samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
William C Dudley: The national and regional economic outlook Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Center for Economic Development, Syracuse, New York, 12 April 2012. *  *  *  Good morning, I am pleased to be here in Syracuse at the Center for Economic Development. It is always a pleasure to speak with business and community leaders because of the important role you play in helping to shape the economy of the region. I thank you all for inviting me here today. I try to get out of my office in New York City as much as I can to get a sense of regional economic conditions across the second Federal Reserve District. I was last here in Syracuse in 2010 and, more recently, I traveled to West Point and the Capital region and Long Island. These visits are just as important as any trip I might take to Washington, D.C., to help formulate monetary policy, or to Switzerland, to help shape international bank regulation. Each visit within the region helps me to deepen the relationships with the people I represent. I believe that the understanding of issues and concerns that I gain today will help ensure that the Fed’s policy decisions reflect the public interest. Today, I want to talk a bit about the Fed – what we do and why we do it. Then I’ll provide some thoughts about the economic outlook nationally and locally.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: 30 years of monetary independence Introduction speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the marking of the 30 years of monetary independence, Skopje, 28 April 2022. *** Distinguished President of the Republic of North Macedonia, Distinguished Prime Minister of the Republic of North Macedonia, Distinguished Minister of Finance, Respected members of the Government Dear guests, It has long been said that history is a witness to the past, example and lesson to the present and lesson and warning to the future. Therefore, the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of a momentous event, such as the monetary independence of the modern Macedonian state, is not just an honor and a motive for celebration. It is also an obligation, standing before the generations of devotees who have invested in what is today our modern monetary history, but also before the generations to whom we owe the future. As the great Goran Stefanovski once said, "Identity is a story about who we are, why we are, and what we want." Monetary independence and our currency - the denar are the central chapter in our story - an essential element of our identity. In 1991, the dream of an independent, sovereign and autonomous, modern Macedonian state came true. Yet, without the monetary independence that happened these days in 1992, without an independent central bank and without a national currency, our story would not have been complete.
16  Figure 8 Bank credit survey (*) (average for four moving quarters)  Demand  Supply  100  100  100  100  50  50  50  50  0  0  0  0  -50  -50  -50  -50  -100  -100  -100  -100  12  13  14  15  12  16  Enterprises  13  14  15  16  Real estate and building firms  Persons  (*) Difference between percentage of respondents that said lending standards had become less stringent to some extent and percentage of respondents that said that lending standards had become more so to some extent. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Gráfico 9 Citigroup surprise index  Manufacturing prospects (*)  (mean of 25 moving weeks, pivot=0)  (diffusion index, pivot=50)  70  70  60  60  35  35  55  55  0  0  50  50  -35  -35  45  45  -70  40  -70 12  13  14  15  16 U.S.  17 Eurozone  40 12  13  14  15  16  17  Japan  (*) Measured using the purchasing managers' index (PMI). Source: Bloomberg.

Bank customers cannot and should not blindly blame banks every time an investment loss is incurred or when they get into financial troubles due to excessive borrowing. Banking customers ought to be responsible and smart. Only then could there be a sustained win-win situation for all concerned. In this regard, the HKMA will shortly launch a consumer education programme to help the public learn more about how to become a “smart and responsible” financial consumer. 7. This is why the HKMA has been working with the industry in the past months in developing the Charter. I am pleased to see that the Charter has received the full support of 22 retail banks in Hong Kong. These banks are here today to sign and launch this Charter, pledging to provide bank customers with better and stronger protection. It also marks a new era for Hong Kong as Asia’s premier international financial centre in the enhancement of consumer protection in the financial realm. 8. 2  Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches
Svante Öberg: Economic conditions for wage formation Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the National Mediation Office, Stockholm, 16 June 2011. *  *  *  The Riksbank’s task is to maintain a low and stable level of inflation. But the development of wages affects inflation and inflation affects the development of wages. Wage formation and monetary policy are consequently connected, and, consequently, the Riksbank monitors wage formation with great attentiveness. The message of my speech today can be summarised by two points:   Wage formation has worked well since the mid-1990s, and my assessment is that it will continue to work well in the years ahead.   But if wage increases were to be slightly less than the approximately 3.5 per cent per year that the Riksbank estimated in April, not only inflation and unemployment could be lower, but so could interest rates. I will start by taking a look back at wage formation over the last 40 years. Following this, I will address the economic conditions for wage formation in the years ahead. I will base this on the Riksbank’s most recent forecast for Sweden’s economy, from April. A look back at wage formation over the last 40 years Wage formation did not work well in the 1970s and 1980s Following the “record years” of the 1960s, a period of weaker development for Sweden’s economy began in the mid-1970s.

Philipp M Hildebrand: The international monetary system Opening remarks by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the High-Level Conference on the International Monetary System, Zurich, 11 May 2010. * I. *  *  Introduction  Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a pleasure and special privilege to welcome you to this conference on the international monetary system. I am delighted that, together with the IMF, we have succeeded in bringing together such an outstanding group of policy makers and academics. I want to thank you for taking the time to join today’s discussion at this critical juncture for the international monetary system. I am especially grateful that the Managing Director of the IMF is with us today. Dominique, a very warm welcome to you. I know I speak on behalf of everyone here today when I say that we really appreciate your presence. Conferences on the international monetary system are held with great regularity, particularly in the wake of financial crises. It is therefore not surprising that the recent crisis has brought renewed attention to the functioning of the international monetary system. But as Herb Stein noted more than 40 years ago, it is not easy to define the international monetary system. Where does the international monetary system end and domestic economic policy begin? Did the recent crisis have its roots in shortcomings of domestic policies or in shortcomings of the international monetary system?
As you can see, the Committee is engaged in a variety of projects that require us to combine the efforts and input of regulators and supervisors across a large number of countries. This is a challenging task. An even greater challenge, however, is prioritising among competing projects to achieve our most pressing objectives. The Committee’s response to the financial crisis has been strong, but there is still much to accomplish. So we have recently spent some time identifying our key strategic priorities, to make sure we have a good means of deciding what we really must do. As you may have seen, these priorities were endorsed by the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) at the same time they endorsed and announced the revisions to the LCR. The Committee’s primary focus in the short and medium term is completing and embedding the full suite of responses to issues that emerged from the financial crisis. With that in mind, foremost consideration will be given to five priority areas: 1.  completing the crisis-initiated reforms of the policy framework;  2.  monitoring and reinforcing the implementation of Basel regulatory standards;  3.  assessing the impact of, and industry response to, implementation of the regulatory reforms;  4.  examining the comparability of model-based internal risk weightings and considering the appropriate balance between the simplicity, comparability and risk sensitivity of the regulatory framework; and  5.  enhancing the effectiveness of both micro- and macroprudential supervision.

The combined effect of these developments affected negatively the real sector of the economy, mainly the business sector. In the first quarter of this year, business confidence index fell under its historic average, reflecting a more difficult financial situation. The latter was also shown by the lower-thanplanned realization of fiscal revenues as well as by the decline of loan portfolio quality that banking sector has encountered throughout the period. In the short-term, the public authorities took measures to lessen the impact of the global financial crisis in the economy. Through the significant increase of the fiscal expenditures share designated for investments, mainly in infrastructure, the government supplied an important impetus for the support of the real sector of economy to cope with the global crisis effects. The Bank of Albania has also been active to provide liquidity in the interbank market, with the aim to preserve the stability of the banking sector and to lessen the expected decrease of its intermediation role. We removed quantitative limits in the size of the liquidity injections through our week-long reverse repurchase agreements, and extended the maturity of our injection operations up to three months. Following a cut of the policy rate by 0.5 percentage points in January and the subdued inflationary pressures at home, the monetary policy paid an important attention to the financial stability, by keeping the policy interest rate unchanged throughout the period.
From the aggregate demand, it was driven by the growth in consumption, investments and exports. The services, industry and construction sectors mainly benefited from this expansion of aggregate demand. A notable development in 2017 was the positive performance in tourism, which provided a positive impetus to economic growth. Together with the high levels of foreign direct investments, it contributed also to the 2/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  increase in foreign currency inflows in the Albanian economy. Employment increased by 3.3% in 2017, driven largely by the increase in the services sector. In parallel to the increase in employment, the unemployment rate fell, from 14.2% at the end of 2016, to 13.4% at the end of 2017. The decrease in the current account deficit averaged 6.9% of the GDP in 2017, against the 7.6% registered in the previous year. Its improvement reflected the increase in tourism and other services of the business. Fiscal indicators marked consolidation, reflecting a low level of budget deficit and the maintained control over the public debt. From the financial aspect, the Albanian banking system maintained good indicators of liquidity, profitability and capitalisation. The financial situation of enterprises has been improving, as illustrated by their high liquidity levels and the progressive decline in the nonperforming loans ratio. Lastly, inflation has been upward, averaging 2.0% from 1.3% in the previous year.

In fact this is not so different from what we have done before. Although we have always decided on asset purchases for a 3 or 4 month period at a time, we have often rolled into further purchases. The total amount is only decided – and then only temporarily – at the point we stop! So we could contemplate a rather longer horizon for asset purchases, even if we continue to cautiously decide on a few months at a time. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  The majority of the MPC took a view in February not to make any more purchases. I accept that there was a good case to be made for that position, even if on balance I took a different view. But I think we need to keep under review whether there is merit in undertaking more asset purchases under a slightly different dynamic approach. Indeed the February meeting Minutes made it clear that the Committee will keep all its options open. Funding for lending Finally, I want to turn to our most recent approach to credit easing. The Funding for Lending Scheme (the FLS) was launched in 2012 jointly with HM Treasury after we saw that interest rates being charged to borrowers had been rising at a time when our asset purchase programme should have been bearing down on market rates. The principal reason for rising lending rates was that bank funding costs were being kept high by the continuing crisis in the euro area.
This has been topical recently, with a number of highprofile cases of executives being paid amounts which do not obviously align well with their company’s performance. Some investors have expressed discontent at these pay packages and some have even gone so far as to vote against them. Investors have had their “Say on Pay”. 50 And, as is often the case at this time of year, as the pollen count has picked up there has been talk of a “shareholder spring”. Ultimately, however, these investor votes are binding on neither management nor boards. They are a “Say on Pay”, but not a “Stay on Pay”. With very few exceptions, no differences were made to executive compensation packages as a result of investor action. And the cases of investors actively voting against pay packages have in any case been rather rare. The “shareholder spring” may be as ephemeral as that pollen. Yet high executive pay-outs potentially have implications, adverse ones, for value-creation by companies and thus longer-term returns to investors. Monies paid out to executives are monies not being re-invested in the company, reducing investment in physical and human capital. They also drive a wedge between management and their employees – a wedge that has widened to over 150 times median wages in the UK and over 300 times in the US. 51 That, in turn, erodes social capital. A company, like a country, whose physical and social capital is being eroded is one whose wealth-creation capacity is being impaired.

This is in line with the design principles described in the Five Presidents’ Report, which notably insists that a fiscal capacity should not entail permanent transfers in one direction. A fiscal capacity in this sense would also be distinct in nature from more allocative tools such as those provided for by the EU budget. To be able to reach this objective, and based on my introductory remarks, I believe we need to see significant further progress along the following three dimensions: First, a pooling of fiscal resources, whatever their nature and size might be, only works if solidarity goes hand in hand with shared responsibility. A move towards more fiscal risksharing in EMU would therefore require a commensurate shift towards increased joint decisionmaking within strong common institutions. In any case, access to a joint euro area fiscal capacity should be made conditional on compliance with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Second, we should aim at containing the burden that falls on fiscal policies by strengthening market-based adjustment. As Ludwig Erhard famously said, we need “as much market as possible, as much state as needed”. This means structural reform at the national level. But it also means completing banking union and supplementing it with a comprehensive capital markets union at the European level. In addition, this calls again for completing the Single Market more broadly, including in the services sector. Third, it lies at the very heart of all insurance that risks are distributed equally ex ante.
With large and, to some extent, varying budget revenues, the basis for determining central government expenditure and taxes from one year to the next may easily be impaired. If budget spending is allowed to vary in step with oil prices, the Norwegian economy may experience abrupt shifts and instability. Changes in oil prices may then quickly influence wage and price expectations, the exchange rate and long-term rates. In addition, short-term rates would have to be changed frequently and sharply. BIS Review 19/2001  9  In recent years, central government real underlying spending growth has accelerated somewhat. In 2000 and 2001, spending growth has been higher than 2 per cent, which is higher than normal growth in the mainland economy. At the same time, direct and indirect taxes have increased. Fiscal policy has thus had a virtually neutral effect on domestic demand for two years while wage growth has been substantially higher than in other countries. A possible interpretation of this development is that it is more demanding to use the government budget to dampen cyclical fluctuations during an upturn than during a downturn. The willingness and ability to pursue a counter-cyclical policy may in itself be cyclical. Another interpretation is that a neutral fiscal stance this year, with a strong increase in government financial wealth, is a balanced approach to using the budget to stabilise the economy while phasing in an increase in financial income in the economy. Conclusion The Norwegian economy is fragile and vulnerable.

Developments in 1998 are one example, when the krone came under growing pressure as a result of the sharp fall in oil prices, turbulence in international capital market in the wake of the Russian crisis and imbalances in the Norwegian economy. Monetary policy The long-term objective of monetary policy is to provide the Norwegian economy with a nominal anchor - domestic price stability, and thereby the basis for a stable krone. Nominal stability is the best contribution monetary policy can make to economic growth and prosperity. A nominal anchor is also a necessary precondition for stable financial markets and property markets. High inflation and wide swings in the exchange rate impair the function of prices as an information vehicle. This leads to booms followed by busts and an arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth. Inflation therefore poisons the economy. By linking movements in the krone to the euro, we have chosen to follow the same standard for nominal stability in the economy as set by the euro area countries. BIS Review 19/2001  7  Since 1997, inflation has been higher in Norway than in the euro area. The difference partly reflects a period of strong growth in Norway, while the level of activity in Europe has been low. But the relatively high inflation rate in Norway cannot continue as this will undermine the basis for stability in the krone exchange rate and weaken confidence in monetary policy.
Enrique Marshall: Central banks’ contribution to financial stability – the experience of Chile Speech by Mr Enrique Marshall, Board Member of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Central Bank of Bolivia’s First Financial Workshop “Macroregulation and Financial Stability”, La Paz, 29 September 2010. *  *  *  I am indebted to Kevin Cowan and Jorge Cayazzo for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this presentation but the opinions expressed here are the exclusive responsibility of the author. 1. Introduction  Financial stability has been a concern for central banks since their very origins. The functions for which they were created – to regulate money and credit markets and to serve as lenders of last resort – have a direct bearing on the objective of financial stability and this relationship has been further reinforced by the fact that many central banks have also undertaken a role in regulating and supervising the banking system. Both the economic literature and historical experience provide sound grounds for this concern for stability, clearly demonstrating that the functioning of the real economy requires an efficient and stable financial system. The hardest lesson of history, however, is that financial crises have occurred time and again, with a very high cost in terms of both their fiscal impact and the associated losses of output. 1 Financial stability has, as a result, emerged as a paramount objective of public policy.

Chairperson, in conclusion, I wish to take note of the commendable step that Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited has taken to build its own offices here in Zambia after a long presence in the country. I am hopeful that this initiative will create a more expansive and customer-friendly environment for your customers. I congratulate you for this milestone. I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 88/2009