samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But I have suggested to my colleagues that while many companies have begun and will likely continue to raise prices to counter rising costs that derive from a range of factors – including the run-up of commodity prices in 2010 and increases in the costs of production in China – weak demand is beginning to temper the ability of providers of goods and services to significantly raise prices to consumers. My concern is with the transmission mechanism for activating the use of the liquidity we have created, which remains on the sidelines of the economy. I posit that nonmonetary factors, not monetary policy, are retarding the willingness and ability of job creators to put to work the liquidity that we have provided. I have spoken to this many times in public. Those with the capacity to hire American workers – small businesses as well as large, publicly traded or private – are immobilized. Not because they lack entrepreneurial zeal or do not wish to grow; not because they can’t access cheap and available credit. Rather, they simply cannot budget or manage for the uncertainty of fiscal and regulatory policy. In an environment where they are already uncertain of potential growth in demand for their goods and services and have yet to see a significant pickup in top-line revenue, there is palpable angst surrounding the cost of doing business. According to my business contacts, the opera buffa of the debt ceiling negotiations compounded this uncertainty, leaving business decisionmakers frozen in their tracks.

The two would appear to be unrelated, but might well be – though not in a manner that would be readily apparent. I will conclude by trying to connect the two dots. Texas’ record of job creation Here is a chart that displays nonagricultural employment growth by Federal Reserve Districts over the past 21½ years, using the employment levels of 1990 as a base of 100 and tracing job creation through June. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  To illustrate a point, I am going to separate out three districts: the Second, headquartered at the New York Fed and consisting of New York, southwestern Connecticut, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and a dozen counties in New Jersey; the Eleventh, represented by the Dallas Fed, made up of Texas, the wooded areas of eastern Louisiana and southern New Mexico; and the Twelfth, or the San Francisco Fed’s district, which consists of California, eight other states, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa and Guam. The state of New York produces 72 percent of the economic output of the Second District; Texas accounts for 95 percent of the Eleventh District’s output; and California accounts for 62 percent of the Twelfth District’s output. One might consider this second chart to be an imperfect but reasonable proxy for the employment growth over the past two decades of the three largest states in the country.
Mr. Heikenstein discusses the Swedish financial crisis of the early 1990s Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Lars Heikenstein, at a seminar arranged by the Swedish embassy held in Seoul, Korea on 15/7/98. Let me begin with a thank you to the organisers of this seminar. I am honoured to have the opportunity to share with you some experiences from the Swedish financial crisis in the early 1990s. 1. Introduction An IMF study from 1996 showed that in the past fifteen years, 132 of the Fund’s 182 member countries had experienced macroeconomic and/or financial crises. Today the figure is even higher. Crises are a recurring phenomenon. In spite of every effort to prevent them, I fear that crises will continue to occur. We should therefore use the opportunities to learn from each other, both in order to avoid making the same mistakes and to find the appropriate correctives sooner. Needless to say, there are no single “best solutions”. Crisis situations are always specific in some respects, not least with regard to their structural and political environment. Had they not been specific, they would probably never have occurred because they would have been “spotted” in advance. Having said this, however, there are a number of globally accepted “truths” about what constitutes a good response to crises. Discussions around crisis situations are usually divided into two parts: crisis prevention and crisis management. In this presentation I will be focusing on the latter.

The efficiency of our response has been strengthened by the concurrent reaction on the fiscal side 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  which is more useful than excessively stretching the monetary policy mandate. Our crisis measures must be temporary and targeted. They are justified only in the light of the exceptional circumstances seen during the pandemic. Extraordinary times require extraordinary action. As the crisis evolves and subsides, the ECB will reconsider its tools and supervisory practices. 1 Recital 3 of Decision (EU) 2020/440 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 on a temporary pandemic  emergency purchase programme (ECB/2020/17) (OJ L 91, 25.3.2020, p. 1). 2 Recital 3 of Decision (EU) 2020/440 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 on a temporary pandemic  emergency purchase programme (ECB/2020/17) (OJ L 91, 25.3.2020, p. 1). 3 ibid., Article 4. 4 Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt  am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 3-4 June 2020, available on the ECB’s website. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
This in part reflects compositional effects, as a higher proportion of non-UK born ethnic minorities have no qualifications compared to their white counterparts. 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  19  Chart 16: Granular ethnicity gaps by country of origin, sample average Ethnicity groups Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups Indian Pakistani  Bangladeshi Chinese Any other asian background Black/African/Caribbean/Black British  Other ethnic group ‐50  ‐40  ‐30  ‐20  ‐10  0  10  20  30  40  Ethnicity pay gap, per cent Non‐UK born  UK born  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts. On average, ethnic minority women earn more than white women, whereas ethnic minority men earn less than white men (Chart 17). This is also true in the latest data. Unconditionally, there is a clear and well-defined pay gap for females, a clear and well-defined pay gap for ethnicity but, somewhat surprisingly, no clear, well-defined pay gap for ethnic minority females. This is a third puzzle in the unconditional pay data.

Finally, a rich literature uses experiments to assess bias in hiring, promotion and bargaining between groups (Neumark (2018)). In this paper, we use the first two approaches – regression-based techniques and decompositions – to analyse gender and ethnicity pay gaps in the UK. In the next section, we describe the dataset, summarise key trends in the UK labour market over the past 25 years and discuss unconditional pay gaps by gender and ethnicity. In the following section, we provide an explanation of these pay gaps using factordecomposition and regression-based methods. Section 5 summarises our key findings and policy recommendations. Section 3: Trends in the UK Labour Market This paper uses quarterly returns from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1994 Q1 to 2019 Q1. This gives us a sample of 1,154,759 observations of employed individuals, reduced to 563,353 observations when incorporating pay variables, as there are fewer observations for respondents on pay.6 There are two  6 Throughout our analysis we only use wave 1 respondents in order to ensure that we are not counting multiple responses from the same individual. In addition to this, we only include workers aged 25 and over in order to remove noise from the data. Most workers under 25 are earning in the minimum wage range which is subject to regulation, and may also particularly represent part-time employment.
It has been easy to find employment. Norwegian owners and shareholders have also fared very well. Although the share of value added accruing to wage earners has decreased since the beginning of the 1990s, real wage growth has been high. On average, today’s wage earners earn real wages that are 50 per cent higher than in 1990. This corresponds to annual growth of over 2 per cent. At the same time, employment has risen. Business and labour market conditions have been unusually favourable in recent years. Should export prices fall, productivity growth slacken and foreign workers return to their home country, the wage share and unemployment will increase and business sector profits will fall. Even in the absence of these developments, low unemployment and high profits may be difficult to sustain. Developments will depend on how far businesses – in their search for qualified labour – will bid up wages. The economic policy reforms of the 1980s and 1990s set the stage for invention and innovation and the development of a market for equity capital and loans in Norway. This has resulted in restructuring in the business sector, increased productivity, real wage growth and a high level of job creation, but also very high earnings for successful businesspeople and entrepreneurs. We will probably have to learn to live with our entrepreneurs and capital owners, and they must live with the society that has provided them with favourable business conditions. In Norway, there is a relatively even distribution of income, as illustrated in the chart.

Memoranda of Understanding regulating these interactions will be prepared in the coming months. Conclusion To conclude, it is unavoidable that the existence of the SSM will alter the functioning of the ESFS. This is, after all, the most significant development in financial supervision in the history of the European Union. However, I am confident that the changes brought by the SSM will strengthen the ESFS, and will overall enhance the quality and consistency of supervisory and regulatory practices across Europe. The more Member States that are involved in Banking Union, the greater these positive effects will be. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The decline in the natural interest rate in recent decades means that, in order to stabilise inflation, real interest rates (and, therefore, nominal interest rates) need to be lower now than two or three decades ago. The problem is that nominal interest rates cannot drop significantly into negative territory, since highly negative interest rates would adversely affect the financial sector’s intermediation capacity, having a detrimental impact on the  1  For example, Holston et al. (2017) estimate that in 2016 the natural rate in the United States was positive but very close to zero. 3  supply of credit, economic activity and inflation. 2 Hence, there is a lower bound to nominal interest rates. This lower bound introduces an asymmetry into the conduct of monetary policy. This asymmetry means that monetary policy is potentially very effective in combating high inflation episodes, but less so in combating deflation or even persistently low inflation. 3  In the years that followed the Great Financial Crisis, in a context of significant disinflationary pressures, the proximity of interest rates to their lower bound led the ECB to introduce a set of non-standard measures to provide sufficient monetary stimulus to preserve price stability. Among these measures, the asset purchase programme (APP), the targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) 4 and the forward guidance on the future path of interest rates can be highlighted. 2  See, for example, Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) for a discussion of the effect of interest rates on banks’ profitability and their ability to lend.

However, it should be noted that in all those cases no central bank was pressurised to take the full responsibility and to be scapegoated, unlike the continual public attacks here against the BNB. In other countries the responsible institutions and politicians have always held the understanding that the central bank’s authority is of paramount importance for the calm of depositors and the stability of the banking system as a whole. All across the world that authority, and the independence of the central bank, are considered to be a long-term asset of the country. Consequently, central banks’ actions have not been compromised under the pressure of temporary economic or political emotions. All said so far does not mean that the BNB has no intention to draw conclusions for improving the efficiency of the banking supervision. Quite the opposite, the BNB has already undertaken serious steps in this direction. Back in the summer we publicly announced a number of measures and actions for reviewing the supervisory framework and practices. I wish to remind you that as early as in July we sent an official letter to the EBA inviting them to carry out an independent review of the quality, capacity, practices and procedures of the BNB’s Banking Supervision Department. In August we sent another letter to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) requesting them to organise a mission of the IMF and World Bank in Bulgaria under the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).
The lagged effects of dips in international oil prices had a favorable impact on transport services in the first quarter. Rental price movements remained quite below the averages of previous years due to the contraction of domestic demand. The prices of the restaurants and hotels group also followed a similar course owing to shrinking demand and decelerating food prices (Figure 5). I would particularly like to draw attention to the decrease of annual rent inflation. Seasonally adjusted data point to a continual and accelerating downward trend in rents in the first quarter of the year. The slowdown in services prices is expected to continue in the upcoming period as well. BIS Review 67/2009  3  Figure 4: Services Prices  Figure 5: Services Prices  (Annual Percentage Change)  (First Quarter Percentage Change)  Other Services Transportation Services Rent Restaurants and Hotels  21 18  6 2006-2007 Average  2008  2009  5 4  15  3  12  2  9  1  6  0  3 0  -1 -2  03 05 07 09 11 01 03 05 07 09 11 01 03 07 07 07 07 07 08 08 08 08 08 08 09 09  Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. Other Services  Transportation Rent Services  Restaurants and Hotels  Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. The first quarter saw a significant decline in the prices of durables excluding gold (Table 1).

Sharp decline in inflation arisen from deepened global financial turbulence-related developments allowed both developed and developing countries to make substantial cuts in policy rates (Figures 11 and 12). BIS Review 67/2009  7  Figure 11: Policy Rates in Developed Figure 12: Policy Rates in InflationCountries Targeting Developing Countries  14  5  13  4  12 3  11  2  10 9  1  8 0109  0808  0308  1007  0507  1206  0706  0206  0905  0405  1104  0104  Source: Bloomberg, CBT  0604  7  0109  0808  0308  1007  0507  1206  0706  0206  0905  0405  1104  0604  0104  0  Source: Bloomberg, CBT  Distinguished Guests, The financial crisis that erupted in the markets of developed countries deepened starting from September 2008, influencing the global financial system as a whole. This led to tremendous hikes in the risk premia of developing countries. In general, countries with low credit ratings end up with more apparent deterioration in risk premia, whereas the opposite applies to Turkey. In this period, being among developing countries having the lowest credit ranking, the decline in Turkey’s risk premium was somewhat limited. In other words, Turkey’s risk premium has resisted the deterioration in global risk perceptions more than is implied by her credit rating, thus clearly differing it from other developing countries in terms of the riskpremium-credit rating relationship (Figure 13).
To adjust the average daily value data to equate to the same reporting convention used by the Bank for International Settlements, the gross values should be divided by two. 3  BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey, FX turnover in April 2013. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  20. So, what’s next? I expect markets to keep changing, and they will only change faster in the coming years. 21. As technology advances, and Asia providing the engine for global growth in the medium term, I see plenty of opportunities for CLS to put its strategic focus in the region. The HKMA welcomes the CLS’ efforts to put more new currencies and members into its orbit. 22. I look forward to seeing this happen sooner rather than later, and welcome opportunities for cooperation and knowledge sharing between us. This is all because of what I said earlier – that we shared a common vision, and a more widely participated system should mean even less settlement risks for market players. 23. I look forward to celebrating our silver anniversary in 2029. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

We are also noticing the inevitable trends, on the one hand, of greater use of the Hong Kong dollar on the Mainland and, on the other hand, of continuing financial liberalisation on the Mainland: this will, in the fullness of time, culminate in the RMB becoming freely convertible. The subject of dollarisation, whether the predominant currency is the Hong Kong dollar or the RMB, is a fascinating one. On a different dimension, in our attempt to enhance our status as an international financial centre, we have adopted the strategy of providing a financial infrastructure to facilitate the conduct of international financial intermediation activities in Hong Kong. This financial infrastructure is characterised by a platform on which financial activities can be transacted and settled real time in this time zone in the major currencies without, for example, Herstatt risk. We now have Real Time Gross Settlement systems for the US dollar and the euro, and of course the Hong Kong dollar. And the lead-time for the inclusion of another currency, such as the RMB, in our settlement platform, if that is considered appropriate, could be as little as six months. If this strategy is successful, it is not difficult to envisage an increasing proportion of the balance sheet of the banking system denominated in foreign currencies, and the greater use of, say, the US dollar in both the equity and debt markets.
Reasons to be optimistic regarding the long-term prospects of the euro area Let me now explain why I am rather optimistic regarding the future development of the euro area economy. The euro area is already highly integrated in economic terms owing to the creation of the single currency and Single Market and further progress in this respect is ongoing. This is a good starting point for dynamic economic development. My optimism is grounded in particular on the transformation we have witnessed over the past years, following the remarkable decision in favour of the Single Market. The successful establishment of the euro and the ECB, which together with the Single Market, have created a new economic entity, is evidence of the ability of Europe to implement far-reaching reforms which are well-designed and underpinned by solid institutional structures. This creation of an entirely new economic entity is a substantial step forward. The euro will act as a catalyst for further reform in many areas. My optimism is further underpinned by the fact that the Treaty sets out a durable anchor to guide economic decisions and to reduce economic uncertainty substantially by entrusting an independent institution, the ECB, with a clear mandate of maintaining price stability.

From an economic point of view, the relevant question is whether the political and institutional framework which governs the euro area is designed in such a way as to ensure bright long-term prospects for the euro area in terms of employment, real growth and, more generally, living standards of its citizens? In this respect, while I see an urgent need for further structural reforms in the euro area, let me emphasise at the outset that I am rather optimistic as concerns the long-term growth and employment prospects of the euro area. Not least as the euro, together with healthy competition among differing policy designs of national authorities, will act as a catalyst for further reform and integration. In my presentation today, I will first briefly address the political and institutional structure underlying the euro area. Secondly, I will discuss some features of the ECB, the institution responsible for an area in which full integration has been achieved, namely monetary policy. Thirdly, I will discuss some of the challenges which need to be addressed to fully grasp the opportunities offered by the single currency, thereby further improving the economic prospects of the euro area. Finally, I shall argue that the unique institutional choice for the euro area brings many advantages and opportunities and thus, if properly handled and carefully further developed, is a very solid fundament for a substantially more dynamic long-term development of the euro area than most observers currently appear to expect.