samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Second, because both climate change and financial instability may threaten our ability to deliver on this primary mandate, we shall take their consequences into account, but with full credibility and transparency in our  Page 9 sur 9 models and actions/tools. Third, we should take care to avoid overpromising, as there is no world in which central banks alone can address those issues, starting with the absolute necessity of an adequate carbon price. Central banks have increased capacities, but they still have limits. This is a piece of wisdom we must never forget. A standard Phillips curve approach provides a simple narrative of the path of euro area inflation over the last 20 years. Let me describe you briefly the exercise: HICP inflation is regressed on (i) a variable of economic slack, (ii) oil prices in euros, (iii) the prices of agricultural commodities in euros, and (iv) a lagged term of inflation measuring its inertia. In two separate specifications, the economic slack variable is (i) the output gap estimated by the European Commission, or (ii) the unemployment rate (ILO concept). The equations are estimated on quarterly data ranging from 1998 to 2019. For more details on reduced-form Phillips curve models used at the Banque de France, see Chatelais, De Gaye and Kalantzis (2015) “Low inflation in the euro area: import prices and domestic slack », Rue de la Banque 6, and Berson, De Charsonville, Diev, Faubert, Ferrara, Guilloux-Nefussy, Kalantzis, Lalliard, Matheron and Mogliani (2018) “Does the Phillips curve still exist?”, Rue de la Banque 56.

In this way, we ensure that SARON and the other secured short-term money market rates remain close to the now positive SNB policy rate. To absorb liquidity by way of open market operations, we will use two proven monetary policy instruments: SNB Bills and repo transactions. Participants in the Swiss franc money market are familiar with both instruments. We have used repo transactions regularly in previous years. SNB Bills are debt certificates issued by the SNB, typically with a term of up  1  Further information is available in the ‘Instruction sheet governing interest on sight deposits’. Page 1/2  Zurich, 22 September 2022 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  to one year. We last used SNB Bills for the implementation of monetary policy in 2011 and have since conducted tests to ensure operational readiness. We expect the volume of SNB Bills issued to increase within a short period of time on the back of the weekly auctions. The new interest rates on sight deposits apply as of tomorrow. The open market operations to absorb liquidity are being conducted with immediate effect. To ensure that our monetary policy is being implemented effectively, we will subject the instruments used to regular review. Further adjustments may be made if necessary. Page 2/2
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  But opening up the capital account amidst a slowing economy, a still developing domestic financial system, and a debt overhang, is no easy task. China has also made progress in reforming its exchange rate framework. •  Decoupling the RMB from the US Dollar last year – while it caused considerable anxiety in the markets – was an important and necessary step towards a more market-based exchange rate. •  The shift to a trade-weighted index for evaluating the exchange rate of the RMB will, however, take some time to gain credibility among market participants. The most decisive yet most difficult piece in the overall reform programme is the reform of state-owned enterprises, or SOEs. The SOEs have been generating lower rates of returns on investment compared to the non-state sector, and are a drag on China’s overall measured productivity performance. •  An SOE restructuring blueprint was announced last year, with the aim of improving competitiveness and efficiency but without outright privatisation, for example by consolidating similar SOEs or promoting “mixed ownership”. •  This is a strong step in the right direction, but the Third Plenum’s vision of a marketbased economy can only be realised if SOEs are subject to competitive forces in all aspects of their operations. China in transition: near-term effects on Asia So, what does this all mean for the global economy, and Asia in particular?

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of Russia’s economic and financial developments in 2015 Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the plenary meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 14 June 2016. *  *  *  Good afternoon, dear colleagues! Today we present the latest Annual Report of the Bank of Russia to the 6th State Duma. First of all, I would like to thank the deputies for the legislative efforts, which we took together to both develop the financial system and protect the rights of financial services consumers, and for the efficient cooperation with the Bank of Russia. As many as 130 laws affecting the financial sector have been adopted over these three years. Now, let’s look at the Bank of Russia’s performance in 2015. A sharp deterioration in external environment in late 2014 – early 2015 (oil price drop and sanctions) triggered turbulence in the external market and followed by a surge in inflation. These developments required measures to stabilise the situation and help the economy adjust to the worsened conditions. The first one is a transition to a floating exchange rate of the ruble. This is a pivotal systemic measure. Though this transition was not a smooth one, I would like to stress, should we have failed to take this step, according to our estimates, the economic downturn could have been deeper. Now the floating exchange rate works as an embedded economic stabiliser that mitigates the external shocks.
Although the present economic environment looks quite favorable, these broader macroeconomic policy challenges make it even more important that we build on the substantial progress we have already made in strengthening risk management and the resilience of critical market infrastructure. Our success in meeting these challenges will help ensure that our financial system proves as resilient in the future as it has in the recent past. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 18/2004

Such risks do not necessarily materialize, but when they do, the repercussions are dramatic. Altogether, considering the different tools are potentially at the disposal of policy-makers, it is crucial to gauge the short- to long-run benefits, limits and risks associated with each of them. I do not think that confidence would really benefit from measures that are known to carry non-negligible long-run risks, even if some short-term relief is expected from them. As a way of conclusion, let me shortly consider the progress that has already been made to solve this crisis and list some of the remaining challenges ahead. First, it seems important to welcome the significance of the fiscal stabilization programs many euro-area governments have committed to. As mentioned earlier, this is a necessary step to restore confidence in a sustainable way. Although this is a difficult task, the timely delivery of the promised reforms is necessary. Second, beyond individual policy actions, the recent progress obtained in the design of a common fiscal governance in the euro area is of the essence. Indeed, many important decisions have been taken in that direction: The creation of the EFSF and the ESM or the agreement on fiscal rules and surveillance mechanisms during the Brussels EU Summit on December the 8th and 9th are historical steps in the right direction. Obviously, most of these newly established institutions, rules and processes would have been unthinkable four years ago. This makes me really optimistic about our prospects for restoring stability and growth in the euro area.
Certainly we need to reform the system to try to ensure greater stability - and a great deal of effort has been expended on precisely that over the past few years - by developing standards and codes of best practice by national authorities, for example, designed to help them to help themselves to take greater advantage of the opportunities presented by globalisation. More certainly needs to be - and is being - done, recognising the particular problems facing different countries at different stages of development. But it would be a terrible mistake to turn the clock back and retreat from “globalisation” into a world of nation states linked together predominantly by official financing. None of the poorer countries themselves are arguing for that, yet that is what some of the protests seem to imply. And so it is with some of the more specific issues - like pushing for higher labour standards in developing countries, which is fine up to a point, but if pushed too far could mean lower activity and higher unemployment in those countries; or debt forgiveness not tied to programs designed to improve the lot of the people living in the debtor countries; or the appropriateness of particular development projects and so on - we cannot simply focus on particular aspects of the problem in isolation, we need to examine both the pros and the cons in each case to try to find the best means to what is quite likely to be an agreed end.

Let me comment briefly on these two points. As regards the lack of structural reforms, I hope that my previous remarks have underlined that the euro countries have clearly embarked on major structural reforms - triggered by the single market and the single currency - that will bear lasting effects on the functioning of their economies. The central banks of Europe call for the pursuit and reinforcement of these reforms. At the same time, in order to serve these economies in the most efficient way, the euro financial markets are experiencing the deep and rapid integration process that I described previously. On the second point, one has to keep in mind that the American and European economies are not positioned identically in the economic cycle, as the latter are probably at the beginning of a more robust phase of expansion. According to IMF forecasts, growth should reach 3% in the euro area in 2001, compared with 3.2% in the US. From a central banking perspective, the present situation is clearly characterized by a misalignment of the euro if one refers to the euro area fundamentals: robust domestic growth, inflation under control, strong domestic savings, healthy external accounts. We are, to a certain extent, in a situation symmetric to that which prevailed in 1995 when the weakness of the dollar was clearly out of line with the fundamentals of the US economy. At that time, it took a few months before a correction appeared that aligned the dollar with its economic underlying fundamentals.
Mandate Most economists would agree that the core task is ensuring price stability. This consensus rests on the conviction that in the long term, when all the lag effects have come to an end, monetary policy only determines the price level, not, however, output or employment. Thus the primary obligation of a central bank to maintain price stability does not imply that priority is given to price stability in preference to full employment. Rather, it is in the economic nature of monetary policy instruments that they are suited for influencing price level trends, not, however, growth or employment trends. Yet in the short term, ie within the monetary policy transmission process, monetary policy does have real effects. The problem can easily be illustrated if one tries to picture a shock, eg a massive rise in oil prices. The immediate consequence will be an increase in the price level and a fall in production. This constellation confronts the central bank with a trade-off between price stability and growth. If the bank’s sole concern is a quick restoration of price stability, it will raise interest rates and consequently exacerbate the loss of output. If, on the contrary, it reacts solely to the production effect, it will strengthen the shock-induced deviation from the goal of price stability by lowering interest rates. Reacting to shocks may lead to a trade-off between the variability of output and the variability of the price level (King 1999, p 12). This trade-off in itself is an extremely complex phenomenon.

If, however, the central bank still harbours an uncertainty and - for example - still wishes to await the disclosure of figures, it should refrain from making a prior announcement as it would then find itself under a constraint. For if, in response to a signal received, the markets anticipate the interest rate move, the central bank will hesitate, out of concern for its credibility, not to implement the signalled move. This may well result in an endogenous interest rate policy: the central bank becomes, through its own fault, the prisoner of market expectations - an absurd notion. A central bank should inform openly about its long-term designs. At the same time, it should not hesitate to make interest rate decisions, if necessary, which come as a surprise to the majority of market participants. 4. The “new economy” - fact or fiction? The term “new economy” is certainly vague, which may be the very reason why it is popular. Coined in the United States, it is used as a label for several hypotheses which strive to explain the performance of the US economy in the second half of the 1990s. Poorly explained by most conventional macroeconomic models, this economy is characterised by continued high growth rates, unexpectedly robust productivity, and long-running low unemployment, combined with very little inflationary pressure. These attempts to explain the phenomenon termed “new economy” refer to two prominent areas of change.
But adaptation requires reflection and caution However, this would not be an easy task. Firstly, the central bank is of course unable to change its behaviour so much that doubts arise as to whether it is actually trying to maintain low and stable inflation. What is known as the nominal anchor, that is the landmark for pricesetting and wage formation, may then be loosened. This would mean losing all we have achieved over the past two or three decades. But even if nothing this dramatic happened, sufficiently large changes in the central bank’s behaviour might nevertheless have undesired consequences. The flatter Phillips curve could reasonably be due to economic agents, such as the social partners, having adjusted their behaviour to how they believe the central bank will act. If the central bank changes its behaviour too much, this may have the consequence that economic agents begin to act differently, too. We will then once again have a new playing field, where the Phillips curve may once again have become steeper.7 Even with these reservations, I believe that it is generally valuable for the central bank to constantly ask itself how it can best ensure that it deserves its independence. What I mean by this, of course, is not that it should anxiously ask its principal what to do – that would mean its independence was lost.

In our latest forecasts, however, none of these factors has suggested that there will be any significant changes in the exchange rate for the krona in the period ahead. 25 The krona does not need to be strengthened, but Sweden is still affected by the global imbalances Despite the fact that Sweden has had a substantial current account surplus for 15 years there is nothing to suggest that this surplus must become a deficit within the near future to  24  See for example Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002. 25  For a more detailed discussion of the long-term development of the krona see Lagerwall and Nessén, 2009. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  prevent Sweden from accumulating a large net claim in relation to the rest of the world. Nor is there anything to suggest that the Swedish krona should appreciate in real terms to enable a shift in the current account from a surplus to a deficit. As Sweden, as far as we can see, does not have any significant positive net external position, there is nothing to say that the real exchange rate needs to be strengthened for reasons relating to the net position. A general reduction in the global imbalances could, however, have consequences for Sweden.
Conclusion  A detailed, disaggregated analysis of household balance sheets suggests the material loosening in UK monetary policy after the financial crisis did not have significant adverse distributional consequences. To the contrary, a detailed household-level analysis suggests that the majority of cohorts across the economy were significant gainers from this loosening, in financial and welfare terms. The channels through which monetary policy has affected people’s lives are often neither easy to observe nor well-understood, giving rise to a large perception gap on the part of the public about the true impact of monetary policy on them. This is not a failing on the part of the public. Nor is it a failing in the effectiveness of policy. Rather it reflects the difficulty of capturing the often subtle ways in which monetary policy affects people, in a way that is clear and relevant to them. While difficult, this is not an impossible objective, as other domains of public policy have demonstrated. A disaggregated analysis can be used to help decompose the ways and means and amounts by which different sets of households have been affected by monetary policy. Some illustrative and tentative examples of these personal “monetary policy scorecards” have been shown. 46  As discussed in Haldane (2017), the Bank already has various initiatives in train to support an increase in public understanding of the economy, such as layered communication, outreach initiatives and educational materials for schools.

Incentives Some of the pro-cyclical dynamics embedded in our financial system occur because market participants do not always have the incentive to behave in ways that will be good for the system as a whole. This occurs, in part, because market participants often do not have to bear the full costs of their actions. For example, the incentive to take on more risk without regard for the broader implications of those actions arises from a number of factors, including poorly constructed compensation schemes, ineffective risk management and gaps in regulatory oversight and risk capture. One problem evident during the crisis has been the reluctance of banking organizations to raise sufficient capital to be able to credibly have the resources to withstand particularly adverse economic conditions. This reluctance stemmed, in part, from concerns about what a capital raise would signal about the firm’s strength, but it also stemmed from an unwillingness to unnecessarily dilute shareholders. The reluctance led to more uncertainty about the adequacy of banks’ capital positions, which, in turn increased concerns about counterparty credit risk. These worries led to a further deterioration in market liquidity. These dynamics tightened financial market and credit conditions, increasing the downward pressure on economic activity and on the financial system. The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) exercise that we undertook in the United States leaned against this.
11  It’s also important to note that, although immigrants are disproportionately represented in low-skilled occupations, they are not, on average, any less well qualified than UK-born people (to the extent domestic and foreign qualifications are comparable). In fact, according to the Migration Advisory Committee, one reason some employers have preferred immigrants for low-skilled jobs is that they “have higher level qualifications than their low-skill job requires”. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 11: Real pay growth more variable  To be sure, you’d tend to under-estimate the  when adjusted for compositional effects  cyclicality of “underlying” wage growth12 and the true slope of the Phillips curve. Over the past few years, as in earlier cycles, real pay growth for people who stayed in their jobs13 has been more variable than the average (Chart 11). But if it’s a really regular thing – if the compositional effects always move in lock step with unemployment – then a Phillips curve estimated on an unadjusted AWE series would still take them into account, only implicitly so. Source: ONS and Bank calculations  12  This point was made by Bernanke (1987) and, in a well-known paper, by Solon et al (1995). 13  To be precise, the red line is pay growth for someone with fixed characteristics – fixed educational qualifications and occupation, unchanging experience. Since any individual’s experience is bound to grow over time (if only by virtue of getting older) there is no such person in real life!

Also, because of the way we’ve done this regression – for the sake of simplicity it’s been estimated in one go, using the entire 20-year sample – we’re implicitly  5  As I said, there are potentially hundreds of detailed occupational descriptions from which LFS respondents can choose. The ONS’s standard scheme then makes high-level classifications – “high skill” occupations, for example, whose job creation rates are plotted in blue in Chart 7, are defined as “managers, directors, professional, associate professional and technical”; “low skill” refers to sales and “customer services, process and plant operatives, elementary”. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  assuming that changes in each of the characteristics have constant effects over time6. But there’s a substantial economic literature explicitly devoted to explaining changes in some of these coefficients, notably the labour-market returns to better qualifications (the “skill premium”). I’ll come back to this point later. Second, the estimated compositional effects have been driven mainly by changes in the mix of people, and their individual characteristics, not by shifts in employment across sectors. Pay clearly differs across industries, even controlling for those characteristics. And on occasion sectoral shifts can matter for average earnings. In Chart 7 the marginal contribution of changes in employment across industries is in red. Thanks mainly to disproportionately large job losses in the financial sector, where pay is higher than average, these were negative in 2003 and 2009.