samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So does the responsibility for breaking off talks lie entirely with Greece? The decision to interrupt discussions was taken by the Greek authorities. That also surprised us, for we were coming to the end of some quite focused and fruitful exchanges. You are talking about proposals in the past tense. Does the ECB consider that the question to be put to the Greeks in the referendum is already null and void, since the assistance arrangement will no longer be relevant from the evening of 30 June? The programme will indeed formally expire on Tuesday evening. Having said that, if the response is “yes” I have no doubt that the euro area authorities will find the means, one way or another, to honour the commitments that have been made. The question is a political one. It’s the Greeks who hold the answer to that question. And if the Greeks say “no”… That would be to refuse the offer made by the other 18 members of the euro area. It would then be very difficult to revive the political dialogue. The Eurogroup clearly considered that the proposals of the three institutions had reached the limits of what was acceptable. Alexis Tsipras feels that Europe has not lived up to its commitments on debt restructuring… The debt question was indeed a priority for the Greek government.

Proposal for a Regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector6 The Regulation contains the following basic concepts: - introducing requirements for the management by financial entities of the ICT-related risks and for the reporting to the competent authorities of major ICT-related incidents and digital operational resilience testing; - sharing information on cyber threats and vulnerabilities; - prescribing measures for the sound management by financial entities of the risk related to ICT third-party service providers; - introducing requirements for the contractual arrangements between ICT third-party service providers and financial entities; - establishing an oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers when providing services to financial entities. 5.2. Proposal for a Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets7 The Regulation defines the notion ‘crypto-asset’8 and lists the main types of cryptoassets, distinguishing between three sub-categories of crypto-assets: - Asset-referenced tokens9. Such tokens may be offered to the public only by credit institutions authorised to operate in the EU or by entities which hold the authorisation referred 6  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/BG/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0595 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/BG/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0593 8 ‘Crypto-asset’ means a digital representation of value or rights which may be transferred and stored electronically, using distributed ledger technology or similar technology; 7  4  to in the Regulation. However, issuers should always draw up and publish a crypto-asset white paper – a special information document which must comply with mandatory content and form requirements.
That paper £ note contains sophisticated counterfeit protections ranging from holographic images to ultraviolet features, which will be further enhanced when we switch to a polymer £ in 2020;  -  12  The foundation of the payments system, RTGS, which processes over £ billion of bank-to-bank payments per day to the highest standards of efficiency and resilience;  13  8  The data are for 2016. To note, banknotes accounted for 45% of transactions in 2015, and as such there was a 5 percentage point fall year-on-year which may be related to increased use of cards and online payments. 9 See McLeay, M., Radia, A., and Thomas, R., (2014), Money Creation in the Modern Economy, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1, which notes that the reality of how money is created often differs from that found in standard textbooks, and rather than banks receiving deposits when households save and then lending them out, bank lending creates deposits. 10 Although it does not target monetary aggregates per se, the Bank of England conducts monetary policy to ensure the amount of money creation in the economy is consistent with low and stable inflation. In normal times, the Bank of England implements monetary policy by setting the interest rate on central bank reserves. In exceptional times when interest rates cannot be lowered further, the Bank implements monetary policy by purchasing assets, which has the by-product of increasing the central bank reserve holdings of private banks.

Because they are an essential element for the financial sector: they deliver creativity and they understand new needs rapidly. And they bring to the forefront French scientific expertise and technology: artificial intelligence, cryptography, distributed ledger technology, etc. Regardless of how they are integrated into the financial sector – via cooperation or direct competition with established players – they make the industry more dynamic. This is also true with regard to the entry into financial services of the Bigtechs, which are often less keen on competition. I'm not just saying this to please the Fintechs that are here with us today. It is a deeply-held belief and a commitment, on my part and on that of the entire ACPR. But what, I hear you ask, are you doing concretely to help the Fintechs in their development? Let me start by reminding you that the Banque de France is working with Fintechs on two levels: via its mission of providing services to the economy – to businesses and SMEs – and via its mission of safeguarding financial stability. Our role as a central bank and supervisor, is to reconcile confidence and innovation. If you would allow me to borrow a metaphor from the history of the railroads – which were originally a major innovation in the 19th century, but also one that was not without its risks – our role is to prevent the train from derailing and to make sure the passengers aren’t afraid to get on board.
Our Governing Council will do whatever it takes to fulfil our primary price stability mandate; have no doubt about that. It is therefore particularly important for the fiscal authorities to ensure debt sustainability in a context of rising interest rates. It is an understatement to say that this issue was far from dominating the French election campaign, so I will first develop the reasons why debt must remain a key issue (I), before discussing possible fiscal rules - including European ones (II). ** I. Why debt must remain at the forefront of economic concerns 1. Ensuring fiscal sustainability Faced with the Covid storm, the public authorities rightly activated both the fiscal and monetary levers. Public debts rose significantly in 2020 and 2021 to absorb  Page 2 of 9 the economic fallout of the crisis: an increase of 16% of GDP in France and 12% of GDP in the euro area. The “whatever it takes” was justified in 2020; however, the downside was that the massive increase in debt started to be considered trivial. Many of our fellow citizens, in good faith, do not understand why the French Treasury would refuse one-billion-euro spendings, when hundreds of billions were suddenly easy to find. Debt became unlimited and cost-free. This twofold illusion, which is so appealing, is our greatest danger today. What was an exceptional response to exceptional circumstances must not become a “new normal”.

almost the equivalent of the current defence budget. It would therefore be irresponsible to build our future on the already outdated bet of a zero or very low cost debt. A higher deficit today clearly implies less room for manoeuvre and action tomorrow in favour of ecology, health and education. The increase in the cost of debt  II. How to set a credible debt reduction strategy? 1. Revised European fiscal rules This brings me to the debate that has kept you busy this afternoon: the debate on rules, in particular European rules. It has been put on hold since the start of 2020, due to the Covid-19 crisis, and now perhaps the war in Ukraine. But this debate will have to be wrapped up: I neither believe in traditionalists - those in Europe who simply call for a return to "business as usual" - nor in angelicists those who simply believe in the wisdom of institutional processes, or in enlightened economic debates for steering national fiscal cycles. No, experience tells us, particularly in France, that we need rules and not too much "discretion" in the sense of entirely discretionary choices. But these rules must be revised and simplified, in order to be better respected and more credible. Paolo Gentiloni and the European Commission have the onerous task of taking  Page 6 of 9 forward this discussion which is a matter for political authorities, so I will just make a few remarks.
Of importance, Islamic financial institutions must be open to rethinking their traditional business models and approach to doing business. In particular, the openness to forge digital partnerships and strategic alliances has the potential for the co-creation of innovative solutions. Globally, 82% of incumbents are expected to increase fintech partnerships in the next three to five years. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Collaboration with the fintech community should therefore become the norm. For example, collaboration with crowdfunding and peer-to-peer financing startups can be a win-win growth opportunity. Through such partnerships, banks would be better able to service smaller businesses by referring potential borrowers not meeting their targeted credit profiles to these lending platforms. In return, these platforms can refer its borrowers that have gained scale to the banks for larger financing. Bank Negara Malaysia is supportive of the growth of fintech, including Islamic fintech. At the same time, as a regulatory body with a mandate for financial stability, we need to ensure that risks to the financial system and customers arising from innovations are properly managed. This is why we have developed the Regulatory Sandbox which allows new fintech solutions to be introduced in a live and controlled environment. It provides a “safe” environment where any risks and failures can be better managed. The time to market for new innovative products can also be reduced, which would otherwise be a hurdle under the traditional regulatory process. Its flexibility is also expected to better improve accessibility, affordability and attractiveness of financial products and services.

The second part of my status report therefore concerns where we stand in the crisis cycle with regard to the financial system, how the socalled unconventional measures we have taken appear to have worked and how we look upon them in the future. But, before we go on to this – let me give you a brief summary of the “extraordinary” or “unconventional” measures taken as a result of the financial crisis and its effects. “Extraordinary” or “unconventional” measures… When the international financial turmoil escalated into a worldwide crisis in September last year, many countries found it necessary to dig much deeper than usual into the economic policy toolbox to find partly new methods and tools. Governments, central banks and other authorities around the world have taken extensive measures to recreate confidence in the financial markets, to maintain financial stability and to counteract the negative effects of the crisis on economic activity. The central banks’ measures, such as lending to the banks, are reflected in the fact that their balance sheets have increased substantially during the crisis, as can be seen in Figure 7. 6  BIS Review 138/2009  Figure 7.
Central banks have provided exceptional support in exceptional circumstances. Now, they need to apply the Lucas critique to their own actions. They need to try and work out what the implications of their actions will be for financial markets in the future. Unless new regulations and a material extension of oversight to the new world of financial intermediation – which the crisis has exposed – are applied in earnest, central bank activism risks fuelling moral hazard in the long run. Provided that financial regulation covers the full breadth and width of financial intermediation, then the new world will likely be one in which the transmission of monetary policy will be stronger, not weaker. Risk aversion will call for more collateralisation. The move away from unsecured to collateralised lending could make overall lending more sensitive to fluctuations in the value of collateral. As monetary policy influences the terms on which these trades are made, its effectiveness will increase. Sovereign debts instruments are likely to continue playing an important role as collateral – both in private lending and in central bank refinancing operations. Central banks should be flexible enough to adapt their instruments to changes to the financial environment. But they  BIS Review 83/2010  7  have to remain inflexible in their overall strategy. In a changing financial environment the only way to maintain credibility is to safeguard the ultimate objective, which is price stability. Thank you for your attention. 8  BIS Review 83/2010

-  We will, however, where appropriate, raise the issue of consolidation in meetings with banks' board of directors and management, and will encourage them to make it part of their strategic planning. -  We will also do what we can to provide appropriate incentives for banks to think seriously about consolidation, in particular by removing potential barriers to competition such as the last remaining controls on interest rates. -  We will not erect artificial barriers to acquisition of local banks by foreign banks, which would be contrary to Hong Kong's traditional free market ethos and our commitments under WTO. -  We note the view that is sometimes expressed that it would be desirable for Hong Kong to retain a core of strong, locally owned banks. This is something that we would support, but it is not something that we can deliver. Rather, it would depend on whether the local banks can agree to merge among themselves. -  We will do what we can to facilitate individual transactions that are put to us for consideration. This will include giving prompt advice on what is acceptable from a banking regulatory point of view. We will also look sympathetically at the use of acceptable debt instruments to finance mergers as opposed to our previous preference for equity or cash. This reflects modern trends in capital management.
Spain is trading between –45 bps and –50 bps. Italy is now trading below –40 bps1. And for Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands, rates have been moving downwards as well. One could say that whereas in the past the repo market was largely characterised by “collateral chasing cash”, today the main dynamic in some markets appears to be “cash chasing collateral”. The evolution of repo rates for different collateral classes over reporting dates suggest that the old pattern still exists in parallel with the new. As I will argue below, this observation provides a key to understanding the roots of these developments. New dynamics in the short term funding markets unsurprisingly lead to debate in the financial industry. There are concerns about short-term borrowing costs swinging sharply at the end of reporting periods, creating volatility and potentially spilling over into government bond markets – an effect we have indeed seen for core general collateral (GC) collateral. And some observers fear collateral scarcity might herald more general disruptions to the “plumbing” of the financial system, which would be especially problematic given ongoing structural changes in financial intermediation. Activity is after all shifting increasingly from banks to non-banks, and marketbased finance is, by and large, organised around collateralised lending. Perhaps inevitably, some point the finger at monetary policy, and in particular at the side-effects of the ECB’s asset purchase programme. The substantial creation of liquidity by the APP is argued to have pushed unsecured lending rates to the deposit floor, causing secured lending rates to fall even lower.

These monetary policy measures carried out by the Eurosystem have been necessary to ensure the continued orderly transmission of monetary policy throughout the euro area and to provide sufficient stimulus to bring inflation back to our objective. They have also been proportionate solutions to the scale of the problems they seek to solve. The ECB is aware of – and closely monitors – the potential impact of its monetary policy measures on market functioning. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, full allotment was put in place precisely because the market wasn’t functioning. But in assessing the impact of its policies, the ECB must have first regard to its primary objective of price stability. Under our mandate, considerations of the robustness of the financial system and market functioning are only relevant once we have fulfilled that primary objective. Nonetheless, in designing the APP programme, the ECB has implemented a number of features designed to minimise the impact on market functioning. The hard legal constraints on issue and issuer limits reduce the influence the APP has on particular bonds. Our recent widening of eligible maturities and removal of the DFR floor permit purchases to be spread more widely and reduce pressure on specials. We have also put in place a number of securities lending facilities.
Worth noting is that, similarly to Thailand, many Asian economies have also capitalized on the opportunities to lessen monetary policy easing during the period of good economic performance since the latter part of 2010. The main objective has been to preserve fiscal and monetary policy space for potentially more difficult times ahead. For Thailand, I believe that our policy space remains appropriate. But, any higher public spending should be done with special care. At this juncture, the need to increase government consumption is less urgent and the fiscal focus should be put on public investment to expand our potential output. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Therefore, the stimulus should be prioritized and carefully planned to leave some policy space for future needs. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to end my talk today by stressing that we now live in a different and difficult world. Current global risks from the slowdown in advanced economies have clearly heightened. Given good economic fundamentals, the Thai economy should be resilient enough to cope with such risks. I would like to urge investors not to swing between over pessimism and over-confidence and behave in a herd-like manner. Instead, all parties, public and private, should be cautious and prepared for the global risks in moving the country forward. It is my firm believe that protecting domestic purchasing power and let everyone have equal chance to benefit from the economic growth can strengthen the future well being of the Thai economy in a sustainable manner in years ahead.

Today, the proportion of Thai exports to non-G3 countries growing significantly higher, particularly to China, and ASEAN. In parallel, the share of G3 in Thai exports has declined from more than 50 percent in 1995 to less than one-third. Ladies and Gentlemen, Turning to the final part of my talk. As a central banker, our challenge is to constantly weigh the balance between risks from global slowdown on our economic growth versus rising domestic inflation pressure. Despite more downside risk on growth at present, the central bank assesses that the Thai economy is growing at around its potential and demand pressure could transmit readily to higher inflation outcome as well as expectations. To this end, the Monetary Policy Committee has been raising the policy rate to normalize monetary policy and bring the real policy rate closer to the positive range, yet remaining sufficiently accommodative to cushion the downside risk on growth. With many uncertainties ahead, it is wise to keep the inflation rate low to ensure that the economy remains competitive and to minimize pockets of instability, whether through excessive growth of bank credits, fiscal spending, or asset price bubbles. Low inflation helps keep the health of the economy in check and preserve the purchasing power or real income of all segments of the population. This is especially important for salary earners and the poor, whose real income could easily by eroded by higher inflation. Worse is to allow inflation expectation to run away because it will be costly to get expectation well anchored again.
Consequently, it makes sense, in principle, for central banks to take on macroprudential tasks as part of their contribution to financial stability. However, because the situation can vary depending on the individual country, there is no consensus about either the extent of these measures or the institutional responsibilities. Switzerland has limited its macroprudential arsenal to what is absolutely necessary and has clearly allocated responsibilities to the different authorities. In this respect, the relevant legislation has extended the SNB’s role in financial stability in some areas but not completely changed it. I am fully convinced that this cautious approach with clear allocation of responsibilities makes sense. We are doing everything we can to fulfil this extended role as best we can, in the interests of our country; in doing so we can draw on our wealth of experience in “traditional” financial stability. Concluding remarks Ladies and gentlemen, we have reached the end of our perusal of monetary policy and financial stability. I particularly wanted to show you which roles can and cannot be assumed by central banks and especially the SNB. As regards monetary policy, our role has not changed, even if the use and the extent of monetary policy instruments have taken on new dimensions since the beginning of the crisis. In the case of financial stability, our role was extended as a result of the experiences gained in the financial crisis, although the adjustments have been much less extensive than in some other countries.

As ever, my votes on Bank Rate at the December MPC meeting and beyond will be determined by pursuit of the inflation target, and guided by the evolution of the economic and financial data. Conducting central bank asset purchases But the MPC is not only taking decisions about Bank Rate. In parallel with increases in Bank Rate, the MPC has also embarked on quantitative tightening. Gilts held as a result of QE conducted over the past decade or more have been sold as of the beginning of this month, following the decision in February 2022 to cease reinvesting the proceeds of maturing bonds. QT is another aspect of the normalisation of the monetary policy stance. The MPC has committed to unwinding its QE holdings in a gradual and predictable manner. Gilt sales are running ‘in the background’, rather than being responsive to month-to-month data news. As I have already discussed, responses to shocks at the margin involve what the MPC has identified as its ‘active’ instrument – Bank Rate. From the outset of its communication about QT, the MPC has emphasised that, were markets to become dysfunctional, asset sales could, if necessary, be paused.