samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
During this time, the Spanish economy has been radically modernised in many other areas, through the adoption of regulatory frameworks and measures comparable to those of the most advanced economies, such as the removal of barriers to trade, the liberalisation of certain sectors, privatisations, etc. However, our labour market, which is characterised by the very high levels of unemployment  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  generated during crises and also by its inability to reduce unemployment rates during upturns, has retained the same institutional structure with no substantial changes for 30 years. The cost for workers of this resistance to reform has been insecurity both for the unemployed and for those who have jobs but fear losing them. The insensitivity of wage growth to the cyclical situation and to productivity generates numerous perverse effects. First and foremost, the adjustment to shocks is borne entirely by employment. But also wage growth in some sectors or firms may be lower than it would have been if more flexible labour institutions had allowed productivity gains at the firm level. This is what one observes when the situation of Spanish workers is compared with that of workers in those European countries that have the highest levels of flexicurity. For all these reasons, as I have so often said, Spain’s labour institutions must be reformed in order to lay the foundations for employment creation and for reducing unemployment from its very high current level to one similar to those of other European countries.

It is quite different in another country where the problems are confined to small institutions, where the ultimate aim should not be their survival in order to avoid a serious interruption in the flow of credit, but rather their removal as soon as possible at as little cost as possible. Indeed, some of the biggest developed economies witnessed, at the onset of the financial crisis, how several of their leading banks were collapsing. This was because, in addition to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the sudden downturn in the value of their assets, they saw the short-term funding channels on which they relied so heavily disappear. Given this scenario, the logical and no doubt inevitable reaction was to swiftly inject huge amounts of public money. Yet in Spain’s case, there was overall excess capacity in the sector and the problems were at a group of small or medium-sized institutions with a reasonably long-term financing structure. All told, the advisability of earmarking public funds to these institutions immediately was much less evident. On one hand, it is not surprising that ailing institutions should apply for public aid, if possible without conditions. But the mission of the authorities is to look out for the general interest, setting conditions for this aid that ensure the adjustment and restructuring of the sector and the creation of new, stronger and better managed institutions, of a sufficient size to gain access to wholesale funding, thus enabling them to channel funds appropriately to the economy as a whole.
That was not just deeply regrettable for the institutions concerned, but also it damaged a proud and long tradition of sound banking in Scotland. It pained me, in my role as the person responsible for resolving a number of these problems, to see the lack of regard for the basics of a well run bank, the foundations which must be there to be sound and successful. I have spent the last seven years also responsible for the Bank of England’s banking operations, and I know from this experience that unless you really understand your balance sheet and its risks, the systems and control environment that supports the balance sheet, and you have the basics needed well covered – the reconciliations work, the right management information available promptly – you aren’t doing your job. It isn’t sexy or headline grabbing, but it is surely what the good Scottish bankers of the past taught us to do, and what I hope is back with the current generation. The financial crisis has moved on since those earlier days. Over the last twelve months, concerns with both sovereign states and their banking systems have intensified in other parts of Europe. Recently, the IMF and European authorities have moved to put in place a substantial package of support for Ireland.

In an important financial centre like Edinburgh, we need to be well connected, and to understand your assessment of the threats to financial stability and we need to explain what we are doing to tackle these threats. Our market intelligence function under my colleague Paul Fisher plays an important role here, and is in frequent contact with the Scottish financial community. This contact will be even more important under the new arrangements in which the Bank will be responsible for macroprudential policy and its focus on the stability of the financial system, with a new policy making body, the Financial Policy Committee, or FPC. Alongside and feeding into the Bank’s macroprudential role will be our new responsibility for microprudential supervision of deposit takers, insurers and major securities dealers, also in a new body, the Prudential Regulation Authority, or PRA. It is therefore a period of major change at the Bank, and we are taking very seriously our role in building a system of regulation in the UK that must meet the very reasonable expectations of the public for a safer and sounder financial system. The overarching objective for the Bank is to put the stability of the financial system at the heart of the mission of financial regulation. We are now in the fourth year since the financial crisis started in the middle of 2007. The Scottish banking system took a pounding during the earlier stages of the crisis.
The considerable strengths of the institutional framework of the Fed - full de jure independence, the depth of technical talent, a committee designed to bring a diversity of independent perspectives to the monetary policy decision making process - have not been strong enough to deliver consistently good monetary policy decisions over time. The constituency for price stability in the United States today seems broad and strong and reasonably bipartisan, but it's been a generation since we've had high inflation and had to face the costs of bringing it down. It seems like a long time since monetary policy has been the subject of major political or popular attention. And the extent of deference the Fed now enjoys - the extent of de facto autonomy - is a relatively recent, surprisingly recent phenomenon, and substantially due to the competence demonstrated by the past two chairmen. Monetary policy has been the beneficiary of a long period of good fortune in the form of smaller and less adverse external shocks, a sustained and very large acceleration in productivity, the disinflationary forces produced by global economic integration, greater flexibility in the U.S. economy and improved financial sector resilience, and the effects of these factors and technological change in reducing macroeconomic volatility. We don't know much about the probabilities surrounding the future path of most of these variables. We face a number of transitions ahead that will have important implications for U.S. monetary policy.

At the end of 2015, in Bulgaria the share of SEPA credit transfers in the total number of customers’ credit transfer orders in euro was 59%, and the migration to the EMV standard for bank payment cards and POS terminals is over 90% and is nearly complete. • With effect from 1 February 2016, Member States must remove settlement-based national reporting obligations on payment service providers for balance of payments statistics relating to payment transactions of their customers. Soon the National Assembly is going to pass amendments to the Currency Law, introduced with the Law on consumers’ real estate loans, and the related changes are going to be made to Ordinance No.27 on the balance of payment statistics. Therefore, payment service providers will no longer be required, for the needs of the balance of payments statistics, to keep registers and provide the BNB with information on transactions and payments between residents and non-residents and on  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  cross-border transfers of over BGN 100 000. We expect that these changes would be passed by the end of July this year. • In relation to the agreement reached between the MoF, BNB and market participants, the BNB as the fiscal agent of the government works on a project for the technical implementation of direct connection of the Government Securities Depository with the EBOND system to the BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL platform and the system of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange.
06  07  08  Sources: The NIER, Statistics Sweden and the Riksban  Figure 8. Repo rate with uncertainty bands Per cent, quarterly averages  7  7  90% 75% 50% Outcome  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 Jun-02  0 Jun-03  Jun-04  Jun-05  Jun-06  Jun-07  Jun-08  Jun-09  Jun-10  Source: The Riksbank  BIS Review 111/2007  9  Figure 9. Expectations of the repo rate according to implied forward rates Per cent  8  8  Repo rate Implied forward rates  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1 0  0 99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Source: The Riksbank  Figure 10.

The reasons for this could be a combination of unclear communication on our part and a willingness among some market agents to read too much into what was actually said. The more our new policy of not signalling between monetary policy meetings becomes established, the better the communication will work. We Executive Board members will of course assess new information continuously and have instantaneous opinions on where we are heading. All those who make forecasts know that one’s opinion of how the future will look like varies over time. But one day one must put one's foot down. It is mainly the result of this sometimes convoluted process that is the interesting factor, although the journey also has some information value. For us Executive Board members each monetary policy meeting is the final point of one such process and it is not until then that we make our collective assessment. Thank you! BIS Review 111/2007  5  Figure 1. Labour market had tightened Per cent of labour force  12  12 Open unemployment Total unemployment  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Note. The broken line refers to the Riksbank’s forecast in MPR 2007:2. Figure 2.
All these developments reflect Singapore’s ideal position for asset managers to deepen and broaden their activities in the Asian time-zone. Annual accounts 28. On our financial statements, MAS recorded a net profit of $ billion for the financial year. The profits comprised mainly interest income, as changes in the valuation of foreign assets and the foreign exchange effects of a stronger Singapore dollar largely offset each other. Total assets, including the Currency Fund, grew by $ billion during the year to $ billion at end-March 2008. 4  BIS Review 94/2008  Remaining vigilant 29. We need to remain vigilant in the face of a number of risks in the global economic and financial environment. We will continue to work closely with the industry to identify vulnerabilities and threats to financial stability through macro surveillance and stress testing. MAS’ work in the coming year will continue to be driven by our mission of supporting noninflationary economic growth, and fostering a sound and reputable financial centre. 30. Thank you. BIS Review 94/2008  5

Growth is anticipated to be low also next year and approach trend growth in 2001. Demand growth could be higher than expected, which would contribute to maintaining the pressure in the labour market. Employment is still high and near capacity level, while we see a tendency towards higher unemployment in sectors such as the construction and engineering industries. Chart 13 Unemployment rate. Per cent 6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  Source: SSB Legg inn filadresse her  Inflation is expected to remain at around 2% for the next two years, with inflation rates of 2¼% this year, 2% next year and 1¾% in 2001. Chart 14 shows the key technical assumptions underlying Norges Bank’s projections. Short-term interest rates are assumed to move in line with market expectations, as reflected in forward rates in September (Chart 15). According to market expectations, the differential against European rates will narrow from the current level of a little more than 3 percentage points to around 1 percentage point at the end of 2001. The krone exchange rate is assumed to be NOK 8.30 against the euro throughout the projection period. Developments, as indicated by Norges Bank’s analyses, imply that there is little room for further decreases in interest rates.
In this setting, one of the main priorities for those responsible for ensuring the stability of the financial system with powers over macroprudential policy is, in my view, to develop a complete and coherent policy framework for the application and communication of that policy. And, in this task, the contribution of academia is of vital importance. In what follows, I would like to share some preliminary thoughts on some of the elements that, in my opinion, should be included in this framework. In particular, I would like to focus on two specific issues: first, the macroprudential policy objectives, which of course should be the basis for the activation of the instruments; and second, the choice among the different tools at the disposal of the macroprudential authority to best achieve these objectives in different circumstances. What should be the objective(s) of macroprudential policy? Allow me to focus now exclusively on banks and on one particular instrument, the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB), the Basel III macroprudential tool par excellence. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) its first objective is rather narrow: The primary aim of the countercyclical capital buffer regime is to use a buffer of capital to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth that have often been associated with the build-up of system-wide risk.

In fact, it cannot be ruled out that banks will step up the growth of the most profitable portfolios, which are precisely those the authorities are trying to moderate, to the detriment of the rest, in order to safeguard aggregate profitability. To achieve the objective of exclusively moderating the growth of the exhuberant portfolios, it would be necessary to act on the relative costs of financing, making these more expensive in relative terms, through the activation of a countercyclical capital buffer to be applied exclusively on those credit segments. However, the coexistence between both tools can be complex, especially if a  8/11  transition from one or several sectorial buffers to the total buffer must be made. Accordingly, its use should be confined to very specific circumstances. Another example is the use of capital instruments vs borrower-based tools. From my perspective, making all prudential supervision rely upon the amount of capital that entities need is too reductionist: the experience accumulated during the last financial crisis clearly shows how credit underwriting standards are a crucial element for the stability of the banking system. And this same evidence4 also shows that the analysis of credit standards must be multidimensional. Therefore, it is not enough to supervise and control a specific characteristic of the loan; rather, a comprehensive approach must be adopted in which the different dimensions are addressed. This would also prevent entities from eluding restrictions by adjusting some other dimension of the loan.
Market participants recognize this successful defense of the exchange rate in the past fifteen years, although in a short run any change may cause, through the transmission effects, only temporary increase of the nominal, and thus of real interest rates in the economy. A logical consequence of all this is that a possible reflation in the Eurozone means that the Republic of Macedonia will not become an isolated island doomed to disinflation and, vice versa, that if the Euro continues to prove effective in delivering low inflation in the Eurozone, in the Republic of Macedonia internal depreciation will be the preferred course of adjustment. The differences between inflation rates in the Republic of Macedonia and the Eurozone will remain temporary and limited. In fact, this marks the success of the stable exchange rate as an intermediate target of the monetary policy which consists of the aforementioned difference of 0.2 percentage points between the inflation in the Republic of Macedonia and the inflation in the Eurozone. In the long run, this enables economic agents to have more definite expectations about the general price level and denotes support to the economic environment. In such monetary policy setting it should be noted that the National Bank, as a public institution, constantly needs to cooperate with the Government without undermining the autonomy of any of these two institutions.

The price of five-year futures contracts for West Texas Intermediate crude has almost doubled in the last three years. Following the sudden rise last spring, US capital market rates have since dropped back to the year-earlier level. The temporary increase in capital market rates in Europe was slightly less pronounced. As a result of the opposing movements of the US and European interest rates of the past few weeks, the long-term dollar interest rates now exceed the corresponding interest rates in the euro area by approximately 50 basis points. On the one hand, the general interest rate development in the capital markets reflects market participants’ misgivings concerning the strength of the economic upswing. On the other hand, the historically low nominal interest rates are testimony to the markets’ confidence in the ability and determination of central banks to further ensure price stability. Moreover, the interest rate structure in the US is characterised by the sizeable dollar investments from Asia. International equity markets trended sideways for much of the year, although some emerging market indices in particular were able to generate significant profits. 2. Managing the National Bank’s assets  The National Bank manages monetary reserves slightly in excess of CHF 60 billion, two-thirds of which are held in foreign currency investments and one-third in gold. In addition to this are approximately 25-30 billion Swiss franc assets in the form of balances from repo transactions in the  1/2  money market and bond investments in the domestic capital market.
Number of hits for “financial frictions” in EconLit 100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Banerjee, R., S. Cecchetti and B. Hofmann, (2013), “Flexible inflation targeting: Performance and challenges”, in Reichlin, L. and R. Baldwin, (ed. ), “Is Inflation Targeting Dead? Central Banking After the Crisis”, Centre for Economic Policy Research. Bean, C., (2013), “Nominal income targets: an old wine in a new bottle”, speech at the Institute for Economic Affairs Conference on the State of the Economy, London, 27 February. Bech, M.L., L. Gambacorta and E. Kharroubi, (2012), “Monetary policy in a downturn: Are financial crises special?”, BIS Working Papers No. 388. Bernanke, B.S.,T. Laubach, F.S. Mishkin and A.S. Posen (1999), Inflation Targeting – Lessons from the International Experience, Princeton University Press. Bernanke, B.S., (2004), “The Great Moderation”, speech at the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, 20 February. Bini Smaghi, L., (2013) “Who killed the inflation target?”, in Reichlin, L. and R. Baldwin, (ed. ), “Is Inflation Targeting Dead? Central Banking After the Crisis”, Centre for Economic Policy Research. Brunnermeier, M.K., T.M. Eisenbach and Y. Sannikov, (2012), “Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey”, NBER Working Paper 18102.

This MoU sets a framework of cooperation among OIC member countries in key economic activities, with the objective of enhancing the opportunities for economic growth and development. Today’s Seminar is indeed a testimony to the continued efforts by both the IDB and Malaysia in enhancing the cooperation and deepening of business relationship. As all of us are aware, infrastructure development is a critical component to unlock potential economic activities, thus supporting sustainable economic growth of a nation. Malaysia has placed great emphasis on infrastructure development as part of its economic transformation, diversifying from agriculture to manufacturing and, in more recent years, in the services sector as well. Over the last ten years, the Government of Malaysia has allocated a total of nearly RM100 billion for infrastructure development mainly in transport, energy and public utilities. The Malaysian government has also encouraged the participation of the private sector in the development of infrastructure through privatization and the public-private partnership (PPP) policies. On the global front, the estimated value of infrastructure development is estimated to be USD35 trillion over the next 20 years. For the Asian region alone, a study done by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) reveals that the region needs USD750 billion per year over the year 2010–2020 to meet the rising needs of infrastructure development. Out of this, the needs for the ASEAN region have been estimated to be over USD60 billion per year. Considering the vast opportunities of infrastructure projects regionally and globally, Malaysian contractors should seize the opportunity for further expansion of their business.