samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Calculations carried out by the central bank of Sweden, published in its December 1999 Inflation Report, show effects comparable to those demonstrated in the English report. It is not uncommon for the effects of economic instruments to be uncertain. On the contrary. This means that we cannot fine-tune economic developments. The possibilities for conducting a successful economic policy increase by proceeding gradually when economic developments require changes in the interest rate. Despite the uncertainty as to the speed and magnitude of the effect of changes in interest rates on inflation, there can be no doubt that higher interest rates lead to a reduction in price inflation. Almost all the analyses referred to above are based on economic models which have been quantified using historical data, as have Norges Bank’s calculations. The models cover some of the channels for interest rate effects, but not all of them. There is evidence to suggest that changes in interest rates may now have a greater impact on the economy, and more swiftly, in Norway and in other countries than was formerly the case. 1  OECD (1999): EMU. Facts, challenges and policies, chapter 2, OECD, Guiso, Luigi, Anil K Kashyap, Fabio Panetta & Daniele Terlizzese (1999): “Will a common European monetary policy have asymmetric effects?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Economic Perspectives, 4th quarter. 2  Bank of England (1999): “The transmission mechanism of monetary policy”, The Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England.

The trend towards net exports of long-term capital, as seen in the table, and the tentative explanations that have been provided may shed some light on why the effective krone exchange rate has been relatively weak for the last few years, despite large current account surpluses and short-term interest rates on a par with or higher than in other countries. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 67/2000  14
For this, it is important that we are well prepared for the next round of evaluation on Malaysia, which may be scheduled from the next year onward. From our past experience, a national AML/CFT assessment demands the joint efforts of all stakeholders, including the financial institutions. Participation, contribution and cooperation by all stakeholders are very critical in ensuring that the result of the assessment truly reflect our strong commitment in not  2  BIS Review 99/2010  only meeting the international standards, but also in achieving the desired result in combating ML/TF. Therefore, I wish also to call upon all stakeholders of our AML/CFT regime at every level to make due preparation for the coming assessment on Malaysia, while continuing our concerted efforts in preventing for the interest of the country, against ML/TF risks. Shifting gear of AML/CFT implementation action Let me now touch on the second area in terms of policy and strategic response of authorities. The Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 (or AMLATFA) has been in operation for the past eight years with the basic foundation of the required framework, such as legal, regulatory and institutional infrastructures, already in place. In the 2007 Mutual Evaluation exercise, Malaysia is recognised as having good AML/CFT framework through good ratings obtained in many areas, comparable to those jurisdictions with excellent AML/CFT framework.

We have addressed, since then, most of the recommendations set out in the Mutual Evaluation Report (or MER), including the only Non-Compliant rating in terms of SR IX by implementing the cross border cash transportation declaration system since January 2010. Moving forward, considering the rising threat of cross border money laundering and greater emphasis on the effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework, a more strategic approach is undertaken. This is also undertaken as a tool to support the Malaysia’s National Key Result Areas (NKRAs), particularly the first and the second NKRAs, i.e., initiatives to reduce crime and combat corruption. For this, Malaysia has formulated (in 2009) a 3-year National AML/CFT Strategic Plan 2010–2012 as a strategic tool to achieve the desired results of AML/CFT regime. The Strategic Plan includes a set of strategies to achieve specific Desired Outcomes in four key areas; focused implementation; enhancement of the legal framework; improvement of the institutional framework; and capacity building. The Plan covers not only the aspect of preventive measures for financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), but also the aspects of legal, financial intelligence and law enforcement, as well as domestic and international cooperation. As the Strategic Plan will be officially rolled out soon, Bank Negara Malaysia and the relevant agencies have started to implement the action plan in stages. The ML/TF investigation and prosecution have been intensified. To date, there have been 94 money laundering cases at various stages of prosecution, with more than 3000 charges involving proceeds amounting to RM1.2 billion.
Growth in the domestic facing sectors is likely to taper, as consumer demand slows in the face of higher interest rates and more moderate wage increases. Singapore's GDP growth for 2023 is expected to slow to a below-trend pace within MTI's current forecast range. Consequently, the output gap is estimated to turn mildly negative, to around -0.5%, from the positive 0.6% recorded last year. Inflation in Singapore has clearly peaked and has discernibly moderated. In assessing inflation trends, it is instructive to focus on month-on-month momentum and price trends going forward rather than year-ago averages. Core inflation on a month-on-month seasonally adjusted annualised basis has come down sharply, to 3.6% in May 2023 from a peak of 9.1% in June 2022. The disinflation has been broad-based across most components in the core CPI basket. Notably, imported inflation has turned negative, reflecting the decline in global energy and food prices and the effects of a stronger Singapore Dollar. Even excluding oil, whose prices have fallen most sharply, imported inflation was minus 1.2% in May this year. The fall in inflation momentum is gradually translating to lower year-on-year inflation. Core inflation on a year-on-year basis moderated to 4.8% in Apr-May from 5.4% in Q1. Headline inflation slowed to 5.4% from 6.1% over the same period. Singapore should see further reductions in inflation by the end of the year. One, imported inflation should remain negative over the rest of the year.

Central banks whose currencies appreciated, like the Swiss National Bank (SNB), recorded negative currency translation effects. Central banks with large investment portfolios, like the SNB, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and Norges Bank, were negatively impacted by the sell-off in global bond and equity markets. Notwithstanding the financial loss, MAS' OFR position remains strong and we transferred $ billion of excess OFR to the Government in this financial year. MAS transfers OFR above what it needs to conduct monetary policy and support financial stability, to the Government for longer-term management by GIC. In FY22/23, MAS transferred a total of $ billion of OFR to the Government. Even after the transfer, the OFR stood at $ billion (or $ billion) as at end May 2023. This is over two-thirds of GDP, much higher than in almost any other country. How does the loss recorded by MAS affect the Government Budget? First, MAS will not accrue a contribution to the Government's Consolidated Fund in FY22/23 but will make a contribution of $ billion based on past profits. Like other statutory boards, MAS makes a contribution to the Consolidated Fund based on 17% of the net profit for the year, after offsetting cumulative losses from previous financial years. In the case of MAS, as our net profits vary considerably from year to year, our annual contributions to the Consolidated Fund are paid in equal proportions over three years, so as to smoothen Government's revenue volatility.
8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  we cannot give any single measure prime position as representing the one and only truth. It is wisest to continue using several different measurements as a guide. In the second place, situations sometimes arise where there is a conflict between stabilising inflation and normalising resource utilisation and different decision-makers may make different assessments. However, this has not been a problem recently as both underlying inflationary pressures and resource utilisation have been low. In the third place, in my opinion economic trends beyond forecast horizons should be taken into account, though it is not possible to make thorough forecasts covering long periods. Let me briefly explain my argument. As I mentioned earlier, the assessments in the latest Monetary Policy Update can be said to paint a long-term picture in which resource utilisation is coming under pressure and there is a risk of high inflation, in other words the reverse of the current macro picture. However, up to a point I was willing to accept these long-term tendencies, since I must take into consideration the need to use expansive monetary policy to offset the low inflation and relatively weak resource utilisation expected for the time being. In the current situation monetary policy considerations mean supporting continued recovery while preventing longterm overheating tendencies from becoming too strong.

On this front, we are happy to see that RMB lending business is developing progressively, with outstanding RMB loans reaching 60 billion yuan at end-July 2012, nearly four times the level of a year ago. So, is the wider use of RMB a continuing trend? Well, I would say the scope for further development is clear, and it will be very much up to how corporates and banks can get more engaged in the new business of RMB. Third question: does the development of offshore RMB business in other financial centres pose a threat to Hong Kong? This question, I have to say, suffers from the fallacy of “zero-sum” thinking. As more corporates and investors worldwide are becoming interested in conducting their business transactions and investments in RMB, it is natural to see financial institutions in different parts of the world providing RMB services to meet the demand of their customers. This does not necessarily mean that RMB businesses are being diverted to other places. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Indeed, such developments will mean that banks in Hong Kong will not be dealing only with each other locally, and there will be new business opportunities to conduct RMB businesses with counterparts overseas. For instance, as a global hub for RMB liquidity and financing, Hong Kong is well placed to channel customer and wholesale RMB deposits towards corporations and financial institutions in other parts of the world. In fact, we are already seeing such a trend.
However, competition indexes show that the devaluation of the Turkish lira do not increase Turkey’s competitiveness in any way. The unfavorable impact of high inflation has also been the felt in the labor market and prevented it from functioning effectively. Economic growth within continuous expansion and contraction cycles made the labor force volatile. Those, who want to work in this volatile environment, especially unskilled workers, are the first ones to lose their jobs in periods of contraction and the last ones that are employed in expansion periods. This means that the period of high and chronic inflation experienced by Turkey is one of the underlying reasons for social problems triggered by the fact that sustainable employment growth has yet to be achieved. Meanwhile, alongside the tendency of currency substitution with high and volatile risk premium created by high inflation, real interests, which were high due to the problematic public debts, caused a debt spiral and the vulnerability of the economy to exogenous shocks increased. This situation both clouded expectations and hindered the effective utilization of monetary policy Inflation diminished the effectiveness of financial markets to intermediate. This is due to the fact that, in a highly inflationary environment, players in the market are unable to foresee the future as they lack the appropriate knowledge. This situation, combined with the problem of public deficit, led to a significant decline in the credits that the banking sector provides to the non-financial sector.

Looking at the past, we see lax fiscal policies and monetary policies, which had to accommodate them. The latter was accompanied by pegged or foreseeable exchange rate regimes. The outcome of this scenario was high inflation and periods of volatile and unbalanced growth. In such an environment, expectations deteriorated because the public sector led the excessive increase in domestic demand, maturities were shortened and uncertainty increased, the current account deficit widened, and measures continued to fell behind. With the addition of the adverse trigger-effect of domestic or external factors to this environment, an increase in foreign exchange demand and pressure on the foreign exchange reserves of CBRT was inevitable, resulting in crises and devaluation. However, the present circumstances of the Turkish economy are very different from those of the past. To start with, as you all know, unlike the past, a floating exchange rate regime is being implemented. The most apparent feature of the floating exchange rate regime is that it is shock-absorbent. In other words, changes in the demand or supply of foreign exchange are reflected in the level of the exchange rate, and in contrast to pegged or foreseeable exchange rate regimes, the exchange rate goes up or down.
BIS Review 27/2005  1  measurement issues currently explain between 0.5 and at most 1 percentage point of the growth differential between the EU and the United States.2 We should consider the upper limit of this range as a litmus test to the question of whether there is a structural growth differential between the EU and the United States. In addition to various measurement differences, about one percentage point of the difference in real GDP growth rates between the EU and the U.S. can be attributed to the higher growth rate of labour input in the U.S. for the period between 1980 and 1995. This is attributable to a stronger increase in the working population in the U.S. and a marked relative decline of effective working hours in the EU. Factors causing this decline in individual labour input can be divided into two categories: First, numerous rigidities in European labour markets were introduced over the past decades: working hour restrictions, minimum wage agreements, and other restrictions on the conditions of hiring and firing employees. These restrictions are often valid over a broad range of sectors and geographic areas irrespective of economic fundamentals. Second, changes in taxing labour evolved over time with significant tax cuts realized in the United States.3 In total, overall labour input for the period 1990 to 1995 increased in the U.S. by an average of 1.2% per annum against a decrease of 0.8% per annum in the EU-13. This is pictured in Graph 2.

In total, the EU-11’s relative position in annual productivity growth worsened by 2.9 percentage points for the period of 2000 to 2003 or by 1.8 percentage points for the period of 1995 to 2000 against the period of 1990 to 1995. The GDP measurement differences I outlined earlier explain at best less than half of this productivity growth gap between the European Union and the United States during the last ten years. Admittedly, we need to be aware of the fact that Europe’s economic performance over this period has been significantly and adversely affected by the terms of German unification. The residual productivity growth gap lies at the heart of the question of why European potential growth has been so weak. To understand the gap, we need to focus on different relative conditions in input as well as output markets. Strongly diverging labour market conditions between the EU and the United States over the decades up to 1995 have led to a massive reduction in EU overall labour input. Rigid labour regulations in Europe restricted labour input and thereby increased the capital-labour ratio which helps explain the higher productivity growth rates in Europe until 1995. From an employment perspective, labour market reforms deserve the high priority they now get by refocusing the Lisbon agenda on “growth and jobs”. 2  See e.g. Nadim Ahmad, François Lequiller et al., ”Comparing Labour Productivity Growth in the OECD Area: The Role of Measurement”, OECD Statistics Working Paper Nr.
The region remains heavily reliant on bank lending, and capital markets are not deep enough. •  According to McKinsey, bank loans were more than a third of Asian banking and capital markets, compared to just 10% in the US. •  Debt capital markets are particularly under-represented, contributing only 20–30% of financing in Asia, compared to 65% in the US and 55% in Europe. A “new normal” in global finance? How will the global financial landscape change in response to these three driving forces? It will be hard to say but let me hazard some guesses. First, if the reforms are well implemented, we should see a material reduction of risk in the financial sector and improved financial stability. I do not think we will see an end to financial crises as such, but financial systems should become more resilient. This, in and of itself, will enhance economic welfare substantially. Second, financial institutions will be forced to rationalise their business models and streamline their operations to better optimise capital, reduce compliance costs, and enhance efficiency. Third, global financial institutions will expand their Asian footprint. They will establish more Asia-focused teams and functions. Many of these firms will make a second home in Asia. But Asia is a diverse and non-homogenous market. Global financial institutions will hub in more than one location. The structure of global banks is likely to change significantly. Banks’ profits and return on equity will come under pressure. The risk-return profiles of virtually all banking products will be re-ordered.

There is a saying: “The face you have at age 20 is the face Nature gives you; but the face you have after 50 is the face you earned” MAS’ face today, on our 50th anniversary, is perhaps marked with the scars of crises fought and overcome and hopefully also a few lines of wisdom gathered over the years. It is also – we like to think – a radiant face, as we look ahead with hope and confidence, to push the boundaries of innovation, to make finance more inclusive, more sustainable, and more purposeful, while ensuring it remains safe. Thank you and have a good evening. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Where we have tried to add value in recent years has been in promulgating the London Approach abroad and in working to develop the framework in the light of recent innovations and developments in global financial markets. Several issues have loomed large. One is the applicability of the unanimity requirement given the proliferation in the number and type of creditors in any large international workout. Another is the lack of a formal moratorium over all or part of the period of resolution of a company’s problems, as distinct from the informal standstill of the London Approach during the initial period of collecting all available information and evaluating the company’s long-term prospects. More broadly, the extent to which the Approach is affected by developments such as securitisation, loan trading and credit derivatives is exercising our minds and those of others closely involved in corporate workouts. These issues raise potentially very tricky questions. For example, loan trading arguably makes the creditor co-ordination problem more challenging, but at the same time provides an exit route for those unwilling to be involved in the restructuring and an entry for specialist turnaround investors. Credit derivatives raise a different set of issues, because they need not involve transfers of the company’s debt until, in the case of physical settlement, a credit event occurs. The knowledge that debt will change hands following a credit event might, however, affect the incentives facing the company, its ”pre-credit event” creditors and its potential ”post-credit event” creditors in unpredictable ways.

For instance, in the mining sector, the supply of goods and services has been taken up by private companies including those that can be classified as SMEs. Similarly, the transport sector, which was dominated by Government through the United Bus Company of Zambia (UBZ), Zambia Railways and Zambia Airways, etc, is now largely run by the private sector, consisting mostly of small and medium entrepreneurs. One can go on to mention the tourism, manufacturing, real estate, construction and others. This development is of great benefit to the economy in general and individual entrepreneurs in particular. Therefore, small- and medium-scale enterprises have the potential to make a significant contribution to the growth of the economy, thereby improving the economic welfare of the population. As you may know, SMEs in Zambia often have a direct impact on community development. Since they are usually based in places where the owners live, they draw upon the community for their workforce and rely on it to do business. They provide employment, particularly for low-skilled workers, as well as women and the youth, who usually make up the greatest proportion of the unemployed. However, this sector has faced difficulties in accessing credit for working capital and expansion of their investments. Mr Chairman, even if more SMEs wished to modernise their plant and equipment, they would find it hard to do so because of the difficulty of obtaining financing. Many banks choose not to provide credit to SMEs as they are perceived to be more risky and yet less profitable.