samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Research indicates that by 2007 the percentage of nonprime mortgages that went into default within their first year rose to 10 percent compared with 3 percent of such loans originated in 2003. While falling home prices appear to be the primary factor explaining this sharp increase in early defaults, most of the increase cannot be explained by traditional risk factors. 4 A potential explanation is that individual home buyers often falsely indicated on their mortgage applications that the property they were buying would be their primary residence. Using an extensive set of data on loan performance that we have developed with Equifax, we find that multiple first mortgage lien holders – that is, people owning more than one home – account for about 40 percent of the dollar volume of seriously delinquent mortgage balances, up from about 5 percent in 2004 (Chart 10). 3  There are a few caveats to note about this trend. First, there are several categories of spending by households that are lumped into the personal consumption expenditures category in our official GDP statistics that can fairly be counted as investment. These include spending on consumer durable goods, education, and, possibly, medical care, and their combined share of total personal consumption expenditures (PCE) rose over the period in which the saving rate declined. Second, other forces were at work to push down the personal saving rate. Prominent among these is a secular decline in the share of health care expenditures paid out-ofpocket by consumers, lessening the motivation for precautionary savings.

Mr Chairman, it is clear from the definition that money laundering is a tool that is used by people involved in illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, organised crime, tax-evading, political bribery and th above all, corruption. In addition, the events of September 11 have added another dimension to the problem of money laundering and brought to light the synonymity between money laundering and terrorism. What then are the stages in money laundering? Though the money laundering process seems so complicated, it usually follows a traceable pattern and three distinct stages can be identified. These are: •  Placement Stage. This it involves the disposal of cash proceeds of the illegal activity. It is at this stage that the proceeds are introduced into the financial system in a manner that avoids detection by the banks and the authorities. At this stage criminals use techniques like depositing large amounts of money in several smaller batches so as to avoid suspicion and detection. BIS Review 6/2003  1  •  Layering Stage. This is when the true character of the cash proceeds of the illegal activities is hidden through a series of transactions in order to erase the audit trail. This is done by transferring this money to off-shore banking centres with strict secrecy laws, or to bearer bonds, and/or shell holding companies and accounts held in the name of nominees. •  The last stage is the Integration Stage where the successfully laundered money is integrated into the financial system.
We believe in the importance of this outreach effort not only because the public has a right to an informed participation in their financial dealings, but also because it is also an important part of our collective and combined efforts that will determine the success of our endeavours. Tuan-Tuan dan Puan-puan, Akhir sekali, saya ingin mengucapkan berbanyak-banyak terima kasih kepada Yang Amat Berhormat Perdana Menteri atas kesudian beliau melancarkan Bank Negara Malaysia LINK. Sekian, terima kasih. 2  BIS Review 12/2005

For this reason, too, we will have to rehabilitate the quantities – money, credit, debt – and estimate the effects of changes in them in the longer run. Furthermore, we must introduce into our monetary policy frameworks ways of systematically identifying and reflecting structural changes related to the functioning of the labour market under the influence of demographic change, to globalisation or deglobalisation tendencies, to society's preferences regarding private and public debt, to the response of economic policy to climate risks, and so on. To this end, we also need to begin to view macroeconomics as a social science again, that is, not to be ashamed of the historical term "political economy". I would like to end by thanking all my current or previous colleagues here at the Faculty of Economics, at universities in other countries, in international organisations and at the CNB for carrying on the torch of the Ostrava Monetary School which we started to build here in the early 1990s. I wish you a successful conference. *** I would like to thank Jakub Matj, Adviser to the Bank Board of the Czech National Bank, for valuable comments and suggestions. Any errors or omissions are my responsibility. 5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
More generally, the sound  3  BIS Review 48/1999  position of our financial system as we exit the crisis is virtually unique in the region, and will be a key pillar in ensuring a return to sustained growth. A number of continuing issues, and new ones on the horizon, will provide the HKMA with a heavy workload in the remainder of this year. These include: •  The possibility of further attacks on the currency, despite the improved stability in local and world markets: we need to be constantly on our guard for signs of trouble. •  Further work to improve the currency board system, with the help of the EFAC Sub-Committee on Currency Board Operations: much progress has been made in the past nine months or so, but this is an on-going process, and a number of ideas for refining the system are in the pipeline. •  The rest of this year will continue to be somewhat difficult for the banking sector - but it remains as a whole in excellent shape to cope with the pressures ahead. •  One of these pressures is the Year 2000 problem. As this Panel heard a few weeks ago, Hong Kong’s banks are internationally recognised as being among the best prepared in the region, if not the world, and work continues on contingency planning and other issues. This has been, and will continue to be in the months ahead, a priority task in the HKMA’s supervisory programme.

Rather, as JFK once said, “the time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining”. By setting the CCyB rate above zero now, we lock in existing excess capital at a time it is relatively cheap (in good times, retain earnings is the main driver of capital increase and the impact of a higher capital requirement on credit and the economy at large is limited is the current circumstances) to be able to absorb futures losses and loosen the regulatory requirement at a time capital is scarcer and the macroeconomic impact of a gap would be significant. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  A number of European countries have taken similar steps to increase their room for manoeuver ahead of a possible future storm. In that context, macroprudential policy is often described as a complement to monetary policy: a policy necessary to remedy the financial stability consequences of very accommodative monetary policy. I would have a more encompassing perspective: macroprudential policy is a complement to monetary policy both today and in the future: by contributing addressing financial buoyancy, it enables monetary policy to be relatively more accommodative today – but the preventive reach of macroprudential policy should not be overestimated, especially while macroprudential authorities are still relatively young and the policy toolkit less sophisticated than that of other policies; more significantly, by building up (macro)prudential room for manoeuvre ahead of the next storm, it also helps restoring monetary room for manoeuvre to address adverse developments.
None of us should be slaves to models. We will challenge robustly, and some of our challenges will be less welcome than others, that is the nature of what we do. As Mark Carney said recently, this rigour has a purpose. The dangers of using poorly designed models were made all too clear in the banking sector. So the PRA won’t hesitate to withhold approval of an inadequate or opaque model. But, I want to give a commitment from the PRA, my door will always be open to discuss the challenges, and the same goes for my colleagues. My third area might at first hearing sound rather odd as it is conduct risk or, sadly, misconduct risk. No, I am not making a bid for the FCA – I like Twin Peaks thank you; and the PRA and the FCA work together, and Martin and I put great emphasis on that happening. But as I said earlier we are in many ways in the second phase of the financial crisis, and this phase has at its root conduct of business, towards customers, in financial markets, and in areas of public policy such as financial sanctions and anti-money laundering. At its most serious, this confluence of conduct risk can threaten the safety and soundness of firms. Let me be clear, as a prudential supervisor I do not condone misconduct, and I support Martin and the FCA in what they are doing.

Society expects higher standards, and the PRA supports the FCA in upholding these standards as part of the global effort to restore trust between financial institutions, regulators and – most importantly – the public. Three things strike me as important as part of this effort and I pick these three because they are close to my role and that of the PRA and the wider Bank of England. First, the Fair and Effective Markets Review under my colleague Minouche Shafik, with Martin and Charles Roxburgh, is vitally important to establish the better standards that society reasonably expects. Second, we need better international coordination among authorities to enable conduct risks to be dealt with effectively, but also in ways that do not threaten safety and soundness. That is a high priority. And third, to support credit and borrowing in the economy, and thus growth, we must all work to ensure that people feel confident to use banks and thus overcome the legacy of mistrust from revealed misconduct. The fourth issue on which I want to comment concerns incentives. These lie at the heart of good pro-active supervision, getting the incentives right. Unfortunately, we see areas where that has not happened. I want to cover two of those. The first is remuneration. Once again there is a lot being said on this subject. My view has not changed.
The second session, chaired by Axel Weber, President of the Bundesbank, will analyse the impact of these developments on international capital allocation and global imbalances. The third session, chaired by Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), will consider economic policy responses and the spontaneous adjustment of markets and economic agents. Lastly, the round table, chaired by Roger Ferguson, will draw out the consequences in terms of international financial stability. Stanley Fischer has agreed to take on the difficult task of summarising this symposium. Stanley, like a few others here, is a symbol in himself of the diverse backgrounds of the participants in this symposium: he is a former Professor at MIT, an ex-Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, ex-ViceChairman of Citigroup and currently Governor of the Bank of Israel. As an introduction, I will touch briefly on a few of the questions raised by each of these sessions. The first session will consider some of the decisive changes in trends in productivity and competitiveness that occurred in the 1990s. First change: as from the mid-1990s, productivity growth accelerated in the United States as a result of the gains arising from the production and use of information and communication technologies (ICT) but slowed down in Europe and Japan. For instance, over the last ten years, productivity growth in Europe has been more than one annual percentage point below that of the United States.

The new international division of labour thus affects every stage of the production process; it influences the localisation of added value and raises the question of the financing of the external imbalances of economies that focus on the design and marketing of products rather than their manufacture. The second session will deal with the impact of trends in productivity and competitiveness on international capital allocation and global imbalances. These trends may have contributed to the increase in global imbalances reflected in current account balances, and highlight several paradoxes. The first paradox is that of the US economy, which combines the structural surge in its productivity with a possible loss in competitiveness illustrated by the increase in its external deficit. This paradox is perhaps only apparent if we consider that the improvement in the US’ relative productivity performance is mainly in the non-tradable sector and as compared to the industrialised rather than the emerging economies. In addition, while this pick-up in productivity does boost the profitability of investments, logically, it goes hand in hand with an excess of investment over national savings that calls for increasing foreign capital inflows. However, the predominant nature of capital inflows to the United States changed at the start of the 2000s, switching from mainly purchases of equities and foreign direct investment by the private sector to purchases of government securities by central banks, which are not motivated by the search for increased profitability. This leads us to the second paradox, a twin to the first, i.e.
William C Dudley: More lessons from the crisis Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Center for Economic Policy Studies (CEPS) Symposium, Princeton, New Jersey, 13 November 2009. *  *  *  Thank you for having me here to speak today. It is a real pleasure to have this opportunity to speak at CEPS again – this is a great forum to talk about policy issues. Tonight I want to discuss some of the challenges we face in making our financial system more robust. We have learned a great deal over the past two years about our financial system and its vulnerabilities. The task ahead is to put these lessons to good use. Our goal must be to make the financial system more resilient to shocks. If we can do that successfully, we should be able to reduce the risk of financial crises. In assessing the causes of this crisis, one clear culprit was the failure of regulators and market participants alike to fully appreciate the strength of the amplifying mechanisms that were built into our financial system. These mechanics exacerbated the boom on the way up and the bust on the way down. Only by better understanding the sources of these damaging dynamics can we construct solutions that will strengthen our financial system and make it more robust. Today, I am going to focus mainly on the extraordinary liquidity events that played out during this crisis.

In parallel, there has also been an increase in the variety of goods and services exported, with intermediate goods and services accounting for a growing proportion. Since 2007 the number of Spanish goods-exporting companies has increased by more than 40%. And this despite the difficulties the international environment has undergone and the competition from the emerging economies. Moreover, the contribution of SMEs to this process is beginning to be significant. A further reflection of the internationalisation of the Spanish economy in the past two decades has been its growing share in international direct investment flows, not only through foreign capital inflows, but also through investment by Spanish firms abroad. Spain has become a net issuer of direct investment, running counter to the historical pattern. Large Spanish companies initially directed their foreign investment towards Latin America, diversifying subsequently towards the European Union. Currently, these two areas account for 50% and 30%, respectively, of total Spanish foreign direct investment in the rest of the world. Direct investment flows into Spain, after having been interrupted at the height of the euro area financial market tensions in 2012, are regaining their pre-crisis levels. The gains in competitiveness and the reforms undertaken have no doubt increased the attractiveness of our economy to investors. The headway made in the internationalisation of the economy against a particularly difficult background underscores the competitive capacity of part of the Spanish productive system.
Also, if governments do continue to contemplate the possibility of fiscal support in a crisis, then there might need to be some kind of agreement – conceivably case by case – on  4  For a discussion of capital of last resort see, See Tucker P M W (2009f) “The Crisis Management Menu”, SUERF, CEPS and Belgian Financial Forum Conference: Crisis Management at the Cross-Roads, pp. 13 and Tucker P M W (2009b), “The repertoire of official sector interventions in the financial system: last resort lending, market-making, and capital”, Bank of Japan’s 2009 International Conference, Tokyo, May 2009, pp. 17. 5  A “purchase and assumption” is the term used by FDIC to describe when a healthy institution purchases some or all of the assets of a failed deposit taker. BIS Review 33/2010  5  principles governing the contributions imposed on each country to meeting the costs of the resolution. But the ideas I aired in the first part of the remarks were aimed at helping to take that off the table. A principle of equitable treatment of worldwide creditors and depositors would be consistent with the imposition of losses on unsecured creditors or uninsured depositors, either in a going-concern restructuring of the kind I outlined earlier or through the application of more standard SRR tools to gone-concern bad banks. But it would require losses to be imposed on an equitable basis, respecting the existing priority ranking regardless of the jurisdictionallocation of creditors. That might require recognition across the main jurisdictions of certain safeguards.

Similarly, Chinese banks can use loan securitisation to recycle bank capital and re-channel the funds to real economic activities back home. •  ICBC’s opening of its Asia Pacific Shipping Finance Centre is a good example of this. •  The centre will help ICBC Singapore securitise its shipping and related loans originated in the Asia Pacific, by tapping the Singapore bond market. Risk management As Chinese corporates continue to venture abroad in Asia, they will confront a variety of risks. These risks need to be managed well. First, there are the usual foreign exchange and interest rate risks. •  As the largest FX market in the Asia Pacific, Singapore offers Chinese corporates effective FX hedging solutions to manage their risk exposures. •  The Singapore Exchange has a strong suite of FX futures contracts, including Asian currencies, and the take-up rate has been strong. •  Many corporate treasurers have chosen Singapore for their regional treasury centres covering Southeast Asia, and even the Greater China region. Second, some of the investments by Chinese corporates could be in locations that are vulnerable to natural disasters. •  Investors would need to take into account not only the immediate risk of loss due to a natural catastrophe but also the secondary impact on their supply chains and working capital. •  Singapore has a critical mass of specialty insurers who can provide appropriate cover against such natural catastrophe risk. Third, infrastructure projects typically expose investors to significant political and credit risks.
Based on these calculations, inflation at end-2007 is projected with a probability of 50 per cent to be between 1.75 and 3.25 per cent. In the Inflation Report, we analysed possible effects on inflation and output based on some alternative assumptions about the functioning of the economy and the current economic situation. It was assumed that the krone exchange rate would remain fairly stable in the period ahead. This assumption was based on pricing in the foreign exchange market. The analyses in the Report show that if the exchange rate appreciates more than this, inflation may be considerably lower than projected. If, for example, the exchange rate appreciates by 5 per cent in relation to the baseline scenario, inflation may stand at 2 per cent at end-2007 - ½ per cent below the inflation target. The change in the interest rate path that will also occur if the outlook for inflation and output changes was not taken into account in these calculations. BIS Review 67/2004  5  As mentioned earlier, the strong krone has a dampening effect on the inflation outlook. This provides a basis for keeping the interest rate level in Norway low for a longer period than would otherwise have been the case and for maintaining this low level even though interest rates rise in other countries. Inflation targeting will therefore ease the pressure on the krone and stabilise exchange rate expectations.

In the first three quarters of 2004, imports increased markedly compared with the same period last year. This may indicate that some of the growth in demand has resulted in an increase in imports instead of higher domestic output. Imports as a share of mainland GDP are rising. This is a result of an increase in the international division of labour, due in part to the removal of trade barriers. The rise in the share of imports must also be seen in relation to low prices for imports from many low-cost countries and the weak competitiveness of domestically-oriented industries. The deterioration in Norway’s competitiveness relative to other countries stems from high wage growth over several years since 1998. The nominal krone exchange rate measured by the trade-weighted index (TWI) is now approximately at the level prevailing in the mid-1990s, while labour costs in manufacturing have risen considerably more than among our trading partners in the same period. The business sector is still burdened with the loss in competitiveness that can be attributed to high wage increases in the period 1998-2002. The exposed sector has been scaled back. Companies that are still in operation may be in a better position to cope with the high wage level. A more efficient service sector may also have strengthened the export industry. Nevertheless, costs may have negative impact on activity and employment.