samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The period of low US policy rates during 2004–5 was in part the result of the FOMC’s desire to make good on its earlier promise during the 2001–3 downturn to maintain low interest rates for a considerable period in order to head off deflation worries. While I do not believe that the evidence supports the view that this was the sole cause of the pre-crisis build-up in financial imbalances in the United States, it is plausible that they made some contribution.11 Maintaining very low interest rates long after the economy has recovered must run the risk of encouraging a new credit/asset-price boom and the reappearance of financial imbalances. While macro-prudential policies, such as the application of the counter-cyclical capital buffer in Basel III, are intended to be the primary instrument to head off such excesses, it seems unwise to place too great a burden on them. For that reason, I believe one should be cautious about committing to monetary policies that remain loose for a very long period after the economy has normalised. Let me conclude with a few more general remarks about the role of monetary policy at the current juncture. The sluggishness of the recovery has led some to question whether the framework is flexible enough to allow for sufficiently expansionary policies to support the recovery. Conversely, others suggest that the persistent overshoot of the inflation target indicates that if anything the MPC has interpreted its mandate too flexibly.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Nominal Income Targets: an Old Wine in a New Bottle The State of the Economy The Institute of Economic Affairs’ 30th Conference  Charlie Bean, Deputy Governor Monetary Policy 27 February 2013  Chart 1: Nominal GDP growth Percentage changes on a year earlier 8 6 4 2 0 -2 Nominal GDP (a)  Nominal GDP expected 1 year earlier  -4  (a)  Nominal GDP expected 2 years earlier  -6 1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  (a) Sums the Monetary Policy Committee’s mean forecasts for real GDP and inflation. The Committee’s forecast for RPIX inflation is used prior to February 2004, adjusted for the difference in the inflation target.
As I have mentioned before, the medium-term stabilisation of existing government debt levels at around 60% (with inflation at 2%) was consistent with running a headline deficit of around 3% of GDP (see left-hand side figure in slide 4). In the current context, however, the observed prevalence of negative r-g differentials (see the right-hand figure in slide 4) would be consistent with government debt levels stabilising at a higher percentage of output. Given this situation, it is legitimate to ask whether a government debt level above 60% is now the correct figure? The question is not easy to answer, and it will depend on national considerations (the economic fundamentals in the medium-term, the vulnerabilities and resilience of the economy) and, of course, the prevailing financial and monetary conditions. Moreover, the current high levels of government debt evidence the difficulties of transitioning to the medium-term debt anchors. At present, converging towards a debtto-GDP ratio of 60% would require a substantial fiscal effort over a prolonged time frame. Using the historical average values of real growth, inflation and interest rates, the euro area would need to maintain a fiscal surplus of 1.1% of GDP over 20 years in order to reduce the debt ratio to 60% (see left-hand side figure in slide 5). This is substantially higher than the average primary deficit of 0.4% of GDP observed since 1995. For this constant fiscal effort to be at more plausible values, the macroeconomic environment would need to be far more favourable than it has been in recent decades.

Finally, we want markets to provide economic incentives for institutions to improve bank management and disclose information that is relevant to end-users’ needs. What I am saying is that the “efficient frontier” can best be achieved through a combination of the three pillars, given the reinforcing/diversification effects of each. Each pillar provides something that the other cannot and is essential to achieving our overall objective of financial stability. I realise that this presentation of the three pillars as items of a portfolio of policy options is an oversimplification, but I think it helps us visualise why we think that the most “efficient frontier” involves a mixture of minimum rules, tempered by supervisory discretion, and supplemented by market-based incentives. Current industry practices and issues that arose in consultations Let me now move to current industry practices and how transparency is incorporated into the Basel framework. In deciding to revise the 1988 Accord, the Basel Committee thought carefully about what improvements to banks’ public reporting would mirror the New Accord’s incentives-based approach to foster improvements in risk management. In recent years, the Committee has noted some improvements in the quality of bank reporting worldwide. Annual surveys conducted by the Committee suggest that the extent of banks’ public disclosures has increased markedly in some areas. Still, important deficiencies remain.
CPI and underlying inflation 1997 Annual average, per cent CP I  U N D 1X  U N D IN H X  4  3  1 .7 2  1 .4 0 .9  1  0 1997  UND1X = CPI excluding interest expenditure, taxes and subsidies UNDINHX = UND1X excluding goods that are mainly imported  3  BIS Review 61/1999  4. CPI and underlying inflation 1998 Annual average, per cent CPI  U N D 1X  U N D IN H X  4  3  1 .8 2  1 .0 0 .4  1  0 1 998  UND1X = CPI excluding interest expenditure, taxes and subsidies UNDINHX = UND1X excluding goods that are mainly imported  5. CPI and underlying inflation 4 3  UNDINHX 2  UND1X  1 0  CPI -1 1995  1996  Average impact on CPI  Annual rate for  1997  1996 •Interest rate fall -0,6p.p. •Tax changes -0,6p.p. 0,8 / 2,2 / 2,9  1998  1997 •Interest rate fall -0,9 p.p. •Tax changes +0,6 pe  0,9 / 1,4 / 1,7  CPI/ UND1X/ UNDINHX  BIS Review 61/1999  1999  4  1998 •Interest rate fall -0,6p.p. •Tax changes +0,2p.p. •Coffee, petrol -0,1 p.p.

Mr Bäckström covers monetary policy in Sweden from 1996 to 1998 Opening remarks by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, the Swedish central bank, before the Standing Committee on Finance in Stockholm on 18 May 1999. Introduction In the period 1996–98 the annual rates of inflation, measured with the CPI, were 0.8, 0.9 and 0.4 per cent, respectively. This means that in each of these years the change in the CPI not only deviated from monetary policy’s 2 per cent target for price stability but was also outside the lower tolerance limit of 1 per cent inflation. The Riksbank has indeed made assessments that subsequently proved to be a bit off the mark. As a result we have also made decisions that, looking back when the outcome was known, could have been somewhat different. But on the whole, the result of monetary policy in this period seems to be acceptable. In my opening remarks I intend to give this appraisal more substance. One major reason why CPI inflation has been low in the past three years is that the price trend has been affected by some specific price movements that monetary policy neither can nor should aim to counter fully. If the Riksbank attempts to counter such price movements, the result might be unnecessarily costly for the economy, that is, exaggerated fluctuations in economic activity as well as in the financial markets. It was against this background that the new Executive Board of the Riksbank clarified the inflation target earlier this spring.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Norway, like Sweden and Finland, has become more closely integrated into Europe. The EEA Agreement, which provides for the free movement of labour, capital, goods and services, has enhanced efficiency in many industries. The recent WTO rounds have covered a broader range of goods and services and the number of member countries has increased. Almost all countries are now members or observers, and the issues are broad-ranging. Trade policy has paved the way for the change in the international division of labour which has brought benefits to Norway and the other Nordic countries. Third, the tax reform in 1992 was a crossroads. It made it possible to finance the welfare state with a substantially lower loss of efficiency and wealth creation than previously. The key was to reform the deduction schemes for personal and company taxation and to introduce more equal tax treatment of companies across industries and aim at neutral taxation of capital income and interest. Marginal taxes could be lowered. The tax deductibility rate for interest was considerably reduced for households. It became more advantageous to save and less advantageous to borrow. The pressure on our tax system has also been reduced because public spending control has improved over the past 10-15 years. BIS Review 15/2007  15  Fourth, Norwegian credit markets have undergone structural changes.

Consequently, the rise in property prices will tend to be highest in those countries where income growth is highest. 8  BIS Review 15/2007  Norway is now reaping the considerable benefits brought by the strong expansion in Asian countries and changes in the international division of labour. Norway’s GDP is increasing sharply and this is reflected in high government revenues and saving, increased household purchasing power and buoyant earnings in the business sector. The rise in house prices is partly being driven by growth in household income. Moreover, this period of prosperity and government budget surpluses may have engendered a sense of security which is also affecting household saving and house purchases. It would appear that household saving has fallen markedly in Norway in the recent past. Saving was probably negative in the latter half of 2006, which would be the first time saving has fallen since 1988. Housing investment for the household sector as whole is being fully debt-financed, i.e. an increase in net debt. External and domestic interest rates are low in an environment of solid growth. Long-term interest rates have fallen sharply both in nominal and real terms since the beginning of the 1990s. Inflation has declined and contributed to a fall in nominal interest rates. A more stable inflation environment also results in lower real interest rates when investors become more certain about returns. Furthermore, it would appear that high saving in some parts of the world is pushing down long-term interest rates.
International financial markets have moved from a situation of widespread risk undervaluation to one in which extraordinary caution is exercised in their evaluation. Past experience has clearly shown the tendency of markets to overreact. It is even possible that certain recent developments reflect, at least partly, an excessive reaction. But it is unreasonable to expect that, once the situation has returned to normal, international financing conditions will simply be as they were prior to the summer of 2007, which nobody today hesitates to qualify as excessively lax. Likewise, few question the fact that the expansion of the balance sheets of a large number of major financial institutions exceeded limits which should not have been overstepped. The current deleveraging process may initially reflect the correction of some of the excesses committed. But taking a broader view, it also reveals a more fundamental movement towards a general reduction in the debt levels of financial intermediaries and the containment of credit flows, the effects of which must likewise be felt by the ultimate borrowers, namely households and firms. Finally, I should point out that the magnitude of the imbalances generated and the scale of intervention designed have prompted a necessary pause for reflection on the role the economic authorities should play in developing and supervising financial markets.

For the moment, however, I shall simply reiterate that one of the aspects highlighted by the current financial crisis is how important it is for central banks to have the appropriate instruments with which to manage their liquidity provision policies with sufficient flexibility. 2  BIS Review 122/2008  And all the more so in the presence of turmoil which, as at present, is profoundly altering the operation of the channels through which liquid resources are normally re-distributed among the various banks that apply for them. In this respect, it is widely acknowledged that the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operational framework is allowing euro area banks' liquidity requirements to be met, thereby preventing the emergence of additional pressures that might exacerbate the situation on financial markets. In any event, returning to the most important macroeconomic developments that will influence the performance of the Spanish economy, it is clear that financial conditions in the euro area, as in the rest of the world, have tightened notably. Such tightening has compounded the adverse effects of the oil and commodities shocks on agents' real incomes and output capacity. The latest data, for the second quarter of the current year, show how the growth rate in the euro area has weakened to 1.4%, standing below potential. The latest ECB projections pointed to increases of between 1.1% and 1.7% this year, and between 0.6% and 1.8% in 2009, subject to considerable uncertainty and to downside risks that have increased in recent weeks.
See also, for instance, Amtenbrink, F. (1999), The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks, Hart Publishing; and De Haan, J., Amtenbrink, F., Eijffinger S.C.W. (1999), “Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification”, PLS Quarterly Review, Vol. 52, No 209. [16]Issing, O. (1999), “The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or ‘Willem in Euroland’”, Journal of Common  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  Market Studies, Vol. 39(3): 503-19; Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2000), “The Institutional Glossary of the Eurosystem”, ZEI Working Paper, No B-16; and ECB (2002), “The accountability of the European Central Bank”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, November. [17]The Governing Council’s quantitative definition of price stability is as follows: "Price stability is defined as a year-onyear increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%." [18]Issing, O. (1999), “The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or “Willem in Euroland””, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(3): 503-19; Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2000), “The Institutional Glossary of the Eurosystem”, ZEI working paper No. B-16, and; ECB (2002), “The accountability of the European Central Bank”, ECB Monthly Bulletin November 2002. [19]Padoa-Schioppa, T. “  An institutional glossary of the Eurosystem” presented at the conference on "The Constitution of the Eurosystem: the Views of the EP and the ECB", 8 March 2000.

This has been as a result of Government’s sound macroeconomic management and the critical contributions that various sectors of the economy have made, of which the insurance sector is a part. Let me once again thank you for inviting me to share my thoughts with you on the role that your noble profession plays in this economy. On our part as Bank of Zambia, we shall keep on facilitating the development of, among others, the insurance sector by continuing to improve macroeconomic conditions that are critical to the expansion of your businesses. In turn, it is expected that other sectors of the economy will benefit and contribute to accelerated economic growth and development that the country is craving so much for in order to reduce poverty. May I, at this juncture, point out that in order to facilitate your work, you may track some of the developments in our economy on the Bank of Zambia website, which you can visit on www.boz.zm. You can also contact us directly for any information you may require on the economy. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 72/2006  3
BIS Review 124/2006  3  •  Anglo-saxon countries which are very good at producing financial assets have already shown enormous imbalances, with US current account deficit and housing market bubbles as the headline examples;  •  emergence of (long lasting) asset bubbles and drop in inflation (and possibly even emergence of deflation) are market mechanisms to bridge the asset gap;  •  bursting an asset bubble makes asset shortages problem worse;  •  while financial markets development moves ahead (think about large listings in China, improving corporate governance or rapid development of credit derivatives) it is unlikely that excess demand for assets will be eliminated soon, as it seems to have a structural origin, related to demographics (aging), or to higher uncertainty for corporations operating in more competitive global economy in XXI century, which probably explains why profits to GDP ratio is at 40-years high and investments fail to recover to pre-Asia-crisis and pre-dot-com-boom levels  It does matter to what view of the world you subscribe, as it dramatically alters the subjective likelihood of competing scenarios for 2007. As PIMCO Michael Gomez puts it in September emerging markets note titled “Is it safe?” 19 : “EM has historically been vulnerable to deteriorating economic and financial conditions in the United States and other developed countries.

This concept was put forward by Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber, who argue that a new world equilibrium has emerged and it is in the best interest of both the United States and China to continue financing consumption of American households with Chinese savings until Chinese economy reaches a status of a developed economy, so the new Bretton Woods can last for many years;  2.  global savings glut hypothesis was proposed by Ben Bernanke 4 , who postulates that the shock causing global imbalances originated from Asia as a result of excessive saving rates;  1  I borrowed this aeronautical comparison from a recent paper by Calvo G. and Talvi E. (2006) “The Resolution of Global Imbalances: Soft Landing in the North, Sudden Stop in Emerging Markets?”, CERES, Documentos de Trabajo. 2  This list is based on Rybinski K. (2006) “Global imbalances”, Ekonomista 4/2006 (in Polish).
This has partly been a matter of supply shocks that do not normally have lasting effects on the rate of inflation. There is therefore reason to believe that when the increased price levels drop out of the twelve-month change figures from next spring onwards, inflation will fall back from the relatively high rates at present. The picture of inflation does, however, include other features that probably have to do with the high resource utilisation during the latest upward phase. The fact that domestic inflation has moved up even though economic activity is slowing could point to some underestimation of resource utilisation or to a relationship between growth and inflation in a wide sense that for other reasons is less favourable than assumed earlier. Recovery with prospective inflation in line with the target In the Inflation Report that now lies on the table we have opted for a main scenario where growth in the rest of the world is lower than we foresaw in the previous Report in May. The situation is particularly complicated in that the usual difficulties in determining exactly when activity is likely to turn upwards are compounded by the occurrence of a structural adjustment of saving and investment, above all in the United States, at the same time as economic policy there is undergoing a marked expansionary realignment. A further major complication is the future security policy situation, which is naturally hard to assess with traditional economic tools.

BIS Review 86/2001  1  In connection with increasing signs in August of a more marked economic slowdown in the rest of the world as well as in Sweden, share prices started falling again. For the krona, which had appreciated in July, this was a negative factor in the same way as it had been during the spring. Early in the autumn the picture of an international economic slowdown became even more accentuated. A number of indicators pointed to a worsening of demand in the United States even before the terrorist attacks. The uncertainty stemming from the attacks was liable to subdue demand in the rest of the world even more. After the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks had cut their instrumental rates on 17 September, on the same day the Riksbank decided to lower the repo rate 0.5 percentage points. An increased risk was perceived of inflation two years ahead being below the target, mainly because business and household confidence in the future might weaken and lead to a slowdown that was deeper and more protracted. The terrorist attacks led to great uncertainty in the financial markets. From what I have now said it will be clear that in recent months monetary policy has taken its cue from declining economic activity. GDP growth has slackened from a level of 3 to 4 per cent in recent years to a rate of between 1 and 1.5 per cent. Meanwhile, since last year the krona has depreciated by around 15 per cent.
In the United States, these rules were not applicable to SVB, as certain exemptions, introduced in 2019 under the proportionality principle, apply to banks that are considered to be less important, this concept being understood in a broad sense since it includes banks with a balance sheet total of up to USD 250 billion. - The post mortem analyses carried out and published by the FED suggest that, had SVB been subject to these rules, it would not have complied with the short-term liquidity ratio as defined by the Basel Committee. Moreover, SVB's heavy reliance on tech companies' deposits should have alerted its supervisor if the additional monitoring tools required by international standards had been put in place. The same FED analyses estimate that SVB's interest rate risk sensitivity was around 35% before the crisis, well above the 15% alert threshold set out in the international rules and supposed to trigger supervisory action. - Monitoring compliance with regulations calls for strict, intrusive and reactive supervision, which, according to the FED, was not the case. Let me reassure you on one point: the European situation is radically different. The Basel Committee's rules are applied in Europe in their entirety and to all banks. By the way, I would like to add that Europe is in the process of finalising the transposition into European law of the latest reinforcements of the Basel III agreements, ahead of the other major jurisdictions.

More specifically, this could involve requiring that financial and related activities be grouped and segregated under a specific structure and, in the event of a systemic footprint, applying the banking framework to these "financial sub-groups" as long as the activities are similar in nature to those of banks. As regards crypto-assets, while MiCA is a regulatory milestone, it needs to be rapidly complemented with additional requirements to extend its scope, in particular to address two issues that are heightening the existing risks posed by crypto-assets. First, it will be necessary to address the challenge raised by the concentration of crypto-asset service activities within so-  7  called crypto-conglomerates. The challenge is to guarantee investor protection, for example by imposing segregation of client funds, rules of good conduct and risk management for intermediaries, and even the unbundling of activities. Next, we need to devise rules to regulate the decentralised finance ecosystem (DeFi). Last April, the ACPR published a discussion paper for consultation that presents the challenges posed by this regulatory development, which could take a hybrid form between traditional financial regulation and regulation inspired by other economic sectors. I'll say no more about it and leave you to discover it, hoping to have aroused your curiosity. Conclusion To quote your director,2 "to specify, design and implement (and I would like to add, to master) the intelligent and connected systems that will transform our society on a daily basis", as future trained engineers, I know that the few elements I have just outlined will resonate with you.