samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Article 130 prohibits the ECB and the members of its decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties. In addition, under Article 130, Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle, and not to seek to influence the members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks. [11] This is a very strong concept of independence from the perspective of its content (double prohibition), its legislative source (Treaty level, meaning that it is very difficult to modify), and the judicial protection granted in the event of violation (individual governors have locus standi against their Member States). The concept of central bank independence has four features institutional, instrument, personal and financial independence. [12] In view of the broadened scope of the tasks performed by http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  central banks, they have to be viewed through a functional lens in order to be in line with the rationale of the Treaty provisions on independence. Institutional independence refers to the prohibition of the influence of third parties on the structure, functioning, decision-making, and exercise of powers of the central bank. Institutional independence implies that the central bank has a “broad discretion”[13] when making policy decisions.

For instance, if the Committee decides the interest rate on one-week maturity repo auctions is to be 16.25 percent, then it will remain as 16.25 percent unless the Committee changes this. b. In the case of liquidity shortage due to unpredicted reasons, thus leading to a decision for an intra-day repo auction, such auctions will be held at the interest rate set by the Committee via the quantity auction method. c.  Each bidder shall make an offer at most for the amount announced for that day and the funding amount to be raised via the auction will be distributed to participants according to the ratios of their bids to the auction amount..  d.  Other guidelines governing the auctions and transactions shall remain unchanged. (iv)  In the case of a temporary liquidity surplus, instead of one-week repo auctions, the Central Bank will hold reverse repo auctions with a one-week maturity subject to the same conditions and with the interest rate announced for the repo auctions. (v)  Fixed rates will be applicable only to repo and reverse repo auctions with a oneweek maturity. Repo and reverse repo auctions or other auctions with maturities longer than one-week that the Central Bank may hold within open market operations will continue to be held under the traditional method and the price/interest will be formed under market conditions.
ASEAN Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Programme Today, I am pleased to announce the official launch of Phase 2 of the ASEAN Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Programme. ADRFI Phase 2 will be impact-focused, 11.  and targeted at strengthening ASEAN’s capabilities in ex-ante risk financing and risk transfer strategies. ADRFI Phase 2 was approved by the ASEAN Finance Ministers at the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting in April 2018 and the 3-year detailed Plan of Action was subsequently endorsed in April this year. 12. To drive ADRFI Phase 2 forward, the Plan of Action will be implemented by a dual programme office, to be led by the ASEAN Secretariat and the NTU-ICRM. The dual programme office will adopt an open architecture structure to support global collaboration with stakeholders including policy makers, governments, multilateral development banks, international organisations and the private sector. 13. Allow me to provide an overview of ADRFI’s 3 focus areas over the next 3 years. These are: (i) Risk Assessment, as I mentioned earlier (ii) Risk Advisory; and (iii) Capacity Building. Leveraging on their respective strengths, ICRM will lead the Risk Assessment and Risk Advisory pillars, while ASEAN Secretariat will lead the Capacity Building pillar. 14. These are upstream activities which will strengthen ASEAN’s disaster risk management capabilities, and complement the downstream public and private disaster risk financing solutions, such as the SEADRIF. Let me elaborate further on the 3 key focus areas. 1 5 . First, Risk Assessment.

4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
They show the observed intraday frequency of certain fluctuations in yield on US or Japanese government bonds for the period since 2001. Fluctuations of the magnitude described here are extremely rare events. Such episodes prompted fears that market distortions of this kind could recur at any time. What do these changes in market liquidity mean for the SNB? At the operational portfolio management level, we are affected by the deterioration in corporate bond liquidity. The greatest difficulty stems from the fact that trading is increasingly focused on a comparatively small section of the corporate bonds outstanding. This has meant that large purchases or sales are more difficult, and more expensive, than before the financial crisis. This, in turn, has necessitated some adjustments in the way corporate bond portfolios are managed. The SNB is now more active in the primary sales market than before, and has also expanded its counterparty base. In addition, depending on the liquidity situation, transactions are having to be split into smaller tranches. Overall, therefore, the management of corporate bond portfolios has become more complex and more demanding. By contrast, the markets for highly rated government bonds continue to be very liquid. Shortterm price fluctuations do not place any limitations on the management of the government bonds in our portfolio. As I have already mentioned, we have a very long investment horizon. We hold our investments for at least one full economic cycle and we are not obliged to sell, even in periods of stress.

More recently, the Swiss franc exchange rate to the euro was about 10% above what it had been shortly before the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. Our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary was – and remains – an important element in countering the excessive strength of the Swiss franc and the associated negative impact on both the economy and price stability in Switzerland. How are our foreign currency purchases and the Swiss franc exchange rate related to the expansion of the SNB balance sheet? I will explain this using the financial account and current account. The current account covers, first and foremost, goods and services trade with other countries and cross-border income flows. For half a century, the Swiss current account has regularly shown a surplus. 1 There are two main reasons for this structural surplus. First, Switzerland is a net exporter; it produces more goods and services than are demanded in the domestic market. Second, the Swiss hold substantial assets abroad, upon which they earn interest and dividend income. Earnings from foreign trade as well as interest and dividend income from foreign assets are generated abroad and are usually reinvested abroad. These investments are recorded under capital exports by the private sector in the financial account and are shown as red bars in slide 2. Until 2007, private sector capital exports made up almost the entire financial account. 1  2  Jordan, Thomas. 2013.
While many digital-asset-related activities fall within existing U.S. laws and regulations, the rapid evolution and adoption of digital assets highlight unique risks that warrant a more comprehensive and aligned approach by agencies across the U.S. government with different regulatory remits. The Federal Reserve, as an independent central bank, is only one part of the puzzle. Many of these other stakeholders across the U.S. government, such as the Treasury Department, market regulators, and federal banking supervisors, will be involved in providing guidance and guardrails to the financial system as the universe of digital assets continues to evolve.7 In the current environment of rapid technological change, it is crucial that innovation proceeds responsibly in order to safeguard the stability of the financial system. To that end, on March 9 of this year, President Biden issued an Executive Order on Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets. 8 This executive order outlined the first whole-of-government approach to addressing the risks and harnessing the potential  2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  benefits of digital assets and their underlying technology. In response, over the past six months, agencies across the government have worked together to develop frameworks and policy recommendations that advance the six key priorities identified in the executive order: consumer and investor protection; promoting financial stability; countering illicit finance; U.S. leadership in the global financial system and economic competitiveness; financial inclusion; and responsible innovation. The executive order will be a catalyst to increased coordination among U.S. regulators.

It is held by depository institutions as bank reserves or by individuals in the form of paper currency. Demand for central bank money is driven by many fundamental factors, including the settlement  1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  of both retail and wholesale transactions and its role as a store of value. In addition to these factors, which are likely familiar to any of you who have studied monetary economics, demand for the U.S. dollar is also driven by international factors owing to the role of the dollar in the global economy. In fact, while precise estimates are challenging to come by, available data suggests that more than half of all dollars in circulation may be held outside the United States. 5 As a result, innovation related to money provided by the Federal Reserve will have impacts that extend far beyond U.S. borders. A U.S. CBDC – a digital form of the U.S. dollar that is a direct liability of the Federal Reserve– has the potential to offer significant benefits. It could enable a payment system that is more efficient, provide a foundation for further technological innovation, and facilitate faster cross-border transactions. It could promote financial inclusion and equity by enabling access for a broad set of consumers and foster economic growth and stability. In order to fully realize benefits such as these, a digital dollar would need to be thoughtfully designed and implemented.
The clearest outcome of a financial crisis is a loss of output – in other words, a severe and long-lasting recession. Using the same dataset they used to identify crises, Laeven and Valencia found that in advanced-economy nations, the median cumulative decline in output accompanying a financial crisis was 33 percent of annual gross domestic product, or one-third of an economy’s output for a year. In addition, the median growth in government debt was 21 percent of GDP, and the median fiscal cost of the crisis-related spending was 3.8 percent of GDP. Other studies confirm these grim statistics. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) point out that recoveries from financial crises are weaker and slower than recoveries from recessions that don’t accompany a financial crisis. Employment growth is slower during recoveries from financial crises, and the associated higher unemployment can have long-lasting effects on a whole generation of young workers who sustain long spells of joblessness. There are many other maladies that come along with financial crises. Ingredients Several economic researchers agree that one crucial ingredient in creating the vulnerabilities that can foster a financial crisis is a buildup of debt.5 In particular, a “credit boom,” that is, a high and fast-growing ratio of credit to GDP, is one of the precursors to a financial crisis. Other, somewhat less reliable precursors include a prior financial liberalization or deregulation, housing price booms, and external imbalances (in practice, large inflows of capital from outside the country).

On the former, key principles guiding the policy approach should include clear global rule beyond 2012, the need for clear incentive structure by the government at the country level, reliance on market mechanism to innovate and grow the response, and financial regulation that is neutral on the issue. Under such policy setting, there will be ample opportunities for the financial system, especially in supporting green technology and carbon trading market. Lastly, for emerging markets that are starting up on the issue, five actions along the following lines could be useful. They are (1) establish the country’s overall strategy on carbon trading; (2) reduce search cost in matching buyers and sellers through a centralized system; (3) create awareness and educate all market players; (4) provide the needed tax incentive to build up the market, and (5) provide a clear legal framework. Actions in these five areas will go a long way in avoiding many of the problems that some countries are now encountering. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 97/2008
If this crisis is not suitably resolved, the effects on the global economy and financial markets might be most significant not only due to the strong links connecting the main economies, but also because the doubts over the sustainability of public finances might ultimately pass through to other major developed economies. The euro area is the epicentre of a crisis whose resolution is key to what may happen in the European and global economies in the opening decades of the 21st century, and it is on this that I shall focus today. European integration can only move forward if the euro area economy operates once again without upheavals. And since European integration is fundamental to the well-being of all Europeans and, naturally, of Spaniards, Spain must, like the other countries and the European institutions, make every effort to resolve the crisis. The truth is, as the Governor of the Bank of France said last week, if we don’t resolve this crisis properly, a “horror scenario” might ensue. But I’ll resist the temptation of detailing all the adverse consequences that failure to overcome this crisis would have for European citizens. To quote Fernando Pessoa, “to be a pessimist is to see everything tragically, an attitude that’s both excessive and uncomfortable”. Therefore I’m going to take a realistic but optimistic approach, stressing the steps forward we have taken to date and presaging a happy ending for this crisis if the necessary measures are adopted. All the EU Member States have a responsibility to resolve the crisis.

Otherwise, a durable single currency would not be feasible. Yet given that political union in Europe over the short term is inconceivable, will a monetary union not be able to survive without political union? In my view, the most important lesson we’ve learned in this crisis is that it is possible to enjoy the benefits of a single currency without political union, but only if strong divergences between the member countries are avoided. This has been understood by the European Union and is what has prompted the changes to the Stability and Growth Pact and to economic governance, which are intended precisely to correct divergences before they become so great that they are difficult to redress. And it must be acknowledged that here a good deal of progress has been made over the past year. The unfolding of the crisis has shown that the governance model in place to date in the EU has been of no use in ensuring economic policy consistency or in managing crisis episodes flexibly and effectively. It’s now clear that public finances were not sufficiently restructured in the upturn, that macroeconomic divergences were excessive and that we need a well-designed financial aid mechanism to assist ailing countries swiftly and effectively. Mindful of this, European governments and institutions have taken major steps towards correcting deficiencies in three fundamental areas: the strengthening of fiscal discipline, closer surveillance of macroeconomic maladjustments and the creation of a permanent crisis-management framework.
Is there a future risk of inflation rising or falling rapidly? 2. Asset prices  The next question concerns the importance of asset prices as regards the formation of monetary policy. Asset prices are not included in the inflation index, which we normally try to stabilise.It is not controversial to say that supply price trends should influence monetary policy to the extent that they are part of the inflationary process. Asset prices can be a leading indicator of price developments in other areas. They can reflect confidence in the future, both by households and by companies and thus affect inflation by influencing demand. Household consumption is also dependent on wealth, which means that property and share prices are important when predicting inflation. Share prices can also be a leading indicator for industrial production and investment. Developments in the stock market influence the will to invest. With the guidelines followed by the Riksbank, the question arises as to the significance of asset prices on inflation, primarily in the time perspective on which we focus, i.e. one to two years ahead. But it can also happen that asset prices are judged not to have such a significant impact in this time perspective, but to have an impact if one looks further ahead. For example, should inflation in two or three years' time be thought to be higher than desirable if it results from various factors driving up asset prices at the current time?

We should have an optimistic view of the future and at the same time make sure our stance is realistic and consistent. Time is ripe for Albania to start producing more goods and services than before. Despite the admirable progress in this context, the gap is still wide. Agriculture and industry remain two important branches of the economy operating far from their potential. Additionally, other sectors that have revitalized during the transition years require more orientation and tuning. These measures will enable better diversification of the Albanian economy, augmenting its stability with the passing of time. Other challenges I believe relate to the country’s external position, implying the reduction of current account deficit and the provision of alternative resources of foreign currency inflows. Therefore, I think that the role of the state needs to be more pronounced, not only in terms of completing the legal and regulatory basis but also of concluding a number of important structural reforms, in particular those related to the land, ownership titles, pensions, to the support of the small and medium-size business, to the further improvement of business environment and the ongoing upgrade of national infrastructure. The further strengthening of safety nets, in the context of a stable fiscal and financial position, is an obligation whose accomplishment would reduce both the real and perceived risk of the Albanian economy, hence creating incentives for the growth of domestic and foreign investments.
For the individual Member State, this is an opportunity to attract financial service providers from third countries who want to take advantage of the opportunity to establish themselves and market their products anywhere in the EU. Second, the single passport will also reduce the cost of doing business. It is in fact estimated that the Action Plan would reduce the cost of capital for 18 million businesses in the EU and drive down the cost of financial services for consumers. Conclusion Against this background it is not surprising that studies on the effects of enlargement show that growth rates would be higher under EU membership than under any other scenario. A European Commission study shows, for example, that during the first five years following accession, growth rates in the acceding countries would be between 1.7% and 3.2% above those that would be achieved if these 25 countries were to proceed with current reforms without joining the EU. A comparable finding also emerges for Malta: the annual growth rate would be between 1.7% and 1.9% higher in the short-run than it would be under the non-membership scenario. The difference would be even larger in subsequent years – Malta’s growth rates could then be between 4.4% and 6.1% higher under EU membership. Such findings and related considerations have led governments, political parties, trade unions and academics from twelve European countries, large and small, islands and continental ones, to conclude that membership of the EU is on balance the best available response to the challenges posed by globalization.

For this audience of bankers and financiers, it would be appropriate to illustrate this point by reference to the institutional framework governing macroeconomic policy in the euro area. Although new members cannot join the euro area immediately upon accession, they are expected to participate in EMU eventually and, therefore, to show a commitment to a stable macroeconomic framework even before accession. Whatever the outcome of the current debate about the Stability and Growth Pact, fiscal discipline will continue to be an important policy ingredient of such a framework as it is a necessary condition for the success of any monetary union. In addition, the obligation to fulfil the Maastricht criteria provides members of the euro area with the impetus to safeguard the sustainability of their economies, not least because deficiencies in the real sector of the economy would ultimately weaken the ability of a Member State to fulfil the Maastricht criteria on an ongoing basis. The euro adds an important dimension to these disciplines. First, through its effects on price transparency it will increasingly compel dominant players in the market place to reconsider their behaviour. This also applies to the financial sector, because a growing number of savers and borrowers will be offered a larger selection of euro-denominated financial instruments that will in time be tradable without limitation across the EU. This will have the added advantage of causing interest rates to converge to low levels.