samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Risk Management and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, June 19, 2008. 2  BIS Review 112/2010  supervising Lehman. The SEC continued to be the supervisor of the broker-dealers and their parents, including Lehman’s broker-dealer and its parent, Lehman Holdings. Lehman showed some signs of recovery during this period. It raised capital in June of 2008. But liquidity continued to be a significant disability. As part of its monitoring, the New York Fed, in conjunction with the SEC, conducted liquidity stress analyses of the investment banks, in part to evaluate their creditworthiness. Those analyses suggested that Lehman needed to improve its liquidity should the credit crisis intensify. Again, to Lehman’s credit, and in response to our analyses, Lehman took steps to, and did, improve its liquidity. At no time, however, did anyone at the New York Fed believe that Lehman had sufficient liquidity to withstand what was to come in September, events that Richard Fuld, Lehman’s former chief executive officer, has described as the “perfect storm.” 3 Accordingly, as has been well-documented in the press and in the comprehensive report by Anton Valukas, the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy examiner (the Valukas Report), senior Federal officials, including President Geithner, continually pressed Lehman to find workable solutions for its capital and liquidity problems from March to September 2008. Lehman executives pursued potential merger partners.

Counterparties’ reluctance to deal with Lehman intensified starting on Monday, September 8, 2008, such that by Thursday, September 11, 2008, it was apparent to us that Lehman faced a liquidity crisis – i.e., it would not be able to pay its debts as they came due. The issue was no longer whether this public company could fashion its own rescue. We had come to the point of no return, where Lehman faced two alternatives: bankruptcy, or some kind of third-party rescue. The United States Treasury Department, working in conjunction with the Federal Reserve and the SEC, convened a meeting of the chief executive officers of major financial institutions at the New York Fed after the close of markets on Friday, September 12, 2008. Secretary Paulson opened the meeting with a short and plain declaration that there would be no public money to support Lehman. The Government then gave the CEOs two tasks. First, it was suggested they form a consortium to finance certain of Lehman’s illiquid assets in  3  Richard S. Fuld, Jr., Statement before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, April 20, 2010. 4  Transcript, Hearing on Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Examiner Report, United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, April 20, 2008, pp. 136, 153. BIS Review 112/2010  3  order to facilitate an acquisition.
Coming to an innovative, cooperative and reciprocal agreement on central clearing would promote competitive financing in the euro area and maintain the resilience of the UK and global financial systems. More fundamentally, it would be an early milestone in the broader rebalancing of the UK, European and global economies. And it would produce far superior outcomes to other elements of the Commission’s proposals, which would fragment global clearing activity and raise costs and risks. V. Conclusion My Lord Mayor, this building, with all its majesty and history and this topic, central clearing of derivatives; could not appear farther from the concerns of people in this country. But they are much more closely related than they appear. A decade of radical financial reform was not an end in itself, but rather a means to serve households and businesses better. We must ensure that the real economy reaps its full benefits, including through freer trade in services and more resilient financing of the investment needed to boost wages of workers in all industries across the UK. One million people across this country work in financial services. The industry contributes 7% of output and pays taxes that cover almost two thirds of the cost of the NHS. At a time when the UK is running a 5% current account deficit, financial services runs a 1.5% trade surplus with Europe alone. The entire service sector runs a 5% surplus with the world and employs 85% of UK workers. We could take these realities for granted.

Therefore we do see the promotion of digital financial inclusion becoming one of the main priorities on a global level. For instance, the G-20 Global Partnership for financial inclusion in late 2020 has set the digital financial inclusion as one of the main priorities in its financial inclusion action plan stressing financial education and consumer protection complemented with regulation as key factors in protecting and empowering the most vulnerable groups. Therefore, we are very grateful that the INFE OECD and the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands accepted our request for workshop on digital financial services and financial education. Bearing in mind the importance of financial education in a dynamic and innovative financial 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  system, there is unquestioned need for an innovative and systemic approach based on our Strategy for Financial Education and Financial Inclusion. In general, the central banks together with other financial regulatory authorities play the leading role. The last survey on financial literacy of adults in South East Europe done by OECD (2020) revealed that the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia is the most trusted among central banks in the region as provider of financial education. However, the active participation of other stakeholders from the private and civil sector is more that welcome to achieve this mission. Last but not least, as socially responsible institutions, we have a mutual obligation to work together closely and constructively and to exploit available synergies for the benefits of the overall population and society.
Assessments of the sustainable rate of unemployment can be made and discussed in an open debate within and outside the central bank, with internal and external economists who are specialists in the field of labour market research using micro and macro methods. A major advantage in this context is that Sweden has a tradition of outstanding labour market research at universities and research and evaluation institutes. It will also be simple and transparent to perform sensitivity analyses in the form of various assumptions about the sustainable rate of unemployment. If different members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank make different assessments of the sustainable rate of unemployment, they can simply and clearly explain how this affects their decisions. It is of course inappropriate for the central bank itself to calculate the price index that is used to assess the attainment of the inflation target, and it is a major advantage if this index is calculated by another, independent organisation or authority, like Statistics Sweden in Sweden’s case. For the same reason, it is inappropriate for the central bank to have a monopoly on calculating the normal level for the measure of resource utilisation used to evaluate target attainment. In practice it is impossible for outsiders (and most people at the Riksbank, including the members of the Executive Board) to verify and assess the calculations of potential production and hours worked that are performed. It is very difficult to determine whether the measures are reasonable and reliable.

However, the CPI also has a well-known disadvantage, which in my opinion makes it less appropriate as a direct, operational target for monetary policy. This disadvantage is that the CPI is directly affected by interest rate changes through their impact on housing costs. This short-term effect also has the reverse sign to the medium-term effect. This means that the Riksbank’s own repo rate increases contribute to an increase in CPI inflation in the short term but reduce it in the slightly longer term. The major interest rate changes during the crisis have led to considerable fluctuations in the CPI. I believe on the whole that it is better to consistently use the CPIF as an operational target for monetary policy and disregard the direct effects of interest rate changes on the CPI when assessing whether monetary policy is well-balanced. By stabilising the CPIF around 2 per cent, the CPI will be stabilised around the target in the slightly longer term. It would then be important to consistently use the CPIF to rank various monetary policy alternatives and not change back and forth between the CPIF and the CPI. If we sometimes refer to the CPIF and sometimes to the CPI, monetary policy will become unclear. The unemployment gap is the most appropriate measure of resource utilisation There are many ways of measuring resource utilisation, for example the output gap, the hours-worked gap, the employment gap, capacity utilisation or the Riksbank’s RU indicator.
I’d like to conclude with another quote on the future, this time from Nelson Mandela, more than 150 years after Kierkegaard: “A bright future beckons. The onus is on us, through hard work, 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  honesty and integrity, to reach for the stars.” I have every confidence that today’s agents have what it takes to thrive in the future, but the hard work of laying the necessary foundations must begin today. With that, I thank you for your time, and wish all of you a productive day ahead. 1 Customer  Behavior and Loyalty in Insurance: Global Edition www.bain.com/publications/articles/customer-behavior-loyalty-in-insurance-global-2017.aspx  2017. 2 Insurance Barometer Study survey in 2016 by the Life and Health Insurance Foundation for Education (LIFE) and  LIMRA 3 Customer  Behavior and Loyalty in Insurance: Global Edition www.bain.com/publications/articles/customer-behavior-loyalty-in-insurance-global-2017.aspx  5/5  2017. BIS central bankers' speeches

Some observers have voiced concerns that the APP could in fact negatively affect bank lending by squeezing margins and hence banks’ profitability. I do not share this view. ECB staff estimates of the impact of the APP show the overall effect on bank capital to be positive. Capital gains on securities held, lower funding costs, improved credit quality and higher intermediation volumes outweigh the negative impact of the flattening of the term structure on net interest income. Though structural problems certainly remain in the euro area banking sector, banks’ weak profitability is to a large extent linked to the macroeconomic environment – something that the successful implementation of our programme will help address. In sum, the expanded APP, combined with our other credit easing measures, is largely producing its desired effects. We judge that the recent volatility in financial markets has not materially affected this picture, although close monitoring and continuous assessment are warranted from a monetary policy perspective. It is nonetheless clear that the effectiveness of the APP would be enhanced by complementary measures from other policymakers. In particular, the improving economic and financial environment provides the ideal conditions for governments to press ahead with structural reforms, which are in turn necessary to make  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  the recovery lasting. Raising expectations of future growth is vital to lift animal spirits and encourage a stronger rebound in investment, which is the cornerstone of a self-sustaining economic recovery. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
It mainly relates to the significant growing number of Banka Popullore branches, which opened 15 new branches throughout the territory of Albania over 2005, and to several other banks within this group, which expanded with some new branches and agencies after a period of long inactivity. The number of employees grew considerably over 2005, by 24 per cent, from the growth of 26 per cent over 2004. This significant growth in the number of employees is mainly related to the expansion of the banking system network and to the extension of the banks’ activities, which requires a better division of work and a more complete organizational structure. By the end 2005, the Albanian banking system had 3,479 employees, from 2,816 over the previous year. Compared to the previous year, the number of employees per banking unit decreased over 2005. In 2005, banks had 13.9 employees per banking unit, compared to 15 over 2004. Such a decrease has been a consequence of the growing number of branches and agencies with higher rates than the growth of the number of employees. A considerable number of branches and agencies have been established in sparsely populated areas; as a consequence, the number of employees in these branches and agencies has been quite small. The number of loan officers has increased considerably, following the significant growth of lending over 2005 and in the upcoming period. A considerable number of banks have restructured their loan departments, aiming at a more distinct division of duties and responsibilities.

This has been due to the concentration of these companies in certain banks, and also because of the problems encountered in the standardization of the bills according to particular banks’ requirements. The Bank of Albania continues to be committed to finding a solution to these problems. 3. The expansion of the ATMs and the POS (point of sale)  Automated teller machines (ATMs) experienced a further development over 2005 - 2006. Most banks have established a number of ATMs in Tirana and in other main cities throughout the country. The number of electronic terminals has grown from 93 at the end 2004 to 266 in August of the present year, while the number of users has increased from 34,090 to about 295,250. ATMs are used through debit cards, but credit cards are also being widely used. Both Visa and MasterCard are actively being used in Albania and most banks are members in one of them, providing the respective cards. Although the use of cards is still limited, the growing number of service units accepting electronic payments (POS-Point of Sale) from 155 in December 2004, to 1073 in August 2006, and the gradual change of  BIS Review 101/2006  1  the attitude favouring the holding of cash will lead to the enhancement of the use of cards as a mean of payment.
This made it less probable that the global economy would remain weak for a number of years. Recent developments in Brazil have contributed to some recurrence of unrest in international financial markets. Once again there has been an international flight to securer assets but it has been more limited than last autumn. There has, however, been a substantial depreciation of the Brazilian currency. It is still difficult to tell just how crisis in Brazil may affect the world economy. The future course in Brazil, with the attendant risks of knock-on effects in Latin American and other parts of the globe, will depend on what the national authorities do to construct a sound foundation for the economy. It has been shown, not least by our own economic experience in the early 1990s, that changing from a fixed to a floating exchange rate does not by itself provide a lasting solution to economic problems. What is needed is rather a comprehensive programme for enhancing confidence, with budget policy as not the least important component. A clear target and a consistent approach in monetary policy BIS Review 14/1999  –4–  can also contribute to economic policy’s credibility. But it does seem likely that developments to date in Brazil will tend to subdue growth in Latin America and even to some extent in the OECD area as a whole. Despite the unusually long duration of the US economy’s upward phase, the situation there is still buoyant. Growth in the closing months of 1998 was very strong.

In other words, Sweden is now in the sixth year of favourable economic growth. The 3% average is much the same as during the upswing in the 1980s but clearly above the annual average of 2% achieved in the 20 years from 1970 to 1990. It may be more than we can expect to sustain in the long run. An important reason why it has still been possible to keep inflation down in recent years has been the existence of unutilised capacity. This in turn has to do with the deep recession from which the recovery started and the comparatively rapid expansion of capacity since then. Medium-term inflation expectations have gradually stabilised around the 2% inflation target. At times, however, including the recent period, transitory price movements have brought the annual average change in the CPI just outside the lower limit of the target’s tolerance interval. There have even been periods when trend inflation has been lower than expected. For the decision-making of monetary policy, as the Riksbank has pointed out earlier, transitory effects on inflation are normally a secondary consideration. We are working to clarify how the target formulation is applied in order to dispel any uncertainty about how we should appraise direct effects on consumer prices that come from movements in, for example, house mortgage interest costs and indirect taxes. Altered conditions for international developments Last autumn, in the September Inflation Report, the Riksbank pointed to a growing risk of a weaker international trend on account of the crisis in Asia.
As we embrace mobile banking, the primary objective of Zambia’s mobile banking framework should be to empower the millions of citizens who do not have access to conventional banking. The essential spirit of mobile banking should be financial inclusion. In this regard, facilitating mobile banking will contribute to the distribution of resources to productive activities such as farming as well as directing resources to areas where there are most needed. In addition the policy framework should be flexible enough to allow the industry players to explore various business models. To this end the National Payment Systems Act of 2007 has provided a platform for businesses involved in mobile banking and money transmission to be designated. The need for effective regulation to ensure a stable financial sector and protection of consumers is vital. Nevertheless, regulation should facilitate and not impede development and must create an optimal, dynamic and agile banking environment. As Regulators we must therefore be open minded to new market solutions while the developers need to constantly engage the regulator in their product development. In stressing the need for effective regulation, I must emphasise the need for providers to observe the mandate and requirements of their licences. Mobile services providers must not perform banking services as this is the domain of licensed banks. Finally, I also wish to stress that mobile service providers and mobile banking solutions developers need to have in place robust business continuity plans that will ensure minimum disruption to services in the event of disasters.

Let me be clear. We must deal with the fire sale issue in tri-party repo and the heightened run risk it creates. I believe there are three potential ways forward, all of which are superior to the status quo. First, tri-party repo transactions could be restricted to open market operations (OMO) eligible collateral.11 Such collateral would likely remain quite liquid during a time of crisis.12 In addition, such collateral could, in a crisis, potentially be passed directly by a broker-dealer to the discount window under Section 13.13 authority, or, because of beneficial treatment under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, be financed by a banking affiliate that would then itself borrow at the discount window. Thus, one could construct an effective lender of last resort backstop for an OMO-eligible- only tri-party repo system. However, there are also some significant disadvantages to such an approach. The less liquid collateral could just migrate to be financed elsewhere, with associated run and fire sale risks. Also, given that housing finance reform could cause the agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be replaced by something different that was not OMO eligible under the Federal Reserve Act, the share of assets that are OMO eligible could diminish over time. Finally, this approach would do little to mitigate the risk of fire sales of a defaulted dealer’s collateral by its investors once a dealer is bankrupt.
Over the last ten years, Nordic banks have increasingly established operations in other countries in the region and have begun to offer their services to households and companies across national borders. Swedbank, for example, accounts for almost 45 per cent of total lending in Estonia, while SEB accounts for  1  I have chosen to define the Baltic region as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Northern Germany (i.e. the federal states of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Hamburg), Poland and the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 2  Refers to the population of EU25. BIS Review 105/2009  1  30 per cent of lending in Lithuania. 3 Prior to the beginning of the crisis, the operations in the Baltic states also generated an increasing proportion of the earnings of these two banks (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Other major players are Nordea and Danske bank, which can now regard practically the entire Baltic region as their domestic market. This financial integration has many economic advantages, but it also poses major challenges. I do not intend to discuss this further here, but will simply say that when the financial systems of different countries become intertwined, the risk increases that problems will spread across national borders. As far as Sweden is concerned, this has resulted in a decline in confidence not just in the Baltic economies but in the Swedish economy too. This is because there is a risk that developments in the Baltic states will entail substantial loan losses for the Swedish banks.

My purpose today is to explain how this recession differs from the others I have lived through, why that calls for a wider range of responses than normal, and the difference between the policy objectives in the medium term and the short term. The boom before the bust? What is striking about the run-up to this recession is that we did not see the booms in output, employment and wages that led to past recessions. Past recessions, in good measure, reflected deliberate decisions by policymakers to rein in spending and damp the inflationary pressures that had been building up. The rise in interest rates then led to a correction in the spending behaviour of households and companies as optimism about future income growth in the boom turned to uncertainty and gloom in the bust. Chart 1 highlights what was happening to domestic output in the two years before the last three recessions. The Barber Boom was a case in point, when output rose by 10% over the  BIS Review 5/2009  1  year to 1973 Q1, and then fell by 3% over the following year. You can see a similar pattern before the recessions of the early 80s and early 90s. But in 2006 and early 2007 growth was close to its average over the past 30 years. That is not the whole story of course. When we look at asset markets, a different story emerges.