samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To conclude on the economy, in its monetary policy statement issued on the occasion of the latest policy rate decision on April 10, the Board of Governors once again stated that the Bank’s most critical task was to reach the inflation target as soon as possible. The demand shocks of the past few years and unusual conditions in the global financial markets had delayed that process. There was no reason to surrender any ground in the battle against inflation. Thus the Central Bank continues to be fully committed to the inflation target. Financial sector You are familiar with the expansion of Icelandic banks to other countries, including Norway. This development followed the banks’ full privatization a few years ago. The three major banks all expanded their activities to other countries but followed different strategies. The record shows that their investment in financial services companies abroad was generally very sound. They have good and solid operations in other countries. Because of this development, the banks have become less Icelandic and more Northern-European, as demonstrated among other things by the fact that in 2007 the three biggest commercial banks derived more than half of their overall income from activities outside Iceland and the biggest bank derived about two thirds of its income from operations outside Iceland. They are therefore much less sensitive to cyclical developments in Iceland than before, or in any one country for that matter. The risks are much better spread than before. 2  4  Central Bank of Iceland: Monetary Bulletin 2008/1.

Lars Nyberg: Developments in the property market Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at Stock market day, Malmö, 18 October 2003. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, At the Lisbon summit in March 2000 the EU’s heads of state and government decided to initiate an ambitious reform agenda that would extend over the entire decade. The goal was for the European economies to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledgebased economies in the world by 2010”. Today, I intend to reflect upon what has happened with economic reforms in the light of the Lisbon agenda, both in Sweden and in the euro area in general. But first allow me to thank you for your invitation to speak here today. As I’m sure you all know, the Riksbank attaches great importance to participating at various events and speaking on issues of significance for monetary policy and financial stability. This is perhaps most true of issues regarding the current stance of monetary policy, of which we were informed a short time ago in conjunction with the Inflation Report that we published last Thursday and which resulted in the decision to leave the repo rate unchanged at 2.75 per cent. The interest rate decisions in particular usually attract great interest from the public and the media, which the Riksbank of course finds very gratifying.
The answers to this question as provided in the Inflation Reports published in 2006 were as follows: •  JANUARY 2006: “... a short-term interest rate path remaining constant for the first couple of months in 2006 and displaying a gradual decline thereafter...”  •  APRIL 2006: “...where the Central Bank continues to cut policy rates gradually...”  •  JULY 2006: “... in addition to the measures of June, the Central Bank will implement measured monetary tightening in the rest of 2006 and cut policy rates gradually in 2007...”  •  OCTOBER 2006: “under the scenario that the Central Bank maintains its tight stance until the last quarter of 2007 and cuts policy interest rates afterwards...”  As it is clearly seen above, as long as there was not a significant shock in the economy, the Central Bank acted in parallel to its earlier statements. However it had to revise its monetary policy stance after important shocks such as the market volatilities of May and June. It is more evident in light of these this example that, as it is frequently emphasized in our announcements, the interest rate path, which is used by the Central Bank in producing forecasts, should not be perceived as a commitment to be followed in every case. Hence, the interest rate risk should be assessed by considering the fact that the outlook presented in the Inflation Report is subject to change depending on the data flow, and thus, the policy perspective can be updated whenever necessary.

Price and wage developments repeatedly came on a collision course with the fixed exchange rate and Sweden suffered cost crises. To rectify the situation,  BIS Review8/2007  1  the krona was devalued a total of five times during a period of seven years. But the trend increase in domestic prices and wages continued to rise. The fundamental problem still remained. The result was modest economic growth, poor productivity growth and more or less stagnant growth in real wages. The performance was markedly weak both compared with earlier periods and in relation to other countries. During the crisis years at the beginning of the 1990s the situation got even worse. Unemployment increased fourfold in the course of a few years and the central government finances deteriorated dramatically. Long-term interest rates rose and the interest rate differential towards, for example, Germany occasionally came to several percentage points. The fixed exchange rate lost its credibility and finally had to be abandoned, following large currency outflows and extreme interest rate hikes in attempts to defend the krona. The nominal anchor that was to hold down inflation and inflation expectations in the economy had loosened. To secure it again and bring the Swedish economy onto a better track required drastic measures. The solution was what one might call a stabilization policy change of regime. The tasks of both monetary policy and fiscal policy were fundamentally redefined and we were given a clear allocation of roles in economic policy.
Finally, at an EU level, the efforts of individual countries to correct macroeconomic imbalances – and Malta is not alone in facing such a challenge – would be greatly facilitated by an early completion of the Single Market project, particularly in the area of services, and by a strengthening of the economic component of EMU, including the Stability and Growth Pact. In this regard, it should not be forgotten that the economic rationale of a monetary union foresees an important role for surplus countries as well in redressing imbalances within the Union. BIS Review 73/2010  5

When the fiscal rule was introduced, the expected return was estimated at 4 percent. The estimates presented today entail a considerably lower expected rate of return for any realistic equity allocation. As mentioned, with an equity allocation of 75 percent, the expected annual real return will be about 2.5 percent per year over the next ten years. Chart: Petroleum revenue spending over the budget Another important objective of the GPFG and the fiscal rule is to insulate the budget from sharp fluctuations in oil revenues. The GPFG is now so large and finances such a sizeable share of government spending that it may become just as important to manage swings in the fund’s value as swings in petroleum revenues. The fiscal authorities face an important trade-off: on the one hand, closely linking fiscal policy to changes in the value of the GPFG will have a substantial impact on other government spending and revenues from one year to another. This is far from desirable. On the other hand, a substantial degree of decoupling between changes in the GPFG’s value and government spending of its funds over the budget could lead to greater uncertainty about the value of the GPFG in the longer term. Oil revenue spending should be based on a realistic estimate of expected return. At the same time, due consideration must be given to return uncertainty. It may therefore be wise to consider spending somewhat less than the expected return over time.
The different surveys and asset prices can be read in more than a way in regards the true pace of normalization. Actually, the same as in June, the MPR implicit in swap contracts is lower than the one that can be inferred from the forward curve, mainly reflecting significant differences between the rates on non-indexed Central Bank bonds and swap contract as equivalent maturities. It is possible that these differences originate in the type of institutions operating in each market, which are not fully integrated, reflecting different preferences for instruments in pesos and in UF by resident and non-resident institutions. Similarly, this partial integration may mean that swap contract rates reflected more quickly and more intensely the movements of risk-free interest rates abroad. The baseline scenario of this Report uses as a working assumption an MPR trend that is comparable to the one observed in various expectations surveys (figure 11). Certainly, if actual conditions differ from those assumed in this baseline scenario, alternative policy measures will be required. Specifically, the Board believes that the scenario outlined here is subject to a number of risks. Considering that in June domestic demand – and output – already was showing faster than foreseen velocity, we cannot rule out gaps closing faster than assumed in the baseline scenario. Nor can we rule out that some part of that strength responded to merely temporary factors, such as the earthquake, and output will slow down before we think. In the global context, several risks are still latent.

(2) Red diamonds correspond to forecasts in the central scenario of June 2023 MP Report for each year in 2023-2025 period. (3) For oil: WTI-Brent average price per barrel. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg, and FAO. 18  Figure 20  MPR corridor (*)  (quarterly average, percent)  25.II  25.I  24.IV  24.III  24.II  24.I  23.IV  23.III  23.II  23.I  22.IV  22.III  22.II  22.I  21.IV  21.III  21.I  21.II  Jun.23 corridor FTS EES Mar.23 corridor MPR  13.0 12.0 11.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0  (*) The corridor is built with the methodology described in box V.1 in March 2020 MP Report and box V.3 in March 2022 MP Report. For details, see methodological note in figure II.10, June 2023 MP Report. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 19
There is a further consideration that I have raised on previous occasions – one that would enhance the effectiveness of the intermediation role in our financial system, and address some of the funding gaps, resulting possibly in instances of market failures. Malta lacks a 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  consistent supply of long term finance that would efficiently fund a project addressed to SME funding needs or to finance structural, economic, social and environmental policies in connection with the long term financing of priority projects. If we look at other countries, such as Germany and France, they managed to cater for SMEs as well as for other environmental and infrastructure investment through promotion or development banks. A development bank would contribute to economic growth by funding sectors and projects that are not catered for by commercial banks on their own. The Central Bank looks at such an initiative as a necessary diversification of our financial base. I understand that progress is being made on this initiative and I find this to be a very positive development. The road ahead Against a rapidly changing economic landscape, Malta needs to be attentive to take advantage of its flexibility and adaptability. In the past years, the Maltese economy went through significant structural change. Not only by diversifying into a number of new growth sectors such as aviation services, pharmaceuticals and internet related activity, but also by upgrading its investments in the traditional sectors.

Moreover, we must do so even while there is continued rapid evolution of financial markets, products and strategies and the constant challenge that evolution poses to our existing supervisory policies and techniques. While the challenge of evolutionary financial markets is clear in countries with financial institutions which are actively involved in the international marketplace, it is no less important for emerging market countries, which increasingly feel the influence of international financial competition. Thus, it is appropriate that we are devoting a day to questions of operational risk, an area of rapid evolution in risk management concepts and practice. The most important current operational risk problem, that of preparing for the century date change in the Year 2000, has a prominent place on the program and in our national supervisory agendas. I congratulate our hosts, the Reserve Bank of Australia, working in cooperation with the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, for putting together this program and I thank them for hosting the ICBS this year. I would like to focus on the dual role of supervisors in preventing banking problems and in providing the necessary support when there are systemic problems. When the Basle Committee, in concert with banking supervisors from around the globe, developed and in 1997 finalized the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, it was with this dual role of supervisors in mind.
Central Bank of Chile June 2020  “Monetary Policy Challenges Facing Emerging Countries Amid the Covid-19 Pandemic” Mario Marcel, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile Itaú Webinar, June 24, 2020 1. The Covid-19 pandemic has unfolded into a global crisis that has left no country unscathed. The economic effects are unprecedented in their origin, size, speed, and simultaneity across the world. 2. While non-pharmacological containment strategies vary across countries given the unknown nature of the virus, almost all of them have included social distancing and lockdown measures that have hit hard on economic activity. Global GDP is likely to lose some 8% to the crisis this year, which will take long to recover– if ever. 3. Economic policy has focused on limiting widening gaps in operational balances of firms and in disposable income of households, with credit called in to cover part of the remaining gap. This would prevent a liquidity problem turning into a solvency one, with the attached string of bankruptcies and long-term unemployment, which would make it much more difficult. 4. Such policy response has taken an unprecedented scale. In contrast with the prior notion of limited policy space, the fiscal, monetary and financial policy response has exceeded that of the Global Financial Crisis in many countries, most notably in advanced economies. 5. Major central banks have been particularly active in this juncture, providing unlimited liquidity through asset purchase programs. This contained the global selloff of mid-March and financial conditions have improved over the last month.

The industrial companies tried to make use of their promised loan facilities with the banks, but the banks were not able to lend money as usual. This resulted in a credit gridlock, which severely limited the access to loans. The problems spread from the United States to Europe and the European credit system also essentially ceased functioning. This meant that the Swedish banks and the Swedish financial system also suffered problems. BIS Review 149/2008  1  …followed by countermeasures and stabilisation In this situation governments, central banks and other authorities were forced to intervene to avoid a collapse in the global financial system. Without these measures the financial markets would most probably have ceased functioning – things were so serious. The measures have taken different forms in different countries, but two main types can be identified. The first is that the banks have been offered risk capital or other guarantees so that they can survive the crisis. The aim is to avoid more defaults like Lehman Brothers occurring when the financial market is so vulnerable. Those who lend money to a bank should be able to feel certain that the bank will still be there when it is time to repay the loan. The second type of measure is that the central banks have continuously supplied the banks with the short and medium-term loans they have not been able to obtain in the usual way on the market.
According to the current outlooks, the economy should stabilise in the second half of this year and it may start growing again either at the end of 2009 or at the beginning of 2010. However, all forecasts continue to be insecure. If our main trading partners' growth recovered faster, it would also give impetus to Estonia's economic activity, whereas a protracted global economic downswing would put a drag on rekindling growth here. Recent days' messages from the world have been slightly more optimistic after several months of bad news. It is thought the large support packages have finally started to render results. This requires even more urgently that countries be ready to take stapes to ensure long-term growth potential. It has happened before in the world that economic crises have been defeated by creating assumptions for a new crisis. Thank you for your attention! BIS Review 89/2009  5

In the US, the burden has been much more concentrated on those who have lost, and not regained, work. And in contrast to the UK, American companies have increased their profits significantly as a share of national income. The euro area What makes the UK performance even more remarkable is that we have faced the added challenge of rebuilding competitiveness. In the run-up to the crisis, the UK’s economy had become increasingly imbalanced. When the crisis hit, sterling fell by a quarter. Prices of imported goods rose sharply and that fed through to higher inflation. The squeeze on real incomes was pronounced. And yet there were relatively few calls for higher wages to compensate. As a result of that painful adjustment, the UK is more competitive. And if the world economy returns to a surer footing, there is a real prospect that the UK can properly rebalance its economy. 5  4  Outturns for unemployment have remained some way below what would have been expected given the past relationship between changes in unemployment and growth (Okun’s law). Year-on-year increases in unemployment during 2008-9, for example, remained around 1ppt below a simple Okun relationship based on data since the early 1970s. That is in stark contrast to the experience of the US in that period, where unemployment outturns were some way above past Okun’s law relationships. 5  See Carney, M (2014), Speech at the Mansion House, June; and Broadbent, B (2014), “The balance of growth”, Speech at the London School of Economics, January.
However, most recently, while the overall domestic activities remain weak, more positive signs on the real sector are emerging, especially in the monthly April data that show greater stabilization in the pace of contraction on a month-on-month basis, of exports, manufacturing output, capacity utilization, and private consumption, as well as a narrowing of the trade surplus. On the financial front, recent rally in equity prices is also positive. The rally, which is largely liquidity driven, is indicative of two developments that are taking place in our financial markets at this time: first, the resurgence of capital inflows linked to the return of risk appetite globally; and second, the search for yield by Thai savers, on account of the low nominal deposit rates, which sees savings shifting away from bank deposits to other instruments. Hence, the latest round of deposit rates increase by banks can be seen as a response to this development. On liquidity, at this time, liquidity in the Thai banking system remains ample. Loan-to-deposit ratio, including B/E, was at 83.9 percent in April. Bank credit continues to grow on a year-onyear basis, but fell by 2.7 percent since December last year. The decline largely reflects the fall in corporate loan demand on account of the slowing economy. Consumer credit and mortgage loans, on the other hand, continue to register positive growth, and this has provided an important underpinning for consumer spending thus far.

There is clearly the expected positive relationship with population, but the ratio varies hugely: a central bank on the highest of the three parallel lines has ten times the staff per million population as one on the lowest line. The extent of this dispersion is more apparent in Figure 5 which shows the number of staff per million population for the large countries. With only around 3,500 people - down by more than 50% over the last twenty years and still falling fast - the Bank of England itself is one of the most modestly staffed in relation to its population. In contrast to the significant results found by Fry et al. from their sample of developing countries, regression analysis on the industrial country data shows only weak evidence of small economies of scale. Nor did other variables tested on industrial countries yield any significant results. As for the transition economies, their staff numbers generally conform to those in industrial countries with similar populations. The exception is the Bank of Russia, whose staff looks abnormally large. Some of these central banks are still growing as they seek to carry out their new functions; but one or two, like the National Bank of Hungary, are already reviewing what they are doing and how they do it, and are slimming down. By the end of this year, they expect to have 40% fewer staff than two years ago.