samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The objective has been the same for both the ECB and the Bank of England – to clarify our reaction function in a highly uncertain world. In a perfect world, guidance would be redundant. People would know how the Committee intends to set rates over the future and how those intentions would adjust to economic developments in all eventualities – the so-called reaction function. But the world is complex and people (outside this audience) don’t have endless time to devote to understanding monetary policy. In practice, therefore, guidance can be useful in providing people with information about how the Committee sets policy and, over time, in improving the understanding of how monetary policy will adjust to news. This can make monetary policy more effective by reducing unwarranted volatility in interest rate expectations and the extent to which the central bank has to move the policy rate to meet the inflation target. The more those expectations are aligned with the policy path necessary to achieve the inflation target, the higher the probability that the policy objective will be achieved. The ECB’s experience provides a classic example. The ECB’s use of forward guidance has evolved over time with the first use in 2013. The previous year President Draghi had skilfully given assurance that the ECB would do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro”5 and the Governing Council followed through with a program of Outright Monetary Transactions which restored sovereign bond spreads to more sustainable levels.

13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  13  Chart 9: Pass through of ECB rate cuts to lending and deposit rates facilitated by TLTRO TLTRO I  TLTRO II  Per cent 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1  2010  2011  2012  2013  Household deposits EONIA ECB main refinancing rate  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  Loans ECB lending rate ECB deposit facility rate  Source: ECB. To sum up on liquidity and lending facilities, reforms over the crisis leave behind a much more comprehensive backstop to dysfunction in funding markets. Liquidity is available more freely, against a wider range of collateral and in all major currencies. Moreover, through careful calibration targeted lending schemes can lower the effective lower bound on interest rates, unlocking more stimulus. ----------------------------------------------------To return to where I started, the past ten years have spurred tremendous advances in the conduct of monetary policy. In this as in so many other respects, Europe has a rich past. And in part because of that past, it now has the possibility of a bright future. For a perspective on the challenges faced by central banks today I will hand over to Stan Fischer. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  14
And what will the ECB be doing on the day the troika returns home? Well, we won’t perhaps be engaging in similarly wild celebrations – we are central bankers, after all. But I suspect that I, and my fellow board members, may raise a quiet toast to the achievement of a country in so admirably fighting its way back to solvency and stability. I wish you continued success in meeting that goal and we stand ready to work with you in achieving this goal. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Norway gradually became an industrialised country, and trade and shipping provided our new nation with much needed income. Moreover, an abundance of natural resources has been essential for our country’s prosperity. Norway never did become a true manufacturing nation. We cannot expect the strong growth in national income we have seen in recent years to continue. Norway is not immune to shifting circumstances and external shocks. But we have a good starting point. The beneficial tailwinds have been put to good use and Norway is in a solid position to tackle challenges when the winds shift. The Constitution is the foundation of modern Norway. This year’s bicentenary of the Norwegian Constitution is an occasion to remember the importance of good institutions that have clearly defined roles. This is essential for stability and progress. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11
Indeed, we have just had a case of co-occurrence of highly remunerated financial innovation and a temporary narrowing of the intermediation spread that was built upon, among other things, a serious erosion of credit standards. We all know how this ended; rather miserably with investors losing a lot of money and borrowers finding credit expensive and hard to come by, and consequently considerable damage to the economy. How do we deal with this conflict? I am afraid I have no answer, other than always to be alert to it and be ready, as protectors of the public interest (in terms of maintaining stability, upholding integrity, promoting diversity and efficiency in financial intermediation) to act whenever the private interest of the financial intermediaries threatens to override the public interest. But this is easier said than done, particularly when financial innovation is often packaged and presented skilfully by financial intermediaries as an effort to enhance financial efficiency. Furthermore, in capitalist, free-market economies, the authorities generally do not have a lot of influence over innovation. The financial intermediaries often constitute a strong political lobby against regulation, arguing quite forcefully that regulation stifles innovation and progress. And so, regrettably, we have an environment that is often not conducive to the financial authorities taking preventive measures to protect the public interest. You have I am sure heard of the rather unkind and unfair street talk that the US Treasury was being run largely by Wall Street.

I believe this is one of the main reasons why X in T+X in the settlement of some financial transitions is still a number other than zero, or why T+X is still not replaced by RTGS DVP even though the technology to do so has been available for some time. Very simply therefore there is a case for the authorities to get involved, as a developer or a service provider, when a private sector solution that is in the public interest is not available. And the public interest is not just in the enhancement of financial efficiency but also in the limitation of contagion and the more effective achievement of financial stability. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority has devoted much effort to the building of the financial infrastructure of Hong Kong. I can assure all of you that it is well worth the effort and the amount of public money involved is really quite modest, although it may take a little time, and some appropriate prudential guidance concerning, for example, the management of payment and settlement risks, to convince potential users before traffic in these financial highways builds up. Allow me to end this address with an advertisement. In Hong Kong we now have RTGS systems for the Hong Kong dollar, the US dollar, the euro and the RMB. They are all linked together to achieve cross-currency PVP in our time zone and they are linked up with our debt-clearing system to achieve DVP.
In any  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  event, as it takes a long time for any drive of this nature to mature, it is also in everybody’s interest to set about studying and putting in place the necessary arrangements as soon as possible. Progress in correcting the external imbalance It is in the external sector where the swiftest and sharpest correction of imbalances is being made. The adjustment in the external sector continued in 2012 and, as a result, after posting a surplus in the second half of the year (an unprecedented development since the launch of EMU), the current account was practically in balance, with a deficit of only 0.2% of GDP for the year as a whole. Current forecasts point to surpluses on the current account for 2013, 2014 and successive years. In addition to the contraction in imports attributable to the fall-off in domestic spending, this performance reflects the restoring of the competitiveness lost by the Spanish economy during the expansion that ended in 2008. By late 2012, two-thirds of the gap built up since 2000 between Spanish unit labour costs and those for the euro area on average had already been corrected. These gains in competitiveness have been accompanied, in the most recent period, by notable growth in the number of exporting firms and by greater geographical diversification of our exports, with an ever-increasing weight of those targeted on emerging markets.

In view of the extent and risks of the current crisis, fiscal policy will need to consider and prepare the deployment of additional stabilisation measures alongside the automatic stabilisers. In addition to the increased focus on economic policy, business practitioners within the Swiss economy are also challenged. In the case of banks, it is essential that credit shortages for companies and private households be avoided. Moreover, interbank business needs to be strengthened in order to smooth out liquidity imbalances. Companies must enhance their innovativeness and use opportunities for opening up new markets. The Swiss economy has many structural strengths and this prompts confidence that Switzerland will overcome the crisis. BIS Review 5/2009  1
It will probably only create a host of new problems, while a number of ways of fencing in collateral still remain. For example, one would probably want to avoid that a bank in distress places all of its US treasuries in a country outside of the jurisdiction of the ECB, while only letting its bad loans and other lower-quality collateral be within reach of Frankfurt… Moreover, one must realize that, within a cross-border bank, liquidity shortages can occur in other currencies than the euro, and one will have to find ways to handle this, for example through prearranged swap agreements. I realise, of course, that achieving such a supranational system is a long-term process and it will inevitably going to be politically difficult, and I’m sometimes confronted with the view that it will take a major banking crisis before we’ll be able to muster the resolve to achieve it. However, as a European policymaker, I cannot accept this view. We have a definitive responsibility, and just because things are difficult we cannot let that stop us from trying. And, if a supranational solution is limited to the forty or so of the most important cross-border banks, it may not be so inconceivable, after all. Financial integration is inevitable and necessary if we are to achieve an efficient financial system and to foster growth in Europe. And when integration takes off it tends to follow the logic of business, and not the "logic" of country borders or national laws.

2  BIS Review 27/2001  Modified capital requirements Let me begin by explaining what we are doing to ensure that the capital held against loans made to small and medium-sized companies is truly reflective of risk. The Committee has on two occasions over the past year asked banks to assess the impact of the revised Accord. The data gathered have enabled us to evaluate the level of capital that our proposals would generate and to consider several modifications. As you may know, our early findings suggested that the internal ratings-based approach as outlined in the Second Consultative Paper would have required banks to set aside too much capital. Contrary to the Committee’s clear intent, banks would not have received a capital incentive for adopting this more sophisticated approach to capital adequacy. As a result, we had to adjust the capital requirements to provide banks with the right incentives under the new framework. The Committee’s aim is to avoid unintended consequences stemming from the new proposals. That’s why we are taking additional time to make sure our proposals are right. To this end, we published in November a change in the IRB formulas for calculating bank capital requirements. This change – based on the Committee’s internal research as well as additional input by bank risk management experts – reduces the extent to which capital will vary with the internal ratings banks assign to their exposures.
If income spreads decline, this can also lead to lower global saving. When saving declines, this can put further upward pressure on global real interest rates, as the competition for savings can be expected to increase among those wanting to invest in new production technology. This can have significance for the development of the real interest rate. Finally, there is the question of monetary policy. Will it be conducted with an inflation target? And, if so, what level will the target have? Nominal interest rates will become higher in the future The demographical changes we can see ahead indicate that global saving will decline. This would imply higher global real interest rates. The future conditions for growth are more  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  uncertain, but if labour productivity were to begin to increase faster than today, there would be further upward pressure on global real interest rates. Let us therefore say that future global real interest rates will be in the order of 1.5–2.5 per cent. If we add to this an inflation target and inflation expectations of 2 per cent in Sweden, we get nominal interest rates of 3.5–4.5 per cent. Even if we do not see a return to the nominal interest rate levels we previously regarded as normal, long-term nominal interest rates will be much higher than they are today. The important thing is that economic agents who now make decisions with long-term consequences bear this in mind.

More pensioners can in the long run lead to lower saving and thereby a higher real interest rate On the other hand, the saving may decline gradually as an increasingly large percentage if the world population attain the age of retirement. However the speed and strength of the impact that demographics will have on savings is uncertain. It depends partly on the extent to which older people choose to remain in work for longer and to what extent those who work save more for their retirement when their life expectancy rises. Greater income disparities also affect propensity to save Another factor that can explain why the propensity to save has increased is the increased income spread. In most developed countries, income spreads have increased since the 1980s. High-income earners normally have a higher propensity to save than low-income earners. The increase in the income spread could therefore have meant that saving has increased. At the same time, it should be said that even if income disparities have increased within a number of countries, they have declined on a global level in that the emerging markets are catching up with the developed economies. It is therefore difficult to say how global saving has been affected. Wages as a share of added value have declined The greater income spreads are also visible in other ways. The trend towards increased saving has been so extensive that wealth has risen substantially in most industrial nations.
I should stress that the experience of the HKSAR Government since its establishment shows that Hong Kong not only enjoys an even higher degree of monetary autonomy after the transfer of sovereignty, but also that its monetary relationship with the Mainland has been handled strictly in accordance with the “one country, two systems” principle. I hope that this will also be your conclusion at the end of this seminar. Hong Kong’s autonomy in formulating its own financial and monetary policies 2. First, let me talk about Hong Kong’s monetary autonomy. Prior to the handover, some people feared that Hong Kong’s monetary autonomy would be eroded. This was quite understandable, since the “one country, two systems” principle was a completely novel concept. However, a comparison between the relevant provisions in the two constitutional instruments applied to Hong Kong before and after the transfer of sovereignty respectively, i.e. the Royal Instructions to the Governor of Hong Kong and the Basic Law, illustrates that Hong Kong’s monetary autonomy has not and will not be eroded. In fact, Hong Kong has enjoyed an even higher degree of monetary autonomy after the transfer of sovereignty. 3. Under the Royal Instructions, the Governor could not assent to “any Bill affecting the Currency of the Colony or relating to the issue of Bank notes”, or “any Bill establishing any Banking Association, or amending or altering the constitution, powers, or privileges of any Banking Association” without previously obtained the approval of the Secretary of State.

In addition, to guarantee that we act in the general interest of the euro area, and not that of individual countries, the central banks of the Eurosystem are all completely independent and free from political influence. This independence is sometimes questioned, but it is a strength: we have to commit over the long term to serving the mandate entrusted to us – price and currency stability. This independence is therefore governed by a strict framework: a clear objective; an obligation to report results regularly to our citizens and to their elected representatives; and a democratic process for the appointment of all senior figures. 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  III. What remains to be done, tomorrow, collectively The euro has brought great benefits, in the form of soundness, confidence, unity and sovereignty – as I have endeavoured to remind you. However, it also raises questions, which I have tried to answer, while at the same time underlining that the euro cannot be held responsible for everything that happens. But we have not yet come to the end of the road. We cannot ignore the rising tide of Euroscepticism in Europe, and the extreme case of Brexit. I particularly like this saying, attributed to Dante, one of the great citizens of Florence: “Some wait for time to change, others seize the moment and act.” But what direction should we take? Less Europe?
The Isuru Project enlisted the expertise, experience and the capacity of grass root level organisations in delivering the project services as retailers. Hence, the project was instrumental in the capacity development of a large number of community based nongovernmental organisations. This paved the way for the development of a large number of microfinance institutions which formed the microfinance infrastructure of the country. Some of these institutions operate at the national level and have the capacity to mainstream and become national level formal financial institutions 24 . It was necessary to assess the success of the project from the point of view of its main objective, i.e., helping the poorest of the poor to cross the poverty line within a given period of time. To assess this, two impact assessment surveys were conducted by the project office by employing hired field workers specifically trained for this purpose 25 . The findings of the two surveys are basically similar and have vindicated the cost incurred in financing the project: •  The head counting of the surveyed beneficiaries revealed that the percentage of female participants was around 67%, thereby confirming the national average (1997). This had increased to73% by 2005. •  75% of the beneficiaries had attended schools and were able to read and write (1997). This literacy rate was somewhat below the national average of 92%, but can be explained as due to the abject poverty with which the group under reference was afflicted and therefore had been disadvantaged.

Examples of HRH’s leadership range:   From domestic initiatives within The Prince's Responsible Business Network to help ensure UK businesses and communities are resilient to the effects of climate change;    To launching the ClimateWise Principles and encouraging the insurance industry to take a leading role in addressing risks posed by climate change;    To support for our hosts Accounting for Sustainability, who have for many years given practical guidance to firms on how to embed sustainability considerations into business decision-making. I have had the great pleasure of engaging with HRH on a number of occasions, and I can think of few people more knowledgeable about the sustainability agenda or as committed to it. Four years ago, he rightly put me on the spot, highlighting that climate-related risks will have serious financial impacts, and asking what regulators were doing about them. HRH’s challenges are even more germane today as the impacts of climate change continue to mount and the time to act continues to shorten. This year has seen blistering heatwaves in North America and Europe, hurricanes in North America and typhoons in South East Asia; droughts in Southern Africa and Australia; unprecedented rainfall causing deadly landslides in Japan; and now the devastating wildfires in California. The human costs of these events are immeasurable. And the financial losses are significant. Last year set a record for weather-related insurance losses at around $ Losses in 2018 may again be among the worst in history.