samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This Office has also acted as the go-between with the head office of the Bank of Japan in Tokyo, for which I thank it sincerely. While the Banque de France has been seconding a representative to the French Embassy in Tokyo since 1976, the Representative Office of the Bank of Japan was set up in Paris over 50 years ago. This Office is an extremely strong and precious link between our two institutions, which enjoy exceptionally good long-standing relations. The Banque de France is very attached to the presence of this Office in Paris and strives to provide it with assistance and information. This Office is also, I believe, for the Bank of Japan, a prime vantage point for observing the French economy and the Paris Financial Centre, naturally, as well as a particular vantage point for the euro area, which is highly complementary with that provided by its Office in Frankfurt. For these reasons the Bank of Japan has retained this representation in Paris, and we are extremely pleased that it has. In addition to this very strong institutional foundation of the relationship between the Banque de France and the Bank of Japan, you, Governor Fukui, bring an important personal dimension in the form of your personal attachment to our country. It should be pointed out that, in the early 1970s, you yourself worked in the Bank of Japan’s office in Paris.

M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul: National Central Bank and building world peace  Speech by Mr M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the 27th International Conference on World Peace “Building a Culture of Peace in the New Millennium”, held in Bangkok on 1 December 2000. *  *  *  Members of the Professors World Peace Academy, Participants of the 27th International Conference on World Peace, Ladies and gentlemen. The history of central banking is normally agreed to have begun around four thousand years ago in the Greece, Roman and other empires up to the middle ages when banks were put up primarily for the purpose of getting finance for governments to wage war. So the first period of central banking cannot very well be said to have been in conformity with the topic I’ve been asked to talk about here today, which is entitled “National Central Bank and Building World Peace”. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and especially later on when industrialisation began in earnest, there were great needs for finance for the many various industries that sprang up around that time. Commercial banks and great finance houses became common but the limitations of the technology of that period of using precious metals as currency became quickly apparent. Commercial banks began issuing their own paper notes, for the amount of the valuable metals that they had in stock being much more transportable.
Our monetary policy strategy is based on using a highly expansionary monetary policy to safeguard confidence in the inflation target, which has provided a nominal anchor for the Swedish economy for over 20 years. However, we are well aware that the low interest rate level increases the risk of problems arising on the housing market later on and that measures need to be taken elsewhere to make our strategy successful in the longer term. Consequently, when we discuss possible measures for the housing market and household indebtedness, this is a matter of risk management: of adopting measures today to prevent the risk of unfavourable events later on. When it comes to the exact design of measures, to some extent it is, therefore, a matter of subjective opinions and not an exact science. The mandate for macroprudential policy in Sweden must be clarified Macroprudential policy is the policy area which has come to dominate the international discussion about reducing risks linked to household indebtedness. 12 Several targeted tools are offered within macroprudential policy which could be used for this purpose. For example, requirements could be placed on banks’ equity by introducing countercyclical capital buffers and risk-weight floors on mortgages, and limits could be placed on how much households can borrow by way of loan-to-value limits and an amortisation requirement. It is therefore obviously very concerning that the previously adopted macroprudential policy framework in Sweden has encountered legal problems.

Stefan Ingves: The housing market and household indebtedness from a central bank perspective Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at SNS (Centre for Business and Policy Studies), Stockholm, 19 November 2015. *  *  *  Why are the housing market and household indebtedness important to the Riksbank? As you have no doubt noticed, the Swedish housing market and Swedish household indebtedness are being widely discussed. In my speech today, I intend to discuss this matter from a central bank perspective. Why is it so important for us at the Riksbank? In this context, it is important to remind ourselves of our role in the Swedish economy. Under the law, the Riksbank has two main tasks: price stability and financial stability. 1 My opinion is that the housing market and household indebtedness may have great significance for our chances of performing both of these tasks. And consequently, as I see it, it is self-evident that the Riksbank should be interested in these issues. In my speech today, I would particularly like to point out two important conditions for Sweden regarding monetary policy, price stability and financial stability. As regards monetary policy, we need to take account of monetary policy abroad. If monetary policy abroad becomes more expansionary and Swedish monetary policy is passive, the exchange rate will strengthen and inflation in Sweden will fall.
2  BIS Review 74/2008  But the U.S. economy and economies worldwide are still in the process of adjusting to the aftermath of rapid asset price growth and unsustainably low risk premiums. This process will take time. As we continue to work with other central banks to ease the adjustment now under way in the U.S. economy and globally, we are working to make the financial system more resilient and to improve its capacity to deal with future crises. We are working closely with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with banking supervisors in the United States and the other major economies, and with the U.S. Treasury to strengthen the financial foundation of the major investment and commercial banks. We have encouraged a significant increase in the quality of public disclosure. We have supported efforts that have brought a very substantial amount of new equity capital into many financial institutions. These efforts will help mitigate the risk of a deeper credit crunch. And even as the Federal Reserve has worked to mitigate the liquidity pressures in markets by implementing a new set of lending facilities, we have worked with the SEC and others to ensure that the major institutions are strengthening their liquidity positions and funding strategies. We are also initiating important steps to strengthen the financial infrastructure.

The combined balance sheets of the then five major investment banks totaled $ trillion. In comparison, the total assets of the top five bank holding companies in the United States at that point were just over $ trillion, and total assets of the entire banking system were about $ trillion. This parallel system financed some of these very assets on a very short-term basis in the bilateral or triparty repo markets. As the volume of activity in repo markets grew, the variety  BIS Review 74/2008  1  of assets financed in this manner expanded beyond the most highly liquid securities to include less liquid securities, as well. Nonetheless, these assets were assumed to be readily sellable at fair values, in part because assets with similar credit ratings had generally been tradable during past periods of financial stress. And the liquidity supporting them was assumed to be continuous and essentially frictionless, because it had been so for a long time. The scale of long-term risky and relatively illiquid assets financed by very short-term liabilities made many of the vehicles and institutions in this parallel financial system vulnerable to a classic type of run, but without the protections such as deposit insurance that the banking system has in place to reduce such risks.
Firms should use the design of the CBES and the underlying NGFS scenarios to inform their own scenario analysis, build their understanding of the climate risks they face, and enhance their climate risk management capabilities. I hope it will act as a catalyst, increasing firms’ knowledge of the risks they face, and incentivising them to take steps to address these risks. In turn, this will require firms’ clients in the real economy to improve their understanding of how climate change and the transition to a net-zero economy could impact their businesses and operations. Lessons learned from the CBES will also be shared with the NGFS as part of the collaborative approach taken by central banks, and on that note, I want to commend the ACPR’s recent publication of its own ambitious scenario exercise for the French financial system. 3  Through both its scenario work in the NGFS, and its internal analysis, the Bank has developed a clearer understanding of where climate knowledge gaps persist and what these might mean for our objectives. For example, there is particular value in the deepening of our understanding of the macroeconomic implications of climate change and the pathways to net-zero. It is for governments to set out a pathway to net-zero and the policy levers that will be used to deliver it. But as central banks, we will need to understand any implications of the transition for the economic outlook and our potential policy responses.

The scenarios bring together the financial and economic impacts of different temperature and climate policy pathways – a critical input for firms and policymakers to understand the future impact of the decisions they are making today. Scenario analysis makes questions like how resilient is this business, this financial system, or this set of policies, to each climate scenario possible to address. Accordingly, the Bank continues to be a strong advocate of the NGFS’ work and in 2019 announced our intention to assess the resilience of individual banks, insurers, and the wider UK financial system to different 1 2  See ‘Tackling climate for real: the role of central banks’ speech by Andrew Bailey, June 2021 NGFS climate scenarios 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  climate scenarios through a Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario exercise (CBES). I am pleased to say that exercise, which draws on the NGFS scenarios, will launch next week on 8 June. The CBES will involve the UK’s largest banks and insurers and explore three different climate scenarios, testing different combinations of physical and transition risks over a 30-year period. It is an important tool to size the financial exposures, to understand how different bank and insurance business models will be affected and how they might respond, and finally as a way of improving firms’ risk management practices through the process of carrying out the exercise.
Constantinos Herodotou: A resilient banking sector in an everchanging economic environment Speech by Mr Constantinos Herodotou, Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, at the Deloitte Annual Conference, Nicosia, 28 September 2022. ***  Introduction Distinguished co-speakers and guests, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me to this conference. It is a pleasure to have this opportunity to speak to you today. I will start with a brief overview of recent euro area and Cyprus economic developments and the monetary policy decisions taken in response to the new challenges of persistently high inflation and elevated economic uncertainty. I will continue with the developments in the Cyprus banking sector which needs to address a number of challenges in this fast evolving economic environment. Euro area Euro area economic developments In the euro area in general, GDP is growing at a slower pace this year than previously expected due to the negative geopolitical developments, mainly caused by the war in Ukraine. Growth is hampered by soaring energy and commodity costs, low confidence and supply chain disruptions. At the same time, inflation is approaching double digits, and a winter with possible energy shortages and high energy prices is on the horizon. Nevertheless, a recovering tourism industry, decreasing unemployment, and EU funding payments help to boost activity and limit, to some extent, output loss. More specifically, the Euro area quarterly economic growth reached 0.8 percent in the second quarter, following a 0.7 percent rise in the first quarter.

To this point, the recently introduced alternative procedure for the simplification of the auditing of the financial statements of very small businesses should support these efforts and facilitate the timely transmission of the financial statements to the credit institutions. It is of utmost importance that a timely flow of up-to-date customers' financials is maintained by banks at all times. Unquestionably, this will be beneficial for both parties, banks and clients, as any events signalling a deterioration of the client's financial standing will be captured early on. Consequently the most suitable restructuring solution may be sought, which could ensure the continuation of a healthy and economically viable business relationship. Conclusion To sum up, the world's economies have been through a lot in recent years, from the challenge of the pandemic, to the impact of the war in Ukraine. It is up to us to come through these challenges unscathed or even stronger, wiser and better prepared for a brighter future. We have done it before, we can do it again. After all, to quote Gever Tulley (an American writer, speaker, educator, and entrepreneur) - persistence and resilience only come from having been given the chance to work through difficult problems. Thank you for your attention. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Stefan Ingves: The crisis in the Baltic – the Riksbank’s measures, assessments and lessons learned Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riskbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 2 February 2010. *  *  *  The crisis in the Baltic – the Riksbank’s measures, assessments and lessons learned It is not possible to provide a comprehensive reply to all of the questions discussed in connection with the crisis in the Baltic in the space of 15 minutes. I shall therefore give a brief summary of the assessments made by the Riksbank during the course of the crisis and something about the measures we have taken. In conclusion, I shall say a few words about the lessons that can be learned. Before I discuss the role of the Riksbank, I would like to point out that the responsibility for developments in the Baltic countries primarily lies with their own governments with regard to economic policy, and with the banks, which have a responsibility for understanding developments in the economy and taking sustainable, long-term action. People often seem to forget in the general debate that we are talking about three different countries here. Financial market participants also tend to see the Baltic countries as a unit, which makes it difficult to manage the crises in these countries. Of course there are many similarities between the countries, for instance, their economic expansion and decline. However, there are also important differences.

To build a fuller picture of how credit is affecting the level of risk in the financial system, it is necessary to drill down into the sectoral components of credit and their counterparts in the economy. Household credit The largest component of bank credit in the UK economy is of course lending to households and within that the great bulk, around 90%, is secured on dwellings. Mortgage lending is the single largest asset class on lenders’ balance sheets and stock of lending secured on dwellings is around 70% of GDP. Net secured lending to households is rising at nearly 3% – the highest rate since the end of 2009. Mortgage rates in the UK are now at very low levels – average quoted rates on two-year (75% LTV) fixed-rate mortgages are below 2%. Some of this of course is because the Bank of England’s official Bank Rate has been close to zero since 2009. But over the past three years, as banks’ funding costs have reduced and as competition in the mortgage market has intensified, on average mortgage interest rates have fallen by 2 percentage points. Unsecured lending to households is a much smaller proportion of credit; it accounts for only 12% of lending to households and around 10% of GDP. And the stock of consumer credit remains £ billion below its peak in 2008. But it is growing at around 8% a year, much faster than secured lending.
There was considerable cross-country heterogeneity in this case too, with net redemptions taking place mainly in certain countries and loans to non-financial corporations continuing to grow in others. The worrisome picture of monetary developments was confirmed by the results of the Bank Lending Survey for the fourth quarter of 2011. Euro area banks tightened credit standards compared with the previous quarter for both loans to non-financial corporations and loans to households, and to a lesser extent for loans for consumer credit. Furthermore, survey participants expected a further tightening of credit standards in the first quarter of 2012. Even  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  if the tightening was slower than during the 2007–2008 financial turmoil, it was starting from considerably tighter credit standards. Although it is always tricky to disentangle supply-side from demand-side factors, banks explained their changes in credit standards mainly by primarily referring to increased funding costs and balance sheet constraints, which were compounded by a rapidly deteriorating economic environment. The funding situation of euro area credit institutions worsened noticeably in the second half of 2011, as shown by the rise in withdrawals of deposits held by non-euro area residents with euro area banks and difficulties in issuing longer-term debt securities. This caused banks to make greater recourse to Eurosystem operations.

Yields of shorter-term notes and bills have declined, with two-year government bond yields of Italy, Ireland and Portugal declining by over 400 bps since 8 December 2011. Longer-term government yields have declined as well, although not to the same extent as shorter-term yields (Slide 7). The positive secondary market developments were accompanied by favourable primary market activity with sustained demand in auctions of T-bills and shorter bonds in several euro area countries. All in all, there is now strong preliminary evidence that the three-year LTROs have helped the banks to reduce liquidity risk and therefore allowed them to smooth the deleveraging process over a longer period of time and maintain exposures to SMEs – at least in some cases. Anecdotal evidence also points to the return of some institutional money market investors, with quite a number of banks reporting that funds (also unsecured) are becoming available again at somewhat longer maturities. While banks seem to have used the funds obtained from the first three-year LTRO mainly for refinancing purposes, when looking forward to the next six months, they now seem to expect a stronger use of these funds for granting loans. Whether these expectations will materialise remains an open question and the Governing Council will closely monitor these developments. Challenges ahead A side effect of the three-year LTROs is that the banking system in the euro area is now in a situation of abundant excess liquidity.
These remain firmly anchored around 2 per cent. Much of my reasoning here on the Riksbank’s monetary policy strategy is described in a booklet entitled “Monetary policy in Sweden”, which we published a few months ago 1 . The most important aim of this booklet is to explain how the Riksbank, when setting its interest rate, has scope to take into consideration developments in both inflation and in the real economy. One step in this direction was taken already back in 1999 when the clarification of monetary policy was published by the Executive Board for the purpose of explaining that the Riksbank conducted flexible inflation targeting 2 . In the period since 1999 we have learned even more about how flexible inflation targeting is conducted. There has also been considerable progress in the academic research on this subject. New insights led to a decision to issue a new document on monetary policy strategy. This is essentially a question of developments and changes in the method of describing and communicating inflation targeting policy rather than in the basic strategy itself. Inflation in focus, not the interest rate Let me conclude this section of my speech with a few words on a concept that has been used in the discussions on monetary policy recently, namely that the Riksbank has begun a “normalisation” of the repo rate.

It is now widely accepted that these are determined by factors that are not directly affected by monetary policy, such as the rate of technological advances and the efficient functioning of various markets. In general terms, one can say that the policy conducted by the Riksbank is aimed partly at limiting the inevitable deviations from the inflation target and partly at ensuring that the real economy does not fluctuate excessively. The objective of monetary policy is price stability, but the Riksbank also considers real economy considerations to be important. This is characteristic of what is known as flexible inflation targeting, which as far as I know, is conducted by all central banks that have inflation targets. Monetary policy affects the economy with a certain time lag. Monetary policy decisions must therefore be based on forecasts of future inflation. Normally, monetary policy is aimed at achieving the inflation target within two years to avoid the deviations from target from being too large and too protracted. This two-year horizon can be regarded as a restriction that the Riksbank has placed upon itself as a means of upholding confidence in the inflation target. At the same time, it provides an opportunity to show consideration for the real economy.