samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Information about the state of the Norwegian economy is available earlier than information provided by official statistics, and it is useful to have closer contact with the labour market and business and industry throughout the country. According to the most recent reports, the economic situation in Central Norway is favourable. The companies that are participating report stable employment and solid growth in all industries. The activity level is high in both manufacturing and construction, but growth is expected to level off. The supply of skilled labour is a constraint on the growth potential. The investment rate is stable and moderate. Enterprises in the region envisage a slight rise in prices in the period ahead. Inflation decelerated markedly from summer 2003 and continued to fall in the beginning of 2004. Consumer price inflation has subsequently picked up, albeit at a gentle pace. In August, the year-on-year rise in consumer prices adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPIATE) was 1.3 per cent. Adjusted for the interest rate’s direct effect on house rents, the year-on-year rise in the CPI-ATE may be estimated at 1.5 per cent in August. The CPI rose by 1.9 per cent in the same period. 1  Stambøl, L.S. (2005): Arbeidsmarkedsmobilitet i like og ulike regionale arbeidsmarkeder (Labour market mobility in similar and different labour markets), Økonomiske Analyser 4/2005, Statistics Norway. 2/7  Prices for domestically produced goods and services rose by 2.1 per cent in the twelve months to August this year.

Much progress has been made in making the U.S. financial system safer and less prone to 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  panics. Still, there is more to do before we can say that we have ended “too big to fail.” This is work that we absolutely must complete. In particular, U.S. bank holding companies must do more to make their organizations resolvable under either Title I bankruptcy or Title II resolution. This requires having clean parent holding company structures, less corporate complexity, and essential service and support operations that are able to continue to operate even when the parent company becomes non-viable. Also, while there has been significant progress in terms of developing a workable resolution regime—the Single Point of Entry regime established under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act—we still have to ensure that this regime can be safely utilized on a cross-border basis. This requires fully implementing the TLAC framework, and defining more explicitly the expectations and responsibilities of the different supervisory and regulatory oversight bodies that would have to work together internationally. In particular, this includes how liquidity would be provided to an insolvent firm during the early stages of resolution, so that the firm’s operations could be wound down in an orderly way without destabilizing the global financial system. Finally, I would like to address the issue of bank culture and conduct. Although there has been considerable effort here, there is still much more to do. Banks must restore their trustworthiness.
There is certainly an element of rivalry between China and India but India is not going to allow itself to be used to check and contain China. Both Chinese and Indian leaders want their two countries to have good relations. They believe that the world is large enough to accommodate the aspirations of both, plus of course, the US, Europe, ASEAN and other countries. ASEAN with more than 500 million people is large but it is not a country. It is an organisation of 10 countries. It does not threaten the interests of the major powers. That is why ASEAN has been able to provide a neutral venue to bring larger powers together. Placing ASEAN at the centre of the Asian construct helps to reconcile and assuage the tensions between major players and their competing interests. It is also the reason why ASEAN must remain in the driver's seat and the political underpinning for the multitude of dialogues and fora that ASEAN has spawned such as the ASEAN +3, ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit (EAS). The inaugural 16-member EAS was held last December. Major powers outside the grouping need not be worried that the EAS would work against their interests. It is in ASEAN's interest that the EAS remains open and inclusive. Conclusion Let me conclude. A rising new Asia will usher in a new era of opportunities for the world. It is therefore appropriate for the Institute of International Finance (IIF) to hold this meeting in Singapore, a gateway to access Asia.

The original target date of 2020 was advanced to 2015 this year. Obviously, there are practical difficulties of integration given the diversity in the region and the different levels of development. ASEAN leaders have tasked an Eminent Persons Group to come up with an ASEAN Charter to guide ASEAN's future development. This will mark a new phase of deeper ASEAN integration. Geo-strategic shifts The re-emergence of India and China, and the revitalisation of ASEAN are taking place within a broader geo-strategic context. Let me now examine some of the larger trends. At one level, Asia is slowly but surely coalescing. The entire region is being sewn together by changing patterns of trade, investment and production chains. Increasing economic integration is reflected by the rapid expansion of intra-Asia trade. From 34% in 1980, intra-Asian trade as a share of the region's total trade has grown to more than 50% in 2005. The transformations taking place in Asia are of a depth and scope historically unprecedented. The combined population of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and India is well over 3 billion, about half the world's population. Changes of the scale that are currently underway could be profoundly unsettling to international order. Strong growth will give Beijing and New Delhi the resources to pursue wider strategic interests across Asia and beyond. Strategic stability is not to be taken for granted, particularly in Asia where there are many territorial and other unresolved issues left over from historically complicated relationships. Great power competition and rivalry are facts of life.
Compared with those published in September, the December staff projections contained an appreciable upward revision in the average inflation rates for 2023 and 2024 to 6.3% and 3.4%, respectively, and also envisaged inflation averaging 2.3% in 2025 (the last year of our projection horizon), above our 2% medium-term target. Importantly, the ECB/Eurosystem staff projections incorporate a number of financial indicators that reflect market expectations of our future monetary policy. A key indicator here is the risk-free yield curve, which is strongly influenced by investors’ views o n the future path of our key interest rates. The risk-free yield curve also plays a central role in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy, because the financing conditions of economic agents (households, firms, governments) are often linked to medium and longterm risk-free interest rates. This is why the staff projections use as an input the path of both short and long-term interest rates implied by the curve. It is also why the ECB, like many other central banks, typically accompanies its decisions on (short-term) interest rates with communication on how it intends, or expects, to set the latter – and other policy instruments – in the future, as this improves its ability to steer the yield curve and thus attain the desired overall monetary policy stance. Therefore, the inflation path in the December staff projections was a clear indication that the financial conditions prevailing before that meeting were inconsistent with a timely return of inflation to our 2% target.

An excellent example of Ben’s interdisciplinary work is his book ‘The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth’, published in 2005. Economists have written countless papers on how to increase growth. But very few have addressed the question of why growth is desirable in the first place, in particular for societies that are already rich. Ben’s book fills this gap. It argues that economic growth improves the moral character of society. People tend to be more generous and tolerant towards each other when the economy grows. Economic stagnation, on the other hand, is associated with repression and bigotry. Ben’s latest book, ‘Religion and the Rise of Capitalism’, was published last year. It describes how religion has shaped economic thinking since the beginning of our discipline. The early economic thinkers of the European Enlightenment, such as Adam Smith, were not committed to religion. Ben argues, however, that their world view was profoundly influenced by developments in religious thinking. There is therefore a close connection between religion and the beginning of modern capitalism. With this I would like to conclude my remarks, since you are surely eager to learn more about this fascinating topic from Ben himself. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Benjamin Friedman with a big round of applause. Page 4/4
As such, an important priority is the development of a centralised data exchange platform by the industry in collaboration with key stakeholders in the medical ecosystem. Such a platform will not only facilitate the standardisation of medical claims data, but enable the industry to transmit and analyse data in a more systematic, efficient way over the longer term. On a broader scale, we are committed to developing the building blocks necessary for an open data ecosystem in the next five years. The first step we are currently taking together with the industry is to identify high-impact use cases. Given the diversity of innovators in the room today, I welcome interest by the fintech and insurtech sector to approach us directly or via your industry associations to propose impactful use cases that will act as a springboard for the development of common data sharing standards. Redrawing the frontiers for greater efficiency The second critical area is on how innovation has the potential of redrawing the efficiency frontier. Sean Gerety, a user experience or UX expert, shared this insight on innovation: "The technology you use impresses no one. The experience you create with it is everything". The protection journey moving forward goes beyond just 'quote to claim'. It must anticipate and fulfil multiple needs of consumers in a more efficient way. While we do see efforts made by existing players to transform manual claims processes with technology, there is room for improvement in Malaysia. The process of buying and claiming insurance remains cumbersome for many.

Events that we once thought to be implausible or highly unlikely, have become the “new normal”. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In many parts of the world, health care costs continue to rise, and many face uncertain futures as public sector safety nets and government finances come under increasing strain. Against this backdrop, financial inclusion for the underserved segments remains an elusive goal. For the insurance industry, this raises important issues. Two issues come to my mind. First is on the industry’s role in addressing a few of the challenges facing our economies and society. And second, the manner in which regulation and supervision can adapt to support broader economic and social development. In addressing these issues, I shall attempt to advocate the idea that a rethinking in approach is an imperative. New paradigms are needed to anchor business and public policy to the realities of the future. I will touch on three of them: competitive, stability and ethical paradigms. A new competitive paradigm In an increasingly interconnected world, traditional models of competition deserve a re-think. Network effects will become more important, both in increasing the value of insurance products and services, and to better manage risks. Rather than see the competitive landscape through a zero-sum lens, co-operative competition or “co-opetition” can result in synergistic benefits. The example of Hewlett- Packard (HP) clearly illustrates this idea.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Using economic development as an instrument for portfolio diversification, GDP per capita projections can be used to simulate the possible future course of home bias. Futurology of this kind of course comes with large caveats and confidence intervals. Given the simplicity of the model, it is a thought-experiment rather than a forecast. And underlying that experiment is an assumption that advanced countries continue to grow and diversify their equity portfolios, but at a slower rate than catch-up emerging market economies. Table 2 shows the evolution of equity home bias at decadal intervals out to 2050 for the G20 in this thought-experiment. Some clear points emerge:   All G20 countries see a reduction in home bias. The un-weighted G20 average home bias index falls by 0.33 between 2010 and 2050. That is roughly the same rate of descent as over the past 10 years or so.   Among a number of advanced countries, home bias has been significantly eroded by 2050, in some cases perhaps implausibly so. For example, in the US home bias falls from 0.51 to 0.09.   Emerging market home bias remains in many cases significant even by the end of the period, reflecting their higher starting point. Average emerging market home bias in 2050 is not dissimilar to advanced country home bias in 2010.   The implied reductions in home bias would have a potentially significant impact on the pattern of global capital flows.

The third step is the resolution of banks, applied by the Bank of Albania in view of the new mandate. Similar to recovery plans, the resolution plans drafted by the Bank of Albania aim to identify the legal and structural obstacles and difficulties with financial resources that banks face, toward resolvability. In this regard, the resolution plans are one of the key instruments to facilitate the Bank of Albania’s resolution implementation. This year in April, the Bank of Albania approved a bylaw that defines the content of resolution plans. Then banks were required to report a broad set of data for drafting these plans, based on the model of the European Banking Authority and we are currently in the process of drafting them. The drafting of the banks resolution plans is complicated, which includes complex and cross-border issues that must be implemented and coordinated within a short period of time. Hence, the resolution planning is an on-going process and a long-term mission to remove obstacles against the possibility for resolution action in banks. This planning does not mean drafting an annual plan that is stored somewhere in some shelf and it is dusted off only when its implementation is necessary; instead, it is the beginning of a long process of restructuring all aspects of the banking business that may hinder this process.
The second crisis occurred in banks founded after changes in the economic system that were not able to remain viable, because of either weak management and/or increased competition in the market as the transition period progressed. Croatia followed that pattern. The first banking crisis, the crisis of the old banks, as they were called, started with the beginning of the transition process (and even before it), and is even now ending with the sale of the rehabilitated state banks to foreign strategic investors. The costs of this crisis, brought about by the legacy of the past and as is too often forgotten, by the enormous consequences of the war, can be estimated at about 23% of GDP. These high costs are typical of countries caught up in a war, like Kuwait and Israel in parts of their histories. During the first half of 1998 the second banking crisis became visible in Croatia. The then government made a decision to rehabilitate two banks which represented about 7% of the total banks’ balance sheet. Bank rehabilitations are payed out of the budget. The Croatian National Bank required that bankruptcy proceedings be started in nine banks and four savings banks, while it withdrew the operating permit from one branch of a foreign bank, one bank and six savings banks. This has imposed high budgetary costs for the payment of insured savings deposits in banks in which bankruptcy proceedings have been started. The total costs of the second banking crisis could be estimated at about 4% of GDP.

SPEECH DATE:  17 June 2020  SPEAKER:  Deputy Governor Henry Ohlsson  VENUE:  riksbank.se  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  Monetary policy during the economic crisis* The economic crisis the world economy is now experiencing is the deepest for many decades. Both demand and supply have declined substantially around the world. Economic policy faces major challenges. Sweden, which is a small open economy, has been severely affected by the reduced economic activity in the world around us. Naturally, we have also been affected by how international economic policy to deal with the crisis has been formulated. I will in this speech highlight three challenges that monetary policy has faced during the spring. These challenges have by no means disappeared, we will continue to deal with them. The first challenge has been that the financial markets function less smoothly during severe economic crises. This has been an important base for the Riksbank's monetary policy during the spring. Monetary policy aims to attain the inflation target. A second challenge at present is that the inflation statistics are difficult to interpret. For instance, there are no prices for many goods and services because there is quite simply no economic activity on these markets. Monetary policy must also be forward looking. Under normal circumstances this means that monetary policy is formulated according to forecasts of future economic developments.
For the CESEE region, data shows significantly smaller capital growth in the post-crisis period (the only exception is Macedonia1). Though the decline/significantly depressed growth in TFP is the key factor for the observed slowdown in potential growth across the region, slower capital accumulation also played a role. Chart 4: Capital, TFP and potential GDP before and after the crisis (average growth rates across countries, in %) 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0  1.0 0.0 avg. 2000-08 -1.0  avg. 2009-16  avg. 2000-08  Growth of total capital  CEE  avg. 2009-16  Growth of TFP  SEE  avg. 2000-08  avg. 2009-15  Growth of potential GDP  Baltics  CESEE  Source: World Bank, The Conference Board Total Economy Database and NBRM calculations. Apparently, the region is in need to boost investment growth, catch-up with the pre-crisis level, and narrow some of the existing gaps. As, not only has investment been lower compared to the pre-crisis period, but also some of the international institutions assess their level to be below estimated benchmarks, which are consistent with the features and the development level of the region. For instance, EBRD in its Transition Report (2015-2016)2 provides estimates for the investment shortfalls in some of the countries in the region. The estimates are perceived as conservative, as they do not reveal the needed investment level. They rather reflect the investment level consistent with the one pertinent to comparable countries.

The main role of private equity is to fill the gap between internally generated financing and conventional market sources, such as bank loans and public equity. Unlike most stock market investments, equity investment enables shareholders to adopt a long-term and hands-on approach in their investee companies, fostering sound corporate governance and transparency, making appropriate contributions to business strategy and optimizing management. Crucially, however, it also contributes to the transfer of skills and has positive demonstration effects in terms of the development of local capital markets and competitive market-oriented behavior10. These modalities such 10  EBRD Transition report 2015-2016. 12  as, venture capital, crowdfunding, business angels, are relatively modest in the CESEE, although the same holds for the EU as well, where private equity has a share of around 0.3% in GDP. Debt market in the region is larger compared to the equity, averaging around 50% of GDP, which is still much lower compared to the EU-28 average of close to 160%. Yet, dominant part of this market segment is related to government securities, while the corporate issuance remains modest. In fact, in most CESEE countries, corporate bond markets remain small, or even nonexistent. Chart 14: Stock and debt market capitalization  Source: ECB and central bank websites. To recap, the region needs to mobilize finance, which amidst burdened government financing and structurally difficult access to bank finance for new and innovative companies, requires further development of the capital markets and more diversified portfolio of financial instruments.
Growth above this level leads to decreased unemployment and vice versa. But it is not just the strength of demand growth that determines the level of unemployment. Other factors, such as economic structures, are also involved and at some level of unemployment the only result of additional growth stimuli is bottlenecks and shortages. Wage costs will then rise in a way that conflicts with low and stable inflation. The GDP growth rate of 3.7% for the first half of this year accordingly exceeds any reasonable assessment of the Swedish economy’s long-term potential. For a time, however, such a high growth rate can be feasible if firms are able to recruit the necessary labour, for instance because the economy is recovering from a situation with high unemployment. That has been the case in Sweden’s labour market and pressure from wages and prices has thereby been able to remain low. Neither are any dramatic changes foreseen in respect of wages in the near future. But how long can this situation last in the present economic upswing? How far can unemployment be reduced without firms encountering recruitment problems more generally? Even with the high unemployment at present, it is, for example, already difficult to recruit computer consultants and some other occupational categories. The situation in certain segments of the Stockholm labour market is also tighter than in other parts of Sweden. But so far, the bottleneck problems seem to be fairly restricted. As yet there are no indications of more widespread shortages.

If we are to prevent another crisis, action is required on both of the fundamental causes. First, we need to resolve the problems caused by massive capital flows from poor to rich countries. Yet the imbalances are growing again. This problem can be tackled only by international cooperation – most obviously through the G20 – and I hope that the trade union movement will continue to engage with that process. Second, our financial system needs radical reform. Slowly but surely, we must move towards a banking system that does not put both the economy and your members’ livelihoods at risk. In the long run, banks will have to hold much more capital and be much less highly leveraged. Part of the answer is improving the way we regulate banks, and devising policy tools to control the risks taken by the financial system as a whole. The aim should not be to prevent all bank failures. Just as with every other company in the economy, banks that get it wrong must be allowed to fail, without risk to ordinary depositors or taxpayers. In 2008, banks were bailed out not to protect them but to protect the rest of the economy from the banks. That may not seem fair – and it isn’t – when other companies, such as Jaguar, had to stand on their own feet or go to the wall. So banks too must face market discipline. But we need to do more than reform our banking system.