samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This means that they are dependent on the path of economic fundamentals; in the case of government bonds, for example, the relevant factors include the budget balance, monetary policy and inflation expectations. Financial asset prices are highly susceptible both to expectations of how the market ought to move, given the underlying conditions, and to how it will move, given the expectations of how other players will act. This can result in wide fluctuations. Prices may deviate for a considerable time from what could be regarded as their long-term equilibrium. Markedly inflated prices can result in ‘bubbles’, out  3  BIS Review 52/1999  of touch with the level that seems to be fundamentally justified. Examples of this are the developments in some Asian countries in the mid 1990s, as well as price movements in the Swedish property market around the turn of the 1980s. To some extent, such phenomena can be explained in terms of how economic policy is conducted. But the causes of large price movements are also to be found in the construction of financial markets. If a market is to function properly, all the relevant information should be available simultaneously to every player. In practice, that is evidently not the case. Moreover, financial players can act in the knowledge that what they do will influence the market. The fact that performance is assessed in the short run, in many cases in comparisons with other players, makes herd behaviour common.

The third panel, chaired by Duvvuri Subbarao, will take up the question of how to deal with these vulnerabilities. What are the appropriate policy responses, and what is the role for regulation and capital controls? One policy response has been the accumulation of reserves, which can provide a temporary shock absorber. However, reserve accumulation entails costs for the countries accumulating reserves as well as for the world economy as a whole. Our last panel, chaired by Masaaki Shirakawa, will discuss alternatives to self-insurance. An obvious question here is the role of IMF lending facilities. 2  BIS Review 65/2010  As already mentioned, the questions we address today are difficult and complex. Someone who played an important role in trying to address them over several decades was Jacques Polak. Sadly, he passed away earlier this year. Reflecting on the efforts to reform the international monetary system since the Bretton Woods conference, Jacques Polak once suggested that “those of us who toil at the international monetary system would do well to adopt Sisyphus as our patron saint”. In honor of Jacques Polak, let us then push the stone back up the mountain once more and start with our first panel. Thank you for your kind attention. BIS Review 65/2010  3
At this time, although monthly value of land transactions has risen back to the previous peak level in 1996 and bank credits extended to real estate developers has picked up, we feel that there is no sign of overheating in this sector yet. Latest land prices have increased only by 14 percent on average, while housing prices for low- and medium-income families rose by less than 10 percent over that of last year. Nonetheless, it is important to keep a watchful eye on developments in the real estate sector, by making sure that bank lending to this sector is prudent. And for our part, there is now greater willingness to use the necessary prudential measures to discourage or forestall any undesirable development. Financial institutions are now required to report all real estate loans exceeding 100 million baht. Any real estate lending that is deemed too risky would require immediate additional provisioning. This should help ensure that growth of the real sector is driven by quality growth with least amount of bubbles, and that policy is proactive enough to prevent a reoccurrence of the real estate bubble prior to the 1997 crisis. To improve our ability to monitor this sector, we have developed a housing price index in cooperation with a number of agencies including the Government Housing Bank. This housing price data will be important for assessing the underlying conditions in the housing market, and will allow us to monitor any concentrations of risk before they develop in this sector.

It is possible that the e-krona could play a role for Sweden's crisis preparedness. But in any case, the Riksbank needs to clarify its role as provider of money in appropriate forms in a crisis situation. In the same way as the Riksbank is ‘lender of last resort’ for the banking system, we have a responsibility to enable payments in a crisis, to be a ‘money provider of last resort’. Personal reflections Two years of intensive work on the e-krona have now passed and I will be leaving the chairmanship of the steering group as the project enters the next phase. It has been two incredibly educational years, but I think it is still too early for me to decide whether or not I shall support an e-krona for the general public in the future. As has hopefully been clear from my earlier reasoning, this depends on whether it emerges that there are better alternatives to guarantee both the security and efficiency of the payment market. And to answer this, the analysis needs to continue. At the Riksbank, we will work in two parallel tracks: partly, we will develop the pilot version of a simpler form of the e-krona and learn the lessons that may be needed if it turns out that an e-krona is to be issued. And partly we will deepen our analysis of the consequences for Sweden if the payment market should become entirely privatised.
They range from the loss of demand in connection with the adjustment to the bursting of the bubble from the late-1980s, to more underlying structural factors. To some extent the explanations overlap and each of them certainly played a part in the dramatic course of events in the early 1990s. In order to understand what happened I believe that we have to go back to the beginning of the 1970s and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. For it was then that the stability oriented regime - a regime that had worked well in the post-war era - broke down in our country. In the absence of a global currency system, it proved difficult to establish a regime in Sweden that would be equally stable. During the 1970s and 1980s Sweden had to manage without a distinct anchor for either monetary and exchange rate policy, wage formation or economic policy in general. We moved through a series of devaluation cycles, fiscal discipline was undermined, structural problems accumulated and wage formation ceased to function properly. When the financial sector was deregulated in the mid-1980s, the problems with stabilisation became even more difficult to manage. Meanwhile, the structural weaknesses were being concealed by an overheated economy. Activity looked strong but the potential growth rate in the Swedish economy had weakened some time before. As the 1980s drew to a close, however, there was a growing awareness that something would have to be done.

The continuation of a strong demand trend can be expected to render resource utilisation in general and in the labour market in particular increasingly strained. On the other hand, inflation is still low and the prospects to date in this respect appear to be balanced. So there are not all that many signs at present of resource utilisation becoming excessively strained. Accordingly, it seems that there is ground to believe that the Swedish economy is functioning better than before. 3  BIS Review 41/2000
In any case, such reforms are a necessary foundation for dynamic and sustainable growth in the future and they must be vigorously pursued. There is no doubt that the euro area as a whole will benefit from these national reforms that represent a significant asset for us in the global economy. 2.2. The challenge for the banking system: continuing to ensure that the economy is properly financed while strengthening the financial sector  The dilemma here is easy to understand: on the one hand, it is absolutely necessary to strengthen banks’ balance sheets to enable them to better absorb shocks, protect public finances and re-establish normal market functioning. On the other, a disorderly deleveraging would create enormous problems and add credit constraints to the many headwinds currently facing our economies. The euro area is currently making sure that these two objectives – although sometimes difficult to reconcile – are achieved. Banks are meeting their new capital requirements. The capital plans submitted to the European Banking Authority (EBA) indicate an intention to exceed the benchmarks set by  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  more than 20%. French banks already comply with the Basel 2.5 regulations. At the same time, bank lending seems to be stabilizing, although at a relatively low level. Banks are starting to assess their financial situation more positively and in many cases their willingness to grant loans is increasing. This would not have been possible without the strong support of the Eurosystem.

It is estimated that the share of foreign trade of the Euro area will be only about 10% of GNP in comparison to about 30% for Germany today. And over the long term, the Euro should become almost as widely used as the US dollar is today. One conclusion to be inferred from this is the following: since Turkey has close trade, service and financial links with Europe, and as the only country connected to Europe in a Customs Union (CU), which I hope will evolve over time towards full membership, the EMU will create completely new conditions in Turkey’s international and European relations. Therefore what will happen in Europe will be decisive for Turkey in the years ahead. It will be a challenge for the Turkish authorities, as well as for bankers and businessmen. One of the most important prerequisites for a successful monetary union is a sufficient degree of economic convergence among the potential members. From that standpoint the degree of convergence among the EU countries is remarkable, particularly as regards the convergence criteria; stable prices, stable exchange rates, low long-term interest rates and healthy public finances. In addition to these criteria, the Maastricht Treaty requires that all member countries in the EU must grant independence to their central banks before the Monetary Union and the establishment of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The reason behind the requirement of independent national central banks is that fixing exchange rates and unifying currencies requires a common monetary policy.
This could in turn result in lower demand and lower commodity prices. High oil prices have mixed effects on the Norwegian economy. Lower demand abroad will have a negative impact on parts of the Norwegian economy. At the same time, domestic demand is normally stimulated by higher petroleum investment. The balance in the Norwegian foreign exchange market will not be affected to any appreciable extent. So far, the effects of high oil prices on developments in the real economy have been relatively limited. Credit developments in the past year have given ambiguous signals to our interest-rate setting. Growth in household debt is high. Enterprises have been reducing their debt for some time, but developments over the past months may suggest that this trend has been reversed. Norwegian enterprises and households borrow primarily at variable rates. Loans with no form of fixed rate agreement account for over 80 per cent of the value of loans to the household and enterprise sector. The current interest rate level is very low. Long-term investments cannot be made based on the assumption that this interest rate level will persist. According to money market expectations, the interest rate will eventually stabilise at close to 5½ per cent. This interest rate, plus a premium for banks’ margins, provides a more realistic indication of the interest rate level that will apply over the loan’s life than the variable interest rates prevailing today. Growth in the Norwegian economy is now solid. It appears that growth will also be high in 2005.

Commodity exports play a key role in several of the countries that were the first to introduce inflation targeting and, and as an oil exporter, we have learned from their experience. The first inflation target was introduced in New Zealand in 1990. Canada followed in 1991, the UK in 1992, and Sweden and Australia in 1993. A number of other countries have followed suit. In Norway, the Government issued a regulation introducing an inflation target in 2001. Monetary policy in euro area countries and Switzerland is also aimed at price stability, even though this is not referred to as inflation targeting in these countries. Inflation targeting means setting the interest rate so as to achieve a numerical target for inflation. Norges Bank sets the interest rate with a view to stabilising inflation at 2.5 per cent within a reasonable time horizon, normally 1-3 years. The more precise horizon will depend on disturbances to which the economy is exposed, and how they affect the path for inflation and output. The inflation target represents a framework for, not an obstacle to, monetary policy’s contribution to stabilising output and employment. We have a flexible inflation targeting regime, i.e. both variability in inflation in relation to the target and variability in output and employment in relation to trend are given weight. The objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation. The instrument is the interest rate. The interest rate influences inflation with a lag and with varying intensity.
9  For example, in his 2009 letter to the Chancellor requesting the MPC be able to use the Asset Purchase Facility for monetary policy purposes, the then Governor, Mervyn King said “At some future date, I would expect that the MPC would wish to exit from the strategy of buying assets and would wish to reduce the amount of assets held under the Asset Purchase Facility.”  10  See for example Alesina and Summers (1993), Klomp and De Haan (2009) and King (2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Conclusion Let me sum up. We are still learning how the post-crisis economy behaves, and some relationships in the data have proven slow to reassert themselves or may have changed. The recent plateau in wage growth despite the ongoing recovery is one example, and I will wait until I am convinced that wage growth will be sustained at a level consistent with inflation returning to target before voting for an increase in Bank Rate. In this sense, I will proceed with caution. But once I am convinced, absent further shocks, I can see Bank Rate rising more quickly than the path implied by the market curve at the time of the last Inflation Report. That is not to say I don’t understand the shape of the yield curve – market participants must consider all of the possible outcomes when making their decisions, and the yield curve could be weighed down by worries about the world.

While compliance will remain important, the nature and intensity of supervisory relations with financial institutions are already seeing a more prominent shift towards more open and engaging interactions that allow both supervisors and financial institutions to develop a more complete understanding of risks confronting the institutions and industry as a whole. This also supports current efforts to strengthen the macro prudential orientation to risk management, both at the system and institution level whereby the assessment of institutional risks is complemented by considerations of macroeconomic developments and collective market behaviors that can have a significant impact on financial stability. The reform measures to enhance the resilience of financial institutions and the supervisory capabilities to identify and assess risks at the macro level are also being reinforced with efforts to strengthen the caliber of the boards and senior management of the financial institutions. In Malaysia, our commitment towards enhancing the performance of boards of financial institution has not only been through the issuance of supervisory guidance, but also with the introduction of a rigorous Education Programme for Directors that was launched in 2008. Beginning this year, this programme is open to directors of financial institutions outside Malaysia. In drawing from the many lessons from the Asian financial crisis and this recent global financial crisis, nurturing of a strong risk culture and ethical workforce within the financial industry is absolutely fundamental to our efforts to promote financial stability and the need for this to start with the board and management of financial institutions.
Indeed, the SDDS is a global benchmark for disseminating macroeconomic data to the public. So far 64 countries have subscribed to the SDDS. BIS Review 170/2010  1  The GDDS, on the other hand, was launched in 1997 for member countries with less developed statistical systems. This system gives member countries a basic framework for a broader national statistical development strategy, addresses the full range of issues critical for compiling and disseminating data, and makes explicit plans for improvement to align national procedures with best practices. Until now, the number of participating countries in GDDS is 106. Both standards share several common features, and have successfully contributed to enhancing the range, quality, and timeliness of country data available to the public. They have also been instrumental in providing better information to underpin the operations of international financial markets and economic policy assessments in general, and thus facilitating public and private decision making. May countries that have participated in GDDS be able to eventually join the club of the SDDS. This is what Saudi Arabia has planned for. Dear Participants, This 5-day workshop is to expand on many data-related issues and standards, including the ones that I have just talked about. Some of the important topics which would be covered over the next five days include: 1. IMF's key data dissemination initiatives  2. Essentials of SDDS and its subscription  3. Essentials of standardized report forms  4. Development details of statistical bulletin tables proposed by the GCC monetary union.

This workshop will provide an opportunity for all GCC organizations in the statistical community to share national experiences, and lead discussions to identify areas for mutual cooperation for further improvement in data production and presentation. I may emphasize here that timely availability of reliable and mutually consistent national data would be of great help to the GCC Monetary Council in its task of preparing for the achievement of the ultimate goal of GCC Monetary Union. It will also provide the basis for judicious policy formulations even after the establishment of the Monetary Union for the region. I therefore urge you all, to actively engage in workshop discussions to fully understand these matters, come to useful conclusions and make your deliberations fruitful. Dear Participants I hope that by the end of the workshop you will have achieved at least the following two objectives: 1. Sufficient statistical insight to effectively address burgeoning data-related issues and concerns, and be in a position to produce intended statistical forms and table, and;  2. Identification of some future work based on mutual cooperation. I thank you all for your attention and wish all a productive and rewarding workshop. 2  BIS Review 170/2010
Our sights should be raised instead to achieve an order whereby those who are worst off benefit more than others, so that gaps in the world are narrowed. Today I shall begin with some reflections about the concepts of democracy and market. I am prompted to do so in that those who arranged this seminar first asked me to speak about “a democratic world economic order”. Then I shall concentrate on some of the issues of a mainly economic nature that have featured in the debate in recent years on globalisation. In doing so I will be drawing on some of my personal experience of economic cooperation. Then I shall sum up and draw some conclusions. Democracy and markets In my opinion there is no contradiction between democracy and markets. It is rather the case that they are two complementary components of a viable social system. A market economy is the form for organising economic activities that in almost every situation has proved superior to other alternatives, such as a centrally planned economy. Democracy is seen today as the self-evident form for political decision-making. One of the points about a market economy is that it allows for decentralised decisions about economic matters — agents can conclude agreements that are mutually beneficial. Political intervention is normally warranted only when a third party stands to lose. However, such situations are relatively common, for instance in environmental questions.

In this regard, the emergence of Islamic finance into the mainstream of the financial system is an opportunity for the Nusantara financial intermediaries, in particular, for Malaysia and Indonesia and other neighbouring countries, to open new frontiers and in so doing strengthen further the economic and financial linkages. The building of a Nusantara financial platform would not only facilitate and mobilise the pool of investable funds from the respective economies but also allow for the more efficient allocation of the funds into the productive investments in other parts of the region. This would not only contribute towards lowering the cost of funds but it would also allow for greater diversifications of risks. More recently there has been growing interest in cross border participation in investment activities in our respective economies. Malaysia's capital inflows into Indonesia has increased by three-fold totalling USD2.2 billion in 2006 compared to the previous year. It is estimated that Indonesia requires  BIS Review 73/2007  1  approximately an annual investment of USD22 billion for the next several years for the development of its infrastructure, with a large part of the funding to be provided by the private sector. In the same way, the Ninth Malaysia Plan for the period of 2006 to 2010 has a financing requirement of RM107.6 billion. The development of our regional financial intermediaries and markets will facilitate the mobilisation of resources towards financing these potential activities and thus contribute to sustaining development in the Nusantara economies.