samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the basis of theoretical analyses of what ought to determine a country’s use of a currency, together with information the Riksbank has obtained from interviews and surveys of Swedish firms and households, we have concluded that the introduction of the euro will not appreciably alter the role of the krona in the Swedish economy. The krona has important functions in Sweden’s economy, both as a means of payment and as a unit of account and a repository of value. The krona is already exposed to competition from other currencies. EMU can be seen as a continuation of this process. One indication of the competition is the very sharp increase in exchange market turnover. Since 1986 this turnover has grown by a factor of eight, whereas foreign trade and GDP have no more than doubled. Only 5 per cent of the exchange market turnover stems from transactions directly connected with foreign trade. In what respects, then, might the advent of the euro alter the position of the krona? What is the line of reasoning behind such a scenario? The discussion about a marginalisation of the krona has started from the view that Swedish export companies will choose to switch to euro in order to reduce the competitive disadvantage of being outside the euro area.

By providing another avenue for financing with the development of the corporate bond market, firms are able to improve their ability to balance debt and equity to better manage the degree of leverage while reducing the impact of shocks arising from over-dependence on any single form or source of financing. The development of corporate bond markets in the region has also enhanced the efficiency of capital allocation by providing an avenue for investing one of Asia’s hallmarks - its large reserve of savings arising from trade surpluses. By developing the regional bond markets, it would enable firms to tap alternative sources of financing at competitive cost thereby contributing to increased efficiency, higher investment and consequently to overall growth. The launch of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) in June 2003 marks the first significant step in regional financial co-operation and integration, and augurs well for the future development of the Asian regional bond market. The Asian Bond Market will not only serve to facilitate the re-investment of a portion of Asia’s reserves back into the region but what is equally important is that it allows for the efficient allocation of savings for productive investments and at the same time broadens and deepens the regional bond markets. In the process, the level of corporate governance in the region would be enhanced as well. Indeed, developing such an alternative source of financing would serve as a more resilient source of long-term financing with improved matching of the currency and maturity profiles of assets and liabilities.
However, I will in some cases refer directly to the situation in the Nordic countries, with regard to the advantages and also the challenges presented by the far-reaching integration of our financial systems. Introduction An IMF study published a few years ago indicated around 130 financial crises in a fifteen-year period during the 1980s and 1990s; some countries were afflicted more than once. As we all know, we have also had our share of crises in the Nordic countries. Denmark has managed better than the other countries – you had no acute systemic crisis, but a few incidents where individual banks suffered major losses. Many international studies point to the large costs linked to crises – costs to individuals, companies and society as a whole, both direct financial costs and indirect social costs. For example, the crisis in Indonesia cost around 60 per cent of the country's annual GDP. A World Bank study shows that poverty combating in this country was reversed by twenty years. The conclusion is, of course, that it is very important to prevent crises and to manage crises in a way that minimises damage. In my earlier work at the IMF, I was directly involved in crisis management in several countries, but also in the prevention work. My assessment is that many countries have made considerable efforts in recent years to reduce the vulnerability of their financial systems. At the same time, much remains to be done, not least to meet the constant changes in the financial world.

If one wishes to detect problems in good time, before they develop into a crisis, it is important that the public authorities within a country and those in different countries can coordinate and exchange information. There have been large inadequacies in this field in previous crises. This can to some extent be blamed on confidentiality regulations, and the relevance of these may be questioned during a crisis, but in all honesty it can also be blamed in many cases on the authorities having insufficient interest in collaborating. Tendencies in the financial sector The financial sector is subject to rapid development. The borders between different financial activities are being eroded. Banks are selling insurance-like products and insurance companies are selling banking products. In some cases financial conglomerations are being established. Moreover, the trade in financial instruments has developed to such an extent that the risks are spread to a greater number of agents than before and also spread outside of the banks and insurance companies. Another development is the cross-border integration, particularly in the Nordic countries. Danish banks have established themselves in Sweden and Swedish banks in Denmark. Integration as such is a positive development, for several reasons and not least to increase economic growth. The Riksbank therefore supports measures, for instance within the EU, that lead to greater integration. It is therefore important that the authorities manage the risks that integration might entail to avoid setbacks.
Not only its monetary policy, and not only in Germany. We will keep explaining to our critics in Germany – and also to German savers – that their country is one of the main beneficiaries of the euro. A stronger euro area, with inflation of below but close to 2%, would be good for Germany. As for the debate we may have from time to time with some academics in Germany, I would say there is a certain irony in them taking us to task because we are focusing on our inflation target, since it is at Germany’s insistence that the ECB was given that mandate – and that mandate only – in the euro’s founding treaties, and in my view rightly so. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Did the euro’s jump after your announcement on March 10 disappoint you? It doesn’t help your return-to-inflation goal… The ECB, as you know, doesn’t have a foreign exchange target. What I saw is that financial markets in general understood what we did, which is more important than the instant reaction of forex operators. The dollar/euro exchange rate is mostly driven by different monetary policies in the United States and Europe. What would be more worrisome for us would be a further decline of emerging countries’ currencies, and increased volatility of the pound sterling due to the EU referendum debate in the United Kingdom. Does the ECB have a plan for a possible “Brexit”?

This construction with companies that have invested in assets that are difficult to value and have a long duration and which have financed themselves in the short-term money market with a guarantee from the banks is a powder keg – and a powder keg where the powder has been piled up more quickly and to a greater extent than both the market and the authorities have been aware. The igniting spark came from the US mortgage market, but it could have come from other areas. 2  BIS Review 136/2007  Bad credits in the US mortgage market is the igniting spark In the United States the financial innovations have gone hand in hand with a rapid increase in loan volumes. As is the case in most of the world, it is mainly households’ mortgages that have increased. What distinguishes the United States in this respect is that a not insignificant portion of the mortgages have been taken by households with poor credit ratings. 1 These loans are called subprime loans. Although the subprime loans constitute a minority of the total mortgages, there are nevertheless significant sums involved. 2 It is worth pointing out here that of course it is not always wrong to grant loans for housing merely because the lenders cannot manage the banks’ normal, fairly tough criteria. But it is always necessary to carry out a proper credit assessment. And the lender should be paid for the higher risk through a correspondingly higher interest rate. None of this happened in the United States.
Problems may arise particularly for the elderly or for people with impaired mobility, but they may also arise for small businesses or for those who live in the countryside or who do not use the internet. Services should not be provided exclusively to people who use the internet regularly, or only those who live in Tallinn or Tartu. The advances in technology have led electronic payments and internet banking to become very popular, and this has reduced the need for cash and the need for people to actually go into a bank branch. This has been driven by both supply and demand. Surveys in Estonia show that bank cards are ever more popular as a means of payment, while internet banking is increasingly used for banking transactions, and this trend shows no sign of abating. This means that preferences of consumers themselves are changing, and bank customers need less and less to visit their local bank or to use cash. This is an inevitable consequence of technological progress, and it must be borne in mind throughout this debate. Demographic changes specifically means urbanisation, and urbanisation is happening here in Estonia too, amplifying the effect of developments in technology. It is inevitable that the decline in customer numbers will be reflected in falling demand, and that falling demand will lead to reduced supply. This applies equally to all forms of service provision, not just banking services.

While these banks have the skills and experience to do the job, even their resources are not inexhaustible. There may be a case to spread the role of lead bank more widely, or at least for banks to make a bigger contribution in steering committees. Steering committee members should strive to represent the interests of the bank group as a whole rather than their own interests. The representatives of banks on steering committees should also have the right level of knowledge and experience to understand the issues and to make a real contribution to driving the process along. They should also of course turn up to meetings in the first place. *  Fourth, banks need to be able to respond more quickly to restructuring proposals that are presented to them for approval. At present, it seems that the decision-making process can get bogged down in internal bureaucracies within banks, particularly when proposals have to be sent to head office for approval. While decisions are delayed, companies can bleed to death. *  Finally, and I realize that this is a contentious point, banks should be realistic and pragmatic about what they can expect to get out of restructuring. While they should obviously be trying to extract the best possible deal from the company and its shareholders, this should not be at the expense of jeopardizing the company’s future business viability. All this results in a process which is often more protracted than it need be.
4. Impact on the Bank of England objectives  So what does this analysis means for the achievement by the Bank of its statutory objectives? Let me begin with monetary policy. 9  For further discussion of these points, see Carney, M (2015), “Fortune favours the bold”, Speech at Iveagh House, Dublin, 28 January. 10  See Draghi, M (2015), “Stability and prosperity in monetary union”, 2 January. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  4.1  Monetary policy  Put simply, economies with sustainable dynamism can grow more quickly before running into excessive price pressures. The UK’s greater openness as a result of EU membership provides potential for both greater growth and shocks. The MPC naturally takes these into account when setting monetary policy for the UK. While they have posed challenges at times, the influence of EU membership on these dynamics does not prevent the MPC from achieving its price stability objective. Under inflation targeting the MPC has ultimate control over the UK’s nominal destiny, allowing the flexibility of the exchange rate and free capital flows to facilitate adjustment to global shocks. The precise path of that adjustment is a policy choice we are free to make, within the framework provided by our monetary policy remit.

Ensuring the Bank of England has the instruments necessary to achieve its financial stability objective will depend on the EU continuing to have regulations of the highest standards, which strike the appropriate balance between harmonisation and flexibility, and which accommodate necessary national responsibilities, including for supervision. 5. Principles of a new settlement for financial stability  A successful and sustainable Economic and Monetary Union is important for the dynamism and stability of both the euro area and the UK. Since the crisis, many euro-area economies have undergone difficult reforms to improve competitiveness. Adjustment mechanisms to address the underlying problems of the euro area have been built, including measures to create a Banking Union and the development of the European Stability Mechanism, a permanent crisis resolution facility for euro area countries. Although much has been accomplished, further financial and fiscal integration within the euro area will be necessary to put EMU on a more sustainable basis. In particular, closer financial integration requires increased risk sharing in the public and private sector. That risk sharing can be achieved by the development of the more complete Banking Union in the euro area and, more broadly, a Capital Markets Union for the EU. How financial regulation in the EU evolves in future will be critical to the resilience of both the euro area and the UK economy. Closer union between euro-area member states is likely to necessitate further harmonisation of financial regulation across the euro area. By extension, those regulations can affect the rest of the EU.
Lars Heikensten: The Riksbank and the euro Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the SEB's EMU seminar, Cirkus, Stockholm, 4 September 2003. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking the organisers for inviting me to speak at this event. The past few months have certainly been hectic for those of us working at the Riksbank. We are undoubtedly in the eye of the storm and feature almost daily in the EMU debate. Moreover, we are affected more directly and tangibly by the result of the referendum than most people. I can take my own diary as an example; if the result is a “yes” vote, I will be in Frankfurt for a day or two at least every other week, while if the result is a “no”, the visits will be reduced to a few hours four times a year. Given this, the temptation to jump into the debate head first has been strong at times. However, we have decided not to participate in any campaigns. The Riksbank as an institution took a stand in favour of EMU membership in the form of submission responses in both 1994 and 1997. However, the Executive Board has now decided to refrain from taking a stand in connection with the referendum. The personal views of the various members of the Executive Board have nevertheless been known for some time. Five of us are in favour, one against.

When it then became clear that we and the Brits intended to remain on one side, our colleagues quite simply decided to postpone a number of important issues where we had strong views, including the monetary policy framework with inflation targeting, transparency, etc. This also applied to various payment system issues, where our position was weaker on the outside. If we now say “no” to membership, if not for good but at least for the foreseeable future, the situation will worsen further, as I have described already. I think this would be very unfortunate. BIS Review 39/2003
(2020), “Do shareholders benefit from green bonds?” Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 61; Zaghini, A. (2020), “The Covid pandemic in the market: infected, immune and cured bonds” (2020), Covid Economics, Vetted and Real-Time Papers, Issue 50, CEPR Press. 42. At present, seven countries in the euro area issue green government bonds. In total, green debt (also including green bonds issued by suprananational institutions, regional bonds and agencies) currently only represents 1.4% of the ECB’s PSPP portfolio. This share is in line with its market capitalisation. 43. Forward-looking metrics, including measures of sovereign issuers’ alignment with the Paris Agreement, are still being developed for commercially available sustainability data. Furthermore, the  methodology for analysing and reporting the carbon impact of sovereign bonds is comparatively less advanced than for other types of fixed income instruments (including corporate bonds). Currently, data providers mostly follow a production-based approach. Under this approach, a country’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are aggregated based on a territorial definition of production. This definition solely considers where the emissions are originally generated, regardless of the final destination of goods and services. The production-based approach therefore ignores the impact of carbon leakage, whereby richer and highly regulated countries “export” GHG emissions to jurisdictions with less stringent regulation. 44. See NGFS (2021), op. cit. CONTACT  European Central Bank Directorate General Communications    Sonnemannstrasse 20     60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany    media@ecb.europa.eu  +49 69 1344 7455  Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.

The recent redesign of monetary instruments and the yesterday’s cut of reference CB bills interest rate from 4% to 3.75% are aimed towards conducting of policy at optimal level of reference interest rate. Allow me to elaborate. We were preparing the monetary instruments redesign for a longer time period, and made the actual redesign when we considered that the time was right. The economic activity decelerates because the euro area demand is lower and the credit growth rate is below expectations. Moreover, data on the foreign exchange market and foreign reserves and on the trade deficit in the first quarter indicate balance of payments deficit lower than projected. The inflation rate reduced to around 2%, as expected for this year’s average. The banks, instead of investing the household savings, that increase faster than expected, in lending, purchased CB bills, the amount of which increased by Denar 10 billion, i.e. one third in only three months, even though the capital adequacy and liquidity are at exceptionally high levels. The net external borrowing of the country decreased by Euro 220 million only in the last quarter of the last year, and by Euro 280 million, or by one fourth, over the entire last year. Finally, immediately prior to our decision to redesign the monetary instruments, the Ministry of Finance announced cut of budget expenses by 5%.
The appreciation of the krone and high wage growth led to a considerable deterioration in the competitiveness of Norwegian enterprises - and made imported consumer goods cheaper. Norges Bank has no set target for the level of the exchange rate. Developments in the krone exchange rate are nevertheless important in interest rate setting. The response to a change in the exchange rate will depend on its expected impact on inflation. This requires an evaluation of the reasons for and the duration of the change. Short-term fluctuations in the krone exchange rate tend to have very limited effects on economic developments, while long-lasting changes can have an impact. High wage growth over several years has eroded the competitiveness of the Norwegian business sector. Last year, the effects of high wage growth on export industries were amplified by the changes in the krone exchange rate. The krone has now reverted to around the level prevailing in the mid-1990s, while labour costs in manufacturing have increased by almost 15 per cent more than among our trading partners in the same period. The appreciation of the krone proved to be reversible, but the loss of competitiveness and jobs caused by relatively high domestic wage growth is difficult to recoup. A precondition for a considerable improvement in competitiveness is that real wage growth is lower than productivity growth in the business sector for a period. Experience shows that this only occurs in periods with low resource utilisation.

[19]Joined Cases T-131/16, Belgium v Commission and T-264/16, Magnetrol International v  Commission, judgment of the Court of 14 February 2019. [20]REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of  27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). [21]COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/2286 of 15 December 2016 laying  down detailed rules on the application of fair use policy and on the methodology for assessing the sustainability of the abolition of retail roaming surcharges and on the application to be submitted by a roaming provider for the purposes of that assessment. [22] 9 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  [22]DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/2366 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of  25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, [23]Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United  Kingdom. [24]OECD (2010), “Have equal-treatment laws improved job quality for part-time workers?”, Box  4.3., OECD Employment Outlook: Moving Beyond the Jobs Crisis. [25]Report of the Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions, Annuities, and Insurance,  1910. [26]DeWitt, L. (2010), “The development of social security in the United States”, Social Security  Bulletin, 70(3).