samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For the private consumers, the most significant advantage may be convenience: just imagine that you receive your invoices electronically and can directly initiate their payments with one tick or click. This is already reality in some countries, but should become available across SEPA. Even more benefits are possible for corporates, since settling paper invoices is usually a very cost-intensive process. Just imagine that 97.5% of all invoices worldwide are estimated to be paper-based! Let’s think about the average unit cost for a biller per invoice and the average unit cost for a payer. Incoming invoices need to be copied, forwarded, entered into different systems and stored – i.e. touched and managed by a large number of hands and transported physically between all of them. These procedures – and also potential mistakes happening along the handling chain – can be significantly changed by introducing electronic invoices that allow seamless automated handling, including direct links e.g. to payment functions. Approximately 27 billion invoices per annum are being produced in the EU. It is obvious that any change leading to their more efficient handling quickly results in billions of possible savings per year for the European economy. How to foster the development of European E-Invoicing has become an important topic for the European Commission, who is currently setting up an official working group to coordinate the standardisation approaches, to address the legal barriers as well as issues of trust and operational risk.. Let me now briefly conclude.

In Germany, for example, I have noticed that some of the larger banks have begun an advertising campaign on SEPA. I encourage other communities to follow these examples. Let me also be clear on one related point: Banks should not try “misusing” SEPA, and blaming SEPA for any unpleasant changes. In that case, we could end up with a similar debate on perceived price increases as we did after the introduction of the euro. This would help nobody – neither the industry nor the customers. Second, the industry should be clearer on the timetable for the “dual circulation” period of its instruments. The request for clarity on the end date also comes from end-user associations. Interesting in this respect is the ECB’s recent study in cooperation with the banking industry analysing the economic impact of SEPA. 2 The study confirms that two main forces will come to play. On the one hand, cross-border competition and new market participants could affect the revenue side of banks. On the other, automation and electronic processes will enable banks to achieve efficiency gains and cost reductions. The study concludes that the dual implementation phase of SEPA should be as short as possible. As initial investments and higher adaptation costs are necessary in the short run, it is for the banks to decide how they will adapt to the new environment in the medium to long term. Indeed, a shorter changeover to SEPA will allow banks to focus more on their offering of innovative products in the medium to long term.
One obvious solution was to limit shareholder liability. This, it was felt, could broaden and deepen the pockets of the investor base, freeing up bank capital and credit. The United States had been an early-adopter, with Connecticut and Massachusetts permitting limited liability from 1817. Neighbouring states had quickly followed suit. Although limited liability had existed in parts of Europe from the 17th century, it was only during the second half of the 19th century that its tentacles spread widely.4 In the UK, wholesale change came with the Limited Liability Act and Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1855 and 1856. Interestingly, banking was slow off the mark. Limited liability status was at first not taken up enthusiastically. Bankers appeared to prize unlimited liability. It served as a safety certificate  2  Cleary (1965), Collins (1988). 3  Turner (2009). 4  Hickson and Turner (2005). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  for depositors, a badge of prudence. “A depositor would be much more likely to trust his money with a bank whose shareholders he knew must yield up to him the uttermost farthing”. This from the lips of a banking expert of the day.5 But unlimited liability in banking remained under attack. Walter Bagehot believed its risk benefits were illusory as many shareholders did not possess so much as the “uttermost farthing”. Bagehot believed unlimited liability generated its own incentive problem: the wealthy assumed too much risk for the control they could exercise, dissuading them from investing (Bagehot (1873)).

Thomas Jordan: Strong Swiss franc and large current account surplus – a contradiction? Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Institute of International Studies, Zurich, 19 February 2013. *  *  *  The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  For almost 18 months now, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has been enforcing the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro with the utmost determination. The need for this measure is widely recognised, both domestically and abroad, due to the substantial appreciation of the Swiss franc in summer 2011. At the same time, however, there are isolated voices claiming that given the large current account surplus, the Swiss franc is too weak, and that the SNB should allow the currency to appreciate in order to contribute towards reducing global imbalances. This view is based on a lack of knowledge about the situation in Switzerland. Specific factors are responsible for the Swiss current account surplus. The balance on the trading account, for instance, makes only a modest contribution. The most important elements with regard to the current account surplus are the following: first, investment income from Switzerland's substantial net international investment position, second, financial sector earnings from business with customers abroad, which is traditionally of significance for Switzerland, and third, earnings from merchanting, which have risen sharply over the past decade. The current account surplus is also statistically overestimated.
To protect the money in the stored value facilities, we propose that such float must be kept separate from the licensee’s other funds, and the float must be adequately protected by safeguarding measures, such as a bank guarantee or a trust account. 27. The proposed legal framework will also empower the Monetary Authority to designate major retail payment systems, such as global credit card schemes, to be put under its supervision. The designated systems would be subject to requirements such as risk management and control procedures relating to their operations, and measures to ensure the safety and integrity of customer data held in the system. 28. We believe the proposed legal and regulatory regime will foster the healthy development of m-commerce in Hong Kong. Results of public consultation conducted last year indicate that there is general support of the proposed regime by the key stakeholders. We aim to introduce the relevant bill into the Legislative Council in the next legislative session. V.  Conclusion  29. As the theme of today’s event suggests, the potential of m-commerce is there for all to tap with innovation, and I am sure there is plenty to tap by users and service providers. 30. The HKMA will continue to monitor market developments and, when appropriate, facilitate the industry efforts in harmonising the technical and safety standards. We will also ensure that the regulatory framework is effective in protecting consumer interests and maintaining financial stability. 31.

An important outcome is shown in this chart. The chart compares two different paths for consumption during a recession. The blue line shows the average path, while the yellow line shows the path following a period of high debt growth. The results confirm that high debt growth ahead of a recession leads to a deeper downturn. It also takes longer for the economy to recover. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Chart: Monetary policy and financial stability When financial imbalances are building up, the probability of a deep recession may increase. This is illustrated in this chart by the blue lines. The uncertainty bands around inflation and the output gap are highly assymetrical. Monetary policy can dampen vulnerabilities by keeping the interest rate somewhat higher than would otherwise have been the case – in other words, by “leaning against the wind”. This policy is illustrated by the red lines. By keeping the interest rate higher, the risk of a deep economic downturn is reduced. The uncertainty bands are more narrow and symmetric. But this policy also entails a short-term cost: capacity utilisation is lower, and inflation may stay below target. The aim of “leaning against the wind” is to achieve an improved path for inflation, output and employment over time. This is in line with our central bank mandate. Flexible inflation targeting with a sufficiently long horizon should take financial stability into account if the situation so allows and so warrants.
Various jurisdictions in Asia such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Indonesia have used macroprudential measures to reduce risks to their domestic financial systems and to dampen the impact of economic shocks, such as the application of loan-to-value limits for mortgage borrowings. However, the detailed impact of macroprudential policies is arguably less well understood. 21 There are research challenges in this regard. For example, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) highlighted that the impact of tools are likely to vary across jurisdictions based on their domestic circumstances and phase of the financial cycle. A key focus area is how best to study the spillover impact across jurisdictions from a macroprudential policy decision point of view. 22 Another challenge relates to effectiveness. Macroprudential tools have largely been employed in more recent years, and isolating their effectiveness from other measures will require further studies. 23 In this context, it may be remiss of me not to mention the apparent artificial divide that has existed between the analysis of the financial vis-à-vis the real sides of the economy. During the GFC, I recall some criticism that economists used mathematical models that did not sufficiently factor the critical roles that banks and other financial institutions play in the economy. 24 Since then, important strides have been made, including in the workhorse Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models used at central banks, to better capture the key interactions between the financial sector and the rest of the economy.

Ong Chong Tee: The post-crisis financial landscape - what next? Remarks by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Society for Financial Studies Cavalcade Asia-Pacific Conference's Gala Dinner, Singapore, 13 December 2018. * * * Professor Laura Starks – President, Society for Financial Studies Professor Ron Masulis – Program Chair Professor Jun-Koo Kang – Associate Chair, Nanyang Technological University Professor Bernard Yeung – Dean and Stephen Riady Distinguished Professor, National University of Singapore, President, Asian Bureau of Financial & Economic Research Professor Massimo Massa – The Rothschild Chaired Professor of Banking, INSEAD Associate Professor Johan Sulaeman – Dean’s Chair, Department of Finance, NUS Business School Ladies and gentlemen, a very good evening. Thank you for inviting a few of my MAS colleagues and I to be here tonight. Introduction 1 The SFS Cavalcade conference is a distinguished forum that brings together some of the sharpest minds in the world of finance and research. 2 This evening, I thought I could share some perspectives of a financial regulator. My hope is to flag a few pertinent issues that could do well with more research insights and discussion. As the great Hungarian scientist Albert Szent-Gyorgyi once said: “Research is four things: brains with which to think, eyes with which to see, machines with which to measure and fourth, money”.
With single monetary policy, commitment not to bail-out heavily indebted member states is necessary to eliminate potential for moral hazard. However, the actual euro-area experience demonstrates strong incentives for sovereign fiscal policies to “trespass” on the prudent fiscal stance, either in the expectations of non-enforcement of the no bail-out clause, with the implicit assumption that sovereign default will be politically unacceptable, or through a direct support of common monetary authority through special monetary operations. This uneasy triangle is usually referred to as the fiscal trilemma of the monetary union. Such a “holy trinity” makes impossible the cohabitation of the independent monetary policy of a supranational central bank, national fiscal sovereignty and the no bailout clause 15. In order to ease the frictions stemming from national fiscal policies, the monetary framework of the euro area was reconstructed by implementing the elements of the banking union (the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism), setting up the European Stability Mechanism (ESM, previously the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF)) as well as by starting the ECB’s quantitative easing program (QE). All these mechanisms should help to decouple bank distress and sovereign debt pressures. 16 The described trilemmas in the European economic and monetary framework, with the still absent synchronisation of real and financial cycles, have given birth to a specific quadrilemma that demonstrates difficulties faced by policy makers in the euro area.

How do we at the Banque de France and the ACPR, given our role and experience as a supervisor, plan to address these new challenges? This is what I would like to briefly discuss with you today, after a quick recap of the regulatory framework for open banking and the lessons that can be drawn from it to guide the development of open finance. Part I: Openness and security A- As regards the assessment of and lessons learned from the regulatory framework for open banking, I would like to start by recalling: 1- The key principles that governed the sharing of payment data: on the one hand, the creation of appropriate statuses and, on the other, the strengthening of security requirements for access. The creation of the payment service or electronic money service provider status has fostered the emergence of an open banking ecosystem. The introduction of an agent status has also contributed to this process, by creating a gradual – proportionate – regulatory framework: it thus allows emerging players to test the suitability of their services with the market under the aegis of a licensed institution, before applying for a license themselves, if necessary. 2 – These developments have led to the rapid growth of Fintechs, drawing on their competitive advantages: speed, agility and responsiveness to customer needs.
This fragmentation has quite considerable consequences in terms of differences in the borrowing costs for households and firms according to their geographical location, which reflects the deficient functioning of the common monetary policy transmission mechanism and leads to highly destabilising imbalances between countries. This is why the banking union – whose aim is none other than to ensure the disappearance of the country-risk component of banking liabilities – has been seen as essential to ensure the stability of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  monetary union, radically altering the European authorities’ set of priorities. What is today a reasonably well-defined project was but a short time ago a mere concept in the minds only of the most visionary pro-Europeans. Single supervisory mechanism The first step towards creating the banking union is the start-up of a single supervisory mechanism, the Regulation for which has recently been approved. We cannot overstate the importance of this milestone: according to the Regulation, in less than one year the financial system of the euro area countries – and of the other EU countries that should decide to join – will come to be supervised by the single mechanism set up within the European Central Bank. In particular, significant banks – which account for 80% of the sector – will be directly overseen by the new European supervisory authority.

Important progress is also being made at the operational and business levels. The most notable example mentioned by many today is T2S, a project with huge potential for market integration. T2S will enable the participating CSDs to focus on value-added services while the basic settlement service is provided via the single T2S platform. T2S will thereby make it easier for business to move from one CSD to another. The actors that harmonise in T2S have a greater chance of reaping the full benefits of T2S and widening their business. Conversely, the European CSDs that do not harmonise may see the securities issued via their CSD being settled predominantly in another CSD participating in T2S. An area of opportunities mentioned several times by speakers today is collateral management. Some of the regulatory initiatives I mentioned before, aiming to enhance safety in financial markets, are generating greater demand for high-quality collateral. At the same time, the crisis is making this collateral scarcer: there has been a shift from unsecured to secured funding and greater recourse to central bank liquidity. The increased demand for collateral is prompting market participants as well as the Eurosystem to develop innovative ways to make better use of existing collateral, i.e. to make assets more easily available, when and where they are needed. Harmonisation in this area is crucial to facilitate the efficient mobilisation of collateral across Europe. Examples are the auto-collateralisation functionality that will be offered by the T2S platform and the several initiatives underway to establish tri-party settlement interoperability.
And the European Court of Justice has also put a question mark over the legitimacy of the ECB’s participation in it. For now, that is an opinion of the Advocate General, not a ruling of the Court. And therefore it is too early to be drawing conclusions. And it is also too early to establish what will happen in Greece in this respect. Was the ECB’s decision to start QE, a week ago, correct and timely in your opinion? It was the right decision, also in terms of timing – in the sense that it allowed us to prepare the operation from a technical point of view. We could not simply import the United States’ or United Kingdom’s experience. We needed to design our asset purchases based on our needs, which was also a useful process for gaining the approval of as many governors as possible. But in economic terms? Good timing in this regard, too. There are signs of economic growth returning and the price of oil has fallen, as has the exchange rate of the euro. And now monetary policy is sufficiently expansionary. All of the lights are green: 2015 could see significant growth and our surveys show that banks are passing on the reduction in interest rates to their customers more than they did in the past. Monetary policy is even more effective when it is not leaning against the wind. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Even without national reforms?

Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Corriere della Sera Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Corriere della Sera, conducted by Mr Danilo Taino on 27 January 2015. *  *  *  In the last few days you have said that Tsipras must “continue to pay”. I said that there’s dual responsibility. Greece must continue to abide by the rules of the game: we are a community of purpose. On the other hand, Europe has to accept the democratic change in Athens, even if it is based on policies that are different from the ones before. No renegotiation of Athen’s debt, then. Not even an extension of maturities? Greece’s debt is made up of various components. As regards the government bonds purchased by the ECB as part of the Securities Markets Programme launched in 2010, we cannot grant even an extension of maturities: it would be like granting a loan to the country and that is prohibited by the treaties. As regards loans given to Athens by European countries, that’s not for us to decide. You’re indifferent? No, I’m saying that any decision that is made must have a goal, namely for the reforms in Greece to continue. There will probably be different reforms from the ones expected, given that there’s now a new government. But we have to be consistent: the country still needs reforms. Tspiras says that the troika is now finished in Greece.
The financial results accumulated over time are therefore not quite as negative as indicated by the change in value this year.32 Table 2 and Table 3 show the accumulated financial results broken down by the different phases of the purchase programme and the different assets purchased.33 Table 2. Financial result of the Riksbank's purchases in the various phases Phase 1 (decisions 2015-2019) −5 Phase 2a (decisions March 2020 – June 2020) −24 Phase 2b (decisions November 2020 – June 2022) −19 Total −47 Note. SEK billion. Refers to total results since the start of the purchases and is based on market valuation on 30 November 2022. Most of the losses that now occur can be linked to purchases during and after the pandemic (phase 2). Government bonds have fallen more in value than covered bonds this year, despite the fact that the holdings were about the same at the beginning of the year. This is because government bonds, especially those purchased in phase 2, have a longer maturity and are therefore more sensitive to changes in interest rates. Otherwise, the losses in Table 3 reflect approximately the proportion of our holdings accounted for by each asset class. Table 3. Financial results of the Riksbank's purchases of different asset types Government bonds −20 Municipal bonds −6 Covered bonds −21 Corporate bonds 0 Total −47 Note. SEK billion. Refers to total results since the start of the purchases and is based on market valuation on 30 November 2022.

The arguments against a possible Swedish membership of the EMU have often touched on the opportunity to pursue an independent stabilisation policy. The starting point for this is that the Swedish economy could for one reason or another find itself out of synch with economic developments in the eurozone, what is known as an asymmetrical shock. Having an independent monetary policy and currency would then give us the opportunity to stabilise our economy ourselves - act as a form of shock-absorber, which we will lose if we have a joint monetary policy governed by the prospects for inflation and the business climate throughout the eurozone. This was also the primary reason why the Calmfors Commission's report on the consequences of 1 Swedish membership in the EMU came to the conclusion that Sweden should wait until its labour market and wage formation showed sufficient flexibility to deal with a serious disturbance. However, it should be noted that the Commission was envisaging a “small” eurozone with around 6 countries taking part, whereas now we are talking about 12 countries, representing 40-50 per cent of Sweden's trade. Moreover, in practice the Swedish business climate has rarely come seriously out of synch with the eurozone. When Sweden has done so, it has mainly been the result of mistakes in Sweden's own economic policy and not due to any unforeseeable external disturbance that has afflicted the Swedish economy.