samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In a pre-emptive move, MAS further undertook a tightening of monetary policy in October 2007 and April 2008, even as there were heightened concerns over developments in the US economy. 7. Between April 2004 and June 2008, the $ appreciated by 12.2%. Against the $ the $ appreciated by 23.4%. The policy moves have had a clear restraining effect on CPI inflation. For example, while WTI oil prices in $ have increased by more than 70% from a year ago, domestic electricity tariffs and petrol prices rose by around 30% each. Similarly, while the IMF global food and beverage index has soared by 43% from a year ago, domestic food prices picked up by a more moderate 9%. The effects of our policy tightening will continue to restrain cost and price pressures going forward. 8. However, we cannot totally insulate ourselves from the increases in global food and oil prices. Hence, we must ensure that inflation expectations remain firmly anchored and that external price changes do not trigger second round effects. For monetary policy, our objective continues to be price stability over the medium-term. At the same time, other policy responses, as well as changes in household and business behaviour have been complementary toward this end. 9. MAS’ current monetary policy stance announced on 10 April 2008 remains appropriate given our assessment of current external economic developments. The next monetary policy statement will be released in October as scheduled. Financial stability 10.

Apart from oil, food prices are expected to remain elevated, even as the rate of increase moderates. 6. These external developments – higher oil prices, continued high prices of food, and inflationary pressures in our trading partners – have affected Singapore because of our openness and heavy dependence on imports. We are thus revising our CPI inflation forecast for this year to 6-7%, compared to the earlier estimate of 5-6%. Given the outcome in the first  BIS Review 94/2008  1  half of the year, the new forecast range implies that headline CPI inflation is expected to come down over the rest of the year. There are several reasons for this: •  First, the one-off impact of the GST hike will cease to affect headline inflation in July. •  Second, although global commodity prices are likely to remain high, any further price increases are expected to be milder, compared to the first half of the year. •  Third, there are early signs of an easing of domestic cost pressures as the economy slows and asset markets consolidate. The rate of increase in commercial rentals, for example, appears to have peaked. Recent employment surveys have also shown that employers have become more cautious about hiring, suggesting that the pressures on the labour market could ease. •  Fourth, MAS had pursued a policy of targeting an appreciation of the Singapore dollar nominal effective exchange rate $ since 2004.
And in the US, the housing market has not yet obviously stabilised, which is probably a precondition for broader recovery there. Domestically, the output data have been on the soft side, moving into line with the battery of surveys and the Bank’s regional Agents. The labour market also appears to have softened, with unemployment rising and fewer vacancies advertised. It is perhaps not surprising that, compared with recent slowdowns, there should be less hoarding of labour if firms expect the adverse environment to persist for a while; and with tighter credit conditions, stretching  the export-oriented euro area would be adversely affected, and the UK with it. But, seriously, should the UK cut the policy rate to head off the risk of a dent to output from a dollar collapse that hadn’t yet occurred? I don’t think so. 2  BIS Review 112/2008  working capital, making it harder for firms to finance the retention of a less-than-fully-occupied labour force. In the manufacturing sector, input and output price inflation have edged down very slightly. In the service sector, the data are less timely, though surveys have started to indicate some slowing in the pace of inflation. Commodity prices – not only energy, but food too – have continued to fall, perhaps reflecting the effects on global demand of the earlier price rises and the reduction of subsidies by a raft of emerging-market countries. Equities have fallen around 3%.

For medium-term maturities, so-called “breakeven inflation rates” – derived from the difference between the yields on conventional and inflation-indexed gilts – have stabilised over the past few months. Given the frictions that many believe distort indexed-linked yields, 15 I also like to look directly at nominal forward rates. The underlying thought is that, relative to fluctuations in bond yields brought about by past shifts in inflation regimes, longer-term risk-free real rates may not move around a great deal, so that any systematic inflationary impulse would be quite likely to show up in nominal yields. Consistent with that, following the UK’s disinflation in the early-1990s, medium-term nominal forward rates fell by around 400bp. Since the new monetary regime became established in the late 1990s, they have been more or less stable, and currently remain within the range prevailing over the past decade or so. Surveys of household inflation expectations tell a broadly consistent story. For near-term horizons, they have picked up sharply. What limited information we have on the public’s  14  Broad money (M4) can be adjusted using Bank estimates of banks' intragroup business with other financial corporations, as well as banks' repo activity with LCH.Clearnet's RepoClear service. Such estimates are based on anecdotal information provided by a small sample of banks. Work is under way within the Bank to improve the basis of these estimates, see Burgess, S and Janssen, N (2007), “Proposals to modify the measurement of broad money in the United Kingdom: a user consultation”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vol.
Accordingly, should a bank find itself in resolution, it would be able to continue to perform its critical functions – essentially lending and holding deposits – without having to resort to public support and without jeopardising the financial stability of the system. Although the Resolution Directive entered into force on 1 January 2015, setting of the MREL requirements is still at a preliminary stage and there is as yet no specific date for compliance with the requirements. The Single Resolution Board, which is the European resolution authority, will set the MREL requirements for the institutions for which it is responsible, that is, those that are directly supervised by the SSM, at the end of the year. These requirements, for which the transition period for compliance therewith has still not been determined, are not expected to come into force before 1 January 2019. In the case of the less significant institutions, for which responsibility lies with the national resolution authorities, the time frame for adaptation to the new requirements will foreseeably be longer. The requirements set will fundamentally depend on two components: the loss absorption component, which in general will be common to all banks and will be equivalent to their capital requirements; and the recapitalisation component, the amount of which should depend on the resolution strategy deemed most appropriate for each institution.

Matters such as the privacy of personal information, security, the risk of cyberattacks or even the risk of exclusion, must 6/8  be monitored and, where appropriate, duly regulated. Regulation has to achieve a balance, protecting financial stability and confidence in the system, without unjustifiably hindering the exploitation of these technological innovations by industry and society in general. It is still too soon to gauge the impact of the technological revolution on the traditional banking sector. I believe that technological innovations will complement traditional banking activities, but to achieve this banks must be sufficiently flexible and dynamic to reap the benefits of technological innovation. There is no question that innovation is also favouring the proliferation of new fintech firms, of highly varying profiles and business models, which may conceivably compete with traditional banks in a specific part of the banking value chain, but are more likely to engage in new ancillary services. One example is joint financing through online platforms, known as “crowdfunding”. It is an alternative source of financing which may offer certain improvements over traditional banking in terms of convenience, speed and cost. But risks have also been identified, such as a potential increase in fraud or greater weaknesses in terms of investor confidence. There is a well-known case of a Swedish P2P platform which went bankrupt late last year after the detection of malpractices in credit extension, prompting a fall in the activity of the sector and closer regulatory attention.
Increase in consumption and private investments, owing to the improved financing terms, confidence and private sector balance sheets, was, and is expected to continue to be, the main driver of the economy’s performance. On the other hand, the public sector has been and remains committed in the path to fiscal consolidation, whereas the external environment continues to face problems and pose challenges to the increase of Albanian exports. In the short run, the increase in consumption and private investments is sufficient to generate initial triggers for economic growth, but the long-term growth of the Albanian economy should rely more on the improvement of its competitive profile and growth of exports. Therefore, we deem that the acceleration of structural reforms has a unique role in supporting economic growth. Inflation continued to stand below our target. Internal inflationary pressures have been upward, but the fall in prices in global markets decelerated the return of inflation to target at home. The monetary policy stance of the Bank of Albania has become strongly accommodative. This policy stance aims at reducing the financing costs of the private sector, in order to sustain the return of the economy to equilibrium and of inflation to target, in the medium-term horizon. In our view, the indicators of economic activity and inflation are performing in the right direction; however, the sustainable accomplishment of targets will need time and will imply keeping low interest rates for some quarters ahead. Overall, the main indicators in banking system activity improved.

As such, a key lesson from the financial crisis is the need to expand the range of instruments available to policymakers, so they are better equipped to ensure the resilience of the financial system. This missing instrument problem provides the backdrop to the Government’s announcement earlier this year that it intends to create a new policy committee in the Bank – the Financial Policy Committee – which will have responsibility for conducting macroprudential policy. In 2010, quantitative easing was entered into the Oxford Dictionary of English, along with chillax and defriend (don’t ask!). I predict that 2011 may be the year of macroprudential policy. The legislation determining the precise tools and objectives of macroprudential policy is still to be enacted. But as the Governor recently emphasised, the over-riding objective is to ensure the resilience and stability of the banking system. 4 If successful, macroprudential policy will represent a significant advance. As we have seen repeatedly through history and across countries, banking crises come hand-in-hand with deep and costly recessions. Promoting the resilience and smooth functioning of the financial and banking system in bad times as well as good would contribute greatly to our future economic stability. But it would be wrong to conclude from this that macroprudential policy is likely to solve the missing instrument problem entirely. That is for at least three reasons. First, macroprudential policy is not the instrument that will solve the problem of global imbalances.
Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Practical aspects of dispute resolution in Islamic finance facilities Remarks by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM) Law Seminar on "Practical Aspects of Dispute Resolution in Islamic Finance Facilities", Kuala Lumpur, 14 November 2017. * * *  “Past, present and future: Legal certainty and Islamic finance in Malaysia” It is my honour to join all of you today in exploring this interesting topic on the practical aspects of dispute resolution in Islamic finance. This seminar marks another significant step in fostering dialogue between Islamic financiers, Shariah scholars and the legal fraternity. Gatherings such as this serve as an important platform for Islamic finance practitioners to develop a better grasp of legal issues, and for lawyers to gain a keener sense of Islamic finance. I am encouraged to see the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM) taking the lead in advancing this mission. Disputes in business transactions have been around for as long as commerce itself. It is therefore no surprise that we come across judges and lawyers very early on in human history. Earlier than bankers – and definitely long before we see the first central banker . Disputes are bound to happen. One party may not be able or willing to honour their obligations. The other party may be dissatisfied with how an obligation is performed.

If bank supervision works well in your country, let it be as is and strengthen the other sector supervisors instead. Operational independence should be implemented and at the same time rules for accountability and transparency. This is more important than the structure of the supervisory authorities. If you see good reasons in your country for changing the supervisory structure, you should follow a transparent process and be clear of the consequences. For obvious reasons, you must avoid making organisational changes when the financial sector is weak. Nor should you change during major developments in the financial sector, such as the introduction of the bank capital framework Basel II and the new accounting standard IAS 39. The structural change must be accompanied by measures to strengthen the capacity of the new authority. Otherwise the change is merely cosmetic. In many countries there is a political pressure to change the supervisory structure to show expediency, in particular when there has been a financial crisis and irrespective of the supervisory agencies’ roles and behaviour before and during the crisis. As a result banking supervision may in such cases be moved out of the central bank or, at other times, into it. Also the unification of the supervisory authorities is sometimes seen as a political issue. In my experience, there is not much to gain from a political point of view. On the contrary, the politicians might be blamed for future failures of supervision.
Vítor Constâncio: A European solution for crisis management and bank resolution Speech by Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at Sveriges Riksbank and ECB Conference on Bank Resolution, Stockholm, 14 November 2011. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and gentlemen, It is an honour for me to speak at today’s conference, which has provided a stimulating debate on the challenging topic of bank recovery and resolution. The complexity of developing an effective framework for crisis management and resolution arises from the objective of achieving stability in increasingly integrated financial systems, where the authorities responsible for safeguarding their respective stability are still responsible towards their respective taxpayers. This element of complexity has been taken into account in a number of policy initiatives and suggestions worldwide. Especially in the EU context, I wish to acknowledge the pivotal role played by Lars Nyberg in this domain. His long-time devotion to the design and implementation of EU crisis management arrangements, coupled with his qualities as a central banker, have made Lars a key policy-maker for crisis management in the EU. I would also like to thank Lars for his long-standing and fruitful collaboration with the ECB in this field. Principally in the context of the work carried out by the Banking Supervision Committee, but also as Chairman of the EFC High-Level Working Group on Crisis Management, Lars has very often acted as a catalyst for coordination and cooperation among national authorities and EU institutions.

In my speech today, I would like to focus on the ongoing reforms aimed at enhancing the mechanisms with which authorities can handle problems in banks and reduce the potential impact of failures, should they occur. First, I will briefly recall the main shortcomings of the current resolution regimes. Second, I will consider the international, European and national initiatives to cope with the challenges. Finally, I would like to say a few words about the future path towards an optimal arrangement for cross-border resolution. The main shortcomings of the current frameworks During the current crisis we have seen several government-funded bailouts and one case where, in place of a bailout, a disorderly collapse occurred with widespread effects around the globe. There are multiple reasons why no better alternative between these two extreme solutions was available in these cases. First, letting financial institutions fail was often not a feasible alternative from a legal perspective. In a majority of countries, only normal corporate insolvency proceedings were – and in many countries, still are – available to banks. However, limiting credit and liquidity losses in the case of failure may not be effectively ensured by using these mechanisms, because they were not designed to take into account the special nature of credit institutions. Second, even if a well-designed special bank resolution or insolvency regime is in place in a particular country, this does not guarantee that cross-border banks can also be dealt with effectively.
On around half of the occasions we have made more accurate forecasts than 80 per cent of the other forecasters. The inflation forecasts measured as the annual rate of change in the CPI have in almost 75 per cent of cases been more accurate than half of the forecasters in Consensus panel (Figure 12). In a comparison of quarterly GDP and CPIX forecasts, it is shown that the Riksbank has on the whole made slightly more accurate forecasts than the NIER. At the same time, it should be said that the differences in forecasting performance are not statistically significant. If we compare the results with an earlier forecast evaluation made by the Riksbank, there are some similarities. In this evaluation we found, for instance, that the NIER has made better forecasts of productivity than we have, at the same time as we have made better forecasts of CPIX inflation.9  8  During the evaluation period for productivity, which extends from 2002 to 2006, we have under-estimated both GDP and employment in our forecasts. Please note that the bias estimate for GDP changes character depending on whether the sample refers to 2000-2006 or 2002-2006. 9  This result from an earlier forecast evaluation applies only to forecasts for the next year. The result is statistically reliable. BIS Review 138/2007  5  There are of course a number of difficulties in making correct comparisons of this nature, which is also indicated in the study.

The CBC is governed by the principle of transparency in exercising its public function, enshrined in Article 8 of the Constitution, the bylaws of its own Constitutional Organic Act and the relevant legislation that has expressly included the CBC, such as Law No 20285 on Access to Public Information (2009), Law No 20730, which regulates the lobbying and management of private interests (2014), and Law No 20880 on public service probity (2016). Still, the Board has added several transparency standards that go beyond the aforementioned norms. For example, last March we made available to the public a total of 96 minutes of past monetary policy meetings held during the period 2000-2007, a practice that will continue into the future years. We have also included as passive subjects of transparency all division directors, area managers and heads of departments that may have relevant decision-making powers, and we have supplemented the obligations of the Lobby Law with the publication on the CBC’s website the weekly agenda of the Governor and all Board members. In addition, we have established an external Audit and Compliance Committee and an internal reporting channel to denounce situations of harassment or abuse. From the perspective of using the powers inherent to an autonomous institution to strengthen transparency in more specific areas that are not covered by general legislation, the CBC is preparing some additional initiatives to implement over the next twelve months. One, we want to raise the levels of information and guidance we give to the community regarding monetary policy decisions.
The outcome is higher inflation without lasting improvements in the economy’s level of output and employment. This detracts from monetary policy efficiency and the commitments to price stability cease to be credible. Taking the long view that price stability requires is more difficult for political authorities, which may be naturally inclined to give priority to shorter-term considerations. Moreover, and more generally, changes in government usually entail changes to political goals and, frequently, the replacement of previous commitments with new ones. That is difficult to square with the objective of credibility that private agents demand when they take their 1  A detailed discussion of independent economic agencies in Spain can be found in J. Segura (coord.) (2018), Reguladores y supervisores económicos independientes: el caso español, Fundación Ramón Areces. 2  decisions with medium and long-term results. Also, the eminently technical nature of the functions of central banks likewise warrants this status. All these arguments could be extended to economic regulatory and supervisory agencies other than the monetary authority. Indeed, independence is one of the principles envisaged in “Best Practice Principles on the Governance of Regulators”, a document released by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), to avoid undue influence and maintain confidence.

3  Article 7(4) of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España, in keeping with Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which states: “When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, neither the European Central Bank, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks." 4  In practice, the personal independence of the institution’s senior officials is sought through the arrangements in respect of appointment, exercise of mandate and stand-down from the post set in place, as a general rule, beforehand.