samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For instance, the creation of the off-balance sheet vehicles at the centre of the recent market turbulence may be seen in part as a response to the crude regime for capital charges established under the original Basel Accord, under which liquidity facilities under a year in maturity were exempt. That is being remedied under Basel II. But it is a reminder that we need to be very careful to watch for these distortions in the regulation and oversight of payment systems and other infrastructures, so as to ensure that we do not inadvertently alter incentives in a way that may hamper the future development of the landscape. 42 This issue arises for example in the context of the establishment of ESCB-CESR standards for securities settlement systems. The Bank of England supports the principle of risk-based functional regulation, which implies that regulatory standards should be applied to a function – such as settlement – regardless of the status of the institution providing that function. We hope that further moves towards implementation will adhere to this principle, thereby establishing a level regulatory playing field at least between CSDs and ICSDs, but ideally also between traditional infrastructures and commercial banks offering infrastructural services. 43 Finally, with a wider spectrum of participants, issues arise around the way in which members interface with infrastructures. It is important to ensure that individual member behaviour cannot threaten the smooth-functioning of the system.

Chairperson, there can be no true development in our Bank without good and effective leadership. Leadership is required for us to achieve our objectives. We live in a dynamic world which calls for good leadership dedicated to hardwork, daily learning , fast thinking and acting swiftly and prudently at all times. Ladies and gentlemen, you will recall that not too long ago, we were all involved in the review of the Bank’s strategic plan and came up with the 2009–2012 Strategic Plan. In order to fully implement the goals and objectives of our strategic plan we need to enhance our leadership skills. It is against this background that this workshop was organised. Our desire is to constantly upgrade our leadership skills for the attainment of our goals and objectives even in the face of daunting challenges. In conclusion, I wish to urge you to actively participate and take a keen interest in the deliberations of this workshop. It is our expectation that you will have an opportunity to carry out an appraisal of your individual leadership style and refine it in order to impact positively on policy and the way the Bank operates. With these few remarks, it is my pleasure to declare the workshop officially open and to wish you all fruitful deliberations. I thank you! 2  BIS Review 107/2010
More importantly, while we adhere to the macroeconomic framework it will shield the economy when oil prices fall and our terms of trade are reversed. Thank you for your attention! BIS Review 30/2006  5

At the moment, there is no structured response to address the financial education needs in Zambia. There are currently some financial educational programmes being conducted by financial institutions, including the Bank of Zambia, but these are generally limited in scope and are not being implemented in a coordinated manner. These un-coordinated initiatives leave gaps that can properly be addressed through the development and implementation of a cohesive financial education strategy. Ladies and gentlemen, with this realization, the Bank of Zambia, with financial assistance from the Financial Education Fund under the United Kingdom Department For International Development (DFID), is taking the leadership role in identifying and developing a national financial education strategy that will be cohesive for the country. As the formulation of both the first and second phases of the FSDP was done through a national stakeholder consultative process, we have taken a similar approach in the development of our national strategy on financial literacy. The FSDP process has already built a wide network of stakeholders, and a platform of institutional and individual membership through its working groups and committees which can take this agenda forward. We believe that the multi-stakeholder consultative process is a critical component of the strategy. Distinguished Guests, let me give you a few examples of how the consultative process has shaped the success of financial literacy strategies in other countries. In the United Kingdom, the country’s national strategy is led by the Financial Services Authority.
By helping to build institutional and human capacity for the making of sound economic policies, IMF technical assistance contributes to the building of strong economies and stable growth. The IMF’s purposes, and its operational activities, were therefore designed with a key objective in mind – that is, the fostering of healthy national economies, linked by finance and trade, as the foundation for a robust global economic system. I think it correct to say that this vision for international peace and stability has produced remarkable results, for the past fifty years have been a period of growing economic prosperity and freedom. Global per capita income has more than tripled, and most of the world has experienced major improvements in literacy and life expectancy. Among the biggest gainers have been the developing nations, home to half of the world’s population. Many of them have been quick to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the global economy, especially during the last two decades. These countries – whose ranks include Brazil, Chile, China, India, Korea, and Mexico – were able to double their share in world trade, raise per capita incomes, and lift millions out of poverty. Their experience demonstrates that integration into the global economy can bring major benefits. The IMF’s evolution The world has witnessed many changes and developments – in technology, politics, culture, as well as economics – over the years, and the IMF has adapted itself accordingly.

Some issues which may warrant closer examination include: •  Ensuring that resources in the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility – our main lending instrument for developing countries – remain adequate to meet future demands;  •  New ways to help low-income countries deal with economic shocks;  •  In the case of low-income countries which do not need or want IMF lending, how to enhance the IMF’s role in signaling to others the strength of these countries’ policies;  •  The role of the Fund in supporting low-income countries’ poverty reduction strategies; and  •  Our relationship with donors and aid agencies. As a partner of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the IMF is committed to supporting countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and reach the Millennium Development Goals. Our unique position gives us the potential to contribute to building both pillars of the Monterrey Consensus. On one side, we can work with countries to design policies and build institutions that will help them grow out of poverty. On the other, we can advocate for more and better international support, and help with its coordination. Nevertheless, examining the issues highlighted earlier will help frame a better understanding of the areas of low-income country work for which the IMF can take responsibility, and those that will fall to other institutions and actors. It would be helpful to have greater definition in this area as we approach the U.N. Millennium Summit in September. Fifth, the IMF’s internal governance and management.
That situation changed – virtually overnight – to one characterised by a lack of liquidity and a re-evaluation of the pricing of risk, and this resulted in substantially increased interest rate premia. Banks became especially careful in their transactions with one another, and a considerable tightening of interbank markets ensued the world over. Central banks on both sides of the Atlantic reacted by granting special liquidity facilities with virtually unprecedented amounts and maturities. As the end of the year approached, conditions in the interbank markets improved markedly, though they were still far from their prior state. On the other hand, the fundamentals of important financial undertakings became an ever greater source of concern. The general economic outlook deteriorated significantly, spurring greater pessimism in the global equity markets. Iceland certainly did not escape the effects of these global developments. Here in Iceland, those developments emerged in the form of higher interest rate premia, shrinking credit supply, and risk aversion. Risk aversion means, among other things, that companies and regions at the periphery – if it can be expressed that way – feel the effects of the changes more than others do. This periphery includes Iceland and its banks. Among Icelandic banks, these changed conditions emerge most clearly in wide CDS spreads.

But the change was small, and then CDS spreads increased once again, as they did for many banks. The fact that Moody’s announced a change in its outlook for the banks’ credit ratings was no help. To some degree, the sizeable CDS spreads arise from suspicion vis-à-vis Icelandic banks. In their penetration into new markets, Iceland’s banks have doubtless threatened competitors that were established in those markets and were subjected to stiff competition as a result. Perhaps it also matters that Iceland’s banks are in a peripheral area and that such banks are generally subjected to higher premia than are banks in large countries. The size of the banks in comparison with the national economy is doubtless a factor as well. Otherwise, higher premia could be explained by the fact that in recent years Iceland’s banks sought out credit in the global bond market. When conditions for such transactions were most beneficial, there was considerable demand for the banks’ bonds because they were considered to fit unusually well with the various CDOs that were then popular among investors. They generated relatively good yields, especially given the banks’ credit ratings. Conditions have changed dramatically, and there is no longer a demand for such instruments. It would seem that many of them are unwinding – that is, that bonds are being sold off, including bonds from Icelandic banks.
In this work, all of the public authorities use the National Institute of Economic Research’s forecasts for economic developments. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The Riksbank’s profits and dividends 1988–2018 SEK billion  Sources: The National Institute of Economic Research and the Riksbank  This development is not unique to the Riksbank. Many of those who have invested in bonds will face losses when interest rates rise. Those that are hit the hardest will be the central banks that have applied what is known as quantitative easing in recent years, that is, they have bought large volumes of bonds with long maturities to stimulate the economy. The fact that the Riksbank makes losses in turn means that the bank will not be able to pay dividends to the government for some years. As the dividend payment is based on the results from the past five years, it will decline with a time lag, and the forecast at the moment is that we will pay two further dividends before the losses take over and the dividend payments become zero. This is of course a setback for the government’s income. And as the dividends cannot be negative when the Riksbank makes a loss, the bank must bear the losses, which will reduce our equity. As we have equity of a good SEK 100 billion, we can manage this without any infringement of our financial independence. The Riksbank is financially strong I have now described how the Riksbank’s balance sheet has changed over the past ten years.

The Riksbank has deliberately altered its balance sheet in recent years, but there are also changes in our environment that have affected the balance sheet, leading to its current composition. The way the balance sheet looks, combined with the developments in interest rates and yields on the Riksbank’s assets and liabilities also have decisive significance for the Riksbank’s capacity to make a profit. We need to understand the Riksbank’s balance sheet to be able to understand the connections. How has the balance sheet developed over time? And what do we think will happen to it in the future? How does our current balance sheet affect the Riksbank’s possibilities to make a profit? In conclusion, I intend to comment on the current situation with very low international interest rates, and what will happen if (or rather when) interest rates begin to rise. What will this entail for the Riksbank’s possibilities of making a profit? BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The Riksbank’s measures are reflected in the balance sheet The Riksbank thus does not have the aim to make a profit, but the bank’s possibilities to make profits are nevertheless very important. They are connected to the Riksbank being able to conduct its monetary policy independent of the government and parliament. The Riksbank needs to be financially independent to do this in a credible manner.
The failure of domestic food prices to decline in line with trends abroad in recent months is a case in point and suggests the presence of market imperfections. The harmful effect of such  7  A similar analysis is presented by Papademos, Lucas, Determinants of growth and the role of structural reforms and macroeconomic policies in Europe, a speech delivered at the 2004 Ludwig Erhard Lecture on the State of the European Economy at the Lisbon Council’s Board of Economists in December 2004 and in a box entitled Labour utilization and economic convergence, published in the Central Bank of Malta, Quarterly Review 2008:2, pages 46-48. 4  BIS Review 60/2009  rigidities is magnified when nominal wages are partly indexed to consumer prices, as they are in Malta, because temporary price shocks can lead to permanent wage and price deviations from the euro area average. The wage determination process must, therefore, give equal importance to achieving offsetting gains in productivity in order not to jeopardize competitiveness and employment creation. This is a vital requirement because Malta is already at a disadvantage given that since 2000 unit labour costs have risen by some 22% compared with an average of 15% in the euro area. Failure to maintain low levels of inflation is also detrimental in the short term. Consumers in several euro area economies are currently experiencing increases in real purchasing power as a result of falling price levels.

6  BIS Review 62/2008  Many schemes rely on a mutual responsibility, where the remaining banks will come up with the financing to cover the insured depositors of a failed bank, in some cases relying on a fund which has been built up in advance. This works fine as long as it is only small banks that suffer problems. However, if a larger bank is affected, there is a risk that the problems will spread as other banks are forced to contribute substantial funds from their own balance sheets. Given that many markets are very concentrated, with a few banks dominating the market, the failure of the largest banks will be difficult to finance in these kinds of mutual systems. Particularly vulnerable are the kind of small private schemes which rely solely on the remaining banks coming up with money after a failure. The deposit guarantee can then rather become a destabilising factor without the problem bank necessarily needing to be a particularly important actor in the payment system or on the financial markets. Clearly, you want to avoid a situation where government intervention may be necessary simply because of a poorly designed deposit guarantee system. A solution to the problem was put forward in a Swedish government enquiry a few years ago. The trick is to make the banks internalise the cost of the guarantee not at the industry level, but at the level of the individual bank.
Norway has had room for manoeuvre because solid state finances secure credibility and because inflation expectations are firmly anchored. Even though oil prices fell from close to USD 150 per barrel in summer 2008 to almost USD 30 at the end of the year, Norway’s state finances were not called into question. In addition, oil prices increased markedly as early as spring last year. The oil fund mechanism curbs the effects of oil price fluctuations on demand and output – as well as on inflation and the krone exchange rate. The Government Pension Fund Global is also an important source of funding for public spending in the next decades. Reductions in government welfare spending, which will probably be a matter of necessity with an increasingly ageing population, will be smaller than would have been the case without the fund. 10  BIS Review 69/2010  5. Challenges to the Norwegian economy  In the period 1992–2008 the Norwegian economy experienced a long upturn. In the 2000s, the cost level started to rise, partly reflecting a sharp improvement in our terms of trade. Prices for Norwegian goods, such as oil, gas, metals, minerals and fish increased sharply while import prices fell. Looking ahead, the impact of these driving forces cannot be expected to be as favourable. It is hardly likely that export prices will show a renewed surge. Moreover, our economy has become vulnerable. Norwegian labour has never been as costly as today.

The non-oil sector exports were valued at about $ billion in 2006 and constituted almost 6.0 percent of total GDP and 13.2 percent of non-oil GDP. During 2006, the national economy continued its remarkable growth for the fourth consecutive year, especially in the non-oil sector which grew by 6.2 percent following its growth rate of 5.2 percent in 2005. The non-oil industrial sector was the fastest growing sector of the economy recording a robust growth of 10.1 percent during the preceding year. The sector has continued its robust growth during the current year. Due to higher economic growth and receipt of higher than anticipated revenues, the fiscal position of the government has improved substantially in recent years. The budget surpluses since 2003 have enabled the government to reduce its domestic debt sharply and increase its expenditure on infrastructure and social sectors. The ratio of domestic debt to GDP has declined from 82 percent in 2003 to 27.9 percent in 2006 which was reflected positively on our public finance and macroeconomic stability. These trends are likely to continue against the oil revenue cushion and fiscal discipline along with continuous expansion of the economy. The foregoing policy initiatives, combined with the recent budgetary surpluses have enabled us to launch a number of key development projects that are designed to develop the county's physical and social infrastructure, especially spending on education and training, diversifying the economy, creating jobs and enhancing growth prospects.
Page 21 of 27  Dec  Figure 15 Investments committed for next five years (CBC) (4)  Capital goods imports and IPSA (1)(2)  (billions of dollars)  (thousands of dollars of 2013; million of dollars of 2013) 14  Real IPSA (t+7)  Capital goods imports and IPSA (1)(2)  1,700  50 45  12  1,500  10  1,300  40 35 30  8  1,100  6  900  4  700  2  500  25 20 15 10  08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21  5  0 18  II  III  IV  19  II  III  IV  20  II  III  IV  21  (1) Quarterly moving averages. (2) Series deflated by the capital goods import price index, with base year 2013=100. Spliced with the base year 2008=100 series using annual changes. For second quarter, data for the first quarter of that year are repeated. (3) Excludes other transport vehicles. (4) Four-quarter moving average. For each version of the CBC survey, includes 5-year forecasts, considering the current year. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg, and Capital Goods Corporation (CBC).

Monetary policy orientation  The recent improvement in the economy’s performance, the significant boost to domestic demand, the imbalances in the dynamics of spending and production, together with cost pressures, will influence the behavior of prices. How much will correspond to temporary effects and how much to more persistent ones will be key to determine the correct degree of expansion of the monetary policy stance, in order to ensure that the recovery of the economy is sustainable and continues to unfold in an environment of stable prices. In the immediate future, the Board estimates that the economy is still suffering from the impact of the pandemic and the lag of the labor market in the recovery. However, the high dynamism that consumption already exhibits and the additional boost to private spending represent major changes in the macroeconomic scenario of the coming months, making it necessary to recalibrate the expansionary nature of monetary policy going forward. In particular, the expected higher growth in spending and activity will make it less necessary for the monetary impulse to support the economy’s recovery with the current intensity, and it should begin to gradually moderate sooner than we anticipated in the last Report. This will help to avoid the buildup of inflationary pressures at a particularly sensitive time of the recovery. It is important to bear in mind that inflation is particularly detrimental to middle- and low-income households, which do not have the purchasing power and asset protection mechanisms available to the better-off.