samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
11  In the decade ahead, members of the G20 will be increasingly well-positioned to defer to each other’s comparable regulatory outcomes, supported by commitments to common minimum standards and open supervisory co-operation. These commitments could be reinforced by reliance on independent peer reviews and a new, independent dispute resolution mechanism. Brexit will be a litmus test of the future of international cooperation. The UK and the rest of the EU have exactly the same rules and the most highly developed frameworks of supervisory cooperation. Their capital and banking markets are already highly integrated. They have the potential to create the template for trade in financial services. Conclusion A decade on from the start of the crisis, the G20 is building an efficient and resilient financial system which serves our domestic economies and supports sustainable cross-border investment and economic activity. As the global recovery strengthens and broadens, now is the time to take full advantage of these hard won gains. That means completing the journey from fragility to resilience by ensuring that: -  shadow banking is fully transformed into resilient market-based finance,  -  durable market infrastructure is in place,  -  we complete the job of ending too big to fail, and  -  emerging vulnerabilities are addressed in a timely and consistent manner. That means adjusting the reform measures dynamically to maximise efficient resilience and avoid unintended consequences. 11  The UK was an early adopter.

These are to be welcomed, provided the overall level of resilience is maintained. Resisting Fragmentation There are, however, other nascent risks that, if left unchecked, could threaten the progress made, and, ultimately undermine the G20’s objective for strong, sustainable and balanced growth. These risks include the impact of reform fatigue on implementation momentum, the outcome of Brexit negotiations, the need to complete Basel III, and the importance of finishing the job of ending too big to fail. In many respects, the global financial system is at a fork in the road. On one path, trust and cooperation diminishes, fragmentation hardens, capital flows are disrupted, and trade and innovation are curtailed. If authorities do not have sufficient confidence that their efforts to promote financial stability are being reciprocated elsewhere, then concerns about the risks of openness could intensify. If that happens, domestic authorities could impose local requirements on domestic entities of foreign firms. In a world where many banks and FMIs are highly interconnected that would generate significant inefficiencies, frustrating the benefits that flow from open trade and investment. Taking this low road would be sub-optimal for all, with fewer jobs, lower growth and higher domestic risks. 10  One example is a report by the Committee on the Global Financial System on the resilience of global repo markets that is being delivered to the G20 this week. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  8  But there is another path: the high road.
Such price increases are all the more remarkable given that these prices had tended to stagnate in recent years. This jump in the price of commodities was mainly attributable to the continuous growth in domestic demand in the emerging markets and low extraction and production capacity. In our opinion, this situation is not likely to change in any direction in the short term. Although partially offset by the weak US dollar, the rise in the oil price during the final quarter of 2007 triggered a sharp increase in inflation – from 0.7% in September to 2% in December. The price rises of other commodities were also significant, but they only had a minor impact on inflation in Switzerland. In fact, commodities are not directly included in the reference basket used to calculate the price index, which means that their price increases only had a minor impact in this respect. However, the indirect effects, i.e. higher prices for goods and services as a result of higher production costs, constitute a much more serious inflationary risk. Having said this, the related impact last year was modest because many companies chose not to pass on their higher costs to consumers, given the considerable competitive pressure in numerous markets. Moreover, the relatively moderate increase in wage costs and gains in productivity over the last few years allowed companies to absorb a good part of the additional costs they had incurred as a result of higher commodity prices.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Review of the Swiss economy in 2007 and the outlook for 2008 Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 25 April 2008. *  *  *  Mr President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests As history has shown, and the President of the Bank Council has reminded us just now, celebrations to mark our various anniversaries have often taken place amid difficult circumstances. Such was the case in 2007, when confidence in the quality of numerous financial products began to fade from August onwards in the wake of the US real estate crisis – subsequently placing a substantial provisioning burden on international banks and leading to a crisis of confidence on the markets. A worsening of the economic outlook and major stock market corrections then ensued. Nevertheless, 2007 as a whole can still be regarded as a successful year in economic terms, with global economic growth settling in at around 5%. This excellent performance is mainly attributable to the continued momentum of the emerging economies, notably in Asia, although favourable financial conditions also played a positive role until the middle of the year. Global economic performance was less homogeneous than in 2006, however.
If we were to dispense with it, Swiss interest rates would increase compared to those of other countries, Swiss franc investments would be markedly more attractive, and we would  Page 3/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  have to expect a marked and rapid appreciation in our currency. Inflation would thus fall significantly into negative territory, and the economy would be slowed. But why are interest rates so low in the first place? This is in some part due to the expansionary monetary policy. However, the main reason is that for some time saving has been increasing worldwide, with comparatively little investment being made. The high saving rate is largely attributable to demographics. The dearth of investment is due, among other things, to low productivity gains. Both these factors have been heightened by the prevailing uncertainty since the onset of the financial crisis. If there is more saving and less investment, the interest rate at which the economy is in equilibrium falls. Switzerland cannot distance itself from this global development. Central banks set their policy rates relative to this equilibrium interest rate. To have an expansionary effect, a policy rate must be lower than the equilibrium interest rate. And if the latter is very low, it can be that the policy rate has to be lowered below zero.

Furthermore, most banks will have to meet the next challenge of fine-tuning their risk management and calculating their economic capital in the coming months, pursuant to Pillar 2. In sum, these regulatory, economic and financial factors are prompting banks to change the way they manage their risks, meaning that supervisors must be more flexible and more watchful. To clarify these considerations, I would like briefly to address two issues: 1. The results posted by French banks in 2006 are good, but they are not without vulnerabilities. 2. French banks are currently in the final straight as regards the implementation of the new regulation. As the banking supervisor, our role is to support them during this transitional period and to ensure together that the reforms are carried out properly. French banks’ 2006 results are good, but not without vulnerabilities Like the majority of leading European banks, French credit institutions reported good results for 2006, in line with the previous three years. For the three main banking groups under IFRS, the net banking income grew nearly 19 per cent, more than in 2005. In all, the aggregate net income of the French  BIS Review 75/2007  1  banking system, under French GAAPS, amounts to nearly € billion. This reflects a substantial contribution from foreign subsidiaries and from non-banking business, especially insurance. Moreover, most large French banks made major acquisitions outside their home market in 2006, particularly in regions with strong growth potential.
Under the Act, all government revenues from the oil sector are to be transferred to the Fund, and the net budget surplus is to be invested in international markets. At the time, in the midst of a deep recession, many doubted that any petroleum revenues would ever be saved. Projections indicated that offshore petroleum production would peak in the early 1990s. However, during this decade, the government’s cash flow from the petroleum sector started to increase sharply. Slide 7: The fund mechanism and fiscal policy The policy guidelines were clarified in 2001. Rules governing the interaction between Norway’s petroleum wealth and fiscal policy were established. Under the fiscal rule, the government can only spend in the annual budget, on average over an economic cycle, the expected real return on the Fund – estimated at 4 per cent annually. At the same time, Norges Bank was charged with the task of keeping inflation low and stable. Thus, our traditional fixed exchange rate policy was abandoned. A clear division of responsibilities between monetary and fiscal policy had been put in place. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  After two decades of spending petroleum revenues more or less as they accrued, the fiscal rule enabled the government to save for future generations. At the same time, the rule made fiscal policy more robust: By decoupling spending from current petroleum revenues, the fiscal rule provides for a gradual and sustainable phasing-in of petroleum revenue spending. The fiscal rule is no straitjacket; it allows automatic stabilisers to work.

Our average ownership in listed European companies is almost three times our average holdings in Asia or the Americas. Slide 12: Changing regional allocation (starting point) At the start of this year, more than half of the Fund was invested in Europe. As the Fund has grown, we have come to realise that a more even distribution between regions will better enable the Fund to take part in global value creation. Slide 13: Changing regional allocation (target) Recently, a new principle for the regional allocation of the Fund’s assets has been approved. A consequence of this principle is that the relative allocation to Europe is reduced. The Fund’s relative holdings in the Americas, Asia and emerging economies will increase accordingly. For the Fund as a whole, a more even allocation across regions will improve the overall long-term trade-off between risk and expected return. In accordance with the new allocation of the Fund’s assets, new purchases will primarily be made outside of Europe, until the adjustment process is completed. As the Fund receives inflows of fresh capital on month-by-month basis, we are able to undertake the adjustment through new purchases. This will ensure a gradual process, and will not entail a large sell-off on our part. Instead, the effect will be merely a temporary drop in our purchases of European assets. Under the new principle, the Fund will still be overweight in European assets, compared to a market neutral position.
Selecting Barcelona as the venue for ISDA’s discussions offers us a chance as well to celebrate the ancient and the innovative, the old and the new, in financial services. This conference, for example, will address some of the most sophisticated products in banking and finance and the risk management practices, legal developments, and technological advances that are emerging to support these new businesses. At the same time, our discussions here in Barcelona will remind us that we must all always monitor and control the fundamental – and traditional – risks involved in our activities. Credit risk, market risk, and operational risk have always been with us in various forms, although they have increased in complexity over recent years. What has changed dramatically, however, is our ability to measure and monitor those risks more comprehensively than our predecessors ever could. We have, moreover, improved our ability to manage or transfer those risks, and I would like to share with you today some thoughts on work underway in the financial community in this regard. There are three topics that I would like to address in my intervention. I will begin by sharing first, in my personal capacity, some thoughts regarding the need for standards to evolve and keep pace with the times, whilst ensuring that new standards are not unduly burdensome and do not hinder firms’ abilities to innovate.

Though the current liquidity levels in the Swiss franc money market are still extremely high, and interest rates are fluctuating around zero, conditions on the money markets have slowly started to normalize and extremely negative rates have disappeared. This is reflected in the recent increase of the three-month Libor, which can be ascribed to a normalisation of the rate’s risk premium and should therefore not be seen as a change in monetary policy. Though few loans are currently being concluded on the interbank market, the Libor remains an important benchmark for many credit transactions in the economy. Concluding remarks The period of low interest rates in which we live is the outcome of cyclical and secular circumstances which are unlikely to last forever. Even if we accept the “savings glut” hypothesis, the demographical and regional factors to which it refers could soon lose relevance. While the call for deleveraging should prompt increased savings in advanced economies, the demographic forces in the west are likely to have an opposite effect on the supply of savings. Similarly, the maturing of emerging markets in the east should lead to smaller current account surpluses and to a gradual reduction in the build-up of precautionary reserves by public authorities. It is also clear that the increased risk appetite associated with the “Great Moderation” was, at least to some extent, based on over-optimistic assumptions.
The Riksbank supports the EU commission's motto of “better regulation” and that all regulation changes must be preceded by objective and extensive impact assessments and cost-benefit analyses. Concluding remarks Let me now summarise. The financial turmoil that began in the United States over one year ago has now spread around the world with full force. Strong distrust currently prevails in the markets, which in one way or another essentially afflicts all financial institutions. For Swedish banks this trend is mainly expressed by the fact that they are forced to borrow on much shorter terms than usual and at higher rates. In brief, although we are not responsible for the current situation we are certainly feeling its repercussions. Both the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen still hold the opinion that the major Swedish banks have strong capital buffers, robust earnings and low loan losses. Consequently, conditions are good for handling the current uncertainties as well as for dealing with unexpected future losses in the economic downturn we see ahead of us. Thank you! BIS Review 125/2008  7

In many of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries of the EU, vulnerabilities have been reduced since May, but the economic and financial situation remains fragile. In particular, further economic contraction is forecast for a number of these countries next year. In this environment, a combination of rising unemployment and falling household incomes could be expected to raise the credit risks on consumer loans and residential mortgages. Corporate default rates are likely to be high in such a context as well. Given these fragilities, the possibility of a resurfacing of risk aversion towards the region can not be excluded. In several CEE economies, vulnerabilities stem from the fact that a sizeable proportion of outstanding bank loans are denominated in currencies other than the currency in which the borrower’s income is denominated. Such mismatched foreign exchange currency positions mostly affect households. In countries with flexible exchange rates, currency depreciations earlier this year have meant that households would have to repay larger amounts than they expected. Recent developments serve to underline the risks that exist when large stocks of foreign currency credit are outstanding. The share of foreign currency lending in many of these countries has been rising, owing to wide interest rate differentials. This has left them increasingly vulnerable to a renewed weakening of their currencies, which could trigger a significant further deterioration in banks’ asset quality. 2  BIS Review 168/2009  The general recovery of risk appetite has benefited the hedge fund sector.
Switzerland as a partner of the EU  Switzerland is deeply integrated in the European economy. Although it is not a member of the European Union, it has very close ties with it. The EU accounts for 60% of our exports and as much as 80 % of our imports. In 2001, one-third of the 30 billion Swiss francs that were transferred abroad in the form of Swiss direct investment went to the EU, while 80% of foreign direct investment in Switzerland came from the EU. It is therefore not surprising that the Swiss business cycle is highly correlated with the activity in the EU, and that the exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the euro is of crucial importance to us. Close economic ties also mean close institutional co-operation. An initial step in this direction was taken with the 1972 Free Trade Agreement concluded with the European Economic Community (EEC). Full membership was never a serious option. In 1992, the Swiss people even rejected the option of becoming a member of the European Economic Area. Further progress was made with the implementation, one year ago, of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU. The purpose of this set of agreements is to secure for Switzerland sectoral access to the European single market. They cover seven issues, among them an agreement on labour mobility and an agreement on transportation. Since the middle of last year new negotiations have been under way between Switzerland and the EU on a further ten issues.

6  See Dong Choi, Michael R. Holcomb, and Donald P. Morgan, Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: New Evidence on a Recurring Question, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report #856 for evidence of risks-shifting in response to the imposition of the supplementary leverage ratio in the U.S.  7 See Andrew G. Haldane, “Multi-Polar Regulation,” International Journal of Central Banking, June 2015, 11(3),  385–401; “Strengthening and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation,” Robin Greenwood, Sam Hanson, Jeremy Stein, and Adi Sunderam, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 479–565, Fall 2017; “Bank Capital Allocation under Multiple Constraints,” Tirupam Goel, Ulf Lewrick, and Nikola Tarashev, October 2017, BIS Working Paper #666. 8 A counterargument is that economies of scale and network effects from technology platforms could lead to  greater specialization, e.g., payments or mortgage lending. 9 See “CoVaR,” Tobias Adrian and Marcus Brunnermeier, American Economic Review, Vol. 106(7), 1705–41 and  “The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation,” Markus Brunnermeier, Andrew Crockett, Charles Goodhart, Avinash D. Persaud, and Hyun Shin, in Geneva Reports on the World Economy, 2009 for a broad discussion and Empirical Evidence on ‘Systemic as a Herd’: The Case of Japanese Regional Banks, Naohisa Hirakata, Yosuke Kido, and Jie Liang Thum, January 2017, for an empirical example. The literature typically focused on small firms acting in the same way, but the same principle likely applies to large firms that behave similarly to amplify systemic risk. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
You cannot change the rules as you go along. That to me, is very essential. So at the moment we are trying to make those rules very clear to all the market players in various forms. We have already done so in most of the markets, in the foreign exchange market, in the fixed income markets, and I think the SEC is now trying to establish the rules in the equity market. Once all that comes together I think you will see a significant improvement in the way our entire financial sector operates and hopefully that will be the main conduit for financing of development in the years to come. So this deals more or less with the challenges we have in the financial space and our efforts to ensure financial stability. But really, it is the third objective, which is the economic development of the country that I wish to spend a few minutes on today. This is the area, which, for various reasons central bank has engaged and disengaged over the years and decades. Basically, the bank took a backward step about fifteen to twenty years ago and very understandably so, because that was the time when the war was raging and we had our own problems to contend with, particularly in-terms of ensuring stability. Therefore the central bank did not pursue aggressively a strategy of engaging with the rural sector and with the broad development of the entire country.

In so far as financial markets are concerned, these recent times have seen us avoid major and abrupt market movements or disruptions. Besides the 2016 measures that stabilised our markets, this growth is also the result of the many initiatives implemented since then. One key fundamental strategy has been our steps to enhance market transparency and visibility, which provides us with information and data for targeted development efforts. The operationalisation of the RENTAS Segregated Securities Account which enables us to observe the activity in the Malaysian bond market has also provided investors with improved efficiency and a reduced reporting burden, lowering the cost of investing in this area. On this topic, I am pleased to share that on Monday this week, Clearstream launched their revamped solution which will provide an internal settlement link to facilitate greater access to the Malaysian market. They now rejoin a host of International Central Securities Depositories and Global Custodians that provide such access. This is yet another positive development for our financial markets. With greater oversight capabilities, we were able to introduce the dynamic hedging programme in 2016, which successfully enabled institutional investors’ active management of their foreign 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  exchange exposures in the onshore market. The programme currently records participation of 104 registered institutional investors managing USD37 billion total asset under management, and has led to the migration of these investors’ former offshore strategies to the onshore market which has increased the level of transparency and orderliness of the ringgit market.