samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A low policy rate in  15  8  Churm, R., M. Joyce, G. Kapetianos and K. Theodoridis (2015): “Unconventional monetary policy and the macroeconomy: the impact of the United Kingdom’s QE2 and Funding for lending Scheme”. Staff Working Paper No. 542, Bank of England. BIS central bankers’ speeches  combination with low risk premiums has resulted in low residential mortgage financing costs for households. Household debt has grown far faster than income. Low interest rates may increase the risk that debt and asset prices rise to levels that are unsustainable over time. Such financial imbalances could trigger or amplify an economic downturn. More resilient banks reduce this risk. Requirements with regard to banks’ equity capital and funding structures have been strengthened and the countercyclical capital buffer has been implemented. In addition, the requirements for prudent residential mortgage lending practices have entered into force. Norges Bank’s policy rate setting takes account of the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. The aim is to avoid an abrupt downturn in the economy and higher unemployment at a later stage. Over the past year, there has been a negative turnaround in the Norwegian economy. Oil prices have decreased by more than 50 percent in a year. The fall in oil prices has amplified an expected decline in activity in the oil sector, and the Norwegian economy is experiencing a period of restructuring. No more than in other countries can monetary policy in Norway assume primary responsibility for delivering structural changes in the economy.

On the asset side, central banks have increased their holdings of government bonds and bonds issued by private enterprises and institutions. These holdings are matched on the liabilities side by increased deposits from private banks in the form of central bank reserves. The stock of central bank reserves in the US and UK is now five times larger than it was before the financial crisis. In the euro area, reserves have doubled in size. These figures provide a good illustration of the extent of the measures implemented. Such large increases in central bank reserves may evoke associations with historical examples of extensive government money printing. But this comparison only goes so far. Historically, money has usually been printed to finance government budget deficits. The increased money supply then had a direct effect on the economy through purchases of goods and services. The result has often been high and uncontrolled inflation. Quantitative easing is different. In the same way as traditional monetary policy, the way quantitative easing is able to influence the wider economy is through lower interest rates and higher securities prices. The transmission mechanism of quantitative easing to the real economy operates through several channels. First, the central banks’ purchases have supported their communication concerning future policy rates. When central banks purchase long-term government bonds, this is in itself a signal that policy rates will be kept low for a long time. This also pushes down interest rates on other securities.
Real convergence is occurring between various parts of the zone and I think this process will continue and support growth in the future, contrary to over simplistic descriptions. One overlooked fact is the very fast productivity catch up in the periphery of the euro area. Between 2000 and 2008, cumulative labor productivity growth in Greece, as measured by the output per employee, was 14,7%, and 10,2% in Ireland. Both significantly outpaced Germany (6,1%). This is exactly what you would expect in an integrated economic and monetary area and this process should continue in the future, provided that appropriate policies are implemented. Economic convergence will therefore boost growth and support the return to debt sustainability. Now, looking at nominal evolutions, a very different picture emerges. During the same period nominal wages grew by a total of 42% in Ireland and 52% in Greece vs only 7,4 % in Germany. The nature of the challenge, therefore, is clear. There has to be a regime change in the way nominal wages and prices are set in some parts of the euro area. As Central Bankers, we have been making that argument for years. One benefit of the crisis has been that this message is now fully accepted by Governments and public opinions. Strong reforms are currently being pushed in labor markets legislation as well as wage determination in the public sector in many countries. I’ll end up with a few words about the banking sector. I have the privilege to be both a Central Banker and a supervisor.

And, the odds are that the cause of the next one will not be the same. I have been involved in mopping up problems in banks long enough to have been involved in Barings, which was an idiosyncratic fraud, not a sector-wide problem. This is the resolution element. In short, we need better fire prevention and better fire-fighting. In the UK we took a major step earlier this year by creating a Special Resolution Regime. But that is not the end of the response to the crisis. Rather, it is where “living wills” or what we now prefer to call Recovery and Resolution Plans, or RRPs, come in. I want to spend the rest of my time setting out what I think should be the role and form of these plans, and why they should be critical tools both for banks themselves, banking supervisors and resolution authorities. I have been struck by the strength of support for RRPs. In April, the G20 leaders endorsed a set of principles from the Financial Stability Board that include strong encouragement for firms to maintain contingency plans and procedures for use in a wind down, with regular reviews to ensure that they remain accurate and adequate. The Financial Stability Board cross-border Crisis Management Working Group, chaired by my colleague, Paul Tucker, has  BIS Review 156/2009  1  published principles aimed at strengthening the ability of authorities to deal with a crisis in certain cross-border financial groups.
And finally, we know that there is change on many fronts, the scale of which may only be exceeded by the scale of the crisis to which it is a response. As supervisors we are on the look out for unintended consequences of this change, and we will assess and refine our approach as needed. Thank you. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Our monetary strategy ensures a continuity from the monetary policies previously conducted by the national central banks, which now belong to the Eurosystem. This strategy has been well received by financial markets and the general public. In particular, the relatively low yields on long-term euro-denominated bonds confirm that the Eurosystem has retained the credibility store it inherited. d)  Lastly, the credibility of the euro also results from the Eurosystem's constant efforts in terms of transparency and communication. I must stress here that the Eurosystem is one of the most transparent central banks in the world. Once a month, immediately after the ECB Governing Council meeting, the President of the ECB holds a press conference which starts with a precise report of the assessment of the Governing Council, and which is made available in real time on the ECB website. The Eurosystem was the first central bank in the world to introduce, on 1 January 1999, the concept of regular, frequent, real-time communication in the domain of monetary policy. Other major central banks have since decided to follow us. Being accountable, for an independent institution in a modern democracy – or, as it is the case for the Eurosystem, in a subtle constellation of democracies like the European Union – means being accountable to public opinion.
And all policymakers have an obligation to learn from past crises and past mistakes. That is the only way credibility can be built: not the avoidance of crises and mistakes, which is impossible, but the recognition by the public that, when they do happen, the crises are contained and the mistakes are honest ones. The Bank of England is embarking on the latest chapter in its 318-year history. We cannot avoid a crisis but, as with Barings in 1890, we can endeavour to prevent it becoming a drama. We will certainly be doing our best to prevent it becoming a tragedy like that of the past few years. If nothing else, this new chapter will have learnt from, and will build on, the lessons of history. Thank you. References Ahamed, L (2009) “Lords of Finance”, William Heinemann Ltd. Bagehot, W (1873), “Lombard Street: A description of the Money Market”, Reprinted 1962. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois. Bank of England Archive E4/2. File on employment of women 1910–1919. Bank of England, (2012), The Framework for the Bank of England’s operations in the Sterling Money Markets available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/ money/publications/redbookjune2012.pdf  14  Capie (2010) p50. 15  Boyle op cit p327.

There may be some early indications that such a shift has begun to occur with prices rising faster outside metropolitan areas. As of March this year, annual house price growth has been in the 13-14% range for the North of England and the 10-12% range for the Midlands, Wales and Scotland, with London the laggard at just under 4%. But even if it has begun, is far too early to say whether or not it will be sustained. Preferences expressed during the pandemic and lockdown may not be a good guide to post-pandemic behaviour. If it occurred, such a shift would reverse decades of movement in the other direction and might see closing of the gap between London and other high cost areas. It is not clear what impact a more buoyant housing market along these lines would have on prices, mortgage indebtedness distribution of housing wealth. Even if prices rise in newly popular locations and the volume of mortgage transactions increased, there could be offsetting effects. First-time buyers of properties outside high cost metropolitan areas who would otherwise have bought in those areas would take on less debt than they would otherwise have done. And existing owner-occupiers who moved from such areas to other areas in the UK might in fact reduce their debt in doing so. Supply may also be more able to respond to demand outside city centres.
Joseph Yam: Complaints against banks and the role of the HKMA Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Association of Banks Half-Yearly Dinner, Hong Kong, 24 June 2002. *  *  *  I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak to you at this half-yearly dinner, and I am grateful to the organisers for choosing an evening that does not happen to coincide with the quarter-finals, semifinals or final of the World Cup. This has, I am sure you will agree, been an exciting tournament so far. One of its striking features has been the record number of yellow and red cards issued to players by referees for fouls, unsporting behaviour and other forms of misconduct. The reasons put forward include worsening behaviour on the playing field, stricter application of the rules by referees, and a greater tendency among players to complain about real or imagined grievances. Whether all this is good or bad for the game is a matter of debate: it certainly makes for interesting television. But it is not just in the world of football that we see a rise in grievances and complaints. It is a phenomenon affecting many areas of life in Hong Kong, including the relationship between consumers and their banks. Complaints against banks are on the increase.

Although we always stress the importance of improving productivity in agriculture and industry sectors, a similar significance should be assigned to the services sector as well. Despite the growing weight in services in economies, productivity growth in services has been slow in many countries and the share of the working-age population employed in services remains low in many countries. If we wish to strengthen economic growth and improve the foundations for the future performance of our economy, the services sector will need to do better. But strengthening growth performance is not the only challenge that we are facing. We are also confronted with the growing globalization of services and with rapid technological change posing the huge challenge of keeping the momentum in the services sector. Addressing such challenges and strengthening the potential of services to foster employment would be definitely through increased productivity and innovation. Certainly a productive services sector would deliver more benefits in a highly competitive environment. Sri Lanka’s telecommunication sector is a good example. In which areas have we been below par? Although Sri Lanka has a huge potential in services such as education, health and tourism, we haven’t done enough. So, also, has it been in the case of ports, financial services, including banking. We have not been able to reduce prices and charges through increased productivity. We may need to open domestic services markets to create new job opportunities and foster innovation and productivity.
Savings capital is attracted to this and these industries can thereby grow and provide jobs to replace those lost in industries that are declining. This means that equity prices on average and across a business cycle should increase at the same rate as potential GDP-growth plus the risk premium required by investors. However, we know from experience that periods when households and companies have increased their borrowing at a rapid rate and asset prices have risen substantially have often preceded large falls in growth and capacity utilisation in the economy and even led to financial crises. It is only with hindsight that we have been able to note that imbalances had built up. Regulation, fixed exchange rate policy, insufficient supervision and deficiencies in accounting systems have often contributed substantially to imbalances being able to accumulate over a long period of time. However, asset price and credit cycles also appear in many cases to have been exacerbated by exaggerated optimism and speculation, what is known as bubbles. This over-optimism often begins because equity prices in a sector, perhaps as a result of a technological advantage, have risen over a period of time and the optimism then spreads. The problem for those of us responsible for monetary policy is that inflation – measured as consumer prices – has often remained relatively unaffected during these periods. It is difficult to distinguish bubbles from economically-motivated fluctuations in advance, which partly is because we have insufficient experience of credit and asset price cycles in deregulated financial markets.

Thank you, because the allocation of funds from the pre-accession funds for the implementation of this Project, means a trust that we are ready to work on strengthening the institutional capacity and on the mutual cooperation in order to implement the recommendations that will arise from the project activities. I am sure that we will justify the trust. Not only with the level of our commitment to the Project in the next eight months, but also with the willingness to implement all necessary activities for establishing a strong and efficient system for fight against counterfeiting of euro in the country. These activities are already outlined in the strategic commitments of our institutions, because our ultimate goal is to provide a system that, in all aspects, will be at the level of the system of a European Union member state. Only with full dedication, readiness and professionalism, the trust will be fully justified and we will prove that the Project was indeed successful – that the 250,000 Euros intended for its implementation were channeled in the right direction. I am firmly convinced that the Ministry of Interior and the National Bank, as beneficiaries of this Project, will jointly succeed in doing so.
With a common monetary policy and (micro)supervisory policies, and a fiscal policy with almost no room for manoeuvre, the macroprudential policy becomes a much-needed ‘degree of freedom’ to deal with the lending cycle, a task that traditionally has been allocated to central banks too. As the recent article IV visit of the IMF made clear, Spain is one of the few countries in Europe still not to have a macroprudential authority. Given the role that macroprudential policy will play in the future, it is probably high time that we all reflect on the optimal design of this authority in order to enhance financial stability. 2  See J. Saurina and C. Trucharte: “The countercyclical provisions of the Banco de España 2000-2016”. Banco de España, 2017, for an account of dynamic provisions in Spain, why they were introduced, their impact and lessons drawn for prudential policy. 3  See G. Jiménez, S. Ongena, J.L. Peydró and J. Saurina: “Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers, and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments”, Journal of Political Economy, 2017, for a thorough quantitative analysis of the countercyclical impact of dynamic provisions in Spain. For a broader discussion of the interaction of dynamic provisions with monetary, fiscal and regulatory policy, see A. Estrada and J. Saurina “Spanish BoomBust and Macroprudential Policy”, Financial Stability Review, Banco de España, May, 2016. 6/7  Let me conclude by stressing the relevance of the conference, given the importance of the correct measurement of credit risk.

We believe these policies would put Thailand on a strong foothold to serve as a regional connector to support closer economic integration. Last but not least, let me once again thank the FCCT for organizing this forum. The road ahead for the Thai economy indeed brings new opportunities as well as challenges, urging us to adjust ahead of the changing conditions. Being among policymakers, businesses, and journalists who gather here tonight, I hope we will continue to work together on the route to enhancing competitiveness and sustainable development of Thailand. Kob Khun Krub. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
This response by the prudential authorities, along with the monetary and fiscal policy measures adopted, has allowed the initial impact of the shock to be absorbed, it has smoothed the provision of credit to the economy and it has prevented the materialisation of  3  See the speech by the Governor of the Banco de España “Retos y políticas para la estabilidad financiera ante la pandemia”, October 2020. 5  a systemic risk in the financial system that would have heightened the crisis further and made it more persistent Looking ahead, however, set against the uneven and uncertain recovery I described earlier we cannot rule out two outcomes: that the risks identified materialise, and that their impact and persistence are greater than expected. In this respect, the economic and supervisory authorities must continue to closely monitor banks and financial markets so that they may continue providing the necessary flow of credit to the economy. We must continue adopting measures to mitigate the risks and, naturally, we must stand ready to respond appropriately should these risks materialise. In the banking area, this response can only be pan-European, given the commitment to the Banking Union and the need to avoid the financial fragmentation problems that might stem from an exclusively national response. European fiscal policy The ECB’s monetary policy measures and action taken by the regulatory authorities have been forceful, aimed at delivering a common, truly European, response to the economic crisis associated with the pandemic.

One of the most important is determined by what we know about the functioning of the economy and the effects of monetary policy. Not everyone agrees, however, that transparency is a good thing for attaining financial stability. Many people argue that so-called constructive ambiguity is the best way to avoid problems of moral hazard in the banking industry. I believe, however, that transparency is important in this area as well. Banks that are "too big to fail" from a systemic point of view will in any case count on support from the government. Especially when it comes to countries like Sweden, which experienced a severe banking crisis not so long ago, it is likely that support to banks that encounter financial problems will be expected if nothing else is being communicated. Another risk associated with constructive ambiguity is that it could limit the motivation of central banks to seriously consider what to do in a crisis. In other words, it could provide an excuse for not thinking the issues through. However, if you are not prepared, you could easily become the bank's prisoner in a time of crisis. Through deeper analysis of the "too big to fail" problem and open communication of crisis strategies, it should be possible if anything to mitigate the moral hazard problem. If you can show that the banks do not need to be systemically important, it should make banks even more uncertain about the possibility of receiving support than any policy of constructive ambiguity.
Ida Wolden Bache: A somewhat faster rise in the policy rate Speech by Ms Ida Wolden Bache, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), during "Arendalsuka", on the outlook for the Norwegian economy and the policy rate decision, Arendal, 18 August 2022. * * * Accompanying slides of the speech. Good afternoon everyone and let me first of all thank Sparebanken Sør for allowing us to use this lovely building. This was once the Arendal branch of Norges Bank. The branch was closed in 1989, and at that time inflation in Norway was on its way down from a high level. Today, after a long period of low and stable inflation, inflation is again high. The central bank’s role is to ensure price stability and promote economic stability. The decisions we take affect people’s finances. I was acutely aware of this responsibility, as were the other members of the Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee, when we convened yesterday to set the policy rate. Chart: A somewhat faster rise in the policy rate After thorough discussions, we decided to raise the policy rate by 0.5 percentage point to 1.75 percent. The decision was unanimous. This means that we are raising the policy rate somewhat faster than indicated by the policy rate forecast published in June. The policy rate will most likely be raised further in September.

In this respect, I would like to thank the organization committee for their efforts in bringing these very interesting and enlightening studies under this conference. I wish the conference a complete success and I would like to thank all our guests for their participation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches