samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The DBU-ACU divide served us well for decades, but has been losing its relevance. There are a number of reasons for this development. First, since 2004, our developmental incentives have no longer been based on the domestic vs offshore distinction. Second, the divide between domestic and offshore banking has in practice become increasingly porous. 19. Third, and most importantly, there have been major global regulatory developments in the last five years, that have resulted in banks’ offshore activities being subject to rules that are broadly similar to those governing the domestic banking business in Singapore. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  New global rules have increased the amount and quality of capital as well as the liquidity buffers that banks need to hold  •  Global regulators have also agreed on a common framework to control large exposures to a single counterparty  20. These global regulatory reforms have put all banks on a sounder footing. It has also reduced the relevance of MAS rules that distinguish between offshore and domestic banking activities of foreign banks, since home regulators will now be requiring their banks to meet enhanced standards on a group-wide basis. 21. Post-global financial crisis, we have also seen a strengthening of co-ordination among home and host regulators. MAS is an active member of the global Crisis Management Groups of regulators of foreign banks with significant operations in Singapore. This aims to enhance regulators’ preparedness and coordination in crisis management. 22.

Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Singapore – a widely respected centre of Asian and global finance Keynote address by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) Annual Dinner, Singapore, 30 June 2015. *  *  *  Chairman and Council Members of the ABS, Ladies and gentlemen, 1. Thank you for inviting me to join you this evening. 2. We meet at a time of renewed uncertainty in global finance. Greece has imposed capital controls and declared a banking holiday to stem a full-blown financial crisis. 3. No one has been able to predict each step in the game of brinkmanship that we have seen over the last few weeks. But the underlying reality of a sharply deteriorating economy in Greece, and the prospect of bankrupt Government, has not been a surprise. It is too early to say if some form of Grexit becomes a reality, but it is a contingency that Eurozone governments and financial institutions have been preparing for. 4. The direct impact of a collapse of the Greek economy is not significant, even in the Eurozone. The ECB and the EU are also likely to take all steps necessary to safeguard the Eurozone financial system in the coming weeks. Markets have hence not shown great panic, with credit spreads widening only slightly in the Eurozone periphery. 5. But there are downside risks we should be mindful of.
In this particular case, we may find that no single player feels incentivised or powerful enough to develop a standard that others will coalesce around, in sufficient numbers such that the benefits outweigh the costs of development. The resulting lack of commonly adopted data standards is not a new phenomenon, or one that is at all unique to the UK financial system. But it is in greater focus for regulators now, in the UK and elsewhere, because of the increased amount of data that we need to collect, its increased complexity, and the increased demands we want to make of that data. The potential for market failure here means there can be a role for the public sector. Again, the LEI gives us a clear example of this role. Prior to the financial crisis, the private sector had tried and failed for 20 years to create a universal, global standard to identify legal entities. It took the intervention of US and international financial authorities for the identifier to become a reality. Our Transformation Plan sets out our approach to move this agenda forward9. We are convening and coordinating an industry group that will look in depth at the development and adoption of data standards. We will help set the agenda for the group by giving our views about the use cases, like CRE, that interest us most. Our data collections themselves can be one useful tool for promoting the development and adoption of standards.

The first years of our democracy were marked by economic difficulties, partly resulting from the international crises linked to sharp oil price increases and the lack of an anchor for inflation expectations in most developed countries. Nevertheless, this new Spain, democratic and integrated into Europe, never stopped looking outwards. Trade and financial flows and the movement of capital increased, and exports and imports rose from accounting for roughly 35% of GDP in 1986 to 66% in 2017. These steps towards modernisation would never have been possible without a society that was convinced of the fact that Europe represented prosperity and the future. The pro-European nature of civil society united Spaniards more strongly than their ideologies or political affiliations, and this sentiment has held firm despite the difficulties people experienced during the financial crisis. A recent survey by the Elcano Royal Institute shows that eight out of ten Spaniards believe that opening up markets provides Spanish businesses with good opportunities2. This is resounding proof that Spain benefits from the European Union in general, and the Economic and Monetary Union created by the euro area in particular. The annual growth in per capita income between 1977 and 1985, one year before Spain joined the EU, was 0.7%, well below the 1.8% enjoyed by the countries that would go on to form the euro area. However, between 1986 and 1998, before the euro was introduced, Spain’s per capita income grew at an extraordinary annual rate of 2.7%, above the average for future euro area countries of 2.1%.
Interest rate developments abroad may have a considerable influence on movements in the krone exchange rate. The inflation outlook in Norway implies that Norway will not be the frontrunner when other countries increase interest rates. As mentioned earlier, themes shift in foreign exchange markets. Norges Bank does not have the instruments for fine-tuning the exchange rate. Normally, Norges Bank will not intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to influence the exchange rate. Foreign exchange market intervention, irrespective of whether foreign exchange is bought or sold, is not an appropriate instrument for influencing the krone over a longer period. We do not wish to act in a way that may trigger a game situation in the foreign exchange market. Foreign exchange intervention rather than a change in the interest rate may give ambiguous signals to foreign exchange operators and a game situation may arise. However, interventions may be appropriate if the krone deviates substantially from the level that the Bank judges to be reasonable in relation to fundamentals, and if exchange rate developments weaken the prospect of achieving the inflation target. Interventions may also be appropriate in response to pronounced short-term fluctuations in the krone when liquidity in the foreign exchange market falls to a very low level. Although the krone may fluctuate in the short term, when inflation is low and stable, the exchange rate will generally stabilise over time. When inflation has been higher in Norway than among our trading partners for a longer period, the krone has generally depreciated.

When inflation in Norway is expected to be broadly in line with that of other countries, the exchange rate will usually also return to its normal range following periods when the krone has been particularly strong or particularly weak. The advantage of a flexible exchange rate is perhaps most evident when the economy is sluggish. If the krone were to remain at a level that is too strong, nominal wages would have to remain unchanged over a longer period or fall in order to bolster companies and jobs. This only occurs when unemployment is very high. With a flexible exchange rate, a depreciation of the krone can also boost competitiveness. A flexible exchange rate can reduce fluctuations in employment and output. 4  BIS Review 34/2004  Empirical studies2 have also suggested that economic growth in industrialised countries with floating exchange rates has been as strong as, and often stronger than, growth in countries with a stable exchange rate. A precondition is that there is an economic policy framework so that inflation does not spin out of control. The real exchange rate The chart shows developments in two measures of the real krone exchange rate, i.e. consumer prices and relative labour costs in Norway relative to trading partners, measured in a common currency. The real exchange rate measured by relative labour costs in a common currency is an expression of the cost competitiveness of Norwegian companies.
The world now has a unique opportunity – an opportunity to galvanise a deeper appreciation and understanding of the issues that affect us all – globally and simultaneously. Policymakers tackling the health crisis have been encouraged to pursue policies that can alleviate the economic shocks caused by the pandemic and in the same instant help address climate issues and challenges. We can leverage the opportunity presented by the current crisis to put the world on a new trajectory with a lower risk of future climate calamities. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Collective responsibility This brings me to my second C that is “collective responsibility”. The former Managing Director of IMF, Madam Lagarde once remarked that “Tackling climate change is a collective endeavour, it means collective accountability and it’s not too late”. Malaysia, together with its ASEAN counterparts, has been responding to climate change by developing national sustainable roadmaps, principles and guidelines. Such actions are even more relevant now. Despite a more pressing public health crisis at the moment, the World Health Organization has warned that “climate change is a gradually increasing stress that may be the defining public health threat of the 21st century”. Now why is this? That’s because temperature and weather extremes, floods, and pollutants can impact human health, directly and indirectly. The pandemic thus stresses the need to progressively continue collective global climate change actions to reduce risk of future epidemics. Commitment This brings me to my third C, which is “commitment”.

Fraziali Ismail: COVID-19 and climate responsibility, commitment, and collaboration  change,  collective  Closing remarks by Mr Fraziali Ismail, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at Malaysia Showcase during Climate Week NYC 2020, New York City, 17 September 2020. * * * From time to time, we chance upon heart-warming stories of how seemingly small and random acts of kindness, result in something miraculous. I am talking about stories like Jadav Payeng, an environmental activist and forest worker from India, who planted a tree almost every single day for 40 years. Jadav was only 16 when he started working with the district’s social forestry division in a tree plantation drive. Upon completion of the 5-year project, Jadav chose to stay and continued on his quest to save his island. This led him to single-handedly create a real man-made forest, the Molai Forest, which houses several species of animals and thousands of trees that is now almost as big as New York’s Central Park. We also marvel at Afroz Shaz, who began picking up trash on Versova Beach in Mumbai, and inspired thousands of volunteers to join the cause. Versova’s dramatic transformation from filthy to fabulous went viral in India, with praises to Afroz and the volunteers for helping to restore the beach that was previously polluted by 15 years of piled up rubbish.
According to the timetable for the new legislation, the Riksdag’s final decision will be made sometime in the middle of November. It will be followed by the appointment of the Riksbank’s new Governing Board, which will consist of eleven Delegates. One of its major tasks  BIS Review 80/1998  -4-  will be to appoint the Riksbank’s new Executive Board. This Board will consist of six full-time members who will direct the Riksbank and decide monetary policy as of January 1999. The present situation Sweden’s monetary policy is conducted in a flexible exchange rate regime and has an explicit inflation target. We sometimes use the following simple rule of thumb to describe what governs our actions: if the overall assessment of inflation indicates that in one to two years time the rate of inflation will deviate from the 2 per cent target, then the repo rate should be adjusted accordingly. Our approach is symmetrical, which means that it is equally important to avoid undershooting the target, as it is to avoid overshooting it. The Riksbank’s appraisal of inflation up to the autumn of 2000 and the monetary policy conclusions that can be drawn from this are presented in the Inflation Report we published last week. In order to visualise the consequences for the future path of monetary policy, the report is based on the working assumption of an unchanged repo rate.

This is shown by the fact that from the mid 19th century up to the late 1960s growth in Sweden was  BIS Review 80/1998  -2-  among the highest in the world. It is rather the case that the favourable outcome was promoted by low inflation and the stability this represents. The decades immediately after World War Two were particularly notable for high growth, low inflation, external balance and an optimistic mood that resulted in the Swedish economy’s successive expansion. That was a prosperous period with a good, stable economic trend, a rising standard of living and high employment. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s it proved difficult to establish an equally robust fixed exchange rate regime. A firm anchor no longer existed for economic policy in general and wage formation in particular. Sweden experienced a series of devaluation cycles, with an expansionary fiscal policy, inefficient wage formation and growing structural problems. With the deregulation of the financial sector the problems became all too evident. During the 1970s and 80s economic growth in Sweden became weaker than in other countries. But the economy still became overheated and this, together with an expansion of public sector activities, meant that unemployment was restrained for the time being. The situation was of course unsustainable. An inflationary, speculative bubble cannot grow indefinitely; sooner or later it is bound to burst. There was also a limit to the public resources for financing employment.
Interest rate reductions around the world can be seen to be an insurance against a really poor outcome. It is important to remember that Sweden already had a very expansive economic policy on 11 September, with a low interest rate, weak krona and expansive fiscal policy. Given this, it is natural to withdraw the ‘insurance’ interest rate reduction when confidence and expectations have stabilised and the risks of a severe negative spiral have declined. The current economic situation So, can we say that confidence has returned or stabilised? To answer that question, I would like to describe how we see the current economic situation. The fact that willingness to take risks has increased can be seen in Standard & Poor’s credit spreads, which have returned to the same levels as prior to the terrorist attacks. In the USA, swap spreads had fallen since mid-September as no financial crisis occurred, however they have increased slightly since the start of the year, probably because of the Enron scandal. In Europe and Sweden, on the other hand, swap spreads have continued to fall to lower levels than prior to 11 September. Much of the statistics received since the beginning of December support the picture of international developments painted in the December Inflation Report. The signals that the subduing effect on demand is declining and that the level of activity is stabilising in the US economy have become clearer. Restraining factors, such as destocking and an adjustment in investments, appear to be gradually abating in strength.

Zamani Abdul Ghani: Growth and development of SME’s in Malaysia Opening address by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Top SMI Supporter Award Presentation, held at the Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia Berhad (CGC), Petaling Jaya, Selangor, 9 June 2008. *  *  *  Bismillahirrahmanirrahim Distinguished fellow members of the Board of Directors of CGC, Yang Berbahagia Datuk Wan Azhar Wan Ahmad,Managing Director of CGC Distinguished Guests and Representatives of Financial Institutions Members of the Media Ladies and Gentlemen Assalamualaikum w.b.t. and a very good afternoon On behalf of the Board of Directors and Management of the Credit Guarantee Corporation, (CGC), I am pleased to welcome you to this Top SMI Supporter Awards Presentation ceremony. This occasion is held in conjunction with the CGC's 35th Annual General Meeting that was successfully concluded just a while ago. I am pleased to note the encouraging representation made here today by fellow members of financial institutions. This signifies the importance that financial institutions attest to this CGC's annual award presentation ceremony. That said, allow me to record our appreciation to all of you for making this ceremony an important event in your calendar. This Top SMI Supporter Awards presentation ceremony, as you are all well aware, is an annual occasion. It recognises the active participation by financial institutions in CGC's credit guarantee schemes in particular, and contributions by financial institutions to SME development in general. We firmly believe such efforts should not go unnoticed.
19  See box on ‘Excess global liquidity, asset prices and inflation, Bank of England Inflation Report, February 2006, page 5. 6  BIS Review 2/2007  How to square this with ‘originate and distribute’? Basically, in contrast to the pre-Big Bang world in the UK, today’s prevailing business model entails a significant commitment of capital by investment banks. This manifests itself in a wide range of on-balance sheet assets on top of the more traditional bond and equity books held as part of ‘market making’. For example, bridge loans are extended to finance Leveraged Buy-Outs prior to more permanent debt instruments being placed via the capital markets. Similarly, there is an intermediate stage between origination and distribution of securitised portfolios, during which they are warehoused on banks’ balance sheets. As I just described, synthetic securitisations, by contrast, can involve investment banks permanently holding corporate bonds and loans to hedge synthetic short positions, where the risk is transferred elsewhere. And loans against a very wide range of collateral are provided to finance hedge funds20; this effectively amounts to writing deeply out-of-the-money options, where the risk flows back to the financer in adverse states of the world21. So investment banking does use balance sheets, but in non-traditional ways. Beyond that, there is an extra ingredient for the commercial banks. As is apparent from the money numbers, they are very much still in the deposit-gathering business.

BNP Paribas excluded due to lack of H1 interim data. BIS Review 2/2007  13
As Irving Fisher noted almost eighty years ago: “The old and apparently still persistent notion of “the” business cycle, as a single, simple, self-generating cycle,…is a myth. Instead of one cycle, there are many co-existing cycles, constantly aggravating or neutralising each other, as well as co-existing with many non-cyclical forces” (Fisher (1933)). Historically, the credit cycle appears to have been just such a phenomenon. But why should we care? One reason might be that credit booms and busts are systematically related to the incidence of crises, with their associated social costs. Using the filtered credit series for the 12 countries, and the dating of banking and currency crises from Bordo et al (2001), it is possible to test this hypothesis. 16 Over the sample period, these countries were in a state of banking and/or currency crisis anywhere between 10% and 25% of the time. This broadly matches the frequency of the credit cycle.

Macro costs and micro benefits: The Eurozone has so far failed to make its member states wealthier quicker (the non-euro EU states are constantly growing faster on average) or to make them converge structurally. Rather, one could argue that the opposite is true. A truly strong measurable result of the euro is lower and less volatile inflation. This is hard to see as a bonus for our country, where we are consistently achieving the same objective with our own currency. The oft-mentioned bonus of lower interest rates due to the euro does not apply to us either. We have long known what it’s like to live with rates below the Eurozone level. Likewise, it’s hard to believe that the euro will deepen our trade relations with the euro countries given that we are one of the few countries enjoying not only growing trade, but also a constantly rising trade surplus with Germany. The euro has micro benefits at firm level, but unfortunately they come with the aforementioned macro costs. The latter are constantly rising and their final size and structure are impossible to quantify. Besides the known contribution to the stability funds, they include mandatory participation in the banking union, which is another unfinished structure. For a country of our type, currency arrangement and monetary history, joining the Eurozone is generally an extremely tough question. It was ever thus, but it is currently all the more so.
Luis M Linde: Reflections on the road and challenges ahead – regulatory changes affecting banking activity Closing address by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the IX IESE (Instituto de Estudios Superiores de la Empresa/Business School of the University of Navarra) Banking Sector Meeting “Banks – beyond the crisis”, Madrid, 12 December 2013. *  *  *  Firstly, let me thank Professor Juan José Toribio, the president of the Centro Internacional de Finanzas, for inviting me to participate in this IESE Banking Sector Meeting. And allow me to congratulate the IESE on this ninth edition of a forum that has become a classic and has consistently been of the greatest interest and highest calibre. I am not going to address certain matters that are very important and topical, such as the signs of recovery in the Spanish economy, the initial steps of the launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, or the asset quality review or stress tests for those banks that are to be supervised by the Single Mechanism. I would hardly have anything novel to say there. Rather, I wish to review some aspects of the regulatory changes which, once the crisis has been overcome, are going to significantly affect banking activity.

To conclude: 2014 will, as we all know, be an extremely intense year as far as international financial regulation and supervision are concerned. There will be no lack of work. My best wishes to all of you and good luck. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches