samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is why we initiated the Network of central banks and  supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), during the One Planet Summit on December 2017. And, in 16 months, our club of the willing has increased almost fivefold, from 8 founding members to over 40 members and observers with its Chair Frank Elderson and the Banque de France as Secretariat. We are now represented on the five continents; NGFS members’ jurisdictions cover 44% of global GDP and 45% of greenhouse gas emissions. We collectively supervise two-thirds of systemic financial institutions, banks and insurers alike. What appears obvious to most of us today was not previously set in stone. With our global effort to ensure that the Paris Agreement produces results, the NGFS’ first “A call for action” report has the potential to lever the financial system and I hope that it will pave the way for a “paradigm shift” in the wider community of central bankers. In my remarks today, I will (i) take stock of central bankers and supervisors’ achievements towards tackling climate change, which are significant and (ii) discuss four important tasks that still lie ahead. I. Central banks and supervisors are promptly moving ahead regarding  the snapshot of risks In its first progress report, released in Bali in October 2018, the NGFS unanimously concluded that “climate-related risks are a source of financial risks. It is therefore within the mandates of Central Banks and Supervisors to ensure the financial system is resilient to these risks.” So what do we do? a.

In order to bridge the data gaps, we must rely on enhanced disclosures that need to be built on sound taxonomies. But we need some data to set out a proper taxonomy! It is time to follow the path set by the TCFD on one side and the European Commission on the other to address all issues at the same time. It means working jointly on disclosures and taxonomies. It will notably help to enhance the quality of disclosure and, ultimately, its relevance in internalising the current climate change externality for all firms. We will then be in a position to move gradually towards compulsory transparency based on a “comply or explain” principle, such as that of Article 173 of the French Energy Transition Law that could usefully serve as a reference. b. Integrating climate-related risks into financial stability monitoring Substantial work remains to be done to achieve “the video of risks”. Our feeling is that risk premia do not currently appropriately reflect climate risks. And therefore I believe that we, as central banks and supervisors, must push for a forward looking vision of the impacts of climate risks. In order to properly size the financial effects of climate change, our goal is clear: we should be able to design some comprehensive climate stress tests. What does it mean in practice? The snapshot of risks provides information on exposures.
The haircut spiral, can be seen in Chart 6. A fire sale dynamic developed, which depressed asset prices further leading to additional upward pressure on haircuts. The rapid deleveraging of the shadow banking system as the run progressed led to a sharp contraction in credit. We saw this earlier in Chart 2 with the near complete collapse in the asset-backed security market. Banks were also adversely affected by this run on securitization markets since they used these markets as well to fund many types of loans. Several banks had to bring onto their balance sheets previously off-balance sheet entities that they had used to securitize loans. This used up balance-sheet capacity making it more difficult for banks to make up for the credit contraction going on outside of the banking system. The problems in the financial system spread to the real economy. When Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, a money market mutual fund – the Reserve Fund – “broke the buck”. The unanticipated losses incurred by the Reserve Fund expanded the bank run to the money market mutual funds. Since these funds were significant investors in the commercial paper market, this transmitted the strains to the commercial paper market. Dollar funding pressures were also increasing for firms operating outside the United States as their ability to access dollars through the foreign exchange markets began to become strained. The  11  An overnight repo loan as compared with a longer term repo loan is the closest in nature to a demand deposit.

The challenge is to strike a balance between timely implementation and rigorous cost-benefit analyses, as well as efforts to make the most efficient use of public resources. Focusing on those projects with the greatest 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  potential for “crowding-in” private investment should also be encouraged. Multiplier effects would provide additional lift to potential growth at no public cost, and would be the very evidence that public policy has served its function of aiding the private sector. Current supply constraints are not limited to physical capital, but extend to human capital as well. In 20 years, Thailand will be among the first ASEAN countries to enter an aging-population phase, with share of senior citizens rising from 15 to 27 percent of total population. Early symptoms have already been felt in some industries, whose capacity to produce and invest is stifled by the lack of qualified labour. Tight labour market is also indicative of labour shortage at the lower end of the skill spectrum. Market forces have failed to resolve these issues. Education policy, tax incentives, minimum wage, and migration policy all have bearings on the labour market dynamics. The long-term growth implications of these policies should be incorporated into the policymakers’ considerations. Implementing a comprehensive set of economic policies to lift potential growth, while pursuing other public policy objectives, is not an easy task. It requires a close coordination among various policy authorities. It also takes immense skills to introduce the right sequencing of policies at the right time.
The MPC’s forward guidance builds on the clarity and credibility of the inflation target to address some of the exceptional challenges currently facing our economy. And in so doing it should help to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  References Bean, C (2011) “The Economic Outlook”, speech to the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2011/speech497.pdf Broadbent, B (2011) “Rebalancing and the real exchange rate”, Speech at Thompson Reuters,London. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2011/520.aspx Broadbent, B (2012) “Productivity and the allocation of resources”, speech at the Durham Business Schoolhttp://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2012/599.aspx Broadbent, B (2013) “Conditional guidance as a response to supply uncertainty”, speech at the London Business School. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2013/678.aspx Fisher, P (2013) “The Outlook for the UK economy”, speech to the Cardiff Breakfast Club. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech659.pdf Maule, B and Pugh, A (2013) “Do inflation expectations currently pose a risk to the economy?”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2013 Q2. McCafferty, I (2013) “Monetary Policy in a Changing Economy”, speech at Bloomberg, London http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2013/627.aspx Miles, D (2012) “Monetary policy and the damaged economy”, speech at the Society of Business Economists Annual Conference. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2012/576.aspx Miles, D (2013) “Monetary policy and forward guidance in the UK”, speech at Northumbria University. http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2013/681.aspx Taylor, J (2013) “Forward guidance as an incipient policy rule at the BoE and ECB”, http://economicsone.com/2013/08/25/forward-guidance-as-an-incipient-policy-rule-at-theboe-and-ecb/ Tucker, P (2013) “Monetary strategy and prospects”, speech at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe flagship conference on Financing Growth, London.

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2013/679.aspx  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Annex: Charts Chart 1: UK CPI inflation  Chart 2: Recoveries across the G7 Per cent  Index (pre-crisis preak =100)  108  6  106  5  104  4  102 100  3  98 Germany France Italy UK US Japan  2 1 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  96 94 92 90  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  Sources: Eurostat and Datastream The pre-crisis peak was: 2008 Q1 for Germany, France, Japan and the UK; 2007 Q3 for Italy; 2007 Q4 in the US; and 2008 Q3 for Canada. Chart 3: UK labour productivity Percentage change on five years earlier  25 20 15 10 5 0 1861  1886  1911  1936  1961  1986  2011  -5 -10 -15 -20  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9
There are three key elements:  1/ A European regulation of stablecoins, as drafted by the European Commission. This socalled “MiCa” has two strengths: its rightly speaks of “Crypto-assets”, and not “Cryptocurrencies” which is a misleading expression. And on substance, the draft requires a strict and dual supervision – by national authorities and EBA – to ensure consumer protection and financial stability in a fair and consistent way within the European single market. 2/ A European acceleration on CBDC, which is not yet a decision, as published by the ECB last Friday. As a principle, central banks need to have an in-depth understanding of innovation and shouldn’t be afraid to “learn by doing”. The Banque de France is now engaging with the innovators from the private sector to conduct a program of 8 experiments on wholesale CBDC. We, the ECB and the Eurosystem, need to be ready to issue a money in digital form in case of need. Let me be clear: we cannot allow ourselves to lag behind on CBDC. That may mean that we create if necessary a retail CBDC, in order to ensure the accessibility of central bank money for the general public, in particular in countries where the use of cash in payments is declining. And it may mean also that we decide to issue a wholesale CBDC, with the aim of improving the functioning of financial markets and institutions. Within the Eurosystem, the ECB has established a high-level task force (HLTF) therefore, and just published its report.

The latest released January economic figures point to more strength in the fourth quarter of 2001 than we had anticipated, given the event on September 11. And, with the current more supportive fiscal and monetary policy stance as well as the expectation of a rebound in the US, the overall environment this year is more conducive to growth than last year. From this vantage point, we are of the view that the economy could grow by 2-3 per cent this year while inflationary pressure would be virtually absent. A continuing expansion in domestic demand and a rebound in exports in the latter half of the year would be the key drivers of this year’s growth. The outlook for inflation remains tame, with core inflation expected to hover around 1-1.5 per cent, well within the target corridor of 0-3.5 per cent. Last year, notwithstanding the slowdown in the global markets, the Thai economy exhibited a noted degree of resiliency. While the world economy was in a slump, Thailand’s exports did not fall to the extent observed in many countries in the region. And, even as export fell by about 7 per cent, output growth remained positive in every quarter. In terms of macroeconomic stability, we saw an improvement both on the domestic and external fronts. In fact, Thailand external position strengthened significantly over 2001. The current account registered a large surplus and external debt continued to fall sharply in 2001. Our reserve position remains strong.
Encouraging banks to take risks that result in large dividend and remuneration payouts when things go well, and losses for taxpayers when they don’t, distorts the allocation of resources and management of risk. That is what economists mean by “moral hazard”. The massive support extended to the banking sector around the world, while necessary to avert economic disaster, has created possibly the biggest moral hazard in history. The “too important to fail” problem is too important to ignore. There are only two ways in which the problem can – in logic – be solved. One is to accept that some institutions are “too important to fail” and try to ensure that the probability of those institutions failing, and hence of the need for taxpayer support, is extremely low. The other is to find a way that institutions can fail without imposing unacceptable costs on the rest of society. Any solution must fall into one of those two categories. What does this mean in practice? Consider the first approach. To reduce the likelihood of failure, regulators can impose capital requirements on a wide range of financial institutions related to the risks they are taking. This is the current approach underpinned by the Basel regime. In essence, it makes banks build a buffer against adverse events. It has attractions but also problems. First, capital requirements reduce, but not eliminate, the need for taxpayers to provide catastrophe insurance.

Third potential impact: the launch of a CBDC could also raise questions related to modalities of access to central bank balance sheet. - Depending on its attractiveness and detailed specifications, a CBDC could trigger a demand from financial actors which usually do not have access to central bank money (money market funds, investment funds, insurance companies …) to be able to settle in CBDC. It would in particular be the case in a broader wholesale CBDC access scenario. The remuneration of the CBDC held by these financial actors – in case access were to be granted – would also matter for monetary policy implementation, as it would play the role of a ceiling for these institutions on the money market. - Beyond these settlement and detention aspects, expanding the counterparty framework (i.e. for central bank refinancing or asset purchases operations) as a response to the implementation of CBDC does not strike me at this stage as being particularly useful nor necessary. In any case the usual requirements related to counterparty eligibility criteria, including financial soundness assessment and supervision, would need to be taken into account. To conclude these introductory remarks, let me stress three points: - Digitalization is a major supply/technology shock, whose implications are multifaceted, and which have been intensified and accelerated by the Covid crisis - As central banks, in the context of our monetary and financial stability mandate, we have a role to play to make sure that digitalization becomes a blessing and not a curse.
And away from home, central banking is undergoing considerable change: both the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the United States and the Bank of Japan have recently made policy changes that emphasise their commitment to provide further monetary stimulus until their economies recover. Against that backdrop, people are understandably asking what role monetary policy in the UK should play in determining growth and inflation? This is an important debate and one that is likely to be central to economic policymaking over the next few years. What I would like to do today is to offer some of my own thoughts on this issue. I want to focus on two aspects in particular. The first concerns the objectives of monetary policy. The inflation target, given to the MPC by the UK government, states that our primary objective is to ensure that CPI inflation is equal to 2%. But it also makes clear that, in so doing, we should be mindful of the implications that our policy actions have for growth and employment. How should we go about reconciling those different objectives? The second issue relates to the current operation of monetary policy. What should we make of the view, repeated in many quarters, that the trade off between growth and inflation may be unusually favourable in present circumstances. That we could buy quite a bit of extra growth at little or no cost in terms of higher inflation? Do such free lunches really exist?

5  King (2012) and Tucker (2012) make similar arguments in the context of financial stability and the role that the newly formed Financial Policy Committee can play in this respect. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The second possibility is that the effective capacity of the economy to supply goods and services depends on the state of demand: the stronger the demand, the greater somehow the capacity of companies and employees to meet it. The likely responsiveness of supply to an increase in demand, it’s argued, means that it would be possible for the economy to grow relatively rapidly without significantly reducing the degree of slack in the economy and so without adding markedly to cost and price pressures. Let’s consider briefly each of these possibilities in turn. The suggestion that the Phillips curve may be relatively flat appears, at least at first blush, to be consistent with our experience over recent years. Following the worst recession in living memory, our economy has barely grown over the past two years. Output is well below its pre-crisis level, unemployment close to 8%. But inflation remains stubbornly above target. The trade-off between output and inflation has indeed been remarkably flat. But that doesn’t mean that the flatness of this trade-off can be relied upon to continue in the future: it depends on why inflation has been so sticky. Much of the slack in our economy is concentrated in the labour market, where unemployment remains painfully elevated.
I think it is more crucial than ever for small nations—emerging nations and advanced economies alike—to work closer together and make sure that our voices from the periphery are heard and that we make progress on macroeconomic policy frameworks fit for the new global environment. Thank you very much for your kind attention. 6

Under the living will process today, firms must approach their bankruptcy using tools geared toward corporate restructuring. Any changes to the regimes under which financial institutions can and will fail should be carefully considered before enactment, particularly to the extent they retain, or not, a credible source of liquidity going forward. This isn’t abstract financial theory. This concerns the ability of people on Main Street—employees, retirees, small business owners—to persevere in times of severe financial stress. Returning to the human element of the crisis, these are the same people who suffered during the Great Recession and who expect us all to do better during the next period of stress. 1 Lisa Kraidin and Ben Snodgrass assisted in the preparation of these remarks. 2 See Mariacristina De Nardi et al., Consumption and the Great Recession, Economic Perspectives, 1st Quarter  2012, at 1, 1. 3 See Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of  Consumer Finances, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Sept. 2017, at 1, 10. 4 See Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & David Gross, The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Crisis, i n International  Monetary and Financial Law: The Global Crisis 293, 298–99 (Mario Giovanoli & Diego Devos eds., 2010). Use of 13(3) had been authorized during the 1960s, but no loans were made. See id. 5 These facilities included, among others, the PDCF (the Primary Dealer Credit Facility), the TALF (the Term  Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility), and the CPFF (the Commercial Paper Funding Facility).
3 Economic activity in both the euro area and the United Kingdom, Malta’s largest trading  1  Eurostat Statistics in Focus 31/2008. 2  Financial Times “The cogs are clogged ”, 16 February 2010. 3  IMF Update of World Economic Outlook, January 2010. BIS Review 50/2010  1  partners, declined by 4.1% and 4.9%, respectively. This contraction had inevitable consequences for labour markets, with unemployment increasing to levels not seen in decades. The combination of lower tax revenues and higher outlays arising from the operation of automatic stabilizers and fiscal stimulus programmes took their toll on public finances, with deficits in a number of countries rising close to, or even exceeding, double digit levels. The growth rate of these economies over the coming years will be constrained by the inevitable fiscal consolidation required to bring deficit and debt ratios back to sustainable levels. These recessionary headwinds inevitably took their toll on Malta’s open economy. The impact, however, proved less severe than might have been expected. The economy came out of the recession in the fourth quarter of 2009, after contracting for three consecutive quarters. On a seasonally adjusted basis, the peak-to-trough drop in GDP was around 3.0%, compared to 4.7% in the euro area. The relative resilience of the Maltese economy is attributable to four factors. First, membership of the euro area has enhanced its capacity to withstand external shocks.

Maltese entrepreneurs have submitted more than 600 proposals for funding under the third call of the ERDF scheme, with the total value of assistance requested expected to exceed EUR 40 million. At the same time, an agreement between the Government and the European Investment Fund will provide another EUR 10 million by the end of this year from a specialized EU fund aimed at small enterprises that would otherwise find it difficult to raise up to EUR 25,000 to improve their operations. These initiatives should also help to increase awareness about EU funding schemes. Malta Enterprise is also involved in the management of the Kordin Business Incubation Centre. Between 2003 and 2008, this facility produced over 50 start-ups, with a success rate of 86%. Some of the most successful ventures have gone on to employ more than 100 workers. Within the next few months small enterprises will also benefit from more than 300 industrial spaces that will be made available in three locations, while other parks for micro enterprises in both Malta and Gozo are in the pipeline. Such initiatives facilitate networking among SMEs and can lead to the development of business clusters and consequent positive spillover effects. Initiatives to assist small businesses have also been taken by the private sector. For instance, a major domestic bank has recently teamed up with a leading international software house in a programme designed to increase the success rate of ICT start-up companies.