samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In Sweden’s case this means that we have really caught up since the beginning of the millennium when we used cards only half as much as these Nordic neighbours. 1 Cards are still used to a greater extent in Norway than in the other Nordic countries. All-in-all, this development means that the use of cards has now reached such a level throughout the Nordic region that a serious disruption that affects the entire card system, or large parts of the system, would have serious consequences for the ability of people to make  1  Speech by Lars Nyberg (2008): “Paying is expensive – are we using too much cash?”. BIS Review 7/2010  1  payments. Cash could no longer replace cards if the card systems were to break down. If card payments do not work, then the entire payment system will not work satisfactorily either. The Riksbank’s responsibility for a safe and efficient payment system therefore means that we also have an interest in ensuring that card payments work safely and efficiently. To get more up-to-date information and to learn more about how the Swedes pay, the Riksbank conducted a survey towards the end of last year. The aim of the survey was to determine how people choose between different means of payment and the factors that affect these choices. As similar surveys were conducted in 2006, we also wanted to see whether the payment patterns had changed over the three years between the surveys.

Although it is common today to use mobile phones for many other things than just making phone calls, our survey shows that private individuals in general are not familiar with the  9  A payment effected directly and which can be confirmed for both issuer and recipient, without delay. 10  Real Time Gross Settlement. 6  BIS Review 7/2010  concept of using their mobile phones to make payments. However, they value convenience highly and if a new payment method emerges that is more convenient than those that already exist it may have a major impact. We only have to look at payments through Internet banks, which almost 80 per cent of the interviewees in our survey use today. Another new development concerns the return of the Cash Card following its lamentable disappearance a few years ago. The new Cash Card has been developed by ICA Banken under commission of the Swedish National Debt Office and will primarily be used to make those payments that public authorities previously made in cash. There are, of course, individuals who lack access to cards and, occasionally, even to bank accounts and who are, consequently, entirely dependent upon cash. This new card differs from the previous Cash Card in that it cannot be topped up by the holder, only by the issuing party. Otherwise, it can be used like a normal debit card and will be equipped with a PIN code.
In general, I see some advantages with having rules that are hardwired in place so that adjustment of the parameters of the tool – say, limits on the loan-to-value ratio – happen automatically in response to sectoral developments. Automatic rules that are always in place have several advantages over discretionary measures that are implemented, ex post, only after some potential source of financial stability risk has been identified. First, they are transparent and will work more quickly. Second, they avoid some of the problems associated with announcing that a new measure is going to be put in place. When implementing a new measure there will always be some reluctance to overcome in terms of deciding whether it is necessary. Also, there may be political opposition to imposing a new measure. For example, during the housing boom, limits on subprime lending would undoubtedly have provoked the objection that the regulators’ actions would limit home ownership for low-and moderate-income families. Imposing automatic, countercyclical standards also has this difficulty to some degree. But I think it is much less severe because at the time such standards are put in place, they generally will not be binding and it will be unclear whether they will necessarily become either more stringent or more binding in the future. In other words, the rule’s potential impact will be highly speculative and uncertain at the time of implementation. This may lessen the political opposition to putting such a rule in place.

d. Finally, there are some additional risks to take into account: Reputational risk if CBDC is not widely adopted by the public, or if privately issued currencies gain more traction; Financial exclusion of the “nontech” persons? Even though many CBDC experiences are from developed economies such as Canada and Sweden, there are also some experiments in developing economies such as China, Colombia and Uruguay. For emerging economies, where persons tend to be financially underserved, is CBDC the most efficient way to solve this problem? Other alternatives, such as fast payments solutions, can be evaluated. Page 9 of 11  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  In conclusion: a. Blockchain technology implies opportunities and concerns that should be carefully addressed: Which is the goal of technology adoption? b. This is especially important in the case of CDBC: financial inclusion, response to new forms of e-money, facilitate wholesale payments, faster payments, cross-border payments? c. CDBC does not necessarily need blockchain. Our understanding is that DLT or Blockchain technologies are more useful when several participants of a given system need to have access to a ledger of information and/or when participants do not necessarily trust each other (and therefore proof of work requirements make the register almost immutable). However, when a Central Bank issues its currency -- either in physical or digital format -- trust should be a given. Also is far from obvious that all market participants should have access to sensitive information such as all transactions in which the CBDC was used.
Overall, however, looking to the extent possible through this volatility, the rate of broad money growth continues to moderate in line with the trend established over the past 18 months, with the intensification of financial tensions since September leading to significant substitution among the components of M3, rather than, at least so far, sharp changes in the trend of M3 itself. Turning to the evolution of bank loans, the tightening of financing conditions resulting from the intensification of the financial tensions has contributed to a slowdown in the flow of monetary financial institution (MFI) loans to the non-financial private sector in recent months. 2  BIS Review 5/2009  More data and further analysis are necessary to form a robust judgement about the severity and scope of credit constraints and their possible implications for economic activity. To sum up, we decided to reduce the interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem by a further 50 basis points, bringing the total reduction since 8 October 2008 to 225 basis points. Today’s decision takes into account that inflationary pressures have continued to diminish, owing in particular to the further weakening in the economic outlook. The Governing Council recalls its operational decision, taken on 18 December 2008, to widen again the corridor formed by the rates on the Eurosystem’s standing facilities as of 21 January 2009.

For the ringgit exchange rate market, the past two years have been uniquely challenging. At the end of 2014, the situation appeared rather benign. The ringgit was stable, market liquidity was good, trading activity was healthy with market volumes averaging USD11.8 billion daily while the volume for USD/MYR pair averaged USD8.3 billion in 2014. The subsequent period however, precipitated by the weakening external conditions, falling oil prices and domestic uncertainties have laid bare these notions. Volume and liquidity declined, bid-offer spreads widened and at times, there were one-way markets which exacerbated any movements. Given these developments, 2015 was a year where our actions were primarily geared towards stabilizing the markets. While this was clearly achieved, it was not without cost; a reduction in foreign exchange reserves, a markedly less liquid and volatile foreign exchange market, and a weaker currency. In the midst of this, an important observation that became increasingly evident is the continued vulnerability of our markets to the arbitrary and unpredictable devices of the offshore markets. Adverse conditions brought on by the NDF market Activities in the offshore market, in particular the ringgit non-deliverable forward (NDF) market, had brought on observable adverse impacts to the onshore market. To our disappointment, onshore players had become followers rather than leaders in determining domestic market rates. Consequently, taking the lead from the NDF market, the ringgit exchange rate has been quite volatile since last year, peaking at 23.1% for its 1-month historical volatility and is the highest among regional currencies for this year.
Svein Gjedrem: Ethics and the Government Pension Fund – global Dinner speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference “Investing for the future”, Oslo, 16 January 2008. *  *  *  Minister, ladies and gentlemen, We are gathered here for a conference – and a dinner – centred on ethics. At this venue, it is obvious that no one will be cheated, and each will get his or her due. Clearly, no one should need to leave this place hungry, or unfairly treated. For that we are truly grateful. Norges Bank is proud, and fortunate, to be the manager of the global part of the Government Pension Fund. And we are proud that Norway has been one of the frontrunners in promoting the idea of ethical investment. Although the debate has broadened over the past few years, some criteria for the management of the Fund have been in place since the beginning: We must have leaders and employees who do their job in a morally impeccable way. We must also make sure that environmental sustainability and social issues are factored in, since they are crucial to future returns, and to the Fund’s legitimacy. And there should indeed be barriers against certain acts and investments, no matter how profitable, basically because ethical behaviour is a goal in itself. In addition to our job of managing the investments, we have been given the task of being active and engaged owners of our global stock portfolio.

1  2  Borio, C.: Monetary policy and financial stability: what role in prevention and recovery?, BIS Working paper No. 440, January 2014  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Lars Heikensten: How to promote and measure central bank efficiency Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at the Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm, 23 May 2003. *  *  *  Let me begin by welcoming you all to Stockholm and Sveriges Riksbank. We have more or less made it a practice to organise an academic conference or workshop at least every second year on a topic which we think is relevant for central bankers. Last year the theme of the conference was Monetary Policy and Financial Markets in an Enlarged European Union. This time we have chosen the topic of Central Bank Efficiency. To attain legitimacy - and keep it - central banks have to use taxpayers' money in an efficient way, not least in countries like Sweden where the central bank is now an independent institution. This is an issue of great importance to the bank, and it has occupied much of our time in recent years. We want to continue this work and develop our thinking in the area. Efficiency is also a very important issue from a European perspective and will be as important should we become a member of the Eurosystem. Central bank efficiency is a fairly abstract concept that encapsulates several areas ranging from the roles that are appropriate for central banks to perform, to cost efficiency in a narrower sense. An investigation of the relevant literature shows that there has not been much research conducted on any of these issues.

Against this background, during 1996 it was possible to cut the repo rate to its lowest level since the early 1960s. Low inflation and decreased inflation expectations also contributed to falling bond rates, accompanied by an appreciation of the krona from the earlier lows. Since December 1996 the repo rate has been unchanged at 4.10 per cent. All in all, conditions were gradually created for a broader economic upswing. With the time lag that generally applies in economic policy, during 1997 we have observed a mood swing among households, leading for instance to increased private consumption, while export growth has BIS Review 101/1997  -2-  been maintained. The Swedish economy is entering a phase of high activity with a combination of strong domestic demand and strong export growth. The impact of the Riksbank’s current monetary stance will take about two years to materialise in full. We therefore have to assess the outlook for inflation as far ahead as in 1999. Such an analysis was presented some weeks ago in the inflation report. I shall be returning shortly to that report and subsequent developments but first I want to discuss the approach in principle to the conduct of monetary policy over the complete economic cycle. Monetary policy in a cyclical perspective A matter that savers and investors are currently discussing is not whether but when the Riksbank will raise the instrumental rate. An expected increase in the repo rate is also indicated by the structure of market rates.
The fact that the coming pay negotiations are taking place in a situation where it is expected that there will be a high demand for labour increases the risk of the historical pattern being repeated. In some industries and regions there are indications that a shortage of labour is developing. However, it is at the same time important to bear in mind that we are a long way from the scarcity levels experienced at the end of the 1980s. Another challenge for wage formation is that the first pay negotiations taking place are for public sector employees. In this sector, there are large groups that have obviously fallen behind in their pay development, leading to shortages. Among these are certain categories of teachers and many health care employees. The Swedish labour market has not only had problems in dealing with pay balances between different occupations. It has also found it difficult to tackle regional imbalances in the same occupational category through adaptation of relative wages. Shortage of labour has, for instance, particularly affected big city areas, although it has hardly affected relative wages between areas where there is shortage and where there is unemployment, despite the cost of living and not least housing costs being lower outside the big cities. With a more flexible wage formation, the imbalances in the labour market would probably be reduced. Changes in a positive direction The starting situation for the pay negotiations is thus not unproblematic.

Targeting the price level directly, however, was generally considered not possible since the linkages between policy instruments and prices were somewhat uncertain and contained the long and variable lags. These problems led to two new issues which brought about a revolution in the approach to central banking. These are transparency and improved forecasting. Clearly, monetary policy is most effective in the presence of a firmly established nominal anchor, and the more understandable that anchor is to the public the better. An effective commitment to long-run price stability is just such a nominal anchor that the target rate of inflation communicates to the public the price level the central bank is aiming to achieve at specified dates in the future. Any move away from policy rules for long periods must face and deal with long and variable lags in the economy’s response to changes in policy stance. Improved modeling and forecasting is giving central banks increasing confidence in basing current policy decisions on expected future outcomes. When we sum up these developments in monetary policy, we need a monetary framework which includes the following components. It should be: •  transparent;  •  accountable;  •  predictable and easy-to-monitor; and  •  reliable. This is also why the IT (inflation targeting) countries introduced these institutional and operational features into their monetary policy frameworks. Before passing to the key issues for the success of IT regime, I would briefly like to focus on the basic key requirements of the inflation targeting framework in the literature.
The ECB and the entire European System of Central Banks stand ready to assume the macro-prudential supervision tasks envisaged in the report by the de Larosière Group and to provide the necessary analytical and logistical support to the Systemic Risk Council. For the new Council to function effectively, three key requirements will need to be fulfilled: First, in order to identify and assess the risks and vulnerabilities in the EU financial system as a whole, to issue risk warnings and to adopt related macro-prudential policy recommendations, the Systemic Risk Council will need to have an information base that draws on both macroand micro-prudential supervisory information. This will allow the use of all relevant information for assessing, among other things, the “interconnectedness” of financial institutions and markets and its implications for financial system stability. Close cooperation and well-functioning information-sharing mechanisms between the new Council, microprudential supervisors and the proposed European System of Financial Supervision will therefore be indispensible. Second, adequate institutional mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that the risk warnings and the related recommendations issued by the Systemic Risk Council are translated into effective action. The days when risk warnings were issued and very few listened – or wanted to listen – should be over! Third, for the Systemic Risk Council to be effective, legitimate and independent in its decision-making, a solid legal basis is  4  BIS Review 49/2009  essential.

BIS Review 49/2009  3  as well as to the commercial and residential property sectors. Moreover, financial markets – despite recent positive developments in equity markets worldwide – remain vulnerable to swings in investor confidence and risk aversion, which could adversely affect liquidity and asset prices in some markets. Against the background of these very difficult conditions, significant policy measures have been taken by central banks and governments in Europe to improve market liquidity and replenish capital buffers. Governments created schemes for guaranteeing new bank debt, injected capital and, more recently, provided asset relief. These measures were successful in preventing a meltdown of financial systems and they helped to bolster confidence. The Eurosystem provided important input into the design of these measures, in the form of recommendations aimed at ensuring that such measures would help to safeguard financial stability and restore the provision of credit to the private sector, while at the same time maintaining a level playing-field within the Single Market to the maximum extent possible, and also containing their impact on public finances. It is still early to accurately assess the impact of these government measures on the longerterm funding and the recapitalisation of banks as well as their effectiveness in fostering bank lending to the private sector. This is because the evidence is relatively limited, as the implementation of the measures has been gradual over the past few months.
Few things are  2  BIS Review 40/2002  certain in life - the distance between Scylla and Charybdis has not widened, but it is a more comforting prospect than I was able to offer you last year. My Lord Mayor, I’m not sure how much comfort that message will bring to the Merchants and Bankers of the City of London here this evening. But they will certainly have enjoyed, as I have, your very generous hospitality, which has been in the very best tradition of the occasion. And on behalf of all your guests I thank you - and the Lady Mayoress - for that. I thank you, too, for your sterling efforts throughout your mayoralty - in support of the City, in its civic affairs, in its business activity, and in its increasing engagement with our neighbouring communities. And I thank you not least for the role that you have played - on behalf of all of us - in helping to celebrate so splendidly Her Majesty’s Golden Jubilee. I invite all your guests, now, to rise and join me in a toast to your good health. My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Toast is: “The Lord Mayor and Lady Mayoress - Michael and Sally Oliver”  BIS Review 40/2002  3

  Hours worked, closely tied to overall economic activity, and personal income excluding transfers (Charts 4–5) illustrate both the depth of the economic decline and the highly unusual nature of the recovery so far compared with all others in the post-World War II period.   The unemployment rate has declined, but to a large extent this reflects the decline of the labor force participation rate (Chart 6). Ranges of estimates of unemployment including discouraged workers run as high as the high teens.   Had the participation rate remained at its business cycle peak level, the unemployment rate would be about 10.5 percent.   Core inflation (excluding energy and food prices) has declined to a very low level, well below the range of 1 percent to 2 percent that market participants have associated with the Fed’s desired, “mandate consistent” range. Low rates of core inflation are of concern because economic research suggests that this is an important indicator of long-term trend headline inflation (Chart 7).   Economic history also suggests that recoveries from financial crisis and recession are fragile. Indeed, one disappointment in 2010 was that an initially strong recovery weakened considerably in the second quarter, in part due to renewed concerns about financial fragility in the wake of the sovereign debt concerns in parts of Europe. The recovery remained restrained, eventually prompting the Federal Reserve in November to embark on a second round of large-scale asset purchases, often called quantitative easing.