samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, higher oil prices cut into household purchasing power, and the tragedy in Japan is leading to supply disruptions that may dampen growth somewhat in the near-term. Also, conditions in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Japan, the Middle East and North Africa remain uncertain and could worsen, with negative implications for global economic growth. Furthermore, we cannot ignore the risks stemming from the longer-term fiscal challenges that we face in the United States. But in the near-term, the most immediate domestic problems may recede rather than become more prevalent. On the housing side, stronger job growth should lead to more household formation. For example, more young people will be able to move out of their parents’ homes when they get jobs. This trend should provide more support to housing demand. On the state and local side, a rising economy would boost sales and income tax revenue, and help narrow near-term fiscal shortfalls. We also need to remain watchful to ensure that low interest rates do not foster a buildup of financial excesses or bubbles that might pose a medium-term risk to both full employment and price stability. In this regard we monitor interest rates on risky and safer assets. An unusual narrowing of these differences could signal that risk is not being appropriately assessed. These differentials for risk on U.S. assets in general do not seem obviously compressed today. On the inflation side of the ledger, the risk of deflation is greatly diminished.

For Kabwe Municipal Council, the main accountability and responsibility will be to maintain and preserve the tree and its surroundings to ensure that the area is well protected and cleaned. The Bank has also worked closely with Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) who have kindly facilitated the provision of power to enable us light the MUKUYU TREE on a continuous basis. We have also worked closely with the National Heritage Conservation Commission whose input has been invaluable in providing insight into the history and status of the MUKUYU TREE as a national heritage site. On behalf of the Bank of Zambia Board of Directors, senior management and staff and indeed on my own behalf I wish to thank all our partners for the good cooperation and oneness of vision that has culminated in the commemoration and re-launch of the MUKUYU TREE today. Distinguished Guests Before I conclude my speech, I wish to pose a challenge to the general members of the public and in particular to the people invited to grace this occasion today. The MUKUYU TREE has been identified and depicted as a national monument under the Laws of Zambia. By this assignment the tree belongs to all ZAMBIANS, young and old alike. My challenge to you all is to cherish it and preserve it.
7  Gunhild Ecklund (2008): “Creating a new role for an old central bank: The Bank of Norway 1945–1954.” Series of Dissertations 2/2008, BI Norwegian School of Management. 8  There was one parliamentary representative on the board as late as 1983. 9  Ivo de Figueiredo (2007): Henrik Ibsen. Masken [Henrik Ibsen. The Mask], Aschehoug. 10  See Harald Haare (2007): “Clearing and settlement at Norges Bank – a historical review”, Economic Bulletin 4/2007. BIS Review 154/2010  3  Norges Bank’s obligation to convert banknotes into gold was suspended, and the central bank provided funding for increased government activities and other purposes. 11 The gold standard ideal of an independent central bank was abandoned during the war. There was strong credit growth. The discount rate was kept low and there was a surge in government spending, while prices for our exports soared and foreign inflows of gold were substantial. The combination resulted in a boom period followed by a stock market crash, a banking crisis and a fall in monetary value. Francis Sejersted wrote the following about the appointment of Nicolai Rygg as governor of Norges Bank in 1920: “When [Prime Minister] Gunnar Knudsen [in 1920] called Rygg to the position of chairman of Norges Bank’s board, his aim was to secure the services of a strong and knowledgeable man. Gunnar Knudsen suspected an economic storm was brewing, and he suspected something that to a great extent was his own responsibility, namely that monetary policy had been neglected during the war.

The monetary policy framework must be based on sound theory concerning how monetary policy instruments affect the economy – theory that is well supported by experience and research. Otherwise, there is the risk either that goals will be set which monetary policy has little or no chance of achieving or that appropriate policy instruments will not be used. But the problem is that monetary policy transmission changes with developments in the economy and the financial markets and the effectiveness of different policy instruments can change over time. For example, where financial markets are underdeveloped and repressed, the tendency is to use policy instruments based on various kinds of quantitative restrictions such as lending ceilings and to actively use reserve requirements instead of price instruments such as interest rates, which are usually the most effective tool when financial markets are less restricted and more developed. In order to lay the groundwork for further discussion of the monetary policy framework, I will give you a broad sketch of the key points concerning monetary policy efficacy that must be considered when the framework is developed. In order to save time, I will paint with a broad brush and emphasise the points that are most important and are well supported by theory and research – including research on Iceland. In addition, these are key points that remain valid in spite of the experience of the financial crisis. In this context, two aspects are most important.
3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  I have no doubt that the quality of the discussions today will allow us to deepen our understanding of these challenges and, hopefully, to draw some useful conclusions on how to address them from central banks, with an eye on serving our society. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Earnings are obviously following the same trend as in 2007 and reflect the persistent effects of the risks associated with the subprime crisis, with valuation losses on assets and higher risk-related costs. A compound indicator, such as ROE shows a decline in profitability, but it still stands at an average of 14 per cent, compared to 18.9 per cent for the three largest banking groups in the first quarter of 2007. On this point, I would like to put this decline into context. It follows several years of exceptional profits, which raised questions about their sustainability. Despite declining income, the French banking system is still financially sound: the Tier 1 solvency ratio based on original own funds stood at an average of 7.1 per cent for the three largest banking groups at the end of 2007, much higher than the minimum ratio of 4 per cent set under Pillar 1 of the Basel II Accord. Banks increased their solvency ratios in the first quarter of 2008 and the Commission Bancaire attaches a great deal of importance to this effort. The benefits of business diversification, the effectiveness of the measures taken to limit risk exposures and the satisfactory capital levels have also enabled the major banking groups to remain highly rated by the leading international agencies. 2  BIS Review 82/2008  2. The current economic situation calls for vigilance nonetheless, since banks must be ready to cope with new risks that may occur at any time.
However, the most notorious movements in the exchange rate have originated in its fundamentals (figure 7). The recent appreciation of the peso is largely responsible for the lower inflation that will prevail in the short term.2 In our Report’s baseline scenario, CPI inflation will be around 2% annually until early next year, returning to near 3% by the end of 2019. Meanwhile, core inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index excluding Food and Energy (CPIEFE), will be close to 1.5% by the middle of this year. At the same time, we estimate that once these pressures ease and the effects of the narrowing activity gap are more notorious—it is expected to close faster than we thought before—inflation will converge to the policy target during next year (figure 8). In this context, the Board will maintain the current monetary impulse until inflation shows clear signs of converging towards the target. This translates into a similar trajectory to the one that can be deduced from the surveys, that is, an MPR hovering around its current levels for several more months, but that by the turn of 2019 will have already begun a gradual normalization. Such normalization is likely to be completed beyond the monetary policy horizon of 24 months (figure 9). These projections, as always, are subjected to various risks. On the external front, in terms of its impact on local activity, the risk balance is downwards biased. The main risk is the possibility of a sharp deterioration of global financial conditions facing emerging economies.

This is the component of demand that lags the most and, at the same time, contributes to increase potential growth, helping to avoid price pressures and thus generating a more gradual convergence of inflation. Although the latest data shows an improvement in investment, and our projections assume that this variable will increase more than GDP in the 2018/2020 triennium, this is not assured. For it to materialize, some conditions are necessary, including an efficient financial system and authorities maintaining a favorable climate, helping projects to meet the environmental, urban and social standards adopted by the country. It is always important to be aware that investment is very sensitive to changes in the external and internal scenarios and depends strongly on having favorable conditions for projects to develop. In a more medium-term view, even in a scenario where the economy behaves as expected in the coming quarters, the fact that activity grows steadily at a faster-than-expected pace requires some changes of a more structural nature. Under current conditions, it is not possible to think that the Chilean economy can sustain growth rates above 3% to 3.5% in the long term, which is our estimate for trend growth in the medium term. In September of last year, we presented the Senate a document in which we gave an account of the factors producing this estimate of potential growth and possible ways to improve it.
If not addressed, this pro-cyclicality could erode the solvency cushions that banks should be holding against the effects of economic downturns. Addressing this is one of the most important remaining challenges of Basel II and is particularly associated with the implementation of the more sophisticated approaches of the new capital framework. Despite reassuring noises from the Basel Committee, this is not going to be an easy problem to address. Few people, and definitely not banking supervisors, can foresee the peaks and troughs of economic cycles. But our inability to perfectly foretell the future should not be a pretext for inaction. An effective supervisory review process will be critical to create a counter-weight to the cyclical tendencies of the new capital framework, in order to prevent increased incidences of failures and financial instability. Managers of banks and bank directors have an even more important role to play. They have the primary responsibility for identifying and assessing various threats to solvency of their own bank, including the risks that are partially covered or not covered at all under Pillar 1 of the framework. They also need to be cognizant of the cyclicality arising from their quantitative tools and should have sufficient compensatory mechanisms against the cyclicality of regulatory capital requirements. These issues are referred to in Pillar 2 of Basel II. This is what we refer to as “Supervisory CAR”, to address risks not covered or not fully covered by the formulae in Pillar 1.

Second, we are seeing a rapid change in the economic environment, with inflation switching from being very low to being extremely high. History suggests this can leave a scar on expectations. For example, research finds that differences in inflation expectations between people from the former East and West Germany can largely be explained by the lasting effect of the inflation shock after reunification. This contrasted strongly with the perceived norm of zero inflation in the German Democratic Republic and seems to have led former East Germans to over-adjust to an environment of rising prices. [16] This imperative to anchor inflation expectations helps explain why, over the last two policy meetings of the ECB’s Governing Council, we raised our key interest rates by 125 basis points in total. This is the fastest change in rates in our history and it has sent a strong signal of our determination to return inflation to our medium-term target in a timely manner. This major step also took into account the unusually low level of interest rates and the limited risk of overreacting at the start of the hiking cycle. Going forward, the appropriate pace of future rate increases will be decided on a meeting-by-meeting basis. Indeed, as we have repeatedly emphasised, we will remain data dependent in all scenarios. Where rates ultimately settle, and the size of the steps that we move in, will depend on how the inflation outlook evolves as we proceed. Conclusion Let me conclude.
Some of the salient features of the Act, as can be read in the Consultative Paper prepared for this workshop are:   provisions to strengthen the legal basis, ownership and structure of Bank of Zambia as a modern central bank, as well as its primary objective;    provisions relating to adequate power and independence;    provisions relating to all aspects of the relationship between the Bank and Government structures;    institutional arrangements of the Bank including the appointment of governors, directors and auditors, internal budgets, reporting requirements, preservation of confidentiality and handling of possible offences;    adequate mechanisms for good governance and security of tenure for Governors;    measures to better manage and application of monetary policies, including the role of lender-of-last-resort, interest rate policies, exchange rate policies and Bank of Zambia’s involvement in money and foreign exchange markets;    creation of a Monetary Policy Committee; and    accountability to Government, Parliament and the Public. By tabling this draft Act before you the Stakeholders, the Bank of Zambia wants to maximise its consultative process by taking into account your views on this layman’s draft. We encourage constructive debate and assure you that your views will be taken into account before the draft is transmitted to our parent ministry, the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. The Ministry is responsible for initiating the legislative process that shall see this layman’s draft transformed into a Bill and tabled before Parliament for debate.

While it is permissible for AIs to rely on intermediaries to carry out checks on the identity of potential customers and the source of their funds, the ultimate responsibility still rests with AIs to know their customers and their customers’ business. Intermediaries should therefore only be used if the AI is satisfied that they apply due diligence standards and procedures as rigorous as those of the AI itself and are “fit and proper”. It helps in this respect if the intermediary is itself regulated or is the member of a reputable professional body. The AI should monitor the track record of the intermediary and the performance of the accounts that it introduces. All relevant identification data used by the intermediary to verify the customer’s identity should be submitted for review by the AI. This latter requirement is not currently mandated for all intermediaries in our current guideline; and we will need to consider whether this exception is still appropriate. A further issue relates to the treatment of client accounts opened by solicitors or accountants. At present, we allow such intermediaries to rely on professional secrecy codes as a reason for not disclosing the identity of the underlying principals. Non-disclosure may be acceptable in the case of pooled accounts where the funds held by the intermediary are co-mingled at the bank. But where the account is opened on behalf of a single client, the justification is much less clear. Again, this is an area where change may be required.
In Sweden, the Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for supervision and regulation, the Riksbank is responsible for lending of last resort to solvent banks and for promoting a safe and efficient payment system, while the National Debt Office is responsible for the resolution of failed banks. During times of crisis, these authorities cooperate closely with the Ministry of Finance. My point here is that financial-stability policy and monetary policy are quite different, with different objectives, instruments and responsible authorities, the latter with considerable differences across countries. This does not mean that there is no inter-action between them. Financial stability directly affects the financial markets, and financial conditions affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Problems in financial markets may have a drastic effect on the real economy, as the current financial crisis has shown. Monetary policy affects asset prices and balance sheets and can thereby affect financial stability. But the fact that financial-stability policy and monetary policy are conceptually distinct, with distinct objectives and distinct suitable instruments, has to be taken into account when considering the lessons of the financial crisis for monetary policy. In particular, it makes little sense to extend the mandate of monetary policy to include financial stability. 15 What are the specific conclusions for flexible inflation targeting? One important lesson from the financial crisis is that financial factors may have a very strong and deteriorating effect on the transmission mechanism, making standard interest-rate policy much less effective.

Woodford, Michael (2007b), “Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy: Policy Rules in Practice”, in Koenig, Evan, and Robert Leeson, eds., From the Great Moderation to the Great Deviation: A Round-Trip Journey Based on the Work of John B. Taylor, forthcoming. BIS Review 16/2010  9
During the first half of 2006, foreign investors accounted for more than 40 per cent of the investment in commercial property. From a stability perspective, there are both advantages and disadvantages to foreign investors being active in the Swedish property market. The advantages include the fact that a larger number of investors means that the risks are spread better and the property market becomes more liquid. However, one disadvantage with foreign ownership is that the contagion risk from other countries to the Swedish property market increases. For instance, an international investor may sell Swedish property to cover losses made in another part of the world. In this way, commercial property prices in Sweden may change without any actual change in the domestic economy. Prices for office premises have risen in all of the metropolitan regions since 2005 (Figure 2). However, cyclically-related factors such as rents and vacancy ratios have not altered to a corresponding degree. Ever since the property crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, prices and rents have almost gone hand in hand, but this trend now appears to have been broken. Real prices increased during the third quarter by 36 per cent on an annual rate in Stockholm, 32 per cent in Göteborg and 11 per cent in Malmö. During the same period, rents rose by between 1 and 1.5 per cent in these three cities and the vacancy ratio remained in principle unchanged.

Responding to a question by Investor.bg, BNB says that given the lev’s fixed exchange rate, delaying the entry into ERM II cannot create direct financial and macroeconomic risks for the Bulgarian economy. Could the opposite happen, however? Is it possible for ERM II membership to be negative for Bulgaria if it comes during unfavourable times for the European economy? To put it in different words, should we be in a hurry for the eurozone or should this goal be consistent with the conditions and trends for the time being? We should follow our strategic plan with a focus on the quality of the process. Due to the nature of our monetary regime, based on a fixed exchange rate, as well as our firm commitment to not change it until country’s eurozone accession, our currency being part of ERM II will not lead to any changes in our macroeconomic position. The direct effects will be rather positive, such as increasing Bulgaria’s credit rating and improving the overall investment environment. Spanish economist Daniel Lacalle told Bloomberg TV Bulgaria in an interview that he believes the ECB’s policy of stimulation has long exhausted its efficiency and the only thing it is currently doing is to transfer funds from productive to non-productive sectors of the economy. Lacalle also recalls that negative interest rates have played a significant role in Japan’s difficulties with inflation and growth. What’s your opinion? Is there a risk for the eurozone to get into the Japanese scenario? The global economic environment is far from being conventional.