samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But data from different decentralised sources are not structured, there is a lack of transparency in methodology, no representativeness, and no use of international standards, concepts and semantics. Hence, there is a need to streamline the wealth of information to structured, understandable, shareable and most of all, reliable data of the future. The latter is prerequisite to preclude devaluation of the data, and statistics plays a critical role in preserving the value of data. In the new era when we have open access to multiple sources of information, it is not enough official statistics to be disseminated more effectively, but it has to be accepted, understood and trusted by the general public. Good official statistics, as dramatically shown during the Covid-19 crisis, can be crucial to provide a first line of defence against misinformation (Biancotti et al., 2020)2. High quality and reliable statistics is the "weapon" against fake news and divisive messages. More than ever as policy makers we are faced with misinformation, fake news and speculations that can undermine our ability to act effectively. The digital environment, the growing role of social media and absence of clear regulatory framework propelled the dissemination of the so called "mal-information". For example, we as a central bank, faced ungrounded speculations against the exchange rate on a couple of occasions. Keeping us 24/7 alerted is the least damage that this type of irresponsible behaviour implies.

4  BIS Review 145/2010  As I mentioned earlier, the Fund has become larger than we expected a decade or so ago as high oil prices have more than compensated for fairly low returns in international capital markets. Looking ahead, market prices suggest that interest rates are expected to remain low for many years. Real interest rates on long-term bonds have been depressed by central bank government bond purchases. Let us nonetheless assume an average nominal return on the Fund’s fixed income instruments of 3 per cent ahead. On the other hand, there are no signs that return requirements in equity markets are low. Dividend payments are high in relation to companies’ market value. Simple valuation models 9 indicate that shareholders require a rate of return between 8 and 10 per cent, a fairly normal level. This results in an overall nominal return of between 6 and 7 per cent. In addition, positive contributions to the return are expected from non-government bonds, active management and real estate. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding these estimates. Nevertheless, Norges Bank’s view is that it is still reasonable for the government to base its withdrawals from the Fund on an expected annual real rate of return of 4 per cent. The increase in the equity allocation from 40 per cent to 60 per cent does not provide a basis for higher withdrawals from the Fund, but reflects prospects for somewhat weaker returns in international markets today than was the case ten years ago.
Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Bankers without borders Opening remarks by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Report Launch for East Asia and Pacific Region - Global Financial Development Report 2017/2018: Bankers without Borders, Kuala Lumpur, 12 April 2018. * * * Thank you for inviting me to speak at the launch of this very important report. The issue of globalisation has featured very prominently in the headlines, especially in recent times. In fact, it has been very trendy over the past decade to herald the end of financial globalisation and international banking. However, the fact that this topic keeps recurring, to me, is a testament that various issues remain unresolved. As such, I am pleased that we are able to have an informed discussion on this issue today. For my brief remarks, I will focus on the theme of the report “bankers without borders”. Finance and globalisation have been an important part of the ASEAN story The title of the report, lends to a very specific definition of the word borders, the conception of finance unrestricted by national boundaries. Conventional economic theory posits that capital will flow from capital rich to capital poor countries to fulfil the productive needs of the economy. This implies that any form of boundary is not only undesirable but may hinder growth.

One – perhaps extreme – characterisation of such robust control thinking starts from the adoption of a so-called MINIMAX strategy to monetary policy decisions.16 Even if it is too abstract to offer a practical guide to monetary policy, it can act as a device to help clarify some ideas underlying the policy debate. The MINIMAX approach involves choosing the policy setting which works best in the worst circumstances that you might face across the possibilities of how the economy behaves. More precisely, if we characterise uncertainty as being reflected in a set of different possible models of the economy, policymakers seek to minimise the welfare cost in that model where those welfare costs are highest, given the observed developments in macroeconomic data. The intuition here can be understood using a recent practical example. Most new Keynesian macroeconomic models have more than one steady state. But the inflation targeting literature originally focused on developments around one of those states, namely – and of course unsurprisingly – that defined by the inflation target itself. But in the face of deflationary risks and the aftermath of the global financial crisis, another steady state – one characterised by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the liquidity trap and the threat of persistent deflation spiral – could no longer be ignored. Since this other steady state entailed lasting deviations from the inflation target, the threat of falling into it weighed heavily on central bank thinking.
Már Guðmundsson: Sovereign risk – a world without risk-free assets? Remarks by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, in a policy panel at a seminar on “Sovereign risk – a world without risk-free assets?”, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, 8–9 January 2013. *  *  *  I would like to cover three issues in my remarks. First, I will reflect a bit on the title of the seminar and some of the more specific questions directed at this panel. Second, I will discuss the nexus between sovereign risk and banking fragility, using Iceland as a case study – after all, the Icelandic experience is probably the reason that I am taking part in this interesting seminar in the first place. Third, and again with reference to the Icelandic case, I will reflect on the connection between sovereign ratings of advanced countries and actual sovereign defaults. The title of this seminar is Sovereign risk: a world without risk-free assets? As has been repeatedly pointed out, there is, strictly speaking, no such thing. The default probabilities of even the strongest sovereigns are not zero, and they increase as the horizon gets longer. Furthermore, the real income stream of nominal government bonds is uncertain.

The bank ratings then started to fall in early 2008 and then plunged to sub-investment grade after the banks had collapsed. The sovereign rating, however, although it fell over the course of 2008, never fell to sub-investment grade with Moody’s and S&P, and it only fell below investment grade with Fitch Ratings after the president sent the so-called Icesave deal to a referendum in January 2010. It is now back to investment grade with all three agencies. It is interesting to see how both ratings and market perceptions evolved around two key dates in September/October 2008, when decisions were taken that could drastically affect sovereign risk. The first date was 29 September, when an announcement was made of the Government’s intention to take a 75% ownership stake in one of the three cross-border banks, an action that should increase sovereign risk. The other date was 6 October, when Parliament passed the so-called Emergency Act, which severed the nexus between the sovereign and the private banks and drastically reduced objective sovereign risk. Both the rating agencies and the market got the sign of the first event right: S&P downgraded the sovereign by one notch and Glitnir by one notch the day after; Fitch downgraded them the next day by two and three notches, respectively; and Iceland’s sovereign CDS spread shot up to almost 600 in the first two days after the announcement, from around just over 300 in the days prior.
Rather it is in the use of credit derivatives that leave the underlying asset on the balance sheet but transfer some or all of the credit risk. The market in credit default swaps on individual investment-grade corporate and country issuers is becoming more liquid, in some cases, we have been told, more liquid than the underlying bond market. And investment banks pricing new bond issues can increasingly look to credit default swap premia as well as to the spread over the relevant benchmark on any existing debt. Increasingly, also, banks use derivatives to transfer some portion of the credit risk on a loan portfolio rather than selling the portfolio outright, creating so-called 'synthetic' collateralised debt obligations. Data on the size of the market are difficult to come by. But a survey by the British Bankers' Association last year found that outstanding notional principal of all credit derivatives had increased more than three times since 1997 to around $ billion. Some contacts suggest the market may now be even larger than this. But I think it safe to conclude that it is already large and has been growing quickly. In a wider sense, the development of these markets for the transfer of credit risk is highly desirable. The institution best placed to originate a loan is not necessarily best placed to bear the risk. Markets in credit risk allow financial institutions to diversify their exposures across different sectors and geographic regions while maintaining customer relationships.

Indirectly, in the same way that the change in banks' behaviour in response to the original Basel Accord had a profound effect in shaping developments in securities markets in the last decade. Directly to the extent that EU investment firms, under the Capital Adequacy Directive, are subject to the same capital requirements as banks. One of the principal goals of the new Basel framework is, of course, greater risk sensitivity. The lack of sensitivity of the existing Accord has been one of the drivers of increased capital market activity: both through disintermediation, as companies have accessed the capital markets for funding directly instead of relatively more expensive bank loans, and through securitisation, as banks themselves have sought to continue originating credit but not incur the capital costs of holding it on their balance sheet. The new Basel proposals to the extent they succeed in aligning capital more closely with the underlying risk, will we hope significantly reduce incentives for pure regulatory arbitrage. While the original Accord created an incentive to securitise or, by other means, move exposures off balance sheet, it is too simplistic to assume that adoption of the new proposals will result in a swing back to more traditional bank lending. The wider use of internal ratings, coupled with greater transparency regarding their compilation and some assurance of quality control by the regulators, may in fact contribute to further 'commoditisation' of bank loans. It is conceivable that this development could reduce the cost of due diligence on loan portfolios by rating agencies and buyers.
01.02.2023  Changes in saving in Spain since the pandemic* 4th Observatory on Saving and Investment in Spain / Bestinver-IESE Madrid Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor *lEnglish translation from the original in Spanish  Good morning. Allow me to begin by pointing out that we are currently observing the “quiet period” that precedes the monetary policy meetings of the ECB Governing Council. This means that I cannot refer to issues that could influence expectations about future monetary policy decisions. Therefore, my thoughts should not be interpreted as insight into the monetary or economic outlook that might shape expectations regarding these decisions. And now let me thank Bestinver and the IESE for inviting me to take part in this closing session of the 4th Observatory on Saving and Investment in Spain. I should like to begin by describing the developments in Spanish household savings in recent years. I will go on to discuss how those savings have been channelled towards the different types of financial and non-financial assets. And I will end by discussing the importance of strengthening financial education, noting the Banco de España’s recent initiatives in that direction in collaboration with other public institutions. As we all know, Spanish households built up a very sizeable stockpile of savings during the most critical stages of the pandemic. Specifically, in 2020 the saving rate of Spanish households stood close to 18% of their gross disposable income. That is far higher than the average level for the five preceding years.

and in terms of residential investment, which is slowing somewhat due to a tightening of financial conditions. As I have said, the extraordinary savings accumulated during the pandemic were concentrated among higher-income households, whose portfolios are also more diversified. According to the 2020 Spanish Survey of Household Finances, real assets1 accounted for 88% of the total assets held by households below the 20th percentile of the distribution (with their principal residence accounting for 66% of the total). However, for households in the 90th income percentile, real assets represented 73% of all assets and the principal residence just 34%. Similarly, a very small percentage of low-income households have listed shares or investment funds in their portfolios (less than 3%, compared with 33% and 22%, respectively, of households in the top decile of the distribution). One factor that influences households’ investment decisions is familiarity with financial products. Indeed, as the Bestinver-IESE/CIF observatory has shown, even in a study targeted at people more likely to be acquainted with financial investments, familiarity with savings vehicles and financial decisions vary across income, age and gender groups. These findings are consistent with those of the Banco de España’s latest Survey of Financial Competences. This survey, based on a representative sample of the Spanish population aged between 18 and 79, shows broad differences in the level of familiarity with the most common financial products.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Mechanisms to prevent and manage banking crises in the future Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the presentation of the report entitled “Mecanismos de prevención y gestión de futures crisis bancarias”, Fundación de Estudios Financieros, Madrid, 1 December 2011. *  *  *  The crisis still with us has seen the adoption of a broad package of financial measures at the global, European and national levels. The global response has had political backing at the highest level of the G-20. In the implementation of this response, a key role has been played by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which has coordinated the work of numerous international institutions and committees. In Europe, in addition to the implementation of these global agreements on the continent, other worthwhile initiatives have been adopted. These include most notably changes in the supranational supervisory architecture. Finally, with regard to Spain, both the Banco de España and the Finance Ministry have contributed long and hard to implementing these global and European initiatives. But, to highlight a singular facet of the Spanish response, I should like to mention the restructuring of our financial system. I shall spare you my assessment of the numerous and substantial changes stemming from various fora that have marked progress in recent years. The authors of the book give a good account of this and, were I to repeat what they say, they might not be read.

B S B aims to link multiple platforms domestically and internationally, connecting buyers, suppliers, marketplaces, and service providers across economies If successful, the BSB experiment will demonstrate that the key to supply chain resilience is not to isolate and retreat behind borders, but to strengthen connectivity across borders even more. Resilient Industry The second dimension is a resilient industry – one that can continue to function in the face of disruptions and movement restrictions. Digitalisation is one of the ways in which an industry can build resilience. We have seen, amid the COVID-19 lockdowns, how firms which have gone digital earlier have managed to ensure business continuity, with the transition to working remotely and serving customers online. To ensure resilience, digitalisation needs to be end-to-end. If every part of a process is digitalised except one step which requires an in-person interaction, or a wet ink signature, or a payment in physical cash, then the “digital chain” is broken and resilience compromised. In financial services, this is what we have been aiming for: to be digital to the core. 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Digital trade finance solutions are trying to achieve seamlessness, to help facilitate trade flows. At the Singapore FinTech Festival last year, a trade finance application portal was launched as a value-added service on Singapore’s Networked Trade Platform, which allowed traders and businesses to seamlessly apply for financing from nine banks.
22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  Chart A: Divine coincidence has continued to reign in the euro area and US post-crisis but not the UK A1) UK Great moderation  Inflation (%)  6  Financial crisis and after 4  Inflationary, with trade-off  Inflationary, no trade-off  2 -6  -5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2 3 4 Excess demand (%)  0 Disinflationary, no trade-off  Disinflationary, with trade-off -2  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. A2) US Great moderation  6  Financial crisis and after  5  Inflation (%)  4 3 2 -8  -7  -6  -5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  1  2  3  4  Excess demand (%)  0 -1 -2 Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, CBO and Bank calculations. Notes: The measure of inflation is the four-quarter change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator. The output gap is calculated using the CBO estimate of potential output. 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  23  A3) Euro-area Inflation (%)  5  Great moderation Financial crisis and after  4 3 8 2 -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  1  2  3 4 Excess demand (%)  0 -1 Sources: Eurostat, IMF and Bank calculations.

Michael C Bonello: Regional economic integration - the options for Malta Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the Annual Dinner of the Institute of Financial Services, St. Julian’s, 7 November 2002. *  *  *  In previous years I used this occasion to focus on issues related to the country’s perennial challenge, which is to converge to the economic standards of its more developed trading partners. Among the appropriate responses to this challenge I emphasised the importance of price and financial stability, fiscal restraint, market-based reforms and a viable exchange rate strategy. These are indeed necessary elements of a strong macroeconomic policy framework conducive to export-led growth. The issue I shall address today is the need to complement these policies with a more secure access to international markets. The reason is simple. Without such access, a small open economy like ours cannot hope to achieve sustained, quality growth in today’s globalized world. A structured, regional approach to building competitiveness In a world economy driven by cross-border flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) seeking the most profitable locations, the challenge of sustaining economic growth must be faced head on by endeavouring to maintain cost competitiveness and gaining access to larger markets. Studies have shown that countries which are more open to trade tend to achieve higher growth rates compared to 1 less open economies at comparable stages of development.
The ongoing recovery of the real economy, however, is likely to produce higher core inflation in these economies, too, in the near future. Against the backdrop of an expanding economy and higher inflation, the US Federal Reserve raised its key interest rate in March – the third interest rate hike since the end of 2015. The  Page 2/10  normalisation of US monetary policy is therefore continuing. By contrast, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan are maintaining their expansionary monetary policy. Does this mean there is cause for optimism for the period ahead? Global economic sentiment is really quite positive. Nonetheless, significant political uncertainties remain. Within the euro area, the French elections are currently dominating the headlines. Uncertainty persists about how Brexit will unfold. Looking across the Atlantic, there are still a number of questions concerning the new US administration’s future economic and trading policy. New political directions which influence the growth of our trading partners are of course highly relevant for a small open economy like Switzerland. And what about the economic situation here at home? The Swiss economy is still recording moderate growth (cf. chart 3). Following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate, GDP contracted as a result of Swiss franc appreciation in the first quarter of 2015. However, since then, the economy has grown, and current economic data indicate that this growth will sustain. For 2017, we are forecasting an increase in GDP of some 1.5%. Nevertheless, production capacity is still not fully utilised.

Collectively, the award recipients and all other financial institutions have helped in making CGC a stronger SME-support institution. This is so as their active participation opened a new window of opportunities not only for the SMEs but also for the CGC in reaching out to a wider cross section of the SME community throughout the country. In 2007, CGC provided credit guarantees totalling RM4.6 billion to more than 13,000 SMEs through our main schemes, the programmed lending schemes as well as the securitisation of SME loans. There was actually remarkable growth with the number of loans and amount guaranteed growing by 73% and 53% respectively. This could be attributable to the strong support given by participating financial institutions that have been robust in serving the SME market in the recent years. I particularly note with interest that the seven recipients today collectively contributed more than 80% of the total loans guaranteed by CGC in 2007. In view of the changing facets of SME financing, CGC undertook several initiatives to further reach out to SMEs that are in need of financing. This includes the introduction of innovative products and services as well as widening the scope of guarantee beneficiaries by forging alliances with strategic partners. In the last two years, CGC has entered into strategic partnership with many local and international institutions with the aim both of expanding its SME outreach as well as to better equip itself with the expertise and knowledge to take it to a higher service delivering platform.