samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
[11]  The upshot is that more firms have been protected and more jobs have been saved. Without the ECB’s policies, we estimate that over one million more people would have lost their jobs. [12]  But we are not out of the woods yet. With the tremendous progress made on vaccine technology, we can now see the light at the end of the tunnel. But we still cannot see exactly how long that tunnel is. We will continue to face a period of high uncertainty until more people have been vaccinated against the virus. In this setting, it is crucial that the bridge for SMEs remains in place for as long as needed. The ECB will help ensure that firms and families can access the finance they need to weather this storm – and that they can do so in the confidence that financing conditions will not tighten prematurely. That commitment is the best way to provide certainty to all sectors of the economy and to bring stability back to the euro area swiftly. And this, in turn, is the best contribution we can make to delivering on our mandate of price stability. 5/8  As Goethe said, “Im Idealen kommt alles auf die élans, im Realen auf die Beharrlichkeit an.”[13] Reality is currently hard for many firms and the future remains uncertain. And so we will persist and persevere until the pandemic emergency has passed.

In the field of blockchain technology, the world has also considerably changed over the past year, with the rise of decentralised finance, the success of non-fungible tokens (NFT), not to mention the first, sometimes spectacular, "clashes” between these new ecosystems and regulatory authorities, in countries as different as China and the United States. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  2. Faced with this changing world, how should we, as central banks and financial sector supervisors, position ourselves? First of all, to be relevant in a changing world, we need to be able to distinguish what does not change. And fundamentally, what does not change in the financial sector is the need for confidence. Consumers of financial services need to have confidence: in the security of transactions, in the protection of their assets and in their freedom of choice. The players in the sector also need to have confidence: in each other, because they remain interdependent, in the rules of the game, i.e. in the regulatory conditions under which they can carry out their activity. Central banks and supervisors clearly have a role to play in maintaining this confidence, in all the forms I have just mentioned. In this respect, I would like to share with you three convictions: Firstly, the mechanisms of confidence cannot be replaced by “algorithmic” confidence, i.e.
1 Transferring this additional duration risk to the Federal Reserve’s portfolio, and hence out of the portfolios of market participants, was one channel through which the asset purchase program was intended to have its effect on financial conditions. This “portfolio balance” channel has been discussed by Chairman Bernanke on several occasions. 2 This view associates the amount of policy stimulus with the stock of assets, or more precisely with the amount of duration risk, that the Federal Reserve takes onto its balance sheet. Policy achievements of LSAP2 The purpose of the asset purchase program was to help the Federal Reserve achieve the economic objectives of full employment and stable prices that it was given by Congress. I believe that the program delivered what could have been expected from it. In particular, let me highlight its success along two dimensions. First, the LSAP2 program made broad financial conditions more accommodative. This conclusion can be drawn from the behavior of financial markets from late August 2010 to the program’s implementation date in November 2010 – a period during which market participants moved from seeing such a program as a remote possibility to expecting it with near certainty. 3 Asset price movements over this period included a decline in real interest rates, a narrowing of risks spreads, an increase in equity prices, and a decline in the dollar – exactly the pattern that one would expect to be generated from additional monetary policy accommodation.

We have also abolished the foreign shareholding limit on local insurers to make way for strategic mergers and alliances with reputable international players. Earlier this month, MAS announced plans to introduce a new modular licensing framework for market intermediaries in the securities and futures industries. In addition, MAS will streamline the regulation of financial advisers and require them to comply with standards of market conduct and practices. MAS is also stepping up its review of the policy issues of the securities and futures legislation, to consolidate and streamline the requirements into a proposed Omnibus Securities and Futures Act. In the coming year, the key priority for the MAS is to follow through the reforms that have been introduced over the past year, and ensure that the implementation is carried out effectively. MAS will continue to review and refine our legislation and regulatory framework to keep pace with global developments. The challenge for us is to sustain the momentum and persevere in our efforts to build Singapore into a world-class financial centre. BIS Review 62/2000  2  International relations Let me now turn to MAS’ efforts in the international fora. With the recovery in crisis-affected economies, the focus has shifted from crisis management to ensuring the sustainability of the recovery and reform of the international financial architecture. Singapore has participated actively in the Financial Stability Forum, established over a year ago to monitor international financial market developments for potential vulnerabilities.
I was head of government during the critical period of 1999-2000 and I know exactly how difficult it is to adjust domestic consumption, even by two percentage points of GDP only. This time, the difficulty posed by the adjustment will be perceived as rather big, because it must be accomplished after several years of significant increases in consumption. The trend seemed to go on forever, which led to the decoupling between aspirations and real possibilities to fulfil them. Therefore, it is adequate to adjust domestic demand sooner rather than later, as long as we still enjoy a marked economic growth, given that at this point adjustment implies only resizing and not amputation. An essential issue that the Romanian society must solve without delay refers to what should be adjusted first: consumption or investment. I realise that we must ponder on this matter. The question is whether we should opt for buying an increasing number of cars or set aside resources in order to build the adequate road infrastructure. In a few years, the former choice could lead us to a total traffic jam, and the only additional consumption left for us could be that of carbon monoxide released by the exhaust pipes. This example is not only metaphorical.

The contributions to the FSR show that most commitments have been materialized in a regulatory framework that is currently being finalized: in particular, at the international level, in April 2012 the CPSS (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems) and the IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) published the “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures” that update, strengthen and broaden the former standards applicable in the different jurisdictions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I will pay a particular tribute to the leadership of the US lawmakers in this field of regulation and the personal action and involvement of Senator Dodd, with the law named after him and his colleague Senator Frank. European Union legislation with EMIR (European Market Infrastructures Regulation) has also marked a decisive step to address the need for further security and transparency on OTC derivatives markets. But the contributions to the Financial Stability Review, also show that reforms must be pursued. Before we get to the discussion, let me briefly give you some personal thoughts on this. Efforts in the reforms should tend to establish a comprehensive, adequately calibrated and consistent regulatory framework. 1. There is a need for a comprehensive framework. This means that we have to extend and complete security and transparency. •  First, pay a close attention to the regulation of OTC derivatives that will remain noncleared.
The answer, as in many other areas of complex decision-making, is simple. Or rather, it is to keep it simple. For studies have shown that the frisbee-catching dog follows the simplest of rules of thumb: run at a speed so that the angle of gaze to the frisbee remains roughly constant. Humans follow an identical rule of thumb. Catching a crisis, like catching a frisbee, is difficult. Doing so requires the regulator to weigh a complex array of financial and psychological factors, among them innovation and risk appetite. Were an economist to write down crisis-catching as an optimal control problem, they would probably have to ask a physicist for help. Yet despite this complexity, efforts to catch the crisis frisbee have continued to escalate. Casual empiricism reveals an ever-growing number of regulators, some with a Doctorate in physics. Ever-larger litters have not, however, obviously improved watchdogs’ Frisbee-catching abilities. No regulator had the foresight to predict the financial crisis, although some have since exhibited supernatural powers of hindsight. So what is the secret of the watchdogs’ failure? The answer is simple. Or rather, it is complexity. For what this paper explores is why the type of complex regulation developed over recent decades might not just be costly and cumbersome but sub-optimal for crisis control. In financial regulation, less may be more. Section 2 sets out the reasons why that might be, drawing on examples from outside economics and finance. Section 3 contrasts that thinking with the rapidly rising-tide of financial regulation.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Welcome address - National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia fintech event Welcome address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the NBRNM fintech virtual event, Skopje, 28 July 2021. *** Good morning to all. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this virtual event today. The purpose of the event is twofold: 1) to share with you the results of the activities we are taking as part of our ongoing efforts to support the fintech development and 2) to announce our next steps in fintech segment. This event would not be possible without the European Fund for SouthEast Europe, an institution with a prominent role in promoting responsible financial sector development. We are very thankful for its continuous support in different areas of our activities, including Fintech. I would also like to extend a gratitude to Mr. Jay Tikam, a financial expert who will present the findings from the first national Fintech Survey that we jointly conducted. Let me now shed some light on a couple of important dimensions related to fintech such as the specific circumstances that brought this issue to the fore in the last decade, the benefits it brings to the society, the role of policy makers/regulators in this segment, the current state and the priorities and challenges ahead. Although "fintech" is a relatively new term, technology has always played an important role in the financial sector.
Conclusions  After I prepared this presentation, I started even more to support the old truth in slightly modified wording – maintaining financial stability is more the art than the science. Maintaining the financial stability is the mission impossible for one institution to carry out in isolation, be it the central bank or any other authority. What is needed is shared data, shared analysis that brings together macro and micro prudential aspects of financial stability, common set of principles to fall back in case of systemic crisis, and perhaps most essentially, there is a need for common mindset. 4  BIS Review 63/2001  I would like to highlight one essential aspect of financial stability. The pan-European consolidation of banking industry has resulted in rapid increase of cross-border ownership. The question of co-operation between central banks and supervisors is the key to maintain sound financial systems. That applies both to crisis prevention as well as to crisis resolution. How to pass on early warning signals, how to provide emergency liquidity support, how to restructure or wind up big financial conglomerates – these questions are highly relevant for us as well as for the whole common market. I believe this a good time to stop and pass the word over to our moderator who will elaborate more thoroughly on the other mission impossible: how to find a right institutional structure for financial sector supervision. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 63/2001  5

The challenge, now, is to calibrate and phase in the new framework in a way that does not impede the recovery. The macroeconomic assessment of the reforms underway will help us strike the optimal balance. 25. Beyond capital and liquidity, other important initiatives are aiming at addressing systemically important financial institutions and cross-border resolutions. To better deal with the problem associated with systemic firms, progress is being made to improve the capacity to resolve them orderly, and to strengthen ex ante preparedness, contingency planning, cooperation and information exchange among the relevant authorities. 4  BIS Review 113/2010  26. There is a broad agreement for an approach that may have two pillars. One is about tools and measures to limit the risk of their failure; the other is about tools and measures to limit the consequences of their failures. Discretion is required to allow national authorities to strike the balance between the two pillars and tailor regulatory and supervisory actions to domestic conditions. The challenge is to ensure that national policies to address the risks associated with these firms are consistent, mutually supportive and thus avoiding regulatory arbitrage. But beyond international initiatives, enhancing supervision at the domestic level remains very critical. 27. Higher and better capital and liquidity standards are not sufficient conditions to secure the stability of the financial sector. Changes in the practice of micro-prudential oversight are also needed. Indeed, a lesson from the crisis is that the way supervision was performed prior to the crisis has likely contributed to it.
Applying these tools to central banking operations is both easier and harder than in the private sector. Easier, because there is no tension between profit and risk: central banking operations are always designed with risk in mind from the start. But harder, because the events in which central banks are called on to act often lie in the very tails of the distributions, making it hard – often impossible – to calibrate risk tolerance using historic data. And many of our operations are not discretionary, but reflect policy imperatives: so binding risk limits which, if applied, might cause a policy to be aborted mid-course, have little chance of success. At the Bank of England, we have responded to these challenges in three ways. First, we have adopted a risk tolerance that, though qualitative in nature, recognises the importance attached to the safeguarding of public resources and the priority placed on ensuring that policy decisions are always made in full knowledge of the financial risk implications. As I have described, maintaining monetary and financial stability – the Bank’s policy mission – can sometimes mean we have to take on material levels of risk ourselves. But where we do that, we should take on no more risk than is necessary, and we should do so with our eyes open, conscious too of the tradeoffs between financial and non-financial risk.

It also sits at the base of a particularly steep waterfall: since any loss in a lending operation would be expected to be met, first by a solvent firm’s own resources, second by the central bank’s collateral haircuts, and only then by its capital. Any loss beyond that implicitly falls to the government, as the ultimate owner of the central bank (Chart 6). Chart 6: The central bank capital waterfall  banking system  Central bank balance sheet  General Government  Probability  Self-insurance  Haircuts Capital  Risk-sharing with the Treasury More severe losses  Central banks across the globe differ in how they divide up this pie. In the UK, the Bank of England operates with a relatively low level of capital, and has few means of rapidly replenishing that capital if it is depleted (Chart 7). As a result it has tended to rely heavily on UK government indemnities for its larger operations, such as the quantitative easing example I gave a few moments ago. The Bank’s measured leverage ratio is 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  just 1%, reflecting the fact that it supports a balance sheet of around £ on less than £ of equity. 12  But the ratio for its non-indemnified balance is materially higher, reflecting the significant role played by indemnities.
Hence, monetary policy works primarily by influencing expectations regarding future interest rates. Monetary policy may thus be more efficient if economic agents understand the central bank’s intentions in its interest-rate setting. In the November 2005 Inflation Report, Norges Bank first published its own forecast for the interest rate for the next three years. The aim is to enhance the predictability of monetary policy. With a predictable monetary policy, market participants can react to new information in a way that contributes to stabilising developments in output and inflation. We try to establish an interest rate path that provides a reasonable balance between the objective of stabilising inflation at target and the objective of stabilising developments in output and employment within a reasonable time horizon, normally 1 - 3 years. Interest-rate setting is also assessed in the light of developments in property prices and credit. The results of this trade-off are published in the Inflation Report in the form of a chart that presents central projections for the interest rate, the exchange rate, inflation and capacity utilisation in the economy. Underlying inflation has been lower than projected in recent months. Nevertheless, several factors point to higher inflation ahead. Capacity utilisation is high and there is little spare capacity in the Norwegian economy. Employment is rising rapidly and unemployment has exhibited a marked decline. There are signs of higher wage growth and expectations of rising inflation. At the same time, the krone exchange rate has depreciated from strong values.

This is currently my best assessment of the sustainable rate of unemployment in Sweden after having read a number of papers on the subject and having discussed the issue with several specialists in the field of labour market economics. 12 The lower repo-rate path is also better if one assumes a level of 6 per cent. 13 At a press meeting on 3 March, the Minister of Finance, Anders Borg, announced that the Ministry’s assessment of the equilibrium rate of unemployment has been revised downwards from 6 per cent to approximately 5 per cent by 2015. 14 The Ministry of Finance plans to publish its calculations in a ministry memorandum in connection with the spring budget bill 2011. One could perhaps object that it is not certain that the lower repo-rate path in panel a of Figure 8 is necessarily the best repo-rate path. It does, however, appear to fulfil the Qvigstad condition in that the inflation gap in panel c is mainly positive and the unemployment gap in panel d is also positive (for the entire forecast period if the sustainable rate of unemployment is 5.5 per cent and for most of the forecast period if it is 6 per cent). One can show that an even lower repo-rate path leads to a lower mean squared gap for unemployment but to a higher mean squared gap for inflation. It is thus no easy matter to stabilise both better. However, a somewhat different profile for the low repo-rate path may perhaps provide a better result.
Growth momentum from the private sector has picked up more firmly, making it possible for the Government to begin moving toward fiscal consolidation to ensure medium-term fiscal sustainability. According to current estimates, effective tax collection together with the economic expansion could allow the Government to achieve a balanced budget a couple of years earlier than planned. It is therefore clear that the thrust of growth has now been shifted from the fiscal sector to private hands, with export also contributing in a very significant manner. This is a much welcome development, as sustainable growth cannot rest forever on the shoulder of the government who makes up only about 15 percent of the country’s GDP. Ladies and gentlemen, The key drivers of the current recovery, as you know, have been the strong performance of export and private consumption. Export of goods broke its highest record in May this year at 6.5 billion US dollars and has since remained at the monthly average of 6.4 billion US dollars, with the average monthly export growth of around 12 percent year-on-year. BIS Review 46/2003  1  To many, this is a pleasant surprise given the export performance of other regional countries of late. It owes partly to the diversification of Thai export, both in terms of product type and market destination. In particular, our export is not concentrated in just one or two commodities but rather well balanced between agricultural, agro-industrial, and manufactured goods.

That said, the studies that do exist tentatively support the conclusion that macro-prudential policy can be effective in the euro area. Assetside measures like LTV, LTI and DTI in particular have been found to be effective in dampening real estate booms. 10 As this was the sector at the heart of the crisis in several euro area countries, this is encouraging. Further research in this area is essential to help us better understand the impact and transmission channels of macro-prudential policies. Questions of effectiveness aside, where the SSM represents a major step forward in macroprudential policy, is in creating some centralisation of macro-prudential decision-making. The SSM Regulation gives the ECB the power to apply stricter macro-prudential measures than national authorities if it deems necessary. This allows us to take an integrated view of macroprudential policy – spillovers, arbitrage effects – and provides a safeguard against inaction bias at the national level. Moreover, the important role of the ECB Governing Council in macro-prudential decisionmaking allows for interactions between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy to be internalised and synergies to be exploited. To give just one example, several of the nonstandard measures we have adopted during the crisis, such as changes in collateral haircuts or reserve requirements, might in certain cases overlap with macro-prudential measures like liquidity ratios and margin requirements. This suggests that macro-prudential policies can support us in fulfilling our mandate. Conclusion Let me conclude. Since the launch of the euro, we have become more interconnected.