samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Almost six years down the road since the start of the financial turmoil that turned into a crisis, many euro area countries have experienced a significant, but to date still partial, correction of external and domestic imbalances. Substantial progress can be seen most clearly in the development of current account balances. In the programme countries – Greece, Ireland and Portugal – current account balances have improved by more than 7 percentage points (relative to GDP) between 2008 and 2012. In Spain the current account has improved even more dramatically. Much of this was driven by an inevitable drop in domestic demand, but we have also seen strengthening exports in a global environment that is not really buoyant. This indicates that the countries’ efforts to rebalance their economies are starting to bear fruits. Part of this picture is also the partial reversal of previous losses of competitiveness, but here the pace of progress varies across countries. Ireland has performed very well, with accumulated unit labour costs falling by 18 percentage points relative to the euro area average. Greece, Portugal and Spain have seen a 10 percentage point relative improvement so far. In some other countries in need of strengthening competitiveness we are still waiting for the correction to become apparent. And in yet other countries, notably some of the countries that joined the euro area more recently, we have actually seen an incipient loss of competitiveness. It is important that these countries take a lesson from the mistakes of others. Fiscal balances have shown strong improvements.

Being in the hands of national authorities, banking supervision sometimes had a bias towards allowing more risk taking and credit growth in the supervised institutions that were operating in competition with banks from other jurisdictions. Consequently, there were cases when banks did not develop sufficient capital and loss buffers in good times, and they  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  were not sufficiently discouraged from investing heavily in government bonds issued by their own home country. Again, I think you will agree with me that the root causes for the crisis – as I have described them – cannot be addressed by monetary policy instruments. At most, the central bank can foster a smooth adjustment. It must never lose sight of its primary mandate, maintaining price stability. And even if the central bank “buys time” for the governments, there is a risk that this will delay or postpone the actions that are needed in terms of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. Let me give two examples: First, expectations that interest rates will remain low for a long time, and that abundant liquidity will be provided, might weaken the incentives for banks to downsize operations and repair their balance sheets. In the absence of a tough banking supervision they could delay the recognition of losses and keep non-performing loans on their books for longer than a realistic assessment of their profitability and viability would suggest. On the side of governments, the same expectations for low interest rates could weaken incentives to reduce public sector deficits.
Combining these two facts, central bankers in emerging economies face the challenge of modeling the economy properly and react accordingly. In addition, I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that subsequent crises and reform processes have largely defined the economic landscape of emerging market economies in the last twenty years. Thus, uncertainty, which naturally exists in every economy, constitutes a real challenge for central bankers in many emerging economies because of their volatile and unpredictable structure. Dear guests, What we have been experiencing in the Turkish economy in the last five years can be classified as one of the clear examples of the impact of structural changes on an economy. First of all, after a thirty-year period of high and chronic inflation, inflation declined from 68.5 percent in 2001 to 10.26 percent in August 2006. This decline in inflation also made it possible to perform the currency reform at the beginning of 2005 and we dropped six zeros from our currency. Second, we experienced high growth rates while inflation was falling. I can say that the Turkish economy has left behind the boom-bust cycle of growth and has been growing for the last eighteen quarters consecutively. Additionally, the sources of growth have changed, as well. Third, the declining trend of the ratio of public debt to national income has contributed both to the fight against inflation and the relative stability in financial markets.

In fact, what is more important than the figures is that central banks were first established mainly as the lender of last resort and banknote issuer, rather than as an institutional body of monetary policy. Today, there are 160 central banks operating around the world. Some of them are also responsible for supervision and regulation of financial system and have been publishing financial stability reports, and some of them are targeting a certain measure of general price level and have been issuing inflation reports. Thus, in a broader perspective, the evolution of central banking has followed a course from maintaining liquidity when it is necessary and issuing banknotes, towards keeping inflation low and stable, and preserving stability in financial markets. In some sense, this evolution process can be characterized as the converging of the objective functions of central banks all around the world. To be more precise, it is generally accepted that in the case of both industrialized nations and emerging economies, the main contribution that a central bank can make to economic welfare in the long run is achieving and maintaining price stability. Moreover, maintaining price stability is not merely an issue of maximization of economic welfare. It gives people the confidence that money will retain its value over time, ensures that price signals function as a guide for markets to function efficiently and establishes trust in the interaction among economic agents, in property rights, in society and in the future in general 1 .
According to the trend, we can actually only detect an increase during the second half of the 1990s, which was broken recently both due to economic activity and to more structural causes. Several factors lie behind this development. Once again it is natural to go back to the crisis years in the early 1990s. At that point the number of hours worked declined significantly as a result of the large fall in demand that took place. Parallel with this, structural changes were implemented. Young people on the verge of working life chose to continue studying, partly because of the lack of jobs, partly because developments on the labour market meant that higher educational demands were made. Another explanation could be that the number of older persons in the labour force also declined considerably during the same period. The labour supply in the age group 60-64 years fell by approximately 40,000 persons during the 1990s, despite the fact that this group's percentage of the population did not change significantly. In addition, the number of people taking early retirement increased at an alarming rate. Recently, as we are all aware, the amount of sick leave has increased. BIS Review 16/2003  3  Another factor that appears to have had some significance is that the Swedish labour market has not been able to make adequate use of the labour reserve comprised of inhabitants who were born abroad. The employment frequency among these people has been much lower than the employment frequency among people born in Sweden.

John C Williams: Bridging the skills gap Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the "Skilling the Gap: Building Local Talent for InDemand Careers", Columbia-Greene Community College, Hudson, New York, 21 October 2022. ***  As prepared for delivery Thank you for that kind introduction. I'm so pleased to be here-especially at this time of year, when the autumn colors light up the region. In fact, my wife and I have fallen in love with this area-so much so, that we are now splitting our time between Columbia County and New York City. Of course, I'm not just here as your neighbor. Part of my job as president of the New York Fed-one of the best parts-is to meet with business and community leaders from across the Federal Reserve's Second District. This gives me the opportunity to see and hear the challenges they face. And throughout the Second District-which includes New York State, Northern New Jersey, Southwestern Connecticut, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands-the issues I hear about consistently have to do with labor shortages and the skills gap. Employers can't find enough skilled workers-and workers can't obtain the skills they need to move up the economic ladder. Before I go any further, I will give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System.
BIS Review 16/2009  3  Five different sets of measures have been implemented: First, central banks have supplied liquidity to banks on a much larger scale than usual and providing loans with longer maturities. Central banks are also providing foreign currency loans to their banks. Second, key rates have been aggressively cut. The US entered the downturn first and had already reduced the key rate in early autumn 2007. And as the crisis developed, the Federal Reserve continued to lower its key rate. Here in Europe, key rates rose up to summer 2008 before being lowered substantially from October. Third, credit policy instruments have been introduced. Several countries are guaranteeing loans to banks. The Federal Reserve is buying mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities collateralised by student loans, credit card loans and loans to small businesses, as well as commercial paper issued directly by large businesses, a measure the central banks in Japan and the UK also intend to implement. The UK government has announced that they will guarantee loans to small and medium-sized firms. 4  BIS Review 16/2009  Fourth, the authorities in a number of countries felt compelled to supply risk capital to banks. Some governments have assumed ownership of financial institutions. In the UK, the government is now a majority stakeholder in the Royal Bank of Scotland and owns over 40 per cent of Lloyds. In Germany, the government is increasing its stake in Commerzbank, which is acquiring Dresdner Bank.

The flow of liquidity has improved slightly, and interbank rates have fallen. In the US and Europe, these rates were more than 2 percentage points above the key rate in October last year, but now the gap has been halved. As a result, the low rates set by central banks are having a greater effect. In the US, mortgages and corporate loans have become cheaper after the Federal Reserve began to purchase bonds and commercial paper issued by mortgage banks and firms. In Germany, Sweden and Denmark, mortgage rates have decreased markedly. And in Norway, borrowing rates have fallen and credit to homebuyers is flowing again. Equity and commodity prices are still fluctuating widely, but the decline is no longer steep. BIS Review 16/2009  9  Lower key rates, higher public expenditure and reduced taxes will push up demand for goods and services, gradually stabilising output and employment and preventing inflation from becoming too low. There are also strong self-regulating mechanisms in market economies that can easily be underestimated when times are at their bleakest. Corporate profitability is being squeezed, but the rise in unemployment will result in lower wage growth, which will curb the impact on earnings. Investment is falling sharply, but there will in time be a need for new houses and commercial buildings and to replace obsolete machinery. Households all over the world are now increasing their saving and reducing debt. When debt eventually reaches a sustainable level, consumption will pick up.
[24] The same protections do not exist at the global level or are much weaker in other regional trading blocs such as NAFTA. The history of the United States itself illustrates the difficulty of aligning the approaches of individual states to improve working conditions. In the early 20th century, there was a growing concern in several US states about the lack of a social safety net, especially for the elderly. But individual states feared that providing social security would impose, in the words of the time, “a heavy tax burden on the industries of the state that would put them at a disadvantage in competition with neighboring states unburdened by a pension system.”[25] The lack of coordination created a severe underprovision of social security, which was exacerbated by the Great Depression. In 1934, half of the population over 65 were in poverty. [26] This was only resolved through the passing of the federal Social Security Act in 1935, which enabled states to coordinate in providing social security. In a similar way, the EU provides a powerful coordination function that allows countries to achieve goals that they could not realise alone. And the EU is able in turn to export some of its 4 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  standards globally. The EU is the top trading partner of 80 countries, compared with just over 20 for the United States. [27] That allows the EU to insist on higher labour and product standards abroad via trade agreements,[28]as well as protecting local producers at home.

William C Dudley: The evolving structure of the US Treasury Market Conference – welcoming remarks Welcoming remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the evolving structure of the US treasury market conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 20 November 2015. *  *  *  Frank Keane, Michael McMorrow, Joseph Tracy and Nate Wuerffel assisted in preparing these remarks. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this conference on the evolving structure of the U.S. Treasury market. As you all know, the Treasury market plays a unique and crucial role in our economy, and in global financial markets more broadly. Treasury securities serve as a liquid investment and hedging vehicle for global investors, a ready source of collateral for many financial transactions and serve as a risk-free benchmark for other financial instruments. The Treasury market is important for the Federal Reserve’s implementation of monetary policy and also is a focus here at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in our statutory role as the Treasury’s fiscal agent. The Treasury market also helps to underpin the U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. And, of course, it is the primary means for borrowing to finance the U.S. federal government. 1 In recent years, the structure of the Treasury market has changed significantly. Trading has become increasingly electronic, and, in many cases, highly automated.
Over the past 15 years, there have been two important instances in which the relationship between the fed funds rate and financial conditions have diverged significantly. The first was the late 1990s technology stock market bubble and its aftermath. The second was the mid2000s credit market bubble that culminated in the recent financial crisis. During these episodes, the relationship between the fed funds rate and financial conditions was particularly unstable. As a result, developments in the financial markets became very important in the conduct of monetary policy. 1  In my comments, I am going to assume that inflation expectations are always well anchored so that I do not need to distinguish between the real and nominal fed funds rate. BIS Review 23/2010  1  In this respect, I would note that financial conditions indicators have implications for “Taylor Rule” formulations for monetary policy. As you all know, Taylor-type rules provide a shorthand metric for the appropriate stance of monetary policy. In such rules, the fed funds rate is set at a level equal to the equilibrium real fed funds rate, plus the inflation objective, plus the weighted deviation of output from its potential and of the inflation objective from actual or, if forward looking, expected inflation. Often, analysts and economists assume that the equilibrium real fed funds rate is equal to 2 percent, its long-term historical value. Although, in principle, such rules allow the equilibrium rate to be time varying, it typically is assumed to be constant.

First, including 44 variables may generate good results more because the additional variables add greater flexibility to soak up variability in real GDP, rather than providing a more solid theoretical underpinning. As the authors note, the variables were selected, in part, on the basis of what we know today about which variables are likely to be important. But this type of selection process – even if conducted on a pseudo real-time basis – introduces selection bias, which the authors do admit could be important. Second, despite the inclusion of a large number of variables, some important ones may still be missing. In particular, leverage variables – such as the leverage ratio of the major securities dealers – may be an important component of financial conditions. The work of Tobias Adrian and Hyun Shin suggests that the increase in leverage of the major securities was a major factor that fueled the asset bubble preceding the recent crisis. If this was indeed the case as seems likely, this type of variable should also be included in a financial conditions framework. 4 Third, as the authors note, the resulting FCI is complex; it is difficult to estimate, update and to communicate what the results mean. I think FCIs have value as heuristic devices in highlighting what is important. One loses that benefit when the number of variables becomes large and the indexes become complex. Fourth, it would be interesting to know how financial conditions indexes for other countries and regions would differ.
They need to have an informed view of how markets and policy makers in other countries are likely to react, before they decide which domestic policies are likely to prove sustainable – and they need to ensure that their policies are robust to possible shifts in other countries policies. The key political risk at present is of course protectionism – not just the possibility of bilateral restrictions, but of a fatal lack of momentum on the Doha round. This could be a material consideration in almost any scenario created by financial market pressures. BIS Review 3/2006  3  All these risks underline the need to greatly improve the standard of dialogue on international economic issues. The quality of analysis needs to improve, the right countries need to participate in the debate, discussions need to be franker, and their outcome needs to be communicated clearly. Getting these things right will be tricky but the need for reform is growing. So I am sure we will need to address these issues soon. As to how we do it? That's for another day. 4  BIS Review 3/2006

This campaign succeeded thanks to the support of Jean Claude Trichet, Cristián Noyer, Tim Geithner and especially Jean-Pierre Roth. As a result of this campaign, aside from Chile, countries like Norway, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Israel and New Zealand were able to also integrate the discussion on the global economy. Those meetings gather central bank governors of the main economies of the world, and are a great opportunity to be updated on the evolution of the global economy and strengthen the networks for interaction across central bankers. Internationally, I must also mention the great recognition that has the work of our Central Bank in other central banks and in international forums. Dear Board members, executives and all the staff: I want to tell you all that I am deeply grateful for having had the opportunity to serve my country from this position. It has been a true privilege, especially for the opportunity that provided me to strengthen this institution and in this way to contribute to build the great reputation that this institution has today in the country and elsewhere. Traveling abroad as the Governor of the Central Bank is a great satisfaction because of the way our country is seen and respected. I have been the recipient of frequent praise for our country and for this Central Bank, which is the merit of each and every one of you.
Efforts by the Accounting & Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Islamic  2  “The New Silk Road: Asia and the Middle East rediscover trade and investment opportunities”, Research Department, Kuwait China Investment Company (KCIC), January 2011. 3  Ibid. 4  “Economic growth moderates across Middle East”, IMF Survey, May 21, 2013. 5  “World Economic Outlook”, IMF, April 2013. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Development Bank and Malaysia’s International Shariah Research Academy (ISRA) in research and fostering dialogue between Shariah Scholars from various jurisdictions are also narrowing the differences in views on Shariah issues in finance. As work on all these fronts progress, this will encourage greater interest internationally to participate in cross border financing and investment activities. The prospects for cross-border Islamic finance are already very bright. We are beginning to see cross border sukuk issuance within Asia, as well as between Middle East and Asia. As early as 2010, Malaysia’s Khazanah issued a $ sukuk in Singapore, while Japan-based Nomura issued 2-year $ sukuk in Malaysia. Last year, taking advantage of favorable currency swap rates, Singapore listed companies Natural Resources and Golden Agri tapped the Malaysian Ringgit (MR) sukuk market. In the last two years, two GCC firms, Abu Dhabi National Energy Company and Kuwait-based Gulf Investment Corp issued MR sukuk in Malaysia. There is considerable scope to issue more such cross-border sukuk, especially to finance the large infrastructure needs in both Middle East and Asia.

Lim Hng Kiang: Boosting international linkages and cross-border opportunities Opening remarks by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 4th World Islamic Banking Conference: Asia Summit 2013, Singapore, 4 June 2013. *  *  *  Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. And to all our foreign guests, a warm welcome to Singapore. Introduction I am honoured to be invited to deliver the opening address for the 4th WIBC Asia Summit. Since its inauguration, I am pleased to see that the Conference has grown in participation and stature, with attendance nearly doubled since 2010. Continued growth of Islamic Finance When this conference convened in Singapore this time last year, one key takeaway was that the Islamic Finance industry, being well-capitalised and tied to underlying real economic activities, was presented with unique opportunities to expand further in an era of deleveraging by global financial institutions and the demand for back-to-basic investment. The need for the industry to integrate itself with global finance and strike roots in key international financial centres was also emphasised. We have indeed seen continued strong growth in the Islamic finance industry over the past year.