samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The employment ratio for females has increased dramatically across a selection of OECD countries over the past four decades. Data on ethnicity are harder to obtain, but there have been improvements in employment rates among foreign-born residents in many countries over the past 15 years. Numbers of women and ethnic minorities in senior positions have also increased. The Davies Review recently found that the UK has now reached its target of 25% female board representation among FTSE-100 companies, having doubled in less than 5 years. 58 Although progress has been made, there are a number of areas where we still fall short. In the UK, the employment rate for those with Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds is still materially lower than for the population at large. 59 Women still only account for a third of employment in higher managerial roles in the UK. Although the pay gap has fallen, average pay for men in the UK remains almost 20% higher than for women. 60 And male CEOs across European public companies earn on average over 30% more than their female equivalents. 61 The Bank has itself made good progress over recent years. For example, we currently have 43% female representation across the organisation and we are working towards a 50/50 gender split by 2020. At senior management levels, 27% are women with a target to boost this number further. If we rewind 10 years, the equivalent figure would have been only 7%.

Denis Beau: The digitalisation of the financial sector - new challenges, new levers Closing speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the 4th Assises des Technologies Financières, 30 September 2021. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to thank the President, Eric Woerth, for inviting me to close these 4th Assises des Technologies Financières, and to provide my insight, as a central banker and supervisor, into the challenges posed by the digitalisation of financial services. In the framework of our mission to safeguard monetary and financial stability, the main issue for the Banque de France is how we can facilitate and accompany the digitalisation of the financial sector, which is a source of efficiency gains, while at the same time preserving the stability of our monetary and financial system. In order to present the concrete responses we are trying to bring to this issue, I shall start by reminding you of the new challenges posed by digitalisation to the safety and efficiency of the financial sector, before describing the three main areas where we are working to  respond, in line with our mandate. I. The digitalisation of the financial sector poses new challenges  A) In terms of security, one of the main concerns raised by the current digital transformation of the financial system is IT or cyber-risk. The digital transformation considerably increases financial system participants’ surface area of exposure to cyber-threats, and hence their vulnerability to such risk.
We must, moreover, act with the urgency demanded by our responsibilities as active members of the common European project in defence of stability and the success of this project. The report I present today is specifically geared to contribute to this task. From spring last year, the economic indicators offered signs that the world economy was emerging from the most critical phase of the gravest real and financial crisis since the Great Depression. Progress since along the path to recovery has been much more evident in the emerging economies, for which the latest projections indicate growth rates above 6% for 2010. By contrast, the developed countries’ economies are recovering at a considerably less dynamic rate, of around 2%. This turnaround confirms that the rapid and energetic economic policy action to support financial systems, to stimulate demand and to sustain confidence was pivotal in halting a spiral of recession and financial instability which, had it continued, would have undoubtedly had disastrous consequences for the world economy. Halting this recessionary spiral was crucial for placing the world economy once again on a path of sustained output and employment growth. But if the incipient recovery – still subject to considerable uncertainty and risks – is to take root, further measures on various fronts will be needed. The bulk of the measures adopted to check the accelerated economic and financial downturn were exceptional. Accordingly, they have to be withdrawn.

And we’ve been on our own ever since. Iceland has a number of unique characteristics that complicate economic policy. The economy is extremely small. Its export sectors are homogeneous and prone to cyclical fluctuations. Most of its financial markets are relatively shallow and illiquid, which complicates price formation. Not only is our currency small, it is also bordered on both sides by two of the largest currency areas in the world – which cannot but make independent monetary policy conduct more difficult. And there are other factors as well. Icelanders demonstrate a decided herd mentality in their consumption decisions, which causes wide fluctuations in private consumption. With its small population, Iceland has a limited number of workers to do all that is needed – operate the healthcare, education, and administrative systems – and conduct monetary policy as well. Anyone discussing Iceland’s monetary policy concerns is bound to acknowledge these problems. On the other hand, it is clear that the greatest problems facing domestic monetary policy do not stem from the structural flaws inherent in Iceland’s history and geographical characteristics – flaws that are unlikely to change. The biggest problems are institutional, political, and – perhaps most of all – societal: They centre on fiscal policy decisions, collective bargaining agreements, and overall societal consensus. These we can change.
With floating exchange rates, the exchange rate may adapt to changes in growth prospects and changes in the terms of trade. Since the end of the 1990s the Swedish krona has depreciated against the Norwegian krone. During this period, Norway has experienced a considerable rise in prices for  2  Source: The Technical Reporting Committee on Income Settlements, Report no. 1, 2005, preliminary version. The estimates take account of both actual hourly wages and indirect costs. 3  Aftenposten, October 1982  2  BIS Review 15/2005  export products such as oil and aluminium, partly owing to high demand in China. Sweden, on the other hand, has been influenced by a slower rise in prices for goods such as ICT products. The close trade relations between Norway and Sweden are of benefit to both countries. Even if petroleum exports to Sweden rose sharply in the 1970s, Norway still ran a trade deficit with Sweden. We have needed goods from Sweden to build up our petroleum sector, and increased wealth has enabled us to increase goods imports from Sweden. Norway has thus maintained its import share of traditional goods from Sweden while our export share to Sweden has declined. Weaker business sector competitiveness in Norway in relation to that of Sweden is probably one important factor. Looking ahead, some of the features we have observed over the past 30 years may change. There is an imbalance between the cost level in Norway and in Sweden. The cost differential cannot be sustained in the longer term.

Hourly labour costs for a Swedish manufacturing worker were on average 8 per cent higher than for a Norwegian manufacturing worker in 1980 measured in common currency. In 2004, however, hourly labour costs for a Swedish manufacturing worker was almost 20 per cent lower2. Competitiveness in Norway’s manufacturing industry is now close to 20 per cent weaker than the average for the past 30 years. Norwegians had to pay close to 138 Norwegian kroner for 100 Swedish kronar in 1970. Today, we only have to pay a little more than 90 Norwegian kroner. The appreciation of the Norwegian krone has made it less expensive to buy goods and services in Sweden. During longer periods, the exchange rate seems to have been influenced by changes in prices for export goods and import goods in the two countries. In the 10 years to 1983, the Norwegian krone showed a particularly strong appreciation against the Swedish krona. This occurred at the same time as Norway experienced far more favourable developments in prices for its export goods relative to import goods than was the case for Sweden. Norway’s terms of trade improved. In the 1970s, the sharp rise in oil prices contributed to this. In practice, the appreciation of the Norwegian krone against the Swedish krona occurred when the Swedish authorities devalued their currency more than the Norwegian authorities. The authorities devalued against a basket of currencies. In Sweden, the Palme government’s devaluation of 16 per cent in October 1982 was particularly strong.
Despite ultraaccommodative monetary policy, most advanced economies have not attained so-called escape velocity. •  The legacies of the financial crisis – in the form of debt overhangs – continue to exert a drag. •  The structural deficiencies in the major economies, such as under-investment, cast a dark cloud on future potential growth. But one thing that ultra-low interest rates over the past six years have clearly done is to depress returns, particularly in fixed income assets. •  US bond returns since 2009 has averaged 2.3% p.a. compared to returns of 5.8% p.a. over the past 20 years. This has contributed to a more challenging investing environment for government funds – namely pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and central banks – many of which have significant allocations to developed market fixed income instruments. Mean reversion is a key tenet of investment theory – the expectation is that as interest rates normalise, returns should revert to pre-crisis levels. But the cliché that this time is different could well be true. Secular trends weigh on future economic growth, and consequently the real return on investment. Drivers of future economic growth What are the prospects for future economic growth? There are, in my view, four key drivers of long-term growth: deleveraging, demographics, productivity, and energy. Let me elaborate on each of them. First, deleveraging. Global balance sheets need to undergo significant adjustments. This is a structural issue that will take time to address.

This assessment derives from studies conducted by the Eurosystem but also from the reports published by “ECB Watchers”, with whom, incidentally, the ECB has regular contact, notably in the context of annual conferences. Research carried out by these “ECB Watchers” show for example that on average, the Eurosystem’s monetary policy decisions were very well anticipated by financial markets, whatever their orientation, at least two weeks in advance, and fully factored in at least a week before. A comparison with the Fed, moreover, does not reveal significant differences between the two institutions with regard to the ability of markets to anticipate the monetary policy decisions of the two institutions. That points to the transparency of the single monetary policy. In particular, the fact that the ECB has chosen channels other than the publication of  BIS Review 113/2007  7  minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council has not prevented it from reaching a high level of predictability. As regards the frequency, since the inception of the euro in 1999, the Eurosystem has changed its policy rates 25 times (8 cuts, 17 hikes), which is on average close to the usual average frequency of interest rate changes 1 . However, compared to the Federal Reserve, in particular since 2001, the frequency of the changes is by far lower. Does this necessarily imply that the Eurosystem does not move enough or too low?
Hence, we need to ensure sound regulation and oversight. Network and scale effects are as important as ever. With globalisation, the network effects are moving from the domestic market to the global. Regarding scale effects, I would argue that digitalisation has increased the fixed costs and lowered the variable costs, thereby increasing the large-volume advantage. Next-generation payment systems I will now turn to the present and focus the remaining part of my speech on the work at the Riksbank on developing the current infrastructure – building the payment systems of tomorrow, if I may say so. Naturally, this is not a solo task, but a joint effort involving many stakeholders, public and private, domestic and foreign. I will concentrate, however, on the Riksbank’s rationales for this work. They are to a large extent related to the lessons that I just highlighted. Before I do this, let me briefly reflect on what I said earlier about the higher pace of innovation in recent years. For those in the commercial sphere of payments, this has increased the risk of ‘falling behind’, we often hear. You need to master the new opportunities offered by the ‘era of digitalisation’ to avoid losing market shares. Add to this that network and scale effects tend to benefit suppliers that are first with a new solution or service. Here my point is that the same factor has also led to demands on central banks to be as vigilant as ever.

Over time, this has become a reality almost everywhere. In Europe, countries and their inhabitants have converged on one currency – with the euro area as a special case, of course. In the United States, developments have been similar. The ‘free banking era’ showcased the impossibility of keeping track of the values of notes by different issuers. In the end, they were replaced by Federal Reserve banknotes, and a common currency was established. During our lifetime and in our part of the world, it has been like that – one country, one monetary unit. However, a few years ago, technology started to challenge this, at least conceptually. We are now seeing the emergence of cryptoassets in various forms, without a public issuer, claiming to be money. Yet, most of them vary significantly in value, which means that their purchasing power also fluctuate. Consequently, cryptoassets mainly function as investment assets and not as a means of payment in the way we use, for example, kronor, euros and dollars. One innovation in the crypto world is so-called stablecoins, which are cryptocurrencies where the issuer promises that the value follows the value of another asset, such as dollars. In this way, the stablecoin issuer uses the trust in already established currencies. So far, stablecoins have mainly been used by those active in the cryptoasset market, but there is the ambition to broaden their acceptance as a means of payment.
Last summer I said that the decision as to when to start raising Bank Rate would likely come into sharper relief around the turn of this year. Well the year has turned, and, in my view, the decision proved straightforward: now is not yet the time to raise interest rates. This wasn’t a surprise to market participants or the wider public. They observed the renewed collapse in oil prices, the volatility in China, and the  4  Refers to non-farm business sector unit labour costs in the US and unit labour costs based on the MPC’s backcast in the UK. 5  Where openness is measured by the share of exports in GDP. 6  Vlieghe (2016), Rachel and Smith (2015), Carney (2013) and Carney (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  moderation in growth and wages here at home since the summer and rightly concluded that not enough cumulative progress had been made to warrant tightening monetary policy. The outlook for monetary policy depends on three things: the MPC’s objectives, its strategy, and the UK’s economic prospects. Our objective is clear: to return inflation to the target in a way that avoids undue volatility in output and employment. The MPC’s strategy for achieving the inflation target varies over time, and it depends on the nature of shocks hitting the economy and the risks facing the economy.

Chart 3: Credit growth coming back into line with GDP growth in the latest data Credit growth relative to GDP growth Credit growth relative to GDP growth (3-year trailling average)  15 10  1969 1971 1973 1974 1976 1977 1979 1981 1982 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1992 1993 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2007 2009 2011 2012 2014  0 -5  Percentage points  5  -10 -15 -20 Source: Bank of England. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  That said, increased vigilance is merited given the softness in nominal GDP growth, the stillelevated levels of household debt relative to income, the large current account deficit and pockets of more buoyant activity in areas such as Buy-to-Let mortgages, unsecured consumer credit and commercial real estate. More fundamentally, it doesn’t take a genius to recognise that a prolonged period of low and relatively predictable interest rates could encourage the build-up of excessive risks. That’s why the Bank is monitoring risks closely and has taken action where appropriate.
Economic developments have been driven by wholly exogenous health developments and governments have provided massive fiscal support to incomes, employment, the corporate sector and in some cases like the UK, to housing markets. It remains striking however, that following some of the sharpest economic contractions in modern history and amid great uncertainty and indeed, initially fear, about the future, housing markets have been strong. In the UK, over the 12 months to February, house prices have risen by 9.1%, the highest growth rate since October 2014. This compares to an average annual growth rate of under 4% in the 10 years prior to the pandemic. Mortgage approvals have averaged around 85,000 per month and total transactions 111,000 per month since housing markets opened in June 2020, compared to around 60,000 and 90,000 in the prior decade, respectively. The pre-pandemic decade, however, may not be the right comparator. The 10 years following the financial crisis appear unusual in that over that period house prices grew broadly in line with incomes, having grown at double the rate of income in the previous twenty to thirty years. I want to look today at some of the reasons why house prices growth and housing transactions were, in UK terms, relatively subdued for the 10 years prior to Covid, and at what drives house prices and transactions.

(2011), "Risk off" 9  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  To help gauge the role played by these factors, we can consider the historic relationship between house prices and fundamentals and how this relationship might have evolved in the decade since the crisis11. The blue line in Chart 6 shows how we might have expected mortgage debt to evolve following the crisis, based on the historic relationship between mortgage lending and fundamentals such as the housing stock and incomes. This shows underlying demand falling in the immediate post-crisis period. This reflects weaker fundamentals. And to the extent that households’ beliefs are shaped by recent trends – and there is good reason to believe that is the case - weaker expectations will be captured in weaker demand. This fall in demand could also reflect credit conditions. In the years immediately following the crisis Bank Rate remained close to zero, but the interest rate spreads over Bank Rate charged by banks and building societies, for new mortgages, were high. This meant that interest rates on new mortgage did not fall with Bank Rate. But, as is shown in Chart 7, from 2013 onwards, mortgage spreads fell and the cost of mortgage credit dropped to well below pre-GFC level. 11  I have borrowed this thought experiment from Geoff Meen. It makes a number of simplifying assumptions, notably that there would not be feedback from higher demand into house prices in the counterfactual in which credit is unconstrained.
Chart: Growth and returns  3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  In the long term, growth in dividends and firms’ cash flows will reflect underlying economic growth. In our analyses, this is clearly evident in global data: internationally, growth in firms’ cash flows and equity returns are correlated with growth in the global economy. Global economic growth in the coming years is expected to be below its historical level. This “pessimism” is partly related to the driving forces behind the low level of the real interest rate. If we use more conservative estimates of future dividend growth as inputs in our models, our estimate of the ERP falls to below 4 percentage points. There is considerable uncertainty around this estimate, and Norges Bank’s projections are based on a more cautious estimate of 3 percentage points. Chart: Equity allocation and expected return The Ministry of Finance has requested the Bank to provide estimates of the expected return on the fund ahead. Expected bond returns are considerably lower than in 2006, while the expected excess return on equities relative to bonds is somewhat higher as expected term premiums are lower. With an equity allocation of 60 percent, our best estimate of average real return is about 2 percent per year over the next ten years. If the equity allocation is increased to 75 percent, the expected real return rises to about 2½ percent.

SPEECH  Higher policy rate will curb inflation Introductory statement by Governor Ida Wolden Bache at press conference following announcement of the policy rate and publication of Monetary Policy Report 3/22 Chart 1 Policy rate raised Norges Bank’s Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee decided to raise the policy rate from 1.75% to 2.25% at its meeting on 21 September. The policy rate will most likely be raised further in November. Norges Bank’s task is to keep inflation low and stable. The operational target is inflation of close to 2 percent over time. We are also mandated to help keep employment as high as possible and to promote economic stability over time. We are raising the policy rate with the aim of bringing down inflation. Price stability is important for the economy to function well. It reduces uncertainty and facilitates planning. Those with low incomes and small margins are normally the hardest hit when inflation suddenly surges. The main contribution monetary policy can make to promoting high employment over time is to ensure low and stable inflation. As long as there is confidence that inflation will remain low and stable, the costs of minor deviations from the target of 2 percent are fairly insubstantial. But if households and firms expect inflation to be elevated and high inflation is incorporated into price and wage setting, inflation may take root, and bringing it down again could prove difficult. Chart 2: Inflation is high Consumer price inflation is now rising rapidly both globally and in Norway.