samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Central banks were born with the inception of fiat money – banknotes – and they have been pivotal for the take-up of non-cash payment instruments. Among the latter, a growing trend in the last few years has been the preponderance of electronic payments versus traditional paperbased ones – such as cheques – even if this trend varies across regions. This physical dematerialisation is actually ongoing, with the slow move away from dedicated form factors – such as plastic cards – towards entirely digitalised ones, for example solutions embedded in smartphones or other consumer devices. So, regarding money issuance, we have to monitor closely the latest technological innovations. Several central banks, including the oldest one – the Riksbank in Sweden –, have started to study the possibility of a digitallyissued central bank currency which could allow not only commercial banks but also the general public to access central bank money. Second, financial stability: payments are a key vector for trust and confidence in the adequate functioning of the financial system. This requires both secure and efficient payments and financial infrastructures. Therefore regulators attach importance to supporting technological innovations, including via the potential development of more efficient regulation or “Regtechs”, as long as they go hand in hand with low operational risks and high transaction safety. Third, economic services: payments are the nexus where a new ecosystem based on technological innovation and entrepreneurship is blooming.

This has resulted in more active and engaged philanthropy in Asia, leading to an increased demand for more philanthropy-related advisory services by wealthy individuals and families. More of the rich are incorporating philanthropy into their wealth management plans and want professional advice in their philanthropic commitments. As a result, Asia is seeing the growth of professional and institutionalized philanthropy foundations. China alone now has an estimated 900 philanthropic entities. Key challenges remain 12. However, there remain challenges to giving in Asia, mainly because philanthropy is developing at varying stages across Asia, in line with the progress of Asian countries. There are two key issues which donors face: the nascent charity infrastructure to support donors, and weak governance practices by fund recipients. 13. In Asia, there are many causes that need championing, and many problems that need addressing. Donors planning to give in Asia have to first understand the needs of the region, decide on the cause they intend to support, identify the worthy projects, and navigate the giving procedures in each country. 14. The success of giving greatly depends on both the giver and the receiver. Clearly, throwing money at charities does not guarantee success of giving. There needs to be followthrough on the charity’s part to ensure that the money is channelled successfully to the cause. 15. The reality in Asia is that many of the domestic charities are small, and are not equipped to handle large amounts of funds efficiently and accountably.
But, I would prefer having such a tool available in extremis given the potential need to buy time for coordination and critical decision-making. I think it is important to ensure that one can “get to the weekend.” Finally, the work needed to ensure that CCPs can always recover has not yet been completed. This is an issue of increased importance given that their role in the financial system has become more prominent. Where the pendulum may have swung too far At the same time, there are some areas where the pendulum may have swung too far, where the costs of regulation—including compliance costs and the potential impact on the provision of services—are likely to exceed the benefits. In this vein, I favor regulatory relief for smaller banking organizations. First, such firms individually are not systemically important, and therefore do not pose a significant risk to the viability of the U.S. financial system. Second, the regulatory burdens on smaller firms can be heavy because they don’t have the scale over which compliance and other regulatory costs can be spread. Regulatory requirements should be appropriately calibrated to avoid inadvertently creating a competitive advantage for larger financial firms. 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  I also think that the Volcker rule could be modified so that its implementation would be less burdensome. As I see it, regulators could review the criteria for permissible market-making. Trading activity should be viewed as market-making when it is customer-facing and inventories are not excessively large or stale.

William C Dudley: Lessons from the financial crisis Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 6 November 2017. * * * James Bergen, Caren Cox, Gerard Dages, Beverly Hirtle, Anna Kovner, Lisa Kraidin, Lorie Logan, Jonathan McCarthy, and Kevin Stiroh assisted in the preparation of these remarks It is a pleasure to have the opportunity today to speak again at the Economic Club of New York. As we mark the tenth anniversary of the onset of the financial crisis, I would like to focus on some of the lessons we should draw from that harrowing experience, and the implications of those lessons for regulatory policy going forward. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and opinions and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. The first lesson is that financial crises can have grave consequences—for the economy and the nation—that can linger for many years. The toll from the financial crisis was severe, with nine million jobs lost and eight million housing foreclosures amid the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression. Moreover, the road back has been long and slow. Despite economic policies oriented toward supporting recovery, it has taken eight years to push the unemployment rate down to a level consistent with the Federal Reserve’s employment objective.
Both monetary and fiscal policy are inherently counter-cyclical, and arguably never more so than when we face a shock of the scale of a global pandemic. But at the core of the argument for central bank independence is the evidence from the past that without an independent institution operating monetary policy the overall effects of economic policy were dangerously pro-cyclical at times, leading to bad outcomes. In the face of what may be the deepest recession since 1709, with a collapse of economic activity alongside very low inflation, the question we ask ourselves is what should an inflation targeting central bank do in this situation? The lessons of history don’t change. The answer is to respect our remit and our target, no good will come of ignoring that. The logic of counter-cyclical policy is that all the tools should be applied to raise activity and support employment and the welfare of the public, all of which is consistent with an inflation targeting monetary policy. In practice, doing so has meant using tools to keep financial conditions sufficiently accommodative to offset as best we can such a large shock. This has been essential to support the flow of credit to businesses, which has been very substantial, and has called on both the monetary policy and financial stability tools of the Bank of England. This has also helped to lessen any longer term economic damage from the pandemic, resulting from longer term unemployment and business failures.

In the last decade or so, the shocks have been larger and the variance of inflation in a number of countries has at times increased, but with a tendency to undershoot. This has been less marked for the UK, but here still we currently face a period of below target inflation. And, as discussed previously, we have moved into a period of inflation targeting in the face of much larger shocks. To be clear, this does not for a moment call into question the benefits of targeting inflation. Indeed, it is notable that over the same period inflation expectations in the UK have not become de-anchored or more volatile, despite the greater economic volatility. But this shift has required central banks to be somewhat more flexible in the way we go about seeking to hit the inflation target, and the tools we use to do this. This is apparent in a number of approaches used by central banks: the adoption of an averaging over time mechanism to calculate the relevant inflation target, thereby allowing some catch-up to account for past inflation shortfalls; allowing inflation to return to target over a longer period of time where there is a trade-off of weaker activity and above target inflation; or using forward guidance such as the MPC is at present in the face of very great uncertainty, so that we make clear that we will need strong evidence that inflation is likely to return sustainably to target before policy should be tightened.
Although the Hong Kong arrangement, and in particular the status of our Monetary Authority, is unusual internationally and may possibly be unique when compared to the more typical set-up of a central bank established as a distinct corporate entity, the process of monetary policy may not in practice be greatly different from that in other jurisdictions – with the broad framework being set by the government and with the central bank executing the policy in a transparent and accountable fashion. However, we do not have such a precisely defined framework of autonomy for the central bank as exists in some other jurisdictions, which is sometimes regarded as a necessary formal safeguard to monetary stability. The distinction may be less important under our firmly rule-based currency board system than it might be in other circumstances. Legal parameters Let's turn now to the "what" question. Although, as noted already, the Basic Law clearly states that the Hong Kong government shall determine its own monetary policy, it also sets some very important parameters within which that freedom can be exercised. Thus:"The Hong Kong dollar, as the legal tender in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, shall continue to circulate." (Article 111) "No foreign exchange control policies shall be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong dollar shall be freely convertible. …….The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall safeguard the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Region."

(Article 112) "The Exchange Fund of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be managed and controlled by the government of the Region, primarily for regulating the value of the Hong Kong dollar." (Article 113) "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall follow the principle of keeping the expenditure within the limits of revenues in drawing up its budget, and strive to achieve a fiscal balance, avoid deficits and keep the budget commensurate with the growth rate of its gross domestic product." (Article 107) These stipulations confirm the continuance of the Hong Kong dollar as an independent currency; they confirm that the Exchange Fund is available to regulate the exchange rate; they rule out the use of exchange controls; and they provide some comfort that deficit fiscal financing should not attain a scale that would pose a serious threat to monetary stability. Choice of regime But within these parameters the exact monetary arrangements are not prescribed. We have chosen to operate a currency board with a fixed rate against the US dollar. I have recently written and spoken at  2  BIS Review 31/2002  2  some length on the rationale behind this choice and do not intend to repeat all of that today. But let me just reiterate one of my principal contentions – namely that monetary policy, which includes exchange rate policy, cannot determine an economy's competitiveness outside the relatively short term.
To lend, to play their necessary role in enabling economic growth banks need to be healthy. So while it is right that we give banks time to transition to the end point of the new standards, that does not mean that we put off strengthening of capital and liquidity until the end of the process. We have needed in the UK to take action intended to restore banks’ capital positions to health. So that now they can move up to higher Basel III standards. On interconnectedness, we have agreed standards for the $ trillion of derivatives, including CDS, previously sold “over the counter”. This includes the requirements for trading to clear through “central counterparties”. So the risks in these contracts are transparent. So the risks are managed by ensuring that the parties to the contract back up their obligations to each other with collateral as the value of the contract changes. The US has implemented the new standards in law and is now implementing them in practice. In the EU, standards are expected to come into force in the next year or so. Between them, the US and EU account for 80% of this market. To be clear: Progress in this area has not been without setbacks. Although there has been now agreement on an international standard, implementation in the US and EU has differed in a number of key respects. At times these differences have threatened to balkanise what is now a global market.

And if it happens again we will again risk destabilising international financial crises. From the other side, in the absence of mutual trust, there will be increasing pressure to break up the global capital market. Regulators and supervisors who cannot trust the implementation of standards in other jurisdictions will defend stability in their own jurisdictions by raising barriers. Ring-fencing of capital and liquidity, non-recognition of foreign firms, restrictions on activities and extra territorial rules are just some examples of what can happen. Such action minimises the risk of international crises. But the cost is the rolling back of financial globalisation with less effective and efficient intermediation of global savings. So without mutual trust, the danger is either slipping back into weak regulation and supervision and regulatory arbitrage risking further crises or fragmentation of the international financial sector – a rolling back of financial globalisation that will damage global growth. Mutual trust will not be easily achieved. It will require more than hope and faith in our fellow man. Perhaps one day it can be founded on international law and treaty. Until then, however, it has to be built on the institutions and machinery established by those initial G20 meetings in Washington, London and Pittsburgh in 2008 and 2009. And in particular, on the work by the Financial Stability Board and the IMF. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The Financial Stability Board has already established peer review mechanisms to assess implementation in its members.
The test is whether member countries are ready to make genuine commitments to each other. Without that the institutions lack any real purpose. So the subject of my talk today is why we need rules of the game to govern globalisation, and the institutions that are necessary to oversee those rules. 2. Is the post-war settlement still relevant today? At the end of the Second World War, a new global order was put in place by the United States, Britain and their allies. One of those primarily responsible, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, described his time as being “present at the creation” of a new global order. A range of new international institutions was created – the United Nations, the two Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and World Bank), the OEEC that implemented the Marshall Plan (and later became the OECD) , NATO, and GATT (which has subsequently been succeeded by the World Trade Organisation). Those institutions are now, for the most part, past their 60th birthdays. And there has been much heartsearching over the past few years as to their role and governance. Unless the spirit of the original founders is rekindled, there is a real danger that the present institutions will wither on the vine leaving us with a more unstable and fragile international environment. As Martin Wolf pointedly wrote, “To defend a liberal world economy is not to defend the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation or any specific institution.

In my view, there are five principles that should be followed. First, create international institutions only when there is a need to do so. International institutions should focus on those areas of global governance where we need to tackle problems collectively – whether on trade, the environment, or large spillover effects of changes in macroeconomic policy. Second, ensure that the commitments countries enter into are clear. The job of institutions is to support those commitments. In many cases, like an umpire, their job will be to uphold them. That will only be possible if the players – countries – are very clear about the agreed rules of the game. Without that, any further design is pointless. Third, provide institutions with the necessary tools to umpire the commitments of nation states. But, just as umpires are accountable for their performance to the whole community of cricket-playing nations through the International Cricket Council, the staff and management of the international institution should be accountable to the whole community of nation states for their performance in upholding the rules. Fourth, recognise that we do not start with a blank sheet of paper. We must accept the constraints of history. Existing institutions have an institutional memory, talented staff and much of the infrastructure that will be needed in the future. But that is not to say reform will be easy – there are far too many vested interests for that to be the case. Fifth, avoid unnecessary duplication.
Their basis will be consistent with the CACs that are common in New York and English laws. Significantly, all those mechanisms associate the IMF and the European Commission “in consultation” with the ECB to avoid relying only on peer pressure between members states and ensure proper conditionality. As you know, the crisis has also led the Eurosytem to embark on a very limited program of bond purchases. It was our judgment that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy was severely impaired in some cases, as local bond markets were close to paralysis. That program has served us well. Monetary impact was instantly and fully sterilized. Where do we stand? Overall, those changes have been favorably received by the markets. Spreads and CDS on most sovereigns are been trending down since January. Nevertheless, the sense of crisis has not yet disappeared. Most recently, Portugal has asked for an IMF / EFSF program. The success of existing programs remains to be demonstrated. The very progressive elaboration of new framework has prevented outside analysts to see the big picture and measure the amplitude of the changes. There is also a more diffuse concern about sustainability, which I would like to discuss. Looking at aggregate numbers, it is very difficult to understand many of the concerns expressed on the euro area. The Euro area is the only major currency zone with its external accounts in balance, and which therefore does not depend on external finance.

Christian Noyer: The Euro area – challenges and responses Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at a breakfast for the Economic Club, New York, 18 April 2011. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be here today. It is also a privilege to address such a distinguished audience. I would like to take this opportunity to present my assessment of the situation in the euro area, particularly with respect to the difficulties we meet on sovereign debt. Three views on the sovereign crisis in Europe Broadly speaking, opinions and views expressed on the euro area by people outside the Eurozone, can be divided into three categories: hostility for, at least very few people, skepticism and support. First, outright hostility. It is unfortunately true that, in some circles, there is a spontaneous and deeply ingrained opposition to European integration. Since the euro is the most accomplished part of the integration project, it is only natural that it crystallizes those oppositions. Somber predictions about the imminent demise of the euro came predominantly from those deeply anti – European commentators. While those views, like all opinions, should be treated with respect, there is no point in trying to refute arguments which, in great part, are irrational and mainly reflect wishful thinking. Second, skepticism. It emanates mainly, but not only, from academic circles.
In particular, it considers that the economy posted healthy growth in 2018, driven by investment, an impulse that is expected to continue in 2019. Externally, growth in the main economies has shown a sharper-thanexpected deceleration, which has led its authorities to implement further economic stimulus packages. The main difference with respect to December’s baseline scenario was seen in local inflation. Measured by the benchmark Consumer Price Index (CPI) calculated by the National Statistics Institute (INE) based on the updated basket and new methodology, annual CPI variation is significantly below the forecast. This differential between forecast and actual inflation occurs in a context where activity and demand have behaved as expected, which in this Report is explained by a lower-than-expected peso depreciation pass-through, favorable supply factors in some markets and greater capacity gaps than had been estimated until now. Said gaps do not originate in weaker demand, but in the labor force effects of massive immigration to the country, an issue that the Bank has brought up in its presentations to this Commissions for some quarters now. In this context, our projections yield that the convergence of inflation to the 3% target will take almost a year longer than we estimated in December. This provides room for the withdrawal of the monetary stimulus to proceed at a slower pace than was announced before by the Board. This scenario plays out in a context of greater uncertainty in the world economy, where global financial markets remain very susceptible and more negative scenarios may occur.

8  Figure 1 Accumulated inflation, February - December 2018  Evolution of CPI and CPIEFE inflation (1) (2)  (percent)  (annual change, percent)  CPI  2.5  CPIEFE  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  1.0  1.0  4.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5 0.5  0.5 0.0  Basket Basket 2013 2018  Basket 2013  Basket 2018  1.5  CPIEFE  1.0  0.0  3.5  CPI  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0 18  Abr. Jul. Oct.  19  (1) As from January 2019 the lines use the new indexes with annual base 2018=100, so they are not strictly comparable with earler figures. (2) Blue (red) diamonds show the annual CPI (CPIEFE) variation using the 2013=100 basket. As from February 2018, they show the annual change that is obtained by splicing the 2013=100 basket series with the monthly variations in the 2018=100 basket. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). Figure 2 Exchange rate and goods EFE (annual change, percent)  6  30  5  25  4  20 TCN (right axis)  3  goods EFE (*)  2  15 10  1  5  0  0  -1  -5  -2  -10  -3  -15 16  16 Jul.