samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
8  BIS Review 129/2009  Chart 3: Changes in terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises (net percentages of banks reporting tightening terms and conditions)  Source: Euro area bank lending survey. Chart 4 - MFI loans to the private sector in the euro area (percentage changes)  Source: ECB. BIS Review 129/2009  9  Chart 5 - MFI loans to households in the euro area (percentage changes)  Source: ECB. Chart 6 - MFI loans to non-financial corporations in the euro area (percentage changes)  Source: ECB. 10  BIS Review 129/2009  Chart 7: Financial situation of euro area firms, change over the preceding six months (percentages of respondents)  Source: ECB/European Commission survey on the access to finance of SMEs. Chart 8: Outcome of the applications for external financing by euro area firms over the preceding six months (percentages of firms that have applied for external financing)  Source: ECB/European Commission survey on the access to finance of SMEs. BIS Review 129/2009  11  Chart 9: Availability of external financing for euro area firms, change over the preceding six months (percentages of respondents)  Source: ECB/European Commission survey on the access to finance of SMEs.

And yet, we have just emerged from a successful experience: let us recall that it was collectively considered that we Europeans were in a very bad position in March 2020 at the onset of the Covid crisis. But together we have managed to weather this crisis very well, thanks for instance to the joint purchase of vaccines and the SURE1 and Next Generation EU programmes, backed primarily by Germany and France. I will therefore venture to outline here, in the field of economics, where we will succeed together, what we differ on today, and - lastly and perhaps most importantly, what both our countries are in danger of forgetting. I. Where we will succeed together: monetary policy This shock further increased inflation, which had already reappeared during the strong post-Covid recovery. Thus, after a decade of too low inflation, and even a risk of deflation during the Covid crisis, inflation now stands at 10.7% in the euro area as a whole (7.1% in France, and 11.6% in Germany). Exogenous factors, especially energy prices (up 42%) and certain food prices, still account for half of total European inflation. Nevertheless, inflation has become more "domestic" and broad-based: core inflation excluding energy and food - has gradually increased and reached 5.0% in October, and this is precisely where monetary policy has a more direct impact. The ECB Governing Council therefore decided at the end of October to raise its key rates by a further 75 basis points, bringing the deposit facility rate to 1.5%.
I will highlight today three dimensions to consider, among many others, in case the introduction of CBDC is decided: liquidity configuration, policy rates and access to central bank balance sheet. 1. First potential impact: the launch of CBDCs could affect monetary implementation through a change in the liquidity situation of the banking system. - While the design of the CBDC should ensure that any risk of sudden large shifts from bank deposits to CBDC would be avoided, it could still substitute a limited part of retail deposits, through an increase of what we call in central banking jargon “autonomous factors”, i.e. an item not linked to monetary policy but affecting the liquidity situation of the banking system. - This could in turn imply that the central bank – depending on its preferred liquidity position – provides additional liquidity through refinancing operations and/or asset purchases. In case of collateralized refinancing operations, collateral availability would also need to be checked to accommodate the operations. While it is very much a speculative thought at this stage, liquidity-providing or liquidityabsorbing operations would need to remain available at any time to ensure that central banks can choose to operate in the monetary policy implementation framework they choose, even in the case of the launch of a CBDC. 2. Second: the chosen remuneration scheme, as well as possible limits, are key parameters for the usage of CBDC that also need to be assessed for the monetary policy framework.

Third potential impact: the launch of a CBDC could also raise questions related to modalities of access to central bank balance sheet. - Depending on its attractiveness and detailed specifications, a CBDC could trigger a demand from financial actors which usually do not have access to central bank money (money market funds, investment funds, insurance companies …) to be able to settle in CBDC. It would in particular be the case in a broader wholesale CBDC access scenario. The remuneration of the CBDC held by these financial actors – in case access were to be granted – would also matter for monetary policy implementation, as it would play the role of a ceiling for these institutions on the money market. - Beyond these settlement and detention aspects, expanding the counterparty framework (i.e. for central bank refinancing or asset purchases operations) as a response to the implementation of CBDC does not strike me at this stage as being particularly useful nor necessary. In any case the usual requirements related to counterparty eligibility criteria, including financial soundness assessment and supervision, would need to be taken into account. To conclude these introductory remarks, let me stress three points: - Digitalization is a major supply/technology shock, whose implications are multifaceted, and which have been intensified and accelerated by the Covid crisis - As central banks, in the context of our monetary and financial stability mandate, we have a role to play to make sure that digitalization becomes a blessing and not a curse.
Mugur Isărescu: Christine Lagarde’s visit to Romania Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, on the occasion of the IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde’s visit to Romania, Bucharest, 16 July 2013. *  *  *  Madame Christine Lagarde, Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, Today I have the pleasure to welcome again here, at the National Bank of Romania Madame Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. It’s good to mention from the beginning that she is the first woman to ever lead the IMF. Timothy Geithner, the U.S. Treasury Secretary at the time, said upon her appointment, on July 5th, 2011: “Lagarde’s exceptional talent and broad experience will provide invaluable leadership for this institution at a critical time for the global economy.” Allow me to briefly introduce Madame Lagarde to you. She was born in Paris. Her father was an English professor. She spent her childhood in Le Havre and after graduating high school she went on a scholarship to Maryland, USA, attending Holton Arms School in Bethesda. Madame Lagarde got her law degree at University Paris X (dix), and holds a Master’s degree from the Political Science Institute in Aix-en-Provence. Already a member of the Paris Bar Association, Christine Lagarde joined the international law firm of Baker & McKenzie, becoming its Chairman of the Global Executive Committee in 1999. Subsequently, she acted as Chairman of the Global Strategic Committee in 2004.

Even though the current account surplus is increasing from 2003 to 2004 as a result of high oil prices, the adjusted basic balance is falling. In isolation, this is contributing to a decline in demand for the Norwegian krone. The decline is due to high import growth, which is reducing the current account surplus. In the Government’s budget proposal, the use of petroleum revenues remains virtually unchanged between 2004 and 2005. In spite of this, the krone exchange rate has appreciated recently. This reflects short-term capital inflows and may indicate that foreign exchange market operators expect that the use of petroleum revenues will increase in the years ahead. A levelling off or a fall in oil prices and a stable use of petroleum revenues could reverse these short-term capital flows. Inflation has been low this year. Consumer price inflation adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) was very low up to the end of the summer, but moved up slightly in September. Inflation is still being curbed by the fall in prices for imported consumer goods, in spite of the depreciation of the krone through 2003 and the global rise in producer and commodity prices. This is partly due to the increasing share of Norwegian imports from low-cost countries. Strong competition and high productivity growth in many industries in Norway have also exerted downward pressure on inflation.
Focusing on the last 15 years, somewhat larger fluctuations have been observed since 1997. In 1998 the price of oil dropped temporarily below $ per barrel. This year the price has increased substantially above the $ to $ a barrel price range that we consider a more “normal” level. 4. Fluctuating oil prices and economic stability: Dutch disease and the Government Petroleum Fund  Oil revenues increase consumption possibilities. However, it is a challenge to manage these resources in a way that increases welfare for current and future generations. A rapid expansion of the sheltered sector based on uncertain and perhaps temporary increases in petroleum revenues may lead to the situation called Dutch disease. The impact of oil price fluctuations on the exchange rate and on economic stability in general will depend on the speed at which petroleum revenues are used. In general, income can either be used now, or saved by accumulating assets abroad, so as to redistribute the increased income and thus consumption between generations. The income can be used to increase net imports while resources BIS Review 121/1999  4  from the internationally exposed sector are transferred to the sheltered sector. This will allow for increased consumption of both exposed and sheltered sector goods. If petroleum revenues are to be used for increased sheltered goods consumption, a real exchange rate appreciation will be needed to initiate the reallocation of resources to the sheltered sector.

This real quantity has to be exchanged among members of the society. Since it is practically impossible to trade one commodity for another commodity in a modern complex economy, there arises the need for adopting a common medium of exchange. “Money” offers the service of this common medium of exchange at the cheapest cost to conclude the transactions running into billions. BIS Review 48/2007  1  Money, unlike the real commodities, is a peculiar animal. Its usefulness arises from its ability to acquire real goods and services which people can enjoy. If money does not have this ability, no one would be interested in having money. Hence, the value given to money is simply an imaginary value . As a result, money bears a nominal feature, as against the real feature borne by other goods and services. That is why any value measured in terms of money is also known as a nominal value. We may illustrate the role played by money in an economy by considering the operation of a simple economy where there are only two commodities, say, coconuts and money. Everybody has to use money to get coconuts or use coconuts to get money so as to store their wealth (for getting coconuts in the future). Suppose there were 10 coconuts and 100 units of money. Then, each coconut has to be exchanged for 10 units of money per coconut.
This note with the largest denomination accompanies the economic development of the country, and according to all analysis, meets the market requirements to have it in the structure of our series of banknotes, which are legal tender. The presentation and issue of this note will enable a better and more efficient circulation of cash, by helping the structure of the currency in circulation, reducing the costs of production, storage and distribution, thus enhancing the efficiency of the Bank of Albania in cash management and issuance. In addition, the presence of this new highest-value banknote in the structure of the Albanian banknotes increases also the effectiveness of the Bank of Albania to manage a rather adequate strategic stock to meet the 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  increased market demand for cash in contingency cases. Despite the development in other means of payments, as electronic ones, currency in circulation is set on an upward trend from years now. This trend reflects the ongoing demand of economy for cash as a payment means. Bank of Albania is attentive while planning to guarantee the fulfilment of this demand of the market, in both normal and atypical situations. The current situation caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, is a real example in this regard. Economy has increased further its demand for cash throughout this period. Thus, over 2020, currency in circulation lifted by ALL 52 billion or three times higher than the growth recorded in 2019.

They are not. Competitiveness is the real issue for these countries. No economy can survive and thrive unless it is competitive. The upshot of the recent U-turns is that the markets are completely confused and do not see any predictable outcome to adjust to. They see no will to allow Greece to leave the eurozone and depreciate, but they also see no willingness to support the country sufficiently. The solution to the crisis has already been made unavoidably costly due to past incredible and unclear communication. There are two possibly costly but credible ways to restore competitiveness. The first is a solution within the framework of the eurozone. This would involve restructuring the debt and imposing and rigorously enforcing fiscal discipline. But the structural reforms are hardly enough to restore competitiveness within a short enough period of time in such a scenario. In addition, tens of billions of euros in aid would have to flow from the strong eurozone economies to the weak ones to restore competitiveness. Such generous aid would very probably have to be conditional on the distribution of the aid not being managed by the Greek authorities. The ECB would provide liquidity support – and assurances of such support – to the Greek banking sector. I believe that given the relatively small size of Greece – and even, if need be, of Greece and Portugal – both those actions are within the realm of the politically feasible.
We as central bankers are concerned here with avoiding overburdening monetary policy by the next recession, but it is of course the responsibility of politicians to act. 1/ The first cliché that emerges when we talk about reforming the euro area is the opposition between vision – be it French or otherwise – and pragmatism – seen as a northern European virtue. We must be practical, and take real needs and particularly those of businesses and entrepreneurs as our starting point. At the same time, we need a political ambition if we are to act – call it a “vision” if you wish. Today, the key to growth in the euro area is investment and innovation. But to innovate, in digital technology or in the energy transition for example, companies need to be able to take more risks, which requires more equity financing over the 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  long term, rather than debt financing. The euro area is seriously lagging behind in this respect: equity capital amounted to only 73% of GDP in the third quarter of 2017, compared to 123% in the United States. This brings me to my first solution for strengthening our Economic Union: a European-level "Financing Union for Investment and Innovation", which would better channel the euro area’s EUR 350 billion savings surplus into equity financing for innovation, in digital or renewable energy technologies.

To work well, our Union needs both: risk reduction mechanisms and risk sharing. As I just said, for crisis prevention to be credible, we should implement fiscal discipline – including the present rules of the Stability and Growth Pact – but we should also have the instruments needed to cushion the effects of asymmetric shocks that may arise suddenly, regardless of all the efforts a Member State can make. It is time to forget about ideological trench warfare. Let me share with you four areas where practical progress is needed: First, bolstering private risk sharing. The simple and obvious way to achieve this is to build the Capital Markets Union within the Financing Union that I mentioned earlier. We are still lagging far behind the United States where capital markets are capable of absorbing around 40% of a state-specific shock. What is more, a genuine Financing Union would further 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  increase the efficiency of monetary policy by ensuring better circulation of liquidity in the euro area. Second, EDIS. We have made significant strides with the first two pillars of the Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). We still need – and it should be our priority – to strengthen the SRM with a sovereign backstop to the Single Resolution Fund and a simplified decision-making process tailored for emergency cases of resolution. Now, there needs to be some form of compromise to move forward on the third pillar, EDIS, as well.
News conference  Embargo 22 June 2023, 10.00 am  Introductory remarks by the Governing Board  Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler Chairman of the Governing Board / Vice Chairman of the Governing Board / Member of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Zurich, 22 June 2023 © Swiss National Bank  Page 1/8  Zurich, 22 June 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Ladies and gentlemen It is my pleasure to welcome you to the news conference of the Swiss National Bank. I would also like to welcome all those who are joining us today online. After our introductory remarks, we will take questions from journalists as usual. Questions can also be asked by telephone. Monetary policy decision I will begin with our monetary policy decision. We have decided to tighten our monetary policy further and to raise the SNB policy rate by 0.25 percentage points to 1.75%. In doing so, we are countering inflationary pressure, which has increased again over the medium term. It cannot be ruled out that additional rises in the SNB policy rate will be necessary to ensure price stability over the medium term. To provide appropriate monetary conditions, we also remain willing to be active in the foreign exchange market as necessary. In the current environment, the focus is on selling foreign currency. The SNB policy rate change applies from tomorrow, 23 June 2023.

Page 3/8  Zurich, 22 June 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  The renewed increase in our policy rate is therefore necessary to bring inflation back to the range consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis over the medium term. We cannot at this stage rule out the necessity of further monetary policy tightening to achieve this objective. It is also important in this regard that the ample liquidity assistance we provided to Credit Suisse in March does not influence our monetary policy stance. My colleague Andréa Maechler will address this specifically when she sets out how we implemented our monetary policy over the past quarter. Allow me to return briefly to the subject of rents. Policy rate increases lead to a rise in mortgage rates and thus also in the reference interest rate for rents. This makes it possible for some rents to be increased, which can in turn temporarily result in higher overall inflation. However, this feedback effect must not be taken as a reason for refraining from necessary policy rate increases. For without a more restrictive monetary policy, there would be a danger of inflation becoming entrenched and much stronger rate increases being required in the future. Today’s further tightening of our monetary policy is therefore also appropriate from this perspective. Ladies and gentlemen, I now hand over to Martin Schlegel. The SNB published its latest Financial Stability Report this morning. I would like to present the main points to you now.
Today’s FX market is very different in its pace, the composition of its participants and its size from the mid-1990s of the Allsopp report. Today’s trading reflects more high-frequency, algorithmic trading; a wider range of financial participants, like hedge funds; and higher overall volumes. In response to those changes, CLS worked diligently with industry and the regulatory community to launch the CLS Aggregation Service (CLSAS), a joint venture between CLS and Traiana, in 2010. •  The service aggregates spot FX trades to support high-volume, low-value transactions, one of the fastest growing segments of the FX market. And in light of volume growth, CLS has also engaged its stakeholders to help them better understand their own capacity needs and to ensure that both its members and the CLS settlement service are able to manage even further growth as the FX market continues to evolve. Third, resilience in difficult times. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, while market sentiment deteriorated rapidly and money and capital markets were brought to a virtual standstill, the foreign exchange market continued to function effectively. Many have attributed this to the role played by CLS. And more recently, CLS remained a reliable market infrastructure during and in the wake of Superstorm Sandy. As you know, the Superstorm disrupted this celebration, and my colleague, Sandy Krieger (no relation), who was to deliver these remarks could not make it this evening, but sends her warm regards.

Despite all that, foreign exchange market participants and central banks in 1974 found Herstatt risk to be an intractable problem. All that was left to banks was to manage it. And so it went for 20 years. Then, in the mid-1990s, Bill McDonough, president of the New York Fed, identified the continued existence of Herstatt risk as a challenge to be met. As chairman of the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems of the G-10 Central Bank Governors, he spurred the central bank community to take a fresh look. This time, the combination of new financial analysis and the rapidly expanding availability of raw computing power made the difference. •  In what today still stands as a landmark in analysis of the connection between operational and financial risk, the 1996 Allsopp report demonstrated in a straightforward manner just how much financial risk existed in the bilateral settlement of gross principal amounts of foreign exchange – an analysis that provided the insight into how a settlement facility could reduce that risk, and into understanding how settlement management could improve in the interim. •  Raw computing power was essential for the design and risk management of any proposed new settlement facility. Through scenario analysis and stress testing, CLS’s founders could determine the necessary capital and liquidity needs, default handling procedures, and the general benefits of multilateral vs. bilateral netting. The inherently multicurrency nature of foreign exchange settlement of course enhanced the challenge.