samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I indicated earlier, EMU is leading to more integrated financial markets. In the absence of national monetary policies, this accentuates the need of joint systems and standards for financial oversight. It also increases the need of readiness for the joint management of financial crises. Work in this field is now in progress in a variety of fora. Concluding remarks Internationalisation in general, with growth in trade and factor mobility, has brought the EU member states closer together and increased their interdependence. Politically motivated changes such as the internal market and the new monetary union have served to promote this trend. BIS Review 102/2000  4  As regards government finances, various processes, including a system of sanctions, have been set up to test national policies. This is because of the risk that individual member states would otherwise be able to pursue a policy that could harm the others. Processes have also been established in other policy areas to highlight key issues in the European debate, to point to good examples and to exert peer pressure. This should not be belittled: we know from Swedish experience that comparative analysis and in-depth debate can push things in the desired direction. So what should we expect in the future? I have briefly touched on a number of situations where cooperation and coordination could lead to a better EU policy.

Inflation’s convergence in the run up to Stage Three has been checked, however, and recently the spread has even become wider. This is hardly surprising in itself, neither is it a major problem. The process known as catching up means that countries with a below-average level of prosperity initially will benefit from technological and organisational advances elsewhere and accordingly grow faster than the rich countries, which in turn can lead to higher inflation. Furthermore, countries with strong export-led growth can experience upward wage pressure in other sectors, too, leading ultimately to higher inflation. So there are reasons why growth rates as well as rates of inflation can diverge in a monetary union without this being unnatural or a problem for either the countries in question or the union as a whole. It seems fairly evident that elements of this kind of “more innocuous” inflation are around at present. The clearest example is Ireland, with catch-up effects and a number of years of exceptional productivity growth. But even there the picture is not unambiguous and when inflation now increases in a number of member states, questions arise about the formation of stabilisation policy. This is definitely not a problem that can be tackled with measures of monetary policy. The function of monetary policy is to maintain price stability in the union as a whole, a mandate that seems to be generally supported and understood. Neither is there any cause to criticise how monetary policy has been conducted in practice.
Although the time profile of the adjustment process is different, as is the degree of short-term pain involved, internal adjustment arguably leaves the economy leaner and fitter than it would if everyone could simply depend on depreciation to see them right. The second flawed perception was that the intervention by the authorities in the stock market in August 1998 represented a fundamental reversal of traditional non-interventionist policy. The mistake here was to fall into the trap of characterising Hong Kong as a place where the authorities never intervened. We have always made clear our preparedness to intervene for such purposes as promoting efficiency in the market economy, providing infrastructure, or providing necessary support for the most needy in society. But our emphasis has always been to keep intervention to the minimum. This may sound uncontroversial today; indeed, it is probably an attitude shared by most governments, including those here in Europe. But you should remember that when Hong Kong was first vigorously espousing this doctrine, perhaps 30 or 40 years ago, the vogue in most western countries was for the  1  BIS Review 23/2000  state to assume an expanding role in the economy. In keeping with Hong Kong’s principles, the stock market intervention in 1998 was specifically directed towards improving the operation of the market economy rather than perverting it: it was designed to frustrate market manipulation that would otherwise have led to serious market dislocation.

Euroland officials should perhaps consider how much a problem there is of substance and how much of perception, and address each as appropriate. Another factor that may contribute to scepticism over the euro concerns monetary policy. But there is not a lot that I would wish to say on the subject. You will appreciate that central bankers are not anyway the sort of people to make public assessments of one another! On the whole, I sense a feeling of some sympathy for the European Central Bank. In the technical sense it appears to have done most things right, in terms of keeping inflation under wraps and so preserving the internal purchasing power of the euro, but it has nevertheless had to preside over a substantial decline in the euro’s external value. Given that Euroland as a whole is a relatively closed economy, the decline of the euro may have caused more concern to outsiders than to insiders. It has certainly influenced international investor perceptions. My own observation, perhaps slightly cynical, of businessmen and investors is that they are less concerned about the technical content of monetary policy - provided that it is seen to be reasonably disciplined - than they are about the conviction with which it is delivered. Thus, the so-called “strong dollar” stance of the United States is clearly stated. It is not contradicted from anywhere within the administration.
Nonetheless, for the time being, the size of these adverse effects can only be estimated with an extraordinary degree of uncertainty. Naturally, this will depend on the severity and duration of the conflict. Second, in such an extraordinarily uncertain scenario, caused by a shock that has little to do with economic fundamentals, it is vital that economic policy should respond forcefully, providing support focused on the most vulnerable affected households, firms and sectors, as well as certainty. In particular, in response to a shock of this nature, the contribution of supranational European policies and national fiscal policies is fundamental. For their part, the latest decisions taken by the ECB are the result of an analysis that weighs up the different risks arising from the current context for our price stability target. The measures agreed strengthen the data-dependent nature of our decisions, increase the flexibility and optionality available in our various monetary policy instruments and provide certainty to economic agents as a whole, with a clear commitment to adopt all the measures that may be needed to fulfil the ECB’s price stability mandate and to safeguard financial stability. Third, the sharp rise in the prices of energy and certain other commodities at global level in recent quarters, which has intensified as a consequence of the conflict in Ukraine, entails for the Spanish economy – a net importer of these products – a negative shock to our terms of trade. This reduces national income and raises inflationary pressures in the near term.

Specifically, the  4  BIS Review 104/2007  latter Act will stipulate prompt corrective action and grant the Bank of Thailand power to conduct supervision on a consolidated basis. The current Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) will move into its second phase, with an emphasis on increased competition and consideration on potential entry of new players to further enhance financial efficiency and resiliency. Our accession to the Basel II accord will upgrade the risk management of banks to the best standard and will further enhance financial sector stability. Ladies and Gentlemen, To end my talk today, I would like to emphasize that policymakers must avoid misplacing the focus of policies just on short-term issues. They must instead always weigh very carefully between short-term and long-term objectives toward achieving strengthened resiliency of the overall economy. Only with such resiliency, will a small open economy like Thailand be able to sail through the waves of global financial turbulence in the years ahead. BIS Review 104/2007  5
In particular, and in keeping with previous communications, the Governing Council acted – with a package of expansionary measures – in response to inflation rates, both realised and projected for the coming years, which have remained persistently below the ECB’s aim, in line with its commitment to symmetry in relation to this aim. In this context, symmetry means that the ECB undertakes to act with the same determination whether inflation is persistently above or below 2%.1 In particular, the Governing Council of the ECB took the decision to decrease the interest rate on the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.50% and reinforced its forward guidance on interest rates by indicating that they will remain at their present or lower levels until it is seen that the inflation outlook robustly converges to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2%. Such convergence should also be consistently reflected in the observed behaviour of underlying inflation. The ECB also agreed to restart net purchases under its asset purchase programme (APP) at a monthly pace of € billion as from 1 November and without a defined time limit. In order to preserve favourable bank lending conditions, the modalities of the new series of quarterly targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III) were also changed, eliminating the 10 bp spread established on the interest rates applied to them and extending their maturity from two to three years.

In 2006, the name was changed to the Government Pension Fund – Global. In spite of the name change, the Fund is more similar to an endowment than to a pension fund. Since the first transfer of some USD 400 million was made in 1996, the Fund has grown rapidly in size. Its assets are currently valued at around USD 400 billion. One third of the portfolio, about USD 130 billion is invested here in North America. The Fund is expected to grow rapidly in coming years, and may double in 5-10 years. The Fund was established as a tool to support prudent management of Norway’s petroleum wealth. One purpose is to shield the non-oil economy from price fluctuations (see Chart 3). The Fund is also a long-term savings instrument. It will help to cope with future financial commitments linked to an ageing population. Accumulation of capital in the Fund reflects the depletion of a non-renewable resource, which is exchanged for financial assets through the Fund’s investments. By setting up the Fund, it became possible to establish a path for production of oil and gas that is independent of the profile for petroleum revenue spending. Furthermore, to effectively shield the non-oil economy, and to make sure that private sector investment decisions could be made independently of the public sector’s saving of petroleum wealth, the Fund is only invested abroad. This also enhances the expected return on government wealth and reduces the risk.
Looking ahead, the baseline scenario predicts that the economy will continue to improve, that mobility restrictions will not return to mid2020 levels, and that the fiscal and monetary momentum will continue, with positive annual growth figures showing more consistently in 2021 starting in the second quarter. Even so, the erosion caused by the deep fall in activity and the use of public and private buffers—which was very necessary to navigate the first months of the pandemic—increases our vulnerability to risk scenarios and poses significant challenges in order for growth to advance towards its trend rate. Let me now share with you our evaluation of the economic scenario and related risks. Page 1 of 19  II. The macroeconomic scenario  Global activity has continued to recover from the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, in a context of increased mobility and continued fighting of the disease. This has also been the case in Chile, although the pace of normalization has been slower than in other countries, slowing down the expected economic recovery (Figure 1). In recent weeks, there have been major outbreaks in the United States and Europe, which has led to the reinstatement of some restrictions. However, as opposed to developments early in the pandemic, these measures have been more focused and not as severe, so mobility has not been reduced as much.

Cooperation has, in fact, always been the ECB’s preferred approach to the oversight of financial market infrastructures (FMIs). This cooperation should rely on two elements, as agreed at the international level: first, effective cooperative oversight arrangements and, second, crisis management groups to allow for mutual consultation in recovery and resolution planning. Unfortunately, for several global CCPs, these arrangements do not yet exist, or do not involve all relevant authorities, despite international commitments. These delays are a source of concern, not least as seven years have passed since the adoption of the PFMIs5, and almost five years since international standards were adopted for both the recovery6 and resolution7 of FMIs. I urge all parties involved to accelerate progress in this area. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  The Eurosystem needs to be able to conduct effective oversight Cooperation is also indispensable for the second topic of today’s conference, namely CCP liquidity and the role of the central bank of issue. In Europe, cooperation ensures that the ECB and the Eurosystem can conduct effective oversight of euro-denominated clearing activities, wherever they may be established. In 2017 the ECB recommended an amendment to its Statute to clarify its competence over CCPs for the purpose of carrying out its monetary functions.8 The ensuing debate among legislators and policymakers in the EU and beyond was marred by some misunderstandings, however, which I would like to dispel today. As you all know, some central banks are CCP supervisors. The ECB is not, 9 and has no intention of becoming one.
Of course, there is the physical damage, which was geographically widespread, but particularly devastating in some communities right here in New York City, including Breezy Point, the Rockaways, and portions of Staten Island, and in so many cities and towns along the Long Island, New Jersey and Connecticut waterfronts, such as Long Beach, Seaside Heights, Spring Lake and Hoboken. Estimates of the costs of disruption to economic activity – that is, services that couldn’t be rendered and goods that couldn’t be produced because of protracted transit shutdowns, power outages and other such damage produced by the storm – are particularly difficult to pin down. Thus, it will be some time before concrete figures are available. However, the early read from recently-released data confirm these disruptions have been widespread. Every one of the New York City area firms that responded to our recent Empire State Manufacturing Survey – fielded one to two weeks after the storm – indicated that the storm disrupted activity at their firm, and 40 percent of them indicated that they were completely shut down or severely crippled for at least five days. Furthermore, the number of workers filing initial claims for unemployment insurance in both New York and New Jersey surged to more than triple their pre-storm levels in the week after Sandy hit, suggesting at least 70,000 storm-related job losses in these two states thus far. These data suggest that the disruptions that we have seen, and continue to see, could be substantial.

This diversity of viewpoints is a key strength of the FOMC. In fact, I believe we make better decisions as a committee because we don’t all think alike. But we are united in our commitment to our dual mandate of maximum sustainable employment and price stability and in our belief that preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve in making monetary policy decisions is very much in the public interest. That independence allows us to make tough decisions based on data and analysis – insulated from short-term political considerations. At FOMC meetings, each Committee member presents a current outlook for his or her District and for the nation. In formulating these assessments, we consult with many sources – our boards of directors, regional advisory councils, community leaders and other key stakeholders. My meeting with you today is part of this systematic effort to understand what is going on at the grassroots level of our economy. To add to what I learn from my conversations, my colleagues and I at the New York Fed continually track conditions in our District, and we have created special tools for that purpose. For example, my staff tracks local household credit conditions, including the amount and type of personal debt and whether repayments are timely. We also conduct a periodic poll about the credit needs of small businesses, which are an important source of new jobs in the District.
In annual terms, credit growth fell during the second half of 2008 relative to the first half the same year. Intermediation indicators increased further; the ratio of loan portfolio to deposits and total assets was 63 and 43 percent, respectively, as of end November. Following September, the structure of loan portfolio by currency displayed a higher annual growth rate of lek denominated loans. The performance of loan portfolio by customer attests to higher annual growth rates of business loans relative to household loans. In contrast to the first half of 2008, loan portfolio to construction and trade shifted downward while loans to industry increased slightly in the second half of the year. The performance of money markets during the second half of 2008 was conditioned by the developments in monetary indicators and the real economy. As experienced by many countries, the increased vulnerability of banks to liquidity has brought about the reduction in the interbank trading volume and upward interest rates on deposits. The coverage ratio of Government demand for money has reduced and some risk premiums have increased in the last two months. This performance brought about the increase in Government securities’ interest rates and in a few cases in the loan interest rates. In response to these developments, the Bank of Albania intervened in the money market by injecting liquidity at different maturity rates. In addition, the central bank changed in November the form of repo auctions to auctions with undetermined amounts in order to better satisfy the banks’ needs.

Against this backdrop, the facing of the economic activity contraction at a global level remains an open issue. The Euro area economy is already experiencing an economic slowdown. Euro area GDP contracted in the third quarter while the unemployment rate reached 7.8 percent in November 2008. The U.S. economy showed quite similar features. The further contraction of economic activity – owing to the deterioration of financial indicators in the U.S. corporate and household balance sheets, mirrored in lower consumption spending and reduced aggregate investment – drove the unemployment rate to reach 7.2 percent. Monetary and financial stimuli managed by central banks and the ministries of finance have helped to bolster confidence and relieve pressure on the financial institutions. Against this backdrop, the “resilience” shown by emerging countries is displaying the first signs of weakening. In contrast to the first half of 2008, the latest data attest to the moderation of economic growth rates in the majority of these countries. The channels through which the slowdown in advanced economies has affected the emerging countries differ depending on their development characteristics. China and India have been severely hit by the slowdown in exports; Russia had hard times owing to the slump in raw material prices in the global market, while East European countries have been impacted by the tightening of funding conditions on a global level.
The government has made it clear that it shares this view of the causes behind our current problems and of the solutions that we need to implement as soon as possible. It has indeed begun implementing major structural reforms, and is committed to going further, notably on firms’ cost competitiveness and on the reduction of the public deficit through greater cost efficiency in public administration. Thank you for your attention and I am looking forward to your questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Nevertheless, the unemployment rate in New York and New Jersey has risen to levels not seen in almost two decades. In New York City, employment has typically recovered more than a year later than the recovery of national employment and has, in the past, been led by a recovery of Wall Street employment. Although Upstate New York has seen little overall job growth for the past several decades, job losses in this downturn were not as severe as losses for the nation, in part, because the upstate metro areas did not experience a boom-and-bust housing cycle. In addition, Puerto Rico, which is also part of our District, has experienced a considerably longer and deeper downturn than the mainland or this region. Before I continue, it is important to explain the integral role of the Federal Reserve System in regional economies across the country. One of our key responsibilities here at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is to connect the Federal Reserve System to Main Street across our District. Real activity takes place on Main Street in the form of the millions of decisions made every day by households and businesses around the country. When we talk to them, we learn how firms and consumers are experiencing the economy. That essential insight from Main Street informs the policy decisions that we make in pursuit of our goals of stable prices, full employment and financial stability.