samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(2015), “Understanding the role of debt in the financial system”, Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper No 479, January. 3 See Committee on the Global Financial System (2017), “Repo market functioning”, CGFS Papers, No 59; and  International Capital Market Association (2015), “Perspectives from the eye of the storm: The current state and future evolution of the European repo market”. 4 See e.g. Altavilla, C., G. Carboni and R. Motto (2015), “Asset purchase programmes and financial markets:  lessons from the euro area”, ECB Working Paper No 1864; Andrade, P., J. Breckenfelder, F. De Fiore, P. Karadi and O. Tristani (2016), “The ECB's asset purchase programme: an early assessment”, ECB Working Paper No 1956; and Blattner, T.S. and M. Joyce (2016), “Net debt supply shocks in the euro area and the implications for QE”, ECB Working Paper No 1957. 5 For a theoretical disposition, see Duffie, D. (1996), “Special Repo Rates”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 51(2), pp. 493-526. 6 See e.g. International Capital Market Association (2017), “European Repo Market Survey”, No 33, October. 7 Securities purchased under the PSPP have been made available for securities lending in a decentralised  manner by Eurosystem central banks since 2 April 2015. As of 8 December 2016, Eurosystem central banks have the possibility to also accept cash as collateral in their PSPP securities lending facilities without having to reinvest it in a cash-neutral manner. The aim of securities lending is to support bond and repo market liquidity without unduly curtailing normal repo market activity.

Our monetary policy, which is currently geared towards this challenging set of circumstances, consists of two key elements: the negative interest rate and the SNB’s willingness to take an active role in the foreign exchange market. Both of these elements are intended to make Swiss franc investments less attractive, thereby supporting economic activity. Swiss sovereign money initiative (Vollgeldinitiative) In conclusion, let me say a few words about the recently submitted sovereign money initiative. This popular initiative aims to fundamentally remodel Switzerland’s monetary policy and banking system. The initiative aims to remove the banks’ money creation powers. Instead, all new money would be created by the SNB and distributed directly to the Confederation or the citizens. Under the new system, proponents want any income that the SNB derives from note-issuance to be distributed to the public. Moreover, they claim that such a system would enhance financial stability. The sovereign money initiative would entail a radical overhaul of Switzerland’s financial system, creating a regime that does not exist in any other country today. The introduction of sovereign money would be a risky experiment. We must therefore carefully analyse the impact of the proposed constitutional change on the structure and implementation of monetary policy. Equally, we must take a comprehensive look at its implications for financial stability, the exchange rate and the economic cycle. We will comment further on the sovereign money initiative in due course. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.
8 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet, May 4, 2022. By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement.

At its core, attracting and nurturing the right talent is crucial for any organisation of the future. Thus, it is critical to begin thinking beyond policies for short-term recovery and start the task of building a future of work that is safer, fairer and greener. "Building back better" calls for increased policy coherence, particularly between economic employment and social policies, and a whole-of-society approach. My remarks today seek to explore three strategies on how we may futureproof our talent workforce: 1) equipping the workforce with the right skills; 2) employing a "good jobs strategy"; and 3) strengthening collaboration among ecosystem partners. Equipping the workforce with new skillsets that are relevant and practical for future needs With greater adoption of technology, in-demand skills across jobs in Malaysia will shift over the next few years. The skills gaps will continue to widen. By 2025, half of all employees will need reskilling. Even for workers who remain in existing roles, 40% of core skills will need to change to remain relevant. A sizeable number of jobs will be replaced or become obsolete. This means individuals need to continuously learn new skills to be indispensable and grasp new opportunities. This means access to comprehensive upskilling and learning infrastructures are essential, whether at an individual, organisation or industry-wide level. And this means, lifelong learning is a must for everyone in the workforce. In the financial sector, we too face this challenge.
With lockdown-easing having concluded, some services segments are still affected by restrictions on operating normally, and the proportion of workers affected by furlough arrangements continues to be a majority. This is the case of the accommodation, air transport and travel agency segments where, at end-June, the reach of ERTEs was still between 70.4% and 53.7%. The very high proportion of workers protected by an ERTE in these specific services segments is in striking contrast to the 8  percentages in manufacturing industry and construction (8.9% and 4.2%, respectively). That highlights the deeply asymmetric effects of this crisis on different productive activities. In absolute terms, at the end of Q2 almost half the workers on ERTEs were in the retail and hospitality sectors. In response to this situation and to the high uncertainty over the recovery, the ERTE support measures - initially programmed to end-June - have been extended, albeit with amendments, to the end of Q3. The new conditions include the possibility of increasing Social Security exemptions in the event of a fresh outbreak of the virus, which is an explicit acknowledgement of the uncertainty surrounding the recovery. These new conditions also attempt to square the objective to continue providing support to firms and workers temporarily affected by restrictions on operating normally with the aim of providing incentives for a progressive reallocation of employment towards activities with a better future outlook.

And along with income-sustaining measures (such as the minimum living income), they will help reduce inequality in Spain. Inequality levels, which were higher at the onset of this crisis than at the start of the previous one, will probably rise further in the coming quarters, given that this crisis is affecting groups with relatively low incomes to a greater extent. Nor can we forget the need to address ongoing population ageing which, among other aspects, will most appreciably influence the behaviour of the labour market, growth dynamics and the main fiscal magnitudes in the coming decades. It is also a first-order challenge for our pension system. And, of course, the Spanish economy must be nimble and proactive so as to harness the new opportunities that arise from combating climate change and from the transition to a more sustainable economy, from the changes in the globalisation model and from the foreseeable acceleration in the digitalisation of the economy. The prompt design of a medium-term fiscal consolidation programme for gradual implementation once the crisis is behind us After the pandemic, the Spanish economy will post the highest levels of public debt in many decades, partly as a result of the necessary fiscal expansion in the short term. Accordingly, it is also necessary to design a plan to restore health to the public finances in the medium term, the application of which, in any event, will have to be postponed until the recovery is firmly rooted.
There is friction in clearing customs, handling trade documents, checking for fraud in trade finance, and ensuring the safety and timely delivery of goods. This is because the approach to trade and trade finance is still manual and paper-based. We need to have end-to-end digitalisation of trade processes. Chongqing and Singapore can work together to apply FinTech solutions to make the STC hassle free, safe, and cost efficient for all stakeholders. Chongqing’s interest to develop a Fintech experimental and demonstration zone in the Western Region is thus timely. The Fintech zone can serve as a source of technology solutions for the successful development of the STC. Several players have embarked on initiatives in this area. For example, VCargo Cloud from Singapore has worked on digitalising the STC’s work flows onto cloud services, synchronising and sharing the information provided by different parties from trade, logistics, and supply chain. I am glad to share that there will be a signing of a four-party Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) later today at the Summit that will catalyse FinTech cooperation between Chongqing and Singapore. The MoU will cover enterprise and talent exchange, the establishment of an incubator platform and a regular communication mechanism. Under a separate MoU, OCBC Bank, Xiaomi Inc, and Hanhua Financial Holding Co will explore Fintech collaboration in the areas of retail and institutional financial services in China. This collaboration will enable more than 300 million Xiaomi retail customers and business partners to have access to innovative financial services.

Risks of changing the regulator’s role If you accept the case for detailed rules being made by regulators, the next debate then is over what checks and balances are needed to give stakeholders confidence in the operation of the new framework. Might we pursue the stability of the graveyard by imposing ever more stringent rules? Or might we go the other way, becoming captured by industry and not protecting policyholders enough? Put bluntly, can we be trusted with more power? To address the point about the graveyard head on: I do not for one moment accept the caricature of a rampant regulator intent on crushing the industry under a slow-motion avalanche of new capital requirements, heedless of the wider consequences. History gives the lie to this caricature. Take the topical example of the matching adjustment (MA), which I read in the trade press last month is to be a ‘key battleground’ in the review of Solvency II. The primary effect of the MA is to reinforce the incentives that life insurers have to make longterm investments. It is something that the PRA had to fight hard for in EIOPA, often with little support from other countries. This matching is prudentially beneficial and may make annuities cheaper than they would otherwise be, but of course it also involves taking more risk because it boosts capital levels and lowers capital requirements.
The recent “tech-stock bubble” provides us with an illustration of such a difficulty: while one was witnessing the “irrational exuberance” in 1996, the surge in capital spending associated with the development of new technologies resulted in a faster productivity growth, which in turn boosted equity prices. At that time, uncertainties about fundamentals (was there an American miracle?) made difficult a proper assessment of asset valuations, although the large movements in asset prices where a concern for central banks. However, when expectations reverse, for example due to the reassessment of expected profitability in the economy, and consequently asset prices decrease, the point is to determine whether the attitude of the central bank ought to be different in order to preserve monetary and financial stability. That is, some could argue that the central bank’s response should be asymmetric. In the booming phase, as long as price stability is not endangered, central banks do not react to the rise in asset prices. Conversely, in the recession phase or when a bubble bursts, central banks could consider reacting if they deem that monetary and financial stability is endangered. What could then restrain them from doing it?

Jean-Pierre Roth: The Swiss economy and financial centre – successes and new challenges Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Handelskammer Schweiz-Österreich und Liechtenstein (Foreign Trade Chamber for Switzerland-Austria and Liechtenstein), Vienna, 25 February 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Mid-2003 saw the start of a remarkable, broad-based economic upswing in Switzerland which is still underway, even if business cycle uncertainty has increased in the recent period. A number of factors indicate that the long-term growth outlook, too, has improved for Switzerland. These factors include the increasing globalisation of our economy and the opening up of the labour market to the EU. The Swiss economy is participating in globalisation through increased direct investment as well as growing foreign trade. At the same time, there is more competition on the domestic goods market, although a fair bit still remains to be done in this area to complement the opening up of the labour market to the EU. Globalisation and market opening present companies and economic policymakers with challenges that become particularly acute when setbacks occur – as in the case of the current international financial market turbulence.
(2) Value above (below) 50 indicates optimism (pessimism). (3) Simple average between manufacturing industries' and trade sector's expected investment. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Icare/Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez. Figure 4 Growth forecasts (*) (real annual change, percent)  2018 3.25  3.5  3.5  2019 3.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  Jun. Sep.  Dec.  4  4  4.25  4.25  3  3.25  3.25  3.25  Mar. Jun. 2.25  Mar. 17  Mar. 18  Jun. Sep. 17  Dec.  Mar. Jun. 18  (*) Ranges correspond to projected growth in each Monetary Policy Report. Red diamonds correspond to the Economic Expectations Survey at respective statistical cutoff. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 9  Figure 5 Actual and expected activity gap  Inflation expectations  (percent of potential GDP)  (percent)  4  2.6 2.6  2.6  4  2.6  2  2.4  2.4 2.4  2.4  0  0  2.2  2.2 2.2  2.2  -2  -2 2.0  Eurozone  2  U.S.  2018  2019  U.S.  2.0 2.0  2.0  U.S. -4 1.8  1.8 1.8  1.8  -6 1.6  1.6 1.6  1.6  -8  -8 1.4  1.4 1.4  -10  -10 1.2  -4  -6  Japan  Eurozone  1.4  Eurozone 05  08  11  14  17 20(f) 23(f)  1.2 1.2 17  17 Jul.

Public expenditure increased by 0.9%, y-o-y, mostly reflecting the negative growth rates of capital spending. As a result, the budget deficit of this period marked 8% annual decline. The fourth quarter highlighted a better pass-through of monetary stimulus in financial markets. It was also characterised by a better anchoring of interbank market rates and their decreasing volatility. The Bank of Albania has pursued an easing monetary policy during the last three years. The monetary stimulus has increased progressively during this period, bringing the key interest rate to record low levels and mitigating the liquidity pressures on the interbank market. However, the pass-through of easing monetary policy effects on the economy has been contained due to higher perceived risk premia and changed stance by financial market agents and the real economy. Over the first half of the year, the domestic primary market faced structural changes arising from implementation of new tight measures by the European Supervisory Authorities. This development impacted on maintaining relatively high yield rates, despite the easing monetary policy and lowering short-term interest rates in the money market. Normalisation of the primary market in the second half of the year was reflected in progressively falling yields over this period. This tendency might have been passed on to ALL-denominated private sector credit costs, though with lower intensity as a consequence of risk premia reflected in private agents’ credit price.
Credit extended to the private sector went up by 12.1 percent to SAR 1,076.4 billion in 2013 (by 12.3 percent in January of this year). Domestic banks maintained their good financial solvency, recording a capital adequacy ratio of 17.9 percent at the end of 2013. The number of domestic and foreign banks operating in the Kingdom currently is 23, 12 of which are domestic and 11 are foreign which became 12 after licensing the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in 2012. Driven by the aim of achieving a better spread and service to a larger portion of citizens and expatriates, bank branches operating in the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Kingdom grew up by 4.2 percent (72 branches) to 1,768 branches at the end of 2013. The number of ATMs stood at 13,883, increasing by 9.2 percent (11,71 machines) at the end of 2013 compared to 2012. At the same time, POS went up by 16.5 percent to 107,783. With regard to the insurance sector in the Kingdom, SAMA continued to guide this sector toward further regulation to work in accordance with highly professional standards and practices, aiming at promoting the competence of its staff and providing better insurance services to policy holders. The insurance sector witnessed a quantum leap over the past few years represented by developed potentials, skills and technical expertise of companies and increased awareness of insurance benefits.

Fahad Bin Abdullah Al-Mubarak: Economic, financial and supervisory developments in Saudi Arabia Opening speech by H E Dr Fahad Bin Abdullah Al-Mubarak, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, on the occasion of the issuance of the 49th Annual Report, Riyadh, 17 March 2014. *  *  *  It gives me pleasure to meet you today. I would like to welcome you at SAMA and thank you for attending this conference on the occasion of the issuance of SAMA 49th Annual Report. We are deeply sorry for the delay of this gathering for reasons beyond our control. Ladies and gentlemen, At the beginning, I would like to review the latest economic developments in the Kingdom. Our economy continued its growth for the 14th consecutive year. The real GDP grew by 3.8 percent during 2013, which was greater than the global economic growth of 2.9 percent for the same year. The private sector grew by 5.5 percent. The growth of the Saudi economy was ascribed to the continuous government investment expenditure, especially on infrastructure projects, and continuous high-paced growth due to the achievements in the area of updating and improving regulations and enhancement of the business environment, which promoted domestic and foreign investments. The growth was also attributed to the finance provided by the domestic banks and specialized credit funds to the various economic activities in the Kingdom.
This is, in my view, a very productive area for future research for academics and regulators alike. Let me conclude by two points about Central Banks. First, they have a natural interest in the efficiency and stability of the financial system. Asset prices are a key channel through which monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy. The ability of the financial system to absorb shocks smoothly was supported by more predictable and transparent monetary policies in many countries. Stable and low inflation helped to reduce the financial system’s sensitivity to shocks. Second, for this reason, they have to monitor closely the process of financial innovation. Different approaches, involving both the public and the private sector, should be combined to enhance transparency, such as (i) the improvement of financial standards and supervisory regulation, (ii) an improvement of data reporting on OTC markets (bonds, derivatives), (iii) efforts to foster better disclosure from financial institutions, (iv) promotion of stronger market discipline. It is my strong belief that this can be done without impeding the efficiency and agility of modern finance, which is so important for our growth and future prosperity. 6  O. Cousseran and I. Rahmouni (2005) “The CDO market-Functioning and implications in terms of financial stability”, Financial Stability Review n°6, Banque de France. 4  BIS Review 64/2006

There are many examples of fraud that undermines said trust, such as identity theft when opening payment accounts, in “know your customer” procedures or to arrange and draw loans and credit; payment fraud, mainly in card transactions, transfers and remittances; and fraudulent offers of financial operations or services by unauthorised or unregistered operators, which are typically a prelude to actual fraud. More recently, though, new technologies and business models have paved the way for platforms and operators that, engaging in regulatory arbitrage, offer payment, credit or investment services without sufficient safeguards and transparency. Here I would specifically mention operators in the crypto-asset arena, which promise handsome rewards via apps, websites and apparently innocuous advertising, and sometimes even embed such offers in traditional payment service chains, making them harder to identify. Unfortunately, these practices do not distinguish between social groups, levels of financial literacy or risk profiles, and ultimately take a far greater toll on the more vulnerable groups, in particular young people and even teenagers, which is of particular concern. Against this background, and notwithstanding any action that might be taken by the public prosecution service, the courts or law enforcement authorities in relation to criminal offences, our role as supervisors is primarily a preventive one. This means oversight of advertising, ensuring that the registry of operators is fit for purpose and, very importantly, raising awareness of the risks among potential users and fostering their financial and digital education.