samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Both of these factors create new incentives for fiscal policy to focus more on short-term job creation schemes and less on long-term fiscal soundness. And the new member states are not much different in this respect. They have experienced a decade of incredible structural change, and yet more is ahead. Furthermore the new member states have great infrastructure needs and, coupled with high unemployment, there will be continued pressure for fiscal expansion, even in a cyclical upturn. So from this perspective, too, the hope that the recovery alone will “fix” the European deficit problem might be too optimistic. In addition, structural fiscal deficits in many of the euro area member states might be larger than present calculations show since there is a large risk that potential growth is lower than commonly assumed. Estimates of potential growth for the old Europe have successively been lowered as labour productivity growth has fallen gradually during the last two decades from around 2% to about 1% per year. However, the figures for the second quarter of this year were the highest we have seen for some time. The IMF’s latest potential growth estimate for the euro area is about 1.8%. Nevertheless, inflation has been remarkably stable, just above 2% in recent years despite poor growth and presumed large negative output gaps. If potential growth is lower, the need for fiscal consolidation is even higher than present consolidation programmes show. Let me summarize the problem.

It is a pity that government accounts, which affect everyone in a society in a compulsory way, are less transparent, less well audited and less understood than the accounts of companies listed on the stock exchange, which only affect few people. Sweden has pre-decided ceilings on government expenditure three years ahead and a target of a 2 per cent surplus for the public sector over the business cycle, a figure that includes pension savings and that, given an ageing population, is in fact akin to targeting a balanced budget over the cycle. This target is present in the debate of every budget. The National Institute of Economic Research comments on the target and helps the public to understand it. This keeps the government accountable not only in the normal political sense but also in relation to the targets agreed upon. The political debate is in a sense being taught to keep the long term in view. The public then knows from the national debate that fiscal discipline is good for the country and, if “accountants” in Brussels or other nations criticise your budget policies, there is a greater chance of the criticism being interpreted as a help towards fiscal soundness. The Swedish trade unions, for example, are among the most vocal defenders of our budget target. The expenditure ceilings have been respected but to some extent with the help of creative accounting. In addition, the last couple of years no decisions have been taken on the ceilings for all three years, as was intended.
Looking at the breakdown by instrument, in the first three quarters of last year households continued to increase their cash holdings and deposits at a good pace, with new investments in these liquid instruments amounting to € billion. By contrast, households divested € billion from other financial instruments. This may owe to the weak performance of financial markets in 2022. Lastly, repayments of outstanding debt increased over the course of 2022, driven by the repayment of loans for house purchase, possibly as a result of higher interest rates increasing the debt payments made by households with floating-rate loans. Some of those with surplus savings may have used part of these to pay down debt, at a time when high inflation is eroding the real value of cash holdings and deposits. To sum up, in 2020 the bulk of the savings built up – mainly by higher-income households – was put into liquid assets. In 2021, residential investment began to gain upward momentum, while a larger share of net financial asset acquisitions took the form of investment funds and cash holdings, and deposits represented a lower relative share. Lastly, in 2022 (albeit in the absence of data for the full year), the acquisition of financial assets declined as savings levels dropped. 3  Further, we will have to wait and see how investment decisions are affected by rising interest rates, both in terms of the type of financial product (investment funds, debt securities, etc.)

Since its launch, the Financial Education Plan has raised awareness of financial planning and encouraged households to treat savings as a fixed expense, helping them to build up a financial safety net based on what they can afford. Further, the plan also aims to teach the general public, and students in particular, to make responsible use of credit as and when it is needed, and to invest their savings based on sound risk assessments and in awareness of the risk-return trade-off. The Banco de España has redoubled its engagement in financial education, with recent structural changes aimed at reinforcing this function and helping the public to make better financial decisions, including when it comes to their savings and investments. In conclusion, Spanish households’ ability to appropriately manage their savings, based on informed decision-making, is a cornerstone of their financial health and, therefore, of stability for society at large. Thank you very much. 5
For a more detailed analysis, see Banco de España (2020), “Recent developments in the most important Latin American banking systems for Spanish banks”, Box 2, “Report on the Latin American economy. Second half of 2020”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 4/2020. 8 For a stress test analysis of the 61 largest banks in Latin America, see Annex 4 of the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook (2020), Pandemic Persistence Clouds the Recovery. 9 See A. Werner, A. Ivanova and T. Komatsuzaki (2021), Latin America and Caribbean’s Winding Road to Recovery, IMF blog. 5  First, in addition to the human cost in lives, the effects on poverty and income distribution have been very severe.10 Indeed, during 2019, bouts of political tensions and social unrest in several countries, partly related to this situation, fuelled economic uncertainty; this in a region where numerous elections are due to take place in the coming quarters. A second challenge is that posed by shrinking fiscal space following the increase in government debt in the region during 2020, positioning it as the emerging region with the highest government debt-to-GDP ratio and, where debt refinancing is concerned, leaving it highly vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment. Against this background, monetary policy is supported by the accommodative policies of the main developed economies and by low inflationary pressures.

I am reliably informed that this workshop is organised by MEFMI, in conjunction with the IMF through the East AFRITAC and the ACBF. The workshop is indeed timely as it is aimed at building sustainable capacity for effective financial sector supervision at a time when our region is beset with a lot of non-bank financial institutions that are financially constrained. I, therefore, wish to commend these organisations for their collaborative efforts and hope that the cooperation exhibited by these institutions through the sponsorship of this workshop will not just end here, but will also grow from strength to strength. Ladies and Gentlemen The liberalisation and continued reforms of the financial sectors in our countries has brought interesting challenges to supervisors and regulators, alike. Of particular importance, are the reforms currently taking place in the areas of regulation and supervision of financial institutions. As you are well aware, in a liberalised environment financial institutions play a critical role in the allocation of resources through intermediating between those with surplus resources (depositors) and those in need of resources (investors). In view of the foregoing, effective and efficient supervision is crucial to limit the risk of loss to depositors, henceforth maintaining public confidence in the financial system. In response to the liberalised environment, there has been a proliferation of linkages between institutions operating in various segments of the financial sector and a growing number of financial mergers and acquisitions, thus creating, in the process, huge financial conglomerates.
In our discussions here in Tirana, we will begin with questions of policy design, which are fundamental to set the stage for the later topics we will come to. We have suggested in advance several questions that may help stimulate the discussion, covering some of the key questions that are certainly left in my mind, as a practitioner, after navigating through the crisis so far. The issues of policy design include the questions how much room for manoeuvre there has been to use discretionary macro policy measures; how far fiscal policy in future should build up a buffer against macro-financial risks; how far national monetary and prudential regimes have been able to shield us from turbulence; and whether we now see a need to attract new kinds of capital flow – perhaps to change the growth model in the region. BIS Review 162/2009  1  This discussion of policy design will bring us to our second issue. It concerns the role of external anchors for monetary policy. One point of consensus in our Washington meeting was that we need to revisit some aspects of this anchoring process, and the way it interfaces with countries’ efforts to build up their own internal anchors over time. There are several questions about the future role of external and internal anchors.

Due to this intervention, and mostly due to prudential policies pursued by the central banks with regard to financial stability and financial supervision, the region prevented not only twin crises in our banking systems and foreign exchange markets, but also any kind of meltdown. Nonetheless, this crisis has been a wake-up call. We agreed on this in our meeting last April, in Washington, among senior policy-makers from the region and from EU and IFIs. Now that we have managed to prevent the crisis, we must start the evaluation of the collateral damage of our response to the crisis. In this respect, it is very important to asses not only the long run sustainability of our region’s equilibrium, but also the effectiveness of our short run response. It is crucial to plan and implement our future moves intelligently for its reversal in line with new normalities. While we are not out of the woods yet, it is important to make sure that the past year’s fiscal appetite that characterised our region does not become part of this new normality. Actually, we need to do some deep thinking about aspects of our policy regimes – starting with the design of monetary policies, continuing with the way they are anchored and the building of due capacities for a greater effectiveness of monetary policy in the future. That is why we agreed to put in place today’s workshop, as part of a continuing process of reflection and reform.
I also feel that the ambitions are even greater. This is obvious even from the motto of the forum. So I wish you success in your work! Thank you for your attention! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The CPIX will be phased out of our reports and our communication in general. This will not have a tangible effect on the actual interest rate decisions in the future. However, we hope that this change will make the way we conduct our monetary policy clearer.
William C Dudley: Regional and national economic conditions Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), before the Morris County Chamber of Commerce, Florham Park, New Jersey, 18 September 2012. *  *  *  Good afternoon, I am pleased to be in northern New Jersey to address the 8th Morris County Economic Development Corporation (MCEDC) Business Growth Forum – an annual event organized by the Morris County Chamber of Commerce. It is always a pleasure to speak with the business community and I thank you for inviting me here today. I get out of my office in New York City regularly to inform myself – first-hand – about economic conditions and challenges across the second Federal Reserve District. Each visit within the region helps me to strengthen relationships with the diverse people of this District and build a deeper understanding of the economic challenges that we face. Today, I want to talk a bit about the Fed – what we do and why we do it. Then I’ll provide some thoughts about the national and local economic outlook. Normally in these regional outreach speeches I say little about monetary policy. But since the Federal Reserve made some meaningful decisions last week and it is important for people to understand the reasons and motivations for our actions. I will conclude with a brief discussion of policy.

Although substantial progress has been made, many households still need to rebuild their net worth following the housing bust. More than 20 percent of homeowners with a mortgage are “underwater” – meaning they owe more on their home than it can be sold for. •  Fiscal drag. State and local governments have been cutting spending for over two and half years and federal government spending is also contracting. While fiscal consolidation is essential over the medium to long term, spending cuts reduce demand and are a drag on near-term growth. •  Risks relating to Europe. The crisis in the euro area has reduced the demand for U.S. exports and weighed on financial markets. •  Fiscal uncertainty at home. Families and firms face elevated uncertainty relating to future taxes and government spending, in particular from the so-called “fiscal cliff” –  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the prospect of sharp increases in taxes and cuts in spending at the start of 2013 if Congress and the White House cannot agree on an alternative fiscal plan. Given the signs of improvement in some of these areas, including the slow but steady progress in healing balance sheets and restoring the supply of credit, I anticipate that the pace of economic growth will gradually pick up, supported by very low interest rates. But heading into the FOMC meeting last week, I judged that, if we did not ease monetary policy further, the pace of improvement would be unacceptably slow.
These are: whether the UK economy has achieved sustainable convergence with the economies of the single currency; whether there is sufficient flexibility in the UK economy to adapt to change and other unexpected economic events; whether joining the single currency would create better conditions for businesses to make long-term decisions to invest in the UK; the impact membership would have on the UK financial services industry; and ultimately whether joining the single currency would be good for employment. It would then submit a favourable decision to Parliament, and the British people in a referendum. The Chancellor recognised that it was unrealistic to think that a decision could be reached during the lifetime of the present Parliament, which runs to May 2002 at the latest. But he stressed that in the meantime the UK should nevertheless prepare - not only for introduction of the euro on the Continent on 1 January 1999 - which we of course did very effectively - but also for our own eventual participation. The Chancellor’s statement was the first by a British Government to accept the principle of monetary union. It recognised that the single currency will affect us whether we are in fact in or out - and that it is clearly in our own national interest to do all that we can to ensure that the euro is successful.

That comes about through a range of channels. For example, greater competition encourages UK firms to operate more efficiently. Access to larger export markets enables them to take more advantage of economies of scale. And the ability to trade allows the UK to specialise in sectors where it has a competitive advantage. To the extent that leaving the single market or the customs union makes it harder to do business with the EU, that will reduce the economy’s productive capacity. (Equally if leaving the EU allows the other economies to trade with and invest more openly in the UK then these same channels are likely to support UK productivity). We don’t know whether these long-run channels are already in operation. But it is possible that they have been contributing to reinforce the continued weakness of productivity growth. 6  In the short run what we do know is that uncertainty about the eventual outcome of the Brexit negotiations, and perhaps the expectation that Brexit will lower economic growth over time, has been depressing business investment. Businesses are waiting for more clarity before embarking on new capital projects, and that reduces their productive capacity relative to what it could have been, as well as hampering resource re-allocation across the economy. We see this most clearly in business surveys. Brexit has consistently ranked at or near the top of the list of 7  the risks identified in the Deloitte survey of Chief Financial Officers.
16.11.2018  Welcome address at the Conference “Economic Policies, Trade Integration and Sustainable Job Creation. A View from the Mediterranean Countries” Banco de España and European Institute of the Mediterranean with the support of the Central Bank of Tunisia Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to be here in Tunis to welcome you all to this Conference on Economic Policies, Trade Integration and Sustainable Job Creation, jointly organised by the Central Bank of Tunisia, the Banco de España and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). Let me start by thanking Governor El Abassi for his kind words and our colleagues from the Central Bank of Tunisia and the European Institute of the Mediterranean for their cooperation in organising this Conference. I would also like to congratulate Governor El Abassi and all the staff of the Central Bank of Tunisia for the 60th anniversary of this institution, created just two years after the independence of Tunisia. I wish to convey my best wishes for the future of this institution which, through the attainment of its of macroeconomic and financial stability objectives, can make a decisive contribution to the prosperity of the country and its citizens. Governor El Abbasi, I hope that this Conference will be an initial step towards permanent cooperation between our respective institutions.

As a result, the household sector’s financial condition today is in unusually good shape for this point in the economic cycle. In relative terms, household indebtedness is low, and—thanks in part to low interest rates—debt service burdens relative to household income have fallen to levels not seen since at least the early 1980s. As we will show in today’s presentation, compared to 2008, a greater proportion of overall debt today is now held by older households that have higher and more stable incomes and more experience as borrowers, on average. Consequently, a much larger proportion of debt is currently held by borrowers with higher credit scores. The resulting higher overall debt quality is reflected in historically low overall delinquency rates. Transition rates into new delinquency are below the levels of the early 2000s, and foreclosure and bankruptcy rates in 2016 are the lowest since our data series began in 1999. Notwithstanding this overall rosy picture, the improvement in aggregate debt quality and performance conceals important underlying changes in debt holdings that could be consequential, with implications for the housing market and for consumer spending over the longer term. While older borrowers hold more debt of all types, there has been a significant shift among younger people toward student debt and away from mortgage and other debt. Student debt has increased more than fivefold over the past 14 years, with more young adults taking out loans and borrowing larger average amounts. And, while debt delinquency rates overall have fallen, those for student debt have remained elevated.
The higher profit margins since 1997 may reflect the greater concentration in the grocery trade. 2  Profit margin is defined as operating income less cost of goods as a percentage of operating income. BIS Review 47/2001  11  Labour cost growth and wage costs as a share of income in distributive trades declined sharply until 3 the mid-1990s and have since picked up. This had the opposite effect on operating margins , which fell in the five years to 1999. One possible explanation is that weaker competition in distributive trades the last few years has made it possible to increase profit margins without losing market shares and thereby weakening profitability. This may also have contributed to the industry’s role of spearhead in the wage settlement in 1998. However, a fresh report from the Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute and ECON 4 shows that gross margins on meat in the grocery trade were reduced somewhat between the spring of 1999 and the autumn of 2000. Farmers' margins fell fairly markedly. The survey concludes that it is primarily the processing industry that increased margins on meat products in this period. A substantial share of the food industry is sheltered from international competition through trade policy measures. Analyses conducted by Statistics Norway show that productivity growth in this industry was 5 very low between 1993 and 1999 . Weak productivity growth in this industry and in the graphics and publishing industry contributed to the substantially poorer productivity growth in Norway compared with Sweden in this period.

[4]  Chart 1 Euro area services trade balance (EUR billions)  Source: ECB. Notes: Quarterly data. The latest observation is for the fourth quarter of 2020. Chart 2 Euro area national accounts: selected components (quarter-on-quarter growth rates in percentages)  Source: Eurostat. Notes: Seasonally and working day adjusted quarterly data. The latest observation is for the fourth quarter of 2020. This highlights a dichotomy between the residency principle underpinning the macroeconomic statistical framework and the global footprint of MNEs. Data on the numerous entities belonging to MNE groups in different countries are not consolidated in the accounts of the home country of the parent MNE. Instead,  these are recorded in the national statistics of the economies where the entities reside, even if their role in domestic economic activity may be quite minor. This dichotomy also extends to the way statistics are collected and compiled: while companies are global, data are gathered nationally, refer only to the activities of MNEs that are located in the country and are subject to strict data confidentiality rules. While European law enables cross-border data sharing for statistical purposes, this is often prevented or highly circumscribed by national rules. Owing to the decentralised manner of data collection, the information sets for global companies that are available to national statisticians differ across countries, which limits cross-country comparability and overall data quality, including for the euro area.