samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the UK a significant proportion of variable compensation now must be deferred for a period of seven years. This ensures that it can be clawed back over the time scales it generally takes for conduct issues to come to light. To address the “rolling bad apples” problem, mechanisms are now in place in the UK to ensure that when 6  individuals move on their history will be known to those who consider hiring them. The FSB is now considering whether to adopt such an approach more broadly. 7  5  The UK’s Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR) recommended that the EU’s market abuse regulation should be extended to cover every major fixed income and currency market, that criminal sanctions be updated, and maximum prison terms extended. See: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/fmreview.aspx 6 The PRA has introduced requirements for regulated firms to provide employment references to one another in a mandatory template when hiring Senior Managers. This includes information on an individual’s conduct record, and their fitness and propriety. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  This is all constructive but insufficient. That’s why we have emphasised measures to ensure firms and their employees take responsibility – individually and collectively – for their own conduct. These range from securing compliance with minimum standards to a common and dynamic understanding of good practice that is widely understood and collectively enforced.

It thus became fully clear  BIS Review 73/1999  2  that Switzerland was going to demonetise gold and to progressively transform a part of its stock into interest bearing assets. But why did we decide to fund the Foundation with gold and not with other assets? In order to understand this, one must take a closer look at the structure of the SNB’s balance sheet. 2. From revaluation of the gold stock to gold sales 2.1. The SNB’s balance sheet If, in relative terms, Switzerland is leading among all industrialised countries as far as gold holdings are concerned, the Swiss National Bank is also a special case with respect to the structure of its balance sheet. The bulk of the SNB’s assets consist of foreign exchange and gold. Swiss franc denominated assets constitute a mere 20% of the total. Compared to the balance sheets of the Bundesbank prior to the introduction of the euro, the SNB’s balance sheet exhibits only a small proportion of domestic assets (see graph 3). Graph 3 Assets Structure of the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank 20% 54% 50%  30% 30% 14% BUBA  Gold  SNB  Foreign Claims  Domestic Claims  Other Assets  On the liabilities side, the most striking feature are the bank’s own capital and reserves to which will be added the revaluation gain on the gold stock (see graph 4).
•  Relying solely on securities as collateral is not enough; a picture must also be obtained of the borrower’s total commitments. •  The LTCM crisis demonstrates that credit assessments must include a larger element of readiness for extreme events. Models based on historical events were incapable of foreseeing the debt moratorium in Russia and the resultant slump in virtually every market. Neither could they envisage that market liquidity would dry up to such an extent that the banks would not be able to dispose of their loan collateral without eliciting a very steep price fall. The banks need to augment their risk models with stress tests— assessments of the direct and indirect effects that unusual market developments would have on their current positions. •  Banks must improve their risk management and knowledge of different forms of risk but so must the supervisory authorities. •  A further question concerns the adequacy of existing laws and regulations. Are there things we have missed? As I mentioned earlier, intensive efforts are being made to improve the rules. Having said all this, we must also recognise that the extensive work that is continuously being done to strengthen the financial system does not mean that the system will be made completely immune to crises. The work must focus on mitigating the effects and trying to ensure that crises which do occur are less extensive and socially costly than those we have experienced in recent years.

Mr Bäckström looks at the Riksbank and financial system stability and comments on the LTCM case Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, to the Swedish Economics Association in Stockholm on 25/2/99. Financial stability is a topical subject in the light of events in the past yeara year that saw continued financial problems in Asia, the devaluation of the rouble and suspended payments in Russia, considerable turbulence in western financial markets and financial unrest in Brazil. What happened last autumn, when it was considered that problems for a single playerthe hedge fund Long Term Capital Managementmight create grave difficulties for the financial system in the United States, highlighted risks of a new type. The LTCM case can be seen both as an extreme example of what could happen in Sweden’s financial markets and as a serious reminder that the continuous development of financial markets is liable to give rise to new risks. The suspension of payments in Russia and its consequences should likewise lead us to reflect on the risks in the system. Today I shall be discussing the problems behind last autumn’s events in the U.S. market and the fact that a systemic crisis was judged to be imminent. First, however, I shall briefly sketch the background and explain stability’s central importance for the Riksbank. Background There is nothing new about financial crises. Over the centuries they have repeatedly hit financial systems in the industrialised world, as well as in less developed countries.
The type of time series model chosen for the comparison is, despite its simplicity, difficult to surpass, according to several international studies. Moreover, they have analysed how far ahead we can make forecasts with good accuracy, that is to say what forecasting memory the different variables have.5 They have also looked at whether there are tendencies to systematically over-estimate or under-estimate the different variables, that is, whether the forecasts have any bias. What does the analysis show about our forecasting performance? Let us first look at the entire period and compare our forecasts for GDP, employment and CPIX with outcomes. CPIX is a measure of underlying inflation, which until recently was known as UND1X. Hardly surprisingly, it appears that the forecasts have varied in accuracy (Figure 1). For instance, we have under-estimated employment growth recently (Figure 2). Nor did we predict the sharp rise in inflation spring 2001 in our assessments the previous year. However, we were more successful in capturing the downswing in inflation during 2003 (Figure 3). But how do things look in more detail for the different variables? Forecasts for GDP growth With regard to the GDP forecasts, we have periodically been accurate and close to the outcome, while we have fallen short on other occasions (Figure 1). It is often particularly difficult to make forecasts in an economic turnaround. Compared with the time series model that is used to gain a perspective of the forecasting memory, we make better GDP forecasts up to a year ahead.

Last year we also had two external researchers, Francesco Giavazzi and Frederic Mishkin, who made a more in-depth evaluation of monetary policy. This was commissioned by the Committee on Finance and covered the entire ten-year period of inflation targeting. New study of the Riksbank’s forecasting performance As a step in the evaluation work, three economists at the Monetary Policy Department of the Riksbank recently made a comprehensive analysis of our forecasting performance during the  1  “Modern forecasting models in action: Improving analyses at central banks” Adolfson, M., M. K. Andersson, J. Lindé, M. Villani & A. Vredin, (2007), International Journal of Central Banking, in the process of being published. 2  ”The Riksbank’s new indicator procedures” Andersson, M. and M. Löf, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2007:1, Sveriges Riksbank. 2  BIS Review 138/2007  period 2000-2006.3 They have analysed the forecasts of the most important variables for monetary policy – GDP, employment, productivity and inflation.4 In the study they have tried to estimate how accurate the forecasts have been on average by comparing them with outcomes. To gain a perspective of the accuracy, our forecasts have also been compared with forecasts from a simple time series model. The so-called AR models, which are often used as a standard comparison in evaluations of this type, quite simply function so that one adjusts the variable in question with the aid of its own historical data.
Our vision is to create a bill payment experience where consumers and businesses can: •  electronically apply for GIRO bill payments;  •  seamlessly pay bills via a “request for payment” function that leverages off FAST fund transfers without needing to bank with the same bank as the biller; and  •  manage their standing payment instructions online or on their mobile phones. MAS is working with the banks and the payments industry to create seamless bill payments and collections. Mobile payments for public transport – account-based ticketing The way we pay for public transport is also due for a refresh. The Land Transport Authority has recently announced that by the end of this year, it will be conducting a pilot for its Account-Based Ticketing System. •  This system will allow commuters to use their existing contactless credit and debit cards to pay for train and bus rides. •  No longer will users have to queue to top-up their stored value transit cards. •  Users will even be able to use their mobile wallets to pay for public transport. An Account-Based Ticketing System will bring Singapore in line with other cities with worldclass public transport payment infrastructure such as London. Pervasive digitisation – maximising productivity gains from e-payments The fourth strategy is to help businesses to digitise their processes and integrate them with electronic payments solutions, so as to maximise productivity and efficiency gains.

But stability at the macroeconomic level does not mean stability for individual firms or industries. Indeed one of the virtues of macro stability is that it allows – indeed forces – firms to focus on the real long term business challenges and opportunities they face rather than how to survive or profit from the short-term cycle. It is not a paradox therefore that the Great Stability has also been a time of great change in industry in ownership, structure and technology. The Engineering Employers’ Federation has itself stated that ‘manufacturing prospers best in a stable macroeconomic environment with low inflation, low interest rates and stable exchange rates’. 3 That is not because they are a recipe for a quiet life but because they allow businesses to focus on what really matters – their products, their technology, their customers and their competition. In the last few years, macroeconomic stability has provided business with a platform for rapid changes in ownership, location and product mix, and for the transformation by IT of all business processes in the factory, the warehouse and the office. 1  Bean, C (1998), ‘The New U.K. Monetary Arrangements: a view from the literature’, Economic Journal, November. 2  ‘The Inflation Target Five Years On’, Quarterly Bulletin  3  ‘Manufacturing in the UK’, Engineering Employers Federation, May 2005.
Internationally, a wide consensus has been achieved between governments and economists that price stability is the most appropriate main objective of monetary policy. The Icelandic economy has witnessed turbulent times since 2001 and undergone major structural changes, particularly in the financial sector. Iceland moved on to an inflation target under conditions of strong macroeconomic imbalances, one result of which was a depreciation of the króna by one-third over a period of eighteen months until near the end of 2001. This development led to a shortlived inflationary episode which peaked in January 2002. Afterwards inflation slowed down sharply and moved below the 2½% target before the end of 2002. It remained below or close to the target into the second half of 2004, but has been above target since then. In the current episode, the twelve-month inflation rate peaked in August 2006 at 8.4%. Since then it has been decelerating and the twelvemonth increase in the CPI measured 7.4% in February 2007. However, the rise in the core indices remained above 8%. Cuts in indirect taxation will bring down headline inflation very rapidly over the next few months, although the reduction in underlying inflation will be slower. The Central Bank has explained in detail the reasons for the inflation target overshoot over the past two to three years. Suffice it to mention here that the episode of overheating that now appears to be coming to an end originated in large-scale investments [in the power and aluminium sectors] in east Iceland and elsewhere.

[12] Duncan Lamont, Apr 2018, Market views - What is the point of equity market [13] McKinsey Global Private Markets Review 2019, Private markets come of age [14] CFA Institute Mar 2019, MIFID II Research Unbundling: A Survey Yielding Mixed Results [15] This year, MATCH has been enhanced with a new “Deal Fridays” format, reflecting a joint partnership with Enterprise Singapore to connect a carefully curated list of growthstage ASEAN companies with investors through weekly investor-company match-making events. Since the launch of “Deal Fridays” in June 2019, over 400 companies and 400 investors have participated in Deal Fridays.
This volatility in itself argues that a central bank with an inflation target should not focus unduly on exchange rate fluctuations.2 If the central bank were to react to every such fluctuation, monetary policy would also be volatile. This is obviously undesirable as it may mean that the central bank itself becomes a source of unnecessary disruptions in the economy. A volatile exchange rate can be regarded as particularly problematic if the central bank allows the exchange rate to take a very prominent position in its analysis, for example by  2  This is closely linked with Krugman’s (1989) assertion that exchange rates are so volatile because the fluctuations are of so little significance to the economy. This effect is generated by a feedback loop in which increased volatility reduces the exchange rate’s effect on trade, which, in turn, leads to an even more volatile exchange rate. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  relying on what is known as a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI). An index of this kind is intended to summarise, in one measurement, the effects of interest rates and the exchange rate on inflation and resource utilisation. Somewhat simplified, the idea behind the MCI can be described as this: all other factors being equal, if the exchange rate is strengthened, the interest rates should be lower, and vice-versa.

Conclusion In summary, I would like to say that, even if there are factors suggesting that the significance of the exchange rate should not be exaggerated, it is my opinion that it should be considered in monetary policy decisions. Recently, the development of the exchange rate has been an important reason for the reservations I have entered against monetary policy decisions. The Swedish economy grew very strongly during 2010, but this should be seen in the light of the very steep fall that started in 2008 and continued in 2009. My assessment is that there are still relatively many unutilised resources in the Swedish economy and that both resource utilisation and inflationary pressures will continue to be lower than normal over large parts of the Riksbank’s forecast period. Contributing to this is the fact that the krona has (nominally) strengthened by about 10 per cent over the last year, which is more than was previously expected. As a stronger krona dampens both inflationary pressures and resource utilisation, I believe that a lower repo rate path than that decided upon would lead to better target fulfilment. References Campa, J. M. and Goldberg, L. S. (2005), “Exchange Rate Pass-through into Import Prices”, Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 679–690. Chinn, M. D. and Meredith, G. (2004), “Monetary Policy and Long-Horizon Uncovered Interest Parity”, IMF Staff Papers 51, 409–430. Ekholm, K. (2010), “Monetary policy and the exchange rate”, speech at HQ Bank, Stockholm 12 January 2010.
10 One important condition for lending in these programs was that the loan needed to be secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank extending the loan. Despite the degree of dislocation in the financial system at the time and the severity of the Great Recession, there were no losses for any of the Fed’s programs. At the same time, I agree with those critics who argue that there was something fundamentally unfair about the disparity in treatment between the few large financial institutions that were saved versus the millions of individuals who lost their homes or their jobs. My response is not particularly satisfying. Recessions inflict considerable pain on innocent bystanders in the economy. Depressions greatly compound this pain. Given the Federal Reserve’s role and authority, what we knew at the time and the powers and tools that were available to us, I think we made good choices. If the large systemic banking organizations had failed, the hardships inflicted on households and small business would have been far worse. 11 From my perspective, I believe that any critique of the Fed or other agencies should be focused more on the regulatory and supervisory shortcomings – some of which, I admit, were ours – that created the economic and financial market circumstances in which the Fed’s extraordinary interventions proved necessary. This leads me back to some of those lessons learned and the changes that have resulted. The crisis showed that the regulatory community did not fully grasp the vulnerability of the financial system.

By locating the duties related to the execution of monetary policy at the New York Fed, the System gains a number of benefits. These include the New York Fed’s ability to develop expertise in and understanding of the broad spectrum of financial markets and institutions, and its access to a deep pool of specialized financial talent in the place where it is most concentrated. The New York Fed’s institutional knowledge and experience in financial markets and its related disciplines are a critical input at all times, but never more so than during periods of duress. This was evidenced during the financial crisis, when the New York Fed’s unique insights and expertise helped the Federal Reserve respond quickly and effectively to unfolding events. The authors who crafted the Federal Reserve Act such as Carter Glass – assisted by H. Parker Willis – deliberately created a central bank structure that fits the U.S. political system, with a series of important checks and balances – between Washington and the rest of the country, between Washington and New York, and with respect to the role of the federal government versus the private sector. These checks and balances exist to ensure that the central bank acts in the broadest interests of the nation, and is appropriately insulated from short-term political pressures and considerations. In this construction, New York does have a special role, but one that stems from where it sits, in New York City, the nation’s most important financial center.
All in all, this indicates that growth will be higher than we had assumed in June, even taking into account the fact that expectations of repo rate increases have been adjusted upwards over the summer. The upward revision in growth prospects has not led to any major revision in our inflation assessment. Although the high GDP growth in itself indicates that inflation may rise more rapidly in future, the strong productivity growth is at the same time expected to contribute to cost pressures being lower this year than was assumed in June. Cost developments in the somewhat longer term are very difficult to assess. If productivity continues to develop strongly, companies may postpone recruiting new staff, which would mean a delay in the labour market upturn and continued low cost pressures. However, there are a number of indications that the labour market is now strengthening and a more rapid increase in employment will probably contribute to rising cost pressures in future. During the summer inflation has been slightly higher than expected, which was mainly due to rising energy prices. The inflationary impulse this entails is to some extent counteracted by the low unit labour costs, but inflation this year will probably be slightly higher than we had assumed in our June forecast. Our assessment is that the effects of the energy prices will subside at the beginning of 2007.

However, as with productivity growth, there is a risk that we are underestimating the effects – this could mean that energy prices may continue to rise and that there could be contagion effects pushing up inflation further ahead. During 2007 rising unit labour costs will provide an increasing contribution to inflation and a couple of years ahead underlying inflation is expected to be in line with the target, given a gradual increase in the repo rate. Prospects for economic activity and inflation thus indicate that less expansionary monetary policy is called for in future. This will ensure that inflation is close to the target and that developments in the real  4  BIS Review 87/2006  economy are balanced. Given this, we chose, in line with the repo rate path expected by the market, to raise the repo rate by 0.25 percentage points at the monetary policy meeting in August. The assessment of the prospects for economic activity and inflation over the coming years that we made then showed it would be reasonable to also assume that the gradual repo rate increases will need to continue. I see no reason to change this assessment today. Thank you. BIS Review 87/2006  5