samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This data access will provide new ingredients for innovative banks to create new products or processes which will allow thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises to access bank credit in an easier and cheaper way than before. 45. We’re also looking to apply new technologies to addressing long-standing pain points in banking. Take international remittances for example. The process is currently slow and costly. Along with the Bank of Thailand, the HKMA initiated a central bank digital currency project for cross-border payments that has now been joined by the central banks of the United Arab Emirates and China. This ‘m-CBDC Bridge’ project is exploring the potential of using blockchain technology to facilitate real-time cross-border payments, which could reduce costs and enhance transparency for users. CBDCs have a range of promising applications and, together with our partner central banks, we want to be at the forefront of this development. Enhancing the Platform 46. We understand that a supportive regulatory environment matters a great deal to the providers and users of financial services. That’s why the HKMA and other financial regulators are working closely with the Government to keep enhancing the attractiveness of the Hong Kong platform. We keep our market infrastructure, legal framework, regulatory regime and tax system under constant review to make sure that they are business-friendly, forward-looking and competitive. 47. In recent years, we’ve been undertaking reforms that provide modern legal structures catering to the evolving needs of the asset management industry.

Thus not only does the price of gilts rise as a consequence of the Asset Purchase Facility’s initial purchases, but also the prices of a whole spectrum of other assets. That in turn lowers the cost of non-bank finance and encourages increased corporate issuance. Also the rise in asset prices increases wealth and improves balance sheets. In this way, Quantitative Easing helps to work around the blockage created by a banking system that is still undergoing a process of balance sheet repair. That is exactly what we have seen since the Monetary Policy Committee started its asset purchase program. Gilt yields fell sharply, though they have subsequently risen and fallen again (Chart 2). But gilt yields can move for a variety of reasons, including changing expectations of future interest rates. If we control for that by comparing gilt yields with a measure of market expectations of the future level of Bank Rate (Overnight Indexed Swap rates for an equivalent maturity), we find that this spread has fallen by around ¾ percentage point (Chart 3). Moreover, no such movement is observed in either the United States or euro  1  That is in contrast to the related policy conducted by the Bank of Japan in the early part of this decade, which was instead directed at purchases of Japanese government debt held by the banking sector. 2  BIS Review 126/2009  area, which strongly suggests that the movement may be related to our gilt purchases 2 .
29 to the Storting of 2001 laid down guidelines for the phasing-in of petroleum revenues into the Norwegian economy, establishing two main principles: economic policy must contribute to stable economic developments and be sustainable over time. By linking petroleum revenue spending to the expected real return on the Fund – and not to current petroleum revenues – the fiscal rule provided for a gradual and sustainable phasingin of the revenues. If we can restrict spending to the return, the Fund will never shrink. Norway will also be less vulnerable to fluctuations in current petroleum revenues. (Chart 8: Effect on the size of GPFG of change in oil price and return) In the first ten years after the establishment of the fiscal rule, the pace of the Fund’s growth was determined by oil prices. Prospects in 2001 indicated that a 25 percent higher oil price over a 10-year period would increase the size of the Fund by almost NOK 800 billion. Uncertainty with regard to the return on the Fund was far less important for growth. This situation will change as the Fund grows and oil and gas production declines. From 2020 to 2030, the oil price will play a less prominent role for the size of the Fund, while the return on the Fund will be all the more important. In the initial years, the actual return, adjusted for inflation and costs, was close to 4 percent.

Yet at the same time, he saw possibilities: “Successfully solving them in a satisfactory manner will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences in the economic and financial spheres, and the year might end better than it began.” While times are difficult abroad in our day too, there are bright spots. Growth in Asia remains robust and some figures for the US economy have been positive recently. Europe is facing the challenge of remedying economic imbalances in the face of weak growth prospects. For many countries, demographic developments will in a few years add to the pressure on fiscal budgets. While austerity measures will improve government finances, in the short term they will stifle activity and delay a recovery. This is a very difficult balancing act. But euro area countries have no choice. There is a need to agree on measures to restore confidence in financial markets. Just like 80 years ago, it is difficult to predict where we are heading. The Norwegian economy should be able to hold a steady course. But we will have to take into account that the return on the Fund’s investments may be lower than expected a decade ago. And wage and price inflation is likely to be low for some time to come. Rygg’s hopes were partly realised. In Europe the crisis bottomed out in 1932. Cycles and confidence may shift rapidly and when we least expect it. After hard times come good times. Come what may.
You may remember that inflation at the time was below target: about 2.3% at the start of the pandemic. As the economic situation evolved and a downturn in multiple sectors sent inflation down, we were able to lower the key rate as much as the economy needed. Incidentally, it was precisely the sustainably low inflation of pre-pandemic years that enabled the focus of monetary policy on support of growth and recovery. Imagine what would have happened if we had needed to deal with the dual problem of a pandemic and high inflation. In addition to temporary financial losses of consumers and businesses and shrinking economic growth, we would have had to counter inflation that would be eating up whatever money people still had. Our policy would have been far less successful. It would have been more difficult for the economy to recover, and a recovery would have taken longer. The monetary policy we had conducted in pre-pandemic years gave us room for manoeuvre and helped set the economy on a recovery path. This year, the economy has returned to the pre-pandemic growth trajectory. The immediate task is to stage a switch from recovery to sustainable growth. In order to do this, it is necessary to overcome the negative effects of the pandemic, and above all, to deal with soaring inflation. This is the focus of our current policy, and this is why we are raising the key rate. What happened? Why did price growth accelerate in Russia and across the globe?

On the contrary, monetary tightening works to constrain the growth of mortgage rates. They have risen far less than inflation. Unsecured consumer lending is rapidly expanding too. Banks often lure people with belowinflation rates — which may seem like an excellent offer. The borrower thinks: I take a loan for repairs and buy all the construction materials today, or else tomorrow they will be more expensive (indeed, prices have grown rapidly in this market) so I will end up overpaying less than if I bought the materials later. This is a typical situation. The same logic works with regard to other goods. And borrowers end up getting ripped off by a loan rate with an additional loan agreement attached, or through tied products forced on them. We are fighting this practice. Fines for misselling need to be raised. Banks should calculate the full cost of credit in such a way as to make all hidden fees visible to borrowers. It is an absolute priority for us protecting individuals’ rights in their interaction with financial providers. Now that inflation is above target, our action may even be tougher than before. It is important that we protect people from unnecessarily paying for openly pushed services they do not need and overspending on fees. I will spare you the details, but will say that we are developing regulatory measures to reduce consumer costs related to interaction with financial institutions. That would present an opportunity to improve people’s well-being, and we should use it.
In Europe, the uncertainty surrounding Brexit and the complex situation in Italy has taken on greater force. Finally, although we believe that the drop in the oil price responds primarily to supply-side factors—which reduces short-term inflationary pressures—it remains to be established to what extent this could be reflecting more permanent demand-side factors. Recent months have seen a substantial adjustment in financial asset prices in the developed world that could be signaling a change in risk premiums, consistent with a scenario of uncertainty that has prevailed for quite some time. On the domestic front, we estimate that risks for activity are unbiased. The economy has decelerated with respect to early in the year, which had been long expected. However, this deceleration could be more persistent if consumption fails to recover its expected dynamism. Meanwhile, the rebound of investment could be stronger as other large-scale projects progress. As for inflation, we estimate that risks are unbiased. Various indicators suggest that the economy will further consolidate the process of closing the capacity gaps, while others show the reaction of the more sensitive CPI components. Thus, expectations two years out are aligned with the policy target. It should be noted that this new Monetary Policy Report features greater insight of the implications of risk scenarios for monetary policy. This will allow having a better appreciation of the Central Bank’s reaction to deviations from the baseline scenario.

There is no option for financial institutions but to be able to deliver and ensure the integrity of their services – banking, payments, insurance or takaful, in dealing with customers – digitally or online during these times. The road is thus wide open for fintech. In a not so distant future, we can expect that fintech will be part of the mainstream, perhaps even becoming the primary mode of delivery for financial services, no longer requiring strategising and planning on how we could fully embrace it in conferences and dialogues like we will be doing today. Before I conclude I would like to congratulate ISRA for their development of the I-FIKR App, which 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  will be launched during the event. The App certainly fits well with the digitalisation of the Islamic finance knowledge of the Islamic finance industry. We hope to see it as another home-grown product that will contribute further toward the advancement of the Islamic finance Industry. Finally, once again I would like to thank and commend ISRA for organising the Islamic Fintech Dialogue 2020. Events such as this provide us an opportunity to take a step away, allowing us the space to focus on key issues and challenges which I hope will inspire us to improve on our vision and strategies for innovative transformation in Islamic finance. Over the course of this 2day event, with the array of speakers and moderators, I am confident this will be achieved.
They should also help to sever the problematic public finances/banking system feedback loop, a vicious circle which contributes to prolonging the climate of uncertainty and makes it difficult to resolve the problems facing the euro area. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the scope of these actions is limited and that definitively overcoming the crisis in Spain will depend on the progress achieved in other domains, including those which depend on our own economic policy. The Spanish economy The challenges facing the Spanish economy are well-known: reducing its high dependence on external financing, sustainably correcting the budget imbalance and strengthening the drivers of medium- and long-term growth through substantial and lasting improvements in competitiveness. Naturally, completing the clean-up and restructuring of the banking system is also a key factor in this strategy, and I will briefly refer to this later on. Significant steps have been taken in addressing these challenges. Nonetheless, the ongoing adjustment of the Spanish economy is at a delicate juncture, since there are no perceptible improvements in activity and job creation because many of the measures taken are structural and will take some time to work fully through. The growth outlook for the coming quarters is still not favourable, as shown by the forecasts released by different organisations in the past few weeks, which point to a fresh contraction of activity in 2013. However, the adjustment undertaken is essential in laying the groundwork for a new phase of economic growth which will allow a substantial and lasting reduction in the unemployment rate.

In June the evaluation exercise was completed, enabling an estimate of the capital needs for the whole system to be made, and confirming that they were clearly below € billion; at the end of August the Royal Decree-Law on credit institution restructuring and resolution was approved, constituting a new code in this area; at the end of September the exercise was completed, enabling the capital needs for each of the banks participating in the exercise, which accounted for 90% of the Spanish banking system, to be determined; and, last Thursday, the Decree which will regulate the activity of the Asset Management Company for Assets Arising from Bank Restructuring (SAREB) was approved, another key step in the implementation of the programme agreed with the European Commission. The analysis concluded in September enabled the classification of banks for restructuring purposes to be confirmed. Previously, the banks without additional capital needs had already been determined (Group 0) as had the banks controlled by the FROB (Group 1), to use the terminology of the Memorandum of Understanding; this classification was completed, dividing the other banks with capital needs into: a) those with plans to achieve the capital levels required using their own means; and b) those which will require State aid to do so. The latter were requested to provide restructuring plans which are currently being studied.
The crises during the 1990s revealed serious flaws not only in macroeconomic management but also, just as importantly, in the structure, regulation and operation of the financial system. Most major financial crises in various countries around the world emanated from overriding economic or financial problems rather than bank-specific issues. If these overriding problems had been identified at an earlier stage, the crises might have been prevented or at least their effects might have been reduced. Financial stability work Banks are the focus of all work on financial stability. This is because banks are the institutions that ensure the functioning of the payment system. We know from experience that if individuals and companies are unable to make ordinary payments, or if the credit function of society is disrupted, this may have disastrous effects on the economy. Insurance companies, finance companies, security brokers and other firms may also be important in society, but they are not critical to the system in the same way as banks. But banks are not only critical for stability. Their balance sheets also contain a built-in source of instability. Banks’ funding is generally short term in nature and can quickly disappear, while their assets have long maturities and cannot be realised as quickly. Should depositors and financiers lose confidence in a bank, it could face an acute liquidity crisis. Moreover, problems in one bank can spread to other banks.

Mervyn King: A tale of two cities Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, 18 June 2001. *  *  *  Vice-chancellor, ladies and gentlemen, It was once said that economic forecasters are the unfathomable in pursuit of the unpredictable. As a student I found this odd. Whenever England played Wales at rugby the result was wholly predictable. The reason was simple. My fellow-student, Gerald Davies, ran faster than Englishmen, even when he carried the ball and they didn't. Economics is, unfortunately, less straightforward. Yet any decision that involves an elapse of time between its implementation and its effects requires a forecast. Time lags are the essence of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. And that is why the Monetary Policy Committee spends much time thinking about the likely future path of the economy. The severe limits on our ability to anticipate future events means that forecasts can be no more than a description of the relative likelihood of a range of possible outcomes. Anyone who presents you with a point forecast for the future path of the economy is either concealing the most interesting part of their analysis, or suffering from self-deception. So the Monetary Policy Committee presents forecasts in terms of probabilities. And it is the balance of risks to the economy which determines monetary policy. So what are the balance of risks to the British economy at present?
William L Rutledge: Basel II - risk management and financial stability Remarks by Mr William L Rutledge, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s International Conference on Financial Stability and Implications of Basel II, Istanbul, 17 May 2005. *  *  *  Let me begin by commending the organizers for pulling together such a timely and important conference - Basel II promises to be a watershed event in global financial stability, and giving a full airing of the issues associated with its introduction is particularly important as we draw closer to implementation. I am very pleased to be able to participate in the discussion of those issues - the views I offer will naturally be my own rather than necessarily those of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve has major roles both as a bank supervisor, and, more broadly as a central bank, for fostering financial stability. Basel II has direct and significant implications for these several roles; it will clearly be an integral part of our supervisory approach going forward, and its emphasis on strong risk management practices also supports our broader financial stability mandate. My comments will set to the side calibration issues and focus particularly on what I believe are two major ways in which the basic structure and operational requirements of Basel II should enhance the stability of the financial system.

I expect that these positive attitudes on the part of all participants in the program will continue until Turkey has achieved the long-sought and much desired goal of durable price stability. BIS Review 9/2000  4
All indicators point to a general decline in confidence, both of consumers and investors. This decline is not unique to France; on the contrary, it is much stronger in our partner countries and particularly in the United States. Indicators, however, only provide information on the near future. Beyond one or two quarters, forecasts are based more on analysis, debate and judgement. In the present circumstances, this is particularly difficult. This is perhaps why, over the past few days, a current of opinion bordering on an intellectual vogue has prevailed, with a view that any banking crisis is bound to have far-reaching and long-lasting consequences. Along these lines, the optimists refer to the Swedish experience in the 1980s, which was marked by almost three years without economic growth, and the pessimists allude to Japan's "lost decade" following its banking crisis. However, a comparison is misleading. The situation today is profoundly different. First, as I have said, our banks, and particularly French banks, are financially sound. Furthermore, the reaction in terms of economic policy has been particularly rapid and vigorous.

This is shown by the fact that from the mid 19th century up to the late 1960s growth in Sweden was  BIS Review 80/1998  -2-  among the highest in the world. It is rather the case that the favourable outcome was promoted by low inflation and the stability this represents. The decades immediately after World War Two were particularly notable for high growth, low inflation, external balance and an optimistic mood that resulted in the Swedish economy’s successive expansion. That was a prosperous period with a good, stable economic trend, a rising standard of living and high employment. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s it proved difficult to establish an equally robust fixed exchange rate regime. A firm anchor no longer existed for economic policy in general and wage formation in particular. Sweden experienced a series of devaluation cycles, with an expansionary fiscal policy, inefficient wage formation and growing structural problems. With the deregulation of the financial sector the problems became all too evident. During the 1970s and 80s economic growth in Sweden became weaker than in other countries. But the economy still became overheated and this, together with an expansion of public sector activities, meant that unemployment was restrained for the time being. The situation was of course unsustainable. An inflationary, speculative bubble cannot grow indefinitely; sooner or later it is bound to burst. There was also a limit to the public resources for financing employment.