samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Aggressive hike is not warranted as the Thai economy is still in the early phase of recovery, while it could risk derailing the recovery. A gradual approach is needed to strike a balance between facilitating a smooth take-off of the recovery and minimizing the impact from potential bumps. • Measured: Policy decision will be calibrated taking into account economic conditions and circumstances prevailing at the time. If a pause is required, we will pause. If 50 bps is necessary to meet our policy objective, we will raise 50 bps. But with the current circumstances, aggressive rate hikes or too early withdrawal of financial measures can jeopardize the economic recovery given pockets of vulnerabilities and the uneven impacts on different groups. c. We have taken first steps towards this at the Financial Institutions Policy Committee (FIPC) meeting on June 30th and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting on August 10th. • The FIPC decided to withdraw some of the blanket-type measures including FIDF fee cut and bank dividend payment restrictions. • The MPC voted 6 to 1 to raise the policy rate by 25 bps. Part 3: What is our rationale for monetary policy normalization? [3.1 MPC decision: 10 August] Two weeks ago, the MPC has delivered the first policy rate hike after having held the policy rate at its historically low level for more than two years.

29  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  29  Chart 17: Firm level productivity distribution over time  (a) Levels  (b) Index GVA per person, £  GVA per person, Index 2002 =100 180  140 10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile  25th percentile 75th percentile  10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile  120  25th percentile 75th percentile  160  140  100  120  80  100  60  80 60  40  40 20  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  0 2014  20 2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  0 2014  Source: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations. Notes: Productivity per worker. Chart 18: Productivity among Frontier and Non-Frontier companies  Source: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations. Notes: Frontier defined as top 5% of firms by GVA per worker in a given year and sector as defined by 2-digit SIC 2007 industrial classification. 30  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  30  Chart 19: Contribution of frontier and other firms to productivity growth  Source: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations. Notes: Frontier as defined in Chart 18. Chart 20: Productivity dispersion*  (a) Services (Levels)  (b) Manufacturing (Levels)  (a) Services (Index)  (b) Manufacturing (Index)  Source: OECD and Berlingieri, Blanchenay and Criscuolo (2017, forthcoming); ONS Research Database and Bank calculations.
José De Gregorio: Macroprudential regulation, financial stability and capital flows Presentation by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the 13th Annual International Banking Conference, Chicago, 24 September 2010. *  *  *  I am very grateful to Gabriel Aparici, Herman Bennett, Kevin Cowan and Pablo Garcia for very useful discussions and comments. I am grateful to the Chicago Fed for inviting me to participate in this important policy panel. Most recent conferences on macro and financial policies have been dealing with the causes, consequences and implications of the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009, and the Great Recession that ensued. This panel has been persuasively entitled Where to from Here? I would like to focus on two issues: capital inflows, which is a very relevant issue for emerging market economies, and the recent agreement of the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation. For this purpose I will start with a brief review of some facts regarding capital inflows. Then I will discuss the policy toolkit to deal with them. I will take a look from a macro perspective and then from the point of view of financial stability. Finally I will make some comments on the Basel agreements, focusing on the Chilean banking system and its financial regulation framework. Some evidence and factors behind the resumption of inflows There is concern in emerging market economies about resuming capital inflows and the challenges they impose on monetary policy.

4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Despite those unprecedented falls in activity, there are some signs that the British economy is beginning to stabilise, and financial markets have improved markedly. There are three solid reasons for thinking that a recovery in activity was likely to occur at some point this year. The first I call the “Honda effect” – many firms, as Honda did last year at its plant in Swindon, cut back production and met demand from stock, resuming production this year once inventories had been reduced. The second factor is the level of sterling which, despite its recent rally, is still some 20% lower than in the summer of 2007. That will encourage a switch in spending, at home and abroad, towards goods and services produced in the UK. Finally, and perhaps most important, is the enormous policy stimulus that has been injected into the economy. Bank Rate was cut by four percentage points in four months. But the Monetary Policy Committee judged that even that was insufficient to prevent inflation falling below our 2% target, and so it embarked on a programme of asset purchases designed to increase the money supply and improve conditions in non-bank corporate credit markets. The programme will shortly be extended to working capital finance, which should be of particular help to smaller companies. But the Bank must not become the arbiter of the allocation of public credit to individual companies or sectors – such decisions are rightly and necessarily the province of government.

For a generation or more, businesses and families up and down the country were told, not least by the City, that the disciplines of the market economy were essential, even if painful in the short run, for greater prosperity in the longer term. That belief in the merits of a market economy was embraced and for many years was not misplaced. But out of the blue – in this case the financial sector – came a crisis that did not stem from weaknesses in the real economy. It has wreaked havoc on those same businesses and families. Unemployment, as we saw in today’s figures, is rising sharply. And yet it is the banking system that has received financial support on an almost unimaginable scale. We who work in the financial sector have much to do to regain the trust of those who work outside it. “My word is my bond” are old words, but they were important. “My word is my CDO-squared” will never catch on. There is no support in this country, and no case, for excessively bureaucratic regulation. But change to the structure, regulation and indeed culture of our banking system is necessary. Blaming individuals is no substitute for acknowledging the failure of a system, of a certain type of banking. We have a real opportunity now to put that right, and regain the trust that has been lost.
Expansionary policy can also be expected to boost activity and profits, which also tends to raise asset prices. But the case for monetary policy having a role in the run-up to the crisis comes less from these conventional monetary transmission channels and more from the idea that loose monetary policy particularly encouraged a shift into riskier asset classes, which then got out of hand – the so-called “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu, 2008). There are broadly three ways in which looser monetary policy encourages increased risktaking. First, and most conventionally, a lower yield on safe assets encourages substitution into higher-yielding risky assets, in the process driving up their prices. Second, some investors such as pension funds need to match the returns on their investments to their commitments. A reduction in the return on safe assets then encourages them to switch into high-yielding but riskier assets in an attempt to deliver nominal returns which match their liabilities – a “search for yield” (Rajan, 2005). Executive compensation linked to absolute returns has a similar effect. Finally, a slightly more complex mechanism is developed by Adrian and Shin (2009) and Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010). They argue that financial intermediaries target leverage ratios which are either constant (commercial banks) or pro-cyclical (investment banks).

“How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset-Price Bubbles?” in A. Richards and T. Robinson, eds., Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, 260–280. Reserve Bank of Australia: Sydney. Heikensten, Lars (2009). “Inflation Targeting 20 Years On”, Presentation at 6th Norges Bank Monetary Policy conference, Oslo, June 12. Joyce, Michael, Ana Lasaosa, Ibrahim Stevens and Matthew Tong (2010). “The Financial Market Impact of Quantitative Easing,” Bank of England Working Paper No.393. Kamenik, Ondra, Heesun Kiem, Vladimir Klyuev and Douglas Laxton (2008). “Why is Canada’s Price Level So Predictable?” IMF Working Paper No.08/25. King, Mervyn A. (1999). “Challenges for Monetary Policy”, in New Challenges for Monetary Policy, 11–58. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas: Kansas City. Levin, Andrew, Chien-Fu Lin and Chia-Shang James Chu (2002). “Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite-Sample Properties”, Journal of Econometrics, 108, 1–24. Meier, André. (2009). “Panacea, Curse, or Non-Event? Unconventional Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom”, IMF Working Paper No.09/163. 44  BIS Review 111/2010  Minsky, Hyman (1982). “The Financial-Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of the Economy” in Charles Kindleberger and Jean-Pierre Laffargue (eds. ), Financial Crises. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Neely, Christopher J. (2010). “The Large Scale Asset Purchases had Large International Effects”, Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis Working Paper No.2010-018A. Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009). “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Economic policy Conference, 18–20 October. Oda, Nobuyuki, and Kazuo Ueda (2005).
In turn, as supervisors on the Basel Committee have been developing standards for the disclosure of components of capital, for loan accounting, and for other topics of mutual concern, we have sought out the views of representatives of the accounting profession. This dialogue will continue. I should add that we are currently seeking new opportunities for discussion on issues of mutual concern with accounting standards-setting bodies and private sector accounting professionals. Current status & future work for the Basel Committee  I know that you are eager to know where the Committee stands at the moment. As I suggested, the Committee and its member organisations are closely reviewing all of the comment letters received so far. Working groups have been discussing potential refinements to the proposals to address the concerns raised during the consultation. The Committee itself will meet tomorrow. Our agenda is straightforward: we will evaluate the industry’s views and consider the solutions proposed by the Committee’s working groups. No conclusions are foregone at this stage. The members of the Committee are in agreement that our primary responsibility is to develop an agreement that is sensitive to risk, forward-looking, and fit for the service of twenty-first century banking. But we are also conscious of the need to avoid unnecessary burden and to provide the industry with as much certainty as possible.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Economic transformation and inclusive growth in frontier economies Welcome and opening remarks by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the conference on “Economic transformation and inclusive growth in frontier economies”, jointly organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Bangkok, 28 January 2013. *  *  *  Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. It gives me great pleasure and honor to welcome each and every one of you to Thailand, and more specifically, to the Conference on “Economic Transformation and Inclusive Growth in Frontier Economies”. This event is the second in a series of conference jointly organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2. The topic of the conference is timely and relevant to current developments in the region. Frontier economies are new and becoming large markets. They all have the potential to grow into tomorrow’s emerging economies. In recent years, we witness faster economic growth in frontier economies than larger emerging economies. We have seen frontier economies integrate into the regional and global economy. 3. Frontier economies are full of potential. However, continued efforts on strengthening policy frameworks are still needed. This is to ensure long term economic growth and sustain robust economy. And I believe that today’s conference will contribute to these efforts as we will share and learn the appropriate lessons of others. One can leap jump the process, without repeating the mistakes.
Andrew G Haldane: Financial arms races Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, at the Institute for New Economic Thinking, Berlin, 14 April 2012. All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches  *  *  *  Elephant seals have got too big for their beaches. A large specimen might weigh over 8000 lbs (3700 kg).1 Their size has a simple evolutionary explanation. Large males fight for the right to mate with a whole beach full of females. For elephant seals it is, quite literally, winner-takes-all. And the key to winning is simple – size. No-one is going to argue with a male swinging around his proboscis on the beach. In that way, size has become the dominant gene in the evolutionary trajectory of the elephant seal. But size is not costless for the elephant seal. It makes them easy prey on land. At times in the past, this has threatened their very existence. In the 18th century, their main land predator – man – hunted elephant seals for their blubber and fur. In the 19th century, their numbers fell rapidly to below 100 and for a time they were believed to be extinct.2 Just in time, governments intervened to place restrictions on hunting, nationally and internationally. Today, elephant seal numbers have swelled to above 800,000. The hand of government has protected them from man – and from themselves.

This duration mismatch means it is more likely than not that risk and reward may get out of kilter in the financial sector. The current environment is evidence of such a mismatch: while bank performance has fallen off a cliff, executive pay remains close to pre-crisis Himalayan heights. Lengthening deferral or claw-back periods, say to 10 years or more on an internationally co-ordinated basis, would help close this gap in horizons, between risk and return. It would elongate the period of liability bank managers face when they take on risk. This would better align firm-level risk-taking incentives with the societal optimum. Avoiding relative benchmarks in the setting of remuneration would also reduce the risk of an upwards-only pay escalator. 29  Bank of England (2012). 30  Bank of England (2011b). 31  Bebchuk and Fried (2003). 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  There is scope, too, for a reconsideration of the instruments used for remuneration. The focus to date has been on non-cash distributions, often in equity. But paying in equity appears in some pre-crisis cases to have exacerbated risk-taking incentives, acting as a disincentive to raising new equity and encouraging gambles for resurrection. Remunerating in long-maturity debt, or contingent capital instruments, may do a better job of aligning risk-taking incentives with the public good than either cash or equity.32 Speed races in financial markets potentially generate societal sub-optimality, for example due to message traffic congestion.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Table 1: Participation rates by age cohort (per cent)  16-24 yrs 25-29 yrs 30-34 yrs 35-39 yrs 40-44 yrs 45-49 yrs 50-54 yrs 55-59 yrs 60-64 yrs 6569yrs 70-74 yrs 75+ yrs  Participation Rate in 1994  Participation Rate in 2007  Latest Participation Rate (2014Q1)  Annual average increase (19942007)  Annual average increase since 2007  72.30  66.77  65.75  -0.10  -0.14  83.45  84.41  93.05  0.02  0.03  82.58  84.37  93.64  0.04  0.06  84.08  84.38  93.60  0.01  0.06  86.02  86.15  92.80  -0.01  0.04  85.43  85.56  91.60  0.01  0.05  79.07  82.47  88.75  0.07  0.10  65.99  71.78  81.82  0.12  0.15  37.93  46.25  59.95  0.15  0.15  10.87  16.23  25.76  0.11  0.17  4.49  6.79  12.43  0.05  0.11  1.85  1.80  4.90  0.00  0.05  Source: Labour Force Survey and Bank calculations. 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Appendix: stylised description of labour market dynamics This appendix sets out a stylized description of recent labour market dynamics derived from a simple model. First, suppose firms employ labour 𝑁 to produce output 𝑌 = 𝑁1−𝛼 , where 1 − 𝛼 is the labour share of income. Firms pay a real wage of 𝑊.

Suffice it to say that efforts to address the resultant problems underpin the current far-reaching reforms undertaken by governments in the sub-region. These include financial sector reforms, public sector reforms and the privatization of public enterprises. Following several years of persistent reforms, some modest improvement has been registered in recent times. Real GDP growth rates of most countries in the sub-region averaged 4.3 percent in 2003, compared with 3.7 and 1.9 percent in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The average fiscal deficit to GDP ratio improved significantly, from 4.2 percent in 2002 to 0.7 percent in 2003, although most of the economies remained fiscally fragile. Inflation rate accelerated marginally to 6.0 percent from  BIS Review 43/2004  1  5.5 percent in 2002. Overall, the external sector of the sub-region improved somewhat as the current account position recovered from a deficit to GDP ratio of 4.3 percent in 2002 to 1.7 percent in 2003, driven by the significant turnaround in the export growth of 4.5 percent in contrast to the decline of 3.0 percent in the preceding year. Managing a post-conflict economy Here in Sierra Leone, the government has stayed the course in its reform programme with an accent on reconstruction and rehabilitation. Helped by the quick repossession of the agricultural and mining belts by government, real GDP grew steadily from 5.4 to 6.6 and to 7.0 percent in 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. The marked recovery in the export of cocoa and diamonds contributed significantly to GDP growth.
Today, the medium-term growth and inflation risks are unbiased, although in the short-term there are greater inflation-related risks. Our monetary policy is based on an inflation target two years ahead, so it requires having an opinion with respect to the most likely evolution of the macroeconomic scenario and associated risks. We are continually on the lookout for news about the local and international economic environments, checking them for consistency with our vision of the most likely or other alternative scenarios. To do so, we need to permanently adapt our vision on the economy and conduct monetary policy with flexibility, being careful not to overreact to onetime news that could trigger excessive pessimism or optimism that occasionally affect the expectations of consumers, businesses or investors in the financial markets. This prudence  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  in our assessment of the state of the economy and related risks is vital for us to properly meet our obligations. At the same time, it is our job to provide grounds for our vision about the macroeconomic scenario and its consequences on the orientation of our monetary policy. The developments of recent months exemplify this. Many market agents’ opinions pointed at the Chilean economy being severely hit by the external situation. However, incoming data have shown us, as I said, that the risks coming from abroad are smaller than we thought before.

10 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC transcript and presentation materials, January 29-30,  2002. 11 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC transcript and presentation materials, June 24-25,  2003. 12 See, for example, Lars E. O. Svensson, The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping  from a Liquidity Trap, Monetary and Economic Studies, Volume 19, Issue S1, pp. 277-312, February 2001; Günter Coenen, Athanasios Orphanides, and Volker Wieland; , Price Stability and Monetary Policy Effectiveness When Nominal Interest Rates Are Bounded at Zero, Advances in Macroeconomics, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2004; Ben S. Bernanke and Vincent R. Reinhart. 2004. Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates, American Economic Review, Volume 94, No. 2, pp. 85-90, May 2004; Klaus Adam and Roberto M. Billi, Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 38, No. 7, pp. 1877-1905, October 2006. 13 Reifschneider and Williams 2000; Board of Governors 2002. 14 Gauti B. Eggertsson and Michael Woodford, The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy,  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Volume 34, No. 1, pp. 139-211, 2003; Reifschneider and Williams 2000. 15 Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack, Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An  Empirical Assessment, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, The Brookings Institution, Volume 35, No. 2, pp. 1–100, 2004.