samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
My first question is how do we establish a better relationship with your organization in an effort to – we can get this information that you have and its resources on the grassroot level? And my second question is –  President Dudley: All you have to do is give me your card afterwards. Audience Member: Oh, okay. My second question is we’ve done an assessment of the economic state of Southeast Queens, Sen. Sanders’ office, and a majority of our residents here are considered banked and under-banked. My question to you is a lot of ... especially for – we have a huge population of Millennials, we’re looking to purchase homes in our area. A lot of us make under $ and probably have some problems with credit. But my question with the home buyers programs is there a way, or how can we have a conversation about increasing the matching funds because the highest that the rates for the federal home buyers program is 4:1. And we want to talk about how we can get that to 10:1 so it can help, it can match the demographics, economic demographics, of our community, so people can start receiving in tangible resources like purchasing a home with the resources that they have. President Dudley: I’m not an expert in the issue of how much money you need to match. I don’t think I can speak to that directly.

It is also well-known, including from historical experience, that productivity depends importantly on a number of structural features of the economy, including levels of education and skills in the workforce, the quality and quantity of infrastructure and innovation and the scale of financing to companies. Price and financial stability are necessary conditions for rising productivity. But they are far from being sufficient ones. When it comes to those structural features of the economy, central banks do not have the tools to affect lasting change. Central bank tools are cyclical, rather than structural, because their impact on the economy is temporary, not permanent. We do not build schools, colleges, houses, roads, railways or banks. Nor do we finance them. Those tools, rightly, are in the hands either of governments or private companies. So too is the financing of them. Through their role in securing stability in prices and the financial system, central banks do have a clear interest in understanding the forces shaping productivity and the supply-side of the economy. Central banks can also help in diagnosing productivity problems and in identifying policies that could lift barriers to productivity improvement. That is the purpose of this lecture. It is also the reason several Bank colleagues have given recent speeches on this topic. 51  Before turning to that, let me say something about monetary policy. The job of securing price stability falls to the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), of which I am a member.
2  BIS Review 113/2009  However, some will argue that monetary policy should react directly to asset prices, for example, by including them in the Taylor rule. Cecchetti et al. (2000) are perhaps the best representatives of this position, claiming that any inflation-targeting central bank should react to asset price misalignments beyond their implications on expected inflation over the policy horizon. In my view, there are three reasons why monetary policy, in general, should not react to asset prices beyond their impact on projected inflation: •  First, it is not clear that an increase in interest rates will be capable of stopping an increase in asset prices. The required adjustments might be so large that they could end up unnecessarily generating high unemployment and an undesired drop in inflation. •  Second, what matters here is to safeguard the stability of the financial system. An excessive interest rate aiming at controlling asset prices could even trigger financial instability, which is precisely what it is meant to avoid, especially if the increase in asset prices is accompanied by higher financial fragility. •  Finally, under inflation targeting, any interest rate movements that are inconsistent with inflation converging to the target may undermine the credibility of monetary policy, destabilizing inflationary expectations, and weakening the effectiveness of monetary policy. This is particularly important in the case of emerging economies with a shorter record of monetary stability.

As for emerging markets, strong reserves positions help emerging markets to be in a better position to weather the impact of market volatility that may occur during the adjustment process. A case in point is the recent experience with the US sub-prime problem. Compared with other markets, the impact of the US sub-prime has been more limited for Asia. This is because direct exposure to subprime CDOs is relatively small compared to the overall assets of the Asian banking system. Moreover, a number of positive developments have taken place since the Asian financial crisis that has made the region more resilient to such a downturn. First, the financial positions of banks and corporate are much stronger with reduced indebtedness and less mismatch, as well as improved balance sheets. Second, Asian economies are much stronger in terms of external position, especially the levels of reserves that can comfortably cushion the outflows. And third, the economies overall have become more flexible both in terms of policy regime and the key prices. All these have put Asian economies in a much firmer footing to cope with the second-round effects of the sub-prime crisis. Let me now turn to policies that are needed for an orderly process of adjustment. In the short-term, an orderly movement in the US dollar is key for ensuring an orderly process of adjustment. The risk at this time is that market forces and expectation can lead to a disorderly movement. Hence, foreign exchange intervention remains a viable option to guide an orderly adjustment.
In other words, most of the deviation in CPI inflation from the inflation target is explained by interest rates falling more than they have risen during the period. When this effect is discounted, there remains a deviation of two tenths of a percentage point from the inflation target. Although this deviation should not be ignored, it can hardly be called a major failure. From a broader historical perspective and with a realistic attitude to the precision of monetary policy, I think that one can stick out one's neck and say that an average CPIF inflation rate of 1.8 per cent is a pass rate, perhaps even a pass with distinction. Calculations of costs in terms of number of unemployed must be taken with a rather large pinch of salt This leads me in to the discussion on the costs to the real economy of inflation on average undershooting the target. One calculation has been presented by my former Executive Board colleague, Lars E.O. Svensson, who arrived at an average cost corresponding to 38,000 persons unnecessarily unemployed.3 Another figure regarding the costs of the monetary policy conducted that has attracted some attention is that 60,000 fewer people would have  2  Support for this use of underlying inflation measures, combined with an inflation target defined in terms of the CPI, was expressed in the assessment of the Riksbank's monetary policy 2005-2010 carried out by professors Goodhart and Rochet in 2011. 3  Svensson (2013a,b).

In 2021, the FOMC introduced the Standing Repo Facility and the FIMA Repo Facility.6 These standing facilities are priced such that they are not used often in normal times but remain ready to provide liquidity as needed should funding pressures arise. We also must continue to prioritize having a robust financial system, and that starts with the most core market of all: the U.S. Treasury market. The Inter-Agency Working Group for Treasury Market Surveillance is doing just that. Ahead of today's conference, the group published a progress report around its work to enhance the resilience of the U.S. Treasury market, which I strongly encourage everyone to read.7 The report emphasizes progress made on the proposed expansion of central clearing, enhancements to data collection and transparency, and the potential for evolution in market structure. It's also important to recognize that the world is not static. The Treasury market has increased enormously over the past quarter century, and the key players have changed significantly. And the rest of the financial system continues to evolve, with nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) playing an increasingly important role. The Financial Stability Board has been actively engaged in this space, assessing global trends and risks through a monitoring exercise and developing policy recommendations to strengthen oversight and regulation.8 Here at the New York Fed, we too are deepening our expertise and monitoring of NBFIs. 3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  But this is not just a job for the official sector.
To incite rebellion against their Roman rulers during the time of empire, the rebel leader – played by John Cleese – asks the question: ‘What have the Romans ever done for us?’, only to be met by a long and impressive list of achievements and contributions made by the Romans to the quality of life. In asking a similar question about monetarism – or perhaps, more precisely, a question about the role of monetary quantities in the design, conduct, transmission and presentation of monetary policy – I seek to explore whether a similar conclusion can be drawn. While monetarism remains unfashionable in academic and central banking circles, perhaps it has contributed more to the past, present and potential future of monetary policy than we conventionally admit. No money, no inflation Twenty years ago, the former Governor of the Bank of England (and now Lord) King published an  Page 3  article in the Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin entitled ‘No money, no inflation – The role of money in the economy’. [1] This article addressed an apparent paradox. On the one hand, Milton Friedman’s famous monetarist dictum that ‘inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’ appeared to have become entrenched in the economics profession’s conventional wisdom. [2] As a result, in most advanced economies, monetary policy had been assigned clear and independent responsibility for the maintenance of price stability.

On the fiscal front, there has been an intensive drive to correct the budget deficit, as indicated by the significant reduction in the structural general government deficit since 2009. The increased transparency and the strengthening of the fiscal framework further to the approval of the Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability in 2012 assist the different tiers of government –central, regional and local – in meeting the budget targets. In turn, the reform of the pensions system is a necessary step for ensuring the sustainability of public finances in the medium term. Despite these achievements, the rising course of the public debt/GDP ratio has not yet been halted and is a reminder of the scale of the fiscal effort still required. There has also been progress in private-sector deleveraging. The sluggishness of household and corporate income is slowing the process, as a result of which the weight of the adjustment is falling on the contraction in lending extended to these sectors. That said, this contraction in credit may be and indeed is proving compatible with its appropriate restructuring. The analysis of the Banco de España suggests that, even in years  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  as difficult as the past two, the proportion of firms that have not seen a fall-off in their bank loans has been significant, around 30%. And more significantly, those that have not seen their credit decline are, precisely, those firms which, in general, were departing from a sounder position of debt and profitability.
As a result the build-up in EME foreign assets have been held mainly as central bank reserves especially in Asian countries (Chart 3). In total the foreign assets now held by EME central banks and governments is about $ trillion dollars, which compares with only $ billion gross foreign assets held by the UK government. Many emerging economies concluded after the Asian crisis a decade ago that they needed bigger liquid reserves in traditional government debt to defend themselves against volatility in financial markets even when that carried the likelihood of a negative return (taking account of expected exchange  2  The Kuwait Investment Office is the in-house investment arm of the Kuwait Investment Authority (formerly known as the Kuwait Investment Board) and was established by Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah on 23 February 1953. Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay reached the summit on 29 May 1953. 3  These figures include the NICs. Excluding NICs the estimated surplus is $ billion (1.1%). 4  Latest data show that current account deficits were 5% of GDP or above not only in the United States but also in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Australia, New Zealand, UK and Iceland. 2  BIS Review 31/2008  rate movements). But when the reserves outstripped the levels needed for that purpose, it was natural to look to increase the returns on investment by widening the range of investments.

The Walker Report recommends a set of guidelines for disclosure and transparency by private equity funds, including the publication of regular information on their financing, ownership and prospects. 4  BIS Review 31/2008  Sovereign wealth funds and global imbalances However, the emphasis on transparency and the politics of SWFs risks missing a bigger policy issue: the recent rapid growth in SWFs reflects large and persistent global imbalances which are a continuing threat to the stability of the world financial system and the global economy. Global imbalances and financial crises While there are many examples of countries which have run deficits for many years such as Australia and New Zealand, history also shows how painful the eventual adjustment can be. There are many examples in which capital flight has resulted in a huge fall in GDP growth and broader financial crises – for example in Latin America in the early 1980s, in the Nordic countries in the early 1990s and the east Asian economies a decade ago – which, in turn, weakened global GDP growth or global financial institutions. Countries with large deficits are vulnerable to a rapid reversal of capital flows. If investors are no longer willing to finance the deficit, domestic spending will need to be cut relative to output through a combination of reducing spending and switching production to the tradable sector. A recent IMF study reviewed 42 episodes of large reductions in current account deficits in developed countries over the past 40 years.
Industry uses payment systems to provide payment services to customers, to innovate and develop new products for users. And industry can help central banks in undertaking the assessments of access and operating hours by collaborating, sharing insights and feeding into consultations and dialogue. To meet the FSB targets there is also a practical role for the industry to respond to the building block actions and reports, with some requiring direct action. This might include: (i) investing in new technologies, (ii) preparing for changing operational procedures and (iii) adapting business models. The role of public authorities And there is a crucial role for the wider public authorities. Central banks changing systems and policies and industry investing in changing operational procedures are just two pieces of the puzzle. There are also important regulatory, legislative and other barriers that overcome on a  Page 8  national and international level. For example, finance ministries will need to prepare legislative change to deliver the benefits of the roadmap (e.g. on AML/CFT standards, data frameworks and settlement finality protections). And international standard setting bodies will need to ensure that these standards are aligned on a global level. The financial system is global, with many of the most important issues requiring the involvement of international public authorities. The FSB, CPMI, the BIS Innovation Hubs, and a range of other standard setting bodies will have a continued important role to play to reach the quantitative targets for cost, speed, access and transparency of cross-border payments.

The global roadshows of the Government sukuk will also provide an ideal opportunity for us to reach out to global investors and showcase our credit strengths and Islamic finance capability. 16. As the Government’s representative under the Government Bond Programme, the HKMA is now working closely with the Government to prepare for the inaugural issuance of Government sukuk. A detailed issuance plan is being devised with reference to international practices and market conditions. According to our current plan, the inaugural Government sukuk would be based on the Ijarah structure and target institutional investors globally. What’s in it for fund raisers to issue sukuk? 17. As I have mentioned earlier, the key objective of the Government sukuk is to play a catalytic role, paving the way for local and international fund-raisers, no matter from the public or private sector, to follow suit. 18. For the potential sukuk issuers sitting here today, you may wonder what benefits you will get by issuing sukuk. Well, let me highlight two key benefits here. 19. First, you would be able to broaden your investor base. By issuing conventional bonds, you will only be able to tap conventional investors. But by issuing sukuk, you will be able to get both conventional and Islamic investors to participate. In particular, issuing sukuk will help you to gain access to the large pool of liquidity in the Middle East and other Islamic countries, where investors are progressively looking for Shariah-compliant assets in this part of the world.
In this respect, I wish to make a concrete commitment to the fight against overindebtedness, with, since 1 January 2018, a simplified procedure, which will reduce processing times by several months for many of the 180.000 families that we help each year. I also wish to commit to promoting financial inclusion: we have recently adopted, together with banks and associations, the recommendations to extend the diffusion of specific banking services to vulnerable customers, because there is still insufficient awareness of this right, with only 10% benefiting from it. Lastly, as regards the economic and financial education of the public, in order to build on the achievements of 2017 with our 450,000 pages consulted on our website "mesquestionsdargent.fr", and almost 15,000 social service providers and 3,000 teachers have been given information by Banque de France staff, we will do more still in 2018. I have two last wishes to make, anniversary wishes this time: for our Golden Gallery, whose 300th anniversary we are celebrating, a venerable age, and for the European Central bank, which will celebrate its 20th anniversary on 1 June 2018. Two more joyous occasions for us to meet again this year. Happy New Year to you, to your businesses, and to our country. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Brexit  Nowhere has that been more obvious than Brexit. On June 24th 2016, we started contingency planning for a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. With our focus on making sure finance can serve the wider economy, our work has had two elements. First, checking that, whatever economic disruption arises as we leave the EU, major banks have the capacity to keep lending through it. We know from our stress tests that banks can withstand an economic scenario for the UK that is worse than the financial crisis. That stress test scenario encompasses even a Brexit scenario based on the very worst case – ‘disorderly’ – assumptions, including: severe disruption at the border, acute economic uncertainty and financial market instability, and sharp increases in inflation requiring interest rates to rise. On that basis, we’ve been able to judge the core of the UK banking system to be able to continue to serve through Brexit, whatever form Brexit takes. The second element of our work has been to ensure that households and businesses using services from EU financial companies can continue to draw on those services after Brexit. 70 branches of EEA banks operate in the UK and provide services to both EU and UK end users. UK households and businesses hold 16 million insurance policies with EU insurers.8 UK investors invest in funds based in the EU. And clearing houses based in the UK sit at the centre of EU and global derivatives markets, helping the financial system to manage and distribute risks.
Even with an interval, monetary policy would more often than not aim to reach the mid-point of the interval. But it could make things easier if it takes quite a long time to achieve the target. And an interval may, as I said before, be a good way of communicating uncertainty about the future and about the effects of monetary policy. Other targets in addition to the inflation target? A question that has emerged now and again in the Swedish debate is whether it should be written into the law that the Riksbank, in addition to the price stability objective, should also have an objective for growth in the real economy. Normally, it is an objective for employment that debaters then have in mind. One usually talks of the central bank having a so-called dual mandate, including both inflation and the real economy. In practice, central banks that conduct flexible inflation targeting act and reason in a very similar way, regardless of whether  25  12  See Memorandum, Basis for Decision. Sveriges Riksbank. http://www.riksbank.se/Upload/Dokument_ riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Pressmeddelanden/2010/nr27_beslutsunderlag.pdf. BIS central bankers’ speeches  they have a statutory dual mandate or not when the real target is not explicitly expressed in numerical terms. 26 There is a risk that many of those who advocate a statutory dual mandate imagining that monetary policy would then be conducted in a completely different way to previously, and that it thereby would be able to contribute in some way or other to a lasting increase in employment.

If oil prices remain low, it may quickly become necessary to take a critical look at the scale of welfare schemes and public sector services, and it may also be necessary to increase taxes. If, later in the business cycle, measures are called for to curb unemployment, they should be designed to be readily reversible and in such a way that they do not erode government finances in the long term. Conclusion By way of introduction, I posed the following question: is our economy sufficiently robust to cope with the fall in oil prices without a new round of major structural adjustments? Our financial system is in a stronger position to cope with a new downturn than it was in the 1980s. We have avoided a debt bubble of the scale we witnessed last time. However, I am in doubt as to the financial industry’s long-term restructuring capacity. Norway must endorse the development of a new architecture for the global financial system. This is a demanding and long-term process, and we cannot expect all the problems to be solved over night. On the other hand, if we are to have any hope of a more stable and predictable world economy, the only real alternative is to enhance international codes for financial markets. We have observed that confidence in the krone is fragile. In order to restore confidence and maintain a stable exchange rate, monetary policy must be a credible anchor for expectations of continued low price inflation.