samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The credit for this goes mainly to the Ministry of Finance. We, as a Central Bank, try to contribute to this process in the best possible way. The formal launch is a matter of decision by the government. I see no reason why this should not happen within the current month. Preconditions The third topic that I will touch on is: What are the conditions for the tasks I talked about to be successfully completed and thus to successfully complete the entire process of joining the euro area? The short answer to these conditions is contained, in my opinion, in one word: "consolidation" with three important dimensions – political, institutional and fiscal. 3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Political consolidation means a functioning parliament and a regular government with clearly defined and consistently implemented priorities, and joining the euro area must definitely be one of these priorities. Institutional consolidation means ambitious reforms to address the still serious institutional deficits in the country and achieve the much-needed institutional convergence. Perhaps biased, but I will give an example with the BNB. In 2014-2015, the Central Bank, and the banking sector as a whole, were the subject of sharp political attacks and heated political discussions. Among other things, one of the main reasons was precisely the institutional deficits in the banking sector. It was about both the state of banking supervision and the lack of an institutional framework for solving problems in the banking sector.

As the BNB is not entitled to direct legislative initiative, we are going to immediately submit this draft to the Ministry of Finance so that they move it on to the National Assembly. Therefore,  2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  when we speak of the legal framework, it is not so much about our readiness with drafted laws, but about whether we will have a working Parliament and political will. If these are present, the legislative programme can be fully completed in the next few months. The fourth group of tasks deals with the technical preparations and the entire logistics of the process of accession to the euro area. With regard to this group of tasks, not a small part of the burden falls on the Bulgarian National Bank and commercial banks. We are working intensely and systematically to fulfil this group of tasks. I will give a few examples to illustrate this. As a Central Bank, we have already received the full documentation on the minting of the Bulgarian euro coins. You probably know that at the end of last year, together with the Minister of Finance, we signed a Memorandum on this issue with the European Commission and with the Eurogroup that represents the euro area Member States. Under this memorandum, we have received the full set of documents from the European Commission and we are preparing for the first tests of minting the Bulgarian euro coins.
To create understanding and support for the goal of price stability, it has been necessary to explain the conceptual framework that guides monetary policy decisions in a simple, pedagogic way. This has perhaps resulted in our creating an exaggerated idea that monetary policy decisions are arrived at with the aid of very simple rules. A simple conceptual framework is a support in a complicated reality. However, factors that cannot be captured in a simple rule for decision-making need to be taken into account. Since the effects of monetary policy extend over a number of years, every decision must rest on assessments of probability and individual valuations of the risks that are associated with alternative developments in the macroeconomy in future. In conclusion, I draw attention to some of these risks in the development of the Swedish economy in the present situation. The three pillars of economic policy A well-balanced economic policy contributes to creating good prerequisites for stable, high growth, which is generally regarded as an important component of the welfare concept. For this, it is required that all components of economic policy play their roles well. This applies to fiscal, structural and monetary policy. Good conditions for growth are created when uncertainty about future income and expenditure is minimised. If at the same time resources are used where they make the greatest contribution to welfare, there are prerequisites for good development.

In the most recently published inflation assessments, it was assumed that the price stability target was not threatened during the forecast period despite the growth of demand being so strong that use of capacity was under strain at the end of the period. The majority view of the Executive Board was therefore that there was no reason to increase the repo rate. This assessment was based on free resources in the initial situation, good productivity growth, low price increases on certain recently deregulated areas, low import prices and finally low inflation expectations. It is not per se strange that GDP can increase as much as 3-4% for a couple of years without inflation sharply accelerating, if the use of resources is low initially. If the pattern from previous cyclical upswings was to be repeated, price pressure should now increase. However, it has proven difficult to identify any exact and very stable correlation. As I mentioned earlier great changes have taken place in the Swedish economy. While there are still considerable deficiencies in competition in many areas, it is nevertheless not probable that inflation will accelerate strongly in the next few years. An important reason for this is that the price stability target has now  BIS Review 48/2000  4  obtained such strong support that inflation expectations are not increasing despite a cyclical upswing that is stronger than for a very long time.
11.12.2019  Opening remarks Conference Climate Change. Challenges for the Financial System/Banco de España Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Good morning, Welcome to the Banco de España for this Conference, where we intend to take a look at the main challenges that climate change poses for the financial sector. The Conference takes place amid two intense weeks of the COP25, which is full of other interesting conferences and events. But I assure you that you won´t regret your decision to be with us today. The World Meteorological Organization certified last week that 2019 will close a decade of exceptional global warming, retreating ice and record sea levels, driven by greenhouse gases from human activities. 2019 is on course to become the second or third warmest year on record. The global average temperature in 2019 was about 1.1 degrees Celsius above the preindustrial period.1 The IPCC estimated that we could reach a temperature increase of 1.5oC between 2030 and 2052;2 but, given the latest evidence, this may actually occur sooner. There is now broad consensus that global warming above 2°C, relative to pre-industrial levels, would have significant economic and social consequences. The effects of climate change are widespread. It impacts directly on the environment, ecosystems and marine life, but it has also important implications in terms of human health, water resources, food production and migration. There is no time for procrastination. We need to accelerate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through the implementation of decisive and forceful climate policies, and we need to begin now.

We have indicated that we plan to shrink the balance sheet to the smallest size consistent with the efficient and effective conduct of monetary policy, and that, in the long run, the asset side of the balance sheet will consist primarily of Treasury securities.9 That’s our strategy, but its execution will depend on the operating framework of monetary policy, among other factors. Here, the Fed basically has two choices. We could return to a system similar in spirit to that used before the financial crisis, in which the supply of reserves in the banking system was kept relatively scarce, and the interest rate was set by adjusting reserves on a frequent basis through open market operations. Alternatively, we could continue with the system that we’ve been using since the crisis, in which bank reserves are abundant and the federal funds rate target is achieved through adjustments to administered rates. As I said, this approach is working very well at controlling interest rates and has proven to be easy to communicate and adaptable.10 The Fed will be looking closely at these options in the coming months and will subsequently make a decision on the future operating framework. And, as is our standard practice, we will be sure to communicate our thinking and decisions on this issue as soon and as thoroughly as practicable. Conclusion Monetary policy-making has perhaps never been more challenging than it was following the financial crisis.
To incorporate fiscal stability through the highest act in the country, the constitution. V. As usual, the establishment of a new action framework is one thing, while whether this framework will become operational, functional, and to what extent, is another thing. It is obvious that the bunch of new ideas, new tools we talk about forced by the crisis, are focused on establishing a concept for managing systemic risk. Therefore, the questions whether it will function, on what the result depends most, are logical. 1) First, the systemic risk is not too hard to define. It is harder to provide operative contents, because of its different dimensions: procyclicality; contagion risk; the spillover effects of a single institution’s distress to the rest of the financial system; correlation risk; concentration risk; then, due to the fact that the risk can originate from several sources, etc. 2) Even when the source is identified, the history shows that there is no action at all, or the action is delayed, or the seriousness of the threat is underestimated. For example, the false reports of the Greek government for the real fiscal deficits were not unknown. And not only for theirs. It is not untrue that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have proposed to the Congress a gradual reduction or possible extinction of the GSEs portfolio (Fannie Mac и Freddy Mac), quite before 2004 when their assets were several times smaller than US Dollar 3.2 trillion at the end of 2007.

(Carosio) Although it is possible, he says, to reach an agreement on some of these proposals, in particular on resolution mechanisms, others (e.g. breaking up institutions according to some criterion) would require a broad international political consensus, which seems unlikely at this stage. The second approach would be directed toward seeking additional capital requirement, or a tax, according to the measure for systemic relevance. Taxation seems, according to Carosio, more adequate in a burden-sharing perspective. “The solution, in my judgment”, says Greenspan “that has at least a reasonable chance of reversing the extraordinarily large ‘moral hazard’ that has arisen over the past year is to require banks and possibly all financial intermediaries to hold contingent capital bonds, that is, debt which is automatically converted to equity when equity capital falls below a certain threshold”. “However, should contingent capital bonds prove insufficient, we should allow large institutions to fail, and if assessed by regulators as too interconnected to liquidate quickly, be taken into a special bankruptcy facility”. So, he supports the second approach, and in that light is the latest legislation in the USA which is about to be adopted, as well as the proposals in Europe which envisage measures of this kind. Namely, “Restoring American Financial Stability Act”, which was passed in the US Senate on May 20, would impose significant new obligations and restrictions for the SIFIs, envisaging a possibility for the FED to introduce rising strict rules for capital, leverage and liquidity.
Some figures indicate that most of the adjustments have now been made, but the picture is not unambiguous. Nevertheless, a recovery is under way, after what must be regarded in many areas, and particularly in Sweden, as a fairly mild  2  BIS Review 15/2003  slowdown. Our forecasts indicate an average GDP growth over the coming years in line with the economy's long-term sustainable rate and resource utilisation is expected to remain largely unchanged over this period. This means that economic activity and the labour market are not expected to put any great pressure on prices and wages at present or in the coming years. There is, of course, a risk that developments will follow completely different paths than those we anticipate in our main scenario. This could in turn entail both upside and downside risks for inflation. The downside risk that concerns us most is connected to international developments. There are problems in the euro area in particular that could lead to a weaker development. The upside risks are mainly linked to domestic price-setting and wage formation. The rise in energy prices pushes up costs in other parts of the economy and can spread. It could also affect expectations and wage demands. We are facing collective wage bargaining rounds in the autumn, which will play a decisive role for the future of the economy.

Today, expectations are of a largely unchanged level of resource utilisation. Thus, price pressure is not as high, either, as long as no secondary effects arise from the energy price rises. Forecasts guide policy Let me conclude by underlining two important aspects when assessing monetary policy. Firstly, the Riksbank, like many other countries with inflation targeting, has chosen to look ahead when making monetary policy decisions. This is clearly seen when the actual policy is compared in the evaluation appendix with simple, rule-based decisions on the basis of observed GDP growth or actual inflation. The import of this is, of course, that forecasts of inflation and GDP growth become more decisive for monetary policy than the actually observed growth rates in price levels and GDP. A disadvantage of this policy is that forecasting mistakes have effects on policy. But one advantage, which we consider  4  BIS Review 15/2003  to outweigh this, is that monetary policy becomes less disjointed, more predictable and on the whole more stabilising for economic developments. Of course, the Riksbank could have raised its rate more when inflation rose because of higher food and energy prices during 2001. But would this have rapidly subdued inflation and led to a more beneficial development in the economy? I don't think so. Secondly, it is difficult both to make and to assess forecasts, as our picture of history and the current situation constantly changes as a result of revisions to the statistics.
12/02/2021  "Pushing Ahead with SOR-SORA Transition in 2021" - Keynote Speech by Mr Leong Sing Chiong, Deputy Managing Director (Markets …  Speeches  Published Date: 02 February 2021  "Pushing Ahead with SOR-SORA Transition in 2021" - Keynote Speech by Mr Leong Sing Chiong, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development), Monetary Authority of Singapore, at ASIFMA Virtual Event: Singapore IBOR Transition on 2 February 2021 1 Good morning everyone. First, let me take this opportunity to wish everyone a Happy New Year! Let me also thank the Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association (ASIFMA) and the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) for organising this webinar and inviting me to speak on the important issue of Singapore’s interest rate benchmark transition. 2 In the next 20 mins or so, I will do a brief recap of the key objectives and milestones that we had set out last year. I will then touch on some recent developments in the US and UK that have a bearing on our transition timelines, and I will finally outline what our priorities are for this year in the transition to Singapore Overnight Rate Average (SORA). Recap 3 Back in 2019, the financial industry in Singapore, represented by the ABS and the Singapore Foreign Exchange Market Committee (SFEMC) [1] , assessed that given the eventual discontinuation of USD London Interbank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) and SGD Swap Oﬀer Rate (SOR), the most sustainable and sensible path was to transition aﬀected SOR markets to SORA.

Therefore, the free funds were invested in non-resident assets against a background of lower return on investment in the global market. The deteriorated loan quality, the obligation to increase the reserve funds and the lower average rate of return were followed by the decline in the banking sector net profit. BIS Review 174/2010  1  For some banks, this situation needs careful monitoring by the governing structures and shareholders in order to identify those operations that would improve the expenditure and income structure and maintain its capitalization levels. With regard to lending, the Bank of Albania has continuously called for greater banking sector commitment in this regard. This has not been a rhetorical-like request considering that we have taken all the necessary actions to meet the banking sector needs with ample liquidity and we have cut the key interest rate several times. These measures, coupled with lower Government borrowing, have provided room for lower interest rates on ALL lending. Nonetheless, their decrease still seems insufficient to push credit demand higher. Loan quality remains a challenge both for ALL and foreign currency-denominated loans. Against this setting, it is essential that banks do not only create in a prompt and rigorous fashion reserve funds according to the regulatory requirements, but they should also complete and improve the procedures and human and financial capacities that enable following-up insolvent borrowers. Complete acknowledgement of loan quality-related concerns and the full commitment of governing structures and shareholders allow for its more rapid and ultimate handling.
To put it in terms of mental time travel, in the pure rational expectations world memory of past experience, with all its attendant imperfections, does not play a role in the formation of expectations whereas in an extrapolative world it does pretty much all the work. Some research and casual observation suggest that a mechanical assumption of extrapolative expectations does not fit reality.15 True, there are many instances of ‘momentum’ in markets that rational expectations cannot explain.16 But there is also plenty of evidence that markets and investors do also factor news into prices. The much criticised theory of rational expectations was a reaction to ‘[t]he implicit presumption in these … models … that people could be fooled over and over again,’ as Robert Lucas said in 1995 in light of winning the Nobel Prize for this work.17 Lucas was commenting in the context of inflation surprises – but the same holds true for other areas like debt default.18  13  See, for example, Shiller (2007) I am using extrapolative expectations here in a broad way to mean expectations that are based on the past experience continuing. There is a broader question of whether expectations reflect learning and adapt – that is, learn from the past without assuming that the future will follow the past. 15 Kahneman and Tversky (1973) famously shows how humans are neither rational nor mechanical in making predictions, rather applying (oft-mistaken) judgment.

We strive to keep up with new forms of communication, making us active on social networks by posting the the latest data in real time, addressing key changes and visualizing trends, making information available to more target groups. One of the aspects of enhancing our communication in this segment are certainly these regular meetings with you, as a platform where certain more complex statistical concepts can be openly discussed thus giving them analytical feature. During this year, there has been a trend where most of the media publish our latest statistical immediately after our release, which contributes to keeping the public informed on time. At the same time, the number of your articles related to central bank statistics more than doubled this year compared to last year, and even more compared to 2017, further increasing the their availability to all users. Since we have been publishing regular statistical releases, the number of visits to our website has increased, indicating that users are actively using these releases as a source of information. I have to mention that we are constantly and actively presenting the statistical data to the public in an indirect way, as well. They are the basis of our analytical infrastructure and decision-making. Therefore, in our monthly press releases, in which we inform on the monetary decisions, we refer to several statistical dimensions that we produce – for example monetary statistics, external statistics and banking system data. In our regular publications, analytically and in a consistent context, we talk about about economics through statistical data.
However, these policy actions must remain focused on the specific groups hardest hit by the crisis and must be of limited duration. Against this backdrop, according to the ECB September projection exercise, the euro area economy is expected to grow by 3.1% in 2022, before slowing down markedly in 2023 to 0.9% - from the 2.1% forecast in June. Although a recession in the euro area is not currently envisaged as the baseline scenario, it is becoming increasingly likely. Indeed, uncertainty is high and both inflation and GDP developments will depend heavily on in the severity of any energy supply disruptions and the winter conditions, which could lead to higher energy prices and more severe production cuts. With this in mind, the ECB has also prepared a downside scenario relating to the war in Ukraine and energy supply cuts. Under this adverse scenario, GDP would contract by 0.9% in 2023. This downside scenario entails a complete cut-off of Russian gas and oil flows to Europe. In addition, it assumes fewer possibilities for energy supply substitution and unusually cold winter weather triggering higher energy demand. As a result, commodity prices and uncertainty would be higher, trade would be weaker and financing conditions would deteriorate further. In this very challenging situation, I would like to highlight one positive aspect of the euro area economy: the labour market remains robust. According to the latest statistics  3  published,5 the euro area seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate was 6.6% in August 2022, well below the 7.5% recorded in August 2021.

As a result, by the first quarter of 2022, inflation in the EU was already at its highest level since the creation of the monetary union. Lastly, in this unstable scenario in which supply and demand had yet to adjust, the outbreak of war in Ukraine fuelled further instability in the inflation outlook and hindered the economic recovery that was starting to take hold in early 2022. Europe is particularly exposed to the economic repercussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. First, the continent has close commercial ties with Ukraine, a supplier of primary goods such as grain, sunflower oil or corn. These products are widely used in the European agriculture, farming and food industries. Second, and most importantly, Russia continues to play a major role as an exporter of energy products to Europe (mainly oil and gas), and remains of key importance for some European countries. Russia is the euro area’s main supplier of natural gas and oil: in 2019, 36% of all of the natural gas consumed in the euro area came from Russia, as did 22% of all of the oil consumed. As a result of the war, the European Union has taken measures to sanction certain activities that could be used to finance Russia and, by extension, the invasion. In turn, Russia has restricted supplies of gas to Europe, and these are hard to replace in the short term. All these elements make up a cocktail that is hard to digest.