samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But in general one can say that it is not so much about inventing new tools, as it is about using traditional supervision tools in a new way – they will be more specifically aimed at signs of exaggerated credit expansion and indebtedness in the economy at large, at the systemic level. What are these tools in more concrete terms? What does a regulation lever consist of? I have already mentioned the possibility to vary amortisation requirements for mortgages. Another example is the countercyclical capital requirement for banks proposed in Basel III. The idea is that the capital requirement will increase if credit growth increases in relation to GDP. This entails a higher lending cost when credit growth is high, and also increases the banks’ resilience. A further example is a ceiling on loan-to-value ratios similar to the mortgage ceiling recently introduced by Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority). This kind of ceiling creates incentives for households to acquire a buffer that reduces the risk of their balance sheets being weakened if property prices fall. Regulation of the loan-to-value ratio could also contribute to slowing down lending and house price increases and thus counteracting a housing bubble. …but traditional supervision is still important But while the discussion now mainly concerns macroprudential tools, it is important that we remember to keep improving the more micro-oriented, traditional bank supervision. Just because it proved insufficient to prevent the financial crisis does not mean that it is unimportant.

But let me state very clearly that the euro area is not a closed club. It is open to any EU Member State that fulfils the convergence criteria on a sustainable basis. IV. Conclusion  The Baltic experience demonstrates that euro membership is not just about economics. The economics alone make only for a partial analysis of the failure or success of an adjustment  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  programme. The political motivations – such as the determination to join the euro area or to safeguard the political capital invested in EMU – have often been underestimated by markets during the crisis. I firmly believe that both economic and political arguments will ultimately also prevail in countries currently in the middle of an adjustment process that is similarly painful to Latvia’s experience. Thank you very much for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Flows of overseas trade, investment and finance have played a major part in shaping the development of the British economy, creating a highly international business and financial environment here in the UK. But links to the global economy have also been strengthened by globalisation, which has reinforced international linkages across the world economy as the global economic system has become more integrated and interdependent. 2  1  Key global economic disturbances over this period include the Asian crisis (1997/8), the bursting of the “dotcom” bubble followed by the impact of 9/11 and war in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001–3), and oil and commodity price volatility in the mid-2000s. 2  I have discussed the impact of globalisation in more detail in earlier speeches. See, for example, “Monetary Policy in Turbulent Times” (21 April 2009) and “Energy and Environmental Challenges in the New Global Economy” (21 September 2009), both available on the Bank of England website: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/speaker.htm#sentance. BIS Review 33/2010  1  The performance of the global economy is therefore critical to the prospects for UK recovery. And it is therefore very encouraging that the global economy has bounced back strongly following the sharp contraction in output and trade in late 2008 and early 2009. As Chart 1 shows, the growth of world GDP in the second half of last year has returned to around its prerecession growth rate and world trade has also bounced back strongly. This recovery in the world economy appears to have continued into the early months of this year.

Bwalya K E Ng’andu: Improving access to finance by the SMEs in Zambia Remarks by Dr Bwalya K E Ng’andu, Deputy Governor (Operations) of the Bank of Zambia, at the Signing Ceremony for a credit line of $ 5 million between NORFUND and BancABC Zambia, Lusaka, 1 December 2011. *  *  *  YOUR EXECELLENCY, THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR, MR ARVE OFSTAD; MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS PRESENT; THE CHAIRMAN OF BANCABC ZAMBIA LIMITED, MR. CHANDA CHILESHE; THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF BANCABC, MR. DANA BOTHA; HEAD OF THE NORFUND SOUTHERN AFRICAN OFFICE, Mr. DEEPAK MALIK; DISTINGUSIHED INVITED GUESTS; MEMBERS OF THE PRESS; LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. Let me begin by thanking BancABC for inviting me to be the guest of honour at this very important event, where we will witness the signing of a credit line worth US $ million between BancABC and the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (NORFUND). It is pleasing to know that the credit line to be signed this morning is specifically tailored to provide financial support to Small and Medium scale enterprises (SMEs). The development of the SME sector and its potential to contribute to aggregate productivity growth, economic growth and development have been stifled by the generally limited access to finance. The credit line to be signed today is an important milestone in improving access to finance by the SMEs in the country. Equally as important as access to finance is the price of financing that is placed at the disposal of SMEs.
At the same time, the introduction of the Inheritance Tax Act and the Land and Building Tax Bill will augment prudent spending by expanding the government’s ability in revenue collection. These laws will ensure a better tax structure to deal with future liabilities, promote greater fiscal balance as well as reduce wealth inequality. As for the Bank of Thailand, we play an important role in ensuring stability in the financial system. The experience of the Global Financial Crisis taught us an important lesson of a timely and efficient crisis management. In this regard, we have proposed an amendment to the Bank of Thailand Act to equip the Bank of Thailand with a broader set of resolution mechanism and enhanced safety nets in the financial system in time of systemic crisis. Ladies and gentlemen, my discussion today regarding recent and upcoming laws provides a snapshot of the legal framework to support our goal of sustainable growth. In the meantime, while one must accept that there will be many challenges ahead, particularly implementation issues, these new laws will at least set forth a necessary path for Thailand to move forward – a path I believe must be complemented by a firm policy direction. This leads to the last part of my talk, which I will focus on the Bank of Thailand’s policy direction and initiatives to support the country’s reform efforts. We are now at the onset of the third phase of the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP III), spanning over 2016 – 2020.

This phase focuses on making the financial sector even more competitive, more inclusive, with improved regional connectivity and greater sustainability. All of this is to serve the diverse needs from fast changing technology as well as to support rising trade, investment, and financial linkages in the region. This leads to two themes that I want to highlight, namely digitization and regionalization. 4 Figure as of November 2016. Source: PDMO and NESDB  6  First, digitization has geared many countries towards less costly cash transactions, which benefit everyone. The concept of “financial services anywhere, anytime” cannot be achieved without developing the necessary infrastructure that fosters more efficient as well as safer electronic transactions. Successful implementation will lower transaction costs for businesses as well as for the banking sector. The Bank of Thailand and the Ministry of Finance have initiated the National e-Payment Master Plan to support this digitization trend. The plan consists of five parts aiming at (1) promoting a fast payment system, or PromptPay, at very low costs; (2) advocating the widely use of electronic debit cards; (3) developing an efficient e-Tax system; (4) improving the Government e-Payment System to make all government’s payment especially welfare transfers electronic; and lastly, creating greater e-Payment literacy. It is important to note that the benefit of e-Payment extends beyond lowering transaction cost; it can also encourage payment transparency, which limits potential leakages and corruption in the payment process and provide e-commerce opportunities for SMEs.
The European Central Bank, for instance, continued to place great value on the usefulness of a monetary pillar. And, as discussed below, there were some who believed that central banks should also use their constrained discretion to lean against incipient asset-price bubbles and credit growth. But the set of beliefs above were, we believe, held sufficiently widely in policymaking and academic circles to be described as a consensus. In the rest of this paper, we re-visit some aspects of this consensus in the light of the crisis. It is not possible to cover all the elements of the consensus, though we shall offer some more wide-ranging observations at the end. In particular, we focus on: whether the experience with unorthodox policies during the crisis has changed our view of the appropriate policy instruments in normal times; whether the target rate of inflation should be increased or a shift to price-level targeting is warranted; and what the experience of the crisis has taught us about how monetary policy should respond to credit/asset-price booms. 1 As a precursor to  1  2  Some of these themes already figured in the contributions to the conference held here eleven years ago. BIS Review 111/2010  that discussion, however, we ask whether monetary policy decisions contributed materially to the crisis. 2. Monetary policy and the crisis  It is worth stressing at the outset that a multitude of factors, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, played into the crisis.

In the past five years, the National Bank has achieved an average yield of 2.9%. This more or less corresponds to the earnings forecasts underlying the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the National Bank regarding the distribution of profits. 2/2
6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  For the first time, these inflows exceeded the income repatriated abroad by MNCs operating in Singapore. •  Gross National Income (GNI) per capita became the more relevant measure of Singapore’s income and standard of living than just GDP per capita. The 2020s and 2030s saw the proliferation and convergence of several technological trends that transformed economies and societies globally. •  Rapid progress in digital and mobile technologies, coupled with advanced biometrics and global wi-fi access, made payments virtually costless and highly secure, precipitating an explosion in the growth of digital commerce and digital finance. •  Advances in cloud computing, big data analytics, smart sensors and learning machines transformed the provision of consumer and business services, including financial, legal, auditing, consultancy, and logistics. •  They also spurred a transformation in the provision of social and public services such as telemedicine, online learning, and congestion control, substantially enhancing efficiency and consumer welfare. Singapore was well-positioned for the pervasive digitisation of the global economy that occurred in the 2020s and 2030s, mainly due to two key initiatives that it embarked on in 2015 in the drive towards productivity-led growth: •  The first was the concerted national effort to build and deepen skills at all levels through extensive worker retraining programmes and subsequent introduction of the teaching of digital technology across the education system.

Speech  Structural changes in energy markets and implications for inflation and monetary policy Governor Ida Wolden Bache's introductory remarks at the European Central Bank Forum on Central Banking on 27 June 2023 in Portugal. Good afternoon and thank you for inviting me to take part in this distinguished panel. In my remarks, I will offer some thoughts on how the structural changes in energy markets will affect energy prices, and more generally, inflation before turning to the implications for monetary policy. But let me start with some observations about my home country. Norway is an energy nation and a large oil exporter. Over the past decade, natural gas exports have increased in importance. Norway is highly integrated into the European energy market, primarily through trade in oil and gas, but increasingly also in the power markets. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Norway has become Europe's largest single gas supplier. Norway is also an important supplier of flexible hydroelectric power. Close cooperation with Europe reflects our common interest in wellfunctioning energy markets during the transition to zero emissions In the years to come, the petroleum sector’s significance to the Norwegian economy will likely decline as petroleum resources on the continental shelf are depleted. Lower activity in the petroleum sector will have consequences for the Norwegian business structure. Substantial investments as well as reallocation of labour and other resources across firms and sectors may be required. Along this path, the green energy transition can be a catalyst.
Of course, while it is reassuring that most of the city has bounced back strongly from this historic natural disaster, it is important to remember that the hardest hit communities, and the residents and businesses there, who lost so much, are still struggling to recover. Many of those communities are right here in Queens: the whole Rockaway peninsula – from Breezy Point to Arverne – was completely flooded, as were neighborhoods like Howard Beach, Springfield Gardens, Lindenwood, and even parts of Flushing, Long Island City, Astoria and Maspeth. Still, Queens as a whole showed strong resilience – employment bounced back from Sandy fairly quickly, and as of early 2013 it had already surpassed its pre-Sandy level. While many residents here commute to work in other boroughs, primarily Manhattan, Queens has a formidable industrial base of its own. Jobs are prevalent in industries ranging from medical care to construction, not to mention printing and a number of other manufacturing industries that benefit from being in a large population center. But Queens’ most concentrated industry is transportation – specifically air transportation which employs about 27,000 workers, about five percent of Queens’ jobs. Education is another key industry in Queens and the city as a whole. And it is not just a job creator. The investment in human capital that education entails makes it a socially desirable activity. There is considerable value from a college education both to the person that has been educated and to society as a whole.

As is always the case, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding this forecast. Moreover, there is always the possibility of some unforeseen shock. Thus, we will continue to monitor U.S. and global economic conditions very carefully and will adjust our views on the likely path for growth, inflation and the unemployment rate accordingly. Thank you for your kind attention and I will now be happy to take some questions. 1  4  Based on the CoreLogic home price index including distressed sales. BIS central bankers’ speeches
Dimitar Radev: Spillovers from the ECB’s monetary policy decisions are fast and strong Statement by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, for the IFLR Yearbook: Global Banking & Financial Policy Review 2019/2020, published on 24 September 2019. * * * There is much discussion these days about the course of monetary policy in the euro area. What global headlines rarely catch, however, is how such policy affects the European economies outside the euro area. Bulgaria is an example where, due to the high openness of our economy and the strong financial links with the euro area, spillovers from the ECB’s monetary policy decisions are fast and strong. Around 50% of Bulgaria’s exports go to the euro area. Investors from the euro area account for 67% of our FDI stock. Our banking system is dominated by the presence of euro area owned banks, which hold around 55% of the sector’s assets. The monetary policy regime in Bulgaria (a currency board with the national currency fixed to the euro) is another factor enhancing the direct transmission of ECB’s monetary policy. Therefore, even though Bulgaria is not a member of the euro area yet, it is important to consider how our economy is affected by the ECB’s continued accommodative stance. Financial stability and its implications are issues to be potentially concerned about. The ECB’s monetary policy in recent years has succeeded in sustaining the economic recovery in the EU following the great financial crisis.

This I find entirely natural in that the exchange rate is an important factor in our assessment of future inflation. The overall picture To sum up, the new statistics since June largely support the opinion about inflation prospects that we presented in the latest report. The figures for real economic activity and inflation suggest, if anything, that the path of inflation will be lower than in our main scenario in the June report. If so, however, it is presumably a question of marginal revisions. The exchange rate, however, instead of moving as we predicted, has weakened. The assessment of this tendency and how it should be weighed up with other factors in an overall assessment of inflation prospects is a matter to which the Riksbank will be returning in the next inflation report on September 28th. Concluding remarks Having presented the Riksbank’s picture of current economic developments, I should like to return to the somewhat longer time perspective from the beginning of this talk and take up the issue that is the theme for today’s speakers. Is there room for expansion in the Swedish economy? In doing so I shall concentrate on two fields that are closely connected with monetary policy: the functioning of the labour market and fiscal policy. The economic policy that has been implemented in recent years, with its emphasis on price stability and sound government finances, has had favourable results in a number of respects. High growth has been combined with persistently low inflation.
In practice, the opposite happened (Charts 2 and 3). Capital and liquidity ratios have fallen secularly in the UK and US for over a century. Since the start of the 20th century, capital ratios have fallen by a factor of around five in the US and UK. Liquidity ratios have fallen by roughly the same amount in half that time. Taken together, these balance sheet trends indicate a pronounced rise in banking system risk and hence in potential demand for state insurance. They have also affected the returns required by bank shareholders. As banks moved up the risk spectrum, the return required by shareholders has predictably increased. Between 1920 and 1970, the return on UK banks’ equity averaged below 10% per annum, with low volatility of around 2% per year (Chart 4). This was roughly in line with risks and returns in the non-financial economy. The 1970s signalled a sea-change. Since then returns on UK banks’ equity have averaged over 20%. Immediately prior to the crisis, returns were close to 30%. The natural bedfellow to higher return is higher risk. And so it was, with the volatility of UK banks’ returns having trebled over the past forty years. 4  Indeed, contract incompleteness is one of the reasons banks exist in the first place (Rajan (1998)). 5  See, for example, King (2009). 2  BIS Review 139/2009  This regime shift upwards in the risk and return profile of UK banks can be explained by the fall in their capital ratios.

Plainly, there has been a dramatic expansion in both the scale and scope of state liquidity insurance to the banking system. This pattern has been repeated in the majority of recent systemic banking crises. In a study of 42 systemic banking crises between 1970 and 2007, Laeven and Valencia find peak liquidity provision of almost 30% of total deposits. Drastic times clearly call for drastic measures. Harman’s description of last resort lending in 1825  6  Thorton (1802), Bagehot (1873). 7  Quoted in Bagehot (1873). 8  The sample ends before quantitative easing began, so base money growth is not affected by recent monetary policy actions in the UK. 9  Committee on the Global Financial System (2008). BIS Review 139/2009  3  would not look out of place today. Except, crucially, the decimal point would have changed place. Deposit insurance and capital insurance have a shorter history. Deposit insurance was first introduced in the US in 1934, to protect retail depositors scorched by the experience of the Great Depression. It failed to catch on internationally. By the early 1960s, the US was still the only developed country with an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Since then, there has been a steady rise in the number of adopting countries (Chart 6). By 2009, almost 100 countries globally had such a regime. Typically, the introduction and extension of deposit insurance regimes has been a response to banking crisis. This time’s crisis has been no exception. Australia and New Zealand have both introduced deposit guarantee schemes.