samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Most of all, being open in spirit and mindset, staying open to diversity, being comfortable working in multi-cultural settings, thriving in a globalised world. We must also remain a resilient society. Able to ride the ups and downs of business cycles and structural changes. Able to adapt, learn new skills, continually improve. We must become a more innovative society to be dynamic. Willing to experiment and accepting failure as a halfway house to success. Investing in R&D, leveraging on technology. Most of all, having an enterprising spirit – always seeking new and better ways to do things. In the end, we must be an inclusive society. It is probably not a coincidence that IPS has chosen to make the theme of this conference ‘Together’. The two forces that offer the most promise for sustained economic dynamism are globalisation and technology. But how far we can reap the benefits of globalisation and technology will depend on how well we bring all our people together. The path of dynamism is also the path of continuous disruption, even dislocation. To sustain the momentum and consensus in favour of globalisation and technology, we must help those adversely affected by them and equip Singaporeans to succeed. And to maintain cohesion in the face of population ageing and growing healthcare burdens, those who have benefitted from our growth and dynamism must contribute to the larger society – through taxation, philanthropy, community service. We then become not just a dynamic people but also a compassionate one.

Finally and most importantly, following monetary policy decisions, the President and VicePresident of the ECB hold a press conference followed by an open discussion with journalists, the transcript of which is published on the ECB’s website. It should be recalled that the ECB was the first central bank to adopt such a procedure, which provides a unique opportunity to fully explain and comment monetary decisions immediately. On the other hand, the Governing Council of the ECB has chosen not to publish the minutes of its meetings. The publication of these minutes would indeed present some drawbacks: -  first, governing council members may “speak for the minutes” when these are very detailed, while, when they are not detailed, may not convey more information than a plain communiqué;  -  second, the publication of the minutes might also create more difficulties for moving from initial positions to new ones in the light of the arguments developed;  -  finally and most importantly, in the case of the euro area, the analysis of the votes could be read and interpreted as reflecting national interests or preoccupations,  2  BIS Review 113/2007  which would be misleading and could jeopardise both the independence of the members of the Governing Council and the credibility of our decision-making processes. The Eurosystem is based on operational decentralisation The third imperative, operational decentralisation is an essential feature of the Eurosystem.
Norges Bank’s instruments are effective in terms of rapidly supplying large quantities of liquidity if this should prove necessary. The central bank will supply sufficient liquidity to the money market in connection with the year 2000, as we normally do throughout the year. Should it prove necessary to depart from the collateral requirement, a risk premium will be applied. 8. Conclusion  To sum up and conclude: Norges Bank places emphasis on promoting financial stability. As a result of the banking crisis, Norges Bank has strengthened its surveillance of the financial sector. In cooperation with other public authorities in Norway and internationally, we will contribute to developing framework conditions for financial institutions and financial markets that reduce the likelihood of future crises. A priority task is to enhance the resilience of the payment and settlement system in the face of a crisis situation. 7  BIS Review 124/1999  It is still likely that financial crises will recur. In the last 20 years, three quarters of IMF member countries have experienced a banking crisis. Not even a perfectly healthy macroeconomic policy and the development of an effective supervisory system constitute a guarantee against crises if the banks fail to exercise sound banking. Herd mentality and over-optimism that are rapidly reversed seem to be a recurrent phenomenon. Systems and contingency schemes are therefore required to handle crises in order to limit the adverse effects and reduce the risk of recurrence. The most important preventive measure is to promote sound banking.

Our goal is to provide information that helps households and businesses follow the data along with the Fed. If people know more about how the economy is performing and how that is likely to influence our actions, this should make it easier for us to achieve our twin objectives. I will now turn it over to Rob to discuss the Snapshot in greater detail. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
This is in the interest of the countries which have already introduced the euro, but even more so in the interest of new countries entering the euro area. Without having achieved sustainable convergence, the loss of the exchange rate and interest rate instrument could cause costly tensions in the economy at the expense of growth and employment. The determined efforts of Greece to achieve such convergence have to be commended. However, it is too early to reach a firm conclusion. Next year, the European Central Bank (ECB) will produce a convergence report to analyse what has been accomplished. Let me repeat and underline that achieving convergence is not a process which ends with adopting the euro. On the contrary, being a member of the euro area and being able to benefit from the potentially great opportunities that offers call for ongoing adaptation to the new environment and the new rules of the game. It is like in sports: reaching the top is difficult, but staying there is even harder. 1  BIS Review 113/1999  Integrating one or more of the EU Member States which have not previously introduced the euro will be a challenge for the euro area. However, an even greater challenge for Europe as a whole lies ahead. I am referring to the enlargement of the European Union. First, I shall deal with that process in general. Then, I should like to say a few words about how the Eurosystem (i.e.

Svein Gjedrem: Risk and growth in the financial industry Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Central Bank of Norway, at the Annual meeting of the Norwegian Savings Banks’ Association, Bergen, 27 October 2005. The speech does not contain assessments of the economic situation or the monetary stance. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The charts in pdf-format  can be found on the Central Bank of Norway’s website. References can be found on the Central Bank of Norway’s website. *  1. *  *  Introduction  Over the past decades, debt and financial assets have risen sharply worldwide. The financial system serving lenders and borrowers has also expanded. The number of participants in these markets has soared, some new operators have appeared and a broad range of instruments has emerged. Growth in financial markets provides the basis for more efficient use and distribution of capital and for improved risk management. Developments in the financial industry have thus contributed to stronger and more stable economic global growth over the past decades. New instruments have increased banks’ possibilities of managing risk, among other things credit risk associated with lending. In many countries, growth in household borrowing has been high for several years. In Norway, mortgage loans account for an increasing share of banks’ balance sheets. I will now discuss different aspects of this. 2.
With hindsight, it is easy to talk about making a mountain out of a molehill, but the lack of problems was of course largely due to the fact that they had been foreseen and due precautions taken. One positive consequence of all the fuss around the new millennium was that openness regarding security and IT was increased and that attention was drawn to the need for routines to manage crises. At the same time, it can also be concluded that the IT systems proved to be fairly robust. The consequences of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September last year could actually be handled to a large extent as there were security arrangements for most of the central financial systems. However, these events emphasised the importance of taking into account such potential threats as terrorism and other physical threats to the financial system when establishing security routines. My second reflection is of a more human nature. After having given a whole speech on IT in the financial sector it is easy to give the impression that the banks and other institutions operating on the financial markets consist merely of technology and money. That is not the case. Fundamentally they are not about technology or money, but about people and the relations between people. All successful managers of financial companies, particularly bank managers, are aware of this. Technology is a useful aid, but a customer who does not receive a respectful, personal and competent reception at one bank will choose another next time.

Jaime Caruana: The New Basel Capital Accord: why we need it and where we're at Remarks by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Fifth Meeting of the Asian Program of the Institute of International Finance, Beijing, 17 November 2003. *  *  *  I’d like to thank the Institute of International Finance and the Bank of China for hosting this discussion on the outlook for banking and finance in Asia. For many reasons, it seems especially appropriate to discuss this topic here in Beijing. The tremendous growth of China’s economy, its recent accession to the World Trade Organisation, and the wide scope of change that is occurring here has made China a reference for the world. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you some of the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to promote financial systems better able to sustain growth and more resilient during periods of distress. It is an honour to address this forum, but I must confess that I have come to listen and to learn. The message I am consistently hearing is on the one hand one of strong support for the principles of the New Capital Accord and on the other a desire for the best standard for financial systems in each country. Too many examples have illustrated the economic costs and social unrest that weakly capitalised and poorly managed banks can inflict on an economy.
One example of this enhanced impact is provided by the behaviour of hedge funds who customarily borrow short-term funds to finance their (longer-term) investments 9 . -  Turning to the exchange rate channel, financial innovation results in greater integration of domestic and international financial markets, which should also strengthen the exchange rate channel as exchange rates become more sensitive to interest rate differentials between currency areas. This has been illustrated by the recent debate about cross-border carry trades 10 . -  At the same time, financial innovation has probably weakened the credit channel 11 . Several phenomena may be at play : •  Financial innovation gives firms broader access to securities markets, which may reduce information asymmetries at the source of the credit channel. 7  BIS, 1994  8  Noyer, 2001  9  Weber, 2007  10  Weber, 2007  11  BIS, 1994; Thornton, 1994  BIS Review 42/2007  3  •  More specifically, securitisation by banks has reduced their liquidity constraints and thus further weakened the credit channel. A recently published research paper by the New York Fed, using a micro data set of individual loans granted by a sample of banks between 1997 and 2005, shows that the use of credit derivatives is associated with a greater supply of newly negotiated loans extended to large corporate borrowers. Previous research has generally found that banks have used earlier credit market innovations such as loan sales and securitisation to diversify credit risk exposures and increase lending.

This observation, combined with the increased securitization of real estate into diversified national portfolios, gave buyers – and those rating the securitizations – confidence that the “real estate cycle risk” was substantially mitigated through diversification. But, as Figure 7 shows, the assumption that a geographically diversified portfolio of real estate assets would avoid price declines proved wrong. While prices nationally had not experienced a substantial decline in the past, for three years the U.S. has experienced substantial and sustained declines in prices. Some of my colleagues point out, probably appropriately, that given the historical data the failure to anticipate nationwide house prices falling is largely understandable. It was certainly very widespread. What may be more surprising is that in the 2005 timeframe, when many were expecting house prices to slow down or flatten, there was not much by way of risk mitigation undertaken. Myth 2 – Triple-A mortgage securities carried little risk The securitization market – that is, the market for securities based on various slices of pooled mortgages – grew dramatically over the past decade. One reason for the growth in securitization was investor interest in, and demand for, securities with little credit risk but returns above those of Treasuries. Many buyers of such securities felt sure of two things. First, that national real estate prices were quite unlikely to fall – in other words, our Myth 1. Second, that even in the highly unlikely event that the price of a national portfolio did fall, they would be protected by the structure of the securitization.
But also other countries (like Norway) with no particular difficulties in terms of anchoring inflation expectations have moved in this direction, presumably because their central banks were convinced of the benefits per se of the strategy. At present some twenty central banks have adopted an inflation targeting framework 4 , and some observers would add a few more to that number. The monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem The Eurosystem has not followed the same route. In October 1998, the Governing Council of the ECB dismissed the adoption of either inflation or monetary targeting and decided instead to select a strategy of its own, which aims at maintaining price stability over the mediumterm. The idea was to develop a credible and flexible, tailor-made strategy that would allow for timely responses to a changing environment, while keeping in clear focus the objective of price stability. And it was necessary to take account of two key factors of that time: the regime shift implied by Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the heightened uncertainty that surrounded the introduction of the single currency. Whilst it was important to build on  1  See Kydland F. E. and Prescott E. C. (1977), "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans", Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-92 and Barro R. J. and Gordon R. (1983), "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model", Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589-610.

Evidently, though, the possibilities of further using these types of policies have become notably constrained, both at home and abroad. It should also be borne in mind that, once the economic and financial fragility beleaguering the world economy has been resolved, demand-side policies should adopt a more neutral stance. All these considerations on the diagnosis of the Spanish economy in the current international crisis and on the limited leeway available to demand-side policies mean, rather, that  6  BIS Review 79/2009  economic policy has a central role to play in implementing the reforms that help improve productivity and the behaviour of the factor and product markets. It is in this area that the authorities undoubtedly have effective room for manoeuvre, and also considerable responsibility. Let me begin with the labour market, which is where the most pressing problems are to be found. The scale of job destruction has once more highlighted the existence of distortions that emerge with force in recessions and compound contractionary trends. And there is a risk that, as in the past, the surge and change in level in unemployment may stick and that this will delay subsequent recovery. Labour market dysfunctions are also closely linked to the discouraging behaviour of the economy in respect of gains in economic efficiency and in productivity, hampering the possibility of attaining genuine improvements in competitiveness and of raising growth potential.
Because the normalization process is expected to proceed gradually, it can be anticipated that monetary policy will remain expansionary still for some time, probably making it the longest period of continued monetary expansion since the adoption of the current monetary policy regime. The CBC will be prepared to act countercyclically if downside risks materialize in the external sector. 1  Let me now turn to the details of our baseline scenario and the related risks we see. In the second quarter, economic activity grew 5.3% annually, giving an important upward surprise with respect to June expectations (Figure 1). By sectors, the greatest differences were observed in non-mining activity, particularly trade, business services and manufacturing. Domestic demand also grew above expectations, reflecting a greater expansion of private consumption, an increase in inventory build-up and more dynamic investment in machinery and equipment. This dynamism was largely maintained in July’s monthly index of economic activity (Imacec). The non-mining component of this indicator posted an annual increase of around 4%, while its mining counterpart dropped by nearly 2% annually, due to some one-off adjustments in some operations. About the labor market, for several quarters its recovery seemed to lag behind activity, mainly because private salaried employment—which typically has a closer link with the business cycle—was stagnant. This phenomenon was not entirely unexpected given that the lags with which activity affects employment are variable, but anyway advised some caution regarding the strength and durability of the economic recovery. In recent months we have been reviewing this diagnosis.

Table 1 Domestic Scenario (variación anual, porcentaje)  2017  2018 (f) Jun.18 Report  GDP Mining GDP Non-mining GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% GDP) Ahorro nacional bruto (% del PIB) Gross fixed capital formation  1.5 -2.0 1.8 3.1 1.8 -1.1 2.7 -0.9 4.7 -1.5 20.6 21.6  2019 (f) Sep.18 Report  Jun.18 Report  2020 (f) Sep.18 Report  Jun.18 Report  Sep.18 Report  3.25-4.0  4.0-4.5  3.25-4.25  3.25-4.25  3.0-4.0  2.75-3.75  4.1 3.7 4.5 3.6 5.2 6.7 -2.1 20.3 21.6  4.6 4.1 5.0 3.8 4.9 6.2 -2.2 20.3 21.7  3.9 3.6 4.5 3.4 3.4 3.8 -2.5 20.6 21.9  3.7 3.7 4.5 3.4 4.2 4.4 -2.6 20.5 22.1  3.5 3.6 3.9 3.5 2.5 2.6 -2.6 20.7 22.2  3.3 3.7 3.9 3.6 2.8 2.8 -0.3 20.5 22.4  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
As is well known, Spain’s current system for valuing assets is highly demanding, both in terms of the criteria for classifying assets as troubled and in terms of provisioning and write-downs. One example would be the treatment of savings banks’ exposure to the construction and real-estate development sector. The total amount of this exposure is € billion, of which 28 billion (13%) is made up of doubtful assets. That said, the requirements of the Banco de España force the banks to also record as potentially troubled investments, and make the necessary provisions for, assets acquired in payment of debt, as well as standard loans under surveillance owing to some observed weakness, even if payments are up to date. As a result of these rigorous asset classification criteria, as at 31 December 2010 savings banks were obliged to recognise € billion of potentially troubled lending to construction and property development, i.e. 46% of their total loans and receivables in this sector. This gives an idea of the transparency efforts made, which have been far beyond those required in other parts of the world. Accumulated specific loan loss provisions represent 31% of these “extended” troubled assets, and if we add the general provisions this percentage reaches 38%.

What has been done so far I shall begin by examining progress to date. At the time of the outbreak of the international financial crisis the Spanish economy and banking system had seen more than ten years of real estate expansion, excessive private indebtedness and continual competitiveness losses. Such imbalances had been generated in an environment characterised by very low interest rates and dominated by the absence of any significant structural reforms in relation to public spending, pensions, the labour market or savings banks. After ten years building up imbalances it was inevitable that the economy would have to adjust and reforms were essential to restore growth and employment as soon as possible. If we examine what has happened during the two and a half years since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it is clear that our country’s economy and banking system have both made considerable progress in terms of adjustment and restructuring. The private sector has made progress in reducing its imbalances at a faster rate than in other countries with similar problems: the external deficit fell from 10% of GDP at the beginning of the crisis to 5% last year and Spain has even managed to turn some long-standing deficits, such as those in trade with the European Union and in non-tourism services, into surplus.