samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In terms of competitiveness, progress since 2008 has been most significant. On Banco de España estimates, we will by early 2014 have regained, relative to the average of the euro area countries, all the competitiveness forgone from 2000 to 2008. These gains in competitiveness have been underpinned, above all, by the moderation of wage costs, a trend to which the labour market reform approved in early 2012 has proven conducive in respect of collective bargaining. Along the same lines, inflation has been very contained since 2009, and this has naturally contributed to the recovery in competitiveness. The export sector has shown great capacity and has notably increased its presence and sales both in the euro area and in other markets. Suffice it to say that this year, from January to August, the trade surplus, excluding energy, was almost double that of 2012, climbing from € billion to € billion. These developments have been upheld by corporate restructuring that has enabled the average value exported per company and the export base to increase. The sustained increase in the number of exporting companies over the past five years is due mainly to the growing participation of SMEs. Our trade balance with all regions has improved, with the exception of the oil-exporting countries. Spain is running a surplus both with the euro area and with the rest of the European Union.

To support this main goal, the Bank was assigned with the duty of maintaining financial stability, and within this context, the Central Bank continued to assess the main risks and vulnerabilities of the financial system and to develop alternative policies against these risks by monitoring the financial system as a whole. In the last couple of years, Turkey has shown a remarkable progress considering the soundness of the economy and the financial system. Today, we have a stronger banking sector, which forms the basis of macroeconomic stability, as well. Of course, considering the dynamic nature of the economies, the conditions do not always stay as what they are especially due to the increasingly interlinked global financial markets. In May-June 2006, international developments such as the deterioration in global liquidity conditions and the decrease in risk appetites of foreign investors towards developing countries, and the uncertainty occurring after it, adversely affected developing countries, including Turkey. However, tight monetary and fiscal policies of the current economic program, on-going structural reforms and flexible exchange rate regime have increased the resilience of the system to shocks. Additionally, the strengthened legal infrastructure and the improved risk culture in the banking sector have alleviated the adverse effects of May-June fluctuations. I believe nobody in this room would deny the fact that today almost all financial developments will have implications for all decision makers around the world-ranging from investors to policy makers. When a decision is made by the FED, ECB, Bank of Japan or China, it is a concern for most countries.
While rules and regulations will certainly be there to ensure orderliness, fair and ethical conduct, risks of a rapidly changing environment would require flexibility and agility in their design. This is both good and bad news. The good news is that the design of rules could be more principle based, outlining key parameters and outcomes, leaving the ‘how’ to achieve them to the best practices of the industry. The bad news is that the industry will have to be independent in figuring out and ensuring compliance. Consequently, there is a need for the industry to further elevate its capacity and capability for the new environment. The goal is not only the greater adoption of digital technology in financial services which will undeniably reshape customer behaviour, business models and the traditional structure of financial intermediation for the better. It is also the push for the industry to adapt, innovate and change. In the banking sphere, digital banking is just around the corner. The Bank will issue a discussion paper on this by year end and perhaps, a regulatory framework by next year. Digital insurers could be next. What about financial markets? I put this challenge to you ~ think about how your industry could change with these developments, how you should adapt and change, and what needs to be done. Tell us what you think and you can reach out to the FMC to share your thoughts and ideas. Another area of focus that has captured wide attention is that of climate change and sustainability.

The SNB’s expansionary monetary policy contributed to the depreciation of the Swiss franc over the course of the year and thus also supported the economy. Inflation is currently negative, due to the appreciation of the Swiss franc following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate and to the reduction in commodity prices. We expect it to return to positive territory in 2017. We will keep our options open should other measures be necessary to fulfil our mandate. But, as always with monetary policy decisions, we need to carefully weigh up the pros and cons to serve the interests of the country as a whole. In the wake of the financial crisis and the use of unconventional measures, central banks have become the focus of intense public interest. Various reform proposals are being discussed and we welcome these public debates. New ideas need to be seriously considered and evaluated. The intentions behind the sovereign wealth fund and sovereign money projects are commendable. But, on closer examination, the drawbacks outweigh the benefits in both cases. Finally, on behalf too of my colleagues in the Governing Board, Fritz Zurbrügg and Andréa Maechler, I would like to take this opportunity to thank our employees for their hard work and dedication. We would also like to thank our shareholders for their solidarity with the SNB and for their loyal support.
What’s going on? Speech given by Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking, Bank of England  Barclays Inflation Conference, London 7 June 2018  I am grateful to William Abel, Harvey Daniell, Bianca Ginelli Nardi, Raf Kinston, Simon Kirby, Elliot Luciani-Kane, Rebecca Maule, Sanjay Odedra, Tom Smith, Pawel Smietanka and Brad Speigner for their assistance in preparing this speech, and Clare Macallan, Michael Saunders and other Bank staff for their helpful comments and suggestions. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  An unusual position UK GDP growth has slowed following the Brexit referendum, and it slowed even more in the first quarter of this year. In the MPC’s May Inflation Report we are forecasting that it will remain subdued over the forecast period. If our forecast materialises, annual growth will have been between 1¼ and 2% for five consecutive years from 2016 to 2020. To give some context, annual average GDP growth has been in this range in only eight of the 50 years before that period, and three of those were since the financial crisis. It’s been said before but it bears repeating: the UK economy is in an unusual position. Over the past few years, meanwhile, unemployment has fallen from a high of 8.5% to a forty year low of just 4.2%. Employment has similarly picked up to record highs.

“The Phillips curve: lower, flatter or in hiding?”, speech at the Oxford Economics Society, 14 November 2017. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Chart 4: The wage Phillips Curve Wage growth (per cent)  1971-1997  35  1998-2012 30  2013-2017  25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 3  5  7 Unemployment (per cent)  9  11  I want to use my speech today to focus on the implications of the UK’s unusual economic position for inflation and for monetary policy, both in terms of what has happened over the recent past and of what I expect to happen in future. I will focus on three aspects of the economy in particular. First, the ongoing consequences of the vote to leave the EU, and what those have meant and could mean in future for monetary policy. Second, the continued evolution of the labour market and how I expect that to affect inflation and monetary policy in future. And third, developments in the economy at the start of this year: the unexpected weakness of GDP and evolution of inflation. These aspects of the economy are unusual in terms of what they imply for the UK outlook. But as a policymaker I feel reasonably confident, even with the uncertainties, that, together with my colleagues on the MPC, I have a reasonable understanding of what’s going on, and in particular what the implications are for inflation.
In both cases, the crises followed a period of strong growth, rapid credit expansion and sharply rising asset prices. Prior to the Asian crisis, there was indiscriminate lending to the corporate sector. Investment activity was excessive, with the ratio of investment to GDP exceeding  1  L. Laevan and F. Valencia, "Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database", (Sept 2008) International Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, WP/08/224. BIS Review 145/2008  1  35% for many economies in the region. The sub-prime crisis similarly originated from imprudent lending practices. The low interest rate environment also accentuated the build up of the excesses and rising asset values. In Asia , domestic credit increased to unsustainable levels, reaching 180% of GDP during this period. In the United States , it had increased close to 240% in 2007. The excessive leveraging and increased risk taking reinforced the formation of asset bubbles. In both cases, there was also abundant liquidity. Both Asia and the United States experienced surges of capital inflows. This was reinforced by favourable sovereign ratings in Asia and the strong ratings for the securitized instruments in the US . The eruption of the crisis set off the reversal of these trends. There was also a failure to recognise that in a highly integrated international financial system, it meant that a crisis that originate in one part of the financial system not only would have an impact on other parts of the system but it could have far reaching implications on other jurisdictions.

The aggregate demand is also affected by the elevated growth rates of raw materials and component inventories. Firstly, companies make up for the drop in inventories incurred during the pandemic and as a result of disrupted logistical chains. Secondly, in light of the last year’s experience companies are seeking to accumulate more inventories to insure against possible disruptions in supplies, as well as further price increases. These processes concern a broad range of production chains rather than a narrow group of goods. The structure of demand is also changing, as a result of changes in people’s way of life due to the pandemic. Neither the sustainability nor the duration of this process is clear so far. Yet, it evidently creates bottlenecks on the supply side. For instance, massive work and study from home spurred a sharp increase in the need for telecommunications followed by a considerable increase in the demand for microchips. Online orders require much more packaging materials. A pick up in demand for real estate is in part associated with the desire to reach comfortable conditions for working from home. Wishing to support their economies, many countries are expanding infrastructure projects; all this also influences the increase in demand for construction materials and metals. It is still difficult for businesses to assess which part of the elevated demand is temporary and which — sustainable. They need time to make decisions about investing in new production facilities.
Wage increases are based on inflation being more permanently high, and in this situation companies do not see any major problems with continuing to raise prices – a price-wage spiral like the ones in the 1970s and 1980s starts. Fiscal policy focuses on broad-based support rather than on more targeted measures. This drives up aggregate demand in the economy as a whole and contributes to the high inflation rate becoming entrenched. Here, the interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy again becomes inadequate.10 To curb inflation, the Riksbank must raise the policy rate considerably more than we now expect.11 Since households and companies are heavily indebted, this can have very significant negative repercussions. Even in such a worse scenario, inflation will eventually return to the target, but it will take longer and be considerably more painful for everyone in Sweden. Of course, it is not necessary for all of this to go wrong to  10 An illustration of the importance of interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy is the market reac-  tions triggered by the UK Government's proposal for a mini-budget on 23 September. The proposal was judged to counteract the Bank of England's attempts to slow down inflation and was considered not credible. Interest rates rose significantly and the pound sterling weakened significantly. 11 See the Article “Alternative scenarios for inflation and monetary policy” in Monetary Policy Report November 2022 for examples of developments if inflation were to be higher than in the Riksbank’s forecast.

Different inflation developments than forecasters expected in January Annual percentage change 12 10  12 Range of other forecasters' estimates  10  MPR Feb 8  8  CPIF  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2 Jan-20  Jul-20  Jan-21  Jul-21  Jan-22  Jul-22  Jan-23  -2 Jul-23  Note. Refers to forecasts based on outcomes for the CPIF up to and including December 2021. The range shows the dispersion between highest and lowest estimates of other forecasters. Sources: Statistics Sweden, individual forecasters and the Riksbank. Figure 2. A broad rise in inflation – not just rising energy prices Sub-index in the CPIF  Measures of underlying inflation  Note. Annual percentage change. The range in the figure on the right shows the highest and lowest outcomes among seven different measures of underlying inflation. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. 12 [15]  Figure 3. Policy rates are eventually determined by the global real equilibrium interest rate  Source: The Riksbank. Figure 4. Inflation as high as in the 1970s and 1980s Annual percentage change 16  16 1970-1992 Average: 8.2  14  14 CPIF  12  12  10  10  8  8  1995-2022 October Average: 1.7  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2 1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  2020  -2 2030  Note.
Regions with a higher concentration of college graduates tend to be more innovative, have higher living standards and experience more rapid economic growth.2 So a college education plays an important role in helping individuals prosper, as well as in strengthening the broader economy. More recently, though, rising costs, increasing student debt and widespread reports of recent college graduates not being able to find good jobs have raised some troubling questions about whether going to college is still a good investment. In fact, some of our own research, including material that we discussed at our last press briefing, has shown the dramatic increase in student debt over the past decade.3 In today’s briefing, we’re going to take a  2  See, for example, Edward L. Glaeser, Jose A. Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer (1995) “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 36, 117–43; Gerald A. Carlino, Satyajit Chatterjee, and Robert M. Hunt (2007) “Urban Density and the Rate of Invention,” Journal of Urban Economics, 61, 389–419; and Jaison R. Abel and Todd M. Gabe (2011) “Human Capital and Economic Activity in Urban America,” Regional Studies, 45, 1079–90.

3  See, for example, Press Briefing on Q4 2012 Household Debt and Credit Report; Meta Brown and Sydnee Caldwell, “Young Student Loan Borrowers Retreat from Housing and Auto Markets Liberty Street Economics  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  close look at the question of just how weak today’s labor market is for new college graduates by putting their recent experience into context using some hard data. It is important for us to undertake this kind of analysis because, as we’ll show, newly minted graduates always take some time to transition into the labor market and find jobs that utilize their education. And young people with college degrees still fare far better than those without. At the same time, with the sluggish jobs recovery from the recession, it’s clear that the transition of recent graduates into the labor market is taking longer, and they’ve experienced higher unemployment and higher underemployment than in years past.4 Still, while times have gotten tougher for recent graduates, we shouldn’t be too hasty in concluding that getting a college education won’t help people find good jobs. I will now ask Jason Bram to present an update of economic conditions in our region. Blog Post, April 17, 2013; and Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and Joelle Scally, “Just Released: The Geography of Student Debt,” Liberty Street Economics Blog Post, May 14, 2013. 4  Underemployment, for purposes of this presentation, refers to college graduates working in jobs that typically don’t require a college degree.
One of the things that I strongly encourage for all countries is a review of implementation of the Basel Committee’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. These principles are key to laying a successful supervisory foundation. Likewise, sound accounting and provisioning standards are critical to ensuring that the capital ratios, however calculated, meaningfully reflect the bank’s ability to absorb losses. This brings me to the second stage. Supervisors do not need to wait for the formal adoption of Basel II to start introducing or using the principles of the three pillars. On the contrary, incorporating these principles is excellent preparation for adopting Basel II in the future. For example, supervisors might choose to move towards a more risk-based approach to supervision, developing skills in assessing the quality of a bank’s risk management and its ability to assess risk exposures. At the same time, banks could be reminded of their responsibility to develop their own processes for evaluating their capital needs and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels, consistent with the principles of Pillar 2. With regard to the principles of market discipline in Pillar 3, supervisors may wish to focus initially on ensuring a baseline level of disclosures across all banks. This might include discussing with banks, investors, and other users of financial information their information needs and the tools available so that supervisors can tailor requirements accordingly. In my view, these two preliminary stages provide an excellent preparation for the “final” stage of moving to Basel II.

In the case of banks, it is important that they rethink their sources of income: one response could be to diversify the range of services – both proprietary and via partnerships – that they offer to customers, and possibly change existing pricing policies, with fewer flat-rate prices and more pricing by use. The digital transition will also involve preparing for shifts in jobs and in skills, through dialogue with social partners. It will also require adopting an open approach, with the creation of partnerships with FinTechs and the scientific community. Finally, it will call for major IT investment to provide services that are increasingly aligned with customer needs, to reduce structural costs and improve regulatory compliance. IT systems will need to be – and this is the crux of the challenge – more secure so that they provide strong protection against cyber-risks, but at the same time more flexible and open to interconnectivity. In the case of insurers, the digital revolution is also starting with a complete overhaul of customer relationships and user habits. But it goes further than that. I’d just like to underline two topics that I think are essential. First, with the help of reinsurers, insurers need to be capable of meeting demand for coverage against cyber-risk, a concern that affects all companies – both small and large.
Conclusion 30 I have probably spoken longer than I should. I think this only goes to show the many areas of supervision which the different panels will no doubt delve further into. May I wish everyone a most fruitful and interesting meeting. I do hope that all visitors in this meeting will also be able to set aside a little time to enjoy Singapore’s lively sights and sounds. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches

I also wish that our commitment to achieve future success of the industry as reflected in this event by the joint efforts and collaboration of the regulators, the industry, the market participants and the relevant parties will be further enhanced moving forward. In this regard, I would again congratulate AIBIM on its continuous effort undertake the initiatives in promoting Islamic finance, particularly by organizing this event. 2  BIS Review 115/2006  On this note, I wish you a successful and eventful week. Dengan lafaz Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, saya dengan sukacitanya merasmikan pelancaran "Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Financial Expo 2006". Thank you. BIS Review 115/2006  3
Also, with an exceptionally large balance sheet there will be considerable attention on the methods that the FOMC will likely use in order to exert control over the level of short-term rates. I can’t tell you yet how we will do it, but I am fully confident that we have the necessary tools to control the level of short-term rates and the credit creation process, and I will share with you some of my own thoughts on the subject. As always, what I have to say here today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve System. Turning first to economic activity, the trajectory of economic growth continues to disappoint. Since the downturn ended in mid-2009, real GDP growth has averaged only 2.2 percent per year despite a very accommodative monetary policy. This performance reflects three major factors – the significant headwinds resulting from the bursting of the housing bubble, the shift of fiscal policy from expansion toward restraint, especially in 2012 and 2013, and a series of shocks from abroad – most notably the European crisis. The good news is that all three of these factors have abated. With respect to the headwinds resulting from the financial crisis, they are gradually becoming less severe. In particular, the sharp decline in household wealth due to the decline in housing prices and the weakness in equity prices has been largely reversed.

Deepening economic integration and interdependency Within Asia, economic integration is deepening, and we are becoming more and more interdependent. Intra-Asian trade as a share of the region’s total trade has grown from 34% in 1980 to more than 50% today. Asia is being woven together by trade and investment flows, MNCs spreading their production chains and a growing web of bilateral and multilateral FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) and regional processes. China plays a critical role in quickening the pace of regional integration. China is serving as a production platform for foreign firms. Many manufacture there. Others export intermediate goods to their affiliates in China for assembly and then shipping the finished products to key export markets in the US and Europe. What we are seeing is production sharing and the intensification of an Asian production network. However, both China and other Asian countries also know that due to China’s sheer size and strategic weight, its re-emergence exerts a displacement effect. To use an image, it is like a huge elephant wading into a pond. This will displace the water and reduce the space of others using the pond. What do we do? We cannot live without water. The answer is to enlarge the pond so that there is more space for everybody. China is conscious of its size. It emphasises peaceful development so that while it displaces, it does not threaten. Hence, China is negotiating an FTA with ASEAN so that its growth will translate into more opportunities for ASEAN.