samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will start with a brief recap of the Asian crisis, drawing some lessons and comparison with the European debt crisis. I would briefly discuss the economic setting and policy reform that brought Asia out of the crisis and end with some thoughts and reflections on the post crisis recovery period. Ladies and gentlemen, As a well-known American author, Mark Twain puts it, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme”. So despite the differences in the context and details of both the Asian and the European crises, the underlying root causes are not dissimilar. First, both crises, like most others in the recent economic history of the world, are often associated with the mispricing of risk and distorted incentives structures. In the case of Asia, our problem was both a currency and a banking crisis. We had to abandon the pegged exchange rate system which led to massive devaluation of our currency. With the corporate sector largely overleveraged and loaded with foreign debt, the sharp depreciation of the currency technically bankrupted firms overnight. Banks NPLs shot up and brought on with it the banking crisis. It was clear that the region’s “original sin” was well beyond redemption. We borrowed in foreign currencies and used it to finance projects that did not generate foreign exchange earning to service such a debt. In the case of Thailand, the amount of private external debt was over three times the level of international reserves.

Let me name a few – 1) sovereign is no longer risk-free, 2) we are taught to value economies of scale but are now confronted with the too-big-to-exist problem and 3) banks should no longer be only international in life but also in death as crises are more and more systemic given the growing interconnectedness. Spillover and contagion were witnessed in 1997 where the turbulence spread from Thailand to South East Asia and to Russia, China and Brazil, as it was a decade later in 2007 where the crisis widened from US and EU to the rest of the world. Imagine the pace of the spread of crisis in the next 10 years in 2017 – where crises would grow in size and speed beyond the management capacity of a single nation, real collective action is called for. Most importantly, we have to be forward-looking and well prepared. As crises are prone to occur more frequently with larger spillover, reform must be continued during normal times. It is imperative that the public is on board and support the reform effort to raise the competitiveness of the country, and minimize vulnerabilities or imbalances that may be triggered by external factors through no fault of their own. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me conclude by offering an observation that in 2002, five years after 1997 crisis, Asian economies had fully recovered, in particular, Thailand was able to repay the IMF package some two years ahead of the schedule.
Indeed, an industry has grown up geared to guessing MPC members' personal habits, psychoanalysing our personalities and classifying us into different species of the aviary. But it is important to recognise, I think, that disagreements are evidence of the strength of the system, not its weakness. Economic analysis involves a great deal of peering into the future, so it is not surprising that there should be differences of view. And the opportunity to explore and explain these differences in a rational and open way is an important part of getting to a better answer. The outlook for the economy Let me turn now to an assessment of the economy. The recent debate has, of course, been dominated by discussion of the implications of the terrorist attack on the United States, and the political and military response. The loss of life was grievous. Few of us will forget the sights we saw on our TV sets that day. And for those most closely involved the feelings must still be of the utmost intensity. Standing back, from an economic perspective I would say that the most serious impact has been on sentiment, particularly in the United States. Consumer confidence there has fallen quite sharply. Equity prices dipped in the immediate aftermath of the attack, the sterling price of oil has fallen by some 18% since the start of September, and credit spreads have risen. Of course, equities have since rallied strongly, with the FTSE100 for example now back above its pre-September 11th levels. But substantial uncertainties remain.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Ten theories on the economic relationship Switzerland Europe Summary of a speech by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to the Arbeitgeberverband Basel, Basel, 8 September 2004. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The relationship between Switzerland and the EU is close in so many ways that it appears almost stronger than that among many member states themselves. The debate on a possible integration into the EU as a logical consequence should be as broad-based as possible. Economically speaking, the issue has become more pressing since the introduction of the euro, as Switzerland is now surrounded by a single-currency area. Switzerland’s weaker economic growth is also frequently quoted as an argument in favour of integration, since the necessary domestic structural reforms would then be easier to realise. However, one tends to overlook the fact that the national authorities would continue to be responsible for implementing reforms and that, moreover, the absorption potential of autonomous monetary and fiscal policies would be forfeited. Even with an independent policy, Switzerland is in a position to outperform if it again focuses on its strengths of flexibility and openness. The independent monetary policy has helped to keep inflation in Switzerland at a low level for decades. This and the diversification properties of the Swiss franc make capital cheaper in Switzerland by approximately 1.5 percentage points (interest premium).
Bruno Gehrig: Review of the Swiss economy: end-of-year media news conference Introductory remarks by Prof Dr Bruno Gehrig, President of the Swiss National Bank, at the End-of-year Media News Conference, Zurich, 7 December 2001. *  *  *  Financial markets characterised by economic slowdown Development on the financial markets during the current year was characterised by a surprisingly significant weakening of the economy affecting all the major economic regions around the world. The slowdown was most pronounced in the US, but Europe is experiencing a considerable setback in growth as well. Inflationary pressure, already weak, thus eased further. The central banks took advantage of the rapidly increasing flexibility and lowered their key rates, in some cases down to historical lows. Up until the middle of the year, the prevalent opinion in the financial markets was that - buoyed by the Fed's marked interest rate cuts - the US economy, along with the global economy, would stage a fairly swift recovery from the deterioration in the technology sector and the associated weak investment activity. For this reason, the second quarter was characterised by a recovery on most stock markets, increasing bond yields and a US dollar defying gravity. By mid-year it became clear that the cyclical decline was likely to be more serious and to last longer. This reversal of opinion led to investors gradually becoming more risk averse. Equities portfolios were regrouped and invested in the money market and in bonds.

Mr Bäckström elucidates the economic situation in Sweden and describes the consequences it may have for future monetary policy  Speech given by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank at Föreningssparbanken, Ulricehamn on 1 September 1999. *  *  *  First a word of thanks for the invitation to visit Ulricehamn and talk about something that is close to the heart of a Riksbank governor, namely Sweden’s economic situation. I shall be describing the situation as I see it and saying something about the consequences it may have for future monetary policy. Unexpectedly strong trend The new statistics in recent months show that economic activity is stronger than most forecasters had foreseen as recently as in the spring. The growth of both domestic and external demand has been higher than expected. Relative to the first half of 1998, the GDP growth rate for the first six months of this year is an estimated 3.7%. Most observers are in the process of revising their forecasts upwards, if they have not already done so. In the Inflation Report last June the Riksbank judged that growth this year would reach 2.5%, followed by 3% next year as well as in 2001. When the Executive Board discussed monetary policy on 12 August, however, our assessment was that this year’s growth rate would be 3.5%. We also saw grounds for an upward revision of growth in the next two years, though the prospects for that period are more uncertain.
Budgetary policy in 2017 Before going on to specify the broad outlines of budgetary policy for 2017, allow me to remind you that the State and Social Security budget provides only a partial picture of general government activity. In a country as decentralised as Spain, in which more than 40% of public spending is by local and regional government, it is essential to take a broader perspective. Since my speech to the Parliamentary Budget Committee on 25 April, the Government has published (at the end of April) the Updated Stability Programme for the period 2017-2020. This document offers an overview of the budgets of central government agencies along with those of regional and local governments. Moreover, the Stability Programme, by adopting a 4/8  broader time horizon, provides a medium-term plan, which is important for correcting public finance imbalances. The macroeconomic projections accompanying the Stability Programme, which update those included in the draft budget for 2017, involve an extension of the current economic recovery to 2020, albeit with GDP growth gradually slowing from the 3.2% rate recorded in both 2015 and 2016. Specifically, real GDP is projected to grow by 2.7%, 2.5%, 2.4% and 2.4% in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020, respectively, while prices are projected to recover, so that nominal GDP growth would stand, on average, slightly above 4% throughout the period. These projections thus incorporate a path of slowing economic growth, which is also present in the forecasts of the Banco de España.

06.06.2017  Appearance by the Governor before the Senate in relation to the Draft State Budget for 2017 Luis M. Linde Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, In my appearance, which forms part of this Chamber’s discussion and approval of the State budget for 2017, I shall begin by reviewing the current macroeconomic setting and outlook for the Spanish economy. I shall then analyse the main aspects of the State budget for this year, according to the draft Law approved by the Government on 31 March, and the Updated Stability Programme for the period 2017-2020, submitted by the Council of Ministers to the European Commission on 29 April. The external environment of the Spanish economy The current international economic setting is characterised by an increase in uncertainty, chiefly the outcome of the political changes in the past year in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, that does not appear to have exerted a significant influence, so far, on the real economy, or on the financial markets. Both have continued to perform favourably and, despite rising in the final months of 2016, interest rates are holding at stillmoderate levels at all terms. The main exception to this climate of relative stability has been oil prices, which have been highly volatile in recent months. Recent economic developments in the euro area show a firming in the recovery, which is progressively extending to more sectors and countries.
This is why our ongoing  3  See for example Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syverson (2008), “Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or Profitability?” American Economic Review, 98(1): 394–425. 4  Albertazzi, U. and Marchetti, D. J. (2010), “Credit crunch, flight to quality and evergreening: an analysis of bank-firm relationships after Lehman”, Working paper, Banca d’Italia. 5  OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2013 (November 2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  comprehensive assessment of banks is so important. It will not only restore confidence in the sector, but also create the conditions for potential growth to recover more quickly. The assessment has a further benefit as well: it ensures the ECB’s low interest rates do not encourage banks and firms to delay restructuring. In this way, it allows us to maintain the monetary policy stance that is appropriate for the euro area, while mitigating any possible negative effects linked to misallocation of resources. The second priority is to encourage alternative funding sources in the euro area and to develop capital market financing, so that long run productivity growth is not so dependent on the health of banks. To some extent this is happening organically: corporates in large countries are already substituting bank lending for security and equity issuance. But this option is largely not available for SMEs, making them very sensitive to banking sector stress. This is why I have been vocal in supporting the revitalisation of the securitisation market in Europe, which has virtually dried up in recent years.

This development demonstrates the bank’s strong and long term commitment to be a significant player and contributor to the development of our financial sector, and the growth of the economy as a whole. The Bank of Zambia wishes to commend the Board of the Bank, Managing Director and his Team for these commendable developments. Ladies and Gentlemen, you will no doubt be aware of the crucial role that banks play in financial intermediation. The real challenge therefore is for all financial sector players to play their honest part in enhancing savings mobilization and to effectively channel the public’s savings to support financing of viable economic activities. as our economy continues to grow and per capita incomes increase, demand for financial services from both the corporate sector and the general public will continue to grow rapidly. Therefore, Zanaco’s wide branch network will strengthen its capacity to meet this growing demand for financial services. Managing Director, Distinguished invited Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank of Zambia is always pleased to be invited to occasions such as the one we are witnessing today, because it gives us an opportunity to share with you and the public some of the key developments that are taking place in our financial sector and the economy at large. In this regard allow me to say something about what is currently the most topical issue not only in the financial sector but in the national economy as a whole.
Also, the greater degree of risk-pooling in the euro area would contribute to aligning financial responsibility with the pan-European decision-making process, which has already been set in place in the areas of banking supervision and resolution. The current situation is such that the ultimate backing for ensuring deposits in a failed institution depends on national institutions, while the responsibility for supervision and resolution falls on other pan-European institutions. Shortly after the financial crisis broke, Mervin King ironically pointed out that international banks tended to be global in life, but national in death. This quote would appear to still be applicable in the euro area. In a genuine banking union banks should be European, both in life and in death. As you know, the debate on the EDIS was rekindled in November last year owing to an article5 by the German finance minister, Olaf Scholz, in which he advocated its implementation. This was something which, in his own words, “was no small step for a German finance minister”. The German proposal actually referred to the introduction of a European reinsurance scheme rather than a fully pooled EDIS, and it was moreover subject to various conditions. In any event, the debate clearly remains open and differences persist among the European partners. But I hope and wish that, as on previous occasions, we can forge a consensus allowing us to complete this basic third pillar, introducing a truly common and, therefore, fully pooled EDIS. European banking consolidation and integration.

Somewhat paradoxically, bearing in mind how slow progress has been, the objectives of attracting institutional investors, improving the allocation of resources, introducing a safe European asset and reinforcing the international role of the euro are more prevalent than ever. Specific progress, though limited, has at least been made. For instance, most work in terms of the EU-wide harmonisation of investment and saving products has now been agreed, including the definition of a pan-European individual pension product. 9/10  However, the complexity of the project calls for greater regulatory and fiscal harmonisation efforts, in particular regarding the taxation of capital. As a case in point, in the EU there are still more than 90 types of forms in different languages for tax refunds. This might seem rather unimportant but, often, these administrative formalities are a major obstacle to investment by market participants. Against this background, mention may be made of the report published in October 2019, during the Finnish presidency, by the so-called ´Next CMU group´8. This comprised highlevel representatives of industry who, at the request of the EU finance ministers, evaluated the progress of this project, proposing a series of measures in order to re-launch it.9 Conclusion. Allow me to conclude. Throughout its history, the EU has moved towards a greater level of economic and political integration that has provided clear social and economic benefits. Yet the pace of this movement has not been constant.
This is perhaps a rather dry topic and I feel sure that there are many more interesting and challenging aspects of derivatives which will be discussed during these two days of seminars related to the Derivatives Expo. 2  Record of discussion of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee Sub-committee on Currency Board Operations on 5 November 1999, reproduced in HKMA Quarterly Bulletin, February 2000. BIS Review 91/2001  3

But we also say that those countries with high levels of public debt, and less robust public finances, need to make sure their fiscal position is prudent. What I have just said there doesn’t boil down to any fixed set of demands. In the end, the decisions of government are correctly left with the political system. But in terms of some core principles, it’s to balance prudence in managing the public finances and to make sure that the government policies are promoting sustainable growth: sustainable, long-term, climateconscious, consistent with the carbon transition, consistent with raising productivity. If you read the manifestos of all the parties, they all have different ideas, but I think all share the same principle, which is: the more we can have a sustainable economy that is delivering employment and so on, the better for the future of the Irish economy. Is the Irish economy one of those countries that has more room to stimulate economic activity? Well, as you know, this is a long-running debate. At one level, there has been a lot of progress. All of these difficult years of austerity have led to a big improvement in public finances and the number one uncertainty is about the future of corporation tax revenue, which has been unexpectedly high.
But it is possible to find both arguments in favour of stabilising inflation a couple of percentage points above 2 and arguments in favour of a target that is lower, perhaps even 0 per cent. One argument for having an inflation target above zero is that it reduces the likelihood that the economy will suffer periods of deflation. If the target were to stabilise inflation around 0 per cent, inflation would probably fall below 0 during certain periods. That is, prices would periodically fall instead of increasing. There would then be a greater risk that inflation expectations – which should be around 0 per cent – would slide downwards so that households and companies would begin to expect a more lasting fall in prices. This could, for instance, lead to households and companies delaying their consumption and investment until later, when prices have fallen even further, thus leading to a decline in demand. This could in turn reinforce expectations that prices will fall and it could create a negative spiral that is difficult to reverse. Having an inflation target that is slightly above zero thus gives some protection against this. So, the inflation target should perhaps be greater than zero, but not too high. A few years ago, professors Francesco Giavazzi and Frederic Mishkin made an evaluation of monetary policy in Sweden during the ten years we have had an inflation target. One of the questions they discussed was the size of the inflation target.

The assessment of the Executive Board members was that cutting the repo rate from 3.75 to 2 per cent was necessary both to dampen the fall in production and employment and to attain the inflation target of 2 per cent. The situation in the financial markets both in Sweden and abroad had not improved appreciably, despite central banks and governments around the world implementing forceful measures. The markets for medium and long-term borrowing were functioning poorly, and sometimes not at all, and liquidity premiums were still high. The financial crisis had severely hampered access to credit and we could see clearly how this was reinforcing the downturn in the development of the economy. GDP had begun to fall in important parts of the world around us, economic indicators were at historically low levels and share prices had fallen drastically in recent months. Energy and food prices had fallen substantially since the peak in the middle of the year and this brought some relief for households. The downturn also contributed to a fall in inflation and in this way there was greater scope to counteract the negative developments by cutting policy rates, both in Sweden and abroad. Our earlier forecast was that the Swedish economy would be tangibly affected by the financial crisis and that there would be a sharp downturn in international economic activity.