samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The HKMA is delighted to work with Euroclear Bank and J.P.Morgan, the two premier global tripartite repo system operators, to bring this concept to fruition. With security pools valued at EUR 10.8 trillion and $ 17.9 trillion respectively, both institutions provide a huge reservoir and a highly sophisticated platform to support cross-border cross currency lending with ample choices of securities as collateral. Linked up by the HKMA’s Central Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) as an agent, CMU members will be able to enjoy the collateral management service of the global repo operators which include functions like auto-selection and auto-substitution of collateral, collateral eligibility filters, daily mark-to-market and prudent haircut execution, all of which will help financial institutions in their collateral management processes. As a further development, we are working with our two partners to expand the repo service to allow financial institutions in Hong Kong to use their securities kept with the CMU, Euroclear and J.P. Morgan as collateral to obtain foreign currency liquidity such as US dollars from the global broker dealers in the second half of 2012. This will help local companies and financial institutions to obtain foreign currency liquidity as they expand their business overseas. Finally, the HKMA has a long term vision for repo financing to become a more important source of funding for companies and banks in Hong Kong.

The new collateral management service, with its cross-border, cross-system, cross-time zone and cross-currency capabilities, will provide an efficient repo infrastructure that will help develop the repo market in Hong Kong. The importance of the repo market as a financing channel has assumed added prominence since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. Due to a combination of the large inflows of funds into Hong Kong in late 2008 and early 2009 and heightened risk aversion, the interbank money market has been less active in recent years and financial institutions have been more careful in lending funds to each other on an uncollateralized basis. The average daily turnover of the uncollateralized interbank market has dropped significantly, by 71% from $ billion in November 2007 to $ billion in March 2012. The higher frequency of flight to quality, and resultant tightness in the global supply of US dollar, has also affected turnover in the currency swap market. The average daily turnover of the Hong Kong dollar swap market also reduced notably by 32% from $ billion to $ billion in the same period. While the Hong Kong banking sector is now faced with ample liquidity, the situation will not be permanent and we will need to find new ways to facilitate efficient interbank borrowing. Development of the repo market will help to activate the money market by addressing the credit risk through the collateralized arrangement. The cross-border funding issue is particularly important to Hong Kong given its role as an international banking centre.
In my opinion, there were essentially four such shortcomings: i) the markedly excessive size of the financial sector, which took the form of an accelerated expansion in lending in a low interest rate setting, ii) excessive exposure to the real estate sector, which underwent an BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  unsustainable boom, iii) an insufficient own funds base to meet the risks assumed, and iv), lastly, appreciable weaknesses in corporate governance, management and risk control systems in a relevant segment of the sector. The reforms since undertaken should indeed be understood as a set of actions whose aim was to redress these singular weaknesses of our financial system. 3. The measures taken  What was done to combat these shortcomings? I believe the measures taken may be grouped into four central issues. i)  Balance sheet clean-up  Firstly, it was necessary to facilitate the clean-up of bank balance sheets and, in particular, to reduce exposure to the real estate sector, which was weighing on banks’ solvency. This was mainly achieved through two types of measures. On one hand, further to two decree-laws and various supervisory initiatives, the already-demanding provisioning requirements were increased, particularly for the most sensitive exposures. And on the other, Sareb (the asset management company for assets arising from bank restructuring) was created, and all banks that received public assistance were obliged to transfer their real estate assets, whether impaired or not, to this company.

None are perfect but all are independent of the internal model, and therefore can help provide us with a different view on the evolution of risk exposures and a safeguard against model drift. All risk measures have their limitations. So we plan to use a range of measures alongside other supervisory review process initiatives, such as the analysis of internal model outputs. Conclusion In conclusion, given today’s audience, I want to stress the critical professional role of actuaries in current soft market conditions, where there may be a greater tension between on the one hand underwriting discipline and appropriate reserving and on the other hand business growth and current-year profits. Actuaries are responsible for providing assurance on reserves and opinions on both the underwriting and reinsurance strategies of firms, implying strong engagement with the risk function, as well as independence and objectivity in their assessments. Events like today’s, where actuaries come together to share knowledge, with the aim of raising professional standards, are particularly important and welcome. Chart 1  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Doing so may enable the central bank to take into consideration the longer-run  BIS Review 96/2007  3  consequences on inflation and production of potentially large movements in asset prices and levels of indebtedness that have been built up over long periods of time. From a theoretical perspective, central banks should always look at inflation and growth over the indefinite future, and thus this seems a reasonable proposal. At the same time one must remember that in practice it is difficult to construct forecasts for longer horizons that actually contain more information than that which is contained in the forecast for the coming two to three years. Also, the horizon may in fact have to be very long to illustrate the issues at hand. The Riksbank view The monetary policy strategy followed by the Riksbank is that of flexible inflation targeting. When setting interest rates we consider not only the outlook for inflation but also the development of the real economy. In most situations, monetary policy is focused on bringing inflation back to target within a two-year horizon, which is deemed as providing enough time to allow consideration to be given to developments in the real economy. In certain circumstances, if inflation has deviated substantially from the target, it is reasonable to let inflation return to target at a slower pace, provided this does not undermine the credibility of the inflation target.

In short, there are two arguments for this: (i) engaging in such behaviour – let’s call it “leaning against the wind” – in situations when an asset price is changing due to non-fundamentals can dampen the effects of the unmotivated price change on the real economy and thereby prevent an inefficient allocation of resources; (ii) if the market knows that the central bank engages in “leaning against the wind” activities the probability will fall of non-fundamental price changes arising in the first place. The key issue here is, of course, identifying price changes that are driven by nonfundamentals. This problem cannot be overly emphasized. But difficult or not, it is an issue that central banks cannot ignore. If prices of houses or other assets are partly driven by factors that are hard to explain and that are believed to give rise to inefficient allocations and risks of large fluctuations in real economic activity and inflation, such events will, in one way or another, find their way into our thinking about monetary policy. Extending the forecasting horizon In practice, most inflation targeting central banks have chosen to adopt forecast horizons of two to three years, at least in external communication and official documents. In this environment, the idea that a central bank can need to extend the horizon over which it constructs inflation and output forecasts is one that has been heard from many central banks.
However, going forward a recovery is foreseen, considering that the expansionary measures adopted by its policy makers have begun to bear fruit. Colombia and Argentina have also shown signs of deceleration, But Colombia growing more than Argentina. Peru, meanwhile, is still growing strongly. In Mexico, growth during the first half of the year exceeded expectations, but in the near future the effects of the frail external sector will be seen more clearly. The developed economies continue to show weak growth. The developed economies continue to post weak growth. In the United States, the overall evaluation is still of a slow recovery. The United Kingdom is in recession, affected by anemic external and internal demand, the latter influenced by tight credit conditions and policies aimed at fiscal consolidation. In the Eurozone, the GDP shrank in the second quarter, after being flat in the early part of the year. The performance of the zone continued to be marked by big differences between peripheral economies (with sharp falls) and central European economies (with modest increases), reflecting financial and fiscal vulnerabilities. However, the weakness of some incoming indicators from Germany is cause for concern, particularly domestic consumption compounded by the weak performance of its exports and manufactures.

The EU’s new Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), for example, is expected to bring about important changes and intensify competition in the European financial market. This development will also influence the future of financial market infrastructures in Switzerland. Against this background, it is certainly crucial for the Swiss financial market infrastructures to persistently foster their competitiveness. They have pursued this strategy so far, and will need to continue doing so in the future. BIS Review 87/2006  1
To set the scene let me return to the middle of last summer, when volatility was exceptionally low across a range of financial markets; both compared to the period of heightened volatility that we saw in the crisis years and the period preceding it. That can be seen from this spider chart which shows measures of short-term implied volatility for a number of assets relative to these two periods. Anything less than zero is less volatile than the past, with the opposite true for positive plots (Chart 1). Our market intelligence suggests that a number of factors contributed to these stable outcomes. There was a relatively low level of uncertainty about the macroeconomic outlook. The extraordinary policy easing from central banks had depressed both implied and realised volatility. Forward guidance, as well as repeated rounds of quantitative easing had also led to market participants to take comfort from the mantra of “low-for-long”. This in turn incentivised investors to “search for yield”, which of course was an intended consequence of the monetary stance, but which depressed volatility and compressed risk premia in a selfreinforcing cycle. Since last summer volatility in many financial markets has picked up and there have been a number of short-lived episodes of extreme volatility and impaired market liquidity. Implied volatilities have risen and in a number of the cases I showed earlier have returned to around pre-crisis levels (Chart 1).

The performance of the US Treasury market was also materially affected on each of these days, such that much smaller trades than normal moved prices. But in each of these cases there were stabilising forces that meant volatility subsided and liquidity returned relatively quickly. In the case of the 15 October event, what had been a crowded trade was pushed so far from prices viewed as “justified” by fundamentals that market participants were willing to provide support to the market. Similarly there was a reappraisal of the fundamentally justified level of the Swiss franc in the days that followed the removal of the peg, following public comments by the SNB. Volatility declined, if not all the way back to the pre-news level, relatively quickly following these initial spikes. This is most true of the 15 October episode: the implied volatility of 10-year interest rate swaps retraced about half of its upward move after two days, and was back to pre-October 15th levels within just two weeks. This quick stabilisation helped to limit contagion to other markets. Neither the increase in “baseline” volatility, nor the recent episodes I have just described, in of themselves materially affected stability in the United Kingdom. For us then, the question becomes what lessons can we learn? Why have volatility and liquidity evolved in this way?
Durmuş Yılmaz: Overview of the Turkish economy in the light of new global realities Speech by Mr Durmuş Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the International Arab Banking Summit (IABS 2010), Istanbul, 18 June 2010. *  *  *  Esteemed governors and distinguished guests, At the outset, I want to express my gratitude to the Union of Arab Banks along with Turkish Banking Association, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and the World Union of Arab Bankers for their efforts in organizing this summit. As the Central Bank of Turkey, we are honored to be a part of this prestigious event congregating such an esteemed group of participants. In this keynote speech, first I want to discuss the post-crisis episode in a global context. Then I will continue with the extent to which the Turkish economy has been affected by the downturn in global economy. Finally, I will conclude with the opportunities and prospects in our region in the light of the new global realities. Dear participants,  As we all observe from the latest data, signs of recovery have continued in the first half of 2010, albeit at variable speeds across countries and regions. Coordinated efforts of the global community have been so far successful in averting a downward spiral similar to the one experienced during the Great Depression. Although global economy is back on its feet, there are several risks involved in this recovery process and many challenges lie ahead.

It is for this reason that the Bank of Zambia has all the confidence that today’s consultative meeting will help advance the agenda for the second phase of the FSDP. This forum therefore, brings together the FSDP secretariat, development partners and key stakeholders to discuss the Phase II document and render support, financial and otherwise, to the process as well as facilitate consensus building for the extension of the FSDP to December 2012. During this meeting, the FSDP Secretariat will update stakeholders on the progress to-date as well as outstanding issues and new developments since 2004. The FSDP Secretariat is further expected to highlight some of the key recommendations that were made in the recent Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) and highlight proposals made by the working groups. 2  BIS Review 131/2009  Furthermore, representatives of Government and cooperating partners will also be at liberty to provide their comments on the programme’s achievements and the policy direction going forward. Finally, it is our view at the Bank of Zambia that the FSDP provides a unique opportunity to enhance contribution of our financial sector to economic growth & poverty reduction as well as deepening and modernising our financial system. However, the ability to move forward will depend on our collective support to achieve the Vision of the FSDP. It is therefore our expectation that this meeting will facilitate consensus among stakeholders on the way forward and update cooperating partners on the need for their continued support of the programme through direct financial support or technical assistance.
This is the fifth occasion in just the past eight years on which I've had the pleasure of giving this biennial report on the state of the UK economy to our Scottish stakeholders. On each previous occasion I have been able to report to you relatively steady growth of overall output, a continuing fall in unemployment and stable low inflation. But I've then gone on to discuss the risks and uncertainties ahead and to worry out loud as to whether or not we could keep it up. On each occasion I have concluded - usually somewhat tentatively - that we could. And indeed we have in the UK - as a whole, though I have to admit it was a close run thing last winter in the wake of the unexpectedly sharp economic slowdown that hit the whole of the industrial world from the beginning of 2001. Despite that global economic shock - which produced near-simultaneous recession in the world's three largest economies, the US, Japan and Germany - we in the UK - at the overall, aggregate, level have now enjoyed continuous quarter by quarter growth at an annual average rate of 2¾% throughout the past 10 years. That is far and away the longest period of consecutive quarterly growth since quarterly estimates began nearly 50 years ago - and the annual average growth rate has remained somewhat above most estimates - at least until recently - of the longer term trend rate of some 2¼% - 2½%.

Those who look for a sharp downward adjustment typically point to the ratio of household debt to income, and to the ratio of house prices to earnings. They discount the relatively low debt-service to income ratio on the grounds that it could rise sharply if interest rates went up, and ask what might happen if unemployment were to start to rise sharply. To my mind those arguments have a degree of circularity. The possibility of a sharp rise in unemployment depends substantially on a sharp slowdown in consumer spending rather than the other way round. Similarly a sharp rise in interest rates is less likely if consumer spending is slowing down. So it is not all obvious to me at least that the household sector will suddenly run for cover in the  current environment, where the labour market remains remarkably robust, and the prospect for inflation - and hence the prospect for interest rates - remains relatively benign, remaining somewhat above target in the near term but moving down gradually as we move into next year. I don't say that things could not turn out rather worse than that - and there are other uncertainties, like development of the exchange rate, or the effect of the upcoming increase in National Insurance Contributions, which I have not touched upon this evening. Uncertainty is a fact of economic life.
Our projections have not changed: the Bank of Albania expects economic activity to improve progressively over the medium-term horizon. This performance will continue to be sustained by stimulating financial conditions and growth of private domestic demand. It will contribute to the improvement of economic and financial equilibriums in Albania and to the return of inflation to target within 2018. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The realisation of these objectives requires maintaining the actual mix of economic policies. The monetary policy will maintain the stimulating trend over the medium-term horizon, while the intensity of the monetary stimulus will not decrease for some quarters ahead. On the other hand, the fiscal policy should maintain its consolidating trend. The balance of risks related to expected developments remains on the down side. The expansion of economic activity continues to be decelerated by the unfavourable economic performance in the euro area, which is further complicated by the Brexit, as well as by the behaviour of economic and financial agents, who continue to show reluctance in undertaking long-term business projects. Against this backdrop, the Bank of Albania deems that economic policies and structural reforms should focus on: –  Maintaining and further strengthening the economic and financial stability. –  Accelerating structural reforms, especially with regard to: improving the legal setting and business climate; encouraging domestic and foreign investments, completing the infrastructure; enhancing productivity; and, improving the labour market. –  Expanding crediting, to support the country's medium-term development.

Zdeněk Tůma: The role of the EBRD in the transition process towards fully fledged market economies Statement by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank and EBRD Alternate Governor, at the 15th Annual Meeting of the EBRD Board of Governors, London, 22 May 2006. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Mr President, Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour to address the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors in London and I wish to express my appreciation also to the Government of United Kingdom and to the City of London for their hospitality. We are today participating in the fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors and we can look back on these years with considerable satisfaction regarding the role of the EBRD in the transition process towards fully fledged market economies. Many countries - including my country, the Czech Republic – have witnessed significant and considerable political and economic transformation. I am glad to say that the European Bank is one of those successful institutions that have significantly contributed to this process. The Board of Governors has today approved the Bank's strategy for the period 2006 – 2010 – the Capital Resources Review 3. The new strategy reflects the successful transition achieved in the “Advanced Countries” and the Bank's activities are being focussed towards the South-Eastern and Eastern countries of its operations. We support this move. In Central Europe the Bank focuses on just a few sectors today.