samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Joshua Rosenberg: Operational risk management at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Remarks by Mr Joshua Rosenberg , Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 18th Annual OpRisk North America 2016 conference, New York City, 15 March 2016. *  *  *  Good morning. I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to speak at this year’s OpRisk North America conference. Today, I will share my perspectives on operational risk based on my experiences at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York including those in my current role as the Bank’s Chief Risk Officer. Before I begin, I wanted to state that the views I will be expressing are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. As you know, operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or external events. The New York Fed faces operational risks because, like other public and private institutions, it relies on people, processes, and systems to execute its objectives, and, in the same way, the Bank is subject to external events that can impact the effectiveness of our people, processes, and systems. To give you a better sense of the New York Fed as an operational entity, I wanted to touch briefly on the broad range of the Bank’s operations.

Are we finding the right balance in our controls between specificity of rules and the adaptability of principles? These and other questions will continue to focus us on improving and enhancing our policies and practices with the goal of supporting the Bank’s ability to manage risk within its risk tolerance. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
An example of this question in action is the criticism that online video companies have received for making available an anti-vaccine documentary that was directed by the author of the discredited Lancet study on the link between the MMR vaccine and autism. 31 This important principle has been reaffirmed with the creation of UK Research and Innovation. Government is fully committed to the principle that funding decisions should be taken by experts in their relevant areas and […] have ensured this is reflected in the design of UKRI. DfE Higher Education and Research Bill: UKRI Vision, Principles & Governance. 32 These principles also underpin the MPC in which independent experts debate the issues and vote on interest rates based on their best professional judgment. 33 Germany, with a long tradition of prosecuting hate speech, is considering imposing a fine on those that transmit fake news. As a result, Facebook is putting in place a process to flag dubious stories to a fact checker, during which they will not be prioritized by news feed algorithms. Facebook, Google, Buzzfeed and others have joined an industry initiative called Crosscheck which aims to verify content circulating online, with a particular focus on the upcoming French presidential election. 30  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  3.

It shed off 1.3% value against the euro and depreciated by 1.9% vis-à-vis the rand ending the quarter at an average of € and  8  Lusaka, Livingstone, Mfuwe and Ndola. 9  South Luangwa, Mosi-oa-Tunya, Lower Zambezi, Kafue, North Luangwa, Blue Lagoon. BIS Review 148/2010  9  K677.45/ZAR, respectively. The rate of depreciation against the pound sterling was relatively lower at 0.6% with the Kwacha trading at £ With regard to the volume of foreign exchange transactions, a total of $ million was exchanged in the domestic interbank market. From the rest of the market, commercial banks purchased a net of $ million compared to net sales of $ million the previous quarter. Similarly banks made net purchases of € million Euros during the review period. Conversely, banks’ net sales of the South African rand amounted to ZAR729.3 million, higher than ZAR645.3 million recorded in the second quarter. Transactions involving the pound sterling followed a similar trend, with commercial banks recording net sales of ₤2.5 million depicting a reduction over the previous quarter’s net sales of ₤1.7 million. Balance of payments Preliminary data show that Zambia’s overall balance of payments (BoP) recorded a surplus of US $ million during the third quarter of 2010 compared to a deficit of US $ million in the previous quarter. This was driven by the improvement in the performance of both the current account and the capital and financial account balances.
Greater regional financial integration While there has been a high level of economic integration, a more recent development has been the acceleration of regional financial integration. As high savings economies, this would facilitate a more efficient allocation of part of the surplus funds of the region into productive investments in the region. This would contribute towards lower financing costs in the region and reducing the risks while at the same time promoting the economic potential of the region. To facilitate financial integration, the liberalization of foreign exchange rules, the harmonization of standards and the removal of impediments to cross-border investment have been undertaken. The ASEAN Roadmap on Capital Market Development has been formulated to foster alliances and linkages in the equity and bond markets among ASEAN exchanges, including the harmonisation of regulations. In the equity markets, multiple listings are being promoted as regional bourses attract domestic companies in the region to list on their exchanges. The FTSE/ASEAN Index and the FTSE/ASEAN – 40 Index, launched in 2005, also serves to increase the integration of the regional bourses and to promote ASEAN as an asset class. In the bond markets, the Asian Bond Funds (ABF 1 and ABF 2) initiated by the central banks aim to broaden and deepen the regional bond markets. Meanwhile, the Asian Bond Markets Initiatives (ABMI) aims to enhance the infrastructure, which includes plans to develop a regional credit guarantee mechanism, a regional credit rating agency and a regional settlement link to facilitate cross-border transactions.

The Zambia Development Agency will incorporate the recommendations submitted from this exercise into its policy recommendations on how to improve the investment climate in the country. With these few remarks, I wish you good deliberations. I thank you…  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Inflation was much higher in Sweden than in other countries, which resulted in poorer competitiveness. Instead of examining the real problems in the way the economy functioned, Sweden gave in to the temptation to conduct a constantly expansionary policy combined with repeated devaluations of the krona. There were five devaluations between 1976 and 1982. The fixed exchange rate lost credibility and was put under enormous pressure. Following large currency flows and extreme interest rate hikes, the Riksbank was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate system on 19 November 1992. Today the capital markets and capital flows are substantially larger than they were at the beginning of the 1990s. The gross turnover in portfolio flows in Sweden is around 25 times greater now than in 1990. The free movement of capital has made it increasingly difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate. This is evidenced not only by our own financial and exchange rate crisis, but also crises in other parts of the world; the United Kingdom in 1992, the EU’s ERM system in 1993, Mexico in 1995, South East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Turkey in 2001 and Argentina in 2002. When it comes to exchange rate systems, the financial integration in the world economy appears to have in principle limited the alternatives to a floating exchange rate or to an irrevocably fixed rate, for instance through a monetary union or currency board. If we look back a few years, both alternatives appear to have worked relatively well.

The correction reflects the pace of housing construction, which has risen to a high level, at the same time as population growth has shown a marked fall. In addition, the requirements in the residential mortgage regulation were tightened on 1 January 2017. Nevertheless, so far the correction seems to be limited, and house prices have edged back up in recent months. Chart: Key policy rate The key policy rate has now been 0.5 percent for a good two years. The very low level of global interest rates has contributed to the low interest rate level in Norway. At the same time, the Executive Board’s assessment through 2017 and into 2018 has been that there is a continued need for an expansionary monetary policy. The projections for the key policy rate have gradually been revised up as the outlook for the Norwegian economy has improved. Economic activity is now approaching a normal level, and inflation is projected to move up in the period ahead. Our latest analyses, presented in March 2018, suggest that the key policy rate will most likely be raised after summer 2018. At the same time, the Executive Board has given weight to the consideration that uncertainty as to the effects of a higher interest rate suggests a cautious approach to interest rate setting. Chart: Consumer prices Looking at the wider picture, we can, 17 years after inflation targeting was formally introduced in Norway, draw the conclusion that the system has functioned well.
I recognize fully that there can be no return to pre-crisis business as usual – whether on the part of the financial sector or on the part of regulators like ourselves. We must learn from the economic catastrophe of the past few years so that the financial system is able to perform its essential role in supporting economic activity without being a source of instability for the economy as a whole. All in all, there is a lot to keep my colleagues and me quite busy – even in normal times. National economic conditions Now, what is the outlook for and risks to economic activity, employment and inflation in the nation? Since the recession ended in 2009, the economy has grown at a relatively modest pace. Economic growth in the first quarter of 2011 was somewhat softer than anticipated, with the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  advanced reading of real gross domestic product (GDP) – that’s the economic output of the economy – increasing at only a 1.8 percent annual rate. A number of factors contributed to the slowdown. Construction activity fell – likely reflecting the continued large supply of unsold homes – and government expenditures at the federal, state and local levels declined. In addition, real consumption growth (that is, spending on goods and services adjusted for price increases) in the first quarter was slower than in the last quarter of 2010.

These patterns suggest that households in the area are making progress on restoring their balance sheets, but they may not have completed the process. With regard to jobs, employment losses in the area during the 2008–09 downturn were steeper than in most of New York State, although less severe than for the Unites States as a whole. As of the first quarter of 2011, the Hudson Valley had yet to see a clear upturn in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  employment. The private sector has actually seen brisk job gains in the leisure and hospitality sector, and the professional and business service sector added jobs in the Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown metro area. And private-sector employment has held steady in the Kingston area over the past year. Both areas, however, have seen continuing job losses in retail trade and, especially, government employment. State and local government employment has declined by about 3.5 percent in the past year and has weighed down overall job growth in both areas. Unemployment rates in the mid-Hudson valley peaked at 8.4 percent in late 2009 – well below the national peak of 10 percent and moderately below the state-wide peak of 8.9 percent. Nevertheless, as in much of the region and the nation, jobless rates have not retreated much thus far and remain stubbornly high. Thus, the area was severely affected by the recession, but somewhat less so than the rest of the country. The recovery has begun, but some signs of distress remain in housing, credit and labor markets.
BIS Review 39/2005  Before we can draw any conclusions from such surveys, however, we have to adjust these figures for transportation costs as well as differences in taxes and wage costs. Transportation accounts for only a few per cent of the final food price, and the differences in transportation costs between EU countries in turn are so small that they do not have any great significance for the price differences. Nor are transportation costs likely to be lower in Finland, for example, which has a lower price level than Sweden. The differences in VAT on food, however, are considerable. Swedish VAT on food is 12 per cent, and the general VAT rate is 25 per cent, while the rate is between 0 and 10 per cent in several comparable EU countries and just over 19 per cent on average in the EU15.5 If we adjust for the respective VAT rates, the differences in food prices between Sweden and other European countries turn out to be smaller, but the majority of comparable countries still have up to 10 per cent lower prices. In comparisons between Stockholm and other European capitals, too, the price difference averages roughly 10 per cent when VAT is excluded. Payroll taxes in Sweden are clearly higher than in many other countries; employers’ payroll taxes and social security contributions comprise around 15 per cent of GDP while the median in the EU15 is roughly 7 per cent.

Kristina Persson: Why is inflation so low? The example of the retail sector Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at the Nordic Retail College, Norrtälje, 24 May 2005. *  *  *  Introduction Strong forces are affecting the developments in the world economy today. Globalisation and stiffer international competition are having an impact on individual countries' economies in many different ways. In Sweden, this has contributed, among other things, to a very low inflation rate in recent years. The subdued developments in the prices of imported goods partly reflect the integration of countries such as China and India into the world economy. Likewise, the surprisingly robust productivity growth can probably to some extent be attributed to the increased international competition. Also contributing to the low inflation is the increasing establishment of low-price chains in the Swedish non-durables sector in recent years. This increases competition and helps squeeze Swedish food prices. I intend to begin by briefly discussing global structural change in general and thereafter to concentrate primarily on the changes that we are seeing in the Swedish non-durables sector at the moment. Finally, I also intend to touch upon the current economic situation.
Despite the trauma of the global financial crisis last year, there have been no signs of an overall slowdown. According to the US Federal Reserve Board, the notional value of derivatives contracts outstanding at US commercial banks, the leading players in global derivatives markets, grew by more than 30% last year: this is the most rapid annual growth since 1994. The sheer volume of derivatives trading does not say much about their associated risks. These new financial instruments have undeniably helped investors to unbundle their risks. They have promoted investments and generated substantial benefits to the developing countries receiving such investments. However, the availability of derivative instruments has also increased the opportunities for speculation that resulted in significant losses with the downturn in markets during the financial crisis. 3  BIS Review 47/1999  The use of swaps, futures, forwards, and other derivative instruments have enabled investors to take on far greater exposure relative to their capital, and to greatly increase the potential for loss. Market Stability and Highly Leveraged Institutions Let me make it clear that the losses or gains by large financial market participants should not be a concern to regulatory authorities. Nor should the positions taken by individual market participants normally be of any concern. Speculators or investors, in essence, buy low/sell high or sell high/buy low, thereby providing liquidity to markets. However, there are two situations in which the very large positions taken by highly leveraged institutions are of particular concern to regulators.

Michelle Neal: Advances in digital currency experimentation Remarks by Ms Michelle Neal, Executive Vice President and Head of Markets of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Singapore FinTech Festival 2022, Singapore, 4 November 2022. ***  As prepared for delivery Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here with you at the Singapore Fintech Festival. It is exciting to be a part of this gathering of industry professionals, policy leaders, and investors to discuss key developments in the fintech industry. Digital innovation has the potential to benefit the financial system writ large by reducing transaction costs, increasing competition, and broadening access to a wider range of participants. However, harnessing the full potential of financial innovation and related technologies – especially regarding cross-border settlements and payments – will require collaboration across a range of international partners. In my remarks today I will discuss the landscape of digital assets and some of the ways that the Federal Reserve System is engaging in research and experimentation that support ongoing innovation. As always, the views I express today are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Digital Assets and the Federal Reserve We are all experiencing the incredible pace of growth and change within the digital asset domain, which encompasses a range of opportunities and risks.
These often stem from sensitivity to fast swings in capital flows, and break out when economic policy lacks credibility. They can also be caused by a combination of domestic problems and contagion from other countries that are considered to be in similar economic situations. At the same time as the free movement of capital increases the potential welfare effects of globalisation, it entails risks that can only be managed through disciplined economic policy. IMF financing for capital account crises should principally aim to quickly restore confidence in the affected countries’ economic policies. The intention should be that the loans be paid back to the IMF after a relatively short period of time. When a serious crisis is at hand, it is hard to say no to a loan request. At the same time, it is important to counter tendencies towards moral hazard, which in the longer term could result in both riskier economic policies and irresponsible lending from private creditors. This is a genuinely difficult issue. There are no easy solutions. The Nordic-Baltic constituency has argued that the use of the IMF's loan instrument must be based on unambiguous, predictable rules. And that the rules be applied. This has not always been the case, e.g. as regards certain decisions concerning exceptional access, i.e. where the IMF has granted substantial loans without requiring sufficient conditionality. In a number of instances the result has been a longer-term dependence on loans and in several cases recurrent crises as well.

Integrating sustainability factors into own-portfolio management Central banks must send the right signal and lead by example in their investment and disclosure policies. The DNB has signed up to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment. Norges Bank, which manages the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, has advocated a diversification of the portfolio and is implementing a divestment strategy dedicated to selling off some oil and gas stocks. We, at the Banque de France, adopted in March last year a Charter on Responsible Investment for the management of our own funds and our pension portfolios: this means allocating them to socially and environmentally responsible investment funds. With respect to disclosure, in March 2019 we were the first central bank to publish our climate-related risks’ exposures. We are also working to further align our reporting with a TCFD-like approach that would fit the specificities of central banks. We trust our experience will be useful to the NGFS membership in defining some best practices as far ESG investment for central banks is concerned. We can be proud of what we have achieved in 16 months, but it is “time to roll up our sleeves”: the merciless perspective of a more than 2°C world requires us to strive to do better and to do it now. Developing practical solutions now tops the agenda of the NGFS “Season 2”. II. The road ahead for central banks/supervisors and other players too a. Disclosures and taxonomies, two faces of the same coin We are currently facing a chicken and egg dilemma.
As a result of this analysis, and having found it less necessary in the current setting than in the past to reinforce our accommodative monetary policy stance through net asset purchases, the ECB Governing Council decided that monthly net purchases under the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) would amount to € billion in April, € billion in May and € billion in June. This means reducing the monthly volumes for May and June compared with those agreed in December. We also agreed that the calibration of net purchases for the third quarter will depend on developments in, and our assessment of, the economic outlook. In parallel, given the current extraordinary uncertainty, we underlined the data-dependent nature of our decisions and increased flexibility and optionality in the use of instruments. First, we pointed out that we will adopt whatever measures are necessary to fulfil the ECB’s price stability mandate and to safeguard financial stability. This allows us to provide certainty to all economic agents about our commitment to these objectives during a particularly uncertain time. Second, we explicitly stated that, if in the coming months new data support the expectation that the medium-term inflation outlook will not weaken even after net asset purchases have stopped, we will end net asset purchases under the APP in Q3. However, should the medium-term inflation outlook change and should financing conditions be inconsistent with continued progress towards our 2% target, we stand ready to revise the net asset purchase plan in terms of both its amount and its duration.

On the workers’ side, they are undoubtedly losing purchasing power. Indeed, the collective bargaining agreements registered in Spain in January and February this year reveal that wage settlements have reacted moderately to the high inflation environment for the time being. Specifically, in February the wage increase agreed for 2022 rose to 2.3% (from the 1.5% wage settlement for 2021), a percentage clearly below the inflation rates observed in recent months and those expected for this year as a whole. When assessing these figures, it should be borne in mind that the collective bargaining system is highly inertial. The above figures basically reflect the outcome of multiyear collective bargaining agreements over the last two years in an inflationary environment that is very different from today’s. Specifically, the figures for 2022 only include 19 agreements signed this year with a negotiated wage increase of 2.6%, affecting less than 15,000 workers. Therefore, they cannot be considered to offer a true picture of the state of collective bargaining in the early stages of this year. As regards businesses, various pieces of information show that in recent months they have not been fully passing the recent increase in their costs (basically the cost of their energy inputs, but also of other inputs) through to the prices of their products. In this respect, whether as a result of competitive pressures or demand weakness, profit margins appear to have declined recently as a consequence of the current inflationary episode.