samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  To get the real benefit from the advancement in ICT, we need to educate and persuade customers to change their behavior in using other payment instruments, from cash to non-cash instruments. In addition, the central bank needs to coordinate with financial institutions and service providers to make electronic payments to be more accessible, reliable and, of course, available at reasonable price. The third consideration is the implementation of principles for financial market infrastructures. From the regulatory point of view, the important payment and settlement systems need to be appropriately regulated. The recent financial crisis has shown that financial market infrastructures, such as payment and settlement systems and central counterparty, can be sources of financial shocks or major channels that shocks are transmitted across domestic and international financial markets. To enhance safety and efficiency, the principles for financial market infrastructures have been prescribed by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in April 2012 with objectives to limit systemic risk and foster transparency and financial stability. In response to the new international standard, the Bank of Thailand intends to adopt these principles to our systemically important payment and settlement system which is BAHTNET system. Moreover, we will coordinate with other regulators to ensure that all systemically important payment and settlement systems are adequately supervised.

Those charged with managing the major financial institutions need to continue to make the investments necessary to stay abreast of change and to get as close to the frontier as possible. This reality makes it even more important that we in the supervisory community continue to look for ways to address aspects of the existing supervisory regime that impose unnecessary costs and burdens or that pull resources and attention away from potential sources of risk to the financial system. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 54/2006
Taking this to the monetary policy context, expectations for disruption or volatility from an substantial change in the Federal Reserve’s operational posture, even if totally unfounded, could bring about disruption, as the holders of those expectations act to protect themselves or profit from what they believe is likely to come. The solution is to try to avoid generating such expectations for disruption to begin with, by acting gradually and predictably. 10 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  Another potential explanation for the relative stability of longer-term rates this time around is that balance sheet news this year, taken together, just hasn’t been all that surprising to market participants. Panel 6 shows market participants’ expectation for the level of the federal funds rate that would prevail when the reinvestment policy first changes, as well as expectations for the date of that change. As can be seen, balance sheet normalization started slightly earlier than expected, both in rate terms – it began with the federal funds rate at 1.16 percent – and, more notably, in terms of the absolute date. But at the same time, earlier in the year, many market participants had seen decent odds that the Federal Reserve would reduce its balance sheet more quickly with a full-stop end to reinvestment. Panel 7 shows the decline in expectations for both no change in Treasury reinvestments and a hard-stop in them.

The minimum is a system that allows the sharing of negative information or some kind of black lists. But one should quickly migrate towards pooling and sharing positive information as well. A well functioning credit information system is not harmful to the consumers. Instead it enables the borrowers on the margin to obtain credit, those who would have been refused in its absence. In Thailand we already have two credit bureaus operating, and the Credit Bureau Act will soon be enacted to govern their businesses. Third, the need to protect the consumers. The charges and expenses levied against them should be made clear and easy to compare between various issuers. Interest rates should be declared as effective annual rates and sufficient lead time should be allowed and communicated to consumers before changes in terms and conditions come into effect. In Thailand, we are planning to set a uniform standard for the whole industry regarding such things as interest free periods, the setting of due dates and calculation methods for past due balances. Finally, if internet transactions become prevalent or poised for rapid growth, there is the need to define its proper legal framework. On this issue, we have just passed the relevant laws and are in the process of drafting the subsidiary regulations at ministerial level. At the micro level, and this is your direct responsibilities, card issuers have to put in place a good system of risk management.
Eva Srejber: The divorce between macro financial stability and micro supervisory responsibility - are we now in for a more stable life? Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the 33rd Economics Conference of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian National Bank), Vienna, 13 May 2005. *  *  *  Introduction I hope I won’t disappoint our kind hosts who asked me to deliver this address but I have a confession to make – in Sweden, macro financial stability and supervision are not divorced. They have never been married. Indeed, it is only quite recently that the Riksbank and the FSA (Financial Supervisory Authority) have started to acknowledge – operationally in their respective policy frameworks – the link between macro financial stability and micro supervisory issues. Whether we just got divorced or are soon to get married, the relationship between financial stability and supervision is highly relevant. I will structure this address in the following way. First, I will give a brief description of how the relationship between supervision and financial stability has developed in Sweden. Then, I will move on to the financial sector developments that now challenge the ways supervisors and central banks have been working. The process of internationalisation, in general, and cross-border integration, in the EU, will force both supervisors and national central banks to focus on their core tasks and to a certain degree invent new ways to perform those tasks.

For example, when discussing lender of last resort in crisis management and burden sharing in crisis resolution we now talk about home and host central banks and finance ministries, respectively. This is natural, since legally the financial liabilities for a group are ultimately carried by the parent bank. Of course, a parent can choose to default a subsidiary, but it will then have to bear the capital loss. Subsequently, in practice, the ultimate public responsibility over a group rests with the home country. … comes under strain… At first glance, the home country principle seems very neat. But take a closer look and you will see signs that this set-up was not designed for a fully integrated market. Essentially, there is a gap between, on the one hand, legal powers and mandates and, on the other hand, de facto abilities and responsibilities. Home countries are given powers over branches and subsidiaries but might be unable or unwilling to use them, while host countries are losing powers that they have been willing to use. 4  BIS Review 35/2005  This gap becomes a problem once you have a banking group or bank that is systemically relevant in a host country (see table 1). Even if there are not so many of these cases yet, I am convinced that the number will increase. The potential conflicts of interest and coordination problems are of many kinds.
In particular, by purchasing longer-term securities, the Federal Reserve removes duration risk from the market, which should help to reduce the term premium that investors demand for holding longer-term securities. That effect should in turn boost other asset prices, as those investors displaced by the Fed’s purchases would likely seek to hold alternative types of securities. Some research studies have estimated that the effects of the earlier expansion of our securities holdings by just over $ trillion lowered longer-term Treasury yields by about 50 basis points through this portfolio balance channel. 3 These effects on Treasury yields appear to have been transmitted into lower rates on private credit instruments and higher asset prices more broadly. 1  Reflecting the long-standing practice of the Desk, principal payments on our holdings of Treasury securities were already being fully reinvested at Treasury auctions. 2  The Fed’s asset purchases initially had an additional and important effect on mortgage rates by improving the functioning of the MBS market. As I have noted in earlier speeches, the use of the central bank’s balance sheet can be particularly effective when focused on markets in which liquidity and market functioning have become impaired. The focus here is whether, in addition to those effects, the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet have a lasting impact on financial conditions in well-functioning and relatively liquid markets.

As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve System. 1 The economic outlook Turning first to the economic outlook, the real GDP growth rate appears to have slowed sharply during the first half of 2015. Based on the revision we received last week, firstquarter real GDP fell by 0.7 percent at an annualized rate. Although most projections anticipate a pickup in growth to around 2 percent or slightly higher in the current quarter, there is little question that economic growth has slowed significantly from last year’s secondhalf pace. What’s going on? Why has growth slowed and what does this portend for the remainder of the year? As I see it, the contraction in GDP growth in the first quarter represents a mix of factors. These include another unseasonably cold and snowy winter, a sharp contraction in oil and gas investment, a deterioration in the trade balance due – in large part – to the stronger dollar and sluggish foreign demand, and a slowdown in consumer spending growth after a very strong fourth quarter. After adjusting for weather effects, I think seasonal adjustment issues probably also played some role. For example, real defense spending has declined eight times in the past nine years in the first quarter, suggesting there is a seasonal adjustment issue. But I judge that this has had only a modest effect on measured real GDP growth.
And we’ll work together to ensure that, if the safety of the system relies increasingly on them, the standards they meet reflect their systemic importance. Because none of these competitive trends are to be stifled. In fact, they are to be spurred. Our job is to enable and encourage, ensuring these developments achieve their full potential. Conclusion  Five years ago, few could conceive of this unbundling of banking. In the wake of the crisis, any return of borrowing seemed a long way off. And Brexit wasn’t even a word. The lesson: stuff happens. And because it does, we all benefit from a financial system that can serve in the bad times as well as the good; from a system that doesn’t disrupt the economy but can deliver for it. But no set of rules, however detailed, will deliver that for all time. The framework that’s now five years old reflects that by hard-wiring the duty to keep up. Keep up with the macro trends. So that, whatever happens, the Square Mile is regulated for the good of all 94,000 square miles of the UK. Thank you. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  Charts Chart 1: Annual growth rates of UK mortgage and consumer credit lending  (a)  Chart 2: Spreads between quoted mortgage rates and risk-free rates  (a)  Source: Bank of England. (a) Sterling net lending by UK MFIs and other lenders to UK individuals. Seasonally adjusted. Consumer credit series excludes student loans.

The first and most obvious of those is Brexit. The challenge is to keep finance capable of serving the economy through Brexit, whatever form Brexit takes. 4  Reported in Brooke et al (2015). 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  The first condition for that: UK banks must be able to withstand any economic shocks arising from Brexit. In our judgement, that condition is met. Even the most severe economic scenarios for Brexit are encompassed within the scenario we’ve tested the banks against in our annual tests. They can pass that test. So they can pass the Brexit test too. But that’s not enough in this case. Because barriers to delivering wholesale financial services across the Channel could disrupt the end users in the real economy. The UK is a net provider of such services to the EU, so end users there stand at most risk of disruption. But end users in the UK would also suffer some disruption. UK investors invest in funds domiciled in the EU and 10 million UK policyholders have insurance policies with EU insurers. 77 branches of EEA banks operate in the UK, providing services that benefit end users in both the EU and the UK. That’s why, from the very start, we have overseen contingency planning across the financial system. And because it would be difficult, by March 2019, for all financial institutions to complete all the steps necessary to avoid disruption, we called for an implementation period.
Other matters of interest  To wrap up this presentation, I would like to comment on three issues related to the Bank’s work in monitoring the economy and exercising its powers. These are: (a) the impact of the economic crisis on women in Chile; (b) the distinction between uncertainty and risk in the behavior of economic agents; and (c) the transparency of the CBC in the formulation and execution of its policy decisions. Impact of the economic crisis on Chilean women The first topic, Madam President, will no doubt be familiar to you, as it was raised by yourself during the presentation of the March Report, a little over two months ago. The impact of the Covid-19 crisis on women is of great relevance not only to understand the concrete experience of the social, sanitary, and economic crisis on the population, but also to identify one of the main challenges for the very process of recovery in which we are engaged today. To this effect, we have included in this Report a box (Box III.1) specifically dedicated to this topic, in the preparation of which we have tried to go beyond traditional economic statistics and which we hope will be the starting point of a longer agenda for the generation of data and analysis by the CBC on this subject. This Box has four main messages: a.

Even so, it is estimated that, in the central scenario, the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) will stay below its neutral level throughout the policy horizon, underpinning a recovery process that will continue to be met with significant challenges. I will now describe our assessment of the economic outlook and related risks. II. The macroeconomic scenario  So far into this year, the Chilean economy has outperformed expectations, notably because the impact of the quarantines on activity was significantly milder than we anticipated. In fact, although activity declined during March and April, the effect of the increased sanitary restrictions was about one fifth of what we saw at the onset of the pandemic. Several factors have contributed to this result: the greater adaptation of businesses to the social  Page 1 of 27  distancing requirements; the support of favorable financial conditions; adjustments to the Step-by-Step Plan; and the boost to demand by public policies (Figure 1). Pension fund withdrawals and massive fiscal transfers have been fundamental determinants of the dynamism of private consumption, which has spearheaded the economic upswing. In the first quarter, private consumption had already grown by almost 5 percent annually, with a nearly 50 percent increase in spending on durables, most notably to purchase technological items and automobiles. Information from retail trade, supermarket sales, and electronic billing shows that consumption of goods remained dynamic through April and May. Spending on services, despite recovering part of last year’s decline, continues to show negative annual variation rates, reflecting the persistence of supply-side constraints.
Bank of Canada (2022), “Economic progress report: Controlling inflation”, available at Economic progress report: Controlling inflation - Bank of Canada. Bank of England (2021), “Box A: The MPC’s strategy for the mix of monetary policy instruments to deliver tighter policy”, article in the Monetary Policy Report, September, available at the Bank of England Monetary Policy Report August 2021. Bank of England (2022), “Monetary Policy Summary and minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting, published 5 May, available at Bank Rate increased to 1% - May 2022 | Bank of England. Breman, A. (2021), “Monetary policy after corona – we need to think in new ways”, digital speech at Swedbank, available at Breman:Monetary policy after corona – we need to think along new lines | Sveriges Riksbank. Brookings (2021), ”What does the Federal Reserve mean when it talks about tapering?”, available at What does the Federal Reserve mean when it talks about tapering? (brookings.edu). Cunliffe, Sir J. (2022), ”Learning from the Dash for Cash – findings and next steps for margining practices”, speech at FIA & SIFMA Asset Management Derivatives Forum 2022, published on 9 February, available at Learning from the Dash for Cash – findings and next steps for margining practices - speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe | Bank of England. Di Casola (2021), 'What does research say about the effects of central banks' balance sheet measures? ', Economic Commentaries No 2, Sveriges Riksbank, available at What does research say about the effects of central banks' balance sheet measures?(riksbank.se).

But a lot has happened since then, which has accelerated the process of both rate increases and QT in many places. 16 See the Federal Reserve (2022a) for information on the latest statement and the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (2019) for a description of monetary policy in the years prior to the coronavirus crisis. 17 See Bank of England (2021). 18 See Bank of England (2022). 19 The ECB has not yet raised its policy rate, but has announced that it intends to start the reinvestment phase of its general asset programme, known as the APP, in the third quarter of this year The policy rate can be raised some time later and reinvestments are planned to continue for a long period after the first increase in the policy rate. See ECB (2022). 7 [19]  is that the holding will gradually decline in the future, and we decided the purchase sum for bonds would be half as much during the second half of the year as the first half of the year. Depending on the Executive Board's future decisions, the holding is expected to decline as securities mature. This means that our reinvestment phase lasts about six months, and that we raised the policy rate approximately in the middle of that phase. Table 2 compares the effects on the economy of raising the policy rate compared to using QT. Increases in policy rates have more direct effects on the economy and dampen inflation more.
The adjustment of external debt will no doubt require continued current-account surpluses in the years ahead, which presupposes that the krona is weaker than its long-term equilibrium level. Moreover, the domestic demand trend needs to be balanced to prevent it from generating unduly high inflation. As central government debt is sizeable, it is also important that fiscal restraint continues, with the focus on debt repayment. However, a continuation of current-account surpluses of the magnitude we have seen in recent years is not to be expected. As domestic demand strengthens, the economy approaches full capacity utilisation and the monetary stance accordingly becomes less expansionary, the krona should appreciate, accompanied by diminishing surpluses on the current account. You would, of course, like to know the rate at which the krona would be linked to the euro in the event of Sweden opting to join the monetary union. Unfortunately it is still too early to answer that question. The rate will depend, for example, on Sweden’s competitive position relative to the countries that have already adopted the euro. We would also have reason to aim for a central rate that puts the Swedish economy on the right track and promotes a continued adjustment to internal and external balance. The optimum central rate might differ somewhat—though probably not all that much—from the market rate in the event of Sweden joining ERM2 if, for instance, Sweden’s monetary policy and cyclical position were to deviate from the euro countries’ prior to Swedish actually joining the monetary union.

The main points of monetary policy under this program were as follows: ·  The Central Bank set a ceiling on increases in net domestic assets. ·  The Central Bank paid close attention to keeping increases in reserve money in line with increases in demand. Open market operations were actively used during the year to mop up excess liquidity created by the increases in our net foreign assets. ·  The Central Bank monitored exchange rates throughout the year, with special attention to maintaining stability in the foreign exchange market. ·  Continuous domestic borrowing by the Treasury made a positive contribution to achieving all targets. ·  Turkish lira interests rates were determined mainly by the borrowing strategy of the Treasury. The Turkish Central Bank has played no direct role in the determination of interest rates. In an economy with market-determined interest and exchange rates, where a persistent public deficit is being financed mainly through the domestic markets, the monetary policy tools available to the central bank are few and of limited effectiveness. As noted above, interest rates are determined primarily by the borrowing activities of the Treasury. By the same token, foreign exchange rates are determined as a function of the external trade deficit (itself a function of growth) and the level of interest rates. Under these conditions, the central bank is absolutely obliged to keep the items on its balance sheet under careful control.