samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Like the educational and Citizen Panel programmes, it has allowed the Bank to engage with an entirely new cohort of people with new perspectives on new issues. Establishing these initiatives as central planks of the Bank’s engagement strategy is one of things I am proudest about from my time at the Bank. I believe they hold the key to closing the twin deficits. The economy affects everyone and everyone affects the economy. Central banks’ actions also affect everyone. So the Bank needs to seek to engage everyone if it is to meet the needs of its stakeholders. Doing so is one of the most effective ways to ensure the Bank’s social contract with the public is not breached. To my mind, the revolution in central bank communication and engagement practices has been as great as with monetary and financial stability frameworks - and crucial in cementing the success of both. I have done my bit, leading the Bank’s outreach programmes and through 32 working papers, 75 published speeches, over 100 regional visits, around 150 published articles in books and academic journals, and many hundreds more unpublished speeches and schools talks. To say nothing of several spectacularly unsuccessful books. Looking ahead, the transparency revolution has yet to run its course. There is more the Bank can do to deepen and broaden its engagement with a wider audience. There is further for the Bank to go in harvesting the stories from this audience to inform its view of the economy.

Beyond this, we will probably continue to raise rates, but we may do so in a more flexible and possibly less rapid manner - "jumbo" rate hikes will not become a new habit. Since July, we have been making decisions on a meeting-by-meeting basis. A favourable condition to interrupt rate hikes would be clear signs of a turnaround in the core inflation trend, i.e. excluding energy and food. One word about the comparison with the US: on both sides of the Atlantic, inflation is too high. But it doesn't have the same nature: the energy component is higher in Europe; the demand one higher in the US, where the labour market is also tighter. Hence we don't need to raise rates at the same pace, nor to the same level. That said, signs of peaking inflation – headline and core – in the US last Thursday are good news for everyone, as the US has been ahead of the global inflation cycle, and the US monetary tightening has had strong spill overs on the rest of the world through the high level of the dollar. Central banks are thus playing their part in the fight against inflation, but let us not forget structural economic measures. "Beefing up" our productive capacity also has the potential to help reduce inflation in the longer term, in addition to increasing potential growth. This holds especially true when it comes to our ecological transformation, in order to decrease our dependency on fossil fuels.
The international financial system and the global economy are still facing significant challenges and downside risks. So far, prompt action by financial authorities in the US and Europe has helped avert a wider crisis. But financial markets remain uncertain and volatile. 11. Singapore banks have limited exposure to US mortgage related securities, and they remain well capitalised. Over the past year, MAS has intensified our monitoring of financial markets and our supervision of financial institutions. We have also conducted stress tests of Singapore banks and the domestic operations of the large foreign banks here, and the results reported by the banks showed them to be resilient. Nevertheless, there is no room for complacency. The current crisis provides important lessons on the areas we have to work on to enhance the resilience of the Singapore financial system. MAS is also participating in several international working groups that are reviewing ways to strengthen supervisory practices and standards. 2  BIS Review 94/2008  Strengthening resilience: Basel II, liquidity management and standing facilities 12. As new international regulatory standards and practices are finalised, MAS will consider strengthening our standards and market infrastructure where appropriate while taking care to avoid a disproportionate response. Let me highlight three areas, where we had started reviewing our regulatory framework before the crisis and have proceeded to implement these new measures to further strengthen the resilience of our financial system. 13.

In particular, to quote Solvency II directly, “the Matching Adjustment must not include the Fundamental 9  Spread, reflecting the risk retained by the insurance or reinsurance undertaking” . Since the credit rating is the main driver of the Fundamental Spread, this means the credit rating must reflect the risk retained by the insurer. One key characteristic of illiquid assets is that they are not usually externally rated. Instead, Solvency II permits insurers to use internal ratings to determine the Fundamental Spread. Since illiquid assets will often not have market valuations, insurers will often also base the asset valuation on the internal rating by mapping to equivalent traded assets of the same rating. The internal rating may therefore drive both determinants of the Matching Adjustment: the spread over risk-free rates and the Fundamental Spread. Getting it right is important! The PRA set out its views on this subject in a supervisory statement (SS 3/17) last year. 10  We said that  internal ratings must lie within a plausible range of the ratings that would be given by external rating agencies. Individual ratings may vary, depending on credit judgements, but there should be no overall upward bias in internal compared to external ratings. Supervisors are reviewing insurers’ internal ratings and may seek greater assurance where assets have spreads that look large for the rating, leading to a large matching adjustment in absolute or relative terms. We will also consider the complexity of the assets and their materiality to the overall solvency position of the insurer.
These conditions are currently met in a number of euro area countries, especially Germany. Page 3 sur 7 Allow me to add a paradox that is not sufficiently well known: to get out of the current low rate environment, we should not turn instinctively solely to monetary policy – as many do. In advanced economies, the natural rate of interest – the level that equates savings with investment over the long run – has fallen by around 2 percentage points in the last 20 years, and monetary policy has a very limited impact on this rate. Instead, what we need is to change the underlying economic factors driving the decline in the natural interest rate. Changing these factors means spending on investment and on the future, including on training and education, the energy transition and of course new technologies, with the aim of lifting long-term economic growth. If we want higher interest rates in the future, we must not be afraid to rapidly put in place targeted fiscal and structural policies. This brings us to the third cliché: other countries have gained more from the euro than we have. Unfortunately, this cliché is repeated everywhere, including in Germany.ii It is also paradoxical given that support for the single currency is currently at an all-time high in the euro area – 76% of European citizens support the euro, and the figure is even 81% for Germany. In reality, the euro has benefited all countries, including – and especially – Germany.

Both its independence and ability to fulfill its mandate are guaranteed even in very adverse economic circumstances. While it should not lead to complacency and negligence, the existence of such buffers should alleviate any concerns about the potential risks that the expansion of the balance sheet may entail. Finally, huge Central Banks’ balance sheets may be seen as influencing the allocation of resources, or effecting implicit fiscal transfers, an issue of special sensitivity inside the euro area. To discuss this question, it is useful to refer to the famous Musgrave classification of public policies between three purposes: allocation, distribution and stabilization. There is no doubt that monetary policy is only and exclusively concerned with stabilization – and a very focused part of it : price stability. No monetary policy action should be taken for any other purpose. So to the extent that “unconventional” tools are implemented, there should be no ambiguity as to their close link with the Central Bank’s mandate of price stability. I believe that has been the case in all major countries and certainly so in the Eurozone. 4. How to mitigate unintended consequences? The truth is, however, that the real world does not always fit perfectly with the beauty of Musgrave’s classification. Some public policies may aim at several objectives. Others may inadvertently, have unintended side effects. All public policies with no exception, health, energy, infrastructures, unwillingly affect some citizens more than others. Those side effects should be minimized, but cannot always be totally avoided.
The Exchange Rate Regulation of 6 May 1994 states that monetary policy in Norway should be aimed at maintaining a stable exchange rate in relation to European currencies over time. Norges Bank has defined “European currencies” as the euro. What we mean by a “stable exchange rate…. over time” needs to be made more precise. The krone exchange rate has fluctuated in recent years, in spite of Norges Bank’s active use of instruments, indicating that Norges Bank cannot fine-tune movements in the krone exchange rate. Thus, in its use of the interest rate Norges Bank focuses on the fundamental preconditions for stability of the krone exchange rate over time. Empirical work on the Norwegian economy suggests that there is mean reversion in the real exchange rate. This implies that higher inflation in Norway than among its trading partners tends to be followed by a nominal exchange rate depreciation. Thus, in order to stabilise the nominal exchange rate against the euro, monetary policy instruments must be oriented towards bringing inflation down to the level aimed at by the Eurosystem. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that a shock that leads to a change in the equilibrium real exchange rate occurs. Examples of such shocks are a large permanent shock to the oil price or a permanent increase in the government expenditure. If such shocks occur, Norges Bank must prevent monetary policy from contributing to higher inflation or a deflationary recession, since that would undermine the confidence in the krone.

Aiming at a price level target may in some situations require a monetary policy that leads to a deflationary recession, which may be hard to turn due to the zero limit on nominal interest rates. In other situations it may require inflating the economy. A monetary policy leading to inflation or a deflationary recession will undermine confidence in the krone, thereby generating exchange rate instability. We also note that the present exchange rate range has more or less prevailed for more than 10 years, indicating that base drift may not represent a substantial problem in practical policymaking. How does Norges Bank operate? Forecasts of inflation and general macroeconomic development play a large role in the conduct of Norwegian monetary policy. Projections are presented in the Bank’s quarterly Inflation Reports. If the inflation forecast does not approach the level aimed at by the euro countries in 2 to 3 years for a given interest rate path, Norges Bank will consider adjusting the interest rate. In this narrow sense, one could say that the conduct of monetary policy in Norway has some similarities with “inflation forecast targeting”, in Lars Svensson’s terminology. In addition to economic forecasts, we aim to develop tools that can supplement the use of our large macroeconometric model. At the moment we are working on the construction of simple calibrated models that will be presented at this workshop. The calibrated models can be employed, for instance, to test the performance of simple indicator rules. How does the Norwegian system differ from inflation targeting?
We must therefore consider whether cash has any important characteristics that are not shared by bank deposits and whether there is a need for other forms of central bank money in addition to cash. Cash has a number of unique characteristics: It is a credit risk-free alternative to deposit money. It is an independent back-up solution if electronic systems fail. It is legal tender that can be used by all. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  For Norges Bank, the question is whether a CBDC could supplement cash to maintain confidence in the monetary system and ensure that Norway’s future payment system is safe and efficient. A list of factors that should be given weight in an assessment of whether Norges Bank should issue a CBDC was presented by a Norges Bank working group in May. Phase 2 of the assessment is now in progress. The working group is focusing on the purposes of a CBDC, the solutions that best serve these purposes and their impact. The working group’s report will be published in spring 2019. This is a long-term process and it is too early to draw any conclusions. A premise underlying the work is that a CBDC must not impair the ability of banks and other financial institutions to provide credit. Conclusion The various developments reflect a payment system in change. It is important to look up and envision the situation a few years ahead. Where do we want to be then?

The Board reaffirms its commitment with the inflation target and will take every action necessary to ensure that it will return to 3 percent annually within the policy horizon. It also reiterates the need for all financial system participants to properly assess their borrowing and lending conditions. We, as the Central Bank, will continue to contribute with what is our duty – that is, safeguarding the stability of our currency and the normal functioning of internal and external payments – to Chile’s development and welfare. Thank you. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1 Inflation indicators (*) (annual change, percent) 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 11  Jul. 12  Jul. 13  Jul. CPI  CPIEFE  14  (*) Starting in January 2014, calculations are based on the new indices with base year 2013=100, so they may not be strictly comparable with earlier figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
Since then, many banks have been benefiting from higher exemption thresholds and have an incentive to take on liquidity via the money market. As expected, this demand for liquidity led to higher trading volumes and a slight rise in SARON and other short-term repo rates in the week following the introduction of the new calculation basis (cf. chart 4). The SNB was active in the repo market from time to time in order to keep SARON close to the SNB policy rate. The Swiss franc repo market functioned smoothly throughout the transition, not least thanks to the state-of-the-art and reliable money market infrastructure. The SNB trades using the same infrastructure as the banks on the interbank market. This is particularly helpful as it ensures that the SNB’s operations are highly effective. Transitioning from Libor to SARON  SARON is currently establishing itself as the leading reference interest rate for financial products in Swiss francs and is replacing Libor. As you know, the UK’s financial regulator will only be supporting Libor until the end of 2021, so it is important that the transition process on the market take place now. Over the last few years, the National Working Group on Swiss Franc Reference Rates (NWG) has put forward recommendations on how to proceed with replacing Libor. Market participants must now act decisively to implement these recommendations. A SARON-based swap market is especially important for the financial markets. Swap markets are used to hedge interest rate risk (e.g.

Its members, individually and collectively, are publicly accountable for the way in which that responsibility is exercised. The supply-side agenda, under successive governments has inevitably been more diverse. It has included a strong commitment to free markets and competition as the motive forces for productive efficiency, and as the essential means of allocating financial and real resources. It includes an equally strong parallel commitment - both regionally within the European Union but also more broadly - to international free trade in goods and services and to the global free flow of capital. The supply-side agenda has included an extensive program of “privatisation”, bringing market disciplines to bear on commercial activities previously undertaken within the public sector, but often involving new forms of regulation in areas of activity that might otherwise be dominated by natural monopolies. It has included extensive deregulation - for example in relation to financial services, including banks and building societies, though this has been accompanied by improvements in the financial infrastructure and by enhanced prudential supervision. It has included measures of labour market deregulation and Trade Union reform. And it has included increased emphasis on education and training; measures to encourage business enterprise - especially among smaller businesses; and reforms to the welfare system to improve incentives to work. The list could go on.
Layard, R. (2003), Happiness: Has Social Science A Clue?, Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures delivered at the London School of Economics, 3-5 March: Lucas, R. (1980), “Rules, Discretion and the Role of the Economic Advisor” and Fisher, S. (ed.) “Rational Expectations and Economic Policy”, University of Chicago Press. Marx, K. (1867): Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Buch I, Hamburg: Otto Meissner; Buch II (1885), Buch III (1894) edited by F. Engels. Moutot, P., F. Mongelli and A. Jung, “The Eurosystem: Monetary Policy Preparation, Decision-Making, and Enlargement - Selected Issues”, ECB Occasional Paper, forthcoming. Nicoletti, G., R. Haffner, S. Nickell, S. Scarpetta and G. Zoega (2000), “European Integration, Liberalization and Labour Market Performance”, in G. Bertola, T. Boeri and G. Nicoletti (eds), Welfare and Employment in a United Europe, MIT Press. Nickell, S and L. Nunziata (2001), Employment Patterns in OECD Countries, Centre for Economic Performance. Nickell, S., L. Nunziata, L., W. Ochel,and G. Quintini (2002), Why Do Jobless Rates Differ?, CESifo Forum 3:1, 50-59. Phelps, E.S. (1973), “Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory”, New York, Basic Books for the Russell Sage Foundation. 10  BIS Review 43/2007  Phelps, E.S (2003), “Commentary II”, in Philippe Aghion, Roman Frydman, Joseph Stiglitz and Michael Woodford (eds. ), Information and Knowledge in Modern Macroeconomics, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Phelps, E.S. (2003), “Globalization and Development”, Public lecture in Bangkok, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Singapore and Havana, January-February. Phelps, E.S.

Switzerland’s only major drawback is the fact that it is a lightweight in the geopolitical arena, which makes it almost impossible for it to defend itself against protectionist tendencies and discriminatory measures taken by big countries. The Swiss government must therefore take a strong stand on behalf of free trade, while also ensuring that the private sector operates within the best possible framework for its further development. Ultimately, our future welfare depends on the vitality of the private sector, not on any state intervention. BIS Review 166/2009  1
First of all, by creating a direct relationship between our profits and the funding of an important element in our system of social security, the initiative would establish a dangerous link, since it would certainly place the SNB under constant pressure to distribute more profits in the future. Higher profit distribution would only be possible if we took bigger investment risks or if we reduced our monetary reserves. Markets would start to ask themselves whether the SNB's goal was to ensure the monetary stability of the country or to generate profits. As I pointed out before, there is a risk that constant debate on this topic could sap market perception of our independence. This would damage our credibility and hamper our monetary policy. At the end of the day, implementation of this initiative would undermine confidence in the Swiss franc. Second, the initiative assumes that our profit distribution can be held permanently at a level above CHF 1 billion a year. This is an illusion. The only possible outcome is bitter disappointment on the part of our fellow Swiss. All our calculations show that, as confirmed in the remarks made by the President of the Bank Council on the results for 2005, the SNB's medium-term profit distribution potential amounts to only CHF 1 billion a year. If we deduct the gains due to the spectacular increase in the price of gold and to exchange rate gains from the CHF 12 billion profit recorded for 2005, the distributable profit falls to CHF 2 billion.

Globalisation does not mean that ASEAN countries should allow themselves to be swamped by foreign companies. It is a legitimate ambition for countries to want to build up their own strong companies. But the companies need to be internationally competitive; it is not viable for them to depend on protected home markets. Companies which cannot hold their own domestically will find it very difficult to compete abroad. Furthermore, governments must understand what industries they have the best chance of building up, given the nature of the global marketplace. In many industries technology and economies of scale have led to a worldwide wave of mergers and consolidations. For example in banking and auto manufacturing the scale has become global, with a few large players dominating the worldwide market. In these industries, the most promising approach for small and medium countries is to seek investments from these major players, not to build up their own national champions to compete against the giants. This is what Thailand has done with the auto industry. Globalisation has its downside. The competition is intense, the environment is constantly and rapidly changing, restructuring and upgrading are endless tasks, and unpredictable disasters strike from time to time. All this brings disorientation, new insecurities, and a sense of loss of control. But governments have to manage these problems and risks.