samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Likewise, a  4  Winje, H. and L.T. Turtveit (2014): “Norwegian banks’ adjustment to higher capital requirements”, Norges Bank Staff Memo 14/2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  pronounced economic downturn with increased bank losses can be addressed by lowering both the key policy rate and the capital buffer. In other situations, it may be appropriate to reduce the key policy rate while at the same time raising the level of the capital buffer. If, for instance, there are prospects that inflation will become too low at the same time as debt and house prices are rising rapidly, the key policy rate will be reduced, in line with its primary task of maintaining a nominal anchor for the economy. Unwarranted negative effects on financial stability of lower interest rates could in this case be counteracted by raising the level of the countercyclical buffer. Macroprudential policy and stricter banking regulation help to reduce systemic risk, but we cannot act on the assumption that tighter regulation alone will suffice to prevent future crises. Monetary policy, on the other hand, has well-documented effects on house prices and debt. Thus, monetary policy deliberations at Norges Bank give weight to mitigating the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. By taking financial stability considerations into account, we seek better, more stable outcomes for inflation and output in the longer run. A simple analytical framework can serve to illustrate this point. Chart: Framework Consider a central bank with a flexible inflation targeting regime.

The model-based predictions can be interpreted as the probability that the economy is in a precrisis period. The chart shows estimated crisis probabilities for the US, Spain, Norway and the UK. The band reflects various combinations of explanatory variables and trend estimation methods. 3 The dataset covers the period from 1970 to 2013, with a total of 27 events defined as crises, of which 11 are associated with the financial turmoil in 2008–2009. As you can see from the chart, the estimated probability of a crisis increased markedly in the years ahead of the financial crisis in 2008–2009, although the UK is the exception in that context. Crisis probabilities also increased in the US ahead of the US Savings and Loan crisis, in the UK ahead of the UK’s small-bank crisis and in Norway ahead of the banking crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s. All these episodes featured rapid growth in credit and rising real estate prices. 2  See Anundsen, A.K., F. Hansen, K. Gerdrup and K. Kragh-Sørensen (2014): «Bubbles and crises: The role of house prices and credit», Norges Bank Working Papers 14/2014. 3  The indicators are incorporated in growth form or as deviations from estimated long-term trends. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The empirical results support our choice of key indicators of financial imbalances. Household and corporate credit, house prices and banks’ wholesale funding ratio are statistically significant in the models and clearly influence the estimated probability of a crisis.
There is evidence, across a number of countries, of the labour share having fallen over recent decades (Chart 24). Even in the UK, the labour share has glided south, if more slowly than elsewhere, over recent years. The relationship between productivity and real wages tells a similar story. Across a number of countries, there is recent evidence of real wages falling short of productivity (IMF (2015)). In the US, this has been evident since at least 1970, with average real wages rising 0.6 percentage points per year more slowly than productivity (Chart 25). In the UK, that gap has averaged 0.3 percentage points per year since 1990. For median wages, these gaps are larger still (Chart 26). Over time, these gaps can accumulate into big income differences. Had US real wages tracked productivity since 1970, the median worker today would be 40% better off. Had UK wages tracked productivity since 1990, the median worker today would be 20% better off. Unlike earlier phases of rapid technological change, labour has not shared equally in the fruits of recent great leaps forward – or at least not yet. A number of explanations have been put forward for these falling labour shares, including the falling relative cost of capital goods and globalisation (OECD (2012)). A third explanation, related to the first two, is technological change. As machine has substituted for man across a greater number of tasks, and as hollowing-out has intensified, the balance of bargaining power has swung against labour.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  These alternative models of corporate governance offer a different balance of power between capital and labour. Indeed, the distinction between the two is blurred: the owners of, and workers for, the robots are in effect one and the same. These governance structures may allow a more equitable distribution of robotic rents and generate greater value for the companies themselves and for wider society. Turning to the nearer-term, what if any implications do these labour market trends carry for the economy and monetary policy? Last week, the MPC set out its view in the quarterly Inflation Report. This painted a picture of solid UK growth, alongside subdued price pressures. The UK is growing roughly at trend, but inflation is 2 percentage points below target. The picture among other advanced economies is not greatly dissimilar. The UK inflation picture is relatively easy to explain, at least in an accounting sense. The lion’s share of inflation’s weakness is accounted for by external factors – weak world prices and a strong exchange rate. These factors are themselves in part a reflection of weak world demand, pushing down the prices of oil and other commodities. The impact of external disinflationary pressures on UK inflation is thus likely to be persistent. Nonetheless, in time these external pressures should wane. What will then determine UK inflation is the evolution of domestic costs, specifically labour costs. The UK labour market has been hard to read over the past few years.
The move was part of a global trend which reflected large macroeconomic forces, including: an increasing share of the global population being of prime working age; the rise of global inequality; the adoption of inflation targeting over the course of the 1990s; and the global imbalances that emerged in the early 2000s in which a glut of savings from emerging economies flowed to advanced economies. 1 Pension reforms in the UK – also over the course of the 2000s – created a further incentive to invest in long-dated bonds to better match defined-benefit liabilities. Of course since then we have had the global financial crisis and its aftermath, during which long yields declined further, reaching new lows in the first months of this year. More recently we have seen some quite sharp moves higher. But on any historical comparison long term interest rates are still at exceptionally low levels. How should we interpret them? A starting point is the pure expectations hypothesis, which says that the long term yield should reflect the market’s expectation of the average short term yield over that period. If that is true, then it suggests that Bank Rate is expected to average 2½% over the next 20 years (about half of its pre-crisis average of 5%). From that it would be easy to infer that financial markets are expecting either very low investment and growth, or very low inflation, or both.

If the Fed were to raise its rates, it would be a sign that growth and employment indicators are robust in the United States. This, essentially, would be good news for Europe. Despite all of the ECB’s efforts to inject liquidity, large companies in the euro area are sitting on mountains of cash and not investing… Monetary policy is supporting the recovery in demand and has removed a key obstacle to investment – financing. But obstacles remain on the supply side. Weak investment, even though financing costs are low, shows that there is a dearth of projects that are sufficiently profitable in the long term. This reveals a lack of productivity and innovation. The ECB cannot do much about that. On top of this, there are external risks: slowing global growth, particularly in large emerging economies. In other words, it’s pointless to expect that an eventual increase in quantitative easing will be enough to stimulate investment… Quantitative easing, by pushing back the horizon for monetary policy action, removed the financing obstacle. Lending rates to enterprises have fallen significantly, including in the stressed euro area countries. What we can do, what we must do, is maintain confidence in inflation returning towards our objective of 2%. The ECB, within its mandate, cannot accept inflation stabilising in the vicinity of 1%. You regularly underline the risks of inflation and growth being too low. But there are always risks – the sky could fall in!
The outlook for the other developed economies is not much more favourable and, indeed, the available projections for the emerging economies, which in recent years have been the main driver of global economic growth, also show a weakening of activity. The difficulties of definitively restoring confidence in the soundness of the Monetary Union continue to weigh on the lack of momentum in the euro area. It is widely accepted that the problems continuing to affect sovereign debt markets in the area and limiting its ability to recover ultimately stem from the slowness shown by certain economies in adapting to the new reality of belonging to a monetary union and from certain weaknesses in the original design of European governance. Since the tensions emerged, significant progress has been made in what could to some extent be considered the first phase of reform of the euro: warranting a mention here, in any event, are the strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Excessive Imbalances Procedure and the European Semester. At the same time, however, the scope and depth of the crisis have shown the need for a more far-reaching review, whose ultimate aim must be to achieve a “genuine economic and monetary union”. The Summit of Heads of State or Government of the euro area in June this year marked the beginning of the second phase of reform, which rests on three basic pillars: the banking union, further fiscal integration and greater economic policy coordination.

These could weigh on the pace of the already fragile global recovery and create more bumps in the road for the Thai economy than we have anticipated. Moreover, the impact could be more pronounced in the rural areas, where drought and low commodity prices worsened the already weak farm income. Nevertheless, I believe there are grounds for optimism for the Thai economic growth. The Thai economy this year will continue to be driven largely by domestic demand and tourism. Exports will likely remain flat or decline further, not only due to subdued global demand but also price effects as export prices have tumbled following the low commodity prices. But, so far the impact on the labor market, even those in export-oriented sectors, has appeared well-contained. Notwithstanding the threatening uncertainty around us, tourism continued to be a main growth driver for the Thai economy, with expected tourist arrivals of around 31 millions in 2016. The CLMV market is another bright spot. The Thai exports to CLMV market are expanding in accordance with their growing middle class and vibrant economic activities. The CLMV market is now accounting for 10.4 percent of Thai total exports, which is already larger than our exports to Japan, the third largest export destination. In terms of the domestic economy, we have learned from the latest GDP release that the construction sector has picked up with a strong growth of more than 20 percent in the fourth quarter of last year, thanks to government infrastructure projects.
Bank of Zambia will continue to encourage financial institutions to administer the FAMOS check tool and the cooperation of all stakeholders in this regard is vital. The Bank of Zambia will continue to create an enabling environment through policies, legislation and regulation that facilitate greater financial inclusion of women. You may wish to know that the Bank has taken on board gender mainstreaming as part of its strategic plan, essentially to have a pluralistic approach that values the diversity among both women and men. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me remind you that Zambia has affiliated itself to conventions and initiatives that have the specific intention of enhancing the welfare of women. The Bank of Zambia will continue to take the role of the provider of an enabling environment that enhances access to finance and financial services by all, especially those that have been traditionally excluded like the economically active poor women whose entrepreneurial prowess needs to be harnessed in order to reduce poverty and increase the economic welfare of our people. Bank of Zambia is therefore delighted to be associated with this study and conference which provide a unique opportunity to listen to findings of the study and exchange ideas on the various outcomes from the study. It is my hope and trust that you will take advantage of this forum to initiate dialogue between Women Entrepreneurs and women in general and the various other stakeholders to propose mechanisms to accelerate women’s access to finance.

To paraphrase Lawrence Summers, it is not enough to explain that globalization is inevitable and that policies that look politically attractive as a response to economic anxiety will only hurt the economy as a whole. Nor is it a politically effective strategy to state simply that economic integration is a necessary and powerful force in raising average incomes, or that technological change may be more important than trade or immigration as an explanation for slower growth in real wages for many Americans. Raising the quality of education and exploring ways to improve the safety net are a necessary part of the solution to this challenge. But these reforms will have a long fuse and they may not yield the hoped-for increase in support. Trade does not appear to be more popular in countries with more generous safety nets, universal health care and highly subsidized higher education than it is today in the United States. The political challenges of sustaining support for global economic integration and fiscal sustainability will be more difficult in the United States because of what has happened to the distribution of income and economic insecurity.
Insurance regulators around the world are adopting risk-based capital and Singapore has been a frontrunner with our current Insurance Risk-Based Capital (RBC) framework introduced in 2004. This risk framework has served us well, and our insurers have navigated largely unscathed through recent financial crises; while the framework allowed for regulatory 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  intervention in a timely and effective manner. Now, I know this begs the question – if it isn’t broken, why fix it? 17. The answer is that the operating environment for global finance including insurance, has and will become increasingly complex given the more connected global markets, the vulnerability of contagion, an overall low interest rate environment that pushes investors including insurers to target more risky higher-yielding products and potential new risk areas such as in some emerging markets or in technology risks. 18. It is important that our insurance capital framework remains relevant and effective and that insurers operating in Singapore are well-capitalised to weather different crises and risk forms. 19. At the global level, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has also embarked on the development of capital standards for internationally Active Insurance Groups (“IAIGs”); while the International Accounting Standards Board is expected to finalise its guidance on insurance contracts under IFRS4 sometime this year. Progress on RBC2 20. Last year, MAS published our second consultation paper, which outlined our key proposals for RBC2. We also conducted the first quantitative impact study (QIS1) to assess the potential impact of the proposed changes on the industry.

All direct life and composite insurers had participated in QIS1. I would like to thank the LIA and its members for the active participation and feedback. Indeed, many of you have expressed understanding and support for many of the proposed enhancements in the RBC2 framework. 21. Let me share a couple of high level observations from the QIS1 results with you. 22. First, there is an increase in risk requirements compared to the existing RBC framework. This is to be expected, given the more comprehensive risk coverage and higher target confidence level under RBC2. RBC2 targets a 99.5% confidence level over a one-year period, which is increasingly seen as the benchmark for insurers globally. From the results that I have seen, most of our insurers are able to maintain capital adequacy ratio or CAR of well above 100% under the preliminary set of RBC2 proposals. 23. Some industry players are naturally anxious if they will still have to maintain the same high buffers of way above 100% CAR or FSR under RBC2, as they do currently for RBC. This is not our expectation, given that the risk requirements under RBC2 are designed to be more risk sensitive, comprehensive and calibrated to a higher target confidence level. 24. A second observation is the greater differentiation in CAR between firms with different risk profiles.
Growth in the Norwegian economy remains strong and is stronger than projected earlier. Capacity utilisation is high. Wage growth is on the rise and there are prospects of higher inflation. At the same time, the krone had appreciated markedly and there are prospects that somewhat weaker growth in the world economy will contribute to curbing inflation and growth in output and employment in Norway. Reference was also made to the analyses in Monetary Policy Report 3/07, which indicate that the key policy rate should be raised further, but to a lesser extent than envisaged in June. In addition, the Executive Board pointed out that the projections are uncertain. New information may reveal aspects of economic developments indicating that the Norwegian economy is moving on a different path than projected. On the one hand, high capacity utilisation and higher cost inflation may lead to higher-than-projected inflation. On the other hand, the risk of slower growth in the world economy has increased. If global economic developments are weaker or if the krone appreciates more than we have assumed, inflation may be lower than projected at present. It was the view of the Executive Board that the key policy rate should be in the interval 4¾5¾ per cent in the period to the publication of the next Report on 13 March 2008, unless the Norwegian economy is exposed to unexpectedly severe shocks. Thank you for your attention.

And ultimately, where we identify that firms have taken an approach which is not consistent with the aims of the policy, then we will certainly let those firms know. Findings on impact tolerances On impact tolerances it’s clear from our work that, whilst progress has again been made, firms have found this more challenging than identifying IBS. This is in part due to the complexity of defining tolerances for the different regulatory objectives of customer harm or market integrity 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  versus safety and soundness, and – for the largest firms – financial stability. For example, we have seen that several of the IBS that have been submitted by firms were accompanied by an impact tolerance for customer harm or market integrity but did not include one for safety & soundness, and an even higher number did not include one for financial stability. These are gaps which we expect firms to fill as a matter of priority. We also noted that the granularity with which firms defined their IBS impacted the tolerances they then defined.
Consumer Loans and Credit Card Claims (Real Quarterly Percentage Change, End Values) 2008  Consumer Loans  2009  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  6.0  -5.0  -0.7  2.0  2.0  2.2  Housing  3.5  -4.4  -0.6  2.0  2.5  3.4  Automobile  -0.5  -11.9  -10.5  -4.9  -5.7  -7.1  Other  9.6  -4.5  0.5  2.9  2.5  2.1  Credit Cards  6.6  -0.4  -3.3  5.0  1.7  -1.9  Source: CBRT. 25. Measures taken by the Central Bank to maintain financial stability and to promote the functionality of credit markets had favorable impacts on credit markets during the crisis. Policy rate cuts and stabilizing liquidity measures were reflected on credit rates and this contributed to the easing of financial tightness. Especially as of the second half of 2009, with the decline in credit rates, the uptrend in credit volume became more pronounced. Distinguished Guests, 26. The comprehensive fiscal incentive policies implemented to alleviate the effects of the global economic crisis caused fiscal deficits and debts stocks to soar globally, primarily in advanced countries. Additionally, the decline in tax revenues consequent to the contraction in economic activity accelerated the increase in budget deficits. 27. In parallel with the global rise in government fiscal balances, the ratios of budget deficits and debt stocks to national income also soared in Turkey in 2009.

BIS Review 68/2010  1  Growth Rates and Unemployment Rates in Advanced and Emerging Economies Growth Rates (Annual Percentage Change)  Advanced Economies Unemployment Rates (Percent)  10  11 USA  Euro Area  8  9  6 4  7  2 0  5 -2 Advanced Economies Emergi ng Economi es Export Weight ed  6. 01 08  01 06  01 04  0309  0307  0305  0303  0301  0399  0397  Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. 01 02  3  -6  0100  -4  Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. Commodity prices, which fell drastically in the last quarter of 2008 due to the significant contraction in global economic activity, hovered at low levels in early 2009. However, commodity prices began trending upward as of the second half of the year mainly on the back of the growing optimism about the global economic recovery and the boosting demand stimulated by the fiscal incentives implemented in China. The liquidity glut that was particularly fuelled by stimulus packages implemented in advanced countries, and the accelerating global economic activity resulted in an increase in oil and commodity prices, which further continued into the first quarter of 2010 as well.