I must point out that you have allowed a renowned and formidable revolutionary into our midst right here in Mansion House tonight. What’s more, he is the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority. Now, it is true that Andrew Bailey doesn’t immediately make one think of Che Guevara. But Andrew has been right at the forefront of the revolution in prudential regulation we have had here in the UK over the last 8 years. Nobody has done more to rescue, repair and reform the UK financial system.
Excluding the purchase of non-regular transport machinery, this component of investment has improved in recent months. 9. In our baseline scenario, gross fixed capital formation should experience a slightly positive growth in 2017, after three consecutive years of contraction. A key factor in the negative figures of the last few years is the ending of the mining investment cycle, which reached its peak in 2012. More recently the deterioration of housing construction has added, as the boom triggered by tax incentives finished and a modification of loan-to-value norms reduced home sales. Going forward, our forecasts rely on an increase in non-mining and nonresidential investment (mainly machinery and equipment). While mining investment will eventually return to positive territory during 2018, the gradual adjustment in residential investment is expected to continue during the following quarters (Figure 5). Figure 5 Real annual contribution to GFCF (*) (percentage points)  16  16  12  12 Other  8  8 Non-mining  4 0  4 0  -4  -4  Housing  -8  -8  Mining  -12  -12  -16  -16 09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  (*) For sectoral GFCF, variations of the 2008 Benchmark Compilation are used. Since total GFCF is expressed using the 2013 Benchmark Compilation, annual variation of other GFCF is adjusted for consistency purposes.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The other is the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks or EMEAP, which have helped develop the capital market in the region through the establishment of the Asian Bond Fund and many other initiatives. The increasingly important role of China to the Thai economy and financial system has brought about the need for broader and deeper understanding of the Chinese economy and a more proactive response from public agencies, including the Bank of Thailand, to seek a presence in China. Your Royal Highness, Ladies and Gentlemen, Following the initial foothold in the form of two representative offices in New York and London twenty years ago, the Bank of Thailand recently established a representative office here in Beijing. The Beijing office is our first representative office in Asia. I also believe that we are the first central bank from the ASEAN region to have its representative office in China. But, being the first is not the only measure of success for our journey here. Since its establishment last year, our Beijing representative office has fulfilled its objectives to further promote closer ties between the Bank of Thailand and the People’s Bank of China, as well as other Chinese government agencies. The office also aims to sharpen its focus and first-hand understanding of the economic and financial developments in China. This achievement is well-illustrated by the deepening financial cooperation between China and Thailand.
For example, putting some temporary restrictions on cross-border movement of capital could give some but not complete independence of monetary policy. But how do we reconcile independence and co-operation? In my view, we can and should act to enhance co-operation between public authorities, based on at least two elements: Ruling out any currency war, as we clearly stated at the meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee in Bali last month. I quote the unanimous communiqué: “[We] will not target our exchange rates for competitive purposes”. Trade multilateralism is at risk, but financial and monetary multilateralism still stands fast. Second, as the G20 Eminent Persons Group (EPG), led by Tharman Shanmugaratnam, rightly stressed in its recent report, we need to put in place a reliable Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) before the next crisis and co-ordinate its different layers. This should include an “IMF standing liquidity facility”. The GFSN is the best insurance we can get against the risks created by economic divergence and it comes at a limited cost. I know that Governor Kuroda is very committed to this issue too. ** Let me conclude by quoting a Japanese proverb: “A frog in a well knows nothing of the great ocean” [“I no naka no kaeru taikai-o shirazu”]. In these uncertain times, the temptation is to look inwards, but that would be exactly the wrong thing to do.

In my view, transmission of monetary policy in this cycle is not weaker but slower, for three reasons: The starting point: the balance sheet of corporates as well as of households was very strong after the exceptional Covid support; Fixed rate mortgages have significantly increased in share, and are now predominant in many jurisdictions. It's nevertheless good news for financial stability; The higher proportion of services in the economy, which are less directly sensitive to interest rates. Non-housing services now represent 49% of Core HICP basket in the euro area, compared with 41% in 2001. In a recent speech,1 I suggested that the lag could be up to two years. Hence, "length" is still more important than "level", to quote the two dimensions mentioned by Christine Lagarde recently2. We stated in our last Monetary policy statement that "the key ECB interest rates will be brought to levels sufficiently restrictive to achieve a timely return of inflation to our 2% medium term target and will be kept at those levels as long as necessary". I think we are close to the former (levels), and should be now sufficiently patient on the latter (duration). In other words, as transmission is of the essence, so is the persistence of our monetary policy. 1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  1 Villeroy de Galhau, F., Monetary policy transmission: where do we stand?, speech, 22  May 2023 2 Lagarde, C., Breaking the persistence of inflation, speech, 27 June 2023  2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
6 7  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  expected to be gradual and, even once spare capacity had been absorbed, the appropriate level of Bank Rate was expected to be materially below the pre-crisis average of 5%. Out of that guidance came the phrase ‘limited and gradual’, so often repeated it has now become part of the monetary policy furniture. Importantly, it is widely recognised by UK households and businesses whose expectations of rate increases have remained well anchored as the recovery has progressed (Charts 3b and 3c) as well as by financial markets (Chart 3a). Similar guidance was subsequently adopted by the FOMC and ECB. 8  Chart 3: Households and businesses have consistently expected increases in interest rates to be gradual and limited a) Historic UK Bank Rate tightening cycles Cumulative change, percentage points 2.0 1.8 1.6  September 1994  September 1999  November 2003  October 2006  1.4 1.2 1.0  August 2006  0.8 0.6 May 2018 Inflation Report market interest rate path  November 2017  0.4 0.2 0.0  Months since first increase in Bank Rate Sources: Bank of England, Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. Notes: Tightening cycles since the start of inflation targeting in 1992. Tightening cycles are shown up to when interest rates reached their highest level before they were next reduced. The curve is estimated using instantaneous forward overnight index swap rates in the 15 working days to 2 May 2018.

15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  Chart 10: With no monetary policy tightening, excess demand builds significantly and inflation remains above target May 2018 Inflation Report projections for inflation and growth Per cent / Per cent of potential GDP 4.0 3.5 Inflation projection market conditioning path  Inflation projection constant rate path  3.0 2.5 2.0  2% inflation target  Excess supply / demand projection - constant rate path  1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0  Excess supply / demand projection - market conditioning path 2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  -0.5 -1.0 2018  2019  2020  2021  Of course, as the Committee has made clear before, its guidance about the likely gentle path of rate increases depends on the economy evolving broadly as expected – in particular, whether growth in demand exceeds that of supply. That might not happen. For example, the weakness in demand at the start of the year could reflect a worsening of the underlying economic climate, not the temporary effects of adverse weather as the Committee currently assesses. In particular, there is somewhat greater uncertainty about the near-term momentum in consumer spending at present, given recent weakness in consumer credit and the housing market across a range of indicators. Growth in consumer credit, particularly credit cards, slowed sharply in March. Retail sales volumes have been falling and profit warnings in the retail sector rising.
The first is addressing the immediate short run concerns emanating from various shocks; and the second is implementing structural reforms to ensure that financial stability becomes embedded in the underlying structure of the economy in the long run. In terms of challenges, the former essentially concerns the challenge of maintaining economic stability through appropriate policy settings and actions to offset the various shocks hitting the economy at any given point in time. The latter, on the other hand, focuses on strengthening the institutional framework for monetary policy and financial supervision as well as fostering financial system development that improves the ability of the system to absorb shocks by itself in a way that minimizes the impact on the real economy without the need for policy intervention. Let me now discuss some specific challenges to monetary and financial stability in emerging markets from both the short and the long run perspectives. For short-run stabilization, it is clear that one of the important challenges at present is how to contain financial vulnerabilities that accompany an influx of short-term capital. In coping with capital flows, lowering interest rates to reduce the relative attractiveness of the country to capital inflows may be a first appropriate way to ensure price stability. But, in most cases, fast appreciation may not subside as exchange rates tend to behave more like asset prices than relative goods prices.

Efficient and well balanced financial system will allow the system to better manage and absorb shocks as the market would be less prone to one-way market conditions and possesses greater liquidity. A well balanced financial structure contributes positively to information processing, price discovery, and risk management. The experience of the Asian crisis, for example, points to the critical importance of the development of long-term local currency debt market, to increase the depth and the breadth of financial market. In relation to this, BIS identified that the lack of diversified structure and market may lead to increased risk from concentration of credit and maturity risks in the banking system as lack of markets may lead to the mispricing of risk and excessive delay in correcting large exposures, as well as increased vulnerabilities from capital inflows. The second point we want to make is the importance of strong financial market infrastructure. One of the key issues for emerging markets is the structural weaknesses which can create disincentive and moral hazard. The presence of such distortions contribute to built-up of financial vulnerability, hinder growth of market solution for tackling risk, and complicate policy actions in events of crisis management. Progress in correcting these weakness however may be slow.
The tightening so far in the 1990s has been of roughly the same magnitude. By contrast, we are now looking at a permanent change in the government surplus. This scenario is not entirely improbable. A pause in growth lies ahead for the Norwegian economy, and we must expect some increase in unemployment. This will quickly translate into demands for expanded public sector activity. The government has some room for manoeuvre to address this challenge by boosting public expenditure or cutting taxes. However, our calculations show that in the course of a few years an expansionary fiscal policy could lead to a substantial reduction in the government’s scope for manoeuvre. What I want to demonstrate is that pursuing such a policy now – assuming that the oil price remains low – would have a major impact on the ability of the government to finance the welfare society. As we see, it would not result in any increase in the budget surplus in the next few years. On the contrary, the surplus would gradually be reduced, and in about 10 years the budget would begin to show a deficit. The Petroleum Fund would suffer a sad fate and would be depleted in 18 years. This is just an illustration, however. Developments would compel a shift in fiscal policy long before the Petroleum Fund is depleted. But that in turn would mean that the state would not have the scope for manoeuvre to stimulate total employment.

Available indicators suggest that there has been a gradual recovery since mid-2015, which continued in the second half of 2016. A key factor here is improved business and household sentiment in the euro area and other advanced economies, which in turn creates a more favourable environment for the Swiss export industry. Overall, the signals from the economic indicators are consistent with our previous GDP growth forecast of around 1.5% for 2016 as a whole. Developments on the labour market support this view. Employment statistics show that the number of jobs in Switzerland grew in the third quarter, too. Up until November, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for this year was stable at 3.3%. The outlook for the coming year is cautiously optimistic. Over the course of 2017, export demand looks set to gradually strengthen further. For the export industry, this will mean better capacity utilisation and less pressure on margins. We are also expecting a gradual recovery on the labour market. Various surveys confirm this assessment. Together with our continued expansionary monetary policy, labour market developments should boost domestic demand. Private consumption, too, is likely to once again make a greater contribution to economic growth. Overall, as for 2016, the SNB expects GDP growth for 2017 to be roughly 1.5%. However, the Swiss economy will also face some major challenges in the coming year. Structural change continues to affect several important industries. Retailing is having to contend with changes both to distribution channels and the spending habits of households.
Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir: Brief overview of Islamic banking and finance Speech by Mr Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Official Launch of Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006, Kuala Lumpur, 24 November 2006. *  *  *  It is indeed an honour to be here this morning at the launching of the Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006, organized by the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM). It was exactly five years ago that all of us witnessed the launching of the first Islamic Banking and Takaful Week by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. And now, after those years, Alhamdulillah, we are pleased with the positive impact of the comprehensive awareness campaign in the year 2001 as it has paved the way to subsequent nationwide annual campaigns on financial awareness in Islamic banking and finance. In this regard, I wish to congratulate all financial institutions involved for providing their unwavering support in this virtuous endeavour. Before I proceed, allow me to take this opportunity to welcome our exhibitors, both local and foreign, who will be participating in the Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006. We believe that your participation will benefit the patrons to this expo.

I hope you will exploit this platform to disseminate as much information on Islamic banking and finance as possible so as to provide an opportunity for the public to learn more on the products, services and benefits of Islamic banking and finance. This year's Islamic financial expo presents a different appeal altogether with various differentiated activities and events organised for the diversified target groups and consumers. I note that various activities have been arranged for the next five days including Islamic banking and finance exposition, the annual Islamic Finance Forum, colloquium on Islamic finance, convention on takaful and Islamic unit trust advisors and Muzakarah for Shariah advisors. This is indeed an excellent opportunity for exchanging ideas as well as providing relevant information to the public on Islamic finance. It is also timely and augurs well with the recent announcement of the initiatives to position Malaysia as the international Islamic financial centre. The Islamic financial industry in Malaysia has experienced rapid transformations particularly in the past ten years. The Malaysian Islamic banking system registered strong performance with higher profitability and positive trends in all key indicators. Profitability surpassed the RM1 billion mark for the first time in 2005, and this year the industry will again register good profit as for the first half of 2006, the amount of profit generated was already RM800 million. The total assets of Islamic banking currently stands at RM122 billion. The performance of the Malaysian Islamic financial market in particular the capital market has been encouraging.
These measures are key MIFC measures and incentives and these include: (i)  Profits and dividends received by non-resident investors from holding of RM and non RM Islamic instruments issued in Malaysia are exempted from withholding tax;  (ii)  A special purpose vehicle (SPV) for Islamic financing purposes via the Islamic capital market is not required to comply with the administrative procedures under the Income Tax Act 1967;  (iii)  A company that establishes a SPV is given a tax deduction on the issuance cost of the Islamic securities incurred by the SPV;  (iv)  Tax deduction on issuance cost for all Islamic securities approved by the Securities Commission; and  (v)  Stamp duty exemption for 10 years on instruments relating to Islamic securities under the MIFC. Third area is outsourcing, insourcing and white labeling activities. Malaysia's more than two decades of experience in takaful operation and product design can be systematically structured as a complete solution to be offered to new takaful operators. Takaful operators in other jurisdictions may leverage on the services and experience of the Malaysian Islamic finance and takaful industry by outsourcing certain operational functions, such as product design and investment activities, thereby allowing them to focus their currently limited resources to important tasks of expanding the business. Strategic alliance by Malaysians can also be forged with takaful operators in other jurisdictions to provide total product solution in the form of white labeling arrangement.

4  BIS Review 68/2010  Risk Premium Indicators 5-Year CDS Rate Changes*  EMBI+ 900  5.5  Turkey Brazil S.Africa Hungary S.Korea  4.5 3.5  EMBI+ Turkey 800 EMBI+  700 600 500 400  2.5  300  1.5  200  0210  1009  0609  0209  1008  0608  1007  0210  1209  1009  0809  0609  0409  0209  1208  1008  0808  *Rate changes with base August 2008 (equals 1 on August 29, 2008). Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. 0208  100  0.5  Source: Bloomberg. 13. However, an important point that needs to be highlighted is that risk indicators for the Turkish economy have exhibited a more favorable performance compared to that of other emerging market economies especially since the height of the crisis during the final quarter of 2008. This development not only implies the soundness of the Turkish financial structure, but also indicates that our economy has gained resilience and strength against global crises compared to previous periods. 14. Turkey’s CDS rating changed dramatically at the end of 2009. Medium to long-term forecasts for Turkey were revised positively, many investors increased the weight of Turkish assets in their portfolios, and more importantly, prominent credit-rating agencies upgraded Turkey’s credit rating. There may be some credit upgrades in the upcoming period, in case a fiscal discipline backed by structural reforms is achieved and maintained.