samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Against an uncertain economic and political landscape, our vision should be to turn challenges into opportunities to sustain economic growth in the long term. Factors underpinning Malta’s remarkable resilience The Maltese economy has been vibrant, showing remarkable economic resilience in the face of the unstable economic environment elsewhere. In fact, the theme “Vibrant Malta” has been chosen for the European Cultural Days at the ECB in Frankfurt, which this year focus on Malta. Earlier this month, we launched a cultural programme aimed to enhance awareness of Malta’s cultural heritage. The theme reflects not only the current cultural scene but also our vibrant economy. Malta is the most open economy in the euro area, having exports and imports of goods and services each over 150% of GDP. Despite this challenging factor, the Maltese economy has managed to outperform its peers, with GDP growth consistently above that of the euro area average. A good perspective to this positive outcome is given in Chart 1, which is an update of a Chart I used in last year’s presentation; since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, Malta’s GDP increased by 18%, whereas that of Germany and the United Kingdom rose by just 5%, while that of the euro area as a whole contracted by 0.5%. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Chart 1: Real GDP growth by group of countries  Chart 2 shows the unemployment rate in the stressed and non-stressed euro area members and Malta since 2005.

I take such credibility risks extraordinarily seriously. The 1930s were an episode of even worse Fed policymaking. This was a period of far greater economic dislocation and hardship. When thinking about the 1930s, I find it useful to turn to the wisdom of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz from their book titled A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960. Friedman and Schwartz discuss how monetary policy in the early 1930s actually contributed to the contraction, despite the fact that bank reserves increased significantly over that period. Broad monetary aggregates contracted, even though bank reserves were higher, because 1) banking panics and the weak real economy led the public to hoard cash and 2) banks wanted to increase reserve ratios as insurance against liquidity shortages and runs. As a result, the amount of lending supported by a given level of reserves fell dramatically, and the U.S. economy experienced a period of deflation. However, the Fed failed to see that it was running a restrictive monetary policy. One reason was they were striving to stay on the gold standard, which dictated policies to counter gold outflows. In addition, the Fed interpreted the excess reserves on banks’ books and the associated low level of money market interest rates as signs of an accommodative financial environment and so did not aggressively loosen monetary policy.
John C Williams: Discussion of "Prospects for Inflation in a High Pressure Economy: Is the Phillips Curve Dead or Is It Just Hibernating?" by Peter Hooper, Frederic S. Mishkin, and Amir Sufi Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the US Monetary Policy Forum, New York City, 22 February 2019. * * * Accompanyting Tables and Figures of the speech. As prepared for delivery. The Phillips curve is the connective tissue between the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate goals of maximum employment and price stability. Despite regular declarations of its demise, the Phillips curve has endured. It is useful, both as an empirical basis for forecasting and for monetary policy analysis. The paper by Peter Hooper, Rick Mishkin, and Amir Sufi—HMS for short—provides an in-depth analysis of key aspects of inflation dynamics in the United States and how they may have changed. This study is particularly timely against the backdrop of an emerging consensus that the Phillips curve has become nearly flat. If this is true it would fundamentally alter the employment-inflation trade-offs the Fed confronts. There is a lot to like about this paper: It synthesizes existing research, new analysis, and bridges the study of wages and prices. Too often these are studied in isolation. But most significant, as someone who has discussed papers at the USMPF that reached the century mark in page count, this year’s paper came in at a relatively svelte 65 pages.

Before I continue, I’ll give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. Has the Phillips Curve Changed, or Is it a Trick of the Data? Throughout the paper, HMS use a reduced-form Phillips curve regression as a basis for their analysis. For my remarks, I simplify the specification and assume the inflation rate depends on the unemployment gap (and variants thereof), four lags of inflation, and a constant (relative to HMS, I have dropped the import price and inflation expectations terms). 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Overall, the results for the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index inflation using this simplified specification are quite similar to those reported in HMS. The full-sample (1961-2017) estimated coefficients using the core PCE price inflation rate are reported in the first column of the upper part of Table 1. The second column reports results corresponding to the “spline” specification of HMS, where positive values of the unemployment gap are added to the equation to capture asymmetry in the response of inflation to labor market tightness versus slack. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 report the corresponding estimation results for the subsample of 1961-1987, and the final two columns report the results for the subsample 19882017. Like HMS, the latter sample shows far less intrinsic persistence in inflation and a severe flattening of the Phillips curve relative to the full-sample results.
It involves all prices being expressed in the same unit, usually called a unit of value, in exactly the same way as we need a standardised way of measuring distance. Money also has to have a stable value (money must be a “store of value”), as this makes it possible to postpone consumption. It also needs to be accepted by everybody. It must be easily accessible and easy to use (it must act as a general means of payment). For a long time, the most common form of money was coinage issued on royal authority, with its value being determined by its metal content. In Sweden, the copper standard was introduced at the start of the 17th century, in addition to the silver and gold standards that already existed. 5 But handling the copper coins proved to be clumsy, which contributed towards King Charles X Gustav granting permission, in 1656, for the formation of Sweden’s first bank, Stockholms Banco, which was allowed to accept coins in exchange for promissory notes. These promissory notes soon started to be used as money, as they were much easier to carry  It is unclear how common barter was in early, primitive economies but we know that money appeared several thousand years ago. See, for example, Humphrey (1985) “Barter and Economic Disintegration”. Man, New Series, Vol. 20, No. 1. 3 See Camera, G. (2017). “A perspective on electronic alternatives to traditional currencies”. Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2017:1.

In addition, the decline in the growth of loans to the private sector has come to a halt and credit demand has recently strengthened. These developments need to be closely monitored, as they may start to point to upward risks to price stability, in particular during a period of economic recovery. BIS Review 40/2002  1  Overall, the outlook for price stability is now less benign than it was in November 2001, when we last adjusted the key ECB interest rates. Inflation has so far declined less steeply and less rapidly than we expected at the turn of the year. This has been partly due to the temporary factors I mentioned before, and to the renewed increase in oil prices in the first quarter of 2002. At the current juncture, even though the appreciation of the exchange rate of the euro will contribute to easing inflationary pressures, we will continue to closely monitor all relevant developments, against the background of the risk that the deviations from price stability, which followed the exceptional clustering of upward shocks on inflation over the past couple of years, may be transmitted into longer-term inflation expectations, thereby potentially affecting wage and price-setting behaviour. In order to maintain price stability, it is crucial that wage moderation prevails in the future. In this respect, we are concerned about recent trends in wages. The importance of wage developments in line with our definition of price stability cannot be overemphasised.
Overview In my remarks today, I’d like to share with you the latest news on the status of our work. We continue to move forward on the basis of our commitment last October to finalise outstanding issues by mid-year and have made significant progress in a number of important areas. As I will discuss in more detail today, by calibrating regulatory capital to unexpected losses only, we found a better solution which will make regulatory capital requirements for credit losses more consistent with bank’s own economic capital models. We have made significant progress in securitisation, credit risk mitigation and operational risk. We have clarified Pillar 2, and we continue to make progress in the implementation of the Accord. After sharing this news with you on our progress to date, I’ll conclude with thoughts on the work ahead in the final months. BIS Review 12/2004  1  Common factor But first let me begin with a reminder of a goal that is a common factor in all our work: namely, the objective to recognise good risk management practices and to create additional incentives to further advance the discipline of risk management. This is possibly the most important and powerful channel of the New Accord for fostering financial stability in the medium and long run. And it builds on the widespread acceptance of the existing 1988 Basel Accord while addressing its key weakness.

Other concerns could include the burdens and deadweight losses associated with reserve requirements, the implications of the framework for the efficiency and resilience of money markets and government securities markets, and the framework’s ability to help support the efficiency and resilience of payment systems. 20  For example, a large supply of “money-like” assets provided by the official sector could crowd out some shortterm private sector liabilities, reducing the amount of maturity transformation in the financial system and improving financial stability. See, for example, Mark Carlson, Burcu Duygan-Bump, Fabio Natalucci, William R. Nelson, Marcelo Ochoa, Jeremy Stein, and Skander Van den Heuvel, “The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial Stability: Some Evidence and Implications for Central Bank Policies,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion Series, no. 2014–102, November 2014. 21  Maintaining a large balance sheet in normal times may be perceived as a “slack” variable that invites policymakers to use it for non-monetary policy objectives. See, for example, https://www.philadelphiafed.org/ publications/speeches/plosser/2010/09–24–10_swiss-national-bank. 22  For a discussion of footprint considerations in the design of the Federal Reserve’s overnight reverse repo operations, see Joshua Frost, Lorie Logan, Antoine Martin, Patrick McCabe, Fabio Natalucci, and Julie Remache, “Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy Tool: Some Design Considerations,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 712, February 2015.
This in turn enables banks to differentiate good debtors from more risky ones, and charge them commensurate to their risk profiles. In view of bank oversight, the Bank of Thailand has reoriented its focus on supervisory framework away from solo-basis transaction-testing analysis, towards risk-based supervision on consolidated basis. To fulfill this objective, we have already issued guidelines on all key risk categories and undertaken internal reform and capacity building to meet the challenge posed by comprehensive risk-based supervision. An example in this area is the development of examiners’ manuals that are regularly revised to ensure consistently high standards of supervision. 4. Going forward  Ladies and gentlemen, in the next few years, Thailand anticipates both opportunities and threats in the retail banking sector for existing banks in the light of the implementation of the Financial Sector Master Plan. As regards the focus of regulators, more attention will be given to watchful monitoring of the use of credit cards, monitoring of non-bank credit institutions, and observance of governance by market participants. The changing landscape of financial system to be brought about by the Financial Sector Master Plan will create opportunities for present market participants that have the courage to explore the niche and capability to satisfy the specialized needs of this group of customers. They come in the form of a new type of bank license - retail bank and other incentives. The tier1 capital requirement of 250 million baht for retail banks will be conducive to their specialized lending to retail customers.

In terms of composition of banking retail credit, housing credit represents almost two-thirds, reflecting the household’s holding of assets mainly in the form of housing real estate - a common feature prevalent in Asia. Credit cards and commercial credits take up 7.2 and 6 percent of total retail credit, respectively, while the remaining 21 percent are credit for other consumption purposes such as electrical appliance, education and so on. Among all types of retail credit, there are three fast growing segments in the past few years that deserve our attention. First, housing credits with accelerating growth. Second, credit card advance with tapering growths close to 40 percent. And third, automobile hire purchase with record growths of well above 50 percent. The booms in these segments commonly rest on the strong economic recovery, coupled with solid performance of the stock exchange - after all the Stock Exchange of Thailand recorded one of the best performing bourse in 2003. The government spending programs such as the village fund has fuelled further consumption, especially at the grass-root level, to ensure firm recovery. Moreover, against the backdrop of persistently low interest rate environment, consumers find it easier to part with their money acquired from liability assumption. This is particularly relevant for the build-up of debt in housing and automobile segments by households that simply mirrors an accumulation of assets on the other side of their balance sheet.
Orderly functioning financial markets are vital not only for the efficient allocation of financial resources in the economy but it is also essential for the transmission of the monetary policy and for preserving financial stability. While competitive forces are expected to result in efficient and optimal outcomes, central banks in emerging economies have had the important role of balancing between the market forces and intervention with the objective of ensuring the orderly functioning of the financial markets. It needs to be recognised that several important preconditions need to be in place to generate equilibrium prices that reflect the underlying fundamentals. This includes the institutional and market infrastructure, the incentive structure, the rules of the game and the level of financial literacy that recognise and understand the market signals. When these elements are still yet to be fully developed in many emerging economies, it increases the risk to instability. Thus, as a result of the stage of development of such markets, or its size or prevailing market imperfections, emerging economies have tended to be more vulnerable to greater volatility and circumstances in which markets do not self-equilibrate. The recent global financial crisis has shown that such dislocations have occurred even in developed financial systems. Institutional structures and rules that become deficient and less relevant heighten the risk for such unstable market conditions. Experience has also shown that such market dislocations have severe and far reaching adverse implications on the overall economy.

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate Governor Gjedrem for the achievements of the Bank under this leadership during his twelve year terms in office. My remarks today will focus on the role of central banks from the perspective of emerging economies and more specifically in the context of central banking in Asia as we confront the challenges in this rapidly changing global economic and financial environment. Central bank mandates While there is no unique blueprint for the design of the institutional arrangements for a central bank, of importance is that it needs to be relevant to our own circumstances. But of importance is that there is clarity on the mandate, the governance framework and the areas of accountability of the central bank. And that needs to be supported by the empowering legislation to ensure that the central bank has at its disposal the capabilities to deliver the mandate. Central banks in emerging economies generally have a broader mandate beyond the traditional mandates of monetary and financial stability. Even within these traditional mandates, the role of central banks have varied considerably. In the mandate of monetary stability, it has ranged from having the narrow mandate of price stability to the mandate where price stability is the primary role of the central bank while due consideration is also given to economic and employment objectives. While for some the mandates are clearly hierarchical, for others, the multiple mandates involve assessments of the trade-offs.
Although average hourly earnings rose more quickly in October―pushing the year-over-year pace up to 2.5 percent – this indicator can be volatile on a month-to-month basis, and it has not been borne out by some other important measures of labor compensation. For example, over the past year, the Employment Cost Index for private sector worker compensation has risen 1.9 percent, remaining within the narrow range of recent years. This is important because my assessment of what constitutes maximum sustainable or full employment depends in large part on how a tighter labor market translates into compensation gains. At the same time, one needs to be cautious about interpreting compensation trends in the current environment. It is possible that factors such as very low headline inflation and weak productivity growth are holding down what workers receive in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  compensation. Therefore, because of such factors, compensation growth may not provide a reliable signal about whether we are approaching full employment. To sum up on the growth side, the economy looks to be in decent shape and is likely to continue to grow at a slightly above-trend pace. Spare labor resources are shrinking. But there still is some risk that the growth pace could slow as the trade sector acts as a drag on aggregate economic activity. On the inflation side of the ledger, I have greater concerns because we continue to fall substantially short of our inflation objective of 2 percent for the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator.

On balance, I believe we have been making progress toward our goals, recognizing that a few issues still cloud the outlook. Most noteworthy is the fact that inflation continues to run well below our 2 percent objective. With respect to the economic growth outlook, the softness in third-quarter real GDP – which according to its initial estimate rose at only a 1.5 percent annualized pace – and the weakness of the manufacturing sector have raised concerns that the U.S. economy may be losing some forward momentum. Sharp reductions in oil and gas drilling activity and a loss of international competitiveness associated with the dollar’s appreciation over the past year have restrained factory output. Judging from historical experience, the impact of the dollar’s recent strength has the potential to be protracted, so that the trade sector probably will continue to be a drag on growth in 2016. Thus, the manufacturing sector is likely to continue to lag behind the rest of economy. But these negatives need to be set against the many positive aspects of the economic outlook. In particular, domestic demand continues to grow at a solid pace as increases in consumer spending, housing and business fixed investment all contributed to the third quarter’s 2.9 percent annualized gain in real domestic final sales. A large decline in the pace of inventory accumulation was the main reason why real GDP growth faltered in the third quarter.
It is not yet possible to state with certainty that financial institutions could fund themselves without the support of capital controls and the declaration of a blanket deposit guarantee. In this context, it is critical to enhance the functioning of the financial markets, which are important for trading, funding, and risk diversification – particularly the foreign exchange and equity markets. It is also essential that financial institutions and other entities re-establish their access to foreign credit markets. A further task is to formulate policy regarding the nature, size, and international relations of the Icelandic financial system. It is no less important to formulate policy concerning the tools and institutional structure for financial stability: the financial crisis has taught us that assessing systemic risk is key, as are sound arrangements for the application of tools to mitigate it. The final crossroads is faced by economic policy, as a result of the changes I have described. In short, it can be said that the tasks at hand are shifting from the achievement of stability to promoting growth, and from crisis management to longer-term development. In terms of monetary policy, this can be seen in the Monetary Policy Committee’s shift of its bias from monetary easing to neutral. This does not mean that interest rates cannot be lowered further, but it does mean that because inflation appears to have hit bottom, economic recovery has begun, and the effective policy rate is closer to equilibrium than before, it is not as clear what direction upcoming interest rate decisions will take.

Már Guðmundsson: Iceland’s economy and monetary regime – a series of crossroads Speech by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the 50th Annual General Meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland, Reykjavík, 7 April 2011. *  *  *  Honourable President; Prime Minister; other Ministers; Speaker of Parliament; Chairman of the Board; Party Chairmen, Bank Directors; Directors of Public Institutions; Ladies and Gentlemen: This year’s Annual General Meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland is held on the Bank’s 50th anniversary. But it would hardly be accurate to say that the Bank is facing halcyon days at this milestone. Quite the contrary: times are turbulent. Furthermore, Iceland’s economy and monetary regime are standing at a complex series of crossroads, and the paths we choose could have a profound impact on future developments. This is reminiscent of the situation that reigned when the Bank was founded, but I will come to that later. What exactly are these crossroads, then? The first fork in the road lies in the changing economic situation. Instability and recession are giving way to better equilibrium and recovery. The current account deficit from Iceland’s overheating period has been turned around to an underlying surplus that has supported the króna, which is now over 7½% stronger than it was at the beginning of last year. At the same time, the Central Bank has bought foreign currency in the market for about 33 b.kr., as part of its plan to accumulate non-borrowed reserves.