samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Employment growth Per cent 6 4  6 4  General government  2  2  0  0 -2  -2 Manufacturing  -4 91  BIS Review 14/2001  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  -4  00  1  Whereas the upturn was balanced for a long period, the public sector has laid claim to a large share of the increase in the labour supply in recent years. Manufacturing employment has fallen markedly since 1998. The mainland economy features some aspects that are associated with a boom period, although growth is low. After several years of mainland GDP growth in the order of 3-4 per cent, activity is now increasing by less than 2 per cent a year. The economy is operating near capacity limits. New working time reforms, increased use of sick pay and disability benefits and a reduced supply of labour from other Nordic countries are restraining growth in many sectors. Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that productivity growth in Norway has picked up to the levels in some of our neighbouring countries. Risk premia for private companies in the US Percentage points 6  6  4  4 High risk  2  0  Medium risk  Low risk  2  0  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  International equity prices declined sharply last autumn. In the US, output and employment are stagnating.

BIS Review 14/2001  7  The government’s asset position and wealth management  Government assets and liabilities Estimates in billions of NOK Assets  Liabilities  Petroleum Fund National Insurance Fund  390  Direct ownership  300  Bonds and Treasury bills  170  50  Minor holdings  100  State banks  165  The table shows in simplified form the central government’s financial assets and liabilities, with estimates for the balance at the end of 2000. The government’s most important assets are the Government Petroleum Fund, assets in the National Insurance Fund, and the state’s direct ownership interests in enterprises. The estimate for the government’s direct ownership in the table includes Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Telenor, Statkraft and DnB. In addition, the state has many smaller stakes and direct loans through the state banks. The government has loan debt. In the table, the figures for the National Insurance Fund are consolidated as the Fund’s claims on the central government and the central government’s debt to the Fund are offset. The table shows that the central government’s loans through the state banks are approximately the same as the central government’s loan debt. The central government raises loans in the bond market and lends through the state banks. The interest rate on the loans and the pricing of risk are market-related. If we exclude this credit intermediation, the management of government wealth is primarily linked to state ownership interests in the Norwegian business sector, the National Insurance Fund and the Government Petroleum Fund.
Users may de facto be captured by an ecosystem and have no choice of their payment service, or at least be 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  influenced by Bigtechs to use their services at the expense of competitors. But the opposite risk exists: payment system fragmentation, which can lead to a deterioration in the service to users. Central banks have a long experience with these issues, especially in the field of payments. In this respect, the balance of cooperation and competition between industry players, in other words “co-opetition”, has proven to be historically valuable. One of the challenges now is to maintain these “co-opetition” relationships over time, ensuring that they can include all players and coordinate effectively the payment systems (and ecosystems) – traditional or innovative. 2. The Banque de France’s action To help meet these challenges, at the Banque de France, we develop our actions along two lines:  (i) The first one is to support and implement regulatory frameworks and supervisory practices that promote both innovation and the stability of our financial system Most of the current regulatory framework was designed before the technological “breaks” that we now face. It therefore seems logical to adapt it to these technological changes and to the challenges and risks associated with them. The same applies, of course, to our supervisory framework and methods.

The krone exchange rate is the price of our currency measured in a foreign currency. Developments in other countries are just as important for the krone as developments in the Norwegian economy. Capital flows freely and flows can change rapidly. This can spill over to exchange rates and interest rates as well as output and employment. There is a cost involved for businesses in hedging against fluctuations in the krone. A krone that is stable - but too strong - also entails social costs in the form of low activity. Likewise, a krone that is stable - but too weak - is a source of high inflation. Norway is running a current account surplus as a result of sizeable oil and gas exports. Owing to high oil prices, the current account surplus is rising this year. An increase in the current account surplus will normally result in higher net demand for the domestic currency. In Norway, however, the additional foreign exchange revenues that accrue to the Norwegian state as a result of high oil prices will be invested in foreign securities through the Government Petroleum Fund. As a result, they will not have a direct impact on the balance in the Norwegian foreign exchange market. Oil companies hold a large share of their financial capital in foreign currency, and higher revenues in these companies therefore results in an increase in capital outflows.
Existing derivative contracts need to be amended and future contracts need to provide that the parent’s entry into the Title II proceeding does not trigger the close-out option, or legal changes need to be implemented abroad so that the “one-day stay” that applies to qualified financial contracts governed by U.S. law is enforceable against those contracts governed by foreign law. Only by making these changes can we avoid the potential for disruptive closeouts. I strongly encourage the ongoing efforts to address this critical issue. A second issue with respect to Title II resolution is that we cannot be certain how foreign authorities will react when the parent is put into the Title II proceeding. While the U.S. authorities have been in discussion with our colleagues abroad to enable the coordination needed for a smooth cross-border resolution process, we cannot always be certain of the circumstances under which host authorities may choose to take or be required to take actions such as unilateral “ring-fencing” that might disrupt the implementation of the single point of entry approach. Thus, we need to continue to work with foreign regulators to iron out any issues ahead of time so that the resolution regime will work well for global, systemically important firms. The smooth operation of a resolution proceeding also depends on the existence of adequate liquidity in the early days of the process.

These plans should identify actionable options that the firm can take in response to financial weakness that will restore the confidence of the firm’s counterparties in the firm without the need for extraordinary official sector support. Firms must also have disciplined processes that analyze the root causes of their problems and identify longer-term strategies that will need to be employed as other recovery options to restore capital and liquidity are being executed. And firms must support the viability of their contingency and recovery plans by implementing the internal governance necessary to develop, test, update and implement them credibly. There is also more work that we, as supervisors, can do to reduce the probability of failure and to incent firm managers to act well before resolution becomes necessary. We need to do more to create incentives to force banks to act sooner to steer away from impending icebergs – cut capital distributions earlier, raise new capital faster, restructure businesses sooner, and restructure senior management and boards of directors more radically when the firm is not performing well. For example, one approach might be to implement a long-term debt requirement in a way that enhances market discipline. Another reform would be to reduce the incentives of large, complex firms to rely on shortterm wholesale funding to finance longer-term, illiquid assets. Among other benefits, reducing a firm’s susceptibility to sudden runs associated with short-term wholesale funding will lengthen the “runway” for management to implement the strategic actions that would restore the firm to health.
We are experiencing, I believe, one of those "Franco-German moments" that will mark history, and we can now rightly celebrate it: on 18 May, a Franco-German initiative on the European stimulus package; on 21 July, a historic agreement by the European Council in Brussels on a EUR 750 billion package, supported by a united Franco-German alliance; on 20 August, the Chancellor visited the President of the Republic in Brégançon. Despite any fears, faced with the threat of the Covid crisis, Germany has clearly and unequivocally opted for Europe and the euro. However, in its early stages, the crisis appeared to distance us, due to our different abilities to respond, and sometimes in different orders. Europe has once again demonstrated in this crisis that it is stronger than is commonly believed. I will concentrate here on economic matters, because that is where my competence lies. Naturally, there are broader issues in Europe, that are concrete and emotional: those of our borders, our institutions, our military and diplomatic power, and, in a wider sense, our common identity, which is apparent to our fellow citizens. The President of the French Republic speaks of the necessary "European sovereignty". I am aware that this expression gives rise to debate. In any case, it means that Europe must not passively put up with events, in the face of the growing rivalry between the United States and China. That we can and should be proud collectively of our achievements.

We can look back at 18 consecutive quarters of economic growth; this is a robust, broad-based economic recovery. Now is the time to sort out the issue of non-performing loans. Banks need ambitious yet realistic plans to deal with their stocks of NPLs. And they need the right governance for these plans. Earlier this year, the ECB published its “Guidance to banks on non-performing loans”. Along these lines, and as part of our supervisory dialogue, we take a close look at the banks’ ability to manage their NPL stocks. We then scrutinise the plans devised by the banks to reduce those stocks. We will start providing our feedback later this month. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Banks have to carefully consider how they will react should any performing loans happen to become non-performing. So, with the future in mind, we have to ensure that the problem of NPLs does not recur. New NPLs should therefore be conservatively provisioned within a reasonable period of time. This would serve to strengthen the balance sheets of banks, enabling them to focus on their core business. That’s why we have drafted an addendum to our guidance on non-performing loans. It sets out how we expect banks to provision for future NPLs. The main goal is to have timely provisioning, which should prevent new NPLs from becoming a problem with systemic implications. But let me say that while our expectations are firm, there are no automatic actions attached to them.
Caleb M Fundanga: Developing Zambia’s Stock Exchange Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official launch of the BancABC Central African Stock Exchange Handbook, Lusaka, 26 July 2011. *  *  *    The Chief Executive Officer of ABC Holdings - Mr Douglas Munatsi    The Managing Director of BancABC Zambia Limited - Mr Dana Botha    The Managing Director of Lusaka Stock Exchange - Mrs Beatrice Nkanza    Management and Staff of BancABC    Chief Executive Officers and Representatives of various Institutions present;    Distinguished Invited Guests;    Members of the Press;    Ladies and Gentlemen. Let me begin by thanking the management of BancABC for inviting me to this occasion, which marks the official launch of the “Central African Stock Exchange (CASE) Handbook”. I also wish to thank the Managing Director of BancABC, Mr Dana Botha, for sending me a copy of the CASE handbook. The handbook provides a snapshot of various company financial results, share price performance and volumes traded in 2010. The handbook also highlights basic information on investment and borrowing options, which will not only assist investors diversify their portfolios but also assist in reducing transaction costs in our stock market. Ladies and Gentlemen, The stock market is an important avenue for harnessing resources for the financing of development in our country.

There is no other way to forecast future developments intelligently than to examine the indicators from the recent past, apply to them the metrics that the copious experience from Iceland and abroad has taught us to use, and to use both indicators and metrics as a guideline in projecting future developments. If we didn’t use this method, there would only be one left: to pour tea into a cup, turn it upside down, and read the tea leaves when the saucer is dry. The Central Bank has no comment to make on those who wish to pursue that course, but it isn’t likely to be terribly successful. When the Central Bank announced its interest rate decision, it stated that several factors that have made inflation harder to control could change over time. Sooner or later, higher mortgage interest rates will affect the real estate market. Global financial market conditions have changed for the worse. Those changes are already being felt, and sooner or later they will be felt in Iceland as well. In its forecasting, the Bank takes these factors into account, and it does not rule out the possibility that their actual impact will be greater than projected. Many people hoped that the unrest in the financial markets, which stems largely from the subprime mortgage market in the US, would blow over rather quickly. Some even seemed to believe that a modest drop in US interest rates would be sufficient to coax everything back into place once again.
Christian Noyer: Global inflation and monetary policy response in the Euro area Keynote speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the “Real Return: The Euromoney Global Inflation Conference”, Paris, 19 May 2015. *  *  *  The paths of inflation in advanced countries have been puzzling over recent years. While inflation rates fell sharply during the financial crisis and thus behaved as expected, it is much harder to explain their behaviour since then. In fact, rather than rebound as might have been expected as economic activity stabilised and then recovered, the global inflation rate fell from 4.2% in 2012 to 3.5% in 2014 and, in OECD countries, prices dropped from 2.3% to 1.7%. The drop in inflation is lasting despite the fact that oil prices have stabilised and a recovery is under way in the US and UK and burgeoning in the euro area. In the US for example, core CPI inflation has fallen from 2.3% in January 2012 to 1.8% in March 2015. In the UK inflation rate fell during the same period from 2.6% to reach 1%, below the targeted 2%. This persistence of low inflation has consequences for the economic outlook and monetary policy. When inflation is low, companies, households and governments have a harder time cutting their debt loads, a problem that is still acute in a number of countries in the Eurozone.

Second, some EU bodies are obsessed with the “all EU countries must be same” approach. While there may be some point to this, why insist on it in the case of the single resolution system, for instance, if it has been negotiated that the SSM only applies to euro-area countries plus volunteers? One can hardly expect non-euro area countries not participating in the SSM to jump at the single resolution system if it means sharing the burden with those inside the banking union without the same treatment in the area of a fiscal back-stop. At the same time, would you join the SSM if you did not have a clue how the single resolution rules were going to work? The CNB’s position was: let’s discuss the whole thing (BU) in one shot as a one compact and coherent package where the balance between powers, duties, responsibilities and money always remains assured. And negotiate everything as a single animal, so that illogical inconsistencies are not being produced all along. Sure, that would take much more time, but the final outcome might look better and we would not build up the house from the roof down. We are debating the supervisory part first, while burden-sharing (money) is being left for the future. The sequence of steps should ideally be exactly the opposite one. Why? My observation is that the way the various bail-outs and the SSM have been negotiated so far shows that the readiness and willingness even among euro-area countries to share money is declining over time.
Janet L Yellen: Views on the economy and implications for monetary policy Speech by Ms Janet L Yellen, President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, at the Portland Community Leaders’ Luncheon, Portland, Oregon, 29 July 2005. *  *  *  Thank you for that very kind introduction. It’s a pleasure to be here with you in this beautiful “City of Roses.” As a monetary policymaker, my main concern is the national economy, and that will be the chief focus of my remarks today. But as President of the San Francisco Fed, I also pay close attention to developments here in the Twelfth District, which, in many respects, mirror those of the nation. Looking at the big picture elements—growth, employment, and inflation—I’d say things are in reasonably good shape. Over the past two years, the nation’s output growth has been pretty steady, averaging just over four percent; this is solidly above trend, which, by most estimates, is around three and a quarter to three and a half percent. This growth has been amply in evidence here in the Pacific Northwest. While unemployment rates in Oregon and Washington remain above the nation’s rate, your region has largely recovered from the severe hit you took during the 2001 recession and its aftermath. As a result of sustained growth at the national level, slack in labor and product markets has trended down.

All in all, the prospects for inflation from the demand side look a bit better than they did when the repo rate was last raised. Another positive sign is that the wage agreements that have been concluded so far in 1998 indicate a rate of wage increases that is somewhat lower than in the main scenario described in December. However the recent weakening of the krona is a cause for concern. If it turns out to be permanent, it could affect inflation prospects. In the Riksbank we are now finalising the next Inflation Report, in which we will present an inflation forecast reaching into the first quarter of the year 2000. There, factors such as the Asian crisis, the wage negotiations and the exchange rate developments will be weighed and put into a larger context. The view of the inflation prospects that will result from this process will form the basis for future monetary policy.
Affordability risks of new mortgages financing residential investment property are high and have risen further. These developments have taken place against a background of persistent imbalances in the mortgage and real estate markets. Both mortgage-lending volume and prices for single-family houses and apartments continued to rise at a moderate rate in 2019. Although prices of residential investment property have stagnated of late, there is still a risk of a price correction in this segment in particular. On the one hand, this is due to the sharp price increases in previous years. On the other, larger numbers of vacant dwellings suggest that brisk construction activity in rental apartments may have led to an oversupply. Despite banks’ high risk appetite and the persistent imbalances in the markets, SNB stress tests suggest that the resilience of the domestically focused banks remains adequate overall. Thanks to robust capitalisation, most of these banks would be able to absorb the losses incurred in adverse scenarios. Given the risks I just mentioned, this is positive. It is crucial for the stability of the financial system that banks continue to hold sufficient capital to be able to cover the risks on their books. Ongoing pressure on margins means that the incentive for domestically focused banks to take on risks remains high. This applies to mortgage lending in particular. The revised selfregulation rules for banks in the residential investment property segment, which come into force at the beginning of 2020, should help to prevent a further build-up of risks in this segment.

Second, the economic and financial context in which French banks are operating is also a source of risks. Indeed, lessons must be learned from the slowdown in the USA, amply illustrated by the housing downturn, which resulted in higher risk in the sub-prime segments of the retail banking market. It should also be acknowledged that financial markets could become more unsettled. If higher risk aversion were to encourage greater use of risk transfer products, this could drain liquidity from some markets and undermine the efficiency of banks' management. From a supervisory perspective, the problem is all the more acute since the growing reliance on credit risk transfer instruments tends to make it harder to assess the type and degree of risk that banks actually bear when, for example, they arrange complex transactions. Third, the regulatory environment for French banks is changing radically as a result of the Basel II accords. Banks that have adopted the advanced approaches to risk management must put models in place – usually as early as January 2008 – for the internal rating and assessment of credit risk, market risk and operational risk. On-site inspection teams from the Commission Bancaire are currently scrutinising these models. Their investigations show that, overall, large banking groups have taken the measure of this project early on, so as to be ready for the deadline of the 1st January 2008, even if some improvements need to be made in certain areas.