samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Five major trends are having a significant bearing on the future development of the global sukuk market. Firstly, the bond market is now becoming key to meeting the funding requirements for both the public and private sectors in emerging market economies. This is particularly the case for the Middle East and Asia, which are among the fastest growing regions in the global economy. This includes financial needs of the private sector following the privatisation and implementation of infrastructure projects. The development of the Islamic Bond Market, the Sukuk Market will provide opportunities for the corporate sector, the government agencies, multinational corporations and multinational development institutions to raise funds through the issuance of sukuk to meet their financing requirements. The sukuk market also serves as an important platform, complementing the conventional bond market, in enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency for the mobilisation and allocation of funds within the domestic financial system, as well as in the international financial system. Secondly, while there has been growing interest in the issuance of sukuks by corporations, sovereigns and multinational corporations, the demand for sukuks significantly exceeds the supply. Today, the global sukuk market, denominated in international currencies, is estimated to exceed USD50 billion. Although the size of the market is modest by global standards, the sukuk market is experiencing remarkable growth, increasing at an average rate of growth of forty per cent per annum. The significant demand for sukuks have been spurred by the high levels of surplus savings and reserves in Asia and in the Middle East.

Applying these tools to central banking operations is both easier and harder than in the private sector. Easier, because there is no tension between profit and risk: central banking operations are always designed with risk in mind from the start. But harder, because the events in which central banks are called on to act often lie in the very tails of the distributions, making it hard – often impossible – to calibrate risk tolerance using historic data. And many of our operations are not discretionary, but reflect policy imperatives: so binding risk limits which, if applied, might cause a policy to be aborted mid-course, have little chance of success. At the Bank of England, we have responded to these challenges in three ways. First, we have adopted a risk tolerance that, though qualitative in nature, recognises the importance attached to the safeguarding of public resources and the priority placed on ensuring that policy decisions are always made in full knowledge of the financial risk implications. As I have described, maintaining monetary and financial stability – the Bank’s policy mission – can sometimes mean we have to take on material levels of risk ourselves. But where we do that, we should take on no more risk than is necessary, and we should do so with our eyes open, conscious too of the tradeoffs between financial and non-financial risk.
Ong Chong Tee: Fostering a strong corporate governance ecosystem Keynote speech by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore Governance and Transparency Forum, Singapore, 6 August 2018. * * * Mr Yeoh Oon Jin, Divisional President – Singapore, CPA Australia Associate Professor Lawrence Loh, Director, Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organisations, NUS Business School Mr Willie Cheng, Chairman, Singapore Institute of Directors Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Thank you for the kind invitation to my colleagues and I to join all of you here today. It is my pleasure to offer some remarks. The timing of this forum is also apt as the MAS has just released the revised Code of Corporate Governance (“Code”) this morning. Allow me to first take the opportunity to thank members of the Corporate Governance Council (“Council”), chaired by Mr Chew Choon Seng, for their valuable contributions over the last one and a half years. I am told that deliberations had been lively and rigorous throughout. These have culminated in a balanced and thoughtful package of recommendations that took into account the views of various stakeholders. The MAS has considered the proposals and accepted all the Council’s recommendations. These are now incorporated into the revised Code. The recognition of high corporate governance (CG) standards is one of the important elements to fostering good practices.

Done well, these can also augment market discipline by promoting debates on important CG issues and in educating investors to be discerning. In sum, building a strong CG ecosystem is most effective when there is collective effort involving multiple gatekeepers – beyond the regulators and the boards of companies. To end my remarks, let me also acknowledge, as this forum demonstrates, that many companies have and do take good CG seriously. The care and vigilance put into this effort must continue. I am sure the boards and management of all the firms present here will not rest on your laurels either. And I trust that from your examples as good CG stewards, others will follow likewise. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
SPEECH DATE: 29/01/2018 SPEAKER: First Deputy Governor Kerstin af Jochnick LOCALITY: Sveriges riksbank, Stockholm  SVER IG ES R IK SB AN K SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergst org 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn @ riks ban k.se www.riksb ank.s e  How the Riksbank contributes to financial stability* In Sweden we have a large financial system, which contributes positively to jobs and growth. But it also entails risks, not only for financial companies, but also for the entire Swedish economy. We have in modern times experienced two bank crises, which the responsible authorities have succeeded in managing in a good way, but which have in the long run lowered production levels and thus general welfare in Sweden. Discussing what central banks and other authorities do in the field of financial stability is therefore important. Right now it is particularly interesting to discuss what the Riksbank does, as the Riksbank Committee is in the process of reviewing the Sveriges Riksbank Act. One of the areas the Committee is to analyse is precisely the Riksbank's responsibility for financial stability, and it is good that this is clarified. The current act says that the Riksbank shall "promote a safe and efficient payments system”. The concrete meaning of this text is not self-evident, but the Riksbank has interpreted it as a task of promoting financial stability.

However, it is important that there are also good forms for discussion, cooperation and consultation between the authorities and the Financial Stability Council is one useful forum for this. The Riksbank's voice on liquidity issues should carry particular weight For the Riksbank, with its central role in providing liquidity to society, the management of liquidity among participants in the financial system is particularly important. The first sign of a financial crisis – regardless of whether it concerns an individual institution or the financial system as a whole – is namely often a shortage of liquidity. By acting as lender of last resort and using its balance sheet, the Riksbank is therefore usually the public authority that first takes action in a financial crisis. In the same way as the fire brigade tries to work on prevention by reducing the risk of fires, it is reasonable that the Riksbank should in various ways contribute to reducing the risks of a financial crisis. It is therefore natural that the Riksbank should analyse and comment on regulations that affect the probability of Sweden suffering a financial crisis, and also the cost of the crisis if it should  10 [12]  come to that. My view is that the Riksbank's voice should carry particular weight with regard to liquidity issues, given our central role in supplying liquidity. There are many different ways of formalising this.
However, I think it is also fair to recognise the recent climate commitment, signed  on the occasion of the COP25, and the launch of the Centre for Responsible and Sustainable Finance (FinResp by its Spanish abbreviation), which convey the sector’s commitment to this fight. The Paris Agreement of 2015 is considered to be the turning point that highlighted the role that finance can play in the transition process. Over the last five years, so-called ‘green finance’ has become more visible and climbed up the agenda of international financial organisations. On the central banking and banking supervision front, the work by the Network for Greening the Financial Sector (NGFS) is undoubtedly noteworthy. This network was created in late 2017 with the aim of analysing, defining and promoting best practices relating to the management of climate risk in the financial sector. The Banco de España actively participates in the work of the NGFS, whose membership has grown exponentially to now comprise around 72 members and 13 observers. I say ‘around’ because there are so many applications to join that it is easy to lose count. In short, I believe that there is a high degree of consensus among official authorities, society, firms, the banking sector and supervisors and regulators as regards the need for changes to address this unavoidable challenge. The work of the financial sector in this collective challenge is undoubtedly important. Allow me to briefly refer to what we are doing in the Banco de España to foster the financial world's contribution to sustainability.

Peter Pang: Economic and financial outlook for the Asia/Pacific region Welcome remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Launch of the International Monetary Fund’s Regional Economic Outlook, Hong Kong, 28 April 2014. *  *  *  1. Good afternoon. It is my pleasure to welcome all of you to the launch of the latest issue of the IMF’s Asia and Pacific Regional Economic Outlook. We are honoured to have Mr. Changyong Rhee, Director of the Asia and Pacific Department of the IMF, and his colleagues to share with us today their views on the region’s economic and financial developments, the outlook and the challenges, and what can be done to manage the risks and promote further growth that is sustainable over the years ahead. 2. I totally agree with the theme of this issue of the REO – sustaining Asia’s high growth momentum would require continuing vigilance and reforms. There is little doubt that Asia will continue to grow faster than most other regions in the world. Since the Asian financial crisis, policymakers have implemented many structural reforms making the region more resilient. Asia has also been leading the world recovery after the global financial crisis. Having said that, Asia cannot afford to feel complacent as the road ahead is bumpy. And we will be in unchartered waters when the high tide of global liquidity starts to ebb as the developed economies embark on the normalization of their monetary policies.
Though I questioned the efficacy of the expansion of our balance sheet through the purchase of Treasury securities known as “QE2,” I have come to expect that the Federal Open Market Committee would continue to anchor the base lending rate at current levels and also maintain our abnormally large balance sheet, now with footings of almost $ trillion, for “an extended period.” I do not believe it wise to commit to more than that, or to signal further accommodation, when the cheap and abundant liquidity we have made available is presently lying fallow, and when the velocity of money remains so subdued as to be practically comatose. At the FOMC meeting, the committee announced that it “currently anticipates that economic conditions … are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.” In monetary parlance, that is language designed to signal that we are on hold until then. I voted against that commitment-cum-signal. In the press’ reporting of my dissenting vote and those of the other two members of the FOMC who voted against that commitment – Mr. Kocherlakota, my counterpart from the Minneapolis Fed, and Mr. Plosser, my counterpart from Philadelphia – there was substantial speculation as to the reasons for our dissent. I will let my other two colleagues speak for themselves; I can only speak for myself. Let me make clear why I was opposed to freezing the fed funds rate for two years.

I think that makes sense for banks, but we’ve come to the view that it is really not relevant for credit unions in the UK. We also want to avoid discouraging growing firms, and are confident of our ability to manage the failure of smaller credit unions smoothly with our colleagues at the FSCS. Therefore we are launching a  9  For more background on this work, see https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/working-paper/2017/the-determinants-of-uk-credit-unionfailure 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  consultation today in which we propose to change capital requirements to simplify them, remove barriers to growth and deliver a greater degree of financial resilience for smaller credit unions that are more likely to fail. We propose to:  ∙  get rid of our “slab” system and replace it with a graduated, income-tax-style approach where larger credit unions would be required to hold 5% capital for assets up to £ 8% for assets between £ and £ and 10% for assets above £ as opposed to today’s system where firms have suddenly to hold 10% on their entire asset base if they grow a single pound over £ in assets;  ∙  maintain capital requirements at 3% for credit unions with total assets less than £ but introduce a “monitoring zone” of 3-5% whereby if a smaller credit union’s capital falls below 5% we would step up our supervisory activity.
If you are honest only in some places or circumstances, but not others—or only with some people, but not others —then honesty is hardly integral or integrated into your life and work. The importance of this particular meaning of “integrity” was made apparent to me on a recent visit I made to the United States Military Academy at West Point. The faculty and students there believe that strong individual ethics are what make large organizations like the U.S. armed forces succeed. The commitment of cadets to living the ideals of the institution was impressive and humbling. They embodied the word integrity—alignment of word and deed in all aspects of life. Another lesson that I took from West Point is that cadets commit to integrity because their careers—and, in combat, their lives—depend on others. We are in this together—this city, this industry, this country. And if we’re in it together, we all have to behave in ways that benefit the group.7 We have to behave in ways that merit the trust of others. Whether we are citizens or soldiers, the most important relationships in our lives are built on trust. In our personal lives, we take action when our trust has been betrayed. To reform financial services, we need to bring the same expectations of trust—and the consequences of a breach of that trust—to the office each day. If you would not tolerate a practice in your personal life, do not tolerate it in the office. Calling out bad conduct is not easy.

The first is the greater income and consumption volatility that have been observed in emerging markets, both in terms of the level and in terms of growth relative to developed economies. And the second is the fact that economic agents in  1  The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Thailand or Bank of Thailand policy. I would like to thank Piti Disyatat, Ashvin Ahuja, Sarawan Angklomkliew, Jaturong Jantarangs, Nawaporn Maharagkaga, Don Nakornthab, Kobsak Pootrakool, Mathinee Subhaswadikul and Supradit Tangprasert of the Bank of Thailand for their substantial contribution to the drafting the original paper. BIS Review 98/2008  1  emerging markets face greater limitations in the ability to smooth consumption in response to shocks. The empirical evidence from two recent studies are summarized in Table 1. As documented by Aguiar and Gopinath in 2007, consumption is around 40 percent more volatile than income at business cycle frequencies for emerging markets, while the ratio is less than one for developed economies. The same is true when comparing relative volatility in growth rates of consumption and income. A study by Kose, Prasad, and Terrones in 2005 also shows greater income and consumption volatility in emerging markets relative to developed economies. Such heightened volatility in macroeconomic outcomes undoubtedly has adverse implications for welfare.
For one, it runs to four, with one bank’s model suggesting $ of capital, another’s over $ for an identical exposure. These inconsistencies are likely to be an under-statement of the true problem. Because they cover only a sub-set of the banks using internal models, these exercises may significantly under-estimate variability across the bank population. The portfolios covered by existing HPE  1  Market-based measures of bank riskiness, such as CDS spreads or credit ratings, are also consistent with this interpretation. If anything, these suggest the panel of banks is as risky or riskier today than 20 years ago. 2  The European Banking Authority (EBA) has also looked at the degree of consistency of European banks’ risk weights, though not using a HPE methodology. It too found large cross-bank discrepancies. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  exercises have also tended to be relatively simple. More complex portfolios would probably result in wider cross-bank variability. The Basel Committee is currently undertaking an equivalent exercise for banking book assets. There is a delicate line to tread between useful diversity in model outputs on the one hand and useless inconsistency on the other. It is clear we are currently on the wrong side of this line. If a regulatory regime can generate capital ratios of 5%, 10% and 20% for three identical banks, it is not a robust basis for assessing capital adequacy. In short, the objectives of the original Basel Accord are at risk.

One possible reason why risk-shifting may have been difficult to detect is that risk-based capital standards coincided with the shift to a much more complex regulatory framework. Complexity has an important impact on risk-shifting incentives - and not in the ways some have suggested. For example, some have argued that simpler rules are easier to arbitrage. The evidence suggests the exact opposite. Take the tax system. Simple linear tax schedules are typically found to be more robust to problems of tax arbitrage than complex rules (Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999)). Why? Because complexity increases the number of loopholes through which the tax-avoider can slip. Indeed, evidence suggests that complexity of the tax system may be the single largest determinant of tax avoidance across countries (Richardson (2006)). The same logic carries across to financial regulation. Regulatory complexity creates wormholes. At a macro level, cross-country studies suggest that regulatory complexity, in particular the use of internal models, appears to have had an important bearing on bank failure (Cihak et al (2012)). At a micro level, the parts of the regulatory framework which have been most prone to arbitrage are those where complexity and opacity has been greatest – for example, the trading book. Incentives will always exist to shift risk to where it is cheapest. No tax or regulatory system can fully avoid those incentives. But some regimes may be better at constraining those incentives than others. The current mix of complexity and self-regulation may provide too few constraints.
Accordingly, the Central Bank has drafted the guidelines in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, the Inland Revenue Department and the Panel of Auditors. These draft guidelines were approved by the Monetary Board, and have been submitted to the Ministry of Finance and Planning for their concurrence. Action 4: Regulatory coordination There are several public institutions involved in the merger and acquisition process of listed and unlisted financial institutions. Therefore, the Central Bank had several discussions with all such institutions including the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka, Colombo Stock Exchange, Inland Revenue Department and Registrar of Companies to facilitate the companies in the consolidation programme to fast track the process. Outcome of phase II Most of the banks and NBFIs submitted their respective confirmed merger proposals by 30 June 2014, while only a few financial institutions did not have firm plans due to certain reasons and were in need of additional time to finalise their respective plans. In order to resolve issues related to these banks and NBFIs, the second round of one-on-one meetings, chaired by the Governor of the Central Bank, were held between 11 and 22 July 2014. At these meetings, matters relating to the delays in arranging mergers and acquisition were discussed and financial institutions were provided with appropriate guidance to manage the consolidation process. Accordingly, all NBFIs who had not confirmed their consolidation plans were requested to submit their final plans at their earliest.

Banks in Sri Lanka have been in operation for over 160 years while the NBFI sector has been a part of the economy for the last 80 years. Before the economic liberalisation in 1977, NBFIs carried out hire purchase and leasing business using their own funds or personally borrowed funds. Since the owners of such companies prudently managed their businesses and were cautious in lending, NBFI failures during pre-1977 era were extremely limited. The new economic policies in the post-liberalisation period gave rise to higher demand for credit from the private sector, which led the NBFIs to raise public deposits. However, lack of controls and regulations during that period limited the ability of the Authorities to move directly into the affairs of NBFIs. With the commencement of operations of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in 1950, the Bank Supervision Department was set up, and has since been entrusted with the responsibility of supervision and examination of banking institutions. The scope of functions of the Bank Supervision Department was extended with the enactment of the Control of Finance Companies Act, No.27 of 1979, to include the supervision of NBFIs. The Bank Supervision Department was entrusted with the responsibility of providing the public with the required confidence in the financial system and protecting the interests of depositors. In order to achieve this objective, the Department was charged with the duty of continuous supervision and periodic examination of all banks and NBFIs in Sri Lanka.