samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The successful implementation of postpandemic measures, when the priority will be a return to economic and social normality as fast as possible, hinges on the extent to which macroeconomic stability is preserved. When I speak of independence I do not see the central bank secluded in an ivory tower, but working actively, and combatively, under the law, with the fiscal authority, with the government. Based on my experience, I do not think there is a better alternative to a balanced, coherent fiscal and monetary policy mix. And central bank independence implies accountability vis-à-vis the law, the mandate, the society. Or, in the words of 19th-century Romanian writer and politician Costache Negruzzi, the central bank needs to ‘stand accountant’ for what it does. By encroaching upon central bank independence, in favour of political decisions seeking shortterm electoral gains, the real costs will be borne from an economic and social perspective, in the long run, by the entire country. A recent study published by the European Central Bank, titled The Case for Central Bank Independence, shows that – while the de jure independence has largely remained intact – the de facto independence has deteriorated in almost half of the sample of central banks under review. This is a fact and, for me, it is a matter of concern. I shall not comment on it. Looking at central banking history that spans more than three centuries, I hope this is part of the long cycle of ups and downs in terms of central bank independence.

One field where this is all the more obvious, because it has to do with competition on the global market, is the management of forex reserves. In principle, they ensure – especially in the case of emerging economies – the resources to overcome external imbalances and to safeguard a relative stability of the domestic currency’s exchange rate around economic fundamentals. The reallocation of reserves for discretionary use and their monetisation strongly erode these essential equilibria, significantly impairing market functionality and the credibility of the central bank and of any government, ultimately to the detriment of society itself. Maintaining and managing an adequate level of international reserves, through the competence and professionalism of the central bank, shelter the country from terrible crises; take this right away and the country is left to the mercy of the winds. For all these reasons, in the context of extensive debates internationally on the importance of central bank independence – debates that I am aware of and I am not contesting –, I plead for the independence of central banks, but also for an institutional balance between central banks and fiscal authorities, as parts of the executive power. Macroeconomic stability – a key prerequisite for sustainable economic and social development – is ensured when there is a balance between the monetary policy and the fiscal policy. Altering the well-established institutional rapports, in times of crisis, may pose a serious risk for the future.
Reforms to remove the defects in the social security system; to prevent unregistered economic activities; to provide the labor market with a more flexible structure via education; to restructure the taxing system; to continue with the reforms in the financial sector incessantly and to increase efficiency in the agricultural sector should be given priority in our country. On the other hand, considering that growth is a dynamic process, it is very important to strengthen the macro reforms with micro measures and being in a search for a strategic approach in accordance with the changing needs and newly emerging structures. The public and private sector should engage in cooperation in this field. 1  Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007, World Economic Forum. 2  Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007, World Economic Forum. 3  Indicators of good governance are prevention of corruption, the rule of law, efficiency of the legislation and regulations, quality of the state services, political stability and transparency and accountability. 4  Macedo, J.B. ve Martins, J.O. (2006). “Growth, Reform Indicators and Policy Complementaries”. 6  BIS Review 28/2007  The public sector should assume a supervisory and regulatory role within the scope of the principles of good governance and work towards creating an atmosphere in which the private sector can compete within the international markets under the market conditions and should absolutely prevent the unregistered economic activities.

In the light of the trajectory of recent decades, what can we say about the future of the Spanish economy in the medium and long term? To tackle the future from a useful perspective, I shall follow Epictetus’s recommendation for gaining knowledge of the world. The stoic philosopher divided worldly matters into two: those that depend on us and those that do not. This classification is useful because, when talking about the future of the economy, it is worth focusing on those things that depend on the behaviour of economic agents and all those who intervene in framing economic, regulatory or supervisory policies, without wasting time regretting what we cannot change or influence. Among the things beyond our control is, for example, the external environment, including the European economy which is so important for Spain, since our influence on developments in the rest of the world is very limited. It is also important to realise that the starting position of the Spanish economy with its strengths and weaknesses, which is the basis for predicting its short-term trajectory, is a given and we can do nothing to change it. As indicated at the start of my address, I do not wish today to dedicate my time or yours to analysing the economic situation or predicting the course of the economy in the coming months. Rather, I shall focus on those determinants of the future of the Spanish economy in the medium and long run that really depend on the behaviour of all economic agents.
This assurance is accentuated in many studies of the enlargement and said to be the most important individual factor for continued strong growth in the 1 eastern European countries. It is also at the point of actual membership that the final trade barriers will be abolished and the investment channels will be fully opened. We can make a comparison with the countries that entered the EU earlier with income levels way below the average, i.e. Spain, Portugal and Ireland. For these countries membership meant a large inflow of capital and technology as well as a further increase in trade. The economic policy of the new member countries became more stable. Rapid growth and a convergence in the standard of living followed. This led to major gains for both the richer, existing member countries and for the newcomers. It would therefore be regrettable if the candidate countries' membership were allowed to delay or be diluted. Fortunately, there is now a clearer timetable and a strong probability that 8 of the 10 countries will become members in the coming years. However, after the enormous efforts made by the candidate countries in recent years, their actual membership must not be blocked by internal power games and ultimatums between the existing EU members. However, the attempts in recent years to create transition periods before candidate countries can enjoy the EU's free mobility for labour are worrying.

The aim is to assess whether the interviewee understands: (i) that money loses purchasing power when prices rise; (ii) that the changes in an amount saved in an account over five years depend not only on the annual interest rate applied to the amount saved the first year, but also on the interest accumulated thereafter; and iii) that the risk of investing in equities diminishes if a broad range of shares is acquired instead of only one type. The replies, obtained from a broad sample of randomly selected individuals representing Spanish territory as a whole and each of its regions, and provided by INE, reveal, inter alia, 3/7  the following results: (i) 58% of interviewees understand what inflation is; (ii) 46% understand the concept of compound interest; (iii) 49% understand the concept of risk diversification; and (iv) the percentage of correct replies increases with educational level and household income level. Given that the Survey includes questions from an international project to measure financial competences, it is possible to compare these results with those obtained in other countries, in particular with OECD countries and EU countries that have information available in this connection. The comparison shows that the percentage of correct replies in Spain regarding the concepts of inflation and risk diversification is below the average, particularly in the case of risk diversification, in which the averages for the OECD and EU countries stand at 62% in both groups (compared with 49% in Spain).
As regards payment systems, the TARGET system will also contribute to the rapid emergence of a unified money market throughout the euro area. TARGET will connect the domestic real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems operated by the national central banks. It will enable participants to make totally safe cross-border settlements in euro, in real time and at a low cost, thereby facilitating interest rate arbitrage. All large-value payments related to BIS Review 112/1997  -6-  monetary policy operations will have to process through TARGET. A common closing time for domestic RTGS and the harmonisation of conditions under which intraday liquidity will be provided by national central banks within the euro area should also help prevent any risk of segmentation of the single money market. 2.1.2. Interest rate volatility The EMI has described in various publications the set of monetary policy instruments that will be made available to the ESCB.7 This set will comprise open market operations, standing facilities and minimum reserves. It should fulfil two basic functions: firstly, to enable the ESCB to control efficiently its operational target; secondly, to signal the ESCB monetary policy stance. It should also be consistent with the requirement laid down in the Maastricht Treaty that the ESCB should act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring the efficient allocation of resources.

In the long term, however, the current low level of interest rates is not compatible with price stability. If the economy performs as expected, the National Bank will further pursue the gradual adjustment of its monetary policy that has already been initiated. BIS Review 36/2006  1
Unemployment in Sweden and selected countries Per cent 12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  Austria Norway United States Sweden  0 94  96  98  2  The Netherlands United Kingdom Germany  0  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  Sources: Eurostat  Figure 4. Household loan-to-value ratio (debts/real assets) and the policy rate Per cent 100  10  90  9  80  8  70  7  60  6  50  5  40  4  30  3 Debt / Real assets (houses, summer houses, and condominiums)  20  2  Policy rate  10  1  0  0 71  76  81  86  91  96  01  06  11  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Debt/real assets, %  Figure 5. Household loan-to-value ratio (debt/real assets) and the policy rate (1993 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 70  70  65  65  60  60  55  55  50  50  45  45 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  Policy rate, %  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 6.

Following a further depreciation in the currency, rises in administered prices and the prospect of continued weak growth in productivity, inflation was thought “likely to remain above target for much of the forecast period”. But “attempting to bring inflation back to target sooner…would risk derailing the recovery” and it was therefore “judged appropriate to look through the temporary, albeit protracted, period of above-target inflation”. I don’t think this was so exceptional. There is no inflation-targeting monetary authority that behaves so rigidly as to attempt to offset all shorter-term shocks to inflation, no matter the effects on the variability of interest rates and output. As the economist Lars Svensson puts it, “in practice, inflation targeting is always ‘flexible’, because all inflation-targeting central banks not only aim at stabilizing inflation but also put some weight on stabilizing the real economy”. In the UK, this regard for the occasional trade-offs faced by monetary policy, and their implication for the planning horizon, was formally enshrined in the MPC’s remit in March 2013. The Committee is now required to “promote understanding of the trade-offs inherent in setting policy and… [to communicate] the horizon over which it is appropriate to return inflation to the target”. This description of the appropriate horizon is now a regular part of our communication, notably in the newly introduced Monetary Policy Summary that introduces both the Inflation Report and the Minutes of our meetings. What of the current situation?
As global liquidity conditions are normalised – following the unprecedented easing of interest rates by major central banks – financial markets could experience bouts of volatility as a range of asset classes are repriced and this could impact negatively on various interest-sensitive industries. 5. In addition, the reform of the global financial system has to be carefully thought through, calibrated and sequenced. It is important that regulatory reforms do not become politicised, with a rush to adopt simple rules that seem to solve the problems. Specific measures, each of which is sensible, may collectively create unintended outcomes and stymie the nascent economic recovery. In this regard, the Basel Committee’s Quantitative Impact Studies will provide an important basis for us to take a more holistic view of the required changes. 6. So far, most of the discussions have been framed around the theme of “how do we prevent a similar crisis from happening again.” Clearly, we must look back and learn from the crisis. But we must not fight the last war. We must also look forward. In the years ahead, significant restructuring of the global economy is necessary. Hence, I believe a more fundamental question to frame the discussion is: “Given the economic changes and challenges ahead, how do we make the global financial system more resilient and at the same time supports economic restructuring and sustainable global growth?” 7. It is therefore critical to get the nexus between the financial system and the real economy right.

The Bank is already doing a great deal to address climate risk, and we outline even more ambitious plans for the future. As a long-term and global investor with holdings in thousands of companies, we have a financial interest in companies adapting well to the risks and opportunities presented by climate change. Norges Bank intends to be a driver for change, pushing companies to make the transition to net zero emissions. The companies we invest in reflect the transition that the whole world needs to undergo. The fund as an investor Our characteristics as an investor The climate risk in the fund reflects who we are as an investor and our overall investment strategy. In a nutshell: the fund is large, broadly diversified, long-term and index-based. Chart: Large, broadly diversified, long-term and index-based 70 percent of the more than 12 trillion kroner in the fund is invested in equities, making us one of the world’s largest shareholders. We have holdings in 9,000 companies in 70 countries. And we are a long-term investor. Since only the real return can be spent by the government, the fund could, in principle, last forever. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Put simply, the strategy for the fund is to strike the best balance between expected return and risk by spreading our investments far and wide and owning a little of everything in the market. There is a solid body of research to support such an approach.
It has also to do with CPI being affected by price changes in components that cannot be related to the state of demand. This has been taken into consideration in the design of the main rule and in clarifications and expansions. There has been an endeavour to design the rules in such a way as to avoid unnecessarily large fluctuations in employment and output. However, there must never be any doubt that monetary policy is always governed by the inflation target, although different strategies to achieve this objective in practice can produce different economic costs in the form of fluctuations in output and employment. The fact that the target horizon is normally stated as 1-2 years is justified by the major fluctuations in output that can result from attempts to influence inflation in a shorter time perspective. Interest rates affect inflation with a time lag through effects on demand or the output gap and attain their greatest effect after 1-2 years. In order to reduce inflation in the short term, the interest rate would therefore have to be greatly increased with major negative effects on growth. If CPI is affected by factors that are unrelated to the demand situation, a monetary policy that strictly complies with the main rule can also lead to unnecessary variations in output and employment.

Since inflation is at the same time lower, the differences in the real interest rate are less, however. An important reason for inflation being so low is the broad agreement on the price stability target that now seems to exist. An expression of this is that inflationary expectations remain at a stable level despite expectations on a continued very strong upswing. The Riksbank’s most important duty in future is to ensure that expectations remain at around 2% inflation. The very low inflation which is now registered has, however, surprised many people, including us at the Riksbank. An important explanation as to why GDP growth has now been able to exceed the growth in output that is possible in the long term for many years without threatening the inflation target is, of course, that the upswing started from a level of output that was greatly depressed after the years of crisis, where a lot of resources had been made redundant. When unemployment was at its peak, there were many who feared that it would persist permanently at a considerably higher level than we were previously used to. There was also opposition to the inflation target policy just for that reason. Examples were pointed to in Europe where unemployment had been over the Swedish for a long time, but where there had been greater success in combating inflation. The labour market is performing better than expected It is difficult to determine the rate at which GDP can increase in the long term.
The Banking Sector Restructuring Program and other measures that were taken following the 2001 crisis, led to the formation of a very strong and resilient financial system. This contributed to the high growth rates achieved after the crisis. I can comfortably say that today the banking sector in Turkey compares well with those of new members of the European Union. The Banking Law enacted in 2005 is in line with the best international practices. Asset size of the Turkish banking sector increased by more than three-folds in the last six years and reached USD 500 billion as of 2007. Still, there is a huge and unexplored potential in the sector taking into account the size of Turkey’s young population and low rate of credit utilization among households and private business. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of the banking sector stood at 18.8%, well above the minimum legal requirement of 8% and the average of the European Union, which is 12.1%. Short-term liquidity ratios comfortably meet the legal thresholds. Thanks to sound and resilient structure of the sector, foreign direct investment to the Turkish banking system has surged since 2005 and the share of foreign investors in the total capital of the sector is now more than 40%. Rather than financing government deficits, the banking sector has returned to its core function, which is being intermediary between borrowers and lenders.

Improving the state of the labor market, removing rigid labor market regulations, reducing the tax wedge, and more importantly enhancing the human capital through education reforms are essential to accelerate the growth rate of the economy on a sustainable basis. Second, Turkey is a net commodity importer in contrast to Latin American countries and South Africa. We need to import in excess of 35 billion USD worth of oil and natural gas each year, almost 5% of our GDP. Looking at the composition of the foreign trade, you can see that our imports are mainly commodities and intermediate goods, whereas industrial goods cover more than 90% of our total exports. Therefore, promoting Turkey's competitiveness is the key to her future success. 2  BIS Review 32/2008  Third, high domestic savings rate, which is high in emerging countries in Asia, is quite low in Turkey. It is around 20%. We need to attract foreign savings to finance investments. It is not surprising to observe a strong and direct positive relationship in Turkey between growth rate and current account deficit. Of course, the upward trend in energy prices has also contributed to the widening of the current account deficit to 5.8% in 2007. The current account deficit is a structural problem and a source of vulnerability. However, Turkey did not have difficulty in its financing in the last 6 years. In fact, the quality of foreign capital flows has improved sharply.