samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is also important that the central bank, even if it does not have direct supervisory responsibilities, closely monitors general financial market developments, including in the major institutions, to detect potential crisis situations that may call for ELA. The traditional view that ELA should never be given to insolvent banks can also be discussed from another perspective. A prerequisite for all kinds of support, including ELA, should be that there is considerable risk for a systemic crisis. Given that, it can be discussed whether it is worse to provide ELA to an insolvent institution, or to refrain from an action that could avoid a systemic crisis. If there is a risk of systemic crisis, it is normally determined that public support even to insolvent institutions may be warranted, but this is normally given by the government through the fiscal budget, not by the central bank. The moral hazard aspects, which are common arguments for not providing ELA to insolvent institutions, will be no different if the central bank provides support or if the government does. The central bank may have a better capability than other authorities to provide financial support if the need arises very quickly. The main reason for this is that the central bank has the instruments for lending available and it has resources in its balance sheet or the credibility to get resources if they are needed (for example in foreign currency).

The way other crisis management procedures are set up also affects the scope for ELA. This is covered in the first part of this note. Second, the way ELA issues are organised within the central bank is also very important for whether it is an effective measure and, in particular, whether it will reduce or increase moral hazard in the financial sector. This is discussed in the second part of the note. Before discussing these two aspects, the importance of speed in granting ELA must be emphasized, as the speedy implementation of ELA is essential to its being effective in a crisis situation. ELA is the only measure in the crisis management framework that normally can be used quickly. It should be seen as an acute measure that is used for avoiding a sudden disruption of the large-value payment system, in particular when threats to the system emerge suddenly. Incidents like the failure of Barings bank, LTCM and the Swedish currency and banking crisis show that threats to the financial system may indeed emerge suddenly, and that authorities must react very quickly - if not within minutes, at least within hours. The growth and increasing globalisation of financial markets, the high volatility in these markets and the increasing complexity of financial institutions, are all examples of factors that increase the risk for sudden crises and increase the probability that such crises will spread from one market to another. 1.
That includes ensuring that our monetary policy feeds through to all sectors of the economy and to all countries, and heading off any financial fragmentation problems like those experienced in the past. In short, we stand ready to adjust all our instruments as necessary. On the supervisory front, the banking sector must clearly tackle this crisis from a healthier position than in the previous crisis. In any event, we should continue to be doubly watchful. First, over banks and financial markets, so they continue to smooth the flow of financing. And second, over the risks to financial stability. Regarding the first objective, beyond the role of monetary policy, we supervisors have enabled banks to make use of the capital buffers available and the Government approved a public guarantees programme for loans to firms that has softened financial intermediaries’ reluctance to incur higher risks in circumstances such as the present. All these measures have been effective. The latest data for April show a year-on-year rebound of almost 90% in the flow of new lending granted by banks to firms. In any case, the information analysed by the Banco de España shows that small firms and those most affected by the crisis might have difficulty gaining access to financing, especially in the absence of public support instruments. In turn, incentives must be gradually restored so that financial resources may be reallocated to those firms and sectors that can most contribute to the recovery in activity and employment.

The Banco de España projections include a third scenario, in which the materialisation of some of these risks might give rise to a decline in GDP for this year of 15%. 3. Economic policy in the second phase of the crisis The key magnitudes of these forecasts illustrate the challenges we face and the need to formulate a forceful economic policy response. I shall now turn to detailing the main elements which, in my view, this response should include. As earlier stated, in this second phase of the crisis economic policy should combine two objectives: to support the recovery and provide for the structural adjustment of the economy. First, I shall broach the policies relating to the monetary and financial areas. As part of the European Central Bank (ECB), the Banco de España contributes to such policy decisions at the European level. Here the priority should continue to be to support the recovery and maintain financial stability. As mentioned in my previous testimony to the Economic Committee, I believe we should all share the goal of preventing the current crisis from being  3  accompanied by a generalised tightening of financing conditions or from seriously harming our financial system. In this connection, and in relation to monetary policy, we have on the ECB Governing Council reiterated our commitment to doing everything needed to support euro area citizens in these extremely difficult times.
As I said at the start, developments in the real economy and developments on the financial markets are interlinked and problems with financial stability thus risk having a negative effect on growth in the real economy. Problems on the housing and mortgage markets thus risk intensifying an economic slowdown by means of the financial markets and resulting in rising unemployment. As such a situation would affect demand in the economy, and thereby monetary policy, we cannot close our eyes to the risks linked to high household indebtedness. This is the case even though the Riksbank has limited opportunities to do anything about the underlying factors that are pushing up household debt. Many people believe that macroprudential policy, which is now becoming established in Sweden, will resolve the problems of high household indebtedness all on its own. I do not think it is that simple. I believe that macroprudential policy is at present only able to alleviate the problems by increasing the banks’ resilience to these risks and hopefully also dampening the indebtedness to some extent. What do we need to do to obtain a better balance in the long run and to attain a development that is sustainable in the long run? I believe that we need input from several areas. In recent years, a number of measures have been taken to dampen household indebtedness. For instance, Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) has introduced a mortgage ceiling that limits how much a household can borrow in relation to the value of the property.

I would say that market confidence is essential for the stability of the financial system. 1  The Riksbank usually discusses household indebtedness from a financial stability perspective in its twiceyearly Financial Stability Report. See, for instance, Financial Stability Report 2013:2. Sveriges Riksbank. 2  Previously, mortgages were often financed through housing bonds, which had maturities of around 30 years. Today, covered bonds are used instead, where newly issued covered bonds had an average maturity of around 4 years in the autumn of 2013. At that time, the average maturity of the outstanding covered bonds was approximately 3 years. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We saw in the most recent financial crisis that high indebtedness in the household sector can create problems, with some countries suffering a severe fall in house prices. When the value of houses declines, households begin to save more. When savings increase, consumption decreases and thus demand in the economy falls. Ultimately, this can lead to lower production and higher unemployment. We do not want to see this kind of development in Sweden. It is also important to remember that there is interplay between developments in the financial markets and developments in the real economy. If we were to experience a fall in housing prices during a recession and thus similar problems to those experienced by other countries, it is likely that we would suffer both a decline in demand in the economy and that the banks would experience greater difficulty and greater cost in obtaining market funding.
This is a clue that if properly supported by policymakers, for example with the adoption of a common regulatory standard, the demand for green bonds could pick up rapidly, fostering the transition towards net zero. In this respect, Malta is catching up compared to larger European countries. Although there are currently no green instruments listed at the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE), despite MSE having laid out advantageous incentives for the listing of green bonds in 2021, green finance is picking up. Over the summer, thirteen businesses set up the Malta ESG Alliance with the goal of taking the lead in the de-carbonisation efforts at a national level. Gradually ESG disclosure is becoming the norm. Nevertheless, a report recently published by the Central Bank of Malta has shown that investors in local markets are still relatively new to green investments, with over 60% of respondents to an ad hoc survey declaring that they have never invested in green bonds. Respondents also emphasised the lack of a unified standard and low market liquidity as constraints to the adoption of green financial instruments. Green finance in domestic capital markets thus has great upside potential. Interest in green finance is widespread among investors and if policies promoting educational awareness in this regard were made available at a larger scale, supply could meet demand, triggering a positive cycle that would jumpstart green finance in Malta. A Bank research paper suggested that a catalyst for change in this direction could be the issuance of green bonds by the  7  government.

Overall, Switzerland – a small open economy with a highly developed financial sector – is in a position to derive particularly significant benefits from the globalisation of financial markets. It is important to take advantage of these opportunities. Protectionism when foreigners acquire companies and excessive regulation of foreign investment should be avoided. Rather, the sale of Swiss companies below their real value can be avoided through innovation, flexibility and good management, and excessive risks of foreign investments can be limited through more personal responsibility on the part of investors. BIS Review 131/2007  1
Chairperson, I am happy to state that “Banking on Health”, with support from the U.S. Government, has worked to address some of the barriers to credit by providing market research information on the private medical sector to commercial banks and microfinance institutions so that they can understand the business characteristics of the sector. The financial management training that Banking on Health provides to health businesses also lowers the risk of lending to these borrowers. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me end by pointing out that the challenges arising from the global financial and economic crisis are huge but surmountable. Major economies of the world are putting in place various stimulus packages, which are expected to take the world economy out of the crisis. Without doubt, these measures will benefit emerging and developing economies as well, provided that we remain committed to pursuing strong socio-economic policies. Although the global financial crisis has negatively affected the Zambian economy in many respects and presents serious challenges to maintaining the health of the economy, macroeconomic stability has been maintained. The Bank of Zambia has continued to monitor the global developments and take appropriate measures to maintain confidence in the banking system and avoid systemic risk. It is important to note that despite the crisis, there still remains investment confidence in the Zambian economy and one example of this is the number of new commercial banks that have commenced operations in Zambia in the last 12 months.

In the process, the private sector gets to mitigate the climate risks of its own assets while at the same time seeking reasonable returns. By doing well, we also aim to do good. As an international financial centre and a green finance hub, our vision is to play a big role in harnessing the power of finance to support the transition efforts in the region. The vision is underpinned by our strong commitment and concrete actions that help create a conducive ecosystem where climate financing can scale, and bring about desirable opportunities and outcomes for the financial sector. A vibrant and competitive climate finance ecosystem needs to be underpinned by a few other critical elements: standards, data and, above all, talent. The work requires leadership from the public sector and partnership with the private sector. In all these areas, the HKMA is joining hands with Government agencies, fellow regulators as well as stakeholders from the financial sector, academia and business community. Much of our joint effort is coordinated through the Cross-Agency Steering Group on Green and Sustainable Finance co-founded by the HKMA and the SFC. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  First, on standards. A common set of green standards, to the extent possible, is important to enhance the transparency, comparability and efficiency of climate finance. Hong Kong is a front runner in setting regulatory requirements for the financial sector.
Corporate bankruptcy rates, bank provisioning and write off experience, bond yields and default experience, together with data from any banks that are on internal ratings, could all be used to help the authorities form a view of typical or average credit risk for bank portfolios in their countries. This sort of overall, aggregate monitoring of the adequacy of the standard risk weights will be particularly important for developing countries who may initially face some resource constraints in implementing Pillar 2. It should result in an overall adjustment of the weight on unrated exposures, if risks appear to be higher than the capital set aside to back them. This would need to be reinforced by supervisors assessing for all their standard-approach banks individually whether their write-off rate is compatible with the 'standard' 100% capital weight, or whether a higher figure is needed. Credit risk mitigation So there may be elements in the new Accord that achieve too little risk sensitivity but I think this was unavoidable and, with Pillars 2 and 3 of the Accord, supervisors have the scope to see that they do not give rise to problems. However, I do not want to leave this question before touching on one more issue. This is the extent of the recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques. The new risk sensitive framework goes much further than the introduction of internal ratings - another area of greatly increased risk sensitivity is the new regime for credit risk mitigation. Again, the Committee's proposals here represent a considered and careful balance.

With the high level of household debt, the rate increase will likely have a greater impact on private consumption than earlier. However, the strength of this impact is uncertain. This suggests a cautious approach to interest rate setting – a strategy we are now pursuing. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
Once inflation has been brought under control, and once this control has been confirmed, monetary policy can guide short-term interest rates to a level which contributes to balanced growth. Quite a number of EU countries are in such a situation already, with short-term interest rates at around 3%. In others, where inflation has been brought under control more recently, rates have not yet reached this level but are approaching it gradually. The confirmation that inflation has been brought under control does, unfortunately, take time. Finally, in one major country which has seen rapid growth for several years now and in which unemployment has fallen remarkably, short-term interest rates have been raised - applying the principle of preventive medicine. 3. Now, what can we say about long-term interest rates, which also have an important role to play in stimulating growth - perhaps an even more important one than short-term rates? Monetary policy does have an influence on the level of these rates, but its influence is not exclusive and we cannot even predict the direction of its influence with certainty. At this particular point in time, in the first group of countries to which I referred a moment ago, nominal long-term interest rates are at a historically low level - they are well below 6% - but real long-term interest rates can be regarded, perhaps, as still being too high to put continental Europe on the road to more vigorous growth.

But before I hand you over to the MoneyPACIFIC team for their presentation I truly believe your goals and objectives in your respective designations can be greatly complemented with our agenda of financial literacy and that this latest resource will be of use to the pursuit of youth and women empowerment, assist the micro-entreprenuers, complement student learnings from the existing national education curricula, and overall greatly assist us in all our diverse capacities as financial consumers. Manuia le tātou fa’amoemoe. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Jon Nicolaisen: Challenges for the payment system Speech by Mr Jon Nicolaisen, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Finance Norway’s payments conference, Oslo, 12 November 2014. *  *  *  Introduction The modern history of payments in Norway began 200 years ago. A clause was included in the Constitution stipulating that the Storting (Norwegian parliament) should “supervise the monetary affairs of the realm”. Two years later, in 1816, Norges Bank was founded. The Storting delegated “supervisory authority” over monetary affairs to the Bank. Today, private banks perform payment services for the general public. Norges Bank has become the bankers’ bank. According to the Norges Bank Act, Norges Bank shall promote an efficient payment system. The Bank issues cash and ensures efficient settlement between banks’ accounts with Norges Bank. In addition, the Bank has responsibility for overseeing and supervising those parts of the payment system located outside of Norges Bank. Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) has responsibility for supervising the retail payment systems. 1 Payment services play a unique role in the economy. The payment system can be compared to the plumbing system in a house. As long as it functions, we do not give it a second thought. But if it fails, the consequences are immediate and serious. The Norwegian payment system is efficient and up-to-date. Fast, cheap and reliable payments save time and provide security to households and the business sector. It gives the nation a competitive advantage over many other countries.

In particular, there have been substantial declines in industrial goods prices over the past year, while services prices, traditionally prone to very high rates of increase, have eased substantially and have even been growing at a lower rate than in the euro area in recent months. Admittedly, this negative inflation differential is very closely linked to the weakness of demand in Spain. But it is a promising sign of the competitiveness on which the pick-up in activity should be based, so it is important that this price moderation should be preserved in the near future. As I said earlier, there are two adverse consequences of the way in which these imbalances are being corrected: the excessive toll imposed on employment by the crisis, owing to the poor functioning endemic in our labour market, and the deterioration of public finances. Job destruction began with great virulence in construction and subsequently spread to manufacturing industry and market services. It was centred above all on temporary contracts, given the prevailing duality in the labour market. In recent months employment has continued to fall, although the State Fund for Local Investment has slackened the effect. The unemployment rate skyrocketed from 8% in 2007 to almost 18% in the third quarter this year, when it stabilised due partly to the strong slowdown in the growth rate of the labour force. This slower labour force growth was the consequence of part of the population being discouraged by poor employment prospects and of the return of some immigrants to their countries of origin.
This is costly and no business can be profitable in the medium to long term without proper networks in their business lines. Net working is about creating a set of contacts and subsequently building a trusting and genuine relationship with these people. Networking provides the opportunity to discover people who may be able to offer assistance to one’s business and who may also benefit from the assistance that one has to offer. In this global economy, millions of transactions are made on a daily basis across borders, regions and continents. For these transactions to be cost effective and profitable there is need to remove information asymmetries and to reduce the risk of moral hazard. These significant impediments can greatly be avoided by counting on the contacts that one may  BIS Review 150/2008  1  have in a different country region or continent. The end product would thus be increase in economic welfare for all. Your Excellency, at a country level, Zambia still requires significant levels of investment in many sectors of the economy to achieve desirable levels of growth. The country possesses abundant natural resources and human capital. It is also surrounded with eight neighbouring countries and close proximity to the large market of South Africa, a surface area of over 750,000 sq km, and an approximate population of over 11 million people. Its active participation in the SADC Trade Protocol and the COMESA/FTA offers preferential tariff access to market potential of about 380 million plus people.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Economic transformation for sustainable economic growth in the Greater Mekong Subregion Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Euromoney Greater Mekong Subregion Investment Forum, Bangkok, 28 May 2015. *  *  *  Excellencies, Honorable speakers Distinguished guests; Ladies and Gentlemen 1. It has always been a great pleasure to be part of the Euromoney Greater Mekong Subregion Investment Forum. Let me first thank the organizers for inviting me to share with you my views and vision on the prospects of GMS during the last three consecutive events. Today, it is my last remark as the Bank of Thailand governor at this forum to highlight the way forward of our region, and today’s topic on “Economic Transformation for Sustainable Economic Growth in the Greater Mekong Subregion” seems to fit the current context and timing quite well. 2. My first talk here three years ago was on the Greater Mekong Subregion as the “rising star” of Asia. For its rich endowments and strategic locations, the GMS is now well recognized as a new gem that shines through the South East Asian economic frontiers. Over the past decades, I have witnessed the beautiful glory of the GMS. With its impressive economic growth and good prospect for trade and investment opportunities, the GMS has gained much interest from both regional and global investors. 3. According to the ADB, the foreign direct investment inflow to the GMS has increased steadily at the annual average of 8–9 percent.