samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the same time, the strained financial situation in the public sector points to weak employment growth in local governments in the period ahead as well. Thus, employment growth is likely to be somewhat weaker during the year compared with our December forecast. As early as February, we changed somewhat our outlook for the rate of wage increases as a result of the situation in the labour market. There is reason to expect total rises in wage costs to average around 3.5 per cent in 2004 and 2005, which in terms of average collectively agreed levels leaves little room for more than about 2 per cent on average in the years ahead. The wage bargaining round appears so far to have gone relatively well, but the historical experiences of Swedish wage formation suggest that one should be cautious about assuming that we are home and dry. The parties appear to be far from agreement on a number of issues, and there are risks of conflicts arising. As long as the agreements are reached at moderate levels from an inflation perspective, longer agreement periods are preferable. This would alleviate some future uncertainty and should thereby contribute to a better economic situation. So while employment, measured by the number of hours worked, in the business sector was weaker than expected last year, GDP growth was roughly in line with the Riksbank’s expectations. This means that productivity was higher than anticipated.

It seems unlikely, however, that the upswing could be derailed entirely for this reason. As regards inflationary pressure, there are a number of question marks as I mentioned earlier. We don’t know how long the recent rise in productivity will last. In the inflation outlook that I have presented, some consideration has been given to the new data. At the same time, there are good arguments pointing to both higher and lower productivity growth. The same applies to our view of international inflation. As regards wages, there are also risks on the upside, which are essentially related to the way in which wage formation in Sweden is conducted. It can still not be ruled out entirely that the wage bargaining round will be derailed. Should the outcomes prove higher than expected, it is likely to have an impact on the future level of interest rates. So far I have not said anything about the exchange rate. There may be reason to touch upon this. For a long time, we have expected a krona appreciation that over the course of the forecast period would bring us to levels approximately in line with what we believe to be appropriate in the long term, given mainly the competitiveness of the Swedish economy. During the period 2002-2003 as a whole, the krona strengthened roughly as expected. Recently, however, this strengthening has been curbed. One reason for this appears to be expected relative interest rates, where there has been a certain shift since the autumn.
However, smaller firms are not immune from climate-related financial risk and could be more susceptible if they are particularly concentrated in a vulnerable sector, product or geography. As a guide, small firms and firms with smaller exposures to climate-related financial risk may focus more on a qualitative strategy for adapting to climate change without as much need for quantitative metrics to substantiate their approach, possibly relying on third party metrics. The expectation for small firms with material exposures would be more aligned with the expectations of medium and large firms. Medium and 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  large sized firms, and firms with medium or large exposures to climate risk, should link business strategy changes to scenarios, identifying triggers to modify their strategies. Therefore, an appropriate approach depends on the firm’s business model. A good starting point for smaller firms when undertaking scenario analysis might be to do a qualitative ‘walk-through’ scenario considering a possible sequence of events (shocks and responses) before moving on to quantification. Recognising the wide variety of firms that are expected to respond to SS3/19 in terms of complexity/simplicity of their business model, strategy, size and varying exposures to identified climate-related risks, we decided to provide additional guidance to firms on our use of proportionality in supervising climate-related financial risks.

Without their support, it would have been very difficult to complete this phase of the Survey. Distinguished Guests, As you are aware, the Zambian economy has recorded significant positive developments in the recent past, owing to the wide-ranging economic reforms the Government has been implementing since 1992. The reforms, which are aimed at stabilising the economy and supporting economic recovery for the purpose of reducing poverty among our people, have facilitated increased investment in various sectors of the economy, such as, agriculture, tourism, construction and manufacturing. As you may also be aware, the mining sector has attracted unprecedented amounts of investment in the recent past. Government’s economic reforms since the early 1990s have contributed immensely to the boosting both local and foreign investors’ confidence in the Zambian economy, which is an important pre-requisite for attracting capital flows. The survey findings that we are disseminating today indicate that Foreign Private Capital flows to Zambia in 2007 rose to US $ million from the US $ million recorded in 2001. The 2007 inflows were largely in form of foreign direct investment, borrowing from nonaffiliates (Loans and Trade Credits) and portfolio investment. We believe that the introduction of economic reforms led to a substantial increase in private capital flows, which regrettably, we have not been able to capture on a regular basis due to budgetary constraints. Mr. Chairman, History has taught us that high volatility in private capital flows, if not properly monitored and managed, can induce financial and macro-economic instability in the domestic economy.
The additional tariffs threatened by the US on China and on auto imports more generally would raise average US tariffs to rates not seen in half a century (Table 2). If implemented, they could reduce global GDP by an additional 0.6% through direct trade channels alone (Table 1). 4 5  US tariffs on steel and aluminium and the reciprocated 25% tariff on $ of US imports from China. The hit to global GDP may be cushioned somewhat by trade diversion, which will likely benefit non-China Asian EMEs. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  7  Table 1: Direct effects of tariff increases small but indirect effects potentially far greater Change in level of GDP (%) US  China  Euro area  UK  World (PPP-weighted)  Measures taken in previous years  -0.4  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  Additional US-China tariffs implemented in May and June 2019  -0.5  -0.4  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  Additional marginal reduction in GDP in the event that… US-China raise tariffs on all imports to 25%  -0.5  -0.5  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  US imposes 25% tariffs on all auto imports and all countries reciprocate  -1.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2  -0.4  -2.1  -1.2  -0.6  -0.4  -0.8  Total if all measures are implemented  Sources: Bank calculations. Notes: The table shows the peak impact over a three-year period.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Our private debt has improved – that is to say it has declined – in recent years, and we are now closer to the average for the euro area countries as a whole. Yet even so, despite the emergence in the past three years of a substantial external surplus, our external debt is a factor of vulnerability that cannot be underestimated because, excluding the Banco de España, public and private and bank and non-bank debt refinancing requirements exceed 45% of our GDP each year. Of this volume, around 60% relates to liabilities incurred by financial institutions, slightly more than 20% to general government and marginally less than 20% to non-financial corporations. Given this heavy financial dependence on the external sector, a downturn in the economic growth outlook might have a considerable effect on the terms of such financing and on the effort required to meet the foreign obligations incurred. Improving our external position hinges largely on our competitiveness, that is to say on our productivity. Allow me to elaborate on this point. 4. The improvement in productivity  In the long run, economic growth is essentially determined by gains in productivity.
Christian Noyer: Basel III – CRD4: impact and stakes Introductory speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel (ACP) conference, Paris, 27 June 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to welcome you today to this new conference organised by the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel (ACP). This morning, the conference will be dedicated to the impact and stakes of the Basel III reform and, this afternoon, to the supervision of business practices in banking and insurance. I would like to thank all the participants for the interest they have shown in these crucial exchanges between regulators, supervisors and market participants. This conference is being held against the backdrop of an economic and financial environment that remains very difficult, characterised in particular in Europe by the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. Many questions surround the future of the European banking system, which has already undergone major transformations in the recent period while significant changes in its prudential framework and the organisation of its supervision are currently being reviewed.

Far from putting on the back burner questions concerning Basel III and its application in Europe, that is to say CRD IV and its project to create a “single rule book” for European banks, I believe, on the contrary, these developments underscore the importance of better understanding the current reform and taking time to reflect, in order to ensure that the new framework for banking regulation and the distribution of supervisory responsibilities in Europe will deliver all their expected benefits. Before leaving you to discuss in greater detail the impact and stakes of the Basel III reform, I would like to make a few remarks on this topic in relation to the current environment. 1. Basel III and CRD IV represent a quantitative and qualitative leap aimed at addressing the shortcomings highlighted by the current financial crisis  First, I believe that it would be useful to rapidly place the Basel III reform in its context, in order to fully understand its scope. Basel III is first and foremost a response to the financial crisis that started in 2007. This crisis and the subsequent wave of shocks to the banking system have not merely resulted in a temporary loss of output for the major advanced economies. They have also had a lasting impact on employment, industrial production, the confidence of investors and households, and needless to say on public finances, which make crisis exit even more difficult.
BIS Review 15/2007  19  force of market mechanisms. Taxes that require the polluter to pay and tradable emission quotas are important instruments. When the costs of reduced emission are to be distributed, it will be tempting for countries to act as free riders. Restrictions and taxes that only apply to one country or to a small group of countries do not solve the problem. There are important lessons to be drawn from international trade cooperation in the post-war period, which was also marked by strong conflicts of interest but still made headway through the period. It is still uncertain how serious the impact of gas emissions will be. But once the impact comes into full evidence, it may be too late to take corrective action. There is also the risk that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere reaches such a high level that it exceeds critical values that cannot be reversed. The right approach is therefore to guard against events that may have serious consequences even if there is a small probability of the event occurring. Most of us already pay a certain amount every year to guard against the consequences of events we will hopefully never experience. The cost of curbing global warming can be looked upon as such an insurance premium. Higher transport taxes and increased electricity and energy prices are a small price to pay. 6  Conclusion  I opened by quoting from Rolf Jacobsen.

Deregulation has followed as an inevitable consequence of competitive pressures. Particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries, labour and product market reforms enhanced this structural shift towards a global competitive trading and financial system. This increased flexibility in factor and goods movements coupled with large scale technological innovations led to a boost in productivity which is the ultimate underlying force of potential trend growth. Though the long-term effects of these structural adjustments on the real economy are complex, there is no doubt they have unleashed a powerful dampening effect on prices in many sectors of the economy. Most of you who are present here today are actively engaged in running companies in a global competitive environment. You need no sophisticated economic analysis to tell you that when exposed to fierce global competition, monopoly rents and pricing power decline and prices therefore come under downward pressure. 4. Switzerland: one Country – two Economies  As a small open economy, Switzerland is greatly affected by global cyclical let alone global structural developments. Unfortunately, over the last twenty years, our economy only partly subjected itself to the global market place. It has therefore developed along diverging paths. Our export sector has been fully exposed to the competitive forces of global economic and financial integration. Many of you represent this sector. To remain competitive in the global market place, you have had to innovate your production processes in a continuous attempt to increase your productivity.
Simon M Potter: Challenges posed by the evolution of the treasury market Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2015 Primary Dealer Meeting, New York City, 13 April 2015. *  *  *  I would like to thank Michael McMorrow for his excellent assistance in the preparation of these remarks and colleagues in the Federal Reserve System for numerous insightful comments and suggestions. Welcome to this year’s primary dealer meeting, and thank you for joining us today. As primary dealers, you play an integral role as the Federal Reserve’s counterparties in operations to implement monetary policy, as participants in U.S. Treasury auctions, and as important providers of information on market developments to support the Desk’s monitoring of financial markets.1 Today’s meeting provides us with a valuable opportunity to communicate our expectations for you as our counterparties and to strengthen our important relationship. Today, I’ll discuss the market for U.S. Treasury securities, with a focus on how the market’s structure has changed in recent years. As you all know, the U.S. Treasury market is one of the most important financial markets globally and is valued as a source of safety and liquidity. Indeed, both domestic and global investors, including private sector institutions, retail investors, and foreign central banks, hold Treasury securities at least in part for these reasons. A deep and liquid Treasury market also helps to underpin the U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency.

As I will explain later, the Treasury Market Practices Group has updated its best practices to emphasize the importance of supporting market liquidity as well as avoiding automated trading strategies that create a false impression of market price, depth, or liquidity. In conjunction with those best practices, the TMPG also released a white paper on automated trading that reviews several categories of associated risk, including operational risk, potential systemic counterparty risk, market manipulation risk, and transmission risk. October 15 Let me now turn to the unusual events of October 15. On that day, Treasury yields exhibited extreme volatility, with the benchmark ten-year yield trading in a range of about 35 basis points between the market open and close. This included a sharp decline in yields following the U.S. retail sales report at 8:30 ET that morning, and a highly unusual round-trip in yields just after 9:33 a.m. At that time, the ten-year yield fell about 15 basis points in a five-minute period, before nearly fully retracing that move in roughly the same increment of time. That very short “event window” was a remarkable occurrence in one of the world’s most liquid markets, and likely reflected a unique dynamic on what was already an unusual day. Indeed, the net change on the session as a whole was less than 10 basis points – a small fraction of the extraordinary intraday range that we are still discussing today (see the chart).
“Global Imbalances: Is the World Economy Really at Risk?” Dexia SA. 2  Bartolini, Leonardo and Amartya Lahiri. 2006. Twin Deficits, Twenty Years Later, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 12, no. 7 (October). BIS Review 41/2010  3  estate assets induced entrepreneurs to produce more of those assets. In the housing market, this increase in prices was helped along by the relaxation of loan underwriting standards, which made it easier to obtain a mortgage and become a homeowner. Credit growth was the strongest among households with relatively low credit scores (Chart 5). The homeownership rate rose after being relatively stagnant for two decades (Chart 6). The increased availability of credit to lower income borrowers and the sharp rise in housing values contributed to the rise of consumption as a share of GDP and the decline of the personal saving rate 3 (Chart 7). Now, with the aid of hindsight, it is clear that we built too many houses, invested in too much commercial real estate and overvalued both significantly. The market overshot for several reasons. First, there was rampant speculative behavior. The longer these asset prices continued to rise, the stronger the belief became that they would keep rising in the future. Second, the rise in prices reinforced the initial relaxation of underwriting standards. During the period of rising prices, defaults and loan losses were very low. A homeowner who had difficulty servicing the debt could typically sell the home for a profit and pay off the loan.

In a rather arbitrary exercise I have looked at the return from investing in 7-10 year government bonds in different countries from mid-1986 (selected only because it was the starting point of the particular data set) to the present. The assumption is that the non-dollar currencies were purchased out of US dollars at the outset and changed back at the end, so that the comparison is on a US dollar basis. It emerges that the average annual return for the period was nearly 12% for Australia, 11% UK, 10.5% Japan, 10% Canada, 8% Germany and 6.5% Switzerland - with the US itself at 8%. How many of you would have got this right ex ante? I hesitate to try to draw any profound conclusions from this, other than that, with US inflation averaging about 3%, there was clearly a reasonable real return to be had everywhere. You did not have to be greedy to survive. The argument of the monetarist school that - to put it in a slightly condensed form - monetary factors do not have a lasting effect on real developments, was especially fashionable during the 1970s when governments were criticised for conceding to inflation in the mistaken belief that they could thereby sustain or stimulate activity. Subsequent experience has proved, if anything, that the optimal monetary stance is, quite simply, a continuing steady one, and that variance on either side - whether too tight or too loose and after allowing for any real shocks - may incur lasting economic losses.
We have to closely monitor how fintech evolves and better understand its impact. Our workshop today serves that goal. It brings together fintechs, banks and supervisors, and it allows us all to share our ideas and experience. It helps us to shape our supervisory views and limit potential risks. And it helps the financial industry to provide modern and safe financial products. Such exchanges are vital. I therefore thank all those who are contributing to this event and all those who made it possible in the first place! Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Philipp Hildebrand: Principles for sound compensation practices Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Economic Outlook 2009 (Unternehmer NW-Schweiz), Basel, 23 April 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Most financial institutions viewed compensation systems as being largely unrelated to risk management and risk governance prior to the crisis. Short-term profits were rewarded with generous bonuses with little regard to the longer-term risks taken on behalf of the firm to generate those profits. With hindsight, it should therefore be no surprise that these bonuses fueled the excessive risk-taking that has ultimately undermined the global financial system. It is important for the future stability of our financial system that compensation systems be viewed as an integral part of the risk management system in financial firms, and designed and governed with this in mind. The Financial Stability Board (previously the Financial Stability Forum) has drafted a set of sound compensation principles for large financial institutions with exactly this goal in mind. The Principles were endorsed by the G20 leaders at the London summit earlier this month and aim to be widely implemented by the 2009 remuneration round. BIS Review 50/2009  1