samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some issues which may warrant closer examination include: •  Ensuring that resources in the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility – our main lending instrument for developing countries – remain adequate to meet future demands;  •  New ways to help low-income countries deal with economic shocks;  •  In the case of low-income countries which do not need or want IMF lending, how to enhance the IMF’s role in signaling to others the strength of these countries’ policies;  •  The role of the Fund in supporting low-income countries’ poverty reduction strategies; and  •  Our relationship with donors and aid agencies. As a partner of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the IMF is committed to supporting countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and reach the Millennium Development Goals. Our unique position gives us the potential to contribute to building both pillars of the Monterrey Consensus. On one side, we can work with countries to design policies and build institutions that will help them grow out of poverty. On the other, we can advocate for more and better international support, and help with its coordination. Nevertheless, examining the issues highlighted earlier will help frame a better understanding of the areas of low-income country work for which the IMF can take responsibility, and those that will fall to other institutions and actors. It would be helpful to have greater definition in this area as we approach the U.N. Millennium Summit in September. Fifth, the IMF’s internal governance and management.

This is no easy task in the present situation. The labour market is quite different today than it was 5-10 years ago. Unemployment is relatively low and there is a labour shortage in some parts of the economy, despite the slowdown in economic activity. Moreover, there are tendencies towards demands for compensation, which, if they were to spread, could provide further complications for wage formation. The trends with regard to labour supply are also worrying. Demographical developments, such as an increasing number of elderly people over the coming decade, will create a demand for more employees to work in geriatric care, for instance. At the same time, the number of persons available on the labour market is declining. An addition problem is the high frequency of absence due to sickness. It is evident that a central target for economic policy should be to get more people in work. This would facilitate wage formation and create greater scope for economic growth in future. This is perhaps just as important a theme for a hearing in the Committee on Finance as wage formation in itself. It concerns measures that are largely in the hands of the Riksdag. Thank you!
The share of foreign currency-denominated loans in the current debt stock of households is rather small compared to other emerging economies, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe. Financial markets seemed to have appropriately appraised these factors, as the risk premium in Turkey deteriorated by a smaller extent when compared to many other emerging economies during the peak of the crisis. Relative stability in financial markets of Turkey has provided our bank more policy space relative to many other emerging economies. The Central Bank of Turkey has used this opportunity to guide expectations. As expectations were further aligned with the policy intentions of the CBT, bond yields decreased to historically low levels. This is an important  BIS Review 123/2009  3  development, because in previous crises real interest would tend to increase, thereby exacerbating the severity of the economic contraction. Current situation reflects the improved effectiveness of Turkish monetary policy and highlights the transformation of Turkish economy. Dear Participants, Turkey has always had a great climate for Green Shoots to blossom. Our recent crisis in 2001 was followed by a strong “V” shaped recovery process. However, despite the signs of partial improvement in domestic consumption in recent months, its strength and durability is questionable. We expect that demand uncertainty and low levels of capacity utilization will continue to weigh down on investment spending and employment. High unemployment will continue to contain private consumption demand and blur the prospects for a solid recovery.

However, as the financial stress intensified and the economic contraction deepened, policy rates rapidly approached the zero interest rate floor. With their economies still under acute strain, central banks in some advanced economies responded by implementing a series of unconventional measures. The goal of these measures was to provide markets with ample amounts of liquidity to help restore the health of financial systems balance sheets, and thereby to reactivate the provision of credit to the real economy. However due to stress in the financial sector, the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy may be hampered to some extent. And the usefulness of conventional countercyclical monetary policy may be relatively limited during financial crises. Distinguished Guests, The global economy is still in unchartered territories creating lots of confusion among the policymakers on the consequences of the monetary and fiscal stimulus steps taken so far globally. Most governments have taken fiscal measures to mitigate the effects of global turmoil either by decreasing tax rates or increasing public investment spending and expenditures. So far we see a consensus about the need for accommodative monetary policies around the globe. On the other hand, high public debt of the most developed economies has aroused serious concern on debt sustainability. According to the OECD projections, by 2017 gross public debt as a share of GDP is expected to rise sharply to 125% in the US, 160% in the UK, 125% in France, and over 100% in Spain.
The global crisis actually emphasized the main weaknesses of the Macedonian economy, such as the high concentration of the export in non-propulsive activities, completely dependant on the movements on the international market and, of course, the trade deficit financing through vulnerable and hardly predictable private transfers. The blow these two components suffered from the decrease in the world economy meant significant widening of the deficit on the current account, which reached 13.1% of the GDP in 2008. These trends continued also in the first part of 2009 and together with the decrease in the capital inflows created serious pressures on the foreign reserves. It reflected directly on the confidence in the stability of the national currency. Thus in the first quarter of 2009, the demand for foreign exchange went up by 77% compared to the supply of foreign exchange. The increased misbalance on the foreign exchange market was equilibrated with the National Bank interventions on the foreign exchange market, in the amount of Euro 230 million, only during the first quarter. Moreover, we were forced to undertake measures to adjust the monetary instruments in function of foreign exchange rate stability maintenance. At the end of March, we adopted a decision on increasing the interest rate on the core monetary instrument – the CB bills from 7% to 9%.

Such a monetary reaction was motivated by the need for increasing the attractiveness of the CB bills, in order to redirect the Denar liquidity from the foreign exchange market and to ease the pressures on the foreign exchange rate. Although after the increase in the core interest rate of the National Bank, from the beginning of the second quarter, moderate stabilization of the movements on the foreign exchange market was registered and the demand for foreign exchange began to decrease, however, also during April and May, the interventions of the National Bank on the foreign exchange market continue to reduce to net sale of foreign exchange. Simultaneously, the trend of currency conversion of the households' savings from national into foreign currency continued, indicating that although after the culmination in March (during the presidential and local elections) the psychological pressures began to ease, they are not completely depleted. Such accomplishments were the reason for additional intervention with new measures. In May, we increased the reserve requirement allocation rate for the banks' liabilities with currency component, as follows: for liabilities in foreign currency, from 10% to 13%, and for the liabilities in domestic currency with FX clause, from 10% to 20%. The undertaken measures should stimulate the Denar saving and we expect to cause change in the trend of accumulation of foreign assets by the banks, which would contribute to decrease in the demand for foreign exchange and to stabilization on the foreign exchange market. And definitely, part of the expectations is already happening.
Not everyone wants to be steeped in fan charts; modelling and stress testing. Yet the decisions we take impact every UK citizen. How can they rely on us – the dreaded experts? Of course, trust can be built through a track record, but it can also be grounded in familiarity. People trust vi  individuals, places and things that they know. Reflecting the diversity of the people we serve can reduce misperceptions that we are experts making esoteric decisions in an ivory tower for the benefit of others. Moreover, diverse decision-making bodies typically have greater political support and enjoy greater public trust. vii  They also tend to achieve better policy outcomes through better understanding of community needs  and more effective dialogue with the wider population. viii  Better decision making, innovation and adaptability  Homogenous groups that pay insufficient attention to minority views are vulnerable to biases, groupthink and over optimism. They are more likely to be influenced by the way information is presented (framing); and to stick with under-performing projects because of prior investments. ix  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  Diverse groups can overcome these ills as they are more inclined to consider novel ideas and challenge each other, enabling them to infer cause and effect and to solve problems better. Diverse teams are also better able to adapt to changes and are more resilient.

However, despite progress in recent years, Spain’s share in some potentially very dynamic markets is still low and faces major challenges, in a world of growing competitive pressures and the globalisation of production channels. Nor should it be forgotten that our economy’s dependence on energy and capital goods imports and the high net payment of income to the rest of the world, as a result of high external indebtedness, are a permanent constraint as regards achieving the surpluses on current and capital account that are needed to deleverage our economy. Institutions and financial policy for the internationalisation of Spanish companies Internationalisation calls for a series of financial services in which the banking industry plays a central role. These services can be grouped into two major categories: operations geared to mitigating the risk of transactions, namely guarantees and insurance; and those geared to providing liquidity or financing to companies. On the data available, regarding the importance of banks in financing international trade, banks participate directly in approximately one-third of global trade. On one hand they offer financing, usually short-term in nature, which responds to the exporter’s or importer’s liquidity or working capital needs. They also offer coverage for risks through guarantees or insurance, ensuring the successful completion of transactions for the customer. Moreover, the extension of coverage for credit risk facilitates – albeit indirectly – access to financing by reducing risk on the company’s balance sheet and, consequently, reducing the financial cost of the transaction.
The Central Bank stated, repeatedly, even in our May Monetary Policy Report, that the monetary stimulus would be sustained for a prolonged period, even beyond what could be inferred from financial asset prices at the time. Finally, in our latest monetary policy meeting on the 9th of July, the Board cut the MPR to its minimum level (0.5%), indicating again that the MPR would be kept at expansionary levels for a prolonged period of time. In order to reinforce this decision and align financial asset prices and the money market interest rates with the monetary policy path, complementary measures were adopted for the provision of liquidity and the administration of our debt. After this rapid process of monetary easing, that has no precedent in any emerging economy nor in our economic history, the expectations regarding the level of the MPR have shown a very significant adjustment (figure 1). Not only has the shortest segment of the yield curve shifted downward, close to the current MPR level and the new measures of liquidity  BIS Review 105/2009  1  provision, but the longer-term segments as well. Private expectations and financial asset prices are showing that the expansionary monetary policy stance will remain in place for several more quarters, or even years. Our latest monetary policy decision was complemented, as I just said, with additional measures that enhanced its impact.

Also, early in the year we witnessed a substantial increase in issues of corporate bonds, which can be interpreted as the response to less favorable financing conditions in both the domestic and the external banking market, a situation that has lost momentum in recent months. Conclusions Monetary policy has acted aggressively to soften the impact of the global financial crisis. Although it is impossible to fully offset all the repercussions that such a severe crisis has on a small, open economy like Chile, especially with the lags that monetary policy operates, we have succeeded as a country in mitigating them substantially. We have preserved the macroeconomic stability framework, even providing room for an extraordinarily stimulating mix of macroeconomic policies. Therefore, we can now state without a doubt that, had we not adopted the stimulus actions you have seen in recent months, our country’s economy would be in considerably weaker shape and we would not be able to envision any prospects of recovery for the second half of this year. Conditions are ripe for the Chilean economy to experience a healthy recovery of output and expenditure during the second half of this year. For the economy to pick up, however, it will still require that the global uncertainty, regarding both the financial dimensions of the crisis and its effects on world activity, fades. We have seen promising signs allowing us to be hopeful, but it is premature to think that the bad news are over.
Meanwhile, our economy requires more lending for companies’ operations and investment. Moving forward, we must understand which issues can be solved through regulation and for which it would be the way. This should never, under any circumstances, be pursued by reducing risk protection. We need to strike a balance between limiting risk in some sectors and stimulating others. This is a major conceptual challenge with no unambiguous answer. We will be discussing it here at the congress. Before addressing the objectives we set ourselves in individual sectors, I would like to say a few words about the most fundamental prerequisite for development – healthy competition. Encouraging competition is our unequivocal priority. What are we doing to promote competition? 4 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  First. Thorough market cleansing. In our opinion, low-quality competition is just as bad as none at all. Honest business should not have to compete with fraudulent market players. Our duty as the financial market’s supervisory body is providing an environment where effective and stable financial institutions reap the benefit. This means ridding the market of dishonest players. Second. Proportional regulation. It levels out the competitive playing field for players of different sizes, and helps the market cultivate niches where different types of financial institutions tie in with different types of clients and their needs. A year ago, in this hall we announced that we were planning to transition to proportional regulation in the banking sector.

It is only now, ten years later, that they are taking steps to move away from these measures. What is everyone afraid of? That growth will remain rather low and unstable. Indeed, after a long period of crises and stagnation, the global economy is entering a new cycle. But what is the aftermath? First. A higher debt load than in 2007. In developed economies, the primary problem is government debt, whereas many countries with emerging markets struggle with corporate debt. Second. Developed economies are contending with exceedingly low inflation and even deflation. Moreover, there are bubbles in individual markets that threaten to grow owing, among other things, to the effects of long-term soft monetary policy. Fourth. Low growth rates in productivity and investment. This not only limits opportunities for development but also hampers growth due to increased debt burden. Fifth. Developed countries are seeing increased inequality in the face of stagnating middle-class incomes, a trend observed over the past 30–40 years and often labelled the result of globalisation. It is clear, however, that unequal access to the opportunities afforded by new technologies also played a role. In this regard, the digital revolution and the new wave of job automation, which changes the traditional profile of the labour market in a number of professions and sectors, bring about significant social risks. As a result, we are observing an upswing of populism in politics, which in itself generates new economic risks and harbours continued financial market volatility. Sixth. An important point for us.
Undoubtedly, liquidity expansion was a necessary condition for accelerated credit growth, as it usually happens during expansionary periods. Current account surpluses of emerging countries and of commodities exporters came on top of this increase in liquidity. Besides, this process took place within a context of an aggressive search for yields and financial innovation. One could even argue that the mortgage boom in the United States was partly caused by the monetary easing (Taylor, 2008). Moreover, there is evidence that, in developed countries, the larger the monetary policy excesses, the larger the mortgage booms (Ahrend et al., 2008). Notwithstanding the above, although liquidity is needed to generate credit expansion and bubbles in asset prices, by no means can it all by itself generate a crisis such as this one. In developing countries, we know very well that when a cyclical downturn is combined with a financial crisis, its effects are much deeper and longer. Actually, during this same period, economies with the same degree of expansiveness in their monetary policy and credit accelerations, but with sound financial systems, have not increased their vulnerabilities. We ourselves are an example of this (Figure 1). Between 2001 and 2004, a strong reduction of the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) took place in Chile, and it did not cause a bubble in housing prices nor did it weaken the financial system.2 The reason why there was no housing price bubble in Chile needs further analysis.

As it will usually be a question of taking measures that are unpopular – for example limiting the possibilities of households to borrow money in a way that will restrict their choices about where they can live, or limiting the possibilities of financial companies to earn money – it is vital that someone is made responsible for ensuring that the measures are actually taken. This may well be, as the Commission suggests, the Riksbank or Finansinspektionen. However, I am sceptical about both authorities being responsible, as it will be all too easy to blame each other when a crisis actually develops.18 It is of course natural for the Riksbank to play a central role in macroprudential policy, as financial stability is a precondition for macroeconomic stability and risks to financial stability are therefore analysed on an ongoing basis.19 However, a responsibility for macroprudential policy may potentially come into conflict with the independence the Riksbank has in the field of monetary policy. This is an independence based on the realisation that a politicallygoverned monetary policy tends to be inflationary, as it may be tempting for political reasons to renege on a promise of low inflation and to conduct a more inflationary monetary policy that reduces unemployment in the short-term.20 However, independence goes hand in hand with a clearly-defined objective for monetary policy that can be constantly evaluated. Macroprudential policy is different in nature, as the objective is to prevent crises.
The CEBS mandate is to promote harmonisation of regulatory frameworks and not to conduct ordinary supervisory work. And even if the consolidated supervisor has group responsibility it is an undeniable fact that the authority answers to the home-land constituents. Thus, the EOFS would contribute important functions in addition to the present regulatory structure within the EU. What I have in mind is an institution with real resources and not a “talk shop” primarily designed to build consensus. BIS Review 83/2007  5  Conclusions Let me summarise. During the last decade, the banking sector has increasingly become cross-border. We should welcome this rather new form of financial integration as it enhances competition and stimulates economic growth. This development also raises challenges for the regulatory community. Our answer to these challenges should not be increased protectionism. Instead, we need to find new forms for cooperation and supervision that allow the benefits from integration to be realised. Today I have presented to you my thoughts on the need for a special body with the mission to supervise the major European cross-border banks. Since this proposal to some probably seem rather radical and not very conceivable in the shorter term, I have advocated a gradual approach. In my view, the time has now come to set up the modalities for achieving this goal.

On the whole, the turnover in the retail trade appears to have increased prior to the changeover, which is connected with an increased use of cash during the same period. Many consumers have quite simply chosen to consume extra during the late autumn of 2001 to use up their national banknotes and coins. The rapidity of the changeover appears to have simplified it for the retailers, as the period of using two different currencies was relatively short. In Sweden, the retail trade is already represented in the SIFS group (Consultation and Information with the Financial Sector), which is led by the Riksbank and as the preparations for a cash changeover proceed, we will certainly have reason for closer contact. The rapid changeover to the euro has had the result that the need for transportation and storage of both euro and national currencies has increased and become more concentrated than estimated. It is above all the national currencies that have created storage problems for the retailers and banks, as return transport of these has had to wait until sufficient amounts of euro have been distributed in the market. Despite this type of problem, the speed with which the euro was introduced has meant that there have been calls in many countries to shorten the cash changeover period, which has lasted between one and two months.