samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And richer people are less likely to move larger distances than poorer ones (Chart 22). 32  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  32  Chart 20: Distribution of house moves by distance in different regions (mortgage-to-mortgage movers in 2018, moving to South-East England and Scotland)  Sources: Product Sales Database and Bank calculations. Chart 21: Distribution of house moves by distance for different ages (mortgage-to-mortgage movers in 2018, upper and lower age quartiles)  Sources: Product Sales Database and Bank calculations. 33  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  33  Chart 23: Distribution of house moves by distance for different (mortgage-and-mortgage moves in 2018, upper and lower income quartiles)  income  groups  Sources: Product Sales Database and Bank calculations. Take Yorkshire and Humberside. A third of all moves are within-region. East, West, Home’s Best. Some do move to the West (around 15%) and some to the East (7%). Although some head South-East for life in the slow lane (7%), a larger number move North to Scotland (around 10%). This only covers moves among those with a mortgage, so will not capture first-time buyers, students, renters or those retiring without a mortgage. It nonetheless offers a new lens on the housing market, locally and nationally. It is not difficult to see how these micro-level flow data could be augmented. Data from payments systems can, and are, being used to track flows of money.

17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Chart 13: Heat maps of health in Belfast, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Inner London  Sources: 2011 Census. Notes: Data show percentage of respondents declaring themselves to be in bad or very bad health at electoral ward level. I draw two conclusions from these micro-level visualisations. First, however striking the regional differences in economic and societal health across the UK relative to historical and international standards, these conceal even more striking differences in levels of health, wealth and happiness within regions. To the extent there is an inequality issue in the UK, it is as much or more a local rather than regional one. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  18  A second, nerdier, point is what this means for our understanding the economy. Many systems – social, natural and physical – exhibit a pattern in which the distribution of outcomes does not converge at higher resolutions; it remains constant or even expands. These systems have a fractal property with patterns that are self-similar at different levels of resolution. Snowflakes and shorelines are the best-known examples. The violins charts suggest economic systems may also exhibit some of these properties, with distributions which do not converge at higher resolutions and may even expand. Outcomes in these systems are not distributed like a bell-shaped, Normal distribution.
Jean-Pierre Landau: Some thoughts on securitization and financial turbulences Remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Landau, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Paris EUROPLACE, Financial Forum, New York, 22 October 2007. *  *  *  There is a paradox in the current situation. However we measure it (by the level of spreads or volatility), the shock created in credit markets by losses on subprime loans is without precedent. And yet, the losses themselves, while significant and spectacular for some institutions, would not seem to pose a major risk to the health of the financial system. Most notable, the turbulences occurred in a very favorable macro economic environment. This disproportion between the cause and the effect points to some existing fragilities – that need to be addressed – in the securitized model of capital markets. There is no rush to take measures, even less regulate. But there is no room for complacency either. Rather, we need to come to a diagnosis and think of the desirable characteristics of a robust securitization model. The current model of securitization, as it has developed in the last decade, has two distinctive features: •  One we were aware of: an increasing complexity of instruments, which combine an extensive use of derivatives with customization to individual investors' needs. This has made valuation and risk assessment more difficult. •  One we rediscovered during the turmoil: the fragility of off-balance sheet structures and vehicles which underpinned securitization. Conduits, especially SIVs, were not built to absorb shocks.

Let me focus in the minutes I have at my disposal on several economic issues. Our debate is so more important for it takes place at a time of some economic slowdown all over Europe and of an erosion of multilateralism, of spreading trade conflicts. The prospect of a hard Brexit is very annoying for all of us and I still very much hope that such a denouement would be avoided. Likewise, it is high time to strike a deal on the Multiannual Financial Framework so that the great challenges the Union is facing (protection of borders, cyber fare, climate change, conflicts in near and more remote neighborhoods, etc.) find proper conciliation with the need to preserve the cohesion of the Union and avoid further fragmentation. I also trust that EU leaders will find the right balance to address key institutional and policy related weaknesses of the Euro area. I mention this, for Romania, like other Non-member States, is bound by EU accession treaties to join the single currency area eventually. And hopefully, this will happen in the not too distant future. In this regard I wish to mention that two major documents on Romania’s path to the Euro area (an analytical report and a Plan of action) have been recently completed and have been subjected to the scrutiny and approval of the political parties and the Parliament. I was one of the vice-chairs of the National Commission which guided the completion of the two documents.
5 At the same time, the effect of policy rate changes on household indebtedness is very small. •  The IMF estimates that hiking interest rates by 100 basis points for a year reduces the probability of financial crises by 0.04 to 0.3 percentage point at most. Back to Tinbergen: an enhanced role for regulatory policy So, we are back to where we started: if monetary policy has at best a limited role, what do we do with financial stability? •  As Stefan Ingves put it recently: “We deal with inflation, we keep an eye on the exchange rate, we do our best to reach our inflation target. But that means that somebody else has to deal with the problem we have in our housing market.” 6  And that someone else could well be regulatory policy. And that includes both the oldfashioned microprudential variety as well as the “new kid on the block” – macroprudential policy. Old is gold: microprudential regulation The lesson of the Global Financial Crisis is not that microprudential policy was ineffective in achieving financial stability and therefore we need to look elsewhere. •  The more pertinent lesson was that microprudential regulation – and might I add, supervision – was inadequate and had to be strengthened. 5  Svensson, L (2014), “Inflation Targeting and ‘Leaning against the Wind’,” International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 10, No. 2, June. 6  “Riksbank Stefan Ingves sees flaws in crisis-busting tools,” Financial Times, 13 September 2015.

•  Do regulatory policies – either the microprudential or macroprudential variety – have an impact on market liquidity or short-term interest rates? The BIS recently convened a working group to assess the impact of microprudential policy on the efficacy of monetary policy. The report concluded that it was difficult to draw firm conclusions. But there were some interesting observations. •  The lending activity of less well-capitalised, higher risk-taking or less liquid banks appears more responsive to a tightening of monetary policy. •  This would seem to suggest that more stringent regulations tend to weaken the transmission of monetary impulses. •  And the transmission of policy rate changes to other interest rates and asset prices may be altered if debt markets become less liquid as a result of regulatory changes. Conclusion Let me conclude by drawing together the main points. •  Microprudential policies are critically important for financial stability and we must get them right. •  But the ability of microprudential policies to achieve financial stability may be dampened by credit cycles that have their roots in broader macro forces. •  Monetary policy matters for financial stability because it affects the credit cycle. To what extent monetary policy should therefore take account of financial stability remains an unresolved matter. •  Macroprudential policy potentially offers a way out by targeting the macro sources of financial instability, leaving monetary policy to focus on price stability. •  But macroprudential policy is neither a panacea nor without cost or distortion.
The banking sector should carry out a reassessment of the stability of the borrowers’ business model, under the post -Covid reality. Clients facing temporary financial difficulties but with stable business models, should be supported with liquidity and temporary operational easing. Clients facing serious difficulties may be supported through the restructuring of credit, always so far and at the level that the long-term perspective of the business remains solid. On its side, the Bank of Albania will encourage a pro-active approach of the banking sector towards this process, without prejudice to the stability of the sector and transparency of its balance sheets. Lastly, the fifth challenge is the safeguarding of the monetary and financial stability of Albania. In this regard, I would like to underscore that: The Albanian business should show transparent and loyal to the banking sector. This sector should provide its help to face the crisis, but it may not counter alone its financial costs. Also, banking sector should find a fair equilibrium between the support to borrowers in need – in a bilateral long-term interest and benefit – and the safeguarding of its balance sheet soundness. As I already mentioned, the monetary and financial stability is not negotiable to the Bank of 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Albania. In compliance with our legal mandate it has been and will continue to be the milestone of our polices.

Gent Sejko: Bank - business relationships: common economic challenges in face of global Covid-19 pandemic Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, to the Discussion Forum on ''Bank business relationships: common economic challenges in face of global Covid-19 pandemic”, Tirana, 13 May 2020. * * *  Dear representatives of business community in Albania, Dear banking system executives, First, I would like to thank you for your participation in this round table, held to discuss on the way and optimum instruments to face the common challenges ahead. This meeting is being organised under extraordinary circumstances. The outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic and the prudential measures adopted to confine it, drove to a rapid drop of the demand for goods and services, in the domestic and foreign markets, and to a considerable contraction of output. The challenges we are facing are serious, in terms of both size and complexity. The Albanian economy is expected to undergo a strong drop of the economic activity during 2020, in those levels never being experienced during the last two decades. It will be accompanied by an increase of unemployment, fall of revenue, and financial difficulties to firms and households. In the microeconomic view, the fall of revenue, reduction of liquidity and worsening of solvency will test the financial stability of firms. In the macroeconomic view, the increase of private and public debt will test the stability of economic equilibriums of Albania.
We are honoured today to have the presence of Tan Sri Mohamed Hashim, Dato’ Dr. Zainal Abidin and Hajjah Siti Jameah, siblings of Governor Ismail Ali, as well as Mr. Ahmad Kamal, Governor Ismail Ali’s son. I am also honoured to welcome back to the Bank those who have worked alongside Governor Ismail Ali. Equally important, we are grateful to have with us the international central banking community, who are travelling to Bali for the IMF and World Bank Group Annual Meetings and have taken time from your busy schedules for this occasion. This indeed underscores the appreciation towards central bank cooperation built on trust and friendship. This book is to honour Governor Ismail Ali as a nation builder; a titan of the Malaysian economic and financial sector. He was an unassuming man but he powered the wheels of the nation – and each turn on the wheel left a mark on history. We have spoken to more than twenty individuals who were close to Governor Ismail Ali and dedicated hundreds of pages to his life. But, it is certain that we have yet to do justice in capturing the breadth and depth of his persona. Governor Ismail Ali had a far-reaching impact, not only on the country’s economic and financial landscape, but also on the personal and professional lives of many. As we were completing this book, we discovered there are others who carried untold stories of him, from here and abroad, each with another brushstroke to add to the portrait of his vision.

The monetary policy debate Allow me to say a few words in conclusion regarding the recent, lively debate on monetary policy. This is because I have received many questions on this subject in recent weeks. However, it is not always easy to get a subtle message across when the media debate is so intense. I therefore decided at an early stage of the discussion to take up this question in greater depth here at the Economics association, a suitable forum for a penetrating and relatively non-media discussion. Before I try to explain my views on some elements of the discussion, I cannot resist pointing out that I found the tone of the discussion somewhat surprising. Sweden has come through the recent economic slowdown better than many other countries. Personally, I also felt much greater concern over economic developments and monetary policy at the end of spring and beginning of summer 2003 than I have done in recent months. The reason is simple. At the end of last spring, the inflation rate was still high. Although we believed it would fall, there was a clear risk that it could become entrenched. Meanwhile, there was considerable uncertainty over international economic activity; would there be a turnaround and if so, when? This could mean we are forced to make difficult judgements. For instance, we might be forced to raise the interest rate even if economic activity weakened. Now the situation is fundamentally much better, with declining inflationary pressure combined with increasing growth. Nevertheless, the debate is much tougher.
All business decisions have risks and there must be mitigating strategies in place to manage adverse occurrences. Hearing your input and perspectives on these issues is an important part of the process for us, and I am fortunate to have the opportunity to meet with many community bankers in the Second District. Some of the most common themes I hear include: an appreciation for the recent regulatory reforms implemented such as the streamlining of the Call Report; the extension of the examination cycle to 18-month for firms under $ billion in total asset-size; and the current discussions around capital simplification. The comment period on capital simplification will close on April 9th, and I hope you all shared input to influence that important policy decision. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  One area where we receive mixed feedback from bankers is the issue of off-site examinations. Some bankers love that idea, while others have stated they like the face-to-face interaction as it reduces the risk of miscommunication, misinterpretations or ambiguities. Still others prefer a hybrid approach with certain portions of examination work conducted on-site and others off-site. All felt critical meetings should be conducted in person. Today’s technology makes all of these options possible, and we will continue to exercise judgment and thoughtful communication with bankers to determine the best option. At the end of the day, our shared goal is a fair and accurate assessment for your institution, and we will continue to work together to accomplish this.

Security of payments The rapid development of e-commerce in recent years and the increased use of electronic channels to initiate payments pose new challenges related to ensuring the security and customers’ data. As of September 2019, it has become mandatory in Europe to implement strong customer authentication. This means that when an electronic payment is initiated, at least two independent elements from different categories – knowledge, possession and inherence – must be used in the process. In the case of remote payment transactions, e.g. via internet, an additional requirement is introduced to perform so-called dynamic linking – linking the code for each transaction to a specific amount and a specific payee. These requirements are implemented by the payment service providers in our country. For the practical implementation of these regulatory requirements, new technologies are again coming to the rescue. Recently, biometric authentication has shown great potential by providing verification of elements characterising the user: fingerprint, iris scanning, facial recognition, etc. Many payment service providers in Bulgaria have already introduced similar customer identification methods using mobile banking applications. Apart from convenience, this leads to a significant increase in the security of the payment process, allowing the use of biometric data for customer identification. On the occasion of the forthcoming review of the Second Payment Services Directive, a comprehensive assessment of the impact of strong customer authentication on the level of payment fraud is to be carried out.
It is senior management’s hope that the facilitation that will be given in these workshops will go a long way in addressing the identified teething problems. It is extremely important that you all realize from the very outset that you will be the anchors for the success of this process for your respective departments. For this reason, it is imperative that you understand in full the processes that will be discussed in this workshop. Senior management’s expectation is that you will acquire the necessary tools to enable you facilitate the proper completion of the Context Establishment and Risk Identification exercises within your respective departments. Ladies and Gentlemen: Allow me to give you a brief background on the implementation of the Risk Management Framework at the Bank of Zambia. You will recall that starting in October 2006 through April 2007, the Risk Management Department embarked on a programme of sensitizing all the members of staff and the Board of Directors on the establishment of the risk management framework at the Bank. Given that these workshops had coverage of 99% of all Bank of Zambia staff, I am more than confident that most of you were participants in those workshops. The end of this series of workshops, marked the end of Phase I of the implementation programme of the Risk Management Framework at the Bank. Following the end of the risk sensitization workshops the next stage required the implementation of the framework in the business areas.

As officers at the frontline of risk management in the Bank, you are expected to be conversant with the risk management process that is being implemented at the Bank, and there is no better platform to provide that opportunity than now! To this end, the programme of that this workshop is organized in such a way as to be highly interactive. Therefore, I urge you to feel free to ask as many questions as possible. With these few words, it is now my singular honor and privilege to declare this workshop officially open. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 71/2008
Permit me to return to last year's discussion about energy prices in order to illustrate what I believe could be one of the problems. As I mentioned, the repo rate was not lowered in April 2003 despite the fact that our forecasts pointed to below-target CPI inflation two years ahead. The reason was that the forecast of CPI inflation was depressed by energy price effects that were judged to be transitory and that were expected to subside just beyond the forecast horizon. However, the measure that was considered a better reflection of longer-term cyclical inflation, UND1X excluding energy, was forecast to be in line with the inflation target at the end of the forecast period. One perhaps likely interpretation, and an interpretation that was obviously common, was that the Riksbank had not departed from its policy rule of adjusting the repo rate when inflation deviates from the target, but that the target variable itself had been changed. And since the new supposed target variable was in line with the inflation target there was no reason to change the repo rate. Our intention, however, was rather the reverse, i.e. to highlight UND1X excluding energy to point out that fluctuations in CPI inflation were driven to a great extent by temporary variations in energy prices, also somewhat beyond the normal two-year horizon, and that this was an occasion on which there was reason to depart from the rule.

Consequently, to this end, the June Inflation Report in 2001 presented an inflation measure that was  1  See Heikensten, L, "The Riksbank's inflation target - clarifications and evaluation", Sveriges Riksbank Quarterly Review 1, 1999. 2  BIS Review 26/2004  adjusted to exclude temporary rises in prices. On that occasion there was no forecast for this adjusted measure. The third and most recent example is when the Riksbank decided last year to highlight UND1X excluding energy as an especially important index for assessing longer-lasting inflationary pressures. Energy prices had risen steeply around the turn of the year 2002/2003. We judged this rise to be temporary and expected energy prices to fall back again. This meant that the inflation rate would come to be affected for a reasonably long period by these temporary fluctuations in energy prices. At the monetary policy meeting in April 2003 the Riksbank judged that inflation towards the end of the forecast period would be somewhat below target if the repo rate were left unchanged. A strict application of our simple rule would have resulted in a repo rate cut, but since temporary fluctuations in energy prices were the chief reason for the inflation forecast being below 2 per cent, the Riksbank decided to leave the repo rate unchanged.