samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The net real wage was higher by 42.7% in 2017 as compared to 2008, while the number of employees is also higher by 2.4% in 2017 compared to 2008. As social contributions and other taxes were reduced, the increase in real wages was only partially mirrored by the increase in compensation of employees. When compared against EU average, labor productivity raised faster than compensation of employees over the entire period, therefore the unit labor cost, relative to our main trade partners (EU), decreased by 7.7 percentage points (Figure 3). This explains the positive dynamics of exports. Public debt, as a percentage of GDP, is three times higher now than it was in 2008 (35% in 2017 compared to 12% in 2008), but this is a misleading figure for a number of reasons. First, in 2008 and few years before that, Romania did not access international markets, by its own choice, as it financed the deficit from one-off revenues. Second, international reserves were 10 billion euro higher by the end of 2017 compared to the end of 2007 (Figure 4). International reserves include a foreign exchange buffer which has been built since 2011, reached an average of 4 months of financing in 2013 and fluctuated around this level since then. This buffer is the first line of defense against short-term external shocks which may affect emerging markets, and our opinion is that it is a very good instrument which needs to be preserved and consolidated.

This means that enhanced information disclosure required by Basle II, could be problematic if not supported by a proper public understanding. That’s why I feel a bit concerned about the effectiveness and appropriateness of an immediate implementation of Basle II. Therefore a more gradual approach may be necessary. This approach could take the form of an interim standard between Basel I and Basel II that could offer banks in emerging market economies some of the benefits of Basel II without having to face a prohibitive cost. This means that Basel II adoption should not be made mandatory in financial assessments (of WB, IMF for example) and countries should be left with the option to keep Basel I. EU banking directives are mandatory for our countries that opt to join EU. As Basel II elements are embedded in EU Directives, and as our countries are making progress toward integration in the EU, we shall be faced with the challenges of Basle II implementation. I’d like to point out three challenges in particular. Albania as many other East European Countries host a considerable number of foreign banks. These consist mostly of branches or subsidiaries of banks from EU countries which eventually may have to implement the new system including its most advanced elements if their head offices decide to adopt it throughout the network for consistency and competitiveness reasons.
Lucas, Jr., Robert E., 1990, Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1990), pp. 92-96. Obstfeld, Maurice and Alan M. Taylor, 2003, "Globalization and Capital Markets". In Michael Bordo, Alan M. Taylor and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization in Historical Perspective, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Summers, Lawrence, 2006, Reflections on Global Account Imbalances and Emerging Market Reserve Accumulation, Speech delivered at the Reserve Bank of India, March 24, 2007. Summers, Lawrence, 2007, Opportunities in a era of large and growing official wealth, in Johnston-Calari, Jennifer and Malan Riedveld (eds. ), Sovereign Wealth Management, Blackrock and Central Banking Publications, London. Truman, Edwin M. 2007a, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 07-6. Truman, Edwin M., 2007b, The Management of China's International Reserves: China and a SWF Scoreboard, Paper prepared for the Conference on China's Exchange Rate Policy, Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 19tt, 2007. BIS Review 150/2007  9  Appendix Table 1.

In my view, a future code of conduct or a set of guidelines must cover two central issues if they are to be effective. First, to quell the concerns of recipient countries with respect to politically motivated investments, a code of conduct must contain governance prescriptions that ensure that the investment decisions of SWFs are not driven by political objectives. I believe the institutional design of modern central banking can offer some clues as to the appropriate form of these governance prescriptions. Central banks and SWFs obviously pursue fundamentally different objectives. But, in principle, they are both at risk of being hijacked by governments for political aims. In the case of central banks, this problem has been successfully addressed by the adoption of an institutional design based on two powerful features. Central banks have a clear mandate, typically focused on or around price stability. Moreover, they have generally been given statutory independence from governments in pursuing their mandate. This simple institutional design has become best practice and has made an important contribution to keeping politics largely out of monetary policy. Second, to preclude a resurgence of state ownership in our economies, SWF guidelines need to spell out upper limits to investment stakes in foreign private companies. It is difficult to determine what such limits should be. As I alluded earlier, it is not just a matter of preempting majority stakes of SWFs in foreign companies. “Cross-border nationalisation” of private companies is simply the most extreme version of a broader unwelcome trend.
Efforts are therefore being made to seek out creative and innovative ways to make better use of existing collateral in terms of making these assets available, when and where they are needed. Both the Eurosystem and the industry have taken a number of initiatives in this respect. At today’s conference, you will probably hear more about the many innovative solutions that are coming from the industry in this respect, so I will limit myself to some key initiatives in which the ECB/Eurosystem is directly involved, although naturally cooperating closely with the industry. The first initiative in this respect of course is TARGET2 Securities – T2S. The main objective of establishing this single European infrastructure for securities settlement is to reduce risk and increase efficiencies in the post-trade environment, especially as far as cross-border settlement is concerned. This greatly enhanced process for transferring collateral across national borders in Europe will in itself be a huge benefit to market participants – both to cover collateralised money market transactions as well as collateralised credit operations with central banks. Moreover, T2S incorporates several features that aim to help banks optimise their collateral management. Once T2S goes live for example, banks will no longer need to hold multiple buffers of collateral when settling in several European countries and can instead use the state-of-the-art T2S auto-collateralisation and self-collateralisation features, also on a cross-border basis. The second initiative that I want to mention is the implementation of cross-border triparty collateral management services within the Eurosystem collateral framework.

I thank you. 2  BIS Review 15/2009
Ardian Fullani: Albania – optimistic, flexible and adaptive to challenges Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Opening of “Klik Ekspo Group” Fair, Tirana, 25 November 2008. *  *  *  Honourable Prime Minister, Honourable Ministers, Honourable Ambassadors, Dear Mr. Uldedaj! Dear entrepreneurs! Dear ladies and gentlemen! I feel privileged to be here with you tonight and at the same time, be a friend to the Albanian entrepreneurship. The times we are living through require the special attention of economic and financial forums, in particular when the latter bring together the governmental bodies, the banking system and the private entrepreneurship. The global table of discussions on macro-finance and future policies is the present focus; hence, I consider this forum as a follow-up of this prevailing philosophy of the time we are living in. Set in a comprehensive context, the economic developments in the recent months have been characterized by the vague situation the monetary and financial markets and institutions have been going through – which in the last couple of weeks has been followed by other developments. The most recent data show that the economies of developed countries – the USA, Euro area, England and Japan – have recorded decline in economic growth. However, most emerging economies have shown higher immunity to the consequences of the global crisis. Economic activity has been buttressed by domestic factors, which is the main reason to justify the immunity in addition to the incomplete financial integration with the developed countries.

Time is  2  BIS Review 148/2008  ripe for the state budget to involve the participation of private entrepreneurs in strategic investment projects through joint financing programmes. The banking system plays a vital role. Banking loan has played a key role in Albania’s economic development. It has been a source of profit in your business and it has to remain so in the future as well. In my recent communications with my counterparts and in the various meetings with senior officials of foreign banks’ main headquarters I have truthfully presented our country’s economic situation and I have required from them to keep their interest in the Albanian economy unchanged. I avail myself of this opportunity to address to the Albanian entrepreneurship. You have to keep being active and focused on formulating and implementing your future business plans. This would be the only way for you to remain well-capitalized, lucrative and credible to the banking system. In the current economic conditions, private entrepreneurship should be a supporter and promoter in the formulation of domestic strategies at home, in the region and broader, and in their implementation process. All conditions are in place for the Albanian business to go beyond the official regional borders, hence, becoming a factor in ensuring a stable regional activity. This also means a real integration into the targeted standards. Concluding, I would like to highlight that the small countries like Albania, should be optimistic, flexible and adaptive to challenges.
It is a topical issue, also relevant to Romania, because the reshaping of the relations among major global currencies – including on the background of the ECB’s recent quantitative easing – complicates the task of identifying the equilibrium exchange rate of the leu suitable for ERM II entry and thereafter for euro adoption. Technically, the adoption of the single currency as of 1 January 2019 would imply joining ERM II in 2016 H1 and the minimum two-year stay. Aside from the difficulty of setting the central parity, ERM II participation calls, however, for a certain preparedness of the economy as well, considering the risks inherently posed by a target-band regime. The need to minimise such risks and the requirement to fulfil the Maastricht criteria by the end of the second year of ERM II participation render all the more important the completion of major economic policy adjustments ahead of adopting this exchange rate regime. I am mainly referring to removing the sources of repressed inflation (the relevant example being the completion of the energy market deregulation), of quasi-fiscal deficits (by restructuring lossmaking state-owned enterprises), as well as other sources of future budgetary pressure (for instance, the unavoidable expenditures to modernise road infrastructure). There are also monetary adjustments that need to be carried out ahead of ERM II entry, namely finalising the process of bringing minimum reserve requirement ratios in line with euro area levels.

Still, Y2K was valuable to the financial community in so far as it opened our minds and increased our sensitivity for problems that nobody had encountered or envisaged before. Today, however, the situation is different and considerably more complex. The events of September 11, 2001, have clearly increased our awareness further. Looking back to the time before the attacks we seem to have tended to underestimate the probability and consequences of disruption. So what needs to be done to make sure that we do not continue to underestimate threats? How can the resilience in financial systems be improved? What are the responsibilities of each and all of us? At the level of a single financial institution objectives and measures - in terms of back up solutions, staff safety and training, testing procedures, and contingency planning in general - may have to be newly defined. A specific issue that has probably not yet received enough attention everywhere is the internal crisis management process. Establishing a crisis management committee, which coordinates decisions and communication in times of crisis, can be vital, especially for large and complex financial institutions acting globally. On top of this, crisis management needs to be tested in general. One of the simpler scenarios could be: what happens if a bank is - for whatever reason - not able to release S.W.I.F.T. messages? In addition, crisis management of a single institution must involve its customers, its business partners and peers, its service providers and its utility providers. Crisis management is therefore a very demanding activity.
Conclusions In sum, our economies are now experiencing some important changes, both with regard to how goods and services are produced and traded, and the possibilities that agents face to organise their economic decisions over time. Most of the underlying forces causing these changes must be judged as largely beneficial per se. Yet as occurs with any new situation, we face much uncertainty that requires a comprehensive learning effort. As central bankers, we have learnt that price stability should be deemed as a highly valuable but insufficient achievement to promote financial stability. We have also gained some understanding as to why this is so, and, hence, on the need to take some steps towards making the goals of monetary and financial stability compatible and sustainable. Admittedly, our knowledge is still scarce in some important areas. However, as the interaction between the two objectives is becoming more pronounced, the role of central banks is probably more complex but also more relevant. 4  BIS Review 53/2006

But the implications of that shift were greatly amplified by a breakdown in the functioning of markets core to the maintenance of monetary and financial stability. Many of those longstanding vulnerabilities I mentioned a moment ago were in play. Liquidity imbalances between asset maturities and redemptions in money market and other open-ended funds exacerbated moves in asset prices. Gaps in liquidity planning meant some firms had to scramble to meet margin calls. And sharp disruptions in government and corporate bond markets raised questions about the role of leveraged investors, and the willingness and capacity of dealers to intermediate at times of stress. To avoid an even deeper economic collapse, the functioning of these markets had to be restored rapidly. And that was achieved through swift and decisive central bank action, using large-scale asset purchases and other tools capable of tackling both the economic shock and the market dysfunction. Since March of last year, G10 central bank balance sheets have risen by over $ trillion. This was an appropriate response to a truly unprecedented situation – just as powerful anti-inflammatory medicines are the right solution to a sudden and massive flare up. But such drugs are less well suited to treating long-term conditions – and there is every reason to believe that, absent further action, we will see more frequent periods of dysfunction in the very markets increasingly relied on by households and firms, if business model vulnerabilities persist and intermediation capacity remains strained.
This protected species status meant large institutions benefitted – indeed, continue to benefit from an implicit subsidy from the state. This subsidy is big. For the global banking system, it may currently amount to as much as several hundreds of billions of dollars each year. By comparison, that is multiples of the global aid budget. For UK banks, the subsidy amounts to tens of billions of pound each year. That too is multiples of the overseas development budget. These are extraordinarily large, and peculiarly-directed, government transfers to one sector. If banks have been the winner from these transfers, then the wider economy has clearly been the loser. The damage wrought by the pre-crisis debt mountain has been huge and is still rising. The cumulative loss of output relative to trend is already fast approaching one year’s output in the UK. As context, only world wars come with a heftier price tag. The strain is being felt by many homeowners, companies and, increasingly, governments. In the US alone, more than 4 million homeowners have so far lost their properties. Many more households and companies globally can only support their debts at near-zero interest rates. They are zombies, caught in a debt trap. In a way, none of this should have come as a surprise. We know from past crises that debt acts as a dragging anchor on growth for a protracted period.

Their business model is fascinating, Quaker-even, in its orientation. They offer only basic banking services, mortgages and small business loans, to people in a tight, locally-defined catchment area. All credit decisions are taken locally by people, not centrally by a computer. No bonuses are paid and no one has a sales-target. When the whole firm out-performs, a contribution is made to a pooled fund which is invested on employees’ behalf. The fruits of success are distributed equally and gratification is deferred. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  For banking, this is back to the future. If that sounds attractive, then it is down to us – not regulators, not politicians, you and I – to deliver it. If as bank customers we want to change the culture of banking, then we should start by supporting those banks who are delivering that change. Putting your money where your mouth is would deliver far greater and more durable change than any amount of banker-bashing. Already there are some encouraging signs of the winds of change blowing through the system, not just from the new entrants but among the UK’s oldest banks too. The new heads of the UK’s biggest banks have committed to restoring trust in their institutions and improving their social usefulness. And those words are beginning to turn into actions. Barclays and today Lloyds are seeking to change their sales-oriented culture, returning to their Quaker roots. There is the quiet, but unmistakable, sound of a leaf being turned.
Eddie Yue: Towards RMB internationalisation - the role of Hong Kong markets Opening keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers (HKIB) Annual Banking Conference 2021, 29 September 2021. * * * Distinguished guests, members and friends of Treasury Markets Association (TMA), ladies and gentlemen, 1. Thank you for having me at this event. It is my pleasure to deliver my keynote speech at the Treasury Markets Summit 2021. Opening 2. We should all take it as a blessing that against the shadow of the pandemic, we could still host this annual event today to exchange views. The pandemic has brought profound and lasting changes to our lives, but not all of them are negative. I notice for instance that several people around me have been hiking more frequently during the pandemic and even maintained it as a habit. It is beautifully ironic that during this period of restrictions, we have had the opportunity to be outdoor more often and to interact with nature. As we enjoy and rediscover the astounding scenery and diversity of our landscape, it is difficult to not appreciate the harmony in nature or, if you prefer a more precise description, the harmony in the co-existence and interdependence of living organisms. One example is the bee and the flower: the bees need flowers for food and flowers depend on the bees for pollination. They live in harmony by helping each other survive and evolve.

All these facts and numbers suggest that Hong Kong has the strongest foundation on which we can launch further efforts to advance the progress of RMB internationalisation. 10. The timing is also right – with the Mainland’s economic growth continuing to outperform. Macro aside, portfolio flow is another major driver. We are seeing increasing capital flows into the Mainland markets by international investors, driven by the inclusion of RMB assets in global indices and also the attractive yield pick-up and diversification benefits. In the other direction, there is also an increasing need for Mainland investors – be they individuals or institutions – to more efficiently manage their wealth and diversify the allocation through outward investments. A good part of these two-way portfolio flows will be conducted in RMB, and through Hong Kong. Some thoughts on “How” 11. So far, the level of the international use of RMB remains relatively low, and is not commensurate to the Mainland’s economic strength. For example, the Mainland is already the world’s largest trading nation, but the use of RMB for cross-border trade settlement is only in the range of 15 to 20% of its total trade volume. Some will argue that in order to 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  further boost the usage of RMB in trade settlement, we will need to see more active use of RMB as an investment currency in capital market transactions.