samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This process includes a potential modification of the current scope of work for our vendor relationships, with a focus on carving out additional roles that might create new opportunities for a broader group of firms, including smaller vendors. Staff on the facilities are currently finalizing their competitive bidding strategies, and we expect to issue RFPs in the next several weeks. Turning to counterparties, in late July we announced an initiative to expand the set of counterparties that transact with several of the facilities. Specifically, the New York Fed is seeking to establish roles for non-primary dealer counterparties to serve as commercial paper dealers, eligible sellers, and agents for the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF), and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), respectively. These three facilities currently rely exclusively on the New York Fed's primary dealers, but the scale and scope of their activities make them well suited for an expanded counterparty base, particularly as we try to reach broader segments of the economy. This initiative represents a major step forward in our efforts to engage with small-tomidsize broker-dealers, including minority-, women-, and veteran-owned business enterprises (MW VBEs), as well as smaller businesses and investors that transact with these broker-dealers. Indeed, we have explicitly encouraged MW VBEs to apply, and I'm pleased to share that just yesterday we announced the addition of seven new broker-dealers for the SMCCF and two CPFF dealers, including several MWVBEs.

Has the publication of regular forecasts, which are seen to bear a close relationship to the decision taking process, helped to make the policy decisions themselves more predictable? The test is whether markets are less likely to be surprised by interest rate changes, given full knowledge of all the relevant economic news. We ran some simple statistical tests on two measures of ‘market surprises’. One is based on the Reuters poll of economists. The surprise measure is the difference between the actual repo rate change and the mean expected repo rate change. The other surprise measure is a bit further out along the yield curve: changes in the implied three-month forward LIBOR rate.11 Both measures suggest that interest rate surprises have become significantly smaller in the post-2001 period than previously (Table 2 Panel C), consistent with improved policy predictability. But, intriguingly, there is also some tentative evidence that surprises in Inflation Report months tend to be relatively large.12 What are we to make of that? 11  More precisely, this is an implied 3-month Libor forward rate at a constant horizon of 3-months, where the constant horizon is calculated by linear interpolation of adjacent futures contracts. The results are largely invariant to using six or twelve month horizons. 12  This could, of course, be entirely driven by the expectation that there would be no move in non-Inflation Report months: in the extreme, if the distribution of surprises in those months is degenerate (i.e.
Naturally, the outlook is also being affected by the political unease in North Africa and the Middle East and the repercussions of the natural disaster in Japan, but contagion effects have as yet been limited. Another risk is that the strong growth in the world will push up prices for energy and commodities beyond expectations. A significant part of the rise in oil prices since February can be ascribed to uncertainty over how the supply of oil will be impacted by the political unease in North Africa and the Middle East. Essentially, however, it is the strong growth in Asia in particular that is making these commodity prices increase. This may result in higher inflation and lower growth in the United States, Europe and other developed economies. The Swedish economy remains strong The high rate of growth in Sweden in 2010 means that GDP has now returned to roughly the same level as prior to the financial crisis. This year, we expect a GDP growth of 4.6 per cent, while, for the next two years, we expect growth averaging 2.4 per cent per year (see Figure 6). Employment is now increasing rapidly. Over the last year, it has increased by 120 000 jobs. This increase has primarily taken place in the service sector and the construction sector, which were not impacted so severely by the crisis.

As part of the efforts to improve the standard of pen-testing in Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia facilitated the formation of a task force last October, to set up a Malaysia chapter of the UK-based Council of Registered Ethical Security Testers or CREST, which will serve as a certification body for ethical hackers. We believe that this is a good platform to grow domestic talent in this area and promote international best practices in penetration testing. c. The Bank has also launched the Operational Risk Integrated Online Network or commonly known in the industry as the ORION system, to enhance the standard of operational risk 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  management in the financial sector. ORION is a risk surveillance system that consolidates information on operational risk incidences, including cyber-attacks. The system will strengthen the Bank’s ability to perform system-wide monitoring and early detection of developing trends in cyber-attacks and frauds within the financial sector. Moving forward, Bank Negara Malaysia is looking to address identified gaps in technology risk management practices within the financial sector. As part of this effort, the Bank is in the midst of conducting a comprehensive review of existing technology risk guidelines, including enhancing the expectations for the board and senior management to play a more active role in managing technology risk, and enhancing the resilience of IT infrastructures such as data centres. In today’s world where there is increasing uncertainty of what the future may hold, it is no longer possible for risk managers to rely solely on historical trends.
The interbank market was more active during 2006, thus ensuring a more efficient way of banks’ excess liquidity management. The average daily volume of transactions amounted to All 1.6 billion or ALL 0.2 billion more than the previous year average. The interbank market was characterised by narrowing the interest rate spread according to maturities and their positioning close to key interest rate. The average overnight-weekly interest rate spread dropped to 0.7 percentage point in 2006, from 1.6 percentage points in 2005. In the first half of 2006, there was a constant decline in treasury bills yields and government bonds, due to low government demand for funds. In the second half of 2006, following the Bank of Albania’s tightening signals and the increased demand for liquidity in the system,  BIS Review 80/2007  7  there was a gradual rise of these yields. The yields increased respectively by 0.83, 0.45 and 0.98 percentage point in comparison with the previous year. The government bonds issues has increased compared to the previous year, making the banks’ portfolio, as the sole participants in this market, increase to ALL 37.0 billion. The share of bonds to total government securities increased 22 percent in 2006 from 12 percent in the previous year. Their maturity structure varies from 2 to 5 years. Five-year bonds were issued for the first time in November of this year, for the amount of ALL 6.3 billion. The demand for them resulted higher than the issued amount.

Needless to say, the beneficiaries of such efforts will be our own economies which we are striving to develop as quickly as possible. 6  BIS Review 24/2007
Mr. Singer said that the weak-koruna policy has persuaded Czechs that the central bank won’t allow consumer prices to fall, and removed the risk of a slide into a prolonged period of deflation. Central bankers aren’t worried so much about falling prices as about the threat that consumers and businesses will come to expect prices to continue to fall and will postpones their purchases, weakening economic growth and pushing prices down further. “We were afraid of this problem of postponed consumption and investment,” Mr. Singer said. “But people have realized the central bank is not going to allow a deflationary slide.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Mr. Singer said that retail sales are picking up, driven by higher auto sales, an indication that consumers aren’t postponing purchases in the expectation goods will be cheaper in the future. He cited a decline in the savings rate as another indication that the risk of deflation has been lessened. The central-bank chief said that while food prices may rise at a slower pace in response to a good harvest, he was not worried about that development because people can’t postpone food purchases. Measured according to an EU standard, the annual rate of inflation in the Czech Republic picked up to 0.7% in August from 0.6% in July, and Mr. Singer said he is confident it will rise to the 2.0% midpoint of the central bank’s target range next year, assuming the eurozone follows a “baseline scenario” of a return to modest growth.

In this respect, we do not think there is any risk of deflation in the euro area, or inflation for that matter. Furthermore, the United States may be substantially below its long-term growth potential, whereas the euro area is relatively close. Le Figaro – Nonetheless, the dollar is sliding and we seem to be moving away from the close cooperation seen between central banks during the crisis... Christian Noyer – First, everything does not come down to the dollar. For example, there are emerging countries that, by not being sufficiently flexible in their exchange rate policy, have monetary policies that are inappropriate and create risks to inflation and growth. Moreover, while each central bank is pursuing a policy appropriate to its country’s situation, nobody wants to move away from the goal of consistency. We are all committed to ensure a framework for balanced growth, and that commitment remains just as strong. As reiterated at the last meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank Governors, no one should or can manipulate their currency. Le Figaro – Is the euro not the real victim of recent foreign exchange developments? Christian Noyer – The euro is not the only currency that floats against all other currencies. Let’s not be so self-centred! The idea that the euro is arguably the adjustment variable for the rest of the world seems strange to me. Le Figaro – Will the G20 be able to make headway on monetary policy issues given that the climate is, to say the least, tense?
Now let’s turn to what monetary policy should/can do  I would like to mention four challenges: First challenge: if the factors at play are global, what can domestic policies do? CBs have domestic mandates whereas the prevalence of lowflation and low rates suggests that some common or external factors may be at play. This is especially problematic for smaller open economies. And the existence of a “global financial cycle” à la Rey highlights the limits of flexible exchange rates in insulating those economies. Ultra-accommodative policies in AEs have definitely had spillover effects on EMEs, including the often-forgotten –albeit welcome- reduction of spreads in the latter, as shown by IMF research. Nevertheless, the formulation and stance of policies in one country can take account of feedback effects from others. And it goes without saying that the world at large would have been even worse off if AEs had fallen into deflation. Aside from building and using forex reserves, domestic policies should therefore contribute towards making the domestic real economy and its financial system more resilient to external shocks. In this regard, prudential policy aimed at building buffers or protecting financial institutions may complement monetary policy, provided these measures do not conceal a form of protectionism or an attempt at deglobalization. Second challenge: what should the inflation target and its horizon be?

Subsequently, we have raised the deposit facility rate to 2%, a cumulative increase of 250 basis points (bp), the fastest in the euro's history. We have also created the new Transmission Protection Instrument to ensure the smooth transmission of monetary policy across the euro area. We have amended the conditions of the longer-term refinancing operations, with the specific aim of strengthening the transmission of interest rate increases. And we have announced our intention to stop reinvesting, from early March 2023, all the principal payments from maturing securities under our asset purchase programme, which will give rise to a gradual and predictable reduction in the size of the portfolio. Overall, this monetary policy normalisation process has already translated into a significant increase in market interest rates. But what can we expect in the future? At the last Governing Council meeting we stated that interest rates would still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that ensure that inflation will return to its target. As I mentioned earlier, the latest ECB projections forecast inflation of 2.3% (i.e. above the 2% target) in 2025. Those projections were based on the market expectations for the future path of interest rates when they were prepared. Deeming the projections valid, interest rates would therefore need to rise more than the markets expected when they were prepared in order for inflation to return to its target.
But nothing is certain when it comes to economic activity. One obvious source of uncertainty is the oil price, which has turned out much higher than we anticipated as late as in June. Forward prices, which reflect expectations of future oil prices, have also risen and judging by these, expectations in general seem to be set on a slowly falling, but nevertheless still high, oil price. Even though the oil price has dropped back recently we have revised up our forecast for the coming years. It is hard to judge what effects the high oil price will have on growth and inflation. Among other things, this depends on whether the high price reflects mounting demand or whether it has been caused by supply shocks. Pointing to the first explanation is the fact that the price rise in recent years has gone hand in hand with an increase in output. A dampening factor is that most industrialised countries are considerably less dependent on oil than they were a couple of decades ago. Against that background, we estimate in our assessment that the high oil prices will have limited effects on economic activity. But, of course, it is not possible to rule out either higher inflation or a more negative impact on demand. Signs of the former can be seen in the United States. Another source of uncertainty is the large savings imbalances around the world and how a correction might come about. Strong domestic demand in Sweden In Sweden, too, economic growth was strong last year.

A credit register will narrow the information gap that exists in the Maltese banking system by reducing asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. It also improves risk management thereby contributing to a better performing loan portfolio and as a result, a lower cost of capital. Ladies and gentlemen, let me close with a few concluding remarks. As you are well aware, the banking sector across the Euro area is passing through regulatory and supervisory changes that are sometimes viewed as expensive and imposing unnecessary burdens on the sector. This is a short-sighted assessment. Though dividend pay-outs may be lower in the short-run, their sustainability will be strengthened in the longer term. Similarly, higher bank capital does not necessarily lead to lower volumes of loans over the long run. Instead, a higher capital base mitigates balance sheet risk, lowers bank funding costs, hence allowing banks to charge a lower risk premium on their loans, to the advantage of both lenders and borrowers. The crisis has uncovered various shortcomings in corporate governance in the banking sector, mainly in areas like risk management and internal controls, compensation, corporate structures and transparency. Some Maltese banks have yet to adopt a number of necessary risk oversight practices that would ultimately benefit the banks and their stakeholders. What needs to be stressed is that reputation is a key asset of Malta’s financial system which cannot be taken for granted. Efforts to safeguard financial sector reputation need to be ongoing and undertaken by all concerned in the financial sector.
As I have already mentioned, this enabled us to conduct a monetary policy in the heart of the euro area that is suited to the needs of Switzerland. And that brings me to my concluding remarks. 5. Conclusion  Switzerland is a small, open country, with few natural resources, which in many ways has become global. The export industry and the financial sector have adjusted well to the new structures and have become global players. The domestic economy and the political structures, however, are straining to make the equivalent adjustments because changes in those areas would often affect vested interests and future claims on the social security system. Nor has there been sufficient pressure to act. However, in order for Switzerland to stand the test in a dynamic global environment, it must ensure that the reform process currently under way will be continued and accelerated. By now, some observers have come to question Switzerland’s ability to make comprehensive reforms altogether and assert that the country has become a problem case because of its inability to make changes. I do not share this pessimistic view. On the contrary, I am convinced that the understanding for the necessity of reforms, and with it the willingness to temporarily accept disadvantages, will grow. What ultimately gives me cause for optimism are Switzerland’s sense of realism and its wealth of experience. We are aware that neither the European environment nor globalisation will take our national feelings into account.

Collectively, our Cornerstone Members, Global Partners and Knowledge Partner will forge a community of practice to support the green transformation of commercial banks in Asia. 18. Today we are also publishing the Alliance’s first thought leadership paper, in collaboration with the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary and Financial Research. The paper presents a curated overview of the effects of climate risk on financial institutions and financial markets, methods for measuring climate risk, the evolving practices as well as regulatory initiatives that seek to address climate risk. 19. Ladies and gentlemen, we are excited to embark on the transition path with the Alliance members and partners. We are confident that the learning and sharing among peers will encourage cross-fertilisation of ideas and the continued advancement of green finance best practices. Starting from Hong Kong, we wish to create a lasting ripple effect in emerging markets throughout Asia and beyond that will contribute meaningfully to the global effort in tacking climate change through the power of finance. 20. Thank you. 1 Source: ASIFMA https://www.asifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/asifma-fosda-esg-  and-sf-data-challenges-and-opportunities-in-asia-f20201221c.pdf
In order to preserve favourable bank lending conditions, the modalities of the new series of quarterly targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III) were also changed, eliminating the 10 bp spread established on the interest rates applied to them and extending their maturity from two to three years. Finally, in order to support the bank-based transmission of monetary policy, a two-tier system for reserve remuneration was announced, such that part of banks’ holdings of excess liquidity will be exempt from the negative deposit facility rate. These decisions aim to counter the worsening growth and inflation outlook by means of a package of measures that complement one another, easing financial conditions by a different route. The resumption of net purchases, without a defined time limit, also has an important signalling effect with respect to the Governing Council’s commitment to meet its inflation aim, which is particularly relevant in the current context of inflation expectations at risk of becoming de-anchored. In addition, the period of time over which the net asset purchases and the reinvestment of existing assets will continue is anchored to the normalisation of interest rates, thus enhancing the consistency and complementarity of the different measures and their dynamic adjustment to inflation. In a setting of heightened uncertainty, this automatic adjustment of the expectations about the future path of monetary policy in the face of potential changes in the macroeconomic environment is particularly desirable.

The technical analysis assesses the recent trend of the indicators, their current status and also their expected behaviour in the coming quarters consistent with the macroeconomic forecasts prepared quarterly by the Banco de España. The forward-looking analysis is particularly relevant in this context since, in the event of the CCyB being activated, banks have 12 months to comply with the requirement. According to these indicators, the credit cycle continues to show values below the activation thresholds (having regard to the credit-to-GDP gap, which remains below its long-term trend value), although it is progressively converging on the long-term equilibrium level. In fact, forecasts as to how it will trend in the coming years indicate that this indicator will turn positive towards 2021 Q1 and might exceed the activation threshold in 2021 Q2. Some complementary quantitative indicators are along the same lines. This is particularly the case for credit intensity, which shows the weight of the change in credit relative to GDP, and the overvaluation of house prices currently show values close to equilibrium, with an upward trend that is forecast to continue over the next two years. Non-financial privatesector debt service, for its part, has maintained the reduction that marked its path at the start of the global financial crisis. Foreseeably, this reduction will continue, albeit more moderately so over the coming two years, given that the process of debt reduction has eased significantly and interest rates have less margin for further cuts.