samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The statistics gathered from these talks – for example on firms' inflation expectations, but also on other evidence, such as changes in companies' price-setting behaviour – can be useful in assessing regime changes before they show up in the official statistics. Systematically collecting and evaluating as much information as possible is crucial. However, in a situation of exceptionally high uncertainty, a key challenge for policymakers is to find the right balance between waiting for additional information and not falling behind the curve. This brings me to the third principle for decision-making: determination. Determination The literature provides arguments for both a wait-and-see approach and more aggressive policies, depending, for example, on whether the uncertainty is related to measurement, the effectiveness of policies, or unforeseen developments. In practice, in an environment such as the one we face today, mixed signals on the persistence of inflation might tempt policymakers to postpone further reaction to inflationary pressures until uncertainty about future inflation has receded. Yet uncertainty must not mean indecision. A risk management approach to policymaking sometimes calls for decisive action. At times, the optimal policy decisions may be those that provide insurance against particularly bad, though very unlikely, events. The SNB's tightening of its monetary policy over the past year should be seen in this context. Towards the end of 2021, at a time when the inflation outlook was still relatively benign, we began to tolerate a certain nominal appreciation of the Swiss franc.

While climate policy is being strengthened in a number of countries, the international picture is also one of resistance to the introduction of effective measures. A stricter climate policy also raises difficult discussions about burden sharing - not least between mature advanced economies and emerging economies. It is not surprising then that the EU’s carbon tax plans are being met with accusations of protectionism. So far, it has been difficult to achieve a sufficient reduction in global greenhouse gases. Instead, emissions have increased. Emissions in advanced economies are still high (Chart 11). Emerging economies account for virtually the entire increase in global emissions in recent years. Since 1990, emissions have tripled in Asia, while they have been reduced by 30 percent in Europe. Chart 11 Emissions on the rise in emerging economies. CO2 emissons. Gigatonnes 35  35 Africa Americas ex. US Asia ex. China China US Europe  30 25  30 25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0 1850  0 1875  1900  1925  1950  1975  2000  Source: Our World in Data  At the same time, both energy consumption and living standards are low in many developing countries, and their emissions are barely visible in the chart. If these countries succeed in raising living standards, energy consumption will rise, which is unlikely to occur without higher emissions.
In other words, central banks have to be prepared to adjust policy when past asset price increases could be a significant factor putting upward pressure on aggregate demand, as well as when past declines threaten to reduce output relative to potential. Although the potential case for adjusting policy applies in both directions, the implications for policy may differ. Because some asset prices may fall more abruptly than they rise, and because the effects of downward moves in asset prices on demand may be larger due to the greater negative impact of deflation on the net worth of borrowers—witness the United States in the 1930s or Japan in the 1990s, the case for adjusting monetary policy in response to negative asset price shocks is commonly considered more compelling than in the alternative context. But this does not mean that monetary policy should generally ignore the effects of increases and only respond to observed declines in asset prices. The test should be the size and circumstances of the asset price moves and their impact on the forecast relative to the central banks’ objectives, not the direction of the asset price move. Different considerations apply in the circumstances where the central bank is considering how a potential future move in asset prices may affect the forecast. These circumstances call for even greater caution and care.

With limited exposure to international financial markets, Algeria has not been directly affected by the global financial turmoil. However, the sharp decline in oil prices over the second half of 2008 significantly impacted export and budget revenues. Despite this external shock, macroeconomic performance remained robust in 2009 with: –  strong external financial position with comfortable international reserves $ billion146, end September 2009 ) equivalent to 3 years imports of goods and services, and low external debt;  –  the real effective exchange rate around its equilibrium level;  –  continued high growth in the non-oil sector, expected to exceed 9% in 2009 against 6.1% in 2008;  –  sizeable savings in the stabilization fund despite the expected first budget deficit for several years;  –  contained inflation, notably on account of continued absorption by the Bank of Algeria of the excess liquidity. The strong economic performance in 2009, in line with the performance of the past several years, reflects continued prudent financial policies, sustained efforts to anchor monetary stability, and progress in strengthening the resilience of the banking sector, which have supported macroeconomic stability since 2000. 2. Savings and investment financing structure  Following a period of external financial imbalances and related adjustment programs during the nineties, Algeria has entered, since 2000, a period of sustained increase in savings, leading to a situation of excess savings over investment.
Hawking, S (1988), A Brief History of Time, Bantam Books. Holmberg, K and Thelwall, M (2014), ‘Disciplinary differences in Twitter scholarly communication’, Scientometrics, Vol. 101, Issue 2, pp. 1027-1042. ING - Economics Network Survey of the Public’s Understanding of Economics (2017), survey, available at https://www.economicsnetwork.ac.uk/research/understandingecon Jost, A (2017), ‘Is Monetary Policy Too Complex for the Public? Evidence from the UK’, SNB Working Papers, No. 15/2017. King, G, Schneer, B and White, A (2017), ‘How the news media activate public expression and influence national agendas’, Science, Vol. 358, pp. 776-780. Kumar, S., Afrouzi, H., Coibion, O and Gorodnichenko, Y (2015), ‘Inflation Targeting Does Not Anchor Inflation Expectations: Evidence from Firms in New Zealand’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 2015(2), pp. 151-225. Lusardi, A and Tufano, P (2009), ‘Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, and Overdebtedness’, NBER, Working Paper No. 14808. Money Advice Service (2015), ‘Financial Capability in the UK 2015’, Money Advice Service. Money Advice Service (2017), ‘Numeracy and Financial Capability - Exploring the links’, Money Advice Service. Morton, B (2011), ‘Falser Words Were Never Spoken’, article in the New York Times. MuLuhan, M (1964), Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, McGraw-Hill. National Numeracy (2017), ‘The Essentials of Numeracy – A new approach to making the UK numerate’, report by National Numeracy. OECD (2016), ‘OECD/INFE International Survey Of Adult Financial Literacy Competencies’, OECD. Patel, R and Gibbon, K (2017), ‘Citizens, Participation and the Economy’, RSA Citizens’ Economic Council.

In the inter-war years, the NBR played a paramount role in Romania’s economic reconstruction. As for the present, it is difficult to provide a self-description. Government authorities and public opinion might be in a better position to do that. Within the space of only two decades, the Romanian society underwent major changes. The future generations will judge what we did well and what we did wrong. During all these years, however, particularly since the start of reintegration and reconnection with the European Union, I can assure you that the National Bank of Romania made good use of its institutional expertise and took full advantage of the experience acquired ever since its establishment. I would like to mention that the NBR would not have managed to successfully accomplish its most complex tasks without the substantial contribution of its employees, namely the human  BIS Review 114/2010  1  resources it has created itself: employees, experts, managers. This is the reason why I want to extend my heartfelt gratitude to both present and former members of this high performance team for its professional qualities and integrity, as well as for their contribution to developing and enhancing the prestige of this institution, to the benefit of Romania.
The different responses of those central banks reflect their institutional framework as well as the economic circumstances of the respective countries. On one hand, the SNB has been more flexible than the ECB. The ECB is a new institution without historical record. Moreover, the ECB has a strict mandate of maintaining low inflation, and there have been upward inflationary pressures in certain European countries due to the convergence process. Those factors induced a less aggressive easing of monetary policy in an uncertain environment. In contrast, with traditionally low inflation, the credibility of the SNB is strong, which allows it to react quickly to economic shocks without creating turmoil in financial markets. In the past few years we have thus been able to act in a flexible way, with our own timing, in order to respond to the global economic slowdown and pressures on the Swiss franc. On the other hand, the SNB reacted less strongly than the Federal Reserve to the deterioration of the international economic environment. The United States is a relatively closed economy where the Federal Reserve mandate is broader than price stability. In contrast, our freedom to maneuver is limited by the openness of our economy. In a small and open economy, monetary activism cannot  4  BIS Review 32/2004  fine-tune economic activity. Institutional and economic characteristics of the different countries and central banks have thus implied differentiated monetary policy profiles. 5.

Dr Abbas is also the recipient of several awards from several governments and from the Islamic Development Bank, he received the Annual Prize for Research in Islamic Economics in recognition of his service in advancing the knowledge in Islamic finance. He has published books and research articles on a wide range of areas including microeconomic theory, mathematical economics and Islamic economics. During his tenure at INCEIF, Dr. Abbas will also engage in research and consultancy in on Islamic finance, including guiding academic research and supervising dissertations and theses of INCEIF students. He will also present lectures abroad organised by INCEIF as part of the efforts to strengthen the international alliances that have been established with INCEIF BIS Review 9/2010  1  from other centres of learning in other parts of the world. His appointment as the inaugural holder of INCEIF Chair of Islamic Finance would certainly give INCEIF the opportunity to raise its capacity to become a world class learning institution dedicated to Islamic Finance. Dr Abbas valuable knowledge and insights and his extensive experience in both academia and at the IMF, will benefit and enhance the knowledge and expertise of INCEIF graduates as well as the academia and financial community. Since its establishment in 2006, INCEIF has grown from strength to strength and has been recording a steady increase in the number of students for its three programmes, the Chartered Islamic Finance Professional or the CIFP, Masters in Islamic Finance and PhD in Islamic Finance.
And you can, and must, make progress now whilst policy is developing – ahead of regulation and to support the development of best practice. A necessary foundation for that is investing in education to increase your staff's understanding of climate issues. Without that, none of this can happen. Transition plans are fundamental to driving the right transition. They allow financiers both to manage their risks and to allocate capital to support real economy decarbonisation. And by highlighting where there is clarity about the way forward and  4/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  where gaps remain, they compel the right conversations. I encourage you all to engage in them now. The second challenge is that the world does not stand still. We have seen unexpected political and economic headwinds and it seems prudent to assume more will come. With unexpected headwinds and limited bandwidth, longer-term issues can end up deprioritised. Issues do not though go away – quite the opposite, they build in the background. So we all need to be nimble and adaptable in our responses to the nearterm whilst continuing to make progress on the long-term. We must also learn lessons as we go. Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, for example, was a shock to our transition pathway and highlighted the sorts of disorderly transition risks we have been worried about. We saw first-hand the economy-wide costs of a necessary reduction in (Russian-imported) fossil fuels before alternative energy sources were in place - a reminder of the costs of disorderly transition.

Inflation rates have been falling in most countries and they have registered appreciable expansion in economic activities with GDP growth rates averaging at about 5% in 2007. In addition, most countries have become more democratic in political circles, giving more say to the public on the running of governments and their institutions. Distinguished Participants, allow me now to turn to the subject we are gathered here for, that is, “Central Bank Governance”. Good corporate governance is generally acknowledged as  BIS Review 26/2008  1  important in economic management. In this regard, Central bank governance is arguably defined by a number of key-concepts or pillars, which together should form the basis of an effective legal framework governing a central bank and on which central bank governance should rest, that is, operational independence, democratic accountability and transparency. Despite its common usage, it is not always very clear what central bank transparency amounts to. Generally, two definitions of transparency can be distinguished in the policyoriented literature. Firstly, central bank transparency is referred to as the activities of the central bank in providing information. Thus, in this case, transparency has been defined as the degree to which information on policy actions is available. However, a somewhat broader approach to transparency includes the public’s understanding of the decisions taken by the monetary authorities and the reasoning behind it.
With the right instruments and tools, and considerable agility, policy autonomy is not only attainable; it can be the perfect catalyst for powerful collaboration as we move forward. Let us collaborate rather than be restrained by collectivism. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches

It first seems reasonable to me to avoid, in this matter and at this stage, any Treaty change. We could keep the 3% deficit target, which is a useful anchor, and even the 60% debt target. But the rule of a 1/20 annual linear adjustment towards the latter target has become unrealistic because it is too strict, especially for highly indebted countries. And, instead of the structural deficit which no one really understands, or even knows how to calculate accurately we could set a ceiling on the growth rate of public spending as an operational target. At constant tax rates, this amounts to much the same thing in economic terms, and was the main thrust of the reform put forward in 2019 by the European Budget Committee (EBC) chaired by Niels Thygesen. These rules should not simply be seen as a constraint imposed by Brussels, but should be widely internalised, 'taken up' in our French budgetary debate, as they are in our national interest. 2. Adding a European stabilisation and investment capacity Allow me to imagine a successful exit from the forthcoming tough European and Franco-German - negotiations: the southern European countries - including France - accept domestic rules for fiscal discipline; the northern countries including Germany - accept a European fiscal capacity.
Should countries be subject to an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) or be involved in a financial assistance program by the European Stabilisation Mechanism (on which I will touch on shortly), they will also be subject to an enhanced monitoring by the European Commission. Overall, the cumulative effect of these reforms will be a significant enhancement of fiscal governance in the euro area and it is important that the reforms are now implemented fully. Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. Another important innovation of the “six pack” Regulations is the introduction of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), which is designed to prevent and correct phenomena such as high current account deficits, unsustainable external indebtedness, abrupt or prolonged loss of competitiveness and housing and credit booms and busts. Unlike reforms in fiscal governance, which were mainly aimed at strengthening what was already in place, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure is something which was completely absent in the initial design of the founding fathers of EMU. The procedure starts from a scoreboard of indicators, whereby the European Commission identifies the countries and issues which require in-depth reviews. Based on these in-depth reviews and depending on the severity of the imbalances the Commission proposes a policy recommendation under either the “preventive arm” or the “corrective arm” of the MIP. In particular, if the Commission identifies an excessive imbalance that may jeopardise the proper functioning of EMU, it will propose a follow-up under the corrective arm of the MIP, the Excessive Imbalance Procedure.

How the crisis revealed institutional weaknesses in the euro area  As I already noted, the monetary policy response to the crisis has been mainly aimed to buy time for reforms that become effective with some time lag, but it cannot substitute for reforms as time goes by. In this respect, the crisis has unveiled the incompleteness of the euro area’s institutional design which currently policy makers are addressing both at the national level and at the euro area/EU level. Let me first outline these main weaknesses and then go through the progress that has been made so far and the road ahead. The euro area was missing an effective framework for (i) crisis prevention (ii) and crisis management and resolution, which are, as I will argue, essential ingredients for effective policy-making in a monetary union. Let me elaborate. The lack of effective crisis prevention framework before the crisis was indeed evident. First, too complacent regulatory policies in the financial sector still allowed excessive risk to build up. The establishment of the monetary union made is easier for deficit countries to finance macroeconomic imbalances through cross-border capital inflows for too long, resulting in the accumulation of risk. When these flows turned into outflows as the economic environment deteriorated after 2008, these imbalances not only led to problems for the countries concerned but also produced contagion to other parts of the euro area.
There is a near-consensus in the literature that expenditure cuts have a smaller adverse impact on the economy than revenue increases. 11 Fiscal consolidation, moreover, produces long-term benefits since a smaller debt stock results in lower interest payments, and thus can eventually create room for growth-enhancing tax cuts. 12 General government expenditure amounted to EUR2.5 billion in 2009, or almost 44% of GDP. The largest single item was the wage bill, equivalent to 14.5% of GDP. It was followed by spending on benefits, mainly old age pensions, which amounted to some 13% of GDP. Health care, excluding wages, absorbed a further 2%. These three items together account for more than two-thirds of government spending. In contrast, an amount equal to only 2.2%  10  See European Commission, Public Finances in EMU 2010, European Economy 4/2010. 11  For example, according to the IMF, “spending-based deficit cuts, particularly those than rely on cuts to transfers, have smaller contractionary effects than tax-based adjustments”. See IMF World Economic Outlook October 2010, Chapter 3, p. 113. 12  See also European Central Bank “The effectiveness of euro area fiscal policies” Monthly Bulletin July 2010. BIS Review 156/2010  5  of GDP was dedicated to investment. A substantial increase in productive investment, particularly in physical and human capital, is clearly necessary. The Budget for 2011 recognizes this need, projecting a marked increase of 15% in capital spending. This is encouraging because in recent years growth has mainly occurred in recurrent spending.

5  European Commission, The 2009 Ageing Report: economic and budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008–2060), European Economy 2/2009, page 47. 6  Source: Eurostat. 7  Ebejer, Ivan and Ulrike Mandl, The efficiency of public expenditure in Malta, ECFIN Country Focus Volume 6, Issue 2. February 2009. 8  The tertiary educational attainment level is defined as the share of the population aged between 30–34 years who have successfully completed university or university-like education with an International Standard Classification of Education 1997 of 5–6. 2  BIS Review 156/2010  stresses, higher education drives innovation and economic transformation. 9 The University of Malta, however, is short of funds. One way of tackling this deficiency would be to limit stipend support to students who are truly in need. This would ensure that access to a university education remains open to everyone with the potential to benefit from it, while releasing funds for improving its quality. It would also address an issue of equity: since a tertiary level education is the key to better-paid jobs and higher lifetime incomes, it is appropriate that those who benefit most from it should contribute at least part of the costs involved. … while investment has not been sufficient But enhancing the supply and quality of labour is still not enough. To produce output, labour has to work with capital. Now a country’s capital stock can only grow through investment. The recent performance in this regard has been inadequate.