samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(cnBlog – official blog of the Czech National Bank). Adam, T. and Michl, A. (2023). Inflace klesá – prbžné vyhodnocení dezinflaního procesu v esku [Inflation is falling – an interim assessment of the disinflation process in the Czech Republic] (cnBlog – official blog of the Czech National Bank). Bianchi, F. and Melosi, L. (2022). Inflation as a Fiscal Limit. (FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2022-37). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4205158 Blinder, A. (2022). A Monetary and Fiscal History of the United States, 1961–2021. Princeton University Press. IBSN: 0691238383. Bullard, J. (2023, 12 May). The Monetary-Fiscal Policy Mix and Central Bank Strategy [conference presentation]. Hoover Institution at Stanford University. 5/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Cochrane, J. H. (2023). The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Princeton University Press. IBSN: 9780691242248. Czech National Bank [CNB]. (2022). Inflation through the lens of demand factors. (CNB Monetary Policy Report – Autumn 2022), 30. Ddek, O. and Michl, A. (2021, 13 October). Krotitelé nákladové inflace [Tamers of costpush inflation]. Mladá fronta DNES. Frait, J. (2023, 17 March). Monetary Macroeconomics and Central Banks in Turbulent Times [lecture transcript]. Czech National Bank. Frait, J. and Matj, M. (2023a). The current monetary conditions in the Czech Republic: tight or easy? (cnBlog – official blog of the Czech National Bank). Frait, J. and Matj, M. (2023b). Are interest rates really unusually low by comparison to inflation? (cnBlog – official blog of the Czech National Bank). Kubíek, J. and Morda, P. (2023).

Aleš Michl: The road to the target Speech by Mr Aleš Michl, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the University of Economics and Business, Prague, 15 May 2023. *** Dear Rector, esteemed guests, It was a privilege for me to study and obtain my master's degree and Ph.D. here at the University of Economics and Business. I have good news for the public today: inflation is finally falling. Annual headline inflation peaked in September last year, when it reached 18%. We managed to stop it. In line with our expectations, a gradual downward trend in inflation started in February this year. Inflation fell to 16.7% in February and then to 15%. And finally, in April, it stood at 12.7%. Within three months, it should be below 10% in annual terms. This is not a victory. In the second half of the year, inflation will still be at a level we must not put up with. We must not get used to it. We must not adapt to it. Interest rates will therefore remain high for longer. A strong koruna is also important for the economy. Based on FRA rates, the market is expecting a rate decrease as early as in the next quarter. We consider the market expectations regarding the timing of the first decrease in rates to be premature. We must continue to fight for long-standing low and stable inflation. A strong koruna played an important role in the turnaround in inflation. We adjusted the monetary policy strategy in July 2022.
Until last August, the MPC had shied away from providing such explicit guidance, lest it be misinterpreted as a promise independent of the state of the economy. Instead we preferred to provide an implicit steer through the medium of the projections contained in our quarterly Inflation Report. Last August, however, the MPC decided that more explicit guidance about our reaction function could be helpful. Rather than aiming to provide more stimulus as in the academic literature, we were merely seeking to ensure that the recovery was not nipped in the bud by a premature rise in market interest rates, despite there still being a significant margin of economic slack. We said then that we would not even countenance a rise in Bank Rate until unemployment had fallen to 7%, subject to overrides relating to excessive upward movements in inflation expectations and to the risks to financial stability, the latter being policed by the Financial Policy Committee. We chose unemployment in part because its behaviour is directly linked to one of the key uncertainties at the current juncture, namely the scope for a recovery in productivity. This has been unusually weak since the onset of the crisis for reasons we do not yet fully understand (Chart 2). If productivity rebounded, then unemployment would fall slowly. But in that case, there would also be more scope to maintain an expansionary policy before inflationary pressures began to rise.

First, we have less of a handle on their impact than we do changes in short-term policy rates and, as I just indicated, that impact may well be less when markets are functioning normally. Second, if the central bank routinely deals in large quantities of government debt, it may find itself more open to pressure from the fiscal authorities, while market participants are more likely to fear that the debt will be permanently monetised. That brings me naturally to the topic of unwinding our present large stock of asset purchases. We have committed to maintaining the stock, including reinvesting the cash flows associated with maturing gilts, at least until the first rise in Bank Rate. But at some stage thereafter, as part of the transition back to normality, we expect to start running down the portfolio and withdrawing the associated bank reserves. In principle, we could do this just by letting the gilts mature. However, as Chart 5 demonstrates, it would take a long time to run off organically in its entirety because of the relatively long average maturity of the gilts held: the weighted average maturity of the portfolio is more than 12 years. So more active sales may be called for at some stage,  2  For the United Kingdom, see: Michael Joyce, Matthew Tong and Robert Woods (2011), “The United Kingdom’s Quantitative Easing Policy: Design, Operation and Impact”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 51(3), pp.200–212.
The paper, written while they were both working in the New York Fed's Research Group in the mid-1990s, formed the basis of many internal discussions in 1999-2000 and 2006-2007 as the U.S. yield curve inverted.11 Much of the internal discussion was around trying to understand whether the properties of the yield curve were different. The current estimate from this model is a 23.6 percent chance that the U.S. economy will be in an NBER-defined recession in January 2020. Just like Tetlock, Arturo liked to extremize the results of the model, so for example a probability of at or above 30 percent is moved to 100 percent and below 30 percent is moved to zero. One reason to extremize the results is that the prediction object is a recession in one particular month, rather than the probability of a recession over a period of time. Marcelle Chauvet and I analyzed this more general problem.12 Our goal was to avoid the problem with the probit model that a constant forecast of, for example, a 25 percent probability that the economy will be in 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  recession in 12 months' time implying after one year of such monthly predictions a 97 percent probability the economy would be in a recession in at least one month of the 12. This is similar to the issue I mentioned earlier, where some of the superforecasters appear to have had difficulty calibrating their probability assessments over varying time horizons.

I expect the unemployment rate to edge down to slightly below 3.5 percent next year, the lowest level in nearly 50 years. In keeping with this strong economic outlook, I expect price inflation to move up a bit above 2 percent. Importantly, I don’t see any signs of greater inflationary pressures on the horizon. This is all very good news, especially in the context of the slow recovery and low inflation that has persisted in the years since the financial crisis. In light of the progress we’ve made on our monetary policy goals, the FOMC has been in the process of gradually normalizing monetary policy for the past few years. Looking forward, I continue to expect that further gradual increases in interest rates will best foster a sustained economic expansion and achievement of our dual mandate goals. Since first raising rates from near-zero back in December 2015, the FOMC has continued to 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  raise the target range for the federal funds rate as the economy has improved and moved toward our maximum employment and 2 percent longer-run inflation objective. Our most recent rate increase came in late September, when the FOMC set the target range between 2 and 2.25 percent.2 Throughout, we’ve repeatedly stressed that we foresaw this to be a process of gradual normalization, reflecting the balancing of risks to reaching our goals.
It needs to recognise that the improving terms of trade driving those improved prospects for activity is simultaneously weighing on both inflation (through the direct and indirect effects of energy price falls) and inflation persistence (by reducing the intensity of the distributional conflict, as the foreign claim on domestically generated economic surplus falls back). Having said that, some part of the recent positive news to UK employment and activity might have a less benign interpretation as regards inflation prospects. If it were to reflect a new positive demand shock, rather than the unwinding of the deterioration in the terms of trade, then – other things equal – it would strengthen the case for further monetary tightening. In that case, the recent improvement in the prospects for UK employment would challenge the view embodied in the MPC’s February forecast that an easing in the labour market – as reflected in higher unemployment, a lower vacancy-to-unemployment ratio, or less job churn – will ultimately weigh against persistent inflationary pressures. In interpreting the implications of recent data for monetary policy, the MPC will need to exercise its judgement about which of these two underlying stories is more relevant. Concluding remarks In February, the MPC signalled that it had adopted a more ‘data-dependent’ stance. This was consistent with establishing a clear inflection point in the upward path of Bank Rate – but not necessarily a pause, still less a turning point.

News conference  Berne, 25 March 2020 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan  Ladies and Gentlemen First, on behalf of the entire Swiss National Bank, I would like to express our sympathy to all those directly affected by coronavirus. Swiss society and our country’s economy face enormous challenges. The SNB is working closely with the Federal Council, the authorities and the business community to overcome this crisis. The measures adopted by the SNB complement those of the Confederation and are intended to cushion the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Monetary policy supplements the various fiscal measures taken by the public authorities. The Swiss National Bank has set up the SNB COVID-19 refinancing facility (CRF). This instrument is designed to strengthen the supply of credit to the Swiss economy by providing the banking system with additional liquidity. There is no upper limit on the amounts available under the CRF, and drawdowns can be made at any time. The CRF will be available from 26 March 2020. The CRF operates in conjunction with the federal government’s guarantees for corporate loans. The facility allows banks to obtain liquidity from the SNB, which is secured by these federally guaranteed loans. In taking this action, we are enabling banks to access the required liquidity that will allow them to expand their lending rapidly and on a large scale. The interest rate for these refinancing transactions corresponds to the SNB policy rate, currently −0.75%.
It fell from an unsustainable peak, of course, but the drop was spectacular nonetheless. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Where are we now, almost five years later? First, there is hardly any talk of a potential sovereign default any more: the public sector has a primary surplus, the overall deficit is estimated to have been around 2% of GDP last year, government debt as a share of GDP is on a downward trajectory, and Iceland has investment-grade ratings from all three major rating agencies. Second, we are far advanced in rebuilding a domestically oriented financial sector. The new domestic banks, which were built on the ashes of the three failing cross-border banks, are profitable, well capitalised, liquid, and with nonperforming loan ratios that, although still high due the crisis, are falling to normal levels as private sector debt restructuring progresses and the economy recovers. Third, the economy has indeed recovered, as can been seen on Figure 1a. The economy has been growing since the second quarter of 2010, and unemployment has fallen from a peak of over 9% to around 5½%. And as Figure 1b shows, this year Iceland is projected to be among the world’s five fastest-growing advanced economies, with growth estimated at 2.1%, although that is due in part to the recent slowdown in many other advanced countries.

Let me conclude by saying that Iceland has made great strides since the autumn of 2008. The next major task is to re-integrate Iceland financially into the global economy, but hopefully in a safer way this time. Thank you very much. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9
Timely implementation of consistent and coordinated policies in a coherent manner is also essential to ensure the realisation of the expected outcome of such policies. In this context, this Road Map intends to set the basis for strong policies and credible frameworks to achieve macroeconomic stability with the support of the government and private sector stakeholders. The outline of the Road Map 2019 is as follows: Section 2: The Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy and policies for 2019 and beyond Section 3: The Central Bank’s policies related to the financial sector performance and stability in 2019 and beyond Section 4: Policies Related to Ancillary and Agency Functions Now, let me elaborate further on these aspects. 11  2. Monetary Policy Strategy and Policies for 2019 and Beyond The Central Bank conducts monetary policy in an increasingly forward looking manner with the aim of maintaining inflation at low and stable levels in the medium term thereby supporting the economy to reach its potential. In 2018, the Central Bank conducted its monetary policy in a challenging environment with rapidly evolving adverse global conditions as well as several upside and downside risks on the domestic front. New developments in the global economy in the wake of rate hikes in the United States and the economic normalisation in most advanced economies have demanded monetary authorities around the world to adjust their monetary policies accordingly.

Besides tackling the various issues, risks and challenges of navigating these uncertain and volatile times, the FMC has been mandated to formulate and propose strategies to take the financial market development forward. I would like to thank the members of the Financial Market Committee and industry association representatives for collaborating with us for the common and greater good of market development. The FMC and its subcommittees have met several times. Some of the initiatives have already been rolled out; such as the extending of trading hours for the FX market and the KL USD/MYR reference rate. Some are going through the woodworks of development. I would like to discuss a few here. 1. We are embarking on a progressive journey of a more liberalized and conducive financial market operating environment. As a concrete step, I would like to announce the introduction of a pilot program for the USD/MYR and CNH/MYR markets. Under this program, residents will be allowed to undertake hedging transaction for USD and CNH against ringgit without the need for sighting of the underlying documents. Subject to a position limit, only a declaration by the customers will be sufficient. Accordingly, cancellation of the hedging will also be freely allowed. 2. To further complement this, the Bank is also currently working with the Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia to facilitate the introduction of USD and CNH against Ringgit futures for the onshore exchange. Similar to the interbank market, these will, for now, be subjected to position limits, and for now only applicable to residents.
This is especially the case of Macedonia and Croatia (with 55% and 62% of total financial assets, respectively) with most CESEE countries staying above the EU average (30%). Subsequently, equity, insurance and pension investments are below the EU average. There are some notable exceptions (Estonia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Lithuania) with share of equity and investment fund shares in total financial assets of 52%, 42%%, 40% and 40% respectively. Broadening the financial knowledge of households and raising their awareness of the possible investment alternatives, might provide support to institutional investors. Chart 16: Households` financial assets  Source: Eurostat  Even if the potential of institutional investors is large or underutilized, allocating their funds to cover the financing gaps requires tailored-made financial instruments. “These groups of investors are more likely to be interested in investments in fixed income instruments, given their potential to deliver long stable cash flows with attractive yields, but potentially with less volatility than equity options”. Instruments that can be used for this purpose are: 1) corporate bonds issuance (by SMEs and SME lenders), 2) securitization structures (project bonds on infrastructure side and loan securitization on the SME side), 3) covered bonds (mainly for SMEs financing), and 4) debt funds (for infrastructure and SME related assets). Given the low level of development of capital market structures in CESEE countries, connecting SMEs financing needs with the funds of bank and non-bank investors via securitization of SMEs loan seems to be viable solution, thus assisting banks in their ability to fund and distribute a risk.

The level of investment, ten years after the emergence of the crisis, is below the pre-crisis maximum in the EU as a whole, and in the CESEE region as well. Exception is countries such as Macedonia, Poland, and Estonia recently, where investment pattern was different, and the current level is above the pre-crisis one. Chart 3: GDP and demand components, 2008=100 CEE  160.0  160.0  140.0  120.0  120.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  80.0  60.0  60.0  40.0  20.0  20.0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  40.0  180.0  SEE  140.0  Baltics  180.0 160.0  140.0  140.0  120.0  120.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  80.0  60.0  60.0  40.0  40.0  20.0  20.0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  160.0  Region  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  180.0  Source: Eurostat and NBRM calculations. At the current juncture, an important question is whether such slow post-crisis investment recovery should be perceived as a natural cyclical adjustment, or are there some structural forces that also play role?
Compared to some countries at this time, the banking sector in Thailand is functioning normally, with the financial markets remaining relatively stable despite greater volatility and uncertainty in the global economy. At the Bank of Thailand, we are optimistic that policy efforts at the global level will be successful in stabilizing the financial markets and in providing a comprehensive solution to the current crisis. Nevertheless, our view is that the adjustment that follows, and hence the process of global recovery, will probably take time. More importantly, in the Thai context, given the global nature of the crisis, and the fact that our economy has been affected mainly through contagion, it will be difficult for an economy like Thailand to achieve a sustained recovery on our own, if the global economy does not recover. Therefore, in the context of policy, the focus of policy response in Thailand should be on helping the economy and the private sector to adjust to the impact of the crisis, while ensuring that the key economic institutions and systems 6 most importantly the banking sector 6 continue to function normally, so that the economy will be in a position to move forward quickly once the crisis storm passes. BIS Review 45/2009  1  It is in this context that the Bank of Thailand has been shaping our response to the current economic downturn.

Domestic credit growth slowed to 6.8 percent in February while deposits grew by 6 percent. Contraction in economic activities further eased the pressure on prices, with headline inflation declined to a minus 0.2 percent in March. Given the sharp dislocation in economic activities in the last few months, market consensus now seems to agree on a small negative growth for Thailand this year, but with an improvement in growth next year. This means the market expects the Thai economy this year to go through a period of sharp adjustment on account of the global slowdown before growth is resumed next year. This view is consistent with the current mainstream view that, with the strengthening of the policy efforts at the global level, the world economy should look better next year compared to this year. As for the Bank of Thailand, our Monetary Policy Committee in its meeting next week, will also be going over this same question in assessing the near-term outlook for our deliberation of monetary policy. Whatever growth numbers we come up with, they will be conditional upon the prospects of the global economy going forward, especially after the G-20 announcement of the new global policy. Turning now to a more positive note, regardless of the adjustment we have to go through this year, or even next year, the Thai economy at this time is fundamentally stronger, and is in a better position to weather the crisis, compared with the situations we were in ten years ago during the Asian financial crisis.