samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Chart 13: Heat maps of health in Belfast, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Inner London  Sources: 2011 Census. Notes: Data show percentage of respondents declaring themselves to be in bad or very bad health at electoral ward level. I draw two conclusions from these micro-level visualisations. First, however striking the regional differences in economic and societal health across the UK relative to historical and international standards, these conceal even more striking differences in levels of health, wealth and happiness within regions. To the extent there is an inequality issue in the UK, it is as much or more a local rather than regional one. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  18  A second, nerdier, point is what this means for our understanding the economy. Many systems – social, natural and physical – exhibit a pattern in which the distribution of outcomes does not converge at higher resolutions; it remains constant or even expands. These systems have a fractal property with patterns that are self-similar at different levels of resolution. Snowflakes and shorelines are the best-known examples. The violins charts suggest economic systems may also exhibit some of these properties, with distributions which do not converge at higher resolutions and may even expand. Outcomes in these systems are not distributed like a bell-shaped, Normal distribution.

15  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  While simple, these maps suggest there is important information on economies and societies to be found by peering through different lenses: lenses that operate at different resolutions, as the striking UK regional differences in income, wealth and health demonstrate;  and lenses that focus on different economic  attributes, as the striking differences between the UK’s regional income and well-being maps demonstrate. Chart 8: Cartogram of UK well-being  Sources: ONS Annual Population Survey (APS) and Bank calculations. Notes: Responses to the question, “overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?” where 0 is ‘not at all satisfied’ and 10 is ‘completely satisfied’ for 2016/17. UK NUTS 1 regions re-sized and coloured by mean response. (b)  Differences within regions  Given these striking regional differences in health, wealth and happiness across the UK, an interesting supplementary question is how those differences compare within-regions. As we alter the resolution at which we view the economy, do these differences narrow? Do economic patterns look different when 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  comparing them within and between regions? Or are these patterns self-similar at different resolutions, as when we use a microscope to study the shoreline? Chart 9 provides one visualisation of these patterns at different resolutions. These “violin” plots compare the distribution of income per head at the regional (NUTS 1) level with the distribution at NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Recent economic and financial developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half yearly media news conference, Berne, 18 June 2009. *  *  *  Since the beginning of the financial crisis in August 2007, our monetary policy has passed through three distinct stages. In the first stage, as the interbank market gradually dried up, we sought to protect the Swiss economy from a deterioration in conditions on the credit market. From the start of the crisis, we countered the forces pushing the level of the three-month Libor up by undertaking appropriate reductions in the repo rate. Between September 2007 and September 2008, we were able to stabilise the Libor at 2.75%. Thus we protected our economy from a rise in interest rates resulting from the increase in risk premia on the money market. Since we were confident that the economic downturn would have a moderating effect on prices, we refrained from adopting a more restrictive monetary policy, despite the fact that soaring oil prices caused inflation to rise and risked destabilising inflation expectations. The second stage began in autumn 2008 with the emergence of the first indications of a swift downturn in the economy and the sharp deterioration in the financial crisis after the collapse of Lehman Brothers investment bank. We rapidly relaxed our monetary policy by bringing down our Libor target by 225 basis points to a level of about 0.5% within three months.

Bearing in mind what we have learned about the importance of financial markets in a highly integrated monetary union, taking measures to ensure a stable and well-ordered financial system in the euro area has to be our first priority. What does this imply in practical terms? First of all, a single supervisory mechanism for banks. As I outlined above, a single financial market combined with national supervision is not sustainable. Before the crisis, it led to a lack of oversight of cross-border activity. Since then, it has facilitated a retrenchment of bank lending behind national borders. A single system of supervision can reduce these risks by allowing for an aggregated view of the euro area financial market; by providing a safeguard against regulatory capture; and by ensuring that national interests are not put ahead of the European interest. With this in mind, the Commission has presented a proposal for the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism, entrusting the ECB with specific supervisory tasks. This is a welcome development and the ECB is ready to assume these tasks. However, it is essential for the credibility of supervision, and for the ECB’s reputation, that the legal framework allows us to implement these tasks in an effective and rigorous way.
Timothy F Geithner: Actions by the New York Fed in response to liquidity pressures in financial markets Testimony of Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Washington DC, 3 April 2008. The original speech, which contains three Annexes, can be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website. *  *  *  Good morning, Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby, and other members of the Committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today. I am here to outline the actions by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in response to present challenges in financial markets, including those in relation to the proposed merger of Bear Stearns and JPMorgan Chase. On the evening of Thursday, March 13, 2008, I took part in a conference call with representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department. On that call, the SEC staff informed us that Bear Stearns’ funding resources were inadequate to meet its obligations and that the firm had concluded that it would have to file for bankruptcy protection the next morning. The SEC said it concurred in that judgment, and it would spend the evening discussing with Bear what kind of bankruptcy filing was appropriate. The conference call that evening took place against the backdrop of an extraordinarily challenging period in the U.S. financial system.

Bear Stearns With this important context, let me return to the actions taken by the Federal Reserve in response to the situation that arose at Bear Stearns. That response was shaped in roughly four stages: (1) the decision on the morning of March 14 to extend a non-recourse loan through the discount window to JPMorgan Chase so that JPMorgan Chase could in turn lend that money to Bear Stearns; (2) the decision on March 16 by JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns for JPMorgan Chase to acquire Bear and guarantee certain of its liabilities, along with an agreement in principle that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would provide certain financing in the context of that acquisition; (3) the launching of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility; and (4) the events of the following week, culminating in the March 24 announcement of revised merger agreement and guaranty terms between JPMorgan Chase and Bear, and the finalizing of the terms and structure of the associated loan from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Let me begin with the market situation in which Bear was operating in the days leading up to March 13. Fixed-income traders had begun hearing rumors that European financial institutions had stopped doing fixed income trades with Bear. Fearing that their funds might be frozen if Bear wound up in bankruptcy, a number of U.S.-based fixed-income and stock traders that had been actively involved with Bear had reportedly decided to halt such involvement. Many firms started pulling back from doing business with Bear.
If individuals have remained unemployed for a prolonged period due to the absence of appropriate job skills so there is a mismatch between labor demand and supply – a structural imbalance in labor markets, then this is very different than if individuals lost their jobs during a deep recession that has been followed by a still tepid recovery – a cyclical problem in labor markets. In the first case, the long-term unemployed may be less well-attached to the labor market in terms of exerting downward pressure on compensation, while in the second case they were particularly unlucky – they are long-term unemployed because of bad timing. I suspect that a much greater proportion of those who are currently long-term unemployed have simply been very unlucky compared to historical averages. This blunts somewhat the distinction between being short- versus long-term unemployed. •  If the long-term unemployed are simply unlucky as opposed to not having the appropriate skills, then their impact on wages presumably depends on whether or not there is an excess supply of short-term unemployed. If there are plentiful shortterm unemployed, they may get the best job opportunities first. In part, this reflects employer bias against the long-term unemployed when they compete with those who have been unemployed for shorter periods. But, once the short-term unemployed pool is depleted, then the long-term unemployed will become more relevant to the labor market supply, so their impact on wages and the labor market will likely increase as the labor market tightens.

We need this collaborative approach to turn promises into practice. One glance at the NGFS website will show you just how much we are doing on that front.23  22 23  NGFS Climate Scenarios NGFS Website 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  8  Green Finance and Green Recovery  Governments around the world are now considering green recovery packages to rebuild economies hit by Covid-19. Such measures to “build back better” offer a unique opportunity for the financial sector to step up by mobilising green finance to maximise the impact of these packages. The benefits for the financial sector go beyond managing the risks from climate change. Identifying the risks will also reveal the enormous opportunities of supporting the transition. And the innovation that follows will be good for business as well as good for the planet. Indeed, there is increasing evidence of a commercial benefit to sustainable investment, both during the recent market volatility around Covid-19 and over the long-term. 24 It is therefore no surprise that global sustainable funds reached nearly $ trillion in assets under management at the end of 2019.25  Next steps  So where does this leave us and what is next on the climate pathway? I like to think of our journey in phases. The first phase was identifying what risks climate change posed to the financial system and convincing the financial sector of the need to act. We have done this.
Since 2015, job creation has been boosted by measures to reduce labour costs (CICE, PRS, SME hiring scheme) [I will come back to French structural reforms in more detail later]. Although the unemployment rate is still too high, 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  notably among young people, our latest projections forecast a steady decline until 2020. Net job creations are expected to remain strong as the economy improves. Following improvement in the labour market, wage growth is expected to build up, supporting households’ disposable income and underpinning solid private consumption dynamics. [Slide 6] Deflationary risks have disappeared in the euro area. Headline inflation printed at 1.3% in March while core inflation is stable at 1.0%. We are now out of the deflationary risk zone although inflationary developments still remain subdued. Yet, the ongoing economic upturn and the labour market improvements are expected to pave the way to increasing inflationary pressures, preparing for a return of inflation to a rate below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Our forecast is 1.7% for 2020. [Slide 7] This gradual rise in inflation in the euro area and improvement in the outlook for inflation is due in large part to the accommodative monetary policy of the ECB. We are now increasingly confident that inflation will soon be on a sustained path of adjustment back towards our inflation aim, and so justify our course of gradual normalisation.

These measures should contribute to supporting the positive trend in private domestic and foreign investment in France. [Slide 12] All these reforms should be enhanced by further progresses made by the French government to improve the sustainability of public finances; I would also hope for an acceleration in this respect. Nevertheless, the present package is already impressive, and reinforces the attractiveness of France. As you know, France has many assets: it has many fast-growing techfirms. It offers high-quality infrastructures and a high-standard quality of life. But more importantly, its capital, Paris, besides being one of the most attractive cities in Europe, is in a strong position to become the main euro area centre for market activities, especially in the Brexit context. 3. Paris’ attractiveness as an integrated financial centre in a post-Brexit world Brexit was and remains bad news mostly for the United Kingdom but also for Europe. As for now, there is one principle which in our view is the corner stone of the future agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom – preserving the integrity of our common good, the EU single market. In practice, it means that we cannot separate access and rules and that UK based entities cannot get a European passport and access the EU single market if they do not fully comply with the single market’s rules and do not recognise the authority of the European Court of Justice.
If one lends money, one will in both cases be able to consume less when one regains what one has lent, including interest. In the case of a negative real interest rate, this is because inflation is higher than the interest payment, and one is therefore unable to buy as much for the sum one receives from the borrower. If instead the nominal interest rate is negative, then the negative return is written into  2 Danmarks Nationalbank, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank also have  negative policy rates (a list of central banks’ policy rates can be found at centralbanksnews.info). It is worth noting that almost a quarter of global GDP is currently produced in countries where the policy rate is n egative. 2 [20]  the contract from the start, so to say, and perhaps this is what many feel goes against normal social and economic conventions. But regarded solely in terms of purchasing power, a negative nominal interest rate is not anything very special, in any case no more special than a negative real interest rate. General interest rates low but not negative Moreover, the fact that the repo rate is negative does not mean that general interest rates in Sweden are negative. The repo rate is a very special short-term rate that only the Riksbank's monetary policy counterparties encounter, including the major Swedish banks.

Let me complement that with one for markets: “Adapt and survive”. But let me add the positive rider - “Those who survive will thrive”. What is the role of the authorities in this future I have described? It is, very simply, to provide as best we can the economic and regulatory environment in which financial markets can do their job - of allocating capital to where it can be most productively deployed - more effectively. On the economic front that means steady growth with low inflation. On the regulatory front it means a framework of rules that provide for the transparency that is essential for the proper assessment and management of risk and sets clear behavioural standards which do not unnecessarily distort business decisions but provide clear guidance to market participants - whether they are end-users or intermediaries - as to what is expected of them and what they can reasonably expect of others. The picture I have painted is one of challenge and change. The flip-side of course is great opportunity. In fact there has never been a time when the markets here in London did not face change and uncertainty. But there has never been a time either when you, we, all of us, did not rise to the challenge. I am sure we will all do so again - and I wish you all possible success. 3  BIS Review 15/2000
Even the safety valve of a floating exchange rate cannot insulate an economy from its trading partners. World trade fell by around 5% in the final quarter of 2008. 54 of the 56 nations for which data are available for the fourth quarter registered falls in industrial output. 7 of those suffered double digit declines. For many years trade has been the route to faster growth. Now trade is leading the world down as the economies most adversely affected by the current downturn are those most dependent on exports, such as Japan and some of the other Asian economies, not those with the worst banking problems. Sharp changes in sentiment, confidence, animal spirits – whatever words you care to use – are capable of wreaking havoc on the world and our own economy. I shall turn later to our immediate response to the crisis. I want first, however, to ask whether central banks have the right instruments and the right policy frameworks to deal with a world in which some of the biggest risks are of the type I have discussed earlier, namely events which occur very infrequently but when they do so have large adverse effects; events such as those through which we are living. In other words, was our framework suitable for a world of stability but inadequate for preventing or responding to large adverse shocks?

In the panic of 1906, the founder of what is now the Bank of America displayed his gold reserves on the street and offered to convert deposits into gold, creating confidence in his bank at a time when many others failed. Forty years ago, the clearing banks in London held around 30% of their assets in short-term liquid instruments. Today that liquid assets ratio is about 1%. For the major UK banks, almost 25% of customer loans are now funded by short-term borrowing in wholesale markets. At the turn of the new century it was close to zero. This was the distinctive feature of the contemporary British model of banking. Distinctive it may have been; sensible it was not. HBoS and RBS paid the price as the availability of this funding dried up, and not one of the building societies that de-mutualised in the 1980s and 1990s in order to expand beyond the constraints of their deposit base has survived as an independent entity. Banks have changed. They have encouraged the expansion of proprietary trading, the funding of long-term assets in short-term wholesale markets, a rapid expansion of balance sheets and a marked rise in leverage. Commercial banks followed the path of investment banks. Balance sheet size and high leverage were seen as the key to obtaining funds at lowest cost. The total assets held by the world’s largest banks roughly doubled in the five years to the end of 2008, and leverage in UK banks rose on average by two-thirds.
One field where this is all the more obvious, because it has to do with competition on the global market, is the management of forex reserves. In principle, they ensure – especially in the case of emerging economies – the resources to overcome external imbalances and to safeguard a relative stability of the domestic currency’s exchange rate around economic fundamentals. The reallocation of reserves for discretionary use and their monetisation strongly erode these essential equilibria, significantly impairing market functionality and the credibility of the central bank and of any government, ultimately to the detriment of society itself. Maintaining and managing an adequate level of international reserves, through the competence and professionalism of the central bank, shelter the country from terrible crises; take this right away and the country is left to the mercy of the winds. For all these reasons, in the context of extensive debates internationally on the importance of central bank independence – debates that I am aware of and I am not contesting –, I plead for the independence of central banks, but also for an institutional balance between central banks and fiscal authorities, as parts of the executive power. Macroeconomic stability – a key prerequisite for sustainable economic and social development – is ensured when there is a balance between the monetary policy and the fiscal policy. Altering the well-established institutional rapports, in times of crisis, may pose a serious risk for the future.

In our baseline scenario for the global economy, we expect growth in the coming quarters to remain in line with potential. In the advanced economies, expansionary monetary policy is lending support, as is fiscal policy in some countries. Inflationary pressure is likely to remain moderate. The risks to this baseline scenario for the global economy are still to the downside. However, they are more pronounced than at our previous monetary policy assessment. Chief among them are political uncertainty and trade tensions, which could lead to renewed turbulence on the financial markets and a further dampening of economic sentiment. Swiss economic outlook  I shall now turn to the economic outlook for Switzerland. The Swiss economy also gathered momentum at the beginning of the year. According to the initial estimate, GDP grew by 2.3% in the first quarter. Growth was broad-based across the different sectors of the economy. Labour market developments were also positive. Employment figures continued to rise, and the unemployment rate remained stable at a low level. Production capacity in Switzerland was well utilised overall. As regards the developments in the second quarter and the months thereafter, the surveys and leading indicators are currently presenting a mixed picture. All in all, however, they point towards momentum remaining favourable. Even in manufacturing, which is likely to be affected most directly by weaker industrial activity, expectations are that the business situation will continue to improve. Companies’ plans regarding capital spending and recruitment also remain positive, which offers further grounds for confidence.