samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the one hand, there is a danger that the current high level of inflation becomes embedded in wage and price setting behaviour, imparting greater persistence to the upside deviation of inflation from target in the coming years. On the other hand, the squeeze on real household incomes coming from higher energy and goods prices threatens to weigh heavily on demand, activity and employment, potentially adding to the undershoot of the inflation target forecast by the MPC at a three-year horizon. As has been emphasised in recent Bank communication, the MPC seeks to follow the narrow path between these two risks, while returning inflation to its 2% target in a sustainable manner. [5] The weight attached to the risks on either side of this narrow path will vary across people and through time, evolving as new economic data are published and analysed. The recent discussion of UK monetary policy – and the absence of unanimity in MPC votes – should be understood in that light. In today’s talk, I aim to flesh out the framework established in the MPC’s recent forecasts and reports for assessing how to identify and follow this narrow path. [6] These forecasts and reports represent the ‘best collective judgement’ of the MPC as a whole. But I will also take this opportunity to flag where I differ from that ‘best collective judgement’.

Of course – as I have explored in previous talks (Pill, 2022) – assessing how supportive any particular stance of monetary policy will prove is difficult, since it relies on conceptually and empirically uncertain measures of neutral benchmarks for policy, such as the natural rate of interest or R-star. 9. On Tuesday, the ONS published an unemployment rate for March 2022 of 3.5% (single month basis) (‘Labour market overview’, Office for National Statistics  ). 10. Private sector regular average weekly earnings (AWE) growth increased to 4.8% in Q1, while annual whole economy AWE growth was 7.0% (‘Labour market overview’, Office for National Statistics ). In part, the difference between these two indicators reflects the strength of bonuses in the data, which – despite adding to household income – are not ongoing costs to firms. 11. Of course, that means the assumption of stable energy prices has not proved very accurate in the recent past. But commodity prices are hard to forecast, and the random walk forecast has performed as well as alternatives over most periods. In particular, there is scant evidence that the path of commodity prices embodied in market futures pricing has outperformed the random walk assumption. 12. See Broadbent (2022). 13. See the discussion of a Brexit ‘doppelganger’ model reflected in Chart 1 of my MPC colleague Catherine Mann’s recent speech (Mann, 2022). 14. See Nickell (2005). 15. See the discussion of labour market trends and long Covid reflected in Figure 6 of my MPC colleague Michael Saunders’ recent speech (Saunders, 2022).
Yet during this entire period the Committee has been devoting considerable efforts to drawing up recommendations that we consider to be key from a supervisory perspective, but which have not received as much attention as Basel II. The Core Principles revision is a case in point. Perhaps the fact that they are recommendations aimed specifically at supervisors, centred around the effectiveness of supervision without imposing direct requirements on the banking industry - although they obviously affect that sector’s activities indirectly explains why this has not generated the same glut of headlines as other initiatives. However, I believe that we would all agree on the important place that the Principles have occupied and continue to occupy, and we know that compliance with them is a priority for virtually all supervisors. The aim of the Core Principles is to establish a set of minimum requirements to be met in order for banking supervision to be considered adequate. This permits the identification of areas in need of improvement and facilitates planning to achieve these improvements. The passage of time has shown that the Core Principles have satisfactorily met these objectives since they were first issued in 1997. Moreover, they have permitted the establishment of an internationally accepted benchmark with which to evaluate the supervisory approaches of different countries. In so doing, they have helped to  BIS Review 45/2006  1  improve and encourage the convergence of banking supervisory standards, thereby contributing to global financial stability. So why revise them, even if the changes are only minor?

As needs and roles change, the organisation must be able to customise its information environment and modify its processes in response. This practice forms a good base to pursue new information technology initiatives. Allow me to share with you several prescriptive pointers which I am sure that you have heard several times before and are probably guided by these and similar practices in your respective central banks. Notwithstanding, the familiarity, I believe that it is appropriate for me to repeat them at a forum such as this. During the course of this week, as you deliberate on how to ensure that your organisation’s information technology investments remain appropriate, I encourage you to be guided by the following pointers which are selfexplanatory: •  Understand the value of your organisation’s data and tie information technology investments to the value of that data. •  Tie information technology investments to factors that provide strategic value. •  Understand the business issues that affect the organisations you serve to the point that they become second nature. •  Develop expertise in areas of business so that you can better contribute to the enhancement of the various business functions in your organisation through the application of information technology. •  Remain in a continuous state of dialogue with various areas of the organisation to facilitate shared learning that can eventually translate in the deployment of information technology in a manner that is in line with the organisation’s strategic directions.
Property prices soared as a result (Chart 1). Such excesses were possible because a decade of non-inflationary, consistent expansion turned initially well-founded confidence into dangerous complacency. Beliefs grew that globalisation and technology would drive perpetual growth, and that the omniscience of central banks would deliver enduring stability. With a growing conviction that financial innovation had transformed risk into certainty, underwriting standards slipped from responsible to reckless and bank funding strategies from conservative to cavalier. Financial innovation made it easier to borrow. Bonus schemes valued the present and discounted the future. Banks operated in a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose bubble and were capitalised for perfection. And a steady supply of foreign capital from the global savings glut – and in Ireland’s case, the initial euphoria of European Monetary Union – made it all cheaper. When the Minsky moment finally struck, debt tolerance decisively turned and the kindness of strangers evaporated. UK households swung from borrowing 4% of GDP annually to saving 2% of GDP. The comparable swing in Ireland was more than twice as large. 3 In the wake of the crisis, three truths came back to the fore. First, while asset prices rise and fall, debt endures. Second, the distribution of debt and assets matters. And third, it is very hard to reduce high debt in one sector or region without at least temporarily increasing it in another. The debt tail is wagging the market dog. These realities continue to weigh on the European financial system.

Mark Carney: Fortune favours the bold Lecture by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, to honour the memory of The Honourable James Michael Flaherty, P C, Dublin, 28 January 2015. * 1. *  *  Introduction  It is a pleasure to be in Dublin and an honour to give this Iveagh House lecture in memory of Jim Flaherty. Jim’s attitude and actions typified the Flaherty family motto: Fortune Favours the Bold. Born the sixth of eight children in La Chine, Quebec; Jim Flaherty worked odd jobs and won a hockey scholarship to put himself through Princeton. Successful in private and public sectors; he rose to become Attorney General and Minister of Finance of his province before becoming Canada’s 37th Minister of Finance. Once there, his accomplishments were legion, ranging from creating and enhancing support programs for the disabled and care givers to setting the country back on the path to fiscal balance after the crisis and ensuing recession. His tenure as Canadian finance minister was shaped by that crisis and its aftermath. It was my honour to work with him as Canada weathered the storm. And many of you worked closely with Jim as Ireland negotiated agreements with the Troika and devised policies to rebuild its battered economy. I am confident he would be proud of the progress Ireland has made. I suspect he would be more than a little frustrated with the euro area, however.
With the reversal of these effects since the second half of 2008, the downward trend in annual inflation of this group gained pace in this quarter (Figure 3). Meanwhile, the downward trend in the annual rate of increase in food prices is expected to continue in the second quarter as well. Figure 3: Food Prices (Annual Percentage Change) 27 Processed Food  24 21  Unprocessed Food  18 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3  03 08  04 08  05 08  06 08  07 08  08 08  09 08  10 08  11 08  12 08  01 09  02 09  03 09  Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. Esteemed Guests, I would like to further clarify the developments related to services prices as I deem it helpful to focus on them to better understand the significant downturn in the underlying trend of inflation. Services inflation, which had remained relatively elevated in the first three quarters of 2008 due to the second round effects of energy and food prices, has eased considerably since the last quarter of 2008 following the sharp contraction in aggregate demand. The cumulative rate of change in services prices during first three months of 2009 was merely 0.53 percent on lower costs and weaker domestic demand, which is the lowest percentage recorded in the 2003 based CPI index’s history. The slowdown in the growth rate of services prices has spread across all services subgroups (Figure 4).

BIS Review 67/2009  1  Figure 1: Contribution to Annual CPI Inflation  14 12  Food and Energy*  Tobacco and Gold**  Services  Basic Goods  10 8 6 4 2 0  03 07  05 07  07 07  09 07  11 07  01 08  03 08  05 08  07 08  09 08  11 08  01 09  03 09  * Food and Energy: Food, non-alcoholic beverages and energy ** Tobacco and Gold: Alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and gold. Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. In the first quarter, the increase in food prices lost pace over previous years in response to the significant slowdown in the processed food group and energy prices dropped owing to the lagged effects of the recent decline in oil prices. Goods prices excluding food and energy slumped by a lower margin over the first quarter of the previous year. The slowdown in services prices became more pronounced (Figure 2). Figure 2: CPI Sub-Groups (First Quarter Percentage Change) 10  2007  2008  2009  8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 Food  Energy  Goods excluding Food and Energy  Services  Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. 2  BIS Review 67/2009  The unprocessed food group posted monthly price hikes of significant levels in the last quarter of 2007 and the first half of 2008 on account of production losses and cyclical developments all over the world. Annual inflation in this group surged to 25 percent.
Well the summit, or summits that are the cessation dates for Libor are now clearly on the horizon with the FCA announcing earlier in the year that Friday 31 December 2021 will be the final publication date for panel bank sterling, Japanese yen, Swiss franc and euro Libor rates along with a number of lesser used US dollar tenors. The remaining US dollar tenors will cease in mid-2023. These summits have been on the horizon for over a decade and have been well signposted but they are now clearly visible, but as any climber will tell you the hardest part of mountaineering is often the descent. It can often be more treacherous than the climb. So with the market having definitive dates for the end of Libor – I am going to focus my comments today on descending safely – remembering the important role benchmarks play in the financial system and why financial firms and borrowers would be well served in choosing the most robust alternative reference rates that meet their use case. Transition from Libor was always going to be challenging given its widespread use, but to those looking for an easy descent by substituting Libor for credit sensitive rates that do not address all of its fundamental weaknesses, they risk much of the good progress that has been made. While these rates may offer convenience as a short-term substitution, they present a range of complex longer term risks.

ICE Term SONIA Reference Rates  ; Refinitiv Term SONIA  14. Standard on use of Term SONIA reference rates 15. Investor size, liquidity and prime money market fund stress 16. Re: Transition to the Secured Overnight Financing Rate – The Views of Nonfinancial Corporations  Descending safely: Life after Libor ‐ speech by Andrew Bailey | Bank of England  Page 6  Andrew Bailey Governor, Bank of England  Sign up for latest updates  Descending safely: Life after Libor ‐ speech by Andrew Bailey | Bank of England  Page 7
Within some range, increased market power raises rents and acts as a spur to investment, innovation and productivity. But beyond a point, those forces go into reverse. Market power is associated with a fall in innovation and investment incentives, with knock-on negative effects for productivity. There is some empirical support for such a relationship. Jones and Philippon (2016) and Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) suggest increased market power may have reduced investment among US companies. De  14  Our results are consistent with De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) who find that exporters charge, on average, higher mark-ups and that firm mark-ups increase upon export entry. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) document a negative relationship between mark-ups and the capital share among global companies. And Díez et al (2018) identify empirically a concave relationship between markups and investment, in line with Aghion et al (2005). We can re-run the Díez et al (2018) investment equations using the panel of UK-listed firms. This also finds a concave relationship with mark-ups (Table 2, column 1). The same relationship holds between mark-ups and R&D expenditure (Table 2, column 2). Chart 12 plots the estimated investment curve. It suggests that firms with mark-ups above around two tend to be associated with lower investment rates, in line with Díez et al. With estimated firm-level mark-ups having risen secularly in a number of countries, this is potentially a cause for concern.

I think it is most important, in these times of uncertainty, for the Bank of Thailand to act as the linchpin to the public policy. We have to set the anchor that stabilizes the economy. It is fortunate that certain elements of our inflation targeting policy has been modified, allowing increased degree of management of the foreign exchange rate which facilitates trade and improves capital flows. The practice which was intended to take care of official reserves while the global economy is slowing down now happens to be the correct policy practice to be further enhanced to cope with addition weaknesses and uncertainties. More careful management of our international reserves is required so that we can fulfil our debt obligations under the IMF program, and still be left with a strong and healthy level of reserves. This will be achieved through a vigilant watch on the markets, keeping close dialogue with market participants, gathering intelligence and acting in a timely manner. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am here today not to give you a false promise that the BOT could provide policy measures that could lead to the recovery of the Thai economy, but to assure you that our existing policy measures are suitable with the situation and we would do our best not to allow Thailand another crisis of similar cause and magnitude as that of 1997.
The war in Ukraine has not affected trade directly  Although the war in Ukraine has affected Iceland’s terms of trade, the net effect is ambiguous, with the prices of both imports and exports rising. Iceland is an exporter of both metals (mainly aluminium) and food products and thus has both gained and suffered from rising raw material and food prices. Terms of trade have remained favourable, although they have declined from their recent peak. Despite access to abundant domestic renewable energy, imported fossil fuels impact the Icelandic value chain both through the price of imported fuels, various imported goods and generally the cost of transportation, which is high given Iceland’s remoteness from major markets. Fuel is also an important cost item in fisheries. Rising import prices, however, result not only from the war in Ukraine, but can be partly explained by supply-chain disruptions and the container cost crisis triggered by a reallocation of resources in the global economy as it recovered from the pandemic. The cost increases seep into the global value chain and affect inflation globally. Eventually those mismatches are being resolved from the supply side, as firms respond to price signals, and from the demand side, with global tightening of monetary conditions and the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus. Mismatches are being resolved by increased supply and global tightening  The post-pandemic recovery in Iceland has two distinguishing features that set it apart from the recovery in most other OECD economies.

13 April 2023  Monetary and Fiscal Dimensions of Responding to Multiple Global Shocks Presentation at the 15th Annual Meeting of the OECD Working Party of Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions by Rannveig Sigurðardóttir, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy, Central Bank of Iceland It is a pleasure to join you here to discuss the role and interaction of monetary and fiscal policy - a topic that deserves our full attention today in times of high inflation. The global economy had barely recovered from the financial crisis when it was hit again by two subsequent shocks that have had enormous impact on both monetary and fiscal conditions around the globe. I want to give you a snapshot of how the Icelandic economy has weathered these shocks relative to other OECD economies, firstly, during the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent supply-chain disruptions, and then, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the ensuing energy and food crises. Finally, I will discuss the role played by monetary and fiscal policies in response to these shocks. Iceland was among the countries most severely hit by the global financial crisis (GFC). Prior to the crisis, the country was uniquely vulnerable due to macroeconomic imbalances, including a large current account deficit, unfavourable net international investment position, highly indebted households and business sector, inflated asset prices, and an oversized and undercapitalized banking sector. Iceland’s strength, on the other hand, was the relatively strong position of its public finances.
Is the strategy of benign neglect the right one in times Asia is holding down its currencies? Trichet: On Asian emerging economies’ currencies we have a very clear message which the Central Banks of the G7 together with the executive branches have confirmed this spring. We all say the Asian emerging economies as well as the global economy would be better off if these currencies would be more flexible. DIE ZEIT: Markets are worried about the crisis of the sub-prime credit market in America. Are you worried as well? Trichet: In a number of segments in the global finance system we have observed in the past a certain under-appreciation of risks. That was visible in the low level of volatility, the low level of spreads, the low level of risk premiums. During the last weeks we saw a correction. At the moment I would say it has been a healthy correction. But I remain cautious: it is no time for complacency. DIE ZEIT: At the moment there's a lively debate in- and outside the ECB whether the second pillar, the monetary analysis, matters anymore. The first revision of the ECB strategy came 2003, five years after its implementation in 1998. Will the next revision come 2008, five years after the last one? Trichet: No. The two pillar strategy has been very effective.

In the time of the preparation of the Treaty I worked with many German friends, for example the Bundesbank Presidents KarlOtto Pöhl, Helmut Schlesinger and Hans Tietmeyer. One of the most inspiring phases was the wording of the Treaty with Hans Tietmeyer, Horst Köhler and Jürgen Stark in particular. It was due to them that the Maastricht Treaty was well constructed and worked. Here you saw the will to unite Europe and the influence of this particular friendship between us. DIE ZEIT: You mentioned independence as the legacy of the Bundesbank. Do you have an absolute independence in mind? An independence that forbids even critique from the political side? Trichet: It is simpler than that: I refer to Article 108 of the Maastricht Treaty. It says the executive branches in particular should not try to influence our decisions. It is a very clear wording. So it's not the ECB who defines its independence, it is the Treaty, which was approved by the people of the member states, by the people of all our democracies. Everybody is welcome to criticise our policy - the media, the analysts, the academics. And we are, as an independent institution, as a last resort, accountable to the people of Europe. By the way it is not known that I go more often to the European Parliament than our friends from the American Federal Reserve go to the US Congress.