samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Turkish accession today would imply an increase of more than 17 percent in the EU population. Indeed, between 1990-2003, the average population growth rate and the birth rate Turkey have been 1.8 percent and 2.3 percent per annum respectively.15 The Turkish population is expected to stay young in the foreseeable future. Whereas in the 2000 s, the EU-15 has 0.3 percent of population growth rate and 1.1 percent of birth rate on average at highly decreasing trends.16 According to certain estimations, in the year 2020, the average age in the EU-15 will be 43, while it will be 33 in Turkey17. This means that in the future, Europe will probably be experiencing labour shortages rather than the unemployment problems of today18. What this argument implies that Turkey s young and expanding population will reduce the negative impact of the EU s aging and diminishing work force in the coming 15-20 years. Turkey with a young population would be an important asset in the long-term in competing with countries such as China, India and the US. As another variable in the equation, we observe an advantageous position for Turkey regarding the dependency ratio. As a result of a young and growing population, the dependency ratio of the Turkish population is in a decreasing trend. As of the year 2000, the share of the age group of 55 and above in total population is 29 percent in the EU-15 while that of Turkey is a mere 11 percent19.

First of all, although the unemployment rate in the Turkish economy is quite high compared to the EU members, we observe that the total increase in employment throughout the year 2004 was much higher than that of the EU members and acceding countries. Another notable issue about the structure of our labour market is that Turkey s economy is moving from a labour intensive structure toward a capital intensive one. And it is a natural consequence that during this period some sectors are expanding while others are contracting. What this implies is that the structure of employment has also been changing. In fact, even though it is still  15  Under-Secretariat of State Planning Organization. 16  http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat. 17  International Labour Organization. 18  Böttcher, B. (2004). "Turkish Accession to the EU- The Way is the Goal". Deutche Bank Research. 19  International Labour Organization. 20  www.un.org. 6/8  high compared to the EU members, the share of the agricultural sector in total employment has been falling while that of services sector has been on the rise. And I believe that Turkey s young and dynamic demographic structure supports easier transfers between sectors and facilitates improvement in the sectoral dispersion of employment. Having mentioned all these demographic and labour market conditions of the EU and Turkey, I need to emphasize the importance of making further progress on educational reforms in Turkey.
The LiFE is a testament to the commitment of central banks to cooperate to secure the stability of the system to the benefit of all our citizens. Liquidity facilities have not just been about firefighting. Given the constraints of the effective lower bound (ELB), lending facilities have been recast into stimulus tools. Drawing on the 3-year long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) launched by ECB the previous year, the Bank of England launched a Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) in 2012, as the nascent recovery was threatened by a sharp rise in banks funding costs and subsequent tightening in credit conditions amid the euro-area crisis. The FLS combined four year funding with sharp incentives to support lending to households and businesses. Banks expanding lending were able to access the scheme for a 25bp fee, a sizeable discount to retail and market funding costs at the time, with higher fees, of up to 150bp, for those that were contracting their lending. Banks could access 5% of their initial stock of lending immediately and to provide a further incentive to lend this allocation was adjusted upward by the amount of their net lending in the 18 months following the launch of the scheme.9 Building on the experience of the FLS, the Bank launched a Term Funding Scheme (TFS) in August 2016 as part of a package of measures in response to the hit to confidence in the UK following the vote to leave the European Union.

7  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  9  Chart 5: Households and businesses have consistently expected increases in interest rates to be gradual and limited Per cent 6  2014 Q1 Pre-crisis average level of Bank Rate (5.2%)  2015 Q1  5  2016 Q1 2017 Q1  4  2018 Q1 3  2019 Q1  2 1 0 0  1  2  3 Years ahead  4  5  6  The experience in the euro area and UK demonstrates how guidance can be effective in managing expectations as circumstances change. As intended, “limited and gradual” guidance has dampened interest rate volatility (Chart 6) and reduced the correlation between interest rate volatility and economic uncertainty (Chart 7). Both developments have increased the degree of monetary policy stimulus, thereby reinforcing the recovery during turbulent times. Chart 6: Interest rate volatility has remained low since guidance was provided Standard deviation of option-implied distributions for 3m Libor in 12 months' time, UK and US August 2013 guidance issued 3m US LIBOR (12m ahead)  Basis points 200 180 160  standard deviation February 2014 guidance issued  140 120  EU referendum  100 80 60 40  3m UK LIBOR (12m ahead) standard deviation  20 0  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  2018  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and Bank calculations.
We have great confidence in the ability of the banking system to promote the best banking and cautionary practices; however, I believe that preemptive action is needed to ensure that latest observed trends do not hamper financial stability. Therefore, we cannot neglect improving our legislative, regulatory and prudential measures as a major element of financial sector reforms in Albania. 2  BIS Review 121/2006  In this regard, a new Draft Banking Law is prepared by Bank of Albania; likewise, a new Law on Securities will be introduced shortly. In addition, efforts are underway to revise legislation on Pension and Investment Funds, and draft a Law on the Payments Systems, which will substitute several sublegal acts issued by the Bank of Albania until now. This process aims at gradual harmonization of the banking legislation with that of the Acquis Communnautaire. To address issues of increased competition, poor managerial practices and safeguard stability, the Bank of Albania is working toward establishing a Credit Registry, revising regulatory framework on capital adequacy ratio and credit risk management, increasing on-site supervision, and improving its stress-testing models. Following Financial Stability and Assessment Program (FSAP) recommendations, a separate entity “The Authority of Financial Supervision”, has been established recently to supervise the securities, insurance and pension funds markets. Last but not the least, I would like to address the implementation of the Basel II accord. While it will shape the financial market, I believe it will pose challenges to our banking system and to us at the moment.

That being so, central banks may be able to stabilize demand and output growth more effectively than in the past. Most obviously, cuts in interest rates are now much more likely to be understood as a response to an adverse demand shock rather than as attempts to generate extra demand and jobs in the short run at the cost of stoking up higher medium-term inflation. And so it is easier for central banks to cut interest rates when that would desirable in order to stabilise demand conditions and so keep inflation in line with the target. Related to that, greatly increased transparency across the central banking world makes policy surprises – and so outsized market reactions to policy decisions – somewhat less likely. Second, more competitive and transparent product markets (partly thanks to the internet), together with more flexible labour markets, may have improved the real economy’s ability to absorb nasty shocks without persistent large falls in output. Third, developments in banking probably mean that more households have access to credit to help them to smooth their consumption by borrowing during ‘bad times’. And by routinely distributing more risk to non-banks, the banking system may be less likely to wish or need to conserve capital, refraining from taking risk, when faced with increased demand for liquidity from its corporate and household customers. For these reasons, consumption growth may be less prone to violent lurches than during, say, the 1970s and 1980s.
Own interest rate forecasts When we expressed our views in February regarding the future development of the interest rate, it was the first time we presented our own assessment of the future repo rate path. By this we mean that we try to calculate what we believe will be a well balanced monetary policy over the coming years. Previously we presented forecasts for the economy on the basis of what the financial market participants believed about the repo rate. Now that we are presenting our own interest rate path it will be clearer both what we believe about the interest rate and what we believe about the economy in general. We consider this to be a major step forward in the Riksbank’s way of explaining how monetary policy functions. For most people I believe it is more important to have an idea of the development of the interest rate over time, rather than to know what an individual interest rate decision will entail. In this context I always try to be as clear as possible. The interest rate path is merely a forecast, not a promise. The economic conditions on which we base our forecasts are constantly changing. Changes are constantly taking place in the economy, which means that we have to reconsider our opinions of future developments. The interest rate path represents nothing more nor less than the best assessment we were able to make at the time it was published. When the world around us changes, we also have to change our forecasts.

It had responsibility for the CHAPS system, providing high-value, same-day settlement with a minimum value of £ (equivalent to around £ in today’s prices).5 Today there is no minimum value, but CHAPS settles around £ billion every working day, representing 93% of non-cash payments in the UK. Around 40% of CHAPS payments originate from organisations based overseas, reflecting the UK’s strong links to the global economy. Bringing CHAPS into the Bank When RTGS was established in 1996, it became the settlement infrastructure for CHAPS, increasing financial stability by ensuring the highest value payments were settled real time in central bank money. The CHAPS Co Clearing Company Ltd (CHAPS Co) continued to operate the CHAPS scheme from a member perspective until last year. Bringing CHAPS in-house marked an important milestone in our ongoing work to make CHAPS and RTGS safer, more secure, more accessible, and in line with international best practice. Until last year, the UK was unusual in that a private sector company (CHAPS Co) was responsible for the governance and rulebook6 of the high-value payment system, while the Bank provided the underlying settlement infrastructure. In 2017 the Bank’s analysis concluded that there were structural constraints in this model. Given the status of RTGS as critical national infrastructure, CHAPS Co could not be given the full range of information on RTGS that it would need to identify and manage risks across the whole payment system.
Ravi Menon: Global economic outlook - renewed optimism, higher uncertainty Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the UBS' Wealth Insights Conference, Singapore, 16 January 2017. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. The global economy in 2016 – resilient but uninspiring 2016 was an eventful year for the global economy. If you recall, we began the year with anxiety over China’s financial markets but breathed easier over the course of the year as China steadied its economy and avoided the hard landing feared by many. We saw economic momentum in the US slip, and then pick up towards the end of the year, which also saw the second rate hike by the Fed in 10 years and an unexpected presidential election outcome. The EU economy was stirred but not shaken by the shock of the Brexit vote in June, with accommodative monetary policy providing support while domestic demand gradually improved. Japan saw further innovations in monetary easing – with negative interest rates and yield curve control – with some but not decisive improvement in growth outcomes. In the ASEAN economies, growth was respectable but below potential, as a pick-up in private consumption was offset by weaker investment and exports. Overall, I would say the global economy in 2016 was resilient but uninspiring. Economic growth was sustained in the face of shocks but remains sub-par.

But they should be supported by strong institutions with discretionary powers. Mario Draghi pointed out 1 the fundamental difference between a monetary policy institution and fiscal rules, which are exemplified by the track records of the ECB and SGP respectively. Third, there is room for an intermediate level of integration, as shown in a simple but illustrative matrix. I would call it “full coordination of national policies”, a presently missing link between integration, as we have for monetary policy decision-making, and rule-based surveillance, such as is currently the case for national fiscal policies in Europe and which is clearly lacking teeth. 1  2  Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at SZ Finance day 2015, Frankfurt am Main, 16 March 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  To be sure, the highest level of policy integration would logically involve building a genuine fiscal union, as well as completing the Single Market; but that would surely require more ex ante convergence and resolution of legacies from the past. My view is that we should leave the door open to further integration for countries that are willing and ready to consider it. Yet the most urgently needed part of EMU reform, is to set up a strong institution, led by a Euro area Finance Minister, to fully coordinate national fiscal and structural policies. In economic terms it would help internalize negative externalities (e.g. demand spillovers, or financial contagion) from asymmetric shocks across jurisdictions, as well as optimize positive externalities between fiscal and structural policies.
What we need to do as supervisors is to make sure that global banks have adequate risk management capabilities, sufficient loss-absorbing capital, and are subject to intensive and coordinated supervision, so that we are able to contain the systemic risk they pose without curtailing their contribution to economic growth worldwide. We have nothing to fear from global banks which are well-managed, well-capitalised and well-supervised by home and host authorities. What we should do is prevent the emergence of badly managed, badly-disciplined banks, whatever their geographical dimension, as they can expose our financial systems to important risks. I hope that this humble contribution provides food for thought. As I said at the beginning of my intervention, I do not have all of the answers. But I do think that we can and should learn lessons from all experiences, both positive and negative. My words reflect the experience that we have had with our global banks in the last three years. But of course, past successes are not, per se, a guarantee of future success. Sophocles wrote in one of his tragedies that “we cannot call a mortal being happy until he’s passed beyond life free from pain”. Following the same principle of precaution, neither supervisors nor credit institutions should succumb to the temptation of unfounded optimism about the future. This is the reason why we will continue pushing for a very intense supervisory process for these global institutions and we will ensure that they are complying with the highest standards in any field.

We have planned an open and rolling application process for these roles and intend to name additional counterparties in the weeks ahead. Complementing this effort, the New York Fed also announced a parallel process last week whereby firms may also apply to become agency CMBS dealers to support the Desk's purchases of agency CMBS. In closing, let me finish where I started. In this time of pain and hardship, we have choices to make in how we respond, and the opportunity before us is to create generational opportunities for a broad and inclusive set of businesses to help advance an equitable recovery. I look forward to partnering with you on this work for years to come. 1 1 Rajashri Chakrabarti and William Nober, “Distribution of COVID-19 Incidence by Geography, Race, and  Income,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, June 15, 2020. 2 2 Rajashri Chakrabarti, William Nober, and Maxim Pinkovskiy, “ Are Financially Distressed Areas More Affected  by COVID-19?,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, August 17, 2020. 3 3 Daleep Singh, “The Fed’s Emergency Facilities: Usage, Impact, and Early Lessons,” remarks at Hudson  Valley Pattern for Progress, July 8, 2020. 4 4 Jerome H. Powell, “Coronavirus and CARES Act,” testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S.  House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., June 30, 2020. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
In terms of monetary policy, this is the sensitivity of inflation expectations to temporary or local factors which induces risks, rather than the fact that households’ inflation expectations exceed inflation measures. This is clear from the analysis of the reasons causing inflation deviation away from our October’s forecast. This deviation is quite notable — +0.7 percentage points. According to preliminary estimates, 0.2 percentage points of this deviation stem from a faster rise in sugar and sunflower 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  oil prices and 0.3 percentage points — from the growth of grain export prices and their passthrough to prices for both bakery products and a broader range of food products. The remaining 0.2 percentage points are interpreted as additional steady inflationary pressure. It may result from both a faster revival of demand in a number of industries already facing supply-side constraints and secondary effects brought about by increased inflation expectations. This is what may impact a steady level of inflationary pressure in the future as well. Therefore, today it is rather important how the situation will be unfolding in the future, including how inflation expectations will be changing and whether secondary effects may become more intense. This may result in a longer-lasting influence of one-off factors on prices. Moreover, we should take into account that a rise in inflation expectations may speed up the growth of the demand for consumer lending which has already been expanding materially amid the accommodative monetary policy.

But of course don’t expect a central banker to answer this question, one year in advance. I will just mention the Banque de France view on the rationale that should be behind the determination of the starting level of the euro area short-term rates. As you know, we currently observe interest rate differentials between the “core” and more “peripheral” currencies participating in the exchange rate mechanism. Although these spreads have been dramatically reduced in the past two years, due to the remarkable convergence of inflation rates throughout the European Union, some interest rate differentials still exist. They can be attributed partly to differing positions in the business cycle, and partly to differences in credibility. Cyclical differences within the potential euro area should not be overestimated. There is, all in all, a relatively high degree of synchronisation in the business cycle in continental Europe. The convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty certainly played an important role in fostering this synchronisation. Moreover, in the future, differences in cyclical developments will gradually be reduced as policies, structures and behaviour will become more and more similar. Lastly, some persisting differences may well be tolerated as is currently the case between the various regions of the same country or, for instance, between the various member states of the USA. Credibility differences between “core” and “peripheral” currencies result from the different lengths of the track records in terms of stability-oriented policies.
In both dimensions, I believe this kind of long-term approach is the hallmark of a high-quality financial system. Concluding remarks 27. I hope these reflections have shed some light on Hong Kong’s distinctive qualities as an international financial centre. It is resilient – our institutions and markets remain safe and sound in good times and bad. And it offers huge opportunities to local and global participants, driven by the Mainland’s continued financial liberalisation, as well as developments in fintech and green finance. 28. My team and I are committed to upholding these qualities. We will continue to reinforce Hong Kong’s position as an international financial centre of the highest quality. This journey has no end – and we will rely as always on strong support from everyone that we work with, including many of you. I am confident that, by working together, we can continue to build on Hong Kong’s unique foundation – and enhance our position as one of the world’s pre3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  eminent financial centres. 29. It only remains for me to thank the Hong Kong Management Association for having me here tonight; to thank you all for your attention; and to congratulate the winners of the Quality Award – your achievements are rightly honoured today. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

The SME financing guide book being launched today is initiated by the Institute of Bankers Malaysia to provide detailed guidance to assist SMEs in their applications for financing from financial institutions. It also provides information on the factors that are taken into consideration by financial institutions in approving the applications. In addition, it elaborates on the responsibility of borrowers, and the redress mechanisms that are available. Irrespective of sectors, SMEs should adopt best practices in financial management to ensure their business will remain sustainable. Managing costs will also enhance the performance and competitiveness of the business in both domestic and global markets. SMEs should therefore actively draw on the wide range of products and services including advisory services offered for every stage of its business cycle, whether it is a start-up, growing or a matured business. The expertise, extensive network and the broad range of services and products which are in place should be leveraged upon by the SMEs. Recognising the importance of SMEs in contributing to the socioeconomic development of the country, the Government has introduced various programmes to assist SMEs through its Ministries and agencies. The infrastructure to support access to SME financing has also vastly improved compared to a decade ago. In 2012, a total of RM217.2 billion in financing has been disbursed to SMEs through the banking system, compared to only RM87.1 billion in 2003. This year, 155 SME development programmes with an allocation of RM18.4 billion have been developed and which is being channeled through government agencies and the private sector.