samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Also, potential investors such as private banks, investment funds and hedge funds have become reluctant to invest at these levels and adopted a wait and see attitude, in the hope of even better spreads or clearer signs about future directions. As a consequence of this increase in risk aversion, the primary market is facing a mismatch between supply and demand: issuers do not want to sell at current conditions, and investors do not want to buy until prices have bottomed out. 4. The Eurosystem’s collateral framework and the ABS market during the turmoil  Let me dwell a bit on the role of our operational and collateral framework during the turmoil. Since its inception the operational framework of the Eurosystem has been tested on several occasions. The present market turmoil has posed new challenges, and in many aspects even more significant than those faced in the past. Overall, the Eurosystem’s operational framework, including its collateral-related component, has served us well during the market turmoil and has proven robust under stressed conditions. One contributing feature to its resilience is the fact that a broad range of counterparties, including all types of credit institutions irrespective of their size and the scope of their business, may access the credit operations of the Eurosystem, including the temporary refinancing operations. Moreover, credit is granted against a wide range of collateral. This implies that sufficiency of collateral should not become a constraint for counterparties.

These  4  BIS Review 68/2008  two features of the operational framework in combination with the large scale temporary refinancing operations have certainly helped the Eurosystem to effectively mitigate funding liquidity risk for counterparties when interbank markets stopped functioning properly. In order to understand better the specific role which ABSs fulfil in the implementation of our monetary policy, let me just remind you of some key elements of our collateral framework. The Eurosystem has a broad definition of debt instruments and against this background a wide range of public and private securities, including asset-backed securities, can potentially become eligible if they fulfil all the other eligibility criteria. Indeed, compared with the traditional concept of other central banks in the world, the Eurosystem accepts a large volume of high quality ABSs, and has done this well before the outbreak of the financial market turmoil. In addition to the general eligibility criteria, such as the denomination in euro and compliance with our minimum rating threshold, some specific requirements apply to ABSs: (i) only the most senior tranche of an ABS structure is eligible; (ii) ABSs must be backed by assets that have been legally acquired by the special purpose vehicle (SPV) in a manner that the Eurosystem considers to be “true sale”, and (iii) the issuing SPV must be located in the European Economic Area (EEA). There are no special restrictions on the underlying assets backing the transaction, with one exception, namely that underlying asset pools may not consist of credit derivatives.
Other countries such as China have pegged their currencies to the dollar, which meant that monetary policy in the world as a whole became very expansionary. This supported strong growth in the world during the years 2002-2006 and gradually led to an increase in oil and other commodity prices. There are also several causes that have interacted and led to the financial crisis. The credit rating agencies have given the new financial products too high ratings because of they have not taken sufficient account of the risk that it would not be possible to sell these products in the market. The supervision of the financial markets has not given sufficient consideration to the problems that can arise from a house price bubble. The regulations in the financial markets are procyclical, that is, they tend to reinforce fluctuations in economic activity. The remuneration structure in the private sector has moreover encouraged short-term thinking and substantial risk-taking. Massive measures have helped avoid a financial meltdown Massive measures by governments, central banks and other authorities around the world have meant that a financial meltdown could be avoided. The central banks have contributed large liquidity injections, that is, lent money to the banks against collateral. Several central banks have also provided emergency liquidity assistance to individual institutions. The Fed, the ECB and other central banks have moreover lent money through swap agreements to other central banks to alleviate the crisis in other countries.

Some issues which may warrant closer examination include: •  Ensuring that resources in the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility – our main lending instrument for developing countries – remain adequate to meet future demands;  •  New ways to help low-income countries deal with economic shocks;  •  In the case of low-income countries which do not need or want IMF lending, how to enhance the IMF’s role in signaling to others the strength of these countries’ policies;  •  The role of the Fund in supporting low-income countries’ poverty reduction strategies; and  •  Our relationship with donors and aid agencies. As a partner of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the IMF is committed to supporting countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and reach the Millennium Development Goals. Our unique position gives us the potential to contribute to building both pillars of the Monterrey Consensus. On one side, we can work with countries to design policies and build institutions that will help them grow out of poverty. On the other, we can advocate for more and better international support, and help with its coordination. Nevertheless, examining the issues highlighted earlier will help frame a better understanding of the areas of low-income country work for which the IMF can take responsibility, and those that will fall to other institutions and actors. It would be helpful to have greater definition in this area as we approach the U.N. Millennium Summit in September. Fifth, the IMF’s internal governance and management.
Again, a simple thought experiment is illustrative: counterparty credit risk, unanticipated margin call and the scale of margin related liquidity flows around the system would have been greater and destabilising had the pandemic struck ten years ago. So if the banking and derivatives markets reforms operated broadly as intended can we conclude that the financial system as whole has – so far – functioned well and proved resilient in the current crisis? Here the judgement is more difficult. We have not seen systemic bank failures, credit crunches or ballooning counterparty credit risks. But we have seen a massive liquidity shock and incipient dysfunction in core financial markets that required central bank intervention on an unprecedented scale. 11  Ben Bernanke has pointed out that panics can be a major cause of credit crunches. Reforms that avoid such panic reduce the likelihood that financial stress transmits to real economy stress. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  It is arguable, as I noted at the outset, that the extreme liquidity shock was simply a function of the scale of the economic impact of the COVID crisis, and the central bank response a necessary and unavoidable consequence of a tail event. Supported by central bank intervention, markets have certainly stabilised.12 Indeed, some seem to have fully recovered their pre-crisis levels. I would reiterate, however, that the crisis is far from over and further negative COVID19 developments could cause financial instability to return.

One significant characteristic of the current expansionary period is the fact that the sustained growth of activity has given rise to a high rate of increase in employment. Here, however, much remains to be done, since the current level of occupation is still some distance off the pre-2008 level. Another notable feature of the current recovery is the progress made in restoring macroeconomic and financial equilibria. This is playing a key role when it comes to explaining the intensity and duration of the current upturn. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the continuing and notable positive external balance and the subsequent reduction in the economy’s – and in particular the private sector’s – over-indebtedness; such progress has proven vital for restoring the confidence of foreign investors and of Spanish households and firms. The current account balance stood at close to 2% of GDP in 2017, a similar figure to that observed the previous year and up on the figures recorded in the early years of the recovery. True, some factors that have contributed to this improvement in the economy’s external balance have effects that tail off over time. This is the case of oil prices which, despite their recent rise, remain lower than those in force until mid-2014. Also, the improvement in financing conditions in recent years has provided for significantly lower interest payments abroad. Other explanatory factors behind the improvement in the balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world are structural in nature.
Yes, it was the result of hard work, high savings, stable governments and good aspirations. But no one can deny that Asian corporations rank amongst some of the most productive and efficient in the world. Perhaps we were victims of our own success. Global capital inflows were the most sincere form of flattery, and those of us who succumbed to the easy money have now wakened to new challenges and risks. 38. Asia is now in a new growth league, with greater global competition. The adjustments will not be easy, especially building stronger and more robust financial systems to handle the new risks of globalization. There is a new realism in Asia, that however painful the adjustment, BIS Review 109/1997  -8-  we have to make the necessary changes. As competition intensifies at all levels, there can be no reversal to the globalization, and we simply have to recognize that we live in one globe and we share the same growing pains. I am confident that Asia’s basic strength of flexibility, realism and pragmatic policies will see the region through, with a little bit of help from the IMF. In the words of Mr. Michel Camdessus, IMF Managing Director, what has happened is a blessing in disguise. Asia will emerge stronger and more resilient, and it will continue to be a pillar of growth in the new global economy. BIS Review 109/1997

This annual expansionary fiscal impact poses a challenge to stabilisation policy in general and monetary policy in particular. Underlying real expenditure growth has exceeded mainland GDP for the last 4 years. Nominal growth in 2002 is 7 per cent. (The deflator, mainly wages, is 4½ per cent). Measured as a share of GDP, public expenditure is growing rapidly. In 2002 alone, this share will increase by some 2½ percentage points. According to the Revised National Budget, an increase in expenditure of 7 per cent this year will lead to an estimated growth in public sector consumption of only 1½ per cent. The rest will be spent on government transfers and wage growth. This is consistent with close adherence to the new fiscal guidelines. The new guidelines for fiscal and monetary policy were introduced simultaneously, and are not independent of each other. Fiscal policy is geared towards the phasing in of oil revenues; monetary policy has been given a more explicit responsibility for macroeconomic stabilisation. Monetary policy is to be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The inflation target is set at 2½ per cent. Monetary policy affects the economy with considerable and variable lags. The key rate is set on the basis of an overall assessment of the inflation outlook two years ahead. If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased.
Anita Angelovska-Bezoska: Workshop on fintech - opening remarks Opening remarks by Ms Anita Angelovska-Bezoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the NBRM Workshop on Fintech, Skopje, 28 May 2018. * * * Dear Mr. Jay Tikam, Dear colleagues, It is my great pleasure to open the NBRM workshop on a topic that has been attracting a rising interest by regulators, supervisors and central bankers, i.e. a workshop on fIntech organizations that, by combining new business models and innovative technology, gradually change the shape of the financial services segment. The main idea of this workshop is to become better acquainted with this rather new but very important topic. It has been organized with the support of the European Fund for Southeast Europe, for which we are thankful. Although in continental Europe, fintech companies account for just a small share of the markets for banking, payment services and asset management, still they are on the rise as they are rapidly entering the markets and competing with banks. According to Ernst&Young’s Fintech Adoption Index, one-third of the consumers utilize at least two or more fintech services and they are increasingly aware of FinTech as part of their day-to-day activities.

Emilija Nacevska: Strengthening the capacities of the system for fight against counterfeiting of the euro Speech by Ms Emilija Nacevska, Vice Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the opening conference of the Twinning Light Project "Strengthening the capacities of the system for fight against counterfeiting of the euro", Skopje, 15 January 2019. * * * Dear Minister Oliver Spasovski, Your Excellencies Samuel Zbogar and Thomas Gerberich, dear Project Leaders Biljana Celeska Anevska and Peter Spicka, dear Mr Damir Bichanic, distinguished representatives of the Delegation of the European Union in the country and representatives of the Ministry of Interior, distinguished colleagues, dear guests, It is my honor and pleasure to greet you on the behalf of the National Bank and to welcome you to today’s event held in our institution, marking together the beginning of this very important Twinning Light Project aimed at strengthening the capacities of the institutions involved in the system for fight against counterfeiting of euro. At the very beginning of my speech, I would like to express the gratitude of the National Bank to the European Union, because it has recognized the determination of our key institutions responsible for fighting money counterfeit to put their maximum in establishing a strong and efficient system for protection of the national, as well as the financial interests of the Union.
Correlation was not expected to be high between investments in, for example, Japanese inflation-indexed government bonds, bonds issued by international organisations such as the European Investment Bank, European covered bonds and US mortgage-backed bonds. These experiences and the abrupt turnaround in market liquidity suggest that active management of the fixed income portfolio should be limited and measured on the basis of a number of criteria, as laid down by Norges Bank’s Executive Board. The Fund currently has extensive holdings of bonds that are difficult to trade in today’s market. Realised losses related to these investments have, as mentioned above, been limited. The flipside of large book losses is that this portfolio has a high return, reflecting not only the increase in credit risk but also high liquidity premiums and fears and uncertainty in the market. The return, measured as the difference in the effective interest rate between the actual portfolio and the benchmark portfolio, is now close to two percentage points. History has seen a number of deep financial crises, and market conditions will return to normal in time. The final results of the management of the Fund’s fixed income portfolio since the beginning of the financial crisis cannot be deduced from the quarterly results while the crisis is at its  BIS Review 53/2009  3  most intensive. Values are not lost as long as borrowers fulfil their obligations. The Fund is prepared to retain ownership of a large volume of bond holdings until they mature in a few years.

Christian Noyer: The challenges of financial liberalisation for emerging market economies Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, to RBI staff, Reserve Bank of India, Central Office, Mumbai, 14 May 2007. *  *  *  I am very pleased and honoured to be here and I want to thank warmly my good friend, Dr Reddy, for having invited me to address the staff of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The BIS recently announced that the RBI Vice-Governor, Mr Rakesh Mohan, will chair a new working group on "Capital flows and emerging economies". I would like to congratulate him for accepting to explore this complex issue. I will offer some views on a related topic: "the challenges of financial liberalisation for Emerging Market Economies (EMEs)". Financial liberalisation is defined here as the dismantling of internal and external controls on capital flows. It exhibits many positive aspects, for instance: •  it contributes to improving global capital allocation efficiency, be it at the national or at the international level;  •  it fosters competition on capital markets and consequently reduces the cost of capital as well as it brings about enhanced risk management;  •  it also increases the role of market discipline for firm managers and policy makers since it raises the costs of poor governance.
d) The ‘too big to fail’ issue is especially pronounced in Switzerland  As I’ve mentioned, in Switzerland, too, a package of state support measures for UBS in 2008 was unavoidable. The capital injection of around CHF 6 billion from the Confederation amounted to some 10% of federal receipts, while the distressed assets of up to USD 60 billion that the SNB was willing to take on represented some 10% of GDP. 6 In its 2011 dispatch on the ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) legislation, the Federal Council noted that this commitment was associated with considerable risks for taxpayers, and that future rescue packages might not be financially sustainable for Switzerland. 7 This is because the ‘too big to fail’ issue is especially pronounced here in Switzerland. The two big banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, have very large balance sheets relative to GDP, owing to their substantial international activities (cf. slide 3). At the same time, they also have a significant market share of domestic lending and deposit business, and are major players in the area of payment transactions. Moreover, in an international comparison, three other banks which have been designated as systemically important by the SNB – PostFinance, Raiffeisen Group and Zürcher Kantonalbank – also have very large balance sheets relative to GDP. For example, Raiffeisen and ZKB relative to Swiss GDP are about double the size of the largest US banks relative to US GDP.

Using the adapted risk model, the maximum assumed risk of loss on the corresponding positions, and hence the requisite capital requirement, was reduced. 18 Granting permission to use this model was, in the conditions prevailing at the time, a logical step and in line with international practice. During the crisis, however, it became clear that the overreliance on risk models was a mistake – something which FINMA (the successor to the SFBC) has also acknowledged in hindsight. 19  Switzerland’s regulatory response to the ‘too big to fail’ issue The financial crisis vividly exposed the shortcomings of banking regulation. A broad consensus quickly developed over the need for a thorough overhaul of the regulatory framework. In Switzerland, the UBS case, in particular, generated strong political momentum for stricter banking regulations. a) Extensive adjustment of international regulatory standards  At international level, the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) subsequently adopted a number of measures to strengthen banks’ resilience and find a solution to ‘too big to fail’. With respect to banks’ resilience, the Basel Committee increased the minimum risk-weighted capital requirements, in terms of both quality and quantity. It also specified a capital surcharge for systemically important banks over and above the new minimum requirements applying to all banks. Furthermore, it revised the calculation of risk-weighted assets with the goal of restricting banks’ freedom to determine capital requirements.
Under this approach, the supervisory and regulatory agencies would maintain most data collection and analysis, with some enhanced authority along the lines I have suggested. Coordination would be committed to the council, which could also have authority to establish information collection  BIS Review 16/2010  19  requirements beyond those conducted by its member agencies when necessary to monitor systemic risk. This approach might achieve the benefits of the current arrangement and the proposed independent agency, while avoiding their drawbacks. The council would be directed to seek to resolve conflicts among the agencies in a way that would preserve nimbleness, and it could recommend that an agency develop new types of data, but it would leave the details of data collection and analysis to the agencies that are closest to the relevant firms and markets. And while this council of financial supervisors could act independently if needed to collect information necessary to monitor the potential buildup of systemic risk, it would benefit directly from the knowledge and experience of the financial supervisors and regulators represented on the council. The council could also have access to the data collected by all its agencies and, depending on the staffing decisions, could either coordinate or conduct systemic risk analyses. Conclusion Let me close by thanking you once again for your attention to the important topic of ensuring the availability of the information necessary to monitor emergent systemic risks and establish effective macro-prudential supervisory oversight. As you know, these tasks will not be easy.

My dear friends, as we all know, the speedy resettlement of the internally displaced people has also been a top priority for the Government. Towards this goal, many extraordinary efforts have been taken. Out of the over 300,000 internally displaced persons who were rescued and had to be temporarily housed in welfare camps, over 217,000 or 72% have already been resettled. All those from Vavuniya, Mannar, Jaffna, a part of Mulativu and Killinochchi have now returned to their homes. The others mainly from Mulativu and Killinochchi are also to be resettled systematically without any undue delay, depending on the speed at which the de-mining processes take place. This is an outstanding achievement against all odds, and I believe the successful resettlement is a tribute to the deep commitment of the Government, the tremendous efforts of our public service and the dedicated contribution of several international organizations. I am also tempted to mention that this surprising outcome may have been a pleasant surprise to many who at certain times  BIS Review 16/2010  1  expressed the belief that the government may not have had the inclination nor the urgency to carry out this challenging task so expeditiously. My dear friends, the Central Bank has also contributed its mite to these normalization processes. We have, so far, over the past 8 months, granted approvals for the establishment of more than 90 banking outlets in the Northern Province.