samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Accordingly, the defining of effective information and analysis co-operation and exchange procedures between the Supervisory and Resolution Boards is crucial for preventing dysfunctions, overlaps and frictions that hamper the proper functioning of the Banking Union. A Memorandum of Understanding between both agencies is currently being drawn up and will, I hope, contribute to achieving the necessary coordination. Lastly, we should sustain our efforts in order to achieve the degree of cohesion between the various components of the SSM that effective supervision requires. The SSM directly supervises 122 European banking groups, encompassing some 1,200 institutions. This is done with supervisory teams that draw on staff from various institutions, with highly diverse skill sets, seniority, experience and working conditions. Evidently, we must strive to fully develop a sense of mission to which all the component parts must contribute, under the leadership of the ECB and its Supervisory Board, without exclusions or unnecessary subordination. That is vital for maintaining the motivation and commitment of all SSM supervisory staff, irrespective of the authority to which they are attached. Indeed, they have to date shown exceptional professionalism. Final remarks In concluding, I will say that the past year has seen major headway in setting the Banking Union in place, but we still have some way to go. We must move ahead in a setting that will be complex for the European banking industry. Specifically, economic activity remains relatively sluggish, price stability is subject to significant risks and, as a result of this, interest rates are holding at very low levels.

Equally, savers would be adversely affected. Their sight deposits in so-called sovereign money accounts would not earn interest and services would be more expensive, so they too would lose out. Sovereign money would be like throwing grit in the gears of our credit system. Banks would not be able to react as flexibly to the demand for credit, and this would reduce consumption, investment and ultimately prosperity in our country. Monetary policy  A sovereign money system would also complicate the implementation of our monetary policy. The ‘debt-free’ issuance of money is based on an outdated idea of managing money supply and fails to recognise the advantages of the modern implementation of monetary policy. The issuance of ‘debt-free’ money would technically correspond to monetary targeting and would therefore be like turning the clock back to the last century. The fact that all major central banks today practise interest rate targeting is no coincidence but is built on the pertinent experience of the last decades. Interest rate targeting is superior to monetary targeting and guarantees a flexible supply of liquidity to the economy, particularly during times of crisis. 2 Furthermore, it is fundamentally unclear how the SNB could absorb liquidity in a sovereign money system if the money supply had previously needed to be significantly expanded. How can you reclaim money you have just given away?
6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  6  To address the “rolling bad apples” problem, mechanisms are now in place in the UK to ensure that when individuals move on their history will be known to those who consider hiring them. The FSB is now considering whether to adopt such an approach more broadly. UK authorities have used their convening powers to encourage market participants to establish standards of market practice that are well understood, widely followed and, crucially, that keep pace with market developments. That’s why the global FICC Market Standards Board is establishing readily understood standards for their markets. And it’s why global FX Committees will launch in May the first consistent code of conduct for FX markets. The best in the markets are codifying the best of markets. But codes are of little use if nobody reads, follows, or enforces them. This is where the UK’s Senior Managers Regime (SMR) for senior decision-makers of banks, building societies and major investment firms comes in. The SMR addresses the common refrain of senior management that they weren’t aware that misconduct was taking place in their firms. The SMR re-establishes the link between seniority and accountability. Senior Managers now must take reasonable steps (including training or proper oversight) to prevent or stop regulatory breaches in their areas of responsibility. Adoption is spreading. Some international firms are voluntarily adopting elements of the SMR’s certification requirements to strengthen their global operations. And the FSB is now reviewing the merits of such “responsibility mapping”.

We host crisis management groups for the UK’s globally systemic banks, insurers, and systemic CCPs and attend all such meetings internationally for firms with significant operations in the UK. And we conduct exercises with other major jurisdictions to test preparedness. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  10  That means recognising that because risks to financial stability are constantly evolving we must continue to work together to identify emerging vulnerabilities in a timely and consistent manner. 12  And that means not merely resisting the forces of fragmentation but actively building an open global financial system that places increasing reliance on, and deference to, each other’s national regimes when they achieve similar outcomes. A decade on from the start of the crisis, now is the time to take the high road to the benefit of all. 12  Just as the FSB is doing in its work to assess the financial stability implications – both opportunities and risks – of FinTech. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  11
16.07.2020  50th anniversary of the UNAAC Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Good afternoon. Thank you very much, Manuel. And my thanks also to Cristina for this invitation for me to speak to you today, on the 50th anniversary of the UNACC. It is a shame that we have not been able to celebrate this anniversary as was originally planned. We are living through strange and difficult times, but we must adapt to them. Yet despite this unique scenario, a 50th anniversary is an event well worth celebrating. Anniversaries, especially those which mark the passage of a decade, not least a halfcentury, are an ideal time to take stock of our achievements. Undoubtedly during this period a great deal has been achieved, but if you will allow me, in my supervisory capacity, I would like to make some mention of those areas where we must continue to improve. Over these 50 years we have been through several banking crises. The picture of our financial system as it stands today is naturally the result of these crises. And one point to note in this “family” photo is the large number of cooperatives which are present. The truth of the matter is that a highly significant number of credit cooperatives, or rather, a highly significant number of yourselves, have overcome these crises.

The principle underlying this single supervisory mechanism is that the severity of the crisis in the euro area has largely been due to the vicious circle that developed between banking and sovereign risk. To break this link, we need to have a genuine institutionalised banking union that ensures not only the same supervision throughout the euro area, but also identical rules, an integrated bank crisis resolution mechanism and a common deposit guarantee scheme. We are moving towards the banking and financial union that was missing from monetary union. 3. The Eurosystem is providing valuable support during this period of necessary reforms  It is clear that the ultimate responsibility for exiting the crisis lies with governments, at national level – implementing reforms, consolidating public finances and restoring competitiveness – and at the collective level – agreeing on and implementing a more coherent and comprehensive institutional framework around monetary union. These reforms are obviously – and fortunately – the fruit of a democratic process and can only be that. But  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the corollary to this is that these necessary reforms cannot be immediate: they take time, first to be implemented and then to yield their effects. And the time of the markets is not that of democracy, as you know. Doubts and delays create nervousness, volatility and worry in financial markets, which often leads to sharp rises in interest rates for countries deemed to be vulnerable.
INFLATION AND MONETARY POLICY Inflation in Singapore has been within expectations—on a modest uptrend but still below historical norms. MAS Core Inflation this year is expected to average in the upper half of the 1–2% forecast range. Core inflation averaged 1.5% in the first five months of 2018, up slightly from 1.4% in Q4 last 4 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  year, mainly due to higher retail inflation. It is projected to rise gradually over the course of 2018, with the gradual absorption of remaining slack in the labour market and the attendant pickup in domestic demand. CPI-All Items inflation is similarly projected to be in the upper half of the 0–1% forecast range for 2018 as a whole. Accommodation costs are forecast to decline less sharply than last year, while private road transport inflation is expected to fall. MAS’ inflation forecasts are robust to alternative outcomes for key external prices, including the upsides to global oil prices. MAS has revised its global (Brent) oil price assumption to an average of $ per barrel for the year as a whole, up from $ previously. MAS undertook a measured tightening of monetary policy in April this year after keeping to a neutral stance for two years. The slope of the $ nominal effective exchange rate policy band was increased slightly, consistent with a modest and gradual appreciation path. The gradual normalisation of monetary policy was appropriate in the context of the continued mild ascent of core inflation since H2 2016.

We are making headway in our strategy to position Singapore as an e-trading hub for FX, facilitating better price discovery during Asian hours and better execution for players in the region. XTX Markets, a global FX liquidity provider, has announced its plans to set up its pricing and trading engine in Singapore. We are working with other key banks and e-trading platforms in the pipeline. JOBS AND SKILLS Let me move on to the second pillar of the ITM—jobs and skills. More finance professionals are going for training and development. Some 27,000 financial industry professionals have benefited from SkillsFuture programmes during 2016-2017. There remains, however, a shortfall of specialised talent in IT—which we are addressing in two ways: MAS, IMDA, the Institute of Banking and Finance and institutes of higher learning are working together to deepen the local IT talent pool at the entry level. IBF is engaging financial institutions on developing local IT talent through company-led training and professional conversion programmes (PCPs). We have ramped up efforts to reskill and redeploy banking professionals into emerging roles. Job roles are changing as banks pivot towards digital banking models over time. We must ensure that our banking professionals can take on these new roles. More than 3,000 consumer banking employees will be reskilled through a PCP over the next two years, acquiring relevant skills in sales, product development, and digital engagement.
Such committees have been set up in practically all EU Member States, normally under the leadership of the central bank, following the recommendation made by the European Systemic Risk Board, on which all EU regulatory and supervisory authorities and central banks are represented. With regard to resolution functions, Spain has already adapted to European regulatory requirements. In this connection it has adopted a structure in which the resolution preparation and planning tasks are assigned to the sectoral supervisors [the Banco de España for banks and the CNMV (National Securities Market Commission) for investment firms], and those relating to the implementation of resolution measures are assigned to the FROB (Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector). As you know, the FROB is also responsible for the management and ultimate divestment of the stakes the State holds in the capital of banks subject to restructuring plans as a result of State aid granted during the crisis. These arrangements are admittedly more complex than those adopted in most Member States, which have placed all resolution functions – preventive and executive alike – under the remit of the national prudential supervisor. In Spain, coordination between the resolution authorities and between these and the prudential supervisor is so far functioning smoothly.

Third: Market functioning I have to mention first the assessment of the role of credit rating agencies, their small number, the transparency of their rating methodology, possible conflicts of interest in particular as regards structured finance instruments. Excessive exclusive reliance on credit ratings by investors without carrying out due diligence or conducting further own risk assessment is a problem as well. The road map also includes a reflection on the consequences of the originate and distribute model of banks for credit markets. Does it induce wrong incentives? A last item in this list relates to non-regulated debt markets and mortgage markets, which might deserve a hard look in the light of recent experience. Finally: The regulatory framework Above all, liquidity risk management relating to complex structured products needs to be investigated. We need a wider concept of concentration risk including wholesale and interbank markets as well as intragroup exposures. We have to look at warehousing and pipeline risk, deal with possible regulatory incentives to move risk off balance sheet into SPVs. We have to assess the links between the regulated and the non-regulated part of the system, including the optimal perimeter of supervision. Special purpose investment vehicles and conduits were used as off-balance sheet investment vehicles. These were prone to liquidity mismatches between their assets and liabilities, causing contingent credit and liquidity lines to be drawn on banks, and resulting in an increased demand for money market liquidity.
An even greater risk for both candidate countries and the EU could be to try to transfer the entire system of subsidies and taxes applying in several richer EU countries to central and eastern Europe. Most of the candidate countries already have higher tax levels and a greater degree of state influence in the economy than the majority of countries in the world at their welfare level, and much more so than in countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, which have succeeded in rapidly attaining a higher standard of living. To further increase the tax pressure and subsidy levels would risk subduing growth. 4  BIS Review 9/2002  Here I should like to highlight a warning example and a good example. The warning example is the former East Germany. It is often said that it was the fact that the East German mark was replaced at parity by the West German mark that led to the economic difficulties in the former GDR. This perhaps was not the decisive factor; rather it was the fact that wages and subsidy levels, together with the rest of the West German system, were transferred to a much poorer economy, which needed much greater room for manoeuvre. Despite massive investments, the new eastern länder suffered a recession and mass unemployment.

Moreover, this will have to be done against a complicated macroeconomic backdrop in Europe, where economic conditions  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  are still prone to vulnerability and interest rates remain very low, acting as a brake on improvements in the quality of loanable assets, growth in lending and recovery in interest margins. That said, at the Banco de España we are convinced that Spain’s banks will successfully adapt to all these challenges, adjusting where necessary their business strategies, improving where possible their efficiency levels and harnessing any opportunities the market may offer to continue to bolster their balance sheets in keeping with the new demands. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Today, total employment is up 5 percent from pre-pandemic levels and is at a nine-year high, and the unemployment rate is at a record low. The recovery has been broad-based, but we've seen particular strength in certain industries like professional business services, transportation and warehousing, and manufacturing. Tourism rebounded significantly too, with hotel occupancy rates reaching above 75 percent. Soaring Inflation All in all, maximum employment has been achieved. But inflation remains unacceptably high, and we are far from the Fed's longer-run inflation goal of 2 percent. Since early last year, inflation has increased rapidly to levels many of you have not seen in your lifetimes. This experience is not unique to the United States; nearly all countries around the world are seeing rising costs, and central banks everywhere are working to contain them. The rise in inflation has been extraordinary. In December 2020, overall inflation, as measured by the 12-month percent change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, was 1.3 percent. In May of this year, it was 6.3 percent. A significant portion of this sharp rise reflects global increases in food and energy prices. But, even excluding those costs, the "core" inflation rate has increased from 1.5 percent a year and a half ago to 4.7 percent today. It's more than just numbers. High inflation is incredibly harmful, especially to those that can least afford to shoulder the escalating costs of necessities like food, fuel, and housing.

Thomas Jordan: Does the Swiss National Bank need equity? Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to the Statistisch-Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft, Basel, 28 September 2011. *  *  *  The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). The Swiss National Bank (SNB) had to report heavy losses for 2010 and the first half of 2011 due to the strength of the Swiss franc – or, more precisely, due to valuation changes on its foreign currency reserves. Consequently, it suffered a substantial reduction in its equity. Understandably in such a situation, concerns began to be voiced in public. Questions often posed in this context include: Might the SNB lose its capacity to act as a result of a negative equity level? And, if its equity were negative, would the SNB have to be recapitalised, or might it even have to go into administration? The short answer to these questions is “No”, because the SNB cannot be compared with commercial banks or other private enterprises. For one thing, a central bank cannot become illiquid. This means that a central bank’s capacity to act is not constrained if its equity turns negative. Moreover, unlike other enterprises, it is not forced to implement recovery measures or go into administration. For another, central banks enjoy a funding advantage over private companies, owing to their banknote-issuing privilege. Moreover, they generate surplus income over the long term.
Two sources of potential stress should, however, be mentioned. First, a slowdown in the economy which, though unlikely, is still conceivable - could have negative repercussions on the quality of loan portfolios and on stockmarket prices. Second, in the more likely event of a sustained economic upswing, a sharper-than-expected rise in interest rates could also worsen the quality of loan portfolios by increasing the interest burden on households and companies more than expected. Analysis of the various scenarios suggests that sufficient capital is available in the Swiss banking sector to withstand even a substantial deterioration in the economic or stockmarket climate or a sharp rise in interest rates. Nevertheless, some banks have announced that they now have an increased appetite for risk. A general rise in risk acceptance would render the banking sector more sensitive to deteriorations in the macroeconomic or stockmarket environment. System oversight At the media conference in December last year, I reported in detail on the background to system oversight, i.e. the oversight of payment and securities settlement systems. Today I am limiting myself given the recent publication of the Financial Stability Report - to a briefing on the current situation. The day on which the new National Bank Act took effect - 1 May 2004 - also saw the entry into force of the new National Bank Ordinance. Among other things, the Ordinance contains the implementation provisions for system oversight.

This task complements those performed by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC), which oversees the individual banks (microprudential oversight). The Financial Stability Report takes account of this division of tasks. The National Bank limits its evaluation of the Swiss banking sector’s stability by focusing on trends observable at the levels of the banking system, the financial markets and the macroeconomic environment. It only focuses on individual banks when this is necessary in order to make an overall assessment. The main purpose of the Financial Stability Report is to allow the National Bank to highlight any stresses or imbalances that could pose an immediate or longer-term threat to system stability. We evaluate the stability of the banking sector in two steps. First we analyse the development of the risk factors in the macroeconomic environment and on the financial markets. Then we evaluate the banking system’s robustness in the face of these risk factors. To do this, we consider profitability, the risks entered into and the capital adequacy of the banking sector. To complete our analysis, we use newly developed models that quantify both the stress to which the banking sector is subjected and its correlation with the macroeconomic environment. The main characteristics and conclusions drawn from these models are published for the first time today. The models will be presented in detail in a series of SNB publications. The analysis presented in the Financial Stability Report indicates that the banking sector is stable.