samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We’re here to learn more at first hand from you what things are really like on the ground, and to give you our impressions of the state of the UK economy as a whole. I don’t suppose it will come as a great surprise if I tell you that we bring a somewhat mixed message on the overall economy. And it won’t surprise us, either, if you give us the same mixed message about the regional economy. And the reason - at both national and regional level - is clear. Our overall economic performance has not been at all bad over the past decade. But for the past few years, beneath that relatively calm surface there has been a sustained imbalance, between businesses and sectors that are heavily exposed to some very cold winds blowing in from abroad, on the one hand, and the more domestically-oriented businesses and sectors, which have on the whole been doing much better, on the other. To remind you of some facts. Inflation - on our RPIX target measure - has averaged 2.6% over the past 10 years, and has for the past 2 years been mostly modestly below our 2½% target. But that hasn’t been achieved at the expense of consistently high interest rates, and weak growth and employment, as many people feared that it would be.

In fact nominal interest rates have been as low they’ve been for 40 years; the overall economy has grown without interruption quarter by quarter - at an average annual rate of 2¾%, which is comfortably above its long-term trend; the number of people in employment has risen fairly steadily - and is still close to its all-time high, while the rate of claimant count unemployment has fallen from 9.6% to 3.1% - the lowest its been for more than 25 years. And what’s true for the UK economy as a whole is broadly true for every region of the UK, including the North West region. Total output in the North West increased year by year from 1992 to 1999 - the latest number I have - though at a somewhat slower annual average rate than in the UK as a whole, at around 1¾%. The number of people in employment in the region rose by about ¼ million from the end of 1992 to over 3.1 mn in the past two years. And the rate of claimant count unemployment fell from over 10% to 3.5% - still somewhat above the rate for the UK as a whole, but again the lowest rate for over 25 years. But I’m well aware that you don’t have to look far beneath the surface to see that at the sectoral or individual business level things are a lot more uncomfortable than these aggregate figures might suggest. To a degree that’s always going to be true.
Other studies, however, have found that human capital differences increase the pay differential (Lang and Manove (2011)). Wage differentials between black and white women have historically been considerably lower than between men (Lang (2007)) and at times have even reversed. However, Neal (2004) demonstrates that this finding partially reflects the differential selection of black and white women into the labour force. For example, black women face a lower household income than white women, which provides a stronger incentive for them to enter the workforce in the first place. For the UK, although evidence is more partial, it suggests that both gender and ethnicity pay gaps have fallen over time (ONS (2018), ONS (2019)). For gender, the factors determining these gaps include age, educational background, sector, occupation and part time work (Olsen and Walby (2004), Manning and Swaffield (2005), Brynin (2017), ONS (2018)). For ethnicity, it includes occupation, being born in the UK and education (ONS (2019), Brynin and Guveli (2012)). As in the US, the UK ethnicity gap appears to be larger for males than females (Longhi and Brynin (2017)). When it comes to explaining the sources of pay gaps, three main approaches have typically been used. Regression techniques estimate pay gaps controlling for various characteristics of the individual or job (Goldin (2014), Brynin and Guveli (2012)). Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions account for differences in pay between two groups using an independent set of factors. This is useful for capturing the effects of compositional differences in the characteristics of groups (O’Donnell et al (2008)).

If we assess by qualification, the largest gender pay gaps are observed for people with GCSE or no qualifications, while the lowest gaps are for workers with a degree or equivalent (Chart 8). Generally speaking, the higher the qualifications, the lower the gender pay gap. Location also appears to play an important role. The gender pay gap outside London is consistently higher than in London, across all levels of qualification. The largest gap between London and the rest of the UK is among workers who have no or “other” qualifications. This might be explained by the fact that “other” qualifications includes degrees from outside the UK which may get less recognition. 9 Olivetti, C and Petrongolo, B (2016) show that structural change of the economy becoming more service based, can explain at least half of the overall variation in female hours, both over time and across countries. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  Chart 8: Median gender pay gap by qualification, sample average  Gender pay gap, per cent London  25  Other 20  15  10  5  0 Degree or equivalent  Higher educ  GCE A Level or equiv  GCSE grades A‐C or Other qualifications No qualification equiv  1 Male  2 Female  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men.
In short, the hot air is cooling. But some big challenges remain: -  On disclosures, to reach the goal of securing a fully consistent, decision useful and forward looking set of metrics requires standard setters to agree on a single framework; for it to be made mandatory; and for corporates to measure, model and disclose;  -  On instruments, we need to see a further scaling up in the range and depth of tools providing credible incentives for green investment and more effective transparency for investors on performance against climate goals. That will drive broader-based price discrimination between climate-positive and climate-negative assets, which in turn will provide powerful incentives for further adjustment; and  -  On asset allocation strategies, we need to coalesce more around terminology and approaches, providing a clear and credible choice for clients and investors, on that journey towards full integration. And we need more research on what works and what doesn’t! Many of the actions here are for the financial markets themselves to resolve – and rightly so, because we want the power of markets working to deliver climate change. But there are important priorities for the public authorities too: to ensure externalities are properly internalised, so markets can do their job; to help co-ordinate and set market-wide standards, and where necessary to make them obligatory; and to use our strength and influence as market participants in our own right to drive change, where doing so is consistent with our mandates.

The first such ‘sustainability-linked bond’ was issued by Enel, an Italian electricity producer, and offered a ‘step up’ coupon penalising the issuer if it failed to meet a specific target for the share of renewable energy in its installed capacity. Such bonds are not a complete answer to the concern of greenwashing: the degree of challenge in the target remains the choice of the issuer, for example, and the use of funds cannot be traced to specific projects in the same way as use of proceeds bonds. But they do illustrate the type of innovation now underway in capital markets. Chart 8: Total green bond issuance  Chart 9: Corporate green bonds outstanding by nationality of issuer  Source: Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI) data (including all selflabelled green bonds aligned with CBI’s Climate Bonds Taxonomy and with at least 95% use of proceeds financing or refinancing green/environmental projects) and Bank  Source: CBI data and Bank calculations. calculations. The billion dollar question, of course, is whether the market is yet discriminating in favour of climate-positive investment, and away from the reverse. There are some encouraging signs from recent primary issuance: green bonds issued by European companies in September priced on average nearly 10 basis points inside existing curves, and tighter than other non-green issuance over the same time period (Chart 11). That’s real money: for example, the average -15bp new issue premium on VW’s recent € green bond issues will save the firm around € a year in interest costs compared to a conventional bond.
The establishment of the credit bureau is likely to increase credit business, lead to more competitive pricing of credit facilities and lower credit loan defaults and delinquency rates. To address the concerns over the treatment of credit data, MAS would follow two broad principles. 1  Refers to the submission of customer’s payment histories on their credit facilities. Positive data refers to timely payment (i.e. a good customer) and negative data refers to overdue payments. 2  BIS Review 7/2002  First, it is important that individuals have access to their own credit files and to have any inaccurate information corrected. Any dispute resolution process should be timely and effective, and should also be covered in the Consumer Banking Code that ABS is currently working on. Second, it is also important that individual privacy is respected and customer data are not misused for purposes other than what they were originally intended for. A good starting point is the principle of reciprocity on data usage, which all participating members to the bureau will need to adhere to. High standards of confidentiality is also expected of both the bureau operators and participating members. The ABS will continue to work with MAS to ensure that these principles are observed. The launch of the consumer credit bureau will mark the beginning of a new risk management process in Singapore. It will further bolster the integrity and transparency of Singapore’s financial sector.

Apart from ensuring that our regulatory framework is progressive and our infrastructure is world class, MAS is also taking an active approach to promoting industry best practices in risk management. The guidelines that we have introduced are steps in this direction. This Risk Conference is another such initiative. The objective of organising such a conference is to highlight emerging fields in risk management by bringing together risk practitioners and academics, to share their experiences and exchange ideas. Such a forum will help the industry and regulators keep abreast of the latest developments in financial risk management I hope you will find this first Risk Conference that MAS has organised useful and fruitful. Thank you. BIS Review 7/2002  3
That is why in its monetary policy strategy, the Committee has interpreted “high employment” to mean the highest level of employment consistent with price stability over time. This level may vary over time and is primarily determined by structural conditions, such as labour force composition, the tax and social security system and wage formation. If we had attempted to use monetary policy to keep employment over that level permanently, inflation could have accelerated rapidly. An even higher policy rate may then have been required at a later stage, which may in turn have increased the risk of an economic downturn. In the Norwegian wage formation model, the social partners put weight on employment and firms’ profitability in wage negotiations, which is also an assumption underlying our economic projections. Over time, the system of coordinated wage determination has likely contributed to greater real wage flexibility and to keeping unemployment low by international standards. Experience nevertheless shows that there is a clear tendency for wage growth to increase when the labour market is tight and competition for labour intensifies. Similarly, wage growth tends to edge lower when the unemployment-to-vacancy ratio is high. Monetary policy trade-offs in the event of a cost shock Let me now turn to how we are seeking, in the current high-inflation environment, to strike a balance between the aim of low and stable inflation and the aim of high and stable employment. Over the past year, the policy rate has been raised from a very low level.

In the model, the central bank therefore raises its policy rate to curb the rise in inflation and gradually bring it down. The tighter monetary stance, which in this model is represented by an increase in the real interest rate, results in a negative output gap. [10] The extent to which monetary policy should be tightened to achieve a reasonable trade-off depends on the impact of higher prices and costs on consumption and investment. In most New Keynesian models, a cost shock does not affect demand directly. This is because temporary disturbances have little impact on households’ permanent income and because households and firms can borrow and save freely in these models. In practice, however, many households have small financial buffers and limited borrowing capacity. A decline in purchasing power due to a higher interest rate and higher prices will compel these households to reduce consumption. In addition, higher costs can reduce firms’ profits and thereby business investment. Chart: Costs shock – monetary policy trade-offs These effects of a cost shock can be illustrated in a model with different types of households – a so-called TANK model. [11] The model assumes that there are two types of households. One group can spread the effect of a decline in real disposable income on consumption over time, that is to say they can smooth consumption. The other group, called hand-to-mouth households, spends all its disposable income in each period. The cost shock hits the hand-to-mouth households relatively hard, and aggregate demand falls.
Figure 6 Interest rates in pesos and dollars in the local market (percentage) 14  14  12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  Jan.08  Apr.08  Jul.08  Oct.08  Stock Exchange-90 days  Jan.09  Apr.09  Jul.09  Oct.09  Libor + 90-day on-shore spread  Sources: Bloomberg and Central Bank of Chile. 8  BIS Review 145/2009  Table 1 Monetary policy rate and expectations according to EES (percentage) Actual level  Expected for Expected 2 same month months ahead  Expected for Dec.09  Oct. 2008  8.25  8.50  8.50  7.00  Dec. 2008  8.25  8.25  7.75  6.25  Feb. 2009  4.75  6.25  5.00  4.00  Nov. 2008  8.25  Jan. 2009  8.25  7.25  Mar. 2009  8.25  7.50  2.25  6.75  3.13  2.50  6.63 5.50  2.00  Source: Economic Expectations Survey (EES), Central Bank of Chile.

From a significant inflationary shock caused by the rise in oil and food prices to the effects of an unprecedented international financial crisis accompanied by a drop in output and a sharp reduction in inflation. Since mid-2007, the Chilean economy went through a process of significant increase in inflation, due to the sharp rise in commodity prices in world markets (figure 1). This rise was caused by supply and demand factors specific to those markets. Therefore, it was an adjustment of relative prices in foreign markets and not a generalized increase in domestic prices. The fact that it was an adjustment of relative prices made us not act with the strength that we would have if, for example, it had been a widespread increase in prices caused by a demand shock. In fact, the purpose of the increases in the monetary policy rate (MPR) applied in 2007 and early 2008 were to avoid the incubation of undesired second-round effects that  BIS Review 145/2009  1  might unreasonably prolong the inflationary impact of the shocks. Also, in that period we decided to begin a process of reserve accumulation consistent with the prevailing financial uncertainty and the evolution of the exchange rate. As from May of last year, the macroeconomic picture changed. Inflation rates began to show a fast and unexpected propagation of these shocks to other prices (figure 2). It could be argued that the Bank reacted too late.
The baseline scenario in our December Monetary Policy Report is still totally valid. Our aforementioned report and the market expect a moderate deceleration of Chile’s growth. Our economy is forecast to grow in the range of 3.75% to 4.75% in 2012, with y-o-y rates for every expenditure component below those of 2011. This would be the response both to a normal, sound convergence of the economy to trend-consistent growth rates, and to the effects of a less favorable external environment. The latest data show our economy gradually adjusting to lower growth rates, at the same time that expenditure indicators are still showing substantial growth. Sure enough, there are differences across sectors. In some branches of manufacturing, especially export-oriented ones, dynamism is milder. In other sectors, such as retail, there is some degree of higher  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  caution in inventory management. By contrast, the consumption of durable and capital goods, which are normally the first to react to a change in the agents’ expectations, remains strong, the same as the construction sector. Meanwhile, various indicators signal a tight labor market. It has been recently reported that in December, the unemployment rate as measured by the Universidad de Chile survey for Greater Santiago dropped to a 15-year low, and that the creation of new jobs has, for the most part, been accounted for by salaried employment.

Jiří Rusnok: The future of monetary policy - what can we see as the dust has settled? Opening remarks by Mr Jiří Rusnok, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the High-Level Economic Conference, Prague, 16 June 2019. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, dear guests, I wish you a good morning. It is my pleasure to welcome you all to this high-level conference on “The Future of Monetary Policy: What Can We See as the Dust Has Settled?” hosted by the Czech National Bank. This conference is organised as part of this year’s celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the introduction of our national currency – named the koruna – in 1919. Before I give the floor to the distinguished speakers, let me first make a few remarks that will set the stage for the upcoming event. During the past 100 years, our currency and the overall economic situation of our country has enjoyed times of economic prosperity, but also some more difficult periods. This alternation between good and bad times applies elsewhere. Before the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, it seemed that monetary policy had triumphed. Inflation in advanced countries and elsewhere had decreased to low and stable levels. The goal of price stability had been achieved. Central banks were using standard tools with well understood transmission mechanisms. The outbreak of the Great Recession suddenly changed this perspective. The GFC brought significant economic slack and deflationary tendencies to many countries. In response, central banks started using unconventional tools.
Furthermore, recovery varies from one industry to another. Overall, the situation today is much better than many observers had expected at the beginning of 2015. The Swiss economy has once again demonstrated its flexibility by, for example, making swift adjustments to working hours and taking measures to improve production processes. In view of the structural changes taking place, this adaptability will remain key, regardless of developments in the international economy and exchange rates. I’m thinking here of traditional retailing, which increasingly has to compete with internet trading. Digitalisation, too, presents new challenges for manufacturing and finance that will continue to call for major efforts on the part of companies and staff in all the industries concerned. Current monetary policy  What challenges does this situation pose for our monetary policy? We have the statutory mandate to ensure price stability. In so doing, we must take due account of economic developments. Since the beginning of the year, the inflation rate in Switzerland has climbed above zero again (cf. chart 4). As is the case with our trading partners, this is largely driven by oil and food prices. Core inflation is somewhat lower, primarily because of underutilised production capacity. Our current forecast puts inflation in mid-2019 at around 1%. Given low inflation and underutilisation of production capacity, maintaining an expansionary monetary policy in Switzerland is the right course of action to take. The Swiss franc is still significantly overvalued.

The SNB’s investment policy The SNB’s investment policy outlines the principles governing its asset management. Our assets chiefly consist of currency reserves, namely foreign currency investments and gold. A small proportion are Swiss franc assets. In principle, the SNB is able to define its own investment policy. However, due to its monetary policy mandate, the SNB’s investment policy is subject to certain restrictions. It has to be designed in a way that helps the SNB fulfil its mandate. To a certain degree, the function of our investment policy is to serve monetary policy. What does this mean exactly? Objectives  In applying its investment policy, the SNB has two main objectives. The first is to ensure that its balance sheet can be used at any time for monetary policy purposes. Investment policy may not restrict monetary policy in terms of either a possible expansion or a possible reduction of the balance sheet. The investment universe must be designed in such a way that we are able to purchase foreign currency and invest it quickly when necessary. But we must also be able to sell the investments again quickly if monetary policy requires it. The second objective of investment policy is to ensure that the currency reserves preserve their value over the long term. Currency reserves serve to build confidence. They are used not just to overcome, but to also to prevent potential crises. Currency reserves allow us to intervene in the market if the Swiss franc weakens.