samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The target is set at 2.5 per cent. In the euro area, monetary policy is oriented towards price stability, defined as inflation below but close to 2 per cent. Inflation targeting has proved to be a sound system and particularly well suited for small, open economies. Normally, interest rate setting under an inflation targeting regime will also contribute to stabilising output and employment. In periods of recession, with prospects of low and falling inflation, the interest rate will be reduced to boost demand and prevent an inflation level that is too low. During an upturn when there are prospects of high inflation, the interest rate will be increased. Inflation targeting is softer around the edges than the exchange rate regimes Norway and many other countries operated earlier. The system has proved fairly robust to disturbances. Nevertheless, the soft landing of the Norwegian economy after several years of high domestic cost inflation and a low level of activity abroad must not lead us to believe that output and employment cannot show pronounced fluctuations in the future. We cannot expect the interest rate to have the same impact from one period to the next. The economy is also exposed to unexpected disturbances. As a result, we cannot fine-tune economic developments using the interest rate, but avoid the largest effects when the economy is exposed to disturbances. Experience seems to indicate that inflation expectations remain stable even if inflation varies somewhat as long as the interest rate is used actively to curb effects.

A smooth functioning of the banking sector is therefore clearly an essential element in the resolution of Europe’s problems. As a central banker and supervisor, I see three major tools which can help to ensure appropriate financing of the economy and financial stability – both of which are essential financial conditions for sustainable growth. 1. Financial regulation and supervision must be tailored to the two objectives of strengthening the financial sector while ensuring an appropriate financing of the economy. Of course, after the 2008 financial crisis, the most urgent priority was to re-establish financial stability and bolster resilience to financial shocks. But in the implementation process of the new Basel 3 rules, we need to pay the utmost attention to their potential consequences for the financing of the economy, especially in view of the much shorter agenda. In particular, the new liquidity rules need to be adjusted. In addition, much more progress is now needed in the area of “shadow banking”. 2. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Eurosystem has constantly provided all possible support within the scope of its mandate to help the banking system overcome its difficulties. For instance, the idea of the two LTROs was to remove funding pressures in order to allow a smoother adaptation to the new rules and difficult environment. Simultaneously, this aimed to prevent a major credit crunch that would compromise both the financing of the economy and the maintenance of price stability in the area.
Jon Cunliffe: The Bank of England’s Monetary and Financial Policy Committees – guiding the economy towards a sustainable and safe recovery Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England, at the International Festival for Business conference, Liverpool, 3 July 2014. *  *  *  When my friends and relations discovered I was going to join the Bank of England I was inundated with the same request. From politicians and senior Whitehall mandarins to family and young children, after wishing me congratulations and good luck, the first question was: “can I please come and see the Bank’s gold?” I of course promised excursions to see the Bank’s gold to all and sundry. On arrival at the Bank, however, I was made aware of the sober reality. The Bank only owns two bars of gold. And they are in the Bank Museum for all to see. Of course, the Bank looks after a great deal of other people’s gold – over 5000 tonnes including the UK Government’s reserves and some of the reserves of other countries. Visits to the vaults in which it lies – as I also found out on arrival – are politely but very heavily discouraged. But apart from the two bars in the museum, the Bank of England itself no longer owns any gold. I am pretty sure that most of those who wanted to see the Bank’s gold would not really be surprised by that.

Developments towards the end of last year were marked by lower demand for oil. In December, the OPEC countries together with Russia, Mexico and Norway decided to limit oil production. This may have contributed to increasing the oil price during the last months. The risk of war in the Middle East and the decline in commercial oil stocks in the US may also have contributed to increasing the oil price. Oil prices plunged by around 40 per cent between autumn 2000 and the end of 2001. Developments towards the end of last year were marked by lower demand for oil. In December, the OPEC countries together with Russia, Mexico and Norway decided to limit oil production. This may have contributed to increasing the oil price during the last months. The risk of war in the Middle East and the decline in commercial oil stocks in the US may also have contributed to increasing the oil price. BIS Review 20/2002  1  2  BIS Review 20/2002  The global slowdown started to have ripple effects on the Norwegian economy during autumn and winter. Prices for important Norwegian export products fell, and markets for many export industries have weakened. Salmon prices dropped by close to 20 per cent in 2001, after reaching record levels the previous year. The trade policy in the EU stipulates a minimum price for salmon exports, to the benefit of ineffective and high cost producers. The volume of traditional exports fell in autumn last year.
Dimitar Bogov: A new normal? The global economic expansion, inflation dynamics, financial stability and its meaning for asset management Speech by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the High Level International Conference on Monetary Policy and Asset Management, Skopje, 16 February 2018. * * * Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, It is my great honor and pleasure to welcome you to the High-Level International Conference on Monetary Policy and Asset Management. The conference has been organized as a joint effort of the National bank of the Republic of Macedonia and Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee. We are delighted for this partnership whose results have been built into the conference program that is both rich in the topics to be covered and in many prominent speakers to lead the discussions. The title of the conference is “A New Normal? The Global Economic Expansion, Inflation Dynamics, Financial Stability and its Meaning for Asset Management” that comes as a timely event to draw upon the lessons learned of the GFC, to assess the current state of the global economy and its future prospects and advice on the challenges facing central banks and asset managers. This decade has been a truly challenging time for policymaking and asset management. The world has gone through financial, economic and debt crises. We have witnessed major central banks using unconventional policies and ultra-accommodative monetary policy stance.

What did mark the post-crisis period was the financial system reform mainly with respect to the banking industry and reconsideration of central banks mandate with respect to financial stability. Financial turbulence, low yields and divergent monetary policies in the US and the EU caused asset managers to diversify and optimally balance risk and return. The global recovery has strengthened recently, but still there have been concerns with respect to its sustainability. Low productivity keeps clouding the prospects of future economic prosperity and growth, and inflation remains muted in many countries. In addition, there are geopolitical risks, risks of excessive indebtedness and financial sector resilience to potential new shocks. All of these critically relevant issues for the policy makers and asset managers will build in our agenda for today. The program will start with a keynote speech followed by four sessions. Session 1 will cover issues related to the current and prospective conjuncture of the global economy, monetary policy and the future of interest rates. Session 2 will tackle upon financial stability issues, and how well are we equipped to deal with potential turbulence. In Session 3, central bankers and asset managers will put forward their views on strategies for effective risk mitigation and how should asset managers prepare for the “new normal” in the converging monetary policies. Session 4 will focus on South East Europe and the perspectives of the region for European integration and growth. I am particularly delighted that we have prominent speakers and excellent panelists to address the topics of the conference.
Gent Sejko: Statement - press conference with IMF Mission Chief Statement by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the joint press conference with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Mission Chief for Albania Minister of Finance and Economy, Tirana, 10 October 2022. *** Dear media representatives, In the last two weeks, the Bank of Albania and the Albanian government have been engaged in intensive discussions with the IMF Mission, which visited Albania in the framework of the regular Article IV consultations. Discussion focused on current challenges for the Albanian economy, as well as structural reforms that would enable a faster and more sustainable development of the country in the long term. Allow me - first and foremost - to extend my thanks to the IMF Mission for the open share of views in addition to the fruitful and transparent discussions. Overall, the Bank of Albania and the IMF share similar opinions on the developmental challenges that lie ahead. The swift upsurge of prices in the global markets following the unprovoked military aggression of Russia over Ukraine, have triggered serious economic and social challenges for the economies and citizens of all countries around the world, including Albania. Inflation hit 8% in August, increasing at a rapid pace and having a broad base. Based on our judgement, we have previously stressed out that the high inflation is the main threat on the macroeconomic stability and both the stable and long-term growth of Albania.

In the same vein, our projections suggest that the Albanian economy will continue to grow in the medium-term horizon. Although the economic activity will suffer from the negative consequences of inflation, the economic growth of Albania is expected to remain in the positive territory. Economic growth will continue to benefit from the overall financial and economic stability in Albania, the sound balance sheets of enterprises and households, as well as the continuing support of the banking sector with credit and payment instruments. In this context, it should be emphasized that the banking sector appears sound, liquid, and well-capitalised. The continuing reforms undertaken in the past years have borne their fruits. The consolidation of the banking sector, the improvement of the lending environment, the multifaceted development of financial markets and payment systems, as well as the initiatives carried out that encourage the use of national currency, have brought about notable qualitative improvements in the stability and efficiency of the banking sector. The growth rate of credit to the private sector recorded a progressive improvement, peaking to 13.7% in August. Also, it shows a good coverage of the need of enterprises and households for long-term financing and liquid tools. The stable growth of credit and the increase in the quality of its portfolio, are crucial indicators which demonstrate the sector's support to the economic recovery of Albania.
Norwegian businesses are part of global value chains. This means that protectionist measures can spill over into the Norwegian economy even if Norway is not targeted. The international framework and trade agreements we have with other countries are essential to the Norwegian economy. The EEA agreement is of particular importance. Thanks to the free flow of goods, services, labour and capital within the EEA area, Norway’s domestic market is about 100 times bigger than it would have been otherwise. A good half of our trade with other countries is with EU countries (Chart 5). Common regulations and product standardisation facilitate market access for Norwegian firms. 1 Based on GDP at market rates. 6  NORGES BANK  Chart 5 We trade mostly with the EU. Goods and services. In billions of NOK. 2017 EU  US  China  ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  Other countries  Exports  Imports  0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  Norwegian business and industry may soon feel the consequences of Brexit. The UK is an important trading partner. The UK’s exit from the EU means it will also exit the EEA agreement, creating uncertainty for many firms. At the same time, international economic cooperation is creaking. In the years ahead, the multilateral trade system is at risk of being undermined, which may leave us with a more fragmented system. This may adversely affect small countries in particular.

Increasingly, it is taking place through vehicles – such as open funds and ETFs – that issue very short-term (often intraday) liabilities and invest in long-term instruments. It may be a matter of priority to develop a conceptual and operational approach to macroprudential policy that allows regulators to monitor those parts of the financial system that are currently out of reach. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  *** When central banks entered into non-conventional territory, most observers saw that as a temporary incursion. For some of us, this temporary situation has lasted seven years. For the euro area, the current horizon extends, at least, until 2017. This is quite a long period. For many young people today – say, for instance, current PHDs students -, conventional monetary policies are a prehistoric curiosity. Non-conventional is the only “normal” that they have experienced in their lifetime as adults. Will the future look like the past or be different? This question cannot be avoided for three reasons. First, over the past 30 years, long-term real interest rates worldwide have been steadily declining. If low equilibrium rates are a permanent phenomenon, which is rooted in structural shifts in the world economy, then current difficulties and challenges will persist. The chances that we will sooner or later hit the ZLB again are non-negligible.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: The outlook for Thailand’s economy in the face of concerns about the slowing US recovery and Europe’s debt crisis Address by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, Bangkok, 3 November 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished FCCT Members and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank the FCCT Board for inviting me to share my view on Thailand’s economic outlook in the face of the U.S. economic slowdown and the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis. Actually, the organizer’s original intention reflects very well what was in the back of everyone’s mind over the past few months when we talked about key challenges to the Thai economy. But as all of us here today might agree, things have changed so dramatically over the past month alone, with the country now being swept over by the flood. While our feet need to stand firm weathering through and recovering from the flood together as a nation, our eyes cannot lose focus on what happens in the U.S. and the Eurozone. I think it is fair to say that what happens in the U.S. and the Eurozone will likely reshape the global financial and economic landscape over the years to come. And for Thailand, these factors and their implications on the global economy will also determine whether the recovery from the flood will be a rosy or a painful one. So, my talk today will be divided into two parts.

2 John C. Williams, Inflation Targeting and the Global Financial Crisis: Successes and Challenges, Essay  presentation to the South African Reserve Bank Conference on Fourteen Years of Inflation Targeting in South Africa and the Challenge of a Changing Mandate, Pretoria, South Africa, October 31, 2014. 3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. 4 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. 5 John C. Williams, Living Life Near the ZLB, Remarks at 2019 Annual Meeting of the Central Bank Research  Association (CEBRA), New York, July 18, 2019. 6 John C. Williams, Monetary Policy in a Low R-Star World, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, FRBSF  Economic Letter, August 15, 2016. 7 This statement is based on ongoing research with New York Fed Research staff using Survey of Consumer  Expectations data and a version of the Malmendier-Nagel (2016) model of expectations formation (Ulrike Malmendier and Stefan Nagel . “Learning from Inflation Experiences,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  121, No. 1, 53 – 87 [gated version].). As such, it differs from the median measures of 1-year and 3-year inflation expectations released monthly by the New York Fed. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Timothy F Geithner: Reducing systemic risk in a dynamic financial system Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at The Economic Club of New York, New York, 9 June 2008. *  *  *  Since the summer of 2007, the major financial centers have experienced a very severe and complex financial crisis. The fabric of confidence that is essential to the viability of individual institutions and to market functioning in the United States and in Europe proved exceptionally fragile. Money and funding markets became severely impaired, impeding the effective transmission of U.S. monetary policy to the economy. Central banks and governments, here and in other countries, have taken dramatic action to contain the risks to the broader economy. Why was the system so fragile? Part of the explanation was the size of the global financial boom that preceded the crisis. The larger the boom, the greater the potential risk of damage when it deflates. The underpinnings of this particular boom include a large increase in savings relative to real investment opportunities, a long period of low real interest rates around the world, the greater ease with which capital was able to flow across countries, and the perception of lower real and inflation risk produced by the greater apparent moderation in output growth and inflation over the preceding two decades.

And also worthy of note is our work, together with the Ministry of Finance, on the initiative for the pension savings formation model through Individual pension capital. By our estimate, the work on this project is now quite advanced. We have undertaken a few rounds of both departmental and expert discussions. I very much hope that these changes will be accepted, as they will provide citizens with better quality of life, and generate a long-term source of funding for the economy, which is vital for investment development. And the last thing I wanted to mention, which I believe to be particularly important – when working on scenarios, on forecasts, on the budget – is our interaction with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development in preparing a firmly grounded medium-term macroeconomic forecast. Because this forecast provides direction not only for the budget, but also for businesses in our economy and economic subjects, and I hope that this work will also help to ensure consistency of views on macroeconomics and economic policy, because this is also very important. In the last two years we really have been consistently working together, and in our opinion this work has indeed paid off. And to wrap up I would like to extend my thanks once again to all the 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  staff of the Ministry of Finance for the constructive cooperation that we have developed, for your high professionalism, and for your responsible and involved attitude to work.
So far, I would say that improvements in Fund surveillance, its policy advice, as well as the transparency it encourages have led to sound policies, better institutions, and overall greater flexibility in emerging markets. A big pay-off was evident last year when the improved economic resilience enabled emerging markets to cope better with the impact of the high oil price. But, definitely, more can be done. And the first point I want to make is that IMF surveillance would be most useful for emerging markets if it strengthens its focus on helping members to better prepare for coping with the challenge of the next crisis. My view is that, with the improvements in economic fundamentals and policies that we are now seeing within emerging markets, there is now less likelihood than before that the next crisis, if it were to occur, will originate from imbalances within emerging market economies. On the contrary, imbalances now seem to be more of a challenge for the major economies with the financing now becoming a major component of the global capital flows. An unwinding of the imbalances could lead to economic slowdown and sudden changes in the financial conditions of the major economies, which, as the past episode of capital account crises shows, can create difficulties for emerging markets in terms of growth implications, abrupt reversals of capital flows and sudden stops.

Two factors played leading roles in that development. The first is the relatively large share of foreign-denominated loans – an average of 20% for households and 70% for businesses. The latter factor is an unusually strong exchange rate pass-through effect, which stems from the magnitude of the exchange rate drop and the lack of confidence that the króna would recover in the near future. As a result, the principal of indexed loans – which constitute about 70% of household debt and 10% of business debt – was written up. As is often the case in severe financial crises that are at the same time country crises, there was a genuine risk of a multi-faceted spiral of currency collapse, inflation, debt crisis, and economic contraction. It was critical to stave off such a vicious cycle, and therefore of vital importance to stabilise the exchange rate. BIS Review 146/2009  1  But this was problematic because of the large amount of capital that had accumulated in Iceland through carry trading during the economic upswing. Current estimates indicate that some 500 b.kr. remain in the Icelandic economy. There was the risk that this money would try to escape through a collapsed foreign exchange market, with unimaginable consequences for the exchange rate. Thus it was quite possible that astronomical interest rates would have been required if exchange rate stability were to be achieved through interest rate policy alone.