samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Banks with CDO exposure have already made full provisioning and recognized losses in line with IAS 39, and presently all sub-prime related CDOs have been unwound. Thai banks also have very low exposure to investment banks like Lehman Brothers and have no investment in US GSE securities. In all, total exposure of Thai banks to foreign investment is about 1.2 percent of total assets, about half of which are sovereign assets. Having said this, we are very mindful of the risk from second round effect of slowdown in global growth and domestic growth, which can affect credit, market, as well as liquidity risk. To handle this, the Bank of Thailand has been holding dialogue with top managements of banks to discuss financial stability outlook, and have conducted stress-test to ensure that banks are alert to these risks and are able to manage them to ensure adequate capital and liquidity. We will continue to hold candid and two-ways dialogues with all the banks operating here to ensure that we can manage these challenges and dynamics of the global turmoil. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to conclude with some lessons learned so far to increase our immune system going forward. First, growth must be based on strong macroeconomic foundation, with prudent fiscal and monetary policy, flexible policy options, and strong external positions.

Gathering market intelligence in a more complex and transparent world  Given its responsibilities for monetary policy, macro-prudential regulation and microprudential supervision, it is quite rightly expected that the Bank’s policy decisions are taken with a detailed understanding of the financial market context in which the Bank operates. Since its inception, the Bank’s market operations have long provided a key input to this understanding, by providing first-hand information from financial institutions. Between the years 1786 and 1989, this was epitomised by the “Senior Broker to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt.” Clad in a top hat, and invariably with a tightly rolled umbrella (see Figure 4 for an example), the holder of that position was responsible for announcing (in person) changes in the Bank’s minimum lending rate, and at the same time gathering opinion on the state of the gilt market. He was expected to report to the Gilt Edged Division three times a day, providing information about market activity, the quantity of buying and selling, and the gilt maturities and coupons that were in particular demand. He was also responsible for reporting on the mood of investors and advised the Bank on the appetite for stock, institutional cash positions and expectations. 9, 10 Even if top hats are a thing of the past, the essence of Market Intelligence (MI) gathering remains the same today: our staff maintain a regular dialogue with financial market participants to draw on their expert knowledge and perspective of the markets in which they operate.
Yet the race to achieve net-zero emissions (‘net zero’) by 2050 is a multi-decade marathon, where the starting gun has already fired, and getting to the finish line will require a sprint start, with a reduction in global emissions of a half by 2030 [figure 1 in the Appendix].1 What I would like to talk about today is how we get there – both what we know and what we don’t know - and the important role of climate scenario analysis in helping us plot the best course. Governments will of course play a central role in laying the track, removing hurdles and setting the pace as we move to net zero. Over 110 countries, including the UK, have now moved to enshrine net zero emission targets in policy or law and are working on detailed plans of what these look like in practice.2  But climate change and climate policy will affect everyone - businesses from all sectors of the economy, public bodies like the Bank of England, households and individuals. And so we all have a stretch of the race to run. Some will perform strongly, others may struggle, and some, particularly in less developed countries, might need a helping hand. But let’s be in no doubt. We need everyone to finish. Role of the financial sector  Let me first say a few words about financial institutions given the unique role they play in this race. As corporates, these firms have some direct emissions but they are not significant.

The working group on scenario analysis has produced some really useful guidance and tools that should be useful both to financial firms and to businesses.10  Next steps  It is critical that financial firms recognise now that the race to net zero has started. Indeed many have.11  9  See Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario. See Climate Financial Risk Forum. The Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero includes 87 asset managers representing $ trillion in assets under management; 43 banks with $ trillion in assets; and 58 asset owners with $ trillion in assets under management. 10 11  In support of their ambitions, and consistent with our expectations, they need to run climate scenarios as part of business as usual risk management and embed climate risk management within day-to-day decision-making. Time is running out. Perfection tomorrow cannot be the enemy of progress today. We also need experts from academia, think tanks and consultancies to fill in the blanks, helping turn the high-level into ground-level decision-useful material. A lot of promising work is already happening – including NGFS-led work to increase the sectoral granularity of risks and to quantify the impacts from flooding and tropical cyclones. But more research is needed. I will highlight three areas in particular:   What are the implications of government policy design on the transition, particularly on jobs, productivity, prices and different sectors of the economy?
In any case, the problem with the exchange rate choice was not the decision to let the rate adjust, but the decision to resist it and the role that played in magnifying the bubble, and thereby the subsequent damage from the fall. Given where we are today, and what we know about the relative merits of flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes, what is the likely evolution of the current monetary system going forward? A few concluding observations. First, I think it is unlikely that we will see a substantial move toward monetary integration involving the major emerging market economies, in Asia or in the Western Hemisphere. As the economist Peter  2  BIS Review 44/2007  Kenen writes in his latest book, it is difficult today to envisage a substantial reduction in national currencies though the emergence of large regional monetary unions where they do not already exist. Within Europe, we may yet see a further enlargement of the euro area. There may be other circumstances in which individual economies can derive benefit from a currency board system or from dollarization or euroization. Countries trying to emerge from a period of high inflation may in the future, as they have in the past, adopt a fixed exchange rate as a nominal external anchor for a disinflation strategy. These seem likely to be exceptions, however, to a general move toward more flexible exchange rate regimes.

By engineering artificial expectations of stability, the regime had led market participants to disregard the possibility of exchange rate devaluations, leading to mispricing of risk, insufficient hedging and ultimately to misallocation of financial and real resources. Governments that found themselves in this position had very limited ability to mitigate the economic damage that was to come, but the policy choices that accompanied the exchange rate change often compounded the problem. Japan's experience provides another example, though the context was different. There is a perception in parts of Asia that the Japanese government's decision to let the yen appreciate in the late 1980s was principally responsible for Japan's so-called “lost decade” of low growth. And, Japan, viewed through this prism, is cited as an example of the perils of letting an exchange rate move up in response to changing fundamentals. The reality is more complex. The problems of the Japanese economy in the 1990s were largely due to the aftereffects of the collapse of the real estate and asset price boom of the preceding decade, a boom fueled in part by efforts by the monetary authorities to limit the appreciation of the yen. The size of the negative shock to demand from the collapse of the bubble was very substantial, and the capacity of the government and the central bank to mitigate the damage was constrained by the weakness in the banking system. A more forceful macroeconomic policy response, however, might have brought about a quicker recovery.
Ongoing work in the Basel Committee to ensure that the new framework functions as intended  Let me turn now to the ongoing work in the Basel Committee to ensure that the new framework functions as intended. I would like to report on the current status of two initiatives that were announced by the Basel Committee some time ago: the treatment of “double default” and trading book issues; and the work to re-confirm that the new framework meets our objective to broadly maintain the aggregate level of capital requirements, while also providing incentives to adopt the more advanced risk-sensitive approaches. Before I turn to the detail, let me say that neither initiative is expected to lead to significant changes in Basel II’s overall structure. However, the Committee has always said that Basel II should be sufficiently dynamic to allow for evolution. As I have already stressed, we must ensure that Basel II serves the needs of the banking sector into the twenty-first century. In this regard, the Basel Committee has pledged to monitor industry developments and to continue its public dialogue on emerging issues that are relevant to capital supervision. The Basel Committee has already begun to honour this promise, in two areas especially.

While we have completed a vast amount of work in developing the international standards, we cannot rest yet. The ultimate success of Basel II still demands a high level of dedication and energy from all of us. I commend and thank the members of the European Parliament for their contributions to the international discussions on Basel II and for their hard work in European discussions on the Capital Adequacy Directive. I know that you will give the directive careful consideration, taking account of the global environment in which European banks are operating. I would like to pledge any assistance that members of the European Parliament believe may be necessary and I would be honoured to participate in future parliamentary discussions on Basel II and the Directive. The considerable efforts that the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors have already demonstrated give me great confidence that we will achieve our goals. Our citizens, businesses and banks deserve nothing less than the promise and benefits of greater financial stability and more sustainable economic growth. BIS Review 3/2005  5
Nor should the Riksbank’s proposals be regarded as set in stone; it must be possible for the retail payments council to develop to remain relevant and thus working methods and participation should be reviewed on a regular basis. The Riksbank intends to have a preliminary constituent meeting at the beginning of February. The way forward involves new and old technology To summarise: Sweden is in the forefront with regard to the development and use of cashless payment methods. This development is positive in many ways, but changes also entail challenges. The Riksbank is taking an active part in the work on managing these challenges to make things easier for the various participants in the economy. Given this, I am convinced that we have a good basis for resolving short-term and long-term problems and frictions. The way forward is to continue refining old technology in new versions and also to create entirely new solutions. There is good scope to ensure our payment services will be even safer, more efficient, easily accessible and cheaper in the future. Thank you! 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Despite a situation of increasing  BIS Review 168/2009  1  investment rates, the ratio of total savings to GDP reached 57% in 2008 against 48% in 2004, leading to a context of excess saving rates of 13% to 24,7% over the period. These developments have allowed sizeable reserve accumulation, particularly from 2004 $ billion 43) to 2008 $ billion 143) as a cushion against possible external shocks, including shocks of a “sudden stop” nature. Anchored to regained macroeconomic stability, a large public investment program was launched in 2001 (2001–04) followed by a larger one in 2005 (2005–09). Implementation of the two public investment programs significantly stimulated gross fixed capital formation, with public investments representing 56.5% of total investment in 2008 up from 40.8% in 2004. Over the past five years, public investments (economic and social infrastructure, housing, agriculture and water, others) amounted to $ billion 80 (representing 51% of a total of $ billion 156). It should be noted that foreign companies, particularly from Asia, hold a significant position in terms of implementation of the public investment programs. In parallel, the national oil company (Sonatrach) implemented ambitious annual investment plans over the past 3 years, increasing the annual investment envelope from $ billion 4.8 in 2006 to $ billion 8.5 in 2008. For the past 5 years, the ratio of Sonatrach’s investment to total investment reached 17.6% (17.1% in 2008). For 2009, Sonatrach’s investment program amounts to $ billion 16.5.
Further liberalization of financial services, progressing as planned in Financial Sector Master Plan II, will provide Thailand opportunity for firms to have better access to funds at a more competitive price, especially small businesses which comprise a large part of the workforce. This adds another dimension to Thailand’s competitiveness and will help strengthen economic growth. Now, let me turn towards the Bank of Thailand’s other major responsibility – to balance between financial stability and economic growth. The role of monetary policy is to manage the financial environment to ensure macroeconomic and financial stability. The Monetary Policy Committee, or MPC, has maintained an accommodative monetary policy stance throughout the adverse shocks in the last couple of years. In the current episode, we are conducting monetary policy to maintain a right balance between economic growth and financial stability, including inflation. The current policy rate which is negative in real term has already helped alleviate small businesses and households’ interest burden and can help the private sector survive the short term slump. Turnaround is coming! Weak sentiment due to the uncertainty about the political situation is the root cause of the faltering domestic demand. Political resolution is beyond our scope, so it may be appropriate to focus more on the medium and long term strategy necessary to support the economic rebound once the political status improves. The collaboration between private businesses and financial sectors to deal with the mentioned structural challenges is required to lay a solid foundation of the future economy.

But this advantage diminished since the global financial crisis. Firms may consider moving up the value chain to differentiate products and enhance value. There are two possibilities that exist in Thailand depending on the industry. The industries that are behind need to catch up with the ongoing trend, and industries that have the opportunity, can leap ahead of the trend. In either case, Research and development investment is needed. To address the issues just mentioned, Thailand’s financial sector, which includes my esteemed guests for today and the Bank of Thailand, must set clear directions for our roles. To deal with the structural challenges, the private sectors need support from the financial sectors. They will require long term and low cost funding, from both domestic and international sources. Ladies and gentlemen, your operation of financial institutions with both caution and long term vision has so far contributed to financial stability in Thailand. We would like you to continue placing value in the long term, and providing liquidity for established customers who will definitely return to growth after Thailand’s rebound. Such support creates long term value for your international investors and helps both your future returns, and to usher the economy through the slump. For the Bank of Thailand’s part, we continue improving financial system strength and efficiency.
1  For a summary of the case for LIBOR transition and an account of the early steps the Bank took to support it for sterling markets, see https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2017/the-bank-and-benchmark-reform-speech-by-chrissalmon.pdf?la=en&hash=597E3C1B41FBFFAFB6A05DFFE148F1E0B53BEB3F 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  By contrast, firms that miss these opportunities risk finding themselves behind the curve: stranded with LIBOR-linked systems and obligations that are no longer fit for purpose. That risk is material – and will only grow as 2021 approaches. Of course not every problem can be solved through innovation alone:  -  Some require collective, or public sector, action – and that is being co-ordinated through the marketled Working Group on Sterling Risk-Free Reference Rates here in the United Kingdom, and similar bodies overseas. The report card for that collective process reads ‘a lot achieved, a lot left to do’, as we discussed at a conference at the Bank on 5 June. 2  -  And some do fall under the ‘must do’ heading for firms. To summarise the key conclusions of our first ‘Dear CEO’ exercise: you need to have identified and quantified your LIBOR-linked exposures; you need a granular transition project plan, including an identified responsible executive covered by the Senior Managers Regime (where applicable); you need to stress test that plan against the base case of LIBOR ceasing to exist at end-2021; you need to identify and manage your prudential and conduct risks; and you need to engage with the work of the relevant market working groups.

In addition, if central banks are perceived to assign higher priority to supporting asset prices than to safeguarding price stability, inflation expectations may be adversely affected and even become disanchored. Let me say clearly that I consider a situation in which the central bank would reduce its interest rate with a view to strengthening asset prices and banks’ balance sheets as purely hypothetical and, in the case of the Eurosystem, simply unthinkable. This is a situation that would obviously open up issues of moral hazard and that no central bank committed to price stability would ever contemplate. This discussion reminds me of a famous article by Alan Blinder, the former Fed ViceChairman. 4 He notes that academic economists are always concerned about the inflationary bias problem, that is the fear that central bankers may be constantly tempted to engineer inflation surprises in order to achieve sustained short-term employment gains, without realising that in the long run they would simply create higher inflation. Blinder reassures these concerns by observing that “during my brief career as a central banker, I never once witnessed nor experienced this temptation”. Let me then borrow Blinder’s words and use them to reassure the concerns of those who believe that we might be tempted to temporarily forgo our commitment to price stability out of worries about financial market developments: this is a temptation that neither I nor my colleagues at the ECB’s Governing Council have ever experienced.
That is the primary aim of this morning’s symposium, bringing together the scientific committees of both the ACP and the AMF who play a key advisory role in each of our  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  institutions and who clearly work in areas of common interest. It is organised around the following specific themes that I would like to introduce with a few words. I.  Firstly, in a difficult context, French households have altered their investment choices: what are the consequences of this alteration? Already high before the crisis, the savings rate of French households has further increased, reaching levels close to those recorded at the start of the 1980s. This increase in the savings rate seems to reflect a precautionary attitude on the part of households. The year 2011 was also characterised by a significant reallocation of assets between the various savings options. Alongside a substantial withdrawal from UCITS and a fall in net new money flowing into life insurance contracts – a movement that has nevertheless slowed since the beginning of 2012 – bank savings products have posted a significant rise in deposits. Savers clearly decided to place their money in more liquid and less risky banking products such as passbooks to the detriment of long-term investments, despite the need for the latter to cover certain requirements for both households and the economy.

As always, we are monitoring developments carefully and in connection with the Monetary Policy Update in April will make a renewed assessment of the international outlook in which we will also take into account how events in Japan may affect the development of the global economy in the slightly longer term. Sweden At the latest monetary policy meeting in February, we decided to raise the repo rate from 1.25 per cent to 1.50 per cent and our assessment was that the repo rate would need to be increased to 3.6 per cent by the end of the forecast period, that is in three years’ time. My assessment was that we will need to raise the repo rate by 0.25 per cent at every meeting in 2011 to 2.75 per cent at the end of the year. This entails a somewhat steeper upward path in the second half of 2011 than the repo-rate path presented in the main scenario of the Monetary Policy Report. However, in light of the uncertainty about the development of interest rates, I did not enter a reservation against the repo-rate path but confined myself to commenting on this at the meeting (see Figure 17). I will now discuss my view of monetary policy in the years ahead in a little more detail and take the picture of the economic outlook presented in the latest Monetary Policy Report as my starting point.