samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We at the Fed need to very closely monitor the data to make sure that inflation remains contained. And we will. But as I believe I will demonstrate this morning, the most likely result is that these supply shocks cause slower growth in the near term while having only a modest effect on longer-term inflation rates – which has been the U.S. experience since 1986. Unemployment remains quite elevated, at 8.8 percent, and I anticipate a slower return to full employment than we would have experienced absent these supply shocks. With the core inflation rate over the prior year at a little above 1 percent, I anticipate only a gradual return of core and total inflation rates to something like our consensus “stable” rate of about 2 percent, over the medium term. If the economic data continue to support this outlook then the current, accommodative stance of monetary policy is appropriate, and can remain in place and continue to support economic growth – so that we continue to make progress toward our goals of returning to full employment and a sustainable long-run inflation rate – the two elements of the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate from Congress. 1  My colleague Geoffrey Tootell, Director of Research at the Boston Fed, has prepared an illuminating public policy brief that investigates whether commodity price spikes cause long-term inflation.

Thomas Jordan: Financial crisis dispersing? Economy changing direction? Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the general assembly of the Handels- und Industrieverein des Kantons Schwyz, Schwyz, 25 August 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The situation on the international financial markets has recently brightened again. This is mainly due to the positive keynote in company earnings reports and a series of unexpectedly favourable economic data. The relaxation of monetary policy was pursued further through the implementation of unconventional measures in March 2009, and this is also likely to have had a calming effect. Price advances since March should, however, be partly seen as corrections to excessive downward movements in the previous period. Considerable uncertainties still prevail and the danger of setbacks should not be carelessly underestimated. The recessionary developments in the world economy weakened significantly in the second quarter of 2009. Expansionary monetary policy around the world, together with fiscal support programmes, have probably played an important role in this respect. Economic indicators are also showing a turn for the better in the Swiss economy. Nevertheless, in view of the exceedingly low level of utilisation of production capacity, industrial investment will probably continue falling. Given the increasingly gloomy outlook for employment, private consumption is also likely to put a damper on the resumption of cyclical activity.
Households and companies may feel growing uncertainty both about developments in public revenues and expenditure, and about the formulation of monetary policy. This can be costly for the economy if it leads to a failure to carry out investments and to unnecessarily cautious decisions about the allocation of resources. To sum up, then, it becomes more costly to pursue an excessively expansive fiscal policy when monetary policy is guided by an explicit inflation target. A good policy mix makes for better conditions A better policy mix arises if the orientation of fiscal policy does not make for higher inflation risk premiums. It can avoid this if the orientation of fiscal policy appears to be sustainable in the long run. The surplus-target in the public finances is a good example of this. One means by which the confidence felt by the general public in economic policy can be monitored consists of inflation expectations, which should not diverge substantially from the Riksbank’s inflation target. When expectations of inflation diverge from this target in the longer term - whether upwards or downwards - it implies that monetary policy should be adjusted so as to steer expectations back towards the target. In this connection it is important to observe that a central bank whose inflation target commands high credibility often has more scope for acting than one that has little credibility. Assume, for example, that an economy where the credibility of the inflation target is high experiences a positive disturbance to the business cycle, leading to higher demand.

The Swedish economy is less open to competition than the American. For example, even adjusted for differences in value added taxes, the level of prices in Sweden is on average 15-20% higher than in the USA. Many deregulations that were carried out long ago in the USA, such as the deregulation of the transport sector, for example, have been carried through more recently in Sweden and there are many indications that we have not yet seen their full impact. However, competition in many markets is expected to increase in Sweden in the future, in part as a result of increased globalisation and European integration. One area in which very little has been done is the labour market, which is very rigid and regulated compared with the American. BIS Review 132/1999  4  –  Where the introduction of new technology is concerned, Sweden has gone further in this than many other OECD countries. For example, we have the highest number of Internet users per capita in the whole world. –  Like the American economy, the Swedish economy is very open to the world around it and Sweden has a long tradition of free trade. To some extent this counteracts the tendencies towards limited competition on the Swedish market. –  But on the other hand, as yet we have seen no clear indications in the statistics of the impact of the new economy.
All in all, this new FSR underlines three main aspects with respect to financing the economy: –  The regulatory drivers have and will continue to have an important bearing on market participants’ behavior and strategies. –  The transition towards a more balanced financing pattern needs to be supported by public intervention. –  There is still a lot to do in order to drain resources more effectively and ensure a sufficient flow of long-term financing, which is a prerequisite for recovery and growth. Before we get into the discussion, let me briefly share with you some personal thoughts in this regard. In my view, the challenges to finance the economy are mainly two-fold: –  On the one hand, some segments of the economy, namely SMEs and infrastructures, rely heavily on bank-financing, due to the existence of high fixed costs and significant information asymmetries. Indeed, banks are better equipped to assess the credit-worthiness of such counterparties or projects. Facing this situation requires to unlock bank lending. –  On the other hand, and that concerns the economy as a whole, it is essential to foster the development of a market financing as a complement to bank financing. Although the process has already started, the speed and extent of the shift differs across countries and sectors. The development of a more balanced funding structure is a necessarily long process, which requires a strong commitment and support from public intervention.

In parallel, reintermediation by non-banks raises level-playing field questions linked with uneven regulation and supervision across sectors and countries. To discuss these important issues, we are extremely fortunate to gather an exceptional panel today, with: •  Mrs Sheila Bair, Chair of the Systemic Risk Council, former chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), who is obviously a prominent regulator. Dear Sheila, your work to build a more robust financial system, that serves the economy, is particularly impressive and your views on how to make it even more resilient are very sharp;  •  We also have Mrs Barbara Novick, Vice-chair of Blackrock and the author of impactful articles on asset management and public policy; as well as Mr Alain Papiasse, Deputy Chief Operating Officer (COO) at BNP Paribas, representing the group in North America. Barbara and Alain are two top market practitioners with a comprehensive experience in both asset management and investment banking. So, dear Barbara, dear Alain, I hope you will provide us with “insider” and complementary visions of what it really means to finance the economy. •  And finally let me introduce Mr Thomas Philippon, a distinguished academic from NYU, notably specialized in the evolution of the financial industry. Dear Thomas, your research on the financialization of the economy will provide a unique viewpoint by putting in perspective the links that exist between the financial industry and the economy. Thank you all for being with us today. Let me now give the floor to our panelists.
the ECB and the 11 national central banks of the Member States which have adopted the euro) is meeting this challenge, in particular since EU enlargement also implies the eventual adoption of the euro by the accession countries. Before doing so, however, I should like to make clear that I am not able to repeat Governor Zolotas’ remarkable performances at the World Bank some years ago, when he made speeches in English using only Greek words. Enlargement of the European Union Let me begin generally by saying that the forces and motivations driving the enlargement process are the very same as those that have driven the process of European integration over the past 50 years. Moreover, these forces have shown themselves to be extremely powerful, as can be seen from the remarkable events that have taken place since the Schuman declaration nearly half a century ago. Some 50 years ago, it was already clear to Europe’s political leaders that they needed to overcome the nationalism which had ultimately led to two world wars and devastated much of Europe in the first half of this century. In order to ensure a future of peace and stability they needed instead to pursue policies which would bring European nations closer together and in so doing eliminate the risk of future conflicts. This, as I believe we are all aware, was one of the original “political” motives behind European integration.

We need a holistic approach for Asia's energy transition that meets three objectives: reduce emissions significantly; meet growing energy demands; and limit any adverse impact on jobs and communities. Neither the continued burning of coal nor the immediate cessation of coal plants meets all three objectives. What we need is a coherent strategy for the managed phaseout of coal that achieves environmental sustainability, energy security, and a just transition for communities whose livelihoods depend on coal. Finance alone is not enough but it can play a critical role in getting us from coal to clean. A combination of public and private capital, coupled with appropriate policy reforms, can provide the right economic model to encourage owners to voluntarily wind down their coal fired power plants ahead of their technical end of life. We will also need innovative financing structures to blend public and private capital. But there are significant challenges to financing the early retirement of coal. Financial institutions will need to justify how such financing is consistent with their net-zero commitments, especially when their financed emissions rise over the short term. They will need to address potential greenwashing concerns that new coal capacity is being created to replace the coal plants being phased out early. There is a lack of scalable risk sharing mechanisms to support coal plant owners in their transition to cleaner energy.
Simon M Potter: Interest rate control during normalization Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the SIFMA Conference on Securities Financing Transactions, New York City, 7 October 2014. *  *  *  I would like to thank Josh Frost, Lorie Logan, and Matthew Raskin for their excellent assistance in the preparation of these remarks and colleagues in the Federal Reserve System for numerous insightful comments and suggestions. Thank you, Rob. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this important event. Securities financing markets are essential to the efficient functioning of the global financial system, and to the implementation of monetary policy in the United States and abroad. As you know, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recently published a statement on its policy normalization principles and plans. Today I would like to talk about these principles, and more specifically, about how the Committee plans to raise and control shortterm interest rates when it becomes appropriate to do so. Obviously, these plans are of interest to the Open Market Trading Desk (the Desk) as we must implement the directives issued by the FOMC after each meeting, and I am responsible for reporting to the FOMC on the transactions made to meet its operating target. I’ll also review the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) operations that the Federal Reserve has been testing for the past year, and explain recent changes the Committee made to these operations.

As was the case before the crisis and indicated in the June 2011 principles, the Committee intends to adjust the policy stance during normalization primarily through actions that directly influence the level of the fed funds rate and other short-term interest rates rather than through active management of the size or composition of the Fed’s securities holdings. Specifically, when economic conditions and the economic outlook warrant a less accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will raise its target range for the fed funds rate. During normalization, the Committee intends to move the fed funds rate into the target range primarily by adjusting the rate of interest on excess reserve balances (IOER) that it pays. We expect changes in the IOER rate to have a significant influence on the fed  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  funds rate and other short-term interest rates. However, to help control the fed funds rate, the Committee also intends to use an ON RRP facility and other supplementary tools, as needed. The Committee will use an ON RRP facility only to the extent necessary, and will phase it out when it is no longer needed to help control the funds rate. With regard to the Fed’s balance sheet, the Committee intends to reduce securities holdings in a gradual and predictable manner, primarily by ceasing to reinvest repayments of principal on securities held in the SOMA.
This is patently unfair, and scrapping such 21 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  policies would help increase economic mobility. 21I really don’t see how our best universities can continue to justify this practice. Yes, fund-raising might suffer slightly over time—but I suspect the impact would be very small. More importantly, do we really want to encourage what is essentially a “donate to admit” policy at our major universities? Such an approach only preserves the status quo and constrains economic mobility. The research shows that upward mobility differs substantially across colleges. Ivy League schools are good at producing top earners, but, as I noted, they accept very few lower-income students, so their impact on income mobility is small. Meanwhile, other schools with economically diverse student bodies produce few high earners, and their impact is likewise small. Then there are certain schools—some of which can be found in the CUNY and California state systems—that manage to produce a large number of high earners from economically diverse student bodies. Learning exactly how they do it and how it can be replicated strikes me as a first-order question for further study. While I am distressed by the high and increasing levels of inequality and diminished mobility that our economy has delivered over the last several decades, I remain optimistic about the future. There is more attention now to inequality and low intergenerational mobility than I can recall at any time during my professional life.

16 See the New York Fed’s Economic Press Briefing on Household Borrowing, Student Debt Trends and  Homeownership, April 3, 2017. 17 For example, the default rate for students from relatively modest backgrounds is around 35 percent, 2-3 times  that of those from wealthier backgrounds. See Press Briefing on Household Debt, with Focus on Student Debt, p.26. 18 Bleemer, Brown, Lee, Strair, and van der Klaauw, 2017. Echoes of Rising Tuition in Students’ Borrowing,  Educational Attainment, and Homeownership in Post-Recession America . Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 820 (July). Tracy, Schneider, and Chan, 1999. Are Stocks Overtaking Real Estate in Household Portfolios? Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 5, no. 5 (April). 19 Zafar, Bleemer, Brown, and van der Klaauw, 2014. What Americans (Don’t) Know about Student Loan  Collections. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics (June 5). 20 Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, and Yagan, 2017. Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in  Intergenerational Mobility. NBER Working Paper No. 23618 (July). 21 See Richard Reeves, Dream Hoarders (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017). 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
I understand the strong desire of the authorities to minimise the costs associated with the banking sector rescue, including costs incurred to date, and those still to come. Let me make some comments in this area. When the programme for Ireland was designed, the costs of the banking sector measures already in place, including the promissory notes, were fully factored in. The annual cash repayments of promissory notes is thus financed by programme resources. That programme is on track. Any deviation from that programme should be considered very carefully indeed. The perceptions that have built-up around Ireland’s successes in the programme should not be jeopardised. It has been hard-won and it is worth fighting for. Therefore, the ECB remains of the opinion that Ireland should honour its commitments stemming from the promissory notes, as foreseen. This in our view is the best way to regain sustainable market access. I frequently hear in the Irish debate the sense that the debt resulting from the bank rescue is not Ireland’s debt. I can understand this sentiment and how many people feel about this situation. But what must be understood, is that in the run-up to the crisis, insufficient domestic policies (banking supervision and economic policies) played a major role in excessive credit growth and risk management failures in the Irish banking sector, the bubble in the housing market and the loss of competitiveness. The ECB has no supervisory responsibilities, despite claims to contrary.

Such coverage is the norm for exports towards countries with appreciable risk and in transactions which, frequently, have the sovereign guarantee of the importing country. CESCE also provides underwriting on the State’s behalf for the political risks associated with exports (the main such risk being default by the sovereign or by the institutions backed by the sovereign), except in operations at less than two years in EU and OECD countries, where it is considered that there is a sufficiently developed private underwriting market; it also extends guarantees and bonds for participating in international tender procedures and projects. From 1998 to 2007 there was a strong expansion in international banking activity in financing for Spanish companies’ international activity. Banks took on a relevant role in the financing of trade flows to emerging countries and in the opening-up of new markets. Against the backdrop of this boom, the use of instruments offered by export credit agencies for exports became less necessary and less frequent. The international financial crisis The financial instability as from mid-2007 and the outbreak of the crisis in autumn 2008 radically altered this financial landscape, giving way to an across-the-board decline in financing by international banks. The contraction in credit had a particularly severe effect on international trade, which fell by between 20% and 30% in the main economies. The central banks responded to this situation through coordinated action that stabilised bank financing conditions.
We are enhancing synergy with the Thai economy through the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Economic Relationship (STEER) programme. Last week's second STEER meeting in Bangkok saw the signing of nine business agreements ranging from tourism to logistics. MAS and the Thai Securities Exchange Commission also signed a letter of intent for closer cooperation in capital markets. 14. Next month, Singapore and Vietnam will sign the Framework Agreement on Connectivity, which will help us leverage on each other's strengths and complementarities. Areas of cooperation include finance, ICT (Information and Communications Technologies), investments, trade and services, transport and education. Singapore is the second largest foreign investor in Vietnam, after Taiwan but ahead of Japan. The Connectivity agreement will further open up opportunities for Singapore firms in Vietnam. Seizing the opportunities 15. Governments in Asia see the benefits of economic cooperation and are building closer links, both on a multilateral as well as bilateral basis. This will enable the private sector to take full advantage of the rich array of opportunities. I strongly encourage Singapore-based companies and financial institutions to ride the growth momentum. 16. Let me highlight a few such opportunities. As capital restrictions are gradually liberalised in their countries, Chinese and Indian individuals, financial institutions and corporates will begin to invest overseas. Singapore-based financial institutions could partner them to use Singapore as a base to expand into the region. 17. The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) is a win-win outcome for Singapore and India.

During my visits to the Middle East, I sensed their interest in investing in Asia. Many are keen to engage China and India but their businessmen told me that they were not so familiar with doing  2  BIS Review 83/2005  business in China. Singapore can serve as a bridge, given our knowledge and connections. Furthermore, Indian, Chinese and Singaporean financial institutions could tap into Islamic funds from the Middle East for infrastructural and other major projects in India and China. 21. As an international financial centre, Singapore is well placed to intermediate and facilitate investment flows between Asia and the Middle East. Already, funds managed in Singapore from the Middle East have increased by over 70% to $ billion in 2004. But this is still a small figure, given the trillions of dollars of wealth in the Middle East. We should work with credible partners to offer a wider suite of Islamic financial services and products. The role of MAS 22. MAS will continue to support and partner the financial industry to seize the opportunities. Last year, I highlighted three strategic priorities for MAS and our financial sector. They are first, strengthen our position as a leading financial centre in Asia; second, maintain excellence in a riskier environment; and third, leverage and build on our reputation. We have made good progress on all three fronts. Strengthening our position as a leading financial centre in Asia 23. As MAS Chairman, I regularly meet CEOs of global banks and big companies.