samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
UK growth has, if anything, surprised to the upside over this period. UK growth in 2013 and 2014 averaged over 2%. And the MPC’s February Inflation Report forecasts the UK growing above its historic trend over the next two years. Yet despite this, the expected path of UK interest rates has continued to drift down. That is because macro-economic surprises have continued, but have switched from the real to the nominal side, from stalling growth to falling inflation. Inflation has consistently and significantly undershot the Bank’s forecasts since 2012, in particular over the past 12 months (Chart 7). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Chart 6: Inflation Report projections of GDP growth  Chart 7: Inflation Report projections of CPI inflation  Percentage change on a year earlier 6.0  Percentage change on a year earlier 4.0  4.0  3.5  2.0  3.0 2.5  0.0  2.0  -2.0  1.5  -4.0  1.0  -6.0  0.5  -8.0 2008Q1 2010Q1 F09 F12 Latest data  2012Q1 F10 F13  2014Q1 F11 F14  0.0 2012Q1  2013Q1  F13 N13 A14  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations  2014Q1  M13 F14 N14  A13 M14 Latest data  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations  This pattern has been mirrored internationally. Global consumer price index (CPI) inflation, on a PPP-weighted basis, currently stands at 1.2%, having fallen 1.8 percentage points over the past two years (Chart 8). Around 40 countries internationally are currently experiencing deflation (Chart 9).

Chart 25: Projection for wage growth and inflation, assuming inflation expectations put downward pressure on wages Wages - lower inflation expectations Wages - February IR projections Inflation - February IR projections Inflation - lower inflation expectations  14  6 4 2 0 -2 -4  Monetary policy If there is evidence that risks to inflation, globally and in the UK, may be skewed to the downside, the obvious next  Percentage change oya  Source: ONS and Bank calculations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  question is what, if any, monetary policy response might be appropriate as insurance against those downside risks. One insurance device comes from the specification of the inflation target itself. Even if the risks to inflation are asymmetric, central banks’ inflation targets typically are not. This reduces the risk of monetary policy imparting a “deflationary bias”. The MPC’s own mandate is crystal clear: deviations above and below the 2% inflation target are to be treated symmetrically. In its Open Letter to the Chancellor earlier this year, the MPC made clear it would act symmetrically to meet the inflation target.15 A second insurance policy against downside inflation risk comes from clearly specifying the horizon over which inflation is expected to return to target following a deviation. Provided that horizon is credible, this reduces the risk of inflationary expectations becoming dislodged from the target on a persistent basis.
Unit costs and list prices L is t p ri c e  NOK  U nit c o s t  30  30  25  25  20  20  115 5 110 0 55  rs T ra nsfe  e e qu Ch  in a term  ed  EF TP OS Ow nb ank 's A TM Oth er b a nk 's A W it TM hd r aw als /de pos its  l gir o  ter  as h by c  Gir op a id  Pa  per  -b a s  iro il g Ma  ec oun  oa t th Gir  its  al g ir o  d eb  rmin  Dir e ct  nic te  iro  Ele ctro  PC /Inte  Pho ne g  rne t  00  7. Cost coverage in 1988, 1994 and 2001 1988  2001 Prices  Other  Other  1994  Float  Other  Prices  Prices  Float  Due to changes in banks’ service range, users participate more extensively in the production of payment services and cover some of the costs directly. This applies in particular to the use of terminals, PCs and telephones for bill payment and to cash withdrawals in connection with goods purchases. The survey does not cover customers’ time and travel expenses and expenses related to telephone or PC.

Average prices (weighted by transaction)  2001 NOK 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Weighted average price giro transactions  Weighted average price all transactions  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  01  For most services, customer prices are lower than banks’ unit costs. The exception is giro services at the counter. The unit cost for EFTPOS has declined so that transaction prices nearly covered costs in 2001. Prices have fallen because the transaction volume has increased and costs related to developing and introducing the system have been repaid. The price for using a card in a POS terminal has not risen appreciably in recent years. The unit cost for paying bills over the Internet is still high. This is probably because development and introduction costs are still not repaid and because there is excess capacity in the banks' solutions. Customer prices cover less than one-fourth of the costs reported by banks in connection with this service. It appears that banks are pricing this service on the basis of a long-term strategy that low prices during the introduction phase will encourage customers to use new, more efficient payment instruments earlier. If the pricing strategy actually increases use, it may contribute to increasing efficiency in the payment system in the long term because economies of scale will be exploited at an early stage.
If incumbents depend on Bigtechs for key infrastructure such as cloud computing, if they rely on the same Bigtech to distribute their products through their platforms and then compete with Bigtechs on certain segments, they will see their strategic independence challenged in the same way as hotels and retailers did. This process of commoditisation of incumbents may lower credit standards to compensate for higher pressure on margins and exacerbate their funding gap because of lower customer stickiness. Second, the development of cyber-risk. With greater interconnections between technologies and the financial system and the opening up of information systems, the Banque de France observed in its Financial Stability Report of December 2017 that cyber-risk is moving from an idiosyncratic risk to a potential source of systemic risk which needs to be addressed. This perspective is widely shared among public and private decision makers and it should not come as a surprise that cyber-security will be one of the priorities of the French presidency of the G7 this year. So, to conclude my second point, the completion of the regulatory decade to strengthen banking financial intermediation is not the end of the story; it’s just the end of the beginning of a new era. The transformation of financial intermediation is full of opportunities but it also highlights the limitations of sectoral and entity-based regulations and the need to adapt regulation and supervision to a morphing financial intermediation. This leads me to my last point. 3.

And unemployment is close to its lowest level for a quarter of a century. In my opinion, that has not happened by chance, but is the result of a range of policies. Achieving low and stable inflation is the best contribution that monetary policy can make to the wider economic goals of sustainable growth and employment. Having an inflation target certainly does not mean that we take no interest in real  BIS Review 87/2001  1  activity. We have discretion over how rapidly we try to bring inflation back to target when and if it diverges from 2½%. And we regularly publish our best guess about the likely future path of growth up to a two year horizon. But the aim of policy is clear - we do what is necessary to keep inflation on target. So far, I have spoken as if monetary policy is carried out by faceless bureaucrats hidden deep within the vaults of Threadneedle Street. Of course, as any of you who read the Diary columns regularly will know, nothing could be further from the truth! There are nine of us on the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee, and we meet once a month to make our interest rate decision. This is a rigorous process, and rightly so. The first stage occurs on the Friday before the policy meeting, with a briefing by Bank staff on all of the data that have been released over the previous month.
24  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Macroprudential instruments  Revision of selfregulation: minimum amount of own funds and amortisation obligation  Activation of sectoral CCyB at 1% from the end of September 2013  Increase in sectoral CCyB to 2% from the end of June 2014  Further revision of selfregulation: shortened amortisation period  Jul 2012  Feb 2013  Jan 2014  Sep 2015  CCyB = Countercyclical capital buffer 25  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Macroprudential instruments Slower momentum on the Swiss mortgage and real estate markets  26  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank  Conclusion  “Debt is a two-edged sword. Used wisely and in moderation, it clearly improves welfare. But, when it is used imprudently and in excess, the result can be disaster.” Cecchetti et al. (2011). 27  1 November 2017  Collegium generale | Fritz Zurbrügg | © Swiss National Bank

These upside risks would be of a lesser magnitude than the downside risks deriving from the potential worsening of the epidemiological situation. I also wish to stress that the assumption contained in the Draft Budget regarding full absorption of the European funds by the Spanish economy and the associated multipliers seems optimistic in the light of historical and empirical evidence. If we analyse the capacity of the Spanish economy to mobilise funds linked to other European programmes, seven years after the last three European structural fund programmes (all with smaller volumes than the NGEU) were introduced, Spain’s rate of absorption of the funds available was below 80% in all cases. In addition, it is important to note that in order for the European funds to have the multiplier effect on aggregate activity that is assumed in the Draft Budget (slightly above 1), these funds will have to be employed in quality projects, that is to say in public investment initiatives with optimal capacity to boost economic growth potential in the medium term, for example, by enhancing technological and human capital stock. Moreover, there must be no negative confidence effects, deriving, for instance, from doubts regarding the sustainability of public finances.5 Hence the pressing need for the medium-term fiscal consolidation programme to which I will refer later and for structural reforms that will boost our potential growth.
The “non-performing loans to outstanding loans (net)” indicator, which estimates the net size of exposure to credit risk, continues to be at low levels, by 1.4 percent as at year-end 2006. Compared to year-end 2005, the capital adequacy ratio of the system decreased by 0.5 percentage point down to 18.1 percent at end 2006. The capital adequacy ratio for 2006 continued to maintain the downward trend reflected in the preceding years. Large banks  BIS Review 80/2007  9  have recorded a rise of capital adequacy indicator, mainly due to increased regulatory capital at end of the year, by about 62.3 percent. At end of 2006, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets of the banking system recorded 57.6 percent, compared to 62.6 percent it was at end of December 2005. During 2006 the banking system underwent important qualitative and quantitative developments. At end of 2006 the Albanian banking sector consisted of 17 banks, of which three are of fully Albanian private equity. At the beginning of 2006 the Union Bank commenced its activity. On May 2006, there was approved the selling of the Italian-Albanian Bank’s 80 % stake, which belonged to the Ministry of Finances of the Republic of Albania and to Capitalia S.A., Italy, to the new stockholder SanPaolo IMI S.p.A., Italy. At the same period, there was also approved the 60 percent (plus 2 shares) ownership transfer of the National Commercial Bank’s stake from Kent Bank/Bayindir Bank, to the new Turkish institutional stockholder, Çalik-Seker Konsorsiyum Yatirim Anonim.

On August 2006 the ownership transfer of 11.25 percent of the ProCredit Bank’s stake, from EBRD to ProCredit Holding AG (existing shareholder) was approved. On October 2006, the 71.97 percent transfer of the stake of Emporiki Bank S.A. of Greece to Credit Agricol S.A., France shareholder was approved. This transfer influenced also the indirect participation of Credit Agricol S.A. to the Emporiki Bank of Albania’s equity, to the same extent. During 2006, the banks’ network was extended also by 62 new branches and agencies, in the whole territory of Albania and abroad, having the highest share in Tirana, with the establishment of 30 new branches and agencies. Also, the opening of two branches outside the territory of Albania was approved and the opening of two other new branches is under the process of approval. 10. New activities of the Bank of Albania  Payment system From the regulatory and operational point of view, the payment system in Albania has already created the physiognomy of a modern system. The number of transactions processed during 2006 has increased by 13 percent, compared to 2005. In the meantime the value of transactions has increased by 21 percent during 2006, amounting to ALL 2,664.43 billion. Compared to 2005, the daily average number of payments (in both systems) has increased from 312, to 352 or 40 more transactions per day. In 2006, a new bank was added to the payment system, leading the number of participants to 17 banks. On March 2006 the e-payment settlement by VISA cards started.
Evidently, the spread of fiscal difficulties in one specific country to other Member States can run through many channels, which may include the exposure of financial institutions to sovereign debt, the correlation between risk premia on markets and the effects associated with changes in trade flows. The importance of these mechanisms is unquestionable. But the speed at which tensions have spread in this case and their initial and sharp impact on those Member States whose public finances have most deteriorated suggest that the weaknesses  4  BIS Review 86/2010  perceived in the institutional arrangements for governance of the euro area may have played a central role. As has been brought home to us in these months, the rapid spread of tensions has meant difficult and far-reaching decisions have had to be adopted on two fronts: the common European front and the domestic front of each Member State. On the European front, the Heads of State and of Government and the Ecofin outlined a powerful programme of financial support for the Greek authorities. Implementation of the programme was conditional upon Greek economic policies being redressed with regard to their fiscal consolidation strategy, which had to be strengthened and accelerated, and to the need to undertake ambitious structural reforms to move back onto a path of sustained growth. Subsequently, the agreement to create a European stabilisation mechanism strengthened this firm commitment of the Member States to maintaining the stability of the euro area.

A second observation is that over this nearly twenty five year period, the challenge for monetary policy in many countries has shifted from one of getting inflation down to target, to one of getting it up to target. This has been less marked for the UK, in part because in a more open economy movements in the exchange rate have tended to raise inflation during this period. However we are facing a period of below target inflation today. And this is very different to the challenge of the early days of the MPC. It is important to emphasise that the UK regime of inflation targeting is a symmetrical one, and with very good reason. Both high and low inflation are costly. Put like this, the story is pretty obvious and uncontroversial. An independent central bank with a symmetric inflation target has the same objective either way, whether inflation is above or below target – it cannot throw the towel in. To do so would amount to abandoning our remit and our independence. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  But that is not the end of the story because of late it has been said that central bank independence has been compromised by the actions taken in the face of the pandemic. What this really comes down to is the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy, between the economic policy of the Government and the actions of the central bank.
The sector is in a phase of downsizing and structural change that will inevitably affect financial intermediation going forward. To think about how this will impact European and global growth, I think it is useful to recall an ancient Chinese fable. The fable is about a boy who lived near China’s northern borders, and whose horse one day wandered off into the territory of the northern tribes. Everyone commiserated with him for his misfortune. But not his father, a well-practiced Taoist. “Perhaps this will soon turn out to be a blessing,” he said. Then, a few months later, his horse returned, accompanied by a fine horse from the north. Everyone congratulated him for his luck, but his father was more sanguine. He remarked, “Perhaps this will soon turn out to be a curse”. The boy quickly became fond of riding the fine new horse, then one day out riding, he broke his leg in a nasty fall. Everyone again commiserated with him. But once more his father disagreed. “Perhaps this will soon turn out to be a blessing,” he said. Soon after, the northern tribes invaded the border regions. All able-bodied young men took up arms to fight the invaders, and nine out of ten died. Due to his broken leg, however, the boy did not join in the fighting. He and his father therefore survived.

Similarly, in our case, the Bank of Thailand recently launched the Financial Sector Master Plan 2, in which we outline the key principles and guidelines for further strengthening of the financial sector over the next five years. Chief among the agenda are our commitments to bring down financial transaction costs through further deregulation and promotion of more competition in the banking industry. The second element of financial soundness is the integrity aspect. That is, financial institutions must be sufficiently immune to “runs”, which I define loosely as correlated and large-scale withdrawals of deposits, triggered by sudden loss of confidence in the solvency of banks concerned. On this, a key lesson for emerging markets from the global financial crisis is that the push for financial market development must be accompanied by constant efforts to review and bolster as necessary the supervisory framework and standards, so that financial soundness can be ensured without compromising the financial system’s integrity. The third and last element of financial soundness is the stability aspect. The financial sector, while playing an important role in supporting the real economy, can at the same time be the source of risk and instability to the real sector. As we know, the spillover effects from financial to real sector can take many forms. For example, the tendency for financial institutions to extend more credit during economic upswings, and scale back lending precisely during downturns, can contribute to the amplitude of the business cycles.
Mark Carney: From Lincoln to Lothbury – Magna Carta and the Bank of England Lecture by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, as part of the Lincoln Lectures 2015, Lincoln, 16 July 2015. *  *  *  I am particularly grateful to Professor Nicholas Vincent for commenting on an earlier draft of this speech, and to James Bell, Ben Nelson and Iain de Weymarn for assistance in its preparation. A burst of inflation. A crisis in the public finances. Public sector bailouts. Infighting in Europe. Not eight years ago, but eight hundred. That was the economic context for the striking of Magna Carta. To many today, Magna Carta is a document of profound, almost mythical, significance. It is seen as the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements and as a blueprint for the constitutions of many other nations, including the United States. It is credited with establishing the foundations of parliamentary democracy, creating a framework for the rule of law, protecting individual liberty, defending the rights of the innocent, and limiting the role of the State. It is undoubtedly true that Magna Carta – or more correctly the idea of Magna Carta – has played a central role in British political development over the centuries, not least as a banner under which those seeking liberty from oppression have rallied. But many modern scholars argue that its significance, in and of itself, has been overstated.

17  The coronation charter of Henry I issued in 1100 (which was also endorsed by Henry II at his own coronation in 1154) is a pertinent example because it was effectively the draft on which Magna Carta was later based, containing several of the clauses now regarded as the most significant. The original text was written in one continuous flow. Its division into clauses is a modern construct. 18  Moreover it came after a lacuna of sixty years during which the House of Plantagenet had issued no similar conciliatory charters and whose actions in the meantime had caused sufficient damage to the relationship between nobility and monarchy as to make an uprising inevitable. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Despite the efforts of Coke and others, Charles I’s rejection of all enterprise to constrain his authority led to the English Civil War and to the king’s beheading in 1649. Meanwhile, Coke’s unstoppable Magna Carta redux had been set in motion. In contradiction to their behaviour at home, James and Charles had been busily granting royal charters promising the liberties of Englishmen to the American colonists. Coke himself had been involved in the drafting of the first charter of the Virginia Company in 1606, and similar English liberties were extended in the charters of Massachusetts, Maryland, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Carolina over the next sixty years. Some have argued that references to Magna Carta, however irrelevant its provisions might by then have been, were used as a way of “drumming up” New World settlers.