samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will not take the risk and predict the development of the gold price, but one thing is certain: it will remain volatile. Our possibilities to actively hedge the gold risk are restricted by the agreement of September 1999. In particular, we may conduct hedging transactions only in the amount of the sales quota allocated to us for the current year. We are therefore all the more convinced that our strategy of regular sales remains appropriate. The principles that have guided our operations for the past two years – namely fulfilment of our commitments under the central bank agreement, transparency in communication and situationadapted handling of day-to-day business – remain relevant. Management of the free assets The market value of the free asset portfolio – consisting of the as yet unsold portion of the 1,300 tonnes of gold and the proceeds from the already effected gold sales – amounted to Sfr 21 billion at the end of May. The free asset portfolio is managed separately from our other reserves, which will facilitate its transfer to the future beneficiaries once the legal framework has been put in place. As I mentioned earlier on, our possibilities of actively hedging the gold risk against an unfavourable development of the gold price are restricted by the agreement on gold sales of September 1999. However, we limited the risks of a weak US dollar that might reduce the value of our future sales by hedging 35% of the future proceeds in US dollars against the Swiss franc.

Niklaus Blattner: Review of the Swiss economy Introductory remarks by Prof Dr Niklaus Blattner, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Geneva, 14 June 2002 *  *  *  Gold sales Since May 2000, the National Bank has been selling gold that is no longer required for monetary policy purposes. A total of 1,300 tonnes of gold is planned to be disposed of under the agreement on gold sales concluded on 26 September 1999 between fifteen European central banks. This agreement limits the total quantity of gold that can be sold by the signatories until September 2004 to 2,000 tonnes. To date, we have sold almost 520 tonnes of gold, which corresponds to 40% of the total quantity earmarked for sale. As shown in our periodic Bank returns, we are conducting regular sales of approximately one tonne a day. We consider this method more flexible, less costly and better suited to the characteristics of the market than the strategy chosen by the Bank of England, which is holding gold auctions of its own. Our average selling price has by now reached USD 279.4 per ounce (level of 31 May 2002), which is USD 2 higher than the average London gold fixing price, the benchmark price for gold. This performance has, to some degree, been realised thanks to the National Bank having been allocated a somewhat higher portion of the central banks' total annual quota of 400 tonnes since September 2001.
Those distributional differences have, however, persisted and have if anything widened further. Despite having fallen by almost 10% since the crisis, real wages among the top 10% are still over 20% higher than in 1997. But wages for the bottom 20% have fallen by almost 20% since 2007 and are essentially back to where they were in 1997. These polarising forces in the labour market are also evident across industries (Chart 17). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Between 2001 and 2007, median annual wage growth across industries was 4% with a standard deviation of 1 percentage point. During 2014, average real wage growth has averaged 1% with a standard deviation of 2.5 percentage points (Chart 18). Wage dispersion has risen markedly. In some sectors wages are growing faster than before the crisis, while in others they are falling in both real and nominal terms. So while strong employment demand has helped sustain wages among the highly-skilled, it has not worked the same magic for the lower skilled. That begs the question – why? The most likely explanation is that rising demand has been more than offset by the rise in the supply of labour for these services. Several factors are likely to have been at play. First, displaced mid-skilled workers may have sought jobs for which they are over-qualified in order to stay in employment. In other words, they have moved down the skill distribution, placing downward pressure on wages. The crisis is likely to have reinforced these trends.

Caleb M Fundanga: Innovation for leadership excellency Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) launch of MBA Alumni Zambia Chapter, Lusaka, 12 February 2010. *  *  *  The Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) Director General, Prof. Bonnard Mwape; The President, ESAMI MBA Alumni Zambia Chapter, Mr. Christopher Mulenga; The Ecobank Zambia Limited Managing Director, Mrs Charity Lumpa; ESAMI Alumni; Distinguished Invited Guests; Members of the Press; Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to officiate at the launch of the ESAMI MBA Alumni Zambia Chapter. I wish to take this opportunity to welcome Prof. Bonnard Mwape and other ESAMI staff that have travelled from Arusha to come and witness this important occasion. I am particularly delighted to be part of this launch because my first interaction with the ESAMI MBA alumni members was during the recent summer school event held in Arusha, Tanzania, where I was invited to present a paper on “The Effects of the Global Economic Crisis on Zambia”. Indeed my memories of that lively interaction are still very fresh and that is why I graciously accepted to officiate at this function when I received the invitation from the President of the association. Ladies and Gentlemen allow me to congratulate the President and his team for this excellent initiative of bringing together individuals with a common academic background under the Alumni umbrella.
A more expansionary monetary policy At the start of 2015, we thus found ourselves in an unusual situation with a series of circumstances that suggested that monetary policy needed to be more expansionary: declining confidence in the inflation target, the measures adopted by the ECB to weaken the euro, the risk that the falling oil price would put further pressure on inflation expectations and increased uncertainty over international developments. Consequently, there was a need to strengthen confidence in the inflation target through clear signals of the Riksbank’s ability and willingness to bring inflation back to the two per cent target in a controlled form. We needed to clarify and practically demonstrate that monetary policy had more to give. The repo rate was already at a historically-low zero per cent and even the interest rates we sometimes call the final interest rates – that is, those actually paid by households and companies – were at historically low levels. But interest rates needed to be even lower and we needed to counteract the increasingly rapid appreciation of the krona. Negative interest rate? The most obvious measure was to cut the repo rate further, that is to make it negative – to introduce what, in everyday parlance, was starting to be called a negative interest rate. When we cut the repo rate to zero per cent, we did not observe any major problems.

We also noted an unusually low interest among companies in raising their prices, despite rising costs. Conceivable explanations for this included decreasing inflation expectations and perceived uncertainty over the economic outlook, as reported by the companies in our Business Surveys.2 The unusually low inflation in recent years is something we have shared with many other countries. This may have strengthened the perception that there are forces in motion making it impossible for the Riksbank to reach the inflation target. There has been, not least, an emphasis on the effects of globalisation and digitisation on costs and competition. However, as my colleague in the Executive Board, Martin Flodén, pointed out in a speech last autumn, it is difficult to see why this should have persistent effects on the rate of inflation in particular and why it has not prevented higher inflation in countries like Norway, Canada and Australia.3 In addition, these factors were relevant when Sweden had a higher rate of inflation, just a few years ago. Regardless of the underlying reasons, it would be very unfortunate if long-term inflation expectations were to drift away from the inflation target. We would then start to lose everything we gained by having an inflation target. Inflation prospects are influenced by international developments At the same time, at the start of 2015, the European Central Bank (the ECB) had announced bond purchases in an amount of EUR 60 billion per month to make its monetary policy more expansionary.
Palmqvist, Stefan (2013), “Konsumentprisindex i Sverige och Kanada är inte så lika” (The CPI in Sweden and Canada are not so similar) (In Swedish) Post on the blog Ekonomistas, http://ekonomistas.se/2013/11/20/konsumentprisindex-i-sverige-och-kanada-ar-inte-sa-lika/. Reserve Bank of Australia (1998), The Implications of Recent Changes to the Consumer Price Index for Monetary Policy and the Inflation Target. Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, October. Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1999), Minor Technical Change to Inflation Target. Press release, 28 October. The Riksbank (2010), The Riksbank removes the tolerance interval from its specified monetary policy target Memorandum, Basis for Decision, 31 May 2010, http://www.riksbank.se/Upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Pressmeddelanden/2010/ nr27_beslutsunderlag.pdf. The Riksdag (2014), Committee on Finance appoints top names to evaluate the Riksbank's monetary policy. Press release, 17 June. Skingsley, Cecilia (2015), Inflation-targeting policy after the financial crisis. Speech at Almega, 22 May. Svenska Dagbladet (2015), “Professorn varnar för låga räntan,” (Professor warns about low interest rate) (In Swedish) 18 November. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1. Stable Swedish economy  Note: The yield differential refers to 10-year government bonds, monthly data. Sources: Thomson Reuters and the Riksbank  Figure 2. Major direct impact of interest rate changes on CPI inflation  Note: Weighted mortgage rate is chained in December 2014 due to an altered measurement method. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 3. CPI inflation varies a lot more than CPIF and HICP inflation  Note: The CPIF is the CPI with a fixed mortgage rate. HICP refers to the EU-harmonised index for consumer prices.

If there were a tolerance band, inflation of just over 1 per cent, or below 3 per cent, instead would be “tolerable” if unforeseen events meant that inflation ended up there, but it would not be something to consciously aim for. The idea that many commentators seem to have is that a target range would mean the Riksbank would feel less forced to bring inflation up to 2 per cent, which in turn would mean that monetary policy would not need to be as expansionary and the risks linked to such a policy could be mitigated. Difficult to pursue another policy even with an interval I would like to point out here, without commenting on the pros and cons of a target range in general terms, that this idea appears to be based in part on a misunderstanding of the motives behind the Riksbank’s policy. The reason the Riksbank is eager to get inflation to rise is not that we have a rigid fixation with achieving exactly 2 per cent inflation all the time. It is due to the fact that the period in which inflation has been below the target has gradually become longer, and that long-term inflation expectations have shown a falling trend and still remain below the target.
8  For a more detailed review of the issues considered here see “The future of repo: ‘too much’ or ‘too little’?”, a speech by Andrew Hauser, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech665.pdf. 9  Estimates reported by the Basel Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) suggest that the combined impact of liquidity regulation and OTC derivatives reforms could generate additional collateral demand to the tune of $ trillion. Depending on the data used, that amounts to at least a third of the high quality collateral in active circulation today. But it is  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  how to innovate. Investor expectations for liquidity are changing and models for risk intermediation should evolve in ways that reduce balance sheet usage. 4. Central banking in global markets  Central banks need to keep up. In particular, we can catalyse more efficient and effective private collateral management by backstopping private markets. 140 years ago in Lombard Street, Walter Bagehot expounded the duty of the Bank of England to lend freely to stem a panic and to make loans on “everything which in common times is good “banking security”.” Bagehot was particularly scathing on the Bank’s failure at that time to state a “clear and sound policy” on this general topic writing “...until we have on this point a clear understanding with the Bank of England, both our liability to crises and our terror at crises will always be greater than they would otherwise be.”10 140 years on, the Bank has a clear and sound policy.

Financial institutions with their extensive branch networks, qualified financial management officers and extensive experience in assessing the risks facing consumers are best positioned to increase the level of institutional capacity that can enhance financial literacy. We need to recognise our shared responsibility to equip the communities in our countries with the necessary skills and confidence in managing their personal financial matters. Collective efforts to develop institutional capacity to share information and knowledge about financial literacy across the region can also bring about mutually reinforcing results. Financial literacy needs to be elevated to a more important level on the national and international agenda for a greater shared economic prosperity. On that note, thank you for your attention. BIS Review 85/2005  3
Banks’s enforcement powers for  As a priority, we expect to strengthen the regulatory framework pertaining to all financial institutions, including licensed banks, licensed finance  violations of the Act and the Directions issued under it. In this regard, we wish to seek views from the banking sector as well. companies (LFCs), specialised leasing  In line with these reforms, we intend to  companies (SLCs) and primary dealers. It  review all key regulations in the medium-  will further ensure the stability of the  term. In this regard, we will review key  financial sector by promoting the safety  Banking Act Directions, such as share  and soundness of those institutions to  ownership, foreign borrowings, and  face unforeseen challenges in the  corporate governance, and these will be  growing business environment. amended where necessary. In this regard, the Central Bank wishes to  In order to maintain financial stability in  implement the following policies in 2017  the country and in line with regulatory  and beyond. reforms, we have identified the need for  Since the last amendment to the existing Banking Act in 2006, the banking sector landscape has undergone a significant  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  further strengthening of the supervisory function of the Central Bank.

Michael C Bonello: Financing the small business sector – constraints and opportunities Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the European Federation of Ethical and Alternative Banks and Financiers Seminar, St.Julian's, 15 April 2010. *  *  *  The holding of a seminar on credit for small businesses is both appropriate and timely given the important role played by these enterprises in modern, free-market economies and the contribution they are likely to make in the recovery phase as economies emerge from recession. It is perhaps not widely known that of the almost 20 million enterprises active within the European Union (EU) in 2005, 99.8% were small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), defined as businesses that employ fewer than 250 persons. 1 In turn, more than nine-tenths of these were micro enterprises, with a workforce of fewer than 10. In 2005 SMEs accounted for 58% of the value added generated in the EU and 67% of all employment, compared to 55% in the US. 2 Small businesses are a major source of dynamism in the Maltese economy too. SMEs constitute the overwhelming majority of businesses, accounting for over 99% of the total and two-thirds of total employment. The vast majority are micro enterprises. These small operations act as customers of, and suppliers to, larger companies and are an essential source of entrepreneurship and innovation.
In the UK, the FSA has recently published how they will approach this international effort. 6 It is a formidable task. Working with the FSB secretariat, my role, as chairman to the CrossBorder Crisis Management Working Group, will be to help colleagues to flush out the issues, so that they can be properly debated and reviewed by G20 Ministers and Governors later next year. With the European Commission on the FSB and also the resolution working group, I hope that will also help to inform work at the European level. There will quite probably be hard questions. They could include whether something needs to be done about the complex structures and organisation of some banks. Another big issue might be which services truly need to be maintained. Whether there are conflicts between the insolvency laws and special resolution regimes of different countries that would materially impede effective resolution for some groups. And another would be whether losses can in the future credibly be made to fall on wholesale creditors. Maybe even about burden sharing amongst national authorities if fiscal support proves unavoidable when an internationally active bank fails. In all this the objective, of course, is to get to a place where taxpayers’ resources are not needed, implicitly or explicitly, to underpin the national and international credit systems. And some of those operational questions, therefore, shade into the broader debates about the structure and regulation of the financial system. 7 Of that list of issues, I should highlight two today.

We also would like to see a more determined effort to provide more transparency and clarity in these systems’ procedures and settlement activity, so that participants and members have a heightened understanding of their obligations and exposures in a situation that would test a system’s risk controls. The safety and soundness standards for payments and settlement infrastructure have been complemented by sound practices for operational resilience. During the past three years, core clearing and settlement organizations in the U.S. have come a long way toward meeting more demanding objectives for recovery and resumption. Going forward, it is important that the major firms maintain a level of resilience that is commensurate with their essential positions in the financial system. Over time, we expect firms will take advantage of cost-effective improvements in technology and business processes to increase, where needed, the geographic diversification of their back-up sites. We also expect senior management at each firm to assure itself through rigorous testing that their firms can, in fact, rapidly recover or resume their important settlement activity. We also need to continue to pay more attention to how to reduce the threat of cyber-attacks. Beyond the direct financial  2  BIS Review 59/2004  losses from criminal activity, these threats pose a broader risk to confidence in the integrity of financial institutions, payments systems, and ultimately, the global payments network. This is a growing challenge, and it will require a major ongoing commitment of resources.
The current account deficit decreased at 6.7% of the GDP in 2018, from 7.5% in the previous year. Its improvement reflected to a large extent the increase in the tourism-related activity. Budget deficit and public debt continued to record a downward trend, reflecting both the consolidation path of the fiscal policy and the economic growth as well as the exchange rate appreciation. The main banking sector soundness indicators, in particular liquidity, profitability and capitalisation, remain at satisfactory levels. Against this backdrop, annual inflation averaged 2.0%, remaining unchanged from 2017 and below our 3% target. Inflation stood stable owing to two effects of opposite directions. The buildup in domestic inflationary pressures, generated by the rise in employment, wages and production costs was offset by the rapid appreciation of the domestic currency over the first half of the year. The exchange rate appreciation was a decelerating factor for achieving the inflation target. The exchange rate has moved along a slight appreciation path over the last three years, driven by fundamental factors that dictate its behaviour such as: improvement of the balance of trade exchanges with abroad, high levels of foreign direct investments, and reduction of risk premia in domestic financial markets. Yet, beyond these effects, the exchange rate was subject to certain shocks in the first half of 2018.

In the long run, this project will simultaneously be an investment for improving the operations not only of the National Bank and the Ministry of Interior, but indirectly also of other institutions that are actively involved in the system for fighting counterfeiting money: the Customs Administration, the Financial Police Office of the Ministry of Finance, the Public Prosecution Office and the judicial authorities. I believe that after the implementation of this Project, our interinstitutional cooperation in the field of monitoring and prevention of counterfeiting banknotes and coins will be further developed. I believe that very soon after the completion of the project activities, we will jointly state and announce that our national system for fighting counterfeit is at a higher level, compatible with the systems of the EU member states. At the end of my speech, I would like to emphasize that I am pleased that our twinning partners in this Project are two older EU member states – Germany and Austria. Having in mind that they are direct participants in policy making, overcoming all the challenges associated with the euro since its introduction twenty years ago, I believe that in communication and cooperation with their experts we will gain knowledge that will be of great benefit for us in the process of strengthening our capacities.