samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One of the biggest misconceptions is on its usage. Waqf is to benefit all. While waqf land has traditionally been used to build mosques, cemeteries or tahfiz schools, nothing in the Quran or 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Hadith prohibits wider use of waqf to meet the needs of the community. In fact, there is no requirement for a waqif or donor and beneficiary of waqf to be a Muslim. There are instances from past Islamic civilisation where the use of waqf extended beyond those that were directly related to the religion and specific needs of the Muslims. Waqf land and buildings were used to build schools, hospitals and infrastructure to benefit both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The Al-Azhar University is an excellent example of a waqf asset. This makes a lot of sense. It is obvious that waqf should be prioritised to improve education and health, critical ingredients for social mobility and a productive workforce. There are an estimated 300 square kilometres of waqf land – the size of the main island of Langkawi – in the country, and unfortunately, most of this land remains undeveloped. Think about all the needs that can be met by developing this land – affordable housing, schools and universities, hospitals, sports facilities, research centres and industrial complexes. While I acknowledge the challenges in developing this land, including ownership and registration issues, as well as limitations in financial resources, these are surmountable.

The third imperative is to professionalise and modernise waqf management. For waqf to progress strongly, it requires a new character and a more modern image. In this regard, I would identify two priorities, namely professionalising those who are entrusted to manage waqf and putting in place proper governance framework. Let me elaborate. The management of waqf must be entrusted to experienced and knowledgeable experts with the highest integrity – that is, people with the right calibre, right competency and right character. The USD 37.1 billion Harvard Endowment is run by some of the best minds in finance, who determine the most optimal asset allocation strategies that deliver the best sustainable returns for the university. In 2017, the endowment contributed more than a third of Harvard’s operating revenue. Returns from the fund help to provide scholarships and to fund ground-breaking research. Surely we would like to see the same in our Malaysian universities. Acquiring such expertise and capability may take time. To expedite this, I would like to suggest that waqf authorities explore partnering or collaborating with experts from the private sector to commercialise or monetise waqf assets. In particular, partnerships with Islamic financial institutions can help waqf authorities develop waqf assets productively with the required financial expertise on board. A good example is the partnership between Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan and Lembaga Tabung Haji in developing Menara Bank Islam on a 1.2 acre waqf land in Kuala 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Lumpur.
If, for instance, the annual interest rate for government bonds is higher for long durations than for short ones, this could be interpreted as the market expecting the repo rate to be raised. One problem when interpreting implied forward rates in this way is that they do not solely measure expectations of the repo rate. They may also contain premiums that can be regarded as compensation  2  BIS Review 6/2007  for differences between securities with regard to duration, credit risk and degree of liquidity. Estimating the size of these premiums can be complicated and can be done in different ways. 5 It is therefore not possible to calculate market expectations of repo rate developments in a clear-cut manner, which may create confusion. Another problem is that the implied forward rates may vary substantially in the short term. The question is therefore when market expectations should be read. A further problem that is sometimes highlighted is that there may be a risk of the central bank allowing itself to be steered by financial market agents when inflation forecasts are based on implied forward rates. 6 Personally, I am convinced that this is not normally any great problem. When we have had a different opinion from the market, we have said so. On these occasions we have also influenced market pricing. This was the case, for instance, with the monetary policy decisions we made in December 2005 and June 2006.

Addressing these challenges, G-20 Summit held in Brazil on 8-9 November 2008, issued a communiqué that included the following statement: “We affirmed our determination to take all necessary steps to foster non-inflationary growth in a stable and sustainable manner according to the needs and available instruments in our respective countries, including through monetary and fiscal policy.” Distinguished Guests, As concerns over inflationary pressures have subsided all over the world, maintaining the smooth functioning of financial system and efficiency of credit markets has become the main priority of policy makers. It will be proper to evaluate the recent developments in Turkish economy in this perspective. BIS Review 144/2008  1  In Turkey, the banking system has been relatively prepared for the current crisis in terms of foreign exchange liquidity. Its foreign exchange short position is also well contained. Foreign exchange position of the public sector is almost negligible. The household sector is net creditor in terms of foreign exchange, while real sector is net debtor. Since securitized products are rarely used in the Turkish banking sector, the ongoing financial turmoil has not put a marked pressure on local banks through that channel. Current account deficit, historically a source of vulnerability for the Turkish economy, is likely to experience a sharp drop in the upcoming period due to correction in commodity prices, slow down in economic activity and depreciation in New Turkish Lira. Still, extraordinary fluctuations in global liquidity conditions have adversely affected Turkey like other countries, which are sensitive to international financial developments.
This is mirrored by the fruitful cooperation between the statistical departments of national central banks (NCBs) and national statistical institutes (NSIs), both at the national and at the European level, for instance in the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics (CMFB). For this reason, I am particularly pleased that Commissioner Almunia has kindly accepted our invitation to give the keynote speech at this conference and that the programme includes a session organised jointly by Eurostat and the ECB’s Directorate-General Statistics and chaired by Mr Carré, the Director-General of Eurostat. I would like briefly to consider three issues: 1.  recent enhancements to euro area statistics from the ECB’s perspective as a policymaker;  2.  the importance of the appropriate communication of statistics; and  3.  the strategy for the further development of euro area statistics. Recent enhancements to euro area statistics from the ECB’s perspective as a policy maker First of all, I would like to reiterate that reliable and timely euro area economic, monetary and financial statistics are of paramount importance for the ECB’s decision-making. This applies not only to the single monetary policy, but also to the other ESCB tasks, including those in the areas of financial stability and payment systems. Statistics are themselves one of the main deliverables of the ECB, providing market participants, analysts, academics, the media and the general public with the aggregate financial data they need.

For instance, the harmonised national average interest rates on the deposits and loans of households and  BIS Review 50/2008  1  corporations that are published every month by the ECB and the NCBs provide citizens and firms with very useful preliminary insights. 1 Concerning the key developments in ECB statistics over the last two years, I would like to highlight the following 2 : 1. Since June of last year the ECB and Eurostat have jointly compiled and published quarterly euro area accounts. 3 These accounts can be considered the “national accounts” for the euro area and provide a complete and consistent overview of its economic, financial and monetary developments. A fairly unique feature of the euro area accounts is their almost entirely consistent representation of “real” and financial developments, which greatly facilitates integrated analyses and permits further enhanced cross-checking of the economic and monetary analyses that feed into the overall assessment of the ECB’s monetary policy stance. 2. The euro area accounts record not only the economic and financial transactions, but also the financial balance sheets of all institutional sectors (i.e. households, nonfinancial corporations, financial corporations and general government). They integrate and complement more timely and frequent statistics, for instance by providing a sectoral breakdown of the broad monetary aggregate M3 and by providing hitherto unavailable quarterly data on household and corporate income, expenditure, savings and wealth. 3.
19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  19  labour that result from Brexit – both effective and actual – should steepen the wage Phillips curve, increasing the sensitivity of domestic wages to domestic labour market slack (moving in the opposite direction to the rotation shown by (3) in Figure 1 above). UK potential supply capacity itself is also likely to be lower as some capacity tied to Europe becomes obsolete. The reduction and reorientation of trade is likely to weigh on productivity for some time through a loss of comparative advantage and the disruption of supply chains as companies in the UK shift from supplying customers in the EU to customers in the rest of the world. Empirical estimates suggest a 20% reduction in trade tends to drag on productivity by around 5% in the long run. 53  The actual impact will  depend on how quickly any lost access to European and third country markets (via European trade deals) can be replaced. In this regard, the UK Prime Minister’s discussions in Canada today are potentially significant. With respect to the exchange rate, the effects of imported inflation are particularly important to UK inflation dynamics, given both the openness of its economy, the low degree of home currency invoicing  54  and the  relatively slow but significant pass through of large, persistent exchange rate moves.

The UK has begun the process of redefining its relationship with its largest trade and investment partner. To be clear, the intention is not to turn inwards but rather to increase openness over time. In particular, the UK government’s objective is a “comprehensive, bold and ambitious free trade agreement with the European Union.” Leaving the EU is intended to enhance the UK’s ability to strike trade and investment agreements with a wide range of countries beyond those covered by virtue of its membership of the EU. But Brexit is an example of reculer pour mieux sauter. 44  That’s because any reduction in openness with the  EU is unlikely to be immediately compensated by new ties of a similar magnitude with other trade partners. And even if new agreements with other partners could be struck instantaneously, the reorientation of business relationships will take some time. This makes Brexit, relative to the experience of the past half century, unique. It will be, at least for a period of time, an example of de-globalisation not globalisation. It will proceed rapidly not slowly. Its effects will not build by stealth but can be anticipated. Let me turn to those effects. The first is the obvious disinflationary impact of Brexit given that the EU takes 44% of UK exports.
During its short life-time the MPC has made changes in its procedures and remains open to the possibility of further improvements. But unnecessary tinkering would be a distraction from its main purpose. One does not have to go as far as Lord Falkland, who said in 1641 that “If it is not necessary to change something, then it is necessary not to change it”, to believe that, at least for the time being, major changes to the MPC are unnecessary. And if imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then the Government can draw comfort from Michael Howard’s speech in March of this year when he argued that “Nor, given the importance of stability and continuity, do I think it right to propose any major changes in either the remit or the composition of the Monetary Policy Committee”. The fact that there is a broad, cross-party consensus on the objectives and broad framework of monetary policy is one reason to think that the stability we have experienced in the first five years of the MPC will continue in the future. 5. Conclusions  The idea behind the MPC was to take day-to-day politics out of monetary policy. It is now widely accepted that this was desirable. Macroeconomic policy in Britain had been much too exciting for comfort for most of the post-war period. In the 1970s, inflation averaged over 13% a year, and reached a peak of 27% in August 1975.

In the Bank study, each participant was asked to play a simple, computer based, monetary policy game sixteen times: four rounds as individual policy makers, followed by eight rounds in a committee of five players, and finally a further four rounds as individuals. The committee stages were divided into two parts: four rounds where committee members were not allowed to discuss their decisions although they could observe the unattributed votes of other players - and a further four rounds where discussion was permitted. As a control for learning, the order of the ‘discussion’ and ‘no discussion’ set of games was randomised across the committees. 1  Fry, M, Julius, D, Mahadeva, L, Roger, S and Sterne, G (1999),“Key issues in the choice of monetary policy framework”, in Mahadeva, L and Sterne, G (eds. ), Monetary frameworks in a global context, Routledge  2  Blinder, A S and Morgan, J (2000), “Are two heads better than one: an experimental analysis of group vs individual decision making”, NBER Working Paper, No. 7909, September  3  Lombardelli, C, Proudman, A J and Talbot, J I (2002), “Committees vs individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making”, Bank of England Working Paper (forthcoming)  2  BIS Review 34/2002  Each game consisted of ten periods of play in each of which the individual or committee had to decide what interest rate to set in response to the data for output and inflation generated in the previous period.
This complicates the compilation of balance of payments statistics, in particular on factor income and factor expenditures, and on the stock of foreign assets. Official data shows foreign assets at market value where market prices are readily available. Otherwise, assets are recorded at their book value. In an article in the Central Bank’s most recent Monetary Bulletin 1 , an attempt is made to estimate the market value of inward and outward foreign direct investment using methods developed in other countries. This is done by estimating the likely market value of assets that do not have a readily available market price. The result of the calculation is that rather than being negative by 120% of GDP, the international investment position was negative by less than 30% of GDP at the end of quarter III of 2007. The large difference stems not the least from the fact that assets of Icelanders abroad are much larger than those of foreigners in Iceland. The lower figure is not necessarily correct. However, it shows that there is an overriding likelihood that the large negative net international investment position of Iceland is exaggerated in the official statistics which are compiled in accordance with IMF standards. The Icelandic economy is at crossroads. It is quite evident that the expansion of recent years is coming to an end. The forecast issued by the Central Bank on April 10 envisages a contraction of GDP in 2009 and 2010. The Ministry of Finance forecasts a milder and more short-lived contraction.

The Icelandic interbank market has operated smoothly with rates consistently staying comfortably within the interest rate corridor of the Central Bank. The Bank has also modified other rules towards ECB standards, including the rules on reserve requirements. The evolution of our financial system over the coming months and years will of course be very much affected by developments in the global financial system. Once conditions improve generally at the world level and the access of banks to financing improves, the most creditworthy banks will be at the head of the queue but others further back. Thus, it will take longer for Icelandic and other banks closer to the fringes of the international financial system to gain normal access to international financing. This is the scenario which the managements of banks will have to adjust their thinking, strategies and operations to. If they do that, I am sure that they will fare well. If they don’t, their business will be more difficult. The business of banking is much dependent on confidence. It is therefore of the utmost importance for the Icelandic banks and others to do everything that they can to strengthen confidence in their operations and not to postpone any measures to that effect in the misguided hope that the operating environment will recover soon. In conclusion, I would like to mention that on May 8 the Central Bank of Iceland will publish its 2008 report on financial stability. It will be available on the Bank’s website on that day.
Europe has profited a great deal from this integration: it is estimated that the Single Market raises GDP in the EU by around 9%, taking into account both the direct trade and competition effects. [7] But as countries become more interlinked, they also become more exposed to volatile capital flows, unfair competition or discriminatory actions – and this necessitates greater protection for their citizens. That protection, which EU countries have created together, has allowed them to garner the benefits of openness while limiting, to some extent, its costs. The EU’s common structures and institutions contain spillovers, ensure a level playing field and prevent unjust behaviour – in other words, they respond to the needs of citizens and allow countries to exercise sovereignty. Thus the Council and the European Parliament set common rules for the whole EU, the Commission ensures they are observed, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) provides for judicial protection if they are violated. In the euro area, European banking supervision and the Single Resolution Mechanism help to contain the effects of financial instability. In this interconnected environment, seeking independence from EU institutions presents complex trade-offs. Countries either have to accept rules decided by others to ensure continued access to the European market, which gives them less control over decisions that affect their citizens’ interests; or they have to disentwine themselves from their most important trading partners, which gives them less control over their citizens’ welfare.

Mario Draghi: Sovereignty in a globalised world Speech by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, on the award of Laurea honoris causa in law from Università degli Studi di Bologna, Bologna, 22 February 2019. * * * It is a great honour to be speaking here today at the University of Bologna. As Europe’s oldest university, it has been at the heart of education and learning in Europe for over 900 years. It has a long history of welcoming students from across the continent, including Thomas Beckett and Copernicus. Erasmus studied here in 1506, and the University of Bologna is today a leading participant in the student exchange programme that bears his name. The Erasmus Programme is one of the many examples of the benefits of the close cooperation within the European Union that enjoy widespread popularity. But we know that other elements of European integration are more contested today. At the root of this debate is the inherent tension between the clear gains of economic integration, and the cooperation that is necessary to bring it about, which can sometimes be politically difficult to achieve or explain. I would like to argue that, in many ways, this tension is illusory. Rather than taking away countries’ sovereignty, the EU offers them a way to regain it. This does not mean we need the EU for everything. But in the face of globalisation, the EU is more relevant than ever today.
Other than the qualitative guidance I mentioned earlier, and an expectation that the level of reserve balances will be appreciably below that seen in recent years but larger than before the financial crisis, the FOMC has not specified how large the balance sheet should be.8 My colleague Lorie Logan spoke recently on the many technical drivers of this level, which include the mode of policy implementation that the FOMC chooses in the longer run, possible increases in recent years in the financial system’s demand for reserves and Federal Reserve reverse repo liabilities owing to new financial regulations and other factors, and the long-term evolution of demand for paper currency.9  Considerations in reducing the balance sheet size In theory, reducing the size of the balance sheet is quite simple. There are two ways to go about it.10 One approach is to simply let securities holdings mature. Principal matures on the Fed’s securities holdings all the time: Treasury bonds mature at specified dates, and agency MBS principal is repaid over time as home loans are paid back.11 For the past several years, the securities portfolio has been maintained at a steady level by reinvesting these principal repayments.12 This activity can be reduced or stopped. A second approach is to simply sell securities on the open market, using a similar procedure to the way the securities were purchased to begin with. Either way, the securities end up back in private hands. This is obvious in the case of sales.

The maturity composition of the Treasury portfolio, not shown in the figure, would be different from what it was before the financial crisis. On the liability side, at normalization, non-reserve liabilities in the median scenario would be considerably larger than they were pre-crisis. Some of the growth in the reverse repo programs we have observed since the crisis might be a second-round effect stemming from the growth in reserves, and therefore some decline in this category is possible as the overall balance sheet size declines. However, my overall read is that much of the increased demand for non-reserve liabilities, particularly currency in circulation, is likely to be persistent past normalization, and indeed demand for reserves is also likely to be higher.7 But what is the longer-run appropriate size for the balance sheet?