samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Modern language around monetary policy objectives was added in 1977, when the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee were charged by Congress with maintaining “long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates…so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” The goals of maximum employment and price stability have come to be known as the Fed’s “dual mandate.” Formulating policy in pursuit of that dual mandate is the province of two separate-but-related policymaking entities within the Federal Reserve System (the System) – the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board of Governors) and the FOMC (which I also refer to as “the Committee”) – each of which has responsibility for certain policy tools. The FOMC is the principal body for monetary policymaking and consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors plus the presidents of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks (only five of whom are voting members in any given year). The FOMC is responsible for the use of open market operations (OMOs), which are purchases and sales of securities in the open market for the System Open Market Account (SOMA), the Fed’s securities  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  portfolio. OMOs are traditionally the primary tool through which monetary policy is implemented. The Board of Governors is responsible for several complementary policy tools.

This operating framework changed as the financial crisis deepened. By December 2008, the FOMC had lowered its target for the federal funds rate from a point target of 5¼ percent in mid-2007 to a target range of zero to ¼ percent. With the federal funds rate and other shortterm interest rates effectively at the zero lower bound, the FOMC’s operating objective for OMOs was expanded to include adjustments in the size and composition of the Federal Reserve’s securities portfolio. In particular, the FOMC initiated large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), agency debt, and later longer-term Treasury securities, in order to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The expansion of the domestic securities portfolio that resulted from LSAPs vastly increased the supply of reserve balances in the system (Figure 1). 4 Importantly, in October 2008, the Fed was granted authority to pay interest on depository institutions’ reserve balances. 5 In an environment of elevated reserve balances that resulted from the Fed’s asset purchases, the payment of interest on excess reserves (IOER) – currently at a rate of ¼ percent – has kept the overnight federal funds rate within its target range (Figure 2).
Since the introduction of the euro, private customer prices of cross-border payment services have not decreased and in too many cases, the payee has been charged with some costs even though the payer has been requested to bear all costs. Furthermore, as the service provided in the case of cross-border payments is still poorer than that for domestic transfers in terms of the speed of the transaction, the higher price is not justified by better quality. In a report published by the Eurosystem in September 1999, it was emphasised that consumers should be able to transfer money as rapidly, reliably and cheaply from one part of the euro area to another as is now the case within each Member State. However, it was also acknowledged that this objective was far from being reached. Since the publication of this report, substantial progress has been made in preparing the ground for a more efficient handling of cross-border retail payments. The banking sector has agreed on so-called straight-through processing standards, which will allow the automated execution of cross-border payments. Furthermore, the Euro Banking Association has announced the development of a payment system specifically designed for low-value cross-border payments. In addition, the European Credit Sector Associations have taken two initiatives to further improve the prices and quality of cross-border customer payment services.

It has also affected banks’ income and cost structures, as they have been able to make profits as a result of advances in technology. That is, banks have been able to specialise in the provision of information and the monitoring of credit exposures, for example in the context of loan securitisation, thus raising the share of non-interest income. On the other hand, banks’ profits have come under pressure in some areas, such as lending to large firms. This resulted from the fact that technological progress has opened these areas to competition from inside the domestic banking sector, from international banks and also from other financial intermediaries such as institutional investors. In point of fact, the development of institutional investors has been facilitated by technological changes reducing the costs of collecting savings, gathering and disseminating public information, and assessing risks. Technological development has also facilitated the rapid development of new financial products. While a large proportion of innovations would not have been possible without the breakthroughs achieved in financial theory, it has been predominantly technological progress that has made the widespread use of these innovations possible. The second factor underlying the structural changes in the financial system and banking sector is the process of financial liberalisation which has been ongoing for some time already. It has allowed an increase in the overall level of competition in financial systems. In the EU, financial liberalisation gained momentum with the Single Market programme.
In 2005, the government decided to allow two casinos to operate within integrated resorts that also included leisure facilities, business and convention zones, and high-end retail outlets. This sparked the growth of a thriving entertainment services industry over the next few decades, attracting the burgeoning Asian middle class. This second phase of our economic development essentially saw the transition of Singapore from Third World to First World. By 2010, Singapore was an affluent society and a global city, at the cross-roads of international flows of trade, investment, finance and talent. Real GDP grew an average 6.7% per annum during this period. It was also a period in which the economy was buffeted by one crisis after another: •  the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998;  •  the collapse of the global IT industry in 2001;  •  the spread of the deadly SARS virus in 2003; and  •  the Global Financial Crisis in 2008  But the economy grew in resilience, rebounding sharply and emerging stronger after each economic shock. 2011–2025: Demographic slowdown and economic restructuring The dominant theme in the third phase of Singapore’s economic history was the overcoming of resource constraints through a significant restructuring of the economy. While Singapore had always been short of land and labour, these constraints came to a head in the 2010s. By 2011, annual growth in the total working age population had declined to less than 3%, and continued to fall steadily over the decade.

The Governing Council has today also decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing operations (MROs) and its special-term refinancing operations with a maturity of one maintenance period as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of this year’s twelfth maintenance period on 18 January 2011. The fixed rate in these special-term refinancing operations will be the same as the MRO rate prevailing at the time. Furthermore, it has decided to conduct the 3-month longerterm refinancing operations (LTROs), to be carried out in October, November and December 2010, as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment. The rates in these 3-month operations will be fixed at the average rate of the MROs over the life of the respective LTRO. The Governing Council has also decided to carry out three additional fine-tuning operations on 30 September, 11 November and 23 December when 6-month and 12-month refinancing operations mature. Overall, the current monetary policy stance remains accommodative. Monetary policy will do all that is needed to maintain price stability in the euro area over the medium term. This is the necessary and central contribution that monetary policy makes to fostering sustainable economic growth, job creation and financial stability. All the non-standard measures taken during the period of acute financial market tensions, referred to as “enhanced credit support” and the Securities Markets Programme, are fully consistent with our mandate and, by construction, temporary in nature.
Besides, we have explicitly stated that the CBRT, in line with the strategy announced today, will not allow exchange rates to deviate from economic fundamentals, nor will it allow a deterioration in price stability and financial stability. I would like to reiterate that various measures will continue to be taken in the forthcoming period, in order to ensure price stability. 3. Risks and monetary policy  Distinguished Members of the Press, In the last part of my speech, I would like to mention risks regarding the inflation outlook and how the monetary policy will be shaped should these risks materialize. The fact that inflation will hover above the target in the short term poses risk to inflation expectations and price setting behavior. Accordingly, as of October, the CBRT has adopted a policy stance aimed at eliminating these risks. These risks will be closely monitored and the necessary measures will be taken to avoid deterioration in the medium-term inflation outlook. Medium term projections assume that the global outlook will remain weak for a long period, but the situation will not worsen further. Nevertheless, uncertainties regarding the global economy continue to be of significant concern. Especially, mounting problems regarding the sovereign debt of euro area economies continue to pose downside risks on the global economy. Concerns regarding the debt sustainability of euro area economies have further increased since the publication of the July Inflation Report, exacerbated by the concerns of a possible contagion to the region’s banking sector.

We have gained an increasing understanding that how we finance postsecondary education has significant effects on a variety of critical economic outcomes, including economic growth and inequality. For example, our research suggests that higher student debt and delinquencies reduce household formation and depress homeownership. But there are many important questions still left unanswered. What is the relationship between the amount and type of educational investment that people make and their outcomes? What attributes are associated with borrowers who are more successful at  1  2  Payback Time? Measuring Progress on Student Debt Repayment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  repaying their student loans? Are there particular types of degrees that are associated with better performance with respect to student debt repayment or with better living standards earlier in life? What are the best interventions to help borrowers avoid the consequences of delinquency and default, and to limit any default costs to taxpayers? Do borrowers who use programs like income-based repayment eventually succeed in paying off their debts? How do income-based repayment programs affect important decisions such as labor supply, consumption and household formation? These are important questions for the nation, as the human capital of our citizens is far and away our most important asset, and student loans are an important mechanism for financing needed investments in that asset. But it is very hard to answer these questions with existing data.
It is now clear to everyone that low inflation must be good for people because price growth does not accelerate, food prices do not grow. However, perhaps not everybody has realised the benefits of sustainably low inflation for businesses, because we are yet to assure them that inflation will indeed remain low and stable, and companies may rely on this assurance in making plans and raising investment. I hope we will be able to achieve this in the forthcoming years. As for the development of the financial and banking sector, I would like to complete the so-called resolution policy and invest more in favourable conditions for banking and finance at large, in order to improve financial inclusion and expand the availability of financial services to customers so that they have more trust in the financial system. The confidence in the banking system is already relatively high, but I would like to support and strengthen it. A separate task is the development of the non-bank financial sector. We have quite a small share of pension funds and insurance companies, though they are a source of long money necessary to economic development. These are the key objectives in this field. QUESTION from Reuters: 11 / 14  BIS central bankers' speeches  The seasonal nature of the balance of payments makes analysts expect purchases of foreign currency conducted by the Ministry of Finance to have larger impact on the ruble exchange rate in April. Do you support this view? And a question about methodology.

The exchange rate is governed not only by oil – oil is an important factor, but not the only one to influence the exchange rate. The depreciation of the ruble was also largely triggered by typical seasonal variation in the current account – the current account usually shows stronger performance in the first quarter, irrespective of oil prices. The second factor is the growth in oil prices and oil sales by exporters. The third factor is important but the Central Bank believes that it should not be overestimated or exaggerated. I am referring to certain inflows of capital, which are comparable to the inflows of foreign capital to emerging markets. Further developments will depend on many factors: oil price movements, the Fed’s policy, strengthening or weakening of the exchange rate, and the strength of our economy. There are many forces at play here. QUESTION from TV channel Russia-24: Mrs Nabiullina, you have already mentioned that the Central Bank will support Russian stateowned banks affected by sanctions in relation to the situation in Ukraine. What specific measures are you going to take? Thank you. ELVIRA NABIULLINA: I would like to repeat and emphasise that we do not see any risk to financial stability of our credit institutions even if their investments in Ukrainian assets depreciate completely, because they account for only a very small share of their assets. Therefore we do not see any systemic risks here. Our banks have already created or are creating provisions for such assets.
As of today, the lower limit for trade execution appears to be around 10 micro-seconds. This means it would in principle be possible to execute around 40,000 back-to-back trades in the blink of an eye. If supermarkets ran HFT programmes, the average household could complete its shopping for a lifetime in under a second. Imagine. It is clear from these trends that trading technologists are involved in an arms race. And it is far from over. The new trading frontier is nano-seconds – billionths of a second. And the twinkle in technologists’ (unblinking) eye is pico-seconds – trillionths of a second. HFT firms  3  Mackenzie (2011) provides a brilliant recent account of the role of HFT, in particular in the context of the Flash Crash. HFT is a sub-set of a broader class of algorithmic trading strategies. See also Aldridge (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  talk of a “race to zero”. This is the promised land of zero “latency” where trading converges on its natural (Planck’s) limit, the speed of light. 4 The race to zero seems like a million miles from the European coffee shop conversations of the 17th century and the noisy trading floors of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. The dawn of electronic trading coincided with the dusk for floor trading. Physical proximity lost its allure. As soon as computers processed faster than traders talked, the time was up for human interactions on physical exchanges. Trading became virtual, distance a dinosaur. Or so it seemed.

However, the Swedish banks need to retain the capital they have at present and, therefore, should not pay any extra dividends. Neither does the introduction of the leverage ratio look like being any great problem if the banks maintain current capital levels. We have looked more closely at the four major banks (Nordea, Swedbank, Handelsbanken and SEB) and, at present, none of them falls below the minimum requirement of three per cent. However, the Swedish banks are finding it difficult to comply with the new liquidity requirements. The greatest challenge will probably lie in complying with the structural requirement. Here, the banks have two alternatives – either cutting back on the commitments that require stable funding (for example lending for housing purchases) or exchanging shortterm funding for long-term funding. This second alternative could well result in the banks’ funding costs increasing, which should push lending rates up somewhat. As yet, we have no exact figure on what this may cost in terms of basis points, but we assess that, despite everything, these costs will be small. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  How all this will affect the banks’ customers is hard to say. In the final analysis, the question of how these costs will be divided among the banks’ owners and customers is a question of competition. But, as we are now introducing regulations to reduce the risk of bankruptcies, I think it would be reasonable to assume that the banks’ financiers will lower their expected return.
The lingering economic uncertainty and the burgeoning fiscal deficit drove the US dollar weaker across all currencies. Therefore, benefitting from the broad based dollar weakness and relatively high levels of US dollar liquidity in the market, the Kwacha posted a 5.0% gain against the American currency. A sustained rise in the copper prices at the London Metal Exchange to an average of $ per tonne in the third quarter from $ tonne gave further support to the domestic currency, with the interbank rate ending the period at an average of K4,869.21 per US dollar. Balance of payments Preliminary data show that Zambia’s overall balance of payments (BoP) recorded a surplus of US $ million during the third quarter of 2010 compared to a deficit of US $ million in the previous quarter. This was driven by the improvement in the performance of both the current account and the capital and financial account balances. The current account surplus increased to US $ million from a surplus of US $ million recorded the previous quarter, reflecting an increase in the merchandise trade surplus coupled with the narrowing of the services and income accounts deficits. Supporting the current account was the merchandise trade surplus which rose by 74.8% to US $ million in the quarter under review following an increase in exports as well as a decline in imports. Merchandise export earnings edged upward by 18.7% to US $ million, on account of increases in both metal and non-traditional export earnings.

During the quarter ending September 2010, developments in commercial banks’ nominal interest rates were mixed. The weighted average lending base rate (WALBR) continued its downward trend, falling to 19.8% from 20.9% in June 2010. Similarly, the average lending rate (ALR) fell marginally to 26.8% in September 2010 from 27.9% in June 2010. However, the 30-day deposit rate for amounts exceeding K20 million and the average savings rate (ASR) for amounts above K100,000 remained unchanged at 5.6% and 4.7%, respectively. Real sector developments Developments were favourable in the real sector during the reviewed quarter. This was reflected in increased output of metals (copper & cobalt), beer, soft drinks and cement. Further, international arrivals also increased during the period under review. Agriculture The stock of maize grain held by major millers in the country rose by 124.6% to 101,807.0 mt as at 29th September 2010 from 45,336.7 mt as at 30th June 2010. In terms of holdings by province, Lusaka contributed 51,117.1 mt (50.2%), Copperbelt 26,644.0 mt (26.2%), Southern 19861.0 mt (19.5%), Western 4,050.0 mt (4.0%), and Northern 35.0 mt (0.03%) respectively, while Eastern province accounted for 100.0 mt (0.1%). Data on maize stocks from Central province was not available at the reporting date. Mining During the reviewed quarter, copper output increased by 16.4% to 232,554.87 mt. This output was also 30.5% higher than the 178,140.1 mt of copper produced in the third quarter of 2009.
The calculated growth in working hours is based on Statistics Sweden's forecast of the Swedish population up to 2050 and fixes other determining parameters at the 2002 level. The average increase in working hours amounted to approximately 0.4 per cent during the period 1981-2001. The calculated series' average increase 2002-2050 stops at a modest 0.01 per cent; in practice almost no increase at all. Conclusion I shall conclude with a summary. A high long-term growth rate is one of the most important objectives of economic policy. It becomes easier to achieve almost all other political objectives if economic growth is good. There is greater scope for private consumption and wage formation is made easier. It becomes easier to finance public sector services such as health and welfare. Higher growth also gives greater scope in other political areas, such as environmental policy. In addition, the potential, long-term growth rate is a variable of essential significance for monetary policy. The Riksbank cannot itself influence the development of the economy's long-term growth rate;  BIS Review 16/2003  5  this is governed by other factors, primarily by how much we work and how efficient the economy is. But the potential growth rate to a great degree sets the framework for monetary policy. Simplified, one can say that our task is to keep actual production as close to potential production as possible. Then inflation will also come close to the target level.

We need to develop a clearer presumptive framework of this kind – no doubt with provision for exceptions where they could be properly justified – before the next crisis hits us, because what debtor countries and their private sector creditors believe they can expect will influence their behaviour in the meantime. BIS Review 36/2001  5  What we all have to recognise is that the exceptional amounts of official funding committed during the Asian crisis are far less likely to be forthcoming in future. And to the extent that official funding is forthcoming, conditions may well be attached to ensure that it is not used simply to re-finance payments of short-term debt to private sector creditors or to fund a resident capital outlflow. Several of the tools which the G7 communiqué identified are designed to have precisely this effect. The last thing that the official international community wants is to get dragged into the micromanagement of relations between debtor countries and their creditors. We would all agree on the desirability of voluntary solutions, which might be easier to achieve if borrowing countries and their major creditors – above all the short-term lenders – were to establish, during the good times but on an on-going basis, arrangements for regular dialogue. Nor would anyone want to insist upon the imposition of constraints on capital outflows.