samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In my remarks this evening, I hope to explain my understanding of what we mean by inflation persistence, and thus how it has and will influence monetary policy decisions. To emphasise from the outset: this is a personal view, not necessarily that of the Committee as whole. In presenting my interpretation, I will address four questions: Why focus on inflation persistence? What is inflation persistence? What drives inflation persistence? And what are the close-to-realtime indicators of inflation persistence on which the MPC is focused? In doing so, I will use one aspect of recent economic experience – specifically the adverse terms of trade shock to the UK stemming from higher imported energy prices – as a ‘case study’ to illustrate my points. By implication – and possibly to the disappointment of some of you – that means I won’t offer a comprehensive assessment of the UK economic situation and outlook in my remarks tonight. And, as a result, I won’t be giving any guidance about the immediate outlook for Bank Rate decisions, which necessarily depends on such an encompassing assessment. Rather my goal is to provide some further insight into the thought process that guides my vote at the MPC: if you like, the thinking behind my own ‘monetary policy reaction function’. Why inflation persistence? The transmission of monetary policy actions to developments in consumer price inflation famously operates with ‘long and variable lags’.

To achieve this goal, we have to build on the best assets of our network: its agility; its technical competence as a “knowledge hub”; and, if I may, the relentless efforts of its Chair, my colleague Frank Elderson, and the commitment of the Banque de France to its global Secretariat. A team of 14 people from the Banque de France is the backbone of the Secretariat, strongly backed by our new Climate Change Center chaired by Nathalie Aufauvre. Given the extension of the NGFS and the deepening of its work, secondments from other NGFS members would be most welcome to contribute to the dynamism of the Network, through one year stays, on site, in Paris, or flexible options including remote work. And we intend to  strengthen our efforts to communicate and disseminate the work of the NGFS among our membership and beyond. We have increased means, and still many avenues to explore. If I had to stress only two tasks where our whole global community needs the NGFS: (i) climaterelated economic scenarios. We released a first wave in July 2020, we will update them next week. I read some unfounded doubts on them: NGFS works with the best partner research institutes, publishes a range of plausible and differentiated futures – not intended to be central forecast –, and will regularly incorporate the development of scientific evidence. This provides, as a common public good for COP26, the best reliable framework for financial risk assessment.
The Bank has been very intensively engaged in much of this work - with the Treasury in the G7, the G10, the new G20 and the IMF, with both the Treasury and the FSA in the new Financial Stability Forum; with the FSA also in the Basel Committee; and with our central bank counterparts in both the BIS and the ECB. All of this, too, points to the critical importance of coordination and cooperation, nationally between the Treasury, the Bank and the FSA, but also to an ever increasing degree with our various interested counterparts abroad. And in this context, given the international importance of the City, we, together with the FSA, have a particular role to play in engaging the private sector financial community in the consultation process: we have a common interest in the outcome. All of these developments, Chairman, pose major challenges both for market participants and for the authorities. But, for the markets at least, with major challenges come major opportunities. Our job is to help the markets take advantage of those opportunities by providing a stable and orderly financial environment within which markets can function more effectively. It is very much in the interests of the City that we should succeed. We - like you - have plenty to do. BIS Review 49/2000  4

He noted that President Harry Truman “wanted a one-armed economist, not the usual sort that analyzes every problem with ‘on the one hand, this, and on the other, that.’” Gross claimed that Fed Chair (Janet) Yellen, in her speech given recently at the Fed’s Jackson Hole, Wyo., conference, introduced so many qualifications about the status of the labor market that “instead of the proverbial two-handed economist, she more resembled a Hindu goddess with a half-dozen or more appendages.”2 Whether you analyze the labor markets with one arm or two, or six or 19, the issue is how quickly we are approaching capacity utilization, so as to gauge price pressures. After all, a central bank is first and foremost charged with maintaining the purchasing power of its country’s currency. Like most central banks around the world, we view a 2 percent inflation rate as a decent intermediate-term target. Of late, the various inflation indexes have been beating around this mark. Just this last Friday, the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) index for July was released, and it clocked in at a 1 percent annualized rate, a pace less than the run rate of April through June. Does this mean we are experiencing an inflation rate that is less than acceptable? I wonder. At the Dallas Fed, we calculate a trimmed mean inflation rate for personal consumption expenditures to get what we think is the best sense of the underlying inflation rate for the normal consumer.
Such a turn of events would have had severe effects on the real economy. In this respect, it is important to refrain from drawing too-sweeping conclusions from the banking collapse in Iceland, as the international part of Iceland’s banking system was so large and domestic banking operations were actually kept up and running at considerable cost. International cooperation on crisis management grew markedly in scope, particularly through collaboration among the G20 countries and at the International Monetary Fund. It encompassed a common perspective on fiscal measures to support the banking system and stimulate demand, and the provision of support to specific countries. Later on, emphasis shifted to the reform of the financial regulatory framework. That work is still underway. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  But in spite of these measures, by late 2008 and early 2009 the recession on both sides of the Atlantic had become the deepest since the interwar years, and on a global level it was the most extensive and synchronised contraction in history. All of this affected the Icelandic economy, of course, but added to it were the collapse of Iceland’s banks, the plunge in asset prices, and the inevitable adjustment of domestic demand following the overheating in 2005–2007 – an adjustment that had begun before the banks fell. The contraction from the peak in Q4/2007 to the trough in Q1/2010 was the deepest Iceland has seen, at least in the post-war period. GDP contracted by nearly 12½%.

First, given the unpredictable and dynamic nature of the financial market, there is urgency for us to keep our fingers on the pulse of the market and have access to real time information. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  There is much scope for cooperation between the central bank and industry players in this area. In addition to being familiar and observance of the rules and regulations of the financial market, we expect market participants to know the details of their clients’ transactions to aid us in understanding the nature of the market conditions. Everyone has an important role to play in maintaining the stability of the market and remain vigilant on all financial market activities. This is necessary to prevent activities that could threaten financial stability and create unnecessary volatility, or incidents that could damage the integrity of our domestic financial market. Secondly, while I’m on the topic of enhancement of market stability and integrity, I should stress on the importance of upholding individual ethics and professional conduct. The market is made up of individuals including institutions. The glue that binds individuals and institutions that constitute the market is TRUST. A case in point, on rate rigging, several global banks paid hefty fines to regulatory authorities because of individuals rogue traders. Many dealers were convicted of wrong doings, and investors are still taking lawsuits against the banks. TRUST was violated. While no Malaysian dealers were caught red handed in market misconduct, we should not be complacent.
To a large extent, such competition has been the outgrowth of a fundamental change in the general approach to mortgage lending. Traditionally, mortgage financing was approached as a credit rationing process. In contrast, today banks compete aggressively for borrowers by packaging highly competitive spread of home loan products to meet different needs of borrowers. In the more developed markets, this has manifested in more prevalent sales of non-traditional mortgage products to sub-prime borrowers as competition for borrowers has intensified. The rise of investment property has also been striking, with significant growth in this loan class observed in Malaysia relative to owner occupiers. In this environment, it is important that banks develop a more complete understanding of the full spectrum of risks presented in this business. The dangers of complacency have been  BIS Review 3/2010  1  clearly demonstrated in the devastating consequences of this global financial crisis. Basic failures in risk management and oversight have been cited as a key characteristic of financial institutions that suffered large losses during the crisis. In many instances, boards and senior management of these institutions neglected to understand and control their institutions’ balance sheet growth and the risks that they were exposed to. Some institutions in fact made deliberate strategic decisions to retain large exposures to financial instruments linked to subprime assets but failed to take appropriate measures to control or mitigate those risks.

In many financial institutions, the rigor of board scrutiny and due diligence was replaced with an over-reliance on external ratings or complex internal models for credit evaluations. This was compounded by incentive structures that were not adequately risk-aligned and inconsistent with long-term value creation, eventually undermining the soundness of banks. These failures have extracted a high price on affected financial institutions, investors and national economies at large. Some of the large financial institutions that entered aggressively into the sub-prime market are now no longer around, while losses from the write-downs of loans and provisions have been staggering. Between the second quarters of 2007 and 2009, the global write-down of loan provisions had amounted to USD1.3 trillion. In October 2009, the International Monetary Fund indicated that the estimates could rise further to as much as USD2.8 trillion 1. The events which have since unfolded underscore the fact that effectively managing risks associated with mortgage financing encompasses a much broader set of considerations – including the consequences of an adverse and broad downturn in the housing market. The crisis has reinforced the need for banks to consider the cyclical developments in the mortgage financing market more explicitly in their risk assessments. Factors such as a sustained growth in house prices, low interest rates and modest equity commitment should inform banks of the risk outlook for the mortgage segment and corresponding risk mitigation actions that are needed to avert potential losses.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Launch of International Centre for Leadership in Finance Welcoming address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Official Launch of International Centre For Leadership In Finance (ICLIF), Kuala Lumpur, 28 October 2003. *  *  *  Yang Amat Berhormat, Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great pleasure and honour to welcome you to the official launch of the International Centre for Leadership in Finance (ICLIF). This Centre is being established with the objective of providing a focused and co-ordinated approach towards the development of world class leaders in the financial services sector in Malaysia and in the region. Ladies and Gentlemen, The unprecedented economic and financial transformations in this decade have created new operating environments that demand new leadership skills. This is most evident in the financial services sector which has become increasingly more complex, more competitive, more uncertain and ambiguous and more challenging. It is therefore essential to have leaders who are able to see the new emerging opportunities, deal with the high level of unpredictability and navigate through turbulent conditions. The pressure on leaders has become increasingly more immense. In emerging market economies where our aspirations are to elevate our level of performance and development, the demands are even greater. Indeed, in this new environment the role of leadership has changed.

Ladies and Gentlemen, The financial sector in our region has now reached a new stage of development. Over the years, the role of the financial system has evolved, facilitating the various stages of development and growth. Increasingly, the financial services industry is also becoming a source of growth, especially as several countries in the region are moving towards a knowledge-based and services-led economy. In the process, the dynamic changes taking place are also being driven by technological advances and an increasingly competitive environment. As financial restructuring and reforms progress to a more advanced stage, financial institutions are also moving on to make the necessary adjustments to become more productive, innovative, and strategically more focused. Efforts are now focused not only on the creation of a sound and resilient financial sector but towards institutional development and capacity building of the financial sector to elevate it to a higher level of performance, efficiency and excellence. This represents an important  BIS Review 46/2003  1  phase in the development of the financial sector as highlighted in our 10-year Financial Sector Master Plan that was released almost three years ago. It represents an important development prior to moving towards a more deregulated and liberalised environment. In this context, we are envisaging forward-looking financial institutions that will be able to face the challenges of financial liberalisation and globalisation as we progress into our next stage of development.
On the regulatory front, a series of enhancements to the risk management regulatory framework has been introduced with the aim of promoting a more robust and comprehensive risk management practices within banking institutions. In addition, significant effort has also been put in place to prepare the industry towards the implementation of Basel II, which is targeted for January 2008 for the standardised approach and January 2010 for the IRB approach. The industry has responded well with various improvement measures that have been instituted, and investments made to enhance their systems and approaches to elevate their capability to manage risk exposures. This will contribute towards enhancing further overall financial stability, and towards the development of new products with better pricing of the financial services. The Islamic banking and takaful industries have been among the most dynamic in the sector. In terms of assets, the annual growth rate of Islamic banking and takaful averaged 19 percent and 25 percent respectively. In 2005, profitability of Islamic banking surpassed the RM1 billion mark for the first time, while its assets breached the RM100 billion threshold. As of end-March, the Islamic banking assets accounted for almost 12% of the total assets of the entire banking system. The takaful industry's assets stood at about 6% of the industry total. The Islamic banking industry has begun to maximise the competitive advantages of the Islamic banking concept of profit and risk sharing.

These efforts have further enhanced the ability of the financial system to respond to the changes that have occurred. The banking sector recorded improvements on all fronts, enhancing the ability to compete effectively and strengthening the resilience to weather any potential adverse developments in particular, any external shocks to the system. The level of capitalisation remained consistently strong with the riskweighted capital ratio of the banking system above 13% for the period concerned with quality of portfolio continuing to improve further amidst sustained economic performance. The banking sector also continued to record strong profitability performance despite the increasingly competitive operating environment. In 2005, the banking system as a whole registered a pre-tax profit level of RM12.4 billion with a higher component of the revenue originating from service related activities such as the sale of wealth management products and remittance services, as well as from trading and investment activities. With this stronger performance and enhanced capability to manage risk exposures, several banking institutions have also taken the next step and moved forward to expand in the regional market to reach new sources of business opportunities. On the domestic front, there has been a narrowing of the gap as compared with the foreign banks. Further initiatives undertaken include enhancing the operational aspects and delivery of services to banking consumers through the rationalisation of the configuration within respective banking groups.
Whoever lived there and worked there felt himself free of all confinement and prejudice.”ix I admire this Viennese spirit, which combines audacity and liberty, and which was the cradle of the greatest minds of our contemporary era. Today, as Europe’s time may be here again, I hope that this spirit will continue to inspire us. Thank you for your attention. i  I would like to thank P. Andrade, P. Antipa, G. Cette, M. Dujardin, O. Garnier, A. Lojschova, B. Mojon and B. Rudelle for their help in preparing this speech. ii Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2017. iii See e.g. Blanchard (O. ), Cerutti (E.), and Summers (L.) (2015) “Inflation and Activity - Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 21726, November. iv Guilloux-Nefussi (S.) (2016) "Globalization, Market Structure and Inflation Dynamics," Banque de France Working Papers 610. v See e.g. Andrade, Philippe, Johannes Breckenfelder, Fiorella De Fiore, Peter Karadi, and Oreste Tristani (2016) “The ECB's asset purchase programme - an early assessment” ECB Working Paper No. 1956 and Arrata, William and Benoît Nguyen (2017) “Price Impact of Bond Supply Shocks: Evidence from the Eurosystem's asset purchase program” Banque de France Working Paper No. 623. Page 9 sur 8 vi  See e.g. D’Amico Stefania and Thomas B.

3 As measured by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, European Commission (2021),  “European Economic Forecast” – Spring 2021 4 McKinsey (2021), “The future of work after COVID-19”. 5 Bloom, N. et al. (2012), “Really Uncertain Business Cycles”, NBER Working Paper Series, No 18245, National  Bureau of Economic Research, July. 6 Batini, N., di Serio, M., Fragetta, M., Melina, G. and Waldron, A. (2021), “Building Back Better: How Big Are Green  Spending Multipliers?”, IMF Working Papers, No 87, International Monetary Fund, March. 7 Darvas, Z. and Tagliapietra, S. (2021), “Setting Europe’s economic recovery in motion: a first look at national  plans”, Bruegel, 29 April. 8 European Commission (2021), “The euro area”, Flash Eurobarometer 488, May. 80% of thosesurveyed believe  that having the euro is a good thing for the EU and 70% say the same aboutthe euro and their country. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Instead, major innovations and economic growth became the norm. If we are to understand why advances were made so rapidly, we have to look at areas that economists probably do not explore often enough. In England, a parliament had emerged as a counterweight to the crown and the landed nobility. There was also the introduction of patents, private property rights and – by the standards of the day – a stable tax regime. These were important, growth-friendly institutions which remain central pillars of modern economies. Growth in per capita GDP in England accelerated gradually during the 19th century. More countries eventually came on board and joined the technology race. The groundwork for two of the most important breakthroughs of the late 19th century – electricity and the combustion engine – was laid mainly in the US and Germany. These innovations remained key growth drivers well into the 20th century. At the same time, the US took over from the UK as the most important base for new advances. With the US in the driving seat, economic growth hit new heights, peaking in the middle of the 20th century. Since 1970, growth has slowed. Growth has moved on a new downward trend since 2000. Growth in Norway has shown a similar pattern. Immediately after the war, our per capita GDP was only around half that of the US. There was considerable potential for catching up, and growth was higher than abroad for a long period.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Recent Swiss experience in monetary policy strategy Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at a seminar on monetary theory and policy, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, 28 November 2007. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  One continually recurring element in the history of the Swiss National Bank has been the application of a clear set of rules that we refer to nowadays as ′strategy′. The SNB′s monetary policy strategy consists of three elements: a definition of price stability, an inflation forecast and a fluctuation range assigned to a short-term interest rate. Experiences with this strategy since its introduction in the year 2000 – judged in terms of both price stability and cyclical developments in the economy – have demonstrated its value. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the strategy have been questioned by academics and by central bankers. These include inflation forecasting under the assumption of a fixed Libor, the choice of the reference interest rate, the role of monetary aggregates and exchange rates in the SNB′s models, and the decision not to publish the minutes of Governing Board meetings. However, these deliberately selected elements in fact serve to reinforce the legitimacy of the SNB′s strategy. BIS Review 139/2007  1