samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
10  BIS Review 138/2008  To ”promote a safe and efficient payment system” Preventive work and preparedness to take action   Regularly analyse threats and risks to financial stability    Preparedness and crisis exercises    Various tools when shocks occur, such as; Information and dialogue with the market  Supply liquidity on special terms     Contact and cooperation with other authorities, in Sweden and abroad  The Riksbank’s measures to ensure the financial system will function more normally   Loans in SEK and USD against collateral and at an interest rate    Special loan facility in SEK with new commercial paper as collateral    Changed collateral requirements    Liquidity assistance to;    Kaupthing Bank Sverige AB. Carnegie Investment Bank AB  Note: Carnegie is now owned by the Swedish National Debt Office and the Riksbank’s liquidity assistance has been repaid  BIS Review 138/2008  11  M easures taken by the state  Riksbank  SEK 390 billion   Swedish National  Debt Office  SEK 116 billion  Has taken over Carnegie Investment Bank AB  Guarantee programme (max total SEK 1500 billion)    Government  Finansinspektionen  (Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority)  M onetary policy and the international financial crisis  A small, export-dependent economy   Affected by international developments   Counteract the effects of the crisis!

With regard to legislation, I also believe that further supplementary measures will be needed in future. I will return to this later on. During the recent financial turbulence the Riksbank has not only had regular contacts with other authorities and the political system – we have also had closer contacts with market participants than usual. Central banks around the world have also had close cooperation with regard to reducing the strains in the financial markets in various ways. So what have we at the Riksbank done to make the markets function better? Improving the functioning of the markets The Swedish banks have mainly experienced two problems. One has been the lack of access to more long-term funding in Swedish kronor. The other has been the limited possibilities to borrow in US dollars. As I mentioned earlier, it has been much more difficult and costly for the banks to obtain financing other than at very short maturities. The banks’ possibility to finance themselves is of course important to financial stability. It also affects other interest rates in the economy and thereby the impact of monetary policy. We at the Riksbank try to counteract these effects of the financial turmoil. We have therefore offered the banks financing – against collateral and at an interest rate – at longer durations than normal, and than what is currently available in the markets. We have so far granted loans in Swedish kronor at maturities of three months and six months to a total of SEK 203 billion.
Second we can lend liquid assets – including cash – against assets that are, or have become illiquid. That is what we did with the Special Liquidity Scheme and more recently the Funding for Lending Scheme. In 2009 the Bank launched two schemes making outright purchases of assets other than gilts.10 We started to buy sterling commercial paper (up to 3 months maturity) and investment grade corporate bonds. At that time, in the worst conditions of the recession, the markets for these financial instruments had not been functioning normally. An increased demand for liquidity and heightened concerns about counterparty risk, caused many markets to dry up and asset prices to fall. By intervening as “Market Maker of Last Resort” the Bank was able, over about a 12–18 month period, to support the markets for both commercial paper and corporate bonds and drive prices back to more appropriate levels. The commercial paper scheme came to a natural end as prices rose and our holdings – which peaked at about £ in 2009 – matured. The corporate bond scheme is still in operation. Each week we offer to buy from a list of bonds, or sell from our stock. After reaching a peak in 2010 of some £ in holdings, the revitalized market has steadily bought the bonds back from us so that our stock is now only around £ Curiously, we still get people advocating the purchase of corporate bonds in large scale as well as gilts.

The recovery in financial markets that we have seen in the past 6 months or so, is in part driven by the statement that the ECB will do “whatever it takes” to keep the euro area together and the perceived commitment that the Fed will do whatever it takes to restore growth in the US. The belief in these policy approaches has been immensely powerful. But it must be backed not only by perceived intent but also by capability and delivery if needed – and economies always generate some surprises. If the actions don’t follow the words when necessary, then similar policy statements in future will be less effective. In the UK, market expectations are already consistent with monetary policy remaining very supportive for some time to come, indicating no change in Bank Rate until well into 2015. Yet there is still a debate about whether the MPC should give more “forward guidance”. In practice we have being doing this through the Inflation Report. The most recent edition makes it clear that we do not see much pressure arising from domestically generated inflation. Rather, we continue to see inflation being driven by factors such as tax changes, higher commodity and energy prices, and other external influences. These and similar adverse relative price changes have made us all financially worse off and contributed to keeping inflation higher than target over the past few years. In response, the Bank could have chosen to tighten monetary policy to keep measured inflation rates down.
As you are aware, the decline in the copper prices on the world market has negatively affected the operations of the mining sector, leading to downsizing and job losses. Contributions by the mining sector to Government revenue is also expected to decline in the 2009 while foreign exchange in the market has declined. The unprecedented high prices of fertilisers and other agricultural inputs also contributed to the current high food prices. These and several other factors have resulted in the depreciation of the Kwacha against other international currencies as well as high inflation which closed the year at 16.6% from 8.9% in 2007. Hon Minister, the economic outlook may not be rosy now. The challenges may be huge but at the same time not insurmountable. You will agree with me that as a country with vast arable land and water resources as well as a huge market of eight neighbouring countries, we cannot afford to sit and wait for assistance from other countries. We need to work extra hard so that we can feed our children as well as export the surplus to neighbouring countries. We need to look within ourselves and determine how each one of us can help overcome the challenges that we face today. It is therefore my appeal to all of us present here today to show more commitment to the growth and development of our country.

Infact, not so long ago on December 10, 2008, I was invited to officially open the Standard Chartered Solwezi Branch. I have no doubt that with the current expansion strategy; the bank will reach greater heights. However, you will all agree with me that those who have more should do more. I therefore look forward to seeing more from Standard Chartered Bank Zambia, it being such a leading bank in Zambia. 2  BIS Review 4/2009  Hon. Minister, it is my sincere hope that the Falls Park Agency will live up to the expectations of the Livingstone community. Once again, I would like to thank Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Plc, through the acting Managing Director, Mr Bairstow for inviting me to witness the official opening of this agency. I thank you. BIS Review 4/2009  3
We will continue to press ahead with the experimentation in tokenised green bonds, leveraging blockchain technology to enhance the efficiency of bond issuance and transaction, and to explore real-time tracking and reporting of the environmental impact of projects funded by bond proceeds. And to promote financial inclusion, we are now looking into an arrangement to earmark a certain proportion of future green and infrastructure bond issuances for priority investment by MPF funds. This will provide a meaningful investment option for MPF scheme members to receive reasonable returns while investing in a better future for our city. Climate finance is a subject that is very dear to the hearts of many of us here. It's also an exciting subject that I could keep talking about. But I am aware that I have taken more than a fair share of your time. So what remains for me is to wish the ASIFMA event every success, and double down on the HKMA's commitment to working with  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  ASIFMA towards our common purpose of scaling up Hong Kong's green and sustainable finance. Thank you. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

But I also feel there is reason to ask how fundamental, in the sense of how natural and sustainable, the low level of housing construction actually is. After all, it seems rather remarkable that the rising prices in the housing market have not stimulated supply more. If construction had reacted in what might seem a more natural way and followed prices and demand better, the increase in prices would have been less dramatic. Part of the explanation is probably that we had some excess production of housing during the economic boom, that led to the crisis in the early 1990s. But this is not enough to explain why so little has been built in the past fifteen years. There appears to be some form of obstacle or sluggishness that has held back construction. It is important that we analyse what this is and, if possible, try to remedy it. I would like to point out that I do not believe that the solution is to try to stimulate massive housing construction. One problem in many countries was that there was a boom in the housing market, not just with regard to demand for housing, but also supply, where excessive resources were attracted to the housing sector. The large supply – the overcapacity that was built up – probably meant that the fall was much greater once demand declined and housing prices began to fall. But here in Sweden developments have rather been the opposite.
The financial crisis in an international perspective Course of events – from increased spreads to bank failures Developments during the financial crisis can be illustrated in several ways, for example by using the so-called TED-spreads1, that is, the difference between three-month interbank rates and government security rates. 1  The TED spread is the difference between an interbank rate and a government bond rate. As the banks lend to one another without collateral (that is, with a credit risk) in the interbank market, while government  BIS Review 7/2009  1  The first signs of problems emerged already at the beginning of 2007 when the interest rates of certain so-called structured products with links to the US housing market began to increase. They fell during the spring but rose again in mid-June 2007 when the US investment bank Bear Sterns was forced to liquidate one of its hedge funds due to major losses. But it was in August that the indications of an approaching financial crisis became clearer and the TED spreads increased significantly. One reason for this was that the French bank BNP Paribas announced that it had stopped withdrawals from three of its mutual funds. The lack of liquidity in certain market segments with financial instruments linked to the US housing market had made it impossible to value the underlying assets. The banks began to protect their own liquidity and were unwilling to lend to each other. The gap between the "uncertain" interbank rate and the safe government security rate increased.

The proportion of Swedish exports has, for example, increased from just over 20 per cent in 1990 to around 40 per cent in 2007. This means that an international economic downturn and a decline in the demand for Swedish export goods have serious consequences for production and employment in Sweden. The financial links between countries have also become stronger and make the Swedish banks dependent on the outside world. Market funding, that is, funding that is not in the form of deposits, accounts for around 60 per cent of their total balance sheets and is acquired on international markets. Both market funding and the banks’ operations abroad have increased substantially over the past ten years. This means that events abroad have an increasing impact in Sweden. The long-term interest rates for government bonds in different countries usually follow one another quite closely. There is also a close correlation between the stock markets and expectations regarding the future. These links may be one explanation as to why the development of GDP in different countries is currently very consistent. Traditionally, there has been a time lag between developments in economic activity in the United States and Europe, such that an economic downturn in the United States has also been followed by a downturn in Europe, but at a somewhat later date.
20/10/2020  The Federal Reserve’s Corporate Credit Facilities: Why, How, and For Whom - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  SPEECH  The Federal Reserve’s Corporate Credit Facilities: Why, How, and For Whom October 20, 2020 Daleep Singh, Executive Vice President Remarks at The U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness (delivered via videoconference) As prepared for delivery  Thank you, Tom, for the invitation to join this event. As all of you know, in March the Federal Reserve—with backing from the U.S. Treasury—created a set of facilities to purchase corporate credit for the first time in its history. Many observers have credited the facilities with repairing market functioning in the corporate bond market and restoring the ability of many businesses to finance themselves through the pandemic. But my focus today is not the corporate bond market, credit spreads, or Wall Street. Rather, I’d like to connect the dots by explaining why these facilities were necessary to support jobs and the economic recovery on Main Street, and why transparency, access, and accountability were so critical to their implementation. Before I review the initial success of these programs, I want to acknowledge the painful realities that many firms, employees, and households continue to face. For millions of Americans, it’s a long road back to normal. I should also make it clear that these remarks are my personal views and not necessarily those of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System.1 The Shock to U.S.

Research from the New York Fed estimates that, within the first three months following the CCF announcement, credit spreads retraced about 90 percent toward pre-pandemic levels, with two-thirds of the improvement occurring on facility announcement dates (i.e., before purchases even began), and that half of the improvement in bid-ask spreads since the peak in March occurred on the initial announcement date itself.14 This provides strong evidence that the market found credible the design the CCFs, as well as the Federal Reserve’s commitment to following through. Improvements in secondary market conditions pass through to corporate borrowing costs in two ways: directly through borrowing rates that are benchmarked to secondary market yields of similar bonds, and indirectly by increasing the willingness of dealers to underwrite bond issuance. And this is precisely what we’ve observed. Since the CCF announcement, firms have raised about $ trillion in the corporate bond market from investors, or about double last year’s pace. Companies have raised new funds and refinanced maturing debt, helping them to maintain their operations and payrolls and build liquidity buffers against continued uncertainty. Importantly, the dramatic improvements in credit conditions have come despite an extremely small CCF footprint that has decreased over time. On account of healthy primary markets, the PMCCF has yet to be tapped. And since mid-May, when we began SMCCF purchases, the pace of our buying has fallen steadily in response to improvements in market functioning.
Outcome of the exercise for Spanish banks  a)  Of the 15 Spanish banks assessed, 14 have passed the examination, i.e. they exceed the minimum capital required in the three phases of the exercise. One bank, Liberbank, does not reach the minimum 8% ratio set for the comprehensive assessment, standing at 7.8%, i.e. 0.2 pp below the minimum required. b)  This bank has already concluded a capital increase for an amount exceeding € million, meaning that it has already made good the shortfall. c)  The remaining banks comfortably meet the minimum requirements in all the phases of the exercise. 8. Interpretation of the results  The result of the asset quality review – which, unlike the stress tests, is not based on scenarios or future assumptions, but is a detailed review of the balance sheets at end-year 2013 to verify that they give a true and fair view of the position of the banks – shows that it is the Spanish banks that have had to make fewer adjustments, less than 0.2% of risk-weighted assets. The findings of the stress tests are somewhat more difficult to compare, because the scenarios used differ from country to country. But the results obtained show that all the Spanish banks would be resilient in a hypothetical, very severe scenario. In recent years, Spanish banks have substantially written down real estate developmentrelated assets, especially following the requirements of Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012.

Additionally, in the second half of 2012 they were subject under the Assistance Programme for Spain’s financial system agreed with the European Union to an exhaustive accounting review and a stress test, the result of which led to the recapitalisation and restructuring of certain banks. Moreover, during 2013 several measures were taken to ensure that adequate provisioning levels were maintained, which included, most notably, the review of refinanced and restructured loans. –  As a result of the criteria issued by the Banco de España in 2013 for the proper classification of these operations, Spanish banks reclassified under an inferior category operations amounting to € billion, which required approximately € billion of additional provisions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  –  To sum up, between 1 January 2008 and 30 June 2014 the provisioning drive by Spanish banks amounted to € billion, that is to say, provisions amounting to the equivalent of 25% of Spain’s GDP in 2013. Given all these measures, the starting point for Spanish banks was expected to be generally better than that of those in the other European countries as a whole regarding the more demanding criteria for recording assets. And, the outcome of the Comprehensive Assessment which has just been published confirms these expectations. 9. Conclusions  The disclosure of the results today marks the end of a period of just under one year in which all the parties involved – the ECB, the national authorities, the auditors and the banks themselves – have made a sterling effort.
That is in line with the intention in our advice from 2017 and will contribute to reducing the exposure of the state’s wealth to oil price risk. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  The report to the Storting on the Government Pension Fund provides for among other things the possibility of investing in unlisted renewable energy infrastructure within the environmental mandates. As we have indicated previously, Norges Bank will approach investment opportunities and build expertise gradually. Investments in unlisted infrastructure will be a topic for the Executive Board’s work on the new strategy plan to apply from 2020. On 10 April 2015, the Central Bank Law Commission was appointed. Precisely four years later, the Government put forth a proposal on a new central bank act. At that time, the Storting had already endorsed retaining Norges Bank as the operational manager of the GPFG. For Norges Bank, the proposal on a new central bank act entails a number of changes, such as increasing the capacity of Norges Bank’s Executive Board in the area of capital management. Norges Bank has already made considerable strides in adapting the internal organisation to the changes ensuing from the new central bank act. The main exposures that are decisive for the GPFG’s long-term performance are decided by the Ministry of Finance and anchored in the Storting. This year’s report to the Storting on the GPFG includes several measures to further develop the investment strategy. But the objective remains firm: The highest possible return at an acceptable risk.

The GPFG is to be managed within an adequate control and risk management framework and in a responsible and efficient manner with a high degree of transparency. The Bank pursues a variety of investment strategies. The strategies are complementary and aimed at delivering good returns over time. In 2018, the return was 0.3 percentage point lower than the GPFG’s benchmark index. Over the whole period since 1998 when Norges Bank established Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the annual return has been 0.25 percentage point higher than the return on the benchmark index set by the Ministry of Finance. A cost-efficient management operation contributes to the aim of highest possible return. Management costs are low, measured as a share of capital under management and compared with other managers. In 2018, the return was weak both in absolute terms and relative to the benchmark index. In 2017, the return was 13.7 percent, as much as 0.7 percentage point higher than the benchmark index. The Executive Board is prepared for wide variations in return from year to year, and applies the principle that performance must be assessed over time. From that perspective, the return of the GPFG has been good and higher than the return on the benchmark index. In the report to the Storting on energy stocks, the Government intends to remove exploration and production companies from the GPFG’s benchmark index and investment universe.