samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So, from a cyclical perspective, the economy is in reasonably good shape. Over the longer term, however, the U.S. economy faces significant challenges. On the positive side, economic expansions don’t die of old age, and there appear to be few imbalances in the economy that could lead to the current expansion ending. But, in order for this to remain the case, it is important that fiscal policy and monetary policy are well aligned going forward. It is also important that the United States retains sufficient fiscal capacity so that fiscal policy can support the economy when the next cyclical downturn does occur. If fiscal policy can play a greater role in promoting macroeconomic stability, it would likely reduce the need for monetary authorities to take extraordinary actions to support economic activity. There are other structural issues worth noting. In particular, productivity growth has been anemic over the past few years, while income inequality has increased and income mobility remains low. As a consequence, the gains in living standards generated by the current business expansion have been modest compared to previous expansions, and these gains have not been widely shared. Much more could be done both locally and nationally to increase the economy’s potential to perform better for a broader array of our citizens. The outlook for growth and inflation The U.S. economy has been expanding at a moderate rate. Growth has averaged about 1.8 percent this year and seems likely to continue at or slightly above this pace in 2017.

William C Dudley: The US economic outlook and the implications for monetary policy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the ABNY (Association for a Better New York) Breakfast, New York City, 5 December 2016. * * * Jason Bram, Andrew Haughwout, Joseph Tracy and Luis Uranga assisted in preparing these remarks. It is a great pleasure to be here and have the opportunity to talk about the U.S. economic outlook. I want to thank the Association for a Better New York (ABNY) for sponsoring today’s event. This is an excellent venue to speak about what we can do to improve our country’s economic performance. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. The U.S. economy—supported by solid gains in household spending—has expanded at a moderate rate in 2016. Job gains have been sturdy, and we have seen some firming in wage growth as the labor market has continued to tighten. Moreover, as the effects of earlier declines in energy prices have dissipated, the overall inflation rate has begun to move up closer to our 2 percent objective. As a consequence, economic conditions are not far from the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate of maximum sustainable employment and price stability. And, I expect that we will make further progress toward these goals in 2017.
We have already achieved more or less the right level of capitalisation for the banking industry through the initial set of Basel III reforms after the financial crisis. If we now precipitate a further increase in the level of capital requirements in the process of adjusting the framework and fine-tuning the calibrations, it would unduly constrain credit intermediation and consequently economic growth. We must guard against these unintended outcomes. It is therefore heartening that the Basel Committee has committed not to significantly increase overall capital requirements for banks. Distribution of Credit Matters as Much as Allocation of Credit Even as we hold the line on aggregate capital levels, we need to be sensitive to the effect of capital requirements on specific business lines and on different economies. •  This brings me to the second area that we should be watchful of: namely the distribution of bank credit across the economy as a consequence of regulation. The Basel Committee will be finalising this year its review of credit risk capital requirements, as it seeks to address excessive variability in risk-weighted assets. •  The revisions to the capital standards for credit risk that are currently being proposed will require bank exposures to be risk weighted under a Revised Standardised Approach instead of the Internal Ratings Based approaches. •  The return to a Standardised Approach is motivated in part by limitations in risk modelling, as the last crisis laid bare.

•  While SME loans tend to be riskier on a standalone basis, as a portfolio the risks are more diversified than loans to larger corporates. •  The Basel Committee recognises this and the current capital framework provides for preferential capital treatment for exposures to SMEs for banks using internal models. •  And the Basel Committee has further proposed applying a lower risk weight for banks’ SME exposures compared to unrated corporate exposures under the revised Standardised Approach. This will help alleviate the cost of SME financing. Conclusion Let me summarise my main points. We have made good progress in bank regulation since the crisis. •  Implementation has been generally good but some areas need more work and some jurisdictions need to close the gaps. •  Overall, the reforms have helped to make banks safer and more resilient. As we finalise the Basel III capital reforms, we must ensure that banks are not only safe but also serve their purpose of supporting the economy. •  We should be mindful of the effects of low profitability on banks’ ability and willingness to lend. •  We should be mindful not to increase significantly the overall level of capital requirements on banks even as we finetune the detailed capital rules. •  And we should be mindful not to unduly penalise lending to important segments of our economies – like trade and SMEs – even as we address the limitations in banks’ internal models.
And had Jane been living in the euro area today, in Germany for example, she would only have been able to invest for the long term at a negative interest rate – the 30 year bund yielded minus 0.27% in August. Nominal interest rates do vary through time of course. Since the Napoleonic wars and outside wartime, UK long term nominal rates moved mainly in a 2-5% range until the decades of inflation following the Second World War, during which they rose above 15%, before falling back as inflation was brought under control. They have been falling ever since. The fall in long rates is a phenomenon that has been building since the late 1980s, gathering pace after the financial crisis (Chart 1). During the past couple of months, UK long nominal rates have dropped to around, and sometimes even below, 1%. They have not been this low in the past 200 years. The same is true, more generally, for other advanced economies. 1 See Avery Jones (2019). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Some of this likely reflects low current and expected inflation. But it is a great deal more than just an inflation story. Long term real rates – in the United Kingdom and in other advanced economies – are extremely low and indeed are negative. I want to look briefly today at why we are in a period of low interest rates and why we might expect it to persist – ‘low for long’ in other words.

Abdulrahman A Al-Hamidy: Compliance and anti-money laundering Speech by His Excellency Dr Abdulrahman A Al-Hamidy, Vice Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) ,to the Fifth Annual Gathering on “Compliance and anti-money laundering”, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Institute of Banking, Riyadh, 26–27 March 2013. *  *  *  Dear Audience, It gives me pleasure to welcome you all, and I would like to thank those who have participated in the preparation for this gathering. I also would like to extend my thanks to the colleagues at the Institute of Banking and the speakers to this gathering. Dear Audience, The continued holding of this gathering for the fifth year confirms the firm conviction held by all of us of the risks that the crime of money laundering poses to the global economy. It also reflects the Kingdom’s commitment to combat money laundering, and its support of the measures taken against it, and the implementation of the best international practices in this field. The discussion of this gathering derives its importance from the increasing trend towards globalization, easing restrictions on international cross-border movement of commodities and services and the revolution of communication and information technology. Dear Audience, Money laundering operations have witnessed a quantum leap at the global level over the last years. This was reflected in the various and diversified methods used in their implementation, expanding the volume this type of crime. Developed and developing countries suffer from this crime.
Second, it seems reasonable to wait and observe potential ripple effects of TLTRO III repayments in bond markets before starting the bond portfolio run-off, as it will allow us to assess the effective impact of balance sheet reduction on financial conditions. After first allowing markets to absorb significant TLTRO III repayments, the normalisation of the ECB’s balance sheet could be followed by ending full reinvestment of the APP portfolio. As announced by President Lagarde last month, we will decide on the key principles of the reduction of our APP portfolio at our December monetary policy meeting. And why we should end APP reinvestments before PEPP reinvestments? In my opinion, a “first-in-first-out” staggered approach is preferable for at least two reasons. First, PEPP reinvestments remain an important line of defence against (pandemic-related) fragmentation episodes, so they are potentially pledged for reallocation across jurisdictions while the lasting vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic continue to pose a risk to the smooth transmission of our monetary policy. Second, we previously declared that PEPP reinvestments will not end up until at least the end of 2024, while our forward guidance on APP reinvestments was open-ended. We have clearly stated our intention to continue APP reinvestments for an extended period of time past the date when we started raising the key ECB interest rates. Moreover, our balance sheet policy will depend too on the operational framework that we adopt for the foreseeable future.

Successful further cooperation along these lines is in the interests of us all. BIS Review 77/2010  1
Now some people may argue that “offshore” markets in national or regional currencies complicate the conduct of national or regional monetary policy, with the implication that national or regional currencies should somehow be confined to their national or regional space. I must confess that this view seems to ignore the fact that it has in practice over the past twenty or thirty years proved perfectly possible for monetary policy to be conducted successfully despite the existence of the euro-markets. And I do not see how one could realistically expect to contain the use of a major currency, which the euro will certainly be, within territorial borders in any event. But as I have made clear, the UK’s interest -- “in” or “out” -- lies unambiguously in doing all that we can to ensure that the single currency succeeds. And in this context we would, of course, co-operate with the ECB in any way we could, to avoid potential disturbance to European monetary policy, were it shown to exist. Mr Chairman, London does not hold its pre-eminent position as Europe’s major financial centre as of right. We must continue to earn it. If we are to take advantage -- “in” or “out” -- of the opportunity that the euro will bring, then we must be technically well prepared. We will be. There is increasing evidence that financial institutions in the UK are now taking the steps necessary to ensure that they are ready for the introduction of the euro, whether or not the UK joins EMU.

But it seems reasonable to assume that some common causes lay behind both the crisis and the imbalances themselves. International capital flows have made countries increasingly interconnected and interdependent. At the same time, major transformations have occurred over the past decade in our international environment. The monetary and financial system has become truly “multipolar”. An increasing number of countries, both developed and emerging, have become active participants in the global capital market. While there are currently three main currency blocs, at least one (the Chinese RMB) and maybe other additional systemic currencies will emerge in the future. Participants in the international financial system are increasingly diverse from the point of view of their economic structure, their demography, their level of development, and, more importantly, their social choices and preferences. For instance, different saving rates may be seen as resulting from divergent time preferences. Likewise, diversity in capital account regimes may, to some extent, reflect different choices and tradeoffs between efficiency and stability in the financial infrastructure. These characteristics will most likely persist over time. A large number of different countries, with different preferences, will permanently be linked and interdependent through growing and active international capital markets. It is not clear, at this stage, how the coexistence and interaction between national financial systems worldwide will finally play out.
Indeed, if this cushion gets internalised in expectations, it reduces the probability of disinflationary dynamics taking hold in the first place. Chart 26: Annual CPI inflation with an effective lower bound of 0.5% Per cent  2010  2012  2014  Chart 27: Annual CPI inflation with an effective lower bound of 0% Per cent  6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4  6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3  2016  -4 2010  2012  2014  2016  Source: Bank calculations. A final, and the most conservative, insurance policy against disinflationary risks would be to ease monetary policy pre-emptively. Even if the modal view of expected inflation is for it to return to target over the planned horizon, mean expected inflation will be lower if risks are skewed to the downside. Provided policymakers care about these risks, there is then a case for setting policy in response to mean, rather than modal, inflation expectations.19 This option is not a hypothetical one. Already during the course of less than three months this year, more than 25 central banks internationally have eased policy through a combination of lower interest rates, currency adjustments or unconventional methods. Here in the UK the situation is somewhat different, with activity growing pretty strongly and slack being eroded. The MPC’s best collective judgement is that interest rates are more likely than not to rise over the forecast horizon.

Over the same period, households’ inflation expectations from the Bank/NOP survey have fallen by 90bp, 60bp and 50bp respectively at the one, two and five year horizons. Chart 20 looks at the term structure of expected inflation by households from the Bank/NOP survey, relative to the past and the Bank’s forecasts.12 The term structure of expected inflation is currently lower than at any stage since the crisis. Moreover, household inflation expectations are significantly below 2% at the two-year horizon and, to a lesser extent, thereafter. That means it is unclear, at present, whether household inflation expectations are consistent with the Bank hitting the inflation target. 11  The MPC’s February Inflation Report included a small downside skew to the inflation fan chart, but this did not extend to two years. 12  These have been adjusted to take into account the average difference between perceptions of the level of current inflation and actual inflation. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 19: UK household inflation expectations Citigroup 1 year ahead  Chart 20: Term structure of UK household inflation expectations Per cent  Citigroup 5-10 years ahead  Per cent  Vintage Series (2009 - 2014) Feb 2015 IR CPI Data NOP Feb 2015  5 4  6 5 4  3 3 2  2  1  1  0 2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  Sources: Citigroup. Dashed lines show series 2005–07 averages.
This has created tensions between short-term output and inflation stabilisation in the UK that have not been evident in other major economic regions. Chart 1: Divine coincidence has continued in the euro area Great moderation  5  Inflation (%)  Financial crisis and after 4 3 8 2 -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  1  2  3 4 Excess demand (%)  0 -1  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  But not in the United Kingdom Great moderation  6  Inflation (%)  Financial crisis and after 4  Inflationary, with trade-off  Inflationary, no trade-off  2 -6  -5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2 3 4 Excess demand (%)  0 Disinflationary, no trade-off  Disinflationary, with trade-off -2  In these circumstances it has been critical for the Bank of England to pursue flexible inflation targeting.2 Since 2013, the MPC’s remit has explicitly recognised that there are circumstances in which bringing inflation back to target too quickly could cause undesirable volatility in output and employment. It directs the MPC to “promote understanding of the trade-offs inherent in setting monetary policy” including importantly “the horizon over which the Committee judges it appropriate to return inflation to target”. The MPC used this flexibility to support activity following the referendum in the wake of the large depreciation.

As wholesale investors started to exit, this set in motion a bad dynamic – a fire sale of assets that cut into earnings and capital. This increased the incentives of investors to run and for banks to hoard liquidity against the risk that they could themselves face a run. This downward spiral of fire sales and funding runs was a key feature of the financial crisis. The inherent fragility of short-term wholesale funding was greatly aggravated by certain institutional shortcomings in these markets, particularly in the structure of the tri-party repo system and the U.S. money market mutual fund business. Through the tri-party repo market, each day the two large clearing banks were providing a large amount of intraday credit to securities firms to facilitate the daily “unwind” of the prior day’s transactions. In the run-up to the crisis, the daily “unwind” helped make tri-party repo  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  look like a very liquid investment while still being an apparently highly durable source of funding. This masked the underlying risks and contributed to weak risk management practices. As the concerns about the U.S. housing market escalated in 2007, participants in the tri-party repo market became increasingly concerned about the liquidity and credit risks that they faced. The clearing banks became uncomfortable with their large intraday exposures to their clients – broker-dealers, thrifts and others.
William C Dudley: Housing and the economic recovery Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the New Jersey Bankers Association Economic Forum, Iselin, New Jersey, 6 January 2012. *  *  *  Housing and the economic recovery It is a pleasure to join you today for the annual meeting of the New Jersey Bankers Association. In a recent speech1 I talked about a number of the challenges facing the economy as we seek to secure the recovery and build for the future. Today I will focus on one of these: the problems in the U.S. housing market. In focusing today on housing, I would emphasize that this is only one factor behind the frustratingly slow economic recovery. Nevertheless, it is an important one that deserves our attention. As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. The New York Fed is deeply committed to contributing to efforts to resolve the housing crisis that still afflicts our nation. Our economists monitor the housing market and analyze its impact on the national economy. My outreach staff work with community groups and housing practitioners to support local programs that aid distressed homeowners.

And I am convinced that today’s conference will play an important role in sharing developments in the frontier economies – the next wave of emerging economies which will contribute to the regional and global growth and prosperity. 17. Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our cohosts, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), who make the conference possible. I wish you all a successful conference and look forward to your discussions. 18. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  This leads me to my final point, which is, how the Bank of Thailand plans to deal with these potential risks on both the external and internal fronts. For external risks, recognizing that sizeable capital inflows could be out of line with real developments, and that spillovers can persist in the near future, we need to closely monitor the external environment to capture these risks. It is also important to improve Thailand’s capacity to cope with international capital flows by developing a systematic capital flows master plan, and promoting the use of financial hedging instruments and the foreign exchange risk management capability of the private sector. The Bank of Thailand also stands ready to implement emergency measures of varying degrees to deal with volatile capital movements as appropriate. In addition, to prevent these inflows from causing economic and financial instability, the Bank of Thailand has prepared a toolkit of macro prudential measures to ensure the soundness of the macro economy and the financial sector. Measures to prevent overheating in particular segments of the property market are one example. Ladies and Gentlemen, It would be uncommon for a central banker not to mention inflation and monetary policy in any speech. I would therefore like to emphasize that the Bank of Thailand’s monetary policy aims to achieve domestic price stability and tighten to more normal levels consistent with Thailand’s macroeconomic fundamentals. Price stability helps foster a stable and predictable macroeconomic environment conducive to investment and growth.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: The rise of Asia – finding the right balance for policy Address by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) seminar on “Outlook for the Global Economy and Financial Markets 2011”, Bangkok, 8 February 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished Speakers and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my honor and pleasure to address today’s distinguished audience on the outlook of and the main challenges facing the global and Thai economies. Rather than giving you data and projections, which are readily available, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you my observations on the economic future of Asia and Thailand. While economic recovery in the West will likely be constrained by crisis legacies, the rapid bounce-back in Asia and its fast rising role in the world economy have made many believe that Asia is on the continued rise, to the extent that Asia is entering a golden age. Nevertheless, there are questions whether Asia can manage the risks associated with continued growth, particularly inflationary pressure and the impact of volatile capital flows. In line with this introduction, my presentation today will focus on four related topics. First I would like to pose a question whether Asia is truly approaching a golden age. Secondly, to sustain the rise of Asia, I would like to highlight the need for Asian economies to build capacities, as well as strengthen innovation and productivity.