samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Had this happened, the króna would probably have plunged in the meantime and not recovered before prices and wages had adjusted. But the problem was not restricted to non-residents. Residents, including Iceland’s pension funds, allocate substantial funds that must be invested on a continuous basis. With the economy paralysed and the Treasury’s ability to fund a large deficit over the next few years uncertain, domestic institutional investors also became reluctant to invest in domestic assets. Under these conditions, central government financing would have been extremely challenging, which would have undermined exchange rate stability still further. The third reason for the capital controls was the shaky balance sheets of the newly established financial institutions and the other financial firms that survived the onslaught, however briefly. Their balance sheets were fraught with uncertainty and potentially unstable. BIS Review 138/2010  1  A considerable share of their deposits could prove unstable as well. The balance sheets of households and businesses were likewise in a state of disarray. In the absence of exchange rate stability, it would be extremely difficult to restructure the finances of Iceland’s households, corporations, and banks. Prerequisites for capital account liberalisation The foregoing discussion should make it clear that the capital controls will not be lifted in full until confidence has been restored to the extent that their removal will not cause prolonged instability.

Ardian Fullani: Recent economic developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Joint Press Conference of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 9 March 2010. *  *  *  Honourable Mr. Minister of Finance, Honourable Mr. Bell, Honourable participants, During the last two weeks we have had an intensive dialogue with the IMF Mission, which visited Tirana in the framework of periodic consultations in terms of the observance of Article IV. During these discussions there is appraised the good performance of the Albanian economy during the past year and there is also emphasized the need for pursuing prudent economic policies, designed and implemented in the context of strengthening the macroeconomic and financial stability. Also, special attention has been paid to the need for ongoing structural reform that will support our long-term economic growth. The Albanian economy has recorded a positive economic growth during the past year and has successfully tackled the direct and indirect shudders of the global economic crisis. Moreover, the Albanian economy has passed the test, by maintaining the domestic economic and financial balances, which serve as a prerequisite for a sustainable and long-term growth. Thus, inflation rate fluctuated around 2 to 3 percent during 2009; the country’s external balances have shown correction signs, while the Albanian banking system remains robust and well-capitalized. However, the economic growth rate slowed down significantly during 2009.
While the technology has changed beyond all recognition, all of these systems are economically the equivalent of 18th century bank clerks with quill pens altering their banks’ ledgers to debit one account and credit another whilst addressing shortcomings. Some of the most high-profile of these have been so-called ‘stablecoins’. Unlike Bitcoin, these aim to ensure a stable value for the digital coin via some form of link to or backing by a stable financial asset such as Government bonds. They use technology platforms, such as blockchain, across which transactions in these new digital coins can be exchanged. Stablecoin developers have claimed a number of benefits that such schemes could bring, including very large reductions in the costs of payments, especially cross border (due in part to the much shorter chains of payment actions and smaller number of actors), greater financial inclusion through easier and cheaper access to payment services for the ‘unbanked’, and better functionality. These proposals have, to be fair, shone a light on some of the failures and costs of the current domestic systems, for all the improvements we have seen. And this is particularly true for cross border payments: retail cross-border payment systems are relatively slow, expensive and unreliable and many do not have access to them. Facebook’s Libra proposal is one high-profile example of a stablecoin proposal that claim such benefits.

Stablecoins however pose potential risks that go beyond those usually associated with existing payment systems because they also create new money-like instruments for transactional purposes and which people would hold as a store of value in the way they hold central bank or commercial bank money. Applying the principle of same risk same regulation, we therefore need to ensure that, where stablecoins are used in systemic payment chains as money-like instruments, they meet standards equivalent to those expected of commercial bank money in relation to stability of value, robustness of legal claim and the ability to redeem at par in fiat. Stablecoin proposals raise broader regulatory issues, e.g. for competition, data protection, anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing. These are for other authorities and I won’t go into them here, but the principle of same risk same regulation applies with equal force. We also need to look at the possible wider dynamic effects of stablecoin systems should they grow to a systemic size – and in particular the impact on monetary and financial stability and on the function of credit intermediation and money creation in the economy. It is difficult to predict how behaviour would evolve.
The overall level of economic activity in the UK is dominated by the services sector and here the picture is more mixed. However, a good survey barometer of the services sector is probably provided by the purchasing managers’ index which is published every month. The latest survey shows that after a dip in December, services activity returned to growth in the early months of this year (see Chart 3). The rate of growth in the services sector indicated by recent business surveys is not as strong as we saw in the period before the recession. But that should not be a surprise. The services sector is more heavily dependent on domestic consumer demand than manufacturing, and therefore the impact of higher VAT and other imported price rises may be more noticeable in the short-term. It is also worth noting that services growth was particularly strong from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, growing much faster than manufacturing and other sectors of the UK economy.5 With the economy rebalancing and the manufacturing sector now performing more strongly, we should not expect services growth to return to the strong rate seen before the global financial crisis. 5  The output of the UK services sector rose at an annual rate of 3.8% between 1995 and 2007, compared with 2.9% average growth across the economy as a whole over this period.

Jon Nicolaisen: How important is it for a nation to have a payment system? Speech by Mr Jon Nicolaisen, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at Finance Norway's payments conference, Oslo, 14 November 2019. * * * Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The payment system and Norges Bank A nation needs to have a well-functioning payment system. Without fast, inexpensive and secure payments, a modern society grinds to a halt. Users today have access to payment methods that are dependent on large-scale IT systems to process payments efficiently. We need to ensure that the payment system can adapt to new technologies and meet the needs of business and consumers in the future. The Storting (Norwegian parliament) has assigned Norges Bank the task of promoting an efficient and secure payment system. This is clearly spelled out in the new Central Bank Act, which enters into force at the turn of the year. Norges Bank is the operator of the payment settlement system and supervises interbank payment systems. These operational roles may take on greater importance in the coming years. Let me point out two trends. First, we note increasing vertical integration in the payment market. Customer interface services are becoming more tightly linked to the underlying infrastructure. We saw an example here in Norway when Vipps merged with BankID and BankAxept. There is also a tendency for common contractual arrangements that were previously situated with industry organisations to be relocated to product companies.
At the country level, however, it must be said that production, employment, wages and investment are growing strongly. Our economy is totally back on its feet after the global recession and the outlook is good. 5  I am convinced that our country must grow in a harmonious way and the benefits of progress must spread to all the country. Economic growth and global integration generate sectoral and regional adjustments; some economic activities expand and some contract, with all the associated tensions. This is what progress is all about. To mitigate the costs of sectoral adjustments – and, above all, the social costs involved – without hurting economic growth, public policies face a tremendous challenge, but the instruments with macroeconomic reach such as the exchange rate are ineffective when it comes to resolving sectoral difficulties. Next week we will be presenting our Monetary Policy Report. We hope that our economy will continue dynamic over the next 24 months, boosting higher income and employment for our people. Our role is to ensure that the process is sustainable in an environment of stable prices. We will watch over it taking every measure necessary. In this presentation I have shown all the factors that may explain parity adjustments. However, many of the elements now pressuring the exchange rate may be reversed in the long term. As a matter of fact, today the real exchange rate is around the minimum levels believed to be consistent with its long-term fundamentals, hence the importance we assign to this issue.

We must also consider the coherence of the intervention with the rest of the economy. A sufficiently bulky intervention could sustain a more depreciated nominal exchange rate, even if fundamental forces point to appreciation. However, these pressures to appreciate will take the form of higher inflation as they will drive demand for national goods to grow too fast. In the medium term, the real exchange rate is the same, but inflation is higher when the foreign 4  exchange rate adjustment mechanism is locked. Some emerging economies that have tried to avoid the nominal appreciation of their currencies are seeing a faster acceleration of inflation because the acceleration of expenditure squeezes internal production capacity. As I said, currencies are appreciating around the world, even in Asian and Latin American countries that have intervened in the market and adopted other types of financial measures to contain this appreciation (figure 7). In fact, interventions may have attenuated somewhat the nominal exchange rate appreciation, but at the end what we are seeking is to affect the real exchange rate, and the evidence on the matter shows that, on average, there is no obvious connection between the level of the countries’ interventions and the behavior of their real exchange rate (figure 8). In Chile, the latest intervention occurred in April 2008, with visible effects on the exchange rate.
By 20192, cyber-crime could reach up to $ trillion, which is three to four times the total banking asset in Malaysia3. Domestically, we saw persistent increase in cyber security incidents reported to the Malaysia Computer Emergency Response Team with the majority of these cyber incidents being related to fraud and intrusion. The threat is imminent not only in the private sector, but also in the public sector. Enhanced security framework and proper mitigating strategy and action plan is vital in order to manage the risk and alleviate the impact of any potential attack. A research done in 2016 in the US showed that only 37% of the financial services industry have a Cyber Security Incident Response Plan. I believe that our financial industry needs to be in greater state of preparedness on this. Emerging Terrorist Financing Threats Terrorism financing continues to pose significant threat to the financial industry, with larger ramifications that reverberate to political stability and the loss of lives. Importantly, the terrorism financing threat continues to evolve alongside technology. While traditional methods such as mule accounts and cash smuggling continue to be the main feature of terrorism financing, terrorist organisations and actors have not been slow in exploiting new technologies and financial 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  products. Social media platforms, online crowdfunding websites and e-wallet services are increasing in popularity among terrorists to gather their resources, especially with the increasing trend in remote radicalisation and “lone-wolf” actors.

A particular benefit was that we were able to access deeper and private information not available to analysts to run the tests; the resultant reports and briefing sessions are always attended with great interest by the market. Charlotte Gerken Executive Director, Insurance Supervision  Annex  ©2023 Bank of England
Today, I would like to focus on this challenge by analysing the context in which the SNB manages its foreign exchange reserves. While a number of problems are shared by both the SNB and other large investors, there are certain features that are specific to a central bank; I will return to these in a moment. My presentation is structured as follows: First, I will outline the latest developments in the SNB’s foreign exchange reserves. Second, I will describe the principles underlying the management of these reserves. Third, I will comment on the current allocation of reserves, based on the results for the third quarter of 2012, which have just been published. I will conclude by setting out the main challenges facing the SNB in the management of its foreign exchange reserves. Substantial growth of foreign exchange reserves since the start of the crisis A first key observation is that the SNB’s balance sheet has grown significantly since the onset of the crisis (cf. slide 1). It is currently around four times its pre-crisis level, at nearly CHF 500 billion, with foreign exchange reserves amounting to nearly 70% of GDP. Such a sizeable expansion is by no means unique; other central banks have also seen their balance sheets grow considerably. However, the SNB stands out because of the very rapid expansion in its foreign exchange reserves (cf. slide 2). It is important to note that this growth results directly from the SNB’s monetary policy, and not from any investment choices.

It is important to remember that the SNB’s activities must primarily be measured against the effectiveness of its monetary policy as well as the financial return on its investments. Conclusion To conclude, let me reiterate two points that have come up several times during my remarks. First: While the SNB is a global investor, it is also a special investor and rather far removed from the classical definition that applies in the private sector. Its investments are the direct result of its monetary policy. That policy continues to have priority over purely profit considerations in financial terms. The SNB must also meet specific requirements when selecting investments; return is obviously a factor, but it also needs to take risk and market liquidity into consideration. Finally, it must invest a significant volume of funds without disturbing the markets. This can prove difficult, and requires transitional periods in order to achieve the desired allocation. Second: The SNB tries to pursue the most efficient investment strategy possible. The fact that several central banks inform themselves about and are inspired by our experiences goes to show that we are sometimes an example for them. In so doing, the SNB also tries to be as transparent as possible, thereby meeting its duty to inform the public. The investment strategy is largely made public, and we are one of the few central banks to publish its results on a quarterly basis. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have now come to the end of my remarks.
Analyzed in terms of the ratio to national income, the ratio of the current account deficit was 6.4 percent by the end of 2005. The said ratio rose to 6.9 percent in the first quarter of 2006. Certainly, high rates of current account deficit are not peculiar to Turkey and can also be observed in other transition economies that grow at similar high rates. For instance, the ratio of current account deficit to gross domestic product is 11.8 percent in Bulgaria, 8.7 percent in Romania, 7.9 percent in Hungary and 7.2 percent in the Slovak Republic, as of 2005 1 . Higher rates of global and financial integration enable countries to sustain higher rates of current account deficit, to the extent that the robustness of their macroeconomic fundamentals allows. Due to the impact of these conditions, a current account deficit on a higher plateau has also been sustained in Turkey in recent years. 1  IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2006  BIS Review 89/2006  9  The recent high increase observed in the current account deficit in Turkey is not the result of the increase in consumption, but comes from the increase in investments that boosts the production capacity. Crude oil prices, which have been following a high and volatile course in international markets and maintaining their upward trend in recent years, stand as another factor explaining the widening of the current account deficit.

Norges Bank will increasingly use the Fund’s properties in developing investment strategies ahead, with particular emphasis on taking advantage of the Fund’s size and long-term investment horizon. BIS Review 45/2008  5  Norges Bank’s mandate sets the tracking error limit at 1.5 percentage points. Given this limit, the actual portfolio return is likely to deviate by less than 1.5 percentage points from the benchmark portfolio in two of three years, but it also implies a risk that active management may reduce the return by more than 1.5 percentage points every sixth year. In light of the size of the Fund, this will be a substantial amount in krone terms. Losses from active management must be expected in periods. Losses are not necessarily an indication that active management is not conducted professionally or not using the right strategies. The performance of the Fund’s investment management must be evaluated over a long time horizon. Even if the contribution from active management was negative for the first time in the Fund’s history last year, it does not change our confidence in and conviction that our organisation will contribute to achieving excess returns in the longer run. Thank you for your attention.
Indeed, apart from the defining characteristic that the internals have full-time executive responsibilities at the Bank, the main distinction to date is that internal members tend to serve for longer; an average of around five and three quarter years, compared with just over three years for the external members. 24  22  Walsh, C. E., 1995, “Optimal contracts for central bankers”, American Economic Review, volume 85, number 1, sets out how a contract between government and the monetary authority can give the latter the incentive to pursue society’s macroeconomic goals in a time-consistent manner. Rogoff’s “conservative central banker” relies on the central bank being more averse to inflation than society as a whole. 23  See Gerlach-Kristen, P., 2003, “Insiders and outsiders at the Bank of England”, Central Banking, volume 24, number 1. 24  To date, the time on the Committee served by externals has ranged from a minimum of 1.4 years to a maximum of 8.9 years. For internals, the corresponding range is from 2.25 years to 11 years. These ranges are calculated by including the  BIS Review 66/2007  5  That seems to me to be consonant with the political economy considerations behind the design of the Committee. The internal members provide a bedrock of accumulated policy expertise and commitment. The externals, coming from outside the Bank and turning over more frequently, keep the debate and the process fresh.

Based on a survey that was conducted, consumer satisfaction towards financial services increased significantly from 61% in 2011 to 73% in 2015. We will continue to invest efforts towards improving the performances in this area. With loans amounting to RM1.5 trillion as at end-November 2016, the banking industry is the main source of funds to households and businesses, including small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Recognising the pivotal role of the banking sector in our economy, Bank Negara Malaysia will continue to develop the financial sector in a progressive and inclusive manner to ensure that all segments of society can benefit from this financing ecosystem. Financial knowledge among businesses and individuals must be continuously improved While results are promising, our efforts in achieving financial inclusion need to be further intensified. There remain gaps in access to financing for certain segments of society, which require collective efforts from all. The Bank is receptive towards these needs and remain committed to assist the public at all times. Among the issues raised by businesses are the difficulties in obtaining funding to start a business, particularly for SMEs and new companies. The factors cited for this include the absence of collateral, or insufficient track record, especially for businesses involved in new growth areas.