samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Media contacts  Copyright 2021, European Central Bank

The figure for Italy was slightly better than the euro area average, while Spanish SMEs were much more negative in their assessment of their access to bank loans. A similar picture emerges when investigating the success of applications for bank loans. While Spanish SMEs reported a lower success rate, French firms reported the highest, followed by Germany and Italy. In sum, comparing the data on bank loans with the results of the survey on SMEs, it is possible to conclude that the modest growth in bank loans granted to the non-financial private sector in recent months is mainly due to the weak macroeconomic conditions. However, it has also been affected to some extent by supply-related factors, which have had a negative impact on bank lending conditions. Some forward-looking considerations Let me finally turn to some forward-looking considerations and the role that monetary policy can play. According to the forecasts of the main international organisations, the economic recovery is likely to proceed gradually and unevenly, in a context of continued high uncertainty and possible further deleveraging on the part of banks. Further ahead, as the economic recovery strengthens, banks should be in a position to enhance their capital ratios, thereby increasing their capacity to provide loans. I would like to refer in this respect to the latest guidelines of the Basel Committee with regard to capital requirements and the implementation of Basel II. Regulatory capital requirements are central to our discussion, as there are clear links between banks’ capital management, the loan-granting process and credit supply.
During the spring this year, however, there were signals indicating that a slowdown was on the way. Moreover, in June growth data were released for the first quarter, which were weaker than expected by all economic forecasters. That prompted the Riksbank to revise down its growth forecast for 2005, as well as our outlook for future cost pressures. But we nevertheless stuck to our assessment that most factors – not least the expansionary economic policy – pointed to comparatively firm growth in the period ahead. 5/7  That now seems to have been a correct assessment. The statistics for the first quarter were revised up over the summer and thus were not quite as weak as they first appeared. During the second quarter GDP growth also rose, according to the data we now have. The performance is positive as regards both domestic demand – consumption and investment – and exports. Looking ahead, we expect that domestic demand will be a more important driving force than it has been so far in the cyclical upswing. However, demand is likely to begin to slacken by degrees as a result of ordinary mechanisms that dampen economic activity. One such mechanism is that interest rates rise as resource utilisation and cost pressures pick up. Previously, the forecasts in our main scenario have been produced on the basis of the assumption that the repo rate is constant during the forecast period.

The participation of banks in the debt guarantee schemes is voluntary, and the very limited use of these guarantees may reflect a decline in the demand for credit and/or the desire of the banks to continue deleveraging their balance sheets. It is, however, important to ensure that other constraining factors are addressed, for example that the disincentives associated with the provision or pricing of these debt guarantees are promptly addressed, so as to help banks finance additional lending to the private sector. Possible further measures A relevant question is whether the tight financing conditions and the continuing stresses on the banking system require further measures by governments and central banks in order to help revive the extension of bank credit to the economy. The answer regarding the need and the nature of potential further measures depends on the causes or determinants of the prevailing financing conditions and on the structure of the financial system. To the extent that (i) financial market stresses, (ii) the deleveraging process, (iii) uncertainty about the economic outlook and about potential further bank losses, and (iv) low confidence impair the functioning of the credit and bank funding markets and the transmission of the effects of monetary policy, “non-standard” measures aimed at reducing funding uncertainty and enhancing the functioning of the credit market and, consequently, the monetary policy transmission mechanism, may represent possible courses of action.
It is evident that businesses must transition to be sustainable to keep pace with the global race towards net zero. As an exporting nation, Malaysia must also prepare for tightening of climate-related regulations that may be imposed by our trading partners. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that form 37.4% of Malaysia's economy3 are the most susceptible. According to report findings by the Sustainable Finance Institute Asia 2022, SMEs stand to lose RM292 billion in revenue due to non-ESG compliance4. The silver lining behind these adversities is the immense growth opportunities. Studies have shown that sustainability investments reward businesses through higher premiums 5 , better brand value, and lower operating expenses6. Without the necessary support, the ambition to achieve net zero would be a tall order for SMEs, which lack funding and knowledge for meaningful transition. In this regard, the Bank launched the RM2 billion Low-Carbon Transition Facility (LCTF) in February 2022 to fund SMEs' working capital or capital expenditures related to low-carbon practices at an affordable rate. Beyond that, other facilities such as the High Tech and Green Facility and SME Automation and Digitalisation Facility are also available for  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  SMEs. In this respect, it is important to note that financing by the financial sector has returned to the pre-pandemic level with funds by BNM only constituting less than 10% of the total financing. We acknowledge that technical know-how is equally crucial for successful transformation.

SMEs need to be nurtured and equipped with the right tools and skill sets to kickstart their sustainability journey on the right footing. The roll-out of the Greening Value Chain Programme, or GVC in short, is a testament to the Bank's commitment to ensure SMEs have access to the necessary support to implement longterm impactful changes. GVC complements available financing via its complimentary technical workshops, financial advisory services and emission measurement tools provided by the strategic partners. Before I end my remarks, I wish to highlight the two key success factors of the GVC initiative. First, strong commitment from participants to undergo the programme and implement the changes recommended. This requires a genuine desire to transition to a greener and more sustainable practices, as well as willingness to invest the necessary resources and time to make it happen. Participants must be committed to making real changes, both in your operations and in the products and services that you offer. Second, proactive actions from large corporations in greening their supply chain network is a must - given their unique position to drive critical mass transition. GVC is the first of many pilot initiatives to come in gearing up our green agenda, and we hope to see more similar private-public partnerships in the future. The Bank remains committed playing bridging role by bringing the national green agenda closer to the public. For this, we welcome any potential partners who are keen to explore new areas of collaboration. Ladies and Gentlemen, Climate change is here to stay.
Such amendments could include (1) 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  replacing the framework’s complex treatment of high volatility commercial real estate exposures, (2) simplifying the current regulatory capital treatment for mortgage servicing assets and regulatory capital instruments issued by financial institutions; and (3) simplifying the current limitations on minority interests in regulatory capital. I should note that, in April 2015, the Board approved a final rule that raised the asset threshold of the Small Bank Holding Company (BHC) Policy Statement from less than $ million in total consolidated assets to less than $ billion in total consolidated assets and expanded the application of the policy statement to savings and loan holding companies (SLHCs). After the issuance of the final rule, 89 percent of all BHCs and 81 percent of all savings and loan holding companies were covered by the policy statement and were excluded from certain consolidated capital requirements. A second relevant topic reflects the challenges and burdens for smaller firms to file Call Reports. In response to industry concerns, the agencies began in 2014 the process to streamline the Call Report for community banks and subsequently published a series of proposals for comment. The result is that, effective March 31, 2017, Call Report requirements have been streamlined for community banks. This new Call Report will reduce the number of report pages from 85 to 61 pages and will remove approximately 40 percent of the data items currently included in the capital schedule. A third example concerns the frequency of examinations.

Opportunities that not only profit businesses, but that enable private enterprise to help solve real world problems confronting society today – including poverty, climate change and growing inequality. As you can imagine, worrying about risks is in the DNA of central banks given our mandates to promote monetary and financial stability. So the idea of innovative risk management itself would typically set off alarm bells within the Bank, and probably among a number of you in this room. But in reality, we are living in a world where exceptional conditions exist. Monetary and financial 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  conditions that prevailed since the Global Financial Crisis have increased financial risks. Thanks to globalisation, regulatory and political developments have a far wider international reach. And social media that has become deeply ingrained in our daily lives has led to a world described in the latest Global Risk Report by the World Economic Forum as “a world without common facts and objective truth”. Innovative risk management is therefore not just about allowing businesses to take on more risks in a responsible way. It is as much about strengthening our defences against new and emerging risks. And perhaps, most importantly, it is about providing businesses with the confidence to move beyond the present to embrace and build a better future. For many organisations, current approaches to risk management are likely to be already severely deficient in this new environment.
A single currency in the euro zone would remove the foreign exchange risk in around half of Sweden's foreign trade, while the other half would in this case continue with a floating exchange rate, as the euro floats against other currencies. A single currency thus provides less risk and thereby lower costs, which are most important to small companies and private persons. The larger corporations have greater capacity to manage foreign exchange risk, although they would also benefit from a lower foreign exchange risk. What role all of these economic arguments play in the final consideration of whether Sweden should join the EMU or not depends on the weight one attaches to the economic arguments. The EMU question contains so many different dimensions that are more than the purely economic dimensions I have taken up here. A central bank can have an opinion on the economic issues, but should, in my opinion, keep a low profile in the final decision-making. It is clear in any case that Sweden has succeeded in recreating confidence in economic policy after the mistakes of the 1970s and 1980s. It is also clear that we, like other countries, need to continue to pursue an economic policy aimed at macroeconomic policy regardless of whether or not we participate fully in the third stage of EMU. It is good to be prepared for action with regard to unforeseen events – what is known as asymmetric shocks – whether we are inside the EMU or on the outside.

After that there was an attempt to "bridge over" the international economic downturn that followed in the wake of the oil crisis. The cost problem was checked by devaluation. The idea was to keep demand up until international economic activity showed an upturn. Another example is the beginning of the 1980s, when activity in the economy once more came out of synch. Sweden came out of the decline faster than other European countries by means of two aggressive devaluations, but the cost was that inflation became stuck at a high level. The General Council also expressed scepticism, in its comments on the commission's report, of the statement that it would be possible to pursue an individual economic policy in the case of remaining outside EMU. With hindsight, one can perhaps conclude that this scepticism was a little exaggerated in that the steering interest rate has been both higher and lower than in the euro area in recent years and the krona has fluctuated substantially. Given that a country has systems for both fiscal policy and monetary policy that inspire confidence, there appears to be somewhat better scope for action within the framework of an economic policy aiming at macroeconomic stability than was earlier assumed. 1  Sweden and the EMU, SOU 1996:158.
The HKMA and BOT are fully committed to the successful implementation of this PvP link. Over the past year, exceptional effort has been made by BOT to engage Thai banks to encourage participation and adequate preparation for its implementation. On our side, apart from rendering support on the technical front, we have been in close dialogue with the participating banks of the USD RTGS system, especially those active in correspondent banking activities, to facilitate Thai banks to identify suitable correspondent banking service providers in Hong Kong. These efforts are bearing fruit. About half of the banks in Thailand, including most of those active in the FX market, participated in the pre-launch tests together with their USD correspondent banks in Hong Kong. On the back of the keen interest observed, I am confident that we will see sizeable flow of transactions through this link. 8. Expanding the footprint of the local financial market infrastructure is a strategy actively pursued by the HKMA to develop Hong Kong into a regional payment and settlement hub. This PvP link with Thailand is the third of its kind in the region, preceded by the launch of the links with Malaysia and Indonesia, in 2006 and 2010 respectively. According to the latest triennial survey on global FX market activity of the Bank for International Settlements, the average daily turnover in FX transactions in Asia increased by 27.5% from $ billion equivalent in April 2010 to $ billion equivalent in April 2013.

First and foremost, this PvP link will help eliminate settlement risk in US dollar-Thai Baht foreign exchange (FX) transactions. Prior to this link, the settlement of the two currency legs was done in different time zones and in an uncoordinated manner – Thai Baht (THB) in the Asian time zone, followed by US dollar (USD) during New York hours. With the new PvP link, all payments can be made within the Asian time zone and in a coordinated manner by adopting the PvP mode. Under this arrangement, when a Thai Bank delivers (or receives) THB to (or from) its counterparty in Bangkok, the correspondent bank of the Thai Bank in Hong Kong receives (or delivers) USD at the same time. Hence, the risk due to time lag in settling the two legs of the FX transaction can be removed. 5. Second, the reduction in FX settlement risk will open up new business opportunities for banks in both Thailand and Hong Kong. USD against THB transactions accounted for about 75% of Thailand’s FX transactions in 2013. Through this link, banks in Thailand can benefit from the highly flexible and cost-effective solution offered by the USD RTGS system in Hong Kong for managing the settlement risk of their USD FX transactions. The seven-and-a-half-hour PvP window offers a high degree of convenience to the system users.
Kristina Persson: Sweden and the Euro Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedish Chamber of Commerce for Germany, Frankfurt, 27 November 2002. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me begin by thanking the Swedish Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to this conference on a subject of immediate importance to Sweden and of course to the Riksbank. This is also a subject in which I have taken a strong interest for many years, as a Member of the Riksdag and also briefly as a Member of the European Parliament. We live in a challenging time for the euro area, facing both the present downturn of the global economy, and the future enlargement to include the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. It is also a decisive period for Sweden, as the issue of EMU participation is now coming to the fore. Given that we are approaching a decision on a euro referendum in Sweden the Riksbank will naturally step up its preparations to ensure a smooth and rapid transformation of Sweden and the Riksbank to the Eurosystem. I will here today share with you some views on the development so far of the euro area and on the possible Swedish membership. My presentation will naturally focus on the economic aspects of EMU, but let me nevertheless emphasize that I personally think that the political arguments for European cooperation remain crucial, especially at times when nationalism is on the rise on our continent.

Our recent experience shows that a small currency on the highly volatile financial markets risk being more affected than the bigger currencies by factors out of its control and with no direct relevance to their economic performance. One such example was the reaction on the currency markets in the days following the 11 September events. It is also quite apparent that the present strengthening of the krona was influenced by the Prime Minister raising the issue of a referendum on EMU. Furthermore, recent experience implies that the deviations from the euro average growth should not be very large in the normal case. Even if Swedish growth and productivity have been somewhat higher than those of the euro area since 1999, recent evaluations show that that the business cycles in the euro area and Sweden are fairly synchronised, despite the asymmetric shocks due to the crises in the mobile telecommunications and IT sectors. However, it cannot be ruled out that Sweden can become subject to serious asymmetric shocks, i.e. disturbances affecting Sweden differently from the rest of the euro area. On those occasions it is important that Sweden has an alternative way of stabilising the economy. One possible instrument is of course to use fiscal policy. The Riksbank recently presented its views on the government report "Stabilisation policy in the Monetary Union" where we elaborate on the possibility of using fiscal policy to stabilise inflation in a similar way as monetary policy does today.
[38]As was done in Article 20 of the SSM Regulation in respect of the audit. [39]For general considerations on that matter, see Bini Smaghi, L. (2006), “  Independence and accountability of supervision in the European financial market”. [40]For instance, the German supervisory authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) is subject to  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  instructions from the Ministry of Finance. [41]See also Bini Smaghi, L. (2006), “  Independence and accountability of supervision in the European financial market”. [42]The Chair has a non-renewable term of office of five years  (Article 26(3) of the SSM Regulation) and may be dismissed from office following a special procedure by the appointing body (the Council) only in two specifically listed cases (Article 26(4) of the SSM Regulation). [43]The Vice Chair is chosen from among the members of the Executive Board and the independence safeguards for the Executive Board apply to her/him (Article 26(3) and (4) of the SSM Regulation). [44]The rules for the ECB representatives in the Supervisory Board are not set out in the SSM Regulation but in the ECB Decision on the appointment of representatives of the ECB to the Supervisory Board (ECB/2014/4), which defines a nonrenewable term of office of five years (Article 1(2)) and lists the two specific cases under which they can be dismissed from office by the appointing authority (the ECB’s Governing Council).

See also, for instance, Amtenbrink, F. (1999), The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks, Hart Publishing; and De Haan, J., Amtenbrink, F., Eijffinger S.C.W. (1999), “Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification”, PLS Quarterly Review, Vol. 52, No 209. [16]Issing, O. (1999), “The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or ‘Willem in Euroland’”, Journal of Common  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  Market Studies, Vol. 39(3): 503-19; Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2000), “The Institutional Glossary of the Eurosystem”, ZEI Working Paper, No B-16; and ECB (2002), “The accountability of the European Central Bank”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, November. [17]The Governing Council’s quantitative definition of price stability is as follows: "Price stability is defined as a year-onyear increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%." [18]Issing, O. (1999), “The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or “Willem in Euroland””, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(3): 503-19; Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2000), “The Institutional Glossary of the Eurosystem”, ZEI working paper No. B-16, and; ECB (2002), “The accountability of the European Central Bank”, ECB Monthly Bulletin November 2002. [19]Padoa-Schioppa, T. “  An institutional glossary of the Eurosystem” presented at the conference on "The Constitution of the Eurosystem: the Views of the EP and the ECB", 8 March 2000.