samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The real krone exchange rate as measured in terms of developments in relative prices is an expression of the Norwegian krone’s purchasing power. When the curves in the chart are above zero, the exchange rate is stronger and competitiveness weaker than the average level since 1970. The real exchange rate has fluctuated considerably over time and has deviated substantially from the average level over longer periods. Nevertheless, there has been a tendency for the real exchange rate to revert to this level. In the chart, the point for 2004 shows the real exchange rate with wage and inflation projections for 2004 from Inflation Report 1/2004. In relative prices, the real exchange rate is now about 2 per cent weaker than the average since 1970, whereas it is almost 4 per cent stronger than its historical average measured in terms of relative labour costs. Economic developments Interest rate expectations have been revised upwards in a number of countries. Growth has picked up in the US. As in the second half of 2003, growth is primarily being driven by private consumption and business investment. Following a surprisingly long period of weak labour market developments, employment has begun to edge up and is now higher than at the same time last year. In recent months, inflation has increased from a very low level. As a result, interest rate expectations have been revised upwards, and the key rate in the US is expected to be raised at the end of June.

While this is definitely a concern for every country, we open-economy EMs are especially concerned about how SMEs—particularly medium-size firms—would cope with the trade and supply chain disruptions. Medium-size manufacturing firms are the backbone of EM economies. Prior to the onset of the trade tension, the new global environment has already brought upon these firms considerable pressure. Technological disruption tends to favor large corporations who better understand the technology and have the resources needed for the adaptation. Low interest rate environment also allows large firms to access bond financing at very low  1  funding costs. These factors have increased market power of large firms and forced smaller firms to quickly redefine their business model in order to stay afloat. Amidst these structural changes, the ongoing trade tension becomes an additional burden to medium-size firms’ survival both directly and through the disruption of the supply chains. Moreover, the increased uncertainty that forces firms to diversify their production locations and hedge against the growing risks together with the ongoing economic downturn have squeezed the profit margins. In such a circumstance, mediumsize firms are in a much more difficult position than large firms that have deeper pockets and larger buffers. Trade tension might be comparatively short-lived when compared to other structural changes like demographic shift and technological disruptions, but these short-term factors could result in a long-term impact to medium-size firms and the structure of the economy through channels such as changes in competition landscape, market dominance power, and investment and employment patterns.
Since 2017, Islamic financial institutions have also taken a leadership role in spearheading sustainable finance through the development of sectoral and activity impact-based risk management frameworks. Sectoral Guides focusing on palm oil, renewable energy and energy 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  efficiency activities have already been issued, and will be followed by Guides for the manufacturing, construction and infrastructure, as well as oil and gas sectors by the end of this year. Through JC3, these complementary developments are being coordinated and integrated to build a credible foundation for the financial industry to support the transition efforts. Beyond the financial sector, the JC3 also actively engages with various stakeholders on climate and transition initiatives. The formation of a new sub-committee this year, to address data gaps for climate risk analysis is another major collaboration as part of JC3’s efforts to strengthen climate risk management and scale up green finance. The JC3 is also pursuing broader engagements with key businesses to better understand transitioning issues and opportunities along the supply value chain. This will help inform the structuring of customised financial solutions for the different types of players within the entire value chain. Objectives and motivations for collaboration As a financial regulator and supervisor, it is important to be clear on the objectives and motivations for our collaborative efforts with the industry and other stakeholders. The primary goal for us is to support the appropriate consideration of climate risks in promoting resilient financial institutions.

Besides entailing rising inflation, this causes firms and households to start accustoming themselves to a high level of inflation. Monetary policy may then be forced to adopt a contractive stance in order to bring inflation back to the target rate. So if the central bank waits too long, the interest rate increases may be all the larger. In the meantime, moreover, economic imbalances and tensions may become so great that they lead to economic setbacks. We are familiar with such a course of events from the 1970s and 1980s, and perhaps not least from the early 1990s. Against this background, in situations when capacity is coming under pressure, it is clearly better for a central bank to act at an early stage. Future inflation The assessment in the inflation report, published just over a month ago, is that growth in the Swedish economy will be about 2 per cent in 1997 and around 3 per cent in 1998. In 1999, the rate is expected to go on accelerating to just over 3 per cent. This assessment envisages that, in an expanding world market, export growth remains relatively high. This is accompanied by an accelerating increase in private consumption, while public consumption at least stops falling. Economic growth in Sweden in 1998 and 1999 would then most probably exceed the potential rate, which is estimated to be just over 2 per cent in annual terms. The broad rise in all the major demand components will therefore gradually exert pressure on the available resources.
Jonung, Lars (1999), ”Med backspegeln som kompass – om stabiliseringspolitiken som läroprocess”, [With the rear-view mirror as a compass - on stabilisation policy as a learning process] report to the Expert Group for Public Economics (ESO). Jonung, Lars (2000), “Från guldmyntfot till svenskt inflationsmål – svensk stabiliseringspolitik under det 20:e seklet” [From gold standard to inflation target – Swedish stabilisation policy in the 20th Century], Ekonomisk Debatt No. 1. Jonung, Lars (2017), ”Jakten på den stabila stabiliseringspolitiken” [The hunt for stable stabilisation policy], Ekonomisk Debatt, nr. 4. Lundberg, Erik (1983), Ekonomiska kriser förr och nu [Economic crises before and now], Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle. Rockoff, Hugh (2015), “War and inflation in the United States from the revolution to the first Iraq war”, NBER Working paper 21221. Vaitilingam, Romesh (2022), “Economic consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Views of leading economists”, column on VoxEU, 10 March, Economic consequences of war in Ukraine: IGM Forum survey | VOX, CEPR Policy Portal (voxeu.org) Vernon, J.R. (1994), “World War II Fiscal Policies and the End of the Great Depression”, Journal of Economic History 54, pp. 850-868. Wetterberg, Gunnar (2009), Money and power – the history of Sveriges Riksbank, Sveriges Riksbank and Atlantis. Åsbrink, Erik (2019), Gunnar Sträng, Albert Bonniers Förlag. 14 [14]

However, in the euro area, all the available evidence so far points to the existence of a stable relationship between M3 and price developments over the medium term. M3 and other monetary and credit aggregates also demonstrate leading indicator properties for future price developments. In the end, it is this evidence which makes us confident that monetary and credit aggregates are an important indicator for assessing risks to price stability. The second pillar of the strategy is associated with a complementary, but more eclectic, approach, which implies that a wide range of indicators is of relevance for monetary policy. While inflation is a 3  BIS Review 44/2000  monetary phenomenon over the medium term, at shorter horizons it will be influenced by many other variables. Changes in international commodity prices, such as the price of oil, will influence developments in consumer price inflation. Demand and cost pressures can also influence price developments in the shorter term. Moreover, policymakers will generally need to tailor their actions to the prevailing economic circumstances, since the impact of monetary policy on the future evolution of the price level at any specific time will depend on a host of factors which are not captured by monetary data. Analysis under the second pillar is intended to reveal this information, giving policymakers greater insight into shorter-run price dynamics and their implications for monetary policy. Monetary policymaking in the euro area has to reflect the complexities and uncertainties which surround the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a wholly new economic entity.
Hopefully this means we will become even better at explaining to the general public and the financial markets how we reason when making monetary policy decisions. But the process does not stop here. We will continue to seek ways of increasing our openness and clarity. One area where I myself feel that it might be time to move on is the forms for our signalling. This applies even more after the changes we have made recently. In my opinion, the Riksbank should only in exceptional cases signal before formally making a decision at the monetary policy meetings. As I have said on earlier occasions, I also believe that it may be appropriate to name the members in connection with their comments in the minutes of the monetary policy meetings. The purpose of the changes we make is of course essentially to become clearer and more efficient in our communication. The fact that we are constantly striving to achieve this is something that both financial market agents and the general public expect of us. Thank you! 11  See, for instance, Eijffinger, S. and P. Geerats, (2006), “How transparent are central banks?” European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 22, 1-21. BIS Review 40/2007  9

The RM151 million project is a milestone achievement, being the first large-scale commercial development project on a waqf land in the country. Another important aspect in professionalising waqf management is instilling good governance. It is unfortunate that management of waqf has had some governance challenges. Efforts must be directed at strengthening its governance and management. Adequate internal controls have to be put in place, including risk management, internal and external audits, and compliance systems. Its standards of disclosure and transparency need to be at par with those of modern finance or of endowments in advanced economies. For a start, waqf authorities should provide high-quality disclosure and reporting of waqf activities to instil trust and confidence among the contributors and wider stakeholders. Contributors want to know where their contributions are going and how they are being spent. In this regard, the Waqf Fund collaboration between Islamic banks and the State Islamic Religious Councils provides a good mechanism for the financial sector to lend its expertise and share best practices on good governance and transparency practices in managing fund. Under the initiative, the Code of Governance and Transparency of Waqf Fund will be issued by AIBIM. This will act as guidance for more efficient and effective management of waqf and with higher governance and transparency practices, thus bringing waqf to the next level. Conclusion Waqf has played a significant socioeconomic role throughout history. Exciting potential lies within waqf, even today.
Most part of this increase is expected to be the outcome of the foreign currency purchase from the Bank of Albania. Table 8. The difference as to trimesters of the gross foreign currency reserve of the Bank of Albania. (USD million) December 2003  T1  T2  T3  T4  December 2004  973.8  0  15  20  10  1018.8  The remaining part of Lek 1.7 billion is expected to come from the increase of the commercial banks reserves at the Bank of Albania. Net foreign currency assets of commercial banks will increase by Lek 1.5 billion, or 2.2 percent. The NFCA increase of commercial banks is forecasted to be at a low level, despite the annual increase by Lek 17.7 billion of deposits in foreign currency. From this sum, nearly Lek 14.5 billion are expected to be used in financing the private sector borrowing, while the remaining part will raise the commercial banks reserves at the Bank of Albania. 3.2.2  Credit to the government  During 2004, the internal borrowing of the government in covering the budget deficit is forecasted to be Lek 22.6 billion, while privatization is expected to cover nearly Lek 2.8 billion. Participation from  3  Borrowing from the Bank of Albania is presented in a positive sign; investment of free funds by the Bank of Albania is presented in negative.

By adopting the new banking law in the Republic of Albania and a range of other monetary policy and banking supervision-related decisions, we have aimed at firming up the macroeconomic balances further and strengthening financial stability. At the focus of the Bank of Albania’s strategy were the good governance and better risk management, improved banking activity transparency to the customer and the strengthening of internal control. This strategy peaked with a large-scale, exceptional and contemporary programme of open and constant communication with the public. I believe that the favourable liquidity and capital situation characterizing the Albanian banking system on the eve of the financial crisis last fall helped to cope with the withdrawal of deposits during September-October 2008. However, the Bank of Albania deemed as necessary the prudent monitoring of the situation and took a number of actions, which alleviated the pressures over the banking system substantially. These actions helped to relax the liquidity situation and they were in harmony with the ECB’s operational response to the crisis. First, an ad-hoc task force was set up. Its main responsibility was and remains the daily monitoring of each individual bank. Our direct conclusion was that the analysis should consider all micro-level aspects, each and every cell of the system and indicators. Second, a number of facilities were adopted for the incessant supply of the system with the required liquidity.
We cannot achieve and maintain financial stability on our own. Above all, it requires recognition of the public interest in financial stability. Thirteen years ago, at the annual banquet for the Bankers and Merchants of the City, in June 1997, just over a month after the Election of that year, commenting on the new regulatory arrangements, the then Governor of the Bank, Eddie George, said that the direction of financial services regulation was driven in part “by a rising tide of public expectations in terms of both the prudential and the behavioural standards required of financial intermediaries”. Eddie George was undoubtedly correct that the public will and should expect more in terms of the standard of business of firms. But history now tells us – painfully – that on the way to higher standards there was a terrible lapse in which too many people in our industry forgot that preserving financial stability is the duty that we all owe to the public. The fact of the matter is that the public has every right to expect us to act in their interest. This means that we cannot have attitudes which put short-term gain first on the basis that the stability of the financial system can be tomorrow’s objective, for the next person. But in order to achieve this, we need to be very clear on the benefits of financial stability. One of the questions I get asked most frequently is how we will ensure that the lessons of the crisis stick.

A primary focus of the new Prudential Regulation Authority will be on determining whether the business models, governance and systems and controls of firms will enable them to satisfy the public interest in financial stability in future states of the world. That requires both a macro and micro prudential view, and for the two to come together to reach forward-looking judgements on whether financial stability is likely to be preserved in a range of plausible future outcomes. This range of outcomes is important, and it also underlines the need to build up the role of stress testing. Such testing is an important mechanism for describing the forward-looking view though it should continue to evolve from a binary pass-fail world into one where it is a toolkit to test a range of possible future states of the world and thereby judge the wider resilience of firms. The PRA will exercise judgement in the supervisory actions it takes, so that firms are likely to be able to meet its objectives, policies and rules over the medium term horizon. Firms will need to demonstrate to the PRA that they are robust to a variety of states of the world, including unanticipated stress scenarios. However, since it is not possible for any forecast to cover all possible outcomes, there will always be some probability of firms failing.
I would like to start this part by stressing the importance of the dialogue with market participants. The constructive discussions with bank managers serve two purposes. The commercial bankers know and  2  BIS Review 63/2001  in their own way understand both the market situation and the prevailing trends in the so-called "real economy". Thus, these regular discussions are most welcome complement to the economic analysis by central bank experts. But the regular contacts provide also a unique channel for moral suasion, for explaining central bank's concerns and in some occasions, possibilities to put pressure on managerial choices. Obviously, these contacts are easy to arrange in a small country like Estonia. We have made use of that opportunity and established dialogue with our financial sector on financial as well as on general economic issues, both on regular as well as on ad hoc basis. What we should do more is to have more in-depth contacts with the main strategic partners of our banks. The other essential, albeit specific element for crisis prevention is the pre-emptive involvement of the private sector in crisis resolution. I would like to point out two simple but effective principles that we have relied upon. Firstly, the completely free movement of capital, both long and short term, has increased the credibility of our financial policy and, thus, encouraged strategic partners to take much longer term approach to their investments. That has by now resulted in a full integration of our banks into Scandinavian markets.

Thirdly, as concerns over the security of corporate and government bonds grew, the premia investors have had to pay against bond defaults have increased very significantly. The perceived decrease in the creditworthiness of key European companies and Western European sovereign bonds was highlighted by the very sharp rise of several benchmark credit default swap (CDS) indices for these markets.1 The foreign exchange market has been of particular concern to the SNB, as the Swiss franc’s safe haven properties and the growing dearth of alternative “safe” assets led to massive movements in our currency, which required the SNB to act. In early August, the real effective exchange rate of the Swiss franc peaked at an estimated level of almost 40% above its post-1990 long-term average.2 The extent of this deviation was very rare, in historic terms, as the previous high point, at the end of 1995, was only 12% above the same long-term average. Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the volatility of the EUR/CHF exchange rate has averaged approximately 5%.3 In August it rose to almost 30%. As chart 1 shows, three of the largest ever daily negative movements in the EUR/CHF exchange rate also occurred in this period. Since the introduction of the minimum exchange  1  The Markit iTraxx Europe Index, for example, which is composed of 125 investment grade entities from six sectors (auto, consumer, energy, financial, industrial and TMT), more than doubled between July and September.
How are the dialogue and decisions likely to develop in the next few years? These are some of the questions that I shall be considering today. 1. Convergence A natural starting-point for a discussion of the current economic situation in Europe is the convergence reports that the Commission and the European Monetary Institute (EMI) presented at the end of March. •  The price trend for the EU area in recent years is impressive. The disparities in the rate of price increases have diminished and in January this year inflation was below 2 per cent in all the Member States except Greece. This development is fundamentally a consequence of the monetary policy focus on price stability, backed up by economic policy in general. Other factors have been increased international competition and low oil prices. •  The picture of government finances in the EU countries has also brightened. Progress has been made in the process of financial consolidation. However, a number of countries are only just below or at 3 per cent and have qualified thanks to measures of a temporary nature. •  A high degree of exchange rate stability now prevails in most EU countries and tensions in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) have been moderate. •  The notable convergence of long-term interest rates is another indication of the stable situation and EMU expectations. BIS Review 50/1998  -2-  All in all, the reports from the Commission and the EMI show that convergence in the Maastricht sense has come a long way.

But the analysis of the euro area will be undertaken centrally to a large extent and the level of interest rates will be decided by the ECB Governing Council, which consists of the members of the ECB’s Executive Board and the NCB Governors of the, initially eleven, participating countries. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has been given a highly independent status so as to be in a position to conduct a monetary policy for price stability without short-run political considerations. But its independence does not relieve the ECB of the duty to inform and communicate. On the contrary, it accentuates the need for a dialogue and exchange of information. The European Parliament has displayed a high profile in these matters and worked to establish a basis for discussing and monitoring monetary policy continuously. The ECB will be obliged to make difficult decisions in various matters. One problem may arise from cyclical disparities between euro area countries. While these disparities may diminish over time, they are unlikely to disappear completely. Meanwhile, the ECB has to set a single instrumental rate for the whole monetary union. The common interest rate will normally not be ideal in relation to the economic situation in every country. The national financial structures also differ considerably, which means that, for instance, interest rate sensitivity varies.