samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will not elaborate on Asia, but on Europe, and the European Monetary and Economic Union. **  I. The need for active multilateralism to face our global challenges. Let me start with my first point: the need for active multilateralism to face our global challenges. We have to strive to maintain the collective rules of the game, at international level and with all our partners. In the current context, international cooperation between countries is more important than ever: it is essential to preserving the improvement in the global economic environment. The global recovery has indeed been gathering pace since 2016: according to the latest IMF forecast, global growth should stand at 3.6% in 2017, after 3.2% in 2016, while in Japan real GDP growth should pick up to 1.5% in 2017 after 1.0% in 2016. Moreover, growth in the euro area should reach at least 2.2% this year, reflecting a strong economic recovery. However, there are two major risks threatening growth: financial instability and protectionism. Regarding financial instability, the continued rise in global public and private debt since the start of the 2000s – from 190% of global GDP in 2001 to 230% in 2016 [slide] – has become a subject of concern. The 2008 crisis stemmed from this, but this trend has unfortunately not slowed down since; the private debt in emerging countries (namely corporate debt) has risen particularly rapidly.

But this must not stop us from making progress straightway on the first two accelerators, in order to breathe new life into the Economic Union. These accelerators would contribute to the functions of economic policy, as described by Musgrave:iii allocation, stabilisation and distribution. The allocation function would obviously be the role of the micro accelerator, but also of the fiscal one. The stabilisation function could be ensured mainly by the macro accelerator, but also by the micro one, thanks to enhanced private risk sharing, and possibly by the fiscal one. Finally, a distribution function – if any – could possibly fall to the fiscal accelerator provided that its implementation does not result in a “transfer union” which would be a one-way budget. ** I would like to conclude my speech by quoting Kazuo Ishiguro, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature for 2017 and who was born in Japan: “If you are under the impression you have already […] perfected yourself, you will never rise to the heights you are no doubt capable of.” iv These words could apply to our international cooperation since the crisis, as well as to the European Economic and Monetary Union. Both are undeniable successes and it is well worth emphasising it. But this should not prevent us from making progress towards a better functioning of the Economic Union. I strongly believe that we could achieve something that even today may still be considered unbelievable. Thank you for your attention.
Two of these do not concern me today. They are, first, the provision of intra-day liquidity under the RTGS system and overnight liquidity through the Discount Window, the main objective of which is to ensure the smooth 3  BIS Review 77/1999  functioning of the interbank payment system on a day-to-day, short-term basis; and, secondly, and at the other extreme, longer-term liquidity support or capital support to a probably insolvent bank, the failure of which would have wider implications for the stability of the monetary and financial systems of Hong Kong. The role of lender of last resort which I am addressing today is neither of those, but comes somewhere between the two. It involves the provision of support to banks that are basically solvent but are troubled by short-term funding difficulties. The immediate purpose of such support is to provide some breathing space to allow the institution to implement corrective measures. The overall aims would be, first, to prevent illiquidity in that particular institution from precipitating a situation of insolvency and, secondly, to prevent the contagion to other banks and hence a crisis for the system as a whole. The Legal Framework This crucial consideration, the effect on the system as a whole, brings me to the question of the resources available to the HKMA, and the legal and other limitations placed on the HKMA, in the exercise of its role as lender of last support.

This development, which has been under way for several decades already, has accelerated as a result of the impact of the crisis on births and migratory flows. People over the age of 65, who in 1970 made up less than 10% of the population, currently account for 21% and, according to INE projections, will represent more than a quarter of the Spanish population within 15 years. Currently, two types of adverse effects of this phenomenon on economic growth can be identified. First, population ageing is leading to a reduction in the number of persons prepared to work or seek employment. Second, indirect negative effects of population ageing on productivity, saving and investment decisions and innovation can be identified. As a result, ageing poses enormous challenges for fiscal policy, since a smaller labour force, that is possibly on average less productive, will have to support the vital needs of a growing number of dependent persons. In fact, the scope and consequences of population ageing form the backdrop to the other long-term challenges facing the Spanish economy. Towards a greater use of the labour factor The formulas to combat the effects of demographic developments involve the search for means to achieve a greater use of the labour factor and higher productivity growth. Despite the recovery, employment still stands below its pre-crisis level. The unemployment rate in the first quarter of 2017 was 18.8%, far higher than in the other euro area countries, 5/8  with the exception of Greece.
At the same time, more than 70 percent of total credit was in foreign currency with EURO making the biggest share of the outstanding stock. The tune of that period was the same in the entire region. The overall impression that the financial innovations had reduced the risk and the abundant global liquidity created a very optimistic picture. Despite some truth in this, the pace at which financial intermediation grew annually was frenetically high. In particular there were two main aspects of financial intermediation that were particularly troubling in my opinion. First, economic agents created financial excesses using mostly the financial system. While meeting their needs, the financial system aligns and matches agents’ positions according to length of maturity and liquidity. This holds true under the assumption that all claims and obligation will be fulfilled in timely manner in the same order. Otherwise if they violate this assumption and end up overlapping each other than financial system might become unstable. Our concern was that too many gaps were opening to fast and the Albanian economy seemed to experience some sort of what latter came to be named as risk-taking channel. Second, there appeared to be a general mispricing of risks from the banking sector. High concentration in particular sectors or clients indicated undue risk analysis or risk management from banks, while lending to  2  BIS Review 173/2010  un-hedged borrowers in a flexible exchange rate regime seemed to be a potential moral hazard issue.

A mechanism such as the Vienna initiative that would encourage the commitment of parent banks to their EE subsidiaries and would discourage their financial disintermediation in these countries can be made permanent with added benefits to all the stakeholders. Furthermore, regulatory harmonization can be improved and regulatory arbitrage can be mitigated. On macro-prudential policies I argued on the need to develop specific anchors that would make more credible, transparent and therefore achievable the goal of financial stability. Measuring financial stability, or instability, might be difficult but that should not discourage us from trying. Thank you for your attention. Box 1 Measures taken in the banking supervision area during the pre-crisis period.   On June 2007, the new Law on Banks in the Republic of Albania entered into force. This Law stipulates rigorous principles and rules on the risk management, aiming at protecting the depositors, investors and fostering the banking system’s stability.   On January 2008, the Credit Registry started the operation representing a vital infrastructurerelated development.   On March 2008, the Bank of Albania adopted a package of regulatory amendments which were generally oriented to adopting more conservatory policies in several main directions of day-to-day commercial banking running. In more concrete terms, this therapy can be described:  In compliance with the new Law On Banks in the Republic of Albania, new quantitative thresholds were set for the calculation, supervision and reporting of banks’ large exposures to parent banks and related entities.
In the case of payments, that key risk is money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF), and the balance that we have to strike is to allow new e-wallet businesses to start quickly, but also ensure that ML/TF risks are managed before they get too large. In this context, while KYC continues to be a key requirement, we allowed smaller wallets holding funds of no more than $ to carry out simplified KYC requirements. This framework is similar to those used in other markets like Hong Kong, India, Australia and the UK. Finally, as a market, how do we ensure that e-payments function smoothly with each other and the financial system? Many of us think of smooth functioning as having liquidity 13.  providers in capital markets through volatile periods. That is because capital markets are welloiled systems that interoperate between banks and trading venues, and even among banks. Not so with e-payments. E-payments have grown quickly because they have been able to develop their own systems quickly – but this has resulted in some fragmentation. Although the vast array of 14.  payment solutions offers more choices to consumers and merchants, too much choice is not always a good thing: a. Consumers may end up holding three or four different e-wallets in order to get the best deals from each: one for transport, one for shopping, and another to split bills with friends.

As they say, necessity is the mother of all invention, and nowhere else is this more pressing than in Asia, where a high proportion of unbanked population is concentrated. In 2017, the World Bank found that China, India, Indonesia and Bangladesh alone contributed to one-third of the world’s unbanked adults5. 7 . This has resulted in a well-trodden path among digital businesses in Asia: Build a digital business around something non-financial, say ride-hailing, food delivery, groceries or gaming. Then offer your customers a seamless payment experience through an e-wallet, to pay for the things that they buy from you. Let me offer a few examples: a. In Singapore, Carousell offers an online marketplace for individuals like you and me to sell or buy anything. You take a photo of what you want to sell, the app can recognise items like shoes and suggest an appropriate category, and you post it for sale. They have about 150 million listings today, including cars and property. And they are launching CarouPay to help its customers to pay for all of them. b. Some of you, like a couple of my colleagues, may have come here this morning using the ridehailing service, Grab. It is very convenient. You book the ride, the driver arrives, you reach your destination, you thank your driver, and you are on your way. No money needs to be exchanged with the driver. You don’t even click “pay”.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 9:  Chart 10:  Volatility and correlation of S&P 500  Excess volatility Per cent 20  S&P 500 1Y Correlation 70% 1990 - 2004  Per cent 60  1yr Correltaion (LHS) 15  60%  2005 - 2010  Excess correlation (LHS)  1yr Volatility (RHS)  50% 40%  +  30%  -  40  5 0  30  5  20%  20% 30% 40% S&P 500 1Y volatility  10  15  0% 10%  20  10  10%  0%  50  10  20  50%  0 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08  Source: JP Morgan and Bank calculations. Source: JP Morgan and Bank calculations. Chart 11:  Chart 12:  Simulated price series under different Hurst coefficients  Distribution of simulated returns at different time horizons with H=0.9(a)  H=0.5 H=0.7 H=0.9  40  T=1  20 + 0  T=20 T=50  20 40 60 80 100 Time Source: Bank of England. -  +  Source: Bank of England (a) Returns at different time horizons have been scaled by the inverse of the square root of time, 1/sqrt(T).

And thus, Willem Buiter and Erik Nielsen in their recent paper (2007): “Mundell on His Head: Asymmetric shocks are good for you, thanks to Economic and Monetary Union in Europe”, argue that home bias has been receding in the Eurozone, so an increasing number of households and companies now hold a Euro-wide portfolio. In finance it is good when returns on particular assets are negatively correlated, because it helps you to diversify risk and achieve the better risk-return tradeoff. Therefore, if asymmetric shocks hit monetary union, it will result in negatively correlated returns on euro-zone assets portfolio, so such portfolio holders will be better off in comparison with a scenario of a symmetric negative shock. Of course this train of thought may seem too narrow, since it boils down merely to the capital income analysis and loses sight of other effects of asymmetric shocks, such as those on the labor market situation. Nevertheless, this example provides a clear evidence that our cost and benefit analysis may change every so often in tandem with new ideas that smart people come up with. However, before I proceed, I would like to make two important points. First, I would like to note that views presented here are my own and they do not represent the official position of the National Bank of Poland. Second, my economic background allows me to speak in terms of standard economic variables: output, consumption, prices etc. On the other hand, I do not feel competent to speak about highly immeasurable values like national pride.
It is kept up at the beginning of the period by the fact that unit labour costs, that is, the labour cost per unit produced, has increased relatively quickly in recent years as a result of weak development in productivity. The National Accounts for 2008 point to weaker productivity and a larger increase in unit labour costs than we were expecting at our monetary policy meeting. Moreover, the krona has weakened substantially since the autumn, which is expected to lead to higher imported inflation. You now have to pay more than 9 kronor for a US dollar and more than 11 kronor for a euro. Compared with a basket of currencies belonging to our most important trade partners, what is usually known as the TCW index, the krona has fallen by more than 20 per cent since September. The krona has continued to weaken since the monetary policy meeting. What the weaker GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008, the increased unit labour costs, the weaker krona and other new information means altogether for our assessment of the Swedish economy is something we Executive Board members will have to consider at our next monetary policy meeting on 20 April. I shall now move on to the fourth part of my speech, about current monetary policy in Sweden. The Riksbank has cut the repo rate to 1 per cent and may need to cut it further At the most recent monetary policy meeting on 10 February the Riksbank cut the repo rate to 1 per cent.

With better understanding, the likelihood of a Shariah convergence is higher and this will enable the creation and trading of Islamic financial instruments at the international arena to be more universally accepted, as interpretations will be uniform and consistent. Harmonisation of the differing views among the scholars from different schools of thought is necessary to enhance the global development of Islamic banking and finance. I believe, at this juncture, the right approach is to advocate mutual respect in any Shariah discourse where there are differences in opinions, interpretations and practices. To complement the efforts to create a sustainable and comprehensive Islamic financial system, consumer education and awareness on Islamic banking and finance should be extensively undertaken. Concerted efforts between the governments and Islamic financial fraternities should be engaged to develop such a consumer education programme. Such programmes would increase transparency on the virtues and availability of Islamic financial instruments offered by the Islamic financial institutions. How consumers can expect to benefit will depend on how well informed they are about the financial services being provided. Barriers across geographical boundaries can be removed by leveraging upon the advances on Information Communication Technology to create an integrated internet platform as means for the knowledge sharing on research findings, conference discussions, Shariah rulings and other vital information on Islamic banking and finance. Improvements can be made to the existing internet portals to be more comprehensive with linkages to other useful information providers. Equally important is the consumer protection infrastructure.
This is understandable, given that many of them have already made progress towards adopting the euro. But we have also heard clear words of caution. Let me take the opportunity to emphasise that the euro area is not a closed shop. Following three enlargement rounds since the start of monetary union in January 1999, and with Slovakia joining the euro area as its 16th member on 1 January 2009, there is no reason to believe that the door might one day be closed. But there is no shortcut. In fact, the difficulties that some countries face today are related to their failures to adjust, failures that go back a long way. As a result, domestic and external imbalances have emerged, with adverse effects on the sustainability of the catching-up processes in those countries. The fast introduction of the euro would not resolve the underlying problems – but could weaken EMU. Structural adjustments as well as nominal and real convergence are therefore needed prior to the adoption of the euro. This means that the countries concerned must achieve a sustainable level of nominal convergence at high standards in terms of meeting the convergence criteria. The adoption of the euro without adjustment is not possible. To regard entry into EMU as an easy way to solve or circumvent the current challenges surrounding the catching-up processes would be wrong. And a premature entry might aggravate current problems and put the credibility of EMU at risk.

Jürgen Stark: Closing address at the Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference Speech by Mr Jürgen Stark, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference “The Euro at Ten: Lessons and Challenges”, Frankfurt am Main, 14 November 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen I wish to thank all of you for joining this 5th ECB Central Banking Conference here in Frankfurt. It has been a privilege for us – and here I am speaking also on behalf of my colleagues on the Executive Board of the ECB – to host this event, with such distinguished panellists and participants during this busy and extremely difficult time. In my view, the past one and a half days have been a great success. Your expertise, experience and thought-provoking ideas, as well as your contributions to the discussions have enriched the intellectual and political debate on monetary union in Europe – its achievements, its challenges and its future. It has not been the aim of this conference to celebrate the ECB and its achievements. However, it is worth recalling that, contrary to what was expected by a number of critical observers in the run-up to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the euro has been a remarkable achievement. Let me also remind you in this context that the ECB is obliged to maintain price stability.
However, Norges Bank’s tasks have otherwise varied over time. We manage the Norwegian oil fund, which was a natural step in light of Norges Bank’s management of foreign exchange reserves. The fund will not, however, be one of the topics of my speech today. 3 The origins of Norges Bank Norges Bank was established in 1816 as a limited liability company, privately owned but under the control of the Storting. It was Norway’s first bank. The Napoleonic Wars had been costly for Denmark and eventually led to hyperinflation. In order to secure confidence in the new specie daler, Norges Bank had to be independent. 4 The intention was to make it difficult  2  A. Cukierman (2008), “Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions – Past, Present and Future”, European Journal of Political Economy, 24 pp 722–36. 3  For a discussion of the Government Pension Fund Global, see Gjedrem (2010): “Perspectives on managing the Government Pension Fund Global”, lecture at the Norwegian Polytechnic Society, 2 November 2010. 4  See also Carsten Smith (1980):”Bankrett og statsstyre” [Banking law and public governance], p. 39: “Det klassiske system internasjonalt sett har vært å knytte penge- og kredittpolitikken til en selvstendig stillet sentralbank [The classic system internationally has been to assign monetary and credit policy to an independent central bank].” Universitetsforlaget. 2  BIS Review 154/2010  for the government and the Storting to influence the central bank. The Bank’s headquarters were located in Trondheim, a 12-day journey from the capital.

The reason is that the inflation target, which is governed by regulation in pursuance of other provisions of the Act, provides the central bank with a suitable mandate. The central bank is no longer a limited liability company as it was until 1985, but a separate legal entity owned by the state. The central bank shall submit matters of special importance to the Ministry of Finance before making a decision. Although this submission arrangement gives the Ministry of Finance an opportunity to state its views, and obliges Norges Bank to consider them, it does not relieve Norges Bank of the full responsibility for its decisions. The text of the Act does not specify which matters are not only important, but of special importance. The preparatory works of the Act provide little guidance today. When the Act was under preparation, the interest rate was not a policy instrument, but had the nature of being an end in itself. It was rarely changed, and then only in critical situations for the Norwegian economy. In the period of exchange rate management in the 1990s, changes in the key rate were also linked to large currency inflows or outflows that might indicate substantial imbalances in our economy. In the past 10–12 years this has changed completely. Norges Bank operates a target set by the government authorities, and interest rate changes are nearly always small and rarely come as a surprise to economic agents.