samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The two-year horizon should be interpreted as a restriction as to how much consideration can normally be given to real economic developments. It is a restriction that we have imposed upon ourselves – like the specified inflation target – to create credibility for the price stability target. Similar reasoning lies behind the set tolerance interval we have chosen around the target. While the tolerance interval provides an interval within which inflation can normally be expected to fluctuate as a result of unexpected shocks and insufficient knowledge of exactly how monetary policy affects the economy, it provides a limit as to the size of the deviations that can be tolerated. However, let me point out that there can be certain situations where the shocks to the economy are so great that there is reason to allow even longer than two years to bring inflation back on target. If our assessment was that such a situation had arisen, we would make this clear when publishing our monetary policy decisions. One condition is that we do not find ourselves in a situation where we would risk undermining confidence in the inflation target or in monetary policy. These thoughts on how to take into account developments in the real economy are of course not unique to the Riksbank. Although the guidelines for inflation-targeting monetary policy vary slightly from one country to another, all central banks with inflation targets conduct monetary policy that to some extent takes into account the real economy. This is usually termed flexible inflation-targeting.

Given this way of thinking, our Inflation Reports contain a special section where we discuss alternative scenarios for inflation and the real economy and the probability that these will materialise. It is the forecast of inflation and the real economy taking into account the risks of alternative scenarios that forms the basis of our monetary policy decisions. Of course, it is not appropriate for a risk analysis to take into account all imaginable risks; not even all those that would have dramatic consequences if they were to materialise. For instance, it is not reasonable, in my opinion, to allow monetary policy decisions to be governed by the risk of global imbalances, as we are unable to affect this development through our own monetary policy. 3 On the other hand, I consider that it is important to always take into account risks that arise from the monetary policy conducted, even if it is sometimes difficult to quantify these risks and calculate their consequences. One problem faced by many central banks with inflation targets, and which relates to this, is the risk of unfavourable developments in property prices and household indebtedness as a result of a long period of expansionary monetary policy. Sweden is no exception here. Both cyclical and structural factors justify the growth rate in household debts and property prices being high over a period of time in Sweden and there is thus reason to take this into account in the normal analysis and forecasting work.
Together with Securities Commission Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia co-chairs a Joint Committee comprising officials from the stock exchange and industry to collaborate on building climate resilience within the Malaysian financial sector. We are currently developing a principles-based taxonomy – to guide financial institutions to classify economic activities that contribute to climate change objectives. These complement efforts by the Islamic finance industry in driving the sustainability agenda through the value-based 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  intermediation strategy. There are many reasons to be optimistic on the future of ASEAN-China economic ties. ASEAN became China’s largest trading partner in first quarter 2020. Trade and investment flows grew despite the crisis. China’s direct investment in ASEAN in first three quarters this year surged 76.6 percent year-on-year. 1 Investment from ASEAN into China increased by 6.6 percent yearon-year, and Malaysia is among the top investors.2 Many cooperative projects under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative resumed rapidly after the initial shock of COVID-19. I echo our Prime Minister’s call last week for ASEAN and China to fully tap the potential of the digital economy as part of our efforts to build a stronger economic region. Opportunities can also be unlocked for investments on green infrastructure – such as renewable and energy-efficient technologies, as well as addressing basic infrastructure gaps in a fiscally constrained environment. Malaysia certainly welcomes China as a partner in this journey and we hope to see closer relations with Chongqing.

I am certain this Summit will explore these further and I wish the Summit success. Thank you. 1  Remarks by Ambassador Deng Xijun at the 3rd Jakarta Forum on ASEAN-China Relations in 2020: “Reinforcing Regional Economic Recovery amid COVID-19”, 2 November 2020. 2 Malaysia is number three after Singapore and Thailand. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
And this positive impact is such that it, in turn, boosts credit demand and banks’ income, which ultimately translates into higher solvency levels. In any event, it is important to note that it may be difficult for banks to use buffers if they fear they may be penalised by the financial markets for reaching certain capital ratios, which would increase their funding costs and could, therefore, affect their solvency levels. This  3  market stigma effect could lead banks to avoid using capital buffers, which in accordance with the above analysis would have a negative impact on the economy.1 In addition, the use of these capital buffers may be more difficult if there are doubts about how they will be rebuilt post-crisis. The difficulty would be if banks were obliged to rebuild the buffers at a time when their capacity to generate profit was only modest or when the market might not be very receptive. In this setting, clear communication by the macroprudential and microprudential authorities on the capacity to make use of these buffers and on the flexibility as to how they are subsequently rebuilt is essential. In this respect, the authorities have made it very clear that banks will have sufficient time to resume compliance with the capital requirements, and that the rebuilding process will not in any event begin until the main effects of the pandemic have been dispelled.

Distinguished delegates, previously, supervision of cross-border banks placed significant reliance on the ultimate home country supervisor to ensure the soundness of the overall institution. This implied that other regulatory authorities could only provide input to the supervisory process in the home country. Hence, it was considered appropriate for global firms to gain the benefits of global approaches to the management of their business and had significant flexibility in the use of legal entities to book transactions and to manage liquidity globally. Therefore, the global inter-connectedness made it very difficult for individual national entities to survive group failure even though they are subsidiaries, given the huge importance of confidence factors in funding markets. The challenge is how to develop regulatory and supervisory approaches which will minimize the likelihood of cross-border failures and to reduce the severity of that impact in the event of a failure materializing. It would appear that an appropriate response would have to combine both greater coordination among supervisors and actions aimed at specifically addressing national concerns. On its part, the Bank of Zambia is currently settling Memoranda of Understanding with various central banks for effective supervision of entities with cross-border operations. This is also necessary for enhancing cooperation among the various regulatory authorities in the financial system in Zambia such as the Pensions and Insurance Authority and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Chairperson, in the wake of the financial crisis, there has been renewed interest in macroprudential supervision.
Mr. Yam discusses “Intervention true to guiding policy” Discussion by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr. Joseph Yam, published in South China Morning Post on 24/8/98. The current debate revolving around government intervention in the stock and futures markets to deter currency manipulation brought a feeling of nostalgia to me. It made me recall the many debates on government intervention there were within the administration when Sir Philip Haddon-Cave was financial secretary. I was then, in the late 1970s, a young economist in the Economic Services Branch of the Government Secretariat, with little responsibility and a lot to learn. Those debates were, somehow, rather more healthy and more intellectual. There was certainly less mud being thrown around. But the contrast is understandable. Today, this is a controversial issue. There are interested parties airing their grievances through punchy and articulate expressions of their views on this philosophical issue of interventionism. This is also an issue in which, in a more politicised environment and at a time when the community is enduring the pain of economic adjustment, the politically minded see great political mileage. A government with the whole of the legislature arguably in opposition makes a vulnerable target. It is so easy to wave the banner of free markets and condemn any government intervention, and be seen to be righteous and knowledgeable; notwithstanding that the government concerned has been so successfully running the freest economy in the world.

What we can see is that periods of relatively high global growth have coincided with accelerating international market integration, deregulation and a rapid spread of technology, which has enabled poorer countries to draw closer to richer countries. If we go back 150 years in time, we find ourselves in exactly this type of situation. At that time, obstacles to trade were being abolished and countries and regions were being united by railways and steamships. Postal systems were developed and the telegraph system made a breakthrough. Intercontinental cables were lowered into the seas to connect Europe to North and South America, Africa and Asia. The world experienced a revolution in transportation and information that has yet to be equalled. The Sweden of that time is a good example of how a country can make use of internationalisation to lift itself out of poverty. When the country entered the 19th century, it had extensive regulations in trade and industry. However, the process of deregulation of the economy began during the first half of the century, under pressure from the growing markets' need for greater flexibility. The cities' toll gates were abolished and people could move more freely around the country. At the same time, private ownership was strengthened. The foundations were laid for the rapid industrialisation that took place during the latter part of the 19th century, when Sweden joined the global economy in earnest.
By Q1 2009, the hedge fund sector had experienced trading losses of around $ amounting to one fifth of their total assets (He, Khang and Krishnamurthy, 2010), a scale that would have wiped out almost all banks given their leverage. Yet many hedge funds have survived. And none has been bailed out with taxpayers’ money. Because hedge funds have so much lower gearing, or leverage, than banks they have been able to absorb much bigger falls in asset values. Close to 3,000 hedge funds have closed, that is liquidated, since mid-2007 2 – but they have done so with a quiet whimper rather than with an alarming bang. Falls in the value of assets that hit the wealth of institutions – but not their existence – do much less damage than falls that wipe out firms and cause bankruptcy. So sharp asset price variability, per se, is not the most serious problem. It is the combination of (and the interrelation between) high debt – or leverage – and variability in asset prices that is problematic. 2  “Global Hedge Fund Industry Report”, Hedge Fund research Inc, Q2 2010. BIS Review 133/2010  3  I believe that an important way to help preserve financial stability is to have policy instruments directed at debt gearing (or leverage) and to be used in the light of what has happened to asset values.

William C Dudley: Unconventional monetary policies and central bank independence Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Bank of Mexico international conference “Central bank independence – Progress and challenges”, Mexico City, 15 October 2013. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to be here today. Does the implementation of unconventional monetary policies pose a threat to central bank independence? My short answer, which I will elaborate on, is that while the threat is low, central bankers need to be cognizant of such risks, and clearly explain the motivations for their actions in order to mitigate such risks. The best way for central banks to maintain their independence is to use all their available monetary policy tools to best achieve their objectives. Because the use of our unconventional monetary policy tools has been in pursuit of our dual mandate objectives of maximum sustainable employment in the context of price stability, I do not see the use of these tools as creating significant new risks to our independence. As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. To start, it is important to be clear on what we mean by unconventional monetary policies.
Is this perhaps why there is less incentive to implement measures today? To mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, the most important measure is the work conducted in the political arena, together with the development of more environment-relatedly friendly technologies. At the same time, the authorities, private individuals and companies must address a new type of economic risk, climate risk. Climate risk includes physical climate risk and transition risk. Physical climate risk is associated with uncertainty about the economic consequences of higher temperatures and more extreme weather. There is a not insignificant probability of an outcome that is far more severe than the Paris Agreement is aiming for. Even if such an outcome does not materialise, and even if mitigation measures are able to limit the extent of the damage, the economic consequences could be considerable. Poor countries in the Global South will likely be hardest hit. Chart: Insurance payouts after natural disasters Norway is in a less vulnerable position, but we see that the weather is changing too. River and coastal flooding has increased and the damage caused is more severe, as reflected in insurance claims payouts. Over the past ten years, annual insurance payouts for climate-related flood and storm damage have been on average about five times higher than in the 1980s. Transition risk is associated with the economic consequences of the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Dimitar Bogov: Payment systems and market infrastructures Speech by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the 10th jubilee edition of the NBRM's Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures: Drivers of European Payment Integration - Innovations and Cooperation, Ohrid, 5-7 July 2017. * * * Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to address you on the 10th jubilee edition of the Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures. Organizing this Conference has become a valuable tradition of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. We take great pride for being able to host it all these years. This notable anniversary is an opportunity to look back and reflect on the beginnings, to honor the achievements we have made so far and set the road for future growth and development. The history of the Conference dates back to 2008 set as a joint project with De Nederlandsche Bank who is our partner in this journey from its very beginning. I feel the need to credit for it the enthusiasm of Toni Mircheski, Deputy Head of the Payment Systems Department within the NBRM, Mr Michiel van Doeveren and Mr Paul Osse from De Nederlandsche Bank for initiating and organizing the very first conference.
These signs are not unconnected to the swift and resolute intervention by the public authorities, which has proven effective in checking the growing perception of risks on financial markets and in increasing agents' confidence, thereby playing a valuable role in containing this crisis. But it is precisely now when the results of the measures are coming to fruition that it is most important to shun complacency and untimely and excessive optimism, which might curtail the process. The latest forecasts from the IMF and from many other supranational institutions admittedly include upward revisions of world output growth rates in 2010; but they also emphasise the persistence of a high degree of uncertainty. This applies in particular to financial market developments, where certain tension indicators still remain at high levels. BIS Review 124/2009  1  It seems reasonable under these conditions that the most immediate objectives of the economic authorities should continue to focus primarily on restoring the orderly working of financial markets and on maintaining the aggregate demand stimulus policies until economic recovery takes firm root, as was recently reiterated at the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit. Further ahead, however, the main challenge will be to identify the appropriate time for withdrawing the exceptional measures that have been adopted in the financial, fiscal and monetary realms, avoiding both a premature withdrawal that might undermine what has been achieved and an unnecessary prolongation that might ultimately generate dynamics that are difficult to reverse, and that are harmful to growth and well-being.

Denny H Kalyalya: Expansion of Zambia’s banking sector Remarks by Dr Denny H Kalyalya, Deputy Governor-Operations of the Bank of Zambia; at the official opening of Bank of China’s new premises, Lusaka, 9 December 2008. *  *  *  • Honourable Minister of Finance and National Planning, Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane, MP; • His Excellency – the Chinese Ambassador to the Republic of Zambia; Mr. Li Qiangmin; • Managing Director of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited; Mr Du Qiang; • Distinguished Invited Guests; • Ladies and Gentlemen. I am greatly honoured for having been invited to speak on the occasion of the official opening ceremony of Bank of China’s new premises. Ladies and Gentlemen As part of the on-going Zambia-Chinese relationship, the Bank of China was established in 1997. Since then the Bank has recorded tremendous progress. Distinguished Invited Guests During the past 8 years, the overall financial performance and condition of the banking sector has been satisfactory. The sector has continued to expand and we anticipate increased economic and investment activity in the period ahead. Banks are expected to continue to provide the required level of finance to consolidate the economic gains registered so far. The Bank has achieved tremendous growth since its inception in 1997. During the last eleven years, total assets have increased by 325% to K507.9 billion in October 2008 from K13.8 billion in December 1997. Regulatory capital increased by about 1,000% to K41.9 billion in October 2008 from K3.8 billion December 1997.
Credibility for the inflation target a binding restriction One condition for a central bank to be able to use the policy rate to counteract financial imbalances is that confidence in the inflation target is solidly established and that inflation expectations are firmly anchored around the target. This is a very important condition and I would claim that it is a binding restriction, that is, if it is not met, the central bank will have no scope to take other considerations. When the Riksbank gave consideration in its monetary policy decisions to the risks linked to indebtedness and housing prices rising too fast a few years ago there were no reasons to question confidence in the inflation target. It was firmly established and long-term inflation expectations were just over 2 per cent. However, what has happened since then is that the Riksbank and other analysts have on several occasions been surprised by inflation being lower than expected and have therefore been forced to gradually revise down their inflation forecasts. As the period with an inflation rate undershooting the target has become longer, economic agents have adjusted their inflation expectations downwards. During 2013 and 2014, for instance, the five-year inflation expectations in Prospera’s survey showed more or less a falling trend to just under 2 per cent. The further long-term expectations deviate from the target, and the larger the deviation, the greater is the risk that the inflation target will begin to lose its role as benchmark for pricesetting and wage formation.

Some have had to implement austerity plans and others, less drastically, are undertaking structural reforms and continuing to reduce their government deficits. This is the case of France. Even if these efforts appear moderate compared to those of other countries, they are necessary for our market credibility. Brussels has presented its proposals for a European bank supervisory mechanism; are they in line with your expectations? Yes, they are. The developments of the financial crisis have brought to light one of the euro area’s fragilities: the link between bank and sovereign risk. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, governments bailed out their banking systems and, in doing so, established a nexus between sovereign debt and local banking systems, which interferes with monetary policy transmission. When the euro area sovereign debt crisis erupted, bank refinancing conditions became correlated with sovereign risk, with the consequences that we have witnessed for ailing countries. The large amount of liquidity provided by the Eurosystem has reduced this impact, but funding costs have remained very high in some countries. It was therefore essential to decouple sovereign risk from bank risk. The banking union will ensure a sounder monetary union. Germany has expressed doubts as to the proposed set-up, in particular with respect to the number of banks covered by the ECB. Could this prove a threat going forward? The proposed union implies a transfer of sovereignty from States to the ECB, which Germany has always wished for.