samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And what are the key challenges the SNB faces when implementing its monetary policy? Let us start by discussing why a well-functioning money market is so important. A wellfunctioning money market is essential for the transmission of monetary policy. Like most central banks, the SNB steers interest rates on the money market. To this end, it sets the SNB policy rate and uses its monetary policy instruments to keep secured short-term Swiss franc money market rates close to the policy rate. It would not be possible to steer money market rates in this way without a well-functioning money market. Since June 2019, the SNB has communicated its interest rate decision via the SNB policy rate. The SNB policy rate signals the level of interest rates the SNB seeks to maintain on the secured money market. When assessing the prevailing conditions in the money market, the SNB nowadays focuses on SARON. In the past, the SNB used to set a target range for the three-month Libor in its monetary policy assessment, and it then sought to keep this interest rate in the middle of the target range through money market operations, such as repo  Page 3/13  transactions. In Chart 1, the old system with a target range for the three-month Swiss franc Libor is shown on the left, and the new system with the SNB policy rate is shown on the right.

impose a negative interest rate on banks’ sight deposits held at the SNB if the deposits exceeded a certain exemption threshold. On 15 January 2015, the SNB discontinued the minimum exchange rate relative to the euro and simultaneously lowered the negative interest rate due to take effect on 22 January to −0.75%. Page 6/13  The role of the interest rate on banks’ sight deposits at the SNB In the years leading up to the Global Financial Crisis a so-called structural liquidity deficit prevailed in the banking systems of many countries, including Switzerland. Since the SNB did not pay interest on banks’ sight deposits at the SNB, banks held as little excess liquidity as possible in the form of sight deposits in an environment of positive interest rates. During this period, the SNB steered money market interest rates via the price and quantity of its daily money market operations, which were conducted in the secured segment of the money market in the form of repo transactions. For instance, if the SNB wished to induce a decline in money market rates, it provided more liquidity and reduced its repo rate. This setup changed with the Global Financial Crisis. Many central banks initially responded to the unfolding crisis by lowering policy rates. Subsequently, they launched asset purchase programmes (‘quantitative easing’) or – as was the case with the SNB – conducted foreign exchange market interventions.
As these new rules are designed and implemented, we are expected to adapt and change our business models and risk practices. Bank Negara Malaysia is adapting as well. I have highlighted earlier the development on the regulation and supervision’s front. Allow me to highlight key developments on the enforcement front. Given that combating financial crime continues to be one of our key priorities in sustaining financial sector integrity, Bank Negara Malaysia is intensifying enforcement actions on AML/CFT non-compliances and breaches of legislations. Since 2012, Bank Negara Malaysia had compounded several banks and money service business operators for various non-compliances with the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act 2001 (AMLATFA). Besides AMLATFA, the new AML/CFT policies are also issued under The FSA and IFSA. FSA and IFSA provide Bank Negara Malaysia with wider enforcement powers including the administrative and civil sanctions for breaches under these Acts. FSA and IFSA also allow for enforcement actions taken under these legislations to be made public. This means that the reputational stake for non-compliance has been set higher. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  This is necessary to strengthen financial sector’s compliance to AML/CFT Policies and preserve the integrity of the financial system from being abuse for criminal activities. Bank Negara Malaysia recognises that the vast majority of the DNFBPs seek to comply with the law and for certain profession such as the lawyers and the accountants, through their ethical obligations.

That policing can be achieved through penal interest rates. But we can see no monetary policy issue in relation to intra-day credit. The extension of sterling intra-day liquidity in our present domestic RTGS system is of no interest to, and never considered in the context of, monetary policy decisions. The same holds for all other countries. Indeed we could go further and say that denying even-handed access to TARGET through out central banks will negate one of the main purposes of the whole exercise, to reduce the risk inherent in systems in which banks are exposed to each other for a period of hours. Banks would find other ways round the restriction which would be more risky. So central banks across Europe will have scored an own goal. We shall need to look carefully at this issue as we move towards 1999. If restrictions were to be applied to out central banks which made TARGET unattractive to banks in London, thereby encouraging them to use less secure cross-border mechanisms for euro payments, then we shall need to think about the other options we could adopt. One possible option might be to develop our own euro RTGS arrangements to allow quick, efficient and safe euro payments within the UK which would not rely on access to intra-day credit from the euro area. We would prefer a pan-European solution which, we strongly believe, would be in the interests of the EU as a whole in the long run. But one thing is clear.
We expect that this research and development work will have important benefits for both the Bank and the fintech industry even if the eventual decision is not to introduce a digital pound. In order to proceed to the next stage, we need clarity about the model of a digital pound to be developed. The report published today sets out for consultation the key features of the model we propose to take forward. The report is accompanied by a Technology Working Paper that sets out an accompanying illustrative conceptual model and seeks feedback on potential approaches to key technology considerations. Before I set this out in further detail, there is one important point I should make. Given all the attention that the cryptoasset world, with its attendant gyrations and failures, has received in recent years, it is perhaps understandable, that the digital pound can be confused in peoples' minds with cryptoassets such as bitcoin. I should take this opportunity to correct this misapprehension. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. The majority of cryptoassets are highly speculative assets, whose value is extremely volatile, because there is nothing behind them. They have no intrinsic value. For that reason, they are not suitable and not used for general payment purposes. One can think of them as more akin to a bet than to trusted money. The digital pound would be a safe, trusted form of money accepted for everyday transactions by households and firms, in the same way as Bank of England notes are today.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Fifteen months of financial crisis – a status report Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Associazione Bancaria Ticinese, Centro di Studi Bancari, Vezia, 3 December 2008. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The financial crisis broke out a little over fifteen months ago. The magnitude of the turmoil experienced by the financial industry has been greater than all the forecasts. So far, our entire attention has been focused on the problems of the financial industry, while the real economy appeared to be passing through this difficult period without too many problems. We now realise that this view was deceptive: the situation in the non-financial sector is deteriorating substantially. This could lead to new challenges in 2009. After having benefitted extensively from the international expansion of the past few years, we are currently experiencing the consequences of a widespread recession. This situation is difficult for our country, but we may be better placed than others for coping with it. BIS Review 150/2008  1
Consequently, other tools than the policy rate will continue to be needed to ensure that other interest  10 See CGFS (2019) for a summary and discussion, and Hansson et al. (2018) for implications for the monetary policy analysis. 11 As I have said, after the financial crisis, new models were developed that included a role for asset purchases; see, for example, Gertler and Karadi (2015). 8 [13]  rates and lending develop in such a way that capacity utilisation in the economy is maintained and the inflation target is met. How far can the policy rate be cut? At present, the Riksbank’s policy rate is at zero per cent and, according to the Monetary Policy Report from November 2020, the Executive Board’s best assessment is that it will remain there over the entire forecast period, which is to say until the end of 2023. At the same time, we have emphasised that the policy rate may be cut to below zero, should the circumstances justify it. We have done this before – cut the policy rate to slightly below zero, that is. Between February 2015 and December 2019, the policy rate lay in the range of -0.1 to -0.5 per cent. Our experiences of this period were mainly positive, as the low policy rate contributed to inflation again rising towards the target without any major negative side effects. Cutting the repo rate ‘deeply’ is another thing, however.

In such cases - is it self-evident that the general public will consider that the economic advantages of cutting the interest rate to far below zero justify the nullification of old rules on for example saving – that you will at least get back what you saved? In a small, open economy, it may be even more complicated, as there are alternative means of payment. It could be said that the local currency is exposed to competition. So if the central bank in a small, open economy were to cut the level of interest rates far below zero, there would not only be a risk of large capital outflows (the traditional macroeconomic analysis), but also a risk that the general public would start to use other currencies for its savings and transactions. Reasoning like this may seem very foreign to us in Sweden. We associate events like this with poorly-functioning countries a long way away. But my argument is that we also need to take account of public confidence in the currency, payments and the central bank when the suggestion of deeply negative interest rates is being discussed. The advantages need to be weighed up against the disadvantages. And alternative measures also need to be considered, for example fiscal policy. This discussion becomes even more relevant when new digital currencies, such as the Facebook currency Libra, are waiting round the corner. New times place new demands on the Riksbank’s balance sheet Requirement to be able to absorb risks...
Today’s consensus is that payments, clearing, and settlement systems must be safe, reliable, efficient, and secure, which are critical to financial system stability. That’s why most regulators, the central banks in particular, have become owners and operators of clearing and settlement systems. Although the tendency is to outsource this function, many regulators at some stage or other have owned or operated these systems. 7. Another technology related risk is the desire of banks to acquire the leading edge with propriety systems, stand alone systems and specific IT systems. Banks tend to hang onto this short-lived approach. Individual systems are costly not only to banks themselves, but also to customers. The norms should be not attracting customers, but reducing their operational risks and reduction of transaction costs to customers. Both are often forgotten or ignored by banks and continuous reminding has become a regulatory responsibility. Despite moral suasion banks in many countries have not realized the gains of having common ATM platforms, back-up sites, disaster recovery sites and sharing of costs. 8. It may also be necessary to for banks to recognize that different risks matter in different lines of businesses. A comparison of business unit economic capital requirement by risk type indicates that operational risk is highest in fund management, private banking, and in retail banking when compared to corporate banking, insurance business (if banks are allowed to engage in). The new operational risk element is expected to hit banks specializing in areas - such as custodian arrangements and asset management.

Our efforts should not be just about coping with short-term fluctuations, but also about laying long-term foundation for Thailand’s future. That requires a forward-looking plan of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  action by all stakeholders. The Bank of Thailand, for our part, will continue to ensure a stable financial and economic environment, so that businesses can continue to thrive and individuals can enjoy better standards of living on a sustainable basis. Thank you and wish you all an enjoyable evening. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
See Facilitating increased adoption of payment versus payment (PvP  )  5. See Harmonisation of ISO 20022: partnering with industry for faster, cheaper and more transparent cross-border payments 6. See Press release on SWIFT website 7. See Dealroom Fintech Q1 2023 report 8. See Payments modernization and technology in 2023 9. See PAPSS and ASEA forge strategic partnership to revolutionize cross-border payment of Stock Exchanges in Africa 10. See Rowing in unison to enhance cross-border payments − speech by Victoria Cleland  Page 9  11. See CPMI press release 12. Recent BIS figures  and FSB press release  show that the number of active correspondents has gone down by 30% in the last decade. 13. See Improving access to payment systems for cross-border payments: best practices for self-assessments 14. See Extending and aligning payment system operating hours for cross-border payments 15. See ISO 20022 harmonisation requirements for enhancing cross-border payments 16. See Interlinking payment systems and the role of application programming interfaces: a framework for crossborder payments 17. See Press release on the BIS website 18. See FATF Recommendations  Victoria Cleland Executive Director for Banking, Payments and Innovation  ©2023 Bank of England

In other words, data on operations for all insurance companies should be captured easily for planning purposes; and  5)  Along the same lines, the insurance companies should focus on their core-insurance business, as this has the effect of reducing outflow of capital. If insurance companies had an avenue for co-operation amongst themselves, some arrangements to compensate for fore-gone income on ceded commission could be worked out under the co-insurance programme. In this regard, I call upon my counterparts at the Pensions and Insurance Authority (PIA) to strictly supervise the industry in order to ensure, among other things, the proper investment of the insured funds. On our part as the Bank of Zambia, we would like to assure you of our continued support, and our doors are open for consultations. As I do not want to take much of your leisure time, I wish to conclude by thanking you, once again, for according me the opportunity to share my thoughts with you. To this end, I wish you all a Merry Christmas and profitable New Year. Please, have a pleasant evening! I thank you. 2  BIS Review 74/2004
One thing we can use, is to look at how things have been before. The empirical national economist’s traditional method is to gather data, to structure data and to seek correlations between different economic variables. Data is gathered from history, the correlations found are historical ones. For me, traditional forecasting is all about using history in various ways to tell us something about the future. But of course it is not always the case that things behave in the same way as before. Sometimes developments take a new path, a path that we had not imagined. Spring 2020 was a good example of this. When the crisis came, history was not much help to us. Apart from being unexpected, each crisis is unique. The April Monetary Policy Report therefore did not present any forecast. Instead, it presented two scenarios showing two possible developments over the coming period. I consider that this was as far as we could go when we could not use history to help us. To me, it has been natural that monetary policy in recent months has been very much in the here and now. The problems arising required immediate measures. The measures taken have made monetary policy more expansionary. And we cannot rule out the possibility of setbacks. When we can once again interpret inflation statistics and when we can once again use history to say something about the future, monetary policy can also become more forward-looking than it has been in recent months.

But this does not mean that there are no important tasks for the Banco de España – or other participating countries’ national supervisors – to perform in the SSM, in addition to the functions that remain intact as they are not assumed – or are assumed only partially or in exceptional circumstances – by the SSM. In recent months there has been talk of the Banco de España becoming devoid of its powers. This reflects a lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of how the SSM is organised and how it will operate and is reminiscent, in a sense, of the talk afoot when Monetary Union came into being and the ECB assumed responsibility for the main monetary policy decisions. The model then adopted entailed full decentralisation of monetary policy implementation. This meant that it relied on the national central banks for its implementation (in fact, credit and deposit institutions have no direct operational relationship with the ECB) and that in practice, although the ECB assumed decision-making powers, there was no decrease in either the workload or the staffing needs of the national central banks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Albeit for different reasons, the start-up of the SSM is expected to have a similar impact on workload and staffing needs at the Banco de España and at the other national supervisory authorities. *** In any event, the creation of the SSM poses an organisational challenge for the national authorities.
M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: How the central bank sees monetary policy in the new world economic environment Speech by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, made at the Shangri-La Hotel, Bangkok, 29 November 2001. *  *  *  Your Excellencies Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen,  Introduction I would like to thank the Thailand Board of Investment, the Department of Export Promotion and Tourism, as well as the Nation Group for inviting me to speak at this conference. I believe that it is important in these times of increased global uncertainty for the Bank of Thailand to share with you and the public our assessment of the current economic situation and outlook, as well as our thinking on the future course of monetary policy. The opportunity to do so today is therefore timely and greatly appreciated. In short, today I would like to discuss what I see as the challenges facing Thailand in the period ahead and what we, at the Bank of Thailand, are prepared to do to meet those challenges. In so doing, I will briefly review the progress of the past few months, and say a few words on the appropriate policy mix which needs to be implemented to help steer the Thai economy through these difficult times. The new world environment Let me begin by outlining two key aspects of the current world economic environment that I think are important.

Unfortunately the most pressing concern also happens to be one that we have the least control of, that is the external demand. With uncertainty regarding the timing of economic recovery in the United States, Japan still having to undergo real and arduous reforms, and Europe not yet stepping up as the locomotive engine for the resumption of world growth, prospects for an export led rebound remains clouded. With these regions together constituting over 52 percent of the market share for Thai products, exports in 2001 are expected to fall in value by approximately 6 percent compared to last year. Assuming an economic rebound in the US, Japan, and Europe by mid-2002, exports should grow by around 3-5 percent in 2002. Real GDP growth is projected to be between 1-3 percent in 2002. Against the backdrop of increased uncertainty and weak external demand, safeguarding our economic recovery will require steady resolve, more reliance on domestic demand, and a supportive set of measures and reform. The main challenge for local authorities is to ensure proper coordination of fiscal and monetary policies as well as the acceleration of structural reforms efforts in the banking and corporate sector to facilitate a pickup in domestic demand, enhance confidence, and bolster foreign investment. Mr. Bosworth did mention yesterday that to resolve the crisis, bad loans must be placed in asset management companies and then AMCs must get rid of them. This is one of the top priority policies of this government.
In order to steer SARON close to the upper bound of the interest rate corridor and thereby towards the SNB policy rate, we perform reserve-absorbing operations that reduce the stock of excess reserves and ultimately lower the supply of reserves in the interbank market. As shown on Slide 10, if the scale of the reserve-absorbing operations is large enough, the new money market equilibrium will be characterised both by a lower supply of reserves and, as desired, by SARON being close to the SNB policy rate. The interest rate in the auctions for our term repos and SNB Bills is near the policy rate on an overnight-equivalent basis. These operations establish a ‘soft floor’ on the interest rates used in transactions in the overnight repo market. This is depicted by the green line on the slide just below SARON, which is indicated by the red dot. It is a ‘soft’ floor because, among other factors, these operations settle with a delay of two business days and thus do not, by themselves, fully control the overnight money market rate. If needed, we can also conduct overnight repo transactions – also referred to as ‘fine-tuning operations’. These establish a ‘hard floor’ for the interest rates used in transactions in the overnight segment, shown as the dark blue line on the slide.

| Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Reserve absorption also reduces stock of reserves above threshold  Banks with reserves exceeding their thresholds Threshold Reserves lent to other banks  Reserves up to threshold  Remunerated at policy rate (0.5%)  Reserves absorbed via term repos & SNB Bills (≈ 0.5%)  Banks with reserves falling short of their thresholds Threshold  Interbank trade  Reserves borrowed Remunerated at policy rate (0.5%) from other banks Reserves  8  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Reserve tiering creates an interest rate corridor for SARON Supply of reserves before OMOs  %  Upper remuneration rate = SNB policy rate (0.5%)  Demand for reserves  SARON (≈ 0%)  Lower remuneration rate (0%) Reserves  9  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Reserve absorption via OMOs steers SARON close to policy rate  %  Supply of reserves after OMOs  Supply of reserves before OMOs  Upper remuneration rate = SNB policy rate (0.5%) SNB term repos and SNB Bills (‘soft floor’) SNB overnight repos (‘hard floor’)  SARON (≈ 0.45%)  Effect of OMOs  SARON (≈ 0%)  Lower remuneration rate (0%) Reserves  10  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering?