samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Investors are demanding more transparency and they want the information they receive to be consistent and comparable. Issuers must account for the impact their actions have on the environment. There must be reliable disclosures and access to data for verification. SGX is spearheading efforts to enhance transparency in sustainable investments. Listed issuers on SGX have been making disclosures on sustainability since 2016. SGX is now developing a common sustainability disclosure portal, that will facilitate sustainability reporting for private companies and SMEs in the future. This will help promote more efficient pricing of corporates’ ESG activities, through for example, incorporating a green premium or a brown discount. It will also help to prepare private companies and SMEs for increasing scrutiny from investors, as well as customers and consumers who demand greater accountability. In conclusion, Singapore has a comprehensive capital markets ecosystem supported by active public-private partnership and well laid out strategies. These are exciting times for Asian capital markets. The Asian middle class continues to grow. There is a wave of entrepreneurial energy and innovation. Technology is enabling more inclusive capital markets. The imperative of transitioning to a lower carbon future will be an increasingly important preoccupation for the region’s capital markets. The Singapore capital markets aim to finance the next chapter of Asia’s growth— underpinned by sustainability, enabled by technology, and fuelled by innovation. Thank you. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

A good example of this was Law 2/2011 on Sustainable Economy, which marked a milestone on the road towards advanced regulation of conduct. For example, this legislation includes for the first time so-called “responsible lending” and modernises claims services. Several European Directives addressing this field have also been approved. Banco de España Circular 5/2012, which replaced Circular 8/1990, includes all these features. I honestly believe that the current rules accurately regulate transparency obligations regarding bank products and services both in the pre-contractual stage and over the life of the operation. Evidently, in parallel with these regulatory developments, there have been most significant changes in society, public opinion and jurisprudence, especially in the past decade. Our supervisory framework has also evolved. Now, in addition to focusing on formal compliance with conduct obligations, it also envisages the management and mitigation of these risks by banks and their incorporation into the business model. I shall briefly refer to these aspects today. But I will also broach the need to enhance customers’ financial knowledge. In my view, this is a key element of which little mention is usually made. The cost of litigiousness Clearly, the changes in customer safeguard regulations and in jurisprudence mean that what was appropriate in the past has ceased to be so today. Undoubtedly, banks have acted questionably; but to be completely fair, we should acknowledge that the legal playing field on which banks operate has changed significantly.
In spite of this, such flows may not be considered as one-time effects, but as flows that are characteristic for the process of transition and which have to be incorporated in the monetary policy conduct. The implications of the capital inflow and appreciation of the domestic currency, as well as the reactions of the macroeconomic policy decision-makers will vary from case to case and will depend on the features of the economy itself. Balance of payments deficits, potential factors that may cause their deepening and the liberalization of the capital flows, obviously pose numerous challenges for the monetary policy, both regarding the monetary strategy and the exchange rate regime and regarding its operational setup. The central banks, as key institutional macroeconomic policy makers, and at the same time institutions that permanently work on strengthening and maintaining of their own credibility, unavoidably should focus on the contemporary challenges of the monetary policy, making attempts for timely comprehension of the possible solutions and repercussions. Having in mind this objective, I am glad that on the today's conference are present distinguished experts, governors and representatives of central banks from a number of countries across the world, as well as high rank officials from important international institutions, whose expertise and experience may contribute to good quality discussions regarding the specified contemporary challenges for the monetary policy.

Consistent macroeconomic policies, confidence in the Denar and increased competition in the banking system had to cause easing of the monetary policy and lower interest rates in the economy. The expectations for maintaining the current direction of the Macedonian economy, the firm stance of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia for continuation and intensification of the structural reforms, the realistic expectations for achieving faster growth and the expectations for setting a date for the Republic of Macedonia to start negotiations for getting the status of a member of the European Union, then, intensification of the process of liberalization of the capital flows in 2008, as well as the larger financial integration of the European capital markets through issuance of Eurobonds, definitely build a foundation of realistic expectations for much higher capital inflows in the forthcoming period. 3  BIS Working Party on Monetary Policy in Central and Eastern Europe, 21-22 February 2005, Sinaia, Romania. 4  Buiter W.H. and Grafe C., "Anchor, Float, or Abandon Ship: Exchange rate regimes for the Accession Countries", European Investment Bank Papers, 7 (2), 2001. 2  BIS Review 100/2006  These expectations are supported also by the positive interest differential and attractiveness of the securities that are listed on the domestic securities market. Under such circumstances, key challenges of the monetary policy, in the context of the capital account liberalization and potential risks for deepening of the current account deficit in the Republic of Macedonia, are the following: 1.
In part, they find this results from location, as twothirds of counties with high levels of Black business activity pre-COVID are in the top 50 COVIDaffected areas. It also reflects thinner financial cushions (e.g., smaller cash positions, weaker bank relationships, pre-existing funding gaps) for many of these businesses entering the crisis. The Fed's Policy Response: What We've Done Turning to the Fed's policy response, there are of course limits to what central banks can do to address the uneven impact of a public health shock, or the structural inequities that were in place long before it hit. But we are determined to do what we can to limit the effects. We know from history and statistical studies that avoiding large and persistent spikes of unemployment is critical to preventing inequality from getting worse. The less advantaged tend to lose their jobs first when a recession hits, and the longer they are separated from the labor force, the harder it becomes to get hired back. Knowing this pattern, the Fed moved with unprecedented speed and scale when the crisis hit. The FOMC cut the policy rate to essentially zero and conducted asset purchases at a record pace. It also used its lender-of-last-resort powers to provide liquidity to dysfunctional markets. With assistance from the Treasury, we provided trillions of dollars in backstop lending support for households, businesses, and state and local governments. The Fed also took action to encourage banks to use their substantial capital and liquidity buffers to support the economy during this time of hardship.

At the moment, the disruption of the global value chains globally and the growth of costs are creating interruptions in certain industries and are one of the major risks to the expected economic recovery. Hence, timely monitoring of all risks and their timely identification is a current priority, in order to reduce the burden on the banks' balance sheets. According to the latest EIB survey, some of the banks in the wider CESEE region expect a certain increase in nonperforming loans in the period ahead. Upward shifts are also possible in our country, but for the time being the stress tests show sufficient resilience of the banking system, in conditions of a strong regulatory framework, cautious behavior of banks and signs of economic recovery. The central bank's policy is currently relaxed, thereby contributing to favorable conditions of financing and economic recovery, in circumstances when we have enough comfort in the foreign reserves to respond to possible shocks. Of course, given the uncertain environment, we constantly and carefully follow the trends of all indicators, relevant to the monetary policy. At the moment, almost in all countries, the growth of savings increases the sources of funding for banks and their capacity to support the economy, especially at the points that will meet the new post-pandemic requirements and will increase the growth potential. The transition to a green economy is undoubtedly one of the issues that with the pandemic has moved from the margins to the core of priorities.
Given the weakness in domestic demand, limiting large currency appreciation becomes a necessity for some economies to support economic recovery. And with weak domestic demand, pursuance of banking reform was an important policy to normalize lending and credit growth. On top of this, liberalization to allow more capital outflows also became an instrument of choice in managing the macroeconomic impact of rapid capital inflows. On the demand side of global capital, policy configuration in the US was instrumental in allowing the external surplus of emerging markets to be absorbed through the US current account deficits. The key mechanism, as I noted, has been the easing of US monetary policy that has helped support global growth through the expansion of US demand. With private investment in the US still recovering from the stock-market correction in early $ lower interest rate and greater access to credit significantly increased US consumption at the expense of a fall in private savings. As a result, the US external imbalance widened while reserves accumulation by emerging markets increased. The next question is can this go on? And is reserves accumulation a temporary or a permanent feature of the international monetary system? To answer this question, one has to distinguish between stock and flows. On the flows side, given reserves accumulation essentially mirrors external surpluses of emerging markets, the pace of reserves increase going forward is more likely to ease. This is because the adjustment process that is now ongoing will reduce the imbalance.

the net borrowings, lie almost entirely with the US, the surpluses or the net lenders are identified with Japan, China, East Asia, the oil exporting economies, and other emerging markets including Latin America. And the third is the financing of the deficits, as well as the reinvestment of official reserves, which are now a major component of global capital lows. The key issues therefore are whether this process can go on? Is it a permanent or a temporary phenomenon? And what would be the implications for the global economy and financial markets. Today, I want to comment on these issues. Specifically, I will discuss the major forces underlying external surplus and reserves accumulation from an Asian perspective. Next, I will comment on policies that are needed globally to address this problem. To begin, reserves accumulation is essentially the mirror image of the evolution of the US external deficits. Two popular views explaining this phenomenon have been put forward. The first is the export-led development model, i.e. the new Bretton Woods, which sees reserves accumulation as a consequence of an attempt to maintain export-led development, especially in Asia. The second explanation is the global-saving glut hypothesis, of which the glut is driven by the transformation of emerging markets from net borrowers to net lenders in the international capital market. Both interpretations I think have merits, and reserves accumulation is probably a reflection of both.
That date is, to an extent, at the discretion of the national authorities. This approach builds on the premise that the considerable benefits of a currency union can only materialise when a close similarity exists with other euro area participants and a high degree of convergence has been attained with them. When this point has been reached, a prospective new member is much less susceptible to shocks which are not common to other members. This ensures that the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is equally suitable for all euro area members - old and new. The two Cabinet meetings held recently assessed Malta's state of readiness in this regard, on the basis of a report prepared jointly by the Central Bank of Malta and the Ministry of Finance. The meetings also discussed issues related to Malta's participation in the exchange rate mechanism, also known as ERM II. The first decision which has to be made in fact concerns the timing and method of participation in ERM II because a Member State cannot adopt the euro without having successfully spent a minimum period of two years in this mechanism. While this decision is taken in a multilateral context involving various EU authorities, Member States and the ECB, the Maltese authorities nevertheless need to have a position. The Central Bank of Malta contributes to the formation of that position through its role as advisor to the Minister of Finance on financial and economic matters.

The Banking Sector Restructuring Program and other measures that were taken following the 2001 crisis, led to the formation of a very strong and resilient financial system. This contributed to the high growth rates achieved after the crisis. I can comfortably say that today the banking sector in Turkey compares well with those of new members of the European Union. The Banking Law enacted in 2005 is in line with the best international practices. Asset size of the Turkish banking sector increased by more than three-folds in the last six years and reached USD 500 billion as of 2007. Still, there is a huge and unexplored potential in the sector taking into account the size of Turkey’s young population and low rate of credit utilization among households and private business. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of the banking sector stood at 18.8%, well above the minimum legal requirement of 8% and the average of the European Union, which is 12.1%. Short-term liquidity ratios comfortably meet the legal thresholds. Thanks to sound and resilient structure of the sector, foreign direct investment to the Turkish banking system has surged since 2005 and the share of foreign investors in the total capital of the sector is now more than 40%. Rather than financing government deficits, the banking sector has returned to its core function, which is being intermediary between borrowers and lenders.
Crucially, the Committee has also initiated an annual stock take of the supply side of the economy. It now publishes its best collective judgments on the natural rate of unemployment, the output gap, as well as the expected growth in productivity, labour supply and potential output. To draw out these points consider three examples of forward guidance by the MPC. The first occurred five years ago when the economy began to recover from the worst downturn since the Great Depression. During previous periods of accelerating growth and firming business confidence, the MPC had always tightened policy significantly (as evidenced in the correlation between survey indicators and MPC votes seen in Chart 1). On the basis of this past behaviour, the MPC would have raised interest rates by 2 to 3 percentage points between August 2013 and the end of 2014. For anyone who might suggest the MPC should have followed that reaction function, note that, even on unchanged policy, CPI inflation in the summer of 2016 was running at only about ½% and core CPI inflation around 1¼%. 3  In other words, the amount of volatility in interest rates should match the amount of uncertainty surrounding the economy. There should ideally be no additional volatility, or risk premium, due to uncertainty about how policy would respond.

Datuk Zamani Abdul Ghani: Role of development financial institutions in the financial system Speech by Datuk Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the International CEO Forum of the Development Finance Institutions 2005, Kuala Lumpur, 12 September 2005. *  *  *  I would like first of all to express my sincere appreciation to the Association of Development Finance Institutions of Malaysia for inviting me to say a few words this morning on "The Role of Development Financial Institutions (or DFIs) in the Financial System". It is indeed an honour to address such a distinguished gathering of CEOs and senior officials of DFIs from many parts of the world. Before going further into the subject at hand, allow me to congratulate the organisers for jointly putting up this international forum. This forum provides a platform for CEOs and senior officials to exchange views and ideas on SME development and just as important, the roles of DFIs in this endeavour. I would also like to specifically welcome the foreign participants to Malaysia and wish that you will have a pleasant and enjoyable stay in Kuala Lumpur. My remarks this morning will consist of three parts. The first provides an overall perspective on the universal establishment of DFIs in many parts of the world; the second will look at the prospects and some of the challenges for DFIs in carrying out their roles; and the final part will provide an insight into the roles of DFIs from the Malaysian perspective.
Those who have been unemployed for a long period of time may lose their job skills and become less employable in the future. This can push up the non-inflationary rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Not only is this bad for those who are unemployed due to the loss of their job skills, it is bad for the nation as a whole because the rise in the NAIRU lowers the effective productive capacity of the economy and, with it, the capacity of the country to service its debts. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In the current economic cycle, I think it is apparent that the path back to the Fed’s dual mandate objectives has been much slower than the one that the FOMC found acceptable in the past. Growth has consistently been disappointing relative to both our own and consensus forecasts. Recent performance and forecasts relative to the dual mandate objectives suggest that standard rules calibrated in earlier times understate the degree of accommodation required to achieve the desired return path to the dual mandate objectives. We should focus on how fast we are moving toward our employment and inflation objectives, and be wary of the risks that we see around that path. If progress toward the mandate objectives is slower than desired, then this is telling us that monetary policy needs to be kept at a more accommodative setting for a longer time period than a standard rule would suggest. As downside risks continue to be present, the case for accommodation is even stronger.

This suggests that policymakers, faced with the economic conditions of that period, weighted deviations from their goals in a manner similar to the weights used in these versions of the Taylor Rule. Despite these attractive features, I do not believe that simple policy rules can take the place of in-depth analysis of economic conditions, evaluation of alternative policy plans, and ultimately policy judgment. While simple policy rules provide useful information to policymakers, their very virtue – simplicity – means they cannot capture all information that is relevant for policymaking. For example, such rules cannot easily incorporate asymmetric risks or financial stability issues. Moreover, the usefulness of simple policy rules depends critically on the stability of the relationship between monetary policy and economic outcomes.
Exports of other commodities add to the vulnerability of our economy to terms of trade shocks.3 The total commodity-related share of exports has risen from less than 40 percent in 1978 to a good 65 percent in 2012. Rules-based fiscal policy We know that commodity producing countries tend to experience pronounced economic cycles. However, as noted by Jeffrey Frankel (2011)4, this can be reduced through wellchosen regimes for fiscal and monetary policy: “We need to set up regimes ex ante which are more likely to deliver the right result ex post, in a world inhabited by human beings, not angels.” In Norway, the act of parliament relating to the oil fund, passed in 1990, provided a new framework for fiscal policy. The policy guidelines were clarified in 2001, and rules governing the interaction between Norway’s petroleum wealth and fiscal policy were established. These rules state: Chart: The Government Pension Fund Global and the fiscal rule  2  For more information about the Norwegian petroleum sector, see “Facts 2012: The Norwegian petroleum sector”, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/documents-andpublications/Reports/2012/facts-2012-the-norwegian-petroleum-secto.html?id=714606. 3  Using a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model that allows them to distinguish between different groups of countries, Aastveit et. al (2012) find that demand from emerging economies (most notably from Asian countries) is more than twice as important as demand from developed countries in accounting for the fluctuations in the real price of oil and in oil production. See Aastveit, Knut Are, Hilde C. Bjørnland and Leif Anders Thorsrud (2012): “What drives oil prices?

In January, the Bank forecast that inflation would average 2.6 percent between 1997 and 1998, and 2.3 percent in the course of the year. It seems clear that inflation during the first quarter of this year has been lower than expected in January. Government Finances In 1997, the Treasury recorded a welcome surplus of 1.3 billion kronur on a cash basis despite tax cuts, a rise in the wage bill and special interest payments associated with government bond redemptions. In order to compare the outcome with the budget it is necessary to exclude the special interest payments of 3.5 billion kronur. Thus adjusted, the Treasury’s surplus was 4.7 billion kronur. A Treasury surplus had not been recorded since 1984. On an accrual basis, which includes accrued interest and pension liabilities, the Treasury’s finances appear to have been close to balance in 1997. The Treasury repaid debt during the year. Amortization of foreign debt exceeded new borrowing by 6.5 billion kronur, or the equivalent of 5 percent of the Treasury’s foreign debt; this marked the first time since 1986 that amortization of foreign debt exceeded new borrowing. Domestically, new borrowing exceeded amortization by 3.4 billion kronur. While this turnaround in the Treasury’s finances is certainly to be welcomed, it is, nonetheless, a somewhat mixed blessing.