samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In terms of analysis by socio-demographic groups, the survey results show that the monetary value in “old lek” is more frequently used by: (i) males; (ii) old-aged people; (iii) persons with a low-education level; (iv) unemployed persons in labour market; and (v) individuals with a low level of family income. These groups identified in the survey will be the focus in the projects of this awareness campaign for bringing to an end the use of the wrong term “old lek”. Against this backdrop, the Bank of Albania is launching this awareness campaign, which will extend in time and will aim at being a comprehensive one, affecting various groups of interest. In a medium-term period, and through various channels, we aim at knocking at the doors of every Albanian to uproot the terms “new” or “old”, by avoiding the confusion in the communication of prices and enhancing the correct reading of economic and financial indicators. Lek is the national currency in Albania, and the face value of each coin or banknote is the one written on it. Nevertheless, the fact that this incorrect use is inherited in the day-to-day speaking and has been resistant for more than 55 years, illustrates that the sporadic and isolated efforts of a solely institution to rectify this phenomenon are insufficient. A joint and coordinated commitment among central institutions of the country, media and other relevant actors is crucial in this regard.

Inflation expectations are fundamental to the process of interest rate determination and low inflation expectations are entrenched not only by the implementation of appropriate monetary and fiscal policies at any given time, but also by past inflation developments. Low inflation expectations were becoming entrenched in 2008 following two consecutive years of single digit inflation in 2006 and 2007. However, towards the end of 2008, the increase in food prices and the impact of the global financial crisis caused inflation to increase to a double digit figure of 16.6%. In spite of this, the prospects for low inflation, now look positive, creating an appropriate environment for interest rate reduction. Mr President, as you may have noticed from the newspapers in the recent days, a number of banks have reduced their lending base rates though not as much as we would like to see. We hope that this is just a start, and that banks will continue adjusting their rates downwards consistent with developments in other macroeconomic indicators. Distinguished Members, allow me to comment on the statutory instrument regarding the $ over the counter limit on deposits. These regulations are meant to encourage the use of the banking system in order to assist in curbing money laundering. Doing away with this would deprive the Central Bank of a mechanism for detecting fraudulent activities and create a healthy environment for money to be laundered in our financial system. Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank of Zambia recognises the importance of long term finance for growth.
Looking closer at individual sectors reveals that productivity was significantly boosted by very high growth in manufacturing sector productivity in the decade before the financial crisis, much faster than in the preceding 25 years. This is the period sometimes referred to as the ‘Great Moderation’, a period characterised by unusually low volatility in both economic activity and inflation. But following the financial crisis, manufacturing productivity growth fell back sharply. This fall in manufacturing productivity is the main cause of the slowdown. The reasons behind it are much debated – and productivity may be harder to measure in the modern economy where businesses invest as much in intangible capital, like software and branding, as in physical capital, like buildings and machinery. Measurement problems could be a big part of this. But much also points to structural change. Perhaps new ideas have become harder to come by, or perhaps technological innovation and specialisation have faded as globalisation slowed. Bank of England  Page 8  Whatever the reason, when productivity growth is weak, companies gain less from installing new capital. So weaker productivity growth has meant that firms have sought to borrow less to finance investments at a given interest rate. This reduction in the demand for capital has lowered the equilibrium rate. The second important factor is population ageing.

Over the short term, moreover, the actual equilibrium interest rate, r*, will fluctuate around the trend level, R*, driven by shorter-term influences from both demand and supply. This is what matters for monetary policy here and now. Why? Because r* is the rate at which demand is in line with supply so that there is no output gap – neither excess demand nor excess supply in the economy. Responding to shifts in r* is what helps keep inflation close to target. This does not mean that monetary policy should always align Bank Rate exactly to r*. Sometimes, monetary policy faces trade-offs between inflation and the balance of supply and demand. But it does mean that supply matters for monetary policy also in the short run. By determining the level of demand the economy can sustain without generating excess  Bank of England  Page 10  inflationary pressures, it affects the appropriate level of interest rates, effectively by setting the speed limit for the economy. And when shocks drive inflation away from target in the way we have seen, monetary policy responds by steering demand to a level – relative to supply – that ensures that inflation returns to target sustainably. Monetary policy cannot affect this level of supply. But the level of supply will affect the appropriate setting of monetary policy. It matters, therefore, that big shocks to the economy have weighed heavily on supply in recent times.
Only in this manner electronic payment advantages and all other facilities will be equal to you and to all the public in general throughout the territory of the Republic of Albania. I believe, in the spirit of this reasoning, we shall establish real opportunities for a harmonised geographical progress, providing a concrete contribution to the growth of country’s welfare. 2  BIS Review 6/2005

The Basel Committee has sought to further embed risk proportionality within its framework. One such example is the simplified alternative to the Standardised Approach to Market Risk, or SA-MR in short. This simplified alternative will make it easier for supervisory authorities to implement the market risk rules for less complex banks. For such simplified approaches to be fit-for-purpose, it has to take into account the differing conditions across a broad range of jurisdictions. This is especially so for emerging market economies with less complex banking systems. In this respect, forums such as the Basel’s Regional Consultative Group (RCG) and the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) can be important platforms for regional regulators to continue to provide feedback or regional concerns. Where the outcomes from impact studies are less certain, the Basel Committee has been careful not to rush into a particular rule. One example is the treatment of sovereign risk exposures. In this case, the Basel Committee has decided to put out a discussion paper to solicit further views. 8 The Financial Stability Institute (FSI) has also recently published an insightful report on proportionality in banking regulation. The report provides a very useful overview of the proportionality approaches in different jurisdictions. 9 Another example is the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) evaluation of effects of reforms. The initial focus is on infrastructure financing, which will be relevant to Asia given the immense infrastructure demands.
Corporate governance, risk management, transparency, disclosure, and internal control requirements in Islamic financial services industry should always be developed, and adjusted to meet the needs specified for Islamic banks, especially that an important part of the work of these banks is based on impression and reputation of the nature of their work. Therefore, these banks should be aware of the role entrusted to them, especially the ethical one. The nature of risks faced by Islamic banks may raise specific issues in terms of assets and inventory assessment, investment costs, regular income and recognition of losses, adequacy of guarantees and others. We must emphasize here the importance of continued development of mechanisms to cover such risks. This underlines the importance of integration into global financial markets, encouragement of competition, and provision of a proper climate for on-going innovation so that Islamic banks can consolidate their positions in all markets and boost their ability to provide products for all segments of customers. On the other hand, a controversy is sometimes raised and comparisons are made between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of risk degree, exposure to insolvency, and the argument ensuing concerning capital adequacy. However, the important point is the awareness and understanding the nature of risks, development of mechanisms to cover such risks, and the ability to compete in markets and meet the needs of customers.

All Saudi banks now provide a range of products that are compliant with Shari’a requirements and with financial engineering specifications of the highest levels under the supervision of well-reputed Shari’a committees and top class financial professionals. In the context of supporting such efforts, SAMA’s IOB has offered many programs, courses and symposia in the area of developing, marketing and supervising Shari’a compliant products. The number of bankers benefiting from those programs stood at 6,300 who participated in 374 programs during the last seven years. These endeavors have considerably helped in developing Islamic banking in Saudi Arabia without undermining compliance with Islamic Shari’a or the technical flexibility needed by an emerging and dynamic market. Dear Audience, It is very important to mention that the industry of Islamic financial services should be completely integrated into the global financial markets while maintaining at the same time its distinguished nature and unique services. The industry should also be subject to the same level of supervisory control as other financial institutions. Any breach of standards, practices or application by Islamic banks will not only be an obstacle to their services and products, but it will also serve as a hindrance to accepting their services and products by international financial markets. Consolidating a bank’s financial data with those of all its subsidiaries and branches is another principle that must be applicable to all banks, and such principle is necessary for ensuring consolidated and comprehensive supervision by the supervisory authorities in the bank’s home country.
This may involve a degree of reliance on head office compliance or the bringing in of outside support - both of which may be necessary, but both require care in how they are used. What are the implications for ongoing monitoring, when technical experts fly in and fly out? If certain compliance tasks are outsourced, is bank management providing effective oversight? Vendors must be scrutinized and, very simply, outsourcing cannot diminish, in any way, the firm’s accountability. These objectives may be met through a variety of organizational models, depending on factors such as the size and nature of each bank’s businesses, its geographical scope, its culture and existing reporting lines, and the legal and regulatory framework in which it operates. There is no “one-size-fitsall” organizational model that we require or even expect. Implications for supervisory authorities Let me now offer a few key principles for the way in which supervisors should be carrying out their responsibilities. First, supervisory authorities have a responsibility to establish clear regulatory requirements, supported by industry and examiner guidance. The goal is to have well-structured rules that implement legal requirements, supplemented by guidance outlining where and how discretion may be exercised. Second, supervisors should employ judgment in how they deal with problems that are found.

The central government invests this amount abroad through the Petroleum Fund. This results in capital outflows and a balance-of-payments surplus. The central government builds up assets, but also obligations through the social security system. Even if a large share of oil revenues is set aside, it would appear that, in the long term, the level of direct and indirect taxes will have to be at least maintained in order to honour these obligations. Petroleum revenues would normally have resulted in substantial currency inflows into Norway. If we had used this capital domestically, we would have had to convert this currency into NOK. The attendant increase in demand for kroner would have resulted in an even sharper appreciation of the krone exchange rate. The capital outflow through the Petroleum Fund contributes to curbing the appreciation of the krone. With oil and gas production now reaching its peak, Norway has - and must have - a substantial balance-of-payments surplus. The return on the Petroleum Fund will to some extent make up for the fall in petroleum revenues in the period ahead. In about 15 years, the return on the Fund may exceed the cash flow from petroleum activities. Norway’s position as international investor may then overshadow its position as an oil and gas producer. Swings in capital markets may have a greater impact on central government finances than oil price fluctuations. We are now in a phase where petroleum wealth is being invested at home and abroad. Norway is and has to be - an international investor.
The mood is to continue cautiously down that path, but to emphasise the need, not only for sound macro-economic policies, which everyone accepts as a sine qua non, but also for steps to accompany capital account liberalisation designed to reduce the risks of volatility. These relate in part to the process of capital account liberalisation, where there is now a good deal more stress on ‘sequencing’ - that is on liberalising potentially more stable, longer-term, capital inflows initially, rather than short-term borrowing denominated in foreign currency. BIS Review 49/1998  -4-  But they relate particularly to three key conditions for living with free capital movements. The first is “transparency”. In a broad sense a need for greater transparency is recognised in relation to public policy, to the relationship between the public and private sectors, to corporate governance, accounting standards, and so on. In a narrower sense there is seen to be a need for more reliable, and greater and more timely disclosure of, financial information generally, at the level of individual borrowing entities, but especially also in relation to countries’ true foreign exchange short-term asset and liability positions. This is especially important in relation to the foreign currency liquidity position of the monetary authorities and of the banking system.

But however much we try to prevent accidents we need nevertheless to be prepared for them to happen. The third condition for living with freedom of capital movements, therefore, is a more consistent view of how, when a crisis does break, the burden might be expected to be shared in future between official and private sector financing. In this context, one thing seems clear: given the evidence of public resistance, we cannot assume that massive official financing packages will in fact be deliverable in the future to bail out private foreign currency creditors. Various ideas have been put forward for involving private foreign currency lenders in an extension of maturities in case of a serious foreign exchange crisis perhaps within a framework of insolvency principles or some other form of code of practice. These ideas, too, need to be developed and refined; and we need to establish suitable incentives and conditions to ensure that the financing burden is in fact shared between official and private sector creditors. The general point here is that it may help to discourage excessive, potentially volatile, short-term foreign currency lending in future if the lenders clearly understand from the outset that they will indeed be expected to carry a substantial part of the load. Mr Chairman, the debate on all these issues is still at a relatively early stage, and is being carried forward seemingly whenever two or more monetary officials, or indeed private sector analysts or commentators, are gathered together in one place.
And, going forward, are we thinking hard about how technological change will influence incentives, behavior and culture? We’ll hear these issues discussed in several panels today. These issues require thoughtful reflection by the industry. The need for reflection, though, is not limited to boards, or even to banks. Regulators and bankers alike can benefit from such a habit. In that vein, I want to share with you an everyday checklist proposed by Ignazio Angeloni of the European Central Bank.7 He has posed six questions that seek to make responsibility for culture both individual and routine: Are you doing what you promised to do? Are you using your best knowledge and intention in doing it? Are you doing what public authorities, superiors, colleagues and business partners expect you to do, and if not why? Are you conforming to the mission and the values of your company, as they are publicly 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  stated? Will your actions enhance public confidence in your company and in the financial sector? Finally, and crucially, would you behave similarly if your actions were publicly observed? I suspect that while seemingly simple, the discipline of asking ourselves these questions on a regular basis and answering them thoughtfully and honestly may be more challenging, thought provoking and effective than one might initially think. I thank the staff at the New York Fed who put together today’s program, and their colleagues who are in the audience and watching today.

To put it very simply, incentives drive behavior, and behavior establishes the social norms that drive culture. If the incentives are wrong and accountability is weak, we will get bad behavior and cultures. This implies a role for both firms and supervisors. Firms need to continually assess their incentive regimes so that they are consistent with good conduct and culture. When they are not consistent, the incentives need to be changed. Supervisors should also play a role in assessing firms’ incentive structures. For example, they should evaluate: 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  How is compensation determined? In particular, is questionable conduct―such as compliance violations―consistently reflected in decisions about compensation and promotion? Do risk managers have the appropriate authority to challenge frontline revenue producers and prevent activity that is questionable? When that occurs, are there appropriate negative consequences for the frontline revenue producers? When people speak up to point out potential conduct issues, how are they treated? Are they held up as examples to emulate, or are they discouraged or even penalized? The answers to these questions should indicate whether incentives must be changed in order to foster the appropriate behaviors and culture. The primary responsibility for reforming culture—and changing incentives—belongs to the industry. However, the industry does not act alone. The public sector can play an important role as well. I’ll discuss that issue this morning with my colleagues Norman Chan, chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and Minouche Shafik, deputy governor of the Bank of England.
The developments I have just described offer some insights into how the future steady state risk management framework might look. At the moment, I see four key features: First, while the temporary collateral framework has successfully eased potential collateral shortages, it could be argued that it should not become part of the regular framework. As liquidity demand declines, there will also be less need for an expanded set of eligible collateral. Whether some temporary measures might be transformed into a state-contingent framework, ready to be activated again in the future if circumstances so require, is an open question. As experience shows, each crisis needs a tailored response. Second, we will need to keep the flexibility to adjust the collateral framework to financial innovations, especially when it comes to complex new financial products. The new “simple, transparent and standardised” securitisation regulation is a case in point. It will allow us to better assess the collateral we accept. In a similar way, we will need to forcefully deal with new types of securities, such as conditional pass-through covered bonds, whose risks may not yet have been fully appreciated. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Third, we will have to retain the risk control frameworks for the asset purchase programmes beyond the horizon of our net asset purchases. As long as we keep outright portfolios on our balance sheet, the reasons behind the risk control measures, including eligibility criteria, purchase limits, benchmarks ensuring diversification and the different risk-sharing agreements, will continue to apply.

BIS estimates that the average daily MYR forwards traded offshore is 4 times the amount onshore. This should not be the case as MYR is not an internationalized currency, and that all forwards should be backed by firm trade transactions. Given the sizeable volume and the opaque nature of such markets, I cannot help but ask: “What are we missing here? Who are the players in the ND markets? Are they hedging or speculating? “ Is it the lack of capacity of our local players to serve certain players? Or is it that the local regulatory and operating environment needs to be adjusted? These gaps should be identified and remedies formulated as the offshore market represents a loss of business opportunity for the onshore players. Fundamentally since the transactions are related to Ringgit, its activities should be captured onshore and transacted through the onshore market players. Ringgit exchange rate should be determined by onshore players, reflecting the underlying demand and supply of foreign currencies in the economy. It should not be dictated by any market other than Kuala Lumpur. Expectation and direction going forward As 2015 draws to a close, let us not allow the increasing challenges to stop us from advancing forward. Volatility is not likely to go away any time soon. It would be the norm. A new normal. Let us persevere, learn from the past and as a group forge ahead into the future. It is appropriate to have a retrospective here.