samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With respect to the Central Bank, and as we have done on previous occasions, we value the widespread recognition expressed during this process in terms of its autonomy, its objectives and functions, and its eminently technical nature. The commitment of all of us who are part of this institution has been and will continue to be to contribute to the welfare of our country and achieving the objectives of ensuring price stability and the normal functioning of internal and external payments. Throughout the constitutional debate, important issues arose. Elements such as employment and financial stability have always been present in our decisions, but we believe it is pertinent to be more explicit about how they influence them. At this point, I should mention that the evolution of the Bank's strategic planning process for the period 2023-2027, on which we are already working, will provide us with an adequate framework to address this task and other medium-term challenges. Some examples of this advancement are our agenda on environmental issues, means of payment, and the compilation of regional statistics with a gender perspective, which will provide more basic information for the formulation of public policies aimed at overcoming existing gaps and barriers. Clearly, the outcome of the plebiscite does not put an end to the debate on Chile's institutional framework. Various political sectors have stressed the need to give continuity to this process, with the purpose of constructing a text that is in tune with the will of the great majorities.

However, in a context where inflation has turned out to be higher than expected; where inflationary expectations remain above target; where the peso is weaker than normal; where the global inflationary problem has become more complex and there are doubts as to how policies to address it will affect the global economy and financial markets, we must acknowledge that the risk of experiencing a more persistent inflationary phenomenon is our primary concern. Monetary policy makers will remain attentive to these developments and, as I mentioned a few moments ago, future movements of the MPR will be contingent on them. Urgently resolving the inflationary problem does not imply that we should set aside our medium-term challenges. More than two years into the pandemic and almost three since the social unrest of October 2019, our economy has suffered a string of events that have put the effectiveness of our economic policy framework and the authorities' ability to react to the test. In addition to the inflationary effects, some of the measures adopted to deal with the effects of the pandemic generated significant costs in the local financial market. Withdrawals of pension funds reduced the size of long-term savings and possibly also the economy's capacity to react to external shocks, especially under conditions of high uncertainty. Therefore, the strengthening of financial markets should be an important item on the economic agenda.
10  A firm is considered to be under high financial pressure when the ratio of (gross operating profit + financial revenue) to financial costs is below one. 11  The net interest burden is considered to be high when the ratio of (debt service expenses - interest income from deposits) to household income is over 40%. 9  Also, it would help to align financial responsibility with the banking supervision and resolution decision-making mechanisms, which are already centralised. Recent events must also be analysed in depth from a global regulatory and supervisory perspective. The Federal Reserve System has already published its review of the reasons behind events in the United States. We have also begun our own assessment through the Financial Stability Committee and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, from which lessons will also be drawn. We should take an open-minded approach to the findings of these exercises, which usually allow us to fine-tune the regulations so that they can be continuously adapted in response to changing circumstances. We must also not forget that the final link of the regulatory reform (Basel III) is yet to be transposed into law in several jurisdictions. This regulation must be transposed completely and consistently so as to remedy the outstanding shortcomings, in particular in the definition of banks’ risk-weighted assets.

The Bank’s interest thus has a stimulating effect on the economy, and note that real interest rates at present are lower than they have been since the spring of 1996. It should  BIS Review 12/2003  1  also be borne in mind that changes in interest rates only affect demand and inflation with a considerable time lag, so that the full effect of interest rate cuts in recent months will not be felt for some time yet. ISK exchange rate No one doubts the importance of the ISK exchange rate for the Icelandic economy. The exchange rate has enormous impact on price levels and the performance of the export and competitive sectors. On the other hand, people must realise that the Central Bank has only limited long-term effect on the exchange rate. Many aspects of the economy affect the exchange rate. These include, for instance, foreign trade, foreign investments in Iceland and investment by Icelanders abroad, not to forget expectations of future economic developments. There is little doubt that expectations concerning power-intensive industry developments have influenced the exchange rate in recent months. Interest rates certainly affect the exchange rate, but experience both in Iceland and elsewhere shows that this effect eventually disappears, as long as monetary policy aims at maintaining long-term inflation comparable to that of the country’s trading partners. At the same time, intervention by central banks can have a temporary impact.
But all this is already available. It can, of course, be said that if only everyone becomes better at obtaining knowledge, information and critical assessments, it is possible that more households than at present can actually come closer than before to the stock market’s return. Unwarranted euphoria can be avoided and share prices can be more stable. At the same time it can be said that the problems go deeper than that and have to do with how the financial system functions today. It is certainly true that in recent decades, financial deregulations, new financial products, improved data and telecommunications and the development of financial theory have led to an outstanding and rather fantastic growth and transformation of the financial system in many parts of the world. Even so, to a growing extent households face what are sometimes very difficult risk-management decisions that were not called for or even possible earlier. Many people still lack the requisite knowledge for this and it may be asked whether people in general can be expected to have such knowledge in the future. Everyone cannot be a specialist in risk management and financial theory. As I have indicated, one reason why households face a more difficult situation than before is, of course, the substantially greater exposure to the stock market that stems from disintermediation. But this tendency has been accentuated by the new pension system. It is now up to the individual to decide how a part of her/his pension capital is to be invested.

Today I shall confine my brief remarks to some aspects that have to do with the fact that shares now weigh considerably more heavily in household financial portfolios than was the case thirty years ago. As I just said, this development has coincided with a return on shares that has been very high historically. Sooner or later, however, there will be a normalisation, more or less in line with what has happened in the past. This is so because the return on shares is ultimately determined by corporate profits, which are bound up in turn with economic development in general. GDP represents the sum of all profits and wages in the economy and it is hard to see how an annual real growth rate of around 2 per cent could result in a development of corporate profits that warrants a real annual return on shares that averages around 20 per cent. A more “normal” combination of stock-market returns and risks makes saving in shares more troublesome than it has been with the good returns in the past twenty years. The financial system will need to do more than before to help households manage the risks associated with stock markets. The question is how this change is likely to occur. BIS Review 5/2002  1  Greatly increased household saving in shares One factor behind the growing interest in share investment in Sweden in the late 1970s may have been the low valuations initially.
I believe that two major mistakes were made: –  First, countries – including France and Germany – weakened the Pact by failing to comply with the provisions of its preventive arm (they were not in balance over the cycle but permanently close to the 3% deficit ceiling), or those of the corrective arm (they never abided by the sanctions). –  Second, the euro area did not equip itself at the outset with an instrument for monitoring competitiveness. The basic premise is important and simple: when joining a monetary area whose goal is to achieve a rate of inflation of just below 2%, changes in its unit production costs must be in line with this central bank objective. In all the countries that did not abide by this calculation and this discipline, year after year, there was a loss of competitiveness. The crux of the matter is that, as soon as countries were approved for euro area membership, they considered that they were protected simply because they belonged to a single currency area: as their fiscal or competitiveness gaps were no longer penalised by the markets that indiscriminately lent to all euro area Member States at the same rate. When doubts started to emerge, the markets reacted rapidly, violently and often excessively, although it must be said that real underlying problems existed. How the euro area sovereign debt crisis has been dealt with to date What have we done to tackle the urgent issues stemming from the crisis and to deal with the underlying problems?

The Riksbank’s forecasts are therefore based on the prices of forward contracts for oil, that is, the price of delivering oil in the future. This means that at the monetary policy meeting in July we were assuming a price for crude oil of USD 130-140 per barrel during the forecast period. Since April the oil price has fluctuated substantially. First it rose to USD 147 a barrel and since then it has fallen. At the beginning of this week the oil price was USD 113 a barrel. 2  BIS Review 100/2008  Food prices have also risen substantially in the world market, particularly over the past year. Rising incomes, urbanisation and changes in diet lead to an increase in the demand for food. As oil becomes more expensive it becomes profitable to use maize and other grains to produce biodiesel and biofuels. Furthermore, the production costs for foods are rising. Other factors such as supply shocks and speculation in future price changes also affect developments. Our assumption in June was that food prices would not continue to increase, but would stabilise at a high level. Since the beginning of July food prices have fallen. High international inflation and rising inflation expectations The upswing in commodity prices in recent years has in turn led to an increase in inflation around the world. In the United States it has risen to 5.6 per cent and in the euro area it rose to 4.0 per cent in July 2008. It has risen much more in several emerging economies.
15  Financial Services Authority (2009): “Strengthening Liquidity Standards”, Policy Statement 09/16, UK October. BIS Review 131/2009  15  House prices in Norway have risen sharply and probably excessively. We must take account of developments in equity prices and property prices when projecting inflation and output. Norges Bank’s interest rate setting does not rely solely on one simple rule. Instead, we seek to take account of all factors that influence inflation and output in the medium term, and the key policy rate is set on the basis of an overall assessment. Asset prices such as house prices, the exchange rate and credit growth therefore have a bearing on Norges Bank’s interest rate setting. A written formulation of Norges Bank’s monetary policy reaction function would be fairly comprehensive and include all the variables that are considered. However, a reaction function must not be confused with the monetary policy target – our target function. The fact that we give weight to variables such as the exchange rate, house prices and credit growth in interest rate setting does not imply that there are specific target for these variables. The operational target for monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. Interest rate setting in a small, open economy can be particularly challenging in periods of strong credit growth and a wide interest rate differential against other countries.

Financial literacy, the Cyprus perspective and the role of the Central Bank of Cyprus In December 2020, an ad-hoc Committee was established in Cyprus with the aim of formulating a National Strategy for the promotion of financial literacy and financial education in the country. The CBC has coordinated the work of the ad-hoc Committee, which consists of members from the CBC, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education, Sport and Youth, the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission and two academic experts from the two public universities in Cyprus. The Committee was also supported by a Secretariat from the CBC and external scientific collaborators, all of whom are here with us today. The formulation of the National Strategy drew heavily from the results of the CBC survey on financial literacy. A key finding of the survey was that the average financial knowledge score in Cyprus is below the minimum level considered by the OECD as sufficient for someone to be counted as financially literate. The results of the survey also indicate specific population groups, which are in greater need for financial education such as the young, the unemployed, women, low income and lower  2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  education citizens, and individuals who did not take economics courses during secondary education. They also indicate specific domains where lack of financial knowledge is evident, namely, interest compounding and diversification.
(X) “A million dollar question” has been asked at Forbes, about whether exchange rate stability can be maintained under such circumstances. The answer is: yes, given the current modalities, it can be maintained as long as we manage to repay our debts and as long as we can obtain new loans from abroad. In this respect, the current world situation is favourable, because free liquidity grows again and waits to be placed, credit supply goes up and buyers are sought for this money. A continuation of EU accession negotiations improves the political perception of Croatia as a debtor. Therefore, I have no doubts that the current search for a billion dollars, or euros or whatever, will be successful. This is a relief, but it also poses the most serious dangers to this country: the danger of inactivity, the danger of believing that we can go on functioning by following the established routine and the danger that we neither have learned, nor will learn enough from the crisis. It is often repeated that our problems are of a structural nature and that it takes time to carry out the necessary reforms. This statement is not unfounded. However, an old Chinese wisdom says: “Even the longest way starts with the first step.” The truth is that the first step is often the most difficult, and we have been putting it off for a long time. BIS Review 2/2010  3

In the area of monetary and banking policies, SAMA followed monetary policy aimed at achieving stability in the financial sector and providing the necessary liquidity to meet domestic demand for credit, by taking a package of proactive measures to enhance the liquidity position and reduce the cost of lending in order to ensure that banks continue their financing role in the development process in the Kingdom. The most prominent measures were: reducing the Statutory Reserve requirements ratio, the Repo and the Reverse Repo Rates several times, enhancing the liquidity position in the banking system by placing long term deposits in local currency and US Dollar with local banks on behalf of government institutions and organizations, reducing the pricing of treasury bills, facilitating foreign exchange swaps in order to provide the necessary liquidity in US Dollar for the local banking system. As for fiscal policy, the government continued the expansion in public expenditure and increasing the pumping of funds to specialized lending institutions by an estimated amount of Rls 40 billion during 2009. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, In spite of the adverse impacts of the successive financial crises, they clearly resulted in combining international efforts to review the global financial system and commence taking reforming measures to perform its role effectively and positively in the global economic activity and international external trade.
Chart 1 plots 4  the turnover share of the largest 100 UK businesses since 1998 (i.e. concentration ratio). This ticks up in the lead-up to the financial crisis, although this pick-up is more modest than in the US, from 20% to around 5  28%. Concentration has flattened-off in the period since the crisis, however, in line with other European countries. Turning to measures of concentration within the financial services industry, the international pattern is somewhat more uniform. Chart 2 plots the largest five banks’ share of total banking assets in the US, euro area and the UK. Levels of banking concentration started fairly high, averaging around 30%. They drifted further upwards in the run-up to the crisis, although this drift was again fairly modest. Since the crisis, however, measures of banking concentration have flat-lined and, in the UK, have fallen slightly. Concentration indices have their limitations, though, and need not always be associated with market power. Some firms may be able to exercise market power in setting prices even without having a large share of a market if, for example, there is brand loyalty. And in a world of differentiated products, concentration measures such as HHIs or concentration ratios no longer correlate closely with market power (Bresnahan (1989)). With non-homogenous goods and non-Cournot competition, a better measure of market power is often provided by firms’ mark-ups – the ratio of their price to their marginal cost (De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018)).

14  Within that, this rise in mark-ups among foreign relative to domestic sales-focussed firms is largest in the manufacturing and ICT sectors. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with a story of rising mark-ups being concentrated among internationally-operating firms, who perhaps benefit disproportionately from global network economies of scale and scope. These firms tend to occupy the fat and fattening upper tail of the mark-up distribution. These are firms that might legitimately be termed “superstars” (Autor et al (2017)). Given this diagnosis, what impact might the rise in mark-ups have had on the macro-economy? One aspect is what impact increased market power may have had on firms’ incentives to invest and innovate and hence on firms’ productivity. With investment and productivity each having under-performed over recent years, the relationship with market power has been subject to increased academic scrutiny recently (for example, Eggertsson, Robbins and Wold (2018)). The relationship between mark-ups and productivity is vital in understanding their macro-economic effects (Van Reenen (2018)). On the one hand, if highly productive ‘superstar’ firms, benefitting from network economies of scale and scope, have become more dominant, then higher mark-ups could be the side-effect of a positive supply shock in the economy. On the other hand, if mark-ups are the counterpart to increased market power and reduced competitive pressures, that would suggest a negative supply shock. These effects are not mutually exclusive. For example, Aghion et al (2005) develop a model which generates a concave relationship between competition and investment.
Page 11 of 18  18  19  20  21  Figure 5 Working-age population forecasts 19  19  2018  18  18  17  17  16  16  15  Millares  (million persons, 2002-2050)  15 2014  14  14  13  13  12  12  11  11 02  05  08  11  14  17  20  23  26  29  32  35  38  41  44  47  50  Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). Table 1 Trend GDP growth forecast (percent) Trend growth (*)  Contribution to non-mining GDP growth  Total GDP  Non-mining GDP  Mining GDP  TFP  Labor  Capital  3.4  3.5  2.0  1.0  0.9  1.7  2019-2028  (*) Weighted mining is 11.9% of total GDP. VAT and import duties are assumed to grow a the same rate than non-mining GDP. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Although each case is, in some sense, unique, and international experiences are not easily transferable, its analysis provides some useful background to understand the Chilean case. The first is to confirm the exceptional nature of the Chilean experience, due to its size and speed. In addition, given the factors that motivate migration— particularly from Venezuela—one can think that it will not be reversed any time soon. Secondly, recent immigration is characterized by an average population that is more qualified, younger and with a greater labor participation than the Chilean population. Third, relative to other countries, Chile poses fewer legal impediments to enter the labor market, and unlike other migratory cases, shares the language and other cultural aspects with a majority fraction of the immigrant population. To update our trend growth estimate, we use the population projections for the period 1992-2050, published by the National Statistics Institute (INE) at the end of 2018. These reflect the significant immigration flow observed since 2015, which is expected to continue to be important in the coming years (Figure 5). This affects the projection of the labor factor and, through it, the growth capacity of the economy. The other forecasting assumptions do not undergo major changes with respect to the fiscal year of 2017, except for the updating of the Quarterly National Accounts figures and an explicit modeling of the way in which capital and total factor productivity respond to the immigration-related increase in the labor factor.