samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The concrete follow-up measures and timeline for their implementation will be announced on Saturday, 1 PM, as part of the published results. Implementation of the measures will begin on Monday, 15 August 2016. They will be incorporated in the individual bank’s capital management plans, as well as in the supervisory process conducted by the BNB. 3. The results do not necessitate any public support to the banks with state budget funds. The follow-up measures aimed at maintaining or strengthening the capital position of all banks are based entirely on available market solutions and funds from private sources. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In closing, I would like to stress out that the asset quality review and the stress test were not an isolated event but an important step in the 18-month reform plan for the institutional development of the Bulgarian National Bank, which I announced upon my election as a Governor in July 2015. Other key aspects of this plan include significant improvement of the BNB’s supervisory process and the development of an institutional framework that is effective in resolving issues in the banking system. The strict execution of the plan to date has strengthened our disciplined approach and contributed to improving financial results in the banking sector. The markedly high half-year results of the banks are a solid platform for implementing the follow-up measures identified as a result of the asset quality review and the stress test.

Dimitar Radev: Assessment of the banking system in Bulgaria Statement by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, on the occasion of the completion of the asset quality review and stress test of the banks in Bulgaria, 11 August 2016. *  *  *  Today the Governing Council of the Bulgarian National Bank adopted the results of the asset quality review and stress test of the banks, as summarized by the international professional services company Deloitte. The main objective of the review was to present a thorough and independent assessment of the banks and the banking system as a whole. In its scale the exercise was unprecedented in the Bulgarian banking history and engaged more than 900 experts, including experts from the most reputable international audit firms, which acted under the direction of the BNB. The detailed results for each individual bank and the system as a whole will be announced at 1 PM on Saturday as per the formerly communicated announcement date. Following the announcement, the Bulgarian National Bank will be ready to address any specific questions related to the results. The asset quality review and stress test were mandated to the Bulgarian National Bank by law and they stem from the Government’s National Reform Programme. On that ground, I have presented the report on the outcomes to the Finance Minister and on Monday I will submit it to the National Assembly.
For example, for the euro area, see Gambetti and Musso (2017), “The macro eco nomic impact o f the ECB’s expanded asset purchase pro gramme (APP)”, ECB Working Paper No 2075. Fo r the United States, see Weale and Wieladek (2016), “What are the macro eco no mic effects o f asset purchases?”, Journal of Monetary Economics (79): 81-93. And lastly, fo r the United Kingdo m, see Kapetanio s et al. (2012), “Assessing the eco no my-wide effects o f quantitative easing”, The Economic Journal, Vo l. 122, pp. 316-347. 7  Co stain, Nuño and Thomas (2022), “The term structure o f interest rates in a hetero geneo us mo netary union”, Working Paper No 2223, Banco de España. 4  over time and across asset classes -, it played an additional role to reduce fragmentation within the euro area and thus ensure a smooth transmission of the single monetary policy. Let me now turn to the TLTROs. In 2014 the ECB launched TLTROs. Unlike the (non-targeted) longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) that preceded them, these ECB loans were specifically targeted at encouraging euro area banks to expand their lending to households and firms. Provided they met certain lending targets, banks received TLTRO loans under very advantageous conditions. 8 In this respect, TLTROs are complementary to asset purchases. While asset purchases aim to reduce the funding costs of those agents (such as sovereign and large corporate issuers) that fund themselves through bonds, TLTROs are intended to increase households’ and (smaller) firms’ access to bank credit.

Second, it seems reasonable to wait and observe potential ripple effects of TLTRO III repayments in bond markets before starting the bond portfolio run-off, as it will allow us to assess the effective impact of balance sheet reduction on financial conditions. After first allowing markets to absorb significant TLTRO III repayments, the normalisation of the ECB’s balance sheet could be followed by ending full reinvestment of the APP portfolio. As announced by President Lagarde last month, we will decide on the key principles of the reduction of our APP portfolio at our December monetary policy meeting. And why we should end APP reinvestments before PEPP reinvestments? In my opinion, a “first-in-first-out” staggered approach is preferable for at least two reasons. First, PEPP reinvestments remain an important line of defence against (pandemic-related) fragmentation episodes, so they are potentially pledged for reallocation across jurisdictions while the lasting vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic continue to pose a risk to the smooth transmission of our monetary policy. Second, we previously declared that PEPP reinvestments will not end up until at least the end of 2024, while our forward guidance on APP reinvestments was open-ended. We have clearly stated our intention to continue APP reinvestments for an extended period of time past the date when we started raising the key ECB interest rates. Moreover, our balance sheet policy will depend too on the operational framework that we adopt for the foreseeable future.
Table 1  The fiscal rule was drawn up in 2001. Today, the situation is different. In 2001, a real return on the Fund of 4 percent, or a little higher, based on the then prevailing distribution between equities and bonds, was a reasonable assumption. Today, calculations yield a lower figure for expected real return. 1 The real return on bonds in the Fund’s portfolio can now be estimated at 1 percent. With a normal risk premium on equities, the real return on the whole Fund can be quantified at 3 percent. There is a possibility that the real return will be higher, but it may also be lower. If we spend more than the annual return on the Fund, we will be eating into the savings portion. The conclusion is that a more robust approach would now be to base fiscal policy on an annual expected real return on the Fund of 3 percent. Such an adjustment would underpin the main principles that were behind the establishment of the fiscal rule – stability and sustainability. 1  8  See Norges Bank Staff Memo 6/2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 8  In 2011 the structural non-oil budget deficit was about 3 percent, which is close to such a new path. Adapting petroleum revenue spending to a lower expected return should not therefore be particularly demanding. If we wait, a necessary policy adjustment later could be far more painful.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Chart 4  The combination of large deficits and growing demographic problems is particularly challenging, as is the case for southern European countries, where fertility rates are well below the replacement rate and lower than the average for advanced countries. The demographic challenge will be even greater ahead. In some of the countries the number of pensioners will be close to the number of economically active. The basis for economic growth is thus weakened. The burden of rising debt and pension payments will be heavier. It takes a long time to reverse demographic trends. Financial incentives can be effective. Norway, with favourable support schemes for families with children, has a relatively high birth rate. In other European countries, there is a risk that these hard times will exacerbate the demographic challenge. Unemployment, in particular among youth, has risen sharply and many people have a dark view of the future. The events of recent years have brought fresh experience and reminded us of several historical lessons. Economic policy must be sustainable. Governments must save during upturns in order to weather downturns. At the same time, there are limits to what economic policy can accomplish if the economic foundations are being eroded. A competitive business sector is crucial to maintaining growth and welfare. This also applies to Norway. The financial crisis was a reminder of how risk can be mis-assessed.
These grew more serious in the 1990s, but they continued to be masked by generally sound macroeconomic conditions and investor confidence in a sustained Asian boom. However, the sudden onset of the crisis cannot be explained without appreciating the panic-prone and panic-inducing behaviour of international financial markets. Fortunately for most of Asia, the crisis, though severe, was short. The Russian default and LTCM debacle in the fall of 1998 were a turning point. The G7 countries, led by the US Federal Reserve, lowered interest rates promptly and decisively. While this lowering was motivated by domestic considerations, there was also a collective sense of concern over the weak state of the global economy. In the event, it helped restore liquidity and confidence to global financial markets. Now nearly all the Asian countries are recovering, though in different ways and to varying degrees. Post-crisis caution After this near-death experience, it is not surprising that countries are re-examining their belief in the global economic system. What lessons have countries learnt? 1  IMF News Brief 97/19, 8 October 1997. BIS Review 76/2000  2  Firstly, unlike previous crises, the crisis was due mainly to a run on the capital accounts. Thus, there was no reason to rethink the merits of free international trade and investments. These fuelled the last Asian boom, and are crucial if countries are to get their economies growing again. The most open of the Asian economies – Hong Kong and Singapore – were among the least badly affected by the crisis.

Companies borrowed excessively, especially in foreign currencies without hedging their exposures, encouraged by implicitly pegged exchange rates. But lenders in the developed economies could not escape blame either. They were only too eager to extend credit, based on the political connections of the borrowers, or on faith in an Asian miracle. Banks stampeded into the region. When sentiments turned, they stampeded out again, equally indiscriminately. The sudden massive outflow of funds, especially through banking lines, left countries in a severe liquidity crunch, and was an immediate cause of the crisis. The punishment meted out by the markets was out of proportion to the crime. The damage was not just the 9% shrinkage in the GDP of the crisis countries, but the social dislocation and political turbulence that followed. Indonesia suffered the worst, even though the IMF made a pre-emptive house call early in the crisis, and pronounced Indonesia’s fundamentals to be basically sound.1 The Indonesian government had pursued prudent macro policies and maintained steady economic growth. But companies had borrowed large sums from abroad, and the banking sector was afflicted by related party lending, poor credits, and weak provisioning. This, together with concerns about KKN – corruption, collusion and nepotism – was enough to turn an initial loss of confidence into a full-blown crisis of the body politic, forcing President Suharto to resign and pushing the country to the brink of chaos. The origins of the Asian crisis thus lay in institutional weaknesses and inefficiencies.
17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Chart 14: Median ethnicity pay gap by sector, sample average Ethnicity pay gap, per cent  London  20  Other 15  10  5  0  ‐5  ‐10  ‐15 Agriculture  Industry  Construction Trade and transport  ICT  Ethnic minority minority ethnic  Finance  Real Estate Professional Public sector  Other  White white  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts. If we look at ethnic minority workers at a more granular level, some interesting cohort effects emerge. There is a very wide dispersion of pay among different ethnic minority cohorts, with some having negative and others positive pay gaps compared with their white counterparts (Chart 15). Median hourly pay is highest for those of Chinese ethnicity, at just over £ or around 15% higher than for whites. There are also negative pay gaps, though smaller ones, for workers from a mixed/multiple ethnic and Indian background. At the other end of the spectrum, there are significantly positive pay gaps for other ethnic minority cohorts, including black and Afro-Caribbean workers. The largest pay gaps are for workers from a Pakistani and Bangladeshi background, which average 13% and 20%, respectively (Chart 15).

Let me mention just four: 1.  to preserve peace;  2.  to improve economic prospects;  3.  to defend our values; and  4.  to increase personal options continent-wide. The founding fathers of the EU were willing to make political sacrifices to end bloodshed in Europe, following two devastating wars just decades apart. Let us not forget that we are here in a former prison in which every respected Luxembourg family had relatives who stood up for these values. After 70 years of peace in western Europe it is easy to be complacent that war will not happen again. Yet the current situation in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine and that of the Balkans in the 1990s shows that peace is vulnerable, even on our doorstep. But defence and security have to be understood as a common endeavour. The economic benefits of the Union are well documented: free trade, the removal of non-tariff barriers, the elimination of transactions costs of foreign exchange payments and the introduction of a single yield curve across the euro area to name but a few. These measures have reduced costs for businesses and households, and in turn generated higher income and created jobs. Looking ahead, also the recovery is on track to overcome the crisis. Europeans, for all our differences, have many values that we share more closely than even close allies such as the United States. Our social model ensures adequate healthcare and workers’ rights that are absent elsewhere.
It is therefore important to publish forecasts for inflation and the real economy, which the Riksbank does. We will never live in a world where it is possible to fully predict the future. Moreover, our knowledge of how the transmission mechanism works, that is, how an interest rate change works its way through the economy, is far from perfect. But given the available information and with the knowledge available we shall make the best possible forecasts and it shall be possible to evaluate our forecasts. When inflation deviates from the target it shall be possible to understand why this happened and to assess the deliberations that were held. To publish a forecast for the repo rate on top of all this, which is something few central banks do, makes it easier for us to find the most reasonable balance between attaining the inflation target and stabilising the real economy. It also helps us explain our policy. We also do this by presenting a number of alternative scenarios for the economy and showing what consequences these would have for monetary policy. Popular and unpopular interest rate decisions In the long run it is the actual "delivery” of low and stable inflation that creates confidence in long-term stable prices. But the economy can be subjected to unforeseen shocks that affect inflation and monetary policy cannot have the precision required to constantly maintain inflation at the target level. Deviations from the inflation target have happened before and will happen again. The important thing is that they are temporary.

He found that movements in interest rates around their long-run level could be explained by just the level of inflation relative to its target, and imbalances between the level of demand in the economy and the capacity of the economy to produce output. 4  8  http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/Sympos/2005/PDF/King2005.pdf. BIS Review 21/2009  Asset prices and stock imbalances of the kind we have seen on the balance sheets of banks, households and companies are conspicuous by their absence in the Taylor Rule. Whether policymakers actually slavishly follow the Taylor Rule, or it simply represents a good description of how we behave is largely immaterial. Either way, the default position of policymakers has been that interest rates should not be used to choke off a boom in financial markets. That non-interventionist doctrine was based on two key judgements. First, that the costs of leaning against imbalances in financial markets were high. It was believed that policymakers would find it difficult to differentiate between movements in asset prices that could be justified by fundamentals and those which reflected bubbles. The central bank which frequently responded to movements in asset prices would often as not be doing so mistakenly. By the time that the central bank was confident that asset prices were unsustainable it would typically be too late to act. An increase in interest rates late in the day could prove counter-productive: the bubble might well have burst by the time the change in policy had filtered into aggregate demand.
Reflecting diversity, choosing inclusion Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  Court Room, Bank of England 9 February 2017  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth, Anne Wetherilt and Iain de Weymarn for their assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Richard Galletly, Cat Hines and Daniel Nixon for background research. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  And there were never, in the world, two opinions alike, no more than two hairs, or two grains; their most universal quality is diversity. (Michel de Montaigne, Essais, Book II, Chapter 37)  Introduction  The Bank of England recognises that to pursue its mission it must reflect the diversity of the people it serves. That has not always been the case. Historically, there were times when this institution was run by the City for the City. Our first female Court member, Frances Heaton was only appointed in 1993, while our first Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) member, Lord Morris, followed five years later. Ten years ago our th  graduate intake was drawn from just 11 universities. And I am the 120 in a very long line of male Governors of the Bank. Frequent charges levelled at this central bank – like many of our peers – include being mono-culture, secretive and ridden with groupthink. Those charges began to lose their force in the face of significant efforts by my predecessors.

With today’s interest rate increase, we are also raising the interest rate on sight deposits above the threshold. For domestic banks, this threshold is calculated on the basis of their minimum reserve requirements. 1 By remunerating sight deposits above the threshold now at 0.5%, we ensure that our tighter monetary policy will continue to be passed through efficiently to interest rates in the money market overall. 1  Further information is available in the Instruction sheet governing interest on sight deposits. Page 1/2  Berne, 15 December 2022 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Page 2/2
The maximum amount issuable (around € billion at current prices) is unprecedented at supranational level, particularly taking into account that the fund will be mainly used (42% of the total) for direct grants to Member States. If all these instruments are brought to bear, the EU's supranational debt would double, boosting the amount of safe assets available in Europe, since the fiscal impulse in countries with  4  See M. Delgado-Téllez, I. Kataryniuk, F. López-Vicente and J. J. Pérez (2020), Supranational Debt and Financing Needs in the European Union, Occasional Papers, No 2021, Banco de España. 5 See Parliamentary testimony: presentation by the Governor of the Banco de España, Annual Report 2019. October 2020. 6  lower credit ratings would be funded through “safe” debt. Moreover, reducing aggregate risk in this way would facilitate monetary policy implementation. In the long term, a deeper supranational debt market could contribute to greater banking and capital market integration, and would pave the way for the future implementation of monetary policy, as there would be a safe benchmark common to all countries. In addition to the aggregate effect, the steps taken to press ahead institutionally in the EU tend to bring about positive effects on the financial markets and, in particular, on the sovereign risk premia,6 which tend to decline as these agreements are perceived as a guarantee of continuity and further strengthening of the European project, thus contributing to reducing the high level of geographical heterogeneity in financing conditions.

In our efforts to achieve the desired outcomes, we are cognizant of the need for our leaders at all levels of the organisation to demonstrate the right behaviours to reinforce our desired culture of trust, integrity, collaboration and innovation. When speaking about leadership here, I should add that this is not defined by one’s position, but rather the values that one upholds in doing what is right and in the best interest of the organisation. Times have changed, and a job for life is no longer the goal to aspire to in a career. Rather, our job is now to be life-long learners, and to facilitate that same learning for others. A continuous learning mind-set is what will ultimately differentiate an outstanding career from a mediocre one, and ensure that we can adapt, thrive and be productively and purposefully employed whatever unfolds in the future of work. I hope that as CEOs, CLOs, Heads of L&D and academia, we will be the agents of change to help steer our organisations towards a work environment and culture that will survive and thrive amid the future challenges to come. Today’s event is a step in that direction. Let us learn from distinguished experts and one another today. Let us reimagine organisational learning. Most of all, let us strive together to build a strong, competent and well-rounded workforce. Thank you and I wish all of you a productive and stimulating day ahead. 1 The Future of Jobs Report 2020 by the World Economic Forum 2 OECD (2019).