samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There should be a judicious balance between limiting banks’ activities that are incongruent to their role as an intermediary of financial flows, and allowing them to perform their role in facilitating economic activity and sustaining the recovery. MAS will continue to be actively involved at these discussions to shape the proposals. 11. Our Singapore banks start from relatively strong capital and liquidity positions. They are generally well-capitalised and have in practice maintained capital ratios much higher than our minimum requirements. As such, on a relative basis, we do not expect the proposals to affect them in a significant manner. Nevertheless, the global reforms will set new norms for the banking sector and the Singapore banks would have to take these into consideration in their capital and liquidity plans moving forward. 12. I mentioned last year that MAS will be reviewing the Corporate Governance Regulations and Guidelines for locally-incorporated banks and significant life insurers. We have since issued a public consultation paper setting out proposed enhancements to the Corporate Governance Framework for these financial institutions. The main thrusts of the proposals emphasise the need for directors to have the relevant skills and commitment to  2  BIS Review 103/2010  oversee the operations of the financial institutions, and the important role of independent directors on the Board. MAS will issue our response to the public consultation shortly. 13.

These include most notably a lack of funds for saving, cost, distance from the nearest branch, a lack of education and the absence of the financial infrastructures needed to improve the availability of financial services. It is indeed here where new technologies can contribute decisively to overcoming or lowering these barriers. Technology can reduce many fixed costs, traditionally associated with the development of financial services, while providing for a greater adaptation of supply on the basis of each society’s idiosyncratic characteristics. Unsurprisingly, then, the technological proposals linked to financial inclusion hail from different areas. We can find them in traditional financial institutions, in the new fintech companies, in telecommunications corporations and in the large technology consortiums known as bigtech. As to scope, one of the activities concentrating the bulk of the initiatives is payments. Thus, in the past decade we have seen so-called mobile money – i.e. transactional services offered mainly by mobile operators – become commonplace. Adding to these, more recently digital wallet solutions have emerged with multiple functionalities and specific proposals for international remittances. Aside from the progress in payment solutions, developments on intermediation markets are providing for improvements in the financing of those groups with a greater degree of financial exclusion, such as microenterprises and small agricultural producers. However, these developments are not spontaneous or uniform from one country to another.
And there are examples of price and wage spirals, when expectations of higher prices in the future led to higher wage increases that eventually forced a change from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate. The inflation target was introduced in connection with this changeover. Economic agents’ expectations of future inflation are an important element in assessing the credibility of monetary policy with regard to attaining the inflation target. What is the situation today? Five-year inflation expectations among money market participants have long been close to 2 per cent. The most recent quotation available at our meeting in April was 2.2 percent on average. In May, it rose to just under 2.4 percent. Expectations have thus risen, albeit not to any alarming levels. It should also be added that the median, that is, the middle observation, is still at 2 percent. 12 [14]  It is important to point out that money market participants’ inflation expectations are not formed in a vacuum. These actors at the same time form expectations of a number of macroeconomic key variables. This includes expectations of the coming monetary policy. In April 2022, money market participants expected a repo rate of rounded 0.8 per cent twelve months ahead and a repo rate of 1.1 per cent 24 months ahead from April 2022. In May, the corresponding expectations were approximately 1.3 and 1.6 per cent. In other words, money market participants' expectations of inflation are based on the expectation of a less expansionary monetary policy.

This does not, of course, mean that the Riksbank can always sit with its arms folded when inflation rises and expect inflation to return to the target ‘by itself’. It is reasonable to assume that the fact that long-term inflation expectations are firmly anchored to the target is because economic agents expect the Riksbank to act when needed. But the fact that there is a credible nominal anchor today does of course make things easier, even though it ultimately hinges upon the way monetary policy is conducted. 11 [14]  Secondly, Swedish wage-formation works in a completely different way than in the 1970s and 1980s. One important reform was the so-called Industrial Agreement, under which the manufacturing industry has set the benchmark for wage negotiations and ultimately steered wage cost increases in the entire economy for over twenty years. The relationship between this benchmark and the inflation target has not always been crystal clear. For instance, employers’ representatives have sometimes expressed the view that the inflation target is obsolete and should not be used as a base in wage negotiations. However, this was during the extended period when inflation tended to be at the lower end of the target. However, as developments now show, we must assume that inflation will sometimes be above the target as well. Hopefully, this will further underline the importance of the inflation target as a nominal anchor for the Swedish economy, both upwards and downwards, so to speak.
In the new forecast, the point at which inflation will begin to climb again has been postponed by half a year. If monetary policy remains unchanged, annual inflation will be 1.1% in 2005 and 1.3% in 2006. 3. Lower inflation in the longer term  After having discussed the medium-term inflation prospects, allow me now to move on to the long-term prospects. The assessment of inflation prospects in the longer term depends on a number of factors, such as the development of monetary and credit aggregates and different asset prices. Long-term forecasts are fraught with a high degree of uncertainty. In spite of this, a central bank must make a sound assessment of the effects of its monetary policy in the longer term. The need for a forward-looking stance is due to the fact that monetary policy has its strongest effect on prices only after a lag of two to three years. M1 was 5.4% below the year-earlier level in November; M2 was down by approximately 3%. M3 increased by 1.4%. Although there is still ample provision of liquidity, it has dwindled as a result of the latest developments. Compared with the September assessment, we have therefore made a downward correction of our inflation projection for the years 2006 and 2007. According to our September forecast - based on an unchanged three-month Libor rate of 0.75% inflation would have climbed to 2.9% in the second quarter of 2007. With an unchanged monetary policy, the current forecast predicts an increase of only 2.3%.

This is because making a payment is about more than just exchanging money for goods and services: it is a form of social interaction made possible by money, which has been described as “the most universal and most efficient system of mutual trust ever devised”7. Finally, a digital euro would increase privacy in digital payments thanks to the involvement of the central bank, which – unlike private suppliers of payment services – has no commercial interests related to consumer data. Ensuring privacy is an essential element of modern democracies and part of our European values. Payments must also respect people’s right to privacy in the digital era, and the design of a digital euro would have to respect this principle. This is a core aspect we will look at – indeed, we have already started exploring possible ways of enhancing privacy.8 At the same time, payments in a digital euro – just like any form of payment – would have to respect the rules on countering money laundering, the financing of terrorism and tax evasion. This would enable public authorities to combat any illegal activity more effectively. To summarise, the digital euro would still be a euro, only in digital form. It would both shape and promote the digitalisation of payments, while reducing the associated risks. This would in turn support the ongoing digitalisation and modernisation of the European economy.9  Why might we need a digital euro? A digital euro would be critically important in a number of scenarios, which are analysed in our report.
Mark Carney: Polymer banknotes Remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the Bank of England, London, 18 December 2013. *  *  *  Ensuring public trust and confidence in money is at the heart of what central banks do. Money can only play its invaluable role in our economy if that trust and confidence is maintained. That motivates the Bank of England’s core objectives of price stability, so that people can be confident of the value of their money over time, and financial stability so that they will be able to access and use money when they want to. It is also why we place such importance on maintaining confidence in our banknotes, the most tangible form of money. Our job is to ensure that the banknotes people use are high quality and genuine. We also recognise that banknotes are an important national symbol and a source of national pride. Our banknotes must therefore be secure from counterfeiting, resistant to damage, and designed in a way that inspires broad public support and fosters legitimacy. We are continually working to ensure that our notes meet those requirements. That is why I am pleased to announce today that the next Bank of England notes will be printed on polymer, rather than cotton paper. The first polymer note will be the £ note featuring Sir Winston Churchill, and will be issued in 2016.

For those who might be concerned about the change, let me reassure you that the new polymer notes will retain the familiar look of Bank of England banknotes, including of course the portrait of Her Majesty the Queen, as well as depictions of historical characters of national significance. That continuity of design helps explain why people who have had a chance to handle specimen notes were even more likely to view polymer favourably. The depiction of historical characters will remain an integral feature of our banknotes, providing an opportunity to celebrate individuals that have shaped the United Kingdom. In  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  order to ensure public confidence in banknotes, it is essential that the choice of characters commands broad public respect and legitimacy. That is why in July, at the same time as announcing that Jane Austen would feature on the new £ note, I promised that we would review the way in which the characters featured on banknotes are selected. Today we are announcing a new set of principles to guide the choice of characters and a new process to ensure that those principles are, and are seen to be, followed. The new principles for character selection state clearly and positively the Bank’s aims in using historic characters on our notes. They put diversity and inclusivity at the heart of the selection criteria. And they make clear our intention to portray a diverse range of characters over time, with each new decision taking into account previous choices.
Initially this appeared to be related to the impact of the global slowdown on some of the larger Eurozone economies, which seemed likely to cause them to run further below capacity than had earlier been expected. But the more recent signs are that the Eurozone economy is now picking up relatively strongly, and it is harder to understand the euro’s continuing weakness in the present context: it may just be a matter of time - for there is no doubt that the euro has considerable scope for appreciation. Taken together, Mr President, these various international developments since I was last here in Belfast have greatly complicated the task of monetary management here in the UK - in fact it has been just about the most difficult external environment that I can recall. At that time monetary policy was still aimed at moderating the pace of domestic demand growth to prevent the re-emergence of inflationary pressure - including wage pressures in the labour market. We actually raised rates by ¼% to 7½% shortly after my visit - but I promise you that was not a direct result of my visit here. But we reversed engines fairly aggressively when evidence of the effect of global slowdown on our own economy began to appear in the autumn - cutting interest rates from 7½% to 5% between October 1998 and last summer.

If a shock is sufficiently large, the financial network may consequently act as a conduit for transmitting rather than absorbing risk. So the flip side of greater integration is that it may have lowered the frequency but increased the magnitude of potential financial crises. 1 3 Improving the toolkit for financial stability analysis is consequently a very high priority for public authorities and for major financial institutions. Enhancing the capability to model the financial system under stress is the key challenge. 4 In recent years, many central banks and supervisory agencies, charged with the public policy goal of supporting the maintenance of financial stability, have sought to develop a socalled “top down” or “macro” stress-testing capability. Utilising information on balance sheet exposures, the authorities draw on macroeconomic and financial models to try to assess the impact of adverse shocks on the financial system. Several inter-related high level objectives can perhaps be set for an “ideal” stress test: •  To assess the vulnerability of the financial system to extreme but plausible shocks  •  To improve the understanding of the transmission of shocks through the financial system (and, in a worst case, the potential propagation of financial crises)  •  To identify “weak spots” in the financial system, to guide risk reduction priorities and crisis management planning  1  Systemic risk in modern financial systems: analytics and policy design by Prasanna Gai, Nigel Jenkinson and Sujit Kapadia, Journal of Risk Finance Vol8, No2, 2007.
On the supply side, as the world economy recovers, the balance of production will continue gradually to shift towards exporters and towards firms which, given sterling’s large depreciation since mid-2007, can now compete somewhat more readily against importers. For sectors primarily serving domestic markets, the adjustment is more challenging. Some face both higher costs for imported inputs to production and weaker demand – not just temporarily but persistently – for their final output. On the ugly side of this rebalancing, there has already been an increase in vacant properties on the high street, which is also facing structural change due to on-line shopping. Some of those properties will no doubt be converted to other uses over time, but I know it will not be easy for the firms affected or for their employees. Company insolvencies have ticked up, and will likely continue to do so for a while. Credit supply and the corporate sector Recovery will come, and the necessary adjustments will occur, over time. But it is made harder for you by the problems in the financial system. You have faced first tightening, then in late 2008 frozen, and now a prolonged period of tight credit conditions. Many of you must have worried at times about the safety of your cash balances and other liquid investments. You will have wondered about the soundness of the counterparties you use in the capital markets.

It must also be expected that there will be strong focus on liquidity risk by financial institutions and supervisory authorities, and not least in the work on international regulations in the period ahead. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 100/2007  7  8  BIS Review 100/2007  BIS Review 100/2007  9  10  BIS Review 100/2007  BIS Review 100/2007  11  12  BIS Review 100/2007  BIS Review 100/2007  13  14  BIS Review 100/2007  BIS Review 100/2007  15  16  BIS Review 100/2007  BIS Review 100/2007  17
But many EMEs also recovered quickly because they had the capacity and credibility to pursue countercyclical policies in response to large external shocks to aggregate demand for the first time. On many fiscal metrics, some economies in the emerging world now look in better shape than many of those in the advanced world. This challenges the traditional distinction between developed country and emerging market sovereign creditworthiness. Where the developed world still stands apart is in the quality of its institutions, legal and policy frameworks, and the sophistication of its technologies and markets. But even here the gap is narrowing. The story of the EMEs has generally been an extraordinarily positive one for the world as hundreds of millions of people have lifted themselves out of poverty. Nevertheless, even before the crisis, it was evident that the relationship between developed and emerging economies was becoming strained and needed to be adjusted; the status quo would clearly be unsustainable. Consider, for example, the economic relationships between the United States and China that prevailed over the past decade or so. Some experts have summarized the arrangements as follows. The United States bought Chinese exports at low prices, which bolstered U.S. living standards and held down U.S. inflation. The United States did not take extreme steps to try to force China to revalue the renminbi upward against the dollar, and China, in turn, invested its trade surplus and capital  2  2  Figures are real GDP-weighted indexes for each group. BRICs include Brazil, Russia, India and China.

William C Dudley: US economic policy in a global context Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Foreign Policy Association Corporate Dinner, New York, 7 June 2011. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here this evening and I would like to thank the Foreign Policy Association for inviting me. The Association has served for decades as a catalyst for developing awareness and understanding of global issues and for providing nonpartisan forums for informed discussion. Your mission is clearly a worthy one – now more than ever. In this discussion I will highlight how the recent financial crisis and its aftermath have accelerated the shift in the relative importance of the so-called developed and emerging market economies. I will then discuss how the global economic system needs to adapt in light of the growing relative importance of the EMEs in the global economy. I will explore the implications of these changes for U.S. economic policy and I will also touch on some of the challenges the EMEs face as they seek to consolidate their gains and sustain their success. I will argue that the developed countries and the EMEs need to adjust in mutually supportive ways. In my view, the current relationship between the EMEs and the United States is not sustainable for either side.
It has proved to be well functioning, inflation is being taken care of, Baht exchange rate has been more stable and provided a better working environment for real sector, and international reserves have not reduced in spite of regular repayments to the IMF. And the framework has up to now been well accepted by the Thai public. But a good and credible policy still has its obstacles and challenges. Let me now turn to discuss the obstacles and challenges. The biggest, the most important, and the most worrisome challenge that we face right now is the world economy. A month ago, the world economy was already weak, with the United States uncertain about the timing of a recovery, Japan still having to undergo numerous reforms, and Europe not yet acting the role of the engine of locomotive for the resumption of world growth. A month ago, East Asian countries were already seeing their exports fast softening, especially in electronic and communication products. These countries were only on the verge of emerging from the depth of the biggest crisis in recent memory. And then disaster struck! The abominable terrorist attacks in the US would affect some businesses more that others. It will certainly affect some business sectors very hard - airline and hotel industry, insurance, some area of financial services. The American consumer confidence index by the University of Michigan during the past 4-5 years was always above the 100 point level. It dropped to 91.5 in August.

I think it is most important, in these times of uncertainty, for the Bank of Thailand to act as the linchpin to the public policy. We have to set the anchor that stabilizes the economy. It is fortunate that certain elements of our inflation targeting policy has been modified, allowing increased degree of management of the foreign exchange rate which facilitates trade and improves capital flows. The practice which was intended to take care of official reserves while the global economy is slowing down now happens to be the correct policy practice to be further enhanced to cope with addition weaknesses and uncertainties. More careful management of our international reserves is required so that we can fulfil our debt obligations under the IMF program, and still be left with a strong and healthy level of reserves. This will be achieved through a vigilant watch on the markets, keeping close dialogue with market participants, gathering intelligence and acting in a timely manner. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am here today not to give you a false promise that the BOT could provide policy measures that could lead to the recovery of the Thai economy, but to assure you that our existing policy measures are suitable with the situation and we would do our best not to allow Thailand another crisis of similar cause and magnitude as that of 1997.