samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In clearer terms: whatever the limits of the February “Brussels agreement”, I am strongly in favour of the UK remaining within the EU; yet, irrespective of the outcome of the British referendum, the EA can and should pursue further integration. 1  Helmut Schmidt, Remarks at the Farewell event for European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, October 19, 2011. 2  Building Europe, building institutions, Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet on receiving the Karlspreis 2011 in Aachen, 2 June 2011. 3  Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at SZ Finance Day 2015, Frankfurt am Main, 16 March 2015. 4  European Union: progress or regress?, Dinner speech by Ignazio Visco, Governor of the Bank of Italy, Istituto Affari Internazionali 50th Anniversary Conference, Rome, 13 November 2015. 5  Agnès Bénassy-Quéré and Xavier Ragot, Conseil d’Analyse Economique, A Policy Mix for the Euro Area, March 2015 , or Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi, European Parliament In-Depth Analysis, Economic policy coordination in the euro area under the European Semester, November 2015. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second, tensions and heterogeneity within the EA, especially between the so-called core and periphery, have been exacerbated by the crisis so that the prospect of risk sharing may be perceived as involving permanent transfers across economies. Pooling risks would thus be seen as involving moral hazard, with permanent suspicion of “free rider” behaviour. Yet, we must realise that heterogeneity across countries calls for reinforced cooperation, based on risk reduction together with risk sharing.

Some Member States also proved to be poorly committed to implementing domestic structural and fiscal reforms that would have created more policy space to address shocks. Collectively, the expected dynamics between peer pressure and market discipline did not work, as markets did not believe in the no-bail-out principle, and as national authorities did not really accept peer pressure, nor the implementation of the rules. The absence of coordination has a genuine economic cost. Several studies have estimated it for the EA. It includes a) the cost of crises and assistance programmes, as well as b) the impact on growth due to uneven compliance with budgetary rules before the crisis and rigidity of the rules during the crisis. Let me mention a few numbers. Banking and fiscal crises can be extremely costly: relative to the U.S. growth trajectory, the EA has fallen behind  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  by 5 percent of GDP per capita since 2011. Both the European Commission 6 and the NIESR 7 have shown the large impact of simultaneous fiscal consolidation in Europe, with around 2% larger GDP declines due to intra-EA spillovers. Optimal policy coordination in the EA would have required differentiated consolidation efforts in line with available fiscal space, leading to better growth outcomes. A last illustration relates to asymmetric adjustment driven by current account imbalances at the country level at the beginning of the crisis and contributing to the large external surplus at the euro area level today.
3 See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for  Certain Large Insured National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches (2014); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Review of the Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk (2014). 4 See Financial Conduct Authority, Behaviour and Compliance in Organizations, Occasional Paper 24 (Dec.  2016). 5 Id. 6 See William C. Dudley, Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry,  Remarks at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014). 7 See Salz Review: An Independent Review Of Barclays’ Business Practices 191–92 (2013) (collecting sources). 8 See Wieke W. Scholten, Banking on Team Ethics: A team climate perspective on root causes of misconduct in  financial services 110–13 (2018) (summarizing psychological research on moral climates that may facilitate misconduct). 9 See Nicholas Morris and David Vines, Capital Failure 15–16 (2014) ((“Trustworthiness requires conscious  choices to be made rather than merely being the outcome of a reliable process.”). 10 William C. Dudley, Remarks at the Culture Imperative – An Interbank Symposium, Jan. 11, 2017, (“My second  message is to reject the idea that a separate regime of ethics or morality applies in banking. I’m sure you have heard this, or perhaps even thought this, at some point in your career. Let it end there. We often teach our children by asking them if they would engage in that type of behavior at home.

The Albanian system’s immunity to this crisis arises from certain factors, namely: •  The relatively low exposure of the Albanian financial system to international financial institutions;  •  The low integration level in general; and  •  The well-capitalized activity of European banking groups and their branches operating in Albania. BIS Review 120/2008  1  In general, we consider that no risks that may be materialized or which may harm abruptly and severely the activity of the financial system are identified. However, I would like to dwell on the risk analysis of the banking sector. Scenario-based risk analyses confirm that the banking sector has the capacity to cope with the various risks that may arise as a result of the unwelcome shifts in the exchange rates and interest rates. Prudent monitoring of assets’ quality is required and time is ripe to pay greater attention to the performance of liquidity indicators. With respect to the latter, the following aspects are crucial to keep under consideration: First, the absence of a developed money and securities trading market curtails the financial institutions’ capacities to meet the unexpected liquidity needs through the sale of assets considered as “liquid”.
Going forward, the access to financing for healthcare, education and retirement will reduce the need for high levels of precautionary savings, and thus strengthen further domestic demand in the economy. The fourth imperative relates to ongoing efforts to expand financial inclusion. Financial inclusion has been, and must continue to be, a key component of Asia’s overall strategy to achieve balanced and equitable growth. Indeed, in the advanced economies, there is a now greater focus and attention on expanding financial inclusion to support the strength of recovery. Emerging Asia has achieved remarkable progress on this front. The period of higher growth has been accompanied by lifting millions out of poverty. Asia however still remains the home of two-thirds of the world’s poor. Therefore, much still remains to be done. The imperative is to arrest the widening income disparities and in inequality through providing more households and small businesses with meaningful access to financial products and services, thus bringing them into the economic mainstream. Another is ensuring that as Asia develops, households, particularly in the lower income groups, do not become financially excluded because financial products and services become increasingly unaffordable or complex, or due to practices of financial institutions which increase barriers to access. Finally, Asia is now building on the progress that has been made in strengthening the resilience of our financial systems. Authorities in Asia are at various stages of translating the global financial reform measures into local standards.

Asia is therefore committed to taking the important steps today to ensure our resilience to future shocks and thus secure the stronger foundations for our collective growth and stability. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The Goldin specification is:  (5) ln  ∝  Where  ∗  ∗  =  1 0  female male  We regress the natural log of average gross hourly pay on a binary female coefficient and a set of controls, wider than the ones used in Goldin (2014). The set of controls comprises both individual and job-specific characteristics. It includes: age, female-age group interactions, usual hours worked, public or private sector, full time or part time, contract type, whether born in the UK, has a child under 2, female and child under 2  26  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  26  interaction, occupation, female and occupation interaction, educational qualifications, tenure, region of home and sector (Annex Table 1A).11 Once we take account of these factors, Table 2 suggests that there was, on average, a conditional gender pay gap of just under -15% between 1994 and 2019.12 This gender pay gap is highly statistically significant. To understand how it has changed over time, we split the sample into five periods (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013, 2014-2019) and re-estimate (5). As Chart 22 shows, the gender pay gap has fallen over time, though it remains around -10% and is statistically significant by the end. Table 2: Gender pay gap for specification (5)  Female Observations  Coefficient  Pay gap, per cent  Number of observations for females  -0.159***  -15%  291,859  (-11.17) 537,177  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations.

Chart 20: Ethnicity pay gap Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, sample average  Per cent  15  10  Unaccounted for  5  0  ‐5 Sex  Qualification  Sector  Age  Tenure  Region  Occupation  Public sector  FT/PT  Job type  Total  Accounted for  ‐10  ‐15 Total gap  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts. ‘Job type’ captures if the job is temporary or permanent. Looking over time (Chart 21), the unconditional ethnicity pay gap was broadly stable from the mid-1990s until 2015, since when it has declined. That decline can to a large extent be explained by the rise in the relative educational performance of ethnic minorities which, by the end of the sample, is subtracting 2 percentage points from the pay gap. By contrast, the unexplained ethnicity pay gap has been largely unchanged over the sample. Not only is the unexplained (“pay bias”) part of the ethnicity pay gap as large as for gender; it appears also to have been more persistent and has shown fewer signs of falling over time. The ethnicity pay gap problem in the UK is every bit as acute as the gender pay gap problem, contrary to the message from the raw pay gap data.
The Accelerator-run proofs of concepts allowed us to change our mind-set to be less bound by convention in terms of how we run the Bank of England, as an infrastructure provider, a payment systems operator and a regulator. We are now looking to build on the success of the Accelerator by integrating its key approaches into our business as usual activities. So today I can announce that we have set up a new Fintech Hub that will sit at the heart of the Bank, to consider both how the Bank understands and how it applies fintech, relevant to its mission. It is important that we continue to do this with our doors firmly open. So the Hub will be a central point of contact for the fintech sector to engage with the Bank, and will play an active role in the new HMT/FCA/Bank taskforce. And it will engage with you to understand and apply these developments to support the next wave of innovation in finance, and ensure that the UK has the right infrastructure to support that into the future. Being open in our minds and approach are important steps in embracing and supporting new technology. But we also need to be open to change to fulfil our mission and keep pace with an evolving financial sector. Open to change  Change is already afoot.

With its open approach of considering, adapting to, and applying fintech across the breadth of its mission, including through its own investments, the Bank will play its part. 14 15  Bank of England (2017b) The proof of concept connects firms to a specifically built, offline version of RTGS so that the live RTGS system is protected.
Another very important change was the creation of a fiscal policy framework with an amended budget process. This framework and the new process aimed to get a grip on the evolution of public expenditures while also leading  1  The Economic Commission (1993). 2  A debate about this had been taking place for a while at that point. The Swedish Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS) had been advocating a so-called norm-based stabilisation policy since 1985, see Heikensten and Vredin (2012) for an overview. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  to an average surplus in terms of net lending. The overall aim was to ensure that fiscal policy would have the desired long-term orientation. Flexible inflation targeting preferable – but improvements not ruled out But even though these and other changes have made the Swedish economy more reliable and resilient to shocks, we too have been affected by the events of the past few years. The global financial crisis and surprisingly low inflation have meant that a number of previously accepted truths have begun to be called into question, and led to a debate about whether the economic policy framework developed prior to the financial crisis should be modified or potentially even replaced. My view here is completely clear: it is important for us to think very carefully before we make any comprehensive changes to the Swedish economic policy frameworks.

In other countries, for example the United States and Norway, costs for owner-occupied housing are approximated to the cost for renting a comparable property – and this is far less affected by interest rate changes. In the euro area and the United Kingdom, the target is formulated in terms of the HICP index (harmonised index for consumer prices) which does not include costs for owner-occupied housing, only operating costs.11 As Swedish CPI inflation has this characteristic, the Riksbank has, since the introduction of the inflation target, calculated several different measures of inflation and has also regularly let inflation indices other than the CPI guide interest rate decisions. The price index which has played the biggest role in recent years is the CPIF, or the CPI with a fixed interest rate. Unlike the CPI, the CPIF is not directly affected by changes in mortgage rates. CPIF inflation, with energy prices also discounted at times, has functioned as a “steering” variable in such a way that the Riksbank has normally aimed for it to be close to 2 per cent within the forecasting horizon. Major interest rate changes lead to substantial and long-term effects on the CPI Despite this, the target has been formulated in terms of the CPI. As interest rates sometimes go up and sometimes down, the idea has been that the differences in inflation according to the CPI and the CPIF will level out over time.
As for the customs system, Thailand has continued to improve the customs system over the past five year as attested by the improvement in indicators of trade across borders, which is a category in Ease of Doing Business assessment, done by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Export-related requirements in terms of number of documents or period of procedure have been reduced or shortened over time. These improvements and further works will certainly help promote efficiency in international trades. With regards to the issue of human resources, I see that the reliance on migrant labour to fill the current labour shortage is not a long-term viable solution for Thailand. In fact, the economy, with joint efforts of private and public sectors, needs to raise labour productivity by upgrading production technology that uses higher skilled labour. Finally, let me close by stressing that the three success factors: growth, sustainability and inclusiveness are necessary and complementary to achieving long-term economic progress for Thailand. For the central bank’s part, many of the issues discussed this evening are beyond the functional scope of the Bank of Thailand. Our main role is to ensure sustainable growth by maintaining macroeconomic stability through appropriate monetary policy and financial regulations. For this, I can assure you that we are fully committed to our role and responsibility.

Before the euro, national economic policies were based on the close monitoring of several indicators such as the trade balance, the balance of payments, the exchange and interest rates. Policymakers thus constantly received information on the markets’ main reactions to shifts in economic policy and were strongly encouraged to take them into account where relevant. With the introduction of the euro, some of these indicators have either disappeared at the domestic level or their impact has been severely limited. Of course, the indicators continue to exist for the euro area as a whole, hence the importance of the Treaty's provisions on the co-ordination of fiscal and economic policies. Nevertheless, the rules of the market economy continue to apply to each Member State of Monetary Union as well as to the Union as a whole. At the national level therefore, economic policymakers need to be even more vigilant than before regarding the indicators of competitiveness. These data, which focus on trends in unit labour costs, the quality of the regulatory and tax framework and, more generally, an economic, legal and tax environment conducive to the creation and dynamism of companies, represent the main indicators shaping monetary domestic policies in the Monetary Union. The level of unit production costs is of primary importance. It would be a serious mistake to forget this in the context of a buoyant economy.
Yet, the SNB has no information advantage over banks, which make this decision today in a competitive environment, taking into account the local circumstances and needs of various industries. The new division of roles would therefore be inefficient and would turn the SNB into a central authority steering industrial policy. Just imagine companies in a particular industry, be it automotive suppliers, the textile industry or the hotel trade, struggling to obtain loans. How should the task to ensure credit supply be interpreted? Would the SNB have to step in where, under the current system, no loans would be granted? A centralised, statecontrolled credit supply does not befit our federalist, business-friendly country and would jeopardise the Swiss success model. The ‘debt-free’ payments to the Confederation, the cantons or the people are also fraught with problems from an economic order perspective because the SNB would then be directly involved in the debate on distribution issues. Who should get how much? Such decisions are a matter of fiscal not monetary policy. ‘Debt-free’ payments would politicise the SNB and would detract from our ability to perform our real task of ensuring price stability. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, the financial system has evolved steadily over the years since the Institute of Banking and Finance at the University of St. Gallen was established. The authors of the Swiss sovereign money initiative want to convince voters that a transition to sovereign Page 7/8  money would just be another minor change to the system. This is misleading.

If I had to choose a motto for a central banker, I think “better safe than sorry” would be very high on the list! More importantly we collectively showed that the London markets were equal to the challenge - even a once-in-a-millennium challenge - and were determined to make sure that come the first day of the new year London would be “open for business as usual”. What of the coming year? Well, I can predict that, after two years of new year working, we will all be able to enjoy our New Year’s Day bank holiday for a change next year! But beyond that, my crystal ball is no better than yours, and I am afraid that if you are looking for me to predict the course of exchange rates or interest rates over the next 12 months I am going to disappoint you. I would like instead to pick out a few themes which I think will be of increasing importance as the year unfolds. Firstly, I think we will increasingly see a fall in the absolute size of government bond markets, although once again Japan remains the exception. This is already happening here in the UK and in the US, as fiscal surpluses reduce bond issuance, and as the recovery in the rest of Europe continues budgets will increasingly move towards balance there too.
Even though there has been a steady shift towards more service production, we are still lagging behind other advanced economies such as the US and, to a lesser extent, Japan, which have higher production of services per capita. In particular, it is striking that service sector output per capita (in PPP terms) is 33% higher in the US than in the euro area, which is the main reason for a smaller difference in overall GDP per capita levels (26%)[27]. To a large extent this is due to old-fashioned restrictions that prevent competition in many countries in the euro area. The European Commission has estimated that an ambitious implementation of the 2006 Services Directive would have the potential to increase euro area GDP by around 2.5%. The latest estimates show that only around 0.8 percentage point of this has been realised – and this is ten years after the Directive entered into force. Also, bear in mind that these figures significantly underestimate the gains from a wider service market reform, given that some of the most important sectors – for instance health care – are completely excluded from the Directive. Another factor in services that is sometimes overlooked is that of scale. In today’s fragmented service market in Europe, there is insufficient pooling of resources to drive large-scale R&D initiatives, new distribution platforms and to increase competition between market participants. We therefore need to take a step back and consider what can be done to complete the European Single Market for services.

Measured against the OECD’s top three performers, the euro area is lagging far behind in both product and labour market efficiency, with no euro area country in the top three and with the largest euro area countries often underperforming the euro area average[17]. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In recent years we have seen a number of important reforms, particularly in those countries that carried out economic adjustment programmes. The main focus has been on reforms in the labour market. The nominal and real labour market rigidities that we have traditionally lived with in Europe have resulted in what is being called the “European unemployment disease”: persistently high unemployment rates and a limited ability to adjust to economic shocks. You get a very telling picture if you plot the unemployment rate in the euro area and in the US over several decades – say, from the 1970s. Every time there is a downturn in economic activity, the unemployment rate goes up in both regions. However, whereas the US quickly readjusts when the economy picks up, the euro area takes much longer to do so and once the unemployment rate actually starts falling it almost never seems to return to that previous low. The end result is that euro area unemployment has risen steadily for 40 years. [18] That said, there is solid theoretical and empirical evidence showing that greater flexibility results in much lower equilibrium unemployment rates[19].