samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As regards the first of these goals, we want to build on the major integration projects that have come before and promote the emergence of European initiatives that can strengthen Europe’s payment market. Right now, just one initiative looks capable of providing a satisfactory response to the challenges: the European Payments Initiative, or EPI. With this initiative now under way, we feel that it is vital for EPI to make good on its promises. On the experimental front, the Banque de France is currently conducting a programme exploring the use of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) to settle interbank transactions, to assess to what extent and under what conditions such a currency could make the settlement of financial-asset transactions safer and more efficient, while at the same time preserving the fundamental role of central bank money in the proper execution of these transactions. The Banque de France is also playing a very active role in the Eurosystem work, under the aegis of the ECB, on a retail digital euro. An ECB report published in October 2020 said that the Eurosystem should get prepared for the swift introduction of a retail digital euro should the need arise. The Eurosystem held a public consultation that closed in late January, attracting over 8,000 responses. The input from this will inform the meticulous examination of the reasons, consequences and prerequisites for the potential introduction of a CBDC that we are conducting.

That is because the Federal Reserve has committed itself to supply sufficient reserves to keep the fed funds rate at its target. If banks want to expand credit and that drives up the demand for reserves, the Fed automatically meets that demand in its conduct of monetary policy. In terms of the ability to expand credit rapidly, it makes no difference whether the banks have lots of excess reserves or not. Another source of concern among some market participants has been the Federal Reserve’s purchase of Treasury securities. The worry here is that the Federal Reserve’s purchases are “monetizing the debt” and that therefore these purchases will ultimately prove inflationary. 4  In a world of excess reserves and a positive IOER, either the IOER or the fed funds rate could conceivably be used as the primary instrument of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve would have precise control over the IOER and this would lead to some variability in the actual fed funds rate. This would not be much of a departure from the recent past in which the actual fed funds rate has tended to fluctuate closely around the fed funds target. BIS Review 94/2009  5  Regarding the Fed’s Treasury purchase program, I want to make two points. First, with the fed funds rate constrained at zero lower bound, policymakers needed to find other ways to stimulate economic activity.
However, my suspicion is that one of the answers is that the EU has started concentrating too much – and in many areas almost exclusively – on the process of deeper and deeper political integration. It is almost a mainstream ideology which states that the answer or solution to virtually any problem in the EU is more integration. Whenever we discuss problems with colleagues in Brussels, the mainstream view typically argues: we need more EU integration to solve this. And if integration has not brought what we hoped for, it means we need even more integration. We probably did not have enough of it. Well, I have some doubts about this approach, at least as regards the impact of political integration on the economy. The concept is based on a simple idea that the bigger the state, or the bigger the economy, the bigger also the wealth of the citizens of such a state or economy. This idea fails terribly when compared with simple statistics and facts. If you take a look at the correlation between the size of an economy and a measure of well-being such as GDP per capita, you will see that on average the bigger, or more populous, economies in the world are not generally richer economies. Rather, it is small open economies (including those in Europe) that tend to be richer, the only exception to this rule being the United States. So bigger does not mean richer.

The celebrated Lisbon Strategy has turned into a farce; many of the structural reforms that it outlined would be beneficial economically, but few of them have been realised or at least enforced by the agent, the European Commission. On the other hand, the EU institutions have repeatedly shown an ability to produce bizarre pieces of legislation that would hardly ever be passed at the national level in any given member state. The famous Czech writer Milan Kundera would probably call it the “unbearable lightness of legislating”. So my suspicion is that the EU is now in a position where it is easier to integrate than to liberalise. And these are two different things in terms of long-term economic growth, as I have argued. What a shame for the EU and for us. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 165/2009  3
With the pandemic also affecting global supply chains for goods it’s proved that much harder1. There are still good reasons to think that this rapid inflation in tradable goods prices is likely to fade, and in some cases reverse, before a policy decision taken now could do much to offset it. In contrast, and although Many individual policy makers have discussed these points (I did so in a couple of speeches earlier this year - “Covid and the Composition of Spending” in January, and then “Mismatch” in July). As the MPC we’ve done so in successive Monetary Policy Reports this year (see, in particular, the ‘in focus’ section in the August Report). 1  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  it’s so far contributed much less, the tightening of the domestic labour market is likely to be a more persistent source of inflation. That’s why the MPC has paid close attention to it, and in particular how it’s behaving now that the furlough scheme has ended. As I say, I’ll have a little more to say about these things – whether rapid goods inflation is likely to prove transitory, what people have actually meant by that word, and what we’ve learned about the post-furlough labour market – in a bit. Sandwiched around those points, both at the end and now, are a couple of more general points about monetary policy. These too are familiar but they’re particularly relevant in the current environment and are therefore worth reiterating.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Islamic finance – financial stability, economic growth and development Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Prize Lecture on “Islamic finance – financial stability, economic growth and development”, Jeddah, 27 November 2013. *  *  *  It is my honour to be invited to deliver this lecture on Islamic Finance: Financial Stability, Economic Growth and Development, here in Jeddah. I wish to thank the Islamic Development Bank for the invitation. The Islamic Development Bank has been pioneering and instrumental in the development of Islamic finance and has been an inspiration in driving its progress and evolution. It is indeed a privilege for me to be part of this journey, and to have witnessed the increasing dynamism of the Islamic financial industry amidst a highly challenging economic and financial international environment. Global financial and economic adjustments My remarks today will focus on the relevance of Islamic finance in modern market economies, taking into account the knowledge that we have today about the vulnerabilities of finance, its causes and its wider economic ramifications. Five years on after the global financial crisis erupted, the most pressing challenge confronting the world economy continues to be securing financial stability and generating growth and employment. While regulatory reforms both at the global and national levels have been extensive to strengthen financial systems, there has been less progress on the recovery in growth.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Is France condemned to undergo a period of prolonged austerity? France must be extremely rigorous in the management of its public finances. A balanced budget must rapidly be restored, which presupposes in particular a structural reduction in government spending. Like many other countries, we have been living above our means for too many years. We need to stop accumulating debt. Growth will return if confidence does. And to reinstate confidence, we must guarantee that our public finances will be consolidated. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

From the repeal of the Corn Laws onwards, the UK has acknowledged that impediments to free trade are seldom, if ever, “first best” responses to the many maladies from which market economies can suffer.4 Where the UK has led, others eventually followed. In time, every major advanced economy has come to embrace openness as a strategy to promote the well-being of its citizens. Today, the UK’s trade totals around two-thirds of its GDP (Chart 1). Its external assets and liabilities exceed ten times GDP. And its share of global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is around two times its share of global activity, accounting for the largest share of FDI into the EU (Chart 2). Its openness extends beyond the real economy to the financial economy. The scale, complexity and degree of global activity of the UK financial system are unmatched in the European Union (Chart 3). More foreign banks operate in the UK than any other EU country, and more than half of the world’s largest financial firms have their European headquarters in the UK. The UK has the largest global share of cross-border bank lending, foreign exchange trading, and OTC interest rate derivatives. It has the world’s third largest insurance industry and its second largest asset management industry. The UK banking sector is four times GDP and non-bank financial institutions are a similar size (Chart 4), while financial services accounted for 8% of output and around 3½% of employment in 2012.
This is dictated by the need to strengthen growth potential. Achieving the non-hydrocarbon growth potential will rely on productive investment, notably in the private sector, in a context of continued public investment programme implementation at  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  an appropriate pace, given the constraints imposed by the acuity and persistence of the external shock. The development and dissemination of economic information for the benefit of economic agents, particularly SMEs, is key to better investment orientation. In particular, appropriate ministerial departments should focus on promoting advisory structures to improve the provision of accurate information on investment sectors and markets. Sustained improvement in the business environment is crucial to boost the private sector’s contribution to high and inclusive non-hydrocarbon growth. In this regard, improving investment effectiveness and increasing its impact on employment should be a strategic objective. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Until the beginning of 2012, the path of the SNB’s conditional inflation forecast lies above that of the previous quarter’s forecast. This is attributable to the assumption of higher oil prices compared to the previous quarter and somewhat higher import prices. Assuming an unchanged three-month Libor of 0.25% over the forecast horizon, the SNB expects average inflation rates of 0.9% for 2011, 1.0% for 2012 and 1.7% for 2013. Over the course of 2012, the path of the new forecast is lower than that of March because of the latest appreciation of the Swiss franc and the slightly slower development of international growth. Towards the end of the forecast period, inflation rises briskly and exceeds the upper bound of 2%. This shows that the current expansionary monetary policy cannot be maintained over the entire forecast horizon without compromising price stability in the long term. Due to the risks mentioned previously, the conditional inflation forecast is, however, associated with a high level of uncertainty. Global economic outlook Economic growth continued worldwide in the first quarter, although there were considerable regional differences. As in the previous quarters, the emerging economies recorded the highest growth rates. In the euro area, particularly Germany, the recovery was supported by strong export and investment activity. In the US, by contrast, high energy prices weighed on sentiment and held back growth. In addition, the persistent crisis on the real estate market is hampering the economic recovery. In Japan, there was a significant decline in GDP as a result of the earthquake.
Technological advancements, while also reducing distribution costs, can limit firms’ pricing power by facilitating price discovery by customers. For example, the advent of online retail platforms has greatly increased price transparency among consumers as the share of people searching for information online has risen continuously in the euro area. The downward pressure on mark-ups and, hence, prices associated with the spread of e-commerce is consistent with an erosion of euro area firms’ profit margins, which did not return to their pre-crisis levels until late 2014. Empirical analysis does not, however, find robust evidence that mark-up shocks have been a particularly dominant determinant of disinflationary tendencies since the crisis. In any case, these forces are only temporary: they can move inflation away from its long-run trend, even for a protracted period of time, but cannot affect trend inflation itself, unless they infiltrate inflation expectations. It is through inflation expectations that shocks to the inflation formation process which would otherwise have no relevance for a central bank can become a monetary policy problem. This brings me to the third element in the Phillips curve – its intercept – which is determined by inflation expectations. Inflation expectations In normal conditions, longer-term inflation expectations should be unaffected by transitory shocks, which typically dissipate over the medium term. However, recurrent shocks leading to a protracted period of low inflation can be misinterpreted as a lasting decline in trend inflation, and could jeopardise public faith in the central bank’s commitment or ability to deliver on its objective.

5 See Bobeica, E and Jarocinski, M., “Missing disinflation and missing inflation: the puzzles that aren’t”, Working  Paper Series, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, forthcoming. 6 See e.g. Lyziak, T. and Paloviita, M., “Anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area: recent evidence based  on survey data”, Working Paper Series, No1945, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, August 2016; and Speck, C., “Inflation anchoring in the euro area”, Working Paper Series, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, forthcoming. 7 See Box 7 “The relationship between HICP inflation and HICP inflation excluding energy and food”, ECB  Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, 2016. 8 For a more detailed assessment of the pass-through of our non-standard measures to financial conditions see,  e.g., P. Praet, “The ECB’s monetary policy response to disinflationary pressures”, speech at ECB and Its Watchers XVII conference, Frankfurt, 7 April 2016; M. Draghi, “The state and prospects of the euro area recovery”, speech at the European Banking Congress, Frankfurt, 18 November 2016. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Emerging economies will enjoy  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  sustainable growth in the years to come. Above all, in Europe, the community of nations are willing to face the extraordinary challenges they are confronted with and to build the lasting solutions needed towards greater integration within the Eurozone. Central banks are constantly cooperating in monitoring the situation and acting as they have done recently to provide dollar funding to international banks. This spirit of cohesion is a strong asset. It is deeply rooted in our dual role of preserving monetary and financial stability. BANQUE DE FRANCE is, for its part, strongly committed to overcome this challenge. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

For a start, we can rightfully boast that as a country we have achieved single digit inflation for the second year in a row and we have had no financial institution failures in the recent past. These successes are the result of monetary and fiscal policies that have changed the economic landscape of Zambia. We have been fortunate that the successes have come at a time when we are seeing renewed economic interest in Zambia. Investments in mining and other sectors have significantly increased, and more importantly, the Eastern Province has not been left out. Ladies and Gentlemen, we have been following the developments in Eastern Province with keen interest; hence our visit to see for ourselves what is going on. I must say that we are impressed with what we have been able to find out. It is clear that income levels have risen in the region and this has been driven by the boom in agriculture. This is an encouraging development. One of our primary concerns as policy makers is to ensure that development is not restricted or concentrated along the line of rail. We therefore urge you to use your enhanced income levels to invest in capital equipment so that your productive bases are sustainable. As a country, we are blessed with land and water resources. However, it is only in the recent past that we are beginning to see the value of what we have through improved agricultural output.
Third, substantial progress has been made on the large adjustment of financial positions in the household and financial institution sectors necessary after the substantial leveraging of households and financial institutions that occurred in the run-up to the financial crisis. Confidence is increasing that conditions are now in place to support sustained abovepotential growth, when it occurs.   Aided by the second installment of Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs), financial conditions have improved. After equity prices, interest rates and inflation expectations fell with the apparent slowing of the economic recovery in the summer, they began to move up again shortly after Chairman Bernanke’s speech laying out potential responses to the slowdown in late August in Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Charts 17–20).   The personal saving rate has risen to a level that is consistent with the historical relationship between that rate and household net worth relative to disposable income, reflecting the very large drop in household net worth from the combined impact of financial crisis and severe housing downturn (Charts 21–22).   The household financial obligation ratio has declined to the level that prevailed in the mid 1990s, reflecting a combination of debt repayment, debt charge-offs and lower interest rates (Chart 23). Households in all credit-quality quintiles are continuing to reduce their overall debt (Chart 24).   Banks tightened lending standards during the financial crisis and recession. Bank lending standards, while tight in level terms, have begun to ease (Chart 25).

In fact, on 10 July, 2009, I was privileged to participate at the “Foundation Stone Laying” ceremony for the multi-billion Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited new Head Office building. I therefore, commend the bank for its relentless effort in trying to modernise its facilities and expand its network. Allow me to conclude by appealing to all banks and other financial institutions to explore ways of enhancing the efficiency in service delivery. By enhancing efficiency, banks will be capable of offering more affordable banking services. This has the potential of drawing a larger number of Zambians to the financial system resulting in an expanded banking clientele for the benefit of both the banks and the economy. This will go a long way in complementing the Government and the Bank of Zambia’s efforts in addressing the various weaknesses in the financial sector as well as to guide efforts for realising the vision of a stable, sound and market based financial system that would support the efficient mobilisation and allocation of resources necessary for economic diversification and sustainable growth. In the recent past, the Government has adopted prudent fiscal policies that enabled the private sector to access more credit from the financial system. In line with this, the yields on Government securities have drastically reduced with the 91 days Treasury bill rate dropping to 7.88% in the latest auction while inflation has also trended downwards to 12.3% in October. Some players have responded positively to these market movements by reducing their lending base rates.
Let me now turn to the other side of the coin. Despite the above examples of areas where good prospects may arise for market activity, there are also elements of uncertainty on the horizon, and one of them is Brexit. Brexit On 29 March 2017, the United Kingdom notified the European Council of its intention to leave the European Union. This means that 30 March 2019 is, in principle, the “withdrawal date”. So far, in the draft Withdrawal Agreement, there is no specific regime with regard to financial services and this unquestionably generates a context of uncertainty that affects all market participants. Allow me to focus on how it affects banks. “Wait and see” is not an option. Banks need to prepare. Within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the ECB, together with National Competent Authorities, is trying to communicate, to banks which may be considering relocating their banking activities to the euro area, the SSM’s supervisory expectations on different aspects such as: authorisations and licences to carry out banking activities in the euro area; internal governance and staffing arrangements; or authorisations and use of internal models. These expectations have a key underlying principle, which is the need to guarantee consistency across the existing and the relocating institutions, so that they both operate under the same regulatory, prudential and supervisory standards. There is another key aspect, which is the need to ensure that relocating banks are not empty shells.

However, the situation remains challenging for large sections of the economy – even at the current exchange rate, the Swiss franc is still very strong. We expect it to weaken over time, and fall back to a level more in line with its economic fundamentals. As the data show, economic activity in Switzerland slowed significantly in Q3 2011. Exports, in particular, fell noticeably. In addition to the strong Swiss franc, the general global economic outlook has deteriorated and downside risks prevail. Given this difficult environment, we remain firmly committed to defending the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. This commitment applies at any time, from the moment the market opens in Sydney on Monday to when it closes in New York on Friday. We will not tolerate any trading below the minimum rate in the relevant interbank market. To enforce this policy, we are prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities if necessary. Moreover, we stand ready to take further measures if the economic outlook and the risk of deflation so require. To explain the rationale behind the SNB’s current monetary policy in more detail, let me briefly outline our assessment of the global economic situation, as well as the risks for the Swiss economy. Subdued global economic outlook and substantial downside risks In our global baseline scenario, the outlook remains – overall – subdued. Economic growth will continue to be driven by emerging markets.