samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We need to enhance the level of knowledge in sustainable finance amongst industry professionals as well as companies that are reporting on their sustainability practices or looking to issue green bonds. MAS is working with partners, such as the Institute of Banking and Finance, SGX, the Asia Sustainable Finance Initiative and our universities, to introduce capacity building courses in sustainability for finance professionals and officers of listed companies. Conclusion Let me sum up. Investing – by its very nature – is an activity that focuses our mind on the future. I have sketched three probable investment themes, by no means exhaustive and by no means certain. The rise of private markets offers an opportunity for investors to achieve higher returns within the context of a well-diversified portfolio that also includes traditional assets. If we can manage the higher risks of investing in these markets, we can eat well. Ensuring financial security in old age is becoming a growing imperative amidst demographic change. If we can start saving and investing for retirement early enough and wisely enough, we can sleep well. Mitigating as well as adapting to climate change is likely to be one of the central issues in the future. If we can invest with a view to that future, recognising its risks and providing the incentive for positive change, with a heart for future generations, we can feel well. I wish you fruitful deliberations on achieving a healthy, balanced, and fulfilling investment life. And I wish you well.

The work done by the BNB in this area is the logical extension of the reforms in the banking sector that started in 2015 and is expected to continue throughout 2019 with the following focal points: • Development of an efficient organization for cooperation with the ECB within the supervisory colleges and joint supervisory teams; • Streamlining the supervisory strategy to match the new institutional reality resulting from the close cooperation arrangements; • Dividing the supervisory focus among important and less important institutions; • Organisation of collection of supervisory and statistical data for supervisory purposes and validation of supervisory reporting; • Development of information systems consistent with the new stage in the supervisory activities. The third working block relates to the organisation and carrying out of the asset quality review and the stress test. The process is under way for the selected six banks and is conducted by ECB in line with an ECB-adopted methodology and macroeconomic scenarios for the purposes of the stress test. The bulk of the assumptions and parameters are determined by the Central Project Steering Committee at the ECB with an established working communication between the BNB, ECB and SSM in this process. The Banking Supervision activities will continue through implementing the European regulatory framework applicable to the credit institutions with a focus on the consistent implementation of the technical standards and regulations, the Guidelines of the European Banking Authority and the recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board.
Policy agenda Our immediate focus must be to limit the damage of the financial crisis on the real economy, and stop the downward spiral created by the negative feedback loop. Policy measures must include not just fiscal and monetary policy stimulus, but also an acceleration of structural changes to correct the underlying imbalances, to put the global economy on a sounder footing for renewed growth. There has also been much discussion about regulatory reform. Reform is certainly necessary, but we must avoid swinging the regulatory pendulum to the other extreme. While the present system has major flaws, it is not fundamentally broken. Fixing these flaws demands thoughtful and pragmatic changes at the global level. Piecemeal quick fixes, which may be logical and perhaps even headline grabbing, may end up creating unforeseen and unintended consequences. It would be a mistake, for instance, to swing towards overly prescriptive rules, or to severely restrict all forms of securitisation and financial innovation. As financial markets are at different stages of development in various countries, we must also avoid a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Certainly, we will need greater international cooperation, and the work of bodies such as the IMF, FSF, BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, 3 and initiatives sponsored by groupings such as the G20 will be important in this reform effort. An effective regulatory framework for Islamic finance The current global crisis has posed a series of extreme stress tests on financial systems and our regulatory approaches, and offers many important pointers for the development of Islamic Finance.

At our monetary policy assessments in June and September, we indicated we would also consider selling foreign currency depending on the development of the exchange rate. Accordingly, we have sold foreign currency in recent months to ensure appropriate monetary conditions. We will also sell foreign currency in the future if this is appropriate from the monetary policy perspective. Conversely, we remain willing to buy foreign currency again if necessary, i.e. if there were to be excessive appreciation pressure. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. I now hand over to Martin Schlegel, who will speak about the latest developments with regard to cash. Page 3/4  Berne, 15 December 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Page 4/4
The forum provides the opportunities for policy dialogues, exchange of views and concerns, and information updates, among other things. This is the major operational arrangement that we have put in place to make the separate authorities model work for us. No doubt other operational arrangements can be put in place to make the integrated model work as well. Having said that, let me add another dimension to the issue of supervisory arrangement – one that is related to central bank’s other key function, namely, monetary policy. I believe that supervisory policy and monetary policy can be arranged in such a way that they are complementary and supportive to each other. I also believe that the often-cited conflicts of interest between the two roles, if performed by the same institution, may have been overstated somewhat. If there are policy conflicts, these conflicts will have to be resolved regardless of who is in charge of supervision. Then, would it not be more efficient if the conflicts could be internalized and resolved within an institution? In fact, many possible mechanisms exist to help ensure full accountability for each role, thereby minimizing potential conflicts while getting synergies from having the two roles under one roof. The arrangement we use In Thailand, as I alluded to earlier, is the establishment of two separate policy boards that include outside experts.

The linking pin is membership in both policy boards by central bank’s senior management, which makes it possible for information and knowledge in one area to be usefully employed in performing the other, without compromising the mandate of each policy board. For example, detailed supervisory information about banks’ changing risk appetite and exposure to different economic sectors and markets – as well as how these risks are being managed – can provide useful early warnings about the health of the economy and potential systemic problems down the road. This can be a very important input for monetary policy board. On the other hand, central bank’s oversight of monetary policy and economic stability can strengthen and provide context to its supervisory responsibilities, for example, in identifying potential macro factors that may affect the health of financial institutions. Decisions about the stance and timing of prudential and supervisory policies in general can  BIS Review 32/2009  1  also be more appropriately made with the full knowledge of macroeconomic conditions and monetary policy. As can be seen, the two policies are essential to each other and hence it is useful or even desirable, in my opinion, for central banks to supervise at least the core financial sector, whether under a separate or integrated supervision model. This is most evident in times of systemic crisis where central banks’ last-resort lending is likely to be called upon and prompt decision is vital.
21  Moreover, average real household income has risen by almost 15% since the turn of the millennium. This can also produce a rise in demand for more and/or better quality housing, with an associated increase in the demand for mortgage loans. Page 11/16  However, momentum on the mortgage and real estate markets has been considerably stronger in recent years than can be explained by such fundamental developments. The ratio between the volume of outstanding mortgage loans and nominal gross domestic product (GDP) since 2000 has risen from 110% to some 145% (cf. slide 21). Lending has thus grown significantly faster than income in recent years. At the same time, we can observe increasing risk appetite among banks in their lending business. This is because banks’ income from interest rate differential business is suffering due to the low interest rates. By taking higher risks – in particular in mortgage lending – banks are able to counter this decline in income in the short term. Yet, this exacerbates their susceptibility to negative developments on the real estate and mortgage markets or to an unexpected sharp interest rate rise. Given the potentially far-reaching negative effects of a debt crisis as outlined in the second part of this speech, it is clear why the SNB has been carefully monitoring these developments for some time and pointing out the associated risks. Should central banks use interest rates to curb excesses on the credit market? But what should central banks do to counter excesses on the credit market?

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  And I am delighted to announce that on the £ note the great economist and moral philosopher, Adam Smith, will be replaced by Joseph Mallord William Turner. Why Turner? Turner is arguably the single most influential British artist of all time. His work was transformative. His influence spanned his lifetime and endures today. He inspired the French impressionists and, as Ruskin said, was “the father of modern art.” His works include masterpieces such as Dutch Boats in a Gale, The Slave Ship, and Rain, Steam and Speed – The Great Western Railway. He captured the age of sail, of the advent of steam, the very atmospherics of the British Isles, and lines between light, movement and colour. And his influence endures. When Mark Rothko visited an exhibition on Turner at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, he jokingly said: “This man Turner, he learnt a lot from me.” The Margate gallery shows Turner’s continuing legacy, with a number of exhibitions influenced by Turner, including that of the Danish artist Joachim Koester – The Other Side of the Sky – which pairs his works with Turner watercolours. Turner’s story begins with humble origins. Born to a London barber and wig maker, his talent was unquestioned. He went to extremes in pursuit of the visceral artistic experience. Turner exhibited at the Royal Academy at 15, and became an Academician at 24. He was undeniably prolific, producing more than 550 oil paintings, 2,000 watercolours, and 30,000 sketches and drawings.
Conclusion The Scottish government has stated that in the event of independence it would seek to retain sterling as part of a formal currency union. All aspects of any such arrangement would be a matter for the Scottish and UK Parliaments. If such deliberations ever were to happen, they would need to consider carefully what the economics of currency unions suggest are the necessary foundations for a durable union, particularly given the clear risks if these foundations are not in place. Those risks have been demonstrated clearly in the euro area over recent years, with sovereign debt crises, financial fragmentation and large divergences in economic performance. The euro area is now beginning to rectify its institutional shortcomings, but further, very significant steps must be taken to expand the sharing of risks and pooling of fiscal resources. In short, a durable, successful currency union requires some ceding of national sovereignty. It is likely that similar institutional arrangements would be necessary to support a monetary union between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK. I suspect you have reached your limits of endurance of the dismal science, so you’ll be relieved to know that economics can take us no further. Decisions that cede sovereignty and limit autonomy are rightly choices for elected governments and involve considerations beyond mere economics. For those considerations, others are better placed to comment. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  References Adrian, T., and D. Gros (2004), “The degree of openness and the cost of fixing exchange rate”, Economics Letters, Vol.

Of course, the Board has to be duly informed, and some of their members should have the necessary expertise to assess these risks. Needless to say, it is not only banks that need to “catch up”; we are also working at the Banco de España to adapt to this reality. I believe it is fair to acknowledge that this is all very new for everyone in the banking sector, including certainly Central Banks and Supervisors. What are we doing? Firstly, we have created an internal function entrusted with assessing the impact we as an institution have on the environment. The aim is to identify and coordinate the necessary measures to reduce that impact. Secondly, as a macroprudential supervisor, we clearly need to be able to assess and quantify the risks that the transition towards a more sustainable economy poses, both for individual banks and the financial sector as a whole. We must be able to perform stress tests for the financial system overall and define scenarios to be applied by banks individually. 4/5  Accordingly, we are designing internal governance structures and methodologies, actively participating in the cultural shift in the SSM supervisory model. Naturally, we are also evaluating the information and data requirements needed to address this challenge. Thirdly, as investors in the debt markets, we are working to include environmental risk assessment in our credit analysis. A fourth key element is our responsibility as supervisors. We must foster the implementation of these changes in the financial sector. We cannot wait for change to occur.
James McAndrews: Negative nominal central bank policy rates – where is the lower bound? Remarks by Mr James McAndrews, Executive Vice President and Director of Research of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 8 May 2015. *  *  *  The views expressed in this speech are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or of the Federal Reserve System. The Swiss National Bank (SNB), the European Central Bank (ECB), Danmarks Nationalbank (DNB), and the Swedish Riksbank recently have pushed short-term interest rates to levels below the “zero lower bound.” The current extent and depth of negative policy rates is unprecedented; previously only Denmark had a modestly negative policy rate in 2012 through 2014. The actions of the four central banks have led a number of commentators to ask, Is the concept of a zero lower bound on interest rates valid? If not, what might be the lower bound, if any, on nominal interest rates? Indeed, some economists have suggested that with changes to the monetary system, we could in fact eliminate the lower bound to interest rates altogether. I’ll first review the reasons given by the central banks for setting negative policy rates – in all cases, the negative rates were seen as a means of advancing the banks’ macroeconomic objectives in the current environment.

Such possible profit squeezes could also prompt financial institutions to take on inappropriately risky assets to earn an apparently positive  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  return. These concerns are present to some extent at very low rates, but they are magnified at negative rates of interest, a point made by Ben Bernanke in his 2004 speech on the topic. 9 A special case in the United States concerns the 2a-7 money market mutual funds, which are more prevalent in the United States than in Europe. Money market mutual funds are institutions that offer a floating rate of interest to shareholders that is intended to maintain the value of a share in the fund equal to par, or very close to par, at all times. With negative interest rates, and in the absence of a sponsor that is willing to subsidize shareholders in the fund, such a financial institution would not be able to return a dollar invested today to a shareholder the next day. In such circumstances, the fund must disband, as it has “broken the buck.” Recent SEC reforms specify that prime institutional funds be offered only shares expressed as floating Net Asset Values in 2016, but retail and Treasury-only money funds will retain a fixed NAV share structure, and therefore will still be subject to this complication in an environment of negative nominal rates. 10 6. Signal of deflation  Another complication centers on the signaling effects I mentioned earlier.
The dollar’s fall in the period 2002-04 has not prompted a turnaround in the progressive widening of the US external deficit, either because, as is well known, depreciations tend only to correct currentaccount deficits with a lag, or because of the aforementioned asymmetry in the behaviour of the dollar against the main currencies and the fact that it has scarcely depreciated against the currencies of the countries that are running the counterpart surpluses. In turn, in a situation of large current-account surpluses and strong capital inflows, the Asian countries with de jure or de facto fixed exchange rates against the dollar continued to build up sizable international reserves. The need of the Asian central banks to place these reserves also partly explains another salient feature of economic developments in 2004: the maintenance of long-term interest rates at abnormally low levels. This is also largely attributable to the persistence of low inflation expectations, set against highly credible counter-inflationary monetary policies, and to the conditions of ample liquidity in which international financial markets operated. For much of the year, European bond yields were markedly synchronous with their US counterparts, despite the different position of the fundamentals of the two economies. From November, however, European rates declined, moving progressively away from US rates so that the yield spread between these areas widened considerably. This more recent development is consistent with the uncertainty over economic recovery in the euro area and the brighter outlook for the US economy.

of active scrutiny of the market, of shareholders and of creditors, which implies a continual strengthening of transparency. It is this latter aspect, relating to Pillar III, which is the least well-known, although it is that with the greatest potential in the medium term for disseminating best practices in risk management. Of course, the completion of Basel II is only the beginning of the implementation process, and not just in credit institutions, but also in their supervisors. In this respect, I believe that our institutions and our supervisory model are in a magnificent position to lead the implementation process insofar as quality is concerned. And this process will yield better managed institutions and more effective supervision. These two key regulatory issues raise other points. First, the development of IAS and Basel II make it necessary to strengthen international co-operation in supervision and regulation. The international expansion of Spanish banking and its presence in a larger number of jurisdictions with differing features raise the need to establish closer bilateral relations with the authorities of other countries, so as better to comply with the respective responsibilities. In addition, the new European legislation on financial conglomerates also addresses in depth the need for greater co-operation. Specifically, the EU has opted for a solution based on co-operation between supervisors as the most appropriate (and essential) approach.
On the contrary, domestic demand has been the most important driving force behind 3 For a more detailed review, see the article “How do low and negative interest rates affect banks’ profitability?”  in the Monetary Policy Report April 2016. The Riksbank's conclusions in this field are shared by Turk (2016). 3 [20]  the improved economic activity in Sweden. In addition, sentiment in the household and corporate sectors is good, according to various confidence indicators (see Figure 5). It is also worth noting in this context that there is a fairly intensive international discussion on whether negative policy rates should be included in the central banks’ normal arsenal going forward, as a weapon that could be used if special needs arise. One advocate of this is Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the Federal Reserve. 4 He argues that negative policy rates have many advantages in relation to raising the inflation target, which is also discussed as a means of creating greater room for manoeuvre in future recessions. It is worth noting that this international discussion exists, as a contrast to the picture often painted in the Swedish debate – that negative policy rates are an isolated and strange invention of the Riksbank and a few other central banks. Negative policy rate wrong policy in current economic situation? The second form of criticism, as I mentioned earlier, is that a negative interest rate is the wrong policy in the current economic situation.

The Riksbank therefore assessed it was necessary to conduct a very expansionary policy to safeguard confidence in the inflation target. Good reasons to preserve confidence in the inflation target There are good reasons for safeguarding this confidence. When economic agents have a collective picture of how prices will develop in the future, it becomes easier to plan for the long term. The inflation target contributes to coordinating expectations in the economy and thereby lays the foundations for smoothly-functioning price-setting and wage formation. As I see it, the good wage formation system that we have today is perhaps the greatest achievement of inflation targeting. During the 1970s and 1980s, wage formation was a constant source of disruption in the Swedish economy. It caused considerable uncertainty for many companies. One was forced to manage the cost problem and poorer competitiveness through recurring devaluations of the krona. The situation was generally untenable and eventually led to an extensive economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. An important insight here is that a credible inflation target can give rise to a beneficial self-reinforcing cycle. If expectations are in line with the inflation target, and if pricesetting and wage formation adapt to these expectations, actual price developments will then also become consistent with the inflation target. On the other hand, if expectations were to become stuck at a level that is too low, one instead has a negative self-reinforcing effect, which means that the central bank has to struggle much harder to attain the inflation target.