samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is the flexibility and health of the supply side of the UK economy. Key issues relating to the supplyside performance of the economy include: how efficiently labour markets operate; how dynamic and entrepreneurial UK-based firms are; how various forms of regulation affect investment plans and the climate for doing business; and how efficiently the economy can reallocate resources away from declining activities to new areas of growth. I have been generally impressed by the supply side performance of the UK economy through this recession and the early phases of the recovery. Most businesses have showed resilience in the face of a big shock to demand, and the flexibility of wages and hours worked was used to protect jobs. Company failures have been lower than we have seen in previous recessions. 10 And the economy has turned round from the very worrying situation we faced in the middle of last year and has generated over 300,000 new jobs since last winter, according to the latest Labour Force Survey results. But there are some puzzles on the supply side of the economy too, and these have an important bearing on the judgements the Monetary Policy Committee is making at the moment. Capacity utilisation appears quite high given the early phase of the recovery. Chart 10 shows the responses from the CBI’s Industrial Trends Survey on capacity utilisation in manufacturing, where it is perhaps easier to assess than in the services sector.

6/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Companies' one-time inputs can be automatically mapped across a range of major sustainability standards and frameworks, allowing them to cater to different investor requirements. Sustainability reports can also be automatically generated from these inputs. MAS will draw on the learnings from ESGenome to ensure that the ESG Disclosure Portal caters over time to the reporting needs of a broader universe of corporates, notably small and medium-sized enterprises, supply chain partners and suppliers. The ESG Registry draws on a blockchain solution to record and maintain the provenance of green certifications issued by various sectoral bodies. Titled ESGpedia, the ESG Registry was developed with the help of local Green FinTech firm STACS and launched in May this year. It allows banks to access green certifications issued by various bodies for their green and sustainable financing decisions. MAS will continue to work with STACS and our industry partners to build up the Registry's network of certifications, thereby providing more confidence to the users of these data. The Data Orchestrator aims to aggregate ESG data from multiple data sources. This will include major ESG data providers, utilities providers, sectoral platforms, and of course the ESG Data Registry. The Data Orchestrator will provide consentbased access to these sources. It will also allow new data insights to be generated through data analytics to better support investment and financing decisions. We aim to launch the Data Orchestrator next year.
François Villeroy de Galhau: What can monetary policy do? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the House of Finance Days of Paris-Dauphine University, Paris, 14 March 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this first edition of the House of Finance Days of Paris-Dauphine University. In order to “[imagine] the finance of tomorrow” – to quote the theme of this event – it is essential to understand all facets, and in particular to be able to decipher the prevailing environment. Through its three main tasks, the Banque de France plays a key role as, firstly, it implements monetary strategy, as a member of the Eurosystem alongside the European Central Bank in Frankfurt; secondly, it ensures financial stability, by supervising the banks, insurance firms and, more generally, the financial system; and, lastly, it provides an economic service to households and SMEs/VSEs. Today I will focus on the monetary policy that we conduct in the framework of the Eurosystem. Monetary policy has long been considered a technical or even an austere subject. But, since 2008, it has been far more widely discussed: central banks in different countries have played a major role, and a role largely hailed as positive, in exiting the crisis. Today, however, their actions to address the persistence of very low inflation are subject to debate. I would first like to talk about our objective, then our instruments and their effectiveness.

They have translated into a substantial easing in borrowing conditions for euro area companies. Since June 2014, the cost of borrowing for businesses has fallen by 80 basis points. Without non-standard measures, we estimate that we would have had to lower key rates by around 100 basis points in June 2014 to achieve a similar effect on bank interest rates. This has also helped to stimulate lending to the real economy: in the euro area, outstanding loans to businesses have gone from a contraction of -2.5% in June 2014 to growth of 0.6% in January 2016. The impact is even more marked in France, where outstanding business lending grew by 4.8% year-on-year in the first month of 2016 - the highest pace of growth in the euro area and, what’s more, with the lowest rates of interest. Convergent estimates from the ECB and the Eurosystem indicate that, all other things being equal, the measures introduced since June 2014 should add 1 percentage point to inflation over the period 2015-2017, with a similar impact on growth. In France, they helped to boost 2015 growth by 0.3 percentage point, and estimates from INSEE even put the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  impact slightly higher at +0.4 pp. That represents about 80,000 additional jobs for the economy - although only structural reforms can generate lasting gains for a country’s growth and employment.
In its country evaluations, the IMF will also be paying more attention to the development of the financial system. There is to be cooperation with the World Bank; these two organisations have agreed on a joint model for the appraisal of national financial sectors. These appraisals are to be based on the current minimum standards for banks and other financial institutions, a broad review of developments and risks in the country’s financial sector, and other conditions such as legislation, accountancy rules, payment systems and financial markets, for example. 3. Greater transparency A more stable development also calls for greater transparency. If the global capital markets are to function as intended, their players must know about the actual risks and be in a position to make realistic profit assessments. This in turn means that international organisations as well as  BIS Review 52/1999  6  governments, private companies and financial institutions must convey a fair picture of the prevailing conditions. As regards the IMF, increased transparency has been proposed in the country assessments, for example. A pilot project has been initiated for the voluntary publication of material about individual countries. Sweden has promised to participate in the project. Transparency also applies to the individual countries and the private sector. One element in the recent crisis has been a misleading account of both private debt and the size of foreign exchange reserves in a number of countries.

Every saver and borrower exerts some influence on the market but naturally not to the same degree. The stage is set by the biggest players, be they individuals, companies or nations. The scope for economic policy Free capital mobility is sometimes criticised for encroaching on democracy and rendering economic policy less effective. Even in a world with integrated financial markets, economic policy is decided by the national political systems. They are free in principle to alter tax rates, boost public spending and adjust interest rates whenever they wish. In this direct sense, a more open economy does not mean that policy is restricted. In many ways, access to international capital can actually enlarge the scope for action. Unlike the case in earlier centuries, a country that is stricken today by severe crop failures, for instance, can borrow external funds to buy seed. Similarly, a country wishing to strengthen its growth potential by more than domestic saving permits can expand its production apparatus more rapidly with the aid of imported capital. At the same time, loans and other financial transactions do entail dependence. If a country’s economic policy does not inspire confidence, the consequences may be unfavourable. Perhaps investors will no longer be prepared to provide new loans and may even stop existing credits. Long bond rates are liable to rise, accompanied by a depreciating currency. Such reactions are the market’s way of passing judgement on economic policy and a country’s creditworthiness. This mechanism is the same as that for private borrowers.
Coordination and cooperation among ASEAN countries must be further enhanced to ensure that prompt remedial actions can be put in place should a crisis occur. Ladies and Gentlemen, In closing, I would like to reiterate that it is important for ASEAN’s economic and financial stability that ASEAN central banks continue, individually and collectively, to increase the effectiveness of their policy instruments through domestic reforms of markets and financial systems as well as communication efforts with markets and one another. In this spirit, I am reminded of how ASEAN has risen over the years to common challenges. History has recorded ASEAN as an exciting region second to none. While rich in diversity, ASEAN has always been united in bringing about successful solution to tackle our common challenges. ASEAN, itself, was formed forty years ago against the backdrop of political and security threats to the region. In addition, ASEAN Free Trade Area, or better known as AFTA, was created sixteen years ago to ensure that ASEAN together reap benefits from greater trade liberalization under the WTO. Going forward, with sustainable growth and development of ASEAN at stake, I have no doubt that we will be able to jointly find ways to overcome the present difficult global environment and together continue to prosper. Thank you. BIS Review 134/2008  3

General Meeting of the OCBF 17 June 2022 Economic and financial situation and outlook in the context of the war in Ukraine Speech by Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be with you today on the occasion of your Annual General Meeting. Last year, I spoke before you about the outlook for the euro area economy in the wake of the health crisis. Since then, new lockdowns in China and especially the war in Ukraine have created new shocks for the European economy and financial system. Today, I would like to share with you our analysis, at the Banque de France and the ACPR, of the outlook and the resulting short-term, macroeconomic and subsequent macrofinancial risks, which guide our actions as a central bank and supervisor in our mission to preserve monetary and financial stability. I will end my remarks with the longer-term challenges we collectively face, associated with climate change and the digitalisation of finance, which should not be overshadowed by the war in Ukraine and its consequences. These challenges still require resolute and immediate action from all of us, and in this context I will say a few words about the role we can play as supervisors and central bankers to help banks in their transition to a sustainable economy and digitalised finance. 1.
Actions by governments to restore stability Across the whole euro area, governments are making determined efforts to reverse economic imbalances. They are implementing reforms to redress the misguided policies of the past and to create sustainable long-term growth. It is a difficult road and there is still a long way to go. But the early signs are encouraging. Fiscal consolidation is progressing well in most countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts that the euro area’s primary budget will be almost in balance this year. By comparison, Japan will have a primary deficit of 9% of GDP, the United States 6.5% and the UK more than 5%. We are also seeing some noteworthy improvements in competitiveness. Price competitiveness has improved significantly in several euro area countries. And current account deficits are falling. For example, the countries under full EU-IMF programmes have seen their unit labour costs improve by more than 10% since 2008, relative to the euro area average. Their current accounts have improved by around 8% of GDP since then. Governments have also taken measures to strengthen the rules and institutions that guide economic policies in the euro area. This is important to ensure that the positive developments do not simply reverse when economic conditions improve and markets stabilise. One notable example is the new fiscal compact, which will provide a strong tool for keeping budgets close to balance in the future. Governments have also set up a new framework to prevent and correct unsustainable developments in the private sector.

In other words, ECB actions that support market confidence are of benefit not only to countries in difficulty, but also to the euro area as a whole. Our measures ensure the proper transmission of monetary policy, which means neither excessively high interest rates nor excessively low interest rates. The measures enable the ECB to continue to maintain price stability for the benefit of all citizens of the euro area. The announcement on OMTs has already triggered positive effects. Sentiment in financial markets has improved significantly. Excessive government bond spreads have gone down, a number of banks in stressed countries have been able to regain access to markets and Target2 balances have broadly stabilised. The way forward Let me draw to a close. Actions by the ECB can build confidence in the euro area in the near term. But only actions by governments can secure confidence in the euro area over the longer term. In particular, governments need to work together to establish a stronger institutional structure for the euro area. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  This process began in June this year with what has been called the “Four Presidents’ Report”. That report – of which I am a co-author – identified four key pillars on which a stable and prosperous monetary union should be built. These pillars are financial union, fiscal union, economic union and political union. In the near term, the most important pillar is financial union.
Norges Bank has explained its interpretation of the Exchange Rate Regulation on several occasions, not least in a letter to the Ministry of Finance dated 21 October 1999, often referred to as the budget submission. When exercising discretion, Norges Bank attaches importance to fulfilling the fundamental preconditions for exchange rate stability. To ensure stability in the exchange rate against the euro, monetary policy instruments must be oriented towards reducing price and cost inflation to the level aimed at by the European Central Bank. At the same time, monetary policy must not in itself contribute to deflationary recessions, as this could undermine confidence in the krone. Hence, there is no conflict between gearing monetary policy instruments towards low and stable inflation and the objective of a stable krone exchange rate over time. In the budget submission, the Bank also provided information about key policy response patterns when price and cost developments and the basis for exchange rate stability are influenced by external factors. Price and cost inflation are influenced by monetary policy through a number of channels. When interest rates increase, it becomes more profitable to save and to postpone consumption until a later date. Interest expenses exceed interest income for households collectively, meaning that a rise in interest rates reduces real disposable income. The value of household wealth decreases, since interest rate rises normally lead to lower house prices and weaker trends in securities markets. Growth in private consumption and fixed investment slows. Lower demand for goods and services may also affect enterprises’ profit margins.

Lars Heikensten: What is happening in the United States and how will it affect us? Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Swedish Shareholders' Association, Malmö, 9 March 2001. *  *  *  First I want to express my thanks for the invitation to speak to you here. It is always a pleasure to visit Malmö at this time of the year; the signs that spring is approaching are more numerous and clearer down here. The current focus for forecasters — around the world, I would say — is the U.S. economy. As usual when activity is turning, opinions among economists differ greatly. This reminds me of the remark someone made to the effect that if you placed all the economists in the world in a long line, they still would not reach a joint conclusion. That I think catches the mood at present among economists, though assessments do seem to be following a pattern. American economists generally appear to be considerably more optimistic than economists with an outside view of the United States. The United States has unquestionably been acting as an economic engine for global growth for almost a decade. It is equally clear that to a large extent it is the U.S. economy’s future path that will steer international economic activity and thereby the conjunctural situation in Sweden. Against this background I shall be considering a number of questions to do with the American economy and outlining some conceivable outcomes.
Rachel Lomax: International monetary stability – can the IMF make a difference? The Gam Gilbert de Botton Award lecture delivered by Ms Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at Somerset House, London, 1 November 2006. I am grateful to Phil Evans, Gregor Irwin and Gareth Ramsay for their help in preparing this lecture. I would also like to thank Katie Farrant, Andrew Hauser, Jens Larsen, Chris Salmon and Misa Tanaka for their very helpful contributions. *  *  *  Next month will be the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Smithsonian Agreement – hailed at the time by President Nixon as ‘the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world’. Today it is remembered, if at all, as a stage in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates. But it also inaugurated a period of intense debate about the future of the international monetary system and the role of the International Monetary Fund, which culminated in the Second Amendment to the Fund’s Articles in 1976. Thirty years on, the Fund’s role in promoting international monetary stability is again under scrutiny. The world economy and the international monetary system have been transformed since the late 1970s. The Fund has evolved to deal with new situations and fresh crises. But much more change is needed if it is to meet the challenges of the 21st century. That much is common ground.

In short, what is now needed is a new decision which will provide a comprehensive framework for surveillance; which will approach members’ obligations explicitly from the perspective of external stability; and which will do so in terms which can readily be made operational. And it must be written in clear and unambiguous language. This is a tall order I know – so here are some suggestions. One very simple way of keeping surveillance focused would be to include a ‘selectivity principle’ in a new Decision. This would say that the scope of all surveillance activities should be based on their relevance to external stability: and that what matters is how a member’s policies could affect the rest of the world. The most difficult challenge will be to state members’ commitments in terms that are both general enough to take account of their very different economic circumstances, and specific enough to provide a clear focus for IMF surveillance. Striking the right balance is essential if a new framework is to provide a useful basis for assessing industrialised countries, emerging markets, and developing countries alike in a way that will be accepted as even handed. A good way of meeting this challenge would be to ground surveillance in a more structured analysis of the policy frameworks which countries themselves choose to adopt. The Fund could then focus on identifying areas where a member’s policy frameworks might be unsustainable or inconsistent with external stability, and then offer policy recommendations tailored to the circumstances of the country or countries concerned.
The original Basel Capital Accord was itself a landmark event, revolutionary in providing a common capital assessment approach, now used by over 100 countries. However, it has obvious limitations that have become more significant over time. It has become less and less reflective of the risks of our largest organizations, and, accordingly, has become less and less integral to our ongoing supervision of them. Basel I, as we all know, includes such shortcomings as: a) its failure to recognize differing credit quality within the same general asset type; b) its varying the capital charge with the credit exposure’s legal form, such as whether it is on or off balance sheet; and c) its simplistic approach to risk transference and credit risk mitigation. More generally, Basel I was not structured to keep pace with the rapid rate of financial innovation that we have seen in internationally active banks. It clearly has created incentives for capital arbitrage, with banks able to structure transactions with the primary goal of minimizing regulatory requirements without a commensurate reduction in risk. Similarly, it has resulted in distortions in bank activity, by creating a tax on certain activities while understating the risk for others. BIS Review 35/2005  1  These have combined to make the regulatory capital metric less informative to investors, supervisors and counterparties, and have eroded the principle of adequate risk-based capitalization that the Basel Accord was designed to promote.

All reporting institutions are invited to provide comments and views on the draft which may be organized through relevant licencing authorities, self-regulatory bodies, industry associations or directly to Bank Negara Malaysia; and 2. second, I would also like to take this opportunity to remind all reporting institutions, that Bank Negara Malaysia is increasing its supervisory and enforcement of AML/CFT compliance, in which we intend to pursue more deterrent action including taking appropriate enforcement actions under the AMLA, for any identified non-compliances, beginning 2020. As such we urge all reporting institutions present today to engage and discourse any compliance issues with the wide ranging of experts that we have lined up for this conference. With that, I wish everyone a fruitful discussion ahead and Selamat Menyambut Hari Kemerdekaan. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches