samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I am thinking particularly of the injunction to smile and whistle through all difficulties. Certainly I am sometimes tempted, when asked to explain the state of opinion in London, to take refuge in a cheery smile, and to begin to whistle a mournful tune (not easy to do at the same time, you will find). Fortunately, it is not my responsibility to discuss the politics of EMU in the United Kingdom. Another good reason for me not to do so is that I would like to keep my job. As a humble central banker, a mere technician, it is more appropriate for me to focus on the economic dimension of EMU and to say something, also, about the financial market implications which concern us, particularly given the Bank of England’s position at the heart of the City of London. In both these areas - economic and financial - the Boy Scout motto is particularly apposite today. Let me explain why. At the Bank of England we have always held the view that Economic and Monetary Union is a momentous enterprise, with huge consequences for European economies. The act of irrevocably fixing exchange rates, between economies which have in many cases been managed separately for centuries, is not a step to be undertaken lightly. It is an exciting venture, almost too exciting for some, perhaps.

These projections, which do not appear to be overly optimistic given the figures – published on Monday – for the decline in unemployment and the rise in Social Security registrations in March, highlight the need to continue pursuing policies geared to boosting competitiveness, investment and exports, the only foundations suitable for sustainable job creation. Price developments in 2015 and 2016 will be greatly influenced by oil prices. Consumer prices might fall by 0.2% on average in 2015, and rise by slightly more than 1% in 2016. Stripping out the energy component, consumer prices are expected to rise modestly, in line with the scenario of growing household expenditure, the lessening of surplus capacity in the economy and the depreciation of the euro. The risk of deflation appears to have been clearly averted in the Monetary Union and, consequently, in Spain. Recent monetary policy conduct Let me turn now to recent monetary policy conduct. Monetary policy in the euro area has been progressively adapted to medium- and long-term inflation expectations, in a setting marked by the weakness of economic growth in the area. The armoury of instruments used by the ECB includes conventional or standard measures – such as interest rate movements and the provision of liquidity in its ordinary refinancing operations – together with non-standard or extraordinary measures, among which the setting of negative interest rates on the discount facility, and long-term liquidity-provision and assetpurchase programmes. The need to keep the deflationary risk at bay, i.e.
The aim was not to achieve a particular level of the exchange rate but to compensate for its deflationary impact. When the exchange rate weakens – as we anticipate that it will in due course – then monetary policy will at some point need to offset that influence in the opposite direction. But in the meantime we have had to manage as best we can a severe imbalance between different sectors of the economy, with the internationally exposed sectors taking a considerable hammering. Despite reasonable macro-economic stability in the economy as a whole, the environment has been anything but stable for those sectors. For a period before 1992 we sought to manage the exchange rate, initially by informally shadowing the DM and subsequently by pegging sterling within the framework of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. Both these episodes ended in tears, essentially for the same reasons: attempting to manage the exchange rate required us to pursue macro-economic policies which were inconsistent with our own domestic macro-economic needs. In the first case shadowing the DM involved accentuating a domestic boom; in the second case our membership of the ERM, at a time when reunification required abnormally tight monetary policy in Germany, involved us in pursuing an unnecessarily restrictive monetary policy deepening and prolonging recession. In that case, too, the formal commitment made exit more difficult, the exchange rate fell very sharply, and we made a very substantial financial loss as a result of massive foreign exchange intervention seeking to defend the ultimately indefensible.

It includes intensified efforts by financial regulators particularly – at the national level but also working collectively through the new Financial Stability Forum, the Basle Committee and IOSCO for example – to improve prudential standards of financial behaviour. And it includes the provision of official financial support to countries that are pursuing sound policies – in parallel with continuing private finance, on which the risks would have been reduced both through the parallel official finance itself and through official international endorsement of the borrowing country’ s policies. In this context I think we in  5  BIS Review 54/1999  the official sector may have placed too much emphasis in international discussions on “bailing in” the private sector – which can sound ominous, even threatening – where what we really need is recognition of our mutual interest in public-private sector partnership. It is a heavy and complex agenda which is being very actively pursued in many different international groupings, involving both the industrial and emerging countries, across a broad front. We are I believe steadily moving towards consensus or many of the issues and this is “leading the way towards sustainable economic growth” into the next millennium. In the meantime we are collectively having to manage the consequences of the recent global financial disturbances and their economic after-effects. Happily we have recently been making progress on that too, particularly in many of the emerging countries here in Asia. BIS Review 54/1999  6
In particular, we cannot rule out here that unfavourable new developments will arise, whether because the worsening infection figures we are seeing during the second wave continue for a lengthy period of time, because it is necessary to resort to more severe containment measures, or because an effective medical solution does not become available in the time frame the scientific community has suggested as most realistic, namely around mid-2021. Should these risks materialise, they would weigh down on the recovery in economic activity envisaged in the above-mentioned scenarios. And we cannot rule out very marked effects as a result of abrupt and potentially non-linear changes in the dynamics of capital markets, the stability of financial institutions or agents’ confidence. Setting aside how the pandemic may evolve, some significant sources of uncertainty remain on the external front. One of these is the possibility that the Brexit negotiations will conclude without an agreement at the end of the transition period, an aspect on which risks currently remain tilted to the downside. A further source of uncertainty concerns future US-China trade relations. Undoubtedly, this matter will be greatly influenced by the outcome of yesterday’s US presidential election, though it is still early to accurately gauge all the ensuing implications. On the domestic front, a significant factor for the Spanish economy, not only in the coming quarters but also in the medium and long term, is unquestionably our ability to mobilise and efficiently assign the European funds available under the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme.

But price controls cannot solve the issue of scarcity, which is often the main cause of high prices. The main disadvantage of capping prices is that price ceilings do not guide consumers to reduce their consumption of the scarce product. This has been the problem with price caps for energy, as it does not encourage consumers to use energy more efficiently, and nor do caps offer producers any incentive to increase supply. The alternative is targeted income support measures, which allow the burden of higher energy costs to be shared within a society. Unlike price controls, these measures preserve price signals and help to steer both demand and supply towards a new equilibrium. The main concern with income support is that it is more difficult to manage. How target groups are selected is a highly political issue and any such measures are an additional fiscal cost, so they need to be temporary and well targeted. In summary Headline inflation is falling in the euro area, but it still remains too far above the ECB's target of two per cent. That measures of underlying inflation are still very high is even more worrisome, as it indicates a presence of more persistent inflationary forces that can be difficult to break. The differences in inflation rates between the member states of the euro area have largely been driven by energy prices and the policy measures taken by governments, and they remain wide.
4  It should also be borne in mind that the Asset Purchase Facility, the vehicle through which the gilts are purchased, is indemnified by the Treasury, while the Treasury will also receive any surplus that results from the transactions. Consequently the coupon payments on the gilts, net of the interest on the bank reserves used to purchase them, is ultimately owned by the Treasury; they are not “lost” to the taxpayer in any sense. 5  Making the monetary financing permanent by cancelling the gilts independently of the economic environment is essentially a step towards a world of “fiscal dominance”, where fiscal policy constrains monetary policy and ultimately determines the price level, as in the classic work of Sargent and Wallace (1981). 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 1: Total stock of UK debt by sector(a) Ratio to nominal GDP  Ratio to nominal GDP 8  2.4  7  2.0  6 1.6  5 4  1.2  3 2  Financial corporations (left-hand scale)  (b)  Non-financial companies (right-hand scale) 1  0.8  0.4  Households (right-hand scale)  0 0.0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  (a) Includes deposits, bonds and loans but excludes derivatives. (b) Includes monetary financial institutions, other financial intermediaries and financial auxiliaries, and insurance corporations and pension funds.

By comparison, we are still in the Stone Age in respect of deploying macroprudential policies. There is lots of scope for academia to help us out here, on both the theoretical and empirical fronts. Even so – indeed, in large part because of that state of relative ignorance – I think one can lay out some key principles that should govern the deployment of the FPC’s tools. It will be very easy for the future FPC, particularly during long periods of tranquillity, to slip into the temptation of neurotically twiddling the dials on its instruments or issuing recommendations left, right and centre. But what will determine the worth of the FPC will be whether it is successful in heading off the really big risks – in other words, avoiding a repeat of the sort of crisis we have just experienced. Ensuring resilience, rather than fine-tuning the credit cycle, must be the name of the game. Second, when the FPC does find it necessary to act, it will need to show resolution in taking the punchbowl away as the party is just getting going. With recent events so fresh in everyone’s memories, this may not seem much of an issue now. But in a decade or two’s time, when recent events have receded into history, such actions will be less welcome. No doubt there will be plenty of people willing then to claim that “this time is different” and that the FPC’s actions are unnecessarily inhibiting growth.
At the end of 2007, it accounted for about 60 percent of the global sukuk outstanding which now amounts to about USD100 billion. The sukuk market has been an important source of financing for productive investment activities, while for investors, it provides great potential for diversification into new asset classes. The issuance of sukuk has not only become a means of raising financing but it also provides access to a wider base of investors, both Islamic and conventional. The Malaysian bond market has also been liberalised to enable non-resident corporations to raise ringgit and foreign currency denominated funds from our market. International issuers may thus issue multi-currency sukuks or alternatively have the flexibility to swap domestic currency funding into other currencies. Stamp duty exemption for ten years beginning 2007 has been granted on these instruments. There is also withholding tax exemption on income earned by non-residents for investments in ringgit and non-ringgit Islamic securities. With the growing maturity of the market, it has been able to efficiently manage significantly large size issuances. Recently, a Malaysian telecommunications company issued the largest-ever sukuk in the world market that amounted to an equivalent of USD4.7 billion. Though the size was large, the issue was two times oversubscribed, indicating the depth of the market. As an investment destination, the Malaysian capital market offers a wide range of world class products. More than 85 percent of the companies listed on the Stock Exchange are Shariah compliant, representing about 60 percent of total market capitalization.

In implementing the road map, it is vital that all stakeholders in the payment system understands the significance of payment systems, their impact on financial stability and take ownership and leadership. Most central banks at some point or other have been owners, operators, catalysts, overseers and users of the payment system. Over the years, central banks have given up their ownership and  2  BIS Review 66/2006  operator’s role and, in some cases, even the catalyst role. Banks and financial institutions and even the corporates should play an important role in shaping the national payment system in Sri Lanka. Let me conclude now by giving an important message. Payment reforms help to adopt best practices by all stakeholders. With or without payment system reforms, banks and financial institutions should be able to meet their payment obligations. Some of the benefits enjoyed by banks and customers over the years will no longer be there under the CIT system. The public too has to make adjustments in their payment practices and ensure that there are funds in their accounts when cheques are issued. All stakeholders should change their past practices and fall in line with reforms which are aimed at improving facilities. Once again, I thank the Royal Bankers Club for inviting me and extend my good wishes for all its future activities. BIS Review 66/2006  3
Households in the Albany region did not accumulate as much debt as did households in the rest of the state and country during the run-up to the crisis. Recent data indicate that the average adult in Albany has about $ of debt, which is about 20 percent lower than the average across the state and country as a whole. Thus, financial strains on many families in the Albany area were lower than in many other places around the state and nation. However, the number of delinquencies did rise significantly during the recession in the area, so it is clear that some households face strong financial pressures. About 4 percent of debt balances currently are 90+ days past due in Albany, which is twice the 2 percent delinquency rate in 2005. Although this is less than half of the rate in New York State or the nation, this doubling of delinquencies in the Albany area still troubles me as a sign of heightened distress for many families here. Stepping back from the current challenges, the capital region possesses a number of fundamental strengths. These strengths show through in some key ways:   Albany is growing. The recent Census shows that the population in the region expanded by 5.5 percent over the past decade, more than double the statewide average. Saratoga County saw an especially strong gain of nearly 10 percent.   Incomes in the region are high. Albany is the state’s most affluent area outside the New York City metropolitan region.

This trip includes meetings with the people at the SUNY Nanotech Center, Global Foundries (an advanced microprocessor plant), the Capital Region Economic Development Council, and the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. At the New York Fed, we continually track conditions in our District, and we have created a number of tools for that purpose. For example, my staff produces monthly indexes of economic activity for New York City, New Jersey and New York State. These indexes are essentially local measures of output – similar to gross domestic product, or GDP at the national level. These measures provide a more complete gauge of activity than the employment report, which is the only other available metric at the state level. We have also started a consumer panel to track local household credit conditions, including the amount and type of debt owed by an average person and whether payments are being made in a timely way. In addition, we have a new poll about credit and financing for small businesses, the latter are an important source of new jobs. The survey asks firms about credit applications and reasons for not seeking credit. Almost 900 regional businesses responded to our May 2011 poll, of which nearly 15 percent were from the upstate region. The next poll will be in January. If you, as part of a small business, would like to participate in our January poll, please pass your card to my colleagues in the audience.
MONETARY POLICY REPORT PRESENTATION BEFORE THE FINANCE COMMISSION OF THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC∗  Rosanna Costa Governor Central Bank of Chile 5 April de 2023  The March 2023 Monetary Policy Report can be found on http://www.bcentral.cl. ∗  Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, senator Ricardo Lagos Weber, senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen, On behalf of the Central Bank I thank this Commission for inviting us to present our views on recent macroeconomic developments, as well as their prospects and implications for monetary policy. This view is presented in detail in the March 2023 Monetary Policy Report, which we have published this morning. This background is also the rationale behind the decision adopted by the Board at yesterday's Monetary Policy Meeting. The presentation of this Report comes at a time when inflation is still very high. Although it has eased from the peaks of the third quarter of last year, it is still four times above the 3% target. Moreover, the core part of the CPI has been around 11% for some time now, accumulating a significant upward surprise in recent months. This is something that cannot be overlooked, as we are aware of the cost that this means for our country's families, especially the most vulnerable ones. There are several factors behind why inflation is taking so long to come down. Most important is that the economy has been unable to reverse the impacts of the overspending it accumulated between 2020 and 2021.

So, it raises the “signal-to-noise” ratio, which reduces uncertainty faced by private agents and strengthens the pass-through from communication to market expectations. Second, transparency is a mechanism for democratic accountability, in a world of policy discretion and central bank independence. Transparency makes it easier to judge whether a central bank is committed to its announced policy, and acts as a check on possible temptations to base policy on short-run or political considerations. In short, communication demystifies and democratises monetary policy. The empirical literature finds that better information about central bank actions can lead markets to do the central bank’s work for it. Blinder et al. (2001) was an early study which found that the US bond market’s ability to forecast Fed actions improved from around 1996 onwards, a few years after the Fed started announcing policy changes and publishing minutes of its meetings. Relatively small changes in the Fed’s policy rate were amplified by complementary movements in the bond market, which helps to stabilise the 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  macroeconomy.
Notable examples are the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the United States, the UK Financial Policy Committee and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the EU. I shall focus in my address on the proposals by the FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which has worked under its guidelines. I shall refer to four broad issues which I consider to be most important in the new regulatory framework being designed. Firstly, the entry into force of the new capital rules known as Basel III, the basic thrust of which, as we all know, is to strengthen banks’ capital; second, the new treatment of systemic banks and the new banking resolution frameworks. Here, I shall comment on potential reforms to banking business models, which we normally call “structural reforms”. And finally, I shall refer to outstanding accounting issues, with significant consequences for bank balance sheet management, geared to achieving the sought-after convergence between US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rules and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) criteria applied in Europe. The entry into force of the new Basel III capital accord One of the key elements of the new regulatory framework is the amendment of the prudential rules governing the banking sector by means of the agreement we refer to as “Basel III”. The adaptation of this accord to the European arena came about just a few days ago with the approval of the new Capital Requirements Directive.

The Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre, or MIFC, initiative, launched in August 2006, has taken Malaysia's liberalisation strategies to a new level with the aim of positioning Malaysia strategically in this new growth area. Islamic banking institutions are allowed to undertake a broader array of Islamic financial activities that include commercial banking, consumer banking, investment banking as well as international currency business under the MIFC initiative. Financial institutions need to consider their own competitive positioning in this area and to have the appropriate strategies to participate in this dynamic growth sector. Finally, the regulatory and supervisory paradigm will also continue to evolve. Indeed, we have over the recent decade witnessed significant global shifts in the approaches to regulation and supervision across many countries. These have ranged from radical policy responses in some countries that led to the introduction of costly regulatory systems to address the problems have emerged, to bold deregulatory measures pursued in other countries, especially during times of exuberance and strong market conditions. A convergence towards the middle ground between these two extremes now seems to be emerging. Two dimensions of regulatory change will be relevant to the context of the new environment. First, the emphasis on creating a strong risk management culture that is fundamental to sound banking operations will become significantly more pronounced. T he transition to Basel II and the implementation of the risk-based supervisory regime are important elements of this change.