samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So I had placed myself on the sideline, but I compensated by offering to chair a number of public commissions.” 26 Governor Knut Getz Wold wrote in 1972 that: “Norges Bank’s position today in relation to the government authorities is not, however, defined by a formal right to make decisions on specific issues, but by its role as advisor …”. He went on to say: “Norges Bank has limited direct power. This is as it should be. But it has, and should have, influence. If store is to be set by its word, it must keep abreast of developments at home and abroad. The Storting and the government have the final word. Having said that, Norges Bank will loyally and actively follow up their decisions.” 27 In 1973, the efforts to develop an economy under strong centralised coordination and control culminated in a proposal to establish an incomes policy council with regulation of wages. 28 The proposal was logical. It was the last wall in the structure erected after the war. Coordination and regulation were important key words.

37 The Act was drafted in the light of Norges Bank’s role in the postwar government administration. Therefore, the new Executive Board, which replaced the board of directors under the 1892 Act, is now appointed by the Council of State. 35  Elster, Jon (1979): Ulysses and the Sirens. Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, University Press, Cambridge. 36  Stanley Fischer introduced the difference between goal and instrument independence. See Fischer (1995): “Modern approaches to central banking”, NBER Working Paper No. 5064. 37  The Norges Bank Act is discussed in Helge Syrstad (2003):” Sentralbankens uavhengighet” [Central bank independence], Fagbokforlaget. 10  BIS Review 154/2010  Under the Act, Norges Bank is an executive and advisory body for monetary, credit and foreign exchange policy and shall monitor developments in the money, credit and foreign exchange markets. The Act makes no reference to the objective of monetary policy. On the contrary, its formulations are completely open-ended. 38 The Bank shall conduct its operations in accordance with the economic policy guidelines drawn up by the government authorities. How this was to be interpreted was the subject of controversy in the first years. Today, in the light of both the text of the Act and of the preparatory works, the implications of this may also be unclear. This provision has not gained any further practical significance. Today, Norges Bank no longer looks for guidelines in public documents.
There were signs of that last week when the minutes from April showed that I had not voted with the Board’s majority. But as observers and market players become more accustomed to how we operate, such differences of opinion are likely to attract less attention. Still, monetary policy signalling clearly cannot be arranged in quite the same way as before and in this respect we will presumably become more like the ECB and the Bundesbank, where individual statements do not automatically constitute a collective signal from the central bank. For those who are interested in following us and our assessments, however, we strive to provide a good foundation by publishing — at intervals of approximately six weeks — either an Inflation Report or a lengthy press notice on the majority view of inflation prospects. Fiscal policies in the euro area Let me now turn to the conduct of fiscal policy in the euro area. A judicious monetary policy is not sufficient to ensure that the monetary union functions properly. The single currency will make the national economies more interconnected than before. The formation of fiscal policy in one country will affect the overall picture of economic prospects and thereby monetary policy. In the Maastricht Treaty the countries accordingly agreed on certain common rules for economic policy and these have been fleshed out with additional legislation and political agreements. Besides fixed and binding undertakings for each country, there are regular common processes for producing more general guidelines and standards for economic policy.

It means that all EU countries — and thus non-euro countries such as Sweden — are bound by the rules for fiscal policy and its surveillance after the move to Stage Three. Each country is to strive for budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus in the medium term. This is intended to allow the automatic stabilisers free play while keeping the government deficit inside the 3 per cent limit. In this way the Pact provides for some flexibility in fiscal policy, which may be particularly important when there is no recourse to exchange rate adjustments. If the budget deficit exceeds the 3 per cent limit, sanctions can ultimately be imposed on the country in question if the problems are not tackled. It is only in exceptional circumstances that this may not apply. A surveillance procedure has been established for monitoring developments; national stability programmes are to be presented at regular intervals, showing how the goals are to be fulfilled. This process is perhaps as important in practice as the threat of sanctions. The establishment of clear rules and sanctions is intended to support the forces in each country that favour a disciplined fiscal policy. The sanctions do not apply to non-euro countries and they submit convergence programmes instead of stability programmes. So what has happened so far? The assessment of convergence or stability programmes from all the EU countries this spring shows a mixed picture.
All of these central bank functions are mutually dependent and, together, highlight the fact that the structure and workings of the banking system are integral to a country’s financial stability and economic growth. Clearly, monetary policy cannot succeed in its mission if the underlying financial system is unstable. The importance of an efficient, safe and sound banking and financial system for a country’s long-term economic prospects cannot be overstated. In any market economy, the banking and financial system plays a central role in mobilizing a society’s savings and in channeling these savings into investment and other productive uses. This intermediation process is one of the core determinants of the pace of a country’s economic development. Moreover, the banking and financial system must facilitate transactions in an economy by ensuring that they can be effected safely and swiftly on an ongoing basis. Both buyers and sellers of goods and services must have confidence that instruments used to make payments will be honored and accepted by all parties. These crucial functions of transforming savings into productive uses and making payments are often taken for granted. But, in fact, it can be difficult to ensure that the legal and institutional framework within which these functions are performed is consistent with the often conflicting goals of free choice, economic efficiency, safety and financial market stability. BIS Review 17/1997  -4-  Experience has proven that there is no easy way to shape financial institutions in a manner that appropriately balances these goals under changing economic conditions.

13 As a central bank, MAS enjoys warm and substantive relations with our counterparts in the People’s Bank of China (PBC). We have been in close coordination with PBC over the past year to enable cooperation in the RMB business and related arrangements. 14 PBC has recently appointed the Singapore branch of ICBC as the RMB clearing bank in Singapore earlier this year. ICBC has been working closely with the industry since then to prepare for the offering of their RMB clearing and settlement services. I am delighted to share that ICBC has officially launched RMB clearing services yesterday. Key banks in Singapore are ready to actively participate in this promising new market. 15 MAS also has growing relations with the key sectoral regulators, namely the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). MAS and CBRC currently hold annual meetings to exchange views on regulatory cooperation and market developments. MAS also plans to step up its engagements with CSRC and CIRC in areas of common interest. 16 These initiatives clearly indicate the increasing importance and connectivity between the financial markets of our two countries. Certainly, we hope for more of such bilateral collaborations as China continues the progressive internationalisation of its financial market and currency. 17 MAS therefore sees great value in establishing a physical presence here to facilitate such future cooperation and regular interactions.
Charts 3 and 4 plot the distribution of quarterly (since 1955) and annual (since 1700) GDP growth rates in the UK, with the Bank’s May MPR scenario highlighted. By any conceivable metric, the Covid crisis has generated an extraordinary left-tail shock to the economy, with few if any historical precedents. Chart 3: Distribution of quarterly GDP growth since 1955  Chart 4: Distribution of annual GDP growth since 1700 Number of observations  Number of observations 160  50  140  45 40  120  35 100 80  May MPR 2020 Q2  60  30 May MPR 2020  25 20 15  40  10  20  5 0  0  -15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19  -24-22-20-18-16-14-12-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4  Annual GDP growth (%)  Quarterly GDP growth (%)  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. Sources: Bank of England Millennium of Data, ONS and Bank calculations. “The Second Quarter”  The same fast indicators used to track the collapse in activity in the first part of this year can also be used to track its recovery. Generally speaking, these indicators suggest the recovery in both the UK and global economies has come somewhat sooner, and has been materially faster, than in the MPC’s May MPR scenario – indeed, sooner and faster than any other mainstream macroeconomic forecaster.

Given the depth of the recession, there is likely to be a greater than usual degree of history-dependence, or hysteresis, in this path. The deeper and longer the recession, the greater the scarring effects on physical and human capital and hence the economy’s productive potential. The May MPR scenario captured some of these scarring effects. In particular, it assumed that lower investment as a result of the Covid crisis was not recovered, leaving the capital stock 4% lower. Combined with some drag on total factor productivity (TFP) growth, the level of output ended 1½% lower. That scenario assumed no scarring effect on human capital, however, with unemployment returning to pre-Covid levels and the long-run rate of unemployment unchanged at around 4¼%. At the same time, it was recognised that this was just one of many possible paths for the economy. Other paths would give rise to differing degrees of scarring to physical and human capital and losses to the long-run productive potential of the economy. On 14 July, the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) will publish three possible scenarios for the economy involving different degrees of depth and length of the downturn. Perhaps the key uncertainty, from a scarring perspective, concerns the labour market. As Chart 2 illustrates, the Covid crisis has had markedly different effects on different sectors and, most likely, will continue to do so. Chart 14 compares different sectors’ contribution to the pre-Covid employment boom and its subsequent output contraction.
Norman T L Chan: Recent economic and financial developments in Hong Kong Remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong, 22 February 2013. *  *  *  The property market in Hong Kong moderated briefly after the introduction of the fifth round of prudential measures on property mortgages by the HKMA in September 2012 and the new tax measures by the Government in October 2012. However, activities in the property market picked up again recently, with significant increases in transaction volume and prices of residential properties as well as commercial and industrial properties. The risk of overheating in the property market has, once again, risen sharply. Moreover, the recent increase in intensity of the quantitative easing by central banks in Europe, the US and Japan has made it more difficult and uncertain for them to “exit” these measures in the future. It will be particularly so when inflationary pressures emerge again in the advanced economies, and the pace and extent of interest rate hike could be greater than originally expected. In fact, in the last quarter of 2012, the HKMA already started requesting local banks to assume a of 300 bps increase in interest rate above the baseline scenario for its mortgage portfolio when conducting stress testing.

In order to further enhance banks’ risk management in property mortgage lending and to strengthen borrowers’ resilience to withstand future interest rate hikes, the HKMA has just issued a set of guidelines to banks, requiring them to adopt an increase of 300 bps instead of 200 bps of interest rate when stress-testing the repayment ability of mortgage applicants. This measure is applicable to all types of mortgages, including residential as well as commercial and industrial property mortgages. The risk of overheating in the commercial and industrial property market also continues to rise. Our experience shows that the quality of commercial and industrial property mortgages will deteriorate more significantly than that of residential property mortgages during market downturns. In view of these circumstances, our guidelines have also required banks to lower the maximum LTV ratio of mortgage loans for commercial and industrial properties, whether or not for self-use, by 10 percentage points from the existing applicable levels. For example, for mortgage applicants with income mainly derived from Hong Kong, the maximum LTV ratio will be lowered from 50% to 40%. If the applicant’s income is mainly derived from outside Hong Kong, the maximum LTV ratio will be lowered from the current 40% to 30%. The HKMA has also required banks to standardise the maximum LTV ratio of mortgage loans for all standalone carpark spaces at 40% and the maximum loan tenor at 15 years.
While some degree of forbearance may be unavoidable and even appropriate under the right conditions, it is at best a temporary measure. It is critical that forbearance not become institutionalized,  2  BIS Review 10/2001  but be tied directly to actions by both bankers and supervisors to address underlying problems. •  Governments are not good long-term asset managers. Prolonged government holding of impaired assets is not likely to enhance their value, nor aid in the restoration of market liquidity. •  Governments are not good commercial bankers. Delayed privatization of nationalized banks always means higher future costs, and usually inhibits fundamental reform. •  Government-directed lending means future fiscal losses. Similarly, efforts to stimulate credit growth by nonmarket forces in the context of a banking crisis at best buy additional time, and usually dig a deeper hole. •  Foreign investment in domestic financial sectors can yield important benefits. Foreign direct investment in the banking sector can provide much-needed capital resources, technology and knowledge transfer, and a more diversified capital and funding base in the event of future economic instability. •  Financial sectors are only as healthy as their borrowers. Without corresponding corporate sector restructuring, financial sector rescue efforts are likely to be necessary in the future. •  Strong financial systems depend on a reliable and credible legal system. In the absence of a strong legal system, borrowers lack appropriate incentives to repay. •  There are no "quick fixes" to financial sector problems.

A full and consistent implementation of the euro area’s existing fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  framework is key to bringing down high public debt ratios, to raising potential growth and to increasing the euro area’s resilience to shocks. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The apparent absence of any marked overvaluation in the country overall does not mean of course that house prices in some parts of the country or in some submarkets have not been driven up more than is justified in the long term. The fact that the price increases can be explained relatively well by rising incomes, lower nominal interest rates and low construction activity does not rule out the possibility that the rate of increase could slow down, or that prices could even fall in the future. The developments in these explanatory factors normally follow the business cycle. However, the adjustment should be less drastic than in a situation when prices have soared in a way that cannot be attributed to developments in underlying factors. At present, it is especially important to remember that interest rates are low in historical terms and that they therefore very probably can be expected to rise in the period ahead. To get an idea of what constitutes a reasonable level for interest rates in the long term, one can look at countries that have had a floating exchange rate and low inflation for a longer time than Sweden. In the US and Germany, for instance, key interest rates have normally fluctuated between two and six per cent. When you have a regime with a successful inflation targeting policy I think that you normally can expect interest rates in this range. That also makes it clear that today’s repo rate of 1.5 per cent is uniquely low.

The confidence indicator has risen for both the manufacturing and construction industries as well as for trade and services industries. New orders in manufacturing have picked up, mainly in the export market but there has also been a clear improvement in the domestic market. Monthly data for foreign trade in goods also indicate an increasingly bright picture for exports. Like the developments elsewhere in the world, the Swedish purchasing managers index for October also showed a positive development. New data for retail sales point to continued relatively strong rises. At the same time, the NIER’s consumer survey for October provides somewhat mixed signals. Households have become slightly less optimistic about the Swedish economy and unemployment, while their expectations regarding their own finances have improved. As regards the labour market, we noted in the October Inflation Report that there were signs of an improvement in the situation. The strengthening of domestic demand and the announced measures in the Budget Bill were judged to lay the foundation for a rise in employment in the period ahead. However, the change in methods in the labour force surveys means that developments in the labour market are particularly hard to interpret at present. Employment growth appears perhaps to have been somewhat stronger than we expected in October. Developments in the number of new job vacancies and redundancy notices also point to an upturn in the labour market. In addition, the NIER’s latest quarterly business tendency survey contained a number of positive signals regarding companies’ hiring plans.
Financial stability has however been a paramount objective from the time we established the ADM. Banks have been required to segregate their domestic and offshore operations into domestic banking units (DBU) and Asian Currency Units (ACU), as separate accounting entities. •  The DBU of a bank holds its domestically-focused operations, which are predominantly denominated in Singapore dollars. •  The ACU of a bank holds its offshore operations, which are (entirely) denominated in foreign currency. 15. This framework has in the initial decades provided a way to safeguard domestic financial stability, without unduly impinging on the regional activities of banks in Singapore. For example, MAS imposed liquidity requirements on banks’ Singapore dollar liabilities (i.e. only within the DBU). In addition, DBU activities were subject to large exposure and equity investment limits. 16. The Asian Dollar Market was hence regulated along broadly similar lines as the Eurodollar market in London. Foreign banks had to meet high standards before they were admitted to Singapore, but once in, their offshore operations were regulated in the same way as in other reputable financial centres. Much weight was placed on the foreign banks having reputable home regulators exercising oversight of their global operations. However, MAS imposed an additional overlay of prudential requirements on the banks’ domestic businesses in Singapore. 17. The DBU-ACU divide also provided a simple basis for offering developmental incentives to encourage the growth of offshore banking activities out of Singapore. The incentives were in the past focused on the ACU. 18.

In its conduct of monetary policy, Norges Bank places emphasis on satisfying the fundamental preconditions for exchange rate stability against the euro: instruments must be oriented with a view to reducing price and cost inflation to the level aimed at by the European Central Bank (ECB). At the BIS Review 105/2000  8  same time, monetary policy must not in itself contribute to deflationary recessions, as this could undermine confidence in the krone. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the main objective of the ECB is the maintenance of price stability. The ECB has defined price stability as inflation of less than 2%. Inflation in Norway cannot remain higher than inflation in the euro area year after year without this having consequences for the exchange rate of the Norwegian krone against the euro. If price and cost inflation remains higher than the rate of increase aimed at by the ECB over a long period, our experience indicates that the krone will depreciate against the euro sooner or later. Norges Bank must therefore counter such a development. There are institutional differences between the Norwegian monetary policy regime and monetary policy in countries with an inflation target. Norges Bank will inform the government authorities (via the Ministry of Finance) if measures other than those available to the central bank are required in the event that the krone exchange rate cannot be returned to its initial range without creating inflation or a deflationary recession.