samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this situation, the capital controls gave monetary policy more scope to focus on the domestic economy, as is demonstrated in Figure 4, which compares developments in short-term real interest rates during and after the currency and banking crises in Korea in 1997 and Iceland in 2008. In Korea there is a clear spike in real rates at the time of the crisis, as interest rates were used to stabilise the exchange rate whereas this spike is missing in the case of Iceland. The economic programme with the IMF included a medium-term fiscal consolidation plan. Automatic stabilisers were allowed to work fully during the contraction of 2009, however, resulting in a significant public sector deficit, as can been seen from Figure 4. The fiscal consolidation that commenced in 2010 arrested the rise in the headline deficit relative to GDP and then reduced it once the economy began to recover. In international comparison, the fiscal effort was sizeable, as can be seen on Figure 5. But it did not derail the recovery that began around mid-2010 and was key to restoring confidence and paving the way for Iceland´s renewed market access. It helped that monetary policy could be relaxed over the course of 2010, as the closure of loopholes in the capital controls in late 2009 helped stabilise the exchange rate. The recession was driven partly by the unavoidable adjustment of imbalances that required a lower level of domestic demand and a shift in its composition, and partly by the negative shocks that deepened the recession further.

The second example relates to senior individuals in firms. Earlier this month we introduced the new Senior Managers Regime. The aim of this regime is to establish clear responsibilities for senior managers, including chairs of Board Committees. This is not to create new responsibilities, but rather to be clear on what those responsibilities are, and then to supervise to hold individuals to those responsibilities. In the previous regime, we had too many examples of individuals shirking their responsibilities. My strong view is that senior figures cannot delegate responsibilities. We will then direct our supervision to support this new regime operating effectively. The third example concerns the supervision of governance, executive and Board level. We are in the process of revamping our approach here, recognising that too many problems of the past have had their roots in ineffective governance. This is probably the prime area where supervision is distinct from regulation, because there is very little regulation, rightly so. Supervising governance is inherently a matter of judgement based on evidence. So, to conclude, we should devote more time to discussing the skill of supervision. It has at its heart the understanding of risk. And, we should devote more time to developing supervisors and value then for the skill that they need to do the job well. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Durmuş Yilmaz: Central banking in emerging economies – the Turkish experience Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the “International Conference on Economics”, Ankara, 12 September 2006. *  *  *  Dear professors, colleagues, and guests, I am very pleased to participate in such a conference covering a broad range of economic issues and attended by many distinguished academicians from different countries. It is also a great pleasure to deliver a speech on the topic of central banking in emerging economies and the Turkish experience. Dear guests, Given the wide range of issues related to central banking in emerging economies and the limited time available, I have decided to limit the extent of my remarks today. I’d like to talk about the challenges we face as today’s central bankers in emerging market countries, mainly in the context of the Turkish experience. However, before embarking on this subject, let me first of all step back and take a look at the evolution of central banking, especially in the recent past. There is no doubt about that throughout the 20th century, central banking has undergone a tremendous transformation both in numerical terms and institutional aspects. At the beginning of the last century, for example, there were just 15 central banks in the world.

Of course, the Board has to be duly informed, and some of their members should have the necessary expertise to assess these risks. Needless to say, it is not only banks that need to “catch up”; we are also working at the Banco de España to adapt to this reality. I believe it is fair to acknowledge that this is all very new for everyone in the banking sector, including certainly Central Banks and Supervisors. What are we doing? Firstly, we have created an internal function entrusted with assessing the impact we as an institution have on the environment. The aim is to identify and coordinate the necessary measures to reduce that impact. Secondly, as a macroprudential supervisor, we clearly need to be able to assess and quantify the risks that the transition towards a more sustainable economy poses, both for individual banks and the financial sector as a whole. We must be able to perform stress tests for the financial system overall and define scenarios to be applied by banks individually. 4/5  Accordingly, we are designing internal governance structures and methodologies, actively participating in the cultural shift in the SSM supervisory model. Naturally, we are also evaluating the information and data requirements needed to address this challenge. Thirdly, as investors in the debt markets, we are working to include environmental risk assessment in our credit analysis. A fourth key element is our responsibility as supervisors. We must foster the implementation of these changes in the financial sector. We cannot wait for change to occur.
These prevented it from efficiently and safely channelling savings between those parts of the country with a financial surplus to the booming industrial areas of the north and the midlands that needed finance for investment. These constraints included the Bank of England’s monopoly position as the only limited liability bank in the country allowed to issue bank notes and its lack of any presence outside London. 11  See Inflation Report, February 2017, Bank of England, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/inflationreport/2017/feb.aspx. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  The Government of the day therefore offered the Bank the choice between losing its monopoly or establishing branches. Parliament’s response, however, was to legislate for both in order to improve financial liquidity throughout the country and provide for a more efficient intermediation of savings for investment. This enabled both the establishment of the Bank’s Birmingham branch and the Midland Bank that Charles Geach helped to start in 1836 – one of the first new joint stock banks, in competition with the Bank of England. The Bank of England has long since given up its private banking role in the financing of the economy. But the efficiency and soundness of the mechanisms for channeling savings to investment remain a key element in the delivery of our now, exclusively public, responsibility to safeguard monetary and financial stability. Today, monetary and financial stability is the most important contribution the Bank can make to stable, productive investment.

This weakness is consistent with survey indicators of 9  For example, Guiso, L, Sapienza, P and Zingales, L (2013), 'Time Varying Risk', NBER Working Paper 19284. Guiso et al use a survey of Italian investors and find that the proportion of individuals unwilling to take any financial risk had increased from 18% in 2007 to 42% in 2009 and put this down to emotional response (fear) triggered by a scary experience. 10 See Nagel, S and Malmendier, U (2011) ' Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk Taking?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol126(1), pp373-416. Kunreuther, H., R. Ginsberg, L. Miller, P. Sagi, P. Slovic, B. Borkan, and N. Katz (1978). Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons. Wiley Interscience. Bernile, G., Bhagwat, V., & Rau, P. R. (2017) 'What doesn’t kill you will only make you more risk-loving: Early-life disasters and CEO behavior', The Journal of Finance, Vol.72(1), pp167-206. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  investment intentions which remain subdued and elevated uncertainty, as detailed in the February 2017 Inflation Report. 11  By the end of the forecast, the level of business investment is around 20% lower than in the Monetary Policy Committee's May 2016 forecast. Our latest estimate of year-on-year business investment growth in the fourth quarter of 2016 is already around six percentage points weaker than our projection in May.
Banks’ sight deposits held at the SNB will be remunerated at the SNB policy rate of 1.75% up to a certain threshold. Sight deposits above this threshold will be remunerated at an interest rate of 1.25%, and thus still at a discount of 0.5 percentage points relative to the SNB policy rate. Inflation forecast  I would like to address the development of inflation. Inflation has declined significantly in recent months, and stood at 2.2% in May. This decrease was above all attributable to lower inflation on imported goods, in particular lower prices for oil products and natural gas. Our new conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate is 1.75% over the entire forecast horizon (cf. chart 1). Through to the end of 2023, the new forecast is below that of March. The lower oil and gas prices and the stronger Swiss franc are having a dampening effect over the short term. From 2024 onwards, the new forecast is higher than in March, despite today’s increase in the SNB policy rate. The reasons for this are ongoing second-round effects, higher electricity prices and rents, and more persistent inflationary pressure from abroad. The new forecast puts average annual inflation at 2.2% for 2023 and 2024, and 2.1% for 2025 (cf. table). In the forecast period, inflation is likely to be increasingly driven by higher prices of domestic goods and services. Without today’s policy rate increase, the inflation forecast would be even higher over the medium term.

Global economic outlook  Let me turn to the global economic outlook. Growth was modest in the advanced economies in the first quarter of 2023. Although inflation declined again in many countries, it remains clearly above central banks’ targets. Core inflation in particular is still stubbornly elevated. Page 2/8  Zurich, 22 June 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Against this background, numerous central banks have tightened their monetary policy further, albeit at a somewhat slower pace than in the previous quarters. The growth outlook for the global economy remains subdued. This is in particular attributable to the loss of purchasing power due to inflation in recent quarters and to tighter monetary policy. At the same time, inflation is likely to remain elevated worldwide for the time being. Over the medium term, however, it should return to more moderate levels, not least thanks to the more restrictive monetary policy and due to the economic slowdown. Our scenario for the global economy remains subject to large risks. In particular, the high level of inflation in some countries could be more persistent than expected. Equally, the energy situation in Europe could deteriorate again in Q4 2023 and Q1 2024. Swiss economic outlook  What is the economic outlook for Switzerland? GDP growth was solid in the first quarter of 2023. The services sector gained momentum, and there was also a slight increase in value added in manufacturing. The labour market remained robust, and overall production capacity has been well utilised.
Zamani Abdul Ghani: Significant trends surrounding the takaful industry Opening address by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at The 3rd International Convention on Takaful and Retakaful, Kuala Lumpur, 29 August 2007. *  *  *  Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, Distinguished Speakers, Ladies and Gentlemen. Assalamualaikum w.r.t. and Good Morning. I am indeed very pleased to be here this morning to welcome you to Kuala Lumpur . Alhamdulillah, we have among us today distinguished market players, regulators, scholars as well as participants from many parts of the world, including Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Sudan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Kuwait, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey and many others. On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, I wish to congratulate the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM) and the Malaysian Takaful Association (MTA) for their efforts in organizing, for the third consecutive year, this International Convention on Takaful and Retakaful. Let me at the outset reiterate the importance of this Convention as a source of collaboration for ideas, sharing of knowledge and exchange of experiences for the continuous development and improvement of the takaful and retakaful industry. In few days time, on 31st of August, Malaysia is celebrating the 50th National Day and therefore, the organization of this 3rd Convention on Takaful and Retakaful is indeed very special. The convention and independence celebration have similarities in their core values. Both cherish the spirit of alliance, tolerance and togetherness.

Both also share strong call for “muhasabah” or reflection – to strategize for the future by reflecting on past experiences. My address today will touch on these two aspects. I will share my observations on the significant trends surrounding takaful industry in recent years as well as key focus areas for the industry moving forward. Finally, I will highlight a couple of major initiatives undertaken by Malaysia to further strengthen as well as expand the breadth and depth of the takaful and retakaful industry. High growth potential of global takaful market As a starting point, allow me to share with you five major trends in global takaful industry over the past few years. These trends have significant bearing on the development of this industry moving forward. First, the takaful and retakaful industry continued to show rapid growth momentum, and is increasingly being recognized as one of the major components of the overall Islamic financial system . Global takaful contributions amounted more than USD2 billion in 2005 and are expected to reach USD7 billion by 2015. The past few years have seen growth rates of around 20%, indicating high growth potential in years to come due especially to the present very low rate of takaful market penetration. As for Malaysia, a commendable track record of the takaful industry has been recorded since its inception more than two decades ago. For the first half of this year, the total assets of the takaful funds stood at RM7.6 billion (as equivalent to USD2.2 billion).
In his presentation today, he presents a system for evaluating and ranking different policy alternatives, showing how Taylor diagrams can be used to evaluate whether one interest rate forecast results in lower volatility in inflation and the output gap than another. If a forecast results in inflation closer to target and a narrower output gap through the forecast period, this forecast is selected. On other occasions, the choice between two forecasts can be more problematic. The forecast that is selected will depend on preference and the considerations that are given weight. I completely agree with Lars Svensson that policymakers must rank the different policy alternatives based on their preferences. In some cases, policymakers may wish to keep the interest rate high while in others a low interest rate may be preferred. However, it is equally important to take account of preferences over time, i.e. having a system to check whether the preferences underlying the baseline scenario in one report are the same as those of the previous report. And once preferences have been formalised in a loss function, it is relatively simple to find the optimal interest rate path for a given model. The choice of path will then depend on policymakers’ preferences. A policymaker’s preferences may of course change over time, but I am in favour of basing the analysis on the same set of preferences as previously. This approach will contribute to consistency in communication over time. 1  Cf.

Criteria 3, 4 and 5 introduce conditions that cannot easily be observed. We have to apply judgement. The criteria contribute to consistency and structure the discussion. The Riksbank also applies judgement when selecting the interest rate path. But Svensson does not discuss possible shortcomings in the macroeconomic model. In Chart 10, he shows how the various interest rate paths, differing by around ½ percentage point in the period to summer, could result in differences in the inflation rate of close to 4 percentage points as early as next autumn. Monetary policy seems to be having a very strong impact. It would be interesting to hear whether he thinks that relying so heavily on such a model in interest rate setting is robust, and how possible errors in the model should be guarded against. We also know from experience that market participants’ perceptions can differ from ours, particularly somewhat further ahead. There can be a variety of reasons for these differences and Svensson discusses a number of them. It would also be useful to study the volatility surrounding publication of key macroeconomic variables. We would prefer to see lower volatility around monetary policy meetings, and that any surprises are postponed to a time closer to the publication of new macroeconomic data. Solberg Johansen (2008) – winner of the Bertil Ohlin prize for best thesis in international economics at the Stockholm School of Economics – examines volatility in the yield curve.
Brodsky, Bonni, Marco Del Negro, Joseph Fiorica, Eric LeSueur, Ari Morse, and Anthony Rodrigues. 2016a. “How Do Survey- and Market-Based Expectations of the Policy Rate Differ?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics (blog), April 7. Brodsky, Bonni, Marco Del Negro, Joseph Fiorica, Eric LeSueur, Ari Morse, and Anthony Rodrigues. 2016b. “Reconciling Survey- and Market-Based Expectations for the Policy Rate.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics (blog), April 8. Bruine de Bruin, Wändi, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and Giorgio Topa. 2011a. “Expectations of Inflation: The Biasing Effect of Thoughts about Specific Prices.” Journal of Economic Psychology 32, no. 5 (October): 834–45. Bruine de Bruin, Wändi, Charles F. Manski, Giorgio Topa, and Wilbert van der Klaauw. 2011b. “Measuring Consumer Uncertainty about Future Inflation.”Journal of Applied Econometrics 26, no. 3 (April–May): 454–78. Bruine de Bruin, Wändi, Wilbert van der Klaauw, Maarten van Rooij, Federica Teppa, Klaas de Vos. 2016. “Measuring Expectations of Inflation: Effects of Survey Mode, Wording, and Opportunities to Revise.” De Nederlandsche Bank working paper no. 506. Bruine de Bruin, Wändi, Wilbert van der Klaauw, Giorgio Topa, Julie S. Downs, Baruch Fischhoff, and Olivier Armantier. 2012. “The Effect of Question Wording on Consumers’ Reported Inflation Expectations.” Journal of Economic Psychology 33, no. 4: 749–57. Carroll, Christopher. 2003. “Macroeconomic Expectations of Households and Professional Forecasters.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 1: 269–98. BIS central bankers’ speeches  17  Correia-Golay, Ellen, Steven Friedman, and Michael McMorrow. 2013.

I am particularly pleased that on the last day of the Conference the honored governors, board members and experts from the European Central Bank, De Nederlandsche Bank, Banco de Portugal, Croatian National Bank, Bulgarian National Bank, National Bank of Belgium, Global Sovereign Advisors and the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia will reflect on innovations and cooperation as the main drivers of the European payment integration as well as on how consumers, firms and government users will pay in the future. Without further ado, I now declare the 10th jubilee Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures open. I wish you pleasant days here in Ohrid and many fruitful discussions. Thank you! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
This naturally impacted the financial health of the corporate sector, and business failure rates rose to levels comparable to those of the early 1990s. These economic trends, combined with the discovery of egregious shortcomings in corporate governance, fuelled misgivings about stockmarkets. And amid a global bear market, equity volatility soared. Consequently, as in 2001, capital market business in the broad sense of the term - securities, mergers and acquisitions, and the fees and commissions charged for these activities - were adversely affected. 1.2  Despite an unfavourable climate in 2002, French credit institutions reported net income on a par with 2001. French credit institutions reported net income of 17.7 billion euro in 2002, the same as in 2001. This works out to a return on equity of 9.4 per cent for the industry as a whole. As in previous years, these results were largely attributable to retail banking business in France. Consumer credit and home loans continued to grow, along with specialised financial services. In addition, falling interest rates had a positive effect on interbank business - which in France has always been significant - and drove down the net expense on these transactions. By contrast, capital market activities and asset management were hit by financial market turbulence, giving rise to substantial provisions in some cases. Furthermore, for the second year running, fees and commissions contracted as a percentage of net banking income, falling to 26 per cent compared with nearly 30 per cent in 2000.

To sum up the impact of the four key drivers of growth, deleveraging and demographics are quite unambiguously a dampener while energy appears a benign force. The long term trend for productivity is hard to predict. But even assuming a generally optimistic prognosis for productivity, it is quite likely that global growth in the next 20 years is likely to be lower than in the last 20. This means that returns from financial investments are also likely to be lower in the next 20 than in the last 20. Safeguarding long-term returns The modest outlook for long-term economic growth presents a major challenge for government funds to close the widening gap between their financing needs and investment returns. •  On the liabilities side, population ageing in the advanced economies will increase pension claims and place a heavier burden on social services such as healthcare. •  On the assets side, slowing global economic growth will constrain investment returns. There are three ways to narrow this mismatch between trends in assets and liabilities: •  The first is to reduce financing needs by lowering social expenditures or increasing fiscal revenues. Both are politically difficult to do. •  The second is to reach for yield by taking on various combinations of higher leverage, longer duration, and greater credit and liquidity risks. But the public perception and character of government funds limit their scope for aggressive risktaking.