samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Europe is clearly losing momentum and competitiveness here: the market share of the six major US investment banks in Europe towards their six major European competitors has increased from 44% to 58% in the last seven years. Moreover, larger groups could invest more in the key challenge of digital transformation: as most of the investment costs are fixed, size is a decisive advantage. But not only the largest, all other institutions will benefit from the increased depth of the market, allowing to reap the fruits of their competitive advantages in a larger market. At the macro level – and I say this as a central banker –, Banking Union would decisively enhance private risk sharing within Europe. The political discussion and energy remain primarily focused on public stabilisation mechanisms, such as a possible common fiscal capacity. Let me stress that private stabilisers are just as important and efficient, and less divisive. Banking Union would enable, in conjunction with progress towards a Capital Market Union, a better 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  channelling of our abundant savings through a genuine “Financing Union for Investment and Innovation“. How to move forward again. The first obvious fact is that we should neither relax now that the banking crisis is mostly over, nor wait for the next crisis to act. It is precisely because we are not in a crisis situation that we should move forward now.

I am conscious that bankruptcy regimes, often mentioned in the framework of the CMU, represent a legal challenge. Let us see how we could at least progress on this issue for bank bankruptcies. This work may be focused on the more essential points to facilitate consistency with the resolution tools, like treatment of depositors/creditors hierarchy. 4. The need for an integrated approach to new players. Finally, looking forward now, let me consider broader developments in the financial sphere. Recent trends in financial innovation have fuelled the emergence of a renewed financial intermediation ecosystem, involving new players – including tech companies, be they FinTechs or BigTechs. The associated technological disruptions have resulted in regulatory arbitrage practices, especially on the banking market. Lending activities by non-bank financial intermediaries also circumvent prudential regulation. I wish to stress a major point here: we must avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. Innovation must not translate into further fragmentation. Right from the start we should try to have an integrated supervision at the European level for new players and new technologies. Regarding innovation, private initiatives do have their role to play in fostering a European integration. Here, let me commend the European Payments Initiative (EPI) project. The EPI will provide citizens with a unified, innovative and autonomous European payment solution, as an alternative to the dominant and extra-European players already established in Europe or the BigTechs in the future. We must support the emergence of such Pan-European projects, in order to preserve and reinforce our financial sovereignty.
On a number of occasions in recent years I have expressed the view that although there were many factors leading to the Global Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis, the root cause of our present predicament is the excessive leverage and indebtedness built up over the past two to three decades in the household, corporate and government sectors in the advanced economies. During this period, the indebtedness of many industrial economies, such as the US, the UK, France and Germany increased steadily from 160% or 1.6 times of GDP to over 320% of GDP. Japan, of course, ranked the highest in this “league table” with over 450% of GDP. This is alarming not just because the stock of debt was rising, but the speed of the increase outpaced the economic or income growth of these economies by 100% over this period. What is even more depressing is that the aggregate public and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  private sector indebtedness ratios actually increased even further after the financial crisis in most advanced economies except for Germany. 6. The increases were mostly due to a sharp pick up in public debt in most advanced economies after the Global Financial Crisis, as substantial amounts of public funds were deployed by the crisis-hit countries to salvage their financial systems, while the real economies were suffering from falling fiscal revenues with slow growth and rising public spending.

This divergence in the regional focus becomes even more apparent when Asia is viewed as a whole. This is because Switzerland maintains far closer trade ties with Asia’s industrialised countries than the EU does, particularly with the four Asian tiger economies of Hong Kong,  6  The USD value of goods exports to developing and emerging economies (excluding the tiger economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) has grown by an average of 7.5% since 1990, i.e. it has quadrupled. Goods exports to industrialised counties increased by 4.7% annually during the same period, representing an increase by a factor of only 2.5. 7  From 1990 to 2008, the GDP of developing and emerging economies rose by an average of almost 8% (China alone grew by more than 10%). The GDP of the EU15, by contrast, rose by just 1.9% on average (US: 2.7%). 8  The USD value of Swiss goods exports to emerging Asia (excluding the tiger economies) has grown by an average of 9.1% since 1990 (since 2000: 18%). The corresponding growth rates for Germany amounted to 11.4% (since 2000: 17.8%), and for the EU, 9.6% (since 2000: 13.6%). 9  Including intra-EU trade. BIS Review 157/2010  3  Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Overall, Switzerland’s share of exports to Asia, including Japan, came to 15% last year – more than twice the EU average. 10 Furthermore, Switzerland is one of the few European countries – alongside Ireland, Sweden and Finland – to run a trade surplus with Asia.
On the crisis prevention side, it has now been agreed that there is a need to reinforce multilateral surveillance at the global level. To this end, the FSF and the IMF will intensify their cooperation with a view to enhancing the assessment of financial stability risks on a global scale as well as to coordinating possible policy responses. This endeavour should be mirrored at the national and the regional level by heightening the level of cooperation and exchange of information between central banks and supervisory authorities to establish an overall better monitoring and assessment of the risks to the financial system. On the crisis management side, the ECB focuses on central bank operations and on crossborder arrangements between financial authorities. With regard to central bank operations, I would underline that we need to ensure that central banks’ operational frameworks are flexible enough to deal with extraordinary situations. In this respect, the Eurosystem’s framework is very flexible. In terms of cross-border arrangements between financial authorities, I would stress the urgent need for enhancing cross-border arrangements between banking supervisors for dealing with weak banks. In fact, the global nature of financial markets and the increasing interlinkages between markets and institutions mean that the systemic impact of a financial crisis can only be properly assessed if supervisory authorities share information on the risk exposures of large institutions and on the impact of shocks in their jurisdiction. In addition, supervisory cooperation should be intensified on a cross-sector basis.

It is such action, called for at the level of the international community three days ago in Washington by the G7, the IMFC and the G20, that the Europeans considered indispensable, particularly in the euro area last Sunday, with the adoption of a concerted European action plan. This plan has six dimensions: ensuring appropriate liquidity; facilitating the funding of banks through various means (guarantee, insurance or similar arrangements for new medium-term – up to five years – bank senior debt issuance); providing additional capital resources to financial institutions; recapitalisation of distressed banks; ensuring appropriate implementation of accounting rules; and enhancing cooperation among European countries. The very day after the meeting, namely yesterday, a large number of euro area countries displayed their implementation of the Eurogroup commitments at the level of the Heads of State and Government. I will not hide the fact that I am impressed by the degree of responsibility and decisiveness that was demonstrated last Sunday and this week in the euro area. I am impressed by the will of the countries that share the single currency not only to work together, but also very closely with the United Kingdom and all EU Member States. And I see that the new decisions taken in the United States are further reinforcing this very impressive implementation of the plan that has been approved by the international community. This is no time for complacency. Central banks will remain solid anchors of stability and confidence.
I also emphasize that SAMA will follow up this matter and take legal actions against insurers that are proven to be negligent. I am sure that you all are aware of the significance of handling such claims promptly and efficiently since this will enhance insurance companies’ reputation and attractiveness to those averse to taking risks. Dear Audience, During the past few years, the insurance sector has not only achieved good results in terms of services provided, diversity of products, and establishing trust with beneficiaries, but also in terms of compliance with laws, regulations, and instructions issued. However, there is a lot more that remains to be done to modernize the insurance industry to enhance its soundness, capabilities and performance to make it comparable to regional and global insurance industries. Such a situation calls for considerable attention to professionalism in application of technical aspects of pricing policies, management of claims, provision of technological infrastructure consistent with the size and nature of the work, investment policy, compliance with the financial solvency standards, and allocations of necessary technical provisions to ensure health and soundness of the companies’ financial positions. It is imperative that the insurance industry remains competitive by developing and providing insurance products and services to the satisfaction of customers at all times. Dear Audience, We expect the insurance industry to continue to improve its performance and achieve balanced growth in accordance with corporate objectives and available resources.

Other key developments that took place during the last five years included: yearly state expenditure rising up to Rls 2.6 trillion; decline in public debt to Rls 167 billion (10.2 percent of GDP); annual current account surplus averaging $ billion and increase of more than Rls 550 billion in bank assets. According to the World Bank Group report, the Kingdom has been ranked eleventh in the world and first in the East region in terms of doing business and provision of competitive environment in 2010. The development witnessed by the Kingdom during previous years has been comprehensive and broad-based. Vast number of development projects to modernize infrastructure, and improve facilities to provide water, electricity, health and educational services have been approved. Therefore, it is expected that strong growth of the Saudi economy will continue unabated and this will expand the financial sector in general and the insurance sector in particular. Dear Audience, Insurance companies play a key role for the development and stability of public and private sectors by providing opportunities to individuals and firms to improve their risk profiles and obtain compensation for losses incurred. It is for this reason that SAMA has been keen in regulating the insurance sector in accordance with the national and international standards and practices. SAMA ensures that all companies operating in the insurance industry comply with such standards and practices and work according to prescribed rules and regulations.
This brings me to the third feature of a trusted financial adviser – the adaptability to change. Traditionally, financial advisers have been a staple for high net-worth individuals. Gen Ys have rarely been reached, reinforcing the unfortunate perception that financial advisory services are an “outdated” concept, or simply not for younger generation. This must change going forward, as this generation represents a large untapped market for financial advisers, and will continue to grow in importance as their wealth increases over time. Whether financial advisers adapt successfully in reaching out to Gen Ys depends on their ability to understand the unique characteristics of this demographic. Gen Ys actively compare products using a wide range of information, such as online research, social media and peer reviews. They are also accustomed to services being convenient, real-time and on-demand. Within the context of financial advisory, engaging Gen Ys may also have a specific challenge – that is, planning for long-term goals such as retirement or wealth accumulation may take a back seat to more immediate needs. To meet these demands, financial advisers must be flexible enough to employ a range of engagement methods. For example, financial advisers should take advantage of social media platforms as part of their marketing strategies. Financial advisers could also leverage on interactive online platforms to better engage with Gen Ys. Recently, tech start-ups are launching applications to match consumers seeking financial advice to financial advisers seeking customers.

This deprived the inexperienced investors of the necessary help and support. A look at, for example, the advice that was provided before stock markets began to fall tells the same tale: recommendations to sell made up less than one per cent of all advice. The media latched onto the stock market boom with reports of rapidly rising share prices. Instead of taking a critical look at what was happening, the notion that the new economy offered chances of earning a quick profit became the conventional wisdom. The part played by human psychology for herd behaviour in financial markets has in fact given rise to a new school of financial knowledge, known as Behavioural Finance. Two key concepts in this analysis are just conventional wisdom and wishful thinking. There’s nothing odd about that. When people make investment decisions they function in much as the way as in other contexts. A familiar example is our reluctance to enter a restaurant that is empty - we generally prefer one that already has many guests, particularly if there is a long queue outside. We simply rely on the good judgement of others and assume that all those inside have made the right choice. By arriving at a better understanding of how people behave, we can certainly do a good deal to prevent unduly large mistakes in market pricing and perhaps ultimately reduce the occurrence of financial bubbles.
As the European Fiscal Board has highlighted, for the next few years, countries should maintain a neutral or even slightly restrictive aggregate stance. This is particularly important for highdebt countries, as they can combine a restrictive tone in the nationally -funded part of the budget with an expansionary tone in the expenditure financed with European funds, for instance under the NGEU programme. This would be in line with the current fiscal orientation of the European Commission for 2023. Second, fiscal policy should stand ready to react flexibly to the materialisation of adverse scenarios. In the case of a downturn in activity, the best way to achieve a targeted and timely response is by letting automatic stabilisers operate freely. If more intense inflationary pressures materialise, a more contractionary budgetary policy stance might be required. Third, fiscal policy measures should be targeted, focused on the households and firms that are most vulnerable to rising energy prices. According to OECD estimates, so far most of the measures adopted in advanced economies to limit the impact of high energy prices have been non-targeted. Moreover, the best fiscal policy response would be to help adjust the supply side of the economy, by supporting investment projects that will increase potential growth and the resilience of the European economy to shocks, including higher integration and interconnection of energy markets. Lastly, the measures adopted should be temporary. This would help ensure that the fiscal cost is manageable and that it does not increase additionally structural public deficits. Conclusions Let me now conclude.

Second, it seems reasonable to wait and observe potential ripple effects of TLTRO III repayments in bond markets before starting the bond portfolio run-off, as it will allow us to assess the effective impact of balance sheet reduction on financial conditions. After first allowing markets to absorb significant TLTRO III repayments, the normalisation of the ECB’s balance sheet could be followed by ending full reinvestment of the APP portfolio. As announced by President Lagarde last month, we will decide on the key principles of the reduction of our APP portfolio at our December monetary policy meeting. And why we should end APP reinvestments before PEPP reinvestments? In my opinion, a “first-in-first-out” staggered approach is preferable for at least two reasons. First, PEPP reinvestments remain an important line of defence against (pandemic-related) fragmentation episodes, so they are potentially pledged for reallocation across jurisdictions while the lasting vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic continue to pose a risk to the smooth transmission of our monetary policy. Second, we previously declared that PEPP reinvestments will not end up until at least the end of 2024, while our forward guidance on APP reinvestments was open-ended. We have clearly stated our intention to continue APP reinvestments for an extended period of time past the date when we started raising the key ECB interest rates. Moreover, our balance sheet policy will depend too on the operational framework that we adopt for the foreseeable future.
The latest retail sales figures provide some comfort with volume growth below that in the middle of last year when consumption was stimulated by windfall gains, predominantly from the conversion of building societies. (Rarely have so many, been so grateful, to so few building societies.) Highs and lows in house prices In the past, domestic demand has been sensitive to developments in the housing market. In the late 1980s house prices increased by 40% in two years, while consumption rose by over 9%. Borrowing using housing as collateral - so called equity withdrawal - amounted to almost 50% of the increase in consumption over that period. The impact of rises in house prices on consumption - which is cause and which is effect - remains hotly contested by economists. A rise in house prices leads not only to an increase in wealth but also to an increase in the cost of housing services. Or, to put it another way, if the price of your home goes up, you will not be able to spend more on other things if you wish to carry on living in your home. So it is not at all clear that changes in house prices will in fact have a significant impact on household spending. Perhaps of greater importance is the role which house prices play in signalling consumer confidence about the future. In common with other assets, such as equities, house prices can respond quickly to news about future economic prospects.

We have gained an increasing understanding that how we finance postsecondary education has significant effects on a variety of critical economic outcomes, including economic growth and inequality. For example, our research suggests that higher student debt and delinquencies reduce household formation and depress homeownership. But there are many important questions still left unanswered. What is the relationship between the amount and type of educational investment that people make and their outcomes? What attributes are associated with borrowers who are more successful at  1  2  Payback Time? Measuring Progress on Student Debt Repayment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  repaying their student loans? Are there particular types of degrees that are associated with better performance with respect to student debt repayment or with better living standards earlier in life? What are the best interventions to help borrowers avoid the consequences of delinquency and default, and to limit any default costs to taxpayers? Do borrowers who use programs like income-based repayment eventually succeed in paying off their debts? How do income-based repayment programs affect important decisions such as labor supply, consumption and household formation? These are important questions for the nation, as the human capital of our citizens is far and away our most important asset, and student loans are an important mechanism for financing needed investments in that asset. But it is very hard to answer these questions with existing data.