samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The value of the Norwegian krone against the Deutsche mark was nearly halved between 1973 and 1987. We paid about 2 kroner for 1 mark in 1973 and close to 4 kroner in 1987. Since 1987, the krone exchange rate against the Deutsche mark has remained more or less unchanged. During this period, price inflation in Norway has been no higher than that in Germany. We cannot be sure how fast the inflation differential between Norway and other countries will translate into changes in nominal exchange rates in the future. Nevertheless, we must expect that any differences in the rate of inflation may be a key cause of changes in the nominal krone exchange rate over time. The Norwegian monetary authorities abandoned the devaluation approach in 1986. From 1986 to 1992 Norway had a fixed exchange rate with a defined central rate and fluctuation margins. This system was abandoned in 1992 following extensive speculation against the krone in connection with the turbulence in European exchange markets. After the krone was allowed to float on 10 December 1992, the guidelines for monetary policy were also revised. Monetary policy was still oriented towards the objective of krone exchange rate stability, but no specific central rate with fluctuation margins was stipulated. The krone depreciated slightly in 1992, but thereafter it remained relatively stable. Looking back at developments in the Norwegian foreign exchange market in the 1990s, no significant change really appears to have occurred in 1992. However, there was a marked shift in January 1997.

And this is despite the fact that we have encountered adverse shocks in that period, not least the slowdown in emerging market economies and renewed tensions in the euro area banking sector. So what accounts for this improved resilience of the euro area economy? Certainly the recovery cannot be explained by “endogenous” or underlying growth forces, which were unusually weak in its early phase. Nor can several of the “exogenous” factors that have supported previous euro area recoveries provide an answer. First, in the past euro area growth has been closely interdependent with world trade, with external demand playing a central role in supporting the recoveries after the dotcom crash and the Lehman bankruptcy. Since mid-2014, however, world trade has weakened considerably and last 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  year grew at the slowest pace since the financial crisis. Yet the correlation with euro area output has more or less broken down. Growth has accelerated even as world trade has fallen back. Second, though fiscal policy has stopped being a headwind – as it was during the 2011–13 period – it has not been much of a tailwind to the recovery either. With governments still undertaking a necessary process of balance sheet repair, fiscal policy between 2013 and 2015 was basically neutral and provided only a mildly positive contribution to growth last year. This contrasts with both the post-Lehman and post-dotcom recoveries where the fiscal stance was more expansionary.1 Third, the contribution of the supply side to the recovery has so far been limited.
2  For more analysis of the impact of quantitative easing, see: David Miles, “Interpreting Monetary Policy”, speech at Imperial College Business School, London, 25 February 2010; and Spencer Dale, “QE One Year On”, speech at CIMF/MMF Conference, Cambridge, 12 March 2010. BIS Review 31/2010  3  That brings me naturally to inflation, the MPC’s mandated target. One might expect that, after such a sharp downturn, inflation would have dropped back. Indeed, inflation had fallen as low as 1.1% last September. Since then, it has moved up sharply, reaching 3.5% in January and triggering an open letter of explanation from the Governor to the Chancellor. That volatility in inflation can be explained in terms of a variety of factors impacting on the price level: the restoration of the standard rate of VAT to 17.5%; recent movements in the oil price and a year earlier; and the pass-through into consumer prices of the higher import prices associated with the depreciation in sterling. When setting monetary policy, the MPC looks through effects that can be expected to affect inflation only transitorily, to the underlying determinants of inflation in the medium term: inflation expectations; and the margin of slack in the economy. Despite recent volatility in actual inflation, inflation expectations, according to a variety of measures, have remained stable and reasonably well anchored at levels consistent with the target. There is, however, considerable uncertainty about the extent of the downward pressure on inflation from economic slack.

With output some 10% lower than it would have been if pre-crisis growth rates had been maintained, it would appear that the margin of spare capacity ought to be large. But the evidence from past sharp downturns after banking crises is that they can have a significant impact on the economy’s supply potential (Chart 8). Downturns typically lead to less investment, more capital scrapping, fewer business start-ups and more business closures and a restriction in the availability of credit is likely to aggravate these effects. Moreover, lower employment can lead to skills atrophying and the long-term unemployed becoming disconnected from the labour market. Business investment has fallen sharply in this recession – down more than a quarter from its peak – though only part of that is likely to reflect a restriction in the availability of credit. Heightened uncertainty is also likely to have played a part. But against that, both business closures and, as noted earlier, unemployment have risen less than feared. So the overall impact of the downturn on the present and future supply potential of the economy is rather uncertain. In addition, in present circumstances the extent of the downward pressure on inflation from spare capacity is also uncertain. Once one allows for the effect of transient factors such as the restoration of the VAT rate, oil price movements and the likely impact of sterling’s depreciation, underlying inflation has been surprisingly resilient. That could be because the impairment of effective supply as a result of the credit crunch is large.
I have been informed by the Chairman of Equity Capital Resources (ECR) Plc that the Company intends to list ECRUT on the stock exchange in the near future. When this commendable intention is achieved, ECRUT will be the first collective investment scheme to be publicly traded on the Stock Exchange in Zambia. With the calibre of men and women behind this investment vehicle, I am confident this will be achieved in the required time frame. When that time comes we want to turn back to this day and say “we were part of the birth of ECRUT”. The existence of the ECRUT shall provide means of resource mobilisation, bringing on board a collection of individual participation in the capital and money markets. This vehicle will  BIS Review 48/2008  1  facilitate the participation of investors who previously were not capable of participating in highly denominated securities in the financial sector. Ladies and Gentlemen, before I end my speech, let me quickly touch on an important aspect of collective investment schemes, that is, investor confidence in the managers and the industry itself. I believe by far this is the most important factor in whether a scheme can attract and maintain long-term investors. There must be a strong regulatory framework. Whereas there is a strong regulatory body in the Securities and Exchange Commission that vigorously administers the law to protect investors, fund managers must be committed to strong self-regulation and exercise professional ethics to the best interests of investors. This, Chairperson, is fundamental.

The people of this country are actually willing to put aside some of their earnings into safe and viable investments. However, safety and viability is only assured with professional investment management which can be offered by people like yourselves. Ladies and Gentlemen, in March 2008, the Lusaka Stock Exchange in partnership with the Bank of Zambia and the Bond Exchange of South Africa conducted a training and consultative workshop to enhance the Zambian bond market. Among the outcomes of this workshop was that one of the modes of collecting funds from the so called “small investors” in the economy is through Collective Investment Schemes. Collective investment schemes can be beneficial to small investors who may not have enough money to carry out a diversification and proper allocation of their assets. Small investor can benefit from diversification techniques usually available only to wealthy investors. With these few benefits in mind, I wish to earnestly appeal to you and other collective investment scheme providers that as you go about doing your business think innovatively about ways you can capture Zambia’s many small investors. Think about how you can provide them with an opportunity to invest in a broad range of assets at affordable cost. I have little doubt in my mind that as you take up this challenge, you will be able to create financial stability by being a good investment manager to this segment of investors.
Since the end of 1992 output has grown at an average annual rate of 2.8%, well above the post-war average. More significantly, growth was more stable, with a standard deviation less than one-half that of output growth in earlier post-war decades. And unemployment, as measured by the Labour Force Survey, has fallen from 10.7% at its peak in 1993 to a current level of 6.3%. So since the inflation target was adopted inflation has been lower, and growth as high, as in any post-war decade, and both have been more stable. And total output in the economy has now increased for 27 consecutive quarters, the longest period of uninterrupted growth since the Second World War. Part of the credit for this improvement in UK macroeconomic performance belongs to the policy framework (both pre- and post-MPC), and part was the result of favourable economic circumstances. From 1992 to 1996, the ability to grow at above trend rates without an increase in inflationary pressure was made possible by using up the margin of spare capacity created by the deep recession of the early 1990s. After 1996, inflationary pressures were contained by lower commodity and other world prices, and the impact of a sharp appreciation of sterling. These developments have had a significant impact on inflation. And they were largely unpredicted. So, although monetary policy has faced some difficult choices over the past two years, it has benefited from an unexpected downward movement in imported inflation. These external influences have offset a much higher level of domestically generated inflation.

Ben Broadbent: Monetary policy, asset prices and distribution Speech by Mr Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy of the Bank of England, at the Society of Business Economists Annual Conference, London, 23 October 2014. *  *  *  I would like to thank Alina Barnett for research assistance and I am also grateful for helpful comments from other colleagues in particular from Richard Harrison, David Learmonth and Gareth Ramsay. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. A few years ago, I used to take the overground train into work. The line was cluttered with stations – mine was barely 400 yards on from the previous stop. So you can understand why my fellow commuters were less than convinced one morning when, seeking to explain why our train was 20 minutes overdue, the driver said this was “because we left the last station late”. It raised a smile. But it wasn’t an explanation. I confess I have a similar reaction to accounts that seek to “explain” low interest rates, and the behaviour of asset prices more generally, solely by reference to what central banks have done. This is especially true when those accounts go on to attribute significant and lasting redistributive effects to these policies. For example, and at least when they happen to be going up, it’s quite common to hear that equity markets are benefiting from “easy money”.
That is why, at the beginning of 2007, in close consultation with the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, the Monetary Board developed a comprehensive monitoring mechanism of key macroeconomic variables in the external, fiscal and monetary sectors. These are based on a financial programming framework to ensure that key macroeconomic targets are met as announced, both in the Budget and our Road Map. We will continue to monitor these key macro economic variables and take appropriate policy measures if and when there are any deviations from the predetermined targets. We are therefore confident that we will be able to keep our economy and development agenda on track and make rapid progress. It is also our hope that our development partners will understand our strategies and efforts towards achieving macroeconomic stability and growth and we look forward to their close support in our endeavours. Finally, I would like to leave a simple message with all of you, our Development partners. The outlook for Sri Lanka is bright. We are optimistic about our country. Join us in our endeavours. Now is the time. 2  BIS Review 11/2007

In July this year, the Committee met in joint session with this working group in Krakow, Poland to discuss, among other things, Basel II implementation issues. In addition, the AIG has encouraged non-G10 supervisory participation in working groups that are addressing issues related to validation and operational risk. The AIG has also engaged in encouraging work with non-G10 supervisors to consider principles for information sharing among home and host supervisors. I believe that this dialogue will, over time, foster greater consistency among Committee and non-Committee members. The Committee is therefore committed to heightening this dialogue and will consider further ways to promote consistency. Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions and comments. 3/3
Although we fully appreciated the benefits that Switzerland would draw from the creation of the euro in terms of increased transparency and lower transaction costs, we were also quite concerned about the possible risks. Three of these came to mind. First, we feared that the Swiss franc might be in for a bumpy ride. In the past, whenever the dollar was under attack, international investors turned their attention to the German mark and the Swiss franc. Their status as safe-haven currencies meant that at times of turbulences on foreign exchange markets they would move well beyond what economic fundamentals could justify. In fact, the Swiss franc often revealed a tendency to appreciate even more than the German mark, a phenomenon that was generally attributed to the relative narrowness of the Swiss financial markets. Now with the German mark gone, wouldn’t all attention focus almost exclusively on our currency? Would it not mean that in a dollar crisis the franc would have to bear even more of the adjustment than in the past? Even more frightful, what would happen if the euro itself were under attack? The last thing we needed was for the franc to become the first currency in the line of fire, or something like the lightening rod of the international monetary system. A second apprehension that we had was that it might become very difficult in the future to conduct an autonomous monetary policy. Switzerland, together with Liechtenstein, would now be totally surrounded by a single monetary zone.

Second, the uncertainty regarding future consumer behaviour remains. During the quarantine and long self-isolation period, a lot of people abandoned some services, formed new consumption preferences, and changed their mode of life. We do not know whether they will become steady and how they will be influencing price trends. Third, after the boundaries are reopened, it is natural to expect that the demand will shift towards outbound tourism services. As labour migrant flows and logistics chains restore, this will become  a disinflationary factor. Finally, as the restrictions are eased, companies will be able to reduce their costs for the sanitation of their premises and the anti-pandemic protection of their staff and customers, which will ease pressures on businesses’ costs. In conclusion, I would like to comment on monetary policy prospects. The accommodative monetary policy and the Government’s package of anti-crisis measures have been promoting economic revival after the acute phase of the crisis. According to our estimates, we consider that the potential for monetary policy easing has been exhausted. Its further easing could additionally increase proinflationary risks. Nonetheless, monetary policy will remain accommodative on average throughout 2021, supporting the recovery of the Russian economy. The baseline scenario provides for a gradual return to neutral monetary policy. We will assess the timeline and pace for this return taking into account our goal to maintain inflation at our target. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
The positive behaviour of the economy contributed to and, in turn, was stimulated by the correction of the macro-financial imbalances accumulated during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Such corrections were particularly significant as regards private sector deleveraging, the reduction of unemployment, the progressive absorption of disequilibria in the housing market, and the balancing of the external accounts, not least due to significant gains in competitiveness. Looking forward, nonetheless, a number of questions remain open. Will this process continue at such a strong pace? Under which conditions would the recovery turn into a sustained and prolonged expansion? Which are the main vulnerabilities and weaknesses that policy-makers should tackle in order to raise potential growth and the well-being of the population? Is the Spanish economy, within the EU framework, well equipped to cope with the next cyclical downturn? Is the euro area as a whole well prepared? The programme of this conference approaches these questions, trying to identify some answers. The discussion is organised around four main topics: how to lower fiscal vulnerabilities; which are the main challenges for the Spanish labour market to function properly; how to raise medium-term growth; how to advance in the euro area architecture. Lowering fiscal vulnerabilities The first session of this conference deals with the policy priorities for addressing mediumterm fiscal challenges in Spain. The panellists are going to explore options to bring down the high level of public debt and to handle rising pressures from ageing population.

Among them: the setting-up of an European Monetary Fund, which would take over the current functions of the European Stabilization Mechanism, eventually adding the role of common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund; the establishment of an European Minister of Finance, who would also be Vice-President of the European Commission and Chairman of the Eurogroup; and the creation of a common stabilisation tool for investment, which should not preclude the future development of a genuine European budgetary capacity for economic stabilisation purposes. Those are proposals that deserve careful consideration. Moreover, the crisis has made it clear that the European budgetary framework is very complex, which highlights the need to simplify it. Recent proposals, which seek to reduce the current excessive number of rules, by focusing on the public debt to GDP ratio, as a medium-term anchor, and to the expenditure rule, as an operational tool, seem promising. In any event, reinforcing the oversight and control of fiscal rules is necessary to ensure their fulfilment. The aim should be that the budgetary governance framework is able to encourage countries to generate room for manoeuvre during expansionary phases, so that the stabilising capacity of fiscal policy may increase in the euro area, as a whole, at times of crisis. 8/9  Summing up: much work remains to be done in the coming months and years. We should make good use of the current benign environment to progress in our European integration agenda.
Iceland’s sovereign CDS spread is higher than the underlying fundamentals warrant, and positive developments in the next few months could make quite an impact on it. Credit rating agencies and others have given us a clear indication of which factors are most important: reducing uncertainty about domestic financial institutions, resolving the Icesave dispute, and demonstrating signs of economic recovery. But where do we stand? Has the turnaround begun? According to the forecast published by the Central Bank last Wednesday, it has: seasonally adjusted GDP is projected to have grown between the second and third quarters of this year. This assumption is supported by various high-frequency indicators such as groceries turnover and payment card turnover. As the chart shows, we assume that this trend continued in the current quarter, although we expect growth to be somewhat less. In examining the chart, however, the viewer should bear in mind that quarterly GDP figures are quite volatile and measurements can show a small contraction in individual quarters, even though such a dip would not be considered to constitute an economic recession in the conventional sense. But in connection with the economic outlook, it is important to remember that consumer confidence appears to have taken a bit of a dive in the past few weeks (see Chart 2), concurrent with the beginning of the legislative session in early October and the demonstrations that took place at the time.

Monetary policy requirements also have highest priority when it comes to managing the foreign currency reserves. This is reflected, on the one hand, in the conditions on which we base our investment decisions, namely security, liquidity and performance. On the other hand, the primacy of monetary policy is also evident in the way we implement our investment policy. We proceed here with great caution to avoid causing distortions in the markets. We take account of the security and liquidity requirements for foreign currency investments by ensuring that a substantial part of our portfolio comprises high-quality government bonds. At the end of September, 83% of foreign currency holdings were invested in foreign government bonds or held as sight deposits at other central banks and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). A further 5% were held in other investments, mainly corporate bonds. Approximately 96% of our fixed-income securities are rated AAA or AA. Around 12% of the foreign currency investments are in – exclusively foreign – equities. The SNB thereby holds equities to a value of about CHF 50 billion. I would like to emphasise that all of our equity investments are managed passively. We first decide in which markets we want to invest, and then replicate appropriate share indices. The primacy of monetary policy clearly differentiates the SNB from most other investors. In contrast to these, the exchange rate risk on our foreign currency investments cannot be hedged.