samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The CPIX will be phased out of our reports and our communication in general. This will not have a tangible effect on the actual interest rate decisions in the future. However, we hope that this change will make the way we conduct our monetary policy clearer.

In total, in the savings bank sector, there are 13 mergers taking place which affect 94% of assets and will reduce the total number of savings banks or groups of savings banks from 45 to 17. The reform of the legal framework for savings banks, approved on 9 July 2010, has three objectives: first, to facilitate the issuance of top-quality capital; second, to contribute to promoting more professional management and governing bodies; and third, to enhance market discipline. In order to facilitate access to capital markets, the reform sets out two possibilities. First, it provides for the issuance of equity units with voting rights. Second, particularly for those institutions with a business vocation which takes them beyond their traditional markets and businesses, three options are available. The first option is to join an Institutional Protection System (IPS) under the centralised coordination of a commercial bank. The second option is the transfer of the whole loan and deposit business to a commercial bank controlled by the savings bank. And the third option is the conversion of the savings bank into a foundation which manages welfare projects. This foundation is supported by the income from its assets, most notably dividends from the shares of the bank to which it transferred its financial business in exchange for the shareholding. The goal of making the savings banks more professional is to reduce the maximum weight of public-sector stakeholders and to establish a regime regulating incompatibility.
1 His professional preoccupations included how international capital flows, trade and labour mobility influence people’s well-being. These factors remain uppermost in policymakers’ minds as they seek to secure the resilient dynamism we all need for sustainable prosperity. And they are among the factors I want to consider this evening in discussing the impact of the UK’s European Union (EU) membership on the Bank of England’s objectives. Today we are publishing a report that examines this question. 2 I would like to be clear at the outset what this report is about, and what it is not. Our report is solely concerned with how EU membership affects the Bank’s ability to achieve our core objectives of maintaining monetary and financial stability. It is not a comprehensive assessment of the pros and cons of the United Kingdom “being in Europe.” And for the benefit of those of you who join us from the ranks of the nation’s press corps, I say again that this report it is not a comprehensive assessment of the pros and cons of the United Kingdom “being in Europe”! Answering that question involves much, much broader issues. Issues for others to analyse, describe and debate. And even those contributions will only be partial responses to a question that only the British people can decide. 1  Cairncross, A K (1953), Home and foreign investment 1870–1913, Cambridge University Press. 2  Bank of England (2015), EU Membership and the Bank of England, October. Available here.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  So if the narrowness of my scope disappoints, I would invite you sit back. Literally. Admire the Sheldonian’s ceiling. Marvel at how Wren’s original design bridged such an expanse with neither beams that could individually span its width nor floor-to-ceiling columns that could support it. Reflect on the allegory in the paintings that shows Truth descending upon the Arts and Sciences, expelling ignorance from the University. While you do, I will attempt my more meagre exam question. The Bank’s very great – yet rightly circumscribed – responsibilities are formalised in the remits of the three major policy-making bodies of the Bank – the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). The MPC’s remit requires it to achieve price stability, formalised as 2% CPI inflation, and subject to that to support the Government’s economic policy including its objectives for growth and employment. The FPC works to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system as a whole, and is subject to the same secondary objective as the MPC. And finally, the Bank of England’s PRA is required to promote the safety and soundness of individual firms; to contribute to securing an appropriate degree of protection for insurance policyholders; and, subject to that, to facilitate effective competition.
These problems may in turn spread to a number of banks and at worst threaten financial stability. Retail payments consist of many transactions of limited size and retail settlement amounts are normally modest. Normally, problems in the retail payment system will not pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, more emphasis can be placed on executing retail payments quickly and at reasonable cost. The purpose of the provisions in Chapter 3 of the Act relating to Payment Systems, etc. from 1999 is to contribute to ensuring that systems for payment services are organised and operated in a way that promotes safe and efficient payments and effective and coordinated execution of payment services. This responsibility has been delegated to the Norwegian Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission. The Norwegian Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission and Norges Bank cooperate closely on issues of relevance to the retail payment systems. In accordance with the requirements of the Norges Bank Act, Norges Bank has focused on efficiency in the retail payment system as a whole. In most western countries, the payment system lays claim to between 1 and 3 per cent of GDP. More efficient structures can therefore result in substantial savings and free up resources for other purposes. In Norway, banks use NOK 5.9 billion to produce payment services. Costs to the payer and payee in connection with payment transactions come in addition.

It is up to each country’s central bank to determine which retail payment systems are important and must therefore comply with the six recommendations. The proposal implies that retail payment systems must have a well-founded legal basis. The individual participant should have a clear understanding of the financial risk connected with participation in the system. Further, the retail payment systems should ensure a high degree of safety and operational reliability and should have satisfactory contingency arrangements. The system should also provide efficient and practical payment solutions. The system should have objective and publicly disclosed  8  BIS Review 66/2002  criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access, and the system's governance arrangements should be effective, accountable and transparent. The ECB suggests in addition that the four remaining core principles may be applied to retail payment systems. Of these, the ECB is of the view that the core principle concerning final settlement on the day of value should receive highest priority. Norges Bank has not made a thorough evaluation of the Norwegian retail payment system in relation to the six recommended core principles. Nevertheless, I will present some preliminary assessments of where the Norwegian retail payment system stands in relation to these recommendations. 12. ECB proposal for core principles for retail systems I. The system should have a well founded legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions. II.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Facing the crisis in Europe Opening address by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Conference in memory of Luis Ángel Rojo, Madrid, 21 February 2012. *  *  *  Good morning, and many thanks for having accepted our invitation to participate in this Conference in memory of Ángel Rojo. Presiding over this tribute by the Banco de España, to which Ángel Rojo devoted much of his peerless personal and professional calibre, and in which he developed many of his analytical and intellectual contributions, is frankly a privilege I would have preferred never to have taken up. It was in the Bank where he was able to successfully transform macroeconomic thought into economic policy design and implementation, heightening the reputation of the Bank itself and no doubt contributing to enhancing the well-being of Spaniards. The Bank wanted this tribute to be as solemn an occasion as the key role Ángel Rojo played within it merits, and that it should be worthy of the deep impression he made and the valuable legacy he bestowed upon us, which all his followers have sought to preserve. Fortunately for future generations, the guiding principles of his thinking as Governor can be found in numerous written texts taken from conferences and speeches that greatly impacted Spanish society and the economic policy debate in a singularly important phase for the modernisation of our economy.

José De Gregorio: Workshop on financial markets and monetary policy Opening remarks by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Workshop on Financial Markets and Monetary Policy, Santiago, 6 August 2010. *  *  *  On behalf of the Central Bank of Chile I would like to welcome you all to this workshop on the interactions between financial markets and monetary policy. We have put together a very interesting group of papers that are surely at the forefront of research in this area. The episodes that started to unfold during the second half of 2008 reminded us once more of the central importance of financial markets for the functioning of the economy. As the crisis progressed and policy makers tried to mount a response that could mitigate the effects on the real economy, understanding which actions would have the bigger impact at the smallest possible cost become a key priority. At the same time, gauging how the traditional policy actions would affect the economy in a scenario of deep disarray of financial markets also become an important priority in Central Banks and Treasury Departments around the world. The collection of papers that will be presented here today try to illuminate different features of the policy dilemmas I just mentioned. They are then a very welcome contribution. To some extent economists lacked a clear theoretical framework to understand the role of financial markets as both an originator and propagator of shocks when the crisis started.
•  The expansion of the banks' aggregate balances, which became too padded out, exceeded the increase in the real economy. •  The structure of the liabilities excessively relied on the maintained availability of the so-called wholesale funding, the maturity of which was on a short-term basis. •  The discrepancy between the capital and liquidity on one hand and the risks on the part of liabilities, was constantly increasing. •  The financial innovations brought a lot of unknown-unknowns, together with the fast trend of globalization. It means that structural changes through financial innovations occurred. The best illustration for this is the so-called "originate-to-distribute" model, i.e. extending credits and claims distribution to chained financial intermediates and end-users, which replaced the socalled "originate-to-hold" banking model, i.e. issuance of credits and holding to their maturity. It really opened new possibilities for the financial system to broaden and manage risks and maturity mismatches. Some of the banks developed this model into a complete integrated business strategy and primary source of financing of their activities. They securitized the loans, transferred the risk to others in a short period of time, in order to borrow capital over and over again, in order to sell the claim again, and to benefit promptly, but it definitely lowered the lending standards. What should be the medium-term agenda of response to the fundamental problems in the financial sector as a lesson from what we have witnessed so far?

My final point, therefore, is that the authorities will have no excuse if they don’t solve the TBTF problem through resolution regimes and reforms. The necessary technology is clear. The necessary restructuring of firms is clear. The necessary degrees and forms of cross-border co-operation are clear. It is a matter of: just do it. 8  Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
William C Dudley: The evolving structure of the US Treasury Market Conference – welcoming remarks Welcoming remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the evolving structure of the US treasury market conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 20 November 2015. *  *  *  Frank Keane, Michael McMorrow, Joseph Tracy and Nate Wuerffel assisted in preparing these remarks. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this conference on the evolving structure of the U.S. Treasury market. As you all know, the Treasury market plays a unique and crucial role in our economy, and in global financial markets more broadly. Treasury securities serve as a liquid investment and hedging vehicle for global investors, a ready source of collateral for many financial transactions and serve as a risk-free benchmark for other financial instruments. The Treasury market is important for the Federal Reserve’s implementation of monetary policy and also is a focus here at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in our statutory role as the Treasury’s fiscal agent. The Treasury market also helps to underpin the U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. And, of course, it is the primary means for borrowing to finance the U.S. federal government. 1 In recent years, the structure of the Treasury market has changed significantly. Trading has become increasingly electronic, and, in many cases, highly automated.

As you all know, the Joint Staff Report concluded that further work is necessary in light of the evolving structure of the Treasury market, and it also highlighted a series of additional steps that the official sector will take to evaluate its approach to this market. I remain very supportive of these efforts. In fact, this conference is among the first of those next steps, and presents a perfect opportunity to have a rich debate on the market’s evolving structure and the actions that may be appropriate in response. Thank you once again for coming here today. I look forward to our engagement and discussion. 4  The TMPG has since expanded its mandate to include the agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets. 5  A more recent and equally successful practice has also been instituted for the MBS market. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Cacciatore, M and Fiori, G (2016), ‘The Macroeconomic Effects of Goods and Labor Market Deregulation’, Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 20, pp. 1-24. Calvo, G (1983), ‘Staggered prices in a utility-maximising framework’, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 383-398. Cavallo, A (2017), ‘Are Online and Offline Prices Similar? Evidence from Large Multi-Channel Retailers’, American Economic Review, Vol. 107, No. 1, pp. 283-303. Chamberlin, E (1933), The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Harvard University Press. Chen, N, Imbs, J and Scott, A (2004), ‘Competition, Globalization and the Decline of Inflation’, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 4695 Chen, N, Imbs, J and Scott, A (2009), ‘The dynamics of trade and competition’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 77, No. 1, pp. 50-62. Claessens, S, Coleman, N and Donnelly, M (2017), ‘“Low-For-Long” Interest Rates and Banks’ Interest Margins: Cross-Country Evidence’, International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 1197, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Clarida, R, Galí, J and Gertler, M (1999), ‘The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 1661-1707. Constâncio, V (2017), ‘Understanding and overcoming low inflation’, remarks at the Conference on “Understanding inflation: lessons from the past, lessons for the future?”, Frankfurt am Main. Dao, MC, Das, M, Koczan, Z and Lian, W (2017), ‘Why is Labor Receiving a Smaller Share of Global Income? Theory and Empirical Evidence’, IMF Working Paper, No. 17/169. De Loecker, J and Eeckhout, J (2017), ‘The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications’, NBER Working Paper, No. 23687.

The rise in average mark-ups globally since 1980 would, on this calibration, be expected to 1  raise the trade-off parameter in the Golden Rule ( ) from around 0.1 to 0.4. This is a reasonably significant 𝜖  shift in the terms of trade between inflation and output variability. Chart 19 seeks to brings all of these points together graphically; it is an empirically-calibrated version of Figure 1. Point A is the starting equilibrium, before any rise in the (trend and variability) of mark-up shocks, with the policy possibility curve tangent to the policymaker’s loss function. A rise in the (trend and variability) of mark-ups then has three distinct effects. First, an increase in mark-up volatility causes an outward shift in the policy possibility frontier (A to B), calibrated here to be equivalent in scale to the outward shift from the counterfactual simulations. Second, there is the clockwise rotation of the Phillips curve, and hence in the policy possibility frontier (B to C), calibrated to be equivalent to the mark-up rise among firms globally since 1980. And third, there is the shift in the relative weight placed on output stabilisation by the policymaker, calibrated in line with the mark-up shift (C to D). The net effect of increased market power is a significant rise in inflation variability but relatively less change in output variability. Chart 20 uses the same calibration, but looks at the relationship between inflation and interest rate variability.
If they hit their target on average (and subject to a small tolerance range around that), they earn Bank Rate on their reserves balance. By contrast, any excess or deficiency incurs a significant charge and banks are thus incentivised to meet their chosen targets. 4  The Bank’s other liabilities include various deposits (e.g. from other central banks) and debt instruments issued in the Bank’s own name (e.g. to finance the Bank’s foreign currency reserves). Various Governmentrelated balances can also appear on either side of the balance sheet from time-to-time. 5  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/publications/redbookdec10.pdf. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In order that it is possible for every bank to hit its individual target – and hence for the system to hit the implied collective target – the Bank calculates the aggregate demand for reserves across the commercial banks and then ensures that the aggregate amount of sterling in the system is exactly consistent with that collective target. It does that by offering, via short-term Open Market Operations (OMOs), exactly the right amount of sterling lending (against high quality liquid collateral).6 Commercial banks can ensure they meet their individual reserves target by transacting with each other in the market. This should distribute the reserves around the system such that no bank falls short or exceeds its own target. Alternatively, in the event of an unexpected operational disruption or exceptional volatility in overnight market interest rates, SMF member banks can borrow from, or lend to the Bank of England via the Operational Standing Facilities (OSFs).

As we have already discussed, the first component of the insurance aspect of the framework is the reserves averaging mechanism itself, which permits banks, within reason and without penalty, to vary their reserves account balances day-to-day in the face of small and/or short-lived liquidity shocks – provided they hit their reserves target on average over the maintenance period. The second component is the OSFs which allow banks to cope with larger, expected (frictional) payments shocks day-by-day. A third component comes through longer-term OMOs to which we now turn. Longer-term Open Market Operations The most routine method for ensuring there is the correct amount of sterling in the system, consistent with reserves targets, is via short-term OMOs. Prior to the start of QE, the Bank carried out weekly short-term reverse repo operations (STRs) against a pool of “narrow” collateral comprising highly liquid sovereign or near-sovereign bonds from a small selection of countries. At that frequency, the scale of the operations could be judged fairly precisely so as to offset any autonomous factors which affected the net supply of sterling to the market. But relying solely on short term OMOs could have meant carrying out very large repo operations every week. To avoid that degree of churn, some longer term reverse repos (LTRs) were also used precrisis – at maturities from 3 to 12 months.
In this respect, in the opening months of this year, the Government set in train various regional and local government support mechanisms in order to smooth the refinancing of their existing debts or payment to trade creditors. The financing mechanisms agreed also require fulfilment of adjustment plans. It is now crucial to insist on strict compliance so that this type of aid does not provide inappropriate incentives. The consolidation strategy must, finally, be completed while keeping in mind the mediumand long-term factors affecting public finances, particularly those deriving from the pressure  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  exerted by population ageing on certain items of expenditure. In this connection, following the enactment in July 2011 of the Social Security Reform Law, an appropriate definition of sustainability is needed as soon as possible so that the system’s parameters may be automatically adapted to demographic changes. In short, the current budgetary imbalance has become one of the main obstacles to growth of the Spanish economy. Correcting it is urgent and unavoidable. What is thus needed is a fiscal adjustment strategy based on commitments made at European level. This strategy has to be accompanied by a strengthening of the national budgetary framework, as reflected in the constitutional reform, and by the application of the medium and long-term reforms that enable the challenge of population ageing to be addressed.

It is essential to prevent these risks from materialising by ensuring a meticulous and rigorous budget outturn allowing budget deviations to be detected in time and any required remedial action to be taken. Should this be necessary, additional adjustments would have to be made in current expenditure, given that the freedom of action in relation to capital expenditure has shrunk enormously, and new tax measures would have to be taken, preferably in the area of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  indirect taxation, which has fewer distorting effects on growth and the allocation of resources and where the tax burden in Spain is lower than in other developed countries. Looking ahead, moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the temporal tax increases applied may have to be replaced in time by measures of a permanent nature. Simultaneously, it is important that the process of budgetary consolidation be accompanied by a strengthening of the national budgetary framework, so as to allow governments at all levels to meet their commitments. In this respect, the reform of the Constitution in September 2011 so as to include the deficit and debt ceilings set at European level, which was subsequently implemented in the draft budgetary stability law, was designed to meet this need and is fully consistent with the recent EU governance reforms.