samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I am pleased to observe that some countries in the euro area have already realised that the only solution to addressing the current economic slowdown lies in structural reforms to strengthen the functioning of the economy. I warmly welcome the efforts of the governments of these countries and sincerely hope that others will follow their example. Second, as I have sketched out in my remarks to you today, while the need for structural reforms is pressing in the euro area, in all other regions of the world - albeit to different extents and to address somewhat different problems - there are benefits of structural reform to be won. Thank you very much for your attention. 4  BIS Review 39/2003

However, I do not see this as a matter of balancing – expansion can only take place while maintaining stability. The Maastricht criteria will not change and this is in the interest of both the euro area as a whole and the individual candidate countries. Let me only add that 2009 January did not only see the 10th anniversary of the euro, but also the joining of the 16th member state, namely Slovakia, to the euro zone. If you consider that we started with 11 countries in 1999, this certainly demonstrates that the euro area is open to newcomers. BIS Review 18/2009  1  China Finance: How effective is monetary easing measures by the ECB in mitigating the economic recession in Europe? Do you see more room to maneuver in case the economic prospects continue to get worse? Trichet: First, let me remind you that we have, in all circumstances, to deliver price stability in line with our definition “less than, but close to, 2%”. Secondly, the present unlimited provision of liquidity at a fixed rate and with a one-week, one-month, three-month and sixmonth duration can certainly be described as a non standard measure. The extension of eligibility in our collateral framework is also another non standard measure, particularly as it was already very broad and flexible. In particular, as a result of these decisions we have also expanded our balance sheet on a scale that would have been unthinkable before the crisis: around 55% in the last 12 months.
Speech  Embargo 8 October 2020, 11.30 am  What constitutes sound money? Economic Conference, Progress Foundation  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board ∗ Swiss National Bank Zurich, 8 October 2020 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2020 (speech given in German)  ∗  The speaker would like to thank Romain Baeriswyl and Peter Kuster for their support in preparing this text. He also thanks Simone Auer, Petra Gerlach, Carlos Lenz, Alexander Perruchoud and the SNB Language Services. Page 1/8  Ladies and gentlemen As the title of today’s event clearly states: supplying the economy with sound money is a constant challenge. I am therefore particularly pleased to have the opportunity to examine the issue of ‘What constitutes sound money?’ with you in more detail here. After all, as Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, I represent an institution that is responsible for providing our country with sound money, a task we have performed since our foundation 113 years ago. Sound money is crucial in a society that is shaped by the division of labour and the exchange of goods and services – as has been demonstrated not least by the experience gained with a wide range of monetary orders over many centuries. Today, money is used in virtually all economic transactions. A sound monetary system is an essential prerequisite for a modern economy, for efficient trade and for social stability.

Without claiming to be exhaustive on such an ambitious subject, particularly in front of an audience of  1  Source: La finance islamique : une solution à la crise ? (2009), E. Jouini and O. Pastré, Economica. 2  Monitor Group and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (August 2009), Analysis of Sovereign Wealth Fund Transactions During Q1 2009. 3  Monitor Group and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (August 2009). 4  An IFOP survey, disclosed at the end of 2008, on the basis of interviews with 530 people of Muslim origin from various backgrounds, considered a representative sample of the French Muslim community. 2  BIS Review 118/2009  distinguished Islamic finance specialists, it seems to me nevertheless useful to briefly recall the following points: •  The fundamental principles of Islamic finance can be seen in different ways as far as financial stability is concerned. As you well know, Islamic finance prohibits the payment and receipt of interest at a fixed or predetermined rate. Instead, profit-and-loss sharing arrangements, purchase and resale of goods and services, and the provision of services for fees are the basis of Islamic finance contracts. Islamic finance is therefore systematically backed by real assets. Moreover, it prohibits speculation and the financing of production or trade in specific sectors. On the one hand, these principles can be considered to provide stability for the financial system. Indeed, in Islamic finance, unbacked expansion of credit is precluded, and banks cannot initiate or accentuate a speculative process.
Christian Noyer: The euro in 2000 - principal features of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy  Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the Recoletos Forum, held in Madrid, on 29 June 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to speak to you here at the Recoletos Forum in Madrid. In order to provide you with the perspective of the European Central Bank (ECB) on the performance of the euro as the single currency of the euro area, it will be helpful if I begin with a review of the objective of the single monetary policy and its underlying strategy, as well as the operational framework of the Eurosystem (ie the ECB and the 11 national central banks of the countries which have introduced the euro). After I have made some comments both on monetary and economic developments which have taken place in the euro area and on the risks to price stability as they have appeared in the first months of 2000, I shall outline the responsibilities of the individual policy areas in achieving and sustaining high growth in an environment of price stability. I shall then discuss the euro’s role in the financial markets. Finally, I shall conclude with a view on the general prospects for the euro area and its single currency. The monetary policy objective, strategy and operational framework As is well known, the main objective of the Eurosystem is the maintenance of price stability.

In this regard, the risks to price stability remained persistently, up until our recent decision on interest rates, on the upside. According to the forecasts currently available, consumer price inflation in 2000 and 2001 is generally projected to be slightly below 2%. This is clearly higher than was expected in the respective forecasts at the end of last year and early this year. We should, of course, bear in mind that these forecasts are snapshots of economic prospects as they appear at a particular point in time. They are typically surrounded by a fair degree of uncertainty and they are highly conditional on a number of specific assumptions. Oil prices and exchange rates are prominent examples of such forecast assumptions. The movements in these variables in the past few months show how quickly such assumptions can move out of line with actual developments. Moreover, in the case of the forecasts currently available, some of these explicitly assume that short-term interest rates will rise over the forecast period. I think that it is fair to say that without this assumption projected inflation would most likely have been higher in the forecasts concerned. Thus, the inflation outlook for the euro area gave a very clear signal to monetary policy: namely that there was no reason for complacency and that monetary policy had to react. The developments in oil prices and the exchange rate have led to a strong rise in import prices.
The recent crisis clearly demonstrated a number of vulnerabilities both in the liquidity risk management in individual banks, and on a systemic basis. Uncertainty and the lack of transparency over the holdings of toxic assets led to general reluctance to provide funding to each other, resulting in the freezing of the wholesale money market in several developed economies. This resulted in short term liquidity to evaporate affecting participants that were too dependent on the market for funding. This largely stemmed from poor liquidity risk management practices, and has now prompted the Basel Committee to develop new proposals for global liquidity management standards. In the context of Islamic finance, the impact of the proposed Basel requirement to maintain sufficient cushion of high quality liquid assets needs to be carefully  BIS Review 64/2010  5  considered, as the infrastructure and tools for liquidity risk management by Islamic banks is still in its infancy in many jurisdictions. A very narrow definition of liquid assets that is currently proposed may exacerbate liquidity risks in many Islamic financial markets in which Islamic banks compete with conventional counterparts for the limited stock of shariahcompliant government securities. This will certainly increase compliance cost and render the market illiquid when the demand exceeds supply, placing Islamic financial institutions at a disadvantage. The importance of a robust liquidity management infrastructure for Islamic financial institutions is well-recognised.

Ladies and gentlemen, A sustained process of excessive financial deregulation and over reliance on market discipline particularly in advanced economies which led to a prolonged cycle of optimism and  BIS Review 64/2010  3  risk taking has been widely cited as part of the root cause of the recent global financial crisis. Indeed, the pre-crisis era was a period of exuberance in financial innovation and rapid development in the conventional financial landscape. Although it was argued that financial deregulation encourages innovation which in turn result in the more efficient allocation of resources, the recent crisis has shown that there is a need to balance between market discipline and regulatory oversight. Whilst there is general support for the reform measures, there is also concern on the dangers of over-reaction by policymakers that could undermine the role of financial intermediation, and adversely affect the ultimate objective of economic growth and development. The concern is specifically on the unintended consequences of the regulatory reform. Financial stability is not an end in itself; it is a means towards achieving the ultimate goal of sustainable growth and shared prosperity. This presents the challenge for policymakers in finding the appropriate balance between preserving the resilience of the financial system versus maintaining the ability of the system to perform their intended function of delivering effective, efficient and innovative financing solutions to customers in the wider economy. Hence, the concern is that that the regulatory reforms would increase the cost of financial intermediation.
In a number of ways I feel that the world’s foreign exchange and money markets may have reached something of a watershed in the past year or so. We have witnessed a reduction in the number of significant world currencies as a result of the arrival of the euro. We have also seen accelerating consolidation among the ranks of major players. These two factors have tended to reduce the volume of interbank business. Meanwhile the traditional market infrastructure is being supplemented and challenged by the emergence of new electronic trading platforms. And, while there has already been for many years a strong momentum for product innovation, the pressure to sustain profits may most recently have intensified that search. At the same time the regulators are as anxious as ever to ensure that risks are properly understood (both by themselves and by the bankers) and appropriately managed. I am sure that the MPC will play a useful role in helping the industry meet this challenge, by providing training for new practitioners and continuing its work on product development. The recent study on the feasibility and desirability of introducing overnight index swaps in Hong Kong is one good example of this work. 7. I should perhaps stop here to avoid encroaching further on the valuable time set aside for our guest speaker today. Donald Mathieson of the IMF is no stranger to Hong Kong. Many of you will be familiar with the authoritative reports and analysis of financial markets that he and his colleagues produce.

2/9  In Europe, the European Commission has set the target of having a “climate-neutral” economy by the year 2050. In short, the aim would be to bring about the decarbonisation of the economy, as our Forum here today is called. According to Eurostat data, Spain emitted 285 million tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere in 2017. That is 7.5% of total European Union emissions, placing Spain sixth among EU members. Logically, in step with their economic and demographic weight, the country with most emissions was Germany (858 million tonnes; 22.8%), while Malta emitted the least (3 tonnes; 0.1%). Since 2012, emissions per unit of value added have fallen by 14% in Spain, practically the same as in the European Union as a whole. However, emissions should also be analysed in relation to the size of the economy and to population. Spain emitted 0.25 kg of CO2 for each euro of (2010) GDP produced, slightly less than the 0.26 kg average. In terms of population, in 2017 our emissions totalled 6.1 tonnes per capita, clearly below the European Union average of 7.3 tonnes per person. A fair transition Despite enjoying this slight initial advantage, the challenge of achieving a decarbonised country is a major one. On paper, I believe nobody is against achieving this objective. However, we should be mindful that moving to a decarbonised economy entails a change in our production model. Practically by definition, such a change has systemic implications, particularly affecting specific economic sectors.
Under these circumstances, the traditional pro-cyclicality of credit emerged once again, fuelling asset price inflation (particularly real estate prices in certain regions of the US and Europe) rather than consumer price inflation. In the past twelve months the scenario changed radically: a severe financial crisis, stemming from the US real estate sector, hit mature economies in general, whereas demand pressures over the availability of limited production factors led to mounting inflation in a global scale. Thus, central banks currently face a much more complex and challenging environment than during the years of the great moderation. Monetary responses have been initially diverse due to the nature of the problems that surfaced, but the priority on the need to preserve price stability prevails. Due to both increases in raw material prices and demand pressures, inflation accelerated sharply around the globe. In mature economies in general, marked by broader levels of idle capacity, higher commodity prices probably explain the bulk of the inflation upsurge. In emerging countries, including Brazil, domestic demand pressures have had a relatively more important role in stoking mounting inflation pressures. As a matter of fact, strong domestic demand in these economies created conditions that enabled initially isolated price pressures to become more widespread. Not surprisingly, monetary policy is currently more and more focused in moderating the pace of demand expansion and containing inflation pressures in the majority of the emerging world.

I am confident that these improved fundamentals will help lessen the impact of the global slowdown on the economy, enhance the ability of the private sector to manage and deal with economic volatility, and provide the economy with a strong foundation to continue with stronger growth and stability in the years ahead. This is all I want to say this evening. I hope it has been useful. And I want to end by wishing the year of the Rat to be a year of plenty, bringing opportunities and good prospects to all of you at the FCCT. Thank you. BIS Review 29/2008  3
A CBDC would need to protect against cyber and operational risks, safeguard the privacy of sensitive data, and minimize risks of illicit financial transactions. Additionally, one of the most important aspects in our deliberations is that any form of a CBDC in the future would need to be intermediated. This means that the private sector would need to act as intermediaries in that system, and a direct account approach would not be contemplated. While the Federal Reserve has made no decision on whether or how to issue a CBDC, we are actively conducting technical investigations into both retail and wholesale CBDC design. Project Hamilton, which is a partnership between the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and MIT, has experimented with potential approaches to a digital dollar, with work focused on retail uses and payment channels. In the use case they explored, the Hamilton team was able to demonstrate the potential for usage at scale, which would be a key design element of a retail CBDC. 6 As a complement, and in line with the New York Fed's unique role in the Federal Reserve System with wholesale payments in both domestic payments and foreign exchange, the New York Innovation Center is researching technical aspects related to wholesale CBDCs. In addition to CBDC, the broader digital assets landscape, which includes stablecoins – cryptoassets that are backed by assets such as U.S. Treasury securities to stabilize their value – and unbacked cryptoassets, has grown significantly in recent years, and continues to evolve quickly.

It is held by depository institutions as bank reserves or by individuals in the form of paper currency. Demand for central bank money is driven by many fundamental factors, including the settlement  1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  of both retail and wholesale transactions and its role as a store of value. In addition to these factors, which are likely familiar to any of you who have studied monetary economics, demand for the U.S. dollar is also driven by international factors owing to the role of the dollar in the global economy. In fact, while precise estimates are challenging to come by, available data suggests that more than half of all dollars in circulation may be held outside the United States. 5 As a result, innovation related to money provided by the Federal Reserve will have impacts that extend far beyond U.S. borders. A U.S. CBDC – a digital form of the U.S. dollar that is a direct liability of the Federal Reserve– has the potential to offer significant benefits. It could enable a payment system that is more efficient, provide a foundation for further technological innovation, and facilitate faster cross-border transactions. It could promote financial inclusion and equity by enabling access for a broad set of consumers and foster economic growth and stability. In order to fully realize benefits such as these, a digital dollar would need to be thoughtfully designed and implemented.
Hence, to estimate the direct cost to the taxpayer of the aid provided to banks, we should first consider the amounts paid out by the FROB to these banks, add this to the expected cost of the APSs extended by the FROB (at Banco de Valencia and Caja Sur) and of other guarantees and coverage offered by it in connection with resolution processes, and subtract the amounts recouped or expected to be recouped. That is to say, we should firstly calculate the funds paid out by the FROB to purchase shares or contingently convertible bonds, which amount to € million, adding these to the estimated cost of the APSs and other guarantees granted in resolution processes which, on the latest valuations available, account for € million. From this amount it would be necessary to subtract the recovery of the amounts disbursed through the redemption of convertible bonds subscribed by the FROB or the disposal of the FROB’s shareholdings in the banks receiving aid. Here, the € million from the sale of  2  As at 30 April 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  NCG and the return of the aid granted to Banca Cívica by Caixabank3 should be recorded. Further, the convertible bonds subscribed by the FROB in Caja3 (absorbed by Ibercaja), CEISS (absorbed by Unicaja) and Liberbank, are highly likely to be redeemed before 2017, entailing the return of € million.

It results from standard economic analysis that fast growing economies require a higher level of real interest rates to remain on a sustainable path. Monetary policy in the Euro area is designed for advanced economies and would be inappropriate for less developed economies. Indeed, a premature entry would imply a downward shock on interest rates and other policy parameters such as reserve ratios. This would generate supply/demand imbalances, credit booms and asset or consumer prices inflation resulting in financial vulnerabilities and deteriorating competitiveness. It should come as no surprise that the third element relates again to the advancement in structural reforms: these are preconditions for ensuring viable economic development inside a monetary union. Such reforms are necessary in order to enhance flexibility, thus giving the economy the necessary adjustment capacity required in a monetary union. The key role of structural policies naturally includes the conduct of fiscal policy reforms (tax, pensions, and social security) and investments in public goods (infrastructure, education, healthcare, etc.) that have to be completed before entry in order to provide enough leeway for fiscal policy to serve as a stabilisation instrument inside the monetary union. The New Member States that have joined the EU since 2004 have made considerable progress in nominal and real convergence. Recovering from historic episodes of economic contraction, hyperinflation and exchange rate depreciation, these economies have recorded gradual macroeconomic stabilisation characterised by disinflation, high rates of GDP growth and real exchange rate appreciation.