samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is, however, ultimately incumbent upon the industry to support and promote adoption of the Code across the marketplace. I’d like to highlight a variety of initiatives underway to support this adoption. First, outreach and education regarding the Code is critical and has been underway via events like this and ongoing engagement with industry associations. Central bank colleagues and industry market participants here and abroad have been active in reaching out locally to raise awareness of the Code. New and updated education tools are already in development to help further promote the Code. As awareness permeates the market, these efforts will support better understanding and adoption of the Code. Second, industry market participants have expressed a desire for a mechanism, such as a public register, to make public their Statements of Commitment. Discussions with industry suggest that multiple public registers may likely be established over time. I look forward to seeing how this work evolves. It will be important to understand how the Code is being adopted across the industry. To this end, the GFXC is also developing a survey to help assess how the Code is being applied following its publication. This survey can provide a baseline that we can measure against over time, and can help to assess how the Code is filtering into the market, going forward. GFXC, evolution of the Code and last look Over the past two years, the industry has been very heavily engaged in Global Code efforts through the MPG and the regional foreign exchange committees (FXCs).

We shall continue to take all of the necessary action to fulfil our mandate and contribute, within this framework, to the success of this tricky but necessary period of transition towards a more coherent, stable and dynamic economic and monetary union. Thank you for your attention. I shall be pleased to answer your questions. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Another consideration is that notwithstanding the low growth of demand, inflation has been surprisingly high. These forces have acted with varying strength on the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts in recent months. Roughly speaking, when economic activity is slowing — with a given potential growth rate — after a time inflation falls back. A weak exchange rate pulls in the opposite direction, however, and can lead to higher price increases: directly through rising import prices and indirectly by stimulating production for export. In addition, abrupt exchange rate movements are liable to affect inflation expectations, a problem that is accentuated when inflation is springing unpleasant surprises. The krona’s weakening in the early summer, after the Riksbank had presented this year’s second Inflation Report, probably had to do with a combination of slackening export activity and portfolio adjustments. Moreover, inflation outcomes in the late spring had been surprisingly high. If higher inflation expectations are allowed to take root and also show up in time in a currency depreciation, public confidence in monetary policy’s systematic commitment to a rate of inflation in line with the 2 per cent target may be shaken. The weakening of the exchange rate in that period was an isolated Swedish phenomenon, which made it particularly serious. The krona also weakened in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September but the circumstances then warranted a different interpretation. General uncertainty in the financial markets was accompanied by extensive portfolio adjustments after the terrorist attacks.

•  Indeed, these investigations must be undertaken hand in hand with private intermediaries. The tokenisation of finance creates a new ecosystem which is also a challenge for them, especially as their role could be transformed by decentralised technologies. •  And we need to ensure that this ecosystem is fully interoperable with legacy securities and payment systems, which are likely to remain an important element of the landscape. •  In that context, our goal at the Banque de France is to facilitate responsible innovation from the market, while safeguarding the use of central bank money and thus financial stability. •  My final point is to say that today’s discussion showed that central banks need to further their exploration of new technologies to prepare for the future of finance. This is the goal that Banque de France has been pursuing since the launch of its first experiments on wholesale CBDC in 2020. We are now taking this endeavour a step further with a second round of experiments. Let me stress that it is a collective work, whose conclusions will feed the Eurosystem’s reflection on CBDC. •  The entry into force of the European "pilot regime" next year offers an invaluable opportunity for private players but also for public players. In this sense, offering settlement solutions in central bank money - for the cash leg of transactions involving tokenised securities - could allow tokenised finance to benefit from the most secure and liquid asset. •  Thank you again for your participation. Page 3/3
See Tobias Adrian, Christopher Burke and James McAndrews. 2009. “The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility”. Current Issues in Economics and Finance 15, no. 4 (August). 12  Gary Gorton. 2010. “Questions and Answers about the Financial Crisis”. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 15787, February. 13  Gorton, ibid. 6  BIS Review 92/2010  subprime “E. coli scare” had effectively been transmitted far and wide across financial markets. Let me turn now to the interventions used to combat the financial crisis. The Fed knew much less back in the autumn of 2007 than we know now about how far and wide the financial crisis was to spread and the implications this would have for the real economy. The initial response by the Fed was to use its traditional liquidity tools. On August 10, 2007, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) issued a statement indicating that the discount window was available as a source of liquidity to those firms that had access to the window. A week later, the FOMC cut the discount rate (the interest rate charged on discount window loans) by 50 basis points (a half of a percentage point) and extended the available term for these loans from overnight to 30 days. Given that the liquidity strains were affecting many firms that did not have direct access to the discount window, a key for this intervention to be helpful was that depository institutions would pass the liquidity on to those firms that needed it the most.

14 In December, the FOMC announced that it would begin to significantly expand its balance sheet through purchases of long-term assets including agency debt, agency mortgage-backed securities and long-term treasuries – the Large Scale Asset Purchase or LSAP program. Other interventions were taking place directed by different agencies and in conjunction with the Treasury. At the same time, fiscal policy was engaging with Congress approving the $ billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) program. Policy had entered the “whatever it takes” phase in an effort to keep the Great Recession from becoming something much worse. 15 By the spring of 2009, the various guarantees and backstop liquidity facilities covering different sectors of the shadow banking system were in place. The last element required to deal with the Panic of 2007 was to address the uncertainty over the viability of the large systemically important financial institutions. A horizontal review of the 19 largest financial firms was conducted to assess their capital needs under a “worse-than-anticipated economic scenario” – this was called the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program or SCAP (you can tell that we are fond of acronyms). There were two design features of the SCAP program that were essential for its ability to reduce the uncertainty in financial markets. First, the process was designed to be transparent with both the methodology published up front and the firm-by-firm results published at the conclusion. Second, if a firm was deemed to need capital but was unable to raise it in the  14  See Brian Sack. 2010.
The main doubts are how long will it last – which depends on the true decoupling capacity that emerging economies will display – and how long will developed economies’ growth hold. Here, accumulating a current account surplus can help. For example, the high levels of reserves in China allow financing deficit for several years and thus weather the turbulences with domestic growth. Still, one cannot rule out a prolonged period of weak activity in developed countries that ends up seriously deteriorating growth in emerging economies, particularly those specializing in goods demanded in the former. Globalization, where countries sell their products in global markets rather than in specific economies, certainly supports the aforementioned decoupling, but it also spreads the effects  BIS Review 124/2008  5  of financial shocks around the world. We have seen international stock exchanges plummeting, and risk premiums of emerging economies rising (figures 15 and 16). Also, large foreign exchange fluctuations have occurred, but this is good news, because the exchange rates are helping the adjustment (figure 17). Asset prices show no decoupling but, as we well know, price corrections may limit the adjustments in quantities. The key to this is whether price corrections are helping to avoid fluctuations in output or are being conveyors of the problems. The good performance of emerging economies should not lead to unfounded optimism or vanity, because this is largely the result of sound macroeconomic policies, and in such we must persevere. Final remarks I will finish with four points.

BIS Review 124/2008  17
But, in contrast to that prophecy, at the end of the day the countries that did not have to bail out any of their financial institutions were, with one exception (Malta), located typically in the CEE region. So it seems to me that GDP per capita, human development and industrial tradition are not the criteria driving the market’s classification of “emerging” economies. Should euro membership automatically make a country “developed”? In other words, does giving up independent monetary policy make a country more “stable”? But why, then, isn’t Bulgaria considered a developed country, when it holds a fixed exchange rate against the euro? Why not Kosovo and Montenegro, which have adopted the euro unilaterally? Much space has been devoted to the so-called decoupling debate, in which many experts 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  claimed that emerging countries were less affected by the global financial crisis. But with the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the GDP declines in emerging countries were, on average, just as steep as those experienced by developed countries. A part of the explanation, once again, lies in the confusing taxonomy: we see huge differences among individual emerging countries as well, even within BRICS. I suggest an analogy to the decoupling debate: we are now observing a “BRICS decoupling” to the power of two: only China and India have shown robust growth since the Great Recession. Russia, Brazil and South Africa have been stagnating, each for its own specific reasons.

But the Czech Republic has a higher GDP per capita than Portugal (or Greece, for that matter, and many other countries in the euro area) and is getting closer and closer to Spain, a solidly developed country according to all measures. The Czech Republic also has a human development index comparable to that of Austria and Italy. In fact, living standards in the Czech Republic have been higher than those in Portugal for at least a quarter of a millennium, since the start of the industrial revolution (with the possible exception of a couple of decades centred on 1990). But once a country enters the euro area, it is almost automatically treated as a developed country, even in the eyes of the markets. Personally, I find that rather confusing. In practice, therefore, we observe that some nominally “emerging” countries (such as Poland, Israel and Singapore) have been dealing with exactly the same issues as the nominally developed ones. At the same time, some nominally developed countries (such as Greece) are dealing with problems typical of developing countries, issues including incomplete land registries and an insufficient basic ability to collect taxes. This confusion in taxonomy complicates our discussion a great deal, especially in the years of the crisis and its aftermath. The question at the beginning of the crisis was: who in Europe will prove to be most vulnerable to shocks? Many believed it would be Central and Eastern European countries.
It would be simpler to have just one set of basic licensing requirements, one set of basic requirements for general managerial skills and one set of basic requirements for the trustworthiness of senior officers for the entire financial market. We would welcome a single, universally applicable set of assessed functions and requirements for sound internal control systems. Examples could include harmonised basic requirements for outsourcing and for the distribution of own and third-party products. It is impossible, of course, to unify all requirements across the financial market. However, the basic set could, or even should, be unified. Even if we succeeded in harmonising only onethird of all the requirements, the quantity of regulations would decrease sharply. This would substantially reduce the load on financial institutions, which are currently struggling with inconsistencies in the sectoral regulations applying to financial groups and with the sheer number of such regulations. It would also be of great benefit to supervisory authorities. The necessary sectoral specifics could then connect to this single common base. Let me make one last remark on safety versus growth. In recent years, we have witnessed on numerous occasions just how diverse the impacts of financial sector problems can be on national economies.

They could, for instance, pay rent for children studying abroad, pay for a holiday home, or pay for services provided by European companies, e.g. mobile telephone services, insurance companies, utilities, etc. People who live, work or study outside their home country will no longer need one bank account at home and another one abroad. The use of payment cards will be more efficient, as consumers will be able to use the same card for all euro payments. This will reduce the necessity for people to carry cash. Innovative services can be offered to consumers irrespective of national borders. The long-term goal of the banking industry is that the SEPA payment instruments will only be used in electronic form. Payments can then be easily combined with other e-services in the case of both individual and corporate clients. These include e-invoicing, mobile or internet payment initiation, airline e-tickets, credit advice or e-reconciliation. As a consequence, consumers will spend less time handling payments. Everything will be easier, faster and cheaper ... in the long term. Payment cards are becoming a favourite payment instrument with consumers, and are increasingly replacing cheques and cash payments. The use of cards is thus expected to grow in the future. Thanks to the creation of a single euro payments area, acquirers will be able to process all SEPAcompliant card payments, even across borders. In the SEPA environment, merchants will be able to choose any card payment processing entity in the euro; this will increase competition and reduce costs.
Ravi Menon: ASEAN financial integration – where are we, where next? Keynote address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the ASEAN Banking Council Meeting, Singapore, 12 June 2015. *  *  *  Dr In Channy, Chairman, ASEAN Bankers Association Mr Samuel Tsien, Chairman, Association of Banks in Singapore Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. ASEAN banks have performed well over the last two decades since the Asian Financial Crisis. Asia’s economies and financial systems, including those in ASEAN, generally held up well during the Global Financial Crisis. The near term economic outlook for ASEAN will be shaped by two themes: the ongoing recovery in the G3 economies and the slowdown in the Chinese economy. Barring shocks, overall growth in ASEAN should remain firm this year, at about 5%, not spectacular but very respectable considering the state of the global economy. Macroeconomic conditions are therefore supportive of banks in ASEAN. There are, however, downside risks they need to watch. •  The divergence in monetary policy settings among the G3 economies could pose risks to financial stability that could also potentially hurt growth. •  The anticipated normalisation of interest rates in the US against continuing quantitative easing in the Eurozone and Japan is already causing sharp movements in exchange rates and bond yields. The scenario of a “double whammy” posed by a rise in US interest rates and a strong US Dollar could expose vulnerabilities among some ASEAN borrowers.

What Do We Do to Get to a “Good” Culture? 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The second thing is we need to understand what contributes to a good culture, and what allows a bad one to flourish. What fosters an organizational culture where people feel empowered to speak up? And what leads to a work environment where employees feel emboldened to commit fraud? That’s one of the things I’m most looking forward to in today’s conference. I can’t wait to hear the insights from such a variety of voices. Looking beyond our own narrow frame of reference to other fields of study, like organizational psychology, will help us understand how to achieve the progress that’s so desperately needed. Behavioral science really gets to the root of how human nature interacts with an organization’s processes. Everything from how we set goals to how we motivate our staff to achieve those goals has an effect on culture, for better or for worse. This is where the rubber hits the road for most organizations, in the financial services industry, and beyond. We’re also going to hear from experts on the role technology plays, including the ethics of data handling, and what artificial intelligence means for relationships with customers. And I’m particularly looking forward to hearing about how diversity, something that’s a strategic priority for me and this Bank, affects cultural norms. This includes diversity not only in terms of race and gender, but diversity of thought and experience, which also affects an organization’s culture and decision-making.
Thomas Jordan: Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy decision and assessment of the Swiss economic situation Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 1 December 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen Welcome to the Swiss National Bank’s six-monthly news conference. I will begin by explaining the Governing Board’s monetary policy decision and outlining our assessment of the economic situation. I will then hand over to my colleagues, Jean-Pierre Danthine and Fritz Zurbrügg, who will comment on current developments in financial stability and the financial markets. Thereafter, we will be happy to take your questions. Monetary policy decision I will begin with our monetary policy decision. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has decided to maintain the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. The target range for the three-month Libor remains at 0.0–0.25%. Deflation risks have increased once again in recent months, and the Swiss franc is still high. We will therefore continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination. If necessary, we are prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities for this purpose. With interest rates at zero, the minimum exchange rate is the key instrument to avoid an undesirable tightening of monetary conditions. This is especially important at the moment, as upward pressure on the Swiss franc has intensified once again. Furthermore, we will not hesitate to take further measures, should they prove necessary.

We are able to control the interest rates in the money market via various policy instruments through an efficient liquidity management and affect the money market rates in the favored direction and to the required extent. Accordingly, I would like to underline that in addition to the average funding cost, Interbank Repo Market rates shown in the chart should be closely monitored for a better assessment of the monetary policy stance. We will gradually raise this predictability of the monetary policy in the period ahead and ensure that interest rates in the Interbank Money Market to hover around 6.75 percent except the days on which the EPS is implemented. To enhance predictability in the funding strategy, we will limit the stock amount of the weekly funding we provide through the quantity auction method at 4.5 percent, not to exceed TL 10 billion until the year-end. Moreover, issues regarding the implementation procedures besides the funding amount to be made under this method as of 2014 will be elaborated on in the Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy for 2014 to be published in December 2014. Under this outlook with a gradual increase in predictability, I would like to remind you that our monetary policy will remain cautious until the inflation outlook becomes consistent with the medium-term projections. In the third quarter, interest rates were down from the previous reporting period across all maturities, with a larger decrease in the shorter end, while the yield curve trended upwards (Chart 5).