samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Cyclically-adjusted net lending Percentage of potential GDP 0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2  -3  -3  -4  -4  -5  -5 2010 2011  -6  -6 Euro area  Germany  Advanced economies  Source: The IMF  The links that exist between the levels of debt, interest rates and growth also suggest that a high level of public debt entails risks. For example, a high level of debt tends to lead to higher long-term interest rates, as shown in Figure 3.3 A high level of debt may also lead to lower growth due to increased vulnerability to future crises, or because taxes may have to be increased to finance the debt.4 The higher the level of debt, the more the country must set aside to make the interest payments on its debts. These are a couple of the reasons why  2  The term cyclically-adjusted deficits here refers to public net lending adjusted for cyclical effects. The group advanced economies includes the United States, the euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Czech Republic, Norway, Israel, Denmark, New Zealand and Iceland. 3  See also Baldacci, Emanuele and Kumar, Manmohan S. (2010), Fiscal Deficits, Public Debt and Sovereign Bond Yields. Working Paper no. 10/184. IMF. 4  For more details see Fiscal Monitor Update, November 2010. IMF or Kumar, Manmohan S. and Woo, Jaejoon (2010), Public Debt and Growth. Working Paper no. 10/174. IMF.

Figure 7 shows that the real repo rate is expected to be negative in 2012–2013; that is for a substantial part of the forecast period. If this proves to be the case, won’t there then be a risk of monetary policy being too expansionary? Won’t we perhaps risk overheating, a too high rate of inflation or an unsustainable development of household debt? This is of course not impossible, but at present I do not think that it is very likely. To explain how I have reached this conclusion I would now like to briefly summarise how I view some of the risks associated with a very low real interest rate. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 7. Low real repo rate for some time to come Real repo rate, per cent, quarterly mean values 3  3 December February  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 06  08  10  12  14  Note. The real repo rate is calculated as a mean value of the Riksbank’s repo rate forecast for the year ahead minus the inflation forecast (CPIF) for the corresponding period. Source: The Riksbank  Overheating – not a risk at present The first risk thus relates to resource utilisation in the economy and the risk of overheating. As I have already said, weak economic development abroad is having a significant impact on the Swedish economy.
1  BIS Review 73/1999  Graph 2 Gold Reserves in Relative Terms  Gold per GDP Unit  Gold / Imports  0.9%  United States  United States  6.5%  Germany  6.3%  1.6%  Germany France  2.0%  France  9.0%  Italy  2.0%  Italy  8.9%  9.0%  Switzerland 2.6%  Netherlands Japan  0.2% 0.5%  United Kingdom  Canada  15.8% 22.0% 59.9%  France Italy  365.5  Switzerland 68.9  Netherlands  0.3%  Germany  45.0  Italy  Canada  1.6%  United States  54.3  France  Sweden  1.7%  Sweden  Gold / Currency in Circulation  45.1  Germany  Switzerland  Japan  12.3  33.0% 97.1%  Netherlands  6.0  46.8% 1.7%  United Kingdom  16.0%  Belgium  29.1  Belgium  Belgium  Canada  30.5  United States  United Kingdom  1.8% 1.6%  0.1%  Grams of Gold per Capita  Japan  Japan  0.6%  Sweden  5.2%  United Kingdom 1.1%  Belgium  25.4%  Switzerland Netherlands  19.5%  Sweden  16.6  Canada  2.6  14.3% 3.3%  Source : IWF, OECD  As you can see, Switzerland probably represents an extreme case with regard to gold holdings.

18.05.2022  Welcoming remarks Pathways to Gender Equality in Central Banks Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Dear ladies and gentlemen, I feel very honored to participate in the opening of this conference co-organized with the International Economic Association, Banco de la República and Banco de España. The development of initiatives, such as this one that gives visibility to issues related to gender diversity, are key to finding solutions to the waste of talent that involves not taking this diversity into account, consequently putting economic growth at risk and depriving economies of opportunities to develop. Ensuring diversity and, in particular, gender balance, must be a priority in our organizations and, with this commitment, we work at the Banco de España, where we have made significant progress in recent years. By the end of 2021, 51% of our total staff were females, and it is noteworthy that, in one decade (since 2012), that proportion has increased in nearly 10 percentage points. More than 4 years ago, in April 2018, Banco de España joined Bank Al Maghrib, the central bank of Morocco, to organize the first international meeting between international central banks with the aim of studying and fostering female leadership in central banks.
There are just 30 or so mentions of COLR on the web. One possible starting point is how we have learned to think about bespoke liquidity-support operations. After explicitly recognising that occasionally liquidity support operations can end up providing de facto risk capital if the recipient deteriorates, the late Eddie George offered some thoughts on this in 1993; 29 “central banks are not in the business of providing public subsidy to private shareholders. If we do provide support, we will try to structure it so that any losses fall first on the shareholders and any benefits come first to us. And any support we provide will be on terms that are as penal as we can make them, without precipitating the collapse we are trying to avoid ……… We look for a clean exit. The company may be required to run down or restructure its operations, under our surveillance, to the point where it can do without our support.

And on capital account liberalization, I agree with my ASEAN colleagues that it would be more useful for the Fund to concentrate on managing the process of capital account liberalization of its members instead of discussing whether to make capital account liberalization an explicit purpose or mandate of the Fund. Finally, the third point I want to make today is that I see strong merits in separating lending and surveillance. At present, crisis resolution is done as an extension of surveillance by the area departments using the approach they see fit. Separating these two functions in terms of duties, responsibilities, and decision-making would provide clear accountability within the IMF on role and responsibilities over these two issues. Moreover, since crisis prevention and crisis resolution require different sets of skills and expertise, separating the two would allow the Fund to pool resources and the special skills on a Fund-wide basis, thereby strengthening the overall institution’s capabilities to deal with crisis resolution. Finally, with the work on crisis resolution becoming more centralized, the Fund’s program design could be more uniformly structured to reflect a common set of guiding principles in relation to absolute limits of access to IMF financing, the use of standstills on debt repayment, the role of the Fund in debt restructuring, and the extent of the involvement of the private sector.
Against this backdrop, we continue to expect the economy to grow by around 1.5% in 2019. As is the case with the global economy, the risks for this scenario remain to the downside. In particular, an unexpectedly sharp slowdown internationally would quickly spread to Switzerland. Exchange rates, interest rates and inflation expectations  Let me now move on to address monetary conditions – that is to say, exchange rates and interest rates – as well as inflation expectations. My comments here relate to the developments since our last news conference in December, and not just those during the past quarter. Monetary conditions are similar today to six months ago. The Swiss franc remains highly valued. The situation on the foreign exchange market is still fragile. When the trade dispute between the US and China escalated again in May, the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen appreciated. Both currencies are sought after as safe havens in periods of uncertainty. In light  Page 4/5  Berne, 13 June 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  of the high valuation of the franc and the fragility of the situation, our willingness to intervene remains necessary, as does the negative interest rate. This brings me to the development of interest rates since December. At the beginning of the year, the US Federal Reserve signalled that it would be patient with regard to raising interest rates further.

This was previously necessary because expectations regarding future monetary policy could strongly influence the three-month rate. The SNB policy rate also sets the terms for monetary policy-related transactions with the SNB. The conditions on the money market are currently determined by the interest rate banks pay on their sight deposits at the SNB. We have decided that the interest on these deposits will at present correspond to the SNB policy rate, and will thus remain at −0.75%. I will now summarise the importance of the SNB policy rate. From this point onwards, we will use the SNB policy rate in taking and communicating our interest rate decisions. Our conditional inflation forecast will now be based on the assumption of an unchanged SNB policy rate over the relevant horizon. The SNB policy rate signals the interest rate level we will seek to maintain on the short-term money market. In assessing the actual conditions on the money market, we are focusing on SARON. The terms for monetary policy-related transactions will be based on the SNB policy rate. Page 2/5  Berne, 13 June 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  This adjustment does not entail any change in our current monetary policy, and in particular our expansionary stance. The inflation forecast of March 2019 and the new forecast can be directly compared with one another.
Various jurisdictions in Asia such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Indonesia have used macroprudential measures to reduce risks to their domestic financial systems and to dampen the impact of economic shocks, such as the application of loan-to-value limits for mortgage borrowings. However, the detailed impact of macroprudential policies is arguably less well understood. 21 There are research challenges in this regard. For example, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) highlighted that the impact of tools are likely to vary across jurisdictions based on their domestic circumstances and phase of the financial cycle. A key focus area is how best to study the spillover impact across jurisdictions from a macroprudential policy decision point of view. 22 Another challenge relates to effectiveness. Macroprudential tools have largely been employed in more recent years, and isolating their effectiveness from other measures will require further studies. 23 In this context, it may be remiss of me not to mention the apparent artificial divide that has existed between the analysis of the financial vis-à-vis the real sides of the economy. During the GFC, I recall some criticism that economists used mathematical models that did not sufficiently factor the critical roles that banks and other financial institutions play in the economy. 24 Since then, important strides have been made, including in the workhorse Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models used at central banks, to better capture the key interactions between the financial sector and the rest of the economy.

And it is important that plans are legally robust and that they are regularly tested. Another lesson from the recent episode is that disclosure practices in relation to liquidity risk management objectives, controls and metrics vary significantly. In some cases banks go as far as providing information on stress tests and contingency funding plans; in others there is a relative paucity of information. That hampers market functioning: in times of heightened uncertainty a lack of information can lead to defensive reactions by market counterparties that provision of additional information could prevent. There are some risks from greater disclosure. For example, a bank revealing a weak funding position could precipitate an adverse reaction, although that should of course lead to stronger risk management as a precaution against that risk. There are also measurement challenges. It is difficult to present a simple, representative summary measure of liquidity risks run by a given bank – any single definition of such a complex array of risks will necessarily be approximate. But that does not seem a sufficient reason not to disclose any measure – indeed there may be some parallels with market risk where a single metric such as a firm’s overall value-at-risk is not viewed as encapsulating all dimensions of such risk. Nonetheless, the degree of disclosure on market risks which banks are now providing under Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord marks a definite improvement in this area.
The arrival of the euro also had a positive effect on growth, in spite of the serious difficulties during the crisis. Since 1999, GDP per capita has been growing at 1.2%, which is 0.1% higher than in the other euro area countries and much higher than during the early years of our democracy. Recently, some people have tried to blame the euro for the length of the financial crisis in Spain and have advocated control over monetary policy interest rates and exchange rates. What they 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  often forget is that being a member of the euro area enables Spanish households and businesses to benefit from lower real interest rates, lower inflation rates and reduced macroeconomic volatility, all of which boost productive investments and make a vital contribution to the sustainability of public finances. Furthermore, it is not true that structural currency devaluations solve economic crises. Devaluations are short-term measures. In the long term, the competitive boost they provide is eroded by the higher inflation they cause. And, in a complex system of global production chains like the one we have today, devaluations can make it harder for businesses to plan. The euro is also the second-most important currency in the international monetary system3, which strengthens Spain’s credibility in a global context. It’s true that the crisis revealed significant institutional shortcomings in the structure of the monetary union, but it’s equally true that European countries have taken this on board and carried out substantial reforms.

1 The text was published as an op-ed in Expansión on 6 December 2018. 2 See the survey entitled “Europe as seen from Spain and France” (Europa vista desde España y Francia), Elcano  Royal Institute, March 2018. 3 See “The international role of the euro”, ECB interim report, June 2018. 4 See Almunia, Miguel, Pol Antràs, David Lopez-Rodriguez, and Eduardo Morales. 2018. “Venting Out: Exports  during a Domestic Slump”. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Relative to its 5.6 percent long-run average, net investment as a percent of GDP fell by twice as far as it had in any prior postwar recession. More to the point, the recovery in investment has been exceptionally anemic. Today, four full years after the trough of the recession in second quarter 2009, net investment as a percent of GDP is still only 3.2 percent – a level typical of past recession lows. Net investment as a percent of GDP was last at or above its 5.6 percent long-run mean 6½ years ago. Small wonder then that nonfarm payroll employment has been slow to recover too. Through August we had restored less than 80 percent of the 8.7 million jobs lost during the Great Recession. Less well known is the fact that real GDP per capita only recovered its prerecession peak this past summer.5 That’s 5½ years to make up the ground lost during the recession. Previous post-WWII recoveries never required more than nine quarters maximum. A Dallas Fed analysis suggests that the recent financial crisis and its aftermath put the U.S.  4  Net investment includes additions to fixed capital net of depreciation. 5  Real GDP per capita was $ in 2009 dollars in second quarter 2013 versus $ in fourth quarter 2007. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  back by more than an entire year’s worth of output, an equivalent of more than $ per American household.6 Baker-Bloom-Davis and better comprehending uncertainty And what of uncertainty?

Richard W Fisher: Uncertainty matters (with reference to kinky monetary policy, two nickels and a dime) Remarks by Mr Richard W Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, before the Causes & Macroeconomic Consequences of Uncertainty Conference, Dallas, Texas, 3 October 2013. *  *  *  The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. The speaker is indebted to Dallas Fed Senior Vice President and Principal Policy Advisor Evan Koenig for his input in developing the themes articulated in this speech. Thank you, Evan [Koenig] It is a pleasure to share this platform with John Taylor. I first met John at a Carnegie Foundation seminar when he was Undersecretary of the Treasury; I have been among the legions of his admirers ever since. He is thoughtful, no-nonsense and, importantly, dedicated to making monetary policy work with maximum efficacy. We at the Dallas Fed are grateful that he chairs the advisory board of our Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute. And we all, as Americans, are grateful for his service and dedication to our country. Thank you, John, for being the good patriot and man that you are. Uncertainty matters Uncertainty matters. A lot. This won’t be a surprise to many of you. The first thing you are taught in any MBA program, be it at Stanford, where I earned my degree, or anywhere else, is that “business” is the process of managing under conditions of uncertainty.
A typical example is a financial crisis situation in which a macroprudential policy authority wishes to reduce the capital buffers of banks in order to stimulate lending while, from a microprudential perspective, it would instead be desirable to see the banks strengthening their balance sheets with more equity. So, there is a need to coordinate these policy areas too. Also, the knowledge about individual institutions generated in microprudential supervision work is important to understanding risk build-up at systemic level. Wind strength is also affected by other policy areas Not only is there a strong link between monetary and macroprudential policy and a need to coordinate macroprudential and microprudential supervision – the need to lean against the wind is also affected by other policy areas. Fiscal policy has a significant influence on borrowing and lending incentives. However, other policy areas can also come into play, such as housing policy when it comes to household indebtedness. There is thus a limit to what can be achieved by macroprudential policy, or monetary policy for that matter, which depends on other policy areas. The opportunities and limitations of macroprudential policy – the example of the Swedish household sector I will now be much more specific about the opportunities and limitations of macroprudential policy by focusing on a concrete example. By now, it is well known that, for a number of years, the Riksbank has seen substantial risks associated with household indebtedness.

There is some concern about mis-measurement of the level of demand in the economy. But compared to the past, changes in ONS methodology and improvements in the measurement of financial sector output in particular, should mean that the very large revisions to growth in the past, which prompted large revisions to views of inflationary pressure, now seem less likely. 9 And, in the present context of a fall in output of 6.2% in the six quarters to the third quarter of 2009, there seems little doubt that a sizeable output gap has opened up. Nevertheless, the MPC indicated in the last Inflation Report that we expect GDP data for 2009 to be revised up somewhat in due course, and that was taken account of in the forward projections. A second source of uncertainty stems from the specification of the output gap. The way in which potential output is estimated in BEQM reflects largely shocks to supply (the capital stock and labour supply). However, arguably for judging inflation pressure after some shocks this is not necessarily the right approach. 10 For example, a rise in commodity prices, or a fall in the exchange rate, may have a long-run impact on supply, by making some supply uneconomic and bringing about some capital scrapping. This is captured in our framework. In the short term, the increases in firms’ costs, leads to both a fall in output and a rise in inflation pressure. This fall in output does not indicate a negative output gap.
Payment service providers will be able to compete for customers supported by an efficient and secure system. Banks save considerable sums because an extensive network of branches is no longer necessary. The infrastructure is a collective good that benefits everyone. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  It has long been our experience that industry operators come together and agree good solutions in partnership with Norges Bank. But developments in technology and market structure, where payment services are increasingly becoming a competitive arena, may hinder the emergence of good common solutions. We run the risk that progress will slow and the payment system will become fragmented because the common infrastructure is eroding. We must now consider whether Norges Bank should take action to counter this fragmentation. Future users of payment services will hardly be satisfied with payment transactions that take several hours or days to complete. The infrastructure for real-time payments is therefore critical. In 2016, Norges Bank took the initiative on a joint project with the banking industry to put in place an improved real-time payment platform. In spring, Norwegian banks declined the invitation to participate in the P27 project. The soon-to-be-launched Straks 2.0 instant payment platform is an improvement, but not a permanent solution for real-time payments in Norway. Among other things, it is not sufficiently well-suited to business users. The question is how we proceed from here. It has proved to be a challenge to drum up support for carrying out the necessary modernisation of the infrastructure owned by industry bodies.

24 Supervisory issues associated with benchmark transition: Report to the G20, July 9, 2020. 25 BCBS, Basel Framework frequently asked questions, June 2020. 26 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Joint Statement on Managing the LIBOR Transition. 27 OCIE, Risk Alert: Examination Initiative: LIBOR Transition Preparedness, June 18, 2020.  https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  6/6