samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With this in mind, the CPSS will continue to closely monitor progress over the next year for any signs of slippage. BIS Review 60/1997  -5-  The search by individual banks for efficient ways to reduce their foreign exchange settlement risk has brought about important progress at the industry-group level as well. The Allsopp report noted the efforts of FXNET, S.W.I.F.T, ECHO, Multinet, and the Group of 20 banks to offer various types of risk-reducing services, and these ongoing efforts are very encouraging. Some banks are also exploring the elimination of settlement risk altogether by shifting the market to trades that simply settle the gain or loss associated with exchange rate movements -- called “contracts for difference” -- instead of requiring delivery of the underlying currencies. We are well aware that many market participants are currently debating what constitutes the most efficient multi-currency netting and settlement services. While there will be potential winners and losers, I believe that the market as a whole should ultimately benefit from this rigorous competition. At the same time, settlement risk reduction should not be used to justify the concentration of market power. The G-10 central bank governors have long been on record in favor of fair and open access to services that permit participation by a broad range of institutions, consistent with the prudent management of risk.

Our collective efforts, along with developments in information technology and risk management techniques, have already contributed to improved market stability. The growing, and successful, commitment of central banks to the achievement of price stability as BIS Review 60/1997  -7-  their primary goal is another crucial and positive contribution toward market stability. Moreover, where we as central banks see gaps that develop in the global financial system, as we did in the areas of market risk and settlement risk management, we play the role of facilitator to private sector solutions. As central bankers, we tend to view our role in the global financial markets as ensuring that the necessary infrastructure is in place to promote well-functioning markets for all players. Then we step aside and let the markets take care of themselves. BIS Review 60/1997
Inadequate financial supervision and regulation, problems with macroeconomic management, and a general lack of transparency certainly contributed to the problems. Ladies and Gentlemen, even with the best economic management, small open economies remain vulnerable. They are like small rowboats on a wild and open sea. Although we may not be able to predict it, the chances of eventually being broadsided by a large wave are significant no matter how well the boat is steered. Though, to be sure, bad steering probably increases the chances of a disaster, and a leaky boat makes it inevitable, even on a relatively calm day. Ladies and Gentlemen, let’s turn to the role of monetary policy and central banks Price stability The interaction between financial markets, economic growth and monetary policy is by no means a new issue for central bankers. However, financial market developments have brought the question to the forefront of the policy debate. The continued integration and deepening of financial markets is a significant issue for policy-makers, and particularly for central bankers, since smoothly functioning and efficient financial markets are crucial in ensuring a smooth transmission of monetary impulses. The best contribution that monetary policy can make to the smooth functioning and integration of financial markets and to economic growth is to maintain steady medium-term price stability. Such a policy will be beneficial, as it will minimise the adverse effects of inflation and high inflation uncertainty. As we all know, price stability is beneficial in numerous ways.

However, these developments also project the improvements in regulatory and supervisory oversight which continues to be updated. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, for Zambia the vision is to become a prosperous middle income country by the year 2030. In order for us to attain this vision, there is need to improve the financial infrastructure in Zambia. Since 2004, the Government has been implementing the Financial Sector Development Plan with the view to improve the functioning of financial markets and increase accessibility to financial services by a majority of Zambians. The second phase of the FSDP is currently underway after the initial five-year plan lapsed. We cannot deny that an improved financial infrastructure will result in efficient capital and money markets which in turn will attract domestic and foreign investment in the economy. Conclusion In conclusion Ladies and Gentlemen I would just want to emphasise that Zambia and many of our regional counterparts are small countries in need of investment. However, the high cost of capital has hampered the increase in investment, particularly among the SMEs which continue to face enormous financing challenges. Therefore provision of appropriate financing to this category of firms is likely to lead to higher investment opportunities and more efficient methods of production. In turn, this will translate into poverty alleviation due to employment creation.
An effective system of AML, means advanced systems of information technology, especially on those parts that deal with the database of the clients, the aggregation of the information from any single point in the network, and those that enable the continuous monitoring and filtering of any bank transaction. For our institutions, especially for those that are not branches or subsidiaries of any stronger financial institution, those costs can be substantial and difficult to be absorbed. BIS Review 49/2005  1  Furthermore, we have been witnesses of a somehow difficult dialogue with the institutions that implement the law. I must say though that such a problem exists almost in any jurisdiction, including the most developed countries. But their attitude toward the abidance to the law, of constructive discussion of problems and of quick reactions in implementing changes, facilitates the solution of different problems. Dear bank directors, I do like though to consider the issue from what we as bankers, can contribute more in this process, in spite of above-mentioned difficulties. Furthermore, history shows that the cost of dealing with those difficulties, whatever their size in normal times, can be easily exceeded in instances of unusual events that are linked with scandals on ML.

Zamani Abdul Ghani: Official launch of Commerce Takaful Berhad Keynote address by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the official launch of Commerce Takaful Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2006. *  *  *  Terlebih dahulu saya ingin menyatakan kesyukuran kita kerana dapat berhimpun pada petang ini. Saya juga ingin mengucapkan terima kasih kepada Commerce Takaful Berhad kerana menjemput saya menghadiri majlis yang sangat bermakna ini. Alhamdulillah, usaha kita yang berterusan dan yang tidak mengenal lelah dalam merumus pembangunan industri kewangan Islam sepanjang lebih dua dekad yang lalu telah mula menampakkan hasil yang memberangsangkan. Usaha kita ini telah melahirkan suatu industri perbankan Islam dan takaful yang mantap, kompetitif, dan berdaya tahan. Pembangunan infrastruktur keinstitusian yang menyeluruh dan saling berkait rapat dalam bidangbidang utama seperti perbankan, takaful, pasaran wang dan modal, menjadi nadi perkembangan industri ke peringkat lebih tinggi dan meluas. Takaful, yang merupakan komponen penting sektor kewangan Islam, telah mencapai perkembangan yang pesat dan semakin berpotensi untuk memacu kemajuan seterusnya di dalam dan luar negara. Peningkatan kesedaran orang ramai mengenai produk kewangan Islam terus merupakan antara faktor penting menyokong perkembangan positif ini. Kesemua elemen-elemen ini terus memperkukuhkan kedudukan Malaysia sebagai pelopor dan peneraju kewangan dan perbankan Islam. Pembangunan seterusnya kini bergantung kepada sejauh mana pengendali takaful dapat menggunakan kelebihan yang ada, terutamanya dalam meneroka lebih jauh dalam pasaran global. Fokus harus diberi kepada menentukan hala tuju strategik yang tepat dan menyeluruh, dan mengembleng inisiatif berterusan dalam meningkatkan kualiti perkhidmatan dan produk.
1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  However, they could also reduce the efficiency of the overall financial system if their roll-out leads to a fragmentation of processes, and their interoperability and coexistence with existing systems are not properly organised, or, on the contrary, if they lead to the creation of monopolies. This latter risk stems from the growing interest of global digital giants in digital payment services. Thanks to their huge user bases and expertise in end-toend technology, Bigtechs have the potential to pose a major competitive threat to European payments’ players, who are less experienced in the digital sphere. They could also increase Europe’s reliance on foreign players for payment services, with all the data privacy and sovereignty challenges that this entails. This double-edged impact of innovation on financial system efficiency notably concerns the tokenisation of financial markets and, in general, the use cases of decentralised finance (DeFI). C) Innovation in the financial sector, especially the emergence of Bigtechs and the development of new settlement assets in the form of crypto-assets, raises new challenges for monetary sovereignty and stability. In particular, if stablecoins were rolled out on a massive scale by BigTechs (Facebook’s Diem project), they could be adopted as private settlement assets on a global scale, thanks to significant network effects.

Denis Beau: The digitalisation of the financial sector - new challenges, new levers Closing speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the 4th Assises des Technologies Financières, 30 September 2021. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to thank the President, Eric Woerth, for inviting me to close these 4th Assises des Technologies Financières, and to provide my insight, as a central banker and supervisor, into the challenges posed by the digitalisation of financial services. In the framework of our mission to safeguard monetary and financial stability, the main issue for the Banque de France is how we can facilitate and accompany the digitalisation of the financial sector, which is a source of efficiency gains, while at the same time preserving the stability of our monetary and financial system. In order to present the concrete responses we are trying to bring to this issue, I shall start by reminding you of the new challenges posed by digitalisation to the safety and efficiency of the financial sector, before describing the three main areas where we are working to  respond, in line with our mandate. I. The digitalisation of the financial sector poses new challenges  A) In terms of security, one of the main concerns raised by the current digital transformation of the financial system is IT or cyber-risk. The digital transformation considerably increases financial system participants’ surface area of exposure to cyber-threats, and hence their vulnerability to such risk.
And this positive impact is such that it, in turn, boosts credit demand and banks’ income, which ultimately translates into higher solvency levels. In any event, it is important to note that it may be difficult for banks to use buffers if they fear they may be penalised by the financial markets for reaching certain capital ratios, which would increase their funding costs and could, therefore, affect their solvency levels. This  3  market stigma effect could lead banks to avoid using capital buffers, which in accordance with the above analysis would have a negative impact on the economy.1 In addition, the use of these capital buffers may be more difficult if there are doubts about how they will be rebuilt post-crisis. The difficulty would be if banks were obliged to rebuild the buffers at a time when their capacity to generate profit was only modest or when the market might not be very receptive. In this setting, clear communication by the macroprudential and microprudential authorities on the capacity to make use of these buffers and on the flexibility as to how they are subsequently rebuilt is essential. In this respect, the authorities have made it very clear that banks will have sufficient time to resume compliance with the capital requirements, and that the rebuilding process will not in any event begin until the main effects of the pandemic have been dispelled.

The Basel reforms that were phased in over the last decade incorporated into regulations the lessons learned during the global financial crisis. The first stage of the Basel reforms began in 2010 and concluded with a second wave of reforms published in 2017. In the first phase, the aim was to boost the level and the quality of banks’ microprudential capital requirements. The intention was to reduce their risk-taking, by increasing their “skin in the game”, and to provide them with greater loss-absorbing capacity. In addition, the releasable macroprudential buffers I referred to earlier were also introduced. The second phase of the Basel reforms focused on a matter that came to light during the first phase, namely the calculation of risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the capital requirements under the Basel standards) and the need to standardise their treatment among institutions. Once again, the aim was to reinforce banks’ credibility with regard to their prudential ratios and the correct measurement of the risks they assume. A crucial aspect of this reform is the “output floor”, which limits the reductions that banks can obtain by using internal models to calculate minimum capital requirements instead of the standardised approach that does not require the use of models and is much less sensitive to new data inputs. 5  The impact analyses of the reform reveal that banks’ capital requirements would increase in some jurisdictions, although they would also be reduced by certain elements.
But the world is complex and people don’t have endless time to devote to understanding monetary policy. In practice, therefore, guidance can be useful in providing people with information about how the MPC sets policy and, over time, in improving understanding of how monetary policy will adjust to news. Guidance thus helps people to think along with the Committee so that their expectations about the path of policy adapt with ours as economic circumstances change. This can make monetary policy more effective by reducing unwarranted volatility in interest rate expectations and the extent to which the MPC has to move Bank Rate to meet the inflation target. The more those expectations are aligned with the policy path necessary to achieve the inflation target, the higher the probability that policy objective will be achieved. Guidance is not a promise of the future path of policy. And its use will not mean that all observers will agree on the likely path of policy for the simple reason that not everyone will agree on the likely path for the economy. However, with guidance, someone who has a different outlook can better anticipate how the MPC will adjust once the scales fall from the Committee’s eyes. Again it is the combination of the economy and the primacy of the inflation target, not the MPC, that ultimately determines that path of policy. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  The MPC’s guidance speaks first and foremost to UK households and businesses.

Bank analysis suggests that Brexit remains the most important driver of short term market interest rates since then (Chart 12). 20  See the written statement to Parliament made by the Chancellor on 20 December 2017, available at www.parliament.uk/ business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2017-12-20/HCWS382/. 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  19  Chart 12: Brexit news has been the main driver of UK interest rates Decomposition of the variance of UK 3-year interest rates since November 2015 Per cent 100  Other  90  Brexit  80  Euo-area data  70  US data  60  UK data  50  Euro-area monetary policy  40  US monetary policy  30  UK monetary policy  20 10 0  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. Notes: This decomposition is based on changes in UK 3-year interest rates in 30 minute windows around data releases and monetary policy announcements in the UK, US and euro area, and news about Brexit. Households looked through Brexit-related uncertainties initially. But as the consequences of sterling’s fall showed up in the shops and squeezed their real incomes, they have cut back spending growth to rates about one half of those pre-referendum. Businesses have been somewhere in between. Since the referendum, they have invested much less aggressively than usual in response to an otherwise very favourable environment – with global demand growing strongly, limited spare capacity, relatively high rates of return on capital and the low cost of finance – reflecting the drag from Brexit-related uncertainties.
Given the relationship between money growth and inflation in the very long run, that means that the rate of inflation has no effect on the real equilibrium. In practice, high rates of inflation have proved highly variable, injecting uncertainty into the economy, which can have real effects. 13  Buiter, W. H., 2006, “How Robust is the New Conventional Wisdom in Monetary Policy? The surprising fragility of the theoretical foundations of inflation targeting and central bank independence”, paper presented at the 2006 Central Bank Governors’ Symposium “Challenges to Monetary Theory”, at the Bank of England. 14  For example, Lucas, R. E., 1987, “Models of Business Cycles, 1985 Yrjö Jahnsson Lectures, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 15  For the genesis of this term in the literature, see Rogoff K., 1985, “The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, volume 100, number 4. 16  From the vantage point of being Private Secretary to Governor Leigh-Pemberton (1989-1992), and later as an official implementing policy and then heading the Bank’s Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division. BIS Review 66/2007  3  the Bank would not be able to account for its monetary stewardship on the Floor of the House of Commons. In a Parliamentary system of democracy, it is Ministers who are accountable. 17 Those circumstances are specific to the UK. Other conditions and histories act as constraints elsewhere.

Thomas Jordan: The challenges of the global economic crisis – can Switzerland master them? Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, on the occasion of a panel discussion at the Central Bank of the Republic of Austria, Vienna, 1 February 2011. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website. *  *  *  Many countries are facing major economic challenges as a result of the financial and economic crisis. Which of these are of particular importance for Switzerland? And how can we tackle them? Switzerland is currently facing three key challenges. First, the crisis has shown that countries can encounter serious difficulties due to systemically important banks. Switzerland has two systemically important banks, in fact, these big banks are systemically important even at the global level. Thus for our country, in particular, it is essential that the stability of the financial system be sustainably reinforced. Second, the crisis has substantially changed the economic environment in which Switzerland – an economy with an extremely global orientation – operates. On the one hand, our country has to cope with the appreciation of the Swiss franc, particularly against the euro, which has come under pressure because of the sovereign debt crisis affecting certain European countries. On the other hand, the crisis has reinforced the shift in economic power towards the emerging economies.
BIS Review 34/2002  3  ‘With the economy on the turn, the MPC has to sift mixed evidence… It would be remarkable if eight intelligent, well-briefed economists could be of one mind.’ But this point is not always readily understood, even by the most astute commentators. In July 1998 the Financial Times suggested: ‘…the MPC bears a closer resemblance to a post-graduate seminar than to a forum for strategic decision making… To put [several] economists in the same room is to invite what one commentator has called paralysis by analysis.’ And in the same month, The Times described the MPC as ‘a committee bursting to the brim with individual opinions’ implying that ‘periods of badly co-ordinated and erratic behaviour are only to be expected’. But it is precisely the exploration of alternative views about what is happening in the British economy, and the discussion of these views by the Committee in a spirit of investigation not advocacy, that is central to the pooling of knowledge through which committees reach decisions that are superior to those taken by individuals. I think that is increasingly understood by commentators, and helps to explain why split votes are now regarded as normal and not a source of great excitement. It is, nevertheless, important that there are no ideological differences among Committee members that would make rational debate difficult, and, in this respect, the Committee has so far been fortunate. A famous 1970s laboratory experiment also showed the value of a frank exchange of views within a 5 committee.

BIS Review 34/2002  9  Table 1  CUMULATIVE MPC VOTING RECORD VOTING STATISTICS  Eddie  Howard  Mervyn  David  Ian  John  Willem  Charles  DeAnne  Alan  Sushil  Stephen  Christopher  Charles  Kate  (SINCE JUNE 1997)  George  Davies  King  Clementi  Plenderleith  Vickers  Buiter  Goodhart  Julius  Budd  Wadhwani  Nickell  Allsopp  Bean  Barker  MEETINGS ATTENDED  61  2  61  58  61  28  36  36  45  18  37  25  25  21  13  61  VOTED UP  9 14 38  2 0 0  17 12 32  8 14 36  9 13 39  10 7 11  17 10 9  12 7 17  2 18 25  5 6 7  3 16 18  3 7 15  0 10 15  0 8 13  0 4 9  9 14 38  61 0  2 0  51 10  54 4  56 5  23 5  19 17  33 3  31 14  14 4  24 13  22 3  21 4  20 1  13 0  -  0 0  0 0  2 8  1 3  2 3  0 5  0 17  0 3  3 11  0 4  1 12  0 3  0 4  0 1  0 0  -  VOTED DOWN VOTED NO-CHANGE VOTED WITH MAJORITY VOTED DIFFERENT TO MAJORITY VOTED NO-CHANGE WHEN CHANGE VOTED CHANGE WHEN NO-CHANGE  10  BIS Review 34/2002  Actual  BIS Review 34/2002  11