samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One of the causes was that the private construction of railways had been excessively boosted by the ample supply of capital during the expansion. The crisis hit those trading companies and banks that had been far too optimistic in their provision of loans. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, headed by A.O. Wallenberg, suffered the most when the public stormed the bank to withdraw their money. The finance minister of the time was forced to intervene and Stockholms Enskilda Bank and other problem banks were able to get liquidity assistance with the help of foreign loans. Lack of experience and underdeveloped risk culture paved the way for the crisis of the 1990s If we take a leap forward in history, then many of us probably remember the domestic financial crisis that began in the early 1990s. For a long period following World War II, the financial markets had been kept under very strict regulatory control by the Riksbank. However, the phase-out of the regulations began in the second half of the 1980s and culminated when the foreign exchange controls, which originally were part of the crisis regulations introduced during the war, were abolished in 1989. When the floodgates were opened there was no way to stop the rapid increase in the demand for loans, and there was no incentive to say no to loan applications. The risk culture at the banks was still underdeveloped. One consequence of this was that the credit risks on the overheated property market were underestimated and underpriced.

Jean-Claude Trichet: Recovery, reform and renewal – Europe’s economic challenge Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the conference “The ECB and Its Watchers” XII, Frankfurt am Main, 9 July 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be with you in this 12th edition of the ECB Watchers’ Conference. Today, I would like to consider where we are in the financial crisis and the economic recovery; to describe the emerging contours of the post-crisis order both in Europe and the wider world; and to reflect on what has been achieved by the global policy response to the crisis and what remains to be done. 1. Where do we currently stand in the crisis? We are now almost three years into the crisis. The development of the crisis was marked by a progressive collapse of confidence: a seizing up of markets, dramatic financial events impacting the global financial system, a sharp decline in trade and a freefall in economic activity in the industrial world. We can all feel relief that the collective international efforts to avert catastrophe in the winter of 2008/09 have been successful. But events over the past few months have made clear that it is still too early to declare the crisis over. And, just as they have done throughout the crisis, governments and central banks in Europe and around the globe continue to respond to shifting economic and financial circumstances with swift, decisive and effective action.
Payments would then be settled in TIPS in NOK on behalf of Norges Bank. Sveriges Riksbank decided to join TIPS earlier this year. Norges Bank’s research will continue for a few more months before we decide whether to pursue one of these alternatives. If we reject both, we will continue to work for better real-time payments under the current division of responsibility with the banking industry. Irrespective of which solution we choose, the system for real-time payments must be efficient and secure, facilitate innovation and competition, and ensure satisfactory national governance and control. We conduct our research in dialogue with the industry and relevant government bodies. It is important to Norges Bank that affected parties support the chosen solution. For society to secure the benefits, we need market participants that develop payment services based on a common infrastructure. The introduction of ISO 20022, a global messaging standard, is important for both real-time payments and the payment system as a whole. A standard whereby different solutions throughout the whole value chain “speak the same language” offers considerable advantages. Projects are now in progress, both in the industry and Norges Bank, to replace legacy national standards and formats with ISO 20022. Solid plans have been made – now it is up to all the affected parties to contribute to implementation. Technological advances – innovation and security Chart 7: Technological advances – opportunities and challenges Innovation and competition improve payment system efficiency, with solutions that are better adapted to society’s needs.

Yves Mersch: Digital transformation - Europe's integrated market of tomorrow Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Joint ECB and European Commission Conference "Into the future: Europe's digital integrated market", Frankfurt am Main, 31 January 2017. * * *  Introduction For over a decade the European Commission, the Eurosystem and the market have been working towards transforming what has up to now been a very fragmented financial market infrastructure in Europe into a more integrated one. This work is still ongoing and requires more effort. However, we are at a point now when progress has become tangible. In the first part of my speech, I will briefly take stock of where we stand, particularly with regard to the post-trade area. I will then address two areas where I still see gaps that are in the way of our achieving a truly integrated European financial market. The first area is securities issuance, the second instant payment settlement. In both these areas, digitalisation is opening up new opportunities, which requires action. We at the ECB stand ready to take action accordingly. Integration in the post-trade area Following the launch of T2S in summer 2015 and two further migration waves in 2016, the German market is due to migrate to T2S in less than a week’s time. This latest development is expected to bring a big increase in the volume of securities transactions being settled on the platform.
Andrew Bailey: Governance and the role of Boards Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Deputy Governor of Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority at the Bank of England, at the Westminster Business Forum, London, 3 November 2015. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to be speaking at the Westminster Business Forum again. I am going to use my time this morning to set out some thoughts on how at the PRA we are thinking about the role of governance and Boards in the prudential supervision of deposit takers, insurers and major investment firms. We work very closely with Boards, more so than in past approaches to prudential regulation, and I find it a very important, constructive and informative engagement. There is a lot of focus at present on the Senior Managers and Certification Regime which will be implemented by next March, and on the proposal before Parliament to change one element of the test, namely the Presumption of Responsibility. This morning I am going to focus on the substance that underpins the regime. Also, I am not for the most part going to comment on the issue of diversity in Board membership, but not because I think it is unimportant, far from it.

But even if there is substantial disintermediation, it does not mean that banks will cease to be dominant players. My point is just that as euro securities markets develop and deepen, more of the finance banks arrange will be off balance sheet. I’m inclined to think also that we will see further consolidation within the European (and indeed global) banking sectors, though I think that will not primarily be a function of the euro, and is something I will touch on in a minute. Now, all these developments offer opportunities for financial services firms globally. This is not a zero sum game. I expect to see financial centres within the euro zone growing in size over the next few years. But London will grow too, and I think it is significant that many of these potential developments depend on market practices and techniques pioneered in London. BIS Review 43/1999  4  I see London as the engine for growth and innovation in the European capital markets. This is not a narrow parochial point. As I have already emphasised, UK financial services are highly internationalised and many of the UK–based beneficiaries of this process are owned elsewhere – in the US, Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Nor does it reflect complacency.
Thus, the TPI will ensure that our monetary policy stance is transmitted smoothly and effectively across all euro area countries, a precondition for the ECB to be able to deliver on its price stability mandate. Purchases under the TPI would be conducted such that they cause no persistent impact on the overall Eurosystem balance sheet and hence on the monetary policy stance.7  5  This forward guidance made the first interest rate rise subject to: (i) expected inflation standing at 2% over an 18-month horizon; (ii) it holding at 2% in the medium term; and (iii) the course of underlying inflation being compatible with inflation stabilising at 2% in the medium term. The APP decisions were also linked to these conditions, with the guidance stating that interest rates will only rise some time after net purchases have ended. 6  At an ad hoc meeting held in June, we decided to activate the flexibility in reinvestment of redemptions coming due in the PEPP portfolio, as the first line of defence to counter the pandemic-related risks to the transmission mechanism being seen. 7  In any event, PEPP reinvestment flexibility will continue to be the first line of defence to counter pandemic-related risks to the transmission mechanism.

That, however, is precisely what those are doing who are pressing for an early - as early  BIS Review 2/2001  5  as possible - decision: adopting the euro as the country's currency as soon as possible or a commitment to run our own currency system for ever. These two radical alternatives, however, are fraught with considerable uncertainties. It therefore seems much more rational to adopt a wait-and-see attitude during which experience is gained, and to delay the decision until such time as its implications may be assessed with greater accuracy than is possible today. If you don't yet know where Berne is and whether you will like it there or not, don't take a non-stop intercity train. Rather board a train that will stop once in a while, giving you a chance to make up your mind. Perhaps you will want to leave the train in Olten and go on to Basel instead, or you may prefer to get off in Lenzburg and return to Zurich. With this little side leap into option theory - or should I say common sense? - I shall close my remarks. I thank you for your patience.
Government oil revenue spending is expected to be brought back into line with the fiscal rule when cyclical conditions eventually normalise. We assume that prospects for higher unemployment, a fall in house prices and a high level of debt will induce households to build up financial buffers and reduce debt. The saving ratio  10  BIS Review 37/2009  is expected to increase considerably. Net lending is projected to be positive this year after being negative since 2004. As household borrowing has been considerable in recent years, deleveraging in the household sector is important to long-term stability in the economy. The outlook ahead, and monetary policy assessments  In Norway, inflation will be curbed by lower capacity utilisation. The marked increase in unemployment now envisaged will result in lower pay increases this year and next. Prospects of weaker growth and lower inflation imply a lower interest rate than presented in the interest rate projection from our last forecast in December. There is also a risk that the global downturn will be deeper and more prolonged than expected. If this proves to be the case, growth in the Norwegian economy will not pick up as quickly and inflation will fall more sharply than we currently assume. The objective of avoiding a pronounced downturn indicates in isolation that the interest rate should be rapidly reduced to a low level. On the other hand, we have already made substantial reductions in the key policy rate.

However, more discerning lending policies have been pursued in the last few years, and this should reduce the chance of a sudden reduction in credit during any future economic slowdown. BIS Review 39/2000  2  Another feature of our work over the last seven years has been to emphasise the importance for small businesses of using the most appropriate forms of finance - the second “A”. Many improvements have been observed. There have been important changes in the provision of bank finance and the use of non-bank finance has increased. It is now more widely accepted that a small business may not meet all its needs from any one source and so may require a ‘package’ of finance, tailored to its individual requirements. This is particularly true for high growth firms. The characteristics of bank finance in the United Kingdom have changed considerably during the 1990s, most notably the decline in the net bank indebtedness of the small firms sector and the continued growth of term lending at the expense of overdrafts. The ratio of overdrafts to term lending has fallen significantly and now stands at 28:72, compared with early 1992 where it stood at 49:51. Notwithstanding the recent rise in bank borrowing by SMEs, the net bank indebtedness of the SME sector has continued to fall. The ratio of deposits to lending was 96% in December 1999, compared with 56% in December 1992. Small businesses have also, since the mid-1990s, gradually increased their use of fixed rate loans.
Rather like the MPC, the owners of Quantitativeasing, winner of all three of his races in 2009, have yet to decide how many outings he will have in 2010. They are waiting for race conditions to become clearer. The bold action, taken both at home and abroad, helped to end the collapse in confidence and spending last year. But equally bold action will be needed to prevent a similar crisis from recurring. The origins of the crisis lay in our inability to cope with the consequences of the entry into the world trading system of countries such as China, India, and the former Soviet empire – in a word, globalisation. The benefits in terms of trade were visible; the costs of the implied capital flows were not. The new entrants adopted a strategy of expanding manufactured exports to create employment. High rates of saving depressed domestic demand. So substantial trade  BIS Review 4/2010  1  surpluses were required to keep total demand in line with supply. Equally, the countries importing those manufactured goods ran trade deficits and required low saving rates to maintain balance in their economies. Everyone seemed to gain. High-saving countries created employment, and low-saving countries enjoyed faster consumption growth as cheap imports meant that living standards rose by more than the increase in production – worth around half a percentage point a year in the United Kingdom. These were the benefits of greater trade. But the pattern of poor countries saving a lot and rich countries borrowing was not sustainable.

Provided monetary growth remains well under control – and remember that at present it is undesirably low – inflation should return to target in the medium term. I hope you will all remember that in both of the past two years inflation picked up as a result of temporary price level factors and then fell back, as the MPC had predicted. So how will 2009 be remembered? As I said at the outset, it is too early to tell. The full impact of the financial crisis has yet to be seen. And the national statisticians will take another two years or so before providing their best estimates of spending and output in the UK economy. More importantly, the question of whether basic reforms to the structure of banking and the international monetary system will be made before another crisis engulfs the world economy remains unanswered. BIS Review 4/2010  5
It is certainly reasonable to assume that inflationary impulses from, for example, rising energy prices will more easily take hold if demand in the economy has been kept up by an expansionary policy than if it has not. But I find it difficult to push the argument further than that. Apart from the fact that there are already convincing explanations for the high inflation, it would require that a monetary policy that has had difficulty for years in bringing inflation up to the target would suddenly result in some kind of all-at-once effect, making inflation instead severely overshoot the target. Even though monetary policy works with long and variable lags, this would be an extreme example, with a very odd monetary policy transmission mechanism.4 In the Swedish debate there is also an almost opposite argument. This states that the high inflation is entirely due to the fact that the supply of commodities and production inputs has been affected by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, and that it is therefore pointless and counterproductive for the Riksbank to try to bring inflation down again by raising the interest rate. If you only wait for a while, the effects on inflation will subside, and then it will fall back to the target by itself. But that is also a questionable argument. Inflation is not only due to supply-driven price rises, but has spread more widely in the economy. This has been partly due  cent. This outcome was published by Statistics Sweden on 18 February.

Philipp Hildebrand: Swiss monetary policy and financial markets Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Autumn forecast of the Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research, Zurich, 5 October 2006. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  *  *  *  Transparency and communication enhance the impact and the precision of monetary policy. Monetary policy functions through expectations. This means that it is first and foremost expectation management. Central banks strive for transparency regarding their methods and approaches. All in all, the current economic and, in particular, the structural uncertainties are resulting in a greater range of possible economic scenarios and thus also in an increase in the range of expectations regarding our future monetary policy. In other words, being transparent does not automatically mean being predictable. Therefore, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) considers it particularly important to communicate its monetary policy concept to the markets and the public. This allows them to arrive at similar conclusions to those reached by the SNB. BIS Review 92/2006  1
According to the same survey again, Turkey took the 7th place among European investors and was the 8th destination that international executives are most optimistic about the economic outlook. Lastly, I would like to touch upon the much-debated hot money issue pertaining to the financing of the current account deficit. Hot money has several definitions. The basic definition of hot money is the sum of foreigners’ purchase of securities, portfolio investments, short-term capital inflows and the net errors and omissions item. According to this definition, by April 2006, the annual hot money inflow has reached USD 17.3 billion. The most important component of hot money is portfolio investments composed of securities and government papers. Some outflow was observed, with the last fluctuations. However, the floating exchange rate regime and strong macroeconomic fundamentals reduce the negative impacts of the outflow. The structural transformation process that the Turkish economy is undergoing is very important with respect to the sustainability of higher current account deficits. We are happy to see that within the framework of the transformation process, the finance sector is much stronger. In other words, open positions in the banking sector are fairly limited. Nevertheless, the private sector should be very careful about open positions. Secondly, macroeconomic fundamentals grow stronger every day and a tight fiscal discipline and monetary policy are being implemented. We have a high level of foreign exchange reserves. The floating exchange rate regime has a shock-absorbing ability.

Let me focus on some of the implications of global economic and financial integration for central banks. What does globalization change and what does it not change? What complications does it introduce and what challenges does it ease? This is a vast and complicated topic, but I want to touch on some of the key issues. In passing, let me note Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Don Kohn’s recent assessment of what we know about the impact of globalization on short-run inflation dynamics in the United States and elsewhere. He noted that the evidence so far on these questions is “far from conclusive” but for the most part it suggests that to date the effects have been gradual and limited. There are, however, some important things we know about how economic integration affects the context in which central banks operate. For example, Harvard economist Ken Rogoff and others have pointed out that to the extent that globalization increases the degree of competition, it can reduce the “inflationary bias” or, to put it differently, it can strengthen the anti-inflation credibility of a central bank. By inducing greater price flexibility, competition lowers the short-run gains to output from an unanticipated inflation, and thus permanently reduces the incentives for a central bank to try to exploit those gains. The improved credibility of the central bank’s commitment to keep inflation low and stable should, in turn, allow it to deliver better inflation outcomes with fewer short-run costs to economic growth and employment.