samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
First, the increase of inflation and rise of interest rates to balance its impact, as well as the respective effects passed through in the economic and financial sector from this interaction, have been the remit in all recent meetings and forums with national and international partners and homologue. The structure of re-pricing credit portfolios, which are dominant in our banking system, has enabled banks to begin to transfer this effect to borrowers, while the relatively high share of non-interest bearing accounts on the liability side has provided for the increase of interest margins, at least temporary. But the increase of credit cost bears the risk of non-performing loans growing in the future, so far as borrowers' solvency has not proportionally increased with the price upsurge. The development of abilities to foresee and assess in an objective manner the solvency of the existing clients – without being inclined to fast and short-term profits, which may harm an already established long-term relationship - will be one of the main challenges in the next year. Second, requirements on capital (macro-prudential buffers and requirements on regulatory capital instruments and eligible liabilities) will continue to increase in  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  compliance with the regulatory provisions and the respective gradual application programme in 2023.

Cross-border payments  Page 5  are by their nature more complex than purely domestic ones. They involve more, and in some cases numerous, intermediaries, time zones, jurisdictions and regulations. In some instances, a cross-border payment can take several days and can cost up to 10 times more than a domestic payment. That is why enhancing cross-border payments was set as a priority in 2020 by the G20 and the UK has been playing a leading role in the comprehensive work programme led by the FSB[6] and which the CPMI and the BIS more broadly are closely involved in. One of the main frictions in the cross-border space is where the same transaction must be reviewed multiple times to ensure that the parties are not exposing themselves to illicit finance under different national regulations and sanctions lists. The current costs of AML/CFT compliance are significant[7]. Experience with complementary innovations such as digital IDs has already demonstrated the potential for cost savings[8]. There is also a significant time and resource benefit as sanctions alerts have typically been generated on a far greater number of transactions than actually are “true” hits. The mismatch between an alert and identification of a sanctioned transaction creates extra layers of review which extend transaction timelines and add cost – particularly where additional manual controls are needed. The G20/FSB Roadmap on cross-border payments is, amongst other things, focussed on how a more effective use of and greater standardisation of data could help to streamline AML/CFT and sanctions compliance.
16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Appendix Chart 1: Unemployment rate and projections  Chart 2: Cumulative Employee growth by skill level Cumulative increase since 2010Q1, thousands  Unemployment rate , % 12  16+ Unemployment Rate February 09 IR projection February 14 IR projection  1,800 Highly skilled  1,600  Medium skilled  11  1,400  Low skilled  1,200  Total  10  1,000  9  800  8  600 400  7  2006  2008  2009  2010  2012  2013  2014  200  6  0  5  -200  4 2016  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  Source: ONS and Bank calculations  Source: ONS and Bank calculations  Chart 3: Percent of 18–24 year olds not in employment, education or training  Chart 4: Nominal and Real total pay growth  Per cent  18  Real pay growth  17  Total nominal pay growth  -400  Per cent yoy  6  16  4  15  2 0  14  -2  13  -4  12  -6  11  2010 Q2 2011  2012  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey  BIS central bankers’ speeches  2013  2014  2015  8  10  -8 2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  -10 2015  Source: ONS and Bank calculations  17  Chart 5: Percentage of people in employment who would like to work longer hours Per cent  Chart 6: Percentage of people in employment on a zero hours contract Per cent  12  3  11  10  2  9 1  8  7  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  6 2015  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  0  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey Notes: Responses to the Labour Force Survey can be affected by respondents recognising the term “zero-hours contract”.

Holding flat the labour share may be too strong an assumption if the UK continues its cyclical rebound. Nonetheless, even the rise in wage growth seen through this year appears to have subsided somewhat over recent months. Shorter-term measures suggest annualised rates of pay growth of around 1 to 1.5% in Q3, down from 2.5 to 3% in Q2. Wage growth appears to be fizzling. And, of course, those are not the only potential downside risks facing the UK. World events have added to those downside skews over the past few months. There is now rather more convincing evidence of a gentle slowing in the UK and world economies since the summer. In the UK, this gentle slowing has been apparent since the middle of 2014. It leaves growth, in the UK and globally, little more than trend. Growth could accelerate in the period ahead, with the cost of credit at historically very low levels. Since the crisis, however, the pattern of UK output has been shaped less by the cost of credit today than by uncertainty about demand tomorrow. It was that uncertainty which cratered world demand in 2008. It was that uncertainty which flattened UK growth during the euro-area crisis of 2011–12. And it was the relief rally after that euro-area uncertainty abated which caused UK growth to bounce back during 2013–14. Uncertainty about demand is, once more, on the rise.
Mohammed Laksaci: Financial system developments in Algeria – resilience and risks in the face of the international financial crisis and its spillover effects Speech by Dr Mohammed Laksaci, Governor of the Bank of Algeria, at a Meeting with the Algerian Bankers Association, Algiers, 22 January 2009. *  *  *  Algeria’s strong macroeconomic performance over the past nine years and the gradual strengthening of the banking sector’s stability have contributed to establishing a relative resilience to external shocks. Key achievements include: •  sound management of international reserves (no investments in risky assets), paying due attention to the strategic objective of safeguarding asset portfolios against any loss of capital;  •  significantly reducing external debt, in 2005 and 2006, after strictly limiting external borrowing since early 2000. By end 2008, total medium and long term debt stood at only $ billion (less than 3% of GDP). Furthermore, banks’ external liabilities represent less than 1% of their total liabilities, and banks are required to deposit their end-of-day foreign exchange balances at the central bank which manages the country’s overall exchange position;  •  saving part of the fiscal revenue windfalls, with an annual budget saving averaging 23% of GDP during the period 2005-2008.

In this regard, a stress testing system, introduced in 2007, already contributes to better assessing banks’ risk management and evaluating adequacy of capital assets to potential risks. In view of the large number of foreign banks presently operating in Algeria, continued efforts are being made to develop bilateral cooperation on their supervision. In conclusion, prudent management of resources and continued strengthening of the financial and banking system stability allow Algeria to consider its medium term economic objectives with a relative confidence. However, the deepening of the international financial crisis and its drastic spillover effects on the world economy is already affecting the country through a number of channels, notably: •  a reduction in its savings capacity. The sharp decline in oil prices is drastically reducing hydrocarbon export receipts and consequently government’s savings capacity. A prolonged weakness of oil prices would inevitably erode the financial wealth accumulated in the stabilization fund with a correlative reduction in international reserves;  •  a reduction in the yields on the investment of international reserves, as a consequence of low interest rates in international markets. 2  BIS Review 21/2009
The UK has recently put in place an explicit macro-prudential regime. In July of last year, the UK government announced a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) to execute macro-prudential policy.7 The FPC is housed in the Bank of England and met for the first time in June this year. The FPC’s objective is to protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system against risks including “unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth”. Therein lies a key FPC challenge. There is evidence of unsustainably high levels of leverage in some sectors. But elsewhere, there is evidence of credit growth being unsustainably low. Some companies remain over-leveraged. Yet others are suffering a credit shortage, with bank lending to companies continuing to contract over the past 12 months. 5  For example, Graham and Narasimhan (2004), Malmendier and Nagel (2011). 6  For example, Cogley and Sargent (2008), Barro (2006). 7  HM Treasury (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In framing macro-prudential policy today, both these factors need to be weighed: on the one hand, enhancements to the risk-bearing capacity of the financial system to repair balance sheets; on the other, encouragement for the risk-taking capacity of the system to boost credit supply. These factors can sometimes point in subtly different directions. The first might point to higher buffers to boost banks’ risk-bearing capacity, while the second might point to lower buffers to boost their risk-taking capacity.

His work will now feature on another 2 billion works of art – our new £ notes. How did we decide? How did we arrive at Turner? As befits Turner, we took the process of selecting a new banknote character out of the black box and brought it into the sunlight. In December 2013, the Bank of England committed to making our character selection process much more open and transparent. First, the Banknote Character Advisory Committee was created and then decided the field of accomplishment. They chose visual arts, which had never before been properly displayed on a banknote. The Bank then invited the public to make nominations in this field. They proposed artists, sculptors, printmakers, designers, craftspeople, ceramicists, architects, fashion designers, photographers and filmmakers. Indeed, the response was exceptional. We received almost 30,000 individual suggestions, between them nominating 590 different eligible characters – demonstrating not only the depth of achievement of British art but also the public’s passion for it. This pool was handed to our expert Banknote Advisory Committee – John Akomfrah, Sir David Cannadine, Andrew Graham-Dixon, Sandy Nairne, Alice Rawsthorn, Baroness Lola Young, and, from the Bank, Deputy Governor Ben Broadbent and Chief Cashier Victoria Cleland. They used their considerable knowledge, supplemented with views from public focus groups, and whittled down to a shortlist of five characters. What were the criteria? 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  First, an unquestioned contribution to the visual arts. Second, a wider contribution to British society. And third, an enduring influence.
“Intervention,” as the late - Charles Kindleberger4 said, “is an art form not a science.” My contention is that, whilst an aspect of such ambiguity may be inevitable, or even necessary, the demands of today’s complex world for enhanced predictability of behaviour and transparency should not be ignored. Ultimately public policy may require emergency liquidity injection through lender of last resort facilities. This may be justified to defend the public good of financial stability which the market itself cannot provide. I stress the word ultimately for this is a last resort after all other efforts have failed. The granting of any such support does, however, contain a basic dilemma. On the one hand there is a strong case for market discipline to avoid the dangers of moral hazard. This is the case for ambiguity as to whether and when the lender of last resort facility would be deployed. On the other hand people want predictability of process: who can be expected to do what if problems do arise? In the UK we are quite advanced in addressing these dilemmas. Our former Governor Sir Edward George, in a speech here at the London School of Economics in 1993, outlined the five key principles of lender of last resort assistance. They are equally valid today. To précis: explore every commercial option; ensure the key benefits come to the financial system not the shareholders; aim towards a clear exit; treat with care any details of the support given; and distinguish between problems of liquidity and solvency.

It explains endeavours to encourage or enforce compliance with them, through a variety of measures including international bodies, such as the Basle Committee, IOSCO, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, the IMF, and the World Bank - and others too numerous to mention. The Financial Stability Forum is noteworthy too, as it brings together the three sets of key bodies involved in financial stability oversight - central banks, regulators and finance ministries - to supplement the actions of other international organisations in promoting standards globally. 13. Public policy response - if things go wrong  I spoke about identifying threats and the steps to mitigate them, but we also need to be able to intervene if things do go wrong. In a non-zero risk environment, failure is a possibility. So we need to look at both mitigants in relation to the impacts of financial crisis, and how to restore confidence. This is true both for financial crises which could occur as a result of business failure, as well as possible major operational disruption - whether from terrorism, cyber failure, or natural calamity. They are situations where predictability is so vital, when normal mechanisms for decision making may be in abeyance. I have left until last the tricky question of emergency liquidity injection and lender of the last resort. This is an area full of mystique and ambiguity.
Is the sector in better shape than it was five years ago? Yes. European banks have become considerably more resilient as they have increased their capital stock and strengthened their governance and risk controls. While preparing for the comprehensive assessment, they have also consolidated their balance sheets by up to € billion in recent months, selling off assets or issuing new capital. It is therefore fair to say that enormous progress has been made. But nevertheless, there is no reason to be lenient. Like an athlete who has to train daily to keep in shape, banks – which operate in a very competitive environment – must permanently work on their business models and strategies to take into account macroeconomic conditions, such as very low interest rates. They need to comply with many new regulatory restrictions, some of them still to come, some of them in transitional periods and not yet fully applicable. Until now supervision was conducted by the national authorities, such as the ACPR (the authority for prudential supervision and resolution) in France. Did that not suffice? Banks are highly interconnected. An independent supervisor at the European level gives rise to a number of advantages. First, it reduces the risk of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage as a European supervisor can create a level playing field. Second, it provides a better overview of the activities of large banks, while allowing for a cross-country comparison of their practices and control frameworks with those of other banks.

As national supervisors will support us in our forward-looking critical assessment, we take the best of both worlds: the additional expertise of national authorities combined with an independent, strong horizontal view when it comes to the centralised decision-making of the Single Supervisory Mechanism at the European level. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  How will you work with the ACPR? Like the other national supervisors, the ACPR will be actively involved, together with their counterparts at the ECB, in the supervision of the significant French banks. Our French colleagues will familiarise us with the characteristics specific to the French market and legal system. They will inform us of national developments that might influence banks’ activities, such as tax laws or laws on loans to enterprises. This expertise, combined with that of the ECB, will put us in the best position to assess banks’ risk profile and to judge whether the differences in banking practices between countries are justified or not. The SSM will supervise the 120 largest European banks, but the other 4,000 will remain under national supervision. Is this not a flaw in the system? The ECB will supervise the European banking system as a whole, the significant banks with a market share of 82% of total banking assets directly and the less significant ones indirectly. We will set the key principles according to which all of the European banks should be supervised, also at the national level. And we will check that these principles are being followed.
2.2 Banks are adapting to the digital and green transition [SLIDE 7] Beyond the regulatory response, banks themselves will be in charge of another course of action: far from being merely a source of risk, the digital and green transition offers growth opportunities for the banking sector, which has already found ways to adapt. Efforts to adapt to the digital challenge are already under way, as illustrated by three examples. First, the ACPR study on the digital transformation of the banking sector published in January, shows the wide array of initiatives taken. Strategies aimed at acquiring fintechs or developing partnerships with them point to the emergence of a new rationale of “coopetition”. This kind of cooperation by competitors is proof that banks and fintechs can grow together and that the digital transition can be a boon for all participants. Next, banks are increasingly harnessing new technologies. Artificial intelligence, as I mentioned earlier, is being built into new operational systems, where it is helping to improve aspects ranging from customer relations to risk management. Banks are also experimenting with blockchain technologies. And they are collaborating on an initiative that has our strong backing: the European Payment Initiative, more widely referred to as EPI, seeks to provide Europeans with an everyday payment solution that combines card and mobile components and addresses all use cases. Banks are also adapting to ensure the transition to a sustainable economy.

Running through to 2024, the plan aims to integrate climate-related risk into the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, not just in asset purchases but also in the framework governing the collateral eligible for central bank refinancing. Central banks themselves also have a role to play in steering investment flows towards the green transition, in particular by greening their own funds. The Banque de France was the first Eurosystem central bank to adopt and implement a Responsible Investment Charter, which it did in 2018 for its own funds portfolios. It aims to limit the exposure of its assets to climate-related risk while also taking account of the impact of its investments on the environment, in keeping with the double materiality principle promoted by the EU. In conclusion, there is certainly no shortage of challenges for banks. However, I hope I have shown that these challenges are also opportunities. Accordingly, we should neither overstate nor underestimate their significance. Thank you for your attention. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
Robert Ophèle: Diversity and harmonisation of deposit insurance Closing speech by Mr Robert Ophèle, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) International ERC Conference, Paris, 26 May 2016. *  *  *  I wish to thank the IADI and the FGDR for inviting me to deliver this closing speech. Bruno Bezard opened the conference for the French Treasury, and a central banker will close it. This is a perfect arrangement. Deposit insurance or deposit guaranty is a fascinating tool. History and geography have demonstrated the variety of schemes and how they are a powerful force for the better, or perhaps for the worse. I can’t indeed refrain from quoting the American Bankers Association, in 1933, i.e. more than 100 years after the introduction in the US of the first deposit insurance scheme, by the State of New York in 1829: “these historical experiences show that the guaranty plan is inherently fallacious and based on erroneous premises and assumptions. It has proved to be one of those plausible, but deceptive, human plans that in actual application only serve to render worse the very evils they seek to cure.” Today 113 Deposit Insurance Funds are in place, but I should stress that the jury is still out as to their effectiveness. Indeed, recent history shows how tricky deposit insurance can be. Just remember a few years ago, when schemes avoiding moral hazard by not providing a 100 percent coverage of even the smallest deposits were favoured.

This means: sustained momentum relative to trend; domestic cost growth resuming a path consistent with headline inflation at 2%; and core inflation measures moving notably towards the target. It is clear to me that, since last summer, progress has been insufficient along these dimensions to warrant a tightening of monetary policy. The world is weaker and UK growth has slowed. Due to the oil price collapse, inflation has fallen further and will likely remain very low for longer. This may mean modestly weaker cost growth through this year, with the likely path for inflation, both headline and core, softer as a result. In short, recent developments suggest that the firming in inflationary pressure we had expected will take longer to materialise. 23  In economic parlance, they are elements of a reaction function. One can think of a reaction function as akin to guide or policy rule relating the policy instrument to a set of macroeconomic variables. These are usually evaluated with respect to an “objective function” containing the policymaker’s target variables. For example, a flexible inflation targeting regime would be consistent with an objective function containing the deviation of inflation from its target and the deviation of a measure or measures of real activity from their equilibrium levels, weighted according to the policymaker’s preferences for stabilising one at the cost of another.