samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Conclusion  We stand on the threshold of a cyclical economic recovery amid profound structural changes to the global economy. For the first time, emerging economic powers, China and India, are thrusting themselves into the global economy. They are forcing a major reordering of the economic landscape, whether in terms of new competition for investments and exports, or new markets for products. Despite all the problems and complexities that Asia faces, this is the most dynamic region in the world. We need to continue to restructure the Singapore economy and move up the value chain of economic activities. Singapore will continue its role as an important financial centre despite the changing  environment and challenges posed by China and India, and must find ways to benefit from these developments. Financial services will continue to be an area in which we have a competitive advantage. The economic recovery presents great growth potential. We need to position ourselves to capitalise on the opportunities. Market players must seek out and seize the business opportunities as they arise. They must continually reassess their strategies to remain competitive in this changing world, and more importantly, implement the good strategies vigorously to create new opportunities for themselves. MAS will continue to ensure the integrity of the financial sector, so that Singapore remains an attractive regional hub for financial sector activities. It will also adapt and respond to market developments to facilitate a more competitive operating environment.

The cooperation between the Riksbank, the banks and the cashin-transit companies is now made easier by the fact that two bank concerns have each built their own company – Bankernas Depå AB and Bank Service Syd AB – which represent their members. In this way, the establishment of cash depots can be speeded up and we can achieve a well-developed structure relatively soon. The Riksbank is also investigating the possibility of being able to destroy old and worn banknotes at the new depots in the future, in order to further reduce the number of cash transports. This would of course be done under our supervision. At present these banknotes are transported to the Riksbank for destruction, which gives rise to additional transports. We are also investigating whether, as a temporary solution, it would be possible to make banknotes unusable prior to transportation to the Riksbank for final destruction. I believe that the new structure will give us more economically-efficient cash management, where costs and income will more visibly fall to those who participate in the market. The banks and cash-intransit companies will find new forms for their operations and develop their own cash management in a better way than an authority can. I also believe that these measures will help us achieve a higher level of security for the provision of cash in Sweden.
The market for these securities had dried up because the traditional investors in these securities – SIVs, bank-related conduits and securities lenders – have either disappeared or are balance sheet constrained. This has reduced the availability of credit for consumers and led to higher borrowing costs. The first subscriptions for financing under TALF Version 1.0 will occur on March 17. The first batch of new securitizations will be funded on March 25. TALF Version 2.0 will follow. This will broaden the TALF into new asset classes such as Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities. Development of this phase is still in its early days. But it anticipated that the size and scope of TALF will expand sharply in the months ahead. So how will the TALF restart securitization activity and provide balance sheet capacity to the private sector? By providing leverage and 3-year term, non-recourse financing to investors, the TALF should increase the demand for AAA-rated securitizations. Yields of LIBOR + 400  4  BIS Review 28/2009  basis points may not be sufficiently attractive on an unleveraged basis, but at 10 times leverage the returns become very attractive. The non-recourse nature of the loans is also important. If the price of the security falls considerably, the investor just loses an amount equal to size of the haircut.

The FDIC has also guaranteed bank  BIS Review 28/2009  3  and bank holding company funding through its Temporary Guarantee Liquidity Program. As a result, bank term funding spreads have narrowed a bit this quarter. However, while the Federal Reserve can provide liquidity to the banks and dealers and the FDIC can reduce counterparty concerns via its guarantee program, these steps cannot force banks and dealers to on lend these funds to their customers. This is where several new initiatives may show the way forward. First, the Federal Reserve has begun to bypass the banks and dealers, which are balance sheet constrained, and instead has begun to provide liquidity directly to borrowers. One of these programs, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility or CPFF has been up and running since late October. Under the terms of the CPFF, the Federal Reserve offered to purchase A1-P1 rated commercial paper at 84-day maturity from issuers. Although A1-P1 rated paper is the highest quality stuff, it makes up almost all of the CP market. The only catch is that the CPFF will only buy at rates that are quite high compared to the rates one would expect in the market during normal times. The Fed has to charge a high rate and up-front fees to provide some equity in the fund to offset potential credit losses. This facility has worked extremely well in restoring market function in the commercial paper market. Initially, there was a surge of issuance into the facility.
Making such a change now might be viewed as “moving the goal posts,” given the persistent shortfall of inflation in recent years relative to the objective. And, doing so now might imply a greater tolerance for missing inflation to the low side in an asymmetric way. That would not be desirable at a time when inflation expectations are, if anything, too low, rather than too high relative to the FOMC’s objective. To sum up, the economy is broadly in a good place and the short-term economic outlook remains favorable. On a personal level, I am pleased that I will be leaving my current position at a time when the FOMC is likely to be very close to its employment and inflation objectives— recognizing, of course, the terrible damage of the financial crisis and the long time it has taken to get here. Uncertainty about trade policy and the fact that we are now on an unsustainable fiscal path, however, have raised the longer-term risks. With respect to monetary policy, there are a number of important choices the FOMC will need to make in the years ahead. I have outlined some of my preferences today: continuing with the current floor system for the implementation of monetary policy, and some of the steps that we could take to reduce the risk should interest rates return to the effective lower bound in the future. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions.

Christine Lagarde: IMFC statement Statement by Ms Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, at the forty-seventh meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, IMF Spring Meetings, Washington DC, 14 April 2023. ***  Introduction Since the October meeting, the global economic outlook has improved on the back of a gradual easing of global supply bottlenecks, declining energy prices, and the recovery of the Chinese economy following the lifting of pandemic-related containment measures. Global inflation has also been declining since it peaked in summer 2022, supported by easing supply constraints, as well as by the tightening of monetary policy among advanced economies. However, the recovery prospects for the global economy remain fragile amid continued uncertainty, fuelled by Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine, and the possibility that pressures in global energy and food markets may reappear, leading to renewed price spikes and higher inflation. Resilient labour markets and strong wage growth, especially in advanced economies, suggest that underlying inflationary pressures remain strong. At the same time, other factors that may accelerate disinflation include: persistently elevated financial market tensions, falling energy prices, and a weakening of demand, owing also in part to a stronger deceleration of bank credit or a stronger than projected transmission of monetary policy. As inflation is projected to remain too high for too long, the Governing Council of the ECB decided in March to raise the key ECB interest rates by 50 basis points, bringing the total increase since July 2022 to 350 basis points.
One obvious example is that the properties we want an e-krona to have will affect what technology we can use. The e-krona project will also need to be run in different phases. As a possible e-krona can affect the financial sector and the economy in so many different ways, there are many and complex questions that must be answered, and the answers are often interdependent. It is therefore wise to begin by creating a full list of all of the possible questions and surveying the most important deliberations and interdependencies. 9 [10]  Only after this, in a second phase, will it be possible to begin answering the questions and in this way gradually identifying which answers give the best target-fulfilment as a whole. If we do this work properly, at the end of the second phase we will have a set of answers that provide a good picture of how we want the e-krona system to look. Here of course the Riksbank can decide either to conclude the project or to proceed further. If the Riksbank decides that the e-krona system would promote the safety and efficiency of the payment system, the next step will be to construct such a system. I believe that the Riksbank has never before launched such a complicated project in such an unknown area. The complexity of course gives rise to risks and uncertainties throughout the project, something we will need to compensate for by being flexible.

Disaster risk reduction and disaster management has thus become a focus of Governments to effectively reduce financial and economic losses. In an industry that is exposed to risks both natural and man-made, this Convention’s theme of “Today’s Risks, Tomorrow’s Claims” is highly relevant especially with regards to the challenges of insurance claims. There are three pertinent challenges that I can think of this morning. Let me briefly share my thoughts on these challenges with you. Firstly, the critical role of insurers in the various aspects of the claims management value chain, that is, claims intimidation, fraud detection and prevention, claim assessment and settlement, and complaint resolution are areas requiring close monitoring by insurers and,  BIS Review 53/2010  1  where necessary, timely intervention to detect and prevent leakages. Insurers have to assess their vulnerability and address the risk of fraud efficiently to reinforce a positive image of the industry to the public. Customers must be kept informed of the progress of their claims and be given clear explanation when a claim is rejected or not settled in full. Any delay or perceived delay in claims processing, particularly for claimants in urgent need of compensation, may be misconstrued as a deliberate attempt to delay claims settlement resulting in bad publicity and ill repute for the insurance industry. Each insurer’s claims management philosophy should therefore set out the broad principles for providing high quality service standards.
Undoubtedly, it would require commitment of substantial capital and human resources on the part of banks and the supervisors. For banks, the main challenges appear to be the skills shortages and data inadequacies coupled with uncertainties regarding costs associated with implementation. Banks all over the world have started to voice concerns over the mounting regulatory costs. It is a regulatory responsibility to encourage banks to have a phased implementation programme starting from a traditional baseline scenario of identification of operational risks, assessment, and awareness monitoring and integrating these elements over a period. Basle II implementation and operational risk mitigation process puts heavy burden on supervisors to detect problems in banks, to stay on top of the latest advances in risk management and to avoid abuses of many powers that are given to supervisors. All these are too much for supervisors to bear as many of us are still on the learning curve. Exchange of information both within and outside the region would be very important particularly in capacity building for evaluation and validation of risk assessment models of banks. This seminar is one such joint effort by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka  BIS Review 88/2005  3  and the SEACEN Centre, which would provide a good opportunity to exchange information and learn from each other. 16. Basel II is expected to foster financial stability through its risk sensitive framework through encouragement of banks to adopt improved risk management practices.

The HKMA has now decided that Participating AIs can include two more types of RMB assets, namely “RMB sovereign bonds issued in Hong Kong by the Ministry of Finance of China” and “RMB bond investment through the Mainland interbank bond market”, in the calculation of this limit. The above two relaxations take effect today. I believe they will help expand the scope of development for offshore RMB business in Hong Kong and provide banks with a greater flexibility in RMB asset management, which will be conducive to further development of the market. Third, the HKMA has imposed some restrictive arrangements on the inclusion of RMB assets as liquid assets in calculating the statutory liquidity ratio of AIs. As the offshore RMB market in Hong Kong becomes more mature, I believe there is room for suitably relaxing these restrictions. Since the adjustments to be made in the calculation are more complicated and technical, we shall announce the details later. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Downward trend in global real interest rates Per cent 6  6 United Kingdom USA Sweden  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4 85  90  95  00  05  10  15  Note. 10-year yield on real government bonds in Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Swedish real interest rates are zero coupon yields interpolated from bond prices using the Nelson-Siegel method. Sources: The Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, Thomson Reuters and the Riksbank Figure 7. Problematic inflation conditions, especially 2014-2015 Annual percentage change Inflation  Inflation expectations  3  3  3.0  3.0  5 years ahead 2 years ahead 1 year ahead  CPIF excluding energy CPIF  2.5  2  2.5  2  1  1  0  0  -1  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  -1 0.0 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  0.0 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  Note. Inflation expectations refer to mean value for money market participants. Sources: Statistics Sweden and TNS Sifo Prospera  17 [20]  Figure 8.

When the repo rate is negative, the banks pay interest to the Riksbank, as the banking system as a whole has a liquidity surplus that must be deposited in the Riksbank. The short-term interbank rates, that is interest on loans between the banks, and some government rates have followed the repo rate down below zero. However, the banks have not introduced negative deposit rates for households and most companies. Only a few economic agents, primarily other financial institutions, large companies and some municipalities, have experienced a negative deposit rate, and these can in some cases also borrow at a negative interest rate. Companies have been forced to expend a certain amount of resources on avoiding negative return on their funds, but they appear to have succeeded relatively well in this. Cutting the repo rate below zero has thus in total contributed to pushing down interest rates, but has not meant that interest rates have become negative for the general public. Good profitability among the banks and few signs of a decline in demand Another fear has been that negative interest rates reduce the banks’ profitability, which could lead to higher lending rates and a lower supply of credit. The reason for this is said to be that the banks’ deposit margin, that is, the difference between the interest on deposits and lending, would decline because it is difficult to cut the deposit rate below zero.
Indeed my first meeting on getting back from summer leave was to review, with Andrew Bailey and other colleagues, our security team’s preparations for an Extinction Rebellion action in the City around the Bank. Some of the protesters seem to believe we are doing nothing much at all, which I do not accept . At the other end of the spectrum, some have argued that central banks have no real role in responding to climate change. This also I disagree with. I think it would be completely non-credible for the PRA, charged with the safety and soundness of banks and insurance companies, to say that climate change and the financial risks it brings should be ignored in its work. I do of course agree that everything we do on climate must be directly rooted in our statutory objectives. But it is essential to acknowledge that banks and insurance companies are exposed to financial risks from climate change. As the prudential regulator, we must understand these risks and ensure they are being well-managed. Moreover, banks and the broader financial sector will play a pivotal role in financing the transition to a 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  greener world, helping to mitigate the climate-related risks to the UK financial system and economy. Diversity and inclusion The same applies to our work on diversity and inclusion. It is not the job of the PRA or the wider Bank of England to pursue social policy – that is a matter for politicians. But we should do two things.

This will entail: 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  further developing our approach to wind-down and run-off planning, so that we and the firms we supervise have the capabilities in place to execute a safe and orderly exit should they enter distress; building this in a proportionate way into BAU supervisory activity and tools, potentially using skilled person reports where needed; and looking at whether there is scope to reform any aspects of the protection framework of the financial services compensation scheme (FSCS) to ensure that depositors and policyholders are appropriately protected in insolvency, and paid out in a timely fashion. To avoid creating excessive alarm from those of you eyeing the prudentist as she considers this new form of intervention, the instruction manual does not contain any of: more capital; bail-in debt/MREL; or their close cousin, root canal surgery. Nor do we necessarily expect more exits than we have had in the past. It is our hope that through time this shift in our approach will reduce the risk of disorderly exits in the small and mid-sized population, and support a competitive and dynamic marketplace while increasing the effectiveness of our supervision. Rule-maker The other major area in which we need to update the PRA’s own operating model is to accommodate the change in our role following Brexit. “Take back control” is a big deal in financial services, given the amount of regulation we have and the large extent to which it has come from or via the EU in recent decades.
Still, it is worth mentioning that recent quarters’ indicators show a slight decline in the percentage of loans that cover a high portion of the property’s value, the Bank Lending Survey reports somewhat tightened credit standards and the business cycle has resulted in a slower pace of total lending growth, although mortgage credit shows a smoother trend. I cannot stress too much how important it is for the agents involved to consider when making their investment and financing decisions that the future behavior of prices might take a detour away from recent trends. Household borrowing risks remain stable. Total household debt rose a little in the last quarter of 2013. In banking debt, there continues to be a shift in composition towards middle to upper income, with faster growth in borrowed amounts than in the number of debtors. Repayment indicators for both bank and non-bank providers show no major change, probably because of a change in composition of the consumer portfolio or because a milder impact of the business cycle on the labor market. Banks have been gradually reducing growth in commercial credit and, while less, also consumer credit, reacting to the economic slowdown. Indicators also show a reduction in the exposure to the most pro-cyclical sectors, which has been visible in stable aggregate default levels in both portfolios. Banks’ profitability increased somewhat in the past few quarters, while their capitalization levels have remained stable.

It also uses as a working assumption that nominal wages will be adjusted in line with productivity and the inflation target. The baseline scenario also uses as a methodological assumption that the MPR will follow a path comparable to that that can be inferred from the prices of financial assets outstanding at the statistical closing of this Monetary Policy Report (figure 8). The baseline scenario reflects the events that are believed to be more likely to occur with the information at hand at the closing of this Report. However, there are risk scenarios which, if materialized, may reshape the macroeconomic outlook and thus the course of monetary policy. This time, having evaluated the alternative scenarios, the Board believes that the risk balance for both output and inflation, is unbiased. Internationally, the biggest risk continues to be linked to the Chinese economy and its financial system. This risk has significant impact, considering China’s weight in the commodities market, copper included, and its importance in world trade. Besides, one cannot rule out the vulnerabilities in other emerging economies resulting in new episodes of volatility. The risks relating with the United States withdrawing its monetary stimulus programs and the Eurozone’s macro-financial situation have diminished, but are still capable of widening the fluctuations in the global financial markets. In particular, the current context of lower sovereign premiums could trigger a sharper reversal. Still, the improved performance of the U.S. economy would also mean a stronger impulse from abroad. Locally, the main risk has to do with the short-term inflation outlook.