samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Generally speaking, unemployment in these countries remained low in the 1990s and employment is high. Many countries with decentralised wage determination and a low level of employment protection have also experienced high employment and low unemployment. Wages are determined on the basis of each company’s profitability and the supply of labour. This system can be found in countries like the US, Canada, the UK and Switzerland. By contrast, a decentralised wage formation system that is combined with a strong bargaining position at the local level and extensive employment protection can produce unfavourable results. Countries with this type of structure include France, Italy and Spain. In these countries unemployment is high, with substantial flows out of the labour market into various pension and social security schemes. Nor have countries such as Germany, Belgium and Finland, where employment protection is relatively extensive and wage determination only partly decentralised, achieved particularly favourable results even though the results are somewhat more mixed. Extensive employment protection and a tightly knit social safety net reinforce the perception that the risk of an income loss is limited. Employees can take advantage of the bargaining power these rights afford to obtain high wages without taking into account the effects on overall employment. For their part, employers may have incentives to promote exclusion through government-financed social security schemes. Those who are not employed will be interested in finding employment, even at a lower wage level. However, it is not the unemployed who negotiate local wage agreements.

Be assured that I am committed to supporting the implementation of the National Strategy on Financial Education through such campaigns. Ladies and Gentlemen The World Savings Day celebrations would not be successful without recognising individual and organizational contributions towards improving financial literacy in Zambia. In this regard, awards will be presented under nine categories namely: 1. Exceptional individual contribution to financial education, 2. Outstanding theme interpretation; 3. Exceptional leadership in financial literacy; 4. Champions award; 5. Most innovative financial education programme; 6. Outstanding financial literacy footprint; 7. Exceptional financial literacy media outreach; 8. Outstanding initiative by an educator; and 9. Best savings product of the year. I am delighted to grace this year's World Savings Day award presentation and wish the nominated participants all the best. In conclusion, I would like to thank the organisers and stakeholders under our partnership arrangement, in particular, the Bankers Association of Zambia, Securities and Exchange Commission, Pensions and Insurance Authority, Rural Finance Expansion Programme and DSIK for their continued support to the World Savings Day celebrations every year. THANK YOU  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
The answer is no. The financial crisis casts a long shadow. Both household and corporate debt levels have declined significantly, with the household debt-to-income ratio around the 2005 level and the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio at its lowest since mid-2004. But there are significant pockets of financial fragility, with some of the households that bought and borrowed at the peak of the market still facing very heavy debt service burdens. And even though public debt is now on a declining path relative to GDP, it is very high in historical terms, which remains a vulnerability. The biggest legacy problem, though, is the capital controls. During the early stages of the crisis, the controls were helpful in stabilising the economy and providing the shelter needed to repair balance sheets and rebalance the economy. But over time – and increasingly, as the economy and the rest of the world recover – they begin to turn into obstacles to economic growth. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The problem is that there are big obstacles to speedy removal of the capital controls. First, we have short-term króna assets in the hands of foreign residents, so-called offshore krónur, which currently amount to 15% of GDP, after having been reduced by more than half since the capital controls were introduced (see Figure 10). But more importantly, we have domestic assets held by the estates of the old banks.

Although equity and property prices serve as important indicators for the future development of economic activity, they are not a goal of monetary policy. Many reasons militate against a direct monetary-policy response to changes in asset prices. The question nevertheless arises as to whether monetary policy could not do more to prevent any speculative bubbles from forming in the first place. BIS Review 53/2003  1
Chart 8: Real pay by region 1998-2007  2009-2018  Average annual real pay growth (per cent) 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5  Sources: ONS and Bank of England calculations. Notes: Data at annual frequency using median gross weekly pay in ASHE deflated by CPI. Regional calculations at NUTS1 level. Over the past decade, average growth rates of real pay in every UK region have fallen into negative territory and well below average GDP growth rates in the economy over the same period (1.3%). The worst-affected regions have been the East Midlands and London. Scunthorpe has been towards the lower end of this pack, with real pay falling by, on average, 0.8% per year over the past decade. The distribution of real pay rises across the wage distribution tells a nuanced story (Chart 9). In the decade prior to the crisis, real pay growth was fairly evenly distributed. The one exception was the top two wage deciles, where real pay growth averaged 2 ¼% – 0.5 percentage points higher than in the lower deciles. The global financial crisis (2008-11) saw a sharp and significant amplification of these pre-crisis trends. The distribution of real pay rises fell below zero for all income groups. But while for the top two income deciles real pay shrank by only 2%, for the bottom two deciles it fell by 4%. This widened pre-existing wage inequalities. For the poor, this really was a Great Recession.

(a) Descending the Jobs Ladder The global financial crisis generated a sharp fall in output. Given that fall, the subsequent rise in unemployment was more modest than expected. Between 2008 Q1 and 2009 Q2, UK output fell by around 6 ¼%, while unemployment rose by just over 2 ½ percentage points. By comparison, in the early 1990s recession output fell by around 2% peak-to-trough, while the unemployment rate increased by over 2.5 percentage points. Chart 15: Forecasts for unemployment Per cent  12 10 8 6 4 2 0  2005  2007  2009  2011  February 2009  2013  2015  February 2010  2017  2019  Actual  Sources: ONS, Bank of England and Bank of England calculations. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  Put differently, in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, unemployment rose by less than was expected by most mainstream forecasters, including the Bank. Chart 15 shows Bank forecasts for unemployment in early-2009 and early-2010. Having expected unemployment to peak at over 10.5%, the eventual peak of 8.5% was reached in late-2011. More recently, the “Okun’s Law” relationship appears to have steepened as weak productivity growth since the crisis has seen unemployment fall sharply since 2012 despite more modest GDP growth (Chart 16).
On the other hand, the SNB employs ESG criteria in the management of its equity portfolio via a selective exclusion policy. Since 2013, it has refrained from acquiring shares in companies whose products or production methods seriously violate ethical principles – notably, firms that produce internationally condemned weapons, seriously violate fundamental human rights or systematically cause severe environmental damage. Such exclusions, which also apply to our corporate bond portfolio, enable the SNB to align its asset management with the fundamental values and norms of our country. How does the SNB go about identifying the companies to be excluded? It follows a clear and structured process, in which it draws on the knowledge of external experts. With respect to the environment and human rights, we regularly evaluate our investments in a two-step process. First, an expert consultancy collects all publicly available information and then draws up a warning list containing high-risk companies (i.e. companies that most likely meet our exclusion criteria). In a second step, another specialist firm evaluates these allegations in detail and prepares a full report for each high-risk company, accompanied by a recommendation. The final decision on whether or not to exclude a company is taken by the SNB. In addition, the SNB exercises its voting rights for a portion of the shares in its portfolio. It focuses on aspects relating to good governance. Good governance contributes to the positive development of a company, which ultimately improves the return on our investments.

Any attempt on the part of the SNB to hedge this risk would increase the demand for francs, which would run counter to its monetary policy objectives. The SNB’s risk profile therefore differs significantly from that of other institutional investors. While the currency risk (orange shading in chart 4) represents 78% of the total risk exposure of our investments, in the case of a representative Swiss pension fund, this proportion is only 16%. Due to its particular risk profile, the SNB is exposed to significant fluctuations in its investment result from one quarter to the next. Given these fluctuations, we exploit all available room for manoeuvre in order to diversify our investments. This allows us to optimise our risk/return profile and maintain the value of our reserves over the long term. To do this, we invest in equities and corporate bonds. Equities are an attractive asset class for the SNB. Their high degree of liquidity ensures the necessary flexibility in monetary matters, while their higher return potential helps to improve the risk/return profile. The SNB differs from other central banks in that it has a relatively high equity exposure (currently 20%, cf. chart 3). Our equity portfolio, which is worth more than CHF 150 billion, is highly diversified. We invest in some 6,700 corporate securities from more than 40 countries. We hold shares in companies which together account for more than 95% of global market capitalisation. Overall, our investments are denominated in some 30 currencies around the world, including those of emerging economies.
This dimension of economic research is often overlooked: it is nevertheless crucial to grasp complex interdependencies between physical and economic phenomena, across sectors and countries, and across time horizons (2) disclose: impose transparency requirements including on counterparties; (3) incorporate climate risk, into our operations on corporates (on both asset purchases and collateral policies). II. Not “too many”: how to transform global discussion into global action In less than 4 years, the NGFS has grown from 8 to almost 100 members, but we will never be too many. This increasing number nevertheless raises the challenge of our efficient work together at the international level. We must definitely transform global discussion into global decision and – at the end of the day – global action. We have functioned with voluntary and expanding coalitions like NGFS, or TCFD for business. And while Europe was key at the core of this coalition, from the very beginning, our colleagues from China, Mexico and Singapore, were around the table. Now, with the new administration in the United States, “mandatory” bodies enter the stage. Standard-setting bodies, international  organisations and international fora have now put sustainable finance as their top priority. In this context, the NGFS is actively requested and involved in the new international climate roadmap of the G20 and the FSB.

Nothing will replace an appropriate carbon price. Second, we are acting in the very name of our mandate: our consideration for climate change is neither an abuse of our mission, nor a mere militant conviction, and we will act with the same technical credibility and professionalism as we do in our traditional domains. I. Not “too much”: what it is our duty to do In a somewhat “proliferating” environment, let me suggest some clarification, with a two-dimensional quadrant. The vertical axis – the most obvious one – relates to our missions as supervisors and includes both climate-related risks for financial institutions and opportunities – linked to green finance. The horizontal axis relates to our missions as central bankers and includes responsible investment of our nonmonetary portfolio and monetary policy. For many central banks, implementing responsible investment strategies has numerous benefits: central banks can then practice what they preach as supervisors, protect their own balance sheets and contribute to financing the green economy. Since 2019, the Banque de France has been the first Eurosystem central bank to publish a yearly dedicated reportii on our responsible investment policy. And we turn our words into action: the Banque de France is completely exiting coal by 2024. As regards green finance, climate change creates opportunities for investors: the expected transition to a lower-carbon economy is estimated to require around $ trillion of investments a year. I will now focus on the top right of the quadrant: climate-related risks of financial institutions and the greening of monetary policy.
And of course the future path of the climate risks themselves is subject to huge uncertainty. But given the urgency of our challenge, we cannot let uncertainties and complexities lead to inertia and inaction. Scenarios are generally comprised of three key components:   Transition models that set out how energy production and land-use can adjust to lower emissions and meet a given carbon budget or temperature target;    Physical models that set out projections for how living conditions and extreme weather would shift given a pathway for emissions; and    Economic models that quantify the potential impacts from both transition and physical risk on the economy. This is unfamiliar territory for most central banks, businesses and the financial sector. It is however territory we all need to get familiar with if we are to find the right climate path. Our desire to improve our understanding and capability to measure and monitor these risks inspired us to launch a project to co-design climate scenarios together with world leading climate scientists and 60 other central banks and supervisors that are part of the macrofinancial workstream of the Network for Greening the Financial System or NGFS.4  It has been a truly interdisciplinary effort. We have had to integrate a suite of models across each of the areas – physical, transition, economic, financial – to deliver insights [figure 3].

The scenarios the NGFS have produced pull together, for the first time, both transition risks and physical risks, and their economic and financial consequences, in a coherent way. As a result, they are decision-useful, reflecting the totality of risks we will face. A guiding principle has been to try to shine a light on some of the uncertainties that exist. We have focused on multiple scenarios and multiple models to highlight the range of potential outcomes. Since modelling these impacts is subject to significant uncertainty and extensive academic debate, our work is open source and we seek your expertise and challenge. 4  The NGFS was founded by 8 central banks and supervisors including the Bank of England in 2017. Members are committed to sharing best practices, contributing to the development of climate and environment-related risk management in the financial sector and mobilising mainstream finance to support the transition towards a sustainable economy. It is currently comprised of 90 members and 14 observers. The first iteration of these scenarios, published in June 2020, drew from the existing work on mitigation pathways, climate change and adaptation that supported the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chance (IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C.5 The NGFS will next month release an update, which will include bespoke scenarios, detailed macroeconomic modelling and a new online portal that can be used to explore physical risks. Insights from the design of the NGFS climate scenarios I would like to share some of the insights I’ve gleaned from this work.
To get them to produce output that they can sell in the domestic market and abroad. So one challenge is really how we link our SMEs into  International Supply Chains, either through larger companies, or directly. We really need to think in terms of linking up our SMEs to supply chains. The Government has already taken some decisive measures to overcome the short-comings of the export sector. With some  improvement in the performance in the export sector, so far, there are signs that the initiatives are favourable. Since March, we have now seen an improvement in export numbers. We’ve got numbers up to May – in March April and May the numbers have shown an up-turn in export revenue. Hopefully that will gather momentum. I think with the GSP-plus kicking in, and hopefully, a more stable macro-environment, export growth will continues. Page 16 of 17  As I said, Sri Lanka cannot attain 6-7% growth on a sustained basis without transformation of its export performance. Nor can we  overcome the constraints associated with our external debt burden without significantly enhanced non-debt creating foreign exchange receipts, generated, inter alia, by increased exports. So, export  transformation is crucial for both boosting growth and employment, as well as to stabilize our vulnerability stemming from our external debt. The performance of the EASL will be a key determinant of the future prosperity of all Sri Lankans. Thank you very much. Page 17 of 17

But when the crisis came, capital was insufficient, forcing a number of governments to contribute tax revenues to prevent a collapse of the financial system. At present, intensive work is underway in various international forums, above all in the Basel Committee, to develop new regulations covering the amount of capital a bank must hold in relation to its commitments. Capital adequacy requirements will be placed on liquidity risks, which previously lay outside such regulations, but this is only one of many areas in which capital requirements will be strengthened. New forms for equity are also being discussed, for example bond loans that, in the event of a crisis – but without requiring the bank to cancel payments – can automatically be converted into contingent capital. Another problem has been that the supervisory structure, which has generally been concentrated around the individual banks, missed the risks building up in the financial system as a whole. One example of this has been the tremendous growth of credit derivatives over the last decade, which, together with the emergence of complicated and hard-to-value structured products, have been given much of the blame for causing the crisis to develop in such a serious direction. An immediate example for us is the lending in euro in the Baltic countries, whose exchange rates are tied to the euro, but where the fiscal policy framework, at least in a couple of countries, has turned out to be weak. This problem is also being discussed intensively in many places around the world.
The Treaty states that for two years before the examination the national currency is to have been inside the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The process by which the initial group of participants was selected suggests that the criterion could be interpreted somewhat more freely. Finland and Italy were both approved in May 1998 even though their currencies had then been participating in the ERM for only around eighteen months. The other countries may also have reasons for not insisting too strongly on a strict interpretation of formal participation by outsider countries. Considering the apparent strength of British opposition to a fixed exchange rate arrangement, such an attitude might obstruct a British membership of the euro area. It seems to me that in this respect the United Kingdom is in a more difficult position than Sweden. Our Government and the Riksdag have stated that participation in ERM II can be seen as a direct preparation for joining the monetary union; the Riksbank has noted that we do not see any problems with that. In a future situation where a referendum or a general election has resulted in a positive attitude to the monetary union, it is difficult to envisage Sweden’s participation in ERM II as posing any major political problems. Regardless of the formal requirements that may apply at the time of the examination, the assessments in May 1998 indicate that a central factor in the evaluation will be how the exchange rate has actually developed.

Of particular interest is that Indian actors are providing fresh interpretations of Ibsen’s work, both in India and in Norway. The topic of my speech today is Norwegian experiences in balancing economic development with macroeconomic stability from a historical perspective. As a background for the subject, let me start with a brief characteristic of Norway today from an economic perspective. First, Norway is a small, mountainous country with a population of only 4½ million people scattered across a land area that is one tenth of the size of India. Second, Norway’s economic growth has been favourable for many years, and the per capita income is among the highest in the world. An abundance of natural resources, not least oil and gas, and openness to trade and capital movements are important reasons for this. The petroleum sector’s share of GDP was approximately 24 per cent in 2005. Over the last 10 years, the government has earned higher petroleum revenues than it has spent. Today we have a sizeable Government Pension Fund, which invests all its funds globally. Globalisation and cyclical developments have been kind to the Norwegian economy. Prices for our imported goods are falling in relation to prices for goods we export. Norway’s terms of trade are improving. The impact of the rise in oil and gas prices is particularly strong, but the terms-of-trade gains for the mainland economy have also been high. One aspect of this is that trade in services with India is increasing.