samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A key question for many supervisors, and particularly for our colleagues in emerging market jurisdictions, is whether the New Accord represents the next step to take. The Committee’s view has always been that the fundamentals come first. It is only after a solid foundation for a sound banking and regulatory system is in place that anyone should contemplate the more sophisticated requirements of the New Accord. Over time, it is our hope that more and more countries will adopt the new framework, but not before they are ready. The better capitalised and the better managed that all banking systems are worldwide, the more resistant the global financial system will become to periods of distress. For this reason, the Committee developed a “simplest standardised approach” during the consultations leading up to CP3. This approach has been developed with the assistance of some of our non-G10 colleagues. More recently, we have developed guidance to assist non-G10 supervisors in making decisions about adoption of Basel II and to help them achieve the transition in the way best suited to their national circumstances. Emerging market supervisors have welcomed both the simplest standardised approach and the transition guidance. And we will do more in this regard. We are currently considering how we might best enhance and upgrade our structures for co-operation with non-G10 countries at the Committee level. BIS Review 42/2003  3  Accounting Standards and Basel II I would like to turn now to the third topic on my list.

I should also stress that no formal decisions have yet been taken in this respect. As you probably know, the Committee will meet next month for the first time since the comment period closed. I can assure you that we will continue to do our utmost to ensure that you - the industry - can take advantage of the benefits of the new Accord at the earliest possible opportunity. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 42/2003  5
There is not a great deal that we can do – through monetary policy – directly to affect the supply-side of the economy, the underlying rate of growth that we can hope to sustain. Maintaining a stable monetary environment can certainly help, but that is essentially determined by the ingenuity and skills of our business managers and our workforce, by the whole range of Government policies and importantly too, Mr Chairman, by the imagination, energy and enthusiasm of organisations like your own Yorkshire Forward in developing and putting into effect your Regional Economic Strategy. Our job – as I say – is to keep overall demand in the economy growing broadly in line with supply-side capacity. BIS Review 2/2001  1  So how then are we doing? First on inflation. Since we came out of the last recession, in 1992, retail price inflation (on the Government’s target measure) has averaged 2.7%; it has in fact been marginally below the 2½% target for much of the past two years and was 2.0% in the latest 12 months to December. Short-term interest rates - which went up to 12% (and tentatively even to 15%) before we left the ERM in 1992 have been stable at 6% for the best part of a year. Helped by a decline in inflationary expectations, UK 10 year Government bond yields have fallen to around 4¾% which, apart from a brief period at the beginning of 1999, is the lowest they’ve been for nearly 40 years.

Many senior managers and specialists view their student days as a pivotal time in their lives, so the quality of teaching has a major impact on both economy and administration. Universities make a direct contribution to a country's prosperity by maintaining the necessary capabilities and developing and imparting knowledge that is useful for the economy and society. But their indirect contribution is just as important: Universities must enable their graduates to understand and appreciate the significance of the Swiss model for success. This model is based on the pillars of direct democracy, the rule of law, federalism and an awareness of the value of stable institutions. The terms 'markets' and 'competition' are key to understanding basic economic relationships, and are fundamental to ensuring prosperity, as well as to acquiring and applying new scientific knowledge. One of the tasks of a university is to provide its graduates and the general public with a realistic picture of the functioning and importance of markets and competition. Only in this way can the Swiss model for success endure in a world of constant change. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
We do appreciate that the System is still in a developmental phase and has yet to reach its ideal configuration. The arrival of ten new members, moreover, will not make things any easier for a time. I would nevertheless like to suggest that a collective effort be undertaken to rationalise the work of the ESCB, not least by containing the number of meetings in Frankfurt and elsewhere. The challenges posed by EMU are clearly diverse and vary from country to country as well as across time, depending on a host of factors ranging from the extent of catching-up that needs to be done and the tools available to policymakers, to the degree of cross-sectoral linkages and of consensus on the respective national strategies. In practice, however, the underlying economic causes are probably quite similar across countries, often being manifestations of macroeconomic imbalances and structural inefficiencies. As such they must be addressed sooner rather than later. Only in this way will it be possible for our countries to derive full benefit from EU membership. That probably hardly needs emphasizing in this forum because central bankers understand the importance of coherent policies designed to achieve a more efficient allocation and use of resources. At the same time, however, we are also conscious of the difficulties involved in reconciling what is conceptually desirable with what is feasible in practice.

In this regard it is reassuring that the recently concluded IMF/World Bank FSAP exercise found Malta’s financial system to be healthy and well supervised, with a comprehensive legal framework and strong adherence to most international standards and codes. An issue of special significance for central bankers is the need to preserve the integrity of their institutions. Although the experience of current euro area Member States already provides useful insights into the appropriate exchange rate strategies to be pursued prior to, and during ERM II, the acceding countries will have to arrive at this judgment on the basis of expectations of the future path of the economy. Expectations, however, are just that. This means having to stand ready to give satisfactory accounts of the rationale for the policy choices made, to explain deviations from targets and to ensure that governments introduce corrective measures without undue delay. Unfortunately, however, the information reaching economic operators, and financial markets in particular, is not always accurate. And yet, with only a few months to go to EU accession, the markets will be looking out for indications regarding the strategies we intend to pursue with respect to ERM II and entry in the euro area. It will be important, therefore, to be constantly on guard against any imprecise information which could provoke untoward market reactions. This highlights the importance of an effective communications strategy and of appropriate coordination between central banks and governments. In Malta the joint working committee established to elaborate the strategy for adopting the euro fulfils this role.
Chart 20: Ethnicity pay gap Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, sample average  Per cent  15  10  Unaccounted for  5  0  ‐5 Sex  Qualification  Sector  Age  Tenure  Region  Occupation  Public sector  FT/PT  Job type  Total  Accounted for  ‐10  ‐15 Total gap  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts. ‘Job type’ captures if the job is temporary or permanent. Looking over time (Chart 21), the unconditional ethnicity pay gap was broadly stable from the mid-1990s until 2015, since when it has declined. That decline can to a large extent be explained by the rise in the relative educational performance of ethnic minorities which, by the end of the sample, is subtracting 2 percentage points from the pay gap. By contrast, the unexplained ethnicity pay gap has been largely unchanged over the sample. Not only is the unexplained (“pay bias”) part of the ethnicity pay gap as large as for gender; it appears also to have been more persistent and has shown fewer signs of falling over time. The ethnicity pay gap problem in the UK is every bit as acute as the gender pay gap problem, contrary to the message from the raw pay gap data.

Chart 1  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  One of the main reasons is the strong demand for Norwegian goods in countries where economic growth remains robust. The centre of gravity in the world economy is shifting. In the course of the next few decades, China will most likely be the largest economy in the world. Emerging economies – with China at the forefront – are the main driving force behind the increase in demand for crude oil and other commodities. As a result, prices for Norwegian export goods have remained high, even in the context of declining growth among our traditional trading partners. Chart 2  The emergence of newly industrialised economies has also led to lower import prices in Norway. The improvement in Norway’s terms of trade is without parallel in our recent history. We have to go back to the boom period at the time of World War I to find anything similar. Developments in other countries have been less favourable. What started as a banking crisis in the US and the UK has developed into a sovereign debt crisis, with Europe at the epicentre. Austerity measures and economic contraction are now going hand in hand. Social unrest is spreading. Unemployment in many countries has risen to alarming levels. Economic growth is weak, particularly in Europe, constrained by uncertainty and fear of new setbacks. Both the public and private sectors are focusing on reducing debt. Banks are consolidating their balance sheets and holding back on lending to businesses and households.
Notes: Charts a and b show percentage difference between the 90th and 10th deciles approximated by log differences; Charts c and d show ratio of productivity at 90th to 10th percentile using the difference in the log levels. UK data only available from 2002, UK index  31  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  31  base year = 2002. Data have been aggregated from a detailed industry level. To the extent that industry classifications in the UK and the other countries shown are slightly different this may affect the comparability of the series. Chart 21: Management practices and labour productivity Density Management score  0.6 0.5  Labour productivity  0.4 0.3  0.2 0.1  0 -4 Z score  -2  0  2  4  Source: BvD, World Management Survey and Bank calculations. Notes: The productivity kernel is based on around 280,000 firm-year observations on labour productivity (in logs) spanning the 20022013 period (source: BVD). The management kernel is based on around 1500 interviews with firm managers from the WMS database (as described in Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010). Covering the 2002-2014 period. The raw data are converted to Z-scores by removing the sample mean from each observation and dividing the demeaned values by the sample standard deviation.

Every 10 percentage point increase in a company’s export share of turnover is, on average, associated with a 3% increase in productivity. While causation could operate in either direction, this illustrates the productivity benefits of a corporate sector which is open to trade and exposed to external competition and innovation. Chart 22e classifies firms according to their spending on new products and processes. The differences here are not especially surprising, with average productivity around 20% higher among firms investing in new  52 53  For example, Haldane (2016). Newman et al (2015). 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  products and processes. Nonetheless it is striking, and perhaps surprising, these differences are not larger. Clearly, they do not explain most of the productivity differences across companies. Firm size appears to matter somewhat more to productivity (Chart 22f). For example, for small firms (with fewer than 50 employees) the picture is a nuanced one. In general, their average levels of productivity are materially lower than for larger firms, on average around 7% lower. There is, in particular, a larger lower tail of small companies with low, or even negative, levels of productivity. Nonetheless, some smaller companies do inhabit the high-productivity, upper tail. Moreover, small companies tend to exhibit faster rates of productivity growth than larger firms, even when it is from a lower base. Table 3 looks at average productivity growth rates among firms of different size.
Figure 2 Commodity prices (*) (index, 2009=100) 240  240  210  210  180  180  150  150  120  120  90  90  60  60  30  30  06 Edible oils  07  08 Sugar  Meats  09 Dairy  10  11  Cereals  WTI oil  (*) Except for WTI oil, FAO indexes are used. Source: Bloomberg. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3 Inflation  (annual change, percent)  CPI  Core CPI (4)  10  10 6  6  8  8  6  6  5  5  4  4  4  4  2  2  3  3  0  0  2  2  -2  -2 1  1  -4  -4 0  0  05  06  07  08  U.S.A. Emerging Asia (2)  09  10  11  05  06  07  Eurozone Emerging Europe (3)  08  09  10  11  Latin America (1)  (1) CPI anc Core CPI include: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. (2) CPI includes China, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand. Core CPI includes South Korea and Thailand. (3) CPI includes Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland and Russia. Core CPI excludes Russia. (4) Uses definition of each country. Sources: Bloomberg, CEIC Data and statitics institutes of respective countries.

Consequently, Switzerland – unlike other countries – was able to avoid introducing state-guaranteed bonds. With the drastic reduction in key rates and the subsequent decline in mortgage rates, the burden on households and companies was eased. In this way, the severity of the recession was somewhat alleviated and the risks of deflation reduced. However, the interest rate is now at a historic low and this means medium-term risks for the Swiss real estate market and financial stability. Experience shows that periods of low interest rates provide scope for excesses on the mortgage and real estate market. Consequently, in the current environment in particular, attention should be given to ensuring that past mistakes are not repeated. Caution must remain the watchword when granting loans. BIS Review 140/2009  1
14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 13: Core inflation has picked up but remains notably below 2% 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  Per cent  12 month CPI inflation 12 month Core CPI inflation (a) Goods price inflation Services price inflation  0 -1 -2 -3 Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 15 15 15 15 Notes: (a) CPI inflation excluding energy, food, alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Source: ONS. Measures of core inflation have been below 2% since the middle of 2014 (Chart 13), and weaker than projected in August. This mainly reflects weaker goods price inflation, which, in turn, is likely the product of sterling’s past appreciation (Chart 14).21 Those dynamics will continue to weigh on core inflation for a while, since around two-thirds of the effects of a currency move are estimated to appear in CPI inflation at horizons beyond one year, making them relevant for monetary policy strategy.22 Of course, the recent weakness in sterling, if it persists, will moderate these effects somewhat. 21  Note that one would not necessarily expect core inflation at 2% with CPI inflation at target if the items excluded from core inflation measures undergo persistent relative price shifts.

Consequently, last month the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) was able to send two signals that the system had turned the corner. First, it has clarified the overall capital framework for banks, providing much needed certainty to the sector. While there are details still to be finalised and complexities to be reduced, there  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  is no new wave of capital regulation coming. There is no Basel IV. Indeed, last week, central bank Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed that work to address the problem of excessive variability in risk-weighted assets – one of the final parts of the post crisis capital framework – would be completed by the end of 2016 without significantly increasing overall capital requirements. Second, the FPC now judges that the system is already within sight of the amount of capital it needs to have by the end of the decade and has the capacity to continue lending to the real economy even under severe stress. The Bank’s most recent stress test underscores these improvements. It focused on an emerging market stress, centred on a sharp slowing of Chinese growth, which prompts reassessments of global economic prospects, falls in asset and commodity prices and increased global deflationary pressures.1 Sound familiar? Despite challenging conditions abroad, the UK financial system can continue to take the types of prudent risks needed to grow jobs and incomes here at home.
In other words, the implementation of reforms and changes in the banking sector after a banking crisis – in respect of business practices, regulation and supervision – has the potential to strengthen the foundations of the banking sector, thereby improving its ability to contribute to sustainable economic growth. Given the limited time that I have, I will focus on some key structural developments in the banking sector that have taken place over the past twenty years and that are described and analysed in several chapters of the book. In addition, I will examine how the regulations introduced by the Bank of Spain during the boom years helped to prevent and mitigate the negative effects of the crisis and, especially, how some of the reforms and structural changes that are currently being considered may substantially reduce the fragilities of the banking sector. If implemented, they will strengthen the banking system and ultimately have positive effects on financial stability and economic growth in Spain. Some reflections on banking developments during the last two decades As I see it, Spain’s banking sector has undergone two fundamental changes since 1990: banking liberalisation and financial innovation. Banking liberalisation has produced a notable increase in competition among institutions and in financial integration. For example, the cajas (savings banks) have started to compete geographically and in different business segments. The increased competition has also led, at different times during these 20 years, to strong competition for bank deposits (e.g. la “guerra del pasivo” at the end of the 80s).

José Manuel González-Páramo: How will historians judge our handling of this crisis? Speech by Mr José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in the occasion of the presentation of the book titled “Un Siglo de Historia del Sistema Financiero Español”, Bank of Spain, Madrid, 10 June 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak today at the Bank of Spain about the Spanish financial sector. The book being presented today consists of a distinguished collection of essays providing a wealth of information on Spain’s financial sector over the last century. Not only does it summarise the key data and the main developments, but it also provides deep analyses. It will definitely become the work of reference on the history of the financial sector in this country in the 20th century. Let me then congratulate the contributors and the editors, José Luis Malo de Molina and Pablo Martín Aceña for their excellent work. Reading the book, notably the chapter by Raimundo Poveda, we can draw some interesting parallels between the current crisis and the banking crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In particular, given the current circumstances, the main message I would like to emphasise today is that certain changes in the banking sector that are implemented in response to crises are essential to guarantee a strong, robust banking sector in the future.
Within this framework, the GPFG should be managed in a responsible way. The report to the Storting notes that there is broad political agreement that the GPFG should not be an instrument of foreign policy or climate policy, and it is important that this continue to be the case in the future. Restrictions or instructions that have a significant impact on the trade-off between return and risk will limit the potential to achieve solid performance over time. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

There are challenges that still exist in coordinating across multiple agencies – domestically and internationally and, at times, with competing agendas (e.g., prudential vs. conduct). As well, there remain some challenges to effectively sharing information, and while some legal impediments have been resolved, the seamless exchange of information is not yet the norm among key supervisors. I do believe that the trust level is building among supervisors as a result of the hard work over the past couple of years, but this will be an ongoing effort as players change and circumstances evolve. There have been several opportunities over the past year to test some of the close coordination among supervisors and regulators, and I think they have provided valuable experience – and lessons learned – for those involved. What I think has been clearest in those lessons is the ongoing need to coordinate – to ensure that problems are well understood from each vantage point or jurisdiction, that mitigants are discussed and implemented as necessary, and that all stakeholders are well informed – all of this to ensure that problems don’t become systemic. A final point on enhancing coordination and communication is ensuring that supervisors continue to develop an understanding of the impact of the new rules and regulations across global organizations. As I noted earlier, there is recognition that regulatory changes are affecting strategies, business models, and business activities in a meaningful way – and that this is occurring across organizations (not just locally).