samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this respect, I would like to commend the ambitiousness of the European Commission’s recent Digital Finance Package and its priorities, in particular those to fight against the fragmentation of the digital single market for financial services and to address the new challenges and risks associated with the digital transformation. With regard to these risks, I think it would be appropriate for the Commission to address the complex but currently unavoidable issue of the oversight framework to be applied to critical IT service providers, including cloud service providers, and the equally important matter of the supervision of issuers and distributors of stablecoins, whether they be single or multi-currency coins. I will not go into detail on the Commission’s proposed legislation, which still requires careful examination on our part and which will, of course, have to be improved by the negotiations that are about to get underway. I simply want to say here that the regulations’ proposals aimed at critical IT service providers and stablecoins include promising provisions: for the former, a dedicated framework that does not exempt financial intermediaries from their responsibilities and their obligation to use European service providers, and for the latter, a strict supervision that involves and associates national and European authorities.

Chile)  2.8 -0.6 1.9 7.7 5.1 3.8 2.7  1.9 -0.4 1.1 8.1 6.3 4.3 3.3  1.5 -0.5 1.7 7.5 5.4 3.8 2.7  1.7 -0.4 1.8 7.6 4.1 3.8 2.6  LME copper price $ Brent oil price $  361 112  350 108  330 108  Terms of trade  -4.1  -0.4  -5.2  Dec.13 Report  2.5 2.6 2.6 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.3 8.2 7.4 7.4 6.4 5.8 5.3 4.7 3.9 4.0 3.7 2.9 2.9 (levels) 332 340 305 310 109 101 108 106 (annual change, percent) -3.9 -1.6 0.1 0.2  2.7 2.1 0.8 7.5 6.3 4.1 3.7  2.7 1.4 1.0 7.2 6.3 4.5 3.4  290 97  290 100  -1.2  -1.5  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Consensus Forecasts, IMF, and respective statistics bureaus.
In parallel, it will continue to regularly reassess the need for an adjustment of the CCyB. Page 3/3

Review of monetary policy Winding up, I would like to remind you that the Bank of Russia has announced its plans to review its monetary policy over the period since the switch to the inflation targeting regime. Within this review, the Bank of Russia will analyse the actual results achieved, the changes in the economic environment over this period, and long-term trends that might impact the implementation of monetary policy in the future. The results of this work and the findings relevant for the parameters and practice of the Bank of Russia’s policy will be presented by the middle of next year and will be taken into consideration in the course of the elaboration of the Guidelines for 2023. Conclusion Recently, Russia’s economy has demonstrated multiple times its ability to adjust to the changing environment. Regardless of how the situation unfolds, we will do our best to create necessary conditions to further develop the country’s economy and enhance its resilience. Monetary policy aimed at ensuring price stability and enabling a countercyclical response to changes in the economy is an essential condition for sustainable and well-balanced economic growth. Thank you for attention. I am ready to answer your questions. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Since August, inflation has fallen back to target (for the first time in 5 years) and unemployment has fallen rapidly towards 7%, so what have we learned on the journey towards our threshold? With the wisdom of hindsight, there have been three main drivers of the recovery thus far: a marked reduction in extreme uncertainty, the repair of the core of the financial system and significant deleveraging by households. These have driven a recovery in consumer spending and housing investment, which together have accounted for almost all the GDP growth in the year to Q3. As my colleague Ian McCafferty outlined earlier this week, there are also early signs of a recovery in business investment. The less good news is that the recovery has not – as measured at least – been accompanied by meaningful productivity growth. Given the continued openness of the economy and the credibility of macro policy, it is hard to think of any reason why there should have been a persistent deterioration the UK’s  1  My MPC colleague Ben Broadbent discussed these issues extensively in September 2013 in a speech at the London Business School, “Conditional guidance as a response to supply uncertainty”. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  productivity performance. In fact there are several reasons to expect productivity growth to pick up as the recovery proceeds. For example, until recently, the fragility of the banking system limited the reallocation of capital and labour from less to more productive activities.

John Gieve: Learning from the financial crisis Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, 2008 Europe in the World Lecture Panel Discussion, at the European Business School, London, 19 November 2008. *  *  *  The years after sterling left the ERM were the most successful and stable in my lifetime. In early 2007, for example, inflation had not moved by more than a single percentage point away from target in the previous 10 years, the output of the economy had grown in every quarter since 1992 Q3 (Chart 1), unemployment had fallen by 5 percentage points from its peak in the early 1990s and living standards had steadily increased. Interest rates had been low and stable. However as we know now, that was the end of “the Great Stability”. The summer ushered in a period of extraordinary turmoil in Western financial markets which we are still trying to calm. And this year has seen the onset of recession not just in Europe but throughout the advanced economies. Despite the dramatic policy measures of the last months, the outlook for 2009 is bleak and the prospects beyond are uncertain. That move – in the space of only 12 months – from the policy maker’s dream of steady noninflationary growth to the biggest banking crisis since the outbreak of World War I and the onset of recession sets the questions for this evening. First, how did we get into this position? Second, what are the immediate challenges for policy?
I have already mentioned the doubtful argument about changing the Link to jump-start the economy, and there have been other ideas put forward - all of them well intentioned - for example, that the Government should dig further into the foreign reserves to stimulate growth. One very specific suggestion which comes up periodically, and which gained currency once again over the summer, is the proposal that the HKMA should relax the guideline that says that banks should not lend more than 70% of the value of a residential property for which a mortgage loan is taken out: this is known as the 70% loan-to-value guideline. The idea behind the suggestion was that relaxation of the guideline would make it possible for prospective homeowners to borrow more and that this would help stimulate property purchases  4  BIS Review 44/2003  and thus stabilise the property market. I think the idea has now passed, partly because the property market appears to have stabilised, but mainly because it seems that public opinion accepted the reasoning that we and others put forward for maintaining the guideline. Setting aside the question of whether relaxing the guideline would have had any effect at all on demand for property, let us go through this reasoning. It is, in fact, quite simple. The guideline exists to prevent banks from excessively exposing themselves to the risks posed by an extremely volatile property market.

In some regions it was almost impossible to buy the policy without additional foisted services, there were difficulties with reimbursement of damages. The overall situation has improved, but some regions still experience difficulties with OSAGO. We have introduced an electronic OSAGO policy. For now, only 200,000 electronic policies have been issued, that is not many. Therefore, we welcome the law that would bind insurers to issue an electronic policy upon the customer’s request from January 2017. Last year, we improved the European accident statement rules – documenting road traffic accidents without involvement of the road police has become easier and more convenient. Microfinance organisations. Microfinancing is discussed with fervour. I would like to stress, that we believe it to be short-sighted to ban microfinancing. Short-term loans are in demand and if there is no regulated business, consumers will turn to illegal lenders. We took measures to ensure better protection of citizens’ rights, primarily, by limiting the maximum effective interest rate and fines and interests on overdue loans. And I believe we should move from the fourfold maximum to the twofold on the legislative level. As for illegal lenders, this problem needs a legislative solution, among other things. The accountability of illegal lenders is currently not very serious, so to say. Moreover, ironically enough, the illegal lender can recover the debt in court. We believe it to be important to deprive agreements with illegal lenders of relief at law. Non-governmental pension funds. We have established a system of pension savings guarantees.
In reality, the capital drawdown banks would have faced, had the COVID shock happened in 2007, would have been a function of their 2007 balance sheets – so the loan losses may well have been higher than those we pencilled in for banks as part of the illustrative scenario. 6 In the first quarter of the year, major UK banks expanded their net lending to businesses by £ (compared to a reduction in net lending of £ by these banks in 2019 as a whole. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  outweighed by the losses they would suffer from the broader economic damage that would result from a widespread withdrawal of credit. No financial system of course can be infinitely resilient. Given its function of providing credit and risk mitigation to firms and households, the banking system is exposed to the real economy. There is inevitably some level of damage to the economy that the banking system cannot weather. Over the coming months we will learn more about how well the post crisis reforms work under stress. One particular area of attention will be the usability of the capital and liquidity buffers intended to absorb a tail event shock. The results of the FPC’s desktop stress test reinforces the message that the clue, as they say, is in the name: the buffers exist precisely to buffer a shock like this. All elements of the buffers banks now have are intended to be usable in stress.

First, as we learned 10 years ago, we need to look at how the system as a whole has performed under stress and whether and how it might be strengthened. Focussing on the resilience of one or another element without understanding its broader effect will give us a false picture. Second, such a comprehensive assessment, cannot be done by one jurisdiction or one international standard setter. And in this respect, one of the other, major planks of the post financial crisis reforms, the creation of the international Financial Stability Board (FSB) – has put us in a far better position than ten years ago. The FSB has been active and in crisis mode from the outset of this crisis. It has enabled jurisdictions and international standard setters to work together, under its umbrella to share experience, to assess risks to financial stability, and in to discuss ‘what works’ (and what doesn’t work) in addressing those risks. The FSB’s assessments also provide input to the political level of the G20. And to ensure national authorities respond in a consistent way, the FSB agreed Principles, adopted by the G20, which reiterate commitment to common international standards, using their inbuilt flexibility including buffers, while leaning against regulatory rollback. Going forward, and just as after the global financial crisis, the FSB can and should enable us to bring together the various perspectives in the central bank and regulatory communities to determine whether we do indeed need more resilience in the system and, if so, how to achieve it.
5  Since 2007, when wealth tax was abolished, no authority has had the assignment of collecting data on individual’s debts and assets. 6  The eight largest banks are Danske Bank, Handelsbanken, Länsförsäkringar Bank, Nordea, SBAB Bank, SEB, Skandiabanken and Swedbank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  loans these borrowers have registered with UC, not just those granted by the eight largest banks. The amount of data is therefore substantial and the loan volume covers approximately 80 per cent of household loans from monetary financial institutions and 94 per cent of all mortgages. 7 This should be compared to the random samples in the mortgage surveys, which cover 1.6 percent of households loans from monetary financial institutions. The data includes monthly data for a three-year period 8 on various types of credit, taxed earned income after tax, number of co-borrowers, taxation values for detached houses, the parish in which the borrower is registered and other information. The material contains information on almost four million indebted adult individuals, which corresponds to 52 per cent of Sweden’s total adult population. 9 The individuals in the data can be linked to over 1.8 million households. On the basis of this material we now have the possibility to conduct an in-depth study of total household debt and not only of new loans – a possibility that we have never really had before. Using this individual data, it is also possible to examine how debts are distributed, for example between different income and age groups and geographically.

Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to the CBI, Institute of Directors, Leeds Chamber of Commerce and Yorkshire Forward at the Royal Armouries, Leeds, 21 October 2008. *  *  *  My first memories of Leeds are from a wet summer in 1958. I was ten years old, we lived on the moors above Hebden Bridge, and my father took me to my first Test Match –England against New Zealand at Headingley. It rained all day on both Thursday and Friday, and, when play started in mid-afternoon on Saturday, on a drying wicket New Zealand were bowled out by Laker and Lock for 67. So I became a slow bowler. I was taught to bowl – slow left arm – at Old Town primary school by the headmaster, Alfred Stephenson. During the morning break he would mark the wickets in chalk in the playground, and draw a small circle exactly on a length. If we could pitch the ball within that circle he would give us a farthing. As we improved, and the payout of farthings increased, the morning break became shorter and shorter – my first lesson in economic incentives, or what is known in the trade as “moral hazard”.
“Irreducible uncertainty” and “multiple equilibria” are occupational hazards; so if you must predict the future, you are tempted to hedge heavily and must modify constantly. But in two areas I’m confident: the Three Lies of John Harvard will continue to be revealed for years to come, and with time, the Three Lies of Finance will come to enjoy widespread credulity again. To resist their siren calls, policymakers and market participants must bind ourselves to the mast. That means building institutional structures that make it harder to act on the lies. Over the past seven years great strides have been made. Take “this time is different”. To guard against future complacency, policy frameworks have been substantially overhauled. The Bank of England has been given formal responsibility to maintain financial stability and has considerable powers to promote it. In anticipation of problems, we have increased bank capital and tightened mortgage standards. We are using our monetary policy and macroprudential policy tools in concert, so that a low for long interest rate environment can promote both price and financial stability. Moreover, when next time proves no different, the financial intermediaries at the core of the system will be on a substantially stronger footing. Their capital requirements have already increased ten-fold and their liquid assets are up fourfold. Their trading assets are down by a third and intra-bank exposures by two-thirds. Though we cannot hope to eliminate systemic risk altogether, reform is ending Too Big To Fail for individual institutions.

International Fund for Agricultural Development Mission •  An International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Mission was in the country to solicit comments on the Rural Finance Programme Inception Report of November 2003 on the development of rural finance. The major findings were that the Inception Report provided the basis for the provision of rural finance, however, it was noted that the report was limited in scope and was too focused on creating an enabling environment for the provision of rural finance. In addition, the report lacked concrete initiatives for rural finance. In view of this, the Mission proposed the following interventions: •  Support of community based financial institutions;  •  Rural banking;  BIS Review 27/2004  5  •  •  Credit facility for contract farming operations;  •  Innovation and outreach facility; and  •  Policy, legislative and management support. As a way forward, the Mission agreed to complete a draft formulation report by end-April 2004, hold a stakeholders’ workshop by end-May 2004 and finalise the formulation report by end-June 2004. The programme appraisal would be conducted by end-September 2004. AFRACA Workshop •  A workshop was held in South Africa under the auspices of AFRACA. A number of issues came up but a particular one we would like to encourage in our market is the linked banking. This involves commercial banks entering into arrangements with other institutions, such as, microfinance institutions to extend some form of banking services even to outlying areas.
For instance, what was first a European Assembly with only consultative powers has now become a European Parliament with legislative responsibilities extended to more and more areas, and members of parliament who are directly elected by European citizens. Within the Council of Ministers, majority voting has increasingly become the norm at the expense of unanimity. Finally, in addition to institutional reform, economic integration has also served to foster progress in areas beyond the economic sphere. In order to effectively guarantee the four freedoms, it has, for example, been deemed necessary to grant powers to the EU in fields such as immigration and human rights. Ladies and gentlemen, as a consequence of the integration process that began largely in the economic sphere, the EU already exhibits a number of features of existing political unions in terms of both its institutional structure and its competencies. However, it is clearly not a complete political union. The extent to which further integration is either desirable or necessary is an ongoing debate. It is a debate that is ultimately for politicians, not for central bankers. Nevertheless, the process of European integration will undoubtedly also have implications for the conduct of the single monetary policy. No central bank operates in a vacuum. It needs to be supported by an appropriate underlying framework. There is no doubt that the overall performance of the euro area economy depends not just on economic, but also on institutional and political structures.

Also, insufficient financial sector policy reaction on the side of governments exacerbated the detrimental dynamics and represented itself as a source of risk and uncertainty during the crisis, ultimately fostering dynamics of self-fulfilling prophecies. The ECB’s non-standard measures In this environment the ECB took bold and decisive action. The disruptions in banks’ short-term funding led to a strong tightening of credit standards to both businesses and households. This threatened to undermine bank lending to the real economy with risks of a severe credit crunch. In turn, the transmission of monetary policy became seriously impaired. And, central banks were less effective in steering term money market rates via the setting of their policy rates. Ultimately, the interest rate set by the central bank did no longer reach the real economy across the euro area in the same way. The size of the shocks and the extent of global and intra euro area adjustments required exploiting the ECB’s full toolkit to implement a wide range of non-standard measures. Here, we always had to keep in mind the importance of the banking system for the financing of the economy. In the euro area, two-thirds of external financing – and even a larger share for small- and medium-sized enterprises – originates from banks. Our measures included the provision of unlimited funding support to banks at maturities up to three years, the extension  6  The Japanese experience since the 1990s was widely seen as an exception.
Households have been worried about their savings, jobs, earning power and their homes; companies have been concerned about the availability of credit, the health of their suppliers, the viability of their markets and the prospects for their investments. Uncertainty has reduced confidence, dampened spending, and slowed growth. As a result the UK has endured its weakest recovery on record. Comparisons with other countries throw that fact into sharper relief. Over the past five years Germany has grown by 2%, the US by 5%, Australia by 13% and China by more than 50%. Meanwhile the UK economy still produces 3% less than it did five years ago. The real cost of this poor performance is that around a million more people are unemployed than before the recession. Capacity has lain idle in firms and opportunities have gone wanting for lack of finance and confidence. It will take a period of robust growth to begin to reduce meaningfully this spare capacity in the labour market and in companies. The Bank of England’s task now is to secure the fledgling recovery, to allow it to develop into a period of sustained and robust growth. We aim to get there in part by reducing the uncertainty that has held back growth. And we are using our full suite of policy tools to help rebuild confidence so that we all can move forward in a sustainable manner. First, we are giving confidence that interest rates won’t go up until jobs, incomes and spending are recovering at a sustainable pace.

In the European context, our colleagues from De Nederlandshe Bank and Banco de Portugal, Mr Michiel van Doeveren, Mr Rui Pimentel, Mr Carlo Winder and Mr Richard Derksen will provide relevant information about the ongoing changes in payment systems and services in Europe. Thus, a discussion will be developed about the three main pillars of the Strategic Vision 2020 of the Eurosystem: achieving a consolidated Eurosystem market infrastructure by bringing the two infrastructures TARGET 2 and T2S closer together, harmonization of its own collateralization techniques and procedures and development of pan-European instant payment services. In addition, the latest developments in the legal spectrum regulating payments at European level, with special emphasis on PSD2 Directive, will be elaborated. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Also, significant attention will be paid on developments in safe and secure payment services as well as the conceptual and practical issues regarding the oversight on FMIs. On the national level, our efforts are focused on the harmonization of the Macedonian legislation with the EU regulation. The new Law on payment services and systems and related bylaws will implement PSD and part of the provisions from PSD2, Settlement Finality Directive and E-money Directive. Thus, a panel discussion is scheduled where esteemed representatives from the payment service providers, NBRM and experts from Slovenia, Mr Peter Centrih and Bulgarian expert, Mr Antonio Barzashki will elaborate the new package of Macedonian legislative on payments.