samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, these are not always straightforward, given the difficulties in agreeing how to apply the fairness principle and because economic theory and empirical evidence are not always capable of reaching irrefutable conclusions regarding the effects of the various taxes on economic growth. 31  A first approximation that may be useful is to compare the composition of tax receipts in Spain with their composition in other European countries. In this respect, Spain stands out for its low level of indirect taxation, which includes VAT, excise duties and, as a particular case of the latter, environmental taxes. Specifically, almost half of the difference between total tax revenues in Spain and the arithmetic mean for the euro area, as a percentage of GDP, is explained by the higher proportion of goods and services taxed at the reduced and super-reduced rates of VAT. A very significant part of this gap is also explained by the lower level of environmental taxation, which is primarily the result of low taxation of hydrocarbons. As regards direct taxation, corporate income tax receipts are also low in Spain. In contrast, when taxes on personal income are considered together with social contributions, their contribution to the revenue gap with the euro area is roughly zero. As highlighted by the second phase of the public spending review undertaken by the AIReF, there is considerable scope to reconsider a characteristic feature of the Spanish tax system, namely the particularly high level of tax benefits.

When the SRR was introduced in June 2016, capital flows into the bond market had more or less clogged up the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. As a result, the effects surfaced primarily in a higher exchange rate. Because capital controls on outflows had not yet been lifted at that time, the risk existed of an overshooting of the exchange rate, with adverse repercussions for Iceland’s tradable sector. In addition, it was considered unfortunate, and actually unnatural, that large carry trade positions should accumulate before those that had entered the economy before the crash had been released. The exchange rate of the króna was also rising, and rose even further thereafter, because of strong tourism-generated inflows through the current account. This, of course, had a crowding-out effect on other segments of the tradable sector. If this had been compounded by a steep rise in carry trade-related inflows, Iceland would have found itself in a more dangerous position, with increased risk of an abrupt correction later on and the associated impact on economic and financial stability. Because of the recent decline in the exchange rate, this risk has receded, and it could even be argued that the risk is currently in the other direction; i.e., that excessive pessimism and self-fulfilled expectations of a further depreciation in the króna could lead to undershooting.
9 [15]  cause a bad scenario with more permanently high inflation. It is enough that some of it does. Interaction important even when inflation is too high Let me round off. I often point out that the inflation target is not just the Riksbank’s target but is a target for society as a whole. Of course, it is the Riksbank that is appointed to attain it, but how well this succeeds is of great importance from a much broader economic perspective. There is strong political support for the inflation target, which, in turn, is based on the conviction that the economy simply works better with a specific, low and stable inflation rate. The development we have had since the introduction of the target also indicates that this is indeed the case (Figure 7). Over the past decade it has become clear that a system where responsibility for the inflation target is seen as entirely resting with the Riksbank, and not as something which agents in general should support, can be problematic. This was evident during the long period when the Riksbank’s policy rate was close to the lower bound, and the Riksbank also supplemented its policy with other measures such as asset purchases, but it was nevertheless difficult to bring inflation up to the target. This was not a specifically Swedish phenomenon, but a problem that many advanced countries wrestled with. Monetary policy in isolation was simply not enough.

Instead of defending a fixed exchange rate, the task of monetary policy would be to keep inflation low and stable. In January 1993, the Riksbank announced that an inflation target of 2 per cent would enter into force as of 1 January 1995. Gradually, the new order was confirmed through changes in the monetary policy framework. The price stability target was written into the law in 1999 and monetary policy decisions were delegated to an independent Executive Board. The Riksbank is therefore now in a much better position to take forceful action to counteract high inflation. Another facilitating factor is, of course, that  5 [15]  the period of inflation targeting has meant that long-term inflation expectations are initially much better anchored than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Fiscal policy, for its part, would focus considerably more than before on keeping public finances in good condition so as to maintain market confidence. The budget process was changed so that it would be easier to gain control over expenditure developments, while public net lending would, on average, be positive through the so-called surplus target. These changes have meant that fiscal policy no longer contributes in itself to persistently high inflation, as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s. Swedish wage formation was also changed and now works in a completely different way than in the 1970s and 1980s.
At this point, it is important to ask a counterfactual question: what would the path of inflation have been had the CBRT not reacted? To provide more guidance on this matter, I would like to draw your attention to the chart (Chart 15). The chart depicts accumulated price increases resulting from exchange rates and administered price developments, in the case of no reaction by the CBRT. Accordingly, we estimate that the contribution of these developments to inflation would have reached 6 percentage points, had the CBRT not taken any policy measures. In this scenario, consumer inflation reaches double digits at 10.1 percent, owing mainly to the excessive depreciation of the Turkish lira, also coupled with the effect of the deterioration in inflation expectations (Table 2). Therefore, given the backward looking pricing-behavior in the services sector, inflation would hover at elevated levels for an extended period of time. This would lead to a deterioration in inflation expectations, and risk the hard-earned recent  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  achievements on the path to price stability. In such a case, bringing inflation back to reasonable levels would be more costly. In order to prevent such adverse developments, the CBRT intervened actively in the foreign exchange market; and in line with its primary objective of price stability, responded boldly by increasing overnight lending rates significantly.

Assuming that the annual rate of credit growth decelerates gradually, and monetary conditions are tightened significantly in the final quarter in line with policy measures taken in October, inflation is expected to be, with 70 percent probability, between 7.8 and 8.8 percent with a mid-point of 8.3 percent at the end of 2011, and between 3.7 and 6.7 percent with a mid-point of 5.2 percent at the end of 2012. Inflation is expected to stabilize around 5 percent in the medium term (Chart 14). I would like to reiterate that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook might lead to a change in the monetary policy stance. Therefore, assumptions regarding the monetary policy outlook underlying the inflation forecast should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBRT. In sum, short-term inflation forecasts were revised on the upside mainly due to exchange rate developments and hikes in administered prices. I would like to underscore that these factors reflect a movement in relative prices rather than a permanent increase in inflation, as the monetary tightening envisaged in the last quarter in the context of the CBRT’s recent strong policy reaction will prevent second round effects. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Distinguished Guests, I would like to highlight once more that the recent tightening in the CBRT’s policy stance aims mainly to prevent deterioration in inflation expectations triggered by inflationary pressures from the exchange rate.
On some measures, last year – 2004 – saw the strongest growth in the world GDP in 30 years. While there has been some reduction in growth this year, most forecasters’ central expectation is that it will not prove very marked. From a UK perspective however, the external conjuncture has been significantly less supportive than this implies. The key point is that the upturn in world growth has been very unbalanced, being driven largely by the US and China. Measures of world activity which give a high weight to these two countries paint a pretty buoyant picture, especially those which use purchasing power parities. However, less than 2% of UK exports go to China and rather less than 20% to the US. Fully 50% go to the euro area, which has grown only sluggishly, and whose growth forecasts have persistently been revised down. And Germany, Italy and the Netherlands – countries which between them take around 25% of UK exports – have underperformed the euro average. As a result world GDP weighted by countries’ importance in UK export markets has shown much a weaker recovery. World price pressures have also been stronger than in recent previous cycles. This largely reflects the sharp rise in the price of oil since early 2004 – a development which seems to have taken almost everyone by surprise. This is a complex story.

Low interest rates curb the decline in investment and make it easier for households to repay debt. The change in behaviour can nevertheless take time and we cannot expect consumers in the US and Europe to drive a new upturn. The public sector will eventually have to rein in expenditure and increase tax revenues to prevent debt from increasing. If growth in the global economy is to be sustained, public and private investment and consumption in China and other Asian countries will probably have to absorb a greater share of output in these countries. In many industrial countries, export prices have risen relative to import prices. Lower oil and commodity prices are easing the burden. But Norway’s terms of trade are deteriorating. Some of the gains of the past few years have now dissipated, and Norway’s disposable income might fall by close to 10 per cent in 2009. Norway will move down on the list of the world’s richest countries. (And perhaps this is not altogether a bad thing.) Norwegian firms are affected when households the world over buy fewer cars and furniture and fewer ships are built. Lower oil prices will probably also result in a fall in investment on the continental shelf in the years ahead. But let us not forget that petroleum prices are still higher than the industry dared hope just a few years ago. 10  BIS Review 16/2009  The competitiveness of the Norwegian business sector declined during the upturn.
And a second theme is the need to bear in mind the distinction between the stability of individual institutions and the stability of the system. Bank of England's role in financial stability But if I may, I'd like to precede all this with a brief explanation of why we are discussing this topic here – that is, why we at the Bank of England have a keen interest in promoting debate in this area. As many of you may know, in 1997 the UK Government took the decision to separate banking supervision from the central bank and unify it with the rest of financial supervision under the new Financial Services Authority. At the same time, the maintenance of stability in the overall financial system was clarified as one of the three core tasks of the Bank of England, along with responsibility for monetary stability and promotion of efficiency and effectiveness in the financial system. So we continue to take a strong interest in the issue of overall systemic stability, including how to monitor it, how to promote it, and how best to deal with any stresses that might arise. Obviously co-ordinating our efforts with the FSA's supervision of individual institutions and the Treasury's legislative responsibilities is key. We work hard at fostering a close relationship, helped by the fact that I am a member of the FSA Board and Howard Davies, who is giving the key-note address tomorrow, is a non-executive director of the Bank.

The information provided by the SME Credit Bureau can further support efforts by banks to strengthen risk management for their SME portfolios, regardless of the level of sophistication and size of the institutions. Banks with an SME credit model already in place can benefit from the Bureau information in various ways. For example, as the Bureau rating is determined based on diverse information obtained from various sources including CCRIS, trade credit data and the Companies Commission of Malaysia, banks can use such information to bridge any information gaps and address the limited pool of internal data available for their internal models. Such gaps currently exist, as banks in general are highly dependent on borrower information alone. In addition, given the diversity of information available within the SME Credit Bureau, banks would now have access to information on various economic sectors that may not be available within existing credit portfolios. At the same time, Bureau ratings could be used by the banks to validate the robustness of their own internal models by comparing the ratings produced between their internal ratings and that by the SME Credit Bureau. For smaller and less sophisticated banks, the Bureau information will supplement the current SME credit assessment methodology that is traditionally qualitative in nature. Such banks will be able to obtain quantitative information from the Bureau database to enhance the overall credit evaluation process, thereby supporting more informed and objective credit decisions.
That has happened in a typical European bank, without significant concentration of deposits or coordination of depositors through social networks, as was the case in the SVB. There are also many risks luring outside of the euro area – geopolitical tensions can have a detrimental effect on growth and inflation, prompting further monetary policy tightening and disorderly adjustment in the financial markets. Recent failures of banks outside of the euro area have exposed vulnerabilities in markets and institutions, and how quickly shocks can transmit through the system. Complacency and overconfidence are chief enemies of every bank and every regulator. Temporary boost to profits may be like a sugar rush – weakening bank discipline on costs and hiding deeply rooted weaknesses. Banks should use the opportunity to improve their capital position, prepare for the potential losses if outlook deteriorates and intensify preparations to resist the rising competition from the non-banking sector. Failure to do so may become expensive in the medium term. Conclusion – a few lessons that we learned 1. Structural issues in the European banking system have likely not gone anywhere – they may just be hiding behind the huge excess liquidity created over the last years, and windfall profits that have started to accrue and will stay with us for some time. However, as they dry out, problems are likely to reappear. In some corners sooner than in others. Banks need to put an effort into efficiency improvements and regulators should not be complacent and need to be cognisant of over-banking.

Singapore aims to help Asia close the protection gap by addressing data paucity issues with the Natural Catastrophe Data Analytics Exchange (NatCatDax) project, co-creating new risk solutions with regional governments and Industry such as the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk and Insurance Facility (SEADRIF). In November 2020, we established the Global Asia Insurance Partnership (GAIP), a tripartite partnership between industry, academia and policy makers. GAIP aims to be the global centre of excellence in insurance and risk management with a focus on Asia. Climate risk and pandemic risk have been identified as the two initial focus areas of the GAIP. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2021/riding-the-growth-momentum-in-asia  7/11  12/02/2021  "Riding the Growth Momentum in Asia" – Keynote Speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development), …  19. The Asian financial markets can also help Asian economies adjust behaviour, for a greener and more sustainable future. Global green bond issuance volume increased nearly 50% to reach $ in 2019 [16] , which is a six-fold increase from 2015. OECD expects it to hit $ trillion by 2035 [17] . In Asia, green bond issuances are also rapidly catching up, and now accounts for 24% of global green bond, a leap from the 5% market share 5 years ago. [18] 20. Singapore launched the Green Finance Action Plan in 2019 to support a sustainable Singapore, and facilitate Asia’s transition to a sustainable future.
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Foreign labour, which had driven Singapore’s labour force growth since the late 1970s, was already one-third of the total workforce. •  It was neither economically efficient nor socially desirable to allow the foreign workforce to expand much faster than the local workforce. By 2020, average total labour force growth was down to 1% per annum. The central thrust of economic strategies in the 2010s and early 2020s was therefore to shift to a productivity-driven growth model. The aim was to increase productivity growth to at least 2% per annum, from the 1.4% averaged during the 2000s. •  The growth of lower-skilled foreign labour was curbed through increases in the foreign worker levy and reductions in the foreign worker dependency ratio ceilings. •  Financial incentives were given to firms to undertake capital deepening and adopt technology solutions to raise productivity. •  Programmes were put in place to help Singaporeans develop and master skills in new growth clusters. While the manufacturing sector had continually undergone restructuring and moved up the value chain in the preceding five decades, this was the first time the entire economy was undergoing such a transition. •  It proved particularly challenging for many traditional domestically-oriented services like retail, hospitality, construction, real estate, and social services, which had come to be heavily dependent on cheap labour over the decades.

These market inefficiencies also lie behind – at least in part – the changes in inequality in Spain during the crisis. Over the course of the Spanish recession, strong job destruction, concentrated among certain groups, and the precariousness of many contractual relationships that arose from this more uncertain macroeconomic setting prompted growth in inequality in per capita income, despite the fact that wage differences among workers oscillated less than in other developed economies. The current upturn and, in particular, strong employment creation are allowing some correction of per capita income inequality. However, looking ahead, additional reductions in the indicators of income inequality will depend on continuing reductions in unemployment, which requires improvements in the employability of the lesser-skilled and an increase in the hours actually worked by employees with lower wages. In any event, the causes behind the dynamics of inequality and its effects are complex, and learning about them will involve analysing in depth the various key facets (wages, household income, consumption and wealth, among others), this being an essential requisite for designing public policies conducive to socially sustainable growth. Against this background, allow me to refer to the discussions surrounding the national minimum wage. The Annual Report mentions the effect of the increases approved in 2017 and 2018, of 8% and 4%, respectively.
2  Between the three months Dec 2009 to Feb 2010 and the period June to August 2010, total employment increased by 315,000 according to the Labour Force Survey. 2  BIS Review 134/2010  optimistic about their future business prospects. The recent growth of employment has been driven by the private sector and that should also give us encouragement that the private sector can generate job growth that will more than offset the public employment cuts that may be in prospect following the spending review. I will come back to this point later. A second positive feature of the early stages of this recovery is that we have seen some evidence of rebalancing in the UK economy. Manufacturing output is growing much more strongly than the services sector, reversing the pattern of services-led growth that prevailed in the decade before the financial crisis. Over the last year, we have seen the strongest rate of growth of manufacturing output that the UK has experienced in over 15 years – as Chart 3 shows. According to the latest data, manufacturing production is 5% up on a year ago compared with growth of just 1.5% in the services sector over the same period. 3 While some of this rebound in the manufacturing sector may reflect temporary factors – such as the turnaround in the global stock cycle – it also shows that British industry is able to take advantage of the recovery in the global economy with the additional support of a competitive exchange rate.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Five lessons learned for monetary policy from the latest years Remarks by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Paris School of Economics, in discussion with Olivier Blanchard, Paris, 28 June 2023. *** Looking at the last three years, which were rich in unexpected events, I would risk two general lessons, and three more technical ones: 1. The first is that we must remain modest, humble: monetary policy is not omnipotent; it cannot be the only game in town. And we must be nimble, able to react to surprises with agility. 2. That said, monetary policy was efficient in preventing deflation during Covid-while not creating the present inflation. 3. On a more technical note: we certainly should work with less forward guidance. I wouldn't throw it away completely but if we use it again in the future, forward guidance should be (i) state dependent and not calendar based except in the very short term (ii) indicative and not committing. 4. We should keep our inflation target of 2%. It served us well, explaining in part why inflation expectations remain rather well anchored; we shouldn't change it, while keeping in mind that the target is for the medium term. 5. Transmission lags are a key question, and we should dig more into this issue.