samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The need to find a buyer to replace a seller can be expressed in the equivalent statement that the maturity of the liability is extremely long, in this case indefinite. The real problems stem from liabilities with very short maturities. These occur with debt finance, whether in terms of bank deposits payable on demand or longer-term debt finance which has almost run to maturity. In these cases, depositors who wish to withdraw their funds do not have to find replacement depositors. They simply take their funds out. The result is that, if this rush to the exit is on a sufficiently large scale, banks find themselves on the receiving end of a liquidity run. Such runs can occur even if the fundamentals are sound, although they are more likely when the fundamentals are weak. And the banking systems of some emerging markets compounded the problem by borrowing in foreign currency at short maturities and investing the proceeds in domestic currency assets at longer maturities. This was indeed a recipe for instability. The importance of short-term debt finance in the reversal of capital flows in recent years is clear. Virtually the whole of the $ billion reversal of flows to the five Asian crisis countries was accounted for by swings in short-term debt finance. And 80% of this swing resulted from changes in the net flow of finance from commercial banks.

In particular, FSTEP will offer scholarships to eligible top graduates from various universities to participate in its one-year fast-track training programme. I wish to congratulate FSTEP for the successful effort in designing a new syllabus and it continuous effort to improve the FSTEP programmes remain contemporary and relevant agreed to by all parties within the financial services industry. More importantly, it is my hope that FSTEP will continue to produce the quality of graduates that will meet the needs of the industry. I hope that all of you will have a fruitful discussion and dialogue. On this note, I declare open the event “FSTEP: Syllabus Enhancement”. 2  BIS Review 100/2010
Urban Bäckström: Swedish economy in transition  Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Independent Academy of Building & Construction, on 2 October 2000. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to talk with you this evening about the Swedish economy and monetary policy. The issues I have chosen to consider are why the Swedish economy is performing so well and what can be done to ensure that this continues. As you know, output and employment are rising rapidly at present. Annual output growth has averaged 3% over the past six years and the current rate seems to be somewhere between 3 and 4%. Unemployment has come down and is still falling to levels that few had believed possible some years ago, particularly in view of the high European rate. At the same time we have seen that even comparatively low nominal wage increases can result in higher real wages. As a matter of fact, the real wage increases have exceeded most people’s expectations and been higher than for many years. Moreover, inflation has remained low in spite of all this. But monetary policy may still have challenges to face as resource utilisation in the Swedish economy becomes increasingly strained. The current situation also contains a number of risks that have to be assessed.

Mugur Isărescu: The power of the mind Opening address by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania and President of the Romanian Association for the Club of Rome, at the Annual Conference of the Club of Rome “The Power of the Mind”, organized by the Club of Rome, the Romanian Association for the Club of Rome (ARCoR) and the National Bank of Romania, Bucharest, 2 October 2012. *  *  *  Dear colleagues of the Club of Rome, Honoured guests, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure and a privilege for the Romanian Association for the Club of Rome and for the National Bank of Romania to be the host of the International Conference of the Club of Rome, here in Bucharest, with such a challenging topic: “The Power of the Mind”. As we all know, 2012 is an anniversary year for the Club of Rome, since we are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the first Report to the Club, which was entitled “The Limits to Growth”. When this Report was published, it created shockwaves all over the world, including the communist countries. I can testify this, because I addressed comments concerning this issue when I was a young research fellow, after graduating the University. Actually, I confessed to my colleagues that my first public appearance in 1973 was related to the Club’s first Report. But the debates were not limited to Romania or to Europe. They were manifest all over the world, and are still continuing today.
No doubt the drama of policy uncertainty will continue. But what will be the end-game? Broadly speaking, we envision two scenarios: an extreme scenario and a baseline scenario. In the extreme scenario, prolonged political gridlock over policy leads to a liquidity seizure. Failure to ratify the fiscal compact results in handicapped liquidity support efforts on the part of the authorities and heightened market concerns. Rising risk premium leads to explosive debt dynamics, loss of market access and rollover difficulty, which in turn leads to even greater liquidity needs. With the cost of rescue mounting, internal country politics may further delay policy leading to a vicious cycle between rising rescue costs and policy inaction. There are signs that these risks are very real. For example, last month in late July, Spanish bond yields recently jumped up again over 7 percent, making the country’s debt dynamics unstable. There has also been upward pressure on Italian bonds. The ECB came to the rescue by promising to “do whatever it takes to preserve the euro as a stable currency”. Markets stabilized and yields came down. The US stock market also picked up. Nevertheless, the risk that yields could erupt again persists, especially if concrete progress in implementing policy does not take place. In the event of a liquidity seizure, there will be considerable spillover into global financial markets. Trade will decline amid the credit crunch that will surely follow. Asia, Thailand included, will not be spared the turmoil. So that’s the extreme scenario.

Our research shows that the gains from structural change can be considerable although adjustment costs, in terms of the reallocation of labor and capital, will also be significant. Now we arrive at the third and final question. Given the euro crisis and Thailand’s prospects for growth, what should monetary policy do? The dilemma here is how to bridge short-term stabilization with long-term goals of structural change. The challenge for policy is to maintain an overall framework where the trend of increasing economic integration can continue while containing crises. Given our baseline scenario of a prolonged recovery without a liquidity seizure we lean towards long-term goals – for example, maintaining capital flow liberalization, financial sector liberalization and market-led exchange rates – but with a readiness for monetary stimulus should a clear need arise. Let me discuss the policy tools at our disposal and how they fit into our overall policy objectives. On the interest rate, the policy rate has been on hold at 3.00 percent since January this year. At the moment we view it as supportive of growth amid global risks and consistent with our inflation target. However, I must stress that the interest rate is poised to go either way depending on developments in the advanced economies, in particular the euro area and the impact on the overall Thai economy. We recently saw how the impact of the euro crisis is spreading to Asia in the form of a broad-based slow-down in Thai exports.
In other words, we needed to act and communicate in order to tighten financial conditions further, including by shifting up the interest rate path expected by markets. Thus, we raised our rates by 50 bp and, more importantly, we signalled our intention to continue raising them significantly at a steady pace to reach sufficiently restrictive levels, and to keep them there for some time. 1  Indeed, after our December communication, there was an upward shift in the risk-free (OIS) forward curve. 1 In particular, the day before our February meeting, the 10-year OIS rate was 0.27 basis points (pp) higher than before the December meeting, while the 3-month OIS rate was 0.51 pp higher. Equally important, in real terms the 10-year OIS rate was 0.51 pp higher than in December, once adjusted for market inflation expectations. And the euro had simultaneously appreciated by 2.88% against the dollar in the same period. Our February decision represents a continuation (i.e. “staying the course”) of the policy tightening path that we signalled in December. Continuing this path was based both on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook and on the financial conditions prevailing in capital markets at that time. Let me address each element in turn. As regards the inflation outlook, at our February meeting we did not have the benefit of a new round of staff macroeconomic projections. But as I said before, our assessment of the inflation outlook is based on a wealth of information, which also includes s urvey-based and market-based indicators.

First was the so-called flash rally of October 2014; then, the repo market distress in September 2019; and third, the extraordinary dislocations at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March of 2020. General George Patton once said, “Prepare for the unknown by studying how others in the past have coped with the unforeseeable and unpredictable.” It’s a good piece of advice—and one that 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  should guide our work on Treasury market reform. The IAWG report I mentioned earlier reviews these events, so I won’t repeat them here. However, two lessons are clear. First, the unforeseeable and unpredictable will happen, and can result in significant stresses in the Treasury and related markets that may spread to broader financial conditions. Second, when disruptions have been sufficiently severe and persistent, the market has not been able to quickly self-correct without official-sector intervention. The severe disruptions to the Treasury and funding markets in March of last year illustrate these points. The incipient breakdown in market functioning quickly spread to other segments of the U.S. and global financial markets, risking a broad-based pullback in the availability of credit that is essential for our economy. The speed and extent of the market disruption necessitated immediate and dramatic action, the scale of which was truly unprecedented. At the New York Fed, we are used to talking in very large sums, but even for us, the figures were staggering.
Sterling markets, where my main responsibilities lie, start in a reasonable place:  -  Many sterling swaps – the primary hedging instrument – have referenced SONIA rather than LIBOR for some time. That transition was given a further kick by the adoption of a ‘SONIA first’ trading convention in interdealer markets in October.6  -  In sterling loan markets, all customers discussing new or refinanced lending with their banks should have been offered a non-LIBOR alternative since the end of September. And new loans for anyone still unable to avoid using LIBOR in the near-term should include a clear mechanism to ensure those loans are converted to an alternative ahead of end-2021. But there’s further to go. In sterling swaps, we’ll need to see another jump if the market is to hit its target of ceasing all new LIBOR use7 by the end of March next year. All new lending linked to sterling LIBOR is also due to be phased out on the same timeline, with the exception of very short loans maturing before end-2021.8 Those are challenging goals – particularly for firms that are still not ready to move away from LIBOR, who have some rapid catching up to do. We recognise this comes at a time of difficult operating conditions more generally. But with LIBOR’s retirement now in the diary, sending new business its way isn’t just optimistic – it’s imprudent too. Though the precise timelines differ slightly in other currencies, the bottom line there is also clear.

China, India and other emerging economies will continue to grow strongly and to account for an increasing share of the world economy. The international competition in the product and labour markets and the international financial integration process will thus continue to increase during the foreseeable future. The deregulation of several markets during the 1990s has probably largely already made its impact on productivity. I interpret the SNS report published at the beginning of the year to say that the most likely development is that this factor will contribute less to the rate of increase in productivity during coming years. 7 At the same time, there is still relatively large scope for continued reforms in this field. A survey indicates that around 32 per cent of consumption was exposed to competition at the turn of the millennium. This figure for Sweden can be compared with the figure for the EU of around 45 per cent. 8 A similar picture is shown in a report by the Swedish Competition Authority. 9 This states that around half of the higher prices compared with the OECD arise from a lack of competition in Sweden. IT will probably fuel productivity for a long time. It takes time for companies to adjust to the new circumstances. This can be illustrated by means of a historical comparison. IT is just like electricity a technique for general use. The advent of electricity had no noticeable effect on productivity until companies literally rebuilt their factories.
Simon M Potter: Money markets at a crossroads - policy implementation at a time of structural change Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Anderson School of Management, Los Angeles, California, 5 April 2017. * * * Accompanying slides Thank you very much. I’m very pleased to be back at UCLA, where I enjoyed eight years in the 1990s as an assistant professor of economics. I’d like to thank my hosts for their gracious invitation to have, once again, the experience of speaking to a classroom of future leaders in finance, business, economics, and—just perhaps—central banking as well.1 Due to the large size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, we are employing a new and innovative framework to control money market rates. Since late 2015, we have seen several significant developments in money markets that have tested this new framework. These include a profound reshaping of the money market fund industry as a result of new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules, significant shifts in cash management practices at the Treasury and large foreign reserve managers, and continued pressure on bank balance sheets due to the ongoing implementation of Basel III capital requirements. Also since that time, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has directed three 25 basis point increases in its target range for the federal funds rate.

As a result, they expect that, as the FOMC increases the federal funds rate over time, other interest rates might not rise one-forone with it. As one consequence of this, they express a concern that the Federal Reserve might see greater use of its ON RRP operations over time as monetary policy is tightened, because the rates offered on these operations—presumably rising one-for-one with changes in the target federal funds rate range—will become increasingly attractive relative to other market rates, which they expect to rise more slowly. To date, at least, this does not appear to be happening. I think this paper makes an important point about transmission: monetary control does not stop at the effective federal funds rate, and our framework must ensure that the stance of monetary policy is passed through into other money market rates. However, I am less persuaded that the data supports Darrell and Arvind’s concern about the present efficacy of the framework. First, I think the recent pickup in dispersion we see in money markets might not tell us much about what will happen going forward. A lot of what has happened in money markets in recent years may relate to one-off factors associated with money market fund reform and with liftoff from the zero lower bound.
Mario Draghi: ECB press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 7 March 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council. Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. HICP inflation rates have declined further, as anticipated, and fell below 2% in February. Over the policy-relevant horizon, inflationary pressures should remain contained. The underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be subdued. Inflation expectations for the euro area remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Overall, this will allow our monetary policy stance to remain accommodative. Available data continue to signal that economic weakness in the euro area has extended into the beginning of the year, while broadly confirming signs of stabilisation in a number of indicators, albeit at low levels. At the same time, necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors will continue to weigh on economic activity. Later in 2013 economic activity should gradually recover, supported by a strengthening of global demand and our accommodative monetary policy stance.

In order to support confidence, it is essential for governments to continue implementing structural reforms, to build further on the progress made in fiscal consolidation, and to proceed with financial sector restructuring. With regard to the liquidity situation of banks, counterparties have so far repaid € billion of the € billion obtained in the two three-year longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) settled in December 2011 and March 2012. In net terms, this implies that, of the increase in the outstanding volume of bank refinancing through the ECB’s monetary policy operations of around € billion between mid-December 2011 and early March 2012, about € billion have now been repaid. These repayments reflect improvements in financial market confidence over the last few months and receding financial market fragmentation. We are closely monitoring conditions in the money market and their potential impact on the stance of monetary policy and the functioning of the transmission of our monetary policy to the economy. Our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative with the full allotment mode of liquidity provision. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. The GDP outcome for the fourth quarter of 2012 was weak, with Eurostat’s second estimate indicating a contraction of 0.6% quarter on quarter. The decline was largely due to a fall in domestic demand but also reflected weak exports. As regards 2013, recent data and indicators suggest that economic activity should start stabilising in the first part of the year.
16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  Saunders, M (2017), ‘The labour market’, speech available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2017/the-labour-market Taylor, M (2017), ‘Good work: the Taylor review of modern working practices’, Department of Business, Energy, & Industrial Strategy, 11 July 2017. Tuckett, A (2018), ‘What can regional data tell us about the UK Phillips curve?’, Bank Underground, 13 April 2018. Vlieghe, J (2018), ‘From asymmetry to symmetry: changing risks to the economic outlook’, speech available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/gertjan-vlieghe-speech-at-birmingham-chamber-of-commerce  17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Annex Chart 1: Long-run real pay Index, 1900 = 100  700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0  1700  1750  1800  1850  1900  1950  2000  Real wage  Source: Bank of England “A Millennium of Macroeconomic Data for the UK” Notes: Data shows an estimate for real consumption earnings for Great Britain. Figure 1: Change in real pay by region in the UK since 2008  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. Notes: Nominal regional pay divided by CPI with a four-quarter moving average.

Pay Power Speech given by  Andrew G Haldane Chief Economist Bank of England Acas “Future of Work” Conference Congress Centre, London 10 October 2018  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Will Abel, Shiv Chowla, Tomas Key, Brad Speigner and Ben Stokes for their help in preparing the text. I would like to thank Ben Broadbent, Clare Macallan, Becky Maule, Mette Nielsen, Silvana Tenreyro and Jan Vlieghe for their comments and contributions. This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is great pleasure to be here at the Acas Annual Conference whose theme this year is the “Future of Work”. It is a particular pleasure to have Brendan Barber as Chair. As a member of the Bank of England’s Court between 2003 and 2012, Brendan’s insights on the labour market and wider economy were crucial in helping the Bank steer a policy course through a period of first macroeconomic calm and then extra-ordinary macroeconomic storm following the global financial crisis. It is the labour market that I want to discuss today.