samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the foreign debt payments of the Treasury should be settled and remittance accounts that comprise a significant part of the liabilities side of the Central Bank’s balance sheet need to be gradually reduced in the long-term. Therefore, the Central Bank holds foreign exchange buying auctions to build up reserves at times where foreign exchange supply increases compared to foreign exchange demand. With the aim of minimizing the impact on supply and demand conditions in the foreign exchange market, the Central Bank has been buying foreign exchange via foreign exchange buying auctions with pre-announced terms and conditions since 1 April 2002 and has been announcing annual auction programs since 2005. Even if the aim is running the auctions according to the pre-announced program, in case of significant developments exceeding the forecasts pertaining to foreign exchange supply, amendments to auction programs can be made with prior notice.

It is particularly useful in that it offers an overview of overall Spanish general (central, regional and local, including the Social Security system) government budgetary policy, providing a broader time perspective of four years. In a country as decentralised as Spain, it is impossible to properly assess public spending and revenue policies without this overview. At the same time, an effective fiscal policy, particularly when the starting point is a budgetary imbalance like ours, should be part of a consistent multi-year plan with specific measures. The Budget and the Stability Programme include macroeconomic projections that point to increases in real GDP in Spain of 2.7% in 2018, and slightly lower levels in the following 5/9  years: 2.4% in 2019, and 2.3% both in 2020 and in 2021. Nominal GDP is expected to increase by around 4.3% over the entire forecasting horizon. The growth forecast and its composition are broadly consistent with the baseline scenario of the Banco de España’s macroeconomic projections I outlined earlier. The Stability Programme envisages an overall general government deficit of 2.2% in 2018, in line with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. That should be conducive to Spain exiting the “excessive deficit” situation still prevailing. For the following years, further declines in the budgetary imbalance are envisaged, until resuming a slightly positive balance in 2021, for the first time since 2007. All tiers of government, including Social Security funds, should attain budgetary equilibrium in this horizon, according to the Programme.
Inevitably, this aspect takes on greater importance. For one reason, supervisors expect banks to operate above minimum regulatory capital ratios included in the Basle Accord – and prudent assessments can help to inform by how much. For another, supervisors seek to intervene early enough to prevent capital from falling below prudent levels – and bank assessments can provide another useful tool in identifying key issues before they become major problems. With these thoughts in mind, supervisors are tackling the challenge of developing a more systematic approach to the review of capital adequacy. Supervisors also are discussing ways to enhance market-based discipline. Most agree there should be a greater role for private-sector monitoring of banks. Of course, there already exists a fair amount of market-based monitoring; however, the collection and use of these kinds of information usually are not systematic or complete. The first goal is to improve information available to the market. With enhanced risk disclosure, supervisors will be more able to rely on the opinion of market investors. These opinions are reflected quickly in the price of bank debt and share prices, and the ease with which banks can access capital. By relying more on these market signals, supervisors will be better able to identify and address waning capital levels at problem institutions. To the extent banks develop disciplined internal approaches to evaluating capital adequacy and capital plans, and enhance disclosures, supervisors will be able to place greater reliance on all three pillars and meet the challenges of a more complex financial marketplace.

The common interest is to keep the Basle standards at a level sufficient to ensure financial soundness, a minimum above which banks will choose to operate. To achieve this, we must fashion a set of standards that does not greatly distort incentives. Supervisors acknowledge that the current regulations and ratios need to be updated to be more meaningful, given the full range of risks banks face today. Supervisors are always challenged to keep pace with financial innovation and improvements in risk management practices, and this suggests that we will need a frequent monitoring and maintenance program for the present and future Accord. In closing, I would like to summarize the key supervisory objectives that we are mindful of as we look to revise the Accord and enhance the overall capital framework. Our first objective, of course, is to promote the safety and soundness of the financial system. Our second is to enhance competitive equality, while allowing for differences among banks based on  5  BIS Review 32/1999  differences in their risk profiles. These were the original goals of the Accord. Our third is to develop standards that are fundamentally applicable to banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication, including those in emerging market nations. In developing this capital framework over the next year, we plan to consult closely with the financial and supervisory community and communicate openly about our progress. By yearend, we hope to have made great strides in furthering our objectives.
In the space of five years (1792-97) it almost tripled, and Pitt’s government tapped not just financial markets but the resources of the Bank of England to finance it18. Second, fears of French invasion led to a steady increase in the desire to hold gold over paper notes and a further drain from the Bank’s holdings (Chart 1119). When in late February 1797 a small French force actually landed in Wales the government immediately took to the decision to suspend  Sources: Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) and Bank calculations. convertibility and with it the gold standard. This was a seismic event in British financial history and was vigorously debated, and in many quarters vigorously opposed, throughout the long Napoleonic wars20. Several early economists – notably  16  Kynaston (2017), Chapter 15. I discussed the role of beliefs about how inflation was determined in a talk earlier this year (Broadbent (2020)). 18 The Bank took only a fraction of new government debt – less than £ compared with an increase in the total of over £ – but it was enough to deplete its gold reserves significantly, by around a quarter, during the first four years of the war. Most of the growth in the Bank of England’s assets, in those years and throughout the Napoleonic wars, reflected higher “discounting” (i.e. buying) of private-sector securities. 19 Chart 11 excludes long-term government debt holdings from the assets and central bank equity from the liabilities.

Forecasts for a low inflation level in the period ahead have dictated the implementation of an accommodative monetary policy in the last quarters. The policy rate cuts have already been passed through to interest rates in the interbank and deposits market, and to most of government securities’ yields. Interest rates on loans have also reflected the expansionary stance of the monetary policy of the Bank of Albania, but they continue to contain high risk premiums for credit risk and other risks related to long-term investment. The slow performance of the economy is also reflected in the monetary indicators. Money supply continued to increase at low annual rates, standing at 2.1% in March. This performance has reflected the decrease in credit to the private sector and the lower financing needs of the public sector. Credit to the private sector shrank 2.4% in March. Besides the weak demand from businesses and households, the sluggish performance of credit reflects the banks’ conservative lending policies. This approach is reflected not only in the interest rates on loans, but also in other lending standards applied by the banking system. In this regard, the Bank of Albania deems that the banking system in Albania has room for and should adopt a more appropriate behaviour towards crediting the Albanian economy. The country’s economic and financial reality, on-going monetary policy easing and our liquidity-injection operations, as well as the adaptation of our regulations to the market situation provide the premises for faster crediting to the economy.
Its Central Bank Governor, Mr. Gideon Gono, recently lamented by equating his country’s hyper-inflation to an economic HIV, an epidemic that would kill people on a mass scale. Hence, using inflation to fund budgets is just like getting a demon to work for you. 4  BIS Review 64/2007

Basel III is a complex set of measures that attempts to respond to the regulatory failings that the crisis highlighted. First, many banks found themselves at the start of the crisis with low levels of capital. Second, this same capital had an excessive proportion of hybrid instruments, with a limited or, at least, uncertain loss-absorption capacity. Third, and finally, the procyclicality of Basel II meant there was a trade-off between capital requirements and growth, which could push banks to lessen the risk they assume, with the subsequent adverse impact on credit and the economy. Basel III has increased the minimum level of core capital, the highest-quality capital, to 4.5% from 2% under Basel II. On top of this minimum, Basel III has added a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and established a connection between banks’ dividend policy and compliance with this minimum capital level. Accordingly, to avoid any interference by the supervisor in their dividend policy, banks must at all times hold a minimum level of top-quality capital of 7%. For the first time, too, Basel III has added a macroprudential component to capital levels. The countercyclical capital buffer could entail an additional capital requirement of up to 2.5%. Building up a capital buffer in good times, with the aim of depleting it in not so prosperous times, is a macroprudential mechanism that will help reduce the contraction of credit when there is a recession, and temper the growth of credit in upturns. However, calibrating the buffer is no easy task.
This document will be available by tomorrow on the Bank's web site at www.banque-France.fr, and it will be constantly updated. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 115/2000  6

As its influence on the economy is subject to a time-lag, monetary policy has to be conducted in a forward-looking manner. Consequently, forecasts play a decisive role in analyses and decision-making. At the same time, the exchange rate, like other prices set on financial markets, is very difficult to forecast.11 Nevertheless, due to its significance for the development of small, open economies such as Sweden’s, it is important to form an understanding of exchange rate developments. The Riksbank tries to analyse and forecast the development of the trade-weighted exchange rate, which is to say the value of the Swedish krona against a basket of the currencies of Sweden’s most important trading partners. Due to the volatile nature of the exchange rate, no attempts are made to capture short-term variations in it. Instead, the focus lies on the more long-term trend. The starting point for this a statistical model in which the real exchange rate is related to relative GDP, the terms of trade and net foreign assets.12 However, the final forecast for the exchange rate considers the fact that the exchange rate both influences and is influenced by a multitude of other variables, including the interest rate differential in relation to other countries.13  10  See, for example, Ekholm et al. (2008). Pressure on firms to improve productivity can be seen as a positive aspect of a strong real exchange rate. A weak real exchange rate is otherwise frequently seen as being advantageous for a country as it benefits its exporting firms.
It should also enable more efficient, effective and inclusive payments, including in ways that we cannot fully anticipate. It is not a one-way street, however. As we extend access, we will safeguard resilience in three ways: by holding settlement account holders to the appropriate standards; by removing legislative barriers to non-bank access; and by designing the right account arrangements for new entrants. I am pleased that both the FCA and HMRC, who together supervise these institutions, are committed to developing a strengthened supervisory regime for those who apply for an RTGS settlement account, to give assurance that non-bank PSPs can safely take their place at the heart of the payment system. And I welcome the Chancellor’s commitment tonight to make the necessary legislative changes to ensure that these new entrants can access RTGS safely and efficiently. 7 By extending RTGS access, our objective is to increase competition and innovation in the market for payment services. To ensure that PSPs are not disadvantaged relative to banks offering equivalent payment services, the Bank intends to give appropriate remuneration for balances that PSPs will be required to hold overnight to support their payments activities. 8 The second way the Bank is enabling the FinTech transformation is by being open to providing access to central bank money for new forms of wholesale securities settlement. Securities settlement is the lifeblood of modern wholesale financial markets – the associated payments account for fully half of RTGS’s daily settlement flows. However, as with retail payments, securities settlement is now ripe for innovation.

There are still expectations of an increase in international interest rates, but market participants have lowered their growth and interest rate expectations as a result of high oil prices. Growth in the Norwegian economy picked up during the second half of 2003. The low interest rate has contributed to strong growth in private consumption and housing investment. Activity has picked up in service industries and the construction sector. High petroleum investment, the global economic recovery and a weaker krone through 2003 have improved conditions for manufacturing. Profitability is improving for mainland enterprises. There are signs of renewed growth in investment in a number of industries. Imports have expanded markedly. Potential growth in the Norwegian economy is estimated to increase somewhat more than normal this year as a result of increased competition and rationalisation in many sectors. This will contribute to fairly high growth in the Norwegian economy without the emergence of constraints on the supply of labour or productive capital. The high rate of growth in output nevertheless implies that the output gap will approach zero towards the end of 2004. The output gap is a measure of the difference between the actual level of output and potential output. Developments in the output gap provide a basis for assessing cyclical developments and can thus shed light on domestic price and cost pressures in the economy. It is difficult to know how high capacity utilisation is at any given time.
The technical details of the policy are needed to make this precise so that it can be implemented and monitored: the MPC intends not to raise Bank Rate from its current level of 0.5% at least until the Labour Force Survey headline measure of the unemployment rate has fallen to a threshold of 7%. The MPC stands ready to undertake further asset purchases while the unemployment rate remains above 7% if it judges that additional monetary stimulus is warranted but will otherwise maintain the stock of asset purchases and will reinvest the cash flows associated with all maturing gilts held in the Asset Purchase Facility. This guidance linking Bank Rate and asset sales to the unemployment threshold would cease to hold if any of the following three “knockouts” were breached:   if, in the MPC’s view, it is more likely than not, that CPI inflation 18 to 24 months ahead will be 0.5 percentage points or more above the 2% target;    if medium-term inflation expectations no longer remain sufficiently well anchored;    if the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) judges that the stance of monetary policy poses a significant threat to financial stability that cannot be contained by the substantial range of mitigating policy actions available to the FPC, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority in a way consistent with their objectives. Explicit forward policy guidance can enhance the effectiveness of monetary stimulus in three ways.

The international division of labour is shifting, and when faced with major changes it is a disadvantage for Norwegian business and industry that costs are high. Credit growth Total credit is expanding broadly in line with growth in nominal GDP. However, the composition of credit growth has been giving mixed signals in terms of interest-rate setting over the past year. Household debt accumulation is high, while it is low in the enterprise sector. Household debt has increased sharply since 1994. The rise in the value of dwellings is one of the main factors behind growth in household debt. House prices have risen by an average of around 9 per cent over the past 10 years. High and persistent house price inflation may contribute to holding up credit growth even after prices have levelled off. Since only a portion of the housing stock is sold each year, there will for a long period be some dwellings that are sold at a higher price than when they were last sold. This contributes to sustaining credit growth at a high level. This probably reflects a structural adjustment to the deregulation of the housing and credit markets in the 1980s, after many households suffered financial distress in the wake of the relaxation. Homeowners with dwellings that have risen in value now have greater scope for taking up new mortgage-secured loans, using mortgage-equity withdrawal to finance consumption and other investments.
Financial markets and institutions can help provide insurance against those risks, but great care is needed to ensure such cover is provided appropriately: too little, and households, companies and lenders will go under-covered; too much, and insurers may be unable to follow through on their commitments.9 But the most important force for internalising these externalities will be public policy – on climate regulation, carbon pricing and taxing, and legal liability. Such policy ‘privatises’ the social cost on specific companies and sectors of the economy, and creates powerful opportunities for those first to innovate climate-positive technologies. I will not have more to say on the priorities for future policy in this area today,10 but it is safe to say that these steps will only intensify as governments follow through on the sort of mid-century net-zero commitments legislated in law by the UK last year, and recently by China. The second factor impeding financial market pricing of climate risk has been the long horizon over which that risk has historically been thought likely to crystallise. Financial markets do not have a great track record pricing such longer-term phenomena, particularly when their scale and incidence is also uncertain – a failing 8  To take just one example amongst many, ‘Make My Money Matter’ was formed by Richard Curtis and Jo Corlett to drive change in pension fund investment: https://makemymoneymatter.co.uk/.

From a business management perspective, this point is obvious: to be useful in shaping strategy, a metric has to be something with a direct influence on investment decisions. And from a financial markets perspective, it has to be relevant to understanding risk and return. A lack of meaningful, consistent metrics makes it hard, or impossible, for investors to construct viable portfolios by comparing climate performance across firms. And that, in turn, dampens the incentive of those firms to improve and disclose their climate performance in the first place. 23  https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-TCFD-Status-Report-FINAL-053119.pdf 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  Chart 4: Correlations between environmental scores from different rating providers24  Key Each matrix displays correlation coefficients between Environmental ratings given by five rating providers (labelled P1 – P5 in the charts) on a sample of 924 firms (2017 data). Right: Correlation coefficients between aggregate Environmental ratings. Below: Correlation coefficients between ratings of a selection of more granular environmental categories.
Indeed: - Franco-German monetary cooperation is based on solid foundations and has steadily developed during the last fifty years (1) - this cooperation will be crowned by the creation of monetary union in 1999 (2). FRANCO-GERMAN MONETARY COOPERATION IS BASED ON SOLID FOUNDATIONS AND HAS STEADILY DEVELOPED DURING THE LAST FIFTY YEARS In order not to bother you by an unduly long speech, I will focus on the last fifty years only! Nevertheless, one could easily demonstrate that our respective monetary histories have been deeply linked since the Middle Ages. Indeed, Emperor Charlemagne enacted a bill creating a unit of account common to its whole empire, which enshrined most of the present territories of France and Germany. The global features of the system (in particular the subdivisions) experienced an exceptional longevity of almost 1000 years. The last fifty years constitute, however, a rather homogeneous period, during which Franco-German monetary cooperation really developed. First, it is useful to underline the solid roots and foundations of this cooperation. These foundations paved the way for the emergence of a common destiny, which is best illustrated by the creation of the EMS. This community of views and interests have been crucial in the decision to create a European monetary union and a single currency. I will first explain the solid roots and foundations on which Franco-German monetary cooperation is based Franco-German monetary cooperation is based on historical and economic foundations. The historical roots of Franco-German monetary cooperation can easily be identified.

Now that the interest rate has moved up to a fairly normal level, the rise in house prices has come to a halt, and prices are now falling. We have seen that when the interest rate is raised to curb the rise in prices for goods and services, interest-rate setting also contributes to stabilising asset prices. Moreover, we believe that our communication, where we emphasise that the interest rate is set with view to stabilising inflation, and with forecasts for the interest rate ahead, has contributed to dampening fluctuations. It is nevertheless important to be aware that in a small open economy like Norway there is little room for setting the interest rate at a level that diverges from that of other countries with the aim of influencing property prices and credit growth. The task of steering inflation is in itself demanding. With Norway’s balance-of-payments position, the effects on capital movements and the krone exchange rate may be considerable. Pursuing a very firm approach to steering property prices and credit will easily lead to a krone out of balance and result in adverse effects on inflation and inflation expectations. Monetary policy contributes to stabilising developments in the economy. Nonetheless, in some areas, the framework may lead to a situation where business cycles may be selfamplifying. In the following, I will focus on aspects of the functioning and regulation of the housing market and banking activities. The interplay between developments in the housing market and the credit market is important for stability in our economy.