samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is still too high but is going in the right direction. For France, after 1.2% of GDP growth in 2015, we are likely to see a growth rate above that range for 2016 and 2017. In the short term, we expect growth at 0.4% in the last quarter of 2016. The Banque de France will publish its new growth and inflation projections for France on 9 December. Inflation developments 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  [Slide 3] Inflation, which was nil in the euro area in 2015, rose steadily in 2016: it should reach 0.6% in November. Monetary policy has helped and will continue to support a move toward the Eurosystem objective of an inflation rate below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. In addition, oil prices have bottomed out since the beginning of this year and this should directly help inflation to increase beyond 1% in the first months of 2017. [Slide 4] The comprehensive package of measures adopted on 10 March 2016 made euro area monetary policy more accommodative. One of its distinctive features is that it targets the financing of the real economy. The second series of targeted refinancing operations (dubbed “TLTRO 2”), for an amount of EUR 444.6 bn allotted so far, should continue to improve medium-term funding conditions for banks and foster bank lending to companies and households. 2/ Structural policies Progress has also been made regarding structural reforms. Several European countries, including Germany and Spain, are showing the way forward to Europe.

The scale of the systemic changeover is tremendous, roughly on a par with our earlier change to driving on the right-hand side of the road. A fundamental principle for the work is that, as far as possible, all those concerned are to find their own solutions to the problems posed by EMU. The Riksbank is responsible for the changeover in the financial sector. To this end we have set up a body called SIFS (the Swedish acronym for Consultation and Information to the Financial Sector). One result to date is a report, published a few days ago, on the situation as regards the euro in Sweden’s financial sector. Good progress has been made in the preparatory work. Timetables and suitable solutions have been established in a number of fields. The Riksbank considers that the financial BIS Review 14/1997  -5-  sector can manage a changeover to the euro on 1st January 1999. Participation from a later date can facilitate the preparatory work in certain respects and complicate it in others. The worst alternative is a long period of uncertainty; that would entail a costly duplication of systems in many fields. I should like to end with some examples of changes that will occur and be of importance for the financial markets. 1. Monetary policy A single currency presupposes a single monetary policy. In EMU this will be implemented by the ECB. In this context the national central banks will function as “operative arms”, acting on instructions from the ECB.
José De Gregorio: Tackling the capital inflow challenge Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Bank of Spain, the IE Business School in Madrid, and CEMLA’s Meeting of Central Bank Governors of Latin America and Spain in Buenos Aires, the three of them in May 2010. *  *  *  I thank the valuable comments of Kevin Cowan, Pablo García and Enrique Orellana. The last few years have brought unprecedented challenges to macroeconomic management in small, open economies. The severe inflationary shock that began in 2007 was followed by the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and a worldwide economic recession with no match in the postwar period. Today, a while after the immediate resolution of the crisis, we face new challenges. On the one hand, some developed economies, whose public finances were severely damaged by the great recession, now face a period of drastic macroeconomic adjustments and, in some cases, uncertainty about how their debts will be restructured. On the other hand, a substantial segment of emerging economies, which suffered no permanent damages in the balance sheets of their households, firms, or governments, is currently experiencing what can be an incipient start of a credit and economic rebound. The new momentum of capital inflows mirrors this phenomenon. The current status of these inflows and how to deal with them are a substantial part of the challenges we face today and the substance of this document.

Source: WEO April 2010, IMF. Figure 9 Real exchange rate (index, 1986=100)  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70  88  91  94  97  00  03  06  Reserve requirement period and exchange rate band Dollar sale Dollar purchase RER  09  Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS Review 72/2010  11
Following the implementation of inflation targeting, the report will be published quarterly; - a model calibrated by the Bank’s staff is currently being tested and will be used for forecasting purposes. Instead of going into the details related to the Inflation Targeting framework, I will let my fellow speakers tackle the most important issues. Shortly after this, Deputy Governor Ms. Rachel Lomax will present a compelling account of UK’s experience and, may I add, success as a benchmark inflation targeter. After the lunch break, Gill Hammond, Deputy Director of CCBS, will give you an excellent presentation dealing with specific issues and challenges faced by emerging market economies when adopting inflation targeting. Later on, we will have our guests from the Czech National Bank and the National Bank of Hungary giving you a purposeful insight of such challenges and of their countries’ experiences with the IT framework. Mr. Ludek Niedermayer, Deputy Governor of the Czech National Bank, will first explain to you “why and how” inflation targeting was adopted in the Czech Republic – the first country to embrace this regime in our region. Then, it will be for Ms Csermely Agnes, Director with the National Bank of Hungary, to share with us the “Lessons and Challenges” put forth by the Hungarian experience with inflation targeting.

In the treasury market, we have maintained our position as the world’s fourth largest forex trading hub after London, New York and Tokyo. We continue to rank as the second largest over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives hub in Asia after Japan. We will build on these strengths and deepen our markets by developing the structured finance market. The asset securitisation market has already taken off, with structured products accounting for more than half of the Singapore dollar debt market. This will be further boosted when Singapore’s first loan securitisation programme for Small and Medium Enterprises is launched. ASEAN will continue to be an important market. We should build closer ties with some of the fast emerging ASEAN economies. For example, we have made a proposal to Vietnam to connect our two economies, including our financial markets, so as to reap the benefits of synergy. Vietnam is receptive. We are approaching this at a pace which Vietnam is comfortable with. Besides ASEAN, we should also position ourselves to play a bigger role in other growing regions. I am pleased to note that our local players have embraced globalisation to capitalise on opportunities in the region and beyond. In response to increased competition, our local banks have consolidated and expanded abroad. They remain profitable, sound and well-capitalised, and are becoming regionally competitive. China, India and the Middle East offer rich opportunities for both wealth management and capital markets activities. Singapore can play a useful intermediary role to serve the needs of Chinese companies seeking funding and expansion overseas.
And how agile and resolute is the bank in actually changing the beliefs, structures, dynamics and thus behavioural patterns that are preventing it from reaching, or restoring, its reputational and strategic goals? Conclusion Let me conclude. Some of you here today are non-executive directors at banks. As such, you play a vital role in setting the right tone for your entire institution. Your conduct is crucial in creating a healthy risk culture within your organisation, and you are responsible for nurturing behaviour which reflects the core values of your organisation and protects its best interests, not just in the short-term, but also in the future. Beyond your technical skills and your experience in banking, there are broader expectations regarding your conduct and behaviour as board members. You must ensure that there are concrete consequences for failing to adhere to prudent behaviour. Governance in the stricter sense deals with the structure which shapes a banks’ actions. Getting these structures right is of the utmost importance. But that is not the whole story. It is also relevant how people behave within these more formal structures and what the underlying cultural drivers of their  behaviours are. Banks would be well advised to seek to identify these behavioural patterns and to act on them if such patterns encourage conduct which is not in line with their values and risk appetite.

It would seem that the least that we as prudential supervisor can do is ask the pertinent questions and challenge banks to look beyond governance in the stricter, more standard sense. I have tried to identify the kind of questions we might ask. I am very much looking forward to hearing your views in the ensuing discussion, which I hope and trust will be lively and stimulating. I promise we will reflect seriously on any suggestions that you might have. Thank you. 1. Kirkpatrick, G. (2009), “Corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis”, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2009/1(1), pp. 61-87; Saghi-Zedek, N. and Tarazi, A., (2015), “Excess control rights, financial crisis and bank profitability and risk”, Journal of Banking & Finance, No 55, pp. 361-79. 2. See SSM supervisory statement on governance and risk appetite, ECB, June 2016. 3. Joint ESMA and EBA Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders under Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU (2021). 4.
On balance, the global economy risks being trapped in a vicious cycle of lower global equilibrium interest rates reducing monetary policy space, exacerbating downside risks, pushing down equilibrium rates further, and leading to a global liquidity trap. This environment raises questions over whether the current inflation targeting framework will provide monetary policymakers sufficient scope to respond to adverse shocks to demand, whether it needs to be adjusted or even replaced. Currently, there is insufficient conventional policy space based on past experience. The average change in policy rates across easing and tightening cycles pre-crisis was around 150 basis points in the UK, and around 250 basis points in the US and the euro area.29 The average easing cycle in the UK prior to the crisis was 250bps. All else equal, insufficient conventional policy space could lead to more frequent, and more costly, episodes at the lower bound. Research indicates that if the equilibrium real interest rate settles at 1%, policy rates could hit zero as much as 40 per cent of the time, resulting in shortfalls of inflation from target and output from potential of up to 2 percentage points.30 Prior to the crisis, the zero lower bound was expected to bind just 10 per cent of the time, with only modest costs as each episode was anticipated to be short in duration.31  27  These flaws reduce the rate of global potential growth, increases its downside skew, and bolsters the likelihood of an extreme downside event (a fatter left tail).

The circumstance that some households are willing to put off the payment of capital gains tax until the future could be a sign that the ongoing level of taxation is too low in comparison to the level of taxation from a sale. All of this makes it important to make structural reforms in housing and tax policy. Our politicians urgently need to address the problems that have arisen and take a long-term socio-economic view of the housing market. 21  0.75 per cent of the tax value with a ceiling of 7,812 kronor. 22 22 per cent. 7 [13]  The macroprudential policy measures have had the intended effect I support the measures taken by Finansinspektionen to manage the risks inherent in household indebtedness. Amortising mortgages is not unusual internationally. After all, a mortgage is a loan and should therefore be repaid. Sweden has previously stood out in international comparisons concerning amortisation culture and the high proportion of interest-only loans. 23 It is therefore reasonable that Finansinspektionen has introduced amortisation requirements. The amortisation requirements have, however, come in for some criticism. One of the arguments is that first-time buyers without high incomes and wealth are excluded from the market, which ultimately also affects new construction and the construction sector. Naturally, it is correct that the macroprudential policy measures affect the borrowing potential of mortgage borrowers. But this is also part of the actual point of the measures. All other factors being equal, amortisation requirements must also have a restraining effect on the development of prices.
The true value of the bond portfolio will, at the very latest, be realised when the loans are repaid. More than 90 percent of the fixed income portfolio is rated A or better. Even though rating agencies do not always prove to have the best evaluations, this still illustrates our conservative investment strategy. The Fund is a long-term savings plan and capable of riding out large swings in the markets. This is the very foundation of the investment strategy with its high allocation to equities. Our ability to adhere to this strategy in a critical phase – even if this should persist for some time – is crucial if the Fund is to deliver the returns we expect in the longer term. We need to attach importance to the real value of equity investments and safeguard assets by spreading the Fund’s investments. Norges Bank therefore supports the strategy that the government has chosen for the Fund. Under the Fund’s strategy, more equities will be bought when equity prices fall and fewer when they rise. The Fund therefore purchased a large volume of equities from 2001 to 2003 and is buying a considerable volume now. Of the equities now owned by the Fund, 40 per cent were purchased last year when prices were moving down. As a result, ownership in the business sector in the US, Europe and Asia has increased – in companies’ human capital, in their machinery and equipment, brands and organisation.

The senior management of the Central Bank protested vehemently against the separation, and I would like to quote from a letter on the topic, sent by the Board of Governors to the then Minister of Commerce in early 1998: “The Board of Governors is of the opinion that there are overwhelming arguments in favour of the Central Bank’s continued supervision of the activities of deposit institutions, other credit institutions, and securities market entities. The Board of Governors wishes to emphasise in particular that such supervision is a normal and appropriate part of the Central Bank’s activities. This supervisory role benefits just as much from its partnership with the Central Bank as various other Bank activities do from partnering with banking supervision.” If there is any single factor that foreign experts have identified as the main cause of the 2008 financial crisis, it is the fact that responsibility for and supervision of the financial system were spread across a large number of ministries and institutions, with the result that no single party had an all-encompassing overview, no single party was actually accountable, no single party had adequate power, and no single party had enough muscle to intervene. Actually, in other countries where financial supervision had previously been hived off from the central bank, the two functions were reunited after the 2008 crisis. The Ministry of Commerce was united with the Ministry of Finance for the same reason: to enhance the punching power of financial and economic administration.
DIE ZEIT: Last week the French secretary of state for European Affairs said in an interview that the Eurogroup - the 13 Finance ministers of the euro area - should be allowed to influence the ECB decisions. You reacted sharply. Trichet: I made the point that what was said was contrary to what the Treaty very explicitly says. BIS Review 85/2007  1  DIE ZEIT: The French intend to strengthen the political influence of the Eurogroup as a counter-weight to the ECB. That makes sense. Each other currency area in the world has one central bank and one Treasury. Trichet: It's a cliché that France is always heading towards a loose monetary policy. Since the creation of the Franc after the revolution, the monetary policy had the very strong tradition of a currency keeping well its value over time. Only during two periods of a little more than ten years over two centuries - after the Second World War up to De Gaulle became President and in the Seventies - the French monetary policy has been loose, but it is not the French culture. From 1994 up to the implementation of euro in 1999, we achieved a lower inflation rate than the Bundesbank. And we were supported by the French people. DIE ZEIT: But today the French government wants a co-ordination between the Eurogroup and the ECB. Trichet: The Treaty organises the relationship between the central bank and the executive branches extremely well.

In addition, for those who opt for deeper information and knowledge, our website provides didactic tools to better understand aspects of economy and finance which affect the life of all citizens, like: what is economic growth; labour market, circulating flow, how do financial crises spread; what is competition, etc. Also, the elective module “Personal Finance in Your Hands", from some years now integrated in the high school teaching curricula, introduces to students the world of personal finance, informs and shape their needed skill to manage money in a more profitable way. This textbook is supplied and allocated for free to all high schools which elect to study it. It is accompanied with a guideline to teachers of economy subject. A similar approach has been adopted for younger children. Hence, the teaching package tailored for the financial education of pupils in class I, II and III of secondary schools, addresses issues, as: the difference between needs and desires; where does money come from and for what does it serve; the right management of money and savings, etc. This package may be used in free classes; classes dedicated to school projects; or in intra-subject projects. All that I mentioned above, makes clear that the Bank of Albania assesses that financial education should start at an early age. This affirmative sentence constitutes the philosophy of our programmes. The Bank of Albania aims at building up the communication bridges, awarenessraising and financial knowledge empowering to the new generation.
As a result of keen competition for loan customers, excessive optimism and problems in distinguishing between sound and unsound projects, risk may be underestimated during upturns. The labour market has few available resources. Registered unemployment has remained steady at about 2½ per cent since the beginning of 1998. Long-term unemployment is low, and spells of unemployment are generally brief. Unemployment has edged up in the last few months, primarily in Eastern Norway, while employment growth has been limited. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on 11 September last year, the aviation and travel industries reported job cuts. Cutbacks have also been announced in the process industry. The guidelines for fiscal policy will stimulate activity because petroleum revenues will now be phased into the economy. According to the Government’s estimate, the guidelines imply an average increase in the use of petroleum revenues in the central government budget of about 0.4 per cent of mainland GDP each year from 2002 to 2010. The government budget that was approved for 2002 implies that the use of petroleum revenues will increase by 0.6 per cent of mainland GDP from 2001 to 2002. The guidelines for fiscal policy imply a substantial stimulus each year. The expansionary impetus varies considerably, and is greatest in the first few years. However, an unpredictable and more expansionary fiscal policy than that implied by the guidelines would have resulted in greater uncertainty. The guidelines provide a stable framework that contributes to reducing some of the uncertainty.

Over time, the size of the internationally exposed sector will be affected by the portion of petroleum revenues that is absorbed by the Norwegian economy but will be unaffected by monetary policy. Any  2  BIS Review 8/2002  appreciation of the krone may, nevertheless, affect the speed at which changes occur in the business sector. To maintain a balance in the Norwegian economy, the phasing in of petroleum revenues must be countered by a monetary policy stance that is tighter than it would otherwise have been. This may be accomplished through a higher interest rate, an appreciation of the krone, or both. On balance, we expect moderate growth in the mainland economy in the next two years. The projections for GDP growth that were presented in the October 2001 Inflation Report were approximately on a par with the growth potential of the economy. Household consumption and public spending are the main forces underpinning growth. Fixed investment and exports are restraining growth. Brisk growth in consumption is resulting in high demand for labour in public and private services. Low international growth and lower petroleum investment are curbing employment growth. A tight labour market is generating continued high growth in labour costs. An expansionary fiscal policy, growth in private consumption and a continued high rise in labour costs contribute to a high rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. At the same time, we expect a temporary decline in prices for imported consumer goods.