samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Spain has followed the lead of the developed countries, and you should rest assured that CCM will meet all its commitments to depositors and other creditors. Second, the Maastricht Treaty prevents central banks from extending emergency liquidity assistance to an ailing institution, such as CCM, without the appropriate collateral. Given the amounts that might have to be committed, the Spanish Treasury had to provide explicit guarantees to the central bank, so as not to infringe the Treaty’s prohibition on central banks extending "monetary financing" to public Treasuries. *** Having explained the substance of and the reasons behind the urgent replacement of CCM’s directors, allow me to offer greater details on the Banco de España’s past supervisory measures in relation to CCM and its current situation. Before that, however, I should highlight what is a primordial starting point: CCM is a credit institution with a positive net worth. That is to say, and in the vernacular of the press, the institution has no "hole" in its balance sheet. Yet this does not mean it is not facing serious problems, the cause of which must be sought in an inappropriate management of risk and a forceful business expansion – especially in the real estate sector – funded largely through resort to the international bond markets, generating sizable imbalances. Past experience shows that these credit expansion policies are very dangerous if unaccompanied by the related risk control measures since, generally, they usually entail a relaxing of credit standards. Responsibility for these decisions falls on CCM's previous directors.

Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Looking beyond the euro's first decade Speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at “The euro’s second decade: status quo and perspectives”, British Embassy, Berlin, 18 February 2009. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be here today. The publication of David Marsh’s new book, shortly after the euro’s tenth anniversary, is a good opportunity to review the status of the currency and its prospects in the coming decade. It’s a real “Marsh book” – a pleasure to read, even though some quotes and statements might sometimes be controversial. In any case, David Marsh seems to have taken to heart the main lesson of the current financial crisis: avoid excessive risk. Indeed, he is walking along a kind of tightrope, often quoting people or presenting views in such a way that they contradict or contrast with each other. That way, he is likely to come out on the right side of things, whatever happens. Let me give an example, by quoting the very last paragraph of the book, which looks forward to the next ten years: “The lesson of the first decade is there is no certainty that the single currency will survive the next one unscathed. Yet if the Euro overcomes its trials and becomes a durable success, that accomplishment, measured by all that has gone before, will truly be the richest of triumphs.” In other words, either it’s a real success, or…it’s a real disaster.
A Swedish company that raises wages sharply risks being driven out of business. As globalisation continues, new markets are being opened in which wage costs differ from the level in Sweden. Companies get increased opportunities to outsource their activities to countries with lower wage costs. The question is if wage growth in Sweden is competitive in relation to other countries? 4  BIS Review 84/2005  The large surplus on the current account, SEK 48.1 billion during the second quarter this year, equals around 7.7 per cent of GDP and can be seen as an indication that Swedish wages and costs in general are competitive. Otherwise, Swedish goods and services would not be in such demand in other countries. At the same time, Swedish companies have outsourced a considerable proportion of their production from Sweden to reduce costs. The stiffer competition from low-wage countries is found mainly in the manufacturing industry. However, the pace of this production outsourcing has decreased rather than increased since the end of the 1990s. One possible explanation for that is the global economic slowdown at the start of the current decade. Swedish companies give outsourcing as the reason for a lower number of employees to a lesser extent now compared with a few years ago.2 That could also be interpreted to mean that the cost of Swedish labour has fared relatively well after all in the increasing international competition that has resulted from globalisation.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Bank Inspection Board was merged with the Private Insurance Supervisory Service into Finansinspektionen. In the majority of EU Member States, the central bank and banking supervision are nowadays under the same roof. There are of course other less far-reaching solutions that would be possible if we wanted to improve our Swedish macroprudential policy structure. Regardless of the solution chosen, each has its specific challenges as regards governance and accountability. But having a well-functioning and effective arrangement for macroprudential policy is extremely important for Sweden. What the best arrangement might be is something I hope the Riksdag will reflect on in conjunction with the planned review of the Sveriges Riksbank Act. The time this will take is certainly beyond my active time. My focus is on what is good for Sweden. The whole of Sweden’s welfare is built on the endeavour to increase productivity. This is clearly true within the private sector and it would be strange if this endeavour did not also lead to some form of structural transformation as regards public sector regulation and BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  oversight of the financial system, especially in light of our large, cross-border banks, technological developments and a world of free capital flows unavoidably posing new risks. New but at the same time old issues for monetary policy As I described, a central bank is “the banks’ bank”, not just in financial crisis situations but also on a day-to-day basis.
Benoît Cœuré: Cyber resilience for pan-European financial market infrastructures Introductory remarks by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the High-Level Meeting on Cyber Resilience, Frankfurt am Main, 19 June 2017. * * *  Introduction It is a pleasure to welcome you here today to this strategic high-level meeting on cyber resilience for pan-European financial market infrastructures. The aim of bringing together high-level representatives from large European market infrastructures, critical service providers and public authorities is threefold: First we would like to gain a deeper understanding of the cyber threat landscape in Europe. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) will make a presentation on the cyber threat landscape and its relevance for the financial sector. Second, we will share with you the Eurosystem’s cyber strategy for financial market infrastructures and also explain ECB Banking Supervision’s approach to the issue of bank cyber resilience. Third, we would like to hear your views on how we can all collaborate in a trusted environment to enhance the cyber resilience of financial market infrastructures. More specifically, we would like to assess with you how much interest there is in creating a highlevel cyber resilience forum for pan-European financial market infrastructures, critical service providers and competent authorities. Before we start, let me briefly set the scene.

This strategy – which will be explained in more detail at agenda item 3 – is built on three pillars. The first pillar refers to the cyber resilience of individual financial market infrastructures. The second pillar refers to the resilience of the financial sector as a whole. The third pillar highlights the importance of establishing a forum which brings together market actors, competent authorities and the cybersecurity service providers. This brings me to the third and final objective of today’s meeting. Creation of a high-level cyber resilience forum Tackling cyber risk is not for regulators or market actors in isolation. Rather it is a collaborative endeavour that must be undertaken together. Hence, I invite you to seriously consider the creation of a high-level cyber resilience forum for pan-European financial market infrastructures, critical service providers and competent authorities. I am convinced that there is cross-fertilisation and collective learning to be gained from such collaboration and I am looking forward to a fruitful meeting today. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
The Future of Money While Adam Smith was cautious about the role of the state, he recognised it should furnish the rules and conditions within which private innovation can flourish. In the monetary sphere, this means providing money which citizens can use with confidence and ease. The Bank of England delivers just that through the quality of our banknotes, the stability of UK inflation, the resilience of our financial system, and efficiency and reliability of our core payment systems. We are overhauling our system, RTGS, so that private innovation can flourish. Bringing crypto-assets onto a level regulatory playing field could also catalyse private innovation to create a more resilient, effective payments system. With these foundations in place, the scene is set for better payments, a better economy and a better Friday night out. 32  Oliver Wyman and Santander estimated that distributed ledger technology could reduce banks’ infrastructure costs attributable to cross-border payments, securities trading and regulatory compliance by $ per annum by 2022. See: https://santanderinnoventures.com/fintech2/ 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15

Along with the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, the SNB is represented as an observer in the IBA oversight committee. Matters discussed by the oversight committee include methodology, definition and data basis for the Libor rates; as such it plays an important role in supporting and evaluating the reforms that have been adopted. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Charts  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Changes in these prices provide little information about inflationary pressures in the economy. Therefore, some central banks focus on an underlying measure of inflation. This may be the consumer price index excluding prices that fluctuate most, or measures such as the trimmed average or the weighted median. While the purchase and sale of a dwelling is an investment, the advantage we derive from using the dwelling – shelter services – is part of consumption. Therefore, the price of shelter services should be included in the consumer price index. However, this is a price that cannot be observed and is difficult to measure. Consequently, some central banks completely disregard shelter services. New Zealand uses an index for construction costs, while Iceland includes the market value of resale homes. As a rule, the price of shelter services will increase when the interest rate rises. All central banks disregard the direct effect of interest rates on the price of shelter services. This is also the case at Norges Bank. In very open economies, inflation may fluctuate somewhat without prompting fluctuations in domestic output and employment or leading to changes in inflation in the medium term. In such economies, it may be appropriate therefore to accept somewhat wider fluctuations in inflation. Which prices to include in the price index is a topic of discussion.

The disturbances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will inevitably delay many streamlining and integration measures, however. Nevertheless, merging the tasks of the Central Bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority into a single institution better enables us to face shocks like the current one and rise quickly and decisively from the downturn that lies ahead. I am convinced that, under these circumstances, the incontrovertible mathematical formula – that 1+1=2 – does not apply. The strength of the two institutions unified will be much greater than the sum of its parts. The new Central Bank is an institution that dares to act, can act, and will act. Although a number of policy actions have been taken in recent weeks, we have not emptied our toolbox – far from it. We have a number of other economic policy measures available and will use them if and when the need arises. We will do what is needed to face down the deep but brief economic shock currently threatening our country. Honoured guests: We thank you for listening. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Global economic recovery - where to from here? Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, Mansion House, 26 June 2002. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Mr Chancellor, my Lords, Aldermen, Mr Recorder, Sheriffs, Ladies and Gentlemen. On this great annual occasion last year I spoke about the problems that confronted us in keeping the UK economy on course in the face of the cold winds blowing from abroad. I drew attention to the risk that in seeking to avoid being sucked down into the Charybdis of adverse external influences, by lowering interest rates in this country, we could find ourselves thrown onto the Scylla of excessive domestic exuberance. In the event, the cruel terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th - had a damaging short term impact on economic conditions everywhere. We were drawn irresistibly towards Charybdis despite the resilience of domestic consumer demand, which we sought to sustain by steering towards Scylla, with further reductions in interest rates. The economy as a whole became becalmed over the winter. That of course, was disappointing after 37 successive quarters of relatively steady growth. But the economy as a whole still managed to grow in the year to the first quarter - by 1% on the present data which was somewhat faster than in a number of other G7 countries.

This increase in yields did not solely reflect an increase in credit risk; it also reflected a genuine loss of confidence and an accompanying increase in risk aversion. Yield spreads on even the very safest ABS obligations soared hundreds of basis points. This can be seen in the fact that AAA-rated student loan tranches, with underlying loans 97% guaranteed by the federal government, climbed to yield levels as much as 400 basis points over LIBOR. With the spike in yields, the economic incentives to issue evaporated – issuance was just too costly and there was no active market. After averaging around $ billion per quarter of new originations in 2007 and the first three quarters of 2008, consumer ABS issuance plunged to only $ billion during the fourth quarter of 2008. Issuance of commercial mortgage backed securities ground to a complete halt and this market currently remains closed. So why did the ABS market collapse? There are many reasons. One factor was that in some areas, the risk management incentives of banks and other issuers of ABS were misaligned with those of the end investors in these securities. This misalignment manifested itself in the overall deterioration in lending standards that took place across the economy beginning during the middle part of this decade. Some originators did not do an adequate job of due diligence because the underlying loans were swiftly moved off their balance sheets through the securitization process.
As the result, prices of metals and energy commodities have doubled since the end of 2004. Although prices of these products do not affect consumer inflation directly, in the medium term will contribute to further increase of inflation volatility. The tail wind of globalization will probably return in the medium run, but structural adjustments, which may take several years, must be completed first. Rising white collar and industrial wages in emerging markets will attract more and more people to the labour market and will consequently lead to adjustments in education systems in those countries. Labour force “great doubling” 3 , together with significant increase of the quality of human capital due to better education system will contribute to further increase of offshoring directed to still cheaper emerging markets. Offshoring, as a strategy of increasing competitiveness, is becoming more and more common and includes not only the manufacturing of products but also – increasingly – services. Numerous analyses show that the process of offshoring is bound to grow and increasingly affect services 4 . For example, McKinsey Global Institute estimated that in 2008 ca. 160 million jobs in services, i.e. 11% of the global employment in services estimated at 1.46 billion, may theoretically be performed at a distance from the customer. It is hard to forecast, however, what the global consequences of such situation will be. On the one hand, offshoring lowers operational costs of enterprises and thus optimal mark-up pricing allows to reduce prices.

Although the appreciation of the dollar is likely to cause some further softness in import prices, the continued decline in resource slack as the economy expands should push in the opposite direction. In addition, longer-term household inflation expectations have been well maintained through this period of very low inflation, as indicated by our Survey of Consumer Expectations. The combination of stable expectations and declining slack should push inflation slowly back towards the FOMC’s objective. Monetary policy As the FOMC has consistently communicated, the timing of lift-off will depend on how the economic outlook evolves. As I have discussed, the labor market has improved substantially and I expect to see inflation begin to firm later this year. If this labor market improvement continues and the FOMC is reasonably confident that inflation will move back to our 2 percent objective over the medium-term, then it would be appropriate to begin to normalize interest rates. At the March meeting, the FOMC removed language from the statement that indicated that we would be patient in beginning the process of normalizing monetary policy. But, as Chair Yellen remarked in her most recent press conference, removal of “patient” from the statement does not indicate that we will be “impatient” to begin to normalize monetary policy. Rather, the timing of normalization will be data dependent and remains uncertain because the future evolution of the economy cannot be fully anticipated. Whenever the data support a decision to lift off, I think it is important to recognize what this would signify.
Moreover, costs are pushing inflation upwards for other reasons as well, namely a shortage of manpower in certain industries, expenses to ensure compliance with additional sanitary and epidemiological rules, and possible disruptions in supplies due to the aggravation of the pandemic situation. Of course, the acceleration of current inflation itself should not significantly impact our monetary policy, but there are signs suggesting that proinflationary trends may become longer-lasting. This is evidenced by a material rise in households’ and businesses’ inflation expectations. Increased inflation expectations may induce secondary effects. This is another factor which we took into account. There are signs that secondary effects have already started to manifest themselves. What are the reasons behind them? A considerable rise in prices for individual frequently purchased products, even when it is driven by one-off factors, makes people expect an increase in prices for a broader range of goods and services. This in turn explains the readiness to pay more and pushes prices upwards. Actually, we are already observing such an environment, which once again proves that households’ inflation expectations are currently not anchored yet. When I say that they are not anchored, I do not imply the level of households’ inflation expectations, but rather their response to one-off factors. The fact that households’ inflation expectations are significantly higher than current inflation is typical not only of Russia, but of a whole range of countries (even where inflation is very low).

In an open letter published three weeks ago on climate-related financial risks from the Governor of Bank of England Mark Carney, Governor of Banque de France François Villeroy de Galhau and Chair of the Network for Greening the Financial Services Frank Elderson, the significant effects of climate change are highlighted and a call for action from central banks and supervision is issued, with specific recommendations where central banks are encouraged to integrate sustainability into their own portfolio management. In closing, the authors recognize that “climate change is a global problem, which requires global solutions, in which the whole financial sector has a crucial role to play”. Today we have unlocked the gates towards exotic, yet newsworthy debates here, in Bucharest. Therefore, permit me to extend an open invitation to you all for further discussions at the National Bank of Romania about the impact of climate changes on economies, finance and central banking. We will be honored to host such a conference in Bucharest. Thank you for your attention. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
17  18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  18  Chart 15: Global Dependency Ratios  160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060  0  World Middle-income countries  High-income countries Low-income countries  Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division Note: Dependency ratio is population aged 0-19 or 65+ per 100 aged 20-64  A second supply-side effect working in the same direction is globalisation. The world witnessed many decades of under-interrupted growth in world trade and global value chains after the Second World War, much of it associated with the rising role of China in the world economy. 19 On average since 1983, global trade volumes have risen by around 5½ % per year, roughly double the rate of growth of the world economy. The Covid crisis has decisively broken those trends. Global trade volumes collapsed by around 15% at the peak of the Covid crisis, compared to a fall in global activity of around 9% (Chart 16). The crisis saw the fracturing of some global value chains, in part as a result of countries prioritising domestic over international supply of some goods and services.

Table 1 shows peak levels of the primary fiscal deficit in the UK during the global financial and Covid crises. The degree of fiscal support has plainly been materially larger – more than twice as large. And relative to the size of the economy’s output gap, which is smaller than at the time of the global financial crisis, this degree of fiscal support has been larger still and multiplies of the output gap. Table 1: Peak Fiscal Deficits in the Global Financial and Covid Crises Peak primary balance (a)  Peak output gap (b)  Global Financial Crisis  -8.3  -4.2  Covid Pandemic  -18.0  -3.1  Source: OBR and Bank of England Note: (a) % of GDP. (b) % of potential GDP. Fiscal numbers for pandemic are based on OBR November 2020 forecast for FY 2019-20. The appropriate degree of fiscal support to close the output gap has recently been a source of debate in the United States. 21 There, the fiscal response is prospectively larger than in the UK, and the output gap smaller, meaning the upside risks to demand and inflationary are likely to be larger. 21  For example, see Olivier Blanchard here. 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  21  (e) Psychological Scarring A final potential difference from the past concerns the degree of psychological scarring of risk appetite among household and companies as a result of crisis.