samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is difficult to give an exact answer to these questions, but recent research conducted by the staff at the Central Bank of Turkey may give us some ideas. Empirical analysis of food prices in Turkey showed that external factors are quite dominant in food inflation. It was estimated that severe drought in Turkey and skyrocketing world food prices were responsible for almost 70 percent of annual inflation in processed food prices in 2007. It was less than 10 percent in 2006. It was also found that aggregate demand conditions, which are mostly within the domain of monetary policy, had a negligible contribution in processed food inflation. These findings show, on balance, that the recent climb in processed food prices was mainly fueled by supply shocks and external factors. Dear Guests, In recent months there are signs of some relief in food inflation. Inflationary pressures triggered by severe drought and related crop losses have been waning for some time around the world, including Turkey. Early forecasts for 2008 suggest that the weather will be more accommodating than 2007. As measured by current indicators, grain production will particularly rebound from its year-ago levels. The rate of increase in food prices is likely to decelerate during the second half of 2008. Yet, despite better prospects on the supply side, food prices are expected to stay elevated in the near future in the medium term as long as the demand pressure from rapidly-growing developing countries continues. Let me give you a few numbers and explain my reasoning.

However, the revision will work only if necessary policy stance is adopted. For this reason, the second pillar of monetary policy comprises the implementation of a monetary tightening that is consistent with the new inflation targets. Newly set targets are references that would help decision makers in the economy understand the reasoning behind the policy stance, i.e. the factors that have led to monetary tightening and the extent of monetary tightening if and when necessary. In other words, the Central Bank has announced, via the target revision, the limits of its tolerance to the first round impacts of supply side shocks. While concluding my speech, I would like to extend my thanks to the Central Bank of Argentina, and all other institutions and individuals who contributed to the organization of this significant event. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 109/2008
Through 2003, the interest rate differential has narrowed as a result of monetary policy easing. This has also contributed to a substantial depreciation of the krone. In Norway, internationally oriented business sectors, such as the ICT sector and the travel industry, have been particularly affected by weak global developments. Expectations concerning future earnings have been revised downwards substantially in these sectors. This has led to cost cuts and  2  BIS Review 43/2003  redundancies. Combined with a deterioration in competitiveness and lower activity in manufacturing, this has resulted in rising unemployment in the last year. Public agencies have had limited opportunities to increase service production because wages have risen. Some municipalities and other government agencies have reduced the number of employees. While real economic activity has declined and unemployment has increased, inflation in Norway is now low. The rise in consumer prices adjusted for taxes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) has slowed, primarily due to developments in prices for imported consumer goods. Low inflation is a consequence of the appreciation of the krone throughout last year and low inflation abroad. The rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services has also slowed. This particularly applies to prices for domestically produced goods influenced by world market prices. In August, the year-on-year rise in the CPI-ATE was 0.9 per cent, after having been down to 0.7 per cent one month earlier. This was slightly lower than projected in the last Inflation Report and considerably lower than the inflation target of 2.5 per cent.

As regards interest rates, both real and nominal rates have fallen continuously since the mid 1990s. For households this has entailed significantly lower mortgage costs. At the end of 1992 the banks' average nominal lending rate to households was just over 15 per cent and inflation stood at just over 2 per cent. Now, the average lending rate is around 6 per cent, while inflation has remained at about the same level. So households can incur more than double the amount of debt today and still have lower debt-servicing costs. The favourable economic climate from the mid 1990s also contributed to a drop in unemployment, on the one hand, and an increase in wages on the other. All in all, this led to a rise in household disposable income. Moreover, disposable income has continued to increase during the period of relatively weak economic activity in recent years. This has been mainly due to unemployment remaining low, in spite of the economic slowdown. So low interest rates and high growth in household disposable income are two fundamental factors that could explain the rise in prices in the housing market. Furthermore, there is no excess supply in the housing market similar to that seen at the beginning of the 1990s when housing construction was encouraged through various kinds of grants and tax subsidies. Instead, there is very little construction of housing today, and discussions are concerned rather with how to step this up.
Each time a borrower ventures abroad, new opportunities are created. As managers of such financial relationships, banking institutions can be part of this process by fostering the banking relationship into a long-term strategic partnership, and by providing the right range of financial products. These opportunities may also be realised by setting up presence in new markets. It can also be in the form of partnerships or strategic acquisition of an existing banking institution in a foreign market. Mergers or alliances in services and products can be pursued through co-branding or complementary products, delivery channels and marketing or product development. Alliances can also be formed to capitalise on intangible assets such as human capital. Such alliances can also translate into increased innovation in processes, structures, business models and ultimately innovation in products and services. Indeed, strategic alliances have been growing, cutting across many industries and business segments. As banking institutions are able to fulfil the differentiated demands and expectations, this would enhance their capacity to compete in both the domestic and external markets and thus be able to capture the opportunities accorded from liberalisation and globalisation. Customer-centric banking system Ladies and Gentlemen: As the financial landscape evolves and competition intensifies, banking institutions need to respond to the changing market needs, and continually reassess strategies and alternatives in this rapidly changing and dynamic market and shift from just the traditional offerings. Consumers are becoming increasingly discerning and demanding.

For sterling borrowers, that bridge is built on the foundations of SONIA – the Sterling Overnight Index Average, produced every day by us at the Bank of England and based – unlike LIBOR – at around 60 billion pounds of real, daily transactions1;  -  And, second, while that work has been underway, we’ve shored up the old LIBOR bridge, through the FCA’s agreement with LIBOR panel banks to continue providing submissions to the benchmark. But those repairs were only ever temporary. The FCA can’t replace those markets that used to underpin LIBOR submissions: they are gone forever. And the FCA’s agreement with the panel banks runs out at the end of 2021. From 2022, therefore, the availability of LIBOR cannot be guaranteed. Something that is unsafe today will become lethal at the end of next year. 1  The Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA) is administered by the Bank and reflects the average of the interest rates that banks pay to borrow sterling overnight from other financial institutions See www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/sonia-benchmark. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  Avoiding that outcome is what we’re here today to discuss. But before we dive into the detail I want to leave you with three key messages: -  First, LIBOR transition affects every company that borrows in sterling. You cannot ignore it, or hope that it goes away: you need to act well before the end of 2021. -  But, second, there is time if you start now.
(h) The Contribution of the Financial System to the Economy and to Society: One of the striking features of the past several decades has been the rising share of financial services in measures of economy-wide value-added and, in tandem, rising financial sector balance sheets as a fraction of GDP in a number of economies. Sometimes this goes by the name “financialisation”. There are good reasons to think increasing financial depth is a natural feature of economies as they grow and develop. Indeed, there is a fairly well-established literature quantifying the boost to growth and productivity which arises from financial depth, especially for developing countries (Levine et al (2000)). Latterly, however, the question has been asked whether it is possible to have too much of a good thing. Some have asked why the cost of financial intermediation continues to rise and what this might signal about the efficiency of financial services as an industry (Friedman (2009), Philippon (2015)). Others have pointed to a possible U-shaped relationship between measures of financial depth and productivity and growth (Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), Heil (2017)). These questions have an important bearing on the contribution the financial system makes to the economy and to society. They are also meta-questions for regulatory policy. They warrant further research. (i) Financial Stability Implications of FinTech: Technologically-enabled innovation in financial services, or FinTech, has grown rapidly in recent years. The FSB’s recent report contains a useful taxonomy of such innovations (FSB (2017f)).

Simon M Potter: Models only get you so far Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and New York's First Annual Joint Research Day on Quantitative Tools for Monitoring Macroeconomic and Financial Conditions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 22 February 2019. * * * Accompanying Figures of the speech. As prepared for delivery It is a pleasure to deliver the lunchtime address during the Atlanta and New York Fed's first annual research day on quantitative tools for monitoring macroeconomic and financial conditions.1 My remarks will focus on some insights from the book Superforecasting by Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner, with respect to how we interpret, use, and evaluate the results from our quantitative tools.2 If you have read the book, subtitled "The Art and Science of Prediction," you will probably be aware that it is much less mathematical than the discussions we have been having today, but at the same time is more complex in how it articulates the role of forecasting in good decision-making. Before I continue, I should note that these remarks reflect my own personal views and not necessarily those of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System. The insights in Superforecasting grew out of a forecasting tournament sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).
Institutions like the Oxford Union were established “as a forum for discussion and debate at a time when the free exchange of ideas was a notion foreign to the restrictive university authorities.” Arguably we need such institutions in all parts of society more than ever where thesis can meet its antithesis and hopefully create a new synthesis. All of us as individuals have a responsibility to be more open and to engage respectfully with different views if we are to have a constructive political debate about the issues that matter to all of us. 5. Manage the boundary between Technocracy and Democracy carefully  How can we get the balance right between that which needs to be decided by experts versus politicians? Not surprisingly, the growth in the space occupied by experts, in part because many decisions are increasingly technical, can foster resentment of unelected individuals making decisions that have huge social consequences. Problems often arise when experts try to be politicians or when politicians try to be experts. Clarity about these roles and accountability to reinforce that clarity are essential. I have spent much of my career managing that boundary.

The first objective is to obtain the securities at competitive and appropriate prices for the Federal Reserve, as doing so will ultimately benefit the U.S. taxpayer. The second objective is to minimize any negative effects that the purchases might have on the functioning of financial markets. As I noted in a speech in October 2010, the liquidity and efficiency of the Treasury market provide tremendous benefits to our economy, and the Desk was intent on designing a purchase program that would not diminish those benefits in any meaningful way. 3 To achieve these objectives, the Desk relies on a system in which it purchases securities through reverse auctions with a set of established counterparties called the primary dealers. 4 The securities that are eligible for each operation and an indication of the total size of the operation are announced in advance. 5 Dealers then submit offers to sell those securities, either for their own accounts or on behalf of their customers, over a 45-minute period on the morning of the operation. Those offers are assessed by the Desk based on two criteria: their proximity to market prices at that time, and an internal methodology for comparing the relative value of the securities at the offered prices. 6 This process occurs over a proprietary trading system called Fedtrade under the oversight of Desk staff, and the results are typically finalized and published within a few minutes of the close of the operation.
Table 1 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent)  2015  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national saving (% of GDP) GFCF (% of nominal GDP)  2.3 2.0 1.7 -0.8 2.4 -1.8 -2.7 -2.0 21.4 23.6  2016 (e)  2017 (f)  2018 (f)  Dec.16 Report  Mar.17 Report  Dec.16 Report  Mar.17 Report  Mar.17 Report  1.5 1.1 2.0 -0.6 2.8 0.1 -1.4 -1.7 19.3 22.2  1.6 1.1 2.0 -0.8 2.8 -0.1 -1.6 -1.4 20.2 23.2  1.5-2.5 2.6 2.0 0.7 2.4 2.0 4.1 -1.9 19.2 21.7  1.0-2.0 2.3 1.9 0.2 2.5 1.6 4.3 -0.9 20.3 22.5  2.25-3.25 4.1 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7 7.2 -2.1 20.5 22.6  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 14. Or growth scenario also assumes that monetary policy will remain expansionary throughout the policy horizon. Following our communication in December, when we signaled that an additional impulse was necessary for inflation to converge to the target, during the first months of the year, we reduced the monetary policy rate (MPR) by 50 basis points (bp), leaving it at 3%. These actions meant anticipating our December announcement. Later, in our March Report, we announced the need of a slightly greater monetary policy impulse.

As a result, we used the working assumption that the MPR would follow a trajectory similar to the one implied by financial asset prices during the ten days prior to its statistical closing. In practice, this meant at least one additional 25bp cut. It is always worth remembering that this is a working assumption and as such, contingent to the new developments and their impact on projected inflation. If incoming information points at the necessity of an additional boost or, on the contrary, if this is no longer needed, we will react promptly, communicating the justification of doing so. Consistent with the assumption used in our March Report, in April we decided to lower the MPR by 25bp, to 2.75%. The press release issued then stated that we will assess the need for some additional increase in the monetary impulse, which will hinge on the medium-term inflation outlook (figure 8). This way, our monetary policy continues to be one of the most expansionary in a group of comparable economies. Figure 8 MPR and expectations (percent)  5  5  MPR  4  Financial asset prices, December 2016 Report (*)  3  Financial asset 4 prices, March Report (*) 3  EES Financial asset prices (17 April)  FBS 2 14  15  16  17  18  2  19  (*) Constructed using interest rates on swap contracts up to 10 years. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 15. As usual when making forecasts, our macroeconomic scenario faces several risks.
This is all about reducing the cost of resolution and thereby the risk to the stability of the system. Just like recovery plans, resolution plans need to be there to be used, and I can assure you that the Bank of England, in its role as a resolution authority, will be placing great emphasis on the existence of credible and useable resolution plans. They will be a tool for the authorities rigorously to ask  2  BIS Review 156/2009  the question, “With this structure and business model, could I achieve a resolution at an acceptable cost”. This will be true for domestic banks and for those operating across borders, and in the case of the latter there is a large amount of work to be done to ensure both complete coverage of resolution regimes and that they can work together. I have emphasised that I see RRPs as a device to enable tough questioning of structures and business models. I want finally to illustrate the sorts of questions that should arise by referring briefly to a couple of well known cases of the last two years or so. Let me start with Northern Rock, the first casualty in the UK and use this case to illustrate the role of a recovery plan.

It is therefore of course desirable that the extended repo-rate path is perceived as credible. As I mentioned earlier, it is possible that the extended repo-rate path with an unchanged repo rate further ahead would be perceived as less credible than a lower repo-rate path with a reduced repo rate now. In this case the effects are shown by the curves marked “Unexpected”. However, as the extended repo-rate path can be justified by the fact that it provides better outcomes for inflation and resource utilisation than the main scenario it may perhaps be perceived as being more credible, in which case the effects are shown by the curves marked “Expected”. 4  4  The effects of deviations from the repo-rate path of the main scenario on inflation, output and hours worked are calculated using the Riksbank's model Ramses with the methods described in Laséen and Svensson (2009) for expected deviations and Leeper and Zha (2003) for unexpected deviations. They are discussed in more detail in Svensson (2010c). The lower repo-rate path gives as an expected deviation (unexpected deviation in parenthesis) a largest increase in CPIF inflation of 0.42 (0.22) percentage points, in output of 0.33 (0.21) per cent and in hours worked of 0.35 (0.22) per cent. The extended repo-rate path gives as an expected deviation (unexpected in parenthesis) a largest increase in CPIF inflation of 0.48 (0.25) percentage  BIS Review 60/2010  5  Figure 2.
Therefore, concluding that real income developments before the onset of the crisis were in line with unconditional convergence theory would simply be spurious. Since the onset of the crisis positive income convergence trends were first reversed in many of the countries in the region and, when convergence reappeared, its pace was significantly slower 3  than at the beginning of the 2000s. At the current pace of convergence, most countries in the region would need decades to reach German, Austrian or Swedish levels of income, countries that are often referred to as the benchmark for the CEE region. Which, in a way, brings us to the notion of conditional convergence. The theory of conditional convergence implies that if there are persistent differences across countries in preferences and other institutional features, divergence is possible in terms of both levels of income and growth rates. And the last crisis has reminded us of this quite roughly. Just take a look at the countries of Europe's periphery. The average level of income of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal in 2016 was only at around 67% of the German income, compared to 80% at the beginning of the millennium. Similarly, in Croatia, Slovenia or, to a lesser extent, also the Czech Republic, the relative level of income in 2016 was lower than in 2008. Therefore, growth and convergence can be held back for a protracted period of time before they reappear, or forces can even work in an opposite direction, leading to divergence.

And although our instruments have changed our conviction and mission have not. Some might wish that we use our armoury for other purposes. But we will not be moved. We are an independent institution. Our rules are non-negotiable and we do not act for the benefit of interest groups or individual countries. Nor can financial stability considerations override our primary objective. Monetary dominance will always prevail. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5