samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But I must stress the urgency here: we don’t have much time left, one or two years. Everybody is talking about a CBDC; but first, and much earlier, we need to regulate crypto-assets, and then implement EPI. The third and final action: be ready to launch a general purpose CBDC, which means for the public and for the financial sector, to reassert the anchoring role of central bank money in case of need. Let me insist on the dual purpose: public attention is naturally focused on a retail digital currency, for individuals and firms. But a “wholesale” or “interbank” form is also important, particularly as the use cases are already even more obvious, and because this interbank money will be vital for cross-border transactions. The next investigation phase and technological prototypes selected by the Eurosystem will, in my view, need to cover both these functions, separately or together. The results of the ECB’s public consultation, published mid-April, show that European citizens regard two aspects as particularly important: privacy and security. Therefore, the retail CBDC would be made available to citizens as an easy-to-use, secure and accessible payment instrument, that protects user privacy and can be used for all types of payment. How would it be distributed? We want to develop a model where CBDC is distributed by intermediaries, to allow private players, first and foremost the banking sector, to keep a key role. Let me be clear on this: it is not the Banque de France’s or any Central Bank’s role to open bank accounts!

At that date, the Governing Council will decide on whether to launch a digital euro. We will then need a few years of serious preparatory work to turn an e-euro into reality. * Let me say it again: on both digital currency and payments, we in Europe must be ready to move as quickly as needed or risk an erosion of our monetary sovereignty – something we cannot tolerate. European citizens must have access durably to effective and independent means of exchange. Recent experience in another field shows that we can do it. Six years ago, there was almost no climate policy among central bankers. Today it has become an important topic with concrete technical advances. I could have spoken of another “road for the future”: green finance. Here also, France and Europe have a strong initial advantage: Paris is home to the global secretariat of the NGFS with about 100 members now; its financial centre participants are ahead in their disclosure of and commitments regarding climate-related risks; France is the  first European country in terms of outstanding of green bonds. And last month, the French ACPR published the first climate pilot exercise worldwide actively involving both the banking and insurance sectors.
Demand decreases with the cost of borrowing, RB and supply increases with the return on bank debt (including deposits), RD, which for simplicity is taken to move in line with the policy rate R. In addition, there is a spread between RB and RD, reflecting expectations of default not only by end borrowers but also by the financial intermediary. In credit booms, this spread is often unsustainably compressed, while during credit crunches it widens sharply. Our macroprudential instrument, K, is assumed either to reduce the demand for credit, or to increase the spread between RB and RD, or both. Either way it reduces the total quantity of credit, C. Now unlike macroeconomic stability, which can be characterised as output being at its sustainable level once nominal wages and prices have adjusted and inflation is at target, there is no corresponding simple characterisation of financial stability. But for simplicity, let us assume that the authorities have in mind some maximum level of leverage that is consistent with the risks to future financial stability remaining acceptable. Then we have the downward-sloping frontier FS (for Financial Stability) in the right-hand panel that shows the minimum acceptable level of the policy rate for any given setting of the macroprudential tool. A reduction in perceived risk leading to excessive exuberance on the part of investors or borrowers would shift this frontier to the right. Putting these two policy relationships, PS and FS, together we get Chart 11.

Not least, Islamic banking continues to grow  1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  further with more institutions adopting an Islamic-first strategy. With the growth of the assets comes the demand for corresponding Shariah-compliant investing and treasury services. These factors point to another area where we believe to be important in further advancing Malaysia as an international Islamic financial centre. The development of a vibrant Islamic financial market, in particular the ringgit Islamic financial market. Currently, Islamic money market volume already accounts for 38% of the total turnover in the money market while total trading volume has increased steadily over the years to RM5.9 trillion in Islamic money market as at end of 2021 (2020: RM4.91 trillion). Commodity Murabahah has been the predominant instrument in the Islamic money market with a 92.7% composition, followed by Qard Acceptance (5.6%), Negotiable Instrument of Deposits (1.2%) and others3. The overall bond market (including sukuk market) continued to grow with outstanding bond and sukuk growing at 8% in 2021 to RM1.7 trillion4. Turnover of debt securities and sukuk remained robust at RM1.87 trillion as of end-2021, with average daily secondary bond trading volume of RM3.8 billion. To date, Malaysia remains the biggest global sukuk market with a share of 52% of total outstanding sukuk and 42% share of global sukuk issuances as of end-20215. These are very good achievements - a strength that we can further build upon.
We are a young nation by the standards of other countries but a hundred years is not a flash in the pan either. Amidst the centennial celebrations, it is worthwhile recalling the journey that Singapore has made as a nation since its humble beginnings in 1965. As this is a gathering of economists, I will do so in the form of a brief economic history of Singapore over the last century. Our economic progress in a nutshell Let me begin by reviewing the economic progress we have made as a nation in the last 100 years, from three perspectives, namely the level, generation, and distribution of income. First, the level of income. I will use Gross Domestic Product rather than Gross National Income since the GNI measure that we use today is not available for the earlier years. •  In 1965, Singapore’s nominal GDP per capita was around $ We were at the same level as Mexico and South Africa. •  In 1990, GDP per capita had risen to about $ surpassing South Korea, Israel, and Portugal. •  In 2015, GDP per capita was about $ We had caught up with Germany and the United States. •  By 2040, when our GDP per capita had reached $ we were already among the top-ranked countries in the world and our benchmark became cities. We were among the top 25 cities then. •  Today, in 2065, GDP per capita is $ fifth highest among cities in the world. Second, the generation of income.

The most  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  important outcomes from that period of review which continued into the 1990s were the structural reforms to: •  enhance wage flexibility in the labour market;  •  tap more decisively into regional markets for trade and outward investment;  •  step up the pace of industrial upgrading;  •  promote innovation, enterprise, and entrepreneurship in the economy; and  •  liberalise various services sectors such as finance, telecommunications, and utilities. In fact, the key story post-1985 recession up till the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was the rise of modern services as a twin engine of growth alongside manufacturing. •  The share of modern services in GDP increased steadily, from 16% in 1965 to 24% in 1985 and 28% in 2010. Financial services. Singapore was already a thriving regional financial centre since the 1970s. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the insurance and securities industries were completely liberalised and progressive steps were taken to open up the domestic banking industry to foreign competition. Business services. A broad range of business activities – accounting, law, advertising, and consultancy – grew in importance, playing an important role in cementing Singapore’s status as a regional hub. Info-communications services. The government embarked on a plan to computerise the civil service in the early 1980s. This helped to kick-start the info-communication services industry, one of the mainstays of the economy ever since. Entertainment services.
In the past, growth in public spending was to be reduced or other fiscal policy measures implemented if the labour market was tight and wage growth high. With today's guidelines, it is primarily monetary policy that is tightened in a similar situation. The rise in labour costs is important when Norges Bank assesses the outlook for price inflation and sets interest rates. Excessive wage growth, in both manufacturing and other industries, will affect the internationally exposed sector through two channels. First, high wage growth will in itself reduce earnings and employment. Second, the interest rate will be increased. Normally, this will lead to an appreciation of the krone, with a further reduction in earnings and employment. The manufacturing sector will therefore feel the effects of excessive wage growth to an even greater extent than earlier. Since the new fiscal guidelines, which entail an increased use of petroleum revenues, were introduced during a period with a tight labour market, it was to be expected that the krone would be strong at times. At the same time, it is important to be aware that low wage growth will be of double benefit to the exposed business sector. With wage growth as low as in the mid-1990s, partly as a result of incomes  BIS Review 2/2003  1  policy, and other things being equal, the interest rate would probably have to be set in such a way that the krone fell in value in order to bring price inflation up to 2.5 per cent.

Let me start by stressing a key point: the Eurosystem's highly accommodative monetary policy is already helping to finance the transition thanks to very low interest rates and abundant liquidity. Green investment will have to be very significant, we are aware of this, – with more than EUR 1,000 billion in public and private investment planned as part of the European Green Deal; xi but never has monetary policy been so favourable for achieving this. The greening of the central bank's actions does not therefore require a further easing of monetary policy, but rather a recalibration of its tools. By next September, we will decide within the Governing Council on the conclusions of our "Strategic Review". To contribute to this debate, I would today like to present our ambitions in the form of a simple triptych: forecast, disclose and incorporate climate risk. 2.1  Forecast, and therefore model  First ambition: to deepen our understanding of the effects of climate change not only on prices but also on growth, both over the business cycle and over much longer time horizons. We are not starting from scratch! Much progress has already been made, notably driven by the NGFS. Our models already incorporate, over a three-year horizon, the effects of tax measures to facilitate the transition, such as the carbon tax. However, changes in the behaviour of economic agents are more difficult to take into account, even though - via expectations - their economic consequences could be felt well before their implementation.
18.11.2020  Opening address of the conference “Consumers and the postCOVID mortgage market” ADICAE Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Good afternoon. I would like to thank ADICAE for kindly inviting me to address you on the opening of this conference on the post-COVID mortgage market. Allow me a minor comment regarding the conference title: I fear it is still too soon to talk about the mortgage market situation after COVID, although there is evidently no lack of will to do so. The latest science news on the progress of the different vaccines gives us hope that we may shortly look to the future without seeing the pandemic on the horizon. Let us trust this will be so. In any event, beyond the effects this health crisis may be having in the short term, housing affordability has been a very relevant subject in Spanish society for decades. Worldwide, we are one of the countries with the highest homeownership percentages, and the mortgage market has unquestionably been a decisive factor in making such housing affordability possible. This conference is directed at consumers, although if you will allow me the technical detail, national accounts treats house purchases as “investment”, not as consumption. This is clearly the case and, almost always, this is the most important investment that we “consumers” make in our lives. Given the importance and scale of this purchase, the authorities should watch over individuals’ interests.

Clearly, in economic terms, the cost of litigiousness and its terrible effect on the reputation of the entire sector more than exceeds any hypothetical benefits that individual banks might have obtained through questionable practices. Society has clearly evolved and, in tandem, so have demands regarding the transparency, diligence, rigour and integrity expected of banks. I believe the sector is responding to this challenge, which involves achieving a significant cultural change in the way banks relate to their customers. I have pointed out that it is premature to analyse the results of this Law in terms of potential improvements to legal certainty, but we can see a change in the number of complaints submitted to the Banco de España. As you will know, in recent years the problems related to mortgage loans have led to the change in the number of complaints lodged with the Banco de España. This is due in particular to two issues: the above-mentioned floor clauses and mortgage loan arrangement costs, which saw a record number of complaints submitted in 2017. However, mortgage loan complaints made last year fell to levels of a decade ago. We expect this trend to continue. But apart from one-off changes in the time series, I wish to emphasise the fact that the problems behind these complaints stem from operations entered into prior to the enactment of the Law in question.
As prepared for delivery Date accessed: October 29, 2018  “U.S. Monetary Policy Normalization is Proceeding Smoothly” Remarks by Simon M. Potter Executive Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of New York at Banque de France Paris, France October 26, 2018  Thank you for the invitation to participate in today’s discussion about post-financialcrisis monetary policies. 1 My remarks today will focus on the implementation of monetary policy normalization. 2 The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has carefully developed and articulated a clear and transparent normalization strategy and is implementing that strategy. This approach has instilled confidence—a key to maintaining market stability, which has supported the orderly functioning of the broader set of dollar money market rates that are important to policy transmission and financial conditions. 3 Against this backdrop, the FOMC has increased the federal funds target rate from the 0 to ¼ percent range that had been in effect between December 2008 and December 2015, to 2 to 2 ¼ percent at its last meeting. Additionally, since late last year, when the Federal Reserve began a program to reduce its securities holdings by reinvesting principal maturities only to the extent that they exceed gradually increasing caps, the FOMC has reduced the size of the portfolio holdings from nearly $ trillion to about $ trillion. 4 Notably, this month, the principal payments from the agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) portfolios are below the level of the redemption caps.

Let me also note that the question of the appropriate longer-run balance sheet size, the point at which the Federal Reserve holds no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively, is a related, but distinct policy judgement upon which the FOMC has made no decision as yet. We will be monitoring that broad range of indicators to search for evidence that we’re approaching the “steep” slope—and I have confidence that our data and analytics will help us to assess this effectively. 29 We have also conducted a new Federal Reserve survey specifically designed to support our efforts to obtain a high-quality estimate of where aggregate reserve scarcity might occur, and the preliminary survey results strongly support my view that reserve scarcity is some way off. 30 Finally, I am confident that the Federal Reserve has the effective tools and is prepared to take measures as appropriate to ensure that short-term rates remain wellcontrolled and efficiently transmit the stance of policy into broader financial markets. For example, another technical adjustment to the IOR rate, as discussed in the May FOMC meeting minutes, could be used to foster trading in the federal funds market at rates well within the FOMC's target range. Concluding Remarks I remain highly confident that the FOMC’s framework for the normalization of the stance of monetary policy—both in the overnight market and the balance sheet—will continue to proceed smoothly, without unnecessary surprise, disruption, or volatility in financial markets.
In order to stop the credit growth and housing boom, interest rates would probably have had to be raised very high so as to cause considerable damage to the real economy. They could have thrown the U.S. right into Japanese-style deflation and eventually a liquidity trap. Certainly higher interest rates would have had no impact on the regulatory problems, distorted incentives and information problems mentioned above (although they could have ended the Great Moderation with a deep recession and deflation). 10 However, perhaps it is possible that the Fed’s emphasis on its readiness to relax monetary policy aggressively in the wake of a sharp fall in asset prices (Greenspan 2002) may have induced expectations of a floor under future asset prices and contributed to the asset-price boom (the “Greenspan Put”; see Miller, Weller and Zhang, 2002). Arguably, this is more a communication issue rather than one of actual policy, and less emphasis on the readiness to clean up after a sharp fall in asset prices might have been a preferable alternative. 5. Conclusion: does flexible inflation targeting need to be modified in light of the crisis? What conclusions can we draw from the financial crisis so far about the conduct of monetary policy and any need to modify the framework of flexible inflation targeting?

We have to ask whether today’s blanket approach to welfare, higher education and health is promoting a culture of reliance on the State rather than the encouragement of private initiative. Our system does not focus exclusively on those who are truly in need, but also provides a cushion for higher income earners, at the cost, however, of a heavier fiscal burden. 2  Swedish Ministry of Finance and H. M. Treasury Social Bridges: Meeting the Challenges of Globalisation, London and Stockholm, April 2006. BIS Review 113/2006  3  Social programmes must be sustainable The time has, therefore, come for a radical reform that reconciles the objective of social cohesion with financial sustainability. Non-essential transfer payments should be reduced, especially those that are of a universal nature and do not address a proven need. The introduction of means testing must be seriously considered, accompanied by continued efforts to reduce tax evasion. The criteria for the granting of certain benefits should be tightened further. The underlying objective should be to promote a culture of self-help and efficiency. In the field of higher education, for example, since an academic qualification enhances the student’s income-earning potential, I believe a strong case can be made for at least the partial replacement of grants with loans for students from a better-off financial background, with a repayment schedule that provides for moratoria to suit the post-graduation realities of the particular student.
The Bank now has responsibility for end-to-end risk management for CHAPS including relationships with CHAPS direct participants, and clearer lines of responsibility and integrated governance, enhancing financial stability in the UK. The first glimpse of the new dawn: ISO 20022 – improving payment messaging June next year will be the first step in the UK’s migration to ISO 20022. Its implementation is a foundational step that will enable many of the future changes that are coming, both domestically in the renewal of RTGS and internationally including enhancing cross border payments. Payment messages are the vehicles for transactional data in the payments world. They provide a common data model and a set of rules for exchanging critical information for a transaction to take place for everything from consumer payments to corporate treasury operations. Increasingly used by payment systems across the world, many other key Payment System Operators are also on the journey to implement ISO 20022 including the ECB’s TARGET2 and the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire. In addition, starting in late 2022 SW IFT’s correspondent banking network will retire the use of the existing MT standard by November 2025 and mandate ISO 20022. ISO 20022 will bring enhanced data deliver significant long-term benefits for not only the UK’s payment systems but participants and their customers. It provides flexibility to adapt to changes in the economy, emerging technologies and innovation. It provides international harmonisation, supporting cross-border payments.

1 UK Finance Payments Market Summary 2021Opens in a new window 2 UK Finance Payments Market Summary 2019Opens in a new window 3 Innovation to serve the public interest – speech by Andrew Bailey City at City UK Annual Conference June 2021 4 Bank of England Discussion Paper: New Forms of Digital Money June 2021 5 Bank of England announce Joint CBDC Taskforce with HMT 2021 6 Bank of England publishes policy for omnibus accounts in RTGS 7 RTGS Renewal Programme Industry Engagement 8 RTGS Renewal Blueprint 2017 9 An Interactive Guide to Global PaymentsOpens in a new window 10 FSB Enhancing Cross-border Payments Stage 3 Report 2020 Opens in a new window 11 FSB Targets for Addressing the Four Challenges of Cross-Border Payments: Consultative document  2021Opens in a new window 12 G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors CommuniqueOpens in a new window  6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches