samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The prospect of the monetary policy stance returning to normal has likewise been reflected in an upturn in long-term interest rates in the euro area. Specifically, the 10year OIS rate, which proxies the euro area risk-free interest rate, has risen by 170 bp since the beginning of the year. 6  Domestic fiscal policy Domestic economic policies also have a key role to play in the current climate. But fiscal policy headroom is constrained by high government debt and structural budget deficits. It is therefore important for domestic fiscal policy to exploit its capacity for highly granular action focused on the households, firms and sectors most vulnerable to this combination of shocks, many of which had not yet fully recovered from the adverse effects of the pandemic. In particular, fiscal policy action should target lower-income households, which bear the brunt of inflation, and more energy-intensive firms. Moreover, again with the aim of minimising their impact on budgetary imbalances, it is important that the fiscal policy measures be temporary so as not to further increase the structural deficit, and that the instruments used do not skew price signals, which would hinder the adjustment in demand. Likewise, averting any feedback into the current inflationary process is further reason to avoid an across-the-board fiscal impulse and the widespread use of automatic indexation clauses in expenditure items. This deindexation must be part of the incomes agreement to which I will return later.

Fiscal 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  policy in the euro area has become mildly expansionary, with the aggregate fiscal stance expected to be –0.4% of GDP in 2019 after five years of being broadly neutral.9 And our forward guidance on monetary policy has been effective, as shown by the continuing easing of financial conditions since last December. The outlook for wages and inflation The weakening growth picture has naturally affected the inflation outlook as well. Our projections for headline inflation this year have been revised downwards and we now see inflation at 1.6% in 2021. Slower growth will also lead to a more muted recovery in underlying inflation than we had previously expected. Reflecting the weaker outlook, market-based measures of inflation expectations have edged down recently. The fall in market-based measures has mainly been driven by a decline in inflation risk premia, a volatile component of overall inflation-linked swap rates, not by a drop in “genuine” inflation expectations. While a decrease in inflation risk premia may suggest that market participants assign increased prominence to lower-than-expected outcomes of future inflation, survey-based measures have remained relatively stable. We therefore remain confident that the sustained convergence of inflation to our aim has been delayed rather than derailed – meaning that we expect inflation to reach our objective at a later date than we previously foresaw. This view is based on our assessment of the resilience of the labour market and therefore of wage growth. Wage dynamics have so far broadly withstood the growth slowdown.
This means that a central bank that has control over monetary indicators should use these indicators as intermediate targets in reaching its final inflation target. On the other hand, in low-inflation environments we have seen how successful the implementation of monetary policy under inflation targeting can be. The ECB will follow both procedures together, in accordance with the principles of independence, transparency, a forward-looking policy orientation and accountability. The ECB’s credibility will grow. It will solve the problems that arise and correct its operational deficiencies. It will strive to attain and maintain price stability. Achievement of this objective in the medium term will create conditions conducive to sustainable growth. Growth and employment will follow a sound path. I see it at this stage as a perfectly designed set of strategies and applications. *  *  *  BIS Review 1/1999

Ong Chong Tee: Review of post-crisis regulatory reforms and initiatives Opening address by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the ISDA Regulators and Industry Forum, Singapore, 13 November 2017. * * * Mr Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman CFTC, Mr Scott O’Malia, CEO ISDA, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen 1. Allow me to first thank ISDA for inviting my colleagues and I to join you today in this Regulators and Industry Forum, and for me to deliver the opening remarks. LOOKING BACK 2. Let me start with an analogy from the popular children story of The Three Little Pigs and the Big Bad Wolf. I am sure you are all familiar with that – how the Big Bad Wolf ‘huffed and puffed’ and blew down the houses of straw and sticks; except for the one made of bricks. 3. Almost a decade ago, we had a Big Bad Wolf that blew down the house of global finance, triggering the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In the post-crisis commentaries and debates that followed, a lot of attention had focused on who was the Big Bad Wolf at that time – was it Lehman together with other investment banks, insurance companies and hedge funds, or was it this product called subprime mortgages? But the more important lesson was that the global financial system was not as robust nor sturdy as previously thought.
Euroclear Bank, with over 300,000 securities in 2011 and holds clients’ assets valued at EUR 10.8 trillion, provides a huge reservoir to support cross-border cross-currency collateralised lending. Its large investor base will also provide a powerful platform for global investors to access the markets in Hong Kong and Malaysia. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Bank Negara Malaysia and Euroclear for sharing our vision and working with us to bring it to fruition. The platform will offer a wide range of services to global and domestic investors. These services include a global securities database containing information of international and domestic securities, provision of a single point of entry to allow investors to buy and hold international and domestic bonds through their accounts of the local system, cross-border issuance and settlement of bonds in foreign currencies on a delivery-versus-payment basis, provision of an effective and efficient channel for cross-border cross-currency collateralised lending and borrowing between financial institutions, and automation and standardisation of the corporate action processing such as interest payments and redemption, distribution of corporate action notices, and exercise of custody instructions. My colleague Esmond will explain these arrangements in greater details shortly. Finally, I would like to stress that the Pilot Platform to be launched is meant to be inclusive, not exclusive, and we welcome the participation of more parties. The benefits in promoting bond market development and financial stability can only increase with more bond investment and settlement systems in the region joining as partners.

As the e-krona is something new, it will take time to analyse and perhaps develop such an alternative. This work must therefore be initiated in  The Riksbank sent out a consultation over joining TIPS on 5 June 2018. See Consultation on instant payments and the Riksbank's role in the payment infrastructure. www.riksbank.se. 4  2 [8]  good time, before cash usage has declined to such a point that cash is no longer a generally accepted means of payment in Sweden. The Riksbank's e-krona project: results and the way forward In my speech, I introduced the discussion of the e-krona by asking whether the Riksbank should adapt the money we issue to the modern, digital economy. I emphasised then that the e-krona should be seen as a complement to cash, which was in the process of becoming marginalised. I also pointed out the need of working in parallel in three areas: investigating the technical possibilities, analysing the consequences for, among other things, monetary policy, and reviewing the legal issues to which a possible e-krona would give rise. After two years, I can say that we have come quite far within all of these areas, but also that we still have some way to go until we reach our goal. We have discovered that it would be possible to develop an e-krona using existing technology, but we will have to start constructing and testing a finished product to learn more and to establish different alternatives for the Riksbank in the future.
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Forecasts of UND1X at different times and actual outcome Annual percentage change  4  4  UND1X, outcome Inflation Report 2004:4 Inflation Report 2003:1 Inflation Report 2002:1  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 2000  0 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  2. Productivity growth in the business sector since 1980 and HP trend Annual percentage change 8  8 Business sector Forecast HP-trend  7 6  7 6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2  -3 -4 1981  1981-1990: 1.7%  1984  1987  1991-1994: 2.8%  1990  1993  1995-2000: 3.2%  1996  1999  -3  2001-2004: 3.0%  2002  -4 2005  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 18/2005  7  3. Forecasts of CPI inflation in 2004 at various times: the Riksbank and an average of other forecasters Annual average  3.0  3.0  Riksbank Average of other forecasters Outcome (0.5) Lowest forecast Highest forecast  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0 Dec-02  Jun-03  Dec-03  0.0 Dec-04  Jun-04  Sources: Consensus Inc., Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  4.
Sources: Swedish National Mediation Office, Swedish Public Employment Service and the Riksbank  Figure 5 indicates that this is not really the case during this period. Seen over the entire period, the correlation, if anything, is negative. If we look again at developments since 2011, the curve is almost horizontal, once again reflecting that wage increases have been low and stable. We have now looked at the correlations between wage increases and unemployment and between wage increases and the number of job openings. Let us complete the cycle and also study the third possible combination, that is, the correlation between the number of job openings and unemployment. The Beveridge curve shows how well the labour market is functioning The correlation between job openings, or job vacancies to be exact, and unemployment is another well-known curve within economics. It is called the Beveridge curve and like the Phillips curve was developed in 1958. In contrast to the Phillips curve, however, William Beveridge was not the originator of the curve, but a British economist who gave his name to the curve as a result of his commitment to labour issues such as unemployment and skills matching. The Beveridge curve is a way of measuring how well the labour market is functioning. It is reasonable to assume that when demand in the economy is high, the number of job openings rises while unemployment falls, and vice versa. The correlation should therefore be negative. But it is above all the position on the Beveridge curve that is interesting.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  The first is that one must of course have regulations in a monetary union that enable one to avoid a crisis of the proportions we are seeing now. This was what the creators of the union were thinking when they initiated the Stability and Growth Pact. However, the pact did not work very well and intensive discussions are therefore underway as to how it can be supplemented with new regulations that will guarantee that no members have excessive budget deficits or can build up excessive debt burdens. Hopefully these discussions will bear fruit. However, it is far from certain that the developments we are seeing now could have been avoided even if the Stability and Growth Pact had been upheld. Low interest rates have meant that not only governments, but also companies and households have built up their debt. But an efficient regulatory system would probably have made the crisis more manageable. A second conclusion is that when one refrains from the crisis resolution mechanism inherent in a national currency, one must replace it with something else. Because crises that entail concern over a member state’s creditworthiness are always a risk. One must have an institutional framework to manage the investors’ concerns regarding rising bond yields in, for instance, Italy now that there is no Italian currency that can depreciate and the Banca d’Italia cannot create the necessary liquidity.
We can thus say that the cost in terms of unemployment of the fact that the average rate of inflation has fallen below the target is approximately 38,000 unemployed.11 As explained in my paper (Svensson 2012d) the sloping long-run Phillips curve is arguably relevant only when the average rate of inflation deviates moderately from inflation expectations and the target (for example deviations less than plus/minus one percentage point). In the case of larger average deviations it is likely that inflation expectations will eventually adjust. Inflation closer to the target would mean 65,000 fewer unemployed An increase in unemployment of about 38,000 people is the average cost for the tight monetary policy conducted during the period from 1997 to the end of 2011. So what is the cost of the tight policy being conducted now? How much lower would unemployment be now if a more expansionary monetary policy had been conducted during the past two years, as consistently advocated by my Executive Board colleague Karolina Ekholm and myself since summer 2010? Let us assume that inflation would have been one percentage point higher and thus been closer to the target now. According to my working paper (2012d), the slope of the long-run Phillips curve, 0.75, is not only relevant in the long run, but also a year or so ahead. A rate of  10  See Svensson (2012d). A 95 per cent confidence interval for the slope is given by 0.75 ± 0.35, that is an interval between 0.4 and 1.1.

This is in stark contrast to the situation in countries such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom which have had a fixed inflation target as long as Sweden. In these countries, the rate of inflation has been at or very close to the inflation target (in the case of the United Kingdom until the end of 2007).2 As, according to the Prospera surveys, inflation expectations in Sweden have been firmly anchored to the target since 1997,  1  See Svensson (2011) for a comparison of monetary policy in Sweden and the United States since the summer of 2010, including which monetary policy has been better balanced. 2  As discussed in Svensson (2012d), Australia has had an inflation target in the form of an interval between 2 and 3 per cent, that is, with a midpoint of 2.5 per cent, since the middle of 1993. Average inflation for the period 1997–2011 was 2.7 per cent. Canada has had an inflation target since 1991 and the target has been 2 per cent since 1995. Average inflation for the period 1997–2011 was 2.0 per cent. The United Kingdom has had an inflation target since the end of 1992. From 1996 to 2003 the target was 2.5 per cent measured using the RPIX index. Average RPIX inflation for the period 1997–2003 was 2.4 per cent. Since 2004, the target has been 2 per cent measured in terms of the CPI. Average CPI inflation for the period 2003–2007 was 2.0 per cent.
Conclusion My theme today has been that perceptions may be at variance with reality, but it is often perceptions that drive financial markets. Economic fundamentals can probably explain some of the euro’s weakness over the past 14 months, but not all of it. I have tried to be frank in my assessment of the way in which the euro is viewed from Asia. I hope I have not been so frank as to be discourteous. Sentiment does appear currently to be somewhat frail and the outlook uncertain. I derive no satisfaction at all from that - we are all in more or less the same boat when it comes to the vagaries of the markets. And as the manager of Hong Kong’s substantial foreign reserves, I am also held accountable for the investment decisions taken. But I am confident that sentiment will improve and our investment in the euro will come good. 7  BIS Review 23/2000

1 Article 3.3 of the Treaty on the European Union. 2 Article 127.5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 3 The monetary policy strategy review: some preliminary considerations, Speech by Christine Lagarde, President  of the ECB, at the “ECB and Its Watchers XXI”conference, 30 September 2020 4 www.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/2020.05.25_sep_en_cl.pdf 5  See Blanchard & Summers (2020), Automatic Stabilizers in a Low-Rate Environment, AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol 110, May. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
13  Figure 3 Domestic demand and components (real annual change, percent)  8  20  6  15 Private consumption  4 2  Final demand (*)  10 5  0  0  -2  Machinery & -5 equipment (right axis)  -4  -10  Construction & other works  -6  -15  -8  -20 14  15  16  17  (*) Without inventory change. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 4 Labor market (percent)  9  Total employment (annual change)  Unemployment rate  6  10  Self-employed (annual change) (right axis)  3  15  5  0  0  -3  Salaried (annual change)  -6  -5 -10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). 14  Figure 5 Consumer expectations: IPEC (1)  Interest rate by type of loan (2)  (original series)  (index, July 2017=100)  80 Country's economic Purchases of situation 12 mo.

More specifically, the energy component is the largest contributor to the surging trend of domestic headline inflation (with around 45% share of HICP). We expect that our domestic short-term inflation outlook will continue to remain, overall, at very elevated levels, similar to the euro area inflation developments, amid the ongoing significant uncertainty and volatility resulting from the war. More specifically, Cyprus HICP inflation for 2022 has been revised upwards in our most recent projections, now reaching 8,4 percent compared with 7,0 percent in the CBC June 2022 projections. Banking sector n this ever changing and uncertain economic environment, the Cyprus Banking Sector is proving resilient, exhibiting a solid and healthy financial standing. The solvency position, as measured by the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio was edging up to 17,5 percent in the second quarter of 2022, a level higher than the respective European average of 15,2 percent. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio, indicating the availability of liquid funds against deposit outflows over a 30 day stressed period, stood at the level of 320 percent in July 2022 which is more than 3 times higher than the minimum requirement of 100 percent, placing Cyprus amongst the most liquid banking sectors in the Union, where the average LCR amounts to 168 percent.
One factor that indicates growth could continue to be high in these countries is that intra-regional trade has increased in Asia and the continent is therefore less exposed to negative direct and indirect trade effects from countries outside Asia. This is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, which show how exports from China and India have developed per trading partner. Figure 4 Chinese exports Percentage of total Chinese exports, ASEAN includes India  Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China  2  This applies to the value of exports in nominal terms. 3  The Riksbank’s company interviews, September 2011  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 5 Indian exports Percentage of total Indian exports, ASEAN includes China  Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India  As the figures show, an increasing proportion of China’s and India’s exports are going to countries in the rest of Asia and exports to the United States have declined in importance. China and India are thus somewhat less sensitive than previously to weaker demand in the European Union and the United States. However, it is clear that the European Union is still the most important export market for these countries, which means that weak economic development in Europe will have significant consequences for growth prospects in China and India too.

Now - although there are some encouaging signs - frankly no-one can know the answer to that question with any great confidence - we are not blessed with perfect foresight! As the IMF says in one of its documents prepared for the recent meetings: “Striking the right balance for monetary policy in this environment is a difficult challenge.” Well you can say that again! It is hardly surprising against this background that there should be disagreement within the Monetary Policy Committee as to whether or not a marginal further tightening of monetary policy is necessary-in fact I would normally expect there to be disagreement when we are close to where we need to be. But we are all unambiguously clear about where we need to get to in terms of inflation, and it is unrealistic in the circumstances - indeed in any circumstances - to expect us to say what will happen to interest rates in the future. Mr. Chairman, the overall prospect for the world economy - and indeed our own domestic economy - is for continuing growth with low inflation, and we do I think have a clear vision of where we want to go and the policies to take us there. But there are certainly a number of immediately painful blackspots - internationally and here at home - and there are some formidable rocks and potential whitewater further ahead. Navigating through them will not be easy. I only hope that our snail is able to swim. BIS Review 36/1998