samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
First, there is adoption (or extensive margin) – the time it takes a new technology to first reach a country or company. Second, there is penetration (or intensive margin) – the extent to which this technology then reshapes processes and products within a company or country. 62  62  Comin and Mestieri (2013a). 17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Take an example like computing technology or robotics. The adoption lag would measure the time it took for a country or company to have their first computer or robot. The penetration rate would measure how many computers or robots the country or company had and how intensively they were used. You would expect both to be important to the process of technological diffusion and to boosting productivity. And, empirically, 63  both are typically found to be important to these processes. So what does the evidence suggest about these twin diffusion processes? Looking at adoption lags of a range of different technologies across countries, the time-series evidence suggests these have fallen over th  time. Average adoption lags have shrunk from over a century in the 18 century, to perhaps 40-80 years in th  th  the 19 century and 20-50 years in the 20 century. 64  It seems possible these lags may have fallen further  st  entering the 21 century, with cross-border flows of information and ideas having risen to new heights. This is a good news story for productivity.

Trade unions helped workers by campaigning to protect their rights, improve their conditions and boost their bargaining power in the workplace. They also provided direct financial support to unemployed workers, through an early form of unemployment insurance, to smooth the income consequences for workers of job loss. The National Insurance Act (1911) and the Beveridge Report (1942) subsequently made this a responsibility of the state and put it on a comprehensive footing. th  This was part of a wider-ranging shift in the role played by the state in society from the 17 century onwards. th  State spending as a proportion of national income rose from around 1% in the 16 century to around 12% in th  th  th 39  the 18 , 14% in the 19 and 33% in the 20 . It financed social infrastructure of various kinds supporting  those facing greatest hardship. This ranged from social housing to healthcare to income support. Its effect was to cap the downside, recessionary risk to individuals, economies and societies. 40  Another form of institutional support came from the creation of state-owned and/or central banks. The Bank th  of England was set up at the end of the 17 century to manage the government’s debt and safeguard the nation’s currency and finances. Over the course of subsequent centuries, this role has expanded.
14  The idea of robust control is that when making decisions, one should take into account that the models being used to guide one’s decisions may be wrong. For discussions of robust control and what it might imply about the conduct of macroeconomic policy in various scenarios, see Hansen and Sargent (2008, 2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  How do I think policy should balance these divergent risks? How should these risks affect my views about how to follow the FOMC strategy of pursuing a balanced approach to achieving our policy goals? In my mind, current circumstances and a weighing of alternative risks mean that a balanced policy approach calls for being patient in reducing accommodation – that is, being patient about when we first increase the federal funds rate and being patient about setting the pace of rate increases once we have begun to move. I know from the NABE Economic Policy Survey that many of you disagree with this view. 15 Let me explain how I get there. Proceed cautiously in normalizing policy To say the least, conducting monetary policy at the ZLB has been a difficult experience that we all want to avoid repeating unnecessarily. In the winter of 2009, with the unemployment rate soaring to double digits, the Fed would have very much liked to lower the nominal federal funds rate an additional 300 basis points; but we couldn’t because the rate was already at zero.

Broadberry, S and O’Rourke, K (2010), “The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: Volume 1, 1700–1870”, ISBN: 978–0521708388. Brynjolfsson, E and McAfee, A (2014), “The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies”, ISBN: 978–1480577473. Buringh, E and Van Zanden, J (2009), “Charting the “Rise of the West”: Manuscripts and Printed Books in Europe, A Long-Term Perspective from the Sixth through Eighteenth Centuries”, The Journal of Economic History Vol 69 Issue 2. Caballero, R (2013), “The shortage of safe assets”, presentation given at the Bank of England in May 2013, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/ccbs/cew2013/presentation_caballero. pdf. Carr, N (2008), “Is Google Making Us Stupid?”, Atlantic Magazine, available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us-stupid/306868/. Carr, N (2011), “The Shallows: How the Internet is Changing the Way We Think, Read and Remember”, ISBN: 978–1848872271. Cass, D (1965), “Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol 32, No 3. Chui, M, Löffler, M and Roberts, R (2010), “The internet of things”, McKinsey Quarterly, available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/the_internet_of_things. 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Clark, G (2009), “A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World”, ISBN: 978–0691141282. Comin, D, Easterly, W, and Gong, E (2010), “Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 BC?”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics: Vol 2 No 3. Cowen, T (2011), “The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All The Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better”, Penguin eSpecial from Dutton.
For the euro area as a whole, the gradual improvement in credit aggregates has continued in recent months with an increase, albeit moderate, in the loans extended to financial corporations and households. Across the euro area, the slight easing in lending standards for firms and households can be seen to have continued, with the exception of those for household mortgage loans, whose standards have been tightened owing to the regulatory changes approved in several countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In any event, most crucial for how the European financial and banking system will fare in coming years will be the macroeconomic setting. Let me turn now to recent developments in and the outlook for the international and the Spanish economies. The international economy International financial and economic developments have been characterised in recent months by heightened uncertainty. The main factors in this connection are: doubts over the intensity of the adjustment of China’s economy, and its consequences for international trade and the global economy; the future timing and pace of US monetary policy normalisation; and the course of oil prices. The global economy has continued to grow, although at lower rates. The projections in the IMF’s latest report put global growth at 3.1% in 2015, 0.3 pp lower than in 2014, and 0.2 pp lower than the July projection. Noteworthy is the change in the composition of global growth in response to the slowdown of the emerging economies compared with the greater resilience of the developed countries.

Ardian Fullani: The financial future of the region Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the summit of finance ministers and governors “The financial future of the region”, Becici, Montenegro, 14 June 2013. *  *  *  Dear Ministers of Finance, Dear Governors, The crisis we are going through, being so profound and lasting, will leave its mark on economics in general, and central banking in particular. Up until the Great Recession, monetary policy was living in a world that we may call “the inflation targeting era”. To anyone that has followed the discussions regarding the optimal central bank policy ever since the onset of the crisis, it is clear that the validity of the previous approach has been heavily questioned. In many ways inflation targeting made the central bank’s job simple, as long as it followed the policy correctly. The Central Bank, seen by the public as an independent institution, had to credibly commit to an explicit inflation target, in order to anchor mid-term inflation expectations. Self-fulfilling expectations from economic agents and price setters would, in turn, help deliver the objectives of monetary policy. Unfortunately, as shown recently, this strict approach to monetary policy has some shortcomings. What this approach missed, due to its focus in consumer prices, was the drift in prices of assets in general. Escalating asset prices and their sudden burst affected significantly the behaviour and balance sheets of the economic agents and challenged the stability of the financial system.
Discussions are ongoing among central banks as to what the significance of low interest rates will be for monetary policy and how the scope for monetary policy to act in economic slowdowns can be increased. One conclusion is that complementary monetary policy measures of the type used by many central banks in recent years, such as the purchasing of various assets, may become more common in the future. Other feasible measures in the monetary policy toolbox are loans directly to companies via banks, and foreign exchange interventions. 11 [13]  The new environment also affects other policy areas Another possibility is other policy areas being used more actively to stimulate the economy in times of recession. In the international debate, it has, for example, been said that the limitations imposed on monetary policy by the low interestrate environment mean that fiscal policy may need to contribute to stabilisation policy to a greater extent than before. 13 I think, to start with, that it is important to point out that monetary policy has not be exhausted as a result of the policy rate being lowered as far as is practically possible. As I just mentioned, there are several tools in the monetary policy toolbox that can be used if need be, in order to stimulate the economy. That said, there are obviously feasible tools in other policy areas as well.

Given the sharp drop in output during the recession and lackluster early recovery, GDP is currently below its potential by nearly 7 percent, or $ trillion dollars.1 Just prior to the recession, the unemployment rate averaged between 4-1/2 and 5 percent. It peaked at 10.1 percent during the recession and, as I just noted, is still 9.1 percent today. In terms of jobs, payroll employment is about 6-1/2 million below its pre-recession level. These are massive shortfalls in output and employment. It does not appear as if these gaps are going to be reduced significantly any time soon. Real GDP growth has been anemic so far this year. Gains in employment have slowed markedly. Even though credit conditions overall have been improving, many households and small businesses still seem to be having trouble getting credit. In addition, the repair process in residential real estate markets is painstakingly slow, and households are still in the process of paring debt and adapting to the huge losses in real estate and financial wealth that they experienced during the recession. I largely agree with economists such as Paul Krugman, Mike Woodford and others who see the economy as being in a liquidity trap: Short-term nominal interest rates are stuck near zero, even while desired saving still exceeds desired investment. This situation is the natural result of the abundance of caution exercised by many households and businesses that still worry that they have inadequate buffers of assets to cushion against unexpected shocks.
I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In several recent cases, the Federal Reserve has taken action to deal with a specific US compliance problem, while the home country supervisor has taken a leadership role in a broader action to address compliance issues across the consolidated firm. •  The Federal Reserve of course not only coordinates with financial regulators in other countries, but with other U.S. supervisors as well - both in terms of policy development and in terms of individual institution supervision. An excellent example of the former is last year’s release of the BSA/AML exam manual by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. A fourth principle is that we should continue improving collaboration between the industry and supervisors. From the supervisors’ perspective, this can take a variety of forms. We have participated in formal and informal public consultations and we have supported industry-led efforts - such as the case of CRMPG II. At times, we have also brought firms together to address issues requiring collective action - as the New York Fed has done with the back-office problems faced by credit derivatives dealers. A final principle I will mention is the importance of regulatory agencies developing specialized expertise to carry out supervisory efforts, with a focus on the hiring, training, development and retention of examiner staff. Specialized examiners can, and should, be exposed to a cross section of firms, so that they can develop a perspective on state-of-the-art industry practices.
They are also to consult with one another prior to decisions on applying macroprudential tools. The committee does not offer any suggestions as to which macroprudential tools are needed or how they should be divided between the authorities. My assessment is therefore that the Financial Crisis Committee’s proposal, which means that both the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen will become macroprudential bodies, does not fulfil the important criteria regarding decision-making powers, independence and accountability. And nor does the proposal appear to be in line with the ESRB’s recommendation. …and differs from the practice that is emerging in Europe Moreover, the Financial Crisis Committee’s proposals differ from the structures emerging in other EU countries. Two models are predominant in this context, and both of them are in line with the ESRB’s recommendation. Either the responsibility for macroprudential policy is given to the central bank, as in the United Kingdom, or it is given to a number of authorities, with the central bank playing the leading role, expressed for instance in the form of a chairmanship or right of veto, as in the case of Germany. If the council’s solution is chosen, the council normally also confers the right of making recommendations regarding macroprudential measures.

As regards monetary policy, the Bank of Russia set itself the task of reducing inflation from the level at that time of 7% to 3-4%. But, as you will see, we also noted that the rate of decline must be dictated by the economic situation. Therefore, due to external shocks, achieving this target took longer than expected. However we are already very close to the target level. The second objective in terms of monetary policy which we set ourselves four years ago was to increase the flexibility of the exchange rate. We have moved to a floating exchange rate and consider this to have been the right decision, as the negative experiences of other exporting countries that did not switch to a floating exchange rate prove to us that this needed to be done. Within the banking sector, we set ourselves the tasks of strengthening supervision and withdrawing from the market of weak players. Unfortunately, accumulated problems in the banking sector turned out to be more serious than was assumed four years ago. And this situation has only been aggravated by crisis. The process of cleaning up the banking sector is not yet complete and, according to our estimates, will take another 2-3 years. Strengthening supervision will require us to restructure internal organisation significantly – a process we are currently undergoing. Four years ago we decided to establish a mega-regulator. We were handed responsibility for the regulation and supervision across all sectors of the financial market, numbering 20 thousand supervised units.
But we are sensitive to the fact that certainly over the past two or three years price pressures in both product and labour markets have been less than we would have expected based on earlier experience, given the strength of demand. You might explain this in terms of more intense competition and lower margins in product markets; or in terms of an increase in the rate of productivity growth, perhaps related to the application of new technology, such as we have seen in the US; and you might explain the recent relatively benign real earnings growth in terms of the more flexible functioning of labour markets. But we cannot be sure of the explanation, nor of how large or persistent the relevant effects will prove to be. We are nevertheless sensitive to these possibilities; we do indeed try to allow for them in our forecasts and in our policy judgements, based upon careful scrutiny of all the latest information that we have. But the process remains necessarily judgmental, and that, of course, leaves us vulnerable to assertions that we don’t give sufficient weight to this or that factor. That, some of our critics maintain is why inflation has been below target for much of the past two years. In fact the undershoot has been marginal – given the uncertainties - and can just as well be explained by the unexpected strength of sterling’s effective exchange rate, reflecting the weakness of the euro, which has both directly dampened the price level and constrained external demand.

It is a lot easier to keep things straight and be happy if your public persona and private persona are not in conflict – you are one integrated person. Being true to yourself also means facing up to problems and mistakes early. Early on in my career as a professional economist, I got involved in writing a paper about tax reform with the head of the firm’s research department. The night the paper went to the printers, I woke up with complete clarity that there was a mistake in the paper. The mistake did not affect the conclusions of the paper. It just slightly changed all the numbers and was obscure enough that no one would probably catch it. What to do? I decided to take my medicine. I walked into the office of my co-author the next morning and said that we needed to throw out the 10,000 copies of the paper that had been printed. The head of research – Leon Cooperman – was known for his – let me say this delicately – strong personality. But rather than blowing up at me, he said fine, let’s fix it. Facing up to the error must have actually worked in my favor since I won his respect. A few months later, he introduced me to Robert Rubin – who, as you know, went on to become the U.S. Secretary of Treasury. And through Robert Rubin I met all sorts of interesting people in the Clinton administration.
Transition risks – which stem from the adjustment to a low-carbon economy – are longer term and therefore less visible. To better assess these risks, we need to both measure exposures and perform forward-looking stress tests. We also need to develop the considerable opportunities associated with the financing of the transition to a low-carbon economy [Slide 5] – this involves finding close to USD 90 trillion by 2030 – while preventing the risk of greenwashing. A major work programme for the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which was launched by the Banque de France in December 2017 and now counts close to 40 members and entities 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  about to join. Conclusion To conclude and summarise my speech, the diversification of sources of financing holds the promise of improving the financial system’s ability to support innovation and sustainable economic growth, as long as this diversification is encouraged and its risks are well managed. Given this promise, the slow pace of change, the modest progress towards a capital markets union, the complexity of the challenges of digitalisation and green finance should encourage us to continue to act with determination, patience and perseverance. On the way, we can seek support and comfort in this quote by the former President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel: “Hope is not the conviction that something will turn out well, but the certainty that something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out". Thank you for your attention.

In framing this question, I asked my team to identify the cascading elements of supervisory guidance, oversight requirements, compliance regimes, and maturity frameworks with which we must contend related to risk management and information security. Their list in reply included 17 elements, admittedly some of which are self-induced and at different states of maturity and implementation. All are well intended, all are well designed, and all seek to address different and meaningful dimensions of the control environment. At the same time, compliance across this waterfront has become a consuming pre-occupation, and arguably one that if we are not careful can intrude upon the more tangible actions, and commitments, to increase the resiliency of our infrastructures and enhance the security of our networks. Make no mistake: some form of risk management and control framework and corresponding policy and oversight guidance is absolutely essential to ensure a necessary discipline and accountability. This is not a call for a collective policy/supervisory/industry confab to craft a consolidated and harmonized uber-framework applicable to all parties in every circumstance— that would be as naïve as it is impractical. Indeed, the proliferation of frameworks can serve as a useful prism to ensure that no stone is left unturned in the development of an FMI’s resiliency and security regime. It is an appeal for awareness among standards bodies, supervisors, directors, and other organizational hierarchies that their individual actions, as rational and defensible as they may be, can have a suffocating effect in the aggregate.