samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Or if I may put this another way, do we even have a consistent view on what “success” in AML work would or should look like? Before I even try to address that, let’s be clear that I do not proclaim to have all the answers here, and I do believe that many of you are better qualified that I am in analysing and addressing these questions about effectiveness of AML efforts. 8. Furthermore, while we work to the same standards in the region, our systems are all evolving, and we have to admit that this evolution is happening at different pace in our respective markets and to address differing risks. And therefore the priorities in different markets will understandably differ, thereby making arriving at a consistent view on the question of “effectiveness” extremely challenging. I would also note that the Financial Action Task Force will do that job for Hong Kong later this year when they conduct the mutual evaluation exercise, while in roughly the same period, they and the IMF also assess other jurisdictions in the region. 9. Despite the fact that I do not have all the answers to the “effectiveness” questions, I think that it may be helpful to talk about some of the issues that arise out of those questions and try to relate them to the agenda for the conference. I hope this would help you to start thinking about some of the complex issues that you would be debating throughout this Conference. 10.

Hong Kong, as an international financial centre with a highly externally-oriented economy, does face high ML/TF risks. Our competitive advantages here – namely, free flows of capital, people, goods and information; well-established legal system; sophisticated market infrastructure; and advanced professional services – also make our market attractive for criminals seeking to hide or move funds or evade financial sanctions. With such a risk profile, Hong Kong has a key role in that fight against attempts to abuse our systems, along with our regional partners who share many of these characteristics and fund flows. So this Conference – focusing on the regional response - is timely and very relevant. 11. Over the years, the regulatory landscape has changed. Since we started this line of work in the 90’s, we have seen a steady increase in the regulatory requirements and expectations we place on our financial institutions to combat ML/TF. More recently, the number of sectors and institutions which come within the regulatory remit also continues to grow. These are far from simple requirements however you look at them, particularly given the risk-based approach, a view which is supported by the experience of many financial institutions who have struggled getting it right. 12. The world of banking and finance has also changed significantly in the same period we have been applying these requirements. For example, technology has created new and significant opportunities for the development of the global economy, which has been good news for financial centres such as Hong Kong.
Enterprises are increasingly becoming price-takers, and thus even in a situation of rising costs of manufacturing, they are unable to lift prices and shift the growing costs onto the customer. Similar is true for wages, whose level is determined on the increasingly global labour market. Research on the manufacturing sector in EU Members States (for the years 1988 - 2000) has shown that the increase in the openness of that sector (growing import) caused a fall of prices by 2.3%, a growth in productivity by 11% and a drop in margins by 1.6%. Altogether, it may explain the inflation fall by 0.14% in annual terms over that period 11 . When looking at the price processes from the microeconomic perspective, vital structural changes can be observed, which bring about lower inflation. Table 3.

Pillar II is based on five key principles. The first principle is to ensure a robust banking system that is resilient, committed and able to provide a strong foundation to support the Thai economy at all times. In the second principle, banks will be encouraged to reap the economy of scale by promoting voluntary consolidation to promote competitiveness. At the same time, proper competition policy will also be put in place to ensure fair consumer treatment. The third principle aims to promote competition via the liberalization of branch network and business scope and to enhance the roles of existing players, including banks and niche banks, while the fourth principle will consider new entries based on the value added to the economy. Lastly, the fifth principle will focus on enhancing the role of specialised financial institutions in providing increasing access to financial  BIS Review 133/2008  5  services for the low-income and small business groups and reducing the role of the state in commercial banking. Pillar III, on the other hand, will focus on laying down the foundation for a strong and supportive infrastructure for the medium term development of the financial system. This will be done through further enhancing the market and products which will facilitate banks, own risk management, promoting an effective information system and pushing for the amendments of necessary laws to facilitate risk management. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Thai banking system will continue to face new challenges going forward, both from external developments and domestic factors.
William C Dudley: The Federal Reserve's liquidity facilities Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Vanderbilt University Conference on Financial Markets and Financial Policy Honoring Dewey Daane, Nashville, Tennessee, 18 April 2009. *  *  *  Thank you for having me here today. It is a great honor to be on a panel with Peter Fisher and Bill Poole. I am the neophyte here in terms of central banking experience! Before I begin, let me emphasize that my comments represent my own views and opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Open Market Committee or of the Federal Reserve System. I am going to talk today about the Fed’s provision of liquidity to banks and dealers and to market participants more generally. I would break down our actions into three broad classes. First, we addressed the acute seizing up of inter-bank financing markets. For banks, we introduced the Term Auction Facility in December 2007 and for the primary dealers, the Term Securities Lending Facility and Primary Dealer Credit Facility in March 2008. In addition, the Federal Reserve entered into FX swap agreements with major global central banks in order to channel dollar liquidity to banks overseas. Second, we expanded our provision of short term financing beyond banks and dealers in order to alleviate constraints on highly rated corporate borrowers.

As a result, they will not be forced to dump assets, further depressing market prices, increasing volatility and the upward pressure on haircuts. The deleveraging will still take place – and we have seen it – just not so quickly and violently that it would destabilize the entire financial system. The second major intent of the liquidity facilities has been for the Fed to expand its balance sheet and, by doing so, offset some of shrinkage that has been occurring among non-bank financial intermediaries. The fact is the banking system is capital-constrained, with insufficient capital to expand its balance sheet fast enough to offset the shrinkage evident in the non-bank sector. Although the Federal Reserve cannot create capital for banks, it can provide funding directly to the private sector, attenuating the consequences caused by a balance-sheet-constrained banking system. The CPFF and the TALF are both important in restoring the flow of credit to borrowers. The CPFF essentially jump-started the commercial paper market, which had largely shut down following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September. The TALF’s purpose is to restart the securitization markets, and thereby lower the cost of borrowing to households and business. The TALF does this by providing term, non-recourse loans to investors against AAA-rated collateral. Investor demand for these loans leads to downward pressure on AAA-rated financing rates, lowering the cost of credit.
Ravi Menon: Economic and financial developments in Singapore Opening remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), at the MAS’ Annual Report 2010/11 Press Conference, Singapore, 21 July 2011. *  *  *  Good morning. Welcome to MAS’ Annual Report press conference. I want to focus on four key themes with a forward looking orientation: first, prospects for GDP growth, second, the outlook for inflation, third, MAS’ financial accounts, and fourth, maintaining high standards of financial regulation. Let me begin with the economy. Singapore’s GDP growth forecast range remains at 5–7% for now, but uncertainties have clearly increased. As you know, economic growth took a sharp step-down in Q2 following the strong performance in Q1. First, disruption to regional supply chains in the aftermath of the Japan earthquake was much more severe than expected. Second, the rise in oil prices due to the unrest in the Middle East and North Africa has put a dampener on global demand. Singapore’s trade-related sectors bore the brunt of impact. Both manufacturing output and re-exports saw sequential declines in Q2. In year-on-year terms, GDP growth averaged 4.7% in the first half of this year. Looking at the second half of this year, the prognosis for global economy has taken on a more cautious tone. There is more uncertainty in US and Europe compared to three months ago. But we expect growth in our external markets to continue, albeit at a slow and uneven pace.

This objective is founded on my belief that the first two pillars gain sustainability only if the public understand the role of the central bank, its independence and its policy. Last but equally important, I would like to emphasise the need of cooperation and coordination with the fiscal policy. Fiscal policy and its impact are facts of life which can’t be ignored. Therefore, monetary and macro-prudential policies have to be designed and implemented in full awareness of its existence. A Central Bank does not live in an isolated island; its success will, among others, depend on its ability to act in coordination and cooperation with the fiscal policy, without losing its independence. Incorporating this understanding in the central bank theory and practice requires some adjustments and flexibility but, at the same time, requires that central banks preserve their focus and independence and acknowledge their limitations. Altogether these changes will allow the central bank and its inflation targeting regime to become a useful tool at the hand of the monetary authorities to preserve economic and financial stability in the post-Global Financial Crisis period. Thank you very much for your attention! BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Barriers to growth are in many ways the inevitable corollary of our lowering the barriers to getting onto the mountain in the first place and of us introducing proportionality into the regime. So ironically our actions to support competition risk creating the very barriers that firms then find it hard to overcome. 10  ‘Credit Union meets robot’: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/sam-woods-speech-at-mansion-house-london 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  Over the past few years, our focus has been on getting more banks onto the mountain at base camp. But as our next step, our focus has turned to ascending the mountain. And I hope the draft Supervisory Statement we have issued today goes some way to making the path up the mountain easier for you all to navigate. Our focus is also on the gradient of the climb and doing our best to ensure those rock-faces are traversable. And, where they prove not to be, to ensure there is a safe way down. In parallel, we will continue to work hard on the design of our prudential regime, including thinking about whether we can introduce a simpler mountain for smaller firms. But in doing so, we will not compromise safety and soundness nor create insurmountable barriers between mountains in the range. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10

Chart 5 plots a measure of global capital market integration (external assets/GDP) against a measure of the incidence of crises – all crises and banking crises (Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)). Integration appears to have been associated with an increase in the incidence of crisis over the past couple of decades, perhaps especially banking crises. It is not just the incidence, but also the prospective size of crises and their spill-over consequences that has increased. Chart 6 provides one perspective on that. It looks at the scale of IMF programmes over time, normalised by the borrowing country’s quota. Two features are striking: first, the increased incidence of programmes; but second, more dramatically, their increased scale. Academic evidence has long pointed towards important spillover effects from national or international disturbances (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Fratzscher (2012)). But recent evidence points towards more potent contagion channels. For example, Rey (2013) finds evidence that a common global risk factor drives asset prices and cross-border capital flows, for both advanced and emerging economies. It is worth putting under the microscope these shifting patterns in global financial market correlations, especially over the most recent period. Charts 7–9 plot correlations between long-term bond yields, equity prices and investment grade corporate bond spreads respectively in the US, UK and the euro-area over the past few decades. Two features stand out. First, there has been a steady rise in the degree of co-movement in asset prices over time. Take government bond yields over the past 50 years.
The public interest objective underlying the status of independence leads me to view it as a value that should be preserved and strengthened, for the benefit of properly fulfilling the mission with which the agency has been entrusted and, thereby, of greater social well-being. In any event, independence should be accompanied by guarantees as to the professional competence and personal integrity of the members of the independent body, especially its senior officials, and as to the controls to which it is subject and its accountability. To attain these guarantees, controls and accountability, action must be taken on selection, appointment and dismissal procedures for individuals in management and governance positions in the independent body, on the transparency of conduct and results, and on the governance of the institution. I shall commence by reviewing the arguments that justify the independence of economic authorities and supervisors. I shall then address the elements that give shape to an institution’s formal independence, and their specific configuration in the case of the Banco de España. Thirdly, I shall offer my thoughts on the status of independence as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for independent agencies. I shall then highlight potential ways to strengthen the independence of the Banco de España, moving on thereafter to identifying potential improvements to the financial supervision model in Spain. Lastly, I shall refer to our institution’s control mechanisms and transparency standards, and certain governance aspects.

High-profile international financial institutions such as the IMF are concerned and involved particularly in economic governance issues, as they provide assistance in two key areas: improving public resource management and supporting the development and maintenance of a stable and transparent economic and regulatory environment so as to foster private sector activities. Other institutions such as the OECD and the World Bank are involved in corporate governance, with the latter formulating a set of principles such as ethics and transparency, as well as accountability. To sum up, I should emphasise that corporate governance at present is a matter of greatest concern to the business environment, just the same as we, those involved in formulating macroeconomics, are concerned more broadly with economic governance. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I believe that emphasis now should be placed primarily on discipline, fiscal discipline in particular, but also on a shift in culture. I also like to add two words that I see essential when speaking about economic governance: stability and confidence. In my view, all efforts these days should be targeted to maintaining stability and restore confidence. Thank you all! 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
For a more detailed and focused analysis of the proposed Swiss law, see the speech given by my colleague Thomas Jordan earlier this week. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Part I: Risk and risk-taking Progress in risk measurement: role in the crisis There is no doubt that significant progress in both the definition and measurement of risk has been made in the recent past. As an example, the function of a risk manager was almost non-existent some 20 years ago. However, it is equally hard to dispute the fact that this progress has been over-estimated. For instance it was regularly claimed in the early 2000s that the financial system had never been as resilient and robust as it was at the time. Clearly, developments since the beginning of the financial crisis in mid-2007 have proved the contrary, and we need to draw suitable lessons from that experience. Progress in the definition and measurement of risk may well have played a role in the recent financial crisis. A reason for this is that – as so often in modern finance – conceptual progress, in tandem with progress in the methodology of risk management, has led to a rather blind trust in models. In general, a trained economist learns to interpret models as abstract approaches to reality, with these models serving as a support for economic and business reasoning. Models are not meant to be substitutes for complete, partially qualitative reasoning including, in particular, a discussion of the model’s assumptions and their degree of robustness.

That is hardly the case today, as the Trade Union Confederation, for example, has acknowledged. Their wage negotiations in 1997 started, in fact, from the 2 per cent inflation target. In the assessment of future inflationary pressure, monetary policy in turn must take the labour market situation into account. Wages are of major economic importance: in that the wage bill accounts for almost 70 per cent of value added, the development of wages has a large impact on costs and thus on price formation. Moreover, wage settlements are liable to influence inflation expectations. Wage tendencies are therefore one of the principal variables in any assessment of inflation. However, the difficulties in forecasting wage trends are considerable. The Riksbank does, of course, follow data on wages and unit labour costs; other important indicators include labour shortages in particular industries, wage drift, registered and total unemployment in relation to job vacancies. A central concept in this context is equilibrium unemployment, often referred to by the English acronym NAIRU—the level of unemployment that can be combined with stable inflation. Attempts to push unemployment down below the NAIRU with monetary stimuli are liable to have the sole effect  BIS Review 77/1999  4  of boosting inflation. In other words, the NAIRU is not responsive to an expansionary stabilisation policy. It depends instead on the workings of the labour market, together with demographic changes and technology. Thus, lastingly higher employment cannot be generated by continuously implementing an expansionary monetary policy.
Given this, we assessed in July that monetary policy needed to be even more expansionary to ensure that inflation continues to rise towards the target of 2 per cent. We therefore decided to cut the repo rate by 0.1 percentage points to –0.35 per cent, see Figure 5. We also resolved to extend the purchases of government bonds by a further SEK 45 billion until the end of the year, see Figure 6. The purchases decided upon in April are expected to be concluded in September, at which point the new purchases will be initiated. At the end of the year, the Riksbank is expected to have purchased nominal government bonds for a total of SEK 135 billion. This corresponds to around 20 per cent of the outstanding stock of nominal government bonds and around 4 per cent of GDP. 1 If the ECB continues to buy government bonds at the same rate as so far, their purchases at the end of the year will correspond to around 7 per cent of the stock and, there too, to 4 per cent of GDP. The Riksbank has been portrayed as particularly “strict” in relation to other central banks, as we charge a negative interest rate to the banks when they deposit money with us. I would like to emphasise that the Riksbank is not endeavouring to be kind or strict.

It has highlighted the importance of improving our knowledge and assessment of interconnectedness in the financial system, both via the direct links between financial institutions and the indirect ones created in financial markets. Micro-supervisory assessment, institution by institution, typically investigates the vulnerability of each entity, under various assumptions of stress. In contrast, systemic risk assessment investigates the possibility of the whole system, or significant parts of it, being vulnerable, and considers that major risks may emerge from the financial system itself. Such risks may arise, for example, because large parts of the system might have similar exposures, may rely on the same funding sources, can be exposed to rising financial imbalances, may comprehend large similar currency or maturity mismatches inducing liquidity vulnerabilities, and can be exposed to large scale underassessment and mis-pricing of risks. In the assessment of the systemic risk of the financial system itself, the judgement on the robustness of financial infrastructures is particularly important. One important issue in assessing systemic risks is to measure the degree of procyclicality which is embedded in the financial system itself, namely the capacity of the system to amplify fluctuations and to produce after a certain period of time, excessive booms and busts starting from relatively modest initial shocks, up or down.