samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One such factor is how a new measure conforms to the current state of the economy and interplays with monetary policy. The suitably-large steps should preferably be taken in the right order. From this point of view I note that two proposed measures, longer fixed-rate periods and reduced tax deductions for interest payments, have opposite effects on how the repo rate affects household finances. Longer fixed-rate periods would weaken the impact of the repo rate while reduced deductions would strengthen its impact. If one worries that the households are myopic in their planning and that they will find it difficult to manage a return to normal interest-rate levels, it is probably appropriate to try to enforce longer fixed-rate periods now that interest rates are still low. If, on the other hand, one worries that the households have too easy access to inexpensive credit and in the near term wishes to see a greater gap between household and corporate interest rates, it is probably more appropriate to reduce the tax deductions. How to take the suitably-large steps in the right order is thus not self-evident, but my assessment is that it is now appropriate to strive for both longer fixed-rate periods and a phasing-out of the right to make tax deductions for the largest interest payments. However, most welcome from my monetary-policy perspective would be measures that lead to a more effective housing market, and in particular to increased housing construction.

So, the key to success for CDI clearly lies beyond technology. We need to find the right commercial incentive for all to benefit and create the network effect. 30. Similarly, for the mBridge project, technical interoperability is key but relatively straight forward. The platform now has the flexibility to allow central banks to easily connect through CBDCs or traditional payment systems. But that won’t attract more jurisdictions to join by itself. To do that, the platform needs to account for policy and business challenges. How to build-in different regulatory requirements like anti-money laundering, how to ensure sufficient on-chain foreign exchange liquidity, or how to develop a shared legal framework are all challenging but necessary tasks. The project team will focus on these issues, which are well beyond technology, in taking the project to its next stage. Closing 31. The HKMA began its fintech journey six years ago. We have come a long way, reached some important milestones, kept pace with our peers, and are now pressing on into uncharted territory. But like everyone else, we are still exploring, experimenting and learning. And as we continue our journey, we will stay radically open-minded, learn from our failures and keep trying, and go well beyond technology to achieve network effects. 32. As I said at the beginning, Hong Kong will continue on the road of fintech adoption. Many exciting developments are taking place, and you are bound to see interesting sights and meet interesting people on the way.
I think this is unfortunate, as it will limit the Riksbank's capacity to safeguard a smoothly-functioning financial system. 38 The Sveriges Riksbank Act should be flexible and not govern in detail under what conditions and in what sequence monetary policy tools should be used. Technical and detailed limitations linking different items on the Riksbank’s balance sheet to different purposes – as the Government proposes in its new bill – would make it difficult to adapt monetary policy to the requirements of a particular situation. My picture is that the draft law deviates from international practice in the area of monetary policy and goes completely against the experiences that we have gained during the pandemic and earlier crises. I find it difficult to understand what one intends to achieve with the new proposal. The role of the balance sheet in monetary policy The Riksbank has several tools it can use in its monetary policy. Most people are familiar with the Riksbank’s policy rate. This is a short-term and risk-free interest rate that affects interest rates with a longer maturity, risky rates and ultimately the interest rates charged to households and companies. The impact of the policy rate on other interest rates can vary over time, and depends on factors such as the situation in the economy, conditions on the financial markets, and the structure of the financial sector. The Riksbank's other tools can be divided up, somewhat simplified, into extensive asset purchases and various forms of direct liquidity support to the banks.

We lent amounts to Swedish banks corresponding to just over 9 per cent of GDP, a measure that was intended to ensure that the financial system stabilised to allow us to conduct monetary policy and contribute to production and employment not falling as heavily as in the wake of the financial crisis. The new act means we would need to determine the main purpose of these measures, and the conditions and procedures differ, depending on the purpose. Was what we did mainly monetary policy or financial stability? Are the measures we implemented during the coronavirus pandemic mostly monetary policy or financial stability policy? In our world they are of course both, as our two core activities are two sides of the same coin. As I described earlier, the financial markets are developing rapidly, and needs are thus changing over time. It is difficult to predict how the next crisis will look, or what measures might then be needed. The fact that we have been able to take action during the pandemic is because the current legislation gives us opportunity to do so. Handling the global financial crisis 2008-2009 and the current pandemic, and also future events, requires the right tools and a flexible mandate. This is made more difficult by the proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act. The proposal also limits the Riksbank’s possibilities to both build up and use its foreign exchange reserves. This is problematic, as the Swedish financial system is strongly dependent on short-term market financing, largely in foreign currencies.
The main doubts are how long will it last – which depends on the true decoupling capacity that emerging economies will display – and how long will developed economies’ growth hold. Here, accumulating a current account surplus can help. For example, the high levels of reserves in China allow financing deficit for several years and thus weather the turbulences with domestic growth. Still, one cannot rule out a prolonged period of weak activity in developed countries that ends up seriously deteriorating growth in emerging economies, particularly those specializing in goods demanded in the former. Globalization, where countries sell their products in global markets rather than in specific economies, certainly supports the aforementioned decoupling, but it also spreads the effects  BIS Review 124/2008  5  of financial shocks around the world. We have seen international stock exchanges plummeting, and risk premiums of emerging economies rising (figures 15 and 16). Also, large foreign exchange fluctuations have occurred, but this is good news, because the exchange rates are helping the adjustment (figure 17). Asset prices show no decoupling but, as we well know, price corrections may limit the adjustments in quantities. The key to this is whether price corrections are helping to avoid fluctuations in output or are being conveyors of the problems. The good performance of emerging economies should not lead to unfounded optimism or vanity, because this is largely the result of sound macroeconomic policies, and in such we must persevere. Final remarks I will finish with four points.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Foreign trade is Switzerland’s growth driver Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at OSEC Business Network Switzerland, Zurich, 17 April 2008. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Foreign trade has played a major role during the present economic cycle. Over the past two years, it has made an exceptional contribution to GDP growth – with figures that bear comparison to the two upswing periods of the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. This strong export performance not only reflects a reorientation to accommodate the world economy’s new growth hubs, but is also the result of successful sector specialisation and the Swiss export industry’s premium-quality positioning. Switzerland’s watchmaking and pharmaceutical industries have been particularly impressive in this regard. Thanks to the speed at which its export industry has been able to adapt to global demand, Switzerland is well placed to benefit from the prevailing increase in earnings within the emerging markets. By specialising in the technology segment and tailoring its exports to customer needs, Switzerland is not only able to reap the rewards of upswings in the global economic cycle.
And in the US, the housing market has not yet obviously stabilised, which is probably a precondition for broader recovery there. Domestically, the output data have been on the soft side, moving into line with the battery of surveys and the Bank’s regional Agents. The labour market also appears to have softened, with unemployment rising and fewer vacancies advertised. It is perhaps not surprising that, compared with recent slowdowns, there should be less hoarding of labour if firms expect the adverse environment to persist for a while; and with tighter credit conditions, stretching  the export-oriented euro area would be adversely affected, and the UK with it. But, seriously, should the UK cut the policy rate to head off the risk of a dent to output from a dollar collapse that hadn’t yet occurred? I don’t think so. 2  BIS Review 112/2008  working capital, making it harder for firms to finance the retention of a less-than-fully-occupied labour force. In the manufacturing sector, input and output price inflation have edged down very slightly. In the service sector, the data are less timely, though surveys have started to indicate some slowing in the pace of inflation. Commodity prices – not only energy, but food too – have continued to fall, perhaps reflecting the effects on global demand of the earlier price rises and the reduction of subsidies by a raft of emerging-market countries. Equities have fallen around 3%.

The value of the Petroleum Fund, measured as a percentage of GDP, will rise in the years ahead. On the other hand, Norway, like many other countries, is facing substantial fiscal challenges. The expected dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of persons over the age of 67 to persons aged 20 to 66, will  BIS Review 34/2005  5  rise sharply in the years ahead. The National Insurance Scheme’s spending on old age and disability pensions, based on the current social security rules, is increasing. The return on the Petroleum Fund can only cover a small portion of this increase. According to Ministry of Finance calculations, a funding requirement equivalent to 6 per cent of GDP will still be uncovered in 2060 given an oil price of NOK 230 (2005-kroner), or around USD 35 per barrel. Oil futures 6-7 years ahead are now higher than this. If oil prices remain as high for the foreseeable future, the funding requirement will be somewhat lower. To base decisions on this, however, would be a very risky strategy. Even though Norway’s petroleum wealth is substantial, it is our human resources that account for most of our national wealth. Even a small increase in the “return” on human capital might generate considerable gains. The return on this capital partly depends on our pension schemes and the application of social security rules. These should be designed in such a way that they provide incentives and opportunities to work. Labour market legislation must also promote production and employment.
This method places a strong emphasis on social acceptability coupled with supply-side reforms designed to ensure that the pension system is sustainable. A society like ours that is devoting more resources to welfare payments than it can afford, is saving and investing too little and is spending more than it is earning - while financing these excesses with borrowed money - stands in blatant contradiction with its professed commitment to social justice, because it is bequeathing to its children an inheritance of debt in selfish rejection of the principle of inter-generational equity. This prospect is clearly unacceptable. It is time for all to recognise this and to shoulder what has become a moral responsibility. BIS Review 50/2003  3  Environmental Degradation It is in a similar spirit that I approach another important challenge, namely that of environmental degradation. There is no question that a significant part of our economic achievements in recent years have been attained at the cost of the environment. It is doubtful whether this constitutes real progress, as it is eroding the welfare of current and future generations and depleting the productive potential of an economy that is highly dependent on quality tourism. From a more practical economic viewpoint, environmental sustainability, involving the conservation of existing amenities and resources for an indefinite time period, will entail significant resource outlays. This is in addition to the resources necessary to finance the investment needed to face the competitive pressures of globalisation and to meet the costs of population ageing.

In 2009, the penetration of deposit accounts and loan accounts in Malaysia are 3,300 deposit accounts per 1,000 adults and 1,100 loan accounts per 1,000 adults respectively, which is amongst the highest in the world. This high level of financial inclusion is the result of conscious policies to build a progressive and inclusive financial system. The strategies implemented have generated six characteristics of the financial system. First, a business environment that allows a diverse range of financial service providers to thrive and compete. This environment has led to the creation of commercial financial institutions with differentiated strategies based on their strengths and the delivery of a broader range of products and services that meet the diverse needs of consumers and businesses. The financial system also includes foreign financial institutions through a series of sequenced liberalisation measures as well as development financial institutions, cooperatives and Government agencies that complement the domestic commercial banking institutions. This approach leverages on the innovation and the implementation capabilities of the private sector and the diversity and dynamism of competitive markets. At the same time, it has allowed the Government to have a complementary role in serving the segments that are under served by the private sector. Second, basic banking products and services that are made available at reasonable costs. In February 2005, Bank Negara Malaysia issued a guideline that required all banks to provide such basic banking services.
At the same time, disruptions in maritime transport, difficulties in the supply of certain inputs and higher input prices affected the recovery in the primary, industrial (particularly in the case of transport) and construction sectors from mid-2021. By demand component, consumption recovered significantly, but not enough to return to pre-pandemic levels.1 It therefore appears that households – particularly higher income ones – still have a high volume of saving built up since the start of the pandemic. Turning to housing, building permits reached levels similar to those seen prior to COVID-19. However, the drastic fall-off in housing starts in 2020 Q2 and Q3 has continued to weigh down on construction completion volumes in 2021 and 2022. For their part, house sales and purchases surged. Private productive investment grew by 8.8%, driven by the intensification of digitalisation and by firms having to adapt to the pandemic containment measures. To date, the boost from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme has been modest. Net external demand contributed nearly 0.5 pp to GDP growth in 2021. By component, at end-2021 trade in goods stood at levels only slightly higher than a year earlier, due to the impact of bottlenecks. By contrast, exports of tourism services recovered vigorously.2 It is worth highlighting that the total number of exporters3 exceeded pre-pandemic levels by 5.5%. However, in 2021 the stable export base (firms that have been exporting for at least four consecutive years) was still 1.4% down on two years earlier.

Regarding incomes policies, based on the findings of the assessments required by law, further adjustments must be made to the conditions governing eligibility for Spain’s minimum income scheme (MIS), to ensure that this instrument can effectively fulfil its mission of eradicating extreme poverty while avoiding undesired effects. To that effect, social security authorities have recently signed agreements with several research institutions in order to evaluate social inclusion itineraries linked to the MIS. Housing affordability has tightened in recent years. According to Eurostat data, 48.7% of Spaniards living in market-price rented accommodation in 2020 were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the highest rate in the European Union (where the average stands at 32.3%), while 35.9% devoted more than 40% of their disposable income to housing, versus the EU average of 25.8%. The Draft Law on the right to housing seeks to ease such difficulties, which hit the young and lower-income households particularly hard. However, some of the measures envisaged, such as rent control, may not have the desired effect or may even have adverse effects in the medium term. Conversely, certain measures that could give a significant structural boost to the supply of rented housing, such as offering greater effective legal certainty to landlords, are absent. 17  (iv) The challenge of increasing firm size, facilitating cross-sector reallocation and fostering innovation Another major challenge is the small size of businesses, which results in less innovation and low productivity.
Chart 12: Dispersion of inflation and GDP growth outturns since 2007Q3 across the quintiles of the one year ahead Inflation Report fan chart distributions Percentages of outturns GDP growth  70  Inflation  60 50 40 30 20 10 Lower  Higher  Lower  Higher  0  Source: Bank calculations. Notes: For further details on the methodology please see Hackworth et al (2013). 22  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 13: Estimate of the proportion of MPC minutes covering the topic of “banking”  Source: Bank calculations. Notes: This chart shows the estimated allocation of each month’s MPC minutes to a topic which we label “banking”. The words used most frequently in the topic are bank(s)/banking/banker(s), credit(s), financial/finance, market(s), asset(s), condition(s), money and lend(s)/lending/lender. The estimation of the topics, and the allocation of each set of minutes across all topics is completed using latent Dirichlet allocation as applied to FOMC transcripts in Hansen et al (2014). The lines correspond to: September 2007 when Northern Rock received a liquidity support facility from the Bank of England; September 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy; June 2011 when speculation and uncertainty about the euro area sovereign debt crisis started escalating; June 2011 when ECB President Mario Draghi delivered his “whatever it takes” speech. Chart 14: Estimate of the proportion of MPC minutes covering the topic of “banking” and major UK banks CDS premia  Source: Bank calculations and Bloomberg. Notes: The blue and vertical lines are the same as Chart 13.

Since these market-based measures were affected by risk illusion, it is reasonable to assume the MPC suffered that same illusion. Just like the students in the Asch experiments, MPC yielded to the wrong answers given by other financial actors. The MPC were looking for their keys under the wrong lamppost. It is too soon to tell whether any collective blind-spots remain. But compared with the precrisis period, the Bank today has two extra pairs of policy eyes through the PRA and FPC. Joint meetings between the MPC, FPC and the PRA Board now take place. These help strengthen the committees’ peripheral vision and are a safeguard against groupthink. As for economic forecasting, this is the most inexact of sciences. The Bank has already undertaken an external review of its forecasting procedures. 62 And it also has taken a sequence of measures to improve this process and the transparency around it. 63 This has included publishing more information on forecast inputs and outputs. This is progress. My own view is that improvements to the Bank’s forecasting process have some considerable distance still to travel. Since the crisis, the Bank’s forecast errors for output and inflation, like those of external forecasters, have tended to be one-sided and serially  61  This is part of a larger, on-going research project led by Stephen Hansen (UPF), Michael McMahon (Warwick) and Andrea Prat (Columbia University). 62  Stockton (2012).
The U.S. disinflation experience in the early 1980s was the prime example of this. Known memorably as the Volcker disinflation, the Federal Reserve took about four years to bring down inflation, but at a cost of the 1981-2 recession which was the most severe in the post-World War II period. Of course, one could argue that monetary policy is ineffective against supply shocks and therefore raising the interest rate would only further hurt the economy. It is true that monetary policy is a demand management tool. It is true that the best remedy to tackle any supply shock should be one from the supply-side policy that mitigates its impact on production costs and the economy’s potential output. However, most supply-side policies take time. For example, it takes many years to improve the logistic system, education and skill attainment of the labor force, and institutional quality. 2  BIS Review 98/2008  On the other hand, alleviation measures such as promoting the use of alternative energy has had a limited impact on inflation. In the short run therefore, what is left as a clear option is to adjust the demand accordingly to ensure stability in the immediate future as well as the medium term. After all, it is also true that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and should be corrected by monetary policy. To make my point clearer, let me compare the current situation with the cake eating analogy. Suppose that you gain happiness from eating cakes. I guess we all do.

That tradition continues with the new £ JMW Turner will circulate alongside Winston Churchill on the £ and Jane Austen on the £ In 2021, Alan Turing will soon replace Boulton and Watt on the £ These individuals have advanced British thought, demonstrated exceptional leadership, and more generally helped to shape this diverse society and forge our common values. I’m delighted to be joined today to celebrate Turner’s continuing influence by one of our most eminent artists, someone whom Turner has influenced and one of Margate’s own. As precocious and prolific as Turner, a fellow Royal Academician, the master of confessional art and fittingly, past winner of the Turner Prize, please welcome Tracey Emin. Book I, Chapter 4 “On the Origin and Use of Money” of Smith, A (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 6 A moniker used by Kocherlakota. See Kocherlakota, N (1998), “Money is Memory”, Journal of Economic Theory, 81 (2). 5  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4