samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to IMF statistics, net capital inflow to emerging markets was less than $ 50 billion a year at the beginning of the decade. By 1996, however, this had increased to $ 235 billion. Asia has received roughly half of this capital inflow. In some Asian economies, net capital inflows have averaged 5% to 8% of GDP over a long period. Contributing to this surge of international capital flows was financial liberalization undertaken by economies which had the foresight to do so, with a view to encouraging financial intermediation, domestically as well as internationally, so that the high savings could be channelled into productive investments, thus promoting economic growth. Meanwhile, there has been continued willingness on the part of the developed economies to export capital, under the influence of sustained economic growth, low inflation and low interest rates. Increasing amount of mutual funds and pension funds of these economies looked for higher returns in the emerging markets. In the case of Japan, sustained large current account surpluses, coupled with the earlier appreciation of the yen, have forced many BIS Review 115/1997  -2-  Japanese firms to relocate their production to the rest of Asia. Thus capital inflows into the Asian region have been large. 7. With financial liberalization and the globalization of financial markets, a substantial part of the capital inflow into Asia has been in the form of foreign portfolio investments directed principally at financial instruments in the form of equity and bonds, and, where available, derivatives thereof.

It is therefore understandable that when the reversal of capital inflows came, it caused the damaging financial turmoil that we have seen in a number of Asian economies. 10. Financial liberalization encourages greater financial intermediation, domestically and internationally, and this obviously is beneficial to economic growth and development. But clearly the risks arising from this worthy process must be identified and managed properly before the long term beneficial effects could be realized. The risks are, nevertheless, not well appreciated, simple as they may be, particularly with the benefit of hindsight. 11. There is, as always, credit risk. Yet it is such a common feature that undue exuberance on the part of investors would push price to earning ratios well beyond fundamentals. Bankers also fail to assess the impact of interest rate hikes on the value of collateral or on cash flows. The result is therefore the usual over exposure of investors and lenders to asset losses. Then there is maturity risk. To say that it is risky to finance illiquid non-tradables, such as property, with short term capital inflows is, I suppose, teaching grandmothers to suck eggs, particularly in this company, but this again has been a common feature underlying financial shocks, not just in Asia but also in other parts of the world. The same with currency risk. Many borrowers, in both the private and public sectors, were keen to borrow foreign currency funds to finance investments that do not generate sufficient foreign exchange to repay the debt. Such debts were also unhedged.
References Alsterlind, Jan (2021), "The development of risk premiums on covered bonds during the coronavirus pandemic", Economic Commentaries No 13 2021, Sveriges Riksbank Archer, David and Paul Moser-Boehm (2013), "Central bank finances", BIS Papers No 71 Bank of England (2022a), “Asset purchase facility quarterly report – 2022 Q3”, Bank of England Bank of England (2022b), “Letter from the Governor to the Chancellor”, Bank of England, 22 November 2022 Bernanke, Ben (2020), ”The New Tools of Monetary Policy”, American Economic Review 110(4), 943-983 Bhattarai, Saroj and Christopher Neely (2022), “An analysis of the literature on international unconventional monetary policy”, Journal of Economic Literature 60(2), 527-597 Bullock, Michele (2022), ”Review of the Bond Purchase Program”, speech on 21 September 2022, Reserve Bank of Australia Calmfors, Lars, John Hassler and Anna Seim (2022), “Samspel för stabilitet – en ESO-rapport om rollfördelningen mellan finans- och penningpolitik, (Interaction for stability – an ESO report on the division of roles between financial and monetary policy), report to the Expert Group for Public Economic Studies ESO 2022: 3  26 [30]  De Rezende, Rafael B., David Kjellberg and Oskar Tysklind (2015), “Effects of the Riksbank's government bond purchases on financial prices”, Economic Commentaries, No. 13 2015, Sveriges Riksbank Del Negro, Marco and Christopher Sims (2015), “When does a central bank’s balance sheet require fiscal support?”, Journal of Monetary Economics 73, 1- 19 Di Casola, Paola (2021), "What does research say about the effects of central bank balance sheet policies?

I’m here today to speak about how some of those changes are showing up in the economic data as it relates to the recovery. But it’s also important to remember that behind the numbers are families, businesses, and communities that have suffered and continue to face tremendous challenges of all kinds. In my remarks this afternoon I’ll share more about how what we are seeing in the incoming data relates to the economic picture nationally and to this region. I’ll also highlight some of the unique inflation dynamics we are seeing. Finally, I’ll explain what that means for monetary policy and the path forward. Before I continue, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System. Dual Mandate I know there are a lot of economics students in today’s audience. I won’t quiz you about the Federal Reserve, but one aspect of our work that you may be familiar with is the Fed’s “dual mandate.” These are the two goals set by Congress: maximum employment and price stability. Given these goals, our focus is studying and understanding the wide range of developments that affect employment, unemployment, and inflation. The Economic Outlook So, what are these developments telling us about the current economic outlook? I’ll start by saying that the economy continues to grow at a strong rate.
SPEECH  The Song Remains the Same June 01, 2022 John C. Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer Remarks at the New York Fed and Columbia SIPA Monetary Policy Implementation Workshop, New York City As prepared for delivery  Good morning, everyone. I'd like to give my thanks to Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs for partnering with the New York Fed once again and for hosting us today. It's wonderful to be here and to see so many colleagues who have traveled from near and far to attend this workshop. We'll have many important conversations over the next two days. To kick us off, I'm going to share some observations on the digital transformation of money and payments. I'll also discuss the potential implications for monetary policy implementation and for central banks more broadly. Before I begin, I must give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. I will get to payments technology in a minute. But first allow me to take you back to the year 1877. You're amazed at the sound of music coming out of a new invention—the phonograph. Fast-forward a century, and you're listening to your favorite band on a cassette tape. In the 1980s, it's a CD. In the 2000s, you're scrolling through the greatest hits on your iPod.

Turning to the future, the big question is what a world of digital currencies like stablecoins and CBDCs would mean for the implementation of monetary policy. How will central banks anticipate and adapt to the changing landscape brought on by the possibility of digital currencies? There is much more to discuss about these important considerations in a fast-changing world. As central bankers, it's critical that we remain focused on carrying out our responsibilities, while keeping pace with the world around us. And that's what brings us here today. This workshop is an important part of learning and understanding the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead so that we can be prepared for and successful in the future. Thank you all for participating in what will surely be thought-provoking and constructive discussions. 1  President's Working Group on Financial Markets, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Report on Stablecoins, November 2021. 2  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Overnight Reverse Repurchase Agreement Facility, January 3, 2018.
But both of the theses I mentioned earlier are the same: When cross-border integration progresses it is important – and profitable from society’s point of view – to create credible crisis resolution mechanisms in advance. But this is rarely or never done. One sometimes talks of Europe’s “financial trilemma”.9 We in Europe want to achieve a continued financial integration and increased financial stability, but at the same time we want to retain each country's national sovereignty. The problem is that it is possible to attain two of the goals, but very difficult to attain all three. If we want to combine financial integration with continued national sovereignty over, for instance, supervision and crisis management, as we have done so far, it will be difficult to achieve meaningful financial stability – the crisis we are currently going through provides a good example of this (Figure 3). Figure 3 Financial stability  Financial integration  National sovereignty  If, on the other hand, we want to prevent cross-border crises and at the same time maintain national sovereignty, we must accept reduced financial integration – for example, stricter regulations as to how banks can move financial assets between countries (Figure 4). One can see clear tendencies in this direction in the current discussions.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  The first is that one must of course have regulations in a monetary union that enable one to avoid a crisis of the proportions we are seeing now. This was what the creators of the union were thinking when they initiated the Stability and Growth Pact. However, the pact did not work very well and intensive discussions are therefore underway as to how it can be supplemented with new regulations that will guarantee that no members have excessive budget deficits or can build up excessive debt burdens. Hopefully these discussions will bear fruit. However, it is far from certain that the developments we are seeing now could have been avoided even if the Stability and Growth Pact had been upheld. Low interest rates have meant that not only governments, but also companies and households have built up their debt. But an efficient regulatory system would probably have made the crisis more manageable. A second conclusion is that when one refrains from the crisis resolution mechanism inherent in a national currency, one must replace it with something else. Because crises that entail concern over a member state’s creditworthiness are always a risk. One must have an institutional framework to manage the investors’ concerns regarding rising bond yields in, for instance, Italy now that there is no Italian currency that can depreciate and the Banca d’Italia cannot create the necessary liquidity.
Hence, a front-loaded monetary tightening was implemented in the same period, which compensated for the distortion in inflation expectations. As of August, we decided to enhance the predictability of the Turkish lira liquidity policy in order to limit the impacts of global monetary policy uncertainties on the domestic economy. To this end, we adopted a strategy of reducing interest rate uncertainty by creating a framework where the relationship between global interest rates and domestic interest rates has largely weakened and market rates have become more sensitive to domestic macroeconomic developments as they should be. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In the third quarter, we continued to provide the market with foreign exchange liquidity via foreign exchange selling auctions, which fed into the growing Turkish lira liquidity deficit in the market (Chart 3). We cut the share of one-week repo in total funding in this quarter, which led to an increase in the share of funds from overnight and monthly lending facilities. Correspondingly, the CBRT’s average funding rate and the BIST interbank overnight repo rate increased (Chart 4). Moreover, in line with its strategy of enhancing the predictability of liquidity management, we have been sharing more information about the frequency and timing of the additional tightening since August. Recently, due to our cautious monetary stance, the Interbank Repo Market rates have been mostly hovering between 6.75 and 7.75 percent.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 4 Real annual contribution to GFCF (*) (percentage points) 16 16  1616  Mining  12 12  1212  88  88  Other  44  Non-mining 4 4  00  00  -4-4  -4-4  Housing  -8-8  -8-8  -12 -12  -12 -12  -16 -16  -16 -16  09 09  10 10  1111  1212  13 13  14 14  15 16 (f) 15 (e) (e) 16 (f)  17 17(f)(f)  (*) 2015 mining investment is etimated using information from listed companies (FECU). Housing investment uses data from the Chilean Chamber of Construction and National Accounts by institutional sector. Other investment calculated residually. For 2016, forecasting models of the Central Bank and other sectoral sources are used, such as the Capital Goods Corporation's surveys and investment plans. (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Recent soft and hard data on economic activity have been somewhat weaker (EA GDP growth for the 3 rd quarter was released at 0.2% qoq, due also to exceptional factors in Germany), although less so in France (French GDP for the 3rd quarter was up 0.4% qoq). But our outlook for inflation is firmer. There are increasing signs that the labour market is tightening and nominal wage growth is picking up: the Phillips curve is back to work, albeit a bit later than expected. At the Governing Council of the ECB, we are thus confident in the sustained adjustment in inflation back to our objective. But our policy normalisation is still based on what I like to call a “quartet” of non-standard instruments: The monetary policy rhythm in recent years has been largely set by our net asset purchase instrument. But net purchases will very probably end in December. The end of our net asset purchases will not, however, mean the end of our monetary stimulus, far from it, because the three other instruments in the “quartet” will take up the beat; Our second instrument is the stock of purchased assets which we will reinvest in full for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation; Our third instrument is policy interest rates. This is a conventional instrument used in unconventional ways.

For example, putting some temporary restrictions on cross-border movement of capital could give some but not complete independence of monetary policy. But how do we reconcile independence and co-operation? In my view, we can and should act to enhance co-operation between public authorities, based on at least two elements: Ruling out any currency war, as we clearly stated at the meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee in Bali last month. I quote the unanimous communiqué: “[We] will not target our exchange rates for competitive purposes”. Trade multilateralism is at risk, but financial and monetary multilateralism still stands fast. Second, as the G20 Eminent Persons Group (EPG), led by Tharman Shanmugaratnam, rightly stressed in its recent report, we need to put in place a reliable Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) before the next crisis and co-ordinate its different layers. This should include an “IMF standing liquidity facility”. The GFSN is the best insurance we can get against the risks created by economic divergence and it comes at a limited cost. I know that Governor Kuroda is very committed to this issue too. ** Let me conclude by quoting a Japanese proverb: “A frog in a well knows nothing of the great ocean” [“I no naka no kaeru taikai-o shirazu”]. In these uncertain times, the temptation is to look inwards, but that would be exactly the wrong thing to do.
Caleb M Fundanga: Innovation for leadership excellency Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) launch of MBA Alumni Zambia Chapter, Lusaka, 12 February 2010. *  *  *  The Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) Director General, Prof. Bonnard Mwape; The President, ESAMI MBA Alumni Zambia Chapter, Mr. Christopher Mulenga; The Ecobank Zambia Limited Managing Director, Mrs Charity Lumpa; ESAMI Alumni; Distinguished Invited Guests; Members of the Press; Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to officiate at the launch of the ESAMI MBA Alumni Zambia Chapter. I wish to take this opportunity to welcome Prof. Bonnard Mwape and other ESAMI staff that have travelled from Arusha to come and witness this important occasion. I am particularly delighted to be part of this launch because my first interaction with the ESAMI MBA alumni members was during the recent summer school event held in Arusha, Tanzania, where I was invited to present a paper on “The Effects of the Global Economic Crisis on Zambia”. Indeed my memories of that lively interaction are still very fresh and that is why I graciously accepted to officiate at this function when I received the invitation from the President of the association. Ladies and Gentlemen allow me to congratulate the President and his team for this excellent initiative of bringing together individuals with a common academic background under the Alumni umbrella.

A robust and strong level of ethics can be achieved by providing ethics training and sensitisation as a component of continuous professional development. Although you are well qualified and are competent in your respective fields, it is vital that you have continuous training including advancement in ethical knowledge. Equally there is need to promote and ensure that your members exercise high levels of Integrity in whatever they do. As a country, we need professionals with high levels of social and moral awareness so that all of us are aware of the moral obligations and potential impact of our thinking, decisions and actions. We need to be good role models for others in behaviour, attitude and relationships. Let us endeavour to act in a way that is professional and that retains the confidence of others at all times. With these few remarks, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the ESAMI MBA Alumni Association Zambia Chapter officially launched. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 18/2010
Deposit insurance makes clear where depositors stand: depositors know exactly how much of their money will be protected if a bank fails. Government statements that it will not bail out depositors beyond the insured amounts become more credible. However, deposit insurance is not without its downside. If its coverage is too broad, or it insures too large a proportion of deposits, it can cause the same problems as a government guarantee. A poorly designed deposit insurance scheme may make the banking system less rather than more stable. These problems can be mitigated if the deposit insurance scheme only insures small deposits, or sets premiums in line with the relative riskiness of banks, or discriminates between banks and subsidiaries that are incorporated here from those that are not. These are complex issues that need careful study, which MAS has begun. Conclusion This liberalisation package will provide further impetus for upgrading and progress in the local banks and Singapore's financial sector development. We will review the progress made in another 2-3 years, before deciding on further moves. Consolidation and continued liberalisation are important in building strong banks. But they are not in themselves sufficient. Banks must press on to upgrade their capabilities. They must keep abreast of international best practices, new products, technological developments and new ways of doing things, while retaining the support and confidence of consumers. ABS can play a part to help the banks do this. The government will do its best to maintain a sound regulatory framework, conducive to competition and innovation.

2  BIS Review 61/2001  d.  Fourth, the consolidation should not lead to loss of service for small depositors, for whom affordable banking services are a necessity. e.  Fifth, any cross-border partnerships should not result in the foreign partner taking control of a Singapore bank. I will elaborate on these five considerations in turn. Managing the integration Consolidation, whilst necessary for the local banks to be competitive, is not in itself sufficient to produce strong banks. Having merged, the banks will have to integrate and rationalise different management teams, information and risk management systems, and internal control procedures. The reality is that some mergers work while others do not. Good execution of a merger will produce a stronger bank, by yielding the expected synergies and cost savings. Poor execution will only lead to a more unwieldy and riskier bank. A larger scale and wider range of activities will demand stronger and more institutionalised management. Singapore banks have benefited from having their principal shareholders, including family shareholders, play an important role in overseeing the banks, although most no longer run the management. The controlling families have had the entrepreneurship and business acumen to build up the banks, and their long-term interests were substantially aligned with those of the banks. This situation currently serves us well, but is not likely to endure over the longer term.