samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These price control schemes coupled with the price support projects outlined above mean that the market mechanism is not well-functioning. Distorted prices in the spot market may have also discouraged foreign players from participating actively in our futures markets. A freely traded spot market is a necessary condition for a successful futures market. Ladies and Gentlemen, I would urge the board of directors of AFET and AFTC, the Ministry of Commerce, the government, all members of AFET and key players in our main agricultural products to be totally committed to making AFET a highly successful futures market - an exemplar to our neighbours and one where global trading is benchmarked. We need to be strategic, prioritising our products and evaluating needs of different participating groups. I pledge my full support to this cause. I have spent a great deal of time talking about the AFET, I would now like to briefly touch on its siblingTFEX. TFEX is launching its very first product SET50 futures in the next few months and from the road shows to date, I hear that it has been very well-received. As the next step, the Stock Exchange Commissioner and the Bank of Thailand are currently working on launching the much-anticipated bond futures or interest rate futures. I hope that once Thai financial market has been complemented by these interest rate futures, our players will be able to make much progress in the area of risk management, financial product innovation and trading.

Given the increasing availability of innovative financial products and much improved risk management techniques by commercial banks in Thailand, the Bank of Thailand has gradually relaxed our regulations in this area. At the moment, importers and exporters who wish to hedge this foreign exchange risk for a traderelated transaction can choose from forward contracts, plain-vanilla options or even certain structured products to suit their needs and preferred level of sophistication. My final point concerns the role of the futures market as an insurance mechanism. As mentioned previously, agricultural products tend to exhibit highly volatile prices causing farmers to suffer from this risk of violent price fluctuation. The government has stepped in to provide relief in the form of government price support scheme. At present, the government is running commodity price  2  BIS Review 14/2006  stabilisation schemes in four products namely paddy rice, corn feed and tapioca. These price support schemes provide an insurance for farmers against adverse price movement- in the form of selling put options to the farmers. The schemes have grown to become a substitute for the futures marketeliminating the very incentive for farmers, traders and producers to participate in the futures market. This is particularly the case when the guaranteed buying prices from the government are set at relatively high level compared to market-determined prices. I mentioned before that the average daily turnover in the AFET now is around 400 contracts. However, the majority of the trading is heavily concentrated in the ribbed smoked rubber sheet no.
According to the present analysts’ consensus, growth differential between the two zones is to narrow this year and practically disappear next year. According to the IMF forecasts, growth should reach 3.2% in the US in 2001 compared to 3.0% in the euro zone. 2.2  Structural reforms which are underway in Europe are likely to permit a sustainable non-inflationary growth  The undertaking and speeding up of structural reforms is one of the conditions for a complete success of the euro. In this regard, the Lisbon European Council, held last 23 April, can be viewed as a further BIS Review 52/2000  4  important step towards the necessary medium term strategy for structural reforms in the Union. The labor market has become more flexible in the past few years in Europe. I would like to give a few examples of this evolution. In all countries, the number of people on fixed-term contracts has quickly increased; they counted for a large part of jobs created between 1995 and 1998 and the trend has continued since then. In many countries, fiscal measures (for instance reduction of non-wage costs) have given incentives to hire younger and less-skilled people (France, Italy, Spain and Germany). Another key change is the rapid growth in part-time employment, especially among women. While Europe has long had a strong tradition of economic regulation, it must be acknowledged that deregulation is well underway in most countries.

2  To help on the supply side the Bank has developed an education outreach strategy with three components: 1. econoME: which includes free lesson plans and supporting materials for teachers to use in their classrooms; 2. Bank Ambassadors: colleagues below the director level at the Bank who volunteer to visit schools across the country to explain the Bank of England’s role; and 3. School visits by senior Bank and policy committee members: to spark young people’s interest in economics and to inspire them to pursue a career in related fields. Let me say a bit more about why we are doing this. 1  May 2017 survey conducted by ING and the Economics Network, available at: https://www.economicsnetwork.ac.uk/research/understandingecon 2 See Haldane, A “Everyday Economics”, Birmingham 2017 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  The first objective is to help young people understand the economy and to make better informed personal financial decisions. The econoME lessons are designed for 11-16 year olds and cover: -  The economic factors that influence personal decisions;  -  How to make informed decisions; and  -  How such decisions collectively influence the economy. An array of econoME resources, designed in close collaboration with teachers and education specialists, support these classes. The materials include lesson plans, presentations, videos, activities and real life case studies. And they can be used by non-specialists with no prior economics training.
In the published accounts it will be deducted from the book value of the credit items that produce it. It is not considered a reserve to be integrated in the regulatory own funds. The annual accounts shall report the various solvency provisions (or value adjustments), and their method of computation. The statistical provision is not a tax-deductible expense although banks can use an asset account of anticipated taxes (i.e. the impact on the profit and loss is neutral but still negative in terms of cash flows). Finally, given the considerable internationalisation of our banking system in recent years, it is important to keep in mind that the statistical provision is required on an individual level of all the members of a consolidated banking group. It is not possible to counter a positive statistical provision requirement in one bank with a negative one in another bank of the same group. This individual bank approach reinforces the statistical provision requirement and squares well with the fact that expected losses arise at an individual bank portfolio level. By now, you are probably wondering about the real impact of the statistical provision in the Spanish banking system. As far as the profit and loss account is concerned, the statistical provision for depository institutions represents around 12% of 2001 total operating margin. At the end of 2000 the statistical fund reached 15% of its maximum amount (remember there is a cap of three times the latent risk) and at the end of 2001 it stands at 27%.

The argument would be that deflating an asset price bubble at an early stage contributes “per se” to long-term financial and monetary stability. Against this view, I tend to share the position of those arguing that asset price bubbles are very difficult to identify in practice and, even assuming that they were correctly recognised, there is a lot of uncertainty as to how asset markets would react to policy changes. Furthermore, this strategy may prove difficult to communicate to the public. As concerns financial policy, the regulators’ task of ensuring the long-term soundness of the financial system entails creating the right incentives for market participants not reacting in excess in a given cyclical position and avoiding excessive misalignments. To this end it is essential, first, to encourage better knowledge of the risks assumed, a long-term orientation to analyses and, consequently, more prudent management within financial institutions. Second, a greater heterogeneity among financial market players to avoid mimetic behaviour seems desirable, although this is something the markets would normally develop by themselves. Third, greater transparency and disclosure by the authorities and private institutions would help market participants to focus on fundamentals. Fourth, a better understanding and evaluation of liquidity patterns in financial markets is called for, on the part of both market participants and supervisors. Finally, the regulatory authorities should obviously not introduce rules promoting short-term strategies. Let me focus now on the relationship between bank credit, loan losses and provisions for loan losses.
(3) We are beginning to understand some of the operational consequences. Most obviously, changes in working patterns have increased reliance on technology infrastructure. In response we are 1  See Follow-up note to insurers on the letter from Sam Woods 'Covid-19: IFRS 9, capital requirements and loan covenants' (April 2020). 2 See PRA Statement to insurers on the application of the matching adjustment during Covid-19 (July 2020). 3 See speech by Anna Sweeney 'Ask not what the economy can do for insurers – ask what insurers can do for the economy' (September 2020). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  increasing the emphasis we place on resilience to cyber threats, reviewing defensive measures and additional controls at firms, and maintaining the priority given to threat led penetration exercises. These and other responses serve to address one of more fronts of risk and uncertainty – whether from regulatory, legal or operational sources. The one big thing the last several months has brought home to our hedgehog brain is the need to be prepared for a world of high risk and high uncertainty on multiple and interacting fronts. The full extent and ramifications of structural changes either brought about or accelerated by the pandemic are unknown, for example the opportunities and threats presented by disruptive trends in FinTech, which has the potential to change economies of scale or to spur competition.

Stress testing is an example of a top-down tool we could consider: does the capital position suggested by the detailed, bottom-up modelling deliver resilience at both firm- and sector level to common, real world shocks that we can reasonably expect them to withstand? Stress testing may not be the only additional tool. The government has an objective of facilitating productive investment to aid recovery and adaptation – not just to the structural changes wrought by the experience of the pandemic, but also to the equally severe, long term threat of climate change. Insurers are embracing the part that they can play in financing the transition to a net zero carbon economy with their long term investment. But many of the projects that take us to net zero will be innovative and lacking an historical track record: there is a legitimate concern that the riskiness of such projects will be overstated by capital modelling that relies heavily on historical data for its inputs and for validation. At the same time the prudential regime has to reflect the economic risks involved. We are interested in the possibility for equally innovative risk measurement tools that have the flexibility to cope with any such bias in existing modelling methods, and deliver a balanced risk assessment: I welcome your thoughts on this directly or in responses to the Solvency II call for evidence. Conclusion In finance, the ‘Greeks’ have become synonymous with the inner workings of models for pricing derivatives – a fox-like activity if ever there was one.
*  *  *  The resurrection of the financial system is well advanced, and the capital base and ownership structure of the new banks have been determined. The next step is to complete the financial restructuring of the savings bank system. The Minister of Economic Affairs has presented a bill of legislation on financial undertakings, which addresses a number of the shortcomings that emerged in their operations during the run-up to the crisis, including large exposures, related party lending, and owner eligibility. A number of projects must be tackled afterwards. The banking system is still too large for domestic needs. Our financial institutions are operating in the shelter of capital controls, and the future arrangements for their links to foreign financial markets are still undetermined. Furthermore, many domestic financial institutions have sizeable currency mismatches between their foreign assets and liabilities. This is risky and increases their need for capital. The financial institutions themselves will have to work diligently in order to reduce the imbalances in their currency composition, but because the hedge market is not functioning properly at present, it is possible that the Central Bank might assist them in repairing their foreign exchange balance through swaps with institutions that have an opposite mismatch. In addition, the Bank will soon review its precautionary rules on financial institutions’ liquidity and foreign exchange balance, in light of recent events. The Central Bank of Iceland has collaborated with savings banks and the Ministry of Finance on a solution to the recapitalisation of the savings banks.

In this spirit the ECB has been reviewing its monetary policy operations over the past year. The enlargement eastwards will entail a new, formative stage. I would gladly work actively to achieve increased clarity and transparency within the ECB if the result of the referendum is a “yes” vote. Is a national stabilisation policy necessary? The risk that Sweden could end up in a different situation from the rest of the euro area, and that this would cause serious economic policy problems, has been strongly highlighted in the Swedish discussions, much more so than in other countries where the monetary union has been discussed. The reason for this is, of course, the severe crisis that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, with the collapse of the krona in 1992, which had such a tangible effect on the lives of many in Sweden. In my opinion, there is a tendency to overestimate the risks that developments in Sweden will differ substantially from the rest of the world and require unique stabilisation policy measures. When we have differed from other countries previously - such as during the crisis years of the early 1990s - this has usually been the result of conducting a different economic policy; of not having control over inflation or focussing on stability, as the core EMU countries did. However, there now appears to be a consensus that economic policy should be aimed at long-term stability and that this policy should stand firm.
I do not need to tell you that there is still a lot to be done. You have said so yourselves many times. These good words must be transformed into actions, and soon, because time is running out. It is no good having the right diagnosis if you don’t apply the medicine and cure the disease.”  6  BIS Review 50/2003

In turn, this in depth knowledge will allow supervisors to fully exploit the proportionality principle embedded in regulations for those viable projects that might finally exit the test environment. Because we should not forget that such test environment should have a temporary nature. Hence, for those projects that prove viable, the principle of same regulation for similar activities and risks should prevail. In any event, it is currently difficult to foretell how the development of these disruptive technological players will evolve in the future. Like any process of change, financial disintermediation will involve significant benefits for society; but it is not free from challenges for banks, for the regulator and, naturally, for the Banco de España itself, in its role as guarantor of financial stability. Among the benefits for those demanding funds, associated with a more diversified financing structure, are, on one hand, their greater stability in the face of shocks that affect specific institutions in the financial sector. Indeed, the international financial crisis highlighted the greater difficulties in gaining access to funding for those firms depending exclusively on bank lending, in contrast to those with a more diversified financial structure. These problems were more acute for those firms – chiefly SMEs – operating with a small number of banks more harshly affected by the crisis, since the possibilities of replacing their usual lenders with new banks was not always easy owing to asymmetrical information problems.
By allowing greater flexibility with regard to the short-term achievement of goals, it is possible to achieve more stable developments in the real economy. But confidence in the nominal anchor must not be undermined. This may lead to a less favourable trade-off, as illustrated in the chart by the broken line. If there is insufficient confidence in monetary policy, economic agents may expect higher price and cost inflation to persist. This will be taken into account when setting wages and prices. The result will be a wage and price spiral. Experience shows that this in turn leads to slower growth and lower employment. A lack of confidence therefore entails a risk of higher unemployment. In consequence, monetary policy must also focus on movements in nominal variables when the economy is subjected to supply-side shocks in order to prevent the economy from entering a vicious circle. The building of confidence in nominal developments must be given sufficient priority. If there is confidence in monetary policy, economic agents will expect the rise in price and cost inflation to be of short duration. Higher prices will then not feed through to prices for other goods and to wages to the same extent, and there will be less risk of a recession. Confidence in monetary policy therefore results in a better trade-off between nominal fluctuations and fluctuations in production and employment. I have been talking about supply-side shocks to the economy.

It is nevertheless relevant to raise the question as to whether monetary policy in general has been too expansionary. I would, however, point out that monetary policy must be evaluated in relation to the decision-making basis that existed at the time the decisions were made. Given the decision-making basis prevailing in 1999, it seemed likely that the Norwegian economy would experience a growth pause and that price and cost inflation would fall. Moreover, the international financial market was fragile as a result of the many financial crises the previous year. As new information gradually pointed to higher growth in Norway and internationally, coupled with the prospect of higher-than-expected price and cost inflation, we raised the interest rate. It may be that the combination of the decline in interest rates in 1999 and the brighter international growth outlook, partly reflected in higher oil prices, had an impact on expectations formation that we underestimated. Today, the krone exchange rate is approximately in the initial range, while inflation is higher than the level aimed at by the ECB. However, the interest rate is oriented towards bringing price and cost inflation down towards this level. If price and cost inflation remains too high, this will translate into a weak and unstable krone exchange rate sooner or later. 12  BIS Review 7/2001  Conclusion In the conduct of monetary policy we have two objectives. First, we have a long-term perspective where building confidence and credibility is important for ensuring nominal stability.
With interest rate developments as outlined above, core inflation is projected to increase from about 1¼ per cent today to about 2 per cent at the end of 2007. There are prospects of a further increase in inflation, with inflation projected to be close to the target of 2.5 per cent three years ahead. The output gap is expected to increase over the next two years, but will peak at a fairly moderate level as gradual increases in the interest rate dampen demand growth. 4  BIS Review 30/2006  On the basis of the analysis in the Inflation Reports, Norges Bank’s Executive Board assesses the consequences for future interest rate development and adopts a monetary policy strategy for the period to the next Report. Interest-rate setting since last summer has been oriented towards a gradual increase in the interest rate – in small, not too frequent steps – towards a more normal level. Based on Norges Bank’s assessment of the driving forces in the economy, this strategy appears robust. Output growth is strong and the labour market is becoming tighter more quickly than expected. Higher growth in the economy may in isolation suggest a faster increase in the interest rate ahead. This would reduce the risk of bottlenecks in the economy, with rising cost inflation and continued debt build-up. On the other hand, the objective of bringing inflation up towards the target and anchoring inflation expectations argues for restraint in the upward movement of interest rates.

Through negotiations in the WTO, earlier on the GATT, agreements have been reached on removal of trade barriers, dismantling of tariff barriers, removal of subsidies, introduction of anti-dumping measures, and agreements have been entered into for textiles, agricultural products and other goods and services. Today, almost all countries participate as members or observers in these negotiations and the issues are far-ranging. Political changes in many regions have amplified the tendency of increased globalization. Over the past few decades, China has changed course and is now a member of the WTO. Its share of total exports is growing rapidly. The countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have increased their exports markedly since the early 1990s. India is at the starting-line. Many of these countries have large labour forces that offer their services at very low wages, and these labour resources are available to companies that compete on world markets. The working-age population in rural China for instance is nearly the same as that of the entire OECD area. Many are seeking new opportunities and work in the urban areas. Low labour costs and more efficient transport and communication attract labour-intensive production. Production of goods and services is being transferred from Norway and other high-cost countries to amongst others the Baltic countries, Poland, China, India or other emerging economies. There are many examples showing that competition in selling highly skilled services is also intensifying. Norwegians are offered myopia surgery in Turkey.