samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We have seen, first, inequality-induced crisis and, latterly, crisis-induced inequality. The 99% have faced double-jeopardy. Let me explain why. The up-escalator Globalisation has conferred many benefits to the poorest in the world and narrowed global inequality. But it is well-known that income distributions within many advanced economies became increasingly skewed in the decades prior to the crisis. There was no single cause of this rise in inequality. Longer-term structural factors, such as dispersed levels of educational attainment, were clearly a key factor. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  But so, too, were financial factors. James Galbraith’s recent book on Inequality and Instability argues that the biggest single cause of rising levels of inequality in the US was the asset price boom which commenced in the early 1990s. This rising tide of asset prices added to aggregate wealth. But it did not lift all boats. The asset rich, in particular the owner-occupying rich, became a lot richer. Meanwhile, the assetless and indebted fell further behind. In other words, the pre-crisis asset price bubble acted like a regressive tax. As Raghu Rajan describes in his book Faultlines, the response to this inequality problem, in the US but elsewhere too, was simple and, on the face of it, brilliant. It was to make assetholders and owner-occupiers of us all. But for the majority there was one small problem: these assets had to be financed with debt.

Their business model is fascinating, Quaker-even, in its orientation. They offer only basic banking services, mortgages and small business loans, to people in a tight, locally-defined catchment area. All credit decisions are taken locally by people, not centrally by a computer. No bonuses are paid and no one has a sales-target. When the whole firm out-performs, a contribution is made to a pooled fund which is invested on employees’ behalf. The fruits of success are distributed equally and gratification is deferred. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  For banking, this is back to the future. If that sounds attractive, then it is down to us – not regulators, not politicians, you and I – to deliver it. If as bank customers we want to change the culture of banking, then we should start by supporting those banks who are delivering that change. Putting your money where your mouth is would deliver far greater and more durable change than any amount of banker-bashing. Already there are some encouraging signs of the winds of change blowing through the system, not just from the new entrants but among the UK’s oldest banks too. The new heads of the UK’s biggest banks have committed to restoring trust in their institutions and improving their social usefulness. And those words are beginning to turn into actions. Barclays and today Lloyds are seeking to change their sales-oriented culture, returning to their Quaker roots. There is the quiet, but unmistakable, sound of a leaf being turned.
They will benefit all member states in the single market. However, they will take time to design and longer to implement, and they will have no impact on the burden of the debt overhang that already exists. For complete solutions to both current and potential future problems the sharing of fiscal risks is required. It is no coincidence that effective currency unions tend to have centralised fiscal authorities whose spending is a sizeable share of GDP – averaging over a quarter of GDP for advanced countries outside the euro area (Table 1). I have already discussed how parts of the UK have benefitted from fiscal risk sharing. The euro area also stands out from federal systems like the US, Canada and Germany. In those systems, the impact of localised shocks to income is reduced by between one tenth and one fifth by centralised fiscal transfers (Chart 6). Without this risk sharing, the euro area finds itself in an odd position. As the Presidents of the European Council, European Commission, Eurogroup and European Central Bank argued in their report, European Monetary Union will not be complete until it builds mechanisms to share fiscal sovereignty. Possible options for sharing fiscal risks range from a transfer union to a pooled employment insurance mechanism. The latter would appear to be an opportunity to combine the current enthusiasm for labour market reform with the longer term imperative to build elements of an efficient transfer union. And it would ensure risk sharing was based on cyclical, rather than structural, labour market positions.

See tables 4.4 and 4.5 of Scottish Government (2014), “Government expenditure and revenue, Scotland 2012-3”. 12  Exchange rate effects alone led to an improvement of £ billion to the UK’s net international investment position between 2006 and 2008, estimated in Whittard (2012), “The UK’s External Balance Sheet – The International Investment Position (IIP)”, ONS, March. 13  See Carney (2014), Speech at the 146th Annual Trades Union Congress, Liverpool. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Our remit recognises that the inflation rate may, on occasion, depart from the target and that attempts to keep it at the target may cause undesirable volatility in output. That flexibility and focus meant that the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) could provide additional stimulus through historically low interest rates, large scale asset purchases and monetary policy guidance even when inflation was temporarily above target. Inflation has recently dropped sharply to 0.5% – equalling its lowest rate on record. So next month I will write the first open letter from a Bank of England Governor to a Chancellor explaining why the inflation rate is too low and what we are going to do about it. The why is relatively straightforward. The majority of the weakness is caused by sharp falls in commodity prices, most notably oil, which has suffered its third largest fall in the past half century. Lower energy and food prices are unambiguously positive for the UK. Temporarily low inflation will boost real take-home pay and help household finances.
This answers to the call that often comes from industry that we should nail down everything in Cooperation Agreements (CoAgs) or work towards some kind of global treaty. I do not think this is necessary to ensure resolution will work effectively. There is a level of detail and complexity in the resolution plans that does not lend itself to a quasi-legal document like a CoAG. But more importantly emphasis on CoAgs misses how the process has evolved. The metaphor originally conceived for resolution plans was living wills. This was powerful, comprehensible by all. It captured the notion that the failure of large banks would not be left to chance in future but instead would be worked through in advance and part of what it would be to be a responsible, regulated entity. But it also gave the impression that each plan would be idiosyncratic, unique to the firm. In fact, as time as gone on it has become clear that for G-SIBs many of the elements of the plans are similar and the identified barriers generic. Indeed discussions in CMGs for individual G-SIBs has translated into minimum requirements for resolvability at the level of the FSB. In the way that we are removing barriers, we are expressly setting out to provide a platform for cooperation to work, ensuring that home and host interests in this process are aligned. The FSB’s TLAC standard is a good example of how the dynamic of resolution planning in CMGs has provided the impetus for the policy changes.

The real sector is showing signs of constant recovery, corroborated by some positive developments in the external economy. I would like to underline that a clearer prospect of the political and economic situation in Greece will have a positive impact over the upcoming period. The Bank of Albania has been continuously monitoring the developments in our Southern neighbour, aware of the various risks that could spill over in the Albanian economy. But, thanks to the precise and duly interventions, especially in the banking sector, these risks never materialised. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The constant easing of the monetary policy seems to be reflected especially in investment indicators, with the domestic and foreign ones showing significant improvement over the first half of the year. On our side, we are happy that these investments were not only due to public sector interventions. There was also a substantial component by the private sector. This makes us believe that well-studied projects by the investors, coupled with an increasingly sound and pro-investment business climate, will serve as main drivers for the economy towards not only higher but also more sustainable growth in the near future. In accordance with the best contemporary practices, the Bank of Albania has endeavoured to enhance the transparency in its communication with the public, not only about the actual decisions but also about our forecasts. The Bank of Albania has constantly conveyed to the economic agents the idea that the monetary policy will remain accommodative and will sustain the revitalisation of the economy.
Today I intend to primarily focus on the relationship between monetary policy and competitiveness. Let me first of all state that the Riksbank has no responsibility for competition issues – our responsibility is monetary policy – and our most important instrument, the repo rate, does not affect competitive conditions on the different markets. However, changes in competitive conditions can have significance for price trends on certain sub-markets. From textbook to reality If there were perfect competition and total information, conditions that only prevail in university textbooks, market prices would be determined by companies’ marginal costs. As there is competition between a large number of producers on every market, no company has any power over pricing and all consumers meet the same prices. On a market characterised by perfect competition, more companies would establish themselves as long as the prices exceeded the marginal costs and they could make a profit. As there would be no entry barriers in this simplified, but pedagogical textbook world, and no lack of skilled entrepreneurs, the profits of all companies would be zero when the market was in balance. In a market with perfect competition, the impact of a cost change (possibly resulting from a weaker exchange rate or a rise in the rate of wage increase) would be total, as the price is set as equal to the marginal cost. Reality is, of course, rather different.

And they are typically much less leveraged. But increasingly they do offer a liquidity promise – that the investors can redeem the value of their investment at very short notice. In this way they can create liquidity mismatches when investors in funds are offered a greater degree of access to investment than is consistent with the ease with which the assets in which they are invested can be sold without a big impact on price. A particular concern occupying both the FPC and authorities internationally is that simultaneous redemptions from open-ended funds offering short-term redemptions could test the resilience of market liquidity, with wider adverse effects through mark-to-market pricing and collateral calls. This risk has increased due to the growing importance of open ended mutual funds. As described in the FPC’s July 2015 Financial Stability Report, global assets under management have grown significantly over the past decade, to around $ trillion. Within that, the share of funds typically offering investors near-term redemptions such as open ended mutual funds has increased, from just below 40% a decade ago to approaching half. This could give rise to particular risks where a liquidity promise offered by a fund gets too out of line with the liquidity characteristics of the assets the fund holds. Corporate bond funds could be relevant here. These funds have more than doubled in size over the last 10 years, from $ trillion to almost $ trillion AUM.
Our Eurosystem central banks are firmly committed to SEPA, among other reasons because we believe it will contribute to shoring up confidence in the single currency, by helping lift obstacles and promoting competition. And now I hope you all enjoy your meal. I believe there will be a round of questions – easy ones I trust – after dessert. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Doing nothing is not an option. BIS Review 167/2009  3
This recognition of the uncertainty and risks around the recovery has been backed up by separate decisions the MPC took in February on the toolbox measures we can employ. We have been quite clear these toolkit 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  decisions should not be interpreted as a signal about the future path of monetary policy. We decided to ask the banks to make preparations within the next six months, in case we need to use negative interest rates to provide further support. This implies nothing about our intentions in that direction, and nor does it imply that negative rates are our chosen marginal policy tool, something that in my view is state contingent at all times. We also signalled that the Bank will do work on the approach it would take to tightening policy, should that be needed, again recognising that it has more than one tool to do so. These decisions are detached from our current or likely future policy decisions, but do recognise the increasingly two-sided nature of the risks we face, as we hope and expect to see the economy get over Covid.

900 Broadbent, B (2012), “Productivity and the allocation of resources” Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (2020), “Home working set to more than double compared to pre-pandemic levels once crisis is over” Cominetti, N, Henehan, K, Slaughter, H and Thwaites, G (2021), “Long Covid in the labour market: The impact on the labour market of Covid-19 a year into the crisis, and how to secure a strong recovery”, Resolution Foundation, February 2021 Decision Maker Panel (2021), Panel data – February 2021 Felstead, A and Reuschke, R (2020), “Homeworking in the UK: Before and During the 2020 Lockdown”, WISERD Report, Cardiff: Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research Haldane, A (2020), “Is home working good for you?” Haldane, A (2021), “Inflation: a tiger by the tail?” Kim, H and Kung, H (2017), “The Asset Redeployability Channel: How Uncertainty Affects Corporate Investment”, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 30(1), pages 245–280 Ramsden, D (2020), “The potential long term effects of Covid” Tenreyro, S (2020), “Monetary policy during pandemics: inflation before, during and after Covid-19” Vlieghe G, (2020), “Assessing the Health of the Economy”  14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  14
Ending on a positive note, I would like to point out that one should dare to be optimistic. If economic and political developments turn out better than anticipated, a regulatory framework such as the SGP should be flexible enough to accommodate such events. The Swedish financial crisis of the 1990s brought a fivefold increase in the unemployment rate and three years of negative growth, the worst performance in a century. In the midst of the crisis, anyone painting the picture of the situation we have today would most certainly have been laughed at. Although such profound institutional and macroeconomic changes that later came about seemed implausible at the time, one should not rule them out in advance. Stabilisation policy from a country’s point of view If we instead turn to viewing each country individually, the tendency is still less towards interventionism and that policy-makers should only respond in the event of large economic shocks. After joining a monetary union, fiscal policy is the only remaining tool for national stabilisation policy. Here, it should be remembered that the smaller the member country is, the less important it is for the overall economic developments of the monetary union. Thus there is a greater risk of the common monetary policy not suiting the smaller member country. Whether using the example of Sweden relative to the euro area or Uganda to the EAC, the general conclusion is that the role of fiscal policy is even more important in such a case.

Perhaps a society has to undergo a learning process on a broad front so that earlier mistakes yield new insights. Economic policy decision-makers like myself are, of course, no exception here. But as financial turbulence does not inevitably lead to a serious crisis in the real economy, we need to ask why it is that in certain cases output and employment do suffer severe setbacks and the attendant deflation. Much will have been gained if we can learn to tell whether or not an extensive share price fall, for example, besides being troublesome enough for many people, is likely to result in a situation with general deflation, rapidly falling output and rising unemployment. An answer to that question was suggested in the summer of 1999 by the Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan: While bubbles that burst are scarcely benign, the consequences need not be catastrophic for the economy. The bursting of the Japanese bubble a decade ago did not lead immediately to sharp contractions in output or a significant rise in unemployment. Arguably, it was the subsequent failure to address the damage to the financial system in a timely manner that caused Japan’s current economic problems. Likewise, while the stock market crash of 1929 was destabilising, most analysts attribute the Great Depression to the ensuing failures of Policy. Most things indicate that when banks run into trouble on account of financial turbulence, the supply of credit may dry up and the payment system cease to function.
After the introduction and the keynote, the conference explores four directions of thought on the topic of monetary unions in history. A panel is devoted to each of them. The first panel will explore the link between monetary unions and economic integration by offering a glimpse in their history. The second session will focus on twentieth century monetary unions following the great and continuous economic stress of the First World War. The third panel will examine monetary unions as facilitating tools for greater customs and economic integration within the Comecon and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Finally, the last session will address the question to what extent the political relations transcend in the monetary unions as well illustrated by the Great Britain and the member-states of the European Union. This program will break for a discussion between leading academics and policy-makers on the issue of the parallel currencies in history. I would not crowd out the precious conference time by dwelling on each piece of research to be presented and discussed today. Let me pause here, to give way to interesting and open exchange of opinion and deliberations which I believe this conference will stimulate. And once again – welcome to Sofia and enjoy your stay in Bulgaria! Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

The stronger the upswing in relation to potential output, the greater will be the risk of a faster increase in prices and wages and vice versa. That is why those of us who work in central banks around the world talk so frequently about the cyclical picture even though our target variable is actually inflation. The future value of the krona plays a part in our assessment of inflation. Exchange rate movements affect inflation directly in that they show up in the price of imported goods and services; they also have indirect effects through aggregate demand. Changes in the value of the krona relative to other currencies of importance for foreign trade have consequences for the competitiveness of Swedish goods and services. Turning finally to inflation expectations among households and firms, there is the effect on the actual formation of prices and wages and thereby on inflation. Altered expectations are liable to influence price formation if the Riksbank does not act through monetary policy. There are, however, other price impulses that the Riksbank also has to handle. Examples are last winter’s shortage of snow that restricted the supply of hydroelectric power, cattle diseases that pushed up the price of meat, and the unusually cold weather in Europe that raised the price of fruit and vegetables. Price shocks of this type can occasion large shifts in the general price level at the same time as their impact on inflation is probably only transient.
In recent years, supervisors have begun to move more generally toward a system of supervision that encourages prudent risk-taking through the offering of incentives rather than simply enforcing compliance with rigid rules. Internationally, the 1996 Market Risk Amendment to  2  BIS Review 52/2004  the existing Basel Accord represented the first time that banks received explicit capital benefits for developing more sophisticated measures of risk, in that case market risk. Basel II continues this trend by extending incentives to the treatment of credit risk and operational risk. 2.3  Basel II embraces both trends  By stepping back a bit from Basel II’s formulas, we can see that the new capital framework builds on two important trends to incorporate a new philosophy for banking supervision. It combines a riskfocused approach to supervision with incentives for prudent risk-taking into a coherent policy objective that seeks to promote adequate capitalisation. By incorporating in all three of its pillars clear incentives for banks to improve their management of risk, Basel II reinforces management’s focus on control structures. •  For example, in Basel II’s minimum capital requirements - or Pillar 1 - regulatory capital charges are aligned more closely to a bank’s own measures of risk. This creates immediate incentives for banks to improve those measures. •  Likewise, Pillar 2 - supervisory review - emphasises that responsibility for evaluating capital adequacy lies with a bank’s management.

Petroleum revenues are gradually phased into the economy, approximately in pace with the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund.” The first sentence can be seen as a justification for a gradual phasing in of petroleum revenues. A phasing in of revenues based on using the expected real return on the Petroleum Fund must be said to be reasonably controlled and gradual. Another aspect is that the plans do not call for using the actual wealth. However, the expansionary impetus to the economy in any one year will depend on the time profile for the accumulation of capital in the Petroleum Fund. 8  BIS Review 7/2002  There was broad support in the Storting for the guidelines. Both the previous and current Government have placed considerable emphasis on adhering to these guidelines in the government budget for 2002. The use of petroleum revenues is calculated on the basis of the structural, non-oil deficit. This means that, in general, changes in activity levels in the economy do not influence the use of petroleum revenues. This also implies that fiscal policy will contribute to curbing fluctuations through automatic stabilisers. In years with a high level of activity, the actual budget deficit will be smaller than the structural deficit. In years with a low level of activity, the actual deficit will be higher. It is the level, and not changes in economic activity, that influences the structural deficit.