samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In conclusion, in an environment where the resource utilization has yet not reached pre-crisis levels and no demand pressure is observed, we anticipate that core inflation indicators will remain consistent with medium-term targets and economic recovery will be slow and protracted. 2. Turkey’s long-term growth performance and potential growth rate  In the second part of my speech, I would like to share with you my views on the necessary reforms for the establishment of strong and sustainable growth in Turkey as well as those to increase its long-term potential growth rate. The growth rate of a country is determined by three factors. These factors can be summarized as: (1)  Capital deepening  (2)  Employment growth and  (3)  Total factor productivity  When we look at the last fifty years in the Turkish economy, we see that Turkey’s average growth rate has been around 4.5 percent. A study carried by staff members of the Central Bank of Turkey, Dr. Seref SAYGILI and Dr. Cengiz CĐHAN, suggests that capital deepening has a large share, as much as 75 percent, in this growth rate. According to the same study, the contribution of employment growth and the increase in productivity remained very limited, at 20 percent and 5 percent, respectively. There is no doubt that capital accumulation plays a leading role in the development of an emerging economy, as expected. Other country cases also present a similar outlook.

There are now 14 Asian economies at investment grades, of which, nine are at or above the single A rating. At the same time, the supply side factors are also highly favourable. The huge financing needs of Asia will support a continuous expansion in bond issuance. According to the Asian Development Bank, Asia’ s infrastructure financing needs alone amounted to USD 8 trillion from 2010 to 2020. Equally important is the emergence of new and attractive bond asset classes. The two products that have caught most attention of global investors are the sukuks in Malaysia and the RMB dim sum bonds in Hong Kong. This is rightly so as these products connect the global market with the vast and increasingly prominent financial systems in the Islamic world and China. We have seen very encouraging development of the sukuk market in Malaysia, the symbol of Islamic financing. The amount of outstanding sukuks in Malaysia increased substantially from MYR 146 billion (USD 41.3 billion equivalent) at the end of 2006 to MYR 361 billion (USD 113.9 billion equivalent) at the end of 2011. Meanwhile, the growth of the RMB debt securities market has been phenomenal. In a short space of 5 years, the annual issuance amount lodged with the Central Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) in Hong Kong increased by 16 times from a modest amount of RMB 10 billion (USD 1.4 billion equivalent) in 2007 to RMB 172 billion (USD 27.3 billion equivalent) in 2011.
In some jurisdictions, national supervisors will conduct additional field tests to determine whether the new rules deliver the levels of capital we expect. Similarly, in all jurisdictions, there will be a period of time during which banks will calculate their capital requirements in parallel under the 1988 Accord and under Basel II. National field tests and the period of “parallel running” of the new framework will serve as some of the final reality checks for Basel II prior to its implementation. We recognise that these tests and reviews will demand resources and substantial efforts from both banks and supervisors. Yet I must emphasise that neither banks nor supervisors will be able to evaluate the calibration of the new framework - and hence its effectiveness - if banks do not participate fully and seriously in the national field tests or in the periods of parallel running. I urge you to devote your best efforts and resources to these undertakings. Only you can provide the data that all of us will need to ensure that Basel II functions as we intend. b)  Monitor ongoing advances and clarify and provide guidance for selected rules  A second area where supervisors are active is in monitoring ongoing advances in risk management while clarifying and providing supplemental guidance for some of the rules. Like the development of the framework itself, this work will require a great deal of communication and co-operation between banks and supervisors.

c)  Home-host co-operation  A third area of focus for supervisors that I would like to highlight concerns our efforts to promote a more consistent application of the new framework across jurisdictions. Certainly one of the goals for any international framework is to foster a more level playing field for internationally active competitors. The Basel Committee wishes to ensure that competition between internationally active banks is driven by each bank’s individual strengths, rather than by differences in each country’s rules. I know that banks are deeply interested in this topic as well. Representatives from many internationally active banks have impressed on me their concern that supervisors must work to avoid large differences in the adoption of Basel II and, more specifically, in the use of advanced approaches across jurisdictions. While we in the Committee share this concern, we have to be pragmatic; I believe that all of us need to stop to make a quick reality check of this matter as well. Basel II is intended to promote a more level playing field for internationally active banks. Yet Basel II cannot and should not be expected to create perfect harmonisation across all jurisdictions. Differences in legal systems, market practices, and business environments in each country make it an extremely difficult task - and, indeed, an impossible one - to level all distinctions across all borders.
Such is our aim in Hong Kong. But this does not mean throwing money into each and every idea which comes along - there’s no point in constructing highways if no-one wants to drive down them. There must be a reasonable business case. On the other hand, no venture no gain. The opening up of a footpath may lead to the emergence of heavy traffic. Thus we have been selective in the initiatives which we support and, although not every project may have been an unqualified success, examples such as our HKD RTGS system which we pioneered in the mid-90s; the CMU which provides such an excellent settlement and custody service for debt securities and which is being linked up with a growing number of overseas counterparties; and the relatively recent USD clearing system; all of these present a strong track record. We are here today to mark another milestone in this infrastructural development - in the field of clearing and payments. Our USD clearing system, introduced in 2000, has demonstrated that a niche exists for services of this type in this part of the world. USD RTGS turnover has grown to about 3,000 transactions a day with a value of some $ billion; and over 1,000 USD cheques are being processed daily. Enquiries and discussions with banks suggested to us that there was also a business case for a roughly parallel service in euro.

Bloomberg, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Debt Management Office, London Stock Exchange, Merrill Lynch, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations  Chart 3: Bank lending to households and nonfinancial companies in the UK  Chart 4: Major UK banks’ leverage ratio  Percentage of GDP 100 90 80 Households  70 60 50 40 30 20 10  Non-financial companies  0 70  74  78  82  86  90  94  98  02  06  Sources: Bank of England, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations. 6  Sources: Published accounts and Bank calculations  BIS Review 132/2008  Chart 5: Major UK banks’ customer funding gap, household saving ratio and foreign interbank deposits  Chart 6: Major UK banks’ and LCFIs’ credit default swap premia  Major UK banks US commercial banks  (c)  US securities houses European LCFIs  Jul. Sep. Nov. Jan. Mar. May. Jul. 2007  Basis points 700 650 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Sep.  08  Sources: Bank of England, Dealogic, ONS, published accounts and Bank calculations. Sources: Markit Group Limited , Thomson Datastream, published accounts and Bank calculations.
1  Nonetheless, the buoyancy of activity has not yet been accompanied by a sustained increase in the inflation rate. Once the more volatile components such as energy and fresh food prices are stripped out, core inflation remains, as it has done for several years now, at low levels of around 1%. Many factors are behind this behaviour of prices, some of which are external in nature, such as globalisation, changes in oil and commodities prices, and technological progress, which have exerted very durable effects on prices. But to date, moreover, there has been very contained wage growth in the euro area as a whole, which is in contrast to the clear improvement in employment. Low productivity, the weight of past inflation on wage-setting processes and the presence – still – of some slack in the area’s labour markets, as reflected by high long-term unemployment and the presence of a notable volume of involuntary part-time employment, hamper, in my opinion, higher growth in wage income. The recovery of the Spanish economy I shall now move on to the essential features of the Spanish economy’s recovery and to the outlook for the continuation of the upturn. The current recovery is proving most intense. GDP grew in 2017 by 3.1%, the third consecutive year of growth above 3%. The strength of growth, which has throughout the expansionary phase outpaced that observed in the euro area as a whole, enabled Spanish GDP to resume its pre-crisis level by mid-2017.

The euro area-wide unemployment rate has fallen to 8.7%, compared with levels close to 13% at the height of the crisis, although there are substantial cross-country differences, ranging from an unemployment rate below 4% in Germany to 20% in Greece and 16.5% in Spain. Moreover, a balanced pattern of economic growth can be seen. Adding more recently to the momentum of private consumption, the sole engine of growth of the start of the recovery, has been the dynamism of business investment. Low financing costs, the sound performance of final demand and high capacity utilisation are enabling investment to pick up to pre-crisis levels. However, factors persist that might restrict medium-term investment projects, including most notably low potential growth expectations, the adjustment of balance sheets and the correction of high corporate debt levels still under way, and the problems that are creating political uncertainty. Euro area exports, boosted by more buoyant global trade, are also contributing to the momentum of activity. And this despite the notable appreciation of the euro since last spring. Undoubtedly, a significant factor underpinning the recovery has been the maintenance of an expansionary monetary policy, which has allowed financing conditions to be relaxed, contributing to the upholding of both private consumption and the recovery in investment. Specifically, estimates by the Banco de España suggest that the series of monetary policy measures adopted since mid-2014 might account for close to half of the nominal GDP growth in the euro area from 2015 to 2017.
and Manzano, C., “Trade disclosure and price dispersion”, Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 8, No 2. pp. 183–216. 8  See Goldstein, M., Hotchkiss, E. and Sirri, E., “Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate Bonds”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 20, No 2, pp. 235-273, and Edwards A., Harris, L. and Piwowar, M., “Corporate Bond Market Transaction Costs and Transparency”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, No 3, pp. 1421–1451. 9  See Naik, N., Neuberger, A. and Viswanathan, S., “Trade Disclosure Regulation in Markets with Negotiated Trades”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 12, No 4, pp. 873–900. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

While risk-based divestments concern companies that we prefer not to invest in, there are other companies that we want more of. These are companies that, in our opinion, provide opportunities for solid returns in the longer term. In the mandate, the Ministry of Finance has also set a requirement for the Bank to establish separate environment-related investment mandates. At the end of 2019, these mandates amounted to NOK 79 billion invested in 77 companies and bonds. In 2019, the Ministry also decided to permit unlisted investments in renewable energy infrastructure. NBIM has a group in place that has begun to seek out opportunities in this sector. We set the same risk and return requirements for the investments under these mandates as for the rest of the fund’s investments. Everything we do in the area of ownership is, and must be, a result of an active approach. In our active management, we seek at all times to make the most of analyses we have performed and the knowledge we have acquired over the past 20 years. Our internal asset managers closely follow the largest European companies in particular. Knowing the companies well puts the fund in position where it is possible to earn excess returns. External management In emerging markets, we benefit greatly from our use of external asset managers. Knowledge of and proximity to markets are essential for being able to assess the risk of investments. In view of challenges associated with responsible investment, a passive investment strategy is not really appropriate in these markets.
(I'm delighted to note, however, that manufacturing output picked up modestly in February - the first monthly increased since August.) For what it's worth, we were not alone in experiencing the earlier decline. Comparable figures show that manufacturing output fell by over 11% in Japan, and by close to 5% in both the US and Germany, while manufacturing employment fell by 6½% in Japan and 7½% in the US - that's to say by more than in this country although it fell by less than 2% in Germany. The frustrating thing is that, with the best will in the world, there was not much that either we at the Bank, or the UK Government, could have done to ward off the pressures on UK manufacturing, which had their origins abroad. That's fairly obvious where we are talking about the global slowdown - with negative overall growth last year of about 2% in Japan (fourth quarter on a year earlier) and close to zero growth in the US and Germany. This compared with growth of just over 1½% in this country - by some margin the highest in G7. We can go to international meetings and encourage the respective authorities there to stimulate their economies, but there is nothing that we can do about it directly ourselves. What we were able to do - given that inflation was marginally below target - was to try to compensate for that external weakness by stimulating domestic demand here in the UK.

The problem - for businesses trading or competing with firms in the eurozone, our largest trading partner, was the persistent and puzzling weakness of the euro. Now many people think that we could have caused the pound to fall against the euro simply by cutting our interest rate somewhat further relative to the interest rate in the eurozone. 4  BIS Review 23/2002  But it really isn't as simple as that. The US has reduced its interest rate far more aggressively than the ECB over the past year or so, and to well below the ECB's rate (to 1.75% as against 3.25%) but the dollar is actually stronger today against the euro than it was at the start of last year. And the same is true, though to a lesser degree of ourselves: UK interest rates were reduced by 2% from the beginning of 2001 compared with a fall of 1½% in the eurozone, yet sterling is stronger against the euro (though weaker against the dollar) than it was to begin with. I don't think I can offer you a wholly convincing explanation for the euro's weakness since its introduction. It seems to have been driven by capital flows reflecting expected medium- and longerterm future corporate earnings growth rather than short-term interest rate differentials, and it is often suggested that these expectations reflect perceived supply-side rigidities within the eurozone.
After all, information is a  2  BIS Review 2/2008  public good and rating agencies are the providers of this good. But the case for further regulation has not as yet been compelling. First and foremost, we should consider the contents of possible improvements. I would pinpoint three areas, among others, for consideration: first, greater transparency of rating methods and the overall role of rating agencies in the securitisation process. Second, a marked difference in the metric used for rating bonds and structured products, which would restore confidence in ratings. This could be done in two ways, which could also be combined: either by adopting another rating scale for structured products (with another symbol for example); or by including an additional measure in the credit rating, in particular on its volatility in times of market or liquidity stress. Third, a specific rating for liquidity risk. I am aware that rating agencies are considering this, despite the difficulties of such an exercise. We must hope that the discussions currently underway in international fora, such as the FSF and groups of central bankers in which the Banque de France is actively involved, will restore the integrity of the ratings system, given its prominent role in the development of modern financial markets. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 2/2008  3

On the one hand, the central bank’s legitimacy among the general public could suffer if short-term interest rates have to move sharply, causing output to fluctuate widely while inflation is held stable and exactly on the target. Maximum stability in output could, on the other hand, result in sharp fluctuations in the rate of inflation and erode the credibility of the monetary regime. A point somewhere midway between the two extremes must therefore be found. Let me also stress the importance of central bank independence. In order to be successful with the implementation of an inflation target approach, the central bank must be able to act independently of day-to-day party politics and to set interest rates continuously according to the specified inflation target. Otherwise a credibility problem arises because it will be hard for policymakers to convince the general public of monetary policy’s long-term nature. Lack of credibility, in turn, means that the central bank has to set its interest rates higher than otherwise would have been the case. Looking ahead, I believe there are at least two major questions that central banks have to address more thoroughly. First, how should monetary policy react to asset prices, such as equity and/or real estate prices? We know from history that the development of asset prices can have a significant impact on both inflation and real economic activity.
FMC members became the bridge between the regulator and the industry at large in the implementation of the many initiatives that have seen us through to this day. I see quite a few of the FMC members tonight and I understand that many have continued to contribute and help Bank Negara Malaysia further shape the development of our financial markets. Thank you to all, and especially to Dato’ Lee Kok Kwan for previously leading FMAM to become the success it is today. The fact is, three years on, we have not only weathered the volatility and challenges then. The financial markets have actually moved from strength to strength. Amidst heightened global volatility, not to mention the many domestic political upheavals and uncertainty of the recent years, it is a wonder that the Malaysian financial market has continued to grow consistently. The onshore foreign exchange market has expanded from an average daily trading volume of USD8.1 billion in 2016 to USD 12.3 billion today. This is mirrored by the growth of the ringgit bond market which stood at RM1.2 trillion in 2016 to reach RM1.5 trillion now. Despite our markets growing larger, stability has been a key feature as witnessed by a moderate level of volatility in the onshore markets. The 1-month USDMYR implied volatility hovers around 3 to 4 percent compared to a high of 12 percent in 2016, supported by a much less disconcerting level of nonresident holdings of government bonds at 22% compared to 34% back then.

We refer to this as the lack of a macroprudential perspective. 3 In general, we have not taken enough account of systemic risks; that is risk that can spread throughout the financial system. In a capital adequacy context, the lack of a macroprudential perspective is reflected in the fact that the banks have calculated their capital adequacy requirements on the basis of the risks to their own operations. They have thus ignored the negative external effects that banks may have on the system as a whole. This has led to a banking system with too high a level of risk and too small buffers in terms of capital and liquidity. It has also led to the risk of distorted market prices for risk, capital and liquidity. Another example is that the models that the banks have used to calculate their capital requirements for market risks systematically underestimate the risk of losses under stressed market conditions. As a result, the calculated capital adequacy requirements have been too low to enable the institutions concerned to manage the losses that occur in serious economic downturns, like the one we have just experienced. A third and closely-related example is that the banks have not held sufficient capital for the counterparty risks that they are exposed to in their derivatives trading. As financial assets, including derivatives, are accounted in accordance with the real value principle, changes in counterparty risks enter the banks’ balance sheets via their income statements.