samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this context, leaders need to be visionary to see future trends focused on organisational vision, to stay competitive and be able to adapt rapidly to changes. In addition leaders need to take into account the corporate social responsibility so that the profit mindset is balanced against the objective of longterm sustainability. When we talk about enhancing leadership capability we are talking about leaders who are continuous learners, who are on the cutting edge of excellence, leaders who have strong convictions and beliefs, and yet having humility and recognising the need to reinvent themselves and inspire their organization to adapt to the new challenges and changes. This is vital if the financial services sector is to forge ahead and remain at the forefront of new innovations, an element that is critical to securing long-term competitiveness. We need the remarkable force of corporate leaders to fuel the drive towards long-term growth and stability. We need dynamic leaders to push the frontiers of excellence – leaders who are constantly learning and possess the courage to take on new challenges. In this process, avenues for continuous learning must be actively sought. The establishment of ICLIF is part of our commitment towards providing such an avenue to enhance our leadership capability and develop world-class leaders in the financial services sector. Towards this endeavour, the Centre is currently in the process of developing a unique leadership competency model that will analyse and understand what makes for great corporate leaders in our regional context.

At the same time, the Centre is putting together a world-class Global Leadership Development Program (GLDP) with leading consultants and drawing faculty from the best schools in the world. The Global Leadership Development Program represents ground-breaking design in terms of an executive education program. By drawing faculty from not just one or two, but up to five leading institutions, the Centre will be able to combine the best ideas and thoughts in the world on the various key leadership issues and concerns. The Centre’s role will not be to replicate the roles of institutions of higher learning, but rather to facilitate and provide specific, directed and targeted learning based on the requirements of our industry. In addition to its Board of Directors, the Centre will also be governed by an International Advisory Panel comprising eminent personalties. In the process, participants will benefit from the best of all worlds in terms of the latest thinking on leadership issues. It is envisaged that the Centre will also serve to complement and supplement the existing capacity building facilities in the financial and corporate sector to become a regional centre of excellence for leadership training in finance. The Centre aims to reinforce the notion that investments in human capital, including the pursuit of leadership excellence, is a continuing process in this ever-changing environment so as to enhance the calibre of our human capital in the financial and corporate sector in meeting the challenges ahead as we advance forward in this new millennium. 2  BIS Review 46/2003
Thomas J Jordan: Financial Stability Report – potential risks and actions Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas J Jordan, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Berne, 16 June 2011. *  *  *  In my introductory remarks today, I would like to present the most important points from our recently published Financial Stability Report, in which we consider potential risks to financial stability and identify where action may be needed. General economic and financial conditions for the Swiss banking sector improved further in 2010. Overall, global economic growth was stronger than expected last year, despite the expiry of fiscal stimuli. In Switzerland, too, economic development was robust and growth was high in an international comparison. Against this background, the profitability and capital situation of both big banks improved further, and remained good for banks with a domestic focus. However, the economic environment remains fragile, and a renewed, sharp deterioration over the next twelve months cannot be ruled out. In the short term, the prevailing uncertainty primarily affects the two big banks, which are still exposed to considerable credit and market risk relative to their loss-absorbing capital. For domestically focused banks, by contrast, the risks are largely of a medium-term nature, and are related to potential adverse developments on the Swiss real estate and mortgage markets. In view of these risks, all Swiss banks should ensure that they have a broad and high-quality base of loss-absorbing capital.

Likewise, the capitalisation of domestically focused banks hardly changed in 2010 and remains good in relation to both risk-weighted assets and total assets. However, the fact that capitalisation is high overall does not take into account that the regulatory capital requirements do not fully capture certain risks. For example, the interest rate risk and credit risk associated with potentially adverse developments in the real estate and mortgage markets are not taken into account, or only partially accounted for. Yet these risks are especially pronounced in the current environment. On the one hand, interest rate risk for all domestically focused banks continues to remain at a historically high level. Since there is a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, a rise in interest rates would result in losses for the banks. The overall high level of interest rate risk is driven by Raiffeisen and cantonal banks. On the other hand, credit risk at domestically focused banks continued to increase. This is because the mortgage lending volume, which is closely linked to developments in the real estate market, continued to grow. The situation in the Swiss real estate market has deteriorated slightly since last year’s Financial Stability Report was published. Even though they varied widely, most real estate price indices suggest that prices also rose substantially in 2010.
Meanwhile, the government’s commitment to reform state owned enterprises (SOEs) is commendable. In particular, automatic pricing mechanisms for fuel and electricity are expected to be introduced in March and September 2018, respectively. This will go a long way towards reducing the future financial losses of key SOEs and avoid large ad hoc adjustments in retail prices. Not only will this be supportive of the effective conduct of monetary policy, but it will also have a positive impact on the balance sheets of both the government and the state banks. As we know, the Central Bank alone cannot manage inflation and inflation expectations in the economy. It cannot influence supply side factors affecting inflation. Although monetary policy is effective in controlling demand driven inflation, the support of the government is essential in managing supply side pressures on inflation. In this regard, timely support of the government is necessary in dampening supply shocks, thereby anchoring inflation. Several key milestones need to be reached over the next three years through the joint efforts and the commitment of the government and the Central Bank to fulfill the key prerequisites of the FIT framework. Legal amendments, continuation of fiscal consolidation, institutionalisation of the required changes to the monetary and fiscal policy processes, and building awareness and the confidence of the general public are the priorities in the near future before the official transition to the FIT framework by 2020. 15  In this regard, as mentioned, we have devised a Road Map for adopting FIT, outlining the necessary reforms and innovations.

As a background to my comments on the topic of this panel, “Where do central banks go from here?”, let me note that, as the world economy recovers from the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed, a debate is underway regarding the causes of the crisis and how to reduce the risk of future crises. The role of monetary policy and its relation to financial stability are also under debate. Some blame the Federal Reserve, saying that its monetary policy was too expansionary after 2001 and that this laid the foundations for the crisis. The lesson to be drawn, they argue is that there is a need to modify the framework of flexible inflation targeting and give a greater role to financial-stability considerations. In my view, the crisis was largely caused by factors that had very little to do with monetary policy. Instead, it was mainly caused by regulatory and supervisory failures in combination with some special circumstances, such as low real interest rates around the world and housing policy in the United States. Neither do I share the view that there is a need to fundamentally modify the framework of flexible inflation targeting. Ultimately, my main conclusion for monetary policy is that flexible inflation targeting – applied in the right way and in particular using all the information about financial conditions that is relevant for the forecast of inflation and resource utilisation at any horizon – remains the best-practice monetary policy before, during, and after the financial crisis.
The NGFS will not stop there and next year will publish its first comprehensive report, which will provide – on a voluntary basis only – policy recommendations for central banks and supervisors. This will take place at the upcoming NGFS Conference, at the Banque de France in Paris, on 17 April 2019: you are all most welcome! To prevent the airplane from crashing, we can help by shedding light on climate risks in order to take accurate and timely decisions, and by seizing opportunities while aligning incentives and mobilising capital. II. Anticipating climate-related risks 1/ Our first priority should be the disclosure of existing exposures in the financial sector, what I call “the snapshot of risks”. The recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), chaired by Mr. Bloomberg with sponsorship from the Financial Stability Board (FSB), have been groundbreaking as they provide a practical framework allowing companies to disclose their climate-related financial risks. However, an accurate and consistent vision of the risks requires a wider implementation of the TCFD’s recommendations. Significant room for progress remains in this area. To enable markets to price risks, we need comparable metrics – thanks to a common taxonomy – and better access to higher quality and more consistent data. I therefore fully  Page 3 sur 6 support the work of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance of the European Commission which is concretely developing a taxonomy; our first NGFS workstream is also working in this field.

There is also a game park, a well stocked curio market and the Mukuni Cultural Village, among the many attractions. I therefore urge you to find time or indeed stay an extra day or more to sample this special menu that Livingstone has to offer. Chairperson, Central Bank of Zambia is honoured and delighted to co-host the second AFRACA Forum that begins today, the 23rd and ends on 25th September, 2008. AFRACA is an association of Central Banks and financial institutions involved in the provision of financial services to the rural population in Africa and increasing access to financial services in general. Its membership of 94 institutions consists of central banks, commercial banks, agricultural banks, development and cooperative banks, other financial institutions and microfinance operators whose networks spread throughout 26 African countries. It is through workshops and fora of this nature, among other events, that AFRACA endeavours to disseminate information and share experiences among members and other industry stakeholders across the continent. Following the first Central Banks Forum held in Accra, Ghana and in view of the need to deliberate further on the topical issue of financial inclusiveness, AFRACA felt it necessary to hold the second Central Banks Forum under the theme, “Promoting Financial Inclusiveness”. The main objectives of this second forum are to harness current views on promoting financial inclusiveness, draw lessons and recommend strategies for improvement of the levels of access to financial services, particularly among the rural communities in our countries.
As the currency of a developing economy, the road to internationalisation of the RMB will have many potholes, and it would be the skills and resilience of the policymakers in China that will determine whether the RMB manages to navigate these hazards and travels far on the road to internationalisation. After all, we can think of other more developed countries, including another at one time second-largest economy, which upon reaching the threshold on which China stands today, decided that the costs that come with having their currency playing a big international role were something that they did not want to bear. For lack of official support, these currencies consequently never achieved their full global potential. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Would the reality be different for China? Only time will tell. It is the case that the RMB will sail more smoothly and speedily in international waters if its sails are filled by the strong winds of robust Chinese economic fundamentals. Five key pre-conditions to being a global currency So allow me to look at some of the key fundamentals that I believe would support a sustainable progress of the RMB towards being a major global currency. Studying the history of global currencies such as the British pound and the US dollar provides us some indication of the possible path of RMB internationalisation. Let me be clear, this does not mean that I am implying that the RMB must necessarily follow the path of other major global currencies.

Kristina Persson: The impact of the euro Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at the Women’s Economic Round Table, New York, 29 October 2003. *  *  *  Allow me first to extend special thanks for this invitation. It is particularly important for me personally as well as for the Riksbank to be given this opportunity to meet women economists and discuss current economic issues. I am privileged to be one of three women on the Riksbank’s Executive Board, which has a total of six members. At the Riksbank we strive to attain an even distribution of men and women at all levels. This is a deliberate policy but also reflects the sharp rise in the proportion of women among qualified economists entering the Swedish business sector in recent decades. If this trend is to continue, and more women are to take the chance of achieving success in this traditionally male profession, we will need more role models like you here today. The subject of my speech is “The impact of the euro”, a topic that was decided before 14 September 2003, when Sweden held a referendum on introducing the single currency. Personally I am convinced for many reasons that Sweden should introduce the euro, and made no secret of that. However, as many of you know, the result was a clear ‘no’ to the euro. The question of the economic advantages and disadvantages of the euro often resembles a tug-of-war between the short- and long-term perspectives.
While central banks may legitimately advise on the technical implementation of such intervention, and be the agency through which it is carried out, it is far better all round in my view that responsibility for the choices implicit in such policies remains clearly with the Government. Secondly, for a long time after the war in the UK - until well into the 1970’s, majority opinion did not identify a specific role for monetary policy within overall economic policy; nor was there any very clear understanding of the central bank’s role in maintaining systemic financial stability. Economic policy was widely seen as requiring the use of all available policy instruments - monetary policy, overall fiscal policy, direct controls, as I say, even prices and incomes policies - in concert to BIS Review 66/2000  2  achieve an appropriate balance at any particular time between what were seen as the conflicting objectives of growth and employment, on the one hand, and controlling inflation and maintaining reasonable balance of payments equilibrium, on the other. Economic policy overall was in fact directed at managing what was seen as the trade-off between these social objectives. And this again involved intrinsically political rather than technical judgements, though in this context, too, there clearly was a role for the central bank in proffering detached technical and analytical advice.

10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 6 Global imports of goods and services (% of GDP) Import share of GDP  Per cent  35 30 25 20 15 10 5  1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012  0  Note: Value of total imports of goods and services divided by world nominal GDP. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database and Bank calculations. Chart 7 Persistent divergence in the price of (core) goods and services  Note: Six-month average of the log-difference of core (excluding food and energy) goods and services price indices (2005=100). The US series uses PCE price indices and begins in 1999 due to data limitations. Sources: DataStream, national sources and Bank calculations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Chart 8 Average world output gap and core inflation (weighted by UK-import shares) 4  Per cent of world GDP  Percentage change on a year earlier  2.5  3  2.3  2  2.1  1  1.9  0  1.7  -1  1.5  -2  1.3  -3  1.1  -4 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Global core CPI inflation (RHS) UK-wtd world output gap (LHS)  0.9  Notes: Average world output gap and core inflation (weighted by UK-import shares). Source: IMF, ONS, DataStream, and Bank calculations. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Thomas Jordan: Current challenges for the Swiss National Bank in the area of monetary policy Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event of the Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 27 March 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  With its forecast that GDP will grow by 1.5%-2.0% and the average inflation rate will amount to 2%, the National Bank is cautiously optimistic for the Swiss economy in 2008. However, since the summer of 2007, the international environment has taken a clear turn for the worse: Financial markets are in a serious crisis, the major economies are weakening and inflation rates are rising worldwide. This means that the SNB’s monetary policy is facing challenges on several fronts simultaneously. With regard to economic growth, the SNB is called upon to assess the consequences of the international financial crisis for the Swiss economy as precisely as possible and to analyse their implications for monetary policy correctly and at an early stage. On the inflation front, it must ensure that the measures taken in connection with the financial market crisis do not jeopardise the credibility of a monetary policy geared to long-term price stability or shake established inflation expectations. Finally, the challenge in the money market is two-fold.

To date in 2014, the rate of decline of lending to the resident private sector has shown signs of easing, in terms both of bank lending to households and of that to non-financial corporations, especially those not pursuing real estate or construction-related activities. In any event, the performance of lending at the aggregate level is affected by the need to continue redressing high private-sector debt. The NPL ratio of the Spanish banking industry continues to post higher levels than those observed a year ago. However, it has improved slightly in 2014. This correction has come about despite the fact that lending, the denominator of the ratio, has continued posting negative rates of change. Hence, the comparatively larger fall in NPL in 2014 has been the main determinant of this reduction. In the first half of this year, the Spanish banking industry posted somewhat lower consolidated profits than in the first half of 2013, although they were far removed from the heavy losses of 2012. In a setting still marked by low volumes of activity, low interest rates and a still-high level of non-earning assets, banks’ ability to generate interest income remains subject to downside pressure. These factors were offset by the decline in operating expenses and by lower losses attributable to asset impairment. As to the industry’s solvency, Spanish banks as a whole had a CET1 ratio as at June 2014 that comfortably exceeded the required minimum.
A new regulatory framework for the recovery and resolution of failing banks is underway. A plan for orderly resolution must be drawn up for all banks. Large losses must be absorbed by writing down the bank’s equity capital and debt. The bank can then recapitalise by converting existing debt to new equity capital. The bank’s creditors step in as new owners. The bank’s losses can be allocated to both owners and creditors, while core banking services continue. A market functions best when there is scope for new entrants and for the closure of lossmaking companies. The same applies to financial markets. The banking sector is characterised by large entities and complex products. Banking regulation is also complex and rich in detail. If the authorities succeed in developing a system for resolving failing banks, perhaps we can take one step back with regard to other detailed regulations. The work on reforms that has been engaged abroad must be followed up in Norway. A national bank resolution authority must be designated. It should be placed in a unit under the Ministry of Finance. This is not a natural role for a central bank. 4  See e.g. the box “Historical monetary statistics for Norway” in Norges Bank Annual Report 2007. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Building wealth for future generations Among Norges Bank’s key tasks is the management of Norway’s foreign exchange reserves. This responsibility has followed the Bank since its establishment in 1816, first in the form of silver and gold reserves.

There are many self-regulating mechanisms in the economy, but inflation does not regulate itself. The inflation target of 2.5 per cent also provides a framework for the social partners. Over time, nominal wage growth above 2.5 per cent will entail higher real wages and higher purchasing power. Real wage growth that exceeds productivity growth may lead to higher inflation and higher interest rates. In government-financed enterprises, which are often labour-intensive, budgets are adapted to expected wage growth. This is usually in line with assumptions about cost inflation in the economy as a whole and with the inflation target. If wages rise more than this, efficiency must be increased in order to minimise the adverse impact on service production and customers. 2  Calmfors and Driffill (1988): “Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance”, in Economic Policy, April, 14-61 and Driffill (2006): “The Centralization of Wage Bargaining Revisited. What have we learned?” in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, no. 4, November, 731-756. BIS Review 122/2007  3  All economic agents can plan ahead on the assumption that inflation will be about 2.5 per cent over time. This is the most valuable contribution Norges Bank can provide the social partners and other economic agents. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS Review 122/2007  BIS Review 122/2007  5  6  BIS Review 122/2007  BIS Review 122/2007  7  8  BIS Review 122/2007