samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2 -6 -5 -4 Output gap (%)  -3  -2  -1  0  1  Such circumstances have characterised the period in  1  the UK since the global financial crisis (Chart 2), 0  which entailed a large adjustment to the supply side of the economy, meaning a lower exchange rate,  -1  lower growth, and higher inflation. Source: Bank calculations. Chart 4: … as has the euro area  Chart 3: US has continued to experience predominantly demand shocks, not trade-off shocks, since the global financial crisis…  Great moderation  Inflation (%)  Great moderation  6  Inflation (%)  Financial crisis and after  Financial crisis and after  4.5 4  5  3.5 4  3 2.5  3  8 2 -4  2 -8  -6  -4  -2  0 1  -2  0  4  1.5  Output gap (%)  1  2  0  2  4 Output gap (%)  0.5 0  -1 -2 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, CBO and Bank calculations. The measure of inflation is the four-quarter change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator. The output gap is calculated using the CBO estimate of potential output from its August 2016 Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook. -0.5 -1 Source: Eurostat, IMF and Bank calculations. The measure of inflation is the four-quarter change in the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP).

First, since the global financial crisis, the UK economy has been subject to a series of major supply shocks, which, for reasons that I will explain, create a tension between short-term inflation and output stabilisation. And second, there has been a renewed recognition that, in extreme circumstances, the monetary authority may have to take into account financial stability considerations in setting monetary policy with potential consequences for the short-term path of inflation control. These are big decisions, decisions subject to considerable uncertainty, and decisions which entail potentially large welfare costs, arising from high unemployment and unevenly distributed costs of inflation. They deserve scrutiny to ensure that they are consistent with society’s preferences as expressed in statute and remit. 1. Monetary policy remit For most of the Bank’s history, an assessment of whether it was acting in a way consistent with society’s view of the public good could not be made. As former Governor Eddie George remarked, during the half century that followed its nationalisation in 1946 “the Bank operated under legislation which, remarkably, did not attempt to define our objectives or functions.” 7  They were, instead, “assumed to carry over from [the Bank’s] earlier long history.” In that regard, the Bank’s ‘constitution’ resembled that of the United Kingdom more broadly, comprising a rich history of law, principle and convention.
First, the international consensus to harmonize standards globally appears fragile. If each country acts to strengthen its financial system in an uncoordinated way, we will be left with a balkanized system, riddled with gaps that encourage regulatory arbitrage. Second, I am concerned that the focus will be too bank-centric. Although it is clearly appropriate to strengthen the liquidity and capital standards for banks, regulatory reform needs to be comprehensive. Third, I worry that the Federal Reserve’s role with respect to bank supervision will be unduly constrained. Let me discuss each of these concerns in more detail. Turning first to the issue of harmonization, I think it is underappreciated how important harmonization is to ensure success of the global regulatory reform effort. Without harmonized standards, financial intermediation would inevitably move toward geographies  BIS Review 28/2010  1  and activities where the standards are more lax. This, in turn, would provoke complaints from those who cannot make such adjustments as easily. The political process, in turn, would be sensitive to such complaints, creating pressure for liberalization, which would cause the tougher standards to unravel over time. In the discussion between countries, the emphasis would subtly shift from how to structure the regulatory regime to ensure financial stability toward negotiating a regulatory regime that works best for the institutions headquartered in each particular country. The harmonization process has some momentum due to the sponsorship of the G-20 leadership and the efforts of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and other international standard setters.

In other words, data on operations for all insurance companies should be captured easily for planning purposes; and  5)  Along the same lines, the insurance companies should focus on their core-insurance business, as this has the effect of reducing outflow of capital. If insurance companies had an avenue for co-operation amongst themselves, some arrangements to compensate for fore-gone income on ceded commission could be worked out under the co-insurance programme. In this regard, I call upon my counterparts at the Pensions and Insurance Authority (PIA) to strictly supervise the industry in order to ensure, among other things, the proper investment of the insured funds. On our part as the Bank of Zambia, we would like to assure you of our continued support, and our doors are open for consultations. As I do not want to take much of your leisure time, I wish to conclude by thanking you, once again, for according me the opportunity to share my thoughts with you. To this end, I wish you all a Merry Christmas and profitable New Year. Please, have a pleasant evening! I thank you. 2  BIS Review 74/2004
Payment service providers will have to apply these requirements as of 19 April 2020. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  With regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/518, Regulation (EU) 2018/389 and the Corrigendum of Directive (EU) 2015/2366, amendments to the Law on Payment Services and Payment Systems have been prepared which are due to be adopted by the end of 2019. 1 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European  Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication 2 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal  market 3 Regulation (EU) 2019/518 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 amending  Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 as regards certain charges on cross-border payments in the Union and currency conversion charges  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

There is also a game park, a well stocked curio market and the Mukuni Cultural Village, among the many attractions. I therefore urge you to find time or indeed stay an extra day or more to sample this special menu that Livingstone has to offer. Chairperson, Central Bank of Zambia is honoured and delighted to co-host the second AFRACA Forum that begins today, the 23rd and ends on 25th September, 2008. AFRACA is an association of Central Banks and financial institutions involved in the provision of financial services to the rural population in Africa and increasing access to financial services in general. Its membership of 94 institutions consists of central banks, commercial banks, agricultural banks, development and cooperative banks, other financial institutions and microfinance operators whose networks spread throughout 26 African countries. It is through workshops and fora of this nature, among other events, that AFRACA endeavours to disseminate information and share experiences among members and other industry stakeholders across the continent. Following the first Central Banks Forum held in Accra, Ghana and in view of the need to deliberate further on the topical issue of financial inclusiveness, AFRACA felt it necessary to hold the second Central Banks Forum under the theme, “Promoting Financial Inclusiveness”. The main objectives of this second forum are to harness current views on promoting financial inclusiveness, draw lessons and recommend strategies for improvement of the levels of access to financial services, particularly among the rural communities in our countries.
The last few years have been challenging times for Hong Kong and for the banks that operate within it. So far 2003 has shown no signs of being an exception to this. Indeed, the environment in the first half of the year has been more than usually turbulent. Attention at the beginning of the year was focussed on geopolitical uncertainties, and in particular on the implications of the war in Iraq for both the global and the local economy. No sooner had concerns eased on this score - for the time being at least - than we were confronted with the escalating impact of the SARS epidemic. Hong Kong banks are used to dealing with unexpected shocks, but the threat of disease is something new in modern times. The immediate need for the banks was to keep their business going and to protect the health of their customers and staff. Business continuity plans were therefore activated, including the setting up of command centres to monitor the situation and the formation of plans to deal with confirmed or suspected cases of infection among staff. Critical to this process was the creation of back-up teams of staff who could man key operations in an emergency from separate offices or even from home. Face-to-face meetings among staff and with customers or clients had to be curtailed. Teleconferencing helped to keep things going, including in the syndicated loan market. The need for such arrangements demonstrated that banks must be able to react quickly and flexibly to unexpected situations.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Asset management at central banks - a special case? Speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the University of St Gallen, St Gallen, 5 December 2003. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Summary Next to monetary policy, the management of international reserves is another important task of the Swiss National Bank (SNB). Since its obligations cannot be defined precisely, there can be no exact determination as to the optimal level of a country’s international reserves. In accordance with the buffer stock model, the level of international reserves should be determined - just as one would choose an appropriate insurance - based on the likelihood of a crisis, on their contribution to managing or avoiding the crisis as well as on the opportunity costs implied in holding reserves. Both the insights derived from this model and from international comparison have shown that Switzerland holds a reasonable level of international reserves. The long-term development of these reserves should be based on a set of clear goals, as is the case in Switzerland with the growth of nominal GDP as a strategic benchmark. In defining its investment policy, the SNB takes into account safety, liquidity, and performance. The new National Bank Law will enable the SNB to better adapt its investment profile to its needs, which ought to lower the opportunity costs implied in holding reserves.
Stefan Ingves: Monetary policy entails a balancing act Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to the Norrland County Administrative Board, Luleå, 4 December 2012. *  *  *  Today I would like to take up some aspects of the difficult balancing act that monetary policy has to perform and that in many respects reflect the lessons we have learned from the financial and debt crisis. The global economy has suffered a number of turbulent years. More than four years have now passed since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Unfortunately, the recovery following this crisis came to a halt when the financial crisis developed into a debt crisis in Europe. The Swedish economy has coped rather well with the crisis so far. We have of course been affected by the unease abroad and by the economic downturn, but to a much lesser extent than many other countries. This is due to factors such as stable public finances and good competitiveness. Another reason why Sweden has coped so well is that we have not suffered a crash on the housing market. However, household indebtedness is very high, which makes the households more vulnerable to a fall in housing prices and other risks. The course of events in several countries during the financial and debt crisis shows that we must take risks of this type seriously.

As the problems have worsened the recovery that began after the financial crisis in 2008 has ground to a halt, and our assessment in the Monetary Policy Report published in October is that GDP will actually fall in the euro area in 2012. …which is having a major impact on the Swedish economy Sweden is what we usually call a small, open economy. We are highly affected by developments abroad. This high dependence on economic activity abroad has led to considerable fluctuations in production in recent years. The fall in GDP in 2009 was the largest since World War II, but growth in 2010 was the highest for 40 years. The recent weak development of economic activity in the euro area has once again dampened growth prospects in Sweden. An important explanation of why the Swedish economy is affected so much by what happens abroad is that we are highly dependent on the demand for the goods and services that we export to other countries. The euro area is our largest export market and problems in the euro area therefore have a major impact on the demand for Swedish exports. One way for Swedish export companies to reduce this impact is to turn to new markets instead, but this is a very slow process (see Figure 7). The euro area will continue to be easily the largest export market for Sweden for the foreseeable future. Uncertainty abroad affects households and companies in Sweden.
At maximum of 1 percentage point above the O/N borrowing rate of the Central Bank announced for the intra-day transactions and to reduce fluctuations in O/N interest rates, in cases where the liquidity shortage in the market is envisaged temporary and when the technical interest rate cut explained in paragraph 48 is not applied,  b. At approximately the mid point of the O/N borrowing and lending rates of the Central Bank, in cases where the liquidity shortage in the market is envisaged permanent and the technical interest rate cut explained in paragraph 48 is applied. (iv)  The weekly repo auctions will be executed at 11:00 and the results will be announced on Reuters’ CBTG page no later than 11:30. The traditional auction method will be used in auctions; in other words, the successful bidders will be evaluated with their own interest rates. (v)  In case of unforeseen excessive liquidity shortage during the day, which would exert excessive pressure on money market interest rates, the CBRT may announce “Intra-day Repo Auctions” in addition to the regular ones. (vi)  The primary dealer banks will be able to conduct repo transactions within the framework of open market operations, between 10.00–12.00 and 13.00–16.00 hours.

The same is true for your Study group: you are about to release a seemingly very attractive study on “net worth at risk” which aims at describing the ability of companies to face an external financial shock, with a focus on recent years: it will certainly attract a lot of attention when you publish this work. As it is time to conclude, I would like first to confirm that BDF, a founding member of the ECCSBO, is still very dedicated in all that is related with corporate analysis. Your presence here today is certainly the expression of a commitment similar to our own one; it is a good augur for your future works and an encouragement for our joint efforts to be pursued. Finally, I would like to thank personally President Manuel Ortega because I know all what you do to keep the dynamics of this Committee. Many thanks also to all of you for being here today, for your support and your participation in this meeting, because I have  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  no doubt that you will have fruitful debates. If I may, I would add a special thanks for my colleagues from the Companies Directorate and for the protocol office, who deployed a lot of efforts in organising this event for the better: without their help we wouldn’t have been able to meet at this venue. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  Chart A: Divine coincidence has continued to reign in the euro area and US post-crisis but not the UK A1) UK Great moderation  Inflation (%)  6  Financial crisis and after 4  Inflationary, with trade-off  Inflationary, no trade-off  2 -6  -5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2 3 4 Excess demand (%)  0 Disinflationary, no trade-off  Disinflationary, with trade-off -2  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. A2) US Great moderation  6  Financial crisis and after  5  Inflation (%)  4 3 2 -8  -7  -6  -5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  1  2  3  4  Excess demand (%)  0 -1 -2 Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, CBO and Bank calculations. Notes: The measure of inflation is the four-quarter change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator. The output gap is calculated using the CBO estimate of potential output. 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  23  A3) Euro-area Inflation (%)  5  Great moderation Financial crisis and after  4 3 8 2 -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  1  2  3 4 Excess demand (%)  0 -1 Sources: Eurostat, IMF and Bank calculations.

This is particularly important during large structural or regime shifts when uncertainty is high. In the wake of financial crises or advance of wholesale changes to trading relationships, people’s expectations for monetary policy can understandably diverge from its most likely path to the detriment of the economy’s performance. Guidance is most useful at such turning points. The views of economists and financial market participants are, of course, central to the transmission mechanism from Bank Rate, set by the MPC, to the various interest rates facing households and businesses and to asset prices more generally. Guidance can reinforce the transmission mechanism by reducing unnecessary uncertainty – not eliminating 3  all uncertainty. It is not the same as guaranteeing the future stance of monetary policy. Indeed, market participants can be expected to pay the closest attention to any explicit conditionalities around guidance and should usually be the first to update their expectations of policy as the outlook for the economy changes. Finally, guidance should be seen in the context of a series of MPC initiatives to increase transparency. In recent years, the MPC has made major structural changes to our communications ranging from publishing statements each time we meet to the simultaneous release of Minutes, Inflation Reports and Monetary Policy Summaries on Super Thursdays to the provision of the detailed assumptions underlying our projections. And last year, we introduced layered communications, with simpler, more accessible language and graphics to reach the broadest possible audience.
The introduction of the euro has been a strong catalyst for mergers and acquisitions in the euro area. The European M & A market seems to be amongst the most dynamic in the world: with operations totalling over 1,000 billion euros in 1999, it is now catching up on the American market. The euro has brought about significant changes for participants in financial markets and has fostered structural developments in the financial industry. This is true both on euro-area money markets and on capital markets. From the beginning of Stage Three of EMU, cross-border transactions in the money market increased so as to represent more than 50% of the total activity in all segments of the money market. The unsecured deposit interbank market—which is mostly concentrated on shorter maturities—exhibits a  4  BIS Review 11/2001  very high degree of integration. The integration of interest-rate markets within the euro area is a key achievement which deserves to be underscored. EONIA and EURIBOR have provided the market with uniform benchmarks fully accepted by all market participants. The diagnosis is the same in the shortterm derivatives market, whose integration, standardisation and depth have increased. This is reflected, for instance, in the scale of daily transactions and the huge expansion of the euro interestrate swap market. These structural changes in the euro area money market have generated significant moves by market participants, who have concentrated their euro cash management activity and have benefited from better liquidity on the secondary market.

It is a keystone of the European single market, which will ensure prosperity in Europe for the benefit of the rest of the world. I would like to draw your attention to why the euro and Monetary Union have been successful from the outset, and to the conditions and prospects for building on this success. I. The euro and Monetary union are based on a credible monetary policy and contribute to an appropriate economic and monetary equilibrium in Europe I.1. A credible, stability-oriented monetary policy a/ First of all, let me point out that, from a technical and operational point of view, the launch of the euro on financial markets has been an indisputable success. In this respect, one has to remember all the doubts voiced three years ago. The decentralised organisation of the Eurosystem has achieved the objectives it was assigned in three important respects: •  operational efficiency, as is demonstrated by the timely adjustment of banking liquidity and steering of short-term interest rates;  •  the security provided by the procedures and systems implemented by the Eurosystem, both for the execution of its operations and in the field of large-value payments. At the shortest end of the market, the integration of the interbank market took place in 1999, right from the start of Monetary Union, thanks to the setting up of the Target system for the transfer of large-value payments in real time throughout the euro area and other EU countries.