samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Mugur Isărescu: Unconventional monetary policies and financial stability – implications for banks and financial markets Address by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the joint CIGI (Centre for International Governance Innovation) – Oliver Wyman conference, Rome, 15 December 2015. *  *  *  The address was presented by Governor Mugur Isărescu during the panel session “Unconventional monetary policies and their impact on financial markets”, which also included the following members: • • • • • •  Domenico Lombardi, Director of the Global Economy Program, CIGI Malcolm Knight, Distinguished Fellow, CIGI (former General Manager of the BIS) Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi, Chairman, Société Générale (former Vice-President of the ECB) Lorenzo Codogno – Professor in Practice European Institute, LES Pierpaolo Benigno, Professor of Economics, LUISS University Carlotta de Franceschi, Co-Founder and President, Action Institute  Participants included, among others: • • • • • • •  Robert Ophèle, Deputy Governor, Banque de France Dimitar Bogov, Governor, National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia Korbinian Ibel, Director General, Micro-Prudential Supervision IV, ECB Margarita Delgado, Deputy Director General, SSM, DG1, ECB Matthew Elderfield, Head of Compliance, Lloyds Bank Carlo Corradini, Member of the Supervisory Board, Intesa Sanpaolo Pierre Siklos, Senior Fellow, CIGI  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour for me to address the audience during this conference on unconventional monetary policies.

But probably the most striking unconventional feature of our monetary policy back then was the active recourse to reserve requirements, the rates of which were increased to levels exceeding by far those of any other central bank in the EU: 20 and 40 percent for lei- and forex-denominated liabilities respectively in 2006. However, taking into account that studies published even before 2006 considered the pure IT framework as not necessarily the most suitable for an emerging economy, one might think that the NBR’s departure from the mainstream was less significant. Specifically, the NBR opted for  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  a “light” version of inflation targeting, which meant retaining the managed float feature of the exchange rate regime, which implied smoothing out excessive volatility, without defending a certain level of the exchange rate or preannouncing interventions. The actual form inflation targeting took in Romania thus matched the “managed-floating plus” concept introduced by Goldstein in 2002, considered the most suitable choice for an emergingmarket economy involved in the global capital market, as it combines the managed float part with an inflation targeting monetary policy strategy and an active pursuit of measures to limit the degree of currency mismatches in the economy. Subsequently, this “managed-floating plus” approach gained acceptance, especially during the global crisis, and now forex interventions are part of the arsenal of many central banks, including some of those using a free floating regime before the crisis. 3. Did markets and banks react to the departure from the paradigm?
We strive to keep up with new forms of communication, making us active on social networks by posting the the latest data in real time, addressing key changes and visualizing trends, making information available to more target groups. One of the aspects of enhancing our communication in this segment are certainly these regular meetings with you, as a platform where certain more complex statistical concepts can be openly discussed thus giving them analytical feature. During this year, there has been a trend where most of the media publish our latest statistical immediately after our release, which contributes to keeping the public informed on time. At the same time, the number of your articles related to central bank statistics more than doubled this year compared to last year, and even more compared to 2017, further increasing the their availability to all users. Since we have been publishing regular statistical releases, the number of visits to our website has increased, indicating that users are actively using these releases as a source of information. I have to mention that we are constantly and actively presenting the statistical data to the public in an indirect way, as well. They are the basis of our analytical infrastructure and decision-making. Therefore, in our monthly press releases, in which we inform on the monetary decisions, we refer to several statistical dimensions that we produce – for example monetary statistics, external statistics and banking system data. In our regular publications, analytically and in a consistent context, we talk about about economics through statistical data.

There are no insolvency laws or bankruptcy forum to address sovereign solvency problems, and IMF attempts to do so during the last decade failed, for several reasons. What is clear is that in the case of an insolvent sovereign, further official finance can only be provided when that sovereign restructures its debts and, at the same time, undertakes serious and credible domestic fiscal adjustment and structural economic reforms.5  3  See US Treasury Secretary Rubin, 1998. 4  The results of the simulations have to be viewed with caution since they are sensitive to the quality of the underlying data and the assumptions used in the exercise. 5  See, for instance, Roubini, 2002. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The third feature that generally sets sovereign and corporate debt workouts apart is the externalities they may generate. A debt restructuring of a sovereign may have severe implications, both for the debtor’s and the creditor’s economies. Most of the experience in this area has involved less developed countries. In these cases private sector involvement has largely been a concern for foreign creditors. Taxpayers in creditor countries were affected, depending on the size of the exposure of their respective financial system and on whether the soundness of that system was jeopardised. Measures have been used in the past to try to reduce this impact, in particular through regulatory forbearance. One example is the prudential measures which, during the 1980s, permitted US banks to book Brady bonds at their nominal value.
Percent of global GDP. 1975 – 2017 70 60  70  Trade in goods Trade in services  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0 1975  0 1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  1) Trade is defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services. Source: World Bank  A more closely interwoven world economy has facilitated specialisation, innovation and better use of local comparative advantages. The room for exchanging ideas and knowledge has expanded. Increased competition and innovation have gone hand in hand. Efficient global trade is particularly advantageous for small open economies, like Norway. Norway has benefitted greatly from the opportunities afforded by trade with other countries. 3  It is almost impossible to imagine today’s welfare level without the specialisation brought about thanks to a world of open borders. Norway exports a limited range of goods and services to the world market (Chart 2). This allows Norway to finance imports of numerous finished goods, which are cheaper than if we had manufactured them at home. Labour is thereby freed up for use in education, health and other services. NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  Chart 2 Exchange of goods gives Norway opportunities. Trade in goods. In billions of NOK.

Trends that now appear to be leading us in the wrong direction can change course. NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  My successor announced that the next generation of central bank digital currency would be managed by artificial intelligence. That is not likely to happen. The responsibility for the monetary system cannot be relegated to models and algorithms. The choices we make as a central bank must be based on thorough analyses, discussions and human judgement. Come what may. 16
Stefan Ingves: Housing and monetary policy – a view from an inflation targeting central bank Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 1 September 2007. *  *  *  I am honoured to have been asked to participate in this final panel debate in such distinguished company. What I intend to bring to this panel is an account of how Sveriges Riksbank, an inflation targeting central bank, takes into consideration developments in asset prices, house prices in particular, and our experience thus far of doing so. Hopefully this account will be of interest, since it illustrates some of the challenges – analytical and pedagogical – that policy makers face when deciding on the appropriate way of bringing asset price developments into monetary policy decisions making. In going through events in the past few years I will also touch on the criticism that the Riksbank has received from various directions – members of the public in Sweden, financial market participants, and from some members of academia. As a matter of fact, some of the criticism levelled at the Executive Board has come from within the Bank, i.e. from members of the staff. As I will elaborate below, this reflects that there are no simple answers to the question of what the proper role is for house prices in an inflation targeting framework.

As I mentioned, one of the core objectives of supervision and regulation is to support resilience in supervised firms so that they can contribute to the sustained provision of credit and other financial services. We strive to do that in the most effective and efficient manner possible. I mentioned just a few examples of our work in this area, and I look forward to continued dialogue on this key topic. Conclusions We at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Federal Reserve System have a strong interest in understanding the issues facing community banks and ensuring that they continue to play their critical role in the U.S. financial system. We hope that today’s conference sparks an informative discussion around many of those issues. 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  I’ll conclude by noting that this conference is just one of several initiatives to encourage communication and outreach with the industry. The Federal Reserve Board also has initiated numerous industry outreach opportunities to provide resources on key supervisory policies, including the development of two programs—"Outlook Live” and “Ask the Fed"—as well as the publication of three newsletters—Community Banking Connections, Consumer Compliance Outlook, and FedLinks. We hope you are able to utilize these resources, and our team will be happy to provide instructions on how you can subscribe to them. Thank you for joining our conference today; I hope you will find today’s presentations useful and informative. 1 FDIC Community Banking Study (December 2012). 2 A Perspective on Supervisory Objectives and Trade-offs, February 23, 2017.
showroomprivé.com, France’s second largest flash sale web retailer, which has accepted bitcoins since 2014]. Second, as intermediaries in exchanges, crypto-assets are far less effective than a currency with legal tender status, insofar as (i) their price volatility makes it hard to use them as a means of payment, (ii) they generate transaction fees that are far too high for simple retail transactions, and (iii) they offer no guarantee of a refund in the event of fraud. Third, the fact that they have no intrinsic value means that they cannot be used to create trustworthy stores of value. In addition, crypto-assets may be conduits for financial risk, security risk and especially risks of cyber-attacks, money laundering and terrorist financing. These would represent major risks for users and hence for the orderly functioning of our payment system if crypto-assets were ever to play a major role in that system. II- In this complicated context, with crypto-assets undergoing technical and economic trials that offer opportunities but also present material risks for our payment system, should we consider establishing a regulatory framework and supervisory approach and, if so, how should we go about this? 1) Various courses of action are available to the public authorities. The first would be to ignore crypto-assets. But even if the volumes in play remain small and do not represent a threat to financial stability, the risks that I mentioned earlier must be addressed. The second course of action would be to ban crypto-assets outright because of these same risks.

The distribution of the government's financial investments and the choice of corporate funding structure should not be based on the notion that we are living in a barter economy. The government can choose the composition, required rate of return and risk profile for its financial investments without regard for the funding requirements of Norwegian enterprises. By the same token, Norwegian companies can choose their debt and equity structure independently of the government's financial investments. Both mainland private saving and business fixed investment have been high in recent years. Thus a possible weak capital market has not been reflected in a low level of investment and saving. As a result of developments in the late 1990s, equities and funds make up an increasing share of 1 households’ total assets. The equity ratio of enterprises strengthened in the 1990s, with a rise in new equity capital from the markets in particular. 1  Norwegian limited companies excluding petroleum companies, financial undertakings and government activities, and groups and holding companies. 2  BIS Review 18/2002  The Norwegian loan and capital market probably has weaknesses nevertheless, with thin securities markets and little breadth in investor and owner environments compared with some other countries. The reasons, and hence the solutions, can probably be found in the structure of the taxation of dwellings, property and financial assets, in a high level of government ownership of enterprises and in the organisation of pension saving in Norway.
Regulation must not stifle markets but seek to make them work better. In the financial sector, this means a judicious mix of rules and incentives for stronger capitalisation, more effective risk management, better transparency, and sharper market discipline. This has been central to the approach taken by the Monetary Authority of Singapore – never hesitating to impose high standards of prudence and financial discipline but always careful to do so in a manner that does not undermine enterprise and innovation. 11. Financial innovation – especially in derivative products – has been blamed as a cause of the crisis. This is not quite correct. Innovation has been a feature of finance for decades. The crisis was caused fundamentally by failures in macroeconomic policies and financial supervision. Monetary policy was too easy for too long in too many countries. This led to low interest rates and lax lending standards that precipitated unsustainable housing booms, mainly in the United States but also in other countries. Financial supervision failed to detect and correct the build-up of leverage in the system, especially in the shadow banking sector. Complex financial products obscured the risks in sub-prime lending and transmitted these risks across the financial sector. As Edwin Truman from the Petersen Institute puts it, “Financial engineering contributed to the market dynamics once the crisis got underway, but it was not ‘the cause’ of the crisis.” 12. Regulation should therefore not restrict financial innovation but seek to create conditions in the market that promote effective risk management.

European Central Bank: Press Conference - introductory statement  Introductory statement by Mr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the Press Conference, held in Frankfurt, on 2 November 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are here to report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. The Governing Council conducted its regular examination of monetary and economic developments and their implications for the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. It decided to leave the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem unchanged at 4.75%. The interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility were also kept unchanged at 5.75% and 3.75% respectively. Starting with the first pillar of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB, the three-month average of annual M3 growth stood at 5.4% in the period from June to September 2000, unchanged from the three-month period ending in August 2000. While remaining above the reference value of 4½%, M3 growth, reflecting the increases in ECB interest rates since November 1999, has shown signs of moderation over recent months. A further factor to be taken into account is the fact that the growth rate of credit to the private sector increased to 10.8% in September. However, this was influenced by the financing of payments for UMTS licences.
11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  And regimes that enable systemic banks to be stabilised if they fail, so that they can be resolved in an orderly way without disrupting critical economic functions will reduce the cost of such failures to the real economy. There is still significant work to do to implement fully the resolution regime, domestically and internationally. And resolving a failing bank will never be a simple or painfree exercise. But, as the Purple Book and recent experiences in a number of jurisdictions show, we increasingly have available to us options that we did not have 10 years ago which will contribute to a safer and stronger financial  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12

Eddie Yue: Structural reforms needed to improve Asia’s economies Statement by Mr Eddie Yue, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and Head of Delegation, Hong Kong, for the 47th Asian Development Bank Annual Meeting, Astana, Kazakhstan, 4–5 May 2014. *  *  *  I would like to express my gratitude to the Government of Kazakhstan for hosting the 47th Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the people of Kazakhstan for their hospitality. I would also like to thank the Management and staff of ADB for the excellent organisation of the event. Since the last ADB Annual Meeting, we have seen a modest and uneven global recovery, with the advanced economies showing a pickup in economic activities while emerging market economies (EMEs) generally experiencing a moderation in growth. Financial markets have turned more volatile in response to the changing pattern of global growth and expectations of a turning point in US monetary policy, and a number of EMEs have seen a sharp reversal of capital flows. Regional economies have remained relatively resilient in the recent bouts of financial market volatility, thanks mainly to the stronger fundamentals of the region nowadays. Since the Asian financial crisis, many regional economies have implemented reforms to improve their macroeconomic management and fiscal positions, built up foreign reserves and strengthened their financial sectors.
After this the meeting, market focus has been transferred to the governments in Spain and Italy, to their attitudes to seeking assistance from the EFSF and to the conditions to which the countries would then be subjected. Assessment of Greece’s savings measures in September Greece, Ireland and Portugal already have relief programmes set up and at the end of June Cyprus also applied for assistance. Representatives of the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB – the so-called troika – visited Greece during the summer to inspect whether Greece had made sufficient progress in its savings measures to meet the requirements for the next payment in the programme. The goal is a savings package of EUR 11.5 billion, which is to be implemented in 2013 and 2014. The troika has announced that it will conclude its inspection of Greece’s progress in September. It appears that Greek funding until the next payment will be secured through new issues of treasury bills. The importance of reliable reference rates Crisis management in the euro area has of course been a fairly central issue during the summer. Another news item that has attracted a lot of attention is the revelation of manipulation of the international interbank rate, Libor. Confidence in international banks received a further blow when it was revealed that several banks had been involved in providing incorrect interest rate data as a basis for calculating the daily Libor.

The objective of the Monetary Policy Council is that the increase in prices, as measured by the consumer price index, should not exceed 2% in 1997. as in the medium term. 2. To meet this ultimate goal, the Banque de France uses two intermediate objectives, one of which is external and the other internal: -  The objective of a stable external value of the currency: as it has been for ten years, the stability of the franc will be maintained against the group of the most credible currencies in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. -  An intermediate internal growth target for the money supply assessed by the development of the narrow and broad monetary aggregates: in 1997, the money supply should be able to show a medium-term growth trend of 5%. This figure is consistent with price inflation of no more than 2% and non-inflationary real GDP growth of about 2.5%, which could be exceeded, in view of the potential for growth to catch up in the medium term. The Monetary Policy Council has decided to simultaneously BIS Review 2/1997  -4-  monitor the main narrow and broad money aggregates in order to obtain a concise estimate of all monetary developments. 3. Total domestic debt is an important indicator. It helps the Banque de France make sure that the economy is supplied with enough financing to grow, and it enables us to track developments in financing for businesses, households and general government simultaneously.