samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This may involve a risk that capacity utilisation will remain high and that inflation will eventually overshoot the target. Household debt has increased at a faster pace than income over the past ten years. Norges Bank’s calculations indicate that debt growth may largely be due to the sharp rise in house prices in recent years. Higher house prices have a fairly prolonged effect on household debt growth. Even though the rise in house prices is expected to slow, credit growth will therefore remain high for a fairly long period. Given the assumptions underlying our projections, it is likely that debt will continue to grow at a faster pace than disposable income through the entire projection period. The household debt burden has increased over the past year and is now record high. The interest rate burden is, however, relatively low. A normalisation of interest rates will increase households’ net interest expenses, but according to the projections the interest burden will not be higher than it was at the end of the 1990s. Households will be vulnerable if unexpected disturbances result in higher-than-expected interest rates. Challenges ahead Petroleum activities give us an economic base that is not available to many other countries. But it also presents us with many challenges. 5/7  First, our petroleum resources are part of our national wealth. When oil is extracted and sold, petroleum wealth is transformed into financial assets. This wealth belongs not only to our generation, but also to future generations.

* **  Page 9 of 9 We have just celebrated the 25th anniversary of the ECB, and next year we will mark the 10th anniversary of the SSM within the ECB. This is certainly not a time for complacent celebrations; it remains a time for active vigilance. But these milestones are an opportunity to recognise that, throughout years of severe international crises, the European financial system, and particularly the French one, is increasingly resilient. The ACPR is committed to contributing further to this. I will now hand the floor to Jean-Paul Faugère, Vice-Chairman of the ACPR, to speak about the insurance sector. i  The slight decrease observed in 2022 results from lower Tier 1 capital, which was impacted among other things by the lower valuation of insurance subsidiaries due to the rise in interest rates, compounded with an increase in risk-weighted assets stemming from a dynamic trend in customer loans. ii Observatoire du financement des entreprises, Le financement des entreprises dans un contexte de crises, 30 May 2023
Ladies and Gentlemen, Provided that the current political deadlock is soon resolved and the new political equilibrium is reached, these fundamentals should provide a solid platform for Thailand’s economic growth going forward. A recent study by the Bank of Thailand’s staff finds Thailand’s potential GDP growth to be in the range of 5.5-6.1% between 2008 and 2015. This may appear a far cry from the 1987-1996 period when the growth of the Thai economy averaged 9.5%. However, everyone now realizes that the Thai economy then was operating beyond its potential and therefore not sustainable. In contrast, our staff’s projection was based on a balanced growth path scenario used to characterize an economy in a steady state. There is however an important catch in the cited projection and that is the implicit assumption that the ratio of real gross investment to real GDP recovers from the current level of 22% to 28-30% by the end of the period. Thus, things like mega-project investments are conceivably already included in the projection. The current political doldrums only make the scenario far reaching. Without the resuscitation of investment, Thailand’s potential growth rate will likely fall to a lower path. The same study also points out the impact of demographic change on Thailand’s future growth. By 2026-2035, the economy’s potential GDP growth rate under the balanced growth path assumption is projected to fall to 4.8-5.4% due to ageing population.

I would like to record Bank Negara Malaysia’s appreciation to this bold initiative by LIAM together with academia and the Ministry of Education through the #IDareYouChallenge to educate and increase awareness among the younger generation on the importance of long-term financial planning and insurance. It is an unconventional collaboration between industry and academia, which allows the industry to benefit from new ideas and perspectives, build brand awareness among these university students and indirectly connect to a future talent pipeline. Likewise, universities and the student population benefit by having more of their students exposed to the industry and being prepared for their post-academic career. But my dare is also for the industry should go further in the age of digital disruption, to be at the forefront of innovation and to be an employer of choice for today’s graduates. A survey conducted among students and graduates of Malaysia’s 100 leading graduate employers, only had two insurance companies on the list, compared to a total of 18 banking institutions in Malaysia. Whether this is borne out of reality or lack of outreach, there is a need to promote and to brand the industry with a culture of innovation and a more visible consumer presence including via digital means, from which it will naturally grow into an exciting and engaging place for new generations to build a career in. To the competing teams today, all the very best to all of you. In my mind all of you are winners.
Now, onto this scene lands crypto and digital money. Note, I did not describe crypto – in its unbacked form – as money. It isn't. For money to fulfil its function as a means of  2/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  payment it requires stability of value. This is clearly not true of unbacked crypto. It could be a bet, a highly speculative investment or a collectible, but note that it has no intrinsic value, so buyer be very aware. More interesting is the creation of so-called 'stable coins' or digital currency, which purport at least to be money as a means of payment. But, as we have seen, they do not have assured value, and in the work we have done at the Bank of England we have concluded that the public should expect assured value in digital money, and confidence in this is needed to underpin financial stability. For stable coins to function as money they will need to have the characteristics of, and be regulated as, inside money. Meanwhile, a lot of work is going on to assess the future of digital money, including Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). Digital money is not new. Digital money in the form of commercial bank deposits and commercial bank reserves at the central bank have existed for many decades. What is new is the idea of broadly available retail digital money.

Faced with this situation, with the dual objective of easing financing conditions and addressing emerging signs of financial fragmentation among euro area countries, on the ECB Governing Council we approved a package of measures which acted in two main dimensions: asset purchases and liquidity-providing operations. First, through the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP), and second, through targeted longerterm refinancing operations (TLTROs). These measures have subsequently been expanded and strengthened (most recently, in December), owing to the persistence of the pandemic and its negative effects on the economy. I would now like to discuss each of these measures in greater detail. The PEPP, a programme for the purchase of public and private-sector bonds, was launched in March 2020. Its flexibility is what sets it apart from the previous asset purchase programme (APP). Thus, whereas the APP is relatively rigid in terms of how the asset purchases are distributed both over time and across jurisdictions, during the most critical months of the pandemic the PEPP has allowed us to concentrate purchases on those countries whose financing conditions have, at any given time, been subject to a greater degree of tightening. 2  Thanks to this flexibility, together with its large initial envelope, the announcement of the creation of the PEPP on 18 March served to substantially reduce interest rates on sovereign debt (especially that of the countries hardest hit by the health crisis at that moment, such as Italy and Spain).
The conditions for an optimal currency area have probably not yet been met. But the currency union will develop further. For large parts of the Swiss economy, the euro facilitates business. The Swiss export sector benefits from lower transaction costs. Currency devaluations, which were previously implemented by some European countries so as to improve their competitiveness, are now a thing of the past. In addition, Swiss monetary policy profits from the existence of a large economic bloc in Europe that pursues similar goals as Switzerland in terms of monetary policy. The exchange rate of the Swiss franc is likely to remain more stable against the euro than it used to be against the former currencies of the EMU members. However, exchange rate fluctuations must still be reckoned with, as the events after the terrorist attacks in the US demonstrated. As a result of the introduction of euro notes and coins, the euro will be used increasingly as a means of payment in the tourism sector as well as in foreign trade. However, the euro will not become a parallel currency. In Switzerland, employment and loan contracts will continue to be concluded mainly in Swiss francs. The same applies to domestic payments. The SNB's monetary policy concept will remain unchanged: in other words, the SNB will continue to conduct an independent monetary policy oriented to price stability and the needs of the Swiss economy. As a consequence, Switzerland is likely to retain its lower interest rate level. Exchange rate targets are incompatible with the SNB's mandate.

Evolution of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Sri Lanka and the Way Forward by  Dr. P. Nandalal Weerasinghe1 Senior Deputy Governor Central Bank of Sri Lanka  I am deeply honoured to have been invited to deliver the Olcott Oration 2017 and to join a list of great Anandians who have delivered this Oration before. I cannot think of a greater honour that my school could confer on me. I accepted this invitation with humbleness, with gratitude and respect, and with great pride. Let me also take this opportunity to appreciate the support and guidance I received during my school career at Ananda College. The guidance our teachers gave us laid the foundation for any success later on in our lives. My oration today, is on the rather technical topic of monetary and exchange rate policy. The biggest challenge that I have to face is to present such a topic to an audience with a majority who might not be familiar with the technical jargon involved. However, I will attempt to keep the discussion as simple as possible. Central Banking and Price Stability The prime responsibility of any central bank around the world is to maintain price stability by way of maintaining low and stable inflation on a sustainable basis. At the outset, I would like to discuss why low and stable inflation is important for growth and stability of the economy. Based on experiences of many countries and different time periods, we have seen varying levels of inflation.
Such assessments are usually allocated according to each member’s contribution to the CCP’s default fund. This way of allocating assessments, provided it is transparent, gives members a degree of predictability about what will happen. Nevertheless, they could expose surviving clearing members to sudden and very large liquidity demands which they would have to source in the market, and could thus have strong contagion effects14 – even pushing members to close out their contracts and leave the CCP, rather than face the spiralling costs of remaining a member. For these reasons, such tools may prove problematic for bank supervisors. Another tool which is frequently mentioned in discussions on CCP recovery is variation margin gains haircutting (VMGH). In my view, this tool may have a certain advantage over ex post cash calls, in the sense that it would alleviate the need for members to raise extra  12  While central clearing protects banks against idiosyncratic risk, it can reduce their incentives to protect themselves from non-diversifiable shocks, hence the need for regulation to provide a strong incentive framework. For a theoretical discussion, see Biais, B., Heider, F., and Hoerova, M., “Clearing, counterparty risk and aggregate risk”, European Central Bank, October 2011. 13  For a discussion of loss-allocation rules, see also Elliott, D., “Central counterparty loss-allocation rules”, Bank of England, Financial Stability Paper, No. 20, April 2013. 14  See Heath, A., et al. (2015, op. cit.) for a simulation of the impact of different loss allocation mechanisms.

Fahad Bin Abdullah Al-Mubarak: Combatting money laundering and terrorism financing Speech by H E Dr Fahad Bin Abdullah Al-Mubarak, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and Chairman of Anti-Money Laundering Permanent Committee, to the 51th Plenary Meeting of Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), Jeddah, 28 April 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to welcome you in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It also gives me pleasure to meet you all in this important regional meeting which is the 51th Meeting of MENAFATF. The meeting encompasses many essential and important issues of common interest and ways that would, in turn, promote cooperation to better levels. All peoples count on the unique role played by your Task Force to protect countries of this region against repercussions of money laundering and financing terrorism crimes. I wish your meeting all success and wish you all a good stay in Jeddah. Dear Audience, Increasing attention has been paid to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing systems over the past years. This has been due to the great progress witnessed in financial and banking systems, diversity of communication means, simplicity of money movement and advanced payment systems. However, the speed factor in conducting commercial transactions, existence of indirect financial operations and unreal existence of dealers have led to great risks. Some of these risks are: potential abuse of these developments in performing illegal objectives.
The date on which the current series is to be withdrawn from circulation will also be announced well in advance. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

As part of the implementation of the National Strategy on Financial Education, we are assured that through the primary and secondary school curricula, children and youths are learning concepts of personal, household and business financial management in subjects such as social studies, expressive arts, physical education, business studies and civic education. Recently, a significant milestone was achieved when supplementary financial education materials for learners and teachers in the lower and upper secondary schools were published with the support of Financial Sector Deepening Zambia. We also commend the Curriculum Development Centre for their contribution in the publication of these materials. Going forward, we will need to embed the principles of sustainable finance in supplementary materials to ensure that our next generation of adults are able to consider social and environmental risks in their investment choices. Ladies and Gentlemen As the Government is developing the 2023-2027 National Financial Inclusion Strategy, it is the right time to integrate elements of sustainability, with consideration of environmental risks and climate change mitigation measures into the Strategy. Sustainability improves the quality of our lives, protects our ecosystem and preserves natural resources for future generations.. In this regard, the Bank has a vested interest in encouraging financial sector players to be innovative, and responsive to climate change effects by designing financial services that support a sustainable economic growth journey, while balancing financial stability, inclusion, integrity and consumer protection in the financial ecosystem.
This is why the sovereign has been able to tap international capital markets twice so far since the crisis struck, and why its five-year CDS spread is currently below 180 points. Why did the Government give a verbal blanket guarantee for domestic deposits only and not for deposits in the banks’ foreign branches? After all, this distinction probably added fuel to the fire of the so-called Icesave dispute about the settlement of deposit guarantees in Landsbanki’s Dutch and British branches. The short answer is that such a guarantee would never have been credible. As a result, it would not have stopped the run on these deposits and, if attempted, might have bankrupted the Government. At the time, the Central Bank of Iceland’s FX reserves amounted to 2½ billion euros, while the foreign currency deposits in Landsbanki’s Dutch and British branches totalled 11½ billion euros and payment of the EU minimum deposit insurance would have required 4½ billion euros. The sovereign was completely closed off from foreign capital markets at that point. Furthermore, in economic terms, given that these deposits were used to a significant degree to finance illiquid assets in these same countries, such a payment, if possible, would have amounted to a net transfer of resources from Iceland to these countries at a time when Iceland was going through its deepest financial and economic crisis in the post-war period! That made no sense.

This was the result of weaker cyclical developments in the world economy and a sharp drop in interest rates internationally. In addition, the Norwegian business sector has felt the effects of the high Norwegian cost level. The weak prospects at home and abroad have in turn had an impact on the Norwegian labour market and the outlook for wage growth and inflation in the years ahead. The mandate implies that the interest rate must be adapted to the outlook for the Norwegian economy. If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. This orientation of monetary policy will normally also contribute to stabilising output and employment. The impact of monetary policy occurs with a lag. The current inflation rate does not provide sufficient information to determine the level at which interest rates should be set now. Our analyses indicate that a substantial share of the effects of an interest rate change will occur within two years. Thus, two years is normally a reasonable time horizon for reaching the inflation target. The interest rate influences inflation indirectly via domestic demand for goods and services and via its effect on the exchange rate. When interest rates rise, it becomes more profitable for households to save, and they will therefore postpone consumption. Borrowing also becomes more costly, with an associated decline in investment.
Anecdotally, the role of migrant labour has increased in various sectors – partly associated with the enlargement of the EU’s single labour market. If that continued, with new residents continuing to help to meet particular skill shortages, the labour supply available to UK businesses would increase, implying that the economy could potentially accommodate stronger aggregate demand than otherwise. However, the available data do not really enable us to get beyond anecdote and speculation. Financing Another important input for firms is finance – for working capital and investment. Here too, there seem to have been changes – in the range and terms of the sources of finance available to both firms and households – that could potentially influence the extent of cyclical fluctuations in output and inflation. One characterisation of the past would be that firms and households depended on bank loans for external finance; and that banks loosened or tightened credit conditions sharply in the different phases  5  See, for example, Nickell S. and Quintini G.,(2002), ‘The recent performance of the UK labour market’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 6(4), pages 26-35. BIS Review 16/2005  3  of a business cycle, reining back when the economy suffered a downturn and arrears and losses mounted.

Inflation and firms’ price-setting behaviour In the medium-to-long run, the average rate of inflation is determined by the rate of nominal expansion permitted by the monetary authority. But over shorter horizons, decisions taken by businesses – in particular, about wages and prices – affect quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in inflation and, more generally, how demand pressures feed through to inflation. Economic policymakers draw on a number of ways of thinking about those influences on inflation dynamics. There is no model that can, uniquely, capture the richness of the real world. But surprising though it may be to some, one of the ways in which we think about firms’ price-setting behaviour would be familiar to anyone running a business. Namely, that firms charge a mark up, or profit margin, over the marginal costs of their various inputs – labour, capital, raw and intermediate materials, etc – with both the mark up and costs varying according to current and prospective demand conditions. This is represented schematically, indeed crudely, in Diagram 1. The key feature is that when demand rises and firms utilise their capacity more fully and add to their labour force, their costs and prices tend to rise. That might involve old-fashioned ‘cost-push’ inflation, with firms raising prices to maintain margins in the face of increased (marginal) costs. Or firms might initially be able temporarily to raise margins, with labour and other costs later ‘catching up’. In either case, firms and wage bargainers will be influenced by what they think is going to happen to inflation in the future.