samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The second issue I would like to highlight is a emerging focus internationally on the sharing of information between the public and private sectors, which I believe offers great potential in enhancing the effectiveness of our AML efforts. Increasingly, law enforcement agencies, regulators and the financial sector are cooperating in ways that go beyond the filing of STRs and assistance with investigations although these, of course, remain essential. The focus is now more on two-way sharing of information on trends and typologies. 20. In Hong Kong, the Fraud and Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce, led by the Police and with participation by the HKMA and the banking sector, was established as a pilot scheme in 2017. This is a public-private platform along similar lines to initiatives overseas, notably in Australia and Singapore, and while it is at an early stage, it has already shown concrete results, not least in the freezing or restraint of some $ million as well as 71 arrests over a 10-month period. I believe that this kind of cooperation shows real promise for sustainable 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  enhancement to the effectiveness of our framework, and the HKMA strongly supports its continuation and development. 21. The third issue is that we all need to keep under constant review whether we are getting the risk-based approach right. To implement AML efforts using an approach based on risk is the cornerstone of the FATF Recommendations. No one – neither institutions nor regulators – can be watching all risk areas all the time.

It was also Rojo who, in the final stage of his mandate as governor of the Bank of Spain, designed and put into practice the prudential regulatory mechanism of dynamic provisioning. This has contributed to reinforcing the stability of the Spanish banking system and today commands wide recognition; but, when initially launched, it aroused understandable rejection by Spanish banks and was met with indifference on the part of the international community of banking regulators and supervisors. Let me give you the background to this prudential and countercyclical regulatory mechanism. The origins of Spanish dynamic provisioning must be sought in credit developments in the late 1990s. Having emerged from the 1993 recession, the worst for 40 years in Spain, the economy, and much more intensely so bank lending, began to expand at an increasingly brisk pace. The Bank of Spain was led to introduce dynamic provisioning, which came into force in mid2000, by a combination of factors. These included most notably: the mix of strong credit growth, with the dangers this entailed for the stability of the financial system; heightened competition, which acted to exacerbate these risks given that credit institutions applied increasingly lower risk premia to maintain their market share; the deterioration in the level of loan loss provisions and their extremely high correlation with current default rates; and, finally, the Bank of Spain’s past supervisory experience.
The risks of this expectation not being fulfilled are not only and strictly in the economic sphere: legal security and political stability will be pivotal to the engine of recovery. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

In the interest of long-term economic stability, fiscal policy, monetary policy and the wage formation process must complement each other. A shared understanding of how these components interact is very important. Monetary policy’s most important contribution to economic stability is to maintain monetary value through low and stable inflation. Both too high and too low inflation can involve costs to society, with arbitrary wealth redistribution, underinvestment and scarce resources that may be misallocated or left idle. This is usually referred to as providing the economy with a nominal anchor. When households and enterprises can base their economic decisions on low and stable inflation, this provides an important foundation for higher activity and welfare over time. As long as there is confidence that inflation will remain low and stable, monetary policy can contribute to smoothing fluctuations in output and employment. When the economy is exposed to shocks, such as a financial crisis or a fall in oil prices, monetary policy can respond rapidly. Sufficiently flexible inflation targeting could help ensure that lower employment levels do not persist over the long term following a downturn. This can reduce the risk of unemployment becoming entrenched at a high level. The probability of a pronounced downturn in the economy has been shown to increase after periods of rapid asset price inflation and debt growth. Monetary policy can also to some extent contribute to high and stable output and employment by giving weight to counteracting the buildup of financial imbalances. However, monetary policy must not be overburdened.
In 1998, the early days of the Great Moderation, GDP-at-risk was benign – that is, even in a tail outcome the level of GDP was expected to be higher three years out. Through the next decade, though central case GDP grew steadily, risks were gradually building. By 2007 a fifth percentile draw was expected to leave GDP 3.5% lower three years out. As the crisis hit, GDP-at-risk shrunk rapidly as risks crystallised. Since then, risks have been relatively stable reflecting post-crisis balance sheet repair, the implementation of comprehensive macroprudential frameworks, and relatively subdued economic activity (Chart 6). Chart 6: Risks grew during the Great Moderation but are now standard 2007  Latest  Probability density  1997  0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08  Risks increasing  0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00  -10  -8  -6  -4  -2  0  2  4  6  8  Cumulative GDP growth over 3 years (%)  10  12  14  [Chart 6 uses same data as Chart 5. For each distribution, shaded area denotes the tail; the line marks the 5th percentile]. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  14  2. Impact on growth The second set of differences between macroprudential and monetary policy concern the interaction between their objectives and growth in the short and long terms. Both monetary and macroprudential objectives apply at all times.

Resilience with a reason. That reason is the ultimate objective that unifies the Bank of England’s monetary and financial functions – the meaning of the central banker’s life which can be found in the opening sentence of our 1694 Charter – “to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom”. It has been my honour to do so. 34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  34
viii)  In case of the emerge of extraordinary fluctuations in the market even at reasonable levels of excess liquidity, the Central Bank may allow the overnight interest rates to fluctuate between the Central Bank overnight borrowing and lending interest rates range by sterilizing the excess liquidity drained in overnight transactions through liquidity bills, New Turkish Lira deposit buying auctions and reverse repo auctions, in order to reduce the said fluctuations. ix)  In case of the emerge of a need to issue liquidity bills, information on auctions will be announced at Reuters’ “CBTL” page at 10:00 one working day prior to the auction rather than on the same day, to provide investors a longer time for evaluation. Information on auctions will continue to be announced to banks and financial intermediaries by Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) system. Liquidity bill auctions will be held at 11:00 with the value date of the following working day, and the results will be announced until 11:30 at Reuters’ “CBTM” page. Auctions will be held by the traditional method. BIS Review 4/2008  9  x)  Information on New Turkish Lira deposit buying auctions will be announced at Reuters’ “CBTY” page; while information on reverse repo auctions will be announced at “CBTF” page at 10:00 on the same day.

Norman T L Chan: Building "Hong Kong" as a brand for financial services - beyond marketing Welcoming remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Treasury Markets Summit 2017, Hong Kong, 18 September 2017. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, 1. A few months ago when my staff asked me what I would wish to talk about at today’s Summit, my immediate response was “culture”. In a rather polite manner, my staff told me that I had spoken on this subject many times before and it would help the TMA sell the tables if I could talk about something else. I didn’t commit myself one way or the other and so I hope it won’t disappoint you too much if I am going to talk about culture and ethics again this morning. 2. That said, I am not totally insensitive to the audience’s desire to hear something different from me, so I am going to start with a true and, I hope, interesting story on what marketing can and cannot do. We all know and appreciate the importance of good marketing in the commercial world. Rule number one in marketing: No matter how good your product is, you need to undertake an effective campaign to reach out to your target customers to make them aware of the product and convince them that they should be interested in it.
Constâncio, V. (2016), “Margins and haircuts as a macroprudential tool”, remarks at the ESRB international conference on the macroprudential use of margins and haircuts, Frankfurt am Main, 6 June 2016; Constâncio, V. (2017), “The future of finance and the outlook for regulation”, remarks at the Financial Regulatory Outlook Conference, Rome 9 November 2017. Da Rin, M., G. Nicodano and A. Sembenelli (2006), “Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture Capital Markets”, Journal of Public Economics 90:1699–1723. ECB Opinion on 20 April 2016 on a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (CON/2016/26). European Commission Report (2015), “Completing Europe’s economic and monetary union”, by Jean-Claude Juncker in close collaboration with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and Martin Schulz (the Five Presidents’ Report). European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) (2017), “Sovereign bond-backed securities”, ESRB High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets. 7/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Fernald, J. (2015), “Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 29:1–51. Furceri, D. and A. Zdzienicka (2015),“The euro area crisis: need of a supranational fiscal risk sharing mechanism”, Open Economies Review 26(4):683–710; previously published in 2013 as IMF Working Paper 13/198. Hsu, P., X. Tian and Y. Xu, (2014), “Financial Development and Innovation: Cross-Country Evidence”, Journal of Financial Economics 112: 116–135.

This approach clearly showed its limits during the financial crisis. The financial fragmentation of EMU during the financial crisis was partly a result of the initial choices concerning EMU’s institutional architecture – to be precise, its minimalist design which left economic and financial policies mostly at national level. This was maybe due to an overriding faith in the efficiency of financial markets that – even though not shared by all of EMU’s founding fathers – prevailed in Maastricht. It has to be acknowledged, however, that over the following years, financial market integration in EMU and at global level, accelerated at a speed that was hard to grasp in those early days after the creation of Monetary Union. The introduction of the single currency gave a major impetus to financial integration in the euro area. Financial integration was impressive in terms of quantitative indicators but it was not sustainable – it proved to be shallow and reversible. In fact, it even contributed to the rapid contagion in the early days of the crisis.1 We learned the hard way that a single currency requires a financial system that is sustainably integrated and, indeed, as single as possible. Much has been done to correct the initial design failures of EMU. Along with the introduction of the euro, the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan was launched to provide an overall framework for the integration of financial services in Europe.
When the Riksbank alters the repo rate, there is an effect on total demand and ultimately also inflation through various channels within the economy. These channels are the cost of borrowing, incentives to save and wealth, as well as exchange rate fluctuations that affect imported inflation, exports, imports and capital flows. In addition, there is an effect on inflation expectations. It takes some time for an interest rate change to have an effect through these channels. The monetary policy decisions must therefore be based on an assessment of future inflation. Flexibility thanks to credibility Conducting monetary policy is not the same as flying a familiar, well-tuned aircraft. The repo rate is unfortunately a blunt instrument with regard to steering inflation, even a couple of years ahead. What monetary policy can do is to ensure an inflation rate that is over a number of years in line with the target and to contribute to reducing fluctuations in the real and financial economy. When the inflation target was announced in January 1993, the Riksbank formulated a tolerance interval around the target of ± 1 percentage point. The purpose of this was to explain that it is not within the power of monetary policy to exactly meet the target all of the time. In addition, the tolerance interval provides scope for temporary deviations from the target which may be justified by taking growth and employment into consideration.

Recurring financial crises have made it clear that there will always be problems that need to be tackled and that the authorities can therefore benefit from a structured approach to financial stability. What can the Riksbank do if it considers that financial stability is threatened? There is no direct steering instrument or lever to pull in the same way as for price stability. Moreover, the Riksbank cannot intervene in the banks’ operations at a microeconomic level. The work is instead largely concerned with preventing crises. This is achieved partly by regulations that establish the framework within which financial companies can operate, and partly by regular monitoring of the system. There must also be an emergency system so the central government can manage any crises that may nevertheless arise. With regard to the first part of the stability work, the responsibility for regulations in the financial markets lies mainly with the Ministry of Finance and Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority). However, the Riksbank can affect financial market legislation by responding to consultation documents, participating in commissions of inquiry and in the international work on  BIS Review 8/2006  5  developing regulations. On the basis of my own earlier experiences of the management of bank crises in different countries, I consider it particularly important to complete the Swedish legislatory work on how banks in distress should be managed.
However, in recent years, we have learned more about the concurrent need for macroeconomic stability and a stable financial system. That concept includes the need for businesses and consumers to have access to credit on fair and reasonable terms through all stages of the business cycle so that they can build and grow. We need an efficient and resilient payments system to maintain the flow of funds through the economy at all times. We need financial markets that remain active, liquid, and trusted regardless of events in the economy. The challenge for supervisors is to promote the health of the banking sector with a broad range of tools. We have certainly found that problems in the banking sector tend to have a “ripple effect” across the wider economy. Therefore, it is in everyone’s interest that a country’s banks should be able to manage their risks today and respond to challenges tomorrow. This is first and foremost the responsibility of the banks themselves, but supervisors also have an important role to play in ensuring that banks are prudently managed and capitalised. Banking is fundamentally about trust. Banks are charged with a special public trust to safeguard customers’ wealth. We have all seen what happens when customers lose trust in the ability of individual banks or the banking system as a whole to protect their savings. This puts a special onus on banking supervisors to ensure that banks operate soundly.

Leveraging on the experience of Bursa Malaysia in the area of exchange traded products, this platform is able to eliminate uncertainty in the transactions and could mitigate risks such as legal risk, market risk and counter-party risk. As Bursa Suq Al-Sila’ is designed to be a multi-currency platform, it can enhance liquidity and risk management capacity of the international Islamic banking community. Furthermore, it could be harnessed into a cost effective global platform to develop universally acceptable Islamic financial products for the financial and capital market. Overtime, in making it into a truly multi-commodity global exchange, the scope of the exchange-traded product offerings could be expanded to include other commodities and the level of participation should be expanded to include players from outside the financial services industry as well. The proposed collaboration between the Bahrain Financial Exchange and Bursa Malaysia is expected to strengthen cross border financial traffic between both our markets, as this platform has a vast potential to facilitate liquidity flows from one financial centre to another. It will also pave the way for optimisation of financial resources across borders as well as diversification of risks between our markets. Furthermore, this venture will also allow both our markets to explore various opportunities for further collaboration in the future, leveraging on each other’s strengths and achieve synergies for effective and efficient Islamic financial services industry. I urge the banks in Bahrain and Malaysia to work together and use Bursa Suq Al-Sila’ to enable the flows of funds that would enhance the liquidity management framework.
As a matter of fact forward-looking decisions should be made on the basis of an ever larger and timely information; They should be constantly consulted with specialized economic and financial market agents. The Bank of Albania, likewise other central banks, endeavors to increase the qualitative and quantitative data base, in order to improve analyses and the decision-making process in making new steps. The finalization of the several-year project of the Bank of Albania, along which the Business and Consumer Confidence Indicator was consolidated, is an accomplishment of one of the medium-term development strategy objectives of our institution. The decision to publish these indicators passed through a prudent process and matured only after experts and decision-makers of the Bank of Albania were convinced that the confidence indicators, together with other indicators, revealed valuable additional  BIS Review 36/2009  1  information about the recent and future developments in the country’s real sector of the economy. Allow me to briefly summarize some of the basic concepts on confidence, tendency and the foregoing indicators. They have been widely used in many advanced countries of the world, particularly over the last two decades. These indicators are constructed on the basis of information collected from surveys, which are technically referred to as Business and Consumer Confidence/Tendency Surveys. The Bank of Albania conducts these surveys in cooperation with INSTAT.

All the users of this information should be aware that this information does not substitute or duplicate the official macroeconomic statistics. These qualitative indicators are compiled on the basis of opinions and expectations of the interviewed economic agents. I would like to be more concrete relate to this point. The Bank of Albania, having the awareness, independence and a certain degree of institutional transparency, and aiming at achieving high professionalism, plays an active and proactive role in the country’s economic development. Economic analysis is under direct function of the monetary policy decision-making process. In essence, the decision-making precedes the medium-term developments, sustaining the maintaining of price stability as the primary policy target drafted and implemented by the Bank of Albania. Profound analysis of the past, present and future developments of the economy contribute to appropriate decision-making. I assure you that building a complete “picture” of the present and the future of an economy is a rather difficult process, not only for an emerging economy, such as that of Albania, but also for the most advanced economies of the world. Economic and financial developments are accompanied by elements of insecurity, which have become, as you already know, dominant in last two years. Making decisions on the future of this already globalised world of economic links, requires professional maturity. Assessing and selecting appropriate and reliable statistical information requires profound intuitive abilities. Making the selected data bank beneficial to the decisionmaking, requires analytical foresight.