samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will come back to this point later… To focus on the matter I was invited to speak about, I would like to address several issues: •  first, the links between the current overhaul of financial regulation and Islamic finance;  •  second, the role Islamic finance could play in France;  •  the third, the relationship between Islamic finance and financial stability;  •  Finally, I would like to mention the conditions Islamic banks need to meet to ensure that their establishment in France is consistent with the smooth functioning of the banking system. ♦♦♦  The current crisis has illustrated the rapid contagion effect fostered by financial globalisation. However, it is important to emphasise that financial globalisation is not in itself the cause of the crisis, which has rather revealed failures in financial regulation. Indeed, the crisis has highlighted the need to better assess and prevent risks in the financial system as a whole, in addition to simply monitoring the risks of each individual institution. It has also shown that some features of the regulatory regime have had an amplifying effect on the economic cycle instead of mitigating it. That is why the G20 has launched an ambitious agenda to reform financial regulation, covering four main areas: the strengthening of prudential standards, the redefinition of the scope of regulation, the revision of accounting standards and the strengthening of risk management.

We will see later that these areas find a strong echo in Islamic finance, which has also to deal with issues linked to lack of transparency, of a level playing field and harmonised regulation. Thus, the overhaul of regulation in conventional finance should be an opportunity for Islamic finance to tackle these issues, and to better integrate into financial globalisation. In France, in particular, Islamic finance has a role to play, which could be beneficial both to Islamic investors and to the French economy. Indeed, the French economy offers major and diversified investment opportunities for Islamic investors in the financing of a wide network of often innovative firms and projects, or in real estate. These sovereign funds, corporates or wealthy individuals should have the opportunity to invest, either directly in individual assets or projects, or indirectly through funds or  BIS Review 118/2009  1  collective vehicles. It is up to banks to offer to these investors the type of Shariah compliant products and investment or financing tools they might wish to have. Let me make a brief point on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and their link with Islamic finance. SWFs have attracted much attention recently but the oldest ones were set up back in the 1970s. Their expansion accelerated about a decade ago, when many emerging countries started to accumulate sizeable foreign exchange reserves, due to high oil and gas prices and to the conjunction of macroeconomic factors and foreign exchange policies.
Thailand is somewhat in an awkward position currently, being left behind by the NICs, and being caught up by countries like China and Vietnam, to name a few. It is therefore important to extend efforts beyond market diversification to promoting higher value along the production chain, a task that both the private sector and the Government have a role to play. Especially with the rising FTAs as well as other regional integration and cooperation, notably among ASEAN, we must work to make sure that Thai producers and exporters can fully utilize the benefits from these arrangements. Fourth, prudent policy has obviously shielded us from the contagion of external developments so far. In addition to the importance of fiscal discipline and debt sustainability which I have already highlighted, I would like to stress that monetary policy has not and should not be used as an instrument to boost short-term growth. However, it can help cushion the economy against growth contraction in the short run, while ensuring stability in the long run. In this past crisis, the adverse effect led us to a series of aggressive rate cuts during December 2008 to April 2009 in order to help shore up the economy. The rate cuts were timely and turned out to be effective, in view of the momentum of economic recovery achieved. Regarding the framework of monetary policy, I should stress that the Bank of Thailand’s policy framework has always emphasized, not only monetary stability, but also financial stability.

Tarisa Watanagase: Enhancing Thailand’s resiliency against economic turbulence Address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the 4th Annual Euromoney Thailand Investment Forum: The Economic Perspective, Bangkok, 6 July 2010. *  *  *  Prime Minister, Distinguished Speakers and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank Euromoney for the invitation to speak to this gathering of prominent members of public and business sectors. I welcome this opportunity to share with you some thoughts on Thailand’s economic and policy issues at this very challenging juncture. As we all know, the Thai economy has been through one of the most turbulent periods due to the global impact from the US sub-prime crisis and the European debt crisis. Despite the difficult external environment compounded by political problem and weak sentiments at home, it is clear that the Thai economy has been able to cope with shocks quite well. Thus far, what the economy experienced has been a mere cyclical downturn, in tandem with the contraction of global demand. The good news is that nothing about our economy amplified the impact of these external and domestic shocks and I call that economic resiliency. Unfortunately, the less good news is that a small open economy like Thailand will be prone to more shocks, especially through international trade and financial market linkages. So, we need to accept this fact and make ourselves as resilient as possible to ride the waves.
I will take a longer perspective and discuss which tools the Riksbank may need to use, especially if the low interest rate scenario that has characterised the past 10 years becomes even more prolonged. The fact that monetary policy measures affect a central bank’s balance sheet has become increasingly common in large parts of the world. This development has been driven by the very low interest rates and the need to make monetary policy even more expansionary. Essentially, it is nothing new – if we go back in time, there are many examples of central banks that have used variation in their asset portfolios as a means of conducting monetary policy. The monetary policy toolbox also needs to take into account changes in the financial system; for instance, we in 1 [25] ---------------------------*This speech grew out of many long discussions held over the spring of 2020. The opinions expressed are my own. At the same time, I would like to thank David Vestin for his help in writing this speech and Petra Frid for her help with the diagrams. I would also like to thank Mattias Erlandsson, Jesper Hansson, Pernilla Meyersson, Ulf Söderström, Anders Vredin, Frida Fallan, Charlotta Edler, Ann-Leena Mikiver, Cecilia Roos-Isaksson and Marianne Sterner for their valuable comments on the speech and Elizabeth Nilsson, Calum McDonald and Gary Watson for their assistance translating it into English. Sweden have, in recent years, seen a development towards a higher share of market financing for Swedish companies.

Such a communication would be reminiscent of the reverse situation, when the central bank is concerned about fiscal dominance – a situation where an unsustainable fiscal policy makes it impossible for the central bank to restrain inflation – and communicates this. 16 Personally, I do not think that an independent monetary policy presumes a total lack of dialogue between the Riksbank and the political system on such matters. The second question concerns the effectiveness of various measures and the risks they entail. For example, assume that the Riksbank can make monetary policy more expansionary by purchasing certain financial assets. This could increase the risks on the Riksbank’s balance sheet considerably and lead to future losses for taxpayers. Assume now that it had been possible to achieve an equivalent effect by means of mild fiscal policy stimulation measures. This would probably be possible in a situation where monetary policy is at its lower bound. The Riksbank would then not have to raise the interest rate as economic activity rises and fiscal policy would thereby become more effective than normal. 17 In this case, there should be conditions for holding a discussion over which policy mix would be most appropriate. In addition, Blanchard (2019) makes the point that, if the real interest rate is lower than the growth rate in the economy, the cost for debt-financed public investments will be very low.
Banking is already the second biggest global spender on AI systems (after retail) and the sector is expected to invest a further $ billion on AI this year.22 A quarter of major banks’ activities and almost a third of all UK payments activity are already hosted on the Cloud, and there are considerable opportunities for even more intensive usage.23 Cloud service providers offer ready-made solutions that can speed up time to market, provide superior analytics, and enable businesses to adjust quickly their business models. If deployed at scale, cloud technology could provide lowcost, resilient computing power and easy access to AI capabilities, unlocking 30-50% unit cost savings.24 These savings can be passed onto customers and, if properly managed, improve the resilience of the overall system. For these reasons, the Bank of England is open to greater adoption of the Cloud and usage of AI. This means ensuring that these technologies are adopted in a safe manner, in ways that increase resilience. Careful attention will have to be given to risks, including of those associated in the single point of failure and market concentration. Two providers account for nearly half of revenues in cloud computing, bringing scale and efficiency, but also concerns about dependence and a single point of failure in the case of a cyberattack. In AI and ML, there is a reliance on data, but when there are biases in data or algorithms, or the situation isn’t captured by past experience prediction becomes difficult and judgement becomes more important.

This workshop is conceived as a platform for getting better insight in the fintech developments, exchanging opinions, sharing ideas with a view of drawing the outlines of our future FinTech Strategy. In this light, I am delighted to invite Mr. Tikam to share with us part of his rich experience and knowledge on this topic. Mr. Tikam is an experienced Executive Level Advisor with 26 years commercial experience, having played multifaceted roles, with the last 22 years in financial services. Having in mind Mr. Tikam’s proficiency, I have no doubts that today we will have fruitful discussions and valuable exchange of experiences to the benefit of all participants. Mr. Tikam, thank you for your efforts in making this workshop happen. The floor is yours. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
The effects of monetary policy on financial market developments, in particular in fostering the subsequent financial bubble, have led to a reassessment regarding the conduct of monetary policy. The debate is under way and concerns various aspects, which I will summarise briefly. The first concerns the tools of monetary policy. Recent experience has shown that the approach followed by most central banks, based on inflation targeting (which involves forecasting inflation on the basis of an economic model and changing interest rates so as to ensure that inflation forecasts are in line with the target), does not sufficiently take into account financial developments, in particular with regard to asset prices, which may affect the stability of the markets and, in time, inflation. It is argued by some that monetary policy should act proactively to avoid the excessive tendencies of the financial markets, known as “leaning against the wind”. 5 In other words, one should be ready to hinder the creation of speculative bubbles, among other things by raising interest rates, before inflationary pressures emerge. This is easier said than done. If it is difficult to forecast inflation, it is even  2  Ben S. Bernanke (2002), “Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here”, remarks before the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C., 21 November 2002; Alan Greenspan (2004), “Risk and uncertainty in monetary policy”, remarks at the Meetings of the American Economic Association, San Diego, California, 3 January 2004.

For instance, if I had to mention three of them, I would choose: (i)  overseeing the development of awareness and training within the organisation;  (ii)  monitoring patch management in order to make sure that identified flaws are corrected in due time;  (iii)  and, last but not least, capturing the effectiveness of the identification and authentication processes. In a nutshell, key indicators help to improve the governance of the IT security system. ** To conclude, I believe that it is necessary to better structure the international governance of cyber security in the financial sector: it is clear that the different regulatory and supervisory authorities are aware of “cyber risks”. This is becoming apparent through the numerous initiatives at various levels (domestic, European, and international). While this is welcome, it is both delicate but necessary to strengthen international cooperation in order to ensure that there are neither loopholes nor overlaps and that there is convergence towards proposals and solutions that can easily be shared with others.
PORTUGAL Could the ending of this zero interest rate environment be a problem for more indebted countries, like Portugal? Obviously, countries with higher debt levels have benefited more from lower refinancing costs, but this is not the objective of our monetary policy, which to ensure price stability. More fundamentally, we should always keep in mind that investor confidence in the sustainability of public finances is the key determinant of interest rates on sovereign debt. If there are doubts about the sustainability of public finances, spreads can increase to very high levels, despite the ECB’s asset purchase programme. I have noted that, following heightened market volatility due to developments in Italy, spillovers to interest rates on Portuguese public debt were contained, thanks to significant progress in public finances. This again stresses the importance of sound public finances. What is your assessment of Portugal’s progress? Commission and ECB staff concluded their eighth post-programme surveillance mission last week. They stress that the current favourable macroeconomic and financial conditions provide an opportunity to accelerate structural reforms, further reduce macroeconomic imbalances and increase Portugal’s resilience to shocks. Fiscal consolidation remains necessary to ensure a steady decline in the debt ratio. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  They also note that, while Portuguese banks have made considerable progress in strengthening their balance sheets, remaining vulnerabilities in the banking sector need to be addressed, in particular the high level of non-performing loans (13.7% in 2017 compared with an EU average of about 5%).

Thus, over time, a central bank like the SNB can usually rebuild its equity level all on its own after a loss. Nevertheless, even for a central bank, a long period of negative equity is not without its problems, as it can undermine the bank’s credibility and its independence in the longer term. For these reasons, it is important for the SNB to maintain a sufficient level of equity. To ensure that the SNB can carry out its monetary policy mandate without restriction, also in the long term, in the interests of the country as a whole it is essential that its capital base be adequately rebuilt. This means that the necessary profits must be earned, and retained. In the long run, the entire economy will benefit. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Cooperative banks also have a significant presence in South Korea, Japan, Canada, Morocco, Mexico and Brazil. So the question immediately arises: how come that no such institution has ever been set up in Malta? After all one would have thought that the idea of cooperation and solidarity, and the spirit of the Seven Basic Principles of the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) would have a strong appeal in Malta. These seven principles consist of: voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and information of members and employees; cooperation with other cooperatives; and, especially, concern for the community. Moreover, we do have cooperatives in other spheres of activity here, and these have been around for some time. Indeed, the start of the cooperative movement in Malta dates back to the later years of the 19th century (around 1884), and the first form of legislation regulating cooperatives here – the Cooperative Societies Ordinance 1946 – came into effect on 12th December of that year. Initially the movement took root in the agriculture and fisheries sector, which in those times employed a significant part of the population. But later, as Malta developed socially and economically, the movement continued to flourish and to expand, and new cooperatives were set up in practically every sector of the economy. Indeed, there are currently some 60 cooperatives in Malta, with over 5000 members, spread over a wide range of activities.

Josef Bonnici: An alternative model for banking in Malta – a case for setting up a cooperative bank in Maltese economic realities Address by Professor Josef Bonnici, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the Seminar on “Cooperative banking”, Valletta 27 September 2012. *  *  *  Honourable Ministers, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. As the previous speakers have shown, cooperative banks, though not often in the news, in these times perhaps thankfully, have a considerable presence in most countries, particularly, but not only, in European countries. Indeed, data for 2010 show that in Europe cooperative banks hold a market share of over 20% of deposits and a similar market share for loans. Their presence is particularly marked in France, where the three cooperative banking groups (Credit Agricole, BPCE and Credit Mutuel) account for some 50% of the market share for loans and 60% of that for deposits. There is also a significant presence in Italy, where they enjoy a market share of 34% of deposits and 30% for loans; in Germany, where they have a market share of 19% for deposits and 16% for loans; in the Netherlands, with a market share of 43% of deposits and 30% for loans; and in Finland, with a market share of 34% for deposits and 32% for loans. They include, apart from the well-known French banks already mentioned, such respected names as Rabobank in Holland and the Raiffeissen banks in Germany.
We do not know yet how the initiative will be implemented and what effect it will have on our relationship to the EU. Consequently, the economic impact of the popular decision cannot really be properly quantified at the moment, and this is why it has not been included in our forecast. For 2014, we continue to expect economic growth of around 2%. Inflation in Switzerland and the SNB’s monetary policy The greater economic momentum which we are forecasting will gradually lead to a better utilisation of production capacity. The underutilisation which still prevails continues to restrain consumer prices in Switzerland. Declining inflation abroad and the slightly stronger Swiss franc are having a similar impact by dampening imported inflation. Thus the SNB’s inflation forecast shows that there is no risk of inflation in the foreseeable future. In 2014, inflation in Switzerland is likely to amount to only 0%. In addition, the international environment is still giving rise to high levels of uncertainty. Consequently, the danger that the Swiss franc, as a safe haven, might suddenly be subject to further upward pressure has not been averted. Short-term interest rates are practically zero. For this reason, the minimum exchange rate is the right tool to avoid an undesirable tightening of monetary conditions, since an appreciation of the Swiss franc would lead to a further decline in import prices and a renewed threat of deflation. Given this situation, the SNB is maintaining the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro.

The scepticism was clearly expressed by Kåre Willoch, who was prime minister when the new Act came into effect in 1985: “[Nicolai Rygg] was held primarily responsible – and  15  In 1926, Minister of Finance Holmboe, of the centrist-liberal party Venstre, said: “It is however a well known fact that wherever governments have assumed authority over the national bank, the outcome has been unfavourable because vested interests have been so considerable and the temptation so strong that it was impossible to resist, and the government has helped itself to the national bank’s cash…”. In Francis Sejersted (1973): Ideal, teori og virkelighet. Nicolai Rygg og pengepolitikken i 1920-årene. [Ideals, theory and reality. Nicolai Rygg and monetary policy in the 1920s]. J. W. Cappelens forlag. 16  In Francis Sejersted (1973). 17  Berge Furre (Norwegian historian, theologian and politician for the Socialist Left Party), (1999): “Norsk historie 1905–2000: Industrisamfunnet – frå vokstervisse til framtidstvil” [History of Norway 1905–2000: from confidence in growth to doubts about the future], Det Norske Samlaget. 18  For a lively description of the personalities governing the large central banks in the 1920s, see Liaquat Ahamed (2009): The Lords of Finance. The bankers who broke the world. Penguin Books.