samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
•  And finally let me introduce Mrs Karen Gifford, Special Advisor for Global Regulatory Affairs for Ripple, and formerly an attorney in the private sector and at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Dear Karen, you have been a distinguished contributor to the Financial Stability Review and you will tell us about blockchain technology and its potential benefits. Thank you all for being with us today. Now I give the floor to our panelists. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

But fire services do not offer free insurance for people who smoke in bed or set fire to their own house, thereby encouraging them to take risks that endanger others. When it became clear that Northern Rock could not find funding elsewhere, it came to the tripartite authorities (FSA, Treasury and Bank) to seek financial support from the Bank of England. Rather than stabilise the situation, the actions of the authorities seemed, at least initially, to fan the flames. There are lessons for us to learn. And I will come to those in a minute. But let me return to the queues of depositors. Here is an extract from a local newspaper: “By noon on Friday, more than 40 … customers … were waiting in line at the branch … waiting upward of an hour and a half to withdraw money from their accounts.” “Anxious depositors clutching withdrawal slips filled the offices for a second straight day. … The company placed extra chairs in a waiting area and asked customers to write their names on a sign-in sheet.” This wasn’t Newcastle or London. It was Los Angeles on August 17 and 18. The bank experiencing the run was not Northern Rock but Countrywide, a US mortgage bank. It is a Tale of Two Banks – banks of similar sizes and facing similar difficulties with funding – just a few weeks apart. Like Northern Rock, Countrywide took risks and relied on short-term funding from investors. But the similarity ends there. There were two significant differences.
We are doing more work to isolate the impact of these factors as part of the ongoing cost-benefits analysis underlying these tools. Putting all of this together, I would conclude that the rationale for the FPC’s action remains sound in the light of subsequent evidence and that the action itself was effective at preventing further build up in the tail of more indebted households, and more importantly that it continues to function as an insurance policy. More work is in train to assess whether the FPC’s actions may have affected the evolution of house prices and transactions but even if we assume there was no broader impact of this kind, the work published by the Bank today suggests strongly that the policies have functioned as intended. They have restrained the buildup of more highly indebted households that would otherwise leave the economy and subsequently the financial system more vulnerable in a downturn. There are two interesting postscripts to the FPC’s 2014 actions. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  12  First, the Committee when it took its decisions left open the possibility that these tools – LTI flow limit and affordability test – might be part of the time varying macro-prudential toolkit. Subsequent consideration by the Committee in 2017, concluded that while the calibration might need to be varied over time, the limits themselves functioned as necessary insurance and should be seen as part of the regulatory system rather than as temporary measures.

Well, by the next day, the markets had figured it out; the projections are made by all FOMC participants, while the statement reflects the policy views agreed upon at the meeting by the voting members of the Committee. We all come into the meeting with our projections, but we then do have a real meeting: All of the participants exchange ideas and argue points of views, and then the voters on the Committee come to a consensus and make a collective policy decision. The information regarding the federal funds rate in the SEP does not substitute for this formal decision of the voting members of the FOMC. That said, the diversity of views is a fact of life. Policymakers may well have differing judgments on the appropriate stance of monetary policy in the particular economic circumstances of the moment. These communications initiatives cannot eliminate these differences of opinion. But they further discipline the parameters of our discussions, clarify the judgments that underlie our policy decisions and enhance transparency and the public’s ability to evaluate current monetary policy with alternative approaches. Forward guidance and policy commitment in an explicit state-contingent policy The macroeconomic environment The new policy tools can also complement the kinds of accommodative policies I have been advocating for some time. The U.S. is now more than two and a half years into its modest and uneven recovery from the Great Recession. Real gross domestic product growth has averaged just 2-1/2 percent.
As I have previously stated, against the background of the drawn-out recovery and the weak labour market, we at the Riksbank expect a wage increase rate for 2010–2012 of approximately 2.5 per cent per year, lower at the start and higher towards the end of the period. This is a very low rate of increase, historically. Our forecast will no doubt be considered to be too high by many on the employer side and, likewise, too low for many on the union side. The wage development we expect is consistent with an underlying inflation rate reaching 2 per cent by the end of the forecast period. All other factors being equal, higher wage increases in this situation tend to lead to higher inflation, higher interest rates and a weaker development of production and employment. Similarly, lower wage increases tend to lead to lower inflation, an ability to maintain low interest rates for a longer period of time and a stronger development of production and employment. 6  BIS Review 11/2010  One factor that will undoubtedly play a major role in the approaching rounds of wage bargaining is the division of the Swedish economy. The differences in the ability of various industries and companies to bear a certain rate of wage increases are currently unusually great. The development of wages along similar lines in different parts of the economy would lead to smaller pay differences, but also to a faster transformation of the economy.

Svante Öberg: The financial crisis and wage formation Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the National Mediation Office, Stockholm, 29 January 2010. * * * Why is the Riksbank interested in wage formation? Wage formation and monetary policy are interrelated. The development of wages affects inflation and inflation affects the development of wages. The target for monetary policy is to maintain a low and stable level of inflation. This job is made easier if wage formation works well. Consequently, it is important for the Riksbank to follow this year’s comprehensive wage bargaining rounds. I will not make any recommendations to the social partners regarding the outcome of this year’s collective bargaining. Instead, I will describe the economic setting for this collective bargaining. This may seem to be an extremely subtle distinction, but it is an important one, nevertheless. We make no normative pronouncements regarding which rate of wage increase may be most appropriate. However, considering the drawn-out recovery and the weak labour market, the scope for wage increases seems to be highly restricted. I would also like to make two points during this introduction. Firstly: I will not be reporting any new view of economic developments beyond that presented in the monetary policy update of 16 December, although a few figures will be updated with the latest statistics. Secondly: The assessments and valuations I make here are not necessarily shared by all of my colleagues on the Executive Board of the Riksbank.
I have three key messages on GMS connectivity to share with you today and would like to invite you to be a part of this exciting journey: Let’s think of the young vibrant graduate I mentioned, there is so much potential and opportunity she can explore. She can broaden her skills and horizon as she gains experience and professional networks over time. She will unavoidably face some challenges along the way. But with support from her peers, together with technological advancement, she will be able to stay on course for success. This is similar for our vibrant GMS. First: The GMS is a region full of opportunities. This is owing to its geography, complementarity and connectivity among its members and with other regions; Second: GMS’s endowments and opportunities can be expanded through enhancing financial connectivity, technology and innovation; and Third: Despite many challenges, policymakers and their private-sector partners can make a difference to the GMS region. ***  1  1. Why do I say that the GMS is a region of opportunities? Over the past 25 years, integration within the GMS has deepened, integrating a diverse group of members through physical, trade, investment as well as people-to-people connectivity. Even more remarkable is the recent growth momentum of the GMS.

The percentage of financially constrained but viable SMEs – defined as those with positive turnover in the last six months seeking a bank loan – was estimated to have varied from around 1% in Germany and Austria to a quarter of the SME population in Spain and as much as a third in Portugal. The second part of our response has therefore been to improve the transmission of loose market financing conditions into the actual borrowing conditions of firms and households. In this context, between June and September last year we launched our credit easing package to strengthen banks’ incentives to improve the availability and lower the price of credit. In parallel, we gave our full technical and operational support to the Comprehensive  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Assessment of bank balance sheets – the supervisory exercise aimed at forcing banks to acknowledge non-performing exposures and to raise provisions and capital where needed. This exercise was powerful in the sense that it accelerated what had until that point been a slow process of balance sheet repair in the euro area; banks strengthened their capital by over € billion in advance of the outcome. In this way the new monetary policy impulse coming from our credit easing package coincided with a banking sector in a stronger position to transmit it. But as these measures were coming into effect the euro area was hit, like all advanced economies, with a further downward shock to inflation emanating from the steep fall in global oil prices.
Of course that leverage needs to be well managed. The rise in yields in late September – 130 basis points in the 30-year nominal yield in just a few days – caused a significant fall in the net asset value of these leveraged LDI funds, meaning their leverage increased significantly. And that created a need urgently to delever to prevent insolvency and to meet increasing margin calls. The funds held liquidity buffers for this purpose. But as those liquidity buffers were exhausted, the funds needed either to sell gilts into an illiquid market or to ask their DB pension scheme investors to provide additional cash to rebalance the fund. Since persistently higher interest rates would in fact boost the funding position of DB pension schemes[1], they generally had the incentive to provide funds. But their resources could take time to mobilise. The issue was particularly acute for one small corner of the LDI industry – pooled funds. In these funds, which make up around 10-15% of the LDI market, a pot of assets is managed for a large number of pension fund clients who have limited liability in the face of losses. The speed and scale of the moves in yields far outpaced the ability of the large number of pooled funds’ smaller investors to provide new funds who were typically given a week, in some cases two, to rebalance their positions. Limited liability also meant that these pooled fund investors might choose not to provide support.

Gent Sejko: Overview of Albania’s latest monetary and economic developments and outlook Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 4 March 2015. *  *  *  Today, on the 4 of March 2015, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania reviewed and approved the Interim Monetary Policy Report. After scrutinising the current and expected performance of inflation and other economic indicators, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged at 2.0%. *** The domestic and external economic environment has generated low inflationary pressures. According to INSTAT data, annual inflation was 1.3% in January, up from the rate registered in December. Inflation fluctuations in the last two months have been determined mainly by the volatility in food prices. The fall in food inflation in December and its rise in January were driven by developments in international markets and the performance of domestic production. In parallel, the decline in oil prices has generated downward pressure on inflation. Prices of other consumer goods’ categories did not display any significant change. The rise in inflation in January was in line with our projections; however, the rate of inflation remains below Bank of Albania’s target. The Bank of Albania evaluates that inflationary pressures will increase gradually and inflation will return to target within the medium term.
These may lead to significant changes in trade relations between countries in the coming years. On the other hand, the uneven impact of the crisis across different sectors, types of business and population groups is becoming visible in this phase. As the crisis continues, some of the damage may become permanent. In this respect, despite the wide range of measures adopted, there has already been a very significant drop in the number of firms 15  registered for Social Security. Specifically, almost 84,000 fewer firms were registered for Social Security at the end of September, compared with the end of February, a year-onyear decline of 6.1% in September.4 It is very likely that Q3 data will also show an increase in long-term unemployment. And, as I have already mentioned, the crisis is affecting workers on low wages and with more fragile finances more severely, which may increase inequality. We can also expect the public sector and part of the private sector to emerge from this crisis with significantly higher levels of debt. It is crucial that these changes and this structural damage are identified promptly and that their implications for the economy as a whole, as well as for specific sectors, firms and segments of the population are understood. Economic policy cannot indefinitely sustain a sector that is set to undergo a structural reduction in its level of activity.

In annual average terms, the unemployment rate is expected to rise significantly this year (to 17.1% of the labour force under the first scenario and to 18.6% under the second) and also in 2021, before starting to descend in 2022 (when, in annual average terms, it would stand at 18.2% and 20.2% under the respective scenarios). Both scenarios forecast inflation to hold at a moderate pace over the projection horizon. Core inflation has slowed notably in recent months as a result of the weakness of demand stemming from the pandemic. Looking ahead, the persistence of a high degree of cyclical slack will mean inflation in non-energy industrial goods and in services will continue to run at relatively low - though growing - rates until end-2022. The risks underlying the scenarios for economic activity published by the Bank remain tilted to the downside. And more unfavourable developments than those contained in the second scenario, i.e. the harsher of the two considered, cannot be ruled out. In particular, in light of the recent course of the pandemic, we cannot preclude the resort to more severe lockdown measures than those envisaged in the scenarios. Moreover, there is much uncertainty over how long will be needed before we have an effective medical treatment, and there are some risks that it will be delayed beyond mid-2021. Lastly, uncertainty remains on the external front, especially concerning the possibility of the Brexit negotiations concluding without an agreement at the end of the transition period or of US-China trade tensions worsening.
Moreover, the 2004‐2007 period was one of prosperity and stability across the developing world. Of course, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 derailed everything, but it is difficult to argue that it was the consequence of the hiking cycle of the mid 2000s. If anything, it might have been the consequence of the lack of a timely normalization. Hence, although there are many common features in the 1994 and 2004 cycles, the consequences were very different. What I want to do in this talk is to identify a few features that help us reflect why this was the case. I think this is useful to extract some lessons for the current process of monetary policy normalization in the US. 1994‐2004 normalization Cycles As a starting point, it is important to notice that the 1994 and 2004 episodes are comparable for two reasons. First, the Federal Reserve started hiking in a context of inflation above 2% and the unemployment rate around 6%. This is of course a simplified characterization of the business cycle, but it offers a good base for comparison. Beyond that, the monetary policy adjustment in the United States looks quite similar in both cases. Not only is the size and speed of the hikes in Fed Funds’ rate comparable.

The increasing relevance of China in the world economy and in world trade following its accession into the WTO, generated a booming effect in commodity markets and world demand that more than compensated the negative effect of increases in world interest rates, giving important support for the balance of payment, fiscal accounts and the investment outlook in emerging economies. We are now at the early stages of a new and historical tightening cycle in the United States. It is reasonable to ask ourselves how comparable the current situation is relative to previous experiences. I want to make a few points here. We expect the Fed to move more gradually than on previous occasions  Why? First, the Fed prefers to err on the side of moving slowly, and markets expect so. In part, as seen in Figure 3, inflation measured as the PCE core is still low compared to its level on previous hiking cycles. Also, neutral rates are estimated to be very low this time, so the Fed considers that monetary policy is not as expansionary as the headline Fed Funds Rate suggests.  Besides, the Federal Reserve is very much aware of the financial stability risks of abrupt changes in rates. The term premium implicit in long term yields is very low, and the taper Tandrum episode of 2013 shows that it can change fast if markets misinterpret the Fed communication.
Exports and domestic private sector spending therefore make up over 90% of the demand for the output of the business sector in the UK with public sector procurement and capital spending accounting for less than 10% of the total. So while the global economy continues to perform strongly and as long as private sector demand is still growing at a reasonable rate, UK plc should be well-placed to cope with the squeeze on public spending flowing from the October Spending Review (OSR). Alongside the recovery in overseas markets, domestic demand in the UK economy has also bounced back following the sharp declines seen in late 2008 and early 2009. In cash terms, domestic spending in the UK economy by consumers, government and business grew by 6.8% in the year to the second quarter of 2010. As I pointed out in a speech last month, this is relatively strong demand growth by comparison with the decade prior to the financial crisis, when the growth of domestic demand in money terms averaged 5.8%. 3 These data do not suggest that lack of demand is the main problem currently facing the private sector in the UK. We may see some slowdown in demand early next year as the fiscal measures announced in the Budget and the spending review take effect and consumers adjust to a higher rate of VAT. But this variability in the growth rate should not be confused with a genuine double dip which is still a remote possibility in my view.

12 For example, the most reliable measure of capacity utilisation in manufacturing – the CBI Industrial Trends Survey – shows capacity utilisation at around its average level, which is quite surprising at this stage of the recovery. There is more survey evidence of spare capacity in the services sector. But this does not seem to be exerting much downward pressure on inflation. The CPI measure of services price inflation has picked up from 2.4% at the end of last year to average around 3.8% in recent months. This is considerably in excess of the 2% target and also slightly above the average rate of services price inflation we experienced during the decade prior to the financial crisis, as Chart 7 shows. This does not appear consistent with the view that spare capacity in the UK services sector is serving to hold down inflation. With the economy recovering at home and abroad, inflation above target and set to rise further, I believe there are three powerful arguments for a gradual rise in interest rates which have been evident for several months. First, the main elements of demand for UK businesses – overseas markets and domestic private sector spending – have been recovering for over a year now and look set to continue to grow. The outlook for growth suggests the UK economy should be able to withstand a gradual rise in interest rates, even taking into account the impact of fiscal consolidation.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Financial sector talent enrichment programme – syllabus enhancement Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the launch of the “Financial Sector Talent Enrichment Programme (FSTEP) – Syllabus Enhancement”, Kuala Lumpur, 20 July 2010. *  *  *  I am delighted to be here this morning to officiate the launching of the Financial Sector Talent Enrichment Programme – Syllabus Enhancement which will be implemented for the next 5 batches until batch 10. Today marks a milestone for FSTEP as the programme has delivered more than 680 graduates to the industry and is now poised to deliver another 500 graduates under an enhanced syllabus. The development of human capital in the financial services industry is core in promoting a well-functioning and stable financial sector. Human capital development is critical in nation building as a whole. At Bank Negara Malaysia, for many years, we have embarked on strategies to strengthen human capital development in the financial services sector. Various institutional platforms were established such as INCEIF, the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance; ICLIF, the International Centre for Leadership in Finance; AIF, the Asian Institute of Finance; and of course, FSTEP, which is entrusted with equipping talents with the right skills and knowledge for their smooth transition into the financial services industry in Malaysia. It is such initiatives that would put the necessary foundation to promote Malaysia as a centre of learning for financial services this region.

In particular, FSTEP will offer scholarships to eligible top graduates from various universities to participate in its one-year fast-track training programme. I wish to congratulate FSTEP for the successful effort in designing a new syllabus and it continuous effort to improve the FSTEP programmes remain contemporary and relevant agreed to by all parties within the financial services industry. More importantly, it is my hope that FSTEP will continue to produce the quality of graduates that will meet the needs of the industry. I hope that all of you will have a fruitful discussion and dialogue. On this note, I declare open the event “FSTEP: Syllabus Enhancement”. 2  BIS Review 100/2010