samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
More generally, we have concluded that making the capital requirements more risk sensitive will help ensure that borrowers are charged a more appropriate price for their debt, and limit the build up of unsustainable volumes of debt. This seems to us a better system than the current, extremely risk-insensitive framework of risk weights, where in the sovereign context nothing short of a rescheduling results in any change in capital requirements for exposures to OECD sovereigns, while for non-OECD sovereigns the charges are completely invariant. It is worth noting here that a similar kind of argument applies in the context of public disclosure by banks, which is also one of the key planks of the proposed new Accord. There is a risk that in some circumstances there are drawbacks associated with this, since disclosure could make a troubled bank’s position worse at a difficult moment. But overall, we think the likely behavioural changes induced by greater transparency offer more benefits than risks. By this I mean that the prospect of having to disclose more about positions to the market will reduce banks’ willingness to take on highly risky positions in the first place. BIS Review 132/1999  2  Benefits and drawbacks of complexity A number of other commentators have questioned the effectiveness of introducing greater complexity into the Basel rules, on the grounds that the framework will always be inadequate to cope with innovation and arbitrage.

Future challenges Finally, before I close, I would also like to stress that many challenges will remain for the Basel Committee even after it has completed its current review of the Capital Accord. I have referred at various points to bank provisioning policies. This has traditionally been an area where internationally there has been little attempt at harmonisation (except at the level of very broad principles). But the systematic use of internal ratings by possibly quite a large part of the banking population will arm supervisors with valuable information about expected losses, and ought to focus attention on the adequacy of provisions to cover such losses. Indeed, more generally, the whole question of the appropriate accounting valuation framework for the banking book may have to be re-examined in the light of any recommendations that come from the Joint Working Group of accounting standard setters that is currently looking at accounting for financial instruments. Also looking to the future, the issue of recognising full scale portfolio credit risk modelling will inevitably resurface. The resulting recognition of diversification effects could result in quite a large reduction of capital for well-diversified banks - who are also of course in many cases the largest, most systemically significant banks. At this point we will have to think very hard about what level of capital we really feel comfortable with in our systemic organisations, and in particular whether an individual firm’s capital requirement ought to reflect the systemic externalities it poses.
In this critical period, we were convinced of the need to build a solid, robust and clearly defined foundation for our actions. In particular: •  We have always acted and will continue to act within the framework of the mandate assigned to us by the Treaty: our priority objective is to maintain price stability, defined as an inflation rate below, but close to 2% over the medium term. Fears concerning the possible inflationary effects of our policies are therefore completely unfounded. •  Moreover, we have always acted, and will continue to act, totally independently from the political authorities. It has always been perfectly clear that the responses to the real roots of the crisis can only be provided by the governments themselves and that monetary policy can never durably mitigate political shortcomings. Thus fears regarding the financing of euro area States are also groundless. Focus on OMTs I would like to conclude by presenting in greater detail the most recent ECB measure, known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). To understand the logic and power of this instrument, we need to make a brief excursion into monetary policy theory (before lunch… sorry! But it’s not that complicated). As you know, central bank monetary policy impulses are transmitted to the real economy via several different channels. In the euro area, with bank loans accounting for three quarters of the economy’s total financing, the “credit channel” is by far the most significant vector.

Fourth, the banking industry should undertake effective measures to reduce the number of cash and cheques used for credit card and loan repayments which totalled 101 million transactions in 2014. This would bring about operational  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  efficiency and reduce costs in the banks’ operations. The industry should strive to achieve an annual decline rate of 15% per year similar to that of cheques; v.  Fifth, payment system infrastructure providers such as MEPS and MyClear should enhance their Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to ensure any payment infrastructure development initiatives would not result in duplication of efforts by the banking system. In addition, both MEPS and MyClear should develop medium term roadmap to enhance payment system infrastructure to keep pace with innovation and meet user needs. This must be supported by consultation with relevant stakeholders and robust market assessment and cost-benefit analysis; and  vi. Last but not least, it is critical for the banking and payments industry to maintain confidence in the use of e-payments, Hence, the industry should continuously enhance their risk management measures and security features, and review the effectiveness of their customer education and awareness programs. On this note, I wish all of you an engaging and productive forum. Please take the opportunity to visit the exhibition booths to find out more on how you can benefit from the various business and payment solutions. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
For companies this could mean: -  Commitment to a net zero target (for scope 1, 2 and ideally scope 3 emissions) by a specific date;  -  Assessment and disclosure of how the transition to a net zero business model will impact strategy;  -  Short-term milestones to track progress; and  -  Details of governance, including whether executive compensation is tied to success and how risks are managed at the board level. These actions will also support growth and the FPC’s secondary objective. By pulling forward and smoothing the adjustment to net zero, it will minimise the costs of transition. And, crucially, by revealing which companies are aligned to net zero, and which are not, these actions will reveal the immense investment opportunities from the transition to net zero, increasing productive finance for sustainable infrastructure. VII. Conclusion  After engaging in an ambitious exercise to outline a Grand Unifying Theory of macroprudential policy, it is now time for a bit of humility. After all, if the experience of the financial crisis teaches us anything, it’s that we cannot anticipate every risk or plan for every contingency. And part of good macroprudential policy is literally planning for failure. 32  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  32  Part of our job is to create a system that is robust to both the intensification of known risks and the crystallisation of Rumsfeldian unknowns. This is directly relevant for the current challenges associated with the coronavirus outbreak.

Resilience with a reason. That reason is the ultimate objective that unifies the Bank of England’s monetary and financial functions – the meaning of the central banker’s life which can be found in the opening sentence of our 1694 Charter – “to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom”. It has been my honour to do so. 34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  34
In order to make Thai banking sector to stay resilience and competitive in the more open market, we need to explore and analyze the impacts of AEC on both practitioner and regulator sides. 1  Taken from the “Declaration of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint”, 20 November 2007  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to talk firstly about the impacts of AEC on financial institutions, and secondly on the role of central bank for small economy like Thailand. For financial institutions, the AEC can give both opportunities and challenges. Obviously, financial institutions will benefit from market expansion and the increasing in cross-border financial and trading activities as well as revenue remittance. However, the AEC will induce higher competition and more risk exposure. To maximize benefits and minimize any negative effects, financial institutions need to adjust their business to the changing environment. Truly understanding customer demand, business culture, and regulatory requirement of other ASEAN countries are inevitable. In the midst of this process, there are three words that management may need to take into consideration. The keywords are connectivity, innovative, and efficiency. •  Connectivity: the connection that can reach to customers in the region will be an important criterion to maintain or increase international competitiveness of financial institutions. These can be done through traditional ways of correspondent banking or establishing new networks and presence in other countries.

I would like to conclude here that, to join the AEC in 2015 both central bank and financial institutions need to have proactive strategies to deal with the changing economic and social environments. The central bank will play an important role in supporting private sectors and ensuring the stability and efficiency of financial system and infrastructures. Concurrently, the financial institutions need to rethink and redesign their business processes and strategies in order to stay at the forefront of highly competitive environment as well as to reap the full benefit of the integrated economic community. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Over the past 2 years the share of lending at loan to income multiples above 4 has increased from 19% to 26% (Chart 18). In part this reflects a lengthening of mortgage loan terms. In the past 2 years the proportion of new mortgages with terms of 30 years or more has risen to more than a third of all new mortgages. That lowers initial monthly payments on a given mortgage but means the debt hangs around for longer, in some cases beyond possible retirement ages. The Return of the Regulator  10  11  Drawing it all together we have: signs of complacency emerging in credit cards and personal loans; a risk that the past may not be a good guide to the future in used car prices; and some tentative pushing of mortgage lending standards. Within the overall picture of credit growing in line with the economy, a pocket of risk has emerged. Lenders have not entered, but they may be dicing with, the spiral of complacency. The trailers to the movie have started. The question is: which one are we going to watch? Are we to endure another re-run of Debt Strikes Back or can we instead enjoy a new – and altogether more uplifting – movie: the Return of the Regulator?

These data series R  sometimes are constructed using different base years, making comparisons of series even of the same variable problematic. Besides weak data series, there is also the problem of coping with lags in monetary data. The computation of the estimated supply of total reserves (OSR), on the day of OMO market often involves several days lag. This means that to be able to obtain OSR, where “t” is the OMO market day, the compiler must be able to project both the sources and uses of monetary base, several days prior to  2  BIS Review 45/2007  the OMO market day say OSR . The techniques for doing this are yet to be fully developed in all t-3  WAIFEM constituent countries. •  Determination of public sector borrowing requirement The primary target for OMO is the difference between the estimated supply and demand for money under equilibrium conditions. But in arriving at the ultimate target for OMO, the excess supply needs to be adjusted to accommodate public sector borrowing requirement in the period. Thus there would be need to make the problematic forecasts of government cash revenue and expenditure, including float items. In this regard some of our member countries, notably Ghana have taken considerable strides through the application of some appropriate software. •  Capacity for econometric forecasting Familiarity with the use of econometric techniques is a sine qua non for liquidity forecasting.
However, various factors may result in a sharper or longer-lasting drop, which could affect price formation over longer terms and inflation expectations. In this context, the Board estimates that the risk balance is unbiased for activity, and for inflation it is biased downward in the short term, but unbiased in the medium term. As a working assumption, our baseline scenario estimates a similar monetary impulse as in June, i.e., the MPR remaining fairly stable and beginning to move up towards neutral only after the economy starts closing the activity gap. Thus, monetary policy will remain expansionary through the entire projection horizon. As always, we will be watchful for any deviations from the baseline scenario that warrant moving the MPR. As I just said, in the short run inflationary risks are biased downwards. If it happens, it may affect convergence to the target, in which case monetary policy will need to be even more expansionary. New institutional developments and contributions Dear senators, I am submitting to you this, my first annual account as Governor of the Central Bank. I head an institution that has more than a quarter of a century of autonomous history and that, over this time, has built and consolidated a technical reputation that has allowed for the correct performance of its functions, transforming it into an institutional reference in the public apparatus and in the group of central banks of emerging countries. This has occurred to a large extent thanks to our important contribution to the country's macroeconomic stability.

The terms of trade have improved, with copper prices above $ per pound in recent weeks. This, in a context in which the price of oil, with fluctuations and considering the Brent - WTI average, is slightly below those at the cutoff date of the previous Report. The copper price rise has coincided with a well-stocked market despite supply-side problems, in the context of a weak dollar. China's low interest rates and better performance lend support to higher prices in the short term. In any case, although its price is not expected to remain stable, it is projected to average more than June's estimates. In our baseline scenario, the pound of copper should trade at an average of $ in 20172018, and at $ in 2019. Stronger economic growth in the developed world has also consolidated. The United States, like it did several quarters ago, shows a good performance of consumption and a dynamic labor market. Europe has seen a strong recovery in its growth rates, all across the economies making up the group, beyond the differences that persist among them in variables such as the size of the gap and the unemployment rate. Growth in Japan surprised positively, and expectations have been revised upwards. Meanwhile, inflation has tended to subside and the monetary authorities of the developed world have made no big changes to their monetary policy strategies.
Hence, the extent of financial stability cannot be summarised in a single, simple financial variable. This type of measurement problem is in fact also apparent in the inflation rate and the resource utilisation. The formal inflation target for the Riksbank is measured using CPI, but we also use various measures of underlying inflation. In order to measure resource utilisation, we look at a series of different measures such as the GDP gap, unemployment gap and the employment gap. For inflation and resource utilisation, we have long learned to use different measures even though we know they are inherently uncertain. Applying that experience will be useful when it now comes to evaluating different measures of financial stability. Financial stability cannot be assessed by relying on various indicators alone, though. The reasons for the development must also be understood. It can be compared to the reasoning of central banks in assessing inflation. An increase in inflation does not in itself constitute a reason for increasing the policy rate. Appropriate monetary policy depends on the reason for the change. If the rise is due to price pressure from increased demand, the monetary policy will not be the same as it would have been had the rise been due to lower productivity. Similarly, rapid credit growth is not necessarily always a sign of lending being unsustainable and posing a threat to financial stability. A hot topic on that subject is how much house prices and the debt build-up of households should weigh in monetary policy assessment.

I will start to discuss monetary policy and then move on to macroprudential policy. The monetary policy framework is in need of review As I have mentioned, monetary policy of the 1990s and up to the financial crisis was viewed as successful by many. It was considered that this played an important role in both the relatively low and stable inflation, and the relatively stable GDP growth during those years. During the global financial crisis, it came to light, however, that major financial imbalances had been built up despite the seeming stability of many macroeconomic indicators. An important lesson from the financial crisis is therefore that low and stable inflation does not always guarantee financial stability or sustainable economic growth. The huge costs of the financial crisis to the real economy have led central banks around the world to start thinking about the current monetary policy framework. The challenge ahead is to create a framework which continues to safeguard stable prices, but which at the same time is consistent with a sustainable development in the financial system. Financial circumstances therefore need to be accounted for in the monetary policy decision-making. Taking account of financial factors in monetary policy decisions Different approaches can be used to formally take greater account of financial stability in monetary policy decisions. For instance, how much a change in the policy rate affects the probability of a financial crisis can be calculated.
For retail use, the motivations in emerging economies are mainly to reduce cash in circulation, or promote electronic payments, foster financial inclusion, and reduce informality and tax evasion. On the other hand, the motivations for wholesale use are mainly efficiency and security. We could also mention cross-border payments as a motivation for either of the two categories as well. In terms of the benefits, I can mention the following: a. Some research indicates that DLT may enhance market efficiency. DLT registers based on real user identities can improve competition, price transparency and liquidity. b. Crisis management around the Zero Lower Bound. In a world of low real interest rates, the impact of unconventional monetary policies, such as QE, nominal GDP targeting and forward guidance, appears to be limited (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2013, Gagnon and Sack, 2018). Fixing negative nominal interest rates in a flexible way could improve the Central Banks’ toolkit (Rogoff, 2019). However, there Page 6 of 11  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  are some drawbacks. The general public could interpret negative interest rates as a new tax and probably legislators would restrict it (Rogoff, 2019). Also, price and wage rigidity can persist, due to habitconsumption, market power, organizational inertia, information frictions. Continuing with the benefits: c. In a world with a widely used CBDC, commercial banks could be smaller/less systemic. CBDCs can give central banks more intervention tools and reduce the risk of runs (Kumhof and Noone, 2018).

Philipp Hildebrand: Principles for sound compensation practices Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Economic Outlook 2009 (Unternehmer NW-Schweiz), Basel, 23 April 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Most financial institutions viewed compensation systems as being largely unrelated to risk management and risk governance prior to the crisis. Short-term profits were rewarded with generous bonuses with little regard to the longer-term risks taken on behalf of the firm to generate those profits. With hindsight, it should therefore be no surprise that these bonuses fueled the excessive risk-taking that has ultimately undermined the global financial system. It is important for the future stability of our financial system that compensation systems be viewed as an integral part of the risk management system in financial firms, and designed and governed with this in mind. The Financial Stability Board (previously the Financial Stability Forum) has drafted a set of sound compensation principles for large financial institutions with exactly this goal in mind. The Principles were endorsed by the G20 leaders at the London summit earlier this month and aim to be widely implemented by the 2009 remuneration round. BIS Review 50/2009  1