samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The four Presidents are proposing that a genuine EMU should be built on integrated frameworks for budgetary policies, economic policies and financial market policies, which in turn must be underpinned by greater democratic legitimacy and accountability. When we look at the options to establish budgetary policies in a monetary union, and exclude any uncoordinated conduct of fiscal policy by Member States, three possible models come to mind. First, there could be a fully-fledged fiscal union, with a central budget and federal debt issuance. It is not on the cards in the short run as important steps would need to be taken to establish the necessary euro area-wide political legitimacy and governance. The second model would involve sharing sovereignty on national fiscal policies, with reciprocal control of public expenditures serving as a basis for common debt issuance by governments. Such reciprocal control would also require strong democratic legitimacy, involving national parliaments. The third model would only rely on unqualified adherence to fiscal discipline by Member States, without risk-sharing. None of these three models alone is possible in the short run. There will be a combination of the three. The desirable mix has to be decided upon by the people of Europe with the appropriate democratic checks. EMU is a unique construct, tailored to European specificities, and it need not resemble any existing federation. Let me give some examples.

This did not prove to be the case. As Jacques de Larosière, the former IMF Managing Director, once remarked, what was supposed to be a system of “peer pressure” too often turned into a system of “peer concessions” or “peer arrangements”. On the whole, the Maastricht framework proved unable to deal adequately with the high degree of economic and financial integration in the euro area. It was not fully understood that sharing a currency means much more than sharing the same monetary policy. It is a commitment to ensuring sound fiscal, economic and financial conditions. Euro area countries largely overlooked the substantial spillover effects that national policy decisions would have on their fellow countries in EMU euro area partners. The ongoing crisis has brought these shortcomings into sharp focus. 3. Short and longer-term solutions to the crisis: going beyond the Maastricht framework  3.1. The ECB’s contribution to resolving the crisis  Let me now turn to Europe’s policy response to the crisis. The EMU framework relies on a strict separation between monetary policy on the one hand, and fiscal and economic policies on the other. The monetary policy function is carried out by the ECB under a clear mandate: maintaining price stability over the medium term in the euro area. To achieve this goal, the ECB has been given full political and operational independence. Since the start of the crisis, the ECB has reacted forcefully. Since 2008, it has lowered its policy rate from 4.25% to 0.75% now.
In the event, the unemployment rate in the UK peaked at 8.5%, or 2.7 million people. •  Since 2013, the UK unemployment rate has fallen sharply, to a rate of 5.3% or 1.8 million people. This fall in unemployment is considerably faster than the MPC, and other outside forecasters, had predicted. At the start of 2014, the MPC forecast that the unemployment rate today would be more than a percentage point higher than its current rate (Chart 1). •  The main reason for this striking fall in the unemployment rate has been very strong rates of new job creation. Since 2010, more than 2 million new jobs have been created in the UK. The lion’s share of these new jobs – around two-thirds – have been full-time positions and in highly-skilled professions (Chart 2). The level of employment is at a forty-year high. •  This rise in the demand for workers has been met, in part, by increased participation in the workforce. Participation by women has picked up strongly and is now close to its all-time highs. So too has participation by those aged over 50, in part taking advantage of more flexible working practices and removal of the official retirement age. •  The other end of the age spectrum has also seen improvement. The percentage of 18–24 year olds who are not in employment, education or training – the so-called “NEETs” – has fallen sharply from close to 17% to below 13%.

– flexible: we cannot guarantee 2.0% either all the time or straight away. – and, consequently, medium-term. This medium-term target needs to be viewed in two ways: it is forward-looking, to guide inflation expectations; but it cannot completely ignore the past either. Should we go as far as targeting an average level of inflation of close to 2%, and therefore explicitly compensate for any undershooting or overshooting of the target over time? This question remains open, and will be part of the “strategic review” of monetary policy that the ECB will pick up again in the next few months. One key question in this case would be the period over which the inflation average would be measured: I think the public health crisis could provide some justification for this sort of “averaging”, at least temporarily, starting as of the beginning of the crisis. In the American debate, this is called TAIT (Temporary Average Inflation Targeting). Independence in implementing the mandate The ECB is independent on two levels. First, its action in implementing the mandate entrusted to it democratically under European legislation is not subject to approval by national governments, nor to national legal interpretation. Second, in its action, the ECB never submits to pressure from the market or from trends in the media. In the current context of an unprecedented rise in public debt, this independence is more important than ever. France’s debt should exceed 115% of GDP by the end of this year.
In NOK - purchasing power parity  US Norway Switzerland Ireland Denmark Iceland Canada Netherlands Austria Australia Germany Finland Sweden 0  100000  Sources: OECD and Norges Bank  200000  300000  The large cash flows from petroleum activities are reflected in official income figures. Measured by GDP per capita, Norway ranks high in the statistics. These figures do not, however, provide an accurate picture of value added. When calculating GDP and national income, the cash flow from petroleum activities is measured in the same way as all other income. Extracting oil and gas from the seabed is measured in the same way as all other production. This means that Norway’s income is overestimated. Oil and gas represent wealth under the seabed. When oil and gas are sold, this wealth is invested abroad. This transaction does not in itself generate income, even though it is posted as income in the national accounts. The income is not equivalent to the entire cash flow, only to the return on this wealth. Chart 14. Adjusted GDP per capita in 2000 In NOK - purchasing power parity  US Switzerland Ireland Denmark Iceland Canada Netherlands Austria Australia Norway Germany Finland Sweden 0  100000  200000  300000  Sources: OECD, Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank  A more accurate picture of Norway’s income is obtained when GDP is adjusted for the transfer of petroleum wealth to financial investments abroad.

All these make Singapore a natural gateway connecting India to ASEAN and East Asia, as well as a launch pad for products and services of the future. Conclusion These are exciting times in Asia. Countries have the opportunity to transform their economies, and substantially improve the lives of their people. For companies, many opportunities are opening up, which will surely be seized, if not by you then by your competitors. Globalisation is an unstoppable phenomenon, presenting opportunities to those who are prepared but threatening the unconverted. It will not be easy for countries to realise this promise of globalisation, and avoid its many hazards each on their own. They need to look beyond their borders to tap and leverage on one another’s strengths. I believe that Southeast Asia will rise to the challenge, hold its own as an attractive market and investment destination, and at the same time be an integral part of a booming Asia. India is a major part of the Asian story. I look forward to deepening and broadening the ties between these two regions, and in particular between India and Singapore, to the benefit of our economies, our private sectors, and our peoples. BIS Review 3/2004  5
The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE: New economy - same old problems  Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE, Governor of the Bank of England, at the CBI National Conference, held in Birmingham, on 7 November 2000. *  *  *  Thank you, Mr President. I’m honoured to have been invited back to address your annual conference. I remember very vividly my earlier visit to your conference in 1996. I remember reporting to you that the British economy was then into its fifth consecutive year - its nineteenth consecutive quarter - of relatively steady growth at an annual average rate of 2.6%; that unemployment had fallen, pretty well month by month for most of that time, to below 7½%; and that inflation had averaged 2¾% over the previous four years - compared with over 10% on average in the preceding two decades. The question then was could we keep up - or even improve upon - that performance. And my answer was a cautious yes - provided we met three conditions: a continuing firm grip on inflation; continuing prudent and sustainable fiscal policy; and continuing structural, supply-side flexibility. Well, that cautious optimism was amply justified.

Today, we are well into our ninth consecutive year our thirty-third consecutive quarter of relatively steady growth (despite having to absorb the global emerging markets financial shock of a couple of years ago) at an annual average rate of 2.8%; the number of people in employment has risen to an all-time high; the rate of unemployment, on a claimant count basis, has fallen to 3.6%, which is the lowest rate for 25 years for the UK as a whole and the lowest rate for 20 years in every individual region of the UK; and retail price inflation on the target RPIX measure has now averaged 2.7% over the past eight years, and on the standardised HICP measure is currently the lowest rate in Europe. And if you ask me today the same question - can we keep up that performance, my answer is still a cautious yes - on the same three conditions - low and stable inflation, fiscal prudence and supply-side flexibility. Now I am very well aware that some of you - perhaps many of you - thinking of your own businesses may conclude that I’m living on a different planet.
Going forward, insurers are expected to leverage more extensively on direct channels to distribute their products and communicate with customers. With digitisation and other new technologies, not just in insurance but across all other financial and non-financial services, the costs of distribution and managing customer relationships can be greatly reduced with expanded reach. Digitisation is also expected to give rise to new entrants into the insurance value-chain such as product aggregators, which will allow consumers to easily compare product features, providers, coverage and price. These developments will drive the increasing adoption of multi-channel distribution strategies. The implications for agents will be a greater need to specialise and to be able to do so while seamlessly integrating with different and more diverse contact points with consumers. This will require innovative business models as parts of the distribution chain become commoditised. For example, agents may specialise in more complex product offerings, provide more tailored advice, improve the customer experience by deploying new technologies and reaching out to untapped consumer segments. As greater efficiencies drive 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  down costs, fees and commissions will increasingly be tied to the breadth and depth of services provided by agents. This in turn will contribute towards lifting productivity and the value of jobs in the industry, including that of the agency force. Third, insurance agents will need to embrace a broader role in the education of consumers.

From the Bank of  BIS Review 50/2009  1  Zambia’s point of view, the objective of financial stability remains key in all our activities. Financial stability depends to a large extent on the existence of robust risk management systems of financial institutions. It is therefore, important that risk management systems should keep pace with financial innovation. I have no doubt that the banking sector will rise to this challenge. Once again, thank you for the opportunity to witness this important event. 2  BIS Review 50/2009
[Plans to set up this Forum were announced by the Bank in June 2019 as part of our response to the Future of Finance report.] The purpose of the Forum is to further dialogue between the public and private sectors in order to better understand the use and impact of AI in financial services. The Forum, which is expected to run for one year, will consist of a series of quarterly meetings and workshops structured around each of three topic areas: Data, Model Risk Management, and Governance. In terms of membership, the Forum will draw on the knowledge and experience of 21 leading AI experts from across the financial and technology sectors as well as academia; the Forum also has observers from the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation and more may be invited. The goal is to ensure that the Forum’s design reflects a wide variety of views. The full list of members can be found on our website.

In a recent survey of the banks and insurers we regulate, conducted as part of our ongoing monitoring of the impact of COVID-19 by the Bank’s Fintech Hub along with colleagues from the PRA, around 45% of those firms that participated reported that the crisis has led to an increase in the importance of AI and data science applications for their future operations, with around 55% reporting no change, and none noting a decrease. The survey also looked at changes in firms’ investment plans and resource commitments for AI projects as well as areas where the crisis has had an impact on existing applications across different business lines. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  While the use of AI has clear benefits in an increasingly data-driven economy, there are risks and challenges. And the impact of those benefits and risks will be felt at different paces and different depths at technological, social, corporate, and systemic levels. It’s useful to think of the risks and challenges in a hierarchical way, starting with those that may become apparent at the data level and building up to the level of models trained on those data; then, widening to the level of the firm, and finally, up to the level of the financial system as a whole. Overlaying this are the regulatory and legal challenges presented by AI.
When this is carefully done the Riksbank – say some of the critics – can use the expected higher inflation (that we ourselves have created) as an argument for making the interest rate increases we have wanted to make all along. This type of criticism was common last autumn, for example, when the BIS Review 14/1998  -8-  Riksbank spoke in various connections about its inflation outlook and explained that interest rate increases might be necessary. I have the following answer to these criticisms. To begin with, the Riksbank’s focus on inflation developments is entirely natural. It is undoubtedly our task to show clearly the reasons for our decisions. Without a candid accounting of monetary policy from the Riksbank’s perspective it would be more difficult for the political decision-makers and the general public to evaluate monetary policy and our fulfilment of our objective. Think what type of debate we would have and how monetary policy would be seen if the Riksbank only made its decisions without commenting at all on the outlook for inflation and without giving reasons for its policies. Thus the need for the Riksbank to speak about inflation is obvious. Naturally it cannot be ruled out that in doing so it will influence households and businesses in their views on price developments, however our influence should not be exaggerated. The cause-and-effect relationship is rather the reverse: the Riksbank reacts to inflationary developments, which in turn are determined by a great number of decisions by businesses and households.

One possible explanation is that, in an economy based heavily on the production of services, firms have been putting their teams to work on marketing and sales to drum up business against a backdrop of weak overall demand. Those teams may well be working hard. In that case, it may not feel to managers, when filling in surveys, as if they have lots of spare capacity, But, as I have described it, those staff would be working on inputs rather than outputs – making productivity across the economy as a whole look weak. Nor does labour hoarding square obviously with relatively healthy growth in private sector employment over 2010 and the first half of 2011, before the recent slowing. In our internal debates, I have posited that this could be a symptom of the economy’s necessary rebalancing. Firms facing expanding markets and demand may be hiring. Whereas, against a backdrop of a very low policy rate and some forbearance by banks, individual firms in contracting sectors could be holding out, either not recognising that their market is contracting or believing and hoping that it will be their competitors rather than themselves that end up cutting capacity or closing. It can be argued against that that rising employment, and weakness in productivity, is spread fairly evenly across the private sector. But I suspect that we have to dive down into the data to get a more disaggregated picture than we, as macroeconomic policymakers, usually need.
Enhancing the practical implementation of macroprudential supervision The systemically important bank – “SIB” – regimes will continue to be a priority area for the Committee over the coming years. Although the regimes for global SIBs and domestic SIBs have now been published, both will require a certain amount of ongoing maintenance and monitoring. Furthermore, as noted in the G-SIB standard, the methodology, including the indicator-based measurement approach itself and the cutoff/threshold scores, will be subject to periodic review and refinement every three years. Beyond this work, the Committee will now turn its attention to the practical implementation of tools and techniques to deal with systemic risks. This will include two complementary areas of work: •  Regulatory consequences of SIB classification: Being a SIB means more than just higher capital. In light of the risks they impose on the financial system, SIBs must be held to a higher standard with respect to supervisory expectations for risk management functions, data aggregation capabilities, risk governance and internal controls, all of which are topics that feature prominently in the Committee’s work plan. In addition, given the principles-based nature of the D-SIB framework, the Committee will monitor emerging practice as banking supervisors move towards implementation so as to facilitate cross-border cooperation and mutual understanding.

•  Use of microprudential tools for macroprudential purposes: The Committee will oversee preparations for the countercyclical buffer, as well as exchange information on the wider range of microprudential tools that have been used for macroprudential purposes (eg sectoral adjustments to risk weights, stress testing requirements, loanto-value limits or varying margin requirements). Concluding remarks Since the financial crisis, the Basel Committee has accomplished a great deal. But we still have work to do to complete the overhaul of the regulatory framework and fully factor in all of the lessons learned. We also need to see whether we have the balance right when it comes to simplicity and risk sensitivity. That work is going to keep the Committee busy for at least the next two years. But that is far from the end of it, because, as I have noted a number of times today, our policy work will not generate its full benefits if not implemented in a full, timely and consistent manner. So our implementation monitoring work is equally important. And then even when  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the new standards are implemented, we will need effective supervisors to ensure that they are adhered to. This is an area where the Committee has the potential to do much more, particularly once the policy pipeline begins to slow. In other words, the Basel Committee will continue to provide you with much to talk about – at this meeting and those in the future! BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
In this context, I wish to cite the Central Bank’s 2007 Financial Stability report, which appeared in April that year. It contained the following statement: “The Central Bank underlines that global market conditions can take a sudden turn for the worse and it is important to be on the alert and prepared for such a contingency.” The report goes on to say: “The current episode of ample liquidity and lower interest rates which has been ideal for riskseeking investors may change unexpectedly. Short-term interest rates have been rising in most markets recently and capital costs are no longer so favourable.” With this warning, the Central Bank was merely stating what should have been obvious, at least to those engaged in banking. The time had come to prepare for a change in the economic and financial climate. In the global arena, it had been stressed time and time again that risk premia were far too low, risk was not correctly priced, and that change would come. One of the side effects of the dramatic developments in the global financial markets starting in mid-2007 was the sharp rise in risk aversion among investors and the rapidly shrinking supply of credit. CDS spreads began rising, including those of Icelandic banks. Around midAugust 2007, Kaupthing Bank announced its intention to acquire the Dutch bank NIBC, which was roughly two thirds its size. Kaupthing’s CDS spreads widened as a result, as the proposed acquisition would have increased its need for re-financing in the years to follow.

Some critics have maintained that, in the May 2008 issue of Financial Stability, the Central Bank contradicted its own knowledge of the state of the banks – or even that it did not know any better. This is untrue. The report examined in a transparent manner the financial system’s weaknesses, as well as its strengths. The developments in the global arena since the spring of 2008 rendered the risks mentioned in Financial Stability far more serious than was foreseen. In its monetary policy statement in July 2008, the Board of Governors said inter alia that “Iceland’s commercial banks play an important role in maintaining confidence in the financial system. Under the current global financial market conditions, they must protect their liquidity and capital position, seek all possible ways to reduce their need for foreign credit, and adapt the scope of their operations to dramatically changed circumstances.” Throughout 2008, the Central Bank of Iceland focused increasing attention on the developments and operational outlook at the nation’s financial institutions – particularly its large banks. Among other things, it monitored their liquidity much more closely and frequently than is stipulated in the Bank’s rules on liquidity requirements, and considerably more than had been customary. The Central Bank met with leaders from the large commercial banks and reviewed various aspects of their operations, requesting information on and explanations of the developments in certain areas, such as liquidity, funding, changes in lending and deposits, asset sales, etc.