samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Indeed, recent MI has suggested that there has been some direct lending  9  And although the aggregate US corporate sector cash position is strong, it is likely to mask significant heterogeneity in the distribution of firms, with a disproportionate share of the cash held by the largest investment grade businesses. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  activity to mid-sized corporates in the UK by non-bank institutions such as dedicated loan, private equity and pension funds (although the absolute amounts are still very small). Chart 13  Chart 14  Issuance of sub-investment grade corporate debt by region(a)(b)  Corporate bond valuation measure(a)(b)  Sources: Dealogic and Bank calculations. (a) Emerging economies includes Africa, Caribbean, Indian subcontinent, Latin America, Middle East, North Asia and South East Asia. “Other” includes Australasia and Japan. Includes issuance in all currencies. (b) 2011 data are to 3 June 2011  Sources: Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. (a) Shows the difference between actual and estimated equilibrium spreads as a percentage. Positive numbers represent overvaluation, negative numbers undervaluation. (b) Equilibrium corporate bond spreads are defined as the total estimated credit component plus a five-year rolling average of the illiquidity premia. Full details of the approach used for the decomposition of corporate bond spreads can be found in Churm, R and Panigirtzoglou, N (2005), “Decomposing credit spreads”, Bank of England Working Paper no. 253.

Despite this, his critics point to the fact that he has left behind a European economy that is “drugged”, with low growth, rates at zero and inflation very far from the objective. Monetary policy is not the reason for this; it’s been the main driver of the economic recovery and growth in Europe. 11 million jobs have been created, in no small part thanks to monetary policy. This is the main thing, although there are collateral effects. The problem we have at the moment is that these monetary policy decisions need to be complemented by other instruments. Sometimes it seemed like you were not exactly among Mr Draghi’s most ardent supporters. I have always supported President Draghi. But when you heard him being talked about as the saviour of the euro or the person who had rescued Spain, it didn’t sit well with you. Well, he didn’t see it like that either. In Spain, we rescued ourselves, off our own backs, with the help of our European partners, including the ECB. Mr Draghi made a key contribution, but there’s no single saviour here. It was a set of circumstances and a matter of everyone carrying out their responsibilities in their individual roles. As Vice-President will you continue to appear alongside President Lagarde? I have no idea. I suppose it will continue like that. It’s an unwritten rule, a tradition. Traditions can change, but they can also be of value. Brexit, trade and currency wars, geopolitical tensions.
And the European Court of Justice has also put a question mark over the legitimacy of the ECB’s participation in it. For now, that is an opinion of the Advocate General, not a ruling of the Court. And therefore it is too early to be drawing conclusions. And it is also too early to establish what will happen in Greece in this respect. Was the ECB’s decision to start QE, a week ago, correct and timely in your opinion? It was the right decision, also in terms of timing – in the sense that it allowed us to prepare the operation from a technical point of view. We could not simply import the United States’ or United Kingdom’s experience. We needed to design our asset purchases based on our needs, which was also a useful process for gaining the approval of as many governors as possible. But in economic terms? Good timing in this regard, too. There are signs of economic growth returning and the price of oil has fallen, as has the exchange rate of the euro. And now monetary policy is sufficiently expansionary. All of the lights are green: 2015 could see significant growth and our surveys show that banks are passing on the reduction in interest rates to their customers more than they did in the past. Monetary policy is even more effective when it is not leaning against the wind. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Even without national reforms?

In Malaysia, our vision of the development of the financial sector over the next ten years is outlined in our Financial Sector Masterplan. The plan includes the strategic direction and strategies for the development of the Islamic financial sector. Finally, greater cooperation among the regulators is necessary in order to ensure that the Islamic financial system is not subject to vulnerabilities and abuses. In this respect, sharing of information among the regulators including across borders is important especially in a more globalised and liberalised environment where financial transactions and activities have become more complex and globalised. In this regard, there is a greater need for regulators to continuously exchange views and share information on key issues and developments faced in their own financial jurisdictions. Another important aspect is in regard to the development of the international Islamic financial market. Although this market is to be driven by the market players, a greater role is expected from the  6  BIS Review 3/2004  regulators and central banks to support its expansion. In this respect, the encouraging support shown by various regulators and central banks in making the launching and issuance of the sovereign sukuk papers a success represents an important progress that has been achieved. These initiatives will bring about a more coordinated effort in achieving market development and stability. VI. Conclusion  Our quest to develop a dynamic Islamic financial system is to achieve the ultimate objective for Islamic finance that contributes significantly toward the overall development of our economies.
Also, as supervisors, we should move to develop models that envisage macroeconomic effects in the face of different ecological transition scenarios. The aim hereby is to become familiar with the potential impacts of climate change on specific economic sectors, industries and even firms, and on more aggregate variables, such as growth and inflation. Naturally, the implementation of many of these initiatives requires considerable international coordination. Hence the importance of our active participation in the NGFS, the supervisors’ and central bank network I mentioned earlier, set up in early 2018. In the short time since its creation, the NGFS has managed to bring together more than 30 central banks and supervisory authorities. The aims of this network include analysis of supervisory practices, of macroeconomic and financial risks, and the means for smoothing financing for the transition to a sustainable economy. Undeniably, the implementation of all these aspects with some degree of harmonisation will be a difficult task. But you will agree with me that we are all facing a fundamental challenge and that, as such, we must spare no effort. Allow me to refer briefly also to the role financial markets can play in this process of ecological transition. In capital markets we have seen some positive discrimination in the valuation of firms with a lower degree of exposure to climate change, albeit limitedly so. Logically, and as in the case of banks, the markets should act as a catalyst for change  4/5  towards certain sustainable activities, while discouraging investment in particularly polluting industries.

By the end of the 1930s, there were only six British banks left with reserve liability. In the US, a similar process was underway. Systemic bank failure during the Great Depression was taken as evidence of the inadequacy of extended liability in protecting depositors. As in the UK, making a call on shareholders was deemed likely to make a bad situation worse. It was quickly replaced with Federal deposit insurance in 1934. With reserve liability gone, so too did the rationale for shareholder vetting. So by the 1930s the governance and balance sheet structure of banks was unrecognisable from a century earlier. Ownership and control were amicably divorced. Ownership was vested in a widely dispersed set of shareholders, unvetted and anonymous. Their upside payoffs remained unlimited, but their downside risks were now capped by limited liability. The pool of reserve capital had largely evaporated. Later in the 20th century, these governance and balance sheet features spread across the financial system. During the 1990s, many of the larger global investment banks abandoned their private partnership status to become limited liability public companies. In the UK, a number of mutually-owned building societies followed suit and turned public. The rationale was familiar from a century earlier – the desire to break their balance sheet chains. By the end of the 20th century, joint stock banking was pre-eminent. What impact did these governance changes have on banks’ risk-taking incentives? Finance theory here is admirably clear.
BIS Review 136/2008  9  higher inflation without lower unemployment in the long term. Credibility hinges on the active use of the interest rate to attain the target. The lawyer and economist Michael Woodford has pointed out that in order to keep your word it is not enough to make a promise today and keep your word tomorrow. 37 When making interest rate forecasts, we must also take into consideration the promises made yesterday. Only then can we fully use expectations to stabilise the economy optimally. This is referred to as monetary policy from a timeless perspective. 38 My understanding is that a person will likewise both look backward and forward when interpreting the laws of a society. It is Norwegian court practice for judges to consider precedent effects and case law when interpreting legislation. Today there is general consensus that price stability is not only the best contribution that monetary policy can make to economic stability over time, but perhaps also the only promise the central bank can actually deliver. 6. Today’s financial crisis  These days the world is in the throes of a severe financial crisis – the deepest crisis since the 1930s. Many foreign banks have suffered large losses and a sense of fear is prevailing. We are entering a global economic recession. The authorities are taking action to restore confidence in the financial industry. Macroeconomic policy measures are aimed at limiting the crisis-related effects on the real economy.

The krone exchange rate is the price of our currency measured in a foreign currency. Developments in other countries are just as important for the krone as developments in the Norwegian economy. Capital flows freely and flows can change rapidly. This can spill over to exchange rates and interest rates as well as output and employment. There is a cost involved for businesses in hedging against fluctuations in the krone. A krone that is stable - but too strong - also entails social costs in the form of low activity. Likewise, a krone that is stable - but too weak - is a source of high inflation. Norway is running a current account surplus as a result of sizeable oil and gas exports. Owing to high oil prices, the current account surplus is rising this year. An increase in the current account surplus will normally result in higher net demand for the domestic currency. In Norway, however, the additional foreign exchange revenues that accrue to the Norwegian state as a result of high oil prices will be invested in foreign securities through the Government Petroleum Fund. As a result, they will not have a direct impact on the balance in the Norwegian foreign exchange market. Oil companies hold a large share of their financial capital in foreign currency, and higher revenues in these companies therefore results in an increase in capital outflows.
Once the risk management Committee has been established, the Board will be able to control risks through this Committee and define types of risks that have to be closely monitored. In addition, the Committee would also responsible for setting up measures to deal with those types of risk, including the process on risk assessment and control. The contingency plan is needed to control risks in timely manner and minimize those risks to be at the acceptable level. This includes the reporting process on risk status to the Committee and Board of Directors with simple and clear message. With such practices, the Board of Directors could fully monitor risk management with appropriate decision, supporting by the Risk Management Committee. On the division of responsibility between the Board and the Risk Management Committee, the Committee should have authority to directly oversee all risks arising from normal course of business, while the Board of Directors should be responsible for approval of the risk management policy framework proposed by the Risk Management Committee, such as approval of aggregate exposure limit to FX risk, and individual limit by transactions and traders; maximum value at risk for interest rate risk; on credit risk, setting aggregate, individual, as well as group large exposure limit to certain types of credits and borrowers, or certain groups, to prevent over concentration. BIS Review 25/2006  3  On top of setting proper risk management framework and risk limits, the directors should also be on guard against situations where normal risk management cannot fully cover.

This year should mark the historic new chapter for the nation’s payment system, where we would see the transfer of the  BIS Review 25/2006  1  payments operation function from the Bank of Thailand to the private sector. This would provide greater flexibility for the system to adapt to the fast changing modern payments system development. Moreover, the recent announcement by the Thai Bankers Association of a major reform in the price structure of various payment media, including cheques, provides an important milestone towards a more efficient payment services. The move reflects a pricing based on the cost of various means of payments which would quickly eliminate inefficiency and costs to commercial banks. Another major achievement that calls for celebration is the significant reduction in the NPL last year. Thai banks have succeeded in bringing NPL down from 556,998 million baht, or 11.82 percent of total loans at the end of 2004, to 461,439 million baht, or 9.05 percent of total loans at the end of last year. In all, the NPL was brought down by a net amount of 95,559 million baht, the largest such decline since 2001, as a consequence of the recovery of the economy and improvement in business conditions. I am confident that this year will see an even more decline in NPL than last year. Moreover, the Financial Institution Development Fund has just completed the merging of Bangkok Asset Management Company, or BAM, with Asset Management Corporation or AMC.
Although some consolidation has been overdue in these asset markets which had overshot as a result of irrational exuberance, when they do fall sharply our exchange rate link with the US dollar inevitably would be blamed as the culprit, at least when everybody was in the heat of it all. 27. Thankfully, it is perhaps in the nature of human beings that even the innocent parties who were unfairly hurt are capable of appreciating the big picture and rationally assessing what the alternative might be. Interest rate volatility is the price to pay for a stable exchange rate. Clearly it would not be in their interest for Hong Kong to get involved in the process of competitive devaluation of others in the region and suffer even higher interest rates. And why should we, given that our competitive position, as very much a service oriented economy, is not really very sensitive to exchange rate changes? The currencies of the Asian economies, other than the Mainland of China, have recently been on a free fall. I am sure even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is surprised by the extent of the devaluation seen in the Asian currencies after they were floated. 28. All concerned might have underestimated the effect of a general realization of the need for hedging when a currency moves from a fixed exchange rate system into a floating exchange rate system. It has now become quite clear that there has been overshooting in the depreciation of some of the Asian currencies.

For fiscal policies, which continue to be largely a national responsibility, the Treaty sets out a framework of surveillance and disciplining mechanisms in order to maintain sound public finances. These indispensable cornerstones of the institutional framework agreed in Maastricht have been confirmed by the Constitution recently signed by the Heads of State and Government in Rome. The Stability and Growth Pact, which was agreed by all governments in 1997 after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty but before the launch of the single currency, sought to provide additional incentives for maintaining fiscal discipline at the national level by operationalising the excessive deficit procedure of the Treaty. It also specifies a commitment to achieving medium-term budgetary positions “close to balance or in surplus” and incorporates multilateral surveillance procedures and the exchange of information in conjunction with medium-term stability programmes submitted by national governments. Assigning the overriding objective of price stability to the single monetary policy is an example of the benefits of a clear division of responsibilities between different policy actors. The delegation of the single monetary policy to an independent central bank enhances credibility, increases transparency and also facilitates accountability. Similarly, the Stability and Growth Pact provides a basic set of rules for the conduct of sound and disciplined fiscal policies by national governments, while in principle preserving sufficient room for manoeuvre for the operation of automatic stabilisers without infringing the 3% ceiling for the deficit-to-GDP ratio.
Of course, that is helpful to – indeed, is a necessary condition for – the maintenance of financial stability. Most obviously, during the current crisis banks chose to more than double their targets for reserves balances with the Bank in the months following August 2007, and we injected the required increase in money into the system. That was necessary to keep overnight rates broadly in line with Bank Rate; and it was also necessary, although not sufficient, to stabilise the short-term money markets and the banking system. But, as the past 18 months or so have demonstrated, contingency plans centred on managing reserves by no means exhaust the range of market operations and facilities available to central banks to reduce the economic costs of severe disruptions to the financial system. While not explicitly directed to managing day-to-day monetary conditions, those wider measures absolutely must, nevertheless, be constructed to be consistent with, and supportive of, monetary policy. Financial stability and commercial banks How best to construct those facilities turns in part on how we think about financial stability, and so I should probably be clear about the definition of financial stability I employ. It is largely to do with money and the role of the banking system in a monetary economy. Monetary policy is, of course, directed to ensuring stability in the value of central bank money relative to goods and services.

As of now such competence resides mostly in big internet platform companies. However, many data subjects have no way to make better use of their own digital footprints, or data about themselves currently scattered in various different platforms, for their own benefit. 12. For example, SMEs are facing the long-standing problem of having limited access to finance. Conventional credit scoring approaches are not particularly favorable to SMEs because they often lack auditable operating data, which large corporates have. This disadvantage hinders not only the growth of SME businesses, but also the stability of our job markets and economic growth. Worse still, the blow of the pandemic has put the survival of many SMEs at stake, and their need for financing is stronger than ever. So is there a way to better empower data subjects to make better use of their own data for their own benefit? 13. With this objective in mind, we are expanding our financial infrastructure to enable data to take the centre stage. Our recently launched initiative, the Commercial Data Interchange (CDI), is a centralized platform which allows data owners to share their digital footprints voluntarily with banks through data providers in an efficient and secure manner. With a more substantial body of up-to-date and authenticated data shared by SMEs (such as monthly or even daily trading and turnover statistics), banks could use data analytics to perform more accurate credit assessments, and then provide more tailored services to SMEs.
We have already seen quite a bit of economic restructuring in the US and Europe – particularly in manufacturing industry – in response to the development of lowcost competition based in China and other Asian economies. We should expect this process of structural change to continue as the leading Asian economies continue their development in the decades ahead. The key for economies like the UK, other European economies and the United States to prosper and succeed in this new world economic order is to have the right supply-side policies which help businesses to remain competitive and adapt to changing market conditions. To support high living standards, western economies will need to stay ahead of the game by upgrading their levels of education of skills and maintaining a business climate which is conducive to enterprise and innovation. Flexible labour markets are also a key ingredient in ensuring that a high level of employment can be sustained against the background of structural change and increasing global competition. 3  See Asian Development Bank (2011). Note that the ADB analysis covers a much wider group of economies than Charts 2 and 3, which boosts the share of world population to over 50%. Llewellyn and Santovetti (2010) also provide a similar analysis of future economic prospects in Asia. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Pressure on energy and commodity markets There are two other wider challenges raised by the changes we have seen in the global economy in recent decades.

Data and news that transcends boundaries in real time are important for not only investors and financial institutions but also for researchers and scholars in Islamic finance. It will contribute towards enhancing competitiveness, product innovation and strengthen the international financial inter-linkages. As we enter this new decade, the challenge for the world is to sustain the economic recovery. While there continues to be many problems still to be addressed in the developed world, most emerging economies have continued to do well. In Malaysia, our economy recorded a strong growth of 7.2% in 2010 driven by strong domestic demand and our stronger economic and financial linkages with other emerging economies. An important part of this recovery is the strong recovery in private investment as capacity utilisation increases and as the dynamic nature of our economy presents new investment opportunities in new growth areas. For the Islamic finance industry, the year 2011 is set to be an exciting period. The global sukuk issuance in the year 2010 surpassed that of the previous year by more than 20 per cent. Against this positive growth, renewed confidence of investors and issuers is evident. In 2011, the sukuk issuance is projected to surpass the level recorded in 2007 when it sustained the highest level of issuances. The year 2010 also saw Malaysia’s evolution as a multi-currency sukuk origination platform with four foreign currency sukuk issuances amounting to about USD3 billlion.