samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Banks were an exception to this, and in different countries, the approach to privatization of banks varied. In the Czech Republic, the privatization of banks had been delayed for several years due to the government’s belief that privatized banks would stop providing soft loans to strategically important firms. This fear was underlined by the experience with foreign banks that were entering the market since 1992 and cherrypicking their clients. After several years, the bad debt burden on banks’ balance sheets reached such a scale that government had to step in. Most of the debt ended up with a special governmental agency and the losses are being paid from the state budget. The cost of the bank clean-up in the Czech Republic is estimated at approximately 21% of GDP. In some other countries [Hungary, Poland], the privatization of banks proceeded quicker and the fiscal costs were substantially smaller [est. 6% for Poland, 13% for Hungary; in Szapáry, National Bank of Hungary, 2001]. Given what I have just described, the financial sector in the accession countries is nowadays in remarkably good shape. The banking sector is sound and stable, the role of non-banking intermediation is growing, and clients have access to most of the products and services they have in the EU countries.

In looking for the origins of the crisis, one also observes instances of fiscal indiscipline, which caused problems at the Euro area level. In some member states, as for example in the case of Greece, EU funds were not put to proper use and in some cases ended up imposing a burden on future government finances. In my previous appointment at the European Court of Auditors, where I was responsible for coordinating the overall audit report on the spending of the EU budget, in almost every report  1  See L. Bini Smaghi, “Eurozone, European crisis and policy responses”, Goldman Sachs Global Macro Conference – Asia 2011, 22 February 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  during my six-year term, Greece was invariably singled out because of its problems and serious deficiencies in the spending of EU funds. Greece often had to pay back to the EU budget funds that it badly needed. It is evident that such weaknesses in the administrative and political structure put an unnecessary burden on Greece’s fiscal position. A recent study describes the first nine years of the euro, between 1999 and 2007 (that is, the pre-crisis period), as “ ‘wasted good times’ during which the foundations were laid for the present crisis … Almost as soon as the euro had been introduced, consolidation fatigue set in”.2 Moreover, governance at the EU level was weak. The application of the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact was softened through intervention at the political level in 2003.
This refinement may mean a reduction in the frequency of issues open to retail investors compared with the experimental period, but it will enable the allocation of a larger portion of the selected issues for allotment to them. It will also facilitate more focused retail marketing for the relevant issues. The second refinement is the enhancement of price attractiveness for the retail investors. Exchange Fund Notes open to retail investors will be allotted to successful non-competitive bids at the lowest price, i.e. the highest yield, accepted at the competitive-bid tenders, rather than the average accepted price (or average accepted yield). In other words, the retail investors will be assured of getting the best price that institutional bidders are able to get. I am sure retail investors will welcome this. The third refinement is the strengthening of the distribution network. The number of Retail Exchange Fund Notes Distributors will be increased from three to seven. The extensive branch networks of the Distributor Banks and their sophisticated telephone and Internet banking facilities will, I hope, make it much easier for retail investors to gain assess to the primary market for Exchange Fund Notes. The large retail banks have in the past been criticised for not supporting the development of the retail debt market for fear of losing their retail deposits. Just by looking at the names of the magnificent seven you will realise how wrong that criticism has been.

Removing a portion of the excess reserves from the system ahead of increasing the rate paid on reserves is a cautious approach, as it should improve the Fed’s control of short-term interest rates when it comes time to tighten monetary policy. 4 To be sure, even at today’s reserve levels, we would expect the interest rate paid on excess reserves to exert considerable pull on other short-term interest rates such as the federal funds rate or repo rates. However, we are unsure of the exact relationship between these rates and believe that it is likely to be tighter when the banking system is not as saturated with liquidity as it is today. Thus, it may be prudent to remove some portion of excess reserves before raising the interest rate on reserves. Note that the policy tightening in this scenario will still likely be taking place in an environment of large excess reserve balances, and the main workhorse of the tightening cycle will still be the interest paid on reserves. However, the draining tools can be used to best ensure the success of that framework. Market conditions: at risk on exit? Finally, let me turn to conditions in financial markets and discuss whether there may be vulnerabilities related to the Fed’s exit from the current monetary policy stance. I think there are two potential areas of concern. The first potential concern is that the exit strategy could simply cause confusion among market participants, prompting volatility in asset prices.
10 See https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/payment-and-settlement/chaps for more information. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  start thinking now about the opportunities that the UK’s implementation of ISO 20022 – and the CCM – may unlock in 5 to 10 years’ time. Legal Entity Identifiers To seize the opportunities for future improvement, we need to examine where there might be existing inefficiencies. Huw Van Steenis is currently leading a major project in the Bank, Vision 2030, to map out what the future of the financial system might look like and the role the Bank can play in making the system as effective as possible for households and businesses in the UK. One of the themes that comes up repeatedly in our engagement is that the burden of identification is heavy – both for banks and businesses. All but the simplest of business transactions involve a chain of institutions in the financial network. Across this chain there can be many unique ways of identifying a business, and because of that, there are manual checks and reconciliation processes involved every step of the way. A single, universally recognised identifier could dramatically improve the speed and efficiency of identification, by cutting out this manual process at every stage. Which brings us back to the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI). The LEI has its origins in the post-crisis financial market reforms pioneered by the international policy-setting and regulatory community11, serving as a means to better aggregate and monitor exposures (amongst many other goods) ultimately helping us preserve financial stability.

The decisions that we make affect the whole economy, and ultimately serve the good of the people of the United Kingdom. And, making these decisions effectively relies on good data. This isn’t new: the Bank has been collecting data in one form or another since its foundation in 1694. But while data have always been important, the pace of change in technology has unlocked much greater potential. Across public and private sectors alike the possibilities of leveraging data on a massive scale or in innovative ways are being explored – in health and consumer tech, in finance in the form of fintech, and regtech and suptech for regulators like the Bank.1 As well as providing new opportunities for individual firms, the use of data in fintech – to better price and allocate capital and to monitor the uses to which it is being put – has the potential to support productivity growth across the wider economy.2 3 It is often said that “data is the new oil” fuelling a new industrial revolution. While the transformational potential is similar, there are differences from oil which mean that the nature of that revolution will be very different. Unlike oil, data are “non-rivalrous”, meaning more than one person can use the same piece of data at once. Once in the public domain it also becomes by definition “non-excludable”, meaning you can’t control who does and doesn’t have access.
Limitations on loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios, which are applied in Norway, are examples of rules that can have a stabilising effect. Minimum capital requirements for financial institutions and liquidity and funding structure requirements are other examples of rules that will make high credit growth more expensive for financial institutions, and thereby for customers. Rules to ensure that shareholders and creditors bear the cost if banks suffer substantial losses or have to be wound up will have a similar effect. Financial vulnerability can build up more quickly in periods of expansion, partly because financial institutions then have a stronger inclination to take risk. This implies that regulations should be countercyclical, having the strongest effect when the risk of a buildup of imbalances is greatest. It is important that the rules function as automatic stabilisers in the economy. Discretionary use of instruments is considerably more demanding. But it may nevertheless be advisable to introduce such instruments, such as capital requirements that vary over time with the rise in debt and asset prices. The Basel Committee, which assesses new rules for financial institutions and which includes members from major countries, has proposed the introduction of a time-varying capital buffer requirement over and above the minimum capital requirement. Financial corporations with a capital buffer judged to be insufficient would be subject to restrictions on dividends and other payments to shareholders and employees.

Much of this “banking glut” 4 can be traced to the advanced economies: for example, around half of the gross inflows into the United States just before the crisis came from European institutions, rather than emerging economies. 5  3  See Borio and Disyatat (2011), Cecchetti (2011) and Tucker (2012) for more on this issue. 4  See Shin (2012). 5  See Borio and Disyatat (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Now global capital flows of this nature can be valuable. They help to oil the wheels of the international financial system, allowing saving to flow to where it can be most effectively used. They allow banks to diversify across national boundaries, reducing their susceptibility to idiosyncratic domestic shocks. And they increase the degree of competition within the domestic banking market. But by increasing the linkages between financial systems, they can also increase systemic vulnerabilities. In this case, banks became dependent on shortterm funding from overseas, rather than their traditional domestic deposit base. When investors re-trenched, that funding dried up and banks struggled to find viable alternative sources of funding. Ensuring gross capital flows are not excessive is just as important as avoiding excessive net capital flows. Moving to a sustainable equilibrium requires a narrowing in the international payments imbalances. And we have indeed seen such a narrowing since the start of the crisis.
The latest released January economic figures point to more strength in the fourth quarter of 2001 than we had anticipated, given the event on September 11. And, with the current more supportive fiscal and monetary policy stance as well as the expectation of a rebound in the US, the overall environment this year is more conducive to growth than last year. From this vantage point, we are of the view that the economy could grow by 2-3 per cent this year while inflationary pressure would be virtually absent. A continuing expansion in domestic demand and a rebound in exports in the latter half of the year would be the key drivers of this year’s growth. The outlook for inflation remains tame, with core inflation expected to hover around 1-1.5 per cent, well within the target corridor of 0-3.5 per cent. Last year, notwithstanding the slowdown in the global markets, the Thai economy exhibited a noted degree of resiliency. While the world economy was in a slump, Thailand’s exports did not fall to the extent observed in many countries in the region. And, even as export fell by about 7 per cent, output growth remained positive in every quarter. In terms of macroeconomic stability, we saw an improvement both on the domestic and external fronts. In fact, Thailand external position strengthened significantly over 2001. The current account registered a large surplus and external debt continued to fall sharply in 2001. Our reserve position remains strong.

To meet the growth challenge, Thailand needs a steady and sincere effort at the micro-level to put our economy back on a more robust growth path. The reforms must aim for good corporate governance, faster debt restructuring, and the efficient and effective banking sector. Without these actions, the potency of the fiscal and monetary policies will be limited, and whatever gains in output we make will be ephemeral. The bottom line, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that Thailand will stand ready to reap the full advantage of an upcoming global recovery only if the real sector becomes competitive and the financial sector functions smoothly. The Bank of Thailand can contribute to the growth process by conducting a responsible monetary policy to ensure price stability, and by prodding the economy along the path of institutional reforms that have been initiated. With a sound policy framework and institutional reforms in place, a more efficient economic structure will have been built and the entrepreneurial energy of the private sector can be unleashed to ensure greater economic well being. This brings me to the last point I wish to make tonight, that is the need to speed up the structural reforms. I am convinced that the necessary transition toward more robust and durable growth lies in breaking out of the current constraints imposed on the economy post-1997, the most pressing of which is the debt-overhang problem. To go forward we first need to unshackle ourselves. The crawling pace of debt resolution is tying down the economy.
Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus: Crisis preparedness menu for guardians of financial stability Opening address by Ms Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 14th IADI Conference on “Crisis Preparedness Institutional Arrangements and Coordination, Crisis Communication and Contingency Planning”, Kuala Lumpur, 28 October 2015. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be here amongst the company of distinguished members of the deposit insurers’ fraternity, fellow supervisors and central bankers. We meet here today, almost seven years, after the collapse of a single firm that shattered conventional wisdom and redefined the “rules of the game” for the management of financial system stability. Seven years later and counting, the path to sustainable recovery remains unclear. The cumulative impact of reforms in the financial sector also remains to be seen. In such an increasingly unpredictable world, crisis preparedness has become more important. Much is already being done on various fronts to prepare us better to manage crises. This has mostly focused on policy reforms, the supporting infrastructure and institutional arrangements. Also important however, and much less discussed, are aspects of crisis preparedness that cannot easily be reduced to a pre-defined framework or template for action. These aspects are humility, agility and trust, and this is what I would like to address today. Let me begin with a short story. On 10 May 1996, three teams set out to conquer the world’s tallest peak, Mount Everest.

The nontradable goods sector will require more domestic resources. 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Graph: Labour market in a three-sector model As a result of higher labour demand from the non-tradable sector, the general wage level will increase, and the non-tradeable sector will expand at the expense of the two tradable sectors. Graph: “Spending effect” But this is only half of the story. The second part is the resource movement effect. Also the oil related-sector will demand more labour. As a result, wages will move up further, and the manufacturing sector will shrink even more. Graph: “Resource movement effect” This crowding-out of manufacturing is unavoidable if the benefits of the oil resources are to be enjoyed. But the process may go too far. The economy may find itself in a difficult situation when resources are exhausted. The structural changes in the economy have to be reversed. Workers who become unemployed must find new jobs in manufacturing. This could be quite challenging. It is at this stage you can really assess whether a resource economy has escaped the “Dutch disease” or not. Gagnon (2018) argues that the necessary adjustment costs will be minimised if spending follows the permanent income principle, i.e. the expected real return of the resource wealth should be spent every year. On this background he claims that Norway has saved too much and that spending should rather have been based on a modified version of the permanent income principle.
Elvira Nabiullina: Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy in 2015 and for 2016 and 2017. Presentation by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at a meeting of the Committee on the Budget and Taxes of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 13 October 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying slides can be found on the Bank Russia’s website: Slides (PDF). Dear colleagues, good afternoon! Today we present for discussion the draft Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy in 2015 and for 2016 and 2017. This document was prepared in rather difficult conditions. The first factor is a slowdown in economic growth. The second is the volatility and tension in the foreign exchange and financial markets. And the third is a leap of inflation, which occurred recently. This all creates a rather complicated environment for developing the strategy of the guidelines for the monetary policy. We have prepared three scenarios. I suggest starting with the baseline scenario in slide 2. The baseline scenario is based on the assumptions of a steady recovery of the global economic growth, a slight decrease in oil prices, a gradual resolution of geopolitical problems and lifting during 2015 of most of the imposed mutual sanctions and restrictions. Nevertheless, in the first half of 2015, in our view, factors limiting investment activity will remain, and investment activity is one of the key elements that can affect the trends in economic growth.

Foreign banks have continued to expand their operations here, and many have made Singapore a regional or even global platform for important banking services. The local banks have strengthened their capabilities and expanded their range of business activities. They have built up their management teams, and made significant infrastructural investments to enhance their operational effectiveness. Fees and commissions have risen as a proportion of operating income. Banks are offering new business services, while continuing to provide affordable banking facilities to the average Singaporean. They have held their own despite the increased competition. For instance, their market share of resident non-bank deposits (both ACU and DBU) has declined only marginally from 62% to 59% over the last five years. The local banks have also improved their business and risk management capabilities. The recent change in MAS’ capital adequacy requirements is in recognition of local banks’ efforts to upgrade their risk management capabilities, and should allow them to manage their capital more flexibly. With greater financial strength from the mergers and increased competition at home, local banks have begun to venture abroad and develop a regional footprint through overseas acquisitions. Banking liberalisation When MAS embarked on the liberalisation measures, we sought to anticipate changes and trends that we were convinced were already underway. Events since then showed that we moved none too soon. Technological advances have continued unabated. The Internet for instance has proven to be an efficient and widely used alternative distribution and marketing channel, and has helped create new business models.
At that time, the credit expansion which was caused partly by the deregulation of the credit market resulted in a debt ratio of around 130 per cent, while the interest ratio increased rapidly over a couple of years from around 6 per cent to almost 10 per cent. However, there is no doubt that the recent rise in indebtedness has made households increasingly sensitive to changes in interest rates. Households tend to focus on their cash flow and are unperturbed as long as their debt-servicing costs can be accommodated in their monthly budget. But an interest rate rise of just a few percentage points would have a much bigger impact on cash flow today than when levels were around 15 per cent. An interest rate rise of four to six per cent would cause monthly costs to increase by 50 per cent. Higher mortgage rates could therefore prompt households to increase their saving and reduce their consumption more than expected or intended. Hopefully we will be able to avoid sharp, quick interest rate rises in our conduct of monetary policy, although mortgage rates are also influenced by events outside Sweden. To some extent though, the effect of any increases in rates could be alleviated by the fact that an increasing number of households have recently been switching over to fixed-rate loans. Developments in the commercial property market Prices in the commercial property market have been driven by somewhat different forces than in the housing market.

2.3  Strengthening of regulatory and supervisory framework  The design of strong and appropriate rules and their rigorous monitoring constitutes a guarantee for the preservation of financial stability. The Bank of Albania has been active in improving the regulatory framework, consolidating it further in compliance with the legal provisions and the Basel Committee principles, the European Council directives and the best practices in the area of regulation and supervision of financial institutions licensed by the Bank of Albania. The main objective was the harmonization of the best practices in:   strengthening internal control;    improving banking institutions’ governance;    strengthening the risk management capacities; and    increasing the level of banks’ transparency to the public. With respect to the latter, the Bank of Albania has required higher and improved communication of the banking system with the public about the products and services being provided, the promotional campaigns for new products and the provision of information on their real financial situation and risk profile. BIS Review 78/2010  7  3. Other Bank of Albania activities  After the analysis of the two key functions of the Bank of Albania, I would like to elaborate on some other aspects of the central bank’s work. 3.1  Payments’ system  The payments’ system reflected security and efficiency in 2009. On average, 225 transactions a day were processed and settled in the AIPS system, with an average daily value of ALL 19 billion.