samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  BIS Review 14/2003  I particularly welcome the efforts of Sir David Tweedie and his colleagues at IASB in addressing so openly the hugely difficult task of getting the right balance and right principles into place. Many of us can see I think that the financial instruments standards IAS 32 and 39 have provoked significant and strong views. Wisdom, foresight and a certain forbearance will be needed if we are to achieve a good solution. So we should all welcome the present initiative of the IASB in holding a series of roundtables with respondents to their exposure drafts on revisions to IAS 32 and 39. Debate and efforts in relation to these particular standards seem to me to be vital. They get to the heart of the dilemmas and challenges presented by new financial techniques and often complex instruments. It has after all been shown, in the Enron case if no others, that detailed and prescriptive accounting standards, in the wrong hands, can engender a moral hazard in the search for ways round them which investment bankers and lawyers may well be expected to find. A similar logic applies in the prolonged debate between historic and mark-to-market accounting principles. Once again, whichever approach is used, neither of them will tell the whole story in terms of the underlying economic realities of a bank's risk and return, nor how the risks are managed. But forms of disclosure may help.

Last but not least, if Switzerland were to give up its monetary independence by pegging the franc to the euro or by joining the euro area, it would lose its privileged status and, consequently, Swiss interest rates would increase to European levels. Since higher interest rates mean lower asset prices and lower levels of investment, and also higher mortgage rates, the Swiss are understandably not keen on giving up their national currency. Since any major decision in Switzerland has to be approved in a public referendum, the prospect of EU and euro membership in the near future is thus highly unlikely. Given our exposure to global economic and financial shocks, and their arguably smaller importance for the euro area, pegging the Swiss franc to the euro is not a realistic option. Flexible exchange rates give us the room for manoeuvre we need. •  What has our experience been of coexistence with the euro so far? Very positive. Rather than crowding out independent currencies, the euro has stabilised the monetary scene in Europe. In fact, the franc is less volatile today than it was before European monetary integration. The price of the euro in Swiss francs these days is about 3% lower than it was in 1999, in other words, almost unchanged. We did have periods, however, when the franc was under pressure, especially after September 11 and before the outbreak of the war in Iraq. The safe-haven function of the franc then triggered a 10% appreciation in our currency against the euro.
By the end of 2008, the problems of banking sectors – in the US, Europe and elsewhere – and the need for massive deleveraging had become apparent. At the same time, the interbank market was severely disrupted, and so was the transmission of monetary policy impulses to the real economy. The measures adopted by the Eurosystem were geared at restoring the functioning of its transmission mechanism, and at supporting the continued availability of credit to households and non-financial firms. As a result of increasing tensions in the sovereign debt markets since 2010, the situation of the euro area financial sector worsened. Doubts about the sustainability of sovereign debt levels in some countries of the euro area led to significantly increased levels of sovereign bond spreads. This, in turn, also led to higher interest rates in the private debt markets of the affected countries. It became apparent that the health of the national banking sector was often closely intertwined with the health of the local sovereign: funding problems in the banking sector and weak fiscal positions mutually reinforced each other. Significant heterogeneity emerges when looking at changes in the bank balance sheet items in different countries of the euro area, primarily concerning changes in deposits and in credit growth.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  to the non-financial sector.3 Therefore, the potential for a very large amplification of shocks to the real economy is particularly strong in the euro area. In such situations, the transmission mechanism of standard monetary policy impulses may become impaired and the central bank has to resort to non-standard measures. Let me elaborate on that. In normal times, central banks provide liquidity to the banking sector through open market operations. Typically, banks obtain central bank liquidity against the provision of central bank eligible collateral in a repo transaction. By setting the interest rate of its open market operations, the central bank can directly steer the risk-free rate in the short end of the money market. This then feeds through to other, longer-term interest rates and ultimately to credit conditions applied to the real economy. During financial and especially banking crises, banks’ demand for central bank liquidity may sharply increase to compensate for the decline in other forms of banks’ liabilities, often resulting from withdrawals of bank deposits. By accommodating such an increase in the demand for liquidity, the central bank is the only agent able to prevent a process of disorderly money-supply contraction. The stabilising role of the additional liquidity is especially strong if it is supplied for longer maturities. In this way, access to central bank liquidity allows banks to obtain funding at the policy rate – as long as they have the required collateral and a sound business model.
13  Figure 8 a) Growth forecast at 2022 (1) (percent)  U.S. Eurozone LatAm China (right axis)  5  4  U.S. 100 Eurozone 6,0 LatAm 80 China (right axis)  7 3,0  6  3  c) Probability of a recession within 12 months in developed countries (percent)  b) Growth forecast at 2023 (1) (percent)  2,5  5,7 60  2,0  5,4  1,5  5,1  1,0  4,8  20  4,5  0  5  2  4  1 3 0,5 Jan.21 Jul.21 Jan.22 Jul.22 Jan.22 Apr.22 Jul.22  40  12 14 16 18 20 22  (1) Latin America considers Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. PPP-weighted growth, shares of each economy according to WEO (IMF). (2) Includes the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Japan. Calculated as the average of survey responses for aforementioned countries. Sources: Consensus Forecast, IMF, and Bloomberg. Figure 9 Global supply chain pressure index (1)  Commodity prices  (standard deviations)  (index, 2010-2022 average =100)  5  250  4  200  Oil (2)  Metal index (3)  Wheat (4)  Copper  3 150  2 1  100  0 50  -1 -2  0  10  12  14  16  18  20  22  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  (1) Standard deviations with respect to historical average.

Nor can it be ruled out that the external scenario will see a reduction in global cost pressures and inflation easing in most 6  economies, including Chile. In this case, the Fed's monetary policy response would be less restrictive than in the central scenario, which would give way to better financial conditions, a less appreciated dollar globally, and lower external inflationary pressures (figure 14). The central scenario projects that the pace of price increases will decrease in the coming months and that annual inflation will begin to decline. However, the risk of a much more persistent inflationary phenomenon is a concern for the Board. If materialized, it could lead to further monetary tightening, outside the upper limit of the MPR corridor. This risk is especially important in a context where inflation has been unexpectedly high for several quarters and inflationary expectations remain above 3% in the two-year horizon. Quickly recovering macroeconomic balances will help reduce this risk, while allowing the Chilean economy to appropriately address a further deterioration of the external scenario. Final remarks Our country is facing many important challenges. One of the most relevant macroeconomically is to reduce inflation, a problem that is putting a heavy burden on all of us. For more than two decades, inflation was not a matter of public concern and there were generations to whom it may have seemed an unknown issue. But in recent quarters it has become a complex issue, which is at the heart of our responsibility as an institution.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Regional financial integration and development of local markets Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the JP Morgan Investor Seminar during the IMF/WB Annual Meetings, Singapore, 17 September 2006. *  *  *  First, let me start by thanking JP Morgan for inviting me to speak this morning. The topic today is “Regional Financial Integration and Development of Local Markets”. Given the limitations of time, I want to focus my talk this morning on just two issues. The first is on what has been achieved so far in East Asia in regional financial integration. And the second is the prospect for regional financial integration as we move forward, and what role should policy play. To begin, I think one important defining phenomenon that has been a key driver of East Asia’s recent rapid growth is the increased interdependency amongst economies in the region, especially in trade, and especially in the trade between China and the rest of the region. Intra-regional trade is now the largest component of total trade in most East Asian economies. For example, total trade share of Asia10 with Asia-10 has risen to 41 percent this year, compared to a share of about 21 percent fifteen years ago. And Asia-10 now trade among themselves more than with the G3 economies.

However, there are risk scenarios which, if materialized, may alter the macroeconomic outlook, with implications on monetary policy. On this occasion, after assessing the alternative scenarios, the Board estimates that the risk balance for both output and inflation is unbiased. Although the risks in the international scenario are similar to those in previous Reports, their possibility of occurrence is smaller. Still, structural issues persist in the Eurozone, so the regained confidence in financial markets is yet to be consolidated. Repeated or intensified financial stress episodes, in a context where banks are more cautious in their lending decisions and capital requirements have increased, could deepen credit constraints, complicating the growth outlook for the region and the world at large. There are also persistent doubts about how China’s slowdown will be. If more intense, its effects will not only hinder world growth, but also pull down commodity prices, especially for copper. Conversely, other economies could well perform better than expected, and offset part of these effects. The calmer external financial markets and the renewed appetite for risk have revived concerns about how to accommodate the new capital flows into emerging economies. Prolonging the strong monetary stimuli in the developed world, particularly in the U.S., may foster an extension of global imbalances. Public indebtedness is elevated in the U.S. and the high oil price hinders the resolution of its external deficit.
Political philosopher Thomas Paine said: “If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, that my child may have peace.” Let us hope that beyond Brexit, we will find common grounds to build a desirable future for the next generations. Thank you for your attention. 1 Chair’s summary : G7 finance ministers and central bank governors’ meeting, Chantilly, 17–18 July 2019 2 « Breaking the tragedy of the horizon – climate change and financial stability », Speech by Mark Carney given at  the Lloyd’s of London, 29 September 2015. 3 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  3 Source: European Commission 4 F. Villeroy de Galhau (2019), “Climate change: central banks are taking action”, Banque de France, Financial  Stability Review, no. 23 – June 2019. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

A robust and strong level of ethics can be achieved by providing ethics training and sensitisation as a component of continuous professional development. Although you are well qualified and are competent in your respective fields, it is vital that you have continuous training including advancement in ethical knowledge. Equally there is need to promote and ensure that your members exercise high levels of Integrity in whatever they do. As a country, we need professionals with high levels of social and moral awareness so that all of us are aware of the moral obligations and potential impact of our thinking, decisions and actions. We need to be good role models for others in behaviour, attitude and relationships. Let us endeavour to act in a way that is professional and that retains the confidence of others at all times. With these few remarks, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the ESAMI MBA Alumni Association Zambia Chapter officially launched. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 18/2010
The themes are broad. That reflects the diversity of our agenda. They focus on the interactions and intersections between policy areas. They emphasise new challenges and new directions, while recognising that familiar questions facing central banks remain no less important. Today’s conference is organised around them. The first theme covers “policy frameworks and interactions” The re-emergence of macroprudential instruments as part of the policy armoury raises fundamental questions about the interaction of monetary policy, macroprudential policy, and microprudential policy. It is essential to improve our understanding of the relationship between credit cycles and systemic risks. Since credit market developments both affect and reflect potential growth in the broader economy, they – and macroprudential measures to influence them – require careful study by financial and monetary policymakers alike. The advent of a new, enhanced policy toolkit raises vital questions about the effectiveness of individual policy tools; their joint operation; and how they interact domestically and across borders. The second theme covers “evaluating regulation, resolution, and market structures” The financial crisis precipitated a radical overhaul of the approach towards regulation, supervision and resolution. Regulatory policies have shifted from a near-exclusive focus on microprudential resilience to a more balanced emphasis on minimising systemic risk. In the whirlwind of essential change, there has been, however, relatively little assessment of the overall effect of reform on the financial system as a whole. Moreover, our understanding of the “system” must extend well beyond the banking sector to encompass the whole of market-based finance.

To coincide with the release of the new Bank data sets, we want to see what novel insights they can yield. The visualisation could be a static description of an interesting pattern or relationship in the data or the creation of an interactive app. Entrants are free to focus on whatever they like, as long as it employs some of the newly available data in some way. The second competition is for the best research paper – the “One Bank research” competition. We are particularly keen to engage early career researchers across the academic world. For our inaugural competition, the paper should be on some aspect of “The interaction between microprudential, macroprudential, and/or monetary policy”. The winners of each competition will be decided by separate judging panels of Bank staff and external academics. The prize for both competitions will be £ Further details on how to apply are now live on our website. Conclusion Economies are complex, dynamic and constantly evolving systems, underpinned by social interactions and behavioural change; shaped by fundamental forces like technology and globalisation; and supported – or at times disrupted – by finance. Policymakers need research to help understand these phenomena and to craft our responses to them. And research can make some of its most effective contributions by addressing the priorities of policymakers.
That group is being chaired by Stuart Siddall, Chief Executive of the ACT, and is due to issue a report in the next few months. Syndicated loans and asset backed securities A substantial part of lending to larger UK corporates is normally undertaken via syndicated loans. The Bank investigated whether there was a market failure or illiquidity premium in this market which could be addressed by making APF purchases. After a thorough investigation, the Bank concluded that what was needed was more large-scale bank funding, particularly to replace the foreign bank lenders who had been withdrawing from the UK market. But the appropriate way to address that was through the various schemes in place to support the banks. Similarly, the Bank investigated the state of securitisation markets. Here, there were two problems. First, many investors were extremely wary of buying mortgage-backed securities and similar products, because the crisis had raised uncertainty over their underlying risk characteristics. At the same time there was a huge outstanding stock of such assets already issued, which would swamp any operation aimed at improving liquidity. In the United States the authorities have undertaken substantial purchases of mortgage-backed securities, and funded the purchase of other securitised assets. It is not clear yet whether those markets will be self-sustainable once official intervention comes to an end. In the United Kingdom, we have made a range of ABS, including mortgage backed securities, eligible collateral in the Bank’s permanent liquidity insurance facilities as well as in the SLS.

2  BIS Review 23/2010  detailed characteristics serve to make several points in the context of this talk. The SLS did not provide the banks directly with funding. Rather it swapped illiquid private sector assets held by the banks for highly liquid treasury bills borrowed from the Debt Management Office. The commercial banks then obtained their funding from the market by repo of the treasury bills. Essentially the SLS provided a temporary collateral upgrade for the banks. By the time the scheme closes, SLS participants need to have either generated alternative sources of funding or created alternative collateral which the market will be willing to hold in place of the treasury bills. Recently, there have been some calls from interested parties for the SLS to be extended beyond its three-year horizon. If the SLS were to be extended, that would mean an implicit subsidy for specific banks. Albeit for a fee, those banks would be funding on an ongoing basis their illiquid, risky assets, by borrowing at “risk-free” government interest rates. That would give a significant competitive advantage to banks that had most recourse to the SLS. But central bank operations are not carried out to protect individual banking franchises, they are there to ensure overall monetary and financial stability. As the Governor has already made clear, the SLS will close at the end of January 2012.
In a crisis, sovereign countries care about the international distribution of losses. Standard setters should look into this. They should do so in the light of the principles and policies that have been agreed on how to improve the resolvability of banks – at both the consolidated and solo level. Because, quite simply, it is legal entities that fail. 5  For the most recent version see BIS (2012), ‘Core principles for effective banking supervision’, available online at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm. 6  Paragraph 33 of the foreword to the Core Principles states that “countries undergoing assessments by the IMF and/or the World Bank can elect to be graded against the essential and additional criteria. It is anticipated that this will provide incentives to jurisdictions, particularly those that are important financial centres, to lead the way in the adoption of the highest supervisory standards. As with the essential criteria, any assessment against additional criteria should recognise the concept of proportionality.”  7  See BCBS (2013), ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’, available online at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 8  To understand the difference of applying capital requirements on a solo basis relative to a sub-consolidated basis, imagine Bank A owns Bank B which in turn owns Bank C. Under both approaches, capital requirements apply to the group on a consolidated basis.

In principle, legal entities within the group can be lightly capitalised so long there is adequate capital in the group as a whole. 2  3  See Tucker (2013), ‘Banking reform and macroprudential regulation: implications for banks’ capital structure and credit conditions.’ See Financial Stability Board (2013), ‘Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies’; and Tucker (2013), ‘Resolution and the future of finance’. 4  For the most recent version see BIS (1996), ‘The Supervision of Cross-Border Banking’, available online at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs27.htm  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Meanwhile, the (1997/2006/2012) Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision5 set out minimum standards for prudential supervision. Supervisors are required to look at a bank on a solo basis; on a consolidated basis covering all related banking entities in a group; and on a group-wide basis, ie taking into account non-banking related entities as well. Under Principle 12, a home supervisor should supervise a bank on a consolidated basis, but “in addition ... the responsible supervisor supervises individual banks in the group. The responsible supervisor supervises each bank on a stand-alone basis and understands its relationship with other members of the group.” Under Principle 16, jurisdictions may – I stress, may – also opt to be assessed by the IMF for compliance with the Principles against the “additional” criterion6 that a supervisor should ensure an adequate distribution of capital within a banking group. But, to repeat, that is not an obligation.