samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
New legislation When new legislation was adopted for the Central Bank of Iceland in 2001, these international developments were taken into consideration and the Icelandic Act patterned on recent legislation in other industrialised countries. There was broad political consensus on this, as people realised that low inflation is one of the cornerstones of economic growth and improved living conditions. In addition to the legislation, inflation targeting was introduced as the Bank’s objective in a joint declaration by the government and the Central Bank. The decision to float the Icelandic króna was taken at the same time, since experience had shown that in the long run it was impossible to ensure a specific exchange rate with free movement of capital in and out of the country. In such case the exchange rate is determined by the market where supply and demand control the value of the króna. This new framework for monetary policy was immediately subjected to a baptism of fire. The Icelandic economy was overheated and inflation rising rapidly. The Central Bank had to respond by raising interest rates. The fall of the króna played a part in the elimination of the current account deficit much more rapidly than anyone had dared to hope two years ago. The economy is more stable at the moment than it has been for some time and, acccording to the outlook, the current slight slowdown will be short-lived.

The growing reliance on short-term wholesale funding to finance longer-term assets increased liquidity and maturity mismatch risk. This was particularly dangerous because many of the assets being financed were structured-credit products, some of which were opaque, difficult to value and illiquid. Short-term funding of longer-term assets is inherently unstable particularly in the presence of information and coordination problems. It can be rational for a provider of funds to supply funds on a short-term basis, reasoning that it can exit if there is any uncertainty over the firm’s continued ability to roll over its funding from other sources. But if the use of short-term funding becomes sufficiently widespread, the firm’s roll-over risk increases. In this situation, there is a strong incentive for each lender to “run” if there is any uncertainty that could undermine the borrower’s ability to continue to roll over its funding from other sources. This is the case even if the provider of funds believes that the borrower would remain solvent as long as it retained access to funding on normal terms. Of course, this insight is not a new one. Prior to the establishment of a lender of last resort and retail deposit insurance for banks – which came with the quid pro quo of prudential regulation – bank runs were a regular and disruptive feature of our financial system. These innovations solved the coordination problem and stabilized this source of funding.
Eddie Yue: Towards a smarter, greener and more inclusive financial system Opening keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers (HKIB) Annual Banking Conference 2021, 28 September 2021. * * *  Towards a Smarter, Greener and more Inclusive Financial System Peter (Wong), Patrick (Fung), Carrie (Leung), distinguished guests, ladies and gentleman, 1. Good morning. It’s good to see you all. I am delighted to be here today at the Annual Conference of the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers (HKIB). 2. The topic for today’s Conference covers some important macro trends. These trends, like re-globalisation and sustainability, have wider impact that are relevant for the long-term development of the banking industry. 3. Over the past two years or so, the social unrest in Hong Kong followed by the pandemic have dominated, and sometimes overwhelmed, our attention. When the banking industry was so busy dealing with the pressing challenges to operational continuity and resilience, it is easy to lose sight of evolving trends with wider implications for longer term development. 4. One of these more profound trends is the increasing challenge in ensuring financial inclusion. This issue is closely linked to HKMA’s strategic priorities. And I believe the financial system does have key roles to play in addressing this challenge. Stronger need for financial inclusion 5. In fact, the challenge of financial inclusion is a global trend that has been exacerbated by the pandemic.

Gent Sejko: Statement - press conference with IMF Mission Chief Statement by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the joint press conference with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Mission Chief for Albania Minister of Finance and Economy, Tirana, 10 October 2022. *** Dear media representatives, In the last two weeks, the Bank of Albania and the Albanian government have been engaged in intensive discussions with the IMF Mission, which visited Albania in the framework of the regular Article IV consultations. Discussion focused on current challenges for the Albanian economy, as well as structural reforms that would enable a faster and more sustainable development of the country in the long term. Allow me - first and foremost - to extend my thanks to the IMF Mission for the open share of views in addition to the fruitful and transparent discussions. Overall, the Bank of Albania and the IMF share similar opinions on the developmental challenges that lie ahead. The swift upsurge of prices in the global markets following the unprovoked military aggression of Russia over Ukraine, have triggered serious economic and social challenges for the economies and citizens of all countries around the world, including Albania. Inflation hit 8% in August, increasing at a rapid pace and having a broad base. Based on our judgement, we have previously stressed out that the high inflation is the main threat on the macroeconomic stability and both the stable and long-term growth of Albania.
GDP is calculated as the total of the current quarter and the three previous quarters. For any quarter(s) that GDP has not yet been published, the most recently-published GDP statistics are used. Sources: Bank of England, Federal Reserve, Macrobond and the Riksbank  Figure 12. Government bonds, municipal bonds, mortgage bonds and corporate bonds over time Nominal amounts, SEK billion 7 000 6 000 5 000 4 000 3 000 2 000 1 000 0  13  14  15  16  17  18  Central government  MFI, covered  Municipality and Kommuninvest  Non-financial corporations  19  20  Note. Securities debt in different sectors. MFIs (monetary financial institutions) include banks, mortgage institutions and finance companies. The series for municipalities’ securities debt refers to individual municipalities’ and regions’ borrowing and the borrowing through Kommuninvest i Sverige AB. The statistics refer to securities debt in SEK and foreign currencies. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  34 [35]  Figure 13. Central banks’ government bond purchases in relation to GDP in Sweden, the euro area, USA, UK and Japan Per cent of GDP 100 80 60 40 20 0  The Riksbank  ECB  Federal Reserve  Bank of England  Bank of Japan  Note. Nominal holdings as of 31 March 2021. Striped bars represent the Riksbank’s purchases of municipal bonds. Sources: Macrobond and national central banks  Figure 14.

Andrew G Haldane: Central bank psychology Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the “Leadership: stress and hubris conference”, hosted by the Royal Society of Medicine, London, 17 November 2014. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like in particular to thank Rashmi Harimohan, Jeremy Franklin, Michael McMahon and Nick Mclaren for assistance in preparing the text. I would also like to thank John Barrdear, Rob Elder, Bob Gilhooly, Chris Hackworth, Jeremy Harrison and Gareth Ramsay for their comments and contributions. 13 September 2007 will be seen as a red letter day in financial history. It was the date news broke of Northern Rock seeking emergency liquidity from the Bank of England, prompting the first run on a UK bank in over a century. It also fired the starting gun on what subsequently became known as “The Great Recession”. That very day, the Bank hosted a conference. In a painful irony, its theme was “The Great Moderation”. The Great Moderation described the long-period of pre-crisis macro-economic calm, with stable growth, stable inflation and stable banks. 1 This view held that central banks, while not eliminating boom and bust, had moderated macro-economic undulations. It also held that financial innovation, while not eliminating risk, had scattered it to the four winds. As Great Recession abruptly replaced Great Moderation, it was clear a grave analytical and policy error had been made.
Medium to longer-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Cross-checking the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis confirms the assessment of low inflationary pressure over the medium term, as money and credit growth continues to slow down. Against this background, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. As the transmission of monetary policy works with lags, we expect that our policy action will progressively feed through to the economy. Hence, with all the measures we have taken, monetary policy has been supporting the availability of liquidity and the recovery of the euro  2  BIS Review 136/2009  area economy. Looking ahead, and taking into account the improved conditions in financial markets, not all our liquidity measures will be needed to the same extent as in the past. Accordingly, the Governing Council will make sure that the extraordinary liquidity measures taken are phased out in a timely and gradual fashion and that the liquidity provided is absorbed in order to counter effectively any threat to price stability over the medium to longer term. By so doing, the Governing Council will continue to ensure a firm anchoring of mediumterm inflation expectations. Such anchoring is indispensable to supporting sustainable growth and employment and contributing to financial stability.

Ultimately, being open means pitting oneself against the very best, irrespective of the region they belong to, since only if we compete against the best, will we be one of the best in the future. Consequently, it would be wrong for Switzerland to limit its openness to a given geographic region. Openness must be the fundamental principle governing all of its economic policies. Even in the changing global environment of intensive competition, Switzerland can increase its prosperity if it rethinks its economic policy direction and embraces former tried and tested virtues such as openness, freedom and personal responsibility.
But it will need to be accompanied by corresponding moderation of the growth of domestic demand - after the offsetting stimulus of a year ago - if we are to maintain overall stability. That essentially is why interest rates in the UK have had to rise since last autumn. We are now in a position where the economy as a whole is again growing above trend - after a pause a year or so ago - while inflation is running - and has been running for nearly a year - slightly below the Government’s 2½% target. Looking ahead, there is the tantalising prospect of new factors that might help to hold the rate of inflation down, at least in the short term. There is evidence for example, although it is hard to evaluate, of more intensive retail price competition, squeezing retail margins across the board, and that could hold down prices, at least for a time. And this effect could intensify and extend further into the future as a result of the spread of e-commerce. And there is, on the supply-side of the economy, the possibility (though so far sadly not much actual statistical evidence) that the spread of IT will accelerate productivity growth across the economy - as it has in the United States, raising the underlying rate of potential output growth at least for a time.

Second, I would like to discuss the economic challenges we face and what it takes to address them. I am acutely aware that the focus of policymakers lies elsewhere for the moment. But let me be quite clear: economic success is also part of the solution in other fields. Therefore, mitigating economic risks deserves to be high on the political agenda. The ECB’s monetary policy: working and still flexible It was about three years ago that inflation started moving away from the ECB’s medium-term inflation aim of below, but close to, 2%. Since October 2013, inflation has been below 1%. Throughout 2015 headline HICP inflation in the euro area was very low or even negative, remaining under the influence of low commodity prices, and euro area annual HICP inflation was estimated at 0.4% in January this year. In parallel to this trend, we had to continually revise our outlook for inflation: while at the start of 2015, our staff was forecasting inflation to reach 1.5% in 2016 and 1.8% in 2017, in December they projected a rate of only 1% for this year and 1.6% for 2017. Against this backdrop, the ECB decided in December to act again. Our assessment of the monetary policy stance had two parts. First, we noted that the measures put in place since the summer of 2014 had been very effective. The monetary stimulus that they introduced led to a broad-based easing of financing conditions, stimulated credit provision, and has since provided substantial support to the euro area recovery.
And shouldn’t it also depend on the kind of vehicle? One could easily think of many more questions like these. So even a seemingly simple rule can quickly start to become more and more complicated. The world is complex and uncertain, particularly when it comes to finance and banking. That leaves us with two options. Either we come up with more rules to try to cover every potential situation. Or we allow supervisors some discretion within a set framework and let them judge specific situations on their merits. In the end, these two options need to be in balance, and we must be careful not to disturb this balance. And here is where I see some cause for concern. Regulators might be tempted to lay down rules to cover every eventuality – think of the example I just gave you. And their motivation would certainly be laudable. But their goal would be unattainable. It is just not possible to cater for every potential situation. There are too many possibilities, most of which we cannot anticipate. No one knows what financial innovations might emerge; no one knows where technological change will lead us; and no one knows how the economy will evolve over the coming decades. If we try to cover everything, the rulebook will, at some point, become too detailed, too big and too complex. From that point onwards it will stop making the banking sector a safer place and instead create new problems. First, overly complex rules facilitate regulatory arbitrage.

In the spirit of the MoU agreement, a primary step in our cooperation is to establish high level policy dialogue with the Bundesbank on a regular basis, the first of which will be held in 2014. This is timely, considering that not only will Turkey assume the G20 presidency in 2015 and engage in an even closer interaction with the central banks of the G20 member states, but will also help meet the recently increased need for policy dialogues over the implementation and implications of new unconventional monetary policies. In general, the CBRT places great emphasis on bilateral relations with fellow central banks, especially those of the G20 member countries. The year 2012 is a testament to our commitment, as the CBRT opened six new representative offices, which brought the total number to ten. The first-round representative offices include those in Frankfurt, NY City, London and Tokyo. The ones opened later on are in Moscow and Sydney – to strengthen relations with other G20 presidency countries; Beijing and Kuala Lumpur – to strengthen relations with the Asian countries; Paris – to strengthen relations with the OECD, and finally Washington, DC – to strengthen relations with the IMF. In her efforts to enhance regional cooperation, the CBRT laid the foundations of the dialogue among central banks that paved the way for the establishment of the Central Banks Governors’ Club of Central Asia, the Black Sea Region and the Balkan Countries.
In this connection, it should be noted that a large part of the adjustment in banks’ earnings in the first half of this year is due to the provisions made in advance for credit impairment  6  that has still not materialised, but will do so in the coming quarters. Specifically, Spanish banks have set aside almost double the amount of provisions they recorded in the same period of last year. This has significantly reduced their profitability, but it has also raised their capacity to absorb credit impairment, something that is particularly highly valued by investors in these circumstances. The message I wish to convey is that banks should persist with this early recognition policy, as it will subsequently facilitate their ability to continue to perform their function of providing financing to the economy. In short, especially if the crisis proves to be prolonged, banks must ensure proper and timely recognition of effective impairment of the quality of their credit exposures through compliance with supervisory guidelines. Global banking regulation  Fourth, I would like to reflect on global banking regulation. As I mentioned earlier, the Basel reforms phased in over the last decade have attempted to incorporate into regulation the lessons learned during the global financial crisis. The first phase of the Basel reforms began in 2010 and was completed through a second wave of changes published in 2017. The initial phase was aimed at raising the level and improving the quality of banks’ microprudential regulatory capital.

Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: Generating new solutions for remittances in Malaysia Remarks by Ms Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launch of Project Greenback 2.0 Kota Kinabalu, Kota Kinabalu, 4 March 2018. * * * It is my great pleasure to be here today for the launch of the Greenback 2.0 Project in Kota Kinabalu. First of all, on behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, I would like to thank Dewan Bandaraya Kota Kinabalu for agreeing to host this Project. We are sincerely honoured by the presence of YB Datuk Hajah Jainab at today’s launch event. And of course, the World Bank has been a truly committed and equal partner in this project with Bank Negara Malaysia, and as we concluded our collaboration in Johor Bahru last year, we are excited to begin another chapter in this journey together with the World Bank. Kota Kinabalu is Malaysia’s second remittance champion city and only the third champion city for the Greenback Project in Asia. Through the project, our aim is to help more people living and working in Sabah remit moneys whether for business or personal purposes, safely and at lower costs. To achieve this, we want to provide people in Sabah with information, with access and with the confidence to use remittance services. And we want to encourage more competitive remittance services in Sabah that will better serve the community. You may ask what is the significance of being a champion city?
Our forecasts of inflation and other components, like the interest rate decisions, are based on a forecast of the future repo rate path. These forecasts change as new information is received, but we report our current views of the future every time we publish a monetary policy decision. The Riksbank is governed by an Executive Board The year 1999 is a natural starting point when describing the process for monetary policy decision-making. This was when the price stability target was prescribed by law and the Riksbank was given a more independent position with regard to our principal, Sveriges Riksdag (the Swedish parliament). This entailed a major change with regard to our decisionmaking and the way we work in relation to the General Council of the Riksbank. As you already know, the work at the Riksbank has been headed since 1999 by an Executive Board consisting of six members, one of whom is Governor of the Riksbank and Chairman of the Executive Board. The members are appointed for a period of six years at a time. Normally the periods of office for the different members overlap to create continuity in the work of the Bank. Previously it was the Governing Council of the Riksbank, whose members are appointed by the Riksdag, who governed the Bank together with the Governor. Today the General Council has more of a controller function. They appoint the members of the Executive Board, but do not have any influence over, for instance, the decisions on the repo rate.

The more daunting problems we face of bringing our healthcare and social security commitments and resources into balance come later and are less acute than those facing most other large mature economies. These facts provide some perspective but they are not a compelling argument for deferring policy action to address them. Another argument for perspective is that our current account deficit reflects in part the relative attractiveness of the United States as a place for the world to invest its apparently ample present supply of savings. It is true that much of the cause of our imbalance seems to lie in optimism about future U.S. economic performance reflected in the willingness of non-Americans to put their savings to work here rather than in their own countries or in Europe or Japan. In this sense, our external deficit may reflect relative strength, rather than weakness. This argument would be more reassuring if we were facing a lower and more sustainable current account deficit. And it would be more powerful if the capital inflows that are the counterpart of our  2  BIS Review 25/2005  current account imbalance were going to finance private rather than public investment, and if a larger share of those flows were private rather than official. Another argument that is important to weighing the risk in running an external imbalance of this magnitude is the very large increase in the share of the world’s savings that now seem to move more comfortably across borders.