samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I don’t want to get too sentimental, but it is clear that our centuries-long common and shared history is no mere accident and that without exactly this similarity and closeness maybe our shared history could never have been so long in the first place. Again, this does not mean that we do not have our differences. Yes, we are still not equally wealthy, for example. Our elites have different opinions on many issues. Logically, we have different historical national wounds and pains. But again, this changes nothing in our mental – and not just geographical – closeness. Ladies and gentlemen, we are in Vienna, and my favourite Czech philosopher Vilém Flusser once said that Vienna and Prague are just two halves of one, single city. I very much agree. Perhaps this is ultimately why Czechs feel good in Austria: they feel very much at home. Therefore allow me right here my last point: if you are looking for anecdotal evidence of the closeness I am talking about, here is one anecdote I like to give here in Austria. Because we have friends here at the central bank, it is good to realise that the governor of the Austrian central bank is named Nowotny, his vice-governor and my dear friend is named Duchatczek, and the head of the local financial markets authority is called Pribyl. All these are typical Czech names.

I do not want to stray more than is necessary from the key idea today, namely the 50 years that we are celebrating and which, above all other considerations, represent a history of success. I must, therefore, express my heartfelt congratulations to you. I trust that our frank and sincere communications may continue, all the more so since I have become Deputy Governor. This clearly does not mean that we will always agree about everything, but rather quite the opposite. As I always say, productive supervisory dialogue is characterised by mutual understanding, where we agree but especially where we disagree. I hope that the next 50 years are at least as successful as the 50 years we are celebrating today. I would like to think they may be slightly less intensive than the last 10 years. Thank you very much. 2
As inflationary pressure can vary according to demand and changes in the level of resource utilisation, the events caused the Riksbank and other central banks to decide to lower their instrumental rates shortly after the attacks. Now that almost exactly nine months have passed, we can conclude that the impact on the global economy was less than feared, although some sectors, such as the airline industry, were hard hit. Furthermore, we are seeing increasing signs that economic activity is improving both in the USA and Europe. One factor that often contributes to turnarounds in economic activity is companies’ stockbuilding. When stocks are well-filled and sales decline, companies cut back on production so that it becomes even lower than demand. This destocking then pushes economic activity down to begin with. When the cutback in stocks gradually reaches an end, companies can increase production again without waiting for demand to increase. This gives increased strength to the upturn in activity. It is probable that this is the case right now; according to several indicators production has begun to increase and a certain amount of optimism is beginning to spread. The total economic policy is expansionary in many countries, which provides additional fuel to the sequence of events. The economic situation in the USA and Europe This means that demand on Sweden’s most important export markets is increasing. The turnaround has been particularly noticeable in the USA. There, both residential construction and household demand have been upheld during the economic slowdown by stimulation policy.

Inflation: outcomes and the main scenario Percentage 12-month change 6  6  KPI CPI UND1X  5  5  UNDINHX UNDIMPX  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2 1995  -2 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 37/2002  9
But the case for realism about what we should expect is not a case for pessimism; rather the opposite. The macroeconomic framework in this country is sound and proven. And the real benefit from Britain’s new-found position of macroeconomic stability is that it provides an opportunity to improve our supply performance - to boost productivity, education and enterprise in order to generate the resources needed to raise living standards. Such improvements are, in the long run, both more important and more glamorous than the rather dull and repetitive role of the Bank of England in trying to maintain macroeconomic stability. The Bank of England is only the referee; you are the players. Unlike countries such as the United States, which has witnessed a significant and seemingly durable rise in productivity growth, in Britain the underlying rate of increase of output produced for each hour worked has remained broadly stable. We can take some comfort from the latest revisions to the National Accounts which show that productivity growth was not as depressed as previously thought, but it still remains close to its long-run trend of around 2% a year, insufficient to close the productivity gap between ourselves and our major competitors. Of course the Bank of England has to look to improve the quality and professionalism of its own activities. And, together with the Court of the Bank, the new executive team is exploring ways to enhance the effectiveness of our operations.

This poses a problem in terms of coordinating behaviour, which has to be resolved by policy-makers. However, time constraints prevent us from exploring this matter any further today. I would like to conclude by looking to the future. I agree with Franco Bruni’s analysis and recommendations. This crisis affirms the need for fully independent central banks in which the appointment of Executive Board members is not linked to electoral cycles, and where such members have long-term mandates. It also confirms how important it is for price stability to be the primary objective of monetary policy. This experience has shown that having more objectives than this does not make the task any easier, neither in terms of preventing a crisis, nor resolving it. Given the objective of price stability, central banks should also aim to contribute to financial stability but they should also have instruments at their disposal to achieve this. 4  BIS Review 82/2009  Finally, whenever central banks are given specific powers, they are also expected – and rightly so – to exercise accountability. Franco Bruni is no exception, but in this regard he cannot be distinguished from a certain trend which erroneously considers the ECB to be less accountable than the Federal Reserve, particularly with regard to parliament. The appendix gives details about the methods of reporting to the respective parliaments, in terms of reporting, hearings and responses to questions posed by the parliament.
Some time ago, when we had more rigid exchange rate systems, less adapted to cope with external shocks, when confronted with tighter external financial conditions, we needed to fight against the depreciation of currency to avoid destabilizing balance sheet and inflationary effects. We had to tighten monetary policy to reduce the speed of private capital outflows and sold massive amounts of foreign reserves to contain the depreciation of the currency. Most experiences ended badly. Final remarks The changes we are seeing in the world economy are part of the development that comes in the footsteps of the global financial crisis. The time has come for the recovery of developed economies, and therefore, the extraordinary monetary stimulus packages they brought about in the past must be withdrawn. By historical standards, the global financial conditions we faced in the past few years were very good, but we knew that sooner or later they would end. This is a healthy development. What is important is where this new situation will find us, as economies that managed to keep strong fundamentals and prevented macroeconomic imbalances from building up, or on the opposite lane. How costly a moving toward a “more normal” world will be for each of our countries will depend on how wisely we have administered our economies during the good times. In Chile, the policy framework that has been in place during the recent decades, has given us more tools to help the economy to accommodate the effects of changes in the external environment.

However, we must always bear in mind that we are not immune to events abroad. For the moment, our economy has slowed and despite a sharp depreciation of our currency, inflation expectations have remained in line with the target, allowing us to steer monetary policy to a more expansionary instance. Thank you very much. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  34  Chart 16: Flesch-Kincaid reading grade level of  Chart 17: Percentage of adult population for  other Central Banks  whom Elvis lyrics and 2016 communications are accessible  18  Reading grade level  FOMC minutes  16  BoC MPR  14  RBI Misc RBA MPS  12  Beige Book summary The Economist on monetary policy  RBNZ MPS Broadsheet  Mainstream press on monetary policy  The Economist  US political speeches  10  Tabloid  8  UK Political Speeches  Elvis lyrics Trump campaign speech 0%  2016  2012  2007  2002  1997  1992  1987  1982  6  20%  40%  60%  80%  Percentage of adult population  Sources: Nexis, Bank of England calculations. Source: Bank of England calculations. Notes: Newspaper and journal content matches a search for ‘monetary policy’. Chart 18: Dispersion of Flesch-Kincaid reading grade for 2016 Bank of England publications (minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile and maximum) Reading grade level 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 Knowledge Bank  Bank Underground  Speeches  Inflation Report MPC Statement MPC Minutes Working Papers  Source: Bank of England calculations. 35  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  35  Table 1: Timeline of selected communication and transparency innovations for major central banks 1993  Bank of England  1994  Inflation report launched.

Norges Bank’s district branches lost their right to set the interest rate in their own district – Norway became one interest rate kingdom. And the stock of gold would no longer set an absolute limit on the supply of banknotes. A formal obstacle to the Bank’s provision of emergency liquidity to private banks in a crisis had been removed – and, as it turned out, the need for emergency liquidity would soon arise. A more complex banking system with a growing number of links to the international financial system had set the stage for financial turbulence. Just before the turn of the century, a speculative economy had developed in Christiania. Property prices soared and newly established banks willingly provided loans – often based on short-term foreign credit. The ensuing crash was to claim many victims. One day in June 1899, a delegation from one of the banks, Discontobanken, marched into Norges Bank with some very bad news: one of the country’s largest companies could not meet its payment obligations and Discontobanken was on the verge of collapse. If the bank fell, panic could ensue, triggering a domino effect in the banking system. Norges Bank, under the leadership of Governor Bomhoff, took immediate action to provide liquidity support. Credit was injected into the economy. Norges Bank soon had to take on the additional task of resolving speculative banks while at the same time protecting healthy banks from being caught in the undertow. Norges Bank was later praised for its approach.
For example, Canada did not have a wage adjustment during the first historical period, but it experienced one during the second period. We refer to the latter as the second episode of wage adjustment in Canada. Peak years are country-specific; hence they are not the same in all countries. This means that the first wage adjustment episode, including the peak years, may have lasted, for example, 7 years in Italy, 8 years in Germany and France, 9 years in US, 20 years in Korea or 28 years (and counting) in Japan. Of the 35 countries analysed, 21 countries experienced the first historical episode of wage adjustments, 33 countries experienced the second historical episode of wage adjustments and only 2 countries experienced the third historical episode of wage adjustments. This is why the total number of observations is much higher for the second wage adjustment episode, compared against the first wage adjustment episode. In the case of the third wage adjustment episode, the total number of observations is much lower. And now we move to the juicy part. We present the graphical representation of our results for all OECD countries which experienced wage adjustments (21 countries for the first wage adjustment episode and 33 countries for the second wage adjustment episode). The results are statistically significant and with the expected sign for the first two adjustment episodes. For the third adjustment episode, the sign of the relationship is as predicted, but the number of observations is too limited to have statistical significance.

Financial conditions might be adversely affected were there to be a sudden reversal in this process, in particular if that reversal were to bring about sharp price corrections, especially in less liquid market segments. Second, there are also worries about low profitability. The comprehensive assessment deemed solvency to be comfortably acceptable, but profitability in the banking industry remains prone to downside pressures, particularly in a macroeconomic setting that is worse than was expected some months back. Low returns hamper organic capital accumulation and raise doubts over the medium-term sustainability of banking activities. Banks will have to adapt their strategies and business models to enhance their profitability in a sustained fashion. Finally, I would highlight the risk of concerns re-emerging over the sustainability of sovereign debt, especially against a background of low nominal growth. This risk has not fully abated and might rear up again in the event of a substantial macroeconomic downturn. These three risks are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, a common denominator they share is the current weakness of euro area economic growth. But, irrespective of the transmission channels through which sluggish economic growth may translate into financial instability, it is precisely this weakness in nominal growth in the European economy that is the main risk to the area at present. The Spanish banking industry The Spanish banking industry is not immune to these risks.
They argue that there has been little evidence, over the long term, of technological unemployment. After all, average employment and unemployment rates today th  are similar to those in the 18 century. 5  The First Industrial Revolution (1760 – 1840) saw the mechanisation of (mainly the textile) industry with the introduction of steam power, moving people from home-based to factory-based production in urban areas. The Second Industrial Revolution (1860 – 1914) was driven by the introduction of electricity to manufacturing, extending mechanised, assembly-line mass production to broader industries. The Third Industrial Revolution (1970 – 2000) was defined by the move from mechanical/analogue to digital, with widespread adoption of electronics from both the home and work environment. The Fourth Industrial Revolution (2000 – current) anticipates the dawn of true Artificial Intelligence in light of advances in robotics, nanotechnology and quantum computing. 6 In the UK, intangible investment rose above tangible investment in the early 2000s, and stood at 11% as a share of output in 2014 compared with 10% for tangible investment. Investment in intangibles also exceeded that in tangibles in the US, Sweden and Finland [on average over 1999-2003], but not in other European countries including German, Italy and Spain. See Haskel, J and Westlake, W (2017), ‘Capitalism Without Capital: The Rise of the Intangible Economy’, Princeton University Press; and Goodridge, P R, Haskel, J and Wallis, G (2016), ‘Accounting for the UK Productivity Puzzle: A Decomposition and Predictions’, Economica, Vol. 85, Issue 339.

Thus, after a decade of persistently low inflation and difficulties of central banks in reaching inflation targets, last year this trend reversed and we have been witnessing a return of inflation across almost all economies. About half of the emerging economies have inflation higher than 7%, which is the highest share in the last two decades. In North Macedonia, as a highly open and import dependent economy, inflation has reached 8.8%. Although supply shocks tend to be temporary and usually limited to price changes of a limited number of consumption items, the recent data points that price shock may be more persistent and more broadly based than initially anticipated. For example, in emerging economies, more than half of the items of the consumption basket have high inflation, including services that tend to have more persistent effect. More persistent and broad-based price changes may lead to "backward-looking" inflationary expectations, as was the case before 1990, affecting the wage-setting process. In fact, the latest Consumer Survey of the EC indicates that inflation expectations in most of the CESEE economies have already picked up. So, how temporary and how strong the effects can be? According to the latest IMF forecast, the current crisis may result in higher global inflation by 3.6 p.p. with stronger effect in emerging economies, where it is estimated to average close to 9%. In a regional context, expectations go up to 8.0%.
We do not have zero appetite for failure of individual firms, provided that they do so in an orderly way that does not impose large costs or disruption on policyholders – neither in the form of direct losses nor of disruption – does not have knock on effects elsewhere in the financial system, and there is sufficient capacity elsewhere to substitute for the loss of the failing firm. We cannot leave this all to the market. Intervention in the form of prudential regulation is necessary because of the inverted production cycle in insurance – policies pay out after, in many cases long after, they are taken out – because of the limited or non-existent ability of many policyholders to monitor or react to increases in risk taking by their insurer during the life of their policy, and because of the incentive for managers and limited liability shareholders to increase risk if their capital stake drops too low – so called gambling for resurrection. These market failures are addressed not just by capital requirements, but by the interplay between capital and the other two pillars of the regime. Goldilocks and the three pillars: how much capital is just right? ‐ speech by Anna Sweeney | Bank of England  Page 3  Pillar 3: market discipline Pillar 3 is disclosure of information about a firm’s balance sheet risks. Market discipline is not wholly absent from the insurance sector either at the inception of or during the course of policies.

The unemployment rate fell by around 2 percentage points in the post-independence period. Its standard deviation was cut in half. And fifteen years of sustained economic growth followed. Table 1: Inflation lower and less volatile since MPC independence Annual CPI inflation  Inflation volatility  Four-quarter GDP growth  Four-quarter GDP growth volatility  Unemployment rate  Real wage growth  Pre-inflation targeting (1972-1992)  9.0  5.4  2.2  2.9  7.8  0.8  Start of inflation targeting to MPC independence (1993- 1997Q2)  2.3  0.4  2.9  0.7  9.0  0.3  MPC independence to crisis (1997Q3 - 2007)  1.6  0.5  3.0  0.9  5.4  0.7  2008 - end 2012  3.3  1.0  0.0  2.7  7.4  -0.3  2013 - present  1.7  1.0  2.0  0.5  5.2  0.2  However, with time, the initially healthy focus on price stability became a dangerous distraction. Against this serene backdrop of “the Great Moderation”, a storm was brewing. 3 This is the time-consistent optimal policy in the textbook New-Keynesian model with purely forward-looking IS and  Phillips curves. See Clarida, R, Gali, J and Gertler, M (1999), “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective”, Journal of Economic Literature, December.
We aim to: Strengthen our financial sector’s resilience to environmental risks Develop green finance solutions and markets Harness technology to facilitate sustainable financing flows Build knowledge and capabilities in sustainable finance 21. Under the Green Finance Action Plan: Banks, insurers and asset managers are required to factor in environmental risks as part of their business and risk management decisions; Businesses can access grants to defray the incremental expenses of taking up green or sustainability-linked loans and bonds to support their investments in green projects and adoption of more sustainable business practices; We encourage Fintechs and financial institutions to develop green fintech solutions, and partner MAS’ eﬀorts to leverage fintech to facilitate the mobilisation of capital, monitoring of commitments and measurement of impact to promote a green financial ecosystem; and We are building a deep pool of Asia-centric green finance expertise in Singapore, beginning with the establishment the Singapore Green Finance Centre, a collaboration between the Singapore Management University and UK’s Imperial College, to undertake green finance research, training and talent development programmes; we welcome corporates and financial institutions to co-create research and benefit from the training programmes available. These are not exhaustive, and work is ongoing to broaden and deepen the green finance ecosystem along the four key pillars. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2021/riding-the-growth-momentum-in-asia  8/11  12/02/2021  "Riding the Growth Momentum in Asia" – Keynote Speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development), …  22.

There has also been increased treasury and risk management activities carried out in Singapore to meet the needs of global investors and businesses in this time zone. Besides increasing fund flows, more regional and global MNCs have been setting up their corporate treasury centres in Singapore to facilitate capital raising, cash management and risk hedging, as their regional businesses grow. Singapore is a major derivatives trading hub in the region, with three derivatives exchanges oﬀering multi-asset class risk management products. We are also Asia Pacific’s largest FX centre, third largest globally, with average daily trading volume reaching $ billion in 2019, as we intermediate flows between regional teams of buy-side and sell-side players in Singapore and beyond. 10. Looking ahead, Asian financial markets are expected to become even more vibrant as the world economy’s centre of gravity shi s further towards Asia. Market participants in the region should embrace this opportunity to shape the future of Asian markets. While the growth trajectory has been very encouraging, more work needs to be done to develop deep and liquid capital markets in Asia, so that they can play a key role in financing economic growth, alongside continued development in the banking segments. 11. I will highlight a few additional areas of focus for Singapore: In foreign exchange, trading volume of Asian currencies, including that of Asian emerging markets currencies, has risen.