samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The persistent Bank of Albania’s liquidity supply to the money market helped to calm the market participants down and supply the  BIS Review 158/2009  1  market with funds, which served to the private sector’s domestic currency intermediation. The needs for liquidity in the interbank market have decreased, hence exerting no pressure on short-term interest rates. The prudent monetary policy of the Bank of Albania has helped relieve the tension in the financial market, while the latest base interest rate cut should be translated into greater lending to the private sector. As we have already stated even previously, the Bank of Albania regards the future Albanian economic activity with a prudent optimism. I mean, in spite of the great shock we have gone through, the macroeconomic and financial stability of the country has not been affected. Furthermore, the restoring of confidence in the banking system opens the way to recovery of the lending process and sustaining of the economy with funds. On the other hand, the Bank of Albania keeps on pursuing a prudent stance, because the financial risks on the economy have not been completely overcome. The banking system has still liquidity shortages, whereas the global economy continues to be frail. Therefore, the economic prospect will depend on our joint work and on the performance of global economic and financial markets.

In concordance with the modern philosophy of macroeconomic administration, the Bank of Albania remains committed to not allowing that rapid and short-term economic growth impair the long-term development perspectives of our country. At microeconomic level, the growth of consumption in economy was followed by increased indebtedness in Albanian households’ and businesses’ balance sheets and by overinvestments in certain sectors of the economy. Both these indicators are either at lower levels than in the regional countries, or at similar levels; hence, they cannot be specified as problematic. However, their rapid growth rate creates the idea of a short-term vision of the economic agents, and in particular cases, even avoidance of rationality. Dwelling upon household consumption, the Bank of Albania invites all economic agents to be more forward-looking and realistic in their consumption and savings plans. This invitation does not imply the contraction of consumption or the change of preferences related to it, but merely placing it in the context of long-term plans that equal income and expenditure at a household level. Beyond the time-related dimension, as we have continuously drawn the attention, borrowers should be cautious as regards their loan currency. This implies that the matching of their loan currency with that of their income would be their best protection. In a more pragmatic  BIS Review 158/2009  3  approach, this advice may be reduced into an appeal for a close consultation with the banking system and the financial market’s specialized agents.
Once linked up, Herstatt risk of foreign exchange transactions involving the two currencies concerned will immediately be eliminated. Payment versus payment (PvP) and delivery versus payment (DvP) within Asian time will become a reality. 57. The fourth area for Asian monetary co-operation is banking supervision and financial regulation. As financial markets are further liberalized and integrated, the growth of cross-border banking activities and other financial transactions is accelerating, increasing the risk of contagion. As ultimately monetary problems surface in the banking system, it is important for regulators in different economies to co-operate to safeguard the integrity of the banking and financial systems in the region. Part of the work will involve the harmonization of supervisory practices, including the adoption of the Core Principles for effective supervision advocated by the Basle Committee. 58. Through working closer together, such as the collaboration of the EMEAP Study Group on Banking Supervision, supervisory authorities in the region would be able to improve their understanding of each others’ banking systems and supervision framework and approach. We will also review practices in the region against the existing Basle Committee benchmarks, identify reasons for any differences and thus help to raise the quality of supervision in the region. Over time, it may be possible to move on to the setting of standards. 59. Last, but not least, in Asia monetary co-operation concerns policy consultation. Clearly, there is scope to improve mutual understanding of each other’s policy framework and priorities.

At the EMEAP forum, monetary authorities have, as I mentioned earlier, examined the whole spectrum of central banking functions quite comprehensively and have identified issues where monetary co-operation would be beneficial. 46. Before going into these issues, let me just make two points about the approach that should be adopted in Asian monetary co-operation. First is that Asian monetary co-operation must be considered within the context of global monetary co-operation. In other words, we should not, and I believe we are not trying to, build Fortress Asia. I do not believe that this is in the best interest of Asia. It is essential that we work within the international monetary and institutional framework as much as possible. Let us not forget that the international monetary order is still largely determined by the G-3 currencies. Asian economies cannot on their own, or without the help of others, determine the fate of the G-3 currencies, even though we may have views about the future system. BIS Review 91/1997  - 10 -  47. Second is that, given the great diversity of the economies in the region, being at very different stages of financial development, Asian monetary co-operation should proceed with flexibility and at a pace comfortable to those wishing to take part in it.
If agents expect inflation to go down towards a target, they will price their goods accordingly and inflation persistence will be lower. If, in contrast, agents expect inflation to persist in high levels, they will price goods higher, making inflation more persistent and more difficult for the central bank to bring it down. As stated in Bernanke (2007): “a one-off change in energy prices can translate into persistent inflation only if it leads to higher expected inflation and a consequent “wage-price spiral”. With inflation expectations well anchored, a one-time increase in energy prices should not lead to a permanent increase in inflation, but only to a change in relative prices.” Credibility of the target in an inflation-targeting regime is therefore a key asset. If we were to give up on the inflation commitment, the future adjustment of interest rates to rein in inflation would have to be much larger, with adverse consequences on economic activity and relative prices, in particular the exchange rate. Indeed, we have witnessed many experiences where a persistent rise in inflation has required strong monetary policy actions, the most notable case being the great inflation of the USA in the 1970s and early 80s. The control of inflation in Chile has also come with a decline in inflationary persistence. Therefore, a credible commitment to price stability brings along output stability. Output stability, in turn, is an important factor to foster economic growth and the consequent social progress that comes with it (Ramey and Ramey, 1995, and Fatas, 2002).

One characteristic of the Chilean economy is that changes in costs are regularly passed on to consumer prices. Markets for foodstuff are globally integrated and competitive. In the case of fuels, every week the changes in the international price are passed on to domestic consumers. However, there is a price stabilization fund to smooth out short run fluctuations  BIS Review 39/2008  3  and recently there has been a gasoline tax cut, which ameliorates the large increase in international prices. Finally, the electric power price-setting mechanism is designed to pass changes in upstream marginal costs to retail prices. Electric power rates, affected by a rise in costs, posted an average increase of 23% during 2007 compared with a less than 6% average increase between 2000 and 2006. This context of price flexibility provides the right signals to markets. In the case of Chile, with the increase in the prices of electricity and minerals, several investment projects are in the pipeline, which will propel an expansion of supply. Electricity $ MM; index Dec-98=100) 1200  240  1000  200  800  160  600  120  400  80  200  40  0  0 96  98  00  02  04  06  III  07  Energy investment (2)  III  08 (1)  CPI Electricity  (1) Figures as of February. (2) Includes investment in buildings, engineering, equipments and others.
1 Given that the sixth anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers passed just a few weeks ago, let me briefly remind you of the hectic events that gave rise to the policy actions of the past few years. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 turned what had previously been a crunch in the interbank market into an outright financial panic. In the weeks and months after the collapse of Lehman, the prospect of a second Great Depression was real. In fact, key economic indicators showed worrying parallels in the early stages of the two crises; by  1  Galbraith (1990). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  January 2009 global industrial output had dropped by more than 10%, global trade by almost 20%, and the global stock market had lost about half of its value. 2 In the 1930s, all three of these indicators continued to fall for another two years, eventually leading to record unemployment of 25% in the United States and around 30% in the United Kingdom and Germany, the second and third largest economies at the time. This, at the end of 2008, was the environment in which policymakers found themselves and the prospect that they were trying to avoid. So how did they react? Almost immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers central banks, including the SNB, began to lower interest rates to almost zero.

The costs of fraud may not have reached commercially unacceptable levels, but in some countries they have reached socially unacceptable levels. So, we very much welcome the EPC taking a stance on these issues. The Eurosystem will also continue to monitor also this facet of the work on the integration of European payments. Improving information security, as well as preventing fraud should remain a key focus of attention in 2010. Ambition needed: SEPA for Cards and eSEPA A frequently asked question is whether the financial crisis has had an impact on the SEPA project and the pace of migration. During the financial crisis, banks’ retail payments business  1  Joint Statement of the European Commission and the ECB on the future SDD business model, 24 March 2009. 2  Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 on cross-border payments in the Community and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001. 3  For non-euro area banks the reachability deadline for euro direct debits is 1 November 2014. 2  BIS Review 151/2009  has proven to be a solid and stable source of revenue. At the same time, I understand that the retail payments are also a costly part of banks’ operations. The aim of SEPA is to make payments in euro more efficient, not just for customers but also for banks, which would strengthen the case for investment in the SEPA project. Despite the financial crisis, cashless payments increased, on a global basis, by almost 9% to 250 billion transactions per year in 2008.
‘Building Societies’ excludes Nationwide.

Transparency and disclosure are very important but we believed it was not sufficient. We have thus been working closely with the Vice-President on strengthening our banks’ solvency. A result of this has been the recently approved Royal Decree-Law, which we believe is a definitive step and a crucial quantitative and qualitative leap forward in restoring market confidence in Spanish banks. The aims of the new Royal Decree-Law are very clear. The first is to reinforce the solvency of all our banks, requiring them a level of core capital of 8% and because the doubts of investors over a small group of unlisted banks with some need to resort to the wholesale market, we are demanding of such banks 10% of core capital. We publicly announced yesterday which banks need capital to reach the 8–10% level, and how much capital they need. We have given them fifteen days to submit a recapitalisation plan. Those intending to tap the markets will have until end-September to attain the new level of capital. But we have made it very clear that if a bank believes it will be impossible to reach these solvency levels, it can apply to the FROB for these funds. The capital shortfall is for a maximum of € million, whereby the impact on public debt if the FROB has to be used would be relatively limited.
B. Fostering “co-opetition” between established players and new entrants Innovation is often associated with FinTech firms and challengers, such as the start-ups that build success from an ability to focus their business and cut costs for a specific service or link in the payment chain. Yet commercial banks, which have traditionally been a major force in payments, also play a key role in innovation. Likewise, the main card schemes helped to drive the emergence of new payment methods, such as contactless payments and mobile payment terminals. Through partnerships, acquisitions and incubation projects, but also by harnessing in house R&D, established participants have expanded their service offerings to add new solutions, while developing competition and cooperation with new entrants. “Co-opetition” relationships are a  deep-rooted feature of the payment industry and are proven to generate value. The challenge now is to nurture them over the long run, taking care to ensure that relationships with BigTech firms are included. This is because the potential network effects enjoyed by BigTech payment solutions and the upstream payment chain positions of these firms could create risks of competitive distortion, particularly in situations where these participants also provide hardware or software components. Users could find themselves effectively captives of an ecosystem and left with no choice in terms of payment service, or at least be influenced by BigTech firms to use their services at the expense of competitors.

A first report will be presented by summer 2021 to the Governing Council,  which will then decide whether to extend the analytical work by carrying out an investigatory phase. In the end, the challenge is to determine whether and in what way a central bank digital euro is necessary. Key areas of analysis include a consideration of ways to prevent a digital euro from leading to excessive conversion of bank deposits into CBDC, which could disrupt bank 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  refinancing and banks’ capacity to lend to the real economy, in turn destabilising the financial system and financing of the economy. A report published by the Bank for International Settlements and seven central banks in October 2020 stressed that three foundational  principles must govern any CBDC-related decisions: do not compromise overarching public policy objectives such as monetary and financial stability; organise coexistence with other forms of public and private money; and promote innovation and efficiency in the financial system. If the decision were taken to introduce a central bank digital euro, this currency would also have to help to strengthen the sovereignty and competitiveness of the European payment market, while interacting smoothly with EPI. Finally, we believe there is a form of continuity between a retail CBDC and an interbank CBDC: logically, a retail digital euro should be able to rely on a CBDC for interbank settlement purposes to support optimal circulation.
A further mitigating factor is that household savings rates appear to have risen, involuntarily and significantly, due to social distancing policies. A Bank of England survey in conjunction with Ipsos Mori suggests the aggregate saving ratio is broadly unchanged, although with considerable heterogeneity across income cohorts (Chart 12). But it is possible these survey respondents did not capture the involuntary increase in households’ cash balances when they answered questions about their savings behaviour. 14 15  Haldane (2020). Hicks (1950). 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  For example, sterling deposits held by households and companies in banks have increased sharply over the past few months, by around £ billion (Chart 13). That is consistent with a significant rise in the saving ratio. These higher involuntary savings could be drawn down to finance future spending, at least by some households. In aggregate, they potentially dwarf any voluntary rise in savings for precautionary purposes. Chart 12: Saving rates by income (net balance) Net balance increased savings (%) 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 Up to £  £  £ - £  £  Sources: Ipsos Mori and Bank calculations. Notes: Research was carried out by Ipsos MORI on behalf of The Bank of England. It surveyed a nationally representative quota sample of 2,243 adults in the United Kingdom aged 16-75 using its online i:omnibus on 29 May to 3 June.

And perhaps as many as 8 million employees are working fewer hours for a variety of reasons.8 Taken together, this means that perhaps as much as half the UK workforce is currently either unemployed or underemployed. This, too, has no historical precedent. 5  ILO (2020a). ILO (2020b). 7 The total number of jobs furloughed may not equate to the number of employees still under furlough. For example, some workers may have more than one job. And some jobs may only have been furloughed temporarily. 8 May MPR: “Those that remain in work may be working fewer hours than normal. This could be because of reduced demand for their services, in which case they will have spare capacity. But they may also work fewer hours because they fall ill, are required to self-isolate, or have extra non-work responsibilities, such as caring for relatives or home-schooling children.” The Ipsos Mori survey in the May MPR suggested around 25% of employees are working fewer hours. 6  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  In its May Monetary Policy Report (MPR), the MPC produced an illustrative but plausible scenario for the UK and global economies. In this scenario, UK-weighted global GDP was expected to contract by 26% between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 and by 13% over the course of 2020. For the UK, the equivalent numbers were a peak-to-trough contraction of 27% and an annual contraction of 14%.
These include the announced merger of Deutsche Börse and NYSE, the sale of SIX Group’s Eurex-stake to Deutsche Börse and a move of trading volumes away from “national” quasimonopolies towards multilateral trading venues such as multilateral trading facilities (MTF). Some estimates indicate that as much as 25% of equity trading volumes are now handled by these new players. Because of such developments, in the Swiss Blue-Chip segment, SIX Swiss Exchange’s average market share declined from over 80% in 2009 to around 70% in 11 2010. Post-trade infrastructure is also under pressure to evolve. Notably, the Financial Stability Board recommends a wider adoption of Central Counterparties (CCPs) in the over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives markets. By mitigating counterparty risk, increasing transparency and limiting the likelihood of contagion in these complex markets, CCPs reduce systemic risk. Regulators in both the European Union and the United States are thus promoting increased use of CCPs. A second example, upon which I would like to dwell, is the European Central Bank’s (ECB) “TARGET2-Securities (T2S)” project, which has attracted much attention in the industry. For those of you who are unfamiliar with the initiative, it aims to establish a single venue where securities may be settled against the euro and possibly against other currencies, partially replacing the existing national settlement infrastructures.

But we are under no illusion that, so far at least, we have only skimmed the surface. Skills and time matching There are several obvious frictions in the matching process between volunteers and sociallyworthwhile activities, which potentially reduce the effectiveness of volunteering or the likelihood of it happening in the first place. One is time. It is not surprising that time is the most cited barrier to volunteering (Figure 14). 32 But technology, as in every other aspect of life, can improve the efficiency of matching in ways which can stretch time. We have recently seen the emergence of a number of charities with support what the NCVO have called “micro-volunteering”. For example, “Help from Home” is an initiative to encourage micro-volunteering by allowing people to donate as little as 5 minutes to a worthy cause. For example, you can spend a few minutes describing photos to improve a blind person’s experience of a museum, play an online game in aid of scientific research, or write an email to a sick child. Tasks are given a “pyjama-rating” to drive home the message that it is easy to volunteer. A second friction is appropriately matching the skills of volunteers to those activities where they would be best put to use. PhD economists are no less capable of painting sheds or cleaning riverbeds than the next person. But this is unlikely in general to be the best use of their skills and time, nor the charities.