samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We're heading into the summer: all the summer activities, whether it's transportation, whether it's hospitality, whether it's vacation, all of that is going to go well. So, that persistence is to be expected in the short run. There will be remaining persistency going through into 2024. It declines in 2025 and we have not revised upwards significantly for 2025 because we believe that other elements will kick in, which will reduce inflation numbers – unless risks were to materialise. But under the baseline, the indirect effect of energy costs will continue to fade. You can still find them in prices, but it is going to gradually fade out. The same goes for food. We expect the persistence of inflation to gradually fade away. As much as it persists, we will persist. You have delivered quite a strong message about wages, and I'm a little bit scared. Has the risk of an inflation spiral increased since March? The second question about the projections: if 2025 is not acceptable, do we need to see 2% inflation in 2024 for the ECB to consider that the objective will be achieved in a timely manner? Or what is exactly a timely manner? Well, first of all on wages: we are not seeing second round effects. We're not seeing this wage price spiral.

I would like to ask you what do you need to see for core inflation actually coming down so it may give you the possibility to pause or to skip – or whatever you want to call it – in September? So, what needs to happen? Then I have a question on the financial conditions. You are saying that they are forcefully tighter. What would you make rethink that it's enough when it comes to tight financial conditions? I wish I could give you the very simple answer where I say when we are there and when financing conditions are such, and the tightening has reached that level for corporates, for mortgages. But unfortunately, it doesn't work like that because what we know is the target that we have – which is price stability as defined by the 2% medium term – added to which we want to be confident that it stays at that target of 2%, which is why duration matters as well. But it is going to be a factor of those three elements that we will be looking at. So, it's the inflation outlook, which is every month, and every three months in particular, informed by all the new financial and economic data that we receive. It's the underlying inflation and the dynamics of it. I can assure you that we look at multiple cuts and subsets of inflation to arrive at what is the corest of the core. We don't limit our review at core; we go further than that.
Contrary to what we saw during the debt crisis of the 1980s, the problems in Asia were not almost exclusively macroeconomic in nature; even if these countries suffered, all of them, from some deficiencies in this respect, by and large they had long track records of successful economic management. Rather, in a context dramatically changed by a major realignment between the dollar and the yen, and important differences in short-term yields, three other factors helped trigger the crisis: • •  the weakness of their public and private banking and financial structures; an unsustainable accumulation of short-term financing - particularly of interbank lending, which Alan Greenspan refers to as the Achilles’ heel of the BIS Review 43/1998  -2-  •  international financial system - which made countries particularly vulnerable to a sudden shift in market sentiment. and, last but not least, deep-seated problems of governance, corruption, and what US commentators call “crony capitalism”. Together with the macroeconomic problems, these three major factors had to be addressed for our response to the crisis to be pertinent. If you examine our programs with Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia, you will see that we have tried to deal with these factors, and they will have to be taken into consideration in the future in whatever efforts are undertaken to avoid the recurrence of crises. But even that will not suffice.

But as expected, there are also challenges that come with fintech expansion: cyber-attacks, phishing emails and other scams are reportedly on the rise, a trend that needs to be addressed before it becomes alarming. Banks must continue to stay ahead of fraudsters through constant building and rebuilding of defences, rigorous stress testing, and educating customers about cyber safety. The enhanced Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative, soon to be launched, should provide banks with a robust framework for managing the risks. 11. Growing reliance on data analytics raises questions about data ownership and privacy. As we have seen in some other jurisdictions, AI and machine learning also introduce the risk of discrimination, sometimes in hidden forms. Banks have to guard against this by ensuring ethical, fair and transparent treatment of customers, and by correcting model aberrations using human intuition. 12. We realise that banks are at different stages in their adoption of AI technologies. For this reason, our risk management approach as a regulator is based on high-level principles rather than on detailed prescriptions that might stifle innovation or be disproportionate to the risks involved. 13. Technology is not just about banks and their customers – it is also an important part of banks’ relationship with the HKMA. As we are a key part of the technology ecosystem, our aim is to add value by facilitating the industry’s technology adoption through a range of initiatives, such as the AML/CFT Regtech Forum and the Regtech Watch newsletter.
The situation in the United States, where the economy is in a cyclically more advanced position and employment levels are close to their structural low, is conducive to the Federal Reserve normalising monetary policy. However, the absence of inflationary pressure, the downturn in and uncertainty over the global economy, and doubts about when interest rates will begin to rise all cast a shadow which has prompted very mixed expectations. As for developments in emerging economies, the slowdown in China, sharp adjustments to its share prices and the depreciation of its currency during the summer have heightened the risks of a steeper-than-expected fall in activity, with effects on the global economy through trade and commodity prices and via indirect contagion effects owing to higher risk aversion in international financial markets. The main issue regarding the Chinese economy is not whether it slows by a fraction of a percentage point more than projected, but rather the external consequences of such a development. For example, a slowdown in growth to around 6% of GDP, compared with 7.3% in 2014, is no grave cause for concern. In principle, these figures, which largely reflect the change in China’s production model to an economy more geared towards consumption, can be managed by the authorities. The uncertainty lies in the difficulty of evaluating the external effects of such changes, and the fact that the differing forecasts of private and public agents are reflected in greater volatility in financial markets.

Asian and Latin American emerging economies are particularly sensitive to changes in the international arena. In Latin America, GDP data for the second quarter show a significant slowdown. The Brazilian economy, in particular, is worrying given its high budget deficit and significant current account shortfall (although the latter has begun to be corrected), along with inflation that needs to be contained and corrected as soon as possible. The IMF projects Brazilian GDP will fall by 3% this year and will fall further, albeit moderately, in 2016. I would like to indicate that the impact of the downturn in the emerging economies on Spanish banks, even for those with significant exposure to some of these economies, has been moderate. The geographical diversification of their businesses and the adjustments made to their management have contributed to the stability of their balance sheets. Developments in the euro area As for economic developments in the euro area, growth in the second quarter was external demand-led, although internal demand continues clearly to support disposable income arising from lax monetary policy, the neutral fiscal policy stance, low energy prices and the improvement in the labour market. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In September, the ECB revised downwards its growth projections for the euro area to 1.4% in 2015, 1.7% in 2016 and 1.8% in 2017. It should also be noted that the approval and start-up of the Third Bailout Programme for Greece has mitigated the risks in the area, a source of uncertainty for the Spanish and other European economies.
Capital markets play a comparatively larger role in our financial system. As a consequence, shocks get  2  BIS Review 9/2005  diffused more broadly, and weakness in traditional intermediation channels can be offset by the strength in other channels. Here in the United States, financial innovation has advanced farther and more rapidly than elsewhere. This reflects a regulatory model that is more supportive of competition, of financial innovation, and of market-driven improvements in risk management. The U.S. financial system has embraced opportunities for risk transfer much more rapidly and extensively than other systems. Finally, we have larger and more developed venture capital, private equity, and hedge fund segments within our financial system. These are important sources of liquidity, they add depth and breadth to capital markets, and they play a valuable arbitrage role in reducing or eliminating mispricing in the financial markets. However, no system is invulnerable to stress and crisis. Recent U.S. financial history is not a history of the uninterrupted achievement of ever higher returns. The stock market crash of ’87, the stress that surrounded the Russian default and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, and the more recent fall in equity prices that came with the collapse of the technology boom all posed significant potential threats to financial stability. In each case, however, with a swift monetary policy response and other actions the process of recovery and repair was reasonably quick. The relative ease with which we managed through these events has reinforced confidence in the stability of the system.

BIS Review 9/2005  3  All this suggests we should complement sensible macroeconomic policy choices with further investments to strengthen the financial system. Let me end by thanking Vernon Jordan and the Economic Club of Washington for providing a forum for thinking about the economic agenda of the country, and for giving me the opportunity to share a few thoughts with you tonight. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 9/2005
Macroprudential policy affects the resilience of the financial system, but one (more or less pronounced) effect of this is also that lending rates are affected, which is of consequence to the trade-off between price stability and financial  3  It should also be mentioned that macroprudential supervision is not the only change to better prevent future crises. Many of the regulatory deficiencies prevailing before the crisis are being addressed by the new capital and liquidity regulations of the Basel III accord. Work on improving the regulations is, however, far from complete and intense efforts are under way in various international forums. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  stability. To highlight this in more detail, I will provide a general picture of how I view macroprudential policy. As a starting point, I will take the interest rate which households and companies pay for loans ( itlending ). Put rather simply, this can be defined as the central bank’s policy rate ሺ݅௧ ሻ plus an interest rate margin (  t ):  itlending  it   t . The interest rate margin depends on the banks’ compensation for administrative expenses and capital and funding costs, risk premiums and the banks’ profit margin. Credit terms such as the loan-to-value ratio and amortisation requirements are not directly visible in the interest rate encountered by borrowers, but in order to illustrate their effect at an aggregate level, they can be restated into interest rate terms.

Such collaboration can also be extended to facilitate retail payment card transactions via the domestic debit card schemes of both countries. Eventually, I envision ATMs in Malaysia and Indonesia will be linked seamlessly. This will reduce cost, enhance safety and expand outreach. Conclusion Let me conclude with a quote by Malaysia’s second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, who said in 1967 that, “We cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together and unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family of SouthEast Asian nations bound together by ties of friendship and goodwill” We have indeed come a long way in our cooperation and journey between Indonesia and Malaysia. The potential of Bank Mandiri as a Qualified ASEAN Bank in Malaysia will be a significant milestone for both our countries and the ASEAN region. It represents the realisation of a vision that was formed more than six years ago with the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, with roots that go even further back. We should expect greater achievements by both our countries. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Thank you. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Hoerova and Monnet (2011) view market  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  money market (as demand might not be fully matched by supply) and segmentation in the market between maturities over and below 30 days. At the same time, by reducing liquidity risk, the LCR may lead to lower liquidity risk premia. The overall effect of these two countervailing forces is unclear though. While there could be an overall impact on the difference between short and longer-term rates, to assess the overall impact on the monetary policy transmission, one would need to see whether the transmission from short to longerterm rates would be also affected. However, it remains to be seen whether unsecured lending beyond 30 days will revive after the crisis. As mentioned, this new set of liquidity requirements is expected to have important consequences for limiting solvency risk and encouraging good risk management. In fact, the regulation is expected to bring an overall positive effect on the functioning of the money market by internalising the negative externalities for financial stability and monetary policy, i.e. reducing information asymmetries concerning banks’ liquidity risk exposure and their liquidity risk bearing capacity, creating the conditions for a better functioning of the money market.17 This has to be combined with actions ensuring a proper functioning of the money market (such as oversight of reference rates along the lines recently proposed by the European Commission).

Philipp M Hildebrand: From monetarism to the inflation forecast 30 years of Swiss monetary policy Public lecture by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the University of Berne, Berne, 23 November 2004. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the Swiss National Bank, in 1974, was one of the first central banks to adopt a monetary policy with monetary aggregates as intermediate targets. The monetarist phase of the National Bank lasted until 1999. During this phase, the National Bank repeatedly changed its monetary targets. In the course of time, it adopted an increasingly pragmatic monetary policy and paid more attention to the development of the exchange rate. In December 1999, the SNB introduced its current monetary policy concept, which uses an inflation forecast as the basis for monetary policy decisions. On the whole, monetarist ideas had a positive influence on Switzerland’s monetary policy. They brought the realisation that price stability is important, thus furthering the process of disinflation in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, monetarism caused the SNB to make its monetary policy more transparent and rule-based. The use of monetary aggregates as intermediate targets, however, was more problematic. With money demand proving to be too instable, simply controlling money supply growth was not sufficient to achieve price stability.
Although the capital and financial account inflows fell by 11.3% in annual terms, the overall balance of payments resulted positive and the Bank of Albania’s foreign-exchange reserves increased over the past year. The current level of this reserve is in accordance with our operational adequacy rates and could pay for 4.5 months of imports of goods and services. Improvement of the structural current account deficit should be one of our long-term policy objectives; it helps in maintaining the financial stability of our country and increasing the country¡¦s resilience to foreign shocks. Fiscal policy was generally consolidating in 2012. Budget deficit dropped by 1.2% in annual terms, estimated at 3.4% of GDP, or down by 0.3 percentage points from a year earlier. Current account deficit narrowed due to reduced public expenditures, which fell by 0.3% on a year earlier. Similarly, public revenues dropped by 0.2% in annual terms, reflecting the cyclical condition of the economy. On the other hand, public debt exceeded 60% as a percentage of GDP, reflecting the higherthan-projected rise in budget deficit and the increase in public guarantees. Bank of Albania’s attitude to this problem has always been transparent: maintaining public debt at sustainable  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and harmless levels for the Albanian economy and preserving financial market confidence regarding the Albanian public debt should remain the primary objective of the fiscal policy. Monetary indicators performed in line with real-economy ones, slowing down in 2012.

NBRM cannot require those banks to increase lending, but we undertake everything we can to prevent a reduction in their loan  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  portfolios. Obviously, this is another area where we have a spillover of the negative developments in the Euro area into our economy. What will be the credit growth this year, and what do you expect it to be next year? The estimate for this year is about 7 percent, and for the next year it is somewhat higher. In which direction will the interest rates on loans and deposits move next year? The downward trend is likely to continue, although at a slower pace. The European Central Bank reduced the basic interest rate to 0.75 percent in order to stimulate the economic growth. The National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia maintains it at 3.75 percent. Why not reducing it down to 1 percent in our country, too, which will reduce the interest rates on loans as well? In a highly euroized economy as the Macedonian, it is necessary to motivate economic agents to demand Denars, not Euros. Therefore, interest rate parity on Denars and Euros must be kept at an appropriate level that stimulates the demand for Denars. In the last three years we have reduced that parity from 8 percent to only 3 percent. Further reduction is a process that depends on the resilience of the economy.
In particular, it surveys inflation expectations over the medium term, at a 4-year horizon, and delivers very useful information since each forecaster is asked about his own probability distribution of inflation over the forecast horizon. It might then be completed by other surveys looking at longer horizons, such as the Consensus Forecast for instance. According to these surveys, medium to long-term expectations have proven remarkably stable in the euro area, standing at a level around 1.8 - 1.9%, in spite of short-term inflation dynamics being adversely affected by a series of sizeable supply shocks that have impacted the economy since 2000. Another very useful kind of survey is the European Commission’s harmonised survey of price expectations of individual households, which completes the set of alternative measures of inflation expectations. Here, households are asked whether they expect price over the next 12 months to rise more or less rapidly than over the past 12 months. The time horizon here is very short and, since 2000, the survey has delivered more worrisome results. A divergence has actually emerged, both in France and the euro area as a whole, between actual inflation and inflation as perceived by households. The proportion of households that feel that prices have risen sharply has substantially increased, without any correlation to actual developments in the general price level.

A deep, single capital market will also strengthen the international role of the euro,5 as further developed euro-denominated markets, derivatives and benchmarks will reduce transaction costs, curb spreads and mitigate rollover risks. This will in turn attract foreign investors and widen the possibilities of using the euro in international transactions. Conclusion Let me conclude. Assessing potential vulnerabilities in the light of current challenges is key to making financial markets and infrastructures more resilient. Authorities and market participants are reflecting on the lessons to be learned from the pandemic and this will be a key topic of today’s discussions. Our panellists will provide insights on CCP margin practices and the related funding and operational complexities that emerged last spring and which we need to address. This conference will also provide an opportunity to discuss the direct and indirect implications of climate change for central clearing. Cash and derivatives markets have already developed products to facilitate sustainable investments and help hedge against climate risks. Our panellists will also consider the changing clearing landscape, including some of the regulatory and supervisory cooperation issues I have mentioned and the global dimension of this debate. Given the challenges currently faced by economies and financial markets, finding the right mix of internal capacity building, cooperation and innovation will be crucial to make central clearing even more resilient. I am sure this conference will give rise to a fruitful exchange of views. Thank you for your attention.