samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The SNB’s investment policy The SNB’s investment policy outlines the principles governing its asset management. Our assets chiefly consist of currency reserves, namely foreign currency investments and gold. A small proportion are Swiss franc assets. In principle, the SNB is able to define its own investment policy. However, due to its monetary policy mandate, the SNB’s investment policy is subject to certain restrictions. It has to be designed in a way that helps the SNB fulfil its mandate. To a certain degree, the function of our investment policy is to serve monetary policy. What does this mean exactly? Objectives  In applying its investment policy, the SNB has two main objectives. The first is to ensure that its balance sheet can be used at any time for monetary policy purposes. Investment policy may not restrict monetary policy in terms of either a possible expansion or a possible reduction of the balance sheet. The investment universe must be designed in such a way that we are able to purchase foreign currency and invest it quickly when necessary. But we must also be able to sell the investments again quickly if monetary policy requires it. The second objective of investment policy is to ensure that the currency reserves preserve their value over the long term. Currency reserves serve to build confidence. They are used not just to overcome, but to also to prevent potential crises. Currency reserves allow us to intervene in the market if the Swiss franc weakens.

At the present point in time, however, we know neither if nor when such an accession scenario will become a reality. But even in the event that accession negotiations with the EU were started relatively soon, for example as early as 2008, and proceeded rather swiftly, transition periods would still apply. Even if such negotiations were concluded as early as 2011, for example, and if they entailed the adoption of the euro, Swiss banknotes would remain in circulation at least until 2015. The National Bank is thus compelled to tackle the development of new banknotes as a precautionary measure. This step has become necessary because of the development of new technologies and the typically high demands on the design quality of Swiss banknotes. Both aspects necessitate an adequate preparation period. Our current decision to intensify the preliminary work already under way was decisively influenced by the awareness that the work can be halted at any time, whereas it is impossible to initiate it or catch up on it within a short period. The National Bank's decision must, therefore, not be mistaken for a statement on its European policy; it is solely a precautionary measure. Banknote security With progress being made in counterfeiting technology, a note-issuing bank, which has to ensure the security of its banknotes, must always strive to maintain a technological advantage over counterfeiters, or copy machines and scanners.
It has been in many respects a particularly testing time, but we have I believe come through it all quite successfully and are now well placed to continue moving ahead. It will require sustained commitment from all of us - but the people of Northern Ireland have never been lacking in commitment! I wish you every possible success. 3  BIS Review 7/2000

Chart: Productivity growth in advanced economies Productivity growth has been declining in advanced economies since the beginning of the 2000s. The willingness to invest has been low since the financial crisis. To what extent this is related to the economic downturn remains to be seen. Better times may eventually entice investors, but it is also possible that the substantial changes in the global economy have had a more lasting effect on the willingness to invest and the growth capacity of western economies. Chart: Real wages in mainland Norway, the US and Germany A demanding restructuring process is underway in the traditional industrialised countries. In the US and Germany, real wages have barely risen since the turn of the millennium. Income inequality has deepened. This may in part be related to the global change in the price of labour. In other countries, particularly in Europe, economic restructuring is throwing a large number of people into unemployment. Over 26 million people are now unemployed in the EU today, almost 10 million more than in 2007. Low growth, high unemployment and high debt levels are not a good combination. Even though there are signs of a moderate revival of activity abroad, growth may remain low for a protracted period. Chart: Real wages and productivity for mainland Norway Real wage growth in Norway has diverged substantially from that observed in Germany and the US. This is attributable to the sharp price rise for Norwegian goods in recent years. Norway’s terms of trade have improved.
Germany Per cent (3 month moving average) 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Source: OECD  2. Relative unit labour cost Manufacturing industry, Index 1970 = 100 (3 month moving average) 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Source: OECD  BIS Review 93/2006  5  3. GDP Annual percentage change 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Source: The Riksbank  4. Labour market 3 month moving average 4400  7,0  Unemployment, per cent of labour force (left hand scale) Employment, thousands (right hand scale) 6,0  4300  5,0  4200  4,0 2000  4100 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  6  BIS Review 93/2006  5. Current account and public finances Percentage of GDP (3 year moving average) 8  8  Public financial saving Current account  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6  -6  -8  -8  -10 1980  1985  1990  1995  -10 2005  2000  Sources: OECD and the Riksbank  6.

For example, the unexpectedly strong productivity growth, combined with moderate wage increases, has contributed to inflation being below target in recent years. Wage formation will remain a focal point in the monetary policy analyses, particularly next year when the majority of the collective wage agreements are due to be renegotiated. The level of capacity utilisation and the impact it has on wage formation are also important and topical issues. The OECD calculates what is known as the GDP gap. Their interpretation is that capacity utilisation in the Swedish economy is already higher this year than is compatible with a low and stable inflation rate. However, calculating the GDP gap and similar measures is a very uncertain process. Nor are the measures stable; they change over time. The National Institute of Economic Research (NIER) calculates the labour market gap and equilibrium unemployment. The calculation in the most recent wage formation report shows the labour market gap as being close to zero in 2007 and then becoming slightly positive in 2008 and 2009. Equilibrium unemployment is calculated at 4.5 per cent; it is predicted that this level will be reached next year and that open unemployment will thereafter be slightly below equilibrium level. However, according to the NIER, the social partners have the possibility in the central wage negotiations next year to choose different alternative actions that could either reduce or increase equilibrium unemployment.
20  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5: Capital accumulation in the UK since 1850 Capital per head, 2006 prices £  50,000 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000  0  5,000  10,000  15,000  0 25,000  20,000  GDP per head, 2006 prices £ Source: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2010). Chart 6: Capital accumulation across countries since 1980 Capital per head, 2005 prices $ 140,000 Japan 120,000 Germany 100,000  Italy  80,000 South Korea 60,000 India  US  China  40,000  UK  Urban China  0  5,000  20,000  10,000  15,000  20,000  25,000  30,000  35,000  40,000  0 45,000  GDP per head, 2005 prices $ Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  21  Chart 7: Literacy rates in Western Europe Netherlands  Great Britain  Sweden  Germany  France  Italy  Literacy rate, percent 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10  1400  1500  1600  1700  1800  1900  0  2000  Source: OurWorldinData.org, based on Buringh and Van Zanden (2009) and Broadberry and O’Rourke (2010). Chart 8: Average years of schooling of the population aged 15+ Percent  Developing economies  12  World  10  Advanced economies 8 6 4 2  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  0  Source: Barro and Lee (2013).

These well-being measures suggest global living standards plateaued for the majority of the past 3000 years, before rocketing over the past 300. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, income was locked at close to subsistence levels. In line with Thomas Malthus’s predictions, they were sufficient to sustain the population, but no more. 16 For that reason, some have called this the Malthusian era. 17 If you think that’s sounds grim, the picture further back in history is, if anything, even less optimistic. Rather remarkably, estimates of global GDP have been constructed back to 1 million BC, the dawn of man. 18 Statistical agencies were thinly staffed back then, so these statistics need to be treated with an even greater than usual pinch of salt. Table 1 considers growth rates in per capita GDP and population over that longer sample. For much of the history of mankind, there was effectively no rise in either living standards or  13  Clark (2009). 14  For example, Clark (2009). 15  For example, Morris (2011). 16  Malthus (1798). 17  For example, Clark (2009). 18  DeLong (1998). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  population. It is possible the most gradual of advances in living standards began tens of thousands of years ago, around the time modern man (homo sapiens) emerged and Neanderthal man (homo Neanderthalensis) disappeared. So the short history (the Golden era) and the long history (the Malthusian era) of growth could not be more different. Secular innovation followed a lengthy period of secular stagnation.
16 See Report from the Swedish Retail Payments Council (2018) “A scenario analysis of payments at points of sale and withdrawals from ATMs in the event of disruptions to the card systems” Sveriges Riksbank. 7 [8]  Equipping ourselves for the future My speech in 2016 had the heading “Should the Riksbank issue e-krona?” After two years of analysis, we now know that the technological possibility exists and we know a bit more about how the design of the e-krona can affect the consequences for financial stability and monetary policy. We are also working to ensure that the means of payment issued by the Riksbank will have legal support, even in a digital future. But it is too early to be able to answer fully the question of whether the Riksbank should issue a broader variant of the e-krona to the general public. Ultimately, this is a political decision, for which the Riksbank, as an expert authority, needs to be prepared to provide advice and suggest solutions. By starting the analysis and creating alternative courses of action, we have made sure we stand better equipped should cash be marginalised further in the future. As Benjamin Franklin famously said: “by failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail”. 8 [8]

In this respect, it is important to emphasise that monetary policy considerations always take precedence over those regarding the SNB’s balance sheet risks. It is therefore worth repeating that there is a very high level of uncertainty in the international environment. An appreciation of the Swiss franc would again expose the Swiss economy to considerable risks and, once more, endanger both price stability and economic situation. Given this state of affairs, the SNB will continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with utmost determination and, should the economic outlook and the threat of deflation require, is prepared to take further measures at any time. Concluding remarks In closing, I would like to summarise my message. The unconventional measures the SNB and several other central banks continue to implement are tailored responses to exceptional circumstances. Their impact should nevertheless not be overestimated, and the associated risks must be recognised. Central banks are the guardians of price stability. Taking the broad economic situation into consideration, they can promote conditions that are conducive to growth. But central banks are not almighty. Monetary policy does not create wealth in and of itself, only financial and economic actors can harness the very best of their innovative, technological and creative talents to generate value and promote sustainable growth. References Gurria, Angel, OECD Secretary-General. 2012. “Policy priorities for a stronger, cleaner and fairer Swiss economy.” Remarks delivered at the launch of the 2012 OECD Economic Survey of Switzerland. 24 January 2012. International Monetary Fund. 2012.
9  BIS Review 121/1999  Chart 10 How interest rates affect the economy  Exchange rate  NBs interest rates  •Market interest rates •Lending and deposit rates  •Demand & production •Loans, investment, share prices •Wages and prices •External balance  Legg inn filadresse her  8. Exercising discretion in monetary policy  The mandate stipulates the objective of monetary policy, but Norges Bank has to choose how to achieve the objective. As shown, the krone exchange rate has fluctuated in recent years in spite of Norges Bank’s active use of instruments, indicating that Norges Bank cannot fine-tune movements in the krone exchange rate. The exchange rate will also in the future be influenced by factors that are not under the control of Norges Bank, like fluctuations in international financial markets, the evolution of the price of oil, fiscal policy, and developments in domestic prices and costs. Thus, in its use of the interest rate Norges Bank focuses on the preconditions for stability of the krone exchange rate over time. The interest rate affects the exchange rate directly through returns on holding kroner, but also indirectly through the effects of the interest rate on inflation and output. More specifically, stability of the exchange rate requires that: •  Price and cost inflation must be brought down to the level aimed at by euro countries. •  Monetary policy must not in itself contribute to deflationary recessions, as this would undermine confidence in the krone. Let me explain in more detail.

It is under such circumstances that output and employment have tended to suffer severely, leading to actual deflation. That, of course, is what prompted the Swedish political system’s resolute intervention at the time of the bank crisis here about a decade ago. It was a matter, not of protecting the banks as such or their owners from losses, but of safeguarding the banks’ central function in our economy. Maintaining a modern market economy would be virtually impossible/ without an efficient credit supply and payment system. In the present context it is positive that the banking sector is functioning well even though stock markets around the world have fallen steeply in recent years. There are also many signs that the banking sector has learnt a good deal from the financial problems in the last few decades. As regards general economic policy, we know that focusing on low and stable inflation creates a better and securer environment for economic policy decisions on the whole. A credible long-term commitment to low inflation does away with some of the uncertainty about future income streams,  BIS Review 50/2002  3  which are what ultimately determine the fundamental value of various kinds of asset. Such a commitment should also provide better conditions for financial decisions. But there is more to it than that. As representatives of the Austrian School pointed out, business cycles are not exactly alike.
This may be a scandalous misrepresentation of the true state of affairs, but there are many readers who would, I am sure, have sensed a grain of truth there. Another cause of possible scepticism over the euro relates to what I would like to call popular acceptability. Let me explain what it is. No one has yet seen the euro in the form of cash. From Hong Kong we cannot witness as closely as you can here in Euroland the extent to which the euro has already become part of economic life. The separate national currencies are still quoted in Hong Kong and any traveller knows that he can only take those and not the euro in banknote form on his journey. There is a feeling that, whatever the law says, the euro will not really have arrived until it is there in your pocket. The sceptics will go on to suggest that poor performance of the euro to date, coupled with nationalistic resentment of the imminent loss of one’s own banknotes - to many an emotive symbol of national identity and sovereignty - might yet cause a wave of popular opposition to the euro at the eleventh hour. I should stress that this may not be a widely held viewpoint, and most international businessmen and bankers have long since discarded the national currencies from their minds and books in favour of the euro. But it is possible for just a few vocal doubters to have a disproportionate effect on the overall mood.

One lesson learned from the experience of the Asian financial turmoil is that if we wish to reduce the vulnerability of the small and open emerging markets in Asia to international finance we need, among other things, to build bigger markets. One way of achieving this, if not the only way, is to follow the example of Euroland and go for some form of currency union. Although the Euroland type of pre-conditions for currency union are far from being satisfied in Asia at present, with so much diversity and fragmentation in the geography, culture, stages of development and policies, this is an option that Asia can ill afford to ignore in the long run. The experience of Euroland operating with the euro is therefore something that should be watched in Asia, and is being watched in the HKMA, with keen, supportive interest. Meanwhile, one way of reducing the short-term vulnerability of small and open markets in Asia to the destabilising influence of international finance, while continuing to benefit from it, is perhaps to promote the greater and prudent use of foreign currencies in financial market activities. This is not an advertisement for “dollarisation” - quite the opposite in fact. It is a suggestion for consolidating the position of national currencies by sparing them from certain extraneous influences. This is particularly relevant to Hong Kong as an international financial centre where non-domestic financial business and movements in portfolio capital unrelated to economic developments intrinsic to Hong Kong are abundant.
Core inflation is now around 1.5% at mid-year and we expect it to rise further, approaching 2% by year-end as the labour market continues to tighten. Monetary policy is predicated on baseline projections of growth and inflation. It does not aim to pre-empt tail risk scenarios. While we are closely monitoring the global risk factors mentioned earlier, our baseline forecast is for continued economic expansion and gradually rising inflation. The threat of a disruptive trade war has risen, but remains a tail risk for now. Our approach therefore has been to begin monetary policy normalisation but to do so in an incremental fashion in view of still-benign inflation and growing trade-related tail risks. In the short term, the policy band provides sufficient room for the $ nominal effective exchange rate to accommodate modest shocks to the Singapore economy. Future adjustments to monetary policy will depend on how the economy evolves and our updated assessments of inflation and growth prospects. PROPERTY MARKET AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY The Singapore property market has seen a resurgence in prices and transactions over the past year. Prices of private housing have increased 9.1% since the trough in Q2 2017. This has mostly offset the cumulative price decline of 11.6% during the four-year period between mid2013 and mid-2017. The number of property transactions over the last 12 months was around 25% higher than during the previous 12 months. New housing loans over the last twelve months have risen by 34% year-on-year.

That said, I do not wish to suggest that CCM has an adequate regulatory profile, since from a prudential standpoint it does not meet the minimum regulatory capital requirements. Allow me to clarify this point further. As you know, Spanish solvency law (which adopts the EU rules known as Basel II) requires credit institutions to observe a minimum capital ratio of 8% of their risk-adjusted assets. The institution, with a level below 8%, does not currently meet this requirement. However, this does not mean that it is insolvent or that its net assets are insufficient to meet its liabilities. Part of this non-compliance with the capital ratio is due to the growing provisions for loan impairment and to the large losses on its portfolio of corporate holdings and financial investments, which had a negative impact on its income statement. The analysis currently being completed by the Supervisor and CCM’s external auditors, which is based on data relating to end-2008, allows us to predict that CCM will post a significant loss in its consolidated financial statements for 2008. This changes the projections issued by its former directors. Indeed, the former directors should have submitted the final accounts for 2008 at the board meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 31 March. The replacement by the Banco de España of the board of directors the previous weekend caused that submission to be postponed while the new provisional central bank appointees receive the latest reports from the audit firm and the Supervisor.