samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In Asia, Swiss direct investments amount to 35 billion Swiss francs, and Swiss firms employ 300,000 people, up 20% from 2000. In Singapore, to take an example, Switzerland is among the top European investors, ranking third after the UK and the Netherlands. The 250 Swiss companies here contribute 18% to total European investment in Singapore. Our trade relations with Singapore have developed rapidly in recent years. Since the late 1990s, total bilateral trade has increased by almost 50% to a new record of 1.9 billion Swiss francs last year. As a consequence of the rapid expansion of our trade with Asia, in general, and Singapore, in particular, the overall significance of Asian trade for us is now of the same magnitude as our trade with the United States. However, taking into account the relative size and the potential in Asia, there is still a lot of leeway for Swiss firms. A similar picture can be observed with respect to Swiss direct investment on the continent of Asia. Despite an increase of 30% between the late 1990s and 2004, Asia still only accounts for 7.7% of total Swiss investment abroad. Although Singapore commands the lion's share in this regard – 2.5% or 11 billion Swiss francs – it is evident that there is enormous potential for the expansion of bilateral economic relations between our two countries, and even more between Switzerland and other emerging Asian countries.

Here it is the commercial banks and other private sector stakeholders that choose the best technologies and solutions. The division of roles between central banks and commercial banks results in a good balance between safety and efficiency. At the first level, the central banks facilitate the settlement of interbank transactions on secure systems and in electronic central bank money. In so doing, they minimise the risks in the systemically important segment of payment transactions, beyond which the risks can be borne by the market. At this second level, settlement can take place via alternative channels, without necessarily having to be based on central bank money. This division of roles between central banks and commercial banks epitomises our current two-tier financial system. In the first tier, the central bank acts as the banker to the banks. In the second tier, the commercial banks act as the interface to the end customers. And it is the competing commercial banks that decide which services they want to provide for companies and private individuals. This system is efficient and proven. There is much more to fintech than just DLT In connection with fintech, I have so far focused mainly on DLT. However, there is of course much more to fintech than just DLT. In addition to DLT, a whole array of promising innovations could potentially be applied to traditional financial services. We need only think of mobile payments, robo advisers, crowd lending or big data.
iii)  Third, a domestic card association had indicated early on that it would build a shared NFC platform for its member banks, which is able to support over 20 banks  3  Based on statistics from Octopus, HKICL, HKMA. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  to provide NFC payment services. The project would to a large extent achieve the objective of having a piece of interoperable infrastructure. 23. So far, the market-driven approach has served us well. One stored value card company has launched such services, so have four other banks, in partnership with two major card associations. By the end of this year, the shared NFC payment platform I mentioned should be ready for operation. IV. Sound regulatory framework  24. While Hong Kong is well-positioned to capture business opportunities brought by mcommerce, we need a legal and regulatory framework to address the related risks. With that in mind, the HKMA and the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau are jointly proposing a regulatory regime for stored value facilities and retail payment systems in Hong Kong. 25. Under the new framework, multi-purpose stored value facilities would need to be licenced and observe a set of regulatory requirements. For instance, it must have a physical presence in Hong Kong and must be a body corporate under Hong Kong law. The issuer must meet a minimum ongoing capital requirement of $ million. There are also “fit and proper” requirements on management and ownership. 26. Of particular importance is the need for adequate consumer protection.

Victoria Cleland: Global action to enhance cross-border payments Speech (virtual) by Ms Victoria Cleland, Executive Director for Banking, Payments and Innovation of the Bank of England, at the Silk Road Cash & Payments conference, Almaty, 29 March 2023. *** Cross-border payments are crucial to the smooth functioning of the global economy, and their importance is growing in our ever more interconnected, global digital economy. The value of cross-border payments is forecast to increase from almost $ trillion in 2017 to over $ trillion by 20271. Yet cross-border payments are typically, though I want to stress not always, slower, more costly, less transparent, and harder to access than domestic payments. And this impacts not just big wholesale players but consumer and remittance payments too. There are instances of payments taking up to 10 days2 and costing more than 10%3 of the payment value, and all too often with timing and cost unknown upfront. The G20 made enhancing cross-border payments a priority in 2020 and developed a roadmapOpens in a new window for delivering improvements. Since then, organisations from around the world have come together and made significant strides to lay the foundations for enhancing cross-border payments.
The New York Fed is proud to play a role in connecting and convening leading policy influencers, stakeholders, and thinkers from across the city and around the country. Our goal in hosting events like these is to be a catalyst for collaboration and creative solutions. The panelists we'll hear from today will help us accomplish just that. They each have a deep understanding of the issues, a familiarity with the communities, and many innovative ideas to share. The topics on the agenda complement the work that many people do in this very building every day. Our outreach and community development team is actively engaged with people and leaders around the Second District through regional visits, advisory councils, and frequent events. And our researchers study economic conditions and trends in the region and make their findings widely available. This is a pivotal time for our city. We are excited to be back here, and we will continue this important work in forums similar to this one. I hope you'll partner and engage with us, because our collective efforts will make a difference. Let's take advantage of this opportunity-this New York moment- and together shape a bright future for this great city. 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

The oil importing countries in our constituency continue to face large fiscal and external imbalances and soaring public debt, although an upside surprise in remittance inflows has provided some relief. The recovery of the LICs, most already beset by fragilities, is further constrained by the lack of fiscal space, elevated debt levels, declining aid and limited access to financing. While welcoming the ongoing international efforts to assist the LICs, including through debt service relief from the IMF and the World Bank and the G20-led DSSI, we strongly believe that a broader international participation, including by private creditors, is critical given the LIC’s debt vulnerabilities and the uncertainties that threaten their medium-term economic viability. The fragile states and countries afflicted by conflict and those hosting refugees in the MENAP+ region deserve close attention and timely and commensurate response by the international community. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  The IMF’s nimble and proportional response to the crisis, including through an expansion of its toolkit and higher access limits, provided a critical lifeline for members facing large financing needs. The crisis is still evolving and there is still need for emergency support. The requests of some 40 members are still pending, including that of a major country in our constituency. In this regard, we would like to reiterate our call on the Fund to ensure that its financial support, policy advice, and capacity development are available to all members in an evenhanded manner without exception.
However, owing to the strong M3 growth in 2001, there is still a lot of liquidity in the economy. We therefore have to monitor monetary dynamics closely in the coming months. The persistence of excess liquidity in the economy could become a concern once the economic recovery in the euro area gathers pace. Turning to economic developments, the latest information has reinforced our expectation that real GDP growth in the euro area will recover in 2002 and that, later in the year, it should again be back in line with potential growth. The recovery should be supported by both domestic and external factors, in an environment in which financial conditions are favourable and where there are no major imbalances in the euro area. However, at the current juncture, some uncertainty still remains regarding the strength of the recovery. As regards price developments, there is no evidence thus far of a significant upward impact on the overall price level from the euro cash changeover. While some shorter-term effects cannot be ruled out, there is reason to believe that the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins will strengthen competition, thereby supporting the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. This notwithstanding, HICP inflation is currently somewhat higher than was expected a few months ago, owing partly to a significant rise in oil prices.

I should like to thank the members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for the very fruitful exchange of views, both in the context of my presentation of the ECB's Annual Report and on other occasions. This Committee has indeed played an important role in bringing the euro closer to the citizens of Europe. BIS Review 26/2002  3
19  For example, Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta et al (1997) and Boulila et al (2006). 20  Guiso et al (2008) and Zingales (2015). 4  information  please  see  http://www.financial-  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and protracted erosion of social capital. It puts finance on notice for losing its social licence. And, unaddressed, that jeopardises future wealth and well-being. The trust problem If this trust in finance problem is to be tackled, it needs first to be understood. Why trust is important, and what determines it, are issues that have occupied the world’s greatest minds for centuries, perhaps millennia. The philosopher Baroness O’Neill from Cambridge University often draws an important distinction between “trust” and “trustworthiness”. 21 Although this may sound subtle, it carries important implications. Seeking to maximise trust may be an unrealistic and, indeed, undesirable objective for society. In a world of risks and uncertainties, including about individuals’ trustworthiness, people need sometimes to mistrust if they are to avoid bad choices. If the principle of caveat emptor – buyer beware – is to work effectively, not just in financial services but more broadly, it requires a constructively sceptical public. Like cholesterol, there is such a thing as too much trust, as well as too little. A plausible objective of public policy, then, is not to maximise trust among consumers of financial services, but to maximise trustworthiness among its producers.

Similarly, many euro-sceptics characterize the euro as a pure “political” or geopolitical, project – clearly implying that it has no economic rationale. It will come as no surprise to you that I do not share this view. Obviously, the creation of the euro has been underpinned by a broad political vision and ambition. But there was – and still is – a strong economic rationale in solidifying economic and financial integration in Western Europe by the creation of a single currency. This economic rationale is clearly perceived by investors and market participants who have made the euro the second world currency for investing in financial assets and holding foreign exchange reserves. This being said, history has also shown that the geography of the international monetary system may undergo fast and abrupt changes. Over decades and centuries, new currencies emerge and existing ones disappear as major vehicles for international trade and investment. Geopolitical changes may trigger such evolutions. But some endogenous dynamics are also at work. Past some stages, or “tipping points”, the use of a currency may expand or shrink quickly due to network and scale effects: the more people use a currency, the more attractive it becomes. This begs the question of possible “spheres of influence” appearing in the future with significant evolutions in the respective role and weight of existing currencies. In my remarks, I will simply define such “spheres of influence” as parts of the world economic system where the use of a specific currency might dominate.
The level of the countercyclical capital buffers will be determined  6  This refers to Core Tier 1 capital in relation to risk-weighted assets. 7  FSB (2011), “Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions”, 4 November 2011. 8  See, for example, Financial Stability Report 2012:1, Sveriges Riksbank. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  by the relevant authorities on the basis of quantitative and qualitative assessments. Among other data, the quantitative assessment will take into account the so-called credit gap, which is how far credit growth deviates from an estimated trend. But this is a fairly rough measure of the degree of risk in the system, and other measures and assessments may also be fairly important. The aim of the countercyclical capital buffers is primarily to strengthen the banks and the resilience of the financial system. One effect of introducing the buffers will be to moderate the fluctuations of the credit cycle. In an upturn, substantial credit expansion will activate the buffers, which means that the banks will gradually have to hold more capital. This will restrict lending and thus reduce the risk of exaggerated credit growth and rising asset prices. In a situation in which lending is being tightened, the banks’ capital will be freed up as the buffer requirement is reduced. The banks will therefore not need to reduce their lending to the same extent, which would otherwise reinforce the downturn.

This picture is broadly mirrored when turning from returns to labour to returns to capital. In the 1950s gross profitability of the financial sector relative to capital employed was broadly in line with the rest of the economy (Chart 16). But since then, and in particular over the past decade, returns to capital have far outpaced those at an economy-wide level. Chart 17 plots UK banks’ return on equity capital (ROE) since 1920 (Alessandri and Haldane (2009)). Although conceptually a different measure of returns to capital, the broad message is the same. Trends in ROE are clearly divided into two periods. In the period up until around 1970, ROE in banking was around 7% with a low variance. In other words, returns to finance broadly mimicked those in the economy as whole, in line with the gamble payoffs in Chart 6. But the 1970s mark a regime shift, with the ROE in banking roughly trebling to over 20%, again in line with gamble payoffs. Excess returns accumulated to capital as well as labour. These returns were by no means unique to UK banks. Chart 18 plots ROEs for major internationally active banks in the US and Europe during this century. Two features are striking. First, the level of ROEs was consistently at or above 20% and on a rising trend up until the crisis. This is roughly double ROEs in the non-financial sector over the period. Second, the degree of cross-country similarity in these ROE profiles is striking. This, too, is no coincidence.
5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  The changes adopted by many central banks around the world in the late 1990s effectively narrowed their focus, reflecting the belief that price stability was the best contribution a central bank could make to macroeconomic stability, and by extension to the broader public good. Although there were tremendous innovations during this period, this reductionist vision of a central bank’s role was structurally flawed. In particular, this narrow focus failed to recognise that financial stability is as important an objective of macroeconomic policy as price stability. Central banks have a vital role in maintaining financial stability because of the deep underlying connection between it and monetary stability. Both are fundamentally about maintaining the public trust and confidence in money and the financial intermediation that is essential to oil the wheels of commerce. That trust and confidence can be undermined through a loss of certainty about the future value of money, a loss of confidence in financial intermediaries, or ultimately a loss of faith in the financial system. The financial crisis was a powerful reminder of the imperative of financial stability. After years of low and stable inflation, it became obvious that central banks had won the war only to lose the peace. The costs were enormous. The complete loss of confidence in private finance that occurred in 2008 could only be arrested by public support that totalled $ trillion in bail-outs, government guarantees of bank liabilities and special central bank liquidity schemes.

On a daily basis, moreover, the Central Bank of Malta liaises closely with the NECC, the Malta Bankers’ Association and other entities which for years now have been participating in joint technical meetings covering key operational areas, including the functioning of money and capital markets, payment systems and the gathering of statistical data. The Bank also has an internal plan, encompassing some 200 different tasks as well as time frames within which they need to be completed, for an orderly transition to the euro. This plan was drawn up using a bottom-up approach, with each department developing its own programme for adapting structures and procedures to the policy and operational requirements of EMU. Plan implementation is on track. Steps have already been taken to align the monetary operations, accounting and financial reporting frameworks with those of the Eurosystem. The Bank has also completed most of the necessary upgrades to its IT hardware and operating systems to ensure that it can exchange information and settle transactions with the Eurosystem in a seamless fashion. As far as the Cash Changeover Plan is concerned, this too is on schedule. The physical facilities for the storage and distribution of cash have been completed, the test run for the minting of Malta’s euro coins has commenced and arrangements for the procurement of euro notes are about to be finalised.
Hence the spectacular failure of models during the crisis: most, if not all, were constructed on the assumption that stable and predictable (usually normal) distribution probabilities could be used to describe the different states of the financial system and the economy. They collapsed when extreme events occurred with a frequency that no one ever thought would be possible. -  Uncertainty itself has huge consequences. As shown by Caballero and Krishnamurthy episodes of flight to quality and liquidity hoarding can be best explained by a regime shift, from an environment where risk can be measured and probabilities attached to different states of nature to a world of total uncertainty. Such regime changes are "tipping points" for the system as a whole, whose behavior is suddenly transformed. When they occur, agents respond by making decisions using “worst-case” scenarios and covering themselves against the possibility of their own demise. Doing so, they faced and created a collective action problem since the general rush for protection only aggravates the stress . This is the best way to rationalize and understand the liquidity and market freezes which occurred in August 2007 and, again, in September 2008. Facing such unprecedented reactions, policy makers may have wondered, "does the market know something that we don't". Actually, markets participants knew that they could not know. Because they were directly involved, they were aware it was impossible for them to fully master the complexity they had themselves created. And they acted accordingly.

Fritz Zurbrügg: Swiss banks from a financial stability perspective Introductory remarks by Mr Fritz Zurbrügg, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 10 December 2015. *  *  *  In my remarks, I will start with an analysis of the situation at the Swiss banks from a financial stability perspective, looking at both the big banks and the domestically focused banks. I will then finish with some information on the new banknote series. Big banks Since the publication of our Financial Stability Report in June, the two Swiss big banks have improved their capital situation further. The improvement was especially pronounced at Credit Suisse, following a capital increase. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) acknowledges the progress made by both big banks in this area. However, a further strengthening of the leverage ratio in particular is necessary. Strengthening the leverage ratio – and hence resilience – will be achieved by means of the measures recently decided upon by the Federal Council as part of the revised ‘too big to fail’ regulations. The substantially increased leverage ratio requirements will put Switzerland back among the international leaders in this regard. Given that the ‘too big to fail’ issue is particularly pronounced in Switzerland compared to other countries, these measures are, in our view, essential.