samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As of now, we expect neither a recession nor a stagflation in Singapore next year. But there are considerable downside risks in the global economy which bear close watching. MULTI-PRONGED APPROACH TO INFLATION  Dealing effectively with inflation requires a multi-pronged approach. monetary policy to directly dampen inflation fiscal support to help vulnerable groups cope with inflation sound labour market adjustments to prevent inflation becoming entrenched  First, monetary policy to directly dampen inflation. Singapore’s monetary policy is centred on managing the exchange rate of the Singapore Dollar. When inflationary pressures build up, MAS allows the trade-weighted exchange rate to appreciate faster. A stronger exchange rate helps to directly reduce imported inflation as well as restrain export demand, providing relief to labour market pressures. MAS has been proactive in tightening monetary policy in response to rising inflationary pressures, tightening policy four times in the last nine months. In October 2021, MAS slightly increased the rate of appreciation of the trade-weighted exchange rate policy band as a pre-emptive move when core inflation picked up from 0.7% in Q2 2021 to 1.1% in July-August 2021. MAS was among the earlier central banks in the world to begin normalising monetary policy. In January 2022, MAS added slightly to the rate of appreciation of the policy band in an off-cycle move to lean against gathering inflation momentum. This was before the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. In April 2022, MAS re-centred upwards the exchange rate policy band and further increased its rate of appreciation.

This was in view of a fresh impulse to inflation arising from shocks to global commodity prices and supply chains in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. And last week, in another off-cycle move, MAS again re-centred upwards the exchange rate policy band to lean against price pressures becoming more persistent. The appreciation of the exchange rate to-date has begun to restrain inflation. The trade-weighted exchange rate has appreciated by close to 4% compared with the beginning of October last year, acting as a filter against rising import prices. Domestic consumer prices have not risen by the same extent as that in the major advanced economies or global commodity prices. Year-to-date, the US and Eurozone have seen inflation rising to record highs of 8.2% and 6.8% respectively. Singapore’s headline inflation has been 5.0% year-to-date. The effects of MAS’ four monetary policy tightening moves are still working their way through the economy and will continue to dampen inflation over the next 12 months. The appreciation of the exchange rate is estimated to dampen core inflation by 0.9% points in H2 2022. Over 2022-23, the four tightening moves to-date is estimated to restrain core inflation by an average of 1.2% points each year. But monetary policy should be applied in a balanced and calibrated manner and not seek to completely offset inflation. Strengthening the exchange rate to try to fully offset the impact of global prices runs the risk of sharply curtailing growth and creating unemployment.
There is already cooperation on financial supervision within the EU. This takes place for instance in the form of special committees for the supervision of banks, securities and insurance. Now it is proposed that these supervisory committees should be given the status of public authorities. This would make it clearer that the joint supervision standards are binding and not, as now, recommendations. Although I guess that in the long term we will need to go even further, this is a step in the right direction, and not a moment too soon! The crisis management routines also need to be reinforced. Supervision, regulation and crisis management are interlinked. This may seem obvious. But here the same psychological phenomenon that has driven private players to take excessive risks has also been found among politicians and others in positions of responsibility. As long as everything is going well they are happy to ignore the risks. I note that Sweden and the Riksbank have been at the forefront of these discussions. It is good that many other countries have now begun to be aware of this. A Taylor rule for capital adequacy? Let me now, towards the end of my speech, test out an idea on you. The nice thing about this gathering is that one can take such liberties without it leading to any misguided monetary policy interpretation.

DLT may provide a more efficient alternative to credit bureaus that compile consumer credit information from banks. The insurance industry in Singapore is looking at how DLT can help prevent duplicate insurance claims. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Probably, one of the potentially more powerful applications in financial services is in customer verification, the so-called “know-your-customer” or KYC process. Banks spend an inordinate amount of time and money on KYC, and yet struggle to effectively detect and deter money laundering, tax evasion, and other forms of illicit finance. DLT brings about opportunities for a shared industry-wide KYC utility that can verify customers and transactions in a more efficient and robust manner. This is not just conjecture. It is beginning to happen. In Singapore, OCBC Bank, HSBC and MUFG announced last week that they have completed a KYC blockchain project to reduce the duplicity of KYC processes, providing convenience for customers and efficiency across the banks. The “killer app” for DLT is really in cross-border transactions. When multiple entities across different jurisdictions are involved, there is no natural trusted central party. DLT allows the possibility of various parties working directly with one another to make crossborder transactions cheaper, faster, and safer. Cross-border trade is a good example. In Singapore, we are exploring two specific applications – trade finance and trade documentation. In trade finance, DBS Bank and Standard Chartered Bank are exploring the use of DLT to prevent the problem of duplicate invoicing while preserving client confidentiality.
More recently, the ringgit had adjusted to reflect changes in the global economy including the developments in the US economy and global crude oil prices. Certainly there are risks associated with different levels of exchange rates and that different levels of exchange rate will benefit differently the various sectors and stakeholders in the economy. Looking forward, while the financial markets can be capricious, as market players focus on short-term developments, our role as policy makers is to look beyond these noises. As we continue to address our vulnerabilities and improve domestic fundamentals, the ringgit will eventually reflect the strength of our economy. Our path forward would continue to be characterised by fast-moving and ever-evolving macroeconomic risks and constantly evolving global trends. In facing the complex and multifaceted risks associated with it, the Malaysian economy is subjected to concerns of price stability and many other considerations that could affect overall macroeconomic stability. This brings me to another one of our approaches in relation to ensuring overall macroeconomic stability. We do not rely on any single policy tool. In particular, dependence on monetary policy as the sole instrument would be too narrow an approach. Monetary policy at best provides an enabling macroeconomic environment to support growth, and it should not be relied upon as the primary instrument to drive growth. In this regard, the Bank’s policy toolkit relies on a broad set of instruments to achieve overall macroeconomic stability. This includes considerations of macroprudential and pro-growth policies, as well as our advice on fiscal policy to the government.

The socio- and geopolitical paralysis that is splicing the centre towards the far-left and far-right in so many parts of the world can be traced back to the unequal sharing of global economic progress in past decades. This underscores the importance of broader-based economic growth and the urgency 7/8  BIS Central Banker's Speeches  to close the inequality gap. Leaders from the public and private sectors must help boost labourmarket participation; across genders, creed and nationalities and cushion any negative social costs that may arise as a by-product of growth. Only by reawakening growth, reigniting productivity and restoring inclusiveness, can we reclaim a positive and sustainable future. On that note, I would like to congratulate MIER on its commitment to research this past 30 years. It is my hope that MIER will continue to produce quality policy-informative-research, strengthening the synergies that exist between policy-making and research efforts. Finally, my wish is for MIER to become the leading “global bearer” for economic research in Malaysia; a think-tank that matters, to the sound policy formulation of the nation. Thank you. 1 Income Inequality: The Gap between Rich and Poor, B. Keely (OECD Insights, 2015). 2 Sharing the Growth Dividend: Analysis of Inequality in Asia, S. Jain Chandra et al. (IMF Working Paper, 2016). 3  The Morning Ledger: Productivity Slump Threatens Long-Term U.S. Growth, W. Azeez (Wall Street Journal, 2016). 8/8  BIS Central Banker's Speeches
The work done by the BNB in this area is the logical extension of the reforms in the banking sector that started in 2015 and is expected to continue throughout 2019 with the following focal points: • Development of an efficient organization for cooperation with the ECB within the supervisory colleges and joint supervisory teams; • Streamlining the supervisory strategy to match the new institutional reality resulting from the close cooperation arrangements; • Dividing the supervisory focus among important and less important institutions; • Organisation of collection of supervisory and statistical data for supervisory purposes and validation of supervisory reporting; • Development of information systems consistent with the new stage in the supervisory activities. The third working block relates to the organisation and carrying out of the asset quality review and the stress test. The process is under way for the selected six banks and is conducted by ECB in line with an ECB-adopted methodology and macroeconomic scenarios for the purposes of the stress test. The bulk of the assumptions and parameters are determined by the Central Project Steering Committee at the ECB with an established working communication between the BNB, ECB and SSM in this process. The Banking Supervision activities will continue through implementing the European regulatory framework applicable to the credit institutions with a focus on the consistent implementation of the technical standards and regulations, the Guidelines of the European Banking Authority and the recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board.

Another important task for the financial system is to reduce risks for both savers and investors. The fact that some companies can involve greater risk than others can be balanced in a well-differentiated financial market by savers spreading their savings across different forms, buying different shares, bonds, shares in mutual funds that in themselves represent a risk spread, and by depositing some in banks. A company that takes on debt in order to make profits in future through sales on foreign markets can protect itself against exchange rate fluctuations by signing futures contracts, which state when and at what prices future income will be converted to kronor. The company can also buy input goods, such as oil, and sell, for instance, pulp at a forward rate, so that the company knows for certain what its future costs and income will be. It costs to do this, but the company then faces no risks. It is quite simply a form of insurance. BIS Review 9/2002  3  When it comes to smaller companies and individual households, the securities market is hardly a suitable alternative. The risks for operators on the capital market are difficult to assess and the costs of the transactions have to be spread out over large amounts. Instead, banks and insurance companies supply services to small companies and households. The banks act as intermediaries, who receive deposits that are liquid and convert them into long-term lending, so that savers' requirements can be reconciled with the needs of the investing company.
These strategies are broadly based on two approaches: •  The one called “single point of entry resolution” (SPE groups), in which resolution powers are applied at the top of the group by a single resolution authority;  •  And the one called “multiple point of entry resolution” (MPE groups), where resolution tools are applied to different parts of the group by two or more resolution authorities acting in a coordinated way. Of course, the choice of the strategy needs to take into account the structure and business model of each banking group. A “Single Point” strategy may be better suited to a firm that operates in a highly integrated manner (through, for example, centralised liquidity, trading, hedging and risk management). On the other hand, an “Multiple Point” strategy may be suitable for financial groups with a decentralised structure and greater financial, legal and operational separation along national or regional lines, with sub-groups of properly capitalised, self-funded subsidiaries, which have enough managerial resources as stand-alone businesses. The feasibility and credibility of the “Multiple Point” strategy will mostly rely on two main issues: •  First, an effective cross-border coordination based on the cooperation agreements, the resolution plans and with the involvement of the resolution authorities of the main jurisdictions in which the groups operate. •  Second, a balanced loss absorbing capacity allocation across the group, according to local business risk profile in each jurisdiction.

Luis M Linde: Key issues on today’s banking industry Closing speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the 6th Santander International Banking Conference, Madrid, 5 November 2013. *  *  *  I would like first to give my thanks to Banco de Santander for inviting me to take part in this final session of your 6th International Banking Conference, an excellent opportunity to review and assess key issues on today’s banking industry, which has to face, in the next few years, important regulatory and operational changes. I will comment on several elements of the new Basel III capital framework that remain contentious or are still open to discussion. Among those, the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio and the very important issue of consistency in implementation. Then, I will move on to the Financial Stability Board’s work on resolution strategies and, finally, I will comment on the European Union Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), and one of the most important elements it contains, the bail-in tool. First, the leverage ratio, the ratio between Tier 1 capital and total balance-sheet and offbalance-sheet exposures not deducted from the calculation of Tier 1. This ratio is set, in principle, at a minimum of 3%. Its entry into force as an obligatory Pillar 1 ratio is foreseen to be in 2018. This new tool has been designed as a simple, transparent measure, not linked to risk, complementing and acting as a floor with respect to the risk-based minimum capital ratio.
V.  Safety nets: crisis resolution  In free market economy, no policy and no supervision can prevent the possibility of financial distress in any particular financial institution. What the public policy can do is to minimize the likelihood of systemic crisis. Crisis resolution is the key to avoid systemic disturbance. As we know, the ultimate policy choice for the authorities is to find the balance between the public sector and private sector solution from the one hand and between the pre-determined schedule and ad hoc approach from the other hand. Estonia's currency board regime sets for Bank of Estonia clear and strict limits that exclude several options available for the authorities in many other countries. By limiting the money supply to net foreign assets of the central bank, the room for emergency liquidity support is very limited. Therefore, in our case, the private sector solution is preferable and particular modalities of crisis resolution will depend very much on the circumstances. At this point, I would like to refer back to previous parts of my speech and underline that this particular approach rests upon a few strong fundamentals. Continuous analysis of financial system developments and early warning indicators, importance of strong owners and sound risk management in banks, high liquidity and capital requirements – these basic principles are a necessity for us. By combining the principles just mentioned, we can now describe a few hypothetical crisis resolution situations in Estonian financial system.

Mr. George looks at the question as to whether banks are still special Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. E.A.J. George, at the IMF 7th Central Banking Seminar entitled Banking Soundness and Monetary Policy in a World of Capital Markets and held in Washington on 29/1/97. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to take part in this well-directed and well-timed seminar. I am particularly pleased to be able to share with you my thoughts on the question you put to me “Are banks still special?” That question is partly a matter of institutional fact; but beyond that lies the question of whether the institutional characteristics of banks still justify central banks’ special concern for the stability of the banking system reflected in both macroand micro-prudential oversight and in their role as lender of last resort. So the answers to those questions could have far-reaching implications for the role of central banks themselves. In offering my answers I will ask, first, why banks have been regarded as special? Then I will ask whether banks have changed, or whether other financial institutions have become more bank-like? I will save my conclusions until the end! I am conscious, in this international forum, that I speak from a British perspective - in terms of the institutional and legal contexts and their evolution in relation to banks. But I would hope that, while some of the detail may be specific to the UK, the broad substance will not be.
What I have in mind here is a strategy that is usually termed “lower-for-longer” or “makeup strategy” and which has been advocated by the previous chairman of the Federal Reserve (the US central bank) Janet Yellen. 8 The idea is pretty straightforward. Let us assume that the central bank in a recession has cut its policy rate as far as it considers to be possible. Exactly how low the interest rate can be set is not obvious and the assessments vary from country to country. The Federal Reserve usually regards zero as the lower bound and talks about the “zero lower bound”, while in Sweden and other countries, which have cut their policy rates below zero, we talk about the “effective lower bound”. For the sake of simplicity I will from now on refer to this simply as the “lower bound” for the policy rate. Let us now assume that the central bank would actually have needed to cut the policy rate lower than the lower bound for monetary policy to become sufficiently expansionary. To compensate for not being able to do this, the central bank can instead hold the policy rate at the lower bound for a longer period of time (see Figure 4). 9 Seen in a slightly longer perspective, for instance a ten-year period, this should give roughly the same average policy rate as if one had been able to cut the rate below the lower bound.

5 See, for example, Summers (2018). 3 [24]  from 0.75 to –0.5 per cent, the cut would be 1.25 percentage points, that is much less than the estimated 2.5–3 percentage points. 6  Raising the repo rate to have ammunition ready? Here I should like to briefly touch on a particular question before I go on. If one is concerned that the repo rate will not be sufficiently high when the next economic downturn comes, can one not just raise it to a suitable level now, as a preventive measure – so that there is ammunition available when needed? This is an argument sometimes put forward in the general debate. But unfortunately there are a number of problems with this argument. Firstly, the economy will of course be affected by interest rate increases. Growth would slow down and inflation would fall. If one raises the rate quickly and substantially, one might even cause the economic downturn one was ultimately aiming to prevent. But even if this was not the case then, secondly, a very probable scenario would be that inflation nevertheless fell substantially, perhaps down to 1 per cent or lower, that is, to the level it was at some years ago. This could in turn mean that the credibility of the inflation target was questioned once again and economic agents would begin to expect that inflation on average would be 1 per cent rather than 2 per cent.
And for the Bank of England, it is to work within its objectives to ensure the financial system is resilient to the risks from climate change and supportive of the transition to net zero. With that in mind, today I wanted to reflect on a speech I delivered in 2020 on how to move beyond rhetoric to make climate action a reality. I had split our journey into three phases. Firstly, recognising and identifying the financial risks climate changes poses. Secondly, building capabilities to enable us to turn aspiration into action. And thirdly, making business decisions to advance the transition. With almost three years passed, I want now to evaluate our progress, identify the barriers we have encountered, and consider what else is needed if we are to progress. Back in 2020, I suggested that we had probably achieved the first phase of our journey to net zero. Conversations with leaders in the financial sector made it increasingly clear that climate change is central to the future of their businesses, not just the confines of Corporate Social Responsibility departments. I suggested we had entered the difficult second phase of turning aspiration into action, across the financial sector and the real economy. This phase involves a lot of hard work: the collection of data and the building of new tools that better enable climate considerations to be embedded in strategy and risk management.

The National University of Singapore Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Centre, as well as the Singapore Management University Sim Kee Boon Institute for Financial Economics both publish useful indices that assess the standards of corporate governance in Singapore. Professional associations such as ICPAS, IIA, SAICSA and SID have also been playing their roles in this area. Conclusion In closing, let me reiterate the point that good corporate governance pays – if not in immediate share prices, at least in the resilience of the firm in a crisis. Indeed, one key conclusion from the study by the Senior Supervisors Group3[3] is that financial firms that best rode out the recent crisis were ones with good corporate governance standards, demonstrating "a comprehensive approach to viewing firm-wide exposures and risk, sharing  3  William Rutledge et al. (March 2008), "Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence", Senior Supervisors Group. 4  BIS Review 147/2009  quantitative and qualitative information more effectively across the firm and engaging in more effective dialogue across the management team." Better governance per se does not guarantee that there will never be a crisis, but it can minimise its probability and its impact if it does occur. Singapore has made good progress over the years in our corporate governance practices, but we must press on with continual improvements. As regulators, professional bodies, investors, academics and the media, we each have a role – let us work closely together in this journey.