samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There is little to suggest that the US federal budget deficit will narrow to a sufficient extent. That is worrying, especially given that the country in the long term will see sharply increasing costs for medical care, health care and pensions. As a result there is a clear risk of rising market rates in the US that could trigger a fall in house prices, which in turn could dampen private consumption. A reduction in public expenditures would also have a tightening effect but in the long term would lead to a more balanced development and thereby prevent an overly quick rise in rates. Another risk factor is the oil price. As the US is more oil-dependent than the euro area countries, its economy is more sensitive to changes in oil prices. Should the oil price remain at a high, fluctuating level it may curtail growth in the US. All in all, this picture of large global imbalances implies a clear risk that growth will be more subdued over the coming two-year period. The question is how fast this slowdown may come about. If controlled, the moderation would be softer, while rapid changes could entail a considerable weakening of the world economy and thereby also check Sweden’s economic performance in the period ahead. In addition to the competition problems that an ever stronger euro means for Europe there is the issue of how we are to meet the competition from low-wage countries, both the new member states of the EU and the emerging economies in Asia.

But since the high energy prices were expected to gradually fall back entirely we saw them as temporary and decided to leave the repo rate unchanged. When the current regime of inflation targeting was established in the early 1990s it had been preceded by a long period of high, fluctuating inflation in both Sweden and other countries. Many countries around the world experienced a similar shift in regime around this time. Partly as a result of this, international inflation fell sharply during the 1990s, from about 30 per cent to below 4 per cent a year on average.4 The inflation targeting regime and its practical application has been underpinned by the conviction that high, variable inflation is bad for the economy. Now we are living in a world with very weak price increases, particularly for manufactured goods. Is there anything in the current circumstances that could motivate a change in the Riksbank’s thinking? The integration of China's and India's large, fastgrowing economies into the world economy will most likely affect world growth and inflation for a long  inflation targeting – theory and practice", Sveriges Riksbank Quarterly Review 4, 13-42, for a similar discussion that is linked to the monetary policy framework in Sweden. 3  Read more about this in, for example, Palmqvist S. & Strömberg L. (2004), "Households’ inflation opinions – a tale of two surveys" in Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 4, 24-43. 4  See Rogoff, K. (2003), "Disinflation: An Unsung Benefit of Globalization?" BIS Review 10/2005  5  time.
Available estimates show that at the outset of the crisis Spain had a high structural deficit of around 3% of GDP.8 The expected increase in public debt resulting from the current crisis will also trigger a rise in the interest burden. The pandemic will also likely lead to greater structural demand for basic welfare expenditure, such as on healthcare. Moreover, spending on pensions will increase over the coming years as a result of the combined effect of population ageing and the suspension of the application of the revaluation index and the sustainability factor. Certain measures permanently raising the level of expenditure have also been announced, such as the introduction of a minimum living income, which has yet to be defined. 7  See Banco de España (2019), “Economic consequences of demographic change”, Annual Report 2018, Chapter 4. Various estimates are available of the size of the structural budget deficit as a result of applying different calculation methodologies. It is estimated at 3.1% of 2019 GDP by the Banco de España, at 2.5% by the IMF and at 4.2% by the European Commission. 8  34  As I mentioned, future improvements in welfare stemming from reducing public debt will have to come not only from decreasing the structural deficit, but also from achieving greater economic growth. That makes it advisable to maintain the resources earmarked for such items as education and research.

According to projections by the National Statistics Institute, in the next 50 years the over-65 population, which currently accounts for less than one-fifth of the total population, will grow to represent more than one-third. This phenomenon will exert – and is already doing so – an adverse effect on the economy’s participation rate, employment and productivity, and most singularly on public finances, raising spending on pensions, health and long-term care. The scale of this challenge means a broader and longer-term strategy must be defined where, along with revising the arrangements for our welfare state and its financing, in order to ensure its sustainability, it will also be particularly important to have policies encouraging worker participation in the labour market, to align migratory policy with labour market needs and to pursue policies promoting the birth rate so as to draw it closer to the rates in other European countries. The Spanish economy also evidences very poor figures in terms of productivity. Reversing this dynamic will require measures in various areas including, among other aspects, improvements in education, the quality of institutions, competition in product and service markets and investment in research, innovation and development, along with a reduction in temporary employment in the labour market. I would like to conclude by stressing the importance of making Europe’s challenges our own. In short, on the economic front, this currently involves two goals: completing the Banking Union and shoring up the fiscal stabilisation capacity of the euro area countries.
Trade volume between Turkey and Egypt has also steadily increased from USD 500 million in 2003 to USD 3.2 billion in 2009. It is expected that these figures will reach up to USD 5 billion in the next three-years. One reason for this rapid increase is that both countries have completed the legal ground which secures free trade between countries. The Free Trade Agreement, which has recently been put into effect, does not only provide opportunities for higher trade volumes but also functions as a framework that brings together investors from both countries. Turkey has long provided a significant conduit for the flow of humanitarian and economic assistance to Iraq. Today, the volume of bilateral trade is also rapidly rising. The bilateral trade volume has been increased significantly since 2006 and reached to 6 billions USD in 2009. The high-level official visits between Turkey and Iraq have been providing impetus to the diversification and advancement of our economic cooperation. Moreover, Turkish companies play a leading role in the reconstruction of Iraq. Our trade with Jordan and Lebanon exceeded USD 1 billion in 2009. With the conclusion of the ongoing negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement between Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, trade relations among our countries are expected to gain volume. Dear guests,  Increasing commercial relations naturally led to an increase in international banking services among our economies. Having a sound financial position, Turkish banks can contribute both to building commercial and financial links within the region.

The question of which should be the role of central banks in  3/4  financial crisis prevention or mitigation is still far away from reaching any definite answer. Several papers in this conference will deal with this important issue. Third, we need to have a better understanding of how monetary policy and other macroeconomic policies are transmitted. By now, it is clear that the standard new Keynesian framework, which still shapes our general view of the basic elements of monetary policy, has some relevant shortcomings. For example, recent research has underlined how additional channels related to household and firm heterogeneity may provide a more realistic depiction of how monetary and fiscal policies affects the economy, modifying –or even overturning- some of the prescriptions derived from models with representative agents. This is a line of research linking both empirical and theoretical work that may have consequences for our work as central bankers. Your discussions over the next couple of days will help to improve our understanding of some of these complex issues, ranging from the emergence and consequences of bubbles in asset markets, to the role of individual heterogeneity in the transmission of macro policies and in the aggregate incidence of financial frictions. Conclusion To conclude, I would like to say that both policymakers and academics face new challenges in our understanding of how central banks should act in order to fulfill our mandates and maximize the welfare of the citizens we work for.
Against this background, securitisation can potentially play a vital role, and thereby strongly support the financing of the economy, in two main respects:   First, in order to mitigate the potential funding challenges that I have just mentioned, securitisation may contribute to the broadening of the funding base – both intertemporally and geographically –, by transforming illiquid assets into negotiable longterm securities (even if these may not necessarily be very liquid). It may thus help to unblock credit supply constraints in an environment of continued de-leveraging by  BIS Review 84/2010  1  taking regionally or sectorally concentrated credit risk off bank balance sheet and distributing it to a wider investor base.   Second, a proper use of financial engineering techniques, such as securitisation, may provide a better match between the preferences of borrowers and investors in terms of cash flow structure, type of interest rate, degree of risk and currency denomination. This is particularly relevant when the securitisation pool is composed of loans to borrowers who cannot have access to the capital markets on their own, i.e. households and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs). In other words, securitisation may function as a bridge between these types of borrowers and those investors who cannot easily access these types of exposures otherwise.

This is natural since structured finance is a combination of manifold features such as different asset types, a variety of interest rate products with diverse maturity profiles and structures, and a variety of legal regimes and market arrangements. Thus, restoring the securitisation markets requires a combination of initiatives, both from the private and the public sector. The Eurosystem is contributing, first of all, by accepting structured finance assets as collateral. This proved and still proves a great support to this market segment during the crisis, as it helped and continues to help to avoid a sudden and disruptive unavailability of funding to originators of ABS. Second, as mentioned earlier, by introducing a loan level data requirement to our set of eligibility criteria, we may contribute to increasing the disclosure standards for the market at large. However, more needs to be done, as many of those required steps, for example enhancing secondary market liquidity, go beyond the scope for direct action by the Eurosystem. Looking ahead, a self-sustained revival of the ABS market requires fundamental changes. It is high time to raise to the challenges of transparency, standardisation and product simplicity. This is where the industry has to step up its efforts in order to help decisively in restoring confidence in the securitisation markets. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 84/2010
Economic Policy Group Report 2012, SNS Förlag, draw the conclusion that there is not sufficiently strong argument to supplement the Riksbank’s inflation target with an explicit target for unemployment, or for raising the inflation target. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  , where π is the forecast for inflation, π* is the inflation target and y-y* is the forecast for resource utilisation in the economy. The parameter λ represents the importance the central bank gives to stabilising the real economy in relation to stabilising inflation.14 It is thus a question of finding the interest rate that minimises the squared forecast deviations between actual inflation and the inflation target during the forecast period and the squared forecasts for resource utilisation.15 This theoretical description has been very useful in developing the policy of inflation targeting. It captures in an intuitive and relatively simple way the essence of inflation targeting and it has helped to structure our thinking.16 However, the step from theory to practice is far from as simple and straightforward as one might think. One often gets the impression from the current debate that “clarity” in monetary policy means that the central bank should follow this theoretical description very closely. Accordingly, monetary policy decisions should be justified on the basis of a detailed quantified path for both resource utilisation and the deviation of inflation from the target.

It is not, as one might sometimes get the impression in the current debate, a result of the Riksbank systematically putting on the brakes, thus pushing down demand and holding back price increases. If this had been the case, the low inflation would have gone hand in hand with a much weaker growth in the economy. So is this development in inflation a poor result for monetary policy? It is of course possible to have different opinions on this. But from what I have said so far, it should be clear that I believe there are good explanations as to why inflation has been slightly lower than the target. The repo rate has been cut more than it has been raised during this period, and there have been changes in the economy – which have been difficult to forecast and often beneficial – that have dampened inflation.6 To gain further perspective, it may also be valuable to go back to where I started, twenty years ago, just before the inflation target was introduced. As I observed earlier, the high inflation trend at that time was a fundamental problem in the Swedish economy. During the decades preceding the crisis of the 1990s, average inflation was almost in double figures and varied substantially from year to year.
Heng Swee Keat: Advances in risk management – theory and practice Opening address by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Symposium to mark the opening of RMI’s new facilities, Singapore, 2 October 2009. *  *  *  Prof Tan Chorh Chuan Prof Tan Eng Chye Prof Duan Jin-Chuan Distinguished speakers, guests, ladies and gentlemen Good morning Introduction It gives me great pleasure to join you today at the symposium which marks the opening of Risk Management Institute’s (RMI) new facilities. RMI is Singapore’s first full-fledged research centre dedicated to risk management. RMI was set up three years ago. The timing could not have been more appropriate. Given the spotlight in the current financial crisis on risk management, the shift of economic weight to Asia, and NUS’ standing as a global university in the heart of Asia, RMI has a major opportunity to play a prominent role in research and education on this critical topic. Emerging from the current crisis In recent weeks, confidence has returned to financial markets. More recent forecasts for global economic growth have been revised upwards, including that for Asia. There is palpable relief that the global economy has avoided the abyss. But some players seem to have forgotten that we have just gone through the worst financial crisis since the post-war period. The clean-up of the wreckages will take time.

Let me suggest three broad areas. First, as researchers are removed from the fray of day-to-day action, you can step back and ask fundamental questions about risk management practices, identify gaps, and facilitate innovation in risk management techniques. I am pleased to learn about your credit rating project, which aims to provide rigour and transparency to the financial assessment of regional corporates. The value of such work is that it is grounded on sound empirical and theoretical work, with a clear focus on solving practical, impactful problems. In the same vein, RMI’s regular workshops and lecture series serve as useful platforms to present findings to the industry, and to encourage two-way discussions. MAS fully supports RMI’s initiatives to deepen its collaboration with the industry. Second, as a repository of knowledge on risk management, RMI plays an important role in education. RMI has been appointed as the lead provider on risk management under the  BIS Review 121/2009  3  Financial Industry Competency Standards (FICS). You have launched 50 accredited programmes across seven Risk Management job families over the past year. To support the role of Boards and senior management in risk management, I hope that RMI would consider appropriate executive programmes for Board members and senior management of financial institutions. I believe RMI can make an impact in enhancing the knowledge and capability of practitioners. Finally, I hope RMI can provide a focal point to bring in global thought leaders and practitioners on risk management, through your flagship RMI Annual Conference.
•  Authorities have already taken significant steps to design a regulatory framework that could stimulate innovation while preserving financial stability. The European MiCA regulation is a necessary first response to regulate the use of crypto-assets and it needs to be implemented as soon as possible. However, let me stress the MiCA regulation is not an end in itself but rather the start of a process. Our regulatory framework will need to be adjusted on a regular basis to keep up with the development of DeFi. •  In addition, these responses from public authorities need to be coordinated at the international level, to avoid arbitrage across jurisdictions. International bodies have a central role to play in coordinating responses, notably the BIS and the FSB, but also the IMF and the OECD. Page 2/3  My third takeaway is that central banks could accompany usefully the tokenization of finance, by leveraging new technologies to provide central bank digital currencies, thereby improving the efficiency of securities settlement and payment systems. •  The discussion showed that this possible positive impact is not confined to retail payments. o A wholesale CBDC directly integrated on DLT could be used to settle tokenised assets, bringing the security of central bank money. In addition, a wholesale CBDC has the potential to improve cross-border payments. o But we need to properly measure the economic impacts and the associated risks. That is why we are working on it step by step, including through experimentation with private actors.

Lars E O Svensson: Flexible inflation targeting – lessons from the financial crisis Speech by Mr Lars E O Svensson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the workshop “Towards a new framework for monetary policy? Lessons from the crisis”, organized by the Netherlands Bank, Amsterdam, 21 September 2009. I am grateful to Claes Berg, Ylva Hedén, Jonas Niemeyer, Virginia Queijo von Heideken, Annika Svensson, Ulf Söderström, Staffan Viotti, Anders Vredin, Karl Walentin and, especially, Björn Lagerwall, for comments and help with the speech. The views presented here are my own and not necessarily those of other members of the Riksbank’s executive board or staff. * 1. *  *  Introduction  The financial crisis has raised some questions regarding monetary policy and how it should be conducted in relation to financial conditions such as credit growth, asset prices, imbalances, the risk of creating bubbles and so on. I will discuss two particular questions: Has monetary policy contributed to the conditions for the crisis? Do the lessons from the crisis justify any changes in the way best-practice monetary policy should be conducted? I will lay out my pre-crisis view of best-practice monetary policy – flexible inflation targeting – and its relation to financial stability and asset prices, discuss the role of monetary policy in possibly contributing to the current financial crisis and, finally, present my conclusions on whether flexible inflation targeting needs to be modified in the light of the crisis. 2.
If we assume that financial crises would otherwise occur once in every 25 years (an annual frequency of 4%) then a rise in banks capital by 10 of riskweighted assets would be justified if it reduced the probability of financial crises so that they occurred with an annual probability of 3.2%, or once every 31 years. Alternatively, taking the most favourable assumptions on cost (full tax offsets, partial Modigliani Miller offsets, a lower use of bank debt and lower sensitivity of investment spending) the blue line indicates a 10% rise in capital relative to assets would be justified if it reduced the probability of financial crises from 4% a year to 3.9%, or from once every 25 years to once every 25.4 years. (The final column in the table shows that calculation for each case). Such a small decline in the likelihood of a financial crisis would not appear to be overly ambitious for such a sharp rise in the capital ratio. For typical banks the capital ratio starts out from a level under 10%, so that a rise in capital of 10% of risk assets is more than a doubling in the amount of bank capital.

But I do not think that is where we are today. So since I joined the MPC just over a year ago I have not voted to increase interest rates – despite the fact that inflation has more often than not been above the target. But even though price rises over the past year have been running at relatively high levels, the underlying domestic inflationary pressures are not strong. Wage rises – despite a move up in household inflation expectations – remain low. Without a pick up in wage inflation I find it hard to think it at all likely that inflation being significantly above target is sustainable. Of course wage pressures may build significantly over the next year or so, though I do not believe this is the most likely outcome. And risks of an extended period of low growth – which would further weaken those pressures – are real. In talking about the possibility of an extended period of low, or no, growth I may sound blasé about inflation risks. But the point about risks is that more than one can exist. There are risks that inflation stays well above the target level; there are also risks that demand in the economy falls even more below supply capacity so that inflation further ahead drifts below the target. In considering how to balance these risks there is a need to look through short run and potentially transitory factors.