samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Because of the use of the hash function, a digital signature allows the receiver of a message to determine whether the message has been altered since it was digitally signed. State legislation in this area tends to address either electronic signatures (23 states) or digital signatures (16 states), but not both. States with legislation on electronic signatures differ on the question of what qualifies as an electronic signature. Several states have taken the UCC Article 1 approach and recognize any form of electronic mark intended to serve as an electronic signature. Other states, however, require that several conditions be met before an electronic signature will be legally enforceable. Generally, for these states, in order for an electronic signature to be effective it must: (1) be unique to the person using it; (2) be capable of verification; (3) be under the sole control of the person using it; (4) be linked to the data in such a manner that if the data is changed the signature is invalidated; and (5) conform to regulations adopted by the Secretary of State. Digital signature statutes typically provide for the promulgation of regulations governing the implementation and use of a digital signature infrastructure. The digital signature infrastructure contemplated by these statutes involves a trusted third party, usually a certification authority or CA, whose job is to confirm that the private key used by a sender to sign an electronic message is in fact the private key of the purported sender.

The White House Framework suggests that Government action may be necessary to ensure the safety and soundness of electronic payments systems, to protect consumers or to respond to important law-enforcement objectives. Of course, the White House would work closely with the private sector to inform policy development and ensure that governmental activities flexibly accommodate the needs of the emerging market-place. From a central bank perspective, one of the most fundamental questions raised by electronic payments is its impact on monetary policy, especially if its development is as widespread as some have predicted. In the near term, it appears that Internet payments systems will not significantly impact monetary policy. For the most part, the Internet and other communication networks are currently being used to facilitate existing banking transactions using traditional banking settlement channels. Most payments over the Internet simply result in the movement of funds from a bank account in one institution to one in the same or another bank. This should have few, if any, implications on the conduct of United States monetary policy or the measurement of the United States money supply. “Money” as defined by M1, M2, or M3, would still be held in accounts at banks and would be reported to the Federal Reserve through existing reporting mechanisms. If, however, Internet payments evolve to the point where digital “coins” or other private electronic money begin to be widely used and circulated like Federal Reserve bank notes, the potential implications for monetary policy could be much greater.
As the economic situation abroad normalises, and pressures on the Norwegian krone ease, cost inflation and high activity in Norway will result in higher consumer price inflation. The key policy rate will then gradually be raised and approach a normal level. But developments could take another course. A pronounced weakening of growth prospects or a krone that is too strong may over time lead to inflation that is too low. Such developments would be counteracted by monetary policy measures. We still have room for manoeuvre in interest rate setting – in both directions. More resilient banking sector The financial crisis provided us with some important insights. First, the crisis illustrated that low and stable inflation is not sufficient to secure financial stability. Second, the crisis revealed severe shortcomings in banking regulation. Banking and financial sector regulation is now being reformed in many countries. New liquidity buffer and capital adequacy requirements are due for implementation in line with the changes to the EEA rules. The regulatory reform will make the banking industry more resilient to periods of rising losses and financial market turbulence. Norwegian banks have become more solid in recent years, which is a positive development. Banks’ capital, in particular that of the largest banks, should be increased further in order to satisfy the new requirements due for implementation. Chart 9: Bank lending margins have increased Banks’ lending rates have remained fairly high over the past year, despite a fall in their borrowing costs.

The currency rebasing shall be implemented effective 1 January 2013, and is expected to bring efficiency in the Zambian currency as a medium of exchange and store of value. As you may be aware, the Bank is re-introducing coins which will encourage the use of mechanisms such as pay phones, vending machines, car parking meters and other related technologies. Mr. Chairperson, According to the Finscope Zambia survey conducted in 2009 only 33,7% of Zambian adults have access to financial services, leaving 66,3% financially excluded. This is despite the growth in the number of banks and indeed branches in Zambia. It is obvious that at the current growth rate of the penetration of banking services, if this is left to traditional banks alone, it may mean that the majority of Zambians will be financially excluded for a long time to come. Ladies and Gentlemen, given the above challenge, it is quite appropriate to conclude that the mobile payments industry provides Zambia with a unique opportunity to accelerate the provision of banking services in rural and remote areas at an affordable cost to the Zambian people. To this extent I am happy to inform you that since the enactment of the National Payments Systems Act of 2007, when we only had one designated Payments Business, which was Celpay, the Bank of Zambia has now registered 28 Designated Payments Businesses. The Bank continues to encourage growth of the mobile payments sector and other initiatives that promote financial inclusiveness.
The Shariah principles must be embedded in each and every operational aspect of the Islamic financial institution, including in the design of financial products and financing structures, financial contracts and their execution, liquidity and balance sheet management, risk management as well as asset and wealth management. The upholding of Shariah principles must permeate from the highest level, including at the board and senior management levels, which provide the strategic direction for the Islamic financial institution and to the operational levels. Sound policies and practices premised on Shariah principles will evolve the Islamic financial system into a financial system that is distinctively ethical and that which promotes economic justice. To meet this objective of providing a total talent management solution for the global Islamic financial services industry and to meet the educational needs of the different levels of Islamic finance practitioners, including professionals and specialists in Islamic finance, Malaysia is establishing an International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF). INCEIF will commence operations in March this year and will offer professional certification programmes in Islamic finance. INCEIF will also forge strategic alliances with domestic and foreign academic institutions to offer post-graduate programmes, namely Masters and Doctorates in Islamic Finance with specific areas of specialization. A professional association for Islamic finance professionals will also be established for the alumni of INCEIF to keep abreast with the latest developments in Islamic finance.

We expect all insurers to have cybersecurity practices and controls that are aligned with our Technology Risk guidance and requirements. It is equally important for firms to have in place good cyber hygiene standards, and ensure that such good practices not just feature prominently in your IT systems and policies, but are also embedded in day-to-day work processes. More broadly, how will MAS, as a regulator, partner the industry in this transformation journey? Let me first set out a few principles that guide our approach: Firstly, MAS is technology-neutral and will not seek to favour one technology over another. Secondly, we take on a more principles-based approach where the focus is on outcomes – 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  whether a new business model or adopted technology will threaten financial institutions’ safety and soundness, or the fairness in their dealings with the public. Thirdly, we believe that regulations should support and not stifle innovation. Innovations by their inherent nature will move ahead of rules. What we want to guard against is regulatory arbitrage camouflaged by a supposed innovative business model. Another consideration is whether a new business model or adopted technology will create inconsistency and incoherence with our existing rules. It follows that as a regulator, MAS will need to: First, keep abreast with technological developments by engaging closely with the industry to exchange views and garner fresh insights. Second, assess and adopt our regulatory response based on careful review.
We are also looking very seriously into the possibility of a wholesale central bank digital currency: it would play a key role as the safest settlement asset, and would thus continue to anchor the monetary and financial system, even as the latter becomes partially tokenised. This is why the Banque de France is going to add, alongside some of you, three more experiments to the nine already carried out; it is also with this in mind that the Bank organised a pioneering international conference on 27 September on the tokenisation of finance. On a regulatory level, France was one of the first to propose a new DASP status under its 2019 PACTE Law, which has since been attributed to 54 players. Europe has provided a pioneering regulatory framework for crypto-assets thanks to the MiCA regulation; following the agreement obtained under the French presidency, it is crucial that it be adopted, and as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we will remain extremely vigilant regarding the risk of regulatory arbitrage in Europe. On a global level, it is imperative that the other large jurisdictions – including the largest one – now implement the shared recommendations of the G20 and FSB on consumer protection, financial stability and the prevention of money laundering. We all confirmed our agreement last week in Washington: this is good news for “trusted innovation”, but we need to turn our words into action on everything, and quickly, following the examples of France and Europe.

The “crypto winter” caused by the crashes of Terra-Luna followed by Celsius Network, by no means signifies that cryptos are over; it’s more of a weeding-out process. The share of stablecoins that are, in principle, backed by mechanisms to stabilise their value has risen fivefold in 20 months. Ensuring a lasting future for stablecoins – which is a legitimate goal – means remaining vigilant with regard to the associated risks. Because, in reality, the name covers a wide range of different forms: -  “crypto-backed” stablecoins, where the word “stablecoin” is a misnomer  as the coins are backed by other crypto-assets; or algorithmic stablecoins, a category to which Luna belonged; -  stablecoins backed by a basket of assets held in reserve, for example  commodities or monetary assets, such as money market funds and commercial paper; in reality these are similar to investment tools and should be treated as such; -  last, stablecoins backed by bank deposits denominated in a single  currency, which are designed to be used as global payment instruments. Page 4 of 5 Regardless of what form they take, stablecoins are, at this stage and in the majority of cases, denominated in dollars and have been developed outside Europe. Their widescale use within Europe would therefore pose a dual challenge, for our strategic autonomy and for our monetary stability; indeed this is one of the reasons why the Eurosystem has launched an investigation phase on a retail digital euro.
5 After four years of low or negative growth, the economy expanded by more than 3% in each year since 2005. At 6.5% the unemployment rate is at its lowest level in eight years, and the annual rate of change in productivity has returned to more acceptable levels after years of negative or marginal growth. Reflecting this general improvement, macroeconomic imbalances have also declined. The fiscal deficit contracted from almost 8% of GDP in 1999 to an estimated 1.6% in 2007 and the public debt/GDP ratio has gone down to 63% from a peak of 73% in 2004. The other Maastricht criteria, of course, were all met in good time and in a sustainable manner. Meanwhile, the current account deficit dropped from the 6 - 8% range in the first years after EU accession to around 3% in 2007, and is expected to drop further as the fiscal consolidation programme continues to unfold. At the same time, the private sector appears to have adjusted well to the changing composition of domestic and external demand. Not only has there been a shift away from public sector employment to private services - the share of the public sector in employment shed five percentage points to 30%since 2000 - but there has also been a move away from low value manufacturing activities to skills based services.

This data constraint could also become an issue for some developed markets, given a structural break in data due to the financial crisis and market dislocation. On top of these, there is the issue of level playing-field, as the structure of bank asset and liability in emerging and developed countries may be significantly different. We have found several policies that may have impact on level playing-field, between countries and business models of banks. An example is the application of a simple leverage ratio, which does not take into account inherent risk, because this would tend to penalise banks in developing countries that generally hold less risky assets compared to developed countries. In addition, macro-prudential measures, such as leverage ratio, could likely have a macroeconomic impact, possibly similar to use of liquidity reserve requirement as per classic monetary policy tool, and thus coordination with macroeconomic policy is vital. For central banks with dual role, this is less of a challenge, but for separated regulators, the issue of organisation structure once again comes into play. Turning to the Bank of Thailand’s involvement on these regulatory debates through various international forums – such as the bi-monthly BIS Governor Meetings, the Standard Implementation Group of BCBS, of which we are a member – we have proposed that developing countries be invited to participate in the formulation of new standards right at the beginning, rather than to be included at the later stage of implementation.
Mr Bergström reports on why Sweden has changed its stabilisation policy regime Speech by Mr Villy Bergström, a Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, the central bank of Sweden, at the 140th anniversary of the establishment of Norrbärke Sparbank in Smedjebacken, Darlana on 21 May 1999. It is obvious to everyone that we live in a different economic world than we did ten years ago. Ten years ago, registered unemployment was 1.3 per cent and inflation 7 per cent. Now inflation is nonexistent while total registered unemployment is over nine per cent. Why has such a drastic change in the economy taken place? What is characteristic for the new economic conditions? Are there alternatives to the policies now being carried out? Background Since the second war, Sweden, in principle, had a fixed exchange rate. However, in practice, it was not particularly fixed after the mid-1970s. From autumn 1976 to autumn 1982, Sweden devalued five times. I will come back to the sorry history of 1982-92. In autumn 1992, the fixed exchange rate was abandoned and the krona immediately fell by 11.5 per cent. Thereafter the krona declined further so that the total fall in the exchange rate to the lowest position of 13 December 1993, was 31.5 per cent. Note that the starting point for the fall in the value of the krona in November 1992 was a cost level that was 25 per cent lower, measured in common currency, than it had been in 1976. This was a failure for stabilisation policy.

Monetary policy must therefore be elaborated taking into consideration a view of inflation over a one or two year period. Therefore, the Riksbank makes inflation forecasts for this time period at regular intervals. Monetary policy is therefore controlled by an intermediate goal, namely the inflation forecasts. It would be unreasonable to try to immediately bring back inflation to two per cent if inflation was higher. It would require a dramatic reduction of capacity utilisation and a deterioration of the situation on the labour market. 5  BIS Review 59/1999  The Riksbank therefore weighs in the situation on the labour market and the real activity in its assessments. In the short run, there is a trade-off between stability of the inflation rate and stability in the real economy. An unremitting stabilisation of the rate of inflation very narrowly around two per cent would at times lead to real economic instability. Precisely for this reason, the target horizon is set at between one and two years, during which time the Riksbank endeavours to gradually meet the inflation target, by steering inflation towards two per cent, guided by the inflation forecasts, which have been made for this period. In the long run, however, there is no trade-off between inflation and employment. A low, stable inflation provides the prerequisites for fast growth and high employment, according to experiences from earlier periods, such as the first two decades after the war. We are now seeing a development that seems to confirm this hypothesis.
Irma Rosenberg: My time at the Riksbank – some final reflections on challenges along the way Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at SEB, Stockholm, 8 December 2008. *  *  *  On a chilly day in January 1976 I crossed the threshold of the newly-built Riksbank building for the first time. It was true that all employees were moving into the new building that day, which contributed to the more or less organised chaos of furniture gone adrift and employees trying to find their new offices. But for me it was probably an extra special day. It was my first day at work. And it was my first job outside of the university after taking my PhD. Almost 33 years have passed since that day in January. And as I leave the Riksbank at the end of the year one could say that I have come full circle. It was where I began my career. In 1986 I left the bank, but in January 2003 I once again crossed the threshold at Brunkebergstorg 11, then as one of the six members of the Executive Board. This will now be my final full-time job. The years have been eventful ones, with more than a little drama from time to time.

Such interactions tend to amplify the amplitude of the bussiness cycle, thereby heightening the risk to financial stability. This description of procyclicality presupposes the existence of two cycles, namely the business cycle and the financial cycle, that interact and reinforce each other. However, economic and financial decisions underlying the two cycles are not independent. They are inherently linked by the risk-taking behaviour of economic agents: the behaviour which is prone to change in response to incentive, perception of risk, regulation, and new information. It is this change in risk-taking behaviour that explains large swings in investor sentiment, from a period of optimism when risk is disregarded to a period of pessimism when there is no willingness to  BIS Review 160/2009  1  take risk. And it is this change in risk-taking behaviour that underscores the abrupt change in financial behaviour, and in the direction and momentum of economic activities. It follows therefore that procyclicality is a mechanism that encompasses the interactions of at least three reinforcing cycles that move in tandem. They are the business cycle, the financial cycle, and the cycle of risk-taking beheviour represented by fluctuations in asset prices or the asset price cycle. The three cycles are self-reinforcing, and it is the ways the cycles interact with each others that define the amplitude and the momentum of the cyclical flunctuations, as well as risk of a financial crisis. Interactions of the three cycles can be illustrated with reference to a typical boom-bust cycle.
In the event that the downwards risks I have mentioned weaken the inflation outlook over the medium term more fundamentally than we currently project, we would not hesitate to act. Should more monetary policy impulse become necessary. The ECB is determined to use all available instruments to achieve its mandate over the medium term. As for potential risks to financial stability, we do not see them materialising at present but we will naturally be monitoring them closely. Over the past two years, national authorities across Europe have been active in developing and implementing macroprudential policy measures but their effectiveness still has to be tested. Before addressing my second topic, let me mention Greece again. The comprehensive agreement that has been reached involved a long and complication discussion. But if, as we all hope, the new programme is completely  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  implemented, it will put Greece in a strong position to grow again and to reap the full benefits of participating in our common currency. The negotiations over the summer once again confirmed that Europe’s institutional framework is not yet commensurate with the requirements of sharing a single currency. A more complete union is necessary. From the ECB’s perspective, two elements are of particular importance. First, despite the best efforts of everyone involved, the crisis has revealed the need for a political centre to economic and monetary union.

In the euro area, inflation has been approximately in line with the objective defined by the European Central Bank. The preliminary estimate for May points towards rising inflation, particularly as a result of higher oil prices. Capacity utilisation in the euro area is low and unemployment remains high. Growth potential is weaker than in the US, although GDP growth picked up in the first quarter. As in the US, private consumption is an important factor driving growth. Increased net exports also contributed to growth in the euro area in the first quarter. Interest rate expectations in the euro area have also been revised upwards somewhat recently. The market now expects the ECB to raise interest rates at the end of 2004 or the beginning of 2005. Interest rate expectations were continuously revised downwards up to March 2004. Interest rates abroad have been unusually low for 2½ years. This has been the greatest challenge for our monetary policy. Even though a somewhat swifter rise is now expected, it appears that interest rates among our most important trading partners will remain low for a period ahead. In Norway, output growth has picked up after a growth pause. The interest rate reductions since 2002 have contributed to the turnaround and a soft landing for the economy. Private consumption is showing fairly strong growth. Household demand will probably be the most important driving force in the Norwegian economy in the period ahead.