samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In Asia in particular, while new bond issuance fell more than 40% compared to 2021, syndicated lending saw modest growth. Quite remarkably, the green and sustainable segment grew by around 50% in 2022. 4. It's worth asking why we continued to see growth and innovation in Hong Kong during the challenging 2022: I believe it's because we benefit from some unique fundamental strengths, as well as some supportive policy measures. 5. So, what are these strengths? First, Hong Kong has a strong banking network. We are home to over three quarters of the world's top 100 banks. With a robust capital adequacy ratio of around 20%, a liquidity coverage ratio of over 160% and a low classified loan ratio of about 1.4%, our banks are always looking for new business. They give Hong Kong the liquidity and expertise needed to handle transactions of any size and complexity, and at highly competitive rates. 6. Our banking system operates within a vibrant financial ecosystem that offers plenty of opportunities for collaboration and cross-feritlisation. This is the most obvious with the bond market, which has a symbiotic relationship with the loan market in providing credit financing. Here again we are by far the number one in Asia. According to the International Capital Market Association, for six consecutive years to 2021, Hong Kong was the largest hub for arranging international bond issuance from Asia, capturing one-third of the market; we anticipate that Hong Kong will top the rankings again in 2022.

In respect of green and sustainable finance, the Government is also setting up a committee with industry experts in green technology, green finance and green standard certification to formulate an agenda for developing Hong Kong into an international green technology and finance centre; and expanding the scope of the Government Green Bond Programme to cover sustainable finance projects. We trust that these will make the Hong Kong platform and ecosystem even more attractive and conducive to market participants looking to seize the opportunities ahead. 17. I know I have covered quite a lot already, so let me close here. I wish today's Summit the very best success. And I look forward to working with the APLMA and all of you here to promote the further growth of our loan market in the future. 18. Thank you. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Fintech and bigtech companies are responding to widespread customer demand for ever faster and more convenient payment solutions. These companies have developed innovative solutions using technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and high-speed data processing. In a fast-moving world, the ability to analyse data in real time is of paramount importance. This has led to a data revolution in the financial industry, which is also reflected in payment services. The second challenge is to enable interoperability between old and new technologies, such as distributed ledger technology – DLT for short. DLT makes it possible to represent and manage assets such as money and securities on a shared system of ledgers. In principle at least, this means that traditional financial institutions are no longer required for making payments. It is too early to speculate where all this is going. What is clear, however, is that innovation should ideally thrive in a way that does not jeopardise the security and efficiency of 4  The SIC system is operated by SIX Interbank Clearing Ltd on behalf of the SNB. Page 4/11  payments. This requires a common vision for the Swiss financial centre – a Swiss Payments Vision. To make this vision a reality, we must find ways to enable cashless value transfers directly from the payer to the recipient in a fast and secure way and to seamlessly integrate new payment instruments, forms of money and technologies. We need to improve the speed and interoperability of payments while upholding our three principles.

With kuna banknotes bearing my signature and the stability of the kuna having been the focus of most of my professional career, I probably have the most reason to regret its passing into history. However, we have introduced the euro for the benefit of Croatia and I have never had any doubt about this being the right way. Not only did Croatia become the twentieth member of the euro area with the  1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  introduction of the euro, but it also entered into partnership with the countries using the second major currency in the world. Looking forward, the introduction of the euro has opened a new chapter of our monetary history for us at the central bank. On 1 January 2023, the Croatian National Bank became part of the Eurosystem and thus an active participant in defining a common monetary policy. Furthermore, our voice in the ECB's Governing Council has a greater weight relative to the size of our country, and for the first time in history we are in a position to influence the financing conditions in the euro area and, consequently, in Croatia. Those opposing the euro might claim that Croatia loses its monetary independence by joining the monetary union, but the truth is in fact the opposite: Croatia has gained more power.
The major dealers and their principal supervisors met at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York about two weeks ago to review progress and discuss next steps. The dealers are now in the process of reaching agreement on a new set of proposals designed to build on the progress to date and produce a more mature, efficient and operationally robust post trade processing infrastructure for the OTC derivatives market. I want to conclude with a few observations about the role of supervision in encouraging progress in both these areas of risk management and the infrastructure for these markets. We live in a system in which nonbank financial institutions play an increasingly important role in a wide range of financial markets, in which the differences between the activities of bank-centered financial institutions and nonbanks has substantially diminished, and in which the largest banks and investment banks in the world compete together in the U.S. market and in other major markets. These changes have many positive implications but they also mean that differences in the incentives faced by institutions with different supervisory and regulatory regimes can have larger competitive effects, and the effects of regulatory arbitrage can reduce the impact of changes applied only to regulated or supervised institutions. They suggest that adverse developments outside the banking system, such as the failure of a major nonbank financial intermediary, can potentially cause greater damage to the core of the financial system than might have been the case in the past.

And I will offer some perspectives on how these challenges should affect the hierarchy of priorities of central banks, and of those who have responsibility for supervision and oversight of the financial system. A characteristic feature of periods of financial innovation is that growth in new instruments and changes in the structure of those markets can outpace the development of the risk management and processing and settlement infrastructure. This gap, the gap between the speed at which markets move to capture the benefits of new opportunities and the pace of development in the supporting control and execution infrastructure, is inevitable. The size and duration of the gap and the risks it presents to the financial system are a function both of will and of ability. They are determined, in part, by the scale of investments that firms make in the infrastructure-investments in people, in technology and in control processes-and they are determined in part by knowledge and experience, which are functions of the environment surrounding innovation. Market discipline exercised by counterparties should create incentives to close these gaps relatively quickly, but competition among financial intermediaries can, at least for some period of time, create offsetting incentives and may make individual institutions less willing to move ahead of the pace of improvement of average practice among market participants. This can take the form of what economists call a collective action problem, leaving individual institutions and the systems as a whole with more risk than would be desirable.
His comments reflect the fact that crypto-assets have unique financial, monetary and technical features that set them apart from the currencies and payment instruments issued by financial institutions and central banks and which form the foundation of our monetary system in Europe. They have no issuer for whom the assets act as a guarantee of value. They do not have a guaranteed fixed exchange rate with the currency issued by the central bank, which forms the basis of our payment system because it is the only one with legal tender status, i.e. which must be accepted by everyone. And they rely for their circulation on blockchain, a decentralised and distributed ledger system using cryptographic techniques. These unique features largely explain the widely varying views that we hear today about the outlook for crypto-assets, keeping in mind that, for now, they constitute a marginal share of holdings of economic agents and within the global economy. At their peak in January 2018, total outstanding crypto-assets represented EUR 330 billion; in comparison, the euro area’s M1 monetary aggregate amounted to EUR 7.5 trillion. Some see crypto-assets as disruptive innovations poised to radically overhaul the way that our monetary and financing system works, changing it for the better. Others believe that these are innovations that still need to find their market.

They are no longer confined to cards, as we are seeing with the rise of mobile payments. A broader range of participants: I am thinking here about how the payments market has expanded to include competition from big techs and major retailers, which are following a wide range of strategies in this respect. The flipside of this trend is the increasingly global nature of the market, which is raising sovereignty and independence issues, including the question of control of data with respect to the American and Chinese tech giants. Payment is becoming less prominent: nowadays the actual act of paying is becoming less visible, as it is combined seamlessly within the overall transaction process to minimise the impact on the payer. We are seeing this shift in online payments, for example, which are designed to be increasingly fluid through solutions such as one-click buying. Availability of payment services: payment services are becoming more available, ignoring physical borders and time constraints to satisfy customer demand for instant, continuous and uniform payment services, as economic agents become ever more mobile. 2. The development of crypto-assets naturally forms part of these underlying trends affecting payment instruments, combining the search for anonymity, management of non-intermediated peer-to-peer payments and the use of entirely web-based technologies. But crypto-assets are also different because of their financial, monetary and technological features that I mentioned in my introduction.
•  As part of the strategy to match better preventive and management efforts, it would be useful to encourage market-based mechanisms that help build time back into the system. While numerous accounting, regulatory, technological, and structural market changes that have  BIS Review 35/2001  5  occurred over the past dozen years have generally made financial systems more resilient, they have also had the effect of accelerating market processes, and thereby removing time—and its shock-absorbing and beneficial aspects—from the system. The approach to crisis management and resolution also needs to be creative. In part this can be accomplished by relying as much as possible on the efforts of debtors and private creditors to work things out on their own. The perception in some circles that private creditors are not interested in resolving payment problems expeditiously is mistaken, and stands at odds with recent experience. If nothing else, investors are interested in restoring liquidity to debt instruments in order to move on to new opportunities. There is also scope for exploring creative market-based ways to lever in private participation and stretch the impact of public sector funds. Finally, a successful market-based, case-by-case approach also needs to be principled. I would suggest that the essence of an effective case-by-case approach is the development of viable plans that link broader, generally acceptable principles to the particulars of a given situation. •  To achieve this, a clearer and more transparent articulation of the public sector’s objectives is necessary.

 The growth potential should be enhanced also by an increase in capital flows and stock, the absorption of EU funds and a better allocation of resources via investment prioritisation.  Achieving convergence is not enough, as convergence should be sustainable, balanced and equitably distributed.  Real convergence should be pursued not only in terms of income, but also in terms of output structure, by means of the level and composition of budget revenues and expenditures. 3   Good European practices should be used to fight tax evasion and strengthen financial discipline.  In the medium run, a balanced primary budget should be ensured and the MTO (medium-term objective) should be again pursued; public debt should be maintained at sustainable levels and inappropriate incentives leading to over-indebtedness of private sector and households should be avoided.  It is necessary to improve the access to financing. 83% of households have 6% of deposits, whereas 0.3% of households hold 25% of deposits. Housing loans have been accessed by only 1% of very low income earners (the 1st quintile) and by only 4% of relatively high income earners (the 4th quintile). 12% of the highest income earners (the 5th quintile) have accessed housing loans.  A roadmap is necessary for joining the euro area.  The public goods that should be preserved and even strengthened include: the country’s security, financial stability, investors’ confidence. European Union – Romania joint agenda for 2019  Conclusion of Brexit negotiations.
Foreign exchange reserves In the last decade, emerging countries have constantly sought to expand their foreign exchange reserves. The emerging markets’ average reserve ratio has more than quintupled from 4 percent to over 20 percent of GDP since 1990 (Obstfeld et al. 2009, Matteo y Lagos et al., 2009). One cannot assume, however, that equilibrium has been reached and that the demand for reserves will stabilize. On the contrary, there are strong indications that this trend will persist, or even be amplified, following the crisis. How much reserves are enough? Theoretical reasoning would balance the benefits of holding reserves against their cost, with some notion that there is an optimum. On the benefit side, reserves can be detained or accumulated for a variety of motives:   to smooth out the impact on consumption of shocks on the current account, which is the most basic and traditional motive, even in the absence of international capital flows    as a result or by-product of foreign market intervention to prevent exchange rate appreciation. This is usually defined as a “mercantilist” motive.   as precaution against possible abrupt capital outflows (the “sudden stop” syndrome)  The costs of holding reserves are also well identified:   there is a direct opportunity cost because foreign exchange reserves’ risk / return profile may be lower than for other, alternative, investments.   finally, as reserves accumulate, countries are getting increasingly exposed to exchange rate risk and face the possibility of significant valuation losses.

Norway is part of the European Economic Area, and EU regulations are thus applicable in this country. Within the remaining national discretion, Norwegian regulations are laid down by the Ministry of Finance, and implemented by the Financial Supervisory Authority. But Norges Bank aims to be an active advisor on these issues. Our work on macroprudential supervision provides insights that we wish to share with other supervisory authorities. The second component of macroprudential policies consists of short and medium term measures to alleviate the effects from the procyclical behaviour of financial institutions. There are two macroprudential aspect of procyclicality. It is the common exposures of a group of  BIS Review 112/2010  1  financial institutions. And it is the interconnectivity of financial institutions through trading and credit relationships. Common exposures are probably the most important of these interdependencies for crisis generation. Individual institutions can look perfectly healthy even when vulnerabilities are building up on the systemic level. The prime example of this phenomenon is naturally lending stimulating a price bubble in the property market. Developing time-varying macroprudential policies is not straightforward. The interest rate policy targets the inflation rate, and cannot always be set as would be appropriate for asset prices. There might be conflicting targets. We should thus be looking for new instruments. As you are certainly aware, most of the macroprudential policy instruments that have been proposed are the same as those already being used for microprudential purposes.
Further, the value added tax on selected agricultural equipment and spares, was zero rated as incentive to increase agricultural production and productivity. (ii)  Tourism sector: – In order to diversify the economy and attain broad based economic growth, Government increased the allocation to the sector to improve access to the Northern Tourism Circuit (infrastructural development in Mbala and Kasaba Bay). Further, Government will embark on the development of a new world class tourism area in Livingstone, and step-up the development of road infrastructure in key national parks namely, Luangwa and Kafue. (iii)  Manufacturing: – In order to expand the manufacturing base, Government is promoting the establishment of Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ) on the Copperbelt (Chambishi), and Lusaka (Lusaka south and east) provinces by providing for fiscal incentives and quality infrastructure development in the budget. Operations at the Chambishi MFEZ have already commenced. Further, the budget reclassified and re-categorised certain manufacturing materials with the aim of lowering customs duty rates. (iv)  Mining sector: – In light of the adverse impact of the global economic crisis on the mining sector and with the view of easing these effects, the Zambian Government introduced tax concessions, which included removal of the windfall tax, increasing capital allowance to 100 percent as an investment incentive, and reduction of customs duty on Heavy Fuel Oils.

Problems may arise, however, if monetary policy is perceived as  BIS Review 32/1997  -5-  The Phillips curve T h e P h illip c u r ve In f latio n  *B *  A  U n e m p lo ym e n t  In f latio n  *  B  *C  U n e m p lo ym e n t  BIS Review 32/1997  -6-  focusing primarily on the stabilisation of employment. As we have seen, people’s expectations play a major part in the inflation process. If people expect monetary policy to concentrate in the first place on stabilising employment, then firms and employees will not regard unduly high wage increases as all that serious because they will count on measures being taken to stimulate demand if employment is in danger. Sweden in the 1970s and ’80s is a good illustration of the problems that may arise. Wage and price increases in that period were systematically higher than in other countries, which led to recurrent cost crises and problems with competitiveness. An important reason for the lack of adjustment to wage increases in the rest of the world was that employees and firms reckoned that the government and the Riksbank would ultimately bail them out with devaluations, which is what actually happened.
Going forward, we should be careful to ensure that new regulations, for instance aimed at separating the banking and trading arms of universal banks, do not have negative consequences for market-making activities that are not justified by significant risks. Likewise, we should be mindful about the fallouts of an ill-designed financial transaction law. Conclusion Let me draw to a close. The euro area banking sector is facing challenges on all sides: from new technologies, from new market players, from new rules of the game. Those challenges, insofar as they lead to competition and innovation, are healthy. They are how a well-functioning market economy works. But we must also recognise that, in the euro area, we need sound banks. A weak banking sector means a weak economy. So I entreat banks to respond to the challenges of the new environment and reinvigorate their business models. And I entreat policymakers to create a fair, clear and consistent level playing field where that can happen. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

At the same time, the introduction of the Inheritance Tax Act and the Land and Building Tax Bill will augment prudent spending by expanding the government’s ability in revenue collection. These laws will ensure a better tax structure to deal with future liabilities, promote greater fiscal balance as well as reduce wealth inequality. As for the Bank of Thailand, we play an important role in ensuring stability in the financial system. The experience of the Global Financial Crisis taught us an important lesson of a timely and efficient crisis management. In this regard, we have proposed an amendment to the Bank of Thailand Act to equip the Bank of Thailand with a broader set of resolution mechanism and enhanced safety nets in the financial system in time of systemic crisis. Ladies and gentlemen, my discussion today regarding recent and upcoming laws provides a snapshot of the legal framework to support our goal of sustainable growth. In the meantime, while one must accept that there will be many challenges ahead, particularly implementation issues, these new laws will at least set forth a necessary path for Thailand to move forward – a path I believe must be complemented by a firm policy direction. This leads to the last part of my talk, which I will focus on the Bank of Thailand’s policy direction and initiatives to support the country’s reform efforts. We are now at the onset of the third phase of the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP III), spanning over 2016 – 2020.