samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This development, which has been under way for several decades already, has accelerated as a result of the impact of the crisis on births and migratory flows. People over the age of 65, who in 1970 made up less than 10% of the population, currently account for 21% and, according to INE projections, will represent more than a quarter of the Spanish population within 15 years. Currently, two types of adverse effects of this phenomenon on economic growth can be identified. First, population ageing is leading to a reduction in the number of persons prepared to work or seek employment. Second, indirect negative effects of population ageing on productivity, saving and investment decisions and innovation can be identified. As a result, ageing poses enormous challenges for fiscal policy, since a smaller labour force, that is possibly on average less productive, will have to support the vital needs of a growing number of dependent persons. In fact, the scope and consequences of population ageing form the backdrop to the other long-term challenges facing the Spanish economy. Towards a greater use of the labour factor The formulas to combat the effects of demographic developments involve the search for means to achieve a greater use of the labour factor and higher productivity growth. Despite the recovery, employment still stands below its pre-crisis level. The unemployment rate in the first quarter of 2017 was 18.8%, far higher than in the other euro area countries, 5/8  with the exception of Greece.

Finally, it may also be said that, from a medium and long-term perspective, population ageing exerts upward pressure on items such as healthcare, care for the elderly and, in particular, pensions. In this latter case, the reforms introduced in recent years, such as raising the retirement age, the definition of a factor of sustainability linking the initial pension to the increase in life expectancy, and the new mechanism that makes the annual revision of pensions conditional upon balance between the system’s revenue and expenses, with ceilings and floors, have  7/8  contributed to containing the increase in expenditure and to shoring up the long-term sustainability of the pensions system. That said, in the absence of increased revenues, the adjustment mechanism would rest mainly on a reduction in the average pension relative to the average wage, which is known as the “replacement rate”. With a view to the future, it would be advisable to set an “objective replacement rate”, on the basis of which system revenues should be adjusted to ensure their sustainability. It would moreover be desirable if the reform strategy chosen were to lead to an increase in the system’s transparency and a stronger relationship between contributions and benefits, maintaining automatic adjustment mechanisms that ensure financial equilibrium. Challenges for the European Union governance framework I should like to conclude with a very brief reference to the risks arising in Europe and globally too from political positions and currents of opinion contrary to globalisation and free trade.
There are tougher rules for fiscal policies, stronger oversight of macroeconomic imbalances, a lender of last resort for sovereigns in the form of the European Stability Mechanism, and there will soon be a sounder and more integrated banking sector thanks to the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The euro area has gone through its difficult initial learning phase, and new members will reap the benefits, which certainly outweigh the costs associated with the existence of these institutions. Joining a stronger euro area will increase the long-term prosperity of its members and their resilience to adverse shocks. But there are also other concrete benefits stemming from trade and foreign direct investment, which will be bolstered, especially given Lithuania’s strong trade ties with its two Baltic neighbours in the euro area, Estonia and Latvia. Moreover, Lithuania will be an equal partner at the Governing Council table and will fully participate in deciding monetary policy for the whole monetary union. Do you share the view that being a member of the euro area is an additional safeguard for countries such as the Baltic states or Finland against the spillover effects of geopolitical tensions in Europe (or even an insurance policy against Russian aggression), such as those that we have recently witnessed in Ukraine? Does the euro make us safer and, if so, how? While we currently consider geopolitical developments as a downside risk to growth, I will refrain from commenting on the political aspects of these tensions, as these issues fall outside the mandate of the ECB.

As regards the economic effects, the recent crisis concerning Ukraine and the consequent imposition of sanctions on and by Russia has so far had limited spillover effects on the euro area economy, either via trade or financial links. However, the Baltic states and Finland are more likely to feel any negative effects than other euro area economies owing to the strong trade ties they have with their eastern neighbours. But on the economic risks, I would like to add that the European “family” provides safety nets to partly offset the negative effects of geopolitical tensions related to Russia and Ukraine. For instance, the European Commission announced support measures to protect food producers affected by Russia’s food embargo. The euro area is a large market that can help Lithuanian producers to make up for losses from the Russian market. Finally, euro area countries can use the emergency liquidity lines provided in euro by their national central banks, which in turn would receive euro liquidity from the Eurosystem, in the event of significant turbulences in the financial sector. Why is lending to the real economy in the euro area sluggish? What else needs to be done in addition to the mix of different measures that the ECB is applying, such as low interest rates (or negative interest rates for bank deposits at the ECB) and the planned asset-backed securities programme? It is true that credit dynamics remain weak. At the same time, recent trends show some positive changes.
Under these conditions, a revision in inflation targets has become a technical necessity. Therefore, the Central Bank of Turkey proposed the government to revise the targets for 2009 and 2010 to 7.5 and 6.5 percent, respectively; and to set the target for 2011 at 5.5 percent, and the government accepted our proposal. I would like to re-emphasize that, we will not treat the revised targets symmetrically. Monetary policy will aim to keep inflation below the revised target path. Dear Guests, We stick to our price stability objective. At the same time, we are aware of challenges we have to face. First of all, the rapid rise in food prices may be more permanent than expected due to rapid economic growth, slowdown in agricultural productivity and employment shift from agriculture to industries. Considering the fact that food has a higher share in the consumption basket of developing economies, including Turkey, this would lead to a decoupling in inflation rates between industrialized world and developing countries for years to come. 2  BIS Review 79/2008  Similarly, commodity prices may remain elevated for the foreseeable future, which may prove to be a challenge for Turkey in particular. Note that Turkey is a net commodity importer in contrast to many other developing countries. Last, but not least, price stability necessitates stability in financial markets. We need to put our house in order to attract foreign capital with long-term horizon, rather than highly mobile short-term capital.

The two cities are situated in different regions and their real economies have different clientele. With capital account controls still in place on the Mainland, the further opening up of Shanghai, such as the development of its Free Trade Zone, will lead to closer and more extensive business, trade and financial links between the two cities, meaning more business opportunities. In 2000, there were 23 flights a day between Hong Kong and Shanghai. In 2013, this had increased to 75, clearly demonstrating that the continuous growth of Shanghai will result in more business exchanges with Hong Kong and creating a win-win situation. 9. Indeed, the launch of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect on November 17 resonates with my assertions here in several ways. Last week, Vice-Premier Ma Kai told the visiting delegation of the Hong Kong Association of Banks that the scheme was not only a 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  milestone for financial co-operation between Hong Kong and Shanghai, but also a strategic move towards the Mainland’s capital account convertibility and the opening up of its capital market. Furthermore, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect adds another important channel for the circulation of renminbi between onshore and offshore markets. It is also a strong vote of confidence in Hong Kong’s development as an international financial centre, reaffirming our unique role as the offshore testing ground for the Mainland’s financial liberalisation. Zero-sum vs positive-sum 10.
1 Forbes  (2017) www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2017/08/27/cryptocurrencys-total-market-cap-has-risen-nearly800-this-year/#7e89e36b67c7. 2 www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/cybercrime-cost-businesses-over-2trillion. 3 RM2.5 trillion (USD633billion). 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

The banks have a key role to play in this effort through financing the transition as well through providing adequate disclosures to the markets. We therefore expect them to adopt both their business models and risk  1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  management frameworks to incorporate climate and environmental risks. The fact that certain banks have started making tangible steps in this regard is a positive development, but there is still some way yet to be travelled. The management of climate risk by banks is on the top of the supervisory agenda. We acknowledge the challenge that this poses especially for smaller banks. However, we do expect them to act more decisively in the said direction. By default, this will ultimately also target the banks' clientele and the submission of detailed climate related information in order to feed the banks' risk management processes. The challenges noted above, require significant up- front investment before reaping the benefits. The banks should proceed without undue delays to the transformation of their business models to address a new challenging business environment. Complacency emanating from short term profits is not a viable option. Sustainability through transformation is the way forward. Thank you. 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Efficiency in individual financial institutions As regards individual efficiency, deposits institutions have the capacity to pursue selection processes among potential borrowers and, at the same time, on the basis of the relative risk, to set different prices. Moreover, they undertake monitoring, seeking to minimise the risk of borrowers not meeting their obligations. In sum, deposit institutions help reduce both adverse selection and moral hazard problems, while their ability to transform maturities allows them to provide liquidity. The enabling mechanism for the proper functioning of this system is depositors’ confidence in deposit institutions. Efficiency in savings banks Among overall deposit institutions, savings banks undoubtedly play a significant role, contributing as they do to the distribution of market share among a bigger number of institutions, thereby fostering  2  BIS Review 31/2003  competition. Likewise, in a sector whose cornerstone is depositors’ confidence, properly run savings banks contribute to reinforcing the stability of the financial system. Savings banks are an old and peculiar form of financial institutions, and display a set of particularities relating both to the significant social content of their action and to their strong regional roots. I shall address these two aspects. First, savings banks have, since the outset, been characterised by their contribution to preventing financial exclusion. That is to say, central to their objectives is a concern to ensure that the more disadvantaged segments of the population may have access to financial services.

The first check stems from public supervisory powers: a characteristic common to all financial systems is the existence of prudential supervision. The second stems from minor shareholders and bank creditors (either holders of ordinary or subordinated debt, or mere depositors), who exert scrutiny in what we know as market discipline. I am sure that these arrangements sound familiar to you: they are the three pillars of the New Capital Accord, or Basel II. But the great worth of Basel II is precisely the acknowledgement that these three levels are part of the structure which, since the very inception of financial systems, has promoted sound banking systems. The three Pillars reflect well-known aspects of the workings of financial and banking systems over many years. And there lies the merit of Basel II. It has been able to identify these three elements and  4  BIS Review 31/2003  to integrate them so as to achieve regulation which is more closely aligned to the management of banks and which, therefore, is more efficient. Let me conclude my remarks by raising the issue of corporate governance and transparency in deposit institutions, including savings banks. One could argue against paying much attention to corporate governance in savings banks, based on the lack of a shareholder structure. I do not agree. First, we should never forget that the issue of corporate governance is related not just to the minority shareholder issue, but also to that of companies raising resources from capital markets.
The higher the participation of non-residents in the bond market, the more vulnerable the market is to volatile portfolio outflows. So it is said that with history, if we learn it well, will not repeat itself. Nevertheless, sometimes lessons in history are cloaked in apparent success. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis and corresponding policy responses by major central banks caused risks not seen before. In the periods after, unconventional monetary policy and a prolonged period of low interest rates had negative spillovers to emerging markets. This was notably evident through the waves of volatile capital flows in large magnitude. These flows were drawn by the search for yields, and ironically coincided with a significant expansion and development of our financial markets, a key reform measure following the AFC. The region was once again at the mercy of global easy money, flattered with an overvaluation of asset prices and domestic financial market exuberance. As these capital inflows mainly originated from the advanced economies, regional financial markets became increasingly exposed to their vagaries. Take the Taper Tantrum for example, which exemplifies how fragile the region’s fate is when just a hint of the US Fed possibly tapering its asset purchases was sufficient to trigger massive 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  capital outflows from the region. Time and again, a clear policy lesson has come to the fore – the importance of diversification and the need to reduce reliance on the de facto reserve currencies to manage negative spillover effects.

Looking at the post-war period, whenever the unemployment rate has increased by more than 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points, the economy has always ended up in a full-blown recession with the unemployment rate rising by at least 1.9 percentage points. This is an outcome to avoid, especially given that in an economic downturn the last to be hired are often the first to be fired. The goal is the maximum sustainable level of employment – in other words, the most job opportunities for the most people over the long run. Some of you may be wondering whether the risk of a recession isn’t already quite high? And, if so, doesn’t this imply a need for special care in adjusting monetary policy? After all, the current economic expansion is more than six years old – a bit long in the tooth by post-war standards. Even so, recession risk did not play a major factor in my thinking. Economic expansions don’t simply die of old age. They primarily end either because monetary policy is kept too loose for too long, thereby necessitating a subsequent sharp tightening in monetary policy to prevent a significant inflation overshoot, or because some large adverse shock hits the economy that the central bank cannot easily offset. Mitigating the first risk of being forced to choke off the expansion argues for getting started with policy normalization now rather than holding off. With respect to the second risk of unanticipated shocks, this is obviously very difficult for the central bank to insulate the economy from.
So we can’t just leave it there. •  That gives UK a massive incentive to achieve good outcomes in international standards for financial regulation. •  So far in this argument, so good – business and the authorities together pointing in the same direction. Ie business will happily live with what I’m calling ‘good’ standards provided they are applied evenly everywhere that matters. •  But two issues remain. First, business is frustrated by the time it takes to reach such international agreements. They want speed. They make the compelling point that they can’t determine their business models and plan their strategies until they know the regime under which they will function. •  The international community finds that hard. Contrast yesterday’s world of a small handful of central bank governors deciding bank-capital standards on their own: a world of G5 or at most G10. Today’s world is G20 plus. And, as capital markets have become more important, securities regulators are rightly also at the table – and finance ministries too given the social and political issues. The result is a big table. (FSB Plenary – c.70). •  By prioritising an international playing-field that is as level as possible and as sound as possible, speed is sacrificed. •  Second issue – some key policy discussions end up being away from home, away from the Westminster Parliament. Mainly global in fact. •  That global process is pretty transparent – consultative papers, speeches and so on.

We need to be clear about what we can do and what we cannot do; we need to operate consistently within our remit; and above all we must be sufficiently transparent to make proper accountability realistic. That is what trust requires, and we are in the business of trust – trust in the value of money. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Internal preparedness is important in order to be able to consider requests for ELA, as the timeframe for reaction normally is very limited. It is important to note that preparation is crucial also if a central bank is to deny a request for ELA. If the central bank has no organisation for analysing systemic consequences and the availability of measures, it is very likely that it will not dare not to lend. 3  BIS Review 42/2000  No central bank wants to give financial institutions and markets the slightest reason to depend on central bank support rather than their own efforts to avoid financial meltdown. Clearly, ELA is a last resort measure that central banks use only when the stability of the financial system is at stake. A well-planned and clear LOLR function need not encourage moral hazard. On the contrary, a central bank with clear guidelines and a solid analysis capability is in the best position to pinpoint those situations in which ELA is necessary. In all other situations, clear guidelines help the central bank to stand firm against the institutions’ demands for help and to force markets to solve financial problems by themselves. BIS Review 42/2000  4

“The Thai Economy: The Current State and The Way Forward” Speech by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob Governor of the Bank of Thailand Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) Thailand Dinner Talk 13 March 2017 Mr. Shingo Sato, President of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Members of the JCC Board, JCC members, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, A very good evening to you, First of all, I would like to thank the Japanese Chamber of Commerce for inviting me again to share with you my thoughts on the prospect of the Thai economy. Last year, I truly enjoyed the exchange of views, ideas, and information with all of you and certainly hoped many of you did so too. With more than 5,000 Japanese firms actively operating in Thailand across various industries, Japan is certainly one of Thailand’s most important business partners in both the real and the financial sectors. Indeed, as Thailand is trying to move towards more innovative and high value-added industries, it is encouraging to see Japan continuing to be at the top among countries that applied for privileges under the new BOI investment promotion scheme in 2016. This would not happen if Japanese professionals already on the ground like yourselves did not have strong confidence in the long-term prospect of the Thai economy. Ladies and gentlemen, My talk this evening will consist of two parts. In the former part, I will briefly discuss the current state of the Thai economy, paying special attention to its resilience and growth momentum.