samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As Andrea mentioned, the focus today is our approach to encouraging diversity in our financial market intelligence contacts, and the networks we engage with. Our priority is to speak to a diverse group of people from a broad range of financial institutions. Our discussions with market participants help us understand market developments, and the implications for our Policy Committees. So all of the arguments about why diversity is important internally here at the Bank of England hold just as firmly when we engage with you externally. We are embedding that approach into our core market intelligence framework, to underscore our commitment. So why is this a priority for us? First and foremost, it’s the right thing to do. As a public institution, we need to represent the diversity of the country in what we look like, who we talk to and the impact of our decisions. But, just as importantly, it helps us achieve our objectives. Our mission is to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability. And diversity in its many forms is a critical part of delivering that mission. Improved cognitive diversity helps make for better decision making. The lack of such diversity has been highlighted as one important factor in the bank and regulatory failures of 2008.5 Having a diverse range of institutions and business models brings positive benefits for financial system resiliency6 – something that you will not be surprised to hear matters a great deal to the Bank of England!

We want to continue to work together with all of you here on this agenda. We look forward to hearing your ideas, suggestions and questions through the panel discussion coming up shortly, and in our networking session with our market intelligence teams later on today. We want to use 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  that as a starting point to build stronger links with a wider, more diverse group of colleagues, and also deepen those over time, as they progress through their careers. There is a very important further issue in all of this, which is sadly highly topical, namely to ask what is the antidote to the problem of lobbying? The answer is not to speak to no-one. That is not likely to lead to good decision making. The answer is to be rigorous about speaking to a diverse range of people to get their views. We look forward to engaging with you in the future, working together to understand financial market developments from a diverse and varied range of perspectives to inform our policy committee decisions. Thank you I am grateful to Christine Boykiw, Sumita Ghosh, Sam Juthani, Ankita Mehta and Arjun Popat for their assistance in helping me prepare these remarks.​ 1 See Carney (2017) – link in References section. Gender, ethnicity, age, disability, sexual orientation and  education are types of ‘identity’ diversity. ‘Cognitive’ diversity is about our perspectives and how we think about and solve problems.
François Villeroy de Galhau: The consequences of Brexit for the French and European financial sectors Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), at the ACPR conference, Paris, 23 November 2018. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to welcome you along with Bernard Delas to this new conference organised by the ACPR, which this morning will focus on the consequences of Brexit for the financial sector. This issue is admittedly constantly evolving in line with current events... I welcome the agreement that was reached between the European negotiators and their British counterparts last week and we all hope that it will pass through the stages to come and ultimately be finalised. However, in a context that remains uncertain, we must be cautious: even if we hope to avoid it, we must also be ready for a possible no deal scenario. The ACPR and the Banque de France are preparing for this eventuality to ensure the smooth functioning of the financial system. That will be my first point and for that reason I will discuss it using the conditional. I would then like to look beyond Brexit to see how we can transform some of today’s difficulties into opportunities for the future and build a more integrated “financial Eurosystem”. ** I.

Of course, by its very nature clearing is an activity that generates major economies of scale, and thus encourages concentration. But greater competition is absolutely necessary to stimulate financial innovation. Fortunately, LCH SA will centralise repo transactions at the beginning of 2019. More generally, we would like to see the development in Paris of an enhanced and extended clearing services offering in the area of interest rate derivatives. More broadly, Brexit represents an opportunity for Europe to effectively transform its own savings, in order to enhance its ability to finance the real economy: what I call the Financing Union for Investment and Innovation. This involves better steering the euro area’s abundant savings to absorb shocks within the euro area more effectively and to meet investment and innovation needs in fields such as digital technology, energy transition and the equity financing of SMEs. In practice, the creation of a true Financing Union requires the acceleration of the Capital Markets Union and the completion of the Banking Union. The second pillar on the resolution of failing banks is more important still than a possible common deposit guarantee scheme. And it is essential to remove barriers for pan-European banks. This was the policy agenda of the FrancoGerman declaration in Meseberg in June 2018: but I insist on the urgent need to make it a reality today.
In the March Monetary Policy Report, we projected a pronounced rebound in activity in the Norwegian economy in the second half of 2021 as a large proportion of the population is vaccinated, and a continued upswing into 2022. Unemployment was projected to fall in pace with the rise in activity. At the same time, inflation was expected to moderate ahead, to somewhat below the inflation target, before moving up again. We projected that house price inflation would be dampened as a result of a gradual rise in lending rates, a normalisation of household consumption patterns and an increase in residential construction. With regard to fiscal policy, we have assumed that public spending – in line with the fiscal rule – would be reduced as and when the situation permits. Conclusion Let me conclude. When I was here last year, the economic outlook was gloomy. We had just set the policy rate lower than it had ever been, and we were highly uncertain about what lay ahead. Since then, we have been through several waves of higher infection rates and strict containment measures. Nevertheless, economic activity has rebounded strongly from the trough in spring 2020, and many of those who became unemployed have fortunately re-entered the workforce. We are now pleased to note that infection rates are heading downward and that the reopening of society is underway. There is still uncertainty about the road ahead, but we can see the light at the end of the tunnel. Thank you for your attention.

The sluggishness of the recovery in many advanced economies from the global financial crisis – the so-called Great Recession - was striking even by historical standards. For example, the level of activity in the UK lies very significantly below its level at the equivalent stage following the 1930s depression (Chart 7). The UK’s Great Recession was far-worse than the Great Depression. A number of factors are believed responsible for the persistence of weak global demand. One often given prominence was heightened risk-aversion among lenders, consumers and businesses, which in turn constrained credit and spending growth in the economy. This so-called “psychological scarring” of risk appetite was also a dampener of credit and aggregate demand following the Great Depression. 7  7  Malmendier and Nagel (2011). 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  On the supply-side of the economy, several factors have contributed to subdued global inflation over recent decades.
In a situation where business confidence - and therefore investment - was weak, that essentially meant stimulating consumer demand. It was not without risk - in terms of the build-up of household debt and of a possible house price bubble - but without it we, too, would have faced recession. Looking forward, there is a reasonable prospect that global demand will pick up gradually, and we may see a more sustainable pattern of exchange rates beginning to emerge with the albeit hesitant strengthening of the euro. There are in fact already signs that manufacturing output has started to recover. But there are downside risks to that prospect associated with the renewed volatility of international financial markets over the summer, which we are monitoring very closely. But abstracting from these recent global and largely cyclical, effects, the more fundamentally important point, looking further ahead, is the likelihood that we - alongside other countries - will continue to operate within a framework of overall macro-economic stability - as a necessary condition for the effective functioning of the market economy. Those presumptions may well mean that manufacturing continues its gradual, long-term, relative decline - as a share of total output, and in terms of the number of people employed - in all developed industrial countries, including the UK.

That increasing short-termism in turn led to the increasing amplitude of the business cycle, so that inflation rose progressively higher from economic peak to peak and unemployment rose progressively higher from economic trough to trough. I am convinced that, with others, we really have taken on board the lessons of that experience. The requirements that public debt to GDP is kept at a stable and prudent level, with borrowing over the economic cycle limited to finance investment spending, constrain the use of fiscal policy as a short-term instrument. And monetary policy has been given the distinct role as the primary instrument for short-term aggregate demand management, with a target for retail price inflation, not simply as an end in itself, as some people still seem to imagine, but as a measure of the extent to which the growth of demand is held consistently broadly in line with the underlying - sustainable - growth of supply-side capacity. The past ten years have in fact been a period of unusual stability in that broader sense for the UK economy as a whole. Inflation has been consistently low throughout that time - close to, and recently modestly below, our present 2½% target. But that has not been achieved at the expense of consistently high interest rates, and weak growth and high unemployment, as many people initially feared that it would.
The achievements of the December agreement must resolutely be built upon: regarding the Banking Union, a common backstop that would be available rapidly and remain in place for a sufficiently long period is an essential element, even more than the deposit insurance scheme, to ensure that the single resolution mechanism is solid and effective. The Capital Markets Union, on which everyone agrees in principle, must finally forge ahead to better channel our EUR 350 billion private savings surplus towards the concrete needs of our economy: digital innovation, the energy transition and SMEs’ capital. Finally, the progress achieved on the public solidarity mechanisms – preventive intervention of the European Stability Mechanism, fiscal capacity – is a promising prospect but it needs to be translated into action. 2 – My second wish is for financial stability 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  I would first like to acknowledge the soundness of our financial institutions. In June 2018, the Tier 1 capital ratio of the main French banks stood at 13.5%, i.e. 7.7% higher than in 2008. The liquidity situation has improved, with an average LCR of 127%. The share of non-performing loans has continued to decline to stand at 3.1% in June 2018, i.e. close to the pre-crisis level, compared with a European average of 3.6%. The same holds true for insurers. Their capitalisation is good, and their solvency has improved, with the average coverage ratio of the major insurers rising by 9 percentage points to reach 241%.

However, insurers are also sensitive to the risk of prolonged low interest rates, and, together with Bernard Delas, I can only call for further moderation in the rates on life insurance contracts. As regards financial stability, we must draw all the consequences of a rejection by the British Parliament of the draft Brexit agreement. There is strong political uncertainty in Britain: we can still hope for the best, but we must actively prepare for the worst scenario, that is a “No Deal Brexit". I would like to welcome the efforts that you have made to anticipate these consequences. The Banque de France and the ACPR, in liaison with the European authorities, will by the end of March take all necessary measures in the framework of the draft law “empowering the Government to take steps to prepare for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union”, which will be re submitted to the French Senate tomorrow. Beyond Brexit, each sector faces its own regulatory issues: Basel III and Solvency II. For banks, the key issue of the CRR/CRD package is the transposition into European law of the Basel III agreement, which was obtained after much wrangling on 7 December 2017 and properly completed with market risks on Monday in Basel. It will have to take into account European specificities – including those of French banks – while maintaining the principle of maximum harmonisation, which is essential to the deepening of the Banking Union.
In the immediate future, a new draft for the General Banking Law has been sent to Congress, with a focus on three areas: Corporate Governance of the regulator, Basel III capitalization rules, and Banking Resolution. Progress in these three areas is of paramount importance. In particular, a greater convergence with the international standards on banking capital requirements defined by Basel III would solve a lag that has pulled back the banking system for several years. Equally important is to strengthen the security network of the financial system by improving the mechanisms to administer banks in financial problems (bank resolution). Once this project is sent by the Executive, it is desirable for it to receive the necessary attention and be able to advance in the formalities bypassing the political processes that will characterize the last months of this year. Another much debated topic internationally are the potential effects of technological innovations in financial markets (Fin tech) 1/. These innovations have the potential to trigger major changes in the financial system, which would provide great opportunities for the agents, but would also / See paper by Carolyn Wilkins (2016), http://www.bis.org/review/r160622a.htm  1  10  threaten its stability and safety. Addressing this matter in a proper and timely manner is another challenge for financial regulators. Likewise, an area with important recent developments is the regulation of derivatives markets. This is a significant point of interaction between the stability of the financial system, monetary policy and economic growth.

Thus, world growth is expected to average 3.5% in 2017–2018, with trading partners that will grow 3.3% in the same period, significantly matching the March forecasts. The copper price is also expected to remain at USD 2.55 per pound this year and USD 2.5 next year, and the oil price will average a little over USD 50 per barrel in the same time span (table 2). In the baseline scenario, monetary policy will remain expansionary through the entire projection horizon. Estimates use as a working assumption that the trajectory will be consistent with the various measures of expectations as of the closing of the Report (figure 10). As always, it must be stressed that this is a working assumption, not a commitment. Therefore, the conduct of monetary policy and possible adjustments to the MPR will be contingent on the effects of incoming information on the inflation outlook. Risk scenarios Abroad, the main sources of uncertainty remain linked to the factors identified in previous MP Reports. On the one hand, there is the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in the United States and its impact on the global economy and on financial conditions. Also uncertainty about the political environment. In Europe, recent election results have been dissipating some of the political risks, in a context where growth has consolidated and data has been higher than expected, so a new boost from the region on the global economy cannot be ruled out.
It erodes what some commentators call the “culture of compliance”, and it tends to foster an employee population that will be inclined to look for loopholes, to place toes on the edge of the permissible, or even to turn a blind eye to a black letter compliance rule. And, the organization’s compliance staff will also suffer from a stifled motivation and the absence of any meaningful authority – it relegates that staff to a bunch of box checkers, rather than people working toward a safer and better world. Is it a surprise then that foreign institutions have problems with sanctions compliance and U.S. institutions do not? I do not excuse this in any way, but I do understand it. Let us now turn to tax evasion. On May 19, Credit Suisse pled guilty to conspiring to help certain Americans evade their tax obligations to the Federal government. Credit Suisse agreed to pay a fine of $ billion. Like the criminal disposition concerning BNPP, this was headline news. Credit Suisse had well developed compliance rules addressing what relationship managers could and could not do when travelling into, and through, the United States. But those compliance rules, while cogent, were largely ignored by certain Credit Suisse personnel. Why is that? Here, again, I believe that the answer lies in the organizational value system. Credit Suisse was not alone in aiding customers to evade taxes. UBS had similar problems although it escaped without a plea to a Federal felony.

Mobile banking will lead to increased outreach, increased efficiency and productivity as well as increased returns for businesses. Let me once again assure you, Mr. Chairman that, the Bank of Zambia is committed to providing an enabling environment through appropriate regulation for banks and financial businesses that wish to promote financial inclusion. We appreciate the Mobile Banking initiative by Celpay Zambia Limited and look forward to greater investment in financial inclusion in our beloved country. I thank you. BIS Review 111/2009  3
Luis de Guindos: Interview in Corriere della Sera Interview with Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, in Corriere della Sera, conducted by Mr Federico Fubini on 13 June 2019. * * *  The 5y5y forward inflation rate is at an all-time low and clearly below where it was when Mario Draghi first hinted at quantitative easing (QE) in 2014. The ECB has already done some more easing and President Draghi himself mentioned that there was an interesting discussion at the latest Governing Council meeting on different tools to do some more easing – the asset purchase programme (APP) and others. What do you need to see in order to decide to do more? What we need to see is a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. This has not yet happened, despite the fact that there has been a drop in market-based inflation expectations. If you look at the survey of professional forecasters, the situation is a little bit different – expectations have remained stable. Then we need to see if there is a significant additional drop in economic activity – a crystallisation of the downside risks that we have indicated. We can always try to look forwards to get an idea of what might happen, but ultimately the reality is the reality. And, well, let’s see what happens. But I think the important part of our stance is that we are totally ready to react. We will have time enough to know the future when it arrives.

It could grow and have a very clear purpose – countercyclical stabilisation. Now it’s more like a sort of competiveness instrument. We have to share more risk, for sure, if we want to improve the performance of the euro area and reduce the burden of monetary policy because, as I said, monetary policy is not almighty. And there is one element that is going to be key to achieving these steps: trust. You have to trust other countries to behave. But when a country misbehaves, as seems to be the case with Italy now, are you concerned that this may hamper trust? In the case of Italy, if you look at the fundamentals there are pros and cons. Italy is not a very vulnerable economy on financial grounds, if you take into account the net investment position and other factors. If you want an example of a vulnerable economy, look at Spain in 2010. It had an external deficit of 10% of GDP and a net investment position of 90% of GDP in the red. That’s not the situation Italy is in now. My point is that trust sometimes depends on the political intentions of the government. You mean the Italian government must provide some clearly stated objectives that are acceptable to the rest of the club. Yes, on both sides. This is a bilateral game, so it’s from both sides. And I think it’s very difficult to make progress if we can’t build trust.