samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As QEs can reduce the short term pain and pressure brought by adjustments, there is a real risk the implementation of the much needed reforms in the private sector and the fiscal reform in the public sector could be delayed, or dropped altogether. This means the fundamental cause of the imbalances in the global financial system is not being addressed at all. The problem is particularly acute in the fiscal positions of many advanced economies that have built up high levels of public debt. According to the “Ricardian Equivalence” theory, when people believe the fiscal positions of their governments are unsustainable and that at some future stage the governments have no choice but to raise taxes to pay back the debt, this will materially curtail the citizens’ desire to spend and invest now because they need to save more to prepare for the “rainy” days ahead. (c) Finally, the third important cost or risk factor is the misallocation of resources and investments: Given the near zero interest rates and abundant liquidity in the financial system, it is to be expected that the asset markets, especially the stock and housing markets, will benefit. With US stock markets continually reaching historical highs and with a strong rebound in the housing market, the positive wealth effects should help boost consumption and investment.

Indeed, we at the ECB consider it of the utmost importance to ensure that the participation of the outs occurs on equal terms as the Euro Area countries. On resolution, we need to find creative solutions to ensure a level-playing field between ins and outs. This holds also true for the backstop for the single resolution fund which is currently the subject of much discussion. Taking part in the Banking Union from the beginning would bring many benefits. Having a chair at the table now allows participants to steer the practical implementation of the SSM – for example the development of the supervisory manual, guidelines and general instructions, as well as benefit from the “healing effect” that the comprehensive assessment should bring. Let me make a third remark: The banking union should be about strengthening the internal market, rather than fragmenting it. Both the single currency and the single market are key pillars of growth and prosperity in Europe. Both should be maintained and enhanced. Hence, the banking union should not create new barriers within the internal market. If countries choose not to join, they should not be discriminated against. Two safeguards will be crucial in this regard: having a single rulebook that sets the same standards for all, and having a strong and effective European Banking Authority with a fair representation of the outs. The relationship between banking and fiscal union Let me now turn to the relation between banking union and fiscal union.
Key challenges and prospect for the world and domestic economy We meet today at the time when the international economic and financial environment has become immensely more challenging. To a large extent, this has been due to the significantly higher degree of uncertainty that has prevailed on several fronts in the world today. Firstly, is the uncertainty about the prospects for global growth in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. The persistence of this uncertainty is now having its implication on sentiment and confidence. Secondly, are the conditions in the commodity and financial markets that have become more volatile. The massive shifts in global liquidity are precipitating volatile capital flows with its immense implications on the asset and foreign exchange markets. Thirdly, is the increased uncertainty prevailing in the policy environment in the global economy in terms of the extent and timing of policy changes. In particular, is the uncertainty with respect to the timing of the exit from the highly accommodative policies and the implications of the divergent monetary policy stance that are being pursued in the major economies. Fourthly, is the uncertainty related to the implementation of the structural reforms to address the structural rigidities and deficiencies that surfaced during the Global Financial Crisis. Fifth and finally, are also considerable geopolitical uncertainties prevailing in the world today. Cumulatively, these developments have compounded the uncertainties surrounding the global economy. In this environment of great uncertainty, a more moderate recovery of the global economy has been projected for 2015.

There is no doubt that these developments will have a dampening effect on the world economy. However, their precise impact is difficult to measure at the current juncture. On the one hand, economic and model-based analysis still suggests only moderate effects on prices and output in the euro area. This is due to the fact that, first, most of the crisis regions are quite small in economic terms, i.e. when compared with world GDP or their contribution to world trade. Second, trade links between these countries and the euro area are also of limited size. Third, the euro area itself is a very large economy, which is only directly exposed to variations in global trade to a certain degree. However, on the other hand, this analysis should not mislead us. We are perfectly aware that the risks associated with current global developments go beyond those effects which we can measure directly. In this respect one may think of indirect influences resulting from changes in confidence, saving and expenditure BIS Review 72/1998  -2-  within the euro area. We have to take these risks seriously and analyse the situation soberly, but we should also not dramatise. Let me now turn to the latest available data. These seem to indicate that economic expansion within the euro area has remained broadly on track, despite the worsening of the external environment. Domestic demand remains strong, while the contribution to growth from net exports has declined.
All of this this work is being closely co-ordinated by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which, as it set out in yesterday’s statement[8], is working to ensure cryptoassets are subject to robust regulation and consultation. The FSB will publish a consultation report later this year with recommendations for promoting international consistency in regulatory and supervisory approaches to non-stablecoin cryptoassets, markets and exchanges as well as for strengthening international coordination in this area. And, putting on my domestic hat, given that the the Bank of England is responsible for regulation and supervision of systemic payment systems in the UK, our intention is to apply the ‘same risk, same regulatory outcome’ approach in the UK. The Government has announced its intention to legislate in the current session of Parliament to update the powers of the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority to regulate and supervise stablecoins. We hope to issue a consultation document on the regulatory policy framework later this year. Taken as a whole, the UK authorities have made clear that they are prepared to see stablecoins – issued by either banks or non -banks - operate in the UK, provided they are properly regulated and supervised[9]. This should not, however, be interpreted as any weakening in standards for risk mitigation. I doubt any of the stablecoins currently in operation in other jurisdictions would meet the necessary standards for operation at systemic level in the UK – whether in the crypto world, should that become systemic, or in conventional financial services.

But to be successful and sustainable innovation has to happen within a framework in which risks are managed: people don’t fly for long in unsafe aeroplanes. Let me elaborate on these in turn. The first lesson is that finance carries inherent risks. Technology can change the way these risks are managed and distributed, but it cannot eliminate them. I will highlight three clear examples. Most obviously, financial assets with no intrinsic value – that is to say with no real economy assets backing them and no means of generating revenue - are only worth what the next buyer will pay. Page 3  They are therefore inherently volatile, very vulnerable to sentiment and prone to collapse. The majority of crypto-assets in in circulation today fall into this category and are proven to have very erratic swings in value – in both directions - as can be seen from the evidence of the last few months. The proponents of crypto assets like Bitcoin have argued that their technological design enables them to function as a hedge against economic volatility and inflation – a sort of ‘digital gold’. The reality, however, is that they behave as a very speculative, risky asset. Since November, against the background of a weakening global economy, higher inflation, and tighter monetary policy, gold has lost 7% of its value, the S&P 500 has lost 18% while Bitcoin has lost 70%[1].
In the emerging economies, performance remained uneven, while growth continued to cool in China. The global economy is expected to gather pace again, reinforced by expansionary monetary policy around the world and ongoing low oil prices. For instance, after a disappointing first  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  quarter, the two large economies, the US and China, are starting to show signs of improvement. Nonetheless, uncertainty about the future development of the global economy remains high. Various risks – first and foremost the difficult financial situation in Greece and geopolitical tensions – could jeopardise the recovery. Swiss economic outlook According to initial estimates, Switzerland’s real GDP declined slightly in the first quarter. As expected, goods exports suffered from the strong Swiss franc appreciation, but also from a downturn in global trade. Domestic demand, by contrast, developed robustly. Having said this, the situation varies considerably from one industry to another. Profit margins are under significant pressure in several sectors, and this is forcing companies to take steps to reduce production costs and raise efficiency. Against this backdrop, unemployment has increased slightly on a seasonally adjusted basis. Over the coming months, the global economic recovery is likely to lead to a gradual upturn in demand for Swiss products; this will cushion the impact of the exchange rate shock somewhat. As the global economy gathers momentum, we expect Switzerland to return to positive growth in the second half of the year. The SNB continues to anticipate growth of just under 1% for 2015 as a whole.

Inflation will reach its low point in the third quarter of 2015, at –1.2%. For the subsequent period, the new inflation forecast is slightly higher than in March due to the rise in oil prices. The short and medium-term forecast is up slightly, by 0.1 percentage points to –1.0% for 2015 and to –0.4% for 2016. The forecast continues to indicate that inflation will move back into positive territory at the beginning of 2017; there will be a slight slowdown in the rate of increase as the year progresses. The inflation forecast for 2017 is down by 0.1 percentage points, to 0.3%. The conditional forecast assumes that the three-month Libor will remain at –0.75% over the entire forecast horizon, and that the Swiss franc will weaken. Global economic outlook As our inflation forecast is heavily influenced by economic developments abroad, let me now present our assessment of the global economy. Global economic growth was weaker than expected in the first quarter of 2015, and this development had a detrimental impact on world trade. In the US, GDP declined slightly, partly due to special factors. Moreover, the strong US dollar weighed on exports. In the euro area, however, the economy continued to pick up, supported by persistent euro weakness and improved lending conditions. In contrast to the previous quarter, all of the large member states contributed to growth. Italy reported GDP growth for the first time since entering a multi-year recession. In Japan, too, the economy gained momentum.
Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Singapore – a widely respected centre of Asian and global finance Keynote address by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) Annual Dinner, Singapore, 30 June 2015. *  *  *  Chairman and Council Members of the ABS, Ladies and gentlemen, 1. Thank you for inviting me to join you this evening. 2. We meet at a time of renewed uncertainty in global finance. Greece has imposed capital controls and declared a banking holiday to stem a full-blown financial crisis. 3. No one has been able to predict each step in the game of brinkmanship that we have seen over the last few weeks. But the underlying reality of a sharply deteriorating economy in Greece, and the prospect of bankrupt Government, has not been a surprise. It is too early to say if some form of Grexit becomes a reality, but it is a contingency that Eurozone governments and financial institutions have been preparing for. 4. The direct impact of a collapse of the Greek economy is not significant, even in the Eurozone. The ECB and the EU are also likely to take all steps necessary to safeguard the Eurozone financial system in the coming weeks. Markets have hence not shown great panic, with credit spreads widening only slightly in the Eurozone periphery. 5. But there are downside risks we should be mindful of.

They recognise and support our desire to develop deep skills and a strong pipeline of Singaporean talent, as part of a vibrant and competitive global financial centre. It is in our collective interest that we do this, and in the interests of each financial institution over the long term. 33. As part of the national SkillsFuture effort, MAS in partnership with the industry and educational and training institutes is now embarking on further initiatives. We will strengthen support for every finance professional to learn continuously, develop his or her expertise, and have a good career. This includes developing Singaporean leaders in finance, with the capabilities to take on responsibilities in Asia and further afield. Continual Learning and Deepening Specialist Skills 34. Let me describe these initiatives briefly, starting with our efforts to promote continual learning and to develop deep pools of financial sector expertise in Singapore. Finance Scholarship Programme (FSP) 35. First, under the Finance Scholarship Programme (FSP), MAS supports early-career Singaporeans in developing specialist capabilities through post-graduate studies. This includes specialisations in quantitative finance, risk management, actuarial science and specialty insurance, and emerging priorities such as cyber security, data analytics and fraud risk detection. Since the scholarship’s inauguration in 2006, more than 150 FSP scholarships  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  have been awarded. MAS will provide 30 scholarships per year to add to the pipeline of specialist talents in the financial sector. SkillsFuture Study Awards 36. Second, MAS will offer up to 70 SkillsFuture Study Awards each year for financial sector professionals.
Norges Bank will increasingly use the Fund’s properties in developing investment strategies ahead, with particular emphasis on taking advantage of the Fund’s size and long-term investment horizon. BIS Review 45/2008  5  Norges Bank’s mandate sets the tracking error limit at 1.5 percentage points. Given this limit, the actual portfolio return is likely to deviate by less than 1.5 percentage points from the benchmark portfolio in two of three years, but it also implies a risk that active management may reduce the return by more than 1.5 percentage points every sixth year. In light of the size of the Fund, this will be a substantial amount in krone terms. Losses from active management must be expected in periods. Losses are not necessarily an indication that active management is not conducted professionally or not using the right strategies. The performance of the Fund’s investment management must be evaluated over a long time horizon. Even if the contribution from active management was negative for the first time in the Fund’s history last year, it does not change our confidence in and conviction that our organisation will contribute to achieving excess returns in the longer run. Thank you for your attention.

In the light of the prevailing uncertainties, it is essential that the bank lending channel continues to function well. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed the need to preserve an appropriate degree of monetary accommodation in order to secure a return of inflation rates towards levels that are below, but close to, 2% without undue delay. Monetary policy is focused on maintaining price stability over the medium term and its accommodative stance supports economic activity. As emphasised repeatedly by the Governing Council, and as again strongly echoed in both European and international policy discussions, in order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute much more decisively, both at the national and at the European level. The implementation of structural reforms needs to be substantially stepped up to reduce structural unemployment and boost potential output growth in the euro area. Structural reforms are necessary in all euro area countries, although specific reform needs differ across the individual economies. The focus should be on actions to raise productivity and improve the business environment, including the provision of an adequate public infrastructure, which are vital to increase investment and boost job creation. The enhancement of current investment initiatives, including the extension of the Juncker plan, progress on the capital markets union and reforms that will improve the resolution of non-performing loans will also contribute positively to this objective.
Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson: Monetary issues in the European Union and Iceland Speech by Mr Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a seminar organised by the Iceland Trade Council, Euro Info office in Iceland and the EU Commission on the theme: Does the Euro affect Iceland?, Reykjavik, 31 October 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen: The evolution of European integration during the second half of the last century is remarkable in many ways. This process began soon after the end of World War II and represented an effort to forge stronger bonds between European nations and thereby, among other things, reduce the likelihood of further conflict on the continent. Although I shall not go into its history here, many notable milestones can be cited along the course that has been taken. One of the most notable was the formal establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union in the beginning of 1999. Now the abolition of the individual member nations’ separate currencies is in sight. As of next year they will be replaced by Euro notes and coin. Not only will prices of goods and services be calculated and stated in a single currency in the twelve EMU countries, but the same notes and coin will be used for business in them all.

Iceland has chosen to remain outside the EU and has not declared an interest in membership. If Iceland were to show an interest in adopting the Euro as its currency, the most obvious course would be to join the EU with all the advantages and obligations that this entails, including membership of the EMU. Such a decision, however, depends on more factors than just the national currency, and this process would take a good many years. Of course, this is a highly political question and therefore outside the scope of this address. We need to continue to find our bearings in the global community as a nation with its own currency, which in an environment of free capital movements calls for very disciplined economic policy implementation. Ladies and Gentlemen: Representatives of all EU countries were involved in formulating and developing the Economic and Monetary Union. They created a monetary framework within the EMU which they regarded as serving the Community’s citizens best. Although Iceland stands outside the EMU, we have incorporated into our monetary policy implementation much of what the EU countries agreed that best served their interests. I am convinced that we will benefit from this. BIS Review 95/2001  5
For example, if the United States had adopted different policies, it might have shifted the composition of growth toward more business investment and less consumption and housing. But in a disinflationary global environment amid chronic EME trade surpluses, the United States could not achieve a high level of employment with a high level of national saving. Looked at from the lens of the emerging world, sustained consumption demand in developed nations induced the EMEs to continue to emphasize investment and exports. This meant that still poor populations did not reap the full benefit of their labors in the form of increases in real income and consumption commensurate with the gains achieved in productivity and output. Also, this system led, in many cases, to poor returns to EME savers. This resulted, in part, from the cost of sterilizing reserves accumulated in the process of managing exchange rates and the use of the banking system as a tool of industrial policy. While it is tempting to draw a line of causation from actions in one part of the global system to the other, this is overly simplistic. Rather, we have to think of the global economy as a single system, with outcomes based simultaneously on all the choices and preferences throughout the system. What is new is that the so-called periphery is now weighty enough to have a large impact on the pattern of economic activity in the core, as well as vice versa.

If these two sectors cannot take up all the slack created by necessary fiscal retrenchment in the years ahead – as seems likely – then the U.S. trade balance will need to improve as well. This implies that EMEs will no longer be able to rely on expanding U.S. demand as a key driver of their own economic growth. Of course, this is not just an issue of U.S. and EME adjustment. Adjustments will be required in other industrialized countries, too – and not just the deficit countries. There has to be recognition on all sides that global rebalancing in terms of the composition of activity and growth and in terms of global capital flows is necessary. Fortunately, this is not a zero-sum game: it is in the interests of all sides. However, it is still very difficult to accomplish because it is not in the short-term interests of some interest groups in many nations. This means that there are likely to be considerable political obstacles to adjustment in many parts of the global economy. In this process, the United States needs to show leadership in contributing to a smooth adjustment. In this regard, I think there are a number of actions that the United States can take – unilaterally and in its own interest – that will make this rebalancing process easier and less prone to disruption.