samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As you know, the objective of the asset purchase programme is to increase the growth of nominal spending to a rate consistent with meeting the inflation target. There are a number of channels through which the asset purchases should help to stimulate demand. Purchases of gilts are likely to cause investors to reallocate their portfolios into other assets, including corporate bonds and equities. This increase in demand for corporate assets should help to reduce borrowing costs faced by firms. Moreover, expansion in the supply of money and liquidity may in itself encourage greater levels of lending and borrowing. Not least, bank deposits are likely to increase as a result of our asset purchases, providing banks with a ready source of funding. Purchases of private sector debt should aid the functioning of corporate credit markets and so improve the availability of credit via these markets. And the programme of asset purchases should help to demonstrate the Committee’s ability and willingness to do whatever it takes to hit the inflation target and so help to ensure that inflation expectations remained firmly anchored. The Bank has so far purchased a little over £ of assets and is on track to have purchased £ of assets by the end of July. It is still early days in terms of judging the ultimate success of the programme in stimulating nominal spending, but initial indications remain encouraging. The growth rate of underlying broad money has picked up in recent months.

Spencer Dale: Inflation targeting – learning the lessons from the financial crisis Speech by Mr Spencer Dale, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the Society of Business Economists’ Annual Conference, London, 23 June 2009. I would like to thank Rohan Churm, Jens Larsen and Rob Wood for their considerable help in preparing these remarks. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. *  *  *  We are in the midst of a deep recession. Unlike recessions of the late twentieth century, this twenty-first century version is not the result of deliberate, but belated, attempts to slow the expansion of money spending in order to bring down inflation from very high levels. Inflation is close to the Government’s 2% target. This recession has at its heart a crisis in the banking system; a crisis that has strangled the supply of credit and undermined public confidence. For the first time in fifty years, the total amount of money spent in our economy during the first quarter of this year was lower than a year earlier. The era of “Great Stability” is over. The Great Stability followed hot on the heels of the introduction of the inflation targeting framework for monetary policy. Some attributed part of the improvement in economic performance to better policymaking. The abrupt end to that stability has, in turn, led the inflation targeting framework to be questioned.
In the November MPR forecasts, the MPC shortened the window for the conditioning assumption on market expectations of Bank Rate13 (Chart 8). This gave a path for expected Bank rate which still peaked at 5.25% and which, together with all the other assumptions and judgements, resulted in a forecast for a more prolonged recession and forecast inflation declining to well below the 2% target by the end of the second year of the forecast and to zero by the end of the third year. In response the MPC took the unusual collective step of communicating that we thought the assumption for Bank rate on which the forecasts were conditioned was too high. Responding to increased uncertainty I’ve set out some of the key sources of uncertainty over the last year and how the MPC adapted our forecast assumptions and judgements in response. Now I want to bring together in one place some personal observations on how the MPC has developed its approach to the forecast and to setting and communicating monetary policy, and how that has framed my thinking. 13  The Office of Budget Responsibility used a similar approach for their forecasts. Bank of England  Page 12  In a speech I gave back in July 2021, I set out the hope that as the influence of the pandemic waned, the MPC would be able to rely more on its forecasts to navigate a path for setting policy to meet the inflation target. Things haven’t turned out that way.

At best, some  BIS Review 44/2004  1  small banks might be required to allocate capital for operational risk through the basic indicator approach. In the case of larger institutions, they will be allowed, at first, to implement only the foundation IRB approach. For the advanced IRB approach more time will be necessary for the banks to improve database quality and for supervisors to improve their experience in validation. Also for operational risk, in the first moment, only the alternative standardised approach will be available. The advanced measurement approaches will have to wait a while longer. No significant impact is expected in terms of capitalisation levels after Basle II. As previously explained, current capital requirements in Brazil are 11% and this buffer has allowed banks to face periods of high volatility with no major impact. Two important challenges expected in the implementation of Pillar I are the construction of adequate databases, either of pooled or individual data, and the incipient stage of operational risk management in the industry. As for Pillar II, with the New Capital Accord, it will be necessary for institutions to further develop their own processes for the internal assessment of capital adequacy and for the supervisory authorities to increase their supervisory focus on such processes. Cross-border supervision is another issue where occasional problems are expected to occur.
The Estonian economy Looking more closely at the Estonian economy, it can be seen that the growth in Estonia in 2014 came primarily from the domestic market. •  Domestic consumption was lifted by rising employment, falling unemployment, and strong wage growth and a simultaneous fall in prices. The economy grew faster in 2014 than in 2013, but it should be remembered that no return to the growth rates seen in the boom years of the last decade is to be expected. •  It may be hard to get used to the idea of lower growth rates, but economic truths cannot be denied. The Estonian economy and Estonian demographics are in a different phase of development now, and long-term sustainable growth is notably lower at 3–4%. Consumer price inflation in Estonia fell below zero in June 2014 for the first time since the crisis. Four years ago prices fell across a wide range of goods and services, but last year the fall in prices was mainly caused by cheaper energy and food. Eesti Pank is not forecasting any rise in prices this year, but rising wages will put upward pressure on the prices of domestic goods and services. One reason for the rapidly rising labour costs has been the decline in the working age population, but faster growth in wages than in productivity could endanger the competitiveness of the Estonian economy in the longer term.

Companies are for now able to cover the rapidly rising labour costs from their profit buffers, but in the longer perspective this will inevitably cease to be possible. Reduced profits threaten the ability of companies to invest in higher productivity and in the human capital needed for more complex and highervalue work. I have often said, and it bears repeating again today, that the key challenge in the development of the Estonian economy is how more complex work than hitherto can be accomplished with a smaller workforce. The rapid rises in wage income and household consumption boosted tax revenues in 2014, which in turn improved the state finances and helped lift the state budget to a small surplus in 2014. Going forward it is important that the government stick to the target agreed in the budget strategy of maintaining a nominal budget balance and building up its reserves. •  Here I should note that the purchases of bonds by central banks and the resulting fall in interest rates have encouraged the belief or the conviction that there is a free lunch to be had and Estonia is denying itself a feed because the Estonian state does not issue bonds. We all know full well that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Even were the central bank to purchase one quarter of the bonds issued by the state, those bonds would still constitute a debt that would have to be paid back eventually.
Overall, the central view is one of inflation rising further above the target in the near term, before falling back to the target. The risks around that benign central view are seen by the MPC as broadly balanced, but there is significant uncertainty about the outlook for inflation. The outlook for growth remains one of a continued modest rebalancing of demand, with consumer spending growing at close to its long-run average rate, business investment continuing to recover, and net trade making a small positive contribution to growth. The MPC judges that assessing the margin of spare resources in the economy is unusually difficult at present. Capacity utilisation within companies, as measured by surveys, has risen. Although unemployment has risen further, it is difficult to know how much of the rise in unemployment actually represents increased slack in the labour market. Over the past year or so, the labour force has grown rapidly, following strong migration from Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and a rise in participation rates. There is, of course, great uncertainty about the scale of migration which has clouded estimates of the supply capacity of the economy. Moreover, it is difficult to know how far migration affects demand for goods and services as well as supply. So the overall impact of migration on inflation in the medium term is unclear.

Rather, there is a market out there where low wages are not the most important form of competitive advantage. We have seen that in the ‘Best of the Black Country Awards’, where last year’s winners were drawn from the manufacturing, services and construction sectors, and where the winners included both new and established companies. Moreover, the Black Country tradition of numerous small firms operating cheek by jowl is exactly the model so successful in Silicon Valley and Bangalore, in science parks and film studios, and in financial centres around the world. Of course, some of the old ways have gone, and many manufacturing companies have perished. Recent years have not been easy for the Black Country, especially as profit margins have been squeezed by greater competition from overseas. But there are – as you yourselves demonstrate – many examples of the regeneration of the Black Country, be they new businesses or older ones re-focussing their activities. And the changes underway here are not restricted to the purely economic. The Black Country has seen successes in education, culture and the media. In education, the University of Wolverhampton – impossible to imagine that there would be one when I was a boy – now has over 23,000 students. The University has put its motto – ‘Innovation and opportunity’ – into practice, through its partnerships with the Wolverhampton Science Park and the TelfordWolverhampton Technology Corridor. In culture, the New Art Gallery in Walsall opened in its internationally acclaimed building in 1999.
Together this implies that the interest rate spread charged and earned by banks has increased substantially in the last 15 years. Figure 5: Lending and Deposit Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (w/o SA) 25 20 15 10 5 0 1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  Deposit Rate (median)  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Lending Rate (median)  What can African central banks do to foster deeper and more efficient financial sectors? In most African countries, central banks are responsible for regulating and supervising banks. Here central banks should ensure that regulatory requirements are not prohibitive for new  BIS Review 110/2007  5  market entrants, particularly foreign financial institutions who may bring cheaper capital and new technology to the sector. Moreover, central banks can foster the development of sustainable microfinance and rural financial institutions to cater to the vast agricultural and microenterprise sector. They can do so by adopting regulatory requirements which suit the limited sphere of activity of these institutions. 5. Conclusion  Ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude these brief introductory remarks. How can we assess the contribution of central banks to improving the business environment in Africa? Most African central banks have been successful in reducing inflation. This enables the private sector to plan ahead and engage in contracts without worrying excessively that their proceeds may be eroded by rapidly rising inflation.

For example, episodes of volatile capital flows may return, while the economy’s long-term competitiveness remains in need of improvement. Policy objectives in 2011 The Bank of Thailand envisages two economic policy objectives this year: (1) to safeguard macroeconomic stability, and (2) to continue strengthening underlying fundamentals of the economy. Both objectives should be interpreted in the broad sense, for example, macroeconomic stability entails price stability, financial stability, as well as fiscal sustainability. Likewise, strong economic fundamentals encapsulate resilient private sector, efficient public sector, and sound banking sector among others. Given these broad goals, the Bank of Thailand and everyone all have parts to play. The government, for example, is in charge of ensuring a sustainable fiscal position in the long-term, and an efficient disbursement of budget so as to best strengthen the economy. Monetary policy Maintaining economic balance is key to the making of monetary policy, as it is one of the most important pre-requisites of macroeconomic stability. In practice, this means that as the economic activity returns to normalcy, monetary policy stance must similarly be normalized. Failure to do so will add undue pressure on inflation, ultimately posing risks to macroeconomic stability. Thus this year, the monetary policy committee (MPC) will need to continue normalizing monetary policy. The amount and pacing of policy interest rate adjustments this year will be consistent with the outlook for growth and inflation as well as the surrounding risks.
Risks to financial stability will be minimised if the transition begins early and follows a predictable path, thereby helping the market anticipate the transition to a 2 degree world. To draw out these crucial points consider the Bank of England’s current approach to the insurance sector. As regulator of the world’s third largest insurance industry, the PRA is responsible for protecting policyholders and ensuring the safety and soundness of insurers. Our supervision is forward-looking and judgement-based. It is risk-based and proportionate – tailored to different business models around the sector – and considers both business-asusual and whether a firm can fail safely – recognising that “zero failure” is neither desirable nor realistic. Our supervisors take a view of your business plans, risk management, governance, and capital models. Where the PRA judges that it is necessary to intervene it does so sooner rather than later. While our mandate is to protect policyholders – many of whom are local – we are conscious that international competition needs robust and internationally-consistent regulatory standards. Solvency II is a good example. It is a prudent but proportionate Directive, that embodies the core principles of our domestic standards and embeds them more consistently across Europe while replacing a patchwork of local regimes. Another example of how best practice is converging globally is the FSB agreement last week on HLA for global systemic insurers, as well as its support for the IASB completing its new insurance contracts standard. The UK insurance industry is well-prepared for such developments.

Participants in the Lloyd’s market know all too well that what appear to be low probability risks can evolve into large and unforeseen costs over a longer timescale. Claims on third-party liability insurance – in classes like public liability, directors’ and officers’ and professional indemnity - could be brought if those who have suffered losses show that insured parties have failed to mitigate risks to the climate; failed to account for the damage they cause to the environment; or failed to comply with regulations. 17  Discussions on correlation are not new. For example, a current issue is the extent to which European windstorms occur in clusters, such as windstorms Daria, Vivian, Wiebke and Herta in 1990 and Lothar, Martin, and Anatol in 1999. 18  See Standard and Poor’s – “Climate Change Could Sting Reinsurers That Underestimate Its Impact” (2014). 19  In 1992 after Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki hit the US, the price of reinsuring weather risks spiked and several carriers left the market, leading to a rise of up to 40% in premiums in some parts of Florida. A series of hurricanes affecting the Bahamas has prompted several insurers to withdraw flood cover for low-lying areas. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Asbestos alone is expected to cost insurers $ on a net ultimate claims basis in the United States – equivalent to almost three Superstorm Sandy-sized loss events.
There is a broad spectrum of regulations around the financial system; everything from rules on consumer protection to rules on how to act if an agent – a bank, company or household – becomes insolvent. If these micro-oriented rules are not properly designed, the risk of a credit-financed bubble increases, and the consequences can be even greater. This means there is an even greater need to actively counteract this type of development by pulling on the more macrooriented regulation lever, and this may entail rather difficult considerations. One could say that well-designed supervision can support a macroprudential policy in a similar way to a well-designed macroprudential policy supporting monetary policy. Does macroprudential policy require support from monetary policy? So will improvements in regulation and supervision be able to solve all of the problems? Unfortunately, I don’t think so. Quite regardless of which solutions we use, I am quite sure that we will not be totally immune to financial crises in the future. What I hope we can achieve is to ensure they are rarer and less severe. I also believe that there will always be situations where the regulation and supervision may need support from a monetary policy that “leans against the wind”. One reason is that experience shows that it is difficult to construct regulations that cannot be circumvented in one way or the other. The policy rate is certainly a blunt instrument, as it affects all lending in the economy.

Christian Noyer: The history and future of corporate social responsibility Welcome speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Symposium ICCA – EABH, Paris, 27 October 2008. *  *  *  Minister, Chairman, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to welcome you to the Banque de France today together with the founder of the Institute for Corporate Culture Affairs, Manfred Pohl, who has organised this event. I would also like to thank Ms Kosciusko-Morizet for doing us the honour of joining us in this debate, in her capacity as Secretary of State for the Environment. Welcome to all! I wish to thank those who have come from neighbouring countries, and especially those who have travelled from further a field to take part in this symposium. This symposium is being held in this prestigious setting that is rich in history: the Golden Gallery of the Hôtel de Toulouse. It is in this Hôtel that the Banque de France set up its headquarters two hundred years ago to this year. Much time would be required to recount the history of this building. I should at least mention that this Gallery was designed at the start of the 17th century by François Mansart for Mr de la Vrillière, a minister of Louis XIII.
Correlations between forecasts and outcomes for the different variables Annual rates of change 1,0  0,8  0,8  0,6  0,6  0,4  0,4  0,2  0,2  Per cent  1,0  0,0  0,0 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  -0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,8  -0,2  GDP Employed CPIX CPI GDP per employed  -1,0  -0,4 -0,6 -0,8 -1,0  Forecast horizon (quarterly)  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 138/2007  11  Figure 10. Mean error for forecasts, an annual rate Percentage points 0,80  0,80  0,60  0,60  0,40  0,40  0,20  0,20  0,00  0,00  -0,20  -0,20  -0,40  -0,40  -0,60  -0,60  -0,80  -0,80 0  1  2  3  4  GDP  Employment  CPIX  5 CPI  6  7  8  GDP/ empolyment  Forecast horizon (quarterly)  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 11. Ranking for GDP following year Per cent Note. The Y-axis shows how large a percentage of times analysts have been better than the percentage of analysts as illustrated in the X-axis. In order to see how large a proportion of times the Riksbank has been better than 50 per cent of other analysts, see 50 on the X-axis, then study the red column on the Y-axis.

6  See, for example, Galbraith, J. and G. Tkacz, “How far can we forecast? : Forecast content horizons for some important macroeconomic time series”, Department of Economics Working Paper 13 (2006), McGill University. BIS Review 138/2007  3  out forecasting memory with the time series models. We were better than the model up to one year ahead and we had a forecasting memory four quarters ahead. Forecasts for employment If we instead look at employment forecasts, we believed that employment would rise more in 2003 and 2004 than it actually did (Figure 2). Instead, productivity growth was repeatedly stronger than expected. But on the other hand, employment has been stronger than expected in our assessments over the past year. The forecasts we have made for employment growth are on the whole more accurate than those of the time series model and the forecasting memory stretches eight quarters ahead (Figure 6). If, on the other hand, we only look at developments over the past two years, the Riksbank has succeeded in forecasting employment about as well as the time series model. This means that we have not succeeded in adding any further information on top of what the simple model can capture. How is the relationship between employment forecasts and outcome? The correlation is almost 0.9 one year ahead and just over 0.4 two years ahead (see Figure 9). The correlation is stronger than for GDP and agrees with the picture we obtained when we compared the forecasts with the time series model.