samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 6/2003  1  Interest rates influence inflation throught their impact on domestic demand and on the market for NOK. When interest rates rise, it becomes more profitable to save and more costly to borrow. This dampens consumption and investment and thereby aggregate demand. Lower demand in turn curbs the rise in prices and wages. Higher interest rates make it more attractive to invest in NOK and borrow in foreign currency. Therefore, higher interest rates normally lead to an appreciation of the krone. This makes imported goods cheaper. In addition, a strong krone reduces activity, profitability and the ability to pay in the internationally exposed sector. It is important to be aware of the relationships between employment, output and inflation. If there is a shortage of labour and other economic resources, a tight monetary policy stance will reduce inflation by affecting aggregate demand. Conversely, when unemployment is high, low interest rates will stimulate demand and contribute to stable wages and prices. A monetary policy stance that is aimed at stabilising inflation will thus also contribute to stabilising aggregate output and employment. 1  The time it takes for a change in interest rates to affect demand and inflation will vary. Our analyses indicate that an interest rate increase of 1 percentage point over two years reduced mainland GDP by ¾ -1 percentage point after two years. The effect is thereafter reversed. The inflation rate is reduced by an estimated 0.20-0.35 percentage point after two years and 0.30-0.40 percentage point after three years.

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the outlook for the Norwegian economy Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to the Mid-Norway Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Trondheim, 13 November 2003. The speech is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the monetary policy meeting on 29 October, Norges Bank’s Inflation Report 3/03, the Report on Monetary Policy 2003 - the first eight months and on previous speeches. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The Charts in pdf can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  I would like to thank the Mid-Norway Chamber of Commerce and Industry for inviting me to speak to you today on monetary policy and the outlook for the Norwegian economy. The operational target of monetary policy as defined by the Government is inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. It is equally important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low as it is to avoid an inflation rate that is too high. The inflation target provides economic agents with an anchor for their decisions concerning saving, investment, budgets and wages. The inflation target also provides a framework for monetary policy’s contribution to stabilising output and employment. This intention is also expressed in the Regulation on Monetary Policy. Normally, Norges Bank sets the interest rate with a view to achieving inflation of 2½ per cent at the two-year horizon.
Temporary price stabilisation would be accompanied by a destablisation of real economic activity. A similar dilemma is posed by VAT reduction, which stimulates the economy and lowers registered inflation. A monetary policy response in the form of a repo rate cut - to return inflation to the target - would act as a further economic stimulus. Here, too, temporary price stabilisation would be accompanied by a destablisation of real economic activity. I have used VAT adjustments here as an example of shocks from the supply side. Effects of the same type are associated with changes in other indirect taxes, for instance the current proposal to lower the tax on tobacco. The same applies to international oil price movements, as well as to the Riksbank’s own interest rate adjustments, which have a direct impact on house mortgage interest costs. How, then, should monetary policy deal with a situation in which prices are exposed to supply shocks of this kind? Part of the answer lies in the circumstance that - provided people’s medium or long-term inflation expectations remain unaffected - most shocks of this type are transitory. The Riksbank has concluded that in the normal course of events, transitory price effects of this type ought to be a secondary consideration in the construction of monetary policy in so far as they do not affect inflation expectations and thereby have a more permanent impact on inflation. Effects of supply-side shocks may, however, be more permanent.

Andrew G Haldane: The Bank and the banks Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, at Queen’s University, Belfast, 18 October 2012. *  *  *  The views expressed within are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Financial Policy Committee. I would like to thank Bethany Blowers, Forrest Capie, John Keyworth, Victoria Kinahan, Emma Murphy, Varun Paul, Richard Roberts, and the staff of the Bank’s archives for their comments and contributions. In the light of the financial crisis, there is much to explain. Doing so is not just important for reasons of accountability to the public. Explaining and understanding errors of the past is absolutely essential if policymakers are to learn lessons for the future. To misquote someone none of you have ever heard of, those who forget the errors of the past are doomed to repeat them. During the course of its 318-year history, the Bank of England has had plenty of crisis experience. And encouragingly, on my reading of history, there is evidence of it having learnt from this experience. In response, radical reform of the Bank’s policymaking framework has been commonplace. There are few better examples than the radical reform of the Bank’s transparency and accountability practices over the past twenty-five years. Those reforms are continuing to the present day. A wholly new framework for financial stability policy is being put in place in the UK, perhaps the most radical in the Bank’s history.
In this second  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  phase, some macro-prudential decision-making would naturally reside at the international, rather than national, level. (d)  Improved international liquidity assistance  This is plainly the thorniest of the issues. Fifteen years ago, then-IMF Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer set out the case for the IMF becoming a quasi-international lender of last resort (Fischer (1999)). His argument was that the IMF’s financial firepower had failed to keep pace with the scale of cross-border capital flows. At the time, I remember being sceptical about the feasibility and desirability of this proposal. In the period since, there has been a further dramatic ratchet up in cross-border capital flows. This has not been matched by IMF resources. The mismatch between global financial risk and global financial resources has widened. Fifteen years, and several crises on, I think it is clear that Stan was right. Ratification by the US of the 14th general review of IMF quotas would help close the gap but, by itself, would not prevent it from yawning. Various proposals for augmenting IMF resources have been put forward (Lachman (2006) and Farhi et al (2011)), but have foundered on political rocks. Partly in response, regional facilities have sprung up as a partial substitute, growing broadly to match in scale multilateral facilities. But the financial system is a global, not regional, one – indeed, increasingly so. Regional facilities can be a complement, but are no substitute, for multilateral insurance mechanisms.

Investment and uncertainty: the value of waiting for news Speech given by Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor Monetary Policy Imperial College Business School, London 20 May 2019  I’ve received helpful comments from colleagues at the Bank of England. I’d particularly like to thank Mette Nielsen for her help in preparing the speech. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Financial Policy Committee or the Monetary Policy Committee. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Good evening! Today I want to talk about “Brexit uncertainty” and investment. This is hardly a new topic. Indeed I put the words in quotes because the phrase has become so commonplace. At least in the context of the economy one rarely hears one without the other attached to it. There are good reasons for that, of course. We know from general experience – from the empirical evidence in the UK and elsewhere (Chart 1) – that greater uncertainty tends to reduce investment spending. It’s also clear, from direct conversation and from more formal surveys, that many businesses are apprehensive about Brexit. Over half of the respondents to the Bank’s Decision Maker Panel, a survey of over 7,000 firms, now count Brexit as one of their three most important sources of risk (Chart 2).1 According to a survey by the Bank’s Agents the outcome they think will have the most negative economic impact is a no-deal exit with no agreed transition period.
6  1)  Percent 6 Policy rate Capacity utilisation  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  2005  2008  2011  2014  2017  ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 13 FEBRUARY 2020  2020  Capacity utilisation is Norges Bank's output gap projecton for the Norwegian economy. Source: Statistics Norway  The primary responsibility of monetary policy is to provide the economy with a nominal anchor, quantified as the Bank’s inflation target. Monetary policy can contribute to high and stable output and employment and to counteracting the build-up of financial imbalances. In normal times, monetary policy is the first line of defence in stabilising the economy. The policy rate can be changed quickly when the economy is exposed to shocks. Given the structure of the Norwegian credit market, where floating interest rates predominate, the policy rate is an effective tool. The inflation targeting regime must be flexible. Norges Bank’s close to 20 years’ experience with inflation targeting suggests that a small, open economy must expect inflation to deviate fairly widely from the target from time to time. However, inflation has remained within a range where deviations from the target cannot be said to have entailed material economic costs. This has provided leeway to give weight to other considerations in interest-rate setting. During the most recent downturn, the krone exchange rate fell in pace with oil prices. This led to prospects for higher inflation.

14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Appendix Chart 1 – GDP wealth and employment GDP  Chart 2 – GDP in different recessions Real GDP (Peak = 100) 1929 Crash 120 1970 Recession 1980 Recession 115 1990 Recession 2008 Recession 110  Index, 2007 = 100 150  Employment Wealth*  140 130  105  120  100  110  95  100 2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  90  90 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of years following onset of recession  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. * Total net wealth; the property component of wealth is estimated for 2015 using by growing the 2014 figure by the rate of increase in house prices. Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. Chart 3 – GDP and disposable income per head  Chart 4 – Measures of disposable income per head  GDP per head  Indices, 2007 = 100  Indices, 2007 = 100  105  Real Net National Disposable Income (RNNDI) per head  100 100  95 Real Household Disposable Income (RHDI) per head Real median household disposable income (equivilised)*  95  2005  2007  2009  2011  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  2013  105  90 2015  2000  2003  2006  2009  2012  90 85  80 2015  Sources: ONS. * Data show income per households with these equivilised in size to make them comparable.
Slide 22  FinTech enablers in Chile ▪  Last year, a bill was passed allowing for the issuance of prepaid cards by non-bank institutions o o o  The Law establishes integrity requirements for these issuers Restrictions on how the funds can be used Requires the Central Bank to issue regulations with the prudential requirements  ▪ The Central Bank took the opportunity to undertake a full revision of its retail payments regulation ▪ The new regulations not only set the prudential requirements o o  ▪  Narrows down the scope of regulated entities dealing with the processing of transactions Changes their capital requirements  These features give some ground for optimism on the potential contribution of FinTech not only to the democratization of financial services but also to price and financial stability and development in Chile  [SLIDE 22] These same factors have provided the basis for the most important step in the development of electronic retail payment services. Last year, a bill was passed allowing for the issuance of prepaid cards by non-bank institutions. Its objective is to foster financial inclusion and competition. Given the sensitive nature of deposit-taking, the Law establishes integrity requirements for these issuers, restrictions on how the funds can be used, and requires the Central Bank to issue regulations with the prudential requirements for this industry. 17  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  The Central Bank used this opportunity to undertake a full revision of its retail payments regulation.

The successful implementation of postpandemic measures, when the priority will be a return to economic and social normality as fast as possible, hinges on the extent to which macroeconomic stability is preserved. When I speak of independence I do not see the central bank secluded in an ivory tower, but working actively, and combatively, under the law, with the fiscal authority, with the government. Based on my experience, I do not think there is a better alternative to a balanced, coherent fiscal and monetary policy mix. And central bank independence implies accountability vis-à-vis the law, the mandate, the society. Or, in the words of 19th-century Romanian writer and politician Costache Negruzzi, the central bank needs to ‘stand accountant’ for what it does. By encroaching upon central bank independence, in favour of political decisions seeking shortterm electoral gains, the real costs will be borne from an economic and social perspective, in the long run, by the entire country. A recent study published by the European Central Bank, titled The Case for Central Bank Independence, shows that – while the de jure independence has largely remained intact – the de facto independence has deteriorated in almost half of the sample of central banks under review. This is a fact and, for me, it is a matter of concern. I shall not comment on it. Looking at central banking history that spans more than three centuries, I hope this is part of the long cycle of ups and downs in terms of central bank independence.
In fact, the persistently high levels of inflation confirm the need for proper coordination of all policies. We at the Central Bank are firmly committed to our mandate and we will continue to conduct our monetary policy to ensure that inflation is reduced and ceases to be a burden for the Chilean people. Thank you. 9  Figure 1 Inflation indicators (1) (2) (annual change, percent)  Total CPI  21  Core CPI  Volatile CPI  15  18  Core goods w/o foods  Core services  12  15 9  12 6  9  6  3  3  0  0 15  16  17  18  19  20  21  -3  22  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  (1) Dashed vertical lines mark statistical close of March 2022 MP Report. (2) For details on groupings and shares in CPI basket, see Box IV.1 in Dec. 2019 MP Report, Carlomagno & Sansone (2019), and Economic Glossary. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. Figure 2 Structural decomposition of goods CPI w/o volatiles excl. Foods (*) (cumulative change since January 2020, percentage points)  10  Demand  8  Supply  Goods CPI w/o volatiles excl.

Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to the South Wales Chamber of Commerce, Cardiff, 23 October 2012. *  *  *  Of the many memorable moments in an eventful summer, recall that balmy night in late July when attention was diverted from the economy by the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games. The sound of Welsh children singing Cwm Rhondda on that beautiful beach in Rhossili filled the Olympic stadium. Inside the stadium, we saw not manna descending from heaven, but thousands of athletes and volunteers rising to their challenge. If the Olympics aimed to inspire a generation, the challenge for economic policymakers is to give that same generation the opportunities to make the best possible use of their talents in a vibrant economy. After a period of lopsided expansion, with growing trade deficits and debt levels, and a collapse of their banking systems, advanced economies across the world are facing a huge adjustment. Such is the scale of the global adjustment required that the generation we hope to inspire may live under its shadow for a long time to come. During the course of this year, the challenge has grown as the economic sky has darkened. The storm clouds coming from the Euro area have not yet lifted, and in other parts of the sky new clouds have drifted over. China, India and Brazil, the three largest emerging market economies, are all slowing.
These trends have been particularly visible in Latin America. During 2012, annual gross capital inflows to the seven largest Latin American countries – as classified by the IMF – amounted to more than 250 billion dollars. Sovereign EMBI spreads shrank to around 150 basis points, and, with a few exceptions, stock market prices recovered or surpassed their pre‐crisis levels.1 After the large depreciation suffered at the peak of the crisis, the real exchange rates of these countries persistently appreciated, continuing with a trend coming from the mid‐2000s. House prices in the region also experienced high annual growth rates, in many cases reaching two‐ digit figures. Chile was no exception to these patterns, although they were a bit less pronounced than in the average emerging or Latin American country. Our real exchange rate appreciated by about 15 percent between the peak of the crisis and the end of 2012, real house prices grew about 20 percent between 2009 and 2012, and our current account moved from a surplus of 2 percent of GDP in the last quarter of 2009, to a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP by the end of 2012. Sure enough, these patterns could be explained by pull factors. The faster recovery of growth rates in emerging markets, the quick rebound of their commodity prices after the crisis, and the sounder policies being implemented by several of them during the last decade could give reason to allocate more capital to this group of countries.

So, Secretary Meade, Secretary Videgaray and dear friend Agustín, I accept this thoughtful honor from the president of the country I love so much with hawkish pride and close kinship to the golden eagle that is the symbol of Mexico. ¡Viva México! Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Distinguished delegates, part of the reason for the resilience of Zambia’s financial sector were the comprehensive financial sector reforms that have been systematically undertaken after the banking sector collapse in the second half of the 1990s. These reforms were promulgated under a Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) that was implemented to address weaknesses in the financial sector, identified in a Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 2002. Zambia’s reforms included the following: the increase in capital requirements for banks; consolidation of the supervision of bank and non-bank financial institutions under the Bank of  BIS Review 63/2010  1  Zambia; legislative reform that gave the Bank of Zambia powers to deal with failing institutions; and the promulgation of corporate governance guidelines including the conduct of outreach programmes on good corporate governance practices for the financial sector and the introduction of credit reference services. The Bank of Zambia is continuing with its work to improve the financial sector and enhance the role of the financial sector in the development of the country through the implementation of the second phase of the Financial sector Development Plan, FSDP II. The FSDP II will focus more narrowly on issues of competition within the financial sector and extending financial inclusion.

However, any theory of optimal capital level will have to strike a balance between the increased cost of financial intermediation which result from higher capital requirements and the benefits of the decreased probability of bank failure and economic harm which will be achieved. Recent developments have established a prima facie case for higher minimum capital requirements. The challenge will be for supervisors to manage the transition to higher capital requirements in a phased approach and take into account the need to avoid procyclical pressure on bank capital adequacy under conditions of economic downturn. Zambia has adopted Basel II for implementation although work is still on-going in this area. The enhanced approaches to capital that I have just described have the potential to significantly minimize the probability of bank failure. They may also assist in reducing the extent to which strains on bank capital and liquidity result in an impaired ability to extend credit to the real economy. But the probability of bank failure cannot be reduced to zero. The system of bank regulation and supervision therefore needs to be buttressed by arrangements for deposit insurance (for protecting depositors in the event of default) and for bank resolution (to ensure orderly wind up and avoid knock-on effects to the rest of the banking system). In this regard, an effective deposit protection scheme becomes an important aspect of the financial safety net especially in crisis times.