samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The reason for this adjustment is that the future of the Libor is not guaranteed. The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority will only ensure that the Libor is maintained through to the end of 2021. The volume of money market transactions underlying the Libor has dwindled. This has also placed a question mark over the basis for its calculation. Given that our monetary policy is focused on the medium term, we are already adjusting our strategy at this juncture. Page 1/5  Berne, 13 June 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Our inflation forecast is based on the assumption that a specified interest rate remains unchanged over the entire forecast horizon of three years. The current forecast extends beyond the end of 2021 for the first time. The introduction of the SNB policy rate ensures that it will be based on the same interest rate over the entire horizon. So what is the SNB policy rate, and what changes does this entail for our monetary policy strategy? In answering these questions, please allow me to give you a brief recap of the three elements of our strategy and explain the impact this adjustment will have. The first element is our definition of price stability. The SNB equates price stability with a rise in the Swiss consumer price index of less than 2% per annum. Price stability is to be ensured over the medium term. This primary goal of our monetary policy remains unchanged. The second element is our conditional inflation forecast.

This is primarily attributable to a rise in the prices of imported goods. The longer-term inflation forecast is virtually unchanged. For 2019 it stands at 0.6%, up from the figure of 0.3% last quarter. For 2020, we anticipate an inflation rate of 0.7%, compared to 0.6% last quarter. The forecast for 2021 is 1.1%, 0.1 of a percentage point lower than last quarter. The conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate remains at – 0.75% over the entire forecast horizon. Global economic outlook  Our inflation forecast is based on assumptions regarding the development of the global economy. The signs from the global economy remain mixed. GDP growth picked up in the first quarter, with all large economies recording above-average expansion. However, manufacturing output again tended to weaken in a number of countries. This has been accompanied by subdued capital spending and a decline in the global trade in goods. The weakening in industrial activity is attributable to various factors, including difficulties faced by specific sectors – in particular the automotive industry – as well as the impact of protectionist measures and increased uncertainty. On the labour markets, the signals have remained positive overall. Employment figures have risen again in the advanced economies. Unemployment has continued to decline, and is now  Page 3/5  Berne, 13 June 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  at or close to historic lows. This favourable situation on the labour market is supporting consumer demand.
Our per capita income was then at RM17,600 (2004) per annum compared to RM37,800 in 2016. And yet, our rating remains the 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  same at ‘A-‘. Rating agencies assess sovereign credit risks based on a long term outlook and at most times are reactionary to certain events. This may result in the credit ratings falling behind the curve and not incorporating the latest market developments. For example, Indonesia was only recently upgraded to investment grade by S&P, more than 5 years after Moody’s and Fitch’s gave a similar rating. Market-implied ratings may be a better gauge of a country’s latest credit profile and is already widely used by the market. In the past 3 years, based on bond market yields, Malaysia’s marketimplied rating has at times reached levels that indicate a better rating than that assigned by the rating agencies. Throughout the first half of this year alone, yields for the 10-year Malaysian government securities have swiftly recovered to 3.9% from a peak of 4.5% last November, post-US elections, reflecting higher confidence in the Malaysian bond market. We are currently the largest bond market in ASEAN in terms of percentage over GDP. The Malaysian bond market continues to be resilient and well-functioning. Non-resident holdings of Malaysian bonds have settled at a lower level of 26% compared to its peak of 34.7%.

In contrast, during periods of capital inflows, it is natural for reserves to be accumulated. Reserves play a role in both circumstances to manage adjustments in the financial markets. This includes ensuring the stability of the exchange rate is preserved. This is how we maintain orderly market conditions. Malaysia’s level of foreign exchange reserves is adequate for our stage of economic development, domestic market structure and external position. Malaysia’s reserves is well-within the adequacy range, placing us in a comfortable position relative to regional peers and fulfilling recognised global standards. Malaysia’s long-term growth prospects also remain favourable. These are reinforced by both naturally occurring domestic economic trends and policy consideration, deliberation and action. Malaysia will also continue to reap its demographic dividends and benefit from a young and productive population for the foreseeable future. As education and income levels continue to rise, an increasingly affluent and informed consumer group would emerge – providing additional impetus for economic growth. Time and again, Malaysian policymakers have continuously supported growth by removing structural impediments and promoting an enabling environment for new growth areas to flourish. Strong banking sector and financial market that intermediate business needs. Malaysia’s diversified and well-developed financial sector can intermediate the business and economic needs of the country, enabling businesses to flourish. Malaysia’s banking sector is one of the strongest and most developed in Asia. Banks are wellcapitalised, with capital in excess of the minimum regulatory requirement of Basel III.
It's hard now to imagine that we had no formal banking supervision at all in this country until about twenty years ago. But for the most part such regulation today does not tell us what we can and cannot do, rather it sets the criteria that we must meet, and the behavioural standards we are expected to observe, in doing whatever it is that we choose to do. It leaves much more room for both consumer and producer choice, including producers from overseas, and much more room, and more incentive, therefore for competition and innovation. And, in that less prescriptive, more permissive, environment, the new technologies have brought about massive changes in traded instruments, in the way in which markets operate and are organised and in payments, settlements and delivery arrangements and so on, which, while not without occasional problems, have overwhelmingly on balance brought massive benefits in terms of market efficiency. In reflecting on this whole process in the UK, there are a number of characteristics of the general approach that I think have been important. The first relates to the extent to which it was market-driven. No attempt was made as far as I am aware - certainly not by the Bank - to tell market players what they should do individually or in organising themselves collectively.

Last but not least, the changes to the euro area governance framework for solving the deficiencies highlighted by the crisis need to stand the test of applicability. Only one year ago, Professor Issing insisted that the euro area prosperity was conditional on the observance of the rules of the club by its members. The turn that the Greek crisis has taken is relevant for the effectiveness of the new institutional architecture of the euro area. Unfortunately, the expectations that the Riga Summit should bring us closer to an orderly resolution have not been confirmed. IV. Should we be concerned, should we think positively or should we use our sense of humour? Currently, the debates over the present and future of the euro area are dominated by the assessment of the situation in Greece. For us, as EU members having not yet joined the euro area, these debates also raise the question of whether we should be very much concerned or take a positive, constructive approach. Although the trials and tribulations caused by the situation in Greece have often been described as a conflict between two totally different mentalities – namely, the Teutonic strictness versus the Levantine easygoingness – my view is that it is an overstatement, just like any generality.
Two facilities created earlier in 2008, the TSLF and PDCF, were set up to deal with the unwind of repo and other trades between private counterparties as doubts about the underlying collateral had increased.16 As discussed by Gary Gorton this unwind was similar to a traditional bank run.17 Since much of the credit boom leading up to 2007 was financed by  14  These experiences also, however, underscore the need for robust statistics on the financial system, and efforts are underway at numerous task forces and agencies to improve these statistics. For example, the Committee on the Global Financial System (currently chaired by New York Fed President William C. Dudley) created an ad-hoc group for the review of statistical proposals in 2010; see Committee on the Global Financial System (2012), “Improving the BIS international banking statistics” CGFS Papers No 47 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, November). Similarly, the Financial Stability Board and International Monetary Fund are currently undertaking an effort endorsed by G20 finance ministers and central bank governors to address financial market information gaps; see IMF Staff and FSB Secretariat (2011), “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps” Implementation Progress Report (June). 15  An example of this bewilderment is V.V. Chari, Lawrence Christiano, and Patrick J. Kehoe (2008), “Facts and Myths about the Financial Crisis of 2008” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Working Paper 666 (Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, October). Note that the current posted version is updated from the version as initially published.

While the basic legal, regulatory and supervisory framework that takes into account the distinctive features of Islamic finance are already in place, efforts are now underway to put in place a comprehensive infrastructure to deal with the new challenges confronting the international financial system. Looking beyond the current crisis, an integrated crisis management framework will be part of this infrastructure. It is recognised that a more facilitative and modernised legal framework is also required and that the boundaries of the regulatory framework for Islamic finance would also have to be regularly adapted to keep pace with the evolution and transformation of the financial system. Finally, the supervisory framework for Islamic finance is also being reinforced by a financial safety net framework that comprises the lender of last resort facility and a deposit insurance system. These financial arrangements are now in place in Malaysia. Also important are the institutional arrangements for resolution of troubled Islamic financial institutions. In Malaysia, we have in place a mandated resolution mechanism to provide for expedient, effective and cost efficient resolution of Islamic financial institutions. Yet to be put in place however, is a mechanism for cooperation between regulators within and across jurisdictions for resolution to contain potential systemic risks beyond the national boundaries.
The positive impact of this measure supplements and has been reinforced by other decisions taken by the various economic authorities, which, as I have said, have released a large part of the macroprudential buffers and have mitigated the impact of the pandemic on banks’ income statements. To date, the potentially negative side effects of these measures have been limited. Although the cost of capital for banks rose substantially with the onset of the pandemic, following the implementation of the broad raft of measures introduced to mitigate its impact this increase has been fully corrected. In addition, the recommendation to limit dividend payouts does not appear to have had a significant effect, at least in most European banking systems. 1  Another question that hampers the use of capital buffers by banks is that, under the current regulations, if capital levels fall below certain thresholds, preventive measures are activated, such as bans on dividends and the suspension of interest payments on AT1 and T2 instruments. Once again, banks would suffer the consequent stigma on the markets where these instruments are issued. 4  At the end of December, the ECB and the European Systemic Risk Board reviewed the recommendation. Given the continuing uncertainty about the economic impact of the pandemic, we have recommended that banks act with extreme prudence and that they refrain from paying cash dividends and conducting share buy-backs, or that they limit such distributions until 30 September 2021.

7  Investments of this kind would enable banks to face up to any major potential competitors –not necessarily financial institutions– that might venture into the credit market with greater guarantees of success. Allow me to end this address with a final reflection on the need to persevere with a European response to this crisis in the financial sphere as well. The response from the prudential authorities, along with the monetary and fiscal policy measures adopted, has so far enabled the initial impact of the shock to be absorbed and prevented the materialisation of a systemic risk in the financial system that would have further exacerbated the crisis and made it more persistent. However, some of the shortcomings that continue to exist have also been revealed. In this respect, the completion of the Banking Union with the approval of a fully mutualised European deposit insurance scheme would make a decisive contribution to ensuring financial stability in the euro area, both over the coming months and in the medium term. Further deepening of the Capital Markets Union project is also essential. Moreover, priority must be given to analysing how appropriate the European resolution and winding-up regulations are for a hypothetical systemic crisis, and the possible role of asset management companies in the event of severe impairment of European financial institutions’ balance sheets. To sum up, if we are to continue to address this crisis effectively, persevering with a European response - in the financial sphere as well - is essential. Thank you very much. 8
And short-term interest rates throughout the euro-area would be set, identically, by the ECB, that will have been established in the early summer of next year. From 1 January, 1999 the participating central banks would immediately begin to denominate their money and foreign exchange market interventions, on behalf of the ECB, in the new currency. Their national currencies would nevertheless continue to exist for a period of some three years, as broken-amount denominations of the euro, and it will still then be possible, through the payments mechanism, to convert those national currencies into euro and vice versa, effectively automatically, for anyone that wished to do so. The likelihood is that wholesale financial market transactions generally within the euro-area will rapidly switch to the euro-denomination, although that would be up to the operators in those markets. The principle that will apply is one of no compulsion but equally no prohibition. It means that, here in Hong Kong, you should expect to be able to have accounts denominated in euro across which to conduct wholesale, particularly, financial market activity, if you BIS Review 89 /1997  -3-  wished to do so, although you would equally be able to continue for the time being to operate across accounts denominated in the national currencies participating in the euro if you preferred. Euro bank notes and coin will not become available until some time probably towards the end of 2001 and it is unlikely that retail transactions denominated in euro will develop much before then.

The euro-member countries would have no possibility of adjusting either interest rates or their exchange rate independently, and they would have somewhat limited scope for independent fiscal adjustment because the Stability and Growth Pact would constrain the size of overall public sector deficits. And alternative adjustment mechanisms -- such as the labour migration or fiscal redistribution that helps to alleviate similar regional problems within individual countries -- are not well developed at the level of Europe as a whole -- nor are they likely to be, at least in the near future. So the risk is that the one size-fits-all interest rate could result in economic weakness and unemployment in some areas if the European Central Bank pursued a firm monetary policy or unwanted inflation in others if it were more accommodating. Such divergent national monetary policy needs within the euro-area could result from differences in the cyclical position as between one country and another; or from different fiscal positions, BIS Review 89/1997  -2although these, as I say, should be constrained by the Stability Pact; or they could result from external shocks which had disproportionate effects on some countries as against others. They may be the more likely because Europe starts from a position of generally very high levels of unemployment [ranging from around 7% in the UK, to around 10% in Germany, over 12% in France and Italy, and even more in Spain on a consistent basis].
Deepening and broadening our talent pool will be a continuing challenge for the financial sector and for MAS. MAS and industry players have taken steps together to address this. The Institute of Banking and Finance had been re-organised to better meet the needs of the industry as a financial training intermediary. It will also serve as a platform for the industry to provide regular feedback on manpower needs and issues. The industry has established the Financial Industry Competency Standards Committee, which will develop internationally aligned competency benchmarks for the whole financial industry. MAS is also working with specific industries to address their human resource needs through a manpower conversion scheme. This scheme will help mobilize, train and channel resources to support growth areas quickly. MAS will work with financial institutions to build and upgrade talent in the financial sector workforce. Singapore has always welcomed talented individuals to live and work here. They have contributed much to the vibrancy of our financial sector. Singapore must remain open to talent and continue to be a conducive environment to work and live in, so that we can continue to attract talent here, and also retain able Singaporeans. Conclusion MAS is committed to the vision of Singapore as a leading global financial sector, one which is competitive, fosters enterprise and innovation, and maintains high regulatory standards. We have made steady progress toward this goal and must continue to do so.

In addition, the lowest permitted level for total Tier 1 capital is raised from four per cent to six per cent. Basel III also introduces a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent, consisting of Core Tier 1 capital. This means that the banks should have a Core Tier 1 capital holding of at least seven per cent. If a bank falls below the seven per cent limit, its entitlement to pay dividends and to conduct share buy-backs will be restricted. The proportion of profits that must be retained within the bank increases the further below the seven per cent limit the bank goes. The idea behind this is to force the banks to accumulate their profits as capital instead of paying them as dividends to the shareholders. However, this will not affect Sweden, at least not directly. Swedish banks are well capitalised and have a quota for Core Tier 1 capital that is already above seven per cent. We will, however, see effects at the international level and, as we are highly affected by what happens abroad, Swedish banks and Sweden in general will also benefit from the fact that banks in other countries will become more resilient. Apart from the changes in levels, there are also stricter requirements regarding the quality of the capital held by the banks. As equity constitutes the difference between assets and liabilities on the balance sheet, both the size and quality of the capital will be highly affected by how a bank’s assets and liabilities are valued.
For example, output growth could be hindered by a number of factors: a setback in global recovery, further delays in the energyintensive industrial projects that have been on the drawing board, or cutbacks in household consumption resulting from consumers’ deciding to save more and improve their net asset position more quickly than in the baseline scenario. The negative effects of the last of these will subside over time, however, and in a small, open economy like Iceland’s, the longterm effect should be positive. On the other hand, output could grow more than in the baseline forecast, particularly if risk premia on Icelandic financial assets decline significantly in the near future, foreign credit markets open up to Iceland again, foreign direct investment increases, and overall business investment becomes stronger. But these are big “ifs.” The roughly 3% output growth currently forecast for 2012 and 2013 is quite acceptable in the average economic climate. But projected growth for 2011 and 2012 is weak in view of the sizeable slack in the Icelandic economy. Furthermore, the foundations are not strong enough, as the contribution of external trade to output growth is negative and investment will be far below the historical average, even if it increases significantly from current levels. According to the forecast, exports of goods and services will increase by a scant 1% in 2011, followed by 2% annual growth in 2012 and 2013, even though the real exchange rate will be notably below its historical average throughout the period.

The court judgments and IMF review were  4  BIS Review 158/2010  in place by the MPC’s September meeting, however, and as a result, the substance of the September statement was different as regards the conditions for liberalisation. But it was conditions that had changed, not the policy. As the chart shows, developments in Government bond yields in August and September have a bubble like pattern that is often described as going down the stairs and coming up on the lift (or vice versa, if one considers price rather than yield). It is likely, then, that factors in addition to the MPC statements were at work here. These could include unusually large leveraged positions, the structure and effectiveness of the market, and a typical bubble phenomenon featuring extreme tension right before the bubble bursts. For its part, the Central Bank will investigate what happened and draw the appropriate lessons from it. But this could be useful for others as well. At all events, if market participants are interested in leveraged speculation on the duration of the capital controls, they are free to engage in it. But if they do, it is their choice and their responsibility. The removal of the capital controls is certainly further off than many observers thought earlier this fall, but a delay of several years is not in line with announced intentions.