samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If the incentives are low for workers to quickly change jobs and move to a new sector, at the same time as the incentives for firms to employ labour from a different sector are reduced by high initial wages, costs of sick leave and job security, there is a risk that more people will get stuck in the transition. This would entail a rise in frictional unemployment. In addition, the risk of long-term unemployment rises if more people become discouraged and stop looking actively for work. The Swedish labour market has previously functioned efficiently in these respects. Think of the closing down of almost the entire textile industry and of the shutdown of the Swedish shipyards at the same time as the paper and pulp industry and the iron and steel industry were rationalised considerably during the 1970s. Not least the trade union movement, more specifically the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, helped facilitate structural change. Read the official reports from 1941, 1951 and 1961 for the Confederation’s conferences in those years. The findings of these reports are something we need to take in today. The trade union movement realised that structural change was the prerequisite for increasing real wages and for generally higher prosperity. Conclusions I believe that it’s fully possible with the right methods to achieve both an employment rate that is sharply higher and an unemployment rate that is considerably lower than today’s level.

Consequently, the capacity utilisation rate of the industrial sector remained at 56 % on average for the year. Capacity utilisation rate did not expand significantly was due to the fact that many manufacturing industries for domestic market were affected by the deceleration in domestic expenditure which led a number of industries to operate at less than half of total capacity namely beverages, automobiles, and iron & steel products. Another reasons being that those export-manufacturing industries which have performed well have been expanding their capacities. For example, the electronics industry, where the capacity in the integrated-circuit sector has increased by 65 % since 1997. With excess capacity prevailing, demand for new investment has been low, thus reducing the role of investment in propelling economic recovery. Moreover, some firms halted operations temporarily as the result of debt problems, adding to excess capacity in the system. This year, the recovery has been propelled mainly by export. Industries geared to export markets expanded by 22 % on average, while industries selling to domestic markets contracted by 7.5 %. Exports which saw high growth rates were in the hi-tech manufacturing products group, the export value of which rose by 30 %. This group comprises such products as integrated circuits, electrical appliances, automobiles and computers. In addition, firms that have upgraded product quality and competitiveness in labour intensive industries such as garments have also recorded buoyant exports. Such development pointed to an adjustment in the right direction.
Policy makers were looking to trade finance as a major channel. However, contagion takes time and cannot fully account for the exceptional synchronisation in the drop in output. With hindsight, the phenomenon may best be seen as a global liquidity shock. Net supply of liquidity dried up at the same time everywhere in the world. International banks faced a sudden and ample shortage of dollars. Firms started to hoard liquidity. Investment and, in part, production, came abruptly to a halt. When such a shock occurs, public provision of liquidity has to replace private provision. In a domestic context, this is the function of the lender of last resort. But when there is a shortage of foreign currency liquidity, this role has to be played by foreign exchange reserves. Following the 1997–98 crisis, emerging countries constantly sought to expand their foreign exchange reserves. The average reserve ratio of emerging markets has more than quintupled from 4 percent to over 20 percent of GDP since 1990. One cannot assume, however, that equilibrium has been reached and that the demand for reserves will stabilise. On the contrary, there are strong indications that this trend will persist, or even be amplified, following the crisis. This may be seen as undesirable but also unavoidable in the current financial architecture. No amount of reserves will fully protect a financially open economy against a systemic shock.

I would like to draw your attention to the following issues: í  first, the euro area will have to face up a number of challenges to confirm its initial success;  í  second, the success of the euro will make a contribution towards encouraging a balanced international monetary situation. I believe that in the current overall economic situation, the success of the euro will help not only Europe but also the rest of the world which will benefit from European prosperity and growth as part of a healthy world economy. This would help facilitate the current accounts adjustments of the countries affected by the crisis. The success of the euro will be complete if a number of challenges are taken up A few years ago, it was necessary to convince a great deal of sceptic people that the euro was a viable project. Many of them pointed to its presumed contradictions and its alleged inconsistencies: for example, the impossibility of achieving an efficient policy mix without a political federation; the impossibility of avoiding some “asymmetric shocks”; the lack of sufficient flexibility of the economy and real mobility of the labour force in the European countries, etc. The result was that the euro would never exist! BIS Review 81/1999  4  These criticisms proved wrong as to the introduction of the euro. But they are useful to help answer the question of what are the conditions for ensuring that the euro is a complete success.
In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account in Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy. We therefore look at different measures of underlying inflation. The chart shows inflation adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products, CPI-ATE, and two other measures. This does not provide a precise measure, but an interval for underlying inflation on the basis of the different indicators. A weakness of the CPI-ATE as a measure is that the variable has not captured the higher rise in energy prices compared with the rise in prices for other goods and services in recent years. Over the past two and half years, underlying inflation has been fairly stable and is estimated at between 1 and 1½ per cent. The indicators of underlying inflation have recently been in the upper end of this interval. 2  BIS Review 47/2007  The fall in inflation in 2002 was attributable to an increase in imports from low-cost countries and a strong krone exchange rate. Prices for imported consumer goods fell sharply. In 2003, slower growth in both Norway and other countries also pushed down the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. In addition, competition was intense in many industries. In 2005, inflation appeared to be rising, but abated again in 2006, primarily reflecting the low rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services.

According to the latest assessments of the Executive Board, the overall outlook suggests that it would be appropriate to raise the interest rate gradually to about 5 per cent in the course of this year and to a somewhat higher level in the period to summer 2008. At its meeting on 25 April, Norges Bank’s Executive Board decided to leave the key rate unchanged at 4.00 per cent. The Executive Board considered the alternative of increasing the interest rate at that meeting. There is obviously considerable uncertainty surrounding the projections. The projections are based on our assessment of today’s economic situation, the outlook for developments in other countries, the functioning of the economy and the conditions necessary for reaching the inflation target. The chart  BIS Review 47/2007  11  shows that we must be prepared for developments in inflation and output that may differ from the central path. This may also imply that the interest rate may be lower or higher than our current projections. Allow me to summarise: The fall in prices for imported goods and services and the increase in export prices have provided the Norwegian economy with an appreciable income boost. The mainland economy has expanded rapidly in recent years. At the same time, inflation has remained low. Increased efficiency and an ample supply of labour have made a contribution to these developments. There are now limited idle resources. Monetary policy increasingly reflects that many Norwegian enterprises are facing capacity constraints and that inflation will pick up.
Despite not being labelled as such, this arrangement seems in some way similar to a modern-day life insurance policy. And yet back then, perhaps unsurprisingly, the subscriptions paid by members were not subject to any protections or oversight – indeed, when a burial society did run out of money, it was commonplace simply to issue a notice to convey the demise of the society and the fact that funeral expenses would no longer be met. There is also evidence that soldiers in the Roman army were paid a lump sum at retirement, despite the fact that contributions were not made throughout the soldier’s lifetime. By medieval times, the Church had become one of the largest employers and had started occasionally to issue pensions to clergymen. One such example involved Nicholas Thorne, a former abbot of St Augustine’s monastery, who was living in difficult circumstances. Thorne had voluntarily retired, apparently stricken by a guilty conscience after he acquired some documentation on behalf of the abbey through bribery at the Court of Rome. The scandal led him to retire to an ordinary monastery in Yorkshire, but when his old comrades heard of his infirmity and weakness, they awarded him an ex gratia pension of 10 marks a year 4. It seems unlikely that the Church extended such gestures on a regular basis, but from this point onwards we can see evidence of pension provision via employers (the Church and King), particularly for notable individuals in society where reliance on charity alone would not suffice.

6 CPMI and the Board of IOSCO: Recovery of financial market infrastructures, October 2014 (revised July 2017). 7 FSB: Guidance on central counterparty resolution and resolution planning, 5 July 2017. 8 ECB recommends amending Article 22 of its Statute, 23 June 2017. 9 Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 (the SSM Regulation) explicitly states that  it would “not confer on the ECB any other supervisory tasks, such as tasks relating to the prudential supervision of central counterparties”. 10 See also Cœuré, B. (2018), “A cooperative approach to CCP recovery and resolution”, panel intervention by at  the ILF Conference on “Resolution in Europe: the unresolved questions”, Frankfurt am Main, 23 April. 11 On 5 July 2017, CPMI-IOSCO announced follow-up work in the area of good practices for CCPs’ default  management auctions (Cover Note to the CPMI-IOSCO revised report on Recovery of financial market infrastructures). 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Presentation of the 2018 annual report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) Press conference of 28 May 2019  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France, Chairman of the ACPR  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr). Page 1 of 5  Ladies and Gentlemen, [Slide 1] I am pleased to welcome you to the presentation of the 2018 annual report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), alongside Bernard Delas, ViceChairman of the ACPR, Rémi Bouchez, President of the Sanctions Committee, and Edouard Fernandez-Bollo, Secretary General of the ACPR. In 2018, the women and men of the ACPR continued to work tirelessly to safeguard financial stability, in a context marked by the uncertainty – and at times the emergency – of Brexit. I would like to thank them for their work. This morning, I shall focus on a topical issue – the profitability of banks and insurers in France and Europe [slide 2]. **  I. The profitability of French banks and insurers remains resilient  The return on equity of France’s largest banks edged up by 0.4 percentage points to 6.7% in 2018,i coming back in line with 2015’s level. The maintenance of profitability levels needs to be viewed alongside the sharp rise in bank capital. French banks have strengthened their solvency and are now more robust. They have more than tripled their capital since the crisis.

That said, private sector actors do not need to wait for public authorities to do everything before starting to think about consolidation strategies. Lastly, we also need to ensure that institutions are treated equally under international regulations. If we are to reach an agreement, two conditions must be met. The transposition of Basel III must be reasonable and take into account the application of the “output floor” at  Page 4 of 5  the highest level of consolidation. Above all, the transposition must be fair and applied to the letter in all jurisdictions, including in the United States. Let me be clear about one thing, however: the solution to our banking challenges is not deregulation but rather innovation; not a step backwards – towards the financial crisis – but a leap forwards. III. We need to remain fully mobilised with regard to two deadly risks: ALM/CTF and cyber-security  The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (ALM/CTF) calls for unwavering commitment. The 23 inspections carried out by the ACPR revealed major failings in supervised entities’ compliance with their AML/CTF and asset-freezing obligations. In 2018, the Sanctions Committee imposed nine sanctions, one of which amounted to EUR 50 million. In parallel with the Financial Action Task Force’s assessment of France in 2020, the ACPR will be closely involved in the implementation of a robust and renewed AML/CTF system at the European level.
Singapore has not been spared the effects of these broader global developments. Our exchange rate-centred monetary policy has been remarkably successful over the decades, in securing price stability amidst rapid economic growth and an open trade and capital account. Consumer price inflation has averaged 1.3% per annum during 1985–2005, one of the lowest in the world. Inflation surged briefly in 2008, moderated in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, but resumed an upward creep from 2010 onwards. Consumer price inflation averaged 4.2% during 2010–2012, the longest period of sustained inflation above 4% in Singapore’s history. It is particularly challenging that the current bout of inflation is occurring against the backdrop of a slowing economy, weighed down by weak external demand and a tight domestic labour market. And in a world awash with liquidity searching for both yield and safety, Singapore has been at the receiving end of such flows. Tonight, I will set out MAS’ policy approach to securing price and financial stability, in this “new normal” of an economy restructuring amidst a global environment of slow growth and easy money. In most respects, this approach builds on the existing framework for monetary policy; but in other respects, it takes a more comprehensive view of macro stability and signifies the need for policy innovation in dealing with new realities. Let me begin by describing the external and domestic context within which MAS is currently operating. External context: surging liquidity, diverging leverage First, the global backdrop.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Monetary policy in the advanced economies has been extraordinarily loose for a prolonged period of time. It has been unconventional in three important regards. •  First, short-term interest rates are at or close to the zero bound – and have been so for over four years now. •  Second, central banks are purchasing non-traditional assets in large quantities to exert downward pressure on long-term interest rates. This has been going on for close to five years now, with central bank balance sheets in the US and the UK, for example, ballooning to more than three times their pre-crisis levels. •  Third, central banks are providing “forward guidance”, either in the form of commitments not to raise interest rates until certain real economy thresholds are met or plans to expand the monetary base until an inflation target is reached, helping to extend expectations of easy monetary conditions. The overall impact of these measures has been to reduce tail risks in the advanced economies and prevent a sharp deceleration in growth. But they have been less successful in restoring economic growth to pre-crisis trend rates, in the face of deleveraging pressures. Debt-to-GDP ratios in the G3 economies must normalise at lower levels to restore macroeconomic and financial stability. This necessitates a decline in consumption. Banks are less willing to lend, and the private sector less willing to borrow. The relationship between liquidity and credit appears to have broken down.
This turn-around from recession was helped initially by the inventory cycle, but it has been underpinned by resilient consumer spending, which itself has been encouraged by the strength of the housing market, offsetting some of the negative wealth effects of lower equity prices. Meanwhile manufacturing output recovered - notably in the semiconductor, computer and communications equipment sectors - and investment appears at least to be no longer contracting. Certainly the macro-economic data are mixed - they almost always are, but on the whole they remain reasonably positive. More fundamentally, the financial system - notably the commercial banking system - has held up well, far better than one might have expected through the slowdown. Market interest rates have fallen where they were pointing higher earlier in the year. And perhaps most importantly, although there has been some deterioration in the labour market, average annual productivity growth has remained strong - at around 2½% since 1995, well above the 1.5% rate averaged over the preceding 20 years. At current growth rates that means there is no inflationary pressure - and both monetary and fiscal policy remain supportive, indeed US monetary policy was eased quite sharply further last week to underpin the expansion. All in all, we - along with many other macro-economic forecasters - expect that after somewhat slower growth in the 4th quarter - US GDP will continue to expand at an annual rate of 3-3½% over the next two years.

That's not a massive rebound, but it is a positive picture - even allowing for downside risks. So we are, in fact, seeing - in terms of Turandot's first riddle - the renewal of the US economy. And of course it is  BIS Review 64/2002  1  immensely important for the global economy that we should, because the prospects in some of the other major industrial economies, notably Japan and Germany, are rather more uncertain. Surprisingly in the light of all this, Turandot's own answer to her first riddle was not "the US economy." Her answer was HOPE. I suppose I would settle for modest EXPECTATION. Her second riddle was "What flickers like a flame when man dreams of conquest?" And again, as I sat there, the answer seemed obvious - it had to be business and financial confidence - or perhaps the global equity market. Given the macro-economic prospect in the US - which is expected to contribute to a recovery to neartrend growth in the world economy as a whole in the course of the next year or two - the recent pessimism of business leaders and the renewed nervousness of global equity markets over the summer seemed somewhat puzzling. Fear seemed to have taken over from man's dream of conquest! There was a real puzzle before the equity markets started to decline.
BIS Review 78/2001  3  we probably still have approximately 17.5 percentage points of the 18 percentage point difference in food prices. Another field in which competition appears to be weak is the construction sector, and in particular the construction materials sector. This area is characterised by a high company concentration with considerable entry barriers to new companies and weak import competition. With regard to prices for construction materials, one can also see a much more rapid price rise than for other industrial products over a number of years, which may indicate rising profit margins or considerable inefficiency in resource utilisation. In some further fields, such as telecommunications services and electricity, deregulation had a pronounced dampening effect on price development for some time. This is no longer the case. The most recent statistics available indicate price increases of 7 per cent and 20 per cent respectively for these areas. In addition, Telia has announced a large rise in its subscriber fees with effect from October. I therefore see it as natural that there are investigations underway and planned into competition conditions in these markets. Vested interests versus consumer interests Although we have thus achieved improvements in certain areas, it appears to me that the description in the Economics Commission's report of 1993 (page 10) still applies to large parts of the economy. "It is evident that a number of important markets in the Swedish economy function poorly and that this leads to considerable wastefulness with resources and to large costs for the national economy.

Eva Srejber: Competition and growth Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Swedish Taxpayers Association, Stockholm, 21 September 2001. *  *  *  According to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, the objective of monetary policy is to safeguard the value of money. The Riksbank has specified this in its inflation target, i.e. that CPI inflation should amount to 2 per cent with a deviation interval of plus/minus one percentage point. This means that when we formulate monetary policy, we must take into account changes in a number of areas that affect price trends, either directly or indirectly. I thought that I would comment on one of these areas today, namely competition, and its effects on potential growth. This is an area that we are forced to consider when we analyse the economy, as it is essential to assess potential growth when shaping monetary policy. However, before I begin, I should like to make the point that I will not be discussing the current monetary policy situation. Growth is a constant central feature of monetary policy discussions, as demand in the economy in relation to production capacity is crucial for determining whether inflationary bottlenecks arise or whether we will underutilise the production potential. It is sometimes claimed that maintaining price stability limits growth. This is incorrect. The limits are determined by the potential growth rate.