samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As net redemptions of loans to non-financial corporations and households (both adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) were observed in June, the annual growth rates for loans to both nonfinancial corporations and households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) decreased further in June, to –0.3% and 1.1% respectively. To a large extent, subdued loan growth reflects the current cyclical situation, heightened risk aversion and the ongoing adjustment in the balance sheets of households and enterprises, all of which weigh on credit demand. A considerable contribution of demand factors to weak MFI loan growth is confirmed by the euro area bank lending survey for the second quarter of 2012. This survey also shows that the net tightening of banks’ credit standards at the euro area level was broadly stable in the second quarter of 2012, as compared with the previous quarter, for loans to both enterprises and households. Looking ahead, it is essential for banks to continue to strengthen their resilience where this is needed. The soundness of banks’ balance sheets will be a key factor in facilitating both an appropriate provision of credit to the economy and the normalisation of all funding channels. To sum up, the economic analysis indicates that price developments should remain in line with price stability over the medium term. A cross-check with the signals from the monetary analysis confirms this picture. While significant progress has been achieved with fiscal consolidation over recent years, further decisive and urgent steps need to be taken to improve competitiveness.

Mario Draghi: ECB press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 2 August 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Rehn. Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged, following the decrease of 25 basis points in July. As we said a month ago, inflation should decline further in the course of 2012 and be below 2% again in 2013. Consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. Inflation expectations for the euro area economy continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. At the same time, economic growth in the euro area remains weak, with the ongoing tensions in financial markets and heightened uncertainty weighing on confidence and sentiment. A further intensification of financial market tensions has the potential to affect the balance of risks for both growth and inflation on the downside. The Governing Council extensively discussed the policy options to address the severe malfunctioning in the price formation process in the bond markets of euro area countries.
And then, when the European chapter of our story is completed and the denar remains our historical symbol of stability, I believe that it will be confirmed once again that as a central bank we have walked down the right path. Since the 2008/2009 Global Financial Crisis and the experiences of the COVID crisis, in a time of accelerated changes on the world stage as a result of globalization, digitalization and financial innovation, the mandate of central banks has been constantly changing and expanding with new functions. All current and new functions and activities  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  of modern central banks that protect the public interest are already part of our vision, but not as an activity that we forecast for the time future and distant, but as something we are already working on. Among other things, we are particularly dedicated to financial education and inclusion given the importance of increasing knowledge about financial services, especially at a time of rapid fintech development, which would eventually provide easier access to finance for citizens and companies. In support of the fintech development, we drafted the first version of the national strategy, with a view of making our story a regional leader in this area as well. Following the example of the European Central Bank, this year, when we celebrate thirty years of the introduction of the denar as our currency, we initiated activities to consider the introduction of a digital denar.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: 30 years of monetary independence Introduction speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the marking of the 30 years of monetary independence, Skopje, 28 April 2022. *** Distinguished President of the Republic of North Macedonia, Distinguished Prime Minister of the Republic of North Macedonia, Distinguished Minister of Finance, Respected members of the Government Dear guests, It has long been said that history is a witness to the past, example and lesson to the present and lesson and warning to the future. Therefore, the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of a momentous event, such as the monetary independence of the modern Macedonian state, is not just an honor and a motive for celebration. It is also an obligation, standing before the generations of devotees who have invested in what is today our modern monetary history, but also before the generations to whom we owe the future. As the great Goran Stefanovski once said, "Identity is a story about who we are, why we are, and what we want." Monetary independence and our currency - the denar are the central chapter in our story - an essential element of our identity. In 1991, the dream of an independent, sovereign and autonomous, modern Macedonian state came true. Yet, without the monetary independence that happened these days in 1992, without an independent central bank and without a national currency, our story would not have been complete.
This has produced a significant acceleration, by some Lm7 million or 10 per cent of the budget deficit, in the rate of increase in pension expenditures. Pension reform clearly cannot be delayed any longer. Population ageing also represents a broader threat to the sustainability of living standards and to social cohesion because the burden of supporting a growing number of dependent persons will, at some point, become unbearable for the productive sectors of the economy. This burden consists not only of pension and other welfare payments, but also of services provided in kind, most notably by the public health system. This is another reason why reducing government recurrent commitments should be a priority objective. A better understanding of the magnitude of these challenges can be obtained by synthesising their effects in terms of the growth rate necessary for the economy to deal with them effectively. For example, in order just to compensate for the increase in the dependency ratio associated with population ageing, the economy would have to grow by around 1 per cent per annum over the next twenty years. At this rate of growth, which is more or less what Malta averaged over the past five years, there would not be any improvement in per capita GDP, that is in living standards. As for hopes of raising the activity rate by ten percentage points to around 70 per cent over twenty years, the economy would have to grow by an average annual rate of at least 3 per cent.

In the five years to 2004, the annual growth rate averaged only 1.2 per cent in real terms, well below that of many of our EU partners; and while this year’s growth rate up to September, at 1.7 per cent, may be encouraging, it is too early to know whether the implied acceleration will be sustained. And yet the need to achieve a faster pace of economic growth has probably never been as urgent as at the present time. Growth is not only necessary in order to satisfy society’s legitimate aspirations for higher living standards. Beyond that, an expansion in the economy’s supply capacity and an enhanced degree of international competitiveness are essential to overcome the daunting challenges the country is currently facing. A threefold challenge: globalization and its implications The first challenge derives from the pervasive process of globalization, which, powered by rapid advances in technology and trade liberalization, has given rise to an unprecedented mobility of resources between countries in pursuit of the best cost-quality combinations. Suffice it to say that over the past two decades exports and foreign direct investment have been growing twice and three times faster than global output, respectively. Globalization is undoubtedly creating numerous profitable business opportunities. At the same time, however, it represents a potential threat for open economies like Malta’s because of the concurrent intensification of competition.
However, owing to the strong M3 growth in 2001, there is still a lot of liquidity in the economy. We therefore have to monitor monetary dynamics closely in the coming months. The persistence of excess liquidity in the economy could become a concern once the economic recovery in the euro area gathers pace. Turning to economic developments, the latest information has reinforced our expectation that real GDP growth in the euro area will recover in 2002 and that, later in the year, it should again be back in line with potential growth. The recovery should be supported by both domestic and external factors, in an environment in which financial conditions are favourable and where there are no major imbalances in the euro area. However, at the current juncture, some uncertainty still remains regarding the strength of the recovery. As regards price developments, there is no evidence thus far of a significant upward impact on the overall price level from the euro cash changeover. While some shorter-term effects cannot be ruled out, there is reason to believe that the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins will strengthen competition, thereby supporting the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. This notwithstanding, HICP inflation is currently somewhat higher than was expected a few months ago, owing partly to a significant rise in oil prices.

However, that being said, the domestic policymaker understands best the context of the local situation that the country is facing. There should be no doubt in this. Third, policymakers must not be afraid of instituting bold policies if they are deemed necessary. This is especially important during times of stress or market failures that risk the orderly functioning of the economy and financial system. Intervention in markets should not be a knee jerk reaction. As a matter of principle, public policies should always first strive to facilitate a selfregulating free market to correct itself. However, when markets fail, it is incumbent upon the regulator to correct market failures. This ought to be the cardinal rule, especially for small and open economies with sizeable financial markets. More often than not, corrective public policy can be unpopular among the masses, but it is important to not lose sight of the bigger picture, for the greater good. Often times, short-term pain is necessary for longer-term gains. Fourth, clear and transparent communication is crucial. Policies will not be effective if the motivations and understanding between policymakers and the public are not aligned. At the end of 2016, the Bank actively sought out the feedback of industries and market participants that were affected by the financial market development measures we introduced in November 2016. This became an important source of information for us to continuously fine-tune the implementation of the measures to help those affected to better adapt to the new environment.
We can have governance of the global financial system even though we do not have global government. Governance can mean legislation, regulation and the institutions of government. But it also encompasses broader frameworks of standards, norms and conventions, international organisations and agreements that fall short of hard law. Indeed, in a world of nation states and national legislatures and governments, it is on these broader frameworks that we need to depend for the governance of financial globalisation, and the management of cross border risk. This challenge is not of course confined to the financial sector. International governance structures are required in many economic and non-economic spheres. But since the liberation of global capital flows and liberalisation of international financial markets which began 50 years ago, financial authorities in multiple jurisdictions have sought together to build the necessary governance frameworks to enable the benefits of financial globalisation while managing the risks. The first Basel Banking Accords of the early 1980s were motivated by the need to ensure that banks involved in cross border services were made subject by their home authorities to minimum standards. In other words, to ensure that the benefits of cross border flows were accompanied by assurance on the risks that might be imported. Financial globalisation accelerated through the last decade of the last century and up until the great financial crisis. External financial assets and liabilities increased from 60% of GDP in the 1980s to 400% of GDP in 2008.

Governance of EU-UK Financial Interconnectedness And that brings me back to the subject of the governance of international finance – the way in which jurisdictions can gain the assurance about the import and export of financial sector risk necessary for their economies to benefit from the efficiency, opportunity and risk management offered by financial globalisation. For the last 30 years or so the governance for cross border financial activity within the EU has been increasingly provided by the legislation, regulation and institutions of the single market in financial services. For the UK, this will continue for another 11 months. But after that we will need new ways to provide the governance for the deep financial connections that will continue between us. The progress in stronger international governance frameworks that I have described provides the basis for that. The development of international standards, of the norms for cooperation, the machinery for scanning and assessing risks and for generating common approaches, provide for mutual assurance in a way that was not possible in the past. We will be able and will need to build on that basis. Some of this may come through the ‘equivalence’ regimes present in some EU legislation, regimes that will initially at any rate be mirrored in UK legislation as we start with the EU acquis on-shored into national law. But those regimes cover only a part of the cross border connections.
In my remarks today, I want to focus on one particular post-crisis change, the introduction of supervisory stress testing, as embodied in CCAR and the stress tests required by the DoddFrank Act (DFAST). In my personal view, supervisory stress testing and the CCAR are the most significant and impactful of the many regulatory and supervisory changes implemented following the global financial crisis. The CCAR and stress testing introduced a forward-looking perspective to capital adequacy and capital planning, something that static book-value-based regulatory capital measures lacked. We felt this acutely during the financial crisis, when market values of bank equity plunged while book values evolved only very slowly, based on accounting measures of losses. Aside from the stress-test-based quantitative requirements, the CCAR also requires large complex banks to do systematic capital planning, including developing criteria for when dividends and share repurchases will be made, increased or curtailed. This is an important innovation, as banks were slow to reduce dividends during the financial crisis, even as losses mounted and share prices fell.1 I want to examine supervisory stress testing through the lens of a paper I wrote in 2009 with former colleague Til Schuermann and current colleague Kevin Stiroh, now head of the New York Fed’s Supervision Group.2 That paper looked at the very first set of stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve and other federal banking supervisors. The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, or SCAP, was a watershed moment in the financial crisis.

Immediately following Sandy, our Regional and Community Outreach function reached out to all of the affected communities as part of a needs assessment. We asked: “How can the New York Fed best leverage our resources to help our community?” After dozens of conversations with leaders of the community, we determined that pulling together key service providers under one roof would make a useful contribution. Our outreach team organized a free relief clinic in this very building. We brought together a wide variety of government agency representatives and other service providers. I would like to acknowledge what is a long list: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Office of the New York Attorney General, the New York 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  State Department of Financial Services, the New York Legal Assistance Group, Staten Island Legal Services, the Legal Aid Society, MFY Legal Services, various bar associations, New York City Department of Small Business Services, Center for New York City Neighborhoods, Neighborhood Housing Services of Staten Island and the Northfield Local Community Development Corporation. I’m proud to say we were able to assist over 150 Staten Islanders, including homeowners, tenants and small business owners. We also heard that it could be challenging to find key recovery information and advice online. So once again, we pulled key resources under one roof – or I should say one URL.
At times during the 1970s and 1980s, when the so-called anglo-saxon model of relatively unbridled financial markets was not delivering particularly good results in terms of economic growth, there was some envy of what one might depict as the institutional model of corporate ownership, as evident in Germany and Japan for example. In this model much of the equity of major businesses is closely held by friendly groups of long-term investors including one’s bankers and associate companies. It has been argued that this arrangement provides the best environment for long-term growth and stability, in contrast to the situation where businesses are exposed fully to the cut and thrust of the stock markets, which are characterised as being populated by people seeking only short-term profit and ever alert to opportunities for takeovers, asset stripping and the like. But experience of the 1990s does not support that view. Germany and Japan have been the laggards of the decade. The true cost to Japan of the longstanding cosy relationships between banks, industrial corporations and government ministries has become apparent. And we watch in some amazement the reaction among some sections 1  BIS Review 135/1999  of the political and business communities in Germany to the Vodafone/Mannesmann takeover battle an almost unprecedented (for Germany) hostile bid, no more palatable for being from abroad - along with the government’s efforts to save the Holzmann construction group, not to mention the authorities’ stout defence of the largely state-owned domestic regional banking network there.

Mr Latter gives a tour d’horizon of the current situation on the world financial markets  Text of the opening address by Tony Latter, a Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, to the Asia Pacific Issuers and Investors Forum, in Hong Kong on 7 December 1999. *  *  *  As we leave the twentieth century behind, the major regions of the world economy appear to be in quite good shape. North America is buoyant; Europe is positioned for more solid growth than of late, albeit only by its own rather modest standards; Japan may be moving forward, even if we have seen too many false dawns to be entirely confident; and the rest of Asia has recovered from the 1997 setback more strongly and quickly than most people expected. Meanwhile, major stock markets look set to end the millennium at or near all-time highs, with the notable exception of Japan, where the Nikkei is still at only about half its peak of more than ten years ago. It is also a confident end to the decade, century and millennium for “markets” in a broader sense. The 20th century has witnessed a considerable ebb and flow of fashions in economics, between allegiances to systems which afford primacy to market forces and those which yield varying degrees of control to the state. As it turns out, the former have held sway.
This also applies to the temporarily restricted autonomy and flexibility when a central bank must act resolutely in certain situations to maintain confidence in the inflation target. So far, it is my assessment that this is something transitory. Different theories behind the weak recovery from the financial crisis One notable theory for the reasons behind the low interest rates and the sluggish recovery from the financial crisis is the hypothesis of secular stagnation advanced by Summers (2013). The concept here is that a chronic surplus of saving has arisen in the world for various reasons, and that this has pushed the interest rate down. The problem, however, is that not even the current low level of interest rates creates a balance between supply and demand. The result of this is the risk that many countries will become stuck in a situation with too low aggregate demand, resource utilisation below normal and inflation that tends to be much too low. Rogoff (2015) instead argues that growth is being restrained by the world being in an adjustment phase of an unusually large debt cycle, a “debt supercycle”. Even if the level of interest rates is unusually low, this needs not mean that countries are stuck in a situation of chronic demand deficit. Demand and growth will start to pick up when the debt situation again normalises. Unlike a case of secular stagnation, which can be regarded as a structural phenomenon, the problems are thus assumed to be of a basically cyclical, albeit long-term, nature.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Developing countries and international capital markets Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to economiesuisse, Zurich, 14 June 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  After having plummeted on the back of the Asian crisis, capital flows to developing countries have risen considerably again in the last three years. In 2005, they are likely to reach the approximate level at which they stood shortly before the Asian crisis. Capital flows are channelled mostly to a few emerging markets, notably China. China’s monetary order is currently undergoing profound changes, with the country gradually liberalising capital movements. The concept of the “impossible trinity”, which was developed by the Nobel Prize winner Robert Mundell, asserts that this will inevitably lead either to a loss in monetary autonomy or to a flexibilisation of the exchange rate regime. Both trends can be clearly observed: the pressure on the fixed exchange rate on the one hand, and the rapid expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates on the other. In the longer term, China’s monetary order will probably move towards floating exchange rates. This transition will hopefully be successful. As China’s monetary policy of gradual change has so far proved its worth, it is likely to serve as an example to other developing countries.