samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Appearance before the Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation Committee (Congress of Deputies) on 18 May 2020. and Appearance before the Parliamentary Committee for the Social and Economic Reconstruction of Spain after COVID-19 (Congress of Deputies) on 23 June 2020  13  gains and, once more, will have to make more intensive use of new technologies to continue to cut their operating costs. Furthermore, there is room for some consolidation in the sector which will contribute to making banks and the system, as a whole, more resilient. Non-bank financial sector  Apart from its effect on the banking sector, this crisis is also having a considerable impact on the valuation of many financial assets, and on their volatility. Initially, there was a major stock market correction and a sharp increase in equity and bond volatility. Subsequently, following the reaction of global monetary and fiscal policies, stock markets began to recover and volatilities to decline. In fact, in both the United States and the euro area, some market valuation measures, such as P/E ratios, have returned to historical highs, potentially indicating a certain disconnect between the recent rapid and significant recovery in financial markets and the more moderate behaviour of macroeconomic data and the concerns over corporate sector weakness. In this respect, despite the slowdown in recent months in the rate of credit rating downgrades, following the sharp increase between March and May, the spreads on highyield corporate debt (i.e.

Higher provisioning and, especially, the non-recurring adjustment to goodwill, both as a result of the expected downturn in economic conditions on account of the pandemic, were the main causes of lower profits. The losses were concentrated at the two banks with the largest international presence but profits decreased by two thirds at the other banks. In any event, banks’ recurring business has only been affected modestly to date and this is being offset partly by an adjustment to operating expenses and, consequently, they continue to gain in efficiency. 11  Therefore, the price-to-book (P/B) ratio — which compares listed banks’ market capitalisation and their book value — contracted notably in Spain, as in other European countries, by declining to levels of around 0.4, although it subsequently recovered somewhat. 12  One way of illustrating the risks to financial stability posed by the current episode is through simulation exercises which assess prospectively banks’ resilience to adverse macroeconomic scenarios. Accordingly, the ECB conducted a so-called “vulnerability” analysis – to underline their limitations compared with the usual stress tests – in order to measure European banks’ resilience to the strains triggered by the coronavirus. The results published last July show some of the risks identified.7 Specifically, based on these results, the euro area banking sector overall is positioned to withstand pandemic-induced stress, although the reduction in banks’ solvency under the most adverse macroeconomic scenarios would be significant. Furthermore, the results of this exercise show significant heterogeneity across banks.
The Commission has set up a working group with EU authorities and industry to address the issues involved and to facilitate the transfer of derivatives contracts denominated in euro or other EU currencies to EU CCPs. From a supervisory perspective, UK CCPs have been recognised as third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).3 And two UK CCPs have been recognised as being systemically important for the EU (Tier 2 CCPs). In line with the provisions of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation, this means that they are subject to ESMA’s supervision. This set-up helps to ensure that Tier 2 CCPs comply with EU regulatory standards. During this 18-month period of equivalence, ESMA will assess whether this set-up is sufficient to address risks to EU financial stability emanating from these two systemically important UK CCPs. As part of its responsibility for issuing the euro, the Eurosystem – which comprises the ECB and national central banks of the euro area – will develop its own stance on the matter and will contribute to ESMA’s assessment. At the end of this process, ESMA may recommend that the Commission deny the UK CCPs recognition to provide certain clearing services or activities in the EU if they pose excessive risks to financial stability. If this recommendation were to affect eurodenominated clearing services, the Eurosystem’s agreement would also be required.

Some CCPs are systemically relevant for multiple jurisdictions in view of the direct and indirect clients they serve worldwide and their interconnectedness with systemically important global banks. We have seen progress in making global CCPs safer and more resilient, starting with the safeguards introduced to address the shortcomings that the global financial crisis revealed. Today, clearing risks are much lower than they were ten years ago. And the robustness that CCPs have displayed since the outbreak of the pandemic shows that regulatory efforts are paying off. We should, however, continue to strengthen the resilience of CCPs. Last March we saw spikes in volatility and trading activity, coupled with a surge in liquidity and credit risk at the global level. Such situations call for closer cross-border regulatory, supervisory and oversight cooperation between CCPs, banks and public authorities. To prevent market fragmentation and preserve financial stability, both domestically and internationally, in the face of such adverse shocks, CCPs must meet the highest standards of financial and operational risk management. And an enhanced dialogue is necessary between CCPs, clearing banks and clients to ensure that, while managing their risks prudently, they each consider the impact that their actions may have on others and on the entire financial system. Central clearing is critical for sharing and managing risks effectively, and thus for supporting economic growth. Euro-denominated central clearing must not be a source of instability in the euro area or hamper the transmission of monetary policy.
Developments in the economy  As is already known, the Sri Lankan economy achieved a growth of 8 per cent in the first half of 2006, and a growth of 7.5 per cent in the third quarter of 2006, Overall, it is very likely that the economy would have grown at over 7 per cent in 2006. These values are laudable because they have been achieved in the face of several major challenges, particularly high international oil prices and an escalation of security concerns during the year. Notwithstanding such challenges, all major sectors of the economy grew at healthy rates. The Agriculture sector continued its expansion with growth recorded in all sub sectors, except tea. Remarkable growth in rubber and coconut, fast recovery in the fish production, record harvests of paddy in the Maha season 2005/2006, supported the growth in the agricultural sector. The Industry sector continued to grow, benefiting from the rapid global economic growth and strong domestic demand. Weather, favourable to hydropower generation, also contributed to the substantial growth in this sector. The Services sector growth was dominated by the telecommunication services, port services, domestic and international trade, and financial services. Figure 1: GDP Growth and Sectoral Contribution to Growth 10 8 Per cent  6 4 2 0 -2 -4 2001  2002  2003  Agriculture Services  2004  2005  2006 F  Industry GDP Growth  At the same time however, inflation began to increase since April 2006 due to rising demand pressures in the economy.

Encik Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: ASEAN - advancing its potential, hurdles and the way forward Closing remarks by Mr Encik Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 4 August 2017. * * * Thank you for having me here today to deliver the closing remarks for the ASEAN@50 Conference. I am also honoured that you have chosen Sasana Kijang to be your meeting point for this Conference. I’m sure that all of you have greatly benefited from the two thought-provoking panel discussions earlier, that drilled down the measures required for ASEAN to achieve its economic promise. ASEAN proudly welcomes its golden jubilee next week. This momentous occasion not only celebrates our achievements thus far, but also marks the gravity of the work ahead of us. We will continue to galvanise all sectors of society – public, private and civil – to ensure ASEAN’s achievements are not just reflected on paper, but more importantly, can be seen, felt and heard. ASEAN stands out as a dynamic region – with diverse strengths that continues to benefit its growing population of 625 million people. In 2015, ASEAN contributed to more than 7 percent of world exports. Our strong trade performance has contributed to increased employment by about 70 million over the past 17 years – enabling better livelihoods of households. Millions have been lifted out of poverty with the significant rise of ASEAN’s GDP per capita, from USD1,054 in 1996 to USD4,000 in 2016.
From the European and Spanish standpoint, this represents a major negative shock to our international purchasing power. In other words, a relative impoverishment has taken place, on top of the price rises in some of these commodities – particularly energy commodities – that had already been observed before the invasion. In addition to a possible decline in the production of some of these goods as a direct consequence of the fighting, there could also be deliberate supply cuts, which would clearly have an even greater impact on prices and economic activity. Against this backdrop, Europe has formally announced its intention to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, but clearly this is not something that can be achieved in the short term. ii. Trade. In addition to the impact from commodities prices, the conflict will also disrupt trade in all other goods and services, not only as a result of the economic sanctions but also because of the expected deterioration in the Russian and Ukrainian economies. In this respect, Europe’s direct trade exposure to Russia is relatively low, being larger in the case of the central and eastern European economies and smaller in the others, including Spain.2 Nevertheless, the indirect effects may also be considerable. The complexity of global supply chains means that the impact on  1  Russia accounted for some 20% of total euro area oil imports and some 35% of total euro area gas imports in 2020.

15.03.2022  The economic setting following the invasion of Ukraine and the economic policy response Working breakfast with the business sector organised by Hill & Knowlton Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good morning. I wish to begin by thanking the organisers for this invitation, allowing me to share some thoughts on the current economic situation. An economic setting which, two years on from the onset of the pandemic, is now feeling the brunt of yet another extraordinary shock with potentially extremely negative effects for the world economy. Naturally I am referring to the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army 20 days ago. In addition to the extraordinary human drama this poses for the people of Ukraine, the consequences of the invasion, albeit difficult to predict, will foreseeably be global and extremely severe, for both the geopolitical and the economic situation. I will now analyse some of these possible consequences and the most appropriate economic policy response. The economic situation prior to the invasion My starting point for this analysis has to be that, after the strong decline observed in 2020 as a consequence of the pandemic, before the Russian army invaded Ukraine the global economy was on a gradual recovery path, albeit one that was uneven by geographical area, economic sector and population group. Thus, while some economies had managed to reach and even exceed their pre-crisis activity levels by the end of 2021, others continued to suffer from an economic activity gap.
Page 1  What did the monetarists ever do for us? − speech by Huw Pill Given at Walter Eucken Institut / Stifung Geld und Währung Conference – Inflation and Debt: Challenges for Monetary Policy after Covid-19  Page 2  Published on 24 June 2022  Huw Pill talks about the challenges for monetary policy after Covid. Speech Good afternoon everyone. It is a great pleasure to be here in Freiburg to attend this excellent and topical conference. My thanks are due to the organisers, especially Professors Feld, Krause and Moellers, and to the sponsoring institutions, the Stiftung Geld and Waehrung and the Walter Eucken Institut, for their invitation and hospitality. I am tempted to start my remarks with the phrase: ‘And now for something completely different …’. In part, this is intended to signal a change of pace. After a series of outstanding presentations of very high quality research papers, I am afraid that I will lower the tone somewhat by bringing more of a policy orientation to the discussion. But it is also a nod to the Pythonesque title assigned to my remarks. I understand that Monty Python was (and is) very popular in Germany. But to avoid any misunderstanding, I thought I should clarify from the outset that the title is an allusion to a famous sketch from one of the Money Python films.

The text has also benefitted from helpful comments from Andrew Bailey, Ben Broadbent, Alan Castle, Jonathan Haskel, Andrew Hauser, Nick McLaren, Fergal Shortall, Dave Ramsden, Silvana Tenreyro, Daniel Walker and Chris Yeates, for which I am most grateful. Opinions (and all remaining errors and omissions) are my own. References Bailey, A., J. Bridges, R. Harrison, J. Jones and A. Mankodi (2020). ‘The central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: Past, present and future,’ Bank of England staff working paper no. 899. Bernanke, B.S. (2003). ‘"Constrained discretion" and monetary policy,’ Speech to the Money Marketeers of New York University, 3 February. Bernanke, B.S. (2004). ‘The great moderation,’ Remarks at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington DC, 20 February 2004. Brunner, K. and A. Meltzer (1988). ‘Money and credit in the monetary transmission process,’ American Economic Review, Vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 446-51. Busetto, F., M. Chavaz, M. Froemel, M. Joyce, I. Kaminska and J. Worlidge (2022). ‘QE at the Bank of England: A perspective on its functioning and effectiveness,’ Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q1. Cagan, P. (1956). ‘The monetary dynamics of hyperinflation,’ in M. Friedman (ed.) Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, University of Chicago Press, pp. 25-117. Cloyne, J., R. Thomas, A. Tuckett and S. Wills (2015). ‘An empirical sectoral model of unconventional monetary policy: The impact of QE,’ The Manchester School, Vol. 83, no. S1, pp. 51-82. Czech, R., B. Gual-Ricart, J. Lillis and J. Worlidge (2021).
We now expect the economy to grow between 0.5-1% this year. But we believe that in the short-term recovery will still be less vigorous, compared to previous cycles. This reflects the continuing restructuring in the Singapore economy, particularly in low-end manufacturing. However, both the manufacturing and services sectors appear poised to ride the recovery and next year we expect GDP growth to pick up to 3-5%. 1  Source: Asian Development Bank. 2  The Business Times, 30 Oct 2003 “KL’s growth will average 6% in 2004-05: Mahathir”. 3  The Business Times, 24 Oct 2003 “Global economy bouncing back, says IMF”. 4  The Business Times, 5 Sep 2003 “East Asia will be fastest with 6.1% growth in 2003”. In the financial services sector, stock market activity reached record levels, with fund management and corporate finance activity also growing strongly. Following several negative quarters, the financial sector started growing again in the second and third quarters. As a result, growth in the first three quarters of this year averaged about 2.5%. The sector should register moderate growth for the rest of the year, and strengthen further into 2004. Prospects for Singapore’s financial centre What does the improved economic and financial outlook mean for Singapore’s financial sector? Back in 1998, when the Financial Sector Review Group was developing strategies for growing the financial sector, we thought that Singapore could become an international financial centre for certain activities, like London. For example, we were already the fourth largest FX centre in the world.

But when ambitious reform programmes are adopted and implemented, that is what happens! These countries are on the road to recovery. The markets have been quite calm so far. But what if the situation worsens? Their reaction also shows the resilience of the euro area to external shocks. The safety nets that have been put in place in recent years are playing their part. I’m referring to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the banking union and the different European Central Bank programmes. But we must be vigilant. The ECB clearly stated on Sunday that it was monitoring economic and market developments closely. Should risks arise, we are ready to use the instruments we have at our disposal – quantitative easing and the OMT programme – and we are even ready to use new instruments within our mandate. What could these new instruments be? The Governing Council of the ECB is monitoring the situation in real time. We have already said that we are ready to do more in terms of monetary policy, if necessary. Until now, the ECB has always found answers to crises, within its mandate. The Court of Justice of the European Union has validated the OMT programme that was put in place in 2012 [a bondbuying programme for countries receiving financial assistance, which has not yet been used, ed.]. It was the Court’s judgment that the ECB should be allowed broad discretion when choosing its instruments.
That is why financial reform will have to go hand in hand with fiscal reform. Fiscal reform will reinforce confidence. In the current situation, we have to – and we do – stand firm on these principles. Speculation on more and more elevated sovereign risk has been one factor behind spreads being driven to very high levels. This is why it was very important that the heads of state and government declared on 11 February 2010 that they were ready to “take determined and coordinated action, if needed, to safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a whole”. I said, on behalf of the ECB, that I approved of this important statement. In this respect let me stress the following: Loans are not transfers, and loans come at a cost. They come not only at a financial cost; they also come with a strict conditionality. This conditionality needs to give assurance to lenders, not only that they will be repaid but also that the borrower will be able to stand on its own feet over a multi-year horizon. In the case of Greece, this will require courageous, recognisable and specific actions by the Greek government that will lastingly and credibly consolidate the public budget. Other countries in the Union and elsewhere have gone through times that were no less difficult, and they have emerged from a determined adjustment stronger and more competitive than in the past. These countries have demonstrated that a clear U-turn in national policy governance is achievable.

This was perhaps the response to rising income inequality, as emphasized by Rajan (2010), and the lack of other policies to correct this problem in a fast and efficient way. Ironically, the crisis affected more intensely precisely those that were supposed to benefit from “financial inclusion.” There are many other cases in which well intentioned developments are implemented through weak policies. Take the case of interest rate ceilings. In order to promote fairness, many countries introduce limits on the interest rate on loans. This policy attempts principally to protect people with disadvantages and allow them to participate in the financial system. If this ceiling is set low enough, it may end up generating exclusion rather than lower financial costs for households, who may end up paying much higher interest rates in informal credit markets. This is not the place to analyze all the causes and culprits of the crisis, but it is worth discussing certain aspects that are frequently singled out by the general public. First and foremost, the crisis was caused by the irresponsible behavior of the financial industry. The structure of incentives was unsuitable. It led to excessive risk-taking without proper risk management. Compensation was heavily biased towards deal-making, regardless of the quality of the deals. Commissions and fees were a very important component of the compensation scheme. In the end, all that mattered was granting credit indiscriminately, maximizing packaging and selling securities, etc. This was at the foundation of the originate-and-distribute model of financial services, and served to increase leverage to unsustainable levels.
But what on earth are we doing not only tolerating but effectively encouraging a financial system in which asset managers and banks can’t always understand their portfolios? It is therefore vital that, together with the Basel Supervisors Committee, securities regulators around the world actively implement the FSB’s Principles for reducing mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings.14 In the US, the SEC is embarked on that. But I worry that others, including prudential supervisors, might not grapple with this admittedly difficult exercise in a determined way. The enhanced (meaning better not longer) disclosure by issuers I discussed earlier could make the standard-setters’ task somewhat less difficult. Infrastructure One of the wonderful things about capitalism is innovation. It helps to drive technical progress and higher-living standards. Open economies allow those innovations to spread across the world. Freely flowing capital is essential for this to work in my view. But innovations can take a nasty turn in financial markets when they outgrow their supporting infrastructure. This is an area where the authorities can do good, because there is often a collective action problem. For example, the recent crisis would have been much worse if the authorities, led by the New York Fed, had not “asked” the dealer and fund community to clean up the problem of assignments in credit-default-swap markets in the early years of the last decade. But we need to remember to be ready to step in. The OTC derivative markets are an example where the authorities have had to chase after events.

In 2017, the TCFD published its recommendations in terms of reporting. These guidelines take into account the double materiality of climate matters: both the information on the exposure of the company to climate change, and the information on the impact of the company on climate must be considered significant. Nonetheless, more progress is necessary concerning climate disclosure. A first step is the shift from ‘voluntary’ to ‘mandatory’ reporting. On June 7, G7 nations came to an agreement to make climate-reporting mandatory in line with TCFD recommendations. Mandatory requirements have been enforced in the EU since 2014, and will be extended to a larger set of corporates when the Corporate sustainability reporting directive (CSRD) will enter into force (expected to apply as of October 2022). It will also be completed by the development of a comprehensive set of EU sustainability reporting standards. The first set of standards would be adopted by October 2022. We expect that the international standards to be developed by the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) will ensure interoperability with regional standards and offer common building blocks across jurisdictions and sectors. ***** Let me conclude in highlighting that we are just at the starting point of what we can do with and what we draw from those scenario analyses. Further collective work is needed to improve them. I have no doubt that we will succeed in doing so. Financial institutions need to step up their  effort to combat climate changes.