samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the first quarter, Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) posted slight annual growth, driven by the recovery of its Machinery & Equipment component, which grew 21.5 percent annually. The Construction & Works item, on the other hand, fell by 10 percent year-on-year, due to works being slowed down and/or postponed because of the pandemic (Figure 2). The labor market has shown a noticeable, albeit heterogeneous, improvement with respect to its worst levels of last year. The measured magnitude of this improvement varies depending on the source of information: while National Statistics Institute (INE) data show the recovery of more than half of the jobs lost since the beginning of the pandemic, the number of pension fund and unemployment insurance contributors —which can be associated with formal salaried employment— has returned to pre-pandemic levels (Figure 3). At the same time, inactivity has declined, although it remains high by historical standards, and vacancies have increased, with the result that the unemployment rate remains at around 10 percent. In any case, there are different indicators showing the fragility and heterogeneity of the labor market’s recovery, even though it still has a long way to go. On the one hand, the recent extension of quarantines had a greater impact on self-employment and informal salaried work, and there was also an increase in unemployment insurance applications, although still below their 2020 levels. Low-skilled workers and women continue to be the segments that lagged the most in the recovery of employment (Figure 4).

Across all of these, we will also want to dig into systemic risks – most obviously those associated with cyber-attacks and the risks associated with a heavy concentration of activity across firms with a handful of outsourcers. But there is also a much wider set of more day-to-day operational issues and problems which arise for firms, and given the increasing importance of digital service delivery firms need to get much better at this. Sometimes these issues will engage the FCA’s objectives, which will be a judgement for Andrew and his team. But in general, they will only be a priority for the PRA if they meet the criteria I have just mentioned. With sufficient but limited resource we need to focus our efforts where they can have the biggest impact in terms of advancing our statutory objectives. Brexit Now Lord Mayor, I admit that I am very tempted to conclude this speech without a mention of the B-word, not least because this would surely guarantee a speech shorter than Andrew’s. But our philosophy on Brexit issues happens to illustrate the point I am making here about shared endeavours. Because getting from A to B on Brexit is very much a shared endeavour, although let’s be honest it doesn’t always feel like that! Of course there are some debates between us and firms as they restructure, in particular where we see structures that appear overly complex or lacking in proper accountability.
However, when I was writing about these issues there seemed to be a significant consensus that, in order to meet these demands, at least in part, a good pension system should be based on three pillars: first, a tax-financed public plan that provides a flat-rate or means-tested basic pension; second, a mandatory occupational or private (but publicly regulated) funded pension scheme; and third, a voluntary pension saving scheme, often with tax incentives. Three pillars, rather than one, are needed in order to accommodate the tradeoffs between goals, make the overall system more resilient to different types of shocks, and  1  The main article referred to can be found http://www.sedlabanki.is/uploads/files/mb011_5.pdf. 2  The speech can be found on the http://www.sedlabanki.is/uploads/files/MB041_7.pdf. BIS Review 63/2010  on  the Central  Central Bank  Bank of  of  Iceland Iceland  website: website:  1  provide for flexibility and choice. This is, of course, familiar to most of you here, and an excellent – by now, almost classic – presentation can be found in the 1994 World Bank publication: Averting the Old Age Crisis. By the turn of the century, the Icelandic pension system had taken on many of these attributes. The public pension system provided a low basic pension but a much higher supplementary pension that was, however, means-tested, also against pensions from other sources. This meant that, as the occupational or second-pillar pension funds matured, the public pension would dwindle in relative terms.

An example is the Risk Management & Corporate Governance Programme, conducted with SPRING Singapore. 2  BIS Review 164/2010  19. SID can do much more in this respect. SID should be sensitive to the current needs of directors and fine-tune the content of its courses accordingly. In addition, SID can better engage experienced directors, and tap on their expertise through putting together relevant case studies. Conclusion 20. Ladies and gentlemen, with increasing expectations on directors, companies will come to place a premium on well-trained, ethical directors who look out for the interests of all stakeholders, and are not rubber stamps for management decisions. This presents an opportunity to directors who are proficient and professional. 21. It is in companies’ and directors’ best interests to “Get it Right” by having effective and committed directors who pursue good corporate governance practices, as this will result in a premium for shareholders. Grooming such directors will help to encourage new ideas, better practices and encourage leadership renewal for company boards. 22. On this note, I would like to end by thanking SID for its efforts in the area of corporate governance. I hope that the discussions arising from this conference will help directors gain a better understanding of how they can carry out their duties more effectively. 23. Thank you and have a pleasant day ahead. BIS Review 164/2010  3
Most of these cases came to light when the auditors were unable to confirm the companies’ cash and account receivables. The counters were suspended pending investigations by special auditors, and investors had to bear the losses. I still get  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  letters from investors who had lost money in these shares. I can understand their frustrations. Many have asked MAS to do more to bring the full force of our law to bear on the wrongdoers. Let me state the position categorically: MAS will leave no stone unturned to take rigorous action against those who break our laws. But there are real challenges when the fraud is perpetrated by parties outside our jurisdiction. Cross-border investigations and enforcement are intrinsically difficult. Singapore is not alone in facing challenges with international listings. Co-operation among securities regulators and enforcement agencies in different jurisdictions is therefore critical. We cannot eliminate fraud. But we can and must ensure that companies that are brought to the market are of good quality. SGX must be rigorous in evaluating the suitability of listing applicants before admitting them. Other stakeholders must play their part too.   First, directors of the company seeking a listing must exercise adequate oversight of internal controls and ensure the veracity of information disclosed.   Second, IPO advisers have a legal and professional responsibility to conduct proper due diligence when bringing companies public.

Opposition to infrastructure reform by those firms that have in the past benefited from complexity and lack of transparency must be firmly overcome. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that central counterparties themselves can become single points of failure, with potentially devastating consequences. Central counterparties must therefore have sufficient financial resources to withstand the default of the largest participants. Operators and regulators should carefully evaluate the adequacy of the risk management models and financial resources of central counterparties. Only if central counterparties are financially sound can they play their critical role in preserving financial stability. Finally, as an ultimate resort, we cannot ignore the need to consider measures that address the size of banks, indirectly or directly. 13 Admittedly, there are some benefits from size. But the empirical evidence suggests that these benefits are rather limited. Economies of scale, whereby larger amounts can be produced at lower average cost, already appear to have been exhausted in the case of relatively small banks. 14 Obviously, banking systems made up of only small banks are not immune to crisis episodes. But let us not make the mistake of using another problem as an excuse to shy away from the severe moral hazard problem associated with the largest banks. It is also sometimes argued that interconnectedness matters more than size when it comes to systemic importance. It is evident that both size and interconnectedness matter. Recent empirical evidence, however, indicates that systemic importance increases more than proportionately with size.
I trust that the outcomes and insights gained from each of the above pilots should help enrich our perspective and refine our focus and priority of the Pilot Programme in subsequent years. CBDC Expert Group Besides the Pilot Programme, the HKMA is also fostering closer government-industryacademia collaboration on CBDC research. We plan to form a CBDC Expert Group to bring together leading professors from local universities, who will come from different fields, such as computer science, business and law. I am glad to tell you that we have already received very positive response from the academia and have started the preparation work with these top-notch experts. The HKMA will work with the Expert Group to study different important issues, such as privacy protection, cybersecurity, and interoperability, and other technical and business aspects surrounding CBDC. While members of the Expert Group do not have any  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  formal advisory role, they will provide us with valuable insights and contribute to our future deliberations on CBDC. Closing In closing, I would say that Project e-HKD is a hugely complex and challenging undertaking. I said earlier that the project goes well beyond just technology. It will take our collective wisdom and effort to create innovative use cases so that in the end, if eHKD were implemented, there could be widespread adoption so as to achieve the network effect required of any successful retail payment instrument. This is going to be a long and winding journey.

Eddie Yue: Opening remarks at the commencement event of e-HKD Pilot Programme Opening remarks by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the commencement event of e-HKD Pilot Programme, Hong Kong, 18 May 2023. *** Good afternoon, everyone. A very warm welcome to all of you for joining today's commencement of the e-HKD Pilot Programme, especially to those of you flying from other parts of the world. Central bank digital currency, or CBDC, is one of the hottest topics in the central banking community today. Over a hundred central banks are studying it and a few dozens of them are working on various types of pilot trials. The HKMA has been researching and piloting on CBDC since 2017. Apart from the exciting work that we are doing with our three partner central banks on the application of wholesale CBDC under Project mBridge, the HKMA has also been exploring the prospect of issuing retail CBDC, or e-HKD, in Hong Kong. e-HKD is Beyond Technology We conducted two rounds of market consultation in the past two years. Overall, the respondents are supportive of the e-HKD initiative and believe that e-HKD has the potential to make payments faster and more efficient while supporting the digital economy. However, we are cognizant of the fact that e-HKD is not and should not be merely a technology project.
2 Because of the time lags between monetary-policy actions and their effect on inflation and the real economy, flexible inflation targeting is more effective if it relies on forecasts of inflation and the real economy. Therefore, flexible inflation targeting can be described as “forecast targeting”: the central bank chooses a policy-rate path so that the forecast of inflation and resource utilization “looks good.” By a forecast that looks good I mean a forecast for inflation and resource utilization that effectively stabilizes both inflation around  1  I have previously discussed these issues in Svensson (2009 b). 2  The term “inflation nutter” for a central bank that is only concerned about stabilizing inflation was introduced in a paper by Mervyn King at a conference in Gerzensee, Switzerland, in 1995 and later published as King (1997). The terms “strict” and “flexible” inflation targeting were to my knowledge first introduced in a paper of mine presented at a conference at the Bank of Portugal in 1996, later published as Svensson (1999). BIS Review 16/2010  1  the inflation target and resource utilization around a normal level. In the event of conflicting objectives, it achieves a reasonable compromise between the stability of inflation and the stability of resource utilization. Different central banks express this in slightly different words. The Riksbank has often used the term “well-balanced” monetary policy.

18  Kohn (2006, 2008) specifies three conditions that should be fulfilled for central banks to take “extra action” to deal with a possible asset-price bubble: “First, policymakers must be able to identify bubbles in a timely fashion with reasonable confidence. Second, a somewhat tighter monetary policy must have a high probability that it will help to check at least some of the speculative activity. And third, the expected improvement in future economic performance that would result from the curtailment of the bubble must be sufficiently great.” He concludes, also in 2008 and after thorough considerations, that those conditions would rarely be met. See also Kohn (2009). 6  BIS Review 16/2010  In particular, if there is evidence of rapidly-rising house prices and mortgage loans, and these developments are deemed to be unsustainable and a possible bubble, there are much more effective instruments than policy rates. Restrictions on loan-to-value ratios and minimum mortgages and requirements of realistic cash-flow calculations for house buyers with realistic interest rates are much more effective in putting a break on possible unsustainable developments than a rise in the policy rates. In particular, more transparency about future policy rates, in the form a policy-rate path published by the central bank, may help in providing realistic information about future interest rates.
As I mentioned earlier, the emphasis in compensation practices on short-term performance over longer-term sustainable returns was a key vulnerability revealed during the crisis that helped motivate imprudent behavior. Currently, senior bankers are paid mainly in cash and deferred stock grants. This structure creates incentives to take actions to maximize a bank’s share price, rather than to minimize the risk of the bank’s failure. While compensation practices today feature a larger deferred component, greater emphasis on deferral in the form of long-term debt—which can also be recognized as TLAC—could better align senior managers’ interests with the long-term safety and soundness of the firm.16 As I see it, this approach could have two benefits. For one, it would reduce the incentives for risk-taking. For another, if TLAC debt holdings were at risk of conversion to equity in the event of failure, I believe senior bankers would be incentivized to cut dividends or raise equity capital earlier to reduce the risk of failure. Having a regime in place that creates strong incentives for management to steer aggressively away from bad outcomes would be better than one in which management has incentives to temporize in the face of rising risks. 6/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  Some banks have experimented with such compensation schemes, and I would encourage more to do so. But, this type of reform may also need a push from the regulatory side. Banks may be reluctant to adopt such pay structures on their own for competitive reasons.

In contrast, a new U.S. Treasury repo reference rate will be based on actual transactions in a deep and liquid market, and is designed to be compliant with new principles set forth by the International Organization of Securities Commissions.7 In the foreign-exchange market, bad incentives helped encourage rate rigging at particular rate-fixing times. Reforms were subsequently introduced, including recommendations from the Financial Stability Board’s Report on Foreign Exchange Benchmarks and the recent publication of the FX Global Code, developed by central banks and market participants.8 The creation of millions of unauthorized accounts at Wells Fargo also reflected bad incentives. Bank employees were compensated on sales volume with aggressive crossselling targets without customers actually receiving beneficial services. In response, the Federal Reserve Board entered into a consent cease-and-desist order with Wells Fargo that requires the firm to improve its governance and risk management processes. These recent cases were particularly disturbing in terms of their scale and flagrancy, and—in the case of the rate-rigging scandals—the collusion by employees across firms. I am particularly struck by the fact that manipulation of the foreign exchange market occurred even after the LIBOR scandal was well known. These episodes underscore the tremendous power that incentives have to influence and distort behavior, potentially leading to massive damage to bank cultures, reputations, and finances.
23.05.2018  “Strengthening the economic governance of the euro: short-term priorities and the long-term view” High Level Seminar. Banco de España Luis M. Linde Governor  Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me first extend a warm welcome to you all to the Banco de España. Thank you for joining us today in this seminar that addresses the pressing and very important topic of the Economic Governance of the Euro: Short-term Priorities and the Long-term View. I would like to thank the panelists who have been so kind to accept our invitation; we are very pleased to have among us a long list of distinguished participants that would certainly throw much welcomed light on the discussion. The timing of this conference is particularly relevant. After years of low growth, Europe is now experiencing a robust recovery which opens up a window of opportunity to make progress in the governance reform agenda before the next economic downturn unfolds. Supported by expansionary monetary policy, real GDP in the Euro Area has expanded for 19 quarters in a row. Stronger price dynamics are yet to materialize, but we are confident that if we are prudent, patient and persistent, our monetary policy measures will be effective in achieving the medium-term goals. Price stability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for achieving sustained and balanced growth. In fact, one important lesson we can draw from the first twenty years of the EMU is the need to improve the area’s resilience to large macroeconomic shocks and to increase its stabilization capacity.

As most of the empirical evidence points out, risk sharing channels are substantially weaker in the euro are than in other monetary unions, but also when compared with large countries inside the euro area, so that a larger share of idiosyncratic or national shocks to income cannot be smoothed out. Upgrading the efficiency of risk-sharing channels, both private and public, and better exploiting the synergies among them would provide the euro area with the shockabsorption capacity and the improved access to cross-border equity finance that is currently lacking. On the fiscal front, the euro area needs to achieve eventually a more complete fiscal union. Some form of semi-automatic cyclical insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks could be designed to make it possible more risk-sharing without entailing permanent transfers between countries. Depending on modalities, such an instrument could also contribute to smooth aggregate shocks, achieve a more balanced policy mix and increasing sharing responsibilities with monetary policy. In addition, the EU rule-based fiscal framework needs to gain in simplicity and transparency. Recent proposals, which seek to give greater weight to public debt as a medium-term anchor and to the expenditure rule as an operational tool, deserve consideration. At the same time, increased national ownership should be fostered by enhancing the oversight role of independent fiscal authorities. The aim being to generate enough room for maneuver during good times, so that the stabilising capacity of fiscal policy may be larger at crisis times.
MONETARY POLICY REPORT PRESENTATION BEFORE THE FINANCE COMMISSION OF THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC  Mario Marcel Governor Central Bank of Chile 14 June 2018    The June 2018 Monetary Policy Report can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. Mr President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, senator Juan Pablo Letelier, senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen, Thank you for your invitation to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) about the latest macroeconomic developments, prospects and implications for monetary policy. This vision is detailed in our Monetary Policy Report (the Report) released this morning. The information therein provide the backdrop for the decision adopted by the Board at yesterday’s monetary policy meeting. In this Report we confirmed that the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario has lowered the risks for the convergence of inflation to 3% within the policy horizon. This risk, that lingered for quarters, has faded in line with the gradual consolidation of the recovery it has shown since mid- last year and which has received an upward inflationary impulse coming from the increase in fuel prices in pesos. Accordingly, the lower bound defined for the 2018 growth range and the headline inflation forecast at December have been revised upward, while we reaffirm the trajectory of gradual convergence of core inflation to the 3% policy target over a two-year horizon. These projections are consistent with the two-year-ahead inflation expectations that have remained well anchored to the target.

China continues to be a source of risk, since it still has to resolve  4  imbalances in several of its markets. Added to this is the evolution of the oil price. If it increases or remains flat for longer than expected, it could have stronger effects on global growth and inflation. The bias and probability of external risk scenarios reinforces the need to maintain solid macroeconomic fundamentals, particularly for a small and open economy such as Chile’s. Actually, the recent events have had greater impacts in countries with greater indebtedness, fiscal deficit and / or current account deficits. At home, we estimate that the risks for activity are biased upwards. The data of the last few months have been higher than expected and we cannot rule out a scenario in which this greater dynamism persists, especially if investment improves above projections. This risk is partly moderated by the possibility that the labor market, and in particular private salaried employment, could take longer than expected to respond to the higher growth rates. On inflation, we estimate that risk balances are unbiased. The downward risks for its convergence to 3% have moderated. However, we forecast that CPIEFE inflation will remain below 2% for a while longer, considering that the determinants of inflation’s convergence to 3% in the medium term have not change significantly from March.