samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These measures proved to be nearly ineffective as they were easily circumvented. Today, in an environment of even more integrated markets, the result would be the same. Introducing such measures to combat an appreciation of the Swiss franc would thus be no solution. Consequently, the SNB would certainly be able to smooth excessive fluctuations in the exchange rate should doubts about the stability of the Euro lead to portfolio shifts into the Swiss franc. However, in the face of extreme capital inflows, we would most likely not be able to entirely insulate the domestic economy from harmful disturbances unless we were willing to jeopardize price stability in the long run. Therefore, Switzerland, like any other country in Europe, has every interest in a successful transition towards EMU and a stability-oriented monetary policy by the new ECB. Let me finish with some thoughts on the consequences of the introduction of the Euro on payments executed in Switzerland. Two cases have to be distinguished: payments related to domestic and payments related to cross-border transactions. As regards domestic transactions, there is no reason to expect that the Euro would to any considerable extent replace the Swiss franc as Switzerland’s main medium of exchange. The costs associated with using the Euro in domestic transactions will be and will remain higher than the ones associated with the Swiss franc. Historically, only in cases of extreme inflation have domestic currencies been replaced by foreign currencies as the main medium of exchange.

31.05.2018  “Banks’ traditional funding sources: opportunities for capital markets” Keynote address at 50th ICMA Annual Conference Javier Alonso Deputy Governor  Good afternoon. I would like to thank ICMA for its kind invitation to take part in this special day: ICMA’s 50th Annual General Meeting and Conference. It is a pleasure to be here and to speak to such a large audience of professionals from such varied backgrounds, representing, among others, issuers, intermediaries, investors, capital market infrastructure providers, regulators and supervisors. Capital markets being at the heart of this event, and banks being at the heart of my day to day work, what I would like to do in this speech is to highlight some developments related to banks’ funding sources that I think may offer new opportunities for capital markets. I would also like to briefly touch upon Brexit, an event that is generating great uncertainty and for which careful preparation is required. All of it, from my perspective as Deputy Governor of the Banco de España and as member of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which explains why my speech will be focused on developments in the European Union. New opportunities Let me start with what appear to me to be promising developments for reactivation of the markets. Firstly, the renewed political commitment reached at the Euro Summit on 15 December 2017 to press ahead with improvements to euro area governance provides new opportunities to accelerate progress in areas where developments so far have been somewhat sluggish.
Owing to financial stability in the banking sector, the key rate decrease has quickly and successfully translated into the easing of monetary conditions and supported the economy, 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  despite higher credit risks. Unlike the previous crisis periods, this year we have managed to prevent a contraction in lending. In addition to the key rate cuts, lending is also promoted by the regulatory easing and other measures implemented by the Bank of Russia. The preferential programmes launched by the Government are another important contributor to the easing of monetary conditions. In particular, preferential lending accounts for nearly one-fourth of new loans granted in recent months to small and medium-sized enterprises and about one-half of new mortgage loans. Nonetheless, the anti-crisis support measures implemented by the Government and the Bank of Russia will be gradually terminated. We also take into account that it is essential to maintain accommodative monetary conditions next year in order to stabilise inflation close to 4% over the forecast horizon. When making our decisions on the key rate, we also estimate how saving behaviour is adjusting to lower interest rates in the financial market. We are aware that in this case financial institutions, companies and households need time to adjust to the new conditions. This is especially relevant since the pandemic, declining incomes and higher uncertainty may dramatically alter consumption and saving models. Seeking higher returns, individuals are increasing demand for various instruments in the financial market.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Developing countries and international capital markets Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to economiesuisse, Zurich, 14 June 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  After having plummeted on the back of the Asian crisis, capital flows to developing countries have risen considerably again in the last three years. In 2005, they are likely to reach the approximate level at which they stood shortly before the Asian crisis. Capital flows are channelled mostly to a few emerging markets, notably China. China’s monetary order is currently undergoing profound changes, with the country gradually liberalising capital movements. The concept of the “impossible trinity”, which was developed by the Nobel Prize winner Robert Mundell, asserts that this will inevitably lead either to a loss in monetary autonomy or to a flexibilisation of the exchange rate regime. Both trends can be clearly observed: the pressure on the fixed exchange rate on the one hand, and the rapid expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates on the other. In the longer term, China’s monetary order will probably move towards floating exchange rates. This transition will hopefully be successful. As China’s monetary policy of gradual change has so far proved its worth, it is likely to serve as an example to other developing countries.
The MPC has set out forward guidance that it does not intend to tighten monetary policy at least until there is clear evidence of significant progress being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% inflation target sustainably. As time passes and the economy recovers the forward guidance will become more salient, providing reassurance that there is a high bar to any future tightening. Figure 9: February 2021 Monetary Policy Report GDP projection, based on market interest rate expectations £ bn, 2018 prices 640 Projection  620 600  580 ONS data  560 540 520 500 480 460  440 420 2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  2023  400 2024  Source: February 2021 Monetary Policy Report. Conclusion  In conclusion, my view as I have set out in this third Peter Sinclair Town Hall lecture, is that QE is a policy tool that has worked: it has proved its worth in the policy response to the Global Financial Crisis and more recently in the response to the ongoing Covid crisis. Over the past twelve years, QE has meant an expanded role for the central bank balance sheet as a key feature of what Peter termed “the new normal” for monetary policy. Of course, public scrutiny and debate about the role of QE is also valid – it is a relatively new tool about which we still have much to learn.

Figure 2: Bank of England QE programmes and selected policy interventions since 2009  Taken from the IEO’s report on its evaluation of QE. Figure 3: Bank of England balance sheet as a % of GDP  Source: Bank of England, available here. Dotted line extends series to end-2021, assuming completion of current asset purchase programme. All figures shown as a % of lagged GDP except 2021 figure which uses 2019 GDP to avoid distortions from the temporary Covid-related falls in 2020. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  The headline numbers involved in those five interventions detailed in Figure 2 have been very large: in total once the current programme comes to an end the Bank will have purchased £ of government bonds and £ of corporate bonds – that is roughly 40% of annual (pre-Covid) UK GDP. Once that programme is complete the Bank’s balance sheet, which already stands at around 40% of GDP, will be approaching £ or 50% of GDP in size – an unprecedented figure in the Bank’s 327 year history (Figure 3). The robust operationalisation of those QE purchases has been crucial to the Bank’s mission over the past twelve years.
Monetary aggregate targeting frameworks fall between these two extreme regimes depending on the extent of exchange rate flexibility of such policy regimes. Evolution of Monetary Policy Framework in Sri Lanka Sri Lanka’s monetary policy framework has also evolved from a currency board arrangement before the establishment of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in 1950. This history has been well covered in the masterpiece, “From dependent currency to central banking in Ceylon” written by Professor H A de S Gunasekera, in whose honour my retired senior central bank colleague Sirimevan Colombage delivered an eloquent speech recently at the University of Peradeniya. From 1950 to 1977 Sri Lanka’s monetary policy framework was largely based on maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime in terms of fixing the value of Sri Lanka rupee first to the sterling pound and then to the US dollar. Under this fixed exchange rate regime, domestic inflation was directly linked to foreign inflation and therefore there was no need for an explicit monetary anchor to manage inflation. The Central Bank did not have much leeway to control domestic inflation as the fixed exchange rate was the anchor to manage inflation. Like many other things, inflation was also more or less imported from the United Kingdom those days! This system worked well as long as Sri Lanka earned sufficient foreign exchange to meet expenditure on imports without any restriction.

The government has endorsed this move since then, and stated in its recently released Vision 2025 policy document that “for medium to long-term price stability, the Central Bank will move towards a flexible inflation targeting regime. They will aim at continuously maintaining low inflation while supporting economic activity and competitiveness. The government will implement the legislative and operational changes necessary.” While it is heartening to note that the Central Bank and the government have agreed in principle that flexible inflation targeting is the way forward in the conduct of monetary policy, the full implementation of flexible inflation targeting by the year 2020 will require increased efforts to fulfil the remaining prerequisites for the success of inflation targeting. It is also expected that comprehensive amendments will be made to the MLA to facilitate the transition to flexible inflation targeting, to redefine monetary policy objectives, eliminate monetary financing of fiscal deficits, and ensure Central Bank autonomy and public accountability. Amendments to the MLA are also expected to streamline the monetary policy decision making process. Within the Central Bank, the ongoing upgrade of technical forecasting and analytical capabilities will continue, and it is expected that by 2020, the Central Bank will commence the publication of comprehensive Inflation Reports. The Inflation Report will explain inflation developments, inflation expectations, projections for inflation and other key macroeconomic variables, the assumptions behind such projections, reasons for any deviation of actual inflation developments from targeted levels, and remedial actions to be taken in the case of deviations.
We run the risk of ending up with international banking groups in which the advanced approaches tend to be used almost exclusively by the parent company. I think that this outcome is neither optimal nor desirable, and falls short of the goals of improving the stability and efficiency of the international financial system, to which Basel II can make a much more effective contribution if it is applied appropriately. Problems also arise over how to consolidate the capital of these subsidiaries. Take, for example, a bank applying an advanced approach at group level with subsidiaries outside the home country that use a standard approach. This bank will have to perform a double calculation: first, using the method applicable under the approaches adopted by its subsidiaries; then, it must recalculate those same subsidiaries’ requirements using the approach for the group as a whole, ie that of the parent company in the home country, for consolidation purposes in order to calculate the overall capital requirement. This double calculation can impose a heavy burden - although a necessary one in some instances and will in any case require close collaboration between home and host supervisors to ensure that the entity’s overall system adequately takes account of the characteristics and sensitivity of the local market. The AIG is attempting to pinpoint which criteria would be acceptable at the consolidated level, assuming the - fairly frequent - scenario of a bank with subsidiaries governed by local requirements that differ from those of Basel II.

It had to include both monetary and economic analysis – the ECB’s famous two pillar strategy. By explicitly taking into account the development of  Page 2/4  money and credit in its monetary policy strategy, the ECB was unique in the world of central banking. However, the ECB’s monetary policy strategy was questioned by some academics. They favoured inflation targeting. Otmar never shied away from his critics and their arguments. Consequently, he launched the ECB and Its Watchers Conference. Academics, journalists and market participants were invited. There were lively debates about the role of money in the ECB’s strategy. In his last contribution to the ECB and Its Watchers Conference in 2006, Otmar reviewed the active discussion about the role of money in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy over the previous eight years. Otmar reminded the audience how some had argued that the role of money was too large. For others it was too small. Otmar pointed out that his typical response had been that it was ‘just right’. This reminds me of a scene in the film ‘Amadeus’. Mozart, Otmar’s favourite composer, asks the emperor whether he likes his new piece, the Abduction from the Seraglio. The emperor answers, hesitantly, that he does, but adds that occasionally the piece seems to have too many notes. ‘I don't understand’, Mozart replies. ‘There are just as many notes, Majesty, as are required.
Museums and various activities organised in light of promoting national values and raising the public awareness help to better transmit the message embedded in banknotes, and educate the public through the art in banknotes, featuring elements of our national identity. For this particular reason, numismatists take delight in the subtleties of colours and images of the banknotes. In the apparently just pieces of paper, they are able to distinguish and recognise different ages, and the degree of social freedom. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  In addition, banknotes may also depict concerns of a society, of course, when the artist was able to properly read this concern. Hence, the green of US dollar was chosen as a symbol to express the need of the stability in the period of civil war. The 2017 series of Norwegian currency reflects the concern on the return to the human basic needs, which are taken away by digitalisation. In reflection to this concern, the portraits of distinguished people of art and science are replaced with the symbols of natural resources, strongly related with the identity of the Norwegian people, such as the Viking ship, fish or the lighthouse. All these facts show that nothing has threatened the educational and national mission of the banknote. Owing to this reason also, it continues to carry it out by resisting even the virtual forms of the currency. In addition, as a Harvard researcher states, the paper may disappear earlier than the banknote.

Dear guests, The International Council of Museums was established in 1946. Every year, since 1977, the ICOM organises the International Museum Day, a worldwide event held on and around 18 May. In 1992, ICOM decided to choose a socially relevant theme for International Museum Day, each year. The theme chosen for 2017 is “Museums and contested histories: Saying the unspeakable in museums". Joining this worldwide celebrating day, in our museum, we have formulated it as “Interesting facts from the treasury: Art in Albanian Banknotes". And to say the unspeakable, we have invited today Mr Mark Bundy, a master of designing working for over 40 years at De La Rue, pioneers of banknote printing in the world. De La Rue is frequently heard by everyone visiting our museum, as it relates to the first company printing the Albanian banknote. Mr Bundy will show the unspeakable on the designing, techniques and art of conceiving the Albanian banknote, illustrated by photos and sketches. In the end, we invite you to explore our temporary exhibition on this topic and see the unspeakable through your own lens. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
These participants can in turn conduct peer-to-peer payments and redeem the CBDC for reserves at the issuing central bank. Project Dunbar in the Singapore Centre is a collaboration among MAS, the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank Negara Malaysia, and the South African Reserve Bank. Built on two open-source distributed ledger platforms (i.e. Corda and Quorum), Project Dunbar focuses on international settlements using digital currencies issued by multiple central banks. Project Dunbar has successfully developed working prototypes that have successfully resolved challenges relating to access, governance, and jurisdictional boundaries. Project Dunbar is also focused on addressing the governance issues related to operating a multi-CBDC platform. For example: Security. How do we get multiple central banks to share a common platform and mitigate national security concerns associated with sharing critical infrastructure? Access. Who should participate in such a shared platform? Non-banks should be included because not everyone has a bank account. Regulation. How do we reconcile across different laws, regulations, guidelines and protocols that govern payments. The third pathway to solving the cross-border payments problem is through private sector led blockchain based payment networks. The use of distributed ledgers for cross-border settlement need not be confined to CBDCs. 4/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Securely-backed stablecoins or tokenised bank deposits issued by private sector players can also be used to enable cheaper and faster cross-border payment and settlement.

The Governing Council chose covered bonds due to their particular importance in Europe and the fact that, by carrying a signature from the issuing bank and the underlying asset, they are akin to our repo operations. Our aim was to have a catalytic role: we decided on a purchase programme with a volume that was significant enough to improve market functioning but not so large as to dominate the market as such. We also chose the covered bond market because we knew we could trigger new issuance activities, and thereby have a positive spillover effect on the overall financing of banks as well as on other market segments. All in all, there are encouraging signs that these measures – in combination with the substantial interest rate reductions – are gradually bearing fruit. At the same time, there is no room for complacency and we are, as always, alert and prepared for any unexpected developments. III. How to exit? – The ECB’s exit strategy  Having described the set of non-standard measures, let me now turn to the question of how to exit from them. The rationale for exit from these measures is the inverse of the rationale for their implementation. We have introduced exceptional measures under exceptional circumstances and will unwind these measures when the situation returns to normal and the rationale for the measures fades away. Note that an exit strategy is not identical to a particular course of action.
Inflation and energy prices In these ways the losses in credit markets are already contributing to slowing growth; the questions are by how much and for how long? The danger that they could turn a necessary modest slowdown into a deeper and more painful downturn is clear and, of course, that would dampen inflationary pressures. That was a key factor in my decision to vote for a cut in rates in November and December. But the current situation is complicated by emerging upside pressures on prices. This inflationary pressure is coming largely from outside the UK, reflecting in part increased demand from countries like China where output growth has been both rapid and commodity intensive. That has led to renewed strength in commodity prices (Chart 11), with oil rising as high as $ a barrel and some agricultural foods reaching record highs in dollar terms. This has already increased the prices of imported goods, and that effect has been amplified recently by the fall in sterling. In turn, it is putting upward pressure on the sterling prices set by domestic producers for crude oil and wholesale gas and electricity. And, in contrast to the past, demand from emerging economies may mean that commodity prices prove resilient to slowing growth in the industrialised economies. The appropriate monetary policy reaction to upside pressures on prices coming from outside the economy (such as an energy price shock) depends on how households and businesses react to that shock – in other words, on so-called “second-round” effects.

Eddie George: Financial stability and the City the evolving role of the Bank of England  Speech by The Rt Hon Eddie George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the London Chamber of Commerce Conference, held in London, on 13 June 2000. *  *  *  Thank you, Chairman. I’m pleased to take part in this Conference, and to share the platform this morning with Gavin, but also with Howard Davies my long-standing partner in crime - or perhaps I should say in crime prevention. You ask me to talk about the evolving role of the Bank of England, in relation to financial stability in particular, which I’m happy to do. In fact it is rather easier to talk confidently about our role these days since it is now more clearly defined. A remarkable thing about the earlier legislation - the 1946 Bank of England Act - was that it made no mention of the Bank’s essential “raisons d’être” - what we were there to do. It seems to have been taken for granted that everyone knew what our role was. But about a decade ago we decided to define our core purposes more precisely for ourselves, primarily for internal management reasons. We identified three core purposes. The first two: –  the maintenance of monetary stability; and  –  the maintenance of the stability of the financial system are key objectives of central banks pretty well everywhere.