samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, it is also worth mentioning that fiscal measures, which help moderate the inflation path this year, will have countervailing effects when they are withdrawn, which could make the inflationary episode more persistent. Indeed, this is the main reason why our December projections revised inflation upwards in 2024 to 3.4%. Howev er, some of the measures approved by governments to shield consumers from excessive energy price increases take the form of price caps and, therefore, their effects depend on the magnitude of the energy increases. In a context of lower energy prices, the ceiling on prices may not become operative; the downward impact of these measures in 2023 would therefore be lower and, subsequently, the upward impact of their reversal in 2024 would be lower as well. The pass-through of euro exchange rate movements to inflation Fluctuations in the euro exchange rate have been significant in the last year. In particular, the euro-dollar exchange rate depreciated significantly in the first part of last year as a result,  6  Industrial pro ducer prices excluding energy and co nstructio n co ntinued to decelerate in December in the euro area to reach a gro wth rate o f 12.3% (3.7 pp less than at the peak last May).

In the years 2005 and 2006 three key laws were enacted, namely, The Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing Act, The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, and the Financial Transactions Reporting Act. The FTR Act created the institutional body of the FIU within the Central Bank, with regulatory powers and a mandate, inter alia, to formulate policies and guidelines to meet the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 + 9 recommendations. The enactment of the necessary AML/CFT legislation in Sri Lanka, early last year and the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Unit soon after, demonstrates Sri Lanka’s strong commitment to the global efforts to fight financial crime and terrorism. Naturally, therefore, in this effort, the areas of vulnerability have been identified and adequate measures taken to deal effectively with the weaknesses. The stakeholders also need to be adequately equipped to discharge their responsibilities effectively. We therefore, see today’s effort at building capacity and processes, as one of the most important pre-requisites for the implementation of an effective AML/CFT regime, and we commend the World Bank and all others who are involved in this endeavour. My dear friends, Sri Lanka has been ever mindful of its obligations in this regard and has been a pioneer in this field. Long before the advent of the AML and CFT legislation, certain safeguards to insulate our financial system from money launderers and terrorists were in fact put in place by us. This was done through legislation such as the Exchange Control Act, the Banking Act and the Customs Ordinance.
MAS has gotten very good feedback on the growing electronic FX trading system in Singapore. Singapore has attracted key liquidity providers and platforms to base their pricing and matching engines here. We already have about seven banks and non-banks who have moved these activities to Singapore. Now, we have got another two global banks joining us.2 So even during this period, we are seeing positive, encouraging developments on the FX front. Upskilling Industry Workforce Talent development and upskilling the industry workforce is another key area that MAS has been focusing on during this period, so that finance professionals are able to function effectively and have a competitive advantage in the future. During this period of slower growth, MAS has been working with financial institutions to retain their talent, use the opportunity to upskill their human capital, and explore ways to build longerterm capabilities in digital functionalities, so that the industry can emerge stronger from the crisis. Last month, in April, MAS announced a $ million package, basically to support smaller financial institutions and FinTech firms, through the downturn. As part of this package, we launched a training allowance grant, which allows financial institutions, especially the smaller ones and FinTechs, to make use of the downtime to train and deepen the capabilities of their employees. We also set up a new digital acceleration grant. The larger financial institutions are able to invest heavily in digital platforms and digital capabilities. The smaller ones do not have the capacity to do that.

Once people have gotten used to live digitally – remote working, e-commerce, telemedicine – the economy and society are going to change in a variety of ways. The financial sector is well-plugged into digitalisation. Those financial institutions that adopt deeper end-to-end digitalisation, who are able to use digital platforms for their business operations that today are conducted in person or on paper, are going to have a strong competitive advantage. New opportunities in particular areas of financial services are harder to tell. Impact investing may become a stronger growth opportunity. We have already seen some financial institutions launching impact funds to seek higher returns by investing in companies which are focused on combating the pandemic or providing solutions to deal with the associated health risks. Healthcare and supply chain resilience have taken on added importance, and there seems to be interest among asset managers to invest in these areas. Pandemic risk insurance is another area that might see good growth. There is now a much heightened awareness of pandemic risks. Although pandemic risk insurance has been around for some time, it never really took off. I think you are going to find demand for risk management and insurance solutions to address some of these pandemic-related areas of risk. The financial sector is fundamentally in the business of risk management. Covid-19 represents the materialisation of an extreme kind of risk.
At the same time, academics have shown how the short-term output costs of price stability can be kept down if central  BIS Review 59/2007  1  banks adopt credible and transparent targets. I will mention here the New-Keynesian theory of price determination, which convincingly relates current inflation to future expected inflation, providing a yardstick for monetary policy actions and communication. In the ECB Governing Council, we are proud that we have been able to continue anchoring inflation expectations at levels consistent with our definition of price stability. But there is no room for complacency. The recent inflation success story and the central bank changes behind it need continuing social support. The public must have a clear-cut idea of what inflation means for their future income and job prospects. But while people appreciate the benefits of low inflation, differing national situations and economic conditions can alter preferences over time and from country to country. Let’s go back to monetary unification in Europe in the 90’s. We could argue that European citizens were not exactly clamouring at that time for a fully independent central bank tasked with maintaining price stability for the euro zone as a whole. What is more, some critics viewed the fact that would-be EMU members had to meet nominal convergence criteria as a costly economic sacrifice that was justifiable only on political grounds, if at all. Yet in some countries, and certainly in Spain, countering inflation with tight monetary and fiscal policies led to a virtuous circle, once convergence became credible.

• For instance, the debut of project bond issuance by PT Paiton, Indonesia’s second-largest independent power producer, reflects growing demand for Asian infrastructure debt. Singapore is well positioned as a gateway to investment opportunities in Asia. •  We offer a world class financial centre, with a sound regulatory framework and business-friendly environment. •  With its pan-Asian reach, Singapore is an ideal location for investors to set up base and tap on opportunities in the region. Let me highlight two things Singapore provides to connect global investors to Asia:  •  first, a compelling asset management ecosystem; and  http://www.imas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Speeches-and-Monetary-Policy-Statem... 21-07-18  Connecting Global Markets Supporting Asias Growth  •  Page 4 of 7  second, a treasury centre with a comprehensive suite of risk management solutions. Singapore is a leading asset management hub for institutional investors and fund managers to access pan-Asian opportunities. •  Assets under management in Singapore have grown by an average 15% each year over the last five years, reaching $ trillion in 2016. • About 80% of funds are sourced from outside Singapore. • Two-thirds are invested in Asia. •  Interestingly, we have seen faster growth in alternative AUM (17%) compared to traditional AUM (3%). •  This points to the growing pool of investors setting up in Singapore to access private market opportunities in Asia. We are taking three major initiatives to further strengthen the asset management ecosystem further.
The meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the euro area, held at the Elysée Palace on 12 October, with the participation of the President of the ECB, provides Europe with a structured and coherent framework: •  possibility of recapitalising banks;  •  guaranteeing new medium-term bank debt (1-5 years), via, in France, a EUR 320 billion funding vehicle;  •  revisiting the accounting rules, with the recent reforms of the IASB – international accounting standard-setters – and introducing greater flexibility in mark-to-market accounting rules, allowing assets for which there is no longer a market to be valued at amortised historical cost. Moreover, the European Investment Bank will be mobilised to support European SMEs. Lastly, long-term discussions will commence on the best way to regulate finance and how it may better serve economic development. 2  BIS Review 129/2008  3. The position of French banks and credit  Our banks are not immune to the crisis. They have direct exposures, in particular through US monoline insurers. They have had to make sometimes substantial write-downs. They are also impacted indirectly by the seizing up of certain markets and the rise in their refinancing costs. That said, our banks are sound and profitable. It is worth recalling four facts that, in the current period of turmoil, are often overlooked: •  The solvency ratios of French banks are high, and much higher than the minima imposed by the prudential regulation.

They have clearly demonstrated their will to take action when necessary. But governments are also intervening to bolster banks’ solvency and soundness. In this context and in order to ensure that national measures for dealing with the crisis are consistent, the international community is taking a collective stand. The G7 plan of action is a major step forward. It sets out clear principles to be applied by the whole international community – in particular the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee – with a view to giving structure to national actions. It expounds the following principles: •  taking decisive action to prevent the failure of financial institutions;  •  taking all necessary steps to unfreeze credit and money markets;  •  ensuring that banks and other major financial intermediaries can raise capital as needed;  •  ensuring that national deposit insurance and guarantee programmes are robust;  •  ensuring accurate valuation and transparent disclosure of assets, as well as consistent implementation of high quality accounting standards. Thanks, in particular, to France’s leading role in discussions, Europe is organising itself.
It is often said, even by supposedly responsible people, that the tools used by central banks all over the world to combat inflation will not work here in Iceland, not least because of the way globalisation treats small currencies like the króna, and because of how many investors, through the shelter afforded by globalisation, have the means to avoid the Central Bank’s thumbscrews. The cannons on Iceland’s coast guard cruisers were no weapons of mass destruction, and the difference in size between Thór and Aegir, on the one hand, and the British navy, on the other, was horrific, but we managed nonetheless. Of course, a reference to the Cod Wars is merely a metaphorical one, and I use it more or less in jest, as it doesn’t fully apply to the current situation. But the comparison between the Central Bank of Iceland’s tools and those of other central banks, which enjoy the relative security of a large currency, is worth examining. In the past few months, though, large currencies have not been protected from tremors, shocks, and even wide fluctuation. For example, the euro has appreciated by more than 70% from its weakest point against the US dollar, an enormous change in a relatively short period of time. The Icelandic króna has not been nearly so volatile despite all of the shocks it has had to tolerate. A volatile króna in a turbulent season tends to indicate that the króna is effective as a currency, and not the reverse.

But by now most have realised how unlikely these problems are to disappear so quickly. There is every reason to believe that the coming months could prove difficult as a result, and there is correspondingly little reason to believe that the crisis is past. Uncertainty abounds. A huge investment bank like Merrill Lynch could not foresee that, in only two weeks’ time, it would have to write down billions of dollars’ worth of outstanding debt. The CEO of the company has had to pack his bags and leave, albeit with a generous going-away present. The largest bank in the world is also beset by the restlessness, and it isn’t yet fully clear what the effects will be, but that CEO has received his marching orders as well. And according to the latest reports, while there are reported write-downs of a mere 20 billion dollars on subprime mortgages, the actual amount could in the end be between 250 and 300 billion. BIS Review 131/2007  3  One cannot help but wonder whether market participants in Iceland and elsewhere preferred to suffer through a shaky third quarter in the hope of some redemption in the fourth quarter, and in the process, avoided recording some items that should have appeared in third-quarter accounts.
Exogenous changes  0.5  in firms’ pricing power are one example – so-called cost-push shocks. Shocks to the exchange rate, the  0 Source: Bank calculations. economy’s supply capacity, or commodity prices also  10  See Blanchard, O., and J. Galí (2007). "Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model". Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 39(1), pp. 35-65. 11 See Broadbent, B (2013), “Conditional guidance as a response to supply uncertainty”, speech at the London Business School. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  6  Chart 2: … whereas after the financial crisis, the economy experienced a challenging monetary policy trade-off  have this flavour. 12  Because monetary policy’s  influence on inflation is predominantly an indirect one, via demand, in such circumstances inflation can only  Financial crisis and after  6  Inflation (%)  be controlled by delivering an opposing movement in aggregate spending. If something pushes up on  5  inflation directly, monetary policy can only bring inflation back down by causing a reduction in  4  spending via higher interest rates. The speed with 3  which this adjustment is delivered is determined by the monetary policy maker guided by their remit.

Bluntly, the challenge is how to sustain the provision of financial services during a crisis without the state bailing out uninsured creditors. BIS Review 33/2010  1  Handling LCFI complex derivative/trading portfolios Some types of business activity, particularly complex trading, do not lend themselves at all well to the standard resolution tools I summarised just now. Not least, unwinding a derivatives book is especially complicated; it typically requires dynamic hedging to preserve value, and that would be very hard indeed in a liquidation. Counterparties flee. Funding flees. The Lehman and AIG experiences demonstrate this. So, in a different context, does the time it took Berkshire Hathaway to wind down the complex derivatives portfolio of its Gen Re subsidiary; years, not months. What can be done? One route, suggested by those examples, would be for the authorities to finance the wind down of complex trading positions, in what would be in effect an analogue to US-style debtor-in-possession financing. The authorities would be preferred creditors. That kind of approach could be used either briefly, in order to bridge to an insolvency procedure, which would amount to putting a framework around the kind of operation the NYFed mounted for a week or so to contain disruption from the failure of Lehman’s US broker-dealer. Or, alternatively, it could in principle be used over a prolonged period, to finance the run off of a whole book.
At each monetary policy meeting it is therefore a matter of choosing the repo-rate path that according to the corresponding forecasts for inflation and unemployment best stabilises these around the inflation target and a long-run sustainable rate respectively. In recent years I have therefore entered reservations against the majority decision, preferring a lower repo-rate path as I consider this would lead to better target fulfilment for inflation and unemployment. Several objections to my view of monetary policy have been expressed in the monetary policy discussion. As far as I understand it, these objections are that monetary policy should have more objectives than stabilising inflation and unemployment or other real-economy objectives than stabilising unemployment. The objectives of price stability and the highest sustainable employment – from which stabilisation of inflation and unemployment follows – can thus be set aside for a period if one wants to slow down growth in mortgage lending or to hold interest rates at a higher level, as low interest rates are assumed to build up imbalances. But several objectives, and unclear ones, would risk making monetary policy arbitrary and disjointed. This is contrary to the government bill, according to which the delegation of monetary policy to an independent Riksbank requires a clear objective for monetary policy. This is to ensure there is no scope for arbitrary monetary policy and so that the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) can evaluate monetary policy on the basis of the established objectives.

Dimitar Bogov: World Savings Day - the importance of savings in Macedonia Speech by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, in front of the Banking Association of the Economic Chamber of Macedonia, marking 31 October the World Savings Day, Skopje, 31 October 2017. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, dear bankers and guests, It is a great pleasure to address you on the occasion of marking the World Savings Day. This is the day when we emphasize the important role of savings, not only in terms of its role as a source of funding for the banks, but also its immediate importance for the economy as a whole and for maintaining financial stability. All of us, you as bankers and we in the National Bank, as regulators, have many times been convinced in the truth of the saying that maintaining bank stability reflects the depositors’ confidence. This year, the banks enjoyed the trust of the population, regardless of the unfavorable influence of the domestic political developments on the ordinary citizen and the depositor. This is also confirmed by the latest available data on the movement of household deposits. As of September, household deposits show a very solid growth rate of 5.8%, which is an important indicator for stabilizing depositors’ expectations and perceptions amid unstable environment and restraint of economic agents from investment in the first half of this year.
Regarding deviations from the inflation target, it is important to bear in mind that a successful and credible monetary policy gives more weight to long-term than to short-term considerations, and that it is neither possible nor optimal to fine-tune the inflation rate with excessively volatile interest rates. We still consider the likely outlook that interest rates will remain unchanged for the time being, then rise as the peak of aluminium-related investments approaches. However, the point at which it may be necessary to raise interest rates could be further away than was previously foreseen, since inflation has been very low recently and will continue to be. As always, the outcome will depend on future developments. In light of the present low rate of inflation it cannot be ruled out that negative shocks to domestic demand and to imported inflation might call for a temporary reduction in interest rates from their present level. This could occur, for example, if proposed investments in connection with the Norðurál smelter expansion do not go ahead, if domestic demand driven from other sources than aluminium industry investments turns out much lower than is currently expected, or if deflationary pressures continue to build up in the global economy. Nonetheless, the weakening of the króna in recent weeks reduces the likelihood that interest rates will be lowered. Monetary policy will be reassessed when the occasion demands, and in particular when the fiscal and housing finance policies are made public.

Market interventions in 2000 and 2001 depleted the Central Bank’s foreign reserves, creating a pressing need to strengthen it. The  2  BIS Review 45/2003  Central Bank has been engaged on this task and will continue to do so. It had purchased foreign currency for the equivalent of 30.7 b.kr. since September 2002, which has undoubtedly exerted some impact on the króna in the short run, although the long-term effect is negligible, if any at all. The exchange rate for the króna plummeted in 2000 and 2001, and for quite some time was substantially below a level reconcilable with long-term equilibrium. This occurred at a time when the price of key exports was very high, making the years 2000 and 2001 especially favourable for the export sector and in fact also for import-competing sectors. Enterprises in these sectors understandably felt the effects of the rise in the exchange rate in the first half of this year. It is not to be expected, however, that the same conditions will re-arise in these sectors as prevailed, for example, during 2001 and in the early part of 2002. The exchange rate remained very stable from spring to early winter 2002, when the króna entered a strengthening phase which continued until the beginning of February. The Central Bank has stated its view that the appreciation over this period was primarily the effect of planned aluminium-related investments in East Iceland.