samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Page 25 of 27  Table 3 Structural parameters Long-term copper price  Long-term oil price (dollars per barrel)  (dollars per pound)  Trend non-mining GDP next 10 years  Nominal neutral MPR (percent)  Technical mínimum MPR (percent)  (annual change, percent)  Dec-15/Mar-21  Dec-15/Mar-21  Jun-19/Mar-21  Jun-19/Mar-21  Jul-09/Mar-21  2.7  70  3.25-3.75  3.75-4.25  0.5  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  3.3  60  2.4-3.4  3.25-3.75  0.5  Source: Central Bank of Chile. ***  Page 26 of 27

In terms of the migration to e-payments, the insurance and takaful sector is a key sector where the usage of cheques is still prevalent. In 2016, 2.3 million cheques were issued by insurance and takaful companies while 9.8 million cheques were collected by such companies from their customers. While good progress has been made this year with the decline in cheque collection accelerating from -0.5% in 2016 to -22.1% in the first 7 months of 2017, more effective and creative measures are needed to drive cheque usage to negligible levels. To this end, Bank Negara Malaysia has recently concluded a consultation exercise with the industry on the implementation of an ePayment Incentive Fund Framework (ePIF). Under the framework, insurance companies shall set aside RM3 for every cheque issued and RM1 for every cheque collected to be used as incentives to encourage their customers, agents, service providers and government agencies to migrate to e-payments. The current practice where agents collect premiums from customers in cash and make payment to insurance and takaful companies using the agencies’ own cheques or credit cards should stop. The industry should promote greater prudence and transparency in the collection of customer premiums by facilitating customers to make direct payments to the insurance and takaful companies. To this end, the industry equipping agents with mobile point-of-sale (mPOS) or mobile apps to collect payment directly from customers should be the norm. Thirdly, the industry needs to collaborate and invest in key market infrastructure and arrangements.
A series of factors can account for this behaviour. Some are transitory, such as the insufficient increase in employment, or the impact of deleveraging processes in some economies. But there are 4/7  also factors of a more structural nature, including the effect of globalisation and technological progress, or demographic factors. In any event, it should be stressed that there are other policies apart from monetary policy. In particular, both fiscal policy and structural reforms have a key role to play in supporting demand, boosting real interest rates and raising productivity and potential growth. Regarding monetary policy, the central question is this: to what extent should the macroeconomy of the “new normal” lead to a new “conventional model” for monetary policy? In particular, it is considered whether the management of the central bank’s balance sheet will become entrenched as a permanent part of the normal instruments of monetary policy. Estimates, while subject to major uncertainty, suggest that real interest rates and inflation will remain at low levels, meaning that nominal rates will also be low, thereby limiting their effectiveness as a monetary policy instrument. Against this background, central banks are likely to retain the use of unconventional monetary policies. Analysis of these policies is leading to debate, as yet inconclusive, on their effectiveness, the optimal size of central bank balance sheets and on the impact that they might have in terms of financial stability and the medium- and long-term fiscal situation.

•  Most notably, the country would import the ECB’s credibility, which could possibly lead to a lower inflation rate. •  Euroisation would also eliminate exchange rate risk. In turn, the country in question may benefit from lower interest rates. •  On the micro-economic side, euroisation would lead to lower transaction costs, and might provide a boost to trade and financial integration. These benefits can, however, not be taken for granted. Most of these benefits can indeed only be reaped if they are supported by sound economic policies. •  For instance, inflation may still be running high in case of pro-cyclical fiscal and wage policies. Accordingly, euroisation cannot be a substitute for stability-oriented policies. •  Again, this underlines the importance of having in place a stability-oriented macroeconomic framework, such as the one established at EU level. What are the possible costs and risks of euroisation? •  First of all, the country in question may face an inappropriate monetary policy stance in case of diverging business cycles. The loss of an independent monetary policy and the exchange rate instrument may make it more difficult for the country in question to respond to idiosyncratic shocks, or to correct a loss of competitiveness. •  The country in question could also run into logistical difficulties, since it would exclusively depend upon private arrangements with credit institutions for a number of key services, such as banknote handling and the execution of high-value payments.
All-items HICP reached 7,5 per cent in March from 5,9 per cent in February. The rising inflation, is increasing the production costs of firms and is eroding disposable income. The war has heightened the uncertainty of future price developments and the pace with which supply bottlenecks will recede. In parallel, new pandemic restrictive measures in China, for example the closing of the city of Shanghai and its port, which is considered the busiest port in the world, also accentuate supply chain difficulties. Energy prices, which were driven even higher after the outbreak of the war, now stand 45 per cent above their level one year ago and continue to constitute the main reason for the high level of inflation. Overall, inflation pressures are projected to remain strong in the shortterm undermining business and consumer confidence. The main challenge for monetary policy now is to control inflation without jeopardising economic recovery. This requires careful attention of all these elevated uncertainties and their implications on the evolving economic outlook. The complication is that the inflation pressures result mainly from the supply side shocks which cannot be remedied via monetary policy. Higher interest rates will neither restore supply chains nor reduce energy prices. For this reason, at the ECB Governing Council, we have already began adjusting certain monetary policy instruments such as the Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme and the Asset Purchasing Programme, reducing significantly the bonds bought by the national central banks of the euro area members states. In other words monetary tightening has already begun.

As a macroeconomist whose work is grounded in thorough analysis, and a profound knowledge of models and data, he also takes into account the policy implications of the findings of his research. This is an important factor as he is a pioneer who has done groundbreaking work, and his research frequently encourages others. In this respect his work on the global decline in labour’s share of income has prompted a number of papers from academia and different institutions so as to understand this change over time and its implications for income distribution and productivity. Similarly, his work on capital allocation and productivity in Southern Europe has been widely influential. Mr. Karabarbounis, congratulations on my behalf and on that of the Banco de España. 2
Spain has followed the lead of the developed countries, and you should rest assured that CCM will meet all its commitments to depositors and other creditors. Second, the Maastricht Treaty prevents central banks from extending emergency liquidity assistance to an ailing institution, such as CCM, without the appropriate collateral. Given the amounts that might have to be committed, the Spanish Treasury had to provide explicit guarantees to the central bank, so as not to infringe the Treaty’s prohibition on central banks extending "monetary financing" to public Treasuries. *** Having explained the substance of and the reasons behind the urgent replacement of CCM’s directors, allow me to offer greater details on the Banco de España’s past supervisory measures in relation to CCM and its current situation. Before that, however, I should highlight what is a primordial starting point: CCM is a credit institution with a positive net worth. That is to say, and in the vernacular of the press, the institution has no "hole" in its balance sheet. Yet this does not mean it is not facing serious problems, the cause of which must be sought in an inappropriate management of risk and a forceful business expansion – especially in the real estate sector – funded largely through resort to the international bond markets, generating sizable imbalances. Past experience shows that these credit expansion policies are very dangerous if unaccompanied by the related risk control measures since, generally, they usually entail a relaxing of credit standards. Responsibility for these decisions falls on CCM's previous directors.

In view of this delicate situation and since the problem is a pressing one, the Banco de España, with the Government’s agreement, decided it was necessary to provide additional financing to CCM to preserve its stability. To this end, the Government granted backing to the loan, for a maximum amount of € billion, extended by the Banco de España. I would like to underscore this point. As reiterated by the Second Deputy Prime Minister at the press conference following the meeting of the Council of Ministers last Sunday, I should stress that we forecast that approximately € billion of this amount will be used. Nevertheless, our room for manoeuvre will make managing the payments more flexible, without any constraints in respect of the amounts involved. Developments in CCM’s liquidity in the three days it has been under the control of the Banco de España nominees have proven more positive than expected. Given the response by all the government authorities involved, management cooperation, the reaction of the trade unions and understanding on the part of the general public, there have been no queues or panic at branches and there have clearly been fewer withdrawals of deposits than foreseen. Having briefly outlined CCM’s current position, let me move on to the ultimate aim of the Banco de España’s supervisory decisions. While seemingly obvious, the Supervisor’s aims are to protect depositors’ savings and creditors, to avoid market turmoil and to preserve the stability of the financial system as a whole.
Villeroy de Galhau, F., Anchors and catalysts: central banks’ dual role in innovation, speech, 27 September 2022 ii Three progress reports are publicly available on the ECB website, the third and latest of which was released on 24 April 2023 iii European central bank, Digital euro – Prototype summary and lessons learned, 26 May 2023 iv The Eurosystem will not know any details of any transaction v The European Commission’s legislative proposal on retail CBDC is expected on 28 June 2023 vi be it for account holding, payments or access to a mobile app vii Villeroy de Galhau, F., Big techs in finance: a bildungsroman that is far from over, speech, 9 February 2023 viii Panetta, F., A digital euro: widely available and easy to use, speech, 24 April 2023 i

To refer only to big projects some have been finalized, as it is the case of the Danube-Black Sea Canal, which runs from Cernavodă, on the Danube, to Constanţa (southern arm, as main branch), and to Năvodari (northern arm), on the Black Sea. Other big projects are still in progress, such as the Danube–Bucharest Canal, a 73-kilometre long canal project that is planned to link Bucharest to the Danube via Argeş River. Thus, at the completion of this project Danube could become home for five capitals, including Bucharest. This conference has two main objectives. One is to bring together Romanian financial sector representatives and project initiators; the other one is to find appropriate financial instruments to better highlight the remarkable business potential of the lower Danube basin. I do hope this conference is going to offer you all the opportunity for successful networking and may you find appropriate solutions for vital issues regarding the agenda. I desire you all success with the materialization and accomplishment of your present and future projects and I conclude by wishing all the foreign guests at this conference a good stay in Romania. I am now giving the floor to Mr Kurt Puchinger, Coordinator of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region and chair of the first session, to start the conference. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
This prediction is supported by empirical studies that have examined the premium that investors pay for inflation protection both in the United States and elsewhere. For example, a study by Brian Sack of Macroeconomic Advisors finds that forward breakeven inflation rates increase as maturity lengthens. In contrast, the level of survey-based measures of inflation expectations is quite constant beyond a time horizon of a few years. This means that the difference between forward breakeven inflation and inflation expectations climbs as the time horizon extends. This strongly suggests that the premium investors pay for inflation protection increases as maturities lengthen. Second, it may make sense to structure the TIPS program in a way that would help reduce the illiquidity premium associated with TIPS relative to on-the-run nominal Treasuries. Some of the current illiquidity premium is likely to shrink as financial markets stabilize. However, further improvements may require a change in either the structure of the TIPS program or the secondary market trading environment. On that note, I leave you with two outstanding questions: 1)  What are the best ways for the U.S. Treasury and the trading community to improve secondary market liquidity in TIPS? 2)  Given that TIPS appear attractive for the U.S. Treasury, what is the optimal allocation of the Treasury’s liability portfolio between TIPS and nominal securities? Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 14/2009

Changes in monetary and financial conditions Overall, monetary conditions are a reflection of our expansionary policy, especially with respect to interest rates and the monetary aggregates. BIS Review 167/2009  1  The Libor is currently at the level targeted since March this year, i.e. 25 basis points, a level which can be regarded as a floor. The fact that it was impossible to bring the rate down any lower than this led us, in March, to introduce other instruments in order to make our monetary policy as expansionary as the circumstances demanded. Monetary conditions have become more expansionary via the interest rate channel in particular. Indeed, credit premia on the capital markets have declined steadily since the beginning of the year. As yields on Confederation bonds have remained low, other long-term yields have also trended downwards. It has thus become cheaper for companies to raise funds by borrowing on the capital market. In addition, our figures show that financing in the form of bank loans has also become more attractive following the decline in the Libor. In real terms – i.e. after factoring in expected inflation – interest rates are even lower. The Swiss franc has appreciated slightly in trade-weighted terms, as a result of the recent weakening of the dollar. However, it has remained stable against the euro, which shows that the monetary policy followed since March has been effective.
26  The fact that such  financial cycles tend to be slow-moving – operating at longer frequency than the monetary policy horizon or even the business cycle – considerably complicates trade-off management. 27  Although by no means the sole  culprit, the absence of a body with a remit and tools to promote the stability of the financial system as a whole was a major gap in the UK’s policy framework. 28  In a sense, prior to the global financial crisis, the  macroeconomic loss function was incomplete. The principal remedy has been the establishment of the independent Financial Policy Committee (FPC) at the Bank, with a remit “to protect and enhance the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom.” The Chancellor’s remit to the FPC defines this as relating “primarily to the identification of, monitoring of, and taking of action to remove or reduce systemic risks”, as long as its actions would be unlikely “to have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term.”  29  To achieve these objectives, the FPC has a range of tools, including  the countercyclical capital buffer banks are required to maintain, together with the ability to set limits on mortgage underwriting standards, such as maximum permissible debt-to-income or loan-to-value ratios. The FPC is the first line of defence against financial stability risks.

17 Inferring policy preferences from the MPC’s published forecasts in this way is not necessarily straightforward, however, because the MPC’s forecasts are conditioned on the market-implied path for interest rates. Implicitly, then, the assumption would be that the MPC’s forecasts and reaction function are, on average, well understood by the market. 18 This assumes a Phillips Curve slope, 𝜅, of ½. The lines of best fit in Charts 1 and 2 have slopes of around minus 0.3 for the period as a whole and minus 0.55 over the post-crisis period. With a value of 𝜅 = 0.5, this suggests 𝜆 of between 0.1 and 0.2 for the whole period and 𝜆 of around ¼ for the crisis period alone. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  10  To put this into some context, consider the stated and revealed preferences of the FOMC. Chair Yellen has referred to a “balanced approach” to trade-off management, implying equal weights on inflation deviations and the unemployment gap. 19  Econometric studies for the US provide a range of estimates for lambda,  centred around ½ albeit with significant estimation uncertainty, with some studies finding evidence that the FOMC’s implied lambda has also varied over time. 20  4. Why there isn’t a simple rule to achieve society’s inflation objective? This exercise illustrates how the MPC has sought to do what society has asked.
Much has been said, and, more importantly, achieved in the area of transparency in recent years. There has been an explosion of codes and standards on different aspects of economic and financial policy in recent years. So much so, that some countries are claiming that the process needs to slow down. It is certainly important to recognise that the appropriate codes and standards for a country at one stage of economic development may not be appropriate to countries at other stages. I say advisedly "may", because in each individual case the argument has to be made. But if it is accepted that codes and standards are likely to reflect different stages of development, then it is even more important that countries make clear to which codes and standards they are actually adhering. That is why countries should not be able to opt out of "transparency about transparency". Following the production of pilot transparency reports on a number of countries, including the UK and Argentina, the IMF has now made rapid progress in producing reports on the observance of standards and codes (ROSCs). As of April 2001, 110 ROSC modules had been completed for 43 countries, of which 76 have been published covering 31 countries. India has recently had a ROSC published on fiscal transparency. It is critical that monitoring of the observance of standards and codes be fully integrated into IMF surveillance under Article IV. Here implementation is urgent.

On its part, the Bank of Zambia, working with several stakeholders, including Bankers Association of Zambia, has over the years made progress in modernising the payment system. The information technology which serves as a major platform for modern payment systems to operate has also advanced. These developments have set the stage for the development of innovative payment systems capable of serving consumers in a cost effective way. Further, the growth of the number of players as well as the increasing number of initiatives require a robust supporting legal infrastructure to govern the payment system. To this end, the National Payment Systems Act No.1 (NPSA) was enacted in 2007. The NPSA empowered the Bank of Zambia to develop and implement the national payment systems policy so as to promote the efficiency, stability and safety of the Zambian financial system. The Bank of Zambia thus designates players wishing to provide payment services such as money transfer services, mobile banking and other payment services. This process has strengthened the capacity of the BoZ to monitor transactions and to ensure that only safe and efficient institutions are allowed to provide payment services. Distinguished Guests, allow me to conclude by congratulating Ecobank Zambia Limited for the innovative products that we are launching today. We hope that our people can send and receive money conveniently, safely, and at a reasonable cost. I also wish to call upon all banks and financial institutions to emulate Ecobank by introducing such products which contribute to increasing access to banking services for the Zambian people.
3  In the March projections, the energy and inflation compensatory fiscal measures are expected to have a downward impact of 0.3 percentage points on HICP inflation in 2023, and to have an upward impact of around 0.5 percentage points in 2024 and 0.2 percentage points in 2025 on their withdrawal. 3  Let me move now to the second input, underlying inflation dynamics, which serve as a complementary cross-check of our forecast. Core inflation, which excludes energy and food prices, is a standard indicator of underlying inflationary pressures. Over 2022, core inflation averaged 3.9%, and reached 5.7% in March 2023, an all-time high. Meanwhile, the core inflation outlook for 2023 has been successively revised upwards in recent staff projections exercises, from 2.8% in June 2022, to 3.4% in September, 4.2% in December and 4.6% in the most recent exercise in March of this year. In the current environment, the indirect effects from past commodity price increases, which have been much larger than expected, are a first key driver of core inflation.

13  Ferrucci, Jiménez-Rodríguez and Onorante (2012, , "Food price pass-through in the Euro Area: Non-linearities and the role of the common agricultural policy" International Journal of Central Banking ) find asymmetries between positive and negative shocks in the food inputs, Borrallo, Cuadro and Pérez (2023, forthcoming) confirm these results for the euro area by extending the sample to the present time. In the case of oil, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011, Quantitative Economics, "Are the responses of the U.S. economy asymmetric in energy price increases and decreases?") show that there are no significant asymmetries in the United States. However, Garzón and Hierro (2021, Economic Modelling " Asymmetries in the transmission of oil price shocks to inflation in the Eurozone") find that asymmetries do exist in the euro area. 14  According to the ECB's March forecast, nominal wage growth, as measured by compensation per employee, will increase from 4.6% in 2022 to 5,3% in 2023, before declining to 4,4% in 2024 and 3,6% in 2025. 15  This has happened in a context of a sharp increase in public employment, whose growth has accounted for about half of total employment growth since the end of 2019. 16  The ECB experimental tracker of negotiated wages shows a clear upward shift in wage increases agreed for 2022 and 2023. Contract negotiations during 2022 delivered wage increases around 4,4% and 4,8% for 2022 and 2023 respectively, with higher increases the more recent the agreement is.