samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This indicates, again, the willingness of the government to undertake additional spending to support the recovery of the economy. On the monetary and financial side, the Bank of Thailand has ensured that monetary conditions remained sufficiently accommodative to support the recovery. We reduced our policy rate down to 0.5 percent which is as low as it has ever been in the history of the Bank of Thailand. In addition, financing conditions were also accommodative and supportive of economic recovery. For example, 10-year government bond yields in Thailand stand at only about 1.7 percent which is almost at a record low. Although we have not reached a zero or negative rate as we see in Japan, but for Thailand, it is a very low interest rate. For the overall liquidity, the loan to deposit ratios in the banks, as well as other measures of liquidity, indicate that overall liquidity is high. Nevertheless, the problem is that not all the liquidity is going where it needs to. In particular, we would like to see more liquidity being distributed to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). If we look at credit growth in Thailand and this is another illustration of my point that overall liquidity in Thailand remains adequate, credit growth to large corporates has been growing at over 10 percent a year. Even for the household sector, credit growth has also been growing at about 4 percent a year. However, the segment where credit growth has been shrinking is the SMEs.

This is because traceability in our food products allows customers to realize the added values; whether they are transgenic or organic. This is one of the examples that the presence of the digital technology gives us the potential to move up the value chain in terms of food, which will provide large benefits in terms of employment and income due to Thailand’s high employment exposure in the agricultural and related sectors. Apart from food, tourism is another sector that would benefit from digital technologies. Currently, most of our tourism would stay for a short period of time and hence do not spend much. However, the digital technology’s trend towards work-from-anywhere provides the opportunity for us to attract different types of tourists who come, work, and stay for a long time. They are able to work from anywhere using working-from-anywhere technology which provides significantly higher value-added for the tourism sector. Because of that, one area that needs the improvement immediately is our visas and other regulations which are preventing us to realize possibilities from increasing values that we get from foreigners and foreign workers. Another area that people talk about is medical tourism. With the help from telemedicine technology, patients will able to come here because the technology allows them to talk to their doctor back in their home country while the actual medical treatments are provided by the doctor here in Thailand.
These include most notably a lack of funds for saving, cost, distance from the nearest branch, a lack of education and the absence of the financial infrastructures needed to improve the availability of financial services. It is indeed here where new technologies can contribute decisively to overcoming or lowering these barriers. Technology can reduce many fixed costs, traditionally associated with the development of financial services, while providing for a greater adaptation of supply on the basis of each society’s idiosyncratic characteristics. Unsurprisingly, then, the technological proposals linked to financial inclusion hail from different areas. We can find them in traditional financial institutions, in the new fintech companies, in telecommunications corporations and in the large technology consortiums known as bigtech. As to scope, one of the activities concentrating the bulk of the initiatives is payments. Thus, in the past decade we have seen so-called mobile money – i.e. transactional services offered mainly by mobile operators – become commonplace. Adding to these, more recently digital wallet solutions have emerged with multiple functionalities and specific proposals for international remittances. Aside from the progress in payment solutions, developments on intermediation markets are providing for improvements in the financing of those groups with a greater degree of financial exclusion, such as microenterprises and small agricultural producers. However, these developments are not spontaneous or uniform from one country to another.

But, of course, it would also entail lower risk for bank equity and bond investors, and surely it is risk-adjusted returns that matter. And it would also deliver lower risk to society more generally, which matters hugely. To be clear, we want banks and the financial sector more generally to thrive. The institution I come from believes in a market economy, in capitalism. The financial sector has played an enormous role in the development of modern economies. But a regime in which banks can thrive standing on your own feet would be a better market – for all of us. BIS Review 83/2009  9
Needless to say, we have built up the relevant capacities and necessary know-how in this area. But the changes go much deeper. In simple terms, the growing importance of the exchange rate instrument has meant that the SNB has had to catch up rapidly with the structural changes that have taken place in the foreign exchange market in recent decades, especially in relation to the introduction of electronic trading. As you probably know, transactions on the spot and foreign exchange swap markets are now largely conducted on electronic platforms. Since 2010, we have been carrying out virtually all our foreign exchange transactions on such platforms. Electronic trading has made the foreign exchange market faster and more transparent. For instance, live streaming of prices enables market participants to precisely determine the price and the market conditions before a transaction is conducted. In order to take account of these changes, we use the latest techniques to carry out our transactions and implement our trading strategies. Electronic trading also brings advantages for the ex post analysis of transactions. For example, we are able to closely monitor individual foreign exchange transactions to gain insights into their effects and adapt our approach as necessary. Page 6/8  Overall, the foreign exchange market today is much more decentralised and the market participants far more heterogeneous than before. This means that the number and variety of market contacts required in order to understand the foreign exchange market and the demand for Swiss francs has also increased.

Speech  Embargo 17 November 2016, 6.30 pm  Financial markets and monetary policy implementation – an evolving relationship Money Market Event  Andréa M. Maechler Member of the Governing Board ∗ Swiss National Bank Geneva, 17 November 2016 © Swiss National Bank (speech given in French)  ∗ The speaker would like to thank Dirk Faltin and Martin Weder for their valuable support in drafting this speech. She also extends her thanks to Roman Baumann, Oliver Gloede and Marco Huwiler for their helpful comments, to Ramon Jud for preparing the data and to the SNB Language Services. Page 1/8  Ladies and gentlemen Welcome to the SNB’s Money Market Event in Geneva. It is a great pleasure for me to be able to address you here today for the second time. Last year, my speech centred entirely around monetary policy itself. Today, I would like to focus on its implementation in the financial markets. As you know, central banks in the advanced economies have expanded their monetary policy toolkits considerably since the peak of the global financial crisis in 2008. This has changed the way in which they act on the financial markets. Traditionally, the money market interest rate has been the key monetary policy variable. In the last few years, central banks have used unconventional measures to exert a more or less direct influence on other financial market prices as well. This was and is the only way to fulfil their mandate in difficult times.
The size of payments will then depend on how much has been saved, the pension period and calculated return. Under a defined-benefit pension programme, life insurance companies and pension funds – or those behind them – in a sense offer insurance against a form of absolute risk to which everyone is exposed. Absolute risk may, for example, be a change in economic developments as a result of major disturbances to the world economy or the domestic economy. Under a defined-contribution pension scheme, the individual member assumes the absolute risk. With a larger share of pension savings in defined-contribution schemes, some of the risk that is now being borne by insurance companies will be transferred to members. One problem that may arise in connection with defined-contribution schemes is that members end up with benefit payments that are  BIS Review 48/2002  9  markedly lower than expected. Therefore, it would also be appropriate to apply risk limits to definedcontribution pension schemes. Conclusion The local government sector employs a rising share of workers in our country, accounting for close to 25 per cent of employment today. The behaviour of local government, as a user of labour and employer, is of considerable importance for economic developments and also for the inflation outlook. The local government sector is a major user of financial service, both as borrower and as buyer of insurance products. Norway has a well-developed financial system, but its bond market is small compared with other countries.

Titles of the boxes are shown on the slide. I strongly recommend that you read these boxes, which will be published on our web-site shortly. Now, I would like to convey the main messages of the report. Firstly, I will touch upon the global economy and then move on to the monetary policy. The last quarter of 2012 was marked by an improvement in the risk appetite (Chart 1). Concrete steps taken towards the resolution of the Euro area problems as well as the favorable news regarding the US and Chinese economies were the leading developments that fed into the risk sentiment. On the other hand, quantitative easing policies were sustained amid the persisting sluggish growth outlook in advanced economies. Continued monetary easing at a global scale accompanied by increased risk appetite led to an acceleration in portfolio flows towards emerging economies (Chart 2). We are of the opinion that all these developments once again highlighted the importance of a flexible monetary policy framework. Chart 1. Global Risk Appetite  Chart 2. Portfolio Flows to Emerging Economies (Billion USD)  Source: Credit Suisse, Bloomberg. Source: CBRT. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  1. Monetary policy and monetary conditions  In this period of extraordinary global circumstances, the policy framework designed by the CBRT plays a great role in confining the adverse impacts of global shocks in Turkey. Particularly the year 2012 was marked by the fruitful implementation of our policy mix.
The correction of this imbalance is particularly pressing in that the reliance on external saving has become a major factor of vulnerability of the Spanish economy during the crisis. The increased dependence on external financing in the pre-crisis period is the consequence of the sizeable accumulation of debt by households and firms, which also led to the Spanish banking system becoming oversized. The need to correct these imbalances poses an added difficulty to recovery in the economy, given that it restricts the headroom available to raise investment and consumption through resort to external financing. It is also crucial to continue with the restructuring of the banking system. Hence, when solvent demand recovers, it may be serviced by a normal flow of financing which, both in Spain and in the rest of continental Europe, is routed essentially through credit institutions. But households and firms still have a relatively lengthy process of debt reduction ahead of them. Accordingly, in the short term, the recovery in growth cannot be credit-led as in the past. Along these lines, credit to the non-financial private sector in 2011 fell by around 4%, although there were significant differences from sector to sector. In the case of households the pace of debt reduction was somewhat slower, whereas in that of firms the reduction in credit was more marked in those sectors, such as construction and real estate development, that had become oversized to a greater extent before the crisis.

However, where the service provider is not the regulator, it is hard to coordinate and preserve the character of accessibility. The UK regulators have taken bold steps to outsource the service provider’s role and concentrate on the regulatory role, while USA, Sri Lanka and India are still trying to strike a balance between the dual roles, which we have inherited for decades. 2. Retail payments outlook and prospects  2.1 Retail banking is still the main force in banking, and is likely to stay that way for the foreseeable future, despite the relentless growth of investment banking, corporate banking and other forms of services. In 2006, retail banking business accounted for euro 1,220 bn in revenue, or about 57% of the global banking revenue pool of euro 2,150 bn. The world over, banks continue to open branches and attempt to make their branches more attractive for retail payments. Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh and many of the SAARC countries are members of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), Asia-Pacific Trade Agreements (APTA), The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and several other trade agreements. During 2002-2006, exports in the SAARC region as a ratio of world exports rose from 1.09 to 1.29 percent, of which India accounted for more than 75 percent. Although firm numbers are not available for 2007, exports are estimated to have increased at a significant rate followed by higher cross-border payments.
All these preconditions were weaker in the United States and the euro area. Lastly, Sweden does not have the major structural problems that have arisen in the economies of those countries hit by a “boom-bust” cycle on the housing market – problems that have been reflected in a substantial weakening of public finances. House prices recovered after a slight turndown in connection with the crisis and are now at a higher level than before the crisis began. While we continue to follow developments in the Swedish housing market, structural factors, such as a low level of construction and traditionally low levels of credit losses on Swedish mortgages, reduce the likelihood of major price falls in the near future. What have we learnt from the crisis? It would be wrong to focus solely on the factors that explain Sweden’s relatively strong recovery. There were also a number of vulnerabilities in the Swedish institutional set up and banking system which threatened to increase the severity and length of the downturn. The major Swedish banks are heavily reliant on international funding and liquidity in these markets fell sharply following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. To protect the banking system, the Riksbank provided general liquidity assistance in the form of loans in SEK and USD at long maturities. This liquidity assistance was substantial: it peaked at around 15 per cent of GDP and lasted for over two years. Some Swedish banks were also exposed to significant risks through their operations in the Baltic countries.

Stefan Ingves: Coming stronger out of a crisis – lessons from Sweden Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Brussels Economic Forum, Brussels, 18 May 2011. *  *  *  “If in debt, you are not free.” This expression was widely used by Göran Persson, Sweden’s former prime minister, to explain the need for the extensive fiscal consolidation process that Sweden underwent after the crisis in the 1990s.1 In 1997, a three-year nominal expenditure ceiling was introduced. This was an important step towards increasing budgetary discipline and strengthening the long-term perspective of the budget process. In addition, as part of this fiscal consolidation process, a new fiscal policy framework that included a budget surplus target of 1 per cent over the business cycle was introduced in the year 2000. With these instruments in place the debt to GDP ratio fell from 56 per cent in the year 2000 to 35 per cent today. Recent developments in many European countries remind us of Göran Persson’s words: small, open economies are vulnerable to crises of confidence when financial markets are in turmoil. They need to stand on very solid economic foundations and be supported by a credible and sound fiscal-policy framework. Sweden was lucky enough to be in this position when the recent crisis struck. This was indeed fortunate as the crisis had a major impact on the Swedish economy. GDP fell by more than 5 per cent in 2009 – the largest fall since the 1930s.
Change in the functioning of payments infrastructures is to be a key enabler if such a result is to be obtained. The sector of wholesale payments is about to enter a crucial stage of consolidation due to the launch of TARGET 2 by central banks. A breakthrough is also necessary on the retail side: in the field of infrastructures this breakthrough should notably mean  BIS Review 49/2005  3  interoperability so that through increased competition, the market selects the best infrastructures for the SEPA. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS Review 49/2005

There could be sound reasons for this, although opinion is divided on the matter. Let us examine Iceland’s current interest rates more closely, ignoring for the moment the problems associated with pursuing independent monetary policy in small, open economies with unrestricted capital flows, which I will mention later. Let us also assume that inflation expectations remain at target, as they are at present. The question of whether or not a nominal policy rate of 5.25% is appropriate then centres on what is considered to be the equilibrium real policy rate; i.e., the interest rate that would keep inflation at target when the economy is in balance. With inflation expectations at 2½%, the real policy rate is currently just over 2½%. Before the financial crisis, the equilibrium policy rate was estimated to be quite a bit higher. As is the case elsewhere, it has probably fallen in the wake of the crisis. Furthermore, recent success in monetary policy may mean that we do not need as high an interest rate as before to keep inflation at target. We do not know how much the equilibrium rate has fallen, although the subject has been under close scrutiny within the Bank and has been discussed repeatedly at Monetary Policy Committee meetings. The newest research on the assessment of the equilibrium real rate will be presented at a seminar held at the Central Bank on 29 November. Perhaps there will be scope in the future to lower the short-term real rate as measured by inflation expectations somewhat further.
Svensson also took up the possibility, as a last resort and in a hypothetical situation with a zero interest rate and very low inflation expectations, of introducing a temporary exchange rate target to bring up inflation expectations. This method would involve first introducing a price level target and then depreciating the currency to attain this price level target. It would in theory make inflation expectations rise and inflation accelerate. The real interest rate would therefore be lower, which would stimulate production and employment. My own opinion is that the Riksbank should not even temporarily hold the krona exchange rate at an artificially low level. When the repo rate is cut, this normally means that the krona weakens. But the current weakening of the krona began back in August last year before the repo rate cuts were made and ought mainly to be due to the financial crisis. There are primarily three reasons against temporary interventions to keep the krona at a low level. The first is that there is no reason to do this, as underlying inflation and inflation expectations are close to 2 per cent. The second reason is that the current problem is that this is a global crisis and all countries cannot depreciate their currencies at the same time to stimulate production and push up inflation. The third is that our experiences of trying to solve problems by depreciating the currency are not positive.

The central banks have also cut policy rates rapidly and forcefully, sometimes in coordinated actions, to alleviate the repercussions of the financial crisis on production and employment. Governments have offered guarantees and capital injections to reduce the risk of further bankruptcies in the banking sector. Several countries have also decided on large fiscal policy stimulation packages. 2  BIS Review 25/2009  The measures taken by central banks and governments around the world so far have contributed to reducing the pressure on the interbank markets. Without these measures the financial markets would probably have ceased functioning entirely. One sign that the crisis is no longer as acute is that the TED spreads have fallen in Sweden, as well as the United States and the euro area. The spreads are now back at around the same levels that prevailed immediately prior to the worsening of the crisis in 2008. But the financial markets are still functioning much less efficiently than normal. It is also still difficult for companies to finance themselves in the capital market. The Riksbank has also implemented a large number of unconventional measures to safeguard financial stability and mitigate the negative effects of the financial crisis. During the second half of 2008 the Riksbank increased its lending to the banks by more than SEK 450 billion. Almost SEK 200 billion of this was comprised of loans in US dollars. We have largely financed this through a swap agreement with the Fed.