samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the OTC derivatives market, where banks are trying to compress hundreds and thousands of lines (and over USD 700 trillion of notional value 7) of OTC derivative transactions, so as to consolidate liquid collateral for margin efficiency. Second, as jurisdictions roll out clearing and trading mandates for OTC derivatives, more transactions will be traded and cleared on regional and global platforms to reap the benefits of scale and liquidity. This will be instrumental in transforming complex webs of gross exposures into smaller sets of net exposures, reducing systemic risk and strengthening the derivatives  4  “Asset Management 2020: A Brave New World,” PwC, 2014. 5  Market capitalisation as of 31 March 2014, Relbanks. 6  “Myanmar’s Banking Sector Liberalisation: A Win-win for All,” PwC, 2014. http://pwc.blogs.com/growth_markets/2014/10/myanmars-banking-sector-liberalisation-a-win-win-for-all.html  7  BIS derivatives statistics, September 2014. http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  market. These pressures will naturally drive more aggregation across geographies and asset classes, and place the issue of market integration squarely on the agenda. Global reforms, if they are implemented consistently, can also support financial integration by making it less burdensome for financial institutions to comply with regulations in different jurisdictions and for regulators to mutually recognise and defer to each other where appropriate. III. Market integration is happening at two levels: among jurisdictions and among participants  11. Over the last three years, market integration has been taking place in Asian financial markets.

In the long term, however, the current low level of interest rates is not compatible with price stability. If the economy performs as expected, the National Bank will further pursue the gradual adjustment of its monetary policy that has already been initiated. BIS Review 36/2006  1
François Villeroy de Galhau: Challenges and opportunities in Europe and beyond Keynote address by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the 2018 Paris Europlace International Financial Forum, Tokyo, 19 November 2018. * * * It is a pleasure to be with you again in Tokyo, with my colleague and friend Governor Kuroda. This 22nd edition of the annual International Financial Forum is focused on the disruptive world that Europe is facing. But beyond disruption, the world is also increasingly uncertain, with tensions coming from protectionism, rising oil prices, a controversial policy-mix in the United States, and equity market valuations that remain volatile; but also, within Europe itself, the Italian fiscal policy and Brexit. So in my remarks today, allow me to elaborate on these two dimensions: the challenges and opportunities for Europe, but also the global questions that we have to address collectively. **  1. Our European challenges and opportunities Let me first speak about the gradual normalisation of our monetary policy. The broad-based expansion of the euro area economy is continuing, although at a more moderate pace. Despite a slowdown in the first half of the year, GDP growth is still expected above potential in 2018, even if the output gap is closed. 9.2 million jobs have been created since 2013 and the unemployment rate has fallen from 12.1% to 8.1%.

Second, we have seen a steady decrease in dependency ratios, which has stimulated excess savings and therefore lowered the equilibrium rate. This trend, too, will reverse soon, as the increase in the share of the elderly population will outpace all other population groups. Dependency ratios around the world will rise, which will buoy the equilibrium rate. Third, inequality has risen in past decades, again adding to the increase in the mean savings rate. But note that we are now observing a decrease in (at least) wage inequality in many countries, including the Czech Republic. Inequality, broadly defined, has decreased in most countries around the world since the crisis (World Bank, 2016). I believe that the discussion on inequality tends to be overly pessimistic. Fourth, more and more developing countries have been getting fully integrated into the world economy, releasing their supply of savings into global markets and giving rise to the notion of a “savings glut”. I see no reversal here, which means that this factor will continue to depress the equilibrium real rate of interest. Fifth, the relative price of capital goods has been decreasing. In consequence, capital has become cheaper relative to labor. This is reducing the total demand for capital (when counted in nominal terms) and thus lowering the equilibrium rate. Again, this trend is likely to continue. Sixth, we have witnessed a preference shift away from infrastructure projects, which is again reducing the demand for capital. In many countries, environmental regulations have made it difficult to invest in infrastructure.
The return on the two asset classes is repre− sented by the fund’s benchmark indexes, measured in foreign currency, for the period June 2011 to May 2012. Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  Today, the fund is far larger than in 2011. As a result, return variations will have a greater impact. With the current size and composition of the fund, the same return as in 2011 would have resulted in a loss of almost NOK 1 000 billion, or close to 35 percent of mainland GDP. The fund has become important for the Norwegian economy. The fiscal rule links fiscal policy to the value of the fund. This year, 15 percent of general government spending is projected to be financed by transfers from the fund. Looking ahead, movements in global capital markets will be the main source of variation in the value of the fund, and at times in a negative direction. The actual stance of fiscal policy must allow for this uncertainty. The fund had several good years following the euro crisis. Markets turned around, and quickly the loss was more than reversed. We cannot take for granted that this will always be the case. Conclusion Let me conclude. The global economy finally appears to have fully recovered from the prolonged weakness that followed the financial crisis. Growth has also strengthened in Norway after the decline following the oil price collapse. The government’s solid financial position has been of considerable help.

When China, India and Eastern Europe joined the global market economy, the labour force of countries participating in world trade doubled.9  Norges Bank Economic perspectives 15 february 2018  The result is that workers in advanced economies face competition from new groups, which pushes down wage growth and affects the income distribution between labour and capital. Lower unionisation levels have also weakened workers’ bargaining power. Since 1980, unionisation in the OECD area has fallen from around 35 percent to below 20 percent. Low wage growth feeds through to prices for goods and services. Many firms also face competition from firms that have relocated production to lower-cost countries. In addition, online shopping reduces the advantage of physical proximity to customers, narrowing the scope for passing on higher costs to prices. Globalisation thus restrains the general rise in prices. Cheap imports from low-cost countries have long been an important source of low inflation in advanced economies. In Norway, prices for clothing and footwear have fallen by almost half over the past 20 years. The price effects of globalisation have not been exhausted. A rising number of low-cost countries are competing on the global stage. So far, global competition has had less influence on services prices than on goods prices (Chart 8). However, global trade in services has increased recently. This may lead to renewed downward pressure on prices. Chart 8 Goods and services inflation. Average annual change 2000 – 2017.
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: What is the role of central banks for banking supervision? Introductory remarks by Ms Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the panel discussion at the ZEIT Konferenz “Finanzplatz: Menschen und Entscheidungen”, Frankfurt am Main, 8 September 2008. *  *  *  The ECB has already expressed its position on the possible role of central bank in financial supervision in 2001. This was triggered in the context in which some countries were in the process of transferring the supervisory function from the central bank to independent authorities. The main position at that time, which remains valid today, is that there is no optimal arrangement for the organisation of supervision at the national level. All organisational models – sectoral supervision, supervision by objectives, supervision in a single authority – can in principle work well or fail depending on circumstances. However, regardless of the model, it is important that there exists a very close and smooth interplay between the central banking and the supervisory function. Does the experience of the turmoil bring new elements in this domain? This is certainly the case. In general the turmoil has clearly confirmed the importance of a strong interaction between central banks and banking supervisors as also confirmed by the specific recommendation of the Financial Stability Forum in this field. As a new element the turmoil has somewhat contributed to specifying the relevant areas in which this interplay should be reinforced.

So this is also about the HKMA changing as a regulator; modernising the fight against money laundering requires change and regulatory support, a more flexible approach, and we are committed to further developing the approach that has been started through our various initiatives. 17. So my message is simple. The purpose of engaging every one of you in these two days is to enable and encourage banks, whatever stage you are at in your Regtech evolution, to consider, test and responsibly implement technology-enabled innovations in the fight against financial crime, facilitated by, as well as contributing to, an effective AML/CFT regime in Hong Kong. 18. On our part we are going to be using a number of tools, including continued engagement through forums like this, to follow up and see that positive changes are happening in banks and the wider eco-system. The HKMA and the banking sector will continue to contribute to AML/CFT efforts in Hong Kong, and through our supervisory processes, regulations and guidance, we support banks’ efforts to innovate and fully grasp the benefits of RegTech. We welcome your feedback. 19. Please enjoy today, I know the team have put a lot of thought into making it interesting and thought provoking. 20. Let us seize this opportunity to develop a stronger collective vision of what each of us can contribute towards a more effective response to money laundering. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
The scope is relatively moderate, but appears nonetheless to have reduced bottleneck tendencies in some industries where demand has increased sharply. Traditionally, many workers from our neighbouring countries have contributed when the labour market in this country has been tight. In 2001, close to 30 000 persons resident in Sweden were employed in Norway for all or part of the year. Swedes who have registered as residents of Norway come in addition. An increased supply of labour from new EU member states to Norwegian enterprises may lead to a higher-than-normal increase in potential output for a period. Many of the foreign workers work for a shorter period in Norway without being employed in a Norwegian enterprise. Examples include foreign contractors and self-employed in the construction industry who carry out various building projects in Norway, as well as others who carry out other types of projects. Aker Kværner, for example, has contracted 300 consultants based in India to work on the Ormen Lange project in North-West Norway. An increase in the use of these short-term contracts will appear as an increase in Norway’s service imports, and contributes to increasing the supply of goods and services without drawing on domestic resources. Protectionist measures may dampen the impact on the Norwegian economy of an increased supply of labour from the new EU member states. The transitional rules from 1 May last year stipulate that foreign workers shall have Norwegian wages and working conditions.

A number of the measures in the programme are directly relevant to foreign banks and you may therefore be interested to hear about what we have done so far, and what more we have in mind. The current state of the banking sector The Consultancy Study was conceived just before the outbreak of the Asian Crisis and took place during it. The Hong Kong banking sector has now come through the crisis, and can be said to have clearly demonstrated its resilience and underlying strength. It is true that the number of foreign banks in Hong Kong has fallen sharply over the last two years. This reflects the fallout from the crisis that has led to the demise of some banks and has required others to cut back on their overseas operations and return to their home base. Hong Kong has certainly not been the only financial centre to witness this retreat. However, the important point is that the core of the Hong Kong banking system - represented by the local banks and the large foreign players - has remained intact. Although bad debts rose sharply during the crisis and a few banks lost money, the banks generally remained profitable and financially sound. The capital ratios of the local banks actually rose during the crisis period. No banks failed and no depositors lost money. The Government was not called upon to provide financial support. The results of the banks for the first half of this year show that their recovery from the crisis is well underway.
That stance combines an exceptionally low policy interest rate – the federal funds rate in a range of 0 to 25 basis points – with forward guidance indicating that this range would be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6½ percent, inflation is projected to be no more than 2½ percent between one and two years in the future, and inflation expectations remain well anchored. Moreover, to support a stronger economic recovery, the FOMC is purchasing Treasury securities at a rate of $ billion per month and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) at a rate of $ billion per month, and has stated its intention to continue purchasing assets until it sees substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market, conditional on ongoing assessment of benefits and costs. Combined, these actions are intended to ease financial conditions and thereby help to establish a selfsustaining economic expansion. Turning to recent developments, incoming data on the U.S. economy have been mixed of late. Based on the advance estimate, real GDP declined slightly in the final quarter of 2012, which was below the consensus expectations of an increase of around one percent. In addition, in January payroll employment rose by just 157,000, below the 200,000 average monthly gain in the fourth quarter, and the unemployment rate edged up to 7.9 percent. Offsetting these soft indicators, we see evidence beneath the surface that private demand firmed in the final months of 2012 and has been reasonably well maintained thus far this year.

During this long period of consumer retrenchment, only one form of consumer borrowing – student loans – consistently grew, and educational debt has now become the largest form of consumer debt, after mortgages. Student loans are widely held – roughly 39 million people have student loans, including a third of people in their 20s and 30s. For many of these families, educational debt is the tool that allows them to obtain higher education in spite of its large up-front cost. And higher education is, of course, the key to higher wages and a better standard of living. Nonetheless, student loans are not well measured or widely understood. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In the second presentation Donghoon Lee will describe the latest trends in the continuing growth in student loan debt and delinquencies, and their implications. Thank you. I will now ask Wilbert to give an overview of developments in household debt and credit conditions. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
2 As for the household sector, even though the level of debt had risen somewhat in the recent years, approximately 85% of GDP last year, the decelerating growth provides us a relief. The transparent and prudent macroeconomic policy frameworks, used for both fiscal and monetary policy, also command trust from investors and the public. For these reasons, the reputable credit agencies have still reaffirmed their positive assessment of the Thai economy. Indeed, the recent economic conditions have underscored the importance of preserving sound macroeconomic fundamentals in order to create resilience in the face of unexpected shocks. Domestically, the recent economic slowdown has put some small businesses and indebted households under financial strains. Loan quality has deteriorated somewhat, with NPL increasing slightly as a result, but these risks have been contained to specific sectors. The banking system and corporate sector remain strong and have coped with the slowdown well, owing to their improved risk management policies. Externally, like many emerging markets, Thailand faced a couple episodes of capital flow volatility in recent years. The economy, however, has withstood these challenges reasonably well. For instance, during the “Taper Tantrum” in May 2013 and our own political unrest towards the end of 2013, Thai baht had swung by more than 10 percent in a year, fluctuating from 30 baht per US dollar to 28 and back to close to 33 baht. Despite this volatility, market reactions (in terms of outflows) have been relatively dampened.

Slide 1  1  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Slide 2  Dynamism During the Reform Process Dovernment pushing infrastructure and investment projects  Anti-corruption measures delaying government spending and investment  3  Slide 3  Thailand Profile 1997  2005 2014E  Inflation  5.6%  4.5%  1.9%  Current Account  9.3  -7.6  8.6  NPL  42.9%  10%  2.3%  D/E Ratio of corporate sector  5.1  1.3  1.3  Household Debt  n/a  54%  85%  Public Debt  42%  51%  46%  (Billion USD)  (% of total loan)  (% of GDP) (% of GDP)  Note: 2014 numbers as estimated; NPL as of Q2, 1998  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Slide 4  Reform Efforts: National Reform Council  DECENTRALIZATION  EQUALITY  ANTI-CORRUtTION  INTRA-REGIONAL COatLEaENTARITY  Slide 5  State-owned Financial Institutions (SFIs) in Thailand Ministry of Finance tolicy-maker  hwner  Bank of Thailand wegulator  SFIs  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Slide 7  15 YeMrs of HnflMtion TMrgeting (HT) % 10 8 6  Headline Inflation 4.4% Pre-HT  2.6% Post-HT  Transparent  Clear target  deliberation  Independence  process  4 2  tolicy  0  Credibility  -2  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010  Monetary policy target for 2015 : Headline inflation 2.5 ± 1.5% (annual average)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
The resolution of such a bank would involve ten national authorities, ten resolution funds and ten deposit guarantee schemes; needless to say, there would be many challenges involved in ensuring efficient coordination. The envisaged EU authority would spare us a great deal of these efforts. And I see no reason why such a vision should be considered unrealistic. Events are moving faster now than before. Crises make us reconsider things that we would have seen as beyond the feasibility horizon. For example, of the challenges that I have mentioned here today, the financing part is probably the biggest obstacle for such a quantum leap. However, in another dimension and for the euro area we already have the EFSF in place. Such a facility would have been simply unthinkable a couple of years ago. Similarly, I consider the setting-up of a permanent EU or euro area resolution fund to be one imaginable way to proceed. Of course, I am fully aware of the technical, legal and, most importantly, political complexities of such a move. Nonetheless, Europe could advance step by step. The euro area may be the most realistic starting point, since a stronger concept of the euro area as a legitimate entity has already been emerging. Likewise, fiscal coordination has been fundamentally strengthened during the crisis, paving the way for a specific economic governance concept for the euro area.

The establishment of temporary credit institutions or bridge banks is emerging as a key resolution tool, but the new resolution frameworks need to address a number of related technical issues, such as the question of who provides the necessary capital and liquidity to the bridge institution, how the bridge bank can use the infrastructure of the failed bank, and how and when it is ultimately dissolved, since bridge banks are temporary entities needing a good exit strategy. Finally, the design of bank levies, which could usefully be collected into resolution funds, is also a delicate area. Mechanisms are under examination both to recoup the losses of the crisis and to create provisions against future events. I believe that ex ante funding is a crucial element, since it may reduce moral hazard and improves the authorities’ ability to react to crises earlier, thus strengthening the credibility of such actions. Levies are valuable revenueraising mechanisms with which to finance crisis measures. Uncertainty remains as to how they would affect the particular problem of moral hazard in the financial sector, and both the rate and the base of levies need to be determined with care, especially if we want to include the aspect of systemic risk as well. However, maintaining a level playing field and coordination between Member States remains in my view paramount in order to avoid a distortion of fund contributions and resolution tools. Challenges ahead – more integration I am confident that the emerging EU regime will appropriately address all these challenges.
In the data, there does appear to be a degree of “smoothness” in the way official interest rates behave. Rather than jumping from one level to another, factoring in all the news at once, the policy rate usually seems to respond to it over time. Two explanations have often been suggested. One is uncertainty about the impact of changes in official interest rates. If there’s a degree of imprecision in estimates of policy multipliers there’s a case for moving a little more gingerly than otherwise. Another, offered by the economist Michael Woodford, is that smoothing the spot interest rate gives the central bank better control of medium-term interest rates, which may matter more in the transmission of policy. In this case I think a third factor may be at play, namely the need to learn about the extent of these “second-round effects”. We have inevitably had to learn about them and, therefore, to respond to signs of more persistent domestic inflation as and when they emerge. Bank of England  Page 15  The response to demand shocks This is less the case when it comes to plain-vanilla shifts in aggregate demand. These are more common and the appropriate response is well understood: an inflation-targeting monetary authority has to lean against them. Indeed, one additional reason for caution, in the face of these big rises in import prices and their impact on domestic inflation, has been the likelihood that they will also weigh significantly on domestic demand.

The greater price transparency in the European market brought about by the euro’s launch also has an influence on Switzerland’s domestic economy, heightening awareness of the need for structural changes. Finally, initial fears that the exchange rate relation between the Swiss franc and the euro might be destabilised by the introduction of the euro have not come true. Notwithstanding a few fluctuations, the relation between the two currencies has remained remarkably stable. Overall, therefore, the cohabitation between the Swiss franc and the euro is definitely a “success story”. BIS Review 49/2003  1