samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This enabled a fast transmission of monetary policy signals to the interbank and deposit markets. Also, the increase in deficit and public debt was absorbed by the liquidity generated in the domestic financial market. Against the backdrop of a high demand for investment in government securities, their yields dropped significantly for all maturities. All these developments created premises for credit interest rates to decline in 2013. Monetary indicators were largely in line with the real-economy developments. The annual money supply growth slowed down during the year. This slowdown reflected the weak demand for borrowing by the private sector, especially businesses. Lending to the private sector started to contract in the second half of the year. At the end of the year, the loan portfolio stood 1.4% lower than a year earlier. Similar to developments in the other countries in the region, this performance was influenced by economic agents’ reluctance to spend and invest, and banks’ more conservative lending policies. I will dwell on lending issues and measures taken by the Bank of Albania to boost lending in the following. Summing up the performance of the economy for 2013, aggregate demand remained weak and economic growth was low but below potential. This economic slowdown had serious implications for the economy’s health and balances. It affected public finances, which saw increase in budget deficit and public debt. Albanian businesses faced financial constraints and banks’ balance sheets suffered from worsened non-performing loan portfolios. It also led to a higher unemployment rate and slower rise in wages and prices.

We depend on our ability to access it, analyse it, and draw conclusions from it to set policies. Effective management and use of data is how we meet our goals. 1  A foot as we now know it is 304.8mm 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  Of course, we are far from alone here – many organisations rely heavily on their use of data. But we are, perhaps, different to many in that the vast majority of the data we want is generated by others rather than ourselves. The data we care about is the sum of millions of financial and economic interactions, taking place every second. And much of that data2 is captured and stored by financial institutions, as they go about serving their customers. We need to get our hands on that data. We need data on the financial system in aggregate and also on specific markets within it, to help us understand where risks are emerging and to help us calibrate policies to maintain stability. And we need data about individual regulated firms, for our work as supervisor and as resolution authority. So we have built data collection processes to give us that data. We publish reporting instructions. Firms then go through various steps: they interpret our instructions, identify the right data within their systems, put in place processes to integrate, cleanse and check the data, and then sign it off and deliver it to us.
The same is true if a rise in infection rates is expected to be permanent. If the future looks exactly like the present there’s no reason for saving – or therefore total consumption – to change. These conditions are obviously unrealistic. Some things are good substitutes for risky activities during the pandemic. Perhaps it’s not much harder to buy things online than in a shop. At a stretch, watching a film on a screen at home can replace a trip to the cinema. But going out with family or friends to a pub or a restaurant, listening to live music or watching a play – for many of the things we’ve been denied for much of the past year, there is no good proxy. As for the dynamics of the pandemic, one thing they’re not is permanent or even slow-moving. Infection rates went up very rapidly in the spring and, once lockdown was in place, they fell almost as rapidly in the early summer. With the promise of looser restrictions as that happened, it would make sense for people to hold off on some spending until the day itself arrived. Nevertheless, it’s clear that a fair degree of expenditure switching took place: some areas of consumption fared unusually well last year, even as others declined extremely sharply. Because it’s hard for economic resources to respond to large and rapid shifts in demand this may have softened somewhat the immediate impact of the downturn, enormous as it was, on inflation.

Guerrieri, V., Lorenzoni, G., Straub, L. and Werning, I, 2020. ‘Macroeconomic implications of COVID-19: can negative supply shocks cause demand shortages?’. NBER working paper No. 26918. Krueger, D., Uhlig, H. and Xie, T., 2020. ‘Macroeconomic dynamics and reallocation in an epidemic: evaluating the “Swedish solution”’, NBER Working Paper No. 27047. Osotimehin, S., 2019. ‘Aggregate productivity and the allocation of resources over the business cycle’, Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 32, pp. 180-205. Samuelson, P. A. and Swamy, S., 1974. ‘Invariant Economic Index Numbers and Canonical Duality: Survey and Synthesis’. The American Economic Review, Vol. 64, pp. 566-593. Vlieghe, G., 2020. ‘Assessing the health of the economy’. Speech available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2020/assessing-the-health-of-the-economyspeech-by-gertjan-vlieghe.pdf. 17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  17
Having said that, you may rest assured that the HKMA is committed to continue its collaboration with the SFC and the industry to make sure that our regulatory framework and rules remain friendly to users without compromising investor protection as we go forward in the months and years ahead. The third and final question is: are private banks fully equipped and ready to capture the rapidly growing business opportunities? The answer to this, I would say, is again “yes” followed by a “but”. This is because much more needs to be done by the industry if it wishes to realise Hong Kong’s full potential in the medium and long term. As I said earlier, the adoption of a portfolio approach in private banking would be a move welcomed by private banks and their customers, but private banks must ensure they have the proper systems and controls in place. A portfolio based approach cannot be taken as an excuse to compromise investor protection. For instance, when more Mainland clients open private banking accounts in Hong Kong, our banks must have in place sufficient number of account managers who are professionally competent and linguistically proficient. It is hard to imagine that quality service can be provided to a Mainland customer who does not speak English or Cantonese if the account manager cannot communicate in Putonghua. Moreover, it would also be helpful if important contracts or documents are written in bilingual forms so that Mainland customers find it easier to understand what they have signed or bought.

I have chosen this topic because over the past few months, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), together with the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, has been working very closely with the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) on what Hong Kong should do to take the private banking industry to the next higher platform. I would like to take this opportunity to share with you my views on the steps Hong Kong needs to take to develop as the premier private banking hub in Asia. To start with, I want to talk about some facts relevant to Hong Kong’s realisation of this aspiration. Hong Kong’s strengths to be a leading private banking centre Wealth in Asia-Pacific is growing exponentially. According to industry research, the region accounted for half of the growth in global wealth from 2010 onwards. In particular, China was the second top contributor to the growth in global wealth after the US.1 In 2011, there were about 30 million millionaires worldwide. Among these, about 20% were from Asia-Pacific.1 This trend is likely to continue. It is estimated that global wealth will rise 50% further by 2016.1 This is hardly surprising in that the International Monetary Fund forecasts that, emerging Asia, led by China, will contribute almost 60% of the world’s GDP growth by 2016.
For euro area economies, the main area where that can be achieved is through addressing regulatory barriers – for example, planning laws that limit retail expansion or transport regulations that hinder cross-border projects. A recent report by a consultancy found that 45% of fixed investment in Europe was concentrated in sectors where governments have significant regulatory influence, implying that structural reforms in these areas could provide a significant boost to investment.7 And as many investment projects benefit from returns over decades, they could be made viable with regulatory changes even in a relatively weak economy. Second, given weak demographic trends in Europe, raising trend labour supply is only really possible through further reform measures. We know that these can work. The increase in labour participation during the crisis has been largely driven by previous reforms to increase  6  Standard & Poor’s, “Transition Study: Less Than 1.5% Of European Structured Finance Has Defaulted Since Mid-2007”, 11 June 2013. See also Moody’s Investors Service, “Structured Finance Rating Transitions: 1983–2013”, 7 June 2013, as well as Fitch Ratings, “The Credit Crisis Four Years On … Structured Finance Research Compendium”, June 2012, and “EMEA Structured Finance Losses”, August 2011. 7  Investing in Growth: Europe’s Next Challenge, McKinsey Global Institute, December 2012. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  female participation rates, as well as reforms related to early retirement and pensions that have raised the participation of older workers.

Joseph Yam: The ADB challenge to help Asia return to stable and sustainable growth Statement by Mr Joseph Yam, Alternate Governor of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the 35th Asian Development Bank Annual Meeting, Shanghai, 10-12 May 2002. *  *  *  Mr President, I would like to first congratulate you on your re-election as the President of the Bank. I would also like to thank the Government and the people of the People’s Republic of China for their hospitality in hosting this year’s Annual Meeting in this magnificent city of Shanghai, itself a powerful symbol of tradition and modernisation. I also express my sincere appreciation to the Bank’s management and staff for the excellent arrangements made for this meeting. I join others in adding our special welcome to our new member of the Bank – Portugal. Poverty is reduced more extensively at times of fast economic growth but less so when growth slows. The past year has been a difficult one for the poor. Amid the synchronised slowdown of major industrial economies, economic growth has been slow and uneven in Asia. The terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September shocked the world. The Enron debacle and the Argentine economic crisis cast long shadows on the equity and financial markets worldwide. Against this background, the task of poverty reduction is made more daunting and pressing. However, I must commend the Bank for meeting the challenges of last year by mapping out and implementing the Long-term Strategic Framework.
In this regard, I would like to point out that the inclusion of information technology developments in financial services is increasingly drawing the attention of central banks, regulatory and supervisory authorities worldwide. Both international and domestic practices show that a comprehensive approach through collaboration considerably supports the achievement of 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  effective and optimal results. A concrete example of aligned efforts in this regard is exactly the one in the field of payments. In this field, the measures undertaken by the Government of Albania for the digitalisation of government services and recently for the draft-law “on billing and monitoring system of circulation”, which aims at increasing and strengthening the fiscalisation of the Albanian economy, appear to fully harmonise with the initiatives undertaken by the Bank of Albania, through the National Payment System Committee, for modernising the payment market and increasing financial inclusion. The Bank of Albania has worked on drafting a new legal and regulatory framework, which aims at promoting digitalisation in the area of payment services. The compilation of the draft-law “On payment services” is considered as the first and crucial step in the framework of reforming and digitalising the small-value payments. In concrete terms, this draft-law is seen to considerably encourage the competition in the market, by providing a crucial contribution to the establishment of low cost services and easily accessible by the large public.

Assuming that the three-month Libor rate will remain stable at 1.25%, average annual inflation is expected to hover between 0.9% and 1.6% in the next three years. For 2002, the National Bank still anticipates a growth rate of around 1%. The difficult situation of the world economy has had a marked influence on the development of business activity in Switzerland in the past few months. Following a decline in the third quarter 2001, the economy stabilised in the fourth quarter, and in the first quarter 2002 gross domestic product again rose somewhat. Notably exports and capital spending were on the decline during this period, while private and government consumption as well as the construction industry exerted a stabilising influence. On the whole, the development in the past six months fulfilled our expectations. We assume that the Swiss economy will grow extremely moderately and below its potential until mid-2002. Growth is likely to pick up perceptibly again only during the second half of 2002. Consumption will remain robust and strengthen economic activity. The actual upswing, however, should be triggered by higher exports and these, in turn, will depend on improved economic conditions worldwide. With a slight time lag, capital spending is also expected to grow markedly again. As already stated, we still believe that real economic activity should increase by around 1% in 2002. In 2003, growth should continue to approach its potential, thereby clearly exceeding this year's level.
However, for a production increase brought about by adjustment in stocks to be durable, it must be supported by a lasting increase in demand. Household consumption continued to increase, but there was no upturn in investment. The imbalances in trade and industry in the USA were perhaps more tangible than many had anticipated. Bankruptcies and accounting scandals created further unease on the financial markets, which then fell at a rate reminiscent of the 1930s crisis. In Europe the signs of economic recovery mainly concerned more optimistic expectations; expectations which were not later realised. The largest euro economy, Germany, in particular proved to be in a poorer condition than anticipated. However, here it was not a question of imbalances like those in the USA, but structural problems, such as a high level of unemployment that had set in and weak public finances, which made it difficult to conduct an economic policy that would support the business climate. Furthermore, the expected supporting forces from the other side of the Atlantic for the export industry were weaker the expected. In Sweden, the slowdown during 2001 had a limited effect on unemployment. The Riksbank’s calculations at the beginning of 2002 indicated that resource utilisation was relatively strained. Economic policy had a stimulating effect on the economy, through lower taxes and higher transfers.

But please remember that this should not be interpreted to mean that I have a different opinion of the Riksbank’s objectives. I consider it a good thing to conduct an open discussion on the policy pursued. And I hope that you intend to take part in this discussion, as the whole point of an open central bank is to facilitate such discussion and allow it to improve monetary policy. Riksbank focuses on total inflation picture I shall begin by describing the way the Riksbank works. The Riksdag has assigned two main objectives to the Riksbank: to maintain price stability and to promote a safe and efficient payment system. Today I shall concentrate on the first of these two objectives. The Riksbank has defined the target for monetary policy as to limit inflation to 2 per cent, with a tolerated deviation interval of plus/minus one percentage point. This tolerated interval indicates that deviations are likely, but that they will be limited. The objective is worded in terms of the consumer price index (CPI), which is a broad index consisting of the prices in a basket of goods and services consumed by an average Swedish household. As interest costs and indirect taxes included in CPI inflation are not assessed to have a long-term effect on inflation, the Riksbank has chosen to normally focus on UND1X, which is an index that excludes these factors. From time to time there may also be reason to disregard other price changes that are assessed as temporary.
In 2019, Facebook unveiled its Libra project that consisted of issuing stablecoins pegged to several currencies, claiming cheap and efficient payment solutions (including for cross-border payments) and greater financial inclusion. Around the same time the strange word "cryptocurrencies" appeared, a word that hurt the ears of politicians and central bankers. From time immemorial, money had been sovereign in order to be reliable and lasting. B. Disappointing learning years? Needless to say Libra had its risks. I will not list them all, but it raised very significant concerns about financial stability, money laundering, etc. The issues at stake reached far beyond mere financial regulation, and also included more acutely than ever the question of competition. This is when big techs entered their learning years in finance, confronting reality. Libra did not materialise, even after it was adjusted and rebranded as Diem. Existing stablecoins are issued by players other than big techs, mainly from the digital asset industry. Incidentally, after the failures and/or crimes committed by some of them, it is high time to regulate cryptos in full and to require licensing. Let us not kid ourselves into believing that we can count on the so called "crypto winter " which has actually lasted for over a year now, to make the problem disappear by itself. That would be a dangerous illusion and would further delay supervision that is so badly needed.v All jurisdictions agree in principle to regulate, under the common FSB umbrella.

The Riksbank has collected data on thousands of individual households’ finances from Statistics Sweden for several years now. These statistics show that the households with the largest debts also have the highest incomes and the largest wealth. We have also examined what would happen to households’ ability to pay if unemployment or interest rates were to rise. The overall assessment is that households at present cannot cause loan losses to such an extent that the stability of the banking system would be threatened. However, even if the household sector’s ability to pay on the whole is good, there is of course a risk that individual households will borrow too much and may experience payment problems. With regard to financial stability, I see no serious risks in the growing household indebtedness and rising property prices. Are there any risks with regard to the inflation target? This question is slightly more difficult to answer. How developments in the asset markets, such as the housing market, will affect monetary policy for a central bank with an inflation target is a subject debated all over the world by academics and economic decision-makers. The problem can be formulated roughly as follows: The increases we have seen in household indebtedness are not sustainable in the long term; household debts cannot grow twice as fast as incomes over long periods of time.
When banks' access to liquidity dried up on every market, this hit all banks, including those that are financially strong, like the Swedish banks. Many central banks around the world had been taking measures for some time to strengthen liquidity in banking systems but the Riksbank had not needed to act. The interbank market and other short-term markets had worked, though interest rates had climbed sharply. When  BIS Review 140/2008  1  the crisis had a more tangible impact on Sweden, the Riksbank also implemented a series of interventions. Meanwhile, central banks in the rest of the world continued with their interventions and governments approved crisis packages to guarantee financial stability. Against the backdrop of this summary of events in the financial sector over the past year, today I will speak about the effects of this financial crisis on the Riksbank's work of maintaining a safe and effective payments system. But first I would like to briefly describe how we carry out this work under normal circumstances. I will also conclude with a comment on the crisis’ effects on monetary policy. Work with financial stability under normal circumstances The task of maintaining a safe and effective payments system includes the role of the Riksbank as the banks' bank. This task includes maintaining the RIX payment system for payments in Swedish kronor. Participants in the system may borrow during the day and overnight to cover temporary deficits. The task also includes continuous oversight of the financial system.

The Monetary Policy Council will keep a close eye on other indicators, including all leading indicators of changes in prices, such as capacity utilization rates, production costs, developments in incomes and commodity prices. The Monetary Policy Council will also monitor long-term interest rates and the current account balance. * *  *  These decisions call for two remarks. First, on a technical level, the Monetary Policy Council has decided to monitor several narrow and broad money aggregates simultaneously in order to obtain a concise estimate of all monetary developments. As we have seen, certain data, and particularly, but not exclusively, M3 data, have been severely disrupted recently by several factors, such as the very substantial fall in short-term rates and the ensuing large-scale reallocation of investment flows towards non-monetary assets, higher taxes on money market mutual funds, and the continuing very high level of interest paid on housing saving plans. We will therefore keep a very close eye on the M1, M2, M3, and M3+P1 aggregates as expressions of the underlying growth of the money supply. Particular attention will be paid to the growth of the M3+P1 aggregate covering monetary assets and contractual savings. A very large proportion of the outflows from M3 in the past year was directed towards investments covered by P1, and particularly housing savings plans with a residual maturity of one year or less. In fact, this type of investment at present constitutes a very close substitute for monetary assets.