samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Page 12 of 19  18  19  20  Figure 7 Real imports and sales (*) (index, base 2014=100, deseasonalized)  a) Automobiles 180  180  New car sales  120  120  60  60  Imports  0  0 14  15  16  17  18  19  20  b) Electronic items and appliances 250 200 150 100 50 0  250 200 150 100 50 0  Sales Imports  14 15 16 c) Clothing and footwear 160 Sales 120 80 40 0 14 15 16  17  18  19  20 160 120 80 40 0  Imports 17  18  19  20  (*)CPI-deflated nominal imports of new cars, clothing and footwear, and electronics (including: home appliances, fax machines, audio equipment, and cell phones), as applicable. Imports of electronics and home appliances include cell phones, computers, television sets and home appliances. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). Figure 8 Changes in income and additional liquidity by quintiles, 2020 (miles de millones de dólares)  16 12  Labor income Transfers 2nd PF withdrawal Expenditures and credits  Other income 1st PF withdrawal Unemployment insurance Total  8 4  15.6  12  8  6.0 3.0  3.3  16  3.9 4  0  0  -4  -4 1st quintile  2nd quintile  3rd quintile  Source: Barrero et al. (2020).

Second, manufacturing costs have increased sharply since 1998. Up to the summer of 2000, this cost increase was to some extent offset by a weaker krone. The appreciation of the krone has highlighted and exacerbated the deterioration in cost competitiveness. On balance, it appears that cumulative wage growth in Norway will be a good 15 per cent higher than in other countries from 1998 to 2003. The krone is now about 7 per cent stronger than the average for the 1990s. BIS Review 51/2002  3  Third, as a result of the fiscal guideline, the internationally exposed sector is subject to additional pressure. Over time, the phasing in of petroleum revenues will lead to restructuring and the transfer of resources from the exposed to the sheltered sector. Fourth, the response patterns in stabilisation policy function in a different way from previously. Under the “Solidarity Alternative”, the response pattern consisted of countering labour market pressures and strong wage growth by reducing growth in public spending (or, if appropriate, by strengthening government revenues). This had a beneficial impact on manufacturing industry. Today, monetary policy shoulders more of the burden. This may sometimes result in a strong krone exchange rate. Fifth, growth in the global economy is sluggish while, at the same time, oil prices are high. The fall in share prices curbs economic growth among our trading partners. Markets for Norway’s export industries are stagnating, but at the same time high oil prices are providing a stimulus for some sectors of the Norwegian economy.
It is only now, ten years later, that they are taking steps to move away from these measures. What is everyone afraid of? That growth will remain rather low and unstable. Indeed, after a long period of crises and stagnation, the global economy is entering a new cycle. But what is the aftermath? First. A higher debt load than in 2007. In developed economies, the primary problem is government debt, whereas many countries with emerging markets struggle with corporate debt. Second. Developed economies are contending with exceedingly low inflation and even deflation. Moreover, there are bubbles in individual markets that threaten to grow owing, among other things, to the effects of long-term soft monetary policy. Fourth. Low growth rates in productivity and investment. This not only limits opportunities for development but also hampers growth due to increased debt burden. Fifth. Developed countries are seeing increased inequality in the face of stagnating middle-class incomes, a trend observed over the past 30–40 years and often labelled the result of globalisation. It is clear, however, that unequal access to the opportunities afforded by new technologies also played a role. In this regard, the digital revolution and the new wave of job automation, which changes the traditional profile of the labour market in a number of professions and sectors, bring about significant social risks. As a result, we are observing an upswing of populism in politics, which in itself generates new economic risks and harbours continued financial market volatility. Sixth. An important point for us.

The biggest risks are a global economic downturn, a  Page 2/4  Zurich, 22 September 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  worsening of the gas shortage in Europe and a power shortage in Switzerland. Furthermore, a resurgence of the coronavirus pandemic cannot be ruled out. Monetary policy tightening  Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to return to our monetary policy. I would like to explain today’s decision. Last quarter, our conditional inflation forecast indicated that, without a further tightening of monetary policy, inflation would be above the range consistent with price stability at the end of the forecast horizon. This meant that further interest rate increases might be needed to stabilise inflation in the range consistent with price stability over the medium term. This has turned out to be the case. While Switzerland’s inflation rate of 3.5% is low by international comparison, it is significantly above the 0% to 2% range we equate with price stability. There are also growing signs that higher prices are increasingly spreading to goods and services that are not directly affected by the war in Ukraine or the consequences of the pandemic. Information from our delegates for regional economic relations suggests that companies can more easily transfer higher costs to their sales prices. In addition, energy prices have continued to rise overall and are increasing inflationary pressure in many sectors. This heightens the risk of second-round effects. We have therefore concluded that a significant increase in the SNB policy rate is appropriate.
Conclusion In my remarks, I have outlined that to “future-proof’’ compliance, we must change the way we think about the subject. I also emphasised that a narrow focus on rule setting and micro managing would likely fail. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Instead, compliance needs deep understanding. It needs to consider incentives, ethics and professional conduct. It needs to leverage on mutually reinforcing partnerships. It needs to fulfil its responsibility to contribute to the well-being of society. After all, compliance is an enabler, it is not the end outcome that we seek. This is how we should future-proof our financial system and compliance. On that note, I wish all of you a productive conference. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

And in response, the Bank of England had to intervene on financial stability grounds through temporary purchases of long-dated UK government bonds. While these new risks and vulnerabilities are evident, the non-bank financial sector has remained largely stable in recent months, despite the stress in the banking sector that emerged in March. Fund investors shifted their exposure from higher to lower risk assets, especially from high-yield corporate to government bond funds. Portfolio de-risking has also been evident in insurance corporations and pension funds, as higher interest rates have reduced incentives for the non-bank financial sector to search for yield. But there are no grounds for complacency here. Structural vulnerabilities from liquidity mismatches and leverage remain elevated despite recent de-risking. Moreover, bank and non-bank financial institutions can be closely interconnected through funding channels, ownership linkages and common risk exposures. The non-bank financial sector remains particularly exposed to asset price corrections and credit risk should corporate sector fundamentals deteriorate substantially. In addition, non-banks’ exposure to property markets has increased markedly in recent years, rendering institutions vulnerable to ongoing price corrections in real estate markets. Fragile risk sentiment and elevated vulnerabilities in parts of the non-bank financial sector could amplify negative shocks. Strengthening the resilience of non-bank financial intermediation Given the vulnerabilities in the non-bank financial sector, it is vital to further enhance its resilience, also from a systemic perspective. To date, the macroprudential policy framework has mainly focused on the banking sector, while the policy framework for non-bank financial institutions still needs to be enhanced.
With interest rates close to zero, the SNB created additional Swiss franc liquidity through foreign exchange market interventions. This prevented the rise in the value of the Swiss franc from leading to what at the time would have been an undesirable tightening of monetary conditions. The foreign exchange reserves therefore surged from around CHF 50 billion at the end of 2008 to a good CHF 200 billion by the end of 2010. A direct consequence of our much larger balance sheet is the increase in the financial risks associated with our foreign exchange reserves. These risks have materialised in the last 12 months, and have led to significant losses for the SNB. They hold the potential for further losses. Just as the increase in our foreign exchange reserves was determined by the demands of monetary policy under the exceptional circumstances that prevailed in 2009 and 2010, monetary policy considerations will continue to dictate our actions in the future. This means, in particular, that selling our foreign exchange reserves (and buying Swiss francs) is not an option at the moment. Monetary policy also dictates that our currency risks not be hedged. In effect, hedging the exchange rate risk using derivatives would be equivalent to buying Swiss francs against foreign exchange for forward delivery. The effect of hedging on the market is thus comparable to the direct sale of foreign currency.

It is thus due to the instruments available on the market that the largest part of our foreign currency investments is in euros (55%) and in US dollars (25%). The remainder of our investments is composed of yen (10%), Canadian dollars (4%), pounds sterling (3%) and other currencies (3%). Finally, taking a general and somewhat longer-term view, the following point should be noted. The SNB’s currency reserves are made up of foreign currency investments and gold. In a risk-averse environment, losses tend to occur on foreign currency investments and profits on gold, while in a risk-friendly environment the opposite is true. Consequently, diversification of a portfolio to include gold and foreign currency helps to stabilise earnings over an entire risk cycle. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Its independent, external scrutiny of the outlook for the public finances will bolster the credibility of the process, thereby helping to add stability in what is a volatile environment at present. The need for a balance between, on the one hand, targeted and timely action on other dimensions to complement monetary policy decisions (which, by nature, have a broader and more medium-term impact) and, on the other hand, wider respect for the institutional framework for macro policy, also arises in the context of actions taken by the Bank and other actors to support the functioning of financial markets for financial stability purposes. Monetary policy works through the financial system. Monetary policymakers therefore have a stake in liquid and well-functioning markets as vehicles for the transmission of their policy decisions. More widely, the Bank of England as a whole has an obvious interest in maintaining orderly markets that support healthy price formation and an efficient allocation of capital and resources. The Bank also has a statutory responsibility for financial stability, which it takes very seriously. In the face of dysfunction that has emerged in some specific market segments in recent weeks, the Bank is conducting a set of temporary and targeted financial stability operations to support the gilt market. Their goal has been to permit an orderly deleveraging of positions held by so-called liability driven investment (LDI) funds, which became vulnerable in the volatile market conditions we have seen of late.

Likewise, we cannot be specific today about the design of the “final” post-crisis operational framework. Before  8  BIS Review 51/2010  deciding on this, we will need to consider thoroughly the lessons to be learnt from the crisis. However, the operational framework that prevailed prior to the turmoil seems to provide a good benchmark. It served us well prior to the crisis, and could be adapted quickly as circumstances worsened. Concluding remarks Let me conclude. There is no doubt that the crisis will leave us a heritage of severe macroeconomic imbalances. Dealing with them will represent one of the most daunting challenges for policymakers in modern history. Against this backdrop, let me emphasise that the Governing Council will continue to deliver on its mandate, which is to maintain price stability over the medium term. All our decisions regarding an exit from supportive measures need to be seen within this context. As regards fiscal policies, it is essential to prevent public finances from running out of control. Clearly, this will require a very ambitious fiscal consolidation effort. In particular, as regards the consolidation strategy, and given that the tax burden is already high in many countries, the fiscal adjustment will have to be primarily expenditure-based. Finally, let me stress that any call to reduce the real value of public debt through higher inflation will be firmly opposed by the ECB. A low and stable level of inflation is a prerequisite for confidence, stability and sustainable growth. Thank you.
The enhanced strength and increased competition has fostered continued profitability as well as expansion of economies of scale and scope in the banking system, with wider range of products to serve the public. Going forward, Phase II of the Financial Sector Master Plan seeks to build further on this process, and ensure that the Thai banking system can meet future challenges. These challenges include globalisation and technological development which will increase competition in retail banking. The Thai economy will become more open, with increasing intra-regional trade and investment, due to the growing importance of regional economies in the world economy as well as various trade and investment treaties. Hence, financial institutions need to not only build resiliency and ability to adjust to these changes, but also build capacity to serve clients which will have growing needs for international businesses and risk management. Moreover, demographic factors point to an aging-society in the future, thus increasing demand for wealth management. The regulatory framework will continue to evolve with due regard to international standards and local needs. Indeed, with the current global financial turmoil, each of these challenges will become even more poignant in the future. The implication of these challenges to Thai financial institutions is that they must enhance their operating efficiency and risk management, while also becoming more responsive to clients, with fair and transparent treatment. Given these challenges, what do we envisage are the key features of the future landscape?

Pillar II is based on five key principles. The first principle is to ensure a robust banking system that is resilient, committed and able to provide a strong foundation to support the Thai economy at all times. In the second principle, banks will be encouraged to reap the economy of scale by promoting voluntary consolidation to promote competitiveness. At the same time, proper competition policy will also be put in place to ensure fair consumer treatment. The third principle aims to promote competition via the liberalization of branch network and business scope and to enhance the roles of existing players, including banks and niche banks, while the fourth principle will consider new entries based on the value added to the economy. Lastly, the fifth principle will focus on enhancing the role of specialised financial institutions in providing increasing access to financial  BIS Review 133/2008  5  services for the low-income and small business groups and reducing the role of the state in commercial banking. Pillar III, on the other hand, will focus on laying down the foundation for a strong and supportive infrastructure for the medium term development of the financial system. This will be done through further enhancing the market and products which will facilitate banks, own risk management, promoting an effective information system and pushing for the amendments of necessary laws to facilitate risk management. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Thai banking system will continue to face new challenges going forward, both from external developments and domestic factors.
Let me end these remarks by underlying some of these remaining challenges on the economic front. The monetary union is one of the milestones of the European project: a single currency, the euro; and a single monetary policy, with its own institution, the European Central Bank. This is the epitome of cooperation among countries: a supranational agency that takes into account the well-being of the whole area instead of nations exercising their powers in a disorderly fashion. As a reward, the contribution of monetary policy to the economic stability of the union has been decisive, particularly during the sovereign debt crisis and, crucially, in the current health crisis. In addition to monetary policy, during this crisis, there has also been a genuine, common fiscal European response to the pandemic, notably including the creation of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund. This fund adds key elements to ensure the burden of the economic recovery effort is shared. Some are unprecedented, such as the large-scale issue of supranational European public debt to finance reforms and investment in those Member States most affected by the pandemic. However, NGEU cannot and should not be seen as the cyclical stabilisation mechanism the euro area needs to complement our single monetary policy. A true macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism should be a multilateral institution in itself, of a permanent nature and with sufficient size, taxation power and borrowing ability.

We in the Executive Board will convene for our next monetary policy meeting at the start of December. At that time, we will also have to factor in the information that has been released up to then. 6/6
If parent banks buy the local subsidiaries’ eligible debt, this would represent a nonintrusive market solution for the problem of financial support, while observing the current resolution framework. Also, it would make central banks in CEE more likely to accept MPE (multiple point of entry) strategies in the future – as long as potential losses will be covered by parent banks. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The late Andrew Crockett, former General Manager of BIS, was one of the first to emphasize the important role of financial stability, distinct but complementary to price stability. The aftermath of the recent global financial crisis has shown us that crisis management and resolution is also a public good, correlated with, but independent from, price and macro financial stability. For financial integration in Europe to work, and for banking union to move forward, we should remember that there is one common market. The European legislation and the new proposals as well, which we broadly welcomed, do not refer to two asset classes of capital: inside and outside the banking union. Eventually, we will all be members of the banking union, and it is our joint responsibility to secure a level playing field. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Are there differences between Europe and the United States that may have a bearing on the pace with which new technology is introduced? And what part does EMU play in this context? One important factor in the process of industrialisation in the late nineteenth century, when Sweden was transformed from poor country into a wealthy nation with almost the world’s highest growth rate, was the contemporary development of the financial system. Banks were established and financial know-how grew when interest controls had been abolished. As a result, inventions could be exploited and investment in the nascent industries could be financed. A mounting body of research findings published in the 1990s indicates that economic growth in various countries is appreciably affected by how the financial system works: the more highly-developed the financial system, the greater the stimulus to economic growth. An accessible banking system and efficient financial markets contribute to the development of investment and thereby to the economy’s growth trend. One conceivable reason why the US economy is being transformed more rapidly than is the case with Sweden and, even more so, the European Community, is the efficiency with which the US financial system works. Corporate financing may well be facilitated by the breadth and liquidity of diverse financial markets. 3  BIS Review 129/1999  With the rapid development of information technology, moreover, a new type of company has emerged. It differs from the traditional pattern in that its operations involve highly mobile human capital.
Malaysia has a comparative advantage in this area. The Malaysian bond market is the largest in the ASEAN region, and it is the leading global centre for sukuk issuance. The regulatory framework and supporting infrastructure for bond issuances here is comprehensive. In the past, many 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  foreign corporations including multinationals have issued bonds and sukuk out of Malaysia. With the increased financing requirement by Chinese companies for infrastructure development throughout the Asian region, estimated to be more than USD1 trillion in the initial stage, investment banks should seize the business opportunities in bonds origination, distribution, investment and trading services. Our markets have already seen issuances of ‘dim sum’ bonds which were highly successful, such as the previous Axiata and Cagamas issuances. 4. Fourth, is to offer competitive trade financing and settlement services. From our industry engagements through Bank Negara Malaysia’s Financial Markets Committee, a key area that we need to strengthen in support of our international and regional trade is trade financing. Given the importance of China to us in this, renminbi trade financing should be given special attention. For corporations which trade predominantly with China, there are many benefits to settle trade in renminbi, in particular, lower foreign exchange conversion costs and greater access to new markets in China.

Since 2015, eight countries including Malaysia had been granted with RQFII quotas; bringing the total available quotas to more than RMB1.4 trillion. In addition, clearing banks across nine countries were introduced since then, adding up to 21 clearing banks worldwide. The increased availability of renminbi globally was evident, with more than sixty central banks and sovereign wealth funds reported to have invested part of their reserves and assets into renminbi, reflecting the broad appeal of the currency: the latest BIS triennial survey in April 2016 showed the renminbi daily turnover reached USD202 billion, almost double the size recorded three years ago, and even more phenomenal when considering it was just around USD34 billion in 2010. The renminbi’s market share globally increased from 2% to 4%, still a small percentage, but is now the eighth most actively traded currency in the world. The sizable pool of offshore renminbi deposit of RMB1.8 trillion has also spurred the growth of renminbi-denominated bonds issued outside China, known as dim sum bonds, while steps are taken to develop the panda bond market within China. Developments of renminbi business in Malaysia Continued growth and investment from China In ASEAN, Malaysia continues to be among China’s largest trading partners. From Malaysia’s perspective, China is our largest trading partner. In 2015, total trade between the two countries expanded by 11.1% to RM230.1 billion, representing 16% of our total trade.