samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
of years before LCI -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  No. of years after LCI  No. of years before LCI -4  4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  4  3  4. Real exchange rate (annual change)  percent  percent  3. Inflation rate (Dec./Dec.) appreciation  depreciation  No. of years before LCI -4 -3 -2 -1 0 LCI: large capital inflows  No. of years after LCI 1  2  3  No. of years before LCI 4  -4  -3  -2  -1  No. of years after LCI 0  1  2  3  4  Source: Stylised facts based on the results shown in the professional literature. For the most recent empirical assessments, I resorted to Reinhart and Reinhart  Charts 1–4 in Figure I allow an overall view of what can be expected in terms of the developments in the aforementioned indicators after the episode of large capital inflows comes to an end. They are an indication of which curve profile cannot be precluded by a country after an episode of large capital inflows draws to an end. However, while the curve profiles are similar for most countries, the curve slopes both before and after the end of an episode of large capital inflows may be sharper or less sharp.

Chart 1  Total External Debt  MLT External Debt  percent of GDP  percent of GDP  ST debt (majority private debt) MLT debt  public and publicly guaranteed debt private debt  16.2 16.0  5.3  7.9  deposits of non-residents  12.8  7.8 8.2 16.5  14.1  10.9  37.4  25.6  31.3 17.4  0.6  1.2  1.0  2.6  4.0  2007  2008  20.4 15.6  2006  29.3  2005  30.9  2004  30.0  2008  2007  2006  2005  12.9  2004  60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0  60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0  Source: National Bank of Romania, Ministry of Public Finance, National Institute of Statistics  In 2004, the Romanian economy had little financial depth (measured as a ratio of M3 to GDP) of only 25.6 percent. The financial depth increased on the back of massive capital inflows, yet it remains relatively low by advanced economy standards (34.5 percent of GDP in 2008). Given the relatively little financial depth, the effects of capital inflows emerged fast and were significant (Chart 2).
The second part of my remarks will touch on the key imperatives to best prepare us for the new global landscape, so as to be better positioned to succeed and survive in this new environment. Policy-makers in the world economy have continued to be confronted with policy challenges since the onset of the global financial crisis. While the policy responses have focused on addressing the origins of the crisis – on the extensive build-up of excesses, the over-leverage and over-indebtedness of the private and public sectors, the breakdown in the functioning of financial markets, the loss of competitiveness, and the loss in confidence in the financial system and the economy, the concern now is on achieving a sustained economic recovery that is accompanied by job creation. Half a decade into the crisis, and this has yet to be achieved. In the recent months, the global economy has again experienced a broad-based moderation in growth from an already modest pace. This has stemmed largely from the renewed weakness of the economic recovery in several of the major advanced economies. In the United States, the significant monetary accommodation, reinforced by the large scale financial market interventions and the significant fiscal stimulus during the early stage of the crisis, has averted an economic depression, but it has not, however, brought about a sustained recovery. In Europe, an economic contraction is being experienced, resulting from the combination of fiscal austerity, tight credit conditions, and the continued uncertainty and volatility in the financial markets.

Another effect of financial innovation is thus to create asymmetries in the reaction of the economy to monetary policy: for example, the slow build-up of bubbles during periods of monetary easing followed by an abrupt retrenchment when monetary policy tightens. Note that there is currently a debate as to whether this inherent procyclicality of financial systems is amplified by our accounting and prudential regimes. Fourth, it may be that modern financial innovation creates new discontinuities in the financial system and dynamics. When conditions are less benign than usual, the transmission process along the interest rate curve becomes non-linear: a striking feature of this summer’s events was the surge in the short-term money market. Wider and variable spreads between term funding rates (of which many bank loans are priced off) and policy rates may reduce the efficiency of interest rate adjustments when needed. Innovation also reinforces the mechanism of the "financial accelerator", through which the level of asset prices influences credit distribution (through collateral values and, now, its impact on banks tier one ratio), then the real economy; and, in return, the real economy impacts asset prices and values. This spiral can go upwards, or, as we see now, downwards. Overall, I believe that central banks have coped well with these challenges over the past ten months. The monetary policy response has differed across industrialised countries, as warranted by the differences in economic situations and outlooks.
This dinner, in fact, provides us with an opportunity to meet together and discuss what went well, and  Page 1 of 10  what went less well, in our economy in a less formal environment than that usually associated with discussions on economic and financial developments. Traditionally, the Central Bank avails itself, through its Governor, of the opportunity of this occasion to give an extensive panoramic review of Malta’s economic performance, of what in our view drove these results, outline the challenges ahead and conclude with policy recommendations. This year we will depart from this tradition. While we will start with an overview of this year’s developments and discuss briefly the outlook for 2018, we will use this as a basis for a broader, more thematic, discussion. In recent years, definitely since the European sovereign debt crisis, we have increasingly come to realise that whilst we are a very open economy dependent on foreign trade and investment, our economy has shown a degree of resilience and adaptability that has defied expectations, surprised foreign institutions and, indeed, ourselves too. All forecasters including the International Monetary Fund, European Commission, European Central Bank and the credit rating agencies, as well as the Central Bank of Malta, were proven to have been conservative. One could argue that the comment on GDP projections is a bit unfair in as much as the December 2015 projections would have been based on the information available at that time. Since those projections were made, historical data would have been revised.

Christian Noyer: From Maastricht to the present and beyond Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the GIC / Drexel Spring 2007 Conference, Philadelphia, 16 April 2007. *  *  *  We have just passed the European Union 50th anniversary. It is a good time to reflect upon the essence and future of this extraordinary endeavor. Never before, in the whole history of mankind, have democratic nations pursued and reached, through peaceful cooperation, such a close degree of interdependence, involving, in many crucial areas, deliberate pooling of sovereignty. Of course, the process has not been without difficulties and tensions, many of which are still apparent and acute. Of course, numerous challenges remain and the future is paved with roadblocks which could still derail the whole project. But, for the first time in more than a thousand years, Europe is at peace and prosperous, with democratic regimes everywhere. This is, by historical standards, an exceptional achievement. At the start, EU was built on a strong intuition: by sharing the instruments and policies underpinning economic prosperity, European nations would create an irreversible situation of interdependence and solidarity where conflicts and wars of the past would become impossible. This intuition led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, then, a few years later, to the European Community. Thus in 1957 the signature of Treaty of Rome was the starting point of this unique experience of regional integration in modern History.
Conversely, in a sharp downturn with higher bank losses, it may be appropriate to reduce both the key policy rate and the countercyclical buffer. The countercyclical capital buffer is not a stabilisation policy instrument. The buffer is more likely to vary over longer credit cycles than follow the normal business cycle. Furthermore, knowledge and experience of macroprudential regulation is incomplete and at an early stage. 8 And we know from experience that financial market participants often find ways to evade regulations. 9 Taking the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances into account will therefore continue to be one of the criteria for an appropriate interest rate path and an important element in a robust monetary policy framework. 8  For a review of our currently limited experience of macroprudential instruments, see for example Smets, F. (2013): “Financial stability and monetary policy: How closely interlinked?” Lecture at a conference arranged by Riksbanken. 9  Jeremy Stein, member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, has pointed out that it is more difficult to evade the interest rate: “while monetary policy may not be quite the right tool for the job, it has one important advantage relative to supervision and regulation – namely that it gets in all of the cracks... changes in rates may reach into corners of the market that supervision and regulation cannot.” See Stein, J. (2013): Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses. Speech at a research symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

It is clear that the events of 11 September, and their aftermath, have given rise to considerable uncertainties. There is plenty, particularly overseas, for central bankers to concern themselves with. When I spoke at a conference last week, one newspaper commented that I always looked worried. Well, of course, central bankers are paid to worry. But when reviewing the economic situation we need to achieve a sense of balance. The data do not all point in a single direction. Certainly in the run-up to the November MPC meeting we will need to take a careful look, as I indicated earlier, at all the data. Our feet will be on the ground, but our eyes will scan the horizon! Thank you very much. 4  BIS Review 87/2001
Taken to its limit, the argument that monetary policy can be used to expand demand with little or no implications for inflation challenges the consensus that the best contribution that monetary policy can make to the long-term health and prosperity of the economy is to deliver price stability. That consensus is based on painful experience that monetary policy can’t affect the level of output in the long run. That we can’t generate permanently higher output and permanently higher employment simply by printing more money.9 We should be nervous about how quickly we overturn that consensus. Conclusion and summary Let me conclude. The financial crisis has thrust the rather reserved world of central banking and monetary policy into the spotlight. That is both understandable and healthy. Monetary policy failed to prevent the financial crisis. And in many countries, including the UK, it has failed to stimulate the growth that we all long to see. It’s only right that inflation targeting – the dominant paradigm governing the operation of monetary policy in much of the industrialised world – should be questioned and challenged. And to my mind it has a good story to tell. The inflation target ensures that the primary objective of monetary policy is to deliver price stability. But it affords the flexibility that it can be operated in such a way as to support output and employment.

McCafferty, Ian (2013), “Monetary policy in a changing economy”, speech given at Bloomberg, London, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2013/627.aspx Monetary Policy Committee (2013), February 2013 Inflation Report, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/framework/framework.aspx Monetary Policy Committee (2013), Minutes of the February 2013 MPC meeting, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Pages/mpc/default.aspx Oulton, N and Sebastía-Barriel, M (2013), “Long and short-term effects of the financial crisis on labour productivity, capital and output”. Bank of England Working Paper no. 470 and Centre for Economic Performance, Discussion Paper no. 1185. Available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/workingpapers/wp470.pdf Tucker, Paul (2012): “Competition, the pressure for returns, and stability”, speech given at the British Bankers’ Association Annual Banking Conference, London, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2012/611.aspx  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Annex: Charts  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9
So far, deposit institutions do not appear to be significantly increasing their exposure to risk, although there are some factors where we are exercising greater watchfulness. In fact, the total volume of lending granted by deposit institutions in Spain to the nonfinancial private sector has continued to fall (-1.2% in June), or shows muted increases when the construction and real estate development sectors are excluded. Moreover, the debt ratios of the non-financial private sector have continued falling, standing at levels below the euro area average. Specifically, the debt/GDP ratio of the non-financial private sector was slightly above 130%, 3 pp down on a year earlier, and 2 pp less than the euro area average, having declined by more than 70 pp from its peak during the crisis. 5/10  In the case of non-financial corporations, overall external financing has continued to expand at year-on-year rates of close to 2%, with significant growth in bond financing and a fall-off since the start of the year in new bank lending extended to non-financial corporations. Overall, the reduction in the deleveraging of non-financial corporations exceeds 50 pp of GDP, from the peak reached during the crisis. Further, in recent years banks appear to be setting greater store by variables such as productivity in lending standards, which results in a more efficient allocation of credit. Nonetheless, some firms still show a certain degree of financial fragility.

"The Changing World" - Keynote Speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at The World Federation of Exchanges General Assembly and Annual Meeting on 9 October 2019 Mr. Loh Boon Chye, Chief Executive Owicer, Singapore Exchange (SGX), Dr. Urs Ruegsegger, Chairman, The World Federation of Exchanges, Ms. Nandini Sukumar, Chief Executive Owicer, The World Federation of Exchanges, Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Introduction 1 Đ Đ Let me begin by welcoming you to Singapore for the World Federation of Exchanges 59th General Assembly and Annual Meeting. 2 Đ Đ Exchanges have a long and illustrious history, dating back to the establishment of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange from as early as 1602. Four centuries on, exchanges continue to play a crucial role in facilitating trade and disseminating information, enabling companies to raise capital, and providing investors with a fair, orderly, and transparent marketplace to trade financial assets and carry out risk management activities.Đ 3 Đ Đ The World Federation of Exchanges (“WFE”) has played a critical role in promoting the development of organised and regulated markets to meet the world’s capital raising needs. As the leading global industry group for exchanges and clearing houses, the WFE has actively pushed for greater industry collaboration and international regulatory coherence to make public markets more vibrant and robust.
Which of the two ratios binds first depends on the kind of risks that banks are running. The leverage ratio automatically places tighter limits on expansions in the balance sheet through supposedly low-risk assets. The international community has made progress on the leverage ratio. The definition guiding how it should be calculated was agreed at the start of this year. This will provide the basis for banks to disclose the ratio over the next 3 years in the light of which the international community will decide in 2017 on the calculation of a minimum standard. A number of authorities, including the US, the Netherlands, and the Swiss, have already introduced or are considering a leverage ratio in advance of the international standard. In the UK, the Prudential Regulation Authority has already asked the eight major UK banks and building societies to take steps to achieve a leverage ratio above 3%. The Financial Policy Committee has been asked by the Chancellor to review whether a leverage ratio framework should be introduced in advance of the international framework. This could include a power for the FPC to vary the ratio to counter macro-prudential risks. The FPC will consult on the review and expects to publish its conclusions towards the end of the year. There is also important work underway to ensure the risk-weighted framework is robust. Reviews are underway to build a credible standardised approach to calculating risk-weights for banks’ trading activities and their loan books; this too should help reduce the system’s exposure to model risk.

This is precisely what happened to both Lloyds Banking Group and Bank of America, which required large public capital injections after they made their acquisitions. If no suitable purchaser could be found, the choice for the authorities was between administration – for all or some of the business – or a taxpayer bailout. In a number of small and middle sized cases it was possible, without unacceptable disruption, to protect insured depositors by drawing on deposit insurance and, in some cases, public funds, while selling some parts of the business to another firm and putting the other parts of the business, including shareholders and subordinated debt, put into administration. Bradford and Bingley was the most notable example of this in the UK. But putting all or part of large institutions – especially large international ones – into administration proved impossible with one, notorious exception. And that exception, Lehmans, proved the rule that large, complex, systemic institutions were truly too big to fail. This should not have been a surprise. There was generally tough talk from regulators before the crisis. And there were some idiosyncratic isolated failures, like BCCI and Barings, which occurred outside a systemic crisis. But as a number of researchers have pointed out, large systemic institutions were able to raise debt on more favourable terms than smaller ones reflecting the perception – which turned out to be generally true – that investors in these institutions were protected by an implicit government guarantee.
Sabine Lautenschläger: 20 years of ESCB statistics - past achievements and future challenges Speech by Ms Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, at the Ninth ECB Statistics Conference "20 years of ESCB statistics: What's next", Frankfurt am Main, 10 July 2018. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, I believe the words of the late US politician Daniel Moynihan are a good starting point tonight. He famously said, “Everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts”. I would add that the best opinions are certainly rooted in facts. And, since we seem to have entered the age of “alternative facts”, I have been reflecting on what real facts are, and how to defend them. And it’s not just the age of “alternative facts”; it’s also the age of “fake news”. Still, neither of these concepts is entirely new. For as long as there has been public discourse, people have been tempted to propagate their own take on reality. And not all of them have been able to resist this temptation. But still, something has changed. Today, Twitter and other tools allow almost anyone to communicate with the general public. And fake news is most successful in creating alternative facts when people stop trusting traditional sources of information. This is what’s happening right now, all around us. Traditional media have come under attack.

16 In conclusion, let me briefly summarise my main message today. The rapid increase in productivity growth is an important explanation for the earlier low inflation. Over the past year there has been a decline in productivity growth. This is assessed to be temporary. A recovery is foreseen in the coming years, but at a slightly slower rate of increase than before. References Bloom, N., Sadun, R. and van Reenen, J. (2007), ”Americans Do I.T. Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle”, CEP Discussion Paper, no 788. Brynjolfsson, E. and Hitt, L. (2003), "Computing Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence", MIT Sloan Working Paper, no 4210-01. Conway, P., de Rosa, D., Nicoletti, G. and Steiner, F. (2006), ”Regulation, Competition and Productivity Convergence”, OECD Working paper, no 509. Criscuolo, C. (2005), “The Contribution of Foreign Affiliates to Productivity Growth: Evidence from OECD Countries”, Yearbook on Productivity 2005, Statistics Sweden. 14  Lundgren, Edquist and Wallgren (2007). 15  David (1990). 16  National Institute of Economic Research (2005, 2007). 6  BIS Review 12/2008  Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D. (2005), ”Measuring Capital and Technology: An Expanded Framework”, i Corrado, C., Haltiwanger, J. and Sichel, D. (red. ), Measuring Capital in the New Economy, Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 65., Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Corrado, C., Hulten, C. and Sichel, D. (2006), ”Intangible Capital and Economic Growth”; National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 11948, Cambridge, MA. Crépon, B., Duguet, E. and Mairesse, J.