samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If we do so, perhaps others too, could replicate some of those efforts which  BIS Review 133/2008  1  have been proved to be successful. Hence, there is an urgent need for us to create the awareness. We also have to enact the necessary laws. Sri Lanka has already passed the necessary laws for this purpose: so have many other countries. That is very important. Because, without the legal framework and the legal backing, our efforts will not succeed. Then, we have to build our own capacities. We have to have people who are trained and competent to deal with these challenges. Because, unless you have the competence, and the ability to recognize certain disguised transactions, the ability to see through the clever facades, and the ability to anticipate the next move of the terror financiers or money launderers, we would not be able to progress. Therefore, we have to diligently follow rules and detection principles. That is why this kind of conference is very important. My dear friends, we have to realize that money launderers and terrorist financiers are also smart. Your Lordship, they may also be having conferences of this nature, in their own way, to see how best they can be a step ahead of all of us, to ensure that they will be able to perform their own dastardly deeds more successfully. They will take advantage of calamities. On many occasions we have seen how that has worked. Earthquakes, droughts, civil strife, tsunamis, etc.

can be useful breeding grounds for this kind of illegal financing efforts. These terror financiers make use of unsuspecting bankers as their partners. Although sometimes, certain bankers can be knowingly involved, on many occasions, they may even be unknowingly involved. Sometimes these money launderers and terrorists use informal systems. They by-pass the formal systems and have other parallel systems. I am sure that, in your deliberations you would be discussing these matters and considering as to how these can be addressed. If there is a parallel system, which is operating side by side with the formal system, they can make use of such systems to do what they want. They also disguise transactions. Certain transactions which are actually for laundering money or which are financing terrorism would not be obvious, as they may be cleverly concealed. The transactions will be packaged in such a way that unless you have a vigilant or trained eye, you would not be able to spot it. Very often, the illegal financiers will also pretend to be very respectable people in society, and indeed, may even be considered so by the world at large. They may come in the guise of social workers, philanthropists, community workers, aid workers, NGOs, etc. Therefore, we have to be alert. We have to be a few steps ahead. We have to have bankers, media, regulators, prosecutors and a judiciary who will keep abreast of the methods and the ruses that could be adopted by these unscrupulous people. We must also have regular updates.
First, the authorities must become better at gathering and analysing information about conditions in the financial sector and the rest of the world in order to be able to better assess the risks of future crises in the financial system. One of the problems has been that the risks have developed during periods when the financial sector has appeared to be in excellent health, at least on the surface. This points to the importance of two things: We need a more transparent financial sector and we need ongoing research and development work to produce indicators that are better at revealing that systemic risks are developing, as well as other types of analytical tools. However, this is not only about discovering and understanding the risks, it is also about counteracting the development of the risks in a more concrete way. This is why we also need effective corrective tools that enable the authorities to better influence risk behaviour in the financial sector and thus reduce the risk of crises in the future. This includes, for instance, finding ways to ensure that the assessments of the authorities have a sufficient impact on the risk behaviour of the financial players. Apart from effective communication, we also need to think about whether we have the "teeth" needed to put sufficient pressure on the players to make them change their behaviour. For example, the possibility to im-pose an extra capital adequacy requirement on particularly large and complex (and therefore systemically-important) banks has been discussed.

Denny H Kalyalya: Zambian financial sector – responding to the needs of business Speech by Dr Denny H Kalyalya, Deputy Governor-Operations of the Bank of Zambia; at the opening of Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Solwezi Branch, Solwezi, 10 December 2008. *  *  *  The Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Hon. Felix Mutati The Minister, North-Western Province, Hon. Joseph Mulyata The Chairman of the Board of Standard Chartered Bank Zambia, Mr. George Sokota His Worship the mayor of Solwezi The Managing Director of Standard Chartered Bank, Mrs. Mizinga Melu Distinguished guests Members of the press Ladies and Gentlemen I am pleased to be here at the official opening of the new Solwezi Branch of Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Limited. Ladies and Gentlemen, recent times have shown a proliferation of commercial bank branches in areas which had previously been considered unattractive for business. Rural areas had even experienced closures where banks felt that they were unable to establish a case for business. The economic environment that the Government created through the reforms instituted in the early 1990’s has given new confidence to investors and has provided an opportunity for businesses to grow, thereby attracting banks to the areas which were deprived of basic financial services. The opening of this branch today, in a town which has attracted major investments, is a demonstration that the financial sector is indeed, now responding to the needs of business.
Our average ownership in listed European companies is almost three times our average holdings in Asia or the Americas. Slide 12: Changing regional allocation (starting point) At the start of this year, more than half of the Fund was invested in Europe. As the Fund has grown, we have come to realise that a more even distribution between regions will better enable the Fund to take part in global value creation. Slide 13: Changing regional allocation (target) Recently, a new principle for the regional allocation of the Fund’s assets has been approved. A consequence of this principle is that the relative allocation to Europe is reduced. The Fund’s relative holdings in the Americas, Asia and emerging economies will increase accordingly. For the Fund as a whole, a more even allocation across regions will improve the overall long-term trade-off between risk and expected return. In accordance with the new allocation of the Fund’s assets, new purchases will primarily be made outside of Europe, until the adjustment process is completed. As the Fund receives inflows of fresh capital on month-by-month basis, we are able to undertake the adjustment through new purchases. This will ensure a gradual process, and will not entail a large sell-off on our part. Instead, the effect will be merely a temporary drop in our purchases of European assets. Under the new principle, the Fund will still be overweight in European assets, compared to a market neutral position.

When growth finally resumes, countries that have improved their economic structures and public finances will be well positioned to take advantage of the upturn. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Slide 1: Landes quote  Slide 2: Output gap: A boom-bust economy  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Slide 3: Current account balance: Large external deficits  Slide 4: Output gap: A boom-bust economy  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Slide 5: Measures were taken  Slide 6: Two golden decades  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Slide 7: The fund mechanism and fiscal policy  Slide 8: The cash flow grew rapidly  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Slide 9: Key characteristics  Slide 11: Considerable overweight in Europe  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Slide 12: Changing regional allocation (starting point)  Slide 13: Changing regional allocation (target)  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Slide 14: Fixed income: new benchmark  Slide 15: Risk has many facets  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Indeed, the University of Malta and other specialized institutions provide training and tuition leading to professional qualifications in all these fields. In addition, Malta benefits from a wide network of Double Taxation Agreements, covering some 40 countries, while investment by both the public and private sectors has provided a modern and efficient telecommunications system and airport facilities (the latter now under Austrian management), good hotels and office space and housing of high quality. These attributes, complemented by Malta’s favorable geographical position and climate, make the island a profitable place to do business from. 4  BIS Review 31/2004

Therefore, looking ahead, acting in a firm and timely manner to ensure price stability in the medium term remains warranted. As regards fiscal policy, there is growing confirmation that the favourable cyclical developments led to better than expected budgetary outcomes in 2006 in a number of countries and in the euro area as a whole. However, updated stability programmes foresee only moderate progress with fiscal consolidation in the coming years. In this respect, some countries’ consolidation targets appear not  2  BIS Review 23/2007  fully in line with the requirements of the revised Stability and Growth Pact. Risks stem in particular from a lack of well-specified and credible measures, notably on the expenditure side of budgets. Given the favourable economic environment, the Governing Council considers it essential that procyclical policies are avoided in all euro area countries and that sufficiently ambitious fiscal consolidation efforts are made in the countries with remaining budgetary imbalances and/or high public debt outstanding. The opportunity should be seized to attain sound public finances within the programme horizons and by 2010 at the latest in all euro area countries. Fiscal consolidation that is part of a medium-term-oriented, credible and expenditure-based reform strategy would support longerterm output and employment growth and help prepare for the fiscal impact of population ageing. As regards structural reforms, the European Council will discuss the current state of, and future progress in, the implementation of the Lisbon strategy at its meeting which starts today.
These lean balance sheets meant that they had an almost entirely risk-free financial position as the central bank receives interest payments on the assets while the liabilities are cost-free. In this way and if the interest rate is sufficiently high and the banknote demand sufficiently large, the central bank can fund its own operations and deliver a surplus to the state. The Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank also had relatively minimalistic balance sheets where the liability side was dominated by cost-free capital, but, apart from banknotes, these central banks had accumulated equity on the liability side. The asset side was dominated by gold and foreign exchange reserves, and the Riksbank held no government bonds at all. Despite these similarities, the Swiss National Bank had a significantly larger balance sheet than the Riksbank. This was due to both a substantially higher demand for cash in Switzerland and the fact that the Swiss National Bank had more equity. In other countries, such as Japan and New Zealand, central banks had balance sheets that were larger than was justified by the cost-free capital. The Bank of Japan had already implemented quantitative easing before to the financial crisis in order to bring up inflation. As a consequence of this, Japanese banks had liquidity reserves on the central bank balance sheet. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand had  2 [16]  a balance sheet with several large items on the liability side.

There were deposits from both banks and the state, as well as currency loans which funded some of the country’s foreign exchange reserve. There are several explanations why the balance sheets looked different in different countries. To a certain extent, it depends on the monetary policy regime. For example, the need to maintain a foreign exchange reserve may depend on whether the country has a fixed or floating exchange rate. To a certain extent, it depends on history and previous monetary policy regimes. The size of the gold reserve can often be explained by previous links between the currency and the gold, and the currency reserve can be a remnant from previous regimes with a fixed exchange rate. The way the balance sheet looks is also influenced by what tasks the central bank has and how profits and risks are distributed between the bank and its owners. 2 Figure 3 shows that many central bank balance sheets, including the Riksbank’s, have grown rapidly after the financial crisis. But how will the balance sheet develop when monetary policy is normalised? Should central banks strive for a lean balance sheet or is there reason to let balance sheets remain large? This review shows that there is no “normal” balance sheet that can be seen as an obvious benchmark. The development will instead be determined by central banks’ analysis of, for example, how the size and composition of the balance sheet interact with interest rate policy in normal times.
The question is: how much is too much, to the point where it would allow banks to sustain flawed business models? Work is being carried out further on the interaction between the LCR and central bank facilities so as to ensure that the LCR responds appropriately to the provision and withdrawal of liquidity support by central banks. In this context, it has been proposed that central banks provide a “Committed Liquidity Facility” (CLF) to banks faced with a scarcity of HQLA. Under a CLF, the capacity to borrow from the central bank counts towards HQLA, with banks paying an upfront fee for a determined amount of CLF commitment. The CLF can potentially be useful not only in jurisdictions with a structural scarcity of HQLA, like for example Australia. The argument put forward is that banks in crisis times, wary of stigma effects, would not let their LCR ratio fall below 100 percent. A CLF, however, would allow banks to meet the LCR ratio at all times, although with time-varying reliance on privatemarket HQLA and on the CLF. One possibility would be for the central bank to encourage the drawdown of private-market HQLA by reducing the pricing of the CLF during crisis time. I would agree with Jeremy Stein13 that a CLF with an upfront fee is very different from counting central-bank eligible collateral as HQLA at no cost, which could weaken the incentive to borrow in markets and create excessive reliance on central bank funding. The  assets.

And when such growth is achieved by an individual bank, over and above that achieved by its peers, adverse selection – attracting weaker borrowers, who are unable to raise funds from other lenders – is an additional factor depressing the quality of the loan book. The simple fact is that rapid absolute and relative growth is strongly associated with poorer average loan quality and, sooner or later, sharply higher non-performing loans. The proposal is that, the risk weighting (and so, the capital requirement) of bank loans should include a growth-based component. This could be linked either to the economy-wide growth rate of a particular type of business, or to the growth rate of an individual bank’s lending relative to the market as a whole; or some combination of the two. This would make it more expensive for banks to expand their balance sheets faster that normal when confidence is high and could be a useful means of dampening banks’ contribution to the business cycle. The third, less direct, mechanism to discourage over-rapid expansion would be on the liabilities side. Rapid balance sheet expansion tends to be fuelled by access to less stable sources of funding, attracted perhaps by higher interest rates as the bank seeks to meet its balance sheet aspirations (and feels able to pay, because – as already explained – loan loss experience is good).
Mr Erçel discusses the monetary policy of the European Central Bank Opening speech by the Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Mr Gazi Erçel, at the Economic Research Foundation, Istanbul. 18/12/98 European economic and monetary union (EMU) will come to life at the beginning of next year. The European Central Bank (ECB) will commence operations, and the euro will become an official reserve currency. Eleven of the 15 countries in the European Monetary System will link their domestic currencies to the euro by January 1, 1999. They will stop issuing their own currencies three years later. There will no longer be independent domestic monetary and exchange rate policies. Instead, monetary and exchange rate policies will reflect the needs of the euro region as a whole, as determined by the European Central Bank. This stage has obviously not been reached easily or quickly. This new institutional arrangement was the product of years of effort. First the philosophical groundwork had to be established, before the technical work could even begin. The final stages were only reached gradually. The European Union was thoroughly thought out. Under German initiative, with French support and British technical assistance, and contributions from all the others, the institutions were established which will be responsible for monetary and exchange rate policy decisions under the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Countries have made heroic efforts to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria.

This means that a central bank that has control over monetary indicators should use these indicators as intermediate targets in reaching its final inflation target. On the other hand, in low-inflation environments we have seen how successful the implementation of monetary policy under inflation targeting can be. The ECB will follow both procedures together, in accordance with the principles of independence, transparency, a forward-looking policy orientation and accountability. The ECB’s credibility will grow. It will solve the problems that arise and correct its operational deficiencies. It will strive to attain and maintain price stability. Achievement of this objective in the medium term will create conditions conducive to sustainable growth. Growth and employment will follow a sound path. I see it at this stage as a perfectly designed set of strategies and applications. *  *  *  BIS Review 1/1999
This means  BIS Review 44/2006  3  that we do not set interest rates merely to ensure inflation is on target as quickly as possible in all situations. It is very important to emphasise that the possibility to formulate monetary policy based not only on inflation prospects but also on how production and employment will develop has come about because the inflation target is currently firmly anchored in the economy. Everyone knows that we will adapt our monetary policy to attain the inflation target. During the years when the inflation target was new, confidence in the target was too shaky for the Riksbank to dare to give consideration to anything other than attaining the inflation target. However, flexible application of inflation targeting is nothing new if one looks at the monetary policy we have conducted in recent years, once confidence in our inflation target had been established. In practice, as I said, we do not aim to bring inflation back on target as quickly as possible in every situation. The Riksbank follows the principle of normally aiming to bring inflation back on target within two years after a deviation has occurred. It is primarily in situations where inflation goes in one direction and the real economy, i.e. growth, employment, etc. goes in the opposite direction that there may be reason to bring inflation back on target at a more gradual rate. Economists usually describe these situations as the economy suffering a supply shock.

At this meeting we will make a collective assessment of events since the previous forecasts were made. The monetary policy strategy Many may wonder why we increase the interest rate despite the fact that inflation is currently slightly below target and there is still spare capacity in the labour market. What must be remembered in order to understand why monetary policy needs to be brought gradually onto a less expansionary path is that it takes time for the economy to adjust to changes in the repo rate. This means, for instance, that we have not yet seen the full effect of the expansionary monetary policy we have conducted in recent years. It also means that interest rate decisions must be based on an assessment of how the economy will look a few years from now. Let me describe how we usually reason when making interest rate decisions. This is also something described in greater detail in the document on monetary policy that we published last week. The objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability. This was established in the changes to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, which came into force in 1999. The Riksbank has specified this in the form of an inflation target, whereby the rate of change in the CPI should be 2 per cent with a tolerance interval of +/- 1 percentage point. Stable prices are thus the objective of monetary policy in Sweden, as in all other countries in the industrialised world.
BIS Review 113/2009  11  Figure 4 Inflation indicators (annual change, percentage)  (monthly change, percentage)  10  10  2.0  2.0  8  8  1.5  1.5  6  6  1.0  1.0  4  4  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  2  2  -0.5  -0.5  0  0  -1.0  -1.0  -2  -2  -1.5  -1.5  07  08  09  07  08  CPI CPI exc. foodstuffs and energy  09  CPI  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. Figure 5 Monetary policy interest rate (percentage) 9  9  8  8  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  04  Jul. 05  Jul. 06  Jul. 07  Jul. 08  Jul. 09  Jul. 0  Source: Central Bank of Chile. 12  BIS Review 113/2009  Figure 6 GDP, Domestic demand and Output gap (percentage) 16  16  12  12  8  8  4  4  0  0  -4  -4  -8  -8  -12  -12  04.I  05.I  06.I  07.I  GDP (annual change) Domestic demand (annual change)  08.I  09.I  Output gap  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Figure 1 Monetary policy and housing prices Monetary policy  Housing prices  (percentage)  (nominal index, first quarter 2001=100)  15  15  250  250  12  12  200  200  9  9  150  150  6  6  100  100  3  3  50  50  0  0  0 90  93  96  U.S. Chile (*)  99  02  05  Canada  08  01  02  04  05  Australia Chile Canada  07  08  0  U.S. Spain  (*) Starting August 2001, the MPR is set in nominal terms. Previously, it was set in inflation-indexed terms. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bank of Canada, Bloomberg and U.S. Federal Reserve. 10  BIS Review 113/2009  Figure 2  Nominal exchange rate  (CLP/ USD) 700  700  650  650  600  600  550  550  500  500  450  450  400  400  Jan.08  Apr.08  Jul.08  Oct.08  Jan.09  Apr.09  Jul.09  Source: Central Bank of Chile.