samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, under the assumption that oil and food inflation will follow a more benign path in 2008 than 2007, we expect some contribution to disinflation from the base effects. Figure 11: Response of Inflation to Monetary Tightening 18  11  17  10  16  9 8  15  7  14  6  13  5 Policy Rates H (right axis) H exc. Processed Food (right axis)  12 11  4 3 1207  1007  0807  0607  0407  0207  1206  1006  0806  0606  0406  0206  2 1205  10  H: Unprocessed food, energy, alcohol beverages-tobacco, and gold excluded CPI. Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. We believe that existing supply and demand conditions continue to support disinflation. The sharp slowdown in the second half of 2006 created an ample slack in the economy (Graph 12). Although domestic demand showed some signs of recovery in the second half of the year 2007, the pace of economic activity does not appear to be fast enough to eliminate the output gap. Moreover, the uncertainty created by the ongoing difficulties in the mature credit markets is expected to hold back the domestic consumer and investment spending in the forthcoming period. Accordingly, our medium term projections are constructed under the assumption that demand and capacity conditions contribute to the disinflation process throughout 2008. 2  Official core inflation measures, published under the name “Special CPI Aggregates“ (SCA),do not exclude processed food prices.

Food, Energy and Tobacco  2007  Services  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Table 1: Contribution to Annual CPI Inflation (Percentage Points)  Energy  Food*  Tobacco**  Goods Excl. Food, Energy Tobacco Services  2007  1.57  3.42  0.87  0.24  2.28  2006  1.51  3.09  0.28  1.43  3.33  * Food: Food and non-alcoholic beverages ** Tobacco: Tobacco products and Alcoholic beverages. Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Distinguished Guests, Elevated prices of crude oil, agricultural products and other commodities exert inflationary pressures all over the world. Recently, both the developed and emerging economies have been facing a rise in inflation. Inflation in Turkey followed a more favorable trend in 2007 compared to other emerging economies under inflation targeting, notwithstanding the administrative price hikes in November, which added by about 1-percentage point to the Turkish CPI inflation. During the past year, inflation in Turkey declined to 8.4 percent from 9.7 percent, while the average of inflation in emerging market economies under inflation targeting rose from 3.4 percent to 5.1 percent (Figures 4&5). Among the mentioned economies, only 4 countries experienced a decline in inflation in 2007, including Turkey, which recorded the highest rate of decline. In other words, Turkey was the country with the largest rate of decline in inflation, in comparison with other economies in this group.
Paper presented at the Columbia University Center on Capitalism and Society Annual Conference “Microfoundations for Macroeconomics”, New York. Bank for International Settlements (2011), Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability. A Report by a Study Group. May 2011. Bernanke, Ben S. (2004), The Great Moderation. Speech at the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, 20 February. Blanchard, Olivier, Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni and Mauro, Paolo (2013), Rethinking Macro Policy II: Getting Granular. IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/03, International Monetary Fund. Borio, Claudio (2012), The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics: What Have We Learnt? BIS Working Papers No. 395. Bryant, Ralph C., Henderson, Dale W. and Becker, Torbjörn (2012), Maintaining Financial Stability in an Open Economy. Sweden in the Global Crisis and Beyond. SNS Förlag. Cagliarini, Adam, Kent, Christopher and Stevens, Glenn (2010), Fifty Years of Monetary Policy: What Have We Learned? In Kent, Christopher and Robson, Michael (ed) Reserve Bank of Australia 50th Anniversary Symposium. Proceedings of a conference held in Sydney on 9 February 2010. Reserve Bank of Australia. Carney, Mark (2013), Monetary Policy After the Fall. Speech at the University of Alberta 1 May 2013. Bank of Canada. Financial Crisis Committee (2013), Att förebygga och hantera finansiella kriser [Preventing and managing financial crises] (only in Swedish). Interim report of the financial crisis committee, SOU 2013:6. Geanakoplos, John (2009), The Leverage Cycle. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1715. Goodhart, Charles och Rochet, Jean-Charles (2011), Evaluation of the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy and Work with Financial Stability 2005–2010. Reports from the Riksdag 2010/11:RFR5.

The purpose of our policy has been to prevent Sweden falling into the deep recession suffered by many other countries in connection with the crisis. It has thus been a question of wanting to manage our task of maintaining price stability and macroeconomic balance in the best way possible. 9 As I see it, there is no doubt that the Riksbank’s mandate allows us and even requires us to take into account risks linked to a credit boom and rising house prices. So, neither in the light of the international debate conducted today nor the mandate given to the Riksbank, has the monetary policy conducted been particularly “unusual” or “strange”. The monetary policy strategy the Riksbank has applied in recent years is also worth mentioning. What we have tried to do is to find a suitable balance where we support the recovery, but at the same time do not accelerate as hard as we might have done if we did not need to take into account housing prices and indebtedness. This has not, as one might sometimes think, been a question of braking hard. When all is said and done, the repo rate is currently no higher than 1 per cent. Difficult balancing act if the repo rate is the only tool But let me now return to Figure 1 and the discussion I started with. Stabilising two cycles – the business cycle and the credit cycle – with the aid of only one tool – the policy rate – is of course not easy.
Elvira Nabiullina: Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy in 2015 and for 2016 and 2017. Presentation by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at a meeting of the Committee on the Budget and Taxes of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 13 October 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying slides can be found on the Bank Russia’s website: Slides (PDF). Dear colleagues, good afternoon! Today we present for discussion the draft Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy in 2015 and for 2016 and 2017. This document was prepared in rather difficult conditions. The first factor is a slowdown in economic growth. The second is the volatility and tension in the foreign exchange and financial markets. And the third is a leap of inflation, which occurred recently. This all creates a rather complicated environment for developing the strategy of the guidelines for the monetary policy. We have prepared three scenarios. I suggest starting with the baseline scenario in slide 2. The baseline scenario is based on the assumptions of a steady recovery of the global economic growth, a slight decrease in oil prices, a gradual resolution of geopolitical problems and lifting during 2015 of most of the imposed mutual sanctions and restrictions. Nevertheless, in the first half of 2015, in our view, factors limiting investment activity will remain, and investment activity is one of the key elements that can affect the trends in economic growth.

The level of 4.0% will be reached by 2017. In addition to scenario II, scenario III assumes a more significant decline in oil prices, i.e. down to $ per barrel in 2017. The GDP growth rate in this scenario slows down to less than 1%. The scenario forecasts the use of the Reserve Fund within the framework of existing budget rules in order to stabilise the situation in the economy. As a result, the fiscal policy, in our opinion, will make a more pronounced positive contribution to the aggregate demand dynamics. In scenarios II and III the reduction of inflation to the medium-term target of 4.0% will require more time than in the baseline scenario; we believe it possible to reach this level in 2017. According to the forecast, the inflation will be 6–6.5% in 2015, 4.5–5.0% in 2016 and 4.0–4.5% in 2017. In both alternative scenarios, the Bank of Russia will focus on ensuring financial stability, preventing the reduction of confidence in the domestic financial system and national currency. To do this, we will be ready to use additional tools, including non-standard ones that have not been applied earlier. Currently, the Bank of Russia is also developing the so-called stress scenario – an emergency scenario, which implies a sharp and more significant drop in oil prices over the forecasted horizon. We consider the possibility of adding this scenario to the Guidelines at the next stage of the document finalisation.
ESIGELEC - Rouen 25 May 2023 Digital transformations and financial system turbulence: What lessons for regulators and supervisors? Speech by Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor Introduction [Go to slide 2] Dear Professors, dear students. I am very pleased to have the opportunity of sharing with you some of the lessons that we at the Banque de France and the ACPR, under our financial stability mandate, have learned from the recent turbulence that has affected the international financial system. This turbulence, which has impacted both traditional financial players in the wake of the SVB bankruptcy and players in the "new digital finance" ecosystem in the wake of the FTX bankruptcy, results from the realisation of risks, whose impact has been amplified or whose spread throughout the financial system has been sped up, by digital innovations that are transforming at high speed, or even shaking up, the way in which finance works. While the effect of this turbulence on the financial system as a whole and the real economy seems to be contained for the time being, the impact of digital innovations raises questions as to the regulation and supervision practices of both traditional finance and the emerging digital finance. I propose presenting these questions to you one after the other, together with the answers that I believe to be appropriate. 1  1. Traditional finance put to the test by the digital world: what lessons can be learned from recent bank failures?

Ladies and Gentlemen, Bank Negara Malaysia attaches great importance to payment system efficiency and will also continue to promote its security, reliability and efficiency, together with the industry and payment service providers, to foster an innovative payments industry. The FPX platform is an excellent example of this collaborative effort, and I wish to commend MEPS, and the pilot group of banks and corporations for their tremendous effort and commitment in developing the FPX solution. The launching of the FPX marks an important milestone in the development of Malaysia’s payments system. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 63/2004
This difference in inflation outturns gives some sense of how monetary policy settings are believed to matter. And the close to one percentage point gap is significant, certainly when compared with the inflation target of 2%. But this difference between Bank Rate scenarios is dwarfed by the overall fall in headline inflation of almost nine percentage points from its peak. That fall is testament to the size of the external shock to which UK inflation has been subject. It gives some measure of the challenge the MPC has faced in the past year in addressing the surge of inflation – a challenge of unprecedented magnitude in the inflation targeting era. There is a long history of MPC forecasts being interpreted as offering an implicit policy view on the interest rate paths upon which they are conditioned. And, prima facie, the constant rate scenario contained in the MPC’s May report appears to justify the guidance that ‘some degree of further tightening in monetary policy may still be appropriate in the coming months’: maintaining Bank Rate at 1% would fail to achieve the 2% inflation target within the forecast period. In my short time as a member of the MPC, I have made it a rule not to comment on the appropriateness or otherwise of market-implied or variant interest rate paths. And I am not going to change that practice today.

If we were to see commodity prices rise further, would this lead to stronger second round effects in domestic wage and price setting behaviour? Or would the real income squeeze implied by higher energy prices lead some of those that left the labour force during the pandemic to seek jobs, easing cost pressures stemming from the tightness in the labour market? The scenarios published by the MPC thus far reveal the impact of changing one of the conditioning assumptions for its baseline forecast, while holding the other assumptions unchanged. Such exercises can provide insight into the marginal impact of changes in the assumptions on the inflation outlook. But they don’t reveal the overall impact that incorporates the joint interaction among the conditioning assumptions. In interpreting the implications of the MPC’s published forecast and scenarios for the monetary policy outlook, this limitation of the published scenarios needs to be kept in mind. The conjuncture To sum up, the MPC’s current forecast embodies a tension between two elements. On the one hand, headline inflation is clearly too high, the UK labour market is tight, wages are growing at stronger rates than would normally be deemed consistent with the inflation target, and business confidence is resilient, in part in anticipation of being able to re-establish profit margins. In short, inflationary momentum in the UK is currently strong.
However, collective bargaining is still underway and it remains to be seen exactly how the results of this process will affect monetary policy. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 9. Rate of wage increases in line with the inflation target Annual percentage change and percentage of labour force  12  Unemployment, aged 16-64  12  Unemployment, aged 15-74 Average 2001-2011, unemployment  10  Wages  10  Average 2001-2011, wages  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0 93  95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  11  13  15  Note. Preliminary outcomes in the short-term wage statistics in 2011. The broken lines are the Riksbank’s forecast in February 2012. Sources: National Mediation Office and the Riksbank  Another relevant factor is that the rate of inflation measured in terms of the CPI has declined since the autumn. In August last year, CPI inflation was as high as 3.4 per cent. It has fallen significantly since then and in January the rate of inflation was just below 2 per cent. I expect, in line with the assessment in February, that CPI inflation will fall further in the period ahead when the interest expenditure of the households increases more slowly. Underlying inflationary pressures are also low in the wake of a strong krona and lower resource utilisation.

i) TeSA aims to identify specific ICT skills in demand and work with training providers to meet these demands. ii) For example, the US-based Byte Academy has recently set up in Singapore, and has come on board IMDA’s Tech Immersion and Placement Programme (TIPP). Byte will offer a series of intensive courses on FinTech and data science to ‘convert’ nonICT professionals to meet the software and programming needs of the industry. 18 I encourage all companies, both start-ups and incumbents, and individuals, to tap on these initiatives and invest in the skills of the future. 19 We cannot talk about expertise without talking about learning. And learning, unlearning and re-learning is what the game is about in the economy that we are creating together. 20 We need to learn more about the things we do not know, and to constantly update our knowledge in familiar areas. In every job, from the CEOs to the fresh entrant from school. 21 We never know where our learning journey will take us, but it usually takes us somewhere better. Take for example Vernon Heng, 32. After university, he worked overseas in a variety of fields, including construction, sales and marketing and supply chain. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  When he decided to return home to Singapore and explore new career options, his brother, a user experience (UX) designer, encouraged him to consider the field. He enrolled in a UX course at General Assembly under IMDA’s TIP Programme, and found himself enjoying every step of the process.
We are currently discussing introducing a new standard, which will differ from the current concentration standards (N6, N21) in that a banking group’s assets will be included in the calculation of N30 without risk weighting and will be correlated with the core capital rather than total capital. This, in our opinion, will make it possible to more accurately assess these risks and take into account risk transfer channels and the spread of risks across the group that forms banking groups. We have prepared a draft regulation and plan to discuss it with the banking community. In any case, the introduction of the standard will not take place earlier than 2022. There are, indeed, many topics that need to be discussed, and we are ready to discuss them. As you can see, I have already listed several of the consultation papers that we are publishing. And we will adhere to the practice that was and is in place and think is useful. All innovations that affect banks, will be discussed conceptually as advisory reports, then we will give everyone time to discuss the draft regulations themselves, and then give everyone time to implement these regulatory acts. At the request of the banking community, we have introduced the practice of a release approach. As you know, we are trying to package all changes to regulation in such a way that they come into force twice a year: on 1 April and 1 October.

In this regard, of course, this lending was also facilitated by special preferential programs issued by the government. The government adopted large-scale programs to support small- and medium-sized businesses, and we introduced our own mechanism: a special mechanism for preferential loans, which was in high demand. And we can see that banks, within the framework of such special instruments, issued about 18% of all loans to small- and medium-sized businesses. But the remaining increase in loans to small- and medium-sized businesses was carried out under normal market conditions, which is also a good factor. Moreover, in the first quarter of this year, we can see that the portfolio of loans to small- and medium-sized businesses 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  has also continued to grow adding another 5%. Mortgages grew at a high rate — as in the segment of small- and medium-sized businesses, there was and still is incentive offered by preferential programs. The mortgage portfolio also grew significantly, by more than 20%. Moreover, it already reached almost half of the total retail portfolio, and in the first quarter, it also continued to grow, also by 5%. As you can see, the figures are quite similar for both mortgages and small- and medium-sized businesses. That is to say that there are positive trends in both. However, when it comes to mortgages (we have talked about this repeatedly), we are worried about the accompanying rise in housing prices in the primary market.
This misperception might lead to inappropriate policy decisions. Unlike in previous crises, one difference on this occasion and in the years ahead is that the euro area countries will not be able to use the exchange rate as a policy instrument. This fact seems to excite many commentators. Some believe it will create further tensions within the euro area, and may lead to a split-up. Other observers, on the opposite, foresee a strengthening of other policy instruments to face up to the challenges. I won’t respond to such speculation, but will make a few points for you to consider. First, one reason for creating the euro was to avoid precisely the kind of turbulence that occurred in Europe when we had a large number of currencies with adjustable exchange rates. There is no doubt that the effects of the crisis would have been greater if the euro area members still had their own currencies. This is the lesson from the upheaval of 1992-93, which is fully understood today. To use Chancellor Merkel’s words: “One of the lessons of this financial crisis is that, if we hadn’t had the euro, we would have had to invent it”. Second, the current crisis is bound to raise again the issue of whether a single market like the one we have among 27 countries in the EU can function smoothly when the exchange rate of some of the members is allowed – or even encouraged – to depreciate sharply, possibly distorting competition.

As a result, country-specific factors have become less important in determining corporate bond prices and spreads. Cross-border holdings of long-term debt securities of monetary financial institutions grew from about 15% in 1999 to nearly 40% in 2007. Integration in the equity markets is less advanced but shows signs of improvement. Between 1997 and 2006, euro area investors doubled their holdings of equity issued in other euro area countries to 29% of their total portfolio of euro area equity assets. The retail banking segment has remained more fragmented. In particular, the euro area cross-country dispersion of bank interest rates, especially of interest rates on consumer loans, has remained relatively high. This reflects different conditions in national economies (e.g. credit and interest rate risk, size of firms, industrial structure and degree of capital market development), institutional factors (e.g. taxation, regulation, supervision and  2  BIS Review 20/2009  consumer protection) and financial structures (e.g. degree of bank/capital market financing and competitiveness). It was probably overoptimistic to expect a faster convergence in this segment. The creation of the euro also gave rise to expectations of a broad based convergence of underlying economic developments. These expectations were quite varied, in fact. Some people expected greater divergence as a consequence of specialisation. Others expected greater convergence. The result is mixed. Some convergence has been observed, in particular in terms of business cycle and dispersion across countries, which is comparable with that among the US states.