samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this market segment, business is conducted bilaterally on an over-the-counter (OTC) basis – typically by phone or through electronic trading platforms like Tradeweb and Bloomberg that are based on the traditional request-for-quote model. The U.S. Treasury has issued a detailed request for information seeking public comment on the many factors that are affecting the structure and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury market, and is seeking comments on the relevant data gaps. 4 This is an important step that will help clarify what further work is needed in this area. Even in the corporate bond market where we have detailed TRACE transaction data, this still tells an incomplete story. TRACE data show what trades have taken place, not what trades have potentially been foregone because of any possible diminution of market liquidity. Gaining a better understanding of this phenomenon is being actively researched by my staff. In contrast to the market liquidity metrics such as bid-ask spreads, indirect evidence on market liquidity suggests that there has been a decline. Asset managers report that large blocks of securities are now harder to buy and sell without generating significant movements in prices. Also, average trade sizes have decreased (Exhibit 4) and there is evidence of a growing bifurcation in the corporate bond market, with greater activity and liquidity in those bonds that were issued more recently, larger in size or brought to market by larger issuers.

See Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 USC 343) and Regulation A (12 CFR 201.4(d)). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In the U.S., given the restrictions on central bank lending, if a securities firm were to lose access to funding the remaining options available would be finding a means of replenishing the firm’s capital, selling assets, or selling all or part of the securities firm’s operations. While this might be manageable in the case of a firm-specific idiosyncratic shock, it might prove more difficult if a common shock was broadly hitting the securities industry. In this circumstance, the failure of one firm could increase the stress on other firms that were facing similar difficulties. If all of the requirements for Section 13(3) are met, the central bank could provide liquidity support. However, since this is not a certainty, it is worth considering possible alternatives. Now that all major securities firms in the U.S. are part of bank holding companies and are subject to enhanced prudential standards as well as capital and liquidity stress tests, providing these firms with access to the Discount Window might be worth exploring. To me, this is a more reasonable proposition now than it was prior to the crisis when the major dealers weren’t subject to those safeguards.
Whereas in 2008 there were no women in the Central Bank’s Board of Directors, in 2013 there were two women Board directors, and in the current year, 2019, we continue to have two women Board Directors, that is half of the non-executive directors. In 2008, there were no female members of staff among the 31 employees in the top band, comprising the grades of senior executive, head and chief  Page | 5  officers. In 2013, there were 6 out of 38. Presently, in November 2019, there are 12 out of 45. Small steps forward indeed but not insignificant: a clear sign of progress is shown by the fact that if we take the key role of heads, whereas there was only one female head in 2014, there are now 6. The gender distribution of staff below the senior executive grade is predictably more equitable, with 56.7 per cent of all staff in the grades concerned being women, compared to 47.3 per cent in 2008. Conversely at the very top level, that of the Deputy Governors and the Governor, we have to date no woman. That at the very top of the European Central Bank, in the Governing Council, the situation is even less balanced than ours, is certainly no consolation for us. However, that the new President is a woman, Christine Lagarde, is hugely significant. *** As hinted during the launch of our Annual Report last May, the Bank is stepping up its involvement in sustainable finance.

To blame all on-boarding failures only on an ultra-conservative banking sector is simplistic and counterproductive. Reality is more complex than that and the causes might vary from the risk appetite of the European supervisory landscape that follows a common rule book, to problems of asymmetric information, complex corporate structures or business models. Unless we get down to this level, we can never really pass judgement on the actions of banks regarding who they on-board. Banking is all about risk management and banks with a zero risk appetite will eventually starve and be forced out of the market. Such risk aversion should not come at the expense of the right of all citizens to access basic banking services, as this will fuel financial and social exclusion. Banks should therefore be encouraged to use their judgment and sense of proportion when exercising due diligence, and to consider their responsibility given their pivotal role in the financing of the economy. Although certain AML/CFT vulnerabilities had already been identified at a national level and actions were already underway and although the Authorities pledged their commitment to fully address these issues, the Moneyval report has set targets that we must reach. Financial systems trade in confidence and credibility and unless we address these shortcomings, we will be unable to develop our sector further.
Initially this appeared to be related to the impact of the global slowdown on some of the larger Eurozone economies, which seemed likely to cause them to run further below capacity than had earlier been expected. But the more recent signs are that the Eurozone economy is now picking up relatively strongly, and it is harder to understand the euro’s continuing weakness in the present context: it may just be a matter of time - for there is no doubt that the euro has considerable scope for appreciation. Taken together, Mr President, these various international developments since I was last here in Belfast have greatly complicated the task of monetary management here in the UK - in fact it has been just about the most difficult external environment that I can recall. At that time monetary policy was still aimed at moderating the pace of domestic demand growth to prevent the re-emergence of inflationary pressure - including wage pressures in the labour market. We actually raised rates by ¼% to 7½% shortly after my visit - but I promise you that was not a direct result of my visit here. But we reversed engines fairly aggressively when evidence of the effect of global slowdown on our own economy began to appear in the autumn - cutting interest rates from 7½% to 5% between October 1998 and last summer.

In the event, the damage was contained, and world economic activity is now recovering far more quickly than anyone could have expected. But, encouraging though it is, the recovery is taking place in a context of large external imbalances within the world economy and large imbalances between strong domestic and weak external demand in a number of industrial countries most notably in the US and here in the UK. The challenge now for the major industrial countries - as we discussed at the G7 meeting last weekend in Tokyo - is to secure a more balanced pattern of growth among our economies in order to help sustain the global expansion. This chain of international events has also had a major impact on the pattern of exchange rates. Many emerging countries and some transition economies saw their exchange rates fall dramatically; but there were also important effects on the relationships between the currencies of the major industrial countries. The dollar and sterling have in fact remained reasonably stable against each other for most of the time since sterling withdrew from the ERM. The yen, which had been notably weak on the Japanese recession, has since picked up strongly as the prospect of recovery in Japan improved. But the most puzzling development in the exchange markets has been the disappointing weakening of the euro since its historic introduction at the beginning of last year.
It is noted that, in recent times, banks in Sri Lanka have made some attempts to capture remittance flows through various means, by providing e-banking services through Internet banking, Tele-banking etc., free of charge. These e-banking products/services can also be extended to the remittance receivers where other infrastructure facilities like telecommunication facilities are available at affordable prices. 9. What should the strategy be? 9.1  Upgrade core banking solutions  9.1.1 Although the current IT environment has brought-in favourable results for banks, they should not ignore the use of major software and core operating system upgrades. It is necessary to change the systems when needed, if banks are to stay ahead of the game and sustain growth. For a long time, banks have considered core banking systems as a technology issue. Worldwide studies conducted on this subject clearly indicate that there is a need for robust core systems that link customers to core banking products and provide consistent information and services to them. The banks need to retain and enhance their credibility by providing a single version of answers to real time inquiries via different channels. BIS Review 13/2008  5  9.1.2 Multi-channel coordination, interbank payments, debit cards and Internet banking all drive customers to demand real time core banking services. Historically, banks have pursued a product-centric strategy and their IT architecture tends to reflect that mindset which has resulted in the application of ad hoc and stand alone systems. Some banks appear to have unrealistic fears regarding core system replacement.

Jean-Pierre Roth: No frontiers in monetary policy – from the fight to avoid internationalisation of the currency to the internationalisation of monetary policy Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Institute of International Studies, Zurich, 6 May 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  In view of the challenges with which it has been faced, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) demonstrated its adaptability time and again. Over the past thirty years, for instance, it abandoned its endeavours to prevent the use of the Swiss franc as an international currency. Moreover, it has gradually incorporated international elements into its monetary policy strategy and its monetary policy instruments. The goal when making these adjustments was always to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in order to protect the country from any inflationary trend. In managing the current crisis, both the internationalised monetary policy strategy and the internationalised policy instruments have served the SNB well thus far. BIS Review 552009  1
It therefore comes as no surprise to hear the view expressed that the capital controls should be maintained on a more permanent basis. This is not as attractive an option as might appear at first glance, however. In the first place, liquid capital cannot be kept here forcibly for an indefinite period of time. The controls are a violation of various international agreements signed by Iceland. They are tolerated as long as Iceland follows the economic Recovery programme supported by the IMF, and thus indirectly by the member states of the EEA, OECD, and the Fund itself. Soon after this programme concludes, the controls will likely have to disappear; i.e., if the Icelandic government does not wish to renege on international treaties it has ratified. Eventually, frozen capital will have to be allowed to go wherever it wishes. Second, long-term confidence cannot be established as long as uncertainty exists as to how much capital is tied up in ISK assets simply because of the capital controls. This uncertainty will not dissipate fully until they are removed. Until that time, there is a risk that it will restrain foreign investment, which is a premise for export-driven economic recovery. Third, the hefty profits that can accrue to parties that circumvent the capital controls undermine business ethics and create a competitive advantage vis-à-vis those who abide by the law. The controls prompt individuals and firms to devote efforts to seeking ways to circumvent them, resulting in waste of resources and excess cost in the economy in the longer term.

In my opinion, a balance must be sought between the structure of ownership of a credit institution in resolution and the origin of the public funds which may be used in the process, with home country fiscal authorities covering the majority of the proceeds, once the asset quality review has proven that host country supervision was carried out correctly and effectively. I hope that an appropriate solution will be found to this matter, the same as in the case of the concerns voiced by some non-euro area countries in the early stages of the Banking Union project. What I have in mind is the issue of the representation in the decision-making mechanisms and that of the contribution requirements in the event of their opting in the Banking Union. Both concerns have been addressed during the negotiations. Specifically, the unequal status of non-euro area countries in the single supervisory mechanism decision-making bodies – given their lack of representation in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, even though they enjoy representation in the Supervisory Board – has been addressed by establishing a mediatory body which would intervene in case a decision of the Supervisory Board is overturned by the Governing Council. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Furthermore, the current decision-making setup of the Single Resolution Mechanism ensures equal treatment of the countries participating in the Banking Union, regardless of whether they are Eurozone countries or countries that have established “close cooperation”.
I should say up front that the split between “global” and “domestic” sources of inflation is not, strictly speaking, an entirely clean one4. And I don’t really buy the argument one sometimes hears that monetary policy can’t do anything about the first – “imported” inflation, as it’s sometimes called – purely because it’s unable directly to affect the source of it. As the MPC cannot affect the global supply of oil, for example – this is how the argument goes – then it can’t do anything about an inflation caused by rising oil prices, even if that were to continue for a long time. That’s true, of course. But it’s also true of just about everything that might otherwise affect inflation, including the many domestic influences. Policy has no direct control over those, either. As long as you’ve got a floating exchange rate there’s nothing about being an open economy (and therefore subject to swings in import prices) that prevents monetary policy from controlling overall inflation, at least over the medium term. What being an open economy might mean, in the  Chart 6. Goods price inflation tends to be more volatile and less persistent than services inflation  shorter run, is that inflation is more volatile. That’s because prices of traded goods tend to be more volatile (Chart 6). And it’s here that the distinction is more significant. Take oil prices as an example.

These move around a lot more than those of non-traded goods and services and often have a significant and fairly immediate impact on the CPI. But that impact also tends to dissipate relatively quickly, after a year or so. And it’s for this reason, not because a change in interest rates can’t affect the supply of oil (obviously), that the orthodox response of monetary policy to a change in oil  Volatility measured as standard deviation over the sample (annual data 2001-21). Persistence measured as the lagged coefficient of a first-order auto-regressive model. Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. prices is in the first instance to look through it. By the time policy could really do anything to offset such a rise, allowing for the delay between action and effect, the direct impact on inflation would largely have disappeared. It’s in this context that, referring to the current surge in tradable goods prices, several policy makers have used the word “transitory”. By that they do not mean (and never meant) that these effects will be gone in one, two or even twelve months. As we saw at the start, thanks to the protracted way in which developments in wholesale markets feed through to the Ofgem cap, the recent jump in wholesale gas prices will directly 4  My predecessor Charlie Bean explained this point very clearly in a talk in Jackson Hole in 2006. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  6  boost CPI inflation in the UK for twelve months.
For instance, Norwegians could only purchase foreign equities through a fixed pool established in the 1960s (by using the so-called “security dollar” market), and foreigners’ investments in Norwegian equities were strictly regulated and actually limited to NOK 50 000 per person until 1979. That ceiling was raised to NOK 1 million in 1979. Experiences over the past year may cast doubt on the effectiveness and benefits of international capital markets. Nevertheless, history has seen a number of deep financial crises, and it is my belief that market conditions will also return to normal this time. I am confident that private entrepreneurship and public limited companies will continue to exist as the primary organisational bodies for commercial activities. Owners and investors will also be needed in the years to come. But capitalism will have to adapt. After all, the willingness to trust the free play of market forces in finance has been seriously impaired. International stock exchanges lost more of their value in 2008 than in any other single year in recent history. Absolute results, especially with regard to equities, were highly unusual. Many investors have suffered losses. As a result of this experience, required returns will be higher in the future. An investor such as the Government Pension Fund – Global will earn more in the long term because of wide fluctuations in equity values. 1  2  National Transport Plan 2010–2019 (St.meld.nr.16 (2008-2009). BIS Review 68/2009  The Fund has a longer investment horizon than the vast majority of other market participants.

And one of the most important duties of a central bank is to safeguard the financial system. In a crisis, that means acting as lender of last resort, supplying emergency loans to financial institutions when normal funding isn’t available. The U.S. Treasury Department and other federal agencies were also doing all they could to shore up the financial system. Now, I know that this financial support to big banks and Wall Street firms made many people irate, especially when so many Americans were losing their jobs or their homes. We should remember, though, that ordinary people suffer terribly when the financial system breaks down. The ultimate goal of our programs was to avert a major depression and much higher unemployment. Because of these programs, we were able to avoid a meltdown of the financial system and head off a depression. But we couldn’t prevent a terrible recession. The shock waves from the burst housing bubble and the financial crisis were simply too great. As it happens, it’s normal that severe recessions and sluggish recoveries follow financial crises.1 Research at the San Francisco Fed and other places shows that downturns following financial crises are much more severe when the preceding expansions had unusually rapid growth of credit and leverage.2 When the credit pendulum swings, it takes many years for household and business spending to return to normal. And, in fact, there was extraordinary credit growth before the recession.
Fiscal stabilization adopted in 1976, later associated to a new fixed exchange rate experiment with financial liberalization, without proper regulation and supervision, resulted in only temporary inflation control, a generalized collapse of the banking system and a profound economic recession. By 1985, the main macroeconomic concerns were to regain fiscal order, normalize external payments, restore the financial system and prevent the acceleration of inflation. In 1989, a new Central Bank’s Constitutional Organic Law was enacted that mandated it to secure monetary stability and domestic and external payments, and granted it considerable autonomy to comply with this mandate. When the renewed Central Bank began operating in 1990, inflation was close to 30% per annum. The new autonomous Board designed a strategy to gradually bring down the inflation rate and adopted, beginning in January 1991, a partial regime of explicit inflation targets announced each year. All that took place in a context of a foreign exchange band that still lacked the institutionality and transparency that any full-fledged inflation targeting regime must have. Despite these limitations, the Central Bank  1/5  was very successful in achieving inflation rates very near its annual goals, along a gradual but monotonic convergence path to single-digit inflation. Average annual inflation dropped from 12.1% in the five years from 1991 to 1995 to 4.8% in 1996-2000. With the adoption of a floating exchange rate in 1999, the inflation target emerged as the only nominal anchor of monetary policy.

Vittorio Corbo: Monetary policy under inflation targeting in Chile and around the world Speech by Mr Vittorio Corbo, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the ninth annual conference of the Central Bank of Chile, “Monetary policy under inflation targeting”, Santiago, 20 October 2005. *  *  *  Dear First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Dear Central Bank Governors, Dear Central Bank officials, professors and economists visiting from abroad, Dear friends, I am very pleased to welcome you to this Ninth Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, which has become a traditional event in the discussion of central banking policies and for the economic development of our countries. This Annual Conference focuses on the subject “Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting,” the monetary system that is gradually being adopted in countries around the world. I am not surprised at the great participation of central bankers from inflation targeting economies in this Conference. Thank you so much for coming down. This year, our annual conference coincides with the eightieth anniversary of the creation of the Central Bank of Chile. The occasion calls for a brief retrospective account of our Bank, which will help to better understand its path to the present monetary policy framework in Chile. Next I will review some of the challenges facing monetary policy in Chile today, which motivate several of the topics that will be discussed during this conference, which I will also list shortly later on.