samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When Iraq then invaded Iran in 1980, the situation deteriorated even further. The price of oil also rose, but very briefly, when Iraq attacked Kuwait in 1990. Figure 2. Real oil price USD/barrel 150  150  Iran-Iraq War  125  125  100  100 Revolution in Iran  Gulf War  75  75  50  50  25  Iraqi invasion of Kuwait  Oil embargo in connection with the Yom Kippur War 0 1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  25  0 1995  Note. Real prices have been computed with the CPI in United States. Souces: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U.S. Energy Information Administration and the Riksbank  19 Åsbrink (2019). 8 [14]  However, the policy that was conducted during this period also played a significant role. It became, for various reasons, on average too expansionary or, as it is called, too accommodating. In economic textbooks, this period of high and longterm inflation in the world is known as ‘The Great Inflation’. This usually refers to the period 1965-1982, where ‘the Volcker disinflation’, the tight monetary policy conducted by then head of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker to curb inflation in the United States, is regarded as the endpoint.20 For Sweden, it is more appropriate to refer to a period that both starts and ends about ten years later. The Swedish economy was wrestling with serious economic problems during this period.

The European panel's responses are presented at https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/ukraine/ and the American at https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/ukraine-2/. The results are summarised by Vaitilingam (2022). 10 [14]  For a monetary policy decision-maker, supply shocks are more difficult to deal with than demand shocks. If inflation rises because demand has risen unexpectedly, the remedy is simple: The central bank raises the policy rate and thus suppresses both inflation and demand, thereby reducing the risk of the economy overheating. But if inflation rises as a result of a negative supply shock, the problem is more complex. If most people assume that the effect on inflation is transitory, the problem does not need to be so great. The central bank can then simply wait until inflation falls back again. However, one risk that is always present is that price impulses spread to other prices and start to affect economic agents’ expectations. These may then expect inflation to remain high, or even rise further. The signs of such second-round effects have now begun to increase in many economies. This creates a tricky balancing act for monetary policy: At the same time as one wants to maintain confidence in the inflation target and prevent inflation from becoming entrenched at a high level, one wants to avoid pursuing a policy so tight that the economy enters a recession. As we saw, this was what happened after the First World War, although the motive then was to return to the previous price level rather than bring down inflation.
We introduced this concept exactly three years ago. You are acquainted with the main elements: definition of price stability, inflation forecast as main indicator and target range for the three-month Libor rate as operational target. Overall, our experience with our monetary policy concept has been good. Recently, this experience was discussed at an internal conference. Since the new concept was adopted, we have widened the basis of our monetary policy decisions and further developed our analysis of indicators and models. The more extensive use of relevant information enabled us to react more swiftly and with more foresight than formerly to changes in the economic situation. Our monetary policy concept met with a positive public reception in Switzerland. The same applies to the financial markets and international organisations such as the IMF and the OECD. The concept has vastly improved transparency. By publishing studies on internal decision-making processes and the forecasting models used, we have made further relevant information accessible. The public is thus in a better position to understand the reasoning behind monetary policy decisions. 2  BIS Review 73/2002  So far, we have published our inflation forecasts regularly in June and December. We should like to take this a step further and will in future publish an updated inflation forecast after every quarterly assessment of the situation. This will further help to improve transparency. From 2003 onwards, we will also inform the public of our monetary policy by publishing new inflation forecasts in March and September.

Vítor Constâncio: The nature and significance of Banking Union Speech by Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the conference “Financial regulation – towards a global regulatory framework?”, Chatham House City Series, London, 11 March 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Thank you for inviting me to speak to you at Chatham House today. The topic of my address is the nature and significance of establishing a Banking Union in Europe. To many this seems like a new initiative borne out of the experience of the crisis. But it is in fact based on an older debate. During the preparations for the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, there was already the strong conviction that a single system of banking supervision was as a key element in the construction of monetary union. Indeed, one of the foremost proponents of this view was a Bank of England official, Brian Quinn, who chaired the preparatory subcommittee on banking supervision.1 This conviction was based on the relatively logical observation that the single currency would deepen financial interdependence in Europe and so require an integrated system of supervision. It was also in line with the prevailing model at the time of banking supervision being entrusted to the central bank.
•  For property loans, tighter loan-to-value ratios, higher minimum cash downpayments, caps on loan tenures, and guidance on total debt service ratios. •  For car loans, tighter loan-to-value ratios and caps on loan tenures. •  For credit card loans, new proposals to: –  help individuals with credit problems avoid further debt accumulation;  –  improve due diligence conducted by FIs; and  –  empower consumers to make informed decisions. These measures helped to limit risks facing financial institutions but more importantly helped to encourage greater financial prudence among borrowers. •  It is important that we act now to limit the build-up of leverage. •  It is much harder to do so later, when growth might be weaker, interest rates higher, and property prices lower. Stringent efforts to ensure Singapore’s financial centre remains clean and trusted Next, let me touch on the efforts we have been making to ensure that Singapore remains a clean and trusted financial centre. •  There has a growing concern internationally on the use of financial centres to hide illicit funds or evade taxes. Singapore takes seriously the integrity of its financial centre and is fully committed to international efforts to combat money laundering and tax evasion. The policy measures Singapore has taken on this front well-known; so I will not elaborate. •  Laundering proceeds of tax evasion and tax fraud is now a crime in Singapore, effective 1 July.

•  There is broad based strength in both financial intermediation and asset management activities. Inflation forecast revised down to 2–3% but core inflation pressures will persist For the first time in three years, CPI inflation has come down closer to historical trends and within MAS’ comfort range. •  CPI-All Items inflation averaged 4.2% over 2010–12. Car prices and imputed accommodation costs contributed around 60% to overall inflation during this period. •  But this year, there has been a clear and significant step-down in inflation. CPI-All Items inflation in H1 is estimated to have dipped below 3%. CPI-All Items inflation forecast for 2013 is therefore revised down to 2–3%, from 3–4% previously. •  The sharp fall in car prices following the tightening of financing restrictions on motor vehicle loans is a major factor. COE prices have risen recently and could be volatile for the rest of year, but this should be accommodated within the 2–3% inflation forecast range. •  Accommodation costs are also increasing at a slower pace. More completed housing units are coming on stream, easing the pressure on market rentals. But MAS’ Core Inflation, which excludes car prices and imputed accommodation costs, will show moderate increase to around 2% or slightly above by end-2013, due to continuing tightness in labour market. •  This is a percentage point lower than recent peak in Q1 2012, and in line with the historical average. •  The Core Inflation forecast for 2013, therefore, remains at 1.5 to 2.5%.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  Orphanides.11 Among other observations, he shows that the estimates of the GDP gap for the United States for a certain year, made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have changed radically between the various dates of calculation, and draws the conclusion that GDP growth should be focused on as the basis for monetary policy, rather than the GDP gap. Figure 10 presents estimates of the GDP gap in real time and in accordance with the most recent calculation from September 2011. The estimates in real time show what we believed the current GDP gap to be at the various previous forecasting occasions. The figure indicates that resource utilisation was higher in the years preceding the crisis than we believed at the time. However, there are also problems with estimating resource utilisation in retrospect, which mean that such calculations may perhaps overestimate how high resource utilisation was before the crisis. I will come back to this. Despite these difficulties, my assessment is that the Riksbank’s calculations of the GDP gap largely give a reasonable view of current resource utilisation. The decisive factor for this assessment is that the GDP gap currently corresponds with other ways of measuring resource utilisation that are based on other economic statistics. These other measures also show that resource utilisation is largely normal. I will review a number of such measures at a later point.

Employment rate Percentage of population aged 16–64 85  85  80  80  75  75  Employment rate  70  70  Mean, 2000-2008  65  65  60  60 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  Source: Statistics Sweden  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13. RU indicator and GDP gap Standard deviation and percentage 6  6  GDP gap (PF) RU indicator  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6  -6  -8  -8 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14  Note. The RU indicator has been normalised so that the mean value is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. The reference period is 1996–2008. GDP gap according to production function (PF) approach. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  14. Actual and long-term unemployment Per cent of labour force aged 16–64 12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  Unemployment Unemployment, forecast  2  2  Mean, 2000-2008 Long-term unemployment  0  0 80  85  90  95  00  05  10  15  20  Note.
In addition, the Riksbank entered into swap agreements with the central banks of the United States and the euro area to increase our access to dollars and euros. I will return to this later. In parallel with our liquidity assistance measures, we quickly reorganised our monetary policy. The repo rate was lowered from 4.75 per cent in September 2008 to 0.25 per cent by July 2009. Furthermore, our assessment in July 2009 was that the repo rate would need to be kept at this low level for slightly more than one year. To emphasise this and also to hold down the longer interest rates charged to households and companies, on three occasions the Riksbank offered one-year loans of up to SEK 100 billion at interest rates of 0.25 per cent. All in all, the Riksbank earned SEK 2.3 billion on the measures adopted during the crisis due to the interest rate differential between deposits and loans. Our primary intention was not to earn money through our measures, but, at the same time, it was important not to subsidise the banking system with public funds. (Figure 4)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 4 The repo rate Percentage points  Source: The Riksbank. Other authorities also acted to safeguard stability The Riksbank was not alone in adopting measures to safeguard the stability of the Swedish financial markets. Other Swedish authorities also intervened to counter the effects of the financial crisis.

One risk we emphasised at that point was that of overheating in the Baltic countries. Two of the Swedish banks had large and growing operations in these countries, meaning that a sudden slowdown in the economies of these countries could have led to significant loan losses for the Swedish banks. In particular, we analysed the banks’ resilience towards a sudden economic downturn in the Baltic countries. The stress tests we conducted indicated that the banks had enough capital to cope with such a development. Another risk we emphasised before the crisis was the rapid rates of increase in household indebtedness and in housing prices. One repeated statement was that we did not regard this as being an urgent problem, but that the development was not sustainable in the longer term. At this point, we could observe that housing prices and household indebtedness had increased by about 150 per cent over a ten-year period. At the same time, households’ disposable incomes had only increased by about 50 per cent. There may indeed be reasons for household debt to increase significantly faster than income for a period, but, over the longer term, this is not sustainable. A third risk we emphasised was that the price of risk was very low in a historical perspective. The low risk premiums could indicate that the investors had not received sufficient compensation for the risk they undertook in the purchase of various types of assets.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: A broader view of compliance in banking and financial sectors Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at Bank Negara Malaysia's Compliance Conference 2017, Kuala Lumpur, 18 May 2017. * * * The topic of compliance has become a widely discussed topic in recent times, often headlined by massive regulatory fines slapped on financial institutions for compliance failures. Banks globally are estimated to have paid over USD320 billion in regulatory penalties since the global financial crisis for multiple failures ranging from market manipulation to money laundering and conduct failures. On the bright side, these fines signal a continued, if not increased, priority given by authorities to strong enforcement. But the fact that such failures occurred at all, and were allowed to reach such extensive proportions to the detriment of the public, should worry us. There is no doubt that the compliance burden has increased significantly. And for good reason. Even though the debate will continue to rage on over the relative benefits and costs of compliance, it is unlikely this question will be settled in the foreseeable future. Given our experiences from the various discoveries that institutions continue to push the boundaries of what constitutes a fair and ethical practice, there is clear evidence that we need to do more to improve compliance. The industry has made some important strides.

Culture can be an abstract concept, but the simplest way to describe it is how a bank employee will behave when there is little threat of “being caught”. This is also sometimes referred to as “soft laws”. The compliance function can help to shape and internalise “soft laws” through an effective monitoring and assessment framework. With a pulse on the ground, it also provides an important feedback loop to senior management and the board on actions that can be taken to reinforce a strong tone from the top. Compliance officers can also galvanise broader industry initiatives, working with bodies like the Financial Services Professional Board to develop constructive codes of ethics and conduct for the industry and encouraging their adoption. Earlier, I alluded that the compliance function can be a strategic business proposition. But this can only be achieved through sufficient investment in capacity building in the compliance function, in terms of both systems and resources. One aspect that tends to be overlooked by institutions in managing compliance risk is the importance of effective channels for communication and information flows between various control functions and the business departments. The closer the cooperation between various functions within the bank, the easier it is to share relevant information and the higher the chances for an early identification of risks. This will improve the quality and promptness of the bank’s response to any occurrence of risk or non-compliance. It is also crucial that institutions invest sufficiently in talent development within the compliance function.
They characterise Magna Carta as a pragmatic political document that was a product of its time, including the difficult economic circumstances that then prevailed. As usual with historical arguments, the answer lies somewhere in between. In what follows, I will spend a few moments on the pragmatic element not only because it plays to my comparative advantage as an economist but also because it ultimately underscores the foundational character of the document itself. The enduring legacy of Magna Carta is how its strictures on unconstrained power are reflected in our systems of political and economic governance. I will conclude that both the constitutional and pragmatic perspectives are relevant to modern central banking and the current conduct of monetary policy. Specifically, the costs of inflation were among the key economic catalysts of Magna Carta, and its core constitutional legacy – namely the importance of delegated authority, with clear lines of public accountability – is at the heart of the Bank of England’s institutional arrangements. In the spirit of Magna Carta, the Bank of England has been given a great responsibility: to deliver monetary stability for the good of the people of the United Kingdom. Our goal, the 2 per cent inflation target, is set by the Government, and we operate under constrained discretion in its pursuit. 1. The economic and political context  Where did Magna Carta come from?

in  ad Abro  Sources : Statistics Norway and the Norwegian Central Securities Deposit SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  The largest holders of Norwegian bonds are insurance companies, but the government, private companies and foreign investors also account for a large share of bond holdings. The largest issuers are the government and financial institutions. Kommunalbanken is also a fairly large issuer in the Norwegian bond market. At the end of 2001, the Bank’s total bond and commercial paper debt came to about NOK 26 billion. This accounted for a good 6 per cent of total outstanding bond and short-term debt issues in Norway at the end of last year. There are historical reasons for the thin securities market in Norway. From the post-war period and up to the beginning of the 1980s, the Norwegian bond market was subject to direct regulation. It was only in the late 1980s that the market for bonds and short-term debt was liberalised and it is now part of the international market. BIS Review 48/2002  5  Outstanding holdings of domestic debt securities issued by non-financial enterprises.
Subject to the caveat referred to above, these experts generally share our conclusion that there is no unequivocal indication of a significant misalignment in the exchange rate. If our EU counterparts in the ERM II-related decision-making process also share these views, one would, therefore, expect Malta to join ERM II with a central parity rate which broadly corresponds to the current exchange rate level. Some commentators have cautioned against what in their view is a hasty approach to euro adoption. How would you respond? A judgment as to whether the path to euro adoption is hasty or otherwise can only be made in relation to the economic principles which underlie the criteria and conditions attached to participation in EMU. This is precisely the approach taken in the Treaty, which contains indicators for measuring the degree of economic preparedness of a country, as also in our own study. The obligation to participate in ERM II for a minimum period of two years serves that purpose. The underlying premise is that once a country reaches the point at which it can derive the considerable, undeniable benefits of monetary union, it should do so. In the case of a small, open economy which must support an independent currency in a fully liberalised trade and capital environment, these benefits must also be evaluated in the light of the costs and risks - which are not negligible - of delaying participation. The report presented to Cabinet builds on that approach.

Before it can adopt the euro, a member state should have fulfilled the convergence criteria, known as the Maastricht criteria, on the interest rate, inflation and public finances, achieved a high degree of structural similarity with the euro area and completed the necessary logistical, administrative and legal preparations. Details of these preparations were explained in an article which was published in the June 2003 edition of the Bank's Quarterly Review. The Treaty, however, does not specify a target date for the completion of these preparations. Neither does it specify a date for entry in ERM II. You have pointed out on several occasions that you are in favour of an early adoption of the euro. What are your arguments for that? What are the implications of a delayed entry? The importance for Malta's small, open economy to lock in, at the earliest practical opportunity, the increased economic security and credibility which this step implies is indeed acknowledged by all the experts the Bank has exchanged views with. This is because the euro offers the prospect of being anchored in the relative safety of the world's largest economy. This would not only mean reduced exchange rate risks and less uncertainty for Maltese economic agents and their foreign business partners but it would also eliminate the need to maintain higher interest rates to compensate for the element of risk associated with the small size of the Maltese economy.