samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The clearest example was the constitution of institutional protection schemes initially, without which it would have been extremely difficult to finally bring about inter-regional mergers. Today some of these problems have already been resolved thanks to these seven laws that have gradually improved the resolution instruments available at the start of the crisis. For instance, with all savings banks having converted de facto into banks, the current situation differs greatly from that at the start of the process, when the regional governments had the  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  power to veto mergers. And although the perseverance and skill of the Bank’s supervisory arm managed to convince most regional governments of the inevitability of merging with savings banks from other territories, there have been cases in which sounder inter-regional alternatives were turned down for the sake of mergers which, though they were viable in the scenario then foreseen for the Spanish economy and avoided, moreover, more costly interventions for taxpayers, were clearly worse than the mergers suggested by the supervisor. As encouraging examples of Spain’s achievements during these years, I have chosen the progress made in correcting the current-account deficit and in financial restructuring. However, I could have chosen other actions. For instance, the Pension Reform Law has made historically significant changes and, if its sustainability provisions are properly implemented, will enable not only the pensions of our generation, but also of our children’s, to be paid without problem.

More encouraging is the principle of better late than never, and the important thing is that Spain initiated the process of bank restructuring, now nearing completion, in 2009, that significant measures to reduce the budget deficit began to be adopted in May 2010 and that an ambitious labour-market reform was introduced in February this year. Spain has proven itself capable of making adjustments and reforms and this is essential to restore long-lasting upswings and sustainable growth. But this reassurance must not lead to complacency. What we have done so far, despite its huge importance, is not sufficient. And some of us have the thankless task of pointing this out. For example, when each financial reform has been approved it has always been argued that the result will be more credit, but although bank restructuring is certainly an absolutely necessary condition, we have always seen that it is not sufficient by itself to make credit flow again. We have to restructure the financial system so that, as in any process of industrial adjustment, the resulting banks can generate a healthy profit and be sufficiently solid to meet demand when the adjustment process is complete. However, credit will not improve until solvent demand increases. Hence the importance of other economic reforms to boost consumer and investor confidence, such as reducing the budget deficit and reforms, such as the labour-market one, to increase the economy’s growth potential.
Caleb M Fundanga: Improved financial services in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of The Barclays Bank Zambia Plc, Chilenje Branch, Chilenje, 9 January 2008. *  *  *  • Mr Fritz Seegers – Barclays Global Retail and Commercial Banking ChiefExecutive • Mr J J Sikazwe – Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chairman • Mr Ahmed Khan – Barclays GRCB Emerging Markets Chief Executive Officer • Mr Michael Miebach – Barclays Sub-Sahara Africa Managing Director • Mr Zafar Masud – incoming Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director • Mr Danie Nel – outgoing Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director • Invited Guests • Ladies and Gentlemen I am delighted to be the Guest of Honour at the official opening of the Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chilenje branch. My appreciation of this opening is because it reflects a fundamental change in strategy by Barclays Bank Zambia over the last few years. I recall that only a few years ago, Barclays Bank Zambia closed a number of its branches in several towns and locations. We were greatly concerned because it meant that even the few that were serviced by commercial banks would have greater problems in accessing financial services. Barclays Bank Zambia obviously had its reasons for taking such an action and we cannot fault them for attempting to curb their costs. However, it is now evident that there is a turnaround in the situation.

Similarly, the forecasting system will have to be adjusted once the Czech Republic enters the euro area and policy is set by the ECB Governing Council. It is worth mentioning that the development of our forecasting system has been part of the wider evolutionary process that the Czech inflation targeting regime has gone through. The first years of the new regime were not easy, and included frequent numerical target misses. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic enjoys low inflation, and inflation expectations seem to be firmly anchored at low levels at present. Monetary policy decision-making is rule-based and transparent, thereby enhancing the credibility of the CNB. Let me conclude with the statement that a “forecast based” monetary policy framework seems to fully allow an independent central bank to commit credibly to its long-term goal of price stability. Therefore, any new developments in economic forecasting are highly appreciated and welcomed by monetary policy practitioners. BIS Review 40/2006  3
At the same time, increasing interest from international investors to diversify a greater proportion of their portfolios to Asian assets has created business opportunities for fund managers based in Asia, including Singapore. The local banks too registered good financial performance last year. Altogether, their profit grew by over 40%. Their return on equity also improved by 2-3% points compared to the year before. At the same time, the local banks have also shown improved financial health. Asset quality has improved further. Classified loans represented 1.6% of total loans in 2006 compared to 2.2% in 2005. The local  BIS Review 74/2007  1  banks remain well capitalized, meeting MAS’ regulatory requirements and in comparison with peer banks internationally. Taken together, these developments bode well for Singapore’s efforts to develop itself as an international financial center. Barring any unforeseen shocks, 2007 looks to be another good year for the financial services sector. Navigating the risks ahead That said I would be remiss if I did not point out some of the risks on the horizon. For now, the global environment appears benign with rosy prospects for growth worldwide. Nevertheless, various uncertainties could quickly unsettle this. For one, it is unclear how the mounting global imbalances between the East Asian countries and the developed countries will resolve. A sharp and abrupt adjustment would affect the global economy. It also remains unclear how long the golden era of good growth coupled with low inflation will continue. Already, fears of inflation have resurfaced.

However, as we look forward to the opportunities before us, we must be aware of the risks that lie ahead. As benign as the environment may seem, banks must not become complacent. Banks should be prepared for whatever surprises lie ahead. At the same time, banks must also safeguard their reputations. More can be done and we look forward to seeing ABS working with industry in bringing about good and fair consumer outcomes. On this note, let me wish everyone a good year ahead and a pleasant evening. Thank you. BIS Review 74/2007  3
Thus far, foreign branches in Norway have primarily focused on the largest enterprises and financial market segments that demand more advanced services. As the euro gradually gains a foothold in the Norwegian business sector, the Norwegian market may prove to be of greater interest to foreign banks. Nor can we disregard the possibility that mergers and acquisitions in the Norwegian business sector – which may partly be perceived as a response to consolidation in the business sector in the euro area – will lead to a situation whereby a larger number of Norwegian enterprises move into the “division” where foreign competition is strongest. Norwegian enterprises with close ties to the euro area will also demand a wide range of euro services from their banks. For this reason, foreign banks will probably compete more intensely with Norwegian banks in the future. Technological advances, including the development of new channels of distribution, will reinforce this tendency. Substantial overcapacity in the financial sector in European countries, particularly in traditional banking, has spurred the need for enhancing efficiency and consolidation. Over the last couple of years we have seen a considerable increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions in Europe, with mergers taking place both within and across national borders. The introduction of a single European currency has probably been an important catalyst in this process. Mergers and acquisitions create entities with ambitions, financial strength and, not least, a range of services well designed to compete on international markets. This points to increasing competition across national borders.

Increased mobility of capital, both in and out of countries, including Norway, could follow. As I indicated earlier, we, like others, have experienced increasing difficulty in maintaining a stable exchange rate in a world of large, unrestricted capital flows. The relative calm within the euro area during the recent turmoil linked to the financial crises in Asia and Russia and later Brazil could be indicative of future differences between Europe’s “ins” and “outs”. Finland, despite its dependence on raw materials and relatively large exports to Russia, was less adversely affected than the other Nordic countries. For Norway, success in maintaining a stable exchange rate could become more challenging in the new environment. BIS Review 16/1999  –3–  Use of the euro in Norway. Euro and the Norwegian banking industry Use of the euro in Norway I would now like to comment on how, and to what extent, Norwegian economic agents might be expected to use the euro in the future. There are many indications that the euro will be used more extensively in trade between Norway and euro countries than the currencies of the 11 member states combined today. Over time the euro will most likely be used on an even wider scale. Obviously, the euro would increase in importance in the Norwegian market should Sweden, Denmark and the UK join EMU. The euro may also play a role – though probably limited – as a settlement currency between residents.
Otmar Issing: Should we have faith in central banks? Speech by Professor Otmar Issing, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, held at St Edmund’s College Millennium Year Lecture, Cambridge, on 26 October 2000. *  *  *  Ultimately, trust must be earned, it is granted temporarily, it must be checked, and it must be backed up by hard evidence, not be based purely on faith or belief. It is a great honour and a great pleasure for me to deliver the St. Edmund’s College Millennium Lecture on the topic of faith in central banking. I must confess that when Professor Heap first invited me to give a talk on “Faith and Finance in the New Millennium” as part of a series of lectures on the general theme “Faith in the Future” I suffered an initial instant of hesitation or lack of faith, if you will. As you can imagine “faith” is not a natural subject to discuss for a central banker and economist, who is trained to look at facts and hard evidence. To address such a difficult issue in such a distinguished seat of learning as Cambridge University would seem to require a good measure of courage. But then, of course, courage - if not faith - is an attribute that central bankers should undoubtedly possess. I am also much reassured and grateful for the faith, if I may say so, that you put in me by inviting me to talk about this subject.

To what extent does this sketch resemble the current situation in the UK? As its policy stance reflects, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) judges that the equilibrium real interest rate has been, and continues to be, negative. Despite very low interest rates, resources are not fully employed. 850,000 more people are out of work than in the years before the crisis and GDP is around 20% below an extrapolation of its pre-crisis trend. As bad as these figures are, the scale of the mismatch between aggregate supply and demand has not been large enough to generate a deflationary spiral. Despite persistently weak nominal wage growth, rising import prices and weak productivity growth have meant that the UK’s problem has been the need to bring inflation back to the target from above. In this regard, there has been welcome progress. Headline inflation has fallen back much sooner than we expected at the start of the year, and core inflation measures are running close to but slightly below the 2% target. What then of the risks of unbalanced growth? This is more delicate. Despite admirable progress by British households in recent years, aggregate debt levels remain high at 140% of incomes. In addition, housing activity is picking up and price growth appears to be gaining momentum. Moreover, the UK current account deficit is near record levels. These developments merit vigilance but not panic. The housing recovery could reflect higher future income expectations, prompted by the nascent recovery, and better credit conditions.
8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 2  CPI inflation (*)  CPIEFE inflation (*)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 March'16 Report  June'16 Report (*) Gray area, as from second quarter of 2016, shows forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). Figure 3 Real exchange rate (index, 1986=100)  120  120  110  RER  110  2001-2015 avg 1996-2015 avg  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70 89  92  95  98  01  04  07  10  13  16  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 8 MPR and expectations (percent)  6  6  5  5 MPR  EES  Financial asset prices in March 2016 Report (*)  4  FBS  4  3  Financial asset prices in June 2016 3 Report (*)  2  2 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  (*) Built using interest rates on swap contracts up to 10 years. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 9 Two-year-ahead inflation's deviation from target (*)  Nominal MPR (percent)  (percentage points)  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2 13  14 Peru  15  16 Colombia  1,2  1,2  1,0  1,0  0,8  0,8  0,6  0,6  0,4  0,4  0,2  0,2  0,0  0,0  -0,2  -0,2 15  Apr. Mexico  Jul. Oct.  16  Apr. Chile  (*) Difference between target inflation and inflation expected for 2017 (Peru), December 2017 (Mexico) and two years out (Chile and Colombia). Sources: Central banks of Chile and respective countries.
In our case, the surge in speculative capital inflows at the end of last year caused a rapid appreciation of the baht relative to regional currencies. I must stress that the recent capital surge heralds the onset, and not the end, of the unwinding of global financial imbalances. There remains considerable room for US dollar correction. As such, the threat of global imbalances to the economic and financial stability of Thailand is still very much present. You may recall that we have experienced sizeable capital inflows, and accompanied with that, a rapid appreciation of the baht effective exchange rate toward the end of last year. In dealing with the rapid appreciation, conventional wisdom suggests an adherence to market mechanisms. This proved to be inadequate. The baht continued to appreciate with the likelihood of it becoming more and more out of line with its fundamentals. After a number of unsuccessful conventional measures, we resorted to the measure of imposing a reserve requirement on capital inflows in December 2006. The measure was designed to break the one-way currency momentum, to preserve our overall economic stability, and to buy some time to allow a smooth transition. Let me be clear that we intended for the reserve requirement to be a temporary measure, designed to preserve financial stability and to afford the real sector time to adjust to a more volatile market condition. To this end, I believe that it has succeeded. To be sure, no measure is without its costs.

Let us not stop now. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 64/2007  5
This is important because residential mortgage lending terms tightened significantly during the crisis, and have not eased subsequently.12 Indeed, over 50 percent of all new loans – and 70 percent of new prime conforming loans – go to borrowers with FICO scores of 760 or above, compared with about 30 percent before the crisis. Borrowers with credit scores of 720 or less now make up less than 30 percent of new originations, although they represent 52 percent of the population with credit scores. Steps should be taken to improve households’ access to credit. Currently, lenders are discouraged from making new prime conforming loans due to excessively stringent put-back rules on these mortgages. Such rules give Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac broad scope to force the originator to repurchase at par loans that go delinquent if there are any errors in the mortgage loan paperwork – even if the error has no direct link to the delinquency. It is essential that lenders are accountable for the representations they make and are appropriately penalized for any misrepresentations. However, doing this via a blanket  10  “The National and Regional Economic Outlook,” October 24, 2011, and “Securing the Recovery” November 17, 2011. 11  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2012. White Paper, “The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Considerations,” January 4. 12  According to the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey.

However, if households believe that house prices could decline further, the expected capital loss adds to the financing cost of owning a home and prospective buyers will be reluctant to buy even if mortgage rates are low. That said, it should also be recognized that the factors that affect demand and home prices are not immutable. They depend, in part, on policy choices. Consider, for example, the fact that most home purchases are financed with long-term mortgage credit. This means that the demand for housing is highly sensitive to the availability and cost of that credit. Outcomes in housing are also affected by the legal and operational infrastructure of the mortgage market. This apparatus has been wholly inadequate for dealing with a systemic shock to housing and employment, and is amplifying bad outcomes. A flawed resolution regime – very different from the more efficient regime for resolving excess debt in private commercial property – exacerbates the risks of under-shooting. 6  In Las Vegas, for instance, the ratio of house prices to replacement costs is now 0.7, having peaked at about 2.0 during the boom. 7  The supply curve is fixed and vertical at the post-bubble stock of housing so the entire adjustment to changes in demand takes place via prices rather than quantities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Conflicts of interest are embedded in mortgage securitization structures and between first and second lien-holders. There are challenges to how the industry records and transfers interests in these mortgages.
Going forward, it is assumed that fiscal spending will follow a path of consolidation. On the expenditure side, as I just said, some salient characteristics of recent quarters have been improved consumption and weaker investment, which have led to revisions to our baseline forecasts. In private consumption, the better numbers so far, especially the dynamism of durable consumption, translate into higher figures for this year and next. On the investment side, there is a clear difference between the behavior of the machinery and equipment and the construction and works components. The former, with a more favorable evolution, has responded to the necessary inventory replenishment after several years stagnant, and has benefited from the exchange rate appreciation and low credit costs. The latter has continued to contract beyond expectations, primarily because of reduced spending on building and engineering works, amplifying the drop in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) estimated in September for this year. In addition, we estimate that this expenditure component will take somewhat longer to recover. Towards 2018, it is still assumed that the adjustment cycle of mining investment will come to an end and that it will very gradually begin to reflect the effects of the copper price rise. Meanwhile, non-mining investment is slightly revised down, mainly reflecting that the downsloping trend of housing investment has been longer than we thought before. With this, as a percentage of GDP, in 2018 the GFCF will reach 21.1% and 21.4% in real and nominal terms, respectively, compared with averages of 23% to 24% in 2013-2017.

In fact findings show that the implications of this in the long term for the ability of households and businesses to get a loan are relatively modest – although there is considerable uncertainty around this result. As such, while other risks may arise during a transitionary phase, the most significant risk arises from the potential for stablecoins in particular to undermine confidence in money and payments, and hence in the wider financial system. As we discussed a few minutes ago, the risk of a loss of confidence in the credibility and stability of private money is not theoretical. Loss of confidence in private money can be a major threat to financial stability. But it is equally true that private money can be made acceptable as a widespread means of payment – indeed, as I covered earlier, the vast majority of money held for transactions in the United Kingdom is already private. So, with the right regulation, a stablecoin could potentially be made safe for wide-scale use. Our existing regulatory framework seeks to ensure that the public is able to trust the reliability and stability of the money it uses every day. Banks are subject to extensive rules and requirements to ensure that consumers can use privately-issued money with confidence and interchangeably with cash. These core rules and requirements were developed over time – in many cases via trial and error, with new rules introduced following financial crises.