samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In light of these events, we have learned that the ample reserves framework has worked smoothly with a level of reserves at least as large as we saw during summer and into early September. Although temporary open market operations are doing the trick for the time being, anticipated increases in non-reserve liabilities would cause reserves to decline in coming months without further actions. Based on these considerations, last Friday the FOMC announced that the Fed will be purchasing U.S. Treasury bills at least into the second quarter of next year.7 Specifically, the Desk announced an initial monthly pace of purchases of $ billion. These permanent purchases will, over time, bring the underlying level of reserves—by which I mean absent temporary open market operations—to a level consistent with the ample reserves framework on a sustained basis. In concert with these purchases, the FOMC announced that the Desk will continue temporary overnight and term open market operations at least through January of next year.8 This combination of permanent Treasury bill purchases and ongoing temporary open market operations is designed to provide  effective control of the federal funds rate over the next several months. I should emphasize that all of these actions are aimed at the implementation of monetary policy and do not in any way represent a change in the stance of monetary policy. The goal is to make sure that the federal funds rate stays within the target range set by the FOMC.

33 See Carney (2020) The Road to Glasgow, speech given 27 February 2020 at the launch of the COP26 Private  Finance Agenda. 31  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  31  The stress test will reveal the financial firms – and by extension the companies – that are preparing for the transition, and it will expose those that are not. On returns, our citizens need to be able to see whether their investments are consistent with the path to net zero. And all companies that are transitioning to net zero should be encouraged. Asset owners and managers will increasing need to disclose whether their clients’ money is being invested in line with their values. Thus far, approaches to doing so have been inadequate. Carbon footprints are not forward-looking. Moreover, a whole economy transition isn’t about funding only deep green activities or blacklisting dark brown ones. We need fifty shades of green to catalyse and support all companies towards net zero and be able to assess collectively whether we’re “Paris aligned”. Given that net zero is both an imperative of climate physics and a commitment by 120 countries; companies, banks, insurers, pension funds and investors will increasingly be expected to develop and disclose their transition plans.
Like disease detection, frisbee catching, sports prediction and stock-picking, living a moral life is a complex task. The Ten Commandments are heuristics to help guide people through that moral maze, the ultimate simple rules. They have proven remarkably robust through the millennia. Less has been more. (3)  Finance – more is more? The response to the financial crisis by banks and regulators has been swift and sizeable. Gaps in risk management have been filled, deficiencies in regulation plugged, errors by regulators corrected. This is a self-healing and familiar response. Past crises have also been met by a combination of more risk management, more regulation and more regulators. More has been more. (a)  The Tower of Basel  The foundations for today’s financial regulatory framework were laid in the 1980s. The Basel Accord of 1988 was a landmark. It was the first-ever genuinely international prudential regulatory agreement. For the first time in financial history, a minimum standard had been established for all internationally-active banks. Yet despite its breadth, the Basel I agreement was only 30 pages long. 8 This brevity came courtesy of focussing on a limited set of credit risks measured at a broad asset class, rather than individual exposure, level. Only five different risk weights were defined under Basel I, varying from zero to 100%. Calculating regulatory capital ratios was possible using pad and pen. In taking this simplified approach, the Basel Committee fully recognised its limitations. It was recognised that the role of regulatory rules was not to capture every raindrop.

However, looking ahead, some of these factors will foreseeably lose steam, owing partly to the effects of the appreciation of the euro, in nominal effective terms, and to dearer oil. These effects will give rise to a considerable reduction in the Spanish economy’s net lending vis-à-vis the rest of the world, which is nevertheless expected to remain positive over the coming years. With regard to the labour market, 2.3 million jobs have been generated since 2013. These developments, along with the reduction in the labour force as a result of population ageing, have enabled the unemployment level to be reduced most significantly. The unemployment rate thus stands below 15%, 12 pp down on its 2013 high (see Chart 10), although still far off the level observed in the euro area on average (slightly above 8%). Most recently, the robustness of employment has eased in line with developments in activity, making for continuing and very low growth in productivity, as has been the case since the start of the recovery. 5/14  Strong job creation has been accompanied by a modest increase in wage compensation in the past four years. Chiefly contributing to this has been the high degree of slack in the labour market which dates back to the start of the current pick-up, and the expectations of very low inflation rates during these years.
In the case of the Eurosystem, the ECB balance sheet accounted for 12% of euro area GDP before the crisis and now stands at approximately 40%, around € trillion. Supervisory policy, for its part, has had to face the challenge of macrofinancial instability in a context of highly interconnected markets at the global level. In this area, the response has been three-pronged. First, the strengthening of microprudential regulation, with the new Basel III Accord, which includes greater capital requirements and a stricter framework for systemically important financial institutions. Second, the development of a new instrument, macroprudential policy, which addresses systemic risk and the procyclical behaviour of the financial system as a whole. And, third, the greater international coordination of regulation, which is necessary given the reality of globalised financial markets. Notable in terms of coordination has been the creation of the Financial Stability Board and, in the case of the European Union, the activation of the Banking Union, beginning with the SSM and the Single Resolution Mechanism. The new monetary policy I shall now turn to the challenges central banks face. The first is, evidently, identifying what is understood by the “new normal”. One question on which economic policy discussions are focusing is whether the advanced economies are in a new situation of secular stagnation, a “new normal” characterised by low growth, low inflation and low interest rates. We are seeing how, despite lower unemployment rates and the closing of the gap between potential and real output, inflation rates remain persistently low.

PEPP – a flexible instrument to fight the crisis within our mandate I would now like to take a closer look at the legality of our most far-reaching and exceptional monetary policy decision, the launch of the PEPP. Let me first look at its features. The PEPP was established to act first as a backstop to potential market disruption. In short, it 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  has had a stabilising effect to counteract the market fragmentation that was unwarranted on the basis of the underlying economic fundamentals, and to safeguard the transmission mechanism. The PEPP also reinforces the ECB’s monetary policy stance. In so doing, the PEPP is a direct and targeted response to an “extraordinary and acute economic crisis”1 and aims to ensure the ECB’s ability to fulfil its mandate under the circumstances. Notably however, “Due to these exceptional, fast-evolving…circumstances, the PEPP requires a high degree of flexibility in its design and implementation” as set out in the Decision implementing the PEPP.2 Purchases under the PEPP continue to be guided by the capital key of the national central banks as for the APP. But the PEPP allows for fluctuations in the distribution of purchases over time, across asset classes and among jurisdictions. This flexibility has allowed us to effectively stave off risks to the smooth transmission of monetary policy. In view of the pandemic’s exceptional nature, we decided not to apply to the PEPP the same selfimposed public purchase limits that apply to the sovereign purchases under the APP.
These vulnerabilities increase the sensitivity of the economy and of financial and real estate markets to adverse shocks. I would now like to outline the position of the two globally active banks, Credit Suisse and UBS. I will then present our assessment of the situation at the domestically focused banks. Page 1/3  Berne, 16 June 2022 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  Globally active banks The two globally active banks developed differently in terms of profitability. UBS’s profitability increased and was high by historical comparison. At Credit Suisse, however, profitability was negative. This is on the one hand due to extraordinary items, such as large provisions for litigation, and on the other to relatively low operating performance during the period under review. The differing profitability is also reflected in market indicators such as CDS premia and stock prices. After the Archegos losses, the market drew a stronger distinction between the two banks and it continues to have a more positive assessment of UBS than Credit Suisse. With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the market’s assessment of the globally active Swiss banks and their international peers deteriorated overall. By contrast, the capital position of both banks has improved further since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report. In the case of UBS, this improvement is attributable to a capital build-up due to retained earnings; in the case of Credit Suisse, it is attributable to a reduction in exposure and a capital increase.

23  In an effort to control debt levels incurred during the war, the British government ran huge primary surpluses during the 1920s, averaging 7% of GDP, with all the social and industrial unrest that entailed. Yet ratios of government debt to GDP didn’t fall, remaining at over 160% of GDP throughout that decade. Just as rapid inflations can eat up debt so deflations can increase it. The short-lived reinstitution of the gold standard (it was then abandoned for good in 1931) was heavily criticised at the time by Keynes. 24 The question was only formally considered – and a return to the pre-war parity recommended – by the Cunliffe Committee in 1918. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  18  Chart 13a: To the extent fiscal variables matter for inflation government demand more important than debt  Chart 13b: Debt higher in wars than in 1970s but residual monetary credibility may have contained inflation, bond yields  Average debt/GDP; changes in central government expenditure less interest payments over nominal GDP; and average inflation. Sources: Thomas and Dimsdale (2017), Mitchell (1988), Feinstein (1998), O'Donoghue et al (2004), ONS and Bank calculations. Average bond yields based on consols/ long-term bonds. Sources: Thomas and Dimsdale (2017), Capie and Webber (1985), Neal (1990), Klovland (1994), Feinstein (1998), O'Donoghue et al (2004), ONS, DMO, and Bank calculations.
Being a trusted, professionally competent and strong institution, the Central Bank is entrusted with vital agency functions. Accordingly, as per our mandate, we carried out  5  public debt management with the objective of mobilising the government’s financing requirements at the lowest possible cost and with a prudent degree of risk. The framework for public debt management was reinforced by introducing a transparent market based auction mechanism for the issuance of government securities. This has already resulted in desirable outcomes of lowering interest costs to the government, efficient price discovery and improved transmission of monetary policy signals across the benchmark yield curve. The Employees’ Provident Fund, which is the largest superannuation fund in the country, is managed by the Central Bank. It passed a significant milestone during 2017 with total assets of the Fund surpassing Rs. 2.0 trillion. The Central Bank also continued to promote financial literacy and inclusiveness and helped entrepreneurship development through our credit schemes for agriculture and livestock, as well as the micro, small and medium scale enterprise (MSME) sectors. In addition, we also adopted measures to promote a clean note policy in the country and improvements were also made in currency operations and processing. In 2017, the Central Bank implemented a new legislative and a policy framework for foreign exchange operations based on the Foreign Exchange Act, No. 12 of 2017.

The reform agenda of the government includes improving financial viability of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to mitigate the budgetary implications for the government. While introducing clear frameworks and reforms in relation to monetary and exchange rate policies in 2017, we have implemented several policy measures during 2017 to address the challenges in the financial sector and maintain a stable financial system for effective monetary policy transmission and to support sustainable growth. With a view to promote a dynamic and resilient financial sector, the regulatory and supervisory framework of the Central Bank was further strengthened in line with international standards and best practices. At present, our banking sector accounts for over Rs. 10 trillion in assets, while the non-bank financial institutions sector accounts for over Rs. 1 trillion in assets. The implementation of Basel III capital standards was commenced in 2017 in order to develop a more robust banking sector. The framework to regulate the non-bank financial institutions was strengthened under challenging conditions, and resolution of distressed finance companies was also commenced. During 2017, the Central Bank continued to strengthen the regulatory framework for the microfinance sector, and continued to combat the menace of illegal pyramid schemes with the assistance of other government agencies. Several measures were adopted to strengthen and modernise the payment and settlement infrastructure in order to develop an efficient and stable payment and settlement system in the country, as well as to pave the way towards a digital economy.
The Riksbank would thus have an account in the ECB’s system so that settlement can be made in Riksbank money without having to keep the Swedish large-value payment system open 24 hours a day. The vision is simply that payments can be made immediately, regardless of what time of day they are made, and that settlement shall be in Riksbank money. In this vision, the e-krona  7 [9]  would be a national back-up to the private payment system and it would enable both instant payments and settlement in central bank money. Conclusion Let me conclude by summarising what I have said. I believe that it is important to update the money the Riksbank issues to a format that suits the modern economy. We will therefore develop a pilot version of a central bank digital currency – an e-krona. Once we have tested the pilot version we can choose to issue, or not to issue, a digital krona to the general public. I have also talked about the rapid changes in the payment market, where rapid real time alternatives will be important in the future. In my opinion, payments ought to be made as quickly as we exchange information in the current digital society. It should be possible to make payments instantly 24 hours a day and to settle them in Riksbank money. A connection to the ECB's technical platform, TIPS, would be one way of doing this.

Our second priority is to accept the challenge of the new responsibilities that you, Chancellor, have asked the Bank to take on in respect of micro prudential regulation and macro prudential control of the balance sheets of the financial system as a whole. I welcome those new responsibilities. Monetary stability and financial stability are two sides of the same coin. During the crisis the former was threatened by the failure to secure the latter. The experience of the financial crisis taught us two important lessons. The first is that, whatever its theoretical attractions – and there certainly are some – putting prudential regulation into the same organisation as the oversight of consumer protection and market conduct didn’t work in practice. The two types of regulation require different skills and a different approach. Separating them – the so-called “twin peaks” model of financial regulation – is the right direction of reform. That conclusion is not a reflection on the people who work at FSA. They are an able group and have worked hard to improve prudential regulation over the past three years. I look forward to working with them in the future. Nor does it follow from this first lesson that prudential regulation should necessarily go to the central bank. 2  BIS Review 84/2010  But a second lesson is that when banks hit trouble the central bank needs to be fully involved in resolving those problems.
Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, and Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, headlined a contingent of over 20 public sector authorities from around the globe. They were joined by the CEOs, senior executives, and board  9  Letter of Martin P. Dunn to the Office of Chief Counsel at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance, January 17, 2014. 10  Federal Advisory Council and Board of Governors, Record of Meeting, May 8, 2015. 11  See Supervision of Behavior and Culture: Foundations, Practice & Future Developments (Mirea Raaijmakers, ed. 2015). 12  U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, § 9–28.500. 13  See Memorandum of Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General, regarding Individual Accountability for Wrongdoing, September 9, 2015. 14  See U.S. v. Allen et al., 14-cr-00272, Dkt. No. 147 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 6, 2015) (jury verdict against Anthony Allen and Anthony Conti). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  members of global financial institutions. Together, they discussed methods of reforming culture and the continuing challenges in this effort. In my view, the workshop offered a number of useful insights, chiefly: •  Culture is a soft concept that is hard to measure, and perhaps harder to manage and sustain. But it is as important as capital and liquidity, and should receive continuous and persistent attention. •  A bank’s culture must be consistent with public expectations and promote behavior that considers the firm’s many stakeholders, including the public.

First, we often talk about how much we don’t know, but this doesn’t do justice to how much work has been done. We know that today three quarters of our emissions come from surface transport, heating our buildings, manufacturing goods, the food we eat, and producing electricity [figure 4]. By 2050 these emissions will have to be almost completely eliminated. Any remaining emissions, mainly from aviation and animal methane, where there are currently no viable alternatives, would need to be offset by increasing the lungs of the earth. For example, through planting more trees, sequestering carbon in soils and biomass crops. Although there are many differences across models, the key building blocks of the transition are pretty clear [figure 5]. Eliminating emissions from fossil fuels will require an increase in the share of renewables in the energy mix, greater electrification, improving energy efficiency, finding substitute fuels (like hydrogen or synthetic fuels) for use in heavy industry and transport, and capturing and storing emissions where it is most feasible or necessary to do so. Eliminating emissions from land-use requires us urgently to prevent deforestation and implement more sustainable agricultural processes related to tillage, crop cover, fertilizer use and animal-related emissions. A number of different types of policy measures can take us there.
The volatility of key variables for economic agents such as the interest rate, inflation or the exchange rate has diminished. But growth has continued to be unbalanced in those aspects I have already mentioned, such as household and corporate debt, and continuing price and cost differentials. At issue here are imbalances posing risks to growth sustainability within an area with very high stability requirements by Spanish standards. Yet while such risks are very important for the Spanish economy, the biggest risk of all is complacency. It is vital to maintain the attitude of non-complacency which has driven economic agents, governments and other players who have sustained the Spanish dynamism of recent decades. A change in attitude which were to convert the satisfaction with the current situation into an excuse to detain the drive to innovate and reform would, sooner or later, bring the ongoing process to a halt. We must continue striving to discover how we can improve the performance of our institutions and companies. This is the main idea I wish to share with you today: let us not fall into complacency. However much we have progressed, let us not stop. There are examples of developed countries which, having achieved very favourable income and wealth levels, lost their reforming dynamism and, as a result, entered lasting situations of slackness and sluggishness with serious employment problems and a deterioration in confidence at all levels. It is therefore important to identify the specific policies we should foster in the future.

Indeed, on these results, Spanish GDP is now ranked seventh among the industrialised countries, in front of Canada and only behind the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France and Italy. Comparison with these seven countries can be taken as a basis to give us an idea of our strengths and weaknesses. In terms of job creation, Spain was once again prominent in 2006, with a growth rate of 3.56%. That ranks us first among the big seven, and if we compare absolute figures (almost 700,000 jobs), no other country in the developed world has created so much employment, with the sole exception of the United States. Turning to public finances, Spain's end-year surplus also compares very favourably with the deficits posted in the other main developed countries. Yet this should not hide the fact that we also ranked first in two unfavourable indicators. True, yearend inflation in Spain was 2.7%, below the figure of 3.7% the previous year and, of course, far below the level of 4% that marked the end of some of the high-growth years earlier this decade. But compared with the other seven major industrialised countries, Spain had the highest inflation in 2006. And likewise for the current account deficit. Our deficit in 2006 will no doubt be close to 8% of GDP, the highest figure among the big economies. The Spanish economy has performed well against the backdrop of an expanding world economy and, most importantly for us, the firming of the recovery in the euro area.