samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Ravi Menon: Stepping up the Chongqing-Singapore connection Keynote address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore-China (Chongqing) Financial Conference, Singapore, 4 September 2017. * * * Vice Mayor Liu Guiping, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. More than 2000 years ago, the Silk Road connected, by land and sea, the major economies of the time, enriching the lives of many people along its routes. And now 2000 years later, Chongqing, one of China’s “super-cities”, is part of the effort to revive this great heritage. Chongqing is strategically placed. It is a pivotal node on the One Belt, One Road, connecting the growing economies of South and Southeast Asia with the rest of China It is also an important city along the Yangtze River Economic Belt and a key player in the overall development of the Western Region. In short, Chongqing is a cornerstone of regional connectivity. Singapore is proud to be a partner to Chongqing in this historic project, through the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative, or CCI. And so, I am happy today to welcome you to the second Singapore-China (Chongqing) Financial Conference, to take stock of the progress we have made together and to set new goals for the future. China and Singapore – a vibrant economic relationship The backdrop to CCI is, of course, the larger China-Singapore economic relationship – one of the strongest in Asia. China is Singapore’s largest trading partner. Singapore is China’s fourth largest trading partner in ASEAN.

It would also mean that the Swedish payment infrastructure is to a greater extent harmonised with the rest of the EU, which can increase competition and the quality of the payment services offered to Swedish customers. RIX plays a central role in the Swedish payment system The payment system the Riksbank currently supplies to financial institutions is called RIX. Institutions wishing to become participants in RIX enter into an agreement with the Riksbank. The Riksbank is a public institution, which means that entry to the RIX system is given on competitively neutral terms to institutions meeting the conditions that are set. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of RIX for the Swedish economy. From the time that RIX opens at 0700 hours on a typical working day until it closes at 1700 hours, a good 20,000 payments are settled to a total value of more than  2 According to the international standards on financial infrastructure issued by the CPMI-IOSCO, systemically im-  portant infrastructures should settle in central bank money whenever it is practically possible. 3 The Eurosystem consists of the European Central Bank and the national central banks in the euro area. 2 [8]  SEK 600 billion.4 RIX is the hub of the Swedish payment system and it is therefore also logical that the functions and accessibility of RIX will be in focus when the Riksbank upgrades its capacity to meet the challenges of the future payment market. The Riksbank is not in any unique situation in this respect.
That could be done either by making MMMFs hold capital, which essentially amounts to turning them into de jure banks; or by requiring MMMFs to mark-to-market daily, so that they become Variable Net-Asset Value investment vehicles. In other parts of the shadow banking forest, I hope that we can consider the merits of the industry establishing a Trade Repository for data on what goes on in the securities lending market, including on the reinvestment of cash or securities collateral. While that will sound technical, this is one of the world’s biggest financing markets: firms and the authorities need at least to be able to gauge broadly what is going on. And, to give a third example, I hope that we will treat ostensibly “non-bank” prime brokers as banks if they finance their business with client balances that can be withdrawn on demand. My FPC colleagues will not necessarily agree with all of that, but I hope the examples illustrate that we are not going to focus myopically only on the banking system. “Cyclical” instruments: how does macroprudential policy relate to monetary policy? The cyclical dimension of macroprudential policy is essentially about leaning against credit booms with a view to maintaining financial system resilience.8  7  See Chapter 2 of HMT’s Consultative Document, “A new approach to financial regulation: building a stronger system”, February 2011. 8  I set out the Bank’s developing thinking in this area in Tucker, “The debate on financial system resilience: macroprudential instruments” in the Barclays Annual Lecture, October 2009.

It is for the obvious reason that we need to preserve the key services that the financial system provides to the real economy: payments and transactions deposits; the intermediation of savings and investment via credit and equity; and insurance and risk transfer. In the latest crisis, the payment system was preserved but only at a massive cost to the taxpayer, and even then official support operations could not prevent the severe credit crunch that led to a horrible global recession. That is why we care. And it underlines the importance of ensuring that the system of credit intermediation (and risk transfer), not only the payment system, is robust. Instability and resilience But not every severe interruption in the provision of financial services is the result of instability. Instability is characterised by a problem in one of part of the financial system – a bank, a market, part of the infrastructure-spreading to other parts and threatening to spiral out of control. Financial systems are prone to bouts of instability, due to the inherent fragility of the balance sheets of many participants, together with the complex networks through which they are connected. First, many firms are highly leveraged, meaning that a given fall in the value of their assets has a magnified effect on their net worth; and run significant liquidity risks, so that they can face distress if their liabilities crystallise before their assets. Given opacity about their financial strength, this can leave such firms exposed to runs when the weather turns nasty.
Overall, the SNB’s loan to the StabFund at the end of November 2010 was down to just roughly USD 13 billion, compared to almost USD 20 billion at the end of 2009. At the same time, the overall risk for the SNB decreased from USD 24 billion to USD 16 billion. This USD 16 billion corresponds to the maximum possible loan. This upper limit exceeds the current loan, since part of the StabFund’s portfolio does not require any financing at present. Owing to the continued favourable market situation in the fourth quarter, the value of the fund’s assets is now considerably higher than the value of the loan. The risk of the SNB suffering a loss upon liquidating the fund has thus decreased further. As long as we have to maintain high levels of foreign exchange reserves for monetary policy reasons, the currency risks in our balance sheet will not be easy to reduce. We have, however, taken two measures in an effort to strengthen our balance sheet further. First, we decided back in 2009 to double the annual allocation to provisions over the course of five years. Second, in recent months, we have reduced risk concentrations in currency holdings and borrower categories – which arose from the interventions – through diversification. My colleague, Jean-Pierre Danthine, will discuss this in greater depth. As previously mentioned, the higher level of risk will be evidenced by greater fluctuations in the SNB’s annual earnings.

The aim is not to infringe on FINMA’s jurisdiction. Instead, FINMA and the SNB need to clearly define how the new responsibilities and tasks arising from the urgent need for more rigorous analysis and regulation of systemic risk should be divided between them. At this point, I also want to stress that this macroprudential task does not call into question the SNB’s primary mandate, which is the maintenance of price stability. Instead, it supports the long-term fulfilment of this mandate. The SNB has also expressed its opinion – along the lines of this proposal – on the recommendations made by the business audit commissions of the National Council and the Council of States in their report on the financial crisis. 2  BIS Review 173/2010  SNB balance sheet risks In my following remarks, I would like to look at the SNB’s balance sheet risks. As the Chairman of the Governing Board, Philipp Hildebrand, has already mentioned, it was primarily the large-scale purchases of foreign currency that contributed to the expansion of our balance sheet to its current level of approximately CHF 280 billion. Of this amount, CHF 260 billion is made up of currency reserves, which comprise not only foreign exchange, but also gold and the IMF’s special drawing rights. If we add to that the SNB’s loan to the stabilisation fund, over 95% of our assets are denominated in foreign currency. Not only is the balance sheet longer as a result, it also carries more risk.
The return of the economy to potential is accompanied with the strengthening of inflationary pressures and the return of inflation to target within 2018. Notwithstanding positive trends, the economic and financial environment has been a challenging one for the monetary policy. At the year start, we faced a rapid and sharp decline in inflation, as a result of acute disinflationary shocks from the external environment. Downside risks intensified. Also, extraordinary events such as Brexit or geo-political tensions in the external environment led to heightened uncertainty. 2/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  Against this backdrop, the Bank of Albania reacted with determination. The policy rate was lowered in two stages, in April and in May, down to 1.25%. The corridor of interbank rates – the floor is the rate on the overnight deposit and the ceiling is the rate on overnight loan – narrowed to two percentage points. In addition, the Bank of Albania continued to use the forward guidance to inform the public on its the monetary policy stance in the future. The use of this instrument was strengthened over the year, and was enriched with time frames. These actions signalled the willingness and capability of the Bank of Albania to fulfill its objective of price stability. The operational framework of the monetary policy did not undergo significant changes and the banking system was supplied with liquidity through traditional monetary policy instruments. The latter were adopted to better satisfy the needs of the banking system for liquidity.

Gent Sejko: Albania's economic and financial developments in 2016 Introductory statement by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, presenting the Annual Report 2016 to the Parliamentary Committee on Economy and Finance, Tirana, 2 May 2017. * * *  Honourable Chair, Honourable Members of the Committee, I have the pleasure of presenting today the Annual Report of the Bank of Albania 2016. This report is a synthesis of the activity of the Bank in accordance with our legal objectives, obligations that arise from relevant by-laws, and commitments with our international partners. Overall, I reckon the Bank of Albania has worked with dedication, seriousness and efficiency, in all such aspects. The policies, measures and legal and regulatory amendments we have initiated, and have provided a substantial contribution to addressing macroeconomic misbalances, bolstering economic activity, enhancing financial stability, and promoting Albania’s European integration process. In parallel to complying with our legal obligation, the presentation of the Annual Report is an important pillar of accountability and transparency for the Bank of Albania. These two commitments accompany and balance our institutional independence. In this context, I believe the Annual Report addresses many of the recommendations the Committee left for us in the Resolution “On the assessment of the activity of the Bank of Albania for 2015”.
In this case, a third and independent party, such as the IMF or OECD, regularly monitors and assesses the economic policies of its members. The ECB participates in the surveillance process for policies falling within its competence (e.g. monetary policy, payment systems oversight). This means that, whenever monetary policy is under surveillance, the ECB is solely responsible for its interaction with the IMF and OECD. Standards and codes recently adopted by the IMF and other relevant international institutions are a way of defining best policy practices and enhancing transparency in the field of monetary and financial policy. In this respect, the ECB’s involvement in regular surveillance further strengthens its accountability through being transparent. Third, in the area of macroeconomic policies, consultation and surveillance are the only forms of international cooperation that are relevant to the Eurosystem. Any form of ex ante policy coordination of monetary with other macroeconomic policies would neither be advisable for the Eurosystem nor be compatible with the ECB’s mandate and independence. Apart from the well-known recognition and decision lags in policy-making, attempts to coordinate ex ante would not only blur the specific responsibilities of individual policy-makers, but also reduce their accountability. In determining its monetary policy stance, the ECB should and does take into account all relevant information. It cannot let its policy solely be determined by the current and future course of other policies. This could easily compromise the maintenance of price stability.

Willem F Duisenberg: The international role of the euro  Speech by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, on the occasion of the 2000 Spruce Meadows Round Table, held in Calgary, on 8 September 2000. *  *  *  Let me first thank the organisers of this conference for having invited me to share some thoughts with you on the international role of the euro. The euro was successfully launched 20 months ago as the single currency of 11 Member States of the European Union (EU) - known as the “euro area”. On 1 January 1999 these Member States transferred their monetary sovereignty to a new supranational institution, the European Central Bank (ECB). Since then, the Eurosystem - composed of the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of the 11 countries that have adopted the euro - has been in charge of the euro area single monetary policy and related functions, such as foreign reserve management and operations and payment systems oversight. The euro has brought about fundamental changes to the economic and financial environment in the euro area and beyond. By lowering transaction costs and enhancing price transparency, the single currency represents a major contribution to fostering competition and efficiency in goods and financial markets across the euro area. As such, the introduction of the euro represents a quantum leap towards completing a fully integrated Single Market in the EU and lays a solid basis for the improvement in the living standards of European citizens.
From the mid-1800s an increasing number of countries chose to link the value of money to gold. The central banks were under the obligation to convert their currency at a fixed rate into gold on demand. At the same time, there were no import or export restrictions on gold. This gradually resulted in the establishment of an international fixed exchange rate system based on a gold standard. Chart 1  1  BIS Review 14/2000  Norway switched from the silver standard to the gold standard in 1874. The krone was introduced as a currency unit and we formed a monetary union with Sweden and Denmark. The gold standard and the monetary union were successful. The world economy and the Norwegian economy were expanding. Price levels were stable. In the 1900s periods of nominal stability, i.e. price and exchange rate stability, have also coincided with periods of steady and solid economic growth. Chart 2  The experience of the last century shows that consumer price inflation is ultimately associated with high growth in the money supply. However, the causal relationship between money supply and inflation may be unclear. Norway has experienced four episodes of high inflation in the last century: during and after the two world wars and the Korean War, and a 15-year period from the first half of the 1970s to the second half of the 1980s. During the First World War inflation accelerated sharply. The British war effort was partly financed by printing money. Price inflation accelerated in most countries, also in Norway.

However, beyond these basic principles, what is the appropriate monetary policy stance for achieving both financial stability and the dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability? With inflation running well below our 2 percent longer-run target and the unemployment rate still well above its normal long-term level, appropriate monetary policy dictates that low real interest rates should prevail until the economy is further along a sustainable path to its potential level and inflation is closer to target. Nonetheless, it is common to hear the  1  Because of some differences in product coverage and statistical methodologies, total CPI inflation tends to average 1/4 to 1/2 percentage points higher than total PCE inflation. Hence, the FOMC’s 2 percent target on total PCE inflation would translate to a 2.3 percent to 2.5 percent target for total CPI inflation. 2  I recently discussed the costs of too-low inflation and the implications of having a 2 percent inflation target in a January 15 speech; see Evans (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  argument that these highly accommodative monetary policies might sow the seeds of financial instability. The fear is that excessive and persistently low interest rates would lead to excessive risktaking by some investors. For instance, some firms, such as life insurance companies and pension funds, are under pressure to meet a stream of fixed liabilities incurred when interest rates were higher.3 (And perhaps these liabilities were offered at somewhat generous terms to begin with.)
Such consolidation would permit small and medium-sized banks to attain sufficient scale to undertake the IT investment necessary to meet the challenges of the digital era. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  While both national and cross-border consolidation options are potentially viable, the key consideration for financial stability is that the combined entity should be able to successfully execute the merger, resulting in a bank that can sustain profitability in the long run. 1 See European Banking Authority (2018), Risk Assessment Questionnaire – Summary of Results, December. 70% of banks view their cost of equity in this range, with a further 15% of banks estimating that it lies in the range of 10–12%. 2 See, for example, Babihuga, R. and Spaltro, M. (2014), “Bank Funding Costs for International Banks,” IMF  Working Papers 14/71, International Monetary Fund; Keeley, M. (1990), “Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking,” American Economic Review, 80(5): 1183–1200. 3 See Andrews, D. and Petroulakis, F. (2019), “Breaking the shackles: Zombie firms, weak banks and depressed  restructuring in Europe,” Working Paper Series, No. 2240, ECB, Frankfurt am Main. 4 See Gopinath, G., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Karabarbounis, L. and Villegas-Sanchez, C. (2017), “Capital Allocationand  Productivity in South Europe”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4): 1915–1967. 5 See Adalet McGowan, M., Andrews D. and Millot, V. (2018), “The walking dead? Zombie firms and productivity  performance in OECD countries,” Economic Policy, 33(96): 685–736.

Finally, +One, Synergistic Growth. Allianz seeks to inculcate systematic cooperation between business lines and markets across the Group to deliver profitable growth. Likewise, Singapore’s insurance market must continue to be underpinned by the strong partnership between industry, academia, and government. Research, talent development and market infrastructure are areas where active collaboration is a critical success factor. Conclusion The commitment of key industry players such as Allianz has been instrumental in establishing Singapore as a leading insurance market. On this happy occasion, we are also pleased to announce that Singapore has been chosen to host the Geneva Association General Assembly in 2015. The General Assembly will bring together global CEOs and other stakeholders in the insurance industry over a two-day conference to discuss industry trends. This is only the second time it will be hosted in Asia, after Japan in 2009. In closing, I thank Allianz for growing with Singapore. I am confident your strong presence in Singapore will serve you well as you continue to extend your Asian footprint. Once again, congratulations, and a very good evening to all of you. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
When prices for marker products surge, even if their share in the consumer basket is rather small, this might speed up inflation expectations. This is what we observed in sugar and sunflower oil prices last year. Today, inflation expectations are already high, and this impact might be even stronger. Inflationary pressure is still spurred by higher prices in global markets. Recently, prices for food products, coal, non-ferrous metals, and especially natural gas continued to trend upwards. Increased gas prices are pushing up prices for nitrogen fertilisers, which might ultimately become an additional driver of pressure on prices in food markets put by agricultural enterprises’ costs. However, there are also goods demonstrating a stabilisation of prices and even their adjustment downwards. These are steel, iron ore, precious metals, and lumber. Nonetheless, we cannot be confident yet about how steady these trends are. Global markets remain a source of elevated inflation risks. However, the question is not only and not so much about transitory factors. It is more important that the indicators of steady inflation are above the target. This is about demand-side pressure, or to be more precise, about a considerable gap between the current level of demand and the potential of supply to meet such demand. It is not always possible to build up production capacities quickly.

Lending growth rates remained high in all segments, which is the main indicator evidencing that monetary conditions remained accommodative, rather than neutral in the third quarter as well. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Over the period from the September meeting to yesterday, yields on federal government bonds rose by 50–60 basis points. The increase in short-term yields suggests a revision of market expectations regarding the key rate, whereas growth in long-term yields is driven by the trends in global markets. Deposit rates continued to go up in September—October, although more slowly than in the previous months. Deposit terms are not yet sufficiently attractive to boost households’ demand for this form of savings. As regards lending, the corporate segment continues to expand steadily. Growth in consumer lending has slowed down somewhat. As regards the mortgage segment, after a slight deceleration in July—August due to the revision of the subsidised mortgage lending programmes, growth sped up again in autumn. In this context, we have revised our forecast range of retail lending growth for this year upwards by 3 percentage points to 21– 25%. The forecast for lending in the economy in general remained unchanged. Currently, the actual changes in the credit market are obviously not sufficient to form such monetary conditions that would help bring inflation back to 4% and stabilise it at this level. Our today’s decision will accelerate the adjustment in the credit and deposit market. As regards risks to the forecast, proinflationary ones currently prevail.