samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Inclusive recruitment  To support our objectives, we have introduced diversity targets that are reviewed and challenged by Court. Specifically, we aim to triple both the proportions of women in our senior roles, to 35% by 2020, and of BAME employees in these roles to 13% by 2022. As a first step, we are fishing from a larger pond and removing perceived barriers to entry. xviii  We want to  make the Bank a more obvious career destination for a wide range recruits: young school leavers who want to develop their skills as apprentices to graduates looking for their first full-time job, people who wish to return to work, or experienced professionals who are considering a career change and want to contribute to public policy. In our last graduate round, we hired from over 40 UK universities (four times as many as a decade ago), attracting students from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. Two fifths of the 2016 intake were female and a quarter came from a BAME background. Only half studied economics. The remainder were plucked equally from the sciences, business and the humanities. 15% of our graduates were hired from Oxbridge, and a fifth were from lower socio-economic backgrounds. In contrast, 21% of fast track hires to public service are from Oxbridge and only 4% are from lower socio-economic backgrounds. xix  While we are casting a wider net, the reality is, the nature of our work means that we will always need to hire technical experts.

One might also ask whether inflation targeting, even if it should have succeeded in anchoring long-term inflation expectations, can become better than it is today at facilitating the formation of expectations in the near and medium term? This relates to an issue that is addressed in several of the contributions, namely how we should best communicate our expectations and plans regarding the future conduct of policy. Recently, a number of central banks have begun to depart from the assumption of an unchanged policy rate in their forecasts, choosing instead to work with paths for future interest rate developments. What kind of interest rate paths should we use in that case - “exogenous” paths based on implied forward rates or “endogenous” paths that reflect the central bank’s own expectations and plans, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of both options? And could, for example, an excessive degree of openness and detail as regards the central bank’s own expectations risk increasing market volatility instead of facilitating economic agents’ planning? These are just a handful of the issues that are addressed in the contributions to the conference and that I hope will provide the basis for a rewarding discussion. Once again - you are all very welcome! 4  BIS Review 45/2005
In August 2011, in a first step to counter the excessively tight monetary conditions, we announced, almost on a weekly basis, an expansion of the monetary base, initially from CHF 30 billion to CHF 80 billion, then to CHF 120 billion and finally to CHF 200 billion. Even when the monetary base reached close to 40% of GDP, this was ultimately insufficient to halt the appreciation of the franc. As a consequence of these developments, on September 6, 2011, the SNB announced that it was introducing a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 against the euro. Since the announcement, the franc has never traded below this minimum. At the zero lower bound, the minimum exchange rate has become an important monetary policy tool for us. Yet despite the introduction of the minimum exchange rate, Switzerland has experienced almost two years of negative inflation. I just received the latest inflation data this morning: After having been at zero for two months, inflation turned negative again in September. In this context, it is also crucial to note that the introduction of the minimum exchange rate is not a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. It must be remembered that Switzerland has always had a negative goods trade balance with the euro area. The trade balance was negative before the implementation of the minimum exchange rate, and continues to be negative today. Swiss exports in goods have not gained market share in the euro area at the expense of others. Allow me to perform a simple thought experiment with you.

In this context, the idea of a global currency did not prosper in the academic debates – and even less so in policy discussions. One recent exception stands out, to which I would like to pay a special tribute. In 2010, Michel Camdessus launched the Palais Royal initiative. This initiative sheds light on the shortcomings of the International Financial System, in particular its global governance and an overreliance on a single central currency. The initiative suggested a greater role for SDRs and enhanced cooperation between the World Bank, the IMF and the G20. However, other major projects have in parallel been assigned higher priority for instance the successful creation and development of the euro - or have been dictated by necessity - for instance the strengthening of the global financial safety net (GFSN) induced by the great financial crisis and then the Covid crisis. That said, there have been significant progress such as the increase of IMF resources, the two special drawing rights (SDR) allocations (including the last one of 650 billion USD in 2021) and the creation of the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) on the 1st of May by the IMF, which will help deliver the G20 commitment to rechannelling at least 100 billion USD of this allocation to the countries in need. 2. The dangers of a fragmented financial system But there are dangers ahead. We have to avoid shifting from a dollar-dominated system to a confrontational non-system with, for instance, a dollar world opposed to a renminbi world.
It goes without saying that progress in the ICT has contributed to the deepening of the globalization process and significantly enhanced labour productivity in many sectors. Global imbalances One of the manifestations of globalization in recent years are global imbalances. In 2005, the US current account deficit approached 6.5% of the GDP, and many forecasts of investment banks point to its further increase in 2006 and 2007. 25 The negative net investment position of the world’s largest economy has moved towards 30% of the GDP in 2005 and, according to all available forecasts, it is bound to deteriorate at a high rate. The large current account deficit in the US is related to the negative savings of households and a strong growth in real property prices. These phenomena have occurred in the recent years not only in the US but also in all Anglo-Saxon countries. 26 Moreover, the current account deficit in the US is financed in a great measure by purchases of American debt securities by the Asian central banks. It entails a significant increase in the exchange reserves of the said banks. For instance, the reserves of the People’s Bank of China went up from USD 166 billion in December 2000 to USD 819 billion in December 2005 and over USD 850 billion in March 2006. It means that China is now ahead of Japan  22  Obstfeld M., Rogoff K. “The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?”, NBER Working Paper 7777, 2000.

These include better risk management, a modern range of products offered to customers, or the development of new distribution channels, to name just a few. Regional integration within the EU, however, means that the application of a uniform bank or insurance licence (i.e. taking up activity in any Member State under a licence obtained in the home country) may cause certain asymmetry in the availability of data and a conflict of interest between supervisors of the host country on the one hand, and institution owners and supervisors from the home country on the other. Such conflict may occur as a result of transformation of foreign bank subsidiaries, operating under local laws and fully supervised by the supervisory authorities of the host country, into branches supervised by foreign supervisory authorities. Individual foreign bank branches operating in the new EU Member States frequently constitute a vital element of the banking system, both in terms of the value of assets and deposits, operations on the domestic interbank market and the share in settlements in the payment system. Therefore, they are described as institutions of systemic importance for the domestic market. At the same time, they are not always equally important components of an international banking group, in terms of their size and the profit generated. In such a case, a relatively low importance of an institution may result in less focus on its supervision, both by the foreign bank and the supervisory authority of the home country in which the given bank has obtained its licence.
See: http://www.ellsbury.com/gne/gne-042.htm. 4 In 1946, King George VI appointed Turing an Officer of the Order of the British Empire for his wartime services, although the details of his work remained secret for many years. 5 Turing, A (1936), ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp. 230-265. 3  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  Having imagined the concept of a computer, Turing helped turn it into reality. He played a vital role in the design and development of early electronic computers after the war, continuing to contribute key ideas such as implementing functions by flexible programing rather than pre-set built-in electronic components. Working first at the National Physical Laboratory in London and later at the Computing Machine Laboratory at Manchester University, his insights led to the creation of the Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) in 1950 and the program for Ferranti Mark 1, the world’s first commercially available electronic computer. A visionary as well as a revolutionary, Turing recognised that “This is only a foretaste of what is to come and only the shadow of what is going to be”. True to his nature, Turing himself began to suggest some possible directions. His interests in neurology and physiology led him to ask whether computing machines could be capable of mimicking the faculties of the human mind, including the ability to learn.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Only three days ago, the capital markets provided the latest proof of the efficiency of the macroeconomic policies in Bulgaria and the resilience of our economy in the face of such a severe global crisis. Bulgaria’s global issue of 5-year euro-denominated bonds, marking our country’s return to the international bond markets after a decade, was a great success. The international investors’ orders oversubscribed the offered amount more than 6 times. Their strong interest has resulted in a very low annual yield of 4.436%. At present, only the highest-rated EU Member States can afford to pay a lower price for borrowing on the private capital markets. To conclude, we have achieved monetary and banking stability in Bulgaria during the last 15 years. They have been bolstered by the synergies of monetary and macroprudential mandates (including banking supervision) within the central bank, complemented by the prudent fiscal policies of several consecutive governments since 1997. The BNB representatives will be eager to discuss our knowledge today and tomorrow, while also looking forward to learning about the experiences of the other countries represented at this conference. I wish you a most fruitful exchange of views and ideas. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Similarly, the level of unit labour costs is lower in Malta than in both the weaker and stronger groups, as will be discussed later. It is important that the public debate and the formulation of policy focus more closely on what is needed for Malta to remain aligned with the better performers. In the first two quarters of 2013, Malta’s GDP growth rate stood at 2.7%. Net exports have been the main source of expansion. The outlook is for stronger growth in 2014 as Malta continues to benefit from its competitiveness. The economy continues to diversify, creating high value added job opportunities. While some sectors have had to downsize, there has been a compensating expansion in other sectors, such as financial and other services. This is shown in Chart 4. An aspect that may go unnoticed is the role of the financial sector in the resilience of the Maltese economy and its alignment with the stronger group of countries. Financial soundness indicators confirm that Malta has a sound and robust banking sector. A three-way split of the banking sector distinguishes between the core domestic banks that are closely integrated with the domestic economy at one end and the international banks that conduct all  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  their business abroad at the other end, along with a relatively small sector, the non-core domestic banks, in between, as shown in Chart 5.

Looking more closely at the external dimension, an important characteristic that distinguishes us from other models, such as the one in Cyprus, is the fact that the international banking sector in Malta is only lightly linked to the domestic economy and to the remainder of the Maltese banking system. Meanwhile, unlike the situation in other countries, the core domestic banks have very low reliance on non-resident deposits. They operate along traditional lines, applying a prudent business model and, like the rest of the banking sector, carrying minimal exposure to securities issued in the distressed economies. The core domestic banks are highly capitalised, profitable and liquid, and the other categories of the banking sector are similarly robust. …in terms of interest rates, Malta needs to further align with its peers. Although various indicators place Malta with the stronger performing group, there is room for further improvement. Interest rates on loans to businesses are currently around 2% to 3% higher in Malta as compared with Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria, and Luxembourg. In contrast, deposit rates offered by Maltese banks are broadly in line with those across the euro area, as shown in Chart 6. As a result, bank interest margins are higher in Malta, as shown in Chart 7. A closer alignment of margins with those of our peers appears to be warranted. The recently proposed Budget measure to conduct a review of bank charges to businesses makes sense.
Europe – from financial crisis to debt crisis In connection with the financial crisis of 2008–2009, problems relating to major budget deficits and sovereign debts became apparent in several countries: primarily in Greece, but also in Ireland, Spain and Portugal (see Figure 6). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  One could say that the position of several countries was already too weak when the crisis began, but also that their situations differed somewhat in nature. Greece had long been struggling with a budget deficit and a high sovereign debt (see Figure 6). In the case of Ireland the sovereign debt was not so large when the crisis began, but the combination of a burst property bubble and a large banking sector meant that the costs of supporting the financial sector became enormous (see Figure 6) Since the end of last year, a number of support measures have been implemented by the ECB, the EU and the IMF. These measures have been vital to the effort to manage the acute problems. On the other hand, it is absolutely clear that neither the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) nor the other support programmes can do anything about the longterm problems. In the longer term, structural measures are instead required to strengthen competitiveness in the countries with debt problems. Costs have increased far too much in several of these countries (see Figure 7).

For example, Greece’s structural primary balance (that is, the fiscal balance adjusted for cyclical developments, interest payments and one-off factors) is estimated by the Commission to have improved by more than 13 percentage points. I acknowledge that the concept of cyclical adjustment is surrounded by large uncertainty in real time, but there is no doubt that quite a lot of progress has been made. At the same time it is positive to see that the general upward trend in private sector indebtedness has been halted, both in the household and the corporate sector. Last but not least, the structural reforms have gathered pace, possibly under the imperative of the crisis. The programme countries have taken many initiatives to make their economies more flexible and market-oriented, thus sowing the seeds for better performance in the future. These efforts include pension reforms, the fight against tax evasion, simpler and better tax revenue services, optimisation of tax structures and – not to be underestimated – politically difficult labour market reforms. All of these developments give reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the prospect for crisis-ridden countries’ return to a path of sustainable growth, productive investments and creation of new jobs with more social security than has been experienced in the past few years. The severe recessions and increases in unemployment in some euro area countries were caused by many years of misguided policies and lack of reforms that could have strengthened the growth potential.
Spread of effect ive personal loan rat e rat es over Bank of England repo rat e  12  BIS Review 16/2005  Chart 11: Composition of UK PNFC sector gross debt Ot her debt Securit ies ot her t han shares Borrowing from non-UK resident MFIs Borrowing from UK resident MFIs  Per cent 120 100 80 60 40 20 0  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  Chart 12: Corporate credit spreads  Basis points  Basis points  1000  300  High yield (lhs)  800  250 200  600  BBB (rhs) 400 200 0 2000  150  AA (rhs)  100 50  AAA (rhs)  0 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Source: M errill Ly nch Op tion-adjusted corp orate bond sp reads  BIS Review 16/2005  13  Chart 13: Share of world imports in world GDP  1995 = 1 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.0 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003  Source: UN (pre-1980); IMF WEO Summer 2004 database (post-1980)  Chart 14: Import shares in consumption and business investment expenditures  Per cent 45 40 35 30  Business investment  25 20 15  Consumption  10 5 1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  Table 3: Value of sales over the internet by UK non-financial sectors  £  2002 2003  Households Business-to- Total business 6.4 11.4  12.7 28.2  19.0 39.5  Source: ONS  14  BIS Review 16/2005  Chart 15: Distribution sector profits (margins)  Percentage of output at basic prices 25.0  Retail 20.0  Total distribution sector  15.0  Wholesale  10.0 5.0 0.0  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  Chart 16: Output price inflation and CPI goods price inflation  Percentage change on a year earlier 4.0 3.0  Producer output prices  2.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0  CPI goods  1997  BIS Review 16/2005  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  -2.0 -3.0 2005  15  Chart 17: Domestically produced manufactured goods: costs and prices  Percentage change on a year earlier  Percentage changes on a year earlier 8.0 Input prices (lhs)  15.0 10.0  Unit wage costs (rhs)  6.0 4.0  5.0  2.0 0.0  0.0  -2.0  -5.0  -4.0 -10.0  Output prices (rhs)  -6.0  -15.0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  -8.0  Chart 18: Private sector productivity  Percentage changes on a year earlier 5.0  Per hour  4.0  Per head 3.0 2.0 1.0  Per job  0.0 1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  Source: LFS, workforce jobs dat a and Bank  16  BIS Review 16/2005  Chart 19: Private sector factor utilisation (based on production functions)  Elasticity of Substitution = 0.5 Elasticity of Substitution = 1  1986  1990  1994  Percentage deviation of output from trend 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 1998  2002  Source: Bank calculat ions.

Chart 8: Proportion of part-time workers  Percentage of total employed 30 25 20 15 10 1985  1988  1991  1994  1997  2000  2003  Source: ONS and Bank calculations  BIS Review 16/2005  11  Chart 9: Real household disposable income growth and terms of trade  Percentage change on a year earlier 8.0  1990 = 100 112  Real household income growth  6.0 108  4.0 2.0  104  0.0 100  -2.0  Terms of trade  -4.0  96  -6.0 -8.0 1990  92 1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  Chart 10: Margins on personal loans to households  Per cent 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  Source: Bank calculat ions.
Foreign direct investment doubled over 2012, although a large portion of the increase was due to the acquisition of Grupo Modelo. Mexico stands apart. As of February, Moody’s boosted its rating on Mexico’s government bonds to A3 – joining Chile as only the second Latin American country with an “A” rating. The structural reforms Mexico has passed played a role, but so did the ability to pass them. A unified political will to work for what’s in the nation’s best interests is a rare find these days and something about which Washington can only dream. Other nations, such as Brazil, may be headed in the opposite direction. Brazil’s economy likely shrank in the second half of 2013 and prospects for 2014 are half of what Mexico’s growth is projected to be next year. The Brazilian slowdown follows years of rapid growth and rising prices. Now, there are fears of a Brazilian house price bubble – homes in Sao Paulo are selling at three times 2008 prices. In contrast, Mexico City house prices are up 35 percent. I am not forecasting a housing bust for the Brazilian economy, mind you. But consumers may have to deleverage, which will detract from growth. The government may have to rein in spending as well. Brazilian government debt has outpaced GDP growth in recent years and currently stands at 57 percent of GDP, nearly twice that of Mexico. Faced with poorer growth prospects and a weakening labor market, Brazilian banks will likely tighten lending after a decade of credit expansion.

Our critics have told us that we should not have squeezed so hard on interest rates last October and that we should not have increased the cost of borrowing for business and for those who have to service their home mortgages. We should have introduced our measures to strengthen our monetary and financial systems earlier. We should not have departed from our free market policy and intervened in the stock and futures markets. That there was a lack of a “sense of crisis” in how we handled the situation. These are the more significant criticisms. 4. I can fully understand the sentiment behind these criticisms. The people of Hong Kong have been suffering the worst conditions we have had to face for many years. Even the most patient and understanding community will have grievances when the value of the assets they hold has been halved while they have to pay significantly higher interest costs for their liabilities. Furthermore, income has not been growing, and, for some, it has been shrinking. And, worse still, the probability that they may lose their jobs has doubled in the past year. 5. So, whatever the cause of this difficult situation, whether or not it arose from events outside the control of the authorities, it is considered, and rightly so, the responsibility of a caring government to do what it can to relieve these grievances. Refusal or reluctance to do so, even for very sound reasons in the larger long-term public interest, is not looked upon kindly.