samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, I would like to thank Alejandro Jara, Markus Kirchner, Andrés Fernández, Victoria Nuguer, and Liliana Rojas-Suarez for setting up the agenda, and to Tomás Gómez, Paloma Navarro and María José Reyes for the excellent organization of the event. I wish everyone a very fruitful discussion and a pleasant stay in Santiago. ***  References Espinosa, C. and J. Fernández (2015). “Comparación Histórica de Resultados en el Sector Corporativo en Chile”. Economía Chilena, Vol. 18, No. 1. Agosin, M., G. Crespi, and L. Letelier (1999). "Explanations for the Increase in Saving in Chile", in C. Reinhart (ed. ), Accounting for Saving – Financial Liberalization, Capital Flows and Growth in Latin America and Europe, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D. C.  Page 5 of 5

The much more flexible monetary and fiscal policies of today have also avoided the intrusion of protectionist distorting measures that so prolonged the crisis of the 1930s, amplifying its costs and deeply hurting the later economic development in several regions of the world, including our country. Still, it is likely that returning to domestic demand levels like the ones we had before the crisis takes a while, especially in the United States. Active fiscal policy actions have taken up the room left by the shrinkage of private spending. However, it cannot be sustained for long. The natural, sustainable solution will come via net exports from the US and, to a lesser extent, from Europe. How it will happen is an open question, because it is also yet to be seen which economies will, as counterparts, have to reduce their own net exports to create the  2  BIS Review 93/2009  necessary space for such an adjustment. Furthermore, this may call for major parity adjustments in the main economic areas. Beyond this last point, currently floating foreign exchange regimes have played a stabilizing role, providing every degree of freedom needed by monetary policy and by liquidity provision measures to tackle the cycle and the financial stability objective. This element was nowhere to be seen in the 1930s, when the main central banks struggled hard, but ineffectively, to defend the gold standard, severely magnifying tensions in the banking systems.
Mugur Isărescu: Developments in the Romanian economy since 2008 Speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the “Romania Investors Days” conference, Bucharest, 16 June 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to witness the growing interest the investors’ community is showing towards the Romanian economy. Since this is the first reverse roadshow focused on Romania, I hope it will prove fruitful for all parties involved and that it will be followed by other similar events. In my address today, I intend to briefly touch on the most relevant developments in the Romanian economy and I guess you will agree with me that we have come a long way since the beginning of the crisis. Probably the most synthetic assessment of the transformation is given by the fact that, at the onset of the crisis, Romania fell short of all four Maastricht criteria – inflation, long-term interest rates, public deficit and debt, exchange rate stability –, but now they are all fully met. Up to 2008, Romania was going through a period of fast economic growth (in excess of 7 percent per year, on average), fuelled by large capital inflows and the strongly pro-cyclical stance of the fiscal policy, especially in the last two years before the onset of the crisis.

As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, in Romania too the vulnerabilities exposed by the crisis in the model of centralised fund management at the level of cross-border banking groups led to a new paradigm, which emphasises the local funding of credit activities. The cross-border deleveraging which accompanied this switch, while sizeable, has nevertheless unfolded in an orderly manner. The shift towards the domestic market in terms of financing sources was accompanied by an increase in the relative importance of local currency-denominated loans: after a long time, their share exceeded 45 percent and will possibly overtake foreign currency lending by the end of the year. This is, undoubtedly, a positive development for both debtors, who avoid currency risk exposure, and central banks, due to the increased effectiveness of monetary policy. Looking ahead, the constraints on both credit supply and demand are expected to continue to prevail, as the effects of a balance-sheet crisis, such as the one we have recently encountered, tend to be longer-lasting. In such an environment, the quality of credit allocation appears more important than the volume, although the latter is not at all irrelevant in our case given a still low financial intermediation at 31.7 percent of GDP (not even during the credit boom period did it exceed 40 percent). In order to put the economy onto a self-sustained growth path, I believe it is necessary for banks to channel credit to productive investment, avoiding the overburdening of good debtors with the costs of past misallocations.
As R* has fallen, monetary policy has moved with it. This is an important point. The low level of interest rates over the past few decades reflects deep underlying factors on the supply side of the economy. As these underlying factors – trends in technology and demographics – only move slowly, it is not unreasonable to expect that R* will remain low. This means that, even as we now respond to rising inflation by raising Bank Rate, interest rates will not necessarily have to return fully to, and remain around, the higher levels they once had. But let me add a caveat: “It’s important to note that forecasting the future path of R* is challenging and subject to a significant degree of uncertainty. Economic developments and policy decisions can have unpredictable and complex effects on the economy, and it is difficult to predict their outcomes with complete accuracy.” This was not said or written by an economist of the human sort. This is a caveat added by ChatGPT. The ‘artificial intelligence’ underlying it reminds us that technology sometimes progresses in leaps, which can lead to a sudden emergence of productive investment opportunities across the global economy. New rounds of technological revolution are amongst the factors that could shift up Global R*. Monetary policy would have to move with it. So even if monetary policy is neutral in the long run, long-run supply does affect monetary policy by anchoring the level for interest rates.

And because if our common initiative is not sufficient to reach a European decision – indeed there are other countries and the Commission around the table –, it is nonetheless a prerequisite: without the Franco-German engine, the European car will remain at a stand-still. The projects for a better Europe must be chosen with care and prioritised; and we mustn’t just talk about them. We must ensure that we have the actual means, through efficient governance, to achieve concrete results. To put it briefly: little, well, until the end. There are naturally some non-economic areas such as defence, border security, climate change and youth education and training – an Erasmus-pro programme should be a priority to put an end to the tragedy of the unqualified and unemployed youth. But, as regards economic matters, much also remains to be done. As Helmut Schmidt repeated frequently, we must build economic union as well as monetary union. To my mind, we need to make headway on two projects. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The first project, to be started immediately, is a “Financing Union for Investment and Innovation”. The European Commission launched the Juncker investment Plan and Capital Markets Union, and Banking Union is now underway. But it is now necessary to make these initiatives converge, in the interest of European savers and firms. Europe needs a better sharing of private sector risk, in order to channel its abundant savings more effectively towards productive investment.
6  Accountability duties are specified as follows (art. 7 NBA): The SNB regularly discusses with the Federal Council the economic situation, monetary policy and topical issues of federal economic policy. The SNB submits a written accountability report annually on the fulfilment of its tasks, and elaborates on its monetary policy to the respective committees of the Federal Assembly. The public is informed through quarterly reports on the development of the real economy and of the monetary situation. At the same time, the SNB is obliged to publicly announce its monetary policy intentions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  meetings with the Federal Council and representatives of the relevant committees of the Federal Assembly as well as with representatives from different economic sectors, and the half-yearly media news conferences covering the current conduct of Swiss monetary policy. This has changed with the crisis. Given today’s circumstances and the SNB’s monetary policy decisions over the last couple of years, public authorities, the general public and financial markets all require substantially more information and transparency from the SNB. We are very aware of the legitimacy of these requests, and have responded in various ways. The SNB has strengthened its communication by significantly enlarging the scope of information available on its website.

Around the same time, Queen Elizabeth granted a monopoly on the writing of assurance policies to Richard Candeler, who led the newly-created Office of Assurances. The Office introduced a system of fees – with the Office receiving a fixed percentage per £ insured 8 – for the production of physical written policies. Both through the creation of the Office and Court of Assurances, and the receipt of customs duties from insurers, the Privy Council in the 16th century – as approved by the monarch – cemented the role of the state in exercising a judicial function and creating an environment of policy registration and anti-fraud conducive to commerce. So, as I see it, this first phase of engagement between the British state and the insurance sector was effectively a trade: dispute resolution services were provided by the state, and insurers contributed some revenue to it in return. Indeed, in the early stages this revenue went directly to Candeler himself. Despite the tight state controls around who could write insurance, the nature of risks being underwritten was granted little oversight – so much so that, for many, the practice of insurance became synonymous with gambling in the 18th century. Perhaps – and I say this with some trepidation here at Lloyd’s – some of the most egregious examples of such behaviour were evident in the marine market. By this point, London had emerged as a centre of excellence in marine risks, due partly to its strategic location on famous shipping routes.
There appears to be a good deal of uncertainty concerning the conditions surrounding the availability of official finance. It could be that investors are demanding higher interest rates to compensate for that uncertainty. There is also uncertainty among market participants about what would happen in the event of a debt restructuring and the expected repayments that would ensue. One role for the official community is to try and mitigate these uncertainties through greater clarity about the criteria for official lending and its crisis resolution policies – a theme I return to below. If successful, one outcome of these reforms would be lower borrowing costs for emerging markets. Investors are also starting to differentiate among borrowing countries more clearly than before. This has led to a greater dispersion of spreads on emerging market debt. Before the Russian crisis these spreads were tightly compressed with the central 50% of the distribution of emerging market spreads covered by a range of only around 100 basis points. At present, the range covered by the central 50% of the distribution is over 500 basis points. Correspondingly, there has been a sharp fall in the correlation between changes in emerging market spreads. The rolling 26 week correlation between changes in emerging market spreads reached a peak of around 0.8 at the time of the Russian crisis. Since then it has steadily declined, reaching a level of only 0.2 before the recent rise to around 0.35 following adverse developments in Turkey and Argentina. This differentiation in spreads is a welcome development.

While individual jurisdictions may be confronted with specific challenges of implementation that may arise from differences in economic and market structures, there is also much in common, particularly among emerging economies, that can be shared among jurisdictions. The period of observation on some of the components of the reform package provided by the Basel Committee is welcomed. It will allow jurisdictions to consider appropriate actions needed to support the effective implementation of the reforms. At the same time, there is an expectation that there will be a willingness by the international standard setting community to adjust or otherwise supplement current prescriptions, frameworks or implementation strategies as more experience is gained under changing market conditions. The effective implementation would also require support for the implementation of the reforms, particularly in the area of capacity building, particularly in the emerging and developing world. Inclusive communication channels with the market and an inclusive process of global consultations will allow us to benefit from the experience of others and, more importantly, facilitate more coordinated policy responses and thus support the orderly adjustments to the new standards. While the evolution of financial stability policies over the recent two years has seen clearer mandates being established for the regulatory authorities, the framework for financial stability both at the national and international levels continue to be a subject of intense discussion.
While recognizing that overreactions can occur in the short term in either direction that could warrant such an intervention, we need to be aware that it entails carry costs for the Central Bank and affects the overall economy. Focusing on keeping inflation near the target and preserving the flexibility of the exchange rate in times of bonanza allows the peso to accommodate conditions like the present ones and adjust more efficiently to the new situation. We also know that exchange rate flexibility plays a critical role in preventing currency mismatches, which have taken such a great toll elsewhere in the region and in Chile in the past. Overall, the appreciation of the peso that we saw a few months back was milder than that of other currencies, so now the depreciation has not been as sharp either. Domestically, monetary policy has continued to face many short-term challenges. The sound economic slowdown we were expecting has been gradually occurring. On the expenditure side, however, consumption continues to be very strong, boosted by labor market conditions. Actually, the latest indicators confirm the strength of the labor market. The information we have reviewed for this Report suggests that this component of domestic demand will moderate in the coming quarters, but we must not overlook the risk of a slower than expected adjustment of consumption, affecting the use of domestic resources and the deficit of the current account of the balance of payments.

The baseline scenario reflects the slowdown in output that has been occurring during the year. It also assumes that investment will moderate further as the investment cycle is completed, consistently with adjustments seen in business surveys and investment plans. Consumption is expected to slow gradually because of the still strong labor market and the relative stability of household saving during the expansionary phase of the cycle. Consumer expectations are less optimistic these past few months and are approaching neutrality, which will help moderate this component of expenditure. So will the slower pace of marginal job creation, particularly salaried work, and the slowdown of real wages. Coupled with this is the depreciation of the real exchange rate which will affect durable consumption. Also, moderating investment will help to take pressure off the labor market. Finally, there is the foreseen reduction in the impulse from abroad (table 2). Inflation is expected to continue to grow steadily to reach 3% during the first half of 2014 and and be stable until the end of the projection horizon, this time the third quarter of 2015. The CPIEFE will take somewhat longer to hit 3%. The underlying assumption is that nominal wages will rise in line with productivity and the inflation target. There is also the methodological assumption that the RER will remain near its recent values. Finally, the baseline scenario uses as a working assumption that the MPR will follow a path similar to the one implicit in expectations surveys available at the closing of this Report (figure 5).
Conclusion For today, just bear in mind that the Fed is doing its utmost to be an enlightened regulator of your banks. For the economy as a whole, there is abundant liquidity to finance economic expansion, and the FOMC will assure that it remains affordable as long as the prospect of inflation rising above its 2 percent target remains in abeyance. It is too early to say that the economy can declare laissez les bon temps rouler. But for you bankers in this audience today, you might be forgiven if you kick up your heels a little bit while you are in New Orleans … though the curmudgeonly old Fed will be watching to make sure that for its part, you don’t let things get out of hand. Thank you, Drake. Thank you all. Now, in the best tradition of central banking, I would be happy to avoid answering any questions you have. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Implications of emerging global economy trends for Malaysia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, on the occasion of the International Women's Day Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 1 April 2008. *  *  *  Fundamental changes occurring in the international environment have dramatically altered the configuration of the global economy. A global shift is taking place resulting in a rebalancing of economic power. Accompanying these changes is the increase in the international mobility of talent and capital flows. In this more dynamic environment, comparative advantages and distinct capabilities are also shifting. This has resulted in a rethinking of the business models and the manner in which we operate to achieve performance. In addition, corporate cultures have needed to change. This reorientation has entailed reviews of the strategic focus, the strategies, approach and processes as well as the redeployment of resources. In conjunction with the International Women's Day that was on March 8, it is my honour to be here today to speak at this forum organised by Accenture. My remarks will focus on the implications of these newly emerging trends in the global economy on Malaysia. More specifically, to discuss the new future that is emerging before us, and the opportunities it accords. Equally important, is the ability to raise the level of our flexibility and capacity to adjust to these changing conditions.
And I am proud to have been along for the ride, not least in my role as Chair of the ESRB’s Advisory Technical Committee. The beginning of the road, in terms of when “a blueprint” of the ESRB reached the public eye, was back in 2009. A high level group chaired by Jacques de Larosière recommended, among other things, that a Union-level body be established with a mandate to oversee risk in the financial system. The aim was to address one of the fatal flaws revealed by the financial crisis – the lack of a truly macroprudential approach for safeguarding the stability of the diverse and interconnected EU financial system. Before the crisis, the quality of supervision varied substantially between countries, and its coordination within Europe was anything but sufficient. The concepts of macroprudential oversight and policy were largely unheard of and it is probably fair to say that most supervisors (or anyone else for that matter)  |1  could not see the woods for all the trees, let alone knowing how they were connected to the “vegetation” in other countries. Part of the remedy would be an EU body that in a holistic way brings together a representation and expertise as broad as its system encompassing mandate. The ESRB was created more or less on the basis of this blueprint.

As we move forward, we may need to strengthen that flexibility even further. We do not have perfect foresight as regards what risks we will have to tackle further down the road. Nor do I think that we will ever develop the perfect tool for every conceivable financial stability risk out there. One thing to bear in mind in all this, is that whether the perspective is global, regional or national, it all boils down to the same thing - safeguarding the stability of the financial system. And in today’s highly interconnected world, it is quite obvious that we to some extent are all in this together. This brings me to a related issue where the ESRB has played a leading role. Reciprocation of macroprudential measures – key for their effective implementation An important prerequisite for effective implementation of macroprudential policy in a financially highly integrated world is that the measures in question can affect all financial actors which influence the specific risk that authorities are trying to mitigate. This is not always the case. For example, foreign branches are regulated by authorities in the home country of the parent company, and may not be affected by measures taken in the country where they are active. Reciprocation may in such a situation help mitigate the risks, minimize potential regulatory arbitrage and also provide a level playing field.