samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The official sector, internationally, could, in my view, probably help – both researchers and itself – by producing data on financial flows and stocks as rich as the real economy data we collect. I have in mind things like the Federal Reserve’s “Flow of Funds” statistics. As well as being of immediate practical use, over time there would be benefits from the richer empirical research it would allow your community to conduct. The underlying thought is that, until we know more about risk premia, we should not give up tracking quantities. Doing so in the future might aid comprehension of the risks in the financial system. The challenge for policymakers is no smaller than that for researchers. We must tackle the task at hand with the tools we have. There are substantial risks to inflation in both directions over the medium term. But at present, the most likely prospect remains that, as the global economy slows, accumulating slack in the economy will head off the upside risks to inflation. That strategy relies not only on real-economy interactions, but crucially on the credibility of the target and the Committee. Above all else, therefore, we must be clear about our mandate: to deliver stable inflation, at 2%, over the medium term. they tell the end of the story, when all relative prices have been determined, whereas we want to enrich our grasp of the narrative so that we can influence the end of the story.

All the prominent scholars who are presenting papers today will analyse some of the aspects of how and why market risk premiums vary. Financial regulations and financial frictions are  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  important to our understanding of why risk premiums change over time. A thorough understanding of financial regulations and financial frictions might also be important in identifying unique investor characteristics. Axel Weber will shed light on the implications of financial sector regulation on the functioning of markets and the pricing of assets. Lasse Pedersen has provided valuable research on the micro structure of funding markets and how liquidity risks create systemic problems. In particular, he will cover frictions in financial markets. It is quite clear that the Government Pension Fund differs from the average investor in important respects. In addition, we need to understand how variation in risk premiums can be consistent with highly competitive financial markets. Why don’t all investors buy “value” or rebalance? Ken Froot will talk about rare events and disaster risks, how these events are priced in markets. He will also give insights on individual investor characteristics which give comparative advantages in holding these priced risk premiums. Ken French will speak about two ways for an investor to generate excess returns: informational advantages and systematically harvesting risk premiums which the investor has a comparative advantage in holding. Both Froot and French will mainly talk about average portfolio weights in highly competitive markets.
Dimson E., P. Marsh and M. Staunton (2002) Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns, Princeton University Press. 2 Dimson E., P. Marsh and M. Staunton “Long-Term Asset Returns” in Financial Market History, edited by D.  Chambers and E. Dimson. 3 The figures are annual figures and the percentage falls are therefore smaller than for measurements from the  peak to the trough on a monthly basis. 4 The Government Petroleum Fund, Annual Report 2002. Norges Bank. 5 See Discussion note 1/2017, International diversification for long-term investors, NBIM 6 Dimson E., P. Marsh and M. Staunton: Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2018. Dimson E., P.  Marsh and M. Staunton. Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns, Princeton University Press, 2002. 7 ibid. 8 Estimated market value in the fund’s benchmark index if the companies had not been excluded. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

This is also reflected by the growth figures of the EU and single Member States. According to Eesti Pank's spring forecast, this year's economic downturn in Estonia will be around 12%. Estonian economy may start to recover towards the end of 2009, albeit the resumption of growth is very much dependent on the state of economies of our main trading partners. In 2011, Estonia's economic growth should recover to almost 5%. I would like to stress that Estonia has undergone considerable economic adjustment, which started already at the end of 2007 and several risk factors are withdrawing rapidly. Estonia's current account – the spread between savings and investment – is practically in balance. Thus, the financing of the economy's current expenditure is ensured by current income. Any external current financing needs will be covered by official EU funds. The correction of labour market and the rapid decline in inflation are just as important. The sharp increase in prices and wages following Estonia's accession to the EU is over. Price level in Estonia will decrease moderately both this and next year. This is an important factor supporting productivity growth in the economy. Let me now turn to euro adoption. The clear perspective of joining the euro area increases markedly Estonia's credibility and serves as the main factor supporting our economy in the near future.
Some inflation targeting central banks – Norway, New Zealand and Sweden – are now publishing charts which show how they expect to change policy rates to achieve their targets 6 . Should the MPC follow this trend? If you follow press reports of our regular Inflation Report forecasts, you might be forgiven for thinking we already have. But actually no: our forecasts take market expectations for interest rates as their starting point, and we leave commentators to draw their own inferences. We have maintained the position that we do not give hints about future interest rate changes. Naturally we are looking closely at what happens elsewhere and we will want to learn from their experience – though of course, since the MPC is not a consensual body, it would be a significant complication to get it to agree an explicit path for interest rates. 6  In addition, the Bank of Canada now includes text in its monetary policy report which indicates whether or not rates will have to change from their current level to meet the inflation target. BIS Review 20/2007  5  Have we become prisoners of our past success? Let me come, finally, to the biggest, and most difficult of the issues I want to raise tonight – namely the extent to which the stability of the past decade has conditioned expectations of what the MPC can and should do, in ways which may be both helpful and unhelpful to its ability to do its job.

In this context, an exact definition of the responsibilities of the SNB and FINMA is of central importance for optimal macroprudential supervision and regulation. The revised Memorandum of Understanding between the SNB and FINMA is an important step in this direction. Secondly, to ensure that the institutions involved can optimally carry out the roles assigned to them, it is also important to give them the right tools. In concrete terms, this means that the SNB would, for example, need to have more extensive information about the stability of financial institutions – regarding their risk exposure, interdependences, etc. – or it would require specific instruments enabling it to take the right decisions when implementing macroprudential policy. Thirdly, the crisis made it clear that closer international cooperation between regulatory authorities is vital. Functioning international coordination mechanisms are required to counter future crises earlier and more effectively. International cooperation is the only way to check undesirable developments on the globalised financial markets. BIS Review 121/2010  5  Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, the stable economic growth and low inflation of the last two decades could not prevent the emergence of vast imbalances in the global financial system, as the financial and economic crisis clearly showed. Such massive economic shocks are bound to have an impact on how central banks work. Nevertheless, ensuring price stability remains our top priority. The crisis made it evident that central banks have an effective set of instruments that can be used to mitigate the negative impact of financial crises.
Notes: the line for the UK shows the average of the BCC, CBI, CIPS and Bank of England Agents’ survey measures of investment intentions. The line for the US shows the Business Roundtable CEO Survey measure. Chart 12: UK financial system much more resilient Per cent 20  Per cent 16  18  Basel II core Tier 1 weighted average (left-hand scale)  14  16  Basel III common equity Tier 1 weighted average (right-hand scale)  12  Basel III definition of capital  10  CET1 ratio adjusted for 2016 stress test losses (right hand scale)  8  14 12 10  6  8  4  6  2  4 2  0 01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  Sources: PRA regulatory returns, published accounts and Bank calculations. See June 2017 Financial Stability Report for details of series. Notes: The chart shows major UK banks’ capital ratios as a percentage of their risk-weighted assets. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  Chart 13: Corporate bond spreads below historic averages Basis points 3000 Dashed lines: averages since 2000 Sterling  2500  2000 Euro 1500  US dollar  1000  500  0  Sources: Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Research and Bank calculations. Notes: Option-adjusted spreads.

M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul: Thailand - where we are now and what we are trying to do  Speech by Mr M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Asia Society Southern California Centre, on 3 October 2000. *  *  *  President of the Asia Society of Southern California, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Two years ago this month, I came to speak to this Society. It was to tell you how Thailand was getting along, what we were going to do and to solicit your support as friends of Thailand. Those of you who were present might recall the things I said we were going to do. They were very rudimentary as far as central banking goes, and that the economic and financial numbers then, whilst improving, were not necessarily a basis around which a good future could be built. The numbers are in many ways now better and we have gone on to do all the things which I said we would do and develop the more sophisticated mechanisms of central banking, such that we are far in advance of our indications two years ago. It is usually a happy occasion when one could report that one has done more than what one has set out to do. But I am not really a happy man today. The economy is still fragile, and there are vast areas left to be mapped out and implemented.
If the household has made an overly optimistic calculation of its loan costs and taken larger loans than its  2  See also Financial Stability Report 2005:2 for a more detailed discussion of house prices. 3  See also Financial Stability Report 2007:1 for the Riksbank’s analyses of households’ margins. BIS Review 56/2007  3  incomes can manage to bear, this could lead to payment difficulties. However, this is a question of each individual household to take into account. US households have had problems paying their loan costs As a whole, Swedish households currently have a good ability to pay. As many of you have probably heard, there has been rather more turbulence with regard to US mortgage customers recently. A growing percentage of US households have had problems paying their loan costs. Property prices in the United States have also risen substantially since the mid-1990s. As in Sweden the higher prices have led to increased indebtedness among households. In the United States the subprime mortgage market has also increased rapidly in recent years. This group includes in principle all mortgage customers who cannot show that they have a credit history sufficient to be granted a normal mortgage. These can be households with records of non-payment of debts, low or undocumented incomes. Thanks to the subprime mortgage market these households have been given an opportunity to enter the housing market. When US property prices rose, the competition among mortgage institutions intensified over these volumes.

Around half of these loans are at variable interest rates and can thereby be initially affected by higher interest rates, and it is households with these loans who have experienced problems in paying them. Most US households still have a good ability to pay. At the same time, the financial institutions have, on the whole, strong balance sheets. This means that even a relatively large deterioration in credit quality in this sector would only lead to limited losses for the mortgage market as a whole. On the other hand, it is not impossible that developments may affect the US households’ consumption. Are there risks with subprime loans in Sweden? Can we expect to see a similar development in Sweden? No, I do not see any risk at present that we will experience this type of development in the Swedish mortgage market. In Sweden, loans to the subprime sector comprise an extremely small percentage of the total number of mortgages, no more than 0.5 per cent. The percentage is much lower in Sweden than in the United States. This is largely because our mortgage market and the US mortgage market are very different. In Sweden, lenders focus primarily on the borrower’s ability to repay. We also have greater access to information on borrowers’ incomes and assets, which makes it easier to assess credit risks. The Swedish and US mortgage institutions also have different methods of financing their lending.
The efforts of the city and the state, starting in the mid-1980s, to redevelop the Theatre District and Times Square area played an important role in revitalizing tourism. But, of course, the city’s well-deserved reputation for culture and arts goes well beyond Broadway—to the hundreds of Off-Broadway and neighborhood theaters, museums, music venues and organizations like yours. Supporting this cultural infrastructure is important to maintaining a vibrant economy and a bright future. The experience of New York City, which has gone from crisis to vibrancy, shows that the past need not be prologue for the future. It also shows that a well-managed regime of fiscal control can help begin the process for future recovery. Other cities and regions are at different points in this journey. Puerto Rico, for example, which has been in recession for many years and which defaulted on its debt obligations earlier this year, is at a particularly critical juncture. On the positive side, the fact that Congress has enacted legislation, the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act, or PROMESA, does provide a way forward. The prospect for good fiscal stewardship has improved and this is an essential first step in the Island’s recovery. As I have noted elsewhere, there are significant opportunities for action that can leverage the Island’s strengths to foster economic growth. These include its bilingual adult population, an open economy occupying a central position in the Caribbean, wide experience as host to international corporations and close economic ties to the U.S. mainland.

Moreover, the aim of deposit protection is to protect small retail depositors, i.e. depositors with deposits of less than $ and DTCs and RLB do not have such depositors. However, the issue of whether their exclusion from coverage might adversely affect the business of RLBs and DTCs needs to be considered. Certainly one might argue that as the first $ of deposits of over $ with licensed banks would be covered, the same should apply to deposits with RLBs and DTCs. This is something that we will consider further in the light of the views that have been expressed. 5. Moving on to the issue of deregulation, July, of course, will see the full abolition of controls on interest rates. This is highly significant, as such controls are surely inimical to Hong Kong’s free competition ethos. Certainly this change in the status quo will provide certain challenges for institutions, but in the long run the competition, innovation and efficiency that the removal of such barriers will engender will help to keep Hong Kong’s banking sector competitive and profitable. We also, as you know, hold the view that some greater consolidation among the local banks would be desirable from this point of view, although we have not forced the issue. This is something, however, to which we would urge bank owners to give careful thought. 6. It is clear that as part of the process of deregulation of interest rates banks will be considering revising certain fees and charges. This, of course, is understandable.
The drafting of the Report took into account several constraints, two of which I would like to mention. 3/14  On one hand, the obligation to maintain the confidentiality of individual banks’ data. The Report contains ample information on credit institutions, including intervention processes and the public aid granted, but it cannot go into details linked to the supervision of individual institutions whose confidentiality is legally protected, or assess those matters that are currently the subject of proceedings initiated in the courts. As to the period studied, although 2008 is the year the crisis started, the analysis is from 2000, on the understanding that it is impossible to explain the crisis without reviewing its sources and causes, which go back to the previous decade. Moreover, the year 2014 has been chosen as the date to close off the period considered, bearing in mind that it was the end of this year that saw the start-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and that the measures envisaged in the Memorandum of Understanding entered into with the European Commission in July 2012 may be deemed to be concluded. In short, the seven years from 2008 to 2014 match quite closely the period which saw the emergence and development of the crisis, its treatment and the start of the recovery. The Report explains the measures applied, which should be considered in their macroeconomic and financial setting, one which progressively changed over the period in question.

The first half of 2012 saw a stepping up of so-called “redenomination” risk, which was a euphemism for the doubts over certain countries, Spain among them, remaining in the euro area and, indeed, over the survival of the single currency. In March, a second bail-out was approved for Greece and, in May, with the inconclusive Greek elections, rumours were again unleashed about the country exiting the Monetary Union. In parallel, there was a fresh bout of tension centred on Spain and on Italy, where two-year risk premia relative to the German Bund climbed to over 700 and 500 basis points, respectively. Fears intensified in Spain over the impact of the double-dip recession on the position of credit institutions and on the feedback loop between sovereign and banking risk. Funding conditions on the wholesale markets once again tightened and net fund outflows to the external sector stepped up, totalling € billion in cumulative 12-month terms, 29% of GDP. In mid-2012, Spain was facing what was practically a collapse in external funding, which it was able to offset with a substantial increase in Eurosystem funding, which came to account for € billion in August 2012, 34% of the liquidity injected by the Eurosystem into banks across the whole euro area.
Thus, measured according to the costs of living index, the annual rate of inflation in 2001 on December basis (December 2001 / December 2000) is projected to equal 1.2%. In that sense, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia will continue with its intention to preserve that inflation rate to low, stable and predictable level, which is in compliance with the empirically confirmed knowledge that the price stability creates the most favorable macroeconomic environment for accelerated, long-term sustainable economic growth. The second aspect of the domestic currency stability is preserving the stability of the Denar exchange rate. The National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia managed to preserve the nominal exchange rate of the Denar against the Deutsche Mark at the targeted level of Denar 31 per 1 Deutsche Mark. The exchange rate stability was preserved, despite the developments on the foreign exchange market, where the supply significantly exceeded the demand for foreign currency. As a result, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia intervened on the foreign exchange market in order to prevent the appreciation of the domestic currency – Denar. From the beginning of the year to December 31, 2000,  BIS Review 9/2001  1  net-amount of USD 190.1 million was purchased on the foreign exchange market. Relating other currencies, the Denar fluctuated according to the changes of the exchange rate of the Deutsche Mark against these currencies on the world markets.

The higher purchase of foreign currency on the foreign exchange market acted towards increase in the NBRM gross foreign exchange reserves. On December 30, 2000 they 1 reached USD 713.6 million, thus increasing by USD 235.5 million compared to the end of 1999 . In 2000, the upward trend of the deposits with the banks continued due to the gradual strengthening of the confidence of the economic agents in the banking sector. Thus, on annual basis (December 2000 / December 1999), the total non-government deposits with the money deposit banks increased by Denar 6,906 million, or by 23.1%. In addition, the foreign exchange deposits registered more intensive growth of 49.1%, while the Denar deposits increased by 13.9%. Analyzed by maturity, both short-term and long-term deposits increased by 27.0% and 4.4%, respectively. It should be underlined that in 2000, the banks’ credit activity registered considerable expansion. Thus, in December 2000 relative to the same month of the previous year the total banks’ credits in favor of the non-government sector (according to the actual balance) increased by Denar 6,042 million, or by 17.2%. A good and close coordination between the monetary and fiscal policy created a room for such an increase in the credits, significant increment in the liquidity of the banks, removal of the credit ceilings by the NBRM and increased banks’ deposit potential. With respect to the currency of denomination, the increment in the total banks’ credits is solely due to the increased Denar credits, whereas the foreign currency placements registered a fall.