samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If the Governing Council judges that the “coronavirus crisis phase is over”, then net purchases under PEPP will end by March 2022. As things stand today, this is likely to happen. It is important, therefore, to stress that exiting from PEPP would not signal the end of our very accommodative monetary policy. Monetary policy will continue to provide accommodation through our quartet of tools, namely asset purchases and stocks, long-term liquidity provision, negative interest rates, and forward guidance. These tools have been durably established by the new strategyiii and we should probably start calling them the “new conventional” instruments rather than “non conventional” ones. Let me now share some more specific thoughts on the successes of our two crisis instruments, PEPP and TLTROs, and how these lessons might influence our future reflections on our quartet. 2. The lessons from the PEPP The PEPP has been instrumental in the euro area since the start of the Covid crisis, thanks to its dual role regarding stance and transmission. It put an end to the turmoil in the financial markets during spring last year, and since then has ensured favourable financing conditions for both public and private borrowers. We can draw two main lessons from the PEPP’s achievements: with respect to asset purchases, stock matters, and flexibility matters. First, the financial literature suggests that it is changes in the anticipated stock of assets that exert a downward pressure on longterm interest rates through a decrease in term premia.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Monetary strategy and inflation in Europe - what’s new? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the SUERF Conference, New York City, 12 October 2021. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to join you today for this discussion on "EU and US Perspectives". Exactly one year after my previous intervention in this Forum, I definitely see a change for the better in the economic climate in Europe. Europe is now the most vaccinated continent in the world. Economic growth in the euro area has so far been stronger than expected and according to our latest forecasts, real GDP is expected to exceed its pre-Covid level by the end of this year. If anything, we can perhaps say that uncertainty has shifted a little bit from the growth outlook to the inflation outlook, but I will come back to this point later. My speech today will address three interconnected issues: I. What are the key changes following the ECB strategy review? II. Where do we stand on inflation? III. Perspectives on the ECB's monetary policy up to and after the end of the Covid crisis. I. The ECB’s monetary policy framework The unanimous adoption in July of the new monetary policy strategy was an important achievement for the Eurosystem. Let me pay tribute to Christine Lagarde, and sum up our review in three key messages: 1.
Moreover, capitalizing on their extensive network of over 3,000 branches, banks have widened the arrays of services to include distribution of corporate bonds or debentures, unit trusts, IPO shares and other debt instruments. Such efforts pay off with tangible result. Within four years, banks’ ratio of net interest- and non-interest income to average number of employees rose from 0.8 to 2.6 million baht per person per year in 2003. We also witness improvement in the area of customer access. Crowded customers at micro-branches speak volumes for the success of banks’ strategy to approach customers outside their office hours. In response to more sophisticated demand, banks introduced new channels of services such as internet banking and tele-banking to satisfy the technology savvy demands of emerging new generation of customers. These efficiency gains have been achieved without forsaking comprehensive risk management. On the contrary, banks have begun to move away from collateral-based lending to risk-based approach. At the same time, financial literate Board of Directors has bolstered its oversight function to ensure that banks are managed in a sound manner. In the area of credit risk management, credit scoring has been widely applied in the retail loan originating process, whereas internal credit rating models have been used for significant corporate loan portfolios. Moreover, banks also have in place security measures, contingency plans and auditing standards within their system of internal control to monitor reputational risk, strategic risk and other risks.

The logical question to ask here is how do we ensure that these positive developments will maintain their momentum and that the banking sector will remain strong and sound amidst a more liberalized environment, fierce domestic and external competition, and the advent of more advanced technology and financial innovation? We can wait passively for external forces to inflict changes on us, or we can chart our own path of development in anticipation of any change. The Asian crisis brought it to the fore that complacency when met with abrupt and radical reforms as a result of external forces could entail enormous output loss and social cost. Thus, we must do what we can to ensure that the banking system is up to meeting any challenge. This brings us to the second point I want to make - what the authorities intend to do to enhance the financial system’s competitiveness and its capability to withstand forces of change in this age of globalization. The authorities are quick to grasp the opportunity of healthy economic and banking conditions conducive to embarking on a structural reform, with the announcement of the Financial Sector Master Plan. Thorough discussion on the Master Plan will require a separate session of its own. So, let me just pick some of its key features that will have the most significant impacts on the structure and efficiency of the banking industry.
Inflation, on the other hand, continues its downtrend in May, and although we see inflation numbers turning negative, the current uptick in commodities and asset prices, together with signs of greater stabilization in the real sector, help lessen the concern regarding deflation risk. Against this background, the Monetary Policy Committee in its meeting on May 20th held the view that monetary policy has been substantially eased and the current policy rate at 1.25 percent remains supportive of the economy. Two implications must be drawn from this decision. First, given the low policy rate and the ample availability of liquidity, more gains could be made by ensuring that, at the current policy rate, the benefits of past rate reductions are passed on more fully to consumers and the private sector through corresponding adjustments in the banking system’s interest rates. The second implication is that, while the  BIS Review 76/2009  1  emerging signs of stabilization are positive and are consistent with the developments on a worldwide basis, they must be treated with caution given that the current state of the global economy and financial markets are still far from normal. Hence, the MPC will continue to monitor closely the uncertainty surrounding both domestic and external economic conditions, and stand ready to implement appropriate monetary policy to support economic recovery in the period ahead. Turning now to the banking sector. The Thai banking sector was able to weather the impact of the global financial crisis with a relatively strong initial position.

Opening remarks at OeNB monetary policy panel by Andrew Bailey Given at Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Annual Economic Conference, Vienna  Published on 23 May 2022  Remarks This is a time of very large economic shocks, and particularly very large external shocks, most recently from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I say that as someone who wholeheartedly supports the cause of Ukraine and the assistance we must give. We are in a period of rapidly rising energy, goods and some food prices. These are the most visible prices too. This is by far the main cause of high inflation, and is painful, particularly for those less well off. What can and should monetary policy do? There is a very important distinction between: whether monetary policy can anticipate and stop the effects on inflation of shocks; and, if not, whether it should respond when they happen? With shocks such as pandemics and wars, the answer to the first question is more likely to be “no”. But the answer to the second is very much “yes, monetary policymakers can and must take the actions needed to return inflation to target over a period that avoids unnecessary volatility in the economy”. It is domestic actions that have to get us back to price stability. For monetary policy, the choice of policy actions is influenced by the nature of the shock we are facing. In the UK we are facing a very big negative impact on real incomes caused by the rise in prices of things we import, notably energy.
However, for those banks with large client clearing volumes, disallowing client initial margins to compensate for potential future exposure may inevitably create constraints on their leverage ratios. This can dis-incentivise the provision of such client clearing services. This may have created an unintended impact on the market’s incentives and overall ability to centrally clear, which will be inconsistent with the objectives of the central clearing. Therefore, in the next phase of our work on the reforms, sector regulators will have to work closely towards greater consistency and coherence with the inputs of all market participants. Balancing between domestic market concerns and international market access 13. As each jurisdiction embarks and complete rebuilding its part of the global house, it is also important to consider how domestic rules would operate and interact across borders and against the global standards. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  14. The recent comparability determination between the CFTC and the European Commission on platform trading and margins for un-cleared derivatives serves as an excellent example of how authorities have worked together to reach a common agreement and approach, bridging the requirements of two major regulatory regimes. Asia-Pacific authorities are working closely with one another as well, and also with the CFTC and EC, to address cross-border issues. Japan’s FSA (Financial Services Agency) and Australia’s APRA (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority) had also announced their recognition of various jurisdictions’ margin requirements for un-cleared derivatives, including Singapore and Hong Kong. 15.

Ong Chong Tee: Review of post-crisis regulatory reforms and initiatives Opening address by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the ISDA Regulators and Industry Forum, Singapore, 13 November 2017. * * * Mr Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman CFTC, Mr Scott O’Malia, CEO ISDA, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen 1. Allow me to first thank ISDA for inviting my colleagues and I to join you today in this Regulators and Industry Forum, and for me to deliver the opening remarks. LOOKING BACK 2. Let me start with an analogy from the popular children story of The Three Little Pigs and the Big Bad Wolf. I am sure you are all familiar with that – how the Big Bad Wolf ‘huffed and puffed’ and blew down the houses of straw and sticks; except for the one made of bricks. 3. Almost a decade ago, we had a Big Bad Wolf that blew down the house of global finance, triggering the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In the post-crisis commentaries and debates that followed, a lot of attention had focused on who was the Big Bad Wolf at that time – was it Lehman together with other investment banks, insurance companies and hedge funds, or was it this product called subprime mortgages? But the more important lesson was that the global financial system was not as robust nor sturdy as previously thought.
Mr Sonakul covers a number of aspects, including good governance, transparency, public policy in the private sector and the financial system in Thailand  Speech by Mr M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Credit Suisse First Boston Asian Investor Conference 2000, held in Hong Kong, on 22 March 2000. *  *  *  This is the first major Investment Conference I have attended in the new millennium - so life goes on - although public speaking is a major part of the life of a central bank governor, it is not the only part and we actually have to study theories and concepts, and execute and implement so let me speak on what we have done during the last two years of the last millennium when I took on this job. I will not address extensively macroeconomic issues. You probably know nearly as much as we do. Our website alone gives a lot of information and macroeconomic data and analysis are easy to come by. In any case, macroeconomic wise, our economy is in a reasonable shape. Growth has been significantly and continuously positive for the last four quarters and we expect the trend to go on. Exchange rates are stable and interest rates are at an all time low, whilst capacity utilisation, at the best for a long time, is still only at 63%, belaying any fear of significant inflation in the near future.

So we hired outside webpage experts to upgrade it, who have been working for the last year, and will be ready to go forward with our easy-to-read, easy-to-use, user-friendly format in the next couple of months. The information available on our webpage, whilst extensive does not go back very far in history, and to do real economic analysis, you may have to contact with the team responsible for these issues. Though this is easily done automatically by just clicking into the information item, it is still much better to have the information readily available on the internet rather than having to contact people. In the more major task of restructuring the organisation, the work system and the vision of the Bank of Thailand which we have been doing in the past two years, we have established a new department called the Data Warehouse Department. This department will store all the information of the Bank, sourcing the raw information totally by EDI, thereby dispensing with the more than 900 paper reports that the financial institutions are having to fill every month and make the information available to  1  BIS Review 29/2000  every user inside the Bank of Thailand and outside the Bank according as to their needs and access clearance. Upon completion of the data warehouse, we have a plan to make economic information available on our webpage over a 20-year historical time-span, and this will be done in the next two years.
7  A breakdo wn o f co re inflatio n by destination of expenditure sho ws that the co mpo nents related to transpo rt reco rded annual price increases abo ve 7% in December, prices in the ho using equipment and maintenance sub-index increased abo ve 9% and inflatio n in the recreatio n, ho spitality and to urism sub-index reco rded gro wth o f nearly 7%. Fo r more details o n these sub-indices, see Pacce, M., A. del Río and I. Sánchez-García (2022), “The recent perfo rmance of underlying inflatio n in the euro area and in Spain”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin 3/2022, Banco de España. 8  This sub-index includes “Clo thing and fo otwear”, “Ho using” excluding energy and ho me maintenance expenditure, “Health”, “Co mmunications”, “Educatio n” and “Miscellaneo us go ods and services”. It includes rental o f ho useho lds’ main residence. 4  above all, of the interest rate differential (hence the different monetary policy response), the increase in global risk aversion and the fact that the energy shock entailed a deterioration in the terms of trade in the euro area (not in the United States). The pass-through of this depreciation may have been faster than in the past taking into account possible non-linear effects 9, since there is evidence that the pass-through is stronger when the exchange rate fluctuations are relatively large, limiting importers’ capacity to absorb foreign exchange rate shocks.

Compared with those published in September, the December staff projections contained an appreciable upward revision in the average inflation rates for 2023 and 2024 to 6.3% and 3.4%, respectively, and also envisaged inflation averaging 2.3% in 2025 (the last year of our projection horizon), above our 2% medium-term target. Importantly, the ECB/Eurosystem staff projections incorporate a number of financial indicators that reflect market expectations of our future monetary policy. A key indicator here is the risk-free yield curve, which is strongly influenced by investors’ views o n the future path of our key interest rates. The risk-free yield curve also plays a central role in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy, because the financing conditions of economic agents (households, firms, governments) are often linked to medium and longterm risk-free interest rates. This is why the staff projections use as an input the path of both short and long-term interest rates implied by the curve. It is also why the ECB, like many other central banks, typically accompanies its decisions on (short-term) interest rates with communication on how it intends, or expects, to set the latter – and other policy instruments – in the future, as this improves its ability to steer the yield curve and thus attain the desired overall monetary policy stance. Therefore, the inflation path in the December staff projections was a clear indication that the financial conditions prevailing before that meeting were inconsistent with a timely return of inflation to our 2% target.
Among the emerging market countries, those in Asia in particular have long been considered engines of vitality and technological adaptation in the world economy, and this recognition had been reflected in very high rates of GDP growth until the financial crises of 1997 and 1998. One problem those crises revealed is that in many countries, economic resources, notably capital inflows, had been misallocated. In the Asian countries, financial market and corporate sector reforms are widely viewed as necessary. It is encouraging to see that some progress has been made on financial restructuring, although the extent to which markets - as opposed to governments - have been the main shaper of change differs across countries. Other reforms appear to be less far along, and the greatest risk is that the sharp recovery so many of these countries have enjoyed will reduce the impetus to undertake and follow through on needed reforms. When we turn to Latin America, we observe an example of how important internal labor market and corporate sector reforms are. In the 1980s and early 1990s, many countries in this region made enormous strides in achieving sounder fiscal and monetary policies, especially in bringing down inflation and strengthening reliance on market mechanisms. However, in several countries, internal reforms were incomplete, with banking systems left in need of further strengthening, labor markets still remaining too rigid, and fiscal policies requiring more attention, starting with the need to ensure that all public sector spending be brought under control.

cnb.cz/cs/verejnost/servis-pro-media/autorske-clanky-rozhovory-s-predstaviteli-cnb /Klausova-draha-permanentka/ 3 https://www.cnb.cz/cs/o_cnb/cnblog/Inflace-v-CR-cyklicky-ci-acyklicky-pribeh/ 4 https://www.cnb.cz/cs/verejnost/servis-pro-media/autorske-clanky-rozhovory-s-  predstaviteli-cnb/Krotitele-nakladove-inflace/ 5 For details, see https://www.cnb.cz/cs/o_cnb/cnblog/Jak-dlouhy-je-spravny-horizont-  menove-politiky/. 3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  6 https://www.cnb.cz/cs/verejnost/servis-pro-media/autorske-clanky-rozhovory-s-  predstaviteli-cnb/Zapisky-z-Jackson-Hole-1-00001.-dil/ 7 https://www.cnb.cz/cs/verejnost/servis-pro-media/autorske-clanky-rozhovory-s-  predstaviteli-cnb/Jdeme-prikladem-brzdime-platy-v-CNB/  4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
They show that home equity withdrawal was driven primarily by households with low credit scores and high credit card utilisation rates, who are most likely to have been credit-constrained in the past (Mian and Sufi (2009)). As these constraints loosened, spending rose and saving fell. Liberalisation fed impatience. These patterns are also consistent with an inequality-based explanation for lower saving (Rajan (2010)). Rising inequality may generate an increased desire to “keep up with the Jones’s”. That, in turn, may have led to higher borrowing, and lower net saving, by the poor. And what applies within countries appears also to apply across them. Among advanced countries, there is a significant negative relationship between within-country measures of inequality and the current account position (Chart 15). Rising inequality, by lowering savings rates among the poor, appears to be deficit-inducing. Rising imbalances may have important social, as well as economic, roots. 6  BIS Review 174/2010  BIS Review 174/2010  7  8  BIS Review 174/2010  Global imbalances – future So what will be the key forces driving global imbalances in the period ahead? Judging from the recent past, two factors have been important:   Global financial integration;    Differential savings behaviour. Consider in turn their likely evolution. Global financial integration. In the period ahead, this will be shaped by a number of mediumterm structural factors. One key such factor is cross-country GDP convergence.

Mian, A and A Sufi (2010), “House Prices, Home-equity Based Borrowing, and the US Household Leverage Crisis” American Economic Review, forthcoming. Obstfeld, M (2010), “Expanding Gross Asset Positions and the International Monetary System” Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City symposium on “Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead”, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Obstfeld, M and K Rogoff (2000), “The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?”, NBER Working Paper 777. Obstfeld, M and A Taylor (2004), Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth, Cambridge University Press. 14  BIS Review 174/2010  Qiao, H and Y Song (2009), “China’s Savings Rate and Its Long-term Outlook” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, No. 191. Rajan, R (2010), Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Princeton University Press. Reinhart, C M and K Rogoff (2009), This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press. Solow, R M (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), pp 65–94. Taylor, A M (2002), “A Century of Current Account Dynamics” Journal of International Money and Finance, 21(6) pp 725–748. Taylor, J (2007), “Housing and Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper, No. 13682. Wang, M, Rieger M O and T Hens (2010), “How Time Preferences Differ: Evidence from 45 Countries”, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper, No. 09–47. Wilson, D and S Ahmed (2010), “Current Accounts and Demographics: The Road Ahead”, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, No. 202. BIS Review 174/2010  15