samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, the ECB expanded scope for central bank intermediation of transactions between banks, thereby offering an alternative to the malfunctioning private inter-bank money market. At the same time, the measures supported financial stability objectives by containing and mitigating the systemic consequences of liquidity tensions in the money market. To conclude, let me say a few words on the recent decisions of the Governing Council taken on 9 May and announced on 10 May. As I already said publicly, I will sum up in five points the Governing Council’s position. 1. The ECB is fiercely independent and takes all its decisions independently of governments, social partners and pressure groups of any nature. BIS Review 70/2010  3  2. We are inflexibly attached to price stability, our primary mandate. Our successful track record since the inception of the euro is remarkable. 3. Our present monetary policy stance is appropriate. Our decisions taken on 9 May have confirmed it. We are not engaging in any form of “quantitative easing”. 4. The “Securities Markets Programme” is designed to ensure an effective functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism by helping to resolve a malfunctioning of some segments of the euro area debt securities markets. 5. The liquidity provided through this programme is withdrawn in its entirety through tenders of term deposits.

Further development of this framework promises to support financial and macroeconomic stability, within an overall strategy focused on achievement of our primary objective: price stability. Such considerations, in concert with the development of a new framework for macroprudential oversight, should permit to reduce the frequency, duration and economic impact of financial crises. These are themes that will be discussed in depth in the course of today’s colloquium. We have to make sure that the global financial system, as well as continental and national ones, are made much more resilient. Yet, it would be unrealistic to believe that financial crises can be eliminated. Recent experience has also demonstrated the need for central banks to be timely and agile in managing financial crises without ever – in any circumstances – losing their sense of the medium to long-term orientation to price stability. As regards the ECB, in the face of financial crisis, monetary policy was eased significantly through conventional means in late 2008 and early 2009, with key interest rates being reduced significantly. Moreover, non-standard measures, in the form of the ECB’s enhanced credit support were introduced. These aimed at maintaining an efficient transmission of monetary policy by supporting market functioning. Such measures were instrumental in the maintenance of price stability, since, in the face of downside risks to price stability, they ensured that the easing of the monetary policy stance was transmitted into a broader easing of financing conditions.
The confidence indicator has risen for both the manufacturing and construction industries as well as for trade and services industries. New orders in manufacturing have picked up, mainly in the export market but there has also been a clear improvement in the domestic market. Monthly data for foreign trade in goods also indicate an increasingly bright picture for exports. Like the developments elsewhere in the world, the Swedish purchasing managers index for October also showed a positive development. New data for retail sales point to continued relatively strong rises. At the same time, the NIER’s consumer survey for October provides somewhat mixed signals. Households have become slightly less optimistic about the Swedish economy and unemployment, while their expectations regarding their own finances have improved. As regards the labour market, we noted in the October Inflation Report that there were signs of an improvement in the situation. The strengthening of domestic demand and the announced measures in the Budget Bill were judged to lay the foundation for a rise in employment in the period ahead. However, the change in methods in the labour force surveys means that developments in the labour market are particularly hard to interpret at present. Employment growth appears perhaps to have been somewhat stronger than we expected in October. Developments in the number of new job vacancies and redundancy notices also point to an upturn in the labour market. In addition, the NIER’s latest quarterly business tendency survey contained a number of positive signals regarding companies’ hiring plans.

National demand is showing a brisker pace of recovery than initially envisaged, based on the increase in household consumption and investment in equipment over the past two quarters, and on some slowing in the fiscal adjustment following the revision of the adjustment path last summer. In fact, household spending, in a setting of improved confidence resulting largely from the gradual improvement in the labour market and from some recovery in disposable income, is showing moderate growth, despite the fact that the necessary reduction of household debt is still exerting something of a contractionary effect on expenditure. Further, investment in capital goods is looking buoyant, in light of the improved business climate and increased investment activity by exporting firms. The contractionary course of residential investment has slowed, although it remains in negative territory, while the stock of unsold housing remains high. The outlook of progressively improving activity is closely linked to labour market developments, where the benefits of wage moderation and the improved incentives for job creation driven by the recent labour reform are becoming patent. The latest employment figures show a continuation of the positive trend discernible since the second half of 2013. Thus, in recent months, Social Security registrations have continued to increase and the pace of decline of registered unemployment has stepped up. However, on the first-quarter figures for 2014, the unemployment rate remains very high, still close to 26% of the labour force.
Releasing the liquidity standard in times of stress could communicate authorities’ views on banks’ forward-looking liquidity resilience and  Page 11  appropriate usage of liquidity buffers, supporting financial stability and market confidence. But while the principle may be similar, in practice there may be bespoke challenges to releasing liquidity standards via the LCR. As I discussed earlier, it is an incomplete, static metric, which can mean different things for banks’ liquidity in different scenarios. But it is the existing regulatory standard. So in considering how to release liquidity standards, we would need to be mindful of the challenges posed by the nature of the LCR metric, and that in some stresses releasing the LCR may not be the right policy. These challenges motivate broader consideration of whether and how we might improve the LCR metric itself to make it less cyclical and volatile. For example, we could explore a less cyclical approach to calibrating the potential liquidity outflows from margin calls stemming from an increase in market volatility during a time of stress. There may also be other options for improving usability that worth exploring, but there are unlikely to be any silver bullets – we will need to be mindful of the potential issues and inherent trade-offs that different options entail.

Chiarotti, Mathur, and Rajan (forthcoming), ‘Assessing Basel III: Impact of automatic distribution restrictions on regulatory capital and bank lending’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper. The authors apply a difference-in-difference approach to aggregate bank balance sheet data and granular loan-level data on syndicated lending to corporates. The latter allows the authors to control for important unobservable features in the aggregate data such as changes in credit demand and in borrowers’ risk. 12. To ensure that banks which have different concerns about MDAs nevertheless have similar probabilities of triggering the restrictions, the analysis considers also the banks’ capital surpluses to regulatory buffers. 13. During the Covid-19 pandemic, several jurisdictions including ECB/SSM Fed and BoE recommended banks to restrict or suspend dividends and share buybacks, but not AT1 coupons (see Svoronos and Vrbaski (2020) (2021)  and BCBC  ). 14. During the pandemic AT1 coupons were excluded from the scope of the blanket distributions restrictions that many jurisdictions imposed, so unlike for dividends banks’ ability to pay AT1 coupons was still linked to automatic distribution restrictions thresholds. 15. A somewhat extreme version of broad-based capital conservation – reflecting the unusual and extreme level of economic and market uncertainty at the time - was implemented during Covid-19 when PRA recommended the major UK deposit takers to cancel dividend payments, share buybacks and cash bonuses. 16.
Perhaps the most common problem mentioned is that investors will then seek assets with a higher yield, which also have a higher risk. One of many reasons for such behaviour could be that some portfolio managers are required to attain a minimum return on their portfolios. This behaviour risks causing an unwarranted rise in asset prices when interest rates are low.6  5  There is a lively debate on this question. One important contribution to the discussion is the Riksbank’s commission of inquiry into risks on the Swedish housing market (Riksbank 2011). The National Institute of Economic Research (2013) and Svensson (2013a) are examples of newer contributions to the debate, claiming that housing prices and household indebtedness do not comprise an evident problem. 6  See Rajan (2005). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Another possible problem with low interest rates is that the monetary policy stimulus can help weak companies to get along without having to deal with their problems. In this way, a necessary structural transformation in the economy may be postponed. There is also a risk that the stimulus will help the banks to struggle along with weak balance sheets, which will inhibit credit granting in the economy.7 The problems I have just mentioned nevertheless appear less relevant to current developments in Sweden. But I would like to mention two other potential problems linked to low interest rates, which I think justify the concern over the Swedish economy.

It is not even self-evident that inflation will return to the target level in the long run if monetary policy is too tight. If we are worried that a long period with a low repo rate will give rise to an unjustified upturn in housing prices and indebtedness, we should perhaps ensure we conduct a monetary policy that means we quickly move towards the inflation target, and that still works even if  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  economic developments are less favourable than forecast in our main scenario. Such a monetary policy could entail cutting the repo rate now to increase inflation and then raising the repo rate slightly faster in the coming period when inflation accelerates (see Figure 7). Admittedly, preliminary assessments within the Riksbank, based on model calculations combined with empirical relationships, indicate that a large repo-rate cut now, followed by faster increases in the future would entail slightly higher risks linked to household indebtedness than if the repo-rate path advocated by the majority is followed. However, the difference in the risk outlook for these two alternatives is almost negligible.
What is somewhat less well known is that at that point, Iceland was already on its way into a recession after an unsustainable boom and serious overheating during 2005–2007 and a currency crisis in the first half of 2008. The banking collapse and the associated wealth loss and further currency depreciation made the recession significantly worse, of course, as did the global recession that began in the fourth quarter of 2008. In autumn 2008, two separate but interrelated sub-stories of the recent Icelandic saga converged in a tragic grand finale. The first story was related to Iceland’s boom-bust cycle and problems with macroeconomic management in small, open, and financially integrated economies. This is a story that has played out many times around the globe, and many of its elements have been seen before in Iceland. It might have been somewhat more extreme this time around, but it wasn’t fundamentally different. All the usual suspects were present, including strong capital inflows fuelling a credit and asset price boom that subsequently turned into a bubble at the same time as the economy overheated and an unsustainable external position developed, as could be seen in a double-digit current account deficit. And macroeconomic and prudential policies were not up to the task. Quite the contrary: there was a policy conflict between monetary policy and the demand levers pulled by the Government, and the risks inherent in capital flows, FX balance sheets, and credit and asset price booms were left under-regulated and insufficiently supervised.

The European League for Economic Cooperation has been, ever since its foundation in 1946, an independent network of business people who put their knowledge and influence together to deepen European integration. The League has stood out over the decades for a lot of significant reasons, including the very diverse nature of its membership and their interests, as well as a specific concern for independence in formulating their opinions. It is exactly this diversity and independence that prompts ELEC to ask the right questions and, in the answers it provides, to give priority to the common European interest. I salute the close cooperation between government officials in the region with high European officials, as well as, with the private sector and prestigious organizations such as ELEC. The Prime Minister of Romania, Mr. Dacian Ciolos, will have a brief address on this topic. Mr. Achim Irimescu, Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development will chair the round table on agriculture, together with his counterpart from the Republic of Moldova, Minister Eduard Grama and other renowned authorities who are ready to share their expertise on the factors that generate food insecurity in the extended Black Sea region in the context of the 21st century challenges. Mr. Vasile Iuga, Partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers will chair the round table on energy security and together with prominent experts will focus on long term development of energy networks in Central and Eastern Europe. Ladies and Gentlemen, Now, a few words about the topic of this conference.
It is well understood that markets must be “fair” as well as “free” to do their job effectively - and that we have to have rules that reflect public policy concerns. But it is equally understood that, carried too far, prescriptive intervention can stifle competition and the market appetite for risk. In getting the balance right, market participants can do a lot for themselves. My impression certainly is that there is a growing recognition that high standards of professional competence and integrity are vital to a firm’s reputation and commercial success, or even its survival - and that helps to limit recourse to intervention. But it’s also true that we have a critically important, longstanding, tradition in this country that, where there is a perceived need for intervention, the relevant authorities consult extensively with the markets which helps to avoid unintended consequences and to ensure a measured and properly targeted approach. It’s a tradition which others would do well to adopt. My second explanation for the City’s success in financial services is non-discrimination. Provided they meet the standards of professional competence and integrity we expect in London, it makes no sense at all - in fact it would be self-inflicted injury - to distinguish between the firms or individuals who work here, on grounds of nationality or ethnic or religious background - or, in the case of individuals, on grounds of gender, which is a point, my Lord Mayor, which I know that you have made forcefully from the beginning of your term in office.

Financial institutions, including insurance companies, unit trusts, and other non-bank financial institutions, need to continue to develop innovative financial products that can meet the needs of savers throughout their life cycle. The availability of a wide range of savings instruments for savers is a necessary pre-requisite for effective mobilisation of the nation's savings. Indeed, the ongoing evolution of an innovative, dynamic and diversified financial system in Malaysia will not only help Malaysians save, but also invest effectively for their future by facilitating the more efficient allocation of personal resources. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 2/2004
In China, the odds have improved in favour of a soft landing.   While economic growth has continued to ease in the face of weakening external demand, domestic demand has been holding up well.   Inflation appears to have peaked, providing monetary policy more latitude to support growth if necessary. 5. But the outcome for 2012 is by no means assured. Significant risks remain on the horizon:   First, resolution of the sovereign debt situation in the Eurozone is still a work-inprogress. With Europe sliding into recession, sovereign and banking vulnerabilities will remain a protracted concern.   Second, the sustainability of consumer spending in the US remains critically dependent on further improvements in the labour and housing markets – both of which are uncertain.   Third, a sharp spike in oil prices could potentially derail global economic growth. Oil prices, which have already started rising, are highly vulnerable to geopolitical developments in the Middle East. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  6. Barring these potential shocks, the IMF projects the global economy to grow by 3.3% this year. The Eurozone will experience a mild recession. The US and Japan will have positive growth, but below trend. Developing Asia is expected to grow by 7.3%. Under these conditions, the growth forecast for the Singapore economy at 1–3% this year remains on track. 7. But it is not this year’s growth that policymakers or asset managers should be most concerned about. It is the medium-term growth and inflation outlook that matters.

The issuance of risk warnings, in the context of safeguarding financial stability – where the analysis is centred on the downside risks and thus on highly improbable events – differs substantially from other types of analysis focused on a central, most probable, baseline scenario (such as the one supporting monetary policy). The translation of systemic risk assessments into proposals for concrete policy actions – of a prudential or supervisory nature – is also, to a large extent, new to the central banking community. 3. What went wrong? Confronted with the question of whether central banks and international bodies with financial stability competencies saw the financial crisis coming, it would be fair to answer “Yes, to some extent”.
The ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF), is now in its final stages of development. The ultimate objective of this initiative is to enable greater presence of ASEAN financial institutions to operate in the region to facilitate greater intra regional trade and investment activities. Businesses will thus stand to gain by having improved access to a larger and a more secure source of financing for such cross border trade and investment activities. Headway has also been made in developing the capital markets in the region and to move towards greater financial integration of the markets. Over the recent decade, the ASEAN bond market has more than tripled in size to USD1.1 trillion. ASEAN Exchanges, a collaboration of seven stock exchanges within the region, was launched in 2011 to drive cross-border collaboration, streamline access, create ASEAN-centric products, and implement targeted promotional initiatives. In addition, the listing of ASEAN indices with the Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) in 2005 has also enhanced the market visibility of the ASEAN exchanges, which represent close to 95% of the investable market capitalisation in the region and which has a combined market capitalisation of approximately USD2.9 trillion. This facilitates businesses in cross-listings between the exchanges and in raising funds given this common platform for ASEAN businesses. Finally, ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary Authorities have long been involved in various regional cooperation initiatives to develop efficient, secure and reliable payment and settlement systems.

Beyond this, we will probably continue to raise rates, but we may do so in a more flexible and possibly less rapid manner - "jumbo" rate hikes will not become a new habit. Since July, we have been making decisions on a meeting-by-meeting basis. A favourable condition to interrupt rate hikes would be clear signs of a turnaround in the core inflation trend, i.e. excluding energy and food. One word about the comparison with the US: on both sides of the Atlantic, inflation is too high. But it doesn't have the same nature: the energy component is higher in Europe; the demand one higher in the US, where the labour market is also tighter. Hence we don't need to raise rates at the same pace, nor to the same level. That said, signs of peaking inflation – headline and core – in the US last Thursday are good news for everyone, as the US has been ahead of the global inflation cycle, and the US monetary tightening has had strong spill overs on the rest of the world through the high level of the dollar. Central banks are thus playing their part in the fight against inflation, but let us not forget structural economic measures. "Beefing up" our productive capacity also has the potential to help reduce inflation in the longer term, in addition to increasing potential growth. This holds especially true when it comes to our ecological transformation, in order to decrease our dependency on fossil fuels.