samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The emerging economies were hardest hit by the previous global crisis in the late 1990s. This time OECD countries were the most severely affected. But Norway seems to have largely escaped the crisis. Overall, output has fallen to a lesser extent in Norway than in other countries and it recovered more quickly. Unemployment has remained low. One might almost believe that Norway was immune to crises and that the country is unique. But this is not the case. It is dangerous to believe that we will be able to manage every crisis as successfully. 2  IMF Country Report No. 10/24, January 2010. Norway: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation. BIS Review 15/2010  7  Norway is not unique. We cannot expect driving forces to be as beneficial in the future. Real interest rates cannot be expected to fall. Another sharp boost to export prices is not likely. In addition, Norway’s economy is now vulnerable. Norwegian labour has never been as costly as it is today. Norwegian businesses may be at a disadvantage in tenders and competitions given the current high level of spare capacity in other countries. Moreover, it has never been more profitable to relocate activities abroad. During the upturn, Norwegian firms fared well in spite of high costs thanks to efficiency gains, high turnover volumes and price increases. The cost of Norwegian labour has been very high, but there has been full employment. Markets will be more demanding ahead.

Moreover, the valuation of property as a basis for wealth tax has been completely arbitrary. The new property valuation system is a small but is the right step towards applying market valuation as a basis for housing taxation. Third, property is an effective tax vehicle but property taxes are low. Property cannot be relocated. Nor does property tax distort the use of resources in the way that taxation of labour and entrepreneurship does. An increase in property tax will dampen fluctuations in house prices and credit cycles, reducing the magnitude of both gains and losses. Tax on capital gains on housing, and deductibility of losses, would in particular make a considerable contribution to attenuating price spirals in the housing market. The result would be a more stable economy. 3 Driven by the tax system, housing accounts for a large share of household wealth. On an uncertain basis, the value of housing capital can be estimated at over NOK 4.5 trillion, or more than one and half times the size of Norway’s sovereign wealth fund. 4 The high degree of concentration on housing investment crowds out business investment. Higher property taxes would increase growth potential because business investment would become more profitable. 3  See Paul van den Noord (2005) “Tax incentives and house price volatility in the Euro area: Theory and evidence.” Economie international 101, pp. 29–45. 4  The figures are based on the model documented in Staff Memo 2006/4, Norges Bank.
This is confirmed by the fact that since midOctober 2010, when the idea of private sector involvement in programmes to assist countries experiencing difficulties was voiced at the highest political level, and in spite of subsequent clarification that in fact no change had occurred in prevailing practices, some euro area market segments have severely suffered. The benefits of a deep and liquid financial market where international investors feel safe to invest have been jeopardised, undermining the competitiveness of the euro. The alternative is for policy-makers to take responsibility and strengthen the economic governance framework of the euro area, in at least three ways. First, the governance framework underlying budgetary policy requires bold changes, with greater automaticity and stronger commitment on the part of policy-makers to ensure full compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact.3  3  4  The ECB published a long article on its views in this regard in the March 2011 issue of the Monthly Bulletin. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second, further progress should be achieved in the implementation of the single market, strengthening the “economic leg” of EMU. Finally, we need to further integrate regulatory and supervisory institutions for the financial sector at the European level, either by reinforcing efforts to harmonise practices across Member States, or by further strengthening European authorities. A great deal has been achieved over the past few months, but much remains to be done to put the Union in a position to meet the challenges which have emerged as a result of the crisis.

Overall, I believe that Europe has the ability to meet the challenges that the western world faces, if it is able to make full use of its own experience and institutions. Changes are nevertheless needed. And this brings me to the questions specific to Economic and Monetary Union. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In this regard, I would like to make two main points: first, the global economy is becoming increasingly “multipolar” and the euro will have to stand its ground alongside at least three – and possibly more – other major international currencies. Second, the euro can only be assured of a major role in a multipolar currency world if the architecture underlying the single European currency is sufficiently strong. The task of achieving this cannot be delegated to financial markets and requires appropriate institutional steps. The euro in a multipolar world When the idea of the single currency was first mooted in the 1980s, the global economy was dominated by three countries: the United States, Germany and Japan. Since then, the global economy has seen major changes. With the ongoing integration of global markets, we have witnessed the rise of emerging market economies. China, in particular, has led to a progressive shift in the centre of economic gravity and is expected to overtake the United States in terms of GDP at market exchange rates sometime from 2025 onwards.
Transition experience so far has shown that high trade deficits were not just financed through official capital flows, which undoubtedly have played a key role, but also through remittances that have increased financing opportunities within current account. During the period 1994 – 2004, out of 6.3 billion USD current transfers that entered the country, 5.8 billion is estimated to be contribution of Albanian emigrants. economic developments. Although during the first stage of transition, inflationary and depreciation expectations were high, monetary policy reaction by the Bank of Albania of  1/5  keeping high (Lek) interest rates, ensured a normal inflow of remittances in Albania. Between 1994 and 1996 the attraction of foreign exchange inflow was further boosted by extraordinarily interest rates offered by pyramid schemes, reaching a historical peak level in 1996. A considerable drop in the volume of remittances was recorded during 1997 and 1999, a period characterized by a political and social unrest.1 With the return of serenity remittances inflow picked up again. The Bank of Albania estimations indicate that total workers’ remittances has reached around 1,028 million (one billion) of USD or 13.5 percent of GDP. This is main country export. Furthermore, remittances are estimated to be three times higher than foreign direct investments (FDI) inflow and its value exceeds by far official aid from abroad. I want to concentrate a bit more on the mechanism of transfers and on the ways remittances are used.

It’s also crucial because it complements, on the one hand, the fiscal stimuli launched by national governments, and on the other, the rapid and powerful intervention by the ECB since the start of this crisis. With all these measures now in 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  play, Europe is better equipped to respond to this unprecedented crisis. The agreement includes a generic reference to a future recovery fund that is yet to be defined. What criteria do you think it should meet? The ECB has always stressed the need for our Economic and Monetary Union to be completed in order for the euro area to become more resilient. On the one hand, we need a European deposit insurance scheme so that savings have the same protections in every country. We’ve also called for progress in capital markets so that euro area firms have access to more sources of funding. And in the fiscal sphere, we need a shared budgetary instrument that completes the monetary union. The fund that has been proposed could go in that direction, but its size and how it is funded remain open to discussion and will depend on future decisions by governments. In any case, the determination to present a shared response is very significant, because it is a strong political signal, and also a strong signal to the markets. Spain started the debate when it too voiced its opposition to the use of the ESM.
Focusing only on direct channels, the effects that one would expect to ripple back to the United States from problems in one or two EMEs typically look quite small. But, when all of the indirect channels of feedback are aggregated properly – which admittedly is difficult to do – the effects may be considerably larger. My point is that we tend to underestimate these feedback effects. For most of us, the market volatility of this past spring and summer still remains fresh in our minds. EME financial markets were hit hardest, with declines in equity prices, a widening in sovereign debt spreads, and a sharp increase in foreign exchange rate volatility. In the U.S., we saw a spike in Treasury yields, with 10-year rates rising by roughly 100 basis points from early May to early July, and rising by roughly another 30 basis points before peaking in early September. Most commentary has focused on the shift in expectations with respect to U.S. monetary policy – and, in particular, to uncertainty about the timing and implications of Fed tapering – as the catalyst for these moves. This focus seems generally right, although other factors also played a role. Market participants also had to evaluate the possibility that growth in China and other EMEs might be slowing even as growth in the U.S. and other advanced economies  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  was picking up.

Moreover, our last system of explicit coordination – the system of fixed exchange rates under Bretton Woods – broke down for a reason. Monetary policy meant to suit everybody is likely in the end to suit nobody. Similar considerations underlie the widespread move in the emerging world away from fixed exchange rate regimes. Policymakers worldwide have learned that a framework capable of responding in a disciplined but flexible manner to changing domestic conditions works best over the long run. While explicit coordination looks neither feasible nor desirable, there is more that central banks in general, and the Fed in particular, could do to be better global stewards. One thing recent events demonstrate is the importance of effective Fed communication. It is clear in retrospect that our attempts last spring to provide guidance about the potential timing and pace of tapering confused market participants. In particular, markets seemed to conflate tapering with monetary policy tightening and raised their expected paths for policy rates. Lately, we seem to have done better: markets now seem to understand that policy rates will likely remain exceptionally low for a considerable period of time even after tapering is completed. As you know, we’ve taken a number of steps in recent years to increase transparency and improve our communications.
With that move, the algorithm broke all previous human playing conventions, built up over thousands of years of play. If you watch the documentary of the match, Move 37 appeared to personally traumatise the World Champion Lee Sedol.38 He promptly lost the game and, in time, the match. Much less widely reported on, but for me as interesting, is what happened in Game 4, Move 78. This move was played not by the AlphaGo algorithm, but by Lee Sedol. This, too, broke all centuries’-old human conventions; it was the imagined made real. Watching the film, Move 78 appeared to send the AlphaGo algorithm into meltdown. It was digitally traumatised, began playing erratically and promptly lost the game. It is difficult to know what prompted Lee Sedol to create an untried and untested move. Perhaps the personal trauma of Move 37 caused some re-wiring of his brain. Perhaps out of destruction was forged creativity, as after the Great Fire. If so, this would be an example of co-evolution in practice, with the neurological and the technological combining in a mutually beneficial cycle. 35  https://www.soci.org/news/general-news/dr-hermann-hauser-delivers-machine-learning-lecture Berlucci (2009). Carr (2011). 38 https://www.alphagomovie.com/ 36 37  15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  Since 2016, humans playing Go have adapted their playing strategies learning from the ever-improving algorithms. The same was true of Chess champions after Deep Blue. Move 37, or its successor strategies, has become a new human convention. This creativity was machine-assisted.

Caleb M Fundanga: Growth and development of the Zambian economy Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of the Standard Chartered Bank Plc, Livingstone, 7 January 2009. *  *  *  The Deputy Minister of Southern Province, Hon Daniel Munkombwe; The Standard Chartered Bank – Acting Managing Director, Mr. Robin Bairstow Members of the Press; Distinguished Guests; Ladies and Gentlemen Allow me to begin by thanking Mr Bairstow and his Colleagues for inviting me to this occasion which marks the official opening of the Standard Chartered Bank Plc , Livingstone Falls Park Agency. I congratulate Standard Chartered Bank Plc for yet another milestone achievement. Hon. Minister, I have stated at various fora that it is important for banks in Zambia to take actions which support the growth and development of our economy. We need banks to open new branches, such as this one, to increase the convenience for our people to access banking services; thereby increasing the efficiency of our economy and empowering our citizens. In particular, I have been encouraging banks to expand their services to areas with vast economic potential like Livingstone, which represents a Win-Win situation for both the bank and the City. I am glad that, although, Standard Chartered Bank already has an established branch in Livingstone, it has chosen to expand its services to other areas of the City in order to bring its products and services to the customer’s door step.
The opinions reflect only those of the author. 2  In the United States, the debate is well captured by the two editorials that appeared in the New York Times on 4 May 2009: one by Paul Krugman arguing that Japan-style deflation loomed; and the other by Allan Meltzer fearing a return of 1970s inflation: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/opinion/. See also The Economist of 9 May 2009, page 15. The risk of global deflation has been pointed out in several articles by Nouriel Roubini (www.rgemonitor.com). Inflation risks in Europe and globally were flagged by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a speech in Berlin on 2 June 2009 (http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_1498/Content/DE/Rede/2009/06/2009-06-02-merkel-insm.html). BIS Review 81/2009  1  thorough examination of the risks, in much the same way as a disease calls for a sound diagnosis if it is to be properly treated. I will start the discussion by explaining how deflationary risks should be monitored and assessed by central banks, in particular with respect to the current situation. I will then turn to inflation expectations, over the short and medium term, to assess in particular how well they are anchored to the objective of price stability. Then I will consider how monetary and credit aggregates can be of use in the current conditions to assess the balance of risks. I will conclude with the monetary policy actions required to ensure price stability in an environment subject to downward and upward pressures to price stability. 1.

In contrast to developments in M3, the growth rate of the narrow monetary aggregate M1 has – after a trough in the third quarter of 2008 – started to rise again, and reached 5.3% in the first quarter of 2009. While M1 developments usually prove inferior to M3 developments in terms of their information content about future inflation, in the case of the euro area they have traditionally exhibited good leading indicator properties for future real GDP growth. Taken per se, such a development would also speak against a deflationary scenario and might offer valuable insights into the timing of the recovery. To conclude, monetary indicators provide important information to try understanding the likelihood of different scenarios ahead. In this respect, the real-time problem which is always prevalent in monetary analysis – but also in other types of analysis – becomes more serious in a financial crisis. 4. Short and long term policy responses to the crisis  There are inevitable challenges associated with policy actions in times of crisis. Central banks around the world have embarked on untested areas of monetary policy-making. Expansionary fiscal policies and government interventions to stabilise the financial sector are expected to dramatically increase public debt. This could pose a severe threat to the sustainability of public finances and eventually to macroeconomic stability. To preserve macroeconomic stability over the medium term, there is a need for careful monitoring of the policy stimulus over the policy-relevant horizon, combined with well-designed exit strategies from non-standard policy-making.
Jarle Bergo: Cyclical developments and monetary policy Speech by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at Regional network, Region East, Oslo, 10 November 2004. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 3 November, Inflation Report 3/04 and on previous speeches. The references and the  Charts in pdf-format can also be found on the website of the Norges Bank. * * * Price stability, in the sense of low and stable inflation, is the objective of monetary policy in a number of countries. Historically, the experience of Norway and other countries is that high inflation has resulted in unstable output and employment. In addition, a fall in the price level will often occur in tandem with a downturn. The first inflation target was introduced in New Zealand in 1990. Canada followed in 1991, the UK in 1992, and Sweden and Australia in 1993. A number of other countries have followed suit. In Norway, the Government issued a regulation introducing an inflation target in 2001. Monetary policy in euro area countries and Switzerland is also aimed at price stability, even though this is not referred to as inflation targeting in these countries. Inflation targeting has proved to be particularly appropriate in very open, small and medium-sized economies.

They know we sit on a large amount of the gold and dollar reserves of the world. But what they think is really cool is the Fed Challenge, and how they can win a place in the national competition. My wife said to me this morning that the Fed Challenge sounds considerably more fun and exciting than the real thing. I applaud all of you who contribute to this effort. And I thank the NAF for its tribute to the New York Fed. 2/2
An economic or financial policymaker without credibility, history tells us, ceases to be a functioning policymaker. Removal of the veil, breaches of the social contract, leaves the economy and financial system vulnerable. There is no single measure, nor quick fix, for closing these twin deficits with the general public. The supply chain for secret sauce, of building and restoring trust and understanding, is long and arduous. Nonetheless, it seems clear that increased engagement between policymakers and wider society is a necessary ingredient for its manufacture. From other spheres, such as medicine, we know that trust and understanding are built on everyday engagement. For the Bank of England, with the scars of the financial crisis still healing, the case for continuing to build those foundations is strong. 2  Haldane (2017a). The RSA call these benefits improved “agency” among citizens. Tetlock and Gardner (2016). The RSA call these benefits improved “efficacy” of policymaking. Botsman (2017). 5 See, for example, the Edelman Trust Barometer. The RSA call these benefits improved “legitimacy” of policymaking. 3 4  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  The Means  If the case is strong, how best is this citizen engagement to be achieved? The RSA report provides a nice framework for addressing this question. This is based on the “ladder of participation” model, devised 6  originally by Sherry Arnstein in the late 1960s. The rungs of the engagement ladder are, in ascending order: inform; consult; involve; collaborate; and empower.

Some of my findings – in the form of words, photos and cartoons – are available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/outreach#. I find that cartoons can be particularly effective, indeed much better than words, in capturing the sentiment and narrative in the room. For example, consider this one on what the local community saw as their key challenges and frustrations, taken from my visit to South Wales. Or this one, on the role of charities in the community from my visit to Leicester. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Or this one, on housing and other issues facing young people from my recent visit to Blackpool. These pictorial narratives provide a simple visual summary which, unlike the written word, can be digested by anyone in less than a minute. They are also a very useful cross-check on my own understanding and a check on my own cognitive biases. Often, I find that the message my non-economist scribe, David, takes from these meetings is different than my own. 14  In these situations, I take David’s reading of the room as  probably the truer reflection of what citizens have really said. I call these visits my Townhall Tours, though this is a rubbish description as I have yet to visit a town hall. I am told that anthropologists would call what I am doing “deep hanging out”, after anthropologist Clifford Geertz. 15  Deep hanging out sounds more appealing than visiting town halls.