samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If the element of national thinking in financial investments were reduced, more savers would also be able to benefit from a broader supply of products. At the same time, it is essential that increased financial exposures towards companies and financial operators in other countries occur in controlled forms, i.e. with a high degree of transparency with regard to the risks attached to them. This is particularly important with regard to financial commitments of normally very long duration, e.g. investments in connection with life insurance. There is reason to believe that the demand for financial services will continue to be a driving force behind the integration process and give a basis for further structural changes in the financial markets. Increased corporate financing through securities is one trend that will undoubtedly be further reinforced. Similarly, households’ saving in funds will probably show a rapid increase in the future, particularly in order to secure future pensions, and this will call for a capacity to diversify investments, where geographical spread in particular is an important aspect. In these two latter aspects, however, Europe is a long way behind the United States. One obvious difference between the US and Europe is that the banking system plays a much bigger role here. This 1  Heinemann, F & M Jopp (2002): The Benefits of a Working European Retail Market for Financial Services, Report to the European Financial Services Round Table. 2  idem.

has largely historical reasons, but it also has importance for the continued structural development of the financial system, since it has proved to be much more difficult to integrate financial institutions than financial markets. The most obvious trend in the banking system in Europe is the consolidation within individual countries into larger units. On the other hand, very few banks have established themselves in other countries, and the - relatively modest - consolidation that has occurred through cross-border mergers and acquisitions has not in general led to any radical change in the market within the EU for the services traditionally offered by the banks to households and small companies. Within this area of the banking sector there is still a substantial over-capacity in the EU, which seems to be taking some time to phase out. However, a number of banks in western Europe have expanded into eastern Europe and contributed to a modernisation of the banking systems in the former planned economies. Internationalisation is a driving force My point thus far is that most of the driving forces behind the developments in the financial sector are connected with increased international competition and an increased awareness of international opportunities, and that regulatory systems are also becoming more international. Within the legal community constituted by the EU, the financial legislation applies to all 15 member states, and the financial services action plan that is now on the agenda for implementation by 2005 will also affect the conditions for the operations of the financial sector in Sweden.
But this technology means at the same time that bitcoin is very ineffective to use, as each payment requires large amounts of time and energy. Nor is there anything to limit the supply of copies of bitcoins in the form of other cryptocurrencies. So-called stablecoins are instead based on borrowing credibility from state money by promising full back-up in a state currency. 11 However, it is very difficult for a totally private currency to gain the same credibility as state money enjoys. What do all of these challenges and changes mean for us central banks? Well, we must also adapt our activities to the new environment. This is nothing new for an 9 This has also been done at EU level, for instance through the PSD2 legislation, which enables payment service  providers, which do not have their own deposit accounts, to offer payment solutions initiated from bank accounts. This increases the circle of companies that can offer payment products. 10 For further information on this, see the CPMI report “Non-banks in retail payments” (2014). 11 For more information on stablecoins, see Arner et al. (2020). 6 [35]  institution like the Riksbank, which has existed for more than 350 years. It is difficult to survive for so long without being able to adapt. But what is new this time is how quickly we may need to adapt.

This probably means that extensive bond purchases will play a larger role than before when we want to affect rate-setting in the economy and contribute to financial stability. It is therefore problematic that the Government’s proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act suggests several restrictions to practical monetary policy. The Government’s proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act is problematic Quite recently, the Government decided on a proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act. The proposal is now with the Council on Legislation and later this year or next year the Riksdag will take a stance on the proposal. I note that a number of changes have been made with regard to the views expressed by the Riksbank in the consultation last year. This is good. However, I am still worried about the usability of the act in practice. This concerns above all an artificial division between our two core tasks of price stability and safeguarding the financial system. Our 23 [35]  tools for attaining these objectives are divided into two different chapters – despite this being a question of largely the same tools. This is problematic. It all comes down to how we use our balance sheet. Let me take an example from the financial crisis 2008-2009.
Page 1  What did the monetarists ever do for us? − speech by Huw Pill Given at Walter Eucken Institut / Stifung Geld und Währung Conference – Inflation and Debt: Challenges for Monetary Policy after Covid-19  Page 2  Published on 24 June 2022  Huw Pill talks about the challenges for monetary policy after Covid. Speech Good afternoon everyone. It is a great pleasure to be here in Freiburg to attend this excellent and topical conference. My thanks are due to the organisers, especially Professors Feld, Krause and Moellers, and to the sponsoring institutions, the Stiftung Geld and Waehrung and the Walter Eucken Institut, for their invitation and hospitality. I am tempted to start my remarks with the phrase: ‘And now for something completely different …’. In part, this is intended to signal a change of pace. After a series of outstanding presentations of very high quality research papers, I am afraid that I will lower the tone somewhat by bringing more of a policy orientation to the discussion. But it is also a nod to the Pythonesque title assigned to my remarks. I understand that Monty Python was (and is) very popular in Germany. But to avoid any misunderstanding, I thought I should clarify from the outset that the title is an allusion to a famous sketch from one of the Money Python films.

On this, I see substantial scope for the pace of financial integration in East Asia to be gaining more momentum going forward as the constraints that used to limit the pace of integration begin to unwind. First, the external positions of the economies in East Asia have now become much stronger, with current account surpluses, substantially lower external debt, and larger international reserves. Second, Asian savers themselves increasingly want to diversify their savings abroad in search for better yields while Asian firms also look for better opportunities to lower their costs of fund by tapping funds from external sources. Reflecting these two factors, we are seeing a reorientation of policy in the region to make cross-border capital outflows more liberal without compromising the risk on macroeconomic stability. And the third factor is that Asian financial institutions are now back in good health after a period of restructuring and consolidation. So, we are likely to see Asian financial institutions becoming more active in intermediating cross-border capital flows within the region, as they explore new business opportunities based on their expertise and knowledge of the region. All these factors, I think, will set in train a stronger momentum of cross-border capital flows within the region in the period ahead. And under such circumstances, what then should be the role of policy? Government policies, in my view, have played an important role in the development of East Asian financial markets.
It is set out in a revised Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF), published today.11 The new framework builds on the lessons learned throughout the financial crisis and draws on the recommendations made by Bill Winters in his review of our system.12 Five simple words describe our approach: we are open for business. Our facilities are not ornamental. They are there to be used by banks to access money and high-quality collateral. We are offering money and collateral for longer terms. The range of assets we will accept in exchange will be wider, extending to raw loans and, in fact, any asset of which we are capable of assessing the risks. And using our facilities will be cheaper. In some cases the fees are being more than halved. Banks can be confident that, when they want to use our facilities, they will be allowed to access them. Because we are both the supervisor and the central bank, the strong presumption is now that, if a bank meets the supervisory threshold conditions to operate and has signed up to our framework, it will be able to use our facilities. Our Discount Window will be open every day for those firms requiring a bespoke facility with lagged disclosure. Its price will be lower. We will hold monthly repo auctions to provide predictable and regular access to high-quality collateral in exchange for a very broad range of collateral. And in times of actual or prospective stressed conditions we stand ready to provide cheap, plentiful money through more frequent auctions.

Mark Carney: The UK at the heart of a renewed globalisation Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at an event to celebrate the 125th anniversary of the Financial Times, London, 24 October 2013. * 1. *  *  Introduction  When the Financial Times opened for business in 1888 London was the world’s preeminent financial centre. It had the most international banks, the largest capital markets, and the deepest money and gold markets. It backed projects all over the world, and most of world trade was financed by bills drawn on London. Supporting the critical mass of banks, insurers and investors was an army of solicitors, accountants and clerks.1 What London had lacked, at least until the FT’s great rival Financial News was founded in 1884, was a ready provider of financial news. The FT famously set out to report “Without Fear and Without Favour”, and declared itself to be the friend of the honest financier, the respectable broker and the legitimate speculator; and the enemy of the closed stock exchange, the unprincipled promoter and the gambling operator. Perhaps as a consequence, its initial circulation was modest. The preoccupations of 1888 were not very different than today. Editions of the FT 125 years ago contained stories on economic development in China, the health of Spanish government finances, and the state of Irish banks.
Esteemed Guests, GDP data for the fourth-quarter of 2010 have been in line with the outlook presented in the January Inflation Report. The third-quarter slowdown turned out to be temporary as expected and economic activity expanded at a remarkable pace in the last quarter. Domestic demand became the main determinant of growth in the said period (Chart 10). Thus, the post-crisis divergence between domestic and external demand growth became more pronounced in this period, confirming the adoption of the new policy mix (Chart 11). Chart 10. Contributions Components  Chart 11. to  GDP  Growth  by  Demand  Exports and Imports of Goods and Services (Seasonally Adjusted, 1998 Prices, Billion TL)  (Percentage Points)  Source: TurkStat. * Estimate. Source: TurkStat, CBRT. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In line with the robust course of economic activity, non-farm employment also maintained its upward trend; while unemployment rates displayed a notable decline (Chart 12). Leading indicators signal an ongoing recovery in employment conditions. Chart 12. Unemployment Rates (Seasonally Adjusted, Percent)  * As of January. Source: TurkStat, CBRT. Data for the first quarter of 2011 indicate that economic activity, driven by domestic demand, is more robust than expected. Accordingly, our revised forecasts are based on the assumption that aggregate demand conditions would provide less support for disinflation compared to the previous period.

However, taking into account the stronger-than-expected effects of the monetary tightening implemented in the first quarter, the output gap is expected to close at a slower pace compared to the previous period. In sum, due to developments beyond the monetary policy control such as the significant surge in oil and other imports prices as well as the renewed tariffs, we have revised our inflation expectations upwards (Chart 17). In addition, I would like to remind you that we will not respond to first round effects of rising oil and other commodity prices, but second round effects will be closely monitored and deterioration in the pricing behavior will not be tolerated. It should be emphasized that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in the monetary policy stance. Therefore, assumptions regarding the monetary policy outlook underlying our inflation forecasts should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBRT. 3. Risks and monetary policy  In the last part of my speech, I would like to mention risks regarding inflation outlook in the upcoming period and prospective monetary policy strategies to be implemented should these risks materialize. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  We envision that the impact of the ongoing monetary tightening on loans and domestic demand will be more apparent starting from the second quarter. However, the extent and the timing of the impact may vary depending on developments beyond the control of monetary policy.
Philipp Hildebrand: The challenge of sovereign wealth funds Speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva, 18 December 2007. I would like to thank Signe Krogstrup for her valuable support in drafting this speech. I also want to thank Rita Kobel, Urs W. Birchler, Daniel Heller and Bertrand Rime for helpful comments and discussions. * 1. *  *  Introduction  I am very pleased to be in Geneva. The International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB) provides a wonderful platform to discuss a wide range of economic and monetary policy challenges. On behalf of my ICMB Foundation Board colleagues, I would like to thank Charles Wyplosz for his successful and long-standing stewardship of the ICMB. Tonight, I want to talk about Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). Broadly defined, SWFs are government-owned investment corporations. For the most part, they invest their funds in foreign currency assets. SWFs are usually managed separately from central bank reserves. Unlike other publicly owned pools of capital, such as social security funds or public pension funds, SWFs have no explicit liabilities. As you can see in slide 1, the estimated assets currently managed by SWFs exceed the combined pool of assets managed by hedge funds and private equity firms. Total assets held by SWFs remain small, however, in comparison to the combined assets managed by pension funds and mutual funds worldwide.

As you know, the GIC recently committed to subscribe to CHF 11 billion of a mandatory convertible bond which will be issued by UBS in an effort to raise capital in the aftermath of losses on large sub-prime mortgage positions. Subject to the UBS shareholders’ approval, the GIC will in due time become a significant shareholder in UBS. In the process, UBS will significantly strengthen its balance sheet and thereby maintain a substantial capital cushion relative to the regulatory minimum. A strengthened capital cushion is to be welcomed. First and foremost, it serves as a confidence-building measure. Moreover, in uncertain times, a solid capital cushion provides insurance against a further potential deterioration in the global macroeconomic environment. Who is this new Asian investor in the largest Swiss bank? The GIC was set up in May 1981 with an original seed capital of several billion dollars from the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). 28 The central bank reserves had grown steadily throughout the 1970s as a result of public sector surpluses. The GIC’s objective was to invest the portion of foreign reserves, which was surplus to the needs of the central bank for its monetary policy management, in longer-term assets. The mandate of the GIC is to preserve at a minimum the international purchasing power of its assets against inflation and global exchange rate risk. The objective of the GIC is commercial, focusing on long-term investment returns. In many ways, it is similar to the objectives of the large European public pension funds.
This is very much the theme of my speech here at the Swedish Economics Association – weighing the effects of monetary policy today against the effects tomorrow and what challenges this creates. But I thought I’d start by discussing the downward trend in global interest rates and what this means for monetary policy, as it is important to realise that the problems we are grappling with in Sweden are very much influenced, and shared, by the world around us. 3 [23]  Downward trend in global interest rates The financial crisis that broke out in the autumn of 2008 was preceded by a seemingly calm and stable period of low inflation and good economic growth. The period is normally referred to as The Great Moderation. This positive development can be attributed to a number of factors. Ever-faster globalisation led to greater movement of goods, services, labour and capital among countries. This, in combination with various deregulations increased competition on labour and goods markets, contributing to higher economic growth. Increasingly independent central banks focused on achieving low and stable inflation are also considered to have contributed to the positive development. In retrospect, we can now see that major financial imbalances had built up in what appeared to be a stable macroeconomic environment. Central bank monetary policy had successfully stabilised inflation. But this did not prevent the break-out of the more serious economic crisis since the 1930s.

The financial education course was not detected, however, to have any significant impact on pupils’ decision to have a bank account or card, or on the amount of money they report they save weekly. The financial education course did significantly raise the proportion of pupils who talk to their parents about economic matters. After having followed the course, the percentage of pupils doing a job at home to obtain income also increased, which suggests that financial education may lead to greater pupil involvement in their household’s financial matters. A change in pupils’ attitudes was detected regarding their temporary consumption preferences six months after the financial education course, with their “patience” increasing when it came to hypothetical money choices. This observed result did not disappear in an exercise performed three months afterwards, in which it was  8  An initial pilot programme was carried out in 2010-2011. Bover, O., L. Hospido and E. Villanueva (2018): "The Impact of High School Financial Education on Financial Knowledge and Choices: Evidence from a Randomized Trial in Spain", Banco de España WP 1801. 9  7/8  proposed to students that they distribute their present and future consumption with real payments.10 These results point to the pertinence of monitoring over time the pupils evaluated, with the aim of analysing the effects of financial education in the long term. This is in light of the potential significance of consumer attitudes in financial decision-making throughout the life-cycle of individuals.
It is therefore not surprising to see that our Fintech Supervisory Sandbox and Chatroom have seen high levels of demand for early supervisory engagement on potential use cases. 7. Second, public–private partnerships between law enforcement agencies, regulators and financial institutions exhibited a remarkable growth in the last three years, including in Hong Kong. That brought about clear improvements to our ability to identify and disrupt financial crime. Let me give you some idea of the results that the partnership in Hong Kong is capable of delivering. Since its launch in 2017, actions taken by banks through the Fraud and Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (FMLIT) have led to $ million being restrained or confiscated – that is the proceeds of financial crime, investment scams, fraud 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  and other serious crimes. 8. And thirdly, there has been an increasing cultural change in the banks that we supervise – a move away from an overarching desire to simply “tick the boxes”. AML work is now increasingly viewed as more of a multi-dimensional activity, to which the understanding of risks – both current and future – is central and fundamental. There is a much broader acceptance that it is this understanding of the risks which then determines which tools to use, and which tools to develop for possible future use, in order to tackle new and emerging threats.

People must realise that the Central Bank exerts a limited long term impact on the exchange rate. The exchange rate depends on various economic factors, including foreign trade, foreign investment in Iceland and investment by Icelanders abroad, and last but not least expectations about future economic developments. For example, there is little doubt that expectations in connection with power-intensive industry have already influenced the exchange rate of the króna, which at present is stronger than if decisions on large-scale investment in aluminium production had not been announced. Interest rates certainly affect the exchange rate, but experience in Iceland and elsewhere shows that in the long run this impact tends to fade out if monetary policy aims for rate of inflation close to the prevailing rate among trading partner countries. Likewise, the Central Bank's foreign exchange market intervention tends to have only a short-lived effect. If the exchange rate is moving with a strong momentum in a certain direction, no central bank can resist this for long. This is a common experience of all countries that have liberalized international capital movements, which was also shared by the Central Bank of Iceland when it tried to stem the depreciation of the króna from mid 2000 until autumn 2001. Recent calls for the Central Bank to set an exchange rate target are unrealistic.