samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Should we conclude, therefore, that in the absence of a world government, the identification of “new rules of the game” is likely to be no more than a theoretical exercise? Certainly, the fate of Keynes’ proposal for an International Clearing Union is not encouraging. But the experience of the past twenty years shows that large imbalances mean that everyone suffers when there is a sharp adjustment. So there is scope, if not for formal international policy coordination, then for an international conversation about how to improve a system that is fragile. Central banks were able to ensure, for a while, that the paths of output were sustainable – consistent with low and stable inflation. But the patterns of demand were far from sustainable. And when the sharp adjustment to demand eventually came, it inevitably had implications for the level of output. Reform of the IMFS, and of our domestic financial systems, is a necessary complement to the domestic price stability oriented policy frameworks of central banks. The immediate issue of how to move to a more sustainable position requires a resolution of different countries’ economic strategies for rebalancing. There can be only one path for rebalancing – with rebalancing in the deficit economies, by definition, just a mirror of that in the surplus countries. But the path that would be chosen by high-saving economies differs from that which the more indebted industrialised economies would prefer.

Durmuş Yılmaz: Food prices and inflation Speech by Mr Durmuş Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Central Bank of Argentina 2008 Money and Banking Conference “Financial turbulence – impact on developed and emerging economies”, Buenos Aires, 1 September 2008. *  *  *  Dear Guests, It is a great pleasure and honor for me to address such a distinguished audience on the issue of “Food Prices and Inflation”. The current level of food prices constitutes a major risk to households, in particular those living in developing countries. I’d like to thank the Central Bank of Argentina to organize this conference and dedicate a special session on this issue at this juncture. Dear Guests, The second half of 2007 was not an easy period for central bankers – and so far 2008 has been even more challenging. We are currently facing significant inflationary pressures on a global scale due to record high increases in commodity prices. The surge in inflation rates has become a major challenge that threatens price stability in many countries. Average inflation throughout the world has been rising rapidly. Inflation in developed countries has reached its highest level of the last eighteen years. For the first time in many years, inflation figures of the developing countries are in two digit levels. Moreover, the financial turbulence that has started in the second half of 2007 and the subsequent credit crunch are adversely affecting economic activities. Growth rates have been slowed in many countries.
The acquiescence of the UK labour force in accepting lower real wages is quite remarkable for those of us who grew up during the wage-price spirals of the 1970s and 80s. It explains in part why unemployment has stayed much lower than we would have expected, given the weakness of output growth. Much of the labour force has priced itself into work. The public sector has also been addressing its finances. There was clearly a greater structural deficit in the fiscal position than anyone thought pre-crisis and the Government are trying to reduce public expenditure and raise income to get back onto a sustainable footing. I should note that no consolidation at all would have been unsustainable and was never an option. Nevertheless, as the May Inflation Report noted, it is likely that the consolidation has weighed on output over the past three years and will continue to do so. The financial sector also has its balance sheet problems. The major banks in particular have been re-structuring, reducing wholesale market borrowing, improving their liquidity positions and building up capital. I believe every large UK lender has at least one non-core portfolio they are running down, and commercial property lending is typically a common factor. Finally, the corporate sector. In aggregate, UK businesses continue to save rather than invest, running up a significant and on-going corporate surplus. But like the household sector, there are different sub-groups. Some, especially large companies, are cash rich and profitable but not investing as much as they perhaps could.

Much has been done even in the weakest institutions. But there is more to do to complete the task of ensuring that the banking system is fit for purpose. My main message today is that you should expect the Bank of England to continue to play its part in supporting the recovery towards genuine real growth, whilst being careful not to let domestic inflationary pressures build, consistent with our remit. But monetary policy can only take us so far and the necessary real adjustments will need real changes and, most importantly, real time to work through. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Firstly, our Report indicates that the Banco de España did not adopt measures that could, perhaps, have checked the sizeable increase in credit to the private sector recorded between 2001 and 2007, in particular in the construction and real estate development 12/14  sectors, and in mortgage lending for house purchases. But it should be pointed out that there were then no legal regulations that could have provided for such action and that other measures adopted in those years – the countercyclical provisions and the more severe treatment of the so-called “special-purpose vehicles” – were effective in helping withstand the first crisis, although they did not suffice to protect our banks from the double-dip recession that began in 2011. Secondly, the treatment of the most characteristic problems of the savings banks through the risk-pooling schemes contained in the institutional protection systems (IPSs) did not suffice to resolve the solvency and governance problems of most savings banks; nor was there much success with certain innovations such as equity units with voting rights, with which it was sought to resolve, or at least alleviate, savings banks’ difficulties in raising resources equivalent to capital. Thirdly, it seems clear that the Banco de España estimated that the 2009 recession would have what the economists call a “V” shape, and not a “W” shape, without anticipating the strong impact of the second recession on many credit institutions’ solvency.

The integration processes called for a voluntary agreement between the parties. In the midst of the crisis, these agreements were not easy and they required, moreover, the approval of the related regional government authorities. But in 2011 nobody, or practically nobody foresaw the double-dip recession and less still how violently it would affect the Spanish economy. In April 2011 most agencies, including the IMF, the OECD, the European Commission and the Banco de España, were forecasting growth for our economy of around 0.8%, which at the end of the year turned out to be a decline in GDP of 1.0%, the biggest forecasting error on record in recent times for these institutions. The European Central Bank was acting in response to what it saw as a recovery scenario for the euro area, as testified by the fact that it raised its benchmark interest rate by 25 bp on two occasions, in April and in July 2011, only to reverse these rises from November, in light of the worsening sovereign debt crisis. The forecasting error was also most significant in 2012: in their 2012 spring projections, most institutions estimated a decline in GDP of around 1.6%, and ultimately it was 2.9%. Overview As is addressed in the final chapter of the Report, I should now like to take an overall view of the crisis.
Developments in the PRA’s supervision of annuity providers Speech given by Charlotte Gerken, Executive Director Insurance Supervision The 18th Conference on Bulk Annuities 29 April 2021  I would like to thank Anu Ralhan and Rob West for their help in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Thank you to Westminster and City for inviting me to speak at your bulk purchase annuities conference. At the time the 2020 conference was scheduled to take place, we were all grappling with the early impacts of the COVID 19 pandemic on our work, our lives and loved ones. In the months since, life insurers’ staff have worked hard and in challenging circumstances to serve their customers in very difficult times. As companies, life insurers have so far come through the pandemic well. That is not to say things have been perfect, but we recognise the commitment of firms and their staff to ensuring business continuity – particularly important when considering in the case of annuity providers that an annuity may be a substantial portion of the retirement income of the recipient.

Let me now conclude by wishing all of you a fruitful and enriching conference ahead and a productive process tapping the international capital markets down the road. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 35/2007
Thus, inflation excluding unprocessed food and tobacco posted a smaller decline, according closely with the upper bound of the July Inflation Report forecast (Chart 9). The inflation outlook remained benign amid waning cumulative exchange rate effects, weakening demand conditions and modest import prices. Cost pressures driven by producer prices remained subdued in this period. On the other hand, rising tobacco prices and adjustments in fuel taxes hampered the improvement in inflation. Therefore, consumer inflation fluctuated while annual core inflation remained on a downward track through the third quarter. After a slight increase in the previous quarter, annual food inflation recorded a sharp drop in the third quarter, standing far below the path projected in the July Inflation Report. The slowing food inflation was mostly attributed to the waning tourism demand, the contraction in exports to Russia and the measures placed on red meat. Food inflation excluding fresh fruits and vegetables fell to a five-year low of 4.78 percent in September (Chart 10). Meanwhile, despite the sluggish economic activity and the slowing food inflation, services inflation remained high mostly due to rising real unit labor costs and rent. 5 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  The underlying core goods inflation slowed down in the third quarter as a result of moderate exchange rates and weakening domestic demand. On the other hand, the underlying services inflation increased. Accordingly, the underlying core inflation indicators remained largely flat compared to the previous quarter (Chart 11).

It is a bold assertion, but not necessarily an unreasonable one, reflecting the dollar value of transactions processed across the Fedwire Funds, Fedwire Securities, and National Settlement Services; the interconnectedness and dependencies between these services and other systemically important infrastructures; our role as central securities depository and as fiscal agent for the issuance, maintenance, and redemption of all Fedwire-eligible securities; and as the platform across which the Federal Reserve ultimately settles its monetary policy operations. Any one of these elements would likely qualify the wholesale services as “systemic”; in the aggregate they represent a staggering portfolio on which the execution of both our nation’s fiscal and monetary policies ultimately depends. In recognition that a wholesale service outage risks a significant shock to the United States, and in light of the escalating threat landscape in which collectively we operate, last year before this audience I shared a series of reflections endeavoring to advance a new paradigm for resiliency and security for financial market infrastructures. This year I’d like to provide an update on our progress on this front, and then to elaborate on the portfolio of wholesale service initiatives that we are endeavoring to advance to add value for customers and end users. As always, my remarks reflect my own views and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
He argued quite correctly that such complex and delicate relationships cannot be established full-blown by a piece of legislation. It must be the result of years of experience and the slow growth of political conventions. Exter Report testifies to the fact that the independence of the Central Bank should be attained and maintained by people in both the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance and working with a “moral consciousness” regarding the well-being of the whole society rather than narrow self-interest objectives. Conclusions Six decades is a long period during which a society should necessarily undergo tremendous political, social and economic transformation. The onslaughts of new technology, globalization and advancements in fast communication systems have changed the ideals of the people of all societies throughout the globe. Hence, one may tempt to question whether the ideals expressed by Exter more than a half a century ago are still valid and relevant. Though the ideals of societies have changed, the core principles that are embodied in the philosophy of central banking have not changed over the time. In fact, they have become much more hardened today than 60 years ago. Nations throughout the world have gone for price stability as a necessary prerequisite for continuous prosperity. Hence, the hands of central bankers have been strengthened much more today in all parts of the world to facilitate central banks to function independently and make appropriate policies for monetary stability.

Exter argued that that should be the case because of the inflationary or deflationary effects which the payment or the non-payment of profits can have on an economy. For instance, when the profits are transferred to the government, the reserve money will increase, raising both money supply and creating inflationary pressures. Exter argued that such an expansion that would have arisen from the Central Bank’s own contribution to inflation by raising its domestic assets should be prevented. Domestic assets of the Bank could go up due to the Bank’s lending to the Government or the commercial banks. If these assets have increased too rapidly, the result would be inflation through a similarly rapid increase in money supply. Exter’s prioritization of the appropriation of profits intended to prevent the Bank from paying to the government such profits earned by inflating the economy. But, he did not have any objection to the transfer of profits to the government, if such profits have been earned on the Bank’s investment of its foreign assets. Since the foreign assets are maintained by the Bank on behalf of the government, the latter have a right to receive its due rate of return. So, Exter concluded that if the domestic assets have not expanded (in other words, if the Central Bank has not inflated the economy), “there should be no ill-effects from paying out the Central Bank’s profits to the Government, especially since in this case the Government could not have been obtaining excessive accommodation from the Central Bank”.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see the introduction of the euro ten years ago as a prescient, forward-looking response by Europe to the challenges and risks of the present world. I would now like to consider my third question: What challenges lie ahead for the single currency? Despite all the achievements, this is not the time for complacency. There are important challenges. The most important and most direct is of course to tackle the financial market turbulence and the economic downturn. But there are also challenges which go beyond tackling the current situation. But they are related to it in part. I would like to consider three challenges briefly: the securing of sound government finances, structural reforms in the euro countries and the expansion of the euro area. Securing of sound government finances Sound government finances are critical. They complement the ECB’s stability-oriented monetary policy. They prevent the fiscal policies of one country in the euro area from having  6  BIS Review 16/2009  negative effects on other countries. Beyond that, sound finances make a national economy more flexible. They are part of a growth-friendly environment. The fiscal policies of the Member States should promote the smooth functioning of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. The Stability and Growth Pact is the instrument to guarantee this. The Pact is the most important pillar in the economic union. It supports the monetary union. The strict and credible implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact is essential.

We are grateful for the assistance provided to the Project Team by our host Dewan Bandaraya Kota Kinabalu, city councils, Polis Diraja Malaysia and other local agencies. I also would like to take this opportunity to thank our two most important collaborators; The World Bank and the Malaysia Association of Money Services Business for their support in making Project Greenback 2.0 a success story that we can be proud of, for many years to come. I am proud to see how the hard work you put in have translated into impressive tangible results. These include a substantial number of new customers being on-boarded for digital remittance services, multifold growth in e-remittance transactions and significant reduction in the cost of sending money. A tiny difference in the remittance costs translates into a huge saving for the migrant workers and their families. Specific to Sabah, reducing the remittance costs by merely 1% means an additional RM24 million in the hands of migrant workers – this will benefit thousands of households in the receiving countries. Overall, this supports the regulatory objective of promoting greater usage of formal remittance channels, a common goal which is shared by our partner, the World Bank. I would like to end by sharing some aspirations about what should we do next after Project Greenback. Experimental economists Michael Kremer, Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee, recent Nobel laureates in Economics showed us how the big problem of poverty, could be tackled by the ability to break it down into more precise questions.
Although these data are far from perfect they suggest that, while within-firm pay differentials have accounted for some of the increased dispersion in pay across households, across-firm variations have made a larger contribution. Tackling the Productivity Puzzle  There has been no shortage of public policy ideas over recent years for boosting productivity growth. Reports by the IMF and OECD have suggested measures ranging from increased infrastructure spending to improved education and training programmes. 58  Earlier this year, the UK Government issued a Green  Paper setting out various pillars to support productivity. 59  And, most recently, here at the LSE the Growth  Commission produced their second report on measures to boost UK productivity. 60  In generic terms, these policy measures fall into three categories. First, there are measures which support all companies, irrespective of sector, region or characteristic. For example, last year’s Autumn Statement provided additional financial support for UK infrastructure spending, while in the Budget a couple of weeks ago the UK government announced plans for increased support for technical skills. Second, there are measures which support technological innovation – the creation and growth of frontier firms. One potentially important micro-economic measure supporting innovation is greater recognition of the importance of companies’ intangible assets, such as intellectual property (IP). These constitute an increasing fraction of companies’ total assets, but are not measured or valued in as consistent and coherent a way as tangible assets such as plants and machinery. This can have real costs for the companies concerned.

Notes: Scenario 1 assumes that half of firms with interest cover ratios of less than 1 exit the market. In scenario 2, only the lowproductivity half of firms with interest cover ratios of less than 1 exit the market. Chart 25: The estimated relationship between leverage and labour productivity  Source: Bahaj, Foulis, Gal and Pinter (2016). Notes: The figure plots the results from local regressions. The red line shows the results from local weighted scatter smoothing (LOWESS), the blue line shows the results from a third degree kernel weighted local polynomial smoothing where the gray area depicts the associated 95% bootstrapped confidence bands. Labour productivity is defined as the log of gross value-added per number of employees. During the local regression estimations, we trim the data by deleting the top and bottom 1% of estimated productivity and leverage values in order to mitigate problems of outliers. 35  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  35  Chart 26: Distribution of average pay across companies  Source: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations. Notes: Series show wage deciles/percentiles. Chart 27: Distribution of firm level labour productivity, wages and profits in 2014  Sources: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations.