samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There is also an interaction: •  In its budget resolutions, the government authorities will attach importance to the effects of the budget on the Norwegian economy and will therefore take account of interest rate effects. In this way, they avoid a situation where growth in public expenditure and the interest rate push the economy in different directions. •  With a known monetary policy response pattern, the parties to the centralised income settlements can take into account interest rate effects when wage increases are agreed. •  Moreover, the parties to public sector negotiations can take into account that the higher the pay increases are, the fewer there are that can be remunerated over government budgets. The interaction here came into clear evidence when employment in the general government sector fell after the expensive wage settlement in 2002. The authorities can achieve better economic policy results if they can commit in advance to a set of credible policy rules. Households, enterprises and capital markets are forward-looking in their decision-making. It is therefore important that the authorities do not sow doubt, but on the contrary act in a long-term and predictable manner. There must be consistency between plans and actions. Monetary policy’s role is to ensure low and stable inflation. Experience shows that we cannot reduce unemployment over time by simply accepting somewhat higher inflation. In many countries, also in Norway, confidence that inflation will be held at bay has increased because interest rate setting has been delegated to the central bank.

Imbalances in the world economy Low interest rates and risk premiums stand in stark contrast to the considerable imbalances in the world economy. There are particularly larges imbalances both with regard to the US trade and current account balance. This partly reflects the US federal budget deficit. Moreover, US households have a high level of consumption and a low level of saving. Strong demand in the US has sustained growth in the world economy. The deficit in the US is matched by surpluses in Europe and Asia. A persistent deficit has pushed up US foreign debt to a high level. The US population is growing faster than that of other OECD countries. This may suggest that saving in the US is somewhat lower and investment somewhat higher, but the impact is now considerably greater than implied by demographic factors alone. The imbalances may continue for a period. International capital markets are deep and liquid with an ample supply of credit for US borrowers. If creditors begin to fear a fall in prices and withdraw, this may still trigger substantial corrections. This may lead to higher interest rates and perhaps also a fall in US equity markets that spills over to other countries’ financial markets. In that case the dollar will also depreciate. The household debt burden in the US may be another source of instability if households abruptly reduce both demand for housing and consumption.
large international banks – should strengthen counterparty risk management practices as they are directly exposed to HLIs (first transmission channel). Second, core intermediaries should improve their robustness to the potential erosion of market liquidity (second transmission channel). Moreover, the FSF suggests that supervisors evaluate whether the link between HLIs and banks should be better monitored. The UK Financial Services Authority, for instance, conducts a six-monthly survey of prime broker dealers' exposure to hedge funds. Finally, the FSF encourages counterparties and investors to demand accurate and timely portfolio valuations and risk information from HLIs in order to strengthen market discipline. At present, HLIs disclose information to their investors and counterparties, but the level of disclosure varies considerably. The best practice guidelines issued by the Managed Fund Association aim at guaranteeing a minimum level of transparency. It is evident, however, that there are also limits to disclosure. A detailed disclosure of all portfolio positions in good time might be neither feasible nor desirable as it would force HLIs to give away proprietary information which is essential for their business. The recommendations by the FSF are an important contribution to the international debate on how to deal with HLIs. The correct measurement and proper management of the risk inherent in HLIs is crucial. Counterparties and creditors of HLIs are thus firmly requested to carry out regular stress tests designed to simulate risk exposures and liquidity during periods of stress.

However, central banks and regulatory authorities will closely follow developments in the HLI industry, in particular the initiatives taken by market participants to mitigate spillovers to the banking industry. References Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (2005), "Toward Greater Financial Stability: A Private Sector Perspective," The Report of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II. De Nederlandsche Bank (2007), "Overview of Financial Stability in the Netherlands." Financial Stability Forum (2007), "Update of the FSF Report on Highly Leveraged Institutions". Greenspan, Alan (1998), "Private-sector refinancing of the large hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management," Testimony of chairman Alan Greenspan before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, October 1, 1998. Hildebrand, Philipp (2007), "Hedge funds and prime broker dealers: step towards a ’best practice proposal’," Banque de France, Financial Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds, No. 10. Managed Fund Association (2005), "MFA's 2005 Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers." McCarthy, Callum (2006), "Hedge Funds: what should be the regulatory response," speech at SUERF (European Money & Finance Forum). The President's Working Group on Financial Markets (1999), "Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of the Long-Term Capital Management." The President's Working Group on Financial Markets (2007), "Agreement among PWG and US Agency principals on principles and guidelines regarding private pools of capital." 6  BIS Review 74/2007
5 My interpretation of these findings is that, although global forces have played an important role in determining domestic long-term  1  See Woodford (2007). 2  See Wu (2006). 3  See Reichlin (2006). 4  See Giannone, Lenza, Reichlin (2007). Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1990) found that real interest rates for seven of the nine OECD countries they investigated mainly depended on world factors for the period 1958-1989. 5  See Ferguson et al. (2007). 2  BIS Review 9/2008  interest rates, they do not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation has been reduced. The increased significance of global factors identified by empirical analysis is likely to reflect common trends as well as the similar orientation of monetary policies and their success in containing inflationary pressures. If national monetary policies diverge from such a common orientation, which itself has been fostered by increasing competition between currencies, 6 the observed regularities are likely to be affected. A central bank is still able to influence aggregate demand and preserve price stability under floating exchange rates. Effects of globalisation on aggregate supply Let me now turn to the effects of globalisation on the aggregate supply and on the dynamics of inflation. Several effects have been identified or suggested, some of which are relatively direct and others indirect.

In this context, perhaps the biggest advances of monetary policy of the last 20 years leading to the GFC had to do with the transparency and the overall macroeconomic coherency of interest rate decisions, which led, among other transformations, to the adoption of explicit inflationary objectives in a number of advanced and emerging market economies. In the aftermath of the global crisis, it soon became clear that traditional MP was simply not going to cut it, especially given the limitations of other policy options, such as fiscal expansion, to reactivate the global economy after the major blow it suffered. Central bankers were forced to be creative and think outside the box of traditional monetary tools in order to make a difference. A useful framework to understand how policy tools have evolved is to think about interest rates in the following way. The price of a given form of debt, issued at a particular maturity and by a specific counterparty, is the sum of three main components. The first is the expectations of short-term, risk-free debt over the maturity of the instrument. Let’s call this component the path of risk-neutral rates. The second is the compensation for risk that must be offered to an investor to account for the fact that longer maturity instruments are more volatile (have higher duration) than short-term rates, let’s call it the term premium channel. The third is simply default risk.
Nevertheless, even though these rules are not currently binding, any deviations that are not caused by a poor economic performance should be avoided, to minimise the possible negative repercussions for budget outturn credibility. Regarding the unemployment rate, the macroeconomic forecast contained in the Draft Budget expects it to reach 17.1% of the labour force in 2020 overall. This forecast, which is at the lower limit of the range defined in the Banco de España’s two scenarios published in September – between 17.1% and 18.6% – would, in my view, be subject to certain upside risks. Nevertheless, the most significant difference between the two sets of projections relates to the unemployment rate in 2021. Thus, while the macroeconomic forecast contained in the Draft Budget expects the unemployment rate to fall by 0.8 pp to 16.3%, under both the Banco de España’s projection scenarios it is expected to increase, by 2.3 pp under scenario 1 and 3.5 pp under scenario 2. It is important to note that these quite considerable differences cannot be explained solely by the fact that the Banco de España’s scenarios do not include the effects of the NGEU programme, because taking the Government’s estimates as reference, the implementation of that programme would entail a drop in the unemployment rate of 0.6 pp between 2020 and 2021. I will return to this question later.

The latter are primarily aimed at ensuring the maintenance of systemically important functions and the orderly resolution of the residual bank, and are therefore important in a “gone concern” perspective. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Increasing the credibility of model-based risk-weighted assets Increasing the credibility of risk-weighted assets (RWA) based on banks’ internal models remains an important goal. As discussed in the 2013 Financial Stability Report, model-based RWA are being called into question by market participants, analysts and authorities worldwide. This is particularly significant as RWA are at the heart of the capital regulations for banks. It is widely accepted that a bank’s risks can, in principle, be more accurately quantified using the model-based approach than using the standardised approach. Yet banks’ internal models are highly complex and can vary widely between institutions, thus making it difficult to accurately assess a bank’s resilience and compare one bank with another. The SNB welcomes the efforts by the Swiss big banks to increase transparency with regard to their risks. For example, both institutions recently started to disclose changes in their RWA, broken down by cause. Of particular interest is the proportion of the reduction in RWA which is attributable to model adjustments. In addition, Credit Suisse has been publishing a statistical measure of total loss potential for some time now, and UBS recently started to publish a statistical measure of loss potential by business division and a scenario-based post-stress capital ratio. The SNB encourages the big banks to further increase transparency with regard to their risks.
Expectation on the Association I have attempted to describe the industry’s operating landscape sometime in the near future. This is the future full of opportunities and can be realised through collective efforts of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  industry players, with the effective leadership of the Association. The industry, together with the Association, should set its sights beyond the domestic agenda. The Association should continue to drive efforts to further elevate the reputation of the industry as a regional benchmark for best practices in money services business. The successful organisation of the regional conference on money services business by the Association last year effectively showcased the remarkable progress that has been achieved in the industry and generated a lot of interest in Malaysia’s experience. Building on this interest, the Association can take a lead in the establishment of a regional network of money services business Associations among ASEAN countries to forge cooperation among industry players in the region. This would contribute towards raising standards more broadly across the region and unlocking the business potential in the money services sector within the region. The Bank stands solidly behind the Association to achieve this operation. Conclusion In closing, let me congratulate the Council of the Association on the significant achievements over the past year which would not have been possible without your commitment in time and resources, and the strength of your conviction to overcome obstacles along the way.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: The money services business industry in Malaysia Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Malaysian Association of Money Services Business (MSB) Annual Dinner 2015, Kuala Lumpur, 25 April 2015. *  *  *  Terima kasih kerana menjemput saya pada malam ini untuk bersama meraikan majlis makan malam Persatuan Perniagaan Perkhidmatan Wang Malaysia yang diadakan buat julung kalinya. Saya amat berbesar hati dengan kehadiran tuan-tuan dan puan-puan sekalian yang mewakili hampir keseluruhan penggiat industri pada malam yang bermakna ini. Ia jelas menunjukkan sokongan padu dan komitmen daripada saudara dan saudari untuk terus merealisasikan aspirasi untuk membina sebuah industri yang moden, progresif dan berdaya saing. I feel only a short time ago that I had officiated the official launch of the Association. Since then the industry has made significant progress on many fronts. Standards have been raised, business conduct modernised and the structure of the industry has changed significantly. In many ways the achievements by the industry had exceeded our expectations. I would like to believe that the regulatory reform instituted over the last few years was the catalyst that had transformed the money services business industry. We have seen very encouraging results. But these transformations would not be possible without the vision and shared commitments provided by the Association and the industry players.
While these criticisms may have some validity, Exter’s wisdom was to create an environment for both the government and the Central Bank to have a peaceful and  8  BIS Review 92/2007  amicable cohabitation. Exter argued in his report that “….there are, however, many important problems of monetary policy, especially those relating to fiscal policy, on which a central bank should work in close harmony with the government”. Accordingly, a degree of independence has been afforded to the Central Bank unlike other governmental bodies. This independence extends to the budget of the Bank, job security of key central bank officials and power to make monetary policy without consulting the government. The wisdom of Exter was that the Central Bank should as far as possible work in consultation with the government, rather than in isolation. He believed that the true independence of the Central Bank could be preserved only through that consultative process. In the words of Exter, “the ideal is….one in which there will be continuous and constructive cooperation between the Monetary Board and the government. The principal instrument for achieving this co-operation should be the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Finance whose membership on the Board will ensure at all times that his Minister’s views will be known to the other members of the Board”. However, Exter did not expect this arrangement to be effective at all times. Hence, he made the proviso that “it would depend on the men occupying the key positions” and not on any legal formula.

Thomas Jordan: Monetary policy and financial markets – what may we expect in 2008? Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Messe Fonds 2008, Zurich, 31 January 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The problems linked to the US housing and mortgage market dominated international financial markets in 2007. Despite the difficulties on the financial markets in the second half of the year, the global economy was robust last year. For 2008, the outlook for global economic growth has deteriorated and become more uncertain. The turbulence in the financial sector led to a considerable increase in risk premiums in 2007. In the past few years, these premiums had been very low, and even after the recent increase they remain modest by historic standards. Due to the higher level of economic uncertainty in 2008, the process of adjustment in risk premiums looks set to continue in various markets. From the current standpoint, the Swiss National Bank anticipates a somewhat slower pace of growth for Switzerland in 2008, although the economy should remain robust. However, the risks have increased in the recent period. As a result of the oil price hikes, inflation in Switzerland is likely to rise above 2% in the first half of 2008. Despite raised stock exchange volatility, the SNB does not judge that any additional actions are necessary at present.
Mugur Isărescu: International Financial Reporting Standards – international experience and implementation by the banking sector in Romania in 2012 Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the IFRS conference “International experience and implementation by the Romanian banking sector in 2012”, Bucharest, 20 June 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished audience, It is an honour to have the opportunity to open the proceedings of the Conference titled “International Financial Reporting Standards: International Experience and Implementation by the Banking Sector in Romania in 2012”. This is a topical and, at the same time, a hotly-debated issue that we are going to discuss together with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). Economic and financial developments tending towards internationalisation of banking operations in the context of globalisation of financial markets have highlighted the importance of financial information provided by companies, especially in terms of assessing and presenting the results and risks attached to their activity. Moreover, in the aftermath of the past years’ financial crisis, stronger pressures for harmonising accounting rules worldwide as a basis for the published financial information have emerged. Under the circumstances, the National Bank of Romania, in its capacity as the regulatory and supervisory authority of the Romanian banking system has steadily sought to harmonise its rules and practices with the best practices in the field so as to increase transparency and ensure comparability of information across the entire banking sector.

Detailed rules on governance in banks and deliberations on transposing extensive rules on banks’ internal control systems into national law complicate or even prevent the desired level playing field of consistent supervision – they increase fragmentation. Moreover, European supervisory legislation provides more than 150 options to choose from, options which have so far been exercised along highly different lines at the national level. Some are justified by local features – in this respect, the principle is that similar things should be treated similarly and dissimilar things should be treated dissimilarly. Many of the options are based rather more on tradition, and are in conflict with the principle of “same business, same risk, same rules”. The smaller proportion of these options remains national in character. Competence for the majority of the options – for over 100 – has been vested in the SSM since 4 November 2014. The ECB, together with the national supervisory authorities, has now begun to arrange for their consistent application. This process and the resulting adaptations will not always be simple or convenient, but the benefits of the outcome should outweigh the cost of adaption – not just in terms of financial stability, but also through more balanced competition and lower transaction costs. In some respects, we are still at the beginning of the road, but I am confident that the SSM has put us are on the right path towards achieving these objectives. 5.
firms  Hedge Funds  10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 -12 -14  Asset Managers  Source: Czech and Roberts-Sklar (2017) Notes: Based on Zen database maintained by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) which includes transaction-level information on trading in sterling corporate bonds for all firms regulated in the UK, or branches of UK firms regulated in the EEA. Dataset covers the period between 1 September 2011 and 31 December 2016. Hashed/dashed bars indicate no statistically significant coefficient. Source: Hoggarth et. al. (2016) Notes: Quarterly gross capital inflows are divided by annual GDP and averaged over four quarters. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  References Adrian, Tobias (2017) ’Shadow Banking and Market Based Finance’ speech given in Helsinki Allard, J and Blavy, R (2011) ‘Market Phoenixes and Banking Ducks: are recoveries faster in market-based financial systems?’ IMF working paper Bank of England (2014) ‘Procyclicality and structural trends in investment allocation by insurance companies and pension funds’ discussion paper by the Bank of England and the Procyclicality working group Baranova, Y, Coen, J, Lowe, P, Noss, J and Silvestri, L (2017) ‘Simulating stress across the financial system: the resilience of corporate bond markets and the role of investment funds’ Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No.

Bandid Nijathaworn: Some thoughts on IMF reform on crisis prevention and crisis resolution Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, presented to the G-20 Workshop on Reform of Bretton Woods Institutions, Tokyo, 28 February 2006. *  *  *  Thank you Chairman, First, let me thank the Ministry of Finance of Japan for inviting me to this workshop on the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions. This workshop is another reminder that the work on IMF reform is still ongoing. Next year will be a full ten years since the height of the Asian financial crisis. Over the past decade, many important ideas on the reform of the IMF have been advanced, but still there is no consensus on how the reform should move forward. I see today’s workshop as another opportunity to contribute to this ongoing debate. And whatever the outcome may be, the reform will certainly mark a critical turning point for the global economy, as the Bretton Woods Institutions attempt to adapt their roles and responsibilities to the forces of globalization. Today, I have been asked to speak on IMF crisis prevention and crisis resolution. Given the limitation of time, and the fact that the recommendations on these two issues have been many and are well-known, I thought the best way for me to add value to today’s discussion is to share with you our thoughts on the subject, as well as to make three specific points.