samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But this presupposes that, instead of again remaining outside, we participate in the contexts where developments are constructed. Opportunities and risks The idea behind a single currency in Europe is simple. One currency is better than many - it makes things work more efficiently. Eliminating the need to exchange currencies reduces transaction costs. The exchange rate stability facilitates trade and investment. A single currency makes price comparisons and economic estimates easier, not least for small and  BIS Review 14/1997  -2-  medium-sized companies. More direct price comparisons should lead in turn to stronger competition and downward pressure on prices, to the benefit of consumers. But risks are also involved when a single currency is introduced in so many countries with geographical, cultural and institutional differences. The Calmfors report has highlighted the insurance argument. I agree that this is an important point against EMU and therefore warrants particular attention. Monetary and exchange rate policy can be used as a kind of insurance against major, unforeseeable shocks in a single country. Without it, large adjustments may be required in other parts of the economy. However, when Calmfors and others claim that country-specific shocks have been more frequent in the Swedish economy than in the EU’s core countries, they are on uncertain ground. There are many indications that the shocks in Sweden have been occasioned above all by domestic economic policy and other institutional conditions, in the labour market and in wage formation.

In the year to November, total household borrowing rose 4%, and consumer credit rose over 10%, the fastest rate since 2005. How household spending evolves, and the inter-temporal trade-off that households strike, will be important considerations over the next year. The MPC will continue to monitor these dynamics. In November, the MPC reiterated that we were choosing a period of somewhat higher consumer price inflation in exchange for a more modest increase in unemployment. But it also noted that there are limits to the extent to which above-target inflation can be tolerated. Those limits depend on the cause of the inflation overshoot, the extent of second-round effects on inflation expectations and domestic costs, the scale of the shortfall in economic activity below potential, and any risks around the development of imbalances that could threaten a sustainable return of inflation to the target. Recently, there have been signs of continued solid consumer momentum domestically and a stronger growth outlook globally. The MPC will monitor developments in the light of its inflation tolerance, and will explain its assessment and policy stance accordingly. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  16  It remains the case that the outlook for inflation will depend on the evolution of the prospects for demand, supply and the exchange rate. Monetary policy can respond, in either direction, to changes to the economic outlook as they unfold to ensure a sustainable return of inflation to the 2% target. 7.
While the ECB and the national central banks of the European Union will be heavily involved in the ESRB framework, it is essential to make a clear separation between macro-prudential oversight and monetary policy. The primary objective of euro area monetary policy will remain the maintenance of price stability. Financial stability lays the conditions for the central bank to pursue its task of maintaining stable prices. It is also the outcome of an environment of steady macroeconomic prospects and confidence, which only stable prices can ensure. Current challenges for European integration Ladies and gentlemen, although the financial crisis did not originate here, it has profoundly challenged the European economy – and it is continuing to do so. Economic and Monetary Union – in short: EMU – is a union based on two foundations: economic and monetary. These are two foundations that reinforce one another. Responsibility for the “M” is centralised and assigned to the Eurosystem with the ECB at its core, aiming to ensure price stability in the euro area over the medium term. We have defined price stability as an average annual inflation rate below but close to 2% over the medium term. How have we performed against this objective since the introduction of the euro? Based on current staff projections for this year, by the end of 2010, the average inflation rate in the euro area since the introduction of the euro is estimated to be around 1.95%.

The highly fragmented banking system and relatively weak risk management systems within the domestic financial institutions which prevailed in Malaysia prior to the financial restructuring and reforms that were undertaken from 2001 would have rendered the implementation of Basel II extremely difficult, if not impossible to achieve without risking disruptions to the intermediation process. The financial reforms that were undertaken to strengthen the underpinnings of our banking system are therefore instrumental in facilitating the smooth transition to the adoption of Basel II in Malaysia without adverse market outcomes. In the more recent period, the Asian region as a whole has made significant strides towards strengthening market structures and institutional arrangements for financial stability. Two developments deserve mention, in view of their important contributions towards mitigating some of the concerns surrounding Basel II for emerging economies. First, in the decade following the Asian crisis, the emerging economies in Asia have extensively developed their bond and equity markets. Measured in terms of market capitalisation, East Asia's equity markets have more than trebled since 1997. The bond markets in the East Asian region have also seen significant growth during this period with significantly improved liquidity conditions in these markets. There is therefore now a more diversified structure in the financial system. Second, within Asia, the regional cooperative framework has been substantially strengthened to support financial sector development, surveillance, crisis management and capacity building.
Governments, regulators, prosecutors and non-executive directors have all struggled to come to terms with firms that pose a risk to taxpayers, cannot be prosecuted because of their systemic importance, and are difficult to manage because of their size and complexity. It is not in our national interest to have banks that are too big to fail, too big to jail, or simply too big. Solving these problems is the work of a generation, and I hope that the financial community will rise to this challenge and not shrink from it. The City as a whole does merit trust. And, when the historians look back on this period many years from now, they will conclude that although we were not wiser than the financiers of the past, we did learn and we reformed, and the country benefitted and prospered as a result. As I leave the scene, there is undoubtedly much unfinished business for my successor. I am delighted that Mark Carney will be the next Governor. He brings a new generation of leadership to the Bank, as well as enormous experience from his time as a central bank governor and his role in steering the Financial Stability Board. He has my wholehearted best wishes for his term as Governor. Mark is, however, not the first Canadian to have been in the frame for the Governorship of the Bank of England. The very first Governor of the Bank of Canada, Graham Towers, was put forward by Keynes as a successor to Montagu Norman.

Mervyn King: A Governor looks back – and forward Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, London, 19 June 2013. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen: Chancellor: thank you for those generous words. It has been a privilege to work with you over the past three years, a period of great change both at home and abroad. Your support for the Bank has been much appreciated at this end of town, and you have changed for the better the regulatory framework that oversees the City. But we both know that the past few years would have been much more difficult without the continual support of two people. And I am so pleased that both Frances and Barbara are with us tonight. And I’m particularly happy, George, that neither you nor I have to speak after either of them because experience suggests that we would suffer from the comparison. Lord Mayor: let me thank you too for presiding over my final Mansion House Dinner. We have enjoyed many musical evenings together, and Barbara and I look forward to sharing many more with you and Clare after you shed the chains of office later this year. The City has been extremely fortunate to benefit from your energy, drive and can-do attitude as Lord Mayor. I shall not detain you this evening with a retrospective examination of my time as Governor.
Existing customers As I have already mentioned, it is likely that AIs will have to upgrade their due diligence procedures in some respects to comply with changing international standards. Obviously, these enhanced procedures would be applied to new banking relationships. But this begs the question about what should be done in relation to existing customers. To what extent should institutions go back and undertake renewed verification of the identity of existing customers? Our current view is that we should not impose an across the board requirement in this respect, but it would certainly be sensible to review those existing customers who fall into higher risk categories. The six major banks in the UK have just announced that they will undertake a risk-based initiative of this type. I would encourage those AIs with a large customer base to do the same. Other triggers for review of existing records may arise when a customer undertakes a significant transaction and where there is a material change in account operation or customer documentation standards. The way forward These are some, but by no means all, of the current issues we are considering in the context of our revised guideline. We hope to have something ready for consultation with the industry later in the year. While this may impose new obligations on AIs, we will try to ensure that these are of a nature that wellmanaged institutions would adopt of their own accord.

David Carse: Anti-money laundering and the role of supervision Speech by Mr David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers, Hong Kong, 23 August 2002. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen,  Introduction I welcome the opportunity to talk to the Institute on the subject of the fight against money laundering and the role that supervision plays in this. This is a good time to speak on this subject since we are currently reviewing our 1997 anti-money laundering guideline in the light of the latest developments in this area. I will use this speech to highlight some of the issues that we are addressing. It is also a useful occasion for me to remind the bankers gathered here today how important it is to combat money laundering. This should really go without saying and I do not intend to dwell on it too much. The key message is that authorized institutions (“AIs”) should view anti-money laundering systems as an essential means of self-preservation - and not as a nuisance or an unnecessary expense that is imposed upon them. The events of 9/11 have heightened the international concern about money laundering. There is less and less patience with jurisdictions, and their banks, that do not comply with the international standards laid down by bodies like the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”). The FATF has begun to “name and shame” jurisdictions that it regards as non-cooperative countries and territories (“NCCTs”) in tackling money laundering.
The outcome was almost one percentage point lower, that is, one and a half percentage points below the target. 4 That there may be a good deal of truth in this interpretation is supported by a number of critical newspaper articles published around that time, see, for example, “Nya direktörer men samma gamla riksbank” [New directors but same old Riksbank], Aftonbladet (2013), 22 May and “Ta tillbaka makten över Riksbanken” [Take back control over the Riksbank], Dagens Nyheter (2014), 15 June. 2 [17]  The important lesson to learn here is, as I see it, that it is absolutely key to show that you always do have your eye on the ball and do not let other factors come into the picture in a way that risks economic actors starting to doubt that this is the case. I have been reminded of this lesson on a number of occasions lately, most recently at the monetary policy meeting in October. The picture we painted at that time of monetary policy going forward, in which we predicted that the repo rate will be raised very slowly to take it back into positive territory in the longer term, was one that I largely considered to be well-balanced. However, I expressed considerable doubt over the next increase in the repo rate happening as early as around the turn of the year, most probably at our next meeting in December, as implied by our forecast for the repo rate.

One often sees forecasts as mean forecasts. This means in principle that the risk that the economy will develop less well is as great as the chance that it will develop better. A mean forecast for GDP growth abroad, for instance, balances everything that could give rise to lower growth against everything that could give rise to higher growth. Another way of expressing the same thing is that the forecast is a form of middle way of all the different roads the economy could take in the coming period. This way of working with forecasts means that one acts as though one has succeeded in quantifying the possibilities and effects of all of the different potential courses of events. A year or so ago there were frequent discussions of the risk of a split or disintegration of the euro system – what was the probability that this would happen and what effects would it have for Sweden? Today there may be reason to ask these questions with regard to an escalation of the Ukraine conflict or to a substantial fall in housing prices in Sweden. If one considers these difficulties in quantifying various possible sequences of events and probabilities that they will occur, it may not be as simple a matter to make decisions on monetary policy and make forecasts for future interest rates as it is sometimes made out to be.
In Europe, there would be little sense in giving a cheque to every household, which forms part of the US recovery plan. We do not have – fortunately, to my way of thinking – the same social model. Given the various social protection schemes in place in Europe, to which we can add forced saving during periods of lockdown, household demand should recover quite spontaneously. In terms of total demand, greater uncertainty remains around investment and external demand, particularly with regard to the time needed for the global economy to overcome the public health crisis. Supply from businesses could remain stymied in some sectors due to lasting loss of capacity (bankruptcies) and supply chain difficulties. This is therefore likely to require investment programmes and climate transition programmes that sustain demand while improving production capacity; and for that, priority will have to be given to financing joint initiatives at the European level , particularly given its higher "debt capacity". In this instance, our remedies for the crisis will be in step with our long-term priorities. At the national level, any initiatives to further education, professional training and more skilled employment will continue to be the best investment for growth: France had fortunately created one million extra jobs during the four years preceding the coronavirus shock; tomorrow, it will still be through our wealth-producing work that we will cover the price of this shock. 2/ How to treat the debts inherited from the crisis? Secondly, the question of public and private debt will arise.

Our arrangement – currently the most generous and costly in Europe – should avoid what has started to happen in the United States: ten million job losses in fifteen days and possibly a lot more tomorrow; it protects employees and their incomes and maintains production capacities for the future recovery. The measures also include state-guaranteed loans, up to a total of  Page 3 of 8 EUR 300 billion, repayable over one to five years and for an amount covering up to 25% of annual revenue. Overall, banks are playing their part, but the Credit Mediation Scheme’s services, under the aegis of the Banque de France, are involved and ready to assist any businesses experiencing difficulties. Already, each week we are receiving over ten times more cases than last year. I will now turn to the monetary measures of this cash shield. All over the world, the major central banks have taken bold measures to guarantee financing for businesses in the short term, through purchases of commercial paper, and in the medium term, through purchases of corporate bonds. In this respect, the ECB was among the first to lead the way. The ECB also stands out in that it has the capacity to provide banks with immediate and almost unlimited liquidity, so that the banks can in turn finance all the economic players: businesses, government and households. To do so, during the course of two successive meetings the ECB took some exceptional decisions.
But it is possible that the increased proportion of households on fixed rate mortgages means the full effect of 15  See Hansen and Sargent (2008)  Bank of England  Page 15  policy takes longer to come through and/or is larger when it does, such that inflation comes down more quickly through 202316. Given the uncertainties we face it is important also to be humble about what we don’t know or still have to learn. I favour a watchful and responsive approach to setting policy17. Although my bias is towards further tightening, if the economy develops differently to my expectation and persistence in inflation stops being a concern, then I would consider the case for reducing Bank Rate, as appropriate. Conclusion Let me conclude with two salutary tales. First a personal one. In a speech I gave in February 2022, I repeated the MPC’s collectively agreed line that some further modest tightening was likely to be appropriate in the coming months. I stressed the word modest as being significant and went on to say that “I do not envisage Bank rate rising to anything like its pre-2007 level of 5%, let alone to the kind of levels we used to see before the MPC was formed in 1997”. That speech was on 22 February, two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Given the experience of the last year, we have to expect and plan for there being further shocks and be ready to respond accordingly. Second a historical one.

Meetings such as this Conference provide an excellent opportunity to strengthen the links between central bankers and academics. I wish you a very productive meeting and a pleasant stay in Madrid, expressing my gratitude for your attendance to this First Annual Research Conference of the Banco de España. Thank you very much for your attention. 4/4
François Villeroy de Galhau: Central banks’ response to the “tragedy on the horizon” Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the SUERF – Online Conference, 14 October 2020. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to join you today for this discussion that, although virtual, will be very real in terms of the strength of the ideas put forward. I am grateful to Michala Marcussen for offering me the opportunity to give this speech on such a dense topic: central banks’ response to the “tragedy on the horizon”. Faced with an unpredictable shock, the past eight months have driven the global economy into uncharted territory. However, one danger is certainly looming larger at the moment : our lasting addiction to public debt. Let me be clear: in the face of the unprecedented covid-shock, a massive and one-off recourse to public debt financing was both inevitable and desirable. However, we have entered this crisis with public debt levels, which were already very high in most countries, with few notable exceptions. The continuous rise of public debt, along with climate change, represent two of the main long-run challenges that we face today. In his famous 2015 speech, Mark Carney spoke of climate change as the “tragedy of the horizon”. With this, he meant that this tragedy is inevitable if we do not act, but it is in the long term, possibly leading to a “status quo bias”.

The exit from exceptional monetary measures should be fully in the hands of the central bank and guided by its mandate of price stability. Fiscal authorities must also be credible and give guidance on their future actions, by committing to tightening the stance when the economy has recovered. They should follow a stronger countercyclical fiscal policy in good times, to create the space that is necessary in bad times. What Blanchard and Summers5 call “semiautomatic stabilizers” – stabilising fiscal policies that operate according to predefined triggers – could be an avenue worth exploring. Let me add as a conclusion that, against this backdrop, the Next Generation EU package constitutes a new and innovative element of the European fiscal framework, which contributes to a sounder policy-mix. Beyond the most recent political and institutional discussions, which belong to elected leaders, a quick implementation of this European Recovery Fund is an economic must. This innovation, while still a one-off, could also imply lessons for the Economic and Monetary Union, which from the start has lacked a permanent fiscal capacity at supranational level for macroeconomic stabilisation in deep crises. Either we succeed in designing – at end – credible and coordinated countercyclical rules for national fiscal policies, or we should think about some 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  central fiscal capacity, reversible in its use, controllable in its size, but effective through the cycle. This should be one area of discussion in the “European momentum” which the crisis has initiated. Thank you for your attention.