samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In respect of the safety and efficiency in the movement of money, we built almost five years ago a state-of-the-art Real Time Gross Settlement system for the full range of Hong Kong dollar financial transactions. This RTGS system has a seamless interface with our debt clearing system – the first of its kind in Asia. We have just replicated that payment system for the US dollar, enabling US dollar transactions to be settled real time in our time zone rather than having to wait for New York to open. The US dollar payment system is also linked up with the Hong Kong dollar payment system and in September this year we achieved the first payment versus payment (PvP) transaction in world financial history between two different currencies. This arrangement makes it possible for Herstatt risk – the risk that money might get lost during transactions between different time zones – to be eliminated. If payment systems for other currencies in this region are also linked up with our US dollar payment system, then most foreign currency transactions involving the US dollar conducted in this region can benefit from this risk reduction service. There is a standing invitation from us to central banks in the region running real time payment systems for their currencies. I hope they will take up this offer.

23.10.2019  The Banking Union: a key building block of the EU project Opening remarks at roundtable “Banking Union – Five years in the making” Banco de España Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Dear chairs of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the European Banking Authority, president of the European Banking Federation, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Let me start by welcoming you to Banco de España for this roundtable. Over the next couple of hours we intend to discuss both the achievements and pending elements of the Banking Union (BU) on its fifth anniversary. We are honoured to be accompanied by such distinguished panelists, so thank you for accepting our invitation and for being here today. But before getting down to the discussion, I would like to share with you a few general thoughts on the European Union project and the role the Banking Union (BU) plays as part of this collective endeavour. In my remarks today I will point out what the BU has meant in terms of greater integration for the euro area banking sector, and I will also refer briefly to those developments that, in my view, may still be missing if we are to achieve a truly integrated and cross-border banking sector. The EU project has certainly improved the life of millions of people in Europe since its creation, not only in economic terms, but also regarding rights and living standards across the whole Union.
That has been true of every industrial revolution. Nowhere have these costs been felt more acutely than here in Glasgow.   These disruptive side-effects do not self-heal. They need to be managed if the fruits of innovation are not to rot in the fields. That means social safety nets to protect the livelihoods of those disrupted by innovation. And it means social institutions supporting the up-skilling of people. The GSA is a social institution created precisely to meet the latter need. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2    The next 50 years may bring opportunities and challenges every bit as great as any in the past. The Fourth Industrial Revolution will offer huge potential to individuals, economies and societies. But the engine of growth may change, with artificial rather than human intelligence playing a much larger role. Some have called this Life Version 3.0.   The creative forces unleashed by the Fourth Industrial Revolution will need to be carefully managed to avoid a tear in the social fabric. This is likely to require new sets of skills, with creative and social skills at a greater premium. It may require new sets of social institutions and safety nets. And it may require a reorientation of our approach to education, training and work.   The “creative industries” are a thriving sector of the UK economy, generating £ billion of value-added each year. But, in future, we may need every industry and every worker to see themselves as creative.

As you can see, the vast majority of reserves are invested in bonds (issued by governments, public sector entities, foreign companies and supranational organisations) or placed with other central banks. This represents around 88% of investments, which further underlines the prime importance of security and liquidity in the management of our assets. The proportion of equities has varied over the years. Currently, they amount to 12%, the highest level since 2004, when investment in equities was first allowed following a change in the legal framework governing SNB investments. For bonds, the SNB uses a combination of major bond indices as benchmarks. The SNB’s portfolio can deviate from these indices for tactical reasons, but always within a clearly defined range. Using such deviations, the SNB’s portfolio managers can exploit market inefficiencies in order to improve returns. Moreover, this bond management method allows the SNB’s portfolio managers to retain a direct link with the main market players – a link which is essential for gathering first-hand market intelligence that might be of use for the SNB’s activities. At present, 96% of our bond investments are in assets rated AAA or AA, or are placed with other central banks and international organisations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Since 2004, the SNB has also invested in foreign equities. This asset class allows us to increase the return on our foreign exchange reserves. Equities are managed entirely passively. Our asset managers ensure that our equities portfolio corresponds to that of the main international benchmarks.
I am well aware that both functional authority and tools lie beyond the Riksbank’s remit, but as household debt and problems on the housing market affect the way the economy works, this development is also a source of unease for the Riksbank. Housing prices have been rising for a long time To begin with, I would like to say a few words on how housing prices have developed in Sweden. Since 2005, they have more than doubled, but the price rise started before then. The fact that housing prices have risen so rapidly for such a long period of time and are now historically high can be explained by factors such as the imbalance between supply and demand for housing, rising real wages and lower taxes, which have increased households’ disposable incomes. 8 Housing prices fell in the autumn of 2017, but have since then recovered slightly. The fall in prices has also affected housing construction, which, after increasing strongly in recent years, slowed down again in 2018 and 2019. Over time, the development of housing prices has contributed towards increasing household indebtedness, even if the slightly weaker development in recent years has contributed towards lending for household mortgages now increasing more slowly than previously. All in all, this has led to household debt as a proportion of disposable income (the debt-to-income ratio) staying relatively unchanged over the last year, but being expected to continue to increase over the coming years. 9 The debt-toincome ratio for the entire household sector is currently over 186 per cent.

As Bank of Zambia, we believe that the recent economic developments, such as, the attainment of single digit inflation for the first time in three decades in April 2006 and sustaining low-level inflation for nearly three consecutive quarters so far to November 2006 are supportive of this initiative. These developments also indicate that Zambia is able to rally foreign private capital to improve the domestic financing limitations and support efforts of encouraging faster economic growth, private sector investment and exploitation of the country’s huge potential in various sectors. Ladies and gentlemen, we also believe that events such as this complement the outcomes of Government’s economic reform agenda which in part is aimed at strengthening our country’s creditworthiness as demonstrated by the attainment of the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) completion point in April 2005. Ladies and gentlemen, please allow me to elaborate. In order to strengthen and sustain our new status as a creditworthy economy following the attainment of the HIPC completion point, the Bank of Zambia, together with Government, is working on ensuring that our institutional arrangements are supportive of keeping the global investor audience, amongst others, informed about domestic economic developments transparently and on an ongoing basis. For instance, we believe that obtaining a formal sovereign credit rating would help us build part of the necessary institutional arrangements of keeping all stakeholders informed.
In the past, new institutions have emerged to cushion this painful transition, limiting the recessionary hit to societies. Historically, doing so appears to have held the key to sustainable growth. If this time’s technological transition is as great as any previously, securing sustainable growth will need new institutions to manage this transition and mitigate its societal side-effects. I have speculated on one area where that next institutional wave might usefully break – universities like this one, as new centres of lifelong learning and technological diffusion. In future, institutional innovation will be every bit as important as technological innovation if that gift of growth is to keep on giving. 22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  References  Acemoglu, D and Restrepo, P (2017), ‘Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets’, NBER Working Paper, No. 23285. Acemoglu, D and Restrepo, P (2018), ‘Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work’, NBER Working Paper, No. 24196. Acemoglu, D and Robinson, J (2012), Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, Penguin Random House. Allen, R (2005), ‘Capital Accumulation, Technological Change, and the Distribution of Income during the British Industrial Revolution’, University of Oxford Economic Series Working Papers, No. 239. Allen, R (2009), ‘Engels’ pause: Technical change, capital accumulation, and inequality in the British industrial revolution’, Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 418-435. Andrews, D, Criscuolo, C and Gal, P (2016), ‘The Global Productivity Slowdown, Technology Divergence and Public Policy: A Firm Level Perspective, Hutchins Center Working Papers.

The selection of a champion city recognises the enormous potential of cities across Malaysia, where three quarters of our population live, to be the engines of innovation. In our work at Bank Negara on a range of issues – whether it is to improve access to financing, promote financial inclusion or lift economic efficiency through migration to electronic payments – our collaboration with cities and their leaders has been the source of many solutions and breakthroughs in addressing the challenges that we face. This reflects the close and vibrant communities and networks within cities that can be drawn upon much more quickly and effectively to deliver solutions that will benefit the community. As a champion city for remittances, Kota Kinabalu will similarly be able to show the way in generating new solutions for remittances. There are many valuable lessons that we can take from our recent experience with the Greenback project in Johor Bahru. But it will be important for us to receive your ideas and your input to ensure that we are addressing the specific needs and circumstances of people and businesses in Kota Kinabalu. Kota Kinabalu has a sizeable population of foreign workers who contribute to the state of Sabah, while supporting and improving the livelihoods of their families back home.
As you know, we have a branch office up here in Yorkshire, in fact in Leeds, which serves as a part of our network of eyes and ears and indeed voices at 13 locations throughout the UK. The new responsibility made us more conscious than ever of the importance also of visits around the country by senior members of the Bank in London, including members of the MPC and indeed our Directors, both to inform themselves about local economic conditions and to explain locally what it is that we are trying to do. That explains why you have been seeing much more of us in recent years and it explains in particular tonight’s invasion of Yorkshire, by 11 of our 16 Directors and 6 of the 9 members of the MPC. Tomorrow in Leeds will in fact be the third occasion on which our Court has held one of its monthly meetings outside London since the new legislation was introduced in 1998, a practice which we intend to continue. So that I hope explains why we are here – and I hope that you will avail yourselves of the opportunity to bend the ears of our representatives where you can – but preferably not until I’ve finished speaking to you!

Further, while the heterogeneity of regulatory frameworks has recently been lessened following the entry into force of the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD IV and CRR), differences persist and must be discussed. Such differences include most notably so-called national discretions and options. On one hand, the new framework provides for a gradual transition to the new capital requirements, in line with the Basel III Accord. The regulation gives countries some discretion in setting the pace of convergence towards the new requirements, which may give rise to temporary differences in the treatment of some specific aspects. For instance, a country may decide to bring forward the application of the new capital conservation buffer, initially envisaged for 2016, or the deduction of certain capital components. Moreover, the regulation provides for a series of national options that might give rise to permanent differences in the treatment of specific aspects. It is logical that the SSM should work to achieve a degree of harmonisation, seeking to restrict national options of a permanent nature. It is perhaps less logical to take steps in the case of temporary discretionary arrangements, which by their very nature must disappear within a few years. Different accounting practices, especially as regards provisioning, also significantly affect the uniformity of capital figures and should be a supervisory concern. It is thus reasonable to expect the SSM to contribute to convergence in the interpretation of international accounting standards. And it is essential that the SSM should strive equally to revise the calculation of riskweighted assets.
I should stress that, when undertaking this transformation, banks have most significant starting strengths. Despite all the reputation problems, people continue to trust their bank, much more than any other service-providing company. Personal relationships with customers continue to be very important, particularly in certain segments and age groups. According to the latest Funcas financial innovation barometer, in January this year, customer ties to their main financial institution remained very strong. Close to 90% of banking activity is conducted with the main institution. Also notable is the fact that customers’ perception of quality of innovation and their degree of satisfaction with their institution is high; higher, indeed, that what the managers of institutions themselves think. 12/15  While the proportion is growing, still less than half of Spanish bank customers (4 out of 10) would be prepared to use exclusively digital channels to take out traditional financial products. Assuming a change in institution, traditional banks remain the first option (71%) for moving an account from one institution to another. Fully digital banks would be chosen by 24%, while FinTech are an option for only 3%. Lastly, only the 2% remaining would change their bank for a technological or telecommunications company that offered these services. This starting position, which is a relatively good one from a “defensive” standpoint, should not have us forget that the tendency towards the use of alternative channels is on the rise.

As indicated, the lower use of IRB models by our banks means they will not be affected by this concept. However, other changes, such as the new operational risk and Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) frameworks, or the introduction of changes in the standardised approach, will indeed affect our banks, which should prepare themselves to absorb the new requirements. 8/15  MREL  Another challenge banks face stems from the introduction of the new eligible liabilities requirements, known as MREL. As you will be aware, the introduction of MREL is the consequence of the change in paradigm in crisis resolution. We have now moved from the bail-out to the bail-in. The aim is to ensure that banks have sufficient unsecured liabilities on their balance sheet, whether own funds or “bailinable” debt, if you will allow me to use this expression, so as to avoid the use of public funds in the event of failure. The Single Resolution Board (SRB) has set MREL objectives for each significant institution at the European level. It has also informed them of the maximum time available to cover these requirements, which must be met through organic growth of specific liabilities and new issues. It is essential that each institution should plan the issues to be made appropriately. It is worth recalling here that the characteristics of these liabilities make them rather unsuitable for distribution among retail customers.
In such an environment, where domestic demand is no longer restricted within the amount of the current national income, the current account deficits are not always an indicator of fundamental imbalances. As has been emphasized by an increasing number of scientists, central bankers, and finance ministers, the imbalanced external accounts of individual countries have become rather the rule than an exception (A. Greenspan, M. King). In addition, empirical research, as well as the European institutions (European Central Bank, European Commission) point out that the process of convergence is inevitably accompanied by current account deficits. Secondly, the decrease in the long-term interest rates in the developed economies, and the accompanying reduction in the risk premiums in the developing economies, resulted in investors’ pursuit of higher yield in the developing markets. There are multiple factors determining these developments, on which I would not focus today. What should be underscored is that these global trends channel significant in amount capital flows to the developing economies. Irrespective of the monetary policy regime (fixed or floating exchange rate), the absorption of larger capital inflows inevitably puts the monetary authorities to trial. To illustrate the large scale of this process, I will give Bulgaria as an example, where the capital inflow (in the form of direct investment and debt) was 1.5% of GDP in 1998, and in the recent two years it approximates 15% of GDP.

At the end of the day, the flow of credit from securities markets has the same impact on our respective societies as that from banks. Therefore, central bankers have an obligation to understand the nature of these flows and the risks that they raise. Crucial to our obligations to our citizens is the need to be certain that these credit markets work smoothly and that credit flows efficiently from those most willing and able to bear the risks to those most able to put the funds to good use. This is as true for the United States as it is for any other country, developed or developing. Does this mean that central banks believe that capital markets should be supervised in the same ways banks are overseen? Clearly the answer to this question is no. This is not our role. In my view, central banks broadly have two main responsibilities with respect to the global debt markets. The first is to enhance the price discovery process by promoting transparency in their own actions. The second is to ensure that the banks, as providers of liquidity, perform their proper role in supporting the trading process by making sound credit decisions. In the United States, the Federal Open Market Committee or FOMC has a pronounced effect on the fixed-income market, both through its policy decisions and in the way the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy. Indeed, an important part of the price discovery process is the anticipation of the Federal Reserve’s future actions.
To understand the most recent interest rate decisions, it is important to remember that we do not adjust the repo rate to affect the present inflation rate, but to influence inflation a couple of years ahead. It takes time for monetary policy to achieve its full impact on the economy. Monetary policy must therefore be based on expectations of the future, i.e. we are dependent on forecasts. It is therefore necessary that we occasionally ”lean against the wind”, that is, that we raise the repo rate despite the current inflation rate being below target level or that we lower the repo rate despite inflation being above the target level. If we were only to look at the present inflation rate, there is a risk that we would be forced to make more drastic adjustments further ahead and this type of roller-coaster interest policy would benefit no one. How do we assess future inflation prospects? The economic outlook is currently bright, both in Sweden and abroad. International growth has been both high and stable in recent years (diagram 1). Strong growth in the United States and parts of Asia has been a driving force for global economic activity. Increased participation in global trade by, among others, several Asian countries has contributed to this upswing and to stiffer international competition. So far, the increase in global  BIS Review 12/2006  1  demand has not had a visible impact on consumer prices.

The risk of inflation can only arise if growth in the monetary base coincides with an increase in the broader monetary aggregates through higher customer deposits in banks. For the broader monetary aggregates to  6  See for example speech by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke: “Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Crisis”, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 31 August 2012. See also speech by Spencer Dale, Chief Economist at the Bank of England: “Limits of monetary policy”, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2012/597.aspx  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  increase, banks must increase lending or purchase securities from enterprises outside the banking sector. Since the crisis in 2008, the monetary base in Europe and the US has grown considerably more rapidly than the broader monetary aggregates. The risk of high inflation in such a situation should be viewed in the context of central bank exit strategies. In the future, central banks will want to reverse the extraordinary measures that have resulted in substantial growth in the monetary base. This will normally be done when the crisis is over and the economy is recovering. Third, the large sums of money involved may also affect exchange rates. Even if central banks do not intervene in exchange markets directly, the measures may in the short term reduce the value of the currency issued by a central bank. This will, in isolation, strengthen exchange rates in countries that were initially less severely hit by the crisis.