samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This principle is embodied in the French novel “The Three Musketeers” by Alexandre Dumas. Set in the 17th century, the novel recounts the journey of D’Artagnan, who left for Paris to join the Musketeers of the Guard, and how he overcomes all adversities. Together with him are three musketeers with contrasting personalities: Athos who is intelligent; Porthos who is adventurous; and Aramis who is true and faithful. But together they form a well-balanced trio that supports D’Artagnan on his journey. The three musketeers today are Finance, Technology, and Trust, corresponding to Athos, Porthos, and Aramis. Society is D’Artagnan. Can the three modern musketeers work together to support Society? Can they complement one another? Can they click? 1 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  Finance – the Astute Musketeer Losing Appeal Let me introduce the first musketeer – Finance. Like Athos, Finance is wise but can be complicated, and to some extent, mysterious and nonaccessible to many people. As a result, Finance – at least in its traditional form – is losing its appeal. Consumers find that banks’ processes are too cumbersome to navigate. They are increasingly looking to technology firms for their needs. Some of them are even losing trust in the ability of banks to act in their interest. Bill Gates once said: “People need banking, not banks”. It is a reminder that, to survive, Finance needs to be intuitive, innovative and customer-centric. Technology – the Musketeer who can Transform Finance This is where the second musketeer – Technology – comes in.

Similarly, the Kwacha depreciated against the Pound Sterling and Euro by 3.6% and 8.3%, respectively. This was partly on account of the US dollar appreciation following the strengthening of the US economy during the latter part of the year. The Pound and Euro weakness moderated on the back of optimism that their economies would continue to rebound. The Kwacha, appreciated against the rand by 10.7% to an average K0.5596/ZAR, reflecting the slowdown in mining output, following continued labour unrest in the South African mining sector. In the first quarter of 2014, the Kwacha depreciated by 10.0% to K6.09 per US dollar. This development was largely attributed to a high demand due to a higher growth in imports relative to exports, as well as investor sentiments associated with the tapering of quantitative easing in the United States of America coupled with falling copper prices on the global markets. Similar weakening of currencies was observed in most emerging market economies such as Ghana, South Africa and Turkey. It should be noted that the Bank of Zambia has continued to implement a market determined exchange rate and has intervened in the market to smooth out volatility and accumulate reserves. According to a recent study conducted by Professor John Weeks of the University of London, there is strong evidence that, the Bank of Zambia’s participation in the foreign exchange market to minimise volatility in the exchange rate has in general been effective.
As can be seen, profitability, measured both in terms of RoA and of RoE, is above the European average. If we analyse average efficiency, we see that Spanish banks clearly have lower management expenses in relation to their revenue than their European competitors, particularly those in the core euro area countries. Regrettably, these strengths do not change our position relative to the comparative average levels of solvency. Admittedly, supervisors are always applying pressure in relation to capital levels; that is our mission. Banks usually protest about this growing capital requirement which, as the most widespread complaints have it, appears to be never-ending and may lead to credit being  5/15  squeezed. Reference is also made, with some justification, to the low density of many European banks’ risk-weighted assets, owing to a more extensive use of internal models. I have indicated on more than one occasion that our banks have comparative strengths. For instance, we are in a better position in terms of leverage when set against the industry average in Europe; moreover, the low use of internal models by Spanish banks enables the volatility of capital requirements to be reduced, while in turn keeping our banks unaffected by the introduction of the Basel III “Output floor”. Nonetheless, I do not share the rest of the analysis of the sector. I would point out that a high level of capital is neither a weakness nor a disadvantage.

In the baseline scenario of this Report, the sum of the effects of the catastrophe, the changes in conjunctural data and other specific elements shapes a scenario where inflation will converge to 3% sooner than was forecast in December. The change in the medium-term inflation scenario is determined by the effects of the earthquake and tsunami on productive capacity and by the persistence and magnitude of a potential contraction in private consumption. In the baseline scenario, annual CPI variation will exceed 3% in the second half of this year, standing around 4% for a few months. It will later fluctuate around 3% through 2011 until the end of the relevant projection horizon, which is currently the first quarter of 2012. Annual CPIX1 will show a more gradual convergence to 3% (table 2). All this within a substantially more uncertain setting than before. This scenario rests on other working assumptions. First, it is assumed that in the long term the real exchange rate (RER) will be similar to its current level. This assumption is made considering that, with the nominal exchange rate and parities prevailing at the statistical closure of this Report, the RER is consistent with its long-term fundamentals. Another working assumption is that inflationary pressures from the labour market will generally not experience any significant change with respect to current indicators. Finally, the external scenario will continue to add momentum to the economy and imported inflationary pressures will remain contained.
Caleb M Fundanga: Recent significant developments in the Zambian economy Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the 2006 Business and Financial Writers, Media Awards, Lusaka, 24 January 2007. *  *  *  • Heads of Diplomatic Missions, Permanent Secretaries and senior Government officials • Heads of Economic, Financial and Business organizations • Heads of Media Institutions • Economic, business and financial writers • The ACCA International Assembly Member and the Branch President • ACCA Country Manager • Distinguished invited guests, ladies and gentlemen I am delighted both as Governor of the Bank of Zambia and as patron of the business and financial writers forum, to officiate at the 5th annual business and financial writers awards ceremony for the second consecutive time. I must say I am always delighted to interact with you my colleagues from the media because we are both stakeholders in the provision and dissemination of financial and economic information to the public. The purpose of this annual event is to recognise outstanding journalism effort demonstrated by economic, financial and business writers from various media institutions. In this room tonight are different organizations represented with a commonality, that is, we all wish to have accurate, timely, informative, creative, relevant and in-depth information. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased as patron of the business and financial writer forum to continue working with you.

They consist, notably, of a reduction in governments’ debt financing needs, leading both to lower long-term interest rates (due to lower demand and declining risk premia) and to the release of revenues to finance more productive expenditure or growth-enhancing tax cuts. More leeway is then also created for the operation of automatic fiscal stabilizers in response to a cyclical downturn. In sum, fiscal consolidation is essential to secure public trust in the long-term sustainability of public finances, and to strengthen the foundations for sustained and durable growth. At the European level, fiscal consolidation should be in line with EU countries’ commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact, which provides the appropriate framework for the coordination of their fiscal policies. Given past experience of a slow and hesitant correction of excessive deficits, I see strong arguments for strengthening the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and reinforcing its rules for fiscal discipline. This could be complemented with enhanced national budgetary rules and procedures that are consistent with the EU fiscal framework. Monetary policy challenges Let me now turn to monetary policy and focus, in particular, on the response of the ECB to the crisis, and its current exit strategies. In response to the crisis and the ensuing subdued inflationary pressures, the Governing Council lowered its key interest rates to historically low levels. In particular, it reduced its main refinancing rate by 325 basis points to 1%, a level not seen in recent history in any of the euro area countries.
Admittedly, a lot of what was said in the much-quoted reports by international analysts is misrepresented, and some of it based on misunderstandings, wrong information and, occasionally, obvious antipathy towards the Icelandic  2  BIS Review 28/2006  banks and their activities. This is all regrettable and, in some cases, deserves to be condemned. But these cases are not the essence of the matter. The essential point is that the banking sector as a whole, or individual banks, are not in a position to refute this kind of coverage for once and for all. Another serious matter is that, at a certain time, these institutions are vulnerable to changes in supply or risk assessment in international banking and bond markets. For its part, the Central Bank reiterates at this meeting that the underlying financial position of the Icelandic banking sector is very solid, fulfils the most stringent requirements and has easily passed all the stress tests conducted on it. This of course is the crucial issue. However, the scenario that we have witnessed since November must be taken very seriously. The Icelandic banking sector must address the shortcomings that international analysts repeatedly stumble over, regardless of whether these are exaggerated and overestimated. Lending growth must be reined in as promised. Certain financial institutions need to improve their communications to a significant degree, and a joint effort by them all could be worth considering. Hype and empty phrases must be avoided.

Davíð Oddsson: Review of the Icelandic economy Address by Mr Davíð Oddsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the Bank’s annual meeting, Reykjavik, 31 March 2006. *  *  *  Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen: On behalf of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland I welcome you all to the 45th annual meeting since the Central Bank was established on April 7, 1961. The Bank’s financial statements for the year 2005 have been ratified today by the Prime Minister. The Bank’s annual report has also been published. It includes a report on the Bank’s performance and a summary of how it has implemented its mandatory role. The Chairman of the Supervisory Board devoted part of his address to Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, the former Chairman of the Board of Governors. The present Governors endorse his words wholeheartedly. In this context I would like to draw attention to two points that the former Chairman of the Board of Governors mentioned at the last annual meeting. One concerned the Bank’s forecast for inflation and the current account deficit. At that time the Bank forecast that the current account deficit would be equivalent to 12% of GDP in 2005 and inflation would be 2½% by today. Now it is clear that developments have been less favourable than was forecast and hoped. The current account deficit ended up at 16.6% of GDP and inflation is currently 4.5%.
As the European Central Bank president, Mr. Jean-Claude Trichet has recently underlined “the international interdependencies are too large for purely national or regional rules to be optimal and there is a clear need to strengthen global governance, in particular in the financial field”. In the case of the European Union, the crisis has exposed fundamental weaknesses of the European economy, revealing growing internal imbalances. The functioning of the European  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Monetary Union has been under particular stress as the existing surveillance procedures proved to be not comprehensive enough. Therefore, more effective economic governance in the European Union and the euro area is seen as achievable through five main pillars: fiscal discipline, broader economic surveillance, closer coordination, a robust framework for crisis management, stronger institutions and rules-based decision making. At this point, let me say that just recently the European Union has taken important decisions to ensure that Member States coordinate their economic policies more closely. The new economic governance is therefore based on three main responses to the crisis: •  reinforcing the common economic agenda with closer European Union surveillance  •  safeguarding the euro area stability  •  and repairing the financial sector  As a result of these decisions, the EU’s interdependent economies will be better placed to chart a path to growth and job creation. To conclude, I would like to emphasize here that economic governance is a topic that concerns us all.

Mugur Isărescu: Economic governance in the European Union Speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Conference “Economic Governance in the European Union”, jointly organized by the European Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Romania, Bucharest, 10 June 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished audience, It is a pleasure be the host of the Conference on “Economic Governance in the European Union”, an event jointly organized by the European Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Romania. We are glad to welcome you all and our special guests: Mr. Gheorghe Ialomiţianu – the Romanian Minister of Finance, Mrs. Elena Flores, Director for Policy Strategy and Coordination in the European Commission’s DGECFIN, Mr. Theodor Stolojan, Member of European Parliament and former Prime Minister of Romania, Mrs. Iuliana Dascalu, Director in the Finance Ministry of Romania, Mr. Hans Martens, chief executive of the European Policy Centre Think-tank and Mr. Daniel Dăianu, Economics Professor, former Member of European Parliament and Finance Minister of Romania. A special note of thanks to my colleagues Deputy Governor Cristian Popa and the Chief Economist Valentin Lazea, who, together with our special guests, have responded to the challenge of debating a hot topic. In these challenging times, economic governance was brought to the spotlight by the recent global economic and financial crisis.
In the last few months, we have seen slight upward price movement with both headline and core inflation rates turning positive since the fourth quarter of last year. Currently, headline and core inflation for February 2010 are at 3.7 and 0.3 per cent respectively. The turnaround was due to a combination of the base effects from oil prices and the pick-up in domestic demand. Looking ahead, with the firming economic recovery, inflationary pressure is expected to increase further, with core inflation forecasted to surpass the midpoint of our target range of 0.5–3.0 percent by the end of the year. Thus, it is clear that in the near term, policymakers need to perform a delicate balancing act that would at the same time ensure a continued growth momentum, the anchoring of inflationary expectations, and the containment of potential financial imbalances. In light of the solid fourth-quarter GDP figures and January’s economic indicators, the current extraordinary accommodative monetary policy stance will be of less need for the Thai economy. Furthermore, an over-extended period of low interest rates can lead to heightened inflation expectations or financial imbalances such as asset price bubbles, as this crisis has vividly demonstrated in many countries. To this end, the timing of monetary policy normalization will be important so that it will not jeopardize economic recovery particularly as private investment has yet to pick up enough pace. Thus, I would like to assure you that, we will put our best effort in considering its timing carefully.

Before I go any further, I will give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. Overheating Whenever I talk about monetary policy, I start with the Federal Reserve's dual mandate: price stability and maximum employment. With the unemployment rate back to very low pre-pandemic levels, and a variety of indicators showing the labor market is very strong, maximum employment has been achieved. But, with inflation rising to unacceptably high levels, we are far from our longer-run goal of 2 percent inflation. High inflation harms those who are most in need. Too many families are now struggling to meet the increasing cost of necessities. I am resolutely focused on restoring price stability, which is the foundation for a vibrant and healthy economy. Over the past year, inflation has increased rapidly and dramatically to levels last seen in the early 1980s. A year ago, overall inflation, as measured by the percent change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, was 2.5 percent. In March, it was 6.6 percent. A portion of this sharp rise reflects global increases in food and energy prices. But, even excluding energy and food costs, the "core" inflation rate has increased from 2 percent a year ago to 5.2 percent today. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Three major imbalances are contributing to an overheating economy and high inflation.
We could, in principle, go further than we have, and deliberately aim off in our monetary policy, in order to try to relieve the immediate pressure on the euro-exposed sectors. But that would necessarily involve taking more risk with our inflation target and with continuing stability in the economy as a whole. That is not consistent with our mandate. And it is not something that most business people I speak to - even from the suffering sectors - would want us to do. 3  BIS Review 98/2000

In principle, a “simple” alternative would be to set a large fund to guarantee the European sovereign debt and help recapitalize the banks. Its sole existence would reinstate confidence, reduce risk premiums and restore the viability to sovereigns and financial institutions. The trouble is that the European legislation does not have the institutions to implement these solutions. And they must define the fiscal support that such measures would require and how to allocate the burden among the participants. It is precisely on these fronts that the authorities are working and hopefully a solution can be arrived at in the short term. Otherwise, the European situation will continue to hold the world under a lot of pressure still for some months. Moreover, some countries in the Eurozone are facing serious competitiveness problems, thus depressing growth and, since they have no foreign exchange mechanism, solving them will take time because it requires flexibility and structural reforms to boost productivity. Monetary policy implications Today, in Chile, the expected course of the economy and monetary policy has changed from the beginning of the year. The focus is now on the effects that the weak global economy will have on the Chilean economy, especially on growth and inflation. About the former, we said in our last Monetary Policy Report that Chile’s growth would be in the 6.25%–6.75% range this year, to decline in 2012 to 4.25%– 5.25%.
I shall therefore refer solely to the State and Social Security budgets. The draft State budget for 2014 is set against a macroeconomic background in which real GDP is forecast to grow by 0.7%. This macroeconomic scenario, whose central forecast is export growth above 6%, is prudent and in keeping with the forecasts of most national and international agencies. It outlines a gradual recovery in activity and employment in a setting in which the ongoing budgetary adjustment and the deleveraging of households and firms will continue, and in which the competitiveness regained in 2012 and 2013 will not be lost. In step with our European commitments, an overall general government budget deficit target, in National Accounts terms, has been set at 5.8% of GDP, against the figure of 6.5% forecast for 2013. In terms of the different agents, a National Accounts deficit target of 3.7% of GDP has been set for central government, against 3.8% in 2013, and in the case of the social security system and the regional governments the figures mark an improvement of 0.3 pp of GDP, taking the respective deficits to 1.1% and 1%. Local governments should maintain in 2014 the balanced budget already forecast for 2013. As in previous years, three expenditure items – the public debt interest burden, pensions and unemployment benefits – will continue to condition budgetary programming.

Luis M Linde: Overview of the Spanish economy against the background of the euro crisis Testimony by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, before the Parliamentary Budget Committee in connection with the draft State Budget for 2014, Madrid, 4 October 2013. *  *  *  My first appearance as Governor of the Banco de España before this Committee was last year, amid a very difficult situation for the Spanish economy and a serious euro crisis. Since then, fortunately, the situation has improved and the most serious uncertainties surrounding the future of the common currency have been dispelled. Allow me to begin by stressing the importance that strengthening the Economic and Monetary Union and Spain's participation in it has for our economy and for the well-being of Spanish society. The difficulties we are facing should not mask the benefits the Spanish economy has reaped from its participation in the European project and in its most significant institution in terms of integration, namely monetary union. It is worth citing some figures. In the 1986–1990 period, Spanish per capita GDP stood at 78% of the average of the countries then comprising the European Union. In the 2007–2012 period, despite the severity of the crisis in Spain, the percentage figure relative to the same group of countries, which are the richest in the Union, was at 93%.