samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let us draw from the declaration of dramatic unities in classical theatre in order to catalyse our efforts: “one action in one day and one place”vi. (i) Unity of action: the highest priority should be the swift finalisation of the FSB recommendations on cryptoassets, which could mean a further strengthening of the European MiCA regulation; (ii) unity of time: more than a day, let’s make 2023 the decisive year of action; (iii) unity of place: if crypto regulation is not implemented everywhere in the G20, it won’t be efficient anywhere. To that end, I suggest the FSB should closely monitor the implementation of its own recommendations on cryptos, just as the Basel Committee does with banking regulations. 3. The last “C” stands for cross-border payments. The momentum to improve and facilitate cross-border payments was strong a few years ago. In 2021, the  Page 7 sur 7 G20 set 11 ambitious yet achievable targets for 2027 within a dedicated taskforce I co-chaired with Lesetja Kganyago: cross-border payments shall be quicker, cheaper, more transparent and more accessible to all. Yet this momentum could fade rapidly due to the lack of political impetus. The latest G20 offers a renewed opportunity to regain impetus on this topic, through the identification of concrete priorities – such as payment systems interoperability – and projects – such as the BIS Innovation Hub Nexus platform, connecting domestic instant (or “fast”) payment systems around the world.

But our objective and our assessment are crystal clear: Basel III is for all French banks compatible with normal allocations of profits to reserves in the coming years, after distribution; in no case will it require a dedicated capital increase. II. Taking the digital turn with lucidity We obviously all need to make the digital leap. Digitalisation is shaking up the way we live and consume, opening up a world of possibilities for corporates and customers alike. Worldwide, it clearly represents both an opportunity and a challenge for banks, as well as for supervisors. The ACPR is working actively on these issues. Last year, it published a discussion paper on the implications of AI in the financial sector. And this year, we are working with financial industry participants on the implications of AI algorithms in three topics: AML/CTF, internal models and customer protection. Beyond incumbents, new players are now becoming increasingly important. Fintechs are competing on niche markets. Yet they do not have the capital resources to disrupt incumbent banks and can even be acquired by them. On the contrary, Bigtechs do have the potential to fundamentally redefine financial intermediation: they have strong brand recognition, a worldwide customer base and privileged access to cutting-edge technologies. This new situation is a major challenge for regulators and supervisors. Of course, financial regulation should remain technologically neutral: the basic principle “same activity, same rules” still applies. This is a good thing for the level playing field.
This is why the National Bank of Poland appreciates the establishment of Forum SEPA Polska by the Polish banking community and is deeply convinced that all programmes and decisions worked out and made in the course of such cooperation will increase the satisfaction of Poles who use services of national banks through making product offers more attractive, through increasing security and level of services and through reducing their prices. Inhabitants of the euro area obtained many benefits upon the introduction of the euro in the cashless turnover in 1999 and in cash handling in 2001. Transaction costs of foreign currency exchange disappeared, home bias on financial markets was reduced, risk premium decreased and the euro has become an important currency in which securities are issued on international financial markets. Menzie Chinn and Jakob Frankel, well-known American economists project that if Great Britain joins the euro area, the euro will replace the dollar as the international reserve currency 2 as early as in the late second decade of the 21st century, which might entail additional benefits for European consumers  1  See also S Quinn and W Roberds “An Economic Explanation of the Early Bank of Amsterdam, Debasement, Bills of Exchange, and the Emergence of the First Central Bank”, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2006-13, September 2006. 2  M Chinn, J Frankel, “Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar As Leading International Reserve Currency?”, presented at NBER Conference, Newport, RI, 1-2 June 2005.

Secondly, monetary union still has a long way to go to achieve sounder governance that will reduce the union’s vulnerability to shocks, provide for better coordination of its economic policies and promote the reforms needed to encourage and to be able to sustain long-term growth. 3/7  The role of monetary policy I shall first address the role that monetary policy has played and is continuing to play in the recovery. The confluence of the financial and sovereign crises in a European monetary union whose institutional architecture was incomplete meant that the ECB had to assume a pivotal role in the economic policy response. Initial measures took the form of a gradual reduction in interest rates and the granting of practically unlimited amounts of liquidity to banking systems, at increasingly longer maturities, with greater flexibility in the attendant collateral policies. In 2012, amid a second recession in the euro area and financial turmoil, the possibility of purchasing the public debt of countries subject to financial pressures was introduced. While this possibility was not actually activated, it contributed to staving off the threat of the single currency breaking up. Yet by mid-2014, and despite the fact that the most acute episodes of the crisis had been overcome, the euro area was immersed in a scenario of low growth and deflation risks in which various external and internal factors were at play. On the external front, the weakness of global growth and the collapse of commodities prices accentuated the downside pressures of producer prices.
An underlying solvency problem will often manifest itself as a liquidity problem, and over time, a liquidity problem will often create a solvency problem. Did the Icelandic banks face a solvency problem? Not if we look at what used to be the traditional metrics before the crisis, cf. the displayed table. Kaupthing  Landsbanki  Glitnir  CAD ratio  11.2%  10.3%  11.2%  Tier 1 ratio  9.3%  8.2%  8.0%  Leverage ratio  15.1  20.0  19.3  Equity/tangible assets  5.2%  4.0%  3.6%  5y  5y  3.2y  32.3%  72.4%  20.8%  1.95  1.74  1.52  Bond maturity Deposits/funding Liquidity ratio  Compared to peers, their capital and leverage ratios were not out of line. Neither do the underlying liquidity problems glare at us through these metrics. But that might say more about the metrics than the reality. Add to this the fact that, around a month before the collapse, the FME issued statements about how well the banks performed on a range of stress tests. However, these stress tests were flawed in the sense that they did not include liquidity. Furthermore, they tested one institution at a time and did therefore not take into account the interconnectedness and contagion elements that proved so important during the collapse.

The highly fragmented banking system and relatively weak risk management systems within the domestic financial institutions which prevailed in Malaysia prior to the financial restructuring and reforms that were undertaken from 2001 would have rendered the implementation of Basel II extremely difficult, if not impossible to achieve without risking disruptions to the intermediation process. The financial reforms that were undertaken to strengthen the underpinnings of our banking system are therefore instrumental in facilitating the smooth transition to the adoption of Basel II in Malaysia without adverse market outcomes. In the more recent period, the Asian region as a whole has made significant strides towards strengthening market structures and institutional arrangements for financial stability. Two developments deserve mention, in view of their important contributions towards mitigating some of the concerns surrounding Basel II for emerging economies. First, in the decade following the Asian crisis, the emerging economies in Asia have extensively developed their bond and equity markets. Measured in terms of market capitalisation, East Asia's equity markets have more than trebled since 1997. The bond markets in the East Asian region have also seen significant growth during this period with significantly improved liquidity conditions in these markets. There is therefore now a more diversified structure in the financial system. Second, within Asia, the regional cooperative framework has been substantially strengthened to support financial sector development, surveillance, crisis management and capacity building.
Prudential bank regulation: present and future Speech given by Vicky Saporta, Executive Director for Prudential Policy, Bank of England  Westminster Business Forum Keynote Seminar: Building a resilient UK financial sector – next steps for prudential regulation, structural reform and mitigating risks  4 July 2018  I would like to thank Matthew Willison for working with me on this speech. Thanks are also due to Thom Adcock, Omar Ahmed, Dana Andreicut, Tamiko Bayliss, Stuart Dossett, Orlando Fernandez Ruiz, Mariana Gimpelewicz, Marc Hinterschweiger, Alex Holmes, Antoine Lallour, Jack Leslie, Damien Lynch, Sinead O’Leary-Barrett, Sam Miller, David Murphy, Santosh Pandit, Thomas Papavranoussis, Rajan Patel, Joshua Plank, Jakob Schedlbauer, Jon Sepanski, Dominic Shaw, Jonathan Smith, Ruth Smith, Anthony Veal, and Sam Woods for contributions and comments. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Introduction  I am pleased to be here today to give this speech. The Westminster Business Forum has a fascinating agenda – from policy priorities for UK manufacturing, to the development of FinTech, even the future of the UK space industry! And your roots are in Parliament, which gives the Bank of England its objectives to maintain monetary and financial stability. Today is also a special day for me personally. Exactly two years ago, on 4 July 2016, I was appointed in my current role as Executive Director for Prudential Policy.

The peer group includes Barclays, Cooperative Banking Group, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide, RBS and Santander UK. (d) From 2018, Basel III Tier 1 capital ratios reflect IFRS 9 transitional arrangements as agreed in European law. (e) Series begins at end-2007. Chart 2: UK banks’ holdings of liquid assets Liquidity Buffer  (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)  LCR HQLA  £ 800 750 700 650 600 550 500 450 400 350 300  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Source: PRA regulatory returns (a) UK liquidity consolidation groups for major 7 UK banks. (b) DLG consolidation is applied to Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, RBS and Santander UK, whilst solo UK entities are shown for Nationwide and Standard Chartered. (c) Liquidity buffer refers to the liquidity held under the ILG regime, which is reported weekly until at least July 2019. (d) LCR HQLA refers to high quality liquid assets under the EU Delegated Act (reported monthly since October 2015). (e) Definition of liquid assets is broader under the LCR. 17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Chart 3: Modelling errors in market risk (10 years of data)  (a)(b)(c)  Variance Squared bias MSPE  4.50E-05 4.00E-05 3.50E-05 3.00E-05 2.50E-05 2.00E-05 1.50E-05 1.00E-05 5.00E-06 0.00E+00 1  2  3  4  5  Past days modelled Source: Hinterschweiger, Neumann, and Saporta (2018), ‘Risk sensitivity and risk shifting in banking regulation’, Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No.44 (a) True model is number 3.
On the implications of DCP for optimal monetary policy, see Egorov, Konstantin and Dmitry Mukhin, “Optimal Monetary Policy under Dollar Pricing,” March 2019. mimeo Yale University; and Casas, C, Diez, FJ, Gopinath, G and Gourinchas, PO (2017), ‘Dominant Currency Paradigm: A New Model for Small Open Economies’, IMF Working Papers 17/264. 27 For more detail, see ‘Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney, 16 January 2017. 26  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  The growing risk of a global liquidity trap puts a high premium on getting more than just monetary policy right. Limited space for monetary policy to respond to adverse shocks means more of the burden for supporting jobs and activity will fall to fiscal policy. Though some may be tempted to resort to protectionism, such policies would merely serve to make the problem worse. Those at the core of the IMFS need to incorporate spillovers and spill backs, as the Fed has been doing. More broadly, central banks need to develop a better shared understanding of the scale of global risks and a recognition that concerted, cooperative action may sometimes be necessary. That doesn’t mean that monetary policy makers in advanced economies must internalise fully spillovers from their actions on emerging market economies, given their mandates are to achieve domestic objectives.

Ravi Menon: Securing good jobs in a growing financial industry Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Inauguration of BNP Paribas’ Asia Pacific Campus, Singapore, 7 March 2014. *  *  *  Alain Papiasse, Deputy Chief Operating Officer and Head of Corporate and Investment Banking, BNP Paribas Group, Eric Raynaud, Chief Executive Officer of BNP Paribas Asia Pacific, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I am delighted to join you today to celebrate the opening of BNP Paribas’ new Asia Pacific Campus here in Singapore. It is a truly impressive campus, skilfully combining the charms of a colonial heritage building with state-of-the-art facilities and technologies. A significant move The opening of this Campus in Singapore is significant for a few reasons. •  First, it demonstrates BNP Paribas’ firm commitment to strengthening the capabilities of its staff in Asia. This is BNP Paribas’ first corporate training centre outside of France. •  Second, it shows strategic foresight. BNP Paribas took the decision to invest in this Campus three years ago, when it was facing a very challenging economic environment with the Eurozone gripped by crisis. •  Third, it reflects in a way a broader story of the continued importance of Asia to European banks. After almost two years of stagnation, European bank lending to Asia has started to rise again.
PART 1: The main features of the Eurosystem monetary policy strategy Let us see what are the main features of the single monetary policy, conducted by the Eurosystem, in terms of institutional and operational framework as well as on strategic issues themselves. 1. The institutional and operational framework is founded on modern concepts Let me recall first that over the past decade, a large body of literature has been devoted to questions surrounding central bank independence, the concepts of transparency and monetary strategies, and the communication of monetary policy decisions. Drawing on this analytical expertise and the experience of the national central banks of the participating countries, the Eurosystem is first and foremost based on a modern institutional framework, founded on the principles of independence, transparency and accountability and, lastly, operational decentralisation. 1.1. The independence of the Eurosystem fosters price stability The Eurosystem’s primary objective, as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, is to achieve and maintain price stability. As many empirical studies have shown, a country’s ability to fight inflation appears very closely correlated to the degree of independence of its central bank. The independence of the European Central Bank and the 12 national central banks of the Member States of the euro area is therefore anchored in the Treaty. In operational terms, this means that, in the conduct of their duties, neither the European Central Bank nor the national central banks of the Eurosystem may request or take instructions from the Community institutions, national governments or any other body.

Benjamin Franklin is the very example of what was known at the time as an “honest man”. Benjamin Franklin showed a marked interest in Europe from a very early age. He started learning French, Italian and Spanish (in addition to Latin) in 1733. He journeyed abroad and lived both in France and England. I would like to stress his interest in France by pointing out that he was elected Associé Etranger of the French Academy in 1772 and became Plenipotentiary Minister in Paris in 1779. When referring to Benjamin Franklin, one often has in mind the great inventor, the philosopher, the essayist or the polemicist but one often forgets to mention that he also published a number of economic essays and studies. It is worth mentioning the book “Way to Wealth”, which some people consider as “the first American book on personal finance” or as “the best and the wisest money book ever written… ”. As you can probably imagine, Benjamin Franklin’s philosophy has crossed the Atlantic and still guides decision-makers today, including at the European Central Bank. In that regard, I would like to touch on a few ideas drawn from his autobiography. I need not remind you of his great fondness for quotations, especially in Poor Richard’s Almanack. In his autobiography, Benjamin Franklin defined a number of virtues that he believed to be cardinal. They included temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, etc. I find his interpretation of these terms interesting.
At the regional level, countries can make a valuable contribution to regional and global stability by joining voluntarily with their neighbors in mutual surveillance. The objective should be to complement IMF surveillance by developing a “club spirit” through which neighboring countries can encourage one another -- and, at times, exert some peer pressure on one another -- to pursue sound policies. We welcome the efforts being made in this direction in various fora. To be effective, such regional surveillance will, of course, have to be based on sound economic analysis. In this connection, the management and staff of the IMF are ready to contribute to regional surveillance in Asia, as they already do in Europe, the G-7, and other fora. Indeed, one of the tasks of our new regional office in Tokyo could be to help promote more intensive regional surveillance. V. The response of the Fund At the multilateral level, the international community sees it as indispensable to work and cooperate through a central institution, the IMF, in order to help countries deal with the opportunities and risks of globalization. And given the challenges of the global financial markets, the international community has encouraged the Fund to strengthen its capacity in this respect. The Fund’s response centers on four broad areas. First, we have strengthened Fund surveillance, which, as you know, lies at the heart of the IMF’s efforts to maintain an orderly international monetary system.

As you may know, the membership has just agreed to an increase of 45 percent, equivalent to about $ billion, in IMF quotas. This will raise the capital base of the institution to some $ billion. In addition, the Fund has taken steps to augment its financial resources through the agreement on the New Arrangements to Borrow. Under these arrangements, participants would be prepared to lend up to the equivalent of some $ billion when additional resources are needed to forestall or cope with an impairment of the international monetary system, or deal with an exceptional situation that poses a threat to the stability of the system. We hope that participants who have not yet done so will complete the necessary legislative action so that these arrangements can enter into force soon. BIS Review 111/1997  -6-  Furthermore, in order to allow all members to participate on an equitable basis in the SDR system, agreement has been reached on a proposal to amend the Fund’s Articles of Agreement to authorize a special one-time allocation of SDRs of about $ billion that would equalize all members’ ratios of SDR allocations to quotas and would double the amount of SDRs allocated to date. These resources will supplement members’ reserves, giving them more flexibility in economic policies and a cushion against adverse developments. Last but not least, recent experience has demonstrated once again that early warnings cannot always prevent crisis from blowing up.
Exports to EU and EU’s Final Domestic Demand 15  160 EU's Final Domestic Demand (billion €  14  140  Exports to EU (2010=100, right axis)  13  120  12 100 11 80 10 60  9  2017*  2015  2016*  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  20 2004  7 2003  40  2002  8  * Forecast. Source: Eurostat, IHS CBRT. 4  Another factor that will lead to an improvement in exports and current account balance is the depreciation of the Turkish lira. As of January, the real effective exchange rate index has fallen to 88.2, which is the historically lowest level in the past 15 years (Figure 7). The most recent data show that export growth has been outpacing import growth and we expect this picture to become more evident during the first half of 2017. Figure 7. Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI Based, 2003=100) 140  130  120  110  100  90  01.17  01.16  01.15  01.14  01.13  01.12  01.11  01.10  01.09  01.08  01.07  01.06  01.05  01.04  01.03  80  Source: CBRT. Regarding external finance, current account deficit is financed predominantly by FDI flows and long term borrowing (Figure 8).

Macroeconomic Outlook and Monetary Policy in Turkey Remarks by Murat Çetinkaya Governor Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey at J.P. Morgan Turkey Macro and Credit Conference London  9 February 2017  Dear Participants, My speech will try to elaborate on the recent macroeconomic outlook, monetary policy framework and the coordinated policy actions to support the fundamentals of the Turkish economy. 1. Macroeconomic Outlook Turkish economy was hit by concurrent shocks in recent years. Geopolitical tensions, global shocks, security related issues and a failed coup attempt have created significant policy challenges. Despite the intensity and size of the shocks in recent years, the growth rate has been quite robust until recently, outpacing emerging market average by a large margin (Figure 1). The resilience of growth in recent years can be attributed to factors such as prudent macroprudential policies reducing the sensitivity of economic activity to capital flow volatility, dynamic domestic market, market flexibility of exports, and the fall in energy prices. Figure 1. Growth Rates in Turkey and Emerging Economies (Percentage Change, Annual) 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Developing Countries excluding China and India Turkey*  -2  12.16  09.16  06.16  03.16  12.15  09.15  06.15  03.15  12.14  09.14  06.14  03.14  12.13  09.13  06.13  03.13  12.12  09.12  06.12  03.12  -4  * Forecast for 2016 Q4.