samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Svein Gjedrem: Economic perspectives Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the meeting of the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank, Oslo, 16 February 2006. The Charts in pdf-format  can also be found on the website of the Norges Bank. *  *  *  1. Introduction On the way into this building, we pass a statue of the nineteenth century Norwegian actor Johannes Brun. He performed at Christiania Theatre, which once stood in the square in front of the main entrance. Brun was an acquaintance of Henrik Ibsen, who also worked at the same theatre for a period – part-time as dramatic consultant – when the theatre he had been directing closed. This was a difficult time for our great dramatist, both personally and financially. He was struggling to overcome writer’s block and the public’s preference for the mediocre and the trivial. 1 Nineteenth-century Christiania (now Oslo) was described as “O great and little city! What a cold and surly sky broods over you!”. 2 A bleak time for Ibsen, perhaps. But the Norwegian economy was not faring all that badly. The economic expansion that had begun in the 1820s gathered momentum from the middle of the century. The British navigation acts were repealed in 1849 and the Norwegian fleet was permitted to transport other countries’ goods to and from England. Norway had suddenly become a major exporter of services. The tonnage of the Norwegian commercial fleet increased almost six-fold from 1850 to 1880. 2.

The use of the Fund’s return must therefore be smoothed over time in order to prevent events in international capital markets from spreading to the Norwegian economy. 6. Conclusion In the character of Peer Gynt, Ibsen drew a rather unflattering portrait of the Norwegian man who travelled out into the world and became rich - but who had no concern for others. At the end of the play, Peer is penniless. Ibsen himself left Norway, and although the Norwegian landscape and his Norwegian identity were at the core of his writing, it was his encounter with other ideas and thinking that enabled him to reshape his experience into world-class literature. In the asylum in Peer Gynt, where “man is himself to the uttermost limit” and “no-one considers another’s ideas” but “encloses himself in a barrel of self”, Peer Gynt is crowned “Emperor of Self”. When the roles are reversed and the asylum’s keepers protest at being caged instead of the inmates, the director of the asylum, Begriffenfeldt, answers: “When the world’s in a whirl, then we must whirl with it”. 13 We do not share this attitude. We must not whirl helplessly along with the world. We should take advantage of the opportunities globalisation offers, but also contribute to those changes ourselves. Thank you for your attention. 13  Henrik Ibsen: Peer Gynt. Translated by Peter Watts. Penguin Books, London, 1966. BIS Review 10/2006  9
BIS Review 66/2004  7  Meanwhile, even with a clear intention to do so, the practice of lending, and the pricing of lending, in accordance with state policy and not the credit worthiness of the borrower takes time to get rid of. Although it does not take long for the credit officer to learn to look at the balance sheet and the profit and loss account of the borrower, the security of the job requires an unspoken recognition of the authority of those in a position of power in the government bureaucracy. A further complication is the fact that commercial bankers are part of the government bureaucracy. In such a system, it is difficult for the bureaucratic position of the individual to be aligned with the commercial interest of the bank, which is to make profit. There is an interesting description of the stance of such an individual: where you stand (on an issue) depends on where you sit (in the bureaucracy). Consequently, it will take some time before the process of credit allocation becomes entirely market-based and the banks subject to the market disciplines that we are familiar with. One implication of this is that the high NPL and low capital adequacy ratios will continue to be a feature, with ebbs and flows, as capital injections get rid of the stock of NPL while the flow of NPL continues, but hopefully at a reduced pace as corporate governance improves. Professionalism cannot be acquired overnight.

Monetary policy decisions are taken, at the centre, by the Governing Council, but are implemented by the national central banks in a closely co-ordinated way. Strategy of the single monetary policy The Maastricht Treaty clearly defines the ultimate objective of the single monetary policy, that is to say maintaining price stability. However, for this it is essential to have a clear definition of price stability: we define it as a year-on-year increase in the overall Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) of below 2% in the whole euro area. Bearing in mind this objective, our monetary policy strategy is based on two “pillars”. We have first assigned a key role to the monetary aggregate M3. This “pillar” is based on a reference value which we set at 4.5% for the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3. The  1  concept of a reference value does not imply a commitment on the part of the Eurosystem to automatically correct deviations in monetary growth in the short term. Naturally, we also follow the counterparts of M3 closely, that is to say the sources of money creation, and especially lending to the economy, the evolution of government finance and capital flows with the rest of the world. However, it is common sense to say that monetary developments alone do not allow for a comprehensive assessment of the risks to price stability.
A copious amount is being harbored by nondepository financial institutions, and another $ trillion is sitting in the cash coffers of nonfinancial businesses. 1  Gasoline prices were not a major factor in January’s headline index, at least relative to the normally wild swings we see in the price of gasoline. On a seasonally adjusted basis, gasoline prices increased 0.9 percent in January (not annualized) and contributed roughly 0.3 annualized percentage points to the headline rate. Based on weekly data collected by the Department of Energy, the price of gasoline in February is on pace for an increase of 6.3 percent over January. Given that the typical seasonal pattern has gasoline’s price falling 1.1 percent in February, we should see a roughly 7.4 percent seasonally adjusted increase when personal consumption expenditures (PCE) data for February come out at the end of March. Gasoline alone may end up contributing about 3 annualized percentage points to February’s headline PCE rate. A more thorough discussion can be found here: www.dallasfed.org/data/pce/2012/pce1201.cfm. 2  FOMC Greenbook forecast, December 1966. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Trillions of dollars are lying fallow, not being employed in the real economy. Yet financial market operators keep looking and hoping for more. Why? I think it may be because they have become hooked on the monetary morphine we provided when we performed massive reconstructive surgery, rescuing the economy from the Financial Panic of 2008–09, and then kept the medication in the financial bloodstream to ensure recovery.

While price stability is being challenged by the recent run-up in gasoline prices – which has yet to be reflected in the personal consumption expenditure and consumer price indexes but may well make for worrisome headlines when February data are released – the underlying trend has been converging toward the 2 percent long-term goal formally adopted by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at its last meeting.1 As to the outlook envisioned by the entire FOMC, you might wish to consult the forecasts of all 17 members, which include those of yours truly, that were made public after the January meeting – though I think a puckish footnote appended to the internal document laying out a component of the December 1966 FOMC forecast might still apply: “Not to be used externally, but also harmful if swallowed.”2 Speaking of harmful if swallowed, I might add that I am personally perplexed by the continued preoccupation, bordering upon fetish, that Wall Street exhibits regarding the potential for further monetary accommodation – the so-called QE3, or third round of quantitative easing. The Federal Reserve has over $ trillion of U.S. Treasury securities and almost $ billion in mortgage-backed securities on its balance sheet. When we purchased those securities, we injected money into the system. Most of that money and more has accumulated on the sidelines: More than $ trillion in excess reserves sit on deposit at the 12 Federal Reserve banks, including the Dallas Fed, for which we pay private banks a measly 25 basis points in interest.
As we have demonstrated, the Swiss National Bank is prepared, in a crisis situation, to take exceptionally far-reaching measures to fulfil its mandate. In doing so, the SNB is making its contribution to a favourable and stable business environment and, ultimately, to a continuously prosperous economy. 18  The extent of the real appreciation of the Swiss franc varies depending on the country sample, the deflator and the weighting method. In terms of the real exchange rate indices calculated by the SNB and the BIS using the CPI deflator, the Swiss franc has appreciated between 14% and 15% in real terms since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The SNB’s export-weighted exchange rate vis-à-vis 40 trading partners shows an appreciation of 14%. 19  Cf. Jean Monnet (1976): Memoires. 8  BIS Review 157/2010

And many of these capital flows are mobilised or indirectly influenced by highly leveraged institutions operating behind a veil of secrecy interlaced with esoteric mathematical models that do not allow the systemic as well as the rather simpler counter-party risks to be identified, let alone properly managed. As recent events in this region and throughout the world have shown, this phenomenon has reached a level where it is capable of disrupting even the largest markets and completely destabilising smaller markets. It will therefore be useful for us to discuss these issues in greater detail before focusing on what needs to be done. International Capital Flows For a long time it has been taken for granted that capital flows are exactly analogous to trade flows: that, wherever they occur, and in whatever form, they invariably benefit long-term economic development, and that therefore the looser the rein they are given, the greater the benefit. This presumption, however, has been questioned recently in light of the experience of some emerging market economies. Professor Bhagwati, for example, in his article last year on “ The Capital Myth” , has argued that the assumption that free capital is as virtuous as free trade is wrong and that the claims of enormous benefits from free capital mobility are not persuasive. There are undoubtedly many benefits that go with free mobility of international capital. Traditionally, capital flows take the form of commercial bank lending, foreign direct investment, or equity portfolio investment.
Today, the euro accounts for 20% of international reserves, second only to the dollar. An internationally recognised currency generates economic gains: financial markets are more attractive to domestic and foreign investors, more liquid, and thus more efficient. But it also carries a political weight: when Mario Draghi speaks at the G20, the whole world listens to Europe attentively, just as when Janet 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Yellen speaks for the United States. Overall, this list of benefits is impressive, particularly when you think that the euro is only 18 years old. More importantly, we have come this far despite the global financial crisis, which triggered the deepest recession in three generations, and despite the euro area sovereign debt crisis a few years later. 2. Let me now turn to monetary policy: the euro has passed the stress test of the crises. a. Monetary policy Successful crisis management The Eurosystem has deployed an innovative and resolute monetary policy strategy, which has helped stabilise the euro area economy and reduce the costs of crises. Let me briefly recall what we have done [slide]. We had first to face, like you, the consequences of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Like many other central banks, we reacted promptly by offering unlimited liquidity to financial intermediaries, sharply lowering our main refinancing rate and providing international swap lines. Yet, this was only our first challenge. The Lehman episode paved the way for the euro area sovereign debt crisis and its amplification through the “bank-sovereign” nexus.

For the future, on the most appropriate way to reduce the intensity of our accommodation when it becomes warranted, two principles should in my view guide us: these are prudence and effectiveness. We need to be prudent, because the recovery is still fragile. This amounts to asking whether the adjustment of inflation towards our target of below, but close to, 2% would continue without our monetary stimulus. At present, the ECB’s Governing Council does not think this is the case. Underlying inflation, without oil and food prices, remains below 1% and should, according to our forecasts, gradually pick up to 1.8% in 2019 according to the pace of wage increases. We also need to be effective, in the sense that, among our combination of various instruments, we should withdraw last the measures that are mostneeded to secure a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with our target. We will continue to assess the situation with great pragmatism. There is no predefined split between the doves and the hawks on the Governing Council, as is sometimes claimed. I am confident that our future strategy, as the present one, will be the result of a collective discussion and a cohesive decision. b. Institutional framework In parallel, the institutional framework of the euro area has been improved in response to the crisis. Member states have secured key steps to reinforce the resilience of the euro area for the future.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the labour market Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference to mark the 10th anniversary of the Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations, Oslo, 24 October 2007. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The speech does not contain assessments of the economic situation or the monetary stance. *  *  *  The Norwegian economy is expanding sharply after the strong upturn began in summer 2003. The upturn followed a period of slow growth from 1998 and a mild slowdown in 2002 and into 2003. Growth has been stronger than in the cyclical upturn in the mid-1990s. The high rate of growth has only to a limited extent fed through to a higher rise in prices for consumer goods and services. Electricity prices have fallen sharply this year, contributing to low inflation and high real wage growth. But even excluding energy, inflation is still low, even though it has gradually picked up since late summer 2006. In recent years, the Norwegian economy has been influenced by a number of positive supply-side factors. First, high export prices and low import prices have resulted in a substantial improvement in Norway’s terms of trade. We can now import considerably more for a given quantity of export goods. Second, productivity growth has been unusually strong, both for companies competing on international markets and those supplying goods and services to the domestic market.

The "leader" – the social partners – can internalise the monetary policy response and take the "follower’s" – Norges Bank’s – response to their actions into account. This approach is most relevant when wage setting is centralised. A number of studies2 have shown that countries with a relatively high degree of centralisation and coordination, such as Norway, can achieve relatively low unemployment. When wage-setting is decentralised, monetary policy will instead influence wage growth via market mechanisms, by stabilising aggregate demand for goods, services and labour. Monetary policy that is flexibly oriented towards low and stable inflation will function well whether wages are set at the central, local or individual level. 2 In the initial period after the introduction of the inflation target in 2001, it appeared that the social partners had not yet internalised the response pattern ensuing from the monetary policy mandate. We are now well into a cyclical phase with very high capacity utilisation and low unemployment. In this situation, there may be a risk that wage growth will again accelerate. On the other hand, the experience gained by the social partners that large pay rises push up interest rates may have the effect of curbing pay increases. In local wage negotiations at enterprise level, competition, the supply of foreign labour and the possibility of outsourcing or relocating activities may dampen the impact. Low and stable inflation should not be taken for granted. Norway’s and other countries’ economic history shows that inflation and inflation expectations can become unhinged.
According to various statistical methods, there has been no clear trend for the real exchange rate since the mid1990s (see Figure 7), which may indicate that the long-term value of the krona is close to the average during this period. 20 The period with large current account surpluses can thus not be associated with any tendency towards a real strengthening of the krona. 20  10  Lagerwall and Nessén, 2009. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 7 Real and nominal exchange rate, TCW index Index, 18 November 1992=100 24  24  22  22  20  20  18  18  16  16  14  14 Sweden - total Sweden -excluding housing  12  12  EU -total EU -excluding housing  10  10 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  Source: The Riksbank  In this context it is worth noting that Sweden, despite so many years with a large current account surplus, is estimated to have a negative net external position. 21 In other words, the value of Swedish assets abroad is lower than the total value of Swedish liabilities abroad. Last year, Swedish liabilities abroad were 2.5 times greater than GDP. The fact that stocks on both the asset and liability sides are large means that variations in the value of these stocks are important to the development of the external position.

This evening I have tried to present a general account of my preliminary view of some aspects of assessments of the future path of inflation. I look forward to the continued discussion of these matters with my Riksbank colleagues. Our decision about interest rate policy is due at the meeting next Tuesday, 4 December. The result of our discussions will be published the following day, 5 December, as will the fourth Inflation Report of 2001. 4  BIS Review 98/2001
The industry has moved ahead: In March, Singtel announced a partnership with its Thai associate AIS to link their mobile wallets up, to enable 1.5 million visitors between Singapore and Thailand to use their mobile wallets at over 20,000 physical merchant acceptance points in both markets. Singtel plans to expand this to other regional associates later in the year. b. More broadly, the banking associations of Singapore and Thailand are exploring the possibility of linking their faster payment systems, PayNow in Singapore, and PromptPay in Thailand. If successful, the benefits of instant, low-cost payments for tourists, migrant workers and professionals will also extend to person-to-person payments and even remittances. c. Earlier this month, when India Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Singapore, he used his RuPay card issued in India to pay for a Madhubani painting on a NETS terminal. In order to address the challenges of cross-border linkages, central banks need to promote the adoption of common international standards and work with industry partners 22.  on all sides in order to ease future integration efforts and pave the way for further partnerships. D. CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES (CBDC) As we talk about cross-border linkages, it would be remiss of me not to touch on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC). Benoît Cœuré, our next distinguished keynote 23.  speaker, and I, as co-chairs of the BIS’ CPMI and Markets Committee (MC) respectively, jointly issued a report entitled “Central Bank Digital Currencies”12. Many of you would already have read it.

If successful, this will provide alternatives for cheaper, safer and faster cross border transactions. Benoit and my respective committees took a hard look at general purpose CBDC, – and there are many implications - including cost of bank funding, credit provision, and financial 26.  stability with the risk of deposits possibly taking flight to central banks during stress periods. These are issues that will have to be addressed should a central bank be deliberating on issuing digital currencies to its wider population. The CPMI and MC study is a reminder that even as we push the boundaries of payments and aim to utilise the latest technologies, central banks need to carefully assess each change and the larger impact to financial stability as well as monetary policy, before jumping on the bandwagon. E. CONCLUSION These are some of the issues that central bankers are grappling with in Asia, and how Singapore thinks about regulating this innovative area of payments through innovative regulation. With the fast-paced and global nature of changes, cooperation and 27.  dialogue between central banks are more crucial than ever before. I am glad to see many familiar faces from various central banks here today. The conference today is a useful forum for us to continue our dialogue, share important perspectives and keep tabs on the latest developments. 28. Thank you, and I wish all participants here today a fruitful two days ahead. 1 1 Capgemini, World Payments Report 2017 (Developed/Mature APAC includes Australia, Japan, Singapore,  and South Korea.