samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Afterwards, as the impact of tax hikes and price adjustments would gradually disappear, inflation is expected to trend downwards starting from the second half of 2010, stabilizing around 5 percent over the medium term. It is critical to note that inflation would be less persistent, and thus economic recovery much smoother, should economic agents take these forecasts as a benchmark in their pricing decisions. It should be emphasized that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in the monetary policy stance. Therefore, I would like to underline that the assumptions on the future policy rates underlying the inflation forecast should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBRT. 4. Risks  Distinguished Members of the Press, In the last part of my presentation, I would like to mention the risks with respect to the inflation outlook in the upcoming period and provide some information pertaining to the probable monetary policy strategy should these risks materialize. BIS Review 143/2009  17  Although recent data releases indicate that the worst is over, concerns regarding the health of the global economy remain. In particular, ongoing problems in credit and labor markets keep the downside risks for global activity on the agenda. Should the global conditions deteriorate again and consequently delay domestic recovery, the CBRT would consider another cycle of rate cuts. The fact that the crisis itself and policy responses are unprecedented in recent history poses risk to the inflation and monetary policy outlook.

The continued run-down in inventories limited production and resource utilization and therefore curbed the effect of the recent rapid growth on inflation. Moreover, high unemployment rates have continued to suppress domestic demand. Accordingly, aggregate demand conditions have continued to support disinflation. Figure 23: GDP  Figure 22: GDP Growth by Periods  (Seasonally Adjusted, at 1998 Prices,  (Percent)  Billion TL) 27  15 9.4  10  8.4  6.2 5.3  7.2  6.9 4.7  5  2.8 0.9  24 1.0  0  21  -5 -5.7  -6.5  -10  -7.0  18  -15  -14.3  12 34 12 3 41 23 41 23 4 1 2 34 12 34 1 2  Source: TURKSTAT. 2009-2  2009-1  2008-4  2008-3  2008-2  2008  2008-1  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  -20  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 2009  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. On the production side, value added fell year-on-year across non-farm sectors. The 3.1 percent value added in services provided the most negative contribution to GDP growth (Figure 24). On the spending side, the adverse impact of private demand on annual GDP growth substantially decreased compared to two preceding quarters. Meanwhile, the unfavorable trend in private investment expenditures continued in the second quarter and private investment became the demand component that made the most negative contribution to GDP growth (Figure 25).
Looking around, I am delighted to see many friends from corporates, banks, fund management firms and other industry professionals sitting here, keen to learn more about sukuk. I am sure that the experts gathered here today will be able to shed light on how sukuk can be a viable fund-raising tool and an attractive investment instrument. Before that, allow me to take this opportunity to say a few words, from a policy perspective, on why developing an Islamic finance platform is important for Hong Kong, and our plans in building this platform. What’s in it for Hong Kong to develop Islamic finance? 4. Islamic finance has become increasingly important in the global financial market, registering exponential growth over the past few years. Compared with a size of only $ billion in 2008, the global Islamic financial industry has expanded remarkably to an estimated $ trillion by the end of 2013, representing an annual average growth rate of 21%.1 According to market estimates, there is huge potential for further growth, with Islamic financial assets expected to reach $ trillion by 2020.2  5. A major growth area for Islamic finance is the sukuk market. Ten years ago, new sukuk issuance was only a modest $ billion. In just ten years’ time, annual sukuk issuance has already surpassed $ billion, amounting to $ billion in 2013 which was more than 20 times higher than the figure in 2003.3  6.

Peter Pang: Sukuk as a viable fund-raising and investment instrument Opening remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA-BNM Joint Conference on Islamic Finance, Hong Kong, 14 April 2014. *  *  *  Dato’ Muhammad Ibrahim, distinguished speakers and guests, ladies and gentlemen, 1. Good morning. It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to this Islamic finance conference jointly organised by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), with the support of the Treasury Markets Association. I am particularly grateful to Dato’ Muhammad Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of BNM, who leads a delegation of Islamic finance experts from Malaysia to share with us their experience and knowledge on a wide range of matters concerning sukuk, from the latest developments of the global sukuk market to the practical issues in structuring sukuk products. 2. This conference marks the third Islamic finance-related event organised in collaboration with BNM within the past year or so, following an Islamic finance workshop held in March last year and the first meeting of the Joint Forum on Islamic Finance between Hong Kong and Malaysia held last December. This series of events is a testament to our determination to deepen co-operation with Malaysia in the development of Islamic finance. 3. The theme of today’s conference is “Sukuk as a viable fund-raising and investment instrument”.
Stronger crisis prevention mechanisms are now in place and a new crisis management framework has been developed. We have financial backstops. A Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Single Resolution Framework have been decided. Most of the countries in IMF/EU/ECB adjustment programmes are “graduating” successfully, and several other stressed countries are implementing structural reforms and financial consolidation. These are important steps forward, towards a more stable and equitable functioning economic and monetary union. We have certainly turned a corner and stabilised the situation. It is an important achievement but it is not the end of the road as it is too soon to declare that the crisis is over. The euro area still faces large challenges in terms of lacklustre growth, excessive unemployment, remaining fragmentation and a low inflation period that threatens to aggravate the burden of the debt overhang still besetting governments and private economic agents. That the stressed countries were able to restore fundamental equilibria, like their external accounts, and to resume positive economic growth is of great importance. However, we face now structural medium term challenges that impair the European potential growth rate. In my remarks today I will concentrate on issues such as the changing financial integration and financial stability nexus, on how to restore a sound and resilient financial system and finally on the need to improve our analytical tools and policy instruments.

Yet, these are necessary but insufficient conditions to ensure that the banking system will again become a vibrant financial engine of growth. Why? Because, over long periods of time, the soundness and resilience of banks also hinges on the dynamism of the economy and society: hence the habitat of banks also has to draw itself out of the crisis. The sustainability of public and private finances and the health of the broader financial system are also critical components in securing a successful and resilient banking system. The crisis has left a heavy, uneven structural legacy across the euro area As the earlier stages of this multi-layered financial crisis unfolded, it became apparent that several banks had grown far too large for their economies, making the fate of several governments and banks ever more intertwined. Fears of debt unsustainability in Greece sparked concerns also about the public finances and financial health of other euro area countries. Some speak of a twin crisis of “two debt overhangs”. Others speak of the “sovereign-bank nexus”: they are all referring to the same phenomenon. 2 That was when the “doom loop” between weak sovereigns and weak banks took hold to full effect and when the flaws in the design of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) became most damaging. 3 While significant progress has been made towards rectifying governance failings and design flaws, the burden of the crisis on sovereigns, households and banks is considerable and unevenly distributed.
While individual business-line stress tests had been done by bank supervisors, a comprehensive stress test of all the largest banks at the same time using the same scenarios was new. While conducting the tests simultaneously for all 19 banks was challenging and resource intensive, the exercise provided supervisors the ability to make comparisons across institutions using the same underlying assumptions, and allowed the same core supervisory staff to be involved in assessments across institutions. Where banks were outliers relative to peers, supervisors could ask for more detailed information to determine if these differences were justified, based on analysis of comparable data. In addition, the stress tests were forward looking, so that the evolution of performance and results over the next two years  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  could be compared across institutions. This provided a rigorous, data-driven assessment. It also highlighted where institutions needed to do additional work relative to peers to improve their risk management practices. The banks were evaluated on whether, over the two-year period under stress assumptions, they were likely to be able to maintain a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6 percent and a Tier 1 common capital ratio of 4 percent. It is worth noting that for most banks it was the Tier 1 common capital ratio that was most binding, and was the capital definition that best reflected the ability to absorb losses.

We have planned an open and rolling application process for these roles and intend to name additional counterparties in the weeks ahead. Complementing this effort, the New York Fed also announced a parallel process last week whereby firms may also apply to become agency CMBS dealers to support the Desk's purchases of agency CMBS. In closing, let me finish where I started. In this time of pain and hardship, we have choices to make in how we respond, and the opportunity before us is to create generational opportunities for a broad and inclusive set of businesses to help advance an equitable recovery. I look forward to partnering with you on this work for years to come. 1 1 Rajashri Chakrabarti and William Nober, “Distribution of COVID-19 Incidence by Geography, Race, and  Income,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, June 15, 2020. 2 2 Rajashri Chakrabarti, William Nober, and Maxim Pinkovskiy, “ Are Financially Distressed Areas More Affected  by COVID-19?,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, August 17, 2020. 3 3 Daleep Singh, “The Fed’s Emergency Facilities: Usage, Impact, and Early Lessons,” remarks at Hudson  Valley Pattern for Progress, July 8, 2020. 4 4 Jerome H. Powell, “Coronavirus and CARES Act,” testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S.  House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., June 30, 2020. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Let me delve into some aspects of these pillars. In terms of regulation and supervision of the financial system, the causes and effects of the crisis of 2008-2009 have taught great lessons to policy makers around the world. Suffice is to mention the changes that are being effected in the United States and the Eurozone, such as the Dodd-Frank Act and the instauration of a European banking authority. In Chile, our financial system was not involved in the practices that originated the crisis in the developed world, because our legislation does not allow it. Even so, we are permanently reviewing our legislation in light of the experiences and best practices in place today in the world. Another significant aspect has to do with our foreign exchange policy. In recent weeks the peso has appreciated against the dollar, prompting some sectors to demand intervention by the Central Bank. I think that some clarification is in order. In the first place, I reaffirm the validity of a flexible exchange rate for the Chilean economy. Our economic history is full of examples in this area. So far, the scheme that has yielded the best results for economies similar to the Chilean is a floating exchange rate regime. When policy makers sought to artificially control the value of our currency, imbalances were generated that ended up being very costly for the country. The adoption of exchange rate flexibility in 1999 has allowed us to wade subsequent complex moments.

For good reasons, the Chilean economy is open commercially and financially to the world, and, because of the nature of its exports, is strongly affected by shocks coming from abroad. In the past we have benefited from the external situation. We have also felt the consequences when the external situation has deteriorated. We cannot isolate ourselves from these external impulses, and it would not be a good idea to do so. The important thing, however, is that we have developed a policy framework that allows us to absorb and mitigate these shocks in the best way possible. Chile needs to keep a robust macroeconomic and financial policy scheme that helps it overcome effectively these external disturbances at the lowest possible cost for the country. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Part of this scheme is the autonomous central bank with clear-cut objectives: low, stable inflation, and the normal operation of internal and external payments. Our monetary policy is oriented at attaining an explicit inflation target over a medium-term horizon, by applying an independent monetary policy that contributes to stabilize the business cycle. Its complement is a floating exchange rate regime. Another important element is responsible and predictable fiscal policy making, as reflected in its governing rule. Add a sound financial system, with proper regulation and supervision. Plus ever growing commercial and financial integration. The fact that the deterioration of the developed economies has not hit our exports so hard is the result of this diversification of external markets, among other factors.
That end is defined in article 5 of the National Bank Act as pursuing a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole and ensuring price stability, while taking due account of the development of the economy. Article 6 is the basis of our independence. Under this clause, we are explicitly prohibited from seeking or accepting instructions from Federal authorities. In other words, we are obliged to make our own decisions. 1  For instance, a very well-known US congressman – possibly a future presidential candidate – has gone as far as calling for the Fed to be abolished. Cf. Paul, Ron (2009), End the Fed, New York: Hachette Book Group. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  There are good reasons why Swiss legislators have established our independence so strongly. Theory and practical experience throughout the world are clear on this point. The more independent a central bank, the better it fulfils its mandate. It has much better chances of ensuring price stability and thereby making a contribution to sustained economic developments than a central bank that is not independent.2 I am not planning to overwhelm you now by citing all the relevant literature.3 However, the most important reasons put forward by academic writers on the subject include differences in the legitimation, time horizon and incentives of politicians and central bankers. While politicians are legitimated through popular election, central bankers legitimate themselves by carrying out their legal mandate to the best of their ability.

Before rejoining the IMF, where he had previously worked for 15 years in the European Department and the Monetary and Financial Systems Department, he was the Director for Financial Stability, as well as for Supervision Policy within the DNB, position that enabled the creation of the respective departments within the National Bank of Romania. Last, but not least, he shares his financial supervision knowledge as a Professor at Nyenrode Business University. It is my pleasure to offer the floor to Mr. Hilbers and thank him once again for being here with us today. 2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  His remarks will be followed by a recorded message from his World Bank counterpart, Executive Director Koen Davidse. Mr Davidse is a more recent, but also very good, friend of our country. With extensive knowledge in development policies, having worked with the United Nations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Davidse has constantly supported the efforts for structural reforms and strengthening Romania's institutions in. Unfortunately, he couldn't join us physically today, but he is with us virtually. Thank you! 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
[12] Brunnermeier (2023), “Rethinking monetary policy in a changing world”, in IMF Finance and  Development, March. [13] Borio and Disyatat (2021), “Integrated policy frameworks: the constraints of policy horizons and  adjustment frequencies”, SUERF Policy note 246. [14] Shirakawa (2023), “Time for change”, in IMF Finance and Development, March.

This debt tends to increase over the periods of economic slowdown, in response to fiscal counter-cyclical policies and the impact of automatic stabilisers. However, given the essential role of fiscal sustainability in the overall economic and financial stability, and the high level of Albania’s public debt, the Bank of Albania has requested and supported the taking of measures to control and reduce this debt in the medium term. In this context, we reiterate our message for anchoring this process to a fiscal rule, which will orient the fiscal policy in the long term, and will be reliable and transparent for all Albanian and foreign economic agents. Developments in the external sector of the economy signalled a sluggish foreign demand in the third quarter of the year. Though trade deficit dropped, the external sector impacted negatively on the economic growth due to lower tourism revenues. In October and November, the external trade data show ongoing annual nominal contraction of the trade deficit, at 11.9%. This contraction was due to increase in exports by 12.0% and decrease in imports by 2.0%, over this period. The Albanian economy's capacity to maintain and speed up the positive export growth rates will determine the country's medium-term and long-term economic growth. In the medium term, increasing exports helps offset the domestic demand sluggishness, while in the long term, increasing competitiveness of the Albanian economy in the world markets should be to the core of Albania's new economic growth model.
The goal of having euro area markets where access is as easy and efficient as it is to the respective national market has – with few exceptions – not been met yet. The remaining fragmentation is often the result of legacy and national rules. This fragmentation is an area that calls for action. It may be worth exploring the establishment of a truly European issuance service – at least for some supranational debt instruments. We could even think about the ECB/Eurosystem playing an active role in setting up such an issuance service. And we could consider whether and to what extent new technologies, like distributed ledger technology (DLT), can be used in that process. TARGET instant payment settlement (TIPS) Turning to the retail payments market, I have to say that, despite the introduction of standardised retail payment instruments and harmonised processing rules, the retail payments market infrastructure in Europe is still fragmented. Apart from a few exceptions, automated clearing houses (ACHs) still primarily focus on their respective national markets. The availability of a safe and efficient market infrastructure that can guarantee the processing of instant payments across Europe is a prerequisite for the launch of pan-European instant payment solutions. Payment service providers should have the choice to either clear their instant payments through ACHs or use a settlement service for instant payments. Earlier this month, the Eurosystem launched a market consultation on user requirements and the expected volumes for a settlement service for instant payments in central bank money.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Given the importance of the matter, I cannot conclude without referring to our level of educational attainment and, specifically, to secondary education. Unfortunately, the measures that raise educational attainment pose a problem; unlike the reforms we have looked at today, the effects of potential improvements in education are very slow and this explains why the attention the subject requires is continuously put off. But this slowness in bearing fruit is precisely what justifies the need to undertake this task as soon as possible and, while waiting, we should reiterate that education is the most important problem facing our society and our economy in the medium term. Thank you very much. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5