samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Indeed, the latest information shows that economic activity is expected to have continued worsening in recent months. This is evident in the manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), which has since the start of the year stood below 50, a level indicative of a contraction in activity. The reduction in the last few months in the global service sector PMI, which had held firmer to date, in expansionary territory, suggests an increased risk of a greater slowdown in global activity. This downturn in activity has also been accompanied by more marked divergences across geographical areas. Among the advanced economies, activity has remained relatively robust in the United States, underpinned by the fiscal expansion and the soundness of private demand. However, the gradual tailing off of the effects on activity of tax cuts, the signs of a global slowdown and the absence of clear inflationary signals have already prompted a shift in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. This has taken the form of the announced conclusion of the balance sheet reduction process as from September and, last July, the first interest rate cut since 2008. Moreover, the financial markets anticipate further cuts in rates in the rest of 2019 and in 2020. In other geographical areas, GDP growth has been increasingly weak. This has been the case in the European economy, to which I will refer later.

3 See Box 1, “An estimation of the impact of the recent protectionist measures”, in the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2018, Banco de España; Box 1, “Implications of rising trade tensions for the global economy”, in Economic Bulletin, 3/2018, ECB; and International Monetary Fund (2018), “Scenario Box 1. Global Trade Tensions”, World Economic Outlook: Challenges to Steady Growth, October, pp. 33-35. 4 See IMF (2018), “Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues”, and J. L. Vega (coord.) (2019), “Brexit: current situation and outlook”, Occasional Papers, no 1905, Banco de España. 5/16  Among the European countries, Germany’s industry and export-based growth model has been greatly affected by external developments. But Italy has been the most beleaguered, given its weak GDP growth, the result of the uncertainty over the course of its economic policy. Indeed, the latest available information generally points to a slowdown in the growth rate across the euro area, concentrated especially in the industrial sectors. Moreover, the weakness of the external sector is also spreading to investment. That means the sluggishness of external demand, heightened political uncertainty in some countries and the easing in corporate profits are already bearing down on firms’ spending plans. Furthermore, the leading indicators of euro area exports show no signs of having touched bottom. The flash estimate for euro area GDP in the second quarter shows quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.2% (compared with 0.4% in the first quarter), with negative growth of 0.1% in Germany and stagnation in Italy.
Registered unemployment was 2.3 per cent of the labour force in October. Unemployment has declined for all occupational groups, and has been most pronounced in manufacturing, building and construction and the engineering and ICT sectors. There are probably limitations to how much the supply of Norwegian labour can increase in the period ahead. Labour participation rates are high, particularly when taking into account demographic developments. Developments in the labour market are similar to those observed prior to the period of accelerating wage and cost inflation that started in 1998, but wage growth so far has been fairly moderate. Several factors may have contributed to this. An increase in inward labour migration and the opportunities provided by an international labour market may have prompted participants in local and centralised wage negotiations to place greater emphasis on the considerably higher wage level in Norway relative to our trading partners and on potential job vulnerability. Foreign companies with contracts in Norway account for a substantial share of inward labour migration. Labour inflows from the new EU member states still appear to be growing, with the construction industry absorbing a particularly large share. In 2006, the number of persons employed  BIS Review 108/2006  1  from new EU member states who are not resident in Norway is estimated at close to 30 000, i.e. an increase of 12,000 since 2005. Inward labour migration has reduced bottlenecks in some industries. However, despite increased labour market flexibility, the risk of higher growth in labour costs is now rising.

In the course of 2005, office rental prices began to pick up in the largest Norwegian cities, with considerable variation within the various quality and location segments. The rise in consumer prices has also edged up since the beginning of the cyclical upturn. The year-onyear rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 2.6 per cent in September. Energy products such as electricity and oil have put upward pressure on inflation over the past year. Electricity prices, including grid rent and taxes, were 48 per cent higher in August than one year earlier, while petrol prices were 1 per cent higher. Since the beginning of 2001, the rise in energy prices has been over 7 per cent on average. Variations in energy prices may also lead to wide monthly variations in consumer price inflation. As a result of high electricity prices, the rise in CPI inflation will remain steady though 2006. Energy prices are expected to fall in the spring of 2007, dampening the rise in CPI inflation. The rise in prices for non-energy goods has been moderate in recent years. Price impulses from imported consumer goods have been particularly weak. Their contribution to inflation has been negative virtually every year since the mid-1990s, partly reflecting increased trade, a shift in imports towards low-cost countries and a substantial improvement in distribution efficiency in Norway. Price impulses from imported consumer goods are expected to continue to exert downward pressure on inflation for some time ahead, albeit to a lesser extent than in previous years.
The Need for Clarification  BIS Review 77/1999  2  Further clarification is particularly necessary at this time, notwithstanding the point that the general principles outlined in my 1994 statement still apply. The banking environment has changed quite dramatically in the past five years. Last year, after many years of growth, Hong Kong, in common with much of the rest of the region, entered a period of sharp recession, with all the stresses and uncertainties that this has brought to the banking sector. The face of banking across the world has also developed rapidly in the last five years. There are strong justifications for the HKMA not only to restate the principles under which we are ready to provide liquidity support to institutions experiencing difficulties, but also to further clarify the objectives, the mechanics, and the limits of this support. As I have said, it has so far not been necessary for the HKMA to exercise its role as lender of last resort, though we have, on one or two occasions, said that we stand ready to do so. Given the volatility that has been generated by the Asian financial crisis and the serious problems that have been faced by banks elsewhere in the region, this is in itself a remarkable testament to the resilience and prudence of our banking sector. It also underlines the effectiveness of our regulatory and supervisory system, which, as any good system should, takes a preventive rather than a curative approach.

Launched in 2017, this network, which I am honoured to have chaired from the beginning, brings together central banks and financial supervisors to track supervisory developments and develop climate scenarios for central banks and supervisors. The network also explores paths to scale up green finance and monitor its market dynamics, thereby bridging data gaps and coordinating research in the fields of climaterelated and environmental risks. I am happy to mention that the NGFS has just welcomed its ninetieth member. The Basel Committee’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Risks will continue working on the further integration of climate-related financial risks into the Basel framework and expectations. To help address the remaining challenges in terms of measuring climate-related financial risks, the ECB is working closely with the European Banking Authority (EBA) on the management and supervision of ESG risks. We have also provided our input to the European Commission’s EU taxonomy for sustainable activities and its non-financial reporting directive 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  (NFRD), which requires large European companies to disclose information on their policies in areas such as environmental protection and social responsibility. In particular, the ECB supports the ongoing work by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on effective and consistent regulatory and supervisory approaches for dealing with climate risks. Conclusion Let me conclude. When dealing with the risks arising from climate change, we must be forward-looking, comprehensive and strategic. But we must also be swift.
These challenges are also putting creative pressure on central banks and supervisors. And I will elaborate today on how to catalyse our efforts together on one “road for the future” towards innovative payments and CBDC. I. CBDC and innovative payments: next steps ahead Once regarded as the "plumbing" behind the financial system, attitudes to a CBDC and to payments in general have dramatically changed over the past 18 months; and these issues are now at the top of the central banking agenda. As is often the case with major innovations, reactions to the idea of a CBDC are very mixed. Let me start by clarifying one major point: no decision has been taken at this stage on whether or not to create a digital euro. And before any such decision is made, rest assured that all necessary analysis will be properly  conducted. It is with this mindset, intent on supporting innovation but within a framework of trust, that the Banque de France has been leading the way on a possible CBDC over the last two years. And the time has come to share with you some of the main learnings regarding three basic questions: why, how and when.

Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s latest economic and financial developments Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision-Making of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 31 October 2012 *  *  *  Today, on 31 October 2012, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council reviewed and approved the quarterly Monetary Policy Report. Based on the analysis of Albania’s latest economic and monetary developments, and following discussions on their performance outlook, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged, at 4.0%. The Supervisory Council deems that the current monetary conditions are adequate to meet Bank of Albania’s inflation target in the medium term. Keeping the key interest rate at its minimum historical level ensures the necessary monetary incentive to promote Albania’s domestic demand and economic growth. Let me now proceed with an overview of the economic and monetary developments and key issues discussed at today’s meeting. *** The Albanian economy was faces with a challenging global environment over the first three quarters of 2012 due to difficult situation of the world economy, and particularly of the euro area. Domestically and externally generated supply shocks determined the economic growth profile and continued to test Albania’s macroeconomic and financial foundations. Over this period, the Albanian economy was faced with slow foreign demand growth, increased financial risk premia and tendencies of several financial market agents to reduce exposure to Albanian economy. These developments were also reflected in low consumption and investment levels.
Moreover, in line with the MTP, it is envisaged that the rising debt-to-GDP ratios will reverse their course steadily starting from 2011, and hence the risk premium would not display any significant changes throughout the forecast horizon. BIS Review 143/2009  15  Table 1: Annual Growth Forecasts 2009  2010  Previous Forecast  New Forecast  Previous Forecast  New Forecast  World  -1,4  -1,1  2,5  3,1  Developed Economies  -3,8  -3,4  0,6  1,3  United States  -2,6  -2,7  0,8  1,5  Euro Area  -4,8  -4,2  -0,3  0,3  Developing Countries  1,5  1,7  4,7  5,1  All OECD  -4,1  -3,7  0,7  -  United States  -2,8  -2,8  0,9  -  Euro Area  -4,8  -3,9  0,0  -  World  -2,3  -2,3  2,6  2,7  United States  -2,6  -2,5  2,4  2,6  Euro Area  -4,4  -3,9  1,0  1,1  IMF  OECD  Consensus Economics*  Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, July and IMF World Economic Outlook Update, October. OECD Economic Outlook, June and OECD Economic Outlook, September. *Consensus Forecasts, September and October.

Greater emphasis and clarity are needed as to the purposes and limits of public intervention, and the extent to which those interests warrant different degrees, modes, and timing of public and private sector involvement, depending on the particular country and circumstances. In this way all parties will be better placed to understand current developments and how the international community might react to future strains. The argument against standstills There are of course other points of view. I would note that some have suggested that perhaps we should go in a different direction, that we should seek to build time back in by calling a time out. In particular, it has been suggested that an early recourse to comprehensive payment standstills (suspensions of debt service perhaps amplified or reinforced by capital controls) would increase the manageability of crises and enhance predictability. My reading of the record convinces me that trying to freeze market processes would do the opposite. I would like to share with you my thinking on this point. •  The desire for certainty and control which seems to underlie standstill proposals is understandable, as it offers the promise of using less public money, and seemingly entails less risk that creditors will be bailed out for poor credit decisions. But the control and manageability that might result may be more seeming than real. •  For one, a perceived disposition to preemptively lock the door seems likely to send investors heading for the exits all that much sooner.
Øystein Olsen: The Norwegian economy and the sea Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a business sector seminar, in connection with the launch of the new 100-krone and 200-krone banknotes, Lofoten, 30 May 2017. * * * Accompanying slides This is a day I have been looking forward to for a long time – it’s not every day a new banknote series is put into circulation. The last time was in 1994. And being able to hold the launch here in the Lofoten islands is an added bonus. The sea and the Lofoten islands are inextricably linked – the sea is a defining feature of the landscape and a key source of food, employment and recreation. Norway’s coastline is embraced by the sea from the northernmost point to the southernmost tip. The sea has shaped our history and our economy, and from today onwards, it will also feature on Norwegian banknotes. Norges Bank has been governed by our elected representatives since 1816 under a clear mandate: to safeguard the monetary system and the value of our money. Norges Bank’s banknotes and coins are the community’s money, and our trust in the value of our banknotes is closely linked to our trust in each other. With this in mind, it was important to design banknotes that would tell a story about us as a community of people. As the sea is a key dimension in that story, it was chosen as the theme of the new banknote series.

I would agree that there are certainly some common features, and indeed we would usually review as part of our own work the work done by the audit department on identifying areas of potential risk and control problems. Similarly, external auditors’ observations and recommendations are often very useful to us in coming to a judgement on the effectiveness of an institution’s internal controls. However, to supervise an institution effectively a supervisor needs, in my opinion, a means of independently verifying that internal controls are sound and that all substantive risks have been identified and considered. For this reason, our ongoing dialogue with institutions, and our periodic on-site examinations of institutions’ activities, are invaluable. I believe this oversight can also be beneficial in a practical way to the institution itself. For example, we may have insights that the institution does not. We may be able to give an institution feedback on how it compares vis-à-vis its peers in similar areas and to indicate respects in which, from our experience, its controls and risk management processes are falling behind the game. I would not want to overplay this “management consultant” type role, but I think it can be beneficial, perhaps especially to the smaller, less sophisticated financial institutions. Of course, this presupposes that we have the necessary expertise to offer useful advice. This is a constant challenge in today’s environment of rapid technological change and product innovation.
9  The Bank of England’s June 2000 Financial Stability Report highlighted the risks to the financial sector of the heavy debts taken on by telecoms firms to finance purchases of licences. BIS Review 134/2009  7  Second, and again anticipating part of my later remarks, the residents of industrialised countries are free to borrow from abroad, so total credit growth may lie beyond the control of national authorities. There is no good reason to turn our backs on free flowing capital. Third, a “dynamic resilience” objective would not leave credit conditions untouched. “Dynamic resilience of the domestic banking sector” should, by contrast, be something national authorities can influence. A required increase in banks’ capital resources or liquidity during a period of exuberance would be likely to act, in degree, as a circuit-breaker on domestic credit supply. So there would be an effect on credit conditions, and so plausibly some indirect taming of the credit cycle during the upswing. And, crucially, during the subsequent downswing, the macro-prudential dial could be relaxed where necessary to lean against the risks of a perverse downward spiral. A broadly symmetric approach would be important. Its feasibility would depend on there being appropriate minimum capital requirements in the first place for normal conditions. That is part of the Basel agenda. So, on this view, the mandate or mission could be expressed in terms of ameliorating the impairment of banking system resilience that typically occurs during credit booms.

We consider that our work has been both interesting and rewarding and we hope that it has also helped some of our colleagues to make their own institutions stronger. 2  BIS Review 123/2006
The recent recession has been accompanied by very low interest rates, which have kept loan losses down, but this may or may not be the picture in the future. It would be unwise to bet on it happening, and particularly when we know that loan forbearance is quite widespread. The fourth thing that supervisors have done is to apply judgement in overlaying the Pillar 1 modelled capital requirements with Pillar 2 capital buffers. Since 2008, required Pillar 1 capital in the major UK banks has increased from £ to £ Pillar 2 capital buffers set by the FSA, in all, have increased during the same period from just under £ to £ Put simply, in the regime up to 2008, there was no judgemental overlay of capital buffers, now there is such a buffer. This is a product of good judgemental supervision. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  What is the role of a leverage ratio? For me, it is not the frontline tool, but rather the very useful back-up check. Why is it not in the frontline? Because it would not on its own prevent the two main causes of the crisis. First, savvy investment bankers would take assets off balance sheet into places where a leverage ratio may not be the best measure. And second, on its own it does not stop the arbitrage whereby the riskiness of each unit of assets rises as a means to circumvent the discipline of the leverage ratio.

The ECB’s Governing Council does not consider that appropriate. The governments themselves have several means to leverage the EFSF. Yet again the banks are deeply in crisis and clearly need to be recapitalised. Can the euro area afford another banking crisis? We have to deal with the sovereign risk tensions and we have to deal with the banking tensions. It is crucial that the banks put their balance sheets in order as quickly as possible. They need to build up a stronger equity position by retaining profits and being less generous with bonus payments. In so far as is possible, they must recapitalise in the market. If a financial institution has no access to the capital markets, the Government must stand ready to recapitalise solvent banks. In addition, where it would be necessary, the Heads of Government have decided that the EFSF can be mobilised to recapitalise banks. How can it be prevented in future that taxpayers have to continuously save the banks? The global financial system must be much more resilient. That is the reason why we have to apply rigorously and fully the new Basel III rules, to be sure that systemically important financial institutions do not put the sector in danger. In this regard we have to be inflexible and oppose any pressure group. Under your leadership, the ECB has risen to become Europe’s secret government. Is it not deeply undemocratic when representatives of an unelected institution like the ECB can dictate austerity plans to an elected government like Italy’s?
Caleb M Fundanga: The importance of multi-cultural awareness and language learning Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of Zambia and the Chinese International School in Zambia, Lusaka, 22 December 2010. *  *  *  The Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Zambia, H.E Mr. Li Qiangmin The Chairperson – Chinese International School in Zambia, Mr Li Tie The Deputy Governor Administration – Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula The Deputy Governor Operations – Dr Austin Mwape The Principal – Chinese International School in Zambia, Mr. Tan Haitao Distinguished Teachers from the Chinese International School in Zambia Colleagues from the Bank Members of the Press Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen It gives me great delight, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia, to welcome you all to this important signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Bank of Zambia and the Chinese International School in Zambia. The MoU that we are about to sign today provides a framework for the provision of Chinese language lessons to members of staff at the Bank of Zambia. Your Excellency, the Bank of Zambia attaches great importance to the need for staff to learn other international languages. In the process of both economic globalization and diversity of culture, language has become more and more important.

The Fund did encourage longer term investment into unit trusts and kick started the ETF market on the HKEx and elsewhere in Asia, where we now have a variety of ETFs covering a wide range of asset classes. The result has been the provision of more choice to investors, both retail and institutional, at lower cost than traditional unit trusts. As we enjoy our 10th anniversary celebration, I cannot help but wonder if the exit strategies currently on drawing boards around the world will be as successful as we were? Only time will tell. I wish you all a very pleasant day and once again many thanks to State Street for organizing this celebration. 2  BIS Review 142/2009