samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Under this scheme, the time required to issue in multiple markets will be the same as that for issuing in one market, reaping both cost and time savings for issuers. The cross border RMB channels with SIP and TEC, which I mentioned earlier, would also allow corporates in these locations to issue RMB bonds in Singapore. These initiatives in the debt and equity markets will allow companies to diversify their sources of funding abroad, more easily tap investors in overseas markets as well as broaden the array of debt investment choices in local markets. d.  Fund Management. There are two similar initiatives for mutual recognition of collective investment schemes in Asia. The first, among Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, led by the ASEAN securities regulators. The second, involving Singapore, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, called the Asian Region Funds Passport under the auspices of APEC. These initiatives will widen the opportunities for investors and fund managers abroad. 13. In addition, we see evidence of partnerships among market participants, especially in the area of OTC derivatives which has been typically a fragmented market: a. Collateral Management. The global reforms for OTC derivatives have drastically increased the demand for collateral. To date, Asian collateral is not widely traded or commonly accepted outside of their home market. This has created inefficiencies as financial institutions can neither obtain specific, nor deploy excess, Asian collateral outside of their home market. Two developments have helped.

Asia remains the fastest growing and most dynamic region in the world today and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. According to projections by The Conference Board, China’s growth in the next ten years will average close to 5% per annum, with India at about 4.2% and the rest of Asia at 4.5%. 1 These projected growth rates for Asia are well above the 3.8% for emerging economies as a whole, and the 1.7% expected for the advanced economies over the same period. Looking further into the future, the Asian Development Bank has projected that the sum of the GDP of China, India and ASEAN in purchasing power parity terms could quadruple by 2030 and even exceed that of the US and Europe combined. 2 5. Asia’s already large middle class, will continue to register strong growth. In ASEAN for instance, the middle class is projected to rise to two-thirds of the population by 2030, from less than a quarter in 2010. 3 The rapid expansion of the middle class will, from the demand side, spur the growth and development of a wide range of goods and services. 6. Alongside Asia’s sustained economic development in the medium-term, financial services will be an important facilitator of growth as well as a growth engine in its own right. 1  “New measures for global growth projections for The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook 2014,” The Conference Board, November 2013. 2  “ASEAN, PRC and India: The Great Transformation,” ADB Institute, Asian Development Bank, 2014.
As a result, the “originate to distribute” model may potentially diminish the likelihood of the credit busts and banking crises that have historically been a major source of macroeconomic and financial instability in many countries. It should be noted though that, even before the outbreak of financial market turmoil, some commentators have voiced doubts about some of the welfare-enhancing effects of the “originate to distribute” model. For instance it has been argued that, while securitisation certainly spreads existing risks, it may in fact encourage the creation of further risks, particularly by relaxing the incentives for banks to screen and monitor borrowers in order to 6 alleviate the informational asymmetries associated with credit contracts. Incidentally, it should be recalled that, when assets-backed securities were in their infancy, concerns about the risks for investors stemming from the possible relaxation of lending and monitoring standards by banks were among the main reasons for scepticism about the prospects of the market for securitised loans. In addition, it has been questioned whether the securitisation of loans has succeeded in ensuring risk diversification. Indeed, for many banks all over the world, risks do not seem to have travelled farther away than the balance sheets of their own conduits, and have been internalised again once the market turmoil erupted. Besides, some banks turned out to have direct exposures through their own investment activity on structured products and secondary exposures via some of their customers.

These weaknesses as well as related policy recommendations from a wide range of fora and organisations have attracted considerable attention over the past months. In my final remarks today, I would like to focus on an area with major repercussions for the smooth functioning of markets, namely: transparency . There is common agreement on the view that a sound transparency framework based on improved disclosure, high-quality accounting standards and solid valuation practices is pivotal for ensuring market confidence and enhancing market discipline. In this respect, the financial market turmoil brought to the forefront a number of shortcomings: disclosure of information on risk exposures to and valuations of structured products and off-balance sheet vehicles proved to be opaque and very diverse in terms of scope and detail, complicating comparison across financial institutions. Furthermore, at the instrument level, the information provided to the market by institutions involved in the securitisation process has been limited, especially in relation to the quality of underlying asset pools. This lack of transparency both on exposures to instruments and at the level of the instrument itself contributed to the loss of market confidence and, as I mentioned earlier, led to disruption in various segments of the financial markets. The complexity and opacity in instruments supported also to an overreliance on ratings and rating agencies.
This year’s Current Account deficit will match the March forecast, because the higher copper price compensates for the expansion of domestic expenditure. All in all, between 2020 and 2021, the Current Account balance will turn negative, reflecting the increase in domestic demand. Compared to March, during the three-year period 2021-2023, the world economy will see slightly higher growth rates and the average annual copper price will be 20 to 30 cents above the downsloping trend projected in March. In addition to the recent rise, this correction responds to the higher long-term copper price, which is increased to USD 3.3 per pound, from USD 2.7 previously. Despite the oil price hike over the projection horizon, the terms of trade are, on average, 4 percent higher than we estimated in March (Table 2). The better actual and expected performance of GDP this year leads to an earlier closing of the output gap than anticipated in the March central scenario. This considers that the strong growth in domestic demand, associated with consumption, will boost effective GDP in the short term. Because of this, and despite the second-quarter pullback and the upward correction to potential GDP (which I will touch upon in a few moments), the gap will close during the third quarter of this year, turning positive for a few quarters. It will then fall in 2022 in line with the reduction of stimulus to private spending, oscillating around zero until the end of 2023 (Figure 16).

We have also worked on a data dashboard for the top management to track gender progress through KPIs on an annual basis, we have launched leadership and mentoring programs to strengthen strategic skills and encourage female to apply for management positions, we guarantee gender equitable panels in managerial recruitment processes, we are deploying training in unconscious bias, we have an internal D&I manifesto and we are working closely on a regular basis with our colleagues of the ESCB and SSM on a specific network to advance diversity and inclusion in our institutions. These actions are already proving we are on the right path, but events, such as this, sharing different views, challenges, approaches, and possible ways of improving, allow us to discover new pathways to become more efficient in the fulfilling of our goal: gender equality in central banks. Thank you very much and enjoy the sessions! 2
Instead, if you pay attention to the incoming economic news and listen to our assessment about how the outlook is evolving, then I think you will be able to judge for yourself when liftoff is likely. What also matters for financial asset prices is the likely post-lift-off trajectory of short-term rates over the medium- to longer-term. In fact, this should be more important than the particular month in which the normalization process starts. On this score, I think it is hard to be precise about the expected path of short-term rates. That is because it depends on two important factors: (1) how the economic outlook evolves, which depends, in part, on how loose or tight monetary policy actually is at a given level of short-term rates, and (2) how financial conditions broadly react to changes in the level of short-term rates. My own view is that the upward trajectory of short-term rates is likely to be relatively shallow. This reflects several factors. First, the lack of strong forward momentum in the economy despite the low level of short-term interest rates suggests that U.S. monetary policy is not as accommodative as one might think. In particular, the lack of strong momentum suggests that the real equilibrium federal funds rate today is considerably lower than the 2 percent rate assumed in the standard Taylor Rule formulation.

Moreover, in the unlikely event that the rates we initially selected for the IOER and ON RRP were insufficient to move the federal funds rate into the desired range, we could alter the level of these rates and/or the spread between these rates so as to move the federal funds rate into the desired range. Finally, we also have other tools, such as the Term Deposit Facility and term reverse repo that could be used if needed to help achieve the targeted range for the federal funds rate. While I don’t expect that these tools will prove necessary, it is nice to have them available should we need to deal with unanticipated contingencies. How will financial markets react to the onset of normalization? My own view is that there likely will be some turbulence. After all, lift-off will represent a regime change after more than six years at the zero lower bound. Recognizing this, we have a responsibility to minimize the amount of potential turbulence by communicating clearly in order to reduce uncertainty about conditions surrounding lift-off and the likely aftermath of lift-off. This means being clear about what factors are important in driving the timing of lift-off. However, this does not mean providing advance notice about precisely when lift-off will occur because the timing should depend on the incoming economic news and how this influences the economic outlook.
In contrast the asset management regulators had no real concept of consolidated or group supervision and looked primarily at each legal entity in a group by itself. A small building society would be visited by staff from the Building Societies Commissioner every six months, while the insurance regulators’ norm for a company with far greater assets than 42  that small building society would be one visit every three years . Through a series of public papers, the FSA therefore embarked on defining a common approach towards all of the institutions it supervised. It defined its interactions with firms into 5 broad activities: authorisation; baseline monitoring; thematic work; specific risk mitigation; and work once a risk has escalated or crystallised. 40  Building Societies Commission (BSC);Friendly Societies Commission (FSC); Insurance Directorate (ID) of HM Treasury; Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO); Personal Investment Authority (PIA); Registry of Friendly Societies (RFS); Securities and Futures Authority (SFA); Securities and Investments Board (SIB); Supervision and Surveillance Division (S&S) of the Bank of England 41 FSA website: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/approach 42 Foot, Michael. ‘The FSA: The first six years’, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 12 Issue. 3, (2004), pp. 201-205 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  The extent of the FSA’s interaction with firms was defined by its assessment of two factors: a firm’s probability of failure and its likely impact upon failure.

Does it have a sustainable business? Are the people running it competent, open and honest? With that in mind, the types of activity undertaken by supervisors became well-established, particularly as supervisory approaches evolved, and indeed began to conform, in the latter half of the twentieth century. This evolution has laid the groundwork for the supervision that we undertake at the PRA today, with some obvious exceptions such as cyber risk which calls for innovation in our approach. It would be hubristic to condemn and discard all the regimes of the past, or to insist that our approach is, for the first time in supervisory history, perfect. But I am confident that we have distilled the best (often basic) elements of supervisory practice from our mixed heritage – forward-looking, judgment-based, focused on the key risks – and combined these with a healthy dose of common sense to deliver the PRA’s approach. So what conclusions should we draw from the evolution of supervision over the past 100 years? Will a supervisor in 2117 look back and say the PRA had the best way of doing things? I doubt it – supervisors of the future will surely identify ways to improve on various elements of our current supervisory model. Our approach here at the PRA is a good one but we would be wise to have some humility about it.
This may curb growth in the Norwegian economy and lead to higher wage and cost inflation. Inflation is expected to pick up ahead. The upturn has also benefited the financial industry. Strong economic expansion has pushed up an already high level of lending growth. As a result, total assets in Norwegian banks and mortgage companies have risen sharply over the past decade. Growth in lending to households has been high since 2000, but growth in corporate lending showed a sharp rise towards the end of 2005. Profitability in the financial industry in Norway has been high. What is the outlook ahead? Will strong growth continue? The strong rate of growth we have witnessed in the past few years is not sustainable over time. Capacity utilisation is very high with labour shortages in many sectors. Monetary policy must be oriented to bringing inflation up to target while avoiding an overheating of the real economy. The scenario ahead, then, is a continued upward adjustment of the interest rate while curbing the high rate of economic growth. It is likely that credit growth will gradually slow, and this may also pose challenges for banks. I will return to this later. Risks to financial stability in Norway In Norges Bank’s most recent Financial Stability report, published in June, we concluded that the overall outlook for financial stability was satisfactory. We nonetheless highlighted a number of factors that might constitute a risk.

Thomas Jordan: Strong Swiss franc and large current account surplus – a contradiction? Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Institute of International Studies, Zurich, 19 February 2013. *  *  *  The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  For almost 18 months now, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has been enforcing the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro with the utmost determination. The need for this measure is widely recognised, both domestically and abroad, due to the substantial appreciation of the Swiss franc in summer 2011. At the same time, however, there are isolated voices claiming that given the large current account surplus, the Swiss franc is too weak, and that the SNB should allow the currency to appreciate in order to contribute towards reducing global imbalances. This view is based on a lack of knowledge about the situation in Switzerland. Specific factors are responsible for the Swiss current account surplus. The balance on the trading account, for instance, makes only a modest contribution. The most important elements with regard to the current account surplus are the following: first, investment income from Switzerland's substantial net international investment position, second, financial sector earnings from business with customers abroad, which is traditionally of significance for Switzerland, and third, earnings from merchanting, which have risen sharply over the past decade. The current account surplus is also statistically overestimated.
Looking across the debate, I remain cautiously optimistic that we will be able to come up with a major reform package which delivers all three of the objectives that the government has set for the review. Looking up Now I can feel some of you growing restless in the prudentist’s chair, and it is true that Solvency II pushes my analogy, already somewhat laboured, well past breaking point. So let’s look up at the ceiling instead, where climate change clouds are gathering. I’m not well equipped to tell you how much weight to attach to this summer’s extreme weather events around the world, but they and the findings in the IPCC’s latest report2 have been unnerving. In the meantime we have been busy on our own climate work. Since I last spoke at Mansion House we have published a discussion paper on options for greening the Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme, following a change in the remit of the Monetary Policy Committee; we have published our second annual climate-related financial disclosure report; and, most significantly for the PRA, we have launched our climate change biennial exploratory scenario exercise. Looking ahead the UK will host COP26 in November and we have an important deadline for PRAregulated firms to have embedded our supervisory expectations on managing climate-related financial risks by the end of the year. There is of course a lively debate about whether central banks and regulators should be doing more or less on climate change.

François Villeroy de Galhau: The euro – which way to go? Keynote speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the EconPol Europe (European Network for Economic and Fiscal Policy Research) Founding Conference and first Annual Meeting "The Euro - Which Way to Go? ", Brussels, 9 November 2017. * * * Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen,1 It is a pleasure to be in Brussels today, which doesn’t happen so often for a central banker… who has just arrived from Frankfurt. I welcome the fact that you at EconPol Europe have chosen the euro as the theme of your founding conference, and invited me to give this keynote speech. Since Maastricht 25 years ago, we have succeeded in building a Monetary Union. However we have not delivered on Economic Union. To avoid overburdening monetary policy, our Union must stand on two feet rather than just one: that is why it is legitimate that we, as central bankers, propose ideas on this subject, even if we are not those who legitimately make decisions. It is now urgent to make concrete progress on Economic Union, all the more so as the economic context is now favourable, as confirmed today by the European Commission. Euro area growth of 2.2% in 2017 should be the highest rate in 10 years, and as strong as in the United States.
In this respect, EU financial groups will be instrumental factors for building bridges of cooperation among economies of the region and its transformation into a larger, better integrated, more competitive, more profitable and prosperous economy, eventually leading to a prosperous economic future through economic cooperation. In this respect, I encourage foreign groups to adopt a regional rather than a country specific view when considering their future in the region. It goes without saying that any policy that restricts commitment and exposure of EU financial groups in the region does not support economic cooperation among our countries. It rather creates a struggling environment and a less prosperous future for all economies of the region. The Western Balkans region offers great opportunities and profitable perspectives for EUbased corporations and financial groups. The harmonization of above-mentioned reforms will create an even more attractive environment for different private entities interested in investing in our region. I invite EU financial groups to see the region under this perspective. European institutions and financial groups should support and become a positive force to facilitate, smoothen and support regional economic cooperation, which will lead to a better prosperous future and a faster European integration process of the region. Thank you for your attention! BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Combined with high productivity growth, this has resulted in high corporate earnings and solid growth in employment. At the same time, wage-earners share of corporate value added has been reduced, from around 75 per cent at the end of the 1980s to 70 per cent at the end of the 1990s, and now  BIS Review 121/2007  1  stands at below 65 per cent. Solid productivity growth and high prices for export goods and deliveries to the petroleum sector have contributed to the reduction in the wage share over the past few years. The ample supply of labour has probably had a dampening effect on wage growth. Increased globalisation may have provided greater opportunities for Norwegian enterprises to relocate production to other countries if labour costs become too high. This probably places some restraint on wage demands among workers in sectors where enterprises have such opportunities. Historically, a high wage share has tended to be accompanied by low unemployment. Developments in recent years have provided the basis for strong growth in employment while the wage share has fallen. Is it possible to sustain the combination of low unemployment and a low wage share? First, it partly depends on whether the positive supply-side conditions are sustained. There is probably symmetry here. Should the terms of trade deteriorate, productivity growth slacken and foreign workers return to their home country, the wage share will increase, profits fall and unemployment increase. There is now a prospect of slower global growth.