samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The ASEAN Vision Statement is "to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free-flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities" by 2020. The ASEAN economies have for more than a decade now experienced growth that is above the global average. While this growth momentum was interrupted during the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and 1998, the ASEAN economies demonstrated their resilience to resume its strong growth within a short period of a year for many of the affected countries. Opportunities are fast emerging in our region reinforced by the more intensified regional integration that is taking place. In ASEAN, efforts are already being accelerated in the implementation of trade and investment action plans under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (or AFTA, for trade in goods), the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (or AFAS, for trade in services) and the ASEAN Investment Area (or AIA, for investment liberalisation). The initiatives to enhance trade and investment flows to ASEAN have also been accompanied by efforts to strengthen monetary and financial stability. The ASEAN countries have also reinforced efforts in regional financial co-operation, including in the surveillance processes. These has brought together policy makers from the ASEAN ministries of finance and central banks to constantly engage in discussions on regional and global economic developments which have implications on the ASEAN region.

This has taken place in a global environment in which the world economies and financial systems are increasingly becoming more integrated. As a result, it can be expected that there is increased interdependence, events that take place in one part of the world will have implications on other parts of the world. This is likely to be more pronounced in the ASEAN economies and financial systems, given their openness and their high degree of integration with the global economy and international financial system. As the ASEAN and the EU continues to evolve as strategic partners, new opportunities can also be realized. An enhanced relationship will also contribute towards more effective management of the new challenges in the ever-changing global environment. Indeed, this Conference takes place at an important time when it becomes even more constructive and meaningful for our two regions to strengthen our associations, our inter-linkages and our relationships. Learning from the experiences of the EU Ladies and Gentlemen, The unification of Europe on many fronts is a major structural enhancement to the global economic and financial landscape. It is very likely however, that in view of our diversity and different structures and stages of development, the route for the integration process will be significantly different. It can be stated with certainty however, that integration will nevertheless occur. Indeed, the process has already commenced and it is likely to gain momentum as we advance forward. The motivation being the greater stability it brings and the increased growth potential it generates.
Moreover, we can see today that the application of monetary easing is also reaching lending rates (Becerra et al., 2009), and this should still be so after last week's drop (Figure 5). Less output in Chile As I have already mentioned, a lower output level bears important consequences on the inflationary outlook. To understand this, it is useful to define three distinct factors: •  The domestic business cycle. •  Real and financial impacts of the international crisis. •  Global confidence crisis. I would like to refer to each of these three factors: (i)  The domestic business cycle  Domestic demand has grown rapidly in the past few years. This did not translate completely into a higher output level, since part of it diverged towards imported goods. During the 20042007 period, the average annual growth rate of domestic demand was 8.1%, i.e., 2.9 percentage points over output. During this same period, average annual growth in private consumption was 7.2%. Investment grew by a 12.1% annual average, thereby doubling the growth of output, and this resulted in the highest ever investment rates in our history. This process had to tone down necessarily, as it gradually occurred during 2008 (Figure 6). A certain degree of bunching of individual decisions on consumption and investment is usually seen, particularly when these have risen in response to common financial and global conditions. Something similar should happen in periods of weaknesses.

This is mainly because it is necessary to give time to the transmission mechanisms of the monetary policy to work, so that the consequences of decisions already made can be seen in practice. Final remarks I would like to end with some lessons about monetary policy conduct which have stemmed from the great inflation rise that has taken place since mid-2007, into our current international situation. In the first place, many times it had been noted that Chile was one of the countries where the highest increase in inflation – more than tripling the target – was observed, with the interest rate rising less than in other economies with lower inflationary pressures. As I have already argued, our policy response was completely consistent with a flexible monetary policy framework. As the price shock became stronger and more persistent, monetary policy became more restrictive. This same flexibility in managing monetary policy enables us to react quickly to the strong deterioration of the external conditions today. Fortunately, our economy is solid enough to absorb significant changes in the course of monetary policy, without this being a threat to stability. In the second place, inflationary dynamics are highly complex and cannot be linearly mechanized based on historical evidence. Early this decade, when inflation was consolidating at low levels, we saw that persistence of inflation had dropped substantially, thereby reducing the impact of propagation via indexation and other phenomena that were characteristic of our high-inflation past (García and Valdés, 2005).
Svante Öberg: The current economic situation Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Swedbank, Stockholm, 20 August 2010. *  *  *  In this presentation I shall begin with an account of the Riksbank’s assessment of the economic situation abroad. I shall then discuss our assessment of economic developments in Sweden. These are the assessments we made at the monetary policy meeting on 30 June and published in our Monetary Policy Report on 1 July this year. I will also comment on new information received during the summer, but I will not make any new overall assessment of economic developments. We members of the Executive Board will not do this until the next monetary policy meeting, which will be held on 1 September. Finally, I shall report how the majority of Executive Board members and I personally viewed monetary policy at the end of June. My presentation of the current economic situation can be briefly summarised in three points:   The Swedish economy is developing strongly after the deep recession we have experienced. Inflationary pressures are currently low, but inflation is expected to rise as resource utilisation increases.   At the most recent monetary policy meeting in June the members of the Executive Board decided to raise the repo rate to 0.50 per cent, and assessed that it would thereafter need to continue to rise towards more normal levels. The earlier extensive lending to the banks is being phased out.

Thanks to the proceeds from oil activities, income and wealth in Norway have risen rapidly over the past 25 years. This chapter of our history is unlikely to repeat itself. It will take some doing for Norway to find a similar source of economic prosperity and growth for the next 25 years. In the recent past, the contributions from the GPFG to government finances have also increased. Now the GPFG is close to its peak, and the contributions from the GPFG are not likely to become much larger than they are today. Even though Norway will continue to be among the world’s wealthy countries, we will likely see an increased resemblance between Norway and its neighbours in future. In 1988, the average bank lending rate was above 16 percent. Lending rates remained in doubledigits until well into the 1990s. Today, residential mortgage rates are at a record low – below 3 percent. We seem to be entering a period of slightly higher interest rates, which may increase interest burdens and curb household borrowing. Regardless of what happens in the years to come, however, interest rates cannot fall as far as in the past 25 years. Those who borrow today must consider whether they are taking on an amount of debt they can live with over time. The rear-view mirror will be poor guidance going forward. Experts and economists like myself have been mistaken before, but there is one thing I am quite sure about: Nothing grows forever. Expectations shift.
Christian Noyer: Some thoughts on the crisis Address by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, to the Congress of the National Federation of the Crédit Agricole, Nice, 21 October 2008. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to participate in the Congress of the National Federation of the Crédit Agricole. I am happy to be here, surrounded by colleagues and friends in the unique atmosphere that characterises your meetings. Nowhere else is there such a blend of conviviality and the greatest professionalism. That is why I would like to take this opportunity to present to you some thoughts on the current situation. For over a year, the global financial system has been in crisis. The crisis is not over. But, as you know, everything is being done to contain its effects. And central banks are at the very forefront of this combat. It is still too early to draw all the lessons from these events. It is however vital to start reflecting on the experience of the last few months. Even more in periods of tension than in normal times, action and reflection should reinforce one another. It is at the very moment of managing the current crisis that we lay the foundations for the future financial system. I am very happy to be able to share a few thoughts with you and in your company.

Interbank markets have started to return to normal, but there is still some way to go. To this end, central banks have mobilised considerable firepower. The action taken in the past two days represents the culmination of a process that has been underway for over a year. Central banks have adjusted their operational frameworks in four different areas: First, the maturity of their facilities has been extended, to help to unfreeze the money market beyond the short-term segment. Second, the range of eligible counterparties has been broadened to allow adequate provision of liquidity throughout the system. Third, the range of assets eligible as collateral for refinancing operations has been expanded. Lastly, extremely close international coordination between the different monetary authorities is ensuring that the actions taken by each of them is part of a consistent overall strategy, while taking account of the specific features of each monetary area. These exceptional measures should greatly contribute to restoring confidence and the smooth functioning of money markets. All in all, combined with the coordinated cut in policy rates on 8 October, they are now enabling European banks to obtain short-term refinancing at a rate that is 120 basis points below that of just 10 days ago. Governments are also now intervening to support banks' solvency and resilience. Thanks, in particular, to France's leading role, Europe is organising itself. Since the Paris Declaration issued by the member countries of the euro area, Europe has a sound and consistent action plan. It is already being applied and comprises three main aspects.
On this issue, the draft of the new Bank of Thailand Act has stipulated this condition. Even though there is a need to review the draft in order to make it more effective, the Bank of Thailand strongly endorses the importance of this Act because it will provide for an up to date framework for the development of the Thai monetary system in the future. In data dissemination, the Bank of Thailand has improved the process of data collection and dissemination to ensure that they are complete, correct, and expeditiously published, such as the improvement of the M3 data, the report on buying-selling of foreign currency especially the forms F.T. 3 and F.T. 4, as well as random checks on the correctness of the report. At this point, we would like to note that the purpose of this random check is not to emphasise the use of penalties but to create awareness amongst the financial institutions the importance of data reporting to the Bank of Thailand, so that the Bank of Thailand can have an up to date database for policy decision-making. On the external data, for the first time there has been a survey and announcement of the International Investment Position (IIP), in order to correctly monitor foreign currency exposure of the Thai economic system. Also, Thailand is the 21st country ranking in the world, in compliance with the International Monetary Fund's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).

Fritz Zurbrügg: The financial crisis in its sixth year – an end in sight? Speech by Mr Fritz Zurbrügg, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event, Zurich, 21 March 2013. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (http://www.snb.ch/en)  *  *  *  In this, the sixth year of the financial crisis, the situation on the financial markets has eased considerably. Is what we're seeing the prospect of an end to the crisis, or is this just a flash in the pan? Measures by central banks made a major contribution to stabilising the financial sector. This sector, however, is just a part of the whole, and while its stability is a precondition for sustained global economic growth, it is by no means a guarantee. The positive mood in the financial markets and leading economic indicators raise hopes that a recovery is underway. If these hopes are to be realised, however, structural reforms need to be implemented. The three most significant challenges for the global economy are increasing the resilience of the financial sector, improving the flexibility of labour and goods markets (especially in Europe), and consolidating the public finances of the advanced economies. Progress has been made in all three areas. The way ahead, however, is still both long and difficult. Due to the relatively lengthy period of weak growth, there is considerable danger that reform fatigue might spread in those countries most severely affected.
On the basis of current assumptions for the development of external conditions this year and in 2004, prices of marine products are now expected to fall by 4% this year and to remain unchanged between 2003 and 2004. Exports of marine products are expected to grow by 3% this year due to increased quotas for the fishing year [beginning September 1] and a larger blue whiting harvest this summer. The assumed increase in catch volume for 2004 is 5%. Aluminium prices are expected to rise by 4% this year, based on futures prices and the pricing assumptions of the two aluminium companies, Norðurál and Alcan Iceland. Import prices in foreign currency are expected to decrease by ½%. Fuel prices are based on futures. These have been on an upward trend in recent weeks and are now expected to rise by 9% this year but fall by 14% in 2004. The terms of trade for goods and services are expected to deteriorate by 1½ percentage points this year. In 2004 they are expected to improve by three-quarters of a percentage point. Assumptions for short-term foreign interest rates are 3% this year and 3½% next year. BIS Review 45/2003  3  According to the Central Bank’s macroeconomic forecast, output growth will be 2¾% this year and 3½% in 2004. This forecast assumes that the Norðurál aluminium smelter expansion will go ahead; if not, the respective growth figures would be 2¼% and 2¾%. Private consumption growth is forecast at 2% this year and 3% next year.

Over the past 12 months, Core Index I has risen by 2.7% and Core Index II by 2.4%. Underlying inflation is therefore somewhat closer than the CPI to the Central Bank’s target. It is interesting to examine the development of individual components of the CPI. The housing component, for example, has risen by 13.6% over the past 12 months and the upward trend shows no sign of coming to an end. Public service prices have also had a considerable impact on the CPI over the past 12 months, but the rate of increase has slowed down. Measures taken to forestall an inflation-  BIS Review 45/2003  1  triggered national wage review in 2002 included a freeze on public service prices, which was relaxed when the risk connected with exceeding negotiated inflation ceilings had abated. There has also been a slowdown in the twelve-month rise in private services, which are highly sensitive to domestic wage increases. On the whole, goods are more sensitive than many other index components to changes in the exchange rate. Last year’s strengthening of the króna is clearly reflected in goods prices, with a significant drop in import prices. In 2003 prices of both imported and domestic goods have fluctuated somewhat. For decades, a far too high rate of inflation was one of Iceland’s main economic problems. This had an adverse effect on businesses, making effective planning difficult. It also had an adverse effect on households, partly because a large proportion of household debt is indexed to inflation.
As we had initially put in place a soft loan facility which is directed to SMEs, we found overtime that the facility was not being tapped as well as it should. To put it as an analogy, the pipes were getting clogged. Thus, we responded flexibly and pragmatically by issuing a new Emergency Decree to put in place a new SME credit guarantee facility with accompanying credit facility for banks to try to lend to these SMEs. We have initially set a target of hundred billion baht loans extended through this facility in six months and we are well on our way to achieving that target. The latest figure stands at around 89 billion baht after about four  Page 4 of 9  months. This is an example of the pragmatic approach and the implementation that we, at the Bank of Thailand, have been willing to do. Another example of our flexible and pragmatic approach, and an indication of our willingness to step outside of our comfort zone as a central bank, is by introducing this other scheme, in addition to the SME credit guarantee facility, an asset warehousing scheme. We recognized that certain sectors require a targeted response in terms of the approach of debt restructuring. Certain sectors that are hard hit by the tourism slowdown are not in a position to engage in usual debt restructuring because with no tourists, several businesses in these sectors do not have any cash flow.

Therefore, a more appropriate solution would be for them to be able to transfer the ownership of their assets in exchange for debt repayment with the option to repurchase those assets back at a later date. As such, this scheme will remove debt burdens that would incur otherwise if they still have to hold onto the assets and loans. These examples provide some concrete illustrations of how we, at the Bank of Thailand, have tried to respond flexibly and pragmatically to the changing circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis. Part 3: Future Plans Let me now turn to the third part of my remarks today, which is what is next? One thing that we would like to do is a move from short-term and blanket measures such as a debt moratorium to longer-term and more targeted solutions such as debt restructuring. Moratoria are good responses to something that is short, severe and broad. However, as we have seen in discussing the economic outlook, this crisis is likely to be long. The recovery is likely to be very uneven, thereby requiring a longer-term and more targeted approach. Hence, we would like to encourage a move from a solution of having debt moratoria in response to waves of infections that are causing a lockdown to more lasting solutions such as debt restructuring. On this light, we have recently announced a series of initiatives and regulatory incentives to encourage banks to undertake debt restructuring, which is important as a lasting solution to the problems that we are facing.
”Conduits” are the more common of the two and account for almost 80 per cent of the outstanding stock of asset-backed commercial paper. An SIV has a more advanced construction than a “conduit”. It is usually highly leveraged, 15-20 times the equity capital. It is not necessarily tied to a bank and the financing is largely for longer durations. But the need for financing in the short-term money market is nevertheless crucial. Although the investment companies in themselves are not banks, they conduct bank-like operations; they have their own balance sheets and names and are in principal independent of the banks. But if an investment company is for some reason unable to issue new corporate certificates when the old ones fall due for payment, the bank guarantees the ability to pay, wholly or partly. The guarantees may be of a formal nature, where the bank commits itself to redeeming the certificate if the investment company is unable to do so. But a guarantee can also be of a more informal nature and based on the bank being unwilling to abandon its investment company in order to protect its name and reputation. Whichever is the case, it means that if an investment company linked to a bank faces financing difficulties, the problem is referred back to the bank, which must provide the company with sufficient liquidity for a short period of time. This is to some extent reminiscent of the situation during the Swedish financial company crisis, which started the 1990s bank crisis.

It was impossible to gain a clear insight into the complicated CDO structures. Consequently the interest rates on the interbank markets soared. Parallel to this, scepticism towards the credit rating agencies' ability to grade structured products increased, and this concerned not only products containing subprime loans. Several central banks decided at this point to intervene in different ways in the interbank market. In general, the interventions contributed to reducing interbank rates towards desirable levels for shorter durations. For the longer durations the difference between the interbank rate and the risk-free rate remained substantial. The unwillingness to lend money was a hard blow to institutions dependent on financing from the market. For example, the British mortgage lender Northern Rock was forced to seek help from the Bank of England to manage its acute liquidity problems when it could no longer obtain financing. The market turbulence during the autumn had relatively limited effects on the Swedish banks. The main effects were higher financing costs, some changes in the value of bond portfolios and less activity on some markets. Here an important factor was the fact that the Swedish banks did not have any significant exposure to securitised subprime loans, neither directly nor indirectly through investment companies. Deficiencies in the functioning of the credit markets have been exposed The rapid developments in the financial system over the past decade have essentially been beneficial. There is no reason to wish we were back in the financial iron age of the 1980s.