samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So, we are not where we want to be if we want to reach our target. In terms of having to pause or having to skip: as I said, number one, we have not discussed it at all and we have not begun thinking about it because we have work to do. I have two questions. The first question is: today you confirmed, repeated, that rates will be kept at the restricted levels for as long as necessary. Because inflation will be above 2% in 2025, we can expect restrictive rates for long. How is the Governing Council concerned that you're going far and you, at the same time, would like to avoid unnecessarily harming economic activity? How far do you look at growth weakening in response to your policies? Then a second question regards this June. That is a historical month for the ECB; the € billion repayment of TLTROs is seen as the biggest daily reduction of the ECB balance sheet. On the top this June is also the last month of APP reinvestments. So, what is the impact of these two unprecedented events in the ECB on tightening of financing and monetary conditions? 7/10  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  I thought you were going to say that it's an important month because we are celebrating our 25th anniversary – which was also the date when the ECB was opened first on the ground here in Frankfurt. As I said, the objective that we have is very clear. The destination we know.

It has been the main driver behind the remarkable increase in economic and financial integration as well as the transformation of the financial system over the past decade. It has made the euro area economically more stable for both investors and consumers. In particular, financial integration has promoted cross-border portfolio flows in the euro area and thus enabled consumers and investors to share and diversify risks. As illustrated yesterday, EMU has increased banking integration. Another interesting finding is that key policy initiatives at the European level, notably within the context of the Financial Services Action Plan, have made a significant contribution to fostering banking and regulatory integration. However, in my view, there is room for improvement, especially as regards cooperation and coordination between national supervisors and regulators in Europe. As the Vice-President emphasised in his opening address yesterday, there is a growing understanding of the need to strengthen the pan-European character of financial stability arrangements for crisis prevention and resolution. However, during the ongoing financial turmoil, the euro area and the EU as a whole have proved their capacity to act decisively and promptly under difficult circumstances. National measures have been coordinated in a pragmatic manner with a view to enhancing their effectiveness through mutual reinforcement. As regards the role of central banks in banking supervision, recent tensions in financial markets have confirmed that close cooperation and active exchanges of information between central banks and supervisory authorities are indispensable. In particular, the financial turmoil has revealed areas in which cooperation could be strengthened.
Standard economic theory dictates that, in such circumstances, exogenous changes in money demand should indeed be accommodated. In a seminal article going back to 1970 1 , William Poole showed that, when there is uncertainty about money demand, the optimal response is to stabilize the interest rate, thus letting money supply adjust. Since short-term interest rates are, for all Central Banks, the main policy tool, an increase in interbank rates over and above the official rate would indeed be tantamount to a shift in monetary policy. In contrast, liquidity provision by Central Banks has ensured that the overall policy stance has remained unchanged. A clear distinction has been – and will be – maintained between temporary liquidity provision, on the one hand, and medium term oriented monetary policy, on the other. Should liquidity be provided at a penalty rate, as some have argued, to avoid moral hazard? The answer is clearly positive if and when liquidity assistance is targeted at specific institutions. But there is no reason, for Central Banks, to significantly depart from prevailing policy rates if their main objective is to respond to an exogenous and general increase in demand for central bank balances. In the future, monetary policy may have to be adjusted, not for the purpose of easing financial tensions, but according to its own objective and in view of the state of the economy.

Christian Noyer: No moral hazard – the banks are doing their job Comment by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, in the Financial Times, 18 September 2007. *  *  *  In recent weeks, Central Banks in Europe and the US have acted repeatedly to provide liquidity to interbank money markets. These interventions have raised some questions. Concerns were expressed that monetary authorities were bailing out speculators, thus creating the same kind of moral hazard that may have led to excesses in the past. There were also concerns as to whether the integrity of monetary policy would be compromised. These are valid questions. On numerous occasions, in the past, we pointed out the potential dangers that mispricing of credit risk posed for financial stability. We may be now seeing some of the consequences. Excessive risks were taken, and losses will have to be accepted. It is important that monetary and financial authorities take no action that would prevent this process from running its course, let alone be seeing to be condoning past or future excesses. However, the logic behind recent interventions is different. Put very simply, financial turbulence and uncertainty have suddenly triggered an upward shift in the demand for Central Bank money. Faced with such a shift, whose direction is apparent but amplitude uncertain, the choice, for monetary authorities, is clear: either accommodate, and provide temporary liquidity; or not, in which case, interest rates would have to rise to restore balance in the interbank market.
Andréa M Maechler: How negative interest works and changes in the management of foreign exchange reserves Speech by Ms Andréa M Maechler, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 10 December 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. In my remarks today, I will begin by talking about developments on financial markets since the middle of the year. Then I will discuss the way in which negative interest works. I will conclude with a report on changes in the way we manage our currency reserves. Situation on the financial markets I will start with the situation on the financial markets. Financial market developments since the middle of the year have mainly been shaped by three topics: the uncertainty surrounding the first interest rate move by the Federal Reserve, monetary policy easing measures by the European Central Bank (ECB) and concerns about growth prospects in the emerging economies, particularly China. In mid-August, disappointing economic data and an unexpected depreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar resulted in a sharp decline in the Chinese stock market. The fallout was also felt by stock markets of other emerging and advanced economies in short succession. After volatility on the stock markets had increased sharply at times, investors’ appetite for risk gradually returned at the end of September. Favourable economic data from the US and the euro area contributed to the more positive sentiment.

Lastly, private bankers must also bear in mind that there is a very wide range of sophistication and investment experience among private banking clients from Mainland China. So private banks must ensure that their account managers take extra care in offering investment advice and marketing investment products to the less sophisticated clients. Ladies and gentlemen, private banking is just a special type of banking: it is all about trust and service. It takes a private bank many, many decades to build up trust, but such trust can be destroyed overnight. My vision, which I am sure is shared by many of you, is that Hong Kong will become the most competitive and dynamic private banking hub in the region in the years to come. This is a highly achievable aspiration if both the industry and the regulators work closely together to develop, nurture and protect the reputation of the private banking industry as well as the professionalism and ethical standards of its practitioners. Thank you very much. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
At times during the 1970s and 1980s, when the so-called anglo-saxon model of relatively unbridled financial markets was not delivering particularly good results in terms of economic growth, there was some envy of what one might depict as the institutional model of corporate ownership, as evident in Germany and Japan for example. In this model much of the equity of major businesses is closely held by friendly groups of long-term investors including one’s bankers and associate companies. It has been argued that this arrangement provides the best environment for long-term growth and stability, in contrast to the situation where businesses are exposed fully to the cut and thrust of the stock markets, which are characterised as being populated by people seeking only short-term profit and ever alert to opportunities for takeovers, asset stripping and the like. But experience of the 1990s does not support that view. Germany and Japan have been the laggards of the decade. The true cost to Japan of the longstanding cosy relationships between banks, industrial corporations and government ministries has become apparent. And we watch in some amazement the reaction among some sections 1  BIS Review 135/1999  of the political and business communities in Germany to the Vodafone/Mannesmann takeover battle an almost unprecedented (for Germany) hostile bid, no more palatable for being from abroad - along with the government’s efforts to save the Holzmann construction group, not to mention the authorities’ stout defence of the largely state-owned domestic regional banking network there.

There is no escaping the reality of this ongoing structural change if a country wants to maintain its competitiveness over the long term. There have also been increasing calls of late for free trade to be curbed because it is not ‘fair’ for certain countries. In this context, the concept of ‘fairness’ is applied in entirely different ways. It is used in assessing bilateral trading relationships, for example, or in connection with alleged violations of existing trade rules. I would like to briefly address both these aspects. It seems rather odd to insist that trade between two countries can only be regarded as fair if the bilateral balance of trade is in equilibrium. Trade between the actors in these countries is voluntary, and therefore only takes place if all of the participants stand to benefit from the exchange. Such trade is not a zero-sum game in which one side’s gain is the other side’s loss. The view that the trade balance between two countries should be in equilibrium ignores both the reality of global value chains and also the very essence of specialisation. Today semifinished products and intermediate inputs can move back and forward across national borders 3 4  Cf. Autor et al. (2016), for example. Cf. World Trade Organization (2017), for example. Page 3/9  many times before the end product is complete. Simply netting bilateral trade flows is no basis for judging whether trade is fair or not.
You will immediately discern upon descending to the bedrock of Manhattan, marveling at the massive vault door, appreciating the multi-faceted control environment, that payments security is a timeless preoccupation. Hardly any of the gold in the vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the property of the United States, whose reserves you know from 007 lore reside in Ft. Knox. Instead, it is gold held on behalf of foreign and international monetary authorities. Indulge me, if you will, in a fascinating historical anecdote in the annals of official reserve custody, which I will endeavor, perhaps feebly, to tie to today’s theme. The Spanish Civil War was a brutal conflict that pitted Nationalist rebel forces, allied with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, against the Republican government supported by the Soviet Union. In 1938, with their government on the cusp of implosion and before fleeing into exile, the Republicans hastily sent their gold stock to their trusted ally, the Soviet Union, for safekeeping. This episode is recounted in a history of the Spanish Civil War by Hugh Thomas, who writes the following: According to Orlov (now I confess to not reading the whole book, so I do not actually know who Orlov is; nevertheless, according to no less an authority than Orlov!

In other words, perhaps uniquely in the constellation of the Federal Reserve System, my colleagues and I work for you. My standing before you represents a visceral reminder of our accountability to depository institutions, independent of size, which rely upon our services to send and receive time critical payments; to maintain and permit the transfer of Fedwire eligible securities; and to provide cash services to support the needs of consumers and commercial establishments. It is with this orientation that I offer these remarks today, which reflect my own views and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The theme of today’s conference, appropriately, has been “Navigating Future Risks for Community Banks”. Allow me to elaborate upon the single risk that dominates from my vantage, regrettably not a “future risk” but an all too present one, and to highlight some of the measures that we are taking in response. The risk to which I refer is not a function of regulatory pressure, or capital demands, or an evolving economy, or compliance challenges, or the proliferation of new technologies, or an unprecedented season of payments innovation, or the challenging competitive landscape. All of these may represent very real risks, and no doubt occupy your consciousness, to borrow the lyrics of a prior generation, “eight days a week”.
In weighing up this decision, interest rate reductions among some of Iceland's trading countries in recent months have also been taken into account. Exchange rate To reiterate, the main objective of monetary policy is price stability. Since the exchange rate is an important determinant of prices, exchange rate stability has been an intermediate objective of monetary policy. During the first four months of last year the króna appreciated somewhat, but this trend was reversed in the middle of June and the currency was under pressure for most of the time until the end of the year. It depreciated by almost 9% from the end of 1999 to the end of 2000. To some extent the depreciation was triggered by fishing quota cutbacks and the resulting deterioration in the economic outlook. Demand for foreign exchange also outstripped supply because of last year's current account deficit, which is estimated at ISK 68.9 billion, as well as heavy investment by Icelanders in foreign securities amounting to almost ISK 40 billion net. Pension funds play the leading role in these investments. By the end of 2000, the real exchange rate of the króna had fallen below its average for the past twenty years. Actions in the foreign exchange market Under the prevailing circumstances, the Central Bank considered it necessary to take action to counter the depreciation of the króna. Besides raising its interest rates, the Bank intervened in foreign exchange markets thirteen times after the middle of 2000 in order to cushion against sharp fluctuations.

•  With these improvements, and generally accommodative external financial conditions, borrowing costs have fallen, capital market access was restored for many countries, and credit growth resumed. Net credit growth to sovereigns has remained moderate, however, as much of the borrowing has gone to refinancing the existing stock of debt on more favorable terms. •  The market for emerging market debt also has matured. There has been more differentiation in the response of spreads, both on the way down as credit fundamentals seemed to improve, and during the recent correction. This progress is indicative of a general increase in the sophistication and skill of economic policy makers in the emerging world, and in the quality of understanding of the benefits of macroeconomic stability and how to achieve it. Many countries benefited from the advice and financial support from the IMF and the multilateral development banks. But the most successful were those with policy makers who were ahead of the Fund and the Bank in diagnosing and addressing their problems, rather than being dragged reluctantly toward a more credible policy stance. These improvements have left the emerging markets as a group less vulnerable to financial crisis than they were in the mid-1990s. The combination of deeper reserve cushions, stronger external positions, improved balance sheets, more flexible exchange rate regimes, and better inflation performance provide a very different setting from what existed the last time we faced a transition after a sustained period of benign financial conditions and low interest rates.
The prices of oil and copper combined, plus those of other Chilean exports, determine a less favorable trajectory of the terms of trade in the policy horizon. Thus, between 2018 and 2020, the terms of trade will accumulate a decrease of the order of 3% compared to a fall of 2% estimated in March (Figure 10). On the side of inflation in Chile, the annual variation of the CPI and the CPI excluding food and energy (CPIEFE) levels remains around or slightly below 2%, without showing significant differences than expected in March. As has been the trend of recent quarters, CPIEFE inflation has been dominated by the evolution of the exchange rate, the persistent capacity gaps in the economy and the indexation of some prices to lower inflation rates (Figure 11). In the baseline scenario, we continue to expect CPIEFE inflation to have a slow convergence to 3%–not very different from what we expected in March–, while for headline inflation we foresee it reaching 3% sooner than we thought then. In the former case, this is consistent with an economy that, beyond recent data, will close its capacity gaps over the next two years, and with a real exchange rate that, as I said, will return to near its historical average during the policy horizon. For headline inflation, its faster achieveent of 3% is explained by the increase in fuel prices measured in pesos (Figure 12).

Mugur Isărescu: Convergence towards euro enlargement Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the European League for Economic Cooperation’s (ELEC) Monetary Conference, National Bank of Romania, Bucharest, 4 June 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery Your Excellency Baron Snoy, Dear members of ELEC, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to open this ELEC Conference, which is the 9th taking place in Romania and hosted by the National Bank. It all started in 2011 with “Renewable energy and transport infrastructure in the Black Sea Region”. One year later we talked about “Eastern Europe and the EMU: finding the optimal path for introducing the euro”. In 2013, there was the 3rd edition of the Danube Financing Dialogue. The following year the dialogue focused on “Agriculture and environmental protection in Central and Eastern Europe and their contribution to growth and employment”. In 2016, we discussed “How the EU can generate a virtuous circle in the Black Sea Region – the case of food and energy security” and in 2017 we debated on “the challenges for Eastern Europe in the present turmoil in the EU and EMU – persevering in the reforms and investing for the future”. The topic of the last year, “Convergence towards euro enlargement”, is approached again today, which is more than welcome, given the importance attached to this issue. The debate on convergence and euro adoption is broad-based and complex. The topic has been addressed in yesterday’s dinner speech by Academician Daniel Daianu.
Under a scenario consistent with the Banco de España’s March 2022 projections, the exercise included in the Financial Stability Report estimated that firms’ interest expenses as a percentage of gross operating surplus would begin to increase from 2023 onwards to stand, by the end of 2024, 1 pp above 2021 levels. In any event, the subsequent upward revision to market expectations of future interest rates means that the estimated share of firms’ interest expenses as a percentage of gross operating surplus is likely to rise by a further 1.8 pp by end-2024, increasing by a total of 2.8 pp on their 2021 level.16  16  Given that business income may be expected to fall under this scenario, the increase in the weight of interest expenses should be considered to be the lower bound of the total impact of the rise in interest rates. Meanwhile, every additional 100 bp increase in short and long-term interest rates above the levels currently priced in to market expectations is likely to add an additional 1.7 pp to the weight of interest expenses in 2024. 12  For households, moderate interest rate rises would have a relatively small impact on their debt repayment capacity, partly because of the increase seen in recent years in the proportion of fixed-rate mortgages, which accounted for 24.9% of the outstanding amount at December 2021.

Based on the latest microeconomic information available,17 it is estimated that the increase in interest rates since the start of this year (of 1.6 pp for the 12-month EURIBOR,18 the main interest rate to which the stock of mortgages in Spain is linked) will lead to a rise of almost 2 pp in the proportion of households with a high net interest burden.19 This effect would be most pronounced among indebted households between the 20th and 40th percentiles of the income distribution.20  17  This exercise was conducted drawing on information from the 2017 Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF by its Spanish abbreviation). The latest Financial Stability Report includes the results of the exercise for various interest rate hike scenarios. It was found that the proportion of households with a high net interest burden would rise by 1.2 pp, 2.3 pp and 3.9 pp, respectively, if interest rates were raised by 100 bp, 200 bp and 300 bp. 18  The 12-month EURIBOR has risen from -0.501% at 31 December 2021 to 1.091% at 20 June 2022. 19  The net interest burden is considered to be high when the ratio of (debt service expenses - interest income from deposits) to household income is over 40%.