samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Secondly, in Chile banks cannot hold substantial off-balance-sheet positions, because the General Banking Act expressly indicates what kind of firms the banks may establish, such as mutual fund administrators or securitizing firms. These firms, that the law terms affiliates, must have a single line of business and are banned from investing in other companies. In addition, banks must submit their consolidated financial statements on a monthly basis. Moreover, banks may not take positions in credit derivatives, and face other restrictions regarding the operation of derivative instruments. In particular, to operate with interest rate or foreign exchange rate options, banks must undergo a thorough test by the SBIF, while holding uncovered positions in the balance sheet are costly in terms of capital requirements. But not only regulators and policy-makers learned the lessons from our financial crisis. Enterprises did too. Thus we haven't seen the massive currency speculations where so many firms in the emerging world were involved through the use of exotic derivatives that were not only complex but also very difficult to price. 10  In De Gregorio (2001), I discuss these points in connection with the first intervention period of 2001, and in De Gregorio (2006) I do so in the context of inflation targets and financial stability. 6  BIS Review 150/2008  In the present juncture we still face a severe inflationary challenge.

As a matter of fact, whenever accelerated growth in credit and money aggregates occurs simultaneously with soaring asset prices and loose lending standards, increased inflation becomes very likely over the three years that follow (Roffia and Zaghini, 2007). 8 In this context, one can argue that an increase in lending with inflation prospects can be fought with a tightening of monetary policy. However, if the boom was triggered by lack of regulation or supervision, monetary policy tightening by itself could probably be ineffective – or even counterproductive – if the financial system is weakened because of excessive risk taking. Thus, financial regulation plays a major role in granting financial integrity. At the beginning, regulation focused on the strength of individual institutions. However, the tensions we are seeing now exemplify, once again, how individual fragility may quickly evolve into systemic problems. The interrelationships among financial institutions and the proper operation of the markets where liquidity is traded are essential ingredients of a market economy, but these characteristics are also the channels of financial contagion, as recently seen. So it is crucial to have a systemic vision, not only from the perspective of how the different institutions relate to each other, but also how the different types of financial and operating risks are intertwined, creating potential vulnerabilities. The Financial Stability Reports that many central banks put together periodically – including us – seek to evaluate the resiliency of the system as a whole to large disruptions, by carrying out stress tests.
The recent “tech-stock bubble” provides us with an illustration of such a difficulty: while one was witnessing the “irrational exuberance” in 1996, the surge in capital spending associated with the development of new technologies resulted in a faster productivity growth, which in turn boosted equity prices. At that time, uncertainties about fundamentals (was there an American miracle?) made difficult a proper assessment of asset valuations, although the large movements in asset prices where a concern for central banks. However, when expectations reverse, for example due to the reassessment of expected profitability in the economy, and consequently asset prices decrease, the point is to determine whether the attitude of the central bank ought to be different in order to preserve monetary and financial stability. That is, some could argue that the central bank’s response should be asymmetric. In the booming phase, as long as price stability is not endangered, central banks do not react to the rise in asset prices. Conversely, in the recession phase or when a bubble bursts, central banks could consider reacting if they deem that monetary and financial stability is endangered. What could then restrain them from doing it?

The issue of measuring price stability However, this raises another issue, especially in the current context of muted inflationary pressures but ample fluctuations in asset prices: are we measuring inflation accurately? Is price stability being ensured, in the context of large movements in asset prices? Shouldn’t asset prices be taken into account when defining price stability? Up to now, this debate has focused on the role asset prices may play as leading indicators of inflation: one rationale behind this thinking may be that asset valuation is computed in a forward looking manner, and therefore asset prices embed expectations about future economic growth and future inflationary pressures. Empirical evidence gathered on such an issue tend to support the idea that some asset prices, housing prices in particular, may actually play such a role. However, this theory has to be qualified by the fact that, as I mentioned earlier, wealth effects are difficult to establish in a definitive manner. This is probably less true for the US, although this is debatable and could be discussed in this conference, but this is more likely to be true for the euro area. Moreover, there might be a danger that asset prices diverge from the CPI, as this was observed over the last few years. There might be an internal conflict here if the objective of price stability is defined by aggregating the changes in the CPI and the changes in asset prices, and this is a crucial issue since the nature of both types of prices is fairly different.
Niklaus Blattner: IT in the financial sector - aspects of regulation and supervision Summary of a speech by Mr Niklaus Blattner, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at 8. Berner Tagung für Informationssicherheit (8th Conference on Information Security), Berne, 29 November 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The completeness, integrity, traceability and constant availability of data that has been securely processed are essential in order for the financial system to function smoothly. The Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) supervises banks and securities dealers domiciled in Switzerland. Its microprudential supervision focuses on the individual financial institution, in particular with regard to the protection of creditors and investors. By contrast, it is the task of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) to contribute to the stability of the financial system, i.e. it is engaged in macroprudential oversight. Banking legislation provisions governing the IT organisation requirements of a financial intermediary do not explicitly address the topic of information security, but rather focus on the notion of “proper and rightful conduct of business”. For the SFBC, information security is merely one concern among others. In one of its circulars it has, however, addressed several critical areas in greater detail, e.g. on the topic of external data management and outsourcing. The SNB’s mandate is limited to the payment and securities settlement systems.

So it was that, once the problems posed by the establishment of a banknote monopoly had been solved, the youthful SNB was quickly confronted, in 1914, with the problem of financing the military expenditure caused by the First World War and, after the end of hostilities, the difficulties related to normalisation. The social disruption of 1918 and the high level of inflation at the end of the war were bitterly felt and attributed to a failure of monetary management. This setback had a lasting effect on morale at the SNB and accounts to a considerable extent for the orthodoxy of the policies adopted in the decades that followed. This accounts for the determination with which the SNB worked to restore the rules of the gold standard once peace had returned. The pre-war gold parity was re-established in 1924. However, after a few good years, the economic situation again deteriorated, culminating eventually in the crisis of the 1930s. The devaluation of sterling in 1931, followed by that of the dollar in 1933, were the first episodes in the eventual collapse of the gold standard. In 1936, following the devaluation of the French franc, the Swiss federal authorities were forced, in their turn, to reduce the parity of the Swiss franc. A few years later, the challenge of administering a war economy again arose. The story of the Second World War, with its doubts, agonies and errors of judgement has been extensively analysed by historians over the past few years.
That said, Roger Ferguson, a former Member of the Fed Board and Chairman of the FSF,  BIS Review 49/2007  5  argues that the well established global network among central banks, such as through the BIS, gives central banks a comparative advantage in informal information sharing and cooperation 5 . Which role remains for the central bank? Ensuring jobs for the central bank staff is not a valid reason for retaining bank supervision in the NCB. Hence, the question is: Which would be the primary tasks of the NCB if supervision is moved out? Of course, the task of conducting monetary policy would remain with the NCB. The NCB will also run the large-value payments system, or at least exercise oversight over it. In addition, the NCB should always have the responsibility for the oversight of overall stability in the financial system. Financial stability is a necessary condition for efficient monetary operations and is in itself an important component in a country’s sustained macro economic growth. Since the NCB will still be the lender-oflast-resort the knowledge gained from its financial stability analysis will be crucial in a crisis situation. But the NCB cannot perform an efficient financial stability analysis, nor act as lender-of-last-resort without close cooperation with the supervisory authorities. The other authorities will also benefit from the stability work by the NCB. Conclusions Let me try to sum up. My first conclusion is to use the American expression “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it”.

There are arguments against changing the supervisory structures in the near term. The first one is the flip-side of the argument above. Also the banks are getting larger and more complex. In many countries they still dominate the financial sector and the payments system. Hence, society has a clear interest in strong banking supervision to avoid costly bank failures. We should take into account that banking supervision in many countries functions quite well, while supervision of the other financial sectors is much weaker. Major structural changes involving bank supervision will therefore hamper the conduct of such supervision for a long time due to the focus on the transition rather than on the operations. There is also an obvious risk that qualified staff will leave bank supervision due to the less attractive work prospects outside the NCB. For instance, government salaries and other benefits are usually not as good and it is less prestigious to work outside the NCB. The result would be weaker bank supervision without compensating improvements in other sectors. There are other ways of meeting the challenge. Many countries have instituted arrangements for closer cooperation between the supervisors. Memorandas of Understanding have been drafted so that information may be shared without legal or other impediments. Joint forums have been established where representatives from the different supervisory authorities meet regularly. Cross directorships imply that high level supervisors sit on each others’ Boards and can inform themselves of developments.
It was common for central wage agreements signed during the 1980s to contain price trend guarantees, wage development guarantees, earnings guarantees, checkpoints etc., which led to prices and wages pushing one another upwards in an increasing spiral. On 1 March 1990, the Government appointed the Rehnberg Commission to follow negotiations of new central wage agreements in the labour market and to act to achieve new agreements that would contain price clauses to replace the agreements for 1990 and new agreements for 1991 and lead to a radical reduction in total wage increases, including wage drift, during 1991. Based on the Commission’s proposals, stabilisation agreements were signed for the period 1 January 1991 – 31 March 1993 for just over 75 per cent of the labour market, which contributed to the rate of wage increasing falling from around 10 per cent in 1990 to 3 – 4 per cent a year during 1992 – 1993. After that, however, the rate of wage increase rose again to around 6 per cent in 1996. In April 1997 I was given the task by Deputy Labour Minister Ulrika Messing of making an inquiry into wage formation and mediation. When I was given this task, the social partners in the industrial sector had recently (in March 1997) signed a new cooperation agreement, known as the Industrial Agreement, whereby the parties took joint responsibility for wage formation in their part of the labour market and had agreed on a regulatory framework for negotiating wage agreements.

However, later research has shown that in the longer term there is no connection between inflation and unemployment. At the same time, I believe that the problems in the 1970s and 1980s could partly be explained by the Swedish economy being unable to manage the low unemployment we had then without excessive price and wage increases ensuing. For me, one of the most important tasks of economic policy over the coming years is to bring down unemployment. However, the Riksbank is unable to do very much about this. The Riksbank’s contribution is to safeguard the inflation target and in this way create favourable conditions for growth and employment. All in all, my picture is still that the Swedish economy has functioned much better over the past ten years than in the 1970s and 1980s. Things are better now. Current monetary policy The other part of my presentation is concerned with economic developments and current monetary policy and the reasons why the Executive Board of the Riksbank decided at its most recent monetary policy meeting on 22 February 2006 to raise the repo rate by 0.25 percentage points to 2 per cent. The Riksbank’s view of economic developments over the coming years is presented in the Inflation Report, which was published at the same time as the interest rate decision. This part of my presentation does not contain any new information or new assessments in relation to the February Inflation Report and the separate minutes of the Executive Board meeting.
Even the Bundesbank built up its formidable reputation during the German post war economic miracle. That said, I do not think there is any doubt that the new approach to monetary policy did represent a major advance on what went before. In what way? Inflation targeting, the UK’s current approach, broke with past attempts to run an independent monetary policy by offering commitment and clarity. For the first time, the Government and the Bank of England committed to clear objectives, clear communications and clear lines of accountability. We now have a decision-taking framework which allows monetary policymakers plenty of room for discretion, while forcing them to provide a full explanation of their thinking. By hook or by crook, the fact is that central banks do now enjoy considerable credibility. They treasure that legacy, much like any blue chip company, and for many of the same reasons. Credibility, and the trust that flows from it, is worth a great deal in policy-making, as in business. If people believe that the Bank will act to keep inflation low and stable they will factor that in to their decisions. (They may have been doing this recently, in judging how to respond to higher oil prices.) If so, that in turn makes it easier for the Bank to keep inflation on track, and reduces the fluctuations in output that controlling inflation can involve. So it is not implausible to assign a significant role to better policy in explaining the Great Stability.

Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Islamic finance and halal industry opportunity, impact, synergy Remarks by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Islamic Finance Rendezvous Series "Islamic finance and halal industry opportunity, impact, synergy", Kuala Lumpur, 1 October 2019. * * * "Opportunity...Impact...Synergy...” ...Introduction in Malaysian...  Malaysia is well-positioned to capitalise on huge opportunities in the global halal industry The global halal business is thriving. This creates abundance of opportunity. In its report on “The State of the Islamic Economy 2018 – 2019”, Thomson Reuters projected the size of global halal industry to grow from USD2.1 trillion in 2017 to USD3.1 trillion by 2023. Growing global population of young and affluent Muslims1, is among the main drivers supporting such demand. Domestically, this is further supported by the Malaysian demography of Muslim-majority. As a nation, Malaysia has the necessary ingredients to seize the opportunity. Infrastructure for halal business is comprehensive. The halal certification programme by JAKIM is internationallyrecognised and well-sought after. Malaysia also has a mature domestic Islamic financial system that stands ready to respond to the evolving and growing needs of businesses. This is evidenced by Malaysia reigning the Thomson Reuters Global Islamic Economy Indicator Index (GIEI) for five consecutive years. The global numbers are exciting. The prospects are great. But, Malaysia remains a small player in the halal trade internationally.
For example, large institutional investors, including sovereign wealth funds, have started to channel more funds to firms with sustainability commitments. Admittedly, the progress made on this front has been rather modest thus far, but it does have the potential to enable a wider range of stakeholders to determine the sustainability of finance and its role in facilitating sustainable economic growth. Conclusion I have not actually finished my story on the Challenger shuttle disaster at the beginning of my speech. After the harrowing accident, President Reagan formed the Rogers Commission to investigate the incident, and it was found that the accident could have been avoided entirely. The special commission reported that NASA’s organisational culture and decision-making processes were key contributing factors to the catastrophic event. NASA managers had been aware of the potentially fatal flaw in the O-rings since 1977, but did not respond appropriately. And on that fateful morning, warnings from engineers about the risks of launching in the low temperatures were met with contempt, and the superiors were not adequately notified of these technical concerns. Therein lies the importance of governance structures and how decisions are made. Governance influences decisions, and decisions shape outcomes. It is no different for financial governance. Be it financial decisions at the international or national level, public or private, corporates or financial institutions, households or individuals, sound financial governance is the bedrock of stable and robust economies.

But, I caution you, this is only the first step in your careers as Accountants. Remember, “it is not what you learned, but how you use what you learned, that counts”. I came across a definition of an Accountant the other day. It said, “an accountant is someone who solves a problem that you did not know you had, in a way that you don’t understand”! BIS Review 49/2010  1  I hope that tonight’s Graduates do not end up being one of these Accountants, who creates a problem first and then pretends to solve it. And, worse still, they end up charging the client for something that was not there in the first place! It’s almost like being a lawyer! The recent global financial crisis started from a liquidity shortfall in the United States. This liquidity shortfall resulted from many loans (especially for housing) going into default, and there were insufficient assets to cover these loans. As a result, many large banks and financial institutions went bankrupt. And, if it were not for the quick and substantial intervention by some major Governments and Central Banks, the global economy would have collapsed. Among others, the Accountants have been blamed for the “financial crisis”, as a result of their “creative accounting” techniques, which contributed to inflating the values of the assets which were used as collateral for the many risky loans that were issued.
I would suggest that unless you were on another planet, no consumer with access to a television, radio or the Internet could have escaped hearing their president, senators and their congressperson telling them the sky was falling. With the leadership of the nation – Republicans and Democrats alike – and every talking head in the media making clear hour after hour, day after day in the run-up to Aug. 2 that a financial disaster was lurking around the corner, it does not take much imagination to envision consumers deciding to forego or delay some discretionary expenditure they had planned. Instead, they might well be inclined to hunker down to weather the perfect storm they were being warned was rapidly approaching. Watching the drama as it unfolded, I could imagine consumers turning to each other in millions of households, saying: “Honey, we need to cancel that trip we were planning and that gizmo or service we wanted to buy. We better save more and spend less.” Small wonder that, following the somewhat encouraging retail activity reported in July, the Michigan survey measure of consumer sentiment released just recently had a distinctly sour tone. Importantly, from a business operator’s perspective, nothing was clarified, except that there will be undefined change in taxes, spending and subsidies and other fiscal incentives or disincentives. The message was simply that some combination of revenue enhancement and spending growth cutbacks will take place. The particulars are left to one’s imagination and the outcome of deliberations among 12 members of the Legislature.

Another way to calculate Texas’ contribution to job creation is to lop off those states that have continued losing jobs and consider only those that have positive growth in employment these past two years. Using this metric, Texas has accounted for 29.2 percent of job creation since the recession ended. These are the facts. You may select whichever metric you wish. Regardless, it is reasonable to assume Texas has accounted for a significant amount of the nation’s employment growth both over the past 20 years and since the recession officially ended. This raises the obvious question – what kind of jobs are being created in Texas? Here are two charts that might help you form an opinion. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The first provides a breakdown of employment growth by sector since the recession ended, listing each employment sector by its weight in the employment mix of Texas. The most jobs have been created in the educational and health services sector, which accounts for 13.5 percent of Texas’ employment. The second-most jobs have been created in the professional and business services sector, which accounts for 12.5 percent of the Texas workforce. The mining sector, which includes support activities for both mining and oil and gas, employs 2.1 percent (yes, two-point-one percent) of Texas’ workers. In the second chart, you will see that these jobs are not low-paying jobs.