samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Hence, the banking sector relies heavily in domestic deposits, both in national and foreign currencies, to perform its lending activity. The foreign currency position of the banking sector is quite balanced, as assets and liabilities in foreign currency stand respectively at around 49 percent of total assets, and liabilities of the banking sector to nonresidents (almost entirely in foreign currency) is only 10 percent of total liabilities. The banking sector is well-capitalized and liquid. The capital adequacy ratio stands at around 17 percent, compared to the required minimum of 12 percent. Liquid assets to total assets, is at around 43 percent. In the last 4 years, the average return on equity has been above 20 percent while the average return on assets has been around 1.5 percent. The branch network of the sector counts around 350 branches all over the country. In the last three years mainly, the banking sector has also introduced modern payment infrastructure and products, to allow for increasing usage of electronic payment cards and internet banking. Despite solid performance in the last years the Bank of Albania has been vigilant to point out areas of the banking activity, related with domestic developments that required attention from the banking industry. Until before the appearance of this international financial crisis, we have expressed our concern regarding the rapid increase in lending which, until 2007 reached up to 8-9 percentage points in terms of annual growth to GDP.

We have drawn our plans and the work has been going on for some time. In some cases we can take advantage of our still-remembered experience of the 1992 monetary reform. In other cases, like some settlement-systems-related issues, we must wait for European institutions to make up their minds about the details. There is no doubt, however that technical preparation would not slow us down. IV. In conclusion  Speaking about future developments in Estonia in the light of the challenges shortly discussed above, it is good to bear in mind that policy efforts are necessary also after becoming part of the EU and the EMU. Fulfilling the Maastricht criteria and being 'admitted to the club' cannot be seen as 'the ultimate achievement'. For instance, the recent achievements of the economies of our Nordic neighbours compared to the developments in a wider Europe should make us very aware that there are real advantages in fulfilling the Stability and Growth Pact. I am convinced that EU membership will be beneficial to Estonia. But I am also very sure that Estonia has something to offer to the EU in its turn - some experience on handling issues pertaining to the  BIS Review 42/2003  3  flexibility and mobility of production factors, for example. It is important that Estonia, like every other future EU member state, offer its contribution towards the common goal. 4  BIS Review 42/2003
It would be remarkable if we reported all other circumstances surrounding the forecasts except the repo rate itself, which is the only one of these we take decisions on. Furthermore, it would not be wise to base our forecasts on the market’s forward rate curve in those cases in which our assessment of the repo rate – as at present – deviates from the forward rate curve. We are also careful to point out that the repo rate is a forecast and not a promise. However, our possibilities of steering interest rates further ahead on the repo rate path are highly limited. What we can do is to communicate our own assessment, which is also associated with great uncertainty. The statistics that have been reported after the most recent Monetary Policy Update indicate a stronger development in Sweden than we had expected. According to the National Accounts from September, GDP growth was more rapid in the second quarter of 2010 than was reported in August’s flash estimate. The Economic Tendency Survey and purchasing managers’ index for the manufacturing sector in September were positive and exceeded market expectations. According to the Labour Force Survey, unemployment fell in August by slightly more than we had expected. As regards international developments, however, the situation continues to be uncertain. Statistics and other information are occasionally above and occasionally below expectations. We will not present any new overall assessment of economic developments until after the next Monetary Policy Meeting on 25 October.

The negative gap at the recession’s lowest point in 2009 has been estimated at – 4 per cent by the European Commission and at – 7 per cent by the OECD. The GDP gaps of 2010 and 2011 according to both of these institutions can be disregarded, as their reports were compiled before the summer and, since then, GDP outcomes have been surprisingly high. In its latest report, the IMF reckons with a GDP gap of approximately 2.5 per cent for 2007, followed by a decrease to almost – 5 per cent in 2009 before reaching – 1.5 per cent in 2011. 8 (Figure 5. The GDP gap according to the Riksbank, the OECD, the IMF and the European Commission). All three organisations reckon that potential GDP has fallen in conjunction with the crisis. For example, the OECD estimates that potential GDP has decreased by an average of approximately 3 per cent for the countries in the OECD area, as a consequence of the crisis. Approximately two-thirds of this decrease is due to higher capital costs caused by the return to normal risk and interest rate levels after the abnormally low levels prevailing prior to the crisis, which is having a dampening effect on capital intensity. The remaining third is due to an increase in structural unemployment and a decrease in labour supply. As regards Sweden, the dampening effects of structural unemployment and falling labour supply are deemed to be below average, however.
And the shift towards a multipolar world is in turn reflected in changes to global institutions and fora, as evidenced by the switch in relative importance between the G7 and the G20, and the ongoing governance reforms at the IMF. In line with the shift in economic centre of gravity, the currency constellation in the IMS may also be gradually changing. In particular in light of the remarkable growth of China’s economy and recent policy measures adopted by its authorities, the international use of the renminbi has gained momentum.4 And China’s plans to liberalise its capital account as well as to increase exchange rate flexibility and develop domestic financial markets will enhance the role of the renminbi as an international reserve currency. Some analysts believe that, over time, it can reach international currency status, alongside the US dollar and the euro.5 We would then enter an era of a tri-polar IMS. Unconventional monetary policy Before the global financial crisis the widespread adoption of explicit price stability objectives had been conducive to prolonged low inflation outcomes alongside economic growth. Major central banks were content to invoke the Tinbergen principle, aiming to achieve their primary objective of price stability through a single monetary policy instrument: short-term interest rates. The global financial crisis changed this setting abruptly. Pursuing central bank mandates in a zero lower-bound environment has meant that monetary policy needed to broaden the set of policy instruments at its disposal, including forward guidance and asset purchases by central banks.

After the global financial crisis the correlation rose sharply to 0.6 for the euro area and 0.75 for non-euro area OECD countries. 2  See Ivashina, V., Scharfstein, D.S., Stein J.C. (2012), “Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks”, NBER Working Paper No 18528, November. 3  See Bank for International Settlements (2014), “EME Banking Systems and regional financial integration”, CGFS Papers, No 51. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  cross-border liquidity flows or the US rules for foreign banking organisations may be seen as examples. Such a “de-globalisation” scenario, if confirmed, could become self-validating and have profound effects on the degree of international risk-sharing, spillovers and the global allocation of savings, and therefore on global long-term growth. Shifting economic centre of gravity Since the early 2000s the world has also witnessed impressive growth rates in emerging economies, which have exceeded those in the advanced world. In particular the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have more than doubled their share of global GDP from less than 10% in 2000 to 21% in 2013; similarly, other low and middle-income economies have seen their share increase from 7% in 2000 to 12% in 2013. The rise of emerging economies is also illustrated by the eastward shift of the world’s economic centre of gravity, which is occurring at a faster speed than ever before in human history.
I’m not sure it would cut much ice with parliament’s Treasury Committee if I said I was voting not on the basis of what was going on in the economy right now but instead because of some guidance a few years ago by an earlier MPC. The interpretation of guidance and the potential costs of mistaking the conditional as unconditional I picked out a moment ago a couple of key bits of guidance by the MPC. There were several others. But all of them contained the message that the outlook for interest rates would be dependent on that for the economy and inflation at the time. However, I think it’s clear from the reaction to these episodes that the points we were trying to get across – including this critical point about conditionality – were not universally understood. One particular problem was that, in response to the September 2013 guidance, many commentators appeared to see the 7% unemployment threshold as a sufficient, not just a necessary condition for the tightening policy. We would apparently be “forced” to raise interest rates if unemployment fell below this level, whatever the outlook for inflation at the time. As for the general point about conditionality, it was only two days after the February 2014 Inflation Report that the BBC said: “What is forward guidance?

If it were possible to eliminate or reduce at least one source of unpredictability, wouldn’t that be a good thing? And since the MPC is in control of interest rates why can’t it just tell us what it’s going to do? The problem is that we can’t be sure. Interest rates are not an end in themselves. They’re a means of meeting our objectives: the stabilisation of inflation over the medium term and, subject to that, the stabilisation of economic activity. And because there are lots of unpredictable shocks hitting the economy, things that would otherwise (and often do) move output and inflation around, the appropriate path of interest rates is necessarily unpredictable as well. The skipper of a boat, adapting to a skittish wind, and interested in making the journey as smooth as possible, may have perfect control of the tiller. But that doesn’t mean she can tell you exactly which position it will be in at every point in the future. That will depend on the direction of the wind at the time. It’s not that monetary authorities are unconcerned about expectations of future interest rates. Quite the opposite: these expectations are central to the transmission of policy. We directly determine only one particular – and very short-term – interest rate (what commercial banks get paid on their overnight deposits, or “reserves”, at the central bank). But demand and spending depend more on longer-term interest rates. In the UK, around half of corporate borrowing has a maturity of three years or more.
Time will provide an opportunity for deeper reflection, and it is important that careful thought does come before action. But I would identify three lessons. First, liquidity should be central to the regulation of banks. Regulation worldwide has paid insufficient attention to liquidity, focussing instead on capital. Northern Rock did not face a problem of inadequate capital. But it was vulnerable to a shock that reduced the liquidity in markets for securitised mortgages. Banks need to face the right incentives to manage their funding positions. Smaller banks with reliance on wholesale funding should be encouraged to put in place insurance. We should not, however, expect regulation alone to solve this problem. That is why I think it is so important to create the right incentives. Second, the single largest impediment to dealing with Northern Rock was the absence of a mechanism for intervening pre-emptively in a bank in trouble to separate the retail deposit book – the insured deposits – from the rest of the bank’s balance sheet. The ability to do this is central to the way the US and other systems operate, where the authorities are obliged to step in early – “prompt corrective action” – to protect depositors. One tool at their disposal, currently unavailable in the UK, is a special insolvency law for banks. Legislation to create the powers to deal with a bank in this way seems to me the single most important necessary reform. Deposit insurance is another area that requires change.

Nevertheless, there is much that the government can do to facilitate financial-market development by clearing the way, particularly where this involves markets of a regional nature. Three areas of work in which the HKMA – with various partners – is taking an active role are worth citing here. The first involves the gradual introduction and expansion of renminbi business within Hong Kong, which requires primarily co-operation between the Mainland and Hong Kong authorities at various levels, including both political and technical. The second example is our collaboration with other central banks in the region, under the auspices of EMEAP, on the Asian Bond Fund, which is intended not just to encourage business in the debt market, but also to stimulate regulatory reforms in economies in the region. The third example is our work in encouraging the development of Islamic finance in Hong Kong, through ensuring a level playing field, stimulating interest in Hong Kong among Islamic countries, encouraging product development, and raising market awareness within Hong Kong, particularly through the educational work of the Treasury Markets Association. All of this work looks both to the past and to the future for inspiration. Looking to the past, we have the still-recent experience of the Asian financial crisis, one element of which was the undeveloped state of some of our financial markets, in particular the debt market. Many of the market-development initiatives on which we have been working have been intended to address these deficiencies.
Occasional Paper No 2014, Banco de España, and Box 3.4 of the Annual Report 2019 of the Banco de España for a discussion of the role of a fiscal policy coordinated at European and international level in the current context. 18  receive from the fund over this period is some € billion (around 12.5% of Spain’s estimated GDP in 2020), of which almost half would take the form of direct grants, with the rest in the form of loans. These funds, appropriately channelled towards projects with the ability to transform the Spanish economy and raise its potential growth, will be fundamental to strengthen the economic recovery and reduce the possible permanent consequences of the crisis. In fact, according to Banco de España estimates,8 this fund has the potential to become an important element of support for the recovery and, especially, a unique lever to raise the Spanish economy’s low potential growth rates. Nonetheless, we would be making a huge mistake if we were to think that mere receipt of the funds will be sufficient for our country to extract the greatest possible benefit from them. First, we need to establish the capacity to design and develop a sufficient volume of new projects, so that the funds are not used to finance spending that would have taken place in any case, or to finance projects with limited added value. Second, prompt execution of these projects would help make the Spanish economic recovery more robust, once the constraints imposed by the pandemic are lifted.

Gent Sejko: Address on remittances of the Albania diaspora Welcome address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the high-level meeting on the remittances of the Albanian diaspora, Tirana, 14 December 2018. * * * Your Excellency, Minister Majko, Dear guests and colleagues, It is a special pleasure to open today’s meeting, which takes place after a year of intensive coordinated effort between our institutions toward the achievement of common objectives in relation to remittances of the diaspora, and other important issues. Today, a year after the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, I have the pleasure of noting that the materialization of these efforts has been reflected in the undertaking of a number of commitments and projects in pursuit of the objectives set out below. The importance of remittances to the Albanian economy, to family welfare and to development in general is highlighted in many communications of the Bank of Albania. In this context, during 2018, the Bank of Albania engaged its resources in developments aimed at creating the necessary prerequisites for an efficient channelling of such incomes into the Albanian economy. International initiatives in the field of remittances underline the importance of reducing the costs and increasing the efficiency of remittance services, thus implying the need to intervene in the retail payment market, in both remittance-sending and remittance-receiving countries.
So if, over the past 40 minutes, I have been sufficiently boring then I promise to carry on in that vein. If not, then I promise to mend my ways. References Blinder, A.S., (1987) “Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics for a Just Society”, published by Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Estrella & Mishkin (1998) “Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy: Implications of Model Formulation and Uncertainty”, paper prepared for The National Bureau of Economic Research conference on Monetary Policy Rules, Islamorada, Florida, January 15–17, 1998 Friedman, M., (1968) “The Role of Monetary Policy” American Economic Review, March: 1–17 Keynes, J. M., (1923) “A Tract on Monetary Reform”, published by Macmillan, London Keynes, J. M., (1923) “Notes for Lecture to the National Liberal Club” reprinted in “Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes”, Vol. XIX, Macmillan, London, 1981 King, M.A., (1997) “The Inflation Target Five Years On”, Lecture given to mark the tenth anniversary of the LSE Financial Markets Group Mankiw, N.G., (1998) “Comment” in (eds.) Solow, R.M. and Taylor, J.B. “Inflation, Unemployment and Monetary Policy”, MIT Press, Cambridge, USA Modigliani, F. & Papademos, L., (1975) “Targets for Monetary Policy in the Coming Year”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , No.

2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  ** Since we are in Berlin, allow me to conclude with a European perspective: Europe has not developed global social networks like some important countries. This raises the stakes for the European authorities, if they want a stronger, more autonomous and more innovative European financial sector, to succeed in developing a coherent strategy. We do not have much time to decide this consistent European payment strategy, including EPI and a possible CBDC: one to two years. This makes our today’s discussion still more welcome. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
For a fund such as the Government Pension Fund Global, it is important to be able to stick to the fund's long-term investment strategy in times of turmoil. Changes to the fund's strategy are subject to thorough analysis and political anchoring in the Storting. This governance structure has served us well, and I am sure that it will continue to do so in a more challenging world. With that, I will pass you to my colleague. 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

The established players also have an advantage in that their relationship with the customers gives rise to a certain lock-in effect, that is changing from one service supplier to another, for example from one bank to another, may entail certain costs for the customer. It may be the case that the local branch of the new bank is further from the customer’s home, the legal terms and conditions governing the payment services may be different, the customer service centre may be slower, the personnel may be less friendly and so on. Getting private individuals to change their bank has proved to be much more difficult than expected. The new alternative service must be better than the existing payment service by a broad margin in order to make changing from one service provider to another an attractive prospect. This affects what innovators will be able to charge for their new services, and thus reduces their incentives to launch such services. However, despite such difficulties, there are examples of very successful launches of innovative payment methods. One such example is the introduction of M-PESA in Kenya in 2007. M-PESA is a mobile payment service based on SMS and was launched by the leading mobile operator, Safaricom. One of the points here is that a large part of the population had mobile phones but not bank accounts. The mobile operator thus had a large, well-established circle of customers and thus an advantage.
As I have said time and again, the best contribution that the Central Bank can make to the country’s development is to keep inflation low and stable, providing the grounds for sustainable growth. Thus, the Board will continue to guide its monetary policy so that projected inflation stands at three percent over a two-year horizon. Thank you. Figure 1 Inflation indicators  (annual change, percent)  12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4  12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 06  07 CPI  08 CPIX  09  CPIX1  10  11  CPI w/o foodstuffs and energy  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. Figure 2 Inflation expectations (percent) 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 06  07  08  09  EES at December 2011 FOS 2 year ahea (1) EES 2 year ahead  10  11  90  90  80  80  70  70  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20 06  FOS 1 year ahead (1) EES 1 year ahead  07  08  09  10  11  Perceived IPEC inflation (2) IMCE costs in 3 months (3)  (1) Financial operators survey (FOS) of first half of the month.

For the regions, dots show the median of Bloomberg's survey to analysts on the expeted MPR for June 2011, September 2011, December 2011, March 2012 and June 2012. Chile uses June's EES for the rate expected for July 2011, November 2011, December 2011 and May 2012. (2) Includes the Eurozone, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. (3) Includes Brazil, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Sources: Central Bank of Chile, central banks of respective countries, Bloomberg and the International Monetary Fund. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 5 Real exchange rate (*) (index, 1986=100) 120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70 91  93  95  97  TCR  99  01  03  1991-2010 average  05  07  09  11  1996-2010 average  (*) Information at 14 June 2011. Source: Central Bank of Chile.