samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This means that, if we looked only at the boost to income and wealth from looser monetary policy, this would significantly understate the well-being benefits to households from the MPC’s monetary actions, by a factor of at least two. 34  For example, Jacoby (2002). Both are shown in Table 1. Log utility is the best fit for happiness across households, but it is also common to use this functional form at the individual level. We also experimented with a variety of other specifications, with higher order terms to capture greater curvature in the utility function, but these were generally not statistically significant. Note that our regressions are based on a pooled cross section of households and so are not pure estimates of the impact on happiness of changes in income and wealth over time. 36 For example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) and Di Tella et al (2003). 37 There are various ways to calculate the income-equivalence of the lower probability of unemployment, and these numbers would vary depending on the assumptions made. For simplicity, we exploit the results from our analysis, which show the effect on welfare from the lower probability of unemployment on the average household to be around six times larger than the welfare boost from higher labour income. 38 For example, Clark and Oswald (1994). 35  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  Second, these gains from higher employment are felt particularly strongly by younger people who gain most from having a job.

A second thought is that the banks, when pricing loans, will look at the cash flow from the loan, which in this case can be equated with the company’s cash flow. In most cases, your companies have a large value in their properties as collateral and this will continue to be a positive thing for you, but as I said earlier, the banks today focus firstly on the customer’s ability to repay and then on the collateral offered. What is important to a company that has loans? •  Meticulous balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for the present time and going back a number of years. •  Low vacancy rates in the housing stock and rents that are paid on time. •  The banks will not merely evaluate the size of the cash flows, but also their stability. •  Orderly and well cared for property stock, i.e. property management is important. It is therefore important to have good knowledge of the bank’s actions and method of working. The difference in interest rate between borrowers of varying risk classes will be greater in future than it is today. It will therefore be important for companies applying for loans to present themselves as attractive borrowers to the bank or the capital market. If they want a low interest rate on their loans as a result of their negotiations with the bank, it is important to be able to demonstrate a company that has been stable and well managed for a number of years.
Last winter we saw how short the path was from a local virus outbreak in Wuhan to a global health crisis. Covid-19 followed the same routes as tourists, labour and goods. The virus showed how closely interconnected and interdependent countries are. 2 See The Productivity J-Curve: How Intangibles Complement General Purpose Technologies Erik Brynjolfsson, Daniel Rock, and Chad Syverson NBER Working Paper No. 25148, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_ papers/w25148/revisions/w25148.rev0.pdf  6  NORGES BANK  Chart 5 Growth in global trade has stalled Share of global GDP. Percent 30  30  Trade in goods Trade in services  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0 1977  1983  1989  1995  2001  2007  2013  ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18 FEBRUARY 2021  0 2019  Sources: Refinitiv Datastream, WTO and Norges Bank  A rising number of countries have been integrated into world trade over the past decades (Chart 5). The gains have been substantial. Poverty has been reduced. Crossborder cooperation has enabled technology to advance faster than it would have done otherwise. Since the financial crisis, growth in global trade has stalled. While service exports have continued to rise, trade in goods as a share of global GDP has been more or less flat in recent years because a number of sources of growth in goods trade are drying up. Large countries such as China and India are now fully integrated into the global economy.

But history is full of stories of reformers who made progress, declared victory, and paused, only to find their accomplishments threatened or reversed. For the post-crisis reforms to be durable, we cannot rest on our laurels – we have to keep learning and adapting. CCPs should keep themselves central by again being part of the solution. Over the past two years, two episodes of extreme market stress caused by external factors have tested the system: first, a once-in-100 year pandemic and second, the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia. We should use the lessons from those episodes to make central clearing stronger. Global Pandemic – Spring 2020 In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic sparked a ‘flight to safety’ by investors, with considerable volatility across asset classes, including government bonds. We saw the biggest two-day price  Page 3  moves for some cleared products in the past decade. [1] Thankfully, the financial system entered the pandemic in a much stronger position than in 2008, with at least $ in additional collateral against over the counter (OTC) derivative exposures; [2] and a significant increase of central clearing in OTC markets. [3] CCPs in this period functioned as intended. Very significant and sudden changes in asset prices did not lead to counterparty credit risk – actual or anticipated. There were no major clearing member defaults during the pandemic, so clearing was not tested to the limit. But there was no panic about counterparty credit risk, no ructions in the interest rate swap markets.
In one breath they say that we should not adopt the euro – so that we can keep our own currency and hence retain the ability “to weaken the koruna in bad times” – and then criticise the Czech National Bank for doing exactly that in the bad times of 2013. They then happily add that Greece would have benefited from having its own currency and that Germany is profiting from the euro being weaker than the Deutschmark would have been. The same, however, doesn’t go for the Czech Republic after 2013. These endearing inconsistencies are present throughout the population. Here again, however, the Eurozone and its satellites offer parallels. The Danes have a fixed exchange rate against the euro (and previously had a fixed rate against the mark) and thus in effect “buy in” monetary policy from Frankfurt. They have their own notes and coins but not their own monetary policy. Note this fine “Scandinavian paradox”: the Danes have an opt-out from the euro following their 2000 referendum, yet they do not make their own monetary policy, nor did they before the euro was created, whereas the Swedes do not have an opt-out (although they have been trying not to fulfil the criteria and not to join ever since rejecting the euro in their 2003 referendum), yet they pursue autonomous monetary policy. I sometimes wonder whether the Czech sitting-on-the-fence approach is heading towards the Danish model. It wouldn’t be my choice, but it’s good to be prepared. 8.

Adopting the euro today would be like being the last to arrive at a party, one where all the food and drink has gone and the other guests are looking for someone to help pay the bill. The British journalist David Marsh, one of the foremost experts on the anatomy of the establishment of the 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  single currency, summed it up brilliantly: “the Eurozone doesn’t need new members, it needs new creditors”.1 And when such a consistent defender of mainstream economic thinking as the American Kenneth Rogoff announces that it is “fairly obvious that the euro was not necessary to the success of the EU, and instead has proved a massive impediment”2, even staunch supporters of the euro in our country probably took notice. The pragmatic Anglo-Saxon approach of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” suits the Czech Republic generally, and especially on this point. In the case of the euro, it holds true here more than anywhere else that we are not rich enough to afford to repeat the potential mistakes of others. We make enough of our own. Thank you for your attention. 1 Marsh, D.: “Řecko se zbaví eura, doufejme že kultivovaně,” Lidové noviny, 19 October 2011. 2 Rogoff, K.: “The eurozone must reform or die,” Project Syndicate, 14 June 2017. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
We do this, but – I also realise – we could do better: we have to steadily adapt our communication channels and satisfy the increased demand for clear and timely information in the unconventional times we are passing through. It is also clear to us that any additional task entrusted to the ECB (such as banking supervision, currently under discussion) must be matched by additional reporting and accountability channels. Looking ahead: completing the architecture of EMU Let me conclude. The euro deserves trust – and trust in the euro as a currency depends on trust in the euro as a project. The ECB, with the legitimacy provided by the fulfilment of its mandate, will do everything within this mandate to ensure price stability in the euro area and therefore trust in the euro as a currency. But trust in the euro as a project relies on a more complex framework and structures. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In a recent article, 6 the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and his co-authors argue that a rallying cry of the American War of Independence – “No taxation without representation” – has a new and unexpected resonance in today’s Europe. Once we create scope in the euro area for policies that result in redistributive effects across national boundaries – they write – European legislators who represent the people must be able to decide and vote on these policies. I tend to sympathise with this view.

So far, the ECB has consistently adopted the second approach to non-standard policies. In the early phase of the crisis, we re-absorbed the liquidity risk and the market counterparty risk that banks were facing in interbank transactions. In keeping with this second approach, the aim was to repair the functioning of the market, not to add stimulus in a situation in which the policy rate was still positive. OMTs, as their name suggests, will operate through outright transactions, not lending operations. But, in essence, they have the same purpose as the non-standard measures we adopted in 2008 and 2009: to price out a type of catastrophic risk premium that investors demand in conditions of market paralysis. It was break down risk in the early stage of the crisis, the risk that the payments system would seize up completely. It is break- up risk now. 5  The policy intervention works by reducing the supply of long-duration securities considered as risk-free and increasing the supply of zero-duration reserves. To the extent that private investors do not view these assets as perfect substitutes, in order for private investors to be willing to make those portfolio adjustments, the expected return on the long-duration securities has to fall. With less duration risk to hold in the aggregate, the market should require a lower premium to hold that risk.
At the same time, we recognise that our digital goals and aspirations can only be achieved through the values and behaviours of staff that promote inclusivity (between those that have technological skills and those that don’t); accountability (that is, the effective and responsible use of technology); effective collaboration that breaks away from working in silos; and an appropriate level of risk-taking that is compatible with a more agile and responsive organisation. And so we have taken pains to be specific and deliberate in our approach to building a digital culture within the Bank. This starts with being clear across the organisation on our tolerance for higher risks associated with disruptive innovations – through the development and communication of our digital risk appetite. We are shifting conversations on new digital initiatives away from the technical solutions themselves, to a greater focus on the business process transformations that they are intended to serve, and that is what we measure and track. We are also investing heavily in equipping our people with the knowledge, skills and confidence to make sound judgment calls in an environment where the pace of change is occurring at a dizzying speed, and our ability to anticipate risks is likely to be more constrained. At a practical level, this means being more precise about escalation, decision and communication protocols, while allowing more flexibility in internal policies to allow business lines to respond swiftly to emerging situations.

Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: Evolving governance, risk and control in the digital age Welcoming remarks by Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Conference on “Governance, Risk and Control in the Era of Disruption”, Kuala Lumpur, 9 December 2019. * * * Dr. Firas Raad, World Bank’s Country Manager for Malaysia, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. Good morning and welcome to Sasana Kijang. Bank Negara Malaysia is delighted to host this Conference on Governance, Risk and Controls in the Era of Disruption. Let me begin by sincerely thanking our joint host, the World Bank Group for working with us to put together a rich programme that speaks directly to issues that I am sure are keeping at least some of us awake at night. In the year 2000, the English author and academic, Sir Malcolm Bradbury wrote this: “We no longer live in the Age of Reason. We don’t have reason, we have computation. We don’t have a tree of knowledge, we have an information superhighway. We don’t have real intelligence, we have artificial intelligence. We no longer pursue truth, we seek data and signals. We no longer have philosophers, we have thinking pragmatists. We no longer have morals, we have lifestyles.” This rather grim view of the world was written almost two decades ago. Since then, the extent of technological change and disruption that has come to define our world gives these words a significance that few could have imagined.
Cooperation between the BdF and MAS has strengthened significantly, particularly since the opening in 2020 of the Asia-Pacific Representative Office, here in Singapore, which is one of the most innovative financial centres (with a strong Fintech sector), and a highly important region in today's world. MAS, BdF and ACPR have deepened and diversified their linkages across key and cutting-edge areas, such as (i) cybersecurity, with an international cyber crisis management exercise conducted jointly in June 2022, (ii) Fintech, with a MoU between MAS and ACPR, (iii) post-quantum cryptography, where ongoing work is joining BdF and MAS, (iv) green finance, with a milestone achieved together with the FranceSingapore Conference on Sustainable Finance in May 2022, and finally (v) tokenisation of finance, with Central Bank Digital Currency experiments involving cross-border payments. My warmest thanks go to Ravi Menon and MAS staff, and also to the colleagues of the BdF's office in Singapour, who have helped the strengthening our bilateral ties. I wish to also express my sincere and special thanks to François Haas for his proactive engagement for making this MAS-ACPR-BdF cooperation flourish. François was the right man in the right place to take up the challenge of launching and leading our rep office here, building notably on his former experience as head rep for the Americas. Your achievements François are all the more remarkable when considering that you took office exactly when in person, face to face, interactions, were hampered for a long while by lockdown measures.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Takaful industry at crossroads - a critical examination Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Takaful Annual Dinner and Awards 2018 "Takaful industry at crossroads: A critical examination", Kuala Lumpur, 23 March 2018. * * * Just last year, I addressed the insurance industry. The day after, the newspaper headlines screamed “insurance models broken”. And so, I was more than a little surprised to receive an invitation to speak. I could not resist it, and so I accepted. This evening, I promise to be no less critical of the takaful industry. But take this well, as the path to success begins with a critical examination of where we are today. We need to work as a collective. And also bear in mind that the takaful’s industry success is also our success. Let us start by reviewing the industry’s progress. Indeed, it has come a long way since its birth over thirty years ago. Its 1% market share in 1990 is now around 15%. Net contributions have grown 9% annually since 2010. These are achievements that we all should be proud of. However, before we celebrate, let us consider three issues. First, can the industry sustain the growth momentum as we move into the 21st century world of technology and innovation. We have set ourselves an objective but we are far away from meeting the target. The objective of 25% family takaful penetration by 2020 is admittedly, ambitious but achievable.
Lim Hng Kiang: Review of the property sector in Singapore and Asia Opening speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Minister for Trade and Industry, at Citigroup Asia Pacific Property Conference 2007, Singapore, 23 April 2007. *  *  *  Thank you Catherine Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen A warm welcome to Citigroup’s inaugural Asia Pacific Property Conference. This is an excellent opportunity for developers, investors and financial intermediaries to share ideas and network with other key players in the market. I am certain that this conference will be interesting and fruitful. Strong regional prospects Asia is witnessing robust growth, led by sustained growth of the Chinese and Indian economies and the welcome recovery of Japan – now into its fifth year of expansion. The regional economy is consistently growing at a much faster pace than the rest of the world. Singapore is fortunate to be strategically located to enjoy the positive effects of Asian growth. We are well positioned to serve as a gateway for global investors to access regional opportunities. As the regional economics grow, they present exciting opportunities for direct investment in real estate, as well as through real estate financial investments, whether in office developments, commercial and retail complexes or industrial estates. Prospects in Singapore property sector Singapore is a good example. Demand for all property sectors in Singapore has been rising, underpinned by Singapore’s economic expansion, particularly in the financial, business services and tourism sectors.

At the same time, though, I can be clear about what conditions are needed for normalization to begin. If the improvement in the U.S. labor market continues and the FOMC is “reasonably confident” that inflation will move back to our 2 percent objective over the medium-term, then it would be appropriate to begin to normalize interest rates. Because the conditions necessary for liftoff are well-specified, market participants should be able to think right along with policymakers, adjusting their views about the prospects for normalization in response to the incoming data. This implies that liftoff should not be a big surprise when it finally occurs, which should help mitigate the degree of market turbulence engendered by lift-off. Nevertheless, I think it would be naïve not to expect some impact. After more than six years at the zero lower bound, lift-off will signal a regime shift even though policy would only be slightly less accommodative after lift-off than it is before. I expect that this will have implications for global capital flows, foreign exchange valuation and financial asset prices even if it is mostly anticipated when it occurs. Which leads to the key question I want to address in the remainder of my remarks: What should the Federal Reserve do to minimize the impact? Like other central banks, our monetary policy mandate has a domestic focus. Our monetary policy actions, though, often have global implications that feed back into the U.S. economy and financial markets, and we need to always keep this in mind.
There would be one, global resolution, led by the home authority. But pure universalism also faces major obstacles. First, it would imply a surrender of national sovereignty – replacing it with pre-defined and enforceable rules that determined the roles of different authorities in different jurisdictions. Second, unless steps were taken to rule out the need for sovereign Capital of Last Resort operations 4 , it might well need to be accompanied by an ex ante burden-sharing mechanism, to facilitate a sharing of the costs of resolution across the jurisdictions in which a bank had activities. In theory, that could be addressed by the main home and host authorities of each LCFI agreeing a set of binding principles to govern the distribution of the costs of a universal resolution across jurisdictions. An alternative would be to design a single resolution regime for all LCFIs, to be implemented along universal lines by a supranational resolution authority. But would countries be prepared to tolerate the loss of fiscal independence and the overturning of national insolvency laws that this model would entail, especially if it required governments to commit to recompense the agency for unlimited amounts in the future? That is most definitely not a question for central bankers. (iii)  Modified universalism  Pure territoriality and pure universalism are corner solutions. We live in a world where some countries are closer to one corner, others closer to the other. Some have suggested that an intermediate solution might be feasible.

So this is an extraordinary time for the world financial market and probably most suitable for an international symposium on the subject of financial globalization. Ladies and Gentlemen, Financial globalization has certainly made the international financial landscape look very different today compared to just a decade ago. And almost every day, new events continue to re-shape it even further. One aspect among these changes, however, remains constant. That is, despite the complexity and sophistication of today's financial institutions as well as instruments that are developed to manage all kinds of risks, the remarkable degree of global financial linkage still makes financial turmoil transmit from one country to another at an ever faster pace than we have previously anticipated. Like all financial crises of the recent past, several weaknesses and excesses were initially submerged and only later found to be much larger than the initial estimates, contributing to the permanent boom-bust cycle that seems to always accompany modern business and finance. Understanding the various causes of the crises is only the initial step towards resolving its short-term impacts and preventing its recurrence, if entirely possible, in the longer-term. In the meantime, we will probably continue to have to witness an intensification of the financial crisis. As mortgage-related assets deteriorate further, economic growth will inevitably slow down even more, along with the downside risks of financial and the economic outlook.