samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget had increased, but employment in traditional industries was still high. Despite Norway’s high cost level, merchandise exports and supplies of goods and services to the oil industry held up due to high demand. Instead of a gradual slowdown, economic growth came to an abrupt halt in autumn 2008 when the global financial crisis came to a head. Demand for Norway’s export goods fell markedly. Norwegian banks proved to be highly vulnerable to the credit freeze in global money markets and stopped providing new loans. 2 However, Norwegian banks were not as exposed to loan losses – at home and abroad – as banks in other countries. The downturn proved to be milder in Norway, but the banking industry may also have performed its craft fairly well. Government and central bank liquidity provision measures were effective. The liquidity crisis passed quickly and did not turn into a solvency crisis in Norway’s banking system. The rapid rebound in oil prices and a weaker krone provided a boost to the economy. The interest rate was lowered and public spending markedly increased. The downturn turned out to be milder than we had expected when the interest rate was reduced to a low level – partly because oil prices proved to be higher than expected and partly because the measures implemented were more effective than we had dared to assume. We therefore now expect to be able to raise the interest rate again at a gradual pace to more normal levels.

The emerging economies were hardest hit by the previous global crisis in the late 1990s. This time OECD countries were the most severely affected. But Norway seems to have largely escaped the crisis. Overall, output has fallen to a lesser extent in Norway than in other countries and it recovered more quickly. Unemployment has remained low. One might almost believe that Norway was immune to crises and that the country is unique. But this is not the case. It is dangerous to believe that we will be able to manage every crisis as successfully. 2  IMF Country Report No. 10/24, January 2010. Norway: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation. BIS Review 15/2010  7  Norway is not unique. We cannot expect driving forces to be as beneficial in the future. Real interest rates cannot be expected to fall. Another sharp boost to export prices is not likely. In addition, Norway’s economy is now vulnerable. Norwegian labour has never been as costly as it is today. Norwegian businesses may be at a disadvantage in tenders and competitions given the current high level of spare capacity in other countries. Moreover, it has never been more profitable to relocate activities abroad. During the upturn, Norwegian firms fared well in spite of high costs thanks to efficiency gains, high turnover volumes and price increases. The cost of Norwegian labour has been very high, but there has been full employment. Markets will be more demanding ahead.
The University at Albany clearly plays this role in the capital area. Perhaps equally important in terms of promoting local economic growth, colleges and universities can play a key role in creating jobs for skilled workers in local businesses. Colleges and universities conduct research and development that can have “spillover effects” into the local economy. Businesses in the region can take advantage of being close to these innovative activities and facilities to develop new products and technologies. This can also help draw new companies to the region to access university resources. Thus, successful industry–higher education partnerships can provide a quite a boost for a region’s economy. The local nanotech sector provides an excellent example of this type of partnership at work. During my visit to the University’s College of Nanoscale Science and Engineering this afternoon I look forward to seeing the facilities and hearing more about the Center’s plans to lead the way in global nanotech research. More broadly, I understand that our audience today includes several members of the Regional Economic Advisory Council – including the University at Albany’s president, George Philip and Michael Castellana, the co-chair of the Council – who are working to advance such partnerships and the outlook for the region. Going forward, the industry–higher education partnerships taking place here will be increasingly important. I expect the strong foundation already in place will help maintain the economic vitality of the capital region.

There is great uncertainty as to the development of the health crisis, the economic crisis related to it, and to how the political situation will evolve. Therefore, as you may have seen from the data we recently published, the Bulgarian National Bank remains conservative in its economic growth forecasts, and with a rather broad range of assumptions, at that. We are presently working on a new, updated assessment of this year’s situation and of our expectations for the next one. We will publish this assessment in October. We also carefully monitor the economic developments in the euro area, which will be of crucial significance, mainly regarding, but not limited to, external demand, for the way and the pace of recovery of our economy. We share the assessment of the European Central Bank, communicated just a few days ago. In short, this is as follows: there are clear signs of economic recovery; however, the uncertainty with regard to the pandemic and the way it will be curbed is still great. Depending on the developments, both in the country and in the euro area, we in the Bulgarian National Bank are ready to launch additional measures, if needed. Out of the context of specific additional crisis-related measures, in the current year we also achieved development of enormous strategic importance, which will be ever more highly valued in the future. What I have in mind is the simultaneous accession of the Bulgarian Lev to the EU exchange rate mechanism and the country to the European Banking Union.
At the same time, we have made banks aware of the supervisory consequences they will face if they fail to meet their climate and environmental risk management responsibilities. Deadlines will be closely monitored and, if necessary, enforcement action will be taken. The case for maintaining prudence While the prevailing macroeconomic tides and the inescapable currents of the climate and environment crises may have different causes, they nevertheless have something important in common. Even if we broadly understand their main characteristics and transmission channels from a qualitative perspective, the models that are being used to inform decision-making may be subject to pitfalls when quantitatively identifying and assessing the associated risks of the current environment. This is especially true when assessing the configuration of tides and currents in conjunction, in other words, when assessing how the macroeconomic environment and the climate and environmental crises interact. 3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Importantly, this applies both to the projection models that official institutions use to inform policymaking – as the ECB does in its monetary policy – and to the internal models that banks use to assess risk exposures. And while we can certainly draw lessons from historical episodes of low growth, high inflation, increasing interest rates and structural transformation, very few policymakers, supervisors or bank executives have hands-on experience of navigating this set of circumstances.

Let me now conclude by wishing all of you a fruitful and enriching conference ahead and a productive process tapping the international capital markets down the road. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 35/2007
The results of the wage settlement so far may suggest that wage growth this year will be somewhat lower than projected by Norges Bank. Inflation, on the other hand, has been broadly in line with expectations, and the krone exchange rate has developed approximately as projected since the March Inflation Report was published. The inflation outlook has not changed significantly since the March Inflation Report was published. At its monetary policy meeting on 25 May, Norges Bank’s Executive Board decided to leave the sight deposit rate unchanged at 1.75 per cent. The Executive Board stated: “The monetary policy assessments presented in the Inflation Report in March indicated that the interest rate will rise after a period and at a gradual pace. The assessments were based on market participants’ expectations that the interest rate would be increased in the summer. A development where the interest rate rises gradually - in small and not too frequent steps - was considered to provide a good balance between the different objectives. The outlook for inflation and activity has not changed substantially since the March Inflation Report. As an alternative, the Executive Board considered increasing the interest rate already at this meeting.

As already announced, the remaining denominations in the series will be issued at half-yearly or yearly intervals, with the next one being the 10-franc note. The appearance, design elements and other information relating to this denomination will be communicated on 11 October 2017, and issuance will begin a week later, on 18 October. I’d like to thank everyone who helped prepare the ground for the successful launch of the new 20-franc note – as well as those involved at all other stages of the process – for their hard work. Page 3/3
Already before the 2008 crisis, central bankers firmly believed that price stability is a necessary – and for some even a sufficient – condition to ensure financial stability. This view is referred to as the ‘Jackson Hole consensus’. Following the financial crisis, financial imbalances were seen as a huge source of disruption which decision-makers needed to remedy, questioning the relationship between monetary and financial policy tools and objectives. Let me give two polar views on that. A first approach, in line with the ‘Jackson Hole consensus’, is to clearly separate monetary stability from financial stability. In line with the Tinbergen rule and the Mundell efficiency principle respectively, one policy should fulfil one objective and each policy tool should be assigned to the objective it can fulfil the best. In this regard, monetary policy would not be efficient at mitigating financial imbalances but would not generate them either. On the other side, an extreme approach is to consider that both policies are strongly intertwined and that their respective objectives could be merged: in this case, monetary policy could reduce risk taking and target asset price bubbles. I consider that full adherence to the separation principle and the combining of objectives are both approaches that are too radical to conduct monetary and financial stability policies. The implementation of unconventional policies has blurred the frontier between the two objectives. Let me quote here my colleague Vice-President Vítor Constâncio: “Macroprudential policy and monetary policy rely on separate tools and aim to achieve different objectives.

It is also our duty to complete the European regulatory framework with the finalisation of the resolution mechanism to make the functioning of the banking sector smoother – in line with the spirit of the Banking Union, also enabling the Capital Market Union (CMU) to bloom, within the holistic approach of the “Financing Union for Investment and Innovation” I have suggested. Finally, we must ensure that the new regulatory framework is consistently implemented everywhere, and avoid any backtracking outside Europe. Financial stability is a global common good, and as such, regulatory arbitrage must not become an option. * * * Let me conclude. Credibility for central bankers now rests on admitting that monetary policy and macroprudential policy are somewhat porous, especially in a situation where we could have an upward financial cycle associated with weak inflation. This calls for a consistent action by central banks that covers both areas: price and financial stability. Moving away from an overly strict separation principle, let us try to be complete and consistent central bankers playing an active role in monetary policy as well as in macroprudential policies. 1 Altavilla C., Boucinha M., Peydro JL, 2017, Monetary Policy and Bank Profitability in a Low Interest Rate  Environment, ECB Working paper series #2105, October 2017. 2 Ratio of non-financial agents’ debt to GDP, first quarter 2017. Source: Eurostat, Federal Reserve, Banque de  France calculations.
However, the most notorious movements in the exchange rate have originated in its fundamentals (figure 7). The recent appreciation of the peso is largely responsible for the lower inflation that will prevail in the short term.2 In our Report’s baseline scenario, CPI inflation will be around 2% annually until early next year, returning to near 3% by the end of 2019. Meanwhile, core inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index excluding Food and Energy (CPIEFE), will be close to 1.5% by the middle of this year. At the same time, we estimate that once these pressures ease and the effects of the narrowing activity gap are more notorious—it is expected to close faster than we thought before—inflation will converge to the policy target during next year (figure 8). In this context, the Board will maintain the current monetary impulse until inflation shows clear signs of converging towards the target. This translates into a similar trajectory to the one that can be deduced from the surveys, that is, an MPR hovering around its current levels for several more months, but that by the turn of 2019 will have already begun a gradual normalization. Such normalization is likely to be completed beyond the monetary policy horizon of 24 months (figure 9). These projections, as always, are subjected to various risks. On the external front, in terms of its impact on local activity, the risk balance is downwards biased. The main risk is the possibility of a sharp deterioration of global financial conditions facing emerging economies.

10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  Arrangements for shared supervision, therefore, need to be worked out carefully, subject to agreed procedures and, crucially, recognise the primacy of the lead supervisor. And, given the systemic importance of global infrastructure to many jurisdictions, they must above all be stable. And finally, these arrangements need to be reciprocal and proportionate. This means as I have said, the degree of assurance depends on the degree of risk. In areas for example where there is no cross-border activity, there is little need for assurance on cross border risk. In the end, both sides will need to make a balanced assessment. It is perhaps human nature on either side to want maximum control and minimum responsibility. But a stable and effective regulatory and supervisory relationship cannot be built on those lines. I am an optimist in this area. Of course, I expect some change. But I also believe we have a very solid foundation on which to build the broad supervisory and regulatory relationship necessary for the UK and the EU economies to continue to benefit from our cross border financial connections and from the integration of global and European markets that this encompasses. I am here talking, with our responsibility for financial stability in the UK, about the management of financial stability risk on both sides. I am not, to be clear, talking about trade negotiations.
François Villeroy de Galhau: Euro area monetary policy and businesses Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft, Munich, 26 January 2017. * * * I am very pleased to be here with you and wish to thank you for inviting me. It is the second time in recent months that I have had the pleasure of visiting Bavaria. In September, here in Munich, I had the great honour of receiving the Montgelas prize, presented by Minister Erwin Huber, in remembrance of one of your great statesmen. If I may add a personal note, I am here as a committed European and a friend of Germany. I am French but my roots are in Saarland where my family has lived since the end of the 18th century and where its porcelain manufacturing company Villeroy & Boch forms part of the German “Mittelstand”. I feel close to your country and admire its success, particularly that of its business enterprises. Bavaria illustrates this success. It is currently one of Europe’s major economic centres. I will also have the pleasure later of meeting Dr Theo Waigel, who, alongside other German political leaders, has played such a key role in the construction of our solid common currency, the euro. Our growth forecasts for the euro area are for growth of 1.7% in 2017, the same as in 2016. This confirms the economic recovery, which is good news, but the situation is not yet satisfactory.

The greater concentration and interconnectedness in the global financial system may also have increased the magnitude of a potential crisis. The greater risk tolerance of market players is ultimately a logical consequence of the exceptionally long and stable period of calm in the financial markets. Market participants have had no reason of late to keep their risk-taking in check. Basically, anyone who held back felt they were missing the opportunity to generate high returns. Even the short-term corrections in the financial markets in February of this year and May of the previous year did not result in a change of attitude in this regard. On the contrary, the low impact made by these corrections and the ability of the markets to absorb them may have served as a confirmation for those operating a high-risk strategy to continue, and as an indication for the more risk-averse to take greater risks. The risk appetite is also fairly high in the Swiss banking sector at present. In our Financial Stability Report, we indicate for instance that the domestically oriented banks – Raiffeisen, cantonal and regional banks – are currently incurring a relatively high interest rate risk. At the same time, the big banks have also exhibited an increased risk tolerance in recent years. Although Credit Suisse Group’s overall risk has declined in the past year, following the sale of Winterthur, both big banks have significantly increased their risk-taking in the banking business; particularly their exposure in trading and in foreign lending business.
The fact that industrial nations enter an economic downturn together has been a rule rather than an exception. The decline at the beginning of the 1990s was different, because it was due to different types of disturbance. The German reunification meant that Germany and Europe went their own way to some extent. Bank crises hit different countries at different points in time. In Sweden there was also a very large increase in real interest rates following in the footsteps of the change in the inflation rate and the defence of the fixed exchange rate, which contributed to the crisis in Sweden becoming deeper than those in most other industrial nations and, in addition, the worst recession Sweden had experienced since the 1930s. The downturn we have just experienced has been unusual in that the decline in production in the USA and Germany was lower than usual and in many European countries there has been no decline in growth at all. In Sweden, too, the slowdown appears to have been one of the mildest during the postwar period. Growth is not expected to decline for a single quarter. During all of the previous downturns in economic activity there has been at least one quarter with a negative result for growth and since 1970 economic downturns have always led to a decline in production over an average of four quarters. Households’ consumption has been relatively strong in many countries during the downturn and this is also the explanation why countries have avoided a decline in production altogether.

In addition, this operation would be financially neutral at the national level, since the recipients of helicopter money would simply be the country’s citizens – a bit like in the case of dividend payments with all households receiving the same amount. Critics might say that it is not the role of central banks to decide on the distribution of funds and that any helicopter money drop should be executed by the government with mere central bank backing. But in fact, any change in the interest rate, just like any other change in the monetary policy stance, inevitably redistributes funds, and indeed does so in a much less transparent way. A helicopter money drop is probably possible even without a digital currency – for example, using central registries of personal bank accounts, often operated by central banks on behalf of the government. But the benefit of using a digital currency is that the central bank would not theoretically need to work with the government, so its independence would not be put in danger. Moreover, the digital currency could be designed specifically to smooth the transmission of helicopter money to consumption. Again, I stress that I only consider this a realistic scenario in a deep recession. The central bank could also limit the possibility of transferring these funds to bank accounts (and vice versa, in order to eliminate any risk of digital bank runs).
The end-result is that the offending companies have been “named and shamed” by the Government and pressurised into paying billions of pounds in compensation. The reputation of these firms, many of whom are household names in the UK, has suffered as a result. This comes at an awkward time when banks in the UK and elsewhere are attempting to expand their bancassurance activities and to persuade the public to trust them with their long-term savings. Banks in Hong Kong will need to bear this lesson in mind as we embark upon the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme. They will also have to be alive to the other types of ethical conflict that may arise as the banking environment becomes increasingly competitive and there is even more focus on the bottom line. The HKMA has already pointed out that as a result of interest rate deregulation that there will be both winners and losers among bank customers. Those with small balances and relatively large volume of transactions may find that increased fees outweigh the benefit of any increase in the interest paid on their deposits. As has happened elsewhere, banks may also become more selective in their choice of customers and the level of customer service may be affected if the number of branches is pruned to save costs. A move towards a user pays approach and a reduction in cross-subsidisation are manifestations of the greater efficiency that deregulation is intended to produce.

More people are becoming increasingly comfortable resuming activities in person, and this is starting to show up in robust consumer spending, job gains, and economic growth. So, now that we are on our second trip around the sun during this pandemic, many are looking to answer the most common question raised when traveling by car. And that is, “are we there yet?" With respect to the virus, I’ll leave that question to the public health experts to answer. But with respect to the economy, I will say this: while I am optimistic that the economy is now headed in the right direction, we still have a long way to go to achieve a robust and full economic recovery. In my remarks today I’ll set the scene for both the U.S. and global economies. I’ll also highlight a few of the factors I consider when evaluating the outlook for the economy. Finally, I’ll explain what that means for our monetary policy decisions. But before I continue, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System. Economic Outlook Let me begin by saying that despite the challenges and uncertainties we’ve faced since the pandemic took hold, the economy is now positioned to grow quickly.