samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Tarisa Watanagase: Securing Thailand’s future with capital market development and the role of the Bank of Thailand Keynote address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Thailand Focus 2008, Bangkok, 17 September 2008. *  *  *  Excellencies, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, Good morning, I would like to begin by thanking the Stock Exchange of Thailand for inviting me to deliver a keynote address at this year’s Thailand Focus. This annual forum, traditionally opened by the Prime Minister of Thailand, has firmly established itself as the event of the year where domestic and foreign investors meet and interact with Thailand’s top policymakers and leading listed companies. It is thus not only my great pleasure but also my great honor to be here. Ladies and Gentlemen, Given the turbulent time we are in at the moment, I am very pleased at the number and the composition of this year’s turnout. Glancing through the list of prospective attendees, I saw participants from Asia, Australia, Europe and North America, representing a large spectrum of investors. This is despite the fact that a number of invited fund managers were forced to cancel their trips due to the declared state of emergency that was lifted on Sunday. Moreover, I see that many of you have been long-time investors in the Thai stock market. All of these are quite reassuring, for they reflect your continued faith in the Thai economy.

Jean Claude Trichet: Welcome Malta! Speech by Mr Jean Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the event for launching the joint communication campaign for the euro changeover at the Central Bank of Malta, Valletta, 30 September 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honour and pleasure for me to be here at this festive moment. This is to mark the launching of the joint communication campaign for the euro changeover in close co-operation with the Central Bank of Malta and with our friend, Michael Bonello, just 92 days before Malta adopts the euro on 1 January 2008. This will signify a great milestone in Malta’s history, especially since Malta only joined the European Union (EU) almost four years ago, on 1 May 2004. Let me first offer my warm congratulations to all of those who have helped bring Malta to this point. In 2002 for the countries that were in the euro area at the time, as well as for Slovenia this year, it was a memorable moment and a positive step. So I can well imagine how the Maltese feel at the moment. You can be proud of Malta’s successful convergence process. In fact, we are very pleased about the fruitful cooperation between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Central Bank of Malta in the preparations for the changeover, be it at the technical level or through the participation of Governor Bonello as observer in the Governing Council since last July.
Would it be acceptable to use tax-payers money to refund foreign depositors at a larger scale? This might pose problems both for the home and host country. The wide divergence of national systems clearly needs attention. Potential solutions might include increased co-operation and harmonisation regarding fees and entry and exit rules. Crisis management. National central banks have national mandates in extending emergency liquidity assistance. In a future integrated European financial market, the mandate of the lender of last resort will not be as clear-cut. How should this function be organised when the largest banks might be systemically important in several EU member countries? There will also be banks that are very important in one country while being completely insignificant in a European context. Another issue is whose interest a national supervisor will protect in a crisis involving a cross-border banking group strictly its own national interest (the case now) or the interest of all member countries where the group might have operations? Conclusions These issues, or challenges, are essentially political. They are about how to share the risks and costs of financial integration. And as long as these challenges are left unaddressed they constitute political barriers to integration. We all say we want financial integration but as usual, nothing comes for free. Financial integration brings some difficult issues for authorities and politicians. Public authorities will have to rethink their roles and priorities.

EU level harmonisation often applies to high level principles and minimum requirements, while implementation, additional requirements and enforcement is left to the member states. In practice, this becomes a barrier to integration. An EU bank will be subject to as many different reporting requirements and regulatory relationships as it has countries of operation. For a banking group involved in life insurance and securities trading this number should be multiplied by three. For instance, ABN Amro is rumoured to be dealing with 47 different regulators only in the EU. Second, today’s banking regulation was originally designed to protect the soundness and stability of the national banking system and sometimes even to politically control it. Thus, supervisors as well as central banks have national mandates and responsibilities vis-à-vis their politicians and citizens. This was all fine in the so called good old days of closed national markets. Now, however, it may sometimes be in conflict with the ultimate goal of a single market in financial services. Some of the work needed in these areas has already been started. The Brouwer reports to the Ecofin well describe some of the difficulties. The BSC Task Force on Crisis Management has taken the first steps towards a more structured approach to crisis management of cross-border banking groups, through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding. CEBS (Committee of European Bank Supervisors) is also trying to take on some of these issues, in particular regarding the convergence of supervisory practices.
Apart from the fact that it was difficult to value the instruments themselves, the complex links between the banks and their special companies made it difficult to see the actual exposures of the banks. Eventually, no one knew where the risks  BIS Review 135/2009  3  were. The increasing amount of loans not only made investors highly indebted in relation to their equity, many banks also did not really have enough capital in relation to the risks they took. When economic activity began to decline in the USA and prices fell on the US housing market, many institutions suffered major losses. Uncertainty about who might be exposed to impaired assets led to trade petering out on a number of financial markets. Many banks now found it difficult to find funding on these markets. In September 2008, the major US investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection. This had extensive repercussions throughout the world. The global financial crisis escalated and the Swedish banks were also seriously drawn into the crisis. All over the world, banks and other financial institutions began to cut back their exposures and reduce their level of indebtedness. The decline in lending reinforced the downturn in global economic activity. This in turn accelerated the decline – many assets fell dramatically in value and the banks' loan losses increased. A vicious circle arose in the global economy in which the financial turmoil aggravated the weakening of the real economy and vice versa.

The dramatic credit expansion of several of the Swedish banks in the Baltic region in euro is one example of a behaviour that entails considerable risks, something that the Riksbank has long pointed out in its Financial Stability Reports. 8  BIS Review 135/2009  There may therefore be good reasons for thinking about different ways to achieve a greater impact for our analyses and assessments in the future. Can we be clearer and more direct when formulating warnings and risk scenarios? Can we, for example, go public to a greater extent, for example by using open letters and so on, in order to increase the pressure on banks to change their risk behaviour? And how should we handle the increase in the banks' lending in foreign currencies? These are examples of questions that the Riksbank and other central banks must now address. There is no doubt that the crisis has raised important and complicated questions. Wars and crises usually strengthen the position of the state. This crisis is no exception. The central banks have taken over the issuing of banknotes, but the provision of credit is still essentially conducted on private markets. The general view is that it is not appropriate for the state to work, for example, with the credit assessment or risk assessment of individual loans. The state can establish rules and regulations for the market, but not work in the market itself.
Without aiming to be exhaustive, I should like to highlight some of the key priorities for reform in three main areas, namely: •  Getting more people into work,  •  Increasing competition,  •  And finally, supporting an innovative environment. Getting more people into work First of all, well-functioning labour markets are indispensable in fostering higher economic growth. The differences in labour market developments, especially with regard to the level of labour utilisation, between the US and Europe has prompted some economists to suggest the existence of a “European model” and a “US model”, related to the trade-off between labour and leisure 6 . One view is that the lower levels of GDP per capita in Europe reflect a European preference for more leisure time. However, we should bear in mind that lower participation rates are not necessarily associated solely with personal preferences, but are also triggered by the legal and regulatory environment, tax systems and social institutions. Necessary measures to increase labour utilisation or labour supply include the reform of tax and benefit systems in order to increase incentives to work. The use of flexible forms of work such as part-time and temporary work may also provide further working incentives 7 . High unemployment rates in the euro area and in particular unacceptable high youth unemployment rates clearly suggest the need to spur not only labour supply but also labour demand. There is a need to reduce labour market rigidities restricting wage differentiation and flexibility.

Unfortunately, Member State's implementation record of Internal Market legislation is worsening and the number of Internal Market infringements remains stubbornly high in some European countries. Let me also briefly mention labour mobility. Labour mobility is an essential element of the Internal Market and an important factor of adjustment mechanism in a context of monetary union. Evidence however suggests that, overall, cross-border labour mobility is still low in the euro area. And we still have formal barriers to labour mobility across the euro area. This is in clear contrast to the situation in the United States 10 . All in all, increasing product market competition and labour mobility – at the EU and national level, would enable more efficient production structures associated with a more competitive price setting. Following the principle of “an open market economy with free competition” is pivotal to fostering long-term economic growth. Let me now focus more specifically on the financial sectors. Financial integration is indeed of key importance for the ECB, given the relevance for the conduct of the single monetary policy. The process of European financial integration is gradually taking place and considerable progress has been made for instance in capital markets and wholesale banking. However, the retail banking sector appears not yet to have reached its potential, and competition seems insufficient in this area leaving European consumers unable to take full advantage of the benefits of the EMU and the Single Market 11 .
Our assessment throughout the year has been that the outlook for inflation and the economy over the coming years indicates that it is reasonable to assume the repo rate will need to be gradually increased. In accordance with this view, we have raised the repo rate four times so far this year and my assessment is that the repo rate will need to be raised further in future. However, as I mentioned earlier, we both can and should change our assessment if the economy develops in a manner we had not expected. Thank you! BIS Review 84/2006  5

François Villeroy de Galhau: Paris 2020 Climate Finance Day Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Paris 2020 Climate Finance Day, Paris, 29 October 2020. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, It is always a pleasure to be here each year. A lot has happened over the past months as well as in the last hours. Covid provoked an unprecedented fall in French GDP in the first and second quarter and its second wave will trigger another drop in the fourth quarter, though hopefully one that is less severe. A short-term view could argue there is a trade-off between supporting a quick recovery, and fighting climate change. I believe the contrary: reconstruction is an opportunity to accelerate the transition to greener growth. It cannot be a mere restart: due also to climate, we need to be Schumpeterian. The Banque de France and ACPR are as committed as ever and delivered on what we announced last year, in spite of the Covid-19 crisis we “walked our talk” (1). But we have also observed, thanks to our experience, a number of methodological impediments to data and reporting practices. Going forward, we must tackle these issues in order to better assess and disclose climate-related risks (2). ***  1. The Banque de France/ACPR lived up to its promises on climate 1.1.
The market will then decide which types of money households and companies prefer over the long term. So far, I have focused on various types of digital token money emerging from the private sector – crypto tokens on the one hand and stable coins on the other. Inevitably, the debate about privately issued digital token money also raises the question of whether central banks should issue their own tokens. This brings me to the last section of my speech, which looks at state-issued digital token money. State-issued digital token money Just like a private institution, a central bank, too, can issue digital token money in its own currency. Essentially, there are two potential areas of application: One, all households and companies could be given access to tokens. Or, two, tokens could be made available only to commercial banks and other financial market participants, just like sight deposits at the central bank today. In Switzerland, the idea of granting all households and companies access to digital central bank money was mooted as an alternative to the Swiss sovereign money initiative. The SNB put out a statement at the time, and remains critical about the idea of broad access to digital  Page 5/7  central bank money. I would like to briefly sum up the main arguments, and point out that the discussion about access to digital central bank money needs to be conducted independently of the technology adopted.

Many forecasters suggest that this trend will not end in the nearest future. There are several explanations of such situation. Firstly, rising oil prices increase demand for alternative sources of energy, biofuels being high on the agenda in many regions. In effect industrial demand for food commodities will further rise. By the way, it is worth to mention what may be the ecological consequences of growing biofuels production. Spiegel online on 26th September 2007 described a research led by the Nobel-price winning chemist Paul Crutzen which had found that biofuels emit even 70 percent more greenhouse gases than fossil fuels. In effect, global warming may accelerate and lead to further increase in frequency of disasters such as floods, droughts, and unexpected weather changes that may have negative effects on crops. Secondly, food prices will be lifted up by an increasing demand for agriculture products in the emerging markets, especially in Asia, as the catching-up process progresses. It is worth keeping in mind that the share of food in the CPI basket is some 10 pp. higher in CEE countries than in the eurozone, so agflation, if it materializes, will lead to inflation divergence. 2. Other commodities prices. Demand for commodities, just as for agricultural products, has substantially risen in recent years. The “problem” lies again in the emerging markets. Fast growing economies create still growing demand for all sorts of commodities, especially metals and fuels (for example: oil consumption in China has doubled within last 10 years).
For example, in Germany, the institution that became the highly independent Bundesbank was established as part of the country’s reconstruction after WWII and so before its new democracy was embedded. It had “goal independence”. And in the US, while there is hesitation over giving the Federal Reserve an inflation target, as great weight is placed by Congress on the “dual mandate”, there is not concern about the scope or mechanics of the FOMC’s accountability to Congress. Every member of the executive arm of the government is unelected except the President. The central bank is no outlier. 18 But in the UK it really was a novelty – in a way, a constitutional departure, foreshadowed perhaps only by the judiciary 19 – to give such a politically sensitive lever to a body of unelected technicians. The institutional obstacles to Bank of England “independence” therefore needed institutional solutions. Responsibility for bank regulation was transferred from the Bank in 1997. The pathway to resolution of the “democratic deficit” problem had potentially been opened up in the 1980s by the St John Stevas reforms of Parliamentary Committees which led, over time, to a Treasury Committee with a high reputation and standing, supported by access to expert advice. In the 1997 reforms, the sphere of politics was carefully delineated. The goal of price stability is set by Parliament in legislation; and, within that framework, the Chancellor of the day sets the Bank its target for inflation.

It is our sincere hope that this global forum will be rewarding and may the collective wisdom derived from the deliberations lead to more collective actions that will be to our increased mutual benefits. Let me once again express our appreciation to Yang Amat Berhormat Dato' Seri Abdullah Badawi for his presence here this afternoon and for accepting to deliver the keynote address at our Forum today. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 30/2007
Institutions deemed as having higher risk are subject to more frequent onsite inspections. Let me cite some outcomes from our inspections. Institutions that have failed to meet our requirements have been warned or reprimanded in writing. A few have been required to appoint external consultants to conduct a thorough review of their AML/CFT frameworks; others have been asked to increase the resources devoted to this function. In a couple of cases, where the frameworks and procedures were adequate but ineffective management oversight resulted in inadequate implementation, we have asked the senior management to be replaced. In all cases, MAS informs the institution’s parent supervisor of our findings and concerns. Our supervisory approach aims to be preventive in nature. This means that sanctions can be taken against financial institutions for weak AML/CFT controls, even if no predicate offence has occurred. Having reviewed our regulations and our supervisory and enforcement actions, the FATF assessors concluded, “Singapore’s AML/CFT sanctions regime is effective, proportionate, and dissuasive”. In a nutshell, while a lot has been done, our institutions can always do better. MAS is reviewing whether we need to increase our supervisory intensity and is considering if we should make public, sanctions against persistently or egregiously errant institutions. Strengthened cross-border co-operation The third prong of our efforts is international co-operation.

Given the cross-border nature of illicit financial activities, it is not enough that we have strong regulation and supervision in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Singapore; we must be able to co-operate effectively with supervisory authorities and enforcement agencies abroad. Singapore contributes actively to the work of the FATF, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, and the AML/CFT Expert Group under the Basel Committee, to shape well-balanced international standards that are effective and proportionate. MAS co-operates with our international counterparts, through sharing inspection reports, participating in supervisory colleges, and facilitating home regulator visits. We also co-operate with home supervisors to enhance AML/CFT controls and standards not only at the branch but at the group level for financial institutions operating across borders. Internationally, the new emphasis is on co-operation in pursuing cross-border tax offences. Singapore has endorsed the internationally-agreed standard, known as Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, for the exchange of information upon request, and is committed to supporting the effective implementation of this global standard. Singapore amended legislation in 2009 to lend effect to its obligations and has since signed 30 Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements incorporating the new standard. This ensures that we are able to assist in foreign requests for information on a person’s tax position, so long as the request is clear, specific, relevant and backed with good reason. Some people think that Singapore’s banking confidentiality regime fetters such international cooperation.