samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Many of its customers, aged 75 and over, had invested their life savings into these products but were left with significantly reduced retirement income. Ten years later, the Government agreed to pay compensation amounting to £ billion. But many policyholders and their families suffered over the decade when their fate remained uncertain, and some of those affected were no longer alive to benefit personally from the compensation. Another way to think about this is to consider the importance, at a human level, of what insurance companies do – and therefore, how we would feel about it if an insurer couldn’t make good on its promises. Much of this is about the everyday business of work, family and home, and I have spent some time this year with policyholders to remind myself of this. The most striking thing about talking to a group of policyholders is simply the vast range of insurance needs people have, from burst pipes to with-profits funds. One is also 1  Based on ABI data, as at end 2016. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  struck by how complex people find insurance, and some of the different experiences that can arise. One person I spoke to had a really excellent experience with a UK home insurer. Another’s family had been injured in a motorway pile-up, and was having terrible difficulty trying to find out if the non-UK insurer of the driver who had hit them is or is not solvent.

6  Given the size of the benefit, we should all want to handle this part of the regime very carefully. We are applying particular scrutiny to two areas: first, the internal ratings and spreads on direct investments in illiquid assets, particularly the senior tranches of internal securitisations; and second, the use of financial restructuring to bring new assets within the MA. We have accepted internal securitisations as a means to achieve fixed cash flows. But that does not alter the requirement that the underlying assets must match the maturities of the annuity liabilities. We will of course take a careful and prudent approach to all such activity. We have made a series of proposals to give firms greater confidence about which assets can attract MA, and how we will deal with any breaches. But my message to the firms is: if we ended up in a position where the MA’s fundamental credibility was undermined for the sake of a few marginal items, we would all regret it immensely. Collectively, we need to remain on a sensible path. Conclusion  I began by making the claim, which might sound somewhat outlandish to the uninitiated, that insurance regulation is fun. It is! But it is also a deeply serious business, precisely because the insurance industry plays such a vital role in society.
The UK is undergoing a consolidation of key retail payment systems under a single New Payments Architecture (NPA), aimed at addressing the lack of a common entry point for access and different on-boarding processes for participants across the different systems. Similarly, Australia launched the New Payment Platform earlier this year, which is seen as a key payments infrastructure for the domestic market. Of significance, these developments share common outcomes – to avoid duplication of industry resources, widen network reach and enable economies of scale. Here in Malaysia, pooling of resources at the infrastructure level has been a longstanding strategy for the payment system. As early as 1997, Malaysia had consolidated its three ATM networks to eliminate fragmentation in that segment. More recently, we saw the formation of PayNet which serves as a shared payment infrastructure to facilitate domestic payments. Of note, PayNet will be launching the Real-time Retail Payments Platform (RPP) next week. This will be supported by a National Addressing Database (NAD) that enables users to pay seamlessly and securely using simple identifiers such as their mobile phone, national registration 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  or business registration numbers. At the international level, regulators should also seek to collaborate towards promoting greater harmonisation or centralisation of legal, technical and operational arrangements for payments. These include exploring the adoption of international standards such as the ISO 20022 messaging standard. These standards would enhance compatibility across different infrastructures and pave the way towards greater cross-border interoperability.

But I would make three points in response: First, I would contrast the time taken to agree Basel III and much of the rest of the framework – around 3 years between the start and finish of negotiations – with the best part of 10 years it took to agree its badly flawed predecessor, Basel II. Second, in the light of the transition to the new standards banks in many jurisdictions have already strengthened their capital positions – often it has to be said with some prodding from the supervisors. In the UK, banks are holding £ more capital than prior to the crisis. Globally, there is around $ more capital in the world’s largest banks. Holdings of liquid assets for the major UK banks have trebled and leverage has almost halved. Third, the lengthy transition is designed to ensure that the new standard does not have a procyclical effect, driving banks to deleverage further, to shrink their balance sheets to help meet the new, tougher standards. I should make clear here that I do not buy the argument that if we require banks to hold more capital and liquidity then, inevitably, they will lend less. Indeed, the opposite can be true. As we saw in Japan and see elsewhere, weak banks desperate to do what they can to improve their capital positions – but unwilling to bite the bullet and issue fresh equity – can become zombies of little use to the real economy.
This, together with the changes that have been made, both with regard to the framework for economic policy and our means of working, convinces me that the Riksbank will be perfectly able to manage the challenges that await us in the future. BIS Review 155/2008  7

Allow me to thank you once again for the work and devotion you exhibited over the course of this year. I strongly believe that the truthfulness and objectivity in reporting economic and financial news will continue to accompany you in fulfilling your duty in the coming year. I reaffirm that the Bank of Albania will continue be a transparent institution, ready to provide opinions and assessments as necessary in all public debates related to the performance of our economy and financial markets. A certificate of this commitment and achievement of the Bank of Albania in the communication with the public is the ranking first of the Bank of Albania among all the banks of Central, Eastern and South-eastern countries, for very active pubic communication, 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  in the last report: “Focus on the European Economic Integration” for the second quarter of 2021, published by the National Bank of Austria. Dear guests, The Bank of Albania continues to focus scrupulously on financial education and research considering it a crucial pillar of its activity. They are seen as the foundations for increasing the social-economic development and welfare of the citizens of Albania. From this point of view, I kindly invite you to share together a special moment of this meeting: the traditional ceremony for the Governor’s Award for the Best Diploma. The Bank of Albania for this 15th year ceremony in a raw has selected and valued three scientific works amid all the presented researches by students graduated in Albanian and abroad.
It also prompts incumbents to adapt, pushing them to develop new business models and new activities that ultimately benefit the customers. In this regard, let me highlight the initiatives to develop instant payments in the SEPA area, to facilitate market-based funding and equity financing in the European Union. I would like also to mention that the Banque de France is conducting its own experiments, with the recent creation of a Lab and the appointment a Chief Digital Officer, Thierry Bedoin, who will moderate the first panel of this afternoon’s session. 2. Technological innovation is to be welcomed but the risks should not be underestimated Innovation brings new threats for the financial system that have to be carefully dealt with: First, it raises challenges in terms of fraud and security, given the multiplication of actors involved in payment and financial processes, the higher circulation of personal data as well as the multiplication of potential “points of failure”. These new “cyber” risks are an acute concern for the whole industry, including for a mature technology such as internet card payments which accounts for more than two thirds of all fraud losses on card payments in France. Thus “younger” technologies that may not have been tested yet, such as the blockchain, and might generate new security risks, deserve early and extended scrutiny. Second, it could endanger financial stability over the longer term, as a result of the process of increased automation that we have seen during the last few years.

Christian Noyer: Regulation in the face of global imbalances Opening speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the VIth International Symposium of the Banque de France on “Which regulation for global imbalances?”, Paris, 4 March 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen I am very pleased to welcome you here in Paris to the International Symposium of the Banque de France. As you may know, this symposium is a recurrent event – this is the 6th edition – but this year it has taken a particular significance as it coincides with the French Presidency of the G-20. This presidency occurs at a key moment of the reform of governance and regulation of the global economy. Hence, today’s topic “Regulation in the face of global imbalances” was not chosen at random. However, beyond this proximity with the work of the G-20, I hope this symposium will also provide an excellent opportunity for extending discussions beyond this institutional forum, for strengthening relations between central bankers (there are more than 100 in this room), government officials, business managers and leading academics from around the globe who honour us with their presence today and to whom I would like to extend my warmest thanks. The world economy has experienced major developments over the last two decades. These changes have brought progress – strong growth, low inflation, less poverty – but they have also led to crises.
Unconventional monetary policy measures, including large-scale purchases of government securities, were necessary to deliver effective market rates negative enough to mitigate globally deficient demand. In the UK, forward guidance supplemented such measures, ensuring households and firms could be confident that interest rates would not be raised prematurely, helping to secure the nascent recovery. 4  See Rachel, L and Smith, T (2015), “Secular drivers of the global real interest rate”, Bank of England Working Paper No. 571. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Central banks have also purchased other assets – in some cases using small-scale programmes to alleviate specific cases of market dysfunction, and, in others, larger ones to inject greater stimulus into the economy. By deploying a broad range of ammunition, the economy has been stimulated through a number of channels. Lower policy rates brought forward consumption to today from spending tomorrow – the real interest rate channel. The all-in costs of borrowing were lowered, boosting existing borrowers’ spending power – the cash flow channel. And lower funding costs for banks increased the availability of credit – the credit channel. Lower discount rates and portfolio balance effects supported asset prices – the wealth channel. Currencies’ values fell, boosting competitiveness – the exchange rate channel. And determined central bank action and forward guidance put a floor under inflation expectations and bolstered sentiment – the confidence channel. In this way, central bank actions combatted the worst global downturn since the Great Depression.

Mark Carney: Redeeming an unforgiving world Remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the 8th Annual Institute of International Finance G20 conference, Shanghai, 26 February 2016. *  *  *  The global economy risks becoming trapped in a low growth, low inflation, low interest rate equilibrium. For the past seven years, growth has serially disappointed – sometimes spectacularly, as in the depths of the global financial and euro crises; more often than not grindingly as past debts weigh on activity (Chart 1). This underperformance is principally the product of weaker potential supply growth in virtually all G20 economies. 1 It is a reminder that demand stimulus on its own can do little to counteract longer-term forces of demographic change and productivity growth. Chart 1 Serial growth disappointments Actual GDP growth 2011 Dotted lines = Emerging economies Solid lines = Advanced economies  2012  2013  2014  2015  Per cent 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  0  Source: IMF. That is not to suggest that such stimulus is without value or impact. Accommodative monetary policy can support activity while parts of the economy delever. Monetary stimulus can avoid hysteresis in the labour market. And monetary stimulus can buy time for structural adjustments which shift activity from public to private, external to domestic, and declining to rising sectors.
Markets have become ever more important to people as they bear increasing responsibility for financing their retirements and insuring against risks. The suitability of those decisions will depend heavily on FICC markets. It is therefore vital that they work well. And are seen to do so. The failures of FICC markets Though markets can be powerful drivers of prosperity, markets can go wrong. Left unattended, they are prone to instability, excess and abuse. Markets without the right standards or infrastructure are like cities without building codes, fire brigades or insurance. Poor infrastructure allowed the spark of the US subprime crisis to light a powder keg under UK markets, triggering the worst recession in our lifetimes. –  Poor “soft” infrastructure such as codes of conduct that too few read and too many ignored. –  Faulty “hard” infrastructure like interest rate and foreign exchange benchmarks that were quite literally fixed; and  –  Weak banks whose light capital and heavy reliance on short-term funding created a tinder box. Central banks shared in these failings, operating a system of fire insurance whose ambiguity was anything but constructive when global markets were engulfed in flames. The Bank of England’s general approach was consistent with the attitude of FICC markets, which historically relied heavily on informal codes and understandings. That informality was well suited to an earlier age. But as markets innovated and grew, it proved wanting. Most troubling have been the numerous incidents of misconduct that exploited such informality, undercutting public trust and threatening systemic stability.

Just as the role of a central bank in monetary policy is to take the punch bowl away just as the party gets going, its role in financial stability should be to turn down the music when the dancing gets a little too wild. Still, we should not put all our faith in regulation. It has limits. If the structure of banking creates incentives to take excessive risk then regulators will be overwhelmed by the avarice so vividly captured by Michael Lewis in his book The Big Short. Incentives must be right. One misalignment of incentives today is the implicit guarantee to banks that are “too important to fail”, so that creditors have little incentive to monitor the behaviour of banks because they believe they will be bailed out. This problem is too important to ignore. There is no one simple solution. But we should not shy away from radical reform just because of the opposition of vested interests. So I welcome the setting up of the Banking Commission, with its talented commissioners and a wise and forensic chairman in Sir John Vickers. Let me now return to the quiz question I posed earlier – to what question is 23 the answer? Several plausible answers come to mind. First, 23 is the number of players in England’s World Cup squad in South Africa. Second, it is of course 23 years since England last won the Ashes “down under”.
Yet they all failed to some degree to prevent the accumulation of risks that finally produced the crisis. So it is unlikely that there is a simple answer. Any plan for reform should take into account the nature of financial risk. Why were so many people misled for so long? And was there an inherent weakness in the structure of modern banking? Banks are dangerous institutions. They borrow short and lend long. They create liabilities which promise to be liquid and hold few liquid assets themselves. That though is hugely  BIS Review 32/2009  1  valuable for the rest of the economy. Household savings can be channelled to finance illiquid investment projects while providing access to liquidity for those savers who may need it. But given how risky banks are, it should not be surprising that from time to time they get into trouble. And they have done so regularly since banking began. Confidence in a bank can disappear quickly making it vulnerable to a destructive bank run. If a large number of depositors want liquidity at the same time, banks are forced into early liquidation of assets – lowering their value. And, of course, if banks make sufficient unwise loans to borrowers who do not repay, then that can threaten solvency as well. Banks can of course take their own actions to ensure that investor confidence is maintained. For example, a visible source of liquidity helps.

Part 3 At this point, allow me to offer some reflections on the changing economic and financial landscape for internationally active financial institutions. Asia is host to a diverse group of foreign financial institutions, many of which have a long history and entrenched presence in the region, with strong roots in our local economies. For the most part, these institutions have made important contributions to the development of domestic financial systems and economies. This includes meeting the demands for financial services in areas not being extensively served by the domestic financial system. While the international policy response to the global financial crisis has been extensive and on an unprecedented scale, an area that has not been as extensive is the cross-border dimension of policy making. More specifically, the global financial crisis has highlighted the gaps in the international framework for the regulation and supervision of the cross-border activities of financial institutions. This has generated renewed concerns on the extent to which external shocks might be transmitted to the domestic economies as a result of the presence of such international foreign financial institutions. As part of the international regulatory reforms, significant progress has been made to ensure that systemically important financial institutions have a higher degree of resilience and stronger incentives to reduce their systemic risks over time. This includes through the holding of higher capital, and requirements for all global SIFIs (systemically important financial institutions) to develop recovery and resolution plans.
4/9  In this respect, an agreement was reached at the Euro Summit in December 2018 to establish a common financial backstop for the SRF. This took the form of a credit line provided by the European Stability Mechanism, to be repaid by the banking system itself through its future contributions. The launch of this financial backstop, currently scheduled for 2024, could be brought forward to 2020 if it is considered that sufficient progress has been made to reduce banking risk. Here it is important to note that the percentage of bad loans on euro area banks’ balance sheets has fallen notably in recent years, down to close to 4% of all loans, albeit still somewhat above the pre-crisis level. Likewise, banks’ capitalisation levels have improved substantially; the total capital ratio for euro area banks overall now stands at 18%. A further key aspect for completion of the design of the euro area is the creation of the common European Deposit Insurance Scheme; this would be the third pillar of Banking Union. In my view, it is difficult to believe that, without this third pillar, the first two will be able to guarantee in a credible manner the same level of protection for all depositors across the euro area, irrespective of where they are located. Sufficient confidence to mitigate the risk of large-scale bank runs and the consequent financial fragmentation in severe crisis situations would thus fail to be generated.

This answers to the fact that cyber knows no borders and the significant operational interlinkages between our systems and it reflects the growing dialogue with the US and others as to how best to manage the risk to financial stability from cyber. So it is clear the world has changed; cyber is an ever-present threat. Firms need to stand ready to manage this risk. And just as cyber has changed the world for firms, it has also changed the landscape for authorities; we need to adapt our approach to operational resilience of the financial sector as a whole. Our work in response to the FPC’s recommendation typifies this; but we will continue to work with firms, government and cyber experts to learn and evolve our approach. 7  4  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/fsc/Documents/wakingshark2report.pdf. BIS central bankers’ speeches