samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The centrepiece of the supervision of significant banks will be the Joint Supervisory Teams, responsible for the day-to-day oversight of these banks. These teams will be made up of specialists from the ECB and from the national authorities, under the leadership of a coordinator designated by the ECB, and a sub-coordinator designated by the national supervisor. Approximately 75% of those making up the teams will be drawn from and designated by the national supervisors; in the case of Spanish banks, it will of course be staff from the Banco de España. Inspection visits to significant banks, what is known as on-site inspection, will continue to be conducted by the national authorities, and their results will be passed onto the ECB for the adoption of the appropriate measures. With regard to the less significant banks, national authorities will continue to directly supervise them as they have to date. Over 3,600 banks across the euro area are involved here. The ECB will define common practices and criteria, it will monitor the actions and position of these banks and it will always be entitled, if it considers it necessary, to re-claim direct supervision over any of these banks. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The competences and responsibilities of the Banco de España in the framework of the new Mechanism I would now like to address the competences and responsibilities of the Banco de España, as a national supervisor, under the new Mechanism.

The banks of the countries participating in the SSM have been divided into two groups of significant and less significant institutions. The ECB will exert “direct supervision” over the former; as regards the latter, it merely assumes “indirect supervision” functions, as the national authorities will in fact continue to be responsible for their effective supervision. A list of 120 significant banking groups has been drawn up, accounting for approximately 85% of euro area bank assets. 15 of these are Spanish groups, representing around 90% of the assets of our country’s deposit institutions. It should be borne in mind that when we talk about 120 groups, we are referring to consolidated groups; that is to say, the number of individual banks is far higher. In total there are 1,244 individual institutions, which is essentially explained by the importance of cooperative banks in certain euro area countries, in particular France, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. To directly supervise the significant banks, the ECB has created two directorate generals, which shall perform the continuous monitoring of the 120 groups. DG I will supervise the 30 biggest banks in terms of balance sheet and activities, while DG II will cover the remaining 90 significant banks. However, the supervision of specific aspects or matters, what is known as on-site inspection, will be carried out by different teams. The ECB has thus adopted a different model to that place at the Banco de España to date: functionally separating the continuous monitoring of banks and inspection visits.
BIS Review 144/2009  5  Resolution of bank failures If recovery plans prove wanting, then distressed banks need to be “resolved” – laid to rest, but without undermining crucial economic services. Sometimes the best course will be a straightforward, whole-bank liquidation, with retail depositors receiving a payout from the insurance fund. But, alternatively, resolution can involve selling the deposit book – and so the vital payments services – to another bank. Good assets might go with the deposits, or be transferred elsewhere. Bad (or at least unsaleable) assets go into run off. Choosing the best course is central to effective resolution planning. To split up and transfer the different parts of a bank, the authorities obviously need specific and extensive powers. The broad model is provided by the Deposit Insurance Corporations of the USA and Canada. The UK has recently introduced such powers, having learnt the hard way that we needed them. A number of other countries in the EU adapt their normal corporate insolvency regime for the special structure of banks, but do not all have the option to break up and transfer different parts of the business. This is the subject of the recent consultation paper published by the European Commission. 5 In the UK, the Bank of England has become the Special Resolution Authority. We have been helped by the hands-on operational expertise necessary for our market operations and for running the wholesale payments system. This new responsibility has given us an interesting vantage point on the preconditions for effective resolution.

This part of the reform agenda – the restructuring of the continuing shadow banking system – must not be neglected. Market maker of last resort? The purpose of providing liquidity insurance to banks is well known – having been developed since Bagehot’s day and before. It serves us well to put a finger in the dyke, with a view to preventing a liquidity panic developing unnecessarily into a solvency problem through the forced-sale of assets. But this crisis has reminded everyone that it is not only firms that can suffer liquidity runs. Markets can too. Liquidity insurance facilities that underpin banks' funding are obviously helpful to preserving market liquidity, as they increase the probability of bank-dealers being able to finance unwanted inventory. But arguments have been advanced during the crisis that the authorities should be able to act more directly to preserve market liquidity, especially if bank-dealers withdraw from market-making because they become capital constrained. That is, essentially, the origin of suggestion that central banks should stand ready to act as Market Makers of Last Resort. 2 As the amount of credit that gets intermediated via markets rather than via institutions grows, the need for a MMLR grows too. This is by no means straightforward, and not only because it is not central to our inheritance. Whereas lending to a bank does with certainty give that bank more liquidity, entering a market as a buyer does not automatically enhance the liquidity of that market in a sustainable way.
With respect to the secular trend toward lower interest rates, two observations are in order. First, I do not think the current situation bears the seeds for a return to the inflation rates of the seventies, despite the fears that are sometimes expressed. As argued, I thus do not see the reasons for a significant increase in the inflation premium. Second, as to the other defining element of the secular trend, lower real rates, it is harder to make definitive statements. The ultimate drivers of this development and their respective roles have not been unambiguously clarified. For this reason, it is not possible to argue convincingly that the secular downward trend has run its course or that it is likely to revert. This is the main unknown in our equation. What is certain, however, is that the crisis-induced cyclical downturn will eventually be reversed. At some point, economies will return to more robust growth paths. Interest rates and monetary policy will accompany this change in circumstances. Thus, making sense of our assessment of the likely future path of interest rates hinges on our assessment of the economic outlook. Let me be more specific here. For the global economy, the SNB forecasts the continuation of a gradual, albeit subpar recovery. In the near term, indicators for the US, Europe and China suggest that global growth should gradually gain in momentum and become more broad based (chart 16). Nevertheless, the recovery is likely to remain subdued.

It already provides for an automatic revision of the situation in the event that the National Bank's earnings should permanently exceed the expected level. Inflation Forecast December 2002 with Libor at 0.75%  Annual average inflation in %  BIS Review 73/2002  2002  2003  2004  2005  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.6  3
This is a small change, well within normal variations from one year to the next. Government revenues - and thus the budget surplus - would increase by almost 1% of Norway’s annual GDP. If the increase in petroleum revenues is used in Norway, it corresponds to almost half of the annual growth in the non-oil economy in a normal year. If the private sector of the economy is also expanding, and the economy is already close to capacity, this policy would swiftly lead to strong pressures on the resources in the economy. This would result in a rise in wages and prices, and would also lead to unstable conditions in the foreign exchange market. The Government Petroleum Fund shall serve as a buffer against short-term fluctuations in oil revenues. As large portions of the revenues from oil activities accrue to the state, fluctuations in oil prices and oil revenues will primarily result in changes in allocations to the Petroleum Fund. Since all of the capital in the Petroleum Fund is invested abroad, such changes will in principle not influence  1 2  See Auerbach et al (1993). See Report to the Storting No 1 (2000-01), the National Budget for 2001. BIS Review 105/2000  4  the level of activity in the economy. This makes the Norwegian economy more robust to fluctuations in oil prices and thus less dependent on oil, even in the short run. Some of the petroleum revenues are therefore used to finance central government budget expenditure.

There are also other dissimilarities between the functioning of our respective economies and between our institutional frameworks which may shed some light on the differences between our monetary policy regimes:  11  BIS Review 105/2000  •  Denmark has a long history of a fixed exchange rate which inspires credibility;  •  Denmark’s membership of ERM II provides exchange rate policy with an institutional anchor;  •  Denmark has more stable terms of trade than Norway. Moreover, there is strong and well-deserved confidence in the ability of fiscal policy to stabilise economic growth in Denmark. The most substantial changes in the Norwegian terms of trade are due to fluctuating oil prices. Variations in Denmark’s terms of trade are negligible. In this sense the Norwegian economy has more in common with countries like New Zealand and Australia, which are also large exporters of commodities. A substantial change in the terms of trade  BIS Review 105/2000  12  translates into considerable changes in these countries’ earnings and balance of payments. Over the years this has resulted in sizeable exchange rate fluctuations. The exchange rate is a buffer against changes in the terms of trade. While a country like Denmark has maintained a stable exchange rate, commodity-producing countries typically experience fluctuations in the exchange rate in tandem with changes in the terms of trade. In New Zealand, Australia and many other countries monetary policy is oriented directly towards price stability, and these countries permit short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate.
In response, the ECB has announced the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) – interventions on sovereign bond markets to repair the transmission channel when the level of spreads hampers monetary policy transmission and reflects market’s perception that the single currency might break up. OMTs would be implemented to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective for countries under an EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme, as long as programme conditionality is fully respected. IMF involvement will also be sought. OMTs would not be carried out while a given programme is under review, but they would resume after the review period once programme compliance has been assured. The announcement of the OMTs has reduced concerns about the materialisation of destructive scenarios. But it is essential that governments continue to implement the necessary steps to reduce both fiscal and structural imbalances and proceed with financial sector restructuring measures. The structural reason that the transmission channel is malfunctioning is the tight link between sovereign and bank funding conditions. The risk that banks’ balance sheets would be contaminated by sovereign risk was highlighted at an early stage by Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz (1998). 1 If banks are to transmit monetary policy impulses evenly, they need broadly similar funding conditions. However, if the ultimate responsibility for the stability of the banking system falls within the domains of individual sovereigns, clearly the two are linked and when one of the two becomes riskier, this risk is transmitted to the other.

Conclusions Let me conclude by stating once more that for monetary policy to work we need an integrated banking system, and to have an integrated banking system we need it to be supervised across the euro area as a whole, which will make it possible to be backstopped by the euro area as a whole. This is the vision put forth in the Four Presidents’ Report, this is the commitment made by the euro area governments, and the ECB supports it wholeheartedly. The monetary and the banking union are symbiotic, and they are the logical extension of the Maastricht Treaty, both in historical and political terms. I look forward to a stimulating discussion and wish you a very successful conference. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
The rapid economic development of these economies as they have integrated into the global economic system has created a major engine of growth for the world economy. However, this period of intense globalisation has not been without its downsides. Over my time on the Monetary Policy Committee since October 2006, we have seen how a highly integrated economic and financial system can also generate instabilities and transmit economic shocks rapidly around the world. The debates and the decisions of the MPC while I have been a member of the Committee have been dominated by the impact on the UK of the turbulence created by a global financial crisis, a major world recession and the inflationary impact of movements in globally traded energy and commodity prices. There was very little inkling of the turmoil to come when I joined the Committee in October 2006. My time on the MPC started towards the end of its first decade, which was a period of relatively stable economic conditions – steady growth and low inflation, with unemployment around 5% of the labour force. For me, however, this honeymoon period did not last long. Less than a year after I joined the Committee, over the summer of 2007, we saw the first tremors of the financial crisis. And by the autumn of 2008 it was clear we were heading into a major world recession.

Looking back over the past twelve months, nearly 400,000 jobs have been created across the economy as a whole – which compares very favourably with the rate of job creation in the decade before the recession.1 Chart 1 UK employment in recessions and recoveries Numbers employed rebased to 100 at cycle peak 102 101 100 99 98 97 96 95  1977 Q4 - 1983 Q4 1988 Q2 - 1994 Q4 2006 Q2 - 2011 Q1 *  94 93 92  -8  -6  -4  -2  0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  Number of quarters from cyclical peak  *: Numbers employed for Q1 2011 proxied by that between Dec 2010 and Feb 2011. Source: ONS Labour Force Survey  As Chart 1 shows, the performance of UK employment has been much stronger through the recent economic cycle than we saw in the early 1980s and early 1990s – reflecting the flexibility of the labour market, the resilience of businesses through the recession and the impact of the recovery in demand over the past eighteen months. According to the latest estimates, UK employment is about one per cent down on its peak level in early 2008, compared to a reduction of 5–6% at the equivalent stage of the previous two economic cycles.
For instance, the Bank supports the initiative of Branchless Banking as an innovative way of growing the banking industry. Mr Chairperson, another important facet in the development of the mobile payments industry shall be the ability of the individual payments systems to interoperate and settle real time across different payment systems through shared infrastructure. This should be one of the objectives of the Zambia Payments Systems Association, and therefore urge that the Association adopts this objective as part of their medium term plan. The Bank of Zambia welcomes initiative that will bring down costs and ultimately make mobile payments services affordable to the people. Ladies and Gentlemen, the conference theme looks to the next decade in mobile banking and talks about universal mobile services, I am glad that this theme is being explored here. Our understanding of this theme is twofold: firstly, that in the next decade all adult Zambians will have access to financial services and secondly that financial services shall be available to the majority of our people through this delivery mechanism. This is indeed an ambitious target and can only be achieved through forums like this one where industry experts come together to share ideas and chart the way forward. As the regulator the Bank shall continue to provide policy guidance and regulations that are clear and unambiguous in support of the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  growth of this industry. Further, our obligations extend to ensuring that as these technological advancements occur: 1. The consumer remains protected;  2.

This has increased my confidence that the economy remains on track for moderate growth going forward. At the same time, recent price data reaffirm that inflationary pressures remain muted. Conclusion Looking ahead, although the baseline forecast I laid out looks very good, the situation can change. We need to remain vigilant in responding to evolving economic conditions and the outlook, with our eye on sustaining the expansion, keeping the labor market strong, and fostering price stability. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
The use of the CPI as the target variable has, however, led to some difficulties and we have therefore analysed other inflation indices as well in our interest rate decisions, more recently the CPIF (the CPI with a fixed rate of interest). It may, however, be difficult to evaluate monetary policy if there are major differences between the development of the variable that guides the Riksbank, more recently the CPIF, and the formal target variable, the CPI. Another problem is that both domestic and overseas forecasters relatively seldom take into account the fact that the Swedish CPI is calculated the way it is when they describe the situation in Sweden. This can lead to misleading international comparisons. In recent years, for example, eye-catching headlines have appeared at regular intervals in the media saying that Sweden is in deflation, despite this being largely due to the fact that housing costs in the CPI have gone down when the Riksbank has cut the repo rate. This can give the impression that the situation in Sweden is worse and the inflation is much lower than in other countries, despite the difference being because the Swedish CPI is particularly sensitive to changes in the policy rate. It may therefore be time to open up a discussion on the target variable. In their evaluation, Goodfriend and King suggest that the target be expressed in terms of the CPIF. An  22  See Flodén (2015). 23  See for example Williams (2009), Blanchard, et al.

I also wish that our commitment to achieve future success of the industry as reflected in this event by the joint efforts and collaboration of the regulators, the industry, the market participants and the relevant parties will be further enhanced moving forward. In this regard, I would again congratulate AIBIM on its continuous effort undertake the initiatives in promoting Islamic finance, particularly by organizing this event. 2  BIS Review 115/2006  On this note, I wish you a successful and eventful week. Dengan lafaz Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, saya dengan sukacitanya merasmikan pelancaran "Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Financial Expo 2006". Thank you. BIS Review 115/2006  3
Later on, this increase in Asia’s net saving combined with significant terms of trade gains (figure 2). Thus, there was a large amount of funds looking for a place to invest. The United States had the capacity to produce profitable securities to absorb said savings (Caballero et al., 2008). A different version of this story was that the deficit was simply mis-measured, owing to its many non-observable components, which led analysts to mistake foreign funding for foreign income (Hausmann & Sturzenegger, 2006). This is the case, for example, of seniorage. Both stories help explain why the current-account deficit can persist in high levels for longer than usual. But domestic factors also played a part in the US. expansionary monetary and fiscal policies while a real-estate bubble was building up, put additional weight on the fall in savings. The main question was if this process could be sustained, and the more benign visions thought it could last a long time. But the accumulation of imbalances at least had to moderate, which indicated that the dollar would weaken and output would slow down. Calculations performed a few years back indicate that a dollar depreciation of around 40% was necessary to reduce the current-account deficit by 3 percentage points of GDP. 2 According to estimates by Freund and Warnock (2007), such an adjustment would cause a GDP slowdown of around half a percentage point, much less than a financial crisis.

The risks multiply. What can one do about this? You can, of course, opt for the easy approach. You can continue to maintain tight controls and resist liberalization. But this will hinder the development of your domestic financial markets, and also the skill of the people involved, both the regulators and the commercial banks themselves. In my opinion, the right approach is for the emerging market to create, or improve and maintain the right fundamentals. In a way, instead of trying to extend your breakwater further and further, it is better to change from the less stable rowing boat to a more sturdy and seaworthy ship, one that can handle the rough ocean better. In this respect, there are three things that I wish to highlight. The first is the need to ensure that the country conducts proper macroeconomic policy. I mention this even though it is not directly the job of supervisors because it can overwhelm everything. To take the example of Thailand, we used the fixed exchange regime for too long, but without the domestic flexibility to adjust wages and prices to correct lack of competitiveness. We therefore could not maintain the parity for long. It also led to distortion in risk perception that led to excessive foreign exchange risk mismatch, over investment in the non-traded sector and damaging speculation, especially in real estate.