samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 38/1997  -7-  Diagram 3a  Real w ages and em ployed persons, EU and U SA, 1970-97 Index 1970=100 EU  170  USA  170  170  160  160  150  150  140  140  130  130  130  120  120  120  110  110  110  100  100  100  90  90  90  80  80  80  160  R e a l wa ges  150 140 130  E m ploy m ent  120  70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  170 160 150  E m ploy m ent  140  110  R e a l wa ges  100 90 80  70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  S ource : O E CD  As shown in Diagram 3a, since 1970 the average real wage in the United States has risen by a total of 15 per cent but by as much as 60 per cent in the EU area. The change in employment, as I mentioned earlier, has been the opposite.

Allow me to cite (from Finanstidningen, 14th October 1996): “There is no direct link between our coming wage claims and the number who are unemployed”. This is an illustration of the theories about insiders and outsiders in the labour market. The costs of hiring and firing labour are one source of insiders’ influence over wage formation, which can affect the possibility of bringing unemployment down. During the latest economic upswing in Sweden the number of hours worked rose by the equivalent of 130,000 new jobs but the increase in the number of persons in employment stopped at 85,000. The direct explanation is that average working time lengthened, which naturally may have reflected a rising propensity to go from part-time to full-time work and to do overtime in order to ease a strained personal economy. But it is also conceivable that employers have become less inclined to hire additional labour and more prone to make greater use of the existing labour force to cope with rising demand. An indication of this could be employers’ willingness to introduce working hours related to the activity in the economy. The differences between the explanatory models should not be exaggerated. They have several features in common and this makes them difficult to separate clearly in practice. Most of the evidence suggests that the high equilibrium unemployment in Western Europe as well as in Sweden has several causes.
Market operations and prudential policy The synergies I have identified so far explain why it makes sense for monetary policy and prudential policies to be operated by a single institution, but there are also complementarities between prudential policy and the way a central bank uses its balance sheet and controls the supply of high-powered money. 13  In a concentrated banking system such as the UK’s the resilience of a subset of large institutions has a disproportionate effect on the resilience of the system. One might think that microprudential regulation is then enough to guarantee systemic stability. But that is not so when there are systemic externalities or financial accelerator effects. The latter operate through feedbacks in the macroeconomy, and would depend (among other things) in the short run on the response of monetary policy. A macroprudential authority – with a macroeconomic viewpoint – therefore complements microprudential supervision even in a concentrated banking system. 14  See Bank of England (2009) for a discussion. 15  Blinder (2010) makes this argument in the context of potential conflicts between safety and soundness considerations and monetary policy. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The design and operation of our liquidity facilities have important synergies with prudential policy. The terms on which we supply liquidity in times of stress affects the level of selfinsurance banks choose. If we are too strict, banks have to over-insure at significant cost by holding an excess of low-yielding liquid assets rather than loans, and markets will freeze too quickly in crises.

In 2005, 4 commercial banks launched the E-switch facility to allow their customers to share their ATMs and other payment delivery channels, like point of sale terminals. These services were unheard of before the reforms and were supported by the international community. •  Commercial banks have also embarked on other initiatives including expansion programmes based on the community banking concept. This is consistent with the rural banking concept and is intended to provide financial services to those sectors of the community that are not currently serviced by the banking sector. BIS Review 72/2006  1  Your Excellency, to meet the challenges which come with an expanded banking sector and in our desire to continue modernising the overall financial sector, it has been imperative to strengthen the prudential and supervisory mandate of the Bank of Zambia. In this regard, the key initiatives that have been endorsed, with an ultimate goal of promoting safe, sound and efficient operations have included: •  The enactment and amendment of the Banking and Financial Services Acts in 1994 and 2000, respectively.
The expression “nothing is as practical as a good theory” probably applies in many ways, but to be really practical also requires that the theory captures the central elements as they appear in real life and – in particular – that one is aware of its shortcomings and faults. Measurement and estimation problems make the step from theory to practice difficult… One circumstance that very much complicates the step from theory to practice is that while the variables in the loss function are well specified in theory, in practice it is far from obvious how they should be measured. Resource utilisation, y-y*, can be regarded as a summarising measure of developments in the real economy and states how far production resources, that is, labour and real capital, are used in relation to the level that is sustainable in the long run, or the “normal” level. Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly observe how high the level of resource utilisation in the economy is, and nor is there any generally-accepted view of how this should be calculated. It is thus scarcely possible to say that a particular policy will lead to resource utilisation increasing or decreasing by exactly this or that figure.17 Sometimes the argument is put forward that it is much easier if one uses the deviation between actual unemployment and long-run sustainable unemployment, or equilibrium unemployment, instead of resource utilisation in the loss function. But I am quite sure that  14  Svensson, Lars E.O.

It is true that the past, global financial centres emerged in jurisdictions with huge trade surpluses: Amsterdam in the 16th century, London in the 19th century New York in the early 20th. But London’s re-emergence 60 years ago was long after the global economic dominance of the UK – and long before the single market in financial services developed in the EU. Openness, time zone, language, law, developed domestic financial markets and, crucially, the concentration of skills and expertise and talent, seem better explanations of the agglomerations of economic activity that are today’s global financial centres.3 The EU has the ambition to build a more integrated and more market based financial system – the Capital Markets Union. I certainly believe this is the right ambition; a greater role for risk capital and for market based rather than bank-based finance will help to diversify risk across borders, reduce costs to the real economy and avoid too great a reliance on the banking channel of credit intermediation. BIS (2019): UK’s share of global 2019 (April) turnover in OTC interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange UK’s FinTech adoption rate was 71% in 2019, global average is 64 3 Roberts, R. (2005). London as an international financial centre, 1980-2000: global powerhouse or Wimbledon EC2?. In: Cassis, Youssef and Bussière, Eric (eds.) London and Paris as International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 287-312. ISBN 9780199269495. Wójcik, D., Knight, E., & Pažitka, V. (2018). What turns cities into international financial centres?
Admittedly, our objective as regulators remains relatively simple: it should be primarily to ensure that financial institutions, infrastructures and markets properly do their job of smoothly and efficiently channelling savings into productive investments. Yet our task is difficult as finance constantly evolves as a result of technological advances or as an answer to regulatory changes. This should prompt us to be both resolute and cautious in dealing with many questions such as whether there is an optimal mix of bank and market financing. The financial crisis has indeed revealed at least three major failures of our financial systems, be they bank or market oriented: excess leverage, excess complexity and excess opacity. Corrective actions have been implemented in these three areas. First, over the past few years, Basel III and various national or regional initiatives have led to a sizeable recapitalization of the banking system and especially SIFIs [systemically important financial institutions]. In the euro area, the Comprehensive Assessment of the balance sheets of 130 major banks shows how much progress has been made. Second, major reforms have been undertaken in order to facilitate the orderly resolution of large and complex financial institutions, thus providing better incentives ex ante to these large financial conglomerates. Such progress can be seen both in Europe, where the Banking Union is a major step forward, as well as abroad. Last, the scope of regulation has been extended to products and markets that remained too opaque in spite of their systemic relevance, such as some major classes of OTC derivatives.

This means that banks are able to lend through severe economic downturns, insurers can maintain underwriting capacity in the face of a wide range of severe shocks, and financial markets are able to function, as they adjust to shocks, including the infrastructures in markets that are at the heart of the financial system in the post-crisis reforms, notably clearing houses. Much of that functioning also relies on the second plank of resilience, namely structural measures which are not designed to vary in a counter-cyclical manner, but instead apply equally at all times. For banks, this means minimum capital and leverage ratios on top of which sit buffers which are there to be used counter-cyclically in times of stress. Consistent with the idea of resilience, there are two key questions to ask about the buffers: are they sized consistent with the financial stability objective; and are they in practice usable in times of stress? We have to keep both of these questions under almost continuous review. Post-Brexit, it is necessary that we review and, where appropriate, revise the regulatory system to make it consistent with our UK specific objectives. When I say UK, however, we must recognise – as TheCityUK does – that we are a leading global financial centre. So, our financial stability objective is a global public good, as the IMF has previously noted. We must therefore continue to be closely involved in shaping international standards, and then implement them properly. I can assure you that we are doing both of these.
John C Williams: Our work Is not yet done Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the New York Bankers Association, New York City, 14 February 2023. ***  As prepared for delivery Thank you, Tom. It's a pleasure to share the stage with you today. As a member of the New York Fed's Board of Directors, Tom Murphy represents the Federal Reserve's Second District. Our directors ensure that a diversity of viewpoints on economic and banking conditions are represented, so we can better understand and anticipate developments in our economy, both locally and nationally. As you well know, a lot has occurred since Tom joined our board two years ago. And we have benefited immensely from his thoughtful insights and perspectives. Today, it should come as no surprise that I'll be spending much of my time discussing inflation, which remains my No. 1 concern. I'll also talk about how we are using our monetary policy tools to restore price stability. And, I'll give you my economic outlook. Before I go further, I'd like to do three things: First and foremost, I want to thank the New York Bankers Association for inviting me here. Second, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System.

In addition, the severe supply-chain bottlenecks that initially affected this category began to improve last year, which likely contributed to the easing of prices for some durable goods in recent months. However, there are factors that may throw sand in this gear going forward. The economic resiliency of Europe and a rebound in growth in China following the end of COVID restrictions will likely increase global demand for goods. And further improvement in global supply-chain disruptions has stalled over the past few months. For example, the New York Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressure Index remains elevated relative to pre-pandemic levels. The slowest gear to turn is the one that represents non-energy services. It's influenced by the balance of overall supply and demand, and it will take the longest to rotate at the right pace for low and stable inflation. One area where we are seeing signs of this gear turning is in shelter costs. After a sharp rise, we have seen a steep decline in the rate of increase in new lease rents. Assuming this trend continues, we should see a slowing of overall rent inflation during this year. That said, we have yet to see the gears turn for inflation of non-energy services excluding housing, which is still quite elevated, averaging 3-3/4 percent over the most recent six months. Tightening Monetary Policy Taking into account the different speeds the gears are moving, it is clear that overall demand remains well in excess of supply, and inflation is running far above our 2 percent target.
M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul: Bank of Thailand’s review of major economic events in Thailand during the past year A Statement by M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, on Thailand’s 1 Economic and Monetary Conditions: Bank of Thailand’s Public Report, 27 December 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, On the occasion of the New Year, the Bank of Thailand as one of the main national institutions would like to take this opportunity to review some of the major economic events during the year. We would also like to review the work that the Bank of Thailand has carried out in terms of economic policies and internal restructuring. This would also be a good opportunity to raise a number of issues, which the private sector may find important for consideration in the next year. In the past year, the Thai economy has continued to expand. However, the growth rate was more moderate than anticipated. Economic recovery was not broad-based, and there remain pockets of fragility. In the second half of the year, with the adverse effect of increased oil prices, consumer and investor sentiment deteriorated, leading to deceleration in domestic spending. As a result, inventories of finished products rose by 22 % from the same period of last year. At the same time stocks of finished products, which averaged around 15 days of sales last year, rose to 17 days of sales this year. Sectors that saw large increases in stocks were canned seafood, beverages, and automobiles.

However, at present, private sector spending has been affected by the decline of consumer and investor confidence, leading to a situation where those with purchasing power are cautious in their spending. This confidence has to be restored. Those who are able to invest have to begin investing. But a good starting point to restore confidence is to have a clear economic policy framework which can be realised only by having people electing good citizens to run the government. If the people are confident in their government and in the policies of that government, then confidence in the economy will be restored speedily. The third issue: Fiscal policies for economic growth Fiscal policies will play an important role in the process of economic recovery next year. At present, government spending amounts to a fifth of GDP, which is not considered as a high level. But for other countries, people are used to the system which the government plays a major role. Government deficit at a level which is conducive to economic recovery should therefore be readily understood and accepted. 6  BIS Review 6/2001  Therefore, fiscal policies must play a more important role in stimulating the economy, but should maintain a balance between economic stimulation and long-term fiscal discipline. The fourth issue: Monetary policy On monetary policy implementation, the Bank of Thailand’s view is that the Thai economy at present and in the near future continues to need low level of interest rate rather than a high level.
At the same time, tax financing may be politically difficult to implement.4 In the short term, the politically easiest way of financing war, but in the longer term perhaps the most harmful, is through the printing of money, as this almost inevitably results in higher inflation. A fairly large share of the literature on the effects of war on inflation is about the financing of war. A review of the effects on inflation of the United States’ wars from the American Revolution to the First Gulf War shows that when the US has been involved in more limited wars, they have usually been financed through higher taxes or increased borrowing or a combination of these. However, in the case of major wars, the point where these two methods of financing have been considered exhausted has often been reached, and the government therefore turned to the printing press. The result has often been a considerably higher inflation rate.5 The two world wars are examples of this. After a war, sovereign debt has often increased considerably. At the same time, it may be difficult to raise tax revenue in the same way as before the war. This may be because the political situation has become more unstable or the economy's production capacity has declined. In such a situation, there may be a great temptation for a government to try to alleviate the situation by using the printing press to finance current expenditure and pay off the loans.

To be a little drastic, one can say that the task facing the central banks is to avoid ‘The Great Inflation 2.0’, and to do so at the lowest possible cost in terms of lower production and higher unemployment. The conditions are better than before I intend to stick my neck out a bit here and say that the conditions for coping with this balancing act are quite good for Sweden and at least considerably better than they were when inflation began to rise in the mid-1970s. There are several reasons for this. None of these are news, but it is still worth reminding ourselves of them. Firstly, since 1993, we have had an inflation target in the Swedish economy. During the most recent period of lastingly high inflation, the idea was that inflation would be kept down by means of the fixed exchange rate. The fixed exchange rate was expected to have a disciplinary effect on price-setting and wage-formation, as excessive inflation in relation to the rest of the world would lead to difficulties for the export industry and increased unemployment. However, as I have pointed out, this did not work very well. Expressed in economist terms, there was no credible nominal anchor in the economy, that is, a clear, quantified benchmark for price-setting and wage-formation. Today, we have one in the form of the inflation target. During the period of inflation targeting, long-term inflation expectations, in the way we can measure them, have remained fairly stable at around 2 per cent.
Urban Bäckström: The current situation for monetary policy  Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, before the Standing Committee on Finance, Stockholm, on 10 October 2000. *  *  *  It is gratifying to be able to note, as on so many of my previous appearances here, that economic developments in Sweden are impressive. Having achieved a growth rate in the past six years that averages 3%, it seems that our economy is now expanding at an annual rate of around 3 to 4%. Employment has really taken off. To date this year the number of people in work is 70,000 higher than in the same period of 1999. I can also note, once again, that notwithstanding the rapid economic growth, the rate of inflation has remained moderate. But these favourable developments do not mean that the Riksbank can sit back and relax. The path ahead contains a number of risks to which we must be alert. What lies behind the favourable economic trend? A basic factor behind the Swedish economy’s favourable path is, in my opinion, the economic policy realignment that has been carried out in the past decade and a half. Credit and currency markets have been deregulated, the tax system has been reformed, components of the transfers system have been modified and competitive pressure has increased. All this has helped improve the workings of our economy.

The Boston Fed’s statistical modeling suggests that a $ increase in the price of a barrel of oil will shave roughly four-tenths of a percentage point off the rate of economic growth over two years, and cause the unemployment rate to be roughly two-tenths of a percentage point higher than it would be absent the oil shock. While this is certainly not enough to completely stop the recovery, it does imply a slowing down of its pace. Oil is not the only commodity to experience price increases of late. A variety of agricultural prices have also increased. For example, Figure 3 shows the movement of wheat prices over the last decade. Droughts in Russia, flooding in Australia, and increased demand in emerging markets have all placed upward pressure on wheat prices. As with oil prices, higher food prices appear to be responding to supply and demand features of this market – and these types of price changes cannot be offset by monetary policy. It goes without saying that monetary policy cannot alter the supply of oil from volatile parts of the world, nor weather conditions in countries that are major exporters of agricultural products. Monetary policy can have a role in insuring that relative price changes do not alter inflation expectations. Rising inflation expectations could make it difficult to achieve a moderate and acceptable inflation rate over the medium term. Historical experience with supply shocks Supply shocks are not unique to this period.