samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If the increase in petroleum revenues is used domestically, this would correspond to almost all the annual growth in the mainland economy in a normal year. If the private sector of the economy is also expanding, and the economy is already close to its capacity limit, this policy would swiftly lead to strong pressures on economic resources. This would result in a rise in wages and prices. This policy would also lead to unstable conditions in the foreign exchange market. When oil prices then fell again and central government expenditure dropped, the economy would experience a very strong contraction. The Government Petroleum Fund was established in 1990 with a view to safeguarding long-term considerations in the use of petroleum revenues. The idea behind the Petroleum Fund is that the cash flow from an increase in the oil price should accrue to the Fund and be invested abroad and that the increase in the oil price should not affect the wider budget. Thus, rather than affecting the domestic economy, the increase in the cash flow would be invested abroad through the Petroleum Fund. Similarly, a fall in the oil price would not affect the domestic economy, but would result in lower accumulation of foreign assets. By building up the Fund, the aim of ensuring that several generations will enjoy the benefits of our petroleum wealth is also taken into account. In March 2001, the fiscal guideline and new guidelines for monetary policy were introduced.

And with the natural trade links and the people-to-people relations, there is a role for Thai banks in the payments and remittance services. These areas may not be commercially viable for global banks if the scale of the transaction is deemed too small. But for Thailand, such basic services can help support the robust growth of cross border trade and investments which are important for rural development and income distribution. •  With the fundamental trend where Thai businesses start to diversify investment and production base to neighboring GMS countries, it is natural for Thai financial institutions to follow their clients. Thai banks therefore have an important role in partnering Thai and GMS corporates. Areas such as project evaluation, business-set up, cross-border financial transaction are areas where the local know how matter and where Thai banks can meaningfully contribute. Through the vertical integration of these corporate finance services, Thai financial institutions naturally become an intermediary between Thai business and our GMS counterpart. As clients organize themselves around a regional supply chain, Thai banks become a natural partner to bring GMS business and investment to Thailand. Thai banks and their GMS correspondent banks or joint venture partners have a niche market advantage. They have close business links, geographical advantage, and access to funding in local currencies which are the natural means of payment for intraregional trade.
And you have asked me, particularly, as Deputy Governor of the Bank to talk about Economic and Monetary Union, and the way it will impact on your business. Let us, therefore, move quickly on to that point. Whenever I have accepted an invitation to speak about EMU over the last couple of years, I have done so with the hope that when the day came to speak, the clouds of uncertainty surrounding the project would have cleared - both in terms of developments among the countries committed to going ahead, and in terms of the UK’s position. But my hopes have so far been confounded, and indeed the events of the last couple of weeks have complicated matters even further. This is not the time or place to talk in detail about the Bundesbank’s little local difficulty with Herr Waigel. And it is too early to assess the consequences for the project of the results of the French election. But it is clear that new elements of uncertainty have entered the scene, making it harder than ever to forecast the outcome next year. Looking at the markets’ own assessment, our interpretation of movements in the forward FX markets since the autumn is that the markets have become more persuaded that the euro will begin, but that it will be a broader, and possibly weaker euro. Until last summer the assumption appeared to be that only seven or eight countries would make up the hard core.

I note with interest that your own assessment is that the best option for the futures and options business in London would be for EMU to go ahead and for the UK to participate in the first wave. It is a moot point as to whether the impact on the profits and bonuses of derivatives traders will be the number one criterion in the minds of Labour MPs when they come to reach a view on EMU, but I will certainly draw it to their attention if you would like me to do so. BIS Review 67/1997  -3-  By contrast, you are slightly, though not exaggeratedly pessimistic about business opportunities in London if EMU goes ahead with the UK a ‘slow track’ country. I regard this as a pessimistic assessment, and will attempt this morning to persuade you that you are wrong. My first point, and perhaps the strongest, is that uncertainty about UK participation in EMU has persisted now for a considerable number of years - perhaps indeed since the late 1970s when the UK government’s response to the original EMU plan was distinctly lukewarm. And certainly no British Prime Minister has given an enthusiastic endorsement of the most recent Delors Plan for EMU, at any stage.
We have always been in favour of a very close relationship between the central bank and the banking surveillance authorities. We said that long before any new problems, any new difficulties. We had a Governing Council position close to the start of the ECB, which we made public. We also strongly believe that better coordination for big cross-border institutions is absolutely necessary. Some avenues have already been suggested by Ecofin, the Council of Finance Ministers in the EU. The European Parliament has also carried out several works. The European Commission set up the De Larosiére group, a high level working group, to make recommendations. One of the European Parliament’s suggestions is that the ECB could play a particular role in this domain for the coordination of surveillance for cross-border institutions. In the US the Federal Reserve has a surveillance responsibility which concentrates very much on the big cross-border institutions. I see similar suggestions coming from the private sector and from the industry. As President of the ECB’s Governing Council I have no position of the Governing Council, but I am impressed by the mark of confidence in the ECB, demonstrated by the previous suggestions. In any case, the fragility, not only of global finance but of the international economy itself, is something that we should not accept as a normal feature of the globalized market economy. A new concept of strong resilience at a global level is of the essence.

In the case of Chile, the supervisory landmark is made up of three superintendencies (including banks). In this setting, coordination for systemic stability is achieved at two levels. One the one hand, the Central Bank is involved in several aspects of financial regulation directly by dictating regulation, or by participating in consultations with other agencies. On the other hand, the Central Bank participates in two coordination instances with the superintendents and finance ministry. The experience during the last years has shown that during periods of financial turmoil, mainly as result of external shocks, the Central Bank, the Finance Ministry, and the financial regulation agencies have indeed worked in close coordination, and, as the global financial crisis testifies, results have been positive. Moreover, in Chile, as banking supervision takes place outside the Central Bank it is key that it is not out of touch with the broader macro environment, so that financial system stance visà-vis the risks perceived in the macro-outlook is the natural first step in the supervisory process. Recently, these instances have been formalized with the creation of a Financial Stability Council, headed by the Finance Minister. This council will, amongst other things, identify systemic risks and mitigation policies, and discuss the systemic impact of regulation. Summing up, monetary and prudential policies are closely connected, first because macroeconomic and financial stability are closely interlinked, and second because instruments designed to achieve stability in each front have cross effects. This interconnection suggests the need for coordination of both types of policy.
Another important issue is the involvement of finance ministries in the crisis management framework. A High-Level Working Group, comprising representatives from the ministries of finance, central banks and banking supervisors, is working on concrete proposals for cooperation arrangements between the three authorities at EU level. As regards financial stability monitoring, the EU framework has been enhanced considerably in recent years. In this context, I would like to highlight the stability assessment of the EU banking sector, performed by the ESCB’s Banking Supervision Committee, and the comprehensive analysis of potential vulnerabilities in the euro area financial system as a whole, which was carried out as part of the ECB’s Financial Stability Review. In addition, the CEBS is expected to improve its internal exchange of information on individual institutions and groups. 2  BIS Review 18/2005  Markets I now turn to the second component of the financial system, the financial markets. The introduction of the euro and the measures adopted under the FSAP have spurred the integration of the European financial markets. Nevertheless, there continue to be varying degrees of integration. Wholesale money and bond markets tend to be relatively well integrated, but only the unsecured euro money market has reached a fully satisfactory level of integration. The integration of the market of debt securities has been significantly increased, although not yet reaching the level of the United States.

Finally, where appropriate, the ECB can take direct action. I will later give several examples of these different roles. I would like to discuss now the three major components of the financial system, namely the institutions, the markets and the infrastructure. I will address both the wholesale and retail aspects of these three components, and will touch upon developments that can be deemed a success, as well as areas where more effort is required. Institutions Following the adoption of the single currency, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) represented the next major stage in the integration process. Now that the FSAP is nearing completion, I see the post-FSAP period as a “window of opportunity” for further enhancing financial integration. At the same time, I am convinced that further progress is inextricably linked to the improvement of the regulatory and supervisory framework and the financial stability arrangements. In particular, institutional  BIS Review 18/2005  1  arrangements must respond to the need for greater cross-border cooperation, with a view to both supporting further integration and at the same time preserving financial stability. In the area of financial regulation and supervision, a key objective is to achieve a high degree of regulatory and supervisory convergence across countries. This will help reduce the compliance burden on financial institutions, thus addressing one of the largest remaining obstacles to enhanced cross-border activities.
Mugur Isrescu: The most important economic decision Nations have ever faced Lecture by Mr Mugur Isrescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Bitcoin versus Central Bank Digital Currency conference, Bucharest, 6 April 2023. *** Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon! Thank you for attending this conference on the topical issue of cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies. Today I have the pleasure of welcoming and introducing our distinguished guest speaker, Ms. Sundri Khalsa, Professor at the National Intelligence University - known as "the Harvard of the intelligence field", and a US Marine Corps Veteran. Welcome, Professor Khalsa, to Romania and to the National Bank of Romania! Sundri Khalsa's background also includes being a Professor at the United States Naval Academy, Director and Instructor of the Marine Corps Military Occupational Specialty training school, where she trained and certified Marine Corps Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officers. She is an expert with field experience in Signal Intelligence and information support for integrated military operations. Let me add that her studies also include degrees from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School, with additional certification in Management, Leadership and Decision Sciences, University of Virginia (with specialization in chemistry and biochemistry) and New Mexico Military Institute (where she was awarded the science scholar awards in physics and chemistry). Her book "Terrorism Forecasting: Indicators and Analytical Techniques" is on the CIA's reading list and used in university courses.

Caleb M Fundanga: Supervision of non-bank financial institutions Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the opening ceremony of a MEFMI/ACBF/IMF - East Afritac Regional Workshop on “Supervision of non-bank financial institutions”, Lusaka, 14 February 2005. *  *  *  •  The Executive Director, MEFMI, Dr. Maruping  •  The Executive Director, Africa Capacity Building Foundation  •  Representative from the IMF  •  Distinguished Workshop Participants  •  Ladies and Gentlemen  On behalf of the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute for Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI), the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and the East African Technical Assistance Centre (AFRITAC), I wish to welcome you all to this important workshop and to the beautiful city of Lusaka. May I also welcome our distinguished resource persons and thank them for accepting our invitations. I hope their participation will enrich the deliberations of this workshop as well as enhance the knowledge of the participants. Having perused through your programme, I noticed that you have a tight schedule. However, I urge all of you to find time in your busy schedule to visit some interesting places that the city of Lusaka has to offer, including shopping malls, museums, cultural villages, to mention but a few. Allow me also to thank the Executive Director of MEFMI, Dr. Maruping, for having invited me to officiate at this regional workshop on “Supervision of non-bank financial institutions”.
Even where national authorities had been created, there was uncertainty over the right way to assess risks, which instruments to use and how to calibrate interventions. Moreover, there was a real risk of inaction bias since the costs of macroprudential policy are visible and are felt immediately, but the benefits accrue over time and are difficult to quantify.5 Given this somewhat tentative start for macroprudential policy in Europe, substantial progress 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  has been made over the past eight years. Macroprudential authorities now exist in all but one Member State. The gaps in our framework and knowledge have slowly been filled through research and experience. The ESRB has played an integral part in this process.6 The framework has also helped to counter the risk of inaction bias. National macroprudential authorities have mandates and legal tools to act. At the European level, the ESRB also holds a mandate to monitor risks and vulnerabilities and has a number of legal instruments at its disposal. It can, for example, issue warnings if it has identified a significant risk to financial stability, as well as recommendations setting out remedial steps to be taken on an act-or-explain basis. National authorities have certainly demonstrated their willingness to use the tools at their disposal. Most EU countries currently have at least one measure in place to address risks in the residential property sector and half have measures to tackle risks in commercial real estate.

The costs to society from the crisis were substantial.1 By 2013, unemployment had risen by 10 million and EU GDP was some 13% below its pre-crisis trend.2 The build-up of excessive leverage in the financial system was a key element leading up to the financial crisis, and policymakers were unable to adequately address systemic risk. While many central banks communicated on financial stability issues prior to the crisis, very few countries had established national macroprudential authorities with a specific mandate and precise instruments for policy action. Some of the tools that we would today call macroprudential instruments were used by central banks in Europe during the post-war period, albeit usually for the purpose of demand management.3 But most were no longer used or were dismantled by financial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s. And without means of enforcement, warnings published in financial stability reports prior to the crisis often went unheeded. It was only after the crisis that there was widespread recognition of the importance of the macro dimension of financial stability. 4 An internet search on the word “macroprudential” yields 5,000 hits for the eight-year period from 2000 to 2007. By contrast, the past eight years yield 120,000 hits. Despite that recognition, macroprudential policy in Europe was far from operational in 2011. Indeed, when the European rules establishing a common legal basis for macroprudential instruments for banking came into effect in January 2014, ten Member States still had not implemented them in primary national legislation.
31  Chart 7 Decomposition of sterling-denominated investment-grade corporate bond spreads Bas is p o ints 750 Res id ual (includ ing co mp ens atio n fo r illiq uid ity)  70 0  Co mp ens atio n fo r uncertainty ab o ut d efault lo s s es  6 50  Co mp ens atio n fo r exp ected d efault lo s s es  600  Actual  550 50 0 4 50 400 3 50 300 2 50 200 150 10 0 50 0  97  32  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  Chart 8  Chart 9  Bid-ask spreads on selected assets  Major UK banks’ and LCFI’s leverage ratios(a)(b)  BIS Review 10/2010  Chart 10 Mortgage repayment gearing(a)(b)(c)  Chart 11 Distribution of income gearing (2007 and 2008)  Source: Bureau van Dijk and Bank calculations 1  Solid bars show distribution of income gearing in 2007. Shaded bars show distribution of income gearing in 2008. Income gearing is defined as interest paid divided by earnings before interest payments. BIS Review 10/2010  33  Table 1 Dividends and earnings in the UK and US  Source: Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations. 34  BIS Review 10/2010

This means that the measures have probably achieved and are continuing to achieve greater demand for domestically-produced goods and services, higher employment and thus, ultimately, greater cost and price increases than we otherwise would have experienced. The monetary policy conducted last year can therefore be said to have contributed towards turning the development of inflation and inflation expectations around (see Figures 3 and 7). The positive effect of last year’s measures on inflation expectations is also suggested by the slight increase in what is known as inflation compensation – that is, the difference between the yields for nominal and real government bonds – in conjunction with the announcements of repo rate cuts and bond purchases that came as surprises. Standing prepared to make monetary policy more expansionary Inflation and inflation expectations are now higher than they were one year ago. But, over the autumn, the development of inflation was weaker than we predicted and the rise in inflation is still largely due to the krona being weak. If the rise in inflation is broken, confidence in the inflation target may be weakened. We are therefore prepared to do even more if it proves necessary to safeguard the inflation target. We still have many possible measures in our toolbox. Experiences from the past year suggest that cuts to the repo rate and repo rate path also work below zero and that purchases of securities form a good complement. We can do more in this style if we deem that inflation prospects are changing.
Europe has made some good progress in tackling this issue in recent years, in particular in harmonising the rules needed for the transparency and integrity of securities markets. Nonetheless, obstacles remain. One is legal uncertainty for cross-border holding and issuance of debt and equity securities – for example, different national definitions of securities ownership.7 Another is differences in national insolvency laws, which make it difficult for investors to properly evaluate the risks they assume when investing in securities in other jurisdictions. Still another is the transaction costs that investors face when engaging in cross-border securities trading due to divergent corporate governance and tax regimes.8 In other words, building a truly integrated capital market in Europe requires further efforts and new legislation extending far beyond Banking Union. It is essential that the progress we have made on the banking side does not cause us to lose reform momentum here. And this is not a case of politics directing markets; it is about policy creating the pre-conditions for markets function properly. Firm size The effects of location on access to finance are exacerbated by firm size. While firms are in general more credit-constrained in some jurisdictions than others, this phenomenon is particularly apparent for SMEs. For example, the percentage of financially constrained but viable SMEs – defined to be those with positive turnover in the last six months seeking a bank loan – varies from a minimum of 1% in Germany and Austria to a quarter of the total population in Spain and even a third in Portugal.

Fines for bad behavior drain resources that could be better used to expand access and improve services, but billions of dollars in avoidable penalties are just the start. The time spent handling a legal crisis is time not spent on more productive pursuits. Moreover, I worry that, in the long term, an industry that develops a reputation for dubious ethics will not attract the best talent.3 In contrast, a trustworthy financial services sector will be more productive and better able to support the economy. Reliable financial intermediaries can help increase the flow of credit, promote economic growth and make the financial system more stable. This is why restoring trustworthiness must be the ultimate goal of reforming culture. The industry’s shared norms—its culture—will not change by mere exhortation to the good, whether from me or from the industry’s CEOs. In my experience, people respond far more to incentives and clear accountability than to statements of virtues and values. The latter are worthy and necessary, but remain aspirational or even illusory unless they are tied to real consequences.4 What does it mean for a firm to profess to putting the customer first, if employees are compensated and promoted regardless of what’s good for customers? Or, worse, if they are not held to account for activities that can harm customers? If we focus on nothing else in today’s conference, let’s explore how best to structure incentives and reinforce accountability to align with core purposes and first principles.