samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Central banks or their government shareholders enjoy a steady stream of profit from the issue of currency in the form of notes and coin - the so-called seignorage. It is noteworthy that the public’s demand for currency has been much less affected over the years than one might have expected by the emergence of successive new forms of non-cash payment such as cheques and cards. And personally I would doubt whether the development of cyberpurses, cybercash and cyberpayments would have much impact on cash in circulation, at any rate in the near term. But suppose I am wrong. Suppose there is a complete revolution such that cybercash, including electronic stored-value cards, substantially displaces physical currency within a few years. How should central banks react? In such circumstances, central banks would lose an important source of income and would have to find ways of replacing it. Perhaps some central banks would lose their financial independence and become dependent - or more so than hitherto - on subvention from the government budget. But in a broader sense they should welcome the development because it would be evidence that the economy as a whole was enjoying a more efficient and less expensive means of money holding and transmission.

Of course, last year the fall in the oil prices was also beneficial for the trade balance. On the financing side, the financial flows were large enough to cover the current account deficit and to provide additional reserve accumulation. It is important to note that FDI inflows continued to flow in the economy, with their ratio to GDP being kept stable at 3.3% of GDP. Yet, the largest part of the financing flows came through the government borrowing at the international market, at rather favorable terms, pinpointing the perception of the investors for sound fundamentals and rather prudent policies in the Macedonian economy. Observing the inflation path, it more or less resembled the inflation pattern elsewhere, with the falling food and energy prices pushing prices down. The average headline rate for 2014 was mildly negative (–0.3%), while the core inflation albeit slowing down, on average remained positive. The inflation adjustment is perceived as temporary, driven by supply-side factors, and without any risks to become entrenched in the inflation expectations and to jeopardize the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  economic recovery. The fact that the negative output gap has been narrowing and the fall of the prices has been significantly slowing down in the first months of this year, just support the former notion. Domestic financing through the banking sector significantly increased in 2014, with credit market recovering much faster compared to the previous years.
Financial integration is a strong complement to trade integration and a critical component of the overall AEC project. Deeper financial integration will yield substantial benefits for ASEAN economies. •  It will support economic growth by helping to mobilise surplus savings more efficiently and channelling them to productive investment opportunities in the region. •  It will strengthen resilience to external shocks by helping to deepen and broaden capital markets. •  It will promote financial inclusion by helping to expand the reach of financial services to a wider community that is currently under-banked and under-insured. The ASEAN Financial Integration Framework (AFIF), adopted by ASEAN Central Bank Governors and endorsed by ASEAN Finance Ministers in 2011, envisages a more integrated financial region by 2020. AFIF sets out the following key thrusts: •  remove restrictions to the intra-ASEAN provision of financial services by ASEAN financial institutions;  •  build capacity and infrastructure to develop and integrate the ASEAN capital markets  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  liberalise the flow of capital across the ASEAN region  •  harmonise payments and settlements systems  •  strengthen capacity building, regional financing arrangements, and regional surveillance  The pace of financial integration has, however, lagged behind trade integration. In part, this is deliberate. In part, this is disappointing. The slower pace is deliberate in the sense that financial integration is more complex than trade integration and requires more time.

•  We should harness technology to support the pooling of data in regional and global data centres. •  Data aggregation will help enhance consolidated risk management and ensure better protection of customer data. Insurance integration In insurance, ASEAN member states have agreed on an ASEAN Insurance Integration Framework. •  ASEAN members have agreed in-principle to liberalise the cross-border supply of Marine, Aviation and Goods in International Transit (MAT) insurance in the seventh package of financial sector commitments of the AFAS. •  When this agreement is signed and ratified in 2016, insurance companies will be able to offer MAT insurance across ASEAN’s borders. •  This move will help to lower the cost of insuring cross-border business risks and help to spur intra-ASEAN trade. The next key steps will be to liberalise the catastrophe insurance and reinsurance markets. •  ASEAN’s insurance penetration rate is barely half the global average, even as the incidence and severity of natural catastrophes in ASEAN continue to increase. •  This large and widening gap in insurance coverage leaves ASEAN countries vulnerable to economic loss and production disruptions from natural catastrophes. •  As risk exposures grow in scale, size and complexity, they will exceed the capacity of individual states to underwrite the risks confronting their communities and economies. Liberalising ASEAN’s insurance markets will reduce the cost of insurance protection to governments, to businesses as well as to consumers.
Mario Draghi: ECB press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 12 January 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. Let me wish you all a Happy New Year. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council. Based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the Governing Council decided today to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged, following the 25 basis point decreases on 3 November and 8 December 2011. The information that has become available since early December broadly confirms our previous assessment. Inflation is likely to stay above 2% for several months to come, before declining to below 2%. At the same time, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains moderate. As expected, ongoing financial market tensions continue to dampen economic activity in the euro area, while, according to some recent survey indicators, there are tentative signs of a stabilisation in activity at low levels. The economic outlook remains subject to high uncertainty and substantial downside risks. In such an environment, cost, wage and price pressures in the euro area should remain modest and inflation rates should develop in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon.

We trust in democracy in freedom, in human rights. We trust in the fact that market economies are the best way to produce goods, services and prosperity. And our future will depend on the people of Europe. It is the free will of our democracies which will shape Europe in the long run. And at the ECB we are very proud to be already an executive institution; we are the “avant-garde” of Europe. DIE ZEIT: Do you understand the French desire for a stronger role of national concerns in Europe? Trichet: I am not speaking of any particular nation. All European nations are members of the European team. And the success of Europe is the success of the team. DIE ZEIT: Perhaps the President of the ECB has to play a more political role in the next years than you want to... Trichet: Communication with the large public opinion, with all our fellow citizens is certainly one of the most important issues for all who care about the Unity of Europe. DIE ZEIT: Chancellor Angela Merkel wants European rules to protect Europe from sovereign wealth funds. Do we need protection? Trichet: These funds, like all new phenomenons, have to be studied and carefully observed. On the other hand the principle of free circulation of capital at the level of the global economy has been beneficial for all economies concerned. DIE ZEIT: The euro is at an all time high vis-à-vis the Dollar and the Yen.
This work goes under the name of T-LAC, or total loss absorbing capacity. I find it reasonable to believe that there will be an agreement on a consultative document to be published in the context of the G20 summit in Brisbane. So, viewed against the broad regulatory reform agenda put in place as a reaction to the crisis, it is fair to say that we are indeed seeing some light at the end of the tunnel. The main pieces are starting to come in place. Unfortunately, concluding the post crisis reform agenda does not mean that we can lie down, relax and declare “mission accomplished”. We need to look closely at the regulatory framework, remind ourselves of the reasons we put these measures in place, and ask whether they are delivering the right outcomes. And here I would like to focus on the interlinked issues of implementation and calibration. Let me start with some reflections on implementation. For some time now, the Basel Committee has engaged in the process of monitoring and assessing how members implement what has been agreed by the Committee. The assessment work is carried out on a jurisdictional as well as on a thematic basis. In the jurisdictional assessment we look at how Committee members have implemented the Basel standard – determining whether or not it is a fair reflection of the Basel III  6  4  Source: Shareholder Report on UBS’ Write-Downs. BIS central bankers’ speeches  requirements.

This worked fine during the Great Moderation, but unfortunately with the collapse of Lehman Brothers another old truism suddenly came to life: “markets function the worst when you need them the most”. Against this background, it is quite embarrassing that so few could see the crisis coming. From a regulatory point of view, all the ingredients were there, or rather they were lacking. And this is the first point I want to make – the regulatory framework was unsatisfactory and becoming more so the more complex the financial system became. Then, turning to my second point, which is: The costs of financial crises are huge. This is true in general, but especially so for the recent one. For example, according to a recent study by  1  2  The figure SEK 17,000 =1,000,000*50%*3,4%, where 3,4% is the implied minimum core Tier 1 capital requirement under Basel I. The risk-weight for mortgages was 50% during this period. Under Basel II the implied minimum core Tier 1 capital requirement fell from 3,4% to 2% of risk-weighted assets, and was 2% in 2011–2012 when banks’ internal average risk weights for mortgages was 6%. SEK 1,200 SEK = 1,000,000*6%*2%. For more information see Sveriges Riksbank (2013) Financial Stability Report 2013:2, November, pp 21–24. BIS central bankers’ speeches  IMF economists, in a sample of countries representing just over 50% of world GDP, the total amount of government recapitalisation, asset purchases and guarantees during the period 2007–2011 amounted to nearly $ trillion.
The latest economic data and survey information suggest tentative signs of a stabilisation at very low levels, after a first quarter which was significantly weaker than expected. The world economy, including the euro area, is still undergoing a severe downturn, with the prospect of both external and domestic demand remaining very weak over 2009 before gradually recovering in the course of 2010. This assessment incorporates a number of adverse developments which are likely to materialise over the coming months, such as a further deterioration in labour markets. At the same time, available indicators of inflation expectations over the medium to longer term remain firmly anchored in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates at levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. A cross-check with the outcome of the monetary analysis confirms that inflationary pressure has been diminishing, as money and credit growth have further decelerated in recent months. Against the background of these developments, after today’s decisions we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. All in all, since the intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008, the Eurosystem has taken a series of measures that are unprecedented in nature, scope and timing. As a consequence, we have observed a clear decline in key money market interest rates that euro area banks typically use as benchmarks to reset floating rate loans and price new short-term loans.

This very significant advance in terms of financial regulation should not obscure the progress that still needs to be made regarding the work underway, especially in the areas of market infrastructures (including for commodity markets), tighter regulation of activities included under the designation the “shadow banking system” and the behaviour of market players themselves. Once again, I underscore our collective responsibility, which is to ensure that all of the G-20 countries and, more widely, the international community as a whole apply international standards. Today’s discussions will be divided into four sessions. The first, chaired by Axel Weber, will examine the notion of disequilibrium after the crisis and will allow us to discuss the unpredictable evolution of global imbalances in the medium term, in the light of different assumptions concerning economic growth and savings trends in the different zones. Mario Draghi has agreed to chair the second session that will focus on questions related to supervision and coordination. As I have already said, the current context is characterised by the reform of global governance and regulation, a process given impetus by the G-20. Therefore, at this stage, it seems appropriate to explore topics such as the evolution of the role of international financial institutions and the accomplishments and future progress in harmonising global financial regulations. The third session, chaired by Michel Camdessus, should help us to gain further insight on what could, or should, be the role of central banks in a post-crisis environment.
Luis de Guindos: Integration and convergence - from the peseta to the euro Remarks by Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at an event in honour of the 40th anniversary of the Spanish constitution, organised by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Madrid, 18 December 2018. * * * This month marks 40 years since Spain began writing the most optimistic chapter of its history1. On 6 December 1978 the Spanish people did more than just vote in favour of a democratic country that would uphold the values of the rule of law and equality. Our support for the constitution also laid the foundations for Spain to modernise its economy and become an integrated part of the European family. In addition to safeguarding fundamental rights and civil liberties, Section 38 of the constitution states that “free enterprise is recognised within the framework of a market economy” and confirms that the public authorities guarantee its exercise. In practical terms, this meant Spain would align itself with the western model of parliamentary democracy, based on a market economy and free competition and underpinned by the social rule of law. A little more than a year later, negotiations began for Spain to join the European Economic Community, a historic milestone that would be achieved in 1986. But this wasn’t an easy road to follow.

The arrival of the euro also had a positive effect on growth, in spite of the serious difficulties during the crisis. Since 1999, GDP per capita has been growing at 1.2%, which is 0.1% higher than in the other euro area countries and much higher than during the early years of our democracy. Recently, some people have tried to blame the euro for the length of the financial crisis in Spain and have advocated control over monetary policy interest rates and exchange rates. What they 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  often forget is that being a member of the euro area enables Spanish households and businesses to benefit from lower real interest rates, lower inflation rates and reduced macroeconomic volatility, all of which boost productive investments and make a vital contribution to the sustainability of public finances. Furthermore, it is not true that structural currency devaluations solve economic crises. Devaluations are short-term measures. In the long term, the competitive boost they provide is eroded by the higher inflation they cause. And, in a complex system of global production chains like the one we have today, devaluations can make it harder for businesses to plan. The euro is also the second-most important currency in the international monetary system3, which strengthens Spain’s credibility in a global context. It’s true that the crisis revealed significant institutional shortcomings in the structure of the monetary union, but it’s equally true that European countries have taken this on board and carried out substantial reforms.
A measure of success is not how much paper we buy, but whether providing a backstop assists the functioning of the market. The Bank’s second facility is in some ways more interesting in the context of the debate about MMLR. We are acting as a back-stop buyer of sterling corporate bonds, by regularly holding auctions in individual securities. To protect against risk, the Bank sets (and updates)  24  Many of them by Willem Buiter. 25  Cecchetti S G (2009), “Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference, 19-20 February 2009. The quote is from the slides used at the conference. BIS Review 67/2009  11  reserve prices, which draw on CDS spreads, models of risk etc as well as qualitative information. The amounts we offer to buy in each auction are small. The objective is explicitly catalytic. It is to reduce the inventory risk run by bank market-makers in the securities, and to reduce liquidity risk for market participants more generally. Perhaps the best way to think about it in the abstract is that it is akin to our stepping into the market with a narrower bidoffer spread than private sector intermediaries would otherwise offer, with a view to those very same dealers bringing their bid-offer spreads inside ours and to investors reducing the liquidity premium they require.

Analogously, in significant degree financial stability is about safeguarding the stability of private money (deposits held by households and firms with the banking system) relative to central bank money. Depositors with banks have to be confident that they can exchange their deposits at face value for our money – our notes; or that they can smoothly transfer their deposits to other banks where they could be confident of that. Those two formulations amount to much the same thing, as transfers between banks are settled across our books in central bank money, the economy’s ultimate settlement asset. 5 At the level of the system, we need an “exchange rate” of unity between private money and central bank money. And we need wholesale funders of banks to be confident of that too. Absent that stability and confidence, the payments system and credit creation become severely disrupted, with big social costs. Of course, banks are not the only lenders in our economies. The current crisis owes a lot to the non-bank financial sector – funds, conduits, SIVs, securities dealers, and so on. But the excessive leverage and maturity transformation in the shadow banking system was in general predicated on the plentiful availability of credit on too-easy terms from the  maintenance period. For more details see paragraphs 74-81 of “The Framework for the Bank of England’s Operations in the Sterling Money Markets (the ‘Red Book’)”, Bank of England. 4  Ibid., paragraph 166.
Zamani Abdul Ghani: Building a progressive takaful sector in the overall Islamic financial system Keynote Address by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 2nd Seminar on Regulation of Takaful, Langkawi, 23 February 2006. *  *  *  Bismillahirrahmanirrahim. His Excellency Dr. Bassel Hindawi Vice Chairman, Director General of the Commission Insurance Commission of Jordan Mr. Anwar Khalifa Ebrahim Al-Sadah Deputy Governor, Bahrain Monetary Agency Professor Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim Secretary-General, Islamic Financial Services Board Distinguished guests and participants, Assalamualaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh and good morning. 2. It gives me great pleasure to be here this morning to welcome you to Malaysia and to this beautiful island of Langkawi. I am also pleased to be invited by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) to address this major event that brings together those among us who share deep interest in the development of global takaful and Islamic finance. Alhamdulillah, we have among us today distinguished market players, regulators, scholars, consultants as well as participants from almost twenty (20) countries around the world. I also wish to congratulate the IFSB for its efforts in organizing, for the second consecutive year, this international seminar focusing on the regulation of takaful. Let me at the outset reiterate the importance of this Seminar as a source of collaboration for ideas, sharing of knowledge and exchange of experiences for the continuous developments and improvements of the Islamic finance industry.

The interdependence between the different components can be seen in cases where Islamic banking relies on takaful operators to provide protection and coverage for Islamic financing products offered by the Islamic banks. In the case of takaful operators, they would rely on the Islamic banks, through bancatakaful arrangement, to have automatic access to the banks' wide customer base and to leverage on the banks' reputation and prominent position to effectively distribute takaful products. The Islamic capital market will also depend on the takaful operators, and to some extent the Islamic banks, to participate in subscribing to Islamic financial instruments which fulfil the medium to long-term financing needs. In return, the adequate supply and availability of a wide range of financial instruments offered in the Islamic capital market has facilitated takaful operator to effectively manage its asset portfolio to match the liability and risk profile of the takaful fund as well as enhances the ability of takaful operator to generate attractive investment return to stakeholders. 9. Allow me now to take this opportunity to share with you Malaysia's experience in the development of the Islamic financial system that has earned Malaysia, Alhamdulillah, the recognition by the  2  BIS Review 13/2006  international financial community as a leading Islamic financial hub. In developing the Islamic financial system, Malaysia has adopted a phased-in approach which can be divided into three different phases.