samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That is, as I quote in my speech, the cause of the double-dip that we had in 2012, 2013, which should not have happened. And was the result of fiscal policy, not monetary policy. So why are you so optimistic that next time it will be better, that fiscal policy can step into the breach during the next downturn? In the first place, I don’t anticipate that we will have the sort of imbalances that we had at that time. Everyone has learned lessons and it’s very unlikely that Member States’ economies will become as imbalanced again. The adjustment that the more stressed countries went through shows that those Members States are now able to work effectively in the framework of the Monetary Union. Both in terms of the fiscal rules and in terms of the sort of level of structural change that we have seen in the past few years. Do you think it was a mistake for the ECB to become involved in the Troika? It was in a way unavoidable in view of the acuteness of the crisis we had, and good that it happened. Everyone wanted us to be there and we could not of course refuse what was then the expectation of everyone that we would help out with our expertise. To what degree do you think austerity and the crisis have influenced the current political mood? I think it plays a big role.

We have a great deal of work to do on these three issues in the months ahead, and I am confident that when bold reforms in these areas are undertaken, we will have achieved the necessary quantum leap in euro area governance. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 97/2010
16  The curve has flattened  A lowering of the curve does not change the sensitivity of pay growth to unemployment, and changes in unemployment, will put pressure on pay growth in the same way. It will all just happen at a lower level. A flattening of the curve, however, reduces the sensitivity of pay growth to unemployment at all levels and to all rates of change of unemployment. This appears to have happened in some estimations of the post crisis estimations of the curve. 15  17  See Broadbent (2014)  16  This could result in a ‘double whammy’: pay growth would be accelerated higher demand for labour while at the same time the inflation adjusted curve would shift up, accelerating pay growth further. This can be seen in Chart 8: a fall in unemployment would result in moving from point A to point B (at higher inflation expectations) or point C to point D (at lower expectations). If those inflation expectations were to change at the same time that unemployment falls, the move would be from C to point B. See also Mishkin (2007). 17  See for example BIS (2017) and IMF (2013). Blanchard et. al. (2015) argue that since 1990 there is no statistically significant slope to a price Phillips curve in many countries, including the UK.

And there has been extensive work on labour market dynamics and frictions to establish the point at which the level of unemployment accelerates the rate of inflation which, for the same of simplicity, I will refer to here as the natural rate. 9  However for nearly 5 decades the essential framework of a labour market impacted by inflation expectations that clears with lags around a natural rate of unemployment over the business cycle (or trade cycle in Phillips’ original work) has played a fundamental role in modern macroeconomic models, including those used as part of their forecasting machinery by monetary policy makers, like the Bank of England. So for monetary policymakers the apparent disappearance of the link between pay growth and employment is, as I have said, one of the key puzzles of the post recovery economy in the UK and in advanced economies. It has of course attracted a great deal of attention. I am afraid I do not have the answer to the puzzle to give you here tonight. I suspect that for many years to come, economists in academe and elsewhere will be occupied - and arguing - about this period and revisiting (again) the established Phillips curve framework. But policy makers cannot just ‘down tools’ until we have a better understanding. So I do want tonight to look at some of the main candidate explanations and what they might mean for the policy maker.
Accordingly, the Central Bank has established an index excluding all food items and started to monitor this index closely. From time to time, the Central Bank draws the attention to price movements in certain subgroups of the CPI in order to increase efficiency of the communication of the monetary policy and to take sound decisions. For instance, in order to highlight the effects of the monetary policy tightening being implemented since mid-2006, the Central Bank has frequently referred in 2007 to the developments observed in sub-groups, such as services or durable consumption goods, whose prices are sensitive to monetary policy actions. In summary, the Central Bank examines several variables including Special CPI Aggregates while assessing the main inflation trend, and can highlight different indicators at certain periods depending on the economic conjuncture. Understanding of the Central Bank’s approach to core inflation by the public will allow for a sound assessment of the monetary policy actions and hence an improved efficiency of communication policies. Uncertainty band and accountability It is stipulated in Article 42 of the CBRT Law that “The Bank shall submit information to the Government in writing and inform the public disclosing the reasons of the incapability of achieving the determined targets in due time announced or the occurrence of the possibility  2  BIS Review 4/2008  of not achieving the targets and the measures to be taken thereof”.

However, as was the case before, the developments related to foreign exchange supply will be closely monitored and in the event of unforeseen extraordinary developments, the Central Bank may, with prior notice, change the daily auction amount and/or optional selling amount in both directions and may suspend the auctions temporarily for shorter and longer periods. On the other hand, the Central Bank will continue to closely monitor the volatility in exchange rates also in 2008 and will directly intervene in the market in the event of actual and potential excessive volatilities. Banks will also be able to borrow foreign exchange in terms of USD and euro from the Central Bank within the predetermined limits with a one-week maturity in the Foreign Exchange and Banknotes Market-Foreign Exchange Deposit Market in the upcoming period. Moreover, the purchase/sale transactions of “foreign exchange against foreign exchange”, “foreign exchange against foreign banknotes” and “foreign banknotes against foreign banknotes” conducted between the Central Bank and institutions authorized to operate in the Foreign Exchange and Banknotes Markets will continue. In conclusion, within the framework of the current exchange rate regime and the exchange rate policy of the Central Bank, economic agents should take into account that they operate in an environment of exchange rate risk and that they should establish mechanisms that will ensure the efficient management of this risk. Liquidity management As an outcome of the Central Bank’s foreign exchange purchases, the excess liquidity in the market continued in 2007, as well.
But during the second half of July, concerns increased again when reports were received of the weak finances in Spanish regions. This contributed to new speculations regarding whether the loan to the Spanish banks is sufficient, or whether it will be necessary to implement a full-scale support package for Spain. Yields on Spanish government bonds with both short and long maturities rose to new heights. Italy was also affected by the unease. At the same time, yields on German and French government bonds remained at extremely low levels. The problematic situation on the bonds markets was discussed by the European Central Bank, ECB, at the beginning of August. After the meeting, ECB Chairman Mario Draghi made it clear that countries needing acute assistance should first turn to the EFSF/ESM and accept support under the terms they stipulate. After interventions might be undertaken by the ECB, within its mandate for price stability, and the ECB will investigate potential measures. It was already clear that potential bond purchases by the ECB would focus on bonds with shorter maturities. Expectations were fairly high prior to the ECB meeting, and Spanish and Italian bond yields had fallen during the days before the meeting. When the ECB did not announce any immediate measures, yields rose quite strongly at first. They have since fallen somewhat again, primarily yields on government bonds with shorter maturities.

A number of important questions are currently being investigated and suggestions or announcements within various areas have been promised by September. After the European Council’s meeting at the end of June, the sentiment on the financial markets was characterised by uncertainty over the details in the measures the Council announced and the yields on Spanish and Italian government bonds remained high. The uncertainty concerned how to implement and design a joint banking supervision in the euro area, something that is a very large step for the member states. Joint banking supervision is, according to the agreement reached at the meeting, a necessary condition for the European Stability Mechanism, ESM, to be able to recapitalise banks directly. The uncertainty was fuelled by the criticism of another agreement reached at the meeting that the European relief funds should be able to buy government bonds to hold back countries’ interest costs. More details on the loan to the Spanish banking sector More details of the loan of up to EUR 100 billion to the Spanish banking sector were released after the meeting of the Eurogroup finance ministers in July. A Memorandum of Understanding with Spain states, for instance, that the exact size of the loan will be determined after a revision of the Spanish banking sector during the second half of September. However, EUR 30 billion is to be made available this summer as a preliminary bailout for urgent measures.
These ratios are many times what they were prior to the crisis (Chart 1). Recognising the feedback mechanisms that so  Sources: PRA regulatory returns, published accounts and Bank calculations. Note: Refers to major UK banks. For detailed definitions see notes to Chart B.1 in the November 2017 Financial Stability Report. amplified the severity of the crisis, there were also reforms designed to ensure the stability of the financial 3 4  Bean (2010) and Svensson (2015). Tucker (2011). 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  system as a whole. Extra capital is now required for institutions judged to be systemically important. Trading in many derivatives has been shifted to central clearing houses, and the associated collateral requirements tightened. And in several countries new authorities have been created to identify and mitigate system-wide risks, using what is known as “macro-prudential” policy. In the UK, macro-prudential policy is conducted by the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), housed within the Bank of England. Mirroring the set-up for the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the FPC’s remit is set by the UK government but it is operationally independent of the executive and accountable directly to parliament. There are many instruments that might fall under the heading of macro-prudential policy, some of which – quantitative restrictions on lending, for example – have, in one form or another, been around for a long time (Elliot et al. (2013), Goodhart (2015)). Others, such as the counter-cyclical capital buffer, are newer.

Armed with the whole array of price and quantity indicators of 12  The observer updates her distribution over the probability using Bayes’ law. Chart 9 is the mean of that updated distribution as a function of the number of years of data that the agent has observed. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  risk we – and others – can make informed judgements about the right level of loss-absorbing capital in the banking system and about the appropriateness of more targeted policy tools. And if it takes time to demonstrate decisively a reduction in system-wide risk, there are some policies whose effects are more immediately obvious. In 2014, responding to concerns about growth in riskier mortgages, the FPC introduced limits on the share of banks’ mortgage lending at high (>4.5) loan-to-income ratios. Recently, the committee noted that there’s since been quite a bit of “bunching” in new loans just below this limit. I’m not so sure this is a problem: for my part I see it mainly as clear and timely evidence that the policy has had an impact. The point remains, however, that the FPC’s objective is inevitably less precise, and its success less immediately measurable, than that of the MPC. Recalling the results of the analysis I discussed at the start of the talk, on the appropriate allocation of tasks, this suggests that there might well be a cost if you asked a single body – an “FMPC” – to meet all these objectives at once.
If there is a more rapid downswing than expected, the problems in the mortgage market may be more profound and spread to other sectors of the credit market. And of course the unrest in the financial markets can in turn contribute to a broader slowdown in the US economy. The situation remains uncertain and there is considerable sensitivity to new negative information and to other shocks. And there will probably be more bad news from the United States and Europe. We were all taken by surprise This autumn has seen a number of unpleasant surprises and, as I have said, there is reason to believe that the unrest will continue. The Riksbank, like most other central banks, had previously warned that there were difficulties in the credit market, particularly the low risk premiums. The situation we have seen was therefore not entirely unexpected. However, something that was underestimated was how quickly and by how much the price of risk rose, as well as how quickly problems in a distant part of the US credit market could spread throughout the world and have such a strong impact on the interbank market, which is the actual core of the international financial system. BIS Review 136/2007  5  To those wishing to learn more about the market turbulence, I can warmly recommend the Riksbank's Financial Stability Report, which will be published soon.

Disturbances to the economy may result in changes in the forecasts. Data revisions imply that the current economic situation is  BIS Review 97/2007  3  not fully known. Our ambition must be to reduce uncertainty with regard to our own response pattern. That actual interest rate developments will deviate somewhat from the Bank's forecast will probably be the rule rather than the exception. What Norges Bank’s Executive Board actually adopts is a monetary policy strategy that applies until the next Report. When Monetary Policy Report 2/07 was presented in June, the Executive Board decided that the key policy rate should be in the interval 4½-5½ per cent in the period to the publication of the next Report on 31 October. And even that is conditional on economic developments that are broadly in line with projections. Financial market turbulence Global economic developments are important for economic developments in Norway, and changes in the growth prospects for the world economy may influence our projections. The turbulence in international financial markets in recent weeks has heightened the uncertainty concerning developments ahead. The source of the turbulence can be found in the US housing market and particularly in the subprime mortgage market. This segment of the US credit market has expanded sharply in recent years. The loans often feature an interest-only period and low interest rates in the first years of the loan's term and higher interest rates thereafter.
The recent reduction of the MPR is part of a necessary adjustment to deal with recent changes in our macroeconomy and, as I said, ensure compliance with our inflation objective. Going forward, further changes to the MPR will depend on incoming information and its implications on the economy’s evolution. Actually, the baseline scenario does not foresee the need for any significant changes in the MPR but, should such need arise, monetary policy has room and is prepared for further adjustments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Over the period, both the real and the nominal exchange rates have depreciated, which is part of the process of restructuring the sources of growth after some time when domestic demand has been the primary driver of such growth. Let me now describe for you our baseline scenario and the main risks we have identified in our reports. Macroeconomic scenario Chile’s third-quarter growth was 4.7 percent y-o-y. Mining grew strongly, boosted by the startup of major investment projects of recent years. Thus, mining exports have increased, helping to reduce the current account deficit. Sectors other than natural resources, meanwhile, continued to post lower growth rates than in 2012 (figure 1). This, together with the revision to growth rates of earlier quarters, confirmed that the Chilean economy has lost some strength compared with last year. On the expenditure side, the slowdown extended to each and every component, including private consumption, which was accompanied with significant inventory depletion (figure 2).

8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3 Inflation indicators (annual change, percent) 10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4 06  07  08  09  10  11  CPI  EES two years hence  12  13  CPISAE  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). Table 1 International baseline scenario assumptions 2012  2013 (f) Mar.13 Sep.13 Report Report  Growth Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP  3.4 3.1  3.6 3.3  3.3 3.0  2014 (f) 2015 (f) Mar.13 Sep.13 Dec.13 Sep.13 Dec.13 Report Report Report Report Report (annual change, percent) 3.4 4.2 3.6 3.6 4.0 3.8 3.0 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.7  United States Eurozone Japan China India Rest of Asia (excl. Japan, China and India) Latin America (excl.
In the discussion at Eidsvoll, Christian Magnus Falsen, a key member of the Constituent Assembly, said that no state can exist without a well-functioning monetary system. Another prominent member of the Assembly, Count Wedel Jarlsberg, insisted that the nation must have its own bank. The people’s elected representatives took responsibility for the monetary system, as stated in Article 75 of the Constitution: «It devolves upon the Storting to supervise the monetary affairs of the Realm». The Storting delegated the task of supervising the monetary system to Norges Bank, which was established in 1816. The king would no longer have the authority to print money at his own will. At its inception, Norges Bank’s head office was located in Trondheim, a twelve-day journey from the government in Christiania, and even farther from Stockholm, giving the central bank a geographical – and not just formal – distance from the government authorities. Much has happened since 1814. Norway no longer lags behind other western economies. Inflation is low and stable. We have established a clear division of responsibility for economic policy and well developed institutions founded on the Constitution written at Eidsvoll 200 years ago. Chart: Shift in the world’s economic centre of gravity In 1814, the great powers of Europe dominated world trade. The world’s economic centre of gravity has since then shifted westward. Today, in the 21st century, the centre of gravity is moving across the Pacific to Asia.

William C Dudley: Panel remarks at The Clearing House Annual Conference Panel remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at The Clearing House Annual Conference, New York City, 18 November 2015. *  *  *  Dianne Dobbeck, Robert Fitchette, Charles Gray, Joyce Hansen, HaeRan Kim, Kristin Malcarney and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here today alongside my fellow Reserve Bank presidents, Loretta Mester and Dennis Lockhart. Today’s event comes almost exactly two years since I delivered a set of remarks at NYU School of Law that covered various aspects of what we know as the “too big to fail” problem. In view of some significant milestones that have occurred over the past two years, I would like today to briefly review my sense of the work that has been accomplished on this critical issue, and the work that still remains to be completed. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System. Broadly speaking, the regulatory reforms that the U.S. has adopted since the crisis have been designed to address the risks posed by large financial institutions in two related ways. First, our reforms are designed to reduce the probability that large financial institutions will fail by requiring those institutions to be more resilient to stress.
For example, higher commodity and food prices function roughly in the same way as a tax increase for households and dampen domestic demand. Price rises on energy and commodities also mean that companies' costs increase. This also tends to dampen production and growth. In such a situation it is important to try to find a policy that is sufficiently tight to prevent inflationary impulses gaining a lasting grip. This is necessary to ensure that they do not spread to inflation expectations, wages and other prices. At the same time, the policy must be sufficiently loose to avoid unnecessary negative effects on production and employment. It is a difficult balancing act. To manage this in a way that provides a good growth in the economy that is sustainable in the long term requires that the credibility of the inflation target remains intact. This is the premise for formulating monetary policy. If the expectations of inflation are pushed up and remain above the inflation target, there is a risk that they will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. And dealing with high and fluctuating inflation rates is often a very difficult and expensive process – for individual households and the economy as a whole. The oil price shocks in the 1970s are examples of how external inflationary impulses were allowed to gain a firm foothold and spread throughout the economy at the same time as economic activity was weak. The cost of dealing with this adjustment was high, not least because our competitiveness was undermined.

In the EU countries that are not using the euro, the effects from monetary conditions in the euro area led to improving macroeconomic environment, loosening financing conditions, and high bank liquidity. That stimulated lending and, in turn, the increase in residential property prices. However, these developments also increased cyclical risks. The Bulgarian National Bank conducted research into Bulgaria’s financial cycle. Our findings showed that we are currently in an upward phase of cyclical risk accumulation. Hence, we activated and then raised the rate of the countercyclical capital buffer. We have so far taken two decisions. In 2018, we set the countercyclical capital buffer rate applicable to credit risk exposures in Bulgaria at 0.5%, with effect from October 1 2019. In early 2019 we raised the rate to 1.0%, with effect from April 1 2020. The rate is applied to the overall credit stock of banks and not to the volume of newly issued loans. We announced that we could increase the rate to a higher level earlier if credit growth significantly accelerates. Our decisions were taken despite the fact that the standard metric of how the credit-to-GDP ratio deviates from its long-term trend remained deep in negative territory. Furthermore, we strengthened the macroprudential powers of the Bulgarian National Bank. The key element here was the introduction into Bulgarian law of a framework of borrower-based measures – requirements such as loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) – in addition to the existing capital-based measures.