samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Miroslav Singer: European Supervisor Education Initiative “Financial supervision in Europe – on the right track?” Dinner speech by Mr Miroslav Singer, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the ESE Conference 2015 “Financial supervision in Europe – on the right track?”, Prague, 1 October 2015. *  *  *  Good evening ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured and delighted to be here with you today to share my views on whether prudential regulation and financial supervision in Europe are on the right track. My opinions are based on the Czech National Bank’s long and direct experience of supervising the Czech banking sector. I’d like to emphasise that our banking sector was hardly affected at all by the financial crisis. Our banks have consistently been posting high profits in recent years, so recapitalisation has not been on the agenda. This allows me to maintain the necessary detachment when observing current developments in financial supervision. I believe that three major trade-offs are encountered when developing regulations. 1. A trade-off between the costs and benefits of implementation. 2. A trade-off between complexity and clarity. 3. A trade-off between growth and safety. Often only the first one, between costs and benefits, is discussed. Mostly lip service is paid to the second one, the trade-off between complexity and clarity. And the third one, between safety and growth, is ignored in many cases. I will deal with all of them in what follows.

At the same time, it extended across national borders. Just before its collapse, the three major cross-border banks that constituted the bulk of the banking system had over 40% of their total assets in foreign subsidiaries, 60% of total lending was to non-residents, 60% of income was from foreign sources, and over two-thirds of total lending and deposits were denominated in foreign currencies. How did this happen, and why was it allowed? I do not think we yet have the research and the consensus to provide a reasonably undisputed list of the main causal factors in this process; however, I think four factors will rank highly on that list. These are Iceland’s membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994, privatisation of the Icelandic banking system in the early 2000s in a manner that placed the major banks in the hands of risk-loving investment bankers, the global conditions of ample and cheap credit that prevailed in the years prior to the international financial crisis, and the tendency in Iceland both to adopt international and EU regulations without critical analysis of Iceland-specific risks and to base supervision to a significant degree on mechanical checks of adherence to those regulations. Let me expand a bit on the EEA part, as it is highly relevant to my topic. The EEA Agreement provides a legal and regulatory framework based on European Union Directives, including a framework for free movement of capital and provision of financial services.
I will take a longer perspective and discuss which tools the Riksbank may need to use, especially if the low interest rate scenario that has characterised the past 10 years becomes even more prolonged. The fact that monetary policy measures affect a central bank’s balance sheet has become increasingly common in large parts of the world. This development has been driven by the very low interest rates and the need to make monetary policy even more expansionary. Essentially, it is nothing new – if we go back in time, there are many examples of central banks that have used variation in their asset portfolios as a means of conducting monetary policy. The monetary policy toolbox also needs to take into account changes in the financial system; for instance, we in 1 [25] ---------------------------*This speech grew out of many long discussions held over the spring of 2020. The opinions expressed are my own. At the same time, I would like to thank David Vestin for his help in writing this speech and Petra Frid for her help with the diagrams. I would also like to thank Mattias Erlandsson, Jesper Hansson, Pernilla Meyersson, Ulf Söderström, Anders Vredin, Frida Fallan, Charlotta Edler, Ann-Leena Mikiver, Cecilia Roos-Isaksson and Marianne Sterner for their valuable comments on the speech and Elizabeth Nilsson, Calum McDonald and Gary Watson for their assistance translating it into English. Sweden have, in recent years, seen a development towards a higher share of market financing for Swedish companies.

Heng Swee Keat: The first Shariah-compliant ETF in Singapore Congratulatory remarks by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Launch of Daiwa FTSE Shariah Japan 100 ETF at SGX Centre, Singapore, 27 May 2008. *  *  *  President and CEO, Daiwa Asset Management, Mr Michihito Higuchi Vice-President and Head of Listings, Singapore Exchange, Mr Lawrence Wong Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am pleased to join you at this ceremony to mark the debut of the Daiwa FTSE Shariah Japan 100 Exchange Traded Fund (ETF), the first Shariah-compliant exchange traded fund to be launched in Singapore. The Daiwa FTSE Shariah Japan 100 ETF will provide retail and institutional investors the opportunity to access the Japanese capital markets via a Shariah-compliant product traded on the Singapore Exchange (SGX). ETFs are one of the fastest growing asset classes in the investment funds industry. They aim to track the performance of indices and provide access to a wide variety of markets. As at the end of 2007, global assets managed via ETFs are estimated to have increased by 41% over the previous year to reach about $ billion while the total number of primary listings has increased by 64% to 1,171. There are currently 18 ETFs listed on SGX covering regional markets such as the AsiaPacific and ASEAN, and individual markets such as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, as well as alternative investments such as gold and commodities.
At least in the Brazilian case, there is very little empirical evidence of that. Under managed exchange rates Brazil suffered recurrent balance of payments difficulties in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1980s debt crisis, which contributed to a dramatic deterioration in macroeconomic performance in the following years, and the slowdown and crisis of the 1990s, before its final collapse in January 1999. Letting the market set the exchange rate does not mean remaining inactive when markets become dysfunctional. Thus, the Central Bank has used its reserves, during the current period of global financial turmoil, to ensure that Brazilian exporters and importers retain access to trade finance, to help Brazilian corporates rollover their debts and to provide liquidity to the spot market. Throughout this difficult period our focus has been on contributing to improve the way markets function, not to replace them. This approach is, and will remain, the cornerstone of our action in the foreign exchange market. There is no doubt that the world is currently experiencing an extremely difficult time. But it is also true that Brazil is among the countries that are better prepared to cope with the effects of the global financial crisis – a fact pointed out by several organizations in many occasions, such as the last issue of the OECD composite leading indicators, a survey encompassing 35 countries. 1 Brazilian fundamentals not only enable us to face the current environment in better conditions than most countries, but also in a much better shape than in the past.

One of the distinguishing features of the Brazilian economy is its prudential regulatory framework. The vigilant stance of the Central Bank prevented the development of  1  2  See http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3343,en_2649_34349_41966331_1_1_1_1,00.html, 2009. January  12,  BIS Review 8/2009  disequilibria and excesses that emerged in several other economies. We did not let the markets adopt risk taking attitudes that led to the losses and problems that many countries are facing today. In fact, the Brazilian framework is considered a model for prudential regulation and regarded as an example to be followed by other regulatory authorities. That does not mean that Brazil is not being hit or suffering the impacts of the financial turmoil. But the Brazilian government is prepared to react and take all the necessary measures to tackle the crisis. In conclusion, a floating exchange rate is no cure-all remedy for all economic ills. But it is certainly the best regime for a large, relatively closed, economy like ours. If Brazil had not floated the BRL in 1999, it would surely have done so since then, and possibly in more adverse conditions. For all the above, this 10th anniversary is worth celebrating. Thank you very much. BIS Review 8/2009  3
If you look more closely at the dollar bill, you will find a further inscription which states “This note is legal tender for all debt, public and private”. This imposes an obligation to accept the note in the settlement of contracts and highlights the fact that money derives its value - whether imposed by a legal tender requirement or not - from the willingness of other economic agents to accept it to settle transactions. Each agent will only accept money, if he can be confident that it will in turn be accepted BIS Review 96/2000  2  by other agents in future transactions. Thus money is a social achievement as has long been recognised by economists for example by Menger. Money is a question of trust, its use requires trust and it reflects trust. This is especially true in the case of fiat money, i.e. the use of printed paper - which has no intrinsic worth - as a medium of exchange and as a store of value. Yet even commodity money requires trust and a well-founded expectation that it will be accepted for a wide range of transactions. Milton Friedman, in his book Money Mischief (1992), reports the well-known story of the monetary system of a small island in Micronesia which at the end of the 19th century used stone wheels as a medium of exchange and as a store of wealth.

The Hong Kong-based company that operates our container port facilities is expanding its operations into the newly modernising ports of the mainland. In new sectors, such as internet services, Hong Kong companies have been among the first to grasp the opportunities on the mainland. The outlook for Hong Kong investment on the mainland is one of both sectoral and geographical diversification: from the mainly manufacturing activities that grew up in the Pearl River Delta in the 1980s, to a variety of activities spread over a much larger region. And, like the establishment of the Special Economic Zones close to Hong Kong nearly a quarter of a century ago, China’s entry into the WTO will underline the truism that the more China opens to the world, the more Hong Kong benefits. The implications for banking and financial service Physical trade and the less visible trade in services require a financial infrastructure in the same way that new buildings need plumbing and electrical wiring. We expect that the “creation effect” of WTO entry will result in a surge in banking business on the mainland. There are two main elements in this process. The first is the greater demand for banking services, resulting from the growth induced by the effects of WTO accession. The second is the financial deepening, stimulated by more rapid financial liberalisation, greater banking competition, and product innovation induced by the terms of WTO accession.
(ii)  It was also difficult to decide the appropriate spread to charge for lending against wider relative to narrow collateral, to mitigate adverse selection and the moral hazard risk. A minimum 50 basis point spread was applied for wider collateral. (iii)  Those long-term repos exposed the Bank and the commercial banks to significant interest rate risk. That is because commercial banks’ reserves balances were being remunerated at Bank Rate but the minimum bid rate in the LTRs was the fixed  10  The narrow and wider collateral sets were redefined in February 2011. The changes will take effect from 1 July 2011. See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice110211.pdf for more details. 11  For more information about changes in the Bank’s balance sheet in response to the crisis, see Cross and Fisher, “The Bank’s balance sheet during the crisis”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2010 Q1. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3-month market (OIS) rate at the time of the operation (plus the spread for wider collateral). So when Bank Rate was cut much more rapidly than was anticipated by the market during Autumn 2008, the Bank recorded a large, unintentional surplus (and the banks a corresponding loss).12 In order to try to resolve these issues, the Bank enlisted the help of Paul Klemperer from Nuffield College, Oxford, an expert in auction theory, to help re-design its long-term operations.

”These words of Caffè do not surprise those who knew him and those who have read his works. They express the fundamental inspiration of his professional and public life: it is a duty of economic policy to act so that the economy can get as close as possible to full employment. In 1975, he formulated it more precisely: “The goal of dignified work for all, however, is not compatible either with situations of privilege, which have now become destabilising, nor with excessive labour and social security rights, which results in job opportunities evaporating away”. The issue that Caffè raises here is one of fairness. We find it again today: the international crisis has affected everyone, and young people especially. In the European Union, between 2007 and 2011 the unemployment rate rose by 5.8 percentage points among the 15–24 year olds, by 3.5 points among the 25–34 year olds and by 1.8 points in the 35–64 age range. Qualitatively, the profile is similar almost everywhere; the clear exception is Germany, where the unemployment rate among 15 to 24 year olds in the first quarter of 2012 was 8%; in Italy it was 34.2%, in Spain 50.7% and the euro area average was 21.9%. These trends reflect a fundamental question: they confirm the particular vulnerability of this essential part of our workforce.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The nature of risks involved in dealing with OTC financial derivatives Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 4th Banking and Financial Law School Seminar, Kuala Lumpur, 19 February 2004. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to be here at this 4th Banking and Financial Law School in light of developments in the global and domestic financial markets. We are in a period of great change. As the pace of globalisation intensifies the global environment has been marked by greater volatility and uncertainty. As a consequence we are often dealing with probabilities. The process of globalisation has resulted in international capital movements and developments in the global financial, and regulatory arena that have had significant implications on domestic financial institutions. There is therefore a need for a global perspective in effectively managing these risks. The universal application of ISDA Master Agreements is a demonstration of the need for globally oriented solutions. This morning my remarks will focus on the need to appreciate the nature of risks involved in dealing with OTC financial derivatives, both by the market and the regulators. I will also touch briefly on the opportunities emerging in terms of developing derivatives within Islamic banking and finance. Financial institutions, as the linchpin for the process of financial intermediation, have a crucial role in facilitating the flow of capital to areas where it can be most productively used.

On a preemptive note, in response to a series of derivative debacles that was sparked off by the Barings crisis in 1994, Bank Negara Malaysia has taken steps to enhance prudential regulations on the derivatives business of banking institutions. In 1996, the Guideline on Minimum Standards on Risk Management Practices for Derivatives was issued to provide a framework that outlines the minimum risk management standards for the derivatives business of banking institutions. It requires banks to ensure that risk management controls and procedures are in place before engaging in derivatives business. The guidelines also ensure that derivatives can be offered to customers for hedging purposes only. In May 2003, as a step towards a more liberalized financial market, banking institutions are allowed to embed derivatives into investment instruments to enhance yields. The investment has to be principal protected, and may be offered to high net worth or corporate clients and for a minimum transaction amount of one million Ringgit. As part of the prudential requirements, no leveraging is allowed on the structure. Gradual liberalization allows the banking industry and the regulator to work in a collaborative manner in developing an innovative yet stable financial system. In the context of the significant growth in OTC derivatives, both in the domestic market as well as the global market, there is therefore an important need for prudential management in derivatives since speculation would itself introduce risks into OTC derivatives market and could deter the principal objectives of risk diversification and risk management.
With a population of just under 650 million, ASEAN is characterised by its rising and expanding middle class. This segment will represent two-thirds of its overall population by 2030. Increasing urbanisation, rising consumption levels and a young workforce are expected to drive future growth. This forms the backdrop that will boost intra-ASEAN trade and investment. Consequently, this will further propel the region’s journey to become a highly integrated and cohesive economy as envisaged in the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. Current state of the ASEAN insurance industry Now, how has the ASEAN insurance industry fared during this period and how will it perform going forward and how do we want it to perform? Ten years ago, the ASEAN insurance sector recorded a total premium income of USD41 billion, with total assets of USD185 billion. In 2017, the region recorded a total premium income of USD103 billion, with total assets of USD480 billion. Nevertheless, the ASEAN insurance industry remains small. According to Swiss Re, the combined premium volume of the ASEAN insurance market accounted for only 2.1% of the world’s market share in 2017. In comparison, the insurance industries in China and Japan each accounted for 11.1% and 8.6% of the world’s market share, respectively. Insurance penetration in the ASEAN region remains low, averaging 3.6% in 2017. This is considerably well below the global average of 6.1% and the greater Asian region’s average of 5.6%.

The two cities are situated in different regions and their real economies have different clientele. With capital account controls still in place on the Mainland, the further opening up of Shanghai, such as the development of its Free Trade Zone, will lead to closer and more extensive business, trade and financial links between the two cities, meaning more business opportunities. In 2000, there were 23 flights a day between Hong Kong and Shanghai. In 2013, this had increased to 75, clearly demonstrating that the continuous growth of Shanghai will result in more business exchanges with Hong Kong and creating a win-win situation. 9. Indeed, the launch of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect on November 17 resonates with my assertions here in several ways. Last week, Vice-Premier Ma Kai told the visiting delegation of the Hong Kong Association of Banks that the scheme was not only a 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  milestone for financial co-operation between Hong Kong and Shanghai, but also a strategic move towards the Mainland’s capital account convertibility and the opening up of its capital market. Furthermore, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect adds another important channel for the circulation of renminbi between onshore and offshore markets. It is also a strong vote of confidence in Hong Kong’s development as an international financial centre, reaffirming our unique role as the offshore testing ground for the Mainland’s financial liberalisation. Zero-sum vs positive-sum 10.
Like many other organisations facing major change in its core business, the Fund will need to be sure that everything it values and rewards is tuned to support its new priorities. Conclusion Over the past fifteen years, the Great Inflation that followed the end of the Bretton Woods system has been replaced by the Great Stability. Globalisation has brought great benefits, but it is creating major challenges for policy makers. How will such issues be handled in future? The Fund certainly has the potential to act as an authoritative medium for international monetary collaboration, providing its surveillance activities are re-focused on external stability and the big global issues. The Managing Director’s current reform agenda is on the right lines. But the Fund’s effectiveness in promoting international monetary stability will depend critically on the organisation’s stature as a trusted and respected source of dispassionate analysis and impartial advice. And it will rest above all on the willingness of its members – large as well as small - to use it as their instrument to improve the quality of their own policy making. BIS Review 103/2006  7  Equipping the Fund with its own version of Hawk-Eye will not be enough. In the end it will be down to them – or more accurately, us.

See, for instance, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I think that the division into these three main views provides a good reflection of the current debate. But there are of course no sharp dividing lines between them, rather the dividing lines are relatively fluid. And where one finds oneself on the scale ultimately depends on which argument or arguments one allocates the greatest significance. It will probably come as no surprise to those of you who follow the monetary policy debate in Sweden that I myself have great sympathy for the principle that monetary policy needs to support macroprudential policy. I would therefore place myself fairly close to the second view in Smets’ description. So what has led me to this view? Allow me to begin by giving my interpretation of what a monetary policy that leans against the wind entails. What does it mean that monetary policy leans against the wind? There are different ways of illustrating how and why financial imbalances and risks should be included in the monetary policy deliberations. Essentially it is a question of avoiding scenarios where the imbalances will lead to very negative effects on GDP, unemployment and inflation. So in principle it is a question, as usual in monetary policy, of stabilising inflation and the real economy.