samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Bartsch, E., J. Boivin, S. Fisher and P. Hildebrand (2019), “Dealing with the next downturn”, SUERF policy note Issue No. 105. Bernanke, B. (2020), “The new tools of monetary policy”, American Economic Association Presidential Address”, Brookings Institution. Billi, R. and A. Vredin (2014), “Monetary policy and financial stability – a simple story,” Economic Review 2018:2, Sveriges Riksbank. Blanchard, O., and J. Simon (2001). “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 135-64. Blanchard, O. (2019), “Public debt and low interest rates”, American Economic Review 109(4): 1197-1229. Clarida, R. (2019), “The Federal Reserve’s Review of Its Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communication Practices”, speech, 26th September. Coenen, G., C. Erceg, C. Freedman, D. Furceri, M. Kumhof, R. Lalonde, D. Laxton, J, Lindé, A. Mourougane, D. Muir, S. Mursula, C. de Resende, J. Roberts, W. Roeger, S. Snudden, M. Trabandt, and J. Veld. (2012), “Effects of fiscal stimulus in structural models”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4(1) pp. 22-68. 23 [25]  De Rezende, R. and A. Ristiniemi (2018), “A shadow rate without a lower bound constraint”, Working Paper Series No. 355, Sveriges Riksbank. Del Negro, M., M. Giannoni and C. Patterson (2015), “The Forward Guidance Puzzle”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 2012:574. Frohm, E. and S. Ingves (2020) “The future isn’t what it used to be – perspectives on changes in the Swedish economy”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2020:1, Sveriges Riksbank.

As things look now, there is considerable probability that global interest rates will remain low over a long period of time, and then monetary policy will have to find other ways of working to attain the inflation target than those we are used to, and many of the measures will have consequences for the balance sheet. We need to endeavour to attain a better analysis of how measures that have an effect through the balance sheet affect the economy and become as clear and systematic when we talk about these as we have tried to be with regard to steering interest rates. I intend to begin with a historical retrospective – focusing on the past 30 years – and to describe how monetary policy has developed over time. Then I will move on to the challenges that monetary policy has faced and that have led to the use of new tools. This takes me to the international discussions about the monetary policy toolbox, and, in conclusion, I would like to discuss what opportunities and limitations the Riksbank Inquiry’s proposed new act entails. The development of monetary policy – a retrospective Ever since central banks in the modern sense were created, their objective has been clear: to provide the economy with a payment system and with a means of payment and to ensure that the value of these funds remains stable over time.
One that can explain the motions of both heavenly bodies and subatomic particles. I am on a similar quest this evening. My topic is one of the hottest fields in economic policy— macroprudential policy. A field that has something in common with Newton, for part of the responsibilities of macroprudential policy is to protect the economy from the madness of people. Macroprudential policy is as core to the responsibilities of central banks as their much better known twin, monetary policy. Both are fundamental to the value of money. The relative simplicity of the monetary policy objective and the relatively focused arsenal of monetary policymakers improve the likelihood that agents in the economy can understand the MPC’s reaction function and anticipate its actions, making its job of achieving price stability somewhat easier. 1 This evening I would like to improve the understanding of the FPC’s reaction function by placing its objectives and policies in a more consistent theoretical framework. A common framework can better explain seemingly disparate macroprudential policies and can guide future policy actions. This will be important if, as has happened all too frequently in the past, either a prolonged period of growth or the emergence of new  1 See ‘Guidance, Contingencies and Brexit’, speech by Mark Carney given at the Society of Professional Economists, 24  May 2018. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  era thinking threaten to take financial stability for granted once again, thereby sowing the seeds of a future crisis. II.

Another important example of delegation to experts has been the creation of independent central banks to decide on monetary policy to deliver an inflation target set by government. Frustration with high inflation in the 1970s made many countries move towards de-politicizing decisions about monetary policy and interest rates. Research suggested that political pressure led to an ‘inflation bias’ in policymaking, which could be 8  solved by delegating responsibility for price stability to independent central banks. The following decades  1  Source: Ourworldindata.org Source: World Health Organisation 3 Source: The World Bank 4 Where poverty is defined as living on less than $ a day at 2011 prices. Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty) 5 Source: World Bank 6 Source The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations 7 Until 46 BC, the calendar used in the Roman Empire consisted of 12 months of a total of 355 days, with the intention that an additional month would be added in some years so as to keep the calendar in line with the solar year (of 365¼ days). The pontifices had some discretion over the calendar, meaning they could use it for political advantage by lengthening or shortening the terms of Roman magistrates who were supposed to serve for a calendar year. This led to considerable confusion for ordinary citizens as to what date it was. Moreover, by the 40s BC the Roman calendar was three months ahead of the solar calendar.
Source: MPF, NBR, NBR calculations  23  Figure 32. Distribution of companies with equity below the regulatory threshold in 2016 by year of establishment 25,000  no. of firms  20,000  15,000  10,000  5,000  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  1991  1990  0  Source: NTRO, MPF, NBR 24  Figure 34. Share of overdue payments* generated by undercapitalised companies  Figure 33. Breakdown of overdue payments* across the economy by company ownership 80  lei bn.

The main risk factors to financial stability are: (i) the undercapitalisation of a large number of companies (276.4 thousand firms with net worth below the required threshold, out of which 268.5 thousand firms with negative equity), induced particularly by losses (217.3 thousand firms with total losses of lei 33 billion in 2016), as well as the high indebtedness level in certain sectors, (ii) the increase in past due obligations to the government budget (up 5.9 percent in 2016), (iii) the low capacity to recover commercial claims, especially at the level of micro-enterprises, (iv) corroborated by the large number of firms in credit institutions’ portfolio which have not gone through a full business cycle, (v) the return of insolvency to an upward trend in terms of both the number of newly-insolvent firms (6.1 thousand firms in the first eight months of the year) and the volume of non-performing loans generated in the banking sector (the volume of non-performing loans generated by the companies undergoing insolvency proceedings increased by about one third to lei 1 billion) and (vi) the rise in overdue payments of the government budget to the real sector (up 9 percent in the period from September 2016 to September 2017 to lei 223.1 million). In a broader perspective, the weak payment discipline economy-wide has highlighted structural vulnerabilities in the balance sheets of companies (Figures 31-34). It is worth noting that the poor payment discipline economy-wide is not a new risk, but a recurrent vulnerability in Romania’s economy.
With that in mind, we strongly encourage you to accelerate your transition efforts and respond swiftly to these important changes, which would no doubt bring about a substantial shift to our market activities and business practices. Above all and most importantly, we must stay committed and work together collectively, with our focus remain firmly on the common goal of ensuring a smooth and timely transition. 21. Given the limited amount of time today, I could only briefly touch on what the HKMA has been and will be doing for being the region’s sustainable financing hub. I look forward to sharing more updates and views with you on other occasions. I would also urge you to stay engaged for further benefitting from the unfolding opportunities in the sustainable financing space in Hong Kong! Thank you. 1 HKMA analysis of the volumes of Asian international green and sustainable bonds arranged in Hong Kong  4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

You can see this clearly in chart 8. Both inflation and the output gap show a strong correlation with the development of the exchange rate. Appreciation of the Swiss franc equates to a tightening of monetary conditions. It leads via lower import prices to lower inflation. At the same time, the appreciation of the Swiss franc has a negative impact on utilisation of overall production capacity and thus also on general price developments. 9  The Swiss Federal Statistical Office and the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences (2016), Switzerland and the Commodities Trade, Swiss Academies Factsheets, Vol. 11, No. 1. Page 11/13  It is not only the export-oriented companies trading in goods on the global markets that are affected by exchange rate fluctuations. Geographically, the Swiss economy lies at the centre of the European Economic Area. Even in the domestic market, Swiss companies are in direct competition with foreign companies and cannot set their prices as high as they would like above those of their competitors in neighbouring border regions. An appreciating franc erodes the competitiveness of these companies, too. In an exceptionally open economy like Switzerland that is highly integrated internationally, exchange rate fluctuations have a major impact on price stability and economic activity. Since 2009, we have repeatedly been confronted with situations in which the appreciation of the Swiss franc has led to an undesirable tightening of monetary conditions so that production capacity has not been fully utilised and inflation has temporarily dipped into negative territory.
On past loss performance, this standard reduces the probability of failure to extremely low levels, and the probability of simultaneous failures that drive crises to even lower levels. And that past performance includes the global financial crisis. In the UK, even the two biggest failures of the crisis – Royal Bank of Scotland and Halifax Bank of Scotland – suffered losses comfortably within these baseline standards. Using Basel III definitions, both suffered losses – even over three years – of around 5% of risk weighted assets. 10 So going further could have a sharply diminishing further effect on the probability of banking failure. And it could run the risk of economic cost. Our standard recognises those risks. By not taking it higher, we are seeking to strike a balance; to be macroprudential. That balance is also served by the make-up of the requirements. Hard floor capital requirements don’t help the real economy. They simply move the point of failure and distress of banks to a higher level of capital. They may make banks more resilient, but they don’t make credit supply and essential service provision more resilient. So a large slice of bank capital should take the form of a useable buffer: a cushion that sits on top of minimum capital requirements that can be run down and built up gradually afterwards. The emphasis is on useable.

Climate change has been among the focus areas of management since 2006. Our work on financial risk as a result of climate change is incorporated in the investment strategy and the financial objectives of the GPFG. The Ministry of Finance is now working to introduce a new behavioural criterion for companies’ climate emissions in the guidelines for observation and exclusion. Such a criterion must then be managed in line with the highest defined threshold for exclusion. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  It is important that the overriding principle for Norges Bank’s investment management continues to be that the GPFG is a responsible investor with a financial objective. If the GPFG is increasingly used as an instrument for pursuing objectives other than financial ones, it may reduce the clarity of the GPFG’s role as a financial investor. If the GPFG investment scope is subject to considerable restrictions, it may entail increased risk or lower returns. The management of the GPFG has been successful to date. The total return since the establishment of the GPFG amounts to more than NOK 2 500 billion, or about 40 percent of GPFG capital. Through its management, Norges Bank will continue to promote its overriding objective: to safeguard the Fund’s assets over time. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The Bank of Thailand has been proactive in this aspect. We have already upgraded our cheque clearing system from paper-based to image-based system, namely ICAS in Bangkok and the Metropolitan areas and we will launch the ICAS for the entire country within next year, and the new version of BAHTNET system will also be launched next year. In addition, a policy to set up a system for local switching (i.e. a system for switching, clearing, and settlement of domestic payment transactions via local debit card) has been prescribed, and will come into force within 2013. •  In Long Term (beyond 2015), ASEAN payment and settlement linkage should be explored. Currently, the Bank of Thailand is exploring the potential of linking our payment and settlement systems with that of other countries, such as the linkage with Hong Kong USD CHATS which aims to reduce FX settlement risk. The second consideration is new channel of payment and new technology Advanced development in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has made it possible for money to move faster and more safely. Important development nowadays is ATM ASEANPay, operated by National ITMX, which already connects ATM system between Thailand and Malaysia. More connections will be made in the future, which will help facilitate retail payment and money remittance across ASEAN countries. Moreover, other payment channels and instruments such as e-banking, e-payment, and mobile payment will play an important role in enhancing efficiency and inclusiveness of financial services.

They could, for instance, pay rent for children studying abroad, pay for a holiday home, or pay for services provided by European companies, e.g. mobile telephone services, insurance companies, utilities, etc. People who live, work or study outside their home country will no longer need one bank account at home and another one abroad. The use of payment cards will be more efficient, as consumers will be able to use the same card for all euro payments. This will reduce the necessity for people to carry cash. Innovative services can be offered to consumers irrespective of national borders. The long-term goal of the banking industry is that the SEPA payment instruments will only be used in electronic form. Payments can then be easily combined with other e-services in the case of both individual and corporate clients. These include e-invoicing, mobile or internet payment initiation, airline e-tickets, credit advice or e-reconciliation. As a consequence, consumers will spend less time handling payments. Everything will be easier, faster and cheaper ... in the long term. Payment cards are becoming a favourite payment instrument with consumers, and are increasingly replacing cheques and cash payments. The use of cards is thus expected to grow in the future. Thanks to the creation of a single euro payments area, acquirers will be able to process all SEPAcompliant card payments, even across borders. In the SEPA environment, merchants will be able to choose any card payment processing entity in the euro; this will increase competition and reduce costs.
The charge that central banks are out of monetary ammunition is wrong, but the widespread absence of global price pressures demands that our firepower be well aimed. Indices of policy uncertainty are about 1¼ times their pre-crisis averages in the US and Japan, and as high as three times in China. In the UK, progress since the financial crisis has been more than totally unwound this year with the measure having risen to five times its precrisis average by the start of the official referendum campaign (Chart 3). 5  A closely watched measure of economic uncertainty – the VIX – spiked when the global financial crisis hit. Measures that combine this with other sources of economic uncertainty, such as dispersion among forecasters’ growth projections, households’ unemployment expectations, and currency volatility, show clear variation over time, and rise at times of economic stress. See Haddow, A, Hare, C, Hooley, J and Shakir, T (2013) “Macroeconomic uncertainty: what is it, how can we measure it and why does it matter?”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q2. 6  One way some of this has been measured is again to count occurrences in media articles of references to economics, uncertainty, and policy terms like “deficit”, “regulation” or terms relating to monetary policy. See: Baker, S, Bloom, N and Davis, S (2015), “Measuring economic policy uncertainty”, NBER Working Paper No. 21633, October. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  While clearly these three uncertainty measures are related, distinct movements are visible.

However, the fallout from the crisis has brought to the fore the need to further enhance the regulatory framework by adopting and fortifying supervisory and regulatory practices which ensure prompt and effective policy responses to developments in the financial system. Ladies and Gentlemen, the introduction of credit reference services in Zambia was necessitated by the poor credit culture, which was identified as one of the weaknesses in the financial sector, under the FSDP. Bank of Zambia licensed the first ever credit reference bureau, in 2006, following the introduction of the Credit Reference Services (Licensing) Guidelines and Credit Data (Privacy Code) 2006. The substantive operations of the CRB commenced in the fourth quarter of 2008 after a Directive was issued by the Bank of Zambia on 10 December 2008 mandating all credit providers to use the services of a credit reference agency before issuing any loan and to provide credit data to a credit reference agency. However in spite of these efforts, the credit reference system still faces problems, largely relating to the coverage of sectors, as the current legislation is limited to the financial sector. In view of this, the Bank of Zambia is currently developing a comprehensive credit reference law that, amongst other things, will have jurisdiction over all credit providers and data sources and will provide for the treatment of credit data.
Some remarks about distributional effects As long as assets are unevenly spread across the population, shifts in their prices will have redistributive effects. Let me now say something about what those might have been. I’ll make only a few, and very broad points. First, as regards the distribution of wealth, one of the main sources of unevenness is age. There is certainly considerable variation within age groups. In Chart 7, a snapshot taken from the ONS’s first Wealth and Asset Survey (2006), the vertical lines are interquartile ranges for each 10-year age bracket. Among households headed by 45–54 year olds, for example, those 25% from the top had over £ more in net wealth than those 25% from the bottom of the distribution. But there is also significant variation across age groups. Even relatively wealthy 25-year-olds have significantly less in the way of net assets than the average 50-year-old. This means that, during the first phase of the decline in real rates, when all asset prices were rising, it was generally older people who benefited the most. Anyone who, in the mid-1990s, happened already to own a house, or whose pension was already well funded, would have benefited materially from these trends. Chart 8 plots the age profile of net wealth in 1995 versus that a decade later.11 It steepened considerably. 8  Eggertson and Krugman (2012) develop a model where deleveraging pressure has very protracted effects on (ex ante) saving and on equilibrium real interest rates.

In the UK, for example, there was a commonly held view in the mid-1990s that, as long as the economy was operating at potential and inflation was on target, real interest rates would necessarily have to settle at a rate of 3% or so in real terms, roughly their average over the previous few years. This would imply a “neutral” nominal rate of close to 6%. “Neutral” doesn’t mean constant, however. It means the level of interest rates that, across the world, ensures the supply and demand for finance – desired levels of saving and investment – are brought into line3 (Chart 3). 2  The blue line is actually E/V, where E is earnings and V the total value of the firm, net debt as well as equity. Unlike E/P, and at least if the Modigliani-Miller neutrality result applies, E/V is invariant to changes in leverage. For a given total value V, higher leverage raises earnings per share and the E/P ratio. 3  I’ve been a bit imprecise with terminology here, using “natural”, “equilibrium” and “neutral” interchangeably. By the first two I mean the real short-term interest rate that would prevail if prices and wages were fully flexible  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3 Stylised supply and demand for finance  And in principle, any number of things – any number of real economic disturbances – can move that rate around.