samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I would also like to emphasise, that the normalisation speed in Albania has been lower than that implemented by our trading partners, due to the fact that fiscal policy has followed a consolidating trend throughout 2022, while a strengthening of the exchange rate has restrained transmission of imported inflationary pressures to the domestic market. The increase in key interest rates throughout 2022 and going forward, in the absence of these factors, would have been faster and more aggressive. Third, even with the presence of normalisation, the overall stance of monetary policy continued to remain accommodative for boosting both consumption and investments, as it provides better financial conditions for a more balanced performance of aggregate demand and supply in economy. The monetary policy has been transmitted smoothly across financial markets. Its transmission to the interbank market has been immediate and complete. It has been rapid to the government securities market, and it still continues to the deposits and credit market. Nevertheless, despite increasing interest rates, credit flows continue to remain positive and the Albanian banking sector continues to provide necessary funds to the economy for expanding activity and for meeting liquidity needs. The volume of credit to the private sector grew by 12.3%, on average in 2022, while credit portfolio quality remained at good levels, and the non-performing loans ratio stood at the lowest levels in the last decade. The financial sustainability of the banking sector and its positive approach towards lending was conducive to the continued support of the economy with funding.

Lim Hng Kiang: The Tokyo Stock Exchange and Singapore Speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Minister for Trade and Industry, at the Tokyo Stock Exchange Singapore Representative Office 10th Anniversary, Singapore, 14 December 2006. *  *  *  Congratulatory remarks I am delighted to be here with you this evening to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Tokyo Stock Exchange Singapore Representative Office. Firstly, I would like to thank the Tokyo Stock Exchange for its commitment to Singapore and the region over the past decade and I hope Tokyo Stock Exchange will continue to scale greater heights in coming years. Growth of Asia and Japan When Tokyo Stock Exchange established its overseas office in Singapore in 1996, Singapore and the region were experiencing strong economic growth with Asian economies developing at rates of about 5 to 10% per year. Today, we continue to witness the rise of Asia on the back of the twin drivers of China and India. Prospects for South-East Asia have improved considerably and Japan, after years of stagnation, is firmly back on the track of healthy sustained growth and is a major investor in South-East Asia. As of 2005, Japan's FDI into South-East Asia totaled $ billion, and it is the top investor in Indonesia, and the third largest investor in Vietnam. Changes in the global exchange landscape The competitive landscape in the global exchange arena has also changed significantly.
Such demand shocks can be triggered by structural changes in the behaviour of economic agents or result from portfolio shifts or financial innovations in the context of financial globalisation. There are indeed some signs that a money demand shock occurred at the beginning of the 2000s in the euro area, as illustrated by an apparent structural shift in the trend velocity of money, which summarises the relationship between money, output and the price level. (see Figure Annex page 8). A tentative explanation is that our economies are becoming more and more "financial" in the sense that the ratio of financial wealth to GDP is constantly increasing. Since economic agents – especially financial intermediaries and corporates – need to keep part of their total financial assets in liquid holdings, there may be a structural increase in the demand for money (everything equal). The euro and the integration of European capital markets may have accelerated this evolution. As an illustration of the uncertainties facing euro area monetary policy makers, one possible consequence of current events in credit markets may be to trigger a re-intermediation process, i.e. an expansion of banks' balance sheets which may further complicate our reading and interpretation of monetary and credit dynamics in the months to come. As you can see there is a need to continuously reassess and diversify the tools used in our monetary analysis. 4. Predictability and frequency of policy actions  Contrary to some preconceptions, most monetary policy decisions have been perfectly anticipated by the markets.

I think there is a broad agreement on the fact that interest rate decisions are state-dependent rather than time-dependent and as a consequence, both the frequency and the amplitude of the policy changes are mainly driven by the underlying state of the economy. As far as the Eurosystem is concerned, the more gradualist approach is nothing but the reflection that the economy of the euro area has been less affected by cyclical fluctuations than the US economy. Moreover, recent research carried out by the Eurosystem on inflation persistence tends to show that the degree of inflation persistence in the euro area is quite moderate while the degree of price stickiness is considerable and higher than in the United States. This finding may provide another justification for a gradualist monetary response to cost-push shocks as: first, the impact of an inflation shock will be small as agents anticipate a low persistence of this shock and therefore will maintain their expectations of future inflation at low levels; in turn, the negative response of the output gap will be limited implying a less persistent response of the real rate. 5. As a result, the Eurosystem monetary policy has won European citizens’ confidence in and acceptance of the new currency  Finally, the euro has been readily accepted by economic agents and is now part of European consumers’ daily lives. Surveys confirm that the general public has confidence in the euro, as a solid currency, and in the Eurosystem as their Central Bank.
Chart 4 plots a measure of financial markets’ expectations of UK inflation since 1985. Also shown is the date of Bank of England independence and inflation targets since their inception in 1993. These measures of inflation expectations were consistently and materially above target in the period prior to independence – the myopia or inflation bias problem looked real. But from pretty much the point of announcement of independence, they began ratcheting down. Within 12 months, they were aligned with the inflation target. They have stayed there in the period since. The Bank of England has thus far passed the marshmallow test. Another lens is provided by looking at the stability of inflation and output either side of central bank independence (Chart 5). Since independence, UK inflation variability has fallen by a factor of five and output stability by a factor of almost two. As this period saw the largest macro-economic collapse in memory, it loads the dice against independence. This evidence may seem to suggest that central banks have tamed the inflationary tiger. That metaphor is apt. Friedrich Hayek likened the process of controlling the economy as akin to taking a tiger by the tail. 53 As far as inflation control is concerned, Hayek was right. As some countries are finding today, the tiger is capable of biting back. Chart 6 plots inflation expectations from financial markets in the UK, US, the euro-area and Japan over recent years. In Japan, inflation expectations have been anything but wellanchored, varying significantly around a trend close to zero.

Indeed, I wish to argue that the evolution of central bank policy frameworks over recent years can be seen as an attempt to make them robust to  1  It was a term first popularised by Ben Bernanke, then-Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board (Bernanke (2004)). 2  In Greek mythology, Nemesis was the spirit of divine retribution against those who succumb to hubris (arrogance before the Gods). The term hubris now typically refers to a loss of contact with reality and an overestimation of one's own competence, accomplishments or capabilities. 3  Loewenstein et al (2008), Kahneman (2011), Mischel (2014), Urminsky and Zauberman (2014). 4  Blinder (2004), Reis (2013) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 5  There are some obvious exceptions in research on monetary policy decision-making, discussed below. Sibert (2006) also discusses the topic of “Central bank psychology”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  psychological biases. I want to illustrate that by reference to the Bank of England’s policy framework. And, based on that analysis, I want to suggest some areas where a further evolutionary “nudge” in those frameworks might be warranted. 6 Behavioural biases in practice The literature on behavioural economics has sky-rocketed over recent years. 7 This identifies a long list of cognitive ticks that can affect human decision-making. All of these are likely to affect policy decision-making to some degree. But from that potentially very long list, let me highlight four biases which may pose a particular policy-making challenge.
However, the technology did not go away but rather re-emerged in a different form, focussed on the development of platforms which have now come to dominate internet commerce. So the interesting question for regulators is not what will happen next to the value of crypto assets, but what do we need to do to ensure that these developments, this prospective innovation about which I shall say a little more later, can happen without giving rise to increasing and potentially systemic risks. This brings me to my third lesson: the extension of the regulatory framework to encompass the use of crypto technologies must be grounded in the iron principle of ‘same risk, same regulatory outcome’. The starting point for regulators should be to apply the same regulation to the risks inherent in the provision of a financial service no matter how it is provided. But differences in technology may mean that existing regulation may not work in this new context or, indeed, may not effectively manage the risk. Implicit in our regulatory standards and frameworks are the levels of risk mitigation we have judged necessary. Where we cannot apply regulation in exactly the same way, we must ensure we achieve the same level of risk mitigation – in other words, the “same regulatory outcome”.

All of this this work is being closely co-ordinated by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which, as it set out in yesterday’s statement[8], is working to ensure cryptoassets are subject to robust regulation and consultation. The FSB will publish a consultation report later this year with recommendations for promoting international consistency in regulatory and supervisory approaches to non-stablecoin cryptoassets, markets and exchanges as well as for strengthening international coordination in this area. And, putting on my domestic hat, given that the the Bank of England is responsible for regulation and supervision of systemic payment systems in the UK, our intention is to apply the ‘same risk, same regulatory outcome’ approach in the UK. The Government has announced its intention to legislate in the current session of Parliament to update the powers of the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority to regulate and supervise stablecoins. We hope to issue a consultation document on the regulatory policy framework later this year. Taken as a whole, the UK authorities have made clear that they are prepared to see stablecoins – issued by either banks or non -banks - operate in the UK, provided they are properly regulated and supervised[9]. This should not, however, be interpreted as any weakening in standards for risk mitigation. I doubt any of the stablecoins currently in operation in other jurisdictions would meet the necessary standards for operation at systemic level in the UK – whether in the crypto world, should that become systemic, or in conventional financial services.
Hence, I very much concur with the conference’s theme of “A Call for Action.” It takes courage to lead a transformative 2  journey into an unknown territory. The collective wisdom shared among directors here will enable all of us to make better informed decisions and lead our organizations, and more importantly, lead Thailand, onto the right path – the path which will rise above disruptions, as the IOD has eloquently put it. As Thailand embarks on the journey for digital transformation, we must focus on three key imperatives of productivity, immunity, and inclusivity. Technological advancement provides tremendous opportunity for us to uplift these three areas like never before. While policymakers and regulators can provide support at the infrastructure level and promote a stable environment conducive for innovation, it is at the firm level that actions can be and must be taken to drive meaningful changes for the country as a whole. First, on productivity: uplifting the country’s productivity is necessary to ensure continued long-term economic growth. Specifically, structural changes due to an aging workforce have hastened the need for our country to improve productivity just to maintain output level. In fact, Thailand’s labor productivity growth has been on a decline. From 2002 to 2017, our annual growth of labor productivity averaged 2.9 percent, a significant drop from an average of 5 percent during 1986 to 2001. In contrast, countries such as China and Indonesia have been experiencing rises in productivity growth.

We must strategically adapt and adopt technologies now to remain relevant and competitive and provide support for sustainable improvement in the standard of living of the Thai people. 5  In closing, I would like to congratulate the IOD once again for fittingly organizing this Call for Action conference. Actions taken at the firm level can determine the direction of our country and whether we can efficiently catch up with rapid technological changes. These changes will also inevitably affect the whole ecosystem of Thailand. Therefore, I urge you all to think on a bigger picture on how your firms can help make Thailand’s digital transformation successful and fruitful. So, think big, stay informed, and act wisely. Only then we can be certain that together we could truly rise above disruptions. Thank you for your attention. *********  6
12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  systemically-important institutions as well as new guidelines as to how these institutions can be liquidated in an orderly manner in the event of a solvency crisis. One also looks in particular at how OTC trading in derivatives will be conducted and how the financial operations outside of the traditional banking sector – the so-called shadow banking sector – shall be supervised and regulated. A lot of effort has also been put into creating an organisation that enables the discovery and management of risks in the financial system that could affect several countries at the same time. In January 2011, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was formed, with the task of identifying threats to financial stability within the EU and of issuing warnings and recommendations to individual countries about such systemic risks. The ESRB cooperation has also included developing models to assess systemic risks and also macroprudential policy tools to counteract these risks. Moreover, the earlier European financial supervisory committees have now received the status of public authorities and been given the task of developing technical standards and guidelines in a large number of areas. They shall also play a mediating role, if member states are unable to reach agreement with regard to financial supervision. Recently, important steps have also been taken within the euro area towards the so-called banking union, with the European Central Bank (ECB) as joint financial supervisor for all banks in the member countries.

The situation today is thus similar, with countries around the world contemplating how best to conduct macroprudential policy. In some areas, particularly in some emerging markets, they already have some experience of what could be described as macroprudential policy. However, the results have been somewhat mixed and it is unclear what lessons can be learned. The research on macroprudential policy has now begun in earnest, but it is still quite new and has not yet generated any very clear conclusions on which to base a policy. It is probably unavoidable, therefore, that practical policy-making in coming years will consist to a great extent of “learning by doing” – with the emphasis on both “learning” and “doing”. Stabilisation of the financial cycle One of the two main tasks of macroprudential policy is to counteract the build-up of financial imbalances in the economy. This task can be described as macroprudential policy trying to stabilise something I here choose to call the financial cycle. The academic literature on this subject contains other similar concepts such as “credit cycle” and “leverage cycle.”1 What this means in simple terms is that the volume of loans, indebtedness, asset prices and attitude to risk in the economy vary over time in a way that is not necessarily linked to the economic cycle. One usually calls this the cyclical dimension, or time series dimension, of macroprudential policy.
So the Oxera team sought to capture the benefits of reducing homelessness in getting young people into employment or training, preventing them from re-offending, treating their mental health issues and reducing their substance misuse. These are a subset, albeit an important subset, of the social costs of homelessness. The results of this study, which was published by PBE last year, are outlined in Figure 12. To cut a long story short, the study suggested that, for every £ spent by Centrepoint, there was a societal benefit of at least £ Or, put differently, Centrepoint delivered a social return on investment of 140% over a five year period. This was very much a lower bound estimate. Let me give you a second example of a PBE social impact study, this time on an even grittier issue – child sexual exploitation. In 2012, a PBE team from the Bank of England did a piece of work for Barnardo’s to judge the impact of their interventions to help exploited children. 26 They looked at the reduced incidence of missing person calls to the police, the reduced probability of becoming classified as Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET), reductions in substance misuse and the benefits from secure accommodation. These benefits are outlined in Figure 13. They suggest a higher social welfare multiplier, perhaps as large as six to twelve. This is not miles away from estimates from a recent City of London study.

This expanded role reminds us that the monitoring responsibility of a Central Bank is crucial. Our dedication to stability and our forward looking approach in a globalised financial world is a challenging task. Long lasting cooperation among Central Banks and stimulating conferences like this one largely contribute to this achievement. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 113/2010
Other pertinent examples might be the United Kingdom's dependence on the euro area, Ireland's dependence on the United Kingdom, Switzerland's 4 links with Germany, and so on. Moreover, many of these other currency pairs have exhibited considerable fluctuations when compared with the stability of the cross rate between the renminbi and the Hong Kong dollar in recent years, indicating that exchange rate variability may not be an obstacle to the continuing expansion of mutually beneficial economic ties. On this evidence there would be no obvious advantage in a closer link between the Hong Kong dollar and renminbi. In our particular case, there is a further crucial consideration: the renminbi is not convertible. There would be little logic in trying formally to fix a fully convertible currency against a non-convertible one. One might argue that the constancy of the HK dollar against the renminbi for the past several years amounts to de facto fixing, but it does at least allow for variation at such time as might be justified – for example, in the light of major or sudden structural shifts such as WTO entry or eventual convertibility. It would not anyway be possible to operate Hong Kong's currency board system by reference to a nonconvertible currency, since the essence of the system, namely continuous convertibility between the HK dollar and the anchor currency, would be denied.

(Article 112) "The Exchange Fund of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be managed and controlled by the government of the Region, primarily for regulating the value of the Hong Kong dollar." (Article 113) "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall follow the principle of keeping the expenditure within the limits of revenues in drawing up its budget, and strive to achieve a fiscal balance, avoid deficits and keep the budget commensurate with the growth rate of its gross domestic product." (Article 107) These stipulations confirm the continuance of the Hong Kong dollar as an independent currency; they confirm that the Exchange Fund is available to regulate the exchange rate; they rule out the use of exchange controls; and they provide some comfort that deficit fiscal financing should not attain a scale that would pose a serious threat to monetary stability. Choice of regime But within these parameters the exact monetary arrangements are not prescribed. We have chosen to operate a currency board with a fixed rate against the US dollar. I have recently written and spoken at  2  BIS Review 31/2002  2  some length on the rationale behind this choice and do not intend to repeat all of that today. But let me just reiterate one of my principal contentions – namely that monetary policy, which includes exchange rate policy, cannot determine an economy's competitiveness outside the relatively short term.