samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
By contrast, the outstanding volume in SNB USD Bills – launched in February 2009 to refinance the SNB loan to the StabFund – is already at USD 15 billion. In addition to these short-term financing operations, the SNB concluded long-term deposit transactions amounting to USD 4 billion. We plan to further reduce the use of the swap facility with the Federal Reserve. Risks The risks facing the SNB as a result of its commitment in the StabFund are substantial, yet owing to the bank’s strong balance sheet, these risks can be absorbed. I would particularly like to emphasise that the SNB’s commitment is actually considerably lower than the USD 60 billion which still gets quoted by the public quite often. The SNB does not consider its loan to the stabilisation fund as a hindrance – either to its risk capability or its monetary policy latitude. The unconventional measures also pose additional risks to the SNB’s balance sheet in the form of interest rate, currency and credit risks. However, our analyses show that, in terms of the consolidated balance sheet, these risks are relatively low. BIS Review 77/2009  3  The SNB is well aware of the fact that the unconventional monetary policy measures pose not only balance sheet risks, but also a whole series of other risks, including the difficulties connected with correctly assessing the monetary policy impact and with finding the best way to phase out the unconventional measures.

Financial System Risks in the UK – Issues and Challenges (John Gieve) (July 2006) www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2006/speech280.pdf . BIS Review 81/2007  1  To deliver these objectives effectively, the aim is also to use a rigorous and consistent analytical framework which integrates behavioural responses, interactions and feedback effects, to ensure that the system-wide implications are fully captured 5 So where is current practice against that ideal? A typical or traditional “macro” stress test has the stylised form set out in Chart A. The first stage is to put together a coherent stress scenario, typically using a macro-econometric model (which may include some assumed endogenous policy response). By mapping important propagation channels, an estimate of likely financial sector credit losses is produced; for example, by modelling the impact of the macro stress on corporate and household balance sheets and gauging the consequent impact on the probability of default and likely recovery rate on banks’ credit exposures. Market losses are estimated by judging the impact of the macro stress on different asset classes. Total bank losses are calculated by aggregating credit and market losses, perhaps including an additional allowance for the impact of the stress scenario on net interest income and on funding costs.
Therefore, concluding that real income developments before the onset of the crisis were in line with unconditional convergence theory would simply be spurious. Since the onset of the crisis positive income convergence trends were first reversed in many of the countries in the region and, when convergence reappeared, its pace was significantly slower 3  than at the beginning of the 2000s. At the current pace of convergence, most countries in the region would need decades to reach German, Austrian or Swedish levels of income, countries that are often referred to as the benchmark for the CEE region. Which, in a way, brings us to the notion of conditional convergence. The theory of conditional convergence implies that if there are persistent differences across countries in preferences and other institutional features, divergence is possible in terms of both levels of income and growth rates. And the last crisis has reminded us of this quite roughly. Just take a look at the countries of Europe's periphery. The average level of income of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal in 2016 was only at around 67% of the German income, compared to 80% at the beginning of the millennium. Similarly, in Croatia, Slovenia or, to a lesser extent, also the Czech Republic, the relative level of income in 2016 was lower than in 2008. Therefore, growth and convergence can be held back for a protracted period of time before they reappear, or forces can even work in an opposite direction, leading to divergence.

If quality of institutions is proxied by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicator (which includes six broad dimensions of governance: Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, Voice and Accountability, and Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism), there has hardly been any convergence of the CEE region towards Germany. Notable exception are the Baltic countries where we have seen positive developments also in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. A very similar conclusion can be drawn when looking at the human capital quality, not only that the CESEE countries lag substantially behind the EU countries that achieve the best results in PISA tests in Math and Science (Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Germany), but the developments over time are also not encouraging as in many countries the results actually worsened during the last decade. So, one can raise the question of how did we manage to  6  converge at a relatively high pace before the crisis, or why convergence continues, with such institutions and human capital? On one side, such developments are worrisome, but, on the other, they give us the opportunity to streamline reforms. Gains from reforms can be substantial. The European Commission estimated that structural reforms that close only half the gap with best performers in different areas (market competition and regulation, R&D expenditure, skill structure, tax structure, labour market participation, unemployment benefit ‘generosity’ and active labour market policies), which is not overambitious, could have significant macroeconomic effects.
The development of new technologies and the appearance of new tools, aimed at making the “customer experience” more fluid or attractive, must also take into account the cardinal principle of consumer protection. This is also a necessary condition for new sustainable and robust economic models to emerge. These areas are currently the main focus of the national and European authorities and the ACPR stands ready to play a full role, drawing on its experience and the dialogue it engages in with the stakeholders. Let me now hand the floor to Patrick Montagner and to the ACPR staff to elaborate on a number of these aspects and I wish you an excellent conference. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

After his death, Collett’s heirs insisted on maintaining an extravagant lifestyle as if the income was still intact. Their wealth rapidly withered away and in 1829 the coffers were empty. The farm was taken over by the state. 1 The time it took Collett to make a fortune is about the same as it took Norway to build up its oil-based financial wealth. Nearly 40 years after Phillips Petroleum discovered commercially viable oil reserves in the Ekofisk field 2, we have an oil-based sovereign wealth fund worth more than NOK 3 trillion. Few other countries are sitting on such huge financial reserves. But our wealth primarily comes from other sources than the oil fund, now called the Government Pension Fund Global. The value of our current and future labour resources is more than ten times as great as the value of our oil and the oil fund combined. 3 The oil fund would be depleted in three years if government tax revenues were to disappear entirely. Our economic future depends above all on our capacity to produce goods and services that others value. But the visible oil revenues may give the impression that we have a huge treasure trove at our disposal. Sound wealth management is therefore first and foremost a question of maintaining and developing the value of our productive resources, particularly our labour resources. A nation that comes into a large fortune must make a number of choices and trade-offs. They can be considered from a legal, ethical or financial standpoint.
But few are.5 And FPS is not yet used for in-store or online purchases as the infrastructure required at the point of sale does not reliably exist in the UK.6 In these regards, the UK is still a long way behind countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands and India where users can make direct, free and real time bank-to-bank payments in stores and online with a text or a scan of a QR code.7 UK card payments are convenient and they are now the most popular means of payment, but they can cost between 0.5% and 2% of the total transaction value, and it can take three days for the merchant to receive their money.8  2  See: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/future-finance. ONS: Comparing “bricks and mortar” store sales with online retail sales (August 2018). 4 UK Finance: UK Payment Markets Summary (2019). 5 See: https://paym.co.uk/how-it-works/. 6 Particularly the soft infrastructure – such as rules around use and consumer protection. 7 In Sweden, Swish launched in 2012 by the six largest Swedish banks and connects bank accounts to mobile numbers, allowing money transfer in real time and eradicating the need for a card reader. In the Netherlands, iDEAL facilitates direct bank-to-bank payment for online purchases. India uses GooglePay technology to enable direct bank transfers through its Unified Payments Interface, a central platform which connects entities for real-time payment. 8 McKinsey research for Future of Finance Report; and UK Card Association Data.

Enable, Empower, Ensure: A New Finance for the New Economy Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London at the Mansion House, London 20 June 2019  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth and James Benford for their assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Julia Kowalski, Tom Mutton, Varun Paul, Simon Scorer, Oliver Thew and the Climate Hub team for their help with background research and analysis. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  New Economy – New Finance There’s a new economy emerging driven by changes in technology, demographics and the environment. This new economy requires a new finance. A new finance to serve the digital economy. A new finance with products that are more cost effective, better tailored, and more inclusive. A new finance to support the transition to a sustainable economy. A new finance that balances innovation with resilience. With its leadership in fintech and green finance, the UK private sector is creating the new finance, but your efforts will be more effective with the right conditions in which to innovate and the level playing fields on which to compete. New Finance - New Bank That’s why a new finance demands a new Bank of England. Our strategy is to enable innovation and to empower competition, while ensuring monetary and financial stability.
The third area in which more work is needed concerns information and advance planning. In recent years the Bank has been forcefully arguing the importance of information gathering to  BIS Review 157/2009  5  the government and FSA. In my experience resolution work is like icebergs – I don’t mean that in the sense that banks are about to hit them. It is like icebergs in the sense that a vast amount of the work done is beneath the surface, hidden from view. Because resolution is an invasive form of surgery, it requires a very large amount of information to be carried out safely. Moreover, the planning work has to be done quietly, out of sight in order to avoid fuelling the failure of the bank, and it needs to start well in advance of the actual resolution weekend. As the authority responsible for resolution operations, the Bank of England faces a tension. In the ideal world, we want to work closely with the management of the bank to plan a resolution, at a time when it remains a contingency option that management naturally wish to avoid. But we also have to avoid the sense that a bank is receiving the attention of the undertakers. A very important development here will be the production and maintenance of resolution plans, as part of the overall recovery and resolution plans, or living wills.

And at the other extreme are those who consider that the evidence available is not sufficiently conclusive as to do away with internal models, since, from their standpoint, the differences in RWAs would essentially be in response to the different levels of risk assumed under different business models. In our view at the Banco de España, risk sensitivity should continue to be at the heart of the capital framework: if a bank assumes more risk, more regulatory capital should be required of it. If this nexus were to disappear, there would then be a disconnect between the bank’s internal risk management and regulatory requirements; and perverse incentives might arise, potentially leading banks to take on greater risks than they could properly manage. That said, internal risk management models undoubtedly pose problems that need to be analysed and resolved. First, their growing complexity means there is a risk they may ultimately become black boxes accessible to only a handful of experts. Second, the elements integrated into models (such as probability of default or loss given default) are difficult to estimate, especially in certain cases characterised, for example, by the absence of sufficient data. And finally, given that the higher the risk calculated by the model, the greater the capital required, banks might be tempted to underestimate the risks in order to save on capital. To sum up, we believe it is necessary to continue to use the internal models, insofar as they provide for credible and consistent risk measurement.
We have been able to affect expectations for the following years through our communications. Other central banks that have not traditionally engaged in this type of communication have, as I mentioned earlier, experimented with different forms of rough ‘triggers’ of various kinds. The academic background to the concept is the insight that expectations of future policy rates are at least as important as their current level when it comes to affecting investment and consumption decisions. In normal cases, the central bank is assumed to be able to influence expectations satisfactorily through its systematic monetary policy. But when the policy rate reaches its lower bound, it is possible to communicate an intention to diverge from normal behaviour and keep the rate low for a longer period and thus substitute, to a certain extent, for an immediate policy rate cut. There has been, however, some discussion of how effective such communication actually is, particularly over longer horizons. 12 The Riksbank's method provides a more complete picture of how we see the situation and the development of the economy. But other ways of communicating about the future have their advantages. One variant of this is the state-contingent US approach: saying that the policy rate will not be raised until the outcome for inflation has reached 2 per cent. 13 In situations where the market does not share the Riksbank’s view of the development of inflation, the US way of communicating can provide more information than inflation and interest rate forecasts.

The global economic performance for 2006 has so far been favourable with a more balanced growth among the major economies, including in Japan and Europe . The world economy is however, facing an extended period of high energy prices and its consequent effects on inflation. Following these developments, interest rates have been raised in most economies. While risks are now emerging for a slower growth in a number of the major economies, growth in the Asian economies have continued to remain robust and resilient. This trend has not only increased Asia 's relative significance in the world economy but it has also contributed to a more balanced global growth. The Malaysian economy has benefited from this favourable external environment. Growth has been supported by both the strengthening exports performance that has be reinforced by strong domestic demand. Domestic demand also continues to be driven by the private sector as private consumption and investment have been an important source of growth. The continued expansion in private investment is particularly important in ensuring the long-term sustainability of the growth. BIS Review 76/2006  1  The focus of the monetary policy in this environment continues to be towards achieving macroeconomic stability. More recently, the higher energy costs have resulted in an increase in consumer prices. In this environment, interest rates have been raised three times. In May this year, a pause in this increase was announced. With limited evidence of demand induced inflation, the assessment is for inflation to moderate in the second half of this year.
But there are a number of strong indications that the ECB is not a relevant institution under the Climate Law. Let me explain why. The Climate Law does not contain many specific obligations. The law sets out a destination: climate neutrality. It does not tell us how to get there. How we do so will depend on environmental and economic policymaking. This is a Union competence the ECB does not have. There are further arguments that support this interpretation. If the ECB is deemed to be a relevant institution, then it would have to submit its policies to the Commission for assessment and the Commission would monitor progress. That would be a fundamental change to the ECB’s accountability framework. Under current law, the ECB is only directly accountable to the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors. [7] A final reason for this view is institutional. If the ECB were deemed to be a relevant institution within the meaning of the Climate Law, this would be an implicit acceptance that the Council of the EU and the Parliament could set additional objectives for the ECB through the ordinary legislative procedure. However, the ECB’s objectives are laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)[8], and their scope cannot be changed by secondary legislation. That would be a violation of the Treaty. Changing the ECB’s objectives requires a special procedure. The ECB is – it seems – not directly bound by the Climate Law. So, can we ignore it? Not at all.

The introduction of a European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change promotes the idea that all policies should be based on up-to-date scientific insights. It is hard to overstate the importance of the Climate Law. The EU is setting the bar high. Allow me to quote what the law says about the transition to climate neutrality. It “requires changes across the entire policy  spectrum and a collective effort of all sectors of the economy and society […] all relevant Union legislation and policies need to be consistent with, and contribute to, the fulfilment of the climate-neutrality objective while respecting a level playing field”[4]. We are starting to see this happen. From housing to energy and from transport to finance, the EU is introducing reforms to put Europe on track to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. So how will the Climate Law affect the ECB? For me, as a member of the ECB’s Executive Board and the ViceChair of its Supervisory Board, this question is relevant to both our monetary policy and banking supervision tasks. This question matters because, in the field of the environment, the ECB is a policy taker, not a policymaker. So what does the ECB need to take from the policy and objectives reflected in the Climate Law? To answer this, we first need to consider whether the ECB is bound by the Climate Law. If so, the ECB would have to take measures towards achieving the climate-neutrality objective. There is more, though.
And while many of you will miss the heady days of the 1990s when growth rates were at 4 percent, the economic fundamentals indicate that these are fundamentally different times. But I’m optimistic for bankers like you because of your relationships with customers and the role you play in your communities. Please enjoy the conference. I look forward to joining you later for the luncheon. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Ardian Fullani: Latest economic and financial developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the press conference on the monetary policy decision-making of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 26 October 2010. * * * At today’s meeting of 26 October 2010, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania analyzed and approved the Monetary Policy Report for the third quarter of 2010. After scrutinizing the latest economic and financial dynamics at home and the expected performance in the future, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged at 5.00%. In what follows, I will elaborate upon the analysis and the main conclusions today’s decisionmaking of monetary policy was based on. *** The performance of the Albanian economy during the third quarter of 2010 reinforced the main developments in the first half of the present year, featuring gradual recovery of aggregate demand, lower risk premiums and consolidation of macroeconomic stability. Broadly in line with our projections:   economic growth has accelerated (resurged) and its base seems to have broadened;    CPI inflation and expectations have been anchored close to the Bank of Albania’s target for inflation;    The external position of the Albanian economy has recovered and the exchange rate is more stable;    liquidity in the system has increased and the interest rates have generally been downward.