samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Figure 7 shows that the real repo rate is expected to be negative in 2012–2013; that is for a substantial part of the forecast period. If this proves to be the case, won’t there then be a risk of monetary policy being too expansionary? Won’t we perhaps risk overheating, a too high rate of inflation or an unsustainable development of household debt? This is of course not impossible, but at present I do not think that it is very likely. To explain how I have reached this conclusion I would now like to briefly summarise how I view some of the risks associated with a very low real interest rate. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 7. Low real repo rate for some time to come Real repo rate, per cent, quarterly mean values 3  3 December February  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 06  08  10  12  14  Note. The real repo rate is calculated as a mean value of the Riksbank’s repo rate forecast for the year ahead minus the inflation forecast (CPIF) for the corresponding period. Source: The Riksbank  Overheating – not a risk at present The first risk thus relates to resource utilisation in the economy and the risk of overheating. As I have already said, weak economic development abroad is having a significant impact on the Swedish economy.

This applies, for example, to the need for consolidation and which strategy is best for finding solutions to the debt crisis in the euro area as quickly as possible. The question of what role the central banks should play in counteracting an excessive expansion of credit and indebtedness is also often debated, and the members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank also have different opinions about this. I don’t find this strange at all, on the contrary it is entirely natural. Hopefully, this debate will contribute to constructive solutions going forward. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13
Third, I will examine how the British state has involved itself in the affairs of insurance companies over the past 500 years. Finally, I will ask what – if anything – we can learn from this as we enter the Solvency II era. My main conclusion, which may make me unpopular with many colleagues and members of the insurance industry, is a simple one: Solvency II is a big and important change, but – when viewed in the context of history – we are still sailing the same ship, in broadly the same direction. Why do we regulate insurers? Individuals and institutions give money to insurance companies to transfer the cost of risks they could not otherwise bear. In doing so, they trust that the insurer will make good on its promise in the event that the insured risk crystallises. Indeed, the word policy comes from the Italian “polizza”, which meant a promise or an undertaking. Like banks, insurers invest policyholder funds directly onto their balance sheet thereby exposing customers directly to the risk inherent in those balance sheets. Our job at the PRA is to make sure that insurance companies keep their promises to pay policyholders and do not let them down, often when they need that money the most.

Jaime Caruana: Basel II and corporate governance issues Speech by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the 2nd Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) Summit 2005: The Rise and Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in the Islamic Financial Services Industry, Doha, 24 May 2005. *  *  *  Introduction and overview I would like to thank His Excellency Governor Abdulla Khalid Al-Attiya and the Qatar Central Bank the hospitality and Professor Rifaat and the Islamic Financial Services Board for inviting me to speak this evening before such a distinguished gathering. It is a great honour for me to be here at what I am sure will be a most successful and rewarding Summit. I consider it a privilege to have the opportunity to share with you some thoughts on two timely and important topics: corporate governance and the Basel II capital framework. My contribution to this important conference comes with a degree of humility. Although I understand that some of the roots of Islamic finance can be traced back to my own country during the time it was known as al-Andalus, I cannot claim to be an expert in Islamic finance, and I certainly would not presume to talk about the specificities of Islamic banking before such a knowledgeable audience. Suffice it to say that we all know that there are differences between Islamic banking and what we normally refer to as “conventional” banking.
However, this is not an easy task by any mean. Rating agencies should satisfy several criteria in order to be eligible. These criteria, as you might already be aware of comprise experience, freedom from external influence, publicly available assessments, requirements to disclose assessment models and approaches, sufficient resources and finally validation or recognition by supervisory authorities in our countries. Third but certainly not the least, the new system poses a challenge to all banks to improve their capacities in order to comply with the new framework to successfully compete and survive. Banks should start adopting a more dynamic and forward looking approach to the evaluation of risk and  provisions since under a risk sensitive approach there is always the risk of pro-cyclicality1, which means bank capital ratios are likely to fluctuate more over the course of business cycles. In spite of the above challenges, in Albania we have already started addressing some of these issues. First, by making sure that we have consolidated the achievements of our supervisory function by completing the requirements of Basel I. We are glad that the good progress has been confirmed also by the FSAP assessment during their mission in February-March, this year. Certain recommendations related with requirements about consolidated supervision, will be followed very attentively; Second, we have been pushing already our supervisory process and the banks, toward a more risk oriented attitude.

One important reason is, of course, the above, namely that the weakness of the krona is the other side of the dollar's strength and reflects the international  BIS Review 34/2001  3  financial unease. We can't do very much about this, no more than can the Canadians or Australians who are in the same situation. Another reason is that we have a price stability target and not an exchange rate target and trying to maintain both with the aid of the repo rate is not an easy task. In many cases the targets are in total conflict with one another. We in Sweden have chosen a floating exchange rate and will therefore have to accept that the exchange rate floats. If the Riksbank were to intervene on the market now and then, we could easily cause speculations as to what exchange rate we might have as a target. The forecasts as to when the Riksbank might intervene and the positions it might take would then become a part of stockbrokers' daily work. This is not a good thing, as it increases unease on the market, rather than reducing it. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that every central bank may need to intervene under certain circumstances, either by buying or selling currency, e.g. to restore some order to a market that has become unbalanced or to even out sudden large flows. In both cases, one should of course state the purpose of the intervention.
Ladies and gentleman Investors continue to show heightened confidence in the Zambian economy reflected in stronger performance in foreign direct investment (FDI). For instance, the 2013 Foreign Private Investment and Investor Perceptions Survey report shows that FDI inflows rose to $ billion in 2012 from $ billion in 2011, the highest in the past 12 years. Similarly, FDI stocks increased to US $ billion from $ billion over the same period. Data for the first two quarters of this year already indicate a strong performance in 2013. It is therefore, my expectation that the banking sector will continue to take advantage of opportunities arising from the conducive macroeconomic environment in the country to create wealth and contribute to the country’s development. We view increased private investment such as FCB as a stimulus for job creation, technological and skills transfer, as well as wealth creation. This investment by FCB is important given the fact that deposit-taking corporations (banks) have recently become among the top three sectors in the country with respect to FDI. FDI inflows to banks were $ million, third to manufacturing and mining at $ million and US $ million in 2012, respectively. Consistently, in terms of FDI stocks, banks were in third place with $ million while manufacturing and mining were second and first at $ billion and $ billion in 2012, respectively.

The new Law vests specific responsibilities in the SNB with respect to the oversight of payment and securities settlement systems. Up to now, our oversight of the SIC interbank payment system was based on a contractual relationship. As from next year, our responsibilities in this domain will be based on the Law and will extend to the oversight of all major payment and settlement systems. My colleague, Niklaus Blattner, will discuss this subject in more detail in his remarks. The new Law also provides that the SNB shall issue implementing regulations in the area of minimum reserves, statistics and the oversight of payment and settlement systems. The draft of an ordinance has already been submitted to the interested parties for consultation. In the field of minimum reserves and statistics we intend in principle to take up the provisions already existing in the Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks and the Federal Law on Investment Funds. As regards the oversight of  BIS Review 58/2003  3  payment and settlement systems, we are advancing into totally new territory, where for the time being only the main principles have been defined. This implies pioneering work in the implementation. 4  BIS Review 58/2003
On the other hand, neither can we rule out a strengthening of copper supply and demand factors that would allow prices to remain high for longer, according to some market analysts. Regarding domestic activity, we expect GDP to gradually regain faster growth. Several local factors pose risks to this projection. For now, the lack of synchrony between different expenditure components persists, with sectors (especially investment-related) that still lag behind in the recovery process. Lower than expected short-term dynamism could threaten the robustness and sustainability of the recovery of growth in the medium term. In particular, because the improvement in the consumer and business confidence indicators owes more to expectations of better conditions going forward than to the present situation, and because the financial market, within a generally favorable scenario, contains segments of greater vulnerability in consumer and commercial credit. In contrast, borrowing costs remain at record lows and international conditions have been better than we anticipated, which could add momentum to investment and speed up its recovery. In this context, the Board estimates that the risk balance for both activity and inflation is unbiased. However, it reiterates its intention to monitor any possible downward deviations of inflation in the short term that could jeopardize its convergence to the target within the forecast horizon. Accordingly, the Board reaffirms its commitment to conduct monetary policy with flexibility, so that projected inflation stands at 3% over the two-year horizon.

Pill, H. (2022a). ‘Monetary policy with a steady hand,’ speech given at the Society of Professional Economists online conference, 9 February. Pill, H. (2022b). ‘What did the monetarists ever do for us?’ speech given at the Walter Eucken Institut / Stifung Geld und Währung conference, Inflation and Debt: Challenges for Monetary Policy after Covid-19, 24 June. Rudebusch, G. D., and J.C. Williams (2008). ‘Revealing the secrets of the temple: The value of publishing central bank interest rate projections’ in J.Y. Campbell (ed. ), Asset prices and monetary policy, University of Chicago Press, pp. 247-284. Tenreyro, S. (2022). ‘The economy and policy trade-offs,’ 2022 Dow Lecture given at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 23 February. 1. The title of my speech is hardly original (see Mann (2022)). Sharing this speech title with one of my MPC colleagues should reassure readers that the Committee is well-aligned in recognising its remit and mandate. 2. See Pill (2022a,b). 3. See the article on the Financial Times, 21 October 2021. 4. See Consumer price inflation, Office for National Statistics  , May 2022. 5. From today’s perspective, it is tempting to reassess policy decisions with the (considerable) benefit of hindsight. This often leads to the conclusion that policy actions should have been earlier and more aggressive. However, such assessments should recognise impossibility of acting ahead of the realisation of an unanticipated (strictly, unanticipatable) shock.
Such far-reaching ex ante transparency is, however, due to fail because of the uncertainty from which policymakers suffer just like any other market players. As the cornerstone of policy implementation, the interest rate path needs to be revised constantly and optimised conforming to updated information. When we fixed a target range for the first time in December 1999 we simply did not know that as soon as the first quarter of 2000 two interest rate increases would be necessary. The commitment to ex ante transparency must take account of the knowledge and the uncertainty of decisionmakers. Thus, as a rule, it is hardly meaningful to give information with regard to any other planned interest rate moves in addition to the announcement of the current interest rate target. In so doing, the central bank would lose essential room for manoeuvre, immobilise its internal decision-making process and give rise to counterproductive changes in market expectations. For this reason, I am also sceptical with respect to the somewhat softer practice of preparing the markets with a so-called bias statement for a probable interest rate move. Such signals cause expectations to be revised, which is of small avail in the best case, and ties the central bank’s hands, in the worst case. Once a concrete decision - eg to raise the 5  BIS Review 35/2000  interest rate - has been taken, it can be implemented without delay, ie without a prior announcement.

; Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1963), A Monetary History of the United  States, 1867–1960, Princeton University Press; and Ben Bernanke (2004), Essays on the Great Depression, Princeton University Press. 4 Robert L. Hetzel (2008), The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History, Cambridge University Press. 5 Milton Friedman (1963), Inflation: Causes and Consequences, Asian Publishing House. 6 Willem Buiter (2016), “Dysfunctional Central Banking; The End of Independent Central Banks or a Return to  ‘Narrow Central Banking’ – or Both?”, Global Economics View, Citi Research, 21 December; Otmar Issing (2016), “Central Banks – From Overburdening to Decline?”, SAFE White Paper Series, No 42. 7 Jakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger (2017), “Central bank independence under threat?”, CEPR Policy  Insight, No 87. 8 Transparency International EU (2017), Two sides of the same coin – Independence and accountability of the  European Central Bank, transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TI-EU_ECB_Report_DIGITAL.pdf. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
(2) Considers long-term interest rates on corporate and bank bonds with over 9-year duration, except for BBB bonds, which considers more than 8-year duration. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and LVA Índices. Figure 4 Stock-index volatility (*) (annualized percentage) 60 Hungary  July-December 2011  50  France Germany Spain Russia Brazil S. Korea Chile Turkey Mexico Australia Hong Kong U.K. U.S.A. Taiwan India Colombia N. Zealand Philippines China  40 30 20  Peru  10 0 0  10  20  30  January-June 2011  40  50  60  (*) Calculated with daily return of stock indexes, base 100=2010. Data at 16 December. Fuentes: Banco Central de Chile a base de información de Bloomberg. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5 Retail sales and new car sales Emploment and unemployment rate (index, centered on mean of period (1)(2) (index, 2003=100) 1990-2010) 40 225 375 30 200 300 20 10  175  225  150  150 -10  125  75  100  0  0  -20 -30 -40 90 93 96 99 02 05 08 11  06 07 08 09 10 11 Non-durables  New cars  Employment  Unemployment  Durables (1) Sold in moving quarter. (2) Seasonally-adjusted series. Sources: Chile's National Automobile Association, Central Bank of Chile, Chile's National Chamber of Commerce, and Ricaurte, M (2011), “Indicadores de Mercado Laboral para la Comparación de las Crisis Asiática y Financiera Internacional,” preliminary document, Central Bank of Chile, June.

In the past year, the TMF also called on the financial regulatory bodies and financial institutions in Beijing and participated in a Financial Services Expo in Shanghai to promote the treasury markets in Hong Kong. In addition to the Mainland, the TMF maintains close contact with our overseas counterparts in the major financial centres, such as the foreign exchange committees in London and New York. The TMF will continue to arrange regular meetings and visits with our overseas counterparts to keep abreast of global developments and to exchange views on matters of mutual interest. Ladies and gentlemen, in less than a year since its establishment, the TMF, with the support from the industry and market practitioners, has made very impressive progress in its work. Looking ahead, with the numerous and valuable opportunities offered by the gradual opening up of the Mainland markets, it is up to all of us to try our best to seize such opportunities to ensure that Hong Kong will remain the hub for financial services and intermediation for Mainland China and the rest of the region. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 6/2005
The employment forecasts appear on average to have been more accurate than the GDP forecasts. Forecasts for productivity Productivity is a central variable in the monetary policy analysis. The most common measure of productivity is labour productivity, that is, the ratio between GDP and the number of hours worked. It has not been possible to evaluate this measure here, as there is not enough historical forecasting data on the number of hours worked. Instead the ratio between GDP and employment has been used as an approximation. The analysis shows that our forecasts have under-estimated productivity growth on all forecasting horizons (Figure 4).7 The time series model is on the whole slightly more accurate than our forecasts have been during this period. The forecasting memory for productivity has only extended one quarter ahead (Figure 7). The same applies to the correlation between forecasts and outcomes. It is 0.7 one quarter ahead, while it is zero both one and two years ahead (see Figure 9). Inflation forecasts When it comes to inflation measured as the annual rate of increase in the CPIX, we have made fairly accurate forecasts during a large part of the period evaluated, that is, 2000-2006 (Figure 3). Something we missed was the sharp upturn in inflation in spring 2001. This was primarily due to an outbreak of mad cow disease which led to rising food prices. But since then we have made inflation forecasts that have been close to the outcomes.

A tolerance interval of 1 percentage point on either side of the target was included mainly to make it clear that deviations would probably occur but also that they should be limited. The target was tied to the consumer price index, the measure of inflation that was most familiar and reliable, besides being published regularly. There is a great deal to say about this — the choice of the target’s level and the choice of index — in the light of our experience and the academic literature that accumulated in the 1990s. I shall have to be brief, however, because otherwise there will be no time for the more practical issues about our procedures, which is today’s theme. So here are three short comments: •  The appropriate level of inflation is one debatable point. There are arguments for a somewhat higher level as well as a somewhat lower. With our present knowledge, this is ultimately a matter of judgement and so far there has been nothing to persuade me that there are any grounds at present for changing our target. As I see it, the most important thing is to set up a distinct target so that a given rate of inflation is anchored among all economic agents, be they households or firms, employers or employees. In this we have been very successful. •  The choice of an index is a complicated matter.
Failure in this task will additionally give rise to substantial operational and reputation risk, particularly for the banks that have only recently become eligible under CEPA to set up branches on the Mainland. So far, the medium-sized banks seeking to benefit under CEPA are doing so primarily to follow their customers into Mainland China. This simple business model should not pose too much risk for the banks concerned. But banks that are contemplating more aggressive expansion plans, such as tapping the local consumer market, will need at least to be aware of the risks involved and be in a position to manage them prudently. There is a more general and important aspect about this process of growing banking relationship between the Mainland and Hong Kong. This process is likely to be characterised by policy shifts that are more frequent than any other banking environment that we are familiar with. These policy shifts mostly in the Mainland rather than in Hong Kong, and in monetary as well as regulatory policies - are an inevitable feature of a monetary and financial system that is going through reform and liberalisation. And in the absence of deep and sophisticated financial markets in the Mainland to provide the signals and instruments, the task of risk identification and management associated with the more frequent than normal policy shifts is, to put it mildly, a difficult one. An ability to understand, closely monitor and anticipate monetary and financial market developments in the Mainland is therefore crucial, for banks and for us as supervisor.

Bwalya K E Ng’andu: Workshop on Zambian banknotes Opening remarks by Dr Bwalya K E Ng’andu, Deputy Governor (Operations) of the Bank of Zambia, at the G&D Workshop on Zambian banknotes, Lusaka, 22 November 2011. *  *  *    Mr. Werner Reisch and all resource persons from Giesecke and Devrient GmbH    Acting Director – Banking, Currency and Payment Systems    Ladies and Gentlemen  I wish to welcome you all to this workshop on Zambian banknotes and in particular allow me to welcome Mr. Werner Reisch and his team from Germany. As Bank of Zambia, we appreciate your efforts to organise this workshop and would like to assure you that by the end of the workshop all participants will have been enriched with new information on cash management. I am reliably informed that this workshop will be divided into two sessions, with this session targeting employees from Bank of Zambia and the next session that will take place tomorrow targeting commercial bank employees. Ladies and Gentlemen, As you may be aware G&D is a reputable printing company based in Germany which has been in existence since 1852. The Bank has a long standing business relationship with G&D going as far back as 1996 when the company first installed the ISS 300 money counting machines in our Currency office and subsequently the BDS 400 banknote destruction system in 2000.