samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The credit institutions need only comply with the minimum reserve requirement on average within the reserve period. This contributes to the stabilisation of money market developments. A key element for the functioning of the operational framework has been the TARGET payment system. This payment system interlinks the 15 national real-time gross settlement systems and the ECB’s payment system, by providing a uniform platform for the processing of crossborder payments in real time. It has allowed a single interbank market interest rate across the euro area to prevail. Overall, the operational framework of the Eurosystem has proved efficient in providing liquidity to the banking system. This does not mean that this framework is rigid. On the contrary, it must adapt to the situation and evolution of the money market in the euro area. In this regard, the Eurosystem switched from a fixed to a variable rate tender for its refinancing operations on 8 June 2000. Let me make clear that this technical decision does not in any way modify the stance of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy, nor does it preclude renewed use of fixed rate tenders in the future. The sole aim of this  BIS Review 58/2000  2  changeover is to address the severe overbidding problem which developed in the context of the fixed rate tender procedure. Monetary and economic developments in the euro area Turning from theory to practice, I shall now consider current monetary and economic developments in the euro area.

In addition, inflation mostly affects social classes less able to protect themselves against changes in nominal prices, if only because the larger part of their financial assets is held in a current account with no or fixed interest. Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, inflation tends to discourage long-term saving, especially that directed towards pension funds. This prevents people from securing their savings for long-term purposes in a reliable way. In the long run this could affect the people’s sense of belonging to society. As John Stuart Mill once said, money (we might say price stability) is one of those instruments whose importance is only felt when put out of order. Over the last century, the European economies and societies have had sufficient experience of this to value the wisdom of this judgement. Times may, of course, have changed. You may think that this concern is now a bit old-fashioned. I would just say that monitoring and combating inflationary pressures is a permanent task. It is an essential feature of a market economy that it will generate inflationary or, less often, deflationary tensions from time to time. It is not because the river is regulated that the dam is useless! What about the other policy areas? How can they best contribute to sustaining high non-inflationary growth? Taking stock of the broad policy developments currently observed in the euro area might suggest that there is little to worry about.
If you invest in either of these, you are not promised all of your investment back, though of course you expect to make a positive return. Such an investor ordinarily expects the full return of their investment, but this is not assured. Investment in debt and equity can of course be managed on a collective basis, as asset management. You may remember the Woody Allen quote that a stockbroker is someone “who invests your money until it’s all gone”. Cruel I know, but it illustrates the difference between deposits, other forms of debt and equity. A distinguishing feature of banks is that by providing deposit contracts, far more of their liabilities take the form of value certain contracts. This alone makes capital and solvency critical for banks. In contrast, for asset managers, the contract does not promise such value certainty. Two particular conditions need to be met in my view to make asset management effective and robust to wider economic conditions. First, that there is no lack of clarity of the nature of the assets held under management. Second, that there is no illusion give to investors about  1  Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig: “The Bankers New Clothes: What’s wrong with Banking and what to do about it”. P38–40  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  liquidity of their assets. It follows therefore that capital and solvency matter much more for bank supervision, and market liquidity conditions matter more for asset management supervision. So bank capital matters a lot.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
These developments have spurred the necessity of our having to better understand and perform more analysis on banking risks. After all, banks do live and prosper by accepting risks, but these risks have to be managed with proper care. As we have all seen, well-managed banks have tended to stay resilient to the banking crisis and provided a backbone for restoration of financial stability. We must therefore, continuously adopt new techniques and technologies in risk analysis to ensure appropriate risk management of all financial institutions in the future. Of course, prevention is always better than the cure. As financial regulators, one of our main tasks is to provide a prudential framework ensuring the overall improvement of risk management of financial institutions. In the case of Thailand consolidated supervision as well as prompt corrective action will be introduced under the new Financial Institutions Act. Study is also on the way to prepare ourselves for the implementation of the BIS New Capital Regime, and we look forward to their conclusion for an explicit framework that will complement our current practices where we ask the Board to understand the nature of their organization’s business activities and risk appetite in order to provide an adequate internal control system to monitor and mitigate risks. Risk-based supervision represents yet another endeavor to tackle the effectiveness of risk management of financial institutions as transaction testing may no longer be an effective approach to examine the ever-more complex financial institutions of today.

M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: A brief comment on credit risk analysis Opening address by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the APEC Financial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Program - Credit Risk Analysis, Bangkok, 26 August 2002. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to be here at the opening of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Financial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Program on Credit Risk Analysis. The Bank of Thailand is indeed privileged to have the opportunity to host this distinctive event initiated by APEC. I also wish to personally extend a warm welcome to all the participants and to express our deepest appreciation to the distinguished speakers who have kindly agreed to come to share with us their knowledge and wisdom on various aspects of credit risk analysis. Needless to say, amongst other risks, credit risk or the possibility that a borrower will default, represents a key risk in the banking business. The example of the Thai financial system where roughly 400 billion baht of non-performing loans, commonly known as NPLs still remains since the 1997 financial crisis shows the painstaking effect of credit risks at the national level. Global trends along with advance technology and financial innovations have further added complications to the matter by enabling financial institutions to change their activities and risk profiles at a speed and scale which could not be imagined a few years ago.
In Harvard Yard sits a statue of John Harvard, seated on a bronze throne, commemorating 1638, the year of the university’s founding. Tour-guides relish in pointing out that, in fact: No-one knows what John Harvard looked like, so it is unlikely to be a great resemblance of him; The college wasn’t founded in 1638, but two years earlier; And it wasn’t founded by John Harvard, but by the Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which first voted to set up the university. The “Statue of the Three Lies” is part of Harvard legend. The Three Lies in question are harmless fun. But they should remind us how deeper untruths can persist, embodied in monuments or sustained by conventional wisdom and mores. We gather this evening almost seven years to the day that the failure of Lehman Brothers shattered conventional wisdom and laid bare three lies about finance. Unlike the statue’s three lies, those falsehoods have had lasting consequences. 1  So wrote F A Mackenzie, a Quebec-born writer and journalist who was the Daily Mail’s travelling correspondent in the Far East in the early 1900s. See Mackenzie, F A, “American shrines in Britain”, Chapter XLV in Hammerton, J A (ed.) (1926), Wonderful Britain: its highways, byways and historic places, Vol. 2.

Distinguished Guests, Let me first talk about the growth momentum and economic stability. In spite of the political transition over the past year, the Thai economy is expected to turn in a satisfactory growth rate in the range of 4-5 percent in 2007. This year, the main growth driver has continued to be exports. Domestic demand has however been affected by dampened consumer and investor confidence, linked primarily to political uncertainty. In July, private consumption remained close to the level recorded in the first half of the year. I am hopeful that once the general election date is scheduled and the cloud of political uncertainty has lifted, consumer confidence would rebound. Investment has shown signs of improvement during the second quarter of this year. There also appears to be a pent-up appetite for investment in view of the continued high capacity utilization of 75 percent as of July. Moreover, investment promotion applications to the Board of Investment have also pointed to a pick-up in investment once the investment climate becomes more favourable. I also expect investment to play a stronger role as growth driver, in line with the consumption recovery. This will be a welcomed development to promote a more balanced economy. The slower domestic demand has also been mirrored by moderate growth of private credits. Nevertheless, the banking system is strong, with the BIS ratio of 15 percent at end-July 2007, while net NPL amounted to 4.4 percent of total loans.
Second, banks can increase the size of the precautionary balances or buffer they hold with the Bank by altering their reserves targets in our voluntary reserves system. 3 And, third, in the face of, say, a  1  “Managing the central bank’s balance sheet: where monetary policy meets financial stability”, Lecture to mark the fifteenth anniversary of Lombard Street Research, London, July 2004, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Autumn 2004, pp359-382. 2  So I am using the expression in its older, broader sense, not narrowly to mean bespoke support operations. 3  Under the Bank of England’s Sterling Monetary Framework, individual reserves banks choose each month a level of reserves they wish to target on average over a month-long maintenance period running between Monetary Policy Committee meetings. The Bank supplies, via OMOs, the resulting aggregate level of reserves. In stressed circumstances, the Bank can permit a revision to the target during the monthly  BIS Review 67/2009  1  9/11-type event that disrupted the financial infrastructure and effectively closed the money markets, the Bank could temporarily substitute itself for the markets by allowing banks to borrow from, and deposit with, us at no charge relative to Bank Rate. 4 Beyond monetary policy All of those contingencies involve events affecting either the demand for reserves or their distribution around the system. And the measures designed to cope with them are therefore part and parcel of the Bank’s management of the banking system’s day-to-day sterling liquidity in the course of implementing monetary policy.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Monetary policy in the present environment - reconciling clarity and flexibility, as well as independence and cooperation Remarks by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Group of Thirty's annual International Banking Seminar, Bali, Indonesia, 14 October 2018. * * * Good morning. Let me begin by thanking the organisers of this seminar for the opportunity to speak on such a distinguished panel. I’d like to elaborate on two challenges. The first is domestic and concerns how we, as Euro-area central bankers, decide and communicate about the gradual normalisation of our monetary policy in uncertain times. The second challenge is a collective one: how we co-ordinate facing diverging economic paths. ** 1. Our domestic challenge in the euro area: combining clarity and flexibility The Euro-area is experiencing a broad-based economic expansion. Q2 2018 was the 21st successive quarter of economic growth. 9.2 million jobs have been created since 2013 and the unemployment rate has fallen from 12.1% to 8.1%, although this figure is still too high. There are increasing signs that the labour market is tightening and nominal wage growth is picking up: the Phillips curve is back to work, albeit a bit later than expected. The output gap was probably closed by the end of last year.
When subprime borrowers experienced problems in paying their credit, it became difficult to value products with subprime loans as underlying assets. At the end of the summer the credit rating institutes also began to downgrade credit instruments containing such loans. This resulted in the financial markets more or less losing confidence in anything that might contain subprime loans. This, in turn, fuelled price falls. 3 A common denominator for many of the investors, both hedge funds and others, who have experienced problems, is that they have had a high share of securities with subprime content, often in combination with high leverage. Considerable attention, as we all know, has been focused on the US investment bank Bear Stearns’ hedge funds, where the situation was such. When the financiers wanted to pull out, the funds were forced to sell their assets. The problem was that it was no longer possible to sell these assets, since liquidity in the market had disappeared. Quite simply, there were no buyers at prices anywhere near those that were previously listed or calculated. The funds therefore collapsed with substantial losses. Bear Stearns’ funds have received considerable attention, not merely because the losses were extensive, but also because they were among the first to experience problems. But there is also another category of hedge fund, which without having any actual exposure to subprime, was particularly affected by the turmoil. This was a type of fund that mainly relied on quantitative models for their investment decisions, so-called quant funds.

The full impact of these developments are only likely to be clear some years from now. This is indeed a most unfortunate situation. When factions exacerbate fractions, it damages even the most established forms of international cooperation. Third, the exponential speed of technological change has altered the global economic landscape and requires us to adapt fast. The proliferation of providers offer services that challenge the status quo. The dynamism of digital financial services redefines the nature of product delivery. It adds to the complexity of regulations and presents new challenges for economies, with broad consequences. Unattended, these challenges create risks that can stunt innovation, cause dislocation of labour and destabilise financial systems. Look at how ransomware attacks such as WannaCry and NotPetya have rattled internet users around the world. These virtual intruders infiltrated our synthetic selves, blocked access to our personal and professional files, and held us ransom by demanding payments to unlock them. These malwares infested computers operating on outdated and susceptible systems. For the financial sector, these recent attacks reinforce the lesson that, if we take a neutral stance to the IT revolution, we open ourselves up to weaknesses that can be extremely costly. For policymakers, these costs can have significant externalities that we must be concerned about. During World War II, Alan Turing and a team of experts took six months to crack the Enigma code. In contrast, today, Google can detect a virus in mere minutes through its algorithms.
The definition that I found most meaningful is: irrespective of the size of system, whether it is a country or a small firm, good governance, as a concept, ensures that the rules of the system are equal, fair and clear to everyone. Although I will focus mainly on economic governance, let me briefly mention that in order to completely grasp the notion of good governance, one has to look at its subtitles. Political governance, legal governance, economic governance, and corporate governance are the most well known among several others. In fact, these subtitles overlap with each other. For example, political governance has common issues with economic governance, while economic governance has implications on corporate governance. Accordingly, economic governance is defined as the nature and practice of economic management, regulation and development; or the institutional environment that constraints and coordinates economic action. Distinguished guests, Another point associated with the analytic evaluation of governance is that good governance provides a very important set of pillars, which are effectual in the design of an economy. The four of them are 1 the most useful ones for every economy: transparency, accountability, rule of law and participation . First, transparency means that the needed and the necessary information is freely available and 2 directly accessible to those who will be affected by decisions and their enforcement . Second, accountability is a mirror image of the responsibility and liability of an organization or institution for its decisions and actions to those who will be affected.

In Sweden, economic policy has charged the economy with a good deal of stimuli that can help to generate a broader increase in demand now that the stocks cycle is beginning to have a favourable effect and the prospects for the international economy are brightening. As a result of lower taxes and increased transfers, for example, most things suggest that household purchasing power is rising comparatively strongly this year. Seen over a complete economic cycle, the Riksbank’s instrumental rate is comparatively low. Considering the rate of inflation and the signs that activity is picking up, the real repo rate (the repo rate less the rate of inflation) can be said to be low. Then there is the weak exchange rate, which has subdued effects of the international slowdown and is now helping to stimulate the export-oriented sector. All this amounts to not inconsiderable stimuli to general demand in the Swedish economy, stimuli that look like materialising successively. How heavily should we tread on the accelerator? If inflation, even disregarding the temporary effects, is above the target initially, activity is entering an upward phase and economic policy’s impact on the economy is expansionary, then monetary policy ought to contribute to a somewhat lighter foot on the accelerator. But if most of the unduly high inflation stems from transient increases in the price level and if an economic upturn is not yet assured, it may then indeed be advisable to somewhat defer an upward adjustment of the instrumental rate.
I simply do not believe that the alternative approaches are sufficiently credible. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s latest economic and financial developments Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision-Making of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 31 October 2012 *  *  *  Today, on 31 October 2012, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council reviewed and approved the quarterly Monetary Policy Report. Based on the analysis of Albania’s latest economic and monetary developments, and following discussions on their performance outlook, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged, at 4.0%. The Supervisory Council deems that the current monetary conditions are adequate to meet Bank of Albania’s inflation target in the medium term. Keeping the key interest rate at its minimum historical level ensures the necessary monetary incentive to promote Albania’s domestic demand and economic growth. Let me now proceed with an overview of the economic and monetary developments and key issues discussed at today’s meeting. *** The Albanian economy was faces with a challenging global environment over the first three quarters of 2012 due to difficult situation of the world economy, and particularly of the euro area. Domestically and externally generated supply shocks determined the economic growth profile and continued to test Albania’s macroeconomic and financial foundations. Over this period, the Albanian economy was faced with slow foreign demand growth, increased financial risk premia and tendencies of several financial market agents to reduce exposure to Albanian economy. These developments were also reflected in low consumption and investment levels.