samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I’ve already suggested, current U.S. law does not have direct answers to these questions. Digital currencies can fall into a variety of categories: commodities or securities or other instruments. How a digital currency is classified will depend partly on the functional use of the digital currency and partly on the priorities of various lawmakers and regulatory agencies that have the authority to regulate it. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the primary U.S. authority responsible for implementing U.S. anti-money laundering laws, was one of first authorities to issue guidance in the United States on digital currencies. FinCEN clarified in 2013 that transmitters and exchangers of digital currency are money service businesses under FinCEN regulations, if the digital currency acts as a substitute for real currency or has an equivalent value in real currency.20 Accordingly, any person that engages in the business of transferring or exchanging digital currency is subject to FinCEN requirements to establish an anti-money laundering program, which includes recordkeeping, reporting, and customer identification and verification requirements.21 FinCEN’s early entrance into the field sought to address the fact that digital currencies, like other forms of payment, may be used for nefarious purposes. Fast forward to 2017. Jay Clayton, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the federal agency that regulates securities, released a statement on digital currencies and initial coin offerings (ICOs).

We should stress here that, of the larger euro area countries, France has the highest proportion of market-based financing, at 40%. Non-bank financing in France totals EUR 1.748 trillion, and the leading asset manager in Europe is a French firm, Amundi. France also has an internationally recognised regulator, in the form of the AMF, while Paris is home to the European Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA. After Brexit, I also have every reason to believe that a significant share of the market activities of the largest global banks will be based in Paris. First of all, I want to put an end to the non-debate over whether market-based financeis better than bank-based finance and vice versa, and the misconception that the US system should be 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  replicated in Europe: working towards a balanced development of non-bank finance simply means giving companies the option of diversifying their debt financing. Fun damentally, the real debate lies elsewhere: it is about switching from debt to equity.This is crucial in advanced economies, where growth is dependent on innovation. Equity financing is better suited to the uncertainty and often long-term returns associated with innovative projects. The euro area is seriously lagging behind in this respect: equity only accounts for 74% of GDP, compared with 125% in the United States. Moreover, it only makes up half of the total external financing of euro area corporations (equity + debt), compared with three quarters in the United States.
It was thus long believed that one could “buy” lasting lower unemployment by allowing inflation to rise. However, this relationship was empirically proved not to hold in the long run. In the 1970s, for instance, there were periods with both high unemployment and high inflation, what is known as stagflation. Instead we now base our discussions on the assumption that there is in the long run a “natural” unemployment level that depends on the functioning of the labour market. This way of functioning can in turn improve or deteriorate as a result of economic policy measures in a broader sense. The problems cannot be tackled with monetary policy. If monetary policy tries to push down unemployment below this “natural” level, it will only result in higher inflation. This is because inflation expectations have great significance. Although there is a relationship in the short run between unemployment and inflation, the central bank cannot make use of this in the long run, as companies and individuals will realise what policy is being conducted and adapt their behaviour accordingly. For instance, wage-earners may demand higher wages as compensation for expected inflation, which will have a negative effect on employment, as the scope for new recruitment will decline. Monetary policy is thus unable to lastingly affect real variables such as long-term lower unemployment. But it can have a stabilising effect in the short run, particularly if inflation expectations are wellanchored so that temporary changes in inflation are not perceived as permanent.

I will leave these to participants in this Roundtable to deliberate on. I believe that the common purpose of today’s Roundtable is to discuss on ways to speed up the migration to electronic payment with special focus on electronic money. This is indeed a good platform for all key stakeholders to provide their thoughts and highlight areas that require further improvement. In conclusion, therefore, I would like to thank OMFIF and the Lafferty Group for their involvement in this Roundtable event. I wish you all success in your deliberations and look forward to your views and suggestions in achieving our common goal. Lastly, I on behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia also wish to register our appreciation to all of you for taking time from your busy schedule to attend this event. 4  BIS Review 69/2010
The ease of the lending rates was pertinent both for households and corporate sector, though in some of the countries, like the Baltic States, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia, the correction of the interest rates on loans was more pronounced at the corporate segment. Macedonia and Poland have the feature of a sharper correction at the housing segment, compared to the corporate. The magnitude of the correction along different sectors is conditioned upon many specific factors, the initial levels, the riskiness of the portfolios, for instance, and hence it is difficult to infer which banking sectors had larger “progrowth” adjustment in the interest rate policy. What is also important is the fact that the costs of financing were reduced, and the intensity of the reduction did not differ much compared to the changes of the key policy rate (highest difference of about 2 p.p. is observed for Macedonia, Serbia and Bulgaria). Thus, access to financing for both households and corporate sector was facilitated, contributing to higher propensity to borrow and underpinning economic recovery.

Analyzing the countries, only 5 countries of them, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Latvia and Estonia, managed to reduce the debt in the 2015/2013 period. These countries, with the exception of Hungary are less vulnerable when it comes to the government debt as they belong to the so called "lower indebted countries". On the other side, the debt rise in the latest period additionally inflated already high levels of debt and deepened the vulnerable positions of some of the countries in the region (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Albania). Chart 11: Fiscal indicators, developments in different periods of time Budget Balance, in % of GDP MKD ALB CRO BUL SRB BIH SLO CZR EST HUN LAT LIT POL ROM  40  Debt change, in p.p of GDP  35 30  4  25  2  20  0  15 10  -2  5  -4  0  -6  -5  -10  -8  100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30  MKD ALB CRO BUL SRB BIH SLO CZR EST HUN LAT LIT POL ROM -10 Average 2002-2007  Average 2008-2012  Average 2013-2015  Debt change 2013/2009  Debt change 2015/2013  Debt level 2015 (left scale)  Source: WEO October 2016, database. The analysis of the long-term rates on government debt reveals that after the peak of the crisis in 2009, the interest rates on government borrowing in the region have been declining.
I am thinking specifically of how the financial sector has developed in recent decades, both globally and in Sweden, and of the fact that global real interest rates have fallen. This has tangibly affected Sweden, which is a consequence of the Swedish economy being increasingly integrated with the global economy. I will then present my view of what these changes have entailed, both for how Swedish monetary policy is conducted, and for how we need to develop how we discuss and perceive monetary policy in general. Crises affect monetary policy The three unusually large crises we have experienced over the last decade or so can be added to these long-term structural and global changes. Over ten years ago, the global financial crisis started in the financial sector, when the excessive risk-taking that had built up over many years finally came to the surface. Shortly thereafter, the sovereign debt crisis broke out in Europe. The pandemic in the midst of which we currently find ourselves is another kind of crisis. It started as a health crisis before developing into an economic crisis. During these crises, central banks around the world implemented different kinds of measure to stabilise the situation. But the episodes remind us that the future is always uncertain and that preparedness for crises needs to be a central element of monetary policy. Twenty years ago, a different view prevailed and the approach developed then, which continues to set the tone in today’s discussions of monetary policy, was based on a fairly stable macroeconomic environment.

At the HKMA, we have set a goal to promote the growth of CTCs in Hong Kong because their activities, such as foreign exchange and rate hedging, financing, and cash management, will help deepen our capital markets and create additional users of our financial and professional services industries. As you know, in many cases multinational corporates will co-locate their CTCs with their regional headquarters. By attracting more CTCs to Hong Kong, we hope this will hasten the process and further consolidate our status as an international financial centre. 19. Ladies and gentlemen, Hong Kong already provides a conducive environment in which CTCs can operate, but we are doing more, particularly on the all-important tax front. Through the work done by the Inland Revenue Department, Hong Kong’s Comprehensive Double Tax Agreements network has expanded from just five in 2009 to currently 35 agreements. These DTAs are important to multinational corporates as they help reduce the withholding tax rate on interests of cross-border loans. The Government has also announced major changes to the tax regime that will make Hong Kong an even more attractive destination for setting up CTCs. 20. With the changes, the interest deduction rules under the Inland Revenue Ordinance will be amended so that interest expenses arising from genuine cross-border intragroup financing activities, under specified conditions, will be deductible. This will lower the overall tax cost and resolve the “tax asymmetry” issue currently perceived by some MNCs as an impediment to their establishing or expanding CTC operations in Hong Kong.
Such a performance – growth above 2% for two consecutive years – has not been observed since 1999-2000. In 2006 alone, over two million jobs were created in the euro area, which brings to 13 million the total number of jobs created since the introduction of the single currency; this figure is slightly higher than that for the United States over the same period. After a catch-up phase in which growth was significantly above its long-term trend, the euro area’s GDP is currently increasing at a rate close to the economy’s potential. This growth is balanced since all of the components of demand are contributing to it in a harmonious fashion. In the first phases of recovery, the contribution of external demand was decisive. But productive investment and, almost everywhere, household consumption are now supporting the business cycle. This has enabled and led, in most countries, to a welcome consolidation of public finances, with no adverse impact on the economy. Concerning the future, the outlook for Europe is dominated by three questions, varied in nature. The first naturally concerns the international environment. Forecasts for world growth remain good. At this juncture, the US economy appears to be absorbing the economic and financial impact of the slowdown in the property market. Emerging market economies displayed encouraging resilience in the face of the two episodes of financial volatility that affected international equity markets in May 2006 and March 2007.

Christian Noyer: Monetary policy, the French economy and its outlook Introductory letter by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, to the Bank of France’s Annual Report 2006, submitted to the President of the French Republic, the President of the Senate, and the President of the National Assembly, 1 August 2007. *  *  *  I have the honour of submitting to you, as required by law, the report on the operations of the Banque de France, monetary policy and its outlook. The year 2006 was marked by robust and more balanced growth in global economic activity across virtually all regions. Thanks to this favourable international environment, the French economy saw a return to dynamic growth conducive to employment and the reduction of government deficits. This cyclical upturn should not, however, mask the structural difficulties facing the French economy, which is performing less well in all these areas than its main trading partners and which, moreover, is witnessing a further widening of its external deficit. Against this backdrop, I should like to outline a number of analyses of the growth environment, monetary policy, the state of the French economy and the main challenges that it needs to rise to in order to take advantage of globalisation and make structural improvements to growth and employment. In 2006, the European economy entered a period of sustained and balanced growth Growth in the euro area is sustained: after 2.9% in 2006, it could stand at 2.6% in 2007.
PLATFORM FOR DISCUSSION Speaking note  SPEAKER:  Ana Mitreska, Vice Governor  DATE:  20-22 November, 2019  LOCATION:  Prague, Czech Republic  NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA info@nbrm.mk www.nbrm.mk   GLOBAL IMBALANCES, EXTERNAL SECTOR VULNERABILITY AND CAPITAL FLOWS – SELECTED COUNTRIES OVERVIEW This Speaking note was prepared for the 42nd Meeting of the Governor’s Club of Central Asia, Black Sea and Balkan Countries, 2019  Contributors to the Note: Dijana Janevska Stefanova, Vesna Stojchevska and Danica Unevska Andonova1 Department: Monetary Policy and Research  1 Special thanks to Aneta Krstevska, Chief Economist, and Biljana Davidovska Stojanova, Monetary Policy and Research  Department, for the useful comments. 1  Global imbalances, external sector vulnerability and capital flows – selected countries overview  Overview of the global external imbalances The discussion on the issue of global imbalances and the overall profile of the external sector comes at a very proper moment, given the rollback of the globalisation and rising trade tensions. The recent changes might affect the external imbalances globally, if not directly, then indirectly by affecting macroeconomic fundamentals of the economies. Tariffs can define productivity, output, and employment over the longer term, and thus affect the potential to grow. In the last three decades, the decline of tariffs gave ground to global value chains, enhanced competition, and improved productivity across countries.

And improving our supply-side capacity is the major challenge confronting us all - at the national level but also here on the ground in the West Midlands. That's not something which monetary policy - which operates - as I say - on the demand side of the economy can do much about - at least directly. Government in all its forms - at the European, national, regional and local levels - has a vital role to play in this, by helping to improve the transport infrastructure, for example, and I know that you will be discussing that subject later this morning; or by raising the standards of education and training, which are critically important in terms of the available skills of the workforce; and by providing the right business incentives and encouraging investment. But the private sector, too, has a vitally important part to play - including at the regional level. Private sector businesses clearly have a strong commercial interest in the prosperity of the communities in which they operate.
Luis M Linde: Reflections on the planned Banking Union in Europe Address by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the First Bank of SpainOMFIF Economists Club Meeting, Madrid, 21 October 2013. *  *  *  Dear colleagues and friends, ladies and gentlemen: It is a pleasure to host this first Banco de España-OMFIF Economists Meeting. I am fully confident that it has provided an excellent opportunity to review and assess the latest developments in the Spanish and European economy and the present situation of the Spanish Financial System. I would like to share with you some reflections on the Banking Union in Europe which is, as we all know, a very important matter for the present European financial scenario. The thrust for the design of such a fundamental reform as the Banking Union in the economic governance of the European Union has come from the crisis, both international and European. The euro zone financial and sovereign-debt crisis has shown the shortcomings of the European institutional framework, triggering a wave of reforms that would, otherwise, most probably, not have taken place. Last year, the Presidents of the Council, ECB, European Commission and Eurogroup agreed on the milestones for building a new Economic and Monetary Union, based, in principle, on four blocks: the banking union is the first of those blocks, to be complemented, according to the political design, a later stage, with a fiscal union, an economic union and, finally, a political union.

We will have to devise a system to make ECB responsibility compatible with a rational division of work, so the ECB will have the direct oversight of significant banks with the cooperation of the national competent authorities. The direct supervision of the Less Significant Institutions is for the National Authorities, which will have to comply with regulations, guidelines and general instructions issued by the ECB. In fact, the ECB will indirectly supervise such banks, having access to their data and the power to assume, if so decided, the direct supervision of any of them. It is important to underline that this is not going to be a two-tier system, but a single one with a distribution of tasks; this is not going to be a “confederation” of supervisors, but an “Union” of supervisors under a single European authority. Preparatory work already done to launch the Single Supervisory Mechanism At this point, I will briefly describe the work we have done, how the SSM is going to be set up in organisational terms, and the work ahead of us. Steered by a High-Level Group on Supervision, chaired by the President of the ECB, a preparatory structure has laid down the work schedule regarding the following areas: (i)  The mapping of all the EU banking institutions, to determine the supervisory regime applicable under the Single Mechanism Regulation.
The only result to be achieved will be higher inflation than desired – that is to say that, on average, the inflation target will be exceeded. Consequently, for monetary policy, the highest level of resource utilisation that is sustainable over the longer term is the normal level. Other economic policies than monetary policy, such as labour market policy and structural policies improving the workings of the economy and the degree of competition, are needed to raise production and employment above the level that today is normal for these variables. Consequently, if the inflation target is given priority, a higher than normal level of resource utilisation cannot be sought in monetary policy. Some people may believe that priority to the inflation target may entail ignoring the real economy entirely and only caring about stabilising inflation. This is an altogether too narrow approach and characterises a so-called “inflation nutter”, to use Mervyn King’s striking expression. It is called strict inflation targeting in the terminology I proposed.1 Giving priority to the inflation target does not, therefore, mean that monetary policy should not stabilise resource utilisation, but, instead, that it should stabilise resource utilisation around a normal level, rather than a higher one. The same concept can be expressed with different words. When it comes to the average level of inflation and resource utilisation, there is only one numerical target, namely the inflation target. There is no independent numerical target for resource utilisation.

Lars Nyberg: Challenges following the current crisis Keynote address by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the 12th annual conference of the Central Bank of Chile “Financial stability, monetary policy and central banking”, Santiago, 6 November 2008. Johan Molin, adviser at the Riksbank, represented Mr Nyberg in Chile. *  *  *  In the last couple of months we have seen authorities all around the globe taking massive actions to deal with the current financial crisis. Few countries are spared as the crisis spreads over the world, not even those that have not been directly exposed to the problems that initially triggered the crisis. Never before has a crisis had such a widespread global impact as the one we are now witnessing. This obviously puts governments, central banks and supervisors in a somewhat new position as they have to deal with the challenges that financial globalisation entails. Needless to say, these challenges are huge. Today I will only be able to address some of the issues that we will have to deal with when the crisis is eventually over. I will also try to give my views on what the lessons from the crisis imply for the central banks’ work on analysing financial stability and systemic risks. However, let me first say a few words about the context of the crisis. Context of the crisis When the crisis was triggered it happened in a quite traditional way.