samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Domestic private savings in 2006 has now been projected to increase to 19.4 as a percentage of GDP. National savings are also projected to increase, resulting from increased savings by non-resident Sri Lankans as evidenced by the high growth in migrant worker remittances. The Investment to GDP ratio is also expected to improve from 26.5 per cent in 2005 to 29.0 per cent in 2006, and Private sector investment, which accounts for about 87 per cent of total investment, is estimated to increase by 31.4 per cent. Public sector investment too is projected to rise by 7.5 per cent as a result of growing construction activity in highways, roads, infrastructure facilities, community development projects, and tsunami related reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. The performance in the External sector improved with the continued expansion in international trade and growing global demand. During the first ten months of 2006, exports grew by 6.5 per cent and Imports by 15.8 per cent with a higher growth in intermediate and investment goods. The outlay for petroleum imports increased by 29.6 per cent during this period due to the soaring oil prices. For the year as a whole, export growth is projected at 7 per cent and import growth at 15.4 per cent. An aspect of the economy which caused some concern in the year was that the trade deficit widened to US dollars 2,955 million. As the result, the Current Account also recorded a deficit of US dollars 1,038 million in the first nine months of 2006.

The achievement of such a target will be facilitated by continued economic growth resulting from high public and private investment and savings, improving competitiveness, gradually rationalised expenditure which leaves sufficient funds for development work, and reducing the budget deficit resulting in low demand pressure. Needless to say, the Central Bank will actively support strategies that ensure such outcomes. In addition, transparency of monetary policy decisions and operations will be maintained to enhance the policy effectiveness and during the year we will also seek the views and advise of experts in the field of economics and on macroeconomic management in order to benefit by their expertise in our monetary policy decision making process. Further, as done in the past, the policy announcements will continue to be made according to an advance announcement calendar, and the Calendar for 2007 is set out below. Table 3 Monetary policy announcements for 2007  10  Month  Date of Monetary Policy Announcement  January  18 Thursday  February  15 Thursday  March  16 Friday  April  11 Wednesday  May  16 Wednesday  June  15 Friday  July  18 Wednesday  August  16 Thursday  September  14 Friday  October  17 Wednesday  November  16 Friday  December  14 Friday  BIS Review 8/2007  6.
If one looks at the estimates of the determinants of indebtedness used as a basis for our forecasts, one sees that the effect of the repo rate on households’ debt ratios (that is, their debts in relation to disposable income) is very small.12 A repo rate that is 0.25 percentage points higher during one year is expected to reduce the debt ratio by at most 0.3–0.4 percentage points (see Figure 4). 10  For example, in November 2010 Anders Borg warned of the risk that a housing bubble would build up, comparing developments in Sweden with those in Ireland and Iceland, and emphasising the importance of putting an early stop to it (Borg, 2010). The Liberal Party then proposed cutting the deductions for interest payments in January 2011 (Hamilton, 2011). 11  Finansinspektionen (2013). 12  See Laséen and Strid (2013) and Sveriges Riksbank (2014b). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Figure 4. Household debts Percentage of disposable income 182  182 Lower repo rate 2013 Main scenario  180  180  178  178  176  176  174  174  172  172  170  170 12  13  14  15  16  17  Note. The experiment with a lower repo rate in 2013 assumes a repo rate cut from 1 per cent to 0.75 per cent at the monetary policy meeting in February 2013 and a repo-rate path that from December 2013 follows the path published in December 2013 and again in February 2014.

During this period the krona strengthened by around 10 per cent and we were forced to revise our exchange rate forecasts in a stronger direction on several occasions. One possible explanation is that the forecast did not fully reflect the large interest rate differential that monetary policy entailed. One consequence of the strong development of the krona is that Swedish import prices have fallen in absolute terms and fallen more than other countries’ import prices (see Figure 2a). This puts downward pressure on inflation. Another consequence is that the international competitiveness of domestically-produced goods and services deteriorates. This could be reflected in lower sales volumes and, to the extent the firms instead prefer to guard their market shares, lower price mark-ups. A strong krona, combined with weak demand from abroad, has meant that the situation for the export industry has been particularly hard pressed, which has probably led to low wage increases in the manufacturing sector. As this sector is traditionally a wage leader, the low wages may have spread to the rest of the Swedish economy and in this way have contributed to the low inflationary pressures. Figure 2a. Figure 2b.
The third term represents the desire for gradual interest rate changes in criterion 3, i.e. that the current interest rate it should not deviate too far from the rate in the previous period it-1. The fourth term represents criterion 4 and can be interpreted to mean that there is also a cost or risk in setting an interest rate it that deviates substantially from the interest rate implied by simple monetary policy rules itsimple. By giving some weight to the consideration that the key rate  BIS Review 113/2010  3  should not deviate too far from simple rules, monetary policy may become somewhat more robust. 1 Key policy rate  A monetary policy that only takes into account the consideration of bringing inflation rapidly back to target (criterion 1) would imply that the interest rate should rapidly have been reduced to below 1 per cent when we presented the latest Monetary Policy Report. In that case, the interest rate would have had to be raised rapidly again to prevent activity and inflation from becoming too high further ahead. Such a strategy could be consistent with the desire to safeguard against inflation expectations becoming entrenched below the inflation target, but could on the other hand have a substantial impact on output and employment. Developments become more stable if weight is also given to stabilising output (criteria 1 and 2). This would also imply an interest rate reduction first and then an interest rate increase further ahead.

The Executive Board lays down principles for responsible investment management and is responsible for decisions on the observation and exclusion of companies. Norges Bank has recently issued a consultation response to the report by the Mestad Commission assessing the guidelines for the observation and exclusion of companies. The Bank views the report as a good starting-point for further development of the GPFG as a responsible investor. Norges Bank addresses companies, not political conditions in countries. We remark in our consultation response that the GPFG enjoys the advantages of free and open markets, with no particular restrictions on our investments. The GPFG has today a clear financial objective. A change that blurs the distinction between company and state could raise doubts about the role of the GPFG. A new Central Bank Act entered into force on 1 January 2020. The Act has brought changes in the Bank's governance structure and organisation. A Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee was established at the beginning of the year. This has given the Executive Board greater capacity to work on the management of the GPFG. Over the past year, the Executive Board has completed a reorganisation of the administrative support functions at the Bank with the aim of pooling expertise, promoting cost-effective solutions and underpinning the identity of the Bank as a single institution. Another important change is the Executive Board's appointment of a new CEO for the Bank's management of the GPFG.
9 Hamilton’s system rested on four pillars: The creation and extension of sources of federal tax revenues; the funding and management of the federal public debt; the increased use of the U.S. dollar as a medium of exchange through the establishment of the United States Mint  4  Albert Gallatin’s father died when he was four, and his mother when he was nine. His mother sent him to be brought up by his aunt, Catherine Pictet, just after his father died, as she had to attend to the family’s financial affairs. For more on Gallatin’s Geneva background see, for example, William Emmanuel Rappard, Albert Gallatin, citoyen de Genève, ministre des Etats-Unis (Impr. Centrale, Genève, 1917) or John Austin Stevens, Albert Gallatin, An American Statesman (Univ. Press of the Pacific, Honolulu HI, 1883). 5  Voltaire arrived in Geneva in 1755, and moved to Ferney in 1758, where he stayed to his death in 1778. Gallatin’s grandparents visited Voltaire in Ferney and Albert Gallatin was often taken there for visits. Rousseau was born in Geneva, left at a young age but returned there in 1754. He published Du Contrat Social (and other writings) in 1762, a year after Gallatin was born. He was subsequently forced to flee from Geneva, so there was no direct contact, but definitely an influence on the intellectual climate of the city. 6  Stevens, op.cit., p. 10, quotes Gallatin as having used this phrase to explain his departure. 7  In Pennsylvania, Gallatin also founded the colony “New Geneva”.

The legacy  Let me now briefly turn to the legacy of Albert Gallatin’s extraordinary life. It seems to me that there are two major achievements to point to. First, there is Gallatin’s singular success in his pursuit of debt reduction. Gallatin took advantage of prosperous and relatively peaceful times to reduce the public debt of the emerging United States. The second key legacy of Albert Gallatin’s efforts is the way in which he reinforced the financial institutions set up by Alexander Hamilton and made skilful use of them. Hamilton’s financial system consisted of newly established institutions, which encountered fierce political opposition. They lacked the robustness that only the test of time can provide. Gallatin spent the next 13 years successfully using Hamilton’s system to ensure fiscal prudence and continuous sound financial management. Without this, it might not have survived its infancy. This is particularly true of the Bank of the United States. It is possible to argue that Gallatin’s strong support for Hamilton’s bank furthered the process of setting up its successor, the Second Bank of the United States, in 1817. Two recent authors have gone further. They refer to Gallatin as the “Savior” of Hamilton’s financial system. 27 This second legacy is remarkable, given the long-standing animosity between Alexander Hamilton and Albert Gallatin. How are we to explain Gallatin’s transformation from a prominent critic of the Hamiltonian system to its guardian and perhaps savior?
The narrower the gap between actual production and the capacity ceiling and the lower unemployment happens to be in relation to its equilibrium level, the greater will be the risk of higher inflation. From this also follows a need to know whether the equilibrium level of unemployment has risen. If that is the case, measures should be taken specifically to lower the equilibrium level, a task that is outside the scope of monetary policy. Where is unemployment’s equilibrium level? What is unemployment’s current equilibrium level in Sweden? As always when one goes from a theoretical analysis to practical economics, everything becomes much more complex. Unemployment’s equilibrium level is not an observable quantity. One has to make do with estimates and their inevitable uncertainty means that interpretations have to be cautious. The available estimates suggest that equilibrium unemployment in Sweden moved up in the early 1990s and, in terms of registered unemployment, is now somewhere in the interval between 4.5 and 7.5 per cent.3 The OECD also counts on a marked increase in the 1990s; in the latest report on Sweden the current level is put at between 6 and 7 per cent.4 There is not, in fact, complete agreement that equilibrium unemployment has moved up sharply.5 But what suggests that it has, even though we cannot be sure of its exact level, is that otherwise the high unemployment should have acted as a strong restraint on wage formation. The actual development of wages does not indicate this. 3  See e.g.

In addition, the relatively steep yield curve and the re-emergence of risk appetite, reflected particularly in the increase in stock prices over the past few months, may have dampened M3 growth to some extent. The overall flow of bank loans to the non-financial private sector remained subdued in July, with the differences across borrowing sectors becoming more marked. The flow of loans to households remained slightly positive, whereas in the case of non-financial corporations the flow of loans was negative again. The decline in loans to non-financial corporations continues to reflect mainly a strong net redemption of loans with a shorter maturity, while lending and borrowing at longer maturities remained positive. The fall in production and trade and the ongoing uncertainty in the business outlook are likely to have dampened firms’ demand for financing. Given the normal lag between a recovery in economic activity and a pick-up in  2  BIS Review 102/2009  loans to enterprises, further weak developments in loans to non-financial corporations in the coming months appear likely. At the same time, a gradual improvement in financing conditions, as lower market interest rates continue to be passed on in lower bank lending rates, should support the demand for credit in the period ahead. Against the background of highly demanding challenges, banks should take appropriate measures to strengthen further their capital bases and, where necessary, take full advantage of government measures to support the financial sector, particularly as regards recapitalisation.
Central banks have fought hard to establish credibility by focusing on measurable goals, maintaining clear communications with the public, and being transparent and accountable in achieving these goals. The focus on inflation, a simple observable variable has helped. Having a central bank with multiple mandates creates risks of policy dilution and conflicting goals. In contrast with inflation, or even employment, financial stability is a fuzzy concept with many dimensions that are hard to encompass in a single indicator. Attempting to do so risks ending with a narrow view of financial stability, but having a broader, less precise definition of financial stability makes it hard to establish credibility and accountability for achieving it. On a more pragmatic front, there are good reasons to have banking supervision conducted outside the central bank (which I will not address now), and many countries follow this institutional arrangement. This should be considered when thinking about the involvement of the central bank in financial stability because it is desirable that micro and macro aspects of financial regulation be well coordinated to avoid sending conflicting messages to regulated entities. For these reasons, the institutional setting for monitoring and preserving financial stability will likely vary across countries. But the natural interest of central banks in financial stability and their advantages in providing a systemic view of the financial sector and the economy suggest that they should be involved at some level.

Rodrigo Vergara: Macroeconomic and financial stability – challenges for monetary policy Opening remarks by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the XVI Annual Conference on “Central banking, analysis and economic policies” of the Central Bank of Chile, Santiago de Chile, 15 November 2012. *  *  *  I thank Sofia Bauducco, Gonzalo Castex, Maria Consuelo Edwards, Luis Oscar Herrera, Kevin Cowan, and Claudio Raddatz for helpful comments. Good morning. Welcome to the Central Bank of Chile’s sixteenth annual conference on Central Banking, Analysis and Economic Policies. This year’s version is about “Macroeconomic and Financial Stability: Challenges for monetary policy.” We are expecting two exciting days of learning and discussion on topics at the forefront of academic and policy research on macroeconomic and financial stability. The interaction between academics and policy makers fostered by this conference provides an important opportunity to learn from each other and share views and experiences that will help us improve our policy decisions and hopefully go home with new ideas for research. Today and tomorrow we will reflect on the role of central banks in preventing and reacting to financial exuberance and financial crises. The discussion will focus on two important policy questions: first, did the conduct of conventional monetary policy before the crisis contribute to shaping it? And second, how should monetary policy react to a crisis? In particular, we will discuss the efficacy of conventional monetary and macro-prudential policy action in ameliorating the effects of financial crises.
In order to prepare for the meeting with John Global, I suggest that we take a closer look at his daily routine. Let us take a sunny day of September 2026. Time: 5 a.m. Place: somewhere in the city of Poznan. John Global is still asleep, but the world is already getting ready to wake him up. The news aggregator is ready to provide him with a set of most recent news in line with his interests. As John Global tends to look through newspapers before 07:00 CET when he is in Poznan, and before 16:00 CET when he is in Hong Kong, the aggregator is already preparing a ‘special edition’. And Global always begins his day with looking through online newspapers and drinking well-brewed coffee. Coffee is one of his indulgences, a look back to recall past events, as coffee has been his morning ritual for more than 20 years. As far as other things are concerned, our Global tries to be more flexible and not to fall into any habits. It's 6:30 a.m. John Global wakes up. He enjoys the view from the window – the forest and lake. It is indeed different from the one he saw two days ago in Hong Kong – skyscrapers and smog blotting out the sun. He left Warsaw for Poznan 20 years ago, in 2006, when he realized that administrative issues are too timeconsuming and generate negative emotions.

Gent Sejko: Aiming for a secure financial system and the key role of deposit insurers Welcome address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the IADI's ERC Regional Committee Meeting, Tirana, 4 April 2019. * * * Dear ladies and gentlemen, Dear Mr Boccuzzi, Dear Guests, Good morning and thank you for giving me the opportunity to warmly welcome you all to Tirana and the Bank of Albania and address this international gathering. It is a particular pleasure to have you here at the premises of the Bank of Albania today and to host the meeting of the Europe Regional Committee (ERC) of the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI). After this opening meeting, the agenda will then continue with the Technical Assistance Workshop for the rest of today and tomorrow. I hope you will enjoy it and, most importantly, hold interesting and constructive discussions. I take this opportunity to thank the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) and the Albanian Deposit Insurance Agency (ADIA), who have made it possible for this event to be held in Tirana. Throughout the development of ADIA, IADI’s contribution and input has been undeniable in setting standards. In this regard, IADI has played an important role as a forum for deposit insurers from around the world to gather and share knowledge and expertise. The IADI has also provided intensive training and educational programs and has produced research and guidance on matters related to deposit insurance.
3/9  Yet irrespective of the different composition of the risk-diversification channels, what needs highlighting is that in the euro area the combined power of all the private risk-sharing channels is much more limited than in more stable monetary unions. Given that the role of the public sector is also virtually non-existent in Europe’s case, the outcome is that more than 56% of the effect of shocks – as opposed to 28% in the United States – is not shared. Moreover, it is important to note that during the most acute phase of the last financial crisis, the main risk-sharing channel in the euro area − the credit channel – virtually disappeared, owing to the process of renationalisation of bank loans. This was due to the climate of mistrust about banks’ financial health, and to the existence of negative feedback loops between public finances and banking solvency. To sum up, in the euro area our risk-sharing channels are weaker and, what is more, they tend to contract precisely when they are most needed. The limited strength of private risk-sharing channels in the euro area reflects both the underdevelopment of capital markets and a highly segmented banking system at the national level. There are practically no banks with a pan-European strategy, and there is little progress in cross-border lending, especially in the retail markets, or in other words, in lending to households and firms.

The five steps range from "Normal" to "Viability at Risk" and terminally, "Winding Up or Closure". Insurers assessed to be on the more critical steps will receive more stringent and intrusive supervisory actions. MAS draws the analogy between the risk classification of an insurance firm and the medical assessment of a patient's health. If an insurer is classified as being on the "Viability at Risk" step, it will probably be admitted to MAS' Intensive Care Unit. However, MAS is not regulating for a no-failure regime. We encourage industry consolidation. In today's competitive environment, size brings financial strength and facilitates diversification on both sides of the balance sheet. But it is not possible, and also not desirable, to operate on the basis that we will never, under any circumstances, allow a financial institution to fail. That way lies moral hazard. Improving corporate governance and internal controls A risk-based supervisory approach relies heavily on the strength of company leadership and management. Corporate governance is thus critical. MAS expects the Board of Directors to provide clear strategic leadership and set consistent corporate values. Management teams must operationalise these strategies while upholding the spirit of the corporate values. Given the nature of the insurance business, corporate values need to be guided by risk management concerns. What is the company's risk appetite? What should be its risk tolerance limits? What is the level of risk management skills in the company? How profitable is the underwriting of various classes of risks?