samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Chart 7  Krone exchange rate 6,0  75 Basket index  80  ECU index  85  6,5 7,0  90  Euro  95  7,5  100  8,0  105  8,5  110  9,0  115 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 Source: Norges Bank Legg inn filadresse her  The pressure against the krone exchange rate was particularly strong in the autumn of 1998. The crisis, first in Asia and later in Russia, led to considerable turbulence in international markets. At the same time, pressure in the labour market led to high wage increases, while the current account was negatively affected by a fall in export prices, combined with increases in imports. All in all, these factors contributed to creating depreciation expectations. Thus, fluctuations in oil prices represent only one of many causes of exchange rate variability over the past few years. Monetary policy is aiming at exchange rate stability. The krone exchange rate depreciated gradually through the first half of 1998, and in August there was a strong pressure against the krone. Norges Bank responded by increasing its key rates seven times through 1998, with a total of 4½ percentage points. After the last interest rate increase, in August 1998, the interest rate on banks’ deposits in Norges Bank was 8%. The strong increase in interest rates was not sufficient to bring the exchange rate back to its initial range.

As long as the increase in petroleum income is kept outside the domestic economy, there will be less need for structural change and thus less need for exchange rates to change. The Petroleum Fund serves many purposes. It is a means of storing wealth and redistributing income from oil extraction between generations, of buffering against changes in oil prices, and of facilitating demand management. Thus, the Fund facilitates the fiscal policy tasks of maintaining the desired size of the exposed sector and stabilising the economy. Chart 6  Objectives of the Government Petroleum Fund  • Allocate wealth • Distribute income over generations • Serve as a buffer against variability in oil prices • Provide financial leeway for stabilisation  Legg inn filadresse her  5  BIS Review 121/1999  North Sea oil and gas reserves are part of Norway’s economic wealth. Extracting the oil and allocating the revenues to the Petroleum Fund is a way of transforming this wealth into financial assets abroad. The purpose of accumulating capital in the Fund is to redistribute petroleum revenues between generations and ensure the long-term stability of state finances. The larger the Fund, the less dependent Norway will be on petroleum revenues in the future, and the more prepared we will be to meet the challenge of an ageing population. Furthermore, the Petroleum Fund acts as a buffer against short-term variations in petroleum revenues by separating the cash flow from oil extraction from current expenditure.
We know that the LCR can be volatile during times of liquidity stress and market volatility, with changes in the ratio not necessarily reflecting a bank’s true liquidity position. Indeed, it is possible for the LCR to fall relatively more sharply than HQLA. For example, under the historical Lookback Approach (HLBA) methodology, when a bank faces an unusual outflows of derivatives variation margin, net outflows can increase while HQLA falls. [30] Another issue is banks’ potential market obligations to notify debt investors in the event of LCR falling below 100%, due to local capital market transparency regulations. In addition, discussions with firms highlight concerns that if banks report a fall in their LCR they may get a credit rating downgrade. This is despite the fact that LCR plays a fairly limited role in the methodologies of most credit rating agencies, which typically consider a much wider set of information. [31] Nonetheless, fears of adverse market reaction appear to induce banks to seek to quickly rebuild their LCR levels, in the event that the levels do fall. Concerns around disclosures may be especially problematic for banks that disclose spot (rather than average) LCR levels, due to the greater volatility and sensitivity of spot LCR rates compared to an averaged metric. Basel III policymakers were aware of this risk. This is why Basel requires disclosure of average LCRs only. However, in some jurisdictions, including the EU and UK, some banks voluntarily disclose their spot LCRs. Fourth, there is uncertainty about the future.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Insights from the financial market in 2015, expectation and direction going forward Opening speech by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Annual Dinner of Persatuan Pasaran Kewangan Malaysia (PPKM), Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 2015. *  *  *  This annual dinner is an important event for it presents an opportunity for us and the market to reflect upon all the challenges in the financial market, and draw lessons as we move into the new operating year. The year 2015 has been a very interesting year for all of us here, industry players and regulators alike. During the year, we witnessed significant capital outflows as markets responded to the global economic developments. In particular, every commentary or data release hinting at policy normalization in the US was met with gyrations in financial markets. Emerging currencies, felt the brunt of such volatility, especially commodity exporting countries given the significant decline in commodity and energy prices and moderation in growth for the China’s economy. For Malaysia, we saw ringgit weakened as much as 18%, while in the bond market, we saw relative stability even though yields went up by 30 to 50 bps given by the negative sentiment in the domestic and global markets. Insights from the financial market in 2015 In the midst of all the global economic uncertainty and financial market volatility, I would like to highlight some observations and comments.
Furthermore, some national supervisors may set higher capital requirements than implied by Basel I, perhaps even higher than those implied by Basel II, depending on the risk environment. For those banks that do experience reductions in capital as a result of Basel II, some observers have questioned whether the lower requirements might provide certain advantages and make it easier for those banks to acquire other banks that do not share in the same benefits. History suggests that this particular concern may be unfounded. In a paper published this past February by the Federal Reserve, researchers reported that they did not find convincing evidence that past changes in capital requirements have had a substantial impact on mergers between banks. The issue of competition between banks has also come up in the context of competition between countries. Here, we should remember that Basel II is intended to help ensure that international competition in banking markets is driven by the strengths of each bank, rather than by differences in each country’s rules. One way that the Committee has sought to promote a consistent application of the new framework is by providing banks and supervisors with detailed requirements where necessary. As I have already mentioned, these details may add to the appearance of length and complexity in Basel II, but that is a small price to pay for greater consistency and a more level playing field.

Nonetheless, we have worked hard over the past years to clarify the rules, to simplify those thought to be the most complex, and to provide options for those wishing to use a simpler approach. In fact, as the Basel Committee demonstrated in an annex to the third consultative paper, supervisors can select  BIS Review 68/2004  3  options that would result in a very simple set of rules that can be specified in just 12 pages of text. That is approximately half the length of the original 1988 Accord. The “simplified standardised approach”, as we call it, is intended to be useful for those countries that do not wish to adopt all of the options available under the new framework. The trade-off, however, reflects the fact that the policy balance at stake is between simplicity and risk-sensitivity; if one chooses simpler rules, the cost is less sensitivity to risk and hence greater conservatism in capital requirements. Competition and consistency of application Another broad concern that the Committee has worked to address is Basel II’s impact on global competition. In particular, some have asked whether banks that choose Basel II’s advanced approaches will enjoy benefits over those that choose simpler approaches. Others have wondered whether banks that remain on the 1988 Accord for some time will be disadvantaged. To respond to these concerns, we should understand that adopting an advanced approach does not automatically reduce a bank’s capital requirements. Basel II is intended to align capital requirements more closely to risk.
At the same time, I think we should improve the timeliness of official statistics as much as possible. In this connection, the recent shorter time lag in the production of INE’s CPI and GDP flash estimates are good examples. In the case of the Banco de España, we have also been able to obtain some real-time granular information that is very useful for assessing the current difficult conditions. As regards information from banks, the data provided by the Central Credit Register is now more necessary than ever for assessing the risks of granting credit and the level of aggregated risk. For us and other economic authorities, this information has also helped in the design and assessment of the effectiveness of the measures adopted during this period (moratoria on loans, public guarantees on lending, etc.). Last April we also made use of the Central Balance Sheet Data Office database to conduct a quick survey of a sample of nonfinancial companies in order to capture their initial reactions to the lockdown. This information proved very helpful in guiding our assessment of the initial impact of the pandemic on Spanish firms. And, of course, the challenge posed by the implications of climate change for the economy and the financial system also requires that new databases be built and that the key signals to keep the authorities’ policies focussed be extracted from those we already have.

Caleb M Fundanga: Financial market progress in Zambia Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official launch of the Equity Capital Resources Unit Trust, Lusaka, 21 April 2008. *  *  *  Chairperson Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me at the onset express my gratitude to Equity Capital Resources Plc for inviting me to come and officially launch its collective investment scheme which I understand will be called “Equity Capital Resources Unit Trust” or ECRUT in short. This indeed is gratifying to everyone who is anxious to see our financial markets progress. As many of you gathered here already know, the Bank of Zambia in consultation with various stakeholders initiated and developed the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) in 2004. The vision of this Plan is to have a stable, sound and market-based financial system that supports an efficient mobilisation and allocation of resources. It is therefore pleasing that the introduction of ECRUT takes us closer to fulfilling the vision of the FSDP. Ladies and Gentlemen, am sure you will agree with me that collective investment schemes are an indispensable part of market development with several benefits. One of the primary benefits of collective investment schemes is that small investors can have access to professional investment management. Many of our people are not conversant with financial investment matters, yet they are eager to enhance their wealth. Many simply do not have the capacity to identify and manage investments that are appropriate to their risk-return appetite.
The impact of the Fed’s tightening cycle in the 1990s on emerging markets was not as widespread as the 1980s episode had been, and countries like Chile and Colombia were able to  st  1 Remarks at the 2017 IIF Latin America Economic Forum, Asunción, Paraguay on Saturday April 1 , 2017. I acknowledge the support of Diego Gianelli and Mauricio Hitschfeld in the preparation of this speech. These remarks do not imply endorsement by the Central Bank of Chile or any of its Board members. 2 There is a third episode between June 1999 and June 2000. This process of 150 bp hikes can be understood as the final adjustment along the 1994 episode. 3 See, for example, the discussion in García‐Herrero, A., 1997, Banking Crisis in Latin America in the 1990s: Lessons from Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela, IMF Working Paper 97/140. See also Sachs, J., A. Tornell and A. Velasco, 1996, Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995, NBER Working Paper 5576. 1                weather this period relatively well and to keep high growth rates.4 But there is ample evidence that, in a context of several macroeconomic imbalances in several emerging economies, the 1994 episode triggered a series of difficulties and crisis that configured the macroeconomic map in the developing world in the second half of the decade. In contrast, the monetary policy normalization process starting in 2004, did not have a negative effect on emerging economies.

The fact that in previously cycles this did not happen is good news, but a series of good output numbers in the US, a few higher‐than‐expected inflation prints, or a change in the strategy on how to manage the balance sheet of the Fed could, trigger a significant increase in long term rates. 7 BIS‐based Real Exchange Rates; for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, México, Perú and Venezuela. 3  The current trajectory of the Dollar/Commodities/Credit Spreads provide mix evidence  Other dimensions suggest we are somewhat in between the 1994 and 2004 episodes.  The dollar has strengthened in multilateral terms in the last quarters, similarly to what was seen in 1994. Commodities have shown a mild upward trend. Definitely smoother than their trend in 2004, but also markedly more bullish than in 1994. Finally, EMBI spreads have decreased in tandem to what they did in 2004. Indeed, capital inflows have returned massively to the region in the last few months. In other words, while commodities are not as supportive of emerging economies as they were in the previous decade, markets are showing a high appetite for emerging market debt.  This suggests two things. On the one hand, there is room for a recovery in emerging economies, and markets are pricing that in. But on the other hand, this recovery will not be supported by a commodity cycle as we experienced in the 2000s, so the region is more exposed to financial shocks coming from a disorderly normalization of monetary policy in the United States.
For instance, a report that received considerable attention recently warned that every second job in Sweden would disappear within 20 years. 4 At the same time, there is another ongoing debate about demographic developments, with an increasing ageing population and several people therefore saying that we need an increase in labour immigration and better integration to maintain welfare at the current levels. 1 I would like to thank Magnus Jonsson for his help with writing the speech and Emelie Theobald for her help  with data and figures. I would also like to thank Mattias Erlandsson, Jesper Hansson, Goran Katinic, Åsa OlliSegendorf, Cecilia Roos-Isaksson, Marianne Sterner, Ulf Söderström and Anders Vredin for valuable comments and Elizabeth Nilsson for helping to translate the speech into English. 2 See Keynes (1930). 3 See Leontief (1952). 4 See “Vartannat jobb automatiseras inom 20 år – utmaningar för Sverige” (Every second job will be automated in 20 years – challenges for Sweden), Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research. 1 [24]  Changes in trends are difficult to predict, as they are not visible until a certain amount of time has passed, as illustrated by the predictions of Keynes and Leontief. I will therefore not make any attempt to predict developments in the labour market today, but instead look back at what has happened. There are many indications that there have been several trend changes in the labour market in the period following the financial crisis 2008-2009.

Figure 1a shows how labour force participation has increased steadily from around 71 per cent just after the financial crisis to more than 73 per cent today. This positive development can probably be explained in several ways. The high population growth, which is to some extent due to a high level of migration, could be one factor. A large proportion of the immigrants who have come to Sweden in recent years have been in the age range 25 to 54 years of age, which is a group with a high labour force participation rate. Another factor could be various economic policy reforms that have increased incentives to participate in the labour force. 4 [24]  Another less positive development is the deterioration in matching efficiency. This could be a sign that companies’ requirements and the job seekers’ abilities do not match – for instance because of structural change or deficiencies in the educational system – or because the search and recruitment processes have declined in quality. It therefore becomes more time-consuming and costly for companies to recruit staff. Matching efficiency fell heavily in connection with the financial crisis, see Figure 1b. 8 This need not necessarily be a problem. During economic downturns, some types of competence become outdated at the same time as other and new competences are in demand. For the individual, this can mean that some form of further education becomes necessary. The problem is that matching efficiency appears to have become entrenched at around the same levels as in 2010.
In particular, according to the flash estimate,2 inflation was slightly lower than expected and stood at 8.5% in January, down from 10.1% in November. Furthermore, the strong fall in gas prices, the easing of global supply chain disruptions, the appreciation of the euro and tighter financing conditions (the latter reflecting, inter alia, our policy tightening) also pointed to inflation falling more strongly in the coming months than envisaged in December. At the same time, the fact that core inflation (5.2% in January, according to the flash estimate) has held at record high levels was a powerful reminder that price pressures remain strong, as past energy price rises continue to spread throughout the economy. All in all, this information led us to assess the risks to the inflation outlook as being more balanced, especially in the near term. As regards financial market-based indicators, in the run-up to our February meeting the riskfree forward curve continued to point to expectations of further interest rate increases in our subsequent meetings, including 50 bp hikes in both February and March, with a terminal market rate of around 3.47% (0.6 pp higher than before our December meeting). This was corroborated by analysts’ expectations, as reflected in surveys conducted shortly before the meeting.

To accommodate various stages of development in thinking and risk modelling, the New Accord offers three approaches for calculating a minimum operational risk capital charge. Two approaches - the Basic Indicator and Standardised Approaches - are, by design, simple and so inevitably are somewhat imprecise measures of operational risk. But when combined with the supervisory review process of Pillar Two  2  BIS Review 45/2003  and the transparency requirements laid out in Pillar 3, the Committee believes that they offer a reasonable point of departure and will spark additional efforts to refine banks’ approaches. For the most sophisticated institutions, the “advanced measurement approach” - or “AMA” - is the ultimate expression of the Committee’s goal to incorporate banks’ own sense of risk into the capital framework. Because the AMA is not subject to supervisory “floors,” the Committee expects it to serve as a true catalyst for innovation. We were pleased that the RMA Working Group on the Regulation of Operational Risk and others in the industry welcomed the Committee’s decision to allow banks to test a great variety of methodologies and measures under the AMA. Results of consultations From our review of public comments, and from our member agencies’ recent discussions with banks, we have noted a growing consensus that the revisions to the proposals have been positive. The operational risk framework has become more flexible, forward-looking, and better able to accommodate today’s best practices. Moreover, we are confident it is nimble enough to incorporate future advances.
The company issuing the bond then deposits that money in their own bank. So now it is the corporate’s bank that holds the claim on us. A similar sort of circle occurs if the corporate then uses its deposit to buy a new piece of machinery, because the seller of that machinery will end up putting the proceeds into her bank, so that the claim on the Bank of England is now held by the capital goods producer’s bank. Whatever the type of purchase, it will always end up with someone’s commercial bank having a claim on us. That is even the case if the money is used to buy foreign goods, as the foreign commercial bank will need to exchange the sterling claim with a commercial bank that holds an account with us, if it does not do so itself. The only way that the claim can be eliminated from the system is if a bank chooses to exchange it for cash, which would make little sense since cash pays no interest at all. The reason for going through this in such mind-numbing detail is to make the point that the level of commercial banks’ reserves in aggregate is determined by the way we have funded the asset purchases, not by the commercial banks’ own decisions. The size of banks’ reserves cannot, as is frequently claimed, be a sign that they are “sitting on them”.

The moral from all this is one that will be all too familiar to you as accountants, though perhaps one that sometimes gets forgotten by consumers of accounting statements, namely that the appropriate way to frame accounts depends on how they will be used and what questions are being asked. The Asset Purchase Facility accounts may tell us the scale of gains or losses on the Asset Purchase Facility portfolio narrowly considered, but will miss the impact on the public finances from higher activity and lower financing costs and fail to tell us anything about it macroeconomic effectiveness. The rise in asset prices and the recovery in confidence since the start of the Quantitative Easing program have been significant. We cannot identify precisely how much of this is a direct result of Quantitative Easing, and hence the scale of the boost to tax revenues. I have no doubt that this issue will continue to be debated for years to come, and that some sceptics may remain unconvinced. But even a sceptic should acknowledge that the net accounting gain or loss on the Asset Purchase  3  4  Of course that is not true of holdings of corporate assets. BIS Review 126/2009  Facility provides an incomplete measure of the impact of Quantitative Easing on the economy and on the public finances. Thank you.