samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Then I will look at how monetary policy in Sweden is constructed in principle and conclude with some remarks on the current situation. In that Sweden will be outside the euro area initially, our economic policy will be constructed to fulfil the goals that are set up in Sweden. These goals are based in turn on our domestic priorities together with the commitments we have as a member of the European Union. To a large extent, Sweden’s priorities are the same as the EU’s: implement an economic policy constructed for stability and low inflation, thereby creating conditions for a good development of prosperity. Participation or otherwise in the monetary union does not affect the need for a balanced economic policy. Monetary policy aimed at price stability A political majority has stated that membership of the European exchange rate mechanism, ERM, is to be seen as a preliminary step towards participation in the monetary union. Thus there are reasons for supposing that the question of ERM membership will not be topical until the issue of future EMU participation has been resolved. Meanwhile, the Riksbank will continue to operate with a flexible exchange rate regime and an explicit price stability target for monetary policy. Here it should be underscored that experience to date indicates that this regime is working well. From the beginning of 1999 the Riksbank’s present independent position will be formally embedded in law.

To date, however, the upswing has been accompanied by subdued price movements. This mainly reflects a number of favourable transitory effects but there may also be signs of a somewhat lower inflation propensity. The strength displayed by productivity may perhaps enable the Swedish economy to expand somewhat faster without immediately generating inflationary pressure. But it is still too early to form a more definite opinion on whether the productivity trend has changed. It is now important that incoming statistics are still followed closely and assessed. As I just said, there is no reason at present to alter the repo rate. BIS Review 35/1998  ˝
But, eventually, the potential investors and creditors have to believe that: -  the political and security shocks in the region and inside the country are behind us,  -  the economy accelerates its growth, which over the recent years is not below 4% real GDP growth,  -  we preserve high macro-economic stability that implies exceptionally disciplined monetary and fiscal policies, which in turn result in low inflation, stable exchange rate and foreign exchange market, sustainable trade and current account deficits and strictly controlled public debt and that these policies for maintaining macro-economic stability will be further conducted, as a prerequisite for good business,  -  the price stability policy will be further implemented,  -  the growth will accelerate registering rates higher than before,  -  serious structural reforms are underway under the leadership of the government in cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF. The tax policy has undergone reforms by reducing the tax burden. The administration has undergone reforms for increasing its capacity. Additional reforms in the financial sector and improvement of the financial market operations have been underway. There are reforms in the cadastre. The conditions for foreign direct investments have been improving. The process of economy deregulation has been underway. The judiciary reforms have improved the efficiency in the contract execution. The ownership rights have been protected. The bank soundness and safety have been strengthening. The depositors feel that and repay with over 20% deposit growth over the last several years.

We will continue to work closely with Bank Negara Malaysia and Euroclear Bank to promote the platform to other central banks and securities settlement systems in the region and to implement additional services to the platform to meet evolving market needs. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Actually, in the last year, local uncertainty indicators have consistently outweighed those of economies such as the United States or the United Kingdom, as the decline to their pre-pandemic levels has taken longer. This trajectory clearly differs from what used to be the case before the social outbreak, when the level of uncertainty was not only much lower, but also more in line with other countries (Figure 7). The Chilean financial market has reacted to the overall local developments by decoupling itself from global trends. Thus, long-term interest rates have increased by 30 basis points since mid-April to date (BCP10), while their external benchmarks have not changed much. This has been accompanied by a stock market drop of just over 10 percent, a 2 percent depreciation of the Peso and an increase in the sovereign premium (CDS) of 15 basis points, all despite the significant rise in the copper price. This has coincided with a period of heightened political tensions surrounding the third pension savings withdrawal and a wide range of legislative initiatives on fiscal and regulatory matters (Figure 8). On the external front, world growth has been consolidating the positive outlook for this year and next, which has been internalized by the global financial markets. The evolution of the external scenario is closely linked to the progress of vaccinations and business reopening in developed countries, which has resulted in a rebound and strengthening of consumer and business confidence and activity in the lagging sectors (Figure 9).

In fact, the female participation rate is still far from its pre-pandemic levels, affected by the extra responsibilities on home care that many women have had to assume. This issue is examined in one of the boxes of this Report, and I will refer to it in more detail in a while (Figure 5). Since the previous Report, benefits for households and small businesses have been expanded and will be significantly increased with the measures recently approved by Congress within the framework of the “Common Minimums Agenda”. In the second half of April, the Government announced the strengthening of the middleclass bonus and the Emergency Family Income, together with a complementary bonus for those with empty pension fund accounts. Congress also approved a third withdrawal of pension savings, which includes an advance of benefits for pensioners with annuities. In the context of the Common Minimums Agenda, a substantial extension and expansion of transfers has just been approved, including an Emergency Family Income, which will be extended in amount and coverage, and will reach more than 15 million people over the next four months. In addition, the provision of subsidies and tax benefits for micro and small businesses is being discussed. These initiatives combined will push fiscal spending growth to around 25 percent in nominal terms in 2021, which compares to the 5 percent considered in the March Report.
There are still no green Swedish government bonds, but green bonds have increased substantially in corporate bonds. 35 See ICMA (2018) for a description of the principles for green bonds. 15 [18]  on the Swedish and the global economy, we will cooperate with others on financial sector regulation and we will continue the work to review the assets we have on our balance sheet. I would particularly like to highlight the opportunities that central banks have to understand and analyse the role of financial markets in the transition to a more sustainable future. It is important that we do not make the same mistakes again as before the global financial crisis when many, but not all36, economists and central banks misjudged how quickly and powerfully a mispricing of risk in the US housing market would spread through the global financial system. We need to act now to reduce the risk of a mispricing of climate-related risk triggering a new economic crisis. The central bank world was perhaps a little slow off the mark, but now when the ball is rolling, things are moving forward rapidly. The rapid emergence of the NGFS is one reason for optimism; an increasing number of central banks are now taking the climate issue very seriously. I would like to finish by once again extending my thanks to you for organising this seminar.

Countries that choose not to put a price on carbon could be subject to carbon tariffs that might indirectly increase their costs, something which is moreover being considered by the European Commission.15 16 Such measures are adopted by national parliaments and negotiated in international contexts by head of government and finance ministers. In the current situation, there are only a few countries that have carbon taxes17 and global carbon taxes have yet to be discussed in international negotiations. As policy-makers, we therefore need to be prepared for a global price on carbon not becoming a reality in the short term. Implementing other measures is therefore a matter of urgency. For example, the Swedish Economic Research Council’s Report 2020 highlights “aggressive subsidies aimed at the production of alternative energy sources” as a possibility.18 International research indicates that energy transition takes a long time and that other measures, such as subsidies to the development of new, green technology, can be effective.19  The Riksbank has a role to play An effective climate policy, i.e. taxes, emissions trading, tariffs and subsidies, falls within the framework of fiscal policy. Central banks cannot replace these types of measures, but that does not mean, in my opinion, that central banks do not have a role to play. On the contrary, several risks are created if central banks do not use the tools within their mandate to contribute to climate adaptation. First, if central banks ignore the climate issue, their own operations risk counteracting other climate policy.
This is not driven by any ideological design but we have always been careful to ensure that policy prescriptions fit our economic, legal and operational circumstances. Some of the policy approaches that have been our practice are only recently being seriously considered by the global community. A good example is capital controls or now more elegantly known as capital flow management measures. Our approaches, while sometimes can be considered as ‘different’ are premised on several considerations. First, is that we considered financial stability risks in our monetary policy decisions. While moves to formalise this as part or within the broader context of monetary policy frameworks have been a more recent phenomenon in the aftermath of the recent crisis, Malaysia has always been vigilant against the risks of financial imbalances. We have looked into this aspect for as long as I can remember. In 1992, for instance, the Bank had already introduced administrative limits, or macro and microprudential measures as it is known now, to address the risks of financial imbalances arising from specific sectors of the economy. Back then, limits on hire purchase loans and guidelines on credit card operations were put in place as complementary measures to the tighter monetary policy stance of the Bank. Even since then, financial stability has remained an important mandate of the Bank. This mandate was reinforced with the introduction of the Central Bank Act in 2009, which established Bank Negara Malaysia as the financial stability authority for Malaysia.

The first is through transparency in our macro-economic policies - in the provision of reliable data, and through clarity in both our monetary and fiscal objectives, in our analysis and in our decision-making, so that you are not exposed to wholly unpredictable behaviour and can make your own considered judgements as to how far our policies are likely to succeed. Your judgements, of course, can in turn have an important bearing on our policy decisions. Secondly we can help in providing robust infrastructures - and I have in mind not just the financial infrastructure, though sound financial systems are clearly hugely important, but much more widely the legal framework, accounting and disclosure standards, and governance structures, for example, as they apply throughout the private sector, so that again you can base your assessment of corporate credits on a fuller understanding of the risks. We have been making very considerable efforts in different international fora in recent years to establish codes and standards of best practice in all these areas which can be universally applied, but I don't need to remind you how far we all still have to go. And thirdly, in relation to sovereign debt, I think that the international community could, and should, do more to clarify the scale of official support that a country running into difficulties might reasonably look for, and the kind of conditions that it might expect to apply.
This framework should be accompanied by added transparency in all the phases of trading, with financial education assuming a special place. Only in this way would we be able to deepen and expand, in real terms, the financial market, and through it a higher efficiency in implementing economic and financial policies, in mobilising and using national savings, in financial inclusion, in economic activity growth, and in enhancing the welfare of the population in the long run. In the hope that the proceedings of this conference will be characterised by a fruitful exchange of ideas and views by the participants in this room, Thank you for your attention! 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Niklaus Blattner: Recent financial and economic developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Niklaus Blattner, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Geneva, 17 June 2004. *  *  *  The new National Bank Act obliges the Swiss National Bank to contribute to the stability of the financial system. In performing this task, the National Bank focuses on the stability of the banking sector and of the financial market infrastructure. Implementation rests on three pillars: first, regular analysis and assessment of the banking system (referred to as “macroprudential oversight of the banking sector”); second, oversight of systemically important payment and securities settlement systems (referred to as “system oversight”); and third, if preventive oversight is not adequate, crisis management measures. Today I will be talking mainly about the first and second areas of our activities with reference to the Financial Stability Report 2004. You have already received this document (subject to an embargo). I will also talk about emergency liquidity assistance, which is one of the instruments used to deal with crisis situations. And I will draw your attention to another publication appearing today: the summary of the 2003 statistical yearbook “The Banks in Switzerland ”. While this statistical publication focuses on reporting, the Financial Stability Report ventures into the domain of analysis and evaluation. Macroprudential oversight of the banking sector The Swiss National Bank follows developments in the banking sector from the macroprudential angle.
However, the idea had already been raised as an objective since the founding of the European Community in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Moving, trading, and establishing a presence or providing services in any EU country appears as something evident today. Yet the single market did not come into force until 1993. Admittedly, we tend not to properly value most things that seem evident to us. But the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons is one of the EU’s major achievements. At the start of the process, in 1985, around 300 measures to achieve this goal were identified. A whole series of internal obstacles and borders progressively disappeared. Changes were made to key mechanisms to allow for progress, introducing the qualified majority as opposed to the unanimity required until that point. It was opted to pursue the minimal rather than full harmonisation of national regulations, which the EU partners acknowledged as equivalent. The history of the single market shows, as Voltaire asserted, that perfect is on many occasions the enemy of good. The lack of headway in achieving the single market before 1985 was no doubt due to competition-busting practices maintained by national authorities, but also to the difficulty of reaching unanimous agreements in the Council and to the pursuit of overly detailed legislative harmonisation. The situation was unlocked after opting for goals which, a priori, were less ambitious. In fact, certain administrative barriers remain, e.g.

14.1.2020  Informational breakfast “The European Banking Union” Club Diálogos para la Democracia Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Good morning. Many thanks, Miguel, for your kind introductory words. My appreciation, too, to Unicaja and the Club Diálogos para la Democracia, in particular their chairman, Antonio Gavilanes, for inviting me to take part in today’s colloquium. As you well know, Diálogos para la Democracia was founded in 1976 as a debate forum that sought to provide ideas and solutions to the numerous problems arising in a society which, at that time, was in transition towards democracy. Evidently, societies evolve, and new problems arise which we must address. This is why this type of forum remains as necessary today as ever. Undoubtedly, since our democratic transition, one of the key landmarks has been our accession to what was then known as the European Economic Community on 1 January 1986, over 34 years ago. The importance of this landmark in shaping our society and our economy has been enormous. Despite this importance, I believe that knowledge in Spanish society of Europe’s institutions and regulatory framework is, very often, scant. This is why I greatly appreciate this opportunity to discuss a European project I consider most important, namely the Banking Union. Allow me to begin by acknowledging that this is a topic I am somewhat biased about.
10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  17

Both are bound to be tempted to take on greater risk to generate absolute returns. Of course this syndrome is widely recognised. Investment mandates and management remuneration are often measured against a risk-adjusted benchmark to avoid rewarding such activity. But it can take considerable efforts to spot such behaviour. The proliferation of new and highly complex financial instruments is making it harder to assess the incidence of underlying risk. The assumptions underlying the valuation of positions in such instruments are often unclear. Many of these products have the effect of selling insurance against unlikely financial market events. In so far as there has been a genuine increase in the stability of the economy and financial markets, selling volatility is less risky than it used to be. But it can be more risky than it appears. Our market contacts often cite the example of selling ‘out-of-the-money’ options as a popular strategy recently. Here the seller receives a steady stream of small payments today in return for paying up in the unlikely event that the price of an underlying instrument moves significantly from its current value. With sufficient leverage, a small payment stream can be turned into a tidy return. But as all insurers know, the key to long term return is to spread your risks widely or to avoid correlated risks. In assessing risk in financial markets, a common metric is correlation of positions with the market return. But this is quite inappropriate in this case.
There may be costs arising from investments in innovation that fail to bear fruit or from investments with payback cycles that end up being much longer than expected, as apparently may be the case, in principle, of some of the initiatives being developed in relation to Distributed Ledger Technology. And risks relating, inter alia, to personal information privacy, fraud or cyber-attacks. In addition, the proliferation of new technologies may also lead to the financial exclusion of those users at a distance from them, who could be adversely affected if the continuity of service provision through traditional systems is not guaranteed. In short, we are facing great technological change in the banking industry, the effects of which are still not clear. The development of new services is a great opportunity for renewal for the more dynamic banks, as it may provide them with efficiency improvements and mean that they can offer greater services to their customers. And, improving customer service is precisely one of the main challenges facing the banking industry, which brings me to the final point of my address: the importance of maintaining the confidence of bank customers. 5/7  3 Confidence Confidence is the most important and the most fragile of a bank’s assets and determines the nature of its relationship with its customers, beyond the ambit of mere commercial transactions. Bank customers deposit their savings with credit institutions, trusting that they will return those savings to them, when they need them, on the terms agreed.

Against this background of low profitability, banks have already made significant efforts to reduce their operating expenses, by adjusting their productive capacity. The number of banking groups has been reduced by 44% since 2007. And, from their peak levels in 2008, 3/7  the number of offices and employees in the banking industry have been reduced by 37% and by 31%, respectively. Orderly correction of the excess capacity in the Spanish banking industry has raised its level of efficiency relative to the banking systems of other European countries. However there is still room for further improvement. 2 New technologies - FinTech The second challenge facing traditional banking activity arises from the development of new technologies and entry into the banking market of so-called FinTech companies. Banks are sometimes presented as rigid, inefficient institutions, in contrast to new agile unregulated businesses, which seek to offer a better service to customers through a broad range of innovations. An extreme view is that these businesses could actually displace credit institutions from the provision of traditional financial services. In my opinion this is a simplistic, distorted view of a much more complex reality. Certainly we are facing a major technological transformation of banking activity. Permanent connectivity and the sheer number of mobile devices affect the way in which financial services are provided and used. Users increasingly demand the ability to access their current accounts and to initiate transactions at all times and in all places.