samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The main role of private equity is to fill the gap between internally generated financing and conventional market sources, such as bank loans and public equity. Unlike most stock market investments, equity investment enables shareholders to adopt a long-term and hands-on approach in their investee companies, fostering sound corporate governance and transparency, making appropriate contributions to business strategy and optimizing management. Crucially, however, it also contributes to the transfer of skills and has positive demonstration effects in terms of the development of local capital markets and competitive market-oriented behavior10. These modalities such 10  EBRD Transition report 2015-2016. 12  as, venture capital, crowdfunding, business angels, are relatively modest in the CESEE, although the same holds for the EU as well, where private equity has a share of around 0.3% in GDP. Debt market in the region is larger compared to the equity, averaging around 50% of GDP, which is still much lower compared to the EU-28 average of close to 160%. Yet, dominant part of this market segment is related to government securities, while the corporate issuance remains modest. In fact, in most CESEE countries, corporate bond markets remain small, or even nonexistent. Chart 14: Stock and debt market capitalization  Source: ECB and central bank websites. To recap, the region needs to mobilize finance, which amidst burdened government financing and structurally difficult access to bank finance for new and innovative companies, requires further development of the capital markets and more diversified portfolio of financial instruments.

These efforts have helped to avoid retrenchment of staff who might otherwise be displaced, and contributed to the steady decline in retrenchments in the financial sector, from the peak of 2,300 in 2016 to 1,300 in 2019.7 However, given the accelerated pace of digitalisation, we need to do more, and at scale. We are now experimenting an Artificial Intelligence (AI) platform with 13 FI partners to automate the process of identifying adjacencies in jobs and skills, so that more workers can benefit from reskilling and pivot into suitable roles. We hope to share more about the platform early next year. Creating Opportunities Our second priority is to expand opportunities for those aspiring to enter or reenter the financial sector workforce. 9. The National Jobs Council has been set up to mobilise tripartite partners’ resources to create opportunities amidst the weak labour hiring conditions. I am pleased to note that the financial sector is one of the top contributing sectors to 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  the jobs and traineeships programmes, offering a wide range of opportunities, including in technology and innovation, retail and corporate banking. Close to 60 FIs have offered about 1,300 SGUnited Traineeship positions for fresh and recent graduates in this challenging job market. As of end July 2020, 50 FIs have committed to hiring 900 Singaporeans over the next 3 years to be groomed for future leadership and specialist roles under structured talent development programmes supported by MAS.
We at the Fed are working through a number of highly complex issues to enable the creation of vehicles that will make it easier for a broader range of investors to have access to financing for ABS securities. The broader the investor base, the greater the demand for the securities, the lower the yield levels and the greater the improvement in credit availability. The rollout of TALF to the Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities market this summer will be important in determining the overall success of the program. The revival of the CMBS market is essential to stabilizing the commercial real estate market. As you know, commercial real estate values are under pressure for several reasons. Capitalization rates have climbed significantly, reducing commercial real estate valuations. In addition, the income generated from commercial property has diminished due to the contraction in overall economic activity. If the availability of funding for this market is not restored, the downturn in commercial real estate valuations and the losses for the holders of these assets will be greater. This will, in turn, likely further constrain credit availability. A revival of the CMBS market is also important to accommodate the demand for funds to refinance commercial mortgage loans that will be coming due over the next few years. If the CMBS market remains shut down, it is unclear where these funds will come from. After all, in recent years, the CMBS market has satisfied about 40% of the credit needs of the commercial mortgage sector.

This increase in yields did not solely reflect an increase in credit risk; it also reflected a genuine loss of confidence and an accompanying increase in risk aversion. Yield spreads on even the very safest ABS obligations soared hundreds of basis points. This can be seen in the fact that AAA-rated student loan tranches, with underlying loans 97% guaranteed by the federal government, climbed to yield levels as much as 400 basis points over LIBOR. With the spike in yields, the economic incentives to issue evaporated – issuance was just too costly and there was no active market. After averaging around $ billion per quarter of new originations in 2007 and the first three quarters of 2008, consumer ABS issuance plunged to only $ billion during the fourth quarter of 2008. Issuance of commercial mortgage backed securities ground to a complete halt and this market currently remains closed. So why did the ABS market collapse? There are many reasons. One factor was that in some areas, the risk management incentives of banks and other issuers of ABS were misaligned with those of the end investors in these securities. This misalignment manifested itself in the overall deterioration in lending standards that took place across the economy beginning during the middle part of this decade. Some originators did not do an adequate job of due diligence because the underlying loans were swiftly moved off their balance sheets through the securitization process.
Minouche Shafik: Interpreting the yield curve – warning or opportunity? Speech by Ms Minouche Shafik, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking of the Bank of England, at the Association of Corporate Treasurers Annual Conference, Manchester,  22 May 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. The views in this speech are my own, and not those of the Bank of England or the Monetary PoIicy Committee. I would like to thank Ben Broadbent, Ronnie Driver, Kristin Forbes, Grellan McGrath, Martin Weale and Chris Young for their comments. It is a pleasure to be here. I would like to talk today about long term borrowing rates – a topic that I am sure is often on the mind of a corporate treasurer. I have been thinking about this issue since I joined the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), as not only are long yields an important input to current financial conditions, but – carefully interpreted – they can offer an insight on future developments too. I have been waiting to find a group who might be as intrigued by it as I am, so I jumped at the chance to speak to the Association of Corporate Treasurers. The yield on nominal 20-year UK government debt peaked at around 17% in 1974. After that long term yields began a period of decline which continued right up to the mid 2000s (Chart 1).

The Swedish Parliament (2022), "the Riksbank's monetary policy 2015–2020 has been evaluated", published on 31 March, available at The Riksbank's monetary policy 2015–2020 has been evaluated - the Riksdag. 13 [19]  Figures Diagram 1. Inflation in various countries and regions Annual percentage change  Note. Consumer prices refer to the CPIF for Sweden, the CPI for the United States and the United Kingdom and the HICP for the euro area. Sources: Eurostat, Statistics Sweden, UK Office for National Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Riksbank. Diagram 2. Riksbank's asset holdings Nominal amounts, SEK billion  Note. The bars refer to executed and decided purchases. Source: The Riksbank. 14 [19]  Tabell 1. Purchases of securities by ECB, Federal Reserve and the Riksbank Government securities  Commercial paper  Regional and municipal bonds  ECB*  🗸  🗸  Federal Reserve  🗸  🗸  🗸  The Riksbank  🗸  🗸  🗸  Covered bonds  MBS & ABS  🗸  🗸 🗸  🗸  Note. Mortgage Backed Securities (MSB) and Asset Backed Securities (ABS) are similar to covered bonds in that there is an underlying collateral for the bonds in the form of a loan portfolio. The difference lies, among other things, in different regulatory requirements and in which party has the underlying collateral on its balance sheet. *The ECB has also purchased bonds by supranational bodies. Source: Hansson and Birging (2021). Diagram 3.
The explanation the members themselves considered to apply the best was that the idea that one can use a figure to explain the relative weight of stabilising inflation against that of stabilising resource utilisation in the economy is overly simple. Many also considered that it was meaningless to try to quantify the relative weight given to inflation and resource utilisation, partly because this could depend on the situation in the economy and thus vary over time, and partly because the measures of resource utilisation are so uncertain. 6  In the academic literature one usually calls a policymaker who gives a relatively high priority to stabilising inflation, a small λ, conservative. A well-known theoretical result reached in the mid-1980s by Kenneth Rogoff, nowadays adviser to the Riksbank, was that under certain circumstances it might be optimal to appoint a governor who was more “conservative” than society in general (Rogoff, K., (1985), “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 100, pp. 1169–1189). 7  Apel, M., C. A. Claussen and P. Lennartsdotter, (2010), “Picking the Brains of MPC Members”, Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 237. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  It thus appears that there is fairly broad scepticism among the members towards drawing farreaching parallels between how monetary policy is described in theory and how they view it as practitioners.

One can thus imagine that part of the explanation as to why an alternative repo rate scenario may give a smaller mean squared gap than the main scenario could be that it is only a purely model-based adjustment of the main scenario. This raises another question: If one were also to supplement the alternative repo rate paths with personal judgements, would one always conclude that the main scenario would give the lowest loss? The answer to this question should reasonably be “yes, at least most of the time” – there are some reservations, which I will discuss in a moment. We try to conduct the policy we judge to be the best or “best balanced” and if we judged that another repo rate path than that in the main scenario would give a better outcome, we would of course choose that one instead. This should be visible in the mean squared gap analysis, that is, there should not be alternative repo rate paths that give a dot that lies south-west of the main scenario. Consideration to developments beyond the forecast horizon and risks There may also be other reasons why the main scenario does not necessarily provide smaller mean squared deviations than an alternative repo rate scenario. One is that the calculations are based on forecasts that extend no further than three years ahead. But there may sometimes be reason to consider what might happen beyond this time horizon, even if this is difficult to capture in a normal quantitative forecast.
To my mind the most notable exclusion is traded or market risk for banks, which might be where a transition shock would be most likely to manifest – indeed current and recent stresses in energy and commodity markets illustrate this point. As we build capabilities, we will be better able to size the risk and its potential policy implications. We will also learn over time whether the real world looks more like the EA scenario, or if we are living in a ‘late’ or ‘no’ action world. All of this will inform the PRA’s judgements about capital requirements and any other responses to climate risks. Today’s publication is important step forward, but it is not the last word. 1. Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario 2. For the purposes of this speech, I focus on the prudential regulation and financial stability aspects of climate risk, as opposed to the Bank of England’s other responsibilities as a central bank. 3. The PRA’s supervisory statement on enhancing banks’ and insurers’ approaches to managing the financial risks from climate change 4. The PRA Climate Change Adaptation Report 2021 set out some of these issues in more detail. 5. My colleague Sarah Breeden also reflected on the role of government, central banks and financial firms in the economy’s transition to net zero in a recent speech: Balancing on the net-zero tightrope − speech by Sarah Breeden | Bank of England 6.

Under both the LA and EA scenarios, climate change has broadly been brought under control by the end of the 30 year period. By contrast, with no additional action the impacts will persist well beyond the 30 years of our scenario – incurring substantial economic costs not captured in these estimates. [11] Even sticking within the 30 year bounds of the scenario – and focusing on financial sector impacts – the NAA scenario is pretty grim. Projected impairment rates for banks are up 50% compared with normal levels. And whereas the ‘transition’ scenarios offer clear opportunities for banks to increase their profits by investing the transition, the ‘no action’ scenario offered no such opportunities. Instead the world gets poorer and more uncertain for all sectors, particularly those directly exposed to physical risks. The ‘no action’ scenario is particularly unpleasant for life and general insurers – even sticking to the 30 year window, their losses in this scenario were worse than in the transition. For instance UK and international general insurers, respectively, projected a rise in average annualised losses of around 50% and 70% by the end of the NAA scenario. It’s worth emphasising that these costs would be mostly passed on to consumers through higher premiums. Ultimately, in a ‘no action’ scenario, we would see a reduction in access to lending and insurance for so-called ‘climate vulnerable’ sectors and households. To give an example of what this means, homes at risk of flooding would likely become prohibitively expensive to insure or borrow against.
Page 20 of 27  Figure 13 Contributions to revisions to 2021 GDP growth (1) (percentage points) 3.0  Increased fiscal transfers  Better beginning of year and agents' adaptation  Third pension fund withdrawal  Other (2)  2.0  1.1  1.0  0.7  0.4 0.3  0.0 1 (1) Built using midpoint of forecast range of March and June 2021 Monetary Policy Report. (2) Includes external sector and mining. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 14 IMACEC scenarios consistent with 2021 GDP growth range (*) (index; 2013 average =100; seasonally adjusted series) April level + Common minimums 2020 average Growth 2021=9.5%  125 120  2020 Growth 2021=7.5%  2021 Growth 2021=8.5%  Considers that the economy remains in February’s level  115 110 105 100 95  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  (*) Colored area indicates period during which the benefits approved under the Common Minimums Agenda will be in place. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

During property market and economic downturns, the chance of default for this group of borrowers can be significantly higher than those with only one property under mortgage. In view of this, the HKMA considers it necessary to require banks to further tighten the underwriting criteria for mortgage loans to borrowers with multiple property mortgages to reduce the risk of banks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  6. Besides, the HKMA notices a recent trend of lengthening average tenor of new mortgage loans. The average tenor for new mortgage loans now is 25 years, which is three years longer than that of 22 years in 2009. Some banks have extended the maximum tenor to even 40 years. Prolonged loan tenors will not only increase credit risk of banks, but may also weaken the ability of borrowers to withstand interest rate risk. In particular, when mortgage rates return to more normal levels, borrowers with a loan that already stretches to 30 or even 40 years simply cannot seek to reduce their monthly instalment payment burden by extending the tenor, and may therefore face financial difficulty. Therefore the HKMA has now required banks to set the ceiling for the maximum loan tenor for all new mortgage loans to not more than 30 years. 7. The above measures take effect immediately. However, loan applications in respect of property transactions with provisional sale and purchase agreements signed today or earlier will not be affected. 8. Mr Arthur Yuen, our Deputy Chief Executive, will explain the details of these measures later.
According to a report from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median tenure of workers ages 25 to 34 is only three years – less than a third of the tenure among people aged 55 to 64 years old. 1 And, according a Future Workplace “Multiple Generations@Work” survey, 91 percent of “millennials” (that is, a person born between 1977 and 1997) expect to stay in a job for less than three years. Job-hopping can speed career advancement. Getting a promotion in the process of changing jobs allows employees to avoid the “dues paying” that can keep workers in a painfully slow rise up the corporate ladder. Job hopping can also lead to greater job fulfillment. A 2012 survey by Net Impact 2 found that 88 percent of all workers considered “positive culture” important or essential to their dream job, and 86 percent said the same for work they found “interesting.” The same survey found that millennials are the least satisfied in their careers. I also recognize that firms are no longer just competing with others in the financial sector for talent. With skills that can be adapted across multiple industries, the talent pool that was once specialized for financial firms is now spread thin. This puts pressure on the firms and gives talented workers the advantage of being selective in their roles. They demand more from hiring managers and sense other opportunities out there if they’re not satisfied.

The promotion of more effective international cooperation on training and skills development to meet the changing demands of the industry, more comprehensive strategies on talent development and greater mobility that is consistent with the realities of the global economy will support such talent development. Despite these demands, under investment in learning remains in a significant proportion of financial institutions. This is largely due to the focus on keeping short term costs low. This has however resulted in drawing talent from the existing pool which has in turn resulted in rising costs of talent. Surveys suggest that the biggest skills and knowledge gaps faced by financial institutions are in knowledge of regulatory standards, communications, management skills and risk assessment and management. Professional and technical skills, particularly in the middle to senior levels, are still very much needed in many parts of Asia. These skills shortages will intensify as financial institutions expand their operations. Strategies for talent management and development must therefore change if financial institutions want to be competitive and well positioned to adjust and adapt to the changing conditions. The Asian Institute of Finance (AIF) was initiated by Bank Negara Malaysia and established jointly with the Securities Commission in [2009] to respond to the growing needs of the financial industry for high quality and efficient training opportunities that would develop indemand skills.
And if there is a role for fiscal policy, then that also affects the financial stability calculus31. The second, and related point, is that the financial stability dimension needs to be taken in the round. The impact of monetary policy on financial assets and leverage, for example, is a very important consideration. But we should not, on the other hand, lose sight of the fact that a world in which downturns may be more severe and more persistent because demand management is less effective would also be a significant and perhaps a greater challenge for financial stability. Conclusion Jane Austen’s Navy Fives, as I noted at the start, gave her nominal annual return of nearly 6%. But her real return, when she purchased them in 1815, was closer to 20%. Britain was entering a severe recession that year at the end of the Napoleonic wars with deflation of more than 10%. The annual return in 1817, the year of Jane’s death, was actually negative 2% as inflation rebounded. A few years later Britain reverted to its pre-war monetary standard by restoring Sterling’s convertibility to gold. Over the following 50 years, nominal interest rates came down a little but stayed in the 3-5% range. 30  Broadbent (2018). From a narrow financial stability perspective, growth of own currency sovereign debt, especially when financed internally, is not a good predictor of financial crises. See Cunliffe (2019).

2  BIS Review 39/2005  The main objective remains enforcing legal initiatives that would bring about the modification of legal and sub-legal basis. Modification of regulatory basis of Bank of Albania I have stated even previously that Bank of Albania aims at reviewing its regulatory basis with the sole intent to simplify it and to ease its implementation. For this purpose I have insisted on a continuous basis that the first contacts among mutual technical staffs to raise the banking system concerns on the regulatory framework enforcement should be established. After several discussions we come to the conclusion that the group of the following regulations should be subject of necessary modifications, and I would ensure you that work at the Bank of Albania has already started for this purpose. Methodical guideline on “foreign exchange risks” Observations: inclusion in the calculation of the open position of off-balance guarantees which include as unused credit limit, the financing commitments made and received, and registering of collateral estimated in foreign currency and received for guaranteeing the credit (all banks in the matrix). These are commitments that remain in force and for which, according to the current regulatory framework interpreting, the bank is required to create a real position (within the balance). It is proposed: to reformulate the methodical guideline, excluding the guarantees. Guideline “on bank regulatory capital” Observations: To make clearer systemization for the items being deducted from the additional capital, explaining that on which size deductions are to be calculated.