samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The current account surplus is projected at 2% of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon and could easily be eroded by a surge in demand and/or lower export revenues. 2  Chart 1  As Chart 2 shows, both private consumption growth and rising house prices are due mainly to increased real incomes and households’ improved financial position. This differs greatly from the situation in pre-crisis Iceland, where increased household leverage played a leading role, but as can be seen in the chart on the right, lending to households has not increased in real terms since 2012. Chart 2  The fact that inflation has been low in recent years despite steep rises in wages and house prices stems primarily from two things: on the one hand, positive supply shocks in the form of strong export growth and improved terms of trade, which have pushed the exchange rate of the króna upwards, and on the other hand, price deflation in international goods trade. Import prices have therefore fallen steeply in krónur terms, as can be seen at the left in Chart 3. What would happen when this imported deflation turned around was always a source of concern. Such a development now appears to be on the horizon, as can be seen in the chart. But fortunately, the rise in unit labour costs seems to be losing pace, as can be seen in the chart at the centre, and house prices appear to have 3  peaked.

Unprecedented demand, especially from developing countries, requires a rapid transition to secure and inclusive digital finance.1 The study points to a double digit increase in number and volume of fintech transactions, as well as  1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  continuous increase of the client base. These trends have been underpinned by changes to the existing fintech products and launch of new ones. About 60% of the surveyed fintech companies reported launching new products as a response to changing behavior and demand of clients amidst pandemics. In addition, the fact that in the last decade banking industry was dealing with the legacy issues of the global financial crisis also provided bigger space for fintech firms, as non- regulated entities, to penetrate in financial business with consumer-centric solutions. This process was facilitated by the more favorable regulatory environment, i. e., falling regulatory barriers to entry for newcomers. Concerning the benefits, I think there is no doubt that Fintech can bring enormous benefits for customers, the financial system, and the overall economy. By enabling new players and business models to enter the market, Fintech has potential to increase competition, meet unfulfilled customer needs, reduce inefficiencies and transform financial services for good. These solutions come from Fintech's ability to unbundle traditional banking services such payments, maturity transformation, and risk sharing from banks, allowing these services to be performed by non-banks, i.e., fintech firms. Furthermore, fintech solutions can enhance data analysis, leading to more personalized products.
Instead, we work closely together with the national supervisors. We also rely on their national expertise, and we rely on their experience. After all, they know a lot about the local circumstances, such as specific covered bond frameworks. Without them, European banking supervision would not work. In my view, working together, and placing our trust in each other, is a small price to pay for a safe and sound banking sector. And in the end, sharing control does not mean losing control – it may even mean the opposite. As members of the banking union, countries might actually gain control and influence. Together, they may be able to shape policies and rules which have an impact beyond the banking union itself. And they can also contribute to discussions at the global level, such as those of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. So, within the banking union, we share control over banking supervision. But the quest for a stable financial system does not stop there. It is crucial for financial stability that each bank is as safe and sound as it can be. But this alone is not enough. The health of each bank is not sufficient to ensure the health of the system. Things are a bit more complicated than that. When it comes to financial stability, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. If we want to limit risks in the whole system, we must do more than just monitor each part in isolation. We must cooperate.

Percentage of those born in Sweden and those born abroad in the labour force, aged 15-74 years. Sources: Eurostat and Statistics Sweden (AKU)  Increased migration in Sweden and abroad During the latter part of the 19th century there was widespread emigration from Sweden to the United States in particular. Around 1.2 million Swedes emigrated to the United States between 1851 and 1930, which at that time was around one fifth of the population. The reasons were in many cases financial, but religious freedom and increased equality were also attractive. There were several factors that enabled emigration. The emergence of the steam ship was one factor. Liberal ideas on economics, politics and freedom – which made a breakthrough around Europe in the 19th century – were other factors. At the beginning of the 20th century, Sweden was an established “emigration country” with more emigrants than immigrants, see Figure 9. This was primarily due to the large-scale emigration, but we also had very few immigrants. In the year 1900 the percentage of people born abroad in relation to the population as a whole was just 0.7 per cent, with most of them coming from other Nordic countries. An interesting fact here is that the immigrants from outside of Europe comprised 90 people from South America, 79 from Africa (56 of whom were from  13 [24]  South Africa) and 87 from Asia.
Note: Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. A negative pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men. Chart 22: Conditional gender wage gap under specification (5) Difference in lnpay  0.05 0 ‐0.05  Gender pay gap  ‐0.1 ‐0.15 ‐0.2 ‐0.25 ‐0.3  1994‐1998  1999‐2003  2004‐2008  2009‐2013  2014‐2019  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A negative gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men. 11 The regressions assume the effect of the controls on pay is homogenous between different groups. If we run a Chow test on this restriction, it fails in our sample. This would be a useful area for future research. 12 Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  We can replicate this regression for ethnicity with the same set of controls, except that the occupation, age groups, and children under 2 variables now interact with the ethnic minority variable. Where  (6) ln  ∝  h  =  ∗ 1 0  h  ∗  person does not belong to white ethnic group person belongs to white ethnic group  With this specification, the conditional gap for ethnic minorities averages around -11% and is again significant at the 1% level.

Both countries have also established regular dialogues including the Joint Council of Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) co-chaired at the Deputy Prime Minister level and the Ministerial level economic and trade councils in seven Chinese Provinces/Municipalities. We want to build on what has been achieved, and explore avenues to deepen our close partnership. Financial cooperation has become an increasingly important pillar of the ChinaSingapore relationship. 9 Singapore has served as a useful platform for Chinese financial institutions to participate in regional markets, especially in ASEAN. To-date, six out of the top 10 Chinese banks already have a presence in Singapore. Two of them – Bank of China and Industrial Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) – were extended Qualifying Full Bank (QFB) privileges as part of the enhanced CSFTA in 2012. These banks are now expanding their Singapore operations as hubs for Southeast Asia. 10 In addition, Singapore financial sector has also served the needs of China’s financial markets. For instance, China is the largest source of offshore reinsurance business in Singapore in 2011. We welcome this presence. 11 At the same time, China has also presented opportunities for Singapore’s financial institutions. Our three local banks already have a presence in 15 provinces in China. Our sovereign wealth funds and private investors based in Singapore are also important investors in China’s financial institutions and markets. 12 There is potential to further these financial interconnections as China gradually widens and deepens its financial markets.
Employment is growing sharply in the public sector and the construction industry. In recent years, consumer price inflation has been higher in Norway than among our trading partners. The year-on-year rise in prices was 2.4 per cent in September. Stable prices for imported consumer goods is contributing to containing inflation in Norway. The rate of increase in prices that is primarily influenced by domestic costs is high. It is not a new phenomenon that Norway is at a different stage of the business cycle than the euro area countries. One reason for this is that changes in the external environment often have a different impact on the Norwegian economy than other European economies. For example, a sharp rise in oil prices has a dampening impact on purchasing power and the activity level in the euro area. In contrast, this tends to boost petroleum investment and household confidence in Norway. The development of a national oil industry and restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s have also contributed to a cyclical path that is specific to Norway. For example, petroleum investment was probably one of the main driving forces behind the booms in the mid-1980s and in 1997-1998. 4  BIS Review 90/2001  BIS Review 90/2001  5  Norwegian labour costs have risen by 5-6 per cent annually in recent years, while labour costs in the euro area countries have increased by less than 3 per cent annually. When cyclical developments are not synchronised and labour costs are at different levels, interest rates will also vary.

Mr Bäckström discusses the monetary policy situation in Sweden Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr Urban Bäckström, at Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and Veckans Affärer on 2/2/99. Thank you for the invitation to attend this conference and talk about “The krona and the interest rate”. I shall be speaking mainly about the current monetary policy situation and the factors that may be crucial for the policy’s future formulation. However, now that the Riksbank is directed by the six members of the new Executive Board, which also makes the monetary policy decisions, the decision-making process has changed. So I shall begin by briefly describing how monetary policy will be decided and presented in this new environment. The new process for monetary policy decisions At 1pm on Thursday 11 February, the new Executive Board of the Riksbank will be convening for its first meeting specifically devoted to monetary policy. Compared with the Board’s ordinary sessions, the discussion at what are called monetary policy meetings is to cover monetary policy more comprehensively and conclude with a decision on the policy’s future stance. The discussion will be minuted and published in this form on 6April, around eight weeks after the event. Moreover, a brief account of the grounds for the decision will be presented in a communiqué on the day after the meeting, in this case at 9.30am on Friday 12 February.
Since every country has its own set of idiosyncrasies, I can obviously not speak for all central banks. I will therefore focus on Switzerland and the SNB. As in other areas of the economy, however, developments abroad affect Switzerland and thus the SNB via the global financial markets. This just goes to show how important it is for us that the right direction for central banks is also set abroad. Role of monetary policy largely unchanged I would now like to say a few words about the central banks’ role in monetary policy. In my opinion, the core mandate should remain unchanged. The SNB’s monetary policy is still credible. The SNB must, as an independent central bank, ensure price stability while taking due account of economic developments. The National Bank Act grants us substantial flexibility in implementing this mandate, and this has made a major contribution to retaining our freedom of action, even under extreme conditions. When the zero bound was reached, we were able to use new instruments swiftly and rigorously even though this was associated with considerable balance sheet risks. As a result, we successfully fulfilled our mandate and ensured price stability. How else, for instance, could we have credibly set and enforced the minimum exchange rate, if the law had imposed restrictions on the SNB with regard to its balance sheet? The key importance of price stability was uncontested for a long time. Now, however, the relatively old discussion about the optimal goal of monetary policy has been fuelled by the crisis.

In Switzerland, this means that as long as the economic recovery remains on track, we should not postpone for too long the process of normalising monetary conditions. Otherwise, we would put medium term price stability at risk. 1/1
Events are still moving quickly, so I hope you will understand why I am not going to attempt a live commentary on events. I hope that the massive and far-reaching measures the US Government has now announced will restore greater calm and confidence in their banking system. Stabilisation of US markets and banks should have a beneficial knock-on effect on wider international markets too. But we will continue to monitor the situation closely, in consultation with our counterparts in the US and elsewhere, in order to judge whether any further measures are needed. Inflation outlook This morning I want to take a wider perspective and discuss how the credit crunch is affecting the wider UK economy and draw some medium-term lessons for economic policy. BIS Review 114/2008  1  And the first point to make is that the turmoil in financial markets has not been the only shock to our economy in the last 12 months. In any other week more attention would have been given to the fact that for the second successive quarter the Governor had to write an open letter to the Chancellor on behalf of the Monetary Policy Committee to explain why inflation was more than a percentage point away from the target of 2%. In fact inflation has risen from 2.1% in December to 4.7% in August and it seems set to peak above 5% soon. The immediate driver of that increase has been the international commodity cycle (Chart 1).

But the same arithmetic applies: such price level shocks need have no long-term impact on the inflation rate. In the medium term the real upside risks to inflation lie at home – in whether we see “second round” rises in wages and prices in the domestic economy. It is to counter those pressures that the MPC have judged it necessary over the last year for growth to slow and create a margin of spare capacity in our economy. That makes it more difficult for companies to raise prices and puts more pressure on them to restrain their costs. It also re-emphasises our determination to get inflation back to the 2% target and thus influences the expectations of financial markets, price setters, wage negotiators and households generally. And expectations themselves have an important impact on inflation. Broadly, the higher households’ expect inflation to be, the less they are likely to save today. Inflation expectations also shape workers’ wage demands as they try to protect their standard of living. And companies’ expectations will shape the prices they set as well as their willingness to concede cost increases. We know from the inflations of the 70s, 80s, and early 90s that raising interest rates will in time bring inflation down, even when expectations of future inflation are high. But we also know how painful that process is. It works through the increased threat of bankruptcy and unemployment. That forces a change in peoples’ behaviour and their hearts and minds and expectations follow.
The emergence of an advanced oil service industry is an industrial success story. We have extracted large quantities of oil and gas in a period of very high prices. And we have set aside a large proportion of the revenues – for the benefit of future generations. In spite of some mistakes and a fair share of luck along the way, we would have to say that Norway’s petroleum wealth has so far been managed well. Norway’s oil age is far from over. But activity in the petroleum sector has passed the peak. We must also be prepared for lower returns in the oil industry. In the period ahead, we should keep an important insight in mind: the key to economic progress is the ability to restructure. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

I invite our guest to share his vision on aspects such as economic policies development in Europe, economic and social trends, euro convergence and the reform steps needed. His lecture will provide an excellent occasion for all of us to get a better grasp on what lies ahead for the Union and for the Euro Area. I hope that Prof. Sapir’s lecture will offer each of you a better view of what lies ahead. I am sure he will willingly answer your questions. I invite Professor André Sapir to take the floor and I wish you a rewarding debate. Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
This rate is in compliance with the provided demand of the economy for money, coming from its real growth by 6 percent. The Bank of Albania monetary program is designed in line with other policies of the economy, where its harmonisation with the government fiscal policy is highlighted. The Bank of Albania estimates that like in the past years, even in 2005, the country's economic development will be in conformity with the overall development program objectives. The last developments of the banking system consolidate the optimism that it will fulfil to the best of its knowledge the role of financial intermediation in the economy. We deem that its consolidation will continue with accelerated rhythms throughout this year, providing to the large public more credits, more services and more security in the savings conduct. 2/2

Unlike Desk operations conducted with fixed quantities, the Desk wouldn’t need to estimate the appropriate amount of reverse repos to offer each day in order to absorb the quantity of reserve balances at the target rate.16 With IOER and an overnight, fixed-rate, full-allotment reverse repo facility, counterparties would determine the level of participation based on daily demand for overnight investments at a fixed rate that’s judged consistent with the FOMC’s overall policy stance. Market forces will therefore determine how to allocate the Federal Reserve’s liabilities between depository institutions holding them as reserves and money market funds, GSEs, and other non-bank financial institutions holding them as reverse repos. The effectiveness of an overnight, fixed-rate, full-allotment facility in helping to control overnight money market rates will depend on a range of factors, including whether a sufficiently wide set of non-bank counterparties has access to the facility. Following seven waves of counterparty expansions since 2009, the Desk currently has 139 reverse repo counterparties, covering 94 of the largest 2a-7 money market funds, 6 GSEs, 18 banks, and the 21 primary dealers. Taken together, these institutions represent an estimated 25 percent of all overnight Treasury tri-party repo volume. More counterparties could certainly be added, and we’re in the process of considering how best to proceed. The efficacy of the facility will also depend on factors such as the regulatory and balance sheet constraints of counterparties and the level of competition in the markets.
Chart 1  UND1X including and excluding energy  4  4 UND1X UND1X excluding energy  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  0 2003  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank

As you know, a broad raft of measures was agreed last Thursday covering the three main spheres of action of the ECB throughout this crisis. The conventional monetary policy stance was additionally eased with a further cut in official rates which, for practical purposes, have now reached their lower bound. The horizon for the policy of generous liquidity provision was extended once more to 2016. And, lastly, a further step was taken in respect of unconventional measures with the launch of a new, four-year, long-term refinancing operation aimed and designed at promoting greater credit flow. As we know, neither the ECB nor monetary policy alone can resolve the problems at the root of the crisis still besetting the euro area. But decisions such as those last Thursday no doubt contribute to facilitating the action of other economic policy tools which, by their nature, may have a more powerful and lasting effect on growth and employment. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Capital adequacy ratio  Capital adequacy and funding duration for some selected banks in March 2008 12 Kaupthing  11,5 11  Glitnir  10,5  Landsbanki Handelsbanken  10 DnB NOR 9,5 Intesa Sanpaolo  Swedbank 9 8,5 1  2  3  4  5 6 7 8 9 Remaining time to maturity of issued securities  Sources: Bloomberg, Riksbank. BIS Review 9/2010  9  A great deal of value is lost at the very moment when banks stop being going concerns. However, low estimated recovery rates after the banks’ collapse seem to indicate the existence of an underlying solvency problem. It also raises questions about the quality of accounting. This is one of the mysteries that still wait to be solved. My list of causes for the collapse of the Icelandic banks is the following: •  Large foreign-currency balance sheets with significant maturity mismatches but without a LOLR. •  Size relative to the home base (country and currency). •  Fatal flaws in the EU financial architecture. •  Bad and non-cooperative crisis management across interested jurisdictions. But there were also triggers and contributing factors: •  The international financial crisis and all the usual suspects that have been named in relation to it, including incentive systems, regulation and supervision. •  Flaws in business models and risk management. •  Iceland’s large macroeconomic imbalances. •  Domino vulnerabilities in Iceland’s financial sector (e.g., cross-ownership, connected lending, large exposures across institutions). •  Bad governance and accounting?

The extension also expands the FLS to cover lending to financial leasing and factoring corporations (which are a source of credit for SMEs). We have been clear that the design of the extended FLS particularly encourages lending to SME’s in determining access to the FLS. Incentives to lend to SME’s are therefore in place,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  no doubt about that. But we cannot promise that the results will follow almost as night follows day, because there is more to it than that. Let me end, by advertising a piece of work done by your chairman-elect, chairing a group that recently produced a report on SME lending in Northern Ireland. In that report, Kate and her colleagues point to structural market failures affecting the supply of finance to SMEs, which mainly relate to imperfect or asymmetric information, and which tend to be exacerbated in times of heighted economic uncertainty and risk aversion. Likewise, the report points to information failures on the demand side for businesses seeking finance. The report goes on to note that over the last five years there has been a market correction as banks have moved away from a lending approach based on property as security to one that is more based on evidence of a business plan that indicates returns to the firm that will repay borrowing.