samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Under the scenario of a more moderate fall in GDP, the public debt/GDP ratio would rise to around 115%, a similar figure to that projected by the Spanish Government, the European Commission, the IMF and the AIReF. Under the harshest Banco de España scenario, the debt ratio would in fact stand at over 120% of GDP (some 25 pp higher than at end-2019).4 Under the assumption of economic recovery projected for 2021, the public debt/GDP ratio would stabilise around its 2020 levels or fall slightly. This projected path is not specific to Spain: in its latest World Economic Outlook, the IMF estimated that the increases in the deficit and debt ratios, as a percentage of GDP, might rise in 2020 to a comparable scale across the advanced economies. Likewise, on the European Commission’s latest forecasts, public debt in the euro area as a whole will stand this year at 102.7%, and exceed the 100% threshold in another six countries, as well as Spain. 4  Comparisons between Institutions on the budget deficit and public debt increases forecast for this year are hampered by the timing of the preparation of the projections and, therefore, by the fiscal measures approved that have been taken into account, beyond the differences between institutions stemming from the different macroeconomic scenarios and from the estimated responses of public revenue and spending to the projected downturn in activity.

On one hand, certain aspects of the application of current accounting rules for calculating credit risk are clarified. On the other, the aforementioned authorities have ruled that banks may effectively use the capital buffers available to absorb unexpected losses. Specifically, the aim of the clarification of the accounting rules is to prevent potentially temporary delays by borrowers in repaying their loans from receiving the same treatment as though what were involved was a lasting impairment in the quality of the loans. The latter would lead to an immediate and abrupt adjustment of credit ratings and, therefore, to an increase in the provisions required which, ultimately, would lead to a downward adjustment in the credit extended by banks. In exchange, it is necessary to prevent the wrongful use of this flexibility from leading to inappropriate accounting practices that translate into a delay in recognising the actual impairment of the quality of certain credit exposures. 27  In the second of the two areas mentioned, the Banco de España has conveyed to all the institutions it directly supervises the various measures introduced by the different macroand microprudential and resolution authorities to alleviate capital and liquidity requirements. Moreover, the Banco de España has recommended that banks under its supervision should temporarily eliminate dividend payouts and apply prudent criteria in the variable remuneration of their staff, so that they may channel the funds they generate towards reinforcing their capital positions.
There is neither an effective platform nor an established framework for policy coordination or for crisis containment, management and resolution. There is also no true global lender of last resort as the IMF itself has only limited resources. This has led to the rise of governance innovations amongst many economies, including Malaysia and its neighbours. Since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, various initiatives have fostered stronger regional cooperation, including information sharing and alternative liquidity support arrangements that are bilateral or regional in scope. While these efforts have reinforced the region’s defences against external shocks, they have not reduced the vulnerability of individual economies to external shocks. Were the fault lines in the global monetary and financial system to widen, there is no guarantee that emerging economies like ours will not be dragged into those crevices. Given the lack of global initiatives to close those fault lines, what economies like Malaysia must do is to ensure that our house is strong. We must build-up our defences and have the resilience to withstand the volatility and headwinds created by the global economic and financial environment. One important source of that resilience is having sound financial governance at all levels of our society: the government, the corporate sector and the household sector. Financial governance: foundation of sustainable economic growth Financial governance sets the stage for sound financial decision-making. Broadly defined, strong financial governance is a sum of many parts including strong institutions, efficient processes, and effective rules, regulations and norms.

Other things being equal, bank balance sheets – and so broad money – would expand, but it might be hard to judge the extent of any inflationary impulse coming through a “shock” to the supply of broad money over and above that stemming from a relaxation in credit constraints and higher asset prices. Also, although a “counterparts” approach to the monetary aggregates would incline one to think that shocks to the supply of credit would flow into broad money, changes in the “technology” of banking and financial intermediation might in some conditions make the connection tenuous. After all, the intermediation of credit occurs via capital markets and not just across bank balance sheets. That could matter, for example, if an increase in the supply of credit happened to occur at much the same time as an increase in incentives or the means for banks to securitise – ie sell – the loans they originate. In the limiting case, a big positive shock to the supply of credit could coincide with shrinking bank balance sheets and so negative broad money growth. That is, of course, not at all what we have 33 seen recently. But the thought experiment underlines two things. First, we need to attend carefully to the underlying drivers. As part of that effort, the Bank has recently launched a new Credit Conditions Survey, which should enrich our grasp of what is going on.
–  Export quantities continued to improve with the year-on-year growth rate in a high positive. This represents both the pick-up in our trading partners' purchasing power and our staying ability to compete. Another factor that continued to firm up the recovery process came from the fiscal front. –  During the first four months of fiscal year 2002, the budget disbursement rate accelerated compared to same period last year. This front-loaded fiscal stance will surely contribute to a sooner recovery. I must note here, however, that the jury is still out on what these early signs may portend. I believe the impassioned judgment on the speed of the recovery must await more data. Ladies and gentlemen, It is rather unfortunate that while economists are busy debating whether these early signs point to a tangible recovery, the recent strong boom in the stock market seemed to have overwhelmed that debate. On this point, let me say that we need to distinguish between the recent asset price performance and the economic fundamentals. It is true that the performance of the listed SET firms has improved. The improvement was led in part by better-than-expected profitability of listed companies. Corporate profits in general were also on the rise in 2001, compared to 2000. With this improvement, we are now more able to segregate the winners that is, the strong performers -- from those lagging behind. This presents a stark contrast to the previous pictures in which almost all sectors were judged to have performed poorly.

To meet the growth challenge, Thailand needs a steady and sincere effort at the micro-level to put our economy back on a more robust growth path. The reforms must aim for good corporate governance, faster debt restructuring, and the efficient and effective banking sector. Without these actions, the potency of the fiscal and monetary policies will be limited, and whatever gains in output we make will be ephemeral. The bottom line, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that Thailand will stand ready to reap the full advantage of an upcoming global recovery only if the real sector becomes competitive and the financial sector functions smoothly. The Bank of Thailand can contribute to the growth process by conducting a responsible monetary policy to ensure price stability, and by prodding the economy along the path of institutional reforms that have been initiated. With a sound policy framework and institutional reforms in place, a more efficient economic structure will have been built and the entrepreneurial energy of the private sector can be unleashed to ensure greater economic well being. This brings me to the last point I wish to make tonight, that is the need to speed up the structural reforms. I am convinced that the necessary transition toward more robust and durable growth lies in breaking out of the current constraints imposed on the economy post-1997, the most pressing of which is the debt-overhang problem. To go forward we first need to unshackle ourselves. The crawling pace of debt resolution is tying down the economy.
However, as emphasised in a forthcoming issue of the Banque de France monthly Bulletin 1 , which is entirely devoted to various inflation related issues, currently available measures of inflation expectations appear crude and limited in terms of information content to explain short run wage formation or consumption dynamics. In practice, the Eurosystem has a prudent and comprehensive approach when considering private agents’ inflation expectations. While taking into account a large range of expectations indicators, the Governing Council does not react to them mechanistically. A firm anchoring of inflation expectations is nevertheless crucial in order to take up the challenges coming from the new inflationary environment. Among the long-run evolutions that can be expected with a high degree of certainty, the changing impact of globalisation on inflation, population ageing and climate change constitute threats to price stability and major new challenges for monetary policy. First, globalisation may turn out to be more inflationary in the future than in its early phase. This was one of the issues addressed in the recent international symposium of the Banque de France. For over ten years, with the growing integration of our economies, powerful forces, throughout the world, have been acting to enhance price stability. Each year, the integration of millions of people into the world labour market has increased global production capacity, in particular for tradable goods.

William C Dudley: Regional economy and current trends in regional employment Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Quarterly Regional Economic Press Briefing, New York, 6 May 2011. *  *  *  Good morning and welcome once again to the New York Fed’s Quarterly Regional Economic Press Briefing. I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with the journalists covering our region – and through you, to the people in our District. This morning I will discuss national and regional economic conditions, with particular attention to employment trends in the Second Federal Reserve District, which covers New York; northern New Jersey; Fairfield County, Connecticut; Puerto Rico; and the U.S. Virgin Islands. I will not comment on the outlook for monetary policy today but instead will focus on the economy itself. Following my remarks, my colleagues will provide more detail. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. National economic conditions I’ll begin by commenting on national economic conditions. Since the recession ended in 2009, the economy has grown at a modest pace. When we met in February, the brisker pace of growth in the last quarter of 2010 appeared to be carrying over to the beginning of this year.
Important work is underway at an international level to adapt regulation, supervision and oversight to the new landscape. Norges Bank supports this work. Two of the main considerations are that society as a whole must reap the benefits of the new solutions, while the associated risks must be contained. We also want to be a driver behind changes that enhance the efficiency and safety of the payment system. An example is the work on developing real-time payment solutions, which today allow payments to be sent within seconds to the payee’s account. We are also considering whether Norges Bank should take on a more operational role in the real-time payment infrastructure. In our work, we have to take a precautionary approach and keep a close eye on the potentially far-reaching implications for the financial system of some of the changes underway. We must ask ourselves whether measures will be needed so that we can continue making payments in Norwegian kroner efficiently and securely in the future. Chart: Central bank digital currency A key issue is whether Norges Bank should launch a central bank digital currency (CBDC).13 Unlike central bank reserves, which is electronic money for use solely by banks, a CBDC will be available to everyone, just like cash. And unlike e-money platforms or cryptocurrencies, a central bank will stand behind it and guarantee its value. If we introduce a CBDC at some point in the future, the purpose will be to safeguard confidence in the monetary system and to promote an efficient and secure payment system.

Chart: Today’s topics To shed light on these questions I will look at what actually characterises the role of banks, how competition from new participants might influence the financial system and finally the implications of the changes underway for Norges Bank’s role and responsibilities. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  The role of banks in the financial system The financial system should deliver a number of very basic services. We want to be able to borrow in order to study or buy a home today, while paying out of future income. We also want to be able to borrow long-term to finance investment projects with high expected returns. In addition, we need a means of payment that provides fast, safe and reasonably priced settlement services for both domestic and cross-border transactions. The means of payment should also be a savings vehicle. A pre-condition is that we have confidence in the current and future value of money. In today’s system, banks have a key role in providing these services. They offer credit, savings products and payment services. Chart: Banks provide credit Banks are often described as agents that provide credit by taking deposits from savers and lending part of that money to borrowers. This description of banks is not entirely wrong, but overlooks an essential component of banking and a function that distinguishes banks from nonfinancial firms. Chart: Banks create money The description does not explain where the deposits originate. The deposit placed in one bank can come from another bank.
Mervyn King: The institutions of monetary policy Lecture by Mr Mervyn King,1 Governor of the Bank of England, at the American Economic Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, 4 January 2004. The references can be found on the Bank of England’s website (www.bankofengland.co.uk)  *  *  *  President, Ladies and Gentlemen, To have one central bank governor address you today may be regarded as a misfortune, but to invite two looks like carelessness! It is a great honour to be invited by this year’s President-Elect, Marty Feldstein, to deliver the Ely lecture. Marty has been my teacher, mentor, colleague and friend for over thirty years, and I never cease to be amazed by the energy and imagination which he devotes to the study of economic problems. I got to know Marty during my time as a Kennedy Scholar at Harvard in 1971. The Kennedy Scholarships form one part of Britain’s national memorial to President Kennedy. The other part is an acre of land, now American territory, at Runnymede. At the ceremony to open the Runnymede memorial in 1965, Prime Minister Harold Wilson remarked about President Kennedy that “his eyes were on the horizon, but his feet were on the ground”. Almost thirty years earlier Richard T. Ely published his autobiography entitled “Ground under Our Feet”. Whereas I found the experience of coming from Europe to the United States intellectually liberating and exhilarating, a hundred years earlier Ely found academic freedom by making the reverse journey.

Massive speculation on that day led to the announcement in the morning of a 2 percentage points rise in interest rates and, when that failed to dampen the pressure on sterling, of a further 3 percentage points rise in rates. That second announcement, far from bolstering the exchange rate, merely convinced financial markets that Britain’s membership of the ERM could no longer be sustained politically. The strong political commitment to joining European monetary union, which was the effective support for other currencies in the ERM, was absent in the United Kingdom. Following its departure from the ERM, the UK introduced an inflation target regime for monetary policy. It succeeded in bringing inflation down to around 2½ percent (see chart 2). 6  BIS Review 5/2004  Chart 2: UK inflation and inflation expectations, Oct 1991-Oct 2003 Per cent 7  Implied inflation (a ) from IGs RPIX inflation rate  6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Oct-91  Inflation target announced  Bank independence  Oct-93  Oct-95  Oct-97  Oct-99  Oct-01  Oct-03  (a )  Implied average inflation expectations from 5 to 10 years ahead, derived from index-linked gilts. Source: Bank of England, ONS  But long-term inflation expectations did not fall as quickly. Only after the announcement in May 1997 by the new Labour government that the Bank of England would be made independent did inflation expectations fall quickly to the target level, as can be seen from chart 2.
In my view, this initial exercise has confirmed that we are a long way from the desired situation in which large complex firms could be allowed to go bankrupt without major disruptions to the financial system and large costs to society. Significant changes in structure and organization will ultimately be required for this to be achieved. However, the “living will” exercise is an iterative process, and we have only taken the first step in a long journey. The second way to potentially minimize the negative externalities from a firm’s failure would be to avoid a bankruptcy proceeding altogether and instead resolve the firm under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Title II orderly liquidation authority.7,8 The “single point of entry” model has much promise, but much remains to be done before it could be implemented with confidence for a globally active firm. Title II authority is U.S. law. Subsidiaries and affiliates chartered in other countries could be wound down under the bankruptcy laws of those countries, if authorities there did not have full confidence that local interests would be protected. Certain Title II measures including the one-day stay provision with respect to OTC derivatives and other qualified financial contracts may not apply through the force of law outside the United States, making orderly resolution difficult. The other essential dimension of solving TBTF is to make the financial system more robust – addressing structural vulnerabilities that tend to amplify shocks rather than absorb them.

If I am to mention a couple of examples, these would be the Bank for International Settlements, which now devotes a much larger part of its analysis capacity to stability issues, and where we are members of a couple of groups entirely focussed on stability. The most well-known work is that being done on the new capital adequacy rules - Basel II. Another example is the work the Riksbank is heading in surveying central banks’ work on oversight of the financial infrastructure. The Riksbank is also heading the work on reviewing the principles for how public authorities should work with regard to banking supervision. Within the European System of Central Banks we are taking part in the work on producing a European stability report. The Riksbank is also heading the working group that analyses issues regarding cross-border banks with a special emphasis on crisis management. This group reports to both Frankfurt and Brussels. The fact that our analysis work has developed since we published our first report in 1997 does not mean that we can rest on our laurels. We have taken outside assistance in our endeavour to focus and develop our analysis work. A few weeks ago, we presented the assessment of our work on the Financial Stability Report made by an American researcher, a manager at IMF and a manager from a Swedish commercial bank over the year. Happily, the three authors considered that we essentially devoted ourselves to the right issues and used the right approaches.
Recently, a Task Force on Climate-related Financial Risks that operates under the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision looked into the effects of physical and transition risks on banks. This task force, which I have the honour to co-chair with the Federal Reserve System’s Kevin Stiroh, concluded that climate-related risks can be captured in risk categories that are already used by financial institutions and reflected in the Basel Framework, for example credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. This is a key insight which saves us from inventing all kinds of new risk categories. The existing ones will do. However, the task force also concluded that we still need an enhanced toolbox that can better measure climate risks. This is why the ECB is encouraging banks to enhance both the quantity and the quality of their climaterelated disclosures, and to become more transparent about their overall exposures to climaterelated risks. Banks are still in the early stages of incorporating climate change into their risk frameworks; risk identification and risk limits around climate-related goals do not yet actually feature in their risk management processes. This needs to change. Euro area banks need to drastically improve their capacity to manage climate-related and environmental risks and start acknowledging how these risks can drive others, including credit, market, operational and liquidity risks. Crucially, we have no need to await regulatory developments before formulating our expectations for the management of climate-related risks.

The OECD1 estimates that global investments of USD 6.9 trillion every year are required until 2030. And that is just to keep us on track to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Investment will need to be considerably higher than this USD 6.9 trillion figure if we are to live up to our commitment under the Paris Agreement of limiting the increase in global temperatures to 1.5 degrees. To put this number into perspective: we are talking somewhere around 8% percent of global GDP each year. Europe’s financial system is largely bank-based, so banks are playing a pivotal role in greening the economy. But what is the supervisor’s role in this process? The ECB aims to ensure the safety and soundness of the banks we supervise. Climate change creates material risks for banks, so it is our job to ensure that the banks under our supervision address these risks adequately and proactively. Regarding the risks emanating from climate change, our sole aim is to live up to our mandate. There is a knock-on effect of doing so, however, but it is a welcome one. By compelling banks to adequately assess and manage climate-related risks, we are, in effect, safeguarding the financing of the transition to a low-carbon economy as well. If banks proactively manage climaterelated risks, they will not be blindsided by stranded assets, meaning that capital will be preserved and can be used to finance investments in the low-carbon transformation.