samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thailand, like Japan, is a country that is aging very rapidly as our labor force would be shrinking within this decade. Given that we were to rely on existing workers including informal workers from other countries in the region, our growth rate would still certainly trend downward. Again, increasing availability and attractiveness of automation will help mitigate that weakness in the Thai economy. The second trend is digital and governance. Currently, for example, people use digital payment as a way to access government income support schemes is something that will help improve the transparency and effectiveness of the government schemes. The overall trend towards digital together with the trend towards increasing transparency will help us in this regard quite significantly. Page 8 of 11  The third area, digital again not just to help with transparency but to help with our long-standing problem of not being able to move up the value chain as well as increase the value-added of many economic activities. For example, what are the things that we think Thailand is good at? What immediately comes to mind? One would probably think of food and the trend now is that people are increasingly concern about health, wellness, and want to know where their food comes from, not just the food itself but all of things that went into their food. Digital technology with ability to improve traceability in a transparent, verifiable way allows us at least to have the potential to increase some value-added of our food products.

• We have also set up a deal making platform called MATCH, or Meet ASEAN’s Talents and Champions) [15] , to connect global capital and the ASEAN enterprise community in 2018. This will help to grow the pipeline of companies that will eventually require listing in our public markets. • Singapore also organises the annual Singapore FinTech Festival (SFF) and this will be combined with the Singapore Week of Innovation and Technology (SWITCH) that is coming up on the 11-15th November, to provide a platform for industry players to gain greater understanding of fintech applications and developments as well as support innovative solutions to find commercialisation opportunities. • SGX is also working with licensed private market platforms to facilitate the listing process for portfolio companies. Such platforms provide PE/VC managers with opportunities to invest or exit, and provide a pipeline of companies that could list on SGX. Such private-public markets partnerships can serve as an engine of growth for our public markets and provide support for enterprises throughout their corporate lifecycle. 28 Đ Đ In keeping up with changes in our public markets, such as the rise of neweconomy start-ups and technology firms, exchanges have continued to innovate to provide product owerings that support the varying needs of these companies. • For example, SGX has joined global exchanges in Canada, Europe, and the US, in introducing the Dual Class Share (DCS) structure to support firms which have shares with diwerent voting rights to raise funds.
John C Williams: No man is an island Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2019 Asia Economic Policy Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, California, 14 November 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery “No man is an island entire of itself,” wrote the poet John Donne in 1624. Almost four centuries later, his words still ring true. And they are particularly salient when it comes to the financial fortunes of the global economy. Today I’m going to explore the commonalities and interconnectedness of the global economy, and what that means for the outlook in the United States. But before I delve into these ideas, I want to say what a pleasure it is to be back at the San Francisco Fed, among so many friendly faces. The Asia Economic Policy Conference is always a fascinating day, and I’d like to thank Mary Daly for the invitation to speak, and Zheng Liu and Mark Spiegel for putting together an outstanding program. I knew I was back in San Francisco when this morning I spent 20 minutes in line, waiting to spend five dollars on a cup of coffee. This is one thing for which inflation appears to be alive and well.

As policymakers, we need to take in how far-reaching those ripples are going to be. Monetary Policy The adjustments to monetary policy we made this year were designed to balance maintaining a strong U.S. economy with slowing global growth, and provide insurance against ongoing and potential future risks. And that’s what they’ve done. The economy is in a good place, and monetary policy is as well. My forecast is for moderate GDP growth, the labor market remaining strong, and inflation moving back to our symmetric 2 percent target. Of course, things can change. Data dependency remains our motto, and if there were a material change to this outlook, we would adjust monetary 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  policy in support of our goals of maximum employment and price stability. Conclusion I’ll conclude with this. John Donne’s words are perhaps more relevant in 2019 than they were in 1624. No man is an island, and no economy can insulate itself—for better or worse—from the fortunes of its neighbors. At the same time, all economies are having a common experience as a result of longer-term structural changes. Shifts in demographics and productivity growth point clearly in the direction of low neutral interest rates and slowing growth. We’re seeing the reality of these changes in the form of sluggish inflation and interest rates much lower than in previous decades. Central banks and policymakers around the world need to prepare for economies that are more connected than ever before. I’ll now take your questions.
So inflation expectations play a key role for monetary policy and for that reason we keep a close eye on how they are developing.3 Perhaps the most important task of monetary policy is to influence inflation expectations since it is via market rates, and not the repo rate itself, that demand in the economy is affected. That is why communication and credibility are so significant. If we can get our message across we increase the chances of a successful monetary policy. Monetary policy in a low-inflation economy The Riksbank’s rule of action, which says that the policy rate should be adjusted when inflation is above or below target one to two years ahead, is not at all as mechanical as is sometimes perceived. The Executive Board’s clarification in 1999 made it clear that the practical formulation of monetary policy takes account of developments in the real economy. According to the clarification there may be reason for the Riksbank to deviate from the target if inflation is being affected by a temporary shock that will not fully dissipate during the coming two-year period but that is nonetheless not deemed to have any lasting influence on inflation developments. Another reason is when a bigger shock makes a return to the target one to two years ahead associated with excessive undesirable effects on the real economy. There are many examples in recent years of when we have taken such factors into account. At the turn of the year 2002-2003, for example, rising energy prices were pushing up inflation quickly.

In other words the policy rate is normally adjusted so that inflation 1-2 years ahead, taking into account the balance of risks, is in line with the target. The Riksbank introduced the current regime of a floating exchange rate and inflation target in 1993, after a number of decades with a fixed exchange rate. The new regime has meant a new way of working whereby we attempt, with the aid of monetary policy, to adjust economic growth to what the inflation target allows. A common analogy is that the economy is like a car with certain characteristics that enable it to drive at certain speeds but not at others. In that case we in the Executive Board are the driver, using the policy rate to accelerate or slow down. If the car is going too fast, its tyres will start to overheat and we risk driving off the road, i.e. prices will rise and we have to raise the policy rate to slow down. Conversely, when the car is going too slowly we accelerate by lowering the policy rate. In reality the analogy with a car is somewhat misleading. First, it is difficult to know exactly the speed at which the economy is actually growing. The statistics that we use when forecasting economic growth contain errors, do not provide a comprehensive picture of the economic situation and furthermore are produced with a lag. Another problem is the difficulty in knowing exactly how long it takes before a rate adjustment has the desired effect.
Their take is that independent central banks are merely a troublesome relict and that monetary policy should largely be determined by the government’s financing needs. But experience from throughout history shows that this would, sooner or later, end in an economic policy fiasco. As you can see, the positions are far apart, with diametrically opposed interpretations of facts. The aim of my speech is to provide some clarity from the perspective of Switzerland’s central bank. To this end, I will set out some fundamental thoughts on the properties of sound money and the various types of money. I will then address the question as to whether, against the backdrop of our current monetary policy, the Swiss franc can still be described as sound money. Page 2/8  Sound money is stable money But let us first take a step back and look at money as a concept. Money is a generally accepted medium of exchange, and performs two other important functions, namely as a unit of account and as a store of value. As a unit of account, money serves to make economic transactions comparable. In this function, it is also used for representing the nominal value of all kinds of claims and liabilities. As a unit of account for determining value, money plays a prominent role in virtually all walks of life – from the workplace to healthcare and pension provision.

Some hedge funds that had used Bear to borrow money and clear trades were withdrawing cash from their accounts. Some large investment banks stopped accepting trades that would expose them to Bear, and some money market funds reduced their holdings of short-term Bearissued debt. The rumors of Bear’s failing financial health caused its balance of unencumbered liquidity on March 13 to decline sharply to levels that were not adequate to cover maturing obligations and funds that could be withdrawn freely. This precipitated the phone call that I described in the beginning of my testimony. The news that Bear’s liquidity position was so dire that a bankruptcy filing was imminent presented us with a very difficult set of policy judgments. In our financial system, the market sorts out which companies survive and which fail. However, under the circumstances prevailing in the markets the issues raised in this specific instance extended well beyond the fate of one company. It became clear that Bear’s involvement in the complex and intricate web of relationships that characterize our financial system, at a point in time when markets were especially vulnerable, was such that a sudden failure would likely lead to a chaotic unwinding of positions in already damaged markets. Moreover, a failure by Bear to meet its obligations would have cast a cloud of doubt on the financial position of other institutions whose business models bore some superficial similarity to Bear’s, without due regard for the fundamental soundness of those firms.
The Committee has recently published a  4  BIS Review 45/2006  newsletter clarifying supervisors’ expectations in terms of the requirements to be met in order for these types of models and databases to be accepted under IRB approaches. Conclusion As we can see, there are a fair number of open topics on the table as regards Basel II implementation. Many of them already existed under Basel I, but now we have a much better idea of their size and nature, and have created better structures and processes to address them. Since work started on the application of the new capital recommendations, the Committee members and the supervisory community as a whole have made considerable progress in understanding and resolving difficulties, and along the way we have improved the level of cooperation and trust between supervisors, as well as the level of communication and mutual understanding with the banking industry on such sensitive subjects as the management of risks and capital. The reality we supervisors are facing was already complicated even before the introduction of Basel II. But now the quality of our knowledge and the way in which we handle the risks and challenges have improved thanks to the revised Framework’s introduction. I would say that all of this is, in my opinion, positive. I would like once again to extend my thanks to ASBA and the FSI.

Finally, it is my view that, over and above the formal standards and protocols, the really important thing is cooperation and communication in good faith between supervisory colleagues. Cooperation is, therefore, a two-way street, and I believe that we all understand that we need to accept a minimum level of flexibility, based on mutual trust and reciprocity, if we want cooperation between supervisors to be effective. Basel II implementation: other aspects Turning now to the other topics currently being discussed, I would like to mention Pillar 2 of the revised Framework as an aspect which is receiving increasing attention. Concretely: the Group is currently exchanging views on how this pillar can and should be applied consistently within an international banking group. As we can see, the question of cooperation among supervisors is not limited to the use of advanced models under Pillar 1, and it is thus necessary to be able to exercise this degree of flexibility as regards the nature and scope of such cooperation. There are also certain topics on which it would be desirable that both banks and supervisors move forward more decisively.
Andres Lipstok: Overview of Bank of Estonia’s first year of the euro Speech by Mr Andres Lipstok, Governor of the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank), at the presentation of Eesti Pank’s 2011 Annual Report to the Riigikogu (the Parliament of Estonia), Tallinn, 29 May 2012. *  *  *  Honourable President of the Riigikogu, honourable members of the Riigikogu, My mission today is to present you with an overview of Eesti Pank’s first year of the euro. I will first run through the activities of Eesti Pank in 2011. Then, I am going to focus on the euro area economic and monetary policy, as well as on economic developments in Estonia and the activities of the central bank against the backdrop of the euro area financial crisis. [EESTI PANK IN THE YEAR 2011] 1. 2011 was an action-packed year for Eesti Pank. First of all, the central bank had to carry out the work required for the changeover to the single currency. Second of all, the transition to the euro bestowed Eesti Pank with new duties and a greater responsibility – the central bank became an equal partner in monetary policy decision-making in the euro area. Our main task is to contribute to price stability in the euro area along with other Eurosystem central banks. From the beginning of 2011, the Governor of Eesti Pank partakes in decisions affecting not only the people of Estonia, but also the 300 million residents of the euro area.

These lie at 75 points above and 75 points below the repo rate respectively. The difference between the lending and deposit rates is sufficiently large for the banks normally to view it as more profitable to balance deficits and surpluses in their payments at the end of the day on the interbank market, rather than utilising the Riksbank's lending and deposit facilities. Both a bank with a surplus and a bank with a deficit win by depositing or borrowing in other banks at rates between the Riksbank's deposit and lending rates. The fact that the interbank rate normally lies at the centre of the corridor, i.e. close to the repo rate is because the Riksbank usually offers the banks the opportunity to borrow or deposit sufficient funds at the repo rate so that no bank will need to utilise the more expensive alternatives offered by the deposit and lending facilities. The condition for this is that the possibilities in the interbank market have been exhausted. Outstanding notes and coins and other items on the Riksbank's balance sheet mean that the banking system currently has to borrow from the Riksbank. To avoid the necessity of converting a large loan stock every day, the Riksbank every week offers the banks the possibility of borrowing via repurchase transactions with a duration of one week at the monetary policy-steered repo rate.
The development of a strong core of Singaporean leaders in finance, working in diverse global teams, will define our continued success as a financial centre. MAS takes this very seriously. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  44. We have in recent years introduced several initiatives to promote the development of Singaporean leaders in the financial industry. •  The Finance Associate Management Scheme (FAMS) offers promising young professionals exposure to different aspects of a financial institution’s global operations and mentorship by senior leaders. •  The International Posting Programme (iPOST) has supported more than 35 overseas postings of Singaporeans in finance since its launch in 2013. They have acquired valuable practical experience in diverse working cultures over their 6 to 24-month attachments to regional and global offices of financial institutions. Asian Financial Leaders Programme (AFLP) 45. To further strengthen these efforts, I am pleased to announce the launch of the Asian Financial Leaders Programme (AFLP). •  The AFLP will take advantage of Singapore’s strong and expanding linkages in the region, including ASEAN, China and India, and aim to strengthen those links through leadership development. •  It is aimed at equipping finance professionals aspiring to C-suite roles with the knowledge and capabilities to operate effectively across diverse business, regulatory, and legal environments. •  Participants will be given the opportunity to learn from and interact with top policymakers from the region and to also build networks with fellow financial sector leaders.

The Treasury’s Request for Information, and comments on various SEC and CFTC proposals, have provided thoughtful perspectives on the evolution of Treasury market structure. We have also benefited from consultation with groups such as the Treasury Markets Practices Group (TMPG), which is made up of market professionals committed to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the Treasury market. Continued engagement between the official sector and the public on the Treasury market remains necessary to help to manage its evolution, and to best maintain its efficient function and integrity. Those of you who transact in this market have a crucial perspective on how the Treasury market works and what information is useful for evaluating its function. Engagement between the official and private sectors can also facilitate the development of timely solutions to important issues in the industry. Such efforts include the best practices the TMPG has produced for the Treasury, agency debt and agency MBS markets, 4 and the Group of 30’s recommendations on banking culture and conduct5―an issue I believe the financial industry must continue to work on.6 In fact, it is this type of collaboration―between a wide array of market participants and official agencies―that helps different perspectives come together to create effective practices.7 In addition to engagement with the public, the Joint Member Agencies have continued their interagency collaboration. We have been working together to share information and help shape the most effective path forward for public policy.
Ben Broadbent: Monetary policy, asset prices and distribution Speech by Mr Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy of the Bank of England, at the Society of Business Economists Annual Conference, London, 23 October 2014. *  *  *  I would like to thank Alina Barnett for research assistance and I am also grateful for helpful comments from other colleagues in particular from Richard Harrison, David Learmonth and Gareth Ramsay. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. A few years ago, I used to take the overground train into work. The line was cluttered with stations – mine was barely 400 yards on from the previous stop. So you can understand why my fellow commuters were less than convinced one morning when, seeking to explain why our train was 20 minutes overdue, the driver said this was “because we left the last station late”. It raised a smile. But it wasn’t an explanation. I confess I have a similar reaction to accounts that seek to “explain” low interest rates, and the behaviour of asset prices more generally, solely by reference to what central banks have done. This is especially true when those accounts go on to attribute significant and lasting redistributive effects to these policies. For example, and at least when they happen to be going up, it’s quite common to hear that equity markets are benefiting from “easy money”.

The Central Bank has been implementing a monetary tightening to offset the secondary effects of supply shocks. Since domestic demand is growing at a moderate pace at the moment, it has been curbing the pass through from cost-push factors. As a matter of fact, the prices of products that do not use food or energy as main inputs have been rather well behaved compared to the prices of products that have food or energy as inputs. However, the fact that first round effects of the supply side shocks have reached unprecedented levels has been affecting inflation expectations adversely. Monetary policy cannot remain indifferent in case of a deterioration in the overall pricing behavior. If supply side shocks last long, their effects will spill over to the other sectors in the economy. A tighter stance is a must in order to control the expectations and to prevent the mutation of supply side shocks into demand shocks. If monetary policy does not react to the disruption in inflation dynamics, supply side price hikes may, after a certain point, easily evolve into a selffeeding vicious circle. Dear Guests, Why did the Central Bank not repeat the strong monetary tightening policy that it had implemented in 2006, but instead opted for a measured and gradual increase in interest rates in 2008? The current conditions differ from the May 2006 fluctuation.