samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is necessitated by the still high sensitivity of inflation to oneoff factors, as well as its inertia and elevated inflation expectations. As they stabilise close to the target level of inflation, prices are expected to be less responsive to various short-term factors. These new conditions would see no need for additional tightening in the monetary policy stance to ensure that inflation holds near 4%. This conservative strategy in monetary policy may appear unattractive short-term; however it will enable us to deliver on a more sustainable result in the mid-term, that is, deliver on the objective to establish in Russia a low price and cost growth environment – such that favours both households and businesses, as well as the overall economy. Q&A for the Media QUESTION from Vedomosti: Given the Bank of Russia’s move to reduce the rate and its guidance that further rate reduction is not impossible in the second and third quarter, does that suggest that the Bank of Russia has launched a monetary loosening cycle? ELVIRA NABIULLINA: An easing cycle is understood as a process of sequential rate reduction, decided at each policy Board meeting. Having said that, we acknowledge that the sequence of rate cuts may be interrupted, though this would not run counter to an overall mid-term downward movement of the rate. We will move forward with care and precision. For the most part we will be largely guided by economic data as well as, certainly, by our forecasts.

The exchange rate is governed not only by oil – oil is an important factor, but not the only one to influence the exchange rate. The depreciation of the ruble was also largely triggered by typical seasonal variation in the current account – the current account usually shows stronger performance in the first quarter, irrespective of oil prices. The second factor is the growth in oil prices and oil sales by exporters. The third factor is important but the Central Bank believes that it should not be overestimated or exaggerated. I am referring to certain inflows of capital, which are comparable to the inflows of foreign capital to emerging markets. Further developments will depend on many factors: oil price movements, the Fed’s policy, strengthening or weakening of the exchange rate, and the strength of our economy. There are many forces at play here. QUESTION from TV channel Russia-24: Mrs Nabiullina, you have already mentioned that the Central Bank will support Russian stateowned banks affected by sanctions in relation to the situation in Ukraine. What specific measures are you going to take? Thank you. ELVIRA NABIULLINA: I would like to repeat and emphasise that we do not see any risk to financial stability of our credit institutions even if their investments in Ukrainian assets depreciate completely, because they account for only a very small share of their assets. Therefore we do not see any systemic risks here. Our banks have already created or are creating provisions for such assets.
At the time, there was excitement about the idea that a stable banking system could be a source of liquidity to fund the expansion of the economy. So in addition to being the government’s banker, the Bank also engaged in commercial activities: taking deposits in exchange for which it issued notes – and providing loans by discounting commercial bills. That was 321 years ago. The Bank of England you see today has its roots in a relatively more recent act of Parliament. I refer of course to the 1844 Bank Charter Act, which paved the way for the Bank to become the monopoly supplier of bank notes, and effectively responsible for monetary policy in the UK. The Act also had the effect of limiting the amount of commercial business the Bank could undertake, so it chose to concentrate not on competing with the emerging joint-stock and clearing banks, but instead to focus on its role  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  as banker to the banks, and supplier of liquidity of last resort. It could be argued that this was the point at which the Bank’s financial stability role was born. In subsequent years, as the Bank sought to define this role, it was helped by the advice of Walter Bagehot, a keen student – and sometime critic – of the Bank of England’s reaction to banking crises over history.

With prices remaining stable, interest rates low and a good level of competitiveness, our economy is well equipped to resume a brisker growth trajectory in line with the global economy. 4  BIS Review 30/2005  As in the past, however, the international environment remains fraught with uncertainty at both the economic and monetary level. The independent course steered by the National Bank has made it possible to create a monetary framework conducive to the development of our economy. This success hinges not only on the correct interest rate decisions, but also on the credibility conferred upon us by our autonomy of action and by sufficient resources for intervening in the markets. It is in the nation's interest to preserve this achievement. Thank you for your attention, and for your interest in the Swiss National Bank and its activities. BIS Review 30/2005  5
Finland responded by devaluing its currency by 6 per cent. In Norway, industrial leaders and industry organisations also pressed in favour of a devaluation of the Norwegian krone. Norway’s finance minister Rolf Presthus characterised the Swedish decision as a serious setback for Nordic cooperation3, and chose not to change the value of the Norwegian krone. In much of the 1970s and 1980s, economic policy in Norway and Sweden lacked a long-term approach and credibility. This contributed to wide swings in production and employment. With a policy of low interest rates and devaluation, inflation became entrenched at a high level. Frequent devaluations in the period following 1976 could not prevent a weakening of the manufacturing sector in the long run. On the contrary, they proved to be self-reinforcing. The wide fluctuations culminated in a borrowing spree that started in the mid-1980s, first in Norway and then in Sweden. The borrowing spree was succeeded by deep economic crises. Both Norway and Sweden had to abandon their fixed exchange rate policy in 1992. Important reasons were freer capital flows, deeper financial markets and hence a surge in cross-border capital movements. Sweden switched to inflation targeting in 1993 and was among the first countries to introduce a system that would later become the norm for small and medium-sized economies. The Riksbank succeeded fairly quickly in anchoring inflation expectations and keeping inflation low and stable in Sweden. Norway followed suit in March 2001.

The high cost level in the Norwegian business sector is adapted to a situation where we are developing the petroleum sector and phasing in the use of petroleum revenues into the mainland economy. After a period, we will be able to cover a smaller share of our imports using current petroleum revenues and by drawing on capital in the Petroleum Fund. The Norwegian cost level will then have to be dampened, also compared with that of Sweden. Competitiveness may in the longer run be brought back to the level prevailing at the end of the 1960s before Norway became an oil nation. During such a period of adaptation, which may start in 5 or 10 or 15 years, a flexible exchange rate, with a fall in the Norwegian krone against the Swedish krona, will have to play an important role. Where do we stand today? Tariff barriers for trade in goods are low. The EU/EEA agreement also provides for increased trade in services. During the 1990s, capital mobility has increased to a level that is higher than 100 year ago. Free capital flows and free trade pave the way for high economic growth and prosperity, but also entail challenges. Competition has increased in many industries. Labour-intensive processes are being transferred to new EU member states such as the Baltic countries. Some multinational companies have streamlined various production processes and distribution and centralised them in the same location. Saab has been acquired by General Motors and Volvo by Ford.
Finance is one of the largest sectors of the UK economy. Around 400,000 people are employed in financial 3  services in London alone, 1.1 million across the country as whole. Their enterprise contributes £ billion to our national income, £ billion to our exports and £ billion to the Exchequer, equivalent to two-thirds of the NHS budget. 4  Your work matters because finance is not an end in itself; financial markets serve the real economy. By financing firms that hire, invest and expand, markets drive growth. By opening up cross border trade and investment, they create new opportunities for businesses and savers. By transferring risks to those most willing and able to bear them, markets help households and businesses insure against the unexpected. 1  See Fair and Effective Markets Review Final Report, HM Treasury, Bank of England and FCA (June 2015). At: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/fmreview.aspx 2 See BIS Triennial Bank Survey (at http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx16fx.pdf) and BIS OTC data at (https://www.bis.org/statistics/d12_1.pdf) and The City UK “Key facts about the UK as an international financial centre” (November 2016). 3 Workforce jobs and financial services jobs in London (ONS). 4 GDP and exports data (ONS), tax revenues from PWC/City of London “Total Tax Contribution of UK Financial Services” and NHS Budget data at: http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/overview.aspx. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  Most fundamentally, your work matters because markets are the best mechanism to drive innovation, productivity, and prosperity. The Problem  Though markets are generally a force for good, markets can go wrong.

11  The Way Forward  The mutually reinforcing relationship between the regulatory framework and market good practice should help the FMSB, and other market standard-setters, maintain their ambition and momentum even once memories of post-crisis misconduct fade. It could sharpen collective incentives to address, more conclusively, outstanding ambiguities that act as obstacles to real markets. And it should help mitigate emerging vulnerabilities. The Bank of England encourages the FMSB to consider where additional guidance and worked examples could buttress its existing standards, to guard against the risk that certain principles mean different things to different parties. The City’s special responsibility, given its pre-eminent position in global markets, is why it has brought so many ideas and such energy to advance reforms to address the misconduct risk that has plagued global markets. 10  See page 16, Financial Reporting Council (FRC), “Corporate Culture and the Role of Boards: Report of observations”, July 2016. In light of its responsibilities for conduct and market integrity, the FCA is consulting on an approach under which it would formalise that in supervising to, and enforcing, SMR rules for unregulated markets and activities, it would consider whether firms and individuals are meeting “proper standards of market conduct” with reference to “recognised” industry codes.
In particular, interest rates on safe assets fell since the build up in foreign assets were invested mainly in government bonds. 14 That both discouraged saving and boosted asset prices. In order to maintain their traditional returns, the private sector sought higher yielding strategies and were too ready to  11  IMF (2007) ‘Exchange rates and the adjustment of external imbalances’ IMF WEO April, Chapter 3. 12  Bernanke, B (2007) "Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects", speech delivered for the Bundesbank Lecture, Berlin, and Bernanke, B (2005) "The Global Savings Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit", speech delivered for the Sandridge Lecture at the Virginia Association of Economists. 13  A fall in desired investment (investment ‘strike’) in some countries also contributed to the decline in global real interest rates. For example, investment-GDP ratios fell sharply in the Newly Industrialised Countries in the wake of the east Asian crisis a decade ago. 14  For example FE Warnock and VC Warnock (2006) (‘International Capital Flows and US interest rates’, NBER Working Paper, 12560) estimate that foreign official flows reduced US 10-year Treasury nominal yields by about 100 basis points lower than otherwise in the year to June 2005. BIS Review 31/2008  5  believe that these could be attained through new products without running bigger risks. We are now dealing with the consequences of that mistake.

8  BIS Review 31/2008  Chart 4: Assets under management by SWFs relative to other investors and size of capital markets, 2006(a) EME  Siz e of e quity and bond marke ts  US Global Private equity Hedge Funds SWFs  Asse ts unde r manage me nt by type of inve stor  FX reserves (a) Insurance assets Mutual Funds Pension Funds 0  25  50  75  100  125  150  $ (a) FX reserve holdings and estimates of SWF assets under management are for 2007. Source: IMF GFSR September 2007, McKinsey and Co., International Financial Statistics, various estimates of SWF assets under management. Table 1: SWF capital injections in financial institutions since November 2007  Date of announcement  Sovereign Wealth Fund  Financial Institution  Amount $  26/11/2007  Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  Citigroup  7.5  10/12/2007  GIC - Singapore  UBS  9.8  19/12/2007  China Investment Corporation  Morgan Stanley  5.0  24/12/2007  Temasek - Singapore  Merrill Lynch  4.4  GIC - Singapore 15/01/2008  6.9 Citigroup  Kuwait Investment Authority  3.0  Korea Investment Corporation  2.0  15/01/2008  Merrill Lynch Kuwait Investment Authority  2.0  TOTAL  40.6  Source: Press releases, market reports.
These challenges increase ambiguity, uncertainty and volatility in goods, services and financial, markets, broaden and intertwine the nature of shocks and place the authorities vis-à-vis new and unprecedented phenomena. These developments render the well management of monetary policies and financial stability even more difficult As a result, scientific research needs to: explore and propose new solutions, more efficient empirical and theoretical models for policy implementation by central banks; assess the effects of the adopted policies; and, carefully observe the side effects in the economy or the financial system, which may potentially accompany such policies. Due to unconventional monetary policies, central banking is practically in unexplored territories; therefore, it is necessary to carry out an assessment of how the economy reacts to shocks under such circumstances. The Bank of Albania is interested in identifying potential shocks and their modelling with a view to guaranteeing optimal solutions in terms of prices, economic activity, employment and financial system soundness. For that reason, we invite you to discuss openly and thoroughly all the papers that will be presented during these two days. This would serve to discuss about their findings, improve them and assess their effectiveness for the Bank of Albania’ decision making. The Bank of Albania deems that the economy and the financial system are currently sound and in line with our expectations and forecasts.

The present indicators of prices and economic growth are not yet at their long-term equilibriums; however, they do not present surprises that would call for immediate attention of the Bank of Albania and change of monetary and financial stability policies. They are in line with our expectations and are very well serviced by the actual decision-making course of action. In concrete terms, consumer prices, the main objective of the monetary policy, returned to an upward trajectory and are expected to progressively approach the 3% target. Economic activity 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  remains stable, at positive figures, reflecting a slight upward trend, and is expected to perform along similar trends in the future. Nevertheless, the current figures appear still far from the optimal conditions and there is place for further improvement in both the inflation rate and the economic activity. In addition, there is place for faster growth of lending and monetary expansion, yet, subject to the situation in the balance sheets of the private sector and banking system. The fall in interest rates is transmitted to all segments of the financial market, contributing to the decrease of existing credit costs and providing the possibility for investments in new projects. The monetary policy transmission has helped somewhat to mitigate the negative effects and improve the households and firms’ balance sheets.
Monetary policy decision We have decided to leave the current Libor target range unchanged and to continue aiming for the middle of the range. This decision is based on the following considerations. Our analyses show that, following the slowdown in the global economy, the outlook for inflation has improved, if we disregard the temporary rise that will occur over the next few months as a result of the rise in oil prices. Moreover, the turmoil affecting the international financial markets and the uncertainty with respect to the extent of possible fall-out on the rest of the economy all call for prudence. The risk of a rise in inflation has not been dispelled; of that there can be no doubt, given the rise in oil prices, the weakness of the Swiss franc against the euro, and the high level of capacity utilisation. Nevertheless, we do not consider this to be a matter of urgency and view an adjustment in our policy as unnecessary under the current circumstances. It is evident that we will continue to keep a very close watch on developments in the situation. Inflation forecast graph I will now turn to the final part of my remarks. What is our inflation forecast? The dashed red curve on the graph represents the new forecast. It relates to the period between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2010, and maps the future development of inflation on the assumption that the 2.75% level remains constant over the forecasting period.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Recent economic and financial developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 13 December 2007. *  *  *  Economic outlook The last few months have seen a number of remarkable events in the global economy. The US dollar has plunged, dropping below the level attained in 1995 against the Swiss franc. Oil prices have continued to soar, threatening to breach the hundred dollar mark. Sub-prime credit markets continue to disrupt financial markets. How have these factors affected the international economy? The US economy is affected simultaneously by the unfavourable developments in real estate markets, which are impacting on credit markets, and by increasing oil prices. At the same time, the fall in the dollar is bolstering external demand, so that most observers are not forecasting more than a temporary decline in US economic growth next year. As for the European economy – which is less open than the national economies of which it is composed – it is only slightly affected at present by the upturn in the euro, mirroring the downturn in the US dollar. The outlook for European growth in 2008 remains favourable, despite a light downward correction. All in all, the international economic situation remains generally positive, although it is true to say that this assessment is even more uncertain than three months ago.
This opens up the possibility of consolidated payments, of liquidity management in one location and of optimising the cash flow. The European Commission has stepped in with the Payment Services Directive which, among other changes, ensures that the full amount of a transaction is transmitted and that payments are executed more quickly, thus saving time and money. As the transition to SEPA had to speed up, the European Council adopted in February 2012 a new regulation establishing 1 February 2014 as the deadline for the migration to SEPA of credit transfers and direct debits made in euro. This means that users, including corporates, need to migrate too! SEPA is also about innovation; the project is active in innovative fields such as einvoicing and e-reconciliation within Europe, which can offer huge savings for corporates in the handling of payments. The ECB, in its role as a co-chair of the SEPA Council together with the European Commission, stands ready to pursue a dialogue with all stakeholders on these important matters. Conclusion Let me to bring my remarks today to a conclusion. In the last quarter of 2011 the euro area economy was facing increasing cross-countries heterogeneities and, overall, a clear risk of a credit crunch. The increasing pressures on banks’ funding and capital positions could have led to a scaling-back of banks’ lending activity to the private sector.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  To apply – or even try to apply – a federal or pan-European approach to such a diversified financial system requires, in my eyes, a key precondition: to have a functioning European federation in the first place. If that is not possible then we should not try to create half-baked pan-European solutions here in the area of banking – an area which is arguably more sensitive in many aspects than that of fiscal policy and fiscal transfers. If we are not careful enough, we risk repeating the difficulties of the single currency project. The euro is a currency without a state. This means nobody knows who should pay what to whom in bad times. It is for good times only. And we now all know very well that this is the biggest shortcoming of the whole project. Some believe that cross-border integration is good per se, without any conditions. I tend to believe – not least because of the current crisis – that cross-border integration of national financial systems is welcome only if EACH of the national systems alone is and can be sufficiently sound and stable. That’s why we at the Czech National Bank are so nervous about this tendency to continue separating the powers of supervisory and regulatory authorities from their responsibilities in the area of financial regulation. These powers are gradually shifting in small steps towards those who have no direct responsibility and no pots of money to pay should things go wrong in the future.