samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I am among the ones who think that the interest rate is often too blunt a tool to deal with financial stability issues, especially when they have clear sources that can be addressed more directly, since the policy rate affects every sector of the economy. Furthermore, under some circumstances the required movement in the policy rate for financial stability purposes may be in conflict with the price stability mandate. Assuming that such tradeoff is absent, that reasonable movements in the policy rate are expected to be useful to deal with financial stability concerns, and that there are no better tools at hand, it may be reasonable to rely on it as a tool for financial stability. However, in many situations at least one of these conditions would not hold and other options would prove more efficient. For instance, more often than not financial stability concerns are related to specific segments of financial intermediation. Concerns about rapid growth in credit to the housing sector can be tamed by changes in loan-to-value or debt-toincome ratios, for example. Dynamic provisions related to general or specific forms of credit may also help banks maintain a solid position through the financial cycle, and discretional changes to reserve requirements may also help rein in rapid bank credit expansion. Of course, all these measures are not cost free and their use must properly consider these costs against specific financial stability concerns.

The financial soundness of a central bank, the usual lender of last resort in a country, is an important firewall for trouble in the financial system. While a central bank may count with the help of the sovereign, this channel may be a source of concern when sovereign themselves are facing problems, and it also raises some worries about the ability of the central bank to maintain its independence. There are also those who argue that, since the liabilities of central banks can be arbitrarily created, the financial position of a central bank shouldn’t matter. But this argument forgets that doing so may endanger the achievement of the inflation targets that many central banks have taken as their operational goals, affecting their reputation and independence. 2  4  Céspedes et al. 2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  In 1982, as the debt crisis spread through Latin America, the Chilean financial system, which had channeled substantial foreign-currency-denominated syndicated loans, became largely insolvent. Under these conditions, the government engineered a massive rescue operation through the central bank where several of the most important banks became nationalized and others disappeared, after their assets were absorbed by other institutions. This intervention prevented an even larger collapse of activity than the one we ended up experiencing. The manner in which it was implemented, where shareholder equity was fully diluted and institutions assumed a subordinated debt to the central bank that took a long time to repay, helped maintain the rescue’s moral hazard concerns at bay.
6 7  All algorithmic stablecoins, which have no backing at all, have failed so far, without exception. The collapse of the Terra stablecoin in October 2022 is the latest in a long line. In Switzerland, these are the SIC system and the SECOM system. Page 9/11  The second model involves integrated settlement, using a Swiss franc wholesale CBDC (cf. slide 12). In Phases I and II of Project Helvetia, tests of the issuance of a Swiss franc wholesale CBDC were conducted on the test environment of SIX Digital Exchange (SDX). Building on the insights gained, we intend in particular to further explore the operational basis that would enable the SNB to issue wholesale CBDC for settlement purposes if necessary in the future. As part of the project, we will issue real wholesale CBDC on SDX for a limited time and test selected transactions with market participants. The third model involves integrated settlement using private Swiss franc token money that is protected under bankruptcy law (cf. slide 13). As part of the project we aim to examine ways in which private token money that is backed one-to-one by sight deposits at the SNB, can be legally structured in such a way that, in the event of the bankruptcy of the token issuer, it would have a risk profile comparable to that of central bank money. We will be reporting on the projects and the lessons learnt in due course.

In 2021, Switzerland became one of the first countries to adopt a comprehensive legal framework for the application of DLT. Besides various adjustments to securities law, a new licence category for DLT trading facilities has been created under the Financial Market Infrastructure Act. This has created the basis in Switzerland for a regulated token ecosystem. Where do you find interesting applications of DLT in today’s financial system? The short answer is in the area of financial market infrastructure, which includes trading platforms, securities settlement systems, and payment systems such as the SIC system, via which transactions are settled. DLT promises efficiency gains in post-trading, i.e. in the clearing, settlement and custody of assets. A shared ledger increases transparency and simplifies the booking of transactions. In addition, it eliminates the need for costly and error-prone reconciliation processes between different databases on different systems. Moreover, DLT also allows assets such as securities, works of art or money to be securitised in the form of digital tokens, represented in a decentralised and fraud-proof network, and managed. Standardisation allows assets of different types to be represented as tokens on a shared infrastructure. Transfers of tokens can be programmed in the form of ‘smart contracts’. DLT enables the efficient and low-risk settlement of transactions. For example, the transfer of tokenised assets versus tokenised money can be effected conditionally according to preprogrammed logic. 5 It replicates the payment process with cash, where the exchange of money and goods can take place simultaneously on a delivery-versus-payment basis.
Timber has steadily found new applications in Borregaard’s products, such as building materials, biofuels and medicine – with timber always as the main raw material.5 Norway’s industry structure is in flux. In the past decades, the manufacturing industry has continued to decline (Chart 8), reflecting increased automation and relocation abroad. Increased prosperity has generated more demand for both private and public services. Employment has shifted towards the service sector. 3 Blomgren, A. et al (2015) “Industribyggerne 2015” [Industry builders 2015]. IRIS Report 2015/031 (Norwegian only). 4 World Bank “Ease of doing business index”. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ. 5 Throughout its history, Borregaard has had various owners and names. See eg Bergh, T. and E. Lange (1989) Foredlet virke – Historien om Borregaard 1889–1989 [Processed timber – The story of Borregaard]. Ad Notam forlag AS, Oslo (Norwegian only), and www.borregaard.no for more information. 10  NORGES BANK  Chart 8 Employment shifts towards services. Annual average change in number of employed in the period 1980 – 2018. Percent  ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  Public services  Private services  Construction  Manufacturing  Agriculture, forestry and mining –3  –2  –1  0  1  2  3  Sources: Stastistics Norway and Norges Bank  The service industry has reaped gains in the form of increased productivity through restructuring and adoption of new technology. The banking industry was among the first to do so. The distributive trade sector has grown in recent decades without any notable increase in employment (Chart 9).

Norges Bank is therefore considering whether the central bank should also offer the public central bank digital currency.8 Like cash, central bank digital currency will be a claim on the central bank. It will have to be designed to be a risk-free alternative to private payment solutions and to function in a contingency in the same way as cash does. It can be based on account systems, as we know them today, or it can be a digital variant of banknotes and coins. The latter alternative will entail a clear distinction between central bank digital currency and banks’ deposit money. In the future, central bank digital currency may be necessary for ensuring an efficient and robust payment system. Its most important purpose will be to underpin confidence in the monetary system. MONETARY STABILITY In order to serve as generally accepted means of payment, money must have a stable value guaranteed in a credible manner. There must be trust that money will be worth as much tomorrow as it is today. This is the primary task of monetary policy. In September 2018, Norges Bank raised the policy rate for the first time in seven years (Chart 11), reflecting the favourable developments in the Norwegian economy. The effects of the fall in oil prices in 2014 have faded, and both output and employment show solid growth. Underlying inflation is close to the 2 percent target. If economic developments prove to be in line with expectations, the policy rate will be raised gradually and cautiously ahead. 7 Kloster, A.
What we need is to match the huge amounts of regional savings with the much-needed investment in infrastructure, which is as high as 8 trillion dollars over the next decade as estimated by the  3  2  ADB website (2012) (http://www.adb.org/features/fast-facts-asean-prc-and-india-great-transformation)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  ADB.4 To match this huge demand for funds, ASEAN along with China, Japan and Korea have put in place several initiatives: two key projects include the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, which pools regional saving into funds for investment in infrastructure projects and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative, which develops and deepens regional bond markets so as to tap regional savings. 15. To conclude, there are great opportunities in store ahead. At the end of the day, the benefits of trade liberalization and infrastructure development will extend to all of us if we work collectively to overcome the challenges. The AEC will be a springboard to benefit the whole region, particularly for the GMS. This is because the whole region will be more closely knitted, not only in terms of physical connectivity but also in terms of shared production networks. I believe that this conference today will be an excellent platform for us to come together and share our ideas towards realizing long-lasting prosperity in the GMS region. Thank you. 4  ADB website (2009) (http://www.adbi.org/files/2009.08.31.book.infrastructure.seamless.asia.pdf)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Goh Chok Tong: Sharing some perspectives on growth Speech Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Group of Thirty(G-30) International Banking Seminar and Lunch, Singapore, 18 September 2006. *  *  *  The good, the bad and the ugly Let me first bid you a warm welcome to Singapore. I was recently invited by the World Bank to be a member of the Growth Commission chaired by Professor Michael Spence. So today's topic "Sharing Some Perspectives on Growth" fits me like a glove. In offering my perspectives, I shall draw heavily on the experience of Singapore. Forty years ago, soon after I started work in the Economic Planning Unit of the Finance Ministry, I was sent to do a post-graduate course in Development Economics at Williams College in the US. The course was designed for young officials from developing countries. There were 20 of us from 16 countries spanning four continents - Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America. The countries included the Philippines, Pakistan, India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Tanzania, Liberia, Honduras, Colombia and Mexico 1 The 1960s was dubbed the "Decade of Promise". An unprecedented number of colonies had just gained independence. My fellow students and I were taught the latest development theories. Brighteyed and bushy-tailed, we were full of hope. But 40 years later, history tells a different story. Only a few had our hopes fulfilled; most had their dreams dashed.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Growth, sustainability and inclusiveness – Thailand’s key success factors Dinner talk by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), Bangkok, 23 March 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me begin by extending my deepest condolence to the Japanese business community in Thailand on the immense losses caused by the unprecedented earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Despite the tragic incidents, I am confident that the strength and determination of Japanese people, together with supports from all around the world, will enable Japan to recover swiftly. For today, I would like to thank the Japanese Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to share with the distinguished audience my assessment of the Thai economy. I also look forward to hearing your views and concerns regarding the economic prospects. Needless to say that Japan and Thailand have a long history of close economic relationship, with Japan being the top foreign investor in Thailand. As such, Thailand has become a production hub for several Japanese industries, including vehicles, electronics and electrical appliances. I therefore hope that our discussion today will help align understanding and further strengthen the partnership between our two economies. For my presentation this evening, I would like to offer my assessment of the economy based on what I see as the three most important attributes that determine the economic progress for Thailand – the “key success factors”, if you will. First is that growth must be sustainable.

What is important is that at the moment of the decision, after having had the possibility of analysing all pertinent information and data, market participants can correctly predict our decision thanks to their intimate knowledge of our policy. 2  BIS Review 5/2005  ECB’s communication in practice Some features of the ECB are bringing about major additional challenges for external communications. In particular, the ECB operates in a multicultural environment with 12 different cultures and 10 different languages in the euro area and 25 cultures and 20 languages within the scope of the European System of Central Banks. And, the ECB was given the very ambitious challenge to be fully credible from day one, without track record and to issue a currency which would be immediately as credible as the most credible legacy currencies. In the practical implementation of the communication policy we make use of a wide range of communication tools. I will mention only a few of them here: First, the monthly press conferences after the first Governing Council meeting in each month. The introductory statement at the press conference is a key element in our communication as it conveys the collective view of the ECB’s Governing Council on the monetary policy stance in real time. In fact, the decision to hold a press conference after each policy meeting was unheard of among major central banks prior to the euro.
José De Gregorio: Adjustment in the global economy Keynote address by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the 2011 Institute of International Finance (IIF) Latin American Economic Forum, Calgary, 27 March 2011. *  *  *  I am grateful to Luis Oscar Herrera, Enrique Orellana and Tatiana Vargas for valuable comments. Thank you very much for the invitation to speak at this 2011 IIF Latin American Economic Forum. The last few years have been the most challenging for economic policy around the world in many decades. From an unprecedented inflationary shock in 2007–08, the global economy went through a financial crisis and a recession in 2008–09, of a scale not seen since the Great Depression. Now, we are experiencing a process of recovery with strong inflationary pressures and tensions in the world economy as a result of asymmetries in this process. The purpose of my talk today will be the global adjustment, how it has been proceeding and what the current challenges for policymaking are, with special focus on the asymmetries and their implications for economic policy. The uneven recovery The world economy is growing unevenly and subject to many tensions. Most advanced economies are recovering from the crisis, but they still have high rates of unemployment and excess capacity, and this is expected to last for some time.

AoF Members will be invited to participate in the Leadership Development Programme through which they can interact with the Academy’s International Advisers, Fellows and other top financial leaders through seminars, workshops and small group discussions. Although the Academy does not offer technical or professional training, which is well served by many tertiary institutions and professional bodies such as the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers, the Hong Kong Securities and Investment Institute, the Treasury Markets Association, we will collaborate closely with these institutions as our partners to achieve the maximum synergy in accomplishing our common goal of enhancing the soft power of Hong Kong. 4. On the research front, the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research (HKIMR), which was set up 20 years ago to undertake monetary and economic research, has become a subsidiary of the AoF and will expand its ambit to cover Applied Finance Research and Thought Leadership. The HKIMR will continue to have its own Board of Directors and, in addition to the existing Council of Advisers for Monetary Research, a new Council of Advisers for Applied Research has been set up to oversee the applied research work of AoF. 5. The AoF is a cross-sectoral collaboration to achieve the goal of enhancing the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s financial industry.
The best, and perhaps the only, antidote to these problems is institutionalised transparency; promoting a regular, public debate on sustainable government finances at the national level. This was the Riksbank’s approach ahead of Sweden’s referendum on the euro. We recommended in this context a model that drew on the experience we have gained from conducting a monetary policy with definite, clear targets, consistent openness regarding background material such as forecasts and regular and open assessments and debates. 2  BIS Review 2/2005  Key steps in this regard could be taken by any country that wants to do so. But increased support could also be provided by way of common decisions at European level. Technically, the Excessive Deficit Protocol already contains an explicit commitment to create national institutions with a view to developing a fiscal policy framework. The EU leaders can now realise this commitment. We can also learn from each other in this process. The Commission was quick to perform benchmarking of budget systems in different countries back in the early 1990s. This was of use to Sweden when we reformed our budget process after the crisis in the early 1990s. The Commission could start up this work again. Countries could be studied, compared and put under the spotlight if they have poor fiscal policy institutions. In this way the national debates could be influenced. Allow me now to conclude with one general reflection in relation to my introductory comments.

Many of us had hoped that the EMU project would be able to contribute to a faster change of our economies in a growth-oriented direction. In some countries there has also been less focus on shortterm stabilisation policy issues - if interest rates are 25 basis points up or down - which are not significant in the long run for economic performance, and more on long-term questions that are crucial to growth and prosperity. Comments from the Commission and the ECOFIN council have also had the desired effect in a number of countries. Policies have been put on the right course. But the exact opposite tendency exists in other countries. The problems are being shifted on to monetary policy, which is being conducted at such a distance that the decision-makers can be blamed without repercussions. Politicians have also tried to take advantage of the situation domestically by making it appear that they are not bowing to Brussels. The crucial issue for EMU in the period ahead is which of the two approaches will gain the upper hand. If the first approach prevails it will go well. But if the second approach dominates the opposite will be the case. So the trick is to find a system for governance that pulls in the first direction; that focuses both national and European debates and policies on the real issues. Thank you.
The majority of buy to let investors in the UK are small landlords; 78% of landlords have only one rental property and the majority of buy-to-let landlords are lower rate taxpayers. It is not in my view at all impossible that sharp movements in prices and a loss of confidence in future capital appreciation, in combination with interest rate increases, could cause a substantial number of buy to let landlords to seek to exit the market. This could put material downward pressure on house prices. Though buy to let investors are very different to owner occupiers, there is in the end only one housing stock and housing market in the UK. So the risk is that they could amplify an adverse shock to the housing market. Rapid growth in any type of debt financed activity should always lead a macroprudential regulator to have a closer look. At present there does not appear to have been a general fall in lending standards. Indeed, a number of lenders have tightened their interest coverage ratio criteria over the last 12 months. But we should in my view at the least be monitoring activity and underwriting standards in this market closely and carefully. Corporate credit In contrast to household lending and the housing market, lending to corporates remains more subdued though it is recovering. Bond issuance has accounted for most of the recent increase in debt.

While we are seeing competition between lenders pushing down on rates, particularly in the mortgage market, we have not yet seen evidence of a general deterioration in underwriting standards. Countercyclical macroprudential policy As we move forward in the credit cycle, I think we will need to consider whether and how risks are building in the financial system and how they should be addressed. This is of course already a regular and important element of the FPC’s discussions. But my guess is that it will become even more so in the next phase of the cycle. With that in mind I want to turn now from the conjunctural assessment of credit in the UK to what may look like a more theoretical question but one that is going to be increasingly important to us – what is the objective and the framework for time-varying macroprudential policy? Here I think one can distinguish a number of different strategies. The first is not to attempt time-varying macroprudential policy at all. The second is to set policy to aim to maintain a constant degree of resilience relative to risk. And the third is to use policy actively to lean against the credit cycle. I want to look at these three approaches for the core and riskiest part of the financial system – leveraged banking – and in particular the use of countercyclical capital buffers for banks. I have some sympathy for the “don’t do it at all” approach.