samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Orphanides, Athanasios, and John C. Williams, “Inflation Targeting under Imperfect Knowledge,” in Frederic Mishkin and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (ed.) Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, Central Bank of Chile, 2007. Reprinted in FRBSF Economic Review, 2007. Reis, Ricardo, “Losing the Inflation Anchor,” Brookings Papers on Economics Activity, Fall 2021, 2022, 307-361. Swanson, Eric T., and John C. Williams, “Measuring the Effect of the Zero Lower Bound on Medium- and Longer-Term Interest Rates,” American Economic Review, 104 (10), October 2014, 3154-3185. 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012). 2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020). 3 See Orphanides and Williams (2004, 2005, and 2007). There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the formation of expectations. See, for example, Evans and  Honkapohja (2001), Malmendier and Nagel (2016), Coiboin et al (2022), and references therein. 4 As discussed in Levin and Taylor (2013), data on longer-run inflation expectations were spotty in past periods of high inflation. This situation has improved markedly over  the past 20 years, first with the appearance of inflation-indexed Treasury securities, and more recently with the introduction of the Survey of Consumer Expectations in 2013, and other surveys of businesses and market participants. 5 This is constructed by inferring the expectations 6-10 years from matched individual responses for “the next ten years” and “the next five years,” then taking the median  from the sample.

In 2008, the Export-Import Bank of Korea and Industrial Bank of Korea successfully raised a total of RM2 billion via bond issuance in the Malaysian bond market. Moving forward, the sukuk market represents an important channel to reinforce regional financial integration. It presents an opportunity for Korean corporations to raise financing and issue sukuks out of Malaysia. In addition, Korean investors can also participate in the wide range of Islamic financial instruments in the Malaysian financial markets, including from more than 150 Islamic unit trusts, Islamic REITs, wholesale mutual fund products and other Islamic structured products. In addition to robust economic ties and potential financial links, Korea and Malaysia enjoy a growing mobility of talents. With the rise in Korean investment in Malaysia, this has led to an increase in Korean expatriates. Koreans are also coming to Malaysia as students and to participate in our Malaysia My Second Home programme. In addition, the Korean Wave, which spread to Malaysia in early 2000s, has contributed to make our country more aware of the Korean culture and traditions, thus promoting a better understanding between these two countries. Prospects for the Malaysian economy Malaysia is an economy that is transitioning into a new phase of development. In the current environment, our economy is now firmly on the recovery path. This year, the Malaysian economy is projected to grow in the region of 5% with further upside potential.
Let me now inform you further on the monetary policy implemented by the Bank of Albania. 2. Bank of Albania’s monetary policy  The primary objective of the Bank of Albania is to achieve and maintain price stability. In quantitative terms, the Bank of Albania aims to keep the CPI inflation at around 3.00%. The inflation target is set to be achieved in the medium-term period, while the actual inflation may be subject to short-term deviations from the target, due to unexpected shocks or shocks independent from the monetary policy. Monetary policy decisions are forward looking and in line with market principles. In 2013, the weak inflationary pressures were reflected in lower annual inflation, which averaged 1.9%, ranging close to the lower bound of Bank of Albania’s tolerance band. It pursued a downward trend during the year, being more pronounced in the second half of the year. Unprocessed foods inflation accounted for around 90% of the headline inflation, hence determining the direction and fluctuation of the CPI inflation. From the viewpoint of macroeconomic factors, consumer prices have reflected, first of all, the weak demand for goods and services, a factor that has generated low inflation over the last two years. Increase in demand, which was significantly below Albania’s production capacity, 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  generated weak pressures for rise in the labour and production costs, and in the profit margin. Supply-side factors also influenced inflation on the downside.

Market-making serves an important function, and it is important that trading desks can intervene and buy during flash crashes or sell during flash surges. Permitting this could provide greater liquidity and stability to financial markets. I would also exempt smaller banking institutions from the Volcker rule since they rarely, if ever, engage in proprietary trading. Do no harm Many speculate that Congress will make changes to the Dodd-Frank Act. If the scope is confined mainly to small bank relief and adjusting how the Volcker rule is applied, I have no objection. But, because the Dodd-Frank Act addresses many of the key lessons of the crisis, I think it appropriate that changes be made carefully—with a paring knife, rather than with a meat cleaver. Here, I would underscore the importance of preserving higher capital and liquidity requirements for systemically important banks; Title VII, which mandates the central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives; and Title VIII, which gives the Federal Reserve an oversight role for financial market utilities that are systemically important, and which helps promote more uniform risk management standards. While Title II gives the FDIC the authority to resolve a large, complex financial firm by converting its debt into equity and establishing a new holding company, I do not think this is necessarily the only way to have a viable resolution regime. However, if Title II were to be eliminated, then the Bankruptcy Code would need to be bolstered.
Furthermore, when stable exchange rates are replaced by flexible, volatile and, in all likelihood, depreciating ones, the demand for hedging in the more volatile environment and under liberalized arrangements may drive exchange rates to such debilitating levels that many would regret the lack of resolve in pursuing sensible policies and in the defence of stable exchange rates in the first place. There is no doubt that confidence in the stability of a few Asian currencies has now been badly undermined and rebuilding it may take more than just time. Nevertheless, as the very productive Asian economies find their feet again, they will soon be on their way with renewed vigour. 23. For Hong Kong, as very much a service-oriented economy, any erosion of competitiveness, as a result of our currency holding stable against the US dollar while others have fallen, is likely to be mild. Our economy is not particularly sensitive to exchange rate changes. The IMF forecast for Hong Kong’s growth rate next year is 4.25%, only a shade below our trend growth rate of 5%, representing a healthy consolidation in the circumstances. BIS Review 115/1997

But even if we accept that little can be done to avoid economic cycles, this should not be an excuse for us, central bankers and supervisors. Our responsibility is to develop macro-prudential approaches and the appropriate regulatory measures to help banks reduce the impact of future economic cycles and diminish their procyclical behaviour. This should be achieved for the sake of financial stability with the minimum economic and social costs, which is the main objective of supervisory authorities In fact, banking behaviour can be not only cyclical but procyclical, that is, it can exacerbate the cyclical behaviour of the real economy. As it has been said many times, there is nothing more procyclical than a badly managed bank. In good times it incurs in more risks than it reasonably should through, for example, excessive lending with poor standards. In bad times it changes its lending policies reducing drastically the loans to the economy and exacerbating the downturn. There are several causes that explain this procyclical behaviour but I will focus on the one that affects us most and towards which all of our work should be devoted: banking regulation and supervision. Basel II was seen as a major step towards a better alignment between credit risk incurred by banks and regulatory minimum capital requirements. This link between risk and capital has forced supervisors to better understand the main drivers behind credit risk and the idiosyncrasy of banks’ credit models, their risk pricing and general portfolio management.
During the financial crisis, this spread rose and fell with changes in investors’ perception of bank credit risk. In contrast, its recent moves are related to money market fund reform: term rates rose considerably as prime money market funds both shrunk in size and reduced their maturities to remain highly liquid, and have recently come back a bit as the market has stabilized and markets have adapted to the new industry structure. Shown in (Figure 15) are customer-to-dealer versus dealer-to-dealer Treasury repo rates. The customer-to-dealer market consists primarily of cash investors like money market funds lending to dealers, while the dealer-to-dealer market reflects dealers lending amongst themselves.31 The 8 / 13  BIS central bankers' speeches  spread between these two rates is thus a proxy for the cost dealers with ready access to cashinvestor financing charge to act as intermediaries between these two markets. Since all the lending is secured by Treasuries, this intermediation entails very modest risk. U.S. versus currency-hedged 3-month interest rates, as reflected by foreign exchange basis swaps, are shown in (Figure 16). U.S. and foreign money markets are linked together by a dealer-intermediated foreign exchange derivatives market, which allows firms to essentially convert money market loans and borrowings from one currency into another. A dealer that intermediates this spread can be thought of conceptually as making a secured loan, in which it lends out dollars and takes in foreign currency cash as collateral.

As always, these views are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System. My comments today are, in part, a condensed version of “Domestic Open Market Operations During 2016,” a report prepared by the Markets Group of the New York Fed for the FOMC. This annual report provides extensive and illuminating detail on the Federal Reserve’s operations and balance sheet. It is published as part of our mission to make monetary policy transparent and accessible to the public. The report will be published tomorrow on the New York Fed’s website and I encourage you to read it. Our new policy framework: a review 1 / 13  BIS central bankers' speeches  Let me start out by reviewing two basic questions: what is our framework for implementing monetary policy, and why has it changed so much? Before the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve followed a well-worn playbook for monetary policy implementation that was based on keeping reserve balances scarce.2 Even though the Federal Reserve paid zero percent interest on reserves, banks still needed to hold small amounts of them, mainly to satisfy their reserve requirement but also for operational liquidity. The demand for reserves by banks was downward sloping (and steep).
The FOMC stated that it expects it will be appropriate to maintain this target range until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with its assessments of maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time.7 In addition, the Federal Reserve will continue to increase its holdings of Treasury securities by at least $ billion per month and of agency mortgage backed securities by at least $ billion per month until substantial further progress has been made toward the Committee’s maximum employment and price stability goals. In other words: Despite uncertainties, we are fully committed to supporting the economy through this period and reaching our maximum employment and price stability goals. We will continue to watch and learn and remain committed to using our full range of tools to help assure that the recovery will be as robust as possible. Conclusion I’ll conclude with this: Despite the progress so far in recovering from the recession, some of the numbers that I’ve shared are staggering. Families, businesses, and communities are struggling. Almost a year into the pandemic, there is still so much uncertainty. But despite the near-term challenges, the longer-term outlook for the economy has improved, and our actions of the past year position monetary policy well to support a strong, full recovery and achievement of our goals of maximum employment and price stability. With this progress in mind, I am hopeful for a time soon that looks “more like normal." Thank you.

John C Williams: The economic outlook- getting back to "more like normal" Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at One Hundred Black Men of New York, 25 February 2021. * * * Hello, everyone. I’m really pleased to be joining your meeting today. Your work in bringing together leaders and visionaries in support of Black communities across our city is invaluable. We’re approaching the one-year mark since the pandemic took hold. At this time last year there was an increasing sense of fear and uncertainty about the future. And the events since then have posed tremendous challenges to families, communities, and the economy. The ongoing human toll is a tragedy we won’t forget in our lifetimes. What has been an extraordinary public health crisis also has had profound consequences for the American and global economies. The cause of this recession—a global pandemic—means that our economic future will be determined in large part by the path of the virus and our collective success in overcoming it. We still face many hurdles on the road to recovery from both COVID-19 and the severe economic hardship that has ensued. A lot depends on the success in quickly getting a large part of the public vaccinated against a backdrop of the spread of emerging new strains of the virus. Despite these challenges and uncertainties, I have become more optimistic about the mediumterm outlook for the economy.
In our discussion to come, I believe we could study two types of aggregates:  Page 7 sur 10   Financial aggregates, from the perspective of financial stability, and potentially looking more closely at the assets of financial institutions including non-banks (such as their provision of credit in the broadest sense) rather than at their liabilities only (including money, as in the past).  Other economic aggregates, starting with nominal GDP, which has the virtue of combining real growth and prices – two variables that statisticians sometimes have difficulties separating in our measures. But also employment and income distribution, which respond to the demands of the Treaties as well as to the expectations of the public. Allow me some remarks on the substance of these “secondary” objectives. To achieve financial stability, in an ideal world, we would have a box of macroprudential tools that could maintain financial stability whatever the monetary policy stance. However, in practice our set of macroprudential tools is comparatively limited. We need a monetary policy strategy that reflects this reality. We should go beyond the old debate of “separation principle” versus “ leaning against the wind”. I advocate a median way, which we could call “coordinated” or “integrated”.viii We have now a range of unconventional monetary instruments and our objective should be to pick the right combination that delivers the necessary accommodative monetary stance while minimizing of adverse side-effects on financial stability.

Financial waters, already extremely chilly, then froze solid. Banks found it almost impossible to finance themselves because no-one knew which banks were safe and which weren’t. From the start of the crisis, central banks provided emergency loans but these amounted to little more than holding a sheet in front of the emperor to conceal the nakedness of the banks. They didn’t solve the underlying problem – banks needed not loans but injections of shareholders’ capital in order to be able to absorb losses from the risky investments they had made. From the beginning of 2008, we at the Bank of England began to argue that UK banks needed extra capital – a lot of extra capital, possibly £ billion or more. It wasn’t a popular message. But nine months later, market pressure forced banks to raise new capital or accept 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  it from the state. UK tax payers ended up owning large portions of two of our four biggest banks, Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TSB, but almost all banks would have failed had not taxpayer support been extended. That bold action in October 2008 could have happened sooner. But the most important thing is that it was done. And the policy of recapitalising the banks was soon copied by other countries. Bailing out the banks came too late though to prevent the financial crisis from spilling over into the world economy.
If oil prices remain low, it may quickly become necessary to take a critical look at the scale of welfare schemes and public sector services, and it may also be necessary to increase taxes. If, later in the business cycle, measures are called for to curb unemployment, they should be designed to be readily reversible and in such a way that they do not erode government finances in the long term. Conclusion By way of introduction, I posed the following question: is our economy sufficiently robust to cope with the fall in oil prices without a new round of major structural adjustments? Our financial system is in a stronger position to cope with a new downturn than it was in the 1980s. We have avoided a debt bubble of the scale we witnessed last time. However, I am in doubt as to the financial industry’s long-term restructuring capacity. Norway must endorse the development of a new architecture for the global financial system. This is a demanding and long-term process, and we cannot expect all the problems to be solved over night. On the other hand, if we are to have any hope of a more stable and predictable world economy, the only real alternative is to enhance international codes for financial markets. We have observed that confidence in the krone is fragile. In order to restore confidence and maintain a stable exchange rate, monetary policy must be a credible anchor for expectations of continued low price inflation.

The crisis in Asia spread to Russia, where the decline in commodity prices led to an even further deterioration in government finances. The announcement that Russia could no longer service its debt was met with strong reactions in global financial markets in August and September. There were growing fears that the world economy would be caught in a financial crash. Many investors withdrew from small and risky markets, particularly in Latin America. The Brazilian currency came under pressure. It was difficult to raise loan capital even in the most advanced markets. As financial institutions throughout the world experienced growing losses, fears of a world economic depression intensified. Reductions in interest rates in the US and Europe facilitated access to credit and prevented a market collapse. Measures perceived as credible were finally implemented to resolve the Japanese banking crisis. Additional capital was allocated to the International Monetary Fund. There are still many challenges ahead. Brazil and Russia are running government budget deficits and are having problems establishing a credible monetary policy. China is bearing substantial costs as a result of the crisis in surrounding countries and may experience difficulties of its own. Other countries may also feel the contagion effect. However, even though the outlook points to lower growth in the global economy this year than forecast earlier, fears of a worldwide depression have receded. This is by no means the first time we have experienced an international financial crisis.
According to the draft agreement, the legal spending commitments attached to the projects included in Next Generation EU shall be made, at the latest, by 31 December 2023, and the related payments will have to be made effective, at the latest, by end-2026. More specifically, 70% of the transfers should be committed during the 2021-2022 two-year period, with a country-based distribution factor that depends on the unemployment rate in 2015-2019, population and the country’s per capita income. The remaining 30% must be committed before end-2023, and the distribution factor will be adapted to incorporate more directly the heterogeneous impact of the health crisis. Thus, the unemployment rate will be replaced by a variable that will weight, in equal portions, the decline in GDP in 2020 and the cumulative decline in GDP in 2020-2021. In sum, the fund will enable, at least in part, a balance to be struck between the potential and real financial divergences among the European partners. This is because it will benefit from the positive externalities arising from joint action and it will serve to engineer a coordinated exit from the crisis, based on common budgetary instruments. The financing of the fund through Community debt will benefit from the favourable low-interest-rate environment and will prevent this new debt being assumed by Member States individually, under conditions which, in some cases, would be foreseeably more unfavourable than those 4  which are expected to be applied to this pooled instrument.

The allocation of responsibility and mandate are of course important also because there are both an interest rate lever and a regulation lever to pull, and that these can in some cases have similar effects. It is not difficult to imagine situations where regulations and the interest rate counteract one another. For instance, one might have a situation where the prospects for inflation and the economy as a whole look bleak, but where there are nevertheless signs that a credit-driven bubble is inflating. There may then be reason to use macroprudential measures to counteract the bubble. But these will reduce lending and thus further weaken the economy. Such counteracting effects need not be a problem, if one single authority is controlling both levers, or if they are controlled by different authorities that are essentially trying to achieve the same aims and make similar assessments. For instance, they may both agree that the economy is weak, but that there may be reason to take action to counteract a bubble. Then it is a question of coordinating and trying to find a suitable dosage, or mix, of interest rate and regulations. It is clear that the problems can be aggravated if the levers are controlled by different authorities that do not have the same aims and make completely different assessments of the situation. It is thus important to try to coordinate monetary policy and macroprudential policy. Of course, there has always been a need to coordinate monetary policy and the work to promote financial stability.