samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For this reason, both when the SMP was first announced in May 2010 and when its active implementation was confirmed in August 2011, the ECB took special note of the commitments of euro area governments to ensure the sustainability of their public finances and address the shortcomings of economic governance in the euro area. Fiscal imbalances, governance in a Monetary Union and sovereign contagion It is clear that a lasting solution to the current sovereign debt crisis requires making swift progress in the consolidation of public finances, the boosting of sustainable economic growth and the strengthening of the governance framework at the euro area level – to which I will now turn. The fiscal situation in euro area countries deteriorated significantly following the financial crisis.10 In 2010, the aggregate fiscal balance of the euro area stood at more than 6% of GDP, up from an almost balanced budget in 2000. The latest projections by the European Commission suggest that the euro area deficit ratio would gradually decline to around 3½% of GDP in 2012. Euro area debt amounted to more than 85% of GDP in 2010 and would increase to around 90% of GDP in 2012. Moreover, 14 out of 17 euro area countries are currently facing an excessive deficit procedure related to a budgetary deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value. To be sure, the fiscal situation in the aftermath of the crisis is even worse in other major economies.

José Manuel González-Páramo: Sovereign contagion in Europe Speech by Mr José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Distinguished Speaker Seminar of the European Economics and Financial Centre, London, 25 November 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to speak to you here in London and discuss some key issues relating to the ongoing crisis in Europe. For centuries the City of London has held its position as a leading international financial centre. Few other places in the world exhibit such a high density of expertise in financial matters. At the same time, where financial activity tends to be concentrated experiences with financial contagion during crises are often also pronounced.
17  Table 1  International scenario  2023 (f)  2024 (f)  Dec.22 MP Mar.23 MP Dec.22 MP Mar.23 MP Report Report Report Report  2021  2022  Terms of trade Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP Developed economies' GDP at PPP Emerging economies' GDP at PPP  11.9 6.6 6.5 5.2 6.6  -7.7 2.8 3.3 2.7 3.7  -1.1 2.1 1.9 -0.1 3.1  LME copper price $ WTI-Brent average oil price $  423 69  400 97  355 81  2025 (f) Mar.23 MP Report  (annual change, percent) 2.3 2.4 2.1 0.3 3.2 (level) 385 73  0.4 2.7 2.8 1.3 3.7  -1.6 2.3 2.2 0.3 3.3  -2.2 3.0 3.1 1.8 3.9  345 76  365 70  350 67  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 11  Inflation forecast (*)  (annual change, percent)  CPI  14  Core CPI  CPI forecast  Core CPI forecast  12 10 8 6 4 2 0 19  20  21  22  23  24  (*) As from the first quarter of 2023, slashed lines shows forecast in March 2023 MP Report. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute.

Commodity exports play a particularly important role in several of the countries that were the first to introduce inflation targeting. The objective of monetary policy is to safeguard the value of money in the long term, and seek to contribute to stabilising economic developments in the short and medium term. The most important contribution monetary policy can make to sound economic developments in the long term is low and stable inflation. The inflation target provides an anchor for economic agents’ expectations concerning future inflation. We have a very open economy with free capital movements. Stable inflation expectations also contribute to more stable krone exchange rate expectations. Inflation targeting means setting the interest rate so as to achieve a numerical target for inflation. Norges Bank sets the interest rate with a view to stabilising inflation at 2.5 per cent within a reasonable time horizon, normally 1-3 years. The more precise horizon will depend on disturbances to which the economy is exposed, and how they affect the path for inflation and output. The inflation target represents a framework for, not an obstacle to, monetary policy’s contribution to stabilising output and employment. We have chosen flexible inflation targeting, i.e. variability in output and employment as well as in inflation is given weight. The objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation. The instrument is the interest rate. The interest rate influences inflation with a lag and with varying intensity. As interest rates fall, household and local government consumption and investment tend to pick up.
In this trajectory, core inflation – the CPIEFE – will be less than 4 percent towards the fourth quarter, and the more volatile prices not included in the CPIEFE – mainly foodstuffs – should help headline inflation to converge to 3 percent slightly faster than we expected in December. In the latter part of 2015, we raised the monetary policy rate (MPR) twice, bringing it to 3.5 percent. After that, we communicated that additional adjustments were still required, which would be made at a measured pace. Accordingly, we held the MPR unchanged in our meetings of January, February and March. Now let me get in more detail into the macroeconomic scenario we believe to be the most likely for the coming quarters, and associated risks. Macroeconomic scenario The main developments of recent months show that in the latter part of last year the economy grew less than anticipated. A fall in mining activity, which we had already seen in previous quarters, was compounded with slower growth in sectors unrelated with natural resources. In particular, those linked to services. Domestic demand also grew less than estimated and is expected to remain weak. The slowdown in its private consumption and investment components stood out (figure 1). Another important development of recent months came from abroad. Mainly, because the external impulse that the Chilean economy will face in 2016 and 2017 will be lower than we expected in December.

There is a summary of the results of the survey for the participating Spanish banks in Menéndez-Pujadas, Á. and M. Mulino (2020), “October 2020 Bank Lending Survey”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 4/2020, Banco de España. 3  Secondly, the comprehensive nature of the monetary policy response has also been very important. It should be borne in mind that the COVID-19 outbreak in the euro area came about against a background of: low inflation and extensive monetary stimulus, with benchmark interest rates at a record low of -0.5%; net asset purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP); and a set timetable for the TLTROs. In this setting, the ECB measures have run along two main axes: the purchase of financial assets and the provision of liquidity to commercial banks, covering the euro area economy’s main financing channels. As regards asset purchases, I have already referred to the approval of the PEPP. The main aim of this programme is to ease financing conditions and ensure the smooth transmission of the common monetary policy to all euro area countries. As to liquidity provision, we should recall that, in the euro area, banks are the main source of financing for households, the self-employed and firms. It was therefore vital to head off a severe contraction in the flow of credit to the real economy.
History has shown that it is precisely in good times that the seeds of financial distress develop. In the present context of the desperate hunt for yield, risk transfer markets may encourage investors to take on more risk. Therefore, financial innovation should not only concentrate on extracting yield but also on pricing risk at a sustainable level. This is one of the most demanding challenges of the coming years for both the private sector and the public authorities. BIS Review 33/2007  3

A central bank cannot do anything about the increases in the cost of living, since it does not produce goods and services. That is why John Exter, the founder Governor of the Central Bank, remarked in his very first press interview that “…the Bank does not itself produce goods and services. It will facilitate it by creating right monetary conditions ” Implicit in these “right monetary conditions” is the need for attaining economic and price stability in its totality. Inflation is a much wider phenomenon than the cost of living. It entails the absence of stability in the macro economy leading to an increase in all the prices at the same time. A consumer price index measures the price impact on a consumption basket consisting of only consumer goods. In contrast, inflation occurs when the prices of all goods, consumption, intermediate, investment and inputs, rise at the same time. It elevates the general price level to a higher level, including those of the consumer goods. The above misunderstanding may lead to the pitfall of a central banker trying to stabilize the value of a cost of living index through artificial means. It can be attained by fixing price ceilings or granting price subsidies. But, it does not cure the malady of generally rising prices generated by rising nominal aggregate demand over the real aggregate supply. A subsidy could ease the burden on the cost of living of a given consumer or a group of consumers.
But perhaps more important from the point of view of the Bank of Thailand is that the current growth has been accompanied by a good degree of both internal and external stability. On internal stability, despite the recent surge in oil prices, inflation remains well in control. Core inflation, which is the Bank of Thailand’s policy target, is comfortably in the target range of 0-3.5%. And the unemployment rate, which shot up after 1997, has now returned to the level comparable to the pre-crisis period. 2  BIS Review 46/2007  On external stability, international reserve is now at a historic high of 67 billion USD and covers 3.4 times of short-term debt. In dollar terms, total external debt now stands roughly at half of its peak in 1997. Part of this rundown has been supported by the current account which has been in surplus in eight of the nine years after the crisis. It is worth noting however that external debt has picked up recently, and is being monitored closely. At the micro level, eight years after the crisis we see a strengthening in several aspects of corporate financial performance. Returns on assets of listed companies are now about twice its pre-crisis average while the average debt-to-equity ratio has fallen to about one-to-one. Higher returns and falling leverage have contributed to the interest coverage ratio of about 7 times.

The meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the euro area, held at the Elysée Palace on 12 October, with the participation of the President of the ECB, provides Europe with a structured and coherent framework: •  possibility of recapitalising banks;  •  guaranteeing new medium-term bank debt (1-5 years), via, in France, a EUR 320 billion funding vehicle;  •  revisiting the accounting rules, with the recent reforms of the IASB – international accounting standard-setters – and introducing greater flexibility in mark-to-market accounting rules, allowing assets for which there is no longer a market to be valued at amortised historical cost. Moreover, the European Investment Bank will be mobilised to support European SMEs. Lastly, long-term discussions will commence on the best way to regulate finance and how it may better serve economic development. 2  BIS Review 129/2008  3. The position of French banks and credit  Our banks are not immune to the crisis. They have direct exposures, in particular through US monoline insurers. They have had to make sometimes substantial write-downs. They are also impacted indirectly by the seizing up of certain markets and the rise in their refinancing costs. That said, our banks are sound and profitable. It is worth recalling four facts that, in the current period of turmoil, are often overlooked: •  The solvency ratios of French banks are high, and much higher than the minima imposed by the prudential regulation.
Some firms have established their regional headquarters here. These companies have helped to broaden the range of products here beyond plain vanilla equity mutual fund products and develop more sophisticated skills and expertise. MAS has decided to place out an additional $ billion to external fund managers. The funds will be invested in Asian equity and fixed income markets. This recognises the investment opportunities in Asia and will also help to anchor and grow specialist skills in Asian investments in our financial centre. This will be on top of what GIC recently announced it will place out for external management. Liquidity and depth in Singapore’s treasury and capital markets is another critical success factor for our financial centre. Singapore can serve global issuers and investors as the gateway to ASEAN markets. We want to promote the ASEAN region as an asset class for capital markets investments. We will work with key players, including the Singapore Exchange (SGX), to forge regional exchange linkages, integrate market infrastructure, harmonise regulatory frameworks and promote regional electronic bond trading. SGX already has a link with the Australian Stock Exchange and is in discussions with Bursa Malaysia and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The ASEAN Finance Ministers agreed at their meeting in April to explore alliances and linkages among ASEAN securities markets to facilitate access to these less mature markets by international investors. A Linkages Task Force, chaired by MAS, will make its recommendations next year.

The common objective of all these efforts is to identify possible measures for improving the safety, efficiency and integrity of the regional payment systems. 7.4 The most demanding factor, common to all, is the rapidly changing global payment system infrastructure that is challenging the existence of domestic and regional payment systems, which are lagging behind. Given the increasing sophistication of cross-border transactions, the need to mitigate risks involved in using outmoded infrastructure has to be given priority. The SAARC payment system development strategy should therefore be designed to cater not only to the region’s present needs, but also its future demands. 8. How does the SAARC Payments Initiative work? 8.1 Let me briefly set out the proposed institutional structure of the SAARC Payments Initiative. 8.2 By consensus, Hon. Governors of the SAARC central banks requested the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to take the lead in this effort. We are happy to be the catalyst and promoter, but hope that at an appropriate time, this Initiative will be driven by the other SAARC member central banks. In consultation with the SAARC Governors, we have already appointed a SAARC Payments Council (SPC), which is composed of the chairpersons of the National Payments Councils (NPCs) in each of the SAARC member countries or by senior officials appointed by the Governors of central banks in countries which do not have NPCs.
I’ve mentioned some of the most useful sources of information such as Supervision and Regulation letters that provide public guidance on specific topics to supervised firms, rules and white papers that outline and implement the underlying conceptual thinking on key issues such as the surcharge for systemically important banks or the expectations around CCAR, and public speeches by policymakers. Of course, we engage regularly in private communications with supervised firms. This is both to provide feedback on a firm’s progress relative to supervisory expectations and to gain information about the developments in the financial industry and the efficacy or our supervisory programs. We do this on a regular and continuous basis through both formal and informal channels, and this is a key part of the supervisory program for firms of all sizes. 2  4  Calibrating the GSIB Surcharge, July 20, 2015, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. BIS central bankers’ speeches  I also want to highlight three specific developments that are relevant for us as we execute our supervisory responsibilities. I expect these topics – cybersecurity, fintech and reputational risk – will be familiar and I’ll provide a supervisory perspective on each. •  Cybersecurity The Federal Reserve, in its supervisory role, collaborates with the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to coordinate work on enhancing cybersecurity supervisory programs. We are also interested in working with the industry on a coordinated approach for cybersecurity to strengthen the resiliency of the financial services sector against cyberattacks.

In Turkey the figure is 52 percent, and is slowly but steadily declining. If we look at the concentration issue from another standpoint, using the data for November 1998 and taking into account the total assets of the sector, 65 percent of the Turkish banking system belongs to the top 10 major banks. If we include the 20 foreign banks and branches having a share of 6 percent, and the 14 development and investment banks having a share of 5 percent, it can be seen that 76 percent of the banking system is consistent with 10 big banks, foreign and investment banks. The remaining 24 percent of the sector belongs to 30 banks. Among these banks, there are banks that are leaders in the sector, functioning properly and effectively. However, a limited number of banks have practical problems which are well  BIS Review 31/1999  2  known to us. We know all their problems. We monitor them. The existing banking laws and other elements of the legal framework do not give us full authority to address them actively and efficiently. The problem of the state owned banks is occasioned by the state budget, and its solution involves different issues. Now let me talk about risk management in the Turkish banking sector. From the standpoint of risk management, we do have well-developed methods of risk management and for supervising the risks that we undertake.
The assessment made by the Riksbank so far is that average working hours will show a tentative rise when economic activity improves. To summarise, there is reason for considerable concern regarding the future labour supply. If there is reason to be slightly more optimistic over productivity growth, the opposite applies to the labour supply. A number of factors, such as demographic developments, absence due to illness and the proposal for shorter working hours all indicate a decline in the labour supply over the coming decade, unless there is a change in policy. 4  BIS Review 16/2003  Future potential growth What does all this mean for the assessment of the economy's potential growth capacity right now and in the coming years? If we uncritically assume the simple model I outlined earlier, we could calculate an estimate of potential growth by simply adding together the trend values I showed in the diagram on productivity growth and the number of hours worked. I have done this in my next diagram (Figure 9). Measured in this way, potential growth was just over 1.5 per cent up to around 1992. Since then it has risen gradually to approximately 3 per cent in 2001. However, my discussion of the causes of the decline in actual growth in recent years showed that there are good reasons to believe that 3 per cent is an overestimate of the growth potential in the Swedish economy today.

Lars Heikensten: Monetary policy and potential growth Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Swedish Economics Association, Stockholm, 28 March 2003. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here to the economic association. As a former secretary of this association it is a particular pleasure to be invited here. My intention today is to discuss a broader question than I normally have reason to take up, namely the Swedish economy's capacity for long-term growth. The greater the economy's capacity for long-term growth, the better the development in welfare. And here I am not thinking merely of material aspects, but also of the possibilities of providing young people with a good education, elderly people with good quality care and the environment with a long-term sustainable development. The long-term potential growth rate is also important for monetary policy. A high potential growth rate allows the economy to grow rapidly without inflation accelerating. I shall begin with a brief description of the intellectual framework the Riksbank uses with regard to potential growth and how this affects the shaping of monetary policy. After that, I shall discuss two factors determining potential growth, namely productivity and labour supply. Finally, I shall round off with some conclusions. My hope is to be able to contribute to initiating continued discussions and in-depth analyses in this field, both among researchers and more policy-oriented economists.
Before I do that, I should first like to update you on the state of our economy as the painful adjustment process draws to a close and as clear signs of economic recovery emerge. I should also like to address some of the concerns – unnecessary ones, in my view – that still seem to be clouding the view of Hong Kong from outside. The recovery Those of you who heard me in June last year may well be a little sceptical about any advice from me on the outlook for the Hong Kong economy. Although I was under no illusion about the less prosperous times that lay ahead, like many at the time I was perhaps a little too sanguine in my assessment about the impact that the Asian crisis would have on Hong Kong. However, the temptation now for many is to go to the other extreme: to be very cautious in making predictions about the future and to acknowledge signs of recovery only very reluctantly. This is understandable when we are still only just moving out of our sharpest recession on record. Yet even the pessimists would now, I think, acknowledge that the storm signals are down, the clouds are thinning out, and there are shafts of sunlight in the distance. I speak only metaphorically, of course.

Mr Yam comments on Hong Kong: from crisis to recovery  Speech by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr Joseph Yam, at the HKMA Luncheon on the occasion of the opening of the HKMA Representative Office in London on 28 September 1999. * * * It is a great pleasure to be speaking here in London again, and to do so at this large and expert gathering. Some of you may have been present at my last speaking engagement here, in June last year at the 11th Dragon Boat Dinner, which now seems like a very, very long time ago. In that speech I described Hong Kong, against the background of the financial turmoil in Asia, variedly as a pillar of stability, the eye of the storm and the typhoon shelter of Asia. My message then was that Hong Kong, with prudent policies and robust financial structures, had been the last and the least to be affected by the storm. Since that time, as you all know well, the tail of the storm has swept through Hong Kong and it has not been so gentle after all. The painful downward adjustment in the internal cost/price structure under a fixed exchange rate system eventually and inevitably came. This was reflected in plummeting asset prices, declining GDP and rising unemployment. Although the fundamentals of the Hong Kong economy remained sound, these events provided an attractive environment for the launch of speculative attacks.