samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
11  Congress granted this authority to the Federal Reserve in the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, with an October 2011 effective date, but accelerated its implementation to October 2008 as part of the legislative response to the financial crisis. A similar tool is critical in the implementation regime of most advanced economy central banks. 12  The FOMC also considered an arrangement under which depository institutions could pledge funds held in a segregated account at the Federal Reserve as collateral in borrowing transactions with private creditors. This approach aimed to reduce credit-related barriers to depository institutions’ borrowing funds in money markets and thereby intensify competition among borrowers. The FOMC decided that these accounts involved operational, regulatory, and policy issues that would have been difficult to resolve in a timely fashion, and it shelved further work. See the minutes to the FOMC’s December 2014 meeting. 13  This approach was discussed in detail in the FOMC’s June 2011 Exit Strategy Principles. 14  The Federal Reserve continues to test its Term Deposit Facility (TDF). In late 2014 and early 2015, the Federal Reserve conducted rounds of testing of the TDF that on two occasions resulted in cumulative take-up of more than $ billion. These operations reportedly had no significant impact on conditions in money markets, suggesting that TDF operations would have to be significantly larger to put upward pressure on rates. 15  This approach has been used heavily, for example, by central banks that have large foreign exchange reserves.

They are even less so at the level of the financial system as a whole. This is nevertheless the challenge we have to face today. Let me come back to the G20 action plan. This plan first recognises the need to strengthen prudential regulation in three areas. Capital requirements need to be strengthened and made more counter-cyclical by introducing a system of capital buffers. The quality of capital should be enhanced and its definition harmonised. We also may need to add to the range of instruments currently available a simple mechanism to measure leverage in order to complement the information provided by the solvency ratio. Another lesson that the G20 has learned from the crisis is that the current scope of regulation and supervision is inappropriate as it is too narrow. The current framework is based on the implicit idea that banks alone – because they collect deposits – are the source of risks for the system as a whole. This used to be the case. Yet, it is no longer true at all. It is now evident that all systemically important institutions and markets need to be regulated. In concrete terms, the G20 is widening the scope of regulation to include rating agencies, hedge funds and derivatives markets. The general principle is to abandon a silo approach to regulation, which was structured around institutions' legal character (e.g. banks, insurance companies, etc.
Inflation has also been stable at a low level of 1.4% in August, whilst foreign reserves have also regained the healthy level at 32.6 billion $ at end of 2000 and have been maintained at that level up to now. Total external debt has declined from 109 billion $ at end of 1997 to 73 billion $ now. Political environment no longer appears as an obstacle towards the recovery path. As far as the financial sector is concerned, sovereign and commercial banks credit ratings have been stable. Prudential and supervision standards such as rules on loan classification, and asset valuation have steadily moved towards international standards. Commercial banks have also progressively recovered, with an increase in capital adequacy ratio reaching over 14 percent. Thai banks' earning performance showed a steady improvement, with a net operating profit of 7 Billion Baht during the first half of 2001, a significant improvement from 3.6 Billion Baht for the whole of last year. Debt restructuring also progressed well, with the NPL ratio dropping from a high 45% at the end of 1998 to 39% in 1999, 18% in 2000, and reaching around 12% recently, in spite of some re-entry NPLs. Development for Monetary Policy Before I go on to discuss obstacles and challenges, let me briefly recap on the changes that have taken place regarding monetary policy since the 1997 crisis. After Thailand floated our currency in 1997, the Bank of Thailand recognized the need to search for a new and appropriate nominal anchor for monetary policy.

More recently in April, the Bank published the Code of Conduct for the Malaysian Wholesale Financial Markets to promote high standards of conduct and transparency in the domestic wholesale financial markets. The code is a binding obligation and it sets out the Bank’s 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  expectations for market participants to adhere to professional and ethical standards of conduct. The Bank views this standard as critical and timely in light of the incidences of ringgit-rate fixing misconduct and also involvement in the opaque NDF market. Another important aspect of preserving the integrity in the industry is by maintaining strict membership requirements for all participants. As an industry riding on trust as the main vehicle for business, the financial sector cannot afford to be tainted by the actions of a few bad apples. Any unscrupulous behaviour exhibited by a player should not be tolerated and be weeded out immediately from the industry. To protect the financial ecosystem, each organisation has the responsibility to investigate any misconduct and record the outcomes to allow other institutions in the market to make informed decisions on the ability of a person to serve with professionalism and integrity. In this regard, the Bank is currently pursuing an initiative that will mandate the sharing of employment references with future employers to mitigate the problem of ‘rolling bad apples’ within the Malaysian financial industry.
Governor Subbarao has been a staunch advocate of RBI’s pro-active role in addressing financial inclusion to help those underserved. As the world’s second most populous country, India has faced an uphill task to expand financial inclusion, especially to individuals in remote areas. But the numbers speak for themselves: in 2011, just 35 percent of adults have bank accounts according to the World Bank’s Global Findex Report. By 2017 that number has dramatically risen to 80 percent. In his keynote address this morning Governor Subbarao will share with us India’s remarkable experience on improving financial inclusion by using digital technologies. Please join me in giving a warm welcome to Governor Subbarao. 4/4

Recently, Matthew Rose, CEO of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (America’s second biggest rail company), expressed frustration at the focus on quarterly earnings when locomotives lasted for 20 years and tracks for 30 to 40 years. Echoes, here, of “quarterly capitalism”. This evidence – anecdotal, survey, quantitative – is broadly consistent with popular perceptions. Capital market myopia is real. It may be rising. For at least some of the jury, however, it remains inconclusive. In 2010, Richard Saunders (Chief Executive of the IMA) summed it up thus: “Now red lights start flashing for me when people talk about shorttermism, particularly when shareholders feature in the same sentence. What do people mean when they claim that shareholders behave in a short-term fashion? And what evidence do they have for it? I have yet to hear a convincing answer to either question”. 3. Testing for short-termism  In the quest for some concrete, quantitative evidence, our test of short-termism uses the forward-looking asset price framework of Miles (1993). A simple example illustrates the basic approach to testing myopia and its implications for project choice. (a)  A simple example  Consider an investment project costing $ This investment is riskless and pays $ at the end of each of 10 years.
Figure 7 A time-varying capital requirement Tier 1 Capital  Countercyclical capital requirements  M inimum requirements  Upturn  10  Downturn  time  BIS Review 68/2010  When economic activity is strong, the capital requirement is high, and vice versa. This timevarying capital requirement has two functions. The first is to build up the bank’s capital buffer when times are good and then let this buffer decrease during less favourable periods. The second function is to dampen credit growth when times are good by increasing the capital requirement and thereby the bank’s lending costs. This increase in the bank’s lending costs in turn implies an increase in the interest rate margin – and thus the lending rate. In light of the discussion of “just the right level of regulation”, a time-varying capital requirement and other regulations varying across time may have certain advantages. Their more apparent connection with risk build-up may make them less costly than the alternative of introducing a constant higher “minimum requirement”. One objective of varying regulations across time is to affect credit growth through the interest rate margin. This creates an additional source of variation in the interest rate margin, which can be illustrated in the lending rate equation by adding an additional time index for the regulations:  itlending  it   t ( zt ) . An interest rate margin with time-varying regulations also implies another dynamic for the transmission mechanism and is more complicated than a one-off shift.

This was formalised in guidelines set out in the Exchange Rate Regulation laid down by Royal Decree of 6 May 1994. If stabilisation policy is to have the intended effect, all components of policy must function effectively. This has not been the case in the last three years. For several years, average annual growth rates and employment growth have been markedly higher in Norway than the average for the rest of Europe. In part fuelled by the sharp expansion  BIS Review /1998  –2–  in petroleum investment, pressures built up in the economy, accompanied by growing labour shortages. Following the currency crisis in autumn 1992, Norwegian interest rates rapidly fell to European levels. The interest rate level in Europe fell after the turmoil early in the 1990s. As growth gradually picked up in Norway, the economy was stabilised by tightening fiscal policy. In order to stabilise the krone exchange rate, Norges Bank reduced its key rates at the beginning of 1997 after the krone had appreciated markedly over a period. Fiscal policy is an important instrument for smoothing fluctuations in the economy. However, it has proved difficult to prevent fiscal policy from being influenced by mood shifts that occur when the economy approaches a peak and memories of earlier recessions fade. Monetary policy shall provide a nominal anchor for economic developments. With exchange rate stability as the anchor, monetary policy may be pro-cyclical in periods.
In Europe, only Germany and Switzerland were able to keep inflation more or less at bay. In Norway, the welfare state and support schemes were rapidly expanded partly based on expectations of large future oil revenues. Economic policy was oriented towards building a bridge over what was expected to be a temporary downturn in the world economy. This led to a tug of war for real resources between the business sector and the public sector - between the exposed and sheltered sector. Chart 6  BIS Review 14/2000  4  The cost level in manufacturing industry was driven upwards. At the same time, the slowdown in growth proved to be permanent. The sheltered sector continued to expand, while industries exposed to international competition experienced deteriorating profitability and a relative decline. The recession at the end of the 1980s was followed by a period of low wage growth and gains in competitiveness. This may help to explain why the decline in manufacturing employment came to a halt in the 1990s. However, wage costs increased again in the late 1990s. The relative wage level in manufacturing industry compared with trading partners is now back at the level in the 1970s. Two forces were behind economic developments from the beginning of the 1970s. First, the deterioration in competitiveness was caused by the expansion of the Norwegian welfare state and a transfer of real resources from the exposed sector to the sheltered sector. Second, inflation expectations took root as a result of low administered interest rates and competitive devaluations.

These are the Top Islamic Bank and Top Development Financial Institution awards to recognize these two categories of institutions for their contribution towards the overall business growth of CGC and the SME sector. These new categories illustrate our sincere acknowledgment of the financial institutions that have made significant contribution to SME development. We believe 2008 is an important year for CGC. Foremost is that it marks the 36th year of the Corporation's involvement in SME development. It is also the year which will see the implementation of the third phase of our three-year business transformation plan and the successful completion of the three-year strategy. The necessary preparatory work under the transformation plan has largely being completed and we hope to take the first step towards achieving financial sustainability. Another significant milestone in 2008 is the establishment of the SME Credit Bureau, a watershed event in CGC's evolution. The Bureau is a source of credible and reliable credit information that serves the needs of both the SMEs and the potential financiers. This reflects the natural progression for the CGC in its continuous efforts to enhance access to financing by SMEs. The establishment of a SME Credit Bureau, by CGC in strategic collaboration with Dun & Bradstreet, would no doubt complement the other initiatives of the Government and the financial sector in promoting growth and development of SMEs. We have seen how CCRIS, where real-time and comprehensive information on consumers' credit exposures and history is readily available.
In Zambia, the effects of the global financial crisis have been generally felt in our mining industry, securities market, and the external sector of the economy. The drop in copper prices has led some mines closing while other have been placed on care and maintenance with massive job losses while the mining subsectors and mining related industries have also seen loss of jobs. The tourism industry is adversely affected with low occupancy rates while the horticulture industry has also recorded losses due to low export volumes as result of low demand and low commodity prices of vegetables and fresh flowers in European markets. The exchange rate has also come under severe pressure as foreign exchange inflows declined reflecting the deterioration in the balance of payments position. This is partly a consequence of reduced earnings from copper exports arising from the fall in copper prices. Further, the weakness of the local currency is a consequence of increased risk aversion to emerging and developing economy financial assets. Chairperson, the challenges arising from the global financial and economic crisis are huge but surmountable. Major economies of the world are putting in place various stimulus packages, which are expected to take the world economy out of the crisis. Without doubt, these measures will benefit emerging and developing economies as well, provided that were main committed to pursuing strong socio-economic policies. I urge all of us here present to be part of the solution and contribute to the economic recovery and prosperity of this continent.

It is also important that we incorporate policy issues arising from this seminar in our domestic policy processes and thereby enrich such processes by taking into consideration regional perspectives. 2  BIS Review 44/2009  The challenge going forward is how to maintain and sustain the economic gains and macroeconomic stability in our countries. There is need to encourage diversification and enhance competitiveness by increasing expenditure on infrastructure and social services. We need to continue to encourage investment in our economies that will lead to a diversified export base and a greater local value addition. For monetary authorities, there is need to continue to closely monitor global developments and always stand ready to take appropriate measures in the local financial markets to ensure that confidence in the financial systems is maintained and any systemic risk is avoided. Such actions will facilitate maintenance of the macroeconomic gains achieved thus far. This is a necessary ingredient for economic growth and poverty alleviation, even against the unfolding adverse effects of the global financial crisis. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me end by urging all of us present here today to deliberate on issues that will help us face the future in a much more confident way. Let us use this unique opportunity to have a discourse on how to protect and sustain the recent achievements of higher income levels and reduced poverty. African countries need to find ways and means of coming up with a response framework to reverse the effects of the crisis.
The Heads of State and Government of the European Union committed to a banking union in June 2012. Since then, major steps have been taken, within a very challenging timeframe, to set the basis for common supervision, through the single supervisory mechanism and common resolution arrangements; as for harmonized rules to protect depositors, they are also on the agenda, but the progress is clearly lagging behind. Let me now address each of these three pillars of the Banking Union. Single Supervisory Mechanism Last week the European Council adopted the Regulation establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism (or SSM). Within one year, the ECB will, together with the national supervisory authorities, assume broad supervisory competences over the whole banking sector of the Euro area and of those other EU countries which decide to opt-in. The ECB will be the central player within this new mechanism. Those credit institutions deemed to be significant according to the criteria laid down in the Regulation will be directly supervised by the ECB with the assistance of the national supervisory authorities, while the rest of the system will be indirectly supervised by the ECB through the national supervisors. In numbers, out of approximately 6,000 credit institutions in the Eurozone, the ECB will directly supervise around 130 banks, covering around 85% of total banking assets. The single mechanism will be based on the idea of centralised supervision, offering a common view for the supervision of the whole sector, while building on the knowledge and expertise which exist at national level.

This common view will be established in a set of rules and standards which will be laid down and developed by the EBA and the ECB itself. With the Single Rulebook as a basis, other instruments will also ensure that the same approach is used in the supervision of all banks. This will include the Supervisory Manual and ECB regulations, guidelines and general instructions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Resolution of credit institutions Single resolution, the second pillar of the banking union, is a necessary complement of single supervision. It is essential that if a bank enters into difficulties, it may be efficiently resolved with no or minimal costs for European taxpayers and with little impact on the European financial system and on the real economy. The draft Regulation on Single Resolution, submitted by the European Commission to the Council and the Parliament last July, builds on the concept, envisaged by the European Council more than a year ago, that is, a resolution system comprising a single resolution authority and a single resolution fund. In such a system, resolution will be based, first and foremost, on common EU “bail in” rules, whereby banks’ shareholders and creditors should first bear the cost of a bank resolution. Only if this were not enough, would the single resolution fund – meaning, the Industry – step in, making the fiscal backstop the very last resort.
At the same time, when looking at accumulated unit labour cost changes we observe that a number of economies which lost cost competitiveness also experienced a loss of market shares, less gains in job creation and/or deteriorating current account position. Despite the decline in the euro area average unemployment rate over the last few years, unemployment remains too high in several countries and regions of the euro area. In these countries and regions, wage increases should not fully exhaust productivity gains in order to provide incentives for firms to create additional jobs. In this respect, sufficient wage differentiation is also required to improve the employment opportunities for less skilled workers where there is high unemployment for this category of employees. The extent to which an increase in nominal wage growth leads to upward pressure on inflation depends crucially on trend labour productivity growth. Under normal circumstances, stronger labour productivity growth would justify an increase in nominal wage growth, thus allowing wage earners to participate in economic growth without adding to inflationary pressures. But for the same reason, without sustained improvements in labour productivity higher nominal wages would not lead to improvements in real purchasing power, but fuel inflationary pressures. Importantly, industries are characterised by different productivity developments. Therefore, wage setting should allow for sufficient wage differentiation and agreements in one industry or sector can not readily be transferred to others. BIS Review 52/2007  1  Those are the reasons whey the Governing Council calls for a high level of responsibility from social partners.

It is aiming at preserving and improving the situation of employees and of all our fellow citizens in the euro area. Such a responsible policy directly benefits those who are unemployed by significantly improving their employment possibilities. It benefits all our fellow citizens by supporting the purchasing power of their income, thus preserving the well-being of euro area households. And it contributes to meeting one necessary condition for sustainable long-term growth and active job creation in the euro area, which is price stability. Naturally there are also a number of other factors that are contributing to sustainable growth and job creation, in particular sound public finances and, as I already said, structural reforms that enhance competition, increase productivity and foster economic flexibility in order to elevate the growth potential of our vast euro area economy. Augmenting the growth potential of Europe is a major goal for all of us. Background information Table 1: Compensation per employee growth (whole economy) across euro area countries  2  BIS Review 52/2007  Table 2: Unit labour costs growth (whole economy) across euro area countries  Table 3. Labour productivity growth in the euro area countries  BIS Review 52/2007  3  Table 4. Employment growth in the euro area countries  Table 5. Unemployment rates across euro area countries  4  BIS Review 52/2007