samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is therefore of course desirable that the extended repo-rate path is perceived as credible. As I mentioned earlier, it is possible that the extended repo-rate path with an unchanged repo rate further ahead would be perceived as less credible than a lower repo-rate path with a reduced repo rate now. In this case the effects are shown by the curves marked “Unexpected”. However, as the extended repo-rate path can be justified by the fact that it provides better outcomes for inflation and resource utilisation than the main scenario it may perhaps be perceived as being more credible, in which case the effects are shown by the curves marked “Expected”. 4  4  The effects of deviations from the repo-rate path of the main scenario on inflation, output and hours worked are calculated using the Riksbank's model Ramses with the methods described in Laséen and Svensson (2009) for expected deviations and Leeper and Zha (2003) for unexpected deviations. They are discussed in more detail in Svensson (2010c). The lower repo-rate path gives as an expected deviation (unexpected deviation in parenthesis) a largest increase in CPIF inflation of 0.42 (0.22) percentage points, in output of 0.33 (0.21) per cent and in hours worked of 0.35 (0.22) per cent. The extended repo-rate path gives as an expected deviation (unexpected in parenthesis) a largest increase in CPIF inflation of 0.48 (0.25) percentage  BIS Review 60/2010  5  Figure 2.

That the Riksbank should aim to stabilise inflation follows from the Act’s price-stability objective, which the Riksbank has chosen to specify as an inflation target of 2 per cent. That the Riksbank should stabilise resource utilisation follows from the fact that the preparatory work for the Act states that the Riksbank “without prejudice to the price-stability target, should support the goals of general economic policy with a view to maintaining a sustainable level of growth and a high rate of employment”. 3 So what can the Riksbank do in order to achieve sustainable growth and high employment without prejudicing the price stability objective? Well, the best thing the Riksbank can do is to attempt to stabilise resource utilisation around a normal level. But why around a normal level? Surely, a higher level of output and employment than normal would be better? Yes, but it is beyond the power of monetary policy to increase the average level of output and employment and thus increase average resource utilisation. To increase the average level of resource utilisation one would have to use areas of policy other than monetary policy, for example a structural policy designed to improve competitiveness and the workings of the labour market. Unfortunately – as 40 years of experience have shown and 30 years of research have explained – attempts to use monetary policy to keep resource utilisation above the normal level only result in average inflation being higher than the target without raising the average level of resource utilisation.
Svein Gjedrem: Interest rates, the exchange rate and the outlook for the Norwegian economy Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to the Mid-Norway Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Trondheim, 28 November 2007. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 31 October and in Monetary Policy Report 3/07. *  *  *  Introduction Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards low and stable inflation with annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. The objective of low and stable inflation provides the economy with a nominal anchor. This means that all economic agents – households and enterprises, whether large or small – can plan ahead on the assumption that inflation will be low and stable. In a small, open and decentralised market economy like Norway, and with our particular industry structure, there will be cyclical fluctuations. When economic agents have confidence that inflation is low and stable over time, the interest rate can also be set with a view to dampening the fluctuations somewhat. Low inflation and solid growth in the Norwegian economy Inflation in Norway decelerated markedly from the late-1980s to the mid-1990s and has since been low and stable, and fairly close to, but somewhat lower than the target of 2.5 per cent, with considerably lower variability than earlier.

Global growth will also influence oil prices and developments in prices for other commodities. Oil prices are high and futures prices indicate that they will remain so. The price of Brent Blend has averaged close to USD 70 per barrel so far this year. In recent months, the price has been well above this level. Gas prices have also increased in recent years, reflecting the rise in oil prices and gas shortages in Europe. Gas prices fell somewhat in the first half of 2007, partly as a result of the decline in UK gas prices and the fall in oil prices in the first half of 2007. Both UK gas prices and oil prices have risen again this autumn. Gas prices are expected to remain at a high level, and the price of Norwegian gas may rise in the period ahead. A long period of high oil prices has boosted investment in oil and gas activities, leading to a strong increase in domestic activity in recent years. The level of petroleum investment is historically high and the outlook is favourable. The discovery rate on the Norwegian continental shelf appears to be high this year. The number of applicants for new exploration activities is unusually high. Coupled with high oil prices, these factors will contribute to increased activity on the Norwegian continental shelf in coming years. At the same time, the composition of production is changing. Oil production is on the decline and has not been lower since 1994.
If the central bank uses all relevant information in constructing these forecasts , including the impact of changes in financial conditions on inflation and resource utilisation at any horizon, monetary policy will automatically respond in the best possible way to changing financial conditions (Woodford 2007, 2010a). One lesson from the financial crisis is that financial conditions may in times of crisis have a strong and deteriorating effect on the transmission mechanism, making standard interest-rate policy less effective. This motivates more research on how to incorporate financial conditions and financial intermediation into the standard models of the transmission mechanism used by central banks. Much progress has already been made in understanding these effects (see Adrian and Shin 2010a, Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010 and Woodford 2010a). The relation between monetary policy and financial-stability policy As mentioned, an important conclusion from the financial crisis is that neither price stability nor interest-rate policy are enough to achieve financial stability (Carney 2009, White 2006). Good flexible inflation targeting by itself does not achieve financial stability. Furthermore, the policy rate is an ineffective instrument for influencing financial stability, and policy rates high enough to have a noticeable effect on credit growth and house prices will have a strong negative effect on inflation and resource utilisation, even in sectors that are not experiencing any speculative activity. Specific policies and instruments are needed to ensure financial stability. A good financial-stability policy framework is necessary to ensure financial stability. Monetary policy cannot serve as a substitute.

William C Dudley: Economic opportunity and income mobility Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development Annual Community Development Conference, New York City, 11 April 2016. *  *  *  Good morning. I am very pleased to speak at the 6th Annual Community Development Conference. I would like to give a special thanks to the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development for organizing this conference about issues of importance to the community development industry and to the future of New York City. At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, we develop a wide variety of research and data products to gain a deeper understanding of regional economic conditions. We track the health of household balance sheets at the state and local level using data from the New York Fed’s Consumer Credit Panel. We also conduct an annual poll of small businesses to understand their credit needs and credit availability. My meeting with you today is part of our continuing efforts to understand what is going on at the grassroots level of our economy and to share insights from the New York Fed. The Federal Reserve has dual objectives, set by Congress, with respect to monetary policy – maximum sustainable employment and price stability. I would like to focus my remarks today on the first of these objectives.
Protecting economic muscle: Finance and the Covid crisis Speech given by Alex Brazier, Executive Director for Financial Stability Strategy and Risk, Bank of England Member of the Financial Policy Committee  CFO Virtual Agenda 23 July 2020  I am grateful to Imane Bakkar, Alina Barnett, Kiman Bassi, Richard Button, Mai Daher, Lee Foulger, Dan Gray, Benjamin King, Philip King, Sophie Stone, Matt Waldron, and Danny Walker for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  These are immensely challenging and uncertain times for many of you. You have faced the reality of the economic numbers that hit the headlines: the precipitous fall in output, followed more recently by the beginnings of a normalisation in some sectors as public health measures have been eased. The path followed by the economy in recent months has had more to do with epidemiology than economics. How the public health situation, and therefore the economy, evolve over the coming months and quarters remains to be seen. The target of economic policy has been to minimise the longer-term ‘scarring’ of our economy’s muscle; muscle that is made up of your and other businesses. The aim is to minimise the harm to our productive capacity – to allow output and employment to get as close as possible to their pre-covid paths, once public health measures are lifted fully. Scarring could arise easily.

I am confident that the distinguished speakers from various institutions, who are present at this conference, would share further helpful ideas and suggestions (we already heard some very interesting ones in the previous discussions), thus ensuring the formulation of sound measures to be incorporated in our policies on remittances. And I strongly hope this exchange of experiences and expertise will continue in the future and contribute producing adequate human, infrastructure, and institutional capacities to transform remittances from potential into real driving forces for the development of our countries. Again, my highest consideration for this activity and Thank you for your attention! 5/5
The resulting fragmentation contributed to the growth of highfrequency trading. See CESR (2009), ‘Impact of MiFID on equity secondary markets functioning’, CESR/09-355, and ESMA (2014), ‘High-frequency trading activity in EU equity markets’, Economic Report 1. 3 See Carney, M (2015), ‘Building real markets for the good of the people’. 2  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  Fast markets and market efficiency  There is much evidence that these developments have improved the day-to-day liquidity and efficiency of these markets; that is, the degree to which participants are able to transact in reasonable size in a timely manner, at or close to prevailing prices – giving rise to prices that accurately reflect market participants’ aggregate view of asset values. Empirical research has found that, on average, the presence of high-frequency traders has been associated with improved headline measures of liquidity, at least for trading in small size. There are two reasons why this might be the case. First, as mentioned above, because automated traders are able to achieve low operating costs per transaction, they are able to charge a narrower bid-ask spread as compensation for providing market making services (Chart 6). Second, their speed allows them to update or cancel their (limit) orders quickly as news arrives, meaning their quotes are less likely to be stale when they are executed 4  (Chart 7). There is also evidence to suggest the presence of high frequency trading can improve market efficiency. 5  These are potentially important benefits.

One obvious concern would be if a prime broker or clearing bank was paralysed, including for reasons unconnected to its activity in fast markets – say because of a cyber attack. I think it is fair to say that our understanding of how market functioning would respond in such a scenario – i.e. one in which a number of, in particular high-frequency, liquidity providers were denied market access – remains relatively limited. If there is a common theme across all three of my examples, it is the limits of our understanding. None of the points I have raised with regard to market resilience are wholly new. We at the Bank are following developments in the structure of these markets and their implications for financial stability closely, 19  including through discussions within the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee (FPC). And as regulator both  of many participants in electronic markets and some of those markets themselves, the Financial Conduct 19  See, for example, Shafik, M (2015), ‘Dealing with change: liquidity in evolving market structures’ and the analysis of the sterling flash crash in box 3 of the Financial Stability Review, November 2016 (pages 39-41). 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  Authority (FCA) too has remained deeply engaged and responsive to those developments which fall under its purview. 20  Likewise, in none of these cases have I argued that there is a risk flashing red that requires an immediate response.
Indeed, employment held up well during the recession, declining by less than 2 percent over a brief period in early 2009, and has averaged a nearly 3 percent annualized growth rate since then. Job growth has been particularly strong at retailers, hotels and restaurants, and also service firms ranging from advertising to engineering. That said, the employment picture does have some difficulties. For example, there is concern over some well-paying health sector jobs given the financial strain at Long Island College Hospital and Interfaith Medical Center and the pressure to close those institutions. Brooklyn’s economic vitality is also reflected in the commercial real estate market, as both office and retail vacancy rates have fallen steadily over the past few years. In fact, office vacancy rates are now lower in Brooklyn than in Manhattan. The strength in the housing market is also evident, with the median home price up by roughly 10 percent in each of the past two years, and the rental market has shown similar strength. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, these increasing prices also raise two other issues that acutely afflict many in Brooklyn and New York City more broadly: housing affordability and poverty. Despite Brooklyn’s economic renaissance and growing affluence, a large swath of the Borough’s population – one in four residents – still lives in poverty, and many struggle to pay their rent or mortgage. Even with the strong pace of job creation, Brooklyn’s unemployment rate has remained high, averaging more than 9 percent in 2013.

There are also continued financial challenges for families here as indicated by the New York Fed’s measures of credit conditions. As of the end of 2013, average debt per person was about $ in Brooklyn – little changed over several years. At the same time, the Borough’s delinquency rate on that debt is now 11.6 percent, much higher than the state average and more than double the national average. What’s more, the mortgage crisis continues to take a toll on local homeowners. As of the end of 2013, more than 11 percent of mortgage debt in Brooklyn was 90-plus days delinquent, again significantly higher than the New York State and national delinquency rate. I also want to make a few comments about the impact of Superstorm Sandy. While areas of the New York City metropolitan region were hard hit by the storm, the devastation was particularly severe along the waterfronts of Brooklyn – and in particular in southern Brooklyn and neighborhoods like Red Hook. We saw and heard about the devastation of the storm from many of those affected, including a number of our own employees as well as other residents we met at a series of assistance clinics we organized in response to the storm. Those already living close to the edge financially were particularly vulnerable as were the City’s public housing residents. Still, Brooklyn’s economy showed resilience: while employment did drop in November 2012, it bounced back strongly the next month and accelerated during the spring of 2013, reaching new highs.
The truth is that questions of European financial solidarity will mainly come in the post-crisis period, which I shall now address. 2.2 Initial strategic thinking on the post-crisis environment Beyond the present emergency and consensus, we must start to consider “postcrisis”. It raises some very open questions, some of which are premature. Let me begin, very simply, with what we know and what we do not know:  Page 5 of 8  We know that growth will be strongly negative in 2020, then positive in 2021. However, we do not know the numbers involved: they depend on the peak lockdown period – 1.5% of GDP is lost with every two weeks –, our ability to bounce back afterwards, and the chain of events with regard to public health and the economy in the rest of the world.  We now know that despite our initial hopes, we will not suddenly go from the current phase of general lockdown to a final phase of complete freedom of movement. Between, there will be a phase 2 of relative lockdown, which will gradually be wound down, potentially over a long period of time. However, we do not yet know how: this is where the interaction between the battle for public health and the battle for the economy will have to be optimised, and where public debate will have to bring together doctors and economists. Their opinions may converge more easily than we believe.

If the 15  government succeeds in negotiating a “new, comprehensive, bold and ambitious free trade agreement ” with the EU, and in opening up trade with non-European countries, the UK’s overall degree of openness may not worsen and it could improve. If so, and all else equal, the currency should in time rebound. But this makes longer-term investment in the tradable sector a somewhat tricky decision. Either the currency market is too pessimistic, in which case sterling’s depreciation is likely to be reversed over time. Or it’s not, in which case the costs of exporting will eventually go up. Barring some other source of exchange rate weakness, such as a sharp rise in the household saving rate (which would have its own implications for the economy), the sweet spot is unlikely to last indefinitely. So while investments with shorter-term payoffs make commercial sense, especially for those already running up against capacity constraints, the uncertainties involved in longer-term decisions could temper the usually positive response of business spending to depreciations in the exchange rate. Indeed they’re probably already doing so somewhat. In its latest forecasts the MPC expects this caution to persist. That’s why, in the central projection in the February Inflation Report, growth slows slightly this year, from 2.0% at the end of last year to 1.7% by 2017Q4.
Figure 16 Output gap (1)(2) (level, percentage points) Mar-21 Report  4  Jun-21 Report  0  -4  -8  -12  -16 19  20  21  22  23  (1) Historic estimates of the gap have changed because of recalculation of Potential GDP. The forecast uses the Multivariate Filter, which factors in the new Non-mining trend GDP (20212030 average: 2.9%). (2) Dotted lines show forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Page 22 of 27  Figure 17 Inflation forecast (annual variation, percent) 5  CPI  MP Report Jun.21  Core CPI (*)  MP Report Jun.21  4  3  2  1  Forecast  0  20  21  22  23  (*) Measured by the CPI minus volatiles. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, National Statistics Institute (INE), and Health Ministry of Chile. Figure 18 Total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Chile (*) (percent) 6  TFP  5  1997-2019 mean  2011-2019 mean  4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  2017  2019  (*) Annual growth in TFP for non-mining GDP. For details, see the monetary policy meeting's minutes released together with this Monetary Policy Report. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Other annexes are still under development and will be finalized during the course of this year. Second, I would like to inform the Committee of the results of an evaluation that the CBC voluntarily underwent as part of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) pilot scheme for the new Central Banks Transparency Code. The Code, which was approved by the IMF in July 2020, covers transparency in governance, policies, operations, outcomes, and official relations.7 This evaluation was done over five months, and concluded that “the Central 5  This document can be seen at https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/PP/2020/English/PPEA2020038.ashx The Panel was composed by former Governor of the Bank of Israel Karnit Flug (Chair of the Panel); Senior Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Member of the Financial Stability Committee of the Bank of England, and former Vice Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Donald Kohn; Professor at the University of Cambridge, England, and Expert Evaluator on Transparency and Communication of Monetary Policy Petra Geraats; Professor at the University of Columbia University, United States, and former Chief Economist of the IADB Guillermo Calvo; and University of Pennsylvania Professor and former IMF Research Fellow Enrique Mendoza. The Panel conducted its work between January and September 2019. Both the final report and the CBC’s response to each of the Panel’s recommendations are available at https://www.bcentral.cl/documents/33528/2077651/BCCh_Evaluaci%C3%B3n_Externa-Respuesta_BCCh.pdf 7 For the IMF’s Central Bank Transparency Code, see footnote 5. For the result of the CBC evaluation, see 6  Page 13 of 27  Bank of Chile has implemented broadly advanced transparency practices.