samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
My point is that the global conditions for growth will gradually improve and that the course of inflation will normalise. But this depends on decisions made abroad, which govern the real interest rate that we in Sweden have to relate to. Growth conditions in Sweden also depend on the Swedish economy's ability to constantly transform in an orderly manner. Monetary policy can function as a bridge over to a new normal situation. But the new normal will be determined by decisions that are beyond the central bank's control. 3  Another such period, but one in which completely different challenges arose, was the financial crisis 2008–2009. 4  See the minutes of the monetary policy meeting on 10 February 2016 and SvD Andrén Meiton 9 March 2015. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

I am sure that the Hong Kong banking sector will not only survive the process, but also go on from strength to strength in the future. BIS Review 48/1998
Still, there may be a fundamental disagreement between the parties about what was agreed in the first place. It is the inevitability of disputes that makes the existence of dispute resolution systems so universal. Dispute resolution in Islamic finance is gaining more attention these days. I would take this to be a good sign. In a legal system, disputes may be viewed as an indicator of vigour rather than weakness – so long as they are resolved effectively and efficiently. The common law legal system is exemplary in this regard. Today, common law systems are the most widespread in the world, in terms of GDP generated under these jurisdictions . The large volume of commercial disputes resolved by these jurisdictions are a reflection of the widely-accepted strength of the common law legal system in providing certainty to business dealings. Today, legal certainty is widely said to be central to the rule of law . It is important that the law be accessible, clear and predictable. People should be assured that questions of legal right and liability will be determined by rules that meet these characteristics. This is not just crucial for social justice – this ensures a stable environment to facilitate sustained business growth. Of course, legal certainty does not mean that the laws are inflexibly set in stone such that justice and common sense are frustrated. In fact, dispute resolution in a healthy legal system will lead to evolution in the law over time – often with positive knock on effects.

In 2013 a joint venture for production of banknotes was set up by the BNB Printing Works and one of the world’s leading banknote printers François-Charles Oberthur Group, France, and thus Bulgaria became an important player in the banknote industry. It is interesting to note that over its 137-year history the BNB has organised the production, issue and circulation of more than 500 types of coins, including commemorative coins and medals produced by the Bulgarian Mint in Sofia. You know that a few months ago, on 7 December, the new 2 leva coin came into circulation. The design of that coin enjoys enormous public approval. But let’s come back to our exhibition. Along with the coins struck after Bulgaria’s liberation until now, the visitors will be able to catch a glimpse of the history of money on the Bulgarian lands going back centuries. I am convinced that the displayed items can tell a lot about the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  long history and background of the economic and political life on the territory of today’s Bulgaria. I wish much success to this exhibition. I hope many citizens and guests of Burgas will come to see it, to learn more about the money used on the Bulgarian lands, and to feel, as we do today, deep respect for the history and accomplishments of our ancestors. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Michael C Bonello: The adoption of the euro by new member states challenges and vulnerabilities Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the SUERF Seminar organised by the Central Bank of Malta, Valletta, 4 May 2006. The references for the speech can be found on the Central Bank of Malta’s website. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen I would first like to welcome you all to this seminar which has been jointly organised by the European Money and Finance Forum (SUERF) and the Central Bank of Malta. A special greeting goes to our foreign participants and guests, including some fifty members of SUERF from twenty-three countries. The topic chosen for the seminar is particularly appropriate at a time when the ten NMS have just entered their third year of EU membership and are increasingly focusing their attention on monetary union. In these introductory comments I shall, therefore, attempt to highlight some key issues which must be dealt with on the path towards the adoption of the euro. As our policy makers have become acutely aware during the past two years, this path is characterised by manifold challenges and vulnerabilities, not least those associated with real convergence, fiscal consolidation and capital account volatility.

A Transition in Thinking and Action  Remarks given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  International Climate Risk Conference for Supervisors, De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam 6 April 2018  I am grateful to Alice Carr, Edd Denbee, Tanveer Hussain, Carsten Jung, Krish Kistnassamy, Alex Michie, Alex Ntelekos, Dimitris Papachristou and Matt Scott for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is a great pleasure to be here in Amsterdam, at the International Climate Risk Conference for Supervisors, jointly organised by the De Nederlandsche Bank, the Banque de France and the Bank of England. In my remarks, I will take stock of the progress made in addressing climate-related financial risks since the Paris Agreement of late 2015. In particular, I will consider how far there has been a transition in thinking and action. As we’ve heard today, the thinking has coalesced around three channels through which climate risk affects financial stability: -  the physical risks that arise from the increased frequency and severity of climate- and weatherrelated events that damage property and disrupt trade;  -  the liability risks stemming from parties who have suffered loss from the effects of climate change seeking compensation from those they hold responsible; and  -  the transition risks that can arise through a sudden and disorderly adjustment to a low carbon economy. The last risk is the most challenging.
Instead we are focussed on doing what we can to reduce uncertainty and build resilience so that the recovery can be sustained despite the inevitable shocks ahead. We are removing uncertainty with our guidance that interest rates will stay low at least until unemployment has fallen. That will boost demand. By repairing the balance sheets of banks we are putting them in a position to support the real economy. That will promote investment. And by standing ready to use the range of other tools at our disposal, we can help to avoid sowing the seeds of the next crisis. In these ways, the Bank of England is helping the British economy over the threshold and into strong, sustainable and balanced recovery. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

At this time, it may not be possible to move towards this system as there is not enough political support and many operational hurdles remain to be overcome. Nevertheless, it is important for the IMF to continue its work on how to broaden the use of SDR in all aspects of an international currency (i.e. store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account). Ladies and Gentlemen, 10. In closing, I would like to stress that the international monetary system is certainly in a period of transition. I do not expect a big bang, but a long and gradual process arising from macroeconomic and structural adjustments. Policy dialogue and cooperation between current and prospective reserve-issuing countries will play an important role in ensuring this smooth transition. As there are so many uncertainties along the way, it would take great leadership from some advanced and major emerging market economies to move the world forward towards a more stable international monetary system. Thank you  1  The Triffin dilemma is the conflict between domestic and international objectives of reserve issuing country. This is due to its duty to supply the world with extra currency, which may cause a loss of confidence in its currency. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The normalisation phase: sequencing Let me now return to our ongoing monetary policy normalisation process. Our normalisation process entails a sequence whereby interest rate increases precede the reduction in our balance sheet, the so-called quantitative tightening (QT). There are at least two reasons for this. First, we have greater certainty about how changes in the policy rate pass through to financial conditions and to the economy than in the case of QT. Central banks have decades of experience in calibrating a rate hiking cycle to actual and prospective economic conditions, but we have far less experience in reducing the size of our balance sheet from such high levels. Second, monetary policy transmission in the euro area is highly dependent on bank credit. Loan pricing is typically benchmarked to short and medium-term rates. Policy rates are thus a more effective instrument to tighten monetary policy. Let me flag an additional consideration regarding the interaction between QT and interest rate policy. Both QT and interest rate policy affect the overall monetary policy stance. Therefore, the path of policy rates that is necessary to return inflation to its medium-term target also depends on how the central bank is implementing its QT. Going forward, how should our balance sheet normalisation proceed? First, a balance sheet reduction has already started with the automatic phasing-out of TLTRO III operations.

And we will work hard, as we have in the past, to try to find the right balance between the broad objectives of stability and security and the efficiency of the system. BIS Review 59/2004  5
In the words of Cynamon, 2008, “A family, in isolation, might choose a more conservative financial path, but the influence of neighbours, both those who have a physical presence and those whose lifestyles are piped in through the media, drives both consumption and debt higher.”6  4  Reinhart C., Rogoff K. (2010), Growth in a Time of Debt, American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2). 5  Rajan R. (2010), Fault Lines, Princeton University Press. 6  Cynamon B., Fazzari S. (2008), Household Debt in the Consumer Age: Source of Growth—Risk of Collapse, Capitalism and Society, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(2). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Finally, sub-optimal levels of savings and corresponding excessive indebtedness may originate from time-inconsistent preferences that lead human beings to deviate today from behaviour they defined as optimal yesterday. We might, for instance, have planned to save more (and consume less) in the future but – when the time comes – we postpone our plan to save because of so-called “present-biased” preferences.7 This behaviour may result in a reduction of lifetime utility because our “long-run selves” do not appreciate it.8 Already in the 18th century, David Hume wrote “There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote”.9 Mitigate the downsides of financial development What lessons can we draw from this multi-faceted diagnosis?

But it’s true that, economically speaking, Italy is a in a difficult juncture. It is the only euro area country that is experiencing a technical recession. And it has not seen an improvement in the labour market, which is another thing that sets it apart from other euro area economies. In the longer term, Italy’s problem is well known: it is productivity growth. I don’t believe that any of this has to do with the euro, otherwise it would be a general problem across the euro area. The response is to focus on the country’s strengths, such as its small and medium-sized enterprises. And to use the Single Market to leverage their strength and help them export to global markets. Isolation and protectionism don’t work. Europe is an asset for our economies. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  It seems to be difficult at the moment to undertake the much discussed reforms to complete the banking union and the capital markets union. Do you share this impression? Yes, I do, and it’s a concern for the ECB. We firmly believe that Europe is part of the solution in dealing with the problems faced by European citizens. Many citizens in many countries are angry because economic results are not what they should be, because it has taken too long to recover from the financial crisis, because unemployment especially among the youth – is still high and because globalisation has not lived up to its promises, instead increasing inequality and marginalising parts of society.
Here in Norway, we have the link between Komplett.no and Komplett Bank, and between the airline Norwegian and Bank Norwegian. In the global arena, the online retail giant Amazon offers a proprietary payment solution, a credit card in collaboration with a large international bank and a crowdfunding platform. Chart: BigTech is entering the financial market With their technical expertise and financial muscle, BigTech companies can potentially be catalysts for sweeping changes in the financial sector. They are able to bundle a range of services, while making use of the information customers have left behind to target their services more directly to each one.12 By offering financial services, these companies gain access to our payment histories – a very valuable commodity. And with already large customer bases, their proprietary solutions can quickly achieve widespread adoption. Unlike banks, other non-bank service providers cannot create their own financing. Financing costs may therefore be somewhat higher than for banks, especially for new participants that have not built up sufficient trust in capital markets. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that a number of participants that have started as FinTech companies have eventually obtained a banking licence. An example is Klarna, which has many users in Norway. The company has obtained a banking licence in Sweden and has the stated ambition of becoming the Ryanair of the banking industry. Also BigTech companies that offer credit services on proprietary platforms have so far done so in collaboration with existing banks, or by establishing their own banks.

We in the Executive Board will convene for our next monetary policy meeting at the start of December. At that time, we will also have to factor in the information that has been released up to then. 6/6
Lars E O Svensson: Monetary policy after the crisis Speech by Mr Lars E O Svensson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the conference “Asia’s role in the post-crisis global economy”, held at Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 29 November 2011. *  *  *  I thank Claes Berg, Hans Dellmo, Hans Dillén, Anil Kashyap, and Bengt Pettersson for helpful discussions and comments. Carl Andreas Claussen of the Riksbank staff contributed to the paper. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily shared by the other members of the Riksbank’s Executive Board or the Riksbank’s staff. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 there has been a lively debate about what caused the crisis and how the risks of future crises can be reduced. Some blame loose monetary policy for laying the foundations for the crisis. There is also a lively debate about the future of monetary policy, whether it needs to be modified in the light of the crisis, and what its relation to financial stability should be. Here I will discuss the lessons for monetary policy from the financial crisis, the relation between monetary policy and financial stability, the role of monetary-policy instruments other than the policy rate, and some issues for emerging-markets arising from capital flows and exchange-rate movements.

The effects that are attributed to monetary policy should only be the effects the deviation between the short real rate and the neutral rate, not the effects of the whole level of the short real rate, the sum of the deviation and the level of the neutral real rate. The neutral real rate is affected by many things and can be low  4  Woodford (2011) sets up a model where the probability of a financial crisis is assumed to be an increasing function of a state-variable that may be identified with leverage. Furthermore, leverage is assumed to be increasing in lagged leverage and the current output gap and is also subject to shocks. From these assumptions obviously follow a case for tighter monetary policy, “leaning against the wind,” in order to, everything else equal, reduce the output gap and thereby leverage and the probability of a financial crisis. However, the introduction in Woodford’s model of financial-stability instruments such as capital requirements, possibly cyclical ones, would allow leverage to be controlled more directly than indirectly and bluntly by the policy rate via the output gap. Monetary policy would be free to focus on stabilising inflation and the output gap and need not lean against the wind.
Second, economic transformation in response to climate change, as a result of an adaptation and mitigation process, will also require the financial sector to adapt, by managing risk and by exploring opportunities for business. Third, being a prominent sector in the economy, the financial system can also be an agent of change, supporting the adaptation and mitigation process, through its influence on financial resource allocation, through developing supportive financial services, markets, and products, as well as engaging climate change in its own business agenda. Let me elaborate in more details on each of these points, starting with the macro impact and implications for the financial system. Conventional wisdom at this time is that the macroeconomic impact from climate change can be large, but uncertain. For example, estimates from three benchmark studies, as cited by the IMF, point to a mean GDP loss of about 0-3 percent of global GDP for a 3oC warming. In Asia, South and Southeast Asia are to be amongst the regions most likely to experience the most negative effects. Such macro-impact is tantamount to a supply shock on the country’s long-term productive capacity i.e. capital stock and technology, leading to a decline in long-term output growth, higher production cost and inflation, shift in relative price away from carbon-based energy, and a decline in productivity. Some countries may suffer balance of payments problems if they are financially unable to cope with the impact.

Prices rose by around 3 per cent annually for a long period, but since 1995 they have been falling by about 6 per cent annually. This kink point coincides with the dismantling of the restrictions on textile trade and with a period of rationalisation in retail trade in Norway. The rapid growth of production in China, India and other newly integrated economies has led to a substantial rise in demand for oil and other raw materials. At the same time, increased trade has engendered higher demand for shipping services and favourable freight rates for a period. BIS Review 39/2006  1  These changes have provided Norway with increased revenues thanks to a remarkable strengthening of our terms of trade. Prices for imported goods are falling in relation to prices for goods we export. The impact of the rise in oil and gas prices is particularly strong, but the terms-of-trade gains on goods in the mainland economy have also been high. The situation in Norway differs from that of its Nordic neighbouring countries. Sales of Swedish and Finnish high-tech products are growing strongly in terms of volume, but prices are falling. Denmark has a diversified business sector, which is moving on a steady path overall. The high energy prices have contributed to increased cross-border capital flows as income is transferred from oil importers to oil exporters. Consequently, a savings surplus has been building up in oil exporting countries such as Norway.
I consider this criticism to be a little strange and to make too many assumptions in advance. It seems to assume that there is already a framework for macroprudential policy in place in Sweden, which clearly states what instruments are to be used and by whom. Let us assume, for instance, that the Riksbank had held the policy rate at 0.25 per cent up until now, as was the case in the counterfactual experiment I mentioned earlier, and that this had meant that lending to households and housing prices had begun to rise sharply again. Would it really have been obvious how this should have been managed and by whom? Bearing in mind how the risks in this field have been allowed to increase in Sweden over the past 15 years, I doubt that this would have been the case. In other words, I believe we are still a long way from a satisfactory situation. I am quite convinced that for this to work the allocation of responsibility must first be clearly specified and there must be clear guidelines for what should be done. However, a potential framework for macroprudential policy is only under investigation. The Financial Crisis Committee has presented a partial report that was recently circulated for consultation. But it is not likely that a complete solution will be in place in the very near future.

Household debt and housing prices were a fairly hot topic on the Riksbank's monetary policy agenda a relatively long time before the global financial crisis broke out.22 Moreover, Sweden is usually regarded as one of the few countries that has in practice applied a policy that, to some extent at least, "leans against the wind".23 The dominant view prior to the crisis was that central banks should not actively try to counteract the build-up of financial imbalances, but should act forcefully once a crisis had occurred. Instead of "leaning against the wind", they should in other words make do with "mopping up afterwards" – they should "clean but not lean". Trying to take preventive measures was perceived as too difficult and too costly, while it was assumed that it would not be very problematic to quickly clean up after a crisis. After the crisis - greater emphasis on preventive measures There is no doubt that the view has changed considerably since the financial crisis.24 In many countries, the combination of high household debt and a fall on the housing market marked the start of a period of weak demand, high unemployment and very weak public finances – problems that several countries are still struggling with. Cleaning up afterwards proved to be much more difficult than anyone had thought. One lesson from the crisis is thus that one must take much more preventive action and try to counteract a development with rapidly-increasing debt and housing prices.