samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, payments processed through Faster Payments grew from 295 million with a total value of £ in 2009 to 1,247 million payments with a total value of £ in 2015. 13 These were developed by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Operational risk is the risk of disruption from systems and processes, from human errors and management failures and from external events and external actors. All types of financial market infrastructure firms face operational risks. Indeed, for many of these firms, it is the ‘number one’ risk they face. A serious operational incident affecting one of these global pipes is likely to have an impact on the system as a whole in several jurisdictions, rather than just upon the infrastructure firm itself. The PFMIs require financial market infrastructure to identify plausible sources of operational risk, and ways to mitigate their impact. 14  FMIs are also required to have credible business continuity and recovery plans,  with the aim of resuming operations within a maximum of two hours following the most disruptive events. However, as the infrastructure that supports the financial system grows in scale, complexity and inter-connectedness, the potential risks and costs of systemic operational risks increase as well. To successfully mitigate this requires a focus on both operational risk and on operational resilience; the ability to respond and recover, as well as prevent and protect.

These central counterparties (known as CCPs), originally developed to manage the risks in agricultural commodity contracts, to act as intermediaries, taking and adjusting collateral from both sides to a financial contract so that if one party fails during the lifetime of the contract and cannot meet its obligations, the parties with whom they have traded are protected. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  But regulators and central banks however have had quite a hand in the making of these pipes and in mandating their use and terms of access – as a way of reducing risk in the system. The CLS international payment system, for example, was created by the FX industry, after much prodding from central banks, as a way of addressing regulatory concerns about the level of settlement risk in the system following the failure of Herstatt bank in the 1970s. Similarly, in response to regulatory demands post crisis, market participants have developed the role of CCPs to enable central clearing of a widening range of financial contracts. And, in line with their role in encouraging the creation and use of these systems, authorities internationally have long taken a close interest in their regulation and supervision. In 1990 the G10 Governors established the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), with a membership that was enlarged to include 25 central banks in subsequent years. In 2014, CPSS was renamed to become the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI).
This in turn has often been the result of wars and the same is true in British history specifically. Having stuck to it uninterruptedly during the preceding decades Britain came off the gold standard during the Napoleonic wars and again at the onset of the First World War. Matching large rises in government spending and debt the general level of prices also went up (these things were all far more extreme in WWI). That inflation didn’t get wholly out of control may have reflected confidence in a return to gold after those wars had ended. That confidence would also have tempered the rise in bond yields. Conversely, the rapid inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s occurred when public-sector debt was much lower than during those two episodes but when there was no stable anchor for monetary policy. That inflation was followed by a material rise in the real cost of newly issued debt, at least on an ex post basis. This suggests that the presence of, and credibility in, a fixed nominal target for monetary policy are more important than the government’s fiscal position alone, not only for the behaviour of inflation but for longer-term bond yields as well. The pandemic differs from these episodes in important ways. Unlike the wars there has been no material rise in government spending on goods and services. Aggregate demand has fallen and spare capacity is rising. All else equal this will depress inflation.

Not only does this raise serious concerns on the risk to systemic stability, it also undermines the integrity and efficiency of the markets. By virtue of their sheer size and aggressive trading strategies, the highly leveraged institutions, through their agencies, who usually also provide them with the credit, and possibly also ride along with them, often use their market power to influence the prices in smaller markets. Almost always an attack on a currency in Asia starts late on a Friday afternoon when the domestic markets in Asia are thin and when the international currency markets in London and New York open for business. Almost always a succession of big sell orders is placed for execution in a short period of time. And almost always the banks, when asked, say that they are executing those orders on behalf of their customers, whose identity and purpose cannot be disclosed because client secrecy is sacrosanct. And all this is supported with an immaculately timed commentary of gloom and doom. Some are more objective than others, but regrettably the impression one gets, particularly as a regulator, is that they are aimed at generating undue pessimism and panic, and consequent sharp and widespread movements across the currency and other related financial markets in favour of those behind the attacks. Most of the activities of the highly leveraged institutions are carried out through the OTC markets, which are very opaque.
No decision has yet been made regarding its issuance or its final design, but we launched the investigation phase of the project last year in order to ensure we are prepared in the event that future developments warrant its launch. Our work is now focused on deepening the conceptual analysis by assessing the different design options, as well as the distribution model. The first step was to identify the use cases to focus on, namely those that better support the policy objectives of a digital euro and facilitate network effects. Payments in e-commerce and physical stores, as well as person-to-person payments are, clearly, natural candidates. They either represent important market segments or have a clear potential to grow, and they rely heavily either on cash or on non-European providers and technologies. Payments between governments and individuals have also been considered a priority, given their potential synergies with the aforementioned ones. In any case, focusing now on these payment segments does not mean ruling out others, but simply leaving them for future stages. The next step of the analysis has covered what we consider to be the foundational design options. They refer to the way a digital euro should be transferred, the level of privacy and the tools to control excessive use and, hence, limit its impact on the stability of the financial system.

6/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Lars E O Svensson: Monetary policy after the crisis Speech by Mr Lars E O Svensson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the conference “Asia’s role in the post-crisis global economy”, held at Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 29 November 2011. *  *  *  I thank Claes Berg, Hans Dellmo, Hans Dillén, Anil Kashyap, and Bengt Pettersson for helpful discussions and comments. Carl Andreas Claussen of the Riksbank staff contributed to the paper. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily shared by the other members of the Riksbank’s Executive Board or the Riksbank’s staff. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 there has been a lively debate about what caused the crisis and how the risks of future crises can be reduced. Some blame loose monetary policy for laying the foundations for the crisis. There is also a lively debate about the future of monetary policy, whether it needs to be modified in the light of the crisis, and what its relation to financial stability should be. Here I will discuss the lessons for monetary policy from the financial crisis, the relation between monetary policy and financial stability, the role of monetary-policy instruments other than the policy rate, and some issues for emerging-markets arising from capital flows and exchange-rate movements.

This serves the interests of governments and taxpayers; but it is also in the fundamental interests of the financial system itself, since it is not impossible that a future crisis could outstrip the resources of monetary and fiscal policy, thus rendering it impossible to rescue systemically important banks. 2.  International approach  Consequently, there is broad international consensus between the relevant authorities on what the objectives of future regulatory measures should be. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), in which Switzerland is an active participant, has clearly formulated these objectives. The financial system must be brought to the point where it contributes to sustained economic growth. Never again must it be allowed to combine such high risks with such minimal safety buffers. Moreover, steps must be taken to avoid profits being privatised while losses are borne by the public at large. In essence, there are two ways of achieving this goal. The first approach is to adopt preventative measures aimed at reducing the probability of a bank collapse or a systemic crisis. This can be done by increasing safety buffers – for example, by imposing higher capital and liquidity requirements. The second approach is to take steps designed to reduce the costs of a crisis once it has already occurred.
The difficulties monetary policy is faced with when markets cease functioning normally has also been underestimated, despite previous experiences from, for instance, Japan. Monetary policy and financial stability overlap in several areas. Following the past year’s dramatic economic developments, it should be evident that insufficient financial stability leading to a major financial crisis seriously impairs the preconditions for monetary policy. Strategically important markets must be made to function in order to avoid a total collapse. Central banks have thus been compelled to undertake a series of unconventional measures, partly aimed at maintaining a functioning payments system and partly aimed at improving the functioning of the financial markets, thereby contributing towards the desired effect of the expansionary monetary policy. At the same time, there exists greater awareness of the fact that a monetary policy that does not adequately consider financial factors can lead to the accumulation of serious financial imbalances. Financial stability has been demonstrated to form an important restriction to the manner in which monetary policy can be applied in crisis situations. 3 Monetary policy models must become better at capturing the functioning of financial markets. In my opinion, the present monetary policy framework, in which monetary policy is aimed at stabilising both inflation and real development, still works well. However, monetary policy analysis needs to be developed, in certain respects, to enable us to make better forecasts within this framework.

BIS Review 137/1999  6  Today we can see similar developments in the IT industry. Besides the giant Ericssson, Sweden has many different IT enterprises. But growth is still being driven not so much by users of the new communication facilities as by the production of new possibilities. To continue with the comparison, in the next phase people started to travel by rail. A journey from Stockholm to Gothenburg admittedly took 11 hours and 45 minutes in 1865 but that was nothing compared with a horse-drawn carriage. Travelling became quicker and more efficient; people gained new impressions and learned new things. Sweden became smaller. Today we travel on the Internet by gathering information simply and efficiently from all over the world, largely for the price of a local telephone call. Millions of people in all parts of the world are indeed using this facility and in that sense the world has now become smaller. The really important phase, however, was when the railways began to affect processes for production and distribution. Previously, production in Sweden had been located in the vicinity of iron ore and forests. The units were numerous and not particularly efficient; transportation was slow. In the county of Värmland, for example, there were sixty different sites for the production of iron in 1870. When the railways had been constructed, it was easier to concentrate production to fewer sites; by around 1900 there were only six sites and they were accordingly considerably more efficient.
Lars Heikensten: Thoughts on how to develop the Riksbank’s monetary policy work Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedish Economics Association, Stockholm, 22 February 2005. *  *  *  Introduction Allow me to begin by thanking you for the invitation to once again visit the Economics Association and speak about monetary policy. Since I was here a year ago there has been a relatively lively debate, by Swedish standards, on monetary policy. Some commentators have focused on the currently low inflation rate, but what has really added fuel to the debate is the rise in unemployment that has occurred despite record-low interest rates and strong growth. Other participants have centred on the low interest rates, voicing concerns over their implications for credit growth, household debt and the housing market. I don’t intend to enter into this discussion today, however. Instead, I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to have a more fundamental discussion about the Riksbank’s monetary policy framework, its monetary policy analysis and the possibilities to improve the material underpinning our decisions. I shall describe the changes that we are planning to make to our methods. At the same time I should stress that it is not a question of changing the Bank’s monetary policy strategy.

I say this in my capacity as a totally independent central banker: the new government in France is taking reforms very seriously and is acting with impressive speed. France is now a reliable economic partner of Europe and Germany. Second, it would be ridiculous to reduce the debate to the old caricature that contrasts "German rules” with “French expenditure". To my mind, it is out of the question to implement a “transfer union”, which would only benefit certain countries, or to introduce Eurobonds, which would amount to collectivising debts. Need I remind that France too is a net contributor to the European budget, or to financing for Greece? But I am convinced that risk sharing between 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  countries can – and should – go hand-in-hand with risk reduction mechanisms. It is wrong to draw a distinction between solidarity and responsibility: in reality, they are complementary. For crisis prevention to be credible, it must also have the instruments needed to cushion the effects of substantial shocks that may arise regardless. As for the third cliché, let’s stop pitting the "French vision” against “German pragmatism". In order to reform the euro area, we must be practical and take real needs, and particularly those of businesses and entrepreneurs, as our starting point – as I aim to do in the second part of my speech.
At the end of the day it's probably fair to say that, although we may experience some difficulty in describing exactly what a derivative is, we can usually recognise one when we encounter it. The interests of the central bank in derivatives will tend to be rather broader than those of any commercial bank, trader or broker, because of its multiple policy responsibilities. The issues can be conveniently grouped under four headings: infrastructure, supervision, information, and operations. Infrastructure HKMA is probably fairly typical of most central banks in developed financial centres in having a general concern for the stability and development of the financial infrastructure, but without necessarily being involved directly in the provision of that infrastructure, of which derivatives nowadays form an indispensable part. Derivatives have brought substantial benefits to the commercial community, in facilitating hedging and hence business planning more generally, and have enabled the financial institutions to offer a progressively wider range of services and greater efficiency in the intermediation process, as well as to exploit market imperfections and other trading opportunities for their own gain. The range of available derivative products in Hong Kong is extensive. Exchange tradable derivatives include futures and options on the Hang Seng Index as well as on individual Hong Kong stocks and, since the launch a few weeks ago, on a selection of leading stocks of certain overseas exchanges. Exchange traded interest rate products include one-month and three-month HIBOR futures; and futures contracts on three-year Exchange Fund Notes are expected to commence trading later this month.

Caleb M Fundanga: Overview of Zambia’s banking sector Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Bank of China (Zambia) Limited, Lusaka, 13 April 2007. *  *  *  • His Excellency – the Chinese Ambassador to Zambia; • Vice-President of the Bank of China – Head Office; • Chairman of the Board of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited; • Managing Director of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited; • Distinguished invited guests; and • Ladies and gentlemen Let me first express my sincere gratitude for having been invited to speak on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited. Ladies and Gentlemen, during the last ten years, the performance of Bank of China has been satisfactory with total assets steadily increasing to K391.4 billion in December 2006from K6.4 billion in December 1997 and total deposits increasing to K294.2 billion in December 2006 from K2 billion in December 1997. On this basis, Bank of China had grown to become the eighth largest bank in Zambia albeit operating with only one branch. Bank of China (Zambia) is a 100% subsidiary of Bank of China which went through a successful initial public offer (IPO) and has resulted in Bank of China being a top tier globally listed bank. Over the same period in Zambia, the overall financial performance and condition of the banking sector has been satisfactory.
Yves Mersch: Making Europe’s financial market infrastructure a bulwark of financial stability Speaking points by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, for the Bank of France/Sciences Po research seminar “Financial stability in a digital world”, Paris, 7 June 2016. *  *  *  Introduction •  Europe’s financial market infrastructure has proved to be resilient through bouts of financial market volatility;  •  it has supported the liquidity and stability of financial markets in times of stress;  •  the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem, in conjunction with European legislators and market participants, have made Europe’s financial market infrastructure into the bulwark of financial stability it is today;  •  in the first part of my presentation, I will investigate the potential impact of the digitalisation of financial services on Europe’s market infrastructure;  •  in the second part, I will outline how the Eurosystem plans to deal with the technological and strategic challenges which affect our market infrastructure.

Part 2: The Eurosystem’s vision for 2020 •  To deal with the technological and strategic challenges to its market infrastructure, the Eurosystem has developed three key action points it will work on in the run up to 2020;  •  The first is to explore synergies between TARGET2 and T2S, potentially even merging them into a single platform in the future, with the goal of achieving a consolidated market infrastructure for large-value payments and securities settlement;  •  The enhancements envisaged for Europe’s financial market infrastructure will benefit users by providing access to all available services via a single gateway;  •  Moreover, these enhancements will provide an opportunity to further increase the resilience of the system, which is also beneficial from a financial stability perspective;  •  The second action point is to consider new service opportunities that the closer integration of TARGET2 and T2S would bring;  •  in particular, the Eurosystem is considering enhancing the TARGET2 services with instant payments, at least in the settlement layer;  •  Third, there are plans to review the harmonisation of Eurosystem arrangements and procedures for collateralisation;  •  The three action points are currently in the design phase, and it is expected that decisions on the actual implementation of the projects will be taken over the summer;  •  For all three action points, the Eurosystem will continue to work closely with the market in order to benefit from its knowledge and experience as well as to ensure that Europe’s future financial market infrastructure fully meets the needs of its users.