samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For this purpose, I would appeal to start thinking from this moment on of future projects in the payment infrastructure. I personally will insist that even in this direction we should focus as a banking system on the European Union directives, so that to orient every step in the future towards the country’s integration in the European Union. Short time ago I was informed about a new initiative of EU, which requires establishing within a certain period of time, a unified payment system within the euro area, including payments with cards. For this purpose, I would suggest that respective specialists from the Association and Bank of Albania be informed as soon as possible about this project and they should come out with their relevant suggestions. Also, I remain persistent in my position that we have to adopt in Albania the most advanced solutions for all the infrastructure projects we are going to implement. I believe that we don’t need to examine and consider old-fashioned models, which besides the initial cost would require all the time new funds for their maintenance and modification. In addition, now when the public administration became a client of the system, I think that there are real opportunities to solve the payments of utility services through the banking system. Returning to the financial markets, I think that in spite of the above-mentioned restrictions there is room for improving competitiveness among banks even under the current conditions.

Limited losses on subprime loans ultimately led to the destruction of millions of jobs throughout the world, and the links between finance and the real economy were cruelly laid bare. ii)  But finance can certainly not be considered “all powerful”: in my opinion, the world of finance only has the political power that State governments choose to give it. •  Granted, the difficulties some countries were facing, notably in the euro area, were exacerbated by financial market pressures – think back to the attacks on Italian debt in the summer of 2011. But if the markets were able to exert this pressure, it was because those countries had, in a sense, put themselves at their mercy by demanding that they finance their ever-expanding public deficits, even during periods of growth. •  In nearly all the crises faced by the euro area since 2009, it is true that market reactions were often brutal and even extreme. But these reactions were frequently based on legitimate fears: for example the sustainability of Greek debt, weaknesses in the institutions of monetary union and divergences in competitiveness between euro area Member States. Again, it was by failing to make the necessary efforts (to ensure budget discipline, preserve competitiveness or finalise the institutions of a European financial union, for example) that these countries put themselves in a position to be rushed or even pressured by the markets and bear the consequences of their overreaction. Governments should not use finance as an alibi or as a scapegoat.
The weakest area of the economy at the moment is probably private investment which has been continuously decelerating for a few months now. But the surging inflation has also put private consumption increasingly at risk. Indeed, the latest issue of Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts shows Thailand’s GDP growth falling over the next three quarters before recovering in the second quarter of 2009. Against this backdrop, the policy priority is to head off the rising inflationary pressure while keeping a close eye on downside risks to growth. This is normally already very difficult in the presence of cost-push shocks that create a short-run trade-off between inflation and output stabilization. What further complicates the current situation is that a prolonged period of oil shocks and inflation tends to divest funds from, as well as discourage, fixed capital investment and hence deteriorates what economists refer to as the economy’s potential output. This issue is especially important when the economy is energy inefficient. Let me elaborate further. Conceptually, potential output is the level of output which can be sustained over an extended period without exerting upward or downward pressure on inflation. When the actual level of output is above potential output, inflation tends to rise. Conversely, when the actual level of output is below potential output, inflation tends to fall.

Unemployment rose to very high levels. The stringent containment measures led to a sharp decline in private consumption. There was also a shift away from services and towards goods consumption. Travel plans had to be put on hold, and much of the cultural sector was shut down. The pandemic and the measures to contain it also dampened the willingness and ability of mainland firms to invest. Petroleum investment fell on the back of lower oil prices and greater uncertainty. Reduced travel resulted in a fall in both exports and imports. After the decline in March and April, economic activity picked up towards summer, and the recovery continued through Q3. Unemployment declined. Through autumn, infection rates increased in Norway, and new containment measures were introduced. Activity slowed in the first months of this year, and in March and April we saw a renewed rise in the number of furloughed workers. Recently, infection rates have fallen. A gradual reopening of society is underway, and a large portion of the adult population in Norway will likely be vaccinated by the end of summer. This suggests that economic activity will pick up through 2021. Following a rise over the past three years, wage growth slowed again slightly in 2020. The moderation in wage growth must be viewed in the light of a sharp rise in unemployment caused by the Covid-19 outbreak and a marked decline in business sector profitability. Inflation has varied quite markedly over the past year.
Which of those explanations can plausibly contribute to explain the remarkable development of credit-to-GDP ratio in Switzerland highlighted before? 4. A plausible explanation for the current Swiss developments  As already hinted at, the review of possible structural drivers of an increase in credit volumes does not seem to provide solid support for arguing in favor of a recent permanent shift in the case of Switzerland. Switzerland has a highly developed financial system. Economic stability, a high wealth level – Swiss households’ stock of financial assets amounted to about 3.5 times GDP in 2011 (Figure 6) – a high savings rate and structurally low interest rates are probable reasons for high credit volumes, possibly even a high credit-to-GDP ratio, in international comparison. It is not clear, however, how one could argue that significant changes in these structural factors are currently at work.9 By contrast, many of the cyclical drivers that we have discussed appear highly plausible in the current circumstances. Specifically, the prolonged current period of ultra-low interest rates feeding into and being reinforced by rising real estate prices, combined with the potential for some of the abovementioned behavioral biases, have a higher explanatory power. These developments bear clear risks for financial stability. Let me go into more detail. We are currently experiencing a prolonged period of low interest rates (Figure 7a). This holds globally as well as in Switzerland; it is one of the key consequences of the financial crisis of  7  Minsky, H.P. (1982)  8  Keynes, J.M.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  cyclical nature, the elevated property prices and the evidence of high risk appetite translate for the Swiss economy into a state of high vulnerability requiring caution and the exercise of responsibility by all concerned. The activation of the CCB and the adoption of other prudential measures have to be seen in this perspective. References Borio, C. (2012): The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt? BIS Working Paper No 395 Keynes, J. M. (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London, Macmillan; Chapter 12 Minsky, H. P. (1982): Can “it” happen again?, Essays on instability and finance, New York 1982 Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2009): This time is different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press Schularick M., and Taylor, A. (2012): Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870–2008, American Economic Review, American Economic Association, Vol. 102(2), pp. 1029–61 Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981): Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 393–410. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The banks restraint over crediting is a result of several factors. One is the economic crisis in the Euro area, the deceleration of our economy last year, the banks prudency, the rise of the bad placements. Another very important factor is the condition in the parent banks of some of the owners of our banks, you know that they mainly come from the Euro area, some of them have serious problems in their own countries and they face with serious challenges, although their banks in Macedonia have extremely good quality and they are in good condition, since the strategy is developed at the level of the group, the problems in the parent bank prevail so they can have conservative strategy also in our country. This exactly was the reason that caused panic in the public, that some banks have problems in their main offices. Has the situation been stabilized a little in this regard? The situation here is mainly stable. Although there are occasional rumors in the public, the data do not mirror that, and we did not have registered, in any moment, that the deposits plunged with the banks the main offices of which are facing with problems. The deposits, generally, were increasing during all these past several years.

What we have learned will, as you would expect, inform our considerations of potential Solvency II reform. 1  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/david-rule-2018-conference-on-bulk-annuities-and-longevity-risk-transfer and https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/david-rule-westminster-and-city-programmes-2019-bulk-annuities-conference 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/solvency-ii-review-call-for-evidence 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  1. Market developments since 2019  The annuity market largely bifurcates into bulk purchase annuities and the purchase of annuities from personal and occupational pensions. Since David spoke to you in 2019 the growth in the bulk annuity market has continued, and is expected to continue [Chart 1 in the Appendix]. From our perspective, the additional capital that annuity firms bring to back these pension obligations provides increased security for scheme members, and gives pension scheme sponsors the opportunity to benefit from de-risking. For some insurers, annuities are part of a wider product set, diversifying with for example term assurance or general insurance products. But for specialist annuity firms the increase in annuity sales leads to concentration in both longevity and credit risk. Chart 2 shows the composition of the solvency capital requirement (SCR) across a range of specialist and mixed-line annuity firms: What this chart does not convey is that the longevity component would be notably larger were annuity writers retaining all of this risk. We are aware that the design of the risk margin has had a number of unwelcome effects such as adding excessive balance sheet volatility which has contributed to longevity risk being something many annuity writers continue to look to cede.
Monetary policy is still aimed at supporting the recovery in the economy, but a normalisation has begun. According to the assessment we made in June, the normalisation process will continue gradually through interest rate adjustments and the maturity of fixedrate loans. The new information we have received over the summer largely supports the picture of the recovery in the world economy continuing. There are some signs of weakness in the United States and Asia, while Europe looks slightly stronger than expected. The unease on the financial markets has waned, but the situation is still not normal. The new information also points to a continued recovery in the Swedish economy. However, the Riksbank will not make any new overall assessment of economic developments until the next monetary policy decision, which will be made on 1 September. By then we will have received more information and we will update our forecasts. Thank you! 8  BIS Review 109/2010  Global GDP growth Annual percentage change 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 70  75  80  85  90  95  00  05  10  Sources: IM F and the Riksbank  Note. Striped bars represent the Riksbank’s forecast.

Broken lines represent the Riksbank’s forecasts. Repo rate and expected repo rate Per cent, all agents 5  5 Repo rate Repo rate expectations 5 year ahead  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 Jan-07  0 Jul-07  Jan-08  Jul-08  Jan-09  Jul-09  Jan-10  Jul-10  Sources: TNS SIFO Prospera and the Riksbank  M onetary policy expectations Per cent, money market participants 5  5 Repo rate Forward rate 2010-06-23 Forward rate 2010-08-18  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Sources: TNS SIFO Prospera, Reuters EcoWin and the Riksbank  16  BIS Review 109/2010  The Riksbank’s outstanding loans SEK billion 400  400 SEK, commercial paper SEK, variable rate SEK, fixed rate  300  300  200  200  100  100  0  0 Jul-08  Jan-09  Jul-09  Jan-10  Jul-10  Source: the Riksbank  BIS Review 109/2010  17
One reason was that the assumption of a constant repo rate often resulted in our forecasts for inflation differing from those of other forecasters; being higher when inflation was rising and lower when inflation was declining. This caused confusion in the discussions on monetary policy. Since October last year, our forecasts are instead based on the technical assumption that the repo rate will develop in line with market expectations regarding the future repo rate, as expressed in the implied forward rates. This has made it easier to compare ourselves with other inflation forecasters and also to assess our monetary policy. 2 The new interest rate assumption we now apply means that we can no longer use our old policy rule. If the forecast with a constant repo rate was close to two per cent, the repo rate would be held unchanged according to the old policy rule. If the forecast according to the new outlook shows inflation close to two per cent, the repo rate will normally develop in the way reflected by market expectations. This could mean that the repo rate, given the underlying inflation forecast, should be raised or lowered in a number of stages over the coming two-year period. The new outlook thus means that the monetary policy discussion is based on an interest rate path throughout the entire forecast period, while the old policy rule only took into account what should be done at the time the decision was made.

The nine MBS issues sponsored by the HKMC so far, totalling $ billion dollars, have all been guaranteed by the HKMC. These issues were all welcomed by investors. The HKMC prides itself on being a financial institution that spearheads product innovation in Hong Kong's capital markets. For this issue, after consulting the market, the HKMC has decided to adopt a MBS structure along the lines of a Collateralised Mortgage Obligation. The CMO structure divides the pool of underlying mortgage assets into credit tranches or classes with different tenors and interest rates to suit the appetites of a wider range of investors in Hong Kong and the region. In today's two billion dollars MBS issue, the Class A portion accounts for 87% of the issue and does not carry any guarantee. Class B accounts for 13% of the issue and is guaranteed by the HKMC. Class A has been assigned a triple-A rating by both Moody's and S&P's. The award of this top rating to Class A reflects the good credit quality of the underlying mortgage pool and the credit enhancement through subordination provided by Class B, which absorbs the first loss in the mortgage pool. The low level of subordination at 13% reflects the high quality of the collateral, the innovative structuring of the issue and market's confidence in the HKMC's ability to manage the credit risk of the mortgage portfolio.
The holder of a single share would have been liable for the equivalent of four times the salary of a teacher of the time. It is not surprising therefore that within about a decade unlimited liability had all but disappeared from the British banking scene, to be replaced with regimes that limited the liability of shareholders in one way or another.2 I would not propose that we go back to a system of unlimited liability for bank shareholders. But the City of Glasgow Bank episode is interesting because it shows that the public policy challenges of dealing with failing banks are not new. When a bank fails, the money has gone. Someone has to pay for the losses, however. The question is ‘who pays?’ This question has probably be-devilled public policy since banks were invented. ‘Who pays?’ – the past It goes back much further than late Victorian Britain. The Code of Hammurabi – written by the King of Babylon in around 1,800BC – included a provision that if the harvest failed due to adverse weather then the ‘debt-tablet’ would be washed in water and interest on the loan would be cancelled for that year.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Sukuk as a viable fund-raising and investment instrument Opening remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the HKMA-BNM Joint Conference on Islamic Finance, Hong Kong, 14 April 2014. *  *  *  Much has been talked about the global financial crisis that had brought about unparalleled financial miseries, economic calamities and social grievances. While the focus has been on financial reforms and economic remedies, the thought on the minds of governments and regulators is how to create a more sustainable global financial landscape. Emphasis on ethics is key to this approach. Greater involvement in ethical-related business has made its strides in contributing towards the overall strength of the global financial system. Ethical investment itself has gained international recognition in recent years. Estimated to be worth more than USD13 trillion, the ethical investment market now represents over a fifth of total assets managed globally. Pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and institutional investors are leading the way. Europe, the United States of America and Canada make up 96% of the share of this market. In Asia, the market is still relatively small – at less than USD100 billion. As ethical investment catches on in Asia, so too has investment in sukuk. Sharing a close affinity, they optimise financial returns while maintaining social good and upholding strong governance. It is my pleasure to be here today at this Joint Conference on Islamic Finance, organised by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Bank Negara Malaysia.
It is also important that we incorporate policy issues arising from this seminar in our domestic policy processes and thereby enrich such processes by taking into consideration regional perspectives. 2  BIS Review 44/2009  The challenge going forward is how to maintain and sustain the economic gains and macroeconomic stability in our countries. There is need to encourage diversification and enhance competitiveness by increasing expenditure on infrastructure and social services. We need to continue to encourage investment in our economies that will lead to a diversified export base and a greater local value addition. For monetary authorities, there is need to continue to closely monitor global developments and always stand ready to take appropriate measures in the local financial markets to ensure that confidence in the financial systems is maintained and any systemic risk is avoided. Such actions will facilitate maintenance of the macroeconomic gains achieved thus far. This is a necessary ingredient for economic growth and poverty alleviation, even against the unfolding adverse effects of the global financial crisis. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me end by urging all of us present here today to deliberate on issues that will help us face the future in a much more confident way. Let us use this unique opportunity to have a discourse on how to protect and sustain the recent achievements of higher income levels and reduced poverty. African countries need to find ways and means of coming up with a response framework to reverse the effects of the crisis.

A monetary stimulus in the US will have a different effect on the euro area if, say, Asian countries have flexible exchange rates rather than fixed rates against the dollar. So the choice of exchange rate regime by any one bloc both depends on and affects the choices of the others. How did we end up in this position? Under the gold standard of the late 19th and early 20th century, exchange rates were fixed and capital flowed freely internationally. Domestic monetary policy was subordinated to the demands of the gold standard, except in time of extreme crisis when the need for flexibility overcame the desire to adhere to the standard. From the end of the Second World War until 1971, the member countries of the Bretton Woods system had a formal commitment to fixed but adjustable exchange rates, and capital accounts were largely closed to give members the flexibility to operate independent monetary policies. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangements, countries have been free to make quite different choices of exchange rate regime, and have not hesitated to do so. As international financial markets have developed, there has been a general movement to flexible exchange rates supported by credible domestic monetary policies. That is a sensible use of the price mechanism to respond to complex and unpredictable shocks.