samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Eurogiro, based in Europe offers several products for payment transfers through the Eurogiro system to accounts of postal members or to the accounts of third party banks. In addition, Eurogiro provides cash and money order services, Western Union urgent cash, cash on delivery, cheque payments and also bulk and pension payments. The Eurogiro postal network uses Tele Money Order (TMO), which is linked to a two-day cash project using Eurogiro bulking principles. Among their products, cash transfers, card payments and direct debits are also popular. In addition to the postal service, Eurogiro connects with banks, other alliances and financial institutions. Sri Lanka's postal service should explore the possibility of partnering with post office members in the remittance originating countries. Issues relating to remittance transfers Despite the promotional activities, institutional arrangements, favourable legal and regulatory framework, improved payment infrastructure, there still remains several un-resolved issues relating to remittance transfers. The lack of awareness of facilities available through formal channels is a prime factor. The absence of, or ineffective links between banks/financial institutions and migrant workers prior to their departure is another factor, which persuade migrant workers to use informal channels. The lack of transparency of full knowledge of the pricing at the point of sale or at the time of delivery of remittances is another important factor that needs to be addressed early by the formal channels.

Contrary to what we saw during the debt crisis of the 1980s, the problems in Asia were not almost exclusively macroeconomic in nature; even if these countries suffered, all of them, from some deficiencies in this respect, by and large they had long track records of successful economic management. Rather, in a context dramatically changed by a major realignment between the dollar and the yen, and important differences in short-term yields, three other factors helped trigger the crisis: • •  the weakness of their public and private banking and financial structures; an unsustainable accumulation of short-term financing - particularly of interbank lending, which Alan Greenspan refers to as the Achilles’ heel of the BIS Review 43/1998  -2-  •  international financial system - which made countries particularly vulnerable to a sudden shift in market sentiment. and, last but not least, deep-seated problems of governance, corruption, and what US commentators call “crony capitalism”. Together with the macroeconomic problems, these three major factors had to be addressed for our response to the crisis to be pertinent. If you examine our programs with Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia, you will see that we have tried to deal with these factors, and they will have to be taken into consideration in the future in whatever efforts are undertaken to avoid the recurrence of crises. But even that will not suffice.
Commodity prices have also begun to fall, which reduces inflationary pressures not just in Sweden but also abroad. If this development does not reverse, it will make things easier for the central banks, as they will have greater scope to meet the slowdown in economic activity with monetary policy actions. I would like to take the opportunity here to talk about what we can and can't achieve with monetary policy. No one wants the economy to fall into a deep decline or a lengthy recession like the one we experienced in the 1990s. However, Sweden has dearly-bought experiences from the 1970s and 1980s when we tried to use fiscal and monetary policy to stabilise fluctuations in economic activity. These experiences were part of the reason why the Riksbank became independent and the inflation target was established. 13  Special analysis "Negative Productivity Growth: Causes and Implications for the Period Ahead", The Swedish Economy, August 2008, National Institute of Economic Research. BIS Review 121/2008  5  The problem with rising commodity prices is a result of high demand that has arisen after the long growth period the world has just undergone. Perhaps this problem has been aggravated by the fact that many countries subsidise food and energy. Now we are in a situation where some adjustment is probably needed. A stimulative monetary policy that allows inflation expectations to soar would possibly help the economy out of the current growth slump in the short term.

In February this year the interest rate was raised by a further quarter of a percentage point to 3.25 per cent. At the most recent monetary policy meeting on 3 May we decided to keep the repo rate unchanged. At the same time, our assessment was that the repo rate will need to be raised gradually, which we had also assumed earlier. Now we believe that it will need to be raised more than was anticipated in February. This is necessary so that inflation will develop in line with the target. The main reason why we need to revise our forecast upwards is the outcome of this year’s wage bargaining rounds. The central wage agreements have been slightly higher than we had earlier had reason to believe, given that unemployment is still quite high in Sweden. Some forecasters have believed in a higher interest rate path than we have predicted. However, this does not appear to be because their forecasts for wages or fiscal policy have differed substantially from those made by the Riksbank. I would also like to point out that so far there are no dramatic differences in our picture of current economic developments today compared with February. We will return to this in the Monetary Policy Report to be presented in June with a more detailed account of how we view the situation.
An important lesson is to continue to strengthen our resilience and buffers, especially during the good times. A World of Contrasts: Bankers as Active Stakeholders, Not Passive Bystanders The banking sector has been a central pillar of strength for the Malaysian economy. The industry can play a more positive role by engaging positively in conversations on economic and financial issues confronting the country. As I have experienced in the last one year, the chamber of conversation on the economy could be further expanded. Narratives on the economy and the industry continue to be shaped by external parties, drowning out the occasional whispers from the banking industry. Given the central role of banks in the economy, bankers have the equivalent of a box seat to provide an informed view on developments in the economy and financial system. Rather than being onlookers, the banking industry should weigh in on domestic economic discourse. From sectoral issues to macro trends, bankers’ perspectives would provide additional viewpoints and enrich assessments by the public and financial community, and help address gaps between reality and perception that have too often dominated the public conversation. It is therefore timely for our bankers to participate more actively in the economic discourse to shape a more balanced narrative. Bankers should be proactively offering solutions to some of the pressing economic and financial issues facing the country. A positive voice for socioeconomic change can help instill greater public trust in the role of the banking sector in nation building.

Conclusion This conference’s organizers have put together an excellent program that addresses many of the points I have touched upon – from international financial stability, to capital market integration, to financial crisis resolution, to IMF governance. In these and other areas, work is underway on a medium-term strategy that will guide the IMF’s priorities and decision-making over the next few years. Your discussions will therefore provide valuable insights for that medium-term strategy, which we hope to finalize by the time of the 2005 Annual Meetings in September. Subsequently, I anticipate that the debate on longer-term issues, relating for instance to global governance and the future structure of the international monetary system, will continue, both within and outside the Fund. I look forward to your contributions to that debate as well. Thank you once again for your presence and participation in this symposium. As we consider how the IMF can best serve its membership and the world, it is indeed a great privilege to be able to tap into your wealth of experience and knowledge on some of the issues that lie at the heart of our institution’s mandate. BIS Review 43/2005  5
A UNODC consultant, Mr. Simon Goddard, was here in Freetown recently to conduct a “needs assessment” and it is in line with this assessment that the UNODC/GIABA and the Bank of Sierra Leone are now hosting this workshop. We sincerely hope that at the end of this workshop, participants would benefit from the experience of the facilitators and will be able to put together a National Strategy on Money Laundering Prevention, and will also provide the basis for the effective operations of a FIU. Monitoring cash transactions is a mammoth task because Sierra Leone primarily is a cash based economy where a significant number of transactions far exceed the statutory cash reporting requirements of the Central Bank. The sale of diamonds is especially conducted in cash, mainly U.S. dollars. Policing of the porous borders and the long coastline for smugglers is another big challenge particularly with the inadequacy of manpower and other logistics. I believe however, that as a country, we will be up to the task and that is why the Bank of Sierra Leone is doing all within its powers to attract the necessary assistance from our development partners. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my singular honour to declare this workshop open. In doing so, let me once again use this opportunity to thank all our development partners, particularly the UNODC and GIABA.

In the West Africa sub-region, the principal sources of money laundering are from the illegal exploitation of natural resources especially in mining, and to a large extent the proceeds from corruption. Concern over Money Laundering is growing because of its perverse effects on the socioeconomic environment and its close links with organized crime. Armed with the immense financial resources at their disposal, money launderers can compromise persons and institutions to acquire economic, social and political power. The ten-year rebel war that officially ended in 2002 sadly illustrates the threat and problem that Money Laundering poses to emerging economies like Sierra Leone’s. The AFRC and RUF using a network of criminal gun running organizations to finance their activities completely destabilized our nation politically, socially and economically. Diamonds obtained by forced labour from the nation’s diamond fields (blood diamonds) played a significant role in fuelling the rebel war. Although the war ended in 2002, the environment wherein criminals can launder their ill-gotten fortunes still prevails today because Sierra Leone is characterized by the following socioeconomic features:•  A large and porous border that gives ample opportunities to criminals who can sneak in and out undetected. •  A large informal sector which is extremely difficult, if not impossible to regulate. •  The preponderance of cash in the payment system due to low level of development and outreach of the financial system. •  Corruption. •  The presence of valuable minerals (gold and diamonds), which are easy to smuggle.
This will be positive as long as we can avoid the defaults we saw at the beginning of the crisis, which were created by vehicles that were opaque and complex and impossible for investors to understand. EUROWEEK: At the same time, presumably French banks should not be discouraged from using the skills of their derivatives technicians, which are recognised throughout the world? Noyer: I agree completely. That is why I have been reticent about the idea of separating investment banking and retail operations. I don’t think that is an appropriate concept. We live in a world where medium-sized and large corporates require access to bank lending for a large number of banking activities but also for market operations. Exporters, for example, also use the markets to hedge their risks – so they’re re-shaping the risk on their balance sheet by changing the structure of their liabilities or their assets if they have claims arising from trade. For all these activities and risks, giving corporates access to banks which are able to respond to their entire commercial and investment banking needs is crucial for the development of the economy. On the other hand, what we don’t want to see is banks embarking on proprietary trading which is totally disconnected from their banking activities. The ideal approach is to have a clear separation between what we in France call "purely speculative activities" – in America they would call it "prop trading" – and what is useful for the financing of the economy.

To this end, the HKMA will be working with the universities and the other stakeholders to make sure they are aware of the knowledge and skills needed by the banking industry, so that graduates are prepared to thrive in this ‘brave new world of banking’. 31. For more than 50 years, HKIB has played a key role in nurturing talent and professionalism. Your membership is growing at a phenomenal rate. Your rich programme of courses, seminars and special events offers continuing professional development that is directly relevant to the transformations I have described this morning. Today’s conference is one of 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  the highlights of the banking year. My colleagues and I look forward to sharing with you, and learning from you as the day progresses. We wish you every success in the year ahead. 1 The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. 2 Open Application Programming Interface. 3 Environmental, Social and Governance. 4 Hong Kong Association of Banks. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
I have now described the fault lines in cross-border banking, both at the global and the EU/EEA level, and how they burst open in a particularly violent form in the case of Iceland. But what is and what should be done about this? The problem with giving a precise answer to this question is that what needs to be done at the national level will depend on what is ultimately done at the global level, and for countries that are part of the EU single market it also depends on what is done at that level. In turn, necessary reforms at the EU or global level are put in place partly to avoid national responses that would unduly fragment the international financial system or, in the case of the EU, undermine the single market and the eurozone. Bearing in mind that circularity, let me start at the national level. The key issue here is that, as long as global risks and EU flaws are not dealt with, individual countries are forced to take action to protect themselves: action that might contribute further to the retreat of cross-border banking and financial globalisation more generally. Such action might take the form of restricting international activities of home banks, placing much stricter prudential limits on foreign currency maturity mismatches, limiting FX lending to unhedged parties, and deciding that deposit insurance shall be paid only in the local currency.

How innovative is an ECB allowed to be, which as a start-up from the year 1999 is in many ways itself an innovation, and as a custodian of a currency without a state can only partly be compared with other central banks. Of course I can only give you today, less than a week before our ECB Governing Council meeting, some general reflections from my personal point of view. I think we can all readily agree that innovation cannot be an end in itself. The ECB must and will act only in accordance with its mandate. Price stability is the guiding principle of our actions. The definition of our mandate does not allow for innovations. Moreover, in uncertain times of crisis a clear focus is not less, but doubly important. Central banks therefore have a particularly strong understanding of tradition, and for a good reason: monetary policy is all about trust, reliability and consistency. Innovative measures must therefore be judged against our mandate of maintaining and creating price stability. As with any decision, innovation demands a sober analysis of the costs and benefits, the opportunities and risks. Allow me to slip briefly into legalese: innovative monetary policy measures, too, should be suitable to achieve their objective. Since monetary policy measures also have side effects, a central bank should use the mildest means to achieve the fewest possible side effects. Low inflation rates and the catalogue of measures So what does this mean for the current situation? Unanimous monetary policy can and must maintain price stability.
We could deliver results, on matters like model approval, on reporting, on the enhanced role of the consolidating supervisor, even on supervisory disclosure. Therefore, I very much support the work which is under way in fora such as CEBS in these areas. After a few months of existence the work done is already very encouraging. And I think that by making rapid and real progress, we can also promote greater convergence beyond the EU, as others may find our experiences of benefit to the wider search for greater international consistency in the implementation of Basel II. 5. Concluding thoughts  Over the rest of the day, we will hear additional perspectives from bankers and supervisors regarding the realities of the work ahead for all of us as we prepare to adopt and implement the new capital framework. In thinking about the preparations that all of us must make, we might recall the words of the Spanish author, Miguel de Cervantes. In his world-renowned novel Don Quixote de la Mancha, he wrote nearly 400 years ago that, “To be prepared is half the victory.” In my remarks this morning, I have tried to highlight why I have great confidence in this victory. It will no doubt require that we continue to dedicate our resources, our staff, and our talent to realise the benefits of Basel II in the coming months and years. Those benefits extend to much more than simply a more favourable capital requirement for qualifying individual banks.

Second, in Switzerland - as, incidentally, also in Japan - the so-called BalassaSammelson effect probably also plays a role. It rests on the fact that the productivity trend in the internationally active part of our economy proved to be much more vigorous than in the less competitive domestically-oriented sectors. It remains to be seen whether, and if so, to what extent, the deregulation of various formerly protected areas of our economy will cause this effect to disappear. The upside trend of our exchange rate development, however, is not really a problem. This is evidenced by the remarkably strong performance of the export sector since 1973 as well as by the favourable trend of our terms of trade which showed an average improvement of 0.8% per year. On the contrary: the appreciation is a clear sign of the confidence placed in our currency. It has a positive effect on prosperity since the purchasing power of a given income in Swiss francs increases in the wake of falling import prices. By contrast, the individual periods of massive and prolonged deviations from the trend proved to be a serious handicap for macro-economic development. No doubt, such shocks are a major stability risk for our open economy even if, fortunately, they are a rare occurrence. Conclusions for monetary policy Let me now turn to monetary policy, focusing first on recent developments followed by some long-term considerations. The pattern of the 3-month Libor rate illustrates how we have proceeded since the euro was launched.
Data on new orders suggest that output is likely to fall sharply in the first quarter of 2009 as well as in Q4 of last year; further declines in output, if not at the same pace, are likely beyond then. The widening margin of spare capacity will act as a significant drag on costs and prices. Coupled with the deflationary impact of falling commodity prices and the cut in VAT, CPI inflation will continue falling over the year and may go well below the target rate of 2% despite the impact of sterling’s depreciation on import prices. With its inclusion of mortgage interest and other housing costs, the change in the RPI is expected to turn negative. The downturn itself has set powerful contractionary forces to work. Over-indebted households and companies will be pulling back on spending to try and pay down those debts. Although the recent falls in commodity prices will help to mitigate some of the downward pressure on household income, rising unemployment is not only constraining the spending of those losing or not finding jobs but is likely to boost precautionary saving across the household sector. And falling property prices are reducing activity in the housing market and the construction sector. With credit hard to come by, companies will find it difficult to fund new investment projects and few companies would be likely to invest large sums of money even if they could raise the funds. Commercial property prices are still falling rapidly.

Conventional mortgage rates have dropped from around 6 percent in early 2004 to around 5 percent recently. Other factors could also be raising housing’s fundamental value. For example, recent changes in tax laws may be having an effect. In 1998, tax rates on capital gains were lowered and the exemption from capital gains taxation for housing was raised to $ Both of these changes would reduce the potential tax bite from selling one home and buying another. Another development, which may be making housing more like an investment vehicle, is that it’s now easier and cheaper to get at the equity—either through refinancing, which has become a less costly process, or through an equity line of credit. Both of these innovations in mortgage markets make the funds invested in houses more liquid. So there are good reasons to think that fundamental factors have played a role in the unusually high price-to-rent ratio. But the bottom line here is fuzzy. It’s very hard to say how big a role these factors have played, so we don’t know how much remains unexplained. Frankly, even the best available estimates are imprecise, and they don’t definitively answer the question: Is there a bubble, and if there is, how large is it? Given this uncertainty, my focus as a monetary policymaker is on trying to understand what kind of risks a drop in house prices would pose for the economy. One of the classic ways to do this is to ask “What if…?”—in other words, to pose a purely hypothetical question.