samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In 2007 they had an average GDP per capita of 56.8% of the average level in the euro-zone (it was 28.2% in 1993). Although the process of income growth is present also in South Eastern Europe, its pace is slower. For the period 1996-2007, convergence was made to the income per capita in the countries of the euro-zone by 8.2 percentage points (from 20.8% to 28.9%). 2 What is clear from these  1  Source: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008 and NBRM calculations. The indicator is unweighted average of GDP per capita of these countries. The indicators are according to the purchasing power parity. 2  Source: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008 and NBRM calculations. The indicator for SEEU is unweighted average of GDP per capita of Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (for 2000). The indicators are according to the purchasing power parity. BIS Review 74/2008  1  comparisons is that the achievements are huge, but also that much more remains to be done in order to reach the level of old EU members. Why the speed of real convergence of the new EU member-states and of the candidate and potential candidate countries is different, is one of the frequently discussed questions. Taking classical theory of growth as a starting point, income actually depends on the factors of production and technological growth, meaning that the reasons for the differences should be sought in these factors.

This is particularly troubling for the countries on a fixed exchange rate regime or currency board, which do not have the exchange rate flexibility as an instrument for handling inflation. Another part where there might be trouble is the exchange rate criterion. Now it is the floaters that could have bigger difficulties, particularly if the current developments continue and capital keeps to flow in these countries, thus making pressures for nominal appreciation. As far as the budget deficit criterion and the interest rate criterion are concerned, it appears that in these areas there will be less difficulties in fulfilling the Maastricht criteria, under the assumption there will be maintenance and strengthening of fiscal discipline. Of course, not all is bad and unreachable as far as Maastricht criteria are concerned. These countries are not giving up and they stand ready to increase their efforts in order to achieve their goals. While it appears that most transition countries have postponed their euro-zone entry a little bit due to the abovementioned difficulties, there are also two remarkable success stories from the transition countries. We already have Slovenia which has been in the eurozone since last year. In addition, we have Slovakia which got a positive opinion by the European Commission on fulfillment of criteria and is getting ready to adopt the euro in the beginning of next year.
It is not easy to quantify, but it is noteworthy that the number of sovereign defaults has declined quite sharply during the 1990s. If sovereign risk is mis-priced by private capital markets, this sows the seeds of future crises. The increased provision of official finance would proceed hand-in-hand with an increased incidence of crises. Second, to be effective, a lender of last resort must have the ability to extend sufficient resources that the market has no doubt whatsoever about the ability to provide whatever it takes to deal with the immediate crisis. The IMF is not in that position. There is no political commitment to provide the IMF with unlimited funds. As the finance ministers and central bank governors representing all IMF member countries said in their communiqué of the IMFC last September in Prague: "The Committee notes that Fund resources are limited and that extraordinary access should be exceptional …". In practice, however, exceptional access has often been more the norm in recent years. Normal access is typically defined as 300% of IMF quota. During the Asian crisis, Korea's programme was almost 2000% of quota and Thailand's over 500%. More recently, Turkey's programme was over 1500% of quota and Argentina's 500%. If creditors and debtors continue to believe that exceptional access is readily available, then international credit will be over-extended and the incidence of crisis will increase.

Mervyn King: The international financial system: a new partnership Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the 20th Anniversary of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, 9 August 2001. *  *  *  Introduction It is both a great honour and a real delight to make my first visit to India in order to commemorate the 20th Anniversary of ICRIER. I feel especially honoured to be invited to deliver the first K. B. Lall Lecture. The theme of my lecture will be the international financial system, and the need for a new partnership between those countries exporting capital, in normal circumstances the developed economies, and those countries which import capital, the emerging market economies. The international financial institutions set up at Bretton Woods over 50 years ago were designed to deal primarily with problems of current account imbalances. In recent years, however, major financial crises have originated in the capital account. Why have these occurred, and how can we make them less likely in future and improve our ability to deal with them when they do occur? I can think of no better place to discuss this subject than ICRIER. The links between international flows of private and public finance, and the need for a restatement of the role of the international financial institutions and a clearer understanding of their modus operandi, are subjects at the heart of the work of ICRIER.
But, from a long run perspective, its performance is highly significant. Internationally, many changes are taking place in the FMI arena and it is vital that our FMI – often referred to as the “plumbing of our financial markets” – continues to serve Switzerland’s best interests in the future. My goal this evening is to raise awareness of the FMI’s importance and of the need to develop a strategy to ensure that it remains an asset for us in the future. Part I: Financial market infrastructure Overall, the key elements of the Swiss FMI function well. In the recent crisis, the resilience of our infrastructure has been remarkable. But, increased competition, international regulatory changes, growing trade volumes and, on occasion, heightened volatility imply that it will have to evolve in order to remain effective. I will hence highlight three aspects of our FMI tonight: its relevance, its strengths and the challenges it faces. The importance of a safe and efficient financial market infrastructure The summer of 2011 will take its place in history as a period of considerable market uncertainty and volatility. On three occasions we saw daily moves of the Swiss franc against the Euro which were among the most extreme experienced since the inception of the euro in 1999. The most significant one day move of 3.2% occurred on 9 August.

In fact, the market itself has this evaluation. Comparing with the effects in other countries, the last three episodes of increased volatility and tension in world financial markets have had very limited effects on the Chilean economy (Figure 6). BIS Review 97/2007  7  Figure 6: Exchange rates (local currency units per US dollar, percent change) May 2006(1) Argentina Australia Brazil Chile Eurozone Hungary Indonesia Japan Malaysia Mexico New Zealand Philippines Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Turkey United Kingdom  1,5 5,8 8,0 7,3 1,6 7,0 6,6 5,2 2,9 5,4 3,3 4,0 6,1 0,1 20,3 3,2 20,3 2,3  February 2007 (2)  August 2007 (3)  0,0 3,0 2,6 1,0 0,7 0,7 2,0 -4,2 0,7 1,0 5,2 1,0 0,6 0,4 5,9 1,2 5,1 2,2  1,7 Argentina 10,3 Australia 8,8 Brazil 1,9 Chile 2,4 Eurozone 5,1 Hungary 3,3 Indonesia -6,3 Japan 2,3 Malaysia 3,1 Mexico 13,6 New Zealand 4,1 Philippines 1,8 Poland 1,4 Russia 6,8 South Africa 2,9 South Korea 7,0 Turkey 3,4 United Kingdom  (1) Shows variation between 10 May and 27 June. (2) Shows variation between 26 February and 5 March. (3) Shows variation between 19 July and 17 August. Source: Bloomberg.
This includes considering a fiscal union and even a political union, which are difficult topics and ones that I have not touched upon today. Let’s remind ourselves that Europe’s Heads of State or Government already “laid the foundation for completion of the European Union” with the Maastricht Treaty. This Treaty,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  according to former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, marked “a new, decisive step in the process of European integration that in a few years will lead to the creation of what the founding fathers of modern Europe dreamt of after the last war: a United States of Europe.” 7 It is time that this affirmation resulted in action. A completed Union would not mean that Member States give up their national identities. Quite the contrary: they bring their national identities with them into the euro area. That is why we speak of “unity in diversity”. The Euro Exhibition illustrates this: while one side of our coins all share the same design, each Member has its own country-specific design for the reverse side. These designs often bear symbols of national identity, such as Milda, the symbol of freedom, who features on the Latvian euro coins. But go and take a look for yourself! I hope you will enjoy the exhibition. My thanks go to the Deutsche Bundesbank and the City of Osnabrück for inviting me to today’s opening event. 7  6  Kohl, H. “Zielvorstellungen und Chancen für die Zukunft Europas”, speech given on 3 April 1992.

In concrete terms, membership of the euro should bring more stability and prosperity. In this respect, the Monetary Union has already taken considerable steps towards integration. But a common internal market and a single monetary policy alone is not enough to achieve this in the long run. With stricter budgetary rules for euro area countries, a stability mechanism and banking union, the Monetary Union is in a considerably better position today that it was at the start of the crisis. But despite these steps towards integration we still can’t speak of a completed Monetary Union. To sit back now, given what has been achieved, would therefore be wrong. Developing the Monetary Union further is a permanent undertaking. As a matter of principle, the prosperity of each individual country in a monetary union always depends on the financial and economic policies of the other Member States. Member States find themselves, as it were, in a community with a shared destiny. All governments are therefore well advised if they take the other Member States into account and coordinate their policies where appropriate. Member States thus not only need a common monetary policy, they also profit when they share more sovereignty in other policy areas. When I talk about “sharing sovereignty”, this in no way means that Member States lose their independent decision-making authority, let alone their national identity. On the contrary, the more sovereignty Member States share, the more influence they can sometimes gain. Let me illustrate this with an example.
Caleb M Fundanga: Zambia’s economic outlook - what have we learnt in the last 40 years and where do we go from here? Paper presented by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the CIMA Zambia annual business discussion on the theme “Zambia’s economic outlook - what have we learnt in the last 40 years and where do we go from here?”, Lusaka, 7 January 2005. * • • • •  *  *  Mr Chairman The President of CIMA Zambia, Mr Cleaver Mulundu Distinguished Invited Guests Ladies and Gentlemen  I wish to thank the President of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) Zambia Chapter, Mr. Mulundu and his Executive for inviting me to present a paper to this distinguished gathering on the theme “Zambia’s Economic Outlook: What Have We Learnt in the Last 40 Years and Where Do We Go from Here.” The topic is timely, as it is very important to take stock of our past economic development efforts, including the mistakes and good policies of the past and assess the current economic conditions in order to put up a future strategy. In this respect, I will discuss what I consider to be the key lessons of macroeconomic management and present an outlook for the period ahead. In so doing, I will also highlight the challenges that lie ahead in our quest to develop our economy. Mr Chairman May I start by reviewing our economic performance during the last 40 years.

Other important events that affected Zambia’s economic development in her early stages of nationhood included: (i)  The pronouncement of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Ian Smith regime in the then Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The declaration of UDI had both positive and negative impacts on the Zambian economy, although the negative effects outweighed the positive gains. The positive gains relate, mainly, to the relocation of industries from Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to Zambia to avoid being affected by the sanctions imposed by the International Community, as a result of the declaration of UDI in 1965. This contributed to the growth of the Zambian manufacturing sector and the increase in employment levels. However, the declaration of UDI had serious adverse effects on the blossoming Zambian economy. As you may recall, at independence, the economies of Southern Rhodesia (now  BIS Review 5/2005  1  Zimbabwe) and our economy were intertwined. Southern Rhodesia was Zambia’s biggest trading partner as well as the main supply route to the sea. The severing of trading, commercial and transportation relations with Southern Rhodesia on account of UDI therefore, meant that Zambia had to invest heavily in her own transportation infrastructure, which finally led to the construction of the TAZAMA oil pipeline, Indeni refinery, TAZARA, the Great North Road (which used to be known as the Hell Run), etc., in order to transport her essential imports and exports. These were huge projects whose construction required enormous borrowing from countries like China, Italy, France, etc.
26.09.2022  Economic developments in the current inflationary setting and the economic policy response* Fundación la Caixa. “Economy and Society” lecture series Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  *iEnglish translation from the original in Spanish. Ladies and gentlemen, first allow me to thank Fundación la Caixa for inviting me to participate in this series of lectures entitled “Economy and Society”, which has become a benchmark for in-depth analysis of current affairs. Against the current backdrop of high inflation and considerable uncertainty over the economic outlook, tragically marked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the first part of my address will focus on describing the Banco de España’s diagnosis of the economic situation and outlook. I will then analyse the monetary policy response of the European Central Bank (ECB) to this setting and some of its possible effects on the Spanish economy. Lastly, I would like to highlight the role that other economic policies can play in tackling the challenges we currently face. 1. The main determinants of the current economic outlook Inflationary pressures are proving particularly high and persistent, causing significant drops in real income Inflation has surged persistently worldwide, becoming one of the major determinants of economic developments. The reasons behind the rise in inflation are manifold and combine supply and demand-side factors, whose weights differ depending on the geographical area in question. These factors include high commodity prices on international markets, production bottlenecks affecting certain goods (due to supply-demand mismatches triggered by the lifting of pandemic restrictions) and shipping bottlenecks.

The Bank of Zambia is in the process of engaging the banks with a view to finding a solution to the high cost of banking which is often cited as the main hindrance to access to finance. I therefore appeal to all the banks operating in Zambia to critically assess the level of their charges and to continue playing the supportive role to development that they have in the past. In this regard, I am particularly pleased to make mention of the spirited efforts that Standard Chartered Bank continues to make in financing SME’s and Micro-finance. The experiences of many economies show that these sub sectors have the capacity to create a middle class and  BIS Review 163/2008  1  to emancipate both rural and urban dwellers from their poverty trap. Zambia has many promising entrepreneurs whose only constraint is affordable funding. As you explore the opportunities that this new venture will bring you, I urge you to focus on the customers who may appear small today, but could grow with the bank if they are given the right support. I wish you every success as you embark on this journey into North Western Province. 2  BIS Review 163/2008
So what can we do? An economic policy that is credible in the long term is, as I said earlier, a very important ingredient in this context. But it is not enough. Rules and institutes that contribute to financial stability are also necessary. This is why international organisations such BIS, IOSCO and the OECD are working to  4  BIS Review 26/2001  strengthen the financial system in various ways. In total, the work covers a dozen different areas, from overseeing and supervising the financial system to observing individual countries' economies and regulations for credit institutes. Allow me to briefly mention, in this context, the capital adequacy regulations worked out by the Basel Committee, as I feel this is a good example of how we can work internationally to create regulations and institutes that contribute to stability, without preventing the important, healthy risk taking. The Basel regulations mean in principle that the greater the risk a bank takes, the more capital it should hold. As capital costs money, the Basel regulations lead to the banks reducing their risk taking. This in turn reduces the risk of bank crises and other disturbances that would have a negative effect on economic growth arising in the financial system. If this is to function, it requires a broad geographical support, which it has. The Regulations from 1988 are applied in more than 120 countries. The Basel Committee has proposed new regulations, which are an extension of the current ones.

Personally, I believe that it will be easier to arouse interest in a discussion based on facts, when the euro banknotes and coins appear next year. Globalisation requires stable game rules After this in-depth foray into the world of the euro, I shall return to the more general issues following on from the current internationalisation process. This creates, as I said earlier, the right conditions for a more rapid economic growth, but it does not offer any guarantee that this will be the case and it is important to remember this. The Swedish economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s is still fresh in most of our memories. That experience provided a clear illustration of the importance of pursuing a long-term, credible economic policy. However, it also showed the importance of building up properly functioning institutions to oversee the financial markets when deregulated. In Sweden it was evident that the supervisory authorities were not prepared for the reality that would prevail after the deregulation of the credit markets in the 1980s. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the crises in for example Mexico and Asia. These also show clearly that countries wanting to participate on the international capital markets must meet the requirements for openness and provision of information.
Unfortunately, I cannot readily assess the level of support for the particular option which the Government have now chosen, since the researchers did not ask you to assess it - which is certainly a tribute to the new Government’s ability to surprise the market. But in these surveys I am always fascinated by the outlying views - the small minorities who express a contrary opinion. For example, when asked about the most appropriate regulatory structure 2 per cent of those asked said they thought the best option would be to abandon the SIB and the SROs, and the Bank of England, and that regulation should be carried out directly by the Treasury. I would be very grateful if that 2 per cent of you could stay behind afterwards, assuming they have not been institutionalised since the study was conducted. BIS Review 67/1997  -2-  The strongest message to emerge, though, was the need for regulators to consult the market effectively on both structures and on rules. I am certainly prepared to undertake here and now that we shall do so. We are charged by the Government to produce an over-arching framework pretty quickly, so our discussions with the market will need to start now. But, thereafter, we will consult intensively on the way in which the new structure will affect day to day regulation. I give you my firm undertaking on that point. But, as I said, today I am not speaking to you as the Chairman of the SIB.

Such consolidation would permit small and medium-sized banks to attain sufficient scale to undertake the IT investment necessary to meet the challenges of the digital era. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  While both national and cross-border consolidation options are potentially viable, the key consideration for financial stability is that the combined entity should be able to successfully execute the merger, resulting in a bank that can sustain profitability in the long run. 1 See European Banking Authority (2018), Risk Assessment Questionnaire – Summary of Results, December. 70% of banks view their cost of equity in this range, with a further 15% of banks estimating that it lies in the range of 10–12%. 2 See, for example, Babihuga, R. and Spaltro, M. (2014), “Bank Funding Costs for International Banks,” IMF  Working Papers 14/71, International Monetary Fund; Keeley, M. (1990), “Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking,” American Economic Review, 80(5): 1183–1200. 3 See Andrews, D. and Petroulakis, F. (2019), “Breaking the shackles: Zombie firms, weak banks and depressed  restructuring in Europe,” Working Paper Series, No. 2240, ECB, Frankfurt am Main. 4 See Gopinath, G., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Karabarbounis, L. and Villegas-Sanchez, C. (2017), “Capital Allocationand  Productivity in South Europe”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4): 1915–1967. 5 See Adalet McGowan, M., Andrews D. and Millot, V. (2018), “The walking dead? Zombie firms and productivity  performance in OECD countries,” Economic Policy, 33(96): 685–736.