samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Early Observations on Improving the Effectiveness of Post-crisis Regulation, Speech at the  American Bar Association Banking Law Committee Annual Meeting. January 19, 2018. 4 An important exception to this is that losses on trading book positions and counterparty exposures as a result of  the global market shock continue to be based on sensitivities generated by bank models. 5 The ClearingHouse. The ClearingHouse Offers Recommendations to Improve Stress Testing Transparency,  January 22, 2018. 6 Til Schuermann. “The Fed’s Stress Tests Add Risk to the Financial System.” Wall Street Journal. March 19,  2013. 7 W. Scott Frame, Kristopher Gerardi and Paul S. Willen. The Failure of Supervisory Stress Testing: Fannie Mae,  Freddie Mac and OFHEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2015–3. March 2015. 8 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Board requests comment on package of  proposals that would increase the transparency of its stress testing program, December 7, 2017. 9 See, for instance, Itay Goldstein and Haresh Sapra. “Should Banks’ Stress Test Results be Disclosed? An  Analysis of Costs and Benefits.” Foundations and Trends in Finance. Vol. 8. March 2014. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

We are building a system that will be flexible to protect against the threats we understand today and the ones we will need to withstand in the future. The renewed service will provide a platform for private sector innovation and one which can respond to and shape a fast changing environment. We will harness leading edge technology to deliver this, coupled with changes to our policies to support growth and resilience. Key features will include:   The renewed service will have a flexible and modular architecture, making it easier to change components of the service or add new components. This will enable us to respond quickly to market changes and continued innovation in payment technologies both from new fintechs and established players. Ultimately, we want to future-proof RTGS to interface with firms and technology that may not exist today.   The renewed service will not be built on a Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) but firms who use DLT will be able to connect to the service. We have completed a Proof of Concept to understand 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  whether our renewed service could be capable of supporting settlement in systems operating on innovative payment technologies. The punchline was that it could. We continue to engage with fintech firms to maintain our understanding of technology developments.
Upon significant alignment with the European capital requirements, the focus will now be on the process of managing liquidity, but also on strengthening risk management in general, especially credit risk, which given the structure of banking activities is the most significant risk in the banking book. Project activities are in line with the latest Joint Conclusions of the economic and financial dialogue with the EU and among other things are aimed to further reduce non-performing loans, i.e. improve the quality of banks’ balance sheets, which is important prerequisite for stronger credit support. I am pleased that this project validates our strategic goal of providing quality statistical data, fully compliant with international and European statistical standards. Specifically, the third project component focuses on the further development of financial account statistics, which is key to identifying cross-sectoral linkages within an economy and thereby identifying any possibility of spillover of shocks from one sector into another. Recently, we have taken a number of activities in this segment. Almost two years ago, we made our first data transfer of the annual accounts - stock to Eurostat, and in April last year, we prepared detailed data on the flow of assets and liabilities for the government sector, which is one of the key components in compiling spreadsheets for the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). The project activities will be aimed to further improving of the quality of this statistics, especially given that its first release is scheduled for next year.

In the coming years, the greater global participation in this developmental process, both directly and indirectly, would enhance the potential role that Islamic finance would have in contributing towards greater global financial stability in the international financial system. BIS Review 136/2008  5
But it is those very things that make intelligence from the Townhalls distinctive and valuable. Statistical surveys cannot capture narrative in a way conversations can. The Townhall visits have been one of the most enlightening things I have done in my almost 30 years at the Bank of England. The Bank has recently expanded and deepened its range of local initiatives. One of these is Citizens’ Panels.63 After a couple of trials last year, the Bank recently began rolling-out Citizens’ Panels across each of its regional agencies. These panels have an independent external chair, drawn from the local region, to facilitate discussion. Each is attended by a senior Bank policymaker. Messages from the panels will be drawn together periodically and published externally. Complementing Citizens’ Panels, the Bank’s direct engagement with community groups is now being expanded through a set of “Community Forums”, working in partnership with local charities and community groups. The Governor recently launched these forums with events in Tower Hamlets and Glasgow. Other Governors and Directors have their own Community Forums planned through this year and beyond. The Bank’s education programme also has strong local presence. The educational materials developed by the Bank for 11-16 year olds, econoME, have been taken up by a third of schools across the UK. Last year, staff ambassadors visited close to 300 schools across the UK to deliver talks on the economy and economic policy. These are examples of a central bank acting locally.

This accordingly holds even if activity does move into a more subdued phase. •  The overall picture of inflation is also complicated by the krona having been weak recently instead of appreciating as we assumed in October. Moreover, the price of oil remains high. This may mean that the earlier tendency for import prices to counter what has otherwise been gradually growing domestic inflationary pressure may not apply to the same extent. In this respect, then, the outlook is more in line with the risk spectrum we outlined in the October Report than with our main scenario there. The composite assessment of the various risks associated with wage formation, the exchange rate, the price of oil and the possibility of weaker activity is naturally a matter of judgement. In my opinion, however, inflation prospects in general are now somewhat more troublesome than before. There has clearly been a gradual increase in resource utilisation. The overall assessment of activity in the coming years implies that growth will continue to be above the level of 2.0 to 2.5% that the Riksbank considers to be sustainable in the longer run. That applies even if there is a slight slowdown in international activity. There are also the high price of oil, the weakening of the exchange rate and signs of some disturbing tendencies in wage formation. To some extent, therefore, the situation for monetary policy has changed. That is also why I began by saying that the time will soon come to raise the repo rate.
The current account balances are in surplus, the foreign currency reserves are at record highs and the external debt levels are at significantly lower levels, with improved maturity profiles. Government budget positions are broadly stronger with ongoing measures towards consolidation. Inflation has generally been contained, despite the recent adjustments due to the high oil prices. More flexible exchange rate regimes are also now in place allowing for the potential for smooth adjustments to external shocks. In this environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) has also continued to increase reflecting confidence in the ASEAN economies. In 2005, foreign direct investment to the ASEAN economies reached USD 37 billion, exceeding the pre-crisis peak of USD 34 billion in 1997. Economic flexibility in ASEAN has been enhanced Economic flexibility has always been one of ASEAN’s strengths. It has been a major element that has facilitated adjustment to the changing global environment and to external shocks. This economic flexibility of the ASEAN economies has ten years later been further augmented. This has been  BIS Review 46/2007  1  achieved by the increased labour and capital mobility, financial market development, a strengthened financial system, and the extensive institutional developments that have taken place. Economic flexibility has been important in enabling the ASEAN economies to shift to new areas of comparative advantage. Significant changes in economic structures have taken place and shifts to new sectors have occurred in response to the changing global competitive dynamics.

Specifically, the ASEAN Roadmap on Capital Account Liberalization, launched in 2003, aims to gradually achieve a freer flow of capital over the medium-term. Malaysia has since progressively further liberalised its rules for foreign exchange transactions culminating in the removal of most of the rules in April 2005. Strengthened regional financial cooperation During the 1997/1998 crisis, Asia did not come together to collaboratively and cumulatively act to contain the crisis and subsequently to facilitate its resolution. Perhaps, it was due to the nature of the crisis, its severity on the financial markets and the economies. Domestic stability had to be first restored before time could be taken to formulate a holistic crisis management solution. The instability in the currency markets lasted for about one and a half years. There was also no entity in the region during that period that provided any authoritative assessment on whether the programmes that were subsequently being implemented would in fact produce the desired outcomes. While efforts to strengthen the domestic economies and the financial systems will continue, this has now being reinforced by the improved regional surveillance including on cross border financial flows, and by institutional arrangements that would contribute towards crisis containment and management. The regional cooperative efforts going forward will continue to gain momentum. These efforts should not be seen as attempting to substitute but rather as efforts to complement the existing international arrangements.
As a result, the increase in nominal GDP would be around 4%. At end-2015 the overall general government deficit target (4.2% of GDP) is expected to be met. For 2016, a deficit of 2.8% of GDP is targeted, which would involve attaining – for the first time since 2007 – a figure close to the 3% ceiling established in the Stability and Growth Pact. In turn, the public debt/GDP ratio would stand at 98.2% in 2016, having posted a figure of 98.7% at end-2015, which would mean a decline in this ratio for the first time since 2007. The macroeconomic scenario used to devise the Draft Budget is, as I earlier stated, and with slight upward differences, similar in terms of rates and composition to that I described when referring to the Banco de España forecasts and, more generally, to the consensus of analysts. It is reasonable to expect the improved cyclical position and the reduction in public debt yields to have a positive direct effect on public finances. In this respect, the upward revision of the Spanish economy’s growth prospects means that the budgetary drive required to further the fiscal consolidation process, measured by the change in the primary structural balance, will be very limited, in line with the latest Updated Stability Programme, which anticipated that the fiscal policy stance would be essentially neutral in the 2015–2018 period. Naturally, any slippage in growth or rise in financing costs would hamper fiscal consolidation, making the process more demanding.

While growth in both the Asian and Latin American emerging economies remains below par, the latest indicators show that the United States and the United Kingdom appear to have picked up speed, following the weak first-quarter results this year. Economic recovery is also holding up in the euro area. GDP grew by 0.4% in the first quarter of this year and, on the latest preliminary estimate released last Friday, by 0.3% in the second quarter. For the year as a whole, projections envisage figures of around 1.5%, considerably up on end-2014 estimates. Private consumption continues to be the driving force here, while the contribution of private investment remains moderate. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Turning to inflation, both actual and projected euro area rates have now turned around from the declining trajectory marking their path throughout 2014, but inflation is still some way off the ECB’s reference level of 2% for the euro area. The favourable performance of euro area economic activity and prices is underpinned by certain external factors, such as the pick-up in the global economy and lower oil prices, but also by other factors whose origin lies in the economic policy decisions adopted by the national governments and the European authorities. These include most notably the reforms undertaken in different countries and the more neutral stance of fiscal policies.
There is also an undertaking that any changes to the content of the letter, and any changes to the delegations, shall be made public. These commitments provide important safeguards of the independence of the HKMA in its day-to-day operations. I should add here that there has never in the past been any instance of the Financial Secretary's overriding or bypassing the Monetary Authority in the exercise of these delegated powers. So we would not expect to see disclosures of this kind very often. Nor would we expect to see frequent changes to the content of the letter or the form of the delegations, for an important part of operational independence is that it should be stable and predictable, and not something that is tinkered with at whim. The Exchange of Letters will, I believe, provide a clear basis for the HKMA to continue to carry out its work with a high level of autonomy in the years to come. Conclusion These will, naturally, be years of challenge for Hong Kong: there have been very few times in Hong Kong when this was not the case. The HKMA, as Hong Kong's central banking institution, has its part to play in helping Hong Kong meet the challenges. It also has its own special challenges. The main challenges in central banking are to maintain a monetary and banking environment that is optimal for stable and sustainable economic growth, and, particularly in the case of present-day Hong Kong, an environment that is conducive to resolving our current problems.

The latter is the responsibility of the Monetary Authority, who (to quote from the Exchange of Letters) shall "on his own be responsible for achieving the monetary policy objective, including determining the strategy, instrument and operational means for doing so." An accompanying letter from the Financial Secretary to the Monetary Authority  BIS Review 44/2003  5  specifies in black and white, for the first time, the monetary policy objective and the structure of the monetary system for Hong Kong. In fact, this accompanying letter does nothing more than describe the existing arrangements, which have been transparently clear to all of us for the past 20 years. Nevertheless, the clarity with which this objective is now expressed, and the responsibility now formally given by the Financial Secretary to me, as Monetary Authority, to achieve independently this monetary policy objective have important things to say about the operational independence - and accountability - of the HKMA. The second aspect of this Exchange of Letters is, in my view, even more important. This involves the disclosure, for the first time, of the details of the delegation of statutory powers from the Financial Secretary to the Monetary Authority to enable the Monetary Authority to discharge independently his functions and responsibilities. In making this disclosure, the Financial Secretary commits himself to explaining publicly, within three months, subject to considerations of market sensitivity, any decision by him to override or bypass the Monetary Authority in the exercise of these delegated powers.
Indeed, since 1998, the median forecast from this SPF question has stayed within a very narrow range. However, the amount of disagreement around this median has increased recently. Much of this increase is related to lower forecasts for the 10-year average. During the past decade many central banks have begun to explore ways to improve through surveys their measurement and understanding of the public’s inflation expectations. At the New York Fed in November last year we had a conference where many different aspects of this research were discussed. In addition to initiating new surveys and gradually moving from traditionally qualitative to more quantitative questions and measures, research is being conducted to analyze the quality and information content of survey-based measures of consumer inflation expectations. In late 2006 at the New York Fed we initiated a major research project to examine a number of issues: First, what is the best way to measure the public’s inflation expectations in terms of inflation concepts and forecast horizon? Second, how do households form and update their expectations of future inflation: to what extent are they based on past inflation experiences and what information sources do they rely on? Third, do people act on their expectations and if so, how? My remarks today will mainly focus on the first set of issues, but I will conclude with some preliminary research on the other two.

The growing internationalisation and cross-border activities in Islamic finance in recent years further accentuates the importance to enhance the ability of the Islamic financial system to withstand shocks from externalities. Moreover, access to a robust liquidity management infrastructure will reduce the cost of intermediation which is an important enabler for a more efficient and competitive Islamic financial system. Recognising that liquidity management in the Islamic financial system is still under-developed, a Liquidity Task Force was established by the IFSB in 2009 with the aim to formulate an institutional arrangement to address this need. Significant progress has already been made in this endeavor with several key proposals now at the final stage for operationalisation. When operationalised, this liquidity mechanism will be another landmark development for Islamic finance. Conclusion The recent global financial crisis has spurred the resolve of the world community to chart a new course towards greater and lasting social and economic stability with fairness and accountability. Whilst this presents a unique opportunity for Islamic finance to transition into the next development stage of greater international integration, there needs to be a higher level of resilience to withstand the new challenges it will bring. This, in essence, requires the strengthening of the financial infrastructure to preserve the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial system. Indeed, our collective will to mobilise a higher level of global cooperation in promoting this outcome will enhance the prospects of Islamic finance to contribute towards securing global financial stability and a greater shared prosperity. 6  BIS Review 64/2010
Equation 3 illustrates the relationship between the current account balance as a flow and the net international investment position as a stock. The current account balance in a particular year corresponds to the change in the net international investment position in that year, adjusted for other influencing variables. Or, put another way, the net international investment position consists of the accumulated current account balances over the period. The other influencing variables, besides the current account balance, which can affect the net international investment position include exchange rate movements as well as changes in domestic and foreign asset prices. An appreciation of the local currency usually reduces the net international investment position, irrespective of the current account balance, as foreign assets are mainly denominated in foreign currency, and foreign liabilities in local currency. Since such valuation effects now play a major role, the current account does not offer a complete picture of developments in the net international investment position. Switzerland’s current account After this quick refresher of the relevant interrelationships concerning the current account, let’s look at the development of the current account in Switzerland from a slightly more longterm perspective. Chart 1 shows the annual balances on the current account in Switzerland during the period 1960–2016 as a share of GDP. The current account has been in surplus since the 1980s. The 3 4  Prior to the financial crisis, Switzerland’s current account balance had long been dominated by net investment income. In statistics, deviations from this equation cannot be avoided.

If we are to fulfil our legal mandate to ensure price stability while taking due account of the development of the economy, we have to implement expansionary measures in such circumstances, in order to counter the strong franc. In the current environment of very low interest rates worldwide, it is not possible to steer monetary conditions exclusively via the interest rate channel. In addition to the negative interest rate (–0.75%), the SNB influences monetary conditions by intervening directly on the foreign exchange market as necessary. The goal of this policy is to reduce pressure on the currency and to make Swiss franc investments less attractive. Our foreign exchange market interventions do not amount to a mercantilist policy at the expense of Switzerland’s trading partners or a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy; rather, this policy provides the SNB with a necessary instrument for ensuring price stability and for fulfilling its mandate. What would happen if we were to interpret the current account surplus as an indicator of the Swiss franc tending to be too weak, or of the economy growing strongly, without taking these particularly Swiss circumstances into account? We would misjudge the risks to price stability and economic development, with which we have repeatedly been confronted in the recent past. And we would not make any appreciable reduction to the current account surplus, even if the franc were stronger. Allow me to illustrate this point with a simple chart.