samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Sixth, the labour market will undergo a major adjustment. Jobs will be lost in traditional carbon-intensive sectors but new jobs will be created in carbon-neutral industries. It is estimated that about 200 million jobs would be created and 185 million lost globally by 2050 from a net-zero transition. There will be a period of net job losses during the transition: foundry workers will not instantaneously be transformed into building-insulation experts. Worker reskilling and redeployment will thus be crucial. Identifying skills adjacencies will be a key part of worker retraining programmes. In Singapore, a comprehensive strategy to green the economy is taking shape, with a focus on boosting energy and resource efficiency and creating good jobs. 6/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  In the petrochemical industry, all the major players have committed to reach net zero by 2050 and government agencies, industry players, and research institutes are developing capabilities in carbon capture and storage technologies. In the maritime industry, investments are being made to help our port terminals become net zero by 2050 and support the provision of low and zero carbon marine fuels such as ammonia, hydrogen, and biofuels. In road transport, Singapore aims to do away with the internal combustion engine and switch to electric vehicles by 2040. Singapore enjoys a trust premium; many emerging green services, like the trading of carbon credits and monitoring, reporting, and verifying carbon emissions, are built on trust. TRANSITION FINANCE The fourth enabler for the path to net zero is transition finance.

At this time, it may not be possible to move towards this system as there is not enough political support and many operational hurdles remain to be overcome. Nevertheless, it is important for the IMF to continue its work on how to broaden the use of SDR in all aspects of an international currency (i.e. store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account). Ladies and Gentlemen, 10. In closing, I would like to stress that the international monetary system is certainly in a period of transition. I do not expect a big bang, but a long and gradual process arising from macroeconomic and structural adjustments. Policy dialogue and cooperation between current and prospective reserve-issuing countries will play an important role in ensuring this smooth transition. As there are so many uncertainties along the way, it would take great leadership from some advanced and major emerging market economies to move the world forward towards a more stable international monetary system. Thank you  1  The Triffin dilemma is the conflict between domestic and international objectives of reserve issuing country. This is due to its duty to supply the world with extra currency, which may cause a loss of confidence in its currency. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The phrase is included in the article "the Speech during the Shanghai visit" in the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 3. ("视察上海的谈话"，《邓小平文选》第三卷)  2  BIS Review 98/2006  (now equivalent to over 40% of GDP) into the hands of those who need funding to finance consumption, investment and other economic activities. Currently, domestic savings on the Mainland are mostly trapped in the banking system earning fairly low rates of interest and as a result sustaining or even increasing a savings rate that is already far too high. There is a serious lack of diversity in investment opportunities. The ability of the banking system to allocate funds in accordance with the credit-worthiness of the borrower, although improving, is still not quite efficient in view of the relatively low degree of market orientation in credit allocation. Thus, the overall effectiveness of the financial system on the Mainland in the important task of financial intermediation is not high. There is, of course, room – and there are concrete plans – for improvement. But meanwhile the financial intermediation needs are there and have to be satisfied. This is where, quite clearly, the other financial system of the country can come in. As reform and liberalisation of the financial system on the Mainland continue, allowing the greater play of market forces, there is a need to conduct experiments in specific areas of activity in finance, including currency convertibility. The free market environment of Hong Kong provides the ideal laboratory for conducting such experiments.

More broadly, the developed financial markets, including derivatives for managing interest-rate and exchange-rate risks, a critical mass of financial institutions and a large investor base, support the growth of the debt market. This brief comparison will, I hope, bring out quite clearly the size, sophistication and efficiency of Hong Kong’s financial system in the context of the country as a whole. It should also give some indication of the actual and potential utility of the financial system of Hong Kong to the country, in contributing to sustainable economic growth and development on the Mainland. It was also Deng Xiaoping who coined another memorable phrase. He said that: "finance is very important; it is the nucleus of a modern economy" 3 . Indeed, the future path of the economy of China depends crucially on how matters concerning money and finance, currency and exchange are organised. To sustain the current rapid pace of economic growth and development, what China needs now is an effective mechanism for financial intermediation for the Mainland – a mechanism to mobilise the huge amount of savings  2  The responsibilities of the Monetary Authority are laid down in the exchange of letters between the Financial Secretary and the Monetary Authority on 25 June 2003. The letters can be found on the HKMA website. (http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/2003/attach/20030627e3a1.pdf). 3  The phrase was used by Deng Xiaoping during a visit to Shanghai in the spring of 1991, when the central government decided to develop Pudong into a modern financial centre.
A similar 6/18  conclusion is drawn from the Labour Force Survey data for 2019 Q3 published last week, which also imply a moderation in the rate of generation of employment, to 1.8% year-onyear, down 0.6 pp from Q2 and 1.4 pp lower than at the end of 2018. Moreover, the magnitude of the fall in the rate of unemployment in Q3 – to 13.9% of the labour force – was more modest than has been typical since the start of the recovery. Against this background, the latest macroeconomic projections of the Banco de España, published on 24 September, foresee a moderation in the Spanish economy’s growth rate over the next two years, in response to the loss of momentum of domestic demand, which has already begun to be observed, in the latest period, and which has affected both private consumption and private investment. As I have mentioned already, this behaviour appears to have been fundamentally influenced by the deterioration in the external environment, as well as by the uncertainty regarding the future outlook. In any event, under the baseline scenario, which assumes that export markets will gradually recover (following their recent weakness) and that budgetary policy will acquire a neutral stance over the projection horizon, the accommodative stance of monetary policy and the improvement in the financial position of firms and households over the last few years, should allow the economy to continue to grow at slightly above its potential rate (which according to our estimates is somewhat less than 1.5%).

Conclusion To sum up, in the last few quarters we have witnessed a deceleration of the global economy, particularly sharp in the euro area and affecting also the Spanish economy. As a result, the macroeconomic projections have been revised downward in most countries, including Spain, and the diagnosis as to the balance of risks also remains on the downside, mainly as a result of the geopolitical uncertainty over developments in trade tensions and Brexit and, in the case of Spain, over the future course of economic policies. Against this background, the Spanish economy, despite the improvements achieved during the recovery, continues to face significant imbalances, including most notably the high unemployment, government debt and external debt. In addition, Spain’s capacity for future growth is constrained by its very weak productivity dynamics and the foreseeable impact of population ageing. 15  See D. Acemoglu and D. Autor (2011), “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings”, Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, pp. 1043-1171. 17/18  Given this setting, the government resulting from the coming elections must urgently take the initiative and marshal sufficient support to push through reforms to resolve the vulnerabilities still persisting in the Spanish economy and enhance its growth capacity. It is, therefore, time to put our headlights on high beam and forge a broad consensus to protect the well-being of the coming generations. Thank you. 18/18
Twice in the past 40 years we have succumbed to the temptation of living above our means. The first time was in the late 1970s, when the Norwegian state borrowed substantial amounts abroad. Our current account deficit in 1977, at 15 per cent of GDP, set an OECD record and we were probably on the brink of having to ask for an IMF program. We were investing heavily in the welfare state and in North Sea projects at the same time, and these investments could not be fully financed on the basis of economic growth. The second time was during the years of economic crisis before and around 1990, when levels of domestic spending, private and public, far exceeded our economic limits. It was not until 30 years after oil had been discovered off our shores that Norway was in a position to put some money aside. We are nonetheless frequently reminded that petroleum production has reached a plateau and will begin to decline in a few years’ time. Our welfare system, including old-age pensions, is basically financed by current income. It is not fundbased, as pensions are in a number of other countries. Even though it is likely that the Pension Fund will grow considerably in the years ahead, estimates show that the capital in the Fund will only cover some 60 per cent of public pension expenditure in the future. It cannot therefore be argued that the government’s savings are large relative to its obligations.

The country possesses all the necessary attributes for sustainable economic growth and development. Competitive production costs, incentives, and reforms have also enhanced the attractive investment climate for both local and foreign investors. Numerous investment opportunities exist in the agriculture, manufacturing, tourism and mining sectors across various regions of the country. Almost all provinces in Zambia remain potential areas of investment whose resources remain largely untapped. Its active participation in the SADC Trade protocol and the COMESA/FTA offers preferential tariff access to a market of nearly 380 million people. A key challenge in developing this economic potential and enhancing the wealth creation capability of Zambians to drive growth and development is the ability to access long term investment capital especially for economically viable projects at start-up level. Financial institutions are critical in this process of mobilising and channeling these investment resources. To do so successfully, the industry must identify the constraints to the provision of finance and credit and provide innovative solutions to address them. Such innovations may include venture capital funds, structured finance products, equity and other innovations that allow a more efficient management of risks during the initial stages of the business cycle. On its part, the Bank of Zambia needs to ensure that there is sustainable stable macroeconomic environment first. But we also need to have a good understanding of the financial innovations that may be needed to attract and disburse investment capital.
Given the nature of these processes, we estimate that annual inflation will pass its peak in February—March, after which it will be going down incrementally. This will become possible as the impact of the above proinflationary factors is gradually exhausted. Beginning from March, the statistical base effect will also play a significant role in the decrease in annual inflation. Taking into account the monetary policy pursued, we forecast that prices will grow by 3.7%—4.2% over the year. The third factor we were taking into account when making our today’s decision is that monetary conditions remain accommodative. While nominal interest rates on loans and deposits changed only slightly, real price conditions were eased. Banks also continued to ease non-price lending conditions in a range of segments. Yields on federal government bonds increased somewhat amid the growth of long-term interest rates in global financial markets. Owing to the monetary policy pursued and the Government’s anti-crisis support measures, the increase in the banking system’s claims on companies accelerated to 10.2% last year, which is more than in 2019. The growth rate of claims on households equalled 12.9%. The economy and borrowers obtained the funds they needed to more smoothly overcome the acute phase of the crisis and resume development. In 2021, monetary conditions will remain accommodative, further promoting lending expansion, despite the expected gradual termination of preferential programmes.

The banking system’s claims on companies are forecast to increase by 7–11% this year, and those on households — by 14–18%, largely as a result of the accelerated expansion of mortgage lending. As regards fluctuations in banking sector liquidity observed in recent months, they had no impact on monetary conditions. As before, the Bank of Russia preserved money market rates close to the key rate. This became possible owing to the streamlined operational procedure which is efficient amid both a deficit and a surplus of liquidity. Today, we have published the Bank of Russia’s updated baseline forecast. It relies on the following assumptions: First of all, external conditions have become more promising. The global economy is expected to grow faster owing to mass vaccination and additional fiscal stimuli in advanced economies. This will strengthen external demand for Russian exports. Therefore, we have increased our forecast of oil prices from 45 to 50 US dollars per barrel for 2021 and 2022. Nonetheless, our forecast remains conservative given the high uncertainty about a potential further spread of the pandemic. According to our estimates, a faster recovery of the demand for oil may translate to a greater extent into a rise in oil output rather than oil prices. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  As regards the 2022–2023 horizon, our forecast remains unchanged. The economy will expand by 2.5–3.5% in 2022 and by 2–3% in 2023.
Changes in the international division of labour We are now again in a period of considerable changes in the international division of labour. Global trade is again growing at a markedly faster pace than production, thanks to technological advances and a sharp reduction in the costs associated with trade in goods, services and information. Trade barriers have been removed. In the early post-war years, tariff barriers between a few industrialised countries were dismantled. The later rounds in GATT, now the WTO, embraced both a far broader agenda and a greater number of countries. Today, almost all countries participate as members or observers and the issues are far-ranging. In addition to dismantling tariff barriers, antidumping measures have been introduced, subsidies have been removed and agreements have been entered into for textiles and agricultural products. In the current round, issues related to health, the environment and development are also being discussed. Political changes have amplified this tendency. At the beginning of the 1990s, China changed course and is now a member of the WTO. Its share of total exports is growing rapidly. India is at the startingline. These countries have large labour forces that offer their services at very low wages, and these labour resources are available to companies that compete on world markets. The working-age population in rural China is nearly the same as that of the entire OECD area. Many are underemployed and are seeking work in urban areas. Low labour costs and more efficient transport and communication attract labour-intensive production.

Svein Gjedrem: Economic perspectives Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the meeting of the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank, Oslo, 16 February 2006. The Charts in pdf-format  can also be found on the website of the Norges Bank. *  *  *  1. Introduction On the way into this building, we pass a statue of the nineteenth century Norwegian actor Johannes Brun. He performed at Christiania Theatre, which once stood in the square in front of the main entrance. Brun was an acquaintance of Henrik Ibsen, who also worked at the same theatre for a period – part-time as dramatic consultant – when the theatre he had been directing closed. This was a difficult time for our great dramatist, both personally and financially. He was struggling to overcome writer’s block and the public’s preference for the mediocre and the trivial. 1 Nineteenth-century Christiania (now Oslo) was described as “O great and little city! What a cold and surly sky broods over you!”. 2 A bleak time for Ibsen, perhaps. But the Norwegian economy was not faring all that badly. The economic expansion that had begun in the 1820s gathered momentum from the middle of the century. The British navigation acts were repealed in 1849 and the Norwegian fleet was permitted to transport other countries’ goods to and from England. Norway had suddenly become a major exporter of services. The tonnage of the Norwegian commercial fleet increased almost six-fold from 1850 to 1880. 2.
One striking example is the pharmaceutical industry, where very innovative, but also potentially dangerous, products are put on the market with (almost) no accident. The reason, of course, is that those products themselves are subject to strict, and costly, testing and approbation procedures. This cannot be transposed to the financial industry, where innovation takes place under a different regime (with no protection for intellectual property). Nevertheless, some product control or standardization may contribute to reducing extreme risk. For instance, those countries where loan to value ratios were strictly enforced tend to experience less credit accidents than others. Those trade-offs may not be stable in time. For that reason, it is important that regulation and supervision become more responsive to changes in circumstances and the macro economic environment. This is the essence of the so called "macro prudential" approach to financial supervision. Implementing such an approach may prove very challenging. Early detection of incipient disequilibrium inside the financial system is conceptually difficult: no crisis looks like the previous one and the search for "early warning" indicators has not yielded fully convincing results. There is also an institutional challenge in bringing together different authorities with different mandates and approaches to financial stability. In the words of C. Borio "there is still considerable reluctance to calibrate prudential instruments more systematically from a macro prudential perspective".

If there are such gains to be made from a common currency in a reunified Europe, would it not be possible that such gains may also be attained on a global level? Should we continue on a path towards more global monetary cooperation? There are many arguments both for and against such an arrangement. In recent years we have seen substantial exchange rate fluctuations between some of the world’s large economic blocs. These have largely been related to developments in the US dollar. The dollar’s weakening against the euro has recently gained impetus once again; in two years, the euro/dollar exchange rate has gone from a low of 84 cents to 1.18 dollars in recent weeks - a rise of just over 40 per cent. Discussions of the implications of an overvalued dollar for the US current account deficit have quickly turned into concern over the effects of the rapid fall in the dollar on euro area growth. Should there be a quicker correction in the US current account deficit due to diminishing interest among international investors in US assets, the dollar could weaken further. A fast and dramatic depreciation of the dollar could derail Europe’s fragile recovery.
But calming global financial markets – and in the case of Switzerland, countering the heavy wave of safe-haven flows into Swiss francs – has been only one facet of the SNB’s policy response. The unique nature of the COVID-19 pandemic has also caused an unprecedented shock to the real economy. To mitigate this shock, central banks – in cooperation with the fiscal authorities – have created new instruments. The SNB during the COVID-19 crisis: same role, new tools Given the nature of the crisis, an important part of the policy response was to address the strains on the corporate sector, particularly among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In Switzerland, 99 percent of all firms are SMEs and they employ some 67 percent of the labour force. The lockdown measures resulted in a sudden stop for many businesses. There was real concern that economically viable SMEs, in particular, could be 1  The US dollar swap basis is an indicator of US dollar funding costs in foreign exchange markets. A large negative basis reflects a scarcity of US dollar funding. Page 3/10  forced into bankruptcy through no fault of their own. To address the problem, the Swiss Federal Council adopted a range of important measures, including the COVID-19 loan programme for companies. To be effective, financial support had to be fast and well targeted.

The Bank assesses all major financial education programmes to evaluate their effectiveness in meeting the intended objectives through a Financial Education Assessment Framework. The Framework, developed in 2013, assesses the impact of financial education programmes on the overall level of financial literacy and on changes in behaviour. Mobile applications have also been introduced to promote more informed financial decisions. These includes applications for personal money management, updates on important consumer news including financial fraud alerts issued by the Bank, and for consumers to make enquiries, obtain advice and raise their complaints with financial institutions. These mobile applications are customised for use in Malaysia and can be downloaded by individuals at no cost. It is envisaged that wider use of these applications will contribute towards enhancing financial competence. The financial education initiatives in Malaysia has been advanced through collaborative efforts by the public and private sectors. Key agencies involved have included the Credit Counselling and Debt Management Agency, the financial industry, consumer associations and the Employees Provident Fund (which has more than 14 million contributors) to ensure that messages on financial management address all the key issues in savings, debt, BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  investment and protection. These strategies are pursued together with the efforts to promote financial inclusion and to ensure fair treatment of financial consumers. It is important to recognise that the financial industry itself plays a pivotal role in helping consumers improve their financial well-being.