samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I personally see no need to administer additional doses unless the patient goes into postoperative decline. I would suggest to you that, if the data continue to improve, however gradually, the markets should begin preparing themselves for the good Dr. Fed to wean them from their dependency rather than administer further dosage. I am well aware of the salutary effect of accommodative monetary policy on the equity and fixed-income markets – remember, I am the only member of the FOMC who used to be on the other side. My firms’ record of substantially outperforming the equity and fixed-income indexes over a prolonged period before I hung up my investment business and entered public service in 1997 was achieved by focusing on the long-term fundamentals of the real economy and the underlying value of the securities we purchased or sold – not by depending on central bank largesse. Counting on the Fed to perpetually float returns is a mug’s game. From my present perspective on the side of the angels, as a member of the policymaking team on the FOMC, I believe adding to the accommodative doses we have applied rather than beginning to wean the patient might be the equivalent of medical malpractice. Having never before pursued this course of healing, we run the risk of painting ourselves further into a corner from which we do not know the costs of exiting.

Lim Hng Kiang: Singapore – pursuing broader and deeper economic integration with major economies Opening keynote speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at Deutsche Bank Access Asia Conference 2013, Singapore, 20 May 2013. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, A very good morning to all of you. It is my pleasure to join you at Deutsche Bank’s Access Asia Conference 2013. Let me first thank Deutsche Bank for the invitation to speak at your conference. This is the largest event hosted by Deutsche Bank each year globally, and a huge turnout is a clear indicator of the strong corporate and investor interest in Asia. In the last 10 years, the centre of gravity of the world economy has been moving away from the US and Europe to Asia. Asia is expected to continue to prosper in the decades ahead as the middle class expands in line with strong economic growth. China is set to be the largest economy in the world by 2030 and is already creating megacities of over 10 million at an average rate of one per year. Besides China, India’s middle class is expected to grow to almost 600 million people by 2025. In Indonesia, almost 60 per cent of Indonesian households, in a country of 240 million people, are expected to reach middle-class status by 2020. Being a very small state, Singapore has and will continue to maintain an open economy.
(c)  A Distributed Architecture  Central banks historically have tended to be, well, centralised. But in a world where understanding of the economy is often localised and trust is built on a distributed basis, a centralised infrastructure may be far from ideal. What is needed instead is a distributed architecture for engagement. In response, central banks have over time changed their structures and further change seems likely. The Bank of England has had a network of Agents around the UK for around 90 years. Today, the Bank’s twelve regional agencies cover all corners of the UK, with an extensive network that generates around 9,000 meetings with company contacts each year. This is a valuable source of intelligence on the economy and financial system. Indeed, I would say it is increasingly valuable. It provides colour and context to accompany our data and models. It offers folk wisdom, the wisdom of the company crowd. But companies are only one crowd among many. Companies are an important lens on the economy, but far from being the only one. Reflecting that, the Bank has recently sought stronger connections with some other crowds, crowds with a different lens on the economy with which it has perhaps had less contact historically – trades unions, charities, community organisations and the like. For more than a year, I have augmented those Agents’ efforts with my own “Townhall” meetings across the UK.

53  By design, these seek out the views of a wider range of citizens, in a wider range of locations on a  wider range of issues around the economy and financial system than has been the case in the past. These events have established for me that there is wisdom in these crowds when gauging some of the key issues shaping the economy and financial system. The lived experience of everyday people making everyday decisions is what makes the economy tick (and sometimes tock). Tapping that lived experience can add to the Bank’s understanding of the economy and help it when setting policy to keep the economy stable. There is wisdom in crowds of citizens, as there is in crowds of companies. 54  The Bank is now taking a further step towards putting in place an infrastructure to formalise its engagement with citizens. Earlier this year, in response to a recommendation from the RSA, we announced that the Bank would be setting-up a set of Citizens’ Panels across the UK. 55  In the remainder of this year, we will be  running trials of these citizen panels to help us decide how best to organise them, before rolling them out systematically, UK-wide, next year. 53 54 55  See https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/outreach Taylor (2018) also discusses the benefits of deliberative democracy in the RSA’s 2018 Annual Lecture. Haldane (2018b). 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  23  There are a number of key design questions that need to be answered.
Comprehensive capital controls were an important element in the programme, but the rationale behind them was to help stabilise the exchange rate after the currency had fallen more than 50% in 2008, and in addition, the stock of relatively liquid foreign-owned krónur – a legacy of carry trade and other capital inflows – amounted to around 40% of GDP and would have resulted in a further meltdown of the currency if it had begun to flow out through Iceland’s shallow FX market. After the split of the failed banks had been executed towards the end of 2010, it gradually became clear that it had not been a pure domestic/international split. The estates of the old banks held significant domestic assets, while only a small part of their claims were domestic. This posed a significant balance of payments problem for Iceland and, if left unmitigated at the point of resolution and distribution to creditors, could potentially have had a severely detrimental effect on the exchange rate and financial stability. The estates of the old banks were therefore brought under the capital controls in March 2012. In late 2008, the combination of capital controls and exchange rate stability was in several ways a key to stabilising the economy. First, a very significant part of private sector debt was either directly linked to the exchange rate or indirectly linked to it through price indexation.

Peter Praet: Interview in Knack Interview with Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Knack, conducted by Mr Ewald Pironet and published on 6 January 2016. *  *  *  For over a year now, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been printing heaps of money, pumping it into the economy and pushing interest rates down to almost 0%. When may this policy be deemed a success? You may label that ECB policy a success if inflation, the rise in the cost of living, stays below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. That is our mandate. I admit that our policy has not yet been successful enough: inflation rates in Europe have been at the very low level of almost 0% for quite some time now. That is why we are continuing to take the necessary measures to drive inflation up to 2% over the medium term. However, the point at which we think we will reach 2% is constantly postponed, because all kinds of things are happening that are dampening inflation, such as the decline in oil prices or lower economic performances in the emerging countries. We have decided to maintain our policy until March 2017. But we need to be careful not to jeopardise the ECB’s credibility by shifting that horizon. It is up to the ECB to keep inflation at just below 2%, but it is failing to do so.
Singapore has political and economic stability, well-regulated financial markets, excellent transport and digital connectivity, a skilled talent pool, and extensive trade linkages with ASEAN. Singapore has one of the most vibrant PE/VC ecosystems in Asia. PE/VC assets under management increased by 42% year-on-year to $ billion in 2021. Over the last five years, growth in PE/VC investments has averaged nearly 30% per annum. As of June this year, there were a total of 428 PE/VC managers in Singapore, up from 336 at the start of 2021. Many existing players have expanded their capabilities and investment teams. The Asia Pacific region remains the top investment region for this group of managers, with 55% of assets invested within the Asia Pacific. Singapore accounted for 46% of the record-high $ billion in VC deal value in ASEAN last year [5] . To make PE/VC investment opportunities more accessible, we now have private market platforms in Singapore – such as ADDX and CapBridge. MAS is working to anchor more such platforms here. Investing to deliver sustained long-term returns in an increasingly uncertain world is no easy task. I hope today’s conference will give you ideas for growth and opportunities to connect with valuable partners. Thank you and best of luck. [1] Boissay, F, De Fiore, F, and E Kharroubi, “Hard or Soft Landing?”, BIS Bulletin No.59, July 2022 [2] BIS Annual Economic Report 2022 [3] Bain & Company Asia-Pacific Private Equity Report 2022 [4] Preqin Territory Guide ASEAN 2022 [5] Preqin Territory Guide ASEAN 2022

Let me now go on to how the interest rate assumption is to be used and interpreted in connection with the monetary policy decisions. 2  BIS Review 33/2006  Communication and the interest rate path The interest rate path which the Riksbank uses in the Inflation Reports is based, as I have said, on implied forward rates, and these are calculated on the basis of interest rates on treasury bills and government bonds. The implied forward rate curve on which the forecasts are based is an average of 15 different daily implied forward rate curves. For instance, the interest rate path used in the latest Inflation Report was based on an average of the daily curves between 20 January and 9 February 2006. The reason we have chosen to use an average is because we wanted to exclude temporary movements in the implied forward rates (see Figure 1). At the same time, this means that the implied forward rate curve, as we calculate it, does not reflect market expectations about the future repo rate at a particular point in time but instead the estimated average expectation during the selected 15-day period. Despite the fact that we now base our forecasts on an interest rate assumption that is normally reasonably realistic, it is important to underline that this assumption does not necessarily coincide with the Riksbank’s own expectations about future repo rates. Our assessment of how the economy will develop can differ from that made by market participants.
Losses likely in the period ahead The fact that the Riksbank’s bond purchases have so far been profitable does not mean that this will always be the case. For example, the ever-lower interest rates have made bond purchases after the spring of 2015 increasingly costly. The Riksbank has now purchased bonds for about SEK 275 billion and several bonds have a long remaining maturity. How expensive it will be to fund this portfolio will therefore depend on the development of the repo rate for a long time to come. According to the current assessments made both by ourselves and others, it is more likely that the bonds that we have purchased in recent months will lead to losses rather than profits for the Riksbank. For example, the yield on ten-year government bonds is now 0.2 per cent. The Riksbank does not make forecasts for the repo rate for more than three years in the future. Even within this limited time horizon, interest rate developments are very uncertain, but let us in any case assume that the repo rate develops in line with the forecast. And let us assume that the repo rate then continues to rise slowly towards 4 per cent (see Chart 5). 14 The average interest rate level up until the bond matures in 2026 will then be 1.2 per cent. Paying on average 1.2 per cent in interest and receiving on average 0.2 per cent in interest represents a loss of 1 per cent a year.

3 At the same time, the problems of falling inflation and inflation expectations also became increasingly apparent in the euro area. This led to the European Central Bank signalling the need for even more expansionary monetary policy in the period ahead, with low interest rates for even longer, supplemented by extensive asset purchases. The increasingly expansionary monetary policy in the euro area also led to monetary policy reactions from several smaller countries on the outside. 3 The significance of the inflation target for the economy is explained in detail in Sveriges Riksbank (2015a) and  Flodén (2015). 2 [12]  Chart 2. Inflation and inflation expectations have picked up 3  3  2  2  1  1  2.3  2.3  2.2  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.0  2.0  1.9  1.9 Inflation expectations  0  0  CPIF excluding energy  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.7  CPIF  -1  -1 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  1.6  1.6 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  Note. Annual percentage change and per cent. The CPIF is the CPI with a fixed mortgage rate. Inflation expectations 5 years ahead according to money market participants. The broken line indicates the time of the monetary policy decision in February 2015.
Financial cohesion, in turn, ensures that the monetary policy signals are properly and evenly transmitted to all jurisdictions of the monetary union, without, however, levelling out the premiums for different credit and liquidity risks. In fact, during the crisis, the divergence of bank funding conditions at national level has led to cross-country differences in both the costs of financing and the availability of loans. The retrenchment of credit supply within national borders, coupled with funding pressures, has impaired the transmission of monetary policy. The need to counter these adverse developments has been a key rationale behind the extraordinary monetary policy actions undertaken by the ECB in the wake of the crisis, such as the full allotment, the longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) or the relaxation of the collateral framework. At the same time, the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) provided by the national central banks was used more intensively. Although this is carried out by the national central banks at their own risk and for their own account, it might lead to tensions between the national and European levels of monetary policy, which would not be sustainable. A renationalisation of the monetary architecture would not be effective. Our non-standard measures can and should only provide temporary support for two reasons. First, keeping our non-standard measures in place for too long can adversely affect agents’ incentives in the economy at large and lead to moral hazard.

In this regard, the banking union with effective supervision and bank resolution can foster the necessary restructuring in the euro area banking sector, can further spur balance sheet repair and can restore the banking sector’s intermediation function. In particular, a European resolution mechanism with adequate powers and tools will be needed for effective resolution without involving taxpayers’ money. At the same time, this framework will ensure the revitalisation of the banking sector and revive financial integration. The early repayment by banks of the liquidity received from the first three-year LTROs has given initial mild indications for improvements in banks’ funding conditions and the overall health of the banking sector. But complacency is not warranted. Balance sheet repair in the euro area banking sector has to continue to fully restore wholesale and interbank funding markets, which will allow banks to return to their normal sources of funding, releasing them from the strong dependence on central bank intermediation, particularly in the case of banks receiving ELA. Conclusion Let me conclude. The sovereign debt crisis has thrown into reverse the steady financial market integration seen since the inception of the euro. This trend was largely driven by the link between banking and sovereign risks. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The crisis has hampered financing conditions. By consequence, the monetary policy transmission channel has been clogged and ECB has been compelled to apply unconventional measures to repair the distorted flow of credit in the euro area.
This will promote consistency in the implementation of standards, a level playing field, and the reduction of unnecessary regulatory burdens. It will also diminish banks’ incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage across different jurisdictions. Work is underway on a variety of fronts to promote such co-operation. First and foremost, the Basel Committee’s Accord Implementation Group, or AIG, is working to foster information-sharing among supervisors to promote consistency of Basel II implementation. The AIG is encouraging home and host supervisors, including those from non-G10 countries, to use actual banks’ implementation plans as the basis for heightened co-ordination and communication. The Committee welcomes the work being done in a number of non-member countries and believes that continued outreach is essential. Dialogue with countries outside the Basel Committee played a critical role in the development of the revised framework, and I am personally committed to continuing such dialogue in the future as the new capital framework moves into the implementation phase. Adoption of Basel II: who and when? I would like to share some thoughts on when and how the new framework should be adopted in different countries. I am not referring specifically to Turkey with these comments, as it is not for me to talk about your plans in this respect, but I would like to make some comments about how we see the process in general terms. Let me begin by emphasising that I cannot answer the question of when or how any country should adopt Basel II.

Hence, after putting into operation the real time gross settlement system and the automated electronic clearing house system, the establishment of a loans register is presently aimed at. After the completion of the automated electronic clearing house system, another possibility is created not only for the banking system but also for the business of services of a periodic nature, so as to enhance its economic efficiency. •  The Bank of Albania deems that a banking system helps the economic growth if it is sound financially, since the developing economies, such as our economy, are generally characterised by a fragile stability. Therefore the Bank of Albania has taken a number of measures, aimed at enhancing its supervisory abilities, with the purpose to have a strong, sound and efficient banking system. Regardless of the positive developments, still much has to be done. The degree of financial intermediation continues to be relatively low. Some economy sectors, such as agriculture, continue to be slightly credited or not credited at all. The banking credit contribution to productive investments is still low, and moreover, given the high weight of lending to support the trade activity, the conclusion drawn is that the majority of loans go for financing the imports. Also, the degree of using the banking system is not in the required parameters, and moreover, the degree of using cash is still high. During the current year, it has been worked for improving the existing Law “On Banks in the Republic of Albania”.
10  9  Perhaps the most notable change has been the shift from bank to market-based finance. This was covered in my speech ‘Market finance and financial stability: will the stretch cause a strain?’ 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  By allowing customers to connect to a range of banks and service providers through a single point, Open Banking could open to the door to the ‘unbundling’ of banking. Deposits could become more sensitive to returns. The ability of large incumbent banks to pay less for deposits – a benefit worth £ each year – may come to an end. And it will be easier for customers to separate their payments services from their savings deposits. The Bank of England is playing an active role by giving new non-bank payment service providers (provided they meet appropriate standards) access to the UK’s real time gross settlement system. The first non-bank payment service provider went live a week ago, and a number of others are set to join over the coming months. This means the new payment providers will gain direct access to the UK’s payment systems, including the world-leading Faster Payments service. It should spur innovation in payments, increasing choice and reducing costs for customers. Regulation will need to keep up with this unbundling to make sure the benefits to the economy in the good times don’t bring with them unintended risks in the bad. How?

The lesson here is to look at the economic substance, not the legal form. Securities lending Most accounts of the crisis give a headline role to SIVs, money funds, securities dealers and, as I shall come on to, the RMBS market. There has been rather less daylight, especially outside the US, around the somewhat obscure but very significant role played by the securities lending markets. The vanilla securities lending market is straightforward and important: it intermediates the loan of securities (equities, bonds or whatever) by asset managers to short sellers who need to deliver securities to settle their transactions. Securities lending is absolutely vital to effective market making, and thus to efficient capital markets. Asset managers hold their  4  BIS Review 6/2010  securities with custodians and, ultimately, in Central or International Securities’ Depositaries. Many enter into a service agreement under which their securities can be lent out by an agent. That provides the basis of a parallel, financing market. This is big, perhaps $ 6 at its peak. Say a Treasury Bond is lent out not against collateral in the form of securities but against cash, as is normal in the US market and had been growing in Europe before the crisis. The cash collateral can then employed in the market, ie it is lent to counterparties, usually secured. During the boom, risky assets, including ABS and CDOs, were increasingly accepted as collateral via so-called triparty repo arrangements, under which they were sometimes grouped with more innocuous securities with similar ratings.