samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a result, this was reflected in stagnating investments and slowing down dynamics of the Albanian economy, both in the private and public sectors. Moreover, current business practices and policy orientations are imposing significant constrains in the efficiency of monetary policy transmission mechanism, and the ability of authorities to provide much needed stimulus to the economy. It is understandable that banks would have to be careful, prudent and responsible given the current situation with non-performing loans; however, they must also consider the fact that credit and financial intermediation is important for growth, which, in turn, can improve the ability of economic agents to repay their loans. This is especially true for particular sectors like agriculture and agro-business, which, so far, have not benefited from credit expansion, but have large untapped potential for growth. The era of an economic growth model, led mainly by the domestic consumption, is now gone. Banks, their European headquarters and their supervisory authorities should work together with authorities of host countries to develop a new long-term and sustainable economic growth model. This new model needs to be based on investments in productive sectors of the economy. Our products and services need to be competitive not only in the home market, but they should also offer comparative advantages in the regional and European Union markets. It is clear that cooperation is the only choice for the future.

Most importantly, European economies and their financial systems, among which the Austrian financial system enjoys a significant share of the market, define the globalization for the region and are, to a large extent, important determinants for the success or failure of these economies. Given the large share of the European financial groups, they have and will play an important role in the transmission of global shocks in the region. What is more important, they have a significant role in the transmission of legislative and regulative shocks carried over by European monetary and supervisory authorities. The size is such that even a simple change in the future business plans of a single European financial institution can transform into real shocks for the economies of the region. It became evident during the crisis and afterwards that an increase in risk and uncertainty, led to increased incentives for banks to withdraw from the Emerging Europe economies. Though this was mostly prevented due to increased cooperation through institutions such as the Vienna Initiative, the concerns from our perspective have not completely dissipated. In this respect the business plan of EU based groups can play a potentially important role in the nature and outcomes of this cooperation.
Relative to money spending, central bank money supply is at its highest levels in the 15-year history of the European Central Bank, the 100-year history of the US Federal Reserve, the 131-year history of the Bank of Japan and the 319-year history of the Bank of England. Accompanying these monetary policy changes has been a marked shift in regulatory philosophy. Since the crisis, financial regulation has become explicitly macro-prudential [Morris and Shin, 2008; Bank of England, 2011; Hanson et al, 2011]. This is an expression much-used, but generally little-understood. In a nutshell, it means that policymakers have begun using prudential means to meet macro-economic ends. Those macro-economic ends include tempering swings in credit and leverage – the classic credit cycle. The credit cycle is a long-established feature of the financial landscape [Aikman et al, 2014]. Chart 1 shows its pattern in the UK over the past 130 years or so. The credit cycle is every bit as regular as the business cycle. But it differs from the business cycle in two critical respects: its amplitude is at least twice as large and its duration at least twice as long. Both are important for the design of macro-prudential policy regimes. The larger amplitude of the credit cycle is one reason why credit booms have, more often than not historically, resulted in banking crises (Table 1). Because financial crises cause large and long-lived disruption to the economy, this suggests a strong empirical link between credit cycles and macroeconomic destabilisation.

For those peripheral European economies that experienced a credit boom, it is plausible to think a tighter macro-prudential stance would have helped reduce the severity of the global crisis of 2008 and the euro-area crisis of 2010. Tighter capital standards would have slowed pre-crisis credit growth, tempering the boom. And the extra capital built up in the European banking system would have helped contain some of the collateral damage from the resulting credit bust. In short, as in the US, the boom-bust cycles in credit and GDP in the euro-area would plausibly have been much less severe had policy been ambidextrous. The current conjuncture The third example is from the present. In response to the crisis, short-term interest rates in major advanced economies fell rapidly to their floor and have remained there (Chart 9). Aided and abetted by programmes of quantitative easing, real long-term rates have followed suit, falling to historically unprecedentedly low levels (Chart 10). These responses from monetary policy were a natural reaction to the opening-up of sizable output gaps in many advanced economies. Extraordinary times called for extraordinary measures. Whether by coincide or causality, what has happened since in financial markets has been striking. The risk-taking cycle in some advanced economies has decisively turned. For example, issuance in the US high-yield market reached a record high in 2013, with half coming in a “covenant-lite” form (Chart 11). This is evidence of a renewed “hunt for yield” among investors [Stein, 2013].
But as expected, there are also challenges that come with fintech expansion: cyber-attacks, phishing emails and other scams are reportedly on the rise, a trend that needs to be addressed before it becomes alarming. Banks must continue to stay ahead of fraudsters through constant building and rebuilding of defences, rigorous stress testing, and educating customers about cyber safety. The enhanced Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative, soon to be launched, should provide banks with a robust framework for managing the risks. 11. Growing reliance on data analytics raises questions about data ownership and privacy. As we have seen in some other jurisdictions, AI and machine learning also introduce the risk of discrimination, sometimes in hidden forms. Banks have to guard against this by ensuring ethical, fair and transparent treatment of customers, and by correcting model aberrations using human intuition. 12. We realise that banks are at different stages in their adoption of AI technologies. For this reason, our risk management approach as a regulator is based on high-level principles rather than on detailed prescriptions that might stifle innovation or be disproportionate to the risks involved. 13. Technology is not just about banks and their customers – it is also an important part of banks’ relationship with the HKMA. As we are a key part of the technology ecosystem, our aim is to add value by facilitating the industry’s technology adoption through a range of initiatives, such as the AML/CFT Regtech Forum and the Regtech Watch newsletter.

As a regulator, we are pleased to witness the progress made by the industry in using Regtech to combat longstanding issues – for instance, Natural Language Processing has been adopted to control conduct risk associated with the marketing of financial products, while Supervised Machine Learning can be deployed to more accurately help AML analysts flag suspicious transactions. 14. Understanding and facilitating the technology needs of the industry improves our own setting of supervisory priorities in a forward-looking manner. The HKMA’s three-year roadmap for Suptech adoption has identified, as key areas of focus, the need for a knowledge management system to handle structured and unstructured information, and the need for capabilities to analyse granular data. The aim is to make our supervisory work more effective without placing unnecessary burdens on banks. We have begun pilot projects to assess the suitability of various solutions. Cross-border banking 15. Technology has enhanced the use of our natural geographic advantage to participate in another major transformation: the growing interaction with the Mainland financial markets, particularly in relation to the Greater Bay Area. 16. As a leading international financial centre, Hong Kong has a long and successful history of serving as a gateway to the Mainland markets. We are the world’s largest offshore hub for renminbi business. Schemes launched in recent years, such as Stock Connect and Bond Connect, have expanded opportunities for investors.
They create deposits and credit in multiple terms restricted only by the public’s preference for currency as against deposits and banks’ own need for keeping a safe cash reserve to meet public’s demand for cash. In Sri Lanka, commercial banks could create bank money five times higher than the initial amount of currency issued by the central bank. Because of this ability to self-produce in multiple terms, (in Sri Lanka, that multiplier is 5), the seed or reserve money produced by central banks is also called “high powered money”. Thus, the total money in an economy would be much more than what a central bank would issue to the economy. When that money which is known as money supply chases after the limited availability of goods and services, the general price level would elevate to a higher level. If it happens continuously, inflation sets in an economy imposing an inflation tax on the society. Why is there a preference for inflation tax? There is a general preference for inflation tax for several reasons. First, it is easy, quick and convenient to borrow from the central bank, compared to conventional forms of taxes available to a government. Such conventional taxes need to be backed by legislation, take time to generate the tax revenue and have to be enforced by an elaborate tax administration. It also runs the risk of failing to generate the required revenue due to tax evasion and avoidance.

We generally share the broad agreement among EU bodies that the Lamfalussy framework has significantly increased the efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation and supervision in the EU. At the same time, however, a number of further improvements seem warranted to reap all the benefits. First, increased regulatory convergence is called for, in particular for reducing national options and discretions in EU directives. Indeed, the inconsistent implementation as well as the “gold plating” of EU rules at the national level give rise to significant compliance costs for financial institutions operating across borders. Second, we need to strengthen the basis and decision powers of the “level 3” committees of supervisory authorities pursuing supervisory convergence and cooperation Third, further improvements in the arrangements for the supervision of cross-border financial groups should be achieved. All authorities need to be adequately informed to effectively perform the ongoing supervision of cross-border institutions as well as to be fully prepared to address potential cross-border situations of financial distress. Given the increased scope and intensity of the cross-border activities of EU banking groups, the need for effective information-sharing and cooperation in their supervision is now more important than ever. In this respect, the Eurosystem underscores in particular the importance of strengthening information sharing also between supervisory authorities and central banks without supervisory responsibilities with respect to the major EU banking groups. Next, I am turning to our role as catalyst for market activities fostering financial integration.
And, perhaps most importantly, we should continue to engage in discussions like this one, so we work together to identify lessons learned and best practices as we pursue our common goals of a safe, sound, and stable banking system. I think we should be optimistic that with the right tools and technology, the right level of commitment, and the right people at the table, we can build cultural capital and mitigate misconduct risk. We all have a role to play in mobilizing our organizations to advance this critical work. Thank you for your attention. 1 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  1 I would like to thank Stephanie Chaly, Robert Fitchette, Jim Hennessy, and Jackie McCormack for help preparing  these remarks. 2 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry:  Progress, Challenges, and the Next Generation of Leaders, June 18, 2018 and Workshop on Culture Measurement and Assessment, June 21, 2017. 3 See SR 16–11: Supervisory Guidance for Assessing Risk Management at Supervised Institutions with Total  Consolidated Assets Less than $ Billion, June 8, 2016 and SR 12–17 / CA 12–14: Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions, December 17, 2012 for details for small and large banks, respectively. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Board requests comment on proposed guidance that would clarify Board’s supervisory expectations related to risk management for large financial institutions, January 4, 2018.

Last year’s rapid disinflation was not least the result of the substantial appreciation of the króna, which in turn can be attributed to better external balance, lower inflation expectations as the year wore on, greater confidence in stability, and expectations that large-scale investment projects would go ahead. Disinflation last year can also be attributed to a considerable weakness in domestic demand. National expenditure  BIS Review 18/2003  1  contracted by 2½%. The decline in fixed capital formation was particularly pronounced, but private consumption also contracted. In spite of the contraction in national expenditure, however, GDP declined by only ½%. This was due to favourable foreign trade developments, with a contraction in imports and expanding exports. The sudden turnaround in Iceland’s current account from 2000 to 2002 is almost unparalleled among the developed countries. In 2002 there was a 1.8 b.kr. surplus on the current account, or 0.2% of estimated GDP. In 2000 the deficit amounted to more than 10% of GDP, as I mentioned earlier. This shows the great adaptability of the Icelandic economy, which to a large extent can be attributed to the wide range of reforms that have been made to the structure of economy in recent years, including changes in the monetary framework. Now I shall turn to last year’s inflation developments in more detail. In 2001 inflation climbed rapidly, from 5.6% at the beginning of the year to a peak of 9.4% in January 2002. Last year, inflation slowed down steadily and dropped to 1.4% in January 2003.
Forward-looking information to base decisions on The work on producing background material for the decision begins with an analysis of the new statistics and new events that have occurred both in the Swedish economy and abroad. Using this as a base, an assessment is made of international economic activity and inflation prospects, and a review of developments in the financial markets. International economic  2  BIS Review 51/2008  activity affects the assessment of Swedish exports, while international price movements affect pricing of the goods and services imported to Sweden. After this a forecast is made of economic activity and inflation in Sweden. The Riksbank uses a combination of assessments made by sector experts and results from several models in its forecasting work. The information is weighed together to form a main forecast for how inflation, the repo rate and the economy as a whole will develop. In addition, various alternative scenarios are produced, which illustrate how the course of events is affected by other assumptions regarding central variables, for instance, productivity growth or international economic activity. Gradually a monetary policy report is pieced together. This is an extensive process, where the Executive Board and officials from the Monetary Policy Department regularly discuss and take a stance on different alternative forecasts. Prior to the monetary policy meetings that do not coincide with the publication of a Monetary Policy Report, the forecasting work is carried out in a similar manner.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Towards proportionality in practice – financial inclusion and implementation of global standards Opening remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Global Symposium on Proportionality in Practice, Kuala Lumpur, 28 May 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to speak today at the opening of the Global Symposium, with the theme “Towards Proportionality in Practice: Financial Inclusion & Implementation of Global Standards”. Financial inclusion has captured the attention of many decision makers around the globe. We can confidently say that we have been successful in educating the world on the importance of ensuring access and usage of quality financial services by all segments of society. I think it has dawn to the power that be that financial inclusion empowers low income households and SMEs to improve their livelihood and because financial inclusion provides equal opportunities (and hopefully, it appropriately designed, equal outcomes), it also enables the under served to save in a secure manner, invest in productive activities and protect against unforeseen shocks. Financial inclusion, based on empirical evidence also reduces inequality 1, which in turn supports inclusive and sustainable growth, by allowing the poor to stay healthy, stay out of poverty, pay for education and accumulate human capital 2. It is, a very worthwhile agenda to pursue.
To contribute to the reflection, we are about to publish a discussion paper on the possible regulatory options for DeFi. In order to build the most appropriate framework, taking notably into account the question of proportionality, we need to feed our thinking with input from all stakeholders: financial services or crypto-assets industry professionals, IT specialists, academics, other regulators and supervisors- That is why this document will be open to a wide consultation and I look forward to listening to your reactions on it. 2. The second axis is to use DeFi innovation to serve the possible development of tokenised finance and to improve cross-border payments Our monitoring of DeFi is not just motivated by financial stability risk but also by our intuition that its innovative potential could serve the development of an ongoing trend: the tokenisation of finance. To do so, central banks and the traditional financial players need to understand how DeFi operates and master its innovative aspects in order to use them in a secure way to do something else than speculate on crypto-assets. This is what we are trying do with the project Mariana, our ongoing experiment with the MAS, the Swiss National Bank and the Eurosystem, Singapore and Switzerland BIS Innovation Hub Centres. Basically, we are building an automated market for the exchange of CBDCs based on a concept imported from DeFi. This project is really at the crossroads of a number of topics: enhancing cross-border payments, CBDCs interoperability, understanding of DeFi and the development of tokenised finance.

As for my part this morning, given the limitations of time, I want to share with you my thoughts on a few issues that I think will be important for the global economy and for Thailand this year. These are my own views on the global outlook and the implications for Thailand. First, the global economy. Conventional market view at this time is for the global economy to slow somewhat from last year, growing at about 4.9 percent compared to a growth of 5.1 percent last year. So, as the numbers suggest, the current view is for a moderate slowdown, reflecting for the most part a slower pace of expansion in the US. This is essentially a soft-landing scenario in the sense that the US will experience only a moderation in growth without major adverse impact on asset prices. From Thailand's point of view, the slowing of global growth will have important implications for our export sector. Exports, particularly last year, have been the key driver of Thailand's performance. Therefore, for the economy to continue to maintain its momentum, it is important that we see in Thailand this year a stronger turnaround in domestic demand, especially in private sector investment. For the global financial markets, I think three important implications are likely to emerge from this year's slower growth. First, inflation is likely to be less of a policy concern across the major economies compared to last year.
The MPC’s central estimate that QE had a total peak impact on GDP of around 2.5% in 2013 implies that adjusted Bank Rate fell below 0.5% during the depths of the crisis. In the May 2014 Inflation Report the MPC judged that maintaining the stock of asset purchases at £ would provide continued, albeit declining support to activity implying that adjusted Bank Rate is still currently below 0.5%. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  natural rate of interest will not rise to pre-crisis levels which is why we believe increases in Bank rate will be both gradual and limited. Moves in financial markets may also be signalling nervousness in the slow healing story. Financial markets drifted down in the second half of 2015 and they fell quite sharply in the first months of this year. Some of these moves have recovered a bit in the last week or so. But nevertheless current market signals seem to be suggesting a structurally weaker economic picture. UK 10-year real yields are negative. And yield curves are flat as far as the eye can see – the 5-year point on the UK forward market interest rate curve has fallen by around 0.8 percentage points to 1% in the last month.8 It is difficult to identify any really major economic news in 2016 that might underlie this. Rather it may be that markets are shifting to a new perception of the world economy and risks, and of policy-makers’ ability to respond to future challenges.

They have maintained, and in many cases increased, their strength during a prolonged period of financial crisis, at a time of far-reaching change to the banking industry worldwide and important regulatory reforms at home. A large part of this programme of reform has aimed at enabling our banking system to build further on its strengths and to channel them more efficiently. An important theme in the reform programme is the removal of barriers to competition with the aim of driving efficiency and energy in the banking sector. One of the outcomes has been the considerable progress made recently towards the consolidation of banks into institutions of a size and scope that can make them more capable of deploying their strengths in an increasingly globalised environment. The complementary theme in the reform programme is improving and expanding safety measures, not with the aim of sustaining weak institutions, but in order to prevent systemic contagion should a bank run into difficulties and to provide a greater measure of protection to the small depositor. In 1999 we clarified our role as lender of last resort, a measure of some importance in times of economic or financial uncertainty. We have made progress in implementing our risk-based supervisory approach, which is intended to produce a more focused and accurate assessment of the areas of greatest risk to individual institutions - and to take pre-emptive actions.