samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A balanced policy approach As I weigh the evidence, I believe we are in a liquidity trap and favor the prescription of continued accommodation. But I recognize that I could be wrong. Central bankers have incomplete information, and sometimes are confronted with very different views of the forces driving the economy. This is especially true in the difficult circumstances we currently face. Instead of a liquidity trap, some have posited that we are in an economic malaise that reflects “structural factors” (such as a job skills mismatch) and that the economy today is actually functioning close to a new, more dismal productive capacity. I have discussed this very pessimistic “structural impediments scenario” in other forums.1 If this scenario is true, then further monetary accommodation will only lead to rising inflation without much improvement in unemployment. Those subscribing to this view warn of repeating the mistakes of the 1970s. At that time, the Fed did not understand that the changing structure of the economy had caused the natural rate of unemployment to rise. Too much accommodation during that time only served to raise inflation and inflation expectations. Although I do not find this structural impediments scenario compelling, as a prudent policymaker, I must at least consider its possibility. Without a clearer picture of whether we are in the midst of structural change or a liquidity trap, I favor a monetary policy strategy that balances the two risks of dismally slow growth on the one hand and creeping inflation on the other.

Earlier this week, the Central Bank published a report on Iceland’s underlying external position, in which it addresses the question of whether Iceland is facing a debt sustainability problem or a balance of payments problem as I have just defined them. But in order to answer that question, it is necessary to peer through the settlement of the estates resulting from the financial crisis – a process that is nowhere near completion – and correct for the effects of certain international corporations operating in this country. These companies have a profound effect on Iceland’s international investment position as measured according to international standards, but they would have a negligible impact on the state of the domestic economy if they defaulted on their debt. As a result, the task requires a great deal of estimation and entails some uncertainty, as previous findings have shown. The estimates are now more reliable than before, however, as time has clarified a number of factors concerning the failed banks’ estates and analysts have now gained access to the best available data. The results are the same as in previous appraisals, however, in that there are no signs of a debt sustainability problem as I have just defined it. Iceland’s net underlying debt position is estimated at 60% of GDP, the lowest since 1999. Furthermore, it is lower than that of many countries that no one would claim faced a sustainability problem. New Zealand’s net debt position, for instance, has hovered around 80% for more than one decade.
Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson: Review of economic development in Iceland during 2002 Address by Mr Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the Bank’s annual meeting, Reykjavík, 21 March 2003. *  *  *  On behalf of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland I welcome you all to the Bank’s nd 42 annual meeting. The Bank’s financial statements for the year 2002 have been ratified today by the Prime Minister. The Bank’s annual report has also been published. It includes a survey of the Bank’s activities and performance, along with a detailed report on the Bank’s monetary policy and actions, the financial system, financial stability and the financial markets, and the main features of economic developments in the course of last year. The year 2002 was the first full year after new legislation on the Bank was passed and it moved onto an inflation target with a joint declaration by the Government and the Central Bank in 2001. The number of countries that have adopted an inflation target for their monetary policy implementation has increased sharply after New Zealand introduced such a policy in February 1990. In all, 21 countries have now moved onto a formal inflation target, including Canada, the UK, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Australia. The chief characteristic of this arrangement is that price stability is the main objective of monetary policy.

But on this, we need to be clear that the strength of the dollar is a global phenomenon – not just a Malaysian one. In fact, the US dollar is now at a two decade high[1] due to aggressive tightening of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve which increased its policy rate by 300 bps this year. Risk-off sentiments arising from geopolitical conflict and a moderating global growth outlook have further increased demand for dollar assets. 14. Like most countries in the world and around this region, the ringgit has not been spared. The currencies of other major economies have also depreciated against the US dollar. If we also look at how the ringgit has fared against the currencies of our trading partners, it has appreciated against some and depreciated against others. In fact, the performance of the ringgit, if weighed against the currencies of Malaysia’s trading partners have been relatively stable. This underlines the point that we are in an environment of US dollar strength. 15. It is also important to emphasise that the ringgit’s performance against the US dollar alone is not a reflection of the state of the economy. The exchange rate is only one indicator among many. Like I said at the start, it is important to consider the strength and positive performance of the Malaysian economy. Growth is robust, the labour market is healthy and the financial system is resilient and continues to perform its role effectively.
Indeed, a lot of work has been conducted on this issue by market participants - and I know that ISMA has been a driving force in this regard - as well as by the public authorities at the European level. To a large extent, it should find its way into the directive on collateral that the European commission is about to propose to facilitate the cross-border collateralisation technique. •  As regards more specifically securities markets, the cross-border circulation and settlement of securities needs to be further enhanced. One can expect the consolidation process that is taking place among securities settlement systems (SSSs) to improve eventually the ability of market participants to move securities efficiently at lower costs across the euro zone. •  Similar remarks can be made regarding stock markets. Confronted with fierce competition coming from new entrants, our traditional stock exchanges are implementing major changes. The introduction of the euro has been a catalyst which added another strong incentive for the rationalization of all the existing market structures. These tremendous changes, perhaps we could even call them a revolution, have been sped up by the never ending improvements in technology. Indeed, the technology revolution is transforming not only the architecture of stock markets, but also the organization of bond markets. It impacts the way intermediaries and investors conduct their business. The outcome of the changes brought about by these developments are not yet well known.

This has largely contributed to the emergence of an environment favorable to price stability and low unit production costs, strengthening the competitiveness of our European economy. Finally, all countries have experienced significant fiscal consolidation in the 1990s Enhanced European performances are also evidenced by the significant fiscal consolidation pursued in Europe in the 1990s. The general government deficit for the euro area fell by 3.5 percentage points between 1993 and 1997 and was brought back below the 3% threshold. Since then, deficits have continued to fall. The most recent data point to a public deficit of 1.2% of GDP for the euro area in 1999, down from 2.0% in 1998. Four countries of the euro area have managed to achieve a fiscal surplus since 1999. The fact that European member states have made significant efforts in order to improve their public finances does not mean that the process of fiscal consolidation is over. In fact, some member states, including France, still have some way to go to meet the Stability and Growth Pact goal of budget positions which are close to balance or in surplus. In addition, there is a need to further reduce government debt levels, which remained above 70% of GDP for the euro area.
Nothing could stem the tide of changes in technology and in tastes for new lighter - foreign beers, and attempts by government through higher excise duties to reduce the consumption of beer. A willingness to adapt and embrace, rather than resist, change is the key to greater prosperity. That road may at times be hard going - as I know many of you will have experienced in your own businesses but it leads ultimately to a more prosperous destination. To follow the right road we need signposts. In a market economy those signposts are movements in prices. If a particular product becomes more abundant or less in demand, its price will fall relative to the prices of other products. That relative price change is the signal which encourages consumers to buy more or producers to supply less. Over recent years, three new signposts have appeared. They mark a process that has transformed demand and supply conditions across the globe: the integration of China, India and other emerging market economies into the world trading system. The first signpost shows that prices of labour-intensive manufactured goods have fallen. China, India and the former Soviet Union between them have massively increased the supply of labour available to industry around the world. As labour-intensive goods have become more abundant, they have also become cheaper. The signpost points us in a familiar direction: the need to change what we produce.

Were we still producing the same labour-intensive goods as before, with output concentrated in industries like agriculture (including hops), textiles, coal-mining and ship-building, we too would have seen the price of our own output fall, just as it did for hop growers a century ago. Instead we allowed output and employment to expand in those industries where we could exploit a comparative advantage. In Kent, the expanding sectors include financial services, transport (with 18 million tons of freight passing through the Channel Tunnel each year) the exploitation of life sciences, and higher education (with five universities in the county). As consumers, we have benefited from falling prices of goods made in China and elsewhere in Asia. Between 1995 and 2005, the prices of imported manufactured goods fell by a sixth and, relative to the price of domestically produced output, by no less than a third. So over the past decade we have been able to increase consumption by more than the increase in production. Openness to the world economy has resulted in a higher standard of living. The second signpost marks the rise in oil and other commodity prices. Rapid growth of production in China, India and other newly integrated economies has led to a substantial rise in the demand for oil and other raw materials. Between 1995 and 2004, net imports of oil to China rose by a factor of seven.
Urban Bäckström: Perspective on the inflation target Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, to the Swedish Economics Association, Stockholm, 17 April 2002. In the work on this paper I have been greatly assisted by Claes Berg, Anders Borg, Jörgen Eklund, Staffan Viotti and Anders Vredin. I am also grateful for valuable comments from members of the Executive Board and other colleagues at the Riksbank. At the same time, I am solely responsible for any remaining errors and shortcomings, as well as for the opinions expressed here. The references for the speech can be found on the Sveriges Riksbank’s website. *  *  *  First I want to express my thanks for the invitation to attend your Association and discuss various aspects of the Riksbank’s assignment. I truly look forward, in keeping with recent years, to a dialogue on economic policy issues both with my two opponents and with other scholars and students in this Association. The theme for today’s discussion, “Perspective on the Inflation Target”, has led me to take the past year’s increase in the rate of inflation as my starting point. To many forecasters, including those of us at the Riksbank, the increase has come as a surprise. This may raise questions about the intellectual framework, which rests on forecasts, for monetary policy’s formation.

We will also provide a detailed picture of access to digital banking services in Spain and recent developments in this area. Lastly, we will conduct a review of the action taken to combat financial exclusion nationally and internationally, which may prove a good platform for future actions in our country. To conclude, I would simply like to thank again the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministry for their efforts to address this problem. And the banking associations for their agile and swift response in drafting and signing this protocol. And, of course, I would like to thank the individuals who have made us more aware of the problem and whose actions have prompted this rapid response. I believe that we should all aim to ensure that Spain continues to take the lead on financial inclusion in the digital era, as it has always done. And I would like to add that the Banco de España is firmly committed to this goal and that we will do everything within our power to attain it. Thank you very much. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
8  See the box on page 5 of the July 2010 Agents’ summary of business conditions, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/agentssummary/agsum10jul.pdf  BIS Review 122/2010  5  But it may also reflect the nature of this recession. Speak to almost any businessperson and they will tell you the same story: to be successful, businesses need healthy cash flow. Cash is king. That has always been the case. But one consequence of the financial crisis – as the availability of bank financed tightened and trade credit dried up – is that the importance placed on maintaining cash flows increased. Companies were less able to trade-off lower selling prices today for future gains in market share. 9 Inflation expectations The final factor emphasised by the pricing model is inflation expectations. The importance of inflation expectations is well understood. If wage and price setters expect the MPC to keep inflation close to target for much of the time, this will be reflected in their behaviour which, in turn, will help keep inflation close to target. Successful policy and anchored inflation expectations are self-reinforcing. A significant risk associated with the recent period of above-target inflation is that it causes inflation expectations to become less well anchored. The dangerous talk may start to be believed. If so, temporary deviations in inflation would tend to be given greater weight in wage and price setting and so become more persistent. And the task of monetary policy would become substantially harder.

It is difficult to know exactly how much spare capacity there is in the economy and what its precise impact is on inflation. But that there remains some slack in the economy and this is likely to be pushing down on costs and prices seems clear. That impact should become more apparent as the temporary effects associated with the shocks to input prices and VAT wane. It is perhaps noteworthy that in the US and euro area, which have not experienced falls in their exchange rates or large movements in indirect taxes, core inflation has weakened substantially. The downside risks to the growth outlook, stemming in particular from the substantial fiscal consolidation now in train and the continuing constraints on the supply of bank lending, add materially to the downside risks to inflation. And even if the economic recovery does continue, it is possible that some of the factors that may have contributed to the surprising strength in inflation in the past may start to fade. As demand increases, companies may begin to bring mothballed capacity back on stream. And as firms build up their cash balances and credit becomes more available, margins may start to fall as companies seek to enter new markets and gain new customers. The risks to the inflation target are real and substantial. The job of monetary policy is to try to balance these upside and downside risks to inflation. In essence this is no different to normal, monetary policy is always faced with a balancing act.
For the past decade, average productivity growth has been negative. This is unusual, if not unique, historically. You would have to go right back to the th  18 century to see a similarly lengthy period of stagnant productivity. Global Productivity Trends  If UK productivity patterns are unusual relative to the past, how unusual are they relative to other countries? To assess that, I draw on a panel of around 116 countries, advanced and emerging, going back to 1950, using data from the Penn World Tables. 36  Chart 7 plots average TFP growth across the whole sample of  countries, while Chart 8 does so separately for advanced and emerging economies. Several interesting features emerge. First, the slowdown of productivity growth has clearly been a global phenomenon, not a UK-specific one. From 1950 to 1970, median global productivity growth averaged 1.9% per year. Since 1980, it has averaged 0.3% per year. Whatever is driving the productivity puzzle, it has global rather than local roots. 34 35 36  Helpman et al (1998). Comin and Mestieri (2014). Feenstra et al (2015). 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  Second, this global productivity slowdown is clearly not a recent phenomenon. It appears to have started in many advanced countries in the 1970s. 37  Certainly, the productivity puzzle is not something which has  emerged since the global financial crisis, though it seems the crisis has amplified pre-existing trends.

25  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  25  Chart 10: Distribution of productivity levels across 44 countries relative to the US  Source: Penn World Tables 9.0 and Bank calculations. Notes: Median TFP level at current PPPs; US TFL level = 1; sample of 44 countries. Chart 11: Productivity level relative to the US, by region  Source: Penn World Tables 9.0 and Bank calculations. Notes: Median TFP level at current PPPs; USA = 1. 26  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  26  Chart 12 – Convergence coefficient  Source: Penn World Tables 9.0 and Bank calculations. Notes: The coefficient can be interpreted as follows: for every 10ppt TFP gap compared to the US, TFP growth is x percentage points faster than in the US. Chart 13: Productivity across sectors  Source: ONS and Bank calculations. 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  Table 2: Contributions to annual labour productivity growth  Source: ONS and Bank calculations. Chart 14: The standard deviation of productivity across industries  Source: EUKlems productivity database, ONS and Bank calculations. Notes: The chart excludes the mining & extraction, energy and real estate industries. 28  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  28  Chart 15: The variance of productivity within and across industries  Source: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations. Notes: This work contains statistical data from the ONS which is Crown Copyright.
All these measures for the support and restructuring of the financial system have proven technically correct, they are well adjusted to Spain’s situation, and they were rapidly designed and approved with broad consensus. Certainly, such characteristics should be applied to other areas so needy of reform, such as the rebalancing of public finances and certain labour market institutions. The need for restructuring has been understood by most of the banks that required this to ensure their viability and soundness in the future, and they have reacted by working on various integration processes. In previous talks I explained the criteria used by the legislator for these processes, and which are those that should prevail: the sufficient reduction of capacity, the soundness of the resulting banks and the minimal use of public funds. These should be the goals both of banks themselves and of all the public authorities intervening in the process. BIS Review 51/2010  1  Along with restructuring, my recent speeches on the financial system have focused on a matter I consider, unquestionably, to be the biggest risk hanging over Spanish credit institutions, especially the least diversified ones: mass unemployment. Unless a reform of our labour institutions that tackles this most serious and most Spanish problem with resolve is approved promptly and with the widest possible consensus, many of our credit institutions will suffer the consequences: more bad debts, less business, higher public indebtedness and, consequently, dearer wholesale funding, etc.

For the institutions that are socially responsible and work for the benefit of all citizens, the most important indicator for measuring the success in achieving their strategic goals, is the quality of the policies. One of the biggest and toughest tasks of the HRM function, is probably managing the knowledge and building the expertise of intellectual force of the institution, through continuous training and professional development. In order to be effective, organisations must be able to understand that human capital alone will not create value. People have to be motivated and managed by the use of good human resource practices and given the opportunity to develop and use their skills to create valuable goods and services. If the knowledge cannot be embedded in goods and services that are in demand, then this human capital will have no value to the organization. I hope that this workshop will contribute for creating better environment for capacity building in all our countries in the region. Also, it is my strong belief, that this meeting of the coordinators, apart from being useful for exchange of information in the process of prioritizing and creating the future visionary training programmes, will lead to strengthening of the regional cooperation among national authorities. Let me finish my address by quoting Mr. Gary Matthews, Consultant with UK Government’s Investors in People, which I believe reflects the actual economic rationale of training and development of human capital: “People are the only asset that appreciates, through training and development. All other assets depreciate”.