samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For instance, assets held by pan-European investment funds represented 8 25% of total assets at the end of 2000, up from 12% in 1998 . The development of a genuine pan-European approach is also illustrated by the introduction of various European stock indexes. The turnover on options based on these indexes –for instance, the volume of options traded on the Eurostoxx50 contract– now matches the turnover of options based on well-established domestic indexes such as the CAC in France. This provides evidence that large investors are looking for – and actually have recourse to– hedging products that are suited to a cross-border oriented strategy. However, this evidence of a strong impetus towards integration does not necessarily support the argument that a brand new asset allocation is overwhelmingly dominant. Let me emphasise two aspects. First, pan-European sectoral strategies have also embraced non-euro area stocks in order to reach an appropriate level of diversification. This is the case in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, or telecom equipment, with stocks listed in non-euro area countries such as Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Sweden. This is in line with some theoretical assumptions, which are stating that currency risk is outweighed by the risk-return parameters, as far as investing in equities is concerned. This leads me to the second aspect: the sensitivity of stock market to general macroeconomic events suggests that domestic macroeconomic variables still influence stock prices.

The significance of climate risks to financial stability may change over time. The SNB therefore considers it a priority to continuously monitor developments and review its assessment. Completion of the ninth banknote series To finish, let me turn to a very different topic – the issuance of the ninth banknote series. The development of the new banknotes was a complex, long-term project with exacting design and production requirements. The 100-franc note, which entered circulation on 12 September 2019, was the sixth and final denomination of the SNB’s new banknote series. Since the issuance of the first of the new banknotes, the 50-franc note in April 2016, feedback on the new banknotes has been very positive. The new series has been well received by the public. The new substrate Durasafe® has also proven a success. Preliminary evaluations suggest that this substrate should ensure a longer lifespan for the banknotes. The issuance of modern and forgery-proof banknotes is a central task of the SNB. It is important to us that we are able to meet the expectations of the Swiss population. The new banknotes use state-of-the-art technology, and are robust and easy to handle. The entire logistical processes, including the modification of ATMs to accommodate the new notes, also proceeded without significant problems. The eighth banknote series will continue to be legal tender until further notice. The SNB plans to announce the recall date for the eighth-series notes in the course of 2020.
But I would urge you instead to look at the reports of our annual medical check-ups conducted by the IMF since 1990 in the form of what are known as the Article IV Consultations. The IMF team was in fact in Hong Kong for this year’s Consultation in the second half of October, when the short-lived but somewhat intense attack on our currency occurred. It was the best time for any diagnosis of financial problems. But after observing us closely over the period the team again gave us a clean bill of health. Let me give you a few relevant quotes from the Concluding Statement of the Consultation, which has already been published.

This has perhaps surprised many, just as they have been surprised that the financial turmoil of the region could so suddenly erupt with such severity and contagion. 4. Indeed, not long ago, stories about the Asian miracle abounded. Asia had been the fastest growing region in the world and the economic numbers had been generally sound. Asian economies had low inflation rates and exchange rates had been stable, at least until recently. Current account for the region as a whole had been broadly in balance, although understandably the situation for individual economies varied. The fiscal account excluding Japan had been in surplus. Asia also had exceptionally high savings rates of over 30% of GDP and investment rates were equally high. Official sector savings of the Asian economies, in terms of their foreign currency reserves, were very substantial, accounting for about 40% of the world’s foreign exchange reserves. Now five of the top six foreign reserves holders in the world are in Asia. The work force in Asia was young, educated and flexible. The political situation was stable. Policies were outward-looking with a commitment to open markets and free trade. 5. So what went wrong in Asia? What turned the Asian miracle into what is now referred to, quite unkindly in my opinion, as the Asian myth or the Asian mirage? A few months into this fall out, there have been many explanations offered. The most talked about was the rapid growth and volatility of international capital flows. 6.
The interest rate reductions since 2002 have contributed to a turnaround and the economy has experienced a soft landing following the years of high cost inflation in Norway and the period of weak activity in the world economy. Lower interest rates in particular have contributed to sustaining growth in disposable income and private consumption. Household demand is one of the most important driving forces in the Norwegian economy. Low interest rates, high growth in real income and improved job security are now creating a basis for strong growth in household consumption. BIS Review 61/2004  3  High wage growth over several years from 1998 has eroded the competitiveness of the Norwegian business sector. The nominal krone exchange rate measured by the trade-weighted index is now approximately at the level prevailing in the mid-1990s, while labour costs in manufacturing have risen considerably more than among our trading partners in the same period. The business sector is still burdened with the loss in competitiveness that is due to high wage increases. The exposed sector has been scaled back. Companies that are still in operation may be in a better position to cope with the high wage level. A more efficient service sector may also have strengthened the export industry. Nevertheless, costs may hamper activity and employment growth. The cost level with the current krone exchange rate is close to 15 per cent higher than in the mid-1990s and about 4 per cent higher than the average for the past 30-35 years.

At present - with continued low interest rates abroad and a close link between domestic interest rates and the krone - a tighter monetary policy would restrain credit demand primarily because job security would be reduced as a result of a stronger krone. House prices and developments in household credit influence consumption and housing investment. We seek to take account of these indirect effects in interest-rate setting. A turnaround has occurred in the Norwegian economy. The economy has experienced a soft landing after the long period of high cost inflation in Norway and sluggish external activity. •  Output has returned to trend and is now showing a marked rise. •  Employment has returned to trend and is rising. •  Unemployment is at the 1996-level and is equal to the average for the 1990s. •  Wage growth is broadly in line with a level that is consistent with the inflation target given normal productivity growth. •  Overall credit growth is balanced. Credit is expanding approximately in line with trend growth in nominal GDP. •  Labour costs in Norway relative to our trading partners are now broadly in line with a long-term average. •  The nominal krone exchange rate is on a par with the average for the 1990s. •  The interest rate level is close to the level prevailing among our trading partners. •  Inflation expectations are approximately the same as the target.
Digital finance: a regulatory challenge [Go toslide 5] I will now turn to digital finance and its regulatory and supervisory challenges. 2.1. Rapidly growing markets but increased risks This digital finance relies on new players, new assets and new infrastructures. Among these new players are big techs, which should not be reduced to the GAFAMs alone. These have made targeted and fragmented inroads into financial services. These incursions include the provision of cloud services to financial institutions, which are progressively migrating their IT systems and infrastructures to these new solutions in order to reduce costs, increase the flexibility and security of their infrastructures, and improve customer experience. Furthermore, big techs are setting up their own financial activities, in a fragmented and unregulated manner, in the form of technical services (e.g. Apple Pay digital wallet, Google Pay, etc. ), or in the form of financial products and services (savings products, loans, issuance or trading of cryptoassets, etc.) which are developed in-house or in collaboration with traditional players. For example, Apple offers a savings account in partnership with Goldman Sachs, while also offering its own fractional payment service. What are the risks associated with these inroads into financial services?

[Go to slide 3] Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), which was virtually unknown to the general public before its collapse last March, was a - if not THE - tech bank and as such had a specific business model, based on two pillars: - its sources of funding were heavily dependent on uninsured deposits, stemming from a highly concentrated customer base of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in the tech and digital world. - a very high share of these deposits was invested in long-term government bonds, issued by the US federal government or federal agencies, at fixed rates, since these securities are intended to be held for the long term. In 2022, the change in the US economic and financial environment transformed SVB's business model into a source of vulnerability to liquidity and interest rate risk. This vulnerability, combined with major failures in the bank's management and governance system, proved fatal. Indeed, in this new environment marked by rising interest rates and slowing growth, the cash flow needs of tech companies led them to withdraw a portion of their deposits, causing a liquidity problem for SVB, which forced it to sell part of its government bond portfolios. These forced sales, which were not anticipated by the bank, resulted in the crystallisation of unrealised losses, real losses in other words, as the securities sold shed value with the increase in key interest rates decided by the US central bank (the FED).
Benoît Cœuré: Challenges to the single monetary policy and the European Central Bank’s response Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Institut d’études politiques, Paris, 20 September 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, 1 It is a great pleasure for me to speak here today at Sciences Po Paris. 9 August this year was the fifth anniversary of the start of the financial crisis. The past few years have been times of hardship, financial turbulence and risks. At the same time, the crisis has exposed weaknesses in the framework of the economic and monetary union and provided an impetus to strengthen its foundations and to begin the process of bringing all euro area countries back to a more sustainable fiscal and macroeconomic path. The crisis has also brought challenges and opportunities for monetary policy, which is going to be the focus of my remarks today. Let me elaborate on two of them. The first challenge I will describe is that after Lehman’s collapse central banks had to combat exceptional threats to price stability arising from financial instability and recessionary forces. At that time their standard tool of monetary policy – changes to the short-term interest rate – was losing traction due to the dislocation in the financial system.

John C Williams: 901 days Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), New York City, 15 July 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery Thank you for the kind introduction and the opportunity to speak this morning. It’s a particular pleasure to be sharing the stage with Andrew Bailey, who has played such an important role in leading efforts on establishing robust references rates to replace the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). This critical undertaking traverses markets and transcends jurisdictions, making international cooperation and coordination essential for success. Before I go any further, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System. Where Have We Come From? Today I’m going to talk about the progress we’ve made, and the path that lies ahead. But first, given that 12 years have passed since LIBOR first became an acute area of concern, it’s important to remember why replacing it is so critical. LIBOR is based on submissions from individual banks. The volume of actual transactions that term LIBOR is based on is very small—totaling around $ million on a typical day.
This has been reflected, since late summer 2017, in a growing discrepancy between the growth of the GDP deflator and core inflation. The GDP deflator has followed a more pronounced upward trend, rising from 0.6% at the end of 2016 to 1.5% at the end of 2018. One development that may have contributed to lower imported inflation was the appreciation of the euro exchange rate by around 8% in nominal effective terms over the last two years. ECB internal analysis suggests that this had an impact on non-energy industrial goods inflation in 2018, especially for durable goods.15 The upshot is that the pass-through of wages to prices is likely to be moderate until these various factors have played out. But there are several reasons to believe that they will unwind over the medium term. Our monetary policy will remain accommodative and will respond to any changes in the inflation outlook. The effects of exchange rate appreciation have now reversed. Demand should recover, so long as the downside risks to our outlook do not materialise. And with stronger demand, firms should be able to rebuild margins. Moreover, even if the economy were to slow more than expected, the risks to wage growth may be contained. Since the end of 2017, wage growth has been driven less by wage drift16 and more by negotiated wages, which are more persistent and react more slowly to cyclical labour market conditions. Negotiated wages for 2019 have to a substantial degree already been set by previous negotiating rounds.

For emerging economies, capital flow volatility is a fact of life and something that policy makers have to deal with; and we have to acknowledge that the size and volatility of capital flows will only intensify. While the transmission of global shocks to the domestic economy through the real economy channel – that is through trade and investment – is something that we have been dealing with for decades, policy makers today are confronted with the increasingly dominant channel of 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  transmission of shocks through the financial markets, at least in the immediate term. All of us have experienced how spillovers from external developments that were manifested through capital flow volatility have adversely affected domestic financial markets, asset prices, liquidity conditions and importantly, exchange rates. All these challenges make for a complicated policy environment for ASEAN central banks. Gone are the days when keeping our own house in order is enough. Sure, good fundamentals matter as they have no substitute. They are, however, no longer sufficient. As Keynes rightly pointed out a long time ago, “the market can stay irrational longer than you can remain solvent.” Often, we have seen how external developments that are beyond our control, such as the unprecedented quantitative easing by the advanced economies and the subsequent Taper Tantrum, triggered periods of large inflows followed by sharp reversals in emerging economies with severe consequences. For small open economies, these flows can easily overwhelm the domestic financial markets and lead to build-up of vulnerabilities in the economy.
Today, we are in a much better state. We have reopened our borders and business travel has substantially resumed. Global firms are now once again able to build up the necessary staff capacity to meet their expanding business needs. Second, public discussions on growing the Singaporean Core, and some recent changes in work pass policies have also added to concerns about whether Singapore continues to be welcoming to foreigners. As I have said earlier, growing the Singaporean Core is not a zero-sum game with attracting the best of global talents. An internal MAS study shows that there is generally a high degree of complementarity between high-skilled employment pass holders and local professionals in the financial sector. In fact, staying open to global talent has been critical to the growth and success of our financial centre. Our financial sector will not be where it is if we had not been welcoming of talents from around the world. As we become an even more international and sophisticated financial centre pursuing cutting-edge developments in technology and sustainability, it is even more critical that we remain open. The recent changes in employment pass policies will not hinder firms from continuing to have access to the talents that they need for their growth in Singapore. There are no quotas on Employment Pass holders. The purpose of the new Employment Pass Complementary Assessment or COMPASS framework is not to reduce the intake of employment pass holders.

She then pivoted to a role in sustainability, advising clients on developing their sustainability strategies and carbon credit verification projects, a role that drew on her audit skills and new knowledge acquired from completing a master’s degree in Environmental Management. Edris is now Head of ESG Research at Maitri Asset Management overseeing the firm’s ESG investment framework. MAS, Workforce Singapore (WSG) and the Institute of Banking & Finance (IBF) have been working together to support more systematically such mid-career transitions to the financial sector. One key initiative is the Technology in Finance Immersion Programme (TFIP), which has seen promising results. 90% of the 2019 cohort who were from non-tech jobs completed the programme and have taken on good tech jobs in financial institutions. Another 530 are going through the programme from the 2020 and 2021 runs. I am pleased to say that IBF is launching the fourth run of this programme this year, with close to 700 training places – which is double the number offered last year. IBF and WSG will also launch a new Wealth Management Accelerator Programme (WMAP, pronounced as “We-MAP”). WMAP targets mid-career professionals with a passion for customer relationship management and an interest in pursuing a career in wealth management. The three-month programme will include structured and on-the-job training to provide participants with the skills to be licensed and hired into relationship management roles. Seven major retail banks are participating in this inaugural programme, to fill close to 200 job roles.
Some of these problems are dealt with by the new capital adequacy rules in Basel II. Nevertheless, it is essential that the authorities play an active role to ensure better insight. And this is also very much in the market’s own interests. The uncertainty remains The outcome of the current information will depend on how subprime loans are valued in the long term. If interest rate payments from the underlying loans are received as calculated, there is no need to write down the value for this reason. However, it looks as though there will be more defaults on payments than originally feared. In addition, it takes several months from the time that a household defaults on payment of a loan until it reaches the minus side of a balance sheet. Although a number of banks have already made major losses when forced to write down the value of their assets, it will be a long time before all the cards are on the table. There are also considerable problems with valuations. Banks and other investors are to write down the value of their assets, but there are rarely any market prices for the structured products containing mortgages. The valuation problems may force the banks to take bigger write downs than what is motivated by the underlying credit quality. An important factor in all of this is US economic activity.

Lars Nyberg: The financial market turmoil Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 22 November 2007. *  *  *  I would like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here to discuss how we at the Riksbank view the recent unrest in the financial markets. I shall begin by talking about the background to the market turbulence and about the spark that ignited the actual chain of events. Then I shall go on to discuss developments during the autumn and what we can learn from what has happened – as far as is possible at this early stage. In conclusion, I shall talk about the risks we see before us. Rapid changes in the credit market In recent years there have been major changes in the international credit markets. New agents have entered the market at the same time as new instruments have been introduced at a rapid pace. At the core of the changes in the credit market is a phenomenon called securitisation. This has to a great extent been practised by US mortgage institutions and banks since the 1970s. So it is not a new phenomenon. In brief, securitisation entails a number of loans, such as mortgages or credit card accounts, being placed in a specially-created company, which is then financed by issuing bonds on the market. These bonds are usually called Asset Backed Securities (ABS). Managed properly, there are considerable advantages to securitisation.