samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Malta, in fact, was not among the first wave of new entrants in ERM II - Estonia,  Lithuania and Slovenia joined the mechanism in June 2004 - despite expectations among many international observers that Malta would have been a candidate. Put simply, we are not rushing. It should also be clear by now that even if we wanted to rush, we would not be allowed to do so. The argument has been made in some circles that the adoption of the euro should be postponed to allow a slower pace of fiscal consolidation. My reaction to that - which is spelled out in my speech to the Institute of Financial Services in November 2004 - is that fiscal consolidation is an end in itself, regardless of whether Malta adopts the euro in the short-term or not because healthy public finances are a fundamental aspect of sound economic management. A country cannot live beyond its means indefinitely. Easing the pace of fiscal consolidation, moreover, would also make meeting the fiscal criteria at a later date even more difficult as it would result in the accumulation of debt and higher debt-service payments, requiring even greater cuts in non-interest spending or increased taxation later on. This would send negative signals abroad about the country's resolve to undertake the necessary reforms, probably leading to a downgrade by credit rating agencies and harming both Malta's image as an investment location and the exchange rate.

Throughout my whole first term of office I followed these principles, and today I would like again to state that my second term of office will be governed by the same principles. I have permitted no political interference in the activities of the Bank, which is a fundamental principle underlying the Law on the BNB and the Treaty on the accession of Bulgaria to the EU. I will not allow any political meddling in the work of the BNB in my next term of office. I highly appreciate the first words of the newly elected Speaker of the 41st National Assembly at our first meeting: „Mr. Iskrov, we are well aware of the Law on the BNB, of BNB’s key role for the financial stability in the country, and in spite of our disagreement with the early timing of your reelection, no one questions the independence of the central bank. This is a question of principle, on which there is no argument”. These were Ms. Tsacheva’s first words, and I am really grateful to her for them. BIS Review 104/2009  1  Independence should certainly not be an excuse for idleness or work not done. I would emphasise once again, just as I have so far worked with two Bulgarian Governments and all legitimate political parties and their representatives regardless of the political spectrum they belong to, so they too can count on BNB’s expert advice and support in the future.
Caleb M Fundanga: Strengthening and promoting the Zambian private sector Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Celtel Loan Signing Ceremony, Lusaka, 12 December 2006. *  *  *  Managing Director, Celtel Zambia plc Senior Government officials present Chief Executives Officers of commercial banks and other financial institutions present Management and staff of Celtel Zambia plc Members of the Press Distinguished invited guests Ladies and gentlemen It gives me great pleasure to join you today at this celebratory event for the Celtel Zambia plc USD105 million 5-year, two-tranche, local and foreign currency syndicated term loan facility. Undoubtedly this event marks a high-point for all those working at strengthening and promoting the Zambian private sector. In this regard, this event clearly unveils and in so doing reveals the hitherto relatively unknown sophistication and ability of the Zambian private sector and surely the coming of age of our nascent banking and financial services sector. Ladies and gentlemen, it is gratifying to observe that the facility we are celebrating today was initially launched as a USD70 million facility but was subsequently raised to USD105 million following significant oversubscription. It is equally gratifying that of the USD105 million, USD86 million or 82 per cent was raised in Zambian Kwacha primarily from Zambian commercial banks with some participation from international development finance institutions. This is a demonstration of the growing confidence in both Zambian corporate borrowers and business climate by both domestic and international banks.

In short, good governance works and we should all simply try it! In conclusion therefore, I would like on behalf of Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf to commend the Zambian commercial banks, international banks and development finance institutions that have participated in this syndication. This is not only testimony of their confidence in Celtel Zambia plc but confidence in the Zambian people and the economy as well. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 126/2006
For instance, in Austria and Spain some shops have refused to accept schillings and pesetas, despite the fact that these were still legal tender, as it was considered unnecessary to have two parallel cash desks when the changeover was more or less complete. This is a question that must be considered carefully with regard to Sweden. I know that the retail trade would like to see the shortest possible cash changeover period and experiences from the current EMU members indicate that two months may be on the long side. However, there is a risk that an introduction of the euro might not occur as rapidly in Sweden at a later date, as the currency would no longer be exciting news and the general public would already have access to the banknotes and coins from other countries. Of course, it is also possible that the Swedish people, as soon as the exchange rate is irrevocably fixed, will begin exchanging krona for euro and there will be unofficial use of euros. In this case, the changeover could be implemented in a very short space of time. It would also mean that the foreign exchange offices would play an important role in the cash changeover in Sweden. This question is one to which the Riksbank will return within the co-operation with the SIFS group. One subject that often arose in the debate prior to the cash changeover was that surreptitious price rises could be made in the translation from national currencies to the euro, which would create inflationary pressure.

Since the end of February the national currencies are no longer legal tender, the major exertion by society is over and life is beginning to return to normal in the euro countries. For Sweden, however, a changeover of banknotes and coins still lies ahead, if we were to say "yes" in a referendum on full membership of the monetary union. It is therefore important that all of us in various sectors of society take a look at how the changeover has worked in the different countries and learn from this. Today I intend to begin by discussing what experiences Sweden could learn from the cash changeover. After that, I shall say a few words about the timetable for a potential Swedish full participation in the third stage of EMU. The cash changeover in the EMU countries The overall picture painted by the ECB, the European Commission, embassies, central banks and media with regard to the euro introduction is that it has gone smoothly, and above all quickly. Only a few days into 2002 the euro was being used in most cash transactions and only a few of the problems that had been feared actually arose. On the other hand, other, rather more unexpected problems arose in the aftermath of the cash changeover, because of the rapid pace at which it occurred. I shall mention some factors here, both positive and negative, which have affected the outcome of the introduction of the euro.
José De Gregorio: Global confidence crisis – the value of waiting and the coordination failures revisited Keynote speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the opening of the Post-Graduate Program of the School of Economics and Business Administration of Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 4 June 2009. I wish to thank Pablo García and Enrique Orellana for their helpful contributions and comments. *  *  *  “When, as today, the unknown unknowns dominate, and the economic environment is so complex as to appear nearly incomprehensible, the result is extreme prudence, if not outright paralysis, on the part of investors, consumers and firms. And this behaviour, in turn, feeds the crisis.” (Blanchard, 2009). I want to begin by thanking you for inviting me to open the academic year of the PostGraduate Program of the School of Economics and Business Administration at Universidad de Chile. Most of my presentations are for an audience that is primarily interested in learning about the Bank’s view on the economy, so my lectures tend to focus largely on the national and international junctures and their prospects. On this occasion, I will take advantage of the academic setting that brought us together, and the freedom I was given to choose the subject, to refer to a central aspect of the current global crisis, namely the confidence crisis, focusing on some key concepts that can help us understand what is going on at this global economic juncture.

Corporate governance regulations and best practices We have seen considerable reform in the regulations and codes of corporate governance, as well as the actual practice of corporate governance in the Asian Roundtable economies. For instance, Pakistan, Chinese Taipei and Thailand all adopted new codes in 2002, while new or updated codes have been adopted in Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Korea since 2003. This has yielded visible benefits. There is greater clarity in many Asian economies regarding the fiduciary duties of the directors of listed companies. There has also been progress made in terms of more independent directors being introduced to the boards of listed companies in the Asian region . Accounting rules have also been beefed up across the region. Some of the Asian Roundtable countries have made significant moves towards convergence with international standards and best practices on accounting. China, India, Indonesia and Philippines, have for example revised their accounting standards to bring them more in line with international standards. Corporate governance in Singapore Corporate governance in Singapore has similarly undergone evolution. I shall leave it to the speakers from the Singapore Institute of Directors and the Singapore Exchange to share on these more fully. I will talk briefly instead about our overall approach to corporate governance. Regulatory framework – balance of mandatory rules and best practices First, let me touch on the regulatory framework for corporate governance. In recent years, we have moved away from a merit-based approach towards a disclosure-based approach.
Until the early 2000s, energy consumption in the advanced OECD economies and in the non-OECD developing and emerging market economies rose at a similar rate, with the OECD economies accounting for the majority of demand. In the wake of the strong growth in the 2000s, this position has been reversed with the non-OECD now the dominant contributor to world energy demand. For example, China’s share of global oil consumption has risen from 6% to 11% in the past decade alone.4  4  6  International Monetary Fund (2011)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 6 – Global primary energy consumption Million tonnes oil equivalent 6500 OECD  6000  Non-OECD 5500 5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998  2001  2004  2007  Source: BP Statistical Review 2010 This pattern of upward pressure on energy and commodity prices has been particularly noticeable since the mid-2000s and it has had a significant influence on inflation in many countries – particularly affecting the prices of goods. The so-called “China effect”, through which the shift of production to low cost countries held down the prices of global manufactures and traded goods in the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, has given way to a period of higher global inflation, driven by rising energy and commodity prices.

This will have an impact on all parts of the insurance value chain – product design, underwriting and distribution. •  Product design – While there is tremendous scope for enhancements in product design, the advent of new technologies and innovation could even render some existing offerings obsolete. For example, autonomous cars and their safety elements could leave some motor insurance products out-dated, if not irrelevant, over the next couple of decades. •  Underwriting – With big data and smart analytics, underwriting models will likely evolve to become more predictive and personalised, such as through the use of telematics to price motor premiums according to driving behaviour, or the use of wearables for a customised health protection plan. Data analytics is not new to the insurance sector, which has had decades of experience working with and analysing large amounts of internal data such as loss histories. This will now be boosted through the insurers’ ability to incorporate external third-party data sources, such as government statistics on health, worker-safety, and energy data, in their underwriting and pricing of risks. •  Distribution – Mobile technologies are influencing financial buying decisions, including the way consumers purchase insurance. This will have a predominantly big impact on Generation Z, a “mobile first” and “mobile only” generation. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Technology and innovation will be a differentiator for the insurance industry, and a key enabler for insurers to access previously untapped risks and businesses.
One point on which I don’t agree with Franco Bruni’s analysis concerns his judgement on changing the objective of monetary policy after the failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. Bruni writes: “…the objective became only that of saving the credit system from the collapse. This last change of objective is of great conceptual and political importance, it has a significance that could prove to be, so to speak, historic. And yet it has never been officially declared, particularly by the ECB”. The proof that he provides for the above remarks is the decision to reduce interest rates from 2% to 1.5% in March this year, a step which, in his opinion, was not justified by the trend of the economy, but by the problems facing Europe’s banking system. There is a misunderstanding here that needs to be quickly clarified, also in view of the ensuing discussion on macro-prudential supervision and on the powers of the central banks in question. From the outset of the crisis in August 2007, the ECB has pursued a policy of separation between, on the one hand, the interest rate decisions, based solely on the priority objective of price stability and, on the other hand, the decisions concerning the instruments used to pump liquidity into the system in order to tackle the difficulties being encountered by the market.

Its consequences are still being felt today and the focus of policymakers has, therefore, shifted to the immediate task of giving the economy a quick resuscitation and lifting it out of the short-term slump. After the crisis, foreign direct investments from the eurozone have dropped significantly. However, despite the weakness back home, the UK’s net FDI to Thailand still managed to register a positive number of approximately 48 million USD for the first three quarters of 2009. It is, therefore, to our mutual benefit for the BCCT to have a good understanding of the outlook and challenges for the Thai economy from a policymaking standpoint. This will be the mission of my speech today and I would like to proceed in the following sequence: First, I would like to start by giving you an update on the current economic development; second, I would attempt to draw an outlook for the Thai economy for the year 2010; and third, I will outline the key challenges that await the Thai economy going forward. Ladies and Gentlemen, As you all know, the Thai economy was hard-hit by a sharp drop in the external demand caused by this global financial crisis. The spillovers from the large decline in exports were far-reaching and affected all sectors of the domestic economy, with the manufacturing sector being hardest hit. Consequently, sentiment turned gloomy as more workers started to lose their jobs. To make matter worse, the escalation of internal political tensions adversely affected private consumption and investment.
(Exhibit 5) Of course, the Federal Reserve’s large scale interventions in the Treasury market over this period may also have had an impact on this measure. Turning to corporate bonds, given their heterogeneous nature, liquidity in the corporate bond market depends on the ability and willingness of dealers to hold these securities on their balance sheets while they find buyers. Disaggregated data on dealer balance sheet holdings have only been published since April 2013. While limited in terms of its history, these data indicate no clear reduction in investment grade security holdings over time, but do show a significant reduction in high-yield security holdings since the end of the financial crisis. This might be indicative of deterioration in market liquidity in corporate bonds. To investigate corporate bond market liquidity in more detail, let’s examine three liquidity measures: the average trade size, “effective” bid-ask spreads and price impact. The evidence on the average trade size for investment grade corporate bonds indicates a slight reduction from between $ to $ in the early 2000s to around $ in the last few years. (Exhibit 6) However, price measures of corporate bond liquidity do not substantiate the trend in this quantity measure. The effective bid-ask spread has been trending down since the early 2000s, around the same time that TRACE reporting was introduced. The spread spiked during the financial crisis, but is now lower than its pre-crisis levels.

With one of the highest savings rate in the world, at approximately 30% of GDP which currently amounts to USD750 billion, a well-integrated regional financial system would provide a more comprehensive eco-system for an efficient and competitive intermediation and investment. An important component of ASEAN growth is the critical role of SMEs in all economies. The AEC recognise this and calls for SMEs to play a greater role in contributing to the overall economic growth and development of ASEAN as a region. Access to financing, however, remains a key challenge for many businesses. Despite various national level efforts, more needs to be done for SMEs to obtain access to financing, including the funding required to grow their business beyond national borders. The credit gap for SMEs in East Asia is estimated to be more than USD250 billion.2 The difficulties in access to financing are compounded by underdeveloped financial systems, the need to manage multiple banking relationships across different markets, and a lack of coordinated financial advisory support to help businesses navigate the regulatory and business environment in different jurisdictions. A larger presence of regional financial institutions can significantly reduce these challenges. 1  Speech by David Lipton, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF on 19 March 2015 entitled “ASEAN – The Challenges of Convergence and Integration”. 2  Sources: International Finance Corporation and McKinsey & Company, “Two trillion and counting – Assessing the credit gap for micro, small, and medium-size enterprises in the developing world”, October 2010.
We know that growth in December was heavily affected by the snowy weather but there are also concerns that the economy may have slowed for other reasons. We would have to wait until April for the next quarter’s GDP data, but even when this arrives it will be a very provisional estimate. So it makes sense to look at other data sources to gauge the pace of recovery – notably the employment figures and business survey information, which also have the benefit of being less subject to data revision. The employment data broadly support the view that the underlying momentum of growth has remained healthy despite the impact of December’s weather on activity levels. Unlike the early 1980s and the early 1990s, when unemployment continued to rise in the early phases of the recovery and the jobless rate rose to over 10%, we have seen a much earlier turnaround in employment in this recovery. Employment picked up in the first half of last year and has risen by nearly 300,000 since last winter.4 More recently, jobs growth has eased off with falling public sector employment offsetting increases in the private sector. But the official Labour Force Survey unemployment rate has remained at around 8% or just below since the recovery started in the second half of 2009. Indeed, the most recent figure we have for unemployment – the claimant count number for February – indicates the lowest jobless total on that measure for almost two years.

And we have already seen some revision to the GDP data through this recession and recovery – for example the rise in 2009 fourth quarter GDP growth has been revised up from a provisional estimate of 0.1% to 0.5% in the space of just twelve months. For all these reasons, I believe we need to be particularly wary of basing monetary policy at present on fine judgements about the current and future growth of the economy. The MPC’s remit is clearly couched in terms of keeping consumer price inflation on target and we have a responsibility to take action when we see the sort of significant upside deviations we have experienced, not just recently, but over a number of years now. Most of the evidence suggests that recovery is underway and it is likely to continue, even though the pace of growth is somewhat uncertain. There are upside risks to the growth outlook as well as downside concerns. The world economy is growing strongly and this is a major factor underlying current inflationary pressures from global energy and commodity prices. And a stronger response of wage growth to current high headline inflation could support stronger growth of consumption than most forecasters currently expect. We have entered a period of UK monetary policy-making when the judgements made by the MPC are much less straightforward than they appeared to be before the financial crisis.