samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And do so together: the German Federal President warned last month, “Germany cannot emerge from the crisis strong and healthy if [its] neighbours do not also become strong and healthy” i. Of course the same applies to, say, the Netherlands or Austria: selfishness today could come at a high price tomorrow. And let me stress the utmost importance of Chancellor Merkel’s words precisely just yesterday: “This will encourage us to do more in the area of economic policy, in order to further integration of the euro area. We will address this issue in connection with what we call the Recovery Fund for Europe”. A. Our common goals: recovery and repair 1/Supporting growth in the recovery phase is a shared objective for all of us in Europe. There is indeed no magic bullet, and – at the end of the day – the debt inherited from the crisis will need to be financed through growth and through our work. As pointed out by my colleague and friend Governor Ignazio Visco, “adequate investment in education is […] needed to face the uncertainty that surrounds the jobs and the skills that will matter in the future” ii. Yet, in the face of such enormous upheaval such as the Covid-crisis, investment at the national level will inevitably reach its limit.

Facing the deep European Investment and growth gap, we need to implement major European investment programmes to bridge that gap while tackling common structural priorities such as the fight against climate change which must absolutely not become a collateral victim of the crisis, or digitalisation which will be even more than before the key driver of future productivity. 2/ Preserving the single market while “repairing” firms is our second common goal in the recovery phase. National governments did well in the acute phase, by taking emergency measures such as providing guarantees and liquidity support to their SMEs. But, as these measures will have to be prolonged and transformed into long-term solvency measures, national differences could create an “unlevel playing field“. A single market – which is in the interest of all Member States, starting with Germany – means common rules for corporates:  Page 7 sur 10 if not, our economies risk further divergence and that would be very unfortunate. The solvency of European business is our shared challenge, and calls for shared solutions. Focusing on these two objectives is more important than arguing about public debt. But let me, for the sake of consistency, propose two basic principles: Existing debts are and will remain the responsibility of national governments. Let us stop this fruitless debate about Eurobonds and the mutualisation of past debt. Fiscal consolidation will remain a national obligation – including in France –, but with appropriate timing in order to avoid the premature and procyclical tightening of public finances.
In this regard, to my opinion, CESEE may feel some stress impact during the process of reforms implementation which will come most likely from: –  deleveraging, in terms of lower “parent” support for liquidity and lending to local economy;  –  cross-jurisdictions similarity in economic and financial cyclicality;  –  cross-border cooperation in supervision;  –  possible capital movements and impact on exchange rate;  –  political process as, in SEE, the EU integration process is determinant;  Nevertheless, there is no option on “holding back” from the reforms for a long time, given the unstoppable process of financial integration and globalization. Hence, an early start of a pacing approach to financial regulatory reform is appropriate. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In the last part of my speech I would like to stop by on the impact on Albania’s financial sector and economy and possible ways to avoid/mitigate negative externalities. The features of our financial system are similar to those of other CESEEs. In fact: –  in Albania, the banking sector dominates the financial system;  –  banking activity is concentrated and controlled by foreign banks (87% of the assets);  –  in total there are 16 banks and the 4 biggest ones possess 68% of total assets. –  home countries are: Austria (1 bank), Greece (3), France (2), Italy (2), Turkey (1), Bulgaria (1).

Even though budget adjustments may curb economic growth in the immediate future, they will help ensure the sustainability of public finances and lower the risk premia of sovereign bonds. We must reverse the growth in debt burden and establish a framework which would support market confidence in the sustainability of public finance management in euro area countries. This is the common interest of all euro area Member States. 3. Alongside crisis management measures, we must lay emphasis on ensuring stability in the long perspective. To ensure an outlook for growth, we must implement structural reforms to enhance economic flexibility, competitiveness and employment. 4. The key task of the Eurosystem central banks, including Eesti Pank, is to ensure general price stability in the euro area. This should be the principle goal of monetary policy and the main mission of the central bank in its efforts to facilitate economic growth and create jobs. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  [CONCERNING ESTONIA] 1. Unlike several other euro area countries, Estonia had no need to engage in local crisis management in 2011. 2. The Estonian economy showed notable adjustment ability against the backdrop of the uncertain environment. Our annual economic growth (7.6%) was the fastest in the euro area. Moreover, the economic developments were far more balanced than before the crisis: the current account was in a moderate surplus and domestic price pressures remained subdued.
But any discomfort I feel in that regard of course pales in comparison with the challenges facing those most directly exposed to the current cost of living crisis. We recognise the hardship associated with elevated inflation rates. For those who spend a higher proportion of their income on energy and food – unfortunately, a group particularly numerous among the less well off – recent price rises have imposed a significant squeeze on their real incomes. These are difficult times for many people. Our current experience is therefore a salutary reminder of the importance of price stability – what makes the MPC remaining ‘in the price stability business’ so crucial. It is essential we bring inflation back down to target, so as to reduce the uncertainties facing households and allow firms to plan for the future. Achieving price stability serves as an anchor for wider macroeconomic stability and prosperity. Page 4  The institutional framework for monetary policy – an independent central bank held to account for its pursuit of an explicit inflation target – is in place. For the first time in its twenty-five year history, that framework is being put to the test in an inflationary global environment. We have to meet that test successfully. Acting to achieve the 2% inflation target is now more important than ever. In the MPC, we have both the tools we need and the resolve it will take to restore price stability. Even in the face of current challenges, I am confident that we will succeed.

One is its impact on and implications for the conduct of financial and commercial business here, essentially at the micro level. The other relates to some macroeconomic policy aspects of the euro’s birth, which are also relevant to Hong Kong despite our being some 10,000 kilometres distant. Consequences for financial markets and trade As one would have expected, the wholesale financial markets switched quite rapidly to quoting and dealing mostly in euros instead of the constituent currencies, and many businesses also chose quickly to redenominate their relevant accounts, although a significant number have not yet done so. The choice is largely one of practicality and economy, rather than of economic significance, given that, formally, the parent currencies are now no more than subdenominations of the euro; one might therefore expect people to opt quite quickly for the convenience of a unified denomination rather than to continue operating with up to eleven separate ones. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the euro is trading in foreign exchange markets just as one would expect a major international currency to trade - that is, with good liquidity and fine spreads. However, total turnover is less than that for the predecessor currencies taken together; indeed one would be disturbed if that were not the case, since the rationale for cross trades and arbitrage between the former currencies has evaporated. That is why in most financial centres - and Hong Kong is no exception - dealing rooms have been slimmed down.
Paul Tucker: A new regulatory relationship – the Bank, the financial system and the wider economy Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at the Institute for Government, London, 28 May 2013. *  *  *  Thank you very much for inviting me here today. For someone who has spent pretty much the whole of my professional life in public service, it comes as something of a relief that the UK has an independent institute dedicated to analysing, monitoring and assessing the workings of government. And, as a central banker during a period in which the role of central banks around the world is once again being reshaped in the wake of the financial crisis, I am very glad to be part of your series on the changing relationship between the State and business. Frankly, it has been impossible not to reflect on precisely that issue as the reforms of the Bank of England have proceeded. I shall confine what I say this evening to brief remarks under three headings: •  The supervision of the safety and soundness of banks, and the place of rules and discretion in that  •  Expectations of what the central bank can and should achieve as a macro policymaker, and how society can monitor that role  •  How the central bank’s relationship with the business community plays out in a wider international, indeed global, setting.

•  There is a growing cluster of Chinese asset managers that are keen to set up in Singapore, attracted by our pan-Asian focus and broad base of international investors. •  They cover a broad spectrum of investments, ranging from traditional asset managers to hedge funds to private equity funds. Conclusion Let me conclude. The biggest story for Asia in the last three decades has been the rise of China. Asia’s biggest story in the next three decades will be the transformation of China. It will not be an easy transition, as China deals with the challenges of debt, deflation, and demographics. There will be dislocations and bouts of volatility along the way, with spillovers into Asia. But if China successfully addresses its vulnerabilities and restructures its economy, it will pave the way for more sustained growth and a more advanced economy. The new China that will emerge will open up new opportunities for Asian economies. The RMB will become more international and Chinese corporates and financial institutions more global. Singapore is well-positioned to partner Chinese companies in their regional journey and deepen China’s connectivity to Asia through trade and investment. The next chapter of ChinaSingapore financial partnership will be exciting and rewarding. I wish you fruitful discussions and a pleasant stay in Singapore. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
For example, it appears easier for companies to fund themselves directly in the markets. When will the central banks and government phase out their support measures? The extensive measures taken by governments and central banks around the world to counteract the effects of the crisis have contributed strong economic stimulation. But in many countries some of the measures, however necessary they may have been, have led to much poorer government finances. In countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Greece and the United States public finances are under great strain, for various reasons. This means, for instance, that there is a risk that the long-term interest rates in these countries will rise quickly, which to some extent has already happened. This in turn can hamper the economic recovery. Sooner or later it is also necessary to do something about the budget deficits. This is a cause for concern and we are expecting that such measures will hold back GDP growth abroad somewhat at the end of the forecast period. Most central banks which have managed the more acute phase of the crisis with the aid of various support measures and very low interest rates, are now in a phase where it is time to think about exit strategies and to return to more normal interest rate levels. At present the Riksbank is lending almost SEK 370 billion to the banks, and around SEK 295 billion of this  BIS Review 25/2010  3  is in fixed-rate loans.

We decided to target the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It is an indicator easily followed by all economic agents and is an effective way of accurately measuring the cost of daily life. However, we also announced that because the CPI is affected easily by several disturbances that are not under the control of monetary policy, several core inflation indicators will also be monitored closely. We set the inflation target as a “point target” and at the same time, we set a three-year time horizon for year-end targets. The year-end targets for 2006, 2007 and 2008 are 5 percent, 4 percent and 4 percent, respectively. Bearing in mind the transition from 2006 onwards to a three-year government  4  BIS Review 19/2006  budget practice, the announcement of a three-year target path is expected to increase the internal consistency of inflation targets and their harmony with other macroeconomic projections. We defined plus and minus two-percentage points around the target as an uncertainty interval. We thought that measured by a comprehensive index such as the CPI on one side and data and model uncertainty in the economy on the other side, it is not possible for the Central Bank of Turkey to ensure that inflation will not deviate more or less from the point targets.
Moreover, not everyone has a floating exchange rate and an inflation target, and countries that try to prevent adjustment of their real exchange rates have exacerbated the problem of spillover effects. Businesses in every country are conscious of how quickly their plans can be disrupted by unpredictable swings in exchange rates, asset prices and commodity prices. When those spillovers are sufficiently large and widespread, countries will want to engage with each other in a multilateral setting to discuss how they should be resolved. (b)  What commitments are needed? Before the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the specific commitments made by countries to each other were very clear: fixed exchange rates and capital controls. In the wake of the collapse of Bretton Woods, the members of the IMF attempted to re-define their commitments. But the exercise of defining what practical commitments were needed focussed primarily on exchange rates and had rather little effect in practice. Two broad commitments are particularly important. First, countries should make public commitments about their targets for macroeconomic policies – fiscal, monetary and financial. That still allows countries considerable discretion in their choice of policy framework – for example, whether to adopt a fixed or floating exchange rate. Second, policy frameworks must be consistent across countries. Policies which try to prevent changes in real exchange rates in response to changes in fundamentals, or lead to an unsustainable build-up of external debt, are properly the concern of the international community. (c)  What tools are needed?

Exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro area has declined, while it would continue to exist vis-à-vis the US dollar even after integration. The as yet more flexible labour market ushered in by the transition period II of the Bilateral Agreements I is the flagship of Swiss economic policy. It keeps unemployment and the resultant national costs low in the long term and strengthens the incentives for individual performance. It is essential to translate openness and flexibility, also with respect to internal structural reforms and external relations, into autonomously implemented reforms and a practical global orientation. BIS Review 49/2004  1
But there are also potential indirect benefits for their national economies: establishing a ‘green risk free curve’ for private issuers to use as a benchmark for green pricing; setting conventions for issuance, including definitions of acceptably green projects or climate goals; providing assets for hedging and collateralising borrowing; and encouraging the development of climate finance expertise in the local financial services community, driving wider product innovation. The issuance of corporate green bonds in the Netherlands, for example, picked up materially after the Dutch government issued a SGB in 2018 (Chart 13). Building block 3: asset allocation strategies However rapid the progress in climate-related disclosures and financing vehicles on the issuer side of the equation, it has been totally eclipsed by the explosion in interest on the investor side. Gripped by an increasing awareness of the scale of the climate challenge, and the impact of past and expected future policy change, investors are demanding, ever more loudly, that those in charge of their savings demonstrate that they can measure, and direct, their investments in ways that are sensitive to the climate impact of those flows. Asset managers have launched an ever-increasing range of ‘climate aware’ funds in recent years (Chart 14), and invested heavily in internal expertise, building systems, and hiring in specialists (or buying their firms outright).36 The consequent shift in assets under management towards funds with higher sustainability ratings, and away from those with lower ratings, is striking (Chart 15).

This analysis draws out an interesting interaction between the quality of climate disclosures, the structure of the asset management industry and the scope for rapid growth in the role of capital markets in climate investment. Poor disclosures force investors either to form crude portfolios – which cannot send particular finely graduated price signals – or to seek active management – which, being costly, is not available to all. Neither is ideal. It is only when disclosures have reached true maturity that the full panoply of modern asset allocation techniques can be brought to bear. That underscores just how vital it is to make progress on disclosures. There are as yet few comprehensive studies of the relative performance of current strategies. Indeed, there is a genuine question about how such performance should be measured, given that one motivation for investing in climate-based funds is the desire to generate a measurable beneficial environmental impact alongside a financial return – so-called ‘impact investing’. There has been a long and lively debate about whether achieving this requires a willingness to sacrifice financial gain. Some funds explicitly recognise this possibility in their construction, for example granting explicit concessionary rates to climate-positive projects. But others dispute the existence of such a tradeoff, noting the range of non-financial tools such as investor engagement that can act as ways to achieve impact.
The behaviour of prices in the euro area is also a cause for concern. Against a fragile macroeconomic background, as at present, very low inflation rates entail a danger that consumer and business expectations will stand excessively below the ECB’s medium- term price stability objective of 2% for the euro area as a whole. Contrary to the downside risks surrounding the growth projections for the international economy as a whole, those for inflation are more mixed and have given rise to different responses by various central banks. The US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have begun to withdraw some of the exceptionally expansionary non-conventional measures they introduced at the height of the crisis. Conversely, the European Central Bank has gone in the opposite direction, deepening the expansionary stance of its monetary policy. The euro area monetary policy stance has taken the form of a series of measures adopted, in the main, at the June and September meetings of the ECB Governing Council, where conventional action has been combined with other exceptional and non-conventional measures. Among the conventional measures, official interest rates have once again been cut. The main refinancing operations rate currently stands at an all-time historical and technical low of 0.05%. The deposit facility rate moved into negative territory in June and was further lowered in September to –0.20%, thus increasing the cost for banks of holding immobilised surplus liquid balances in their accounts with the Eurosystem.

John C Williams: Building an equitable future Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Inequality Policy Forum: The Impacts of COVID-19 on Communities of Color and Policy Insights for an Equitable Economic Recovery, 24 September 2020. * * * Hello everyone, and welcome to the New York Fed’s third Economic Inequality Policy Forum. It’s a pleasure to speak with all of you who are joining us for this conversation. For me, today’s event is about sharing research and hearing your recommendations, so I’m going to keep my opening remarks brief. Before I continue, let me give the disclaimer that the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, we’ve seen severe economic pain, unprecedented levels of unemployment, and enormous uncertainty about the future. The health and economic effects of COVID-19 have created tremendous hardship for many Americans across the country, but they have been especially painful for communities of color. We know that people of color and Black people in particular have experienced higher rates of illness and death.