samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The more successful you are on this train journey, the more you should care about the other passengers who may not be as accomplished or resourceful as you are. Have empathy and be just. Be generous to those in need of help. Finally, be fully committed and have the courage to tackle challenges, adversity and changes. There are many decisions during the train journey that are very tough and difficult. Many involve choices that do not produce or guarantee good outcomes. Be courageous and decisive. In the real world, there is no such thing as perfect information. Very often indecision itself can bring about much worse outcomes than picking any one of the seemingly unsatisfactory choices. Life is full of changes and surprises and you will be much better off to embrace them rather than resist them and feel depressed when you are down. 8. So my advice to you, my fellow graduates, is that write down on the back of your train tickets these three words: “Wisdom”, “Morality” and “Courage” (智、仁、勇). Keep on reminding yourself that these are the tips for you if you wish to reach your destination: Success. Success has to be earned, no matter how you define it. While you have your own right to define what you mean by success, I would advise you not to confine yourself just to the material benchmarks, although they are very important. A successful life is a meaningful life, something that money alone cannot buy.

The simple truth is, unless you are on a train, you don’t have the chance to move forward and will never come closer to your destination: Success. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  5. If you feel that I should not be depicting a rather scary train journey on this auspicious and joyful occasion, then please forgive me and let me try another scenario for you to think about, again using my train journey story. 6. Suppose that you have been bumped off the train once or twice and have found your way back onto the next trains to carry on with the journey. You will gradually realise that there are certain rules and disciplines on the train that determine who get the good seats, who can be upgraded from the economy cabin to the business class and then the first class cabin. There are also rules and booking system that govern who can enjoy a good meal at the dining car and when. So you will come to realise that the train is not a wild jungle filled with animals, or people, trying to eat each other alive. You will also discover that there are some passengers who have got upgraded to the business or first class cabin not just because they are muscular or clever. They are ahead of most other passengers because they possess certain qualities that we in modern time called leadership.
Subdued wage growth, together with subdued inflation, are presented among the risks in the euro-area – while the divergent wage growth trends between euro area and emerging Europe are considered to reflect differences in labor market slack. Alternative explanations provided by recent international literature for the disappearance of the Philips curve refer to under-measuring the amount of spare capacity (slack) in the labour market; a lower natural rate of unemployment; lower or more anchored inflation expectations; and changes in expectations of real pay growth. The IMF’ REO presents an innovative econometric model reshaping the wage Philips curve against a measure of unemployment gaps. This shows that the Philips curve is flatter in the euro area than in the NMS, but that in general it still works. However, caution in interpreting the results is needed because this model splits the EU countries into three distinctive groups (Germany a group of its own, some euro-area countries and some NMS countries including euro and noneuro area, but excluding Romania and Bulgaria – probably because, in particular for these 2 countries, any measure of unemployment should be regarded prudently given the large emigration and underground economy). Let us remember that catching-up is an inflationary process in itself, as postulated by BalassaSamuelson. Maybe not much convergence is taking place between North and South, but catching-up has continued throughout the crisis between East and West – as Daniel Gros recently concluded in a CEPS study.

Jon Nicolaisen: Challenges for the payment system Speech by Mr Jon Nicolaisen, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at Finance Norway's payments conference, Oslo, 1 November 2018. * * * Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. Changing payment landscape The way we make payments is changing. New services and operators are constantly appearing. The underlying infrastructure, our payment system, must be adapted to the changes. But where is this all heading? How will we make payments in the future? And what will the future form of money be? The forces driving payment market developments are new technology, changes in consumer behaviour, globalisation, and new regulations, such as the new Payment Services Directive (PSD2). PSD2 requires banks to grant third-party providers (TPPs) access to their systems to enable TPPs to offer payment and account information services. PSD2 is both a response to developments in the payments market and a catalyst for future developments. At the same time, a number of large international technology companies are moving into the payments market. Apple offers mobile payment services to Norwegian customers. Google has just launched its own mobile payment solution in Norway. Other operators will follow suit. The role companies such as Facebook, Amazon and Alibaba may take remains to be seen. Vipps is now the only Norwegian mobile payment solution. A planned merger of the Vipps, BankAxept and BankID systems was announced towards the end of 2017. The merger was approved by the authorities in summer 2018.
My assessment was then that our main scenario, with a decline in GDP in the world of around 1 per cent this year and an increase of just over 2 per cent next year was reasonable. But at the same time I considered that there was a risk that the recession would even be deeper and more protracted than we predicted. My reasoning was based on the fact that recessions that arise as a consequence of financial crises and recessions that are synchronised between several countries are normally followed by slow recoveries. Sweden was in a severe recession in April and we are still. We were assuming a fall in GDP of around 4.5 per cent this year and a weak recovery next year. As in the case of international developments, my assessment was that on balance the predominant risks were that the recession could be deeper and more prolonged. CPI inflation was expected to be negative this year, but underlying CPI inflation with a fixed interest rate, the CPIF, was expected to be close to 2 per cent throughout the entire forecast period. In my opinion, there was no reason to worry about deflation and no reason to worry about high inflation. We decided to cut the policy rate to 0.5 per cent. Today I would like to take up two questions in the current situation that are linked to monetary policy. These are the link between resource utilisation and inflation, and the limits for stabilisation policy.

Today, all the Swedish banks have voluntarily strengthened their capital bases by more than the Basel regulations require. Banks in many other countries have done the same. At the same time, the concept of bank sector solvency has been increasingly undermined. Many risks are not on the balance sheet. It is therefore more relevant to consider the ratio between total risk exposure and the capital base. With the expansion and growing complexity of financial market operations, it has become increasingly important that banks are capable of managing the risks in their business. The financial turbulence in recent years has underscored this and banks are also more determined to have such a capability. The  BIS Review 9/2000  2  capacity to understand, monitor and control internal risks is thus featuring more and more prominently in the organisation of financial enterprises. A major aspect of this work has been the development of more advanced methods for the quantitative measurement of risks. As one might expect, most progress has been made in the measurement of market risk; the extensive trading in financial instruments provides a good supply of price statistics and this is a considerable help when it comes to estimating market risks. Much work is now being done in many places to construct models for a better management of credit risks, which are still by far the largest risk category for banks. The difficulties here, however, are far greater than in the case of market risks.
Where innovation will flourish, changing customer demand will be supported and exceeded, and ultimately life-dreams enabled. It is up to each of us to help build the foundations that will allow this to take place. This transformation involves many new actors, alongside the traditional banks. There are growing numbers of challenger banks as well as innovative payments services, Payment Service Providers (PSPs), and increased interest from the world of FinTech. Indeed, payment businesses currently make up 17% of the UK’s c2500 FinTech companies. Global household ‘bigtech’ names such as Facebook and Amazon are also breaking into this market. These competitive pressures are pushing existing market participants to invest and think more intensively about what the future world of payments should look like. And due to the pivotal nature of payments, the public sector is actively involved too, seeking both to enhance and strengthen the existing infrastructure but also assessing whether there is a more fundamental approach to complement it. New forms of digital money could contribute to faster, cheaper, and more efficient payments and have financial inclusion as a prominent design consideration. As innovation develops further in this space, it will be important that regulation follows suit. Our Governor Andrew Bailey noted in his recent speech, that it is crucial the regulatory framework adapts to innovation in a way that fulfil the Bank’s core mission to promote the good of the people of the UK.

Had countries turned their backs on foreign investments and exports, it would have impoverished them and weakened the region. Fortunately this has not happened. There have been understandable nationalistic sentiments against selling distressed companies at low prices to foreigners. But all ASEAN countries continue to seek foreign investments and trade. Their people are eager to learn English, and to exploit the internet. They know that plugging into the global economy is still the best way to sustain growth, and to create jobs and prosperity for their citizens. They also know that competition has become keener, and that they have to make their economies more attractive to foreign investments. As Malaysian Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin acknowledged in his recent Budget speech: “In a borderless world, large international conglomerates have greater choices in their investment decisions.” Accepting globalisation means progressively deregulating and liberalising ASEAN economies, easing rules on foreign ownership and participation, and opening up hitherto protected sectors. By exposing their economies to the winds of change and the pressures of global competition, countries will strengthen their own players, who will learn to hold their own without crutches or protection. Of course the process has to be managed. Sudden deregulation of a controlled economy may lead to chaos and collapse, as happened in Indonesia in 1998, when the IMF pressed the Suharto government to dismantle everything overnight. But properly implemented, opening up will lead to substantial long term benefits and prosperity, despite the short term social and economic costs.
Since there has been some confusion in the past, I would like to reiterate that this would indeed require a change of the ESM Treaty but not of the EU Treaty. Second, we would need an insurance mechanism against tail events that may still arise and endanger euro area financial stability. Here we already have the ESM to act as lender of last resort to sovereigns. To sum up: a functioning banking union reduces the need for the stabilisation function of a fiscal union, but not to zero. Conclusion I have tried to give you the ECB’s view on the various aspects of the banking union. Our preparations to take over the task of the SSM are well under way. We are adamantly  4  A recent study demonstrates that automatic stabilisers absorb 38% of a proportional income shock in the EU, compared with 32% in the US. In the case of an unemployment shock 47% of the shock is absorbed in the EU, compared with 34% in the US. This cushioning of disposable income leads to a demand stabilisation of up to 30% in the EU and up to 20% in the US. See: M. Dolls, C. Fuest and A. Peichl (2012), “Automatic stabilizers and economic crisis: US vs. Europe; Journal of Public Economics”, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pp 279–294. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  convinced that banking union will only function if the SSM is complemented by a single resolution mechanism and that it is put in place without undue delay.

We must now pursue the efforts already initiated and do our utmost to ensure that these improvements feed through to the real economy so that economic growth can return and unemployment can reverse its rising trend. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
This is a problem that affects not only the governments and authorities in the countries suffering crises. The arrangements for crisis management, like the supervision, affect the business conditions the banks work under. An efficiently-functioning safety net comprises a form of "quality label” on the bank system. This in turn has significance for the banks’ ability to attract customers and financiers. If legislators and authorities cannot supply this, the domestic market will lose out in competitiveness compared with other markets. The fact that there is currently a lack of joint regulations for crisis management within the EU is therefore a problem, also from the banks' perspective. Possible solutions I have now come to the fourth and final part of my speech, the part about possible solutions to the problems. Regulations, supervision and crisis management need to be developed so they can function even when banks have cross-border operations. The aim is to form a framework that can supply the need for financial stability, both nationally and internationally. It is equally important to ensure that regulations and institutional arrangements are designed so that the financial integration process can continue and the competitiveness of the European bank sector can thereby be strengthened. Considerable thought is being put into these issues at EU level right now. Some measures have already been taken. For instance, the need for a more efficient and uniform supervision of banks with cross-border operations has partly been met by giving the supervisory authority in the group’s home country strengthened powers and increased responsibility for coordination.

The salaries of these workers are especially sensitive to the cycle. Along with the high turnover rates, this facilitates cost adjustment in companies and cushions the impact of negative shocks on hiring. The results indicate that individual salaries are more flexible than what appears in aggregate statistics, emphasizing the importance of having real-time microdata to detect the evolution of inflationary pressures and thus help in monetary policy decision making. 3. Despite the adjustment capacity of the labor market, periods of weakness have significant associated costs. In particular, the process of reallocation to better quality jobs and more productive firms is diminished in the lower part of the cycle. For some workers, especially those in the early years of their working life, its effects can be very persistent. 17
For this second category, it is often difficult or expensive to monitor the risks on the bank’s asset side. One important aspect of bank regulation is the requirement for the amount of capital the banks should maintain. As capital adequacy requirements play a central part in the discussion of financial stability, I would like to examine them in a little more depth. There is a difference between the private and social benefits and costs of financial regulation Demands for bank regulation are not infrequently met with resistance from interested parties who claim that regulation is too expensive. Not least, this resistance is aimed at higher requirements for banks’ capital adequacy, as the interested parties claim that capital is more expensive than loans. But in this context, it is important to make a distinction between private costs and social costs. Higher capital adequacy requirements entail private costs for the banks. But we public sector participants should primarily be discussing the social consequences. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  One cornerstone of modern financial research is the basic theory that was established by Modigliani and Miller over 50 years ago.1 This says that the value of a company does not depend on how that company is funded – under certain assumptions. In principle, the model shows that the form of funding is only significant if there is a difference between the debts of companies and those of private individuals.

So how will the FLS help? Let’s be clear on one thing. It is up to the banks whom they lend to. If a firm goes under, or simply can’t repay its loan, that bank loses money: under the FLS the credit risk stays with the banks. And it is not our intention that banks put themselves at risk by making imprudent loans. Although there are many good quality businesses seeking extra credit, not every one is as good a credit risk as they might make out to their local journalist or MP, so we need to be wary of judgement by anecdote. But the FLS will put the pressure on banks to lend where they profitably can. That may “turn the conversation around” as banks do more to seek out lending opportunities rather than businesses or home buyers struggling to find accommodating banks. If demand for credit turns out to be weak then that will add to the competitive pressures on the supply of credit. In summary, I am confident that the FLS will help the supply of credit. Before its introduction, it was more likely than not that the stock of credit would contract further over the next 18 months. Perhaps it still may. But any return to positive credit growth would be a better outcome than we could have previously hoped for. But I want to underline one thing about the expected outcome: I expect banks’ usage of the scheme to exceed their lending growth.
My view is that there is a strong case for making, on a periodic basis, comprehensive and transparent assessments of the distributional impact of monetary policy. This would help people understand the purpose and impact of monetary policy, both on the economy in general and on them as individuals, on “their GDP”. I give some illustrative examples of a “Monetary Policy Scorecard” summarising the impact of monetary actions on particular cohorts. Greater transparency of this type would not, by itself, reduce any distributional effects of policy. But it could help in explaining the impact of these actions, in a localised and personalised way, as a means of improving understanding and trust in central banks. Both have been a casualty of the crisis. Why Distributions Matter  Let me start with a bald statement: all public policy is distributional, be it monetary, fiscal, structural or social. The reason I know this is because redistribution is the way public policy works; it is what policy does for a living. Some policies redistribute resources between agents at a point in time. Others redistribute resources between agents over time. If policy is not working through one of these channels, it is not working. If all policy is distributional, it does not take much of a leap of imagination to see that policymakers may wish to understand and explain its distributional impact. In some policy settings, that already happens – in fiscal policy, social policy, climate change policy, pension policy.

And this, coupled with the challenges that lie ahead, has led us to look at ways in which corporate governance among the banks might be further enhanced. If I could sum up our objective, it would be to try to reassert the role of the board of directors in banks. While the day-to-day running of banks should certainly be left in the hands of the management, the board must play a leadership role in approving the objectives, strategy and business plans of the bank, monitoring the performance of management and ensuring that the internal control and risk management systems of the bank are effective. The board must also make sure that the bank conducts its affairs with integrity and in accordance with high ethical standards. The board is part of the system of checks and balances that ensures that neither large shareholders nor management abuse their power and that decisions are taken with the bank’s best interests in mind. If the board does not play its full part, a vacuum in leadership will be created. This vacuum may be filled by the shareholders becoming directly involved in running the bank’s affairs, or by the executive management acting more or less in isolation. In either case, the board of directors is bypassed and checks and balances are lost. The HKMA has recently issued for consultation a draft guideline for banks and other authorized institutions which sets out what the HKMA expects of them in relation to corporate governance. The guideline aims to establish minimum standards.