samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, the process is fragile because there are pressures to shape the standards in a way that puts the least burden on the domestic banks and financial infrastructures in one country relative to the institutions in other countries. There is understandable and genuine concern that the impact of moving to global standards will fall disproportionately on some types of firms. In my view, the way to mitigate these issues is to have a long phase-in period in the transition to the new standards rather than to soften or alter the standards to shelter those firms that happen – perhaps by historical accident – to be starting in a less advantageous position. The focus should be more on the side of all ending up in a similar place, rather than on the relative degree of difficulty in getting there. The process is also fragile because some countries seem intent on strengthening their own set of standards before the international process has had a chance to reach consensus. Although it is understandable that countries would want to move quickly to strengthen their regulatory regimes, such actions should not be undertaken in a way that is immutable and unresponsive to the emerging international consensus. 1 At the end of the day, to achieve harmonized standards, each sovereign nation is going to have to bend a little bit from what it believes is best for its financial system viewed in isolation.

However, I suspect that these efforts will not fully succeed without measures to develop marketplaces and infrastructures that promote greater transparency for all OTC derivatives activity, including more and higher-quality information on prices and transaction volumes. OTC derivatives dealers have natural incentives to favor opaque, decentralized markets that preserve their information advantage relative to other participants. The greater profit margins that derive from this advantage create incentives to favor more bespoke OTC derivatives over more standardized OTC instruments. Making more and better pricing information available to a wider range of market participants will increase competition and lessen the profit incentives that stem primarily from the opacity of these instruments and markets. Improving transparency should make the benefits that stem from standardization such as increased liquidity, reduced transaction costs, and lower counterparty risks more dominant, helping push the evolution of the OTC derivatives market in the direction of greater standardization and homogeneity. This doesn’t mean that bespoke products will vanish. They will continue to exist. But they will exist primarily because they better serve the needs of the OTC derivatives customer, not because they create an informational asymmetry that allows rents to accrue to the securities dealer. Greater transparency would also have other benefits. If regulators had ready access to current OTC derivatives transaction information in trade repositories, I suspect that this would serve as a brake on the use of OTC derivatives that are used for more questionable purposes. For example, this includes trades undertaken to evade accounting rules or to circumvent investment charter limitations.
The Central Bank has bought a smaller share of foreign exchange inflows in the recent past than it did earlier in the year, and the króna has appreciated more as a result. This is because the foreign exchange reserves are larger and somewhat above the recommended minimum for liberalisation of the capital controls. The nature of the inflows is important, as is the view that if the currency appreciates due to a rise in the equilibrium real exchange rate, this is part of the desirable countercyclical role of the exchange rate; furthermore, it is not desirable to disconnect the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission entirely. Nevertheless, the foreign currency purchases have been substantial, based on precautionary principles concerning the durability of the inflows and attempts to prevent excessive appreciation of the currency in advance of liberalisation-related outflows. In the wake of the Central Bank’s large foreign currency purchases this year, the question has arisen whether large foreign exchange reserves are a problem in and of themselves; i.e., whether they jeopardise the Bank’s finances to such a degree that they could undermine its ability to pursue appropriate monetary policy at any given time. We do not have time to explore this in depth here, but the short answer is: no, they are not. First of all, we must not focus only on the cost of financing the reserves; we must also consider the benefits associated with them.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Monetary policy in a global context Speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Zurich, 8 October 2003. *  *  *  It is a special privilege to be able to give my first formal address as a central banker before the distinguished audience of the Swiss-American chamber of commerce. I have always been very fond of the Swiss-American friendship. It has been an integral part of my family’s life for several decades. More importantly, I am convinced it is an essential ingredient to the long-term vitality of the Swiss economy. Like any friendship, it has had to endure difficult moments. The vibrancy of your association is testimony to the fact that the cultural affinities and common interests between our two countries provide a reliable foundation for extensive and mutually beneficial economic relations. Let us strive to make this foundation as solid as the public service record of the Geneva-born Albert Gallatin, whom Thomas Jefferson appointed as the fourth Secretary of the U.S. Treasury in 1801. To this day, Gallatin remains not only the longest serving Treasury Secretary in the history of the United States but the only Swiss-American to have occupied that most prestigious position in the then newly established capital in Washington D.C. My focus today will be on the long period of global disinflation following Paul Volcker’s paradigmatic shift of monetary policy in the United States.
During the last ten years, for example, U.S. nonfinancial corporations borrowed a net amount of $ billion in the form of bonds, three times the net amount they borrowed from banks. Over this same period, these companies as a group spent $ billion more to retire stock – through buybacks and mergers – than they raised in new offerings. Accompanying these increased levels of debt market activity has been a continuous process of financial innovation. This innovation has served to unbundle different kinds of risk and, thereby, to enlarge the menu of risks that investors may choose to bear. For example, interest-rate swaps, futures and options help reconfigure various interest-rate risks. Total return swaps and creditspread options are tools for reallocating the payment risks primarily of emerging market debt. Credit-default swaps and credit-linked notes are ways to redistribute default risks. In practice, this unbundling of risk means that a broad range of financial institutions today performs the credit intermediation process, eroding the historical comparative advantage of banks in bearing credit risk. At various times, some institutions will be underwriting issues, while others will be making bridge loans, providing credit enhancements, writing derivative contracts and taking up riskier components of securities. Within the United States, the fixed-income market is today a market of some $ trillion, roughly the same size as the total equity market. Trading activity in fixed-income instruments is concentrated in Treasury securities.

Boris Vujčić: Macroeconomic developments and structural issues in CEE countries Speech by Mr Boris Vujčić, Governor of the Croatian National Bank, at the Roundtable on Macroeconomic Developments of the 16+1 Economies, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary), Budapest, 9 November 2018. * * * Accompanying slides of the presentation. Economic expansion in the CEE region can be expected to continue in the near term supported by still favourable cyclical conditions. However, in many countries pace of growth might moderate, partly due to supply side constraints and maturing business cycles. Potential growth estimates indicate that in all countries output gaps are positive or have been closed, and unemployment rates are close or below pre-crisis levels, pushing-up the wage growth. While such a positive outlook for future growth is somewhat disturbed by rising risks to the global economy, such as escalation of trade tensions or tightening of financial conditions, CEE countries seem to be in a generally good shape to withstand the impact of negative shocks. Current account positions have improved and in many countries turned into surplus, while international liquidity positions are ample. Also, economic recovery coupled with efforts to push through fiscal adjustment programs led to improvement of general government balance and public debt was put on a declining path. Furthermore, financial systems in most countries remain robust and resilient, as attested by withstanding the shocks emanating from the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.
Immediately prior to the Industrial Revolution and running chronologically, these included the th  th  th  windmill in the 12 century, the mechanical clock in the 13 , the cannon in the 14 , the printing press in the th  th  th 17  15 , the postal service in the 16 and the telescope and microscope in the 17 . It will surprise no-one that waves of innovation, big and small, have been lapping the shores of society for the entirety of human civilisation. In other words, while ideas and innovation may well be a necessary condition  14  Van Reenen et al (2010), for example, document the economic impact of ICT. See Bughin et al (2017) and Haldane (2018), for example. Flohr (2016), for example, discusses innovation in Roman society. 17 Clark (2009). 15 16  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  for economic growth, the historical record suggests they may not themselves have been sufficient. Other forces appear to have been at play, translating these ideas into sustained growth in living standards. What might those forces be? I want to provide two different, but complementary, lenses on the growth story. The first focusses on a rather broader set of “capitals” – not just physical capital (plant and machines) but human (skills and expertise), intellectual (ideas and technologies), infrastructural (transport and legal systems), social (co-operation and trust) and institutional (national and civic, private and public) capital.

43  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  Typically, the two sides of this argument are taken to be in a secular struggle: the dark forces of secular stagnation pitted against the dynamic forces of secular innovation. Yet in practice, both arguments have merit. They are certainly not mutually incompatible. It is perfectly possible to imagine a world of rapid innovation which nonetheless leaves large swathes of society in its slipstream. More than that, recent research suggests this is a likely outcome of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. There are good conceptual grounds for thinking the displacement effects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution may be larger than ever-previously. Every industrial revolution has resulted in a hollowing-out, typically of mid-skilled tasks. Historically, that has meant largely manual, labour-intensive tasks. Machine has replaced human in activities that are routine and repetitive. The future could well be very different. For example, the dawning of AI means that humans will no longer have the cognitive playing field to themselves. Thinking or non-routine tasks may increasingly be taken up by machines. They will be able to process more quickly, more cheaply and with fewer errors than their human counterpart, at least in some activities. That could make the hollowing-out of human tasks, now cognitive as well as manual, far greater than ever before. 48  A cottage industry has emerged over recent years manufacturing estimates of job loss that might result from 49  this rise of the robots.
From taking prompt action to prevent the economy from overheating to acting just as promptly to avoid deterioration. In this dilemma, we have always opted for a medium- to long-run look over the short-term ups and downs, and therefore considered all the risks involved. So far this has allowed us to properly anticipate events and stick to what we believe has been the right monetary policy. The international conjuncture puts us to the test; we have identified many risks in this area. Over the months they have increased in both variety and origins. We know that we are prepared to face them in the best way possible. It is impossible to be immune. In fact, a small open economy like Chile is always subject to the vagaries of the international economy: it could not be otherwise. However, policy makers should be able to overcome them without major setbacks. There are also challenges within our borders, especially doubts about the evolution of a number of variables, such as employment and consumption, among others. It is precisely this medium- to long-term vision what helps us not to make hasty decisions. We have said that we are ready to take action if necessary, but overreacting to one particular event would be tantamount to throwing away the well-earned credibility of the Central Bank, which is a fundamental anchor to achieve our goal of safeguarding the stability of the price level and the financial system.

All of this points at more favorable current-account balances in the medium term. Anyway, for the purposes of assessing this risk we also need to review the evolution of the deficit measured at trend prices. In this sense, news is pointing in the right direction, because the estimate for this year went from 5.7% of GDP last March, to 4.9% in this Report. We estimate that in 2014 it will continue to recede to 4.6% of GDP. The international economy is undergoing a normalization process that influences the Chilean economy. This means a lower external impulse, with more balanced world growth between developed and emerging economies, terms of trade approaching their long-term level and global financial conditions more in line with historic patterns. A smaller boost from foreign investment is also to be expected – especially in mining –, which will take pressure off the current-account deficit and the use of internal resources. Monetary policy is well equipped, if so required, to back this adjustment process. The Board follows closely the evolution of the external and domestic macroeconomic scenario and its implications on inflation, and reaffirms its commitment to conduct monetary policy so that projected inflation stands at 3% over the policy horizon. I would like to end by sharing with you some final thoughts. Final thoughts We have been 19 months with the same monetary policy interest rate. And as with the exchange rate, during this time we have received the most diverse recommendations and suggestions from the market.
Even with only one goal and with only one instrument, in theory Central Bank actions can be organized in different ways. For a long time in the past, monetary policy was conducted through the control of monetary aggregates. This practice, however, proved to be increasingly inefficient as economic systems designed new substitutive mechanisms to create money that had not been supplied by the monetary authority. With advances in information technology and its effects on the productive processes of commercialization and of consumption, this element of endogenous money creation made control of money ineffective, which in turn led Central Bankers to abandon the use of targets for monetary aggregates. It is important to highlight that this does not mean that the evolution of the monetary aggregates will be watched or treated carelessly. They are still closely monitored, but they have ceased to be the policy variable. Another choice available to the Central Bank is to conduct monetary policy through the control of the exchange rate, which implies that the focus of the monetary authority is aimed at managing the exchange rate's trajectory. This option has been also abandoned due to its high costs and to its limited effectiveness when the economy goes through significant changes and shocks. The option that has proven to be most efficient to conduct monetary policy is the inflation targeting regime. This system has explicit targets for the monetary authority, which brings transparency to the targets being pursued and allows for reporting to society the absolute commitment to the control of inflation.

In accordance with the goal of stability and its role as guardian of the currency, the CB has as a permanent objective the maintenance of a sound financial system. The quest for excellence in supervisory standards, in line with the best international practices, is a permanent challenge for the CB. In this respect, it is important that the modernization process be sped up in the supervision and regulation areas, with the aim of solidifying the Country’s position in risk management and the  prevention of banking crises. There are many examples of severe financial system crises in emerging countries which led to significant losses of income and production, with disastrous impacts on society. Brazil may face challenges but will work to avoid crises. Banking supervision and the set of prudential rules play a major role in this process. In the short run, important challenges include the improvement of methods to evaluate the quality of financial system information, and the implementation of the new Credit Risk Center, which aims at enhancing the effectiveness of off-site supervision. In the long run, we will seek to enhance supervisory transparency and the implementation of the new Basel capital accord, without forgetting the issues related to supervisory autonomy and legal protection for supervisors. I am committed to maintaining rigorous supervision procedures, because this is the only way to assure the stability of the system. But it is also important for inspections to have a beginning, a development and an end.
•  Some thoughts on the future role of the IMF in the international monetary system. In going through these subjects, it is my hope that the developments and ideas in each section will provide useful context for your panel discussions later today. The IMF and its origins We live today in a highly globalized and integrated world. However, some analysts may suggest that the global economy was actually more integrated at the end of the 19th century than it is now. In the first half of the 20th century, nationalism and protectionism disrupted this integration, setting off the Great Depression and contributing to World War II. The IMF – and the World Bank, its sister institution – were established to restore an open system of trade and finance, help countries rebuild from the war and, in the process, hopefully build a new era of world peace and prosperity. Against that background, a key part of the IMF’s mandate today is the promotion and maintenance of monetary and financial stability, both in individual countries and at the international level. Stability is the foundation for sustained economic growth, and crisis prevention and resolution is an integral part of our work. The IMF discharges this mandate in a variety of ways, including the following. First, it provides the framework and mechanisms for international economic cooperation. With increasing integration in the world economy, the importance of this aspect cannot be overstated. Second, it helps countries design macroeconomic policies that achieve and maintain high levels of employment and income.

The International Energy Agency has called for a 55% reduction in coal-related emissions by 2030 and a full phaseout of unabated coal in power generation by 2040. Early phaseout of coal is especially critical in the Asia Pacific. The region's coal plants account for about a third of APAC's total GHG emissions. More ominously, if they continue to operate as planned, they will exhaust twothirds of the carbon budget that we have remaining to keep the rise in global temperatures from increasing to within 1.5 degrees Celsius. The challenge of phasing out coal is also most acute in the Asia Pacific. Coal accounts for nearly 60% of power generation in the region. Asia's energy demand is projected to increase by two-and-a-half times by 2050, on the back of economic development, population growth, and urbanisation. The Asian Development Bank estimates that around 150 million people in APAC still do not have access to electricity. So this is a huge problem. Asia stands to suffer the most in terms of hundreds of millions of lives due to climate change, and yet the transition is going to affect them the most as well. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Added to the challenge, Asia's coal plants are young, less than 15 years old on average. This makes the economics of phasing out coal more challenging, especially as new coal plants continue to be built to keep pace with energy demand.
Brian P Sack: The SOMA portfolio at $ trillion Remarks by Mr Brian P Sack, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, 20 July 2011. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me here tonight to give these remarks. These events organized by the Money Marketeers provide an excellent venue to talk about the Federal Reserve’s involvement in financial markets, given the focus and expertise of your group. As you know, the Federal Reserve recently completed its second round of large-scale asset purchases, known inside the Fed as LSAP2 and to everyone else in the world as QE2. With the program now in the books, I thought it would be a good time to look back and assess the experience with LSAP2. Specifically, I will discuss the effectiveness of the program relative to its stated objectives, and I will describe some the operational challenges that we faced in implementing it. Lastly, I will touch on several issues related to the potential evolution of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet going forward. As always, my comments do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or any other members of the Federal Reserve System. LSAP2 and the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet Let me start with a few facts.

Indeed, there are no signs that trading activity has been notably impaired for Treasury coupon  6  In my own remarks before the program began, I referred to asset purchases as an “imperfect policy tool” because of the limits on their effectiveness. See Brian Sack (2010), “Managing the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet”, remarks at the 2010 CFA Institute Fixed Income Management Conference, Newport Beach, California, October 4. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  securities, even in those issues for which our holdings are particularly high. 7 Moreover, the market has not encountered any meaningful problems with delivery and settlement of Treasury securities. 8 Lastly, I should note that the market seems to have adjusted fairly well so far to the end of the purchase program. The pace of the Desk’s purchases fell back sharply at the end of June, as we moved from expanding the portfolio to simply reinvesting principal payments. In particular, our purchases slowed from an average pace of about $ billion per month through June to an anticipated pace of about $ billion per month going forward. We do not expect this adjustment to our purchases to produce significant upward pressure on interest rates or a tightening of broader financial conditions, given our view that the effects of the program arise primarily from the stock of our holdings rather than the flow of our purchases.