samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Rather, it is to enable the entry of high-quality global talent in a more transparent and flexible way to complement the local workforce in Singapore. The enhanced framework has three key features that facilitate bringing in of talent that businesses need. First, the framework is based on a transparent points-based system. It clearly lists out the criteria that will be assessed for each application. Second, the system is more flexible. If an application for an employment pass falls short in certain criteria, the shortfall can be offset by scoring well in other criteria. Third, the framework facilitates applications where there is a skills shortage locally for specific job roles. A list of job roles where there is local shortage, will be developed for each sector. We want this list to reflect the needs of our financial institutions. MAS will be seeking the industry’s inputs in the next 1 to 2 months, to identify job roles where there is a shortage. The framework has been designed such that most existing employment pass holders will have no problem meeting its requirements. Of course, some financial institutions may need to adjust their workforce profiles, as they transition to the new framework. But they will have ample time to make these adjustments – at least 15 months for new employment pass applications and 27 months for renewals. MAS will work closely with financial firms to ensure they have access to the talent they need to grow and that is in short supply locally.

The programme has provided 20 students with the opportunity to gain exposure to tech roles in finance that leads to potential employment with the bank. The 12-month programme – double the duration of typical internships – ties in students’ work projects with their final year core curriculum, making their learning more applied and practical. These examples show that with the right support and programmes, polytechnic graduates who are willing to put in their best can succeed in the financial sector. We need more financial institutions to do what JP Morgan, OCBC, and some others are doing. And we need to scale up these efforts. MAS is working with the industry to develop meaningful programmes and support mechanisms to facilitate the hiring of polytechnic graduates by financial institutions. The second group that we’re looking at is mid-career professionals from other sectors who are keen to pivot to the financial sector. This is already happening organically. Take for example Zainon Yussof, who started her career as a customer service officer in the healthcare sector. Last year, she took up a traineeship opportunity offered by BlackRock, a global asset management firm. Zainon learnt to help people plan their financial future and also picked up valuable tech programming skills. Her background in customer service enabled her to address client queries effectively and collaborate with stakeholders to find solutions to problems. This landed her a permanent role, as an analyst with BlackRock’s Aladdin Technology Team. Another example is Edris Boey. Edris started her career as a financial auditor at KPMG.
Should any significant deviations between actual inflation and the monetary policy target occur, the Bank will provide an assessment of the reasons for this. 2  BIS Review 74/2001  Even though there was confidence in the implementation of monetary policy prior to the change in regulation, the communication of Norwegian monetary policy was clearly facilitated by the Government quantifying an inflation target. However, in our view the most important aspect of the shift to an inflation target is that political authorities clearly recognise that low inflation is a benefit in itself. History has shown that high inflation does not lead to sustained higher economic growth or lower unemployment. This recognition and the positive inflation track record in Norway since 1990 provide the Bank with a sound basis for conducting monetary policy. Implementation  In the light of the orientation of monetary policy in recent years, the new guidelines have been applied without any significant change in the conduct of monetary policy. The key rate is set on the basis of an overall assessment of the inflation outlook. Higher interest rates curb demand for goods and services and reduce inflation. Lower interest rates have the opposite effect. If evidence suggests that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. There is symmetry here.

Prudential regulations have been tightened in response to rapid credit growth and intensified competition in the banking system. We are working to ensure proper supervision over the parts of the Albanian financial sector that are outside the Bank of Albania’s jurisdiction, while trying to preserve fair competition across the sector. The Bank of Albania is assisting the MoF to improve its debt-management capacities. I believe our hard work will be reflected in a satisfactory rating of our sovereign debt, due to be carried out early next year. The competence, credibility and professionalism of our monetary policy provide necessary conditions to support and guarantee achievement of economic goals and successfully fulfill economic convergence toward ERM II preconditions. However, our achievements will not last in the absence of a careful fiscal policy and conservative fiscal expansion. The Bank of Albania is not the only major economic player. Therefore, we must find and implement clear anchors to guarantee the compliance of other players’ economic policies. In this respect, we can transform ERM II preconditions into an important foreign anchor to preserve the credibility of our reforms in the future. As a pre-accession country, Albania will be facing ERM II problems in the medium term. We are well aware of the difficult road ahead and the challenges we will face. Nevertheless, we remain committed toward economic and legal reforms considering it as a natural approach toward EU accession process. ***  BIS Review 1/2007  3  References Begg, B., Einchengreen, B., Halpern, L., Hagen, J. Wyplosz, CH. (2002).
From 1986 to 1992 Norway had a fixed exchange rate system with a defined central rate with fluctuation margins. This system was abandoned in 1992 after extensive speculation against the krone during the period of unrest in European exchange markets. Following the decision to allow the krone to float on 10 December 1992, the guidelines for monetary policy were revised. Monetary policy was subsequently oriented towards exchange rate stability, but without stipulating a central rate with fluctuation margins. The krone depreciated slightly immediately after the crisis, but then remained stable without extensive use of Norges Bank’s instruments. Since 1996, the exchange rate has fluctuated more widely. There may be several reasons for this. During part of this period, the government budget has not contributed sufficiently to smoothing growth in domestic demand and production. Wage inflation in 1997 and  BIS Review 121/1999  6  1998 was higher than in other countries. Turbulence in international financial markets has also had an important contagion effect on the krone. In addition, oil revenues have fluctuated, which may have affected investors’ expectations regarding future developments in the Norwegian economy.

Suppose that price and cost inflation in Norway were allowed to be higher than in the euro countries. The nominal exchange rate would then have to depreciate in order to keep the real exchange rate constant over time. Thus, stabilising inflation at around the level aimed at by the ECB is a means of achieving exchange rate stability against the euro. In a situation with the prospect of increased inflationary pressure and a depreciating exchange rate, an increase in the interest rate may at the same time bring the exchange rate back towards its initial range and reduce inflationary pressure through lower demand and lower imported goods inflation. This in turn will contribute to long-run stability in the exchange rate. Similarly, with an appreciating exchange rate and a low inflation and activity level in the economy, a lower interest rate will contribute to stabilising the exchange rate in both the short run and the long run through a stable inflation level. On the other hand, we can think of situations where we would need to set a high interest rate in order to keep the exchange rate close to the initial range in the short run, creating a deflationary recession in the economy. Normally, a deflationary recession will lead to a weakened krone exchange rate, which means that the high interest rate set to keep the level of the exchange rate unchanged in the short run in itself will induce exchange rate instability in the long run.
It is obvious that it´s still too early to assess properly the impact of this labour market reform, and any such evaluation will have to consider multiple issues, including employment, labour turnover, human capital accumulation, among others. In the meantime, learning from the experience in other countries about the impact of similar regulatory changes on temporary employment could prove to be useful for the design of a rigorous evaluation of this reform in the case of Spain. These issues are covered in the first session. Second, another major challenge for the Spanish economy is the dismal performance of aggregate productivity, the ultimate and most important engine of economic growth and prosperity. Average annual total factor productivity growth over the 2000-2019 period was 0.2% in Spain, as against 0.5% in the euro area (and 0.9% in the United States). Among the various determinants of this gap, recent literature has been highlighting the role of the misallocation of resources across firms and the small size of businesses, which has a bearing on the country’s low aggregate productivity. In particular, 35.7% of total employment is in firms with less than 10 employees, compared with 28.5% in the European Union. To tackle this challenge, it is essential to explore the various reasons why our business sector is so skewed towards small, low-productivity firms and to mitigate the effects.

A study of Swedish data shows that such changes have raised productivity growth by 0.2 percentage points a year during the second half of the 1990s. 6  2  ITPS (2007). 3  Conway, Nicoletti, de Rosa and Steiner (2006). 4  See, for instance, Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998). 5  Esser, Villalba and Tarantola (2007). 6  Forsling & Lindström (2004). BIS Review 12/2008  3  Organisation important for productivity growth IT is available all around the world at roughly the same price, but the differences are substantial with regard to how different countries and sectors use this technology to make their production more efficient (see Figure 5). The United States and Europe have experienced a similar productivity growth in the IT-producing sectors, but the Americans have had stronger growth in sectors with intensive use of IT. This includes, for instance, the wholesale and retail trade sectors and financial services. Studies indicate that one of the explanations for the United States’ relative productivity advantage over Europe is that the US companies have been quicker and better at adapting their organisations to the new technology. 7 One factor that might contribute to this difference is that the stricter regulations in the labour market in Europe mean that it takes longer time and costs more money to reorganise. Sweden is an exception in this context. We have seen a strong growth in productivity in the sectors using IT at the same time as we have a relatively regulated labour market.
These buffers would help protect the firm against having to liquidate assets under duress, and would therefore help prevent the probability distribution from sliding left toward the zero line in Figure 2. But there is a cost to the firm from holding greater liquidity buffers in terms of lower returns on capital. So, requiring greater liquidity buffers would also tend to drive up intermediation costs. And, just as in the case of higher capital requirements, banks could respond by taking greater risks. Third, regulators could implement changes that would reduce the degree of dispersion in the potential value of a firm, pushing the right tail of the distribution in Figure 2 to the left. For example, we could require greater transparency about the composition and quality of the firm’s assets and liabilities. Or, regulators could increase transparency by forcing greater disclosure of the sale price of assets and/or by pushing for greater homogeneity and price  6  This problem has been largely addressed in the banking sector by deposit insurance and by providing access to lender of last resort facilities. In addition, supervisory and reporting requirements address transparency issues. 6  BIS Review 143/2009  discovery for products such as OTC derivatives. We could improve the quality of regulation and supervision, which would increase confidence in regulatory measures of capital and financial firms’ soundness. Fourth, the central bank could provide a liquidity backstop to solvent firms.

If you want to know what behaviors are valued or esteemed in reality, look to see who is promoted and well-compensated and the behaviors that they embody. Do the results match what is said? Do they match your expectation of fairness? Do you aspire to be one of these individuals, not because of their status and compensation alone, but because of the esteem you hold for them and their values? Over the long haul, the economy needs a vibrant and trustworthy financial sector in order to thrive, just as the financial sector needs a vibrant economy to thrive as well. You are the rising leaders of your firms. You can help accomplish these aims. A strong and ethical culture in the banking industry will make it more trustworthy, and therefore more effective in performing its mission. It will also help the industry be held in higher esteem and this will help attract the talent needed to sustain the industry. I am encouraged by today’s gathering, and hope you will take heart that an improved culture in the financial services industry is both necessary and possible. Thank you for your continued efforts and your kind attention. 1 Stephanie Chaly, James Hennessy, Thomas Noone, Joseph Sommer and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing  these remarks. 2 See Criminal Accountability and Culture, Remarks by Preet Bharara, Reforming Culture and Behavior in the  Financial Services Industry: Expanding the Dialogue, October 20, 2016. 3 See John C. Bogle, Enough: True Measures of Money, Business, and Life, 45 (2009).
The world is undergoing dynamic shifts The world around us is shifting dramatically. To understand this shift, we should pay attention to five megatrends. The first is the shift in global economic order with the rise of Asia, including the rising prominence of ASEAN. The gravity of the global economy is moving to the East. Being the sixth largest economy and home to around 650 million people, there is an abundance of opportunity, hope and dynamism in this region. The financial sector will no doubt, be a key player in further catalysing the growth of ASEAN countries. The second is the risks brought about by climate change. Tackling climate change may be one of the biggest challenges for humanity in building a sustainable and prosperous future. It could lead to devastating, wide ranging and irreversible damage to our economy, society and the way we live. Economic losses in itself could be very significant, as high as USD20 trillion. Insured losses from effects of climate change have already increased five-fold in the past 30 years. The third is the rising income inequality that can threaten the fabric of our society. Consider this. The top 1% of the population has captured twice the global income growth of the bottom 50% since 1980. Worse still, inequality has persisted despite large transfers of public to private wealth in many countries. The fourth is the rising populism and protectionist policies. This can be seen in inward looking policies and anti-establishment views that have become more entrenched in parts of the world.

Slow growth, lack of economic mobility and erosion of trust in public and private institutions are among the factors that are likely to have contributed to this. Like undercurrents before a storm, these trends have far reaching implications for political, economic and social systems. Last but not least, the fifth shift is the advancement of technology. This has and will continue to 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  dramatically alter the way we behave, interact and transact. Much has been said about the benefits, but an increasing reliance on technology presents risks that we cannot ignore. This includes issues of data privacy, discrimination or biases and also displacement of certain segments within society. In the digital age, higher order risks of cyber-attacks and operational disruptions are magnified in ways that we have yet to fully comprehend. Calling for a financial system that is relevant, safe and socially responsible These five megatrends and finance are deeply intertwined. While undoubtedly finance has helped to power the economic rise of ASEAN, its role in contributing to an increase in climate risk and inequality cannot be denied. Therefore, as we consider the future of finance, we need to contemplate not only how these megatrends may impact finance, but how finance itself can respond to and shape these trends in more positive ways moving forward. In my mind, this calls for a financial system that is relevant, safe and socially responsible. Finance must be relevant to the needs of the economy.
In this connection, however, it can also be pointed out that the Euro lost more than one-quarter of its value against the US dollar from the beginning of 1999 until it bottomed out, and since that time has risen once more by just over one-fifth. The Central Bank is not unconcerned about the exchange rate, but has limited means of influencing its development, as has been explained. There is only so much the Bank can do to restrain currency fluctuations. A substantial lowering of interest rates could possibly force the exchange rate down somewhat, but this would mean sacrificing other and more important objectives for precious little gain. The joint declaration issued by the government and the Central Bank in March of 2001 states that the Bank will intervene in developments on the foreign exchange market through buying and selling foreign currency if it deems this to be necessary in order to achieve its inflation target, or if it is concerned that exchange rate fluctuations could threaten financial stability. There is no cause for so doing at present. As I mentioned, the primary objective of the Central Bank’s monetary policy is to foster price stability. Price stability is recognised to be a prerequisite for long-term economic growth and thus improved welfare. The Central Bank has lightened its monetary restraint substantially in recent months. In the course of ten months, the policy rate has been cut very significantly, resulting in a real policy rate which is lower now than it has been since 1996, as I mentioned.

In recent public discussion the claim has often been made that the exchange rate of the króna is far too high and that the Central Bank needs to take steps to bring it down again. The fact of the matter is that the Bank’s means of controlling the exchange rate are overestimated and the power of the market underestimated when the claim is made that the Central Bank can, through its actions, direct the króna to a specific level. The proposal has been made, for instance, that the Central Bank cut its interest rates substantially with the aim of lowering the exchange rate. In this context it should be pointed out that the Bank has cut its policy rate substantially, from 10.4% only a year ago (11.4% two years ago) to 5.3% at present. The Bank’s nominal policy rate has not been lower since 1994 and the real policy rate is at its lowest since 1996. The domestic and foreign interest rate differential has narrowed significantly. In addition, the Central Bank’s interest rate is now below the estimated equilibrium interest rate and thus has a stimulating effect on the economy. The impact of interest rate changes generally is only visible after a certain time lag, prompting one to conclude that the effect of the major decrease in interest rates during the past year has yet to be fully felt.
This could happen for a number of reasons - related to different cyclical positions, different fiscal positions, or as a result of external shocks or structural changes. The famous Maastricht criteria for sustainable convergence that are to be met, according to the Treaty, before a country qualifies for the Single Currency were designed precisely to reduce the risks of tensions of this sort arising after the start. I should like to think that the political leaders across Europe, who will take the decisions, all really appreciate the crucial importance of sustainable convergence to the success of the venture and that they do not see it just as a technical obstacle to their wider aspirations - I should like to think that. So, Mr. Chairman, some difficult decisions lie ahead. The period up to your next biennial dinner will be momentous. But that should not obscure the fact that our immediate economic prospects remain encouraging. I do not know of any serious economic forecaster who does not expect the economy to continue to grow over the next two year, or unemployment to continue to fall. The challenge is to ensure that we can still say that in two years’ time. BIS Review 5/1997

Whether for time-sensitive transactions as part of the often intricate choreography of global financial stability operations or for more routine official payments, the insights developed and experiences with the policies, environments, and constraints of other central banks provide the Federal Reserve with enhanced capabilities to formulate and execute policies. The dedication, skill, and expertise of this staff transform on a daily basis the abstract principle of safe, confidential, and reliable service provision into an operational reality. So, to the current and former staff here today, I pay tribute to your service to the global official community, to the Federal Reserve, and to the U.S. You are worthy heirs to the legacy of Benjamin Strong, Montagu Norman, and other early giants of central bank cooperation. The evolving risk environment in cross-border payment operations Even as we hold this commemoration and celebrate the legacy of central bank cooperation in this most tangible of forms, the evolving risk environment in cross-border payment operations requires us as central bankers to continually rededicate ourselves, in word and deed, to the mission of providing safe, confidential, and reliable services to each other. As we are all no doubt aware, risks in cross-border payment operations have undergone major shifts in recent years, with cyber threats in particular emerging as one of the most critical security issues facing our community.