samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When the fiscal rule was introduced, the expected return was estimated at 4 percent. The estimates presented today entail a considerably lower expected rate of return for any realistic equity allocation. As mentioned, with an equity allocation of 75 percent, the expected annual real return will be about 2.5 percent per year over the next ten years. Chart: Petroleum revenue spending over the budget Another important objective of the GPFG and the fiscal rule is to insulate the budget from sharp fluctuations in oil revenues. The GPFG is now so large and finances such a sizeable share of government spending that it may become just as important to manage swings in the fund’s value as swings in petroleum revenues. The fiscal authorities face an important trade-off: on the one hand, closely linking fiscal policy to changes in the value of the GPFG will have a substantial impact on other government spending and revenues from one year to another. This is far from desirable. On the other hand, a substantial degree of decoupling between changes in the GPFG’s value and government spending of its funds over the budget could lead to greater uncertainty about the value of the GPFG in the longer term. Oil revenue spending should be based on a realistic estimate of expected return. At the same time, due consideration must be given to return uncertainty. It may therefore be wise to consider spending somewhat less than the expected return over time.

Moreover, our statistics have been integrated into the euro area accounts, which provide an overall picture of the euro area economy. The next milestone is the release of the new investment funds statistics, today. For some years, the ECB has already published un-harmonised and partly estimated euro area investment fund statistics, at a quarterly frequency. Today we will present, for the first time, harmonised investment fund statistics that cover all investment funds resident in the euro area. This includes data for the main fund types such as bond, equity or mixed funds, but also other types of funds, including hedge funds. Our new dataset contains much more detailed breakdowns both on the assets held and liabilities issued by investment funds. The data provide, for example, detailed information on the residency and sector of the issuers of securities and shares held by the funds. New information is available, as well, on the residency of the holders of the shares issued by euro area investment funds. In addition to the detailed quarterly information, the ECB now also publishes key monthly information on the outstanding amounts and net sales of shares issued by the funds. A further important improvement concerns the timeliness of the publication of these statistics: as from 2010, the statistics will become available after one-and-a-half months (compared to 3-and-a-half months in the past). There are many reasons why high quality statistics on euro area investment funds are important for the ECB’s monetary and financial analysis.
The Spectre of Monetarism Speech given by Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England  Roscoe Lecture Liverpool John Moores University 5 December 2016  I am grateful to Ben Nelson and Iain de Weymarn for their assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Phil Bunn, Daniel Durling, Alastair Firrell, Jennifer Nemeth, Alice Owen, James Oxley, Claire Chambers, Alice Pugh, Paul Robinson, Carlos Van Hombeeck, and Chris Yeates for background analysis and research. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Real incomes falling for a decade. The legacy of a searing financial crisis weighing on confidence and growth. The very nature of work disrupted by a technological revolution. th  This was the middle of the 19 century. Liverpool was in the midst of a golden age; its Custom House was the national Exchequer’s biggest source of revenue. And Karl Marx was scribbling in the British Library, warning of a spectre haunting Europe, the spectre of communism. We meet today during the first lost decade since the 1860s. In the wake of a global financial crisis. And in the midst of a technological revolution that is once again changing the nature of work. Substitute Northern Rock for Overend Gurney; Uber and machine learning for the Spinning Jenny and the steam engine; and Twitter for the telegraph; and you have dynamics that echo those of 150 years ago. Then the villains were the capitalists. Should they today be the central bankers? Are their flights of fancy promoting stagnation and inequality?

2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  2  The deepening of the symbiotic relationship between global markets and technological progress has lifted more than a billion people out of poverty (Chart 2), while a series of technological advances have fundamentally enriched our lives. Chart 1: 3 ½ billion people have internet access  Chart 2: 1 billion fewer people live on less than $ a day since the early 1980s  Billions of people  Billions of people  3.5  2.0 1.8  3.0  1.6 2.5  1.4 1.2  2.0  1.0 1.5  0.8 0.6  1.0  0.4 0.5  Number of poor at $ a day (2011 PPP)  0.2  0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  0.0  Source: Internet Live Stats. An internet user is defined as an individual who can access the Internet at home, via any device type and connection. 2015 and 2016 are estimates. 1981  1986  1991  1996  2001  2006  2011  Source: World Bank. $ a day is the World Bank’s current global poverty line. Globally, since 1960, real per capita GDP has risen more than two-and-a-half times (Chart 3), average ii  incomes have begun to converge, and life expectancy has increased by nearly two decades (Chart 4).
- N21 MPR  3.5 2023 2024 Unemp. - Scenario  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. In the literature estimates of the policy lag seem to vary quite a bit. In Cloyne and Hurtgen (2016, ‘The macroeconomic effects of monetary policy: a new measure for the United Kingdom’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics), the authors find that the peak effect of changes in UK monetary policy takes well over two years to come through. Cesa-Bianchi, Thwaites and Vicondoa (2020, ‘Monetary policy transmission in the United Kingdom: a high frequency identification approach’, European Economic Review) provide evidence of material effects after barely a year. 2  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  In other words, there would’ve been no way to control inflation in prices but, at the same time, leave nominal wages and nominal household incomes untouched. It’s sometimes been suggested that, had monetary policy acted to suppress it, consumers might have been protected from this rise in the cost of living. Unfortunately, that’s not true. At a fundamental level this is because monetary policy cannot, over the long run, offset real economic shocks. If structural productivity grows more slowly, for example – as it did after the financial crisis – then, ultimately, real wages will do so as well, no matter what happens to monetary policy.

At a deeper level there are also some signs of a rotation away from goods demand and back towards services. Non-auto durables spending in the US has fallen back a little in the second half of this year. And although trends in the UK are less important in this respect (our share of global goods demand is small), you 6  See “Asian countries are at last abandoning zero-covid strategies”, The Economist Oct 9th 2021 edition. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  can see from Chart 11 that retail spending here has also declined since the spring. I mentioned a moment ago that some of the shifts in spending caused by the pandemic had persisted, even as pandemic itself receded. You can also see in Chart 11 that spending on transport is still a long way short of pre-pandemic levels, not least because many of us are still working from home (to some extent, at least). But total spending on services has nonetheless outgrown that on goods in the second half of this year. Finally, and more generally, we know that, in many instances, tradable goods prices exhibit a significant degree of mean reversion. More often than not, big  Chart 12. Shipping costs have fallen in recent months and forward contracts suggest further material declines Jan 2017 = 100 400  rises are followed not just by slower growth but  Latest  outright declines.
I would like to highlight four emerging lessons from the current crisis that should help prevent future problems. First, we need to understand better the various sources of liquidity risk, particularly under stressed conditions. Second, banks need to develop more effective contingency funding plans. Third, banks should support improved market functioning and stricter market discipline through better disclosure. And finally, supervision should ensure that banks’ liquidity risk management is undertaken to a more robust standard, in order to internalise some of the costs of a bank failure on the wider financial system. I shall cover these briefly in turn. Banks and public authorities alike need to develop a more in-depth and more complete understanding of the various forms in which liquidity risk can arise. That requires both a careful analysis of the various potential sources of liquidity risk, and of how such risks may crystallise under stressed market conditions. As outlined earlier, in today’s financial environment, it is not just the simple maturity transformation between deposits and loans that generates liquidity risk for banks. To this must be added contingent risks, such as the potential activation of liquidity lines to off-balance sheet vehicles, or the drawing of committed facilities extended to corporate customers. Contingent risks may also arise, in a variety of forms, from complex trading instruments, as detailed well by the Institute for International Finance (IIF) last year.

4  BIS Review 50/2008  Section IV: Lessons The recent turmoil has highlighted clear deficiencies in banks’ liquidity risk management. And it has also demonstrated that these deficiencies pose serious risks to financial stability and thus to the economy more broadly. To address this risk in the near term, central banks globally have provided additional liquidity to the banking system and emergency operations have been conducted to support Northern Rock and Bear Stearns. Additional liquidity has been provided at longer-term maturities to address the problem of funding an unexpected overhang of illiquid assets. The Bank’s recently launched Special Liquidity Scheme is enabling UK banks to liquefy a proportion of their outstanding stock of illiquid assets by swapping them for high quality liquid government securities, while ensuring that credit risks remain very clearly with the banks. That should ease current funding pressures. But in the medium term, it is clear that action is needed to strengthen the financial system’s defences to liquidity risk to limit the likelihood of any recurrence of the recent problems. Central banks globally are reviewing the lessons of the episode for their market operations, for example, to ensure that the usefulness of facilities is not undermined by perceptions of stigma that may be attached to a bank that uses them. But it is clear that primary responsibility for bolstering the defences lies with the banks themselves and that supervisory regimes for liquidity risk need reinforcing to support that process.
Now, of course, it all depends on how badly you need that car, and in reality some price levels may stay elevated and some may not. Monetary policy should not respond to supply shocks which do not become generalised through their impact on inflation expectations. In more modern times, and certainly in the life of the MPC, supply shocks have tended to be temporary in terms of their impact on inflation. But if that is not likely to be the case in our assessment, we will step in and adjust policy as needed. Nothing has changed in our approach. To illustrate this approach, let me briefly summarise the announcement we made at the end of our meeting last week, drawing out the differences of view, which are very reasonable differences. The MPC emphasised that the inflation target applies at all times, with a clear focus on medium-term prospects for inflation rather than transient factors. The judgements required by this medium-term focus are particularly important and challenging at a time like this of very large shocks to the economy. For most members of the MPC, the outlook for the labour market – as I described earlier – is highly uncertain and to some degree likely to be resolved in fairly short order, and this justified a wait and see approach on policy in view of the continuing belief that higher inflation will be temporary.

The weakness of the recovery has led some people to suggest that we could increase the effectiveness of quantitative easing by directing the money used to buy the gilts to buying private sector assets instead, or else to inject purchasing power more directly by passing it directly to households in the manner of Friedman’s famous helicopter. Such options can always be split into two legs: a fiscal leg, involving some bond-financed public expenditure and which ought to be subject to the control of the Chancellor and the Treasury; followed by a second monetary, or financing, leg in which the Bank buys the corresponding quantity of government debt on the secondary market and is just conventional quantitative easing. Viewing it this way is, I believe, helpful as it allows one to focus on the merits of the alternative use to which the funds are put. For instance, the easiest way to implement a “helicopter drop” would be to increase tax allowances temporarily. But the life cycle/permanent income model of consumption behaviour suggests that one should expect the vast majority of such a temporary windfall to be saved rather than spent. It certainly is not the obvious way to try to boost demand, unless one can direct the additional income to credit-constrained consumers who are more likely to spend it. In any case, the design of any fiscal intervention does not need to be tied to the question of how the financing is split between money and bonds.
17/18  Conclusion In conclusion, allow me to recall that, in a setting of limited potential growth, the only means of improving the economy’s well-being turns on raising productivity. Indeed, set against the mere accumulation of production factors, increasing productivity is the sole mechanism that can generate sustained and stable economic growth in the long run. It is therefore crucial to make the structural reforms needed to improve productivity dynamics. Among other aspects, there is ample room to undertake reforms that reduce labour market duality, limit regulations impinging on competition and the allocation of resources, and eliminate the human and technological capital shortfall. Thank you for your attention. 18/18

Whatever is negotiated, in terms of both the final arrangements and the transition to them, the most important influence on demand in the short run will be the degree of access to the single market since the UK runs a 1.5% trade surplus in services and a 5% trade deficit in goods. 45  External demand for UK exports will also reflect the extent to which UK firms can maintain their positions in EU-based global supply chains. The proportion of UK exports that are intermediate components of EU value th  rd  chains has increased from about 1/5 of exports in 1995 to about 1/3 in 2014 (Chart 13). 46  Increasingly,  44  Literally: stepping back in order to jump better. The ultimate impact of Brexit on EU demand for UK exports depends on the extent to which UK access to EU markets resembles being a member of the customs union for goods and the single market, which covers trade in goods and services as well. 46 World input-output database. See also Credit Suisse, ‘Brexiting the supply chain’, European Economics Research 11 August 2016. 45  17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  the UK doesn’t so much export to Europe as through Europe; it is a supplier of components to final goods that are exported beyond the continent.
In continuously creating an enabling environment for the efficient functioning of the MIFC, the Malaysian commercial banks and investment banks are allowed to establish International Currency Business Units (ICBUs) to carry out Islamic  2  BIS Review 129/2007  banking business under their existing entities. Foreign institutions are also allowed to take up to 49% of the equity of domestic takaful operators and Islamic banks. To enhance the delivery system, an executive committee of key government officials, financial regulators and industry players has been set up for the effective and efficient implementation of the MIFC initiatives. Among others, an "executive green lane" has been accorded to expedite applications by expatriates for long-term employment passes with multiple entry visas. To allow greater operational flexibility within the Shariah parameters, the Islamic financial system adopt a conducive stance on Shariah interpretations and practices, consistent with its international dimensions. It mutually recognizes and accommodates the various juristic reasoning that has been approved by recognized Shariah advisers. To accord better access to MIFC information, Bank Negara Malaysia has launched the MIFC Portal at www.mifc.com as the primary source of comprehensive on-line information on the MIFC. It provides information on the latest initiatives, incentives and developments in the MIFC, and enables convenient access to application forms, procedures and guidelines related to entrance and participation in the MIFC.

The announcements following the recent G20 Summit and the associated announcements of the Financial Stability Board reflect the international economic regulatory cooperation that will set the agenda for the conventional standard setting bodies to put in place a framework to strengthen the international regulatory standards. It will also form the basis by which assessments will be made by multilateral agencies such as the IMF. It is therefore important for there to be engagement with the prudential standard setting entities for Islamic finance, not only to raise awareness of whether the new standards being introduced can be applied to Islamic finance and whether modifications need to be made but there could also be possible consequences that are unintended. Equally important is for there to be recognition of the standards that have been issued for Islamic finance specifically by the Islamic Financial Services Board. As a growing component of the international financial system, it becomes important for the interface and engagement with the international standard setting entities to take place given the common interest of global financial stability. Let me conclude my remarks. While the inherent strengths of Islamic finance have contributed to its viability and resilience, going forward into the future, the foundations for its sustainability as a competitive form of financial intermediation will continue to be strengthened.
All households who have previously paid more than SEK 4,500 a year in property tax will have lower monthly costs, according to this proposal. If households choose to use the sum they save on the abolished tax to take out larger loans, it is possible that this will lead to a slightly faster increase in prices than would otherwise have been the case. If the increased opportunities to borrow were to have a full impact on house prices, the reform could push up prices by around five per cent. The price increases would probably be highest in the parts of Sweden with the higher taxation values, where they have previously paid a relatively higher tax rate. However, there are a number of factors that imply that this calculation probably overestimates the effect on prices. Firstly, the Government has been indicating for some time that it intended to lower property tax. It is therefore possible that house prices have already been affected to some extent by the decision. Secondly, the price increases could be counteracted by the higher capital gains tax. Thirdly, if households believe that the property tax will in some way be increased in the future, it is not certain that they will be prepared to increase their borrowing. As I said, it is not easy to measure the overall effects of the changed taxes. This is a subject which I believe we will have reason to discuss further in the future.

Lower real interest rates mean that it becomes cheaper for households to take out loans when buying housing. The low interest rates are therefore an important driving force behind the price increases. Secondly, developments in the real economy have been favourable after the crisis. Although unemployment has periodically been high measured by Swedish standards, households’ disposable incomes have increased substantially. Higher incomes have meant that households can afford to pay more for their housing. Thirdly, prices have also been affected by the fact that construction declined considerably directly after the crisis. When the demand for housing accelerated, it took some time before this could be met by a growing number of new houses on the market. Quite simply, it takes time to build houses. It was not until around 2000, when house prices had become higher and made new production of housing more attractive, that construction really accelerated. Moreover, there have been some significant changes in the mortgage market, which have also contributed to house prices rising so sharply. I will return to these changes shortly. The development of these factors largely explains why house prices have risen as much as they have in recent years. It does not appear to be a question of general over-optimism among households and lenders. I therefore do not see any serious risks to financial stability from developments in house prices at present. Household indebtedness has also risen substantially Household indebtedness has kept pace with property prices and has thus risen substantially.