samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I think that for the Asia-9 economies, increased trade-linkages and cross-border investment have resulted in a “symbiotic” relationship, with China as the driver of growth for the rest of Asia, AND vice-versa. Together, this relationship has helped raise the profile of Asia-9 as an important pillar for regional and international trade. Factors underlying Asia-9’s growth in trade What have been the driving forces behind this synergy in the evolution of trade among the Asia-9 economies? When one speaks of the remarkable growth in Asia, the general perception is that growth has been dominated by China. While it is true that growth has been driven by China, the traditionally strong trade and investment ties between the remaining Asia-8 have been just as important in allowing the high rates of growth to be sustained in the region. In terms of intra-regional trade among the Asia-9 economies in 2005, 13% of trade flows are with China, while 28.4% of trade goes on among the other 8 economies. Why has this intra-regional trade grown so substantially? One explanation is that East Asia has adopted an outward oriented policy of internationalization of production process which has allowed the benefits to be derived from the linkages and alliances among the players in the region, both at firm level and at the level of the macro economy.

India’s economy is the 14th largest in the world measured in nominal US dollar terms, but in terms of purchasing power parity, India is the 4th largest economy in the world according to the iMF. India’s GDP in purchasing power terms has also risen substantially, with its share rising from 4.3% to 6.1% of world GDP over the past 15 years. India’s unique characteristics that enhance this growth potential include its dynamic population and demographic structure, as well as its emergence as a global leader in service exports. This dynamism, growth, and positive sentiment has been clearly evident in India’s stock market, which has rallied 40% in 2005, second only to Korea as best performing major market in Asia last year. Sometimes overlooked however, is an informal group of Asian economies (excluding Japan) that account for the majority of trade and GDP in East Asia, known as Asia-9. The Asia-9 economies comprise China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan. The share of Asia-9’s GDP in purchasing power parity terms has grown from 11.4% in 1990 to 20.6% in 2005. To put this in perspective, this exceeds the EU’s PPP share of world GDP of 18.8%, Japan’s share of 6.7%, and is very close to the United States 20.7% share of world GDP in 2005. But I am not here today to overwhelm you with facts and figures! Today I would like to discuss one of the most important drivers of this phenomenal growth – and that is, international trade.
The scepticism was clearly expressed by Kåre Willoch, who was prime minister when the new Act came into effect in 1985: “[Nicolai Rygg] was held primarily responsible – and  15  In 1926, Minister of Finance Holmboe, of the centrist-liberal party Venstre, said: “It is however a well known fact that wherever governments have assumed authority over the national bank, the outcome has been unfavourable because vested interests have been so considerable and the temptation so strong that it was impossible to resist, and the government has helped itself to the national bank’s cash…”. In Francis Sejersted (1973): Ideal, teori og virkelighet. Nicolai Rygg og pengepolitikken i 1920-årene. [Ideals, theory and reality. Nicolai Rygg and monetary policy in the 1920s]. J. W. Cappelens forlag. 16  In Francis Sejersted (1973). 17  Berge Furre (Norwegian historian, theologian and politician for the Socialist Left Party), (1999): “Norsk historie 1905–2000: Industrisamfunnet – frå vokstervisse til framtidstvil” [History of Norway 1905–2000: from confidence in growth to doubts about the future], Det Norske Samlaget. 18  For a lively description of the personalities governing the large central banks in the 1920s, see Liaquat Ahamed (2009): The Lords of Finance. The bankers who broke the world. Penguin Books.

The interest rate level which has now been established should, in addition to directly contributing to stabilising the krone exchange rate, dampen price expectations.”  32  Svein Gedrem (1999) “Utfordringer i pengepolitikken” [Monetary policy challenges], Aftenposten, 4 May. 33  Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C. (1977): “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” Journal of Political Economy No. 87, pp 473–492. 34  Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon (1983): “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model”, Journal of Political Economy No. 12 pp. 101–121. BIS Review 154/2010  9  long-term cost can be considerable and the short-term gains limited. Norway and other countries learned this in the 1970s and 1980s. The British prime minister Harold Wilson once remarked, “A week is a long time in politics”. This attitude also influenced economic policy in our country. The result was economic instability, with both high inflation and high unemployment. Just as Ulysses had himself tied to the mast to resist the Sirens’ 35 temptations, the government authorities can prevent themselves from pursuing a policy that is harmful in the long run by setting objectives and delegating tasks. A central bank should be independent in its use of policy instruments, though the objective of monetary policy should naturally be set out by the government and the Storting. 36 The division of responsibility was clearly defined when the government presented its guidelines in 2001.
To this end, they issued further bail-in bonds, which can be converted into equity in the event of impending insolvency. On the other hand, the two big banks have implemented key organisational measures. For instance, they have both set up Swiss subsidiaries that contain their systemically important functions, including, in particular, domestic deposit and lending business. In order to resolve the ‘too big to fail’ issue in Switzerland, more progress also needs to be made in the area of resolution. This will involve, first, further improvements in gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity in a gone-concern perspective, as stipulated in the regulations and, second, further progress in drawing up robust resolution plans. By end-2019, the big banks will need to demonstrate that they would be able to maintain their systemically important functions in Switzerland without interruption in the event of impending insolvency. The resolution plans will also need to meet foreign regulatory requirements. Domestically focused commercial banks  I will now turn to domestically focused commercial banks, whose main business is in lending and deposit-taking. I would like to highlight three key developments at these banks. First, domestically focused banks further increased their risk exposure in 2016. Mortgage growth at these banks remained strong. Moreover, their interest rate risk exposure from maturity transformation continued at high levels. In addition, they took on greater affordability risks and the share of new mortgages with a high loan-to-income ratio reached a new peak. All this took place against the background of high imbalances on the Swiss mortgage and real estate markets.

William C Dudley: Asset bubbles and the implications for central bank policy Speech by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 7 April 2010. *  *  *  Thank you for that kind introduction. Today I want to tackle a difficult subject: How should central bankers deal with potential asset price bubbles. As always, my remarks do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. As I see it, we need to reexamine how central banks should respond to potential asset bubbles. After all, recent experience has underscored the fact that poorly regulated financial systems are prone to such bubbles and that the costs of waiting to respond to an asset bubble until after it has burst can be very high. Today, I will try to define some of the important characteristics of asset price bubbles. I will argue that bubbles do exist and that bubbles typically occur after an innovation that has created uncertainty about fundamental valuations. This has two important implications. First, a bubble is difficult to discern and, second, each bubble has unique characteristics. This implies that a rules-based approach to bubbles is likely to be ineffective and that tackling bubbles to diminish their potential to destabilize the financial system requires judgment.
The federal guarantees for the COVID-19 loans and the liquidity provided at favourable conditions by the SNB have contributed towards Switzerland being able to avoid a credit crunch in the past few months. Page 3/4  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Thomas Jordan  News conference  It will take some time yet before the economy recovers, and uncertainty will remain high for the time being. We will therefore be seeking to do our utmost with our monetary policy to ensure price stability and to contribute to the economic recovery. Climate change and the SNB  I would now like to talk about the significance of climate change for the SNB. We have been working intensively on this topic for some time now. We want to properly assess possible consequences of climate change for the economy, for financial stability, and for the management of our foreign exchange reserves in order to ensure that we can fulfil our statutory mandate at all times. To this end, we also collaborate with other central banks, in particular in the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), and we work together closely with FINMA. As regards monetary policy, we are continuously deepening our analysis into how climate change could affect economic growth and inflation. The dialogue with other central banks is particularly important in this area. When it comes to financial stability, the SNB focuses its efforts on determining the impact of climate risks on the stability of the Swiss banking system.

In so doing, we take the overall exchange rate situation into consideration. Furthermore, we are supplying generous amounts of liquidity to the banking system via the SNB COVID-19 refinancing facility (CRF). The SNB’s expansionary monetary policy provides favourable financing conditions, counters upward pressure on the Swiss franc, and contributes to an appropriate supply of credit and liquidity to the economy. Page 1/4  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Inflation forecast  In the current situation, the inflation outlook remains subject to high uncertainty. The new conditional inflation forecast through to the end of 2021 is slightly lower than in September. This is primarily due to the renewed deterioration in the economic situation as a result of the second wave of the pandemic. In the longer term, the inflation forecast is unchanged from September. The forecast for 2020 is negative (−0.7%). The inflation rate is likely to be higher again next year (0.0%) and slightly positive in 2022 (0.2%). The conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate remains at −0.75% over the entire forecast horizon. The long-term inflation expectations are well anchored and stand at around 1%. Global economic outlook  The coronavirus pandemic and the measures implemented to contain it led to a historic downturn in the global economy in the first half of 2020. With the decline in new infections and the easing of the containment measures in the summer months, economic activity increasingly resumed.
Contrary to the pessimistic assumption that the Swiss National Bank would be forced to shadow the policy of the European Central Bank, we have been able to set interest rates according to the needs of the Swiss economy. And we will continue to do so. Summing up, we are as happy as central bankers can be with the outcome of the test imposed by the change in the European monetary system. Why joining the EU and the euro is not a realistic option And what about the European issue? As you know, we are not a member of the European Union, nor do I foresee Switzerland joining the EU in the near future. The Swiss people remain sceptical about the efficiency of the Union and are very aware of what they stand to lose in terms of political rights and economic freedom in the event of integration. But our relationship with the EU is of key importance, since Europe accounts for two-thirds of our foreign trade, as I mentioned before. In order to secure our access to the European market and to avoid discrimination, we have concluded two packages of bilateral agreements with the Union – one in 2002 and one in 2004. The present situation – with free movement of goods, capital and labour, but without monetary and fiscal integration – is probably the best solution for us. In short, our relationship to Europe is well organised and established.

This situation has nothing to do with the appeal of our bank secrecy, as many believe, but with the abundance of savings and the high degree of price stability. Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the average interest rate on three-month Swiss franc deposits – 1.4% – has been less than half the rate for euro deposits. If Switzerland were to give up its monetary independence by pegging the franc to the euro or by joining the euro area, Swiss interest rates would increase to European levels. Since higher interest rates mean lower asset prices, lower levels of investment, and also higher mortgage rates, the Swiss are, understandably, not keen on giving up their national currency. A major decision of this kind would have to be approved in a public referendum in Switzerland; the prospect of EU and euro membership in the near future is thus highly unlikely. Conclusion Having chosen the option of free trade and free movement of capital, Switzerland is, in many respects, better prepared than others to take advantage of the greater opening of borders brought about by globalisation. To be sure, this is no easy ride, as international competition always necessitates painful adjustments, and Switzerland is no exception in this respect. Given our openness, we are immediately affected by a slowdown of the world economy. On the other hand, as in the current circumstances, we can take full advantage if worldwide business activity is healthy. When we take stock of the last few years, the bottom line looks favourable.
However, unemployment is still too high - the increase in production of almost 15% since the end of the 1980s has not been sufficient to bring the labour market into balance. The employment ratio has increased, however, from 72 to 74% during the past year and employment is expected to increase greatly during the coming years. It is expected that open employment will fall to 3.7% in 2002. However, the beginning of this decade looks very promising. Almost the entire 1990s were marked by the problems in the wake of the high inflation economy of the 1980s and the overheating that ended that decade. Loan-financed consumption, excess investment, among other things, in properties, which took place in tandem with the increasing asset and property prices, had led to large financial and real imbalances being built up. When the bubble burst and the krona fell, there was a great need among households, businesses and banks to review their balance sheets and reduce their debt. As we know, this led to a great reduction in demand and increasing unemployment, which in turn caused major problems in public finances. The costs of the bank crisis aggravated the central government budget problem at the same time. Monetary policy, focused on stable prices, has played an important role for creating balance in the Swedish economy. This favourable development would not have been possible, however, without a responsible fiscal policy.

Although we are still in the infant stages of development, we have accumulated some experience, which I would like to share with you today. First, since it is now such a hot topic to talk about change, I trust that you will agree with me that Islamic finance, at least for jurisdictions like Hong Kong, means change – a change in perception, a change in skills, a change in structures and techniques, in contracts, standards, and so on. Change, in all its many forms, is happening within the global Islamic finance arena, even as we speak. In the past year or so, we have seen the inception of several standardisation initiatives for Islamic financial documentation, spearheaded by international institutions like the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM). This form of change is significant towards facilitating harmonious practices, providing greater clarity for the Islamic financial services industry and thus acting as a boost to the development of global Islamic financial markets. There have also been many exciting developments in the new markets for Islamic finance in Asia, where there is a growing tendency for sukuk issuance, such as the sovereign issues from Indonesia and Singapore to support the development of Islamic finance. At the same time, we have also seen enhanced co-operation and increased linkages, both internally within the region and externally with other Islamic financial centres in the Middle East.
The expansionary fiscal policy is contributing to a strong development of household disposable income in the coming years, providing a basis for higher private consumption as well as increased saving. Exports rise during the forecast period but the increase is relatively modest both on account of the international upswing being tentative initially and because the krona is expected to appreciate. GDP growth is judged to be 1.6 per cent this year and then accelerate to between 2.5 and 3 per cent in the coming years, which as fare as can be judged is somewhat more than the Swedish economy can sustain in the longer run without giving rise to inflationary tensions. With the high resource utilisation, labour costs are judged to rise somewhat more than we foresaw in the December Report. Partly for this reason, domestic inflation in the forecast period is somewhat higher than foreseen earlier. CPI inflation stops at 2.2 per cent one year ahead and 2.4 per cent after two years. The corresponding forecast for inflation’s underlying rate, UND1X, is 2.2 per cent both one and two years ahead. Monetary policy focuses in the first place on the latter rate. In this price forecast, the supply shocks that are now leaving their mark on inflation are judged to drop out of the twelve-month change figures successively during the late spring. Inflation is accordingly expected to approach 2 per cent in the early summer.

After that, however, it is foreseen that the more strained resource utilisation connected with stronger economy activity will lead to a renewed increase in inflation. The risk spectrum mainly concerns domestic inflationary pressure. If resource utilisation is more strained than the Riksbank now assumes or if potential growth has been overestimated, there is a risk of future inflation being higher than in the main scenario. When the risk spectrum is taken into account, underlying inflation, measured by UND1X, amounts to 2.3 per cent both one and two years ahead. Monetary policy conclusions I should like to conclude with some words about monetary policy. In the light of increasingly clear signs of an economic recovery and resource utilisation that is somewhat more strained than expected, the Riksbank has decided to raise the repo rate 0.25 percentage points, to 4.0 per cent. By safeguarding price stability, we aim to create conditions for a stable and sustainable development of production and employment in the Swedish economy. Last year’s higher inflation and our assessment that it was not solely transitory have already left their mark on monetary policy. That was the case not least last summer, when we raised the repo rate because of concern that the weak exchange rate combined with comparatively high resource utilisation might lead to the higher inflation becoming entrenched. In September we, like other central banks, cut the interest rate 0.5 percentage points; later in the autumn, however, we were more cautious about lowering the instrumental rate than, for example, the European Central Bank.
As Greg Mankiw put it: “Wishful thinking is one reason that monetary policy has historically been excessively inflationary… To my mind, wishful thinking is as worrisome a problem for monetary policy as time inconsistency.” Genuine concern for the unemployed means a recognition that sustainable reductions in unemployment require a combination of monetary stability on the demand side and microeconomic reforms such as the New Deal on the supply side. As Alan Blinder has reminded us, we need soft hearts and hard heads, not the other way round. Despite suggestions to the contrary, the MPC does have soft hearts and hard heads, and does not base its assessment of the labour market – never mind its decisions on interest rates – solely on estimates of the growth of average earnings. An assessment of the overall tightness of the labour market requires all the available data – both quantity and prices – to be analysed. The wealth and diversity of published labour statistics means it is rare for them all to point in the same direction. The MPC’s analysis of the labour market is like the construction of a jigsaw puzzle. The pieces of data are assessed alongside each other in order to build up as clear a picture as possible. No single piece of data is interpreted in isolation. And no single piece of data is, in itself, decisive. The growth of wages and salaries is an important indicator of domestically generated inflation.

This January, the Bureau launched a Fintech Proof-of-Concept Subsidy Scheme. This scheme provides financial incentives to banks to transform their processes through the use of innovative Regtech solutions. Regtech firms will also benefit as they will have more opportunities to showcase and validate their solutions and gain experience in the Hong Kong market. 17. In addition to offering incentives and opportunities for developing innovative use cases, I would also like to highlight several key infrastructure developments that will make launching Regtech solutions easier. 18. One example of these is that the HKMA is developing the CDI, the Commercial Data Interchange, that will allow SMEs to grant financial institutions access to their data at different commercial establishments, of course with their consent. These will include ecommerce platforms and utilities companies. With more alternative data available to financial institutions, SMEs will stand a better chance of obtaining bank financing and also other customised services that will be made possible by the use of advanced data analytics. 19. I should also mention the HKMA’s collaboration with the Government on the “iAM Smart” platform, which is a one-stop personalised digital services platform available free of charge for everyone in Hong Kong. Financial institutions can now leverage iAM Smart to provide 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  customers with Regtech services such as remote onboarding and log-in authentication. The HKMA is now exploring a corporate version of iAM Smart, which will offer another important infrastructure to support Regtech development. 20.