samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to Bank of Albania periodic estimates, the public expectations have converged, mostly around 1-3 percent. In the meantime, the business expectations on price performance have reflected a high volatility. The monetary policy and the consolidation of macroeconomic stability have played an important role in anchoring the expectations of public at large to Bank of Albania’s inflation targeted rate. 3. Money supply  During the major part of 2006, monetary indicators have reflected the stabilised demand for monetary assets. The average M3 growth rate resulted to 12 percent. The demand for money of the public sector grew by 3.3 percent during 2006. This relatively low borrowing has balanced the high lending rates of the private sector, positively impacting on the maintaining of monetary stability. In compliance with the trend noticed over the latest years, monetary developments have been characterised by shifting to longer-term monetary assets. Currency outside banks has followed the general trend of the demand for money. The currency outside banks to M3 stood at 24.2 percent at year-end or 1.7 percentage points less than in the previous year. In nominal terms, the currency outside banks grew by ALL 13.6 billion or 9.1 percent. The macroeconomic environment during 2006 has been favourable for a steady growth of banking system lek deposits. The positive real interest rates have been associated with further rise of lek deposits. They rose by 38 billion during 2006, satisfying the needs of the economy for ALL 35.9 billion and the needs of the government for credit in ALL.

When the repo rate is negative, the banks pay interest to the Riksbank, as the banking system as a whole has a liquidity surplus that must be deposited in the Riksbank. The short-term interbank rates, that is interest on loans between the banks, and some government rates have followed the repo rate down below zero. However, the banks have not introduced negative deposit rates for households and most companies. Only a few economic agents, primarily other financial institutions, large companies and some municipalities, have experienced a negative deposit rate, and these can in some cases also borrow at a negative interest rate. Companies have been forced to expend a certain amount of resources on avoiding negative return on their funds, but they appear to have succeeded relatively well in this. Cutting the repo rate below zero has thus in total contributed to pushing down interest rates, but has not meant that interest rates have become negative for the general public. Good profitability among the banks and few signs of a decline in demand Another fear has been that negative interest rates reduce the banks’ profitability, which could lead to higher lending rates and a lower supply of credit. The reason for this is said to be that the banks’ deposit margin, that is, the difference between the interest on deposits and lending, would decline because it is difficult to cut the deposit rate below zero.
It is imperative that we stay on track in our goal to release a new capital adequacy framework by early next year, with a comment period and industry implementation to follow shortly thereafter. BIS Review 50/2000  4  Corporate governance My remarks thus far have focused on the need for a more risk-reflective capital framework. Clearly, a strong capital position is crucial to the sound operation of any banking organization. It allows banks’ board of directors and senior management to focus on strategic objectives and growth opportunities, supports the business activities of the organization, and provides the financial strength necessary to sustain the occasional losses that are inevitable in a business of taking calculated risks. In this latter sense, capital represents the last line of defense against potential loss-creating problems. But, I want to briefly address the first line of defense - effective bank management, which increasingly is an important element of today’s supervisory framework as banks’ activities and their associated risks become ever more complex. There are several aspects to effective bank management. The importance of good corporate governance cannot be overemphasized. Broadly speaking, corporate governance refers to the organizational infrastructure necessary to achieve a workable corporate strategy, to effectively implement that strategy, and to continually evaluate its risks and benefits to the organization. These basic infrastructural elements include: –  independent and competent outside directors;  –  capable and experienced management;  –  a coherent corporate strategy and business plan; and,  –  clear lines of responsibility and accountability.

CEMFI is the outcome of the ambition of the leadership of the Banco de España in the late 1980s, who saw the possibility of innovating in the organization of a graduate programme comparable to the best programmes in Europe. It was Luis Ángel Rojo, at that time the Banco de España's Director General of Research, who invited Rafael Repullo to lead this venture. Precisely as a token of appreciation for his decisive contributions in the early days of CEMFI, the prize for the best Master student bears his name. The Banco de España is very proud of its ongoing support and collaboration with such a special institution providing first-class graduate education and research, contributing a host of public goods to the Spanish economy and generating valuable ideas for public policymaking. An excellent example of this collaboration is the co-organisation of the biennial Financial Stability Conference that concluded this morning at the Banco de España. Demonstrating an outstanding academic level and policy relevance, it has enjoyed the presence of a large number of distinguished visitors, including the Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Jerome Powell. Building on this example, I am pleased to announce a new collaboration between the Banco de España, CEMFI, and the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, an annual conference on the Spanish economy, the first edition of which is due to take place next week in Santander.
Today, the global banking industry is at a major inflection point, facing several internal and external challenges that are coming  *  Keynote speech delivered by H.E. Dr. Mohammad Y. Al-Hashel, Governor, Central Bank of Kuwait at CBK International Banking Conference: Shaping the Future, September 23rd 2019, Four Seasons Hotel, Kuwait City – Kuwait. Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  -2-  together to create a perfect storm. Certainly, the industry will not be able to weather this storm by holding on to the same course it has pursued for decades. Rather it must reinvent itself for the future. That is why CBK is organizing this event under the theme of ‘Shaping the Future’. We believe that all stakeholders in the banking industry need to take a proactive role in shaping the way banks operate in the future, rather than continuing along the well-trodden path, no matter how well that path had previously served them. Taking this opportunity, I would like to share a few thoughts on our vision for the evolution of the banking industry. I will begin with a brief overview of the major challenges that the industry faces today. Second, I will reflect on the key areas that banks will need to focus on in order to stay relevant. Finally, I will touch upon the role that enabling stakeholders need to play to support the banking industry through its transformative journey.

But even a snail can make considerable progress provided it keeps going. I am told that the world record for a snail is about 16 cms a minute, or roughly one kilometre in 4 days. On that basis a snail could leave here this evening and be in the BIS in Basel in under a year. It necessarily takes time to build an international consensus to move forward on any significant issue, and you need a broad consensus if whatever it is you agree is to have any meaningful effect. And if you look back over ten, or even five, years, rather than just at the outcome of any particular meeting, then the amount of progress really has been very considerable. Overall economic management Let me illustrate this first in relation to the broad consensus that now exists – within the developing, emerging, and transition economies as well as within the industrial world – on the general approach to overall economic management. That consensus can perhaps be summed up essentially as "macroeconomic stability and supply-side flexibility", though that characterisation needs elaboration. On the macro-economic side we have learned – and it has taken some countries longer than others – that you cannot achieve what we are all trying to achieve – sustained growth, high levels of employment and rising living standards – simply by pumping up demand in our economies through expansionary monetary and fiscal policies without proper regard to the underlying supply-side capacity of our economies to meet that demand.
For instance, South Korea is the eleventh global economy with th the voting share of 0.77%, which makes it hold 28 position among the IMF participants; whereas as per analyses of Kelkar V. et al. ”The International Monetary Fund: entitled Integration and Democratization in the 21st Century”, presented at the meeting of G24 in Manila, 17 - 18 March 2005, the total vote of Brazil, China and India in international institutions is equal to the total of Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, whereas the total GDP of the first group of countries based on PPP is fourfold higher, with a 29 times larger population. 2  BIS Review 64/2006  Chart 1. Global demographic trends – the world population according to UN forecasts  LO – left axis (LA) PO – right axis (RA) Africa – (LA) Europe – (RA) The rest of the world – (RA) Asia – (LA) North America – (RA) Note: „LA”, „RA” mean the left and right axis, data in million persons. Source: the UNO, http://esa.un.org/unpp/  Hence the demographic developments, supported by the globalization mechanisms which have led to the establishment of the global labour market, will drive Asia and possibly some areas of Africa to become fierce competitors for Europe and the US in the forthcoming decades. There are many estimates that show the sizes of particular economies in the decades to come, based on demographic trends, assumptions concerning the long-term growth of performance, or changes in real FX rates.

Polska, Czechy, Słowacja.” [“The future of labour. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.”] concludes that out of the three analysed countries, the culture of innovation has the smallest chances for development in Poland. The author recommends to launch a modernisation project under the name Polska 2.0. It appears that in the homo sapiens globalus society of the 21 st century, many of the terms used in the debate on a unified Poland or the IV Republic of Poland, should adopt totally new meanings. Solidarity should not mean an algorithm for sharing the growth fruit, but should mean a policy which will allow the greatest possible number of Poles to function well on the global labour market. Patriotism should not confine to the roots of Poland, the tradition of the great fellow countrymen, but should also have a global character, i.e. lead to such behaviour and policies that will enable Poland as a country and its citizens to become successful in the fast globalizing economy, whilst maintaining close ties of Poles with their homeland. In this context, it is worth raising a few questions. -  Is the Polish educational system able to deliver a sufficient number of specialists in the fields on which the success of Poland in the global economy depends, in particular engineers, IT specialists, people with multi-language skills, incl. e.g. Chinese? 18  See the study by Aguiar M. et al. (2006) referred to in footnote 2. 19  For example, Baily M., Lawrence R. op. cit.
This, in turn, introduces uncertainty over the behaviour of the incomes of these agents, which means they tend to postpone their consumption and investment decisions. The sharp decline in the consumer confidence indicator in March (the largest decrease in the historic time series, which goes back to July 1986) gives an indication of the magnitude of these effects. This fall suggests that the increase in uncertainty may have begun to adversely affect household spending decisions. The results of the latest edition of the Banco de España Business Activity Survey (EBAE) suggest that the war has begun to worsen the expectations of non-financial corporations regarding their turnover and also the duration of the global supply chain problems, which is now estimated to be longer. Third, the invasion of Ukraine will affect the Spanish economy through the trade channel, the direct impact of which is assumed to be moderate, as bilateral trade flows with the countries at war are relatively limited. In 2019, the last year before the pandemic, Spanish goods exports to Russia and Ukraine represented only 1.6% and 0.3% of the total, 2  respectively. Russian tourism, meanwhile, accounted for 2.2% of total spending by foreign tourists. However, the indirect effects on Spanish trade flows may be significant. The war will particularly affect central and eastern European countries, which are more exposed to Ukraine and Russia, and, therefore, the growth of Spanish export markets.

Furthermore, in economic terms, given that these deposits were used to a significant degree to finance illiquid assets outside Iceland, such a payment, if it had been possible, would have amounted to a net transfer of resources from Iceland to other countries – where the United Kingdom would have been prominent – at a time when Iceland was going through its deepest financial and economic crisis in the post-war period. That made no sense whatsoever! However, the preference given to deposits under the Emergency Act is a key element in the fact that recoveries on the failed banks’ estates will cover deposit claims from the foreign branches in full. In international discussion, there have been a number of misconceptions about this process. There have been claims that Iceland allowed its banking system to collapse, with what now seem reasonable results, and that others should consider doing the same. The fact is that Iceland kept the domestic part of its banking system running throughout, and at significant expense; otherwise, the consequences would have been dire. Some have claimed that the banks were nationalised. They were not. The failed private banks are private companies in winding-up proceedings governed by law. The Government fully recapitalised one of the new banks. The other two are private banks owned primarily by the estates of the old banks. Others have claimed that Iceland defaulted and got away with it. The opposite is true. The credit of the sovereign was preserved, and all debt obligations have been paid on time.
Slow recovery Quarterly changes in per cent calculated as annual rate, seasonallyadjusted data 6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6 -8  -6 Euro area  -8  USA  -10  -10 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  Note. Broken columns represent the Riksbank’ s forecasts in July 2009. Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat and the Riksbank  BIS Review 98/2009  9  5. The oil price, Brent crude USD per barrel 140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  20  20  Outcome Forward rates, average up to and including 25 June 2009  0  0 00  01  02  03  04  05  Note. Broken lines represent the Riksbank’s forecasts. 06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Sources: Intercontinental Exchange and the Riksbank  6.

The assessment which guided today's monetary policy decision was that, overall, the prospect has strengthened for inflation to fall below 2% in the course of 2003 and to remain in line with price stability thereafter. Our decision should also help to improve the outlook for the euro area economy by providing a counterweight to some of the existing downside risks to economic growth, thereby supporting confidence. The most likely scenario is that economic growth will gradually recover in the course of 2003 towards rates more in line with potential. Falling inflation should support real disposable income and, together with a reduction in the gap between perceived and actual inflation rates, should underpin private consumption. Moreover, we expect an improvement in world demand. This, and the low level of interest rates, should benefit investment. Let me point out that, with today's decision, the key ECB interest rates have reached a very low level by historical standards. The Governing Council will continue to monitor closely all factors that may affect the prospects for inflation in the euro area. The outlook for the euro area economy will also very much depend on visible progress in other policy areas. Regarding fiscal policies in the euro area, I would like to reiterate that budgetary discipline strengthens the conditions for sustainable growth of GDP and employment. Therefore, sound fiscal positions, as enshrined in the Treaty and further developed in the Stability and Growth Pact, are in the interest of all the Member States.
BIS Review 71/2004  3  We perhaps need to look again at the process for considering, and reaching a conclusion about, the fundamental “design parameters” some of which I have touched on today. This is no small task, but if agreement could be reached on the fundamentals, these could be stated as clear principles in a preamble to any new standard, to guide the more detailed requirements. And it might enable the widely-held vision of a less detailed and prescriptive standard to be realised, to replace the hundreds of pages of complex rules. To address this, however, raises three questions: (i) On what is early consensus necessary? (ii) How should the transition be approached? And (iii) What does this mean in institutional terms? Early consensus Early agreement seems to me particularly important in three areas. The first is to review the conventional understanding on who the accounts are for, and clarify how the different interests of different stakeholders are to be met. The second is to agree where the standard should be placed along the spectrum between historic cost and fair value measurement. A particularly difficult conceptual question in this area is: precisely what economic meaning is there in so-called fair valuation of instruments in which (a) there is little or no secondary market, or (b) there is a market, but a clear intent to hold an instrument to maturity? Finally, the implications of any increase in measured volatility will need to be assessed.

In his presentation today, he presents a system for evaluating and ranking different policy alternatives, showing how Taylor diagrams can be used to evaluate whether one interest rate forecast results in lower volatility in inflation and the output gap than another. If a forecast results in inflation closer to target and a narrower output gap through the forecast period, this forecast is selected. On other occasions, the choice between two forecasts can be more problematic. The forecast that is selected will depend on preference and the considerations that are given weight. I completely agree with Lars Svensson that policymakers must rank the different policy alternatives based on their preferences. In some cases, policymakers may wish to keep the interest rate high while in others a low interest rate may be preferred. However, it is equally important to take account of preferences over time, i.e. having a system to check whether the preferences underlying the baseline scenario in one report are the same as those of the previous report. And once preferences have been formalised in a loss function, it is relatively simple to find the optimal interest rate path for a given model. The choice of path will then depend on policymakers’ preferences. A policymaker’s preferences may of course change over time, but I am in favour of basing the analysis on the same set of preferences as previously. This approach will contribute to consistency in communication over time. 1  Cf.
Moreover, electricity and telecom prices rose for reasons that did not seem to have to do with demand. But does this analysis hold or did the increase in inflation stem — wholly or in part — from an excessively overheated economic upswing? There are also survey data that point to rising inflation expectations. But the picture is not clear-cut. 2  BIS Review 98/2001  ·  Secondly, the picture may be upset by the weak exchange rate. In relation to comparable long-term equilibrium exchange rates, the Swedish krona is currently very weak even though there has been some appreciation from the low earlier this autumn. With the important proviso that all else is equal between the economies, by itself the weak krona could warrant considerable differences in monetary policy between the Riksbank and other central banks. ·  Thirdly, the Swedish economy is being stimulated by fiscal policy. A look at how household disposable income, after taxes and transfers, is developing this year and next illustrates this. Even with some increase in unemployment next year in connection with the economic slowdown, everything points to a sizeable increase in connection with increased public spending and tax cuts. So on the one hand we have a continuation of weak activity next year, on the other excessively high current inflation, a weak exchange rate that leads in time to a stimulation of exports, and an expansionary fiscal policy that feeds consumer demand.

What I have in mind is next year’s prospect of a relatively large increase in fiscal policy’s contribution to household disposable income, accompanied by low interest rates. An expansionary economic policy normally tends to stimulate cyclical activity, which implies that 2002 should be a fairly good year for domestic demand. However, there are at least two factors that could limit or counter this effect. One factor has to do with the lower share prices and the tendencies for house prices to stop rising and in certain cases to fall. In recent years, purchases of cars and other consumer durables have been stimulated by the appreciation of assets that feature in household wealth. Conversely, falling asset prices during the past year have tended to subdue these purchases. The stimulus from economic  BIS Review 98/2001  3  policy may accordingly be dampened or delayed as long as asset prices continue to fall. Of course, the situation will be reversed if share prices and property prices instead stabilise, or even begin to rise once again. Another factor is connected with the risks in the labour market. The redundancy statistics suggest that employment will level out or even fall next year, which may involve an attendant increase in unemployment. Households are already expressing such fears in Statistics Sweden’s surveys. Besides the direct downward effect on household disposable income, a weaker labour market may make people in Sweden more cautious when making purchasing decisions.