samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The direct effect of the global downturn on overall growth in the Norwegian economy has so far been limited. This is partly attributable to high oil prices and the high level of activity in the oil sector. However, as a result of the interest rate differential and the strong krone, the global downturn will have a substantial impact on Norwegian business and industry. The government’s use of petroleum revenues or expectations of increased spending of petroleum revenues may have contributed to sustaining activity and the strong krone. Increased use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget is stimulating demand for goods and services. This will intensify the contest for economic resources and pressures in the business sector. Mainland GDP in 2002 Percentage change. Projections published at different points in time 2.5  2.5  2  2  1.5  1.5  1  1  0.5  0.5  0  0 Nov 00  Mar 01  Jul 01  Nov 01  Mar 02  Jul 02  Nov 02  Source: Norges Bank SG Gausdal 31.01.03  The exchange rate may move more in the short term than is necessary in the long term. One reason may be that the krone has to overshoot its long-term level since market participants will weigh the interest rate differential against the possibility of a future depreciation of the krone.

Many of you will know that similar changes are taking place globally in AML/CFT; technology is providing practical solutions that are being applied in the real world. So what’s holding some of us back? Should we be afraid to experiment, to change the way we are doing AML work? 13. Let me be very clear about one thing: the risk for all of us is being complacent, of carrying on as we have been and not confronting the barriers that may stand between us and progress. We should not be afraid of trying out solutions that we feel will have genuine impact, even if some turn out not to deliver everything they promise. 14. With that in mind, our focus in these two days is to bring banks, regulators, technologists and other important players within our AML/CFT eco-system together to challenge our thinking, tackle pain points and discuss how we can move further ahead. Working collaboratively with like-minded people, we need to be ambitious because this is just as much about the human element, the impact of global financial crime, as it is about compliance with AML/CFT requirements. 15. We want to help enable change in banks because we recognise that, the better banks are able to apply a data driven, technology-enabled approach to AML work, the better we are able to discharge our role and achieve the HKMA’s statutory objectives. 16.
Similar to other country experiences, in Turkey as well, the positive effects of falling inflation on investments are retarded relative to other effects such as rise in consumption. That is because it takes time for the firms to be convinced that the downward trend in inflation will continue and will be permanent and to make decisions for new investments. Therefore, under falling inflation conditions, it is natural for the firms to tend not to make as much investments as they actually can. In Turkey, despite the economic recovery has a history of three years, investments have just started to increase in the last few months. This is an outcome of the fact that confidence has recently been established that decline in inflation and achievements in inflationary expectations as well as stability established in economy will be lasting. Consequently, while increase in investment demand is an outcome of the falling inflation, sustainability of this increase depends on attaining price stability. Distinguished guests, The second change that came along with the decline in inflation is that as a result of the ease in uncertainties, economic agents were able to foresee longer periods and financial intermediation activities became more active. Within this framework, when we look back to the chronic inflation period, we regret to see that high inflation has led to chronic budget deficits and very high interest rates; caused deterioration in wealth transfer mechanism and forced banking sector to finance the public deficits.

Moreover, these economic agents tend to put the blame on the falling inflation for the worsening of their situation. These economic agents that fail to harmonize with this new process are the ones who resist the most to the fight against inflation. This adaptation problem also prevents these economic agents from seeing the advantages offered by price stability. In this context, the most important development in fight against inflation is that credibility of current policies have improved, whereas the inflation target has increasingly become a more credible nominal anchor for a majority of the economic agents in Turkey. In other words, the inflation target was taken as a reference more extensively. Further developments will facilitate the adaptation of economy to changing dynamics and support maintenance of the price stability as well. Distinguished guests, Before discussing the effects of the falling inflation on economy, let me elaborate the importance of price stability for economies. As we all know, the primary objective of economic policies is to provide sustainable growth and to increase employment throughout the country. The role of monetary policies has been misunderstood for a long time. This wrong assumption is that the increase in inflation and growth are parallel to each other and growth rates can be accelerated by loosening the monetary policy. Frankly speaking, in the framework of early economics literature, this assumption can only be verified in the short term, in countries where inflation rates are low and there is no credibility gap in monetary policies.
Figure 12 Activity gap (1) (2)  Current account: Savings and investment (3)  (level, percentage points)  (percent of annual GDP)  8 Jun.22 MP Report  Sep.22 MP Report  4  32  0  24  -4  16  -8  8  -12  0  -16  -8 19  20  21  22  23  24  External savings Private savings Investment  13  15  Government savings National savings Current account  17  19  21  23(f)  (1) Dotted lines represent forecasts. (2) Projection uses structural parameters updated in June 2021 MP Report (trend) with methodological revision of potential GDP. (3) The government savings component takes as effective data up until 2021 the general government balance sheet; for 2022 to 2024, government savings in the central government balance sheet is used as a projection. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

In the local financial market, the exchange rate, interest rates, and the risk premium have shown greater volatility than is observed in other economies. Worth noting is the peso/dollar parity, which by mid-July experienced unusually high swings, with a marked divergence from its external determinants, causing distortions in the functioning of the markets and leading the Central Bank to announce an intervention program (box I.2). Upon said announcement tensions in the price formation process in the foreign exchange market eased, with a decrease in volatility and in the exchange rate. Compared to the statistical close of the June Report, the peso depreciated in both nominal and real terms (figure 10). Projections The central scenario does not consider a specific effect of the plebiscite outcome on the economy. It does assume that uncertainty will gradually subside in the coming quarters, in the midst of a process where institutional changes continue, allowing institutions and the economy to function properly. 4  In the central scenario, headline inflation is estimated to be near its peak for this cycle, which it is still expected to occur in the third quarter of this year. In the coming months, prices will begin to slow down the pace of increases compared to previous months, so that annual inflation will begin to gradually decline. Inflation projection for the end of 2022 and all throughout 2023 is revised upwards with respect to our last Report, due to the additional depreciation of the peso and more persistent inflation.
Against this backdrop, we expect GDP growth of 2.5% to 3% for 2021. The recovery thus remains incomplete. Unemployment is likely to rise again, and production factors will remain underutilised for some time yet. The forecast for Switzerland, as for the global economy, is subject to high uncertainty. Monetary policy’s contribution to crisis management and outlook  Prices will decline this year as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, and economic output will be lower than in 2019. Production capacity is likely to still be underutilised next year, with inflation still at 0.0%. An expansionary monetary policy therefore continues to be necessary for crisis management. Our monetary policy contributes to crisis management via three channels. First, we provide favourable financing conditions for Swiss businesses and the public sector via the low level of interest rates. This eases the burden on those companies and institutions that face increased funding needs as a result of the crisis. Second, the negative interest rate and our foreign exchange market interventions counter the upward pressure on the Swiss franc. This pressure is especially high in periods of uncertainty, and a strong appreciation would weigh particularly heavily on the economy in the crisis. We have therefore made considerable foreign exchange purchases this year to maintain appropriate monetary conditions. Third, we are making additional liquidity available to banks via the CRF, allowing them to refinance the COVID-19 loans they grant and to do so at an interest rate of −0.75%.

This is something on which individual banks will have to take a view, but I would like to offer some general advice. First, banks should accept that profits for 2003 may not reach budgetted targets as a result of the outbreak; and they should not strain too much to make up the difference. When profitability comes under pressure, it is important to avoid the mistakes that might arise from over-aggressive business tactics. Keep the bank healthy from a capital and liquidity point of view in order to benefit from the business recovery when it comes, as it surely will. Banks should also monitor closely the financial position of their customers and adopt a supportive attitude to those experiencing financial difficulties as a result of the SARS outbreak. This means being prepared to offer temporary relief arrangements to borrowers who find that they cannot service their debts in the current environment. This should not be seen as soft option for customers since the banks will certainly not benefit if those customers go bankrupt. Nor do I suggest that relief should be offered indiscriminately. The long-term viability of the customer or his business, his track record and his willingness to cooperate with the bank are all factors to be taken into account in deciding whether to restructure debts. Each case thus needs to be looked at on its merits.
In the few cases where counterparties have defaulted, for instance in the case of a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers, the Eurosystem was able to fully cover its exposure by seizing the posted collateral. At the same time, the collateral framework ensured that banks were able to obtain sufficient amounts of central bank liquidity throughout the crisis. This became most visible in the context of the two Very Long Term Refinancing Operations that the ECB conducted in 2011 and 2012. In these operations banks obtained collateralised central bank liquidity in the order of EUR 524 billion within only 10 weeks. This basic set-up of the collateral framework has remained the same since the beginning of monetary union; the three constituent parts of the Eurosystem collateral framework, i.e. (i) the counterparty framework, (ii) the basic eligibility criteria for underlying assets and (iii) the risk control measures, have remained largely unchanged. The Eurosystem maintains a broad counterparty framework and its eligibility criteria are still based on the same principles as at the beginning. This shows that the design of the Eurosystem collateral framework is in general very robust. However, some changes were necessary to guarantee a smooth implementation of monetary policy at times of financial market stress that led to a general reduction in access to market funding.

Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, for the Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 17 November 2014. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Honourable Members of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to be back again in this committee for the last hearing of 2014. This year has once again been a year of profound change for the euro area and for the Union as a whole. It was a year of legislative and institutional progress on many fronts, as 2014 saw the birth of banking union with the agreement of the Single Resolution Mechanism, the start of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the successful conclusion of the comprehensive assessment of banks’ balance sheets. And it was indeed a challenging year for monetary policy, which saw the ECB take a wide range of measures to respond to the risks emanating from an increasingly sobering economic outlook. You have chosen two topics for today’s hearing, the relationship of financial fragmentation and monetary policy as well as the Eurosystem’s collateral framework. I will touch on both these issues, but let me first run you through our current assessment of the economic outlook. Economic and monetary developments The euro area growth momentum has weakened over the summer months and most recent forecasts have been revised downwards.
If, on the other hand, we understand political union as the establishment of an entity that resembles the traditional nation state, the European Union may still have some way to go, if indeed this is the direction that Europeans want to take. Today’s Union is not a European Federation, for example, or a United States of Europe, with a constitution and a single executive. The euro marks the achievement of full integration in the monetary field. In purely functional terms, it is therefore an end point, rather than an intermediate step. However, with the euro, we now form a “Schicksalsgemeinschaft”, a community with a shared future. Our economies are linked, and so our policy decisions have become a matter of concern for all. We have a legitimate interest in developments and political actions in other euro area countries, since we are affected by them - for better or for worse. If I may use a “domestic” metaphor, the marriage in which the euro has joined our countries is about more than just living under the same roof, it is about sharing a common vision and about managing life together. Concluding remarks In the context of the current attempts to help the European Union work smoothly and on a sustainable basis following its future enlargement, I would like to conclude by mentioning the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The process of European integration has delivered half a century of stability, peace and prosperity.

Willem F Duisenberg: Maastricht and the future of Europe Speech by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the presentation of a stamp commemorating the ten-year anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty, Bundesfinanzministerium, Berlin, 22 October 2003. *  *  *  Dr Eichel, Dr Genscher, Dr Waigel, Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great honour for me to make one of my final public appearances as President of the European Central Bank on the occasion of the launch of a “Sonderpostwertzeichen” - a special stamp - to commemorate the Treaty on European Union, better known as the Maastricht Treaty. It is not as a Dutchman that I consider this Treaty to be one of the most important milestones of the European integration process, but as a truly convinced European. Together with the Governing Council of the ECB, I have been responsible for managing the single monetary policy and the single currency of the euro area, and I will not deny that my job has been inextricably linked to the wider historical process of building an “ever closer union” of the peoples of Europe. In this respect, I consider that the Maastricht Treaty embodies the most decisive impulse in the deepening of the European Communities established in the 1950s and strengthened by the Treaty of Rome. The move to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was a profoundly political act - despite the fact that the underlying rationale was predominantly economic, namely that a single market requires a single currency.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Capital requirement tools, including changes in leverage ratio requirements, imposition of a countercyclical capital buffer, and higher differential capital requirements for commercial real estate exposures;  •  Liquidity tools, such as changes in the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio;  •  Credit-based tools, such as limits on loan to value ratios;  •  Supervisory guidance; and  •  Stress testing. Monetary policy was also considered as a tool – either as a complement or as a substitute. It was noteworthy that in the discussion there was no agreement as to what instruments should be emphasized and the ordering in which they should be used relative to monetary policy. Among the available macroprudential tools, stress testing, raising margins on repo funding, and supervisory guidance garnered greater support compared to capital, liquidity, or credit-based tools. In general, the exercise identified several issues with respect to the use of macroprudential tools. One issue was the perceived difficulty of coordinating among different regulators. Another was the fact that many of the tools have implementation lags. The challenge of timely implementation steered some members back to using monetary policy, or toward those macroprudential tools – such as stress tests – that might be able to be implemented more quickly. The exercise underscored that much more development work in the area of macroprudential regulation is needed. Let me now turn to the issue of ex ante, hardwired macroprudential standards that Adam has discussed.

The availability and quality of genuine euro area statistics – i.e. those which are more than just the sum of the national data of the Member States – has improved very substantially over the last ten years. Most notably, the ECB and Eurostat now regularly and jointly release quarterly real and financial euro area accounts that are both integrated and comprehensive. And yet, I would strongly favour an improvement in the timeliness of such releases, which would then be even more useful for the ECB’s monetary policy-making. The credibility of euro area and relevant national statistics is of key importance to the ECB, and this also requires that such statistics be effectively communicated. This applies in particular to the HICP. In view of the importance to the ECB of euro area monetary, financial and external statistics, the Governing Council has endorsed a strategic vision that should further increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the compilation of these statistics by the Eurosystem. This entails even more intensive cooperation not only among the statistics departments of the NCBs and the ECB, but also between those departments and external parties such as statistical institutes, supervisors and the financial industry. I hope that the gains resulting from these synergies will then be used to close some of those gaps in the ECB’s statistics that I mentioned earlier and to improve market transparency as regards the issues that have come to the fore in the ongoing financial turmoil.
Moreover, our analysis shows that the cumulative income generated over the period in which the balance sheet has been unusually large is likely to exceed normal levels under a wide range of scenarios. In my view, while the costs are real and need to be carefully evaluated, they pale relative to the costs of not achieving a sustainable economic recovery. A failure in that regard would lead to widespread chronic unemployment. Not only would that be tragic for millions of people, but it also would generate chronic shortfalls in the nation’s potential output and fiscal capacity. Relative to the costs outlined above, the benefits from avoiding such an outcome seem overwhelming. Cyclical and structural policy Although I favor an aggressive monetary policy in the current situation, I also recognize that monetary policy is not a panacea. We all know that in the long run money is neutral – that is, that while monetary policy can help the economy return to full employment following a shock, the full employment level of output, employment and real income depends on factors outside of monetary policy. Also, we must recognize that the strength of the current cyclical recovery will depend importantly on non-monetary policy choices. Other steps are needed to secure the best available economic outcome.

When the bust arrives, over-indebted households and businesses want to increase their saving and liquidity buffers, and financial intermediaries want to raise credit standards. Both responses restrain demand and make a cyclical rebound more difficult. In the U.S. case, because the bust was concentrated in housing, the scope for a strong cyclical recovery was particularly constrained because the interest-rate sensitive sector that would typically lead such a rebound could not recover until the overhang of unsold homes and the impairment of housing finances was corrected. The U.S. recovery has also been subpar because it has been taking place in the context of a weak global economy. Historically, after a country experienced a financial crisis, growing foreign demand and currency depreciation have often led to a sharp improvement in the trade account that has put a floor under economic activity. In such circumstances, rising exports substitute for domestic consumption in supporting aggregate demand. This demand, in turn, encourages businesses to hire and invest. In contrast, this time the shock generated by the U.S. housing bust had global consequences, exposing economic vulnerabilities outside of the United States, especially in Europe. Under these circumstances, the scope for trade as a support for U.S. growth, while positive, has been very limited. These two factors – the dynamics following financial crises and the weakness of foreign demand – help explain why U.S. growth has been weak, but I don’t think these factors explain why it has been consistently weaker than expected.