samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The second salient feature is Asia's high rate of savings, exceeding 30% of gross national product (GNP) in most Asian economies, which have enabled the private and public sectors to fund capital accumulation from domestic sources. While the private sector focuses on investing in physical capital and adopting new technologies to raise productive efficiency, governments across Asia place commensurate emphasis on developing infrastructure, such as roads, ports and utilities, as well as on healthcare and education. The combination of efficient capital and productive labour in turn generates more higher-value-added activity, thereby accelerating economic growth. Third, the Asian economies have adopted an outward-oriented development path, rather than depended only on domestic demand, to expand industrial production. Just five decades ago, Asia was amongst the world's poorest regions. Asia recognised that its development process would be slow and marginal should low-income-driven domestic demand be relied upon to incrementally stimulate industrial activity. It accelerated the movement of resources from low-productivity traditional activity to high-productivity modern activity. Most of Asia, early among the developing economies, has been very open to international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), resulting in Asia to be rapidly integrated with the global economy. The trade volume of Asia as a share of total world trade increased from 14% in 1970 to 22% in 1990, and subsequently to 28% in 2008. Furthermore, Asia has also been a major recipient of FDI, with FDI flows into Asia increasing from 7% of total global FDI to 20% in 2007.

The EMU will reinforce monetary and financial stability The international role of the euro With regard to the international role of the euro, let me say that the Eurosystem does not regard it as part of a zero sum game in an atmosphere of confrontation. On the contrary, I view it as a positive sum game, based upon close international cooperation and certainly not on confrontation. The international role of a currency is a complex matter. A currency can be used by different groups of economic agents for different purposes, as an anchor and reserve currency on the official side, as an invoicing and payment currency for international trade, as well as a currency of denomination for financial assets, on the private side. BIS Review 81/1999  6  My understanding of the process towards internationalisation of the euro is based on the following observations: í  firstly the euro , as I said before, has the full legacy of the most credible currencies in Europe, taking into account the fact that the European monetary convergence process has been based upon a benchmarking principle. The euro is not starting from scratch but from the solid soil of currencies having proved their solidity over time like the franc, the DM, the guilder, and so forth;  í  secondly, the policy which is pursued by the European Central Bank is a policy of stability, credibility, low inflation so that the euro will be an excellent store of value. This is called upon us by the Treaty.
Øystein Olsen: Monetary policy from the perspective of a commodityexporting country Dinner speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 19 November 2012. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. I would like to thank the ECB for hosting this conference on a topic that is a core interest for us in Norges Bank. It is a pleasure to visit the ECB in Frankfurt. In my remarks tonight, I will give you a glimpse into the historical background for our economic framework and the conduct of monetary policy in Norway today. As you know, Norway is in the fortunate position of having ownership rights to large natural resources. Oil was discovered in the North Sea in 1969. Back then, it soon became clear that oil and gas would be a source of substantial wealth – and government expenditure and social programmes expanded rapidly. By 1977, a surplus on the current account had turned into a deficit of 12 percent of GDP. The deficit was three times larger than that of Italy and Spain last year. Predictably, we also experienced a contraction in the non-oil tradable sector. Fiscal policy had fuelled a boom-bust economy and had to be reversed and tightened. Many Norwegians experienced a decline in real income. When oil prices fell in 1986, the Norwegian economy was hit again.

We experienced a collapse in house prices, as well as a severe banking crisis, a foreign exchange crisis, fiscal deficits and high inflation. Hermod Skånland, the Norwegian central bank governor at that time, summarised the causes of the crisis as “bad banking, bad policy and bad luck.” Efforts were now focused on bringing public spending under control, while large parts of the banking system were nationalised. Unemployment soared. Monetary policy aimed at a stable krone exchange rate, resulting in high real interest rates. But with a binding commitment to a fixed exchange rate, inflation was brought under control. The banking crisis and the downturn in the early 1990s made clear how vulnerable our small open economy was to terms-of-trade shocks and that our banks needed to be properly regulated. Furthermore, it became evident to policymakers how hard it is to conduct countercyclical economic policy, or even to avoid being procyclical. In the following years, structural reforms were implemented in order to increase growth capacity, including a major general tax reform. The tax code had already been tailored to capture the economic rent in the petroleum sector – the petroleum company tax rate is about 80 percent. Confidence in monetary policy gradually gained a firmer footing, after a succession of devaluations had come to a halt. Inflation and the real interest rate declined, and cost competitiveness improved considerably. Norway has not experienced a really pronounced economic downturn since the crisis around 1990.
The guidance also sets out an indicative template containing the type of information we think we will request from firms following a loss, and also expectations of firms with approved internal models. We note that this is an area where the Industry itself is keen to ensure that it is well prepared and we welcome working with it on this topic. None of us will have a crystal ball to plan perfectly for such an event, and as decision makers we will only be able to make final judgements on how to respond at the time, once we have the facts as best as we can gather them. However, we still think there is more that can be done to think through how firms would go about gathering initial loss information, what information their boards are likely to need to see to inform their response, and some of the practical challenges which might arise for firms. Capital and model drift Given the challenging market conditions I have referred to earlier, and the uncertainties I have just discussed, it is all the more important that firms hold adequate and appropriate capital against the risks they face. As you will also be well aware, your and our work in the run up to January this year included significant work on internal models, and it would be unsurprising if there was not some collective sigh of relief within the industry after January given the work involved to get to that point.

We have no convincing answer to why Swedish consumers are less willing to use card payments than are their Nordic neighbours. One possible explanation is that card payments are, or are just considered to be, more costly, more complicated or more risky, in Sweden than elsewhere, by consumers or by terminal keepers. I will come back to this issue later. 2. Swedish consumers use debit cards rather than credit cards (fig. 2). Concerning preferences between debit and credit cards, clearly, Swedish card users favour debit cards, both in terms of value and volumes of transaction. In the year 2001, the number of debit card transactions amounted to just above 80 per cent of the total. Charge cards dominate the remaining 20 per cent. Credit cards with revolving credit arrangements do not seem to appeal to Swedes. In this respect, Swedish consumers' preferences are in line with those of consumers in the other Nordic countries and with those of continental Europeans. On the other hand, consumers in Anglo-Saxon countries seem to demand pure credit cards to a larger extent. Cultural factors may account for the different preferences between credit and debit card products. At least in Sweden, consuming out of credit is still considered to be somewhat irresponsible. In the old days of bank regulation, banks were not supposed to give credit for consumption purposes since available credit recourses should be channelled into productive investments. 3. The use of checks is negligible (fig. 3).
Reports of the demise of cash are vastly exaggerated. Notes and coins have been with us a long time, and have served a crucial role in the growth of the modern economy. I suspect they will be with us for quite some time more. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Three “C”s of a good payment instrument But be it physical cash or electronic payment, the medium of exchange for transactions must satisfy three requirements. I will refer to these as the three “C”s of a preferred payment system – confidence, convenience, and cost-effectiveness. First, confidence. Businesses and consumers must be assured of the security of payment instruments. The widespread circulation of counterfeit notes and coins can impair confidence in a country’s currency. As John Maynard Keynes put it nearly a century ago, quoting Lenin, “There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency.” Keynes was, of course, talking about the deleterious effects of inflation. But it applies just as well to debasing the currency through counterfeiting. Ensuring the fidelity of notes and coins and the soundness of electronic payments is therefore a critical function. Central banks and currency issuing authorities must continually innovate and stay ahead of fraudsters. In electronic fund transfers, we have instituted more end-to-end security measures like two-factor authentication. Modern currency notes come with very advanced security features. I wanted to give some examples, but have been advised that it would be tantamount to giving away our secrets!

Ravi Menon: Three “C”s of a good payment instrument Welcome address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), at the Currency Conference 2011, Singapore, 3 October 2011. *  *  *  Why cash is still king Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning and a warm welcome to Singapore and the 2011 Currency Conference. Singapore is honoured and delighted to host this flagship event. The late Mr John Shepherd-Barron, who pioneered in 1967 the development of the Automated Teller Machine, or ATM, said during a 2007 interview: “Money costs money to transport. I am therefore predicting the demise of cash within three to five years.” Shepherd-Barron believed fervently that we would soon be swiping our mobile phones at till points, even for small transactions. We have indeed seen an increasing use of cashless payments at point-of-sale. Electronic payment alternatives have mushroomed in many countries, ranging from contactless stored value cards in Singapore to real-time settlement of electronic fund transfers in the United Kingdom. But cash remains “king”. Even in advanced economies. This is especially so for person-toperson transactions and micro-payments. Take high-tech Singapore. The use of electronic payments has proliferated rapidly in recent years. Yet, currency-in-circulation has been growing at an average 7 per cent per annum during the last ten years. This has reflected demand from a growing population and a growing economy. Less well known is how the demand for cash globally is being driven by tourism.
This policy, now a cornerstone of our prudential arrangements, pre-dates even the foundation of the HKMA and evolved out of a productive dialogue between HKAB and the supervisor. It has survived strong political pressure for relaxation and market pressure for innovative credit risk transfer through securitisation. The policy – now nearly two decades old – fits in well with the macroprudential approach which, particularly in the light of the recent crisis, supervisors in other jurisdictions now consider to be essential to banking stability. The fact that no such policy existed in the advanced financial systems is remarkable enough. But what is more remarkable is the level of initiative of the Hong Kong banking sector itself in seeing the importance of systemic stability and giving it precedence over the profitability of individual institutions. We might therefore observe, in the light of this and of our experience over the past year, that Hong Kong has got it broadly right in the relationship between the supervisor and the banking system. However, this should not lead us to the complacent conclusion that there is nothing much that needs changing. And indeed, no such conclusion is in our minds. Both the  BIS Review 116/2009  1  Carse Report and the recent reports to the Financial Secretary on the Sale of Lehmanrelated products see room for development and improvement in the way we carry out our work.

I shall therefore simply offer a few reflections that I hope will be relevant to the banking profession in Hong Kong. The first observation is that Hong Kong has, so far, escaped the worst. We have not experienced a collapse of our financial system, or a nationalisation of our major banks, or other forms of government intervention that will burden taxpayers for many years to come. In fact, our banking system has been resilient throughout the crisis, and the measures taken early on to reinforce confidence and ensure liquidity were effective and at minimal cost to the public purse. This is not an observation to be made with any sense of gloating or complacency. We all recall the intense anxiety of those days, and many in our community have suffered losses as a result of mistakes and mismanagement in other financial systems. Nevertheless, our well-capitalised banks have been well prepared for shock. Crisis management, particularly when public confidence momentarily came under strain, was effective. The generally cautious approach of our bankers, your refusal to get carried away by innovation, helped minimise the damage: this is a vindication of your reputation for prudence, and a great credit to Hong Kong's banking system. We also seem to have achieved a good balance in the relationship between the supervisor and the banking system. An excellent example of how that balance has contributed to banking stability is the 70% loan-to-value policy for residential mortgage lending by banks.
A recent study by New York Fed economists shows that high inflation hits Black and Hispanic Americans particularly hard.2 I am resolutely focused on restoring price stability, which is the foundation for a vibrant and healthy economy. The Federal Reserve's Policy Actions While monetary policy actions won't directly reduce fuel or food costs, they will reduce overall inflationary pressures that arise in an economy where demand exceeds the available supply, like we are experiencing today. Higher interest rates reduce demand for goods and services. This is especially true for those sectors that are most sensitive to interest rates, such as durable goods and housing, where we have seen the greatest imbalances between demand and supply. Therefore, in support of our goals of achieving maximum employment and inflation at a rate of 2 percent over the longer run, the FOMC last month decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1‑1/2 to 1-3/4 percent and said it anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate.3 In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May.4 Raising the federal funds rate by 75 basis points was the largest single increase that the Federal Reserve has put forth since 1994.

Lars Nyberg: Hedge funds and the recent financial turmoil Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Nordic Hedge Fund Investment Forum, Stockholm, 28 January 2008. *  *  *  Hedge funds have come to play an increasingly important role in the financial system. In the past decade the assets managed have quadrupled and now stand at around USD 2 000 billion; growth of between 25 and 30 per cent per year. 1 But it is not just the fact that the hedge funds have grown in number and size that makes them important. They also have different trade strategies and more liberal investment rules than many other types of investor. This makes them important players on several of the world’s financial markets. Many have said (and some have perhaps hoped) that hedge funds would cause the next financial crisis. As we know, the past autumn saw a number of unpleasant surprises in the financial markets. In this context I believe it may be of interest to note that the hedge funds have not contributed to amplifying the problems in the market. To date, if anything they have had the reverse effect, that is, their actions have generally had a stabilising effect in the markets. 2 At the same time, many hedge funds, like many other financial market agents, can surely learn some lessons from recent events. I will reflect on this today. This also brings me to the current animated debate on the regulation of hedge funds.
Yes, we could add page after page to the rulebook, setting out detailed rules, definitions and thresholds governing how banks should deal with risks and specifying, for instance, which tools supervisors should use in certain situations, and when. But with each new page, more loopholes open up. It becomes easier for 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  banks to game the system. This defeats the purpose of a rulebook and poses a threat to stability. Second, there is the problem of interaction. The more rules there are, the more they can interact and interfere with each other. If there are two rules, there is just one way in which they can interact. If there are 1,000 rules, they can, in theory, interact in at least 500,000 ways. It becomes ever more difficult to foresee the overall effect of the rules, and the danger of unintended sideeffects increases. And third, there is the issue of costs. The thicker the rulebook, the more expensive it becomes for banks to comply with it and for supervisors to do their jobs. These costs are justifiable if each additional rule reduces the risk of another crisis. However, at a certain point the costs of the rules begin to outweigh the benefits. So, instead of having overly detailed rules, we should have a strong basic set of rules that allows supervisors some discretion. .Supervisors have the relevant skills and experience, and in-depth knowledge of the banks they supervise. We should ensure that supervisors can continue to apply their judgement.

Ladies and Gentlemen, as we move ahead and look to the next 40 years of central banking in Zambia, the Bank of Zambia will continue to play a catalytic role in facilitating the exchange of ideas among the banking community, the private sector, and all other key stakeholders through such gatherings as this conference. We will continue to carry out our mandate, with the objective of facilitating the work of Government and economic activities of the private sector for the betterment of all Zambians. Mr President, Madam Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would be failing this occasion if I do not recognise that the achievements of the Bank of Zambia over the last 40 years are a result of the hard work by employees, past and present, including the former Governors. Allow me at this point to present the names of the former Governors and also to recognize those that are in our midst. BIS Review 48/2004  3  These are: •  Mr R C H Hallet, 1964-1967;  •  Dr Justin Zulu, 1967-1970;  •  Mr Valentine S Musakanya, 1970-1972;  •  Mr Bitwell R Kuwani 1972-1976 & also 1981-1984;  •  Mr Luke Mwananshiku, 1976-1981;  •  Mr David A R Phiri, 1984-1986;  •  Mr Leonard Chivuno, 1986-1987;  •  Mr Francis X Nkhoma, 1987-1989;  •  Mr Jacques A Bussieres, 1990-1992;  •  Mr Dominic C Mulaisho, 1992-1995; and  •  Dr Jacob Mwanza 1995-2002.
A risk management unit has been established to manage operational risks more effectively, by reviewing and monitoring areas of risks in central bank operations with a view to taking forward looking risk mitigation actions. Another important area that has been strengthened is in the process of monetary policy operation. The inflation targeting framework adopted by Thailand provides sufficient flexibility to take care of the challenges facing the economy. Through regular communication with the market and through open discussions on public policy issues, the central bank has fostered and enhanced the participation of academic and market interests. The Bank of Thailand’s monetary policy-making process was reformed to ensure a balance of transparency, independence and accountability. This is with the belief that transparency of operation limits discretion and leads to accountability. The Bank quickly moved towards greater openness in the provision of data and timely economic information. It is our belief that public acceptance and understanding of monetary policy is most important. And this will come about only with greater transparency and predictability. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, In conclusion, I hope that I have given you some updates and direction of where we are heading in this current environment. The experiences of Thailand are not significantly different from other countries emerging from a crisis and I therefore welcome any comments and suggestions which you may have. Before leaving you today, may I thank you once again for the honour to address this distinguished forum.

When inflation is high for a long period of time, an important role for monetary policy is to ensure that inflation expectations remain anchored as the shocks work their way through the economy. If expectations become de-anchored and trigger a wage-price spiral, it can lead to inflation becoming persistent even after the shocks disappear. Raising interest rates has a mechanical effect on demand and inflation, and thereby on inflation expectations. But when interest rates are starting from unusually low levels, rate hikes are more powerful if they also create signalling effects that influence expectations directly. In this context, especially compared with the traditional focus on 25 basis-point increments, adjusting the pace of rate hikes is a key tool to signal our determination to fulfil our mandate and keep inflation expectations contained. And moving faster at the start of the hiking cycle clearly conveys our commitment to bring down inflation to our medium-term target. At present, inflation expectations remain relatively well anchored across a range of measures. But there are two reasons why it would be unwise to take this for granted. First, the shock is severely affecting the prices of those consumption items, such as groceries and petrol, that have the greatest influence on households’ inflation expectations. [15] The ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey shows that, since February this year, both mean and median expectations for inflation three years ahead have risen by around 1 percentage point.