samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
8 The concept of a balance sheet recession can be described as follows. Let us assume that we have experienced a large price rise on an important asset market, for instance, the property market, and that this rise has been largely financed through loans – that is, roughly what happened with the North Atlantic property bubble. If prices then fall drastically, many people will be stuck with assets that have declined substantially in value, while the value of the loan remains unchanged. In other words, their balance sheets look much worse than they had anticipated. This can create uncertainty regarding the outlook for the future. In this situation the participants in the economy may set a target that overshadows all others – to get rid of enough of their debts. This means that their income will for some time to come be used for amortisation rather than consumption and investment. Interest rate cuts less effective when everyone wants to pay off their debts It is then of minor importance if interest rates are cut – the participants in the economy are still only interested in consolidating their balance sheets. Even if one steps on the monetary policy accelerator pedal, the engine does not give the usual response. This is what I meant earlier when I said that monetary policy has less effect than usual in certain situations. The actual consolidation of the balance sheets may go more quickly if the interest rate is cut, as this creates scope to increase the pace of the instalment payments.

However, it was not clear, at that point in time, whether this sharp increase at the beginning of the year was a one-off effect in connection with the launch of the single currency and thus quickly fall again. In view of these uncertainties, the Governing Council of the ECB saw nothing in the development of M3 in the spring of this year to prevent it from reducing the interest rates. 3  BIS Review 99/1999  Current assessment of the monetary, financial and economic situation Please allow me to explain briefly how the Governing Council of the ECB currently views the monetary, financial and economic situation in the euro area. Since the beginning of the year, the annual inflation rate for the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices has stood at around 1% in the euro area as a whole, i.e. within our definition of price stability. Whilst the rate of price increases in food products has been falling since the beginning of the year, energy prices have increased strongly as result of the sharp increase in oil prices over the last few months. Overall the upward pressure turned out to be moderate, and perhaps more moderate than expected, which is a reflection of the increased competition in the service sector and the success of deregulation in some markets. However, since production costs could also increase in time as a result of the increase in energy prices, the increase in oil prices contributes to certain risks to price stability.
Gold  Source: NBR  Foreign currency reserves  40.0  30.0  20.0  10.0  Figure 5. Financing gap  percent of GDP 18.0  16.4%  16.0  14.8%  14.0  13.0% 11.5%  12.0  11.6%  10.0  9.0%  8.0 6.0  8.8%  9.1% 7.5%  7.6%  2017  2018f  6.4% 4.3%  4.0 2.0 0.0 2007 Source: MPF  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  Figure 6. Average maturity of Romania’s public debt 12  percent  9.7  10 8  7.2 5.8  6  3.8  5.3 4.1  2 1.7  2011  2012  8.1  5.7  5.8  5.9  3.5  3.3  3.2  2016  2017  Jun-18  6.4  4.4 2.4  1.6  8  6.2  4 4  7.8  3  3  2014  2015  0 2013  average maturity total debt Source: MPF  average maturity eurobonds  average maturity local bonds  Figure 7. Net external debt percent of GDP 45 40 36.0 35 30  37.7  38.4 35.8  32.0 29.8 27.2  27.0  25  22.4 20.2  20 15 10 5 0 2008  Source: Eurostat  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  Figure 8.

Harvard University Press. Fisher, P (2010), “Why is CPI inflation so high?”, Remarks based on a talk given to Merseyside Young Professionals, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech438.pdf Haskel, J, Martin, C and Small, I (1995), “Price, marginal cost and the business cycle”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 57, pages 25–41. Ihrig, J, Marazzi, M and Rothenberg, A (2006), “Exchange rate pass-through in the G7 countries”, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 851, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Macallan, C and Parker, M (2008), “How do mark-ups vary with demand?”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Volume 48, No. 2, pages 167–173. Marshall, A (1920), Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan. Posen, A (2010), “The British recovery in international comparison”, Speech given to the Society of Business Economists Annual Conference “Sustaining the Recovery”, London, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech439.pdf Ravn, M, Schmitt-Grohé, S and Uribe, M (2006), “Deep habits”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 73 (1), pages 195–218. Salop, S (1979), “Monopolistic competition with outside goods”, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10 (1), pages 141–156. Sentance, A (2009), “Monetary policy in turbulent times”, Speech at the Agricultural Engineers’ Association Annual Conference, Institute of Civil Engineers, London, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech385.pdf Spence, M (1976), “Product selection, fixed costs, and monopolistic competition”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43 (2), pages 217–235. 8  BIS Review 122/2010  BIS Review 122/2010  9
The sum of each column is the Krugman Specialisation Index (multiplied by a factor of 100) and is a measure of dispersion of industrial structure. A value of 0 indicates all regions within a monetary union have an identical industrial structure. The higher the index, the more diverse the industrial structure across regions. A more detailed description of different indexation measures of specialisation can be found in Appendix B of EMU and business sectors (HM Treasury). (a) Based on data for Vulnerable Euro Area Periphery economies (VEAPS) (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy) and core (all other EA countries). (b) Based on data for 17 Euro Area (EA) countries (all EA countries excluding Malta). (c) Estimates for rUK and Scotland exclude the 'extra-regio' contribution from North Sea mining & extraction. (d) The contribution from 'extra-regio' mining & extraction is allocated on a ‘geographical’ basis. This assumes that around 90% is allocated to Scotland and 10% to the rest of the UK. This is in line with estimates proposed by Professor Kemp and used by the Scottish Government. Used here for illustrative purposes. (i) Throughout this annex the abbreviation ‘rUK’ refers to the UK excluding Scotland.

14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5: Cost of default protection for euro area core and periphery banking systems Periphery  Core  Basis points 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  0  Sources: Markit Group Limited, SNL Financial,Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. Notes: Asset-weighted five-year senior CDS premia for major banks in each country. 'Periphery' covers Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 'Core' covers Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Chart 6: Real economy lending growth – core/periphery divergence Core Periphery  Percentage changes on a year earlier  30  20  10  0  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  -10  Sources: ECB and Bank calculations. Notes: Periphery includes Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Core includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Lending to non-MFIs excluding general government (adjusted for sales and securitisation). Weighted using 2012 GDP weights. BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  Chart 7: Euro area non-financial corporations loan rates – core/periphery divergence € Periphery Core  Interest Rate, per cent  8  6  4  2  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  0  Sources: ECB and Bank calculations. Notes: Average interest rate on new lending to NFCs (excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt). Core: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France and Netherlands. Periphery: Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland.
Central banks have adopted different approaches to this challenge, even as there has been broad convergence toward the model of independent central banks, with explicit mandates that include price stability and greater disclosure and transparency. The central banks that publish quantitative forecasts for growth and inflation now typically show the confidence bands around their forecasts. In some cases, these forecasts use, as a conditioning assumption, financial market expectations for the path of short-term interest rates. In others, the central bank publishes a forecast that includes the central bank's assessment at that time of the likely path of monetary policy over some horizon. In the former case, the implications of the forecast for monetary policy are left implicit. In the latter case, the likely path of monetary policy is made explicit, but that path is heavily qualified or conditioned to make it clear that that expected path of short-term interest rates will change as conditions change. The FOMC's approach to communication differs in interesting and important ways from these other models. Although the Committee has introduced a gradual but marked increase in the degree of communication over the past two decades, it provides information about its forecast in quantitative terms less frequently and with less detail than has become typical of many other central banks.

But the rapid growth in the market sectors of emerging and developing economies may also contribute to more rapid growth in global demand and inflation pressures. This changing configuration of world markets complicates the task of forecasting inflation and output within national economies. Energy prices have surprised us over the past few years, in terms of the extent of the rise in prices, the increase in volatility, and the limited negative effects to date on global economic growth. Our capacity to project future energy prices has proven to be very limited, as has our ability to convincingly ascertain the extent to which temporary supply factors, rather than an unrecognized strength in global demand, accounts for the energy price trajectory we've witnessed recently. The consequences of these limits to our knowledge may be even greater given the extent of the price increases already experienced. 2  BIS Review 54/2006  The unprecedented level of the U.S. current account deficit and dramatic rise in U.S. indebtedness adds to the normal degree of uncertainty that surrounds any medium-term forecast because of the dynamics that could accompany the path to a more sustainable pattern of capital flows. The process of adjustment that appears to be underway in the U.S. housing market, occurring as it is after a sustained and very substantial decline in the household savings rate, provides more than the usual challenge in predicting the future strength of consumer spending.
That should leave default risk more readily monitorable and more efficiently priced. We should therefore see an enhancement of banks’ and investment houses’ credit analysis functions and more trading of credit differentials. My second question was how much will be traded in a post-EMU world? This is not an easy question to answer. Volumes are difficult to predict. On the one hand, EMU may bring about a more stable interest rate environment, as well as eliminating national interest rates and exchange rates, reducing the need for hedging mediums and hence for derivative products. On the other hand, increased liquidity in the euro bond markets could encourage business and we could well see new participants entering the capital and derivative markets. My hunch is that the latter possibility is more likely. And that the market for carefully constructed derivatives contracts, properly sold to customers with a genuine need for them, will continue to expand. BIS Review 67/1997  -5-  That brings me to my third question, where will the trading be done? I do not think that there is a determinist answer to this question. Nor, certainly, should it be a matter of decision by politicians, central bankers or financial regulators. Certainly, our predisposition is to think that competition will and should determine where business is done and the outcome will depend on the imagination and effort of the managers and controllers of the different markets. There will be lively competition between LIFFE, the DTB and Matif, I am quite sure.

But as with CCP margin, it is important that we remember the reasons for the regulatory reforms in this area. As I have noted, one of the key differences between this crisis and the financial crisis has been the ability of the core banks to absorb a very severe financial market shock. We should not put that at risk by weakening the regulation of banks. If we want to increase the overall resilience of the system we cannot simply lower resilience in one area in order to strengthen it in another. Rather we need to look at other ways to reduce surges in the demand for liquidity and improve the supply of liquidity under stress. See BIS (2017) ‘Repo market functioning’ https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs59.htm and BIS (209) ‘September stress in dollar repo markets: passing or structural?’ https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1912v.htm 14  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  13  Conclusion  The issues outlined above are neither an exhaustive nor a definitive list. There are other lessons about the financial system under stress that we will inevitably learn as this crisis progresses. Not all of these will be in the financial market and non-bank sectors. We will, as I have said inevitably learn more about the performance under stress of the banking capital regime and the usability of banks’ capital buffers. But the list, I think illustrates two important points.
Lastly, specific remunerative arrangements have also played a significant role in encouraging short-termist behaviour. One rather controversial novelty, especially in investment banks, has been to introduce ceilings on and restrictions to credit institutions’ remunerative policies, the aim being to correct or, at least, mitigate certain perverse incentives. Supervisory changes Yet despite all these regulatory changes, we must be aware that no rules can stand in for proper supervision. The role of supervision remains essentially the same: it is preventive. It is usually said that July and August forest fires are controlled and extinguished in the preceding months of March and April. At this earlier time, scrub is cleared and firewalls are set in place, enabling the future advance of the flames to be controlled. If the homework is not done in the spring, we pay the consequences in the summer. Likewise, the fundamental role of the supervisor is to prevent. This means ensuring that, during upturns in the economy, the lending granted by banks has been correctly analysed and its price set so that the risks assumed are covered. That prevents excessive growth in lending that may lead to bubbles emerging. Sadly, one of the lessons from the crisis is that our ability to act as supervisors is limited once the banking crisis has broken, and the solutions are always costly and painful. New perspective: macroprudential supervision So far I have referred to the so-called microprudential perspective of supervision.

Thank you. 13/13
5.4  Cost of banking services  •  It has been observed that the Zambian banking industry has one of the highest operating costs when compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In turn, the cost structure makes it difficult to develop efficient, low cost services that the general populace can afford. The challenge for the industry is to come up with innovative ways and means of providing banking services at affordable costs in order to capture the larger un-banked population and also improve economic activities in productive sectors. This challenge is slowly being addressed in various ways including the following:  5.5  i. Consumer awareness through quarterly publication of bank charges in the daily papers of circulation in order to allow the public an opportunity to make informed decisions by comparing charges offered by banks; and  ii. Banks are required to comply with the Cost of Borrowing Regulations of 1995 and to disclose to the borrower the cost of borrowing whenever a loan is made. Corporate governance  In recent years, corporate governance has emerged on the global agenda as a key part of the pursuit of proper and effective business practice. The objective being the need for probity in business activity, compliance with the law and regulations, and to secure good reputation and confidence and thus attract investment. At the heart of the debate on good corporate governance lie the conflicts or potential conflicts of interest, between shareholders and either the board of directors as whole or individual board members.

At 8 per cent, the vacancy rate is still relatively high, although in some central areas, it has fallen to below 4 per cent. The share of vacant office premises in Bergen has been lower than in Oslo for the past three years. The value of property has increased, both in Norway and in other countries, even though the rise in rental rates has been moderate and the vacancy rate has been high. Investors have been willing to pay more than previously for a krone, a dollar or a euro in future net rental income. The direct return, i.e. annual rental income minus operating costs as a share of the price paid for the property, for office premises in Oslo has fallen to a historically low level. This is probably related to developments in longterm interest rates. An investor will expect a higher return on property, and property as an asset class is probably midway between equities and bonds in terms of both risk and return. Since nominal interest rates are low, many investors prefer to move their low-risk investments from the bond market to alternative vehicles such as property. Developments in the real value of office premises and our estimates of capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy seem to co-vary in the period 1980-2005. The effect on the value of office premises prior to the banking crisis was much greater than the effect of a similar level of capacity utilisation in the years 1998-2000.
The natural resources sector reduced its annual growth rate by more than two points compared with the previous quarter, primarily related to lower mine production early in the quarter, but also to the significant drop in fishery. Sectors other than natural resources performed below trend in the second quarter. Growth was mainly driven by trade and construction, while other areas linked to investment slowed. Installed capacity utilization has declined accordingly. Domestic demand slowed down further in the second quarter. Final demand, however, which excludes inventories, continued to grow at the same pace of the first quarter. Gross fixed capital formation posted y-o-y expansion flat from the first quarter of this year, but below the figures of the second half of 2012. As has been noted before, this slowdown owes mainly to the maturing of mining investments after three years largely outperforming GDP. Also in an external context where the copper price has dropped and moderating expectations for growth around the world but especially in China, which call for more caution when evaluating investment decisions. On the other hand, private consumption was more dynamic, especially in its non-durable component, while durables remained high. Labor market conditions have continued to tighten, but are still the main driver of this component. Nominal and real wages have moderated their annual variation, while the unemployment rate remains near all-time lows. Again, unlike previous cycles, credit growth has accompanied private income, but has not been the main determinant of household spending.

Basel II principles require all banks to address all risks, such as credit risks, market risks, operational risks and others. The principles envisage that banks should have in place systems that would help identify, measure, monitor and make provisions for such risks. The domestic banks are aware of the importance that the application of the new standard should coincide with concentration on risk management in keeping with the best global practices by using the best technological solutions. Reviewing the topics of this Symposium and the quality of its speakers, I see that it broadly covers aspects and all types of applications of banking risk management as Basel II principles seek to highlight and address. In conclusion, I express my deep thanks to the audience and the organizers of this symposium, and we look forward to having positive contributions and outstanding papers, wishing you all success. Al Salumu Alaikum Warahmatu Allahi Wabarakatuh. IS Review 125/2006  1
We are home to: four of the top five global insurance players; a vibrant ecosystem comprising a strong brokers’ cluster where nine out of ten of the top global brokers are based here; the largest captive community in Asia Pacific; a growing concentration of more than thirty specialty players; and the largest grouping of Lloyd’s syndicates outside of London, with 26 syndicates. Reflecting the increasingly important role of non-life insurance in driving overall industry growth: The share of offshore non-life insurance as a proportion of total non-life insurance premiums has increased steadily, rising from 60% in 2010 to close to 70% in 2016. Over one-third of offshore premium flows are attributed to specialist lines of business, such as large and complex property, marine, construction and engineering, energy, financial lines and agriculture. Insurance companies are gradually anchoring more global and regional positions in Singapore, and most Asian risks, including large reinsurance programmes and specialty risks, can now be fully placed in Singapore. Singapore’s share of global Asia-Pacific originated reinsurance premiums has also risen from 3% in 2013, to close to 10% in 2016. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Vision 2025: Global capital for Asian risk transfer 6 So what next after this? 7 The global reinsurance industry continues to face structural challenges, in a few forms: Alternative capital, which gives rise to excess capacity and softening rates, is expected to persist. Insurance underwriting is not keeping pace with the rate of emergence of new risks, such as cyber, supply chain, and reputation risks.

30 November 2017  Speech on the 60th Anniversary of the National Association of Specialised Lending Institutions (ASNEF) Luis M. Linde Governor  Good evening everyone. It is a pleasure for me to take part in this celebration of the 60th anniversary of the National Association of Specialised Lending Institutions. As your president, Fernando Casero, has just mentioned, throughout its history your Association has played a very important role in promoting and enhancing consumer lending, which is a key factor in driving economic growth. Indeed, consumer lending has a series of characteristics that make it especially relevant both for the financial system and economic activity. On the one hand, it is highly cyclical and is, therefore, a leading indicator of confidence among both consumers and financial institutions. On the other, it generally leads the way in terms of adaptation to innovation. As is well known, in the past consumer lending played an important part in the expansion of credit cards, and more recently it has been at the forefront of the incorporation of new technologies. In the expansionary phase that began after 2000, consumer lending grew rapidly in Spain, reaching a balance outstanding of € billion in mid-2008. The financial crisis reduced these figures, down to almost half that amount by early 2015. Since then, in keeping with the economic recovery, consumer lending has been very dynamic.