samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the forefront are the regulatory requirements on banks’ equity capital and liquidity through laws and ordinances by the federal government and FINMA. Moreover, in Switzerland, the self-regulation rules for banks also constitute an important element. Thus, the relevant legal requirements are supplemented by rules and guidelines set by the Swiss Bankers Association, which FINMA can also recognise as a minimum standard. 8 This instrument has been applied several times over the past few years in relation to the mortgage and real estate markets. 8  Cf. finma.ch/en/documentation/self-regulation/ (consulted on 30 August 2021). Page 6/12  At international level, the SNB participates in various committees and working groups, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The recommendations and agreements of these bodies in turn have a major influence on our national legislation. One example of this is the CCyB. It was devised at international level and introduced in Switzerland in 2012 by means of a Federal Council ordinance. The CCyB is a key instrument for counteracting imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets. When activated, banks are obliged to temporarily increase their equity capital beyond the levels imposed by existing capital requirements, depending on the magnitude of the vulnerabilities. The CCyB is designed to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector against the risks of excessive credit growth and also to counter any unsustainable credit growth. The capital buffer in Switzerland has so far been targeted at mortgage loans granted for residential real estate.

The third challenge is that we are currently living with genuine uncertainty. Who could have imagined in autumn 2019 that spring 2020 would turn out the way it did? * I would like to thank Mårten Löf, who has helped me with this speech. Moreover, I have received valuable comments from Charlotta Edler, Mattias Erlandsson, Rebecka Hallerby, Peter Kaplan and Marianne Sterner. 1 [6]  Monetary policy has pushed down market rates During the spring, the Riksbank has decided on a number of monetary policy measures. When financial markets do not function as normal, the credit supply in the economy is threatened. Here, I wish to highlight four measures that the Riksbank has implemented.1 The first has concerned buying government bonds, mortgage bonds and municipal bonds, as well as commercial paper for a total of SEK 300 billion. The Riksbank has, secondly, decide to give the banks the opportunity to borrow from the Riksbank so they can in turn offer loans to companies, SEK 500 billion has been allocated for this purpose. The third measure gives the banks the opportunity to borrow an unlimited amount from the Riksbank. And the fourth measure is the Riksbank's decision to lend up to 60 billion US dollars to banks that need foreign currency. These measures have two effects. They facilitate credit supply as the Riksbank in this way supplies more money to the financial system. When the volume of money increases, there is also downward pressure on market rates.
By adopting the new banking law in the Republic of Albania and a range of other monetary policy and banking supervision-related decisions, we have aimed at firming up the macroeconomic balances further and strengthening financial stability. At the focus of the Bank of Albania’s strategy were the good governance and better risk management, improved banking activity transparency to the customer and the strengthening of internal control. This strategy peaked with a large-scale, exceptional and contemporary programme of open and constant communication with the public. I believe that the favourable liquidity and capital situation characterizing the Albanian banking system on the eve of the financial crisis last fall helped to cope with the withdrawal of deposits during September-October 2008. However, the Bank of Albania deemed as necessary the prudent monitoring of the situation and took a number of actions, which alleviated the pressures over the banking system substantially. These actions helped to relax the liquidity situation and they were in harmony with the ECB’s operational response to the crisis. First, an ad-hoc task force was set up. Its main responsibility was and remains the daily monitoring of each individual bank. Our direct conclusion was that the analysis should consider all micro-level aspects, each and every cell of the system and indicators. Second, a number of facilities were adopted for the incessant supply of the system with the required liquidity.

This situation may have considerable implications for the long-term economic growth rates in the regional countries, which still are in need for foreign financial funds to support their  BIS Review 118/2009  3  convergence process. Therefore, I believe that the crisis has called for another lesson: the need to draft and implement joint regional programmes and structural reforms to absorb projects and financing lines, which will in turn expand and deepen our joint Balkan market. It is true that after each crisis, macroeconomics as a science has made steps forward. Each crisis represents an event with specific characteristics, dissimilar or partly dissimilar from the previous crises. Each crisis brings in new information, regardless of the intensity, geographic extension or duration. Each crisis fills in a piece of the hard puzzle of free-market economy functioning, helping to a better understanding of the whole. I hope to provide a consensual conclusion if I say that we, the administrators, had the fortune to govern in a time of crisis and that we have a motive to feel privileged – and why not proud – to have coped with the challenge, being witnesses and active players in that regard. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS Review 118/2009
Jean-Pierre Danthine: The strong franc and the future of Switzerland’s financial market infrastructure – two current challenges for the Swiss National Bank Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at a Money Market Event, Geneva, 3 November 2011. *  *  *  The speaker would like to thank Marlene Amstad, Anna Faber, Peter Kuster, Angelo Ranaldo, Andy Sturm, Dominik Salierno and Andreas Wehrli for their valuable support in drafting this speech and preparing this presentation. Introduction In today’s global economy, central banks face no shortage of challenges. Of the many issues we confront, I will discuss two that are currently of particular relevance to the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The strength of the Swiss franc is on everyone’s mind. This summer it became a predicament of unprecedented dimensions and it continues to put tremendous pressure on the Swiss economy. I will address this topic in the second part of my speech. By contrast, the challenge I will discuss first – the future of Switzerland’s financial market infrastructure (FMI) – is not making headlines at present. Essentially, the term FMI encompasses the exchanges, central counterparties, settlement systems, central securities depositories and other service providers which support the financial system. This infrastructure is central to the functioning of financial markets. It is crucial for the implementation of monetary policy and participants’ access to central bank liquidity. As long as the FMI functions smoothly, it rarely attracts public attention.

However, that would then require a change  1  Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf. 2  See the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón on Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler, et al. and Fraktion DIE LINKE im Deutschen Bundestag v Deutscher Bundestag (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany)) delivered on 14 January 2015, paragraph 38 ff. BIS central bankers’ speeches  21–22  June  1993,  1  to the European treaties. There is no provision for a transfer union in the current Treaty. And whether you like it or not, that applies to the front door as well as the back door. This is something which those who call for more (financial) solidarity must realise. More solidarity within Europe in this sense would also require more European control. But we don’t yet have a “euro area parliament” with the democratic legitimation for this, or a supranational budget worthy of this name. At the moment I see correspondingly little willingness from national parliaments to relinquish their budgetary powers in order to centralise them at the European level. The flipside of this coin, however, is that Member States, with their own national budgets, have disproportionately more individual responsibility. Even without financial transfers, there must be reasons why it is more attractive for Member States to be part of the Monetary Union than to stay outside it. In addition, they must be better off in the euro area than out.
At the same time, the ECB may apply more stringent measures than those envisaged at the national level, giving sufficient notice to the national designated authorities, which may raise objections for their consideration by the ECB. The design of the SSM’s governance arrangements was conditioned by the governance structure of the ECB, whose decision-making bodies are the Governing Council and the Executive Board, as set out in the TFEU and its Statute. With the two-fold aim of ensuring that the assumption of new supervisory competences by the ECB does not jeopardise its independence in the determination and implementation of monetary policy, and of allowing all national supervisors to participate in the ECB’s decision-making (given that prudential supervision is not the responsibility of central banks in all Member States and that national authorities are not represented in the Governing Council), the SSM Regulation established a new internal body, the Supervisory Board, responsible for planning and carrying out supervisory tasks. The Supervisory Board comprises a Chair (appointed for a non-renewable term of five years), a Vice-Chair (chosen from among the members of the ECB’s Executive Board), four ECB representatives and one representative from each national supervisor. It is currently made up of 27 members with voting rights: its Chair, its Vice-Chair,9 four ECB representatives and the representatives of the 21 NCAs of the participating Member States. In the case of Spain, the representative of the Banco de España, in its capacity as national supervisory authority, is the Deputy Governor.

Even though I am not the strongest advocate of our government bond purchases, we do not finance individual governments with them, directly or indirectly. Our aim is to maintain price stability. Thanks to our bond purchases, interest rates go down and loans become cheaper, primarily benefiting households and businesses. Besides, we have a very clear set of criteria for the timing, selection and volumes of our government bond purchases. Our parameters ensure that the private market for government bonds remains intact. One sign of the continuing relevance of this market is the divergence in the prices for German, Italian and Spanish government bonds. Another criticism is that the ECB defers problems rather than solving them. Owing to the low interest rates, cheap credit is even available to firms that are no longer competitive, and would otherwise have gone under long ago. These zombie firms tie up capital and employees, all of which is harmful to economic efficiency. We have only bought corporate bonds with high ratings. This has indeed improved financing conditions predominantly for the companies in question, but also indirectly for the firms with lower credit standing. However, banks lending to companies must take the risk involved into account in their financing conditions. So, basically, the higher the risk, the more expensive the loan. Moreover, European banking supervision requires more capital to cover the risk and looks very closely at credit standards. And indeed: not every group in the euro area can borrow for five years at less than 3% interest.
Finally, another important supervisory development has been the adoption, in 2004, of a risk based supervisory approach by SAMA. This has significantly strengthened and made more efficient the onsite and off-site supervision practiced by SAMA. This approach is proactive and requires enhanced and frequent communication with banks at all levels. It brings SAMA supervision fully in line with the new international standards. In recent years, the strength of the Saudi banking system and SAMA’s sound banking supervision practices have been recognized by a number of important international institutions. One of the findings of the Financial Sector Assessment Program by an IMF/WB Team in 2005 indicated that the SAMA Banking Supervision, fully or largely met the 25 Basle Core Principles. On the other hand, external rating agencies including S&P, Fitch and Capital Intelligence in 2004 and 2005 have issued favourable reports on the Saudi Banking system. The recent external rating upgrade by S&P to A+ reflects the inherent strength of the domestic banking system. The developments of the banking sector have been reflected positively on the performance of the Saudi economy. Over the preceding three years, GDP (at current prices) have increased by an annual average growth rate of 18.1%, and private sector GDP by 6.7%. Money supply has grown by an annual average rate of 12.9%, providing adequate liquidity to growth requirements of the economy.

Over these decades, the economic environment has been characterized by freedom of capital flows, open investment climate, low inflation, stable financial system and availability of ample liquidity. This has encouraged the rise in both domestic and foreign investment in the country. Particularly in the past two decades, the growth has been rapid in the non-oil private sector which has almost doubled and now represents over 44% of the annual GDP, while the percentage contribution of the oil sector has declined to around 33%. As for SAMA’s other major objective of supervising and regulating the financial system, SAMA has followed prudent policies aimed at creating a sound, stable, solid and efficient financial system with a modern payments system. SAMA’s Charter and the Banking Control Law give it broad regulatory powers to ensure that banks are adequately capitalized, having efficient managements, run by fit and proper Directors and Managers who meet competence and integrity requirements, and that the banks have fit and appropriate operation and control systems. Over this long period, prudent supervisory policies and timely action have ensured that banks stayed strong and solid. This is a remarkable achievement in the face of global and regional economic uncertainties, political crisis, wars and volatilities of the oil market. Today, Saudi banks play a leading role in the financial system that also includes five large specialized government development financing institutions and leasing, investment and insurance companies and a few money changers.
Otherwise the central bank will be unable to keep its promise. Throughout history, central banks have tried various mechanisms for tying themselves to the mast. Being accountable for their promises in the form reporting and follow-up is one mechanism that ensures that the bank is tied to the mast. Relinquishing the opportunity to break a promise makes that promise more credible. These are matters I touched on in my speech “On the topic of keeping promises” in 2008. Keeping a promise is difficult, because reneging on a promise will often be the tempting or rational choice in the short-term. The legal scholar and economist Michael Woodford has pointed out that in order to keep your word it is not enough to make a promise today and keep your word tomorrow. When making interest rate forecasts, we must also take into consideration the promises made yesterday. Only then can we fully use expectations to stabilise the economy optimally. This is referred to as monetary policy from a timeless perspective (Michael Woodford, 2003: Interest and Prices, Princeton University Press). Today there is general consensus that price stability is [not only] the best contribution that monetary policy can make to economic stability over time, [but perhaps also the only promise the central bank can actually deliver]. In the long term, a stable value of money is the only promise that the central bank has the means to deliver. This promise was previously kept by regulating the supply of money issued. Today, the interest rate is the instrument.

Management of specific, more common or day-to-day operational risks is not a new practice; it has always been important for banks to prevent fraud, maintain the integrity of internal controls and reduce errors in data transaction processing, ensuring the availability of information technology infrastructure and their back up systems when needed. More often than not, operational risks are taken as given and very little attention has been paid to it. Operational risk is intrinsic to financial institutions and it should be an important component of their firm-wide risk management systems. However, operational risk is harder to quantify and model than market and credit risks. Operational risk differs from other banking risks. It is a risk that is not willfully incurred in return for an expected reward but is implicit in the ordinary course of banking business and has the potential to affect the risk management process. However, ignorance of operational risks or failure to properly manage such risk can result in a misstatement of an institution's risk profile and expose the institution to significant losses. Such institutions can become a regulatory burden. These and a few other factors have led the Basel Committee to recommend a separate capital for operational risk. 3. Definition of operational risk has evolved rapidly over the past few years. First, it was commonly defined as every type of unquantifiable risk faced by a bank, which has been refined considerably to include modern day risks.
At the very least, firms and households are likely to delay major expenditure decisions until things become clearer. And this may act as a drag on the recovery in activity. The rise in the cost of security and insurance will also probably have a more long-lasting effect on activity. Discussion of the attacks has somewhat obscured the fact that the world economy seemed to be slowing more rapidly than expected even before 11 September. Overall activity in the US had been weak, despite continued strength in some sectors, notably retail. And the euro area grew by just 0.1% in the second quarter, as net trade slowed sharply. The monetary policy reaction has of course been rapid. In the United States, in particular, interest rates have already been reduced by four percentage points since the start of the year. And fiscal policy has been expanded. These actions should clearly stimulate demand. But, as is always the case, the size and timing of these effects is extremely hard to judge. 2  BIS Review 87/2001  So far this year, the UK economy has fared rather better than its main trading partners. GDP growth has slowed from the peaks it reached during 2000. But the economy still grew by 0.6% in the first quarter of this year, and 0.4% in the second. Much of that strength, of course, reflects domestic demand growth, and particularly household consumption, which rose a further 1.3% in Q2. In many ways, this should not be a surprise.

Published Date: 08 June 2022  "Towards Net Zero in Asia" - Opening Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Launch of GFANZ’s Asia Pacific Network Central Oﬀice on 8 June 2022 Friends and colleagues Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. There are four key enablers for the journey to net zero: carbon pricing in some form; emissions standards, across various activities; technological advances, in renewables as well as energy efficiency; green finance This fourth enabler is where the financial sector can play a critical role – both the financial industry and those who regulate it – in getting us to net zero. The starting point for climate action in the financial sector is through the gateway of risk management. Before the financial sector can do good, it must first ensure that it comes to no harm. Hence the importance of ensuring that the financial system is climate resilient – that it can identify and manage the risks associated with both climate change and mitigating actions. Seven years ago, Mark Carney – when he was chairman of the Financial Stability Board, and I had the great pleasure of working with him – socialised the importance of managing climate-related financial risks. The work that Mark initiated through the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) has led to a broad consensus today on the relevance of climate-related risks to financial decisions.
But it is a fair bet that, if we had, then we would have put the chances of a contraction as large as the ONS’s current estimate of 6% as being virtually negligible. It is worth stressing that we were not alone in thinking a very severe contraction in activity was unlikely. Almost all forecasters were in the same boat. For instance, when we prepare our projections each quarter, we also canvass the views of outside forecasting bodies. Their assessment of the probabilities of various ranges of possible outcomes was very similar to 1 ours. Chart 2 illustrates the same point, but puts it into a broader context. The blue line shows the actual path of four-quarter GDP growth over the period since the creation of the MPC, while the pink line shows the Committee’s central (mean) projection from a year earlier. The green bars show the range of end-year forecasts for the following year produced by about 25 other organisations, together with their corresponding average (the green diamonds). The striking feature is the close proximity of the MPC’s projections and the average of the outside forecasts throughout the sample. For most of the period – one in which, it should be said, growth was unusually stable – those forecasts are close to the subsequent outturns.

Since joining the EU and until 2018, Romania had accessed more than 21 billion EUR as EU funds that contributed to development and bridged the gap of convergence with developed economies in the EU. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  NBR’s recent research on the impact of EU funds on Romanian economy shows that an increase by 1 percentage point of GDP in structural and cohesion funds has a short term eﬀect of up to 0.7 percentage points on economic growth and a medium-term effect of up to 3 percentage points1. Thus, significant efforts should be made to guarantee that Romania improves the efficiency of EU funds absorption. In order to achieve that, Romania needs sound policies oriented towards macroeconomic balance and safeguarding financial stability. Foreign direct investments are also essential for economic growth. The picture here is mixed. During the second half of the year 2018 and in 2019, persistent pressures on global economic growth and subsequent downward revisions of expected growth rate impacted the investments and the reallocation of capital. Constant trade tensions, terrorism and geopolitical uncertainties are causing a slowdown in economies across the world. At the same time, new technologies have disrupted global value chains and the classic employment model, while new climate change related risks have emerged in the financial sector. On the other part, investing in companies with strong environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies, in green bonds and in new technologies supporting the digital economy, will contribute to achieving the Paris Agreement objectives and a sustainable development.