samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We have so far only presented two forecasts for the policy rate, and as I mentioned earlier, there is a fairly large measure of ”learning by doing” for all those involved before everything falls into place. Everything does not always work perfectly from the start. But as I said, the purpose is that our communication will become clear and more efficient. And I am fairly convinced that we will get there, once the new system has been established. Clarity in the way we express ourselves in speeches and press releases The Riksbank has also changed its method of signalling monetary policy in speeches and press releases. In a broad sense, signalling means that we communicate in some way what we are intending to do with the repo rate. A narrower – and perhaps more common – interpretation of signalling is that it is when representatives of the Riksbank describe in speeches and press releases how they consider the interest rate should be set at the next meeting, and perhaps slightly further ahead. Previously, the Riksbank signalled ”by degrees”. Between the monetary policy meetings the individual Executive Board members held speeches on the theme of "the current situation” or something similar. There we indicated, more or less explicitly, how we thought the interest rate should be set.

In such a scenario, the outcomes that the PRA is seeking could be delivered through less onerous governance arrangements than specified precisely by the rules, and the PRA has been willing to consider more proportionate solutions. A bank may apply for a waiver or modification in respect of a PRA rule, so long as it can demonstrate that complying with the rule would be unduly burdensome, or would not achieve the 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  purpose for which the rule was made. What the PRA has sought from a firm applying for a rule modification is that its governance arrangements allow it the means to identify conflicts of interests between the ring-fenced bank and the broader group, and that it has the ability for the former to act independently should such a conflict occur. Flexibility around ring-fenced banks’ governance was envisaged by the ICB. In its final report, the ICB stated that “the appropriate degree of independence depends upon the proportion of the banking group’s assets which are outside the ring-fenced-bank. Specifically, some degree of flexibility might be appropriate where a ring-fenced bank forms a very large part of the overall group.”5 The process of granting or refusing applications for waivers and modifications is now all but complete, and rule waivers and modifications will be published by the PRA in the Financial Services Register when the regime goes live in 2019.
At the same time, the regulatory framework for the banks’ operations was improved significantly. Now we have a banking system that primarily serves domestic households and businesses and, in terms of total assets relative to GDP, is about 15% of its precrisis size. As can be seen in their high capital adequacy ratios and sound liquidity position, the banks are quite resilient. Their capital ratios have fallen in recent years as a result of dividend payments, and it can be said that there was scope for such a reduction. But now their capital ratios are much closer to the Financial Supervisory Authority’s capital requirements, and under current conditions of elevated economic uncertainty, it would be imprudent to lower them much more with dividend payments. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the current capital requirements also include buffers that can be used without the banks being deemed to have failed. These capital buffers are a sort of cushion, and if they are tapped, resilienceenhancing measures such as restrictions on payments of dividends and bonuses will be adopted. Furthermore, the countercyclical capital buffer can be lowered very quickly if conditions warrant it, although it has been decided to increase it to 2% in the coming term. On the whole, the 2008 IMF programme objective of rebuilding the banking system on firmer foundations was met successfully.

Caleb M Fundanga: Zambia’s Financial Sector Development Plan Welcome remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) Phase II Consultative Meeting, Lusaka, 20 October 2009. * • • • • • •  *  *  The Honourable Minister of Finance and National Planning; The FSDP Steering Committee Chairman & Secretary to the Treasury; Co-operating partners; Chief Executive Officers and Representatives from Banks and Non Bank Financial Institutions; Distinguished Invited Guests; Ladies and Gentlemen. It gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia, to welcome you all to the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) Phase II Stakeholders’ Consultative Meeting. Honourable Minister, this very important forum is a demonstration of the recognition, by Government and various stakeholders, of the strategic importance of the financial sector to the country’s development and poverty reduction efforts. Distinguished invited guests, there are a number of strategies currently being implemented by both the private and public sectors to make the financial sector more inclusive, thereby increasing the benefits for the average citizen to participate in the formal economy. The Financial Sector Development Plan is one such Government initiative. The FSDP was aimed at realising the vision of a financial system that is sound, stable and market-based and one that supports efficient resource mobilisation necessary for economic diversification and sustainable growth. Ladies and Gentlemen, various countries have established specific programmes to strengthen their financial sectors.
Non-performing loans continued to decline in 2015, falling by more than € billion (against the fall of € billion in 2014). At end-2015 the proportion of NPLs on Spanish banks’ balance sheets was 22% down on the previous year. This trend has been seen both in credit to non-financial corporations and in that to households. Profitability is unquestionably a fundamental challenge facing European and Spanish banks. In 2015, consolidated income at the global level for the sector as a whole was close to € billion, almost 13% down on the previous year; and the return on equity fell from 6.9% in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  2014 to 5.6% in 2015. In terms of domestic business, profitability was worse than for consolidated activity at the global level, with the ROE in 2015 standing at 4.4% (against 5% in 2014). The main factor bearing down on the sector’s profitability may be said to be the environment of very low interest rates, and this environment might be expected to hold as long as inflation expectations justify the highly expansionary monetary policy stance in the euro area. The spread between the return on assets and liabilities in domestic business is at levels very close to all-time lows. Also, there is little room for further downward movement as regards the cost of funds; accordingly, if asset-side rates continue falling, net interest income may continue declining. But we should mention another two factors bearing down on profitability.

The high level of public debt is harmful to the economy’s financing conditions, it restricts the countercyclical leeway of budgetary policy and it means a high volume of resources must be set aside to pay the interest burden. There is room, moreover, for the fiscal consolidation process to be compatible with a revision of the structure of public revenue and spending, making it more efficient and  3/5  enhancing its contribution to growth. And, at the same time, a greater degree of fiscal coresponsibility should be promoted across the different tiers of general government. It is likewise a priority to pursue further reductions in unemployment and its persistence among specific groups, especially the lesser-skilled. The high level of joblessness is also closely related to the notable increase in inequality that came about during the crisis. Achieving this will require not only labour market measures but also, more broadly, actions targeting employee skills and training, to encourage their greater adaptability to a new environment marked by technological progress, the automation of productive processes and the knowledge economy. In parallel, despite the significant progress in recent years, the financial sector continues to face deep-seated challenges. These include the need to tackle the effects of the farreaching changes in regulation, technology and competition, to improve low profitability levels and to complete the ongoing reduction of problem assets. Looking ahead to the medium and long term, population ageing is probably the main challenge the developed societies face.
The more recent criticism has been that the ECB has been slow to respond to the weakening of the US economy. Implicit in that criticism is no doubt a judgement about the extent and duration of the US slowdown and its likely impact on the euro area. As I have said there is a great deal of uncertainty about that. But the ECB has to take account, too, of domestic demand pressures in the euro area, and of the fact that even on the core measure Euro area inflation has been moving up gradually towards the top of the ECB's 0-2% range. Frankly I don't see how anyone can be confident whether the ECB has it precisely right or wrong – it is perfectly normal for even the best-informed people to disagree on  BIS Review 36/2001  3  these judgements, as anyone who reads our own Monetary Policy Committee meeting minutes will tell you. But I am wholly confident that the ECB is sensitive to the issues surrounding those judgements, including the downside risks in the US. So, too, are we in the United Kingdom. In our case, we again enjoyed relatively steady overall economic growth last year combined with a further fall in unemployment to its lowest rate for 25 years. Inflation meanwhile continued to run somewhat below the Government's 2½% target, partly at least as a result of the dampening effect of sterling's surprisingly persistent strength against the euro.

Domestic demands have been helped not only by direct government spending, but also by other government schemes that injected funds directly to the grass roots. We had the Bht 74 billion village fund (approx $ 1.7 billion) whereby each village had been allocated Bht one million to on lend to village members, often under group mutual guarantees. We also had the micro loan scheme organised by the Government Savings Bank, the government owned bank, which lend directly to the poor. Ladies and gentlemen, The good news went on. Despite the strong recovery, we have been able to keep inflation under check. Headline inflation for 2002 was 0.7% and core inflation 0.4%. The adverse affect from high oil prices has not translated into much inflation. BIS Review 8/2003  1  Our currency was also quite stable. For the whole of 2002, the bath appreciated against the US dollar by less than 2%, which was quite modest compared to other Asian currencies. The international reserves level was also ample at $ 38.9 billion, allowing us to aim to pay back all the loans under the IMF program by the end of July this year. Moreover, three major credit rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings, all assigned better outlook to the Thai economy. Japan Credit Rating Agency did in fact upgrade Thailand’s sovereign rating from BBB to BBB+ last November. Such widespread improvement in confidence among consumers, entrepreneurs, and investors helped support both consumption and investment throughout the year.
Small changes in projections can have a huge impact on sustainability. Some of the implicit assumptions underlying current negative judgments seem to me seriously misguided. Let’s look first at the short run. As you know, we have been recently surprised on the upside with the dynamics of growth in the Euro area. Consumer confidence is almost back to pre crisis levels, PMI are at an all time high and GDP growth will almost certainly be above potential, on average, for the year 2011. Those developments take place at a moment where drastic fiscal consolidation programs are implemented in all countries. Those analysts who predicted that fiscal tightening would stifle growth in the Euro area are currently being proven wrong. Positive confidence effects in the private sector are outweighing the negative impact  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  of public expenditure reduction. In our economic jargon, we seem to be living to day in a “Ricardian” world. What about countries in the periphery? Spanish growth rate swung from –3.7% in 2009 to –0.1% in 2010, despite the fact that a major austerity plan was being implemented. Spanish exports are booming with an increase of 10% within the euro area in 2010 and 19% outside the euro area in 2010. This compares very favourably with performances of other countries both inside and outside the eurozone. Turning to the long run, it is essential, when looking at the inner workings of the euro area to make a distinction between real and nominal evolutions.

In closing, let me re-dedicate on behalf of my colleagues at the MAS, our commitment to our mission:   to secure for Singaporeans a low rate of inflation;    to preserve the purchasing power of our official foreign reserves;    to keep our financial sector safe and sound amidst crisis and change; and    to grow Singapore as a vibrant and trusted financial centre. In this, we look forward to your continued support. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
And with internationally active banks managing multi-currency balance sheets, a local approach to liquidity regulation is becoming less relevant. It is for this reason that the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision decided to convene a Liquidity Working Group to take stock of prudential approaches internationally and to explore whether there is a case for greater consistency. The critical role of infrastructure The financial market infrastructure – exchanges and the systems used to clear and settle market trades or cash obligations – also plays a critical role here. Market participants rely on such infrastructure to implement their desired portfolio allocation; to execute risk management strategies; to raise liquidity, both in normal course and in times of stress; and to manage contingent exposures and cash-flows. It is therefore important for financial stability that these systems function efficiently and continuously, and do not introduce unnecessary costs, risks or frictions to trading and post-trade processes. Frequent interruptions to pre- or post-trade processing, or excessive costs in accessing core components of the market infrastructure, can impose significant welfare costs. Under such circumstances, agents may be forced to deviate from their desired portfolio allocations and risk exposures, or indeed may be prevented from meeting their obligations as they fall due. With markets for credit risk transfer (CRT) growing rapidly, there has been an expansion in the range of transactions for which robust, resilient and well-designed infrastructure is essential.

BANCO DE ESPAÑA  10	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  The third source of risk for projected revenues that I wish to highlight relates to the fact that the estimation of the revenue impact of the new taxes is subject to a high degree of uncertainty, given the absence of any data on how they have functioned in the past. Finally, caution should be exercised in relation to the potential delay in the entry into force of the measures accompanying the Draft Budget, which adds a further risk for expected revenues in 2019. 2.3  The government deficit target and the fiscal policy stance in 2019  Having discussed the spending policies and revenues of the Draft Budget separately I will now consider them together, in order to assess the uncertainty surrounding achievement of the deficit target of 1.3%. For this purpose, economists at the Banco de España have conducted a preliminary updating of the December projections, which I have already considered in detail. In particular, the impact on these projections of the revenue and spending measures that have been included in the Draft Budget since then is estimated, resulting in a general government deficit of around 2% of GDP in 2019, as compared with the Banco de España’s December projection of 2.4%. Moreover, the economic growth forecast would be revised down slightly, mainly as a result of incorporation of the impact of the tax measures.
Hearing of François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  before the Section for the Economy and Finance of the French Economic, Social and Environmental Council Paris, 8 April 2020  “From the emergency crisis response to initial thinking on the post-crisis environment”  Press contacts: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr) and Deborah Guedj (deborah.guedj@banque-france.fr)  Page 1 of 8 Madam President, Vice-Presidents, Section Members Thank you for this “virtual” invitation, which is nevertheless essential to maintaining a productive dialogue on the economy between our two institutions during this crisis: the Banque de France is fully mobilised in the economic battle to support our businesses, and, of course, representatives of civil society such as yourselves are following the situation extremely closely. This afternoon, I will briefly present the findings of our monthly business survey published today. It is the first French survey to analyse the economic impact of the first fifteen days of lockdown. I shall then turn, in greater detail, to the economic policy responses: those introduced in the short term, for which there is a solid consensus, and those that will have to be devised once we emerge from the crisis. In this respect, questions remain open. ** I. Findings of the Banque de France’s monthly business survey: a substantial economic cost  In 2019, the French economy was defined by its resilience, as it better resisted the economic slowdown than its European neighbours, particularly Germany.

Since March, the Bank accelerated the withdrawal of the monetary impulse, with greater intensity than foreseen by analysts’ consensus, bringing the MPR to a level within the normal range. This, coupled with the changed external macroeconomic scenario due to the drop in commodity prices, managed to contain inflation expectations (figure 11). While in mid-year we expected inflation to be around 4% for much of the second half, the data have shown inflation hovering around 3%. The propagation of specific shocks has been similar to the historical average, but lower than that of 2007 and 2008. Today, in Chile and in a large part of the emerging world, inflation forecasts have been lowered and the risk of overheating has lost relevance (figure 12). For the same reason, while in mid-year we foresaw that the MPR would end the year 2011 close to 6%, in recent months we said that there will probably be no more increases, an opinion we have reaffirmed in our latest communiqués and I will come back to shortly. But first let me take a look at what is going on in the developed world. The 2008 crisis is not over yet The crisis of 2008 was not a typical recession because it originated in a financial meltdown, whose effects are deeper and its recovery, slower. This we know first-hand in emerging countries. In Chile we had one in the early 1980s.
The practical way is to ensure that you are moving up each step you take, in other words making improvements, regardless of whether you are following a spiral or a zigzag path, or whether you can see the top, or the point where allocation of resources is optimal. Appreciation of this concept is essential in understanding developments in the Mainland of China, including those on the financial front. The preponderance of the banking sector in domestic financial intermediation calls for great care in the reform of the banking system, in a manner that does not undermine public confidence in the banking system. This means the continuation of state ownership and financial support, and, for the time being, de facto limited competition from foreign banks, notwithstanding WTO commitments. On the other hand, there is a strong desire to modernise management and move towards the observation of international standards, to facilitate the ongoing commercialisation and the eventual privatisation of the banks. This is a delicate process, particularly when, in terms of the prudential numbers, the banking system is clearly weak and, with the greater freedom of information that comes with modern information technology, depositors’ faith will not remain unwavering forever. The drive for diversification in financial intermediation, evidenced in genuine efforts to develop the debt and equity markets, will further divert funds away from the banking system.

It is only right that we continue to capture these recollections and stories of Governor Ismail Ali and therefore, the Bank will publish a Second Edition of this book. It is our hope that the vision, dedication and resilience of Governor Ismail Ali would inspire our future generations, be it central bankers or not – and to prepare them as they partake in the dynamic financial ecosystem. This book chronicles, not just who he was and what he did, but also what Governor Ismail Ali stood for and what he envisioned for this country. It is said that there are two things parents should give their children: one are roots, and the other are wings. As the first Malaysian Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, Governor Ismail Ali planted the principles that now run deep within the Bank and gave us the vision to soar towards. As guardians of the financial system, central bankers must maintain public trust. Not only does a 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  central bank need to be careful custodians of monetary policy and an able adviser to the Government, we need to be seen and recognised as the competent authority to discharge these roles. A central bank needs to engender confidence. Governor Ismail Ali’s immutable emphasis on the integrity of the Bank’s moral compass and the strength of our competency stems from a sense of duty, Amanah.