samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, we monitor excessive credit card loans to sub-par debtors, excessive foreign exchange speculation, and formation of a real estate bubble. Apart from abovementioned policies, the managed float exchange rate regime helps maintain stability in capital flows. Under this regime, Thai Baht is allowed to move in line with the market forces but gives the central bank ability to influence the exchange rate in the time of excessive volatility. All the mentioned policies have helped to keep the current economy in good balance. Today, capital flows, private sector balance sheets, as well as real estate values remain healthy, which should enable fast recovery. Although the economy is anticipated to recover after private confidence regains, some notable risks must be addressed and closely monitored over next year. One that is worth mentioning is the expected U.S. interest rate normalization after recovery of the U.S. economy, which could lead to capital flow volatility in Thailand. Even with headwind from the Fed’s action of hiking policy interest rate, we anticipate only limited impact on overall Thai economy as the market has already gradually priced in the Fed’s stance since last year. Additionally, our reserves remain high, allowing the economy to be cushioned from the possible outflows of capital. Moreover our managed float exchange rate regime automatically stabilizes against possible volatility. At the same time, household debt, currently at 83% of GDP, requires a long-term solution. While its effect so far remains contained, its risk cannot be ignored.

Public sector borrowing and domestic financial market The draft-budget 2017 envisages domestic borrowing amounting to ALL 19.8 billion. The liquidity situation in the domestic financial market and the low interest rates provide the premises for accommodating the aimed borrowing level. However, the Ministry of Finance and the Government of Albania should give due attention to the even distribution of borrowing and budget expenditures, in order to reduce domestic markets’ volatility. Also, the Ministry of Finance should constantly monitor the absorption of borrowing in domestic financial markets, in order to enable the constant re-calibration of debt instruments with market requirements. *** Concluding, the Bank of Albania would like to present some suggestions, which – in our opinion – would contribute to the process of drafting and implementing the Budget in the future. 4. Suggestions and recommendations 4.1 Forecasting, Uncertainty and Risk Management The forecast on the revenue of the budget – like any other economic forecast – is surrounded by uncertainties and risks. The proper acknowledgment and understanding of this fact necessitates measures to identify and quantify them, and paves the way to effectively manage the possible consequences. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In line with our previous suggestions, Bank of Albania deems that the drafting and implementation process of Budget would benefit from the establishment of alternative budget scenarios, which would be implemented in the event of large deviations from the forecast.
The Islamic corporate bonds stands at RM121 billion, which constituted 55 percent of the total corporate bond market in Malaysia. More recently, a total of 26 new corporate sukuk issues with an aggregate value of about RM23 billion were announced in the first half of 2006, representing 71 percent of the Malaysian domestic market's rated corporate bond issues for that period. The operating environment of Islamic finance in Malaysia has also evolved dramatically. The product range has now expanded into broad array of innovative instruments using contracts beyond murabahah or Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA). In past few years, several new Islamic financial products were introduced which included residential mortgage backed securities, commodity based financing, as well as investment and equity linked product based on musyarakah, mudarabah and ijarah. Recent issuance of Khazanah's exchangeable sukuk is based on musyarakah contract. Malaysia has strong potential to be the centre for sukuk origination as over 60 per cent (USD32 billion) of the outstanding sukuk issuance globally was originated from Malaysia. We have also seen that multi-lateral agencies have begun to tap the Malaysian market and our recent move to liberalise foreign currency denominated financial instruments to be issued out of Malaysia provides a strong catalyst in facilitating the international sukuk market. I would like to urge the industry players to take this opportunity and establish strategic alliance and form syndicates to market these products particularly in view of the growing infrastructure and construction projects being undertaken in the Middle East.

Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir: Brief overview of Islamic banking and finance Speech by Mr Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Official Launch of Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006, Kuala Lumpur, 24 November 2006. *  *  *  It is indeed an honour to be here this morning at the launching of the Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006, organized by the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM). It was exactly five years ago that all of us witnessed the launching of the first Islamic Banking and Takaful Week by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. And now, after those years, Alhamdulillah, we are pleased with the positive impact of the comprehensive awareness campaign in the year 2001 as it has paved the way to subsequent nationwide annual campaigns on financial awareness in Islamic banking and finance. In this regard, I wish to congratulate all financial institutions involved for providing their unwavering support in this virtuous endeavour. Before I proceed, allow me to take this opportunity to welcome our exhibitors, both local and foreign, who will be participating in the Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006. We believe that your participation will benefit the patrons to this expo.
Third, liquidity requirements can be increased to reduce the risk that the firm will have to engage in a fire sale of assets that might deplete its capital. Also, a liquidity buffer gives the firm’s management time to respond to bad events without having to resort immediately to selling assets. Fourth, a lender-of-last-resort can provide a liquidity backstop that makes funding liquidity more resilient. Consider the case when a counterparty is uncertain about how other potential lenders view a firm’s solvency. If there is no lender-oflast-resort backstop, this may cause firms to be unwilling to lend, not because they perceive the counterparty as insolvent, but, instead, because they are worried about what others think. That is, I may be unwilling to lend to you, not because I perceive you as insolvent, but because I am uncertain about how others view your solvency. If I do lend and others don’t share my view, will I be able to get my money back? With a lender-of-last-resort added to the picture, I no longer need to know what others think. As long as the lender-of-last-resort is available, if I am correct in my assessment that the firm is solvent, then I can be assured that I will be paid back. This issue was particularly relevant during the financial crisis when counterparties even pulled back from firms that were widely viewed as solvent. The Federal Reserve stepped in and created funding backstops for a wide array of assets, such as commercial paper and asset-backed securities.

Where a country has transparently been pursuing an unsustainable macro-economic policy, most people find it easy to accept that that country should bear the burden and adjust, painful though that may be. Many people find this harder to accept where, as in the present case, conventional macro-economic policies had, for the most part, been relatively responsible. There were certainly adjustments to macro-economic policy that needed to be made - a more flexible exchange rate regime in some cases, for example, or a somewhat tighter overall macro-economic stance, with perhaps some adjustment between fiscal and monetary policy. And, once the capital outflow had started, macro-economic adjustment had to be harsher than might otherwise have been necessary, in order to re-establish confidence. But there are real dangers in extreme market movements or in excessively severe macro-economic adjustment to contain them. The political and social consequences are all too apparent in parts of Asia; but even without that there is a danger of a vicious circle of domestic default and systemic financial weakness in the affected country. And that could have seriously adverse implications - in terms of both financial and economic knock-on-effects - for the global economy. That, essentially, is why it may be in the self-interest of the international community to attempt to mitigate the market and macro-economic adjustment pressures by providing financial support.
So to round off: Norway and Sweden have followed one another through the centuries, in war and peace, through crises and growth. And we can be thankful that we have succeeded in moving from poverty to wealth and becoming two of the world’s wealthiest nations. Often the central banks have been able to contribute to higher welfare, but sometimes monetary policy has unfortunately been destabilizing. Our joint history is continuing, we have common challenges to face going for-ward. Higher capital and labour mobility throughout the world opens new possibilities to raise welfare even further, but globalisation also require that we try to find common strategies across countries. We can also enjoy our similarities and continue teasing one another when we meet on the sports field. As Sweden now follows its team in Euro 2016, we can’t help but ask, oh where’s Norway? But on the other hand we can expect a lot of teasing from you in the next world cup ski event! BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

The Bretton Woods System became unsustainable as the US began to allow money supply to grow well beyond the gold reserves held by the US Government. When the System collapsed in 1972, the world’s monetary system was converted to a fiat money regime in which major international currencies freely floated against each other. The post-Bretton Woods era represented a new era in which governments would be given more or less a free hand to pursue their national interests and domestic policy agenda without the rigid constraints imposed by a Gold Exchange Standard. Unfortunately, the initial experience under the new regime was far from satisfactory. In my view, financial and macroeconomic stability cannot exist without an effective monetary anchor. For many centuries, the linkage to the precious metals had provided an external monetary anchor. Of course, the Gold Standard or Silver Standard had many shortcomings but it nevertheless provided an externally imposed discipline against monetary expansion. However, under the fiat money and floating rate regime, financial and macroeconomic stability can only be achieved if we have “3 Ds”! What does “3Ds” stand for? The first D stands for “Monetary Discipline”, the second “Fiscal Discipline” and the third “Market Discipline”. Conceptually, the removal of the external monetary anchor in the form of backing by precious metals must be replaced by these three types of discipline. If any of these three disciplines breaks down, then serious consequences or even a financial crisis may occur. Let me address these three disciplines in turn.
FOMC Actions Against this backdrop, the FOMC has taken decisive actions to curb demand, restore balance to the economy, and bring inflation down. Last month, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 4-3/4 to 5 percent, its ninth consecutive increase. In its post-meeting statement, the FOMC said it "will closely monitor incoming information and assess the implications for monetary policy. "4  2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The Committee also said it "anticipates that some additional policy firming may be appropriate in order to attain a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent over time." According to the median projections in the FOMC's March Summary of Economic Projections, the stance of monetary policy remains restrictive this year and next year.5 In addition, the FOMC said it will continue to reduce its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, according to the framework announced last May.6  Economic Outlook Because of the lag between policy actions and their effects, it will take some time for the FOMC's actions to bring inflation down to our 2 percent target. With inflation expectations well anchored, I expect inflation to decline to around 3-1/4 percent this year, before moving to our longer-run goal over the next two years. Turning to GDP, the data flow for the first quarter indicates that the economy continues to expand at a solid pace.

Indeed, throughout this period of high inflation, one of the bright spots is that various measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably well anchored and consistent with our 2 percent target.2  Imbalances Endure Our most important policy tool is the setting of the target range for the federal funds rate, which influences demand for goods and services by affecting borrowing costs. So far, tighter monetary policy from the Federal Reserve and central banks around the world is helping to bring a better balance between supply and demand. Inflation has declined in a number of sectors, particularly for many categories of commodities and goods. In addition, the supply-chain bottlenecks that had constrained the supply of goods have largely dissipated. For example, the New York Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has declined to a level that indicates supply pressures are now actually somewhat lower than normal.3 I hear the same from business leaders from around the Federal Reserve's Second District, who confirm that supply chains have improved considerably. At the same time, data on rents for new leases provide early signs of slowing inflation for shelter. This is important because shelter inflation had been a significant driver of higher inflation over the past year. However, despite the moderation of inflation, imbalances endure, with overall demand still exceeding supply in the economy. This is seen in the inflation rate for core services excluding housing, which has been running around 4-1/2 percent since last August.
2  Rygg, Nicolai (1950): Norges Bank i mellomkrigstiden (Norges Bank in the interwar years), Gyldendal Norske Forlag, p. 98. 3  Sejersted, Francis (1973): Ideal, teori og virkelighet. Nicolai Rygg og pengepolitikken i 1920-årene (Ideal, theory and reality. Nicolai Rygg and monetary policy in the 1920s) Cappelen, p. 51. BIS Review 131/2009  1  2  BIS Review 131/2009  Today we can see that the crisis was amplified by the surprise at how closely financial markets are interconnected. 4 Losses on high-risk US subprime mortgages triggered general distrust in the financial system. Financial institutions began to doubt their counterparties. They did not know whether counterparties held sufficient capital to cover any losses. Even worse, they were uncertain whether counterparties’ counterparties would be strong enough to withstand losses. So they stopped lending to each other. In the interwar period, as described by Rygg, depositors were responsible for the flight of funding. This time, that role was taken by banks’ lenders. Confidence had evaporated. Many banks worldwide had to take losses. The liquidity crisis turned into a solvency crisis. Banks in Norway have also noted that borrowers have experienced problems servicing their loans. However the increase in non-performing loans has been modest compared with the banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. 4  See for example Caballero, Ricardo J. and Pablo Kurlat (2009): “The ‘Surprising’ Origin and Nature of Financial Crises: A Macroeconomic Policy Proposal”. Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas’ Jackson Hole Symposium.

Currently, the amount of spare capacity appears to be close to historical averages, which is not what we might expect when the economy is in such an early stage of recovery from recession. This, and other evidence, casts doubt on the degree of spare capacity in the economy and on how significant this factor will be in dampening inflation from its currently elevated level. 10  Business failures in the recent recession peaked at below 1% of firms, compared with 2.6% in the early 1990s and 1.8% in the early 1980s. 10  BIS Review 134/2010  Another puzzle is a surprising drop in productivity we have seen over the recession. Unusually, the decline in output appears to have been much bigger than the decline in employment when normally we observe the opposite result. In terms of the impact on unemployment, this has been a good thing, helping to dampen the cost of the recession in terms of lost jobs. But this raises further questions about how much slack there is in the UK labour market as the economy begins to grow and generate new jobs. The behaviour of productivity in the recession also raises the question of whether the UK productivity growth trend over the medium term has shifted. If it has, we may make big mistakes basing our assessment of underlying growth on past productivity trends.
Consequently, I am not optimistic that a modified fixed exchange rate regime, such as that pursued in Iceland before the inflation target was adopted in 2001, will be successful.7 In the event that currency union membership is not an option, the question arises whether it would still be desirable to remove the temptation and source of instability represented by a flexible or floating exchange rate, either through a currency board or through unilateral adoption of another currency. The preconditions for such radical steps to be sensible are much farther off on the horizon, however, than EMU membership, should that option become available. There are two primary reasons for this. First of all, recent experience has demonstrated that the provision of central bank liquidity can determine whether a country’s banking system survives a period of extreme stress. It failed to prevent the collapse of the Icelandic banking system, but many relatively healthy banks in Europe and elsewhere would probably have failed as well in the autumn of 2008, with all the economic and social cost implied, if their national central banks had not provided them with liquidity during the turmoil and were it not for cross-border co-operation among central banks. Therefore, I am of the view that unilateral adoption of a foreign currency or a currency board could only be considered prudent if all of Iceland’s largest banks were owned by a strong foreign bank with the financial strength to provide them with liquidity during times of distress.

Conclusion Our banknotes serve as repositories of the country’s collective memory, promoting awareness of the United Kingdom’ glorious history and highlighting the contributions of its greatest citizens. That tradition continues with the new £ As Austen herself advised us “You must learn some of my philosophy. Think only of the past as its remembrance gives you pleasure.” Today, we look forward to the launch of the new £ note, graced by Jane Austen, as we look back to her life and celebrate the joy she has brought, and is yet to bring, to all those who read her work. 7  The advantage of using the engraving, rather than the original portrait, is that it has sufficient detail that it can be used without requiring any alterations to the image. 8 This image is from a drawing by Isabel Bishop (1902-1988), who illustrated E. P. Dutton & Company’s 1976 edition of Pride and Prejudice. 9 Miss Bingley, Chapter XI. 10 Other features of Bank of England banknotes that aid the visually impaired include the tiered sizing of different denominations and bold numerals. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4
This process will be based on the FOMC's "Principles for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet" released in January.6 A key principle is to reduce the balance sheet in a predictable manner primarily by adjusting the amounts reinvested of principal payments received from securities held in the System Open Market Account. I expect that this process of reducing the size of the balance sheet can begin as soon as the May FOMC meeting. Our monetary policy actions, combined with those of other countries, will help bring demand for labor and products in closer alignment with available supply. As this reduction in demand-induced price pressures takes effect and supply constraints gradually ease, I anticipate inflation readings will begin to decline later this year, although this process will take time to fully play out. For 2022 as a whole, I expect PCE inflation to be around 4 percent, then decline to about 2½ percent in 2023, before returning close to our 2 percent longer-run goal in 2024. These actions should enable us to manage the proverbial soft landing in a way that maintains a sustained strong economy and labor market. Both are well positioned to withstand tighter monetary policy. In fact, I expect the economy to continue to grow this year and for the unemployment rate to remain close to its current level. Conclusion These are uncertain times, and the policy questions we face are challenging. But we have learned the lessons of high inflation from the past.

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