samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Within this framework, a more detailed examination of the struggle against inflation process in Turkey reveals that decline in inflation also helped mitigate the fluctuations in inflation and this means less uncertainty and less volatility in economy. While decreased uncertainty brings along decline first in risk premium and then in nominal as well as real interest rates, it decreases borrowing costs from the consumers’ point of view, and opportunity cost of investments from the producers’ view point. At this point, I would like to draw your attention to a risk factor in which the decline in borrowing costs has a significant role. Under chronic inflation conditions, consumers tend to renew durable goods such as automobiles, white goods and alike less frequently. However, when a certain point is attained in the process of reducing inflation, the consumers start purchasing their postponed needs. Demand for durable goods that the consumers defer to purchase tends to increase rapidly in the face of decline in inflation and fall in the borrowing costs. The recovery in demand is not yet at a level that could create an inflationary effect since it is coupled with a rise in productivity. Provided this demand does not assume a permanent nature and lasting economic stability is attained, it is expected that such fluctuations will become less frequent and less intense, but still, it should be monitored very closely. 2  BIS Review 63/2004  Meanwhile, there is another point that I would like to emphasize.

Esteemed participants, In terms of the structural transformation programs, financial sector, owing to its significance, is the sector that is most and fastest affected from the process, as well as being the leading sector in terms of supporting the process. Accordingly, further steps need to be taken in this sector in the process of falling inflation. Dear audience, The third factor I will be conveying to you today within the context of the effects of falling inflation on the economy is that, together with falling and foreseeable inflation, prices resume their signaling task in the economy and thus their roles as indicators in the allocation of resources. Departing from the example of Turkey, as we all know from the past experience of chronic inflation, consumers used to be inclined to make less price and quality controls, and attach less significance to diversity in their choices of goods. Producers on the other hand, used to set their profit margins freely to a large extent, paying little attention to their pricing, the costs and productivity. They also showed little interest in making investments for increasing the diversity of their products by adding them new ones. As a result of this structure, the quality of production declined in time, global competitiveness of our country weakened and integration with the world economy was delayed. Nevertheless, with the absolute as well as the relative prices resuming their signaling task following the decline in inflation, the behavior patterns of producers and consumers in Turkey began to change.
As I understand, First Capital Bank has plans to increase its foot prints in Zambia and I hope that the bank will open up branches in other districts of BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Zambia. This will enable it to enhance financial inclusion, which is among the country’s key priorities. Chairperson I have been informed that FCB has initiated the process of acquiring new state of the art banking software, and is in the process of introducing a full range of IT related products like internet banking, mobile banking and visa card. This demonstrates the bank’s strong and longterm commitment to becoming an important player in the development of our financial sector. This is no doubt driven by the confidence FCB has in the Zambian economy. Ladies and gentleman Zambia’s economy has continued to show resilience in the midst of a slowdown in the global economy as a result of the on-going Euro zone debt crisis and the sluggish growth in the United States of America and some leading emerging market countries including the BRICS. Economic performance has been strong with GDP growth in 2012 at 7.3%. Inflation has continued to be in single digits and was 6.9% in October this year. Although the exchange rate of the Kwacha against major international currencies has been under pressure, it has remained relatively stable, while the country has maintained a positive account balance over the last four years.

22  It is possible that families, or more accurately dynasties, can provide such insurance themselves through changes in the bequest which they make to their descendants: passing on a larger bequest if the current generation dies earlier than expected and a smaller bequest if it survives for longer than expected. But only a small proportion of bequests seems large enough to act as a buffer in this way. 23  As far as I am aware, the first instrument offering a return specifically to aggregate longevity was issued by Swiss Re, a large reinsurance company, in 2003. 24  To the extent that insurance companies offer both life insurance and annuities, they may be able partially to hedge the risks. 8  BIS Review 73/2004  There are two ways in which government involvement can, in principle, improve risksharing. First, collective schemes, whether compulsory or employer-based, avoid the costs of adverse selection associated with individual provision. Second, by combining taxes on current employees with deficit finance (i.e. taxes on future employees), statefunded pensions can transfer risks across generations in ways private markets cannot. Alternatively, the government could issue its own longevity bonds. Private annuity providers could use them to hedge aggregate longevity risk. By assuming longevity risk the government would make it possible for the private sector to purchase such bonds and in turn support a private market in annuities.
How to deal with the reality of the business cycle is an area where Europe -- with its tradition of social safety nets -- and the United States -- with its tradition of flexible work arrangements -- can perhaps learn something from each other. To date, neither of us seems yet to have found the optimal way to cope with the unavoidable reality of the business cycle to enable us to avoid both high unemployment rates and too skewed a distribution of income. My last general observation about the implications of EMU for the United States has to do with the dramatic changes in macroeconomic policies that will accompany the creation of monetary union in Europe. Naturally, the main change will concern monetary policy, and it is in this area that the similarities between Europe and the United States will ultimately be the greatest. The first similarity is that, with EMU, the formulation of monetary policy in both Europe and the United States will be highly centralized and the European central bank will enjoy, as the Federal Reserve does, a considerable degree of independence. These institutional features will reduce the scope for national governments to bend monetary policy to the needs of their country’s business cycle and will help keep the focus of the European central bank on the objective of price stability.

It will also have to pay for the retooling of information management and delivery systems, as well as face increased uncertainties in its core deposits. At the same time, however, the larger single market will create new opportunities for banks, particularly in the areas of investment banking and the cross-border sale of deposits, mutual funds, and other savings products. On balance, it seems fair to conclude that the commercial position and earnings of many European banks are likely to come under pressure. This may accelerate the ongoing restructuring of Europe’s banking industry, a process that has been confined, to date, primarily to developments within each country. More broadly, there can be no doubt that the implications of the growth of a more efficient and cost-effective market for euro-denominated capital would extend well beyond Europe. The availability of a new, low-cost channel for portfolio investment, for example, could help reverse the traditional reluctance of households and many institutional investors worldwide to invest internationally -- a reluctance that has long puzzled academics and policymakers. Moreover, a well-developed market for euro-denominated capital would encourage institutional investors from the United States and elsewhere to acquire diversified European portfolios offered in a single currency. In fact, this development could be accelerated if member governments chose to deepen the euro market by increasing the available range of bond maturities, which in some countries is somewhat limited at the short and long ends.
Mr Bäckström discusses the prospects for the Swedish economy on the threshold of the new millennium  Speech given by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Umeå School of Economics and Business Administration on 3 December 1999. *  *  *  First a word of thanks for the invitation to Umeå to discuss the prospects for the Swedish economy on the threshold of the new millennium. In an economic perspective, the last century of this millennium appears to be unique. The dramatic improvement in prosperity and living standards that has taken place during the 20th century is unparalleled in the history of our country. As recently as the 19th century, Sweden was poor, perhaps even one of the poorest European countries. History teaches us that material prosperity can never be taken for granted. Countries and areas can suddenly rise up and become culturally and materially prominent only to subsequently fall back again into poverty. There are examples of this in the present millennium as well as in those preceeding it. Economic growth is not just a matter of the usual economic aspects, i.e. accumulation of real capital and population increase. There are cases where countries with a high rate of capital investment and relatively high population growth have failed to transform this into rapidly increasing material prosperity. The former planned economies are clear examples of this. Something more is evidently required.

This support has taken various forms, including the following:   Salary supplementation to fifteen (15) academic staff in the Department of Economics at UNZA and nineteen (19) academic staff in the School of Business at the Copperbelt University (CBU);    Full sponsorship of five undergraduate students at third and fourth year level at CBU and five students at Masters Degree level at UNZA;    Financial support in the acquisition of books and periodicals;    Purchase of equipment such as computers and computer software. The Bank of Zambia acknowledges the various efforts being made by the University to improve its infrastructure and the delivery of quality university education and research. We are also mindful of the various funding constraints faced by the University as it expands its programmes to meet the ever increasing demand for its services. The Bank is therefore, proud to respond to the University’s call for partnership with industry and other stakeholders in order to realise its noble objectives that cannot presently be fully funded from public resources and students fees. In this regard, the Bank of Zambia has seen it fit to not only extend this support, but to also streamline and enhance it in order to better align this support with strategic objectives of both the Bank and the University. Ladies and Gentlemen; as you are aware, the Bank of Zambia has been providing financial support for the purpose of promoting scholarly and academic excellence in research and instruction at the University of Zambia.
Mark Carney: Speech at the Mansion House Bankers and Merchants Dinner Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London at the Mansion House, London, 12 June 2014. *  *  *  Introduction My Lord Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen. A year ago when my predecessor Lord King delivered his final Mansion House speech, he noted “clear signs that a recovery in the UK, albeit modest, [was] underway.” That recovery was due in no small part to measures he and his colleagues had initiated including extraordinary monetary stimulus, recapitalisation of the banking system and innovative support for lending. The task a year ago was to secure that recovery in the face of continued domestic frailties and ongoing international weaknesses. At home, unemployment and underemployment remained elevated, productivity growth was anaemic, and debt levels were high. Abroad, the European crisis had moved only from its acute to its chronic phase and financial markets were demonstrating their fragility during the “taper tantrum”. With this backdrop and with real wages around 10% below their pre-crisis levels, it was not surprising that consumer confidence, though improved, remained low. Business confidence was similarly shaken by past shocks and current scepticism about the ongoing strength of demand. The Bank responded to these challenges.

Before I give you my answer to this question, let me briefly touch upon the question of the risks of introducing the digital euro and the potential downsides of its deployment. RISKS First, and this is something central bankers are concerned with the most - the potential of the digital euro for disintermediation. The story goes like this: if we deprive banks of their funding sources in the form of deposits and people then move those deposits with us instead, aren't we going to destabilise the system, suppress credit activity and eventually cause the decline of the economic activity? The ECB and the central banks first identified this risk in 2020, and now we believe there is a solution to it. With the right design of the digital euro that places a limit on the amount of digital euro per holder, we can successfully mitigate that risk and not allow the digital euro to become a source of instability. Another risk is a potential for market distortion that lies in the introduction of the digital euro when a public institution enters the private market, disrupts it and even competes with both current and future market participants. Why do that when we already have an innovative and well-functioning payment system in the EU? And isn't it that the markets always do things better and more efficiently driven by the invisible hand, with the regulators' task being only to level the playing field by providing an adequate legal framework?
But the political scene on climate has already been changing dramatically and it will continue to change - hopefully for the better. ** Looking back at how far we have come in developing green finance over the last six years, one may wonder: “Is it useful?” – certainly yes; “Is it enough?” –certainly not. Let me remind everyone of one simple – and dreadful number: according to the IPCC, we have less than six years of greenhouse gases budget left if we want to have 83% chance to stay below 1.5°C. Let’s not fool ourselves: we have been making very significant progress to make sure that the financial system is fit to the challenge of the transition. But there is still much work to do on our side, starting with mandatory and harmonised disclosures, and a close monitoring of transition paths. Still more fundamentally, what we are doing only makes sense if this is part of a wider collective endeavour. Finance, and still more Central banks, cannot be the only green game in town. A few days ahead of Glasgow, it is the right time to listen to the Pink Floyd again and the Dark Side of the Moon: “And then one day you find ten years have got behind you; no one told you when to run, you missed the starting gun”4. It is not too late yet, but let us hear the starting guns. I thank you for your attention.

It now has 95 members, including the US Fed since last December and this number will still grow in coming weeks. The Banque de France provides its global secretariat with 15 staff, and we created last April our Climate Change Centre chaired by Nathalie Aufauvre. We are indeed making good progress across the board. But each year that passes without sufficient emission reductions makes the issue more severe, and the solutions more radical. To grapple with this dynamic situation, it is imperative that we are able to better understand and forecast the macroeconomic impacts of climate developments. 2. An imperative for the year to come: forge models that gauge the interaction between climate and the economy One aspect of the ECB’s action plan launched on the back of the strategy review may have received too little attention: macroeconomic modelling and scenario analyses. The challenge is huge as we face a triple source of uncertainty: first, how climate change will materialise, second, what the transition could look like and, third, how both will translate to the macroeconomy. The NGFS has produced detailed macro financial scenarios and the corresponding data that provide the most comprehensive framework to date for financial risk assessment. To make such scenarios possible, the central banking community – with a strong involvement of Bank of England and Banque de France among others - has collaborated with first tier research institutes in climate science and economic modelling. This is a huge step forward.
Second, despite the steps reported above and some lively academic literature on financial contagion over the last two decades, systemic risk analysis and research is far less advanced than that of monetary policy, for example. There are no established frameworks that can be taken “straight off the shelf”. Having said that, let me describe briefly the concept of systemic risk. Systemic risk was defined by the G10 in 2001 as “… the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy.” 6 In simpler terms, it is the risk that the failure and distress of a significant part of the financial sector reduces the availability of credit, which in turn may adversely affect the real economy. Interestingly, this notion of systemic risk is quite similar to the definition of financial stability that the ECB uses in its Financial Stability Report, underlining the fact that our financial stability work has always had a macro-prudential orientation. Our working definition describes financial stability as a “condition in which the financial system – comprising of financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of imbalances, thereby mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermediation process which are severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment opportunities”.

Globally, actual and expected demand have increased, output has been contained and inventories have seen some depletion. The baseline scenario of this Report adjusts the projection for the average price of Brent and WTI upwards, placing it at around USD 59 and USD 56 per barrel in 2018 and 2019. The combined effect of higher copper and oil prices and adjustments in the prices of other exports and imports have led to an improvement in the terms of trade, particularly this year. Thus, considering the period 2017-2019, the terms of trade will accumulate an increase of around 10%, which compares with the 7% estimate of last September. Turning to our activity and demand projections, the baseline scenario assumes no major changes from September. This year, the economy will grow 1.4%, inside the range expected in September. For 2018, the growth projection in the 2.5% to 3.5% range is maintained. Part of the improvement with respect to 2017, particularly during the first half of the year, owes to the low comparison base of the mining sector. This same scenario assumes that non-mining GDP will have a more paced recovery. The gradual return to higher GDP expansion rates leans on a favorable external scenario, the end of the adjustment of mining and housing investment, the absence of significant macroeconomic imbalances and a clearly expansionary monetary policy stance. A working assumption is that in 2018 the economy will receive a fiscal impulse in accordance with the approved budget.
The exact specification of the shocks in the illustrations can differ somewhat from one Report to another, but the shifts in the interest rate, and the corresponding scenarios for inflation and the output gap give an indication of how the Bank responds. The shifts are specified such that, if shocks of the same type and size should occur, the alternative interest rate path is the Bank’s best estimate of how the interest rate would be set in such a situation. In addition to presenting policy reactions to new developments, the Monetary Policy Report includes an account of the disturbances that have lead to a change in the interest rate  2  BIS Review 132/2008  forecast from the previous Report. For example, we see from Chart 3 that our interest rate forecast was revised upwards in Monetary Policy Report 2/08 published in June. The shocks contributing to this revision are illustrated in Chart 4. The black line is the difference between the current interest rate path and the path in the previous Report. The “interest rate account” is a technical model-based illustration of how the change in the interest rate forecast from the previous Report can be decomposed by different exogenous shocks to the model. The illustration shows how changes in the assessment of international and domestic economic variables as well as changes in shock processes have affected the interest rate path, and is based on our core forecasting model.

Joint EU integration would supersede certain regional integration frameworks, such as trade and factor mobility, but it would not supplant the need for further policy dialogue and common regional perspectives and solutions. Let me now to briefly describe the role of institutions in structural reforms in Albania. Institutions and structural reforms in Albania It is virtually impossible to do justice to the breadth and depth of reforms in Albania over the limited allotted time. Therefore, I will try to highlight only its main items. In order to improve our business environment, the Albanian authorities have engaged in comprehensive reforms of the property rights, of the tax regime, of the electricity sector, of the general infrastructure, and remain engaged in the fight against informality. The most recent measure in this regard is a banking sector regulation that aims to put an end to the practice of lending through uncertified company balance sheets. Further, to enhance efficiency and tackle corruption and informality, a determined drive to improve the functioning of the public administration, which broadly speaking encompasses also the judicial system reform, has been undertaken. In order to increase economic stability and to improve financial resilience, we have initiated a wide ranging set of reforms. To that end, the Government has improved its public finance management procedures, has adopted a fiscal responsibility framework, and has undertaken measures to reduce debt. The Bank of Albania has strived to model itself after the ECB. Its professionalism has increased while its independence, transparency and credibility have all improved.