samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this regard, I wish to make special mention of the Stock Exchange Technical Committee (SETC) First Initiative, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management, the Team of local Lawyers headed by Mr Eke Halloway, as well as market practitioners in neighbouring countries who have been unrelenting in sharing their experiences and expertise with us. Naming people in these situations can be invidious, but let me crave your indulgence to mention Mr Maroof Matin, the Resident Consultant provided by First Initiative, Mr Jacob Kanu of First Discount House, Mr Melvin Tucker, former Deputy Governor and other members of the Stock Exchange Technical Committee. To all of these, I say thank you very much and please let us continue to work together for a more prosperous Sierra Leone. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 107/2007

History has shown that it is precisely in good times that the seeds of financial distress develop. In the present context of the desperate hunt for yield, risk transfer markets may encourage investors to take on more risk. Therefore, financial innovation should not only concentrate on extracting yield but also on pricing risk at a sustainable level. This is one of the most demanding challenges of the coming years for both the private sector and the public authorities. BIS Review 33/2007  3
To assess that, we need to identify the distinct impact of monetary policy on the economy, both in aggregate and looking across the household distribution. Step Two: Calibrating the Impact of Monetary Policy  The policy episode we consider is the relaxation of UK monetary policy after the global financial crisis. These actions by the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) comprised: first, the reduction of short-term interest rates by 5 percentage points (from 5.5% to 0.5%) between February 2008 and March 2009; and second, the purchase of £ billion of government securities between March 2009 and mid-2012. In combination, these measures represented a very significant relaxation of UK monetary policy, perhaps the largest in the Bank of England’s history. We consider their combined effects, as interest rates and QE were part of a single monetary policy strategy by the MPC. Nonetheless, given their potentially different distributional consequences, we also consider the effects of QE and interest rates separately. To trace out the impact of these monetary interventions on the economy and on households, we use a macro-to-micro simulation approach. This involves two mappings. The first is from the monetary impulse to a small set of macro-economic aggregates (interest rates, employment, wages, equity and house prices and consumer prices). This is done using the Bank of England’s macro-economic model. Charts 7-9 show the effects of the combined monetary stimulus on aggregate GDP, unemployment and CPI inflation.

For example, the MPC’s monetary loosening added around £ per year to the average household’s net interest income, £ to their labour income and £ to their net wealth. The lower part of Figure 1 looks at the effects of non-financial channels on well-being, namely the reduction in the probability of unemployment, translated into income-equivalent units. 44  The increased probability of  being in a job adds in excess of £ each year for the average household. All in, this gives a boost to welfare for the average UK household of close to £ This is large relative to annual household income of £  As a memo item, and point of comparison, Figure 1 also shows an estimate of the annual cost of undertaking monetary policy, using data from the Bank of England’s accounts. 45  On a broad estimate, this annual cost  amounts to around £ per household per year. This “servicing charge” for monetary policy is clearly a very small fraction of the annual benefit to households from looser monetary policy over the period. The disaggregated analysis set out means that, in principle, a monetary policy scorecard like this could be fitted to any individual’s circumstances. As an illustration, Figures 2-4 show scorecards for three different hypothetical households: a renter under the age of 30; a 30-50 year old mortgagor; and a 50-plus home-owning household.
The higher purchase of foreign currency on the foreign exchange market acted towards increase in the NBRM gross foreign exchange reserves. On December 30, 2000 they 1 reached USD 713.6 million, thus increasing by USD 235.5 million compared to the end of 1999 . In 2000, the upward trend of the deposits with the banks continued due to the gradual strengthening of the confidence of the economic agents in the banking sector. Thus, on annual basis (December 2000 / December 1999), the total non-government deposits with the money deposit banks increased by Denar 6,906 million, or by 23.1%. In addition, the foreign exchange deposits registered more intensive growth of 49.1%, while the Denar deposits increased by 13.9%. Analyzed by maturity, both short-term and long-term deposits increased by 27.0% and 4.4%, respectively. It should be underlined that in 2000, the banks’ credit activity registered considerable expansion. Thus, in December 2000 relative to the same month of the previous year the total banks’ credits in favor of the non-government sector (according to the actual balance) increased by Denar 6,042 million, or by 17.2%. A good and close coordination between the monetary and fiscal policy created a room for such an increase in the credits, significant increment in the liquidity of the banks, removal of the credit ceilings by the NBRM and increased banks’ deposit potential. With respect to the currency of denomination, the increment in the total banks’ credits is solely due to the increased Denar credits, whereas the foreign currency placements registered a fall.

In 2000, relative price stability was achieved and the inflation rate on annual basis (December 2000 / December 1999), measured through the retail prices index equals 10.8%. Measured through the costs of living index, as agreed with the IMF arrangement, the inflation in 2000 equaled 6.1%. In 2000, compared to the previous several years, the inflation is higher, however it should be underlined that the reason for that is not the monetary policy, but the impact of the non-monetary factors. These factors are the following: •  one-time effect of the introduction of the value-added tax on prices;  •  increase in the price of oil on the world markets, accompanied with the appreciation of the US Dollar;  •  increase in the price of electricity and maintaining higher tariff for calculation of the price of the electricity;  •  increase in the prices of particular services which are under direct control of the government  However, it is crucial that the potential fundamental generators of inflation such as the monetary policy, the fiscal policy, the exchange rate and the wages remained under control and coordination. Therefore, the Central Bank considers that the impact of the non-monetary factors that gave rise to the inflation in 2000 are of temporary character and that in 2001 the inflation will get back to the level from the previous several years.
ECE and Russia rates  network  supervision Russia Poland Hungary Slovenia Czech republic Slovakia  system  debt  4 Alex Cukierman, Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence: theory and evidence, MIT  Press 1992, page 393.

A lasting stabilization of the financial system obviously requires a holistic policy approach which successfully integrates monetary policy objectives into development framework for the financial markets. In the longer term, the response of both public and private sectors to this experience should help create a stronger financial system. Ladies and Gentlemen, On this note, I very much look forward to this two-day symposium. I hope that we will have many opportunities to touch upon various issues about monetary policy and regulatory  BIS Review 141/2008  3  implications of the ongoing events. I wish you a successful, productive and memorable meeting. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 141/2008
Our target is not only to adapt our business lines and redesign our processes, but also to play a role in the development and support of our ecosystem, through a participatory approach. Ladies and gentlemen, To conclude, I would say that we may have taken some time to grasp the scale of the digital revolution, but the numerous initiatives and interactions, such as this meeting, leave us with the hope that the backlog will be quickly cleared and that this revolution will effectively contribute to sustainable and inclusive development in our countries. In this respect, we are pleased to note the willingness of international organizations, including the IMF, main interlocutor of central banks, to upgrade their means and human resources with a view to providing support to their member countries. As such, I suggest, if you deem it suitable, that we request the Fund to institutionalize such a meeting in our region, at the frequency most appropriate to us. Hence, we would be able to continue the debates and exchanges, assess the progress made, ultimately unite our efforts, and capitalize on our mutual experiences in order to better address the current and future challenges of digital transformation. Thank you. 10

All told, this means that in the face of foreign shocks, EMEs are forced to compromise their monetary sovereignty, temporarily diverting monetary policy away from targeting domestic output and inflation and instead using it to try to stabilise capital flows. While this strategy is the best EMEs can do given the current structure of the international monetary financial system, outcomes for them are a distant second best when compared to those advanced economies that are less exposed to international financial spillovers. See ‘Pull, Push. Pipes’, speech by Mark Carney, Institute of International Finance Spring Membership Meeting, Tokyo, 6 June 2019. Within the Bank’s Capital Flows-at-Risk framework, these actions are estimated to have Capital Flows-at-Risk (that is, capital outflows as a percent of GDP in the fifth percentile of the distribution) by 3% of GDP. 21 Within this, investment funds are growing, accounting for the bulk of the growth in asset management over the last decade. In parallel, investment fund flows to EMEs now account for around one third of total portfolio flows, compared to around one tenth precrisis. 19 20  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  8  ------------------------------The deficiencies of the IMFS affect EMEs more directly than advanced economies, but their consequences influence everyone because they reduce the global equilibrium interest rate. Against the current backdrop of an inadequate and fragmented global financial safety net, EMEs have chosen to self-insure against capital flow volatility by accumulating reserves of safe assets, contributing to Ben Bernanke’s “global savings glut”.
A common view has been that monetary policy should only react to a rapid credit expansion and price increase in the housing market if the forecasts made by the central bank indicate problems of, for instance, overheating and too high inflation in the coming period. If this is not the case, the central bank should wait and see, but be prepared to quickly ease monetary policy if the housing market were to collapse and demand in the economy were to fall drastically. One should not, as the expression goes, “lean into the wind”, but make do with cleaning up afterwards if problems arise. 4  BIS Review 155/2008  The main argument in favour of this way of acting is that the central bank is not better than others at assessing whether or not the price increase is due to over-optimistic calculations – if a bubble has arisen. If the bank makes the wrong assessment and raises the interest rate despite the events being justified by fundamental factors, demand will be pushed down unnecessarily. And even if the central bank were to be sure that the problem is overvaluation, the timing of the measures may be problematic. The hope is, of course, that tighter monetary policy will contribute to counteracting an imbalance. But if the central bank acts too late and, for example, raises the interest rate just before a bubble would nevertheless have burst of its own accord, monetary policy may instead contribute to worsening the fall in demand.

Our policy works much better and more efficiently when we are open and clear about our objectives and the reasons for our decisions. An important piece of the puzzle is that we now have a "direct” and clear inflation target. Although the fixed exchange rate was aimed "indirectly” at providing low and stable inflation, this was not really as clear. But with a fixed exchange rate monetary policy is also governed by external events, which has both advantages and disadvantages. Up to the beginning of the 1990s, the Riksbank was on the whole a closed and rather secretive institution, just like most other central banks at that time. Today the situation is the opposite. We are now considered one of the world’s most open central banks. The fact that an independent authority must provide opportunities for insight and evaluation is natural in our society. Another aspect that may be of importance is that the openness puts a little extra pressure on us to develop and do our job as well and as efficiently as possible. And I can note that our methods have changed substantially. Willingness to change and rapid development in our working methods The fact that a lot has happened since the mid-1970s when we sat and drew diagrams and forecasts by hand on graph paper is not surprising. But even during my period in office the last six years our methods of working have shown a rapid development.
Failure in fiscal consolidation would lead us to scenarios involving further contraction and further losses in employment and welfare. The exceeding of the deficit targets last year has highlighted the difficulty of correcting fiscal dynamics in adverse cyclical situations. But it has also revealed the faults existing in the monitoring, early warning and budgetary control procedures then in force, especially for the regional governments, which the budgetary stability law currently before Parliament and which I shall refer to later must correct. In this respect, the experience of the last two years shows how important it is that budgets be prepared on the basis of a prudent macroeconomic scenario and that the measures are suitably designed to ensure their effectiveness. It is also important to have early information available on the budget outturn, so that any deviations can be corrected in time. These principles affect both the Stage Budget, the reason for my appearance here today, and the regional government budgets, which I am not going to discuss, although I do wish to take this opportunity to convey my concern regarding the obsolescence of some of the assumptions on which the latter were prepared during the latter months of 2011. These assumptions need to be updated and the appropriate measures urgently adopted to ensure that the regional governments achieve their targets. Allow me to refer briefly to the delicate cyclical situation that frames the context of the State budget for 2012.

Admittedly, as I have noted on previous occasions in this House, the evidence on the effectiveness of previous fiscal consolidation processes implemented in other developed economies shows that it increases when they are concentrated on public expenditure, in unproductive expenditure. However, the scale of the adjustment required in our country is so great that we need to make use of all the instruments available, including taxes. The 2012 Budget envisages an increase in revenue from tax measures falling basically on household and corporate income. Also, a special charge is imposed for the regularisation of hidden assets. The revenue-raising potential of these measures is expected to offset the fall in revenue due to the unfavourable trend in tax bases deduced from the macroeconomic scenario accompanying the Budget. Last year’s experience, when the bulk of the budget deviation stemmed from the adverse performance of government revenue, showed that it is essential to budget prudently for this variable. In this respect, the projected course of overall budget revenue is subject to downside risks. The reasons for this are various. First, because both the expected corporate income tax receipts and any other tax revenue will depend on the ultimate effectiveness of the numerous legislative changes, which is particularly uncertain in the case of the special charge on undeclared income.
Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, London, 20 June 2007. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Mr Chancellor, My Lords, Ministers, Aldermen, Mr Recorder, Sheriffs, Ladies and Gentlemen: Chancellor, this will be your last Mansion House Dinner with the Merchants and Bankers. And I want to start by warmly congratulating you on your record-breaking period in office, and on the imminent assumption of the leadership of your party and country. It has been a remarkable decade for the British economy. Your decision to grant independence to the Bank of England ten years ago is widely and rightly regarded as a fundamental improvement to the conduct of economic policy in this country, and we in the Bank are grateful to you for giving us the opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of an independent central bank. Your reform illustrates the key principle that institutions matter. Individuals, however talented, cannot consistently perform well if the institutional structure in which they operate is badly designed. For too long the UK economy lurched between success and failure rather in the way that the national cricket team has recently. Getting the institutions right was a crucial part of the 1997 reforms. Perhaps there is a lesson here for the ECB – the England and Wales Cricket Board.

There has been much, and in my view justified, criticism of their availability and condition. Over the past ten years, the value of Bank of England notes in circulation has doubled, from around £ billion to around £ billion. But none of that is accounted for by the £ note for which the value in circulation has remained constant for fifteen years at some £ billion. And the average lifetime of the note has doubled. As a result, many more notes are noticeably soiled and scruffy. ATMs account for over 60% of all cash obtained by the public. Few issue £ notes. It is more economical for banks to stock ATMs with £ and £ notes. The problem is not at the production end – we have an ample supply of new £ notes waiting to be used. We want to see them in circulation. There is a need for an adequate supply of low denomination notes that can be used for small transactions where cash is the predominant means of payment. Such mutual convenience is a public good, and may not correspond to the private interest of commercial banks. That is why we must not let this situation continue any longer. The public need £ notes. The solution may involve some alteration in the incentives for banks to obtain different denomination notes from the Bank of England, new arrangements to increase the availability of notes to retailers, and an improvement in the durability of the notes that we print.
Mr. George gives an address on recent changes in the international financial and economic environment Speech given by Mr E A J George, Governor of the Bank of England, at a Dinner with the Lord Mayor for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London on 10 June 1999. My Lord Mayor, Mr Chancellor, My Lords, Aldermen, Mr Recorder, Sheriffs, Ladies and Gentlemen. When we were last here for this splendid occasion I suggested that we were living in a dangerous international financial and economic environment. These were strong words for a central banker – but perhaps not strong enough. That environment rapidly became worse through the autumn, so that by around the time of the IMF Annual Meetings in October there was a good deal of talk about global financial meltdown and impending world recession – which was not simply journalistic hyperbole. Since that low point things have certainly improved. The hectic scramble for financial asset quality and liquidity following Russia’s default and the near collapse of LTCM – an exceptionally highly geared hedge fund – failed to uncover fatal weaknesses elsewhere in the financial system, and lenders and investors have gradually regained some of their appetite for risk. Fears of a general credit crunch in major industrial countries quickly receded; and sentiment towards the emerging markets has improved, with growing evidence of recovery in the original Asian crisis countries and a better than expected outcome in Brazil.

We are an integral part of the global economy. And we had particular problems of our own. In our case, in marked contrast to the Eurozone, and despite the dampening effect of an already exaggeratedly strong exchange rate, we were confronted, in the early part of last year, with the prospect of excess demand and accelerating inflation, and policy had been tightened to head that off. But we, like others, were then hit in the autumn by the renewed turmoil in the global economy. That caused a sharper fall in external demand, but it also caused both business and consumer confidence to plummet – so that prospect of moderate overall slowdown we’d been deliberately trying to engineer quite suddenly threatened to turn into an unnecessarily sharp downturn, with the risk that the rate of inflation would fall significantly below the Government’s 2½% inflation target. So we promptly reversed gear – cutting interest rates very sharply – by 2½% to as low as they have been since the mid-1960s. That has helped both business and consumer confidence to recover – from very low levels – and the prospect now is that, after a pretty flat economic performance either side of the year-end, overall demand and output growth will pick up steadily to around trend by the middle of next year. But, despite these interest rate cuts, the pound has actually strengthened – notably against the euro – in part, as I suggested earlier, because of weaker overall demand pressure on the Continent.