samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There is another important reason, particularly when several countries are involved. If one is to create a framework to manage crises, one will unavoidably face the question of how the 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  costs are to be divided, and it is almost, if not completely, impossible to agree on this in advance. All crises are different. It may be possible to agree on how to act when the problem arises, for instance, who should negotiate and how. One can thus decide on “ex ante preparations for ex post burden-sharing”, but not on “ex ante burden-sharing”. Given this, it is interesting to note that with regard to the ECB there is actually a crisis resolution mechanism in the form of an implied agreement on “ex ante burden-sharing”. It is written into the Treaty on European Union exactly how the national central banks should recapitalise the ECB if this were necessary. If the securities the ECB purchased were to fall in value so that the ECB needed more capital, it is thus clearly stipulated to what extent the different countries shall contribute. It may be because of this that some countries do not want to allow the ECB to buy government bonds, while others think it is an excellent idea. So, paradoxically, it may be the actual crisis resolution mechanism that in this case leads to a deadlock that risks aggravating the crisis. Crisis management mechanisms equally important in the banking system Let me now change focus from countries to banking systems.

Table 2 Economic growth and current account (annual change, percent) 2010  2011  2012  2013 (f)  GDP  5.8  5.9  5.6  4.5-5.5  4.0-5.0  Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports  13.6 10.3 12.2 9.7 2.3 25.9  9.1 9.4 14.7 7.9 5.2 14.5  7.1 7.3 12.3 5.8 1.0 4.9  6.1 6.1 7.2 5.7 3.1 5.9  4.9 5.1 5.5 5.0 3.8 5.0  Current account (% of GDP)  1.5  -1.3  -3.5  -4.4  -4.7  Mar.13 Report  Jun.13 Report  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 4  CPI inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  CPIEFE inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  10  10  10  10  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  -2  -2  -2  -2  -4  -4  -4  -4  07  09  11  13  15  07  Mar.2013 Report  09  11  13  15  Jun.2013 Report  (*) Gray area, as from second quarter of 2013, shows forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
In the same manner, interest rates will normally need to be raised in situations in which future inflation tends to get excessive as a consequence of a too high resource utilization. Consequently, when an inflation forecast shows that future inflation does not appear to be in line with the target, policy must be altered. In these situations there is a balancing problem. The question is how forceful the interest rate change should be. If it is dramatic, the adjustment in the rate of inflation to the established target may be faster, but the repercussions in the short term in the form of fluctuations in production and employment will probably be bigger also. Figure 1  P r ice Sta b ilizatio n : Alte r n a tive Pa th s  πt  2%  t+4  t+8  t  The reasoning can be made clear with a simple diagram (Figure 1). By choosing interest rate path 2 rather than path 1, the adjustment to the inflation target will be somewhat slower; however, the development in the economy will also be less spasmodic. BIS Review 56/1997  -3-  The fact that the Riksbank--when the price stability objective was introduced in 1993--chose to postpone its application for about 2 years (the decision that evaluation would only be made when the direct effects of the krona’s weakening had died away in 1995) can be said to have been a way of taking into consideration the above reasoning.

A growing middle class and rising affluence will underpin a steady increase in insurance penetration rates. Continued industrialisation, growing trade activities, and infrastructure development will mean greater demand for insurance solutions to mitigate a variety of risks. Over the next decade, insurance business in Asia is projected to grow at about 8% per annum. By 2020, Asia is likely to account for almost 40% of the global market. It is vital that insurers seeking to expand in Asia have a deep understanding of Asia’s risk landscape. Aggregate exposures have grown steadily in Asia, due to rapid urbanisation and economic growth over the last two decades. Asia’s strong record of development means that we have more to lose from unforeseen calamities. Take for example the spate of natural calamities in Asia in 2011. The three costliest events – the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, Thai floods and New Zealand earthquake – caused a combined insured loss of almost $ billion. The scale of these losses was unexpected. Thailand had not even been viewed as a catastrophe risk zone, and had in fact been used to diversify against catastrophe risks. These events are a timely reminder to the industry to constantly stay ahead of the risk management curve. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  3 + One strategy I understand that Allianz embraces a “3+One” strategy to achieve sustainable growth. In the spirit of this very happy occasion, allow me to adapt your framework to illustrate its relevance to Singapore’s insurance industry as a whole. One, Capacity.
Publishing the interest rate forecast may not be sufficient to communicate the central bank’s reaction function, as one specific forecast does not in itself convey much information about how the central bank responds to various shocks. One could argue that three ingredients are required; 1) the forecasts, 2) how the central bank responds to shocks, and 3) the criteria underlying the forecasts and reaction function. The first two ingredients provide efficiency in monetary policy, in the sense that private agents knowing the central bank’s assessments and reaction function can respond appropriately to economic developments. The third ingredient contributes to a better understanding of the objectives of monetary policy and the link between objectives and policy. This could underpin the credibility of the reaction pattern, and is also important for democratic accountability. In addition, the reaction function could change over time, for example due to a change in how the economy works or an improvement of the understanding of economic mechanisms. The criteria could then give some guidance to the public on how and why the reaction function might change. Let me briefly explain how Norges Bank communicates the three ingredients of our communication, and let me start with the forecasts. Chart 1 shows the forecasts of the key variables. The uncertainty bands are based on model simulations and reflect estimated variances of the different shocks. (Note that there is also a fan chart for historical values of the output gap, since there is also uncertainty about potential output in retrospect.)

This is in line with EBRD Strategy of Graduation and the graduation of EU 8 countries from EBRD operations can be envisaged. The Czech Government has already given approval that discussions with the Bank's management on the graduation of the Czech Republic from EBRD operations can begin. We believe that October 2007 - which would be the date of the regular consideration of EBRD Strategy for the Czech Republic could be considered an appropriate for this debate. This time-frame should be sufficient for the Bank, the Czech authorities and investors to make the necessary arrangements. We understand that the Bank's management will make their decisions regarding the supervision of its portfolio in the Czech Republic, including decisions concerning the future of the Bank‘s representative office in Prague. The mandate of the EBRD in the Czech Republic is thus approaching its conclusion, and I would like to express our gratitude and appreciation to the Bank for its support during the ups-and-downs of the transition process in my country. Our sincere thanks go to the Management and all those numerous members of staff who for years and sometime in difficult circumstances brought many successful projects to the Czech Republic. We wish the Bank much good fortune for fulfilling its mandate. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 44/2006  1
22  This change was intended to  ensure the leverage ratio did not impede the transmission of monetary policy. But to offset the removal of central bank reserves and ensure the amount of capital banks need to meet the leverage ratio requirement did not decrease, the requirement was also raised from 3% to 3.25%. A second change was designed to deal with window dressing behaviour that we had started to observe. From 2016 banks have been required to report and disclose the denominator of the leverage ratio based on assets averaged over the quarter. 23,24  Previously it was based on assets observed on the last day of the  quarter. But this led to banks seeking to shrink their balance sheets at quarter-ends in an attempt to  22  Prudential Regulation Authority Statement on the leverage ratio, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudentialregulation/publication/pra-statement-on-the-leverage-ratio-august2016.pdf?la=en&hash=F50C86C8AAA788EBFAC159F009BBED7D2FE07B83, August 2016. 23 Prudential Regulation Authority Policy Statement 27/15, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudentialregulation/policy-statement/2015/ps2715. 24 Banks in scope of the UK leverage ratio framework are required to disclosure a leverage ratio each quarter. A bank’s leverage ratio denominator should be based on its daily on-balance sheet exposures averaged over the quarter and its monthly (on the last day of the month) off-balance sheet exposures averaged over the quarter. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  increase the leverage ratios they disclosed. This led in turn to volatility in some financial markets at these times (Chart 6). Volatility at quarter-ends appears to have abated since this change.

This correction has also affected the establishment of more steady balances of the demand and supply for foreign currency in this period. Notwithstanding these encouraging developments, lending activity at home remains far from its potentiality, responding to the lower demand for banking loans and the tightened lending conditions as applied from banks. Lending to private sector marked an annual growth of 4% in real terms, providing an annual growth of 7.8 percent of monetary supply in January. All denominated credit continues to rule the lending activity, which mainly covers the businesses’ needs for circulating capital. January 2010 embodied a particularity, that is the improved state of the banking system assets denominated in foreign currency, has started to be mirrored on the growth of credit denominated in foreign currency. Notwithstanding, the stable increase of lending should be assisted by the re-activation of the demand for loans and the parallel easing of lending conditions as applied from the banking system. Bank of Albania deems that banking system should reveal more visionary in assessing potential sectors of economic growth and to take a more active role in encouraging the economic activity. Annual inflation in February 2010 pointed to 4.4%, exceeding by 0.4 percentage points the upper limit of the Bank of Albania target’s tolerance. The annual average inflation pointed to 2.6%.
Jan F Qvigstad: Contribution at the conference on “Welfare effects of financial innovation” Comments by Mr Jan F Qvigstad, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), on Mr Frank Smets (ECB) paper “Financial markets – productivity, procyclicality, and policy”, at the Netherlands Bank conference in honour of Mr Nout Wellink on “Welfare effects of financial innovation”, Amsterdam, 11 November 2011. *  *  *  I would like to thank Birger Vikøren, Sigbjørn Atle Berg and Helle Snellingen for useful comments. Thank you for inviting me and giving me the opportunity to comment on Frank’s paper. The common starting point of the literature is that the value of financial markets lies in their contribution to real economic growth. This is the perspective we always need to have for any meaningful discussion of the social value of financial markets. A well developed financial market is not a goal in its own right. During my 30 years of service in the Treasury and the central bank, I have had my fair share of dealings with banking and financial crises. I will draw on some of that experience in my comments today as part of my modest contribution to this distinguished group. In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse the funding situation for banks became difficult, also for Norway with its oil-driven economy. Early in 2009 a swap arrangement was introduced to improve the medium-term funding situation for our banks.

1  4  Speech by Adair Tuner on 29 September 2011, Credit Creation and Social Optimality. BIS central bankers’ speeches  One key answer to the spiral described by Minsky has been to introduce macroprudential regulation. Instruments such as the countercyclical capital buffer are meant to provide a cushion when the credit cycle turns down. There is also a commonly held view that we need instruments to dampen credit growth during an expansion. We should probably look broadly at how the Minsky style spirals could be contained. Discretionary policy can be a useful tool, but due weight must be given to building strong automatic stabilisers into the financial system to reduce the risk of future bubbles. The topic of this conference is financial innovation. Both Adair Turner2 and Paul Tucker3 have raised doubts about the social value of some of these new instruments. I quite agree: Restrictive regulation of some of these instruments could contribute to stabilising financial markets. One could imagine that the regulator should evaluate the pros and cons of allowing any new instrument. At the very least, the regulator should make sure that any instrument traded in significant quantities is sufficiently transparent to be a useful risk shifter. In short, I agree with Frank that the positive relationship between financial markets and economic growth has its limits. The difficult question is naturally where these limits are. It will be hard for a regulator to draw the line. But there are few other candidates for doing it.
The pick-up in economic activity in the United Kingdom has been sharper than in the United States and, according to most analysts, it appears to be underpinned by sounder foundations. Inflation is holding on a path consistent with the target of 2% and it should also be borne in mind that the prices of certain assets, housing in particular, have been moving on a rising trend and have reignited debate on the role the central bank and its monetary policy should play in preventing potential bubbles. Here, although the Bank of England has not yet modified its accommodative monetary policy stance either, the prevailing expectations are already discounting a more or less immediate change. The latest messages from the Bank of England suggest, in any event, that when rates begin to rise they will do so very gradually, remaining below historical values for a lengthy period. The monetary policy of the Bank of Japan The differences are even more marked in the case of the Bank of Japan. Nor can we forget that, prior to the international crisis, the Japanese economy had not overcome the effects of its own domestic crisis which began in the 1990s following a substantial credit boom and a burgeoning real estate bubble. The various economic programmes implemented since have not managed to put the Japanese economy back on a stable growth path, illustrating the difficulty involved in restoring normality when an economy enters a perverse cycle of deflation and contraction of activity.

Massive injections and the enabling of mechanisms to supply liquidity in different currencies were pivotal in containing the risk of such collapse. These measures were accompanied by official interest rate cuts that contributed to generating the necessary demand stimuli to counter, as far as possible, the adverse effects of the crisis on activity and employment. In the initial stages of the crisis, the measures of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank essentially followed a common pattern. The differences between them had, above all, to do with the singular characteristics of their respective operational frameworks. Subsequently, differences have become apparent between the paths pursued. While cyclical positions continued relatively to coincide, the emerging divergences were linked to the specific structural features of the different economies, such as, for instance, the different weights of banks and capital markets in the intermediation of financial flows. Later, however, differentiation was increasingly more related to the differing pace of exit from the crisis in each economic and monetary area. The monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve Since the start of the crisis, the US Federal Reserve has been pursuing a strongly expansionary monetary policy. In this connection it has resorted to a wide array of both conventional and less conventional measures. The Federal Reserve cut its official interest rates successively until placing them at their natural lower bound, i.e. close to zero, and it embarked on massive securities purchase programmes that substantially expanded its balance sheet.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  2. Resources: On the resource front, we are seeing firms struggle to secure and retain sufficient expertise in some areas, with firms competing for the talent needed to implement the new standards. Firms need to get better at planning in advance, ensuring their recruiting efforts are providing a steady stream of qualified candidates, and looking for opportunities to move people around within the organization, particularly between the front office and control functions, for more well-rounded professions. This is likely to mean more aggressive, creative and targeted searches and a commitment to ongoing training. As the landscape and regulatory requirements change, firms will need to find the right balance between hiring new talent with specific expertise and training current staff to keep them up to speed and capitalize on institutional knowledge. 3. Regional coordination: Cross-functional regional coordination across business areas is necessary, as is coordination across regulatory change programs (EPS, Volcker, Derivatives, RRP, etc.). In addition, FBOs will have to manage several regulatory layers of risk governance including meeting the demands of their home regulator and various host country regulators. 4. Capital Planning, Liquidity and Stress Testing: As firms become more accustomed to – and experienced with – the range of stress testing and capital requirements, there should be greater appreciation for the expectations around governance, quality of modelling, quality and granularity of data, and the level of coordination needed with the head office.

The work of the Basel Committee on capital and liquidity standards, as well as the work of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on cross-border resolution, are but a few examples of the hard work that global bodies have been undertaking to address the weaknesses identified through the crisis. At the same time, national authorities have been working hard both to implement the agreedupon global fixes, but also to develop and execute appropriate remedies for problems identified at the national (or local) level. Locally, while appreciating the need to address the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  crisis on a global scale, many countries saw the need to be in a better position to safeguard their own. The bottom line, in fact, was: the crisis was global, but the impact was felt locally. Global in life; local in death, as the saying goes. So, while authorities have endeavored to develop and implement common global rules across a wide range of issues, many national authorities have simultaneously moved to develop and implement national standards – that may conflict with or appear at odds with a barrier-free and harmonized financial system that allows the free flow of capital and competition across the globe. National rules that require local capital and local liquidity are two examples of standards that may present challenges to the efficient and effective operations of global firms. It will be important for firms to be in a position to meet both sets of requirements.
They limit borrowing, over the economic cycle, to the level of public investment and place an upper limit on the debt to GDP ratio of 40%. In assessing the fiscal position it is important to look forward and not just backward at the realised deficits over the past cycle. Of course, it is also important to recognise the many uncertainties surrounding the future path of the public finances. Central bankers probably talk too much about fiscal policy. Certainly, there are politicians, especially in Europe, who believe central bankers confuse the deficits which dot the fiscal landscape with all manner of economic evils, rather as Don Quixote confused the windmills which dotted the landscape of La Mancha with the terrible giants sent by some evil force. So I do not want to overstate the case and tilt at windmills, especially in the light of the fact that this month sees the 400th anniversary of the publication of Cervantes’ great novel. But it will clearly be important that the prudent approach to fiscal policy that has served the UK so well in recent years is continued - over the next cycle and beyond. In that way our national saving rate can be maintained or even raised. The market response to inadequate saving is higher real interest rates. Since the UK is a part of an open international capital market, long-term real interest rates in this country reflect the balance between investment and saving, including the stance of fiscal policy, not just at home but throughout the world economy.

Climate risk is a real threat: financial institutions should have the conviction to want to understand the environmental risks in their portfolios and to mitigate these risks. It is imperative that financial institutions step up efforts to collect the data that are necessary to mitigate their physical and transition risks as soon as possible. Second, financial institutions need greater clarity on the ESG data they need. The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) has recently published a progress report on bridging data gaps. MAS agrees with the recommended approach, which is to first identify the stakeholders and 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  use cases, and then define the metrics and data requirements. In the absence of a use case driven approach, technology will remain a solution looking for a problem to solve. In Singapore, MAS is working with our financial institutions, solutions and data partners to pilot some use cases so that we can collectively learn, adapt, and grow in our ability to define the right metrics for ESG measurement. MAS has launched, together with the industry, Project Greenprint – a technology platform to support the green finance ecosystem. The project will identify use cases where technology can help to mobilise capital for green projects, monitor commitments to emissions reductions, and quantify the impact of abatement efforts. We look forward to collaborating with more international financial institutions and solution providers in this effort. Third, we need to develop methodologies to translate raw data into quantifiable assessments of climate-related risks.