samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Banque de France played a central role in setting this agenda, notably through the creation of the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and its global secretariat. 3. The ECB also intends to step up its communication. As I often stress, communication is 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  fundamental for economic efficacy and for the transmission of monetary policy to all economic agents. Better-informed households and firms will also make better economic decisions. Our inflation targeting policy will be much more effective if economic agents understand it, adhere to it and believe in it, thus helping to better anchor inflation expectations. To this aim, a first step is our new Monetary Policy Statement, which is shorter and provides a clearer narrative of why we took our monetary policy decisions. Since effective speaking also means active listening, the Banque de France organised 17 listening events this year, both at national and regional levels, reaching out more than 300 000 French citizens. We discussed our mandate, the principles of monetary policy, and the effect of monetary policy on their daily lives. I have decided to make this an annual event. II. The current and future courses of inflation Let me now turn to the economic outlook. The robust euro area recovery has been helped by a successful combination of accommodative monetary and fiscal policies, both at national and EU levels.

Inadequate or inconclusive data in areas such as measuring financial literacy, consumer awareness and financial education means that it is difficult to assess the cost and benefit of the proposed policy framework and its impact on financial inclusion. Conclusion Allow me to now conclude my remarks. The successful implementation of policy work in the area of financial inclusion requires the availability of quality data. The fact that this area still remains relatively unexplored, compared to the availability of data for corporate business, financial markets and other more sophisticated aspects of finance, clearly suggests that much work remains to be done. The magnitude and scope of the topic also requires a diverse group of policymakers to collaborate on a long-term basis. The establishment of a working group to improve the quality of financial inclusion data is therefore most timely, and will benefit policymakers in making better and more informed policies, as well as tracking the outcome of policy initiatives. In addition, it may also serve to increase the visibility new issues areas which are currently not being given sufficient priority by policymakers. I would also like to encourage the working group to consider, in the longer term, the development of some form of a composite financial inclusion index. The composite index will  2  BIS Review 88/2010  benefit everyone by providing a broad measure of trends, facilitate comparisons between distinct segments and create a benchmark for policy work in financial inclusion.
Fifth, the complexity of many of these structured products and the risks involved were simply beyond the comprehension of the ordinary investors and perhaps even the professional investors who did not have the time to look into the fine details of the financial arrangements. And so the rating agencies were relied upon, for a fee, to provide an objective view, or rather a rating that was as objective as it could be under the circumstances. But we all noticed the instability of these ratings, some falling from AAA to junk within a short time span, which threw doubt not so much on the integrity of the rating agencies – they are respectable organisations essential to the functioning of the financial system and they do a good job generally – but, in my view, on the appropriateness of the models that they used. Relative ratings comparing the risks of different financial structures do not throw light on the absolute level of risk when different structures are taken together. This I think requires a wider market or general equilibrium view, taking account of the behaviour of the entire economy and the financial markets in particular. Sixth, then, the structured products containing sub-prime mortgages were given the necessary qualifications to get into the hands of different investors, high net-worth individuals who probably can assume the risk and take the hit, leveraged hedge funds that may be a lot more vulnerable, financial institutions with surplus liquidity, and so on.

I should of course start by re-iterating the firm HKSARG policy of keeping our exchange rate to the US dollar within the range of 7.75 to 7.85 through the linked exchange rate system, characterised by currency board arrangements that require our monetary base, and any changes in it, to be 100% backed by US dollars. With the weakening US dollar and the strengthening renminbi; with the local inflation rate, excluding the temporary effects of tax relief, edging higher; with an “asset bubble” on the lips of many commentators; with the exchange rate hitting the strong side Convertibility Undertaking late last month, requiring our passive and un-sterilised foreign exchange intervention, injecting quite a lot of Hong Kong dollar liquidity into the inter-bank market; and with current US monetary policy possibly becoming inappropriate for Hong Kong; questions have understandably been raised on the appropriateness of the system. Let me provide answers to these questions. First, the appropriateness of the linked exchange rate system should be judged by its ability to deliver monetary and financial stability in Hong Kong through economic cycles, and should not be judged by the short-term cyclical conditions of the economy relative to that of the US economy. The linked exchange rate system has served Hong Kong extremely well since its establishment.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  behind the creation of a single system with a single resolution authority and single resolution fund, in line with the proposal by the European Commission for a single resolution mechanism. The resolution fund is to be entirely financed ex ante by the financial industry itself so as to protect the European taxpayer. Still, until the fund is fully built up or for exceptional circumstances, it should be able to obtain external funds via a backstop. Here, the feasibility of a credit line from the European Stability Mechanism could be explored. Any such backstop should be temporary in nature and compensated by ex post levies on the banking sector ensuring that the fund is fiscally neutral over the medium term. A banking union with these elements in place has the potential to delink banks and sovereigns, not least by following an important principle: bail-in precedes bail-out. This will ensure that shareholders and unsecured creditors according to the hierarchy of their claims are the first to bear losses, not the taxpayers. Monetary policy Speaking in my capacity as a central banker, let me finally come to the role of monetary policy in the deleveraging process. To counter the risks from disorderly deleveraging, the swift cuts in ECB policy rates and our non-standard measures were key. Fixed-rate full allotment and longer-term refinancing operations stabilised financial markets early on and counteracted the risks from fire sales by providing liquidity where it was most needed.

As regards the sector’s capacity and the size of banks, staff and office numbers fell by around 12%, standing at similar figures to those as at end-2004, and the average size of banks in terms of their assets increased twofold. Yet this progress was not enough to restore investors’ confidence in the soundness of our banking system. Given the double-dip recession, the insufficient reduction in the budget deficit and the continuing effects of the sovereign debt crisis, doubts persisted about the quality of construction and real estate development-related assets. In an attempt to dispel this uncertainty, various measures were adopted in the first half of 2012. Furthering the principles that have governed the ongoing restructuring of the financial system, the measures addressed accelerating the clean-up of bank balance sheets, reinforcing their solvency, boosting integration processes and promoting transparency. RDL 2/2012, approved in February, stipulated an increase in provisioning for construction and real estate development-related assets, and the creation of a capital buffer to cover potential losses arising on problem loans associated with land and ongoing developments. More recently, in May 2012, the Government approved RDL 18/2012, on the clean-up and sale of financial-sector real estate assets. The aim was to dispel doubts over the quality of Spanish credit institutions’ non-doubtful real estate portfolio. To do this, provisions for construction and real estate development-related assets not classified as troubled have been raised substantially, bringing forward the impact of potential additional impairment to this portfolio.
Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s latest economic and financial developments Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision-Making of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 30 October 2013. *  *  *  Today, on 30 October 2013, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania reviewed and approved the quarterly Monetary Policy Report. Based on the most recent monetary and economic developments in Albania, and following the discussions on their outlook, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged, at 3.5%. The Council notes that the inflationary pressures deriving from the real and financial sectors of the economy are weak and will continue to remain so. These circumstances require the stimulating monetary policy to persist in the period ahead. The monetary stimulus, transmitted through the low key interest rate and continuous injection of liquidity, provides the required conditions for meeting our medium-term inflation target. Let me now proceed with an overview of the economic developments and key issues discussed at today’s meeting. *** The Albanian economy was characterised by slow economic growth and weak inflationary pressures throughout 2013. Economic growth slowed down to 1.1% in the second quarter, while available information suggests weak economic activity will continue in the third quarter. The weak private demand offset the increasing positive impulses generated by the fiscal stimulus and foreign demand, in the first half of the year.

The Bank of Albania will continue to supply the banking system with adequate liquidity for the smooth functioning of financial markets. *** At the end of discussions, the Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged, at 3.5%. The Supervisory Council deems that the current monetary conditions are adequate to meet our medium-term inflation target, and provide the monetary stimulus necessary to recover the domestic private demand. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
When risks are unknown or ill-defined, the market cannot allocate resources in an efficient and profitable manner. Until recently, reliable information on how companies were anticipating, responding or failing to respond to climate-related risks and opportunities has been hard to find, inconsistent and fragmented. 2  For a full list of current supporters see: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/tcfd-supporters-march-2018/ and supporters at the Paris Summit see: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/TCFD-Press-Release-One-Planet-Summit-12-Dec-2017_FINAL.pdf 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  The information needed goes beyond the static to the strategic. Markets need information to assess which companies are well positioned to seize the opportunities the transition to a low carbon economy brings. Which car manufacturers are leading the way on fuel efficiency and electrification? How are energy companies adapting their mix of energy sources? This needs to be considered against investors’ views of possible transition paths – the International Energy Agency’s Sustainable Development Scenario, for example, sees the consumption of natural gas rise by nearly 20% by 2030 to become the largest single fuel 3  in the global mix. Given the uncertainties around climate, not everyone will agree on the timing or scale of the adjustments required. And different people will have different views about the effectiveness of timelines of government climate policies. The right information allows sceptics and evangelists alike to back their convictions with their capital. At the same time as this increased investor focus, there have been signs that global companies are becoming increasingly aware of the risks climate change can pose.

The good news is that governments are now establishing the policy frameworks, and the private sector is beginning to allocate capital accordingly. Our efforts will help smooth the transition prompted by these actions. With better information and risk management as the foundations, a virtuous circle is being built with better understanding of tomorrow’s risks, better pricing for investors, better decisions by policymakers and a smooth transition to a low carbon economy. Financing the transition to a low carbon economy is a major opportunity for investors and creditors. It implies a sweeping technological revolution, including investments in long-term infrastructure at roughly quadruple the current rate. As this event testifies, climate finance and risk management is moving into the mainstream. There has been a transition in thinking. And this is now beginning to be translated into action, and the NGFS will play an important role in this. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9
As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve System. 1 The economic outlook Turning first to the economic outlook, the real GDP growth rate appears to have slowed sharply during the first half of 2015. Based on the revision we received last week, firstquarter real GDP fell by 0.7 percent at an annualized rate. Although most projections anticipate a pickup in growth to around 2 percent or slightly higher in the current quarter, there is little question that economic growth has slowed significantly from last year’s secondhalf pace. What’s going on? Why has growth slowed and what does this portend for the remainder of the year? As I see it, the contraction in GDP growth in the first quarter represents a mix of factors. These include another unseasonably cold and snowy winter, a sharp contraction in oil and gas investment, a deterioration in the trade balance due – in large part – to the stronger dollar and sluggish foreign demand, and a slowdown in consumer spending growth after a very strong fourth quarter. After adjusting for weather effects, I think seasonal adjustment issues probably also played some role. For example, real defense spending has declined eight times in the past nine years in the first quarter, suggesting there is a seasonal adjustment issue. But I judge that this has had only a modest effect on measured real GDP growth.

When the normalization process starts and we raise the target range for the federal funds rate, what should we anticipate? I anticipate a smooth lift-off in terms of the ability of the FOMC to push the federal funds rate up into a higher range. Less clear is what the financial market reaction will be. Will it be more like the turbulent taper tantrum of 2013 in response to Chairman Bernanke’s remarks that we might at some point begin to taper our asset purchases, or the benign response when the FOMC actually tapered in 2014? Let me consider these two issues in turn. I am very confident that the Federal Reserve has the tools in place to ensure that the FOMC can successfully raise the federal funds rate into a new, higher target range when the time comes to do so. This reflects several factors. Most importantly, we have demonstrated that the interest rate paid on banks’ reserve balances (IOER) – which is our primary tool to raise the federal funds rate target – and daily overnight reverse repo (ON RRP) operations – which is a supplementary tool to help put a floor under money market rates – have been effective in keeping the federal funds rate well within the FOMC’s desired target range.
In addition and as a crucial complement to its operational responsibilities, the Markets Group has responsibility for monitoring and analyzing financial markets. These activities serve to support existing operations and provide vital knowledge as new types of operations are contemplated. They also supply an important source of unique market intelligence for policymakers on developments in an array of financial markets that could affect the economy or have policy implications. These efforts tend to focus on understanding broad financial market conditions, expectations for monetary policy and the real economy, and financial stability risks. My use of the phrase “market monitoring” is intended to capture much more than following prices and trading activity in asset markets and conversing with market participants globally about the causes behind market developments, as important as that is. It includes broader responsibility for analyzing both immediate and longer-term trends in global financial markets and linkages among financial institutions, and it rests upon a deep understanding of the microstructure of financial instruments and markets and of the motivations of market participants.2 By maintaining deep expertise in particular asset classes and detailed knowledge of market behavior and infrastructure, the Desk is able to structure and execute operations to achieve the objectives of policymakers. This deep expertise also enhances the quality of the information and staff assessments about current market developments that is communicated to policymakers throughout the Federal Reserve System through a variety of briefings, conversations and written products.

In order to illustrate some of the lessons learned from the crisis, I offer two different perspectives: first as a research economist trying to make sense out of the initial phases of the crisis in real time and mostly failing; and second as a central banker directly observing and trying to counteract the panic that took hold of global financial markets in September 2008. My observations will further underscore the absolute criticality of a central bank’s interactions with financial markets as a basis for properly diagnosing financial disruptions that threaten the economy and developing effective remedies. In an immediate response to the onset of the crisis in August 2007, the New York Fed began to hold an in-depth discussion every afternoon about the day’s developments. These discussions involved staff from all parts of the Bank and were usually led by Tim Geithner, the president of the New York Fed at that time. In addition to a summary of market developments, prices and liquidity conditions, staff would bring information from across a spectrum of financial institutions and market participants, the kind of information that throughout the crisis period would prove to be invaluable to policy makers. In addition to sharing information from across the Bank, discussions at these meetings would aim to synthesize diverse information gleaned from markets or if no synthesis was available generate new questions for the staff to gain intelligence on.
Sweden is not alone in changing its approach to economic stabilisation policy. A similar change of course has taken place in country after country – in fact, this took place very late in Sweden – in which context the deregulation of the financial markets nationally and internationally played a crucial role. Sweden’s economic successes during this century are the result of an openness towards the surrounding world, a large foreign trade, and the growth of large multinational companies. It would not have been possible to adopt a completely different approach than liberalisation of foreign exchange legislation and the capital market without very large costs for Sweden. It can therefore be said that the alternative to the new approach to economic policy would not have been feasible. However, this also says that when the present economic order changes, then Sweden will follow the tide. No economic policy regime lasts forever. To date we can distinguish at least five distinct regimes/epochs this century. History has not come to an end. 6. Conclusion The principles I have outlined above are illustrated by the Riksbank’s policy this spring. At the special monetary policy meeting on 2 November, the repo rate was at 3.4 per cent. The Riksbank noted then that at that interest rate inflation would be less than the target of two per cent in one or two years’ time.

The shift to a new policy took place between 1993 and 1995. 3  BIS Review 59/1999  However, it should be added with regard to the failed defence of the krona, that experiences of free capital movements were not especially extensive. The Government and the Riksbank and political analysts in Sweden did not have any experience of the conditions for economic policy in a globalised world. The new stabilisation policy regime The Government formulated the goal for monetary policy itself in January 1993. Inflation was to be maintained at two per cent per year with a tolerance interval of +/- 1 per cent. The goal is symmetric. It is as important to bring inflation up to two per cent when actual inflation is under two per cent as it is to bring down inflation when it is higher than the target. This can be said but a lot of practical issues remained to be resolved and the answers are not at all obvious: 1. How is inflation to be measured: by CPI, the GDP deflator, or some other measure of price movements? 2. Shall the Riksbank have other objectives besides price stability? 3. Shall policies be directed at controlling the money supply or inflation directly? 4. How is confidence to be established in the Riksbank’s policy and expectations about low inflation? 1. The inflation target The Riksbank’s objectives has been expressed in the following way in legislation: “The objective of the Riksbank’s operations shall be to maintain price stability.