samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One prospect is that ageold ideas that have shaped most of our history are revived, such that the prosperity of some cannot be achieved without the poverty of others; international and supranational organisations lose their relevance as places for negotiating and finding compromise solutions; the affirmation of 7 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  the self, of the identity, becomes the first requirement of every policy. In such a world, freedom and peace become accessories which can be dispensed with as needed. But if we want these values to remain essential, fundamental, the path is a different one: adjusting existing institutions to change. This process of adjustment has so far encountered resistance because the inevitable national political difficulties always seemed to be above such need. This reluctance has resulted in uncertainty about the capacity of institutions to respond to events and has strengthened the voice of those who want to pull down these institutions. There should be no doubt: this adjustment will have to be as deep as the phenomena that revealed the fragility of the existing order, and as vast as the dimensions of a geopolitical order that is changing in a way that is not favourable for Europe. The European Union wanted to create a sovereign where there was not one. It is not surprising that in a world where every point of contact between the great powers is increasingly a point of friction, the external challenges to the existence of the European Union become increasingly threatening.

10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 9 Average capital flows to and from emerging economies (*) (percentage of GDP) 15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  Inflows  94  96  98  Outflows  00  02  04  06  08  10  Net flows  Source: Central Bank of Chile based on IMF data. (*) Includes Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and Turkey. Figure 10 Capital flows to and from Chile (*) (percentage of GDP) 20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10  -15  -15 86  88  90  92  Inflows  94  96  98  Outflows  00  02  04  06  08  10  Net flows  (*) Up until 1995, it shows foreign direct investment and portfolio investments from or in a foreign country, in the capital account (excluding reserves) of the balance of payments. From 1996 onwards, it shows assets and liabilities of the financial account flows (excluding reserve assets). Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Manufacturing will, therefore, feel the effects of high wage growth to an even greater extent than earlier. Since 1997, labour costs have increased annually by between 5 and 7 per cent. In spite of this, consumer price inflation has been close to 2½ per cent over the past few years. The krone exchange rate has appreciated as a result of a wider interest rate differential between Norway and other countries. Combined with low growth abroad and increased trade with low-cost countries such as China, this led to a slower rise in import prices. As the world economy recovers, import price inflation will edge up. A rise in labour costs of more than 5 per cent will then only be consistent with the inflation target if the krone continues to appreciate. BIS Review 11/2002  3  In the long run, wages must be compatible with the value added that is generated by workers, i.e. labour productivity. Over time, the increase in real wages is therefore determined by developments in labour productivity. In Norway, productivity growth has averaged 1½-2 per cent over the last 20 years. If this continues to be the case, an increase in nominal labour costs of around 4-4½ per cent in the long term will be consistent with the inflation target. In general, an unexpected upward shift in labour costs will prompt an increase in interest rates in order to avoid higher inflation.

Furthermore, given the nature of the crisis, the restrictive measures and the movement limitation, part of the population faced a forced reduction of the consumption, primarily the consumption of different services, which is characteristic for persons with higher income and with greater capacity and propensity to save. Third, given that all future economic flows are determined by the extremely uncertain epidemiological curve, in such an environment, the precaution motive has a great role in the depositors' behavior. The European Commission surveys for both our country and for the countries of the Western Balkans also show that the respondents' perceptions in 2020 and in 2021 are in favor of the view that due to the economic situation in this period, savings are more favorable decision, compared to recent years. At the same time, the surveys of our Statistical Office show a decrease in the utilization of savings as a source of income during 2020. What has been happening to the savings in the banking system in our country from the beginning of the pandemic onwards? The deposit potential is increasing with a relatively solid intensity of over 8% on an annual basis, whereby the dynamics of increase is very similar to that of the period 2018 - 2019. Such dynamics does not resemble a bit the developments during the global financial crisis, when in a short time the deposit growth slowed down, which from around 20%, reduced to around 7% on an annual level.
Andrew Bailey: Monetary and financial stability - lessons from recent times Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Institute of International Finance, Washington DC, 12 April 2023. *** It is a great pleasure to be back in Washington. There is plenty going on and a great deal to talk about, so thank you to the IIF and Oliver Wyman for organising this event. I want to pick out big issues we face, and try to set out how they fit together and the challenges they give rise to. In recent weeks, we have seen the crystallisation of problems in a few parts of the banking sector. This is against a background of a necessary sharp tightening in monetary policy to bring down inflation from levels that are much too high. All of this has to be set against the most serious global pandemic for at least a century and the most serious war in Europe since 1945. Let me therefore draw a first set of conclusions and propositions from what is going on. The post crisis reforms to bank regulation have worked. Today I do not believe we face a systemic banking crisis. When I look at the UK banks, they are well capitalised, liquid and able to serve their customers and support the economy. This positive assessment of financial stability is important for monetary policy.

For instance, for a regional cross-border banking group, I imagine the supervisory team to be based in the relevant region, perhaps in the same premises as the national supervisor, and to consist of staff from that region. As for crisis resolution, one could think of the EU building up a deposit insurance fund for the largest cross-border banks, possibly within the framework of the new European supervisory agency, akin to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the USA. This would considerably reduce the risk of destructive negotiation games. Such a deposit insurance fund would certainly be better diversified than the national funds are today, which would, all else being equal, enable it to charge lower fees or hold a larger risk-adjusted buffer. However, the fund itself would lack the ability to handle the largest banking failures. In order to cope in the event of a really large bank or several large banks failing, the fund should be able to borrow in the capital market. To be able do this in a cost-efficient manner, it would need backing by a government guarantee from the 25 member states. In the event that the European deposit insurance fund is not able to recover enough money from a troubled bank to repay its creditors in the capital markets, a key for burden sharing would need to be in place. One could establish a system of committed payment obligations, where the fund has the right to receive contributions according to the agreed key to pay back its capital market loans.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Building human capital for emerging challenges Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 9th Bank Human Resources Conference 2008 organised by the Indian Institute of Banking and Finance (IIBF): "Building Human Capital for Emerging Challenges", Kuala Lumpur, 29 February 2008. *  *  *  Let me first of all extend a warm welcome to the participants of this 9th Bank Human Resource Conference organised by the Indian Institute of Banking and Finance (IIBF). It is our honour to host this conference that is being held outside India for the first time. This is one of the concrete outcomes of the alliance that has been entered into between the Indian Institute of Banking and Finance and the International Centre for Leadership in Finance following the MOU that was signed about three months ago between the two organisations. The development of human capital has to be a constant undertaking in an environment of constant change. As recent as ten years ago, we have seen the economic and financial environment dramatically transformed. There has therefore required a corresponding change in the knowledge, skills, competencies and capabilities that are now required, in particular, by the banking industry, which is a highly knowledge-intensive and skills based industry. New challenges have also emerged in this environment arising from the rapid globalisation and internationalisation of the financial system and the significant advancement in technology.

Finally, this initiative of bilateral engagement on the issues in developing talent in the industry will also gain from the synergy and will contribute to strengthening the ability to further the agenda of building human capital in the financial services industry. On this note, I wish you a productive and successful conference. Thank you. BIS Review 25/2008  3
There is also a risk that the market will become fragmented and by this I mean that there may be a number of different payment solutions, but that none of them is generally accepted by the payment recipients. One example could be mobile payments. If the launch of new mobile payment services continues, perhaps I as consumer will need to have a couple of different payment applications in my mobile phone to be sure of being able to pay in different shops. Similarly, the retailer will then need to subscribe to several different payment services. Last year, an inquiry on the use of cash in Sweden was published, and earlier this autumn the commission of inquiry presented its report entitled Cash management in Sweden. This inquiry has resulted in a number of proposals and I will discuss two of them here. The first is that it is proposed that the Riksbank has overall responsibility for cash management in Sweden. The second is that the counting services of cash-in-transit companies should become subject to licence and come under financial supervision. It is recommended that the Riksbank become the supervisory authority for these operations. The Riksbank welcomes the work of the inquiry as we consider it important that cash management in Sweden functions smoothly. We have taken part in the work of the inquiry and will now analyse the proposals put forward and respond to the submission sent out for comments.

3  BIS Review 56/1999  Monetary policy operates on the demand side of the economy, and essentially what we can hope to do – and what we are aiming to do - is to keep overall demand broadly and continuously in line with the underlying supply-side capacity of the economy to meet that demand. How close we come – on average and over time – to meeting the 2½% inflation target is in effect simply a measure of our success in achieving macro-economic stability in this wider sense. We cannot directly affect supply-side capacity – the underlying rate of growth that we can expect to sustain. But, by operating symmetrically – as we have shown that we do – we can provide an environment in which supply-side improvements (for example, more rapid productivity growth which apparently explains the stronger performance of the US economy in the past few years, but which we have yet to see in this country on anything like the same scale) have the best chance of feeding through into faster sustained output growth. And, to the extent that we are successful in maintaining macro-economic stability, that can help to improve our supply-side performance indirectly by lowering real long-term interest rates and encouraging better decision–making in the economy as a whole with less distortion from unnecessary erratic movements, particularly in nominal values. But we can only hope to maintain macro-economic stability for the economy as a whole.
In practice, it would appear that such responsiveness has not increased over the last decade, while empirical evidence supporting a growing role of global measures of economic slack in the inflation process of the euro area and other advanced economies has been limited. On balance, not only is the net effect of globalisation on euro area prices difficult to accurately gauge, but it may also be changing through time. For this reason, the ECB continues to actively monitor possible ongoing changes in the inflation process. At the same time, efficient adjustment can be best facilitated by focusing on price stability and continuing to solidly anchor inflation expectations in the face of considerable relative price shocks. Developments in the real estate sector Let me conclude with some remarks on residential property prices. As with other asset prices, residential property prices are closely monitored by the ECB in terms of our economic analysis. Within this context, while we take the euro area real estate sector into account in assessing risks to price stability, we certainly do not target house prices, or for that matter, any other asset prices. We do monitor asset prices closely because of the potentially high costs for price stability and for the economy as a whole that are associated with strong appreciations and rapid reversals in asset prices. Also, our monetary analysis covers the monitoring of money and credit which often reflect the evolution of prices and house purchases.

The expectation of an improvement in economic activity in the euro area is contingent on a recovery of growth in private consumption, supported by a reduction in actual and perceived inflation rates. This expectation is also based on a projected gradual recovery of the world economy and export growth which, together with the low level of interest rates, should help to strengthen investment. Nevertheless, the uncertainty surrounding this scenario remains high. It is therefore very difficult, at this juncture, to predict the timing and strength of the economic upswing, both in the euro area and globally. Turning to recent price developments, in September annual HICP inflation was 2.1%. For October, Eurostat's flash estimate indicates an annual HICP inflation rate of 2.2%. This increase is again likely to reflect developments in energy prices, although no detailed information is available at present. Looking at price developments for the remainder of 2002 and the early part of next year, despite the recent decline in oil prices, some upward impact may occur reflecting base effects and country-specific developments - such as increases in indirect taxes or specific developments in services prices. Although difficult to anticipate, particularly due to the volatility of oil prices, a further increase in the annual rates of inflation around the turn of the year and a delay in the return to inflation rates below 2% cannot be ruled out. However, this further increase should only be temporary.
These are the correction of macroeconomic imbalances, which I have often characterized as the need to live within our means; the need to respond to, and exploit the competitive forces unleashed by globalization; and the deleterious economic effects of population ageing and of environmental degradation. These challenges are by no means unique to Malta. Economies all over the world at different stages of development are similarly affected. They can, and must, therefore, be transformed into opportunities, because economies which are more successful than others in overcoming them will enjoy a significant competitive advantage. In Malta’s case the task is particularly difficult because all of these issues need to be tackled at the same time. Indeed, undue postponement of the necessary reforms could have serious consequences. The Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances The Maltese economy has been devoting far too many of its relatively scarce resources to consumption. Household and government consumption have increased steadily over the past decade from 80% to 85% of GDP. The household savings rate has meanwhile declined from almost 16% to around 1.5% of disposable income during the same period. These trends are a source of concern. First, because a reduced savings pool will compromise future economic growth by curtailing investment. Indeed, the share of resources devoted to productive investment has shrunk from almost 30% a decade ago to just over 20% today. Second, because excessive consumption threatens the sustainability of the economy given the high import content of  BIS Review 50/2003  1  domestic expenditures.

In our latest assessment this was based on the belief that inflation was somewhat higher than now proves to be the case. But monetary policy does not have such a degree of precision that it can control inflation to a tenth of a degree. And, moreover, inflation in July was high and far above the inflation target even after the downward revision of the figure. In the discussion ahead of the interest rate decision, I and other members of the Executive Board highlighted the weak labour market indicators which uniformly pointed to a weaker development of employment, which is also in line with the Riksbank's forecast. After the decision, the Labour Force Survey for August has been presented. This shows that employment increased by a moderate 0.5 per cent on a 12-month basis, which is marginally lower than the Riksbank's forecast. At our September meeting, we had access to the initial version of the National Accounts for the second quarter. These showed that GDP did not increase at all compared to the previous quarter and increased by only 0.7 per cent on a calendar-adjusted12-month basis. Now that the revised version of the National Accounts has been published, we can see that growth in the first two quarters has been marginally adjusted downwards in both cases. This means that growth in the first quarter was 2 per cent on a 12-month basis and with calendar effects taken into account. The corresponding figure for the second quarter was 0.6 per cent.
That is to say, if there were a business segment of this type, it would be very small. Bad debt ratios in the Spanish mortgage market stand at 0.4%, compared with 4% in the United States. The information available for Spain therefore precludes talking of a market of this type. Regarding bad debts, the aggregate ratio for the sector during 2006 was on a declining trend and, in any event, is holding at minimum levels, whether analysed from a historical perspective or in comparison with institutions in other euro area countries. In other words, this indicator of the credit risk borne by institutions is not currently showing signs of difficulties feeding through to the industry, and this despite the higher growth of doubtful assets over the course of 2006. This higher growth, however, must be analysed bearing in mind at least two considerations. First, the increase in doubtful assets is due in part to the strong growth in activity recorded in recent years. In an expansionary setting it is logical that, if the volume of credit increases, the volume of doubtful assets will afterwards increase with some delay even if default probabilities hold constant. Second, it should not be forgotten that the changes in accounting rules introduced by the Banco de España to adapt to International Financial Reporting Standards mean that doubtful assets must be recognised earlier and in a higher proportion.

The emergence in recent years of new products, such as credit derivatives and CDOs (collateralised debt obligations), and deeper markets for other more traditional products, such as asset-backed securities, have provided financial market agents with a new range of profit and risk possibilities, allowed more dynamic and intensive risk management, and made for greater diffusion and better diversification of risk. Similarly, the emergence of new operators, with investors prepared not only to assume new risks but particularly to do so over longer terms, has in recent years enabled shocks to be absorbed on markets with a lower level of stress and, subsequently, lower volatility. Finally, regulated and non-regulated financial institutions alike, by increasingly having better risk management systems, combined with supervisory and regulatory models based not on coercive restrictions but on providing incentives for proper risk management, contribute clearly to market stability. Unsurprisingly, as a result of all these factors, the international financial system has demonstrated notable stability and substantial capacity to absorb adverse impacts level-headedly, ensuring that the few episodes of overreaction have been very short-lived. However, these structural improvements should not mask the fragilities inherent in this new and more complex environment. The improvements based on proper risk management and diversification are genuine ones. But they entail considerable management complexity and the growing involvement of agents not subject to prudential supervisory arrangements who do not yet have tried and tested experience in managing the risks assumed in more adverse economic environments.