samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Advanced Eco nomies Emerg ing Eco nomies 0110  0709  07 08  01 09  0 0108  0110  0709  0  0109  0708  0108  0707  0107  -2  1  0707  1  Emergin g Econo mies  01 07  Adv anced Econo mies  -1  Source: Bloomberg, Datastream, CBRT. In the first half of 2009, the global financial markets recovered, albeit modestly relative to the final quarter of 2008 when the impact of the crisis was felt most strongly. This recovery is mainly attributable to measures taken worldwide in order to ensure the proper functioning of financial markets, unconventional monetary and fiscal measures taken by advanced countries and the relatively promising data on global economic activity. The global risk appetite continued to improve, though slowly, as of the year-end and early 2010. Global Risk Appetite and Risk Premium Indicators Currency and Risk Premium Indicators for Emerging Economies*  Global Risk Appetite Indices Credi t Suisse Ris k Appet ite Index  EMBI+ (basis poi nts)  100 0  VIX (right axi s-invert ed)  Currency Ind ex (b ask et - 1 US dol lar and 1 Eu ro) (righ t axi s)  3  8  80 0  6  16 0  14 0  2.5  4  2  60 0  2  12 0  1.5 40 0  0 1  Source: Bloomberg.

Then, I will briefly touch upon the exit strategy, the details of which were shared with the public last week, for gradually withdrawing measures taken during extraordinary circumstances. IV. Inflation developments and monetary policy implementations  31. As I have also mentioned at the beginning of my speech when evaluating the global economic developments, inflation rates saw dramatic declines on a global basis due to rapidly contracting economic activity and plunging commodity prices as of the last quarter of 2008. During this period, a similar pace was observed in Turkey regarding the inflation outlook. Despite the relatively sound structure of the Turkish financial sector, our exports being composed of mainly products sensitive to foreign conjuncture; the sensitivity of production to global credit conditions and high level of capacity at the onset of the crisis have deepened the contraction in economic activity. During this period, in addition to tightness in financial conditions, a sharp contraction in domestic demand was also experienced due to prevailing perception of uncertainty and increased precautionary savings. Furthermore, temporary tax incentives for stimulating the domestic demand led inflation to fall faster-than-  BIS Review 68/2010  11  expected in the first half of 2009. Consequently, the inflation rate remained below the announced target-consistent-path, in June. 32. As I have previously mentioned, as the pace of recovery in the global economy became more pronounced, the risk appetite in global financial markets started to boost as of the second half of 2009. Accordingly, emerging markets attracted more capital through increased portfolio movements.
A key question for many supervisors, and particularly for our colleagues in emerging market jurisdictions, is whether the New Accord represents the next step to take. The Committee’s view has always been that the fundamentals come first. It is only after a solid foundation for a sound banking and regulatory system is in place that anyone should contemplate the more sophisticated requirements of the New Accord. Over time, it is our hope that more and more countries will adopt the new framework, but not before they are ready. The better capitalised and the better managed that all banking systems are worldwide, the more resistant the global financial system will become to periods of distress. For this reason, the Committee developed a “simplest standardised approach” during the consultations leading up to CP3. This approach has been developed with the assistance of some of our non-G10 colleagues. More recently, we have developed guidance to assist non-G10 supervisors in making decisions about adoption of Basel II and to help them achieve the transition in the way best suited to their national circumstances. Emerging market supervisors have welcomed both the simplest standardised approach and the transition guidance. And we will do more in this regard. We are currently considering how we might best enhance and upgrade our structures for co-operation with non-G10 countries at the Committee level. BIS Review 42/2003  3  Accounting Standards and Basel II I would like to turn now to the third topic on my list.

The tighter the labour market is, the higher wage growth will be. Demand for goods and services determines to a great extent how tight the labour market will be. High levels of private and public consumption, investment and exports will sustain the demand for labour. When the supply of labour is limited, the competition for labour pushes up wages. A tight monetary policy stance with a high real interest rate will curb domestic demand. In many countries, low and stable consumer price inflation is the goal of monetary policy. Consequently, we can assume that imported price inflation will remain subdued. However, price inflation will nonetheless vary in pace with global economic developments. The krone exchange rate also plays an important role in determining import prices. A strong krone exchange rate will curb prices for imported goods, while a weak krone exchange rate will result in higher prices. When there is a rise in the interest rate in Norway and a widening differential between domestic and foreign interest rates, investments in NOK will increase, and the krone exchange rate will rise. Price inflation may vary considerably from month to month. This variation may be due to random or temporary conditions, such as fluctuations in electricity prices or petrol prices, or the effects of changes in real taxes. When we assess the interest rate, we disregard these effects. Statistics Norway has constructed an indicator for adjusted price inflation - CPI-ATE - which is the measure we use to examine the results of monetary policy performance.
We also understand that financial development must be underpinned by a solid foundation suitable for each country’s economic, social, and political context. The speed of liberalization and change must not be too fast that it overtakes the fundamental preconditions such as strong financial laws, the ability to regulate and manage risk and the financial literacy of people. Failure to satisfy these prerequisites risks creating imbalances in the macroeconomy that cause financial instability. With this awareness and the experience still fresh in our mind, I believe we are a natural and understanding partner in the development process. Our banks can relate to and respect the local context in the GMS countries. They can adapt to it as well as share the experiences. Joint ventures, correspondent banking, as well as regulatory and supervisory cooperation are ideal for capacity building. Indeed, close proximity as well as common language and cultural heritage also help relay the experiences. Lastly, the task of financial development would not be complete without the supporting infrastructures, institutional set up, and risk management system. This entails but is not limited to (1)  the adoption of a robust regulatory framework to ensure prudent conducts of financial intermediaries that foster an open and competitive regime;  (2)  appropriate monitoring and policy tools to detect occasional imbalances, flag early warning signals and encourage quick remedial actions;  (3)  talent training and development to manage risks and drive continuous advancement of the financial sector and;  (4)  good governance, predictability and ease of doing business.

•  Thailand is therefore poised to assume the role of a connector – by acting as a link or point of reference for the entry of global banks into the subregion. This is underpinned by our established financial platform, familiarity with the local business practices, as well as close cultural ties among our people. •  Of equal importance is our own inherent understanding of the challenges of developments faced by GMS, through our own experience. This is particularly important in two aspects. •  First, Thai financial institutions are still focused on core financial intermediary functions such as payments services, deposit, and loans which serve the basic needs of the real sector. Thai banks are inclined to serve the needs of the real economy rather than in speculative types of businesses such as proprietary trading. For these reasons, Thai banks are also less complex, with good risk management  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and strong capital base. Regulators in Thailand and GMS neighbours can understand fairly well the business model of our banks and their risk. We believe that given the lesson of the current global crisis, this type of bank model makes good sense for home and host regulators. •  Secondly, both regulator and the banks in Thailand could well remember the bitter experience of our own economic and financial crisis in 1997. We understand that financial liberalization needs to be properly sequenced.
Mervyn King: The MPC ten years on Lecture by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to the Society of Business Economists, London, 2 May 2007. I am indebted to Alex Brazier, Iain de Weymarn, Richard Harrison, James Proudman, Chris Salmon, Tim Taylor and Ryland Thomas who have worked closely with me on this lecture. *  *  *  Not long before his untimely death, David Walton invited me to deliver this lecture. Anyone who knew David will be desperately sad not only that he is no longer with us to ask important questions and make us smile at his dry humour, but even more so that he is unable to take his place at the deliberations of the Monetary Policy Committee to which he contributed so much in such a short space of time. David had a wonderfully clear mind, an independence of thought, and was a warm and generous colleague. He is, and will continue to be, deeply missed. David asked me to look back on the experience of the first ten years of life with the MPC and to try to learn from that experience. So, in his memory, that is my aim this evening. Although the announcement in 1997 of independence for the Bank of England was a bolt from the blue, it was a long time in the making. During the 1970s inflation in the United Kingdom averaged 13% a year and peaked at 27%.

Behind this favorable response of the Chilean economy lies a macroeconomic policy framework able to pursue an effective reaction, and a regulatory scheme supporting the high resilience of the domestic financial system. In Chile the monetary policy framework consists of a flexible inflation-targeting regime with a floating exchange rate. This framework has allowed us to respond efficiently to external shocks keeping inflation expectations anchored. Before the Asian Crisis of 1998, we had a managed exchange rate and we had capital controls in place to allow monetary policy independence to manage inflation in a context of abundant capital inflows. Indeed, we experienced a costly adjustment to that episode, and this was fueled in part by financial stability concerns that called against an exchange rate adjustment. But once the harder times had passed, the exchange rate was allowed to float freely, facilitating not only the external adjustment against shocks but also improving the incentives for private agents to properly hedge their foreign currency operations. The deep-rooted credibility of our Central Bank has also facilitated the conduct of monetary policy with a floating exchange rate system. The fact that the market understands that the Central Bank pursues a goal for inflation at a 24-month horizon means that the exchange rate pass-through to inflation is relatively low, indeed the lowest in the region. This can be illustrated with the reluctance of the Central Bank to tighten monetary policy in 2015 despite a 49 percent devaluation in 2014-2016, and without affecting 24-months-ahead inflation expectations, which remained anchored at the target level.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Achieving Thailand’s true growth potentials – the role of the central bank Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Thailand Focus 2014: Reforming for Sustainable, Bangkok, 27 August 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very honored and pleased to be addressing you at Thailand Focus once again. I would like to thank the Stock Exchange of Thailand, Phatra Securities and Bank of America Merrill Lynch for arranging what has become the must-attend forum on investment, policies, and the Thai economy. This year’s topic, potential growth, has gained new dimensions on the world stage since the Global Financial Crisis. Through harsh experience, advanced economies have learned that their long-term growth potentials may have been diminished by a protracted period of sub-par short-term growth. This idea of “secular stagnation” which went back to Alvin Hansen during the Great Depression and brought back to the spotlight last year by Larry Summers has now been widely discussed in the media as well as policy circles. While our situation is different from the West, Thailand has also been experiencing sub-par growth during most of the past seven years. As the economy now wakes up from the third contraction since 2008, it is natural to ponder about the economy’s growth going forward. Ladies and gentlemen, I am most pleased to have this talk with you today because the Bank of Thailand stands between short-term hiccups and Thailand’s long-term growth, bringing decades of experience in economic stabilization.

While the leu was strengthening, up until the summer of 2007, the issue of adopting the euro was not on the agenda of economic agents. The crisis highlighted the fact that the leu was overappreciated and the market made the necessary correction. Over a relatively short period – from July 2007 to date – the leu weakened by around 35 percent. Over the same period, the prospects of economic growth changed dramatically: from an almost 9.4 percent growth rate in 2008 Q3 to a most likely significant decline in 2009 Q1. The monetary and fiscal policies will be resorted to with a view to adjusting to the new environment. In face of the crisis, the relatively large stock of private foreign debt and the increased market volatility made some economic agents believe that the early adoption of the euro could supersede the need for economic policy adjustments. Yet this is not a viable option, as adopting the euro prior to having achieved the main stages of convergence with the EU might pose serious threats in the future. The adoption of the euro today would mean to relinquish monetary policy before having ensured convergence sustainability, namely before removing all the imbalances we are facing today. The outcome would consist in monetary policy being designed by the European Central Bank (ECB). But the ECB policy might prove inadequate from the standpoint of the specific problems facing the Romanian economy.
On the economic side, uncertainties heightened because of both external and internal factors. The impending threat of global imbalance became even more pronounced. The dwindling confidence in the US dollar continued, which brought about massive capital inflows into the region, resulting in an across-the-board currency appreciation. At the same time, rising oil prices continued to put pressure on inflation during the first half of 2006. Consumer and investor confidence, meanwhile, was clouded by lingering political uncertainties that brought about delays in consumption and investment decisions, as well as in government spending. As domestic demand weakened, export became the main driver of the Thai economic growth. Despite the negative environment, the overall economic performance was quite satisfactory. The economy proved to be resilient, as the growth momentum continued while overall economic stability improved. Regarding internal stability, headline inflation came down from a peak of 6 percent in the second quarter of 2006 to 3.3 percent in the last quarter and to 2.3 percent in February this year. Core inflation fell from its peak of 2.9 percent in April 2006 to 1.4 percent in February – well within our target range. Overall external stability remained sound. The current account turned into surplus since August and registered a surplus of 1.2 billion US dollars in December 2006, or an overall surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP for the year 2006. Meanwhile, reserves to short-term debt also rose further.

[Chart: December 2008: Market rates shifted down markedly after policy announcement] As shown by the black line in this chart, we cut the key policy rate substantially at the monetary policy meeting in December 2008. The dashed blue line, which shows the market path the day before we announced the rate cut, indicates that a significant cut was anticipated by the market. However, in addition to cutting the policy rate, we also published a new interest rate forecast, shown by the solid purple line, which was considerably lower than our previous forecast, shown by the dashed purple line. The market had not fully anticipated this, and forward rates shifted down markedly after the meeting, as indicated by the solid blue line. The interpretation could be that we provided news to the market about the strength of the action deemed necessary by Norges Bank as a response to the financial crisis. On this special occasion, when uncertainty was larger than usual, we believe that publishing the interest rate forecast was particularly helpful in making monetary policy more effective. This example suggests that we can indeed guide the market and affect expectations. [Chart: Interest rate expectations one year ahead] Further evidence supporting our ability to affect expectations comes from household survey data. In this chart, the purple line shows a diffusion index of households’ bank rate expectations one year ahead.
The number of ‘Statements of Commitment’ (SoCs) – which record organisations’ recognition of, and commitment to adopt, the Code – has risen sixfold, from 100 in April 2018 to 605 in November, as recorded on the GFXC’s global index. That index, available on the GFXC website,1 allows market participants to see who signed up, and when. It includes statements from banks, asset managers, corporate treasurers, infrastructures, non-bank liquidity providers – and 41 central banks, including the Bank of England, who have committed to following the principles in the Code in their official operations and investment activities, except where doing so would inhibit the discharge of their legal duties or policy functions. Adoption of the Code is now widespread amongst banks and other sell-side firms. Table 1 shows that all of the largest 30 firms by asset size have signed up to the Code. Progress on the buy-side has been slower, though still quite encouraging: 11 of the largest 30 asset managers, accounting for over $ trillion of assets under management, have so far committed to the Code (Table 2). That number will rise over time, as firms currently working towards adoption reach the end of their internal processes. Nonetheless, it is clear that more remains to be done to secure the same degree of signup to the Code as there has been on the sell-side. What are the remaining obstacles, and how can we address them?

Hamad Al-Sayari: Financial planning and wealth management in Saudi Arabia Speech by His Excellency Hamad Al-Sayari, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, on the occasion of the graduation of the 7th and 8th Batches of the Financial Planning Program and the 2nd and 3rd Batches of the Wealth Management Program, Riyadh, 17 January 2007. *  *  *  Dear Audience, I am really glad on this blessed day to be with you in this happy occasion to celebrate the graduation of the 7th and 8th Batches of the Personal Financial Planning Program, and the 2nd and 3rd batches of the Wealth Management Program. In pursuance of its key role in developing the banking and financial sector, SAMA has been very keen to develop human resources in all financial and banking specializations. To this end, SAMA has made many initiatives. It has instructed the IOB to conduct a comprehensive study on the investment sector to determine the professional and educational criteria that must be satisfied by personnel involved in the various areas of investment. The findings of the study have showed that all staff working in investment and financial intermediation should have certain basic knowledge and skills in these fields. To meet these needs, the IOB designed scientific subjects and standardized tests on the basics of investment and stock trading. Moreover, the findings have indicated that banks’ customers are in need of persons specialized in offering financial advisory services.
Mr McDonough focuses on issues related to his responsibilities as Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  Remarks by Mr William J McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Foreign Policy Association Conference on Global Capital Markets and a New International Financial Architecture, held in New York on 17 November 1999. *  *  *  I am delighted to take part this afternoon in the Foreign Policy Association’s conference on Global Capital Markets and a New International Financial Architecture. It is a special pleasure to be here among so many old friends and colleagues. In my remarks today, I will focus primarily on issues related to my responsibilities as Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. First, I’d like to give you a brief update on the Committee’s efforts to implement globally an agreement reached initially in September 1997 on Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Second, I’ll describe the Committee’s work to promote improvements in risk management, including some related lessons drawn from the LTCM episode. Third, I will discuss the Committee’s proposal for a new capital adequacy framework to replace the 1988 Capital Accord and give you some idea of what on our timetable is going forward. Many of these efforts were initiated prior to the Russian financial collapse in the summer of 1998. There is no doubt, however, that all went into significantly higher gear thereafter.

The absence of a sufficiently thorough system of banking supervision and the lack of transparency not only became problematic before the crisis, but also caused confidence problems later on. Fourth, the quality of the assets of the banking system is vital for the soundness of macroeconomic policy. In allocating savings to investment use, the banks should be extremely careful about the risks that must be taken for a variety of reasons. There are five main types of risk that the banking system and of course the appropriate authorities have to deal with: interest risk; foreign exchange risk; maturity risk; loan risk; and market risk. A sound financial system is the best assurance of efficient monetary and fiscal policies. In my view, all four of these factors contributed to the change of foreign perceptions and sentiment and produced a cutback in normal financing (in fact, 95 percent of external flows to emerging market countries come from the private marketplace). This cutback, in turn, weakened the external reserve positions of these countries. Then the combination of weak reserves and a weak financial sector brought on a liquidity crisis. We are now in a position to draw some lessons from the East Asian crisis. First, policy implementation must pursue sound macroeconomic policies in order not to lose the confidence of the markets. And second, four main principles must constantly be kept in mind: •  The currency should not be allowed to appreciate, except as part of a bold anti-inflation program.