samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Chart 8  Through the 1990s, inflation has been on a par with or below inflation in Europe. While the average annual rise in prices was a good 8% in Norway in the 1970s and 1980s, the annual rise in consumer prices has been confined to 2 1/4% in the 1990s. The subdued rate of increase in consumer prices has coincided with a strong expansion. In 1999, the number of employed was 200,000 higher than in 1990, i.e. an increase of 10%. We had to abandon our fixed exchange rate policy in December 1992, primarily as a result of the system’s inherent weaknesses in a world of free flows of capital and deep international financial markets. When the fixed exchange rate policy was formally abandoned, there was a risk that the Norwegian economy would again lose its nominal anchor. However, the krone exchange rate showed little change and quickly found a new trading range. BIS Review 14/2000  6  Chart 9  In the first years the krone exchange rate was very stable, also on a daily basis. When we now look back at developments in the Norwegian foreign exchange market in the 1990s, we see no significant change in 1992. On the contrary, we witnessed a pronounced shift in January 1997. It was from this point in time that daily quotations and month-to-month variations in the exchange rate show that the krone is floating. Wider fluctuations in the exchange rate have improved the functioning of the options market and forward contracts in Norwegian kroner.

To summarise, if the ABS markets work satisfactorily, they may contribute to the completeness of the financial system by distributing the risks and returns associated with a large range of non-marketable financial assets to a more diversified set of holders, with at least an equal or better capacity to bear these risks. This can contribute to enhancing the efficiency of the economic system. This is why I believe that a rebound of the securitisation market on a sounder footing, including a stable issuance activity of marketable assets remains crucial from a macro-financial point of view. III. What is the current state of the securitisation markets? Of course, the state of the securitisation markets is connected with the general situation of financial markets, and we all know that the current financial environment remains challenging. Financial markets had experienced some sort of improvement in 2009 and the early part of 2010. However, in early May adverse market dynamics took hold again across a broad range of financial markets, including several debt securities markets in the euro area, in an environment of diminishing market liquidity. As a result, most funding markets deteriorated rapidly. As you know, to help restore a normal market functioning again, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to take additional non-standard measures on 9 May 2010, including the conduct of purchases of euro area public and private debt securities in secondary markets, the reactivation of fixed-rate full-allotment long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), and the resumption of US dollar liquidity-providing operations.
If necessary, regulators may consider limiting the scope of non-auditing services or requiring the auditors to submit a request for approval prior to engaging in non-auditing activities in the same entity that they provide auditing service. One good example is the Sarbanes Oxeley Act, which was issued in the U.S. in 2002 disallowing audit firms from providing specifc functions to their audit clients such as bookkeeping, financial information system design and appraisal service, etc. Second, the work of the auditors should never replace supervisory responsibilities. Audited financial statements are not prepared to serve supervisory purposes and external auditors are not trained as bank supervisors. Accounting policies and definitions used by auditors may be different from those required by supervisors under Thai regulatory standards, although in general they tend to be the same. For example, there are differences between supervisory guidelines and accounting requirements on asset classification and provisioning. Whereas the supervisory guidelines prescribe minimum specific ratios of loan provisions depending on the quality of loans, the accounting standard is less specifc and only requires banks to set aside appropriate provisions. Second, the method used by regulators to set aside provisions is based on an “expected loss model”, while the accounting standards require provisions based on an “incurred loss model”. These conceptual differences can lead to different outcomes on such critical issues as the volume of classified asset, the adequacy of provisions, and therefore, capital adequacy. It’s useful to be mindful of these differences and understand the context that leads to the need to maintain these differences.

To this point, the recently introduced alternative procedure for the simplification of the auditing of the financial statements of very small businesses should support these efforts and facilitate the timely transmission of the financial statements to the credit institutions. It is of utmost importance that a timely flow of up-to-date customers' financials is maintained by banks at all times. Unquestionably, this will be beneficial for both parties, banks and clients, as any events signalling a deterioration of the client's financial standing will be captured early on. Consequently the most suitable restructuring solution may be sought, which could ensure the continuation of a healthy and economically viable business relationship. Conclusion To sum up, the world's economies have been through a lot in recent years, from the challenge of the pandemic, to the impact of the war in Ukraine. It is up to us to come through these challenges unscathed or even stronger, wiser and better prepared for a brighter future. We have done it before, we can do it again. After all, to quote Gever Tulley (an American writer, speaker, educator, and entrepreneur) - persistence and resilience only come from having been given the chance to work through difficult problems. Thank you for your attention. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
The pall of misconduct in Fixed Income Currency and Commodity markets The shadow of the worst financial crisis in living memory has been significantly lengthened by a series of appalling cases of misconduct in Fixed Income, Currency, Commodity and other markets. Details of these began to emerge relatively late in the crisis, but they have proved surprisingly prevalent and persistent. And they have further eroded the trust of the general public in financial markets. Public outrage is based on the view that the rewards in finance are disproportionate and that the system is rigged. When people read of malpractice in financial markets, of trading profits being claimed through manipulation, collusion or dishonesty, they naturally wonder if they are one of the people who have been wronged. In fixed income, employees in firms around the world attempted to manipulate Libor, Euribor and other similar measures of short-term borrowing costs in order to benefit themselves or some other part of their firm’s business. In the United States and elsewhere, firms structured the mortgages or other assets used to back securitised assets, or misrepresented the nature of those underlying assets, in ways inconsistent with the interests of end investors. Regulators identified systematic attempts to mis-value and otherwise engage in market misconduct in relation to large scale positions in credit default swaps. In commodities markets, traders were found trying to manipulate physical or derivative prices, including those of gold, oil, lead, platinum, palladium and coffee.

These are like salt rubbed into the wounds to public confidence in financial markets. This is in no one's interest. Many leaders in the financial industry and the majority of those who work in these markets are ashamed of this bad behaviour and want to find a way to put it comprehensively behind them. The fines alone have been sufficiently large to require substantial reshaping of firms’ businesses. I am confident we can find a way forward. I recall the story of when the Queen visited the LSE in November 2008 and asked the gathered assembly of eminent economists why had nobody noticed that a crisis was on its way? The reply came in the form of a letter from the British Academy7. Their bottom line was that the crisis was caused by “a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally to understand the risks to the system as a whole.” This is a moment when we need collective imagination – to imagine financial markets that are fair and effective and work in the interests of all of us.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: De-risking Asia - the growing role of selfinsurance Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Asian Captive Conference 2017 "De-Risking Asia: The Growing Role of Self-Insurance" Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2017. * * * It is probably fair to say that captives have had, at best, an uneasy relationship with regulators. Captive insurance did not get off on the right foot with regulators. In the early days of the modern captive, efforts to regulate captives were mostly ill-suited to the nature of the captive business. Prudential and market conduct regulations intended for the protection of the general public were applied equally to traditional and captive insurers. This reduces the cost savings that captives were set up to achieve. In response, captives relocated and domiciled in jurisdictions with less onerous regulations, which on hindsight is an onerous consequence. Fast-forward half a century, captives are have an entrenched reputation for being tax evasion vehicles of large corporations. Offshore centers that are hosts to many captives have come under greater scrutiny, with stronger tax and regulatory regimes back on the cards to haunt the industry. We seem to have come full circle, and possibly still without a clear grasp of how captives, as well as the economics in which they operate, have fundamentally changed over time. This raises a risk that the captive and regulatory community may yet find itself caught wrong-footed (again! ), with potentially higher stakes at hand.

As disruptors, their business models and risk profiles, are often unique. Much of their competitive edge is derived from concepts and technologies that are new to the market. Ride-sharing platforms such as Uber and Grab are built on seamless apps that work exactly the same whether in London, New York or Kuala Lumpur. From an insurance perspective, however, trans-border solutions for such businesses are substantially more complicated. The ride-sharing model combines private vehicles with commercial use. The seamless insurance coverage for Uber drivers that integrates exposures from private and commercial use, and satisfy the mandatory requirements under different domestic laws, are not yet fully developed in all markets. This example calls for bespoke and efficient solutions which may not be readily available in certain traditional insurance markets. To put this in perspective, Google has projected that Southeast Asia’s web-generated business will multiply over 6 times to $ billion by 2025, from $ billion in 2015. The massive impact of technology on the world as we know it, will create new insurance gaps and demand for bespoke solutions. This will set the stage for captives to take on a more active role in the risk management ecosystem. Companies that are altering the business landscape will need creative and efficient risk transfer solutions that address their unique business needs. Used alongside other risk management strategies, including the traditional insurance market, captives allow companies to design an optimal risk transfer structure.
And given the interconnected nature of these markets, this is not a purely domestic challenge: UK borrowers are exposed to any deterioration in global risk appetite. One potential trigger for loss of investor appetite is so called ‘fallen angels’ – companies whose credit has been downgraded to sub-investment grade. This is a vulnerability the FPC keeps an eye on, as it could have amplifying effects – with forced selling and many investors scrambling to sell assets at the same time, either because investment mandates prevent them from holding such bonds, or to avoid higher capital requirements associated with riskier debt. There are various international and domestic efforts underway to improve our understanding of market based finance and to make it more resilient to stresses. The Bank, for example, is currently working on a system-wide exploratory scenario to consider bank and non-bank behaviour in a severe but plausible market stress, as well as the potential consequences of their actions. Corporate debt and sustainable growth I’ve talked about why the FPC cares about the supply of finance to corporates under its primary objective for financial stability. But in addition, and subject to meeting that objective, we also have a secondary objective to support the Government’s economic policy – sustainable economic growth. [4] Of course financial stability is a prerequisite for sustainable growth, so pursuing our primary  Page 9  objective helps us meet our secondary one. But the secondary objective broadens our interests in corporate finance.

Page 1  Investing in financial stability − speech by Sarah Breeden Given at the Insolvency Practitioners Association annual conference  Page 2  Published on 27 April 2023  Sarah Breeden discusses why we monitor corporate debt given its impact on financial stability. She goes on to explain how the financial system can assist longterm productive investment and where it can do more to support business investment. Speech Introduction I suspect I won’t need to convince this audience of the importance of corporate debt and financing conditions. What I’d like to do instead is explain why the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) cares about them. The FPC has two objectives: a primary one to maintain financial stability, and a secondary one to support economic growth. The supply of finance to the corporate sector touches on both. For our primary objective we look to ensure that risks to financial stability aren’t generated by excessive levels of corporate debt – where indebtedness might build in an upswing and lead to a damaging credit crunch in a downturn. And for our secondary objective we want to make sure the financial system is supplying enough long-term, stable funding to allow businesses to make productive investments, and finance major economic transitions such as the journey to net zero. So, in both cases, stability is our watchword. We are aiming at a supply of business finance which is stable through the economic cycle – avoiding damaging swings from credit boom to bust.
On the other hand, banks with activities in several countries should be in a stronger position to cope with a recession or a crisis situation in a given country than banks whose activity is confined to one single country. This is positive from a financial stability point of view. 5.2  The Internet as a distribution channel for financial services  Let me now turn to the impact of the Internet on the banking and financial services industry. The Internet creates new opportunities for traditional banks. For example, banks should be well positioned to become key operators in trading on the Internet. They have a large customer base and strong brand names, and can offer payment transmission services, advertising space and links on their home pages. Internationally, many banks have agreements with Internet or telecommunication companies for the development of Internet banking and marketplaces on the Internet. This is probably just the beginning of a trend towards increased cooperation across industry boundaries. The Internet poses great challenges as well. It is clearly intensifying competition in the industry. This is partly because it is easier for customers to compare prices and terms and partly because it is simpler for new operators to penetrate the market. The Internet may also change the relative positions of existing market participants. Many Nordic banks have established some form of Internet banking. So far, most services offered on the Internet are relatively simple, for example loan applications, bill payments and account transfers.

Larger and more efficient securities markets - both in equities and debt instruments - provide more financing alternatives for companies and investment alternatives for savers. Companies financed in the securities markets are continuously monitored through a transparent process. Well-functioning securities markets may thus increase the profitability of capital and hence economic growth, by making sure that capital is allocated to the best new investment projects and by facilitating the restructuring of existing companies. In other words: competition for capital contributes to creative destruction. In my opinion, larger and more efficient securities markets will also reduce the risk of financial instability. Let me give you a recent example. The Long Term Capital Management crisis in 1998 showed that banks and securities markets can complement one another in crisis situations. During the crisis, the market for securities with credit risk dried up for a short period. Banks then increased their lending, and thereby averted a more extensive shortage of credit. More frequently, financing through securities markets has been used as a substitute for bank loans in the event of banking problems. The goal of financial stability thus implies both well-functioning banks and securities markets. The optimal balance between the two is difficult to define, but in most countries - including the Nordic countries the financial system would be more robust with larger, more developed securities markets than is the case today. This could also enhance the growth prospects of the respective economies. 5.
William C Dudley: The economic outlook and the Fed's balance sheet – the issue of "how" versus "when" Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Association for a Better New York Breakfast Meeting, New York, 29 July 2009. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here at the Association for a Better New York. This group has obviously been very successful. New York today is a far different and vastly superior place from what I found when I first arrived as a freshman at Columbia University in 1970. Today, I’d like to accomplish two tasks. First, I’ll comment briefly on the economy and the economic outlook – where we have been and where we may be going. I’m going to suggest that the balance of risks is still tilted toward weakness in growth and employment and not toward higher inflation. I will also argue that it is premature to talk about “when” we are going to exit from this period of unusual policy accommodation. Second, I will talk about the impact of the Federal Reserve’s lending facilities and purchase programs on the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. I’ll explain why an expanded balance sheet does not constrain our ability to exit from the current degree of policy accommodation. In other words, contrary to what is sometimes argued, it is not the case that our expanded balance sheet will inevitably prove inflationary.

It is important that this critical issue be well understood. The public must be absolutely confident that the Fed can meet its monetary policy objectives of low and stable inflation and sustainable economic growth. Before I begin to get into these issues in earnest, let me note that, as always, the views I put forward today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. Turning first to the outlook, the economic contraction appears to be waning and it seems likely that we will see moderate growth in the second half of the year. The economy should be boosted by three factors: 1) a modest recovery in housing activity and motor vehicle sales; 2) the impact of the fiscal stimulus on domestic demand; and 3) a sharp swing in the pace of inventory investment. In fact, if the inventory swing were concentrated in a particular quarter, we could see fairly rapid growth for a brief period. Regardless of the precise timing, there are a number of factors which suggest that the pace of recovery will be considerably slower than usual. In particular, I expect that consumption – which accounts for about 70 percent of gross domestic product – is likely to grow slowly for three reasons. First, real income growth will probably be weak by historical standards.
Page 7 sur 8  The impacts of the climate transition could last throughout the decarbonisation of our economy. If we looked through it, we would overburden fiscal policy in cushioning these shocks. 3. Market alignment >>> signalling through Central Banks’ operations - Third, appropriate market incentives are necessary. This is where carbon pricing is needed, as I mentioned earlier, to align firms’ behaviour and private financing, but also (and maybe primarily) a fair pricing of climate risk on financial markets. This is where central bank operations and their greening have a key role to play, giving the right market signals and inducing changes. With Christine Lagarde, we at the ECB are already implementing a greening of our corporate sector purchase programme, as well as adapting our collateral framework. 4. Funding green investments >>> solvable through blended finance - Last but not least, if these conditions are met, the question as to how to finance investments is solvable. Different estimates have been computed, and their amounts may look impressive especially when presented in gross and absolute terms, for instance around EUR 500 billion per year in the EU until 2050. viii. However, when you consider net and relative financing needs, which represent between 2% and 3% of current GDP be it for the EU or France ix  Page 8 sur 8 according to the reports quoted, this turns out to be manageable.

Employment has also risen somewhat since the start of the year, and if economic activity strengthens as we are expecting, the demand for labour will rise. Then unemployment will fall and the employment rate, that is, employed as a percentage of the population, will attain roughly the same level as before the financial crisis. When the labour market situation improves, we will also see gradually higher wage increases. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Even if the situation is currently uncertain, we thus see signs that economic activity will gradually strengthen, both in Sweden and abroad, and thus companies will have greater scope to raise their prices. However, we believe that one condition for growth, employment and inflation to rise in accordance with the forecasts is that we continue to hold the repo rate at a very low level. This forecast for the repo rate – what we call the repo-rate path – is, however, a highly uncertain forecast, at least with regard to the end of the forecast period. This relates to something as self-evident as the fact that we live in a world full of uncertainty, not least with regard to the preconditions for monetary policy – for example, developments abroad, inflationary pressures, the level of unutilised resources in the economy and coming measures in the field of economic policy. Here there are many factors contributing to making our forecasts uncertain and our repo-rate decisions difficult, and I shall touch on some of these problems.