samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
D’un point de vue technique, le passage à l’euro au cours du dernier week-end de 1998 a été une réussite Au cours du week-end de passage à l’euro , le SEBC a suivi le déroulement des opérations de conversion à la BCE, dans les banques centrales nationales participantes et dans les principaux établissements. Des échanges réguliers d’informations ont eu lieu par l’intermédiaire d’un réseau de points de communication entre la BCE et les BCN. Il n’a été signalé aucun incident susceptible d’entraver le démarrage sans heurt du système, qui a ainsi pu débuter normalement ses activités le 4 janvier, à l’ouverture des marchés. Ces résultats témoignent de la qualité des préparatifs auxquels se sont livrés la communauté des banques centrales et les opérateurs privés des marchés de capitaux, ces derniers mois et années. Pour ce qui concerne la communauté bancaire et financière française, la fin de l’année dernière a été consacrée à la planification et aux phases de tests en vue d’organiser le basculement des marchés financiers au cours du dernier week-end de 1998. C’est grâce à ces préparatifs que le processus de conversion a été un grand succès. 2. Ces préparatifs ont permis une introduction réussie de l’euro sur les marchés de capitaux Le 4 janvier, l’introduction de l’euro s’est effectuée avec succès.

Actual and estimated repo rate Estimates with a simple forecast-based rule  it = 1.29 + 0.66it - 1 + 0.50(πFt , 1 – 2) + 0.26(πFt , 2 – 2) + et 10  10  9  9  8  8  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  0 2000 2001 Source: The Riksbank  Diagram 1, published in our latest Inflation Report, shows the actual path of the repo rate and estimations obtained with a simple forecast-based rule. It seems that on the whole, our actions can be explained fairly well by applying an equation based on the Riksbank’s own series of forecasts of inflation one to two years ahead plus a term for the repo rate’s “inertia”. Considering the rule’s simplicity, the deviations from it must be said to be small. The diagram accordingly shows that the Riksbank’s actions have been reasonably systematic and based on the Bank’s inflation forecasts. It is, of course, too early for a more thorough evaluation of explicit inflation targeting regimes compared with other monetary policy strategies. It is also the case that Taylor rules, albeit in a somewhat modified form, likewise give comparatively good explanations for a number of central banks that have not explicitly adopted an inflation target, for example Deutsche Bundesbank and the U.S. Federal Reserve.
William C Dudley: Panel remarks at Bank Indonesia-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Joint International Seminar Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Bank Indonesia-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Joint International Seminar, Bali, 31 July 2016. *  *  *  Linda Goldberg, Jonathan McCarthy and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. In my remarks today, I will focus on why global growth has been so anemic following the financial crisis and what we can do about it. I think it is fair to say that the global recovery following the financial crisis has been disappointing. Growth is below pre-crisis levels for the United States, Europe, Japan and China. For example, in the U.S., real GDP growth has averaged only about 2.2 percent per year over the period from 2010 to 2015, below the pre-crisis average of 2.4 percent from 2003 to 2008. This slower growth performance has been accompanied by relatively low inflation rates – persistently below the objectives of the monetary policy authorities in the United States, Europe and Japan. As I see it, there are many causes for these persistent shortfalls in growth, and they vary across regions and countries. Let me focus on the reasons for the United States in the post crisis period. Growth has been weaker than expected for many reasons.

The third point is the risk to growth. For the most part, we still see developments in the global economy as a key downside risk to Thailand’s growth this year. A key risk at this time is the strength of global recovery in the second-half of the year, given a more limited room in the advanced economies for using fiscal stimulus to drive growth because of concern over longer-term fiscal sustainability and the risk of eroding inflation expectations. Another issue is the possible spillover of concerns over sovereign debt onto the European banking sector. Domestically, the drought situation seems to have improved substantially after a bout of plentiful rainfall country-wide. Finally, we have risks relating to how Thailand’s political situation will evolve going forward. This is an issue which remains a known-unknown to most Thais. For this evening, I have been asked to dwell a bit more into the interactions between politics and the economy in the context of what has been happening in Thailand. Without getting too much off track, let me end my remark with three personal observations on this point. First, it is clear that politics does affect the economy and its performance. The channels of impact come largely through: (1) disruption to normal businesses from unsettling political events as we have seen in the last two years; (2) its effects on the country’s image internationally which negatively effects our international sectors such as tourism and exports; and (3) its impact on investor confidence due to the perception of political instability.
The PRA remains open to all insurers seeking to operate in the UK, and will assess applications against a clear and consistent set of criteria. This includes hosting business on a cross-border basis both from the EU and more broadly provided, among other things, that we are satisfied that the level of “supervisability” of the EU branch and its parent entity is commensurate to the level of potential risk it poses to the PRA’s statutory objectives of safety and soundness and policyholder protection. Where appropriate, branch hosting provides a relatively low cost, low impact route for overseas insurers to operate in the UK. Key considerations of the assessment of “supervisability” is our view of the approach home state regulators take to supervision (which is likely to be made easier when assessing the EU given our rulebooks are broadly identical) and the level of co-operation we can secure from home states, including on the exchange of supervisory information. This latter requirement is as much an objective for us as it is for insurers – our ability to establish and maintain productive relationships with home state regulators will in turn enable lower friction access between insurance markets. We are working hard to build on our existing relationships with European and global regulators, and engagement to date on this has been positive. There are advantages in the branch model for both insurers and regulators, not least that duplication of supervisory activity is reduced.

As Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, stated explicitly to the point2: “..that’s what we have to do with every variable that we look at, work out why it’s growing faster or slower than it was before and not to use some rather mindless regression.…The secret of good policy is to try and think trough what are the economics of the shocks hitting the economy at present. That in a nutshell is my philosophy of how you should do policy. Don’t rely on regressions from the past.” Having discussed the role of monetary policy and rather complex economic models, I will move on to the final theme which may seem more prosaic, notably measuring current inflation. In general, the production level of economic statistics is probably very high in Norway, as shown in international comparisons by the IMF among others. It would also seem that it is very cost-effective. Improvements are frequently made to the methodology and the compilation of CPI statistics. In August this year, the indices for electricity, books and air travel were revised. Last year, Statistics Norway changed the method for the treatment of rents in the housing market, and the previous year the food index was revised. A general view is that changes in statistics production should be well documented and should place particular emphasis on identifying the effects such changes might have on measured inflation.
The upward inflation reflected the improvement of economic activity, but its undershooting continues to reflect the operation of the economy below the potential, the low level of inflation in trading partner countries, as well as the strong exchange rate. I would like to focus on the last item – the exchange rate. The appreciation of the Albanian lek over the last two years has been at the focus of the Bank of Albania, as a result of a comprehensive impact of this factor on the overall economic and financial indicators, including inflation. Our analyses show that the appreciation trend of the exchange rate reflects the improvement of fundamental factors, such as narrowing of the trade deficit and of the current account deficit, high levels of foreign currency inflows in the form of foreign direct investments, and the improved confidence in the national currency in the domestic financial market. For as long as such appreciation reflects the effect of stable economic and financial factors, it does not lead to harmful consequences for the Albanian economy. However, its effects appear in the form of reduced inflationary pressures in the domestic market. The appreciation of the Albanian lek is estimated to have reduced the inflation rate for 2017 by 0.2-0.3 percentage point. In the context of the not-yet-complete utilisation of production capacities and of low inflationary pressures, the Bank of Albania maintained the direction and intensity of the monetary stimulus unchanged over 2017.

In 2017, the Bank of Albania, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the World Bank explored options for developing the secondary market of Government securities and improving the functioning of the primary market. This project will help in the Government securities trading, increasing the investors’ base, and forming a yield curve that is a representative one for the economy. Such a curve enables a better management of liquidity for all the financial agents, as well as a better monetary policy transmission to financial markets. I would like, however, to underline that the development of markets is a long process, which requires cooperation by all economic and financial agents in the economy. *** Turning to the contribution of the Bank of Albania in the overall improvement of the financial and economic context, I would like to present now our work with regard to safeguarding and promoting financial stability. The main aspects of our work consisted in strengthening the stability 5/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  of the banking system, enhancing its resilience to shocks and adoption of international standards. 3. Financial stability and banking system performance In 2017, the activity of the banking system was stable and supported the safeguarding of the financial stability. As at the end of 2017, the share of its assets stood at 92.5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The main financial indicators of the banking sector activity improved, and the net financial result of the banking sector grew considerably in 2017.
And the banking system, with much stronger capital and liquidity reserves, continued to lend – supported by new schemes such as the CCFF, built from scratch in record time. In designing our interventions, we have been careful to demarcate clearly between our respective institutional responsibilities: the MPC took the decisions on asset purchases; the Treasury bore the financial risk on lending to corporates; and we reminded financial markets that any usage of the Ways & Means account would be temporary and short term. In light of those actions, and similar steps by other central banks globally, core markets are today stable and well-functioning. That is no small achievement. But it is far too soon to take a lap of honour, even on the narrow stage I have occupied today. Financial markets could come under strain again, if there is another leg to the global infection cycle, or if economic data come out persistently worse than expected. And even if – as hoped – we escape that, the sheer scale of our interventions means we must, in time, ask ourselves hard questions about the financial markets we  14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  14  rely upon, and their potential to amplify the sort of ‘dash for cash’ we saw in March and April.

of ops Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF) per week US dollar swaplines  Audio/video calls bank wide (RHS) Attendance in Threadneedle Street office (LHS)  3000  40 2500  30  Calls per day  Attendance 11 Mar: Bank rate cut 19 Mar: Bank rate cut 23 Mar: Lockdown begins  14000 12000 10000  2000 8000  20  1500 6000 1000 4000  10 500  2000  0 28 Feb  13 Mar 27 Mar  10 Apr  24 Apr  08 May 22 May  0 Mar.20  0 Apr.20  May.20  Source: Bank of England Source: Bank of England  What have we learned? Some (very) tentative lessons  The Covid-19 crisis is very far from over. The medical and economic challenges we face are huge and potentially persistent – and many are not for central banks to resolve. Against that backdrop, I have covered only one aspect of our actions during the crisis: the steps we took to prevent the initial shock, and the uncertainty that came with it, from threatening monetary and financial stability. Let’s take the good news first. The central banking response was bigger, faster, and more comprehensively co-ordinated with domestic and international partners than ever before. We deployed the tools developed since the GFC – extending the dollar swap lines, the CTRF, the TFSME and asset purchases.
Without a regulatory framework designed for digital currencies, regulators in United States are reacting to abuses instead of proactively addressing risks. As an example, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the agency in the United States that regulates futures and derivatives contracts, used its enforcement authority over fraudulent purchases or sales of commodities to stop an alleged digital currency scheme.25 Organizers of the scheme claimed that the digital currency in question—My Big Coin—was backed by gold and actively traded, but the CFTC concluded that neither was true, that payouts to customers were funded with money fraudulently obtained from other victims of the scheme, and that the organizers misappropriated approximately $ million in customer assets.26 My Big Coin appears to have been a modern wildcat currency, but the scheme was detected only because the CFTC could regulate it as a commodity. We are fortunate that, today, the CFTC has this market-based authority to combat fraud in U.S. commodities markets that was not present in the wildcat era.

At a minimum shouldn’t we aim for clarity on certain essential features, such as clarity on the rights of digital currency holders and the nature of assets that back a digital currency? Third, are there key activities that are cardinal to the functioning of digital currencies that require special attention from regulators? These may include actions to create, distribute, destroy, or and transfer digital currencies, and may also include key infrastructures, such as the technology that underpins a particular digital currency. To the extent that these critical activities are performed by actors that are not within a regulatory purview, should we fill this potential gap in oversight? Fourth, should we agree on a common approach across jurisdictions on least some aspects of a refined regulatory approach? Digital currencies can be designed to be used across borders. Key parties may be situated across the globe. If we are to reach ubiquity in regulation, or at least something approaching it, isn’t coordination the way to do so? The Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision may address some of these questions, but it’s too soon to know what they will conclude. Last, should we consider other lenses through which to view these activities? Common sense dictates that we begin with an approach that considers protections for holders of digital currencies against unfair losses and the potential for certain digital currencies to present risk to financial stability. Are there other factors for us to consider? This is not easy stuff.
In this case, the “what if” question might be, “What’s the likely effect if national house prices did fall by 25 percent, enough to bring the price-to-rent ratio back to its historical average?” Before going any further, I want to emphasize that I’m not making any predictions about house price movements, but instead, simply discussing how a prudent monetary policymaker could assess the risk. First, there would be an effect on consumers’ wealth. With housing wealth nearing $ trillion today, such a drop in house prices would extinguish about $ trillion of household wealth—equal to about 38 percent of GDP. Standard estimates suggest that for each dollar of wealth lost, households tend to cut back on spending by around 3½ cents. This amounts to a decrease in consumer spending of about 1¼ percent of GDP. To get some perspective on how big the effect would be, it’s worth comparing it with the stock market decline that began in early 2000. In that episode, the extinction of wealth was much greater—stock market wealth fell by $ trillion from March 2000 to the end of 2002. This suggests that if house prices were to drop by 25 percent, the impact on the economy might be about half what it was when the stock market turned down a few years ago. Moreover, the spending pullback wouldn’t happen all of a sudden. Wealth effects—positive or negative—tend to affect spending with fairly long lags.

Ardian Fullani: Economic developments during the second semester of 2004 and expectations for year 2005 Statement by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 28 January 2005. *  *  *  The second part of 2004 has generated a larger economic activity, marking a certain general impulse, especially after a relatively quiet start of the year. The acceleration of production growth is reflected almost in all the economy sectors, while the major objectives of the economy have been achieved in conformity with the overall programme of the country's economic and financial development. At international level, this semester coincided with an acceleration of the confirmed tendencies in the first part of the year, especially with regard to US dollar performance and oil price rise. The Fed monetary policy has changed the monetary policy tendency, during this period, through some successive increases of the core interest rate, in attempting to prevent the inflationary pressures in the economy. On the other side, the European Central Bank, considering the inflation performance and the strong pressure against the Euro has deemed unreasonable to change the core interest rate, keeping it at the level of 2 percent for almost a year and half. Annual inflation in December resulted 2.2 percent, while the average annual inflation was only 2.9 percent. The maintenance of inflation within the targeted range was mainly attributed to the stable macroeconomic situation, the control of domestic demand of the economy and monetary indicators stability.
Except the temporary amendment concerning the short-term advances to the government before the Second World War, no major amendments were made to the Central Bank Law. 1950s and 60s were relatively easy years. However, the authorities thought that the provisions of the Law of the Central Bank fell short of meeting the necessities of contemporary central banking. Therefore, on January 14, 1970 a new Law on the Central Bank of Turkey was adopted. The new Law brought in changes on the structure of the Bank as well as changes in its policy implementations. The most important organizational change was replacing the General Director, the highest post in the Bank, with the Governor. As regards policies, the Bank was directly authorized to set monetary policy in line with the development plans and annual programs. The Bank was also authorized to conduct open market operations in order to manage money supply and liquidity and was entrusted with medium term discount credit facilities to real sector through the intermediary of commercial banks. In the 70s, there were significant developments in the world economy. In the aftermath of the first oil shock in early seventies, inflation all over the world economies became rampant. Accordingly, the main focus was directed towards the fight against inflation. The 1980s and 90s were the years where a number of structural and institutional changes were introduced in the Turkish economy. With various measures taken between 1980 and 1989 Turkey’s both current and capital account transactions were fully liberalized.

The second major program for disinflation was the exchange rate based stabilization program of 2000 under the IMF support. This program collapsed for known reasons in February 2001. At this juncture, one might wonder why Turkey was not successful in her disinflation attempts. I believe the answer lies, as already mentioned, in the lax fiscal policies. As I have already mentioned the very  2  BIS Review 57/2007  first law of the Central Bank did not have any provision for financing the government. However the amendment made to the law just before the Second World War to extend temporary short-term advance facility to the government, in order to smooth out the difference between timing of taxes and expenditures, was firmly incorporated in its Law in 1970. The provision stipulated that the government had the access to the Central Bank financing to the tune of 15 % of the total budget spending. Although this facility was phased out after the 1994 crisis, it was one of the reasons of fiscal indiscipline and high and persistent inflation in Turkey. As we all know, tough times call for tough decisions. The collapse of exchange rate-based stabilization program in 2001 was, in one sense, an opportunity for Turkey to “put her house in order”. The fiscal cost of the crises brought every individual in the economy to his senses. Fiscal discipline and tight monetary policy were the immediate answers to the chronic problems of Turkey. But how would this discipline be achieved?