samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The findings from the market, needs assessment and scope for intervention were materialised 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  in a National Strategy on the Modernisation of Retail Payment 2018–2023) The Strategy aims for improvements in the retail payment market to provide Albanian citizens with more options to choose from for their daily transactions, more easily and more cost-effective, by supporting the objective for a broader-based financial inclusion. The strategy lays down concrete and measurable objectives, such as the doubling of the population having a bank account (from 38% in 2018 to 70% in 2022), the increase in the number of electronic payments per capita, from 4.3% in 2016, to 10 in 2022 (increase by 130%). The Strategy aims also legal and regulatory improvements, which lay the foundations for  innovative initiatives, and a level playing field. In this regard, the Bank of Albania finalised the drafting of the law “On Payment Services in the Republic of Albania”. The approval and implementation of this law will provide a crucial contribution to establishing services at low cost and easily accessible by the public, and promoting competition and innovation also based on a prudential consumer protection regime. This will be the theme of the first session of the Conference. Also, the Strategy aims at infrastructural improvements. In this regard, a set of measures are envisaged to promote interaction among various actors from the infrastructural point of view, aiming at reducing costs, in particular, for end users.

Another possibility is that low long-term rates reflect unusually strong demand for long-term securities, for example, by pension funds seeking to improve the match between the durations of their assets and liabilities, by holders of mortgage-backed securities seeking to maintain the durations of their portfolios, or by foreign central banks that have been acquiring dollars. China may have been playing an especially large role, as its central bank has intervened in foreign exchange markets to peg the renminbi at a low level against the dollar. Of course, last week the People’s Bank of China announced that it had revalued the renminbi against the dollar by 2.1 percent, with the stated intention of managing the renminbi’s exchange value against an unspecified currency basket. This is not a large revaluation, but some observers think that it is the beginning of a much bigger move over time. If this is the case, we may gain a better understanding of the impact, if any, that Chinese exchange rate policy has had on U.S. bond rates. An alternative to “special factors” as an explanation for the low level of long-term yields is the possibility that the flat yield curve reflects the market’s assessment that bad news is on the horizon. In other words, investors may expect only modest increases in the funds rate in the future because they think that the drags I’ve described will keep demand on the weak side for some time to come.
By contrast, in Greece, Portugal and Spain reforms were less fast and comprehensive. In Spain, for instance, slow implementation of labour market reforms meant that wages continued to rise until the third quarter of 2011, despite output falling by almost 5% in that time. In Greece, labour market reforms were enacted early on but without in parallel opening up product markets, meaning that when wages adjusted, prices did not: the price level only began falling in October 2012. The result was that these countries experienced a quantity adjustment – higher unemployment – which triggered a protracted disinflationary process that is still ongoing.12 In sum, while both options have been costly in terms of output and employment, and notwithstanding differences in labour market flexibility, in a situation where countries had to undertake an internal devaluation, accelerating the pace of reforms seems to have been the better approach. It has led more quickly to higher growth prospects and higher current and expected inflation – i.e. conditions where the positive income effects of reforms can outweigh the negative real interest rate effects. This contrasting experience also, in my view, disproves the view that reforms should be staggered because political capital is scarce. We have seen that this type of thinking tends to lead to authorities avoiding taking on organised vested interests – such a protected sectors – and instead prioritising measures that affect a more diffuse group – such as lowering minimum wages.

Several euro area economies had experienced a sharp rise in  6  See Gomes, S., P. Jacquinot, and M. Pisani (2011), “Structural reforms and macroeconomic performance in the euro area countries: a model-based assessment”, ECB working paper no. 1323; Berger, H. and S. Danninger (2007), “The Employment Effects of Labor and Product Market Deregulation and Their Implications for Structural Reform”, IMF Staff Papers Vol. 54, No. 3; and Nicoletti, G. and S. Scarpetta (2005), “Product Market Reforms and Employment in OECD Countries”, OECD working paper no. 472. 7  See Eggertsson, G., A. Ferrero, and A. Raffo (2013), “Can Structural Reforms Help Europe?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming. 8  See Gerali, A., A. Notapietro, and M. Pisani (2014), “Structural reforms at the zero lower bound”, mimeo. 9  See Andrés J., O. Arce, and C. Thomas (2014), “Structural reforms in a debt overhang, Banco de Espana, working paper n. 1421. 10  For a discussion see Blanchard, O., K. Froot, and J. Sachs (1994), The Transition in Eastern Europe, University of Chicago Press. 11  See Blanchard, O., and F. Giavazzi (2003), “Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  unit labour costs (ULC) associated with the pre-crisis credit boom, which required a period of internal devaluation to correct. And they were starting out with rigid economic structures.
I will try to illuminate two questions: 1) Is our reaction pattern and the conditionality of our interest rate forecast understood? and 2) Do we affect the expectations of economic agents? [Chart: Decomposition of change in the interest rate path: Forecasts] Prior to the announcement of a new interest rate forecast, many of the market analysts publish their own forecast of our interest rate path. These forecasts are usually accompanied by a discussion of the factors pushing the expected revision of our path in either direction. Some analysts even publish their own assessment of our decomposition of the interest rate change, quantifying the estimated effects from different factors. The charts show the forecasts of the change in our interest rate path provided by three different macroanalysts prior to the publication of the October 2011 Monetary Policy Report. Our published change in the path and its decomposition are shown in the lower panel to the right. As shown in the chart, the forecasts are quite accurate, which is a typical pattern. We take this as an indication that market participants in general understand our reaction pattern. It also indicates that the agents correctly perceive our interest rate path as a conditional forecast, and not as an unconditional promise. [Chart: Changes in money market rates after monetary policy announcements] The next chart shows the changes in money market rates on the day of a new monetary policy announcement.

The Swedish economy has coped relatively well This is a general outline of the international picture. Although the world economy has begun to recover, there is no doubt that it is facing fairly major challenges over the coming years. But what is the situation here in Sweden? Well, in many ways things look rather good. The Swedish economy appears to have coped fairly well in the crisis. Although production fell more in Sweden than in many other countries, the recovery has been much quicker. The situation now looks much more stable than in most other places. One important reason why we have managed so well is, I believe, that it is not so long since we experienced a crisis here in Sweden – both in the bank system and the economy as a whole. The crisis at the beginning of the 1990s was much more isolated than the recent crisis and can in many ways be described as “home made”. But we nevertheless managed to learn some important lessons from it. Stable frameworks provide security… Perhaps the most important lesson is that both monetary policy and fiscal policy need stable long-term frameworks. The previous crisis therefore led to a number of changes in this direction, many of them through decisions made here in the Riksdag. Unlike the situation in the previous crisis, monetary policy is now conducted by an independent Riksbank with an inflation target.
Per cent 25  25 Non-financial corporate sector  20  20  15  15 Households  10  10  5  5 House prices  0 1998  0 1999  2000  2001  2002  Sources: Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents, EFF, FINN.no, ECON EF, ECON and Norges Bank SG Gausdal 31.01.03  The sharp rise in electricity prices may lead to lower growth in consumption this year. Higher electricity expenses reduce household purchasing power. Many enterprises will also be facing higher costs. On the other hand, high electricity prices generate revenues for central and local government. Electricity prices 1 January 1998 = 100 340  340  300  300 260 220  Spot prices incl. tax and grid rental  180  260 220  Electricity prices index in the CPI*  180 140  140  100  100 *Electricity (including grid rental) accounts for 3.3% of CPI  60 Jan 00  60 Jul 00  Jan 01  Jul 01  Jan 02  Jul 02  Jan 03  Sources: Statistics Norway, NordPool, Viken Energi and Norges Bank SG Gausdal 31.01.03  Higher electricity prices will result in a sharp increase in the consumer price index this winter. The year-on-year rate of increase in the consumer price index may approach 4 per cent in January and February. Underlying inflation will also be affected. For example, this can be the result of higher rents and higher costs in some business sectors.

Labour costs1) in manufacturing: Norway and trading partners Percentage change in hourly costs  8  8 7  7  Norway 6  6  5  5  Trading partners  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1)  1  Labour costs per hour  0  0 1991 1993 1995 1997 Sources: Statistics Norway, TRCIS/IMF and Norges Bank  1999  2001  SG Gausdal 31.01.03  Since 1998, wage growth in Norway has been markedly higher than that of our trading partners. Until spring 2001, the monetary policy objective implied that, over time, wage growth had to be reduced to the level in Europe. The inflation target of 2½ per cent implies that wage growth over time can hover around 4½ per cent. This takes into account that productivity growth in Norway has been around 2 per cent over the past twenty years. If wage growth is higher than 4½ per cent, monetary policy generally has to be tight in order to counter inflation. This will normally lead to deteriorating competitiveness in the business sector. If wage growth is lower than 4½ per cent, monetary policy normally has to be eased to counter inflation that is too low. This can result in a weaker krone and an improvement in competitiveness in the business sector. The difference between current wage growth and the long-term equilibrium level of 4½ per cent can be 2 referred to as the wage gap for the Norwegian economy.
Kristina Persson: The economic situation in a monetary policy perspective Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at a conference by Sveriges Kyrkokamerala förening, Sundsvall, 11 June 2002. *  *  *  First of all, I would like to thank you for the invitation to participate in your congress and for the opportunity to expound the Riksbank’s views of the Swedish economy at the present time. By way of introduction, I intend to discuss the role of monetary policy on a more general level and then to present the Riksbank’s view of the economic situation and inflation prospects on the basis of the most recent Executive Board meeting, where we decided to leave the repo rate unchanged. I shall also describe the risk scenario and how we see developments beyond the forecast horizon. In conclusion, I shall briefly touch on an issue that I have personally been interested in for some time, namely the economic aspects of a potential Swedish membership of the Eurosystem. The role of the Riksbank Let me first clarify the Riksbank’s tasks and explain how monetary policy decisions are taken, i.e. how monetary policy strategy is formulated. The Riksbank has had a statutory duty to maintain price stability since 1 January 1999. We have chosen to put this in operational terms by means of setting an inflation target.

This will be decided by the government and parliament, following a referendum on this question. The timetable for a decision will be determined by a political process. Statements by, for instance, Prime Minister Göran Persson indicate that a referendum will be held as early as next year. If the result were a “yes”, parliament would decide to send in an application to the European Commission and the ECB to examine whether we meet the convergence criteria. In connection with making a decision on application, Sweden would probably also have to take a position on participation in ERM2. The government has said earlier that if Sweden is to take part in stage three of EMU, it would be logical to first tie the krona to this exchange rate mechanism. The economic criteria are the inflation rate, long-term interest rates, exchange rate stability and the budget balance and debt in the public sector. Following this scrutiny, the European Parliament and Council of Europe would give their opinion on the Commission’s proposal and after this the ECOFIN Council would take a decision on whether Sweden could participate. If Sweden were accepted as a member of the Eurosystem, there would be negotiations on when membership could occur and at what exchange rate the krona would be fixed against the euro. Parliament decided as early as 1997 that Sweden should keep the door open for future membership by creating the highest possible level of readiness for action, by means of technical and practical preparations.
The reason I  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  am returning to this forecast is that I don’t think anyone would question that the National Institute of Economic Research is a serious and competent forecaster – and it can scarcely be accused of deliberately spreading “misleading pictures of the future”. And as I said, the National Institute of Economic Research’s forecasts were not in any way unique, but reflected well how forecasters in general viewed the situation. Anyone who claims to have predicted the current low inflation back when the repo rate increases began in 2010 must thus have had much greater insight than all of the Swedish and international analysts. I would rather argue that this instead is a good illustration of the fact that things have happened in the economy, which could not be predicted and which have pushed down inflation in an unexpected manner. Unexpected international economic slowdown in 2011 and even lower inflation in 2013–2014 I would like to give examples of two occasions in recent years when developments have turned out rather differently than expected. The first is the slowdown in international economic activity that became apparent during the second half of 2011. Global growth prospects deteriorated in connection with increased unease over the sovereign debt problems in the United States and euro area. Uncertainty over the future led to increased pessimism among households and companies and also affected the financial markets.

Basing an analysis on such an assumption is therefore not a reasonable way of evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of leaning against the wind. One needs to assume not just that the Riksbank has lied about its motives, but also that well-known and prominent external economic analysts have said one thing but really meant another. Nevertheless, this is the starting point for the counterfactual analysis many appear to rely on when drawing conclusions about the Riksbank’s monetary policy.8 In Sweden, this analysis has been given considerable scope, for instance on Dagens Nyheter newspaper’s editorial pages, where the Riksbank’s policy has been described as more or less incomprehensible and contrary to the prevailing opinion at that time – an ”interest-rate increasing experiment in summer 2010”.9 One might think it is strange that the claim that the Riksbank’s repo-rate increases were only about leaning against the wind, and moreover that the increases were made contrary to prevailing opinion, has become so widely spread. After all, one does not need to make a more in-depth check of the facts than I have provided here to see that neither claim is correct. It doesn’t require very much digging to be able to conclude that not only the Riksbank but also external domestic and international economic analysts found it natural, even after the repo rate had been raised to 2 per cent, that the increases would continue – and this without any particular reference to household debt.
Again, this is significantly lower than pre-crisis – annual growth in unsecured lending was around 12% in the decade before the crisis. But it has picked up quickly and advertised rates on some products are close to historical lows. Much of the increase has been non-credit card unsecured loans such as personal loans and car finance – the majority of car finance is provided by non-banks. And, not surprisingly, alongside the pick-up in secured lending and lower mortgage rates there has been an increase in the growth rate of house prices and a pick-up in housing market activity. After a lull in 2014, house prices are now growing at just under 6% a year – more than twice the rate of earnings growth. Mortgage approvals for house purchase have increased by 10% over the year to an average of 69,000. I do not think that the role of the macroprudential authority should be to control asset prices including house prices. But increases in house prices and housing market activity can give rise to macroprudential concerns. If they are debt financed this can in turn lead to vulnerabilities in bank balance sheets, excessive increases in aggregate debt to income ratios or adverse changes in the distribution of debt. It was this concern that led the FPC in June 2014 to limit the flow of high debt to income mortgages; those limits have not been reached but, as the housing market begins to heat up again it is prudent that they remain in place.

The success of the transition will also depend on our ability to broaden the sources of financing: we should not rely solely on green bonds. We also need more green loans, and more green financing in general, accessible to individuals, SMEs and start-ups. Mobilising this capital raises also some qualitative challenges. An orderly scaling up of green finance requires keeping markets away from green washing practices. The emergence of a new ecosystem of financial “good products”, such as green, social, impact or Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) bonds would appear to be great news. But we should be cautious not to create a confusing diversity of definitions that could undermine the reputation of green markets and impede progress. An EU-wide standard based on high level common principles regarding the management of the funds and impact assessments, articulated with a common green taxonomy is critical to protect market integrity. It would certainly make sense to build, notably on the two most widespread standards: the Green Bond Principles (GBP) and the Climate Bond Initiative (CBI). Page 5 sur 6 2 / Central Banks must also send out the right signal and lead by example in their investment and disclosure policies. We at the Banque de France have adopted in March this year a Charter on Responsible Investment for the management of our own funds and our pension portfolios: this means allocating them to socially and environmentally responsible investment funds.
In the light of experience of this practice, consideration can later be given to do the same for the minutes of meetings of the EFAC. Accountability 26. The third area that requires attention in the political process of monetary management concerns the accountability of the HKMA. Here again, there are certain characteristics peculiar to Hong Kong. Unlike arrangements in other jurisdictions, the HKMA, as the institution responsible for issues generically called central banking, is not a body established by law. The legal entity is the Monetary Authority, as a person, appointed by the Financial Secretary to assist him in the performance of his duties under the Exchange Fund Ordinance. I have the honour of being the person who has been so appointed. That means I am accountable to the Financial Secretary for my actions when exercising the authority delegated to me by the Financial Secretary under the Exchange Fund Ordinance. The Financial Secretary is advised by the EFAC appointed by the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, whose authority has been delegated to the Financial Secretary. 27. It is through the Financial Secretary that the Monetary Authority is accountable to third parties, and the form this takes is determined by the Financial Secretary. If the Financial Secretary wants me to appear before the Legislative Council and formally present a report to the Council every six months, as suggested by some, I am quite happy to do so. But the Financial Secretary must of course make an assessment of whether the implications of such a practice are acceptable.

Erdem Başçi: Recent economic and financial developments in Turkey Speech by Mr Erdem Başçi, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the press conference for the presentation of the October 2013 Inflation Report, Ankara, 31 October 2013. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Welcome to the press conference held to convey the main messages of the Inflation Report. I will now present an overview of the report, which will be published on our website soon. The report typically summarizes the economic outlook underlying monetary policy decisions, shares our evaluations on macroeconomic developments and presents our medium-term inflation forecasts, which were revised in view of the developments in the last quarter, along with our monetary policy stance. In addition to the main text, the report includes ten boxes entailing interesting and up-to-date analyses on various topics. I strongly recommend that you read these boxes, which will soon be published on our website. Now, I would like to convey the main messages of the report. Firstly, I will review the global economic outlook given its undeniable influence on our policies. Global monetary policy developments continued to influence financial markets in the third quarter of the year. Ongoing concerns over global growth led to expectations that the US Federal Reserve might soon start trimming its bond purchases, while the pullback on bond purchases was postponed later on, causing the global risk appetite to remain volatile (Chart 1.1).