samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some inflation targeting central banks – Norway, New Zealand and Sweden – are now publishing charts which show how they expect to change policy rates to achieve their targets 6 . Should the MPC follow this trend? If you follow press reports of our regular Inflation Report forecasts, you might be forgiven for thinking we already have. But actually no: our forecasts take market expectations for interest rates as their starting point, and we leave commentators to draw their own inferences. We have maintained the position that we do not give hints about future interest rate changes. Naturally we are looking closely at what happens elsewhere and we will want to learn from their experience – though of course, since the MPC is not a consensual body, it would be a significant complication to get it to agree an explicit path for interest rates. 6  In addition, the Bank of Canada now includes text in its monetary policy report which indicates whether or not rates will have to change from their current level to meet the inflation target. BIS Review 20/2007  5  Have we become prisoners of our past success? Let me come, finally, to the biggest, and most difficult of the issues I want to raise tonight – namely the extent to which the stability of the past decade has conditioned expectations of what the MPC can and should do, in ways which may be both helpful and unhelpful to its ability to do its job.

Our monetary policy framework can only offer flexibility as long as it remains credible. But our credibility needs to reflect reality. It is important that the unprecedented stability of the past decade does not lead people to believe that central banks can walk on water. They can’t. When that becomes clear – as at some stage it will – I see some risk that people will be excessively disillusioned. So let me end by being very clear about what I regard as reality. The MPC cannot keep inflation exactly on target, at all times and in all circumstances. Large price shocks will sometimes drive us away from target, and we need to be able use our judgement in deciding how to react. But we can and will keep inflation close to target on average. Short run deviations from the target should not leave anyone in any doubt about that. Conclusions The stability of the period since 1992 has been almost as unexpected as the falling of the Berlin Wall, and every bit as welcome. It remains something of a puzzle and we cannot assume it will continue indefinitely. We do not know quite how big a part the MPC has played in achieving this outcome. But it has certainly been shaped by it. Success – however earned – has its price. It may have bred expectations of the MPC and what monetary policy can deliver which are frankly unrealistic – and unsustainable in the longer term.
If people are reluctant to pay taxes but demand social security and good roads, it is the shadow of the past. In brief, if people do not understand why elections are held and what is the state’s role, it is the shadow of the past. But, of course, in ten years a lot has been achieved. We have built up democratic institutions. Market economy functions. Private ownership has a solid foundation. Banks provide credit to people for new housing developments. But our current success should not be taken for granted. And we should also bear in mind that much needs to be done yet. The public has to understand the role and possibilities of the state and the government in the market economy. Everybody should feel responsible for their own welfare as well as their family’s and the state’s well-being. Our new generation should be able to cope with the complicated processes of the modern society much better than we did. In our efforts to achieve this goal it is impossible to underestimate the support provided by our partners. The Estonian society and politicians need partners with whom to exchange experience and from whom still to learn the fundamentals of the functioning civil society. At that, I would like to thank Konrad Adenauer Foundation for the work it has done and is doing in Estonia and elsewhere for the promotion of political co-operation, preservation and support of free democracies throughout the world, development and consolidation of the social market economy and respective values.

D.  Concluding remarks  To date the European Union faces several complicated but well-known economic policy problems from the recent past. Estonia as the future EU member state must take this into account. It is not enough to be able to overcome challenges on the WAY to the European Union. We must become equal partners to other European states, be able and willing to participate in the discussions on the monetary and fiscal policy issues, perceive Estonia in Europe and Europe in Estonia. Today the European Economic and Monetary Union within which 12 states have adopted the single currency, offers a historic chance to create a truly strong, flexible and efficient economic area. I believe that potentials of the single currency will be exploited in the best possible way. It would serve the interests of the current as well as future member states and the whole of Europe. BIS Review 51/2002  7
As for companies, the concessional financing term according to the scheme was specified as three years, not four as with SMEs. Part of the cost of financing is subsidized where the State shoulders the entire cost for the first year and 50% of the cost for the second year, while the beneficiary has to cover the whole cost for the third. Part Two: guarantee of financing In addition to subsidizing the cost of financing, the scheme proposes a State guarantee of the financing extended to SMEs to incentivize banks to grant financing. The layout is suited to the local economy where the State guarantees 80% of the principal debt but not the cost of financing. Meanwhile, an annual fee of 0.25% is to be paid to the State to reduce banks’ moral hazard and to generate revenue for the government to partially offset the cost of the scheme. The committee proposed a set of controls and restrictions to guarantee that the financing is spent towards the indicated purposes, most importantly: companies refrain from distributing dividends to shareholders while benefiting from the scheme. They must retain the national staff ratio as of 31 December 2019 and work towards satisfying the target ratio for 31 December 2021, relevant to their respective sector. It is worth noting that this guarantee has several advantages for the economy, for banks and economic entities including the following: -  The actual cost to the government to guarantee financing does not exceed one tenth of the overall financing extended to economic entities.

The impact would continue to grow as the crisis persists, since the cash flow crunch would force companies – including those previously in a good liquidity position - to shut down for failure to secure financing; either due to increasing financing costs or the banks’ reluctance to finance amid fears of growing default risk during the crisis. This could lead to companies’ bankruptcies, which, due to the chain effect between economic sectors could thus result in a contraction in non-oil GDP. The Committee’s Mandate To counter the impact and repercussions of the crisis on the national economy, the Higher Steering Committee for Economic Stimulus (The Committee), formed by the Council of Ministers Resolution (455) on 31 March 2020, and chaired by the Governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait, adopted a proactive approach to realize economic stability throughout the crisis. It laid down and initiated economic stimulus measures to prepare for the economic recovery stage that shall  Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  -3-  follow once we overcome this crisis. Immediately afterwards, a national economic and structural reform plan needs to be launched and adopted by all the relevant stakeholders. The Committee listed several measures and governing principles to serve as a framework for all its activities, and they are as follows:  -  -  -  -  Introducing immediate remedies that provide practical and swift solutions to protect the national economy supporting economic reform and best possible resource allocation.
Greater use of financial products; as well as prudent use 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  of credit among households – would promote wealth creation. A nation with a more literate population – can achieve greater financial inclusion through the access and appropriate use of financial products and services. Such households would facilitate in achieving the intended outcomes of macroeconomic policies. Let me focus on three areas that are relevant towards shaping a better future in the context of financial literacy: 1. First – long-term financial planning begins at young age and relevant at each key life stages. 2. Second – on the individual responsibility to take charge of its own financial decisions and well-being; and 3. Third – building financial capability and enhancing literacy – is a shared responsibility. I will share the on-going collaborative efforts undertaken to raise financial literacy among Malaysians. Talking about long-term financial planning Based on Bank Negara Malaysia’s observation – there is a continuing concern – on the lack of attention to long-term financial planning among a majority of Malaysians. Only 40% of Malaysians are financially ready for retirement. A recent focus group discussion with retirees – shows that they would still rely on their children or purchase using credit in the event of emergency or for higher value items. This could be a result of lack of financial planning when they were younger.

Furthermore, our analysis6 shows that there are only limited spillovers from the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve to euro area inflation and output. This suggests that ECB monetary policy actions are, by and large, able to shield the euro area economy from spillovers from US monetary policy. But undoubtedly, there is evidence that US monetary policy is a driver of a “global financial cycle”.7 In step with such a financial cycle the risks to euro area financial stability can change as well. Current financial stability concerns in the euro area As you know, our characterisation of the main risks to euro area financial stability has remained broadly unchanged over the recent years. We see four main risks: The most prominent risk stems from the possibility of a disorderly increase of global risk premia. The second risk is related to renewed debt sustainability concerns, for sovereign debt in particular. The third risk is that banks’ intermediation capacity may be hampered by their continued low profitability. Finally, we are of the opinion that possible liquidity strains in the investment fund sector constitute a growing risk. All four risks are intertwined and would have, if they were to materialise, the potential to be mutually reinforcing. In 2018, a growing economy and improved banking sector resilience were important positive factors supporting financial stability. Now, however, the assessment is affected by a weakening economic growth outlook for the euro area.
A:  Avenue for meetings – To promote discussion and policy analysis among central banks, the Asian office has hosted and supported numerous meetings and events in the region, collaborating with other organisations such as the Financial Stability Institute, EMEAP and SEANZA. R:  Reserves management – The Asian office plays a vital role in the management and administration of Asian Bond Funds 1 and 2 that aim to broaden and deepen regional and domestic bond markets. The dealing room of the Asian office also provides Asian central banks with ready access to BIS banking services, helping facilitate their liquidity and portfolio management of foreign reserves. Over these 10 years, I have seen the Asian office play a significant role in helping to strengthen financial sectors, develop financial infrastructure, and promote stability and  BIS Review 88/2008  1  financial integration in this region. And since its establishment, the HKMA has stepped up its participation in the BIS' wide range of activities, sometimes co-hosting seminars and meetings, fostering an even closer relationship between us. Let me take this opportunity to acknowledge with thanks the great work of the BIS management and its staff, who have made the Asian office a success. In particular, I would like to thank Bob McCauley who has contributed significantly to the achievements of the Asian Office in the past decade. The accomplishments of the BIS in Asia over the past 10 years call for celebration. With this in mind, let's celebrate these achievements and anticipate even greater endeavours to come.

Remember that in a basic Solow growth model, investment should grow at the growth rate of productivity plus the growth rate of hours worked along the steady state path of the economy. For many European countries, there is scope to increase labour participation rates over time. But given demographic trends, a major part of raising investment demand must be engineering an upward shock to productivity. Besides, internal devaluation can be the backbone of reform in a small, open economy, but not in a larger and more closed one – and even less in the euro area as a whole, where it is by and large a zero-sum game. This is why the composition of reforms also matters – we need reforms that both boost competitiveness and raise productivity. The reforms undertaken so far, despite proceeding at different speeds, have achieved a significant internal devaluation in some euro area countries. Since 2009 Greece has almost entirely reversed the ULC growth it experienced in the pre-crisis period (–19.4% relative to the euro area), while good progress has also been made in Spain (–11.3%), Ireland (–12.3%) and to a lesser extent Portugal (–8.2%). As a result, most of these countries have been able to improve their competitiveness and export. Spain and Portugal, for example, have persistently outperformed the euro area between 2011 and 2013, with both countries gaining more than 10 percentage points of export market shares relative to their competitors.
It is also our duty to complete the European regulatory framework with the finalisation of the resolution mechanism to make the functioning of the banking sector smoother – in line with the spirit of the Banking Union, also enabling the Capital Market Union (CMU) to bloom, within the holistic approach of the “Financing Union for Investment and Innovation” I have suggested. Finally, we must ensure that the new regulatory framework is consistently implemented everywhere, and avoid any backtracking outside Europe. Financial stability is a global common good, and as such, regulatory arbitrage must not become an option. * * * Let me conclude. Credibility for central bankers now rests on admitting that monetary policy and macroprudential policy are somewhat porous, especially in a situation where we could have an upward financial cycle associated with weak inflation. This calls for a consistent action by central banks that covers both areas: price and financial stability. Moving away from an overly strict separation principle, let us try to be complete and consistent central bankers playing an active role in monetary policy as well as in macroprudential policies. 1 Altavilla C., Boucinha M., Peydro JL, 2017, Monetary Policy and Bank Profitability in a Low Interest Rate  Environment, ECB Working paper series #2105, October 2017. 2 Ratio of non-financial agents’ debt to GDP, first quarter 2017. Source: Eurostat, Federal Reserve, Banque de  France calculations.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Monitoring financial stability, with active monetary policies Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at a conference at the London Business School, London, 23 November 2017. * * * Accompanying slides Ladies and Gentlemen, Price stability and the prevention of financial imbalances are often two sides of the same coin. Indeed, price stability and financial stability are supposed to be complementary and mutually beneficial. During the recent crisis in the euro area, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy was hampered by a fragmented interbank market, as borrowing conditions deteriorated in stressed countries. The resulting deterioration in the economy in turn contributed to a further worsening of the financial stress, in what we call a real-financial feedback loop. To cope with this difficult situation, the policy response in the euro area was twofold. First, we adopted an active monetary policy and launched unconventional measures that included the credit easing package. Second, we set up a Banking Union and assigned new macroprudential powers and tasks both at the European level (the ECB, the ESRB) as well as at the national level. In France, the Haut Conseil de stabilité financière (HCSF or High Council for Financial Stability) was created in July 2013 as the French authority with the legal ability to impose binding macroprudential measures. The economy is now recovering, so the medicine seems to have worked. However, our attention is now turning to the potential side effects of our treatment.
Indeed, I find it hard to understand how an earnest rating agency might assess sovereign risk without even referring to that country’s level of public debt and international reserves. As a professor, I can safely assume that the “subject is not treated”, hence the conclusion is unsubstantiated. As concerns these assessments, I must say however that things are not in the least that simple. Of course, we could assert that at present our economy is in a better position than those of other countries in the region rated within the “investment grade” range. But those countries have at least adopted austerity measures at domestic level. How do things stand in our country? After two consecutive years of wage increases in a range from 20 percent to 25 percent per year – i.e. more than twice the labour productivity gains – the wage rises envisaged for 2009 ranged between 50 percent and 60 percent, whereas the agreements with the trade unions, whenever struck, do not provide for hikes lower than 35 percent. Such an approach reveals a dangerous decoupling between aspirations and reality. In the current international context and given the already dangerously high level of external deficit, we must not aim at further increases in domestic consumption above labour productivity gains, since there are no more financing sources for something like that. And unless we understand this state of affairs ourselves, rating agencies are going to warn us.

With these thoughts, I wish the best of luck to all the editors of Ziarul Financiar as well as professionalism in dealing with the difficult economic issues to all the economic media. 4  BIS Review 161/2008
I described capital flows to emerging Asia earlier, largely in terms of cyclical factors relating to monetary policy. But there is a larger secular phenomenon underpinning these flows to Asia – the structural rebalancing of investment portfolios towards emerging economies in general, and Asia in particular. Given the size of developing Asia, there is not enough portfolio investment in Asia and not enough portfolio investment by Asia. There is scope for both to increase – dramatically. 31. First, global investors will invest more in Asia. Advanced economies represent only half of world GDP but three-quarters of global market capitalisation. A reallocation of just 5% of advanced economy equity portfolios to emerging economies translates into a potential flow of $ trillion. 32. You know the story well – strong economic growth, sound fundamentals, and favourable demographics will support the valuations of Asian assets and draw a growing tide of institutional investor interest from the rest of the world. At the same time, rapid urbanisation will mean large infrastructure needs in Asia – the ADB has estimated that Asia needs about $ trillion through 2020 to upgrade its infrastructure. This financing need cannot be met by public funds alone. Infrastructure funds are set to play an increasingly important role in the asset management landscape in Asia. 33. Second, Asian investors will invest more, both in Asia and globally.

Ravi Menon: Forces driving the global economic outlook Keynote address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Investment Management Association of Singapore 13th Annual Conference, Singapore, 14 March 2012. *  *  *  Mr Lester Gray, Chairman of IMAS, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. A. Fragile equilibrium  1. The world economy appears to have found a fragile equilibrium. There are weaknesses in key economies balanced by pockets of growth elsewhere. More notably, the worst fears of the last three months of 2011 have not materialised. The last six weeks in particular have shown signs that the global economy has avoided imminent disaster. 2. In the Eurozone, the threat of a major crisis has receded, at least for now.   A deal has been struck on the second Greek bailout package, allaying fears of a messy default situation.   The ECB’s two tranches of Long-Term Refinancing Operation, or LTRO, amounting to more than 1 trillion Euros, has provided Eurozone banks much needed liquidity to meet their funding needs.   The LTRO has also helped to compress sovereign yields significantly, particularly at the front end of the yield curve. 3. In the United States, the risk of a double dip recession has waned.   Employment data have surprised on the upside.   New orders for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing continue to indicate higher levels of activity for the next six months. 4.