samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Predictive models used for decision-making must be subject to regular reviews against consumer outcomes and redress channels need to be aligned with the digital experience. Indeed, we should be concerned that while the delivery of financial products and services is taking on increasingly digital dimensions, when something goes wrong, processes for consumers to seek redress are still heavily manual in nature. As for financial education, I am reminded of the old adage by Sir Francis Bacon: “Reading maketh a full man, conference a ready man, writing an exact man”. Today’s digital consumer – at least many of them – has neither the patience nor time to read, confer or write. In fact, this is almost the entire premise of digital financial solutions – brevity, speed and convenience. The short attention spans of financial consumers are further constrained by an overload of information and misinformation. Digital solutions that can efficiently deliver financial education to masses of people, while simultaneously providing capabilities to tailor knowledge and information to one’s personal circumstances (such as through loan affordability calculators), have gained increasing traction. However, the fact that digital interventions are more cost-efficient, accessible and scalable, do not automatically make them any more effective than more traditional interventions in the past that have failed to achieve a consistent and lasting impact in changing behaviour. We need to develop reliable insights into behavioural influences that may help or prevent consumers from making good financial decisions. This sounds simple in theory, but is as complex as an understanding of human psychology itself.

The region as a whole is an active hive of experimentation in digital financial services, supported by favourable consumer demographics, particularly the digitally savvy youth. In Southeast Asia, digital financial services is estimated to contribute about 5% of the total revenue for the financial sector this year. This share is expected to more than double to 11% within the next five years, driven among others by digital lending, investment, remittance and insurance products. Here in Malaysia, the most recent demand side survey on financial capability and inclusion indicated that four in ten Malaysians utilise internet banking services, up from just one in ten as recently as three years before. This trend is expected to intensify, with the expansion in digital product offerings and growing acceptance of online financial services. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Building trust and confidence Digitalisation can also be a powerful force for sustainable financial inclusion. By lowering costs and increasing scale and reach, it has become a means for providing access to essential financial services such as e-payments, micro-insurance and online remittance to previously underserved segments. Other innovations such as banking and insurance aggregators are also helping consumers make better financial decisions, in turn, increasing their confidence in using financial services.
Philipp Hildebrand: The Swiss National Bank’s view of international financial markets against the background of trends in the United States Introductory remarks by Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 12 December 2003. *  *  *  The past year was a turbulent one for the international financial markets, which were essentially influenced by trends in the US. During the first half of 2003, market developments were shaped by economic and deflation fears as well as by the war in Iraq. In this environment, equity markets reached an annual low in March. In June, bond market yields fell to their lowest level. The second half of the year saw an economic recovery in the US, which is now spreading to other economic regions as well. Capital markets Long-term yields on Swiss paper rose by approximately 60 basis points from their low in June to roughly 2.7%, approximately tracking yields in the euro area. In both cases, yields followed the US market very closely, albeit with modest fluctuations (see graph 1). Under the present economic conditions, the interest rate environment in Switzerland is still viewed as attractive by consumers. The high level of new fixed-rate mortgages is an indication of this sentiment. The higher Swiss yields reflect the improved economic outlook and not inflation expectations, which are modest given that there is still pronounced underutilisation of capacities. In contrast to capital market yields, money market yields were decidedly stable.

In addition, foreign direct investors have placed more importance on factors other than just the exchange rate alone. In managing exchange rate policy, no amount of exchange rate manipulation would satisfy the interests of all parties at all times. Indeed, it is a stable and fundamentally sound exchange rate system that will best serve the overall economic interests of the country. This will continue to be the objective of our exchange rate policy. Ladies and Gentlemen, Dr. Yilmaz Akyüz’s lecture today would provide an international perspective on managing financial instability and shocks in a more globalised world and touches on some of the issues I have mentioned. Although the regional financial crisis occurred more than six years ago, the issues it raises are not history. They are still very relevant and important. Emerging economies need to continue to evolve approaches and solutions on how best to manage the vulnerabilities and to promote and preserve stability. In this endeavour, there is potential to not only consider what individual economies can do but also the opportunities for regional arrangements or regional solutions. As the region becomes increasingly more integrated in terms of trade and investment flows, the potential for this will be  2  BIS Review 8/2004  greater. The desired outcome is to achieve stability, which in turn, will contribute to the overall stability of the international monetary system and thus, enhance the prospects for shared global prosperity. BIS Review 8/2004  3
Charles Bean: Business surveys and monetary policy Speech by Mr Charles Bean, Deputy Governor (Monetary Policy) of the Bank of England, at the CBI Industrial Trends Survey 50th Anniversary Reception, Centre Point, London, 24 July 2008. *  *  *  Good evening! It is a great pleasure to be asked to say a few words to mark the 50th birthday of the CBI’s Industrial Trends survey. The birthday boy and I have, in fact, been acquainted with each other for over thirty years – from when I started my professional career in 1975 as a forecaster in the Treasury. In those days, the quarterly Industrial Trends survey was really the only game in town as far as business surveys go. Since then, the field has become more crowded, but the Industrial Trends survey remains a key source of information about business developments. To celebrate the survey’s birthday, I thought that I might say a few words tonight about the part played by business surveys, and intelligence about business conditions more generally, in our setting of Bank Rate each month. Because our interest rate decisions affect UK economic activity and inflation with a rather long, and sometimes rather variable, lag, there is nothing much that we can do to affect the current and near-term rate of inflation. That is already largely baked into the cake. Instead we have to focus on inflation prospects in the medium term – that is, two years or so ahead.

BIS Review 95/2008  5  I hope that this gives you a sense of the use we make of business surveys, and business intelligence more generally, in making our regular assessment of the state of the economy each month, before taking our decision on the appropriate level of Bank Rate. The timeliness of this information is particularly important at the current juncture, when the economic climate is changing rapidly. The global and UK economies have been subject to two large shocks of uncertain magnitude, duration and impact. The first is the continuing de-leveraging in the banking system and the attendant squeeze on the terms and availability of credit. The second is the fairly relentless rise in commodity prices, especially that of oil, driven in part by the robust growth in demand in the emerging economies. These two shocks both depress output growth, though they have divergent effects on inflation. In our May Inflation Report, our central expectation was for four-quarter GDP growth to slow markedly through this year, reflecting both subdued real income growth and tighter credit supply (see Chart 7, which also includes the same backcast information as Chart 6). It was then expected to gradually recover through 2009 as credit conditions slowly improved. The corresponding projection for CPI inflation is shown in Chart 8 (note that no uncertainty is shown for the past, as the data for CPI inflation are rarely revised).
Mr. McDonough gives a US perspective on Economic and Monetary Union in Europe Remarks by the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. William J. McDonough, before the Association of German Mortgage Banks in Frankfurt, on 17/11/97. I am honored to be invited by the German Mortgage Banks to be the keynote speaker tonight at the Association’s annual Pfandbrief Forum. It is a great pleasure to be here in Frankfurt among so many distinguished representatives of the German banking and financial community and members of the Bundesbank Council. In my remarks to you this evening, I would like to offer a few thoughts on the implications of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe from my perspective as President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Many in the United States today are following developments in Europe’s move toward monetary union with considerable interest. I am certainly among them. There can be no doubt about the magnitude and economic importance of the historic event that will take place on January 1, 1999, when the currencies of up to 15 member countries of the European Union are scheduled to be unified. It is a goal toward which Europe has been working ever since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 creating the European Economic Community. While some might claim that this historic development will have little impact on the U.S. economy, nothing could be further from the truth.

Hopefully, the report can contribute to a well-informed debate on the stability of the Swedish financial system and influence those participating in the system. The Riksbank can also use the Financial Stability Report to show how we work to achieve the objectives the Riksdag has set us. The layout of the report provides a good insight into the way we work. It begins with a review of international events, describing growth and prices in the financial markets and on various assets. In this context, the analyses and assessments of developments outside the Swedish borders play an increasing role, in line with the ongoing internationalisation process. After describing the environment in which the banks and their borrowers operate, we devote a chapter to a survey of how the borrowers - households and firms - have been affected. What is the level of indebtedness and the ability to service debts? Are there any risks entailed in their actions? If things go well for the banks’ borrowers, they normally go well for the banks. Developments over the past five years, with the Swedish banks increasingly investing abroad, have meant that a substantial percentage of their borrowers are in other countries - mainly in the Baltic region. This means that our analyses cannot focus exclusively on Sweden; we must also take into account developments in, for instance, neighbouring Nordic countries. The banks own actions can also affect the stability of the payment system. What strategic choices do the banks make?
30 For example see Baranova, Y; Coen, J; Lowe, P; Noss, J; and Silvestri, L (2017), Simulating stress across the financial system: the resilience of corporate bond markets and the role of investment funds, BoE FS Paper No. 42, July. 29  21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21  pooled resources, achieving the same level of insurance for a much lower cost.31 This would imply a tripling in the IMF’s resources over the next decade, enough to maintain their current share of global external liabilities. 32 The design of the GFSN is also important. Positive steps have been made in recent years by introducing precautionary liquidity facilities so countries can borrow to prevent crises, as well as mitigate their impact. This should also reduce stigma of drawing on the facilities. But so far, only a few countries have taken them up. It is important to do everything we can to normalise use of these precautionary facilities. 33 Conclusion In the deceptively simpler time of the pre-crisis world order, “keeping your house in order” was a handy prescription of the G7 to EMEs. When countries were hit by volatile capital flows, they were admonished that there were “no innocent bystanders” and that only by doubling down on the Washington Consensus reforms could they be free to enjoy the benefits of sustainable cross-border investment. The experience of successive crises and shocks – confirmed by the Bank of England’s analysis – suggests that advice was once worthy but is increasingly incomplete.

1  Comparison is between medians for the high and low groups of the sample shown in Chart 1 and 2, with high and low groups defined as those above and below medians of the sample. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  Time and again, waves of investment into EMEs are sharply withdrawn (Chart 3). And more generally, financial openness has tended to amplify domestic imbalances and leave EMEs more vulnerable to foreign shocks.2 As a consequence, a fifth of all surges in capital flows to EMEs have ended in financial crises. And EMEs are at least three times more likely to experience a financial crisis after capital flow surges than in normal times. 3 Chart 3: Net private capital flows to emerging market economies and incidences of crises Number of EM crises (rhs) Net private capital flows to Non-China EMEs (lhs)  % of GDP 6  Number 6  Crises tend to occur when capital flows slow  5  5  4  4  3 3 2 2  1  1  0 -1  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  0  2015  Source: IMF. Notes: Excludes China.
But before that, let me say a few words about our monetary policy. Our monetary policy is doing its part, thanks to its persistence and patience, as Mario Draghi stressed this morning. Past questions about its effectiveness and our exit strategy seem to have receded – and rightly so. We confirmed last week our course of gradual normalisation, with the removal of the so-called “easing bias” on the APP. What we see now is a welcome alignment of the stars: against the economic background of a robust expansion with gradual progress on inflation, there is a broad convergence of market expectations with the views within our Governing Council. At present, there is very little debate among us. But this convergence doesn’t preclude vigilance. We’re closely watching the somewhat slow pace of inflation – I believe the Phillips curve is still at work, although with a time lag – and the global risks, starting with US trade policy and the evolution of the exchange rate. Let me now turn to the core of my message: the need to strengthen our Monetary Union by making concrete progress on Economic Union. There is currently a window of opportunity: the economic recovery is robust, and many euro area reform proposals point in the same direction, including the Commission roadmap of December 2017, President Macron’s speech at the Sorbonne last September and, more recently, the European chapter of the German coalition agreement. The outcome of the recent elections in Italy shows that we can’t waste any more time with theoretical debates.

See Lipsey, R and Lancaster, K (1956), “The general theory of the second best”, Review of Economic Studies, 24(1). 8  Arrow, K and Debreu, (1954), “Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy”, Econometrica, 22 (3). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Then they can trade contracts and insure each other against risks they are unwilling to bear. A moment of introspection reveals the absurdity of these assumptions as a description of the actual world. More often than not, even describing the universe of possible outcomes is beyond the means of the mere mortal, let alone ascribing subjective probabilities to those outcomes. That is genuine uncertainty, as opposed to risk, a distinction made by Frank Knight in the 1920s. 9 And it means that market outcomes reflect individual choices made under a pretence of knowledge. The swings in sentiment that result – pessimism one moment, exuberance the next – don’t reflect nature’s odds, but our own assessments of them, inevitably distorted by Keynesian “animal spirits”. 10 In the end, belief in the second lie that “markets always clear” meant that policymakers didn’t play their proper roles in moderating those tendencies in pursuit of the collective good. Lie III: “Markets are moral” Despite these shortcomings, well-managed markets can be powerful drivers of prosperity. By financing firms to hire, invest and expand, they drive growth. By opening up cross-border trade and investment they create new opportunities for businesses and savers.
This initiative grew out of the recognition of the fact that financial institutions and certain NGOs that were engaged in promoting various financial education activities and programme were operating in isolation. What was clearly missing was a coherent and well-co-ordinated strategy among these organisations for delivering an effective education to enhance financial literacy and inclusion. Consequently the FSDP identified the need to develop a coordinated approach to financial education as a meaningful way of bringing progress to this process. It therefore, started its intervention by commissioning a stock taking study of financial education efforts taking place in Zambia in order to establish its true status. DFID provided financial support in the form of technical assistance which enabled the FSDP to recruit FinMark Trust to carry out the study. Subsequently, a report was produced and presented to various stakeholders in November last year. The recommendations from the stakeholders meeting were then sent to the FSDP Steering Committee in April this year. This Committee endorsed the report and it is this report which is being launched today as the National Strategy on Financial Education for Zambia. Once launched, it will be implemented in earnest. Honourable Ministers, the activities that have been carried out under this programme have been made possible by the very generous financial support extended throughout the different phases of the programme by the IMF, World Bank, DFID, SIDA and the Government of the Republic of Zambia.

Access to financial services among the adult population is at 37.3%, the cost of accessing financial services is still high, the quality of financial service  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  delivery can do with some improvement and financial literacy remains low and presents an important factor in explaining the low level of financial inclusion that we see in the country today. The FSDP, Honourable Ministers, therefore, remains work in progress. I would like, however, to mention some milestones which have been achieved under this programme in order to underscore its potential as a tool for transforming for the better, Zambia’s financial sector landscape. Under the FSDP, we have witnessed the establishment of the Credit Reference Bureau which is beginning to play an increasingly important role in helping financial institutions better manage credit risk, which in turn, should feed into less expensive credit. A draft rural finance policy and strategy aimed at improving finance to rural areas has also been completed and awaits implementation. Another important exercise accomplished has been the law review exercise which has reviewed all existing legislation in the financial sector with the view to modernise, harmonise them and ensure that the different legislations speak to each other rather conflict each other. Consequently, we will be submitting to Government amendments to various laws, including those in banking, insurance and the capital market. Another significant accomplishment under the FSDP has been work done so far in formulating a national strategy for financial education.
(2) Red diamonds correspond to forecasts in the central scenario of June 2023 MP Report for each year in 2023-2025 period. (3) For oil: WTI-Brent average price per barrel. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg, and FAO. 18  Figure 20  MPR corridor (*)  (quarterly average, percent)  25.II  25.I  24.IV  24.III  24.II  24.I  23.IV  23.III  23.II  23.I  22.IV  22.III  22.II  22.I  21.IV  21.III  21.I  21.II  Jun.23 corridor FTS EES Mar.23 corridor MPR  13.0 12.0 11.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0  (*) The corridor is built with the methodology described in box V.1 in March 2020 MP Report and box V.3 in March 2022 MP Report. For details, see methodological note in figure II.10, June 2023 MP Report. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 19

The lower share prices and the contagious spread of the crisis to other markets were liable to have consequences via decreased demand for exports from the industrialised countries, as well as via more cautious behaviour among their consumers and firms. BIS Review 14/1999  –3–  The problems in LTCM also aroused fears of a considerably more serious scenario where banks in the industrialised countries became so cautious about granting credit that this would paralyse global economic activity. As the signs of an international slowdown became increasingly clear and were accentuated by the growing turbulence in financial markets, the Riksbank revised its assessment of the Swedish economy and the path of inflation. This warranted some easing of the monetary stance. In November the repo rate was therefore lowered in two steps, from 4.10 to 3.60%. In the December Inflation Report it was still considered that in one to two years’ time, both the change in the CPI and the underlying rate of inflation would be below the Riksbank’s 2% target for price stability. On 16 December the repo rate was therefore lowered another 0.2 percentage points, to 3.40%. After this adjustment, responsibility for the future formulation of monetary policy passed to the Riksbank’s new Executive Board, which would be taking over from the turn of the year. Strong finish to 1998 Most signs suggest that activity in the Swedish economy was fairly strong in the latter part of 1998. GDP figures have still to be published but the available statistics point to a good fourth quarter.