samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Germany has opened the debate; the Netherlands have shown the way with the announcement of the creation of an investment fund for the future. Low rates, here and elsewhere, can provide an opportunity to finance investments if – and only if – those investments deliver increased potential growth: the ecological transition, digitalisation, education and research. For that, we need – finally! – to focus our fiscal debate on the quality of our spending and investment, and not just on its quantity. At the European level, we have considerable borrowing capacity: we should use it, as soon as we know how to choose these priorities properly, beyond the success of the Juncker Plan or of InvestEU. **  Page 14 of 14  I shall conclude with a more “philosophical” consideration: interest rates are also the price of time. My generation created the euro and tried to tackle the financial crisis. Yours is inheriting a world that is equivocal, to say the least: the positive explosion of innovation and interdependencies, but also that of climate threats and inequality, and all with a worrying weakening, the world over, in public governance. A low price of time is as much a threat as an opportunity: a threat if we give in, in the short term, to the ease of abundant liquidity and allow financial instability to grow; an opportunity if we use low rates collectively to invest in the future, from the ecological transition to education. You can count on our determination to act on the monetary side.

Thus, even under extreme market conditions, covered bonds would remain attractive, at least in relative terms. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Role in balance sheet of banks While covered bonds provide investors with a broad range of options to the investment opportunity set and contribute to deep and liquid markets, they also impact banks’ balance sheets. When banks use covered bonds as a source of funding, a proportion of the banks’ assets become pledged to covered bond creditors. One issue that arises is what effect this may have on the quality of the balance sheet of banks. At the outset, a banking group’s liquidity and credit risk will rise since covered bonds reduce the volume of encumber-able assets available to the bank. In addition, banks are often both significant issuers and holders of covered bonds. Such interconnection may increase systemic risk. However, market participants may assume that resolution rules and liquidity and capital requirements nonetheless limit the risk. For example, all banks are subject to regulation of their core equity – notably through the Basel III standard of the Basel Committee, implemented in Europe through the CRD4/CRR regulation. This is the primary insurance for tax payers and investors against the potential failure of large banks. Sufficient equity and a resilient banking system will always be the main instruments to ensure stability in the financial system as a whole. This is why senior bonds are also considered a relatively safe asset.
Mr. Held would like to thank his other colleagues at the Federal Reserve who  provided comments and corrections. 2 Michael Held, SOFR and the Transition from LIBOR, February 26, 2019.  https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  5/6  30/09/2020  The LIBOR Countdown Has Not Stopped - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  3 FCA, Impact of the coronavirus on firms' LIBOR transition plans, March 3, 2020; see also Letter from Randal Quarles to G20  Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 4 Libor death notice could be served this year--FCA, Risk.net, June 22, 2020. 5 FSB Statement on the Impact of Covid-19 on Global Benchmark Reform, July 1, 2020. 6 ARRC Recommended Best Practices for Completing the Transition from LIBOR. 7 For example, see Internal Systems & Processes: Transition Aid for SOFR Adoption and the Practical Implementation Checklist for  SOFR Adoption. 8 Proposed Legislative Solution to Minimize Legal Uncertainty and Adverse Economic Impact Associated with LIBOR Transition. 9 Statement by Rishi Sunak, Chancellor of the Exchequer, June 23, 2020. 10 Edwin Schooling Latter, LIBOR transition-the critical tasks ahead of us in the second half of 2020, August 3, 2020. 11 Commission's proposal to amend EU rules on financial benchmarks. 12 Fact Sheet: IBOR Fallbacks. 13 ARRC Announces Recommendation of a Spread Adjustment Methodology for Cash Products; ARRC Announces Further Details  Regarding it Recommendation of Spread Adjustments for Cash Products. 14 ARRC Releases Request for Proposals for the Publication of Forward-Looking Term Rates.

It raises the prospect of LIBOR continuing under a new methodology as “synthetic LIBOR,” at least in some currencies. But the FCA itself has warned that whatever it does will not be an alternative to firms’ transition efforts, and that any synthetic continuation of LIBOR will still not be deemed to be a representative rate.10 The FCA has said that any action it takes will be focused on contracts that cannot feasibly be amended by the parties to mitigate the effects of LIBOR cessation. It will not provide a solution for new contracts. And even at that, it will not necessarily address every LIBOR setting or currency. For those it does reach, users will be giving up control of the economics of their contracts to whatever the new methodology may be. In short, if you rely on these new powers to take care of your LIBOR contracts, you may not get what you want, and you may not like what you get. The message is clear: you must still do everything you can, right now, to anticipate the end of LIBOR and take control of your own risks. https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  2/6  30/09/2020  The LIBOR Countdown Has Not Stopped - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  In the European Union, there is draft legislation that is similar in approach to the ARRC’s proposed New York law.
Trade unions helped workers by campaigning to protect their rights, improve their conditions and boost their bargaining power in the workplace. They also provided direct financial support to unemployed workers, through an early form of unemployment insurance, to smooth the income consequences for workers of job loss. The National Insurance Act (1911) and the Beveridge Report (1942) subsequently made this a responsibility of the state and put it on a comprehensive footing. th  This was part of a wider-ranging shift in the role played by the state in society from the 17 century onwards. th  State spending as a proportion of national income rose from around 1% in the 16 century to around 12% in th  th  th 39  the 18 , 14% in the 19 and 33% in the 20 . It financed social infrastructure of various kinds supporting  those facing greatest hardship. This ranged from social housing to healthcare to income support. Its effect was to cap the downside, recessionary risk to individuals, economies and societies. 40  Another form of institutional support came from the creation of state-owned and/or central banks. The Bank th  of England was set up at the end of the 17 century to manage the government’s debt and safeguard the nation’s currency and finances. Over the course of subsequent centuries, this role has expanded.

First, it requires the active involvement of many different stakeholders, in particular Government agencies and very often a variety of NGOs, as well as financial institutions with specialized skills and knowledge. Second, the state of economic and social development of a society is an  BIS Review 88/2010  1  important determinant on the level and quality of financial inclusion. Third, what constitutes acceptable level of inclusion, in terms of access to finance, protection of personal rights and liberties, or assurance of retirement and healthcare benefits varies from one jurisdiction to another. For the reasons that I mentioned, there is no uniform global benchmark that can be used as a successful model for financial inclusion programs. Success stories and experiences are dispersed and often go unrecorded and to further the cause we need to reveals this situation. The financial inclusion agenda requires a systematic and internationally-recognized set of financial inclusion indicators that is meaningful and capable of assisting us in formulating developmental policies. Furthermore, enormous efficiency gains from the availability of such indicators can both reduce the cost of research and implementation as well as increase the effectiveness of the delivery and execution of the policies. Lessons learned in using financial inclusion data in the Malaysian context Let me to briefly share some of the lessons we have learnt in terms of using data to improve the policy formulation process, and develop a more efficient and inclusive financial sector.
This is what we have assumed in our latest Inflation Report forecast, where conditional on a smooth Brexit investment growth resumes in 2020 and 2021 (Chart 9). But we are unlikely to achieve full certainty until the final outcome of negotiations is known, and there is a risk that more persistent uncertainty could push out the pick-up in investment and continue to drag on growth. The weakness of investment also casts further doubt on how durable the resilience of the labour market has been. Usually business investment and employment rise and fall together – in aggregate, businesses either increase hiring and investment at the same time, or they cut them both. For businesses to be increasing employment at the same time that they are reducing investment suggests something unusual is going on. One explanation would be if they are substituting labour for capital, perhaps on the grounds that hiring would be easier to reverse in the event of a shock than capital expenditure. Another would be if demand is shifting away from capital-intensive, export-oriented businesses and into labour-intensive, domestically-focused ones. Either way, this shift away from capital and towards labour matters for the economy. Bank staff calculations suggest it has left the economy around 1½% less capital-intensive than we were forecasting ahead of the Brexit referendum. By itself that reduction in capital intensivity accounts for a ½% reduction in labour productivity, even before allowing for the additional impacts of foregone innovation and process improvement.

It has picked up a little in the recent data as US-China trade tensions intensified, but has also fallen back to below historical averages. This apparent disconnect does not necessarily mean that markets are complacent – the policy uncertainty index might be more sensitive to short-term political developments, while market indices could also be factoring in a belief that monetary policy might be able to offset the impact of shocks. But if market participants are underestimating the extent of political risks materialising, that suggests the potential for sharp price corrections if those shocks do come about. The second risk I want to highlight today, and unarguably biggest risk to the UK economy and UK financial stability, remains that of a Brexit outcome of no deal and no transition. That would have large negative economic effects, both in the Bank’s view and in the views of the businesses we talk to up and down the country (Chart 11). This has been a key focus for the FPC in particular since the Brexit referendum, and we have taken many actions to prepare for and respond to it.
As the policy rate impacts the cost situation in the economy in general, it is difficult to circumvent it in the same manner as regulations can be avoided. On the other hand, regulations can be applied in a more differentiated manner, which can mean that they will be a less costly way to lean against the wind. Another advantage is that regulations increase resilience by building buffers, for example in the form of capital. Consequently, neither the policy rate nor regulations are preferable in all situations. The conclusion I have reached is that a combination of policy rate and regulations may be the most practical path. Concluding remarks The financial crisis has exposed problems and shortcomings, much as crises often do. As I see matters, this is not a decisive blow for the prevailing order, as far as monetary policy goes. I still believe that the best model is an inflation targeting policy conducted in an open and clear manner, and in which the work of clarification and development continue apace. However, it is obvious that we need to learn more about how financial imbalances should be handled, and that the crisis will have consequences for central banks’ methods of working. I have attempted to present a picture of a few of the challenges I see ahead. By necessity, this picture is quite sketchy and has been painted with broad brushstrokes. The final practical consequences of the intensive discussion currently being held cannot be predicted with any certainty at present.

3 See President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Report on Stablecoins (November 2021), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Crypto-assets, and amending Directive (September 2020), UK regulatory approach to cryptoassets and stablecoins: Consultation and call for evidence (January 2021) and Progress of Research & Development of E-CNY in China (July 2021). 4 Based on preliminary review of results from the May 2022 Senior Financial Officer Survey. A summary of aggregated results will be released by the Board of Governors in July 2022. 5 See Bank for International Settlements, Developments in retail fast payments and implications for RTGS systems (December 2021) 6 A recent BIS report found that 90 percent of central banks surveyed are engaged in some form of work on CBDC. See Bank for International Settlements, Gaining momentum - Results of the 2021 BIS survey on central bank digital currencies (May 2022) 7 Market rates can also affect the composition of liabilities at the central bank. 8 For the purposes of these remarks, tiered remuneration systems are included as a version of a floor framework. 9 Nessén, Marianne, Peter Sellin and Per Åsberg (2018), “The implications of an e-krona for the Riksbank’s operational framework for implementing monetary policy”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, no. 3; Bindseil, Ulrich (2020), “Tiered CBDC and the financial system” ECB Working Paper Series No 2351 / January 2020. 10 Bindseil, Ulrich, The case for and against CBDC – five years later (February 19, 2022).
Hamad Al-Sayari: Financial planning and wealth management in Saudi Arabia Speech by His Excellency Hamad Al-Sayari, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, on the occasion of the graduation of the 7th and 8th Batches of the Financial Planning Program and the 2nd and 3rd Batches of the Wealth Management Program, Riyadh, 17 January 2007. *  *  *  Dear Audience, I am really glad on this blessed day to be with you in this happy occasion to celebrate the graduation of the 7th and 8th Batches of the Personal Financial Planning Program, and the 2nd and 3rd batches of the Wealth Management Program. In pursuance of its key role in developing the banking and financial sector, SAMA has been very keen to develop human resources in all financial and banking specializations. To this end, SAMA has made many initiatives. It has instructed the IOB to conduct a comprehensive study on the investment sector to determine the professional and educational criteria that must be satisfied by personnel involved in the various areas of investment. The findings of the study have showed that all staff working in investment and financial intermediation should have certain basic knowledge and skills in these fields. To meet these needs, the IOB designed scientific subjects and standardized tests on the basics of investment and stock trading. Moreover, the findings have indicated that banks’ customers are in need of persons specialized in offering financial advisory services.

These credit exposures with some sign of impairment may, in turn, be more vulnerable to the materialisation of the risks stemming from the current context. Accordingly, they should be monitored with particular care, and any potential losses must be recognised early and appropriately. The Spanish banking industry’s profitability improved substantially in 2021. Specifically, return on assets (ROA) stood at 0.7% (compared with -0.2% in 2020 and 0.5% in 2019). Extraordinary items,7 which were negative in 2020 and positive in 2021, had the largest impact on profitability. Excluding extraordinaries, ROA stood at 0.57%, a similar level to 7  In 2021 extraordinary gains were recognised as a result of two mergers € billion in total), the spin-off of an insurance company € billion) and restructuring costs at the two main banks € billion). In 2020, extraordinary items included negative adjustments to the goodwill of the two banks with the largest international presence € billion), an adjustment for deferred tax assets € billion), restructuring costs at one bank € billion) and capital gains on the sale of business lines € billion). 9  2019 (0.63%). The main driver of this improvement was the reduction in impairment losses, which fell by 43.5% compared with 2020 to stand at levels slightly below those in the two years prior to the pandemic. The recovery in profit was widespread across the main countries where Spanish banks pursue significant international business, and also extended to other European banks. Profitability continued to recover in early 2022.
Parentage would also be important – it would be highly desirable from our point of view that an internet bank was itself majority-owned by another well-established bank that could provide guidance and financial support if necessary. In general, we would need to be assured that the virtual bank has “substance”, and is not simply a “concept”, taking advantage of the popularity of the internet. On this basis, our authorisation and supervisory regime for virtual banks would be similar to that for conventional banks. However, an offshore internet bank, whether wholly “virtual” or not, might not attempt to take deposits in Hong Kong in the strict legal sense – in other words, the deposit contract might not necessarily be created in Hong Kong. Instead, the offshore internet bank might invite potential customers to send their money to a location abroad, where the deposit would be legally created. In this case, the bank would be taking deposits outside Hong Kong and would not require authorisation under the Banking Ordinance to carry on a deposit-taking business here. But that is not the end of the story. It is also an offence to advertise for deposits in Hong Kong, even if they are to be taken outside the territory, unless the disclosure requirements of the Fifth Schedule of the Banking Ordinance are adhered to. An advertisement would include one contained on a website. The problem is how to determine whether a particular offshore website is targeted at Hong Kong.

Here, we would have to look at the circumstances of each case – whether, for example, the offshore internet bank advertised its services in the local Hong Kong press or accepted Hong Kong dollar deposits or refused to take deposits from a number of specified jurisdictions, but did not include Hong Kong among these. If we come across such cases of illegal advertisements targeted at Hong Kong, how would we deal with them? The easiest case would be where the bank itself is respectable and is based in an overseas location which is properly supervised. We could then write to the bank itself and to its supervisors to notify them of the advertising rules in Hong Kong, and request the bank either to comply with these rules or to add Hong Kong to the list of the jurisdictions from which it was not prepared to take deposits. If necessary, we would seek the cooperation of the home supervisor to enforce this request. It might also be necessary to supplement this with a reminder to local Internet Service Providers about the advertising rules in the Banking Ordinance and to seek their cooperation to block offending websites. The problem with this, however, is that the website in question may not actually be posted on the local ISP’s server – in which case, there may be little that the ISP can do. If the bank concerned is not respectable and it is based in an uncooperative jurisdiction, the situation would be more difficult to handle.
Also, compared to purely national banks, many cross-border banking groups have a more complex structure. This makes the analysis and information gathering more difficult. The functional specialization of cross-border banks also complicates supervision and information gathering. If a cross-border banking group concentrates all its credit assessments in one country it will be difficult for the supervisor in another country to assess the risk of the bank in that country without efficient supervisory cooperation and exchange of information. Further, if the bank puts all its liquidity management in a third country, extensive information sharing will be needed in order for any supervisor to get the full picture of the group’s total risks. In principle the parent bank – and therefore the parent bank’s supervisor – should have a full overview but in a crisis, positions may change quickly and thus complicate the collection of all relevant information. Such extensive information sharing becomes acute in a crisis but is also necessary in the day-to-day supervision. A second challenge is that conflicts of interest multiply. Banking problems can be very costly and the ultimate guarantee for financial stability can only be given by the government, since only the government has the power to tax. In most countries the deposit guarantee schemes are only able to  2  BIS Review 96/2006  finance the problem if it is confined to minor banks. For systemic problems, the government would have to intervene. With predominantly national banks, how this is done is fairly straight-forward.

In addition, a significant number of important emerging economies are in a very favorable situation of liquidity and external solvency, with more flexible foreign exchange rate systems and low inflation rates. 6  BIS Review 97/2007  The Chilean economy in this new financial setting It is premature and bold to try to quantify the possible effects on the economy of this adjustment that is under way. Pass-through channels will be rises in risk premiums, changes in the future path of monetary policy interest rates in industrial economies, adjustments in government bonds’ interest rates of industrial economies, a slowdown in the US and the world economy and a drop in commodity prices. What we do know is that Chile has built through the years a framework of policies and institutions that has not only favored price stability and reduced output volatility, but also increased the economy’s resilience to shocks generated by adjustments occurring in international financial markets as have been observed recently. Such a framework includes an autonomous Central Bank that conducts an inflation-targeting monetary policy under floating exchange rate, a fiscal policy whereby public spending is tied to the government’s permanent income, accumulating foreign exchange assets abroad during times of copper-price bonanza, thus contributing to enhance fiscal solvency, stabilize the real exchange rate and smooth the business cycle. Finally, Chile’s banking regulation and supervision system has helped develop a strong and safe banking system.