samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 7/2008  7  Chart 5: Mortgage arrears and possessions rates  Chart 6: Household secured and corporate credit availability Net percentage balances(a) Easier credit 30 Corporate 20  Percentage greater than 3 months in arrears  Percent  Household Secured  7  0.9 0.8  6  10  0.7 5  0.6  0  4  0.5 0.4  -10 -20  3  Possessions (LHS)  -30  0.3  2  0.2  Arrears (RHS)  1  0.1 0 1990  -40 -50 -60  0 1993  1995  1998  2001  2004  2006  Source: CML Back cast data before 1994  Tighter credit  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Reported change, past three months Expected change, next three months Source: Bank of England Credit Conditions Survey  Chart 7: Quoted mortgage spreads  Chart 8: Mortgage product availability (a)  Thousands  Basis point spread to funding rate 250 SVR  Credit impaired Prime  200 150  Bank Rate Tracker 100  5 yr fixed  50 0 2 yr fixed -50 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  Source: Bank of England. (a) SVR mortgages spread over one month lag of Bank Rate; Tracker mortgages spread over Bank Rate; 2 yr, and 5 yr fixed rate mortgages spread over one month lag of 2 and 5 year swap rates.

This is quite understandable. And there is no reason to soft-pedal the fact that the capital controls are harmful to the Icelandic economy. It is difficult to make a sufficiently accurate estimate of the magnitude of the negative effects, and I am not sure that the assessments made thus far would all stand up to close examination. One thing we do know, however: the detrimental effects escalate as time passes. But we must understand the nature and scope of the problem if we are to make a reasonably fair assessment of the time that has passed and of how quickly the controls can be lifted. In this context, I have found it helpful to explain to foreign observers that the collective collapse of Iceland’s three large banks is thought be the third-largest bankruptcy in history. The Lehman bankruptcy was larger, and its settlement is not complete. Our own settlement is taking place in one of the smallest countries in the world and is associated with a severe balance of payments problem, whereas in the case of Lehman, balance of payments problems have relatively little relevance. Another point that I make is that if all of the estates’ króna-denominated assets were added to the current stock of offshore krónur, the combined stock would increase to about half of GDP. Of course, we will not let that happen, but if it did, the new “overhang” would be much larger in proportional terms than the UK’s post-war sterling overhang, which totalled nearly a third of its GDP.
22.10.2020  Closing address to the CNMV Conference on Financial Sustainability The CNMV's activity in the area of sustainable finance Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Good morning everyone. I would like to thank the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), and in particular its Vice-Chair, for kindly inviting me to close this conference on sustainability. I regret not being able to attend the presentations over the last two days, but judging by the topics addressed and the quality of the speakers, I am confident that the conference has been a success. I think that it is difficult to find an aim that is more global or shared more widely than the fight against climate change. Although this consensus has gradually developed over time, it is clear that it has quickly grown recently. Traditionally, this challenge has been addressed through fiscal policies. From a theoretical standpoint, and in the opinion of the Banco de España, these policies continue to be the most suitable for resolving the challenge posed by pollution. More recently, a CO2 emissions trading system has been developed in Europe, pursuing the same objectives of internalising environmental costs, which is currently being revised. Nevertheless, this type of conventional measure has been complemented by other developments. The foremost of these are undoubtedly technological changes and the falling cost of renewable energy production, together with the shift in economic agents' and the public’s attitude and awareness as regards sustainability.

Although equity and property prices serve as important indicators for the future development of economic activity, they are not a goal of monetary policy. Many reasons militate against a direct monetary-policy response to changes in asset prices. The question nevertheless arises as to whether monetary policy could not do more to prevent any speculative bubbles from forming in the first place. BIS Review 53/2003  1
This is one instructive example of how consumer or investor bodies, such as CASE, can play a useful role bringing together and articulating the common concerns of consumers. The second example is structured deposits. Structured deposits have become a popular new investment instrument providing the chance of higher returns than conventional fixed deposits, in exchange for the risk of lower returns if the bet turns out wrong. However, the calculation of returns and risks on such products may be complex. The average retail investor may not understand what the outcome depends on, much less judge the odds of things working out in his favour. Investors may also be misled by the assumption that, being deposits, such products are very safe. Nevertheless, MAS has not prohibited such structured deposits, because that would restrict investor choices and would benefit neither the industry nor the consumers. But under our disclosure-based philosophy, it is important that consumers understand exactly what they are buying. So MAS has proposed guidelines for full and meaningful disclosure of the risks involved, including reasonable illustrations of potential benefits, and clear explanations of any limits on returns. We have also required banks distributing such products to treat these as investment products rather than deposits which can be sold over-the-counter by bank tellers. These guidelines are currently under consultation. MAS will monitor how the market develops to see if further action is required. Going forward, we will produce educational materials to help consumers understand these products better. VI.

News conference  15 December 2022, 10.00 am  Introductory remarks by Andréa M. Maechler In my remarks, I will talk in more detail about the implementation of today’s monetary policy decision, which Thomas Jordan has already touched on. I will start, however, by giving you an overview of how we have steered interest rates since the switch to a positive SNB policy rate in September. The switch from a negative to a positive SNB policy rate required us to make an adjustment to the implementation of our monetary policy in the money market. The new approach comprises two elements: reserve tiering – that is, tiered remuneration of the sight deposits that banks and other financial market participants hold at the SNB – and reserve absorption. This approach has proved successful. Following our monetary policy decision on 22 September, secured short-term Swiss franc money market rates moved quickly towards the new SNB policy rate (cf. chart 1). We are also continuing to see solid activity among participants in the money market, which ensures a robust basis for the calculation of SARON. From the outset, the market responded favourably to the deployment of our monetary policy instruments to absorb liquidity. On the very day of the monetary policy assessment in September, we started conducting repo transactions on a daily basis and issuing SNB bills on a weekly basis (cf. chart 2). In this way, we were able to reduce the liquidity supply in the money market sufficiently to allow us to steer interest rates effectively.
4  BIS Review 3/2007  V.  Involvement of boards, senior management and governance issues  Basel II requires the involvement of the senior management in the process of identification, evaluating and mitigating risks. Does this mean that the senior management and the board members should use some supervisory and monitoring powers to ensure that the technical and other officers continue to engage in risk mitigation activities and that the board is satisfied with action taken by them? When there are several layers of supervision, you might need a liaison officer to communicate with the management and the board. The bank management should address this issue early and avoid serious governance issues. VI. Capturing new risks  When financial market innovation takes place globally, new products such as derivatives, securitization will be introduced and they are likely to bring in new risks including operational risks. How do we balance these new risks with other internal risks, systems, processes and also with supervisory prudence? It is evident that Basel II enables banking to be based on more market driven systems which is conducive to financial innovation and it requires setting aside risk mitigation processes to deal with ever increasing financial innovation. VII. Handling of operational risks  Should banks use stress testing or best practices in handling operational risk? Stress testing is merely a tool which gives results on a reliable set of data.

We have witnessed a process, with no practical solution in sight, involving nationalisations, bankruptcies, bank interventions, the creation of new investor guarantee schemes and considerable curbs on market practices, such as those affecting the short-selling of equities. The list of institutions affected includes most notably: the major investment banks, whose business model has succumbed to the turmoil; the US government-sponsored mortgage agencies; one of the biggest worldwide insurers; and major US credit institutions. In Europe, UK, Danish and Icelandic banks have been involved, as have more recently those from euro area countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany. Moreover, several European governments have announced their readiness to guarantee their banks’ deposits. The foregoing developments pale into insignificance in the face of the importance of the US Treasury’s decision to propose a far-reaching programme whose stated aim is to tackle globally the serious problems besetting the American financial system. The initial appropriation of $ billion for this programme, and its dramatic presentation by the US Treasury Secretary, illustrate the scale of the problem. As you are aware, the plan was finally approved following heated debate in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. Clearly, beyond its effects on specific banks, this unprecedented crisis is profoundly shifting some of the key coordinates that have framed global financial developments in recent decades. An economy such as Spain’s, which has been financing a substantial proportion of its expenditure abroad, can hardly isolate itself from the consequences of such deep-seated changes.
The idea behind deposit protection is to set a level below which the assurance of value holds, and above which it does not. Practice, I would suggest, points to the difficulty of this principle. In seeking to solve too big to fail we have tackled this problem by requesting an additional slice of subordinated liabilities which can explicitly bear losses by being converted into equity in the event of a resolution. I'm not talking here about AT1 securities, but what comes further up the hierarchy – what in Europe we call 'Eligible Liabilities'. The point is that for large banks we have reinforced the assurance of deposits by requiring a bigger cushion of loss absorbing liabilities. But smaller banks find it harder to issue marketable long-term debt securities that can count as Eligible Liabilities. I think the answer here lies in the world of deposit insurance. 3/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The US authorities have announced a review of their deposit insurance system. In the UK, the Bank is also considering improvements to our approach to depositor pay-outs for smaller banks which do not have Eligible Liabilities. Our work has thus far focused on the speed of pay-outs. Going further and considering increasing deposit protection limits could have cost implications for the banking sector as a whole. As with all things relating to bank resolution, there is no free lunch. Two issue areas to go.

We are tracking the situation closely, and will take further steps as these become necessary. Singaporeans must be psychologically prepared for the problem to stay with us for some time. Each of us will have to learn more about the disease, adjust our habits and take sensible precautions, so that we can protect ourselves, our families and the people around us, and carry on with our lives. SARS is not just a medical issue; it is a test of how well Singaporeans can respond collectively to resolve a serious problem facing our society. Synopsis The same ability to respond collectively is critical to our remaking of the Singapore economy. So far the debate on economic reforms has focussed predominantly on Singapore's present situation, and indeed on our immediate problems. We need to take a step back from the close-up snapshots of where we now are, and see our challenges in a historical and international perspective. The story of a country consciously restructuring its economy to adapt to a changed environment is not unique to today's Singapore. It is a recurring theme in world economic history. Tonight, I will explore the challenges of remaking the Singapore economy against the broader context offered by the lessons and experiences of history. In particular, the experiences of Japan, China and UK offer useful insights into the process of our ongoing reforms.
Strong cooperation will not be a panacea, however, as legal and other restrictions on data sharing differ from one jurisdiction to the next, and it is unlikely that all such restrictions can be overcome. But cooperation and legislation to facilitate sharing with foreign authorities appears to be the best available strategy. Significant practical barriers also exist that can, at times, limit the quality of data collection and analysis available to support effective supervision and regulation, which include barriers to sharing data that arise from policies designed to protect privacy. For example, some private-sector databases and bank’s loan books include firms’ tax identification (ID) numbers as identifiers. Mapping those ID numbers into various characteristics, such as broad geographic location or taxable income measures, can be important for effective analysis and can be done in a way that does not threaten privacy. However, as a practical matter, a firm may have multiple ID numbers or they may have changed, but the Internal Revenue Service usually cannot share the information needed to validate a match between the firm and the ID number, even under arrangements designed to protect the confidentiality of the taxpayer information obtained. In addition, a significant amount of financial information is collected by private-sector vendors seeking to profit from the sale of data. These vendors have invested in expertise and in the quality of data in order to meet the needs of their customers, and the Federal Reserve is a purchaser of some of these data.

Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Expanding financial services in Sri Lanka Address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the opening of a new branch office in Jaffna by The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd, Jaffna, 11 February 2010. *  *  *  My dear friends, I am delighted to be here in Jaffna today for the opening of a new branch of HSBC, one of the market leaders in global banking. The history of the HSBC in Sri Lanka could be traced back to 1884, when it first commenced operations in Colombo. Today, the largest foreign bank operating in Sri Lanka has moved to Jaffna bringing banking to the doorsteps of people in the Northern Province. This is indeed a historic milestone. This development did not happen by chance. It did not take place automatically. With the liberation of our entire nation in May last year, the Government and the Central Bank have taken determined efforts to expand financial services, facilitate and stimulate economic activities, and develop infrastructure in the North and the East. In fact, I have personally participated at several bank branch openings during the last few months, and our officers have been following up the progress, and these outcomes are a result of such combined efforts.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  decisively in the event of an excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc. This policy was maintained throughout the first half of 2010. In spring 2010, the news on the state of the Swiss economy turned increasingly positive although the forecast remained fraught with major uncertainties. It was not clear, for instance, that partial unemployment (short-time work) could be reabsorbed without a significant additional increase in the rate of unemployment. The recovery appeared to be on the way but was presumed to remain very fragile. At the same time, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe was causing major tensions in financial markets. In general, markets were commonly afraid that the euro could face long term structural problems, the flight to safe investments was universal and the pressures on the Swiss franc were substantial. The SNB considered that, at that time, the Swiss economy was unlikely to have gained enough strength to be able to withstand a further violent appreciation of the franc. Such a development would have placed the Swiss economy under such severe strains that the threat of a deflationary trend would have again come to the fore. The SNB was not prepared to take this risk; it resisted an excessive appreciation of the franc and in so doing was led to acquire large quantities of foreign exchange.

In fact, over the March to December 2009 period, the Swiss franc depreciated by a little over 2% with respect to the euro and by less than 1% on an export-weighted basis. In December 2009, the SNB updated its view of the economy and decided that some appreciation of the franc would be tolerable but that an excessive appreciation needed to be prevented. It maintained this policy until June 2010. Over the course of this period, while the franc gained almost 8% with respect to the euro it lost about 10% against the dollar. Chart 7 shows that the export-weighted value of the franc increased by approximately 2.5% during this period. After June 2010, the SNB refrained from intervening. Until the end of the year the franc gained around 10% on the euro, 15% on the dollar and more than 10% on an export-weighted basis. What can we conclude from this? We can certainly not conclude that the SNB was not able to hold on its policy, or was “defeated by the markets”. On the contrary, the SNB did what it had announced it would do and thus provided the Swiss economy with monetary conditions that have contributed to a reasonably swift recovery from the crisis and an early return to precrisis GDP levels, while, importantly, assuring price stability. Chart 8 shows the evolution of the Swiss GDP in comparison with a few other industrialized countries.
The Great War broke that trend, however, and both the Scandinavian and the Latin monetary union were dissolved. The EEC, predecessor of the European Union, was established after World War Two primarily as a project for peace. Political integration was the objective, to be achieved in large measure with economic means. When the Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC, was signed in 1957, there was already talk of a need to supplement the economic integration with a monetary union. When these ideas found expression in the 1970 Werner Plan for economic and monetary union, monetary and fiscal policy cooperation were equally prominent. According to the Plan; EMU would become a catalyst for the development of a political union without which it cannot ultimately survive. The currencies of Europe had already been linked up by the Bretton Woods agreement on international monetary cooperation. The Werner Plan extended this with the prospect of a single monetary policy and, in time, a single currency. In the present context it is worth noting that the Plan’s primary thrust was for increased economic coordination, above all the notion of harmonising the member countries’ stabilisation policies in order to avoid tensions. Pierre Werner, prime minister of Luxembourg, and the central bank governors on his committee proposed an economic policy centre that would control national budgets, regional, structural and social policies. The whole process would be crowned by the single currency. When the Bretton Woods system collapsed and the oil crises erupted, national considerations put a stop to the Werner Plan.

Innovative instruments such as the sukuk have attracted interest from both the Islamic and conventional markets. 2  BIS Review 43/2003  One of the central issues towards developing a dynamic Islamic financial industry is the Shariah. The Shariah should always be viewed as an enabler to innovation and creativity, rather than a constraint. On the contrary, innovation and creativity is strongly advocated. Efforts therefore, need to be enhanced to fully appreciate and maximise the true potential and wisdom of Shariah. Thus, there is a need for greater collaboration among the Shariah scholars, practitioners and researchers to undertake in-depth studies and research to originate products. This would provide the fundamental foundation towards developing a dynamic Islamic financial system. An issue that needs to be addressed is the development of a pool of intellectual capital for Islamic finance. The investment in adequate expertise for the development of Islamic financial instruments and services need to be made. In this regard, there is a need for Islamic financial players to intensify efforts in the training and development of expertise in the various specialised areas. Such Islamic financial programmes would benefit from a comprehensive approach, encompassing both conventional banking and Islamic banking, complemented with Shariah. The dynamism of the Islamic financial industry can only be demonstrated through a pool of talent that possesses convictions and expertise in Islamic finance.