samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The effects can come from a series of deregulations that affect different stages of price formation for a variety of goods and services. So even if it were feasible, I believe that working with a narrow price index would have more drawbacks than advantages. We must accept instead that all economic activities pose difficulties that stem from the impossibility of predicting the future exactly. When it comes to evaluating monetary policy, it is better to accept certain deviations from a relevant target than to have a target than can only be fulfilled because it has been defined so narrowly as to be hardly relevant. This particular aspect is also highly important and valid in other situations to do with the evaluation of monetary policy. There needs to be a widespread awareness both of what monetary policy is actually capable of achieving and of the choices that continually have to be made. Otherwise it will be difficult to achieve a comprehensive evaluation. All this is, of course, a matter of learning. But sometimes there is too great temptation to score a cheap point in the public discussion by accusing the central bank of acting too late or ‘missing’ the target. The point I want to make on this topic is that an inflation targeting monetary policy normally functions satisfactorily even in situations that are characterised by price effects from deregulations. Monetary policy may not be capable of fully countering every change in the general price level, including more or less transitory effects on the rate of inflation.

But across the financial world, investors and regulators are asking themselves whether it also brought costs that are only now becoming clear.” The way oversight of the financial system is split between the FSA, the Treasury and the Bank of England is in doubt. Gordon Brown’s reform of a decade ago means that those responsible for monitoring the banking system are separate from those who make the decision to intervene.] In understanding the factors that impinge on this particular case about Northern Rock, one will learn that the roles and tasks faced by the supervisors and the regulators are enormous. Supervisors need to keep a step ahead of financial market developments and innovations. We must not be oblivious or ignorant to the fact that, despite all the strength of legal framework, regulatory and supervisory arrangements we can have, we always learn that banks still fail, even those too big to fail collapsed at their own demise – some due to reasons other than risks. In other words, the supervision of banks cannot provide full or complete guarantee against banking failures. However, supervision can assist the banks in managing their risks by taking appropriate measures and precautions. After all, banks are vulnerable to errors in human judgment and the fragile confidence of depositors. Therefore, regulation and supervision is not a substitute for good management. That is the lesson we have to learn from many bank  2  BIS Review 142/2007  failures even in countries with the best regulatory systems.
Our aim in this is to make sure that cash can circulate smoothly and without interruption and we also manage the state’s cash reserves and test the quality of the cash in Estonia every day. Tomorrow Eesti Pank will release ten-euro notes of the second series into circulation, and these are more secure and longer-lasting than the notes of the first series, with better security features. As Governor of Eesti Pank I can confirm that cash is not going anywhere. I personally like to use cash and I am proud of the quality of the euro cash used in Estonia. Access to cash is important, and it is a complicated issue that doesn’t have a quick and easy solution. This is why it needs to be discussed, and Eesti Pank is very pleased that we could be part of the working group set up by Minister of Economic Affairs and Infrastructure Urve Palo to look for solutions. Eesti Pank believes that the issue of access to banking services across Estonia should not be handled under the Emergency Act, but this does not mean that it should be ignored. I will now answer questions about the Emergency Act first, and then questions about access to banking services. Coming to the first question of the interpellation, as Governor of Eesti Pank I have set minimum requirements for the provision of cash and payment services in case of emergency.

What we need is to integrate the legal and institutional systems in parallel with the EU banks. With the introduction of the Euro there would arise a number of technical issues which must be immediately tackled. As of today, Turkish banks are allowed to maintain foreign exchange positions in 23 foreign currencies, of which 17, including the ECU, are European currencies. With the Euro the CB and the Turkish banks will no longer have to deal in these currencies, but only in Euro. Of course, initially there will be some currencies, like the British pound and a few others, which will continue to exist for a while. But within this process, all foreign assets and liabilities in the currencies of the countries participating in the monetary union will need to be converted into the Euro. Currently, Turkey follows an exchange rate policy based on a basket consisting of the US dollar and the Deutsche Mark. It is assumed that since other European currencies are related to the Deutsche Mark through the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), the basket also reflects the weight of other European currencies through the Deutsche Mark. With monetary union the share of the Euro area in Turkey’s overall trade in goods or services will be more than 50%. But this will not change the picture from the exchange rate policy point of view. Therefore the Euro could easily be substitute for Deutsche Mark in the present basket.
The discussions on the completion of the Banking Union are already at a standstill; we need, at least, to fully harness the existing measures! Supervisors must allow the effective implementation of liquidity waivers provided for in the level 1 text. In this regard, the fact that the SSM published guidance mentions the need, in a first phase, to comply with 75% of the liquidity requirements at the individual level in order to grant a cross-border waiver creates an additional obstacle. And we shall not give up on the extension of intra-group waivers to MREL and capital requirements. Let me add three possible ways of making progress: we could first think of a system of workable guarantees between the parent company and its subsidiaries. Backed by the common supervisor, they should provide enough reassurance to host countries, so that they could support waivers in local subsidiaries. Another step would be to ensure preferential treatment for intragroup exposures within the Banking Union. There should be no cases where there is a difference between the treatment of domestic and cross-border intra-group exposures, be it for liquidity or capital requirements. To go further, in parallel with the aforementioned options, we also need to explore the possibility of relying more extensively on the branchification of subsidiaries located in other Banking Union countries. This was the core of Andrea Enria’s statement yesterday. The branch would then abide fully by the home country’s prudential rules. The example of Nordea demonstrates the feasibility of such an option.

Before he does so, I would like to share with you my assessment of economic conditions on the mainland and in Puerto Rico. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. National economic conditions The mainland U.S. economy has continued to slowly recover from the after-effects of the housing boom and bust and the financial crisis. But the recovery has been disappointing. Despite a monetary policy that has been extraordinarily accommodative by historical standards, the economy has grown only about 2 percent over the past year. After a brighter start to the year, economic momentum has slowed in the last few months. (This may partly be a payback for the mild winter, which brought forward some spending.) Employment growth remains positive, but has slowed considerably of late as the economy has lost forward momentum, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. The headwinds retarding recovery are well known. Many consumers have been deleveraging in response to the large losses in wealth generated mainly by the collapse in home prices. The supply of credit – particularly mortgage credit – to many families remains constrained, limiting the degree to which many households can fully benefit from low interest rates. Although there have been some positive signs in the housing market recently, housing activity nevertheless remains at very low levels.
The growth rate we attained with the high inflation in the 1980’s did not last long and had been replaced by higher inflation rates and economic recession. Meanwhile, between 2002 and 2007, high growth rates were attained while a remarkable decline was recorded in inflation. In this scope, we are of the opinion that the monetary policy implemented by the Central Bank of Turkey, which is consistent with the main objective of price stability, has supported the establishment of price stability in Turkey and contributed to the permanent increase of the competitive power of the whole economy and the exports sector. I would like to emphasize that the quality of fiscal adjustment is crucial for both the struggle with inflation and the permanence of the high growth rates. The fiscal rule, which is to be enforced in the near future will enhance predictability and create confidence for the future. Fiscal rules play a critical role in the establishment of fiscal policies consistent with sustainable debt dynamics and foster a more prudent and permanent implementation of fiscal discipline. However, in the light of country experiences, in order that fiscal rules can function as expected, these rules should be implemented in a transparent way as per the required institutional and legal framework to be established. 5. Exchange rate  As you may have noticed, in my speech regarding how to increase the potential growth rate of Turkey, I have not mentioned the issue of foreign exchange rates.

The global economy has displayed a mild recovery since the second half of 2009. Yet, European economies have recently shown signals of deceleration. Although problems in the credit markets of advanced economies have attenuated, they have not been completely eliminated yet. As a matter of fact, credit developments in the USA and the Euro area suggest no significant increase in credit volume. The unresolved issue of troubled assets in  BIS Review 104/2010  1  the banking sector of advanced economies impedes proper functioning of the credit mechanism. Meanwhile, soaring and persisting high unemployment rates in many countries reduce household expenditures and negatively affect the aggregate demand. Soaring budget deficits and public debt stocks stemming from loose fiscal policies implemented in developed countries are an important risk factor that may adversely affect private demand by increasing long-term interest rates in the years ahead. The risks that I have mentioned above also have the potential to affect the Turkish economy in a negative way. Considering that our largest exports market is the European Union, problems prevailing in European economies pose an important risk for our economy, too. As a matter of fact, external demand indicators have recently indicated a partial slowdown. Global turbulence also has the potential to affect the Turkish economy negatively through the channel of expectations. Problems in the global financial markets are likely to restrain the accessibility of external financing.
But, if a delay in monetary policy normalization or a very shallow trajectory in normalizing short-term interest rates were to cause inflation expectations to move meaningfully above our 2 percent inflation objective, then an inertial policy would likely become detrimental in achieving the FOMC’s objectives. The third, and related, issue I want to address is the care needed in using rules, such as Taylor 1999, as a guide to policy. As the paper convincingly shows, over time, financial market conditions have become a much more important factor in evaluating the appropriate setting of monetary policy and the level of short-term interest rates. This reflects several factors. First, over the past few decades the U.S. capital markets have grown in size and scope, and our financial system has become much less bank-centric. This has loosened the linkage between the federal funds rate and financial market conditions. Second, the U.S. economy and financial markets have become more interconnected globally. Thus, the impact of U.S. monetary policy has become more diffused, and financial market conditions have come to depend increasingly not only on developments at home, but also on developments abroad. As an example, the current low level of U.S. Treasury bond yields reflects, at least in part, the fact that long-term interest rates in Europe and Japan are much lower. While simple policy rules provide useful benchmarks for policymakers, their very virtue – their simplicity – is also a significant shortcoming.

Zamani Abdul Ghani: Growth and development of SME’s in Malaysia Opening address by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Top SMI Supporter Award Presentation, held at the Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia Berhad (CGC), Petaling Jaya, Selangor, 9 June 2008. *  *  *  Bismillahirrahmanirrahim Distinguished fellow members of the Board of Directors of CGC, Yang Berbahagia Datuk Wan Azhar Wan Ahmad,Managing Director of CGC Distinguished Guests and Representatives of Financial Institutions Members of the Media Ladies and Gentlemen Assalamualaikum w.b.t. and a very good afternoon On behalf of the Board of Directors and Management of the Credit Guarantee Corporation, (CGC), I am pleased to welcome you to this Top SMI Supporter Awards Presentation ceremony. This occasion is held in conjunction with the CGC's 35th Annual General Meeting that was successfully concluded just a while ago. I am pleased to note the encouraging representation made here today by fellow members of financial institutions. This signifies the importance that financial institutions attest to this CGC's annual award presentation ceremony. That said, allow me to record our appreciation to all of you for making this ceremony an important event in your calendar. This Top SMI Supporter Awards presentation ceremony, as you are all well aware, is an annual occasion. It recognises the active participation by financial institutions in CGC's credit guarantee schemes in particular, and contributions by financial institutions to SME development in general. We firmly believe such efforts should not go unnoticed.
As shown in Chart 3, 2008 stands out as one of the worst years in this period. Ten years ago, on 25 November 2008, Norges Bank presented the GPFG’s results for the third quarter. Lehman Brothers had gone bankrupt. The world’s central banks were making large and frequent cuts in policy rates. In the course of autumn 2008, the US stock exchange fell more than five percent on as many as ten separate days. Norges Bank wrote in its press release that “The third quarter of 2008 was an unusually demanding quarter for the management of the Government Pension Fund – Global.” And it was to get worse. The GPFG posted a return for 2008 of minus 23 percent, measured in terms of the fund’s currency basket. Chart 4: Post-crisis paths have differed Chart 4 shows developments in the US equity market from 2008 onwards. The rapid reversal in equity markets, shown in the chart, also affected the GPFG’s results. In 2009, the fund posted a positive return of 26 percent, largely thanks to a 34 percent return on the equity portfolio. The return continued to rise in 2010. While the fall in the fund’s value as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 was historically large, the fund’s recovery in 2009 was stronger and faster than had generally been expected. Owing to a weakened krone, the GPFG’s return was less negative in terms of NOK than in terms of the fund’s currency basket.

We are the first Asian jurisdiction mandating climate-related disclosure across the financial sector by 2025, in line with the global framework set by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. We also made an early commitment to adopting new standards promulgated by the International Sustainability Standards Board. Hong Kong adopts the Common Ground Taxonomy jointly developed by China and the EU. We are now exploring the development of a green classification framework on the basis of the China-EU taxonomy, in order to provide the necessary disclosure and guidance to inform capital allocation and encourage market discipline. The HKMA has set clear rules – for example by formulating clear supervisory requirements and integrating climate-risk into the supervisor-driven stress-testing framework. The various regulatory requirements help build climate resilience into our banking and financial sector. In the process, financial intermediaries such as banks also act as facilitators to help the real sector adapt and transition, in line with global consensus and commitment to achieving carbon neutrality. Second, on data. Currently, there is a lack of accessible, standardised data and analytics support in the market. It presents a challenge, not just for climate risk management but for other purposes such as portfolio assessment and business development. We are working with other regulators and the private sector to address these issues, by improving data accessibility and developing a data repository and analytics capability for the industry. We are making good progress.
An example of emergency liquidity assistance of this kind was the support provided to UBS in 2008. Prevention is better than cure The crisis showed, first, that it is not easy for central banks to identify all of the risks in advance. Second, it became clear that when central banks talk about specific risks, their warnings often go unheeded. The crisis also showed that policies limited to clearing up once a situation is out of control can be extremely costly. Moreover, there are contexts in which, for monetary policy reasons, the interest rate tool cannot be used for financial stability purposes. This situation has been only too familiar to us in Switzerland for some years now. Imbalances are developing on the mortgage and real estate markets, thereby posing a risk to financial stability. In principle, this risk could be combated by higher interest rates. However, the higher ranking monetary policy goal of price stability does not allow for any increase in interest rates in the foreseeable future. Thus monetary policy instruments, rhetoric and emergency assistance alone are not enough to make an effective contribution to financial stability. That is why new tools – the new macroprudential measures – have been developed internationally in accordance with the principle that prevention is better than cure. Their aim is to strengthen the resilience of the financial system as a whole and to prevent the build-up of such excesses on the asset and credit markets.

Disaster risk reduction and disaster management has thus become a focus of Governments to effectively reduce financial and economic losses. In an industry that is exposed to risks both natural and man-made, this Convention’s theme of “Today’s Risks, Tomorrow’s Claims” is highly relevant especially with regards to the challenges of insurance claims. There are three pertinent challenges that I can think of this morning. Let me briefly share my thoughts on these challenges with you. Firstly, the critical role of insurers in the various aspects of the claims management value chain, that is, claims intimidation, fraud detection and prevention, claim assessment and settlement, and complaint resolution are areas requiring close monitoring by insurers and,  BIS Review 53/2010  1  where necessary, timely intervention to detect and prevent leakages. Insurers have to assess their vulnerability and address the risk of fraud efficiently to reinforce a positive image of the industry to the public. Customers must be kept informed of the progress of their claims and be given clear explanation when a claim is rejected or not settled in full. Any delay or perceived delay in claims processing, particularly for claimants in urgent need of compensation, may be misconstrued as a deliberate attempt to delay claims settlement resulting in bad publicity and ill repute for the insurance industry. Each insurer’s claims management philosophy should therefore set out the broad principles for providing high quality service standards.
Potential risks include blunting the creative destruction of the crisis by allowing unproductive, zombie firms to remain in business and permitting the inflation of asset bubbles. Some have also raised concerns that low interest rates have reduced incentives for governments to carry out difficult fiscal and structural reforms. These topics are complex and deserve a greater depth of comment than I have time to cover today. Given the audience here tonight, I wanted to focus on two particular potential consequences of our unconventional measures: the impact on the distribution of wealth and income, and the impact on bank profitability. To an extent, monetary policy always works through a redistribution of activity. Lowering interest rates encourages households to bring forward to today some consumption planned for the future. Some have argued that negative rates have the perverse effect of forcing savers, such as those with a fixed savings target for retirement, to save more. But such an argument is not borne out by the data. Since the introduction of the negative rate on our deposit facility, saving rates across the euro area have remained broadly stable, or have fallen. The only major country to have some rise is Germany. However, the profile of the German saving rate also reflects the ongoing recovery in the residential investment sector. But before I analyse more deeply the distributional impact of monetary policy action by the ECB, let me first consider the distributional impact of monetary policy inaction. These effects are clear.

There has also been a savings-investment imbalance beyond that explained by the fall in productivity growth, often referred to as a “global savings glut”. In part, this is explained by the ageing populations of advanced countries, driving up the demand for safe assets at a time when they have become increasingly scarce. This falling real rate is bad news for savers since it means lower future returns in terms of consumption of additional goods and services. And in the long run it is the concept of the natural rate that determines the return to saving, not short-term movements in monetary policy. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  This concept of a natural rate of interest represents the real rate consistent with saving and investment being in balance, output being at its potential and neither upward nor downward pressure on inflation. While the natural rate may change over time, it is unobserved and can only be estimated. Such estimation is relatively imprecise, with different models giving a range of estimates making it uncertain as to the true level of the natural rate.1 Nonetheless, the natural rate does appear to be lower than in the past.2  Why unconventional measures have been necessary Developments in the natural rate matter for the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area. To stimulate the economy, central banks steer short-term real interest rates below the natural rate to encourage the public to bring forward spending, be it in the form of consumption or investment.