samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is difficult to estimate how the impact of a change in interest rate on growth and inflation will differ at different points in time and in different countries, but the attempts to do so indicate major differences. Given the fact that the composition of households' financial portfolios, their method of financing their accommodation, the significance of bank lending for corporate investments and the formulation of regulations and taxes differ substantially between different periods in time and different countries, this is hardly surprising. As I pointed out earlier, inflation expectations probably also play an important role in price setting. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the exchange between interest rates and inflation is less in countries where monetary policy has been aimed at stabilising inflation expectations than in countries, and points in time, with large fluctuations in the inflation rate. There is also a monetary policy interest in being familiar with the banks' methods for credit assessment, to aid forward-looking assessments of growth under the assumption of unchanged monetary policy. When the Riksbank makes decisions on the formulation of monetary policy, these are based on, for instance, assessments of how households and companies will react to rising prices on shares and property. One important condition for enabling optimism regarding future growth and increase in wealth to be converted into consumption and investment is that this can be financed. This is where the banks' assessment of credit risks comes in.

It is intuitively easy to understand that the amount of money in the economy is a decisive factor for the price of the goods produced in the country. In modern economies, where payments are largely made electronically, the monopoly on issuing banknotes is no longer an equally evident condition for enabling monetary policy to determine price trends. Today, it is instead the right to determine the terms in the systems for large electronic payments between banks and the opportunity to influence how much the banks shall borrow or deposit in the Riksbank that enable us to steer interest rates. For electronic payments to be able to function as money, it is necessary for the central bank to be perceived as guarantor for these means of payment in the same ways as with banknotes. This role can only be fulfilled by a central bank and in this way one can say that the possibility to determine price trends in the economy still lies with the monopoly on issuing money. The Riksbank governs the shortest interest rate in the interbank market, so that it normally remains close to the monetary policy-steered repo rate. The fact that the Riksbank can steer the interbank rate is primarily due to the fact that each individual bank participating in the system handling large interbank payments - known as the RIX system - always has an opportunity to borrow and deposit money in the Riksbank overnight at the lending and deposit rates set by the Riksbank.
It is a centrally located country with eight neighbouring countries and close proximity to the large market of South Africa, a surface area of over 750,000 sq km, and an approximate population of over 11 million people. It also boasts of a suitable climate, peace and a multi-party competitive democratic political system. The country possesses all the necessary attributes for sustainable economic growth and development. Competitive production costs, incentives, and reforms have also enhanced the attractive investment climate for both local and foreign investors. Numerous investment opportunities exist amongst the agriculture, manufacturing, tourism and mining sectors across various regions of the country. Almost all provinces in Zambia remain potential areas of investment whose resources remain largely untapped. Its active participation in the SADC Trade protocol and the COMESA/FTA offers preferential tariff access to market potential of nearly 380 million people. The Zambian Development Agency (ZDA) Act ensures that property rights are fully respected with full compensation on market value made in case of expropriation. The country is also a signatory to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank which guarantees foreign investment protection in cases of disasters and other disturbances. Bilateral investment treaties with a number of countries also encourage, promote and protect foreign investment. Foreign investors seeking joint venture partners can approach ZDA which registers investors together with project profiles of domestic investors seeking collaboration.

In the main urban centres, public telephones and independently operated cellular telephone networks are in place. Zambia also hosts ZamNet and other internet service providers. In order to continue diversifying our export base and further increase our export earnings, it is imperative that we intensify use of marketing strategies that take advantage of the fact that globalisation requires each country to develop more efficient modes of communication. Therefore, inadequate infrastructure, institutional capacity and investment in skilled human resources should continue to be aggressively addressed by targeting identified weak areas, and implement policies to tackle the weaknesses speedily so as to enhance economic growth and developments prospects. In addressing these issues, it is crucial to build strong partnerships, particularly with the private sector, for effective Information and Communication Technology (ICT) development in Zambia. The agriculture sector however, remains one of the key areas where advancements in ICTs have not yet been fully taken advantage of in order to benefit rural communities and the economy in general. In fact, communications infrastructure has been either lacking or inadequate in most rural areas of Zambia to give an opportunity to rural communities to access and distribute information at low cost, as well as facilitate interactive participation in the creation and use of agricultural information.
In short, diversification strategies by individual firms generated a lack of diversity across the system as a whole. So what emerged during this century was a financial system exhibiting both greater complexity and less diversity. Up until 2007, many participants in financial markets would have viewed that network evolution as the inevitable by-product of technical progress in finance. Until then, complexity plus homogeneity equalled stability. But in just about every non-financial discipline – from ecologists to engineers, from geneticists to geologists – this evolution would have set alarm bells ringing. Based on their experience, complexity plus homogeneity did not spell stability; it spelt fragility. In understanding why, it is useful to explore some of the wider lessons from those disciplines, taking in turn the effects of complexity and diversity on stability. Complexity and stability Tropical rainforests are a complex adaptive system. In the immediate post-war period, these eco-systems were often used as a case-study when demonstrating why complex systems tended to exhibit greater stability. 3 In Elton’s (1958) words, this was because there are “always enough enemies and parasites available to turn on any species that starts being unusually numerous”. Complexity strengthened self-regulatory forces in systems, so improving robustness. This was the prevailing ecological wisdom up until the early 1970s. That conventional wisdom has since been turned on its head. From the 1970s onwards, orthodoxy was altered by a combination of enriched mathematical models and practical experience.

But the second is likely to be variable and sociological. In other words, agents’ responses to infection, or indeed the fear of infection, are often crucial in determining its rate of transmission. In practice, these behavioural responses typically take one of two forms: “hide” or “flight”. For example, the response to the SARS epidemic in the 21st century was a “hide” response, with people self-quarantining by staying at home and with flight, in this case literally, prohibited. But the response to yellow fever in North America in the 19th century was “flight”, with half the population of Memphis fleeing in 1878. 15 Either response is rational from an individual perspective. Both responses have the aim of removing that individual from circulation with other, potentially infectious, agents. But the implications of these responses for infection rates across the system are potentially very different. Hide responses tend to contain infection locally, thus protecting the system globally. This was the SARS experience. Flight, by contrast, tends to propagate infection globally. This was the yellow fever experience, as incidence of the disease followed the railroad line out of Memphis. 16 During this financial crisis, faced with fears about infection, similar sets of behavioural responses by financial institutions have occurred. Only the names are different. The “hiding” has taken the form of hoarding, typically of liquidity. And the “flight” from infected cities has taken the form of flight from infected assets, as institutions have sold toxic assets.
On several occasions, the Eurosystem has voiced its expectations regarding SEPA for cards. In particular, the card schemes should offer consumer choice, operate in competitive markets  2  “The economic impact of the Single Euro Payments Area”, by Heiko Schmiedel, ECB Occasional Paper No 71, August 2007. 3  Payment and securities settlement systems in the European Union, Blue Book, fourth edition. 4  “The Costs of Paying – Private and Social Costs of Cash and Card Payments”, Mats Bergman, Gabriela Guibourg and Björn Segendorf, Working Paper No 212, Sveriges Riksbank (September 2007). BIS Review 134/2007  3  and avoid geographical segmentation. In doing so, the Eurosystem expects that the SEPA for cards offers high efficiency and low prices derived from current best practices. In my view, a clear long term strategy of a SEPA for cards is not yet developed. The Eurosystem expects at least one new European card scheme which can compete with the international schemes in the SEPA environment. I’ll address this issue more in depth in the following panel. What I would like to stress, however, is that the Eurosystem welcomes the progress that has been made towards standardisation for cards, which, when implemented, will lead to the creation of a European market for terminals and for cards acquiring. The Eurosystem also welcomes the efforts of the international card schemes in preparing for SEPA and the SEPA changes they have already announced.

Timothy F Geithner: Asia, the world economy and the international financial system Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Society of Singapore 2007 Annual Dinner, Singapore, 13 June 2007. *  *  *  Good evening. I am pleased to be able to join you tonight. The past decade has been one of remarkable achievement in Asia. This is a testament to the resilience and dynamism of this region, and yet the memories of the financial crises remain vivid and still exert a powerful influence on policy today. Tonight, I want to reflect on what policymakers learned from the crises, to review the extent of the progress since and to examine some of the challenges ahead. The Asian financial crises of the late 1990s were exceptional in many respects. Described at the time by some as the first crises of the 21st century, they were commonly regarded as without precedent and fundamentally different from previous emerging market financial crises. Here were countries with a remarkable record of rapid economic growth over several decades, substantial rates of investment, with low inflation and relatively strong fiscal positions. Most conventional indicators of economic performance and financial strength did not suggest acute underlying vulnerability. Yet the crises erupted with remarkable speed and force. The sudden collapse of confidence led to a sharp reversal of capital flows to the region.
It also provides credit for long maturities (with a 3-month maturity);  -  procedures guaranteeing a high level of security for all interbank transactions and large-value payments within the euro area and with other countries in the European Union, with in particular the TARGET system, which played a predominant role in the integration process of the euro money market. 2. The strategic framework also contributes to the efficiency of the single monetary policy  From the outset, there was a consensus among the designers of the Eurosystem that the Single monetary policy would require a clear strategic framework. This framework can be characterised by two main principles: a quantitative definition of price stability and a mediumterm orientation of monetary policy. The quantitative definition of price stability has been clarified after five years of experience The definition adopted by the ECB’s Governing Council in October 1998 was confirmed and clarified in May 2003 following an in-depth review of its strategic framework by the Eurosystem. In the wake of this assessment exercise, the Governing Council specified that price stability was defined as an annual increase in the HICP close to, but below, 2% over the medium term. Several remarks should complement this definition: -  by specifying that inflation should be close to 2%, the Governing Council intended first of all to confirm the symmetrical nature of its strategy by ruling out situations of deflation.

This is asking for strong vigilance so as to ensure that medium to longerterm expectations in the euro area remain solidly anchored at level consistent with price stability. 2. Macroeconomic stability and convergence  Price stability has not come at the expense of higher unemployment. Moreover, there are no visible signs of costs in terms of higher real macroeconomic volatility. Quite on the contrary, the volatility of real variables has declined relative to the averages observed during the 1980s and 1990s. Does one size fit all? It is often argued that a single monetary policy combined with inflation differentials leads to different real interest rates across countries, which in turn may destabilisize the currency union by creating divergence in output growth that exacerbate inflation differentials. This is by no way what we have observed: First, inflation dispersion among the euro area countries (measured as the unweighted standard deviation of annual HICP inflation rates) amounted to 0.7 percentage point in 2006 compared to around 6 percentage points in the 1990s. Since the inception of the euro, the average inflation dispersion across the euro area countries has been around 1 percentage  BIS Review 113/2007  5  point. This figure is very close to the dispersion observed across the 14 US metropolitan statistical areas. Concerning growth differentials, euro area averages naturally mask a variety of growth performances of individual countries within the single currency area, especially in a context where structural convergence has not been completed yet.
And we expect subsidiaries to be capable of accreting a portion of their own capital, rather than being fully dependent on a drip-feed of capital from the parent, as this creates poor incentives and can become problematic if the parent gets into trouble. We expect high standards of governance (including clear accountability for the management of local entities via the new Senior Manager’s Regime) and risk management, consistent with these firms’ importance to the financial system. At this juncture we have chosen not to apply either domestic system wide stress tests or local capital buffers to reflect the systemic importance domestically of these institutions. We instead seek to develop close dialogue and greater information sharing with the home regulator on the stress exposures they see for the group as a whole, and to allow us to judge how these will affect the UK entity. All this is cooperation. But what about the risk that this coordination and insight might disappear, particularly in the event of stress? How do we create committed cooperation? In that event, the ability to set internal TLAC is key. By turning debt into equity in the event of stress, internal TLAC gives host supervisors the ability to upstream losses in bad states of the world and so creates a binding commitment to downstream capital from the group when it is needed. Together with supervisory cooperation internal TLAC ensures the home regulator is fully sighted on and committed to act to mitigate financial stability risks inside the host country.

Luis M Linde: Brief comments on the interactions between monetary policy and macroeconomic adjustments Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the XXXI Conferencia del Círculo de Economía, Sitges, 30 May 2015. *  *  *  Let me first thank Antón Costas, President of Círculo de Economía, for his invitation to participate in this final session of the XXXI Conference, which is a classic on our schedule of economic meetings and conferences. Many thanks, too, to Andreu Mas-Colell for accompanying us in this session, where we are joined by the Vice President of the ECB, Vitor Constancio, to whom it will be an honour for me to give the floor immediately after my address. First, by way of introduction, I should like to make some brief comments on the interactions between monetary policy and macroeconomic adjustments, one of the major matters raised in the euro area monetary policy framework in recent years. Long periods of very low inflation pose risks to medium-term price stability, to economic activity and to financial stability. The first of these risks is the de-anchoring of inflation expectations from levels consistent with price stability which, as we know, the ECB defines as an expected inflation rate below but close to 2% in the medium term. Being in the proximity of a deflation dynamic may encourage the postponement of spending decisions by households and firms.
Page 2 sur 7 Partly, because the not-so-good news is that inflation has changed in nature in the meantime. Indeed, core inflation (excluding energy and food prices), which accounts for no less than 70% of the consumption basket, remains strong and is proving sticky at 5.7%. In other words, inflation has become more broad-based, as also demonstrated by U.S. CPI this morning, and potentially more persistent. But the good news it that this is exactly what we central banks can and must fight back against. Our commitment at the ECB is unambiguous: to make sure that inflation returns towards 2% by the end of 2024 or the end of 2025. And rest assured we absolutely have the will and the capacity to deliver on this commitment. Faced with the surge in inflation, the ECB raised its policy rates at an unprecedented pace (+350 bp since July 2022) to reach a restrictive stance. Page 3 sur 7  But from now on, we are entering a new, more open phase of monetary policy; we are shifting from automatic pilot to navigation by instruments. What does that mean in practice? Our decisions on interest rates will be taken meeting by meeting. This navigation by instruments will especially rely on three cockpit dials: •  The outlook for headline inflation, based on our macroeconomic  projections. •  The dynamics of underlying inflation.

As we already know, the payment and settlement systems are the backbone of the modern economy. In this regard, the Bank of Thailand has laid down financial market infrastructure to facilitate business operations. This year the Imaged Cheque Clearing and Archive System (ICAS) coverage will be expanded across the country to speed up the provincial cheque collection and clearing. This will help promote a more efficient payment system, enabling fast, safe, and secure financial transactions. The Bank of Thailand also encourages the use of electronic payment by coordinating with relevant parties to build infrastructure to facilitate this process. Concluding remarks Ladies and gentlemen, Despite many roles that the Bank of Thailand plays in ensuring economic and financial stability, I would like to say that the Bank of Thailand’s policy alone cannot ensure sustainable economic growth. Given Thailand’s structural shortcomings, there is the need to improve Thailand’s infrastructure and productivity, by improving technology and innovation. The well-being workforce and quality of education and training are also crucial to increasing competitiveness. For this, long-term coherent vision and concerted efforts among all stakeholders, both public and private, are needed. Let me close by leaving you with some final thoughts. Thailand is now challenged by both external and internal risks. These are not necessary unfavorable, as they also come with opportunities to urge us to prepare ourselves collectively to cope with uncertainty in the global economy. In an increasingly volatile world, we must do more.
2002, No 2, and Beyer, A., Gaspar, V., Gerberding, C. and Issing, O. (2009), “Opting out of the Great Inflation: German monetary policy after the break down of Bretton Woods”, Working Paper Series, No 1020, ECB, March. 26. ECB staff estimates find that the change in market pricing of the short-to-medium term interest rates and in survey evidence of Eurosystem balance sheet expectations between December 2021 and the assumptions implied in the September 2022 ECB staff projections would on average subtract around 1 percentage point from annual real GDP growth each year until 2024 (i.e. annual real GDP growth is estimated to be reduced by around one percentage point on average in 2022, 2023 and 2024). Since the September 2022 ECB staff projections, tightening expectations have further increased, implying a further impact on GDP growth. The estimated impact refers to the average across a set of models used by the ECB for policy simulations, including the NAWM-II model (Coenen, G., Karadi, P., Schmidt, S. and Warne, A. (2018), “The New Area-Wide Model II: an extended version of the ECB’s micro-founded model for forecasting and policy analysis with a financial sector“, Working Paper Series, No 2200, ECB, November (revised December 2019)), the ECB-BASE model (Angelini, E., Bokan, N., Christoffel, K., Ciccarelli, M. and Zimic, S. (2019), “Introducing ECB-BASE: The blueprint of the new ECB semi-structural model for the euro area”, Working Paper Series, No 2315, ECB, September) and the MMR model (Mazelis, F., Motto, R. and Ristiniemi, A.

First, conducting monetary policy based on the view that potential is permanently lower – without clear evidence that this is the case – could prove self-fulfilling and costly. The evidence increasingly shows that destroying demand also affects supply. Research on recessions over the last fifty years has found that deep contractions – including those driven by monetary policy – lead to long-lasting effects on real GDP compared to the pre-contraction trend. [20] This suggests that current macroeconomic policies should be designed to avoid unnecessarily heightening the risk that the increasingly likely contraction in coming months becomes a severe and protracted one, which would scar the economy. This requires that energy and fiscal policies remain targeted and contribute to dampen inflationary pressures, helping to keep inflation expectations anchored while preserving productive capacity. But it also requires that monetary policy does not ignore the risks of overtightening. [21] If we were to compress demand in an excessive and persistent manner, we would face the risk of also pushing output permanently below trend, irrespective of whether the initial shocks were temporary or not (that is, even if a harsh policy reaction was unnecessary). And that could not be easily reversed by subsequent policy easing, not least because expansions do not rebuild supply nearly as much as contractions destroy it. [22] Second, even if we were to conclude that supply shocks will lower potential durably, we would still need to examine their effects on demand before deciding our policy stance.