samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At least in the Brazilian case, there is very little empirical evidence of that. Under managed exchange rates Brazil suffered recurrent balance of payments difficulties in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1980s debt crisis, which contributed to a dramatic deterioration in macroeconomic performance in the following years, and the slowdown and crisis of the 1990s, before its final collapse in January 1999. Letting the market set the exchange rate does not mean remaining inactive when markets become dysfunctional. Thus, the Central Bank has used its reserves, during the current period of global financial turmoil, to ensure that Brazilian exporters and importers retain access to trade finance, to help Brazilian corporates rollover their debts and to provide liquidity to the spot market. Throughout this difficult period our focus has been on contributing to improve the way markets function, not to replace them. This approach is, and will remain, the cornerstone of our action in the foreign exchange market. There is no doubt that the world is currently experiencing an extremely difficult time. But it is also true that Brazil is among the countries that are better prepared to cope with the effects of the global financial crisis – a fact pointed out by several organizations in many occasions, such as the last issue of the OECD composite leading indicators, a survey encompassing 35 countries. 1 Brazilian fundamentals not only enable us to face the current environment in better conditions than most countries, but also in a much better shape than in the past.

Indeed, by urging governments to aim at a fiscal position “close to balance or in surplus” in the medium term, the pact enables them to let fiscal deficits increase during recessions without exceeding the 3% reference value. In short, it allows them to create a fiscal buffer during normal economic periods that can be drawn on to counter economic divergences or asymmetric shocks. To summarise that overall issue, the “Optimal Currency Area” theory has frequently been called upon by economists who criticized EMU and expressed concerns about giving up the exchange-rate policy instrument as a response to asymmetric shocks - in particular to asymmetric shocks within a monetary union. I would like to point out, first, that one of the most remarkable effect of the European integration has been the increasing symmetry of shocks. Second, Professor Mundell himself, in support of EMU, made an interesting clarification at the beginning of 1998: in the event of a shift in demand from one member country to another, creating unemployment in the first and inflationary pressure in the second, flexible exchange rates would not be able to solve the problem. I quote: “If the argument for devaluation were valid, it could be applied to every state or sub-region in any country, with a proliferation of new currencies, so they could be devalued!”.
Real gold prices have more than doubled since 2008, edging towards their previous high-water mark after the oil price shocks of the late 1970s (Chart 6). Safe-haven flows to the Swiss franc have boosted its value by over 30% against both the euro and the dollar since September 2008. The reach-for-return, familiar at times in the past, has flipped into a scramble-for-safety. Risky assets tell a similar tale. The compensation investors demand for risk – the so-called risk premium – in advanced economy equities and investment grade corporate bonds is above or in line with its long-term average value. Bank lending spreads, which embody a compensation for risk, are materially higher for all classes of borrower. And measures of equity market uncertainty, such as the VIX, are at levels not seen since early 2009 (Chart 7). Not for nothing has the VIX become known as the “fear index”. Some risky assets have fared better. Since their trough in late 2008, global high yield debt prices have risen by two-thirds, emerging markets equities have roughly doubled, while commodity prices have risen by even more. But even these assets have recently fallen from their peaks. Investors have concluded this is not a time for bravery. For much of this century, risk was cheap. Today it is expensive. Market participants’ willingness to put risk capital to work can be seen in measures of financial market liquidity. Those have also yo-yoed (Chart 8).

Clearly, it was not by chance that some countries found themselves in a more difficult situation than others. It was mainly those countries that had implemented inappropriate economic policies in the past. This is also why the first responsibility in this situation is for countries to make determined reforms and convince markets that they are credible. But many were already doing this, only for interest rates to rise even higher. There was an element of fear in markets’ assessments that governments, acting alone, could not remove. Markets were not prepared to wait for the positive effects of reforms to emerge. In our view, to restore the proper transmission of monetary policy, those unfounded fears about the future of the euro area had to be removed. And the only way to do so was to establish a fully credible backstop against disaster scenarios. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We designed the OMTs exactly to fulfil this role and restore monetary policy transmission in two key ways. First, it provides for ex ante unlimited interventions in government bond markets, focusing on bonds with a remaining maturity of up to three years. A lot of comments have been made about this commitment. But we have to understand how markets work. Interventions are designed to send a clear signal to investors that their fears about the euro area are baseless. Second, as a pre-requisite for OMTs, countries must have negotiated with the other euro area governments a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) programme with strict and effective conditionality.
To put it simply, we usually put the brakes on when economic activity is rising and we accelerate when it is falling. Inflation targeting should thereby often be able to contribute to smoothing the business cycle. It is also possible that it can reduce fluctuations in unemployment. However, it is not reasonable to believe that the fluctuations in economic activity can be eliminated entirely. It is therefore seriously misleading to make the Riksbank responsible for the difference between actual unemployment and what could potentially have been attained if it had been possible to abolish fluctuations in economic activity. What we can hope for is a slightly more stable development, which we appear to have attained over the past ten years, although it is too early to draw any completely certain conclusions. The policy is flexible Another question which arises in the discussion now and then is how mechanical or how flexible the policy should be and how it should then be assessed. The Riksbank currently conducts what is known as flexible inflation targeting. We are definitely not what my British colleague Mervyn King would call “inflation nutters”. The focus lies not merely on stabilising inflation under any circumstances; as long as there is fundamental confidence in the policy, that we will have low inflation in line with our target, we also take into account other factors. In January 1999 we published a clarification of our policy.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  inflows into U.S. Treasuries in order to keep the renminbi from appreciating too rapidly. The U.S. terms of trade improved as the cost of imported goods dropped, and U.S. interest rates stayed relatively low as China recycled its trade surpluses back into U.S. financial assets. For China, the benefits included strong economic growth, technology transfer and the creation of many manufacturing jobs. These developments, in turn, helped foster rising living standards and political stability in China. These outcomes were by no means all the result of a deliberate grand strategy. But I think this is a reasonable, albeit overly simplistic, description of what happened. Although the pre-crisis arrangements worked reasonably well for a while, the flaws became increasingly evident over time. Looked at from the lens of the developed world, the combination of rapid gains in production capacity and relatively repressed consumption in the EME world helped foster a global deficiency of demand relative to supply. In these circumstances, the United States and many other industrialized economies had to sustain domestic demand at elevated levels in order to achieve “full employment” and prevent deflation. For the United States, the consequence was elevated consumption facilitated by asset price inflation, easy underwriting standards for credit and structural budget deficits. Of course, this particular outcome was not preordained or caused by the EMEs. There were multiple combinations of domestic demand consistent with full employment in the United States during the pre-crisis period.
This is thus an example of a situation where raising the policy rate will if anything increase the risks to financial stability. 10 Using policy rate to influence housing prices is costly There are also many references to developments in housing prices in the monetary policy debate. Monetary policy would appear to have very little effect on housing prices. If one nevertheless uses the policy rate to influence housing prices (and thereby mortgage growth) this will lead to large costs to the real economy. A study by Claussen, Jonsson and Lagerwall (2011), which is included in the Riksbank’s inquiry into the risks in the Swedish housing market shows, for instance, that it would have been very costly in terms of both production and inflation to try to prevent the upswing in housing prices from 2004 onwards using monetary policy. Keeping housing prices at a long-run trend level in 2004–2010 would have required repo-rate increases over several years of up to 5 percentage points in both 2006 and 2007. GDP growth would then have been on average almost 2 percentage points lower up to 2010, which corresponds to an accumulated GDP loss of around 12 per cent. CPIF inflation would have been on average 3 percentage points lower during the same period. The study confirms for Sweden what several other international studies have concluded, such as Assenmascher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010).

…  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I therefore consider it important that monetary policy is conducted in a clear and comprehensible manner so that it can be evaluated easily and fairly. At present, the Riksbank makes a qualitative assessment of resource utilisation based on a number of different measures. This contributes to making the justification for the monetary policy decisions unclear and it also makes it more difficult to assess the Riksbank and hold it accountable. I thus instead want to focus on stabilising unemployment around a long-run sustainable rate and not on trying to stabilise a number of other, quite shaky measures of resource utilisation in the economy, such as the output gap. Compared with other measures of resource utilisation, unemployment has a stronger link to household welfare, is better understood and more familiar to the public, is measured often and with fewer errors and is seldom revised. The fact that other measures of resource utilisation are not appropriate as targets for monetary policy of course does not prevent them from playing an important role as indicators when assessing inflationary pressures and constructing inflation forecasts. Nor do I see that there is any support for a qualitative assessment of resource utilisation instead of a quantitative, measurable target fulfilment. In economic policy it is now wellknown that targets must be measured quantitatively to obtain sufficient weight and to be fulfilled in practice. “What is measured gets done,” as they say.
Gent Sejko: Albania's economic and financial developments in 2022 Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, presenting the Annual Report 2022 to the Parliamentary Committee on Economy and Finance, Tirana, 31 May 2023. *** Honourable Chair, Honourable Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be back before the EF Committee to present the Annual Report of the Bank of Albania for 2022. I consider the presentation of this Report, as well as the today's hearing, fundamental for the Bank of Albania's accountability relationship with the Parliament. Dear ladies and gentlemen, Meeting our mission and legal duties, realising the commitments in view of the mediumterm development strategy, and complying with the recommendations left by the Parliament of Albania for 2022, have been important objectives guiding the activity of the Bank of Albania throughout 2022. The Albanian economy has faced a wave of complex and unprecedented shocks in recent years. These shocks have tested the sustainability of the economic and financial balances of Albania, triggering serious challenges to Albanian businesses and households, in turn requiring fast and coordinated reaction from public authorities. Though it is still early to provide a final analysis of consequences from the war in Ukraine, I am pleased to see that the Albanian economy has displayed a high resilience against these shocks. This resilience has been shown, first, in the maintenance of a positive economic growth rate, and second, but no less important, in the preservation of overall economic and financial stability in the country.

Overall, Switzerland – a small open economy with a highly developed financial sector – is in a position to derive particularly significant benefits from the globalisation of financial markets. It is important to take advantage of these opportunities. Protectionism when foreigners acquire companies and excessive regulation of foreign investment should be avoided. Rather, the sale of Swiss companies below their real value can be avoided through innovation, flexibility and good management, and excessive risks of foreign investments can be limited through more personal responsibility on the part of investors. BIS Review 131/2007  1
The four firms met at the Federal Reserve at 7:00 p.m. A draft term sheet was reviewed which provided detail with respect to the consortium approach. The terms and conditions were debated, altered in some places, and ultimately refined so that the four firms could present it to a wider group. Although Federal Reserve officials were present at the meeting, we did not participate in the discussion about terms and conditions. At about 8:30 p.m., a meeting of a wider group involving 13 firms began. Meanwhile, some representatives of the Core Group called Long-Term Capital to discuss the terms and conditions of the consortium approach. Federal Reserve officials did not participate in any conversations with Long-Term Capital regarding the terms and conditions. In the meeting with the wider group, Peter Fisher explained the importance of avoiding a disorderly close-out of Long-Term Capital’s positions. He also underscored the desirability of parallel efforts to resolve the problem. It was agreed that the group would reconvene at 10:00 a.m. the following morning. It was clear to everyone that time was of the essence. I returned to New York from London around midnight. During the early morning hours, I called various foreign central bank officials to inform them of the situation. At about 9:30 a.m. my colleagues and I met with the Core Group to review the status of the situation.

Moreover, an enabling environment for the effective use of local currencies will bring about greater cost efficiency and stability for businesses and increase demand for local currency financial products. That will, in turn, be the impetus to strengthen regional financial markets’ development. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  I am pleased that the event today is made possible by all three central banks, mutually agreeing to grant regulatory flexibilities to the appointed banks under these Frameworks, enabling them to provide a wider range of financial services under their respective jurisdictions. Taking this opportunity, I wish to introduce the appointed banks in Malaysia for these Frameworks, namely, Maybank Berhad, CIMB Berhad, RHB Berhad, Public Bank Berhad, Hong Leong Bank Berhad, Bangkok Bank Berhad, United Overseas Bank (UOB) Berhad and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (BTMU) Berhad. The implementation of these Frameworks will complement our existing close partnership and cooperation as neighbors, with common objectives and shared aspirations. On this note, I look forward to witness the growth in the use Indonesian rupiah, Thai baht and Malaysian ringgit for cross-border settlement of trade between Indonesia and Malaysia, and Thailand and Malaysia, respectively. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Let me begin by discussing different types of measure more generally, and then I will say a few words on the quantitative effects of household indebtedness. Put simply, we can say that there are two different ways to manage the problems on the housing market: either attempt to increase the housing supply in order to dampen housing prices, or dampen demand for housing and mortgages by making it more expensive to borrow, or simply limit how much households can borrow. In terms of measures which subdue demand, it is important to differentiate between measures which affect all loans, or the whole stock of credit, and measures which only affect new loans, or the flow of credit. But let us begin with measures which affect the supply of housing. An increased supply of housing could dampen price increases – but it would take time! Structural problems on the Swedish housing market are the main reason why housing construction has been unable to meet rising demand. An increased supply of housing is a central piece of the puzzle, as it can subdue the increase in housing prices, which would also help to limit household indebtedness. However, the quantity of housing is not the only significant factor in terms of household indebtedness. It is also necessary to review how we can exploit the current housing stock more effectively. The distribution between purchased and rented housing is significant.

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The black line shows that the average 5th percentile GDP draw in the UK historically is 0% growth. Estimates of GDP-at-risk for any time period t utilise the full series of data available (and not just the data that would have been available had it been estimated at t). 11 See Aikman, D, Bridges, J, Burgess, S, Galletly, R, Levina, I, O’Neill, C, and Varadi, A, (2018) ‘Measuring risks to UK  financial stability’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 738; and Bridges, J, Jackson, C, and McGregor, D, (2017) ‘Down in the slumps: the role of credit in five decades of recessions’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 659. 12 See Aikman, D, Bridges, J, Hacioglu Hoke, S, O’Neill, C, Raja, A, (2019) ‘Credit, capital and crises: a GDP-at-Risk approach’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 824. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  13  Chart 5 estimates the whole forecast distribution of GDP in t+3 years’ time, conditional on the financial risk environment. The red area shows the steady growth in GDP-at-risk from 1997 to the crisis. Chart 5: Risks grew during the Great Moderation but are now standard  [Chart 5 shows the expected distribution of the cumulative change in the level of GDP in t+3 years’ time, given the macro-financial risk environment at time t. Historical distributions are estimated using the full sample of data.]

Even though many countries including Thailand have been affected by financial crises and regulatory reforms, we are currently in the stage of revival with high potential growth among ASEAN countries. According to the IDC Financial Insights’ observation on key structural shifts, trends of financial institution sector are: expansion of banking industry, particularly, in South Asia and Southeast Asia due to an escalation of financial inclusion and new-entry of financial players; technology refresh to serve with more sophisticated financial products and services; and regional integration (AEC) and the growth of Asian insurance business. These are paths to higher competition among banks, in which, IT innovation is a key to distinguish each brand. Undoubtedly, banks and related parties invest more in IT projects to advance their services responding to digital era. To be more specific, we have to admit that we live in the world of digitization with an escalation of Internet users and Y generation. Consequently, this group of people becomes a new targeted customer group for banks. Interests in higher conveniences of services which result from high integral digital environment and multi-task lifestyle of the people prompt banks to respond with “Virtual Banking Concept” – any interaction with a bank happens online instead of face-to-face meet up at a branch. To illustrate, the numbers of Internet and mobile banking users have grown up recently as well as volume and value of transactions via such systems.