samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Before I conclude, let me again stress that the development of more inclusive financial sectors is an important objective, and as policymakers we need to pursue this without compromising on the prudential standards that sustain confidence in the financial system. Branchless banking has tremendous potential to increase the outreach of financial services provided the different players and regulators are able to work within common regulatory framework. And finally that we must adopt a collaborative stance in pursuing this important global agenda which can make a real difference for the millions of people that remain caught in poverty. 4  BIS Review 162/2009  On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia I would also like to thank our principal facilitators for the workshop from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, the subject matter experts from World Bank, the representatives from Maxis Communications Malaysia and Global Exchange of Philippines, and the representative from Group Speciale Mobile Association who joins us from London. I also welcome the participation of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion in this Forum, and we look forward to working with all of you on developing more inclusive financial sectors in the Asian region. Finally, I would like to thank all the participants who have come in from all over Asia to support this Forum. I wish you a fruitful forum and hope that you will form valuable professional relationships during this event. BIS Review 162/2009  5

We believe that the industry is ready to build and expand its capacity in this area. While we are moving to being more risk-based, there is still a lot more to be done. This includes educating everyone in the industry that “risk-based” does not mean “total risk aversion”. While it is crucial to protect our financial system from being abused, it is also necessary for financial institutions to serve their roles and purposes in the economy and for the society. Accordingly, the new 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  regulatory framework demands reporting institutions to take greater ownership of their individual AML/CFT frameworks. Reporting institutions must strengthen their internal governance and controls to preserve financial integrity, not because Bank Negara tells them so, but because it is the right thing to do. This demands a high level of maturity by the industry. For individual institutions which have established a mature control environment, there will be greater latitude to design control frameworks in a way that is more operationally flexible. On the other hand, for individual institutions who are not quite there yet, the new framework raises the compliance bar, calling for them to strengthen awareness, governance and processes to ensure they have the capabilities to preserve integrity of the financial system. On this point, I wish to applaud the Financial Services Professional Board (FSPB) on its recent publication of standards on whistleblowing and on managing conflicts of interest.
PEPP – a flexible instrument to fight the crisis within our mandate I would now like to take a closer look at the legality of our most far-reaching and exceptional monetary policy decision, the launch of the PEPP. Let me first look at its features. The PEPP was established to act first as a backstop to potential market disruption. In short, it 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  has had a stabilising effect to counteract the market fragmentation that was unwarranted on the basis of the underlying economic fundamentals, and to safeguard the transmission mechanism. The PEPP also reinforces the ECB’s monetary policy stance. In so doing, the PEPP is a direct and targeted response to an “extraordinary and acute economic crisis”1 and aims to ensure the ECB’s ability to fulfil its mandate under the circumstances. Notably however, “Due to these exceptional, fast-evolving…circumstances, the PEPP requires a high degree of flexibility in its design and implementation” as set out in the Decision implementing the PEPP.2 Purchases under the PEPP continue to be guided by the capital key of the national central banks as for the APP. But the PEPP allows for fluctuations in the distribution of purchases over time, across asset classes and among jurisdictions. This flexibility has allowed us to effectively stave off risks to the smooth transmission of monetary policy. In view of the pandemic’s exceptional nature, we decided not to apply to the PEPP the same selfimposed public purchase limits that apply to the sovereign purchases under the APP.

Some banks that might want to make such loans may lack the knowledge of how to make small loans and package them appropriately. The other challenge lenders have to work with in assessing SMEs for them to access credit is the lack of reliable data. For example, data on the share of bank credit to SMEs are almost non-existent in Zambia. Even in banks where credit data are available from credit registries, in most cases they do not include information about the size of firms. Any estimates regarding the share of credit to SMEs have to rely on proxies, such as the size of loans. BIS Review 79/2008  1  Mr Chairman, it is clear that lending to SMEs is different from lending to large firms. In the case of young firms, it is more difficult to acquire information. Moreover, given the small size of the loans, it does not pay for the bank to undertake a detailed review of the creditworthiness of SMEs. Thus, for SME lending to be profitable, banks must experiment with new approaches and technologies for risk assessment and loan management. Such experimentation produces positive externalities by generating knowledge that is difficult for the bank to keep for itself, since trained agents can leave the bank to work with competitors. The other benefit we get from SMEs is that when there are adverse shocks in the market, their small size and flexibility allow them to speedily adjust to market changes.
Now that we have demonstrated that we have monetary control even with a very large balance sheet, I would hope that this issue has been put to rest. As I noted earlier, I am a committed advocate for enhanced transparency and we are always looking for ways to improve. But, of course, there are limits. One could argue, for example, that a live broadcast of a Federal Open Market Committee meeting would be more transparent. But, such a broadcast would do considerable harm by constraining candor and debate over the appropriate monetary policy decision. I believe it would likely lead to less informed decisions and, consequently, poorer execution of our monetary policy responsibilities. Similarly, disclosing in real time who was borrowing from the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window would likely undercut the efficacy of the window. Banks might be reluctant to borrow if it were immediately made public because such borrowing might be construed in the market as a sign of weakness. 19 Stigmatizing Discount Window use by banks would make this tool less effective as a lender of last resort backstop for bank liquidity needs. While there obviously is a point of diminishing returns in terms of increased transparency, I think it’s reasonable to evaluate what further steps the Federal Reserve could make in this direction, judging whether additional steps would enhance versus diminish the effectiveness of our tools and policies, and our ability to achieve our objectives.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Expanding further understanding of Islamic finance Welcoming remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the INCEIF's (The Global University in Islamic Finance) Public Lecture by Dr Abbas Mirakhor, the First Holder of INCEIF Chair of Islamic Finance, Kuala Lumpur, 29 January 2010. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the INCEIF's Inaugural Public Lecture by Dr Abbas Mirakhor, a distinguished scholar and the first holder of the INCEIF Chair of Islamic Finance. The INCEIF Public Lecture Series aims to provide a forum for promoting intellectual engagement to discuss the issues, developments and challenges in the area of Islamic finance. The global financial crisis that has dominated the headlines across the world for more than two years has brought to the forefront the fundamental issues in the international financial system that need to be addressed. Now, as the growth prospect resumes, the debate is focussed on the priorities and direction needed to reshape the post crisis world to ensure that the recovery will be sustainable. While Islamic finance has demonstrated its resilience during this period, the industry is now entering into an environment that is fundamentally different in this post crisis era. The international financial reform agenda will result in new structures, standards and regulatory regimes for the global financial industry. Greater financial inter-linkages and integration will also require greater cooperation and collaboration in the endeavour to preserve global financial stability.
Tarisa Watanagase: Rethinking monetary policy in a globalized world – coping with current challenges and beyond Remarks by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Central Bank of Malaysia High Level Conference 2009, Kuala Lumpur, 10 February 2009. * 1. *  *  Introduction  I would like to congratulate Bank Negara Malaysia on its 50th anniversary, and the magnificent job the Bank has done both in the domestic and international arenas. I wish the Bank continued success in the next 50 years and beyond. Thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished audience on a topic that is a current concern for all central bankers during these turbulent times. I would like to raise a number of issues which have challenged the traditional thinking behind monetary policy as a consequence of globalization and the current turmoil. In some others I hope to propose solutions – some new, and some old. In many cases I will address the challenges and the blind spots which we face as monetary policy makers, and raise questions to which I myself do not yet know the answer. The developments that globalization has brought about has tested the limits of conventional monetary policy, both in terms of the current thinking about how monetary policy is conducted, as well as the effectiveness of the current approach to monetary policy. I will discuss these points in detail in a moment.

Unlike the frog, we must strive to know the wide world outside and continue to work together with our partners to address all the challenges we are faced with. Be assured this is true for France and for Europe, and in this respect I know that we can count on Japan as a reliable partner. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Let me start at home, so to speak: at the SNB. People frequently call for the SNB to abolish the negative interest rate in order to significantly ease the pressure on pension funds. But if we think things through, would that actually happen? If there were no negative interest rate, the franc would be even more attractive internationally and would appreciate. That would slow down our economy considerably, and unemployment would rise substantially. In this gloomy scenario, long-term interest rates would therefore  Page 5/8  barely increase at all. Instead, the downturn in economic activity would cloud the outlook for Swiss companies – with adverse consequences for share prices as well. So you see, under current circumstances the earnings outlook for the pension funds would not improve significantly if the negative interest rate were to be abolished. On the contrary. Higher unemployment would impact on the economy and the pension system, as it would have the effect of reducing value added and hence the contribution base. At present, it would therefore not be in the pension funds’ interest to abolish the negative interest rate. So if it is not possible in the current situation for the SNB to abolish the negative interest rate, could it not at least use the income derived from it to alleviate some of the pressure on the pension system – for example by distributing this income to the pension funds as ‘compensation’? In our view, this would not be a good idea either.

This showed that the negative interest rate, and our willingness to intervene on the foreign exchange market as necessary, are still essential in order to ease pressure on the franc, thereby stabilising price developments and supporting economic activity. Only in this way can we fulfil our mandate – to ensure price stability while taking due account of economic developments – in the interests of the country as a whole. In September, we also adjusted the basis for calculating the exemption threshold, which defines the portion of a bank’s sight deposits at the SNB on which we do not charge negative interest. This adjustment reduces the overall burden imposed on the banking system by negative interest to the minimum required for monetary policy purposes, 6 while taking account of the possibility that the low interest rate environment may persist worldwide for some time to come. While negative interest rates are unusual and should only be temporary, moderately negative rates are not fundamentally different in terms of their economic effects from interest rates above zero. As the negative interest rate has brought about an easing of financing conditions in the economy, companies are able to take out loans for investments at lower cost. For us, however, this so-called ‘interest rate channel’ is not of prime importance. Rather, it is the effect on the exchange rate that is decisive for Switzerland as a small open economy. With the negative interest rate, we can ensure that the traditional interest rate differential versus other countries is not eroded excessively.
As I indicated earlier, EMU is leading to more integrated financial markets. In the absence of national monetary policies, this accentuates the need of joint systems and standards for financial oversight. It also increases the need of readiness for the joint management of financial crises. Work in this field is now in progress in a variety of fora. Concluding remarks Internationalisation in general, with growth in trade and factor mobility, has brought the EU member states closer together and increased their interdependence. Politically motivated changes such as the internal market and the new monetary union have served to promote this trend. BIS Review 102/2000  4  As regards government finances, various processes, including a system of sanctions, have been set up to test national policies. This is because of the risk that individual member states would otherwise be able to pursue a policy that could harm the others. Processes have also been established in other policy areas to highlight key issues in the European debate, to point to good examples and to exert peer pressure. This should not be belittled: we know from Swedish experience that comparative analysis and in-depth debate can push things in the desired direction. So what should we expect in the future? I have briefly touched on a number of situations where cooperation and coordination could lead to a better EU policy.

Atchana Waiquamdee: Brief look at financial market indicators Opening remarks by Dr Atchana Waiquamdee, Deputy Governor for Monetary Stability, Bank of Thailand, at the Workshop on Financial Market Indicators, Bangkok, 7 June 2007. *  *  *  Good morning, and allow me to welcome you to Bangkok, and to this morning’s Workshop on Financial Market Indicators. The issue we are about to discuss today, namely the use financial indicators, itself is not a new topic. Especially in more developed financial markets, the use of financial indicators has been integral to the well-functioning of markets. In those cases, utilizing financial market indicators in the policy-making process is nothing new. In many of the emerging markets of Asia, however, this has not been the case. Financial indicators in the emerging markets have been more difficult to come by, and even much more difficult to interpret – due largely to gaps in market development. Yet, as the financial markets of Asian economies began to gather both depth and breadth, more and more financial market indicators are becoming readily available for policy use. Since the availability of the indicators in emerging markets is rather recent and the fundamental conditions in these markets are still very dissimilar to those of the more matured ones, the use of financial market indicators in emerging markets for policy purposes merits much thought and attention. So what exactly are we talking about when referring to financial market indicators?
Estimated GVA (EBIT + employee costs) is regressed on a range of variables to control for sub-sector and number of employees using a Weighted Least Squares method (with employee numbers as the weighting). The output of this regression is used to compute an expected productivity, representing the average for a firm of that size in that sub-sector. The residual for each firm is plotted as a percentage of the median productivity for a firm in the same size bracket in the same sub-sector.

Due to the changed international environment, however, which we are unable to influence, we have no choice but to adjust to a leaner period, whether we like it or not. Monetary policy of the SNB With the end of the minimum exchange rate, the SNB has now returned to interest rate management. However, this does not mean that we have reverted to business as usual for monetary policy. In December last year, the SNB introduced an interest rate of –0.25%, to be charged on sight deposit account balances held by banks and other financial market participants at the SNB. On 15 January – concurrently with the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate – we lowered this interest rate again, to –0.75%. This lowering of the interest rate makes it substantially more expensive to hold Swiss francs compared to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  other currencies. Over time it is intended to cushion the impact of the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate and counter a tightening of monetary conditions. Discontinuing the minimum exchange rate does not mean that the SNB will stop paying attention to foreign exchange market developments. We will continue to take account of the exchange rate situation in formulating our monetary policy in future. Following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate, the Swiss franc initially appreciated sharply against all currencies. The appreciation diminished somewhat in the following weeks.
There are therefore compelling arguments in favor of a generally positive assessment of the consequences of innovation. Does experience provide support for these arguments, or are these changes too new for us to know? The recent changes in credit markets have been dramatic. We have seen rapid growth of structured credit products, credit default swaps and new types of collateralized debt and loan obligations. Although these instruments are very new, they are the natural extension of earlier innovations in credit markets. Over a long period we have seen innovations ranging from the syndication of bank loans and the direct provision of credit through the capital markets, to the spread of asset-backed securities and products that separate different parts of the payments stream and different dimensions of the risk in a credit obligation into different instruments. These changes have contributed to a substantial reduction in the share of total credit held by banks. They have produced a greater separation or distance between the entity that first arranges a loan and those who end up holding the risk, and more intermediaries in that chain. And they have contributed to a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of creditors to any individual borrower, and a greater capacity to actively trade credit risk. BIS Review 29/2007  1  We are now well into the third decade of experience with the consequences of these earlier innovations, and this history offers some useful lessons for evaluating the probable impact of the latest changes in credit markets.

In this new environment, the Paris financial centre has obvious advantages, building on the very welcome measures announced in July by our Prime Minister to strengthen Paris’ attractiveness. To name a few, France has the biggest investment banks in continental Europe, the largest asset management industry and is the leading private equity investor; and French universities are renowned worldwide for the excellence of their finance teaching. And, last but not least, Paris will have the privilege of welcoming the EBA. Furthermore, the euro area has to keep control of the risks regarding its currency, the euro, and euro-based transactions. Some financial market infrastructures located in London, which are key for the EU, will soon become off-shore to the EU as a consequence of Brexit. This is particularly problematic when these infrastructures could put the EU’s financial stability at risk, as they represent 70% of the daily euro clearing business, equivalent to around EUR 930 billion (GBP 792 billion) in trades per dayi. This is the reason why the Commission proposed – and we support – a location policy for CCPs. Clearing activities in euro, for all those of “super-systemic” importance, must be located where the supervision of the Eurosystem can be exercised effectively. It is a matter of consistency for monetary policy and financial stability.
But I do have empathy, because regulators are also sometimes caricatured – in our case as single-mindedly risk averse, driven by an incentive to avoid firm failure, and paying insufficient attention to counter-balancing commercial incentives. Like any caricature, this one starts with a single distinctive feature – it is the job of the regulator to uphold prudential standards particularly in good times when the long term benefit, indeed necessity of maintaining standards is easily overlooked – and then magnifies that one characteristic to the exclusion of all else. Today I want to look past the caricature and explain how we really think about the relationship between capital requirements and the rest of the prudential regime, in the context of the government’s review of Solvency II. Goals of the review of Solvency II What does the PRA hope that the review will achieve? We are committed to upholding the principles of Solvency II – they are our principles, and given the amount invested by firms in implementing the Solvency II regime, we see no appetite to tear them up and start again. The top level goal of the review is instead to tailor a regime based on those principles to the UK market.

M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: Commercial Banking and Financial Services - our Vision for Thailand Speech by M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Conference on “Modernizing our Financial System: Challenges for the New Millennium”, Bangkok, 23 January 2002. *  *  *  Your Excellencies Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome all of you to our conference on "Modernizing our Financial System: Challenges for the new Millennium". I would also like to express our deep appreciation for the distinguished speakers who came all the way from Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, and South Africa to share with us their expertise and knowledge on this very important topic. And, of course, to the World Bank, our co-host, for help organizing the conference. Our financial crisis in 1997 and its subsequent impacts highlighted the lesson of critical importance that dynamic and strong domestic financial institutions are vital to sustainability of development and growth. Over the past 20 years, financial sector has been one of the major forces that support our progress and financial services share in our GDP has grown from a mere 3 percent to roughly 8 percent. It is the fifth largest industry in term of value added to our GDP, and currently employing more than 300,000 of our workforce. Nevertheless, despite such favorable development, there are some concerns: -  First, in term of competitiveness of our financial institutions, there is room for improvement.