samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It indicates that market movements around monetary policy meetings have been marginally smaller since we introduced our own interest rate forecasts in October 2005. Announcing the whole interest rate path has not resulted in more pronounced market reactions than before. Instead, the graph could be taken to mean that we have become somewhat more predictable overall. But other factors may also have contributed to smaller market movements: reduced volatility may also be related to the very low level of interest rates during recent years. [Chart: December 2013: Small market reactions after policy announcement] As I noted earlier, in a world of perfect and symmetric information, where the reaction pattern of the central bank is known to all, there would be no need for forward guidance. Agents would not pay any attention to our forecasts, as these would already be internalised in expectations and reflected in asset prices. But it is also the case in the real world that the better we are at communicating our reaction pattern, the less attention our forward guidance will receive. For this reason, it will be hard to identify the contribution of publishing the interest rate forecast. This chart shows a typical example of an announcement where our new path had been anticipated. The market interest rate path prior to our meeting in December last year (blue dashed line) was already well aligned with the new interest rate path to be published (the purple solid line).

Ardian Fullani: Economic and monetary developments in Albania in 2010 Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Parliament presenting the Annual Report of the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 9 June 2011. *  *  *  Dear Madam Speaker, Dear Members of Parliament, It is a pleasure for me to be here today to present the Bank of Albania’s opinion on economic and monetary developments of the past year. Pursuant to legal requirements and our institutional commitments to enhancing the central bank’s transparency and responsibility, in this presentation I will share with you the main highlights on Bank of Albania’s activity over 2010. This activity, in its entire spectrum, aimed to fulfil our mission and legal obligations, and reflect the Parliament’s recommendations for 2010. Let me begin my presentation with a brief overview of our conclusions. During 2010, the Albanian economy experienced an overall positive performance. The economic activity posted growth, while the macroeconomic stability and financial health indicators improved. Economic growth reflected mainly the foreign demand for Albanian products and services, affirming, above all, the dynamism of our private sector. It was also supported by a sustained macroeconomic environment, with downward risk premia and improved liquidity indicators. In particular, reflecting developments in the financial and real sector of the economy, as well as our monetary policy, consumer price inflation remained in line with our 2010 target.
During the first half of the year, the economic outlook became increasingly pessimistic. In Sweden, it was mainly investment that was weaker than expected. The weak economic activity was also reflected in the Riksbank’s forecasts of inflation. This in turn was a contributory factor in the Riksbank’s decisions to cut the repo rate on three occasions for a total of one percentage point. During the latter part of the year, however, the outlook became somewhat less pessimistic. In Sweden, the weak investment was countered by favourable growth in consumption, both private and public, and a rise in exports. The assessment at the end of the year was that growth had increased gradually in 2003 and would reach 1.5 per cent. Growth in 2004 and 2005 was forecast to be approximately 2.5% both years, which on  2  BIS Review 6/2004  the whole is somewhat faster than what the Riksbank considers to be possible in the long term without giving rise to inflation. New Swedish data support this scenario, but the picture is still not entirely unambiguous. The National Accounts for the third quarter showed higher growth compared with previous quarters. Household consumption also rose, as did exports. At the same time, business tendency data are indicating growing optimism among firms during the latter part of the autumn, while retail sales continue to grow at a historically high level. But growth in industrial production was relatively weak in October and November while there was a reduction in the number of new orders.

ix DE PASTOR R., “SMEs and VSEs in France: an improved financial situation and easier access to credit”, Bulletin de la Banque de France No. 226, December 2019. x INSEE xi ALTAVILLA C.; BOUCINHA M; PEYDRÓ J., “Monetary policy and bank profitability in a low interest rate environment”, Economic Policy, Volume 33, Issue 96, October 2018, pp. 531–586.
As the basis of an inflation-targeting policy is that the long-run inflation expectations are anchored around the target, this development has gradually made it more important to bring up inflation. The Riksbank has therefore needed to focus more and more on its main task, to maintain confidence in the inflation target, while the scope for taking other issues into consideration has become more and more limited. It is these considerations which form the basis for the policy being pursued by the Riksbank today. It is not a question of a rigid fixation with achieving exactly 2 per cent all the time. On the contrary, the Riksbank normally demonstrates a considerable degree of flexibility when it comes to how fast the target should be met. There is a limit to this patience, however. Difficult to maintain confidence simply through communication I believe the critics take the importance of maintaining confidence in the inflation target far too lightly. This argument is often not considered at all, with everything focusing instead on the Riksbank needing to stop the increase in household debt and housing prices by raising the interest rate. If confidence in the inflation target is even mentioned at all, the idea seems to be that it is something that should be maintained by the Riksbank communicating that even though it intends to continue to allow inflation to undershoot the target for some time to come, it will eventually bring inflation back up to the target at some point in the future.

This will make our intentions regarding future monetary policy as clear as they can be. In my opinion, this new way of working reduces the need for signalling prior to the monetary policy meetings. Objections of principle… It is also possible to raise issues of principle regarding when and how one should signal. The signalling has sometimes been a question of wanting to communicate that we have had a slightly different view of how the interest rate should be set at the next meeting than the market has expected. In these situations one can say that we have preferred to prepare the market by signalling a few weeks before a monetary policy meeting rather than to risk surprising them when the decision is announced. But it is not necessarily the case that much can be gained by “fine tuning” expectations over the course of a few weeks. Although this system has meant that we have sometimes been able to avoid strong reactions and indignant comments in connection with the actual interest rate decision, we have nevertheless had roughly the same reactions when we have signalled the probable interest rate decision a few weeks earlier. The question is then what value the signalling has had. …not least because we are several members who must agree Many questions regarding the signalling are connected to the fact that we are a group of persons making interest rate decisions. The Executive Board of the Riksbank is what is usually known as an individualistic committee 8 .
But the extraordinary stability of the past decade may have given people an exaggerated idea of what to expect of monetary policy. While the Bank can deliver low inflation, we cannot reliably deliver rock steady growth in output and employment, still less falling unemployment. Whether or not that happens depends on events in the wider world – what economists like to call ‘shocks’ - and other economic policies, including taxes and regulations. All we can do is try to keep demand growing in line with supply. And in fact, most economists a decade ago would have said that the Great Stability, as we have experienced it in the UK, represented a pretty unlikely set of outcomes. The then Governor, Eddie George, said he hoped that low inflation would contribute to a more stable economy but warned: ‘We cannot hope to achieve that with any great precision’ 2 . The MPC’s formal remit from the Chancellor, originally drafted nearly a decade ago and still in force, seems to be predicated on a more turbulent world. It makes specific allowance for situations in which inflation might be thrown sharply off course. It reads: ‘The framework is based on the recognition that the actual inflation rate will on occasions depart from its target as a result of shocks and disturbances. Attempts to keep inflation at the inflation target in these circumstances may cause undesirable volatility in output.

This strategy of relaxing monetary policy once a bubble bursts certainly makes the creation of bubbles more likely. But while the mop-up strategy worked in some earlier episodes, it failed miserably during the biggest collapse in decades. I will return to this point below. In summary, financial fragility played a crucial role in explaining the origin and magnitude of the crisis. But financial fragility was related to poor regulation more than monetary policy. Having said this, it can be still argued that the original sin in this case was a “relaxation” (loosening) of their financial stability responsibilities by some central banks and the inability of the existing supervisory bodies to adequately monitor aggregate financial stability. 2  BIS Review 76/2010  The objectives of central banks Given the magnitude of the financial crisis we faced, there is always a discussion on whether the objectives of central banks were the right ones or if they should be changed. As I mentioned before, the financial crisis was mainly related to a poor implementation of a key task of central banking. Nevertheless, it will be useful for the ensuing discussion of the challenges of implementation of central bank tasks to evaluate first their current objectives. Should the objective of price stability be changed? Broadly speaking the answer is no. For a start, central banks need to retain a clear mandate for price stability. Inflation is costly and should be avoided, and this has to be done by the monetary authority.
In other words, economic agents and financial market participants expect the ECB to ensure price stability over the medium and long term whatever the amplitude of the short-term impact of the various shocks it has to cope with. They trust our commitment to stability. This is expressed most clearly by the issue of eurodenominated bonds with a maturity of 30 and even 50 years, the yields of which stand at a remarkably moderate level. For example, a 50-year French government bond maturing in 2055 currently yields 4.1%. This implies confidence into the stability of the euro – in its function as a store of value – extending beyond more than one generation. Cash changeover and price increases I know that in Germany and in other countries in the euro area the introduction of euro cash in 2002 was “associated” with price increases. Was the euro “a Teuro”? There were some price increases in the course of the cash conversion. The statistics office of the European Union – Eurostat – estimates that the cash conversion added between 0.12% and 0.29% to the inflation rate in the euro area in 2002. This was overall small in 2002 and negligible over the ten years of the euro. Also to be noted is the discrepancy between the “felt” inflation and the actual, statistically measured inflation. This discrepancy cannot be attributed to a measuring error in the consumer price statistics. These statistics are of high quality.

There are also continued financial challenges for families here as indicated by the New York Fed’s measures of credit conditions. As of the end of 2013, average debt per person was about $ in Brooklyn – little changed over several years. At the same time, the Borough’s delinquency rate on that debt is now 11.6 percent, much higher than the state average and more than double the national average. What’s more, the mortgage crisis continues to take a toll on local homeowners. As of the end of 2013, more than 11 percent of mortgage debt in Brooklyn was 90-plus days delinquent, again significantly higher than the New York State and national delinquency rate. I also want to make a few comments about the impact of Superstorm Sandy. While areas of the New York City metropolitan region were hard hit by the storm, the devastation was particularly severe along the waterfronts of Brooklyn – and in particular in southern Brooklyn and neighborhoods like Red Hook. We saw and heard about the devastation of the storm from many of those affected, including a number of our own employees as well as other residents we met at a series of assistance clinics we organized in response to the storm. Those already living close to the edge financially were particularly vulnerable as were the City’s public housing residents. Still, Brooklyn’s economy showed resilience: while employment did drop in November 2012, it bounced back strongly the next month and accelerated during the spring of 2013, reaching new highs.
I wish you an enjoyable and productive day, and give the floor to President Jean-Claude Trichet. BIS Review 28/2008  3

Following a public consultation process, its final version is about to be published and we expect it to be a relevant contribution to the development and updating of our retail payments market. The new regulations not only set the prudential requirements for non-bank prepaid card issuers. It also narrows down the scope of regulated entities dealing with the processing of transactions, and changes their capital requirements, aiming to facilitate the entrance of new participants to the acquiring and processing business. By removing requirements that may be burdensome for small entities, and by considering explicitly the possibility of non-physical payment cards, as well as remote purchase and acquiring, we expect to see the retail payments market in Chile taking a new shape in the near future. That almost certainly would involve—and perhaps require—and active participation of FinTech entities. These features give some ground for optimism on the potential contribution of FinTech not only to the democratization of financial services but also to price and financial stability and development in Chile. Ladies and gentlemen, A few blocks from where we are gathering today, on Regent St. and Park Terrace was the bank branch where I opened my checking account as a Cambridge student. There I was handed my first debit card, which I could use to withdraw cash from the automatic teller outside. Coming from a country where banks were places where people lined up in front of a human cashier to perform basic banking transactions, these seemed enormous changes to me.
Current developments pose one of the greatest stress tests to the globalization that in the last 4 decades through trade, financial and technological integration, brought many benefits, including marked decline in global inflation. The costs of de-globalized world can be severe - lower efficiency, higher costs and stronger and more persistent inflationary effects. Against this background, central banks need to be more humble. They cannot prevent the first-round effects of many of these shocks, but containing second round effects and anchoring inflation expectations has to be their focal point. This context prompted central banks to embark on the most synchronized and rapid monetary tightening in the last 50 years3. As interest rates hikes are taking hold, with easing supply pressures and stabilizing commodities prices, forecasts indicate that inflation will soften this year, both in advanced and developing economies. And indeed we already see signs of slowdown, but it is too early to claim victory over inflation. Core inflation in many countries remains persistent, with tight labor markets keeping pressures on wages. Nominal wage growth in the region last year was the highest following the GFCat 8.6% notably exceeding productivity gains (2.3%) thus contributing to rise in core inflation, which reached 7.4%. If this wide wage-productivity gap persists it can slow down inflation stabilization process and require longer ad stronger monetary policy reaction.

As we are lagging behind advanced Europe in terms of income and productivity, sustaining banks' financing can contribute in narrowing those gaps. At the same time, climate change and technological innovation continue to accelerate, pressing on our societies to transform towards greener and digital future. Banks can have a crucial role in financing the twin transition. To sum up, as policy makers we do face a difficult conundrum. After long time of economic moderation, all of the sudden we have to deal with major global shocks that impose tectonic shifts in the economic order, modify conventional macroeconomic paradigms, and accentuate the tradeoffs in policymaking. In this current context, it is crucial to preserve stability- stability of prices, as our primary objective and contribute to stability of the financial system. We all recall how profound consequences and scars instability causes, which is why we have to remain determined, focused and clear. It is the only way to preserve public trust, and as Brunnermeier said "the public is the ultimate source of central banks power and independence". Thank you and looking forward to the insightful debate! 1 Cited from "Monetary Policy in a High Inflation environment: Commitment and Clarity  ", Lecture by Christine Lagarde, November 2022. 2 Geopolitical risk dashboard, Black Rock, December 6, 2022 3 "Front-loading" monetary tightening: pros and cons", BIS Bulletin 63, December 2022. 4 Three have increased the rate (Slovakia, Bulgaria and Czech Republic) while other  four introduced the buffer for the first time (Croatia, Romania, Hungary and North Macedonia).
Since the G20 summits of London and Pittsburgh in 2009, the regulatory  Page 2 sur 6 effort that has been undertaken is unprecedented, in particular in the banking sector: by increasing both the quantity and quality of banking sector own funds, the Basel III reform has considerably enhanced the robustness of banks; in addition, it ensures better account is now taken of the diverse risks to which banks are exposed, thanks to the introduction of two new liquidity ratios for bank cash levels. I am confident that we are about to finalise a fair and reasonable agreement at our GHOS meeting next Thursday. This would be very welcome for our international financial order. But beyond Basel III, we should finalise measures that target non-banks. We must ensure a balance between financing channels. The priority has now shifted from the solvency of banks, which has improved substantially, to the liquidity of the shadow banking sector, particularly funds and asset management companies that are exposed to the risks of sudden panic-driven runs. Moreover, we have to make sure that this internationally agreed regulatory framework is implemented everywhere with consistency. Unilateral deregulation would be nothing less than a lose-lose scenario with serious consequences for the stability of the global financial system – we would be paving the way for the next financial crisis – as well as the competitive landscape for US, Japanese and European banks. The second risk is related to protectionist tendencies, namely in the United States.

This could be part of a European Monetary Fund, provided that its scope of action is extended beyond the current European Stability Mechanism. -  A micro accelerator: i.e. a Financing Union for Investment and Innovation. The aim is to mobilise the EUR 350 billion savings surplus of the euro area, notably to shore up equity which is the key to an innovation economy, and also to foster synergies, thanks to an integrated steering mechanism, between the Juncker investment Plan, the Capital Markets Union and Banking Union. -  A fiscal accelerator, once we have increased trust between Member States and made headway towards greater economic convergence: the euro area budget could be used to  Page 6 sur 6 finance, for the benefit of all countries, certain “European common goods” such as digital technology, energy transition, security, and migration controls. -  An institutional accelerator: The fourth is not an accelerator in substance, but rather a “facilitator” for the first three. In terms of institutions, we would need first and foremost a euro area Finance Minister, President of the Eurogroup and member of the Commission, backed by a European Treasury; but also a euro area Parliament group, in order to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the institutions and decisions. But it only makes sense if we make progress on the substance: if not, it would be little more than mere window dressing. The latter two accelerators, fiscal and institutional, would require Treaty changes, unless they were to be very limited.