samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Banks should pay attention to consumer feedback for early warnings of potentially larger issues and proactively take steps to address emerging customer concerns early. The ABS Code of Consumer Banking Practice is premised on four key principles – fairness, transparency, accountability and reliability. These principles are a good foundation for building a trusting and open relationship between customers and their banks. As members of ABS, we encourage you to uphold and observe these principles. You are best placed to raise standards through market discipline, industry codes and guidelines. Together, ABS and banks can do more in monitoring consumer feedback on industry practices and taking steps to manage consumers' concerns at an earlier stage before they become broader public issues. For example, ABS could initiate measures to identify emerging issues, conduct research to better understand consumers' concerns and work with member banks to address them. Individual banks could also do more by reviewing their customers’ feedback, sharing their observations on concerns regarding industry practices and working with ABS to manage these issues. MAS will continue to share with the industry our observations from feedback received from members of the public. We will also continue to work with the industry to encourage best practices by banks, with the aim of achieving good consumer outcomes. This more collaborative and consultative approach, we believe, is more desirable than formal and often more prescriptive regulation. Conclusion The Singapore financial services sector looks set for another year of good growth.

To complicate matters, we must not forget the geopolitical risks in the Middle East, terrorism and other surprises. This year, we have already had several reminders of the risks in the system. The Chinese stock market has experienced a few incidents of volatility following expectations of and actual government action. It remains vulnerable to further corrections. In the US, the sub-prime market has imploded. More recently, US treasuries have come under severe selling pressure, causing interest rates to rise and generating unease in stock markets. Nevertheless, the financial system has been resilient so far. Have we learnt our lessons from past crises and are now better prepared? Or are we just plain lucky? Whichever the answer, we should remain vigilant. As bankers, you will be familiar with the saying that bad loans are made in good times. This saying is particularly worth repeating when the environment appears rosy and serves as a reminder that vigilance is our constant responsibility. With this in mind, MAS initiated a survey of risk managers and traders, many of whom are based in Singapore, about their key risk concerns. This poll was conducted between April and June this year. A roundtable discussion was also held with risk managers. Let me now share with you some of the findings from this survey. The feedback received was open and honest and many views were shared. Most respondents believed that asset prices were frothy and that a big shock could happen. Some speculated that this could happen before the end of 2008.
However, it had sold financial insurance instruments against the potential default of the securitisations of these loans (CDSs) to its clients, who were, above all, other financial institutions. The contagion effect to the rest of the financial system that the bankruptcy of AIG would have caused was on such a scale that it led to its bailout by the US authorities. But the mere expectation of this type of bailout can affect managers’ risk-taking decisions in periods of expansion, which may be excessive precisely because they expect to be bailed out in the event of difficulties. This is the wellknown “too big to fail” problem. The multi-dimensional nature of systemic risk means that macroprudential policy needs an extensive range of tools (or instruments) to allow it to tackle each of those dimensions as efficiently as possible. Moreover, given that a wide variety of institutions with greatly diverse characteristics operate in the financial sector, these instruments should be adjusted to their particularities. In this respect, the significant interconnectedness of these financial system players calls for an all-encompassing overview when taking macroprudential policy decisions. And this requires close coordination among key institutions if, as in Spain, the oversight of the financial system is shared by different national [Banco de España, CNMV (National Securities Market Commission) and the Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation] and European authorities. No less important is the need for international coordination.

A recent Banco de España article8 finds that this measure has, in conjunction with other measures adopted, enabled the provision of bank lending to the productive sectors of the economy to be increased. Also, the ESRB has during the crisis analysed various issues, such as: i) the implications for the financial system of the public guarantee programmes and other fiscal measures to protect the real economy; ii) the lack of market liquidity and its consequences for asset management and insurance companies; iii) the procyclical impact of debt downgrades on markets and financial institutions, and iv) the liquidity risks derived from margin calls. These avenues of research led to a set of recommendations for the EU Member States’ authorities to act in unison on the appropriate monitoring of the risks and vulnerabilities identified and on potential measures to mitigate them during the crisis. The future of macroprudential policy Allow me to conclude with some brief thoughts on the future of macroprudential policy. In my view, there are two aspects on which we should focus in the coming years. First, the current crisis should be used to draw lessons about macroprudential policy; and, among these lessons, one key aspect relates to the use of capital buffers. The empirical evidence shows that it is precisely during crises when the CCyB and, generally, the instruments that increase capital requirements acquire their full potential via the effects of their release [see Broto and Galán (2020)].
During this period one could say that the central banks’ original task of guaranteeing the value of the means of payment was neglected as other tasks, primarily affecting demand in the economy, were perceived as more important and more interesting for monetary policy. The consequence was that the nominal anchor was relinquished and to establish it again proved to require considerable effort. Let me before I discuss the other important component of an efficient payment system – financial stability – say something about the most common approaches to attaining price stability. There are currently two predominant means of trying to ensure that inflation remains at a low and stable level. One is to tie one’s own currency to the currency of a country with a long tradition of low and stable inflation. The fixed exchange rate thus becomes an intermediate target through which one hopes to attain the ultimate target – price stability. The other means is to allow the exchange rate to float and to give the central bank the task of acting more directly to attain low, stable inflation – what is known as inflation targeting. The changeover in monetary policy made by Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s meant that we switched from the first method, fixing the exchange rate, to the second, targeting inflation. The reason was quite simply that the fixed exchange rate had not functioned very well as a means of keeping down inflation and establishing a nominal anchor in the economy.

According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation was 1.8% in February 2013, down from 2.0% in January. The on-going decline in annual inflation rates mainly reflects the energy and food components of the price index. Looking ahead, while the monthly pattern of headline inflation rates may be somewhat volatile, underlying price pressures should remain contained given the environment of weak economic activity in the euro area. Inflation expectations are well-anchored and in line with price stability over the medium term. The March 2013 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area foresee annual HICP inflation in a range between 1.2% and 2.0% in 2013 and between 0.6% and 2.0% in 2014. In comparison with the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges are broadly unchanged. In the Governing Council’s assessment, risks to the outlook for price developments continue to be seen as broadly balanced over the medium term, with upside risks relating to stronger than expected increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, as well as higher oil prices, and downside risks stemming from weaker economic activity. Turning to the monetary analysis, monetary figures for January 2013 support our assessment that the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be subdued. The annual growth rate of M3 remained broadly unchanged at 3.5% in January, after 3.4% in December 2012. The annual rate of growth of the narrow monetary aggregate, M1, increased to 6.7% from 6.3% in December 2012.
In this light, first and foremost, in the health context, vaccination, and hopefully, the relevant cures under progress, will turn into powerful instruments in curtailing the effects of the pandemic on both economy and finance. The good news is that the analyses carried out in our institution indicate that the economic rebound, the achievement of prices objective and the preservation of the financial stability are being materialised accordingly to the optimistic forecasts of the Bank of Albania. The continuation of simulating monetary and fiscal policies has: guaranteed both the monetary and financial stability of Albania; bolstered lending at low cost to the economic activity, and eased the burden that the prolongation of pandemic imposed on private sector and households. The crucial role that mas media has played in meticulously detailing and convening the policy message to the audience for enhancing its awareness, has supported and benefited to the prudential policy making. The pandemic and restrictions in place to contain it posed a barrier to public communication by increasing the distance with institutions, and above all, they turned into the most pressing issues of our time. In this view, I take this opportunity to thank all the journalists (particularly those covering economic issues), who through the professional commitment and integrity assisted the public at large to acquire the decision making of monetary and fiscal authorities throughout this unprecedented situation. The professionalism in making and conveying the news and economic analysis were a valuable and indispensable support to marinating price and financial stability.

To illustrate this point, I want to focus on three key markets for the SNB that have experienced major changes: the goods and services market, where digitalisation may be influencing pricing and where we, in turn, must remain alert if we are to fully grasp the associated dynamics; the foreign exchange market, where the emergence of new technologies and players has led us to expand our in-house capabilities and redouble our efforts to stay at the cutting edge of technological progress (Thomas Moser, Deputy Head of Department III since 1 September, will give you more detail on this topic); and finally, the money market, where structural changes are prompting us to work on modernising infrastructure and maintaining appropriate framework conditions in order to ensure effective implementation of monetary policy. Evolution of the goods and services market and weak inflation So let me start with the goods and services market and inflation developments. This market is presenting central banks with an important conundrum: why, given that the economy has firmed significantly since 2017, has inflation remained low in most advanced economies? Page 2/9  Two major reasons stand out: on the one hand, monetary policy geared to price stability has firmly anchored inflation expectations; on the other, various structural factors linked to globalisation may have had a moderating effect on prices.
A recent Banco de España article8 finds that this measure has, in conjunction with other measures adopted, enabled the provision of bank lending to the productive sectors of the economy to be increased. Also, the ESRB has during the crisis analysed various issues, such as: i) the implications for the financial system of the public guarantee programmes and other fiscal measures to protect the real economy; ii) the lack of market liquidity and its consequences for asset management and insurance companies; iii) the procyclical impact of debt downgrades on markets and financial institutions, and iv) the liquidity risks derived from margin calls. These avenues of research led to a set of recommendations for the EU Member States’ authorities to act in unison on the appropriate monitoring of the risks and vulnerabilities identified and on potential measures to mitigate them during the crisis. The future of macroprudential policy Allow me to conclude with some brief thoughts on the future of macroprudential policy. In my view, there are two aspects on which we should focus in the coming years. First, the current crisis should be used to draw lessons about macroprudential policy; and, among these lessons, one key aspect relates to the use of capital buffers. The empirical evidence shows that it is precisely during crises when the CCyB and, generally, the instruments that increase capital requirements acquire their full potential via the effects of their release [see Broto and Galán (2020)].

(vii)  In case of an excessive increase in the liquidity surplus or the emerge of extraordinary fluctuations in the market even at reasonable levels of excess liquidity, to enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of monetary policy and liquidity management strategy, in addition to YTL deposit buying auctions with standard maturities, reverse repo auctions and Central Bank liquidity bills with maturity up to 91 days may also be used actively. As a matter of fact, technical procedures regarding the issue of the said bills were completed by the Central  BIS Review 1/2007  9  Bank, by “the Communiqué on Liquidity Bills” published in the Official Gazette, number 26310, dated 5th of October 2006. (viii)  Currently, depending on liquidity conditions, whether there will be standard one week or two weeks YTL deposit buying auctions will be held or not, if there will be an auction, the maximum amount to be drained through the auction is announced at 10.00 at Reuter’s CBTY page. In 2007, the Central Bank may hold New Turkish Lira deposit buying auctions with standard maturities of 1, 2 and 4 weeks and continue to announce the maturity and the maximum amount to be bought in the auction(s) on Reuters’ CBTY page. Starting from 2007 onwards, no announcement will be made on the said page on days when no auction is deemed necessary according to liquidity conditions.
Many of these agents had a business model based on lending or investing money in the longer term and regularly obtaining financing through different forms of short-term market funding. When access to short-term funding was strangled, there was an overhanging threat of suspension of payments. To counteract this problem, many central banks established different types of ‘facility, where a number of financial institutions could borrow money against various forms of collateral – even those that could not be sold at a reasonable price on the market. Here we can see that the central bank has an important task to fulfil in a crisis: to take on risk in a time when no one else is willing to do so. In a crisis, there is a risk of a ‘fire sale’ dynamic arising. Institutions that cannot replace their funding are forced to sell off assets, which leads to a fall in prices If the central bank, in this situation, goes in and offers the actors loans with these assets as collateral, and does not fully apply the prevailing market valuation, the market can stabilise. The purpose of the measure is primarily to preserve financial stability by ensuring that the liquidity supply functions. But if the central bank does not support the liquidity supply, there is the threat of a credit crunch and bankruptcies, which will, of course, in turn have macroeconomic effects that impact the monetary policy objectives.

4 [25]  Steering the interest rates worked well during this period, despite the Riksbank using a very small toolbox when conducting its monetary policy. We went from doing to mostly talking about monetary policy. But the fact that this works is based on the Riksbank having built up credibility on the market and that it is ready to use its balance sheet if market rates were to deviate from the desired levels. On Wall Street there is an expression “Don’t fight the Fed” – which means it is not a good idea to take positions based on the assumption that the central bank will fail to attain the interest rates aimed for. Steering interest rates is also based on the fundamental transmission mechanism functioning – that other interest rates in the economy actually change when the shortest money market rates the Riksbank affects are changed. How well this functions depends on different conditions in the financial sector that can be state-dependent. A similar development took place in many countries during this period – the central bank's job conducting monetary policy was relatively simple. But below the calm surface, two interlinked problems were bubbling up – a trend fall in real interest rates and rising debts. I have talked about these problems on several occasions. 5  Falling interest rates Over the past 30 years, interest rates around the world have fallen heavily.
Our own study further suggests that, contrary to popular intuition, a devaluation of the renminbi might actually provide a stimulus to the Hong Kong economy: this is because the positive impact on demand arising from the complementarities between the two economies would outweigh the negative impact of any loss of competitiveness in those relatively few activities where the two economies remain in competition with each other. Such complementarities are in part reflected in Hong Kong’s role as a major entrepot for mainland exports. For any renminbi devaluation, while Hong Kong’s own direct trade balance with the mainland will deteriorate, our re-exports of mainland origin should rise. Indeed, with the surge in mainland re-exports activities since the early 1980s, the margins earned on such re-exports are now larger than all other components of Hong Kong’s trade with the mainland combined. Conclusion I have suggested in this address that China’s accession to the WTO will bring benefits to Hong Kong on a number of fronts. WTO entry will see a vast and rapid increase in China’s external trade. Not all of this additional trade will go through Hong Kong, but nor will it all avoid Hong Kong. More important still, the stimulus to liberalisation, globalisation and better corporate governance will expand and deepen Hong Kong’s well-established role as a fund of professional expertise, a centre of international experience and a source and channel of investment.

What is clear however is that we have to overhaul our traditional ways of measuring, assessing and reacting to productivity and welfare indicators. Socially, uncertainty will weigh heavily on people’s shoulders in the years to come amid these structural changes. How should policymakers react? The fact that our established gauges have lost their assumed precision does not mean that we have become clueless. In spite of the elevated uncertainty, it is still possible to grasp the obvious. Potential output may not the most reliable benchmark in the current environment. Moreover, perhaps it misses the broader structural changes, which are of paramount importance in the longer run pursuit of improvements in standards of living. So it is crucial that policy makers pay heed to broad and thorough analyses, coupled with an understanding of the limitations to our understanding we face at this time. In this way, modest judgment and prudent action will provide the indispensable preconditions for policymakers to live up to their responsibilities. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
These have enabled banks to obtain long-term funding at beneficial interest rates, which may temporarily be as low as -1%, on the condition that the participating banks maintain their supply of credit to the real economy in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. To reinforce this measure, the ECB also eased the collateral eligibility criteria for banks in its refinancing operations, thus increasing the volume of funds they may obtain. These measures have been highly successful. In the June TLTRO-III operation, participating banks received liquidity totalling € trillion, an all-time high in Eurosystem refinancing operations. The available evidence suggests that participating banks are using a significant portion of the funding received to continue to provide liquidity to the real economy. In short, the measures taken by the ECB under its refinancing operations are playing a key part in preserving the supply of bank credit. And, in an economic setting as difficult as the present one, they are helping to hold interest rates on bank loans at historically low levels and to support the vigour shown by new bank lending since the start of the crisis. Indeed, in Spain the volume of credit to the non-financial private sector has expanded again after ten years of deleveraging and posted year-on-year growth of 2.5% in the summer months.

Jan F Qvigstad: Understanding macroprudential regulation Introductory remarks by Mr Jan F Qvigstad, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the workshop on “Understanding macroprudential regulation”, organised by Norges Bank, Oslo, 29 November 2012. *  *  *  Dear all, It is a pleasure to welcome you to Norges Bank for this workshop on Understanding Macroprudential Regulation. The topic of the workshop is timely; Authorities in all parts of the world are now actively debating macroprudential policy. Academic research provides a necessary foundation, both for the design and the implementation of such regulations. During my years of service here at the central bank, and also some years at the Treasury, I have had my fair share of dealings with banking and financial crises in Norway. In the 1990s, Norway was hit by a severe banking crisis. Three of the four largest banks failed. Required capital injections were more than three and a half per cent of GDP. This is substantially more than the percentage share that euro area banks currently need to recapitalise. Ever since the Norwegian banking crisis in the early 1990s, our banking industry has been regulated more strictly than banks in comparable countries. For instance, bank capital definitions have been tighter, while packaging loans into complex instruments was in practice not permitted until 2007. Financial supervision has also been rather strict.