samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To this day, I can probably tell you as much about Benito Juarez, journalist-turned-jurist-turned-president Jose Maria Iglesias and other Reformistas as I can about Houston or Lamar or Washington or Lincoln.1 Alejandro and Rosa Laura, seeing you tonight has revived school-day memories of some 53 years ago! It is a delight and honor to be with you. I will do two things tonight. First, I will give you an update on the performance of the Texas economy and what lies ahead. Second, I will give you my personal view of what the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee – the FOMC – announced after our meeting last week. Then, time permitting, I will be happy to avoid answering any questions you might have. An update on the Texas economy The economic performance of Texas since December 2007 – the beginning of the U.S. recession, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research – can be summarized with the chart being projected on the screen denoting employment growth in the 12 Federal Reserve districts. The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and its branches in Houston, San Antonio and El Paso administer the business of the Eleventh District (depicted by the red line), which includes Texas, northern Louisiana and southern New Mexico; 96 percent of the economic production of my district comes from the 25.7 million people of Texas. In 2011, Texas created 211,600 jobs. We now have more people at work than we had before we felt the effects of the Great Recession in the United States.

At the same time, we stated that we cannot specify an exact goal for employment because “the maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market” and that “change over time and may not be directly measurable.”7] In the aviary of monetary policy makers, I am considered a “hawk.” I respect the fact that the Congress of the United States has given the Federal Reserve a dual mandate of conducting monetary policy so as to have full employment and simultaneously maintain stable prices. I believe monetary policy is the principal determinant of long-term price stability. But I have long maintained that monetary policy is but one gear in the complicated gearbox that drives job creation. Education and other structural aspects of our economy condition the nation’s job-creating capacity; fiscal and regulatory policy, in turn, condition both the structure and dynamics of employment. I was delighted that the full committee recognized this and made it part of its official credo. In a world driven by rapid technological change and globalization, job-creating capital will flow not only to countries that conduct sound monetary policy but to places with the most welcoming, competitive tax and regulatory systems. This was underscored in a recent Harvard Business School (HBS) survey authored by Jan Rivkin and Michael Porter, two widely admired scholars on national competitiveness and economic development.
The ECB has also made its liquidity provision facilities more accessible to the banking sector, in terms both of cost and volume, and it has relaxed the requirements made of assets pledged as collateral, in order to smooth financing to households, firms and the self-employed. All these measures have been effective in alleviating the financial tensions generated by the crisis. These tensions took the form of a strong rise in sovereign and corporate debt yields, which were then largely reversed. The ECB’s action has also helped keep bank lending flows 5  to companies notably robust in recent months and contributed to their cost holding at low levels. Also crucial for these dynamics have been the government-implemented public guarantee programmes for bank lending. The ECB measures have further provided considerable room for manoeuvre for national authorities. In this second phase of the crisis, in which the recovery in economic activity is, as I said, incomplete, fragile and uneven across sectors in countries, actual inflation and inflation expectations are holding at very low levels. And it is to be expected in the medium term that the weakness of demand will continue exerting downward pressure on prices. Against this background, on the ECB Governing Council we have made it clear that a high degree of monetary accommodation is needed to support the recovery and safeguard our price stability objective. Specifically, we have reiterated our commitment to do what it takes to support the euro area economy in these extremely difficult circumstances.

That includes ensuring that the common monetary policy is properly transmitted to all sectors of the economy and to all countries, and to prevent the financial fragmentation of the area. We also stand ready to adapt all our instruments should it be necessary. Naturally, we must also remain vigilant regarding the risks to financial stability. Evidently, the banking sector is facing this crisis from a healthier position than in the previous recession, which highlights the importance of the far-reaching changes made in this sector over the past decade. The ECB has also taken resolute action here. Among other measures, it has allowed banks to use the capital buffers available, which were created precisely for situations such as the present one. But, undoubtedly, the crisis will significantly impact the quality of banks’ credit portfolios, on a scale that will depend on its ultimate severity and which will be uneven across banks. The outcome will depend on banks’ starting position, on their business model and on the distribution of their exposures to the sectors and regions most affected by the pandemic. Accordingly, we supervisors must continue to closely monitor the risks to financial stability and we must be ready to provide a forceful, panEuropean response should such risks materialise. In short, European and national economic authorities must share the objective of preventing the current crisis from being accompanied by an across-the-board tightening of financing conditions or from seriously harming the stability of the financial system.
Following on from this, the higher the potential growth rate, the faster the Swedish GDP can grow without putting the inflation target at risk. A natural starting point for calculating potential growth in the economy is the growth trend for productivity and the labour supply. Productivity growth has shown tendencies towards improvement during the 1990s. It is probable that factors such as the new low-inflation rate regime and greater openness with stiffer competition have played an important role in this development. However, it is far from certain that the high rates of increase at the end of the 1990s will continue. They mirrored both a rapid growth in the private sector relative to the public sector and a strong growth in the IT/telecom sector. Nevertheless, it is probable that the long-term increase in productivity is higher now than it was during the 1970s and 1980s. The number of hours worked has also developed relatively favourably since the mid-1990s. However, this development has largely depended on demand, influenced by the fact that there were considerable unutilised resources in the economy after the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. With regard to the labour supply, there is less reason for optimism, partly because the demographic situation will be adverse in a few years' time, with more departures from the labour force relative to entries. Nor are there clear signs that economic policy has been organised to contributed to an increase in the labour supply in future.

•  Would it be necessary to promote a certain tactical flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy, so that central banks might carry out adjustments in terms of objectives as well, not only instrument-wise? Such an approach would diminish the predictability of monetary policy, but would allow, when need be, for financial stability considerations to prevail over the inflation objective. •  Is the reassessment of the desirable level of inflation suitable? How low is too low? The same as for capital inflows, we can ask ourselves in the case of price stability as well: how much of a good thing is too much? •  Will the policy instruments which have been resorted to in the context of the global crisis become an integral part of the new conventional framework? If macroprudential tools are here to stay, the future of non-conventional monetary policy instruments is less certain. Will the central banks keep using these instruments or will they abandon them at some point in time? I fully share the belief of the Governor of Banco de España Luis Linde (2013) that monetary policy – conventional or not – cannot solve the ultimate causes behind the loss in investors’ confidence or the tensions in financial or banking markets; in fact, its main role is to provide time to adopt the necessary measures to reform and/or adjust. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  How much room for trade-off among different goals is available?
See de Guindos, L. (2021), “Shining a light on climate risks: the ECB’s economy-wide climate stress test”, The ECB Blog, 18 March. 11. See Allen, T., et al. (2020), “Climate-related scenarios for financial stability assessment: an application to France”, Working Paper Series, No 774, Banque de France. 12. See Lagarde, C. (2020), “Climate change and the financial sector”, 27 February. 13. While there is widespread consensus about central banks’ potential role in mitigating the consequences of climate risks, a number of concerns have also been raised. Some refer to the possible interference with the primary mandate, others to the politicisation of monetary policy and the danger of mission creep, with potential negative ramifications for central bank independence and monetary policy effectiveness. See, for example, Cochrane, J. (2020), “Challenges for central banks”, October. 14. This includes various members of the ECB’s Governing Council. See, for example, Knot, K. (2021), “Getting the Green Deal done: how to mobilize sustainable finance”, 11 February; Villeroy de Galhau, F. (2021), “The role of central banks in greening the economy”, 11 February; de Cos, P.H. (2021), “Economic and financial policy geared to climate goals”, 25 February; Weidmann, J. (2021), “Climate risks, financial markets and central banks’ risk management”, 2 June. 15. See NGFS (2021), “Adapting central bank operations to a hotter world: Reviewing some options”, March; Villeroy de Galhau, F. (2021), ibid. 16. See Hauser, A.

See, for example, de Greiff, K., Delis, M. and Ongena, S., (2018), “Being stranded on the carbon bubble? Climate policy risk and the pricing of bank loans”, Discussion Paper Series, No. 12928, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), May; Altunbas, Y., Marques, D., Reghezza, A., Rodrigues-Acri, C., and Spaggiari, M., (2020), “Do banks fuel climate change?”, Working Papers Series, ECB, forthcoming. 6. See de Haas, R. and Popov, A. (2021), “Finance and green growth”, European Banking Center Discussion Paper Series No 2018-001. 7. See Flammer, C. (2021), “Corporate green bonds”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 20–39. However, evidence on the impact of green bonds on carbon emissions is mixed: other studies have found that the issuance of green bonds is not associated with a decrease in the carbon emissions at the firmlevel. See Ehlers, T., Mojon, B. and Packer, F. (2020), “Green bonds and carbon emissions: exploring the case for a rating system at the firm level”, BIS Quarterly Review, September. 8. As stressed by Ignazio Visco at the recent Green Swan Conference hosted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), these externalities are particularly relevant as emissions entail spill-overs to other markets and countries. Such spill-overs create an additional need for coordinating mitigation policies across countries to avoid undue delays in countering the effects of climate change. See Visco, I. (2021), “The conference messages in light of the G20 Presidency programme”, 4 June. 9. ECB and ESRB (2020), “Positively green: Measuring climate change risks to financial stability”, June. 10.
I want to talk about three big themes: •  MREL and TLAC: how far are they the same or different? •  The relationship between the regulation of banks’ liability structures via TLAC and MREL and resolution planning. •  And why, if we are preparing firm specific resolution plans, have a TLAC standard at all? Starting with MREL and TLAC, much has been made of the differences between them. Let me set these out in turn: •  TLAC sets a global standard for G-SIBs 1 while MREL is for all EU banks and investment firms. •  TLAC describes a Pillar 1 minimum requirement, while MREL is set by the resolution authority, bank by bank on the basis of a resolution plan. •  The TLAC requirement is set in terms of risk weighted assets (RWAs) and leverage while MREL is formally set in relation to total liabilities and own funds. •  The FSB consultation specifies the quantum and quality of TLAC a G-SIB requires and sets out how TLAC should be distributed within groups. While BRRD provides for more flexibility, certainly on whether liabilities need to be subordinated to count as MREL. So much for the differences. But both are founded on the same principles and in the Key Attributes have the same DNA. Both are designed to achieve the twin objectives of: •  1  Maintaining critical economic functions in the event of failure; and  Global systemically important banks.

If, at failure, there is no obstacle to putting the firm into insolvency and paying out covered deposits using the relevant deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) then no MREL is required beyond capital requirements as a going concern. This goes too to the location of TLAC or MREL in groups. There needs to be externally issued MREL wherever, under the preferred resolution strategy, bail-in of external liabilities is likely to occur or where other resolution tools are to be applied. The plan under a single point of entry (SPE) strategy is that only the entity at the top of group is put into resolution on the basis that the interdependencies within a group are so extensive that resolving the different operating companies within a group separately is either impossible or not credible. By contrast where a group is organised in a more modular fashion with limited or no interlinkages between the parts, then the resolution can have multiple points of entry (MPE). It has been convenient for exposition to set up this dichotomy between SPE and MPE. But in practice, many SPE firms will have around the periphery subsidiaries that could be resolved separately or allowed to enter an insolvency without adverse consequences for the resolution of the firm. And many MPE banks are, in practice, collections of SPE strategies. They may be set up to be resolved jurisdiction by jurisdiction. But within jurisdictions the resolution is likely to involve keeping together in resolution the legal entities within that jurisdiction.
The average market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries established by banks from EU countries was 10% at the end of 2000, which is definitely not negligible. Also, the ownership structure of the banking sector is changing significantly. It is no longer true that only Luxembourg's banks have a significant proportion of capital owned by foreigners. In Ireland, Belgium and Portugal, and in the Nordic countries, the percentage of banks' capital in foreign hands ranges from around 40% to some 20%. France, Italy, Spain and Austria also show ratios of between 15% and 10%. For many large European banks, the holdings of stakes in other large players is sometimes associated with joint ventures in specific business lines or geographic areas – for example, in accession countries. Looking at the strategies of individual banks, some banks have already developed strong multi-country operations in the retail field. For instance, two major banking groups have retail activities in more than five EU countries. In any case, if the integration of the retail markets proceeds, more such operations could be expected to emerge. Integration could also be advanced via electronic banking, or crossborder lending, both of which are still relatively limited. In fact, e-banking could represent a forceful boost to integration, since it could allow customers to access banking services offered by banks in other countries, or it could be a powerful way to enter a new market without the need to establish a costly branch network.

Along the way of trying to solve different policy problems transparency and openness have been important features to us and helped us to increase credibility for our actions. The clearer the principles and rules are that guide policy, also in the financial stability area, the better. Given the complexity of European policymaking and the many different national aspects involved I think that the arguments for this clear framework and for rules are even stronger on a European level although perhaps more difficult to obtain. BIS Review 85/2000  4
In the current crisis, monetary policy is said to have played a role in contributing to excessive risk-taking behavior in the period leading up to the crisis, but monetary policy is also powerful in handling the economic and financial downturns through aggressive actions on interest rate and the provision of liquidity. This shows that it is crucial to get the stance of monetary policy right early by formulating monetary policy in a forward-looking manner. This, of course, is easier said than done. And the last lesson is communication. One lesson we learnt clearly from the crisis is that policy actions alone cannot ensure a successful outcome without the support of an effective communication strategy. In this crisis, the Fed has demonstrated the importance of this to the highest level through its ability to articulate its understanding of the situations, to communicate the rationale for the use of unconventional measures, its approach to making the results of the stress-testing exercise public, as well as its ability to manage market expectations while maintaining policy credibility. All these have been instrumental to the success so far of the Fed’s policy response. It is, therefore, clear from the crisis that wellexecuted and credible communication can help anchor market expectations. Let me now turn to my second remark on strengthening the monetary policy framework. I agree much with what has been said about the need to improve bank regulation and supervision going forward, especially to reduce procyclicality in the financial system.

Caleb Fundanga: The cost of capital – wither the Zambian financial markets? Keynote address by Dr Caleb Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Business Conference on “Change and the Paradigm Shift in the Accounting Profession”, Livingstone, 6 August 2010. *  *  *  The President of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants; Mr Chintu Mulendema The Chief Executive of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants; Mr Hapenga Kabeta Distinguished members of the Eastern, Central and Southern African Federation of Accountants Members of the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants Members of the Press Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen The theme for this symposium portends an important aspect of our daily lives, either at individual or corporate level. We are all, one way or the other, affected by developments in our financial markets. The role that finance plays in an economy is certainly an important one and you do not need to go far back in history for you to appreciate that role. You only need to make reference to the recent financial crises to appreciate the potency that finance has on economic activities. Chairperson, your choice of this topic therefore could not have been more appropriate. This topic is also timely given the current challenges that face many countries in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, some of which seem to be just unfolding in some European countries.
Looking back at the first speech I gave as an MPC member this time last year,8 gas prices barely featured. Rather the focus was on supply chain disruptions and the potential threat of the Omicron variant, which had just started to emerge as I spoke in Newcastle. Second, the shock was large. Although it has eased somewhat in recent months, the January European wholesale gas price future – most relevant for next year’s household energy bills that enter the CPI basket – rose more than ten times to its August peak. Third, these gas price rises passed-through to the CPI inflation that the MPC targets relatively quickly: in a matter of months – certainly at a shorter horizon than the 18-24 months typically associated with the lagged pass-through of monetary policy actions to inflation developments. And fourth, higher gas prices exerted an adverse supply-side effect on the UK economy, and thus induced a difficult trade-off for monetary policy: inflationary pressures rose at a time when economic activity weakened. Taken together, these characteristics implied that gas price driven volatility in CPI inflation was inevitable.

The efforts based on further expanding the number of universities, technical and technological colleges as well as schools of general education; increasing admissions and offering more scholarships for study abroad and increasing budgetary allocations for promoting health and social services represent a sound strategic option for enhancing the sound march of economic development and will bear fruitful results, God willing. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, The economic indicators observed by SAMA indicate a continuous high inflow of direct investments in almost all sectors, and a deeper and more solid national economy. This, in turn, was reflected by the International Rating Agencies’ increase of the Kingdom’s credit rating and the remarkable interest of the world top investors in the Kingdom’s investment opportunities. Your wise directives have emphasized that the development and investment efforts should cover all the Kingdom’s regions, which were supported by Your regional field visits around the Kingdom to increase growth and investment capacities and expand the economic base. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Inflow of direct investments to various productive sectors is a strong evidence of the Kingdom’s investment attraction and the interest of both local and foreign investor. Part of these investments flow through the Capital Market which plays a very important role in the economy. It provides additional channels for project financing, and, at the same time, it offers to investors diverse investment instruments.