samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But the precautionary measure has served us well. We will continue to be vigilant in anticipating issues, and in taking proactive measures to strengthen the resilience of our system. With regards to the flow of credit from banks to corporations, we believe this is best facilitated through government schemes to co-share some of the risks with banks. In February, the Government announced the Special Risk-Sharing Initiative (SRI). Under this Initiative, the Government will absorb 75% of the risk for insurance covering working capital and trade-financing loan facilities. The Government will also absorb 80% of the risk for bridging loans which go towards meeting firms' working-capital needs. We also have schemes for SMEs and micro-loans. Apart from ensuring that the financial system continues to function effectively, the Government has, as in past periods of downturns, used fiscal measures to minimise the impact of the crisis. This involves targeted help for families and companies, while continuing to build capabilities to prepare for the upturn. This time, a creative Jobs Credit Scheme has been added to help companies keep their workers. Conclusion Ladies and Gentlemen, these are very challenging times. The global economy is in recession, and the financial system remains fragile. We need tough, decisive and forwardlooking actions in the core economies that are deeply affected. Asian economies have also been severely affected, and policy adjustments are necessary. However, the medium-term prospects for growth remain strong.

The mechanisms for mopping up the excess liquidity need to be put in place early. Meanwhile, the scale of fiscal stimulus, and funding needed to support this, has raised the spectre of destabilised sovereign bond markets and the crowding out of private borrowings. This does not bode well for private capital formation, and could create stresses downstream for corporations which do not have the advantage of sovereign backing. Further, if deficits are seen to be structural, market reaction could negate much of the effect of fiscal stimulus. There is also the issue of how to  BIS Review 30/2009  3  restore private-sector driven intermediation of credit in due course. While government support for businesses’ access to credit is necessary now, it cannot continue indefinitely. In other words, even as we take unconventional measures, we need to have an eye on medium-term sustainability, and make clear our "exit" strategy and timing. Just as we must not be behind the curve in taking action to stabilise markets, we need to anticipate what lies ahead and plan accordingly. This is crucial because that later-stage "exit" action represents not just the end of this phase but a crucial transition into another set of conditions with totally different policy demands. Third, we need to consider the global dimension of our responses, and the impact on other economies. For instance, the bank deposit guarantee scheme that first started in Ireland triggered a domino effect and made its way to this region.
Richard W Fisher: “Not to be used externally, but also harmful if swallowed” – projecting the future of the economy and lessons learned from Texas and Mexico Remarks by Mr Richard W Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, before the Dallas Regional Chamber of Commerce, Dallas, Texas, 5 March 2012.. *  *  *  The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. I have been asked to speak about the economy. I am going to take a different approach than is typical for a Federal Reserve speech. I’ll eschew making the prototypical forecast, except to note that from my perch at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, I presently see that: a.) On balance, the data indicate improving growth and prospects for job creation in 2012. However, the outlook is hardly “robust” and remains constrained by the fiscal and regulatory misfeasance of Congress and the executive branch and is subject to a now well-known, and likely well-discounted, list of possible exogenous shocks – the so-called “tail risks” – posed by possible developments of different sorts in the Middle East, Europe, China and elsewhere. And b.)

Besides dealing with short-term volatilities, another related challenge that has come with the reality of QE tapering is maintaining strong economic outlook. Specifically, recent data seem to suggest that signs of economic softness that are reflected in, for instance, deteriorations in the current account performance and weak public finances, are likely to amplify the probability of abrupt flow reversals. That is, the remaining pool of funds seems to differentiate between their investment destinations based more on fundamentals, as is exemplified in the recent episodes of substantial outflows in some of the “Fragile Five” countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  6. When looked at from this fundamentals perspective, Thailand’s recent economic slowdown and political setback definitely come to mind as another growing concern. Particularly, manufacturing production and private spending have already shown signs of moderation in the midst of political uncertainty and poor economic outlook. This, combined with the likely additional delay in public spending, could have further dampening effects on growth. Moreover, should the current political situation persist, prolonged political instability will certainly have dire consequences firstly on the tourism industry but also eventually on our ability to maintain and attract the FDI flows. The country’s higher credit default swap, if left unchecked, could lead to higher funding costs in the financial markets and certainly constitutes another challenge going forward. I do hope, however, that political uncertainty will be a short-term factor and that political stability will be achieved again once agreements are reached among the different groups in the society. 7.
If such changes happen too rapidly, they can lead to temporary disruptions in the labour market.1 So it is natural for people to wonder what the economy will look like in the future and how we will ensure sustainable growth. Our task today – if we want to prevent a persistent increase in precautionary saving and instead to direct such saving towards needed investment – is to provide them with credible answers. Transitioning to the post-crisis economy Dealing with uncertainty about the outlook is the task of stabilisation policies, and here the ECB will continue to take all necessary steps within our mandate of price stability – for all euro area citizens in all parts of the euro area. Already our policies have dispelled tail risks in financial markets that could have led to selfreinforcing vicious circles. We are now orienting our measures to ensure that the right financial conditions are in place to support a recovery from the crisis. This was the motivation behind our recent decision to expand our pandemic emergency purchase programme to € trillion, coupled with the up to € trillion we are making available to banks that lend to the real economy. But monetary policy cannot address the more profound questions about how the economy will look in the future. Historical experience suggests that major economic shifts like the one we are going through today require government action to foster change and smooth the transition to the new normal.

This illustrates the importance of further reforms. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
The first is that since the referendum there has already been a material hit to the supply side of the economy in the form of a reduction in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which is the efficiency with which companies put their labour and capital inputs to use. This would reduce output per worker, and hence real wages. It would also reduce future profitability, thus deterring investment. A reduction in TFP would have a lasting effect on productivity and hence the supply side of the economy, reducing the rate at which it can grow without generating above-target inflation. Like most economists I expect Brexit to have a negative impact on TFP for a variety of reasons, including the need to reallocate resources toward supplying new customers or new products, and the general effect of  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  2  reduced openness . But these are effects that, like the effects of capital deepening on productivity, will tend to either build over the long run or only really take hold after our trading arrangements have changed. So, while they can be expected to have a material impact on productivity by the end of the MPC’s forecast horizon, I’m not convinced they can fully account for the additional weakness in productivity we have already seen. It shrank by 0.2% in the year following the referendum compared to growth of 0.5% on average in the preceding seven years.

I also have a direct set of prescribed responsibilities under the Bank’s application to itself of the Senior Managers Regime – a framework developed to improve accountability at the top of financial services firms. As a key part of that accountability, over the coming years I look forward to giving many talks and speeches such as this one to set out the thinking behind decisions and their delivery across the full range of my and the Bank’s responsibilities. The Bank has quite rightly placed emphasis on the role of communication as a policy tool in its Vision 2020 strategy; describing our work to as diverse a range of people as possible. Of course I start this new role at an interesting point in time. It is nearly 17 months since the UK voted to leave the EU, and just over 16 months until that decision takes effect in March 2019. In the period since the referendum we have learned that while Brexit was at one level a binary decision, there are many potential outcomes, and paths to those outcomes. Perhaps reflecting this multidimensionality, uncertainty about Brexit seems to be increasing rather than diminishing over time (Slide 1). In the Bank’s Decision Maker Panel Survey (which is run jointly with Nottingham University), the share of firms who placed Brexit among the top sources of uncertainty rose from 35% in a survey taken in September 2016 to 40% in August this year.
This implies not only that the banking system itself has remained robust, but also that it has fulfilled its mission, providing significant support to the economy, restructuring loans and granting new ones. Specific figures are well known, but still I would like to repeat these data again. Last year, corporate lending expanded by 10%, which is nearly two times more than in 2019 before the pandemic. Lending to small businesses increased by 20%. Disbursements peaked in spring when businesses desperately needed financial resources and their revenues plummeted. Lending was largely a way to support wages and repay loans, and so on. The banking system was thus capable to address this challenge in spring. Of course, the Government’s preferential lending programmes were also of major importance. We can see that mortgage lending surged last year by over 20%, but I will dwell on this topic later. Both preferential mortgage lending programmes and interest rate decreases in the economy in general played a significant role in this respect. Consumer lending used to be a matter of our concern before the pandemic, but last year it was growing moderately, in our opinion, adding about 9%. In this regard, banks were reasonable and conservative in their assessments of borrowers’ risks. Moreover, borrowers themselves preferred not to increase their liabilities in such an uncertain environment. Loan restructuring has become one of the main channels for the financial system to support the economy.

In fact, even for countries such as the Republic of Macedonia, with relatively modest financial education and low utilization of modern technologies in the financial area, the question that arises is not whether, but when the digitization process will engulf the domestic banking system. In this light, I would like to point to the process of digitization and use of information technology not as a threat against the competition in banking, but as a new opportunity to bring financial services closer to as many clients as possible, to raise financial inclusion and literacy, and to ensure better allocation of resources, as phenomena of greater economic and social significance. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  On the other hand, the application of new technological solutions brings changes in the range of risks that banks face and manage in their day-to-day operations. In addition to the conventional bank risks such as credit risk, interest rate risk, currency risk, the importance of non-financial operational risks will gradually increase. Increased use of modern technical solutions will mean greater significance of the risks related to the information systems security, the confidentiality of the data, the storage of information content, the access and the maintenance of the payment systems. At the end, before awarding the Best Counter Officers, allow me to express gratitude on my behalf and on behalf of the National Bank for their daily and painstaking work in the banks’ branches. Thank you for your attention and congratulations on the World Savings Day! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
CRE valuations have fallen by about 10 per cent from their peak in June 2022 and equity valuations of European real estate groups continue to fall.6 In this context, the ESRB issued a Recommendation earlier this year to help address vulnerabilities in CRE markets.7 The sector is particularly vulnerable to lower growth, heightened inflation and higher interest rates. Rising vacancy rates result in lower income streams and lower property values. Lower collateral values and tighter financing conditions reduce CRE investors’ scope for refinancing existing debt and for taking out new loans. This, in turn, may force some investors to sell properties to meet maturing debt obligations and liquidity needs, even under stressed market conditions, thereby adding further downward pressure on prices. The cyclical vulnerabilities are compounded by adverse factors that relate to structural change. They include the impact of climate-related economic policies, the shift towards e-commerce and a greater demand for flexible office space to accommodate mobile and hybrid working models. And large falls in CRE prices could lead to spillovers on the financial system. Let me now turn to risks related to financial market corrections. This is important as all financial institutions, including banks and non-banks, interact in financial markets. Such asset price corrections and heightened volatility could be exacerbated by vulnerabilities in the non-bank financial sector. In fact, there have also been several episodes of market volatility in recent months that resulted in liquidity challenges for non-bank financial intermediaries.

These different agents may have different opinions as to what level is most appropriate for business continuity and crisis recovery planning. The Riksbank’s tasks The Riksbank’s role with regard to business continuity and crisis recovery planning can be divided into two areas. One of these concerns our role in mediating cash and payments and the other is our role of overseeing financial stability. With regard to the first role, the Riksbank issues banknotes and coins. We are also responsible for the system that makes large-value payments between the banks and for lending money intraday so that these payments can be made. The business continuity and crisis recovery planning for cash management is aimed at security for values and personnel and also reliability of supply. With regard to the RIX system, the business continuity and crisis recovery planning are aimed at being able to continue activities despite problems. It is also a question of maintaining a capacity to trace and remedy faults. The ultimate purpose of the Riksbank’s role as overseer of financial stability is to prevent both conventional and financial crises in the financial system. In concrete terms, the work entails following developments in the financial sector in the short term, primarily in the major banks, and working with structural changes, crisis management and regulation. An important part of the Riksbank’s work in this field concerns cooperation with other authorities and companies in the financial sector.
The starting date of the estimation sample of the countries examined ranges between 2003Q1 and 2011Q3, with the last observation being 2021Q3 for all countries. 3 Frederic S. Mishkin, Housing and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism, NBER  working paper 13518, October 2007. 4 The period of Quantitative Easing is defined according to the speech by Vítor  Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB "Past and future of the ECB monetary policy" and starts in July 2014. 5 Data from the Household Finance and Consumer Survey, 2017. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

Debt service has not risen by the same proportion, due to rising  BIS Review 41/2007  1  incomes and easier credit terms, and arrears are at a low. However, some borrowers have stretched their capacity to the limit and the most indebted group has seen its debt grow substantially as a proportion of income and assets in recent years. Conditions will not need to change much to cause them serious difficulties. The bulk of household debt is in the form of CPI-indexed mortgage loans, making low inflation critical. Household debt in foreign currency was very low, but has been increasing. High levels of foreign currency-denominated debt could prove questionable for households with no income in foreign currency. Since house prices are currently buoyant, they are likely to rise by less than general inflation or even fall in nominal terms. Household equity could shrink under such conditions. Business profitability appears to have been strong in 2006, in spite of a massive increase in financial expenses from exchange rate losses on foreign borrowing, higher interest expenses and a substantial increase in interest-bearing debt. Debt of listed companies grew as a ratio of equity and the same is probably true of other businesses. Higher debt levels leave them more vulnerable to a contraction in the economy. Equity prices have soared in Iceland in recent years. One explanation for the increase may be that Icelandic companies were undervalued by the markets, for example by international comparison, and another that bold investment ventures have driven up their value.
In the domestic context, the LOLR ensures that neither the managers nor the equity holders of the institution receiving support are allowed to benefit. Internationally, it is not easy for the IMF to penalise those responsible for management of the economy, nor to distinguish between those citizens that have been responsible for excessive risk-taking and those who will be the innocent victims of the consequences of a financial crisis. It is the ordinary taxpayers in emerging market countries who will have to bear the burden of servicing loans from the IMF.5 4  Fischer, S (1999), “On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort”, IMF. 5  A point stressed by Calomiris (“The IMF’s Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort”, Cato Journal, Vol. 17 No. 3 1998) although he underestimates, in my view, the possibility of liquidity runs as seen, for example, in Korea in 1997. BIS Review 95/1999  4  Absent a world government, it is difficult to see a credible ILOLR on the horizon. The reason is the simple maxim: “it’s the politics, stupid”. The second purist solution, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is the imposition of permanent capital controls. In other words, a return to the world in which the Bretton Woods institutions were created half a century ago. The advantage of capital controls is that they prevent the liquidity runs that result from currency and maturity mismatch of the financial sector. India did not experience a financial crisis, Korea did.

Fiscal revenues increased 9.0% in annual terms, while budget expenditures were 7.5% lower than the previous year. Our monetary policy easing has also taken into account this feature of fiscal policy that the Bank of Albania has urged and supported. However, the Bank of Albania would like to bring to attention the need for a more uniform distribution of expenditures and budget deficit over the year, to enhance their effectiveness and avoid the fluctuations that their excessive concentration may cause to the country’s economic and financial indicators. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The improved foreign demand and positive dynamic of some sectors of the economy were reflected in an increase in annual exports by 10.3% in April. The detailed analysis of trade data reveals encouraging signals about re-exporting and agricultural activities. Trade deficit, however, expanded 1.8% in April, due to the simultaneous increase of imports by 6.0%. In particular, the energy situation continues to burden the trade balance of the country due to high levels of energy imports. Structural improvements to the economy and a more favourable external environment would pave the way for a faster growth of Albanian exports. The Bank of Albania considers this channel as the most appropriate tool to support the country’s sustainable growth in the medium and long term. Projections for low annual inflation rates, against the backdrop of below-potential economic growth, have dictated the pursuit of an easing monetary policy by the Bank of Albania.