samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Of course, progress has not been uniform across EMEs, and more work remains to further strengthen institutional structures in some countries. In particular, vulnerabilities remain in several important EMEs, and some EMEs are now being hit by a sharp adverse turn in their terms of trade due to the recent fall in global commodity prices. Still, the fundamental improvements I’ve cited leave many EMEs better positioned than in the past to weather those times in the cycle when the external environment becomes more difficult. The impact that changes in Fed policy can have beyond our borders has led to calls for us to do more to internalize those impacts, or even further, to internationally coordinate policymaking. As I’ve already noted, we are mindful of the global effects of Fed policy, given the central place of U.S. markets in the global financial system and the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. Accordingly, we seek to conduct policy transparently and based on clear principles. Promoting growth and stability in the U.S., I believe, is the most important contribution we can make to growth and stability worldwide. There is, of course, the argument that Fed policy has been too accommodative for too long, creating risks for financial stability worldwide. Here, I think it’s important to consider carefully the counterfactual. Would countries beyond our borders really have been better off with a weaker U.S. economy – an economy that might have required exceptional monetary policy accommodation for a much longer period of time?

Central banks have an additional stake in this game. Cash is one of our main products and an increased supply of services from non-banks is likely to reduce its usage. On the one hand, central bank should embrace the development from an efficiency point of view. On the other, a rapid decrease in the use of cash is not without problems. This is only a few of the aspects that may be debated in the second session. The third topic is the future and we all want to know what it will look like. Will the banks be reduced to mere suppliers of infrastructure and account holding services while other actors, the non-banks, have most of the end-user relation-ship? Or will the banks win by knock-out? Will the non-banks become banks over time as their activity expands? Will payment services be delivered to us by Apple? Google? Facebook? Alibaba? What about Bitcoin and its peers? Will we simply have payment services provided by an anonymous network? In addition to having all these kinds of issue debated among representatives for market actors and authorities, we will also have the pleasure of listening to the academic perspective of Professor Charles M. Kahn from the University of Illinois. I’m really looking forward to learning more about all these topics today. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Such a trade-off needs to take into account possible costs linked to households and companies having made decisions over a long period of time on the basis of what turn out to be incorrect inflation expectations.15 Moreover, one must assess the risks that a low inflation rate in itself entails. I consider it important to keep a respectful distance when prices are not increasing at all, so that one avoids deflation, which could lead to major problems for the economy. In addition, one must take a stance on how long inflation can be allowed to deviate from the target, given the other trade-offs, without having consequences for inflation expectations, for the credibility of monetary policy as a whole and ultimately for target attainment in the long run. As I said, the inflation target has been an anchor in many countries for a long period of time – for twenty years in the Swedish economy – and we almost take for granted that long-run inflation expectations will be around the target. They also still appear to be well-anchored around the target of 2 per cent in Sweden, although expectations in the shorter run are lower (see Figure 5). However, a monetary policy that explicitly leans against the wind is in many ways untested as a strategy and it is not clear how the participants in the economy will interpret inflation deviations in this context. One must therefore be careful.

Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Advancing financial literacy towards rebuilding financial resilience post-pandemic Keynote address by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the National Financial Literacy Symposium (NFLS) 2022, Kuala Lumpur, 11 October 2022. *** Assalamualaikum w.b.t and a very good morning, Tan Sri Dr. Rahamat Bivi Yusoff, Chairman, Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia, Emeritus Prof. Datuk Dr. Norma Mansor, President, Malaysian Economic Association and our guest speaker today, Ms. Caroline Siarkiewicz, Chief Executive Officer of The Money and Pensions Service United Kingdom, distinguished panellists and guests. Let me also take this opportunity to thank the teams from Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia and the Malaysian Economic Association for jointly organising this Symposium. It is my great pleasure to be speaking to you here this morning. Allow me to start by reflecting on the theme today – "Advancing Financial Literacy Towards Rebuilding Financial Resilience Post-Pandemic". Indeed, the pandemic has revealed the importance of financial resilience, and the need for all of us represented here today – from the public sector, civil society, financial industry, business, academia, and international organisations – to support Malaysians in rebuilding such resilience as we emerge from the crisis. When Bank Negara Malaysia published our 1H 2022 Financial Stability Review recently, it included the findings of our Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand Side Survey for 2021.
As banks enter new markets, create ever more complex products, and pursue customers near and far, the challenge for all of us is, first, to understand how our risk profiles are changing and, next, to find responsible ways to manage them. Whether they compete on a national, regional, or global level, banks have developed countless new tools and processes that promote their competitiveness, strengthen their returns, and control their exposures to credit, market, operational, and other risks. In turn, supervisors must review periodically the tools and processes at our disposal to ensure that our regulations and practices accommodate changes in market trends, the introduction of innovative products and services, and advances in the art of risk management. The current efforts to reform the international guidelines on capital adequacy represent a critical review of the cornerstone of bank supervision. The members of the Basel Committee have devoted substantial resources to this reform because we believe that, when banks are adequately capitalised and well managed, they become more stable and better able to withstand periods of financial distress. But more importantly, when all banks have the proper incentives to manage their risks appropriately and hold adequate levels of capital, we believe that the entire financial sector becomes more resilient, less sensitive to the ups and downs of the business cycles, and better able to serve as a source for the sustainable growth of the broader economy. That is our motivation for proposing the adoption of a New Basel Accord, which I will discuss this morning.

“Liquidity Regulation.” November 20, 2014, speech at the Clearing House 2014 Annual Conference, New York. Tucker, Paul, (2016). “The Political Economy of Central Bank Balance Sheet Management.” May 5, 2016, prepared for a workshop jointly sponsored by Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York. 23  See Tucker (2016) for a consideration of these issues. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11
Rodrigo Vergara: The Monetary Policy Report and the Financial Stability Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, before the Finance Commission of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 15 December 2014. *  *  *  The Monetary Policy Report of December 2014 and the Financial Stability Report of the second half of 2014 can be accessed at http://www.bcentral.cl. Introduction Mr. President of the Finance Commission of the Senate, Senator Ricardo Lagos, senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me to present Central Bank of Chile’s financial and macroeconomic outlook and its view on the most recent developments and their implications for monetary and financial policy. This vision is contained in detail in our December 2014 Monetary Policy Report (IPoM) and our Financial Stability Report (IEF) of the second half of 2014. In recent months, our macroeconomic outlook has reflected unexpectedly high inflation and a slowdown in economic growth. In the projection scenario that I will be presenting shortly, we have revised upward our inflation forecast for the coming months, although we continue to estimate that it will converge to 3 percent during 2015. We have also revised downward our growth forecast for domestic output and demand this and next year. There are several factors underlying these corrections. The inflation surprises of the past few months originated in specific prices and were mostly temporary.

Short-term fluctuations in the krone tend to have very limited effects on economic developments, while long-lasting changes may have an impact. Norges Bank has mainly based projections in the baseline scenario in its inflation reports on a constant exchange rate equal to the average for the previous three months, and in some cases the average for the previous month. Using these averages, very short-term variations in the krone exchange rate will have less effect on the exchange rate assumption. A more long-lasting change in the krone exchange rate will, on the other hand, be taken into account over time and will gradually have an effect on the inflation projection and on interest rate setting. Norges Bank’s Executive Board sets the interest rate with a view to achieving the inflation target of 2½ per cent. The inflation target also provides a framework for stabilising output and employment. When setting the interest rate, the Executive Board seeks to strike a balance. On the one hand is the consideration of bringing inflation up to target and stimulating growth in the Norwegian economy. On the other hand, we must consider the risk of new pressures in the Norwegian economy when looking further ahead. Since December 2002, we have found it appropriate to reduce the interest rate to a low level. At the last monetary policy meeting on 17 September, it was decided to reduce the interest rate to 2.5 per cent.
Given the nature of the shock and the restrictions, it is unclear in principle whether we would expect the hit to demand to be greater than to supply. In other words, the implications of the Covid shock for the output gap, and hence inflation, are unclear as a matter of theory. It is clear restrictions forced large number of businesses to close and large numbers of workers to be furloughed, constricting supply in the economy. The crisis clearly also had a large adverse impact on the demand for certain goods and services – for example, social spending due to health concerns and travel spending due to working from home. The net effect of these large forces of supply and demand on slack in the economy is an empirical judgement. Empirically, the unemployment rate typically provides the cleanest guide to slack in the economy. Unfortunately, that is not the case at present. Statistical surveys of employment are less reliable than usual. Official measures of unemployment from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) show a fall in employment of around 500,000 over the past year, giving an unemployment rate of around 5.1%. But administrative data from HMRC suggest job losses 1½ times that, implying an unemployment rate of over 6%. A further complicating factor is the various government support schemes. By design, these have broken the link between the demand for workers by firms and the unemployment rate.

259-264. Goodhart, C and Pradhan, M (2020), ‘The Great Demographic Reversal: ageing societies, waning inequalities and an inflation revival’, published by Palgrave Macmillan; 1st ed. 2020. Haldane, A (2018) ‘Pay power’, Speech given at ACAS Future of Work Conference, available here. Johnson, R (2018) ‘Measuring global value chains’ American Review of Economics, 10:207-36. Malmendier, U, and Nagel, S (2011), “Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect RiskTaking?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2011, vol. 126(1), pp. 373-416. O’Connor, M and Portes, J (2021) ‘Estimating the UK population during the pandemic’, available here. Orphanides, A and Williams, J (2007) ‘Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge’, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, Issue 5. Tenreyro, S (2020) ‘Monetary policy during pandemics: inflation before, during and after Covid-19’, Speech available here. Von Hayek, FA (1972) ‘A tiger by the tail: the Keynesian legacy of inflation’ published jointly by the Institute of Economic Affairs and the von Mises Institute. 24  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  24
Jean-Pierre Roth: “A franc remains a franc” – 100 years of National Bank policy in support of monetary stability Address by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the official ceremony of the 100th anniversary of the Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 22 June 2007. *  *  *  Honoured President of the Swiss Confederation Honoured Prime Minister of the Principality of Liechtenstein Honoured members of the federal parliament Honoured representatives of the cantonal governments Honoured governors of fellow central banks Honoured guests Almost to the day 100 years ago, the Swiss National Bank opened its doors at the head offices in Berne and Zurich and the branch offices in Basel, Geneva and St Gallen. This marked the end of around 16 years of parliamentary work that had followed the acceptance, in 1891, of a constitutional article leading to the establishment of a central note-issuing institution for the whole of Switzerland. This prolonged process can definitely be explained by the fact that our countrymen, at the end of the 19th century, did not see any urgent need for the establishment of a central bank. In fact, the political debates prior to 1907 mainly focused on questions relating to the organisation of the bank and the distribution of its profits; the regulatory role that the new institution was to assume was hardly touched upon.

Our currency was created in 1850, and the coins of that time were in circulation in 1907, when the National Bank started operations. We still use these coins today for our day-to-day payments. This is tangible proof of our country’s monetary stability. “A franc remains a franc,” declared the President of the Swiss Confederation in a radio address one day after the 1936 devaluation, in an endeavour to reassure the Swiss people about the abolition of the gold standard. I am pleased to be able to say today – 100 years after the National Bank started business – that a franc has indeed remained a franc. All this could not have been achieved if our policy did not enjoy broad support in our country. I would therefore like to conclude by expressing sincere thanks; first of all to the federal and cantonal authorities for the support that they have given us, particularly in difficult times when we had to make unpopular decisions for the sake of monetary stability. Second, I would like to thank the business community for its understanding of our policy, even at times when we assessed the situation differently or when monetary constraints necessitated painful adjustments. And, finally, my thanks go to the Swiss people for their unwavering confidence in our institution and their support for our monetary autonomy over the last 100 years. BIS Review 71/2007  3  May the National Bank continue to enjoy such broad support!
This is an important milestone – one that takes us further towards embedding the right idea of increased resilience for those few insurers that have the capacity to impact the global financial system. I look forward to your continued support as the IAIS builds on this progress to put into practice the overall package of requirements for systemic insurers by 2019. And we will need your support as we further develop, over time, an International Capital Standard to apply to all internationally active insurance groups. Our aim is nothing less than a standard which embodies the principles which underpin ICAS and Solvency II. Conclusion The ideas I’ve described today are vital to preserving the positive role of insurance in the financial system and the real economy. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  These ideas – tailored capital standards that promote a level playing field; a framework to hold the right people to account; and global standards for globally systemic insurers – are needed now in practice. The Bank knows that as our reforms are implemented and as your business models evolve we need a regulatory approach that is regularly reviewed, adjusted if necessary; and that takes account of evolving financial conditions, product innovation and changing markets. Robust interaction with the industry is essential to ensuring the right ideas can be put into action now, and for the future.

That sorry experience highlights the need to understand all the activities in which insurers are engaged, including on occasion substantial business beyond the boundaries of traditional insurance. Regulators have grouped those activities as “non-traditional” and “non-insurance” – including business involving extensive use of market instruments, like derivatives, and instruments that engage in substantial maturity transformation. Where this type of business is carried out in scale or across borders, risks to the system can be substantial. The crisis also showed how particular insurance markets can affect systemic stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The Monolines demonstrated how sub-sectors that are excessively concentrated or undercapitalised can amplify shocks. The failure of multiple insurance companies in response to economic stress can disrupt the provision of critical economic functions. It can also suddenly transfer risks to other parts of the financial system that may be ill-equipped to manage them; or shift assets around in a way that can amplify and spread distress. As I said previously, the insurance sector is systemic in a positive way. Insurance companies have different risk bearing capacities than many other financial institutions. They play a stabilising role by deploying funds over a longer time horizons, in a manner less vulnerable to sudden outflows. The resilience of large insurers is therefore important to safeguard that positive contribution to the global economy. The starting point for the application of global standards has been the identification of systemically-important insurers.
b)  Support for policies  Ultimately sound economics is sound politics as well. But the problem is that economic measures may take time to bear fruit. In other words reforms usually have immediate costs and the benefits are (sometimes) distant. Let me stress again that policymakers must educate the public at large to get their support. If this is not the case, it may be a serious obstacle to rapid transition. With the benefit of hindsight and from the perspective of a central banker I would say that in the past we lacked not so much sound economic decisions but good public relations for our policies. This is especially true in the case where the central bank initiated bankruptcy procedures or withdrew licences for 25 banks which was something unheard of in Croatia in the last fifty years. Let us not blame only people or politicians for their resistance to those measures. New economic policy is like a new 7  BIS Review 43/2000  product. It is the responsibility of the producer - the policymakers - to overcome the information assymetry and inform the consumers - the population and the politicians - of the benefits of this product (bankruptcies in the banking system) and sell it successfully. If central banks in transition economies want to be successful they should be much more “customer-oriented” and educate the public and politicians about the benefits of their main products: price stability and financial stability. Otherwise, they risk a weak demand for their services.

5 Figures 1 and 2 show a comparison of the accuracy of the forecasts in the period 1999-2008 for CPI inflation and GDP growth for a number of analysts. The red bars show the absolute mean error adjusted for differences in publication dates. The blue bars show the mean error with positive or negative sign. The shorter the blue bars, the smaller the systematic over- or underestimation has been – and the less bias the forecasts have had. If the bar is above the zero line the mean error has been positive and the forecasts have on average been too low, and vice versa. In the case of both inflation and GDP growth, the Riksbank's accuracy has been relatively good and its bias relatively small compared to other forecasters. Was monetary policy well-balanced ex ante? Given that it has been determined that the central bank's forecasts are normally satisfactory, the next step is to analyse, ex ante, the monetary policy deliberations the central bank has conducted on the basis of the forecasts. The first question to answer is whether the monetary policy conducted has been efficient. Given the information available at the time the decision was made, would it have been possible, by selecting a different interest rate path, to have stabilised inflation or the real economy better without stabilising the other less well? Would it even have been possible to achieve a better stabilisation of both?