samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
My overall assessment in April was therefore that the repo-rate path from February was still appropriate. This entails a very expansionary monetary policy with a negative real repo rate for most of the forecast period. As I have mentioned, we saw indications at our meeting in April that the fall in growth at the end of last year was temporary, and we revised up our assessment of growth in the first quarter of this year. Since the monetary policy meeting we have received quite a lot of new information. For example we now know that Swedish exports of goods increased slightly during the first quarter after the steep fall in the fourth quarter of last year. According to Statistics Sweden’s figures, employment was higher and unemployment lower than in our most recent forecast. The National Institute of Economic Research’s Economic Tendency Survey also showed a large increase during the first quarter and the retail trade index, which rose strongly in February, continued to rise in March. All in all, new information received since the most recent monetary policy meeting shows no tendency to revise the forecast for Swedish growth during the first quarter. Still, I will wait to make an overall assessment of the new statistics until our next monetary policy meeting in July. Monetary policy in uncertain times I have described my views of the situation in Sweden and abroad.

Efforts are now underway in a variety of contexts to try to secure better coordination in these various initiatives, but it has to be admitted that in an ideal world they would not be quite so clustered together. That said, I would be the first to acknowledge that Basel II requires heavy investment in risk management systems and IT infrastructure, as well as radical changes in the risk management culture at some banks. However, this is a healthy development. I suspect that banks would have in any case needed to make most of the so-called "Basel II-related" investment if they wanted to stay at the top of their game. By agreeing to accept banks' internal risk management systems as the basis for the calculation of regulatory capital requirements, the Basel Committee has provided a powerful incentive for banks to upgrade their risk management systems. But this is only what they otherwise would have needed to do to be able to compete with the best. There are, however, some quite specific challenges for Asian banks in using the more advanced approaches under Basel II. One of the most important is the availability of data. Historically, many Asian banks have not collected the data needed to develop the type of models needed for IRB purposes. Some are only now starting to do so, and it will be several years before they have sufficiently rich data that it can begin to inform their credit risk management processes.
This is especially valid with respect to the area of macro-prudential tools and instruments, in view of the significant differences across countries in their initial conditions or stages of development and convergence. Starting with the obvious focus of interest for every central bank – namely monetary policy – I would like to remind you that the BNB is among the few central banks in the world with such recent know-how in two remarkably contrasting monetary policy regimes. Since the start of transition from the centrally planned economy 25 years ago and the restoration of the traditional two-tier banking system in Bulgaria, we initially practiced discretionary monetary policy, and then after our crisis, we introduced the currency board arrangements in 1997. In addition to conducting monetary policy aimed at maintaining price stability, the BNB was traditionally entrusted with the regulation and supervision of the Bulgarian banking system. The banking regulations in Bulgaria and the supervisory powers of the BNB were strengthened after our crisis in the mid-1990s. The BNB has ever since persisted in implementing highly conservative supervisory standards. As a result, today the banking system of Bulgaria remains one of those in the EU where no single bank needed to be rescued or supported with taxpayers’ or central bank money. Furthermore, our banking system is already in full compliance with the new Capital Requirements Directive and the Capital Requirements Regulation.

Of course, since new forms of shadow banking activities are certain to develop in the future, FSB members will continue to monitor for emerging risks, and share data and analysis in order to support any future regulatory response. 9 The data refer to the UK, the US and the Euro Area, as of June 2009 (see Bank of England Financial Stability Report, June 2009). 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  These include reforms to secure the tools and powers authorities need to deal decisively with failing banks. At the same time, major banks are required to make themselves easier to resolve, including by writing ‘living wills’. Most importantly, global standards now require that banks hold sufficient debt in life such that, in the event one fails, its successor can be recapitalised to support the continued operation of its most important activities. The combination of these initiatives and the determination of authorities to complete the job explains why the too-big-to-fail public subsidy for private systemic banks has fallen by 90% in the UK. Put simply, a decade on, market discipline is coming back. The system is also fairer because we are addressing the root causes of misconduct. In the wake of the crisis, a series of scandals ranging from mis-selling to manipulation undermined trust in banking, the financial system and to a degree markets themselves. The economic consequences have been enormous.
To evaluate forecasts it is necessary to understand what these forecasts are based on. Solely model-based forecasts mean, for instance, that there is only one interest rate, linear relationships, that the household sector is represented by one household and that imperfections in the financial markets are not picked up. The fact that there is only one interest rate means, for instance, that the effects of unusually low long-term real interest rates are not included. The fact that the relationships are linear means, for instance, that the model will never be able to forecast abrupt falls in demand following a shock. So how should a central bank judge whether there is a risk that lending and asset prices are increasing too quickly if the inflation forecasts provide no signals of this? What one wishes to avoid are abrupt corrections in asset prices leading to a large fall in demand and low inflation in the future. Although it is possible to extend the forecast horizon, as the DSGE models are based on rationality, they provide no opportunity to quantify such a risk scenario or to answer the question of whether an interest rate increase now would be able to reduce imbalances. The central bank must nevertheless make decisions and in some way take into account the risks it envisages.

The non-performing loan ratio has continued its downward trend and stands at 11.2  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  percent as at June 2022, with total non-performing loans amounting to € billion, which is the lowest level observed since 2014 when the definition was harmonised across the European Union. So far the first round effects from the geopolitical crisis have been manageable and of limited direct extend. Nevertheless, the second round effects are yet to be materialised. Adverse macroeconomic developments may weaken banks' profitability and deteriorate asset quality, causing delinquencies and an upward pressure on impairments and provisions. It is therefore important for banks to adapt their business models to the new realities as shaped by the consecutive crises. Challenges emerge through various channels. Intense competition, from entities not falling in the traditional banking spectrum, threat of additional provisions due to increased credit risk, the need to invest in digitalisation to streamline operations, and the costs of managing climate change and the transition towards a sustainable greener economy are among the challenges that the Cyprus banking sector faces. It is important to say that these challenges are not country specific to the banking system of Cyprus. They are challenges that are commonly faced by European banks. Especially the issues of digital transformation together with the management of climate risks and the transition to a green economy are key issues that should be on top of the agendas' of European economies and banks. They surely are on the top of the supervisory agenda.
The proposal of the Financial Crisis Commission has now been circulated for comment and I and the other members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank will now formulate our joint response to the proposal during the spring. Conclusions I thus believe that there are many indications that demand is too weak in the Swedish economy and that in principle this has been the case ever since the autumn of 2008. One should not have exaggerated expectations of what monetary policy can achieve when it comes to reducing the relatively high level of unemployment in Sweden. However, as long as inflation is expected to be clearly under the target of 2 per cent I believe there is scope to use monetary policy to try to alleviate the situation on the labour market. I have argued that one of the reasons why fiscal policy and monetary policy have not been used more actively to increase demand in the Swedish economy is the concern about financial stability. The risk that public finances will be radically weakened if the government is forced to intervene to support banks in crisis seems to be an argument for being cautious with public finances at present.

Seasonally-adjusted data Source: Statistics Sweden. 1  Long-run sustainable unemployment rate here refers to the level of unemployment that is expected to prevail when all cyclical shocks have abated, when ongoing structural changes have had a full impact and when inflation expectations are equal to the actual rate of inflation. See for example “The long-term development of the Swedish labour market”, Monetary Policy Report, July 2012. See also “Correction of the Riksbank’s estimate of the long-run sustainable employment rate”, Appendix 2 of the minutes of the monetary policy meeting, July 2012, for a discussion of the role of expectations in the assessment of the long-run sustainable unemployment rate. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Unemployment has also begun to increase again in recent months and our latest forecast predicts that it will increase further to reach 8.2 per cent in the third quarter of this year. Figure 3. CPIF inflation in Sweden Annual percentage change 4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Note. The series refers to monthly data. Source: Statistics Sweden. Developments thus indicate that we have had spare capacity on the labour market since 2008. This is one of the reasons why inflation has been low in recent years. It also appears that inflation has in principle shown a downward trend since 2008.
Guidance that provides clarity around both short-term interest rates and the balance sheet might help to anchor interest rate expectations—for example by indicating while purchases continue that the central bank intends to maintain overnight interest rates at low levels even after the completion of asset purchases.38 Lesson 6: Focus on one tool during normalization Uncertainty associated with managing multiple tools and the degree of substitutability between them poses possible challenges in removing policy accommodation after a zero lower bound episode, as the central bank switches from conducting policy with one lever to another. It therefore seems prudent to take a gradual approach to normalization, emphasizing one tool at a time. The Fed’s adopted normalization approach has thus far been an effective one. Starting to raise rates first, and waiting to start reducing the balance sheet until normalization in the level of overnight rates is well underway, has helped to ensure that the economic recovery is sufficiently advanced before making changes to the balance sheet.39 This strategy has reduced the likelihood that an unexpected adverse shock to the economy not long after the start of policy tightening would have necessitated a return to the zero lower bound on the federal funds rate and 7 / 13  BIS central bankers' speeches  potentially a reversal in balance sheet normalization.

First, balance sheet policies can serve as a signaling device that strengthens forward guidance and reduces expectations for the path of short-term interest rates. Putting actions behind its words—either through new asset purchases or by maintaining reinvestments—helps the central bank to establish a credible commitment to maintaining monetary easing.33 Second, balance sheet actions transmit through a portfolio balance channel, which—through the stock effect I described earlier—reduces term and risk premiums embedded in bond yields by reducing the supply of long-term bonds in the market. Many studies conclude that this channel is likely the dominant one.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Thailand’s banking and economic outlook Keynote address by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Australian-Thai Chamber Luncheon, Bangkok, 3 April 2009. *  *  *  Let me first thank AustCham Thailand, especially President Andrew Durieux, for the invitation to speak at today’s luncheon. It has been almost four years since I last spoke at an AustCham event, so, it is a pleasure to be back. Today I will speak on Thailand’s banking and economic outlook, a subject which I am sure will be of interest to all of you. In keeping with what a good luncheon speaker should do, I will keep my remarks short and to the point, so that we will have plenty of time for desserts and for questions and answers. This week is undoubtedly an important week for the global economy, as leaders and finance ministers of the world’s twenty most important economies gather in London to map out a strategy that aims to comprehensively address the current global financial crisis. Up to now, policies to tackle the crisis have been left largely to the individual economies in response to the problems that arise. But as the crisis has mutated into a major global problem, a coordinated policy response at a global level is clearly needed to ensure a synchronized recovery in all the key parts of the global economy. Without coordinated and comprehensive policy response, a synchronized recovery will not take place.

This is best illustrated by the following statistics: •  According to the Bank for International Settlement's triennial survey in 2004, our average daily foreign exchange turnover was close to $ billion, which was the sixth largest in the world;  •  On average, transactions settled through the various RTGS systems in Hong Kong amounted to $ billion each day in 2005;  •  New debt securities issued in 2005 amounted to $ billion; and The total amount of funds raised through IPOs reached $ billion in 2005. 3. Our treasury markets have done well in servicing the financial businesses behind these impressive numbers. Further globalisation of financial markets and financial liberalisation on the Mainland will likely place new and increasing demands on our treasury markets. We need to move with the times, if we are to maintain our status as an international financial centre, and I think the establishment of the TMA provides a good mechanism for us to do so. In my view, there are four key areas which the TMA should focus on: professionalism, market development, codes and standards, and publicity. 4. The professionalism of market practitioners contribute significantly to the competitiveness of a financial centre. An important area of work of the TMA is therefore to enhance the professionalism of the practitioners in the Hong Kong treasury markets.
This correction is the result, in particular, of the less favourable economic outlook for Europe compared with the last assessment. For 2011 it is marginally higher, due mainly to a higher price for oil. Assuming an unchanged three-month Libor of 0.25%, average inflation for 2010 is expected to amount to 0.7%, for 2011 to 0.4% and for 2012 to 1.0%. The conditional inflation forecast shows that there is no threat to price stability in the short term. However, the rising path in 2012 and 2013 shows that the current expansionary monetary policy cannot be maintained over the entire forecast horizon without compromising long-term price stability. The inflation forecast is still associated with a very high level of uncertainty. Global economic outlook  I would now like to take a closer look at the economic situation and at monetary conditions. Overall, the recovery in the global economy continued, encouraged by expansionary economic policies and vigorous economic activity in the emerging economies. In the euro area, however, growth slowed markedly in the third quarter. The favourable developments in Germany’s economy differ from those in the peripheral countries of the euro area, with their weak growth. The recent financial market turmoil is likely to hamper activity in the euro area. Although domestic demand is gradually firming up in the US, the momentum is insufficient for a sustainable reduction in unemployment, which remains high. In addition, construction investment is suffering from the situation on the real estate market. Consequently, GDP growth in the US will remain modest.

Philipp Hildebrand: Global and Swiss economic outlook Introductory remarks by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 16 December 2010. *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank (SNB) is maintaining its expansionary monetary policy. It is leaving the target range for the three-month Libor unchanged at 0.00–0.75%, and intends to keep the Libor within the lower part of the target range at around 0.25%. The global economic recovery is continuing. While the growth dynamic in emerging economies is vigorous, the recovery in the industrialised economies remains modest overall. Growth in Switzerland was robust in the third quarter of 2010, but the weakening of exports, in particular, points to a significant reduction in growth in the quarters ahead. The SNB expects GDP to grow by some 1.5% in 2011, following growth of about 2.5% in the current year. Monetary policy operates in an environment of heightened uncertainty. Concerns about stability in the euro area have led to renewed financial market tensions. Against this backdrop, the Swiss franc has again appreciated. Should these tensions be exacerbated and put a strain on economic developments in the euro area, this would also have a detrimental effect on the Swiss economy. If a deflation threat emerges, the SNB would take the measures necessary to ensure price stability. The SNB’s conditional inflation forecast for 2012 and 2013 is slightly below the September forecast.
Reference to excessive monetary growth made central banks relatively immune to daily political and fiscal pressure, even in places where institutional independence had not (yet) been established. Control of the money supply lost some of its attractiveness because its central analytical basis was subject to successive erosion. Money demand functions became increasingly unstable. Given some differences between countries on the one hand and the aggregates employed on the other hand - mainly M0 to M3 - the connection between the intermediate target and the ultimate target became more and more unreliable. That was also the case in Switzerland, even if with a time-lag and to a lesser extent than in other countries, notably English-speaking ones. We recorded shifts in cash  BIS Review 35/2000  2  holdings which we could not even explain satisfactorily ex post, much less have forecast them with any degree of accuracy. The central banks reacted differently to this experience. Some rapidly threw money supply targeting overboard. Others - including the SNB - changed from annual to medium-term targets. The extended room for manoeuvre made it possible to consider various indicators in shaping the policy course. One could use the term pragmatically adapted targeting of the money supply. In actual fact, this step came close to a transformation of the money stock from an intermediate target to a monetary indicator, albeit the most important one. The destabilisation of money demand as previously set out has complex reasons on various levels.

In addition to supporting price stability, the Bank of Albania has also paid attention to the promotion of financial stability, through the supervision and careful regulation of the banking 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  sector, as well as through the coordination of work with other supervisory authorities of the financial sector. 2. Banking supervision and financial stability The Albanian banking sector continues to remain financially sound and has shown increasing dynamism. This sector has been profitable during 2019, while its liquidity and capitalization indicators are above our regulatory requirements. Also, resistance testing exercises show that the banking sector exposure to systemic risks is controlled and that the banking sector’s ability to withstand risks is strong. Below I will briefly list some of the main directions of our work to strengthen banking supervision and to support financial stability. First, the Bank of Albania successfully administered the banking sector consolidation process. This process reshaped the domestic banking market, bringing in new and motivated actors, as well as increasing domestic capital. Second, the Bank of Albania fulfilled all its obligations under the national plan for the reduction of non-performing loans. Thanks to measures taken over the years, the nonperforming loan ratio fell from a maximum of almost 25% in 2014 to 8.4% at the end of 2019. Third, the Bank of Albania worked to meet the recommendations of the CoE Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Measures against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (MONEYVAL).