samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Basle Capital Accord of 1988 was a landmark document for the banking industry. It helped increase the capital held by internationally active banks, and created a more level playing field for banks under different jurisdictions. However, there were some weaknesses in the Accord. The most important of these was the practice of assigning the same risk weight to all counterparties in each class, irrespective of the differences in their credit-worthiness. These issues led regulators to propose a more risk sensitive framework. The proposed new Capital Accord will have a great influence on the risk management practices of banks. The new Accord, however, poses challenges to Asian banks and regulators alike. Banks will have to develop more sophisticated risk management capability while regulators will need to build up technical knowledge as well as supervisory resources to validate banks’ risk management systems. As financial markets progress towards greater transparency, the market disciplinary mechanism will reward banks that manage their risks effectively, and penalise those that do not. Good risk management practice is thus even more essential for banks to maintain their competitiveness over the long run. The frequency of shocks has increased. In the past 10 years there has been an average of one shock every year starting from the Gulf War in 1991 to the Latin American crisis of the early nineties and so on down to the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997, the Russian Bond Default Crisis in ’98 and most recently last month, Argentina’s default. The causes of these stress events are wide-ranging.

If all stakeholders do their part well, not only will we have fair and efficient capital markets that everyone has confidence in, but we will also make Singapore a competitive and vibrant financial hub in Asia. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9
Property-related debt – for residential and commercial real estate purposes – makes up around 60% of private nonfinancial sector debt in the UK. And, of course, the counterpart of that is that domestic property-related loans make up around 55% of the domestic loans of the UK banking sector; 76% when financial sector loans are excluded. 1 Moreover, the evidence is pretty clear from history, and across  1  Non-bank lenders are also an important source of finance, providing 15% of all property-related loans according to Bank staff estimates. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  countries, that there is a strong and special link between booms in property-related debt and financial crises in a way that is much less true for other assets like equities. 2 I want also to reflect a little today on the health of banks in the UK. Since last summer, and particularly since the turn of the year, investors have written down the value of banks in advanced economies. Does this signal concerns about banks’ resilience and robustness? Or about their returns? The Financial Policy Committee The FPC is charged with identifying risks and taking action to protect the resilience of the UK financial system. In essence this means two things. First, we need to be confident that the regulatory framework in the UK addresses the risks not just of individual financial firms, important though that is, but also the risks inherent in the financial system as a whole.

Whether we are talking about your cash or your securities, if you can call them on demand and they are being used to finance your broker’s business, that used to be called ..... banking. I suggest the following in this area:   Only banks should be able to use client moneys and unencumbered assets to finance their own business to a material extent; and that should be a clear principal relationship. Legal form should come into line with economic substance.   For non-banks, any client moneys and unencumbered assets should be segregated and should not be used to finance the business to a material extent. It should, however, remain permissible for non-banks to lend to such clients on a collateralised basis to finance their holdings of securities (“margin lending”). This is an area where regimes vary enormously around the world or are non-existent. For example, the US domestic regime is stricter on this than Europe. We need a global discussion. Securities lending, repo and collateralised-financing markets So far I have discussed funds or vehicles or firms that are in economic substance shadow banks. We also need to think about the markets that firms and vehicles can use to develop a de facto banking business. Perhaps the key such markets are securities lending and repo – or, more generally, collateralised borrowing. Before proceeding I must stress that these markets are vital to efficient capital markets. The crucial economic function of market-making entails intermediaries going short, and so needing to cover their position by borrowing securities.
Whatever happens in relation to monetary union it is vital, it seems to me, that we hold on to this fundamentally important consensus. Moving on from there to the narrower question of monetary union, the potential economic benefits and risks have now become much clearer, and are rather well illustrated by our own present monetary policy dilemma. On the one hand, any manufacturer will tell you after his experience since last summer - about the great advantage of intra-European exchange rate certainty. On the other hand, with the single currency comes the single monetary policy the single, one-size-fits-all interest rate throughout the euro-area. The risk very simply is that the single interest rate may not in the event suit the domestic monetary policy needs of all the euromember countries - just as the present level of German interest rates of around 3%, reflecting the disappointing weakness of the German economy, would not at this point suit the UK - where, as I have said, we need to moderate the pace of our economic expansion. The potential economic risks, as well as the potential benefits, were recognised when the Maastricht Treaty was signed - and the famous “convergence criteria” were put into the Treaty precisely in order to limit the risks.

Our working assumption is that banks and others active in the wholesale financial markets will in fact choose to transact most of their wholesale business in the euro-denomination more or less from the start. And we assume that they will wish to offer euro-denominated facilities to major business customers that wished to use them. So, for example, non-financial companies, including large retailing companies, with an active business in other euro-area countries may wish to be able to quote prices or undertake transactions in euros from an early stage, although they would certainly still need to transact most of their local business in national currencies for some considerable period. On the other hand, we would not expect there to be much demand for banking facilities denominated in euros either for individuals or for the vast majority of smaller local businesses much before euro banknotes and coins become available in late 2001 or early 2002. At that point, the conversion of retail facilities into euros might proceed quite rapidly during the subsequent six-month period when national currency notes and coin are to be withdrawn - but again the principle of no compulsion and no prohibition would apply. Retail conversion is of course a massive undertaking. But the timetable does at least provide some 4-5 years from now for people to prepare.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The global Islamic financial services industry Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launch of Kuwait Finance House Research, Dubai, 14 May 2007. *  *  *  Let me first of all congratulate Kuwait Finance House on the establishment of the Kuwait Finance House Research. It is my great pleasure and honour to officiate its launch. The establishment of this research entity is timely to meet the more intense demands of operating in a dynamic and highly competitive environment where new challenges and opportunities are continuously emerging in this era of globalisation and change. In the recent five years, there has been a rapid evolution and expansion of the global Islamic financial services industry. Islamic finance has now been accepted as a viable and competitive mode of financial intermediation, not only in Muslim countries but also beyond the Muslim world, which offers a wide range of financial products and services to meet the highly differentiated demands of the new economy. The continued progression in the economic and financial landscape has presented many opportunities for new products, services and innovations. With the accelerating pace of financial integration, financial institutions are presented with prospects to expand beyond domestic borders to capture opportunities from regional and global markets. Nevertheless, these opportunities cannot be fully realised without sound research and development efforts. Successful financial services players must leverage on expertise and knowledge to deliver superior products and services.

The first concerns the continuity of the research and discussion processes in the respective areas of central bank cooperation. Continuity helps keep track of the emphases and priorities of regional members and promotes effectiveness of the ongoing collaboration efforts. The second aspect concerns the need to follow through cooperative initiatives that have been agreed upon by central banks in the region. The follow-through can be done effectively through intensified, and perhaps more conveniently organised, dialogue and information sharing. The third aspect concerns the approach towards central bank cooperation. There are many areas of common areas of interest among regional central banks, including monetary and financial stability, payment systems and reserve management, to name just a few. In short, there is a need to organise central bank cooperation in a more focused, coordinated and dedicated manner in order to pursue our common interests. 2  BIS Review 61/2006  Today, with the World Bank experts and policy-makers, regulators and private-sector participants of the region gathering here, the conference will offer us a good opportunity to exchange views on what is needed to further promote regional cooperation and financial integration in Asia. We will also cover more specific subjects including the broadening and deepening of securities markets, the development of securitization and derivative markets, and the role of the contractual savings and asset management industries in the development of capital markets.
1  2 percentage points (pp) on June 2019. This was higher than our estimated cost of capital for the period (7%, similar to the level estimated prior to the pandemic). This improved profitability owed to a better performance in banks’ recurring business, with growth of more than 10% in net interest income and in fees and commissions. It is worth noting here that banks are beginning to pass through the increase in money market interest rates to new loans, albeit, for the time being, far more slowly than in the past. Evidently, for variable-rate loans the impact is automatic, but it will likewise take some time. For their part, banks’ wholesale funding costs are reflecting the tightening of financial market conditions, while risk premia are also rising. As yet, however, deposit interest rates have not increased, and to June there has been no significant shift of funds towards term deposits. Further, listed banks as a whole recorded a year-on-year increase in impairment losses to June, as a result of specific contributions from business abroad, but at most banks these impairment losses declined. In any event, impairment provisions remained slightly higher than those recorded before the onset of the pandemic. Third, as regards solvency, the overall common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio of Spanish banks stood at 12.9% in June 2022, down 50 basis points (bp) on a year earlier, but 70 bp above the pre-pandemic level (12.2%). The recent reduction owed to the increase in risk-weighted assets, since the numerator of the ratio barely changed.

Concluding remarks In short, we are in the midst of a highly complex macro-financial situation, characterised by high inflation, a tightening of financing conditions and greater uncertainty, which has already triggered a slowdown in economic activity in Q3 and a widespread downward revision in the growth outlook for the coming quarters. Against this backdrop, although the banking sector’s starting point is positive, it is necessary to exercise the utmost prudence and to closely monitor risks, which may rapidly take a turn for the worse, making it necessary to consider new stress scenarios. All of this leads us to recommend that banks be very careful in their provisioning policy and their capital planning over the coming quarters. 6
The economic growth rate of Albania has been throughout this period higher than the one of other Southeastern European countries or even the one of the countries being recently members of the European Union. The activity conducted by the Albanian economy, as a relatively open economy, was fuelled by the invigoration on a world-wide scale of the economic activity throughout 2004. A slow but a safe growth of the European economy experienced over 2004 has been a positive factor for the Albanian economy, fostering the demand for our exports and sustaining the rise of remittances inflow in foreign currency from emigrants. The average inflation rate of the euro area has been around 2.4 percent over this year, without exerting any influence on the rise of the imported inflation rate in Albania. Simultaneously, the impact of shocks on the world economy during 2004 resulted to be smoother in the Albanian economy. Oil price rise in the international market was amortised partially due to Lek appreciation and partially due to the rising competitiveness and the emerging of a certain flexibility of demand for this product. The impact of oil price rise on the inflation rate in the country has been restricted. Also, its impact on the Albanian economy, though hard to be measured, is believed to have been rather a smooth one according to the estimations on the performance of the most exposed sectors to oil price, the transport and industry. Exchange rates have been fluctuating over 2004.

According to assessments made by the Bank of Albania, there exist some long-term factors whose operation has influenced on appreciating the Lek’s value: •  Constant consolidation of the country’s economic stability. •  Interest rate spread between the Lek and the foreign currencies. •  Consolidation of public finances and budget deficit, dictating a low government demand for monetary assets. •  Stable remittances by Albanian emigrants working abroad. In the meantime, during 2004 the exchange rate performance was also impacted by specific factors of the year. Specific factors relate to starting of tourism earlier than in the previous years, rise of agricultural produce and decline of demand for agricultural merchandise imports, impacting on the supply and demand for foreign currency in terms of the Lek appreciation. Also, the international foreign exchange market developments are reflected in our foreign exchange market. The euro appreciation versus the dollar over more than a year is reflected in the reduction of the dollar’s value even in our country, though no strengthening of the euro is observed. During 2004, the dollar was depreciated by 7.5 percent against the euro in the international market. During 2004, the Bank of Albania intervened in the foreign exchange market in terms of purchasing foreign currency, in an effort to prevent large exchange rate fluctuations reflected mainly during the summer and end-year period. Financial markets Growth of deposits in Lek, in the presence of a low government demand for monetary assets, created premises for increasing banks’ liquidity and extending interbank market activity.
International experience shows that countries’ export growth is driven mainly by new firms – in existing product categories and to existing destinations – with a stronger capacity for growth than existing exporters. 7 As some authors have pointed out, taking advantage of this growth potential requires fostering factor mobility across firms of different productivity levels. This process generates a major portion of the gains from economic openness, such that policies that hinder workers crossing over to other firms or that raise the cost of adjusting the scale of production weaken capacity for innovation. 8 Finally, and in the same token, it is clear that the opportunities that China’s strong growth generates for the region must be well used. For this to take place, not only will greater saving be required, but also more productive investment. In other words, one significant challenge facing the economies of the region – and Chile in particular – is to take advantage of this momentary boom in the terms of trade by promoting saving and investment, thus making sure that it does not simply translate into an unsustainable spending spree. To that end, fiscal policy plays a key role by setting up well evaluated investment programs, while maintaining the incentives that promote the accumulation of scarce physical and human capital among private agents. Policies that distort these incentives inevitable end up lowering the rate of saving and investment.

Their conclusion is clear: “For debt-intolerant countries, sustaining access to capital markets can be problematic unless debt ratios are quickly brought down to safer levels. To assess how such ‘deleveraging’ might be accomplished, we examine how, historically, emerging market economies with substantial external debts have managed to work them down. To our knowledge, this is a phenomenon that has previously received very little, if any, attention. We analyze episodes of large debt reversals, where countries’ external debt fell by more than 25 percentage points of GNP over a three-year period. Of the twenty-two such reversals that we identify for a broad group of middle-income countries since 1970, two-thirds involved some form of default or restructuring. Only in one case – Swaziland in 1985 – was a country  1  Sources: World Bank, Moody’s and IMF (WEO, April 2012). 2  Reinhart, C., M. Savastano and K. Rogoff, (2003), “Debt Intolerance”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  able to bring down a high ratio of external debt to GNP solely as a result of rapid output growth.” Thus, in the early 2000s, there were widespread expectations that a default would occur. Overall, the history of Latin America in the 2000s did not go as expected. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Latin American countries succeeded in lowering their levels of external debt by nearly 20 percent of GDP.
It was able to consolidate its position as a significant international financial centre, and thus remains an important pillar of Switzerland’s economy. Stiff global competition, meanwhile, is still forcing the financial sector to increase its efficiency and lower costs. The days when banks and insurance companies were reliable job machines are gone and will probably not return in the foreseeable future. The challenges I mentioned - from securing the social security institutions to standing our ground in a global environment - will be major issues for the Swiss economy, politics and the public in the coming years, and they will put Switzerland’s adaptability to the test. Allow me now to comment briefly on a few of these challenges. 4. Current challenges  As in most industrialised countries, demographics create a need for action in Switzerland, too. The population is steadily aging and grows only slowly. It is thanks to immigration that it is rising at all. We will therefore face a massive increase in social security expenditure in the decades ahead. At the same time, economic growth in Switzerland is weak. This constellation threatens to destabilise public finances. There are solutions, yet none of them come for free. BIS Review 69/2004  3  The first two solutions, i.e. cutting back social benefits and/or increasing social contributions, are not very popular. In the first instance, the people are opposed to such measures. As to the second solution, it does not make economic sense to further increase the already heavy tax burden.

Tarisa Watanagase: Thailand’s economic outlook and challenges under the volatile financial environment Keynote address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the International Herald Tribune and Citigold Wealth Management Economic Forum 2007, Bangkok, 19 September 2007. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be here today to give a keynote address at the economic forum hosted by the International Herald Tribune and the CitiGold Wealth Management. I also like to thank the hosts for this important opportunity to share with you my perspectives on the Thai economy moving forward, especially in the global environment of greater financial volatility and uncertainties. I believe that the media, local and international, provides a very important two-way avenue for the central bank to communicate our views and the rationale underlying our policies to the public at large, and to receive feedbacks, positive as well as negative. The topic of my talk today is “Thailand’s Economic Outlook and Challenges under the Volatile Financial Environment.” I will divide my address into three parts. First, I would like to highlight the key risks stemming from the recent global developments and outlook. In this connection, I would briefly touch on the implications of the US sub-prime market on the Thai economy. Second, I like to focus on recent key economic developments in Thailand and the outlook for 2008.