samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The increase in the confidence in an economy generates more investment, which in turn leads to more production, more employment and increased welfare. In lending support to these claims the following empirical work can be cited as evidence: the World Bank study over the period 1964 to 1993 shows that economies with high institutional capability combined with good policies grew nearly eight times the rate of economies with low capability and bad 8 policies . The good governance is also essential for equitable distribution of income. High growth rates have an impact on poverty reduction by supplying more employment to the economy, but do not have direct effects on the redistribution of income. Indeed, good governance principles are the tools to redistribute income equitably, to produce policies for the provision of public health, infrastructure, education and other public goods and services either by directly government or by the private sector in a market, which is regulated and supervised by the government. Distinguished guests, However, in the vast literature on the subject, not all scholars think the same. There are some who disagree. They argue that the good governance is not a significant factor for economic growth and for an increase in the welfare of society. They challenge the findings of empirical studies by arguing that the existence of principles of good governance in a country is impossible to quantify and hence it is hard to compare it with quantitative aggregates in the economy, such as growth, poverty, etc.

Have financial institutions taken structural and technological efficient steps to improve their cyber defense? Is cyber-crime insurance effective and how is it pricing the risk? What type of public communication to we need to fight those new threats? We expect such important questions to be addressed in this context. Besides, overseers and supervisors should ensure that at an individual level, risk management is efficient. A normative framework has been established set up by European institutions to fight cybercrime and ensure the robustness of the financial markets (in particular through the adoption by the European Parliament of the Network Information Security directive); a BIS committee, the CPSS, is currently reflecting on cybersecurity for market infrastructures. Two prominent speakers will share their views on whether the existing regulatory framework provides sufficient guarantee against cybercrime. Lastly, as a central bank it is of utmost importance to make sure that the marketplace is resilient when facing cyber-threats. The purpose of the last roundtable should be to assess to what extent financial centers resilience should evolve under the influence of cybercrime threats: do increasing cross border interdependencies between financial centers (use of common market infrastructures, existence of international financial actors and cross border providers) call for an international approach? Should a multi-sectorial approach also be worth reflecting on as reliance on common service providers (such as telecoms) create a large community of interest when cyber-security is at stake?
Public investment, and supranational investment coming from the NGEU funds, can only account for a small portion of this amount. 9  Moreover, a fundamental, game-changing feature for a more integrated capital market would be the existence of significant pan-European safe assets. A common safe asset would most likely become a common benchmark, allowing the prices of equities and bonds across the euro area to reflect fundamental risk more clearly. It would facilitate the development and integration of capital and financial markets in the euro area, as flight-to-quality movements would no longer imply flight-to-core-countries movements. This would be particularly relevant in times of stress, when it would help mitigate the possibility of monetary policy transmission being hampered in a context of fragmented bond markets. In this sense, the experience with the issuances to finance the SURE and NGEU programmes can serve as the prototype for this safe asset. Although relatively small in size, they have been a success in terms of market appetite and have helped most Member States reduce costs because of the pooled financing (see slide 9). Final reflections  As I mentioned at the beginning of my address, the fiscal-monetary policy mix has passed the demanding test posed by the COVID-19 crisis, so far, with good marks. The ad hoc decisions taken by policymakers were adequate, and compensated for the lack of a complete euro area institutional architecture, enabling monetary and fiscal policies to do their job, without overburdening each other.

Under the Maastricht Treaty, the design of EMU had two core elements: an independent common central bank targeting price stability, and a framework to coordinate national fiscal policies. The former was entrusted with monetary policy, while the latter was based on a set of fiscal rules geared towards ensuring that national fiscal policies did not endanger the price stability mandate. This meant that Member States could no longer rely on monetary policy to stabilise asymmetric economic shocks (domestic, or common with highly uneven domestic effects), while the exchange rate could not act as an adjustment mechanism between countries. Instead, they had to rely on additional adjustment channels, such as capital and labour mobility, and, especially, countercyclical fiscal policy. 1  In addition, the set of fiscal rules included in the Treaty acknowledged that the fiscal behaviour of one country would affect the rest of the members and the monetary union as a whole. In particular, unsustainable fiscal policies in one country could generate economic and financial instability across the monetary union and influence the single monetary policy. Thus, the Treaty stipulates that Member States should avoid excessive deficits, and that the European Commission should monitor public finances to identify significant deviations that could endanger the macroeconomic and financial stability of the monetary union. In practice, the Protocol operationalises these principles by means of two quantitative reference values: 60% for the ratio of government debt to GDP and 3% for the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio.
The biggest impact from war developments is expected to be shown in the data of the fourth quarter of 2022 and the first half of 2023. This outlook is reflected in the latest ECB projections for economic growth, which have been revised down markedly for the remainder of the current year and for 2023. The euro area economy is now expected to grow by 3.1 percent in 2022, 0.9 percent in 2023 and 1.9 percent in 2024, compared to the December 2021 projections of 4,2 percent, 2,9 percent and 1,6 percent respectively. Harmonized inflation rose to a high of 9.1 percent in August, up from 8.9 percent in July, indicating a continuing rising trend. For the period January-August as a whole, inflation stood at 7,6 percent. Compared with the June 2022 Eurosystem staff Broad Macroeconomic Projection Exercise, headline inflation has been substantially revised up in September by 1,3 percentage points to 8,1 percent for 2022, by 2 percentage points to 5,5 percent for 2023 and by 0,2 percentage points to 2,3 percent for 2024. Energy price inflation remained extremely elevated, (at 38.3 per cent), and it continues  1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  to be the dominant component of overall inflation. Market-based indicators suggest that, in the near term, oil prices are likely to moderate, while wholesale gas prices will stay extraordinarily high. The relatively high import share of gas needed for the EU27 energy consumption, will create extensive challenges in the coming winter months, especially, in countries with gas-intensive industrial sectors.

Andrew G Haldane: The Sneetches Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the Scottish Business Friends dinner in aid of BBC Children in Need, Edinburgh, 12 May 2016. * * * Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. I would like to thank Kiran Bance, Venetia Bell, Stephen Brown, Gurmaj Dhillon, Will Dowson, Jeremy Franklin, Richard Galletly, Cat Hines, Charlotte Hogg, Tom Mann, Matthew Manning, Alex Mitchell, Ben Nelson, Raakhi Odedra, Charlotte Pope-Williams, Alice Pugh, Amandeep Rehlon, May Rostom, Emma Sinclair, Anne Wetherilt and Richard Wyatt for their comments and contributions. I would also like to thank Professors Philip Bond and Heidi Johansen-Berg and Alan Milburn and Emma Hardaker-Jones for their insights. In 1953, Dr Seuss published The Sneetches. 1 It tells the tale of an imaginary creature of which there are two types: those with and those without stars on their bellies (Figure 1). Star-bellied Sneetches are perceived in Sneetch society to be superior to those without. Until, that is, those without discover a machine for adding stars to their bellies. At that point the original star-bellied Sneetches, no longer distinctive, begin removing their stars to regain their special status. And so it goes on in a merry-go-round, until the Sneetches collectively realise they are better off treating equally those with and those without. The Sneetches is a parody of status and discrimination.
Salience can be achieved by prompting about moral codes—through language that emphasizes words like “moral,” “ethical,” and “good.” Discussions by leaders and key culture carriers—that is, esteemed colleagues regardless of rank in a hierarchy—can also help if they address ethical dilemmas that arise in the course of business decisions. Finally, salience occurs through proximity of decision-makers to those affected by decisions.12 So, look for ways to make the human consequences of choices more apparent. In my view, a habit or culture of considering what is right, and not merely what is permissible, will help any organization attract, retain, and develop high-quality employees. It will promote individual wellbeing and will contribute, over time, to an industry that makes fewer errors of judgment. Do not rest Above all, remember that this is a marathon, not a sprint. So your organization now has three lines of defense—great! But your work is not over. You still have to question whether your organization can be better controlled vis-à-vis its risks. The challenges and opportunities facing your firm do not stop changing. You need to adjust accordingly. I encourage you to ask questions about the three lines of defense model and how it is applied in your organizations. Here is one of the questions on my mind: How do the three lines of defense take account of advances in technology? Technological solutions in financial services are becoming cheaper, faster, more easily available—almost off-the-shelf—and help make your business more efficient and profitable. But do you know how these solutions work?

If such compression in expected forward short-term rates were to persist even after the FOMC begins to raise short-term interest rates, then, all else equal, it would be appropriate to choose a more aggressive path of monetary policy normalization as compared to a scenario in which forward short-term rates rose significantly, pushing bond yields significantly higher. In closing, I agree with the authors that it is very much premature to accept the hypothesis that we have entered a sustained period of secular stagnation. That said, however, I do think that the real potential GDP growth rate will be lower over the medium term, held down by much slower growth of labor input and an anticipated continuation of lackluster productivity growth performance. If I am correct, this does have implications for the longer-run value of r*. My point estimate is that the longer-run value of the federal funds rate is 3½ percent, well below its long-run historical level of 4¼ percent. At the same time, I also have little confidence about the accuracy of this specific estimate. So you see that I come out in a very  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  similar place as the authors of this year’s Monetary Policy Forum paper. They suggest that the long-run equilibrium real federal funds rate might be in the range of 1 to 2 percent. Add on 2 percent inflation, you end up in just about the same place as my current long-term 3½ percent nominal federal funds rate point estimate.
While there are around 15 million unemployed workers, there are also around 9 million workers who are working part time for economic reasons (as opposed to their own choice), and around 1.3 million “discouraged” workers who want a job but who are not currently actively looking for work – and therefore are not counted as unemployed. As firms decide to increase their total hours, some of this additional labor demand will take the form of firms restoring part-time workers to full-time status – an action that does not reduce the unemployment rate. In addition, as conditions begin to improve in the labor market, discouraged workers may decide to reenter the labor force and to renew their search for a job. This reentry pushes up the measured unemployment rate until these reentrants find new employment. As the recession ended, consumption growth returned to positive, supported by improvement in disposable income growth and a leveling off of the household saving rate (Chart 20). Household wealth began to recover as equity markets improved and the deterioration in house prices abated, supported in part by demand created by the housing tax credit programs (Chart 21). As conditions in financial markets improved, banks ceased tightening their lending standards (Chart 22). Lending activity stopped contracting, and credit became more readily available for large firms that had access to the credit markets (Chart 23). Midway through 2010, however, questions started to arise as to whether the economy was entering a “soft-patch” or heading toward a “double-dip” recession.

Joseph S Tracy: A strategy for the 2011 economic recovery Remarks by Mr Joseph S Tracy, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at Dominican College, Orangeburg, New York, 28 January 2011. *  *  *  Good morning. It is a pleasure to be with you this morning to look back on the tremendous events impacting the economy over the past several years, and to assess the outlook for the economy going forward. Let me note that the views that I will discuss with you are my own and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. On September 20, 2010, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determined that the “Great Recession” officially ended in June 2009. The Great Recession did not earn its moniker due to its length. At 18 months, the length of the Great Recession was only slightly longer than the average of 17.5 months for the 33 recessions tracked by the NBER since 1857. In fact, the longest recession was 65 months and lasted from October 1873 to March 1879. The Great Recession distinguished itself from earlier recessions in terms of its severity rather than its length. There was a decline in real output relative to trend of $ trillion or 8 percent (Chart 1). This contraction brought the level of real output back to its level in 2006. In most recessions, consumption growth slows but remains positive.
This additional year of data collection and analysis will be invaluable to the prudent  BIS Review 29/2004  1  and consistent implementation of the advanced treatments.Let me explain in more detail the supervisory perspective. As you know - and perhaps many of you have been involved - supervisors, bankers, and others have discussed intensively the technical requirements for the most advanced treatments of credit and operational risk over the past few years. This exchange of views has helped us to improve the requirements tremendously. The Committee wishes to have the best information possible to assess how the recent changes will improve risk sensitivity, enhance the role of supervisory judgement, and promote sound disclosures regarding a bank’s measures and processes for controlling risk. The Committee agreed that this could be done by requiring additional impact analysis, perhaps through national field tests in those jurisdictions that plan them. An alternative is to require banks to calculate their requirements under the 1988 rules and the new framework in parallel for two years, rather than just one as originally proposed. Consequently, those banks that will adopt Basel II’s advanced approaches to risk will be permitted to implement the new rules at year-end 2007, or just one year after the standardised and foundation banks. I believe that this decision responds to the views of both national supervisors and the industry that a limited amount of additional time is necessary to prepare consistent approaches to the implementation of the most sophisticated rules.

Third, and this is the trickiest of the three, is when individuals consciously tap on these cognitive biases to their own advantage. The rise of the asset management industry is one example, where asset managers’ herd behaviour may be looked at as perfectly rational. An IMF researcher referred to such situations as “rational bubble-riding”, whereby financial benchmarking and the short-term nature of performance appraisals imposed on asset managers, lead them to consciously ride on bubbles, despite believing that the prices are unjustified by fundamentals. Investors may be incentivised to herd, preferring to succeed or fail together to prevent reputational damage. As John Maynard Keynes famously said, “It is better for reputation to fail conventionally, than to succeed unconventionally”. Whether these cognitive biases are unconsciously wired in us or consciously being tapped on, we ought to recognise the power of perception. Edward de Bono aptly pointed out that “perception is real, even if it is not reality.” In reality, a few of these misperceptions result in tangible consequences that influence the ringgit exchange rate level. Let me cite five instances of misperceptions that have been making its rounds in the market: First, the perception that the ringgit is driven by oil prices. This was derived from fact that Malaysia is one of South East Asia’s net exporters of oil and gas. Petronas is also one of the world’s largest producers of LNG.
Svein Gjedrem: Norwegian monetary policy  Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Norges Bank, held in Copenhagen on 17 November 2000. *  *  *  Introduction I am happy to have this opportunity to speak to you here in Copenhagen about trends in the Norwegian economy and about Norwegian monetary policy. Norway’s choice of monetary policy regime is closely linked to the structure of the Norwegian economy. Norway is a welfare society with a large public sector, a high level of transfers to households and enterprises and high direct and indirect taxes. Our economy is also characterised by the great significance of petroleum activities. We have a growing aquaculture industry, and our manufacturing is also partly resource-based. The engineering industry - which is substantial - is partly based on petroleum activities. The exposed sector of the mainland economy has been fragile and vulnerable. A key concern in economic policy since the 1970s has been to avoid undermining the exposed sector too much, in view of our desire to avoid becoming too dependent on petroleum revenues. In this address I will discuss the relationship between the special structure of the Norwegian economy and Norwegian monetary policy. I will attempt to shed some light on certain differences between the Norwegian and Danish economies, and how these differences have influenced the formulation of monetary policy. Background  Oil production started in the early 1970s and has gradually increased. Forecasts show that production will peak in 2002, and thereafter decrease gradually.

Long-term fixed-rate financing is far less common in Norway than in Denmark, for instance for financing dwellings. As a result, interest rate changes have a greater impact in the relatively short term. However, the strong impact of the interest rate also places constraints on its use to underpin the exchange rate. The situation in Denmark, with its well-developed bond market, is somewhat different, since here the short-term interest rate has rather less pronounced effects on the real economy and prices, and can therefore be used to a greater extent to underpin the exchange rate. Consequently, a monetary policy strategy in which interventions are used to influence the exchange rate will have greater credibility, and the risk of ending up in game situations with the market is smaller than in Norway. Norges Bank does not intend to act in a way that will prompt game situations. The bank may nevertheless use interventions to a limited degree if the exchange rate moves significantly out of line with what we consider to be reasonable on the basis of fundamentals or in the event of exceptional short-term volatility in thin markets. In such circumstances, there is less risk of ending up in a game situation against exchange market operators. We have also experienced game situations in which one or more major operators were behind the krone exchange rate fluctuations at the same time as they took speculative positions in the bond market in the expectation that Norges Bank would raise its key interest rate to defend the krone.