samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Whilst remote working only accounted for around 8% of total hours worked in 2019, this increased sharply during the pandemic, reaching 43% in 2021 Q1. Moreover, firms expected remote working to persist into 2022 and beyond, with around 20% of hours expected to be worked from home. 1  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  has been a negative impact on productivity resulting from measures taken to contain Covid. Firms in the DMP estimated that Covid has increased average unit costs by around 7% in the second and third quarters of last year. They expected this impact to reduce to 5% by the second quarter of this year, with a more persistent negative impact of 2%. All of this reflects new costs – for PPE, screens etc., and the impact on costs from social distancing reducing capacity. However, this negative effect from higher unit costs was offset for DMP members by what is often called a batting average effect – namely that the impact of Covid has shifted the composition of activity towards higher productivity firms. But this means that Covid has seen lower total output and higher average labour productivity. This is consistent with the greater than normal supply side impact of the Covid shock. But this is not creative destruction in a Schumpeterian sense; in other words that raises output through competition and innovation. Rather, this is a form of destruction that lowers total output and welfare.

Thank you  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  Annex Chart 1: Level of GDP and potential output(a) Index 1997Q1 = 100 160 150 140 130 120 110  Potential output GDP  100 1997  2000  2003  2006  2009  2012  2015  2018  (a) Potential output is defined as the level of GDP achievable if all factors of production were utilised at their long-run equilibrium levels. Its projection is a matter of judgement for the Monetary Policy Committee, consistent with the Committee’s forecast for the output gap. The historic path therefore reflects, in part, a sequence of judgements by current and past MPCs rather than the output of any one model. Source: Office for National Statistics and Bank calculations Chart 2: Impact of Covid-19 pandemic on labour productivity as estimated from Decision Maker Panel (b) Percentage impact of Covid-19 on labour productivity per hour 12 10 Between-firm Within-firm  8 DMP Labour Productivity (private sector)  6 4 2 0 Feb MPR Labour Productivity -2 (whole economy)  DMP TFP (private sector)  -4 -6  2020 Q1  2020 Q2  2020 Q3  2020 Q4  2021 Q1  2021 Q2  2022+  (b) See Bloom et al (2020) for details. The impact of Covid-19 in the February 2021 MPR forecast is estimated as the difference between the February 2020 and February 2021 forecasts.
We also anticipate the industry to meet the needs of the market and beneficiaries to increase their confidence in the insurance activities. It is important that insurance companies strike a balance between the size of business and geographic expansion, and human and financial resources and operating infrastructure. I would like to conclude the speech by emphasizing the importance of the insurance sector with respect to employment and training of male and female citizens through paying more attention to the development of human resources and training policies and increasing Saudization. SAMA has designed a compulsory exam on the basics of insurance activities to measure employees’ competence and insurance providers’ awareness of insurance fundamentals including laws, regulations and standards. Companies are required to organize vocational and technical development programs to raise insurance awareness and help provide qualified manpower to serve the insurance sector and the country well. Thank you for your attention. I wish you all a successful symposium. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The danger is that, if we do not proceed with due care, hurried decisions will be made that will be revealed to be poorly conceived the next time the financial system runs aground, which might not occur until decades from now. The other point I wish to make is that the Central Bank of Iceland will do its utmost to ensure that this policy-making process is carried out as meticulously as possible, and its staff have significant expertise on all of these issues. The Bank’s next major contribution to this process will be an in-depth report on Iceland’s options for a currency regime, which will be published this spring or early this summer. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Before I close, I would like to thank the Central Bank’s many collaborators for a successful cooperative relationship over the past year. Particular thanks are due to the ministries with which the Bank works most closely: the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, as well as the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I would also like to express my gratitude for the cooperation with the Parliament of Iceland, particularly the Economics and Commerce Committee. In addition, I wish to thank the Financial Supervisory Authority for successful collaboration in 2011, the first year of the new cooperation agreement between the two institutions. And last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank the staff of the Central Bank for their work during the year.
If the Riksbank launches an e-krona with a positive interest rate, it can in some situations be very attractive for both the general public and companies to convert their account balances in the banks to e-krona with the Riksbank. The banking system could then be drained of the funding for its lending, and become unstable, which could damage the supply of credit in the economy. In addition to the questions I have just mentioned, there are a number of other questions, such as technological solutions, consumer integrity and how a solution can be adapted to suite different groups in society. As you hear, I have only been able to take up a lot of questions here. I don't have all the answers. And I don’t think anyone else has at present. The only thing we can be fairly certain of is that whatever direction the Riksbank chooses to take - whether or not to issue e-krona - it can have a major impact on the payment market, the banks’ business models, the way interest rate setting functions, financial stability, and so on. The Riksbank will investigate e-krona Now I have given my view on the situation for Sweden as one of the countries where the use of cash is declining the most and the fastest and where the general public are finding it increasingly difficult to get access to central bank money.

This includes the banks’ deposits in the Riksbank overnight through the Riksbank's deposit facility and fine-tuning transactions in RIX, shown in the chart as MP debt (debt related to monetary policy transactions, see the Riksbank's Annual Report 2015). During the day, the banks have pledged assets and received liquidity in RIX. The average value of the collateral provided was SEK 112 billion during the second four months (see RIX four-month report 2, 2016). These are reported as funds in accounts in the chart. 4 If we look at the value of the payments between households, companies and a uthorities, it amounts to a total of SEK 14,000-15,000 billion a year, of which perhaps SEK 200 billion is in cash. In shops, almost one in seven payments is made in cash. More than half of the adult population has the Swish payment app. 4 [10]  the chart (Figure 1) and it shows clearly how cash in relation to GDP has declined substantially since 1950, when it comprised almost 10% of GDP, compared with around 1.5 per cent today. The blue line is the nominal demand for cash outside of the banking sector, that is, the cash held by companies, households and authorities. Demand from the general public has fallen from SEK 97 billion in 2007 to around SEK 61 billion today. This is a marked decline in just a few years. Similarly, the withdrawals from ATMs give some indication.
Urban Bäckström: The Swedish economy Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, to the Swedish Shareholders’ Association, Stockholm, 27 November 2001. *  *  *  First a word of thanks for the invitation to this evening’s meeting. I intend to talk about the Swedish economy and monetary policy. The past year has been marked by a successive weakening of economic activity in Sweden as well as abroad. Forecasters all over the world have made sizeable downward revisions to the prospects for growth both this year and next. Consider the picture of the economic future that Consensus Economics compiles once a month from the predictions of 200 professional observers. At the beginning of this year the combined assessment was that in 2001 and 2002, GDP growth in the United States and Sweden would amount to between 2.6 and 3.5 per cent. It was foreseen that the slowdown would be comparatively moderate and be followed by a quick recovery. Today, growth in the United States is judged to be just a modest 1 per cent or so this year and even weaker in 2002. In Sweden, GDP is now expected to rise 1.4 this year and 1.7 per cent next year. In other words, it now looks as though the slowdown will be both deeper and more protracted than many observers counted on less than a year ago.

In its featured plenary and multi-track programmes which include the Regulators Forum, the International Shariah Scholars Forum, the Global Islamic Liquidity Management Conference and the Global Islamic Finance Taxation Forum, a new highlight is the Bridging Economies Forum that aims to discuss the Islamic finance prospects and opportunities across regions, and to explore possible market linkages that can be generated through Islamic finance. Several important signings of MoUs will also be taking place during this Forum, highlighting increased commitment and international cooperation. Let me now conclude with an extension of our appreciation to the panel of distinguished speakers for their contribution to GIFF 2012. I would also like to once again, express our gratitude to the Honourable Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, His Excellency Mr. Ali Babacan for being with us today to speak at this event. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Like 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  financial institutions, we need to balance the significant benefits of financial innovation with its risks. We are also mindful that the calls we make in regulating and supervising the industry can themselves sometimes, restrain innovation. Our responses to new financial technologies will continue to be primarily concerned with the risks that they pose to financial stability and consumer protection. In finding the right balance in our overall regulatory and supervisory posture, we will continue to consult widely with the industry and experts in the field. A key priority for the Bank is to ensure that our regulatory and supervisory system is appropriately calibrated to encourage innovation, but also has the agility to shift gears when required to respond to new risks. This recognises that innovation without stability ultimately destroys value, confidence and undermines our future. What does this mean in practice? There are at least three things, which are each a reflection of our ongoing efforts to build an enabling, yet safe environment for innovation: First, building interoperable infrastructures. This will start with open and fair access to a shared payment infrastructure for banks and non-banks alike. It is also important to recognise the need for other digital public infrastructures as key enablers to harness the full potential of fintech. These include having a national digital identity system, framework for open API and open banking, clear cloud policy and nationwide broadband connectivity.

Financial institutions can and must assert the much needed leadership in a world where the continued neglect of equitable development and a rapidly deteriorating environment is displacing communities, raising social and political tensions, and putting future generations at grave risk. Finance still holds the trust of society and substantial influence over economic agents. But this is a privilege earned, and demands that financial institutions behave ethically, and act in the best interest of the communities they serve. The role of technology to revolutionise finance There is no question that technology will lie at the very heart of these imperatives for the financial system. This has been true for decades, only the order of its impact is now, arguably much greater. After all, the world’s first ATM in 1967 transformed the relationship between people and money and making finance more accessible. Today, fintech signals the next phase in the transformation of finance. Fintech holds enormous potential to enhance competition, increase productivity, address unfulfilled consumer demand and fundamentally change the way institutions provide financial 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  services – in ways we may not even have fully discovered. Similarly for Islamic finance, adoption of technology could present significant opportunities to reduce the cost of financial intermediation and expand access. For example, distributed ledger technology could enable automated execution of contracts through the use of digital protocols, or smart contracts, which can simplify complex Shariah contractual processes.
Thirdly, most countries have implemented extensive fiscal policy stimulus measures. The OECD estimates that these measures have accounted for just over half of the reduction in general government net lending in the OECD area. In the United States, where stimulus packages have been introduced on an unprecedented scale, the OECD estimates that these active stimulus measures have accounted for as much as three-quarters of the deterioration in public-sector finances. In the euro area it is instead the automatic effects on tax revenues and cyclical expenditures that have predominated. Consequences of the deterioration Extensive historical studies of financial crises show that they are often followed by a severe weakening of public finances and prolonged periods of subdued GDP growth. 2 The deterioration in public finances that we have seen during this crisis will keep GDP growth and inflation down in many regions for some time to come, as the weak finances will enforce fiscal policy contraction and/or may lead to higher interest rates. A tighter fiscal policy is inevitable to make public finances stable in the long term. Restoring the deficit to the level that prevailed prior to the crisis, and one might ask whether this will be sufficient, is not simply a case of replacing the fiscal policy stimulus measures implemented during the crisis with corresponding tightening measures after the crisis. In addition, expenditures have to be replaced as potential GDP and thus potential tax revenue have fallen due to the crisis.

Broken line represents OECD’s forecast  14  90  94  98  02  06  10  Source: OECD  BIS Review 56/2010  Sweden’s central government debt and gross public debt Percentage of GDP 90  90 Central government debt  80  80  Gross public debt  70  70  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0 50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  00  05  10  Sources: Swedish National Debt Office and OECD  General government net lending in Sweden, the euro area and the United Kingdom Per cent of GDP 10  10 Sweden Euro area United Kingdom  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10  -15  -15 90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  Note. Red broken line represents the Riksbanks’s forecast, blue and yellow broken lines represent OECD’s forecast.
Capital account liberalisation led to entrust international financial markets with the “disciplining” function. When it became apparent that the discipline could often lead to abrupt capital flows reversal and crisis, the international community attempted to strengthen the IMF surveillance and develop its facilities so as to pre-empt such shocks and make them more manageable. That is, basically, where we are today. Everything must be done to ensure that IMF surveillance works. But, like any “disciplinary” approach, it meets with three essential difficulties: first, diverging interests between countries; second, enforcement problems (the IMF has naturally more leverage on countries that need its help than on others). Finally there is a perception of asymmetry in IMF surveillance; it may be compounded by a more fundamental and natural asymmetry between surplus and deficit countries, when it comes to implementing adjustment measures. And, some would say, there might also be a de facto asymmetry between reserve and non reserve currencies, although, as I shall mention later, the situation is more subtle. These difficulties were apparent during the last part of the 20th century. But what makes the “disciplinary” approach almost impracticable today are the changes that have occurred in the world at the turn of the 21st century. The world today stands in stark contrast with both the Bretton Woods era and the period that followed immediately:   The first – and most obvious – difference is the number of countries that are active participants to the system and have a stake in its functioning.

We have expected that the import pattern would gradually become more stable, but if the shift continues, the price-dampening effects of increased imports from low-cost countries in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe may persist longer than assumed. The change in China’s exchange rate regime in July, with a 2 per cent revaluation of the Chinese currency, may over time have an impact on price developments for imported consumer goods. The global economy Economic growth among trading partners appears to be somewhat lower this year than in 2004. In the years ahead, growth is expected to be relatively stable. The outlook for growth in different regions indicates that the imbalances in the global economy, with a large deficit in the US and large surpluses in a number of other countries, will persist. There are particularly large imbalances both in the US balance of trade and current account. Persistent trade deficits have pushed up US foreign debt to a high level. This is partly due to the federal budget deficit. Moreover, US households have a high level of consumption and a low level of saving. This may be related to a more rapid rise in the US population than in other OECD countries. This suggests in isolation that saving in the US is somewhat lower and investment somewhat higher, but the impact is now considerably greater than implied by demographic factors alone. The imbalances may persist, and may increase. International capital markets are deep and liquid with an ample supply of credit for US borrowers.
With the benefit of hindsight, at least in our own analysis at the Bank, the complexity of global value chains was not well enough understood and, as a result, the duration and intensity of disruption was probably underestimated. Fortunately, supply disruptions appear to have eased in recent months and there have been some, albeit still tentative, signs of a normalisation in the patterns of US consumer demand. Global goods price inflation has weakened somewhat, and that has passed through into UK core goods inflation. Against that, the end of the zero-Covid policy in China may have again increased the uncertainty surrounding supply bottlenecks. On the one hand, less strict restrictions in China should ease supply constraints if lockdowns are fewer in number. But, on the other hand, the current surge in infection rates may create its own disruption to production and distribution. Ultimately what matters for an inflation targeting central bank like the Bank of England is the implications of these developments for world export prices and thus imported inflation. This is something we will have to  Page 6  continue to monitor closely. Tight labour markets In both the UK and the US, the labour market has remained tight. The UK unemployment rate recently reached its lowest level since the mid-1970s. Recruitment difficulties in a tight labour market have supported stronger underlying wage growth. The relative contributions of demand and supply to labour market tightness are a topic of intense debate.

[9] On this basis, the inflationary impact of a deterioration in the terms of trade could be seen as selfcorrecting, since it will generate weaker domestic demand that eases the inflationary dynamics that higher energy prices trigger. Since an adverse terms of trade shock can create self-sustaining inflationary dynamics in the economy, it can be understood as raising at least temporarily the level of unemployment that is required for inflation to be at target – the so-called NAIRU. But how much the NAIRU will rise (and for how long) depends on how actively and persistently domestic firms and workers seek to sustain their own real incomes in the face of that shock. In coming to a view on how much monetary policy needs to respond to these inflationary pressures, the MPC will need to assess how much the NAIRU has risen and how much of a rise in unemployment will anyway follow from the weakening of demand owing to squeezed household incomes. Recent MPC communication In December, the majority of the MPC stated that, should the data largely follow the outturns foreseen in our November forecast, further increases in Bank Rate may be required for a sustainable return of inflation to target. Moreover, the Committee as a whole repeated that, if the outlook suggests more persistent inflationary pressures, it will respond forcefully, as necessary. This communication rightly places the persistence of inflation at centre-stage.