samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We can see that banks did not restrict lending, as was the case, for example, during the crisis of 2014–2015, but, on the contrary, significantly increased it and, moreover, restructured a large volume of their clients’ loans. That is to say, they supported borrowers in an acutely difficult period when they needed financial resources. This made it possible to avoid more serious consequences both for banks, whose credit losses were not as serious as many expected, and for the economy as a whole. It seems to me that this shows that building such long-term relationships with clients is very important, and banks had the opportunity to do so because the financial stability they had established in previous years made it possible to carry out a policy of not demanding that their clients immediately repay loans and continuing to issue loans. Therefore, it seems to me that this is a positive result of an overall very difficult last year. The corporate portfolio has shown serious growth, by almost 10%, and continues to grow. In the first four months of this year, growth was 3.5%, taking January to the end of April into account. That is, this trend continues to be seen this year as well. At the same time, it is important that not only large companies are being granted loans, but small- and medium-sized businesses too: the portfolio of small- and medium-sized businesses grew by 20% last year, which is a record level since 2014.

This is because we understand that these implementations require that IT systems be developed because almost everything is now tied to IT. We want banks to be able to do this at the same time. There are exceptions when there are extraordinary situations or risks. Or when banks, due to the fact that this is an easing measure, a preferential regime, ask us to introduce these new changes faster. Sometimes we just let them choose: they can remain on the old system or migrate to the new system. This is more difficult for us, but we understand that it is easier for banks to work this way. In our opinion, this increases predictability of the implementation of all our changes in regulation. I would like to say that, together with you, we are trying to remove bottlenecks, to reduce costs where possible, so that banks of varying sizes have the opportunity to work and benefit their customers. For example, for a long time there have been discussions, on all the platforms and during meetings, of banks’ access to funds from the budget, state-owned companies, and today Mr. Aksakov spoke about this, about a draft law. We hope that it will indeed be adopted, and that this topic will no longer require constant discussion. We understand how serious it is from the point of view of ensuring an equal playing field regarding access to state and state companies’ funds. All the more so because they form a significant part of banks’ equities.
In fact the public interest in non-banking financial activity has certainly increased in this sense - both in terms of the range of BIS Review 13/1997  -8-  activities covered and the standards of protection demanded - as is reflected in the spread of financial regulation over the past 10-20 years as the activities themselves have expanded. Our own Financial Services Act, for example, which provides for formal regulation of investment business dates only from 1986. A corollary of this broadening public interest is that multifunctional financial services providers are bound to be subject to a broadening range of functional regulation - however such regulation is structured. What I think is less clear is the extent and nature of the public macro-prudential interest in non-banking financial activities. I have argued that other, non-banking, financial activities are not - because of the different characteristics of the related liabilities and assets subject to runs in the same way as banks, and that they are not therefore subject to contagious systemic - disturbance in the same sense as banks. But that does not mean that non-bank financial institutions cannot face liquidity pressures. It does not mean either that the failure of a non-bank financial institution could not - through its direct credit or settlements exposures to other financial institutions (bank or non-bank) - have damaging knock-on effects.

In effect, the mere existence of a digital euro would offer a fallback solution in the event of geopolitical tensions. Moreover, when carefully designed, a digital euro could be a catalyst for innovation at a wider scale in that it could support intermediaries’ role in developing new types of services on top of it while enjoying Pan-European reach. 1  Negroponte, N. (1995). “Being Digital”, Vintage International. Random House, New York. Cunliffe, J. (2022) “Some lessons from the Crypto Winter” (https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2022/july/joncunliffe-speech-on-crypto-market-developments-at-the-british-high-commission-singapore). 2  1  A digital euro does, however, exhibit a number of non-trivial risks as well. If, for example, anonymity was to be allowed as a means to provide the highest possible level of privacy, we would be compromising our commitment with fighting money laundering and the financing of criminal activity. What’s more, this setup would put into question the effectiveness of the tools to limit the use of digital euro as a store of value, a point on which I will come back later. In that respect, a balance needs to be struck between minimizing the Eurosystem’s and intermediaries’ involvement in the processing of users’ data and still ensuring compliance with the law. A digital euro is likely to increase as well the Eurosystem’s general operational responsibilities over the payments channels irrespective of the role it ultimately intends to play in the settlement of these transactions.
It contributed 11% of annual tax revenues or over £ billion per week in 2016. 1  1  Employment and tax data is from “Total tax contribution of UK financial services, Tenth edition”, City of London & PWC, November 2017. Lending data from Bank of England statistics and calculations. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  Internationally, the UK is the pre-eminent financial centre. It accounts for 40% of global foreign exchange volumes and trades in over-the-counter interest rate derivatives. More international banking activity is booked here than anywhere else. The UK hosts the world’s second largest asset management and fourth largest insurance industry. The City is Europe’s investment banker, and it is leading the internationalisation of green, Islamic, renminbi and rupee finance. Being at the heart of the global financial system reinforces the ability of the rest of the UK economy, from manufacturing to the creative industries, to compete globally. And it broadens the investment opportunities and risk-adjusted returns for UK savers. This evening, I want to set out some of the ways the UK financial system can continue to serve the UK and the world in the face of major structural changes. II. Core attributes of UK leadership The City’s pre-eminence reflects lessons learnt over the centuries that an effective financial system must be resilient, fair and dynamic. Resilient so that it can finance households and businesses through good times and bad. A resilient system is anti-fragile – robust even to risks we do not anticipate.

17 The exact amount that can be provided will depend on a range of factors, including the type and amount of collateral, the currency composition of the lending and the concentration to individual counterparties. 18 See https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/letter/2016/governor-apf-letter-040816.pdf. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  desire to have sufficient scope to cut Bank Rate materially – relative to the effective lower bound on Bank Rate of 0.5% at that time – if necessary to respond to adverse shocks. 19  Although the principles guiding the MPC’s choice of threshold still hold, with the lower bound on Bank Rate now permanently close to 0%, the MPC views that the level from which Bank Rate can be cut materially is now around 1.5%. Reflecting this, the MPC now intends not to reduce the stock of purchased assets until Bank Rate reaches around 1.5%. Any reductions in the stock of purchased assets will be conducted over a number of years at a gradual and predictable pace. The MPC continues to view sales and reinvestment decisions as equivalent from a monetary policy perspective. While any reduction will be solely a decision for the MPC based on meeting its objectives, the Bank will liaise with the Debt Management Office ahead of implementing any change in its asset purchase programme. As asset purchases unwind, decisions on Bank Rate will take into account any impact of changes in the stock of purchased assets on overall monetary conditions in order to achieve the inflation target.
To the extent that issuers and investors are unwilling to participate in TALF because of fears that their involvement might lead to unforeseen complications at a later date, this would lead to the unattractive outcome of underutilization and the achievement of only a portion of the potential benefits. Of course it is of critical importance in this facility and in all the programs instituted in response to this crisis that the interests of the taxpayer be protected, and the safeguards and restrictions on the use of TARP funds are designed to achieve this. However, I think it is fair to say that TALF got off to a relatively slow start because investors were worried that the use of TARP funds in TALF could restrict their ability to conduct their business activities more broadly, perhaps in unanticipated ways and potentially retroactively. Put simply, to the extent that the use of TARP monies creates stigma, this may limit the effectiveness of TALF and other programs that use TARP funds. Although we think these fears among market  4  BIS Review 69/2009  participants that use TALF are misplaced, such anxieties have had an impact on the program. Another challenge faced by the TALF is to increase the participation of real money investors (such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies), many of whom are not permitted to use leverage.

Turning first to the economic analysis, according to Eurostat’s first estimate, the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of real GDP in the euro area for the fourth quarter of 2006 was 0.9%, which was above previous expectations. Our current assessment is that the quarterly profile of real GDP growth is likely to be somewhat smoother in response to the impact of indirect tax changes in one large euro area country than had originally been anticipated. The strength of real GDP growth in the fourth quarter is thus indicative of ongoing robust growth in the euro area. Both domestic demand and exports made significant contributions to real GDP growth, confirming the sustained and broad-based nature of the current expansion. The information on economic activity from various confidence surveys and indicator-based estimates supports the assessment that robust economic growth has continued into 2007. Looking ahead, the medium-term outlook for economic activity remains favourable. The conditions are in place for the euro area economy to grow solidly. As regards the external environment, global economic growth has become more balanced across regions and, while moderating somewhat, remains robust, supported in part by lower oil prices. External conditions thus provide support for euro area exports. Domestic demand in the euro area is also expected to maintain its relatively strong momentum. Investment should remain dynamic, benefiting from an extended period of very favourable financing conditions, balance sheet restructuring, accumulated and ongoing strong corporate earnings, and gains in business efficiency.
At the Central Bank, we have also shifted the currency composition of our reserves from euros to US dollars. The share of euros in our reserves has fallen from 73% to 54%, and there has been a parallel shift in the composition of our foreign exchange liabilities. Now let me point out two major positive effects of introducing the euro into the Turkish economy. The first positive effect is that elimination of the transaction costs arising from a multitude of European exchange rates has encouraged the use of the euro as a unit of currency. Between 1994 and 1998, the euro’s share in the current account’s foreign exchange receipts averaged 37% and in its foreign exchange expenditures averaged 32%. Eighteen months after the introduction of the euro, these figures have barely changed: the respective shares are 40% and 33%. The second positive effect is that the Convergence Criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, and the Copenhagen Criteria, require economies seeking to join the EU and EMU to become efficient market economies and achieve a high degree of verifiable convergence with the EU. As we all know, the requirements include BIS Review 109/2000  2  price stability, low market-based interest rates, stable exchange rates, and sustainable public finances. And whether or not it is considered immediately important for Turkey to become a member of EMU, these convergence criteria can give us an effective means of disciplining our economy.

I personally think that acceptance of the euro in daily life and financial transactions will come faster in Turkey than in other countries, for three reasons: the large numbers of Turkish citizens living in Europe, the large volume of trade and tourism transactions with Europe, and the consistent stability of the deutsche mark for 20 years and more. The introduction of the euro has reduced transaction costs and removed the risks connected with more volatile currencies, increasing the incentives for European capital markets to rely more on direct financing. A deep, liquid, and efficient euro bond market will be welcomed by Turkish sovereign and private bond issuers. Moreover, the volume of transactions in the euro bond market is expected to be much larger than today. 1  BIS Review 109/2000  Increased acceptance of euros in Turkish trade and financial transactions, of course combined with an environment of low inflation, will make direct investments in Turkey more attractive to European firms. Turkey’s presently very small total of direct foreign investments from European investors would surely be encouraged to grow by the disappearance of foreign exchange risks. Under such circumstances, both Turkish and European banks could be expected to increase their merger and acquisition activities. For the short term, the most important goal is to promote the euro as an international currency. Success will crucially depend on the new currency’s acceptance by the people of the EMU countries and other countries as well.
In Japan, good news comes from the labor market – with unemployment at 3.8%, the lowest rate in eight years – and from private consumption that is waking up after a long period of stagnation. Emerging Asia continues to show high growth rates, led by China and India. In particular, China surprised with an annualized growth rate of 11.9% the second quarter. Growth is fairly widespread with important contributions from retail sales, investment in fixed assets and exports. Despite sharp rises in world prices of foods and fuels, CPI inflation has remained stable in the U.S., the euro zone and Japan. In the U.S., recent indicators show a fall in core inflation and are more consistent with inflation converging to the ceiling of the comfort zone defined by the Fed’s open market committee. In the euro zone, despite 1.9% of annual inflation in the  BIS Review 87/2007  1  past two months, output growing above potential, combined with the closing of output gaps and strong credit growth, there is a higher risk of inflation acceleration, which has led the ECB to continue with its process of monetary policy normalization. In Japan, although inflation is still low, with an expanding economy, the Bank of Japan introduced two rises of 25 basis points each in the policy rate to reduce distortions and vulnerabilities associated to excess liquidity. In China and other emerging economies, inflation is increasing.

In any case those ideas can be implementable only if they do not focus on a single sector, but also recognize the close relationship and inter-linkages among various sectors in the economy. Thank you very much! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The last year has been characterised by large moves in exchange rates and falls in risky asset prices but the repricing of government bonds and of expectations for monetary policy have been particularly striking. Significant UK specific factors emerged in September and October, which have been covered in detail elsewhere12. The UK policy premia which opened up have now disappeared. The cumulative increase in yields on UK 10 gilts over the last year is now very closely in line with the change in US and German 10 year bonds (Chart 7). Having peaked at 4.6% in late September yields on 10 year gilts were back down at 3.2% at close yesterday, their level at the start of September. Source: Bloomberg L.P., and Bank calculations Notes: The path for Bank Rate implied by forward market interest rates are based on overnight index swap rates. Latest yield curve refers to forward market interest rates at cob 21 November 2021. UK fiscal policy developments in response to the energy price shock have been a key contributor to the outlook for inflation. In early September the Government announced an Energy Price Guarantee (EPG) for households (and a business equivalent) to cap average energy bills at £ up until April 2023. In the Autumn Statement on 17 November, the Government announced an increase in the cap to £ for the year to April 2024.

Bank of England  Page 1  That was the year that was − speech by Dave Ramsden Given at Bank of England Watchers’ Conference organised by the Money Macro Finance Society and King’s Business School at King’s College London 24 November 2022  Bank of England  Page 2  Speech Thank you for the invitation to speak today. I am particularly pleased that I have close links with the two institutions, the Money Macro and Finance Society and Kings College London, who have organised this first Bank-watchers’ conference. In the spirit of the sixty year old TV programme that inspired my title I want to give my personal review of why the economy, and in particular inflation, turned out to be very different over the past year, and suggest some potential consequences for the MPC’s approach to forecasting the economy and setting policy to hit the 2% inflation target. As a member of the MPC I hope to be able to do justice to how our thinking has evolved but I should stress at the outset that these are personal observations, which will nevertheless hopefully help set the scene for discussions at this conference. In my other monetary policy speeches this year I’ve focused on the impact of shocks. Today I’m going to look more through the lens of the uncertainty generated by those shocks, which has made the course of the economy in general and inflation in particular increasingly hard to predict1.
This is a clear example that, if not accompanied by credit risk management measures at the individual level and proper systemic prudential regulation and supervision, encouraging access to mortgage loans by formerly excluded sectors, a praiseworthy goal without a doubt, may end up substantially weakening the financial positions of not only the ones being intended to help in the first place but also the financial system at large. Inflation targeting and asset prices A corollary of those blaming monetary policy is that, apart from focusing on the variation of the prices of goods and services, it should also have asset prices in mind. Under inflation targeting regime, increased lending and asset prices can generate demand increases with repercussions on inflationary perspectives. This would require a monetary policy adjustment to prevent a persistent rise in inflation. Hence, in an inflation targeting  1  Interestingly and, according to Blinder and Reis (2005), using Taylor rules as from the first quarter of 1988, the residuals indicate that in all the mentioned episodes the Federal Reserve set the interest rates significantly below those prescribed by the rule. 2  There is evidence for the United States that securitization caused a relaxation of risk evaluation in the subprime segment and increased the rate of acceptance of mortgage applications (Loutskina and Strahan, 2006; Keys et al., 2009). BIS Review 68/2009  3  regime, asset prices and the level of credit aggregates affect the monetary policy decision to the extent that they affect the inflation perspectives (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999).

It is a non-statutory code, although compliance with it is expected of all AIs. It is monitored by the HKMA as part of its regular supervision, although, as I mentioned earlier, we have no formal, statutory mandate in this project. There is, I think, scope, as the Report advocates, for HKAB to take greater ownership of this code, particularly in the setting of standards – and in ensuring that these are high standards – and in monitoring and enforcing compliance. This would be consistent with the practice of banking associations in other jurisdictions, and it would be a logical development of HKAB’s role. A third area highlighted in the Consultant’s Report is consumer education in the field of banking services. This is a neglected subject in Hong Kong. The question of which organisation should take the lead in this is, of course, tied to the question of who should take on consumer protection. But, whatever the answer to the second question, it seems clear that HKAB would need to be involved in some form or another. This, in fact, reflects the practice among industry organisations in other jurisdictions, many of which have a strong tradition of producing plain-language factsheets, webpages and other resources on running personal finances, protecting one’s financial interests, and making the most of new forms of financial services. Moving away from the recommendations in the Consultant’s Report, there is, I think, a fourth area in which HKAB could become more involved. This is in the development of Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure.