[27]ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/ [28]For example, to participate in the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences, developing  countries have to put into practice key UN human rights and International Labour Organization conventions. [29]Bradford, A (2012), “The Brussels effect”, Northwestern University Law Review, 102(1). [30]See European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice (2018), The European Higher Education Area in  2018: Bologna Process Implementation Report, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. [31]For a discussion of these phenomena in the US context, see Inman, R. and Rubinfeld, D.  (1997), “Rethinking Federalism”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall 1997. [32]See ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#_in-place  andustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements [33]Capella-Ramos, J. (2018), “Country-specific recommendations for economic policies under  the 2018 European Semester”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB. [34]For an in-depth discussion of the policies that are needed to increase the international role of  the euro see Cœuré, B. (2019), “The euro’s global role in a changing world: a monetary policy perspective”, speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 15 February. [35]European Commission (2018), op. cit. [36]Case 6/64, Costa v E.N.E.L., judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, p. 594; Case 314/85,  Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, judgment of the Court of 22 October 1987, paragraphs 15–16. [37]Habermas, J. (2008 repr. ), Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory  of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg, MIT Press, p. 144 et seq. ; Luhmann, N. (1993), Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, pp. 150–3. [38]Sermon at St. Winfried Church, Bonn, 26th November 1981.

Most countries would no longer benefit from local currency invoicing, which would exacerbate the effects on inflation if they undertook large exchange rate devaluations. And they would be more exposed to monetary policy spillovers from abroad – not least from the ECB itself – which could constrain their domestic policy autonomy. In recent years, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and central and eastern European economies have been affected by spillovers from our policy measures. [13] In fact, spillovers from larger economies were one reason why the euro was created in the first place. Under the European Monetary System that preceded the euro, most central banks had to follow the policy of the Bundesbank. After more than a decade of disappointing, if not devastating, experiences, it was deemed preferable to regain monetary policy sovereignty by launching the single currency together. [14]  Cooperation and economic policy The second way in which globalisation constrains sovereignty is by limiting countries’ capacity to set laws and standards that reflect their social goals. Global trade integration tends to reduce that capacity, because as production fragments through value chains, there is a greater need for countries to agree on common standards. Those standards are mostly set not within the World Trade Organization, but by large economies with dominant positions in the value chain. Smaller economies tend to end up as rule-takers in the international system. [15] Global financial integration can likewise reduce individual countries’ power to regulate, tax and uphold labour standards.