samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Unnecessary fluctuations in the real economy can then be avoided. As I  BIS Review 98/2000  4  mentioned earlier, the Riksbank has therefore clarified that if higher or lower inflation is judged to be a transitory phenomenon, attempts to counter it immediately and fully are sometimes not desirable. From these clarifications it will be clear that in the conduct of monetary policy we do in fact also take the real economic consequences directly into account. It should be underscored, however, that making allowances of this kind does presuppose a basic confidence in monetary policy - that different economic agents count on our fulfilling the inflation target, if not immediately then at least in the near future. There has been a discussion recently, among economists as well as in the public debate, as to whether the interest rate should be raised already even though a threat to the inflation target is not apparent in the coming two years. In that way we could avoid a build-up of imbalances that in the longer run might necessitate a drastic repo rate increase and thereby expose the real economy to major strains. I have no objections to this view in principle. We can indeed take such matters into account in our intellectual framework. It is important, however, to be clear about which imbalances one is referring to and what real economic effects they might have.

The latest business surveys and economic data point towards some moderation of late, which is 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  not specific to France but also seen in other euro area economies. GDP growth in the first quarter could thus prove somewhat softer than previously anticipated. However, the underlying momentum remains solid and broad-based, and we interpret recent data as reflecting a temporary pull-back from the very strong and above-trend pace recorded in the second half of last year. It does not alter the inflation outlook over the medium term horizon that is relevant for our monetary policy. [slide 6] Against this backdrop, we forecast GDP growth in France to remain robust in 2018, at 1.9%, after 2.0% in 2017, and to stabilize at around 1.6%-1.7% per year in 2019–20, which would remain above potential. Thanks to this performance, the output gap is expected to close in 2019. The engines of growth should be more balanced. Household consumption is expected to accelerate somewhat, with significant gains in the purchasing power of households of + 1.5% to 2% per annum. In particular, the tax measures set out in the budget laws should help to boost household income from the end of 2018. Total investment should lose some momentum but remain a significant contributor to output growth. And as exports pick up, the contribution of external trade should turn neutral. [slide 7] The performance on the labour market has been very encouraging as well.
Heng Swee Keat: Corporate governance developments in Singapore Keynote address by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 2009 Asian Investors' Corporate Governance Conference, Singapore, 19 November 2009. *  *  *  Mr. Tan Chok Kian, Chairman, Securities Investors Association (Singapore) Mr. David Gerald, President & CEO, Securities Investors Association (Singapore) Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen Introduction Good morning. I am very happy to join you today at this inaugural Asian Investors' Corporate Governance Conference. Thank you for inviting me to speak at this event. I congratulate SIAS and your partners on bringing together such a wide range of investors and corporate governance practitioners from across Asia. I applaud your commitment to hold this event annually, as it is necessary for practitioners to stay abreast of the latest corporate governance developments and to reflect on how we can do better. Corporate governance as an on-going concern Good corporate governance is a key pillar underpinning Singapore's reputation as a trusted financial and business hub. Over the years, we have sought to continually improve corporate governance in Singapore. This includes a review of the Code of Corporate Governance in 2005 by the former Council for Corporate Disclosure and Governance ["CCDG"], chaired by Mr. JY Pillay. In the last two years, following the transfer of oversight of corporate governance of listed companies to MAS and the Singapore Exchange, we have focused on strengthening the practices of corporate governance in Singapore.

This design worked incredibly well, as activity in most of the facilities gradually declined to near zero, allowing the Fed to simply turn them off with no market disruption. Overall, central banks were able to accommodate the most extreme shift in the demand for liquidity that has been seen in a generation, and to do so in ways that responded to the specific needs that arose in a market-based credit system. Structural changes in dollar asset markets Although U.S. authorities managed to provide the financial system with sufficient liquidity and support to stem the market panic, they must now find a way to foster more enduring changes that will result in a sounder financial system. The crisis revealed significant structural flaws, but reforms are being debated to address many of these issues. Some of the required changes are associated with the oversight of large and interconnected financial institutions. The reform efforts underway in Congress are intended to address several points of weaknesses, including gaps in the coverage of systemically important firms and the absence of a resolution process for an orderly wind-down of failing firms. In addition, regulatory standards are being reevaluated to strengthen capital and liquidity requirements and to improve the risk capture of those standards. The crisis also revealed weakness related to specific financial markets involving structured products, housing-related GSEs, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, triparty repo and money market mutual funds. Reforms are underway in each of these areas.
•  Do regulatory policies – either the microprudential or macroprudential variety – have an impact on market liquidity or short-term interest rates? The BIS recently convened a working group to assess the impact of microprudential policy on the efficacy of monetary policy. The report concluded that it was difficult to draw firm conclusions. But there were some interesting observations. •  The lending activity of less well-capitalised, higher risk-taking or less liquid banks appears more responsive to a tightening of monetary policy. •  This would seem to suggest that more stringent regulations tend to weaken the transmission of monetary impulses. •  And the transmission of policy rate changes to other interest rates and asset prices may be altered if debt markets become less liquid as a result of regulatory changes. Conclusion Let me conclude by drawing together the main points. •  Microprudential policies are critically important for financial stability and we must get them right. •  But the ability of microprudential policies to achieve financial stability may be dampened by credit cycles that have their roots in broader macro forces. •  Monetary policy matters for financial stability because it affects the credit cycle. To what extent monetary policy should therefore take account of financial stability remains an unresolved matter. •  Macroprudential policy potentially offers a way out by targeting the macro sources of financial instability, leaving monetary policy to focus on price stability. •  But macroprudential policy is neither a panacea nor without cost or distortion.

•  Financing restrictions – in the form of LTVs and caps on loan tenures – were imposed on housing loans and car loans to moderate demand and reduce price pressures. •  Over 2013–2014, inflation came down steadily as housing and car prices declined. So, monetary policy and macroprudential policy can potentially be complementary to help achieve both macroeconomic stability and financial stability. They can do this sometimes by acting in the same direction; sometimes in opposite directions. •  Charles Bean 7 gives a useful pedagogical exposition of how a restoration of price and financial stability could be achieved by a combination of instrument tightening and loosening, similar to employing an optimal mix of fiscal and monetary policies to influence the composition of aggregate demand. 7  Bean, C. (2015), Comment on Applying an Inflation-targeting Lens to Macroprudential Policy Institutions, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol 11, Supplement 1  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  •  But we need to deepen our understanding of when to use monetary policy and when to use macroprudential policy and when to combine the two, if at all. Does tighter regulation weaken the efficacy of monetary policy? There is one other aspect of the interaction between monetary and regulatory policy that I would like to touch on. •  Just as monetary policy that is set to achieve macroeconomic stability can sometimes be inappropriate for financial stability, could there be a situation where regulatory policy weakens the transmission mechanism of monetary policy?
To me, the market’s opinion is clear: derivative markets in Asia need to be further developed. Let me share some recent experiences in Hong Kong in this regard. By daily average trading volume, our interest rate and FX derivative markets have almost doubled since 2013, and are now first and second, respectively, in terms of regional market share. Notwithstanding this growth, Hong Kong still only accounts for a small global market share, and the products we cover – both in terms of contract type and underlying currency – has a lot of room to expand. We have therefore taken a proactive approach by encouraging international banks to establish derivative hubs serving Asian risks in Hong Kong as long as they meet capital adequacy requirements and our risk management standards. Establishment of these hubs can help banks take advantage of Hong Kong’s double tax agreements with all key economies in the region; more importantly, our city’s growing status as a nexus between Mainland China and the rest of the world means that Hong Kong will play an increasing role in providing risk management solutions for international investors going into China and, increasingly, Chinese investors going global, just like how we successfully facilitate those investments through our Connect schemes. Our commitment to further developing the derivatives market is strong and we stand ready to work with various partners on this. One key current issue is benchmark reform.

But I do want to remind ourselves to stay vigilant and ensure that implementation is seen through, as this work has not yet been completed. For example, initial margin requirements on non-cleared derivatives, which guard against the overuse of embedded leverage in derivatives, are still being phased-in in a number of jurisdictions including Hong Kong. At the same time, while derivative transactions that are intended to be cleared has increased five-fold in the past four years in Hong Kong, according to data from our Trade Repository, there is more room for further standardisation. Finally, solutions such as deference mechanisms, which helps eliminate cross-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage, are still works-in-progress between the HKMA and our overseas counterparts. As we embark on further deepening of the derivatives markets in the Asian region, the high standards set up by regulators and by the industry over the past ten years should be well respected, and strengthened regulations on margins, clearing, and transparency should be taken seriously as safeguards against potential risks. Let me close by saying a few words about our host today. ISDA has been instrumental in promoting standardisation of documentation and practices in derivatives markets. In the process, it has played a key role in navigating the industry through post-crisis reforms. ISDA is and will continue to be an important platform for consensus building and knowledge sharing. I’m certain that ISDA will remain a valuable partner for everyone in Asia as we continue to overcome the challenges I discussed today. I look forward to more fruitful collaboration going forward.
Let us instead develop a coherent and integrated system that relies upon the classical elements of defense, but none of them exclusively: perimeter security to keep the adversary outside of the environment; defense in depth to safeguard our most critical assets; sophisticated intelligence to understand the adversary’s tactics; robust surveillance to monitor for intrusion and ensure environmental integrity; rapid response to fend off attack; effective collaboration with allies to enhance information sharing and collective security; and a strategic reserve to respond deftly in the event of loss. Make no mistake: as it relates to the wholesale services of the Federal Reserve Banks, we aspire not merely to a commercial standard of resiliency, or even a supervisory standard, but something approaching national security grade. We proceed on this trajectory from a position of strength, reflecting a record of experience that has endured the most severe terror attack in our nation’s history, a financial crisis of historic proportion, and an array of extreme weather events. But in this sphere, either intentionally we are progressing, or inevitably we are regressing: there is no idleness. Thank you for your generous attention today. I’d be pleased to respond to a few questions. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches

Let us imagine that our households – which we assumed did not amortise at all to begin with – are forced to amortise their loans over a period of 50 years. If the households began to amortise in this way, it would on the one hand initially mean increased expenditure for the households corresponding to between almost 5 and a good 12 per cent of their disposable income. To achieve the same effect with an interest rate increase, the mortgage rate would need to increase by almost 3 percentage points. On the other hand, the amortisations would mean that interest expenditure fell as the loan was paid off. As amortisation is a form of saving, this measure means in the long run that the loan cost falls and that the household improves its balance sheet or financial position. In this example we have assumed that the  19  With a tax deduction of 30 per cent, an interest rate increase of 1.7 percentage points means that the interest after tax increases by 1.2 percentage points. This is as much as abolishing the tax relief would increase costs if the interest rate was 4 per cent to start with. 20  http://www.fi.se/upload/43_Utredningar/20_Rapporter/2011/effekt_bolanetak_delstudie.pdf. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  households do not have any savings, in practice of course they would also be able to manage changes in amortisation requirements by reducing other saving. Comparisons with the interest rate A relevant comparison is what a direct increase in the interest rate would entail for our households.
From the perspective of underpinning policies, economic activity expanded, favoured by the following: The accommodative monetary policy and the favourable financing conditions, in both domestic and foreign markets; The fiscal consolidation, which has reduced the impact of the public sector on the domestic financial markets; and The structural reforms programme, which, irrespective of the short-term costs, have started to yield initial results. Economic growth has contributed to the overall improvement of Albania’s economic and financial balances. In line with our previous statements, the following is notable: Inflation edged up slightly, despite the containing effect of the sharp appreciation of the exchange rate, suggesting that the improvement of the cyclical position of the economy is beginning to be reflected in higher wages and other production costs; Albania’s external position has improved, reflected in the narrowing of the current account deficit;  Budget deficit remains low and public debt has trended down; Lastly, Albania’s financial system is stable. The Albanian banking sector shows stable or improving capital, liquidity and profitability indicators. Our analyses and stress tests suggest that the sector is resilient to potential stressful situations, thus guaranteeing its ability to withstand shocks. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Such analyses show that the foundations of the country’s development remain relatively solid. The analysis is reflected also in our projections. In the baseline scenario, these projections suggest that economic growth will continue in the medium-term horizon, production capacities will be utilised in fuller terms, and inflation will converge to the central bank target by 2020.

Sim Kee Boon helped to chart Singapore’s economic development through the turbulent 1970s, when stagflation and oil price shocks shook the world’s economies. We are living in even more interesting times today. 27. The Institute has gathered an impressive collection of talent here today. I wish you fruitful discussions. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
But if one really thought that the repo rate should have been 0.25 per cent, it is difficult to understand why one would advocate a repo-rate path that did not turn down at all over the coming three years, but rose throughout the entire forecast period and reached 3.8 per cent in the middle of 2014.4 So what was the view outside of the Riksbank? At around the same time, in June 2011, the National Institute of Economic Research forecast that the repo rate would be 3 per cent at the end of 2012 and that at the end of 2014 – that is, around now – it would be just over 4 per cent.5 The NIER’s forecasts are often something of a benchmark for other analysts and on this occasion, too, they were a good reflection of how most analysts perceived the situation. The forecast for the repo rate was also fairly well in line with the Riksbank’s view (see Figure 2). This policy was considered compatible with a balanced resource utilisation in 2014 and a CPIF inflation rate close to 2 per cent in 2013–2015. It is thus obvious that this is a picture of a policy that was essentially governed by traditional monetary policy motives and where concern over household debt certainly did not play a major role. How did international analysts view the Swedish economy at this point in time?

Per Jansson: Swedish monetary policy after the financial crisis – myths and facts Speech by Mr Per Jansson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the SvD Bank Summit 2014, Stockholm, 3 December 2014. *  *  *  “The Riksbank has in recent years conducted a monetary policy experiment where it has aggressively, using a high repo rate, attempted to prevent household debt from rising. The results have been more or less devastating for the Swedish economy. Eventually, the Riksbank has realised that its policy was wrong and has made a 180 degree turn.” This is roughly how some critics have described the monetary policy conducted in recent years. This description has received quite a bit of attention and been widely spread, and many who follow the monetary policy debate have probably gained the impression that this is actually what has happened. I argue that this description is wrong and I now intend to explain why. I shall divide the criticism into three different parts, or claims, and discuss them one by one. I will present these claims in the form of quotations, but this does not necessarily mean they are exact quotations. However, they capture the spirit of the criticism and I believe that those who have followed the monetary policy debate will recognise them. It is important to meet the criticism, for several reasons One question one might begin with, is why it is so important to respond to these claims.
The global economy is entering its new cycle at a low phase of the commodity (primarily oil) super cycle. So far, there has been no truth to the predictions that low commodity prices will have a positive impact on global growth thanks to the positive 1 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  momentum enjoyed by raw material-importing countries exceeding the negative impact on exporting countries. However, it is important to note the technological progress in the oil industry both in terms of supply (e.g. the development of shale technologies; incidentally, the decreased investment in shale oil in the face of low oil prices has once again begun to grow) and in terms of demand (the development of the electric car and alternative green energy markets). In fact, in the medium term the balance of these factors remains highly uncertain. Therefore, the markets are constantly shifting their expectations about medium-term trends (almost every quarter) and thus the oil market remains relatively volatile. Lastly. The global economy is entering a new cycle with growing cyber-risks capable of threatening both the stability of financial systems and economic growth. Positive developments include the financial technological revolution (fintech and the cost cutting, increased financial service penetration, and the improvements to their quality it entails), and the financial markets’ increased stability in the face of various shocks. This stability has been repeatedly tested over the past year and a half, a period not lacking in political surprises.

Meanwhile, our economy requires more lending for companies’ operations and investment. Moving forward, we must understand which issues can be solved through regulation and for which it would be the way. This should never, under any circumstances, be pursued by reducing risk protection. We need to strike a balance between limiting risk in some sectors and stimulating others. This is a major conceptual challenge with no unambiguous answer. We will be discussing it here at the congress. Before addressing the objectives we set ourselves in individual sectors, I would like to say a few words about the most fundamental prerequisite for development – healthy competition. Encouraging competition is our unequivocal priority. What are we doing to promote competition? 4 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  First. Thorough market cleansing. In our opinion, low-quality competition is just as bad as none at all. Honest business should not have to compete with fraudulent market players. Our duty as the financial market’s supervisory body is providing an environment where effective and stable financial institutions reap the benefit. This means ridding the market of dishonest players. Second. Proportional regulation. It levels out the competitive playing field for players of different sizes, and helps the market cultivate niches where different types of financial institutions tie in with different types of clients and their needs. A year ago, in this hall we announced that we were planning to transition to proportional regulation in the banking sector.