samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In order to achieve this, financial statements must – in the case of instruments for which it is economically relevant – be sensitive to price signals from markets, which reflect transaction values. I believe that two elements are important in this argument. The first is that financial statements have the crucial merit of providing information. The second is that the rationale of fair value valuation contains within it its own limitations. The concept of "transaction", which is  BIS Review 160/2008  1  fundamental in this context and, as a result, that of "market", should constitute the limits of the scope of application of fair value accounting. Are accounting choices neutral? It goes without saying that the greater sensitivity of balance sheets to market fluctuations resulting from fair value accounting obviously has an impact on financial stability. A central banker may legitimately wonder whether accounting conventions are neutral with respect to the behaviour of financial players and market dynamics. The current crisis and volatility that we have been faced with over the past few months suggest that accounting conventions have an impact in terms of financial incentives and may have had a not insignificant impact on financial players' strategies. One example serves to illustrate this point. It is macroeconomic in nature and relates to risktaking by financial institutions. It is the possibility, in the case of some instruments, of recording as of the first trading day all of the discounted future profits even though the risks remain on the balance sheet.

Over time, the size of the internationally exposed sector will be affected by the portion of petroleum revenues that is absorbed by the Norwegian economy but will be unaffected by monetary policy. Any  2  BIS Review 8/2002  appreciation of the krone may, nevertheless, affect the speed at which changes occur in the business sector. To maintain a balance in the Norwegian economy, the phasing in of petroleum revenues must be countered by a monetary policy stance that is tighter than it would otherwise have been. This may be accomplished through a higher interest rate, an appreciation of the krone, or both. On balance, we expect moderate growth in the mainland economy in the next two years. The projections for GDP growth that were presented in the October 2001 Inflation Report were approximately on a par with the growth potential of the economy. Household consumption and public spending are the main forces underpinning growth. Fixed investment and exports are restraining growth. Brisk growth in consumption is resulting in high demand for labour in public and private services. Low international growth and lower petroleum investment are curbing employment growth. A tight labour market is generating continued high growth in labour costs. An expansionary fiscal policy, growth in private consumption and a continued high rise in labour costs contribute to a high rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. At the same time, we expect a temporary decline in prices for imported consumer goods.
And if a private-sector digital currency uses the technology to substitute for a third-party clearer, the central bank counterpart would do the opposite. The aim would be to widen access to the central bank’s balance sheet, beyond commercial banks. There’s no rigid correspondence here: in principle, one could introduce the technology and preserve the current arrangements, under which it is commercial banks that hold central bank deposits; it’s also possible to increase the number of counterparties without it. But the distributed ledger would probably make it easier to do so. That might mean adding only a narrow set of counterparties – perhaps a wide range of non-bank financial companies, say. It might mean something more dramatic: in the limiting case, everyone – including individuals – would be able to hold such balances. So although they might share the same technology, and the same name, the private and central-bank versions of a digital currency are actually rather different. The one would expand what the other seeks to replace. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  As far as its economic effects are concerned, my guess is that much would depend on how exactly a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is designed – and in particular the extent to which it competes with the main form of money in the economy, commercial bank deposits. As individuals, we already have the ability to hold claims on the central bank, in the form of physical cash.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Would it compete with cash or with bank deposits? The CBDC and “narrow banking” But which would it be – an actual bank account, with all the extra services such things entail, perhaps including the payment of interest; or simply “e-cash” – something that can only be used for retail transfers and doesn’t receive any interest? This is an important question. If all it did was to reduce the demand for physical cash, it’s not clear the macroeconomic effects of a CBDC would be that significant. It’s possible the retail payments system might become more efficient. It’s also true that, were a CBDC fully to displace paper currency, that would open the door to the possibility of materially negative interest rates (Buiter (2009), Rogoff (2014), Haldane (2015)). But that would require explicitly abolishing cash, not just introducing an electronic alternative. As long as it’s possible to hold something with a guaranteed nominal return of zero there’s a similar lower bound on all other forms of money, whether reserves at the central bank or a more widely available CBDC. Leaving aside the question of whether or not you should actively get rid of banknotes8, a purely cash-like version of a CBDC would mainly involve substituting one zero-yielding liability of the central bank for another. It seems to me that the more material effects of a CBDC would arise if it provided competition not just for banknotes but for commercial bank deposits as well.
Chart 8: Proportion of part-time workers  Percentage of total employed 30 25 20 15 10 1985  1988  1991  1994  1997  2000  2003  Source: ONS and Bank calculations  BIS Review 16/2005  11  Chart 9: Real household disposable income growth and terms of trade  Percentage change on a year earlier 8.0  1990 = 100 112  Real household income growth  6.0 108  4.0 2.0  104  0.0 100  -2.0  Terms of trade  -4.0  96  -6.0 -8.0 1990  92 1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  Chart 10: Margins on personal loans to households  Per cent 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  Source: Bank calculat ions.

In the long run, both the real exchange rate and the surplus increase over time. Thus, the theory that a stronger real Swiss franc automatically leads to a lower current account surplus does not hold empirically for Switzerland. Why is this? Let’s look at Figure 3, which shows the trade account and current account balances for selected countries. If a country’s current account surplus is primarily determined by its trade account in goods, then we might expect an appreciation to result in a smaller surplus, through lower exports and higher imports. The underlying assumption in many economic models is that current account adjustment comes about primarily through the trade-in-goods component. Switzerland is different to most other countries, in that its trade account balance in goods represents only a small fraction of the large current account surplus. This stands in stark contrast to other economies such as China, where goods trade makes up more than 80% of the current account surplus. So, if the Swiss current account is not driven by the trade balance in goods, then what are the factors responsible for its surplus? As we can see from Figure 4, the large surplus in the  3  See, for example, Joseph E. Gagnon (2013): “The Elephant Hiding in the Room: Currency Intervention and Trade Imbalances”, Working Paper Series WP13-2, Peterson Institute for International Economics. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  current account is mainly attributable to two components: investment income and services. The figure shows just the net amounts for these components.
There is a concern by the U.S. correspondents 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  transferring funds for Middle Eastern customers that the correspondents might unwittingly be providing services to a terrorist organization, or be enabling a person or affected sovereign to evade economic sanctions. So, the correspondents close accounts for all banks in the Middle East. Similarly, there is a concern by the U.S. correspondents transferring funds for Latin American customers that they might unwittingly be providing financial services to drug traffickers, a money laundering risk. So, they close accounts for all banks located in Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. The de-risking exercise succeeds in its risk-reducing objective, but it succeeds in an overly broad manner by cutting services indiscriminately to so many. The adverse and unintended consequences for certain regions of the world are clear and present. There are also implications for U.S. policy with respect to the role of the dollar as the international medium of exchange. These issues, while highly consequential, are not the object of my remarks today; rather, they are a symptom of what compliance can lead to – namely, a reason to restrict business activity. Given the size of penalties for violations, and the potential reputational damage associated with this business, it is very difficult to quarrel with the business judgment. The success of compliance over the last 20 years has conditioned business leaders to think about compliance as a pathway to terminate or constrain a risky business relationship.

We reason backward, “if the program were effective, this would not have happened.” I think this is natural and understandable for the enforcement community, but it is not necessarily good policy. To borrow an observation from Senator Ted Kennedy concerning the Federal sentencing guidelines, this creates “a risk that companies without substantial compliance programs will get a free ride, and those with strong programs will not receive the credit that they deserve.”3 Alternatively, if there were a reliable and acceptable measure of program effectiveness, this kind of backward reasoning would be replaced by reliance on the effective measure. Institutions could use the measure when making arguments for leniency, again assuming that the measure demonstrated that their programs were effective. It might, of course, show just the opposite. And there are other, perhaps even more important, benefits. If an industry and its regulators came to have great confidence in a particular effectiveness measure, this might provide a foundation for building a program that could be used to on-board risk. Put differently, a particular organization could have confidence that its ethics and compliance program would be protective because the program had been validated by a well-accepted measure of effectiveness. Some of the skeptics will say “you are dreaming”. When I hear them, I am reminded of the words of George Bernard Shaw, and specifically the reminder to dream things that never were and ask “why not”.4 4.
These preliminary estimates suggest a one-off inflation impact of 1 to 2 percentage points. Moving forward, the impact would ride on the range of products affected, as well as, among other things, on the timeline: whether it would be a one-step or a two-step move. The many unknowns in this area prevent us from making any final estimates. When making this decision we certainly took into account that potential changes to the tax system are not impossible. These have been discussed and will be discussed moving forward. While we are on this subject, we would like to ask the Government to make the parameters of these initiatives known before they are implemented so these could be reflected in our monetary policy, enabling a consistent and smooth monetary policy stance. This is what we would like of the Government in relation to tax reforms. QUESTION from TASS Agency: When you reviewed lending to the economy, were you guided by certain adjustments to the macroeconomic forecast? Also, could you please comment on capital outflow. Were there any revisions in the three-year estimate? Thank you. ELVIRA NABIULLINA: Yes, we have indeed made some corrections. Overall, as I have noted, our assessment of 2017 is more positive, while 2018–2019 assumptions are unchanged. This does indeed translate into movement in various indicators. On the subject of lending, we are expecting growth, and we expect this growth to be gradual and sufficiently smooth.

I am unaware of the details currently being discussed in the media, but I can say that the Bank of Russia extensively cooperates with the regulators in as far as it is competent, and while adhering to the law. We are able to provide documents, if necessary. However, I just cannot recall this case: these enquiries must have been received outside of my tenure. I cannot recall having received such enquiries over the past four years, but I will check. 14 / 14  BIS central bankers' speeches
Thus, when the Monetary Policy Council makes interest-rate decisions, it bears in mind first the objective of preserving the purchasing power of the currency, for and on behalf of all French people, and second, its corollary, namely the creation of monetary, financial and competitive conditions that will allow our economy to achieve its full potential for sound and sustained growth, for job creation and therefore for combating unemployment. Central Banks cannot “command” growth. Growth is the fruit of the labour of men and women, of the efficiency of employees, workers and engineers, of the imagination and skill of business leaders, and also, more broadly, of the influence of European and international business conditions. It is stimulated, in the medium and long term, by structural reforms that liberate initiative, strengthen the dynamism of the economy, combat unemployment effectively and encourage the creation of the greatest possible number of jobs for a given level of wealth and growth. However, it is up to Central Banks to create the best possible monetary and financial conditions, through the credibility and stability of the currency. These conditions now exist in our country and the Monetary Policy Council is convinced that the time has come for firms and households to invest. In many sectors and firms, the financing exists. The self-financing rate of the entire French productive sector is above 100% overall. Interest rates as a whole are at historic lows. The French economy has substantial BIS Review 2/1997  -6-  potential for growth in the medium term.

Second, the Monetary Policy Council has set monetary policy against the background of potential growth for the French economy of around 2.5% per year. We consider the average growth of our economy in the medium-term, and it could be exceeded given that we have a potential to catch up in the medium term. We reckoned with a maximum price increase of 2% and potential real growth of between 2.5% and 3% in the medium term to arrive at a figure of 5% for the medium-term growth trend of the money supply. * *  BIS Review 2/1997  *  -5-  It is very important to bear in mind the essence of the policy implemented by the Monetary Policy Council. Parliament confers on the Banque de France an objective, namely the objective of price stability. Maintaining the value of the currency preserves the purchasing power of the currency, and therefore that of French citizens. In addition, Parliament has sought to create the conditions for growth and for job creation, via the stability of the currency. This is also the goal of the Monetary Policy Council. To achieve this goal, we use two means. First, by preserving the value of the currency, we enhance its credibility in France, in Europe and in the world and allow our economy to benefit from financing at favourable market interest rates.
The flow of corporate euro bond and equity issuance has grown significantly, though it is important to keep this in proportion: the stock of issuance outstanding in both cases is still - by some margin - lower than the US. (Domestic debt securities in the euro area, taking governments and corporates together, amount to the equivalent of around $ trillion, compared with some $ trillion in the US. And the equity market capitalisation of companies in the euro area amounts to the equivalent of around $ trillion, compared with some $ trillion in the US.) Since the launch of the euro, the focus of risk assessment in the corporate debt market has shifted from currency risk towards credit and liquidity risk. A growing number of companies in the euro area have been seeking external credit ratings. And an equity culture is beginning to take root in the euro area, despite the volatility in TMT stocks over the past two years. In Europe as a whole, for example, there were over 17,000 M&A transactions with a combined value equivalent to $ trillion last year. The second change concerns the integration of euro trading and settlement. Trading has increased in most euro markets, and dealing spreads have narrowed. Electronic trading and communication  2  BIS Review 11/2001  networks have greatly increased the reach of traditional financial markets, while allowing new providers to enter at relatively low cost.

The yield curve of federal government bonds, which is used by banks as a benchmark for the interest rates they set for their clients, has significantly increased for maturities of up to three years, while staying almost unchanged in the long end. The rise in short-term yields reflects both our recent decisions and market expectations regarding the future key rate path. Shifts in long-term yields are minor. Among other things, this is an evidence of market participants’ confidence that monetary policy will finally bring inflation back to the target. I would like to reiterate that these are long-term interest rates, rather than our key rate as such (as is often stated), that determine the affordability of credit for companies’ investment purposes and of mortgage loans. As compared to yields on federal government bonds, interest rates on loans and deposits have responded more slowly and rose less significantly. Our today’s decision is aimed at accelerating this process. An increase in interest rates will help restore households’ propensity to save. Growth in retail and corporate lending is close to its highest rates recorded in recent years. Many borrowers seek to take out loans as soon as possible at lower interest rates. We have raised our lending growth forecast for this year. Mortgage lending will continue to expand fast, while slightly decelerating after the amendments to the subsidised mortgage lending programme become effective. Speaking of unsecured consumer lending, we can already observe the first signs of overheating. This lending segment has been growing faster than we forecast in April.
This is explained by the fact that we are supplying liquidity on an unlimited basis and that we have allowed collateral in a way which is more forthcoming. And this is true for all central banks. But for us, our weekly balance sheet in comparison with that of one year ago has increased by around 55 % [from around 1.3 trillion to 2 trillion euro]. Of course, this increase does not imply an increase in net liquidity, because a significant part of the liquidity we provide comes back in the central bank through the deposit facility. FT: That’s less than the Fed. Trichet: Yes, true. For the ECB part of it comes also from the fact that we have the counterparts of the dollar that we are supplying ourselves, and a counterpart of the dollar is our own collateral. The central banks are in a situation where they are playing a much more quantitative role than they used to play, and it is true for all of us. FT: Should there be more centralised supervision within the Eurozone, and should the ECB take responsibility? Is the ECB willing to take that responsibility if the politicians so desire? 6  BIS Review 159/2008  Trichet: As you know, we have always been in favour of a very close relationship between the central bank and the banking surveillance authorities. We said that long, long before any new problems, any new difficulties. We had a Governing Council position close to the start of the ECB, which we made public.

We have an exceptional situation, but understanding where exactly the limits are of the fiscal room for manoeuvre also depends on the culture. I see some cultures where people are very anxious that in the medium and long run the fiscal situation would be unsustainable, others that are reasoning short term. The “discount rate” which is implicit in the various cultures is not the same. We have to also take that into account. We don’t have a federal government. We don’t have a federal budget. If we unravel the Stability and Growth Pact we won’t rebuild it afterwards. It would have been unravelled. And what would I say then to American friends telling me, “you put the cart before the horse – you don’t have a federal budget or a federal government – but you have a single currency”? I understand that from the outside our setup might seem a little surprising, but taking everything into account, the credibility of the euro area, the fact that there has been a quid pro quo at the birth of the euro area in terms of the institutional framework, our setup is very solid. And don’t forget that there is also something which is not negligible. The role of automatic stabilisers is also important, and I urge the members of the euro area to display to which  BIS Review 159/2008  3  degree the worsening fiscal balances represent the functioning of automatic stabilisers.