samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The result is greater transparency and stronger price competition. Price differences in Europe today are twice as large as in the United States. The price of a small car, for example, can vary more than 50% between EU member states. Risk of countries getting out of step However, the road to greater cohesion is not necessarily smooth. In a monetary union, forces are at work that may cause member states to develop in different directions instead of converging. Discussions about EMU often raise the topic of asymmetric shocks, a technical term that stands for something quite simple. The conditions for the countries involved differ initially as regards their economic structures, for example the corporate sector, the level of technical development, wage bargaining systems and competitive pressure. Economic shocks will therefore affect them differently. Problems may also arise if economic policy in one country is markedly different from the general direction. In Sweden, for example, the economic differences from the EU countries in the 1970s and 1980s were in large measure a consequence of self-imposed stabilisation problems. If a shock does hit a single country, a monetary union eliminates the possibility of mitigating its effects by adjusting the exchange rate. Neither can this be done by implementing a national interest rate policy. Instead, wages and prices need to be as flexible as possible so they adjust and counter the impact of the shock.

But an intense dialogue has now started on structural issues at extraordinary Council meetings, such the coming meeting in Stockholm, as well as in more regular processes such as the Luxembourg process for better employment policies and the Cardiff process for more efficient product markets. The EMU to date It must then be asked, of course, how well this framework is working now that EMU is a reality. It is certainly too early to draw definite conclusions about these matters but I can offer some observations. The first point worth noting is that we are now reaping the benefits of the convergence process and of the consensus on stabilisation policy that has, in fact, been established. Europe is now experiencing an  3  BIS Review 102/2000  economic upswing in which macroeconomic conditions are more stable and inflation expectations lower than for many decades. Since the move to EMU, there have been no clear signs of asymmetric shocks that might hit a particular country or group of countries, although the Asian crisis and the subsequent unrest did affect the member states somewhat differently. And we do not know what would have happened during the tempestuous autumn of 1998 if Stage Three had not been well on the way. Perhaps exchange rate developments in Europe would have been considerably more dramatic and disruptive. It will be recalled that the Swedish currency’s deviation from a reasonable long-term level was considerably greater than that of, for example, the Finnish markka.
Maximum stability in output could, on the other hand, result in sharp fluctuations in the rate of inflation and erode the credibility of the monetary regime. A point somewhere midway between the two extremes must therefore be found. Consequently we cannot be called "inflation nutters" as Mervyn King, deputy governor of the Bank of England, once said. Let me also stress the importance of central bank independence. In order to be successful with the implementation of an inflation target approach, the central bank needs to be able to act independently of day-to-day party politics and to set interest rates continuously according to the specified inflation target. Otherwise a credibility problem may arise because it would be hard for policymakers to convince the general public of monetary policy's long-term nature. Following the changeover to a flexible exchange rate in 1992, monetary policy in Sweden was directed towards an explicit and quantified inflation target. The decision rule by which our monetary policy is usually guided is in fact quite simple. It states that if the forecast rate of inflation 1-2 years ahead is above 2 per cent, then normally the repo rate should be raised and vice versa. The reason why we chose this target horizon is that an adjustment of the monetary stance takes time to exert its full impact on inflation and the macro economy in general.

The apparently unending increase in expectations of rising share prices on U.S. stock markets stimulated the capital imports, which continued to such an extent that the dollar rose to high levels against other currencies. Together with large investments in the real capital stock, which led to a capital-deepening process and hence an acceleration of productivity, the dollar's appreciation held back the price impulses that normally accompany growing pressure from wage costs. BIS Review 42/2001  3  It is not yet possible to tell to what extent the U.S. economy will experience a lengthy, more difficult process of adjustment. That is probably the background to how the Federal Reserve has acted in recent years. A series of interest rate hikes during 1999 and 2000 was presumably intended to restrain the euphoria and excessive expansion. When a downturn then became evident, it seemed desirable to try to limit the mood swing by means of the marked interest rate cuts we have seen this year. It is precisely the Federal Reserve's vigorous action that underlies certain analysts' view that the current economic slowdown will be fairly mild and brief. …and the tensions between supply and demand in Sweden Since the previous inflation report, demand in the Swedish economy has slowed down somewhat. This is true in particular for industry. Incoming statistics also indicate a slightly weaker growth in household sector consumption. Employment, on the other hand, remains strong even though more forward indicators of the labour market are signalling slower growth later this year.
Indeed, the experience of countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal confirms that a key element of their successful entry into the euro area was their success in controlling sources of inflation other than the Balassa-Samuelson effect. In particular, a balanced monetary and fiscal policy mix and the control of real wage increases have supported the disinflation process in these countries, and allowed them to advance in the process of nominal convergence without compromising the gradual catching-up in real incomes. 3. Monetary policy and exchange rate strategies  With regard to monetary policy and exchange rate strategies, most accession countries have already indicated their intention to join ERM II as early as possible after entry into the EU. The accession countries have also signalled their intention to adopt the euro as soon as possible, that is, after two years of ERM II membership. 2  BIS Review 92/2001  The whole issue of the timing of ERM II membership, both as to when to join and how long to remain in the system, is dependent on a somewhat more complex question, namely whether the discipline which ERM II imposes on its members is advantageous for the accession countries. The answer, in our view, is “yes”. Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to reflect on this question for a moment and explain why we hold this view. Being small open economies, most accession countries cannot disregard exchange rate developments when making their monetary policy decisions.

Only for more complex organizations, a more extensive technological infrastructure is needed. Let’s come to the answer to the question then. To have a well established, in other words, efficient risk management system, first we need to develop the risk culture within our organizations meaning that we need to make sure that at all levels every person understands the risks the institution is exposed to. It is the responsibility of top management to provide that kind of information by having a clear approach to risk, its appetite for risk and assigning responsibility for assuming and controlling risks. Therefore, the first step in risk management process is to identify the risks the institution is exposed to and to quantify those risks. Effective risk management requires that a consistent methodology be developed for analyzing risk. Important steps in risk management analysis are as follows: •  identifying the key financial flows;  •  determining the appropriate time horizon;  •  setting a benchmark;  •  defining the institution’s return objectives and views toward risk. As you all know, most progress has been made in the measurement of market risk and much work is now being done in many places to construct models for a better management of credit risk. Difficulties with credit risk measurement lies in the lack of statistics about individual default probabilities. Even if these default probabilities can be estimated reasonably accurately, it is still rather difficult to combine them into portfolio assessments.
253-66. BIS Review 17/2005  5  Consequently, derivatives markets contribute to the predictability cash flows of economic agents and their profits or losses arising from risk or volatility by reducing excessive volatility in spot markets, on one hand, and by offering an opportunity to economic agents for risk management, on the other hand. In this way, fragilities in the firms sector arising from deteriorations in balance sheets are restored and the economy as a whole strengthens itself against shocks. At this stage, I would like to highlight one more point about the floating exchange rate regime. In Turkey, firms have to be cautious about imbalances in foreign exchange denominated assets and liabilities on their balance sheets. Under the floating exchange rate regime, firms with foreign currency-denominated income and domestic currency-denominated expenditure, or vice versa, should restore the imbalances on their balance sheets, in other words, eliminate the exchange rate risk they are faced with. In order to achieve this, firms should observe risk management principles and employ derivatives market instruments. Firms, especially production firms, can allocate more resources for production by reducing the financial risks on their balance sheets. This also makes an important contribution to enhancing the competitiveness of firms. As of 2003, 92 percent of world’s largest 500 non-financial firms are protected against risk through derivatives instruments and this further reinforces the importance of such instruments6. Moreover, I would like to point out that the benefits of derivatives instruments do not depend on the size of the firms they are used by.

This is one of the underlying reasons for the poor risk management in our country. The fact that future uncertainty was high until recently due to macroeconomic instability had kept the general level of interest rates in an upward trend. As a result, these factors have prevented the smooth operation of derivatives markets. The second factor that has led to the poor development of risk management and of derivatives markets in Turkey is high public deficits, which caused the fragility of the public finance. As we are all aware, in the past, capital accumulation was based on public resources in Turkey. However, as a result of increasing public deficits, the capital provided by the public sector to the private sector was then extended by the private sector to the public sector. In this context, the market developed by “government securities” that are issued against public debt have become the most important and only market, which uses almost all the resources of the economy due to increasing public debt as well as high real interests payable. Such a framework, in other words, an environment where fiscal dominance is rather high did not allow neither the emergence of new financial instruments to finance the private sector, nor the deepening of financial markets. Moreover, portfolio diversification, the simplest element of risk management; could not be achieved.
In any event, the question of whether and when government support is to be provided should be unclear, and the conditions triggering support should be very strict. 6. Norges Bank’s liquidity support  Ultimately, it is only the central bank that can secure the liquidity in the financial system, which is why it is called the lender of last resort. The classic example of a liquidity crisis is a situation where there is a rupture of confidence in the banking system. Depositors panic and shift funds to more liquid assets, primarily cash. The conventional formulation of the role of lender of last resort is that the central bank shall supply ample liquidity during the crisis - at a penalty rate - to illiquid but solvent institutions. In the Norges Bank Act this role is anchored in our responsibility for effective payment systems and our duty to exercise the traditional functions of a central bank. 5  BIS Review 124/1999  This raises three questions: •  What instruments are available to Norges Bank? •  How does one determine whether an illiquid institution is solvent or not? •  When is financial stability in jeopardy? These questions are highly interdependent. Norges Bank can use several instruments in the event of a liquidity crisis. If a crisis affects the whole financial system, we can change interest rates and supply large volumes of liquidity to the banking system.

Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement Introductory statement by Ms Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 9 September 2021. * * * Good afternoon, the Vice-President and I welcome you to our press conference. The rebound phase in the recovery of the euro area economy is increasingly advanced. Output is expected to exceed its pre-pandemic level by the end of the year. With more than 70 per cent of European adults fully vaccinated, the economy has largely reopened, allowing consumers to spend more and companies to increase production. While rising immunity to the coronavirus means that the impact of the pandemic is now less severe, the global spread of the Delta variant could yet delay the full reopening of the economy. The current increase in inflation is expected to be largely temporary and underlying price pressures are building up only slowly. The inflation outlook in our new staff projections has been revised slightly upwards, but in the medium term inflation is foreseen to remain well below our two per cent target. Financing conditions for firms, households and the public sector have remained favourable since our previous quarterly assessment in June. Favourable financing conditions are essential for the economy to continue its recovery and to offset the negative impact of the pandemic on inflation.
The operational environment will be different. The business model will require remodelling. Board members are therefore expected to familiarise themselves with the economic, financial and social environment of foreign markets if they are to be effective and successful. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Along with higher expectations, there has also been a noticeable increase in the absolute demand for financial institution directors in Malaysia. Since a decade ago, the number of directors in the Malaysian financial sector has increased significantly. This can be attributed to several factors. One reason is the increase in the number of financial institutions arising from the establishment of new Islamic banking and takaful entities within existing banking and insurance groups. Besides that, financial institutions have also progressively strengthened the composition of their boards. This was largely driven by the need to bring more diverse perspectives and skills to the board to meet the growing demands placed on it, and to better prepare for board succession. In the process, we also saw independent directors forming a majority on boards of more financial institutions, including some of the largest domestic financial institutions in the country. It is important to emphasise that this growing demand has not been just about numbers; it is more importantly about the quality of talent that boards must have to perform their role effectively.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Of directors and supply of talent Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of FIDE Forum Directors Register “Of Directors and Supply of Talent”, Kuala Lumpur, 1 April 2016. *  *  *  Today marks an important step forward for board talent management among financial institutions in Malaysia. The Directors Register will be launched this morning to address the financial sector’s need for a reliable supply of qualified individuals to meet the growing demand for high-calibre directors. Financial institutions play a critical role in the economy, intermediating funds to support the real economy. Because of the criticality of the role, financial institutions must be led by directors who possess the necessary skills, experience and integrity to spearhead financial institutions in a competent and effective manner. Identifying, developing and retaining directors of high calibre are no easy task. We need to design a solution to achieve it. The Directors Register is therefore a timely initiative as this acts as a solution to expand the pool of potential directors for boards of financial institutions. Demand imperatives Being a director of a financial institution is highly demanding. The last financial crisis has shown the failure of board oversight in managing the affairs of financial institutions. Unbridled risks-taking, misaligned, incentives structures and failures in overall governance were just a few of the shortcomings that almost brought the global financial system to a standstill.
A change of culture is possible and as the England Cricket team has demonstrated to our great enjoyment, a lot can be achieved in a short space of time where there is commitment. Thank you  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

One reassuring point is that the major UK banks and building societies were tested against precisely this scenario by the Bank of England in 2015 and demonstrated they had the resilience to weather such a shock and carry on lending to the UK economy. Conclusion Looking back over the last two years, I think that the slow healing story can still explain where we are and provide a guide to our future prospects. But the story has to be adapted in the face of more UK and world weakness than I had expected and this weakness might be signalling that there are deeper structural factors at work. Nonetheless, my central projection remains that the UK economy will continue to grow solidly and that inflation will return to target over the next few years. But, as always, policymakers need to be alive to the possible meaning of disappointments, to be very sensitive to the possibility of changing temperatures around them, and to the risk of unfortunate events. We have a range of tools at our disposal and should be ready to use them whichever risk materialises. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Die Welt Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, conducted by Jan Dams and Martin Greive on 7 October 2011. *  *  *  WELT: Mr Trichet, at the time you took up office, did you think it conceivable that you would be dealing with such a serious crisis in the currency union? Jean-Claude Trichet: Even before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the ECB warned that it was highly likely that there would be major corrections in the financial markets. However, the fact that the crisis would call into question the whole economic and financial strategy of all developed economies was not quite so foreseeable. You have had to take harsh criticism of your crisis management from Germany. How disappointing is that for you? That reminds me of a Goethe quote: “Against criticism a man can neither protest nor defend himself; he must act in spite of it, and then it will gradually yield to him.” The ECB must accept the criticism. The only thing that matters is that we are faithful to our primary mandate and take our decisions fully independently. It is about precisely that that increasing doubts are being expressed. Under your leadership, the ECB has lost its independence because it has financed hard-up euro area countries by printing money. This criticism is completely inaccurate. We are fiercely independent of governments and pressure groups. All our decisions are made fully independently by the 23 members of the ECB’s Governing Council.

For example, we will not entertain attempts at fishing for banking information and other spurious requests. As with all major international financial centres, customer confidentiality is a cardinal principle of our financial sector. It will only be lifted by a Singapore court order and only if the safeguards set out in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act are met. These provisions do not shield criminal activities. Singapore will continue to participate actively in the fight against crime, money laundering and terrorist financing. Going forward, we will work to deepen the sharing of knowledge and practices with jurisdictions that approach us for assistance through training programmes. We believe that we can make contributions on economic and financial issues, particularly those pertaining to the region. For instance, our unique monetary policy framework has proved to be sufficiently robust and flexible to cope with shocks in the external environment. We are keen to share our experience through research papers, policy dialogues and seminars with developing countries which are experimenting with intermediate exchange rate regimes. IV. Conclusion  Let me conclude. I have outlined our priorities for the next five years. Our emphasis is on action. We must translate the seminar findings and conclusions into a set of practical initiatives and implement them. We must be prepared to take calculated risks and adapt as we go along. This will require not just hard work and dedication, but also a spirit of openness, inquiry and enterprise. I am confident that together we can achieve our goals for MAS and Singapore.