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Third, the decisions to waive seniority and make full use of the EFSF and ESM instruments send an important signal to markets. That signal is: policymakers have understood the complexity of the crisis and are prepared to exploit the flexibility of the rescue funds to address it. This is also evident in the decision by the Euro Summit to allow EFSF/ESM assistance for countries respecting their fiscal and structural reform programmes, reducing the stigma of requesting support. The ECB will play its part too by acting as agent for the EFSF and ESM to facilitate effective market operations. Overall, it is difficult to uphold the caricature that Europe does not have the tools to handle the crisis. If anyone had known, in 2010, that within two years there would be a firewall of 700 billion euro usable for loans to sovereigns, bond purchases and bank recapitalisation, the euro area would have been called ahead-of-the-curve. Now that this exists, it is criticised for being insufficient. This is simply the nature of evolving expectations. But it should not distract us from the steps that have been taken. They are impressive both in historical comparison and in their own right. 2. Fiscal consolidation and growth  The second current criticism of the euro area is that its focus on fiscal consolidation is destroying growth prospects. The argument goes that in a weak economy experiencing  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  private sector deleveraging, an active public sector is essential to maintain demand.