samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
25.02.2021  Latin American economies: developments and challenges Consejo Empresarial Alianza por Iberoamérica (CEAPI) Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. First of all, I would like to thank the Consejo Empresarial Alianza por Iberoamérica (CEAPI) and its President, Núria Vilanova, for the kind invitation to participate in this event. I should also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the role that the CEAPI plays to support the business and investment of Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American firms. As you all well know, Latin America is a very important region for Spain owing to our close cultural and economic ties. It is likewise important for the Banco de España, as evidenced by one of the initiatives in our Strategic Plan for 2020-2024:1 positioning the Banco de España as a leading central bank for Latin America. This objective entails engaging in a series of actions, such as organising events, entering into and implementing cooperative agreements with central banks and institutions in the region, and the provision of services and international cooperation, all with a medium and long-term strategic view. It also means working to extend and improve our institution's analytical capacity and its visibility vis-à-vis the region’s economies and financial systems. Fortunately, it is already viewed as a benchmark in this regard within the Eurosystem.

One tentative indication that high capacity may be playing an important role is that unsecured rates appear to have settled in about the same position relative to IOR as before liftoff, even though one might have expected the widening in the IORON RRP spread and the lower support from the ZLB to result in some downward shift. The ON RRP also has a per-counterparty cap, which was, and is, $ billion. It seems that the current level of the per-counterparty cap was also adequately large for perceived individual “headroom,” thereby supporting lender bargaining power. Figure 14 shows summary data on how frequently we receive large bids in our operations at the ON RRP and term RRP facilities. As you can see, we rarely see bids of more than $ billion, and combined individual counterparty usage across overnight and term operations has never exceeded $ billion. Recently, we learned a bit about the term RRP operations. We have been conducting these over quarter-ends as a way of providing additional RRP capacity. Additional capacity is available because term RRP operations are subject to a separate overall size limit, and because there is no per-counterparty cap in those operations. Counterparties appear to regard these as close substitutes for ON RRPs, and as shown in Figure 15, we’ve typically seen that overall RRP take-up, across overnight and term RRP, has been fairly stable across quarterends. At this past year-end, there was essentially no take-up at the term RRP operations.
Ravi Menon: Smart regulation and sustainable insurance growth Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Insurance Institute of London, London, 12 May 2015. *  *  *  Mr Stephen Riley, President of the Insurance Institute of London Mr John Nelson, Chairman, Lloyd’s of London Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I wish to thank John for inviting me to speak to you today. It is a privilege to address members of this esteemed Institute, and a pleasure to do so in a heritage building of such architectural and historic interest. I have been to this building before. And my first thought as Lloyd’s Building came into view, along with its plumbing, stairways and lift shafts, was transparency. So it is apt that in the same spirit of transparency, I should make a couple of disclosures: •  one, I am not an actuary or an accountant, and  •  two, I am not responsible for Solvency II. But John has kindly assured me that the musings of a central banker and regulator from the Far East counts towards fulfilling your continuing professional development requirements. So for my speech today, I will offer an overview of MAS’ roles as central bank and integrated supervisor, our approach to regulating and developing the financial sector, and prospects for the insurance industry in Asia.

Moreover, our new forecast, which as always takes account of today’s decision, shows that a further tightening of monetary policy cannot be ruled out in the coming quarters. However, the environment continues to be subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Let me now say a few words about the exchange rate. The Swiss franc has appreciated in trade-weighted terms by around 7% since the monetary policy assessment in June. This appreciation helps to tighten monetary conditions and dampen inflationary pressure. In order to set appropriate monetary conditions, we remain willing to be active in the foreign exchange market as necessary. If there were to be an excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc, we would purchase foreign currency. If the Swiss franc were to weaken, however, we would consider selling foreign currency. Period of negative interest rates comes to an end  With today’s decision, an extended period of a negative SNB policy rate comes to an end. Negative interest was introduced at the beginning of 2015 to counter upward pressure on the Swiss franc associated with the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. Over the past years, negative interest has helped to dampen the appreciation of the Swiss franc and to ensure price stability. At the same time, we were always aware that negative interest can have undesirable sideeffects and presents challenges for many economic agents. On the whole, however, negative interest has proved its worth.
The inter-bank market has become highly integrated thanks to the setting up of the Target system for the real-time transfer of large-value payments throughout the euro area and in other EU countries. Let me turn now to the introduction of euro banknotes and coins, which has been the last step of a now more-than-twenty-year process of monetary integration. Euro changeover On 1 January 2002, the euro banknotes and coins were issued and became legal tender in the countries of the euro area. This was a unique and highly symbolic milestone for Europe. Let me first stress that, thanks to national efforts and the co-ordination by the European Commission and the Eurosystem, almost 100 % of cash transactions in the euro area were being carried out in euro only two months after the changeover. Although the practical changeover to the euro might be considered as an outstanding achievement, we should remain vigilant on the following issues: •  First, price stability. Although some increases in prices of a certain number of consumer goods and services have been reported, the first evidence shows that, overall, the effect of the changeover on price stability has been marginal. But consumers must keep alert, while companies and retailers remain responsible as regards price setting. In the end, competition should also contribute to lowering the prices in the short-to-medium term. •  Second, we must closely monitor the risks of counterfeiting of notes and coins: the information campaign of the Eurosystem “The Euro.

In this regard, one of the statutory tasks of the Eurosystem is, according to the Treaty, to contribute to the smooth conduct of prudential supervision policies and the stability of the financial system. I am therefore convinced that the involvement of central banks in this issue will remain absolutely crucial. •  Finally, since the tragic events of 11 September and their impact on financial stability, concerns over the potential abuse of the financial system for the financing of terrorism have received top priority in international and European regulatory discussions. The international community and, within it, the financial community, should step up its efforts to hunt down money used by organised crime and terrorism. We shall not be successful overnight, but, today, there is a strong political determination on the part of the international community to co-operate on this issue. As far as the fight against organised crime and terrorism is concerned, we can no longer accept that certain players are not prepared to observe the rules of international legal co-operation. rd  Beyond structural reforms and financial stability, the accession of new Member States to the European Union and to EMU is the third challenge that I have identified. The last challenge but not the least. Accession of new Member States to the EU and EMU Twelve countries from central, eastern and southern Europe are currently negotiating accession to the EU, of which ten, according to the calendar endorsed by the European Council, will join the E.U.
It is also essential to maintain the criterion of demanding conditionality when designing public assistance, so that this is only received by institutions that adjust their capacity and manage to improve their efficiency, which is easier to do when their size is increased. At the same time, any strategy that encourages banks to seek private solutions requires more time than one of wholesale public intervention. But this system of incentives, which has required an enormous amount of work not only by the supervisory authorities at the Banco de España but also by many savings bank managers, has meant that most institutions have voluntarily undertaken integration and restructuring process. That has not only served to reduce the contribution of the Spanish taxpayer, but also to increase banks’ size and reduce their capacity, thus giving rise to a banking system that is somewhat better prepared to withstand  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the crisis than the one we had when it started, although all the institutions still have much to do in the way of improving their efficiency. It is also important to emphasise that the key to every restructuring is to clean up balance sheets. Some of the criticisms that you may have heard during the savings bank restructuring process have been that it was unfair to require savings banks first to write down their assets and then to recapitalise too.

The assessment of different alternatives for appropriate remuneration schemes, on the basis of correct incentives and horizons, constitutes the right starting point from which to explore how excesses or bad alignments may have contributed to accelerate or amplify disorders within the financial system. As you have seen, we are not lacking ideas on how to reduce procyclicality. Rather, our main problem is to select what are the best tools to include in our toolbox. In this sense, I am sure that your contributions in this seminar will be extremely useful for this purpose. Now, let me give the floor to Mr. Josef Tošovský, with whom I have the honor to chair this opening session and to whom I personally thank his presence in this conference. BIS Review 552009  3
As Krueger (2018) discusses, there are other types of “implicit contract” which might dilute workers’ bargaining power. See also Manning (2003). 25 Autor et al (2017b). 26 Autor et al (2017b). 27 Autor et al (2017b). 28 Benmelech, Bergman and Kim (2018). 29 Mueller, Ouimet and Simintzi (2017). 30 Abel, Tenreyro and Thwaites (forthcoming). 24  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  Implications for Monetary Policy  Let me conclude with some reflections on current and prospective pay developments. A year ago, prospects for pay were cloudy. Average weekly earnings growth – excluding the volatile bonus component – was running at a 2% annual rate, in line with its growth over the preceding three years. Average pay settlements were running at just over 2%. Signs of a pay pick-up had, to that point, proved to be false dawns. A year on, I think there is more compelling evidence of a new dawn breaking for pay growth, albeit with the light filtering through only slowly. Average weekly earnings growth (excluding bonuses) has risen to 2.9% – a clear rise and a little stronger than the MPC had expected at the time of its Inflation Report in August. Pay settlements have risen to 2.8% in a similar pattern (Chart 23). Measures of labour market tightness have increased to their highest levels since before the crisis and, in some cases, ever. Looking beneath the headline figures, evidence of an up-tick in pay is clearer still.

Today, with a mobile penetration rate of 145%, internet transactions are becoming more prevalent. Last year, Malaysians spent 23% more on online shopping platforms compared to 2015. This is consistent with what is happening around the globe. The number and value of non-cash transactions have increased steadily in recent years. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Balance between paper and digital However, despite these observations, central banks around the globe expect cash to stay necessary and never go away. There are several reasons for this but ultimately they boil down to having a good mix of both. Think about the printed book. There are some things that an e-book simply cannot offer. You can’t turn down a corner, leaf through the pages, or crack a spine. However conversely, reading off a tablet or Kindle saves you the hassle of lugging around heavy books or lengthy academic articles – especially when you do not need to read them from cover to cover. As a policy maker, I would think that there are three elements, or the ‘3S’, that we should consider in determining an optimal balance of paper and digital, cash and cashless. Security The first consideration is security. Counterfeiting is as old as money itself. However, cash has become more secure in recent years. In Malaysia, the amount of counterfeits discovered reduced by 25% in the past year. The currency industry is continuing to make good progress in enhancing security features.
True, as the recovery gains momentum, and provided this translates into a sustained adjustment by inflation towards its target, the need for monetary policy to support the economy will tend to diminish. The US Federal Reserve has already begun to reduce its balance sheet at a gradual and predictable pace, and the ECB has slowed the pace of increase of its own balance sheet. This reduction in stimuli will extend the monetary policy headroom for acting effectively in the face of possible future crises. The monetary policy normalisation strategy can but be slow and will tend to be applied predictably, with close scrutiny of its impact both on economic growth and inflation and on financial stability. It is worth recalling that, in 2013, the markets rather hastily interpreted some statements by the Federal Reserve, the clarification or correction of which gave rise to a bout of turbulence, owing to the different forecasts as to the speed at which expansionary monetary policy would be abandoned or softened. That episode provided a lesson for all central banks that have applied unconventional policies, in two respects: monetary policy should be corrected very slowly, and the correction should be predictable to the markets. In sum, predictability and a clear communication strategy will be important in preventing adverse market reactions. Financial regulation and supervision The second area I would like to mention concerns the challenges in financial regulation and supervision.

The withdrawal of pension savings will have a significant effect on consumption and trade-related activities next year. The fiscal stimulus will continue to be positive, in accordance with the approved budget. The Chilean economy will receive a slightly greater external boost than previously considered, with our trading partners growing by an average of 4.9% in the years 2021 and 2022, with an average copper price of USD 3.15 per pound in the same years. With this, we project that after falling between 6.25% and 5.75% this year, the Chilean economy will grow between 5.5% and 6.5% in 2021 and between 3% and 4% in 2022 (Table 1). With respect to monetary policy, our assessment of the macroeconomic scenario and its outlook leads us to anticipate that the monetary stimulus will remain high for an extended period of time, so as to ensure the consolidation of the economic recovery and the achievement of the Bank’s objectives. In particular, we foresee the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) remaining at its minimum level for much of the 24-month monetary policy horizon. As for the unconventional measures, they will remain in place. This considers that the total stock of bank bonds acquired by the CBC under different programs—around USD 8 billion—will be maintained for the next six months, reinvesting the coupons as they mature. This excludes the purchases made under the Cash Purchase and Term Sale (CC-VP) program, which have a different objective. With respect to the FCIC, the Board has made no changes to the total amount of resources available.
My colleague Lars E. O. Svensson has, for example, claimed that unemployment has been unnecessarily high since the mid-1990s because monetary policy has not been used to a sufficient extent to counteract shocks that have pushed down inflation.3 It is of course important to determine what the situation was with regard to resource utilisation before the financial crisis in order to be able to assess the level that unemployment should eventually fall to. But this is not the issue that I intend to focus on today: my focus  3  See the paper “The possible unemployment cost of average inflation below a credible target” or the speech “Monetary policy and inflation: monetary policy is too tight”, 16 January 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  here is instead on the issue of how economic policy could be used more effectively to stabilise business cycle fluctuations in the future despite the risks to financial stability. Limited stimulation from fiscal policy In contrast to the situation in many European countries and the United States, there was a significant surplus in public net lending in Sweden when the financial crisis began. In the euro area and the United States, public net lending as a percentage of GDP had shown an average deficit of just under 2 per cent during the 10 years before the crisis.

Mugur Isărescu: The macroeconomic perspective in Romania Welcome speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Romanian-Czech Business Forum, Bucharest, 20 May 2014. *  *  *  Your Excellency, President Zeman, you are most welcome here, at the National Bank of Romania, a place that holds within its walls countless pieces of history, tails of how Romania has grown into a modern state. We are privileged to greet here, today. Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, Allow me to extend a very warm welcome and thank you all for gracing us with your presence at the Romanian-Czech Business Forum. It is a great pleasure for the National Bank of Romania, and an honor for me and for the members of the board, to host what will be a substantial discussion about the challenges currently facing Europe, in particular the development of economic relations between the Czech Republic and Romania. Here, at the National Bank of Romania, we take pride in having always been a forum for debating, in an open and profound manner, the themes and trends defining our age. A few weeks ago we celebrated the 134-th anniversary of the Romanian National Bank, a central bank ranking 16-th in the world. During the break, after the working sessions, you are kindly invited to visit/walk the outstanding halls of the Old Palace of our national bank.
Mervyn King: Monetary policy – practice ahead of theory Text of the Mais Lecture 2005 by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Cass Business School, City University, London, 17 May 2005. The references can be found on the Bank of England’s website. I am indebted to James Proudman, Gertjan Vlieghe, Tony Yates and Richard Harrison who have worked closely with me on this lecture and are effectively co-authors. Alan Mankikar and Tim Taylor provided excellent assistance in preparing the empirical and historical research that support this lecture. *  *  *  Introduction Monetary policy is aimed at maintaining price stability. That may seem self-evident. Thirty years ago it was not. From the end of the second world war until the mid to late 1970s, the majority view of academic economists and policy-makers alike was that monetary policy had rather little to do with inflation, and was largely ineffective as an instrument of demand management.1 The intellectual basis for that view was never clear. And painful experience taught us that price instability led to costly fluctuations in real output and employment. Far from being ineffective, a monetary policy aimed at price stability has proved to be the key to successful management of aggregate demand. Fortunately, the theory and practice of monetary policy in the UK have changed out of all recognition in the past twenty-five years.2 We have moved from the Great Inflation to the Great Stability.

But, by anchoring inflation expectations on the target, it can alter the transmission mechanism by reducing the persistence of inflationary shocks. And it does so without pretending to commit to a rule that is incredible because it is not expected to last. The implications of an inflation target for central bank communications are natural enough. First, the clarity of the inflation target focuses attention on the case for price stability which must be made continuously. Second, each forecast must be accompanied by an explanation of the current thinking behind the MPC’s views; in essence the “model” underlying the MPC’s thinking is changing all the time. Third, there is no point trying to communicate a time-invariant policy reaction function when that does not exist. The regular commentary on its thinking published in its Minutes and Inflation Reports is part of a process by which the MPC communicates with the general public. A reputation for communicating openly and honestly about the range of possible outcomes matters, because it makes it more likely that people will continue to listen. What are the main challenges for inflation targeting in the future? The most immediate stems from its very success. Although it is now widely accepted that there is no long-run trade off between inflation and output, the ability of monetary policy to affect output in the short run means that there is, in principle, a permanent trade off between the volatility of inflation and the volatility of output, which might be represented by the line AA in chart 6.