samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In order to allow banks to mobilise a larger share of assets for refinancing purposes, the Eurosystem expanded the set of assets that could serve as collateral for central bank credit. Belonging to the same family of tools are the two 3-year Longer Term Refinancing Operations that were announced a little more than a year ago, also to address a funding crunch in solvent banks. As a further step to address the banks’ funding problems and the deep financial fragmentation within the euro area, the instrument of intervening in securities markets was launched. This tool has been available to the ECB since the inception of the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union in 1999, but it was not until 2009 that it was actually used. The first action of this type was the purchase programme for bank-issued covered bonds. In May 2010 the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) took effect, in conditions in which the collapse in the markets for securities issued by distressed governments threatened a renewed wave of chain defaults. The SMP programme was finally superseded by the so-called Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), announced in September 2012 but so far not activated. I will talk more about the OMT later. The standard measures have definitely served their purpose, to maintain price stability. And it is undisputable that the non-standard measures have helped repair the monetary policy transmission mechanism by alleviating funding pressures in banks and thus complementing standard measures.

This correction is painful and requires perseverance of all responsible parties. The reward should be positive results that are now in fact tentatively observable. Third, governance reforms at the level of the euro area and the European Union at large have contributed to an improvement of the foundation for a better performance in future, and this work is still in progress. The multi-layered crisis  When looking at the crisis as it has developed since 2007, it can be helpful to use the metaphor of an iceberg. In each phase of the crisis we have discovered new layers, from the visible tip of the iceberg to the dangerous ice cliffs that linger under the surface – and which, in the economic context, have emerged in the subsequent phases, each time proving to be larger than previously thought. This has challenged policy-makers to acknowledge the real dimensions of the problems, and to adjust their response accordingly. The tip of the iceberg – the liquidity crisis – was revealed in mid-2007 when the US mortgage market, which lay at the basis of a complex, tangled web of globally-held financial derivatives, took a sharp down-turn. This triggered the first case of what we have later come to describe as “frozen” interbank-markets around the world, quite a fitting extension of the iceberg metaphor. The underlying cause was a spike in counterparty risk, due to the obscure distribution of exposures to the risks in the market for subprime mortgages.
By de-politicising the short run trade-off between inflation and activity, this arrangement has provided the grounds for the most successful monetary policy regime for the UK thus far. The MPC’s flexible inflationtargeting framework was further strengthened by the 2013 Treasury Review and the following Remit update which effectively ‘completed the contract’ by further specifying the relationship between the MPC’s primary objective for price stability, and its secondary objective to support jobs and growth. Though, having overseen the 2013 Review, I must declare an interest in judging its contribution. Since then, the Remit has explicitly acknowledged that, in exceptional circumstances shocks to the economy may be particularly large or the effects of shocks may persist over an extended period. In such a period the  1  Carney M (2017), remarks given at a conference to mark 20 years of the MPC’s operational independence, notes that Governor Eddie George once remarked that in the half century that followed the Bank’s nationalisation in 1946 it “operated under legislation which, remarkably did not attempt to define our objectives or functions.” 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  MPC must balance the trade-off between the speed with which inflation is brought back to the target and the consideration that should be placed on the variability of jobs and economic activity.

Stefan Ingves: Evaluation of the Riksbank’s monetary policy and work on financial stability 2005–2010 Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 31 August 2011. *  *  *  The Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) and the people of Sweden must be able to see that the Riksbank is doing its job well. It is therefore necessary for them to have good insight into our work and for the Riksdag to be able to make regular evaluations of this work. The evaluations are also important for the Riksbank to be able to develop and improve its analyses. We have already said on several occasions that we consider it an excellent initiative by the Committee on Finance to regularly commission highly-qualified external experts to evaluate our work. Today, when we are to discuss the second evaluation of this type, I would therefore like to begin by thanking Professors Goodhart and Rochet for carrying out this work on behalf of the Riksdag Committee on Finance. We also welcome the Committee on Finance’s decision to give the evaluators the task not only of assessing how we conduct monetary policy, but also how we manage the task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system, that is, what we have interpreted as our responsibility for financial stability in Sweden.
Our per capita income was then at RM17,600 (2004) per annum compared to RM37,800 in 2016. And yet, our rating remains the 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  same at ‘A-‘. Rating agencies assess sovereign credit risks based on a long term outlook and at most times are reactionary to certain events. This may result in the credit ratings falling behind the curve and not incorporating the latest market developments. For example, Indonesia was only recently upgraded to investment grade by S&P, more than 5 years after Moody’s and Fitch’s gave a similar rating. Market-implied ratings may be a better gauge of a country’s latest credit profile and is already widely used by the market. In the past 3 years, based on bond market yields, Malaysia’s marketimplied rating has at times reached levels that indicate a better rating than that assigned by the rating agencies. Throughout the first half of this year alone, yields for the 10-year Malaysian government securities have swiftly recovered to 3.9% from a peak of 4.5% last November, post-US elections, reflecting higher confidence in the Malaysian bond market. We are currently the largest bond market in ASEAN in terms of percentage over GDP. The Malaysian bond market continues to be resilient and well-functioning. Non-resident holdings of Malaysian bonds have settled at a lower level of 26% compared to its peak of 34.7%.

In this connection, it is worth offering some figures illustrating the scale of this change. Specifically, the Spanish economy’s current account balance has improved by more than 11 percentage points (pp) of GDP since the start of the crisis, turning from a deficit of 9.4% of GDP in 2007 to a surplus of around 2% in 2019. In terms of components, while all captions have contributed positively to this adjustment, of most note has been the correction of the net balance of non-energy goods and of the primary and secondary income balance. The contributions of the latter to the improvement in the total balance in this period were almost 6 pp and 3 pp, respectively. But the energy goods, tourism and non-tourist services balances have also each contributed about 1 pp. As suggested, among the key factors behind this correction of the external balance are the gains in competitiveness achieved in these past ten years. These are estimated to have contributed both to the increase in the structural level of exports and to their geographical diversification towards markets with greater growth potential, thereby resulting in a favourable market-share performance. At the same time, imports have been seen to be flatter in relation to the rise in final demand, despite the momentum of exports in firms and sectors with a high import content. That likewise points to an improvement in the competitiveness of the resident productive sector compared with foreign competitors.
Earlier on I mentioned the importance of governance in the work of the PRA. It is one thing that can help generate robustness in the face of these uncertain developments. Good governance should lie at the heart of every organisation. It is not just about the role of the board but includes management, controls, oversight and management information. Good governance encourages better business practices and outcomes. Of course, well intentioned people can make sub-optimal structures work – just as good structures can be run poorly. But a better structure gives a firm a better chance of avoiding a big business mistake and of surviving an unexpected shock. Insurance retains highly talented and competent individuals. However, I have observed that the sector can be a bit of a “closed field”. I hear some firms – not all – talk of the difficulty in being able to appoint successful executives and even more difficulty in finding qualified, independent non-executives. Insurers also talk about the challenges of attracting young and  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  ambitious individuals to supply the talent of the future. These people issues become particularly relevant in an environment under the Solvency II regime when the system of governance will be given even more prominence. I hope that the new Senior Insurance Managers Regime will be seen as both appropriate and proportionate to the needs of the industry and policy holders alike.

Over time, we would expect countries’ income levels to converge, as currently low income countries catch-up with their high income trading neighbours (Solow (1956)). This convergence process is a well-established empirical phenomenon (Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)). Accompanying this GDP convergence is likely to be catch-up in gross external balance sheet positions. As countries develop, so too does their integration into global capital markets, with higher levels of gross external assets and liabilities. Cross-country evidence bears this out. There is a well-defined empirical relationship between a country’s GDP per head and its gross external balance sheet position (Chart 16). BIS Review 174/2010  9  Taken together, these two factors imply a pattern of steadily rising gross capital flows over time, with growth strongest among countries catching up with their high-income trading neighbours. It is possible to calibrate these integration trends and project them forward to simulate future external balance sheets positions among the major economies. These simulations take as initial conditions cross-country GDP per capita, projected forward using a calibrated rate of growth convergence drawn from previous empirical studies and adjusted for known future changes in population growth. This gives a set of cross-country projections for GDP per capita. These are then translated into gross external balance sheet positions using historical relationships with per capita GDP. Chart 17 plots some projections of (the average of) gross external assets and liabilities relative to GDP for the G7 countries, China, India, Brazil and Russia. These projections go out to 2050.
While these changes may appear to be important, it would be to inflate the wording to characterise them as matters of special importance. When in more critical situations, such as autumn 2008, a need arises for more pronounced changes in interest rate and liquidity policy, the Bank has without a doubt an obligation to submit the matter to the Ministry. There must always be a good flow of information from Norges Bank to the Ministry of Finance. Norges Bank has a special position in public administration. This is expressed, for example, in the instructions section of the Norges Bank Act. While ministries in Norway, in contrast to Sweden for example, can easily issue instructions to their subordinate agencies, this provision sets strict formal requirements for instructing the Bank. This power cannot be delegated by the Council of State to the Ministry of Finance. The Bank shall be consulted in advance and the Storting shall forthwith be notified of the reason for the instruction. Former supreme court justice Carsten Smith has stressed that the Act must be interpreted to mean that this must be set out in a separate report and under full transparency. 39  38  39  The following is stated on page 3 of the recommendation from the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs concerning the Act relating to Norges Bank and the Monetary System etc. (Recommendation No. 50 (1984–85) to the Odelsting: “A new Norges Bank Act should be able to be adapted to various scenarios.

The Asian Leadership Index therefore aims to contribute towards a greater understanding of “what do business leaders in Asia need to do to get more energy and commitment from their most important followers?” As part of the study, selected senior leaders and emerging leaders in companies operating in Asia were asked to describe what their leaders need to do for them as professionals if they were to participate wholeheartedly with that leader, and be fully invested in their organizations over the longer term. They also indicate what they see as missing from the leaders to whom they report. As leadership is about being able to deliver results even in the most challenging of environment, it is therefore also about generating the drive and energy in the organisation, and thus creating an environment in which the best talent will gravitate to, and contribute with the same energy and drive. In an international environment in which high quality talent is scarce, this aspect of the expectations of leadership becomes important. In essence, leaders need to be supported by high powered and committed teams. The expectations of talent is however not only rapidly evolving but may differ when contextualised to different parts of the world. This study undertaken by ICLIF provides insights on such expectations of leaders in Asia and on the areas that need to be addressed if sustainable impact and influence is to be achieved. What then are the findings of the study?
The plenary session will encompass all members of the SRB, which – on top of the ones just mentioned – will include  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  one member appointed by each participating Member State, representing the national resolution authorities.9 The fact that the ECB will be an observer in the Board, with no voting rights, is supported by the ECB. This accurately reflects the need to have the supervisor involved in resolution matters, while maintaining the necessary separation of institutional responsibilities between the supervisory and resolution function in the Banking Union. The decision-making within the Board is designed to enable taking resolution action in the interest of stability within the euro area and of the Union as a whole. In particular, decisions in the executive session should be made by consensus. If the executive session is not able to reach a joint agreement by consensus, the Chair and the permanent members will take a decision by a simple majority. By reaching a decision either by consensus or by a majority, efficient a European decision-making should be ensured.10 Decision-making in resolution It is important that the decision-making process in the SRM allow for timely and efficient decision-making, if necessary, within a very short time such as a weekend. It is therefore welcomed that the decision-making process in the SRM is capable of this, in spite of the fact that it may involve both the Commission and the European Council. Let me describe this process as simply as I can.

[De]Globalisation and inflation Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  2017 IMF Michel Camdessus Central Banking Lecture 18 September 2017  I am grateful to Clare Macallan and Iain de Weymarn for their assistance in preparing these remarks. I would also like to thank Will Abel, Fernando Eguren Martin, Rebecca Freeman, Alex Haberis, Simon Lloyd, Rana Sajedi, Andrej Sokol, Gregory Thwaites, Thomas Viegas, Matt Waldron and Gabija Zemaityte for the background research and analysis they conducted as well as Wayne Chapman, Chris Peacock and Lyndsey Pereira-Brereton for help with the presentation materials. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  I. Introduction During his term as Managing Director, Michel Camdessus oversaw the second great wave of globalisation. The Berlin Wall fell, capital controls were liberalised, the euro was constructed, and China prepared to join the WTO. Product and financial markets became increasingly integrated, with trade growing at an annual rate of 10% and capital flows of 20%. The effective global labour force doubled, and more than a billion people were lifted out of poverty. Central banks are now grappling with one consequence of such enormous achievements – the impact of globalisation on inflation. All central banks must consider the cyclical relationship between global slack and domestic inflation; the degree to which secular forces from globalisation affect local inflation dynamics; and how global factors influence the stance of domestic monetary policy itself.
Any other policy is anti-social, destructive of confidence and incompatible with the working of the economic system”. 8 In the US, these sentiments were echoed in the immediate post-war era by Benjamin Graham, the original “value investor” and yesteryear investment guru to today’s investment guru, Warren Buffett: “A serious investor is not likely to believe that the day-to-day or even month-to-month fluctuations of the stock market make him richer or poorer”.9 And, famously, “in the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine”. Whether an untutored savage, defective telescope or anti-social voting machine, something sounded amiss. Thus far, however, this evidence was largely anecdotal. It was not until the 1960s that the short-termism hypothesis was first tested empirically. This drew on survey evidence from investing firms. It found that investors typically expected full pay-back on an investment within 3 to 5 years. At the time, the average life of plant and equipment was often 10 times that.10 Firms played short even when they desired long. The first quantitative evidence that discount rates might be high began to appear in the early 1970s. For example, King (1972) examined investment in plant and machinery in the UK. Empirical estimates suggested the internal discount rate implied by firms’ corporate investment decisions may be up to 25%.11 This literature failed to catch fire. Starting in the  5  Jevons (1871). 6  Marshall (1890). 7  Pigou (1920). 8  Keynes (1938). 9  Graham (1949).

23 These measures appear to have contributed both to the rapid subsidence of SARS-related fears and uncertainties among the general public and to containing the spread of the disease. Since April 2004, there have been no reported cases of SARS. The global information infrastructure of GOARN is widely acknowledged as having helped nip the SARS crisis in the bud. There are important lessons here for the financial system. At present, risk measurement in financial systems is atomistic. Risks are evaluated node by node. In a network, this approach gives little sense of risks to the nodes, much less to the overall system. It risks leaving policymakers navigating in dense fog when assessing the dynamics of the financial system following failure. The market repercussions of Lehman’s failure were in part the result of such restricted visibility. What more might be done to prevent a repeat? Part of the answer lies in improved data, part in improved analysis of that data, and part in improved communication of the results. On data, in some real-world physical networks, data is collected on virtually all nodes and links. For example, in modelling the US electricity grid, data are collected on all major power stations (nodes) and power lines (links). 24 As these total 14,000 and 20,000 respectively, this is a large-dimension network. Data from physical networks such as the power grid are relatively easy to collect. For many other large-dimension networks, sampling techniques are typically required. These typically take one of three forms: node sampling; link sampling; and “snowball” sampling.
Spencer Dale: Tough times, unconventional measures Remarks by Mr Spencer Dale, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the Association of British Insurers Economics and Research Conference, London, 27 March 2009. I would like to thank Rohan Churm, Alan Mankikar and Tim Taylor for their considerable help in preparing these remarks. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. *  *  *  The UK economy is in a deep recession. Output in the United Kingdom fell at its fastest rate in nearly thirty years in the final quarter of last year, and a similar fall in output in the first quarter of this year appears likely. We are in the throes of a synchronised global downturn, which has spread far and wide. But the darkest hour is just before the dawn. Although immediate prospects appear bleak, the substantial economic stimulus that is underway means that there are grounds for thinking that economic conditions may start to improve later this year. An important part of that stimulus stems from the extraordinary measures taken by the Monetary Policy Committee over the past six months, including our decision to start using unconventional policy measures. Today, I will describe my view of the economic outlook and outline the factors that I believe will spur a gradual turnaround in our economy.

Also on the policy response to the crisis, we have invested in stress-testing to examine how the balance sheet performs under stress, and thus establish whether the bank is robust in terms of its loss absorbency to extreme but plausible outcomes. This is a central part of what we describe as our forward looking judgemental approach to supervision. I have not so far mentioned one other very important part of the post-crisis reform package, namely ensuring that banks can be resolved if they fail. This should be done without recourse to public funds or the disruption of the critical economic functions provided by banks, such as continuity of access to deposits. At the heart of the resolution reforms is the concept of bail-in, which is that private creditors of a bank absorb the cost and provide the new equity to sustain the provision of these critical functions in the event that it suffers large losses that cause failure. There is nothing radical about the concept of bail-in, which is a debt-equity conversion should a trigger event occur. That is consistent with well-established principles of company restructuring. But with banks it has to happen very quickly if the trigger event that the bank is no longer viable occurs. We cannot wait for a lengthy bankruptcy process. TLAC (Total Loss Absorbing Capacity) or MREL (Minimum Requirements on Eligible Liabilities) are used to describe the specific liabilities which banks will be required to maintain to ensure there are enough liabilities which can feasibly and credibly be converted.