samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Perspectives on Thailand’s economy Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Global Macro Conference, Hong Kong, 27 January 2015. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to share with you my perspectives on Thailand’s economy in these times of growing concerns about global financial markets and economic recovery. I would like to thank Goldman Sachs for arranging this platform for policymakers like us (the Bank of Thailand), senior global leaders and investors to exchange information and ideas. And, it is very important, at this juncture, to foster constructive dialogues between policymakers and industry specialists. I would like to first share with you my thoughts on Thailand’s recent economic development and the direction in which I see the Thai economy is heading. Update on economic activity Last year marked a bumpy ride for Thailand’s economy. In the first half of the year, the economy was stagnant due to a combination of low domestic demand and external challenges. In the second half of the year, clarity of political situation boosted private sector’s confidence, which in turn encouraged a turnaround in private consumption and a pick-up of private investment in some sectors, such as telecommunication. With the resumption of a functioning government, public spending resumed somewhat, although not as much as we had hoped. Throughout the year, low interest rates made the overall financial condition an accommodating factor. Despite occasional challenges, the financial and the real sectors remained resilient.

I think the first thing is you want to get some knowledge before you start to invest. And recognize that there are no quick, get-rich-quick schemes. If something seems to be too good to be true, it probably is. I remember when I got out of college, back in 1974, a long time ago, I decided – I had this very small amount of money that my great-grandmother left to me, I think it was $ and I decided I was going to go out and invest. And I have to say, at the beginning, I didn’t really know what I was doing. But I read a lot of books and I got really pretty well educated. There’s a lot of good books in the market, and I think you can actually educate yourself. And if you do that I think then you can start to gingerly start to invest. And you’ll learn as you go. It’s a long journey. I’ve learned things as I invested over the years. Now I don’t do anything, but I’m sort of retired from investing in my current role. But part of that I found that I kept learning it over a very long period of time. So, it wasn’t like the journey of knowledge was over at any point in time. But first thing is to find a really good book on investing, and read that.
These are summarized in the Report’s box V.1. Also, this time around, we have attached to the Report a supplement describing a body of background information on the determinants of and perspectives for Chile’s trend growth over the next 30 years. I will come back to the contents of this document in a few minutes. Our estimates suggest that Chile's trend GDP growth over the next ten years is in the range of 3% to 3.5%, quite comparable to our estimates a year ago. This range implies, among other things, that investment again grows in line with GDP; that the productivity of sectors other than natural resources grows near its average of the last 20 years; and that immigration and increasing female participation partially offset the effects of the aging population on the labor force. With regard to potential growth, at the shortest terms, investment and productivity show below-trend growth rates, so potential growth is lower than trend. Thus, potential GDP growth is now estimated to be around 2.5%, compared to the 2.5% to 3.0% we estimated in September 2016. With this, the current activity gap is somewhat narrower than previously estimated, even considering that the evolution of GDP has also been somewhat lower (figure 9). For the purposes of monetary policy, the evolution of the activity gap is still consistent with an economy needing an important monetary impulse throughout the 4  projection horizon. In addition, the Board continues to estimate the neutral interest rate to be between 1% and 1.5% in real terms.

Indeed, the data show that, beyond the difficulty of calculating productivity by sector, the negative effect of the decline of mining ore has taking its toll on this industry (figure 12). The evidence from Chile suggests that there are important inefficiencies in resource allocation across firms and that there would be first order gains from measures aimed at improving them, which, unlike the case of human capital, could generate gains sooner. To back this last analysis, the document provides some international comparisons on productivity, microeconomic evidence on how the productivity of firms evolves, and its degree of dispersion. In particular, from a comparative perspective, although Chile's productivity appears to be aligned with its GDP per capita, it is about 60% that of the United States and less than that of the richer OECD countries, which implies that there is great room for improvement (figure 13). In Chile, as in many other economies, there appear to be significant gains from fostering a better allocation of productive resources, helping the more efficient firms to grow and the less efficient to shrink and eventually exit the market. As can be seen in table 3, 9  resource reallocation is an important source of TFP growth. For this, it is essential to have flexible labor markets that allow adjusting the endowment of companies when necessary, developing the financial system to direct resources to where the good ideas are and implement rules that facilitate the creation and dissolution of companies.
According to the IMF, this effect is estimated to have contributed 1.5-2.0 percentage points per annum to inflation for EU countries catching up on productivity. The recent statistics available for the United States also confirm that wage and salary differentials within the euro area are by no means atypical in a monetary union : for example, in the US the average weekly earnings in the non-durable goods sector stood at USD 546 at the national level, while standing at USD 437 in Mississippi and USD 644 in New Jersey. I am convinced that we can be reasonably confident in the increasing integration of European countries, and in the fact that economic developments are becoming more and more correlated in the area. It has been highlighted, in the academic field, by several empirical investigations that business cycles are becoming more synchronous across Europe. Secondly it has often been questioned whether EMU can be a success without some form of enhanced political union. Certainly, for EMU to function well, all Member States must be aware of the spill-over effects of all their national policies, especially their budgetary policies. In this regard, we are in favour of strong co-ordination between economic policies, while respecting the independence of the Eurosystem. This co-ordination is contained in the Treaty itself, which obliges Member States to treat national economic policies “as a matter of common interest” and subjects them to a multilateral procedure. Even more importantly, the euro zone is not devoid of mechanisms conducive to an appropriate policy mix.

II.The euro as a catalyst for further progress While many acknowledge that the introduction of the euro has been broadly successful, one may ask at this point what needs to happen to ensure the success of the euro in the medium term. What is very encouraging in this respect is the fact that in a number of areas the euro itself appears to be as a catalyst for these conditions to be met. II.1. The euro and the single market a/ The euro is the crowning achievement of the single market. Need we mention the advantages inherent in the single market? It enables the productive sector to make significant economies of scale and allows savings to be allocated to the most efficient investments. It also enhances market visibility and boosts competition and innovation to the benefit of consumers. But the ultimate objective of the single market could not be achieved while monetary barriers continue to prevent the free flow of goods, services, capital and, in a way, people, by imposing unpredictable and erratic exchange-rate movements and transaction costs. The last step in this process will be made with the cash changeover at the end of this year; it will enable not only enterprises but all our citizens to enjoy all the advantages of using the same monetary instrument throughout the European continent, just like Americans do today throughout the territory of the United States. b/Moreover, the introduction of the euro brings about a significant change in the economic and financial environment.
To sum up, the extent to which the central bank uses collateralised lending to intermediate between banks has proved helpful in restoring confidence and “real money” financial flows in the underlying asset markets – the markets in which the collateral is priced. This has repaired links in the early stages of the transmission channel, the viability of which depends on those collateral prices. These links would have been brutally and perhaps irrevocably severed, if private arbitrage had been the only force of market motion, as in normal times. But increased intermediation has an impact on the liquidity risk exposure of banks, on their ability to carry out maturity transformation, as well as on the liquidity of specific money market segments. Whether the impact is positive or negative is hard to say. But moral hazard – which is the pitfall of any such type of thinking – makes conditions (and behaviours)  2  The significant increase in activity in the primary market for covered bonds – which the ECB started purchasing in July 2009 in the context of the covered bond purchase programme – is an example of how these measures have stabilised financial markets. 4  BIS Review 83/2010  change in response to central bank actions. As was the case at the start of the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics, a prudent central bank needs to internalise the private sector’s response to its own actions. 4.

It should be abundantly clear by now to any financial institution that is serious about VBI, that, the task of building the human and intellectual capital to achieve and sustain value-based business models cannot be left solely to the human resource departments. It requires nothing less than strategic direction and resourcing decisions at the highest levels of the organisation. Changing mindsets Einstein once said “The world as we have created is a process of our thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our thinking”. The world today continues to push the limits of social and environmental thresholds, that are posing increasingly serious threats to humanity. VBI is therefore, much more than a current and passing fad, but a deeper conviction of the critical need 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  to begin the process of changing mindsets in a lasting way. Financial institutions are a key, but not the only catalysts in this process. Customers and investors need to be supported with relevant information, along with the means and ability to compare such information, in order to better understand the value propositions of Islamic finance. The encouragement of pension and institutional funds with a sustainable investment orientation, particularly in markets where such funds remain largely underdeveloped, would be important to provide a stronger impetus for VBI. Credit rating agencies could also be important contributors to a new landscape, with stronger emphasis on economic, social and environmental sustainability in assessment frameworks and methods.
If that was so, the additional base effects from last year would mean that reported consumer price inflation would still reach towards 3%, before falling back to 2% next May. That’s the base effects at work. Second, and beyond that, additional price pressures can arise from the various shortages caused by imbalances in the recovery of supply and demand, as the latter recovers more rapidly than the former. But these imbalances should not last. Let me take an example from the US to illustrate. The continuous lumber contract – highly relevant for house building there – rose from around $ pre-Covid to around $ in early May, as the price rose in the face of inelastic short term supply. However it is now down to below $ as more lumber supply comes onto the market, and there is a shift to satisfy the higher demand at a lower price. Third, we expect to see a switch from demand for goods towards services as restrictions are lifted, which should rebalance the composition of demand. Over time, this should lead to an easing of inflation as spending is redirected towards sectors with more spare capacity. But, initially, that rebalancing may be uneven. Here in the UK, over recent weeks we saw an initial very strong pick-up in retail sales and restaurant table bookings, the growth of which has already eased off. Where supply returns more slowly than the initial surge in demand, we may see a temporary rise in prices.

Andrew Bailey: It’s a recovery, but not as we know it Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, Mansion House, London, 1 July 2021. * * *  Introduction Lord Mayor, there has been nothing usual about the last sixteen months. Even long-standing neighbours like the Bank and the Mansion House have had to resort to video conferences rather than popping round for a word. And one of the trickiest issues for all of us is dress code and etiquette – is this a ties on or off video, who knows? I can admit that I don’t seem to be a very good predictor of dress code. But you did throw me not long ago Lord Mayor, when we had a video call about an hour before we were both speaking at an event, and I can reveal that you were dressed in a Mansion House bomber jacket. So, white tie to black tie to bomber jacket. I should say that by the time of the event, the Lord Mayor had changed into something more conventional. The story so far Conventional is not a word I have used about the performance of the economy in the last sixteen months. Last calendar year, UK GDP declined by an annual growth rate of 9¾%, and based on our last forecast in early May we expect it to grow by 7¼% this year. It’s more meaningful to express the level of activity relative to the end of 2019 (pre-Covid).
The IT sector is relatively large in Sweden; IT investments have been extensive; the previous phase-out of product markets has increased competition; Sweden is a small, open economy which also leads to great competitive pressure and so on. My impression is that IT will continue to contribute to a relatively rapid development of productivity in Sweden, while higher real interest rates and energy prices may subdue the rate of growth. All in all, we expect to see a lower long-term rate of increase than we saw from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. The current economic situation and monetary policy I will now briefly address current monetary policy. The situation can be summed up as follows: the economy is weakening, inflation is falling rapidly and the Riksbank is reducing the interest rate. The financial crisis is reinforcing the downturn in economic activity GDP growth is now declining in Sweden and abroad. We expect to see negative growth in the Swedish economy next year (see Figure 8). It is predicted that employment will fall by approximately 120 000 over the next two years and that unemployment will rise to approximately 8.4 per cent (see Figures 9 and 10). An important reason for the dramatic downturn in economic activity we see ahead of us is that the global financial crisis has worsened during the autumn. Inflation has been unusually high over the past year. But it will probably fall rapidly in the year ahead.

The argument is that the same restraining effect on wage formation could now be achieved if the service sector sets the norm rather than the manufacturing industry. The idea is that if the service sector sets the norm too high, the Riksbank would increase the interest rate and that this would dampen economic activity, employment and inflation in the same way as if the manufacturing industry set the norm too high and lost international competitiveness. The sector exposed to international competition should set the norm My own view is that the sector exposed to international competition still has a central role to play in wage formation. But this sector should not be equated with the manufacturing industry. Other sectors are also exposed to international competition to varying degrees. It is also important that there is consensus between the negotiating organisations on what part of the economy should set the norm. I do not think that there is any major difference between the previous situation with a fixed exchange rate and the present situation with a floating exchange rate. Our inflation target is largely the same as in other countries. As we saw earlier, inflation over the last 15 years has also been more or less the same in Sweden and Germany. The only way that we can have higher wage increases is if the development of productivity in Sweden is higher than in other countries.
Despite contemporary opinion at the time suggesting that a delicate balance needed to be struck between the role of the state and the activity of the market, the willingness of the state to legislate on these matters was a significant step in that it acknowledged more explicitly than before a legitimate public interest in insurance 18. Despite this, many thought that the Act was not robustly implemented, nor did it deliver results overnight. Indeed, the 1870 Act was relatively non-interventionist compared to how insurance regulation would evolve throughout the 20th century. But before we come to developments in the nearer term, it is worth noting that it wasn’t just the private sector that was mobilising itself in the insurance industry at this time. In 1865, Parliament passed the Government Annuities Act, which empowered the PostmasterGeneral to conduct life assurance business on behalf of the state. A year earlier, Gladstone (then Chancellor) delivered a speech to the House of Commons in which he was particularly scathing of the high lapse rates and expense ratios which it was felt were giving  14  Clayton (1971). See also, Alborn (2009). 15  Rawlings (2015). 16  Alborn (2009). 17  Council of The Institute of Actuaries, Minute Book II: January 1854 – May 1866, see minutes of 9 March 1854 and 1 August 1857. 18  Rawlings (2015). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  policyholders a raw deal.

In the last few months the expected future correlation of the deutsche mark/dollar and lira/dollar rates has strengthened, suggesting a stronger market expectation of those currencies being part of the first wave. Very recently, a few doubts seem to have emerged about the project itself, though it would seem that, according to the market, the most likely outcome remains that a euro of some sort would start on time. I recognise that this is a difficult background against which businesses need to plan. Our own advice, which we have maintained for some time now, is that it is prudent to plan on the basis that the euro will begin on 1 January 1999, as set out in the Treaty. As far as the position of the UK is concerned, the option remains open, the policy remains what the French call ‘le wait and see’. But the new Chancellor, like the old, has acknowledged that there are considerable difficulties to overcome if the UK is to be a first wave member. This is not a tidy position to be in, perhaps, but against the uncertain background, it nonetheless has a certain practical appeal. But taking my prudent assumption - that EMU will go ahead - what can we say about the impact on the London market in general, and on the futures and options business in particular?
This part of the monetary policy decision-making process is important, as it provides a base for the Executive Board to be able to choose the decision alternative that appears to provide the best target fulfilment. The staff’s proposal for monetary policy is the most important base for the discussion at a longer meeting that includes a large number of analysts from the Monetary Policy Department and the Executive Board, and which is normally held around two weeks prior to the monetary policy meeting. The Financial Stability Department of the Riksbank also plays an important role in the analysis work and therefore takes part in this meeting. The Riksbank has always considered it important to monitor developments in the financial markets and in the Swedish banks, and this has been particularly important in the forecasting work during the financial crisis. The Executive Board members’ input is important at this meeting and may in particular affect the forecast for the repo rate. However, this has repercussions for the forecasting work as a whole, as the future repo rate affects most of the other variables in the forecasts. The Executive Board may also have views on other parts of the forecasts than the repo rate path, but the discussion usually mainly centres on what is a well-balanced monetary policy. At a shorter meeting that usually takes place the day after the large meeting, the members of the Executive Board have the opportunity to discuss the main scenario and give their views on it in a more limited circle.

At the One Planet Summit in Paris in 2017, financial institutions responsible for managing $ trillion of assets – equivalent to annual global GDP – publicly supported the Task Force for Climate-related Disclosures (TCFD). 2  The supporters included 20 globally-systemic banks, 8 of the top 10 global asset managers, the world’s leading pension funds and insurers, the largest sovereign wealth fund and the two dominant shareholder advisory service companies. Established by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in response to a call from G20 Leaders, the TCFD delivered recommendations for voluntary disclosures of material, decision-useful climate-related financial risks for the G20 Summit in Hamburg. Suitable for use by all companies that raise capital, the recommendations: -  include disclosure of governance and risk management arrangements;  -  establish consistent and comparable metrics applicable across all sectors, as well as specific metrics for the most carbon-intense sectors; and  -  encourage use of scenario analysis so as to consider dynamically the potential impact of the risks and opportunities of the transition to a low carbon economy on strategy and financial planning. That financial institutions have come out so strongly in support of enhanced disclosure reflects their recognition that there is a correlation between managing climate risk and long-term value creation as well as their belief in the power of markets. They know that for markets to do what they do best – allocate capital effectively and dynamically – they need the right information.