samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But even abstracting from the snow, activity seems to be have been broadly flat. How much should we read into that? One possibility is that the figure is simply erratic or will be revised away in due course. But other indicators – particularly some measures of consumer and business confidence – also weakened during the second half of the year,  3  While some outside commentators regarded that projection as being on the optimistic side, it would still have left output below its pre-crisis level until 2011 Q4 and broadly in-line with the average experience after banking crises recorded by the IMF (Chart 1). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  suggesting that something more substantial may have occurred. It could just be a short-lived soft patch – after all, recoveries are rarely smooth. Indeed, that is the judgement incorporated in the projections we published a couple of weeks ago (Chart 2). But it could instead be the harbinger of a more durable slowing – only time will tell. Let me now turn to the sources of the recent elevated inflation and the chances of inflation remaining above our 2% target into the medium term and beyond. A year ago, in our February 2010 Report, our central expectation was that inflation would be around 1% in the first quarter of this year. Yet in January, CPI inflation reached 4% and is likely to move higher in the coming months, in part reflecting the recent surge in oil prices.

Input-output data suggests that goods are between two and three times more import intensive than services. The implied contributions of import prices to inflation under these two assumptions are shown in Chart 8, with import prices contributing between 2 and 3 percentage points to inflation in late 2009/early 2010. Back in 2009, our central view, embodied in successive Inflation Report projections, was for inflation to oscillate around the 2% target over the next couple of years, with the upward pressure from sterling’s depreciation very broadly offset by the downward pressure from spare capacity and additional volatility induced by the restoration of the crisis-driven cut in VAT. That view was predicated on a considerable body of research, for this and other countries, which suggested that the pass-through of exchange rate movements into consumer prices had fallen in the past two decades 6 . That research pointed to better anchoring of inflation expectations as one possible cause, coupled with an increased tendency to “price to market”, meaning that more of exchange rate movements were absorbed in either profit margins or in other costs, rather than being passed on into prices. In the event, the pass-through seems to have been rather larger, and closer to that seen prior to the Great Moderation. In part, that may reflect the recognition by market participants and businesses that a substantial decline in the real value of sterling was necessary to re balance the economy and the fall was consequently likely to be permanent.
Each government must keep its own house in order. In addition, the European Commission and all governments are responsible for ensuring that the fiscal policy of all euro area countries is constantly surveyed and monitored in line with the Stability and Growth Pact. We always made publicly the point that governments must live up to their responsibility. FTD: Now that the markets are losing confidence in Italy and Spain, can Europe still manage this crisis? Trichet: Naturally the Europeans can manage the issue. It is not a question of technique. It is a question of will and determination. And the situation, at the level of the euro area as a whole, is more sound than in the equivalent advanced economies. For example at the end of the year the euro area will post around 4 ½ % of GDP public finance deficit when the US and Japan will post around 10 %. FTD: The ECB argues against private sector involvement in the second rescue package for Greece on the grounds that, in international terms, this is not usual in such cases. But even the International Monetary Fund is now in favour of involving private bondholders. Why is the ECB still resisting such a move? Trichet: If you read carefully what the IMF writes, you will see that it is much more prudent. In any case you know the position of the Governing Council on Greece, which I repeated in our last press conference.

The National Bank of Romania invites you to an anniversary concert performed by exceptional artists of the “George Enescu” Philharmonic Orchestra, conducted by the renowned conductor Horia Andreescu. We will also be delighted by the talent and virtuosity of a young pianist, Andrei Licareţ. All these artists will give us a great joy in this splendid hall of the Romanian Athenaeum with a programme comprising well-known musical compositions from the national and international repertoire, selected from the “Eastern flank” of the European Union: Enescu, Smetana, Chopin, Bela Bartok, Grigoraş Dinicu. I thank you once again and I invite to take the floor Mr Jean Claude Trichet, the President of the European Central Bank, a close friend of the National Bank of Romania. 2  BIS Review 114/2010
We have already seen some evidence of more diversification in the sources of finance of private firms in the euro area, in particular the increasing use of securities financing.1 The euro will continue to act as a catalyst in further integration of national financial structures of the euro area into a truly euro area-wide financial structure. The euro’s function as catalyst is particularly important for the banking sector. It will reinforce already prevailing trends in the EU banking systems, such as pressure for the reduction of excess capacity, increased internationalisation and conglomeration, and further mergers and acquisitions.2 I intend to approach the relationship between the euro and the banking sector from two different angles. First, I shall discuss the factors underlying the changing structure of the financial system, in general, and the banking sector, in particular. Second, I shall touch upon the impact of the euro on the euro area banking sector in the field of both wholesale and retail business. Factors underlying the changing structure of the financial system and the banking sector Widespread deregulation and liberalisation, accompanied by technological development, have changed the environment in which banks are operating. In addition, globalisation and the increased and transformed wealth of individuals have affected the operations of financial institutions, in general, and of banks, in particular.

I’m looking forward to his insights and I know they will be the catalyst for some rich discussion. Please join me in welcoming John Dugan. 1 The information in this speech on the history of the New York Fed’s headquarters building comes from About  the Building on the New York Fed’s website. 2 Citigroup, Third Quarter 2019 Results and Key Metrics, October 15, 2019. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
There is now an increased demand for highly-skilled knowledge workers that are able to meet the changing requirements of an increasingly globalised and borderless workplace. More interconnected businesses within national economies and across the globe have also increased expectations for employees to be highly versatile and able to adapt to the fast changing conditions. Talent mobility has therefore increased substantially not only across geographical boundaries, but also across sectors, as the demand for talent in financial services by the energy, telecommunications, software and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  consultancy sectors are likely to increase over time. Organisations including financial institutions therefore need to give greater attention to these shifts and develop clear strategies to narrow the skills gap, in particular to address growing shortages in the mid to senior level talent groups. The recent regulatory reform in the financial sector and the onset of new standards and requirements under both Basel II and Basel III, the emergence of new risk disciplines and the fundamental changes in financial reporting standards, also require financial professionals to be equipped with new knowledge and skills. Similarly, talent shortages continue to be acute in high-growth areas such as wealth management, Islamic finance, and investment advisory services.

Working with its Affiliated Institutes from the industry, the Institute of Banks Malaysia (IBBM), the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM), the Malaysia Insurance Institute (MII) and the Securities Industry Development Corporation (SIDC), AIF has an important role in driving and supporting the development of talent in the financial sector. This also includes the development of intellectual capital through research that is being undertaken in the AIF Risk Management Centre and the Applied Finance Research Centre. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  AIF has the vision to build a world class financial sector workforce. In support of this vision, AIF has developed a Learning Programme Assessment and Accreditation Framework (LPAAF) which provides a structured and comprehensive approach that defines quality assurance standards for training programmes for the industry. Benchmarked against international standards, the framework is designed to be both current and forward-looking. The education standards promulgated through the framework ensures first class, job-specific training to meet the industry requirements, and equip practitioners with the practical knowledge, skills and expertise that are important to their respective job functions. Malaysia’s financial sector has continued to forge ahead. The contribution of the financial industry to the country’s GDP has increased from 9.2% in the year 2000 to 11.7% in 2009 and this figure is expected to grow further in time. Likewise, the employment growth in the financial sector will continue to accelerate, with increasing demands for specialised skills and enhanced expertise in finance.
I could talk about r-star at great length, but you may be relieved to hear that for the purpose of this speech, there’s just one point I want to make: r-star has fallen, not only in the U.S., but around the world. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Fundamental shifts have been occurring in the two main drivers of r-star over the past two decades: demographics and productivity growth. Lower fertility rates and aging populations, as well as slower productivity growth, have pushed down r-star by as much as two percentage points in a number of developed nations. These structural shifts are having fundamental effects on real interest rates, growth, and inflation. A number of advanced economies have inflation below desired levels and longer-term interest rates that are well below where they were a decade ago. There are, of course, a few outliers, but the commonalities between the world’s developed economies are becoming more and more apparent. There’s no doubt that the U.S. is experiencing first-hand the effects of the structural shifts in demographics and productivity growth. But the fact that these changes are a common experience for so many developed economies creates challenges to our economic prospects at home. Slowing Global Growth Which brings me to the second trend I highlighted: slowing global growth. This story—of low interest rates, low inflation, and slow growth—is showing up in the data. The latest numbers from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) follow the recent trend of steady downward revisions of growth estimates.

Before I explore issues like inflation in any greater depth, I should give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System. The U.S. Economy If monetary policy represents a set of scales, on one side we have a strong U.S. economy with unemployment near a 50-year low, and on the other, a more challenging and uncertain landscape. GDP looks to grow around 2 percent this year, and unemployment has stayed at or near historically low levels, boosted by solid job growth. At the same time, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has moved to cut rates three times. What’s going on? There are three trends I’ll explore today, which all demonstrate the commonalities and the interconnectedness of the global economy. The first is the low neutral rate of interest, or r-star, the second is slowing global growth, and the third is rising geopolitical tensions. All are critically important to the long-term prospects of the U.S. economy, and each tells an important story about the conditions we’re experiencing today. Low R-star Those of you who know me won’t be surprised that I’m starting with low r-star! The neutral rate of interest—the rate that prevails when monetary policy is neither restrictive nor accommodative— has been an area of study, and a personal passion, for the past two decades.
Properly managed and analysed, taking financial imbalances into account in monetary policy decisions – under certain conditions – means that target fulfilment should be better in the long run. Interaction between monetary and fiscal policy As mentioned above, monetary policy and financial stability are interdependent, but so are monetary policy and fiscal policy. The interaction between these two policy areas plays a central role in the Riksbank's ability to attain low and stable inflation. Some simple reasoning can illustrate the interaction.34 For example, if the central bank cuts the policy rate, the government's interest payments decrease and there is greater scope for a more expansionary fiscal policy. Another example is when the central bank buys government bonds. Among other things, this can mean that the government has lower costs for new borrowing at longer maturities. Conversely, fiscal policy also affects monetary policy. A more expansionary fiscal policy increases demand and ultimately also inflation and thus affects monetary policy. There are also many historical examples where fiscal policy has led to disruptions in the financial system with consequences for monetary policy. Episodes of hyperinflation are extreme examples, but there are also examples of milder crises from, for example, the euro area. Stable public finances are a prerequisite for price stability. If the government's future capacity to obtain tax revenue were to be less than future expenditure, the credibility of the inflation target would be undermined.35 This implies fiscal dominance and can lead to rapid price increases.

And, over a five year period, since each member of the MPC is trying to hit the same inflation target, I predict that it will be impossible to distinguish between “doves” and “hawks”. What will the commentators call us then? If Britain either has or is about to join Monetary Union, then the birds may have flown the nest. But if the MPC is still setting interest rates in Britain, then I hope that we shall be seen as a group that is tediously predictable, sometimes raising interest rates, sometimes cutting them, but always moving in response to the economic data in order to hit the inflation target. BIS Review 53/1998
It wishes to divide the Riksbank’s toolbox into different parts and micro regulate which tools should be used when, where and how. The effect will be a narrowing of the concept of monetary policy, less independence and freedom of action for the Riksbank, and an impaired ability to adjust monetary policy to changed conditions. In this event, Sweden will have its own definition of monetary policy that deviates markedly from the rest of the EU and the world. As I have explained above, monetary policy is so much more than just a short-term adjustment of the interest rate and purchases of government securities. The Riksbank Inquiry is not characterised by this insight. According to my way of seeing things, the Inquiry is far too attached to the simple model used at the start of the 2000s. Despite the lessons of a global financial crisis, the Inquiry has chosen to cling to a model typical of this earlier period. It is extremely important for the Riksbank that we have a Sveriges Riksbank Act that allows leeway for a changing world and that accepts that monetary policy, not just in Sweden but internationally too, now looks different compared to twenty years ago. And what will the world look like in twenty or thirty years? If the Riksbank is to continue to function for many decades, it needs to focus more on principles and combine clarity over the Riksbank’s tasks with flexibility over how this can be achieved.

Instead of one tool, the policy rate, central banks now use several different tools. Previously, the focus lay on influencing the financial conditions via a short-term, risk-free interest rate that primarily affects the banks’ funding. Now, central banks also introduce measures that directly affect more long-term and even non risk-free interest rates. These too can lead to the intended effects on the interest rates and other credit conditions that households and companies face, and thereby to the desired effects on capacity utilisation and the rate of inflation. Another way of describing the menu of monetary policy measures that are now being used is that they concern both sides of the Riksbank’s balance sheet. When the policy rate is adjusted, this entails changes for a part of the Riksbank’s liabilities. 8 And when the Riksbank purchases different types of assets, this means that the asset side changes. In other words, today’s monetary policy works with the entire balance sheet. 7  Rajan (2005) is a very well-known reference. 8 In 2020, the Riksbank has also changed the conditions for other kinds of liabilities. 6 [13]  Crisis preparedness – part of monetary policy Another change is that the central banks have been reminded of the importance of not just being able to stabilise normal economic cycles but also being prepared to act rapidly and broadly to restrain the effects of crises affecting both the development of the real economy and the financial system.
Ong Chong Tee: Review of post-crisis regulatory reforms and initiatives Opening address by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the ISDA Regulators and Industry Forum, Singapore, 13 November 2017. * * * Mr Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman CFTC, Mr Scott O’Malia, CEO ISDA, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen 1. Allow me to first thank ISDA for inviting my colleagues and I to join you today in this Regulators and Industry Forum, and for me to deliver the opening remarks. LOOKING BACK 2. Let me start with an analogy from the popular children story of The Three Little Pigs and the Big Bad Wolf. I am sure you are all familiar with that – how the Big Bad Wolf ‘huffed and puffed’ and blew down the houses of straw and sticks; except for the one made of bricks. 3. Almost a decade ago, we had a Big Bad Wolf that blew down the house of global finance, triggering the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In the post-crisis commentaries and debates that followed, a lot of attention had focused on who was the Big Bad Wolf at that time – was it Lehman together with other investment banks, insurance companies and hedge funds, or was it this product called subprime mortgages? But the more important lesson was that the global financial system was not as robust nor sturdy as previously thought.

By mandating more OTC derivatives to be centrally cleared on CCPs (Central Counterparties), market participants benefit from netting of exposures and reduction of credit risks, ultimately reducing systemic risks. However, without ensuring sufficient access to CCPs before implementing such a mandate, some market participants may find themselves scrambling to sign up with the fewer clearing members who have access to the CCPs. Some may even find the new economics of clearing prohibitive. Such factors should therefore be carefully considered so that in the desire to address possible vulnerabilities, and to cover all bases, perfection does not become the enemy of the good. 11. I have mentioned the important work around coherence. Taken individually, each set of reforms have been well-considered and for good reasons. For instance, the banking capital and liquidity reforms strengthen the ability of banks to better withstand future shocks; OTC derivative reforms seek to improve transparency, prevent market abuse and reduce systemic risks. The two sets of reforms aimed at achieving a safer financial system, albeit from different angles. However, to ensure that they complement each other without creating unintended consequences, we also need to carefully examine how the different elements will interact. 12. Take the example of the impact from the leverage ratio on the capacity of clearing members to offer client clearing services. The leverage ratio is intended to be a non-risk-based backstop to supplement the capital reforms and does not factor in risk offsets.
3  Third, the financing gap is now much lower than it was when the crisis emerged: after jumping in 2009 to 16.4% of GDP, it gradually decreased year after year, it went below the 10% benchmark in 2014, then to 7.5% in 2017 and it stagnated now in 2018. (Figure 5). Fourth, the refinancing risk has been significantly diminished as it is negatively correlated with the average maturity. As of June 2018, the average maturity of Romania’s Eurobonds is 9.7 years (Figure 6), and the investors base is much more diversified than in 2011. Average maturity for local bonds doubled from 1.6 to 3.2 years, and the average maturity of our debt is 6.4 years, compared to 3.8 years in 2011. Moreover, the share of public debt with fixed interest rate is 90%, which reduces the interest rate risk on the stock of debt. Regaining and consolidating our access to the international markets after the crisis has been a major success of all governments and it is a sign of trust in our economy. Another factor pointing towards lower contagion risk from external shocks refers to net external debt. The net external debt is now lower than in 2008: 20.2% of GDP in 2017, against 27% in 2008 (Figure 7). The reduced contagion risk is also visible in the banking sector, through at least 5 key indicators.

One driving force is of course that the world around us is constantly changing – and often very quickly. Quite simply, there are new demands made on us from outside, which we must deal with as best we can. Developments during the financial crisis in recent months are a good example of this. There are also demands from outside regarding our interaction with the general public, with other public authorities and with you who work in the financial markets. It is important that we communicate and work together efficiently, both to ensure monetary policy functions smoothly and to safeguard financial stability. But the pressure for changes does not only come from outside. We are constantly working on developing our working methods. It may not always be apparent to those who do not work at the Riksbank, but there is a strong will among our employees to improve our ways of thinking and working. There is a positive driving force behind the changes we are implementing. I am convinced that this driving force has contributed to the fact that we now have much better working methods than before. Another positive driving force is the regular contacts we have with other central banks and with the academic world. 2  BIS Review 155/2008  The developments cover everything from new methods to our communication. Something that constitutes an example of both of these things is the forecast for the repo rate path that we now publish regularly.