samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For those aspiring to senior roles in technology, such postings may even be necessary, as the competition for such jobs is at a global level. Next, what can financial institutions do to help grow the pipeline of Singaporean technology professionals? One, they can collaborate with polytechnics and universities on apprenticeships to prepare students for technology jobs. JP Morgan is looking to hire more than 30 polytechnic graduates in their 1-year Apprenticeship programme for the Tech and Ops function this year. Apprentices will receive on-the-job training in product knowledge, personal development and professional skills, as well as exposure to top professionals across diﬀerent businesses within the bank. Two, financial institutions can hire individuals from a broader range of backgrounds and upskill them into technology roles. DBS Bank has a skills development programme to train individuals with STEM backgrounds or have taken some STEM modules in specialised technology skills. Individuals will be trained to take on roles in areas such as product development, platform infrastructure, or information security. Three, financial institutions can set up specialised facilities to build up technology capabilities in their workforce. Standard Chartered Bank launched its global learning hub diSCover Lab in Singapore, in December last year. The aXess Academy, one of nine academies within the Lab, aims to train over 2,100 of its Singapore-based technology talents in areas such as cloud transformation, open banking solutions, cybersecurity, and client digital journeys. Finally, how is the government helping to grow the tech talent pool?

Joseph Yam, JP: The Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s main initiatives in the area of banking supervision Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, JP, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), at a lunch with representatives of the Finance Constituency organised by Dr David Li, held in Hong Kong on 15 January 2001. The speech outlines the latest state of play on the HKMA’s current initiatives in the area of banking supervision, as well as responding to some points raised by Dr Li on behalf of the Finance Constituency. *  *  *  1. I would like to thank David Li for arranging today’s lunch with representatives of the Finance Constituency. The number of live issues in the realm of bank supervision, some of which have been set down in David’s letter in advance of this lunch, is currently quite considerable, so it is useful to have this opportunity to get together to exchange views. As you will know, it is very much our style to work in close collaboration with the banking industry on developing our policies rather than to adopt a confrontational approach, and long may this continue. 2. Let me run through what I see as the HKMA’s main initiatives in the bank supervision area in the next twelve months, in the course of which I will try to pick up some of the points made in David’s letter.
Given its need to instil confidence in the markets and to ensure the stability of the euro exchange rate, the European central bank is likely to want to be perceived as ready and able to operate effectively in the dollar market, for which substantial dollar reserves may be required. In the short term, the response of non-European central banks to the introduction of the euro is also likely to be cautious. Ultimately, the desired euro holdings of these central banks will largely depend on the decisions they make about their exchange rate regime. A number of countries -- including the central European countries that have applied for membership in the European Union and other countries in Africa -- may decide to peg their currency to the euro. Yet these countries may well wait for the newly-formed European central bank to establish its policy record and clarify its operating procedures before they commit their currencies to a euro peg. Indeed, history suggests that a currency’s role as an international reserve, means of exchange, and store of value is slowly gained and slowly lost -- as the examples of the dollar and pound sterling illustrate. The dollar, in particular, may have seemed on the way to losing much of its international prominence after the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1973. After declining as a share of international reserves and a means for international transactions from 1974 to the mid-1980s, however, the dollar’s relative use has not changed significantly during the past decade.

By contrast, American policymakers might have found it helpful to devalue the dollar in Texas when oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s or the dollar in New England at the end of the defense-led growth of the late 1980s. These options, however, simply were not available. In retrospect, it was the discipline fostered by the absence of the opportunity to alter regional exchange rates that forced our firms, local governments, and workers to reorganize, become more efficient, and grow in what are now some of the most productive areas of the United States. Similarly, if national labor markets in Europe become more flexible and efficient in the presence of a common currency and firms learn to count only on their own resources -- with no help from an occasional exchange rate adjustment -- European capital and labor markets may themselves become more integrated. And if greater integration of labor markets can only proceed slowly -- given persistent and unavoidable cultural and language differences -- this need not be the case for financial markets, where the disappearance of exchange rate risk will cause capital to move in response to interest rate differentials of only a very few percentage points. In this context, I would like to make clear that I do not view as ideal the U.S. model where the burden of recessions tends to fall heavily on the shoulders of workers, who may be obliged to move across regions and industries in response to the business cycle.
Figure 2: Contribution to Annual CPI Inflation 12  Tobacco and Gold** Food and Energy* Services Core Goods  10 8 6 4 2  03/08  02/08  01/08  12/07  11/07  10/07  09/07  08/07  07/07  06/07  05/07  04/07  03/07  02/07  01/07  0  * Food and Energy: Food, non-alcoholic beverages and energy. **Tobacco and Gold: Alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and gold.. Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. . Both domestic and international developments have played a part on the course of food prices. A prolonged shortage of rainfall in Turkey resulted in low crop yields in 2007, which turned into an adverse supply shock. Strong global demand for food and continued elevation in agricultural commodity prices further added to domestic food inflation through the external trade channel. Recently, adverse impacts of these factors have been quite visible especially in processed food prices. Accordingly, annual food inflation maintained its high levels with a marked contribution of about 2.3 points to the 3.1 percent year-to-date headline inflation. Therefore, food prices became the main factor impeding the disinflation process (Figure 3, Table 1). Adverse developments in energy prices have been another major factor in slowing the disinflation process. Rising oil prices continued to lead to significant hikes in the prices of fuel-oil products. Elevated oil prices have also affected the prices of energy items in housing utilities, including electricity tariff rates, which were adjusted upwards by a significant margin.

7  In a recent contribution, Nicholas Bloom and co-authors showed that US multinationals obtained higher productivity from IT than non-US multinationals and that establishments taken over by US multinationals (but not by non-US multinationals) increased the productivity of their IT. They attributed a bulk of productivity differences to differing people management practices across US and non-US firms. See Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen, 2012, “Americans do I.T. better: US multinationals and the productivity miracle”. American Economic Review 102(1), pp. 167–201. 8  For more information about the Network visit http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/researcher_compnet.en.html. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Production constraints continue to ease, while private sector demand is back on track. The growth momentum in the period ahead is likely to sustain, driven mainly by domestic demand. We expect that economy will grow at 5.7 percent this year and 5.0 percent next year. This episode of rapid growth recovery is that it also witnessed macroeconomic stability. Thailand has a long history of low and stable inflation, averaging around 3 percent over the decades. The unemployment rate in recent years has also been low at around 1 percent. Meanwhile, external position remains solid with moderate short-term external indebtedness. The banking sector has been safe and sound with sustained profitability amidst the ongoing global financial crisis. Despite capital inflows into Thailand, there appears to be no sign of asset price bubble while the degree of leverage in the corporate and household sector is still low. Such promising outlook is reflected in Thailand’s sovereign credit rating which has been stable at investment grade despite intermittent political tension. At this juncture, please allow me to highlight a number of Thailand’s fundamental strengths that underpin this positive outlook. First, our corporate sector remains competitive with accumulated robust savings and profitability. This fact is well evidenced by their healthy balance sheets and their ability to explore investment opportunities overseas. Net profit of most listed companies in the second quarter 2012 turned out be positive despite damages inflicted by the floods.

In line with the cyclical situation, this policy has provided its stimulus through the key interest rate cut and ongoing liquidity injection into the banking system. We have also revised the banking system regulatory basis from the viewpoint of easing it, in order to stimulate lending by the banking system. I avail myself of the opportunity to reiterate that the banking system remains profitable, liquid and well-capitalised. Safeguarding the stability of this system will always be on our focus. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Third, reducing uncertainties and risk premiums in the economy is an important priority. As I have already stated, these uncertainties stem, to a great extent, from the foreign market, but a part of them stems from the Albanian economy. Without intending to make a list, I will mention just a few: •  Reducing informality should be a primary objective. Besides outflows in public finances, informality brings hidden costs in terms of diminishing competition, inefficiency in terms of lack of balance sheet transparency, and artificially increased financing costs to businesses. •  Fostering the financial system infrastructure protection is another aspect deserving attention. The Bank of Albania signed and has already made effective a cooperation agreement with the People’s Bank of China, which also provides for the possibility to obtain liquidity in case of need. An important step in this regard is the agreement between the Deposit Insurance Agency and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to increase the deposit insurance coverage.
This is a unique and highly symbolic event for Europe. As regard France, the early changeover of non-cash payments in 2001, and the rapid introduction of banknotes and coins in euro in early 2002, proved to be a success and entirely in line with the scenarios devised in consultation with all the involved parties (the banking sector, cash-in-transit companies, the Police and the Army, retailers and the general public). In France, almost 70% of non-cash payments were in euro at the end of December 2001. Since 1 January, all transactions have been conducted in euro, and no major incidents came to light, thanks to the early use of non-cash payments by the general public throughout the second half of 2001. This was also a key factor in the rapid acceptance of the banknotes and coins by the public. Similar success has been witnessed in all European countries, thanks to national efforts and the co-ordination by the European Commission and the Eurosystem; a month and a half after the  introduction of euro banknotes and coins, more than 95% of cash transactions in the euro area are now being carried out in euro. Although the practical changeover to the euro might be considered as an outstanding achievement, we should nevertheless remain vigilant on the following issues: ·  First, price stability. Although some increases in prices of a certain number of consumer goods have been reported, it is likely that, overall, the effect on price stability will be marginal.

The intensive trade and financial links with the euro area are the main factors behind this choice. Of course, the adoption of a euro-based exchange rate arrangement is a unilateral decision, and does not involve any commitment from the Eurosystem. However, this growing use of the euro as a reference currency, and also the use of euro banknotes and coins outside the euro-area, may be seen as a sign of confidence in the stability-oriented macroeconomic policies of the euro area. The internationalisation of the euro might develop further, thanks to an established track record of the Eurosystem with reference to its primary objective of price stability and continuing integration of financial markets in the euro area. But the Eurosystem does not pursue the internationalisation of the euro as an independent policy goal: this implies that it neither fosters nor hinders this process. It does not mean that the international dimension is irrelevant for the Eurosystem. Of course, we take into account potential spillover effects on monetary policy. However, the impact of the internationalisation of the euro on monetary policy should not be over-stressed, as the Eurosystem’s monetary policy is sufficiently robust to take into account and accommodate its potential implications. At this point, one may ask what conditions are required to complete the success of the euro and EMU in the medium term. In my opinion, the metaphor of rugby is appropriate: by introducing banknotes and coins in euro, we have scored a try. Now, we must convert our gains.
In the long run monetary policy is only capable of influencing inflation; a systematically higher rate of inflation, however, would not lead to higher long-term growth. The level of long-term growth is determined instead by real economic factors such as demographic changes, technology, education and the efficiency of markets. In so far as a long-term relationship between inflation and growth does exist, most of the evidence suggests that, if anything, higher inflation impairs the workings of the economy and thereby weakens output. Today there is widespread - though not yet complete - agreement on this. What monetary policy can do, on the other hand, is influence the economy’s fluctuations around the long-term trend, albeit without any lasting effects on growth. This means that if resource utilisation is low or high, monetary policy can be used to stimulate or dampen activity temporarily, but not to fine-tune the economy. With an inflation target which applies downwards as well as upwards, so that deflation as well as inflation are avoided, monetary policy can then exercise a stabilising influence and help to smooth economic fluctuations around the long-term trend. Problems arise if resource utilisation becomes so high that inflation starts to accelerate and the central bank has not intervened. People may then begin to count on inflation remaining high in the longer run. A higher level of inflation may then be established, whereas the effects on production and employment will be only temporary.

This is a reason why the central bank should act with foresight and be alert to the development of inflation expectations. BIS Review 8/1997  -2-  The potential for influencing fluctuations in activity around the trend is dependent on people’s appraisal of the central bank’s determination and ability to maintain price stability. Central bankers talk of the importance of credibility, by which is meant the extent to which people expect inflation to be in line with its targeted rate. The degree of credibility is conditioned by, for example, the historical record of inflation and the existence of government financial deficits. Weak credibility calls for caution in monetary policy, just as higher credibility confers more room in which to manoeuvre. Experience has shown, moreover, that even in the shorter run, the possibility of influencing employment and unemployment via monetary policy is very limited. Limited fluctuations around the growth trend are by no means sufficient condition for a smooth development of employment and low unemployment. Comparisons between countries and regions reveal that a similar growth pattern, even over a considerable period, can involve markedly divergent effects on employment and unemployment. This highlights the function of the labour market. It is there that measures must be taken in order to tackle problems with employment and unemployment. I want to underscore some conclusions from this discussion. Monetary policy cannot have growth as the primary objective because it is not capable of influencing growth in the longer run.
I shall only reiterate here that for a small, open economy like ours with no trade or capital controls, keeping a separate currency leaves us exposed to external shocks and volatile capital flows. We are thus obliged to maintain a large amount of external reserves. These are financial assets that could perhaps earn higher rates of return if invested domestically. Instead, we invest them abroad, in effect promoting foreign, rather than domestic growth. That is the price we pay to have an independent currency. This vulnerability is indeed one of the main reasons why some leading academics in this field believe that the small new Member States should have been allowed to lock themselves into the relatively greater security of the euro area as quickly as possible. The validity of this view was underscored by Malta’s experience in late 2004/early 2005 when the Bank’s external reserves declined as a result of uncertainty created by speculative comments on the exchange rate. Your second question reflects the view that the fixed nature of the exchange rate as well as the level at which the lira was pegged to the euro in ERM II are both inappropriate and are stifling Malta’s competitiveness. Let me first address the issue of the fixed peg. This has been a mainstay of our monetary policy for over three decades. It is what Maltese traders and investors, and the public at large, have become accustomed to. The resulting exchange rate and price stability have made a vital contribution to the country’s economic development.

The baseline scenario reflects the developments that the Board believes to be the most likely to occur with the information at hand at the statistical closing of the Report. However, there are risk scenarios that, if materialized, might change the macroeconomic outlook and, therefore, the course of monetary policy. On this occasion, after evaluating the alternative scenarios, the Board estimates that the risk balance is downward biased for output and unbiased for inflation. On the global front, a first risk comes from China, namely the fragility of its financial system, among other factors. As I said at the beginning, the banks’ off-balance-sheet financial intermediation has been increasing and credit has accumulated enormous growth in the past few years, with a substantial portion going to local governments. In other economies, episodes of rapid credit growth have resulted a few years down the line in a deterioration of the quality of banking assets and financial intermediaries’ balance sheets, and in a slowdown in domestic demand. Although the Chinese financial system has some features that differentiate it from others, there is no denying that any difficulties in this field could have negative effects on China’s growth for a longer period. If so, it would hurt world growth and commodity prices, particularly for copper. A second risk coming from abroad has to do with the way emerging economies will accommodate the withdrawal of monetary stimulus packages in developed countries.
Jean-Pierre Roth: The long path to restoring faith in financial markets Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the CEO Luncheon of the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Zurich, 4 September 2002. *  *  *  At the outset I would like to acknowledge the long-standing ties between the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce and the Swiss National Bank. In the past, members of the Governing Board have been invited to speak before this select audience. It is a great pleasure and honor for me to continue this tradition. My remarks today will focus on the present challenges faced by the global economy: a crisis in confidence which has pushed equity prices to unexpected lows and an economic recovery which does not seem to take the desired path. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the fundamentals are in place for a return to sustained growth. Inflation is low in almost all industrial countries, monetary policy is supporting the recovery, household consumption still plays a stabilizing role and public finances despite short-term difficulties - are not far from equilibrium. While numerous factors are responsible for the present economic uncertainty, the prolonged volatility witnessed in equity markets has hit investors particularly hard. In hindsight the stock market correction fits partially the classic story of fundamentals; one that is driven by a bubbles collapse in dotcom companies and the anticipated slowdown in economic activity.

This has raised other issues of rotation of auditors to prevent cozy relationships undermining the integrity of the audit. A periodic change of the firm might have led to more serious questioning of the accounts. Further, some US firms have announced plans to include, as an expense, the cost of executive stock options. The changes aim to more accurately describe the revenues and costs associated with companies’ primary business. And Standard and Poor’s has introduced new benchmarks for reporting corporate earnings. These are all positive examples of participants working together to enforce the spirit of the rules under which financial markets operate. What has been done recently in Switzerland to improve the transparency of Swiss financial markets? Some efforts have already started some time ago. Most notably, the Swiss Exchange and the Swiss Business Federation “economiesuisse” co-ordinated their efforts to develop two sets of rules which became effective on July 1, 2002: The “Swiss Code of Best Practice” and the “Directive Concerning Information on Corporate Governance”. This will hopefully lift the standards for corporate governance and improve the level of transparency for the publicly traded firms in Switzerland. We have also seen political initiatives aiming at more transparency in remunerations. Business uncertainty It would be shortsighted to believe that the recent stock market reaction has only been the result of misconduct and the lack of corporate governance. The world economy is still digesting the consequences from the deep retrenchment in capital spending, which started in 2000 in the high-tech and the telecommunications sectors.