samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At times where there was still high uncertainty, and there was a higher demand for safety and liquidity, the long-term interest rates of various public instruments in Chile went to record lows. As this uncertainty faded, the precautionary demand followed suit, pushing up long-term interest rates in pesos and in UF until the end of May. In the last couple of months, because of a string of episodes of higher and lower doubts about the true strength of the global recovery, long-term interest rates have fluctuated, but always above the levels of early this year. A similar pattern has been seen in long-term interest rates around the world (figure 2). We are not indifferent to the evolution of long-term interest rates. This is evident from the facts that, to enhance our last monetary policy measure, we have not only begun providing liquidity at the current MPR level for up to six months, but we have also suspended issues of instruments at one to two years’ terms. Furthermore, we permanently take into consideration bond issuance plans of the Treasury before defining our own programs. Nonetheless, it is necessary to undertake a careful analysis of the long-term interest rate levels to properly assess their implications. After all, very low long-term rates are a symptom of depressed prospects for long-term growth and strong demand for safety.

And I would like to share with you that some banks have launched what we may call a “pre-vetting” process for account opening. This means an applicant may request to first submit the documentation and information required for opening an account to the bank by mail, fax or email, and the bank will “pre-screen” or “pre-vet” them before arranging the applicant to have a face-to-face meeting in Hong Kong. I trust this change in process flow would be welcome by customers based overseas. 8. We are also working closely with the industry to explore the use of technology to enhance the efficiency of account opening processes, such as KYC Utilities (“KYCU”) and technology to allow remote account opening. You may have heard about KYCU, which are third-party platforms that aim to manage data as a strategic asset across banks to reduce duplication and cost and assist banks in making decisions, on all types of risks, including but not limited to AML, and as a result to make smarter business decisions. For example, a single source of customer data or documents would remove the need of a customer to provide KYC documentation to every bank, and may shorten the turnaround time for new account opening. We have had a number of discussions with major banks and relevant technology providers and steps have already been taken by both the HKMA and some major banks to take this work forward.
But an appreciably weaker development of consumption, which was a prominent component of one of the alternative scenarios, seems to have become somewhat less probable. Exchange rate The Riksbank does not target the exchange rate. The monetary policy target is price stability. But the exchange rate does feature as one important factor in the Riksbank’s assessment of inflation in the coming two years. The exchange rate conditions demand in the economy, particularly in the export sector, and also affects inflation directly in the form of import prices. The latter, more immediate effect is, however, transitory and of secondary interest provided it does not influence inflation expectations and thereby price and wage setting behaviour. An assessment of future inflation therefore requires a forecast or judgement of the exchange rate in the coming two years, yet this is a variable that is notoriously difficult to predict and has fluctuated widely for Sweden since 1992. A natural starting point for this is the current exchange rate together with an estimate of what a reasonable long-term level might be in relation to competitiveness, financial saving, etc. The past six months provides an example of how the argument might go. Since October 1996 the krona’s effective exchange rate has weakened by about 7 per cent. Most of this change stems from the appreciation of sterling and the US dollar against currencies in continental Europe (Diagram 6).

The third is that the Bank of Thailand will begin integrating the depository system as well as the clearing and settlement system for all debt instruments with the TSD under a multi-year migration plan. This is aimed at enhancing market efficiency and reducing transaction costs in the debt market. The integrated system will also provide an important foundation for future regional linkages of the clearing and settlement system. Fourth is the development of hedging instruments. With the current upward trend in domestic interest rates, hedging instruments particularly interest rate swaps will provide the bond market with additional instruments that will be useful in an environment of market volatilities. The interest rate swaps market can help diversify and reallocate risk among various groups of bondholders. The fifth focus is our plan to improve the functioning of primary dealers as market makers. This is to say that their obligations and privileges will be reviewed so that they will be in a strong position to perform their functions as market makers. And the sixth is the ongoing project to strengthen the regional bond market through the Asian Bond Funds Project. For the past years, development of the local and regional bond markets has been given an unprecedented emphasis by various regional fora. The most notable is the launching of ABF1 project by eleven EMEAP central banks. That efforts is now being followed by the ABF2 project.
Macroprudential policy As you all know, a macroprudential authority (AMCESFI) has been in place in Spain since the start of the year. Its main task involves contributing to the coordination and exchange of information on financial stability-related aspects between the Banco de España, the Ministry of the Economy and Enterprise, the National Securities Market Commission and the Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds. In parallel, the supervision of the financial system as a whole has been bolstered by the extension of the macroprudential tools available to the sectoral supervisory authorities. Some of these new tools, in particular those of the Banco de España based on borrowers’ ability to pay, aim to prevent an excessive easing in lending standards on the part of banks and to contribute to the sustainability of household and corporate debt. These new instruments complement those already being used by the Banco de España: the countercyclical capital buffer, the systemic risk buffer and the buffer for systemically important institutions, among others. Overall, this new institutional framework and the attendant powers mark progress and the strengthening of financial stability in Spain. In fact, in my opinion1, the introduction of macroprudential policy instruments to complement monetary and fiscal policy is probably one of the most significant advances in the wake of the international financial crisis. For countries which, like Spain, belong to a monetary union, these tools are particularly important. They are some of the few instruments available in the national realm to ensure the stability of the domestic financial system.

The paper, written while they were both working in the New York Fed's Research Group in the mid-1990s, formed the basis of many internal discussions in 1999-2000 and 2006-2007 as the U.S. yield curve inverted.11 Much of the internal discussion was around trying to understand whether the properties of the yield curve were different. The current estimate from this model is a 23.6 percent chance that the U.S. economy will be in an NBER-defined recession in January 2020. Just like Tetlock, Arturo liked to extremize the results of the model, so for example a probability of at or above 30 percent is moved to 100 percent and below 30 percent is moved to zero. One reason to extremize the results is that the prediction object is a recession in one particular month, rather than the probability of a recession over a period of time. Marcelle Chauvet and I analyzed this more general problem.12 Our goal was to avoid the problem with the probit model that a constant forecast of, for example, a 25 percent probability that the economy will be in 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  recession in 12 months' time implying after one year of such monthly predictions a 97 percent probability the economy would be in a recession in at least one month of the 12. This is similar to the issue I mentioned earlier, where some of the superforecasters appear to have had difficulty calibrating their probability assessments over varying time horizons.
The largest hedge funds typically have assets under management of less than $ the largest banks assets in excess of $ trillion. Unlike banking, concentration in the hedge fund sector is low and has been falling. The top 5 hedge funds comprise around 8% of total assets, down from 30% a decade ago (Chart 10). Unlike banking, the business models of hedge funds are typically specialised rather than diversified. And unlike banking, entry and exit rates from the hedge fund industry are both high. The annual average attrition rate for hedge funds is around 5%. At present, it is around double that. Among US banks, the average attrition rate over the past few decades has been less than 0.1%; it has not come close to hitting 5% at any point since the Great Depression. It may be coincidence that the structure of the hedge fund sector emerged in the absence of state regulation and state support. It may be coincidence that the majority of hedge funds operate as partnerships with unlimited liability. It may be coincidence that, despite their moniker of “highly-leveraged institutions”, most hedge funds today operate with leverage less than a tenth that of the largest global banks. Or perhaps it might be that the structure of this sector delivered greater systemic robustness than could be achieved through prudential regulation. If so, that is an important lesson for other parts of the financial system. 18  King (2009), Dudley (2009). 19  King (2009). 20  For example, Kay (2009), G30 (2009).

BIS Review 139/2009  9  (b)  Redesigning the safety net  •  A framework for the banking safety net: Even with systemic risk reduced, the state is unlikely to be able credibly to stand aside when future tail risks eventuate, as they are sure to do. Some bulwark is needed. As in other public policy arena, a predefined and transparent regime can help reinforce the credibility of ex-post actions, serving as a pre-commitment device. At present, only some of the ingredients of such an ex-ante framework exist. Internationally, deposit insurance frameworks tend to be fairly well-defined; liquidity insurance frameworks somewhat less so. Both are much better defined than frameworks for capital insurance. A well-articulated framework for the banking safety net would not only provide greater clarity on each of these pieces. It would also set out interactions and interdependencies between them – when and how the different insurance strands come together to avert crisis. At present, no such ex-ante map exists. Having one in future would not guarantee, but could only increase, the chances of it being adhered to. •  Time-consistent liquidity insurance: Almost all central banks have flexed their liquidity frameworks during the course of this crisis. And rightly so. In many cases, this has meant a combination of longer-maturity lending to a broader range of financial institutions against a wider set of collateral. Pre-crisis liquidity insurance frameworks were shown during crisis to lack time-consistency. How can we best guard against a recurrence? Two elements are key.
has noted that climate change may result in physical and transition risks that could impact the 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  safety and soundness of individual financial institutions and have broader financial stability implications for the banking system. In response, the Committee established the TFCR to undertake work on climate-related financial risks in February of 2020. I am acting as a co-chair of the Task Force, along with Frank Elderson, Executive Director of Supervision at the Netherlands Bank. In the first phase of work, the TFCR conducted a stock-take of members’ existing regulatory and supervisory initiatives on climate-related financial risks.3 This work highlighted the increasing focus on climate-related risks. To take the work forward, the TFCR is following a gradual and sequential approach from a banking supervisory perspective with a current focus on understanding climate risk transmission channels, as well as methodologies for measuring and assessing these risks. The TFCR plans to complete these fundamental research initiatives by mid-2021. Building on this analytical work, the TFCR will then consider the extent to which climate-related financial risks are incorporated in the existing Basel Framework and identify effective supervisory practices to mitigate such risks. The TFCR does not currently have a view on potential prudential treatments or supervisory expectations related to the mitigation of climate-related financial risks.

Ravi Menon: MAS Marks 50 Years Serving Singapore Welcome remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at MAS 50th Anniversary Partners Appreciation Evening, 7 October 2021. * * * Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Chairman and Board Members of MAS, ESM Goh Chok Tong, Friends and Family of MAS Welcome to the MAS’ 50th Anniversary Partners Appreciation Evening – the first in a series of events to commemorate our Golden Jubilee. This evening is a time for thanksgiving. There are about 50 of us here at the MAS Building and about 800 friends and family joining us virtually. This includes our friends from the financial industry, consumer and governance groups, tripartite partners, academic institutions, and international organisations. And of course, our family – past and present staff and leaders of MAS and our colleagues in the broader Public Service. This is a special occasion for me personally. I joined MAS in 1987 and have spent most of my professional career here. So much of what I have learnt and how I have evolved, I owe it to the many bosses and colleagues I worked with in MAS over the years. MAS was already a highly competent organisation in 1987, and I have seen it grow over the decades to become what it is today – a central bank and financial regulator highly regarded among its international peers and the global financial industry.
The more certain assessments are about future interest rate developments, the lower risk premiums that investors will require to purchase short-term, interest-bearing treasury paper, for instance, or the banks to lend money to businesses and households. Great uncertainty leads to macroeconomic costs such as lower investments and higher costs for central government debt. There is therefore a wish not only on the part of the participants in the financial market but also from the Riksbank to be as clear as possible about the factors underlying monetary policy decisions. However, absolutely most important is to make the inflation target credible since that controls the long-term interest rates. However, it is important to be as clear as possible about the conduct of monetary policy in the short term to avoid unnecessary uncertainty. But this does not mean that we can remove the uncertainty that actually exists about future developments. We continuously evaluate our previous assessments when new information and statistics are received. And we continuously develop our methods and models and may, when we have received new information, be obliged to re-evaluate earlier conclusions. This was the case, for instance, in the spring when we revised our assessments about the output gap. The conclusion of that is that the interest rate path cannot be announced in advance and even less that we can undertake to supply the interest rate decisions that the market participants sometimes consider that we have given indications of.

Jacqueline Loh: Shanghai and Singapore - synergies amidst a dynamic Asian financial landscape Keynote address by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Second Shanghai-Singapore Financial Forum, Shanghai, 30 November 2016. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen Introduction 1 Good afternoon, it is my pleasure to join you at the 2nd Shanghai-Singapore Financial Forum (SSFF). 2 In November last year, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the Shanghai Municipal Financial Services Office (Shanghai FSO) launched the inaugural SSFF. That was a significant and important milestone. As the Chinese saying goes, 二人同心，其利断金. The SSFF is more than just a forum. It is a reflection and commemoration of the longstanding relationship and cooperation between Shanghai and Singapore. Following last year’s success, both sides are keen to build on the good momentum achieved and bring our relationship to a higher plane. 3 The aspirations of both the MAS and Shanghai FSO are reflected in the theme for this year: “Shanghai and Singapore – A Partnership for a New Asian Financial Landscape” . Our hope is that both cities can work together to forge a stronger, more future-ready partnership ahead. This is important for both Shanghai and Singapore, which are international financial centres in the midst of a rapidly evolving Asian financial landscape. 4 Let me outline briefly what we have achieved together so far and highlight the synergies that we see ahead for both Shanghai and Singapore. I.
What laws can I – what do we need to put on the books to protect communities like this? Liberty and other organizations, research organizations, that you guys have can come up with some of these things. I look forward to speaking with you later today. President Dudley: Okay. On this issue of predatory lending, I mean this is – I think you raised a very good point, and this is something that we actually heard about small business lending when we were up I think in the Bronx awhile back, where, basically, people have these come-ons to lend money to small business, and it seems attractive on the surface, but it turns out that the actual rate of interest that people are paying is prohibitive to be able to run a successful business. So, I think the predatory lending thing is a completely important issue that we do need to address. Obviously, the Small Business Administration can play a role in this. I think we would certainly be interested in having a conversation about it, because I think it is a really serious issue. I mean one of the problems, just more broadly, is financial literacy in the United States. Part of the reason that predatory lending can work is because people don’t really have a good idea –they don’t know enough about the financial system, about the economy, about what’s a good value or not.

Banks, as you know, are reluctant to lend to start up businesses because the firms don’t have collateral to pledge against the loans, and they don’t have a track record of experience. So CDFIs are really the group that can provide that lifeblood to small business enterprises at the start-up stage. It’s also very resource-intensive to lend to small businesses, so the economics don’t work very well for a for-profit company. So, I’m a big fan of CDFIs. We think it’s really an important avenue, especially in less developed areas where getting a small business well-established can create local jobs which can create a virtuous circle in terms of economic development. So, this is something that we definitely want to encourage over time, and anything that we can do to be helpful – we try to partner with the CFI community to be helpful, in terms of providing data, information. We have a lot of very detailed information about the local economies and we can be, I think, helpful in actually providing some information and support to the CDFIs. Audience Member: Good morning. I want to thank you for coming here and sharing some information with us. I have two specific questions I wanted to ask. A lot of us, we’ve already talked about access to capital, which is a huge thing. For those who don’t know, Sen. Sanders is the ranking Democrat on the Banking Committee for New York State.
I have therefore recently suggested to the Hong Kong Association of Banks that it would be timely to review the manner in which workouts operate in Hong Kong. I will close by pulling together some of lessons that can be drawn from our experience during this difficult period. The Asian crisis has demonstrated weaknesses in banks’ credit controls and even Hong Kong has not been immune from these. Improvements need to be made to deal  5  BIS Review 53/1999  with the aftermath of the crisis and to reduce the chances of similar problems in the future. The key points I would recommend to the banks are as follows: •  Be clear about your lending strategy, including how much risk, and what types of risk, you are prepared to undertake. •  Know your customer, his business and, to the extent possible, his other financial commitments. •  Keep track of what your lending is actually being used for. •  Lend on the basis of cash flow rather than collateral. •  Maintain an effective early warning system for problem loans and make sure that the loan portfolio is properly graded. •  Devote sufficient resources to debt recovery and make sure that your workout staff are properly trained. •  Approach debt workouts in the right spirit of compromise and consensus. These are very basic messages that should be familiar to any prudent lending banker.

We look forward to hearing your views. Why achieving net zero requires action from everyone, including central banks 2020 was a global catastrophe. 3 million lives tragically lost to Covid.2 The worst decline in output since World War 2 globally, and the Great Frost of 1709 in the UK.3 Working hours slashed by the equivalent of 255 million jobs.4 And children’s education cut by at least a quarter.5  Even hardened optimists would struggle to find a silver lining in all of that. But, unintentionally, 2020 did achieve at least one extraordinary thing: it showed us just how big the challenge of tackling climate change  1  Sesame Street: It's Not Easy Being Green (Kermit's Song) - YouTube WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard | WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard With Vaccination Data https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WEO/2021/April/English/Ch1.ashx and https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/statistics/research-datasets/a-millennium-of-macroeconomic-data-for-theuk.xlsx?la=en&hash=73ABBFB603A709FEEB1FD349B1C61F11527F1DE4 4 wcms_767028.pdf (ilo.org) 5 https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WEO/2021/April/English/Ch1.ashx 2 3  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  really is. Last year, as a result of all of that turmoil – air travel down by two thirds;6 road miles halved7 – global fossil CO2 emissions fell by 7%.8 That may not sound like much. But it’s the biggest fall for over a century (Chart 1).