samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Import prices  Services prices  Annual percentage change  Annual percentage change  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  5  Australia USA United Kingdom Norway Canada Sweden  4  3  -5  Australia USA United Kingdom Norway Canada Sweden  -10 -15 10  11  12  13  5  4  3  2  2  1  1  -5 -10 -15  14  0  0 10  11  12  13  14  Note. In Figure 2b, the data for Australia is quarterly, while the data for other countries is monthly. For Sweden, Norway, the euro area and the United Kingdom, the data refers to services prices in the HICP and for others in the CPI. Sources: National sources and Statistics Sweden  9  The KIX index for policy rates only includes the euro area, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its composition has been governed by the relevance of the respective country’s policy rate for pricing on the foreign exchange and financial markets. For a more detailed explanation, see Sveriges Riksbank (2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Slower domestic demand and low inflation expectations also contribute The impact of monetary policy via the exchange rate can be primarily observed in prices of internationally-traded goods. However, a monetary policy that leans against the wind also has effects on inflation in that it dampens domestic demand.

Looking ahead, we expect the euro area economy to grow at a moderate pace, in an environment of continued tensions in some financial market segments and of unusually high uncertainty. A cross-check of the outcome of our economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis confirms that inflationary pressures over the medium term remain contained, as suggested by weak money and credit growth. Overall, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. Inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The firm anchoring of inflation expectations remains of the essence. Accordingly, the Governing Council will continue to monitor all developments over the period ahead very closely. As regards fiscal policies, the Governing Council welcomes the recent decision by euro area countries to formally establish a European Financial Stability Facility. This needs to be accompanied by decisive action at the level of governments. It is essential that all countries stick to their commitments to correct high budget deficits and government debt and reduce fiscal vulnerability. To this end, the concrete adjustment measures needed to achieve the budgetary targets should be fully specified. All countries must ensure that confidence in the sustainability of public finances is guaranteed.
With such heavy trade flows, when the mainland economy does poorly – as during the past year – Puerto Rico’s economy and job growth suffer. Financial regulation also represents an important linkage. Of course, my presence here representing the New York Fed is one example of that particular connection – Puerto Rico is part of the Second District of the Federal Reserve System, along with New York, the U.S. Virgin Islands and parts of New Jersey and Connecticut. I’ll return to the theme of financial regulation shortly. For now, let me just say that we share, along with the rest of the world, a commitment to taking the necessary steps to prevent the type of financial crisis that we just experienced from recurring in the future. The Fed’s role in coping with the crisis and the outlook for the United States The close ties with the mainland means that the broader outlook for the United States is very important for Puerto Rico. The U.S. economy has been through a terrible period, having suffered the worst financial crisis in 70 years. Extensive study of banking crises shows that they tend to be “protracted affairs” with surprisingly similar, if unpleasant, contours. Downturns average four years, during which the unemployment rate rises an average of 7 percentage points. The peak-to-trough decline in output averages 9 percent. Those statistics point out the risks that we faced. Well aware of the threat of a second Great Depression, U.S. policymakers took very aggressive actions to support economic growth in 2008 and 2009.

In the UK that will now be enshrined by putting a Financial Policy Committee alongside the Bank of England’s existing Monetary Policy Committee. The Committee has recently been established, on a non-statutory basis for the interim. But that poses a host of questions. How do we define financial stability? What is the FPC and what is its objective? Why should it be separate from the microprudential supervisor, which is also being moved to the Bank? What will be the FPC’s instruments? Are they all directed at banks? Will they conflict with monetary policy? And, more prosaically, how will the FPC operate and be accountable? I shall set the scene with some general reflections on financial stability, including how it might be defined, and how its scope extends to the resilience of capital markets as well as that of banks (and shadow banks). After those more general observations, I shall try to answer some of the key questions about the FPC. What is financial stability? Why financial stability matters Under legislation introduced in the UK in 2009, the governing body of the Bank of England, Court, is required to set out a strategy for the Bank’s financial stability work. We publish it in our Annual Report. We have tried to clarify why society should care about financial instability.
All public policy is re-distributional and monetary policy is no exception. Relative winners have included debtors, whose borrowing costs have collapsed. Relative losers are likely to have included savers reliant on bank deposits for income, due to falling bank deposit rates. Studies have tended to confirm that distributional pattern (McKinsey Global Institute (2013)). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  But these relativities need to be seen against the backcloth of a rising, not retreating, income and wealth tide. The majority of people – savers and borrowers, old and young – appear to have been made better off absolutely as a result of extraordinary monetary measures. For what it is worth, the Bank’s own research points firmly in that direction (Bank of England (2012)). Of course, some of the losses may be more visible than the gains and some of the relative losers more audible than the gainers. For example, low yields have reduced annuity rates for some pensioners, lowering income streams. But those same low yields have boosted asset prices, raising the value of pension pots. The net effect appears on average to have been positive. And extra-ordinary monetary measures will of course not last forever. When they unwind, so too will any distributional effects. In others words, central banks’ influence on income and wealth shares is likely to be temporary. Yet even if, over the medium-term, central banks cannot influence inequality, the reverse may not be true.

The Spanish economy The weakening of the international economy and the loss of buoyancy in the European economy contributed in 2001 to prolonging the gradual slowdown in activity in Spain in train since the previous year, when the first symptoms of the previous lengthy expansionary phase having run its course were discerned. Consumption and investment in construction were the main underpinnings of growth in our economy, while productive investment and exports were the chief components dampening it. That said, GDP increased by 2.8% in 2001, clearly above the figure of 1.5% posted in the euro area. The maintenance of high job creation rates during 2001, set against the slowing trend marked by general developments in the economy, and the favourable financial conditions in place contributed to sustaining household income and helped underpin consumer spending and residential investment. However, the declining course of investment in capital goods steepened in the face of heightening uncertainty, worsening expectations and slowing final demand, which the generous financial conditions were unable to offset. The effects on activity were reinforced by the fall in the growth rate of exports as from the early months of 2001.
It may take some time before interest rates are increased substantially in the US. Growth in Asia is solid, but a global rise in interest rates is unlikely to start there. Inflation is higher in the euro area than in the US and approximately in line with the objective defined by the European Central Bank. In the euro area, however, capacity utilisation is very low, unemployment high and the outlook for growth is weaker. Recently, inflation has moderated slightly. Against this background, it will probably also take time before interest rates rise markedly in the euro area. Interest rates abroad have been unusually low for 2½ years, and it appears they will remain low for a period ahead. This poses a challenge to monetary policy in Norway. Growth in the Norwegian economy has picked up. Lower interest rates have contributed to sustaining growth in private consumption. Household demand will probably be the most important driving force in the Norwegian economy in the period ahead. Against the background of high real income growth, improved job security and expectations of continued low interest rates ahead, household consumption is expected to exhibit strong growth. Petroleum investment exhibited brisk growth in 2003. Growth in petroleum investment would appear to continue in 2004, but probably at a slower rate than in 2003. Low interest rates and house price inflation imply higher housing investment in the period ahead. Fiscal policy also contributes to stimulating activity.

The effect is, however, expected to be more than offset by the prospects of very low inflation this year. In 2005 and 2006, wage growth is projected to increase as a result of a tighter labour market and higher inflation. There has been a tendency in recent years for a larger portion of pay increases to be agreed in the first year of the two-year period covered by the main agreement. If we consider these two-year periods together, the estimated relationship between wage growth and developments in the labour market are approximately in line with that observed since the mid-1990s. Developments in real economic variables are mirrored in credit markets. In recent years, household income has shown solid growth, and household confidence has been high. However, corporate earnings have been low, and until recently enterprises have primarily focused on enhancing efficiency. Credit developments are giving ambiguous signals to our interest-rate setting. Growth in household borrowing is high, but enterprises are reducing debt. The change in the breakdown of credit may have been amplified by banks’ increased eagerness to extend credit to households after a period of losses on loans to the business sector. Some reports from our regional network indicate that there are some restraints on credit for the business sector in some areas. Developments in credit to enterprises shadow developments in their investments. Low credit growth indicates that mainland business investment has not yet picked up. Total credit is expanding broadly in line with normal growth in nominal GDP.
6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1 GDP: Total, natural resources and other  Domestic demand by components  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  8  8  15 GFCF  NR 6  6 4  10  2  -2  -2 14  15  5 0  -5  -5  -10  -10  Total 0  Domestic demand  0 2  0  10  Private consumption  5  4  Other  13  15  -15  -15 13  14  15  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 2 Trading partners' GDP (*)  Terms of trade (*)  (annual change, percent)  (index, 2008 = 100)  8  8 140  140  6  6 130  130  4  4 120  120  2  2 110  110  0  0 100  100  -2  -2 00  04  08  12  Sep.15 Report  16  90  90 09  Dec. 15 Report  11  13  15  17  Mar.16 Report  (*) Dashed lines show the forecast included in respective Monetary Policy Report. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Rodrigo Vergara: Chile’s March 2016 Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Finance Committee of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 28 March 2016. *  *  *  Accompanying figures and tables can be found at the end of the speech. Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, senator Andrés Zaldívar; senators members of this Commission, ladies and gentlemen, Thank you for your invitation to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile on recent macroeconomic developments, its outlook and implications for monetary policy. This vision is contained in detail in our Monetary Policy Report of March 2016. Since our last Report saw the light December of last year, inflation has behaved as forecast. It has remained high, mainly due to the effects of the significant depreciation the peso has accumulated, in a context where indexation to past inflation and narrow capacity gaps have limited the decline of non-tradable inflation. Regarding activity, 2015 figures showed weaker demand and slower than expected growth towards the end of the year. As I will describe in a moment, this factor, along with an expected weakening of the external scenario, results in reduced growth prospects for this year. In our projection scenario, inflation is assumed to be slightly lower than we thought in December.
With regard to public sector employment, it is proposed that temporary employment be reduced to 8%, over the next three years, from its current level of 23%. According to the draft budget, this would involve converting 250,000 temporary employees into permanent employees within this period. Also, there will be an increase in the number of sectors allowed to increase their replacement rate to 100%. For general government as a whole, this measure will mean, according to the budget, that there will be 67,000 public sector vacancies in 2017. Overall, these measures would result in growth of 1% in the wage bill in the State budget, as compared with the decline of 1.2% in 2016. At the same time, the restriction is maintained on current spending on goods and services, which declines by 14%. 6/9  As regards public investment, real investment is projected to increase by 23%, with respect to the initial budget for 2016. However when the effect of certain defence-related payments outstanding from other years is taken into account, State investment is budgeted to fall by almost 20%, which is accompanied by a significant reduction in business investment in the public sector. Turning to the Social Security system, the increase of 0.25% in pensions, arising from application of the indexation formula in force following the 2013 reform, is notable.

These positive developments are occurring against a background in which, moreover, competitiveness gains are being sustained, our exports continue to gain market share and the substantial external surplus persists. That said, this favourable situation 8/9  should not be understood as meaning that Spain has managed to completely overcome the imbalances built up during the previous expansion and during the crisis that began in 2007, as demonstrated by the figures for unemployment, public debt and external net borrowing, among others. Persevering with reforms to increase the economy’s growth potential, maintaining competitiveness gains and fiscal consolidation policies are a prerequisite for progress in making the reductions required in the budget deficit and public debt, controlling the economy’s financing costs, improving the balance of payments and, last but not least, increasing the Spanish economy’s capacity to generate employment. Thank you for your attention. 9/9
They danced a happy jig while they decorated their balance sheets with cheaper debt and improved their margins and earnings per share  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  through share buybacks. Slowly they began to hire new workers, and the ship of the economy started gathering momentum to steam along at an improved clip. As Act IV came to an end, the FOMC evaluated the utility of its navigational tactics, and having tentatively decided that it was on course to its desired destination, began cutting back on the amount of fuel it was pumping into the financial system. Initially, it fumbled the dialogue, but eventually the articulation of its intention was accepted, if not applauded, by its audience. Now we have entered Act V. Not until the final scene will we know whether we have achieved the auspicious outcome of arriving at the desired port of an economy that grows sufficiently to bring about full employment without giving rise to inflation. With Shakespeare, the most pleasant plays typically end in marriage. The happy outcome to our economic predicament would entail the marriage of sensible fiscal policy with prudent monetary policy, carrying the American economy to new horizons, allowing the Fed to emerge a hero. One can envision less-pleasant outcomes, however, some of them tragic.

By forging public-private partnerships amongst various stakeholders including policymakers, international organisations and the private sector, ADRFI will play a key role in forging a robust and comprehensive disaster risk financing strategy in the region. This will help to strengthen ASEAN’s disaster risk resilience, and move our economies onto a sustainable and inclusive growth path. Conclusion 21. In conclusion, climate change and natural catastrophes are clear and present dangers in ASEAN. We must act quickly to fortify our economies by adopting a comprehensive disaster risk financing strategy. This is a complex undertaking, but we can solve this together through regional collaboration and knowledge sharing. ADRFI Phase 2, providing a focal point for regional cooperation in disaster risk financing, marks a significant milestone in our journey towards enhancing ASEAN’s disaster risk resilience. 22. Singapore, along with our ASEAN counterparts, remains strongly committed to protecting our societies against the effects of natural disasters. I am pleased that NTU is contributing to this significant initiative in many ways, and we look forward to the strong commitment and support from our public and private partners. 23. Thank you. 1 Global Climate Risk Index 2019 2 ACDM comprises the national emergency authorities. SCDF is Singapore’s representative. 3 Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines and Singapore. 4 Insurance Development Forum (IDF) is a public-private partnership led by the insurance industry, United  Nations and World Bank, and aims to enhance the use of insurance to build greater resilience for people, communities and businesses, and public institutions that are vulnerable to disasters.
William C Dudley: A preliminary assessment of the TALF Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Pension Real Estate Association's Public-Private Investment Program Summit, New York, 4 June 2009. *  *  *  I thank you for this opportunity to speak to you today about what we at the Federal Reserve have been doing to improve market function and credit market access. Since August of 2007, the Fed has introduced a wide range of special facilities designed to improve market functioning, increase the availability of credit and bring down borrowing costs for households and businesses. Today, I am going to focus my comments on the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which in my view is one of our most innovative programs. This facility is a complement to the Public-Private Investment Program efforts being undertaken by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Treasury, which are the primary focus of today’s conference. In what follows, I would remind you that my comments reflect my own views and opinions and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. I will discuss how the securitization markets broke down last fall creating the need for TALF, how the TALF works and what it already has accomplished, where we see it evolving going forward, and finally, some preliminary thoughts on the future of securitization markets.

TALF loans are leveraged – haircuts against the AAA-rated collateral average about 10%; the loan terms are three or five years; and the loans are non-recourse, which means that if the economy performs very badly and the securities fall sharply in value, an investor can put the collateral that secures its TALF loan back to the Fed, only losing the collateral haircut. The loan is then extinguished. Because term, non-recourse financing is not readily available from the private sector currently and the spreads on asset-backed securities remain elevated, TALF provides an opportunity for investors to purchase AAA-rated consumer asset-backed securities and earn relatively high returns. Although some observers are concerned by the prospect of TALF investors achieving relatively high returns, I think that concern is misplaced. Investor participation is absolutely essential in order for the TALF to improve the availability of credit and to bring down the cost of credit for households and business. The prospect of relatively high expected risk-adjusted returns is precisely what gives investors an incentive to participate in the program. As investors begin to take advantage of the attractive TALF terms, spreads on ABS securities contracts, and rates of return go down, and most importantly, the costs of funds for the issuers of the underlying securities falls. Investors’ actions to seek attractive returns lead to lower borrowing costs for households and businesses. Does the possibility of attractive returns for TALF investors mean that the Federal Reserve is taking on large credit risks?
Risks  ▪ Risk from external shocks that may threaten price stability ▪ Risk of misjudging macroeconomic projections ▪ Risk of changes in the behaviour of banks that may compromise the transmission of monetary policy to market rates ▪ Risk of liquidity excess or shortage in the banking sector ▪ Risk of bank insolvency ▪ Risk of disruptions in the flow of funds at the interbank or retail level ▪ Risk of risk misjudgement ▪ Risk of compromising trust  The financial sector, central banking, and economic development  Slide 5  ▪ Development is closely associated to financial development, both historically and comparatively across countries ▪ Efficient financial services are essential for an economy to grow and to make growth self-sustaining and inclusive ▪ While advanced economies are characterized by broad and deep financial markets, finance in developing countries is usually fragmented, unstable and costly  Thus, while technologically-supported financial products can potentially improve the quality and speed of financial services to the public or lower their cost, a central bank would focus on how they can influence the risks they face—either to lower or raise them. The financial sector, central banking, and economic development [SLIDE 5] Development is closely associated to financial development, both historically and comparatively across countries. Financial services are essential to channel domestic and external savings to investment, support personal and business projects, cushion risks, and reduce the transaction costs of economic exchanges.

There is hardly any good reason for different risk weightings on similar loans given by a domestic bank and a branch of a foreign bank. With these thoughts on central banks and macroprudential policies, I would remind you that we organize this conference hoping that we shall be able to take something useful away for our further work on financial stability. I would like to thank the program committee for putting together what looks like an engaging program. I wish all of you good luck and hope you shall have fruitful discussions in the next two days. 2  BIS Review 112/2010