samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As emerging Asia aspires towards achieving higher levels of income and living standards, a different path from that which led the way for many advanced economies will need to be considered. The global financial crisis and the Asian financial crisis have provided us with many important lessons that should form the underpinnings for the development of a sound economic and financial policy framework. Such a framework must effectively combine strong regulation and market discipline to reinforce financial stability. The recent crisis has shown that markets cannot be exclusively relied on to rein in excesses. A broader perspective of regulation that looks beyond individual institutions is also essential to identify the build-up of system-wide risks. Equally, financial institutions need to consider how to meaningfully include such system-wide perspectives in their approach to managing risks in their respective institutions. Public policy also has a crucial role in promoting economic development that benefits society at large, and that addresses the disproportionate social welfare effects of a financial crisis on the most vulnerable groups of society, including low-income households, retail consumers and small businesses. Specifically, policies that protect the core savings of these groups, promote financial inclusion and contain excessive leverage should also form an integral component of the resolution and reform agenda. Given the high costs of financial crises there is now a better appreciation of the need for such policies to co-exist with free markets, working to efficiently allocate economic capital to achieve more sustainable outcomes.

This provides an opportunity for banks and businesses to leverage on, to improve the coverage of Point-of-Sale Terminals to facilitate the use of the debit card as means to reduce the need for cash, as well as, to increase tourist spending at more merchant outlets. With higher broadband and debit card penetration rate, coupled with increased payment innovation and strengthened security measures, businesses should consult their banks and take advantage of the various electronic payment solutions to reap the benefits of cost savings and productivity gains. 6  As at end-Sept 2013 – Total broadband subscriptions = 4.5 mil. With the additional 2.8 million household, total broadband subscriptions will increase to 7.3 million. Penetration rate = 7.3/6.7 mil household = 108%. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I hope you will continue to provide your support in making this national electronic payments campaign a success for the benefit of the country. Conclusion I hope that all of you will benefit from today’s program. Please do take time to visit the exhibition booths to inquire about the latest promotional offers on electronic payment services and sign up to experience electronic payments at an affordable cost. On this note, it gives me great pleasure to open the Payment System Forum 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
The international community may in future need to provide stronger incentives to countries to improve debt structures, be it through GDP-linked bonds, CoCos or CACs. Linking the availability or terms of IMF financing more explicitly to debt structures might be one way of doing so. (c)  Enhanced macro-prudential and capital flow management policies  Significant progress has been made over the past decade in the design and implementation of macro-prudential regimes and capital flow management policies. The shift in the prevailing orthodoxy, analytically and operationally, has been remarkable. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A decade ago, policies to manage actively inflows and outflows of capital were frowned upon by the IMF and the international community. Yet today these measures have been largely accepted as part of the toolkit for protecting countries from boom and bust cycles in capital flows (IMF (2012)). Perhaps most significantly of all, more than 40 countries have already deployed these measures since 2009. A great many analytical and operational issues remain open. What are appropriate states of the world for introducing and releasing capital flow management measures – a first or last resort? Which policy measures are likely to be most effective – outflow versus inflow, price versus quantity controls? And how do these policies operate alongside other arms of policy – monetary, macro-prudential and micro-prudential? At present, we have neither the theory nor the experience to answer these questions definitively.

That is why systemic risk entered the public lexicon. And that is why financial regulation has, in the period since, been fundamentally re-oriented towards the monitoring and management of systemic risk. Interestingly, that lesson would have come as no surprise to anyone familiar with dynamic, integrated networks outside of the world of finance. Assessing the stability of almost any network known to man – whether natural, physical, social or economic – relies upon a system-wide assessment. And protection mechanisms for this system need to be calibrated to system-wide characteristics (Goldin and Mariathasan (2014)). Financial webs are no exception. The history of financial crises suggests they may be closer to the rule. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This new orthodoxy has framed the post-crisis regulatory reform agenda. It is why so-called macro-prudential policy has risen in prominence. It is why the world’s most inter-connected banks will in future be required to run with extra capital and liquidity. It is why OTC derivatives will in future be centrally traded and cleared. And it is why resolution of the world’s largest, cross-border banks has become such a priority. For the global banking system we now have a blueprint, an emerging new set of international rules of the road.
Indeed, this became the norm across the income statement. Thus, ordinary profit rose by more than 30%8 year-on-year in the first quarter, with increases of 9% both in net interest income and fee and commission income. Meanwhile, impairment losses fell by 12.5% compared with March 2021. It must be noted, however, that the full economic and financial impact of the war in Ukraine did not materialise in the first quarter of the year. As regards the cost of bank funding, the average cost of liabilities9 has fallen since the onset of the pandemic, down to 0.5% at end-2021. The latest data available point to a change in trend, albeit with these costs holding below pre-pandemic levels (slightly above 1%) for now. In particular, wholesale market funding costs rose in the initial months of 2022. Indeed, expectations of interest rate rises have fed through to wholesale market interest rates on long-term bank debt (a measure of funding costs) more robustly than to the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate.10 Thus, banks’ credit risk spread has widened. Banks stepped up their debt issuance in 2021 to comply with prudential and resolution requirements, with issuances of Tier 2 instruments and contingent convertible bonds  8  By contrast, in 2022 Q1 net profit fell by 30% compared with the same period a year earlier, but this was due to the almost € billion recorded in extraordinary gains in March 2021 as a result of the merger at CaixaBank.

An important similarity with the other measure, however, is that the liquidity that was injected via Kaupthing into the system also comes back to the Riksbank in the form of deposits from the bank(s) that have excess liquidity. In this way this measure does not have any direct monetary policy effects either. The common denominator for everything the Riksbank has done to date is that all measures are aimed at strengthening liquidity conditions within the Swedish financial system. Unlike many other countries, thus far it has not been necessary for the Swedish authorities to provide the banks with any form of capital support from the government. This point is also important. However, it remains to be seen whether the Riksbank and other authorities have done enough. How the situation develops in the future is essentially a question of what happens outside of Sweden. Nevertheless, the Swedish authorities are prepared to take those measures that are necessary to ensure financial stability. For the Riksbank, this means that we will continue to provide the banks with the liquidity required for the financial system to function. Let me now proceed to discuss paths out of the crisis. Paths out of the crisis We are now in the middle of the most serious financial turmoil that the world has seen in a very long time. It is difficult to anticipate how the situation will develop in the future, which means that it is also difficult to talk about paths out of the crisis.
In the speech at the University of Economics and Business, I also mentioned two problems that are and will continue to be relevant: (1) the CNB's large balance sheet and (2) government debt. 3/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Regarding the CNB's large balance sheet, over the last ten years, interest rates were too low, in fact zero for a long time. In addition, in early 2017, interventions led to an increase in the CNB's balance sheet within four months, or rather in the banking sector's liquidity. It increased from CZK 1,300 billion in December 2016 to CZK 2,300 billion in April 2017, i.e. there was an additional CZK 1,000 billion in the balance sheet, or an almost doubling of the balance sheet within four months of 2017. During these interventions, demand for Czech government bonds from non-residents increased. This further expanded the country's borrowing options. Budget constraints were eased. Then, during Covid, in particular at the end of March 2020, interest rates were reduced too close to zero. And fiscal policy was expansive for too long – we created a dangerous entitlement economy in which the state was the rich uncle who helped with almost everything. When an economy such as this one (especially one with a huge surplus of money and incomplete price convergence) was hit by a strong cost shock after the lockdowns, the Czech Republic ended up with the highest core inflation in the EU (from November 2021 to October 2022).

All this shows that there is enormous potential for the expansion of bilateral economic relations between our two countries. BIS Review 45/2005  1  Many politicians in Europe seem to forget that China, like all the other emerging economies in Asia and South America, has become one of the dynamic poles in the global economy in recent years. By contrast, Europe has trailed behind in terms of growth. This is precisely why globalisation makes sense for an economy open to international markets such as ours. For both historical and geographical reasons, our country is exposed to a considerable commercial risk in Europe: 60% of our exports are destined for European countries; accounting for 25%, Germany ranks first among our export markets. These European markets are no longer the most dynamic today, nor will they be in the future. It is essential that we step up the diversification process so as to ensure the expansion of our export sector. It is therefore in our own best interests to strengthen economic relations with Asia, in particular with China. Business relations between industrialised countries and China currently take centre stage in political discussions. In particular, harsh criticism has been levelled at China because of its exchange rate policy of pegging its currency to the US dollar despite the fact that it has made considerable progress in terms of efficiency.
Yet another conceptual issue to be put across clearly is the fact that an inevitable cost of fixing the exchange rate through currency board arrangements is interest rate volatility. An external shock involving any substantial flows of funds into or out of the currency will lead to interest rate changes. The larger the flow the sharper the changes, in a manner very much dictated by the market. And as there is little or no discretion on the part of the HKMA on interest rates, the HKMA was in fact not responsible, for example, for overnight interbank interest rates hitting 280% last October. We did not squeeze interest rates. It was those shorting the Hong Kong dollar who squeezed interest rates and, on that occasion, squeezed themselves as BIS Review 87/1998  -5-  well, along with the innocent borrowers. Interest rate volatility can be dampened by discretionary action, but that would undermine the credibility of the system. Alternatively this could be done by further modifying our currency board arrangements and incurring the cost in the form of greater fluctuation in our foreign reserves while eschewing the exercise of discretion. This was the objective of the seven technical measures we took in early September to make our system less susceptible to manipulation. 20. I do not wish to continue to bore you with these conceptual issues. Although they are technical, they are essential if there is to be sensible and meaningful discussion about monetary management in Hong Kong.

It would be naive to think that we can be right all the time. Nobody can be. We can only be less wrong. But more importantly, public support should not be built merely upon faith in an esoteric and aloof BIS Review 87/1998  -3-  HKMA being professional and acting in the best interest of Hong Kong. Whatever reputation the HKMA has been able to achieve, domestically and internationally, such support could never be sustained for long. We do run a system that, at times, inflicts considerable pain on the community. Many of the decisions taken by the HKMA are unpopular. The pain and the unpopular decisions may become too severe to bear just on the foundation of faith, particularly in the peculiar political setup of Hong Kong. 11. An essential part in the management of the political process concerning monetary issues, therefore, is to promote a better general understanding on those issues. This is not easy. Not only are those issues technical, but they are also changing all the time with the rapid changes in the global financial scene. Financial liberalization and the globalization of financial markets, encouraged by the advance of telecommunications and information technology, have drastically changed the behaviour of money. On top of all this, we have the complication that Hong Kong’s monetary system has really only started to take shape in the past ten years or so, as monetary reform measures were introduced to modernize it so it could cope with the demands and expectations of modern finance.
UK monetary policy  Measures to make the system safer, fairer and to operate with more integrity are re-founding a more resilient, open global financial system. This sets the stage for monetary policy to support a supply side recovery. Ben Bernanke once said to Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, “You [were] right, we [the Fed] did it [caused the great depression]. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.” Thanks in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  part to Chairman Bernanke’s leadership, central banks have pursued the opposite strategy to the 1930s to great effect. While the human cost since 2008 has been considerable, it is dwarfed by the experience of the Great Depression. Central banks haven’t done it again, but that doesn’t mean they should be satisfied. There remains still considerable, if uncertain, slack in their economies. I say uncertain because obvious measures of slack, such as unemployment, are much lower than we would have expected given the scale of the fall in demand. Supply side performance in advanced economies has been surprisingly poor. Before the crisis, the growth in potential supply was largely predictable (technically a stationary trend). As a consequence, central bankers responded to movements in demand around that trend. The issue now is the extent to which the fall in demand has itself eroded potential supply and whether that could be reversed as economies recover. In the US, the question is whether labour force participation rates will pick up.

Just last November I visited OnForce Solar, an installer of solar heating systems located in the Port Morris section of the South Bronx. There has also been a great deal of retail development over the past decade – most notably, perhaps, the Bronx Terminal Market just south of Yankee Stadium. A little known fact is that, on average, jobs pay more in the Bronx than in any other of the five boroughs, except for Manhattan. And my regional economists assure me that it’s not just the Yankees that bring up the average, although they do make a difference. This, of course, is not to say that all is well in the Bronx. Its poverty rate and unemployment rate are both roughly twice the national average, and higher than in any of the other boroughs. While crime has fallen dramatically over the past two decades, it also remains higher than in the rest of the city. Debt is also burdensome for many Bronx residents. Delinquency rates on household debt are relatively high, suggesting that many people are financially “distressed.” All this makes it especially important to maintain the economic momentum that is improving the quality of life in the Bronx. Community banks have an important role to play in this process. Bank lending can help businesses – especially new and small businesses – expand and grow jobs, and help residents invest in improving their homes, neighborhoods and communities.
Wallison, P J (2008), “Fair Value Accounting: A Critique”, American Enterprise Institute for Pubic Policy Research. BIS Review 28/2010  13  Annex  14  BIS Review 28/2010  BIS Review 28/2010  15  16  BIS Review 28/2010

In any case, I would like to stress that, from my perspective as a supervisor, Pillar 1 should remain risk-based and that we should move beyond the somewhat artificial opposition between green and brown exposures, by assessing transition risk more on the basis of transition plans. As regards the digitalisation of finance, in addition to contributing to the development of regulations such as DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act) and MiCA (Markets in cryptoassets), which aim to facilitate the development of innovations in a framework that improves confidence and financial stability, we can, as a central bank, play a positive role from an operational point of view by reviewing our offer of monetary services. In this perspective, the Banque de France has successfully conducted nine experiments with central bank digital money (CBDM) for the purpose of interbank settlement, securities transactions and cross-border payments over the past two years. They will continue in 2022 in two major areas: -  The first area concerns the settlement in central bank money of securities issued on new distributed ledger platforms, which will be governed by the pilot scheme from 2023. New technologies offer opportunities to facilitate the trading of financial securities and improve the functioning of markets. However, central banks are careful to ensure that they do not lead to market and liquidity fragmentation. Following the example of what has been done for TARGET2-Securities, the Eurosystem could therefore adjust the means of access to its settlement asset to secure trading of tokenised assets.
This is of course good news, but it is rather like one of those TV series which begins with a narrator saying, “Previously on…”. This is a reminder of what has happened so far. What does the next episode contain? Well, the answer is that it hasn’t been anything near fully recorded yet, but we are of course very much in the action. The nature of the recovery I want to frame my assessment of that action in terms of two big questions that we face. First, as we experience a very rapid bounce-back, what conclusions can we draw on the temporary nature of the causes of higher inflation, and what should we look out for to judge if those causes might be more sustained? Second, when the bounce-back from Covid is done, and the temporary features have come to an end, what sort of economy are we likely to be in, and what does that suggest for inflation and growth? It’s clear that we are seeing stronger momentum in economic activity in many parts of the world, including here in the UK, in response to the progressive easing of restrictions and growing confidence of people to be out and about (as revealed in mobility data). The process of normalisation is very dependent on how the two big moving parts of supply and demand respond, whether they recover in synch or not.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Developing countries and international capital markets Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to economiesuisse, Zurich, 14 June 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  After having plummeted on the back of the Asian crisis, capital flows to developing countries have risen considerably again in the last three years. In 2005, they are likely to reach the approximate level at which they stood shortly before the Asian crisis. Capital flows are channelled mostly to a few emerging markets, notably China. China’s monetary order is currently undergoing profound changes, with the country gradually liberalising capital movements. The concept of the “impossible trinity”, which was developed by the Nobel Prize winner Robert Mundell, asserts that this will inevitably lead either to a loss in monetary autonomy or to a flexibilisation of the exchange rate regime. Both trends can be clearly observed: the pressure on the fixed exchange rate on the one hand, and the rapid expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates on the other. In the longer term, China’s monetary order will probably move towards floating exchange rates. This transition will hopefully be successful. As China’s monetary policy of gradual change has so far proved its worth, it is likely to serve as an example to other developing countries.