samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, while growth and employment rates have been converging upwards across the euro area, significant gaps still remain in terms of levels. In large parts of the euro area there are still substantial under-utilised resources, reflected in a negative output gap and high unemployment rates. And this is of course crucial for our assessment of the path of inflation – namely, whether we see a sustained adjustment that would warrant a scaling back of our exceptional degree of monetary policy accommodation. Let me remind you that we have established four criteria to confirm a sustained adjustment: first, that headline inflation is on a path to levels below but close to 2% over a meaningful mediumterm horizon; second, that inflation will be durable and stabilise around those levels with sufficient confidence; third that inflation will be self-sustained, meaning it will maintain its trajectory even with diminishing support from monetary policy. And finally, it goes without saying that in each case the relevant metric is euro area inflation not the inflation rates of any individual country. For the first criterion, the assessment does now seem to be improving: our latest projections foresee the path of headline inflation now much closer to the target over 2017–2019. But the inherent uncertainty in the forecasting process needs to be mitigated by cross-checking with other available information on inflation dynamics. Particularly useful here are measures of underlying inflationary pressures, since they can be monitored in real-time and tend to be more informative than headline inflation for medium-term price developments.

The reason that our interest rates remain higher than those in the Eurozone is that, despite the recent slowdown, our economy is operating closer to capacity than theirs. That’s partly why our rate of unemployment is almost half theirs – though the greater structural flexibility of the British economy is even more important in this context. The MPC sets interest rates to achieve the inflation target. We have made it clear by our actions that we are just as vigorous in relaxing policy when the risks to inflation are on the downside as we are in tightening policy when the risks to inflation are on the upside. That’s the best help that we can give through monetary policy. It does not mean that we ignore the external pressures. In assessing the prospects for the overall economy, and for inflation, we take full account of the impact of world demand and of the exchange rate, just as we take full account of all the domestic factors bearing on inflation prospects. When, as now, the external influences are having a powerful disinflationary effect, monetary policy is of course easier, and interest rates lower, than they would otherwise be. That does not – and cannot – mean that we are able to pursue any particular objective with regard to the exchange rate – or that we respond, Pavlov-like, to exchange rate fluctuations.
Ardian Fullani: Albania – optimistic, flexible and adaptive to challenges Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Opening of “Klik Ekspo Group” Fair, Tirana, 25 November 2008. *  *  *  Honourable Prime Minister, Honourable Ministers, Honourable Ambassadors, Dear Mr. Uldedaj! Dear entrepreneurs! Dear ladies and gentlemen! I feel privileged to be here with you tonight and at the same time, be a friend to the Albanian entrepreneurship. The times we are living through require the special attention of economic and financial forums, in particular when the latter bring together the governmental bodies, the banking system and the private entrepreneurship. The global table of discussions on macro-finance and future policies is the present focus; hence, I consider this forum as a follow-up of this prevailing philosophy of the time we are living in. Set in a comprehensive context, the economic developments in the recent months have been characterized by the vague situation the monetary and financial markets and institutions have been going through – which in the last couple of weeks has been followed by other developments. The most recent data show that the economies of developed countries – the USA, Euro area, England and Japan – have recorded decline in economic growth. However, most emerging economies have shown higher immunity to the consequences of the global crisis. Economic activity has been buttressed by domestic factors, which is the main reason to justify the immunity in addition to the incomplete financial integration with the developed countries.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Heading for more sustained growth? Summary of an address by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the General Meeting of the Swiss Italian Chamber of Commerce, Zurich, 20 June 2006. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Lately, Switzerland has been experiencing an encouraging upturn in the economy on the back of growth in the international economy. This development is particularly welcome because it follows a number of years of economic listlessness which have prompted repeated criticism from international bodies, due to the lack of growth in the Swiss economy. However, Switzerland's medium and long-term growth problem has not disappeared. Faster economic growth is the only possible response to the challenges posed by an ageing population. Moreover, it is the sole antidote to Switzerland's continuing loss of ground with respect to the other members of the OECD. Reforms are needed to ensure that, in the future, we can achieve more with fewer resources. The ways and means of doing this are evident. The Federal Council's package of growth measures is a move in the right direction, and the current improvement in the economy gives Switzerland the opportunity to move ahead with the requisite reforms. BIS Review 59/2006  1
The Banco de España has to approve or, where appropriate, require the necessary changes to be made to these plans, which must be implemented by 30 September, although the Banco de España may grant an extension of this deadline in the cases specified in the Royal Decree-Law. It is important to stress that the FROB is obliged to contribute the necessary capital to the banks which request it, as either a first or a subsequent option, to supplement or replace private capital. This contribution of government funds does not constitute, as some have argued, a nationalisation of banks, but rather exceptional and temporary support, since the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  FROB funds must be repaid or replaced by private capital as required by the Royal DecreeLaw. The participation of the FROB in this process enables an orderly entry of private investment in the savings bank sector. But what has been most effective to improve market confidence has been the very existence of the FROB as a backstop, assuring investors and lenders that, from the entry into force of the Royal Decree-Law, all Spanish banks are, de facto, operating with levels of core capital exceeding 8–10%. The entry of private capital will require savings banks to undertake a definitive and clear professionalisation of their management. This requirement is fortunate because it is a necessary condition for preventing a repeat of past events.

The markets appreciated that effort and, after the summer, Spanish banks were again able to issue debt on the international wholesale markets. However, Ireland’s sovereign debt crisis again increased the strains on the government debt markets and a fresh lack of confidence in the Spanish banking sector and misgivings as to the quality of its assets resurfaced. Those events highlighted the need for more rapid and far-reaching action to confront the difficulties facing a part of the Spanish banking system. Immediately, the Banco de España stepped up its transparency requirements for the asset portfolios on which doubts centred. Thus early this year all savings banks were obliged to make public their exposure to the real estate development sector, their doubtful assets, their standard exposures under surveillance and their provisioning levels, and to specify the type of collateral securing those exposures. Also, they were asked to publish information on their foreclosed assets and on their exposure to households through residential mortgages so that, although this is not an area of concern, the market could distinguish between risks which at times – unjustifiably – it treated similarly. Further to the recently ratified Royal Decree-Law, the Spanish Parliament has taken an additional step to strengthen bank solvency. Happily, it was understood that, while important, what had been achieved thus far was not sufficient and that it was necessary to take further measures to hasten the restructuring process.
There is, unfortunately, a great deal of painful experience of the negative impact of high and volatile inflation on investment. And the adverse impact of the recent financial crisis on investment is clear. Indeed, as I have noted, it may still be with us in the form of higher hurdle rate risk premia. It is also important for the Bank to understand the drivers and obstacles to productive investment, even if the policy responses to obstacles are no longer primarily for us. Our monetary policy benefits from a better understanding of productivity and the supply side of the economy. Investment is an important channel through which monetary policy is transmitted. Understanding how businesses make investment decisions informs our understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism. On the financial stability side, our aim is a resilient financial sector that can support the economy even in times of stress. Diversity and robustness in the channels of finance to the real economy increases resilience. That is why we are interested in the way firms finance investments and the constraints they may face. And, of course, we have a secondary objective to support the economic policy of the Government. The work I have been drawing on today is part of our work to support the government’s productivity agenda and will I hope be helpful in developing policy responses that go wider than the Bank’s primary objectives.

In addition to the requirement for equal charges, the new Regulation envisages requirements with respect to currency conversion charges related to card payments and electronic credit transfers which are expected to increase transparency and to ensure comparability in cases where a payment service user is faced with a choice between currency conversion alternatives f. According to the requirements concerning currency conversion charges related to card payments, payment service providers and the parties providing currency conversion services at an automated teller machine (ATM) or at the point of sale shall provide information prior to the initiation of the payment transaction for the total currency conversion charges expressed as a percentage mark-up over the latest available euro foreign exchange reference rates issued by the European Central Bank. In addition, the payer must also be provided, prior to the initiation of the payment transaction, with information about the amount to be paid to the payee in both the currency used by the payee and in the currency of the payer’s account. With regard to the requirements for currency conversion charges related to electronic credit transfers, payment service providers will be obliged to inform the payer prior to the initiation of the payment transaction about the expected currency conversion charges applied to the credit transfer, the expected amount of the credit transfer in the currency of the payer’s account, as well as about the expected amount which will be transferred to the payee in the currency used by the payee.
The significance of systems and governance principles Given the gigantic nature of the risks faced by banks and the inability to foresee the delivery of external shocks, the life of the internal auditor is made miserable today. He has to function as an effective watchdog. But, he does not possess a set of well tested paraphernalia to do this job. He may be an honest, genuine and committed worker. But, the rest in the organization may not be so to the same degree. Hence, any mishap can occur without warning or the knowledge of the internal auditor. If it so occurs, the internal auditor himself is driven to a serious quandary. The way to overcome this risk is to develop and place in place suitable and effective systems, processes and methods across the organization at all levels. The internal auditor could just monitor and ensure that the systems are genuinely and effectively followed by all. An important element which also helps him to perform his job effectively is to introduce and follow to the letter the good governance principles in the organization. These governance principles would bind all in the organization by a common code of ethics. The absence of proper governance will lead to misuse of the resources to the detriment of outside stakeholders. The internal auditor cannot keep a watchful eye on everything that happens in a bank. A good deal of discipline that should be inculcated throughout the bank comes from self-discipline and there again, through the strict adherence to governance principles.

3  BIS Review 56/1999  Monetary policy operates on the demand side of the economy, and essentially what we can hope to do – and what we are aiming to do - is to keep overall demand broadly and continuously in line with the underlying supply-side capacity of the economy to meet that demand. How close we come – on average and over time – to meeting the 2½% inflation target is in effect simply a measure of our success in achieving macro-economic stability in this wider sense. We cannot directly affect supply-side capacity – the underlying rate of growth that we can expect to sustain. But, by operating symmetrically – as we have shown that we do – we can provide an environment in which supply-side improvements (for example, more rapid productivity growth which apparently explains the stronger performance of the US economy in the past few years, but which we have yet to see in this country on anything like the same scale) have the best chance of feeding through into faster sustained output growth. And, to the extent that we are successful in maintaining macro-economic stability, that can help to improve our supply-side performance indirectly by lowering real long-term interest rates and encouraging better decision–making in the economy as a whole with less distortion from unnecessary erratic movements, particularly in nominal values. But we can only hope to maintain macro-economic stability for the economy as a whole.
Sciences Po Paris – Paris, 18 September 2019 Inaugural lesson at the Paris School of International Affairs,  by François Villeroy de Galhau Governor of the Banque de France  What economic sovereignty for Europe? Facing the threats with lucidity, and boldly seizing an opportunity  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr; 06 88 56 54 03). Page 1 of 10  Mr Director, Dean (dear Enrico), Ladies and gentlemen, teachers, dear students, It gives me great pleasure to speak before you today. I follow in the footsteps of several Ministers of Foreign Affairs, including Jean-Yves Le Drian and Nathalie Loiseau. Caro Enrico, thank you for your invitation, knowing this makes me feel all the more grateful and honoured! The decision to switch from diplomats to a central banker such as myself perhaps sends out three signals. First, rarely have geopolitics and economics been so closely intertwined. Faced with the rise in protectionist tensions and the verbal volleys, which unfortunately intensified again this summer, some even say that economic interdependence – the “sweet ties of commerce” praised by Montesquieu – is the only thing still shielding us from military conflict. Conversely, rarely has a global economic slowdown been so clearly attributable to political causes: nearly everywhere, public policy instability and uncertainty are on the rise and are damaging private sector confidence; I shall come back to this. Second signal: rarely have central banks been called upon to do so much.

J. Rodgers Hollingsworth; Karl Müller; Ellen Jane Hollingsworth. Advancing Socio-Economics, Rowman Littlefield, pp.351 380, 2002. Hall PA, Soskice D. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press; 2001. Pontusson Jonas (2005), Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe versus Liberal America. Cornell University Press. Co- recipient, Gladys M. Kammerer Award, American Political Science Association, 2006. viii “Guérir le capitalisme”, video of Marie-Laure Djelic, August 2018 presenting her course: “The Great Transition - Responsibility, Innovation, Commons”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w2uiVqQk_wI ix Aglietta, Michel and Reberioux, Antoine (2014), Dérives du capitalisme financier, Albin Michel. x Dani Rodrik (2018), Straight Talk On Trade. Ideas for a Sane World Economy. Princeton University Press. xi Michel Albert (1991), Capitalisme contre Capitalisme, Seuil. xii Stiglitz, Joseph E., (2013), The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers our Future. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. xiii Piketty, Thomas (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Piketty, Thomas (2019), Capital et idéologie, Seuil (published on 12 September) xiv Cingano, F. (2014), “Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 163, OECD Publishing, Figure 3. xv IMF (2019), Inequality of Opportunity, Inequality of Income and Economic Growth xvi World Inequality Lab (2019), « Has the European social model withstood the rise in inequalities?
household 70 ahead items  80  240  70  210  60  60  180  240  Housing (3)  210  Commercial  180 Consumer  50  50  150  150  40  40  120  120  30  90  90  20  60  60  Current personal economic situation  30 20 07  09  11  13  15  IPEC 02  17  05  08  11  14  17  (1) Value above (below) 50 indicates optimism (pessimism). (2) Weighted averaged rates of all operations performed in each month. (3) Loans denominated in UFs. Sources: Adimark and Central Bank of Chile using SBIF information. Figure 6 Contribution of GFCF to annual GDP growth  Imports of capital goods (annual change, percent)  (percentage points)  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5 GFCF  1.0 0.5  1.0 Machinery & equipment 0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.5  -1.0  -1.0  -1.5  Construction & -1.5 other works -2.0  -2.0 15  16  17  80 60  80 Total  60  40  40  20  20  0  0  -20  -20  Minus other -40 transportation (*) -60 -60 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 -40  (*) Excludes non-regular transportation vehicles (airplanes, ships, helicopters and trains). Source: Central Bank of Chile.

The PSD has provided the Bank with a new, higher resolution lens on household and housing market behaviour. For example, in 2014 the PSD was used by the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee (FPC) to help inform and calibrate its decisions on setting macro-prudential restrictions on high loan-to-income mortgages to UK households. 30  Since then, we have used these data to track the characteristics of existing mortgagors with 31  high loan-to-income and high loan-to-value mortgages over time. 32  PSD data have been used to understand  And they have also been used to calibrate a multi-sector,  pricing decisions in the UK housing market. 33  agent-based model of the UK housing market. The Bank and the ONS have over recent years been developing a more comprehensive set of data on flows of funds between institutions. The hope is that these data help in tracking not only portfolio shifts but also how these might affect financial markets and the wider economy. For example, do portfolio reallocations by 34  institutional investors affect asset markets and have knock-on effects for spending? Answering questions  35  like this helps, for example, when assessing the efficacy of quantitative easing. 29  https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/articles/vatturnoverinitialresearchanalysisuk/december June 2014 Financial Stability Report. 31 Chakraborty, Gimpelewicz and Uluc (2017). 32 Bracke and Tenreyro (2016) and Benetton, Bracke and Garbarino (2018). 33 Baptista et al (2016). 34 Bank of England and Procyclicality Working Group (2014).
Besides, we are working on revitalising market-based financing in the euro area, notably through the revival of a transparent, robust and efficient securitization market; this has the potential to provide a useful complement to credit, the ultimate objective being, of course, the healthy financing of the euro area recovery. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In this context, of course, the key question at the heart of current debates is: how can we amplify this recovery? I believe that, fundamentally, what Europe needs in order to strengthen its pace of growth is to improve its competitiveness in today’s globalised world. Obviously, the euro area is not without its strengths, and the region is well-equipped to face the challenges of the 21st century. With 370 million consumers and a high level of purchasing power, it is still the largest market in the world. It is also the world’s most economically integrated zone, with a highly qualified labour force and extremely good infrastructure. Besides, we have achieved considerable improvements in our economic governance and are continuing to make progress in this area with the implementation this year of the single supervisory mechanism, which will be followed by a single resolution mechanism, as announced by the European Council of Ministers in March. This banking union is absolutely key to the strengthening of the euro area.

The ECB staff macroeconomic projections foresee annual real GDP increasing by 1.2% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015. In addition, the majority of soft indicators are improving, and have been above their long-term average for a number of months now, confirming a rebound in economic activity. Although the strength of the rebound varies across countries, it is important to highlight the return to positive growth in those countries most affected by the crisis and which are of major importance to the euro area: I’m thinking above all of Spain and Italy, where exports have rebounded sharply and are currently driving economic activity. On a financial level, we are also seeing a significant return to normal in the euro area: •  bond markets in periphery countries are continuing to stabilise and interest rates have come back down to sustainable levels, with several periphery countries or programme countries recently managing to obtain market financing at perfectly satisfactory rates;  •  fragmentation within the euro area is decreasing – as shown for example by the fall in liquidity surpluses or Target2 balances;  •  credit dynamics are still subdued on the whole, due to continuing weak demand and ongoing bank deleveraging. But we are confident that the asset quality review which we are undertaking and the upcoming stress tests will revive confidence and thus boost credit.