samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Overall, the reforms in these markets, along with the regulatory reforms to the oversight of financial institutions, should result in more robust system of credit intermediation, whether it is taking place through traditional intermediaries or through the markets more broadly. This reform process faces several important risks, though. First, there is a possibility that the process will stagnate or end up incomplete, given that the issues are complex, the stakeholders are numerous and the solutions are not always obvious. Second, there is a risk that, with so many efforts taking place in so many areas, the results will not fit together into an effective, cohesive solution. And third, there is the risk that the pursuit of reform will be overly zealous, resulting in a set of restrictions that will significantly undermine the functioning of financial markets during normal periods and thereby impede employment and growth. On this last point, it is worth making a few observations about the functioning of financial markets as we think about how to encourage a safe and yet efficient financial sector. These points may be obvious but are worth emphasizing. First, securitization is a powerful vehicle that should play an important role in the intermediation of credit in the economy. Securitization can be quite effective at transforming illiquid assets into negotiable securities and transferring risk to a more diversified set of holders. To be sure, the expansion of securitized credit was much too extensive, and its subsequent collapse was terribly disruptive, contributing significantly to the damage to the economy.

Two basic macroeconomic policies, monetary policy and fiscal policy, have contributed toward the economic activity stabilization, without exerting increasing pressures on the inflation rate. The budget expenses during 2004 have been relatively uniform throughout the year, without jeopardizing the rise of inflationary pressures in the economy in given periods. The domestic borrowing of Government has been 2.0 percent of GDP over 2004, compared to 2.9 percent in 2003. Monetary policy The monetary policy followed during 2004 maintained the easing trend of the policy being followed during 2003. Bank of Albania has cut 5 times the core interest rate over 2004, with a total effect of 1.25 percentage points. The core interest rate reached new minimum historical levels through every cut occurred during 2004, remaining by the end of the year 5.25 percent. The easing monetary policy  4  BIS Review 38/2005  has been in compliance with the inflation developments during 2004 and the positive expectations on this indicator in the future. These developments seem to have been perceived by the public, who is increasingly anchoring the inflationary expectations to the inflation target announced by the Bank of Albania. This is reflected in the increase of public interest in depositing their savings in Lek, generating also appreciation pressures on the exchange rate in Lek. The appreciation of exchange rate in Lek, accompanied by stable inflation values in the largest trade partners of Albania, has impacted the decrease of inflation value imported during 2004.
It is not for us to remind you that one of the attributes of being factual and accurate is to be able to verify information as much as possible. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is for this reason that the Bank of Zambia finds immense pride in organising this event, whose objectives are to interact with the media so as to: 1. Share information on the role and functions as well as operations of the Bank of Zambia in the Zambian economy;  2. Discuss recent developments in the Zambian and global economy; and  3. Provide an outlook on future economic and financial developments. Through this interaction, we also seek to clarify certain economic and financial terminologies that are frequently used in economic or business reporting. At this juncture, Distinguished Colleagues, allow me to outline the recent macroeconomic performance in Zambia and its projected outlook. The Zambian economy has recorded robust economic growth rates for over a decade now with GDP growth averaging at 6.4% in the last 10 years. This growth has been broad-based, extending beyond the mining sector to the agriculture, forestry and fisheries; manufacturing; construction; transport, storage and communications; and financial intermediaries sectors. In 2013 Zambia’s overall macroeconomic performance was generally buoyant relative to other countries in the region and the world economy in general. Real GDP growth was registered at 6.5 percent in 2013 from 7.3 percent in 2012. The growth was higher than 4.9% and 3.0% growth for sub-Saharan Africa and for the global economy in 2013, respectively.

Similarly, the Kwacha depreciated against the Pound Sterling and Euro by 3.6% and 8.3%, respectively. This was partly on account of the US dollar appreciation following the strengthening of the US economy during the latter part of the year. The Pound and Euro weakness moderated on the back of optimism that their economies would continue to rebound. The Kwacha, appreciated against the rand by 10.7% to an average K0.5596/ZAR, reflecting the slowdown in mining output, following continued labour unrest in the South African mining sector. In the first quarter of 2014, the Kwacha depreciated by 10.0% to K6.09 per US dollar. This development was largely attributed to a high demand due to a higher growth in imports relative to exports, as well as investor sentiments associated with the tapering of quantitative easing in the United States of America coupled with falling copper prices on the global markets. Similar weakening of currencies was observed in most emerging market economies such as Ghana, South Africa and Turkey. It should be noted that the Bank of Zambia has continued to implement a market determined exchange rate and has intervened in the market to smooth out volatility and accumulate reserves. According to a recent study conducted by Professor John Weeks of the University of London, there is strong evidence that, the Bank of Zambia’s participation in the foreign exchange market to minimise volatility in the exchange rate has in general been effective.
The act generally requires that public notice be provided, and approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) be obtained, before any information requirement is applied to more than nine entities. Over the years, the act’s requirement for OMB approval for information collection activity involving more than nine entities has discouraged agencies from undertaking many initiatives and can delay the collection of important information in a financial crisis. For example, even a series of informal meetings with more than nine entities designed to learn about emerging developments in markets may be subject to the requirements of the act. While the principle of minimizing the burdens imposed on private parties is an important one, the Congress should consider amending the act to allow the financial supervisory agencies to obtain the data necessary for financial stability in a timely manner when needed. One proposed action would be to increase the number of entities from which information can be collected without triggering the act; another would be to permit special data requests of the systemically important institutions could be conducted more quickly and flexibly. The global nature of capital markets seriously limits the extent to which one country acting alone can organize information on financial markets. Many large institutions have foreign subsidiaries that take financial positions in coordination with the parent. Accordingly, strong cooperative arrangements among domestic and foreign authorities, supported by an appropriate statutory framework, are needed to enable appropriate sharing of information among relevant authorities.

 Lastly, we know that we will emerge from this crisis with significantly higher levels of debt. This is clearly the case for government debt, with an increase of between ten and several dozen percentage points of GDP. But it is also the case for business debts: the longer the economic hiatus lasts, the more their problems will evolve from simple cash requirements to lasting balance sheet challenges and losses to be covered through capital increases. In financial terms, several businesses will go from facing liquidity constraints to solvency constraints. And the current cash flow problems will become stock problems. Relatively speaking, the economic agents generally least affected by this crisis are households, which experience high levels of “forced saving” during the period. Of course, this does not mean that, on a micro-economic level, some low-income households and financially vulnerable people are not already feeling the effects of lost income; and these households, which struggle to make ends meet, have no precautionary savings. *** This leads us to consider the lessons that history can teach us about recovering from crises, starting with the post-war years. This has become a particular focus of economic research today, even though, fortunately, our situation is less  Page 6 of 8 dramatic: the three "classic" themes – which give rise to so many questions – are the return to growth, debt treatment, and the proper use of monetary policy. 1/ How to support growth?
As a result, the economic growth of 2019 resulted in the level of 2.2%, down from the level of 4.1% recorded in the previous year. The shocks we suffered slowed down the growth rate, but did not divert the Albanian economy from the positive development trend. This performance was reflected in the reduction of the unemployment rate, in the increase of employment and wages, as well as in the reduction of the foreign debt and the public debt of the country. In parallel, the main indicators of the health of the banking sector remained at satisfactory levels. The average inflation of 2019 resulted in the level of 1.4%. The performance still below the inflation target, required the maintenance of the stimulative direction of monetary policy during 2019. For this reason, the Bank of Albania kept the key interest rate unchanged at 1.0%, oriented the market on maintaining the easing direction of monetary policy in medium-term horizon, as well as supplied banks with the necessary liquidity. In response to our monetary policy, financial conditions were stimulating to increase aggregate demand and appropriate for returning inflation to target. The monetary stimulus brought about the reduction of the credit price and stimulated the growth of lending. Under these circumstances, private sector lending experienced a relatively rapid growth and showed a better distribution. Also, the monetary stimulus reduced the cost of debt service for businesses and households, as well as created the premises for a more stable exchange rate.

In addition to supporting price stability, the Bank of Albania has also paid attention to the promotion of financial stability, through the supervision and careful regulation of the banking 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  sector, as well as through the coordination of work with other supervisory authorities of the financial sector. 2. Banking supervision and financial stability The Albanian banking sector continues to remain financially sound and has shown increasing dynamism. This sector has been profitable during 2019, while its liquidity and capitalization indicators are above our regulatory requirements. Also, resistance testing exercises show that the banking sector exposure to systemic risks is controlled and that the banking sector’s ability to withstand risks is strong. Below I will briefly list some of the main directions of our work to strengthen banking supervision and to support financial stability. First, the Bank of Albania successfully administered the banking sector consolidation process. This process reshaped the domestic banking market, bringing in new and motivated actors, as well as increasing domestic capital. Second, the Bank of Albania fulfilled all its obligations under the national plan for the reduction of non-performing loans. Thanks to measures taken over the years, the nonperforming loan ratio fell from a maximum of almost 25% in 2014 to 8.4% at the end of 2019. Third, the Bank of Albania worked to meet the recommendations of the CoE Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Measures against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (MONEYVAL).
Likewise, the progressive re-opening of commercial establishments deemed non-essential since early May prompted a pick-up in retail sales that month, more markedly so in the case of products whose sales were more affected during the lockdown, such as personal equipment goods, home equipment and motor fuel. This improvement in consumer spending is expected to have run into June, according to the information available on payments made using cards. Throughout Q2, the labour market moved on a path of recovery similar to that described for economic activity. Consequently, the fall in Social Security registrations eased in May and, especially in June, following the heavy declines recorded in the second half of March and in April. In any event, registrations provide a partial picture of the scale of the labour market adjustment since the start of the crisis, insofar as the workers affected by furlough-like schemes (ERTEs) continue to be considered as registered, despite the fact they are not contributing to production. For a truer assessment of changes in the labour force since the onset of the crisis, regard is had to the series of registrations after having stripped out workers subject to ERTEs. This series, which might be dubbed “actual registrations”, is estimated to have shown a year-on-year decline of 22% at end-April, with much sharper reductions in some of the services segments most affected by the restrictions on movement 2  associated with the state of alert, such as the hospitality sector.

We are well aware that crises that incorporate a significant financial downturn are usually deeper and longerlasting. The health crisis will directly affect the profitability of the European banking sector. Such profitability was already low before the crisis broke, and events have highlighted the need to tackle even more urgently certain challenges, such as those associated with digitalisation, the management of cybersecurity risks, reputational risks and those relating to climate change. This underscores the importance of making further headway in improving banking efficiency. Given the extraordinarily prevalent role played by this sector in the Spanish and European economy, how successfully these challenges are resolved will notably influence the intensity and sustainability of economic growth in the coming years. The importance of an extension and selective adaptation of national stimulus measures In the national economic policy arena, achieving the dual aim of supporting the recovery and smoothing the adjustment of the economy to the post-pandemic scenario calls for two actions. First, the authorities must extend and regularly recalibrate some of the 6  measures already applied, which will have to be more closely focused now on the groups of firms, sectors and individuals most affected. And further, their design should enable the structural adjustments needed ahead of the new post-pandemic environment to be brought about. Allow me to illustrate this idea in relation to two measures that have been particularly important in recent months: the policies on guarantees and on ERTEs.
One of the reasons why macroprudential tools are not always effective, could be that vulnerabilities are not necessarily driven by the credit cycles. In the cases examined, it is evident, that credit for house purchases is not always correlated with the trends in housing prices. For example, Slovenia and the Netherlands experienced a build-up in vulnerabilities in the residential real estate market without a corresponding excessive growth in housing loans. Structural factors could explain the above observation as they affect both demand and supply of housing. More particularly, Net migration and population growth are factors that have continued to put pressure on house prices in countries such as Luxembourg, which experienced net population growth of 13,6% in 2020. Countries with low vulnerabilities in the housing market, such as Greece, experienced a negative population growth. Strong preference for home ownership could also be a driving factor for the observed vulnerabilities in Luxembourg and Slovakia. Homeowners represent 92,9% of the population of Slovakia whereas in France, a country with low identified real estate vulnerabilities, homeowners represent 65,2%. From the above examples, we can conclude that in designing a macroprudential tool, idiosyncratic structural factors need to be identified and accounted for. Monetary policy also plays a role. Although macroprudential policy is the first line of defence, the ECB has recognised that Financial Stability is a precondition for price stability. It has also been acknowledged that monetary policy, can, in principle, influence asset prices such as real estate.

Simon M Potter: Discussion of “Evaluating Monetary Policy Operational Frameworks” by Ulrich Bindseil Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium “Designing resilient monetary policy frameworks for the future”, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 26 August 2016. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech or on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website. My thoughts on implementation issues have been enriched by numerous conversations with colleagues, particularly around the current longer-run efforts in the Federal Reserve to examine implementation. Recent dialogue with Antoine Martin was particularly helpful in producing this discussion. Introduction: what do we still need to know to evaluate operational frameworks? Thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss Ulrich Bindseil’s excellent paper, which builds on his considerable body of work in this field and provides an insightful discussion of monetary policy implementation. What makes Ulrich’s contributions notable is the unique combination of academic rigor and practical insights he brings to the topic. By distilling the key elements of his previous research into an accessible form, this article is a useful read for anyone who wants to gain a deeper understanding of the economics of monetary policy implementation, including practitioners of central bank market operations, central bank researchers, and academics.
The range of risks to be met by international business is thus far broader  3  The Economist, Global Finance Survey May 2003. BIS Review 120/2006  3  than in the past and demands permanent monitoring and continuous improvement of risk management at all levels. Financial, operational and reputational risks are all new by-products of globalisation, and we are only just beginning to come to terms with them. A survey of corporate directors quoted by the Economist in 2004 showed that a clear identification of risks is still too difficult for many well trained CEOs: 36% of the corporate directors polled actually admitted that they did not fully understand the risks faced by their company. Implications for the private sector With globalisation, your lives have undoubtedly become more difficult. Operating at a global level is infinitely more complex than the regional approach of the past. Globalisation is a challenge for business management. It entails many sources of uncertainties but also offers many vehicles to cope with risk. Can we beat these new risks? No. We must prepare ourselves to face them. We can only insure against some risks, but we cannot predict where the next blow will come from. I think that this is the most important characteristic of our times. What has increased is not our insecurity. We are, in many respects, safer than in the past. This, I hope, is what I have managed to convey to you.

By the late 1960s, fundamental misalignments between the major economies had become too great to support an international fixed exchange rate system and, reluctantly, we had to accept that the security we had taken for granted had become an unsustainable fiction: with ever growing international capital mobility, pegged regimes had become increasingly difficult to maintain. The reason is easy to understand: with capital free to move across national borders, the price of any currency is determined like the price of any other internationally traded asset – through the interaction and expectations of actors that operate beyond the borders of the issuing country and in response to variables that are beyond the area of influence of national authorities. By the early 1970s, central banks could not ignore this basic truth, and by 1976 all major currencies were floating. The Bretton Woods system was dead. In the decades that followed, many countries, especially developing ones, tried to cling to a dollar peg with periodic adjustments, in an effort to bring stability to their currencies. They were operating what economists call intermediate exchange rate regimes. The series of costly crises of the 1980s and 1990s proved how dangerous this path could be. The adjustable pegs that were able to channel thin capital flows were completely ineffectual when it came to containing the huge capital flows  BIS Review 120/2006  1  encountered in a more globalised world. By 1996, flexible exchange rates predominated in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, non-industrial Europe and the Western Hemisphere.