samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
23 In the Monetary Policy Report published in April 2020 (Riksbank 2020d, p. 9), we justified the purchases, among other things, as follows: ”The fact that credit conditions are tightened and interest rates on lending to households and companies are increasing in relation to interest rates on safe assets is of course natural when credit is assessed as more uncertain. But at the same time, tighter credit conditions and higher interest rates mean that the economic downturn will be deeper and more prolonged. The Riksbank's monetary policy aims to ensure that increased uncertainty and reduced risk appetite do not become a self-fulfilling prophesy. This helps avoid the downturn worsening and being prolonged unnecessarily.” 24 See, for example, the Riksbank (2020a). 13 [30]  to have contributed the housing market in particular developing strongly (see Figure 10). To summarise, the Riksbank's purchases during the pandemic functioned differently from those before the pandemic. This is not surprising. During spring 2020, the Riksbank entered as buyer into markets which, due to the high level of uncertainty, were functioning poorly when many wanted to sell and few wanted to buy. Moreover, the Riksbank began to buy bonds issued by private agents (mainly banks). The Riksbank thus took over risk from market participants. This is unlike the situation prior to the pandemic, when the Riksbank's purchases meant that one government asset (government bonds) was removed from the market but was replaced by another asset with a similar risk profile (reserves at the Riksbank). Figure 10.

Given this, the Riksbank focused its measures on ensuring that there was good access to liquidity and that the financial markets continued to function. We did not see it as meaningful to stimulate demand in an economy that was largely closed;  11 [30]  instead, the ambition was to avoid tightening financial conditions and, in the long run, to avoid the great uncertainty causing a financial crisis. Among the measures we decided at a number of ordinary and extraordinary meetings were broader and substantially extended asset purchases.20 At the monetary policy meetings in April and June 2020, these measures were consolidated in a programme where assets worth SEK 500 billion would be purchased by mid2021. The purchases now included not only government bonds, but also covered bonds, municipal bonds and corporate bonds.21 Since many actors at the same time put in place a variety of support measures, it is almost impossible to evaluate the effects of an individual measure. However, I do draw some conclusions. The support measures during the pandemic were important and worked very well First, I think it is clear that the overall measures worked very well. Risk premiums in the financial markets began to fall rapidly in April, and the pandemic did not lead to a financial crisis either in Sweden or abroad.
By the middle of the 19th century, aggregate real wages were rising in the US and UK. Yet despite increased demand for their services, unskilled workers do not seem to have shared in this pay rise. Higher demand for their services was more than matched by increased supply, both from child labour and from displaced artisans as they moved down the skill spectrum (Clark (2010)). As a result, their pay appears to have flat-lined. At the high-skill end, the supply of workers was also increasing as some workers skilled-up (Clark (2010), Wallis (2014)). Despite that, there is evidence the skill premium for clerks and other professionals rose through the 19th century. The net effect of these complex shifts was thus to widen the distribution of wages between skilled and unskilled workers (Katz and Margo (2013)). Income inequality rose. The pattern of labour’s share of the national income is also interesting. This appears to have fallen in the first part of the 19th century (Allen (2009)), as Chart 21 illustrates. Workers do not appear to have enjoyed the early fruits of the Industrial Revolution. That perhaps explains why David Ricardo entered the fray at this time. In the event, these concerns proved ephemeral. With a lag, the rising tide of productivity and incomes lifted all boats, whatever their level of skill. Inequalities in wages started shrinking and labour’s share of income began to rise, returning to their levels at the end of the 18th century.

Jarle Bergo: Inflation targeting in a small open economy Address by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank, at the General Meeting of ACI Norge on 31 August 2001. *  *  *  The overview of the economic situation is based on the assessments from Norges Bank's monetary policy meeting on 8 August. Introduction First of all allow me to thank you for the opportunity to provide this address on Norwegian monetary policy. Since Governor Gjedrem was here one year ago, the Central Bank of Norway has been given new guidelines, and I therefore find it natural to start by providing an account of the new mandate for monetary policy. I will then talk about the implementation of monetary policy, with a closer look at the role of the krone exchange rate. I would also like to address the topic of the evaluation and transparency of monetary policy, before concluding with a discussion of the basis for interest-rate setting and the current economic situation. New mandate  This spring, the Government and the Storting (Norwegian parliament) adopted new guidelines for economic policy. The Government has announced that it will use the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund over the central government budget. The Government estimates that the guideline implies an average annual increase in the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget of about 0.4 per cent of mainland GDP in the years between 2002 and 2010.
Some Member States also proved to be poorly committed to implementing domestic structural and fiscal reforms that would have created more policy space to address shocks. Collectively, the expected dynamics between peer pressure and market discipline did not work, as markets did not believe in the no-bail-out principle, and as national authorities did not really accept peer pressure, nor the implementation of the rules. The absence of coordination has a genuine economic cost. Several studies have estimated it for the EA. It includes a) the cost of crises and assistance programmes, as well as b) the impact on growth due to uneven compliance with budgetary rules before the crisis and rigidity of the rules during the crisis. Let me mention a few numbers. Banking and fiscal crises can be extremely costly: relative to the U.S. growth trajectory, the EA has fallen behind  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  by 5 percent of GDP per capita since 2011. Both the European Commission 6 and the NIESR 7 have shown the large impact of simultaneous fiscal consolidation in Europe, with around 2% larger GDP declines due to intra-EA spillovers. Optimal policy coordination in the EA would have required differentiated consolidation efforts in line with available fiscal space, leading to better growth outcomes. A last illustration relates to asymmetric adjustment driven by current account imbalances at the country level at the beginning of the crisis and contributing to the large external surplus at the euro area level today.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Europe at a crossroads – how to achieve efficient economic governance in the euro area? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, recorded for the event at Bruegel, Brussels, 22 March 2016. *  *  *  Summary There is a growing perception of the need to rethink the economic governance of the euro area. Compelling ideas have been put forward to that effect; yet their implementation is tricky, especially in the present climate of Euroscepticism. Shifting from ideas to action has become urgent if monetary policy is not to remain the only game in town. Clearly, the single monetary policy cannot be a substitute for the coordination of national economic policies or the lack of reforms. To be sure, the debate over EMU reform is politically loaded; but for euro area citizens the poor coordination of national policies involves a high cost in terms of growth, of several points of GDP. The economic case therefore needs to be made: this discussion is not about “more Brussels”, it is about more growth and jobs in Europe. In addition, it is not a choice between domestic reforms or European coordination; we need both. Between complete integration – of the monetary-policy type – and monitored national policies, as currently conducted, the missing link is “full coordination” of fiscal and structural policies. This is clearly shown in a matrix crossing these three degrees of integration and the four policy dimensions (monetary, financial, fiscal and structural).
Lars Nyberg: Economic slowdown - but how soon and how severe? Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to Danske Securities, Stockholm, 2 May 2001. *  *  *  I would like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to speak about economic developments in Sweden and the world around us. We economists usually begin and end by covering ourselves and pointing out that the situation is uncertain and that assessments can vary. However, this seems a more relevant approach than normal right now. A lot has happened in recent months and there are some important pieces missing from the economic puzzle. When in December we raised the repo rate by a quarter of a percentage point, to 4 per cent, we saw signs of an incipient overheating in the Swedish economy. We were approaching the production ceiling in a situation where a number of sensitive wage negotiations were under way and we assessed that the krona could remain weak for some time longer, which would give extra stimulation to export demand. Although we saw signs of a slowdown, particularly in the American economy, the likelihood of this slowdown having a serious effect on the Swedish economy over the next few months seemed limited. The overall assessment was that the Swedish economy needed some easing up on the throttle to move down into a lower gear. Today, just over four months later, the picture looks rather different in several important aspects.

This is because a given basket of goods today costs considerably more if bought in Europe or the USA using exchanged euro or dollars than if bought in Sweden. Sometimes they talk about "hamburger parity" as a simple illustration of this concept, i.e. compare what a certain well-known hamburger costs in different countries. And this brings us to the fact that the krona should be valued approximately ten per cent higher in order to buy the same hamburger here as in the USA. More complicated calculations of the balanced real exchange rate provide similar results, perhaps even slightly more than ten per cent. The Riksbank's forecast of the path of the krona shows a similar development. Now we in Sweden are not alone in having seen our currency weaken; other industrial nations with a floating exchange rate are seeing the same thing, e.g. Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This is probably due to the unease on the financial markets during the spring, as times of trouble often entail capital moving away from the less liquid currencies and fleeing to those perceived as more stable and liquid, primarily the US dollar. On top of this comes the development on the Swedish stock exchange, which appears to have played a major role recently. The foreign exchange market and the stock exchanges have been strongly correlated for a period of time, particularly since the stock exchange fell. Since mid-2000, 85 per cent of the variations in the -SEK/EUR exchange rate can be explained by variations in share prices.
The Cyprus economy, continued to record noteworthy GDP growth, despite the outbreak of the war. Real GDP growth in Cyprus expanded by about 6 percent during the first half of 2022, mainly driven by a faster than expected recovery in tourism-related activities and, to a lesser extent, by growth in information and communication activities and in professional services. At the same time, weakness in the Cyprus GDP performance could be expected to become visible over the second half of 2022 and early 2023, primarily owing to the anticipated worsening in the international economic outlook. More specifically, the impact of the war is expected to be channelled directly, via the disruption in trade of services and the rise in commodity prices, as well as indirectly, via the impact on business and consumer confidence. Our exposure to Russia via the export of services is the most significant vulnerability, with the most important exposure relating to financial and other business services and, to a lesser extent, tourism and transport. 2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In terms of inflation, the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) reached 9,6 percent in August 2022 compared with 3,3 percent in August 2021. For the period January-August 2022, inflation climbed to 8 percent, compared to 1,2 percent in the same period in 2021. The spike in the domestic inflation is mostly attributed to the significant negative impact of the war, as well as the continued consequences of the pandemic.

Arrangements like these, with trusted protocols and agreed measures, will build confidence in managing the risks of importation of the Covid-19 virus, and allow countries to re-open to trade and travel. Strengthening Digital Connectivity The second area countries must co-operate on is relatively new but is growing rapidly in importance – digital connectivity. We all know how the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the use of digital services. Amid safe distancing measures and movement controls, many firms have shifted to digital channels to conduct business. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  E-commerce, online education, tele-medicine, remote working, internet banking – have all taken off spectacularly. The ability to conduct business on digital platforms, especially across borders, has become a competitive advantage – for it allows people and businesses to tap onto a global market for sales or supplies or solutions. We need to deepen digital connectivity across countries, to expand opportunities for our people and businesses. An area that could clearly benefit from digital and data connectivity is cross-border trade. There is a large number and variety of parties involved in an international trade transaction. The trade process is highly fragmented, paper-based, slow, and cumbersome. Harmonising and digitising trade documents and putting them through a seamless digital platform will help to make trade more efficient and secure. Food safety will be an area of high priority as we emerge from the Covid-19 pandemic. This often requires traceability in supply chains that span multiple countries. Being able to do this well requires data sharing and digital connectivity.
It most clearly represents an explicit commitment by the central bank to the objective of price stability. In the United Kingdom, that commitment is in the form of a target for inflation that is defined as 2% a year, as measured by the consumer price index. In the medium term, a central bank can affect only monetary values – the price level. It cannot change the amount of goods and services an economy is able to produce. Over time, there is no trade off between inflation and output, as recent UK history illustrates. Between 1950 and 1997, UK inflation averaged nearly 6%. In contrast, since 1997, inflation has been close to target and much more stable, but annual output growth has averaged a little above its post-World War II average of 2.5%. In the medium term, low and stable inflation does not imply lower output. Moreover, even in the short term, meeting an inflation target is in many cases fully consistent with maintaining steady growth of activity. If demand falls below the supply capacity of the economy, inflation will tend to fall. If demand rises too quickly, putting pressure on capacity, inflation will tend to rise. Inflation-targeting central banks can, however, face an apparent dilemma when inflation moves away from the target not as the result of fluctuations in demand, but in response to commodity price changes. Following increases in gas and electricity bills, consumer price inflation in the UK has risen.

For takaful operators, staying competitive in a digital world will require far more than just direct sales channel or automated processes. It requires a rethinking of the fundamentals and principles of takaful, for which digital technology can be a catalyst. Takaful operators must rethink their sources of revenue, operational efficiency and talent strategy to reap the opportunities of digital disruptions. It is also important to rethink the business model and the role that takaful operators can play in a digital ecosystem that has transcended geographical boundaries. Digital disruptors such as virtual or peer-to-peer takaful provider that is tech-enabled might be able to overcome many pain points experienced by the industry in more efficient ways. The buzz right now in the financial industry is around digital banks. Nonetheless, this can swiftly turn to digital insurers or takaful operators. Such development could be the next phase that could further enhance the 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  quality and pricing of services delivered, while also penetrating new areas for the industry to achieve our protection goals. This development could provide the impetus for exponential growth in insurance and takaful penetration in the country. Thirdly, the industry must take greater responsibility to educate consumers and inculcate understanding about the importance of financial protection. Almost half of respondents in the 2018 Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand Side Survey cited lack of product understanding to be the key reason for not purchasing life insurance and family takaful.
As for the financial tensions that have shaken the Spanish economy in recent weeks, holding resolutely on a course towards fiscal consolidation is a pre-requisite for dispelling the mistrust stifling the economy. Therefore, the potential short-term costs will be amply offset once it becomes apparent that the efforts made are yielding results. The State and Social Security budgets for 2012 are pivotal to this strategy. Fortunately, while they have not yet been approved, many of the measures they envisage have already been implemented, thereby preventing precious time from being lost in adjusting the fiscal imbalance. In this respect, it should be stressed that cutting the budget deficit requires an unprecedented structural effort. The measures that have to be adopted must reduce debt in an environment in which the interest burden will be growing and where the double-dip in economic activity will affect tax revenue and some cyclical expenditure. In light of these conditioning factors, the consolidation strategy must obviously use all the instruments available, on both the expenditure and revenue sides. As regards revenue, various measures have been adopted affecting, above all, the direct taxes households and firms pay. A reduced rate has also been introduced to bring undeclared assets out into the open. Here, although the macroeconomic forecast for 2012 may be realistic, there are risks of slippage in projected revenue.

This is in light of the composition activity is likely to evidence, given the sizeable weight of exports and the weakness of private consumption and the real estate market, which may lead to lower revenue than the course of output might suggest, as was the case in 2011. The foreseeable decline in employment also appears to suggest Social Security contributions will be more modest than budgeted. Finally, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding projected revenue takings in respect of the special treatment accorded to undisclosed income. Turning to expenditure, the draft Budget outlines highly significant cuts in public investment, current transfers and goods and services purchases. These projections are not without risk, given the substantial inertia some of these items show, which hinders any permanent change in their trajectory. Precisely to reinforce this trajectory, the government added further education and health-care measures following the presentation of the draft Budget, which should contribute to attaining the targets set. That said, overspending on items such as unemployment benefits or pensions cannot be ruled out, since they depend on factors beyond the control of the authorities, such as the unemployment rate, demographics and inflation. Given these risks, the Budget must be rigorously implemented and mechanisms activated to enable any emerging deviations to be detected sufficiently in advance, so that additional countervailing measures may be taken. If this were necessary, measures to contain current expenditure or to increase indirect taxes could be adopted, as already contemplated in the Stability Programme ahead of 2013.
(iii)  Third, our approach must be sensitive to the impact on industry. No new regulation is costless. MAS must weigh the cost of new regulations on institutions which have to comply with them, against the broader benefits that those regulations have for the economy and society. With these principles in mind, I will now outline MAS’ approach to the issues I mentioned earlier. I will first touch on what Basel III will mean for Singapore’s capital adequacy requirements. After which, I will share MAS’ views on the current debate on universal banking. Capital requirements for locally-incorporated banks MAS has reviewed its bank capital adequacy rules. We will require Singapore-incorporated banks to meet Basel III earlier and at a higher standard. Singapore-incorporated banks will be required to meet the Basel III minimum standards by 1 January 2013, ahead of the Basel Committee’s January 2015 timeline. Singapore banks are well-capitalised and are in a good position to adopt Basel III sooner than 2015. Moreover, the long phase-in period provided by the Basel Committee was to ensure that the new requirements did not stall the economic recovery in countries that were at the centre of the crisis. Singapore’s situation is different: the recovery has been robust and the economy is well above pre-crisis levels. MAS will increase the minimum levels of common equity that locally-incorporated banks will be required to hold. The experience of other countries in the recent crisis shows that common equity is the most effective capital instrument to absorb losses and write-downs.

In these two days, discussions will focus on monetary policy, financial stability, economic modelling and forecasting, risk assessment and management, which are all traditional instruments in the central bank toolkit and need to be improved constantly. It is very important to note that, in addition to these traditional topics, the workshop will discuss research in new and important areas such as: digitalization of financial services, structural reforms, healthcare and its implication for central bank objectives and national welfare. Technological developments disrupting traditional labour, financial products and markets, and demographic developments may impose some of the most important challenges to our societies and institutions. Therefore, it is important to study and adequately understand these phenomena. In addition, we are glad and eager to discuss research findings from a number of authors who come from academia, central banks and other research institutions. The ideas and methodologies that are embedded in their research will introduce our researchers and economists to new ideas, will help them extend their research agenda, and will reveal potential opportunities of cooperation in the future. I believe that research in these and other innovative areas, like green finance, will develop further and become traditional topics in central banks’ research agenda. For this reason, I challenge our researchers to consider these trends in their future research agenda. Continuous enhancement of research topics and methodologies is a must for a central bank.