samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In France an important contribution comes from the “Observatory for payment cards security”, which I have the pleasure to chair. Its recommendations have facilitated the recognition by stakeholders, who are all represented in the Observatory, of the importance of strong customer authentication for Internet payments and facilitated its wide adoption. This has significantly contributed to limit the impact on fraud rates, at least for national payments, and it has helped foster the dramatic expansion of e-commerce that we currently see. But beyond the development of card payments via the Internet, other innovations such as mobile and contactless payments or online banking services also raise important issues. These issues notably include the protection of sensitive payment data. To address them, the Banque de France has been working with the banking community, which translated into an agreement in 2011 to promote the protection of bank account identifiers and card numbers. This issue of protection of sensitive data appears all the more important to address that we  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  witness the entry of newcomers in the payment chain like third party payment services providers, who may contribute positively to foster innovation and potentially competition in the retail payments market but whose modus operandi should not lead to lower the current security level of online banking services. What lessons can we draw from that experience to promote best practices in the field of security for retail payments on a larger scale?

Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Beyond the turmoil – rules, supervision and infrastructures Speech by Ms Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the opening panel at the SPIN 2009 Conference, Rome, 15 June 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to participate in the opening discussion at this conference. The organisers, in choosing the title of the panel, have given us the challenging task to look beyond the current turmoil surrounding rules, supervision and infrastructures. This is certainly not easy as we cannot yet speak of an end to the difficult period facing both the financial and real sectors of the economy. However, looking beyond the turmoil and start implementing the lessons we have learned is exactly what is needed at this point in time. Against the background of the crisis up until now, we have to draw the right conclusions and begin designing the future of the financial architecture, including new rules and improved supervision and oversight. This needs to be done now before the window of opportunity – which will not remain open forever – closes. However, before looking beyond the turmoil let me take the opportunity first to examine the performance of market infrastructures in the current crisis. Developments in the financial markets and the fate of specific institutions have been at the heart of the public debate.
While the unemployment rate – which is based on a different survey – ticked higher last month to 9 per cent it is nonetheless 0.8 percentage points lower than it was in November, a relatively rapid decline by historic standards. Private-sector job growth has been strong enough to more than offset government layoffs, particularly at the state and local level. A particularly encouraging sign is the rapid growth of manufacturing jobs over the past year and the recent broadening strength in services employment. While the exact pace of a jobs market recovery is always hard to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  predict, we were expecting the rate of job growth to pick up over the first half, and I am hopeful that job growth will continue to strengthen in the coming months. We would welcome this. Even if the economy added 300,000 jobs per month from now on, we would likely still have considerable labor market slack at the end of 2012. Despite these clearly encouraging signs, there are still some downside risks to the growth outlook that bear watching. Let me list them for you:   As I mentioned earlier, high oil and commodity prices have cut into household purchasing power, a difficult situation for many families that could constrain overall spending more than I anticipate.   The renewed decline in home prices could dampen consumer spending and housing activity more than I expect.

However, there are some signs that the economy has stabilized in recent months. Regional employment trends Now, let me turn specifically to employment trends in the region, the focus of our briefing today. In particular, we want to describe our region’s experience during the recession and recovery. Nationally, the Great Recession, which began in December 2007, has been the deepest economic downturn since World War II. At the jobs trough in February 2010 – about 7 months after the official end of the recession – the country had lost almost 6.5 percent of its jobs and the unemployment rate had more than doubled. Many people lost their jobs or saw their hours or income cut, and the duration of unemployment for jobless workers reached a historical high. For many families, this distress was compounded by losses of wealth from declining home prices and stock market losses. Since the jobs trough, unemployment has retreated by a percentage point and jobs growth has resumed, albeit at a slow pace. Today, we will review questions about jobs in our region such as: How severe was the downturn? Where are jobs returning? And, what factors affect the employment outlook? As in other parts of the country, employment in our region declined substantially during the recession. But, New York and New Jersey and Puerto Rico had very different experiences. Employment in much of New York State, including New York City, declined less severely than the nation. Both the state and city lost about 3.8 percent of their jobs.
As shown in Chart 3, there was also a clear build-up of financial vulnerability in Norway prior to the financial crisis.   The rise in both house prices and debt in Norway was on a par with countries that were much harder hit by the crisis.   In addition, Norwegian banks had also increasingly financed strong lending growth over a long period with market funding, of which a considerable share was shortterm funding. The Norwegian banking sector became increasingly dependent on well functioning international money and capital markets, enabling banks to roll over their funding. Nonetheless, the liquidity crisis never developed into a solvency crisis in Norway. Perhaps financial sector operators had learned from the previous banking crisis and engaged in more responsible banking during the upturn. Furthermore, they were subject to stricter banking regulation in some areas. But other factors also played a role.   Macroeconomic developments after the outbreak of the financial crisis were more favourable in Norway than in other countries. The decline in output and the rise in unemployment were far more limited. Because of particular features of the industry structure in Norway, it took time for the full impact of the international downturn to reach our economy. In the meantime, an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy had begun to take effect. Against the background of relatively favourable macroeconomic conditions, the vulnerability related to a high household debt burden and elevated house prices never translated into higher losses for banks.

In some countries the authorities already have the option of splitting up a bank and subsequently selling it in parts, or the option of transferring vital parts to a bridge bank for continued operation. A newer instrument in the international debate is what is called internal recapitalisation – or bail-in. Internal recapitalisation means in principle that debt is converted into equity capital. This can provide a basis for the bank to continue operating. Creditors have to take the losses and the authorities do not have to provide capital. With such a crisis management system, lenders will have a stronger financial incentive to monitor banks’ risk-taking. They can price funding so that it reflects to a further extent the risk taken by banks. This will reduce the risk of excess debt growth and lessen the likelihood of crisis. Conclusion As I mentioned by way of introduction, our most important task in the work on financial stability is to contribute to containing imbalances and secure a robust financial system. Prevention is thus a key component of the work: that is to say prevention by means of a sound, general framework that does not stimulate risk-taking among financial market participants; prevention through surveillance of financial imbalances and through active use of instruments when we see clear signs of a build-up of serious imbalances. It is unlikely that we will be fully immune to financial instability. But with solid work in the area of prevention we will be better poised, also in turbulent times. Thank you for your attention.
Challenges on the Horizon When I think about the road ahead, my number one goal is to keep the expansion on track. This is how we will keep unemployment low and bring inflation back to 2 percent. I will be watching closely at how both domestic and broader, global developments unfold. At present, slowing global growth and geopolitical uncertainty pose particular challenges. In its latest World Economic Outlook report, the International Monetary Fund downgraded its projection for global growth and highlighted downside risks.3 Slower global growth reduces demand for our exports and puts a dampener on both U.S. inflation and growth prospects. And these aren’t just projections for the future—we’re seeing manifestations of slowing growth around the world now. Germany, the UK, and China are all experiencing slowdowns, and the euro area is of particular concern. In response, the European Central Bank and several other central banks have either adjusted, or indicated they will adjust 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  their monetary policy stance to support their economies. These concerns about global growth are compounded by broader geopolitical uncertainty. The risk of a no-deal Brexit for the UK is looming large, the political situation in Italy remains fraught, political tensions continue in Hong Kong, and Argentina’s economy is coping with a debt crisis. On our own shores, concerns around trade policy with China are adding to an uncertain picture. My contacts in the business community have said this is making them more cautious about investment.

Those small countries in particular had to accept the new economic reality of lower demand, higher unemployment and forced fiscal consolidation due to a fall in tax income or borrowing difficulties. The other group consists of bigger or more closed economies that were relying on domestic demand. They were able to smooth the initial impact of the crisis with more extensive government support measures. There was also the expectation that the crisis would be temporary. With the benefit of hindsight we know that we were not facing a temporary bump on the road, but a more fundamental need for adjustment. The initial smoothing of the shock may have been even more costly as it resulted in a higher level of public debt. Secondly, the required policy adjustment involves a dimension which we now consider critical: the speed of reacting and the decisiveness of policy actions. The Baltic countries have learned it firsthand through their experience, which of course is the hard way. There are few economists today that would fundamentally question the need for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms in Europe, as the crisis has clearly turned out not to be temporary. However, we all know it is politically difficult to cut government spending and implement reforms fast. The natural tendency for most politicians is to favour gradual adjustment. “Gradualists” say that in case of fast changes the risk of possible policy mistakes is higher, leading to losses in physical and human capital. Opponents of that view, including myself, certainly acknowledge those risks.
Overall, while a positive outcome remains the most likely prospect, the possibilities that the risk-management systems and lossabsorption capacities of financial institutions may be severely tested, while still small, cannot be excluded. Finally, I would like to remark that many of the risks discussed in my presentation today have already been identified some time ago. The fact that they have not materialised to any significant extent does not mean that these risks have diminished. Therefore, we should not be complacent in the face of what might currently appear to be a reassuring stability in the euro area financial system. Continuing vigilance is required to safeguard financial stability in the euro area. I am now at your disposal to answer questions on the Review. BIS Review 50/2006  5

Inflation in the euro area has proven to be much higher and more persistent than originally projected. This reflects the unprecedented series of shocks we have faced, and the fact that those shocks have led to turning points in our economic environment. Monetary policy cannot prevent the first-round effects of many of these shocks. But it can ensure that they do not become embedded. This is what the ECB is doing. We have taken major steps along the path of normalising our monetary policy, frontloading our rate increases. This signals that we are determined to bring inflation back to our medium-term target of 2% in a timely manner and ensure that inflation expectations remain well anchored. We will not let this phase of high inflation feed into economic behaviour and create a lasting inflation problem. Our monetary policy will be set with one goal in mind: to deliver on our price stability mandate. 1. Rees, D. and Rungcharoenkitkul, P. (2021), “Bottlenecks: causes and macroeconomic implications”, BIS Bulletin, No 48, Bank for International Settlements, November. 2. ECB staff have estimated that errors in our assumptions about energy prices explain around 75% of our forecast errors one-quarter ahead over the period from the start of 2021 to the first quarter of 2022. See Chahad, M., Hofmann-Drahonsky, A.-C., Meunier, B., Page, A. and Tirpák, M. (2022), “What explains recent errors in the inflation projections of Eurosystem and ECB staff?”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 3, ECB. 3. Average levels from 1 January 2022 to 23 February 2022. 4.
Investors in schemes involving crypto tokens may also be exposed to a heightened risk of fraud. These schemes are often conducted online by operators whose authenticity and credibility are difficult to verify. Managing crypto risks The challenge for central banks and regulators is this: how can we harness the potentially transformative benefits of blockchain technology and crypto tokens while containing some of their risks? MAS has to-date chosen not to regulate crypto tokens directly. But we are: 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  focusing on the activities associated with crypto tokens, evaluating the different kinds of risks these activities pose, and considering the appropriate regulatory responses, all the while, seeking to ensure that we do not stifle innovation. The key risks MAS is monitoring in the crypto world are in the areas of financial stability, money laundering, investor protection, and market functioning. Financial stability MAS and other regulators are studying the nexus between the crypto world and the financial system to assess how risks to financial stability may be transmitted: market risk from the direct exposure of financial institutions to crypto tokens; credit risk through unsecured lending to crypto token businesses; and leverage when borrowers pledge crypto tokens as collateral to borrow and buy more crypto tokens. MAS assesses that the nature and scale of crypto token activities in Singapore do not currently pose a significant risk to financial stability. But this situation could change, and so we are closely watching this space.

commercial banks’ claims on the Riksbank, amounts to SEK 435 billion. The liquidity surplus would therefore be about SEK 70 billion even if the entire bond portfolio was sold. 17 Another argument sometimes put forward in favour of large bond holdings is that the central bank’s purchases would increase the supply of safe assets in the economy, and that there is otherwise a shortage of such assets. 18 The Riksbank’s bond purchases result in that government bonds with a specific maturity disappear from the market and are replaced by Riksbank certificates with a maturity of one week. 19 The Riksbank then takes over some of the maturity transformation that the market otherwise tries to achieve on its own, and helps to reduce the interest rate risk in the outstanding portfolio of government securities. This argument isn’t particularly convincing either. If it is considered important to have short maturity on the national debt in normal times, this should be dealt with when the government bonds are issued, and it is then a question for the National Debt Office. Furthermore, the conversion from government securities to Riksbank assets does not seem to increase the supply of safe assets in Sweden; the interest rate on (short-term) government securities is lower than the repo rate which means that the market price of government bonds is higher than the price of Riksbank certificates with the same maturity.
So I invite you all to rise and join me in the traditional toast of good health and prosperity to “The Lord Mayor and the Lady Mayoress”, Michael and Barbara Bear. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

This success has been achieved through ambitious professional and theoretical work which is one of the Bank’s main focuses. We became aware that other central banks following the same kind of policy had noted and commented on how carefully Iceland had prepared for the introduction of inflation targeting. It is aimed to strengthen the Central Bank’s research and theoretical work still further, and it is worth pointing out that the new legislation specifically states that it should undertake economic research relating to its tasks. Inflation targeting establishes itself Inflation targeting policies have established themselves in recent years, with a correspondingly large reduction in the number of countries which apply policies based on fixed but adjustable exchange rates, or exchange rates within a fluctuation range. The reason is not least that it proved increasingly difficult to adhere to a fixed exchange rate policy in a world of deregulated capital movements. It could be said that prevailing opinion identified only two possible exchange rate options: a floating exchange rate or a completely fixed one, for example through membership of a currency union, unilateral adoption of some other currency or establishment of a currency board. The new policy has produced good results and is applied in countries including Sweden, Norway, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, along with several countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. It can also be argued that the European Central Bank partly follows the same kind of policy.
One example is the interest rate fluctuations, which have shown up in the own homes item in the CPI. During 1996-97 in particular, the CPI was relatively far below not just the targeted rate but also the lower tolerance limit. To a fairly large extent, this was because the Riksbank lowered the interest rate markedly with a view to ensuring that the target would be met a little later on. In the period 1993-98 the Riksbank tried to explain how effects of this kind would be handled. But not everyone considered the policy was sufficiently clear. The Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament), for  BIS Review 98/2000  2  example, assessed the Riksbank’s performance solely in terms of the CPI outcome even though there had been long periods when monetary policy had focused on other indicators that exclude transitory effects. In the best of all possible worlds one would prefer to use an indicator of inflation that excludes all those effects one wants to disregard. Unfortunately, there is no such indicator that suits every situation. For example, a tax increase may, under certain circumstances, need to be excluded as a transitory effect. In other cases, however, tax increases should be taken into account when formulating policy because they are a part of the inflation process. Against this background, in 1999 the Riksbank declared that in connection with every monetary policy decision, any grounds that existed for modifying the policy’s target variable would be clarified.

Over the years there has been clear evidence of this in connection with excessively high expectations in the stock market or the property market, for example. In the end, it becomes difficult to justify prices in terms of economic fundamentals. Elements of this have been apparent in recent years, for instance in the United States. One issue is whether central banks ought to consider asset prices when setting the interest rate. The notion here is that asset prices may influence the path of inflation. An increase in household wealth on account of rising share prices, for example, is likely to affect consumption and thereby demand in general and the price trend. Effects from expectations are also involved. Rising share prices may mirror expectations of permanently higher corporate profits and lead to expectations of higher lifetime incomes. If confidence in the future becomes much stronger in this way, the effects on demand may be considerable. Share price increases may perhaps affect the corporate investment propensity in a similar way. The Riksbank takes this into account as far as possible in the inflation assessment. But much remains to be done, theoretically as well as empirically, when it comes to understanding the nature of these relationships. A lively discussion is in progress, at the Riksbank as well as among those who scrutinise us, about what a given development of asset prices should imply for monetary policy. There is even less agreement as to whether central banks should conduct policy so that the development of asset prices is affected directly.