samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(b) Constructed using data reported in the supplementary tables to Piketty & Zucman (2014). (c) These data are consistent with the ONS Quarterly National Accounts Q2 2015 release. Selfemployed labour income is imputed differently than series (b) due to data availability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  25%  Top 10% income share in the UK  40 1900  1950  20%  2000  Source: Piketty (2014)  21  0  Chart 17: Share of employment by sector, since 1688  Primary  Secondary  Percentages of workforce 90  Tertiary  80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1688  1718  1748  1778  1808  1838  1868  1898  1928  1958  1988  0  Source: Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley (2013); ONS; Bank calculations.

As Mark Twain almost said, labour market history, if not repeating itself, has certainly rhymed. This should come as no surprise. As in the mid-19th century, this is a time of huge change in the jobs market. Rarely a day passes without concerns about job prospects in some of the UK’s most iconic industries, from steel to oil and gas to cars. And rarely a week passes without evidence of jobs and industries being fundamentally reshaped by globalisation and technology, be it the digital economy, the sharing economy or even the Second Machine Age. There is no shortage of explanations for these searing developments. They are part cyclical, as the global economy continues to recover from a financial crisis which is likely to be the most costly since the Great Depression. But these changes are also in part structural given tectonic shifts in demography, inequality and technology, to name but three. None of these challenges is of course entirely new either. My own interest in economics was spawned in the early 1980s by just such a challenge. At that time, more than 3 million people were unemployed in the UK, or almost 12% of the working population. In Yorkshire, where I grew up, the unemployment rate peaked at close to 13%, hit by a double whammy of deep recession and a contraction in steel, textiles and coal-mining. Unemployment at that stage was not for me a statistic. Nor was it the bloodless theorising I would go on to study at university.
Over 145 million euros are earmarked in 2012 for this so-called direct contribution by Government by way of a grant to the private sector in terms of the Social Security Act of 1987. The total top up for both public and private sector employees comes to just over 191 million euros. This amount is in addition to the national insurance contribution by the government in its capacity as an employer. To put these numbers into perspective, one must keep in mind that the deficit in the consolidated fund for the same year is projected at roughly 145 million euros. The size of these outlays should be of concern for two reasons. The shortfall is certainly not arising from pension benefits that are too generous. Secondly the amount of the welfare gap as identified in the Estimates is going to rise rapidly as people live longer and the population ages. One suggestion for alternative financing would involve a multi-year programme that would reduce the government’s matching contribution gradually over an extended period of time, ideally through a tripartite consensus at the MCESD. This programme would be financed from productivity growth. During times of economic growth, when the growth rate exceeds a particular threshold, the revenue from a marginal increase in income tax or national insurance rates would be earmarked to reduce the subvention. The increase in rates would automatically be suspended during times of slower growth.

Thus, in terms of labour cost competitiveness, Malta has kept pace with the euro area average. However, to maintain competitiveness a further focus on the wage setting process may be appropriate. In particular the basic principle must be to emphasise that productivity improvements are at the basis of sustained wage increases, and that these are best negotiated at firm level, where improvements in productivity can be best gauged. Consequently, any cost of living adjustments should form part and parcel of the collective agreement and not be superimposed on collective agreements by legislation as happens today. Indeed, already a number of collective agreements incorporate the COLA increase, and I suggest that this should be the norm. Another important message that has emerged from the sovereign debt crisis is the need for fiscal prudence, which provides the space for countercyclical fiscal policy during a downturn. In the euro area, fiscal policy is the major macroeconomic management tool at the national level. Thus, in periods when economic activity is relatively strong, policy needs to be sufficiently prudent to build the necessary fiscal buffers that would be utilized during periods of weaker growth. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In the aftermath of one-off expenditure during 2008, the deficit ratio in Malta declined in 2009 despite the recession of that year and narrowed slightly further in 2010. The debt ratio generally declined until 2008, but then picked up in 2009, partly in response to the contraction in the economy.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: A broader view of compliance in banking and financial sectors Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at Bank Negara Malaysia's Compliance Conference 2017, Kuala Lumpur, 18 May 2017. * * * The topic of compliance has become a widely discussed topic in recent times, often headlined by massive regulatory fines slapped on financial institutions for compliance failures. Banks globally are estimated to have paid over USD320 billion in regulatory penalties since the global financial crisis for multiple failures ranging from market manipulation to money laundering and conduct failures. On the bright side, these fines signal a continued, if not increased, priority given by authorities to strong enforcement. But the fact that such failures occurred at all, and were allowed to reach such extensive proportions to the detriment of the public, should worry us. There is no doubt that the compliance burden has increased significantly. And for good reason. Even though the debate will continue to rage on over the relative benefits and costs of compliance, it is unlikely this question will be settled in the foreseeable future. Given our experiences from the various discoveries that institutions continue to push the boundaries of what constitutes a fair and ethical practice, there is clear evidence that we need to do more to improve compliance. The industry has made some important strides.

The Monetary Policy Report  The evolution of the macroeconomic scenario, in Chile and around the world, continues to be driven by the spread of the Covid-19 and the containment measures needed to protect the health of the population. The information at hand shows that, after a sharp fall at the beginning of the second quarter, in recent months the Chilean economy has shown signs of stabilization, combining an incipient improvement in some sectors and deterioration at the margin in others. This stabilization has responded to the evolution of sanitary restrictions, the adaptation of various sectors to new operating conditions and the boost from economic policies. The economic impact of the pandemic, however, is very significant and recovery will pose major challenges for public policies, institutions, and economic agents. The magnitude of this challenge is especially evident in the high number of people and businesses whose source of income has been disrupted. Reversing the loss of jobs, the fall in household income and the deterioration in consumption, together with responding to the financing needs of businesses, avoiding bankruptcies and enabling them to recover, are the greatest challenges for economic policy at this stage. As I will show later, based on known activity data and short-term perspectives, we estimate that GDP will end 2020 with a fall of between -4.5 and -5.5%, which compares to the -5.5 to -7.5% range estimated in the June MP Report and which implies a significant recovery in the second half of the year.
Word trade index, volume, Index 2005 = 100, seasonally-adjusted data 150  150 World trade index Forecast IMF (WEO April 2013)  140  140  Forecast IMF (WEO July 2013)  130  130  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90 05  07  09  11  13  15  Sources: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis  Manufacturing industry catching up It is probable that we will be able to continue to describe the Swedish economy as divided for a while longer, even though confidence indicators suggest that the situation in the manufacturing industry is returning to normal. However, given the prospects for higher global demand we should also expect Swedish exports to increase in the years ahead. In combination with a more expansionary fiscal policy in Sweden and a low repo rate, GDP growth can thus be expected to pick up and the current low rate of CPIF inflation can be expected to gradually increase. Some new statistics have been published since the monetary policy meeting in September that shed light on the current situation in the Swedish economy. CPIF inflation was 1.2 per cent in August, which was somewhat higher than expected. A revised version of the National Accounts has also been published which shows that GDP fell slightly more in the second quarter than indicated by the figures published earlier. The growth figures have also been revised down somewhat for 2011 and up somewhat for 2012.

To be able to evaluate our policy – not only the political authorities – but also financial markets and the general public need to know how we interpret our mandate, our view on how the economy works and trade-offs. Therefore, monetary policy must be transparent. Transparency and communication are also important for monetary policy effectiveness. Monetary policy works mainly through expectations and is only effective if the central bank is able to influence interest rate expectations. Professor Michael Woodford has expressed this very clearly in stating that monetary policy is “management of expectations”. “For not only do expectations about policy matter, but (…) very little else matters”. The central bank determines the shortest money market rates through the key rate. The shortest rates, however, are of limited importance. Economic agents’ spending depends more on their interest rate expectations. In recent years, Norges Bank has strived to achieve greater transparency with regard to its monetary policy strategy. As from the beginning of 2003, the Board has published its monetary policy strategy document for the next four months. The strategy was initially published at the end of the period to which it applied. Since June 2004 it has been published ahead of the period. While the document was initially an appendix to our Inflation Report, it is now the first section of the Inflation Report with monetary policy assessments. The strategy includes a recommended interval (red bars) for the policy rate over the following four months, conditional on economic developments that are broadly in line with our projections.
But in order to ensure that sufficient monetary policy stimulus continues to support the further buildup of headline inflation that we see in our projections, the Governing Council decided: to enhance our forward guidance on the likely future path of our policy interest rates, expressing our expectation that they will remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued convergence of inflation towards our aim; and to re-assert our intention to continue to re-invest the principal payments from maturing securities in our portfolio for an extended period of time after the end of our net asset purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. These measures will continue to provide the necessary degree of monetary policy accommodation to bring inflation back towards a level that is below, but close to, 2%. Let me now turn to the Spanish economy. Following the severe recession in 2008-09 and 2012-13, Spain’s economic recovery has been strong, with five years of growth since 2013. During this time, the economy has expanded by an estimated 14% and the level of GDP is now above its pre-crisis peak. This strong recovery reflects substantial policy efforts at both national and European level, particularly the reforms initiated at the height of the sovereign debt crisis. Under the EU financial assistance programme, numerous measures and reforms were undertaken to strengthen the banking system.

These included the stress testing and recapitalisation of troubled banks; the identification of troubled real estate assets and their transfer to SAREB (Spain’s “bad bank”); and the reform of the savings banks. At the same time, actions and reforms at European level, including monetary policy (longer-term refinancing operations, LTROs, asset purchase programme, APP) and the move towards banking union, have ensured liquidity and strengthened confidence in Europe’s monetary and financial system. Financial reforms were accompanied by a series of reforms to labour and product markets and to the public sector. The 2012 labour market reform gave priority to collective bargaining agreements at firm level over those at sectoral or regional level. Reforms to product markets, including the law on market unity, have sought to reduce regulatory obstacles to firms’ growth, although implementation has been challenging. The Spanish economy has rebalanced as far as “flow” variables are concerned, while “stock” imbalances are gradually correcting. Banks’ asset quality and solvency has substantially improved, as reflected in higher capital ratios and a steadily declining ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs). The NPL ratio of Spanish banks has more than halved from 13.6% in 2013 to 6.4% now and continues to fall steadily. The banking sector has been able to finance growth with new loans while steadily deleveraging as legacy loans mature. Private sector debt has fallen considerably. Deleveraging of firms and households is well under way, with debt having declined by almost one-third since 2012.
14  Figure 5 Durable consumption and imports (annual change, percent)  30  15  Durable consumption (right 10 axis) 5  20 Capital goods imports (*)  10 0  0  -10  -5  Consumer goods imports  -20  -10  -30  -15 14  16  15  17  (*) Excludes uncommon transport vehicles. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 6 Evolution of self-employment (percent of total employment)  32  32 Self-employment  30  1986-2017 average  30  28  28  26  26  24  24 2010-2017 average  22  22 86  88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). 08  10  12  14  16  15  Figure 7 Interest rate by type of loan (1) (index, 2002-2017=100)  200  200 Commercial  180 160  180 160  Housing (2)  140  140  120  120  100  100 Consumer  80  80  60  60  40  40 02  05  08  11  14  17  (1) Weighted average rates of all operations performed each month. (2) Loans denominated in UFs. Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF information.

Access to interbank money markets for short-term borrowings gives considerable flexibility to banks to adjust their short-term cash flows. Existence of secondary markets for financial instruments is also an important source of liquidity. However, this conventional mechanism of liquidity management including interbank market, secondary market financial instruments  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  and facilities from the central bank as the lender of last resort are all based on interest and therefore, not acceptable for Islamic financial institutions. In addition to the challenges regarding the liquidity management, there are also supervisory and regulatory issues to be considered. In order to resolve the differences in country level regulations regarding appropriate Shari’ah-compliant instruments, working on globally accepted liquidity management regulations and infrastructure could be a viable option. Establishment of a carefully designed and structured Global Shariah Supervisory Board could be a step in the right direction. In this context, we also appreciate the excellent and productive work of Bank Negara Malaysia, the Gulf central banks and other parties. As a major effort, the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM) has been established to assist institutions offering Islamic financial services in addressing their liquidity management issues in an efficient and effective manner. This institution addresses one of the fundamental problems of Islamic financial institutions: the provision of adequate liquidity in times of stress. Once there is an international lender-of-last-resort facility (to complement and not to replace existing national facilities), the provision of Islamic financial services will be carried out with an increased confidence.
The robust recovery momentum on the global scale has resulted in a strong expansion of Thai exports across product categories and export destinations. In addition, the Thai tourism sector has grown consistently with steady increases in the number and quality of tourists. Therefore, it is not surprising to see businesses associated with exports of goods and services enjoying the benefits from the improved external demand. Domestic demand growth, however, is still proceeding at a gradual pace. Despite a continuous recovery, private consumption growth remains well below that of GDP, registering within the 3 percent range. And until recently, private investment growth had concentrated mainly in the export sector. Overall, the large current account surplus of 10.5 percent to GDP last year summarizes the pattern of economic recovery and reflects the imbalance between the external and domestic demand. Second, the rural economy has been exposed to more adverse shocks than its urban counterpart. Specifically, several populist measures including the controversial rice pledging scheme were withdrawn, together with adverse weather conditions such as severe droughts in 2016 and floods in 2017 as well as declines in global prices of key export crops especially rubber and rice, all constituted negative income shocks to farmers. In addition, rural entrepreneurs, which are mostly SMEs, tend to be less 2/10  productive and might not be able to compete with larger firms who are better equipped with capital and technologies.

4/10  Given these outlooks, we expect the growth momentum to be more balanced with a stronger contribution from domestic demand. In our March forecast, the GDP growth for both 2018 and 2019 was projected at 4.1 percent. These figures are likely to be revised up given better-than-expected growth outturns in the first quarter this year. Headline inflation in April and May has turned up above the lower bound of our target, which is set at 2.5±1.5%, mainly due to the recent pickup in energy prices. Yet inflationary pressure remains soft overall and we must continue to closely monitor inflation developments once these supply-driven fluctuations fade. Over time, improvement in domestic demand and rising energy prices are expected to bring about higher inflation, although it is likely that headline inflation would still remain below the midpoint of the target over the year. For now, an accommodative monetary policy stance would be maintained to foster a strong economic growth and facilitate the return of inflation to the target. Going forward, the Monetary Policy Committee will closely monitor the strength of growth momentum, inflationary pressure as well as underpricing of risks in the financial system that could lead to financial fragility and financial stability concerns. Ladies and gentlemen, So far, I have given you an overall near-term summary of the Thai economy. Let me now move on to the second part of my talk which looks further into the backbone of Thailand’s economic growth engine over a longer horizon.
The CPIF is the CPI with a fixed mortgage rate. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 18. Repo rate Per cent, quarterly averages 5  5 September October  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 06  08  10  12  14  Source: The Riksbank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15

Another, it is sometimes suggested, would be that the economic framework for firms would be perceived as more secure and stable if Sweden adopted the single currency. Once again, the strength of these arguments is difficult to assess, partly because they have evident political purposes. But opinions of this type may clearly have effects if they are current among central decision-makers in the business sector. Political arguments favour participation This brings me, finally, to the political arguments for and against adopting the single currency. The Calmfors report discussed the implications of participation for Swedish policy and its legitimacy, as well as the consequences for Sweden’s voice in Europe and the world. On the first point I shall simply say that I agree about the importance of any decision to participate having a high degree of legitimacy. This in turn calls for an animated discussion of the EMU issue. Having said that, I shall now concentrate on the other aspect. The report considered that if Sweden participated in the monetary union, we would be in a better position to influence EU decisions. The more countries that participated, the greater would be the strength of this argument. The Riksbank agreed but found the argument unduly cautious as regards the political advantages. We saw major political benefits from participation and considered that an outsider position would clearly weaken Sweden’s voice in the European debate and decision-making process. As I see it, since the report was presented and the Riksbank submitted its opinion, the political argument has gained appreciable weight.