samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Reducing the temporary employment ratio One of the differential aspects of our labour market is its high temporary employment ratio. On average over the past decade it has stood at 25.2%, compared with 13.9% for the euro area. It is indeed employees on temporary contracts who have disproportionately borne the brunt of job destruction flows in the Spanish economy. That gives rise to very adverse effects on inequality, careers and productivity. And this without forgetting that excessive temporariness influences such important decisions as those on youths leaving the family home and starting a family. For all these reasons, reducing duality is unavoidable. In this connection, the employment protection mechanisms should be reviewed under the prism of squaring the necessary protection of employees with flexibility for firms. Accordingly, I believe we should explore modalities such as contracts with growing severance costs. There are also mixed models which combine the possibility of accumulating in advance in a fund a portion of these severance costs with a severance payment in the event of dismissal whose amount increases with years of service. Improving active labour market policies Another characteristic of our labour market is the high persistence of unemployment. For example, at end-2019, almost 43% of the unemployed had been seeking a job for more than one year. The situation will now worsen, given that the workers most affected by this crisis are, on average, lesser-skilled. Active labour market policies should therefore be strengthened.

In order to mitigate the inherent pro-cyclical nature of financial activities, to which I will return later, the Basel Committee’s proposals also contain capital buffers and forward-looking provisioning. Finally, the proposals include global minimum liquidity risk requirements enabling credit institutions to withstand a short-term liquidity stress and aiming to ensure longer-term stability in their funding requirements. The objective of this comprehensive package is to enable financial institutions to better withstand the adverse effects of economic shocks. In order to assess the cumulative impact of the proposals, quantitative impact assessments are underway. The outcome will be available in the coming weeks, and will assist decision-makers in properly calibrating the measures. At this stage, therefore, it is premature for me to say anything about the desirable  2  BIS Review 87/2010  calibration of the measures. Nevertheless, I am of the view that the measures are warranted from a conceptual point of view, though their cumulative impact needs to be carefully assessed. Indeed, it is important that the right balance is struck between enhancing banking stability and maintaining a stable provision of credit to the economy. IV. What has been done? The main strands of the reform agenda I come to paint are at various stages of development. It is therefore useful to briefly run through what has already been achieved, in particular in Europe. Starting with the prudential framework for banks, most FSB members, including the EU Member States, have fully implemented the more risk-sensitive Basel II framework.
For me it is not important that it is the Riksbank, rather than any other authority, that is given the responsibility and the instruments to conduct  22  See, for example, Apel, Mikael and Carl-Andreas Claussen (2012), “Monetary policy, interest rates and risk taking”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2012:2, pp. 66–80, for an outline of the relationship between low interest rates, increased credit expansion and the boom on the property market in many countries that to a large extent lay at the centre of the crisis. BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  macroprudential policy. But it is important that someone is given responsibility, otherwise we will have created a framework that is no clearer than the one we have today. Exactly how responsibility should be allocated is an issue that I am not prepared to discuss further today. It is an issue that will have to wait until the Riksbank submits its response to the interim report of the Financial Crisis Commission later in the spring. References af Jochnick, Kerstin (2013), “Monetary policy and macroprudential policy”, speech, Länsförsäkringar, Stockholm, 25 January 2013, Sveriges Riksbank. Apel, Mikael and Carl-Andreas Claussen (2012), “Monetary policy, interest rates and risktaking”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2012:2, pp. 66–80. Borio, Claudio and Mathias Drehmann (2009), “Assessing the risk of banking crises – revisited”, BIS Quarterly Review, March, pp. 29–46. Englund, Peter (2011), “Swedish house prices in an international perspective”, The Riksbank’s inquiry into risks in the Swedish housing market.

The World Economic Forum Banking Strength index shows that the Chilean banking sector is very strong, as it ranks in the 11th place in the world. Let me finish by pointing out the relevance that the exchange rate derivatives market has had in favoring both financial stability and the conduct of the flexible inflation targeting scheme in Chile. This market is not as deep as it is in developed countries, but it has experienced significant growth of more than 10-fold since 1998, fueled in part, as I already mentioned, by the floating exchange rate regime. The role of pension funds has been significant as well, as they maintain a large positive foreign financial position, and keep hedging against exchange rate risk even above the regulatory requirements, especially in the aftermath of the last crisis. Thanks to these factors and a favorable regulation, Chile shows a high level of penetration of financial derivatives compared to other emerging economies and countries in the region. All this has contributed to a limited exchange rate mismatch of corporations. Today the share of firms with a mismatch over 10 percent of their assets is below 10 percent, down from around 20 percent before the Crisis. Hence monetary policy can be conducted in a countercyclical manner, without the need to manage the exchange rate. However, as the recent experience in developed countries has revealed, the rapid development of derivatives 5  markets also poses challenges to regulators due to their complexity and potential concentration of risks in a few entities.
Mr. Bäckström gives a broadbrush picture of the Swedish economy and monetary policy Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Urban Bäckström, held at seminars before the Midland Bank and Merrill Lynch, respectively, in New York on 30/4/97. Economic developments in recent years In the past few years Swedish economic policy has achieved tangible results. •  By an improvement in credibility, important progress has been made towards greater economic stability. Favourable economic growth in Sweden has been combined with a rate of inflation that is the lowest for several decades. •  There is broad political agreement in Sweden on the consolidation of government finance. This is manifested in the so called convergence programme that aims to eliminate the budget deficit not later than 1998. The budget reinforcements which the Government and the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) have undertaken in recent years are extensive. The six-monthly monitoring arrangement provides a means of ensuring that government finance is developing as planned. Moreover, in the Economic Bill this spring the Government states that the long-term target for the general Government budget is a surplus of 2 per cent of GDP as a cyclical average. The gradual adjustment to this goal is also specified. The general government financial balance has been strengthened from 12.3 per cent of GDP in 1993 to -2.5 per cent in 1996. This is a substantial improvement.

First and foremost, this role consists in the creation of an environment in which citizens, business community and the entire economy may succeed on the global markets of products, services, labour, capital and knowledge. Efficient performance of this role calls for significant changes in the functioning of e-administration, as compared to the traditional public administration. E-administration must creatively use technology to provide better services to citizens and business community, by offering them a wider choice (e.g. of ways of communicating with public offices) and options of customization of services, accompanied by mitigation of costs. E-administration must alter organization of its work and communication among public offices and public administration authorities. This can be achieved e.g. by taking over the burden of information management from customers (citizens and business community). Eadministration must set the directions of development of eeconomy through creation of strategies, regulations and a system of incentives. The state, acting as a regulating body, can define the standards of operation by imposing on the citizens or a group of “better prepared” citizens the obligation to use electronic media of communication. In the United States and the Netherlands, for instance, large enterprises are obliged to submit e-tax returns. 5 In France, on the other hand, the student and academic community have been viewed as an engine to launch the new standards. Therefore, applications for scientific grants are accepted solely in the electronic format. 6 The imposition of obligations is one of the methods to popularize the interactive communication methods.
Within this network, systemically important banks provide essential services for other banks. For example, they play a key role in system-wide liquidity provision and adjustment between banks. Normally, this takes the form of short-term interbank lending. If a key player in this network gets into difficulty, this interbank market can seize up, causing problems for other, otherwise sound banks, too. c) The result is false incentives and high risks for society as a whole  A systemically important bank can expect to be bailed out because the cost of failure for the real economy would be extremely high. In other words: the bank benefits from an implicit state guarantee. The consequence of this are far-reaching, as it provides significant false incentives for a bank’s shareholders, management and creditors. On the one hand, shareholders and management of a ‘too big to fail’ bank benefit from unjustifiably low capital borrowing costs, compared to other banks. The state guarantee is tantamount to a subsidy worth billions. 2 It allows shareholders and managements to take on more debt and greater risk. 3 On the other hand, the state guarantee means that creditors have less incentive to make sure that the bank does not take on excessive risk. If all goes well, they will benefit from virtually risk-free interest income. If, however, things do go wrong, the state will have to intervene and the creditors will not be held liable for any losses that may arise.

Allied to this underestimation of the significance of systemic interlinkages was an excessive faith in modelling, to which the supervisory authorities also subscribed. 11 There was a general conviction that the commonly used quantitative models for measuring risk captured the actual risks in the banking system fully and reliably – a dangerous misapprehension. For instance, these models’ risk calculations were based on correlations of price trends in the recent past, while often disregarding the fact that such correlations can change rapidly and significantly, for reasons that are not directly apparent from the data. Moreover, the models simply did not 9  The ‘too big to fail’ issue had been discussed in detail in a number of academic studies and textbooks before 2008; for example, cf. Stern and Feldman (2004). 10 Cf. Moosa (2010). 11 For example, cf. Bernanke (2006). Page 6/14  sufficiently replicate certain risks which grew to major proportions over the course of the crisis, such as the default risk of positions which the banks were holding on the assumption that they could easily sell them at short notice. 12 Since the regulatory capital requirements largely relied on these model-based calculations, they did not adequately take account of the actual risk exposure. Against this background, the resilience of many banks proved to be insufficient overall during the crisis. Relative to their risk exposure, the banks simply did not have large enough liquidity and capital cushions. They were unable to absorb large outflows of funds and losses.
Safe and efficient clearing and settlement have been in demand as banks’ trust in each other has weakened. In Norway, our systems have had to handle major problems in two Icelandic banks operating in our country. These problems have been handled smoothly. Times of crisis can also be a turning point, providing the opportunity for change. During the Norwegian banking crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Norges Bank and other public authorities put pressure on banks to increase their income from bank charges, including payment services. I believe that as banks have to focus even more on running a costefficient business, the incentives for developing the payment system further will be strong in times to come. For this conference we have received a large number of high-quality papers. I know that the selected conference speakers represent some of the best researchers in this field. We are especially pleased to have as keynote speakers two of the leading scholars in the economics of payments systems: David Humphrey from Florida State University and Jean-Charles Rochet from Toulouse School of Economics. Let me also extend my thanks to the three other members of the programme committee: Gabriela Guibourg from Sveriges Riksbank, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and Bent Vale from Norges Bank. As I mentioned earlier, I visit Nice in the South of France quite often. And from my direct observations, I notice that France has developed very fancy methods of processing cheques.

I hope this new edition will be appreciated as much as, or even more than the previous ones. Before we start the discussion, let me briefly share with you some personal thoughts on this subject. The digitalisation of financial services is clearly a fascinating subject. It is also an issue that is particularly relevant at the moment, as the emergence of digital technologies is coinciding with a period of burgeoning recovery. The fact that regulators, and notably the Banque de France, are turning their attention to these issues should come as no surprise. It is our responsibility, as central bankers and regulators, to strike the right balance between the obvious benefits that digital innovation can bring to the financial sector, and the need for an adequate framework to mitigate risks and guarantee financial stability. The search for this subtle balance can best be represented as a trinity comprising innovation, stability and regulation. We are thus facing a form of “trilemma”, and our role is to build a “possible trinity”. 1. With regard to the first element: innovation. The Banque de France is a proponent of digital innovation in financial services. There is no denying that technology has opened up a wealth of opportunities for innovation, and that we still haven’t unlocked its full potential. However, in finance, the majority of these innovations also have the potential to be highly disruptive, be it in payments, in financing (think of crowdfunding) or in financial markets (think of HFT, which has more questionable objectives).
The turnover on the Money Market continued to increase also in 2008 and 2009, with the average monthly turnover reaching the level of Denar 3,813 million, i.e. Denar 4,187 million, respectively. The deepening on the Money Market is largely a result of the activities the National Bank and ACI – Financial Markets Association undertook in the that period: introduction of electronic trading platform; introduction of the interbank interest rate for selling Denar deposits calculated from the quotations of the reference banks (SKIBOR); and initiation of the calculation and disclosure of the interbank interest rate for concluded overnight transactions by the reference banks as sellers of Denar deposits (MKDONIA) etc. All of these activities resulted in improved market transparency, easier matching of the supply and the demand and creation of interest rates on the basis of information on the market condition in real time. Such stable movements on the Money Market, exactly in the segment of non-collaterized borrowing, were indicator that in the period when the rest of the world economy faces with a serious banking crisis, the banking system of the Republic of Macedonia remained relatively safe and sound. This is contributed by several factors: orientation of the Macedonian banks towards traditional banking activities, direction towards domestic market and absence of utilization of structural products and execution of complex financial activities, as well as low dependence on the external sources of financing.

However, thus the procyclical nature of the banking operations and the banks' tendency for larger relaxation of the credit activity standards in periods of growth are proven, which in time of economic activity deceleration, through risks reassessment, results in higher loss volume due to impairment and restraint from crediting non-financial entities. And the last, however key question: What are the challenges for the forthcoming period? It is definitely clear that there is a need of a comprehensive response to the world financial (banking) crisis. In his new book "The Return of Depression Economics and Crisis of 2008"), Paul Krugman says: "How did this second colossal muddle arise? In the aftermath of the Great Depression we redesigned the machine so that we did understand it, well enough at any rate to avoid big disasters. Banks, the piece of the system that malfunctioned so badly in the 1930s, were placed under tight regulation and supported by a strong safety net. Meanwhile, international movements of capital, which played a disruptive role in the 1930s were also limited [due to the regulations]. The financial system became a little boring but much safer. Then things got interesting and dangerous again. Growing international capital flows set the stage for devastating currency crises in the 1990 of the 20th century, and for a globalized financial crisis in 2008. The growth of the shadow banking system, without any corresponding extension of regulation, set the stage for latter-day bank runs on a massive scale.
Maria Merian, one such famous artist from the 17th century, was recently celebrated for her works at an exhibition at Buckingham Palace last October. Merian’s work which featured detailed drawings of plants and insects are preserved to this day in private and academic collections all over the world. I confess I knew nothing about Maria before this week. Having now seen specimens of her incredible body of work, I can only imagine the sensation she would have created in her time with the quality and eye for detail that brought her drawings to life – and on a subject like insects, of all things, which were her passion. They are immensely, strikingly beautiful. We hope the artists of ‘Nature Nurtured’ will receive the same appreciation. The artists in this exhibition do much more than record what anybody with a handphone can manage these days. They immerse us in the natural wonders that surround us, from the bustling cities to the more distant hinterlands. Whatever the setting, every one of the artists has a visual story to tell, informed by research and many hours spent to observe and understand the subjects of their artistic creations. These are not just snapshots, in many ways they tell us as much about the artist as they do their subjects. If people centuries ago could be thrilled by pictures of insects, then surely these artists can reignite a deeper appreciation in all of us of our environment.

An area of focus has been in green finance, with over RM2.5 billion in financing extended from the financial sector to companies that promote clean and efficient energy from sustainable sources. There are many ways in which we can better protect our environment. Art provides a sober reminder of this, as depicted in one painting from the Bank’s collection which captures the KL Banjir of 1971, by Mohd Hoessein Enas, showing the iconic Merdeka Square under several feet of water, just a stone’s throw away from the location of the Bank’s headquarters which had moved only shortly before the event. Another exhibit at the BNM Museum and Art Gallery depicts the two major Asian tsunamis of the past 13 years. This piece of installation art by Malaysian artist Oi Nuen Sprunt was displayed here in 2014, bringing home the message of nature’s power and unpredictability, but also the healing power of human compassion and kindness. Today, we bring you a more hopeful exhibition, with works that remind us of what exists just beyond our doorsteps, to be preserved and nurtured. The artists featured here today have all created their imagery direct from the source, which says a great deal about their passion and commitment to their craft. Few of us would take the time or trouble to observe nature at such an intimate level. These works allow us to do so in some measure. I am deeply encouraged by our own Bank staff who have also submitted works for the exhibition.