samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the conditions for the Riksbank to take action were improved as the bank was gradually given increased independence and in 1999 was given a statutory objective of safeguarding price stability. Developments since the crisis have been good on the whole, even regarding other aspects than inflation and competitiveness: •  Growth has been high. On average, GDP has increased by 2.9 per cent a year during 19942005 as compared with 1.8 per cent a year during 1970-1993 (see Figure 3). •  Employment has increased and unemployment has declined, although not as much as might be desired (see Figure 4). However, the Riksbank’s assessment in the most recent Inflation Report was that the labour market situation would continue to improve over the coming years. •  Public finances have improved to an extent where they now show stable surpluses of around 2 per cent of GDP (see Figure 5). •  The current account balance has improved and now shows very large surpluses (see Figure 5). Exports as a percentage of GDP have increased from 27 per cent in 1992 to 49 per cent in 2005. Wage formation has improved At the end of the 1980s it had become increasingly evident that Swedish wage formation did not function in a manner compatible with economic balance.

It was common that central wage agreements  2  BIS Review 93/2006  signed in the 1980s contained price development guarantees, wage development guarantees, earnings development guarantees, control stations, etc., which led to prices and wages chasing one another in an upwards spiral. The work on changing wage formation can be divided into three important steps. The first step entailed the Government appointing the Rehnberg Commission in March 1990. On the basis of the Commission’s proposals, stabilisation agreements were signed covering the greater part of the labour market, which meant that the rate of wage increase fell from around 10 per cent in 1990 to 3-4 per cent in 1992-1993. The fact that a lower rate of wage increase was not yet fully established in the mid-1990s is, however, shown by the fact that wage increases rose again to around 6 per cent in 1996, after the 1995 wage bargaining rounds. The second step entailed the social partners in the industrial sector signing a new cooperation agreement in March 1997, known as the Industrial Agreement, whereby the parties took joint responsibility for wage formation in their part of the labour market and had agreed on a regulatory framework for negotiating wage agreements. The agreement was followed by similar, but not as farreaching, agreements in other sectors. The third step meant that the new National Mediation Office began its operations in 2000. This established a third, independent party in the labour market, which could actively promote an efficientlyfunctioning wage formation process.
One consequence of pricing in a single currency in all member countries will be to facilitate buyers of goods and services greatly in making price comparisons, and competition within the EU will certainly become more active than it has been until now. Economic and Monetary Union The EMU has a population of more than 300 million and accounts for 16% of global GDP. By way of comparison, the USA has a population of 280 million and accounts for 22% of global GDP. Exports of goods and services are equivalent to 19% of EMU GDP, while the corresponding figure for the USA is under 11%. Some 19% of total world merchandise exports come from the EMU, and 15% from the USA. Twelve of the fifteen EU nations belong to the EMU. The UK, Denmark and Sweden remain outside it, but their positions differ somewhat. Denmark and the UK have stated reservations about membership, on which they have reached agreement with other EU states. Sweden, on the other hand, has opted to remain outside the EMU, although no special reservations have been agreed upon for them. Denmark is involved in currency cooperation with the EMU, one aspect of which is that the exchange rate of the Danish krone may not deviate from the Euro by more than 2.25% from a defined central rate. Denmark therefore enjoys limited monetary independence.

This is reflected in the fact that the Danish Central Bank invariably alters its interest rates in the wake of announcements of changes in the European Central Bank (ECB) policy rate. Sweden and the UK have opted for inflation targeting as their monetary policy framework, which therefore does not have the objective of keeping these countries’ currencies stable against the Euro. European Central Bank The Maastricht Treaty stipulates monetary arrangements in the EMU. The EU countries created a framework for the ECB’s activities which was to some extent modelled on the Central Bank of Germany but differed in many ways from the arrangements in others. Various conditions were set which EU members had to fulfil in order to be granted EMU membership. On the one hand these related to major components of economic developments, such as inflation, fiscal deficit, government debt and interest rates. On the other hand they addressed the framework that the Maastricht Treaty lays down for monetary policy implementation in the EMU. This policy was consistent with growing support for the view that it was natural to set a simple target for central banks – i.e. promoting price stability – and to increase their independence from the political leadership in pursuing their main objectives, and to strengthen their financial independence. Another emphasis was that, at the same time as the central banks’ independence was strengthened, stricter demands would need to be made of them regarding transparency in their activities and actions, and regarding accountability towards the government and general public.
With the November 2019 adjustment, banks’ exemption thresholds became dynamic, in the sense that the reference period over which the exemption thresholds are calculated is updated each month as the sliding window over the preceding 36 months. Starting in January 2015, a bank’s exemption threshold was determined as 20 times its minimum reserve requirement, based on the October 2014 reference period. With the November 2019 adjustment, its exemption threshold was raised to 25 times (raised further to 30 on 1 April 2020) its minimum reserve requirement, using a moving average of the minimum reserve requirements over the preceding 36 months. Page 9/13  The increases in the exemption thresholds also broadened the scope for additional liquidity redistribution, causing trading volume on the repo market to rise. Indeed, repo market trading volume, shown by the vertical blue bars in Chart 4, increased substantially in November 2019, as did the number of banks active on the repo market. Let us now take a closer look at the impact of the exemption threshold adjustments on the repo market and, in particular, at the tools the SNB has deployed to ensure that secured money market rates remain close to its policy rate. The role of SNB monetary policy operations in the money market The increases in the aggregate exemption thresholds have changed the dynamics in the repo market, as they simultaneously caused the demand for liquidity to rise and the supply of liquidity to fall in the repo market.

At that time, commercial banks did not have the capability to assess the viability of the industry, nor accept the intangible assets offered as collateral. It was only much later, 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  when the industry recorded healthy profits that private investments followed. The success speaks for itself. Between 2008 and 2011, private domestic and foreign investments in the culture content industry had quadrupled to more than USD 157 million. The second example is Uganda’s first ever private bond issuance by a multinational mobile telecommunications company. The provision of a financial guarantee by a development financial institution helped to connect Uganda’s poor and low income population in more than 20 rural communities by enabling access to telecommunication services. This culminated in the telecom industry that now provides 135,000 jobs for Ugandans and contributes 1.4% of its GDP. Taking lessons from these examples, I believe that development financial institutions need to possess three key traits to promote and champion the new growth areas: a. First, they must have specific mandates to develop and prioritise niche segments identified to be of strategic and economic importance. These will give them legitimacy with funders and partners; b. Second, affiliations with Government, ministries and agencies to facilitate the design of appropriate government support. This will enable them to take higher risks; and c. Third, a broader focus on socio-developmental goals allows risk-return trade-offs to take into account positive externalities for the economy.
That is why, as Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke said in London last week, central banks will look to intervene only in markets that “normally play major roles” in the functioning of the financial system. Therefore, the Bank will need to be satisfied that there is a genuine private demand for an asset in normal conditions before it would be eligible for the asset purchase facility. We are aiming to complement and stimulate private demand, not substitute for it. 4  BIS Review 8/2009  The Bank is actively considering in which markets targeted purchases might stimulate new issuance. One example is the corporate bond market. Spreads on high quality corporate bonds have more than doubled since early September to an average of over 5 percentage points. Despite innovation in financial markets this is the highest spread since the mid-1970s. The Bank estimates that a significant element of this spread represents an illiquidity premium which could be reduced somewhat by increasing activity and liquidity in the market. Commercial paper is another case where purchases might help, although that market is considerably smaller in the United Kingdom than in the United States. In each case the Bank will keep the market fully informed, and more details will be published at the end of the month. It will be a matter of weeks not days before a programme of purchases can begin, but it will be weeks not months. There is another reason to tread carefully.

Since the summer, the exchange rate has fallen by almost 20%; and oil prices have fallen by around two-thirds, both of which will boost demand. No one can know at what point the impact of all this stimulus will have a visible effect on activity; the lags in economic policy are notoriously long and unpredictable. But welldesigned policies implemented within a consistent policy framework will eventually work. BIS Review 8/2009  5  1. Ten largest monthly falls in UK equity prices  Percentage change on a year earlier  South Sea  Aug-Sep 1720  Black Monday  Oct-Nov 1987  South Sea  Sep-Oct 1720  10 Se p-10 O ct 2008  10 Sep-10 Oct 2008  Oil shock & secondary bank crisis  Nov-Dec 1973  Oil shock & secondary bank crisis  Jul-Aug 1974  France fall to Germany  Jun-Jul 1940  Oil shock & secondary bank crisis  Feb-Mar 1974  Unexpected rate hike  Aug-Sep 1981  Oil shock & secondary bank crisis  Nov-Dec 1974  2. Chinese electricity production 30 20 10 0 September 2008  -20 Jan 01  -60  -40 -20 Percent change  Jan 03  Jan 05  4.
Naturally, those of us behind the Plan are obliged, as I advocate for public policies as a whole, to support our actions with empirical evidence substantiating their efficiency and effectiveness. To obtain data on which to base the evaluation, I would stress that the Banco de España will be conducting in the coming months the second wave of its Survey of Financial Competences. And, in coordination with the OECD, work to evaluate the financial literacy of our small and mediumsized firms has just been concluded. Evaluation as a basis for political consensus This call for evidence-based public policies as a key element for progress and freedom in democratic societies should not be understood as being at odds with the healthy ideological debate proper to free and plural societies. On the contrary, I believe both elements should complement each other. Ideology has, at least, a dual role in the public policy decision-making process. The first is related to ends. It provides an ethical notion of what is good or bad for society. And this cannot or should not be subject to evaluation. It is a question of personal preferences which, in the event of legitimate discrepancy, should be settled in the political domain democratically, under each nation’s constitutional framework. Professor Fuentes Quintana, who has also received here deserved acclaim from the Spanish General Council of Economists, stated in 1948 that “theoreticians aspire to see reality eclipsed by their light, and it is politicians who must ultimately transform theoretical proposals into a wealth of favourable outcomes.

But this process can take too long. There is always the risk that when the dust has settled the initiative and enthusiasm, dare I say, on the part of those less affected by the crisis, may be stifled. There is also the risk that the plight of those who have been seriously affected by the crisis is not given the attention it deserves, simply because they do not have an adequately representative voice on the issues at hand at these international forums. There is no lack of ideas, but they need to be translated into actions sooner rather than later. Let me take this opportunity to outline three broad approaches mooted at different forums and supported by us. The first approach involves enhancing the transparency of markets. Timely and reliable information relevant to decision making by market participants as well as by the regulatory authorities is crucial to the effective functioning of a market. It is thus important that there should be an adequate public disclosure framework to provide information that is necessary for counter-parties, creditors and investors to assess risks properly. Not only should increased transparency be promoted in markets trading products in an established exchange. It is also perhaps time to consider whether some suitable form of transparency requirements should be imposed in OTC markets. This is not an easy task, but I believe that with earnest international co-operation, we can achieve meaningful results.
Yet, challenges remain in ensuring that the data is both complete 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  and comparable. These challenges are compounded by an increasing need for data at a more granular and disaggregated level. For example, initiatives by the United Nations Capital Development Fund to survey remittance recipients in the Mekong region helped develop a better understanding of relationships between gender and financial inclusion. Yet such data is not available in many other countries. With the large and increasing size of intra-regional migration in this region, there are opportunities to collect and share remittance and migration data at the regional level to complement global datasets. This could be advanced through existing regional forums, including various forums at the ASEAN level. Without good data, we cannot hope to move very far, or with much confidence in efforts to increase the development impact of remittances. In summary, the notion of proportionate regulation has more than one dimension. It should not be mistaken for lighter regulation, nor should it be informed by considerations of size alone. The world is much more complex and regulators will need to find creative ways to better understand and manage that complexity. This is a paradigm shift in the way that regulation is traditionally approached – to one that is more iterative, more inclusive and more discerning. Conclusion Eleanor Roosevelt once said that universal human rights begins in small places close to home – where every man, woman, and child seeks equal justice, opportunity and dignity without discrimination.

Remarks given at a panel to launch the third annual America’s Pledge report, at the 25th Annual Conference of the Parties Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England  US Climate Action Centre, Madrid 10 December 2019  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth for her assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Introduction The Accelerating America’s Pledge report comprehensively documents the scale of change that is needed across our economies to put emissions on a trajectory consistent with building a net zero economy. That will require a more sustainable financial system. Changes in climate policies, new technologies and growing physical risks will prompt reassessments of the values of virtually every financial asset. Firms that align their business models with the transition to net zero will be rewarded handsomely. Those that fail to adapt will cease to exist. Now is the time to ensure that every financial decision takes climate change into account. For that change to happen, we need to focus on the three Rs – reporting, risk management and return. First, reporting In 2015, G20 leaders tasked representatives from the public and private sectors to review how the financial system takes into account climate risks. We established a Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), chaired by Mike Bloomberg. Four years on, the TCFD has generated a step change in both the demand for and supply of climate reporting. The demand for TCFD disclosure is now enormous.
•  Similarly, inflation also puts further pressure on the government budget by raising current expenditure due to increases in the prices of inputs and the salaries of employees. It also causes the revenue to fall behind the increases in the national income. Therefore, the use of inflation as a measure for funding government budgets is not an advisable strategy for any government. This was very cogently expressed by Dr. Goh Keng Swee, economic pundit behind Singapore’s economic miracle, in his reminiscences of why Singapore chose to retain the currency board system, as follows:  BIS Review 64/2007  3  “Financing budget deficits through Central Bank credit creation appeared to us as an invitation to disaster. There was no effective way of exchange control in an open trading economy like ours to deal with inevitable balance of payments troubles. ……The way to better life was through hard work, first in schools, then in universities or polytechnics and then on the job in the work place. Diligence, education and skills will create wealth, not Central Bank credit.” There is no better explanation of the evils of inflation tax than the above statement of wisdom. Countries which did not have this wisdom fell through the line and were gripped by uncontrollable hyper-inflation in their economies. The most recent example is Zimbabwe where inflation presently runs at mo re than 3700% p.a.

Its Central Bank Governor, Mr. Gideon Gono, recently lamented by equating his country’s hyper-inflation to an economic HIV, an epidemic that would kill people on a mass scale. Hence, using inflation to fund budgets is just like getting a demon to work for you. 4  BIS Review 64/2007
(e) Market-Based Finance: The emergence of a large and diverse shadow banking system, both prior to the crisis in the US and subsequent to it elsewhere around the world, plainly poses both considerable opportunities and potential threats to financial stability. So-called market-based finance provides the financial system with a second, non-bank, engine on which to fly which could be beneficial in a diversity 27  For example, the results of the Bank of England’s 2014 stress test found that risk-weight procyclicality was a significant contributor to the change in capital ratios in the stress test scenario (Bank of England (2014)). 37  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  37  sense. Nonetheless, it also gives rise to potentially new sources of systemic risk and contagion, as risks change shape and location. The FSB has made significant progress in progressing the regulatory debate on such matters (FSB (2017e)). Certainly, these trends carry implications for both the conduct of regulation and for central bank procedures. A world of greater market and liquidity risk may call for different sets of regulatory instrument than the bank-based solvency and liquidity metrics of Basel III. Market-based instruments, such as margin requirements, may have a greater role to play (see, for example, ESRB (2017)). It may also call for different types of market intervention by central banks – different markets, different instruments, different counterparties. The crisis has already seen a mini-revolution in the design of liquidity facilities by central banks.

The economy has also faced significant cost shocks in the past couple of years, this time in a negative direction. Commodity prices have fallen sharply, sterling’s exchange rate has risen. The combined impact has been enough to push CPI inflation down to zero. We don’t face the same trade-offs as during the 2009-12 period, as output now looks much closer to potential. Equally, there is a good argument for “looking through” some of the effects of these cost shocks. Faced with the same situation, Committee A would probably choose to loosen policy now in order to get inflation back to target as rapidly as possible. But, with the output gap projected to narrow further anyway, and because the effects of lower commodity and import prices are likely to fade over time, it would probably then face the prospect of having to re-tighten policy thereafter, as inflation threatened to move above the target. There was a very slight flavour of this in the MPC’s latest projections. The Committee has said it wants to get inflation back to target in “around two years and [keep] it there in the absence of further shocks”. Given all the other underlying assumptions in the forecast, the yield curve we faced at the time broadly does the first part of that job. But the central forecast rises a touch above target at two years and then drifts a little higher. For what it’s worth, and if only at the margin, that yield curve was thought likely to over-achieve.
It is obvious that it´s still too early to assess properly the impact of this labour market reform, and any such evaluation will have to consider multiple issues, including employment, labour turnover, human capital accumulation, among others. In the meantime, learning from the experience in other countries about the impact of similar regulatory changes on temporary employment could prove to be useful for the design of a rigorous evaluation of this reform in the case of Spain. These issues are covered in the first session. Second, another major challenge for the Spanish economy is the dismal performance of aggregate productivity, the ultimate and most important engine of economic growth and prosperity. Average annual total factor productivity growth over the 2000-2019 period was 0.2% in Spain, as against 0.5% in the euro area (and 0.9% in the United States). Among the various determinants of this gap, recent literature has been highlighting the role of the misallocation of resources across firms and the small size of businesses, which has a bearing on the country’s low aggregate productivity. In particular, 35.7% of total employment is in firms with less than 10 employees, compared with 28.5% in the European Union. To tackle this challenge, it is essential to explore the various reasons why our business sector is so skewed towards small, low-productivity firms and to mitigate the effects.

Let me finally express my gratitude to the organisers for making this conference possible and to all of you for attending. I wish you a very productive meeting and a pleasant stay in Madrid. Thank you very much. 6