samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As the existing procedures are usually based on dated legacy systems and manual processes, appropriate use of innovative technologies such as artificial intelligence, cloud platforms and APIs can surely help refine supervisory processes. 17. For example, our granular data reporting (GDR) which started in 2019 seeks to collect transactional level data from banks, instead of template based aggregate data in the past. This has enabled us to discover insights and trends in a timely manner and conduct advanced analyses through slicing and dicing the data collected. But this is only possible with very fundamental changes in the way we analyse the risks of banks, with new people, new organizational structure, new IT systems as well as continued experimentation by colleagues with different skills and expertise. 18. One thing we have learnt is that the prerequisite for such a digitalization journey is to have strong commitment by all colleagues from top to bottom, and for everyone to have the mindset for embracing changes. Although we are already seeing some concrete positive outcomes from our digitalization project, we are still at the early stage of this long journey. I would love to hear the experience of other central banks and regulators at this or other forum. Conclusion 19. I have highlighted just three areas, namely payment and CBDC, use of data, and digitalization of our own organization, as some of the key challenges many of us are facing. There are many more technological developments in the banking sector that we have to understand, regulate or promote.

The significance of IT is visible in two ways; in production and use. If we look at the production of IT, we can observe that the telecom industry's share of total industry is relatively large in Sweden compared with many other countries. This means that the rapid development in productivity that has occurred in the telecom sector has contributed to pushing up productivity growth in the business sector as a whole. If we instead look at use of IT, Sweden has a relatively large share of IT capital in the total capital stock, compared with other countries. Sweden is in this respect more like the United States than continental Europe. The use of IT means that one can simplify and automate the work so that those who work can carry out more tasks in a shorter time, that is, productivity increases. The financial sector is very skilled at making use of IT to increase productivity. Its customers currently carry out many simple tasks from home in front of their computers instead of going to a bank office. During the second half of the 1990s, major investments were made in IT capital. These investments accounted for approximately half of the growth in productivity during the period 1996-2000 (see Figure 4). The investment upturn was broken in connection with the IT bubble bursting at the beginning of the 2000s. After that the contribution from IT capital to productivity growth has declined substantially.
As a result, we used the working assumption that the MPR would follow a trajectory similar to the one implied by financial asset prices during the ten days prior to its statistical closing. In practice, this meant at least one additional 25bp cut. It is always worth remembering that this is a working assumption and as such, contingent to the new developments and their impact on projected inflation. If incoming information points at the necessity of an additional boost or, on the contrary, if this is no longer needed, we will react promptly, communicating the justification of doing so. Consistent with the assumption used in our March Report, in April we decided to lower the MPR by 25bp, to 2.75%. The press release issued then stated that we will assess the need for some additional increase in the monetary impulse, which will hinge on the medium-term inflation outlook (figure 8). This way, our monetary policy continues to be one of the most expansionary in a group of comparable economies. Figure 8 MPR and expectations (percent)  5  5  MPR  4  Financial asset prices, December 2016 Report (*)  3  Financial asset 4 prices, March Report (*) 3  EES Financial asset prices (17 April)  FBS 2 14  15  16  17  18  2  19  (*) Constructed using interest rates on swap contracts up to 10 years. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 15. As usual when making forecasts, our macroeconomic scenario faces several risks.

This is the pathology I worry most about. So I ask: Can my colleagues and I at the Fed cure this with monetary policy? Obviously, businesses cannot create jobs without the means for investing in job-creating expansion, so, yes, monetary policy is necessary to propel job creation. But as I have shown you tonight, the store of bank reserves awaiting discharge into the economy through our banking system is vast, yet it lies fallow. Take a look at this chart of total reserves of depository institutions: They have ballooned from a precrisis level of $ billion to $ trillion. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  There is plenty of money available for businesses to work with. Consider this: In fourth quarter 2007 the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) was $ trillion; at year-end 2013 it was estimated to be $ trillion. Had we continued on the path we were on before the crisis, real GDP would currently be roughly $ trillion in size. That’s a third larger than it was in 2007. Yet the amount of money lying fallow in the banking system is 60 times greater now than it was at year-end 2007. One is hard pressed to argue that there is insufficient money available for businesses to put people back to work. Now, bear in mind that we at the Fed only control the monetary base (cash plus bank reserves), not the velocity with which money is used.
Memo to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  December 14, 2000. 5 The first instance was the May 2001 Bluebook. 6 Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams. Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion  Paper Number 2001-56. November 2001. 7 Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams. "Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest," Review of Economics and Statistics 85, no.4 (November 2003): 1063-70. 8 Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams, "Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest Redux," Business Economics 51, no. 2 (April 2016): pp. 57-67. 9 Kathryn Holston, Thomas Laubach, and John C. Williams, "Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants," Journal of International  Economics 108 (May 2017): S59-S75. 10 These issues are discussed in detail in "Adapting the Laubach and Williams and Holston, Laubach, and Williams Models to the COVID-19 Pandemic," and "Measuring the  Natural Rate of Interest After COVID-19," by Kathryn Holston, Thomas Laubach, and John C. Williams. 11 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. 12 Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. 13 Note that we no longer produce HLW estimates for the United Kingdom because the model does not provide a good fit for the data. The estimates for the UK were highly  imprecise even before the pandemic and the subsequent data has exacerbated this problem. 14 Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams.

This requires many steps, including systemic risk oversight and solving the so-called too-big-to-fail problem. In this respect, we need to think hard about what we can do to prevent the type of speculative bubbles that occurred from causing so much damage in the future. In particular, are there macro prudential tools that the Federal Reserve and other regulators can use to limit leverage and speculation and thus prevent the type of asset price booms and busts that have proved so troublesome? Second, we need viable exit strategies from this recent period of monetary and fiscal policy stimulus. On the monetary policy side, we have been working hard to ensure that we have the tools in place so that we can be effective in tightening monetary policy when the time is right, even with an enlarged balance sheet. Third, we need a rebalancing of global economic growth. That means a smaller share of consumption relative to GDP in the United States and offsetting shifts in Asia. Circumstances have improved considerably from what they were a year ago. But job creation is still much too slow and we have much to do on the regulatory side to make our financial system more resilient and robust. Thank you very much for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. 5  Financial Market Turmoil: The Federal Reserve and the Challenges Ahead, William C. Dudley. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, March 6, 2010.
Øystein Olsen: Oil and the Norwegian economy – the challenges ahead Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a lunch hosted by Danske Bank Markets, New York City, 27 March 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying slides can be found on the Norges Bank’s website: Slides (PDF). It’s a great pleasure to be in New York City again and an honour to be invited to give a lunch presentation here today. As Norges Bank, a week ago, published its latest monetary policy report, the economic outlook and the considerations behind the interest rate decision naturally warrant some attention in my speech today. First, however, I would like to give some background information on the economic policy framework in Norway, focusing on the sovereign wealth fund – the Government Pension Fund Global – the fiscal rule and Norges Bank’s foreign exchange transfers to the fund. Norway is a small, open, natural resource-rich economy. About a quarter of our GDP is related to oil and gas extraction, and a large share of our petroleum production is exported. The oil and gas industry has played a vital role for the strong growth in our economy over the past 40 years. When the first oil was brought to the surface in 1971, GDP per capita in Norway was lower than the average for a western economy. The picture has reversed since then. We have gradually caught up to the wealthiest nations.

Page 7  Table 1: Changes in Global R* from structural and empirical models Structural model  Baseline Range  1985–2015  -1.9  (-3.3, -1.1)  Productivity growth -0.9  (-1.2, -0.3)  Population growth  -0.1  (-0.5, -0.0)  Longevity  -1.0  (-1.8, -0.8)  Empirical model  Median  5%–95%  1985–2015  -1.9  (-2.4, -1.3)  Of which:  Note: For the structural model, the table reports the estimate of Global R* in the baseline simulation, together with the minimum and maximum across the sensitivity tests. For the empirical model, the table reports the median estimates of Global R* together with the 95 percent posterior intervals. Source: Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2022). Table 1 shows that, in the structural model, Global R* falls markedly between 1985 and 2015. The total decline of 1.9 percentage points is driven by the response to the five global trends mentioned earlier. [9] The baseline structural model simulation matches the median change over the same period from the statistical model in the earlier chart (reported in the last row of the table), though both are subject to a wide range of uncertainty. [10] With respect to the main drivers of this decline, two factors – population ageing and a slowdown in productivity growth – play the largest roles in explaining the dynamics of Global R*. The productivity growth slowdown across advanced economies has been discussed extensively in existing work.
The result was that some bank conduits and buyers of securitized products such as SIVs became distressed and failed as mark-tomarket losses increased. In the post-Lehman bankruptcy world – when liquidity was paramount – securitized products were very difficult to trade, in part, because they were very difficult to value. 2  BIS Review 69/2009  The cessation of new asset-backed securitizations has been problematic because banks have not had the capacity to keep credit flowing freely. This is especially true given that bank balance sheets were already under strain – bank capital has been depleted by credit losses and bank balance sheet capacity has been strained by an inability of banks to securitize new loan originations and by the need for banks to honor their off-balance sheet obligations. For all these reasons, the Federal Reserve determined that it was important to augment the balance sheet capacity of the financial system by supporting the ABS market. This was the purpose of the TALF. By providing non-recourse, term financing for new AAA-rated consumer asset-backed securities to investors, the TALF essentially provides the balance sheet capacity necessary to facilitate the continued flow of credit to households and businesses. The TALF offers three attributes that the private sector has had difficulty providing during this time of financial and economic distress: 1) leverage to purchase highly-rated, low-risk assets, 2) term financing and 3) protection against very adverse economic outcomes.

To put this in context, in the preceding 3 decades stretching back to the 1960s, annual GDP growth deviated from its 10 year average by more than 1 percentage point about half of the time (about 20 quarters in each 10 year period). 2  BIS Review 80/2008  employers and employees are less likely to adjust their prices and wages to a surprise movement in inflation. In other words, their expectation of inflation in the medium-term remains low, stable and anchored at the target. And that has helped to contribute not only to the stability of inflation, but output as well. Reforms to both the labour market and monetary policy have undoubtedly played an important role in the reduction in output volatility and emergence of a stable, low inflation environment. But there was a third factor at play that was probably also quite fundamental. Over the first decade of the MPC the economic cycles in the rest of the world were generally moderate, although not without excitement. And there is good evidence to suggest that the integration of emerging economies, such as China, into the global economy was beneficial to countries like the UK. The share of Chinese goods in total UK goods imports has almost tripled in money terms over the past fifteen years to around 8 per cent, and it’s likely that much of the content of imports from elsewhere originated in China. This rising share of Chinese imports has reduced manufactured imported goods prices relative to other prices and wages.
The aim would be to provide a kind of “digital banknote", which would combine the security of banknotes issued by the central bank with the ease of use and innovation of dematerialised means of payment. The ECB and the Banque de France are working on all the associated challenges, and we have already conducted 9 experiments in Paris on an “interbank” digital currency. They will be continued in 2022, focusing on improving cross-border payments. Indeed, the euro is also a global success: no continent before us had managed to create and introduce a new currency in this way. In this respect, the euro has a political dimension, to consolidate European sovereignty – like the dollar for the United States. Our currency has proven its role in protecting European economies from the turbulence of Covid, and has preserved favourable financing conditions for all economic players, households, SMEs and companies, and states. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  But for the trimaran of the euro to be fully operational, its central hull – the ECB and the single monetary policy – needs to be completed with two floats. A public float with a permanent common fiscal capacity (which does not mean that an additional annual budget is needed), to better cope with macroeconomic shocks. And a private float to promote a better allocation of capital in the euro area. The latter has abundant savings: the surplus of domestic savings over investment structurally exceeds EUR 300 billion.

Andrew Bailey: The new approach to financial regulation Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Deputy Governor of Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority at the Bank of England, at the Chartered Banker Dinner 2013, Edinburgh, 1 May 2013. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be here this evening for the Chartered Banker Dinner. President, in the description of tonight’s dinner you made the important point that the Chartered Institute supports “ordinary” bankers providing a vital service to their customers at a very difficult time. I want to speak tonight about the importance of those vital services. The fact of the matter is that banks are in the dog house, and for reasons that are very well documented I am afraid. But, in saying that, it would be wrong to believe that this makes banks irrelevant and unwanted. On the contrary, the financial crisis has through adversity reminded us of the importance of banks to the functioning and health of the economy and their role as providers of critical financial services. Going back in history, it was Walter Bagehot in the 1870s who argued that the development of joint stock banks played an important part in the growth of the mid-nineteenth century British economy with its very high degree of openness to world trade.
The latest estimates predict a significant increase in public expenditure on pensions, health-care and long-term care stemming from the substantial rise in the dependency ratio. Even on the most optimistic demographic projections, this ratio is set to rise from 25% today to 50% by mid-century. In the case of the pension system, the 2011 and 2013 reforms included a number of adjustments that made it possible to significantly counteract the effect of the expected longterm increase in the dependency ratio. Nevertheless, the latest legislative developments have eased the implementation of these mechanisms with the postponement in application 11/14  of the sustainability factor until 2023 and, above all, the return to a system of annual pension increases in line with the consumer price index. According to the Banco de España's calculations, reintroducing this indexing system on a permanent basis would lead to an additional spending increment of more than 3 pp of GDP in 2050. Consequently, guaranteeing the financial sustainability of the public pension system will require additional measures on the revenue or expenditure sides of the system to offset this additional burden. Pending structural reforms In the context just described, characterised by the need to pass the baton to demand-side policies to underpin the current expansionary phase and boost growth potential, it would be particularly desirable to give more prominence to measures to correct the Spanish economy’s structural vulnerabilities and strengthen its capacity to adapt to future shocks.

There is friction in clearing customs, handling trade documents, checking for fraud in trade finance, and ensuring the safety and timely delivery of goods. This is because the approach to trade and trade finance is still manual and paper-based. We need to have end-to-end digitalisation of trade processes. Chongqing and Singapore can work together to apply FinTech solutions to make the STC hassle free, safe, and cost efficient for all stakeholders. Chongqing’s interest to develop a Fintech experimental and demonstration zone in the Western Region is thus timely. The Fintech zone can serve as a source of technology solutions for the successful development of the STC. Several players have embarked on initiatives in this area. For example, VCargo Cloud from Singapore has worked on digitalising the STC’s work flows onto cloud services, synchronising and sharing the information provided by different parties from trade, logistics, and supply chain. I am glad to share that there will be a signing of a four-party Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) later today at the Summit that will catalyse FinTech cooperation between Chongqing and Singapore. The MoU will cover enterprise and talent exchange, the establishment of an incubator platform and a regular communication mechanism. Under a separate MoU, OCBC Bank, Xiaomi Inc, and Hanhua Financial Holding Co will explore Fintech collaboration in the areas of retail and institutional financial services in China. This collaboration will enable more than 300 million Xiaomi retail customers and business partners to have access to innovative financial services.
2 The long period of low inflation has also started a debate regarding the grounds for the Riksbank’s monetary policy and the inflation target, which as far as I can tell is more intense than in most other countries. In this sense, too, one can therefore in some ways say that we are pioneers. What I intend to do today is first to say a few words about this debate. Most often, the criticism merely states that the “monetary policy of the Riksbank is wrong”. The reasons for this vary: because a negative policy rate is not healthy, because housing prices are rising, because the krona is too weak or because the economy is already developing well. There is usually no detailed reasoning as to what the consequences would be if the policy was shifted in another direction. In particular, what is often missing, but I argue is crucial, is a discussion on why the advantages of the inflation target should no longer apply and what the consequences would be if the Riksbank abandoned it. After discussing the debate on monetary policy, I intend to conclude by looking ahead and examining the problems and possibilities for monetary policy in the future. Here, I focus in particular on a scenario where monetary policy is not made more expansionary despite a delay in reaching the inflation target. In Sweden, the policy rate has been negative since February 2015. This has not been an uncontroversial policy. The criticism can be divided into two types.

Serious situation in spring 2015 Exchange rates  Unit labour costs 115 140  115  140  Germany USA Sweden  130 105  105  95  95  85  EURGBP  130  120  120  110  110  100  100  85  EURUSD EURSEK  75 Jan-14  75 Jul-14  Jan-15  Jul-15  Jan-16  Jul-16  90  90 05  07  09  11  13  15  Note. The ECB communicated its decision to purchase securities on 22 January 2015 and initiated purchases on 9 March 2015. Exchange rates, index, 1 January 2014 = 100. Unit labour costs in manufacturing industry, euro, index, 2011 = 100. The blue square indicates the effect of the krona appreciating by 30 per cent against the euro. Sources: The ECB, Macrobond and Conference Board Figure 9. Rising trend in housing prices and debts for 20 years despite varying repo rate Index 2000 Q1 = 100  Note. Housing prices have been converted from nominal to real terms by using the CPIF. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  18 [20]  Figure 10.