samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  To help on the supply side the Bank has developed an education outreach strategy with three components: 1. econoME: which includes free lesson plans and supporting materials for teachers to use in their classrooms; 2. Bank Ambassadors: colleagues below the director level at the Bank who volunteer to visit schools across the country to explain the Bank of England’s role; and 3. School visits by senior Bank and policy committee members: to spark young people’s interest in economics and to inspire them to pursue a career in related fields. Let me say a bit more about why we are doing this. 1  May 2017 survey conducted by ING and the Economics Network, available at: https://www.economicsnetwork.ac.uk/research/understandingecon 2 See Haldane, A “Everyday Economics”, Birmingham 2017 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  The first objective is to help young people understand the economy and to make better informed personal financial decisions. The econoME lessons are designed for 11-16 year olds and cover: -  The economic factors that influence personal decisions;  -  How to make informed decisions; and  -  How such decisions collectively influence the economy. An array of econoME resources, designed in close collaboration with teachers and education specialists, support these classes. The materials include lesson plans, presentations, videos, activities and real life case studies. And they can be used by non-specialists with no prior economics training.

Some of the targeted mitigation measures undertaken by the authorities include: •  Intensified joint investigation efforts by the LEAs to effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This is reflected in the increased number of raids, arrests and prosecutions related to money laundering and terrorist financing and predicate offences;  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  •  Another effort is the enhancement of the structure of the individual LEAs, which includes the formation of dedicated AML/CFT unit within the LEAs and increase in manpower focusing on money laundering and terrorist financing investigations;  •  Another response by the government is the amendment to the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 (AMLATFA) which is aimed at strengthening Malaysia’s AML/CFT framework against criminal activities. The amendments would provide clarity on reporting obligations so that preventive measures can be implemented more effectively, such as requirements to submit STRs related to terrorism financing, tipping off provision and CDD requirement;  •  The intensity of enforcement actions against financial institutions that failed to comply and implement AML/CFT programs is also increased. In 2013 and 2014, BNM has compounded banks for various failures to implement effective compliance programs. With the coming into force of the amendments to the AMLATFA on 1 September 2014, the maximum penalty for various provisions was increased. For instance, maximum penalties under general offence have been increased from RM250,000 to RM1 million.
On the other hand, the concerns that were raised about the sustainability of the currency peg system deepened the lack of confidence further and the Turkish authorities decided to allow the lira to float freely on 22 February 2000, in order to avoid further damage in the economy. It is interesting to note here that, the turbulences occurred in November 2000 and in February 2001 differ from each other as regards their starting points. The crisis in November 2000 was started by the banks’ failure to meet financial obligations, and then was followed by a liquidity crisis that increased pressure on exchange rates. On the other hand, the crisis in February 2001 directly manifested itself as a direct attack to domestic currency, with the increased financial vulnerability after November 2000. An analysis of the fundamental reasons behind the failure of the disinflation program implemented in 2000 reveals that the problems in the banking system should have been resolved well before the implementation of the program. It was natural that, pursuing a monetary policy similar to a currency board, forced the Central Bank to pay less attention to the liquidity needs of financial markets compared to previous years. Moreover, this practice reduced the flexibility of the monetary policy against external shocks. The continuation of problems in banking sector in 2000 put pressure on the rule-based monetary policy based on rule.

Emerging economies are better prepared than in the 1990s to absorb these shocks, but we do not expect the subsidy coming from the commodity windfall. One final point about China  China has become a source of stability in the world economy in the last few decades (isn´t this the role China played after the Global Financial Crisis in 2009 and 2010? ), but it has become more interconnected with the rest of the world, and it is also subject to pressures on the capital account and its balance of payments. The very same risks that emerging economies face from US rate increases are relevant for China, too. This time, a bumpy process of monetary normalization in the US could become amplified rather than ameliorated, depending upon how China is able to adjust to it. And this time, the room looks smaller.
Indeed, there is even a feeling among some that Hong Kong will inevitably be marginalised no matter what as Mainland China’s reform and liberalisation gathers pace and other Mainland cities bypass Hong Kong to establish direct trade and financial links with the world. 3. These people believe our future is doomed and would be eclipsed by the Mainland’s reform and liberalisation. They tend to look back with fond memories of the “good old days” in the 1980s and 1990s when Hong Kong was the sole gateway between Mainland China and the rest of the world. So, I pose this question – Is their reasoning sound? Will Hong Kong become irrelevant as Mainland China opens up? 4. First, let’s look at the changes in the role of Hong Kong as an intermediate trading hub for Mainland China over the past few decades. In 1979, Mainland China’s external trade amounted to a mere $ billion and container throughput amounted to just 30,000 to 40,000 TEUs, which were mostly processed at the Kwai Chung Container Terminal in Hong Kong. By contrast, in 2013, the Mainland’s external trade ballooned 140 times to $ trillion with container throughput up to 190 million TEUs. The throughput at Hong Kong’s container terminals increased more than 20 times from around 1 million TEUs in 1979 to 22 million TEUs in 2013. However, if the majority of the Mainland’s imports and exports continue to be routed through Hong Kong, how many additional container terminals would need to be built?

There are also those who believe that to maintain Hong Kong’s competitive edge, we must be the only conduit for foreign capital going into and out of the Mainland. It means a “single access” model, with Hong Kong as the only link and conduit between the onshore and offshore markets. The rationale for Hong Kong to continue to monopolise the access to the onshore market is understandable. It also serves practical purposes at the initial stage of the renminbi’s internationalisation. But as the renminbi internationalisation progresses, this model is not sustainable in the long run. The aim of opening up the capital account and internationalising the renminbi is to foster general acceptance of renminbi in global trade and investment and as a reserve currency. To promote the extensive use of renminbi by corporations and investors around the world, renminbi business must flourish in different parts of the world. The development of the offshore renminbi market must shift from a “single access” model to a “multiple accesses” model. We pride ourselves as the world’s most important offshore renminbi centre, still far ahead of other centres in terms of the size of the liquidity pool and various financial intermediation activities. But there is no time for complacency. Our task is to consolidate Hong Kong’s unique advantages and leverage our first-mover position by incessantly upgrading our renminbi platform, making it the ideal choice for companies and financial institutions, on the Mainland and around the world alike, to conduct various types of offshore renminbi business.
The euro area economies were badly affected by the crisis (first financial, then economic, then sovereign debt), and the fiscal adjustment that became necessary to overcome it has had a negative impact on growth as well. ECB projections see a gradual recovery taking shape later this year. A number of elements support this view: •  Our accommodative monetary policy stance – which will remain so for as long as necessary – should contribute to underpinning this recovery;  •  Recent developments in economic sentiment survey data have shown some improvement from their low levels;  •  Looking ahead to later in the year and to 2014, euro area export growth should benefit from a recovery in global demand, while domestic demand should be supported by our accommodative monetary policy stance and by the recent real income gains due to lower oil prices and lower overall inflation. •  Furthermore, the significant improvements in financial markets seen since last summer boost confidence and generate wealth effects and should work their way through to the real economy, as should the progress made in fiscal consolidation. Nevertheless, the Governing Council continues to see downside risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area. They include the possibility of weaker-than-expected domestic and global demand and the slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries.

As well as being a year that saw a considerable strengthening of fiscal and macroeconomic discipline in Europe, 2012 also saw significant progress towards a banking union. Why has a banking union suddenly become such an indispensable and urgent project? Simply because we are now certain that many of the problems we have experienced, could have been avoided with a banking union. A banking union is necessary for the smooth functioning of a monetary union for the following three reasons: •  It breaks the link between banks and sovereigns by bringing banking supervision and crisis management to the federal level. With the banking union, banks will be considered as euro area institutions over and above their nationality; it will ensure that credit conditions in the euro area will not depend on where you are but on who you are, which is what should be expected of an efficient financial market. •  It allows re-integration of the European banking system. A supra-national supervisor is in fact better placed to assess the risks of cross-border activities and therefore to protect and encourage such activities; it is not subject to national biases that can lead to the temptation of economic introversion. It is therefore more credible and strengthens stability and confidence in the area;  •  Moreover, it restores the full efficacy of monetary policy.
It is notable that this explanation is consistent with evidence from business surveys of spare capacity which suggest that underlying productivity growth in the manufacturing and services sector has essentially stagnated since the start of the recession (Charts 5 and 6).9 What might account for this flat lining in potential productivity? Impact of financial crisis In an accounting sense, this stalling in productivity growth must be attributable to one of two factors. A slowing in the rate at which companies have added to the physical capital used by each member of their workforce. Or a slowing in the pace of efficiency gains associated with the way in which companies combine capital and labour to produce output, known in the jargon as total factor productivity. In reality, it is unlikely that a slowing in the pace of capital accumulation contributed significantly to the weakness of productivity. This is largely a matter of arithmetic. Annual business investment flows are small relative to the size of the capital stock. So even though business investment fell by around a quarter in the year following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and remains 20% below its pre-crisis level, it is unlikely to have had a significant impact on the stock of capital available per worker.10  8  Evidence from business surveys (eg BCC, CBI) and the Bank’s Agents suggest that capacity utilisation was above normal in both manufacturing and services sectors.

This would help foster value-added characteristics of the Thai economy and increase opportunities for our people, businesses, and everything else that will bring about a better standard of living for all. The two mega-trends I have outlined, when combined with the flood crisis at the end of last year, mean that Thailand needs to quickly upgrade infrastructure to improve competitiveness. In particular, public investment in effective natural resources management system and improved governance of public administration will serve as an important driving force for sustainable economic growth. Evolution of economic activities in line with the changing environment While the immediate obstacles may have changed, the overall challenges that have remained require all parties to formulate a strategic framework and policy space, to enable the Thai economy to stride pass the transitional gateway smoothly. For the public sector, the implementation of policy that promotes investment and enhances competitiveness effectively relating to infrastructure, education, and governance such as reducing corruption and improving political resiliency would be an important impetus to boost Thailand’s position in the competitiveness race. This is because public investment attracts further investment from both private investors and foreign investors, the so-called crowdingin effect. For the private sector, the search for new markets, improvements of production efficiencies, creation of value-added goods and services, and effective risk management are things that the private sector can do to prepare for new challenges.
An inflation target for monetary policy was introduced, with an operational target for annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. The fiscal policy rule was also introduced. According to this rule, the cyclically adjusted non-oil government budget deficit shall correspond to the long-term real return on the Government Pension Fund – Global. The division of responsibility in economic policy has since been the following: •  Monetary policy steers inflation in the medium and long term and can also contribute to smoothing swings in output and employment. •  The central government budget – growth in public spending – affects the real krone exchange rate and the size of the internationally exposed business sector in the long term. At the same time, developments in government expenditure and revenues must ensure a reasonable distribution across generations. •  Wage formation, the structure of the economy and incentives determine how well and how efficiently we utilise labour and other real economic resources. It is the government that defines the inflation target. Norges Bank sets the interest rate with the aim of reaching the inflation target. The Bank must account for its decisions. It does so through an annual report on the conduct of monetary policy. The report is submitted to the Ministry of Finance to be presented to the King and communicated to the Storting. The government’s assessment is presented in the annual credit reports.

High inflation and inflation that varies considerably over time result in random changes in the real value of assets and debt. This leads to unintended transfers between creditors and debtors. When inflation is high and variable over time, the function of prices as an information vehicle is also impaired. When inflation is low and stable, changes in relative prices are more easily discernible, and it is easier for households and businesses to make decisions about consumption and investment. Low and stable inflation is the best contribution monetary policy can make over time to employment, economic growth and welfare. The central banks in the first industrialised countries have attained a more independent status over the past 20 years. This is partly because Germany and its firm Bundesbank fared better during the period of high inflation in the 1970s and 1980s than many other countries. Arguments in favour of an independent central bank are also found in economic theory. Studies by Finn Kydland of Norway and Edward Prescott of the US at the end of the 1970s on economic policy rules were groundbreaking. 10 The insights gained from these studies provide arguments for ensuring central bank independence and deriving monetary policy objectives. History and theoretical studies have taught us that adverse effects may occur if the authorities do not take into account that households and enterprises are forward-looking when making decisions about consumption, investment, wages and prices. They base these decisions their expectations of economic policy in the future, not only on today’s policy.
In my remarks, I intend to address three aspects of globalisation and their potential impact on central bank policies: •  First, I will discuss to what extent globalisation may affect the conduct and effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation and influencing domestic economic activity. Or: does globalisation alter the job of a central bank, and if so, how? •  Second, I will explore the impact of globalisation on the functioning of financial markets, which is of course a particularly pertinent issue during the ongoing financial market turmoil, and its potential implications for financial stability. Or: did we sow the wind of financial globalisation, only to reap the whirlwind of market turbulence? •  Third, I will briefly seek to shed some light on links between monetary policy and financial stability, and how globalisation may affect this interrelation. Or: did past central bank policies worldwide play a part in building up imbalances in global financial markets whose correction and unwinding we are witnessing at present? II. Globalisation and monetary policy  In recent years, it has been argued that globalisation has had – or is likely to have – significant implications for the conduct and effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation and influencing domestic economic activity.

Financial institutions should provide easy access to funds to reduce cost of doing business. The multiple drivers of informality should be tackled through integrated policy packages that promote a gradual transition to formal activities. Ladies and gentlemen, this is the challenge I give all stakeholders that are involved in skills development, youth empowerment and development of MSMEs. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
7 But then the financial crisis arrived and the transmission mechanism broke down. The expression ‘pushing on a string’ was coined, meaning that policy rate adjustments from the central bank did not spread to other interest rates as expected, if at all. An established approach became significantly less useful in that it said nothing about what should be done if the transmission mechanism stopped working. This required another kind of analysis, based on the understanding that the financial markets were not functioning without friction or normally, and that was able to use this diagnosis as a starting point to suggest appropriate measures. I will come back to this later. Preparedness and flexibility – a new, yet familiar, way of thinking The last decade has been turbulent and the Riksbank and other central banks have several times had to act in situations where uncertainty is considerable. When the transmission mechanism broke down during the financial crisis, the central banks took measures to maintain the functioning of the financial system. And now, during the coronavirus pandemic, the Riksbank has taken a number of different measures to ensure that there is no doubt that there is plenty of liquidity in the economy. Thanks to measures by central banks and governments around the world, the pandemic has not turned into a financial crisis. As I mentioned earlier, these measures entail a different way of conducting monetary policy compared to the one that was part of the prevalent approach from the time before the financial crisis.

And for the new challenges to be met and the new opportunities to be exploited, there is often the need for new approaches and new initiatives, at both the national and international levels. There is a view, for example, that trade integration in the region has not been adequately served by financial integration, given restrictive controls on capital mobility still being practised in selected jurisdictions. As a result there is some doubt as to whether the long term development potential of the region has been maximised and whether the rapid economic growth the region is experiencing is sustainable. There is further concern from the point of view of the maintenance of monetary and financial stability. New approaches and new initiatives are indeed necessary to promote greater financial integration in the region. I am sure there are many other areas concerning development of the region in which new approaches and new initiatives may be desirable. Being a regional financial institution of strategic importance, it is obvious that the ADB has a significant role to play. I would argue that this should be a role of increasing significance, or even a pivotal role, given the increasing interdependence among jurisdictions within the region and therefore the greater need for regional co-operation. The ADB has the right institutional framework for promoting such co-operation, and I am glad to see that under the leadership of the President there has been increasing involvement of the ADB in regional financial cooperation recently.