samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It was sought thereby to acknowledge the growing presence of institutions operating in the different realms of financial activity, and the increase in large financial conglomerates, which blurred the old sectoral boundaries. Moreover, the single supervisory authority model enabled the synergies existing in the supervision – whether prudential or conduct- related – of different types of institutions to be harnessed. Finally, this model sought to prevent potential conflicts of interest between monetary policy, which remained in the hands of the central bank, and financial supervision, which was entirely the responsibility of a separate agency. More recently, especially in the wake of the crisis that broke in 2008, the twin peaks model has become more widespread in Europe. Under this model supervision is structured around two agencies: the first, set up within the realm of the central bank, is entrusted with the prudential oversight of all institutions capable of generating systemic risk (be these deposit-taking institutions, insurance companies or market intermediaries); the second agency is tasked with monitoring the conduct of all types of intermediaries and with pursuing the protection of investors in or consumers of all financial products and services. Compared with the single supervisory authority model, the twin peaks model seeks to protect the system from potential conflicts of interest between the monitoring of financial institutions’ solvency and the oversight of rules of conduct and of market integrity.

Unlike regular deposit insurance, where the Bank has favoured the UK moving to a degree of pre-funding of the system, it is less clear that such a regime could or should be pre-funded. But, as with regular deposit insurance, the question of whether or not any ex post allocation of costs should somehow be risk based would need to be considered. Indeed, more generally, including perhaps even for liquidity insurance, we need over time to be clearer about the principles that drive whether insurance premiums are risk based and collected up front. This is obviously difficult territory. There are arguments against any approach along those lines. I air it not so much a proposal but in the hope of stimulating serious thinking about what a COLR regime might look like. If a COLR regime could be devised, it would be very important that it was not overused. Private sector backstops should be used first; and they could be better designed. One such approach would be to require banks to take out private capital insurance. This could take a variety of forms. One idea would be straight capital insurance: ie a commitment from investment institutions to subscribe when called upon to do so by a bank. As with possible public sector capital-insurance schemes to be activated only during a systemic crisis, such private insurance could be linked to maintaining a required minimum capital ratio.
As we strengthen diversity internally, we are also doing more to improve the diversity – in its broadest sense – of our external engagement with market participants. A key part of my team’s role is to act as the Bank’s ‘eyes and ears’ in the financial markets: gathering the best possible intelligence on market developments to support the decisions of our Monetary and Financial Policy Committees. As those markets evolve, so too we must adapt and change those we engage with to keep our finger on the pulse. Different and broader types of firm, using different technology. Different people within firms, as those who matter for decision making change. And a different and more open style to that engagement, more open to challenge and different perspectives on what makes markets tick. Just as embracing diversity is no longer a choice for success in your business, so it is no longer a choice for us in ours. Unless we ensure we are speaking to a broad, diverse set of market participants who are truly reflective of the diversity in the market, and feeding that input into our policy decisions, we will not be doing our job. 18  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/mark-carney-women-in-banking-and-finance-22nd-annual-awards 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  9  To deliver on that goal, we are working with a wide range of financial market stakeholders and external networking organisations.

Above and below the micro-chip image are green metallic sunflower shapes, and on the back of the note, a red foil patch containing the letters “AT” is based on the image of a sunflower head. These sunflower images reflect Turing’s ground breaking morphogenetic work. This new branch of developmental biology which Turing pioneered, was the study of algorithms underpinning the formation of patterns in nature. The way a leopard’s spots develop into patterns, or the way the seed heads on a sunflower spiral. Turing found a way to predict these using maths. Here, also, we see him laying the foundations for a new scientific field. His contributions to Britain’s war effort and its scientific status, make the circumstances of his own death all the more poignant. Though guarded about his private life, Turing’s sexual orientation wasn’t a complete secret at the time. He was arrested under indecency laws in 1952, after the police learned of his relationship with another man. The tragic events surrounding this arrest would eventually lead to Turing taking his own life, at the age of just 41. In 2017 the Turing Law was passed in memory of Alan, pardoning all men who, like him, were convicted based on their sexuality. Another legacy for which Alan Turing can be remembered. The Turing £ completes our family of polymer banknotes, which already include the £ £ and £ pound notes. These polymer notes are more secure than their paper predecessor, and I'm very pleased that we have made this important transition.
We should consider giving authorities a greater ability to provide direction on the use of liquidity management policies by fund managers. This applies both to exceptional circumstances – where authorities currently only have the option to suspend redemptions, which may be detrimental for investors searching for liquidity – and also to normal times to limit the build-up of vulnerabilities in the first place. Second, regulatory shortcomings regarding the use of leverage need to be further addressed. In particular, we need to make sure that authorities can make effective use of their existing ability to limit leverage for alternative investment funds where, so far, a major impediment has been the lack of clarity on how it should be applied in practice. And, third, the crisis has shown that the current regime for MMFs may be inadequate in certain aspects and that regulatory reform in this area could be needed to mitigate liquidity mismatches and reduce the risk of suspensions during periods of stress. This includes a review of the liquidity requirements for MMFs and their portfolio composition, especially for LVNAV funds given their vulnerability to liquidity shocks. Conclusion https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201119_1~4a1ff0daf9.en.html  5/7  20/11/2020  COVID-19 and the liquidity crisis of non-banks: lessons for the future  All in all, and with this I would like to conclude, the market turmoil earlier this year suggests that structural fault lines in the non-bank financial sector continue to persist.

I will then explore some of the regulatory gaps that need to be closed with a view to both strengthening the resilience of the financial sector and mitigating the risk of financial dominance. The expansion of the non-bank sector The financial sector landscape in the euro area has changed significantly over the past decade. Today, non-bank credit accounts for around a third of firms’ total external debt financing, twice the share in 2008 (see left chart slide 2). And the share of marketable debt securities in external financing has also doubled in the euro area since the global financial crisis (see right chart slide 2). These developments are to be welcomed. There are significant advantages of having broad and diversified funding sources. If properly regulated, a diverse financial system has the capacity to distribute risk more efficiently, foster economic resilience and allocate funds more effectively towards their most productive uses. [1] This is why the ECB has repeatedly called upon legislators to accelerate progress towards a true capital markets union in Europe. [2] A more balanced funding mix is also important as a shock absorber, or as “spare tyre” as Alan Greenspan famously put it. [3] When the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis hit the euro area, the disproportionate reliance on the banking sector as a source of external finance threatened to destabilise not only the economy but also cohesion in the single currency area.
I am delighted to be working with Mark, and he also brings his experience as Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, which is spearheading the work to create simple global capital standards for insurers as a central plank of its work on insurers which are of significance to the financial system. I will say some more on this later. I hear occasionally the charge that the PRA and the Bank lack senior level knowledge and experience in insurance. As I hope you can tell, I don’t accept that argument. The Bank of England has the objective of promoting financial stability by ensuring a more resilient financial system that, inter alia, is able to support the credit creation and asset allocation necessary to build and sustain economic recovery. A more resilient financial system will support that recovery, and by reforming and bringing the Bank’s monetary and financial stability objectives closer together, I can assure you that we are working very hard to use our toolkit to the best advantage. And this includes insurance supervision, where the new arrangements have already brought about a closer understanding of the role of insurers in the transmission of monetary policy, and the issues that arise in a world of sustained very low interest rates and Quantitative Easing. A key part of the new structure of the Bank of England is the Financial Policy Committee. The FPC has the so-called macro-prudential responsibility which has at its heart the resilience of the financial system as a whole.

They made loans to the trusts they judged solvent, but the Knickerbocker Trust, the second-largest in the country, did not make the cut, and its collapse precipitated panic throughout financial markets. To stem that panic, Morgan and his banking colleagues lent more generously to the surviving trusts. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The consequence of these events was a severe recession, and the U.S. economy contracted more than 10 percent. As a result of the financial sector’s inability to contain recurring financial panics, Congress realized the need for the public sector to step in, a process that led in 1913 to the creation of the Federal Reserve System. An Unprecedented Challenge Returning to more recent events, as the pandemic began to unfold in the U.S., we saw intense strain and disruption to financial markets. In response, the Federal Reserve has taken a set of strong and decisive actions to supply liquidity and to assure the continued flow of credit in the economy.2 The unique nature of this recession—a global pandemic—has required us to design an innovative response. Some of our actions have the hallmarks of those taken during the 2008 financial crisis, but many more have required a fresh approach. As uncertainty about the coronavirus took hold, we saw disruptions in short-term funding markets.
As many of you maybe aware, at independence in 1964, Zambia had one of the most vibrant economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, which was supported by a strong mining industry. The country’s external position was in surplus between 1964 and 1974; inflation rates were low, averaging 7.7 percent; and experienced high economic growth rates. In addition, GDP per capita was one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa at about $ 950. Further, unemployment levels were low. Between 1968 and 1972, Government announced sweeping economic reforms under which 80 percent of industry was nationalised, giving the state greater control over the country’s resources, with which it could implement an ambitious industrialisation programme to bring about rapid economic development. In addition, nationalisation was aimed at empowering Zambians economically, which was important following political independence. However, following the outbreak of the 1973/74 international oil price shock and the world economic recession that ensued, Zambia experienced a significant change in her economic fortunes. For instance, the external position deteriorated; inflation increased; per capita GDP fell; the performance of the mining sector, which accounted for over 80 percent of total export earnings declined; and Government capacity to finance economic and social infrastructure was severely curtailed. As a result of these budgetary difficulties, Government began to run huge fiscal deficits, which were financed, primarily, by borrowing from the domestic banking system and the international financial markets.

It also guarantees the proper monetary support for the economy under this stage of development. In the future, the Bank of Albania remains willing to operate in line with the actual and expected performance of the economic indicators and in accordance with its principal objective. 4  BIS Review 11/2010
We are seeking industry and public views on the key design choices that determine the model. The Consultation Paper is accompanied by a Technical Working Paper which sets out our current thinking on the relevant technology and seeks feedback on the approaches we propose to consider. There is not time today to go through the model in detail, but I will briefly set out some of the most important details of what we propose. Page 7  We envisage the digital pound as a partnership with the private sector. The Bank would provide the digital pound and the central infrastructure, including the ‘core ledger’. Private sector firms – which could be banks or approved non-bank firms – would provide the interface between the Bank’s central infrastructure and users by offering wallets and payment services. These private companies would be able to integrate the digital pound, as the settlement asset, into the services they would offer to wallet holders. The wallets would be operated on a ‘pass-through’ basis. That is to say, they would not constitute a claim on the wallet provider in the way that a bank account is a claim on a bank. Nor would they represent a custody arrangement. Rather, the wallets would hold all of the customer related information and ‘pass-through’ the customers instructions to the Bank’s infrastructure. All of the digital pounds would be held on the Bank of England’s central ledger. Privacy has been a major theme of the Taskforce’s engagement with industry and the public.

We envisage that these could operate alongside the digital pound and alongside commercial bank money and cash. The digital pound could act as a bridging asset between different types of privately issued digital money and establish standards for interoperability. And, crucially, the requirement for privately issued digital money to be exchangeable on demand and at par for Bank of England digital pounds would help secure the interchangeability and uniformity of money in the UK. Finally, many central banks, across the globe are exploring the issuance of a central bank digital currency for both retail and wholesale purposes. A few have now been launched[15]. Page 10  There is clearly a great opportunity and a great need for international cooperation in this area. Interoperability between national and regional central bank digital currencies could bring substantial benefits by reducing the cost and frictions in cross border payments. At the same time, there are broader macro-economic and geopolitical issues that need to be considered. The Bank of England is working actively on these issues with international counterparts through the Bank for International Settlements Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), through the G7, the G20 and FSB and through close cooperation with a small group of advanced economy central banks[16]. Conclusion To conclude, the Consultation Paper and accompanying Technology Working Paper marks the end of the first stage of the work of the Bank of England – HM Treasury Taskforce.
Today, I will focus on one of the most discussed elements of the monetary policy response, our interventions in the foreign exchange market. Before doing so, I would like to stress a key element of the Swiss financial market structure that has shown particular resilience and has helped to provide appropriate financial conditions throughout the crisis in the Swiss economy: the Swiss franc repo market. The good performance of this market is closely related to another element of the SNB’s policy that has drawn public attention, and even criticism – our collateral policy. 1  During the recession of 1974–1976, real output in Switzerland fell by more than 10%. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I. An important feature of the Swiss money market: the SNB’s collateral policy  A plausible and popular diagnosis for the recent financial crisis is that it started with a bank run.

Durmuş Yılmaz: Turkey beyond 2008 Speech by Mr Durmus Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Annual Investment Conference "Turkey beyond 2008", organised by the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) and The Turkish-American Business Council (TAIK), New York, 17 March 2008. *  *  *  Dear Guests, As you all may know, the Turkish economy used to experience boom-and-bust cycles throughout the 1990s. The economic crisis in 2001 was the low point of this period, when the economy contracted more than 5 percent. Since then, Turkey has put in place a very intense and ambitious structural reform agenda, coupled with sound monetary and fiscal policies, to establish macroeconomic and financial stability and to improve the business environment. Central Bank independence that was granted by Law in 2001 was one of the milestones of this agenda. The introduction of free-floating exchange rate regime in 2001 and inflationtargeting regime in 2002 were other key steps. The Central Bank of Turkey has also experienced a comprehensive institutional change towards a better communication policy and clearly defined accountability measures. We have experienced a significant disinflation process since 2001. The consumer price index came down from 68.5% in 2001 to 8.4% in 2007. I should call your attention to the fact that the list of countries that lowered inflation in 2007 was quite short, thanks to global inflationary pressures in food and other commodities.
Funding liquidity problems continue to bring pressure on the major banks’ operations. While the conditions have improved substantially in most funding segments throughout 2009, including the money markets, some of these institutions and parts of the broader euro area banking system, remain reliant on temporary support measures extended by the Eurosystem and governments. Box 11 summarises the government measures to support the banking sector and discusses their implications for fiscal balances. Regarding the implementation of the measures, several conclusions can be drawn: First, the take-up rate has been generally low across all measures, but there are substantial variations: the use of recapitalisation measures has been relatively widespread, while the take-up rate for the issuance of bank bonds with government guarantees has been considerably lower than expected. Second, the largest part of the financial support has been provided to a relatively small number of institutions (See Chart 12). Indeed, about half of the extended support has been absorbed by the largest three recipient institutions in each category of support. The various measures to support the financial sector amount to considerable actual and contingent liabilities for euro area governments. Although they are expected to have only a small direct impact on government deficits in the short to medium term, potential fiscal risks in the form of higher refinancing costs are sizeable for all countries that have provided significant financial system support, as these measures seem to have had a negative effect on market perceptions of the creditworthiness of the respective governments.

18 18  1.2 17  17 Jul. 18 18  (f) Forecast. Source: Bloomberg. Figure 6 MPR expected by the market  Interest rate differential between the US and Germany and multilateral dollar  (at December of each year, percent)  (basis points; index)  3  3  330  June MP Report 2 Fed fund  2 March MP Report  95  2 years  310  94  290  93  270 1  1  Libor  250  0  0  -1  -1 12  14  91  230  10 years  210  Euribor 10  92 DXY (right axis)  16  18  20  190 01.18 18  Source: Bloomberg. 10  90 89 88  03.18 Mar. 05.18 May  Figure 7 Nominal exchange rate and multilateral measures (1)  Parities against the US dollar (1) (2)  (index, 2017-2018=100)  (index, 2017-2018=100)  110  110 120  120  105  105 110  Latam currencies 110 (3)  MER-5 100  100 100  100  MER 95  95  90  90  80  Commodity currencies (4)  Chile  90  TCN 90 17  17 Jul. 18  80 17  17 Jul. 18 18  (1) Dashed vertical line shows statistical cutoff date of March 2018 Monetary Policy Report. (2) Uses April 2018 WEO weights. An increase denotes a depreciation of the currency with respect to US dollar.