samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
RFAs are largely untested and swap lines may only be used in very specific situations between specific countries. There is no evidence the formal GFSN deters countries from holding reserves. 19 The extra reserves that EMEs have accumulated over the past two decades have reduced the sensitivity of Capital Flows-at-Risk to Push factors by almost 50%. But this extra insurance has come at a domestic high cost, both to finance and because reserves can crowd out domestic investment.20 And it has global externalities, with the vast accumulation of safe assets distorting yields, building global imbalances and increasing the risks of a global liquidity trap.21 Chart 14: Components of the global financial safety net as a per cent of global external liabilities 12 10  Per cent of global external liabilities  IMF Permanent (rhs)  IMF Temporary (rhs)  RFAs (rhs)  FX Reserves (lhs)  Per cent of global external liabilities  8  3  2  6 4  1  2 0  0 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016  Sources: IMF, central bank websites, RFAs, Lane Milessi-Ferretti (2007) External Wealth of Nations dataset and Bank calculations. Notes: FX reserves exclude gold. 19  See Scheubel, B, L Stracca and C Tille (2019), Taming the global financial cycle: What role for the global financial safety net?, Journal of International Money and Finance 94: 160–182.

Comparing the present situation with that a year ago, there has evidently been notable progress in restoring confidence in the Spanish economy. The growing normalisation of external funding flows and the fall in the sovereign risk premium clearly illustrate this. However, the pass-through of this improvement in overall financing conditions is still proving limited, whereby the financial restrictions continue to weigh down most significantly on private-sector spending and investment decisions in Spain. All told, the slowing trend in inflation has continued over recent quarters and further headway has been made in correcting the main imbalances. The increases in the annual rate of the consumer price index in the first half of this year have slackened as the effects of the tax rises and increases in administered prices from July to September last year have been stripped out. According to the flash estimate, the CPI rate stood at 0.3% in September. It is therefore likely that its annual rate of change will stand below 1% in December. Running such a moderate inflation rate evidently contributes to alleviating the impact of weak incomes on households’ and firms’ purchasing capacity. The legislation on the deindexation of the economy will be a valuable instrument for entrenching this trajectory. But the clearest example of the marked re-balancing the Spanish economy is undergoing is the elimination of the external deficit.
Rapid credit growth, emerging external imbalances with growing current account deficit (reaching at one point 10% of GDP), and consequently rising external debt. Price bubbles in the real estate and equity markets coupled with the expansion of the construction sector all provided red flashing lights far ahead of the 2008 global market mayhem. In order to preserve stability of the banking system throughout the crisis, resolute action had to be taken years ahead of the global financial crisis. In the period of large capital inflows, raising interest rates to tame the cycle was not a policy option due to the risk of exacerbating capital inflows even further. Therefore, already in 2003, in the early phase of the cycle, the CNB started to implement a range of measures to limit excessive lending and the increase in foreign debt, which were gradually adjusted and tightened until 2007. Stringent capital and liquidity requirements, way above and beyond anything we have available in the current macroprudential setup, were necessary in order to stem excessive risk-taking and instil resilience into the system to cope with a potential fallout. Such measures were at that time labelled (by banks and some of the colleagues) "administrative" tools, but would later be classified under macroprudential policy instruments. For example, implicit tax on credit growth (when we asked banks to subscribe zero yielding CB bonds for any  euro of credit growth over 12% per annum), and high marginal reserve requirement on foreign borrowing by banks, together with high capital requirements.

At the Federal Reserve, experience has shown that supervising large, complex banks calls for supervisors with a high level of technical expertise, the intellectual ability to make difficult specific judgments based on general principles, and the strength of character to remain open-minded but steadfast in the face of pressure from the management of supervised institutions. The accounting industry needs to be certain it is attracting people with these same attributes. As to accounting rules, one of the major issues today concerns executive stock options, as I have noted. Grants of stock options and the exercise of these grants are, as we know, disclosed in the footnotes of a firm's reports, but this information typically is not accounted for in the firm's income statement or balance sheet. Some might argue that, as long as the information on stock options is disclosed, exactly how the information is accounted for is unimportant since disclosure in and of itself is sufficient. In theory, this view may be justified. In practice, however, what we have found is that information that is disclosed but remains off the accounting statements is unlikely to be fully incorporated into the price of the stock. Another major issue with respect to accounting rules - and there is some overlap with disclosure issues here - concerns how intangible assets and complex financial transactions are treated. Intangible assets are generally thought to include a valuable trademark, a renowned reputation, or an efficient process in delivering goods or services.
[26]See Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12. [27]See Article 21(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. [28]The Chair has a non-renewable term of office of five years (Article 26 (3) of the SSM Regulation) and may be dismissed from office following a special procedure by the appointing body – the Council - only in two specifically listed cases (Article 26 (4) of the SSM Regulation). [29]The Vice Chair is chosen among the members of the Executive Board and the independence safeguards for the Executive Board apply to her/him ( Article 26 (3) and (4) of SSM Regulation). [30]The rules for the ECB representatives in the Supervisory Board are not set out in the SSM Regulation but in the ECB  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  Decision on the appointment of representatives of the ECB to the Supervisory Board (ECB/2014/4) where the appointing body – the ECB Governing Council – define a non-renewable term of office of five years (Article 1 (2)) and lists the only two specific cases under which they can be dismissed from office by the appointing authority.

William C Dudley: Brief remarks about the centennial “The Fed at 100” Exhibit Introductory remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Museum of American Finance, New York City, 25 September 2013. *  *  *  Thank you all for being here to commemorate the opening of the centennial exhibit for the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the Museum of American Finance, just a few blocks from the New York Fed’s landmark head office at 33 Liberty Street. I would like to say thank you to our friends at the Museum for their work and interest in the Fed and for supporting us in organizing this event. Before making some brief remarks about the centennial, I would also like to acknowledge some of the people in attendance tonight. We have two former New York Fed presidents here this evening: Jerry Corrigan and Bill McDonough. I met Jerry, the seventh president of the Bank, when I was still wet behind the ears. I was just out of graduate school at the Board of Governors in Washington, but Jerry was already a force to be reckoned with and a part of Paul Volcker’s inner circle. Jerry’s tenure as president had many memorable moments, including the October 1987 stock market “break”.
The second challenge is market fragmentation. Across domestic markets, incumbent banks, technology companies and telco firms – among others – are all vying for a share of the pie, leading to a proliferation of payment service providers. Although a more diversified market can reduce some of the concentration risks that I highlighted earlier, there are trade-offs that need to be managed. In 2018 alone, the UK saw its number of e-money players increased from roughly 400 to 600 companies. A country that has a high number of proprietary networks is likely to face challenges for interoperability across payment providers. This in turn could weaken network effects and economies of scale for domestic payments. Meanwhile, on the ground, merchants may cope by putting up a dizzying array of signs and stickers to indicate the range of accepted payment options. The sheer amount of choice – each with differing benefits and limitations – could be confusing for consumers, and frustrating for merchants especially when it comes to reconciliation. For countries striving to encourage the adoption of e-payments, these issues could be a major stumbling block. Similarly, market fragmentation is a growing challenge at the international level, especially as individual countries and firms embark on their respective initiatives in the payments landscape. This could lead to substantive cross-border differences, such as in the technical standards, business rules and regulatory requirements. While these differences are not insurmountable, overcoming them can entail significant costs – such as when a web of intermediaries is needed to facilitate a cross-border transaction.

The tests include cyclical convergence and structural flexibility, the impact on investment, the impact on the financial services industry and the impact more generally on growth, stability and jobs. So the UK will not join EMU at the outset. But financial firms in London, whatever their nationality, see the euro as a key part of their business. With our support at the Bank of England, they have been actively preparing for the introduction of the euro. London thrives on liquid markets, regardless of currency. So the introduction of the euro is a major opportunity for London. BIS Review 11/1998  -2-  From the start, London will act as a link between New York and the euro area by providing a full range of euro services in wholesale financial markets. That includes euro payments and settlement, so that anyone who wishes to do so will be able to trade and settle in euro in London from the first day of EMU. But it also extends to euro banking, foreign exchange and derivatives trading, bond and equity issuance and trading, fund management, financial advice and professional support services as well. The City of London is Europe’s leading financial centre and one of the top three global centres, alongside New York and Tokyo. Here in New York, the financial centre is influenced by the size of the domestic economy. That is true of Tokyo as well. But London’s success has historically been due to its international financial business.
He has held various positions of responsibility at the BIS over the last 35 years and during this period he has authored numerous publications in the fields of monetary policy, banking, finance and issues related to financial stability. Alfred Kammer is the Director of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund. In that capacity, he leads and oversees the IMF's work with Europe on financial sector surveillance, monetary and macroprudential policies and financial regulation, among other key areas. Lucrezia Reichlin is Professor of Economics at the London Business School with a background in central banking. She was previously Director General of Research at the European Central Bank. Last but not least, Ricardo Reis is the A.W. Phillips Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics. Widely regarded as one of the top research macroeconomists of his generation, Ricardo has published extensively on monetary and fiscal policy, inflation and business cycles. Thank you Claudio, Alfred, Lucrezia and Ricardo for kindly accepting the invitation to be with us today. As discussed with you, I would first give the floor to Alfred. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

The relationship between economic activity and inflation is not particularly stable either. In the difficult deliberations we had to make in September we Executive Board members reached different conclusions, with a majority voting to raise the repo rate while the minority to which I myself belonged voted to hold the interest rate unchanged. On this occasion I shall not go into the various reasons for my stance in depth; they were clear from the separate minutes of the monetary policy meeting and I discussed them in a speech I held a couple of weeks ago. 6  BIS Review 121/2008
Particularly, this stand for: independence, transparency and accountability. It is well recognized by foreign and domestic institutions that legal and real independence status of Bank of Albania enjoys satisfactory standards. On the other hand we believe that independence represents a dynamic rather than a static process, therefore we have adopted contemporaneous practices of communication explaining our decisions to Albanian public. This process is embodied in the continuous improvement of the monetary policy report, standard communication of the supervisory board monetary policy decisions, improved analyses and research efforts, and last but not the least, intensive public activity of the Bank of Albania Governor, with various groups of interest across the country. Taken together these have improved public understanding and expectation building for current and future developments in inflation and economic activity. Our approach to communication has further improved our accountability and has resulted in increased credibility and authority within Albanian public. During the past 2-3 years we have increased our ownership in the short and medium run economic and financial development programs. Since the beginning of transition the economic program has been designed and implemented under the setup of IMF support programs. The current program will end in 2008. Starting from 2009, the Bank of Albania and other Albanian authorities will have full ownership in the design and implementation of financial and monetary policies. In the meantime our relationship with IMF will continue under Article IV, moreover the IMF assistance will be considered a welcomed secondary factor.

If the build up in credit risk is underestimated, foreign banks will tend to set overambitious ROE targets. When the extent of underestimation is recognized, banks have to increase their provisioning rate in line with their upward reassessment of credit risk, reducing ROE projections. This could lead management of large foreign bank groups to conclude that their ambitious ROE targets cannot be met and curtail lending growth in response. The entrance of big international foreign groups puts upward pressure on the entire banking system attempt to compete for borrowers. However, there is a risk that credit growth is associated with lower lending standards, enhanced by the lack of financial information available on potential borrowers that continues to be a problem in the region. As the FSAP for Albania indicates, in the area of corporate lending, firms balance sheets and income statements may be altered to avoid taxes, while information about remittance income for individuals is imprecise and unverifiable. The rising real estate prices in the region have also encouraged lending, using the real estate as collateral to a great extent. As real estate prices continue to rise, this could lead to an over-extension of credit, and if the real estate market becomes more speculative and more leveraged through bank loans, a decline in demand can cause a fall in real estate prices, causing both collateral to fall in value, and the ability of borrowers to pay to decline.
Still, we are working with the same timetable.” A storm of criticism from banks, academics and politicians in recent months has strengthened expectations that the final draft will not be completed until some time in early 2004, instead of end-2003 as planned. Critics blast the rules as fearsomely complex, too prescriptive and incurring costs far greater than the potential benefits. Some areas require more work, such as risks posed by highly diversified banks and on credit derivatives. Regulators were prepared to adapt the accord as they gained a better understanding of new risk modelling techniques, said Caruana. “Certainly there will be issues that will be important that we cannot manage now,” he said. “We have recognised that the Basel II process is an evolutionary approach.”  2  BIS Review 39/2003  The Basel II accord, so named because it will replace the 1988 Basel Accord, would update existing rules on how much capital large international banks must hold to remain sound and reflect changes in financial services over the last 15 years. Due for implementation in 2006, it would set standards for how bank capital is supervised and what type of financial disclosure institutions must make. Experts say that a delay in publishing the final draft of even several months could throw the target implementation date back by a full year if it means domestic rule-making and legislative deadlines in Europe cannot be met.

Caruana also sits on the Governing Council of the European Central Bank which sets euro zone interest rates. Less blue sky or rain? His top assistant Daniele Nouy, who is secretary general of the Basel Committee, was even more  BIS Review 39/2003  1  insistent, saying in the same interview that the new accord should help to smooth economic cycles. “I am personally absolutely convinced that it will be much less pro-cyclical than the old accord,” Nouy said. The new accord will require banks to make better decisions earlier about how much capital they need, thus reducing risk and economic volatility. “Right now we move from blue skies to full storm (in bank lending activities),” she said. “This could easily disappear. We will have much more light grey and dark grey. I know it is very hard to convince people in advance, but I have zero doubt on that.” As for the pressure the new accord will place on bank regulators, Caruana said he was impressed by how well prepared they are in general. Many bank analysts have said that relying on a patchwork of different national supervisory structures to implement the regulatory pillar will highlight weaknesses, for instance in emerging markets. “You would be very surprised. There is tremendous supervision there,” he said. Bank regulators have progressed immensely in the past five years in their sophistication in risk management assessment and are well equipped to implement the accord, he said.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which was formed in 1974, in the wake of the Herstatt incident25, has been setting the norms for banks’ capital adequacy, for instance, since the 1980s. With regard to financial legislation, harmonised regulations have long been drawn up for banks and other financial companies within the framework of the European Union. However, there is no doubt that the international cooperation has further intensified since the global financial crisis. The focus has more clearly been on a systemic perspective, or, if you will, a macroprudential policy perspective. After the crisis, it became a natural task for the Basel Committee to make a thorough review of the requirements with regard to capital and liquidity. The results of this review include the guidelines that are known as Basel III. The G20 countries’ reform agenda now includes, within the framework of the work conducted by the Financial Stability Board, special capital requirements for so-called  25  On 26 June 1974, the West German authorities revoked the Cologne-based Herstatt Bank’s licence to conduct banking activities. On that date, several banks released payments in D-mark to Herstatt Bank in Frankfurt, in exchange for US dollars, which were to be delivered in New York. A time lag arose between the different time zones, where operations ceased before the counterparts in New York had received their dollars. The Herstatt incident is a famous case that is often used as an example of so-called settlement risk.

I nevertheless think that one can draw some conclusions from these exercises: Firstly: Whatever the authorities do in terms of macroprudential policy measures, changes in fiscal policy or in monetary policy, it will affect the price of money in the economy, that is, loan costs, and thereby the incentives for indebtedness. This means that measures taken in one area must take into account what is being done in other areas. The one hand must be aware of what the other is doing, even if they are not completely coordinated. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Secondly: It is clear that of the measures now being discussed, some have much greater potential than others for influencing the incentives for households to borrow. Here the challenge will be to find measures that are sufficiently forceful, but will not be the actual straw that breaks the camel’s back. What one wants to achieve is a controlled adjustment. Thirdly: If we are to deal with the excessively high indebtedness, it is unavoidable that this will have an effect on individual households and entail costs for the economy as a whole – although of course the benefits will ultimately weigh heavier, if we can avoid a really poor outcome. Let me be clear that I do not believe it is enough to solely implement measures that affect the supply and demand for credit through increased loan costs for households. Other measures are also needed.