samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I can also see a case for reporting how votes are actually cast. This is, in fact, already the practice of the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. BIS Review 58/1998  -4-  Monetary policy and asset prices Finally some words about a matter that is not directly on the agenda for our discussions. I am referring to how monetary policy should respond to asset prices. The reason for bringing it up today is threefold. First, it is a matter that is widely discussed today in many international forums as well as in many central banks. Second, as a practitioner I would like to encourage our leading international experts present here today to study it further in the years to come in order to develop more knowledge in this area. It could be the topic for a future conference. My third reason is more personal. Before I came to Sveriges Riksbank I was state secretary at the Ministry of Finance and involved in the management of Sweden’s financial crises. The obvious question for me is why did it happen and how can we prevent it from ever happening again. I have already touched on the question of monetary policy’s target variable, which, as we all know, is a very complicated matter. An additional dimension is whether asset prices more formally should be included in the target variable for monetary policy? The question about monetary policy and asset prices is by no means new.

One conceivable explanation is that, having waited longer than other countries, the road back to price stability was more difficult for us. There were also a number of exceptional events along the way. What was perhaps the worst bank crisis of the century erupted in the wake of the 1980s’ bubble economy. Exchange rate turmoil was such that, during some dramatic days, the instrumental rate was hiked to 500 per cent. In the early 1990s the budget deficit grew to be the largest in the industrialised world. There are many similarities, as well as some differences, between the financial crisis in Sweden and those in Mexico and Southeast Asia. In recent years the situation in Sweden has become more stable and, with a resolute economic policy, developments have taken a positive turn. The bank crisis has been resolved, the economy is in an expansionary phase and inflation expectations are low. Step by step, the credibility of the new regime is being established. Experience in other countries clearly shows that the consolidation of a changeover to a low-inflation regime takes many years. Inflation target’s historical roots and advantages The idea of focusing monetary policy on price stability goes back, as I mentioned earlier, at least to Wiksell’s arguments a century ago. It seems to me that Wiksell’s emphasis on deflation being as important to avoid as inflation has much to do with the acceptance of this policy today.
In 2001, average inflation rates in the region as a whole fell to single figure levels for the first time since the fall of the iron curtain and, thereafter, they have continued to decline. In this context, let me highlight that, bearing in mind the potential inflationary pressures that might arise from completing structural reforms, the conduct of a  BIS Review 58/2002  1  monetary policy in the accession countries aiming at price stability should be seen as a medium-term objective, rather than as a short-term target. However, the sound management of macroeconomic policies cannot rely on monetary policy alone. In particular, stability-oriented policies in accession countries need to be supported by sound fiscal policies. Prudent fiscal policy management has been key to making sustainable progress in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation in the accession countries. At the beginning of the transition to a market economy, poor tax collection and governments' limited access to financial markets led to substantial monetisation of public deficits. However, from the mid-1990s onwards, fiscal policy has focused on macroeconomic stability. Therefore, a key lesson from the accession countries' experience is that responsible fiscal policy has been a crucial element in achieving and maintaining macroeconomic stability. Looking ahead, the best contribution that fiscal policies can make to sustainable noninflationary growth is by pressing ahead with fiscal consolidation, as is necessary to ensure the flexibility needed to deal with potential domestic and/or external economic shocks in the medium term.

Willem F Duisenberg: Perspectives on EU enlargement Speech by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from IMADEC University, Vienna, 14 October 2002. *  *  *  Dear Klaus, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great privilege for me to be awarded an honorary doctorate today by such a distinguished institution, IMADEC University, in Austria. It is also a great pleasure to hear the kind words of my colleague and friend, Governor Klaus Liebscher. When listening to Klaus Liebscher, who has indeed studied my curriculum vitae in great depth, Shakespeare's words came to my mind and I thought for a moment he had come to bury me, although he has actually come to praise me. I am afraid that this is the fate of anybody whose retirement comes within sight. Nothing but good should be said of the dead, they say. Considering that I am still alive, it is even more gratifying to hear nothing but good things about myself; perhaps with the exception of my addiction to tobacco - an addiction that Klaus and I happen to share. There is one thing I should like to emphasise in the laudation. As Klaus Liebscher has just said, my career has benefited from a “Summe von Zufälligkeiten” that I have been lucky enough to encounter throughout my professional life.
Chart 6 Wage growth on the rise Wage growth is rising and reached the highest level seen in over a decade last year, turning out higher than we had expected. This can be ascribed in large part to a tight labour market and improved profitability in some business sectors. The social partners expect wage growth to rise further this year, and expectations have increased in recent months. Wage growth is projected to be around 5 percent this year,  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  which is higher than we projected in December. While wage growth did not keep pace with price growth last year, we expect wage inflation to be slightly higher than price inflation this year. Higher wage growth means higher business costs, which will likely also contribute to sustaining inflation. Figure 7. Further rate rise most likely in May It is our responsibility to ensure that inflation falls to 2 percent. At the same time, we will avoid raising the policy rate beyond that needed to curb inflation. There is considerable uncertainty about future economic developments, but we will most likely raise the policy rate again in May, followed by a further rise to around 3.5 percent in summer. This could mean an increase in the residential mortgage rate to between 4½ and 5 percent. Chart 8 Prospects for lower inflation and somewhat higher unemployment In our current projections, inflation falls back towards 2 percent over the next years.

When the AIG began its work, it quickly became clear that there was no “one-size-fits-all” approach to implementing Basel II. Rather, implementation should be tailored to the specific circumstances of a bank and the jurisdictions it operates in. In this regard, one of the primary methods the AIG uses to promote convergence is to encourage home supervisors of the 50 or 60 largest internationally active banks in Basel Committee member countries to engage in practical outreach to host supervisors and the banks to open clear lines of communication and cooperation in based on banks’ own implementation plans. Each home supervisor coordinates the work in a way that is most practical in light of the particular bank circumstances and its own supervisory approach. It is clear that successful implementation rests on adequate flows of information, as well as trust among supervisors. As we go forward, we need to strike an appropriate balance between top-down and bottom-up consistency. That is, the top-down rules and the bottom-up convergence of supervisory practices should work together to reinforce a level playing field. This balance will naturally be dynamic. Early on, the scales were tipped toward developing a common set of rules. Now that these rules are in place, the scale is tipping the other way toward enhancing communication and convergence among  2  BIS Review 46/2006  supervisors in the implementation of these rules.
The baseline assessment would include the environmental risk of a bank’s lending and other businesses. In this Phase, the HKMA will need to work with the industry to develop a ___ (a) common framework, drawing on the latest international standards and best practices. The HKMA will also, in collaboration with the relevant international bodies, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), provide capacity building and training programmes to banks in Hong Kong for better understanding of the green principles and methodology in undertaking the baseline assessment. Phase II – once we have completed the baseline assessment of banks in Hong Kong in Phase I, the HKMA will engage the industry and other relevant stakeholders in a 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  (b) consultation on the supervisory expectation or requirement on Green and Sustainable Banking going forward. The key objective of this Phase is to set tangible deliverables for Hong Kong’s banking industry to become “greener” and “more sustainable”. Phase III – once the deliverables have been set, the next Phase is Implementation, (c) Monitoring and Evaluation. The success of this Phase depends crucially on appropriate measurement of the “greenness” of the banks and the timely disclosure of progress or the lack of it. 4. With the support of the banking industry, I expect Phase I could be completed within around 12 months’ time from now. Responsible Investment 5. In the past few years, there has been a significant shift in mind-set amongst asset owners on Green and ESG investments.

The US central bank, the Federal Reserve (the Fed), and the European Central Bank (ECB) took action in this situation by lending large volumes of money to the banks when they could not borrow from one another. The degree of financial unease then varied during the course of a whole year. The TED spreads peaked when the banks wanted to secure their liquidity ahead of the turn of the year 2007-2008. A further peak was reached in March 2008 when US investment bank Bear Sterns suffered acute liquidity problems and suspended payments, but things calmed down again after the Fed mediated the takeover of the bank by JP Morgan. BIS Review 25/2009  1  In mid-September 2008, when the US investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the financial turmoil became an acute financial crisis. The TED spreads were driven up to very high levels. Many banks, institutions and funds were highly exposed to Lehman Brothers. Few had expected such an important financial agent to be allowed to fall. There was a great deal of concern that more players would end up in a similar situation. The remaining large investment banks as such quickly disappeared. The financial crisis also spread to other countries and developed into a global financial crisis. Access to credit declined on the financial markets around the world and some markets more or less ceased functioning.
Challenge 1 - Continued internationalisation Allow me to deal with the different challenges in turn and therefore begin with the challenge posed by internationalisation and, in particular, European integration. One of the driving forces behind the trends in the capital and credit markets is increased international competition and increased awareness of international opportunities. The diversification of both financing and investment is increasing, and risk management instruments are being improved. Europe affects the financial markets through the euro. In addition to the 12 euro countries in the EU, there are a large number of countries in which the euro plays a pivotal role either as a means of payment or through some form of link to the euro. In coming years, when the current accession countries gradually introduce the euro, the euro markets will become larger. At the same time, the harmonisation of rules will continue and the markets will become more integrated. Meanwhile the euro has been accepted by the rest of the market; both the United States and the United Kingdom keep just over half of their official foreign exchange reserves in euro. Canada and Australia keep around 40 per cent in euro. There has therefore been a rise in demand for euro bonds and an increase in liquidity in the market. At the same time, the supply of bonds has risen as an increasing number of agents, both companies and states, are choosing to finance their activities  BIS Review 15/2003  3  through the bond market.

See the box on page 13 of the May 2009 Inflation Report for discussion of the reasons for excluding intermediate OFCs in measures of broad money. 7  This is in a similar spirit to Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004). BIS Review 29/2010  5  Similarly, movements in OIS rates following policy announcements may provide a guide to the extent to which the announcements affected expectations about the future stance of monetary policy. OIS rates fell sharply following the initial announcements of QE, particularly at short horizons, suggesting these announcements caused market participants to revise down the expected future path of Bank Rate. However, perhaps not surprisingly, as QE has become better understood, OIS rates have responded less to more recent announcements. This is consistent with market participants increasingly viewing QE as part of the systematic component of monetary policy. To the extent that gilt yields and other asset prices have moved in response to this systematic component, these movements would not be captured by event studies and hence looking only at announcement effects may tend to understate the impact of QE. Gilts make up a relatively small proportion of total assets held by the private sector. As such, when assessing the overall impact of our asset purchases it is important to consider the increase in other asset prices. Since we started QE, equity prices have increased by more than 50%, and corporate bond yields have fallen by over 400 basis points.
Joseph S Tracy: A strategy for the 2011 economic recovery Remarks by Mr Joseph S Tracy, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at Dominican College, Orangeburg, New York, 28 January 2011. *  *  *  Good morning. It is a pleasure to be with you this morning to look back on the tremendous events impacting the economy over the past several years, and to assess the outlook for the economy going forward. Let me note that the views that I will discuss with you are my own and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. On September 20, 2010, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determined that the “Great Recession” officially ended in June 2009. The Great Recession did not earn its moniker due to its length. At 18 months, the length of the Great Recession was only slightly longer than the average of 17.5 months for the 33 recessions tracked by the NBER since 1857. In fact, the longest recession was 65 months and lasted from October 1873 to March 1879. The Great Recession distinguished itself from earlier recessions in terms of its severity rather than its length. There was a decline in real output relative to trend of $ trillion or 8 percent (Chart 1). This contraction brought the level of real output back to its level in 2006. In most recessions, consumption growth slows but remains positive.

Favourable labour market conditions, as reflected in a further decrease in unemployment since late 2018, and a dynamic, albeit gradually normalising housing market, should continue to support household income and private consumption. Moreover, growth in government consumption will remain elevated, as Government is expected to use some of its fiscal space, while investment is expected to maintain a high share in GDP, reflecting the substantial upgrade to Malta’s infrastructure. Nevertheless, growth is set to moderate compared with 2018, reflecting two main factors. Firstly, given the less favourable external environment, we foresee lower contributions from exports. Secondly, it is to be expected that an economy that has been growing very fast to gradually return to rates that are more in line with its long-term growth. The balance of risks is tilted to the downside. This mainly reflects the risk that economic conditions abroad deteriorate further, in which case the recent slowdown in some of our closest trading partners could develop into a more severe downturn, limiting the expansion in our exports. These risks are seen as more elevated than the upside risks associated with domestic factors. For example, the labour market’s resilience and strong liquidity position of households could be reflected in higher than expected private consumption. Government expenditure could also surprise on the upside. Indeed, Malta is one of few countries in the euro area which has the fiscal space necessary to mitigate the effects of weaker foreign demand. Ideally Government should utilise this space to enhance the economy’s capital stock and potential growth.
For sure, if there is a lesson to be had from the crisis, it is that there is always a risk of another crisis; we cannot easily repeat the famous “this time is different” approach. But we are now better prepared. As a general approach, the main challenge is to fully implement the reforms and to closely monitor their impact on the financial sector, and if necessary, fine-tune them.  The interrelation between monetary and macroprudential policies. Under general circumstances, monetary policy and macroprudential policy complement each other. But, as shown by the run-up to the global financial crisis, there might be periods in which achieving monetary policy goals does not necessarily guarantee achieving macroprudential goals and vice versa; low interest rates had an influence on financial imbalances and excessive risk-taking while inflation was contained and the real economy did not show overheating pressures. This is a tradeoff which central banks will have to deal with. It would help to design an institutional set-up that ensures synergies and consistency among monetary, micro and macroprudential policies, but also separates ex-ante analysis, probably through Chinese wall-type structures. 5/6  3. The fintech challenge   “Fintech” is gradually entering into the financial sector. Information technologies can have important implications in terms of increasing competition and redefining the relationship between consumers and suppliers of financial services, fostering efficiency gains, better financial inclusion and improvements in quality through tailored services.

Caleb M Fundanga: Broadening access to mortgage financing in Zambia Opening speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the re-launch of the Pan African Building Society (PABS), Lusaka, 24 July 2007. *  *  *  • The Shareholders of PABS; • The Board of Directors of PABS; • Senior Government Officials present; • The Deputy Governor-Operations and Registrar of Banks and Financial Institutions; • The General Manager of PABS; • Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen. It gives me great pleasure and gratitude for having been invited to speak on this occasion of the re-launch of the Pan African Building Society. Ladies and Gentlemen: Today marks an important day in the calendar of Pan African Building Society which brings on board new shareholders. The Bank of Zambia is happy to note that this development has turned around the financial condition of Pan African Building Society. Ladies and Gentlemen, as you are aware, there is shortage of housing in Zambia and therefore the demand for housing finance is increasing. It follows therefore, that the primary challenge of housing finance institutions in Zambia is the broadening of access to mortgage finance particularly to many people in urban areas. Due to the prevailing macro-economic stability that the country is experiencing, we have seen substantial growth in the housing finance industry in recent years. For instance, in the last four (4) years to December 2006, the mortgage portfolio of the building society industry has grown five fold.
Extending the logic of domestication  Retail deposit-taking is a critical economic function and local supervisors have more levers over subsidiaries than branches. Therefore – consistent with the ICB’s logic – we have preferred for several years that international banks from outside the EEA (known as ‘third countries’) with more than £ of retail and SME FSCS-covered 6  transactional or instant access account balances put them in a subsidiary . There are not many of these: most international banks in retail focus on small expatriate or diaspora communities, or on particular niches in private banking. We expect each of these firms to have a viable and sustainable UK business model which accretes a portion of its own capital, rather than being reliant on its parent, with high standards of risk management and governance. 5  See the PRA Annual Report and Accounts; July 2017 and U.S. Department of the Treasury; A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities; June 2017. 6 See SS10/14: Supervising international banks: the PRA’s approach to branch supervision; September 2014. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  EMBARGO: not for release before 19:30 on Wednesday 4 October 2017  These retail subsidiaries are not as insulated as the financial and operational separation required by the ICB. But with a much lower threshold than the £ billion of core deposits at which ring-fencing kicks in, our policy follows the same logic, proportionately applied.

2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  2  I see four main risks: 1. longevity risk - the risk that annuities to pensioners need to be paid for longer and therefore at a higher cost to the insurer because people live longer than expected; 2. market risk - the risk that asset returns are insufficient to pay the pensions: for example, because the insurer holds assets of shorter maturity than its liabilities, market interest rates fall and the insurer cannot afford to buy sufficient bonds to produce the income needed to meet its annuity obligations to pensioners; 3. credit default and downgrade risk - the insurer suffers losses because the assets in which it has invested default or downgrade; and, perhaps most importantly 4. management and governance risk - in the absence of regulation the owners and managers of an insurer may be incentivised to maximise their own short-term returns rather than managing the business in the long-term interest of the annuity holders. The interests of owners and managers are not necessarily aligned with those of the policyholders because owners share the benefits of taking more risk in a good outcome but have limited exposure to losses in a bad outcome because of their limited liability. Policyholders might be unable to monitor how an insurer is run because of the long-term and complex nature of pensions business.