samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Countries that choose not to put a price on carbon could be subject to carbon tariffs that might indirectly increase their costs, something which is moreover being considered by the European Commission.15 16 Such measures are adopted by national parliaments and negotiated in international contexts by head of government and finance ministers. In the current situation, there are only a few countries that have carbon taxes17 and global carbon taxes have yet to be discussed in international negotiations. As policy-makers, we therefore need to be prepared for a global price on carbon not becoming a reality in the short term. Implementing other measures is therefore a matter of urgency. For example, the Swedish Economic Research Council’s Report 2020 highlights “aggressive subsidies aimed at the production of alternative energy sources” as a possibility.18 International research indicates that energy transition takes a long time and that other measures, such as subsidies to the development of new, green technology, can be effective.19  The Riksbank has a role to play An effective climate policy, i.e. taxes, emissions trading, tariffs and subsidies, falls within the framework of fiscal policy. Central banks cannot replace these types of measures, but that does not mean, in my opinion, that central banks do not have a role to play. On the contrary, several risks are created if central banks do not use the tools within their mandate to contribute to climate adaptation. First, if central banks ignore the climate issue, their own operations risk counteracting other climate policy.

Norman Chan: Sound banking Closing remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Conference for Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs), Hong Kong, 16 March 2017. * * *  What is sound banking? Sound banking is not (a) excessive risk taking; (b) irresponsible or unfair treatment of customers and counter-parties; and (c) maximisation of short term profits. Sound banking is: (a) Prudent and profitable; (b) responsible and fair to customers; and (c) sustainable. Trilogy of sound banking (I) Robust Regulation and Supervision – it will provide an externally imposed set of rules and codes that define what is acceptable and what is not. However, no matter how well designed and robust the regulatory regime is, it normally works better in setting minimum standards for compliance and is not so effective in promoting good or best practices. (II) Good Corporate Culture – culture consists of a set of formal and informal values that guide the mindsets and behaviours of management and staff. Unlike externally imposed rules and regulations, which normally entail sanctions if breaches are detected, good corporate culture and values reflect the attitude that “we do things the right way not because we are afraid of being caught but because this is the way it ought to be done”. A simple illustration of the importance of culture and values is the example of combatting littering on the streets.
Noteworthy among these fees is the relative increase in fees for selling products such as investment funds, against a backdrop of growing demand for these assets, bolstered by households seeking more profitable investments than deposits given their low returns. These developments have resulted in the ratio of gross income to assets, which includes fees in addition to net interest income, having fallen to a lesser extent than the net interest margin. Banks have also made huge efforts to reduce their operating expenses through branch closures and job cuts, but to date these expenses have declined more moderately than gross income. This was reflected in a continued increase in the ratio between these two magnitudes, that is, the efficiency ratio, until 2017, which underlines the deterioration in their efficiency during this period. This trend seemed to come to a halt in 2018 when this ratio improved slightly. In terms of assets, in 2018 operating expenses were at similar levels to their pre-crisis ones. However, in a setting where the share of credit in assets is currently significantly lower than it was then, these expenses should also be smaller given that the costs associated with the management of non-credit assets are lower. The information in the consolidated statements also shows that the most recent levels of the efficiency ratio are above pre-crisis ones, therefore indicating a situation of lower efficiency.

Thomas Jordan: Global economic outlook and economic developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 12 December 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen Welcome to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. I would like to begin today by explaining the SNB’s monetary policy decision before moving on to present our assessment of the economic situation and monetary conditions. My colleague, Jean-Pierre Danthine, will then talk to you about developments in connection with financial stability and banknotes. Finally, my colleague, Fritz Zurbrügg, will look at the current situation on the financial markets, as well as at the management of our currency reserves and interest rate benchmark reforms. As always, we will conclude with a question and answer session. I will now start with our monetary policy decision. As you will have no doubt expected, the SNB is maintaining its minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. The Swiss franc is still high. With the three-month Libor already practically at zero, the minimum exchange rate continues to be the right tool for ensuring appropriate monetary conditions in Switzerland. If the Swiss franc were to appreciate, this would have significant consequences for the Swiss economy. On the one hand, an appreciation would lead to a further decline in import prices and a renewed threat of deflation.
Fiscal policy has been fairly well adapted to the economic situation over the last decade. The active role it has played in demand management has functioned as an anchor for fiscal discipline. The Government Petroleum Fund is meant to be a buffer against changes in the terms of trade. In other countries this role must be filled by the exchange rate. Chart 12 How does the Norwegian regime differ from inflation targeting? • Co-operation: – Tradition of co-operation between political authorities and social partners – Wage-setting considering employment effects  • Fiscal policy: – Fiscal policy has financial leeway for stabilisation policy – Petroleum Fund buffer against terms of trade variability, not the exchange rate  • Monetary policy: – Different formulation of target – Different institutional setting Legg inn filadresse her  •  Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards stability of the exchange rate and not an explicit inflation target. The setting of interest rates will more or less be the same. Norges Bank focuses on keeping a low rate of inflation and on avoiding a situation in which monetary policy in itself contributes to a recession that may threaten the fundamental conditions for stability of the krone. •  The institutional set-up for monetary policy in Norway is different. In a country with inflation targeting, the central bank will inform the political authorities if the inflation target is not met.

Conclusions  Oil and gas provide substantial wealth for the Norwegian economy, while fluctuations in the price of oil give rise to variations in the value of this wealth. Norwegian economic policy is organised so as to maintain stability in the face of these variations. Fiscal policy carries a responsibility for stabilising the real economy, while monetary policy is aiming at price stability and preventing a deflationary recession with a view to maintaining exchange rate stability over time. Changes in the price of oil may influence expectations about future economic development in Norway independently of how much of the petroleum revenues are absorbed into the economy in the short run. However, successful use of the Petroleum Fund will provide financial leeway for an active stabilisation policy, the redistribution of wealth between generations and to a large extent protect the Norwegian economy from oil price fluctuations. 15  BIS Review 121/1999
For example in our latest Inflation Report we published a central projection which showed inflation rising gently but steadily above the 2% target, assuming a nearly flat profile of interest rates out to three years. But the Report noted that the balance of risks was to the downside and singled out some key near term risk areas, such as the household sector. This provided a nuanced background to the MPC’s February decision to hold rates unchanged. Forecasts and public communication All inflation targeting central banks use their forecasts as a communication tool. They provide a coherent statement of policymakers’ thinking about the economic outlook and the policy stance. Together with the minutes of the policy meetings (in our case published with individual votes after two weeks), this helps to discharge the Committee’s democratic duty to explain itself, as well as supporting its credibility and helping to anchor inflation expectations.13 The Inflation Report plays a central role in the Committee’s communication. Since August 2003 the Governor has fronted the regular Inflation Report press conference, and the MPC’s appearances in front of the Treasury Select Committee has been (loosely) linked to the Inflation Report cycle. This brings me to a much debated question: how much information should a central bank provide? Academics have tended to press the case for more transparency, while practicing central bankers have been more cautious, (though much more predisposed to openness than they would have been twenty years ago).

To be sure, there have been times when differences of view about the central projection have been too significant to be handled within the ambit of the fan chart and on those (few) occasions the Inflation Report has included material illustrating the minority view. But, as the MPC’s preface to the Inflation Report notes, the fan charts reflect the Committee’s best collective judgement about the most likely paths for output and inflation and the uncertainties surrounding the central projections, while recognising that members may have slightly different views about the underlying assumptions. Forecasts and interest rate decisions How influential is the forecasting process when it comes to the actual business of taking decisions about interest rates? One yardstick might be whether the MPC is more likely to change rates in Inflation Report months. There is no necessary reason why this should be so: information accrues relatively evenly over the year, and the Committee goes through the same decision taking process every month. On the other hand, the MPC might be more likely to change rates after a systematic and full review of the inflation outlook, rather than in response to the news on the month. On this argument, ready-reckoners may give a rough indication of what the impact of new data may be, but they are no substitute for a full analysis. So in non-Inflation Report months the MPC may sometimes decide to ‘wait-and-see’ – to postpone a possible interest rate change until more evidence has accumulated.
This corresponds to a deficit of 4.4% of GDP with the pension funds classified outside the general government sector, which will be the binding methodology from next year onwards and which is therefore the relevant methodology for assessing Poland’s future compliance with the European fiscal rules. This implies that Poland is 1.4 percentage points away from meeting the Maastricht fiscal criteria. It is not a demanding medium-term consolidation target for an economy with an expected real GDP growth of close to 5 percent, providing a very good environment to reduce the ratio of public spending to GDP. It is worth noting that Germany may achieve consolidation of this magnitude over the 2006-2008 period, without such a favorable growth environment. However, the Convergence Programme 15 presented by the government in January of this year, does not foresee fulfilment of the deficit criterion in the programme horizon; in 2008 the deficit is to stand at 3.7% of GDP. Such a slow pace of deficit reduction has been criticized by the Council of the European Union 16 , which pointed out that Poland would be failing to comply with the required annual fiscal adjustment of 0.5 percentage points of GDP in cyclically adjusted terms. NBP projections confirm that the deficit path is not an ambitious one.

The remaining risk is due primarily to foreign banks’ króna deposits and the old banks’ deposits. However, before the controls on these deposits can be lifted in full, it is necessary to channel as much of this capital as possible into long-term investments and structure the winding-up of the old banks so as not to jeopardise exchange rate stability. Although conditions in the global financial markets are still difficult, they are better overall than they were a year ago, not to mention two years ago. But the fiscal problems faced by Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have contributed to investor flight to the relative safety of low-yielding markets. The Icelandic Government is faced with the intricate task of demonstrating that Iceland is a better target for investment than other indebted European countries. The progress made under the IMF programme is gradually laying the foundation for enhanced confidence, but the programme will only be successful if we adhere to its objectives. Funds lying in wait in the shelter of low-yielding markets will eventually seek more bountiful shores. When the flight to safety begins to subside and investors begin to seek out better returns, the Icelandic authorities must be ready to direct their attention to Iceland. BIS Review 138/2010  3  The existence of capital controls and their proposed removal represents a problem for both the Monetary Policy Committee and those who trade in the bond market.
In addition, we reduced the annual commission rate of 0.02 basis points that had been applied since 1 February 2015 on euro-denominated accounts of banks and financing companies at the CBRT to a yearly 0.005 basis points as of 1 July 2015, and abolished it as of 27 July 2015 due to the recent developments in the euro area. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Thanks to the tight monetary policy stance and the macroprudential measures, loan growth continues to stay at reasonable levels. Adjusted for exchange rate changes, loans provided to the non-financial sector increased modestly by 18.1 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2015. A comparison of consumer and commercial loans shows that commercial loans continue to grow more at a higher rate than consumer loans, partly due to BRSA regulations. The annualized growth rate of commercial loans dropped to 15.1 percent at the end of the second quarter of 2015, whereas this rate was 21.6 percent for exchange rateadjusted commercial loans. Likewise, comparing their growth trend to averages in past years, commercial loans are close to the average whereas consumer loans are significantly below the average (Charts 10 and 11). Due to the moderate economic activity and the recent tightening in financial conditions, loan growth is likely to slow somewhat in the forthcoming period. 2. Macroeconomic developments and main assumptions  Now, I will talk about the macroeconomic outlook and our assumptions on which our forecasts are based.

My current estimate for r-star is 0.5 percent, so when you adjust for inflation that’s near 2 percent, the current federal funds rate of 2.4 percent puts us right at neutral. What Does the Future Hold? So what does the future hold? With a strong labor market, moderate growth, and no sign of any significant inflationary pressures, the baseline outlook is quite favorable, as I’ve said. Of course, there are a number of different scenarios that could play out over the year ahead. Geopolitical uncertainty and other factors holding back growth may recede, and the U.S. economy could resume the robust trajectory of last year. Or GDP growth could continue closer to trend, which is my own forecast. Finally, there’s always a chance that downside risks could knock GDP growth off course. What will the response of the Fed be? My short answer: It depends! I promised talk of interest rates, and here it is. I’ve said it before, and no doubt, I’ll say it as long as I work for a central bank. But in the current conditions the phrase takes on even more importance. Our response will always be “data dependent.” When growth is well above trend, raising interest rates to keep the economy on a sustainable path is the right decision. Equally, when faced with a crisis like the Great Recession, it’s incumbent upon policy makers to use every tool at their disposal to get the economy back on course.
Unemployment is high, while there is a need for investment in infrastructure, new technology  3  Data from CEIC Data Company, which uses China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) as its source. According to CEIC, debt-to-equity ratios at these companies are around 70 percent, up from 50 percent in 2001. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  and education. There are also many advocates of investing in a “green” shift towards sustainable growth. But investment is not forthcoming. In the light of the pessimism now holding sway in Europe, this is perhaps not surprising. As Keynes wrote in his letter in 1932: “.... the [released] real resources do not find a new home waiting for them. In present conditions their entry into investment is blocked by lack of confidence.” Keynes would have said that this is the time to deploy public investment to create jobs for idle labour. The cost to society would be low. Wages would replace expenditure on benefits and social security. Value-added would be generated, unemployment would decrease and employment would rise. This solution seems obvious. But it is not happening. In southern European countries in particular, government debt is high and growth is low. Future public funding is tied up in servicing debt and funding public services and pensions. Public administrations are cumbersome, inefficient and often over-staffed. The willingness and ability of governments to increase taxes, and perhaps the public’s confidence in the authorities, is low.

The challenge to the banking system and businesses, but also to the Bank of Albania, still remains the public encouragement to use them. So, to put this into practice, I shall stimulate the banking system to become more active, that is banks should provide to the households and businesses clear and ready products, quick and efficient services. Given the latest developments in the banking system and the increasing number of the branches as well as the increasing banking services, I advocate the banking system will be more attractive in 2005. I consider the optimistic signals of the previous year will be followed by more vigorous operations of the banking system related to the business of electronic card payments. In this spirit I would say that banking system solutions properly consist in issuing a unified card. Evidently, steps to be taken in this direction will be more complex, and naturally some of them imply inter-institutional cooperation. Bank of Albania is already paving the way toward wider use of cards in Albania. Credit cards service shall not only contribute to cash reduction in the economy, but also provide a positive impact on the reduction of informal economy. However, I deem as important encouraging and  BIS Review 6/2005  1  stimulating the banking system in order the service level be uniformly present all over the Albanian territory where banks conduct their activity.
Of course, this is not to say that financial sector weaknesses are not important, or sufficiently recognised. The broad Comprehensive Assessment that we have started reflects precisely the importance of balance-sheet repair. My point is rather that while the on-going deleveraging in the banking sector certainly plays an important role in the inadequate current levels of credit supply to the real economy, factors related to the demand side may play an even more important role. The weak demand outlook combined with the slack in industrial capacity is the most important explanation for the drop in private investment since the crisis, and the most relevant limiting factor for future investment. In addition, the protracted period of low inflation and consequent low nominal growth will increase the burden of the debt overhang of households and governments, further complicating the recovery process. The separation of banks from sovereigns As I mentioned before, the goal of separating the fortune of banks from that of the sovereigns and vice-versa through direct European recapitalisation of weak banks via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was present in the embryo of what later became the Banking Union project. Somewhat ironically, however, this widening of the focus caused the initial objective to become obscured. The question of European direct recapitalisation – for which a framework has still not been published– ceased to be the main focus of attention. In the view of many commentators, the SRM became the expected instrument to achieve the separation between banks and sovereigns.

The CRIB is totally dependent on these institutions for reliable information and given the objective of looking after its client institutions, the CRIB would fix negative labels on defaulting borrowers. The CRIB is not in a position to verify or go into details of the operations of any credit institution and establish the class, creed or social status of the customer. It only fix labels according to what is reported by the credit institution. On the other hand, the Bank Supervision Dept. and Non-Bank Supervision Dept. of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, within their own regulatory ambit, can detect the non-reporting by institutions to the CRIB, but these departments are not mandated to share such information with the CRIB or vice versa. Hence, the injustice continues and often some of the deserving borrowers are denied access to credit institutions. In such a situation, how can the CRIB ensure social justice and equity in terms of public policy? The CRIB can be fair only if the credit institutions resolve to report on all defaulting customers with no exceptions. This situation clearly indicates that the decision to groom, retain or eliminate a customer rests largely with the bank or the credit institution. The injustice begins when the reporting institutions do not report defaults of all segments of borrowers. The extent to which the banks and credit institutions have done a disservice to some of the deserving borrowers, is known only to the banks and credit institutions themselves.