samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Gradually, people came to realize that, if this was an intervention, it was a very limited, one-off intervention designed to keep the markets free from disruptive and ultimately destructive forces, and to prevent a possible systemic collapse. The operation was perhaps more readily understood in Hong Kong, where people welcomed the speedy return of stability and reason to the markets, and where the additional interest rate volatility imposed on the community by unbridled speculation quickly became a thing of the past: it has to be recognized that this was a community already patiently enduring a painful economic adjustment, and that the additional pain inflicted by what amounted to a gross abuse of the system was weighing heavily on their patience and confidence. More recently, and despite the edict from the Heritage Foundation that we should mend our ways or surrender our position as the world’s freest economy, international opinion has arrived at a better understanding of our motivations. The success of the operation has, I think, helped. But so too has the growing realization of the magnitude of the challenge we faced. Since August, further problems with heavily leveraged, volatile fund flows have arisen elsewhere in the world. The LTCM crisis suggested that even the largest economies and their financial systems were at risk. World leaders have unanimously called for action. Even George Soros has vaguely called for international controls on the cross-border movement of funds, which, in his recent book, he describes as threatening the disintegration of global capitalism.

Elisabeta Gjoni: Role of money in wartime Opening remarks by Ms Elisabeta Gjoni, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Second Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 20 September 2018. * * * Dear guests, participants, researchers, academics, numismatists, collectors, students, Welcome to the Bank of Albania! It is a special pleasure for me to open the proceedings of the Second Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania on “Role of money in wartime”. The rich collection of coins and banknotes and other items exhibited in our Museum becomes more meaningful when supported by the historic background of the period of the country of issue. The organisation of this Conference, an annual one, contributes to the both the historic and educational role of the Museum. This conference is also an excellent opportunity to share experiences with representatives of the main institutions of culture in Albania and museums of central banks and other prominent foreign institutions in this field. I am happy to see in this room both old and new collaborators, whom we wish to be “permanent consultants” of the Bank of Albania. We aim to create and cultivate a solid and productive relationship with the best experts in numismatics, museology, cultural heritage and research. Dear participants, Today’s presentations will address the mutual, complicated and multi-dimensional relation between money and war. Wars have had an impact on the economy and development of human kind from the birth of civilisations to modern times.
Paul Tucker: Developing an EU cross-border crisis management framework Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at the Eurofi Financial Forum, Brussels, 30 September 2010. *  *  *  Thank you very much for inviting me to join you here today. It is terrific that the EU, and the Commission in particular, have been taking resolution really seriously as part of the programme for reforming the financial system. This is a domestic issue, an EU-wide issue, and a global issue. In introducing this session of the conference I’ve got five points, and I’m going to try to be quite crisp on those five points once I have made an introductory comment about resolution regimes in general. It may be helpful to say a few words about what resolution is. Resolution is what happens when we are in the “last chance saloon”. That is to say when supervision, however enhanced, has not prevented distress. When higher capital and liquidity requirements have proved insufficient. When any Cocos or other instruments have been converted or written down but have proved insufficient to absorb the distressed firm’s losses, and so the institution is still teetering on the edge of failure. That is we are talking about the point at which all the usual remedies have been exhausted, and the authorities face a desperate choice between taxpayer bailout or chaotic liquidation unless special resolution tools are available. All those other, essential measures are about reducing the probability of distress.

The question now, of course, is where do we go from here. There have recently been encouraging, but still tentative, signs that the worst of the global slowdown may now be behind us, and that the US and Eurozone economies are now beginning to bottom out and will pick up, perhaps to around trend, as we go through this year. Some Asian countries actively involved in the ICT sector are showing a strong recovery, and even in Japan financial markets have recently strengthened. As for the exchange rate, the euro, which has, as I say, been puzzlingly weak since soon after its introduction 3 years ago, still seems likely to strengthen eventually. As it becomes clearer that the international environment really is improving, and that external demand really is picking up, then we can look forward to better balanced and generally stronger growth in our own economy. That will in due course mean that domestic demand growth - and consumer demand growth in particular - will need to moderate if we are to avoid a build up of inflationary pressure. But let me be quite clear - that's not a warning, still less is it a threat. It is essentially just a matter of arithmetic! It's quite possible, even quite likely, that the necessary moderation of consumer demand - and I emphasise the word moderation - will come about of its own accord, given the gradual increase in unemployment we are currently seeing, and the build up of household debt.
[INF*RES*AS]  MONETARY POLICY REPORT FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT PRESENTATION BEFORE THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC∗  Mario Marcel Governor Central Bank of Chile 5 June 2017  You may browse the Monetary Policy Report of June 2017 and the Financial Stability Report of the first half of 2017 at http://www.bcentral.cl  ∗  Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Committee, senator Carlos Montes, senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen. Thank you for your invitation to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile on the recent macroeconomic and financial developments, projections and implications for monetary and financial policy. This vision is detailed in our June Monetary Policy Report and our Financial Stability Report for the first half of this year. In the past few months, the macroeconomic scenario has evolved in line with forecasts depicted in our March Monetary Policy Report. On one hand, inflation has brought no surprises, consistently with an exchange rate that has changed little since mid-2016 and gradually expanding capacity gaps. First-quarter activity growth was virtually flat in annual terms, largely affected by downtime in Escondida mining company, in a context of still very weak performance of sectors linked to construction investment. In contrast, consumption shows a more stable outlook, driven by significant growth in demand for durable goods, which has offset the poorer performance of the other components.

These foreign currency sales lead to a reduction in sight deposits. We will also sell foreign currency in the future if this is appropriate from a monetary policy perspective. Conversely, we also  Page 6/8  Zurich, 22 June 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  remain willing to buy foreign currency in the event of excessive appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc. Charts Chart 1  Table  Page 7/8  Zurich, 22 June 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Chart 2  Chart 3  Page 8/8
Lessons of the financial market turmoil An economic recovery must not however be a reason for returning to “business as usual”. Lessons must be learnt from the financial market turbulence. This work is still under way. Many national, European and international institutions and bodies are discussing the conclusions to be drawn for the financial system. The global financial system must become  BIS Review 16/2009  5  more resilient in order to avoid such episodes in the future. I would like to name three key words, which point to the need for change: •  short-termism in the financial sector. A far too short time horizon for many actors in the financial system has contributed, among other things, to an excessive risk appetite. That’s why, for instance, the compensation systems and risk management of the banks need to be profoundly improved. •  The transparency of the financial markets. Full information on all institutions, instruments and markets of relevance to financial stability is of the essence. •  The pro-cyclicality of the financial system. In the financial system there is a tendency to accept excessive risks in good times. In a downturn, sharp movements occur in the opposite direction. Here, among other things, banks face the question of adequate capital requirements. Current developments and the euro’s role Against the background of the current developments, let me say a few words about the role of the euro.

Current account imbalances are no more than the arithmetic difference between gross capital inflows and outflows. As these gross flows increase as a result of financial liberalisation, it is natural to expect the difference between them to become more volatile (Obstfeld (2010)). As Chart 4 shows, the growth of gross capital flows in the  2  BIS Review 174/2010  years preceding the crisis was dramatic. At the start of the 1980s, gross capital flows were around 5% of world GDP. By 2007, they had risen to 7 times that. This growth in capital flows and imbalances has been mirrored in the path of the external balance sheets of the major economies. These, too, have adjusted rapidly. In 1985, the US was a net external creditor. By 2009, it had become a net external debtor to the tune of around 20% of GDP. In 1999, China was a net external debtor. By 2008, it had become a net external creditor of around one third of GDP. An interesting perspective on the drivers of imbalances is provided by looking at the gross saving and investment behaviour of surplus and deficit countries over this period. Chart 5 looks at these patterns. It suggests a couple of striking patterns. First, the correlation between saving and investment rates appears to have weakened significantly over the past two decades, for both surplus and deficit countries. This is consistent with increasing capital mobility. Historically, there has been a high correlation between national saving and investment rates – the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) puzzle.
Then, as now, there was a large migration to the cities, and a severe shortage of housing. One means of increasing construction was to push down the cost of building housing. Households and construction companies had the possibility to receive both interest subsidies and interest guarantees if they built housing in accordance with specific requirements regarding design and size. This led to a large demand for loans. The regulations not only governed the terms for households’ loans, but also the terms for the mortgage institutions’ funding of the loans. Mortgage institutions were usually independent of the banks and funded themselves by issuing mortgage bonds. The maturity for these bonds was normally 30 years, but it could sometimes extend to 40 years, that is, much longer than today. Demand for these bonds was governed by the state through so-called liquidity ratios, which regulated how much the banks were forced to invest in mortgage bonds in relation to their deposits. Insurance companies were also obliged to invest in mortgage bonds. One could say that the state created a form of artificial demand for mortgage bonds. The bond yield was set by the Riksbank. It was thus probably lower than it would have been on a free market. Steps towards market funding Right from the start, mortgages were thus funded by bonds since the mortgage institutions were not allowed to receive deposits from the general public.

The fact that around one third of all Swedish covered bonds are owned by foreign investors is both an opportunity and a risk. The opportunity to spread funding has been positive, at the same time as we have previously seen that foreign investors tend to be the first to sell their holdings in times of unease, and that this can start a sales spiral. We saw this type of selling behaviour in 2007, for instance, when unease on the financial markets increased and the Swedish banks’ exposure to the Baltic countries made investors want to sell the Swedish banks’ covered bonds, which were perceived as high risk.5 Investors then sought safer assets, such as government securities. During the second half of 2007, foreign investors reduced their holdings of Swedish covered bonds by as much as a quarter, from SEK 450 billion to SEK 330 billion.6 It was primarily investors with a short-term investment strategy who withdrew, which meant that bond yields rose. With the exception of the acute global financial crisis, however, the market for covered bonds has functioned well. Foreign investors’ interest in Swedish covered bonds is currently high, which is evident in the low yield levels. But the more the banks become dependent on a particular source of funding, the more vulnerable they become if this market were to suffer problems.
All these (monetary, fiscal and structural) policies may be especially effective is they are adopted jointly, thus harnessing the positive complementarities that exist between them. As I discussed at the beginning of my speech, profitability has a direct and indirect effect on the Spanish banking sector’s resilience to adverse shocks and, therefore, on the extent to which these intermediaries can contribute to amplifying or smoothing the impact of these shocks on the economy. Consequently, it is essential for Spanish banks to address the challenges which will mark their profitability in future, such as technological change, the reduction of non-productive assets, the strengthening of capital and the improvement of their reputation. Thank you for your attention. 13/13

At the same time, it is a competitive disadvantage for Norwegian banks when their issues are covered by the quota, while this is not the case for issues by for example Swedish and Danish banks. Therefore, from 1 December 2010 we will include foreign bank issues in the bank quota without increasing the percentage rate of 35. From 15 February 2012, we will discontinue access to using bank issues as collateral for loans. Covered bonds will still be eligible as collateral, also when the bonds are issued by a bank’s own mortgage company. We assume that this will also contribute to developing the Norwegian covered bond market. Conclusion  Allow me to conclude. Developments in recent months indicate that the financial crisis in Norway will not develop into a real economic crisis. We have not experienced a bank solvency crisis as was the case 20 years ago. Unless the Norwegian economy is exposed to new major shocks, we expect the bankruptcy rate for Norwegian enterprises to stabilise or to be at about the same level recorded in the moderate downturn at the beginning of this decade. Nevertheless, the crisis has revealed weaknesses in the regulatory framework for banks, also in Norway. It is our hope and belief that international cooperation will set the stage for an improved regulatory framework and systems. For us in Norway, it is important that the Nordic countries can stand together. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 131/2009  19
Flexible labour market structures and decentralised wage-setting are generally regarded as the prerequisite to support smaller enterprises, for these are often the engines of innovation in post-industrial economies. Last but not least, we should not underestimate the role of policy-makers in developing education systems. Let me add a word on this last point. We are often told that Europe and Western countries in general need more engineers and mathematicians to restore their supposedly lost competitive edge. Engineers are definitely essential as creators yet the success of a company or a society requires more. To be truly competitive a firm also needs excellent management and marketing skills. In short, you need an entrepreneur. However, it is often overlooked when it comes to the educational reform in Europe. Young people should be taught the essentials of ethical entrepreneurship and finance from the very first grades onwards. When creating and producing something innovative you cannot just stop half way – you also have to sell it. Thirdly, talking about competitiveness, we should not underestimate the role of universities and higher education either. Money is again an issue here. We should be much more open to finding additional sources of financing. As we know, in the United States the success of universities relies on relatively broad-based funding. We also know that European education systems are already facing tensions in light of the traditional role of a state. In my opinion, policy-makers should promote new and innovative ways of funding higher education which would be clearly beneficial for all parties.

Uncertainty is part of the cause as well: the exact date of the euro adoption is not known and there is no time to look deeper into the matter against the background of everyday life. Nevertheless, Estonians are one of the most pro-EU nations in the whole Union. More than 70 per cent of us hold positive or very positive views on the EU. However, the origins of euro scepticism and EU optimism are the same. The European Union and EU membership represent common European values, economic prosperity and security for our citizens. Our own currency stands for the same values: credibility, prosperity and economic security. The Estonian kroon represents these values for a very specific reason. Namely, our currency has been pegged to the euro for already 15 years. I cannot resist joking that from the monetary policy perspective we are one of the oldest members of the euro area. A whole generation of Estonians has grown up without having to ask what the interest rate of Eesti Pank is. Instead, they know that the value of the kroon will not change and interest rate changes come from Europe. Most probably, what matters for Estonians is that while being part of Europe we still wish to retain something our own. This is not the most convenient situation for Eesti Pank. On one hand, we should be proud of the trust we have earned at home. On the other hand, we know that joining the euro area is beneficial and necessary for the whole country.
2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The second phase of this reform should aim at improving the education and know-how of the labour force, creating a legal, political, administrative and fiscal environment that attracts foreign developments and encourages domestic ones, and increasing the integration of Albania’s economy with the regional and European development infrastructure. Third, the opening of accession negotiations with the EU should be viewed as a primary instrument for the advancement of Albania’s development. The Bank of Albania judges that the fulfilment of the criteria for opening accession negotiations and the rigorous implementation of reforms that this process imposes should be the focus of the entire political spectrum in Albania. Thank you for your attention! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Net trade on the other hand has performed less strongly; while it did support growth immediately following the referendum and in response to the  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  7  accompanying depreciation, that boost has now come to an end, and slowing trade is now dragging on growth. Chart 7: G7 business investment  Chart 8: Business investment compared with previous recoveries Indices: peak in GDP = 100  Percentage changes on a year earlier  20  180  EU Referendum Act  15 160  10 5  140  0 120  -5  2008  100  -10 -15  80  -20 -25 2007  60 2009  2011  2013  G7 (ex. UK)  2015  2017 UK  0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  Quarters since pre-recession peak in GDP  At the same time, business investment has been strikingly weak. Investment growth was already slowing ahead of the Brexit referendum (Chart 7). Following the referendum it has come to a complete stop. In fact the level of business investment has actually fallen slightly over the past three years – that is despite a supportive global environment and accommodative financial conditions that have supported growth in other countries, and in contrast to the 7%-plus annual growth we were forecasting ahead of the referendum.
I will explain why. But first I would like to describe very briefly what characterised the crisis. The characteristics of the financial crisis I have experienced two crises in the past, one in the late 1970s and early 1980s and one at the beginning of the 1990s, and have seen them both mainly from the perspective of the Ministry of Finance. When I came to the Riksbank I believed that the worst crises were behind us. However, this was not the case. Instead we experienced a third crisis, which in international terms was the most severe crisis since World War II. The financial crisis hit Sweden and the rest of Europe with full force in September 2008, when the major US investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. It became much more difficult for the banks to fund their operations as the financial markets were not functioning normally. Some markets were not functioning at all. The central banks took on the role of lenders of last resort and several governments provided guarantees and support programmes for the banking sector. Monetary policy also quickly became more expansionary in the United States, the euro area and other countries. In addition, a number of central banks adopted measures to also push down the longer-term interest rates. There was also a shift towards a more expansionary fiscal policy. Despite extensive policy stimulus, the financial crisis led to a severe downturn in the United States and Europe and in developed countries in other parts of the world.

Svante Öberg: My view of monetary policy 2006–2011 Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Handelsbanken, Stockholm, 18 March 2011. *  *  *  I have now been at the Riksbank for over five years and my appointment as Deputy Governor of the Riksbank expires at the turn of the year. I will have celebrated my 65th birthday by then and I have informed the General Council of the Riksbank that I will not be seeking reappointment. This makes it natural for me to look back at the conduct of monetary policy over the last five years and, in the light of this experience, discuss the direction of monetary policy in the years ahead. The three theses that I will argue for in this speech are:   Monetary policy was too expansionary before the financial crisis    Monetary policy worked well during the crisis    The repo rate needs to be raised at every meeting this year (and perhaps next year too)  Monetary policy was too expansionary in the years before the financial crisis My first thesis is thus that monetary policy was too expansionary in the years before the full force of the financial crisis hit the world in September 2008. This applies both in Sweden and abroad. I will present arguments to support this thesis in this section. Abroad Monetary policy was expansionary in the years before the financial crisis in both the United States and the euro area.