samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Central Bank’s latest forecasts now point to the economy recovering much slower than original expectations, with our real GDP growth rate struggling to make it past 1 percent. This is way down from the 3.0 percent growth anticipated in the Bank’s earlier forecasts. The recent IMF Article IV Mission has suggested that the economy may even decline further, by up to (negative) 3 percent in 2009/10, due mainly to the severe impact of the tsunami on the tourism sector. Our balance of payments, however, is expected to be in substantial surplus resulting in the level of our foreign exchange reserves being sufficient to still cover in excess of 7 months of imports. At the same time, our inflation rate is expected to decline further and is likely to remain close to zero for the remainder of the current financial year, on the back of lower global food and commodity prices as well as the recovery of domestic food supplies. Reflecting the relatively weak state of the economy, the Central Bank’s Board decided at its Meeting last month, for monetary policy to remain eased to help stimulate the economy. The current deflationary trend and the substantial level of international reserves have made it feasible for the Bank to pursue this monetary policy stance. In the remaining months of 2009/10, therefore, the Central Bank will aim at maintaining a substantial amount of free liquidity in the financial system, to drive down market interest rates further.

But, I caution you, this is only the first step in your careers as Accountants. Remember, “it is not what you learned, but how you use what you learned, that counts”. I came across a definition of an Accountant the other day. It said, “an accountant is someone who solves a problem that you did not know you had, in a way that you don’t understand”! BIS Review 49/2010  1  I hope that tonight’s Graduates do not end up being one of these Accountants, who creates a problem first and then pretends to solve it. And, worse still, they end up charging the client for something that was not there in the first place! It’s almost like being a lawyer! The recent global financial crisis started from a liquidity shortfall in the United States. This liquidity shortfall resulted from many loans (especially for housing) going into default, and there were insufficient assets to cover these loans. As a result, many large banks and financial institutions went bankrupt. And, if it were not for the quick and substantial intervention by some major Governments and Central Banks, the global economy would have collapsed. Among others, the Accountants have been blamed for the “financial crisis”, as a result of their “creative accounting” techniques, which contributed to inflating the values of the assets which were used as collateral for the many risky loans that were issued.
The prospective creation of a European Systemic Risk Board will partly fill this lacuna. For the reasons I have discussed, financial supervision and regulation clearly cannot be conducted without reference to the monetary policy stance. But, both in finalising the institutional framework and in the conduct of these policies in the future, the principles I have articulated must be respected. We need to ensure that macro-prudential policy is formulated both independently and transparently, guaranteeing a rich flow of information among the relevant authorities, including monetary policy-makers, while at the same time avoiding any blurring of responsibilities, objectives and accountability. Concluding remarks In conclusion, what are the main lessons from recent experience that we should seek to incorporate in any revision to the framework for monetary policy-making? First and foremost, monetary policy should have remained more closely focused on the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. This implies that this objective must be defined clearly and pursued symmetrically. Monetary policy should not be burdened with additional objectives, which it is ill-equipped to pursue. The institutional independence of the central bank is essential to building the credibility required to pursue price stability in a consistent and coherent manner. Dual mandates for monetary policy place this independence at risk. Independence accords central banks the necessary flexibility to deal with a rapidly changing world without putting their credibility at risk.

It will be interesting to see how this story plays out in coming years. Thank you very much! 10  I have discussed the potential implications of the foreign currency surplus for the international monetary system in: “The implications of cross-border banking and foreign currency swap lines for the international monetary system”, in O. Blanchard, D. Romer, M. Spence and J. Stiglitz (eds), In the Wake of the Crisis, MIT Press, 2012. 11  See Flemming and Klagges (2010), op. cit. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
But it will be hard for the recovery in the second half of 2020 and 2021 to make up for this year’s downturn. Is the ECB’s current monetary policy sufficient to deal with the economic impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19), or can we expect additional measures soon? We have taken a number of key measures. In terms of monetary policy, our response to the situation has been very active, with three types of measure. First, we have provided liquidity to the banks, adjusting the rules on collateral for accessing liquidity-providing operations. European banks therefore have more liquidity at their disposal and at more favourable conditions. Second, we have responded with the measures taken by the ECB Banking Supervision. To avoid a credit crunch, we have eased the requirements on capital held by European banks, the classification of non-performing loans and the accounting rules. And third, we have launched the € million Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), which will increase the total assets purchased by the ECB to € trillion in 2020. This is a large sum in order to maintain financial stability in the debt markets, in particular in the government bond markets, and to safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanisms. In addition, of course, we have the fiscal policies of national governments and the European Commission, as well as the decision by the Eurogroup last week.

What advice would you give to euro area governments on how to deal with the economic impact of this pandemic? We need to be aware that this will lead to a significant drop in business revenues and the public sector will need to fill this gap. The main factor in terms of ensuring the economy starts to recover when the health situation improves is to try to “vaccinate”, as best we can, the business ecosystem of each country. What we need to do is try to keep the business system alive, as much as possible, and to come through this period. That is what my advice would be. Keeping this ecosystem going is also important in terms of safeguarding jobs and reducing the social impact. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Building upon these initial studies, the Committee has started extending its analysis to establish a comprehensive picture: for the trading book, the initial analysis has been extended to more complex portfolios, with results expected in the next few months. In parallel, the work on the banking book will extend to the other remaining core asset classes, especially retail portfolios, SMEs and so-called “partial use” exposures (ie exposures that  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  have not been migrated to the internal models). The Committee also foresees extending its work to operational risk, the third core risk type. And once the Committee has done an initial round of assessment, we will need to repeat the exercise periodically to see whether the policy measures that I will discuss shortly are having the desired impact. Further analysis to establish a comprehensive picture will take us into 2015, but this does not, of course, prevent us from taking action in the meantime. It is clear that a problem exists and the Committee is considering a range of supervisory and policy responses – without, I must add, settling on anything definitive just yet. Given the multi-faceted nature of the problem, it is also clear that we will need a multi-faceted response. As there is no silver bullet, we will likely end up with a series of incremental policy and supervisory changes, drawing from the following list:   Most immediately, we will see supervisory action.

But nowadays, London's role depends mainly on making markets and providing financial services in foreign currencies, like the dollar. That means that London continues to thrive only by remaining internationally competitive. And I should add that we in the Bank of England take a close interest in this. Maintaining the stability of the financial system and the effectiveness of the UK's financial services are key objectives for us. The City is a centre of innovation and excellence London is internationally competitive, because it acts as a centre of innovation and excellence, in a whole range of complementary ways. •  London has a vast, critical mass of markets and financial services in commercial and investment banking, securities and derivatives, fund management, insurance and commodities. •  London has a long track record of innovation, and a ready availability of financial skills and professional support services in law, accountancy, tax, property and communications. More than 300,000  •  people work in financial services in London, and nearly a further 600,000 work in the supporting professions and services. •  London is at the forefront of technology, with an effective financial infrastructure. •  London has a reputation as a 'clean' market, and it has a commitment to openness in welcoming foreign firms. There is a genuinely level playing-field for foreign firms, with no overt or covert advantages given to domestic institutions. •  And in London, we have a non-bureaucratic but rigorous approach to regulation.
Given the increasing availability of innovative financial products and much improved risk management techniques by commercial banks in Thailand, the Bank of Thailand has gradually relaxed our regulations in this area. At the moment, importers and exporters who wish to hedge this foreign exchange risk for a traderelated transaction can choose from forward contracts, plain-vanilla options or even certain structured products to suit their needs and preferred level of sophistication. My final point concerns the role of the futures market as an insurance mechanism. As mentioned previously, agricultural products tend to exhibit highly volatile prices causing farmers to suffer from this risk of violent price fluctuation. The government has stepped in to provide relief in the form of government price support scheme. At present, the government is running commodity price  2  BIS Review 14/2006  stabilisation schemes in four products namely paddy rice, corn feed and tapioca. These price support schemes provide an insurance for farmers against adverse price movement- in the form of selling put options to the farmers. The schemes have grown to become a substitute for the futures marketeliminating the very incentive for farmers, traders and producers to participate in the futures market. This is particularly the case when the guaranteed buying prices from the government are set at relatively high level compared to market-determined prices. I mentioned before that the average daily turnover in the AFET now is around 400 contracts. However, the majority of the trading is heavily concentrated in the ribbed smoked rubber sheet no.

I personally feel that it is imperative for a country to have a well-developed futures market. They enable growers, traders and end-users to benefit from improved riskmanagement practices. For the price discovery mechanism to be well-functioning, the futures market needs to command respectable volume and liquidity - the achievement of which is a goal that I feel we should set for ourselves. To sum up, the future of futures promises to be exciting and challenging. For TFEX, I hope that it gets off to a very successful start. For AFET, I am seeing a lot of potentials for it to be a futures market with sustainable growth and efficacy, enhancing the efficiency in the agricultural market. To realise its vision statements is only possible with full and complete cooperation from all of us. Again, I would urge the board of directors of AFET to take a lead and push for the much-needed change. Thank you. BIS Review 14/2006  3
Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 23 July 2021. * * * Good afternoon, We have made the decision to raise the key rate by 100 basis points to 6.50% per annum. Our today’s decision is based on the updated macroeconomic forecast that was significantly revised. The growth of the Russian economy sped up in the second quarter, and inflationary pressure turned out to be higher and more persistent than forecast. Some sectors are already demonstrating signs of overheating. Inflation expectations also continued to go up. Given the observed trends, we have revised our inflation forecast upwards by one point. This year, it will equal 5.7–6.2%. The important step in our policy, which we have made today, is needed to bring inflation back to the target. We expect inflation to slow down to 4.0–4.5% next year and stay close to 4% further on. Nonetheless, our policy will not contain the steady rates of economic growth. I would now dwell on the factors behind our today’s decision. I will start out with inflation. As of 19 July, inflation was 6.5% in annualised terms. This is considerably above the target and is close to five-year peaks. High growth rates are driven by both temporary and steady factors. According to our estimates, steady factors dominate at the moment.

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2016/redeeming-an-unforgivingworld.pdf?la=en&hash=7B7AC35CC3017FCD8EF5BE7D5F2D0C4EA22C7E05  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  resolution failed, and defaults occurred, it would take the failure of more than the CCP’s two largest clearing members in extreme but plausible market conditions to lead to the exhaustion of the default fund – this is a scenario, in the tail of the tail, which would almost certainly be more severe than those we have seen historically, including in the crisis. The crisis has, of course taught us, that we need to think about events in the very tail of the probability distribution. So we do need to ask what happens when prefunded loss absorbency is exhausted and insufficient to cover losses. Unlike banks, if prefunded resources are insufficient to absorb losses, the CCP does not become insolvent. CCP’s rulebooks, to which all members agree in advance, allow a further series of recovery actions, in a prescribed sequence. A CCP could require its members to contribute more resources, it could reduce its liabilities to some of its members, and ultimately it could “tear –up” (i.e. cancel) all or some of its contracts – in effect the closure of the clearing service. The sequence of ever more draconian actions, reflect the fact that CCPs are not independent risk takers. In fact, they should not be risk takers at all. They are services that, for a fee, manage the risks of derivative counterparty default that their members would otherwise face directly and at far greater cost. Again, the comparison with banks is instructive.
In a longer perspective, openness can also be vital to create a political pressure for change in individual countries. In the same way, openness with regard to current imbalances lends support to change in different countries and for considerations in the financial markets. I myself would very much like to see more transparent application and assignment procedures for posts at all levels within the IMF. The best candidate should get the job regardless of the applicant’s country of origin. 2. For the IMF to have enough weight, it is necessary that the key issues for the world economy really are discussed at the IMF’s table and not at others. Those who wishes to strengthen the IMF – and are serious about it – could therefore not create new forums outside the IMF with a view to discussing matters that fall within the IMF’s mandate. If this is done, the organisation will, in practice, be undermined. 3. One way of reducing the need for creating new fora, and, at the same time, in a pragmatic way approach issues of representation, would be to work more actively in the Executive Board with various (small) committees/subcommittees (similar to those in many national parliaments and in the Executive Board at the World Bank).

For example, there could be a committee for global exchange rate issues, in which the large currency blocs are represented; another committee focused on poverty issues, where poor countries and major donor countries have a high representation; and a committee for crisis resolution, in which creditors have a strong position, etc. Reforms in this direction could also increase the efficiency of the Executive Board. It could also imply that a small increase in the number of chairs would be manageable. The problem that a number of countries would end up outside some of the discussions, should not be exaggerated particularly if the consequence of total changes is that IMF gets a more central role in the international discussion than today. To the extent that the problem remain, it should be possible to manage through a high degree of openness. 4. The role of the Executive Board should be stronger and more clearly defined in relation to the IMF’s management. The current principle whereby the IMF’s managing director is both chairman of the Board and responsible for executing the Board’s decisions is open to question. With a more clear division of responsibilities, the IMF management could be more effective and, in practice, possibly stronger. It is also vital that the Board is represented at a high enough level with full confidence from the capital level in order for the Board to be able to become an effective arena for central policy discussions. 5. The IMFC could be reinforced.
Coordination was also one of the questions discussed in the report by a working group at the Bank for International Settlements, where I was chair, see the Bank for International Settlements (2011). 15  See H M Treasury (2013), which points out, for instance, that "The Government intends that the frameworks for monetary policy and macro-prudential policy, operated by the MPC and FPC of the Bank of England respectively, should be coordinated” (p. 5), and “In order to foster coordination between monetary and macroprudential policy, there is overlap between the membership of the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee” (p. 10). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  be what one can call a holistic, or comprehensive, view when formulating both types of policy. If both the credit cycle and the business cycle are to be stabilised in a good way, I do not believe that they can be too far from the policy mix implied by full coordination, at least not over a long period of time. The two types of policy could then counteract or reinforce one another in ways that would be harmful to the economy. It is probably also the case that this interplay is particularly important in sensitive situations, such as preventing a credit boom going too far and ensuring that the credit cycle has a slow, soft downturn instead of a rapid, dramatic one.

Stefan Ingves: Central bank policies – the way forward after the crisis Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Royal Bank of Scotland, Stockholm, 4 October 2013. *  *  *  How should the Riksbank and other central banks act to contribute to the best possible development of the economy? This is a question that one might need to contemplate from time to time. Because at the end of the day, there is probably some truth in the old joke that it is not a problem if the questions in the Economics exam are the same year after year – the answers will change anyway. The international financial and debt crisis that started around five years ago, and which still afflicts many countries, makes it particularly important to consider whether the answer to the question has changed – whether the central banks should conduct their operations differently from before the crisis, and if so, how. This issue is currently being discussed internationally, both in research and in policy. We do not now know exactly where this discussion will lead, although it is possible to distinguish some main conclusions. Prior to the crisis – most of the pieces of the puzzle appeared to be in place Before the crisis, everything seemed quite simple. The global economy had experienced an unusually long period of good growth, relatively minor cyclical fluctuations, and low and stable inflation.
As of late June, the annual decline in actual registrations is estimated to have eased, such that the level of actual registrations was 11.4% down on the figure a year earlier. Should the epidemiological situation not change significantly, the recovery observed in Q2 will continue over the summer and give rise to high quarter-on-quarter growth in Q3. Nonetheless, interpreting this growth calls for caution, since we should not lose sight of the fact that the level of activity will continue to be significantly below that observed prior to the pandemic breaking, such that the process of recovery will be far from complete. We can thus talk of an incomplete recovery, using the first of the three adjectives I referred to at the start of my address. The conditioning factors I mention for the short-term outlook to materialise - the absence of any material changes in the course of the pandemic in Spain - are no minor matter. Indeed, economic developments would be adversely affected in the coming months, perhaps severely so, if the outbreaks seen in recent weeks in different territories after the easing of the restrictions on movement could not be controlled with local-level and temporary measures. Accordingly, health-related uncertainties will persist for some time until effective treatment for the illness or widespread access to a vaccine against the virus are achieved. Moreover, the doubts over economic developments in the coming quarters are not confined to the health area.

While these developments are likely to further reinforce the strong intra-regional trade and investment linkages that are already in place, a key aspect of the increased financial integration in Asia is the need for more efficient intermediation of funds within the region. This includes the mobilizing and channeling of some part of the sizeable savings in Asia to productive investments. The average savings rate in Asia is 35% of GDP and Asia as a group has a total of about USD5 trillion in foreign reserves. Even if we invest 1% of this amount, the impact would be significant. With further liberalisation of the financial sector and the capital account, and the increased linkages of the national payment systems in Asia, financial flows within the region is envisaged to increase. This trend is reinforced by the increased presence of regional institutions in the individual countries’ domestic financial systems and Asia’ s favourable economic prospects and the increasingly more developed and sophisticated financial markets. This region has already experienced an increase in intra-Asian financial flows. One should expect that given the uneven growth paths across economies in the next few years, issuances out of the emerging economies, in particular Asia, will also likely assume greater importance as an asset class. The greater variety of asset classes would contribute to the stability of the international financial system. It will also provide a wider range of options for investors and borrowers and thus, contribute to a more efficient allocation of financial resources across borders.