samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The flow of liquidity has improved slightly, and interbank rates have fallen. In the US and Europe, these rates were more than 2 percentage points above the key rate in October last year, but now the gap has been halved. As a result, the low rates set by central banks are having a greater effect. In the US, mortgages and corporate loans have become cheaper after the Federal Reserve began to purchase bonds and commercial paper issued by mortgage banks and firms. In Germany, Sweden and Denmark, mortgage rates have decreased markedly. And in Norway, borrowing rates have fallen and credit to homebuyers is flowing again. Equity and commodity prices are still fluctuating widely, but the decline is no longer steep. BIS Review 16/2009  9  Lower key rates, higher public expenditure and reduced taxes will push up demand for goods and services, gradually stabilising output and employment and preventing inflation from becoming too low. There are also strong self-regulating mechanisms in market economies that can easily be underestimated when times are at their bleakest. Corporate profitability is being squeezed, but the rise in unemployment will result in lower wage growth, which will curb the impact on earnings. Investment is falling sharply, but there will in time be a need for new houses and commercial buildings and to replace obsolete machinery. Households all over the world are now increasing their saving and reducing debt. When debt eventually reaches a sustainable level, consumption will pick up.

Mr Carse gives a speech on the subject of credit risk during the Asian crisis Speech by Mr David Carse, a Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asian International Conference & Trade Credit Workshop in Hong Kong on 5 May 1999. Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you today on the subject of credit risk during the Asian crisis. Given the fact that just about every economy in the region has been affected by the crisis to a greater or lesser extent, this is rather a large topic; and I hope that you will forgive me therefore if I begin with some generalities about the region as a whole, but then make some specific observations based on my own direct experience of credit risk as it has affected banks in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a melting pot of international and regional banks and you can be sure that any credit problems that surfaced in Hong Kong during the crisis manifested themselves elsewhere in the region, and probably in a much more virulent form. It is a sobering fact that we are only two months away from the second anniversary of the Asian crisis, and we are still analyzing what went wrong. Explaining the origins of the crisis has helped to maintain many academics, particularly in the United States, in gainful employment.
Would two loans of £ each to the same customer represent a higher level of activity than one loan of £ Methods for measuring FISIM at constant prices are based on conventions. In the UK, real FISIM is calculated by applying the base-year interest margins to an appropriate volume indicator of loans and deposits. The latter is estimated by deflating the corresponding stocks of loans and deposits using the GDP deflator. This method means that any volatility in the current price measure of FISIM caused by changes in interest margins does not feed into the real measure. (c)  Refining the measurement of FISIM  While the introduction of FISIM into the national accounts was an important step forward, it is not difficult to construct scenarios where the contribution of the financial sector to the economy could be mis-measured under this approach. A key issue is the extent to which bearing risk should be measured as a productive service provided by the banking system. (i)  Adjusting FISIM for risk  Under current FISIM guidelines, which use risk-free policy rates to measure the reference rate, banks’ compensation for bearing risk constitutes part of their measured nominal output. 2  4  1993 System of National Accounts, paragraph 6.128: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/toctop2.asp. BIS Review 95/2010  This can lead to some surprising outcomes. For example, assume there is an economy-wide increase in the expected level of defaults on loans or in liquidity risk, as occurred in October 2008.

All in all, developments in the krona have largely been in line with our forecast in the June Inflation Report. So the appreciation of the krona so far is in line with previous forecasts. Should the krona continue to strengthen - and particularly if there is also reason to believe that the appreciation will last - it will of course have implications for our forecast. However, it is currently too soon to come to any real conclusions for inflation in the near future from the perspective that is significant for monetary policy. What these developments have mainly illustrated so far is perhaps how greatly exchange rates can fluctuate and how unexpectedly quick changes in sentiment can be. Developments in the fixed income market have been less dramatic. However, the long-term yield spread on Germany widened slightly in connection with the referendum. In all probability, the current yield spread is partly due to recently better growth prospects in Sweden than in the euro area. It is also reasonable to expect that we will have to pay a certain premium in the form of a differential between Swedish and German long yields for remaining outside the single currency. We can illustrate this by comparing the yield spread in, for instance, Sweden, Finland and Italy (see Chart 1). Swedish long yields are higher than Finland's, whose situation in terms of growth and government finances has been roughly in line with our own. Our yields are also higher compared with Italy, despite their markedly weaker public finances.
I wish you an interesting debate. Thank you for listening. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Thus, in an OECD comparison, Chile is in the lower part of this ratio’s distribution (figure 16). Although the current capital levels are sufficient to absorb a possible severe stress scenario, gaps have narrowed. While every bank’s CAR exceeds the 8-percent regulatory minimum in the stress scenario, the share of banks having a CAR above 10 percent in such a scenario has dropped in recent years, to less than half the system’s assets in the latest test (figure 17). Let me conclude with some final thoughts. Concluding thoughts In the past several months the macroeconomic scenario has brought no big surprises, but that does not mean that challenges have been absent. Inflation has dropped in line with expectations, but remains above the tolerance range. Our projections indicate that in a few more months it will return to that range to then decline towards the 3-percent target. If this is so, we will have ended quite a long period during which inflation was at or above 4 percent and monetary policy-making has been particularly complex, as we have had to deal with a significant depreciation of our currency and the ensuing rise in prices, aside from the economic slowdown. Still we have been able to keep inflation expectations over the projection horizon well anchored to the 3-percent target. In the short term, there are obvious inflationary risks, which could again push back this convergence.
First, we have spent too much time and energy on protracted discussions on prerequisites and pre-conditions, such as a full EDIS, itself pre-conditioned by sovereign de-risking. Second, we should not focus on the creation of new instruments and their financing, but start by making existing ones work better. Third, in order to move beyond political divisions, we need to abandon the sequential approach in which the issues are discussed one after another, so that the smallest obstacle can bring the whole process grinding to a halt. I would like to call for simultaneous, parallel movements on several fronts and to broaden the scope of possible action. While welcoming the ambition of the Eurogroup’s “package” and its President, such a pragmatic method of small and parallel steps could help to move forward again. None of these steps is sufficient, but each of them taken separately would be welcome. Or if you prefer a restaurant analogy, call this proposal “à la carte” rather than a “set menu”… bearing in mind that at the end our lunch must be just as substantial and significant. II. Four pathways towards reigniting the Banking Union Building on this approach, I would like to share with you four possible and broader pathways towards a stronger Banking Union. 1. Moving beyond home/host issues. On this topic, I would like to start by issuing a wake-up call on the effective implementation of cross-border liquidity waivers within the union, as prescribed by the European legislation. They remain far too limited in practice.

Chart 19: Gender pay gap Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition time series  Per cent Unaccounted for  Accounted for  Gender pay gap  35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  2017  2019  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men. Looked at regionally, although the unconditional gender pay gap is relatively stable over the sample in London, once we allow for compositional effects the picture is more promising. The unexplained (“pay bias”) component of pay has fallen over time in London, reaching 5.5% by the end of the sample. Outside London, the gender pay gap has also been on a downward trend, driven by both explained and unexplained factors. Next we implement the same methodology for the ethnicity pay gaps.10 Chart 20 shows the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the ethnicity pay gap over the full sample. The conditional ethnicity pay gap averages a relatively modest 5% over the sample, smaller than for gender. This is no longer the case once we account for compositional effects. These point to higher, rather than lower pay, for ethnic minorities. Specifically,  10  The share of the ethnic minority population has been increasing over time in our sample from approximately 4% in 1994 to 10% in 2019.
According to the monetary policy strategy in Inflation Report 2/06, the sight deposit rate should be in the interval 2¾ - 3¾ per cent in the period to the publication of the next Inflation Report on 1 November, conditional on economic developments that are broadly in line with projections. In the first six months of 2006, the key rate was increased twice by increments of 0.25 percentage point. There are prospects that the interest rate will rise further at about the same pace. In line with this strategy, Norges Bank’s Executive Board decided to raise the sight deposit rate by 0.25 percentage point to 3.00 per cent at its meeting on 16 August. Capacity constraints and a shortage of skilled labour were cited as mounting challenges to a number of industries. At the same  4  BIS Review 80/2006  time, corporate earnings are very high. Local government tax revenues have increased substantially. Household and corporate borrowing remains high. Property prices are rising markedly, and the level of building activity is high. Growth among our trading partners is solid, and a number of countries have raised their policy rates. These factors point to a higher interest rate. At the same time, inflationary pressures, with the exception of energy prices, in the Norwegian economy remain fairly moderate. The krone exchange rate has depreciated recently, but over a period of several quarters the krone has varied around fairly strong levels. Exchange rate movements are difficult to project.

But the Taylor rule is a good test because, other things being equal, the policy rate should be reasonably well in line with it unless there are convincing reasons for a deviation. With this in mind, let us turn to the November interest rate decision. The Monetary Policy Committee decided to raise interest rates by 0.25 percentage points. That decision, of course, was based on the most recent statistics and the indications in the Bank’s forecast. First of all, inflation is far above target and is forecast to continue rising until early in 2012 before tapering off as the year progresses. Second, available measures of inflation expectations indicate that longer-term expectations are considerably above target. These measures of inflation expectations are flawed, of course – perhaps especially so at this time. Survey measures have a tendency to take excessive account of recent inflation, and bond market measures of inflation expectations are skewed by a variety of market imperfections at present. But flawed though they may be, these are the only measures we have, and it would be irresponsible simply to ignore them. Third, indicators suggest that domestic demand was strong in Q3 in spite of the global situation, and that the economic recovery is strong enough not to be derailed by resistance to inflationary pressures through modest rate interest hikes. Fourth, we have the global situation, which is mainly a risk factor at this juncture and has not yet had a measurable impact on domestic economic developments. But we did not merely raise interest rates.
The risk of being out-of-stock in  9  4  As at 6 March 2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Wal-Mart stores equipped with radio frequency technology has been found to be 30% lower than in stores without that technology.10 More resilient supply chain management has also been a trademark of a number of web-based companies. In September 1995, Pierre Omidyar created a website for online buying and selling.11 He did the programming over a weekend and launched Auction Web using the domain name he had bought for his freelance consultancy Echo Bay Technology Group (ebay.com). Omidyar put a broken laser pointer for sale. At the end of its first day, the site had attracted no visitors. Even as transactions grew, so did disputes between buyers and sellers. Transactions between anonymous traders created enormous information problems. With sellers knowing more than buyers about their goods, the market risked being flooded by “lemons”.12 For a time, Omidyar appeared to have created the first-ever global market for lemons. Information markets such as these are notoriously fragile. But the web, underpinned by its common language, provided eBay with a solution to its gigantic lemons problem. Omidyar adapted the site to allow buyers and sellers to give each other feedback on transactions, positive or negative. These scores created a method for buyers to assess risk. It also incentivised good behaviour. Bad traders were removed from the supply chain, while good traders were rewarded with reputational incentives to strengthen their links.

By drawing explicitly on the information embedded in the network, PageRank produced dramatically improved web search capabilities. By now, the graduate project had become a company called Google. The vast, growing multi-dimensional cats-cradle of global information could now be sliced and diced in fractions of a second. Navigating the web no longer required a specialist pilot; it could be mapped by a novice. The World Wide Web had been given an instantaneous backrub. That has yielded vast productivity improvements. Google itself is today valued at around $ billion, having gained in value by on average $ million every week of its life. Applications of Google’s network mapping technology grow by the day. For example, Google indicators produced from the analysis of the popularity of search terms such as “estate agents” or “motor vehicles” have outperformed some existing indicators of house prices and motor sales.19 And what has allowed the World Wide Web to be Googled in this way? A common language. (d)  Lowering barriers to entry  Creating a common language also has the potential to transform the industrial organisation of an industry. It does so by simultaneously expanding the frontiers of a global network and by lowering the barriers to entering it. This allows new companies, with innovative and superior product offerings, to quickly erode the market share of incumbents. Higher productivity and growth have been the fruits.20 Global supply chains are one example. Prior to GS1 standards, small suppliers faced an uphill struggle connecting to global supply chains.
The level of debt, in contrast, seems to matter much less as an indicator of a turn in the financial cycle, though it does seem to matter as an indicator of the extent of the correction and the consequent damage to the economy.24 We also have a wide range of other economic and financial indicators, such as asset prices and credit conditions. We can estimate how far these are above or below an equilibrium value to help us make an assessment of where we are in the financial cycle. And, of course, macroprudential policy makers need to apply their judgment. The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England uses all of these approaches to make its assessment of the level of risk or, to put it another way, where we are in the financial cycle. And we use that assessment to inform our stress test of the core banking system so that the test becomes more severe, with higher losses and greater stress, when we judge the risks in the financial system are getting higher. But we would, in my view, benefit greatly in this area from a better understanding of how the expectations of the future that inform financial sector risk-taking are formed, the ability to use that understanding in modelling the financial cycle and better real-time information on the evolution of expectations.

That is, that we know the range of outcomes that might happen and how the economy works and, insofar as is possible, given uncertainty, that we correctly analyse the available information to weight the probability of those. A famous corollary of this is the efficient markets hypothesis – that it is not possible to systematically ‘beat the market’. The stronger form of the hypothesis posits that market prices fully reflect all available information – that the price reflects the likely future revenue streams. But even if the price does deviate from that fundamental level, it may be rational for investors to remain in the market – as Chuck Prince famously put it, to keep dancing so long as the music is playing. The rewards of the game may be worth the risk of being stuck without a proverbial chair at the end. And even if they are not, sitting on the sidelines may not be a winning career move if promotions and funding flow to those with a reputation for high returns. It may be rational to stay with the herd, as Keynes said “it is better for reputation to fail conventionally”.11 Rational expectations do not mean that the future matches expectations and corrections are avoided – when new information arises, agents react to that. If the information is material for a financial asset, for example a change in Roman property ownership laws in AD 33, the adjustment can be large.
The fan chart is constructed so that outturns of inflation are also expected to lie within each pair of the lighter red areas on 30 occasions. In any particular quarter of the forecast period, inflation is therefore expected to lie somewhere within the fan on 90 out of 100 occasions. And on the remaining 10 out of 100 occasions inflation can fall anywhere outside the red area of the fan chart. Over the forecast period, this has been depicted by the light grey background. See the box on pages 48–49 of the May 2002 Inflation Report for a fuller description of the fan chart and what it represents. BIS central bankers’ speeches  21  Chart 11: The uncertainty parameter in the one year ahead inflation and GDP fan charts Inflation  Standard deviation  GDP  2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2  1998Q1  2001Q1  2004Q1  2007Q1  2010Q1  0.0  2013Q1  Source: Bank calculations. Notes: The chart shows the standard deviation implicit in the one year ahead probability distribution published in the MPC Inflation Reports since 1998. See the box on pages 48–49 of the May 2002 Inflation Report for a fuller description of the fan chart.

Thank you Chair  INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE  the IMFC Deputies meeting Tuesday, September 20, 2022, Statement by Mr. Mouatassem BOUDIAF Deputy Governor Bank of Algeria On behalf of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia Session 2 MD’s Global policy Agenda Thank you, Chair. I will be brief. We welcome the Managing Director’s GPA, which we believe is balanced and well focused. We particularly welcome and strongly support the GPA’s emphasis on “acting together and acting now” to alleviate the immediate hardship due to successive years of global crises, and to build resilience for addressing future shocks. Food insecurity and debt distress are two key challenges facing the developing countries where a global collaborative approach is most urgently needed. It is also important to recognize that the current geopolitical fragmentation will likely have major longer term implications for the global economy and lasting impact on global trade, including energy, and supply chains, for which we have to prepare. We welcome the Fund’s readiness to enhance and adapt its lending toolkit to address not only the immediate financing needs related to the two overlapping crises, but equally importantly, the future crises that could not be easily anticipated. In this connection, we welcome the establishment of the RST and urge members with strong external positions to meet its funding requirements, including through additional pledges to channel SDRs and bilateral contributions.
These are better indicators of the underlying inflationary pressures. Moreover, in the longer run CPI inflation and CPIF inflation coincide. But it has turned out that uncertainty sometimes arises as to which target variable the Riksbank uses, whether it is the CPI or the CPIF. Sometimes it has been said that target fulfilment would be better if CPIF inflation was closer to 2 per cent during the forecast period, even if this means that CPI inflation is further from 2 per cent. I don’t believe this is correct. 11  For a description of the model see L. Christiano, M. Trabandt and K. Walentin, “Introducing financial frictions and unemployment into a small open economy model”, Working Paper no. 214, Sveriges Riksbank, 2007. 12  See C. Goodhart and J.-C. Rochet, “Evaluation of the Riksbank’s monetary policy and work with financial stability 2005–2010”, Sveriges Riksdag, August 2011, p. 66. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, it is natural to highlight the CPIF as a measure of underlying inflation when the forecasts for the CPI and the CPIF differ, and this is because of the Riksbank’s own monetary policy.13 Be clear about resource utilisation The Riksbank also endeavours to stabilise production and employment around sustainable paths of development. However, neither the Riksbank nor the Government and Riksdag have specified what are considered to be sustainable paths for production and employment. We usually try to ensure that resource utilisation is normal towards the end of the forecast period.

16  See, for example, the main report and sub-reports from the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress headed by Professors Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi: “Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress”, September 2009. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  shortages and the RU indicator17 – and CPI inflation.18 The correlation is highest for a lag of 4–6 quarters. Also take into account credit expansion and asset prices We should take credit expansion and asset prices into account more when we formulate our monetary policy. And we should develop and formally integrate the forecasts for credit growth and asset prices into the base for the monetary policy decisions, as well as reporting the uncertainty of the forecasts. Far too many countries have allowed their expansion in credit to be too high for too many years and this has led to very large problems when the bubbles have burst. The low interest rates have been a contributory factor to this trend.