samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Poor investment or loan decisions will not be forgiven by inflation. This environment will alter attitudes to property, especially among users who will increasingly regard it purely as a factor of production subject to the full disciplines of cost controls. But lower nominal rents need not mean lower real income. 19 The second fundamental difference lies in the role, and potential, of the Private Finance Initiative. In many ways, the PFI simply reflects processes already underway in the private sector whereby occupiers are seeking more flexible arrangements and are prepared to pay a price for changing the traditional relationship between landlord and tenant. It opens up the possibilities for more imaginative use of property, and the principles are applicable both to public and private sector users of property. The providers of services, whether public sector or private, no longer want automatically to own the productive assets needed to provide them. They prefer to rent them instead with a higher level of service as part of the deal. Landlords with property expertise are well placed to provide this wider type of service and have a competitive advantage in doing so compared with less experienced operators. And maybe the word “property” will itself imply something too narrow. Owners will provide a working environment. They may move from “core and shell” to “finish and facilitate”. Indeed in some PFI cases the owners will go even further and operate as well, “provide and process” you might say. This would give outsourcing a new meaning.

Thailand is somewhat in an awkward position currently, being left behind by the NICs, and being caught up by countries like China and Vietnam, to name a few. It is therefore important to extend efforts beyond market diversification to promoting higher value along the production chain, a task that both the private sector and the Government have a role to play. Especially with the rising FTAs as well as other regional integration and cooperation, notably among ASEAN, we must work to make sure that Thai producers and exporters can fully utilize the benefits from these arrangements. Fourth, prudent policy has obviously shielded us from the contagion of external developments so far. In addition to the importance of fiscal discipline and debt sustainability which I have already highlighted, I would like to stress that monetary policy has not and should not be used as an instrument to boost short-term growth. However, it can help cushion the economy against growth contraction in the short run, while ensuring stability in the long run. In this past crisis, the adverse effect led us to a series of aggressive rate cuts during December 2008 to April 2009 in order to help shore up the economy. The rate cuts were timely and turned out to be effective, in view of the momentum of economic recovery achieved. Regarding the framework of monetary policy, I should stress that the Bank of Thailand’s policy framework has always emphasized, not only monetary stability, but also financial stability.
Ravi Menon: opportunities  Global  outlook,  Asian  promise,  alternative  Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the DBS Institutional Investor Symposium 2017, Singapore, 22 June 2017. * * * Mr Piyush Gupta, CEO, DBS Bank Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I am happy to join you today, and I thank DBS Bank for the invitation. The American author John Maxwell once said, “The pessimist complains about the wind. The optimist expects it to change. The leader adjusts the sails.” As investors, you too seek to adjust the sails, to avoid being knocked over by market turbulence and to find new harbours of opportunity. So, what are the winds facing us like? Let me offer some thoughts in three areas: First, the global economy and financial markets – where are we today, what are the risks? Second, Asia’s medium-term prospects and the promise it offers to investors. Third, opportunities in alternative assets as investors look to unlock new sources of value. Global economy and financial markets The global outlook seems rather straightforward at this point. Growth is on a positive momentum and is increasingly broad-based, across both advanced and emerging economies. Global trade has picked up, manufacturing has recovered, and commodity prices have bottomed. Most measures of confidence are looking up. But the factors that underpin sustained growth – capital investment and productivity – remain weak in most parts of the world.

Its aims were shaped by an extreme tail event (the Great Depression) and were explicitly minimax (to avoid a repetition). It sought to achieve this by acting directly on the structure of the financial system, quarantining commercial bank and brokering activities through red-line regulation. In other words, Glass-Steagall satisfied all three robustness criteria. And so it proved, lasting well over half a century without a significant systemic event in the US. The contrast with Basel II is striking. This was anything but simple, comprising many thousands of pages and taking 15 years to deliver. It was calibrated largely to data drawn from the Great Moderation, a period characterised by an absence of tail events – more minimin than minimax. Basel II was underpinned by a complex menu of capital risk weights. This was fine-line, not red-line, regulation. In short, Basel II satisfied few of the robustness criteria. And so it proved, overwhelmed by the recent crisis scarcely after it had been introduced. (c)  Incentives  Tail risk within some systems is determined by God – in economist-speak, it is exogenous. Natural disasters, like earthquakes and floods, are examples of such tail risk. Although exogenous, even these events have been shown to occur more frequently than a normal distribution would imply. 24 God’s distribution has fat tails. Tail risk within financial systems is not determined by God but by man; it is not exogenous but endogenous. This has important implications for regulatory control. Finance theory tells us that risk brings return.
This applied, for instance, during the depression in the United States in the 1930s, when the large credit crunch was not sufficiently taken into account in monetary policy, and to the period prior to the high peacetime inflation rate during the 1970s and 1980s, when the money supply expansion was not taken into account. If we judge that developments might lead to substantial disturbances, the choice lies between attempting in time to avoid the accumulation of large imbalances and waiting until the situation turns and then counteracting the fall in demand. Many in the central bank world consider that interest rate policy should not react to asset prices and credit expansion in an upswing phase, over and above their estimated consequences for inflation and real stability in the short term. The arguments they bring out are that it is difficult to make an accurate evaluation and that it is uncertain what effect an interest rate increase will have. Other objections are that it may be difficult to be clear with regard to what has affected the interest rate decision and that confidence in the price stability target may therefore be undermined. Those who advocate a more preventive strategy meet this criticism by saying that there are nevertheless theories regarding asset price and credit cycles and some methods for calculating when large deviations from equilibrium levels are building up.

However, when the rate of increase remains at a high level, my concern increases that imbalances are being built up, which may later on check demand and inflation. This risk has been taken into account in the monetary policy decisions in recent years. The costs of increasing interest rates at a slightly faster rate than is motivated by the inflation forecasts made by traditional means must also be considered. My opinion is that when GDP growth has been strong, the risks in the housing and credit markets have carried greater weight in the decisions, and vice versa when the economy has been weaker. Inflation is low and stable… Let me begin by reminding you of why we have our current framework. The attempts during the 1970s and 1980s to keep employment up by means of a very active stabilisation policy led to sharply rising central government debts and high inflation. This laid the foundation for the current broad agreement that economic policy should not attempt to fine tune demand in the economy and that price stability should be the long-term objective of monetary policy. Price stability creates favourable conditions for  BIS Review 62/2006  1  households’ and companies’ decisions. It contributes to channelling savings to economically profitable investments, which benefits growth in the long term. In Sweden, as in the rest of the world, the rate of increase in consumer prices has been low for the past ten years, and inflation expectations have stabilised around 2 per cent in many countries.
And the reason I am doing so now is that it may be a good starting point for distinguishing what monetary policy may achieve in the short and long run. We can note already that the policy areas I recently mentioned concern politics in a broad sense and not monetary policy. It is thus not monetary policy that can affect these most fundamental conditions for long-term growth. One illustration of monetary policy’s limited potential to affect employment in the long term is the disparate regional developments in one and the same country. In Sweden, for instance, there are large regional differences in employment levels, despite monetary policy being the same for all regions. These differences appear to be lasting, which might indicate that they are due to underlying, structural factors that are beyond the control of monetary policy. However, monetary policy can affect the conditions for long-term growth on one very essential point, namely by keeping inflation close to the target and inflation expectations anchored around the target. If inflation deviates from the target the Riksbank’s aim is normally to bring it back on target within a couple of years. Depending on how large the deviation is and its cause, the time horizon may be extended. This flexibility makes it possible for the Riksbank to take into account developments in the real economy in its monetary policy considerations. In the short term, monetary policy can contribute to reducing the fluctuations in production and employment that arise during an economic cycle.

Barbro Wickman-Parak: What can monetary policy achieve? Speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a meeting, Karlstad, 27 March 2009. *  *  *  Economic policy can be divided up into two areas: fiscal policy and monetary policy. In Sweden and all other countries with independent central banks, there is as we all know a distinct difference between these two policy areas. The Government is responsible for fiscal policy and the central bank for monetary policy. The central bank is not allowed to receive instructions from any other party when carrying out its monetary policy tasks – it is to conduct its monetary policy in an independent manner. So what is the range of the policy area delegated to an independent central bank; that is, what can we expect a central bank to be able to achieve? This question is the theme of my speech today. Economic policy ultimately concerns creating the best possible conditions for long-term growth and thereby a high level of welfare for the population. The given limit for growth is set by developments in the labour force and in productivity. To attain long-term growth the policies must be aimed at, for instance, educating the labour force, creating an incentive structure that stimulates people to work, creating a good innovation climate that promotes technological developments and so on. This is all common knowledge, but may be worth saying sometimes.
Indeed, monitoring the robustness of the financial system requires the evaluation of various factors that threaten the financial system as a whole and create systemic risks. For this reason, the perspective of the Bank is a macro and risk-focused one, similar to the perspective used in the financial stability reports published by other central banks. The definition of objectives and functions of central banks are different from those of supervisory authorities. Though central banks increasingly tend not to deal directly with the monitoring and supervision of banks in recent times, they continue to monitor developments in the banking sector as well as the basic systemic risks. Today, 38 central banks around the world publish the Financial Stability Report. In a total of twenty countries, fourteen European and six non-European countries, supervisory authority is separate from the central bank. Especially in systems where the power to monitor is granted to autonomous institutions other than the central bank, the function of monitoring and supervising the financial system focuses on the issue of financial soundness and effectiveness of individual institutions. However, the monitoring of the financial system as a whole in terms of financial stability is carried out by central banks. In countries such as England, Australia, Norway, Finland and Sweden, where the supervisory authority is not the central bank, central banks, including that of Turkey, focus on the objective of price stability and carry out operations consistent with monetary policies by monitoring the developments in financial markets.

Thomas Jordan: Currency reserve adjustments, the SIC payments system and financial market developments Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Berne, 14 June 2007. *  *  *  In my remarks, I would like to address three topics. First, I will speak about the adjustments in the composition of our currency reserves. Then, I would like to comment on the Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) payment system and its twenty years of existence. At the end, I will say a few words about developments in the financial markets. 1. Adjustments in the composition of currency reserves  The Swiss National Bank is adjusting the composition of its currency reserves. Before the end of September 2009 it will sell 250 tonnes of gold and increase its foreign exchange reserves by a corresponding amount. The overall level of currency reserves will remain unchanged. The gold sales fall within the bounds set by the second Gold Agreement of 8 March 2004, in which the central banks of the Eurosystem, plus the Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank, agreed to limit their gold sales over a period of five years, beginning on 28 September 2004. The Gold Agreement specifies that annual sales by all signatories may not exceed 500 tonnes and that the total sales volume over this period shall not amount to more than 2,500 tonnes.
Two initial evaluations are already underway: the first deals with the effectiveness of reforms that encourage the use of central clearing while the second assesses the impact of G20 reforms on access to financing, which will begin by looking at infrastructure financing before focusing on credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The first evaluation reports are expected to be made public by the end of 2018. 4) The fourth challenge, in order to consolidate the progress we have made, is to ensure that  the new regulatory framework is implemented consistently across the board while remaining vigilant to avoid backtracking. In The Country Doctor, Balzac wrote “...in all things human, is not constancy the highest expression of strength? ", rightly reserving this virtue for the great men of his day. Now, as you know, the new US government has raised the possibility of reviewing their national banking regulations.15 Certain national adjustments could be considered appropriate and justified, as is the case, for example, for regulations that concern entities whose operations are only local in scale, or regulations that are purely American in scope such as the Volcker rule on proprietary trading portfolios. But the same cannot be said for abandoning the minimum requirements agreed internationally that apply to entities operating on a global scale, like the FRTB that I mentioned previously.

Thorsten Beck, Tao Chen, Chen Lin and Frank M. Song (2016), “Financial innovation: the Bright and the Dark Sides”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 72, pp. 28– 51. 3 See, notably, Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, Thorsten Beck, “Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and  cause”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 46, Issue 1, August 2000, pp. 31–77 and Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, Finance and the sources of growth, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 58, Issues 1-2, 2000, Pages 261–300. 4 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The aftermath of financial crises”, American Economic Review 99,  No. 2, 2009, pp. 466–472. Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor (2012), “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870–2008”, American Economic Review, 102 (2): pp. 1029– 1061. Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef (2013), “An International Look at Growth of Modern Finance”, Journal of economic perspectives, 27, pp. 73–96. Stephen Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi (2015), “Why does financial sector growth crowd out real economic growth”, BIS working papers, 490. 5 Jack Guttentag and Richard Herring, “Disaster myopia in international banking", Essays in International  Finance, No. 164, 1986. 6 See notably Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes and Ugo Panizza, “Too Much Finance? ", Journal of Economic  Growth 20, 2015, p. 105–148. 7 Private non-financial sector debt as share of GDP, Q1 2017. Sources: Eurostat data, Federal Reserve, Banque  de France calculations. 8 Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, “Systemic banking crises database", IMF Economic Review, Vol.61, No.
When the P27 initiative was announced, the BRO project was put on hold in order to consider whether a future common Nordic infrastructure as proposed by the P27 banks could be a satisfactory replacement. Norges Bank has engaged in joint discussions with the other Nordic central banks since P27 was launched. The central banks have given preliminary feedback on the P27 project and appreciate the project’s ambition to improve payment system efficiency in the Nordic area. At the same time, there are issues that need to be addressed before the authorities can take a position on any transition from domestic infrastructures to a common Nordic solution. This process may take time and will also involve authorities other than the central banks. Security legislation is one of these issues. If P27 is realised, it will probably be viewed as an important critical infrastructure for the countries involved. National security concerns may influence the conditions governing whether a payment system infrastructure can be operated across national borders. In the case of Norway, one likely condition could be that satisfactory contingency arrangements must be in place in Norway. Domestic control of the payment system must be possible in a crisis. The European Central Bank has launched a European solution for real-time payment settlement in central bank money called Target Instant Payment Settlement, or TIPS. The system is scheduled to commence operations this month and may be expanded to include non-euro area countries.

Furthermore, it is at the core of central banking to prioritise macroeconomic objectives over the central bank’s own finances. Moreover, this situation could make it possible to resolve most of the problem in the auction, in a more permanent way than was previously envisioned. Preparations for the auction are now well underway, and the date and format will be publicised soon, so that the auction can take place in the first half of the year. Other things being equal, it should then be  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  possible to move relatively quickly towards lifting capital controls on residents, as the current account surplus, foreign exchange inflows, and robust foreign exchange reserves provide ideal conditions for it. On the other hand, it is important to reach successful conclusion regarding offshore krónur before general liberalisation of controls on residents can take place. Now I would like to turn to longer-term issues regarding monetary policy and its relationship to other aspects of economic policy and prudential policy. In its reports entitled Monetary policy after capital controls and Prudential rules following capital controls, published in 2010 and 2012, respectively, the Central Bank described the new monetary policy framework and prudential rules that will be necessary to preserve financial stability and support monetary policy after the capital controls are lifted.
Private regular pay growth is currently running at 3.7% year on year. The reasons for this rise can also be found, to some extent, in job dynamics. There is only modest evidence that those moving position are climbing the ladder any faster. But it is notable that, as the labour market has tightened and skill shortages have emerged, we have seen pay growth among stickers beginning to rise after a long period of tranquillity. In other words, employers’ increased appetite to retain staff, and employees’ increased willingness to consider moving, appears now to be affecting pay. This might also help explain why, although pay has picked up (as stickers are rewarded not to move), there is little sign so far of productivity following suit (as job moves towards higher-productivity firms have not picked-up). With productivity subdued alongside higher pay, growth in annual unit wage costs is now running at elevated levels of over 2 ½% year on year.21 That is in excess of levels consistent with meeting the Bank’s inflation target and begs a question about the stance of monetary policy, to which I now turn. 21  Bank of England estimate using monthly AWE, employment and monthly GVA. 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21  A Polarised Economy At present, we are being fed a rich daily diet of news about polarisation in our politics and societies, globally and nationally.

Companies’ investment remains strikingly and significantly subdued. Business sentiment is weak. And UK growth for the year as a whole, at less than 1.5%, is expected to lie below potential. My personal view, though, is that I would be very cautious about considering a monetary policy loosening, barring some sharp economic downturn. First, despite some Brexit-related volatility quarter-to-quarter, underlying UK growth remains fairly steady, if not spectacular, at a fraction below its cruising altitude. Consumer confidence and spending remain robust, underpinned by a still-strong jobs market and rising real pay. The UK housing market may be bottoming-out. When British consumers have more money in their pockets, it takes a lot to persuade them not to spend it. Nothing so far has dissuaded them. And they are three-quarters of all spending in the economy. Second, the starting position for both the economy and monetary policy need importantly to be borne in mind. As best we can tell, there is little, if any, slack left in the UK economy. That is why pay is picking up at pace. UK inflation, meanwhile, is already at target and the monetary stance remains accommodative, with short-term real interest rates still negative, augmented by almost £ trillion of asset purchases. 30  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  30  Third, there is sometimes a tendency in the current environment to extrapolate from international experience, or recent historical experience, to the current stance of UK monetary policy.