samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the fact that the considerations are reported openly may help increase confidence in the assessments and conclusions. Consistency in monetary policy actions also increases confidence in the price stability target, which in turn should have a stabilising effect on inflation expectations. The role of predictability in monetary policy It is important the Riksbank is clear and explains the bases on which the interest rate decisions are made. As the effect of monetary policy on price developments has a time lag, the interest rate is changed on the basis of forecasts of future price developments. However, it is not always easy to interpret correctly what is happening in the economy. In recent years it has been difficult to find a clear relationship between the demand situation and inflation in Sweden. GDP growth was high from 1997 to the middle of 2000. Since then the growth in demand has been subdued. During 1997 and 1998 inflation fell, but the rate of price increase has tended to accelerate thereafter. At the same time, inflation expectations have remained at a relatively stable level. There are many explanations for this development and the Riksbank’s view has been described, for instance, in various Inflation Reports. Let me here expound some personal reflections on this issue. If the Riksbank’s monetary policy inspires confidence, inflation expectations will be established around the inflation target. This means that resource utilisation in the economy could vary slightly more, without having an immediate impact on inflation.

Eva Srejber: Monetary policy and inflation expectations in Sweden Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, to Föreningssparbanken in Karlstad, 25 February 2002. *  *  *  I should like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here. Today I intend to talk about what guides the Executive Board when we make decisions on monetary policy and what role predictability in the central bank’s actions plays for maintaining price stability. Then I shall take a brief look back at the economic situation immediately following the tragic events of 11 September and summarise the economic situation today. Finally, I should like to explain my views on monetary policy and why I entered a reservation against the decision to leave the repo rate unchanged at the last Executive Board monetary policy meeting. Monetary policy strategy I shall begin with a reminder of what guides us when we make decisions on monetary policy; i.e. how monetary policy strategy has been formulated. The Riksbank has been assigned by law the task of maintaining price stability. We also have the task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system. The banks play a central role in both of these tasks. The monetary policy objective has been defined by the Riksbank as a target for CPI inflation of 2 per cent with a tolerated deviation interval of +/- 1 percentage point. The steering interest rate is the instrument at the Riksbank’s disposal for maintaining price stability.
An additional dimension of the monetary policy decision of last Friday is to clearly separate the implications for the MPR of recalibrating the monetary impulse in the face of the current configuration of structural parameters and economic variables, of the responses that might be necessary in the face of the evolution of macroeconomic conditions. As I have stressed in this presentation, the world economy is experiencing a delicate moment, where a declining phase of the cycle is combined with high policy uncertainty in the world's leading economies and where financial markets rely heavily—perhaps too much—on the will of the central banks to react to episodes of volatility. Although the world economy continues to grow, we note with concern the escalation and expansion of trade conflicts, a stagnation of international trade, deteriorating expectations and frequent episodes of market volatility. In these circumstances, as we have pointed out before, the Chilean economy, despite its commercial and financial openness, has powerful buffers, given by the exchange rate, the depth of the domestic financial market and the anchoring of expectations. However, it also has room for robust policy responses, particularly of monetary policy. Having solved the past imbalances of the MPR helps us identify future phenomena and apply the proper responses. On other occasions we have said that the Central Bank of Chile is prepared to face new challenges. Recent decisions include an additional element in this statement: the evidence that we have the capacity to identify important changes and react with the necessary speed.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In sum, we are at a juncture where achieving the right monetary and fiscal stance and successfully managing economic policy will be pivotal for the future of the Spanish economy. The course the European sovereign debt crisis takes will be a determinant of paramount importance. But whatever the scenario the role of our economic policy will remain fundamental for overcoming the inefficiencies highlighted, for redressing the lack of confidence hampering and raising the cost of external funding, and for keeping the Spanish economy safe from any incident that might occur in the European arena. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Options provided to firms include: distribution to shareholders includes dividends and share buybacks. Purchasing financial assets includes M&A. Source: Bank of England Finance and Investment Decisions survey. And, on a related question, 80% of all the publicly owned firms agreed that financial market pressure for short-term returns to shareholders had been an obstacle to investment. Somewhat surprisingly, a significant proportion of the privately owned firms in the survey also saw financial market pressures as an obstacle to investment. This implies perhaps that financial market pressures for returns have a more general effect on the way investment returns are viewed by firms. The underinvesting firms also faced non-financial obstacles. Chief amongst these were greater risk aversion and greater uncertainty about the economic environment, which may include uncertainty about the returns to investment. I want to deal with these under my second set of observations around rates of return. At this stage, however, it is worth noting that for the group that underinvested, non-financial obstacles seem to have played as big a role as financial ones in their investment decisions. And, when looking at constraints on finance, using profits to finance investment appeared as important as constraints on borrowing. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  As I noted earlier, the question of constraints on finance for investment in the UK has deep roots.

2 Hye Jin Rho, Hayley Brown, and Shawn Fremstad, A Basic Demographic Profile of Workers in Frontline  Industries, Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2020, and Tiana N Rogers, Charles R Rogers, Elizabeth VanSant-Webb, Lily Y Gu, Bin Yan, Fares Qeadan, Racial Disparities in COVID-19 Mortality Among Essential Workers in the United States, World Medical & Health Policy, August 5, 2020. 3 Ruchi Avtar, Rajashri Chakrabarti, and Maxim Pinkovskiy, Understanding the Racial and Income Gap in COVID-  19: Essential Workers, Liberty Street Economics, January 12, 2021. 4 Ruchi Avtar, Rajashri Chakrabarti, and Maxim Pinkovskiy, Unequal Burdens: Racial Differences in ICU Stress  during the Third Wave of COVID-19, Liberty Street Economics, August 9, 2021. 5 New York Fed on Medium, New Initiative Focuses on the Social Determinants of Health, April 7, 2021. 6 New York Fed on Medium, Exploring the Economic Benefits of Broader Support for Mental Health, June 2, 2021. 7 New York Fed, The Fourth Trimester and Beyond: The Case for Broad Investments in Maternal and Child Health. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
We intend that the digital pound would have the same (or stronger) privacy protections as bank accounts, debit cards or cheques which are now used for 85% of transactions in the economy. Individuals’ personal details and transaction records would be known only to their private sector wallet provider in the same way they are for bank account providers today (and subject to the same privacy protections). But individuals’ details and records would not be known by the Government or the Bank of England. In this way, the digital pound would provide privacy while also protecting against fraud and financial crime. The digital pound would not be an anonymous bearer instrument like cash, but physical cash would remain available to those who wanted to use it. Neither the Government nor the Bank would program a digital pound or restrict how it was spent. Instead, the Bank would provide the infrastructure and minimum functionality for the private sector to provide programmability features for users. Those features would require user consent. As with banknotes and many current accounts, no interest would be paid on a digital pound. Its purpose would be as a means of transaction - to make and receive payments - rather than as a savings product. Nor do we see the digital pound as a monetary policy instrument and as such it would, like cash, have neither positive nor negative remuneration.

I would like to thank Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Ben Broadbent, Victoria Cleland, Andrew Hauser and Tom Mutton for their comments. 1. To function money relies on a shared understanding that the relevant instrument can be used to calibrate, exchange, store and settle claims. For further discussion on this point see recent speeches ‘It’s Time to Talk about Money’ (2020) and ‘Do We Need Public Money (2021)’. 2. The Bank of England also issues reserves to financial institutions. This is a form of wholesale money that allows regulated firms to hold claims on the Bank of England. 3. Only the Bank of England issues banknotes in England and Wales, but six banks in Scotland and Northern Ireland also issue banknotes, backed largely by assets at the Bank of England. See Scottish and Northern Ireland banknotes | Bank of England and the Scottish and Northern Irish Banknotes Regulations (2009) for further details. 4. The Payments of Wages Act 1960, as amended by the Truck Act. 5. Some examples of programmable functionality might include: instantaneous currency exchanges with reduced settlement risk; more efficient real estate purchases whereby all parties’ transactions are executed simultaneously by a smart contract; or an automated payment made by a vehicle at a toll booth. 6. Financial Services and Markets Bill (2023) . In December 2022, the Bank of England published a consultation closing on 10 February, setting how it intends to use these new powers. ,  7. See for example Haldane, A.: ‘Seizing the Opportunities from Digital Finance’ (2020). 8.
Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula: Stimulating academic development in Zambia Speech by Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula, Deputy Governor (Administration) of the Bank of Zambia, to the Zambia Centre for Accountancy Studies Students, Lusaka, 17 October 2012. *  *  •  Management Staff  •  Lecturers  •  Students,  •  Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen  *  Good afternoon to you all, I feel greatly privileged to be here with you this afternoon to share with you the background to my career progression and to also give you an inspirational message that may stimulate you to greater heights. I take this opportunity to thank the management of the Zambia Centre for Accountancy Studies for extending an invitation to me. I always get a satisfying feeling to speak to students, particularly given that I am coming from a background of lecturing. As has been said earlier, I am currently the Deputy Governor Administration at the Central Bank of Zambia. For those of you that may not be too familiar with what the role of the central bank is; the primary role of the Bank of Zambia is, and I quote: “to formulate and implement monetary and supervisory policies that will ensure the maintenance of price and financial system stability so as to promote balanced macroeconomic development”. The functions of the Bank are stipulated in the Bank of Zambia Act and these are as follows: 1.

If a settlement bank encounters difficulties and there are no back-up solutions, there will be a risk of widespread disruption of the payment system. This risk can be reduced through good back-up systems. Second-tier banks have recently improved their back-up solutions. Most banks have an account at Norges Bank. In the course of 2013, all 106 of the second-tier banks with an account at Norges Bank have submitted authorisations permitting the bank to be moved up automatically to first-tier level if the settlement bank should fail, enabling them if necessary to participate in net settlements at Norges Bank directly at short notice. This makes second-tier banks and the settlement system as a whole less dependent on the private settlement banks. The authorisations have strengthened financial stability. Banks participating directly in net settlements are required to have sufficient cover for their clearing positions. Satisfying this requirement is the banks’ own responsibility. They can do this by either depositing funds at Norges Bank or pledging approved securities in favour of Norges Bank. Our analyses show that the great majority of second-tier banks have sufficient liquidity in Norges Bank’s settlement system to be able to participate directly in the net settlements. However, clearing positions can vary widely. Banks participating directly in the settlements over time must maintain sound liquidity management. Conclusion Allow me to conclude by highlighting that new and improved regulation of banks will help to reduce the likelihood of deep financial crises.
Banking problems have afflicted both industrial and emerging market countries, including the US, which weathered the savings and loans and banking problems of the 1980s and early 1990s. Crises around the world have exacted a high price, with direct fiscal costs of associated resolutions typically starting at roughly 5 percent of GDP (in the US case, such costs ran more than $ billion). To these substantial sums, one must add the less quantifiable, but no less real, consequences for the economy and financial system. A weakened financial sector cannot serve its role as intermediary - as banks seek to repair their balance sheets, restrict new lending, and shore up capital - leading to diminished growth prospects. In a number of Asian countries today, exporters have difficulty obtaining trade financing from domestic banks, delaying the process of economic recovery and raising fears of a credit crunch in which even sound companies are driven into bankruptcy. Banking sector problems reduce depositor confidence in the banking system and can trigger capital flight. Banking system problems, significant in their own right, can cause distortions in monetary policy, render monetary policy tools less effective, and put at risk the integrity of the payments system. In an integrated international financial system, it is increasingly difficult to contain a banking crisis within a country’s borders. Finally, we must not forget the human consequences of a financial and broader economic crisis, which disproportionately fall on those least able to weather the storm.

In such circumstances, the only way to maintain the competitiveness of the Macedonian producers was the specialization and exports of lower quality products. These developments did not generate inflationary pressures, which caused absence of real appreciation that was evident in the other transition countries. In the past several years, Macedonia is quickly moving closer to the more advanced transition economies. Several years in a row we have achieved positive and stable growth rates, equaling 5.1% in 2007, which is the highest growth rate since independence. Even though economic growth rates are lower than the ones in Baltic countries as well as some of the countries in the region, this is a sure sign for the acceleration of the process of real convergence. This process is also supported by the foreign direct and portfolio investments (6.3% of GDP in 2007) and the faster credit expansion, with annual growth rate of 39% in 2007. As far as nominal convergence is concerned, Macedonia is facing challenges that are common for most of the economies in the region and elsewhere. Since the last quarter of 2007, we are having an acceleration of the inflation rate, which is mostly caused by the global rise of food and energy prices. Therefore, the uncertainty regarding the movement of these prices, as well as the expectations for pressures initiated by the process of real convergence are the main challenges for monetary policy in the medium term.
Goh Chok Tong: Developments in Singapore within the last 10 years Speech by Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister of the Republic of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce's (SICC) 170th Anniversary Dinner, Singapore, 25 May 2007. *  *  *  Distinguished guests Friends and Fellow Singaporeans I congratulate the SICC (Singapore International Chamber of Commerce) on your 170th Anniversary. You are one of Asia’s oldest chambers of commerce, and have contributed much to Singapore’s development. Ten years ago, in May 1997, I spoke at your 160th Anniversary Dinner. Little did I know then that within months, the Asian Financial Crisis would erupt and devastate many countries in Asia, plus a few outside. Singapore suffered collateral damage but our economy was relatively unscathed. What was the big lesson learnt? It was not just about having a flexible exchange rate or better supervision of the financial industry. It was: get your fundamentals right, build a strong economy with good governance. Then, you will better survive any unexpected financial or economic earthquakes. Following the Asian Financial Crisis, the world was hit by the dot.com bust and the September 11 attacks in 2001. The global economy slowed down and ours went into recession. Within one year, 23,000 jobs were lost. Just as we were recovering, we were hit by SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome).

Traders from both sides of the border are forced to carry cash and must first convert funds into United States Dollars from their respective countries and then into the domestic currency of the country they are purchasing goods or services from. By so doing, cross-border traders face many risks including theft, exchange losses and other conversion costs. Ladies and Gentlemen, although there have been some bilateral efforts towards formalising and facilitating small-scale cross-border trade in Southern Africa, these have not been  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  enough. For instance, Zimbabwe signed a memorandum of understanding with Malawi to facilitate informal trade, especially between small and medium-sized enterprises. Mozambique and Zambia also signed a memorandum of understanding to facilitate the repatriation of currencies of the two countries that are accumulated by traders located along the common border areas. It is expected that this memorandum of understanding will be expanded to include Malawi. The lack of financial and payment services has not only hindered small-scale cross border trade but also led to the establishment and entrenchment of parallel currency markets at the borders. Needless to say, these are associated with vices such as counterfeiting, facilitating illegal trade, as well as enhancing cross-border money laundering activities. Moreover, to us monetary authorities, illegal cross-border local currency circulation creates the potential for complicating the conduct of monetary policy, especially if a significant amount of a country’s domestic currency is being used outside its jurisdiction.
4  Barro and McCleary (2003). 2  BIS Review 114/2010  argued that pre-dominantly Protestant countries in Europe grew faster than Catholic countries as a result of differences in patience and work ethic. 5 This has echoes with recent literature emphasising the role of “Asian values”, such as thrift and patience, as a driver of growth in the region. 6 Patience is also likely to have been a key factor in the evolution of financial systems. At root, banks and capital markets are simply a means of matching saving to investment. They are about realising the benefits of patience and thus growth. There is strong evidence for such effects. Financial deepening is known to be an important determinant of long-run growth. 7 Why? Efficient financial intermediation increases the returns to patience, thereby encouraging thrift and promoting growth. The impatience “gene” For every virtue there is a vice, for every ego an alter ego. So it is with patience. In Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, he also spoke of a “two self” model. People had both a patient and impatient component. This double-self principle was developed by psychologists and philosophers, such as Freud and Berlin, during the 1950s and 1960s. Latterly the work of behavioural economists, such as Thaler and Shefrin, has formulated the two selves as the patient “planner” and impatient “doer”. 8 Using brain imaging, this model has recently been given neurological support.

Inflation in the euro area has proven to be much higher and more persistent than originally projected. This reflects the unprecedented series of shocks we have faced, and the fact that those shocks have led to turning points in our economic environment. Monetary policy cannot prevent the first-round effects of many of these shocks. But it can ensure that they do not become embedded. This is what the ECB is doing. We have taken major steps along the path of normalising our monetary policy, frontloading our rate increases. This signals that we are determined to bring inflation back to our medium-term target of 2% in a timely manner and ensure that inflation expectations remain well anchored. We will not let this phase of high inflation feed into economic behaviour and create a lasting inflation problem. Our monetary policy will be set with one goal in mind: to deliver on our price stability mandate. 1. Rees, D. and Rungcharoenkitkul, P. (2021), “Bottlenecks: causes and macroeconomic implications”, BIS Bulletin, No 48, Bank for International Settlements, November. 2. ECB staff have estimated that errors in our assumptions about energy prices explain around 75% of our forecast errors one-quarter ahead over the period from the start of 2021 to the first quarter of 2022. See Chahad, M., Hofmann-Drahonsky, A.-C., Meunier, B., Page, A. and Tirpák, M. (2022), “What explains recent errors in the inflation projections of Eurosystem and ECB staff?”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 3, ECB. 3. Average levels from 1 January 2022 to 23 February 2022. 4.