samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The first is that since the referendum there has already been a material hit to the supply side of the economy in the form of a reduction in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which is the efficiency with which companies put their labour and capital inputs to use. This would reduce output per worker, and hence real wages. It would also reduce future profitability, thus deterring investment. A reduction in TFP would have a lasting effect on productivity and hence the supply side of the economy, reducing the rate at which it can grow without generating above-target inflation. Like most economists I expect Brexit to have a negative impact on TFP for a variety of reasons, including the need to reallocate resources toward supplying new customers or new products, and the general effect of  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  2  reduced openness . But these are effects that, like the effects of capital deepening on productivity, will tend to either build over the long run or only really take hold after our trading arrangements have changed. So, while they can be expected to have a material impact on productivity by the end of the MPC’s forecast horizon, I’m not convinced they can fully account for the additional weakness in productivity we have already seen. It shrank by 0.2% in the year following the referendum compared to growth of 0.5% on average in the preceding seven years.

Realised losses related to these investments have, as mentioned above, have been limited. The flipside of large book losses is that this portfolio has a high return, reflecting not only the increase in credit risk but also high liquidity premiums and fears and uncertainty in the market. The return, measured as the difference in the effective interest rate between the actual portfolio and the benchmark portfolio, is now close to two percentage points. History has seen a number of deep financial crises, and market conditions will return to normal in time. The final results of the management of the Fund’s fixed income portfolio since the beginning of the financial crisis cannot be deduced from the quarterly results while the crisis is at its peak. Values are not lost as long as borrowers fulfil their obligations. The Fund is prepared to retain ownership of a large volume of bond holdings until they mature in a few years. Moreover, unless the economic outlook goes from bad to considerably worse, the Fund will record a substantial excess return in the years ahead. Conclusion The Norwegian Pension Fund has been hard hit by the crisis. Norges Bank’s management results in 2008 were weak in both absolute and relative terms. Relative returns were significantly worse than might have been expected based on the investment strategy chosen. In the management of the fixed income portfolio, the crisis in the financial system revealed that risk exposure in the various mandates was not sufficiently independent.
I would also like to share with you some thoughts on each session, which – far from pre-empting future discussions – aim to spur the debates with our audience. The first topic today concerns the challenges of conducting monetary policy with large public debts. Numerous questions arise including fiscal dominance, the trade-off between debt sustainability and fiscal discipline, multiple equilibria and financial instability. First, I will comment briefly on how high public debt increases the risk of fiscal dominance on monetary policy. Low interest rates may very well be justified by specific business cycle conditions or risks of undershooting the inflation target. They also facilitate the sustainability  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  of higher public debts. Hence the need to ascertain whether risks related to public debt sustainability considerations might in turn jeopardize price stability. Another paramount risk of very low interest rates is to entertain the illusion that governments can continue to borrow rather than make difficult and yet necessary choices and indefinitely put off the implementation of structural reforms. Such risks are very real in the euro area. Very high public debts are also a factor of financial fragility. Market participants therefore expect central banks to intervene on public debt markets to safeguard financial stability. Indeed, in extreme circumstances a central bank should mitigate the effects of confidence shocks on sovereign yields by purchasing government bonds.

Admittedly, our objective as regulators remains relatively simple: it should be primarily to ensure that financial institutions, infrastructures and markets properly do their job of smoothly and efficiently channelling savings into productive investments. Yet our task is difficult as finance constantly evolves as a result of technological advances or as an answer to regulatory changes. This should prompt us to be both resolute and cautious in dealing with many questions such as whether there is an optimal mix of bank and market financing. The financial crisis has indeed revealed at least three major failures of our financial systems, be they bank or market oriented: excess leverage, excess complexity and excess opacity. Corrective actions have been implemented in these three areas. First, over the past few years, Basel III and various national or regional initiatives have led to a sizeable recapitalization of the banking system and especially SIFIs [systemically important financial institutions]. In the euro area, the Comprehensive Assessment of the balance sheets of 130 major banks shows how much progress has been made. Second, major reforms have been undertaken in order to facilitate the orderly resolution of large and complex financial institutions, thus providing better incentives ex ante to these large financial conglomerates. Such progress can be seen both in Europe, where the Banking Union is a major step forward, as well as abroad. Last, the scope of regulation has been extended to products and markets that remained too opaque in spite of their systemic relevance, such as some major classes of OTC derivatives.
The Bank of Albania - in its recent analyses - has been underlining the fact that its monetary policy has been a careful, financial, budgetary policy, where special emphasis has been given to the budget expenditures control versus the realized revenues ratio. Consequently, the government’s liquidity needs, up to the present moment, have been completely covered by the banking system, and therefore, the Bank of Albania financing was unnecessary. Under these circumstances the fiscal pressures on the monetary policy are weak. Following this reasoning, it could be concluded that the move of both policies (monetary and fiscal) has been in harmony and in conformity with the general economic-financial development program of the country. Domestic budget deficit financing from the banking system during 2003 is estimated to be almost at the same level as the one of 2002, being about 2.2 percent of the GDP. The stable level of the internal government borrowing, facing the rapid increase of Lek deposits, was another factor, which influenced the immediate reduction of treasury bills interest rates. The monetary policy of 2003 has continued to be careful, characterized by smoothing tendencies. This is reflected in the reduction of interest rates three times throughout the year. Watching attentively the inflation performance and the liquidity indicators in the banking system, the Bank of Albania reduced, all in all, the Repos rate by 1.5 percentage points during 2003, bring it by the end of October at the pre-crisis liquidity level of the previous year.

Table 1: General economic indicators 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003*  Real growth of the GDP (in %)  9.1  -10.3  12.7  8.9  7.7  6.8  4.7  6.0  Number of employees (in thousand)  1,116  1,107  1,085  1,065  1,068  920.5  920  927  Unemployment percentage  12.4  14.9  17.8  18.2  16.8  16.4  15.8  15.2  17.4  42.1  8.7  -1  4.2  3.5  2.1  3.0  M3 aggregate growth  44  28  21  22  12  20  6  9.5  M3 aggregate velocity  1.82  1.72  1.92  1.73  1.64  1.51  1.58  1.66  MoB growth  14  52  -6  19  22  20  10  -3.3  New credit to the economy (Lek billion)  7.4  3.98  5.8  8  24  40.6  62.6  70.6  Inflation percentage (y-o-y)  Lek deposits (Lek million)  72,831  89,495 130,940 158,326 165,261 186,211 193,886 223,500  Budget deficit (in % of the GDP)  -11.4  -13.2  -11.3  -11.9  -9.1  -8.3  -6.2  -4.6  Domestic debt (in % of the GDP)  30.7  36.18  35.12  36.31  41.01  39.42  38.49  39.1  Current account (in % of the GDP)  -11.5  -12.03  -6.12  -7.34  -7.1  -6.1  -8.9  -8.5  Internal debt (in % of the GDP)  29.2  33.2  31.8  29.1  30.2  28.2  24.9  23.7  Average exchange rate lek/usd  104.5  148.9  150.6  137.7  143.7  143.48  140.15  123.1**  146.9  132.58  128.5  132.4  137.9**  Average exchange rate lek/euro  Note:* The GDP calculation is made by INSTAT with a different methodology, only for 1996-2000.
For a beneficiary who has an account within the same bank with the payer, which is known as Intrabank, the funds will be credited instantaneously. The program for today includes the showing of three video clips on online banking and IBG, which can be downloaded through YouTube and ABM and AIBIM’s website, including presentations by two banks. In addition, 17 banks and MyClear (the national payment system operator) have also set up exhibition booths to showcase their respective electronic payments and funds transfer solutions. This is indeed an opportunity not to be missed as you will be able to learn and ask questions about online banking solutions and sign up for the special offers such as free security tokens or waiver of monthly subscription fee for business Internet banking as provided by some of the exhibitors today. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In conjunction with today’s roadshow, I am pleased to announce that 2 banks namely, Bank Simpanan Nasional and OCBC Bank, together with 8 banks in Temerloh1 in Kuantan will hold their “Open Day” from today, 2 December until this Friday, 6 December. During the weeklong “Open Day”, visitors can enquire and learn more about e-payment solutions from the branch staff. The “Open Day” event is open to all businesses and the general public to complement the efforts of the roadshow to reach out to smaller towns and I encourage all participants to take this opportunity to visit the bank branches in Kuantan and Temerloh.

Based on the “Open Day” events held in 8 towns in 4 states for the past 2 months, more than 900 (911) banks’ customers have signed up to use the online banking services. For information of all participants, to date, cheques are still widely used in our country. Based on the last 3 years data, an average of 205 million cheques amounting to about RM2 trillion are issued on an annual basis. In terms of the number of cheques over the country’s population, or cheques per capita, it is at 7.1. This figure is much higher than 3.9 in advanced countries such as Norway, Finland and Australia. It is also worth noting that 92% (or 18.4 million) of the total adult population in Malaysia have banking accounts and of these, about 74% (13.7 million) of bank account holders have Internet banking accounts. However, although 74% of the bank account holders have Internet banking access, only 43% (5.9 million) of the Internet banking subscribers are active users in conducting financial transactions. In this regard, we have not reached a stage where the masses are familiar or have gained sufficient trust in using Internet banking to conduct their financial transactions. It is through educational programs such as this roadshow event that we hope the businesses will take the opportunity to learn more about the security safeguards and safe practices to gain sufficient confidence to adopt online banking and conduct e-payments.
March MPC  May MPC  August MPC  per cent 6 5  20-year 10-year  4  5-year  3 2  3-year 1 0 Jan 2009  Apr  Jul  Oct  Chart 3 – Gilt-OIS spreads  basis points 40 US 20 0 -20  Euro Area  -40 UK  -60 -80  Mar 2009  BIS Review 126/2009  Jun  Sep  7  Chart 4 – Sterling investment grade corporate bond spreads  Basis points 800  March MPC  700  Dollar  600 500  Ste rling 400 Euro  300 200 100 0  Aug Nov Feb 2007 08  May  Aug  Nov  Feb 09  May  Aug  Chart 5 – UK equity prices 4000  FTSE All -Share  3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  8  BIS Review 126/2009  Chart 6 – UK PNFC’s Cumulative equity and debt issuance  70 average 2003-2008 60 2009  40  £ bns  50  30 20 10 0 Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug Sep  Oct  Nov Dec  Chart 7 – International 3-month LIBOR-OIS spreads  Basis points 400 Sterling US dollar Euro  350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0  Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr 2007 08 09 10  BIS Review 126/2009  9  Chart 8 – Nominal GDP and broad money growth percentage changes oya 20 M4-Intermediate OFCs  15  10  5 GDP 0  -5  -10 1987  10  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  BIS Review 126/2009

Encik Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Shaping the future starts now Speech by Mr Encik Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the launch of the Financial Management for Retirement Module "Shaping the future starts now", Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2017. * * *  Importance of financial literacy There is a growing concern on the low financial literacy level of Malaysians as measured by financial knowledge, attitudes and behaviours. Based on the Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand Side Survey conducted by Bank Negara Malaysia in 2015, the main observations on the state of financial literacy of Malaysians can be described by: a. First – the majority of Malaysians have inadequate knowledge on financial matters to enable them to make informed financial decisions, particularly among the vulnerable groups; b. Second – a significant majority of Malaysians display short-sighted tendencies and are inclined to ‘live for the moment’ – that is to only focus on instant gratification at the expense of long-term financial planning; c. Third – more than 75% of Malaysians find it difficult to even raise RM1,000 to meet emergency needs; d. Fourth – only a quarter of Malaysians have any form of investment; and e. Fifth – most Malaysians indicated that they will face financial pressure should there be a loss of income. Therefore, building the financial capability and literacy of Malaysians is certainly a priority for the nation.
Insofar as the legal provisions of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/3893 are more general, its practical application raises many issues that require additional clarification. To this end, in 2019 4. the European Banking Authority (EBA) established a Working Group on APIs under PSD2 Within this group, representatives of the EBA, the national competent authorities, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank consult the market participants (banks, third party providers and industry organisations) and identify potential practical implementation problems and possible solutions thereof. Based on the consultations, by 31 July 2021 the EBA has published clarifications on 31 issues relating to the practical application of the requirements for APIs. With the aim of converging the supervisory practices among the Member States of the European Union, in June 2020 the EBA published its Opinion on obstacles under Article 32(3) of the regulatory technical standards on strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication (EBA/OP/2020/10)5. The work on the raised issues is still going on via the Q&As published by the EBA6. The Bulgarian National Bank, in its capacity as a regulator, has active communications with the market participants with the aim of improving the functionality of the dedicated interfaces already 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  built by the banks in the country. The process is developing in line with the European progress and in compliance with the legal framework, the opinions and clarifications published by the EBA.

This internal consistency explains why monetary policy is the only part of the EMU framework that has clearly functioned as designed. Fiscal policies were supposed to conform to the other form of governance, where countries would decide on and execute their own budgets, but within the strict constraints of the deficit and debt limits set in the Treaty. Those limits were supposed to be policed by markets, the Commission and other Member States, but in practice the incentives of the latter to enforce the rules were weak. This meant that de facto rules could be applied with discretion, while Member States themselves decided on how to exercise that discretion – in other words, the worst combination of the two forms. The result was that fiscal positions diverged significantly, which then created substantial spillovers for other euro area members. But perhaps more fundamentally, internal inconsistency meant that fiscal policy itself became ineffective in several jurisdictions. A number of governments either did not have the fiscal space to absorb the shock they faced in the early stage of the crisis, or they were unable to maintain the trust of the market when investors finally reacted – and over-reacted. Fiscal policy therefore had to effectively give up its stabilisation function – which is vital with a single monetary policy – and switch to convincing investors of debt sustainability. Prudential policies were also supposed to fit the decentralised model, although here the framework was even looser.
Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson: Iceland in a global setting Keynote speech by Mr Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the Euromoney conference on the Nordic Financial Markets and Investment Opportunities, Stockholm, 13 September 2002. *  *  *  Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to participate in this ambitious conference on the Nordic Financial Markets and Investment Opportunities. I will in my remarks today mainly focus on aspects relating to Iceland. Size separates Iceland from the other Nordic Countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Other factors separate the Nordic Countries as well. Finland is a member of the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU, as well. Denmark and Sweden are members of the European Union but are outside the EMU. Norway and Iceland are outside the European Union but maintain very close ties to it, particularly through the European Economic Area Agreement. That agreement makes Norway and Iceland a part of the single market of the European Union, which entails among other things that they are obliged to maintain financial market legislation, which fully conforms to that of the European Union. The Nordic Countries have different monetary regimes. Finland is a member of the EMU, Denmark is linked to the EMU through an ERM II agreement entailing that the Danish krona is very closely tied to the euro. Sweden, Norway and Iceland have chosen an inflation-targeting regime as their monetary framework (Iceland in March 2001).

Between now and the 15 November, the Bank will therefore be running a consultation programme that will provide the public with a greater familiarity with polymer banknotes. The consultation will, in turn, provide us with a better understanding of the public’s views on the proposed change and whether such a change would meet with broad public acceptance. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We will be holding around 50 events across the UK to enable the public to see and feel examples of polymer notes, and to deliver feedback to the Bank. We will hold events in 13 major shopping centres to allow shoppers to see and handle specimen notes. And we will be running over 30 discussion events with audiences including regional chambers of commerce and retailers. A market research company will separately be conducting another 36 focus groups and carrying out a face-to-face survey with 2,000 people to collect further feedback. We will also publish a range of useful material on our website including a facility for the public to provide feedback directly to us. And there will be a specific display about polymer in the Bank’s museum for anyone visiting London who wishes to learn more. In parallel with the public consultation we will conduct further outreach with the cash handling industry, to confirm our understanding of the impact on industry of a switch to polymer.
Free international trade was supposed to open countries up and create prosperity, and democracy and Western values would then find their way in. The US Marshall Plan marked the beginnings of this policy, as we Icelanders know from our own experience. In past decades, almost all countries  were invited to enter into commercial cooperation even if they did not satisfy Western human rights criteria – and even if they had plenty on their conscience. The invisible hand would lead them in the right direction. The end of the Cold War after 1990 was considered virtually a total victory for this policy. There was an awakening of optimism that globalisation would guarantee world peace because war was so costly. This was best encapsulated in the Golden Arches Theory propounded in 1996 by columnist Thomas Friedman, who noted that no two countries would go to war with one another if both had McDonald’s franchises. But the Golden Arches Theory was debunked a mere three years later when NATO began bombing Serbia, where McDonald’s had opened in 1988. I went to the US to study for my doctoral degree in 1995, when optimism was at its high-water mark and the reigning belief was that we economists could solve the problems of the world with the help of the invisible hand. Many people probably have difficulty envisioning economists as idealists, given that the field is well known as the dismal science and has often been criticised for callousness and materialism.

Many approaches were tried, some proved their worth, while others were abandoned. The establishment of these monetary institutions was not a constant reinvention of the wheel; rather, progress was evident. The sound institutions that have grown in this way represent valuable capital for our country and have made a significant contribution to Switzerland’s prosperity. I feel that it behoves us to become familiar with the history of our monetary and currency institutions. This is true not just for the employees of the SNB, but in particular for them. In fact, this was the original idea behind Professor Baltensperger’s book, namely to improve employees’ knowledge of Switzerland’s economic history. Or, expressed in a different way: To encourage them to “become familiar with the ground on which we lay our foundations”. On the initiative of the former Chairman of the Board, Jean-Pierre Roth, an internal seminar on the history of the Swiss currency in the 19th and 20th centuries was organised in the autumn of 2008 and in the spring of 2009. It became clear that no work yet existed which covered the entire period of the history of the Swiss franc. It was this realisation that laid the foundation for this book. The book was ultimately written by expanding on the material derived from the internal seminar. As you will be able to conclude for yourself after reading the work, the result can certainly be considered a resounding success. The book by Professor Baltensperger is a beautifully illustrated work with fascinating contents.