samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(1935), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Cambridge: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Maddison, A. (2009), Historical Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per capita GDP, 1-2006 AD, updated March 2009 in http://www.ggdc.net/maddison. Mankiw, N.G. (2006), “The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(4): 29-46. BIS Review 112/2009  7  Medina, J.P. and C. Soto (2007), “The Chilean Business Cycles through the Lens of a Stochastic General Equilibrium Model,” Working Paper N°457, Central Bank of Chile. Rajan, R. (2006), “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?,” in The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future, Proceedings of the Jackson Hole Symposium 2005, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Rose, A. and M. Spiegel, (2009), “Cross-Country Causes and Consequences of the 2008 Crisis: Early Warning,” CEPR Discussion Paper N°7354. 8  BIS Review 112/2009

In this context, the “triangle of vulnerability”, identified in the December 2006 FSR, connecting the state of the credit cycle, credit derivatives and highly leveraged institutions, could have grown in relevance in the recent period. A shock involving any element of this triangle could have implications for the other two. For example, a sharp turn in the credit cycle could mean that credit risk protectionsellers, such as hedge funds, would have to make payments to banks which are protection-buyers, but hedge funds might not be capable of paying. Although many hedge funds have attempted to extend their investor lock-up periods, their positions are typically marked-to-market, implying that their funding remains vulnerable to any losses suffered because it could significantly impact on the willingness of banks to continue to grant credit. At the same time, a turn in the credit cycle could represent a challenging test for the functioning of the credit derivatives markets. Similarly, if widespread problems were to emerge in hedge funds active in credit risk transfer markets, this could spark a downturn in the credit cycle itself, as it could impair the “originate and distribute” business model upon which large banks have become reliant. 6. Overall assessment of the financial stability outlook  Let me now conclude with the overall assessment of the financial stability outlook.
We must, as part of the comprehensive suite of financial services that we offer to global investors and borrowers. Shariah-compliant financial instruments allow issuers to tap a new source of funds and liquidity. But the development of an Islamic financial services market does not just serve indigenous Muslim populations. Malaysia, for instance, has successfully launched global sukuk, or Islamic bonds, to tap liquidity from investors in both Asia and the Middle East. Other issuers of global sukuks have also stopped by Singapore on their road shows to tap Singapore’s investor pool. It may not be too long before we have a Singapore corporate issuing a sukuk to raise funds from global investors. We are also seeing already private fund managers in Asia and the Middle East working together. Recently, for instance, ARA Asset Management based in Singapore had worked in partnership with Dubai Islamic Bank to launch a $ 450 million Islamic Far Eastern Real Estate Fund with underlying assets located in Asia. Fourth and finally, we can do more to foster people-to-people interaction in the financial sector. For instance, Asian central banks including the Monetary Authority of Singapore have participated actively in Middle East finance and central banking seminars to share our perspectives on issues of mutual interest. Tomorrow there will be a seminar organised jointly by the Islamic Financial Services Board and Islamic Development Bank tomorrow in Kuala Lumpur on developing a 10-year master plan for the Islamic financial services industry globally.

Today, I would like to focus my remarks on three important shifts that I believe will underpin innovative risk management practices going forward. · First is the changing role and focus of risk managers in supporting business decisionmaking. ·  Second, is a shift from risk measures to risk narratives. · And third is an increasing emphasis on building resilience alongside the prevailing focus on averting risks. Changing role of risk managers One of the most important changes that corporations can make to strengthen risk management is to appropriately position the risk function to effectively support enhanced business decision making. An effective risk management function should interact with other business functions to deliver value. This itself is hardly an innovative idea. But you would be surprised (or maybe not) to learn that despite an increasing involvement of risk managers in business decision-making, poor alignment between decisions that are taken by business leaders, and the intentions of senior management and the board, continue to persist in many organisations. A common reason for this is the absence of, or a poorly defined risk appetite framework. And very few organisations, if any, have gone further to articulate their risk appetite for managing innovation specifically. This has important implications for risk managers. We cannot expect risk managers to be very helpful to business leaders who have explicit growth and revenue targets to meet, if risk managers are not themselves guided by a risk appetite that is equally well-defined.
Particularly in small open economies, where shocks to the exchange rate and other shocks from abroad have a significant impact on inflation, it is quite likely that the generation of inflationary potential may initially translate into asset price growth or, in some cases, current account deficits rather than into overt CPI inflation. The latter may then stay quite low for a long time even when the economy is overheating. As a result, rather than inflation-forecast targeting, central banks may slide towards a response-torecent-inflation-numbers regime. What is the solution to this situation? I offer no simple one. The above dilemmas need to be reflected in our thought processes. In monetary policy decision-making, in addition to model-based forecasts of highly variable CPI inflation, we need to give equal weight to the longer-term fundamental inflationary pressures generated by macroeconomic, monetary and financial developments. I understand the arguments that we have no reliable indicator of these pressures and that few people outside the central bank itself would pay heed to an index of fundamental inflationary pressures. But you can't escape reality. It doesn't pay to put everything on one card. It's better to have a broader set of models and, on top of that, a set of indicators to allow for cross-checking. From fears of low inflation to the current inflation shock For a quarter of a century, central banks in developed countries, along with legions of renowned macroeconomists, focused almost exclusively on how to prevent inflation from getting too low. At certain times, this undoubtedly made sense.

Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Singapore’s dynamically changing landscape Speech by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the opening of One Raffles Place Tower Two, Singapore, 18 September 2012. *  *  *  Wee Ee Cheong, Chairman, OUB Centre Limited, Mr Henry Kok, General Manager, OUB Centre Limited, Distinguished guests, Good evening. It is my pleasure to be invited to officiate the opening of a new twin skyscraper in Raffles Place – One Raffles Place Tower Two. It is part of the continuing rejuvenation of the cityscape at Raffles Place, which continues to be at the heart of businesses and commerce in Singapore. Raffles Place – a continuing history of new blended in old Raffles Place has indeed been a continuous story of the new inserted in the old, as it emerged from being a humble docking location for small boats and ships in the early 1800s, to become a thriving centre of regional commerce and now a global business and financial centre. On 8th August 1988, OUB Centre, now called One Raffles Place Tower One, was opened by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, who was then Prime Minister. He had noted the building’s quality design and distinctive workmanship. It was also an icon for Singapore at the time, as the building went on to be recognised as the tallest building in the world outside of the United States. Designed by Kenzo Tange, One Raffles Tower One still remains amongst the tallest three skyscrapers in Singapore.
Øystein Olsen: Management of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 25 April 2014. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. I would like to thank the Chairman of the Committee for the invitation to speak on the management of the Government Pension Fund Global. The framework for the management of the GPFG rests on a clear division of responsibilities and roles between owner and manager. The Government and the Storting decide the key principles and guidelines for the GPFG. Norges Bank’s role is to secure the highest possible return over time within the framework established by the political authorities. Since the first capital transfer in 1996, the GPFG has grown to over NOK 5 trillion. A third of this amount – NOK 1.8 trillion – is the return. Achieving returns requires risk-taking. The GPFG’s investment horizon is particularly long and its short-term risk capacity is high, which is the reason behind the relatively high allocation to equities. This is also the reason for adding other asset classes, such as real estate. We can outperform the market by taking advantage of these specific features in its investment choices. When new companies become listed, they are included in the equity indices.

In some cases, we can achieve better terms by investing in new companies ahead of a planned listing. As the GPFG has grown so has Norges Bank’s experience in investment management. The investment universe has broadened. Every year new emerging economies are added to the list of countries in which we can invest. The aim is always to improve the trade-off between risk and return over time. The GPFG is subject to an extensive governance and control framework. The Ministry of Finance draws up the mandate for investment management. Norges Bank’s Executive Board has laid down, pursuant to the mandate, further detailed guidelines for the CEO of Norges Bank Investment Management. Pursuant to these guidelines, Norges Bank Investment management makes decisions concerning individual investments. Control and supervision of investment management follow the same lines as the delegation of investment decisions. Risk and return are routinely reported to the Executive Board and discussed at its meetings. Norges Bank reports on investment management to the GPFG’s owners on a quarterly basis. Norges Bank works to safeguard financial wealth over time. Responsible investment is a key component of that task. The Bank uses a number of instruments to promote active ownership, such as international principles and standards, expectations documents, voting at shareholder meetings and contact with companies. Corporate governance and environmental and social considerations are integrated into the investment process and risk management. In a number of cases, the Bank has sold off or refrained from buying securities as a result of concerns regarding longterm sustainability.
Several inflation-targeting central banks (including the Bank of England, Norges Bank and the Riksbank) have for other reasons already extended their forecast horizon from the previously common two years to three years. There is nothing that in principle prevents an inflation targeter from considering forecasts beyond a three-year horizon, but in practice there is usually little information about anything at longer horizons except the tendency to revert to the long-term average. What about “leaning against the wind” (as advocated by, for instance, Borio and White, 2003, and Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani, 2002), the idea that central banks should raise the interest rate more than what appears to be warranted by inflation and resource utilization to counter rapid credit growth and rising asset prices? It has sometimes not been quite clear whether advocates of leaning against the wind mean that credit growth and asset prices should be considered targets and enter the explicit or implicit loss functions alongside inflation and resource utilization, or whether they mean that credit growth and asset prices should still be considered just indicators and are emphasized only because credit growth and asset prices may have potential negative effects on inflation and resource utilization at a longer horizon. In the latter case, leaning against the wind is a way to improve the stability of inflation and resource utilization in the longer run. Then it is completely consistent with flexible inflation targeting.

Market Functioning Speech given by Chris Salmon, Executive Director, Markets, Bank of England  OMFIF City Lecture, London Tuesday 24 January 2017  I am grateful to Charlotte Barton, Nick Butt, Liam Crowley-Reidy, Nick Govier, Tom Horn, Rebecca Jackson, Sarah John and Nick Mclaren for their assistance in preparing this speech. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Introduction  It is a pleasure to be here this evening. The economic and political events of the past twelve months raise many questions. From my vantage point as the head of the Bank of England’s Markets Directorate, they reemphasise the need for central banks to understand the structure and functioning of core financial markets. That matters both for our role as guardians of financial stability, and to ensure the effectiveness of our own operations to implement monetary policy. Let me illustrate this with reference to developments in two very different markets. i)  The first – the sterling FX market – a large, global, highly liquid, and almost continuously traded, market, with a constantly evolving structure. Here, the challenge is to understand how those developments affect the functioning of the market. My focus will be on the lessons about market functioning from two particular episodes last year: the period immediately following the EU referendum and its ‘flash crash’ a few months later. ii)  The second market – the sterling corporate bond market – is small, local, and thinly traded, with heterogeneous underlying assets.
Who would want to come to the rescue of a country that is not prepared to pay the cost of a reasonable insurance? Let me make a comparison. Some years ago, Sweden chose to re prioritise within its defence forces, and the compulsory military service system was abolished. Now that uncertainty in global policy has increased, the Swedish defence budget has increased, and compulsory military service is being considered again. It is quite simply safer to have, for instance, a number of JAS fighter planes on standby than to rely on being able to rent them if one needs them, partly because in an acute situation it would probably take too long and because it would be difficult and expensive. Foreign currency reserve – part of Sweden's economic defence Similarly, we can regard the foreign currency reserve as part of Sweden's economic defence. The advantage of having a foreign currency reserve is that it can quickly be made available for liquidity support to the banking system if an acute need were to arise. A foreign currency reserve can also prevent a financial crisis by creating confidence in the central bank’s ability to take action when necessary. This is particularly important in a situation where market confidence in the country’s credit and payments systems is under pressure. If you say it could never happen to Sweden, let me remind you of Ireland and Iceland.

One of the most comprehensive evidence has been produced for New Zealand’s firms, showing that inflation expectations among business leaders are not so different from household expectations. In Europe, Banca d’Italia has also developed a very rich and informative firms’ expectations survey since 1999. The Bundesbank has also conducted a very interesting survey asking tradeunions and employers what was the relevant inflation underlying the last collective wage agreement. Comparative information on such issues across the Euro area would be very useful. I am convinced that more analysis on firms’ expectations would produce very valuable and relevant information for our monetary policy. Conclusion Let me now conclude by saying that we need to better measure consumer and firm inflation expectations. This lack of information prevents our communication policies from being fully efficient. One important question for monetary policy is what kind of communication tools can be used to better communicate with the general public and influence their inflation expectations. This conference is a unique opportunity to benefit from the analyses of the most distinguished experts on the various exciting issues that are related to household expectations. I wish you very fruitful discussions. Thank you for your attention. 4  Figure 1. Long term inflation expectations for the Euro area  Source: BIS report “Recent developments in the global economy” (August 2019) -  5  Figure 2. Households perceive quite well the overall evolution of inflation  Source: B. Coeuré (2019).
Let me give two examples of what is being done: •  As regard prudential supervision, I would only mention the fantastic work which has been achieved by the Basel Committee under the leadership of Bill McDonough, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in the field of banking supervision. I trust that the new accord will permit a better and more appropriate handling of this extremely important domain as regards financial stability. I am also happy that the concept of “dynamic provisioning”, which is anticyclical by nature, has been recognised by the Basel Committee as a useful concept. •  As regards accounting standards, it seems to me that we should also inject in the present meditations in the US, in Europe and at a global level the concern for financial stability. Let us beware of changes that would increase the procyclicality of accounting rules. Let us favour changes that would simultaneously help fair accounting and diminish procyclicality. In that regard, it seems important to me to design accounting practices which would try to take into account of the time horizon of institutions and market participants. Otherwise, we would take the risk of driving all financial institutions and market participants to shorten their time horizon down to a day-to-day basis. This could be a recipe to favour inappropriate market functioning and foster herd instinct in time of excessive volatility. 2.

Cases of financial turmoil in emerging countries, which are usually due primarily to inappropriate domestic policies, show that there is room for improving the timely identification and correction of vulnerabilities by International Financial Institutions. In particular, a key point is to improve the analysis of debt sustainability in order to have a more forward-looking assessment of possible cases of insolvency. We can only praise the ongoing work by the IMF on this matter. Unfortunately, enhancing warning signals will probably not be sufficient to protect us against financial crisis. 2.2. Designing effective procedures for handling international financial crisis represents another challenge  First, there is a need for clarifying the financing policy of the IMF, as acknowledged by the G 7 and the recent IMFC communique. Greater discipline in the provision of official finance is key to ensure a more timely involvement of the private sector in crisis resolution (PSI), and to provide strong incentives for debtors and creditors to start debt negotiations timely and appropriately. By doing so, the international community will benefit from the so-called « catalytic approach », that was at the core of crisis management in the 1980s and proved quite successful, and that was recently restated by the international community. A precondition for an orderly crisis management relies upon more predictable decision-making process regarding the use of Fund’s resources. In that regard, the presumption of clear access limits to Fund financing is key.
Even in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami of February 2010, Chile rapidly returned to a path of sustained growth, with an unprecedented recovery of employment, and unwavering strength. All within a context of low inflation, despite the international price shocks. Monetary policy has given practical proof that it can act with flexibility and determination, and be resolute in attenuating the effects of the external cycle on our economy. As I said, at three years after the outbreak of the crisis we are still enduring its consequences. Chances are, its reverberations will continue for a while longer. The task of monetary policy is to preserve its necessary capacity to react in difficult times, the same capacity it has displayed to withdraw the stimulus packages in due time and prevent costly adjustments later. The Board will continue to fulfill its legal mandate of safeguarding price stability and the normal functioning of the payments system. Accordingly, it reaffirms its commitment of conducting monetary policy with flexibility, in order for projected inflation to stand at 3 percent over the policy horizon. An environment of low inflation improves households’ welfare, particularly those less capable of protecting themselves from rising prices. Furthermore, keeping inflation low and stable permits to soften the fluctuations of output and employment, which contributes to the people’s well-being. Chile must continue on a path of growth that will ensure continual progress of the living standards of its inhabitants. The world, including our country, is living a decisive moment.

Figure 2 Global imbalances, current account balances (Billions of dollars) 1,200 800 400 0 -400 -800 -1,200  96  97  98  99  00  01  US Japan Emerging Asia Oil exporters Other prima and goods exporters  02  03  04 05  06 07(e)  Euro area Latin America  (f) Forecast. Source: International Monetary Fund. BIS Review 124/2008  9  Figure 3 Real price of housing (*) (IT01=100, index) 200  200  180  180  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80 01 02  03 04  05 06 07  Australia US (2) New Zealand  08  80 01 02  03 04  05 06  Spain Germany Denmark  US (1) UK (3)  07 08  Ireland France Austria  (*) Nominal index deflated by CP1. (1) OFHEO. (2) S&P/Case-Shiller. (3) Nationwide. Sources: BIS y CEIC Data.