samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Kevin Stiroh: Introductory remarks at 2017 Community Bankers Conference Introductory remarks by Mr Kevin Stiroh, Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2017 Community Bankers Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 6 April 2017. * * *  Introduction Good morning. I’d like to welcome you to the 2017 Community Bankers Conference. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is pleased to once again host this conference and to continue to foster a robust dialogue on key industry trends and supervisory issues affecting community banks. In addition to about 130 representatives of community and smaller regional banks in the Second District of the Federal Reserve System, we are happy to welcome fellow supervisors from the states of New York, Connecticut and New Jersey; representatives of the FDIC and the OCC; and colleagues from the Board of Governors and Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago and Atlanta Federal Reserve Banks. In all, we have record attendance with 178 participants. As in past years, our goal for this conference is to promote a constructive dialogue between senior managers and directors of smaller financial organizations in our District and federal and state supervisors. This type of constructive engagement helps us reach our shared objective of resilient financial institutions operating in a safe and sound financial system that supports the growth and stability of the U.S. economy.

3 The Banking Crisis of the 1980s and Early 1990s: Summary and Implications, FDIC. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
However, the actual effect of the structural change towards more market-based financial transactions could be larger than the share of external financing from the market would suggest. The existence of market-based financing through increasing competition within the banking sector may have affected the terms and conditions of bank lending in the sense that banks are now more clearly no longer the only potential supplier of external funding for all but the smallest firms. In other words, the contestability of external financing may have increased, with potential competition from market-based financing limiting the scope for banks to profit from lending relationships. It could be added that banks have been encouraged to take part in the process of securitisation by undertaking investment banking activities such as underwriting, which uses their capacities for collecting information as well as private information based on existing credit relations. This also tends to boost the share of non-interest income in the total revenues of banks. The changes in the structure of the financial system and the role of banks are also illustrated by the emergence of new types of players in the financial system. Most apparent is the rise of institutional investors who are gaining a more important role in allocating savings from the household sector to the corporate sector, both domestically and across borders.

Christian Noyer: The euro and the banking sector  Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the Duisburger Banking Symposium, organised by the European Center for Financial Services, on 27 September 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to speak here at the Duisburger Banking Symposium. The famous American comedian, Bob Hope, once typified a bank as “a place that will lend you money if you can prove that you don’t need it”. As we all know, this description does not give credit to the extremely important role that banks play in a modern economy. Nowadays, economic life simply would not be possible without the wide range of services and products that banks offer to various groups of society. The issue that I shall address today - the euro and the banking sector - cannot be fully comprehended without considering the particular, and to a large extent unprecedented, nature of the introduction of the euro. The single currency does away once and for all with internal exchange rate fluctuations, completes the structure of the Single Market and, by virtue of its availability to almost 300 million people, increases the efficiency of currency use in an unprecedented manner. The introduction of the euro was a regime shift that will undoubtedly have a major impact on the euro area economy and its financial structure in the years to come.
I have received helpful comments from Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Hugh Burns, Fabrizio Cadamagnani, Jon Cunliffe, Josh Jones, Andrew Hauser, Dave Ramsden, Martin Seneca, Fergal Shortall, Daniel Walker, and Sam Woods for which I am most grateful. The responsibility for all remaining errors is my own.

On the other hand, given the high level of capacity utilisation and movements in the exchange rate, there is a danger that higher production costs will increasingly be passed on to prices. Should economic momentum remain unchanged or should movements in the Swiss franc result in a further relaxation of monetary conditions, further increases in the interest rate are likely in the months ahead. Economic outlook The international environment has a strong impact on economic developments in Switzerland. According to the IMF forecasts, the global economy is poised to grow at a sustained rate of approximately 5% in 2007. While the economic activity in the United States has been satisfactory, it is a little less dynamic than expected. By contrast, the economic situation in Europe is clearly healthier than we had expected. This encouraging development has had a favourable impact on our economy. Economic activity in Switzerland continued to be dynamic in the first months of the year. In the first quarter, gross domestic product (GDP) was up by 3.2% saar, exceeding the long-term average growth rate by a significant amount. The strong economic performance assisted the recovery of the labour market. Employment was up in industry as well as in the construction and service areas. As a result, unemployment figures dropped further and the unemployment rate fell below the level of 3%. Demand indicators were still trending upwards, which should result in a renewed drop in unemployment in the months ahead.
Lars Heikensten: Monetary policy and wage formation Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 13 February 2003. *  *  *  Firstly, I would like to thank you for the invitation to come here to the Riksdag and discuss wage formation together with Anders Lindström from the National Mediation Office and Ingemar Hansson from the National Institute of Economic Research. I shall begin by describing how we take wage formation into account when making decisions on interest rate changes. Then I shall comment on the assessment made in our most recent Inflation Report (published in December), which we did not find reason to alter significantly at our last monetary policy meeting on 6 February. I shall continue by discussing how wage formation may develop in future. In conclusion, I shall summarise and mention some of the challenges facing wage formation. Just over a decade ago, there was a comprehensive realignment in economic policy. The budgetary process was tightened up. At around the same time, monetary policy changed direction, the exchange rate was allowed to float and the new target was to limit inflation to 2 per cent, with a tolerated deviation of plus/minus 1 percentage point. The economic policy realignment can only be described as a success.

Bundesbank, Frankfurt – 26 September 2019 Speech in the presence of Jens Weidmann  by François Villeroy de Galhau Governor of the Banque de France  « Household Expectations »  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to open - with my colleague Jens Weidmann - this joint Bundesbank - Banque de France conference on households’ expectations. I would like to thank warmly the Bundesbank: this FrenchGerman cooperation testifies that our two institutions can promote and contribute to good research on a very topical policy issue. Over the past year, the decline of market inflation expectations has been pronounced while households’ expectations have been increasing quite steadily. This divergence is a challenge for our assessment on inflation expectations. All the interesting papers presented in the next couple of days will illustrate how much we can learn on inflation expectations when observing them outside financial markets. I. Inflation expectations: a key issue for monetary policy  I.1. Policy relevance for Central Banks  Stable inflation expectations at a level close to our target are - of course - key for our monetary policy: they provide a strong nominal anchor helping us to stabilize inflation when facing large demand or supply shocks. Since the 1990s, management of inflation expectations through central bank communication has become a standard tool for monetary policy. A lot of evidence suggests that this policy has contributed to anchor inflation expectations and to reduce their volatility, while facing strong inflationary or deflationary shocks.
There are still no green Swedish government bonds, but green bonds have increased substantially in corporate bonds. 35 See ICMA (2018) for a description of the principles for green bonds. 15 [18]  on the Swedish and the global economy, we will cooperate with others on financial sector regulation and we will continue the work to review the assets we have on our balance sheet. I would particularly like to highlight the opportunities that central banks have to understand and analyse the role of financial markets in the transition to a more sustainable future. It is important that we do not make the same mistakes again as before the global financial crisis when many, but not all36, economists and central banks misjudged how quickly and powerfully a mispricing of risk in the US housing market would spread through the global financial system. We need to act now to reduce the risk of a mispricing of climate-related risk triggering a new economic crisis. The central bank world was perhaps a little slow off the mark, but now when the ball is rolling, things are moving forward rapidly. The rapid emergence of the NGFS is one reason for optimism; an increasing number of central banks are now taking the climate issue very seriously. I would like to finish by once again extending my thanks to you for organising this seminar.

The cost level in the Norwegian economy, compared with that of our trading partners, rose substantially with the beginning of the oil age. The level has fluctuated somewhat since then, without a clear tendency to become higher or lower, and has, over time, been adapted to a steady phasing-in of petroleum revenues into the mainland economy. When we reach a point in the future when the share of imports that can be financed by petroleum revenues declines, the relative cost level will have to be reduced. The real exchange rate may have to be brought back to around the level prevailing at the end of the 1960s, prior to Norway’s emergence as an oil nation. This depreciation can be achieved either by lower price and wage inflation in Norway than in other countries or by a nominal depreciation of the krone. The latter would be the least painful channel, and with a flexible exchange rate it is also the most likely. Final remarks To sum up, increased globalisation and the ensuing terms of trade improvements have exposed the Norwegian economy to a significant upward income shock. This has amplified the domestic upswing. So far, however, strong growth impulses have not led to major imbalances in the labour market or strong upward wage and price pressures. This may be seen as an indication that our fiscal and monetary policy guidelines have been quite successful so far in shielding the Norwegian economy from excessive fluctuations.
The main driver of the improvement in ordinary profit was the reduction in impairment losses, which fell by 43.5% compared with 2020 to € billion, a somewhat lower level than in the two years prior to the pandemic. The recovery in profit in 2021 was widespread across the main countries where Spanish banks pursue significant international business. Profitability also improved at the European level, following the notable decline in the previous year, returning to close to prepandemic levels. As in Spain, the main driver of this improvement was the significant fall in impairment provisioning. The breakdown shows that gross income rose by close to 3% in 2021, driven by the timid recovery in net interest income9 and, above all, by a 10.4% increase in net fees and commissions, which more than offset the drop in gains on financial assets and liabilities. In any event, net interest income remained lower than in 2019.10 Fee and commission income has increased in recent years,11 mainly on account of payment services, although it is still low compared with Spanish banks’ main European peers. Profitability remained positive in 2022 Q1. Thus, ordinary profit at the six listed banks rose by more than 30%12 year-on-year, with increases of 9%-10% both in net interest income and fee and commission income. Meanwhile, impairment losses fell by 9% compared with March 2021. It must be noted, however, that the full economic impact of the war in Ukraine did not materialise in the first quarter of the year.

The credit quality of loans backed by the State through the Official Credit Institute (ICO) deteriorated somewhat in 2021, although at a slower pace than in the previous half-year. At December 2021, 20.2% of ICO-backed loans were classified as Stage 2 exposures (up 3.9 pp on June 2021), and 3.5% as NPLs (up 1.4 pp on June 2021). It must be noted, however, that 30% of these loans continue to benefit from grace periods, which will come to an end in summer 2022.6 In the present setting, these credit exposures with some sign of impairment may, in turn, be more vulnerable to the materialisation of risk. Accordingly, careful monitoring is needed, together with early and correct recognition of potential losses. Third, profitability improved substantially7 in 2021. Specifically, return on assets (ROA) stood at 0.67% (compared with -0.21% in 2020 and with 0.51% in 2019). 6  In the sectors hardest hit by the COVID-19 crisis, the proportion of Stage 2 loans is higher (35.5% and 22.7% in hospitality and transport, respectively); this is also true of NPLs (6.5% and 4.5% in hospitality and transport, respectively). 7  Consolidated net profit totalled € billion in 2021, an increase of € billion on the losses recorded in 2020. 7  Extraordinary items, which were negative in 2020 and positive in 2021,8 had the most impact on profitability. Excluding extraordinaries, ROA stood at 0.57%, an increase of 37 basis points (bp) on 2020 and down just slightly compared with 2019 (0.63%).
If the government itself is already heavily indebted or has incurred a huge amount of debts after bailing out the private sector or introducing measures to stimulate the economy, the market may start to doubt the sustainability of its fiscal position. A case in point is Ireland, where the government incurred a huge amount of liabilities by bailing out the banking system, calling into question the government’s fiscal sustainability and triggering the sovereign debt crisis. (f)  The crises unfolding in the US and Europe are not new to Asia. This region had its share of suffering during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998. In Hong Kong we went through almost seven years of painful economic adjustment after the burst of the property bubble in late 1997. Our economy shrank by 8.7% in five quarters. Unemployment increased fourfold from 2.1% to 8.5%. Property prices dropped by 70% in six years while the general price level fell by 15% in five years. The hard lesson we learned from our experience is to face the reality, take the pain in stride and do whatever it takes to restructure the economy, to increase productivity and improve competitiveness. If this can be done, it should be possible to return to the track of sustainable economic growth. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Researchers have documented and studied how asset valuations seem to move far more on news that affects risk premiums than on news on future cash flows. This was vividly illustrated by the market turbulence of 2008–2009, as well as the last few weeks. In their investigation of why risk premiums vary so much, researchers have moved far beyond the simplest models of introductory finance classes. Theoretical progress, data availability and computational advances have made it possible to study the implications of potentially important features:   investors are different and not necessarily fully informed or rational;    markets are incomplete and have frictions;    returns might have fat tails and face sudden disasters;    and government regulations are important. Models of investor heterogeneity, non-tradable, non-financial risk, market frictions and timevarying uncertainty go a long way in accounting for variations in market risk premiums. This has profound implications for portfolio theory and practical portfolio strategies. Modern portfolio theory builds on differences in defining characteristics between investors. Investors with distinctly different non-tradable, non-financial risk, who are affected differently by market frictions and regulations, should hold different portfolios. In the NBIM Strategy Plan for 2011–2013, we stated that we will implement an investment strategy built on the Fund’s defining characteristics – with strategies that are long-term oriented, scalable, and focused on underlying value. This sentence covers a wide range of interesting questions. All the speakers today will, in fact, offer perspectives on the challenges outlined here.
Real GDP growth in Cyprus expanded by about 6 percent over 2022H1, mainly driven by a faster than expected recovery in tourismrelated activities and, to a lesser extent, by growth in information and communication activities and in professional services. At the same time, weakness in the Cyprus GDP performance could be expected to become visible over 2022H2 and 2023, primarily owing to the anticipated worsening in the international environment outlook. More specifically, the impact of the war is expected to be channelled directly, via the disruption in trade of services and the rise in commodity prices, in particular oil and wheat, as well as indirectly, via the impact on business and consumer confidence. Our exposure to Russia via the export of services side is the most significant vulnerability, with the most important exposure relating to financial and other business services and, to a lesser extent, tourism, transport as well as telecommunications, computer and information services. At the same time, it is important to mention significant adaptation effects for example in the area of tourism, losses from the Russian market have been covered to a large extent by other markets such as the UK, Poland, Germany, Israel and Scandinavian countries. The labour market has also been exhibiting continued resilience. Over 2022H1, the unemployment rate reached 6,7 percent, well below the 7,5 percent rate recorded in 2021. The resilience of the Cyprus labour market is in line with business views about expecting a relatively small impact from the war.

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Of course, there is plenty still left to do with parts of the City still among the poorest in the UK. But compared with when I last visited a few years ago, there is now a real sense of opportunity and optimism in Bradford, lifting the spirits of the businesses operating here and the people living here. Regional visits such as these are the most useful and most interesting part of my job. Over the course of two days, I will speak and listen to over two dozen businesses of all shapes, sizes and sectors. I will speak and listen to a number of charities, not-for-profit enterprises and schools. I will do a walkabout in Sunbridge Wells, an underground parade for retail and leisure and a great example of that civic investment and entrepreneurial spirit operating once again in the City. And I will have with me a film crew, distilling some of the key bits of my visit to a wider audience across the whole of the UK. This is part of a renewed effort by the Bank, under Mark Carney’s leadership, to engage with as wide a cross-section of people, and as broad a range of views, as possible. Events of the past twelve months – indeed, events of the past twelve days – have illustrated just how important it is for policymakers to do so.

This needs to be more than feeding a handful of macroeconomic assumptions into a model. It requires an understanding of the events that could lead to that macroeconomic outcome, and what other indirect effects might be likely to occur. Who should be responsible for regular, thoughtful stress testing? Risk managers, CEOs, and boards of directors should all understand key risk drivers – and should consider whether a stress scenario is sufficiently severe, and whether the direct and indirect effects are reasonably captured. Rating agencies and stock analysts should be increasingly demanding better quality stress tests, and that the results be made available to them. Finally, regulators should be able to compare and contrast the quality of stress tests across organizations and hold accountable those organizations that are not keeping up with their peers. As I mentioned at the outset, challenging assumptions and understanding risks should not only be the responsibility of the risk manager. These things also need to be better ingrained in CEOs, members of boards of directors, and regulators. Operationalizing this point is not going to be easy, but it is critical. At a fundamental level, debunking a myth requires individuals to go against strongly and widely held beliefs, to convince decision-makers, and to build consensus. For this to happen we may need significant changes in the governance of risk management at banks and other parties in the financial system.