samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
After the Global Financial Crisis, there is some reduction in the private sector debt in some countries, notably in the US. However, the levels of government debts have continued to rise. Before the Global Financial Crisis, the US federal debt was $ trillion. In 7 years’ time, the federal debt increased by almost 100% to $ trillion. This is equivalent to an increase from 63% of GDP to 103% of GDP. In the euro-area, the level of public debt was 100% of GDP prior to the eruption of the European Sovereign Debt crisis in 2011, and it went up by another 2.7 trillion Euros and reached 120% of GDP in Q3 2014. In Japan, the situation is even worse. Public debt to GDP ratio went up steadily in the last twenty years and now reaches a stunning level of about 260%. Together with private-sector debt, the total debt of Japan adds up to about 480% of GDP, the highest in the developed world. So we don’t have a pretty picture in the developed world as a whole. 9. Such rapid growth of public debt in major advanced economies reflects the lack of fiscal discipline and unrestrained spending behaviour of their governments. Except for Germany, most European governments have never been able to record fiscal surplus in any year since the early 1980s, with average annual fiscal deficits amounting to about 3–8% of GDP.

Mojmír Hampl: European integration – a critical economist’s view Speech by Mr Mojmír Hampl, Vice-Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Europe at Sixty: 1949–2009, Metropolitan University, Prague, 20 November 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Let me first express my deep gratitude to the organisers for inviting me to give this keynote speech today. And do not take it as a standard, politically correct opening sentence. I really mean it. For me it is quite a rare opportunity to speak frankly and openly on such an important topic, which the process of European integration certainly is, and to speak more as a scholar than a policy-maker. So I will try to do my best and to be outspoken enough to provoke questions and comments after I finish. Therefore, the usual disclaimer is more relevant than ever this time: my opinions are not necessarily the opinions of my employer. I think European integration is a process that provides a lot of food for thought for many social scientists. I will try to approach the topic from the point of view of an economist, but also a citizen and a mere mortal, sharing with you some of my concerns as to how the process of European integration has been evolving so far and where it is most likely heading.
Beyond the 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  potentially arbitrary labelling, the efficacy and desirability of a given policy should be judged solely by its outcome and its effectiveness in correcting market failures and imbalances. Only then can policies be evaluated intelligently, fairly and measurably. Today I have talked about how it has become more difficult for central bankers in open economies to conduct monetary policy. I attempted to highlight that in order to manage these difficult challenges, there needs to be sufficient pragmatism and agility by central bankers. Most importantly, policymakers have to be given sufficient space and autonomy to address rising challenges to our respective economies. I am reminded by John Baldoni’s article on “The Secret to Team Collaboration: Individuality”. The author warned about the risks of confusing between collectivism and collaboration. Collectivism leads to confined “group-think” and decisions; collaboration on the other hand breeds innovation. While collectivists do work towards a single goal, they ignore alternate paths to achieve that purpose. Collaborators, however, while similarly focused on a single purpose, arrive at their goals by incorporating different points of view and creative solutions. In short, collectivists value ideology over results. Collaborators are pragmatists that look for alternative ways to get things done. As we move forward and fight for greater policy autonomy, we might be tempted to think that integration and collaboration come at the expense of individuality and domestic autonomy. In my opinion, it is the exact opposite. Collaboration thrives with individuality and autonomy. This is not wishful thinking.

"7 In addition, the FOMC indicated it will continue to reduce its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, according to the framework announced a year ago.8 The FOMC also said that the "Committee will closely monitor incoming information and assess the implications for monetary policy." I will be particularly focused on assessing the evolution of credit conditions and their effects on the outlook for growth, employment, and inflation. Always in Motion Is the Future Because of the lag between policy actions and their effects, it will take time for the FOMC's actions to restore balance to the economy and return inflation to our 2 percent target. I expect inflation to decline to around 3-1/4 percent this year, before returning to our longer-run goal of 2 percent over the next two years. As tighter monetary policy continues to take effect, I expect real GDP to grow modestly this year, with growth then picking up somewhat next year. And I anticipate slow growth will continue to cool the labor market, with unemployment gradually rising to about 4 to 4-1/2 percent over the next year. Knowledge Lights Our Way I am confident we are on the path to restoring price stability. As always, I'll be monitoring the totality of the data and what it implies for the achievement of our goals. To paraphrase wiseyouphilosopher Yoda, little more knowledge lights way."
Touching briefly on the stock market, equity trading in Iceland has risen very rapidly in recent years, as has the number of publicly listed companies and their total market capitalisation. Among other things, the depth of the market is increasing because of the incorporation and privatisation of public enterprises, including the banks. The laws and regulations pertaining to the stock market, including disclosure requirements, are similar to those in other European countries. The conduct of monetary policy Turning more specifically to the Central Bank of Iceland and the conduct of monetary policy, the current legislation stipulates many goals for the Bank. With the liberalisation of financial markets and the opening up of the capital account, as well as with international developments towards greater independence for central banks and simplified policy targets, the main target of the Central Bank of Iceland has gradually become that of maintaining a low rate of inflation. The Bank has also gained greater independence than is strictly provided for in the current law, which it has achieved with the tacit approval of the Government, but partly in agreements on specific aspects. In my view, this is important for enhancing the credibility of monetary policy and the Central Bank. Credibility is very fragile and it takes strong effort and careful policy and policy implementation to enhance and maintain it. Another objective of the Central Bank is to monitor the stability of the financial system.

There is no doubt that having to call off a test at the last minute because of insufficient planning will be counter-productive to reaching such a goal. Contingency Planning The final issue I will discuss today is contingency planning. Much has been said about the need to develop contingency plans for the Year 2000 conversion, and I fully support these efforts. We need contingency plans in place for two main reasons. First, to ensure that we have considered how to handle the inevitable disruptions that will occur as a result of Year 2000, and, second, to help build confidence that disruptions will not have systemic consequences. In the process of contingency planning, we must also keep in mind that it is prudent to consider the possibility of some very serious, but improbable, events. Contingency planning for Year 2000 will not be limited to the century rollover itself. As my colleague, Roger Ferguson, has described it, there will be a Year 2000 “shadow” that will affect financial markets both before and after the event itself. This shadow will relate to BIS Review 85/1998  -8-  the uncertainty among market participants about the possible consequences of Year 2000 disruptions for particular firms and markets. In some cases, this concern will lead market participants to consider conventions and procedures for limiting risks during the rollover itself. For example, some transactions that normally would be executed for settlement on January 3, 2000 may be postponed.
1  For an extensive survey, see Reinhart, C and Rogoff, R, (2009), This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly, Princeton University Press. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  2  Stagflationary threats were tamed by new regimes for monetary stability that were both democratically accountable and highly effective. Clear remits. Parliamentary accountability. Sound governance. Independent, transparent and effective policy-making. These were the great successes of that time and their value endures today. But these innovations did not deliver lasting macroeconomic stability. Far from it. Price stability was no guarantee of financial stability. An initially healthy focus would become a dangerous distraction. Against the serene backdrop of the so-called Great Moderation (Chart 1), a storm was brewing as total non-financial debt in the G7 rose by the size of its GDP (Chart 2). Several factors drove this debt super-cycle including demographics and the stagnation of middle-class real wages (itself the product of technology and globalisation). In the US, households had to borrow to increase consumption. “Let them eat cake” became “let them eat credit”.2 Financial innovation made it easier to do so. And the ready supply of foreign capital made it cheaper.

28  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  8  However, as the old fault lines close in advanced economies, they are widening in some emerging market economies. For example, while China’s economic miracle over the past three decades has been extraordinary, its postcrisis performance has increasingly relied on a large build-up of debt and an associated explosion of shadow banking (Chart 5). The non-bank finance sector has increased from around 10% of GDP a decade ago to over 100% now, with developments echoing those in the pre-crisis US such as off-balance sheet vehicles with large maturity mismatches, sharp increases in repo financing, and large contingent liabilities of borrowers and banks. The Chinese authorities recognise that “this time may not be different” and have begun taking measures to manage the risks.30 More broadly, a potentially major new vulnerability has emerged across the G20. This risk starts, as is often the case, with a positive development. Global assets under management have grown from around $ trillion a decade ago to $ trillion in 2017,31 and have accounted for all the increase in foreign lending to EMEs since the crisis. This is bringing welcome diversity to the financial system. At present, however, asset management’s growing importance could increase the risks of sudden stops and feed more intense capital flow reversals from emerging markets.
To contain these risks, the SNB took unprecedented measures, first increasing liquidity to historically unparalleled levels, then introducing a minimum exchange rate against the euro. 4  Estimates suggest that the first round of US quantitative easing has reduced yields on 10-year U.S. treasuries by 50 to 100 basis points, see e.g. Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) or Gagnon et al (2011). However, we are not yet in a position to undertake a final assessment of the broader macroeconomic effects of these programmes. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Summing up our investigation into the causes of low interest rates, the main message is that interest rates reflect the prevailing economic and financial circumstances and the reaction of monetary policy to these circumstances. The low levels we currently observe can be explained by a secular downward trend that began in the 1980s, a cyclical downturn due to the financial crisis, the correspondingly accommodative monetary policy and, in the case of Switzerland, additional downward pressure resulting from the safe-haven demand. But – and this brings me to my next point – such low interest rate levels are not without risk. Consequences of a long period of low interest rates An extended period of very accommodative monetary policy, even when fully justified as a reaction to prevailing economic circumstances, is not without risks and side-effects. Let me raise two issues: the risk to price stability, and the risk to financial stability. I will start with the former.

This partly explains the feeble economic recovery and declining potential GDP growth trend in the US (Chart 2). 6. The weak recovery in the US in recent years fell outside the expectations of many economists at the Fed. Because of the lacklustre growth, QE was extended and expanded, feeding an addiction from “low for long”, to “low for longer” and then to “low forever”, and developing a dependence on QE by the market. When the then Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke hinted at the possibility of scaling down the asset purchase programme in May 2013, the market panicked in an episode we later called the “Taper Tantrum”. 7. So, why is the present recovery weaker than in previous cycles? This is a complicated and controversial subject. I believe that both cyclical factors and structural factors, such as household de-leveraging, the high home inventory levels after the bursting of the housing bubble and structural changes in the population and labour market, are at play. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  External factors are also involved, including the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011. However, due to time constraints, I will focus on how QE may have supported US economic recovery and affected the global financial environment. 8. The prevailing mainstream view, including the major advanced economies such as the US, Europe and Japan, as well as the International Monetary Fund, is that QE is the right policy response to prop up the economy and stave off deflation.
Their effect will soon be exhausted and the increase will stop as pressures from the demand side have been completely absent. Temporarily higher inflation does not mean that price stability is undermined. Over the last two years, inflation in the Euro area has continuously been well above the ECB’s target, but no one gets upset about it, as it is clear that it is not a consequence of overheated domestic demand. Monetary policy cannot prevent the initial impact on prices from the supply shocks, but it can prevent the transmission effect on other prices. NBRM will not allow price stability to be undermined. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  You have recently admitted that monetary policy is facing several challenges, which call for contrasting reactions. Can you explain what you think specifically and how you would solve this problem in the monetary sphere? If there had not been price shocks of the global commodity exchanges, the NBRM would have had room for further easing of the monetary policy. However, due to the pressures from international prices we must give a clear signal that we will not allow undermining of price stability, while simultaneously adjusting the monetary policy to the slower economic growth. It is a great challenge, a difficult task, but not impossible. Now is the time when many central banks apply unconventional monetary policy measures to respond to the unusual economic trends.

In my view, without pretending to be exhaustive, these global issues on which  Page 6 sur 7 interests and deliverables could converge encompass the following three “Cs”: climate, crypto-assets, cross-border payments. 1. Of course, addressing climate change comes to mind first. In the wake of the IPCC’s January Synthesis Report, it is estimated that if emissions continue at current levels, the carbon budget to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C with limited overshoot would run out in around six years. The latest IPCC report is the final warning from the scientific climate community to all of us policy makers. From a financial standpoint, the collective priority is to make green finance more mature. The path is clear: better data and better standards will allow us to shift from voluntary to mandatory climate-related disclosures, and still more developed climate stress-tests and transition plans for all financial institutions. At the international level, we must ensure the convergence, or at least the interoperability of the various disclosure standards currently under development. ISSB should be the international standard, and be assured the European standard – EFRAG – will be somewhat more demanding but fully compatible. 2. Second, crypto-assets. In light of last year’s debacle, there is a broad consensus in international fora on the need to regulate them. But this consensus must now be leveraged and translated into concrete action.
This is consistent with both lower terms of trade for Chile and tighter financial conditions, given the expected monetary policy response in the major economies. In addition, the projections consider a slowdown in the growth of our main trading partners (table 1). In the central scenario, the narrowing of the activity gap that began early this year will last for several quarters. Thus, GDP will see annual change between 1.5% and 2.25% this year, between zero and -1.0% in 2023, and between 2.25% and 3.25% in 2024. Regarding fiscal policy, for this three-year period, the projection envisages a spending path consistent with that reported in the last Public Finances Report (table 2). The Board estimates that, following the hike agreed at the June monetary policy meeting, further smaller adjustments in the MPR will be needed to ensure the convergence of inflation to 3% over the two-year horizon. Still, risks are still high, especially considering the level that inflation has reached and its long-lasting persistence. Risks surrounding the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario remain significant. The upper part of the MPR corridor reflects sensitivity scenarios where inflation could prove more persistent than expected. This could occur if private consumption continues to show no significant adjustment in the coming quarters.

Ardian Fullani: Recent economic and monetary developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the press conference on the Monetary Policy Decision of the Bank of Albania Supervisory Council, Tirana, 29 May 2012. *  *  *  Today, on 29 May 2012, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania reviewed and approved the monthly Monetary Policy Report. Based on the analysis of Albania’s latest economic and monetary developments, and following discussions on their performance outlook, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged at 4.25%. This decision reflects the Supervisory Council’s opinion that the actual monetary conditions are adequate to meet the Bank of Albania’s inflation target in the medium run. It holds the key interest rate at a record low, thereby maintaining the strong stimulating nature of monetary policy, in order to boost aggregate demand and economic growth. This decision also reflects the heightened uncertainty deriving from the external economic environment and, particularly, from the recent economic developments in Greece. Let me now proceed with an overview of the economic developments and key topics discussed at today’s meeting. *** Annual inflation marked 1.6% in April, continuing to pursue an upward trajectory over the last two months and approaching the lower limit of the target band. After marking a minimum low in February, the rising trend of inflation was expected and communicated by the Bank of Albania.
It enabled banks to swap legacy illiquid securities (principally RMBS and covered bonds) for UK Treasury Bills for a period of three years. The Bank announced in early February that it lent £ of TBills, against £ (nominal) of collateral. 8  BIS Review 67/2009  Prudential regulation of banks’ liquidity: how it relates to central bank liquidity insurance But such insurance is not and cannot be a source of longer-term funding to the banking system. Prudent valuations and haircuts mean that our insurance cannot finance anything like the whole of a bank’s balance sheet even in the short run, and also that banks need a clear buffer of surplus capital. Nor is central bank liquidity insurance always going to work. That underlines why prudent liquidity management must be a major responsibility of the banks themselves. In the normal course of their business, they should insure themselves against liquidity risk in private markets. They can do so by, for example, holding a stock of assets that can unquestionably be exchanged readily in the financial markets for cash in anything other than the gravest market distress; by maintaining funding with a prudent maturity structure relative to that of their assets and contingent commitments; and in the case of smaller banks, up to a point by buying insurance in the form of completely committed lines of credit from larger banks, but also crucially by holding unquestionably liquid assets in case their bank-provider is ailing when they call on the line.

Paul Tucker: The repertoire of official sector interventions in the financial system – last resort lending, market-making, and capital Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, of the Bank of England, at the Bank of Japan 2009 International Conference “Financial System and Monetary Policy: Implementation”, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, 27-28 May 2009. *  *  *  Everything – and I mean everything – about central banking stems from our liabilities being the base money of the economy. From this flow our roles in monetary policy and financial stability. And, in consequence, the manner in which central banks supply our money – overnight, intra-day, and for term maturities; in routine and in various stressed circumstances – just could not matter more, even if much of the time it seems like an obscure corner of the financial system’s plumbing. About half a decade ago, I set out the thinking that underpins the Bank of England’s management of our balance sheet, focusing principally on the implementation of monetary policy. 1 Today I want to explain how, over the past eighteen months, we have developed our system for providing liquidity insurance to banks in the interests of preserving financial stability; and how that bears on the prudential regulation of banks’ liquidity.