samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is essential that we all ensure that there is a real-time and ambitious approach across the globe. Second, central banks shall continue to be active players in innovation. A few have already launched digital currencies, some – including the Eurosystem – are testing it in pilot experiments. We at the ECB decided a two-year investigation phase under the leadership of my colleague Fabio Panetta, before taking a decision about whether to go further by the end of 2023. Retail CBDCs have caught the attention of the public; however, they raise sensitive questions, especially regarding the use cases for households and the role of commercial banks. That is why I would call for a ceiling of the individual CBDC holdings. Let us not forget the other possible digital currency, a “wholesale” CBDC for banking institutions. DLT could bring the benefits of central bank money digitalisation to a new level, with increased efficiency of some interbank processes and the development of new services, especially in a cross-border context. Let me be clear, CBDC is not about the Big Brother of central banks threatening the free world of decentralized finance. Rather it could be about providing further tools to help make Defi successful and sustainable. The Banque de France carried out nine successful experiments in 2021, with a wide array of partners and on different segments, and a new series of experiments focusing on cross-border payments will take place in 2022.

The teething problems with the Stability and Growth Pact have been an example of these challenges. One of the key motivations of the Pact was an effort to avoid free riding by national governments in a multinational currency area. In other words, the desire to achieve a proper policy mix was present at the birth of this rule. In spite of that, the Pact is now criticised for being too rigid, not allowing for a proper policy response in times of distress, and thus ultimately leading to poor real economic performance. This naturally undermines its credibility and supports calls for various “escape clauses”, to use the inflation-targeting terminology. The Pact is thus fighting the same battle that the conservative central banker was some time ago. It should evolve towards a “constrained discretion” system that will fulfil its major goals - sustainability, credibility and co-ordination of stabilisation policies - yet at the same time be sufficiently flexible to allow for proper responses in adverse periods. It has yet to convince policy-makers and the public that it can deliver the lunch without them having to pay too high a price for it in terms of cyclical stabilisation. So far, the Pact has seemed to be losing the battle. This is somewhat unfair, as the adverse period came before most EU countries had achieved the target of balanced structural budgets, which reduced their manoeuvring space considerably. In a sense, the Pact is thus paying a price for being too lax in the previous period, i.e.
A study of Swedish data shows that such changes have contributed approximately 0.2 percentage points a year during the second half of the 1990s(3). 3 The same picture, although applying to the situation in the United States, can be seen in US studies. 4 Another possibility to improve the accounting is to look more closely at the link between labour and capital. So far the analysis has been based on the two resources in production being dealt with separately. But there are good examples of when labour and capital are interdependent. Technical knowledge becomes particularly valuable with regard to the development of programs and systems, the production of computer games, etc. Artists, film stars, elite athletes/sportsmen and others active in the experience industry get more out of their special skills through the developments in IT and communications. The US central bank governor Ben Bernanke uses the company Walmart as another example. 5 For the purpose of using the IT investments the company had made, they reorganised their work, gave the staff further training and changed the relationship to their suppliers. This type of technique for general use, of which IT can be said to be an example, can in turn push up other investment, such as further education. There are also other ways of developing the analysis.

Some people would argue that the stocks of assets held by Central Banks matter more than the flows of purchases. Others would contend that the composition and size of purchases are the real levers. The issue boils down to whether an expansion in the monetary basis is enough to trigger credit expansion or whether the latter is correlated to banks willingness to expand credit and more importantly to the appetite of economic agents to borrow. Based on how monetary policies have been conducted for the past several decades, banks have always had the ability to expand credit at a given level of interest rate irrespective of the size of the Central Bank’s balance sheet. Being at the ZLB does not change that simple reality. Hence I would tend to argue that, given the transmission channels of an asset purchase program, its composition and length may matter as much as its size. In any event, increasing the size of the Central Bank’s balance sheet, via large scale asset purchases, sends very important signals. This “signaling” operates at several levels. It may contribute to strengthening forward guidance on the policy rate. More importantly, it may have a direct impact on inflation expectations, therefore contributing to lowering real interest rates. When the balance sheet size is explicitly linked to the achievement of an inflation objective as in Japan, it may prove an effective tool to communicate the monetary authority’s determination – what economists would call a “commitment device”.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  If the sector continues to grow twice as fast as the economy over the next five years – not easy but we aim to – financial services will make up 14% of the economy in 2020, compared to 11% in 2010. Now, the bad news. The financial sector is inherently vulnerable to risk and volatility. •  As crisis after crisis has shown, problems in the financial sector quickly become problems for the entire economy. •  The Global Financial Crisis imposed a tremendous cost with the global economy estimated to have lost 5 percentage points of growth between 2007 and 2009, not to mention the human dimension in jobs lost and companies closed. •  As an international financial centre – connected to the global network of financial flows and playing host to hundreds of foreign financial institutions – Singapore is particularly vulnerable to contagion and shocks from abroad. The global financial industry is facing unprecedented headwinds. •  We are looking at a prolonged period of low growth and low interest rates – a combination that spells reduced earnings and increased risks for most financial institutions. •  The regulatory and compliance burden has increased significantly, following wideranging regulatory reforms in the wake of the global financial crisis. •  The reforms were necessary to help make global finance safer; but their cumulative effects do pose a challenge for the profitability of financial institutions, especially banks. •  Unprofitable banks are not necessarily safe banks.

Finally, the financial industry in many parts of the world is facing a crisis of trust. •  Financial institutions have come under increasing public scrutiny over their business conduct. •  Globally, we have seen repeated cases of mis-selling financial products, manipulating benchmark rates, and using the financial system for illicit transactions. Singapore’s financial sector has to overcome these headwinds and manage these risks as it develops further. And it must do this while seizing on opportunities presented by a growing Asia and technological change. Let me touch on three attributes that our financial sector needs to maintain and strengthen in the years ahead: resilience, dynamism, and trust. A resilient financial centre I will start with resilience. •  We cannot insulate our financial sector from the stresses and turbulence in international financial markets. •  We must remain open but be able to absorb shocks from abroad and bounce back. High prudential standards have therefore been a hallmark of Singapore’s financial sector since the very beginning. •  In recent years, we have further strengthened the resilience of the system through higher capital requirements and enhanced liquidity rules. Singapore banks operate well above the regulatory capital minimums. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  The Basel Committee prescribes a minimum Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio of 6%;  •  MAS has set a regulatory minimum of 8%;  •  The three local banking groups have Tier 1 ratios in excess of 13%.
The standstill provides an essential breathing space during which accountants appointed by the company can report on its financial problems and prospects for survival, and the company can try to reorganize its business and management. Assuming that the company looks as if it is salvageable, the banks will normally be prepared to continue the standstill to allow proposals to be presented by the company’s financial advisers to restructure its debt, by for example extending its term, reducing the interest rate or even the principal amount and swapping debt for equity. If the shareholders are able and willing, it may also be possible for fresh capital or assets to be injected into the company to fill a hole in the balance sheet and to improve its income earning capacity. During the period of the standstill and while the restructuring plans are being formulated, it will be the responsibility of the lead bank appointed at the first all banks meeting to enforce the standstill, to negotiate with the company and its financial advisers and to share information with the other lending banks. The lead bank will be assisted in this process by a steering committee, normally consisting of about 4-6 banks. It is important to note that while the steering committee may recommend a restructuring plan to the bank group as a whole, it cannot commit them to it. This means that a workout can only go ahead if there is unanimous agreement among all the banks involved.

The Guidelines are in turn based on the London Approach that was formulated by the Bank of England when the UK market was going through similar strains at the beginning of the 1990s. The underlying principles of the Guidelines are as follows: *  When it becomes public knowledge that a debtor company may be experiencing financial problems and the borrower has approached its banks, banks’ initial attitude should be one of support. They should not withdraw facilities or hastily put the company into receivership, or issue writs demanding repayment. *  Further decisions should only be based on information that is reliable and shared fully with all the creditor banks (after obtaining the debtor’s permission). *  The decision to offer the company financial assistance - or not - should be a collective one by creditor banks. It will be seen that the process begins when the debtor takes the initiative to approach the banks and to call what is known as an “all banks” meeting. This is the first psychological barrier to be crossed, since companies are often reluctant to own up to their difficulties. The meeting with the banks offers the company the opportunity to explain the nature of its problems and to ask the banks to agree to a standstill on repayments of principal and possibly also of interest.
Baldwin attributes the severe and synchronous slump in goods exports to two main factors: first, the uncertainty that was triggered simultaneously around the world by the collapse of Lehman Brothers; second, the strong internationalisation of the value chain. The former led to a concurrent drop in demand, particularly for consumer durables, while the latter resulted in the goods trade volume reacting disproportionately to changes in production. This is because a product can cross national borders several times during the manufacturing process. Demand for services remained relatively robust, however, with the exception of financial services. Cf. also Ingo Borchert and Aaditya Mattoo (2010): Services trade – the collapse that wasn’t. BIS Review 157/2010  1  more, the recovery observed since mid-last year has been comparatively brisk. As a result, by mid-2010, Swiss goods exports had recouped almost two-thirds of the losses suffered. The Swiss National Bank’s decisive action undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the Swiss economy as a whole emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed. The SNB didn’t hesitate to lower interest rates decisively and – like other central banks – to employ unconventional monetary policy measures when required by the legal mandate, once the room for manoeuvre using the traditional interest rate instrument had been exhausted. In particular, we created additional liquidity through the purchase of foreign currency. In doing so, we resisted extreme exchange rate developments that could have initiated a deflationary dynamic and would have had devastating consequences for the Swiss economy.

This divergence in the regional focus becomes even more apparent when Asia is viewed as a whole. This is because Switzerland maintains far closer trade ties with Asia’s industrialised countries than the EU does, particularly with the four Asian tiger economies of Hong Kong,  6  The USD value of goods exports to developing and emerging economies (excluding the tiger economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) has grown by an average of 7.5% since 1990, i.e. it has quadrupled. Goods exports to industrialised counties increased by 4.7% annually during the same period, representing an increase by a factor of only 2.5. 7  From 1990 to 2008, the GDP of developing and emerging economies rose by an average of almost 8% (China alone grew by more than 10%). The GDP of the EU15, by contrast, rose by just 1.9% on average (US: 2.7%). 8  The USD value of Swiss goods exports to emerging Asia (excluding the tiger economies) has grown by an average of 9.1% since 1990 (since 2000: 18%). The corresponding growth rates for Germany amounted to 11.4% (since 2000: 17.8%), and for the EU, 9.6% (since 2000: 13.6%). 9  Including intra-EU trade. BIS Review 157/2010  3  Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Overall, Switzerland’s share of exports to Asia, including Japan, came to 15% last year – more than twice the EU average. 10 Furthermore, Switzerland is one of the few European countries – alongside Ireland, Sweden and Finland – to run a trade surplus with Asia.
Here in Singapore, as we develop GIC to invest our national reserves, we have always looked towards NBIM in maintaining a close professional exchange of views and in mutual learning from one another. Over the past 12 years, the two organisations have actively exchanged best practices across a full spectrum of investment, risk management, operational and governance issues; the professional ties extend across many levels between the two organisations. These, I am told, have included a regular dialogue between GIC’s senior management and Governor Gjedrem of Norges Bank and his management team at NBIM. 5. This partnership extends into the international arena. In particular, the work undertaken by the International Working Group or IWG , IMF’s grouping of SWFs which includes both Norway and Singapore, has important relevance to the global community. I believe NBIM and Singapore’s GIC and Temasek share many common views of SWF best practices and serve as thought and practice leaders in the area of SWF investments. 6. I am pleased to note that the IWG has since advocated a meaningful and credible set of principles in the form of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices or GAPP, for short. These principles serve to underpin the strategic investments of the SWF community. This is an important development because SWFs have become a significant investor group. According to the IWG, since 2005, at least 17 funds were created. There are now 38 SWFs. Last year, SWFs collectively managed over $ trillion of assets.

Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Inequality, poverty and development Inaugural address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at Annual Sessions of the Sri Lanka Economic Association (SLEA), Colombo, 10 August 2007. *  *  *  Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Invitees, Ladies and Gentlemen, At the outset, I wish to congratulate the Sri Lanka Economic Association (SLEA) for their initiative at organizing this important and timely event, the Annual Session focusing on Inequality, Poverty and Development. This forum would give a wonderful opportunity to all the participants to share their valuable thoughts and eventually enable them to contribute to the prosperity of this country and the well-being of our people. I am also delighted to have been invited to deliver the inaugural address to this distinguished audience and I must say that I consider it a great honour and a privilege. The SLEA has been organizing events of this nature for many years and at most such events I have been an active participant. I have myself benefited immensely from these fora, and I know most of you academics, and professionals have also gained from these well balanced sessions and fruitful discussions. Further, the themes that have been selected by SLEA and the calibre of the resource persons they have invited during the past prove their willingness to make an important contribution to the development in this country.
Today, financial firms with around $ trillion assets under management have committed to harmonised reporting using the Task-Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) template.16 This has encouraged wider scrutiny of, and actions to mitigate, the risks to companies’ profits and balance sheets posed by climate change. Pay gap disclosure could have a similarly profound behavioural effect on companies. Fourth, there is also a strong case for improving the sets of data available publicly to monitor progress towards equality of pay and opportunity in the workplace. One example of useful additional data would be longitudinal data tracking individuals from school into employment, perhaps using administrative data or new surveys. This would help to understand the key determinants, and obstacles, to career and pay progression. Fifth and finally, published pay gap data are imperfect and can sometimes give a misleading impression of diversity patterns. We have demonstrated how raw pay gap data can sometimes give rise to puzzles. We 15  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/business-population-estimates-2019/business-population-estimates-for-the-uk-andregions-2019-statistical-release-html 16 TCFD (2019). 34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  34  have also demonstrated, however, that a careful consideration of various compositional factors can resolve these puzzles and provide a clearer picture of underlying patterns. There is no reason why companies could not use these techniques when interpreting their own results.

Note: Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. A negative pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men. Chart 22: Conditional gender wage gap under specification (5) Difference in lnpay  0.05 0 ‐0.05  Gender pay gap  ‐0.1 ‐0.15 ‐0.2 ‐0.25 ‐0.3  1994‐1998  1999‐2003  2004‐2008  2009‐2013  2014‐2019  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A negative gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men. 11 The regressions assume the effect of the controls on pay is homogenous between different groups. If we run a Chow test on this restriction, it fails in our sample. This would be a useful area for future research. 12 Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  We can replicate this regression for ethnicity with the same set of controls, except that the occupation, age groups, and children under 2 variables now interact with the ethnic minority variable. Where  (6) ln  ∝  h  =  ∗ 1 0  h  ∗  person does not belong to white ethnic group person belongs to white ethnic group  With this specification, the conditional gap for ethnic minorities averages around -11% and is again significant at the 1% level.
Just after 9pm that evening, we received an email from the Federal Reserve: could the dollar swap line central banks speak the following morning? The dollar swap lines may be the most important part of the international financial stability safety net that few have ever heard of. Global trade and investment relies on the dollar. In normal times, firms and local banks located outside the United States can easily secure these dollars using FX swaps, provided by international banks with access to US markets, to exchange their local currency for dollars. In times of turbulence, however, these markets can become impaired, or even seize up altogether, as the international banks batten down the hatches. Trading firms who cannot secure dollars will either have to cease trading altogether, or try to raise dollars in other ways, for example by liquidating dollar-denominated assets. That selling pressure, if allowed to take hold, could trigger, or amplify, global financial instability. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  That Monday night, the first signs of such stress were starting to emerge: the dash for cash had reached FX markets. Falling asset prices and rising panic about the outlook were boosting offshore dollar demand. But international banks’ capacity (and willingness) to meet this demand was becoming impaired – raising the cost of local dollar funding relative to that available to onshore US firms. That divergence was particularly marked in Japan (green line in Chart 3).

This is understandable, given that many of them have already made progress towards adopting the euro. But we have also heard clear words of caution. Let me take the opportunity to emphasise that the euro area is not a closed shop. Following three enlargement rounds since the start of monetary union in January 1999, and with Slovakia joining the euro area as its 16th member on 1 January 2009, there is no reason to believe that the door might one day be closed. But there is no shortcut. In fact, the difficulties that some countries face today are related to their failures to adjust, failures that go back a long way. As a result, domestic and external imbalances have emerged, with adverse effects on the sustainability of the catching-up processes in those countries. The fast introduction of the euro would not resolve the underlying problems – but could weaken EMU. Structural adjustments as well as nominal and real convergence are therefore needed prior to the adoption of the euro. This means that the countries concerned must achieve a sustainable level of nominal convergence at high standards in terms of meeting the convergence criteria. The adoption of the euro without adjustment is not possible. To regard entry into EMU as an easy way to solve or circumvent the current challenges surrounding the catching-up processes would be wrong. And a premature entry might aggravate current problems and put the credibility of EMU at risk.