samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As regards our present diagnosis on the situation of the Eurozone we are very often asked three questions, namely : “ How do you assess the risks to price stability ? “ “What is your judgment on the present conjuncture in Europe? “ and finally “What about the euro on the exchange markets?”. Let me respond as concisely as possible to these three questions. To the first one I will refer to the analysis displayed, in the name of the Governing Council, by Wim Duisenberg :” after the recent slowdown in monetary growth the risks to price stability from the monetary side have become increasingly balanced. Caution still needs to be exercised ”. As far as the second question is concerned I can also refer to a joint analysis of the Governing Council : “ While downside risks to real GDP growth exist, growth is very likely to continue at a reasonably robust pace.” Finally, as regards exchange rates I will only mention that we are living in a universe of floating exchange system : in such a system exchange rates are not a target but are a pertinent indicator for monetary policy. And I see only one sentence to sum up our position : “ A solid , a strong euro is in the interest of Europe”. Thank you for your attention. *  BIS Review 11/2001  *  *  7

There are now more than 600 Islamic financial institutions operating in more than 75 countries. Increasingly, existing Islamic banking institutions are expanding their operations with presence in new jurisdictions. This is resulting in increased cross border financial flows. There has also been increased international participation in Islamic financial markets. Since the late 1990s the Sukuk market has emerged as an important form of intermediation in Islamic finance. It has been instrumental in the financing structures for infrastructure projects, investments in the utilities sectors, in particular for water and power projects, and in the services sector, in education, healthcare and transportation. Islamic finance essentially offers clear value propositions to both global issuers and investors. For issuers, there is access to new sources of funds and liquidity. And in introducing a new asset class, investors gain from portfolio diversification and new investment opportunities that are aligned to productive investment activities. Internationalisation of Islamic finance: mutually-reinforcing benefits Islamic finance draws its strength from serving the real economy. An important feature of Islamic finance is that it involves financial transactions that must be accompanied by an underlying economic transaction. And when it is cross border, it will facilitate financial flows that will support international trade and investment flows. It will contribute towards bridging economies and enhancing our economic connectivity with each other. In this current global environment in which emerging economies are demonstrating their resilience with the ability to sustain growth despite the moderation in global expansion, there is tremendous prospects for mutually reinforcing growth from increased economic connectivity.
One reason why we look ahead in this way is that monetary policy’s effects are exerted with a time lag. But the two-year horizon is also motivated by considerations to developments in the real economy. This creates some scope for trade offs in the inflation-targeting policy. Let me explain. If we were only concerned with inflation, we would always want to bring inflation back on target as quickly as possible. On many occasions it would be possible to attain the target sooner than within two years. But we would then need to change the interest rate in larger stages and more often. This type of policy would risk leading to unwanted fluctuations in the real economy. This applies in particular to the situations where inflation has deviated from target as a result of supply shocks. These could be, for instance, sudden increases in companies’ production costs due to soaring commodity prices and/or energy prices. The result could then be that inflation would rise above the target, while economic activity would be weak. The reverse can also occur - a fall in production costs could lead to inflation being lower than the target, while capacity utilisation was higher than is sustainable in the long term. If monetary policy were to aim at bringing inflation back on target as quickly as possible in these situations, it would further reinforce the fluctuations in the real economy.

In a few months’ time, the Bank will be issuing an Exposure Draft on Fair Treatment of Financial Consumers which will set out heightened regulatory expectations for all players. Agents will need to exercise greater care, skill and diligence in their dealing with customers. But rules and regulations are in themselves not sufficient to create a pool of agents trusted by customers: That would require all-round, holistic professionalism – an agent who is technically qualified, fully committed and uncompromising on ethical standards. To me, it is this integrity and calibre that will ultimately guarantee the continued success of agents into the next decade, more so than any other factor. Faced with a more demanding and complex business environment, agents must continuously develop and equip themselves with skills and knowledge that are relevant, and that will continue to remain relevant well into the future. There are plenty of formal programmes available to help agents progress in their technical competencies. There is also a whole host of open online courses which can be accessed anytime, anywhere, with the desire to learn is the only prerequisite. It is encouraging that various professional training courses are already being offered through NAMLIFA’s Financial and Life Practitioners Council, and that one of the programmes has been accredited by the Financial Accreditation Agency (FAA).
As I have mentioned before, supervisory authorities of the home country are responsible for direct supervision. However, supervisory authorities of the host country are always responsible for the financial system stability. Responsibility for the financial stability translates not only to preventive measures, but also to crisis management, including financial support to institutions or – in a broader sense – to markets that have lost their liquidity, but remain solvent. Appropriate authorities of the host country should thus have access to comprehensive information that enables a proper assessment of risk and financial standing of large financial institutions operating in its territory. The need to provide information has not been adequately articulated so far by international organisations that shape the supervisory architecture; however, the recent years have brought changes in this respect. The idea to transform the Nordea Bank, operating in the Baltic countries, into the so-called European company, and the subsequent transformation of its subsidiaries into branches, has supported the changes. For some countries, this operation means a loss of supervisory control over a significant part of the  43  16  An example of one of the first major incidents of operational nature were the problems of the Bank of New York. As a result of a computer system error in November 1985, the bank was unable to transfer to customers’ accounts the Treasury securities purchased for them, and enforce payments. In the meantime, the bank’s account was debited with payments for the securities.

The other option, described by Kohn as the “extra action” policy, provides for a deviation of current inflation from a level determined as stable, in return for an improvement of the perspectives of achieving price stability in the future. However, the extra action policy does not mean bursting speculative bubbles by central banks. It rather means “buying” additional insurance against possible negative shocks, which may happen in the future. In Kohn’s opinion, the extra action policy may be run very rarely and only where the three conditions are met: •  the central bank must be able to identify bubbles on the asset market in a timely manner and with high certainty as to the correctness of conclusions from the analysis,  •  the probability that a slight tightening of monetary policy will be able to stand against the speculative activity on a given asset market must be high,  •  the expected improvement of the future economic situation resulting from a smaller speculative bubble must be significant and higher than the costs incurred by the economy in the aftermath of running the additional action policy. In view of the available studies, it may be stated that it is extremely difficult to sufficiently fulfil the three abovementioned conditions. It may not be excluded, however, that in the future, the understanding of economic processes will improve as much as to enable running the additional action policy in justified cases.
We want to ensure that central bank money remains available for the public to use everywhere in the euro area for their day-to-day transactions – not just in its physical form, but in digital form too. But we are also actively working to modernise the payment infrastructure underpinning our financial system. Technologies and preferences are changing, and preserving the role of central bank money as a safe asset at the heart of the system remains key. It strengthens the confidence in the smooth functioning of the financial system. The discussion on the wholesale version of central bank digital currencies – wholesale CBDC for short – is often prone to confusion, however. Wholesale CBDC is generally presented as something new, made possible by the emergence of distributed ledger technology (DLT). [1] But wholesale CBDC has existed for decades. And it has provided efficient digital infrastructures for the settlement of transactions between banks in central bank money. The discussion about wholesale CBDC should therefore focus on how existing infrastructures have to be adapted as technologies and needs evolve. Today I would like to demystify this concept of wholesale CBDC. I will first clarify what wholesale CBDC is and what it is not. I will discuss the emerging need to adapt the wholesale infrastructure to evolving user demands. And then I will outline some of the technological choices that lie ahead. Defining wholesale CBDC Let me start by clarifying some frequent misunderstandings about wholesale CBDC. First, there is confusion surrounding the term “wholesale”.

Five of us are drawn from the executive of the Bank, increasing to six when microprudential supervision of banks and insurers moves across in  5  Hyun Shin has set this out with great clarity. 6  See Tucker, Comments at Clare College, discussion of Lord Turner’s Lecture, “Reforming finance: are we being radical enough?”, Cambridge, February 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  2012/13. The two senior officials of the UK’s existing regulator, the Financial Services Authority, are members during the interim period. And once the legislation has passed, the chief executive of the planned new securities/consumer regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, will be a member, reflecting, as I have outlined, the vital role of market regulation in preserving stability. There are four external members, including from the USA Don Kohn, the former Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. The Government expects the legislative process to be complete towards the end of 2012. In the meantime, during the interim, non-statutory phase of our existence, the Financial Policy Committee has two broad functions: “paving” and “shadowing”. We will pave the way for the statutory incarnation of the Committee by advising the government on the instruments and powers we could be given by Parliament. And, secondly, we will as far as possible shadow the role of the statutory FPC, which essentially means advising the FSA on where and how it should use its regulatory tools for system-wide ends. So what are those ends? They are consistent with my earlier overview of financial stability.
One important lesson from the financial crisis is that financial factors may have a very strong and deteriorating effect on the transmission mechanism, making standard interest-rate policy much less effective. This motivates more research on how to incorporate financial factors in the standard models of the transmission mechanism used by central banks, and a rapidly increasing volume of such research is now being produced by academic and central-bank researchers and presented at an increasing number of conferences on financial factors and monetary policy. Important questions include how potential output and neutral real interest rates are affected by financial factors and financial distortions (Curdia and Woodford 2009, Walsh 2009), and what impact financial factors have on the general equilibrium effects of  6  BIS Review 112/2009  alternative policy-rate paths on inflation and resource utilization forecasts. 11 Before such extensions to the modelling framework are operational, policymakers and staff have to improvise and apply unusual amounts of judgment on the effects of the financial crisis on the transmission mechanism. Even with much better analytical foundations concerning the role of financial factors in the transmission mechanism, there will of course, as always, be considerable scope for the application of good judgment in monetary policy.

These measures were efficient, at least to some extent. Although sometimes circumvented by banks, they have managed to slow down forex credit growth, providing a wise solution to the problems faced at that time by our economy. Back then, we referred to them as unorthodox monetary policy measures, but after the crisis, the IMF mentioned the National Bank of Romania as being among “the pioneers” of what later became “macroprudential instruments”. After the EU entry, the actual membership in this “convergence club” has fueled and enhanced 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  the catching-up process. Being in the EU meant free exchange of goods and services, along with the free movement of capital and labor, which increased trade, foreign direct investment, and migration flows, for the benefit of economic growth in our country. Moreover, in the long run, EU membership fostered convergence through investments from European funds. Romania has certainly come a long way in terms of economic convergence, with growth resuming and gaining momentum after the global economic crisis: its GDP per capita as a share in the EU average (based on PPS) more than doubled from 30.6 percent in 2003 to 62.7 percent in 2017. The advance was the fastest within the group of peer countries that recorded similar trends: for instance, Bulgaria went from 32.4 to 49.3 percent, while Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, which started from a more advanced level, added between 7 and 22 percentage points to the same indicator during 2003–2017.
This included powers to resolve non-viable financial institutions and powers to direct specific institutions running systemic risks to take measures to reduce those risks. These powers are in addition to the Bank’s regulatory and supervisory powers over banks and insurers. Having such powers is useful in a crisis. But the ability to operationalise them can be a whole different matter that requires greater attention to forethought and scenario-planning. Fourth, authorities need to increase policy agility. Every crisis or financial stability issue is different, and each requires a different policy response. The pressure will be on authorities to be able to respond to an infinite variety of problems, which are very rarely understood clearly at the onset, and which often evolve rapidly. Going forward, long-standing policy frameworks are likely to come under increasing pressure, simply because they are not built to respond to the intensity and pace of change taking place in the financial system. I believe the solution lies not in building new frameworks, but in strengthening institutional foundations which allow for more nimble frameworks to emerge. Such foundations include clear decision authorities, credible analysis to support decision-making, effective policy feedback loops and strong monitoring and accountability frameworks. Equally important is the ability to react to unplanned events given the inherent difficulties in predicting market behaviour, especially further out in time. Managing financial stability will ultimately require authorities to walk a fine balance.

The more inclusive process to global standard setting is therefore very much welcomed and needs to be further enhanced through continued open dialogue and support for implementation approaches that are more responsive to unintended consequences at a jurisdictional level. Today, the Bank will communicate its intention to extend the observation period for the Net Stable Funding Ratio, or NSFR, in Malaysia for another year to 2020. This takes into account the Bank’s intention to conduct further on-site assessments to validate the maturity and robustness of the liquidity and funding practices of banks, and uneven progress in implementation at the global level. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The Bank remains committed to implementing the NSFR requirements as part of overall liquidity standards applicable to licensed banks in Malaysia. At present, all banks maintain adequate liquidity buffers against short term liquidity stress, and the vast majority of banks already report NSFR levels above the minimum 100% based on observation data. Let me now draw my remarks to a close. The task of financial stability authorities is to prepare for the worst, and work for the best. There are rarely easy fixes to the issues that we face, but also no shortage of diverse experiences to draw from and to guide our path. It is my hope that this conference will serve to generate useful discussions that will help inform our own preparations to confront any eventuality, and strengthen our conviction that being prepared is better than being right.
It is also important to appreciate that there is no systemic problem across the O&G industry. •  The problems in the O&G industry are concentrated in the upstream marine and offshore engineering segment which makes up less than one-fifth of the industry. •  About 60% of the surveyed banks’ O&G exposures are to the more resilient downstream, oil trading, and integrated firms, which are less impacted by the decline in oil prices. •  Firms focusing on oil refining have also fared better on account of regional demand for refined petroleum products and lower feedstock prices. The most recent stress tests conducted by the MAS indicates that the banking system would not do too badly even under some pretty severe scenarios. The stress scenario assumed: •  the US, EU, Japan and several emerging Asian economies slipping into recession and China’s economic growth falling below 3%;  •  sharp depreciation in regional currencies and oil and commodity prices falling by another 50% over 3 years;  •  a protracted recession in Singapore with resident unemployment spiking to more than 6%;  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  •  property prices falling by another 50% over 3 years, with similar declines in China and Hong Kong; and  •  the banks’ top O&G counterparties failing. Under these rather dire conditions, the banks’ NPL ratios could rise to 8–10% by the end of 2018. That should not be surprising.

The second was the economic programme developed by the Icelandic authorities in co-operation with the IMF. The programme had three key goals: stabilisation of the exchange rate, fiscal sustainability, and reconstruction of the financial sector. Comprehensive capital controls were an important element in the programme, but their rationale was to help to stabilise the exchange rate in a situation where the currency had fallen more than 50% in 2008, where foreign króna positions that were a legacy of carry trade and capital inflows amounted to around 40% of GDP, and where a large fiscal deficit that had to be financed in the domestic market had developed. The capital controls therefore gave monetary policy more scope to help stabilise and turn around the real economy once inflation came down. Subsequently, they shielded the eocnomy from the financial spillover effects of the crisis in the eurozone. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  But the problem is that they are still in place, over five years after the climax of Iceland´s financial crisis. The reason is that Iceland is still facing a balance of payments crisis that is a legacy of former capital inflows and the unwinding of these big cross-border banks.
In the European context, our colleagues from De Nederlandshe Bank and Banco de Portugal, Mr Michiel van Doeveren, Mr Rui Pimentel, Mr Carlo Winder and Mr Richard Derksen will provide relevant information about the ongoing changes in payment systems and services in Europe. Thus, a discussion will be developed about the three main pillars of the Strategic Vision 2020 of the Eurosystem: achieving a consolidated Eurosystem market infrastructure by bringing the two infrastructures TARGET 2 and T2S closer together, harmonization of its own collateralization techniques and procedures and development of pan-European instant payment services. In addition, the latest developments in the legal spectrum regulating payments at European level, with special emphasis on PSD2 Directive, will be elaborated. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Also, significant attention will be paid on developments in safe and secure payment services as well as the conceptual and practical issues regarding the oversight on FMIs. On the national level, our efforts are focused on the harmonization of the Macedonian legislation with the EU regulation. The new Law on payment services and systems and related bylaws will implement PSD and part of the provisions from PSD2, Settlement Finality Directive and E-money Directive. Thus, a panel discussion is scheduled where esteemed representatives from the payment service providers, NBRM and experts from Slovenia, Mr Peter Centrih and Bulgarian expert, Mr Antonio Barzashki will elaborate the new package of Macedonian legislative on payments.

Maja Kadievska-Vojnovik: Global, European and Macedonian developments in the area of payment systems and services Speech by Ms Maja Kadievska-Vojnovik, Vice-Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the Ninth International Conference on Payment and Securities Settlement Systems, Ohrid, 6 June 2016. *  *  *  Dear ladies and gentlemen, It is with great pleasure and honor to welcome all of you to the Ninth Conference on Payment and Securities Settlement Systems this morning in Ohrid. This year, again, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, in cooperation with De Nederlandsche Bank and Banco de Portugal, continues the tradition in organizing international conferences in the domain of Payment and Securities Settlement Systems, thus enhancing the awareness of the importance of development of the payment systems and services for the national economy and beyond. Therefore, allow me to use this opportunity to express my gratitude and appreciation to De Nederlandsche Bank and Banco de Portugal, as well as their esteemed representatives, for this fruitful collaboration and the privilege to continue this traditional cooperation in the future. In addition, we in the NBRM are very pleased with the presence of the representatives of the central banks of the countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and the participation of the countries of the Black Sea and the Middle East region, as well as those of the Northern Africa.