samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
13  Page 14 sur 14  i  Villeroy de Galhau, F., Monetary policy post-pandemic : balancing between science and art, predictability and reactivity, speech, Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, 27 August 2022 ii Svensson, L. (1997), Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets European Economic Review, pp 1111-1146. iii Measures of underlying inflation for the euro area, issued as part of the ECB Economic Bulletin 4/2018 iv A possible new indicator to measure core inflation in the euro area, Banque de France Bulletin, 240/1, 2022 v Gopinath, G., How will the pandemic and war shape future monetary policy? Prepared for the Jackson Hole Symposium vi Rey, H., Dilemma not trilemma: the global financial cycle and monetary policy independence, paper presented at the 25th Jackson Hole symposium, 2013 vii Obstfeld, M., Uncoordinated monetary policies risk a historic global slowdown, blog, September 2022. viii Villeroy de Galhau, F., Monetary policy in the present environment: reconciling clarity and flexibility, as well as independence and cooperation, speech in G30, 15 October 2018 ix Powell, J.H., Monetary policy in the post-crisis era at "Bretton Woods: 75 Years Later - Thinking about the Next", a conference organized by the Bank of France and the French Ministry for the Economy and Finance, Paris, 16 July 2019. x Brainard, L., Restoring price stability in an uncertain economic environment, speech, 10 October 2022  14

While the stress testing element was only part of the CCAR review, it was an important input into evaluating banks’ capital planning. The assessment was conducted between November 2010 and March 2011. Once again the largest 19 U.S. domiciled bank holding companies were asked to participate, using a baseline scenario, their own stress scenario, and a supervisor-provided stress scenario (a set of macroeconomic assumptions consistent with an economic downturn). A critical benchmark was whether banks could meet a 5 percent Tier 1 common capital ratio under stress conditions over the next two years, assuming they paid dividends or carried out the stock buybacks as they proposed. Additional capital measures were examined, including the ability to satisfy over time the new Basel III capital ratios and changes in capital required by the Dodd-Frank legislation. Bank holding companies were required to provide information on their capital adequacy processes and capital distribution policies, and supervisors assessed them. Conducting the analysis for all of these institutions simultaneously gave supervisors a good benchmark as to how the financial institutions were performing relative to a stress scenario. In addition to providing a method for evaluating capital assessments, the stress test that was one component of the broader CCAR provided an opportunity to determine how financial institutions had refined their ability to conduct stress tests and incorporated lessons learned from the SCAP. In that vein, these types of capital assessments are likely to be an important tool in understanding the capital planning process in the future.
“Forward rates minus Prospera inflation expectations” shows nominal forward rates from 28 April for the coming year minus inflation expectations according to Prospera for the corresponding period. 9  See the box “What is a normal level for the repo rate?” in the Monetary Policy Report, February 2010 for a discussion of a normal level for the repo rate. See also Björn Lagerwall “Real interest rates in Sweden”, Economic commentary no. 5, 2008, Sveriges Riksbank, for a discussion of real interest rates. BIS Review 85/2010  9  Concluding thoughts Publishing our own repo rate path was a further step towards openness and transparency in the Riksbank’s monetary policy. Our forecast for the repo rate is reported in the same way as other important forecast variables. We can also use alternative scenarios to illustrate how the Executive Board may respond with its monetary policy if economic developments deviate from the main scenario. When the Riksbank introduced the repo rate path there were fears that many analysts would stop making their own forecasts and slavishly follow the Riksbank. The merit of having many different assessments would be lost. However, this has not been the case. There was also concern that we would avoid changing the repo rate path, even when this was motivated by changed conditions. This has not happened either. “The repo rate path is a forecast, not a promise”, this has been a message that the Riksbank has communicated all along.

At the same time, we continue to expect euro area economic activity to benefit from ongoing growth in the global economy as well as from the accommodative monetary policy stance and the various measures taken to support the functioning of the financial sector. This assessment is also reflected in the September 2011 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP growth in a range between 1.4% and 1.8% in 2011 and between 0.4% and 2.2% in 2012. Compared with the June 2011 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges for real GDP growth in 2011 and 2012 have been revised downwards. In the Governing Council’s assessment, the risks to the economic outlook for the euro area are on the downside, in an environment of particularly high uncertainty. Downside risks  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  mainly relate to the ongoing tensions in some segments of the financial markets in the euro area and at the global level, as well as to the potential for these pressures to spill over into the euro area real economy. They also relate to further increases in energy prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. With regard to price developments, euro area annual HICP inflation was 2.5% in August 2011, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, unchanged from July. We have now seen inflation rates at relatively high levels since the end of last year, with higher energy and other commodity prices as the main drivers.
The concern is not so much about control over access to restricted areas and cash vault, but about ensuring proper authorized access to the IT systems and the electronic funds transfer network. And the issue is not so much about keeping bank premises open after a major disaster, but about ensuring that all key banking operations and network continue to function uninterrupted under a proper business continuity plan. These are aspects of modern security risks to banks. They are part of the broader operational risks, which have received greater attention as the business of banking moves further and further away from face-to-face transactions. In Thailand, to address this challenge, we as bank supervisors, have over the past years provided best-practice guidance to the local banking industry in a number of important areas, including loss data collection, business continuity management and plan, IT security, outsourcing, and IT disaster recovery. In addition, Basel II will, for the first time, impose an explicit capital charge on banks for operational risks, on top of the traditional credit and market risks. Implementation of Basel II in Thailand will begin at the end of this year, and the preparation for its implementation is progressing on schedule. I am confident that with the implementation of Basel II, the quality of risk management by banks in Thailand, especially with respect to operational risks, will improve further. I have taken a lot of your time in this opening remark. But the topic of today’s seminar is important.

Given the depth of the recession, there is likely to be a greater than usual degree of history-dependence, or hysteresis, in this path. The deeper and longer the recession, the greater the scarring effects on physical and human capital and hence the economy’s productive potential. The May MPR scenario captured some of these scarring effects. In particular, it assumed that lower investment as a result of the Covid crisis was not recovered, leaving the capital stock 4% lower. Combined with some drag on total factor productivity (TFP) growth, the level of output ended 1½% lower. That scenario assumed no scarring effect on human capital, however, with unemployment returning to pre-Covid levels and the long-run rate of unemployment unchanged at around 4¼%. At the same time, it was recognised that this was just one of many possible paths for the economy. Other paths would give rise to differing degrees of scarring to physical and human capital and losses to the long-run productive potential of the economy. On 14 July, the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) will publish three possible scenarios for the economy involving different degrees of depth and length of the downturn. Perhaps the key uncertainty, from a scarring perspective, concerns the labour market. As Chart 2 illustrates, the Covid crisis has had markedly different effects on different sectors and, most likely, will continue to do so. Chart 14 compares different sectors’ contribution to the pre-Covid employment boom and its subsequent output contraction.
Harnessing risk advisory expertise to provide advice and design risk financing solutions. These building blocks will enable ASEAN members to better understand their needs and design appropriate disaster risk financing programs including through transferring risk to capital markets. b. Governments are increasingly using alternative risk transfer mechanisms such as government pools, like the Philippines parametric disaster insurance pilot, the Thai crop 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  insurance scheme and the Vietnam pilot agriculture programme. In May this year, the establishment of the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility (SEADRIF) in Singapore was officially announced. As ASEAN’s first regional catastrophe risk facility, SEADRIF will start by establishing a regional catastrophe pool to insure the flood risks of Lao and Myanmar. SEADRIF will also seek to sponsor different risk management strategies, including issuance of catastrophe bonds, or to act as a reinsurer to national catastrophe pools, to further strengthen the region’s financial resilience to disaster risks. Supporting ILS growth in Asia through Singapore 11 The presence of a full-fledged ILS market and ecosystem in the region will encourage the development of this risk financing instrument. However, there is currently no established market in Asia for ILS. 12 As the leading financial centre in Asia, Singapore is well positioned to fill this need: a. We are a well-established regional insurance hub that offers a comprehensive spectrum of re/insurance activities through a vibrant ecosystem of re/insurance players and service providers.

The aim of the scheme is to defray the frictional costs of catastrophe bonds issuances. We have received keen interest from the region, with a healthy pipeline of issuers keen to tap on the grant scheme to issue a catastrophe bond here. Leading insurance brokers have expressed support for Singapore as a domicile and are working with their Asian clients for potential issuances here. b. We have also formed an industry-led Alternative Risk Transfer work-group to advise MAS on initiatives to support the development of Singapore as an ILS domicile. The workgroup will continue to provide feedback on the current ILS regime including on 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  regulations, tax and structures. 15 Fourth, our proximity to Asian markets allows for a deep understanding of underlying risks and needs of the sponsors. We have grown as a traditional re/insurance market due to this and it will likewise be an important consideration for Asian ILS issuers looking to tap capital markets in the region, and for capital providers that are underwriting the risks. 16 Despite this promising outlook, we recognise that ILS expertise is still nascent in Asia, and there is much scope for Singapore to learn from international best practices. We hope to strengthen Singapore’s proposition as a ILS domicile in 4 ways: a. First, we seek to explore the introduction of bespoke corporate structures for the ILS market, like the Protected Cell Company (PCC) structure, to provide more structuring options to potential issuers.
I mentioned earlier that there were over 950 public commitments to the Code on the Global Index. But only 85 of those are from the buyside – and only a handful more represent platform, infrastructure or technology operators (Chart 6). The GFXC has recognised some of the practical challenges faced by smaller firms when signing up to the Code, and has prepared new material to help ease this process.17 But we need more of the largest firms too: 17 of the largest 30 global asset managers are still not signed up (Table 2). That’s $ trillion of investors’ funds without a voice in the use and development of the Code. Chart 6: Public commitments to the FX Global Code18  Source: Global Index of public registers as of 9 September. Signing up to the Foreign Exchange Global Code should be high on the agenda for the CEO of every major asset management firm. It deepens trust: between you and your clients, your counterparties and your regulators. It strengthens corporate governance: providing a ready-made blueprint for best practice within your firm. That is especially true for UK firms, which will fall under the Senior Managers Regime from the end of 2019. Behaviour that is in line with the Code will tend to indicate a person subject to the Regime is meeting their obligation to observe 'proper standards of market conduct.'

This entails focusing our sights on the path ahead, towards re-building a global financial architecture that will facilitate and secure our economic prospects. With the considerable benefit of hindsight, we now know that finance, if not anchored to the aim of creating sustainable value in the real economy, will become inherently unstable and destabilising to the ultimate goals of greater shared prosperity. There is thus a compelling need for finance to have a greater role in shaping responsible behaviour that underpins a stable and well-functioning economy, and advances the goals of a progressive society and sustainable environment. This is the underlying objective of responsible finance. Of significance, aligning business practices towards responsible finance entails a paradigm shift away from the conventional thinking of finance - the most important distinction being the need to recognise and appreciate that responsible finance delivers value by focusing on its ultimate outcomes, rather than its immediate returns. Responsible finance at its core strives to serve wider objectives that is consistent with, but goes beyond, the predominant objective of enhancing shareholder value. In delivering long term sustainable value, allocative efficiency is achieved in a manner that promotes stability and prosperity in the broader economy and sustainability of the environment. Above all, responsible finance aims to optimise its positive impact on society, economic wellbeing and development. Over the recent decade, the heightened advocacy for ethical and socially responsible investments has also seen the proliferation of financial instruments that cater for both financial and societal objectives.
Information technology  My second worry is about the broad area of information technology – and this has really a couple of dimensions to it. The first is legacy: that most firms still have so much “clean-up” to do to fix longstanding technology and data issues that have built up over the years: systems don’t talk with one another; data aggregation takes days or weeks, when the needs are really more immediate; and data quality isn’t what it needs to be. So, there is still a significant amount of basic blocking and tackling that needs to be done. The second dimension that concerns me is the competitive landscape for financial institutions in the digital world. As more and more non-financial entities are entering the financial arena, like Amazon, Apple, peer to peer lenders, and others, I worry that financial firms lack the agility and ability to compete at the level that they need to – particularly with the constraints of regulation. At the end of the day, will financial firms be able to compete in the same way – or will these largely unregulated players be the future of our financial system? The final dimension I’m certain won’t surprise you – and that’s cybersecurity. I’m sure I don’t have to explain too much why this keeps me awake at night, but suffice it to say that as I think about the kinds of risks that might cause the next crisis, cybersecurity is the one that worries me the most.

Once the appropriate level of the key interest rates has been set, the Executive Board of the ECB implements its monetary policy stance so that the effects of its interest rate decisions are transmitted to the financial markets and the real economy effectively. In this sense, the ECB had to act swiftly and decisively to avoid that tensions in the money market would spill-over to other markets and adversely affect the real economy. So we had to clearly convey two complementary messages. One was that the ECB was determined – from the onset of the financial crises in August 2007 – to ensure the orderly functioning of the euro area inter-bank money market by offering supplementary liquidityproviding refinancing operations or – more recently – by widening the collateral framework to facilitate the provision of liquidity to merchant banks and to engage in unlimited provision of liquidity for all our refinancing operations at a fixed rate. The other message which is fundamental was to raise the public’s awareness that the exceptional interventions aimed to alleviate the tensions in the money market would not compromise the longer-term achievement of price stability in line with our definition less than 2%, but close to 2%. Conclusions Let me conclude. The fundamental changes in central bank communication have helped to enhance the effectiveness, predictability and credibility of monetary policy and have notably contributed to lowering both inflation rates and volatility in the real economy.
17 This is despite oil price shocks having had on average much less impact on the economy, largely thanks to the  8/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  enhanced credibility central banks have gained over time. See, for example, Choi et al. (2017), “Oil Prices and Inflation Dynamics: Evidence from Advanced and Developing Economies”, IMF Working Paper No 17/196. 18 See, for example, Bielen et al. (2017), “The Future of Power Markets in a Low Marginal Cost World”, Resources  for the Future Working Paper 17–26; and Archer, C. and M. Z. Jacobson (2005), “Evaluation of global wind power”, Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 110, pp. 1-20. 19 See, for example, the Platform for Climate Adaptation and Risk Reduction on www.placard-network.eu. 20 Google, for example, managed to reduce its energy consumption by more than a third by optimising its cooling  system through artificial intelligence controlled systems. 21 On the positive side, however, the associated increase in the economy’s trend growth rate will help lift the  natural rate of interest, thereby increasing the policy space available for central banks to manage fluctuations in the business cycle. See also Cœuré, B. (2018), “Scars that never were? Potential output and slack after the crisis”, speech at the CEPII 40th Anniversary Conference, Paris, 12 April. 22 See the European Parliament resolution of 29 May 2018 on sustainable finance (2018/2007(INI)). 23 See Articles 11 and 127(1) TFEU and Article 3 TEU.

This significant strengthening of the trade relations with the EU member states is mostly a result of the intensified trade with Germany, and moreover, such development is fully conditioned by the increase in the exports of RM to Germany. Thus the share of the export of goods to Germany in the total export of goods of RM in 2008 equaled 14%, while in 2013 it climbed to high 36%, or in absolute amounts, from Euro 383 million, for only five years, it reached Euro 1,154 million. It is a significant increase, a triple increase. It means that, despite the crisis in the Euro area and its negative implications, the strong economy based on sound and solid economic fundaments – such as the German, proved to be our certain partner for placement of more than a third of the exports. Besides the traditional export products, i.e. the export of the domestic textile and metal manufacturing industry, in the last two years, Germany is important destination for export of the new capacities in the technological industrial development zones (TIDZs), i.e. for the export of machinery and equipment and equipment of automotive industry. Second, Germany is our significant investor, which in 2013 advanced on the list of the ten most important foreign direct investors (9th).
And for another, we need to factor in various considerations to keep up with the latest international standards, including measures to uphold and protect data privacy. Therefore, enhancing our financial data infrastructure must be a concerted effort by the banking and tech industry as a whole. A team effort will ultimately lead to public goods that deliver value, benefit all the parties, and at the same time are commercially viable. 30. By improving our data infrastructure, we are empowering the industry and encouraging creativity for developing innovative financial products and solutions, in turn building up the overall appetite for fintech solutions. Expanding the fintech-savvy workforce 31. The three strategies I just mentioned will, hopefully, generate demand in the industry for fintech solutions. However, from what we learnt from the industry, the supply of fintech talent remains a pressing issue. Therefore, our fourth strategy is that we want to foster a fintechsavvy workforce and nurture all-round fintech talent, including students and practitioners. 32. We don’t need reminding of how Hong Kong boasts an extremely strong talent pool – be it in law, finance, accountancy, or other professions. We are a city that thrives on our people’s high agility and efficiency. We pride ourselves on keeping up with international standards as well as customer and market requirements. 33. With fintech being a relatively new area, it is understandable that we currently face an acute fintech talent shortage. Hong Kong is in need of grooming all-round fintech talent and expertise.

Now, we must recognise and accept the fact that COVID-19 has permanently changed customers’ behaviour. Their digital appetite will outlast the pandemic. The only way to satisfy their increasing digital appetite is to increase our fintech offerings, which in turn, will make them hungrier for more. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  11. The HKMA believes now is the right time for the banking industry to double down on fintech development. It is time to work together as a whole to embrace the numerous untapped possibilities that fintech can bring. Fintech has the potential to become a major economic growth engine in the post-pandemic era; and it would be in the banking industry’s best interests to be a part of this progression. 12. With this in mind, we have talked to a lot of stakeholders in the past few months to map out what needs to be done to take Fintech development to a higher level. Our conclusion is that we must build an ecosystem where the value of fintech is experienced across all levels and by all groups of people. When we bring sufficient benefits to customers, investors, and the public at large, we will create a virtuous cycle that generates even more demand for fintech solutions, in turn energising the whole industry. 13. As we build this ecosystem, we also need to ensure that we maintain the right factors for the ecosystem to grow further. Data, infrastructure, talent, and funding will all be vital to this growth.