samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(2017), “The international dimension of the ECB’s asset purchase programme”, speech at the  ECB’s Foreign Exchange Contact Group meeting, Frankfurt am Main, 11 July. 3 See e.g. Fratzscher et al. (2016, op.cit.) and Georgiadis, G. and J. Gräb (2016, op.cit.). 4 See e.g. Gabaix, X. and M. Maggiori (2015), “International Liquidity and Exchange Rate Dynamics,” Quarterly  Journal of Economics, 130(3), pp. 1369-1420; and Hau, H. and H. Rey (2004), “Can Portfolio Rebalancing Explain the Dynamics of Equity Returns, Equity Flows, and Exchange Rates?”, American Economic Review, 94, pp. 126-133. 5 See e.g. Engel, C. and K.D. West (2005), “Exchange Rates and Fundamentals”, Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 113(3), pp. 485-517; Froot, K.A. and T. Ramadorai (2005), “Currency Returns, Intrinsic Value, and Institutional-Investor Flows”, Journal of Finance, 60, pp. 1535-1566; and Engel, C. and K. West (2010), “Global Interest Rates, Currency Returns, and the Real Value of the Dollar”, American Economic Review, 100, pp. 562567. 6 A second explanation could be that exogenous monetary policy shocks may have less impact on long-term  interest rates (see e.g. Evans, C.L. and D.A. Marshall (1998), “Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of Nominal Interest Rates: Evidence and Theory”, Carnegie Rochester Series on Public Policy, 49, 1998, pp. 53– 111). 7 For more details on estimates of US term premia, see e.g. Adrian, T., R. Crump and E. Moench (2013), “Pricing  the Term Structure with Linear Regressions”, Journal of Financial Economics, 110, pp. 110-138.

The City of London has been making a positive and constructive contribution to their development by doing what it does best: providing a lead through innovation; and setting the standard for excellence. As a result, all the available evidence continues to indicate that, since the launch of the euro, London has fully maintained its market share. Let me give you a few figures. •  There are 482 foreign banking institutions in London, around double the number in Frankfurt, and more than double the number in Paris. •  The wholesale euro payment system in London, CHAPS euro, has recently accounted for 19% by value of cross-border payment flows in TARGET, the pan-European payment system. This figure has grown from 15% since the launch of the euro, and the UK now accounts for more crossborder payment flows in euro than any other country, except for Germany, even though the UK is not participating in EMU. •  London is estimated to have a 32% share of global foreign exchange turnover, compared with 5% for Germany and 4% for France. •  London's global market share of over-the-counter derivatives is around 35%, compared with 5% for Germany and 6% for France. •  Over 98% of the euro short-term interest rate contracts on the three major European derivatives exchanges (in London, Frankfurt and Paris) are traded on LIFFE.
Over the period since 2011, we’ve witnessed a number of fundamental changes in the banking sector: The regulatory and supervisory framework has substantially raised requirements and expectations around capital, liquidity and risk management including, for example, more rigorous stress testing and capital surcharges for systemically important firms; The macro/finance environment of sluggish growth and low rates is putting pressure on bank business models. We are now in the eighth year of interest rates near zero in the U.S., which has hurt bank profits and affected risk-taking and business model choices. Ongoing technological innovations have altered both the opportunities and the threats facing financial institutions. Marketplace lending, distributed ledger, and robo-advisers promise great opportunity, while cyber threats, data privacy issues, and IT-related vendor management issues are legitimate concerns. With that idea in mind, I thought it would be useful to look at the last five years of this Forum’s program in order to identify key themes and common topics. I’d like to discuss three specific issues: systemic risk, governance, and regulatory reform. First, systemic risk has been a central topic of discussion at each Global Risk Forum over the past five years. Given the acute trauma of the financial crisis and its systemic nature, that is not surprising. I did find it interesting to see how the discussions of systemic risk have shifted over these five years. Initially, the discussions were primarily focused on defining systemic risk, including the underlying shocks and propagation channels.

2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Conclusion As risk professionals, it’s important to be forward-looking and to continually ask ourselves: are all risks being captured, measured, and monitored? What is missing? Are we focused on the right areas? So, here is another question: When we look back at this conference five years from now, what will we view as a major blind spot? I expect there will be issues that we will be surprised we missed, and part of the purpose of discussions like this is to lower the likelihood and impact of those inevitable blind spots. Thanks for your attention, and I’m looking forward to hearing the discussion throughout the day. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Although evidence on the extent to which jobs have been lost due to global trade is inconclusive, job losses that are attributed to trade tend to be viewed differently. That is, they are seen as having been “lost to foreigners” and are often viewed as a consequence of the policy decision to liberalize trade in the first place. Having said that, the challenge of adjusting to open trade is a serious issue that has not received the degree of attention it fully deserves. This may partly reflect the fact that the burden has been borne unequally and spread out over a long time period. It also may reflect the fact that the winners from trade have often tended to have a stronger voice than those who have been the losers. 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Research has documented that the effects on individuals of job dislocation—including those resulting from trade—can be significant and long lasting. Older workers tend to suffer larger earnings losses, and may face larger transition costs. Displaced workers may not have the appropriate skills to find good jobs in other areas of the economy, including in growing export sectors. When the affected industry represents a large share of the local economy, the damage is often magnified. In this case, the burden is more widespread because wages across the community are likely to be hit as well.

Trade restrictions address the symptoms and not the underlying problems, and they introduce other costs and distortions. While such measures might generate temporary boosts to growth from greater domestic production and consumption, these would likely be offset by a range of other costs. Over time, such measures would retard productivity growth and thereby shrink the economic pie. As an illustration, import substitution models that were pursued by many emerging market economies following the Second World War eventually led to lower long4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  term growth outcomes. This was the experience in India, which helped trigger the reforms of the early 1990s. In assessing the benefits and costs of trade, it is important to understand that a nation’s trade balance reflects much more than its trade policy. Just as important are the country’s saving and investment spending proclivities, which are affected by many factors, including tax and fiscal policies. For example, in the United States, we have a chronic trade deficit because domestic investment spending exceeds our domestic saving. Foreign capital inflows make up the gap. In this process, the foreign exchange value of the dollar plays an important equilibrating mechanism. If the domestic saving/investment imbalance is unchanged, then any reduction in the trade balance from higher trade barriers will be offset by lower exports. The domestic currency will appreciate to cause the trade deficit to widen to accommodate the desired capital inflows.
The first is the negative interest rate, which is currently –0.75%. This is charged on sight deposits held at the SNB by banks and other financial market participants. The second is our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary, while taking the overall currency situation into consideration. Our monetary policy is thus expansionary and aimed at easing pressure on the Swiss franc, thereby ensuring price stability in the medium term. Many feared a recession on the back of the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate and the rapid appreciation of the Swiss franc. Yet our economy grew by 0.9% last year. This may not be a strong growth rate, but it is still a good sign. On the one hand, it reflects the flexibility and adaptability of Swiss companies and employees. On the other, the economy was also supported by our expansionary monetary policy. This contributed to the weakening of the Swiss franc over the course of the past year. It remains significantly overvalued, however. The slight increase in economic output in Switzerland is a positive development, particularly in view of the continued tentative recovery of the global economy. This hesitant recovery was accompanied by a collapse in commodity prices in 2015, in which both weak demand and increased oil production played a role. The drop in oil prices and the appreciation of the franc following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate pushed inflation in Switzerland into negative territory. Both factors produce a one-off downward adjustment in prices.

My first speech as Governor – in 2003 – was also in the Midlands. In it, I talked about the non-inflationary consistently expansionary – or “nice” – decade from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. I argued that the next decade was unlikely to be as nice because, and I quote, “when shocks, as they will, hit our economy it is almost inevitable that there will be somewhat greater volatility of both output and inflation than the remarkable stability to which we have become used in recent years”. I certainly did not anticipate the scale of the downturn in the world economy that followed the collapse of the banking system in 2008. But I did point to the need for a rebalancing of demand in the UK economy because, as I said then, “the strategy which the MPC has pursued in recent years – stimulating domestic demand to compensate for weak external demand in the face of a strong exchange rate – carries the risk that there could be a sharp correction to the level of consumer spending at some point in the future”. BIS Review 136/2010  1  The counterpart to strong consumption in the past was low saving. Having averaged close to 20% in the 1960s and 70s, gross national savings fell to just 12% of income in 2009 – the lowest since the War. This was all the more remarkable because one might have expected saving to increase as life expectancy rose.
Unquestionably, the key current challenge, is to put under control excessive and persistent inflationary dynamics. Monetary policy decisions, however, have to be considered and made within the following context: Monetary policy takes roughly 18 months to affect the real economy as it is channelled through banks, households and firms and consequently impacts their decisions on credit, consumption and investment, respectively. Therefore, monetary policy does not target current inflation but the medium term inflation outlook. At the current juncture that most of inflation is cost push, stemming from energy and food prices, monetary policy attempts to re-align aggregate demand and aggregate supply so as to contain inflationary pressures. So, monetary policy has a more difficult job than when dealing with the typical demand driven inflationary pressures. Therefore, it requires a balanced approach to contain cost-push inflation but avoid having an exacerbated negative effect on output and unemployment. In addition to the balance I mentioned before, monetary policy decisions have to deal with a lot of uncertainty. The risk of a wage-price increases spiral, even though not yet evidenced in the Eurozone, would exacerbate inflationary pressures. If inflation expectations get de-anchored then inflation will persist for much longer. In such a case the pace of interest rate adjustment as well as the final rate level may have to increase. Currently no material de-anchoring has been observed even though some measures indicate inflation expectations to be slightly above 2 per cent in medium term.

The spike in the domestic inflation is mostly attributed to the significant negative impact of the war, as well as the continued consequences of the pandemic. More specifically, the energy component is the largest contributor to the surging trend of domestic headline inflation (with around 45% share of HICP). We expect that our domestic short-term inflation outlook will continue to remain, overall, at very elevated levels, similar to the euro area inflation developments, amid the ongoing significant uncertainty and volatility resulting from the war. More specifically, Cyprus HICP inflation for 2022 has been revised upwards in our most recent projections, now reaching 8,4 percent compared with 7,0 percent in the CBC June 2022 projections. The Cyprus banking sector Let me now give you a brief overview of the banking sector developments in Cyprus. The Banking sector exhibits a healthy financial standing, with solid solvency and liquidity buffers. The solvency position, as measured by the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio amounts to 17.5 percent in the second quarter of 2022, a level higher than the respective European average of 15.2 percent. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio, indicating the availability of liquid funds against deposit outflows over a 30 day stressed period, stood at the level of 320 percent in August 2022 which is more than 3 times higher than the minimum regulatory requirement of 100 percent, placing Cyprus amongst the most liquid banking sectors in the Union, where the average LCR amounts to 165 percent.
The public commitment that the Committee will do whatever it takes to hit the inflation target is central to the conduct of monetary policy. It underpins the credibility of the inflation target. This commitment is more important than ever in the current environment of unprecedented shocks and unconventional policy measures. Recent events have raised the question of whether the Committee could provide even more information about its policy strategy by committing to keep interest rates low for a particular period of time or until the economic outlook evolves in some specified way. The difficulty is in designing such a commitment that would be both useful and that the Committee would be willing to adhere to. A commitment to keep interest rates low for a certain period of time runs the risk of being overtaken by events. The past eighteen months has demonstrated only too well how rapidly the state of the economy can change. I truly have little idea as to how long Bank Rate will need to be maintained at its current low level in order to meet the inflation target. As such, it would make little sense to commit to a rule that suggested I did! The potential benefit of a state contingent commitment – in which the MPC commits to maintaining Bank Rate at its current level until the economic outlook has evolved in a particular way – is that it may aid the public’s understanding of how the Committee is likely to react to economic developments.

They are based on spurious international comparisons since other central banks – such as the Bank of England – do not print their own banknotes, do not (yet) incorporate the banking supervisor and do not perform tasks such as the management of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  over indebtedness, which is entrusted to the Banque de France by law. More than 200,000 households debt applications processed every year is no mean feat! We have already made a great effort over the past few years as our staff levels have been cut by nearly 20% in ten years. And we will continue with this effect; but it is based on a detailed analysis of our activities and requires substantial investment in order to increase productivity. Our programme is ambitious but in keeping with the reality of the tasks we perform and respectful of our employees. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
6  IATA - 2020 Worst Year in History for Air Travel Demand Changes in transport behaviour during the Covid-19 crisis – Analysis - IEA ESSD - Global Carbon Budget 2020 (copernicus.org) 9 Cut global emissions by 7.6 percent every year for next decade to meet 1.5°C Paris target - UN report (unep.org) 7 8  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  Governments may be responsible for the policies to achieve net zero. But much of the emissions reduction itself has to come from the corporate sector. And that requires investment – and lots of it. In the UK alone, spending on low-carbon technologies and infrastructure will need to rise five-fold, from £ to £ a year (Chart 4), or 2½% of GDP. Globally that number is more like 8% of GDP. Chart 3: UK balanced path to net zero  Source: Sixth Carbon Budget - Climate Change Committee (theccc.org.uk)  Chart 4: UK sectoral investment needs  Source: Sixth Carbon Budget - Climate Change Committee (theccc.org.uk)  Much of the job of financing this investment programme falls to the financial sector: to banks, and to investors in companies’ equity and debt. The scale of that task would be challenging even if the path to net zero were certain. But it is not – so investors must also manage the potential for significant losses on their assets, as and when more aggressive policies to reduce emissions come on stream, or physical climate events grow in intensity.

It is the wish of the Bank of Zambia that in future all the SADC central banks can enter into group agreements on certain ICT services that are provided by the vendors. We also believe that this would enable us share the cost of expensive ICT resources in order to achieve economies of scale and leverage effective support from vendors of common software applications. Ladies and Gentlemen, may I conclude by expressing my gratitude and thanks to the staff of the ICT Department at Bank of Zambia for successfully organizing this Conference. I wish you fruitful deliberations during this business week. It is now my pleasure and honour to declare the 2008 SADC ICT FORUM CONFERENCE OFFICIALLY OPENED. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 42/2008
The negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market are intended to make Swiss franc investments less attractive, thereby easing pressure on the currency. The Swiss franc is still significantly overvalued. Compared to September, the new conditional inflation forecast has been revised slightly downwards in the short term. This mainly reflects the fact that inflation in October and  Page 1/5  Berne, 15 December 2016 Thomas Jordan  News conference  November was somewhat lower than expected. However, our expectations for the mediumterm development of inflation remain essentially unchanged. We continue to anticipate an inflation rate of –0.4% for the current year. For 2017, the inflation forecast is down to 0.1%, from 0.2% in the previous quarter. For 2018, we now expect inflation of 0.5%, compared to 0.6% in the third quarter. The conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the three-month Libor remains at –0.75% over the entire forecast horizon. Global economic outlook  I would now like to turn to economic developments abroad, as these have a considerable bearing on the inflation and economic outlook in Switzerland. Since the last monetary policy assessment in September, the global economy has developed in line with our expectations. It has continued to recover and capacity utilisation in many countries is improving gradually. This is especially evident in the labour market, where job numbers are on the rise and unemployment is declining. However, global economic growth is moderate and not yet broad-based.

The two elements on which our monetary policy is based – the negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene – are both helping to reduce pressure on the Swiss franc. Thus, despite periods of heightened uncertainty over the last few months, the franc has remained quite stable overall. Furthermore, the negative interest rate has led to lower interest on the capital market, which is facilitating corporate financing. In other words, our expansionary monetary policy is effective. The negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market continue to be both necessary and  Page 4/5  Berne, 15 December 2016 Thomas Jordan  News conference  appropriate. This is because inflation is still very low, production capacity is not yet being fully utilised and the Swiss franc continues to be significantly overvalued. Our monetary policy stabilises price developments and supports economic activity in Switzerland. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to Fritz Zurbrügg, who will speak about current developments in the area of financial stability. Page 5/5
Let us now see what it is like today: Growth is over 7%, and average growth from 2006 to 2012 has been 6.7%; Growth appears to be on course to reach around the 8% level from next year; Foreign reserves exceed $ 6.3 billion and around 4.4 months of imports; The country enjoys peaceful and stable conditions; Foreign investment inflows are strong and foreign Investment via international sovereign bonds and Government paper amounts to about $ billion; Unemployment is around 3.6%; Poverty is down to about the 6% mark; Inflation has been at single digit levels over the past 4 ½ years; GDP is at about $ billion; Per capita income is around $ 3,000; The economy is being diversified under a 5Hub + Tourism strategy to avoid the middle income trap; The Fiscal deficit has been limited to 6.4% in 2012, and on a reducing trend; The Debt to GDP level is below 80% and falling; The level of infrastructure has improved tremendously; The Doing Business global rank is at the 81st, and is poised to jump about 10 places this year; Regional development has made tangible progress and the Western Province share of GDP has dropped to around 43%; Regular foreign investment is flowing into banks and the stock market; Private remittances have reached nearly 10% of GDP, or about $ 6 billion in actual inflows; The banking system has been stable and even in the midst of very difficult global circumstances, the country enjoys favourable reviews from many influential international quarters.

At present, there are no research findings on the costs associated with capital controls or how much those costs rise each year, as this is a complex estimation task that may not even be feasible until several years from now. On the other hand, it can be argued that the costs were small to begin with because of the situation represented by a worldwide financial crisis. Furthermore, in implementing the capital controls, the Central Bank has attempted to reduce these costs as much as possible by granting exemptions. A bill of legislation relaxing certain restrictions affecting firms and individuals is expected in the near future. But none of this changes the need to make every effort to abolish the capital controls. I mentioned long-term costs. In addition to this, the controls were imposed as an emergency measure and constitute a deviation from our contractual obligations under the EEA Agreement. That deviation has been approved by our counterparties, but we are still obliged to make our best effort towards lifting the controls without jeopardising financial and economic stability. Does this mean we must revert all the way to the regime we had before the crisis? I think that, as regards corporate and household capital movements, the answer is broadly yes. On the other hand, it will be necessary to limit financial companies’ exchange rate risk more than was done before the crisis, including the maturity mismatches in their balance sheets and overall size of foreign-denominated balance sheets.