samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Further modernisation and enhanced security of the payment process remains a constant priority across the EU and on national level. One of the main targets continues to be provision of high level of security of remotely initiated electronic payment transactions by ensuring the completion of migration to strong customer authentication for card internet payments. Efforts continue for exploiting the full potential of open banking and eliminating any obstacles in the interfaces of payment service providers. In the same vein is the Opinion of the European Banking Authority on supervisory actions to ensure the removal of obstacles to accessing accounts under PSD2, published in February 2021. In order to address the new developments in financial technology the European Commission has already launched a public consultation aiming at update and amendments of the Settlement Finality Directive1. In addition, review of other basic legal acts related to payments as the Payment Services Directive2 and the Electronic Money Directive3 is expected to start by the end of 2021. I wish interesting and fruitful work to the participants in the video conference.

First and foremost, I would like to focus on instant payments introduced in response to the dynamic development of communications, digital services and e-commerce. Instant payments outline the forthcoming changes in payment infrastructure both in the EU and in the country. Their advantage is the possibility for synchronisation between dispatching of goods and receipt of payment. Transferred funds are immediately available, which enhances the security and trust in business relations and in the payment process. In the EU Retail Payments Strategy, instant payments are called ‘the new normal’. The Commission aims at full uptake of instant payments in the EU by the end of 2021. In Bulgaria the project of instant payments in the national currency (BGN) is already at an advanced stage. It has been developed by the BISERA6 retail payment system operatorBORICA AD with the assistance of the BNB as the operator of the national RTGS system RINGS. Recently, the necessary amendments have been made to the legal framework and the payment systems. Technical and functional changes were implemented in the BNB-operated RINGS system that ensure a possibility for making instant payments. The license of BORICA AD as the operator of the BISERA6 payment system was updated, thus allowing the system to process instant payments of up to BGN 100 000. The operator BORICA AD developed the necessary infrastructure that made possible the launch of testing and implementation of the new functionality with market participants. Instant payments are based on the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme.
And Solvency II sets tests and standards that we must enforce. As models can be highly complex, this is necessarily an intensive process. As you would expect, we are reviewing our approach in the light of experience, including seeing if we can streamline in some areas without compromising standards. We do already seek to focus on the most important risk drivers, including assumptions made about diversification across risks. This includes assessing the expert judgements firms have applied against our own estimates in key areas such as (in the case of life insurers) credit, longevity and interest rate risk. But these are not rigid standards. If firms can provide credible evidence that a different number is appropriate for them, we will accept it. And our estimates are usually in the pack of firms’ estimates. We are not enforcing a higher standard of prudence than required by Solvency II. For the same reasons, we take a robust approach to approving major changes to firms’ internal models. We have now completed the first round of such modifications and my observation is that firms proposed  4  Financial Stability Report , Bank of England, December 2016, chapter on ‘Risks to financial stability from insurers’ investment behaviour’. 5 Solvency II: Matching adjustment – illiquid unrated assets and equity release mortgages – CP48/16, Prudential Regulation Authority, December 2016. 6 Solvency II does include provision for supervisors to set temporary capital add-ons reflecting management and governance failings.

As a result, key elements of it, such as the Matching Adjustment, were designed with the needs of the UK industry in mind. The PRA’s implementation of Solvency II has been robust but proportionate, consistent with our statutory objectives. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Appendix: Drivers of changes in UK annuity rates  10  Chart 1: Annuity rates, risk-free rates and  Chart 2: Relationship between annuity rates and  corporate bond spreads since 2007  risk-free rates  Percentage points  Per cent Risk-free rate (rhs) 8 Annuity rate (rhs) Corporate bond spread (lhs) 7  6  5  Annuity rate (Per cent) 8 Pre-SII (2007-15) Since SII (2016)  6 4  7  5  3  4  6  3  2  2 1  5  1  4  2017  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  0  2007  0  0 1 2 Risk-free rate (Per cent)  3  4  5  6  Sources: Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg,  Sources: Bloomberg, sharingpensions.co.uk and Bank  sharingpensions.co.uk and Bank calculations. calculations.
  Propose to the Ministry of Public Administration, or issue a report to that effect, the initiation of proceedings against members of the Banco de España’s governing or management bodies, to ascertain responsibilities relating to presumed breaches of any of the obligations established in Articles 6, 26(2) and 28 of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España.   Learn, in the immediately following session, of any resolutions of the Executive Commission adopting any kind of precautionary measures against credit institutions.   Be aware of the resolution of the Executive Commission on approval of the Banco de España’s organisation chart and changes to it and on the creation of commissions and committees.   Be informed of delegations and advocations made by the Governor. 4 Powers of the Executive Commission  14    Contribute to implementation of the monetary policy developed by the European System of Central Banks, in accordance with Article 21(1)(b) of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España.   Make decisions on administrative authorisations to be granted by the Banco de España.   Organise the Banco de España and appoint its staff. Understood to currently refer to the Minister for Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation. 8    Appoint Directors General and set their remuneration in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 71 of the Internal Rules. The Governing Council shall, in any case, ratify these appointments.

For example, the IEA estimates that the transition could require $ in energy sector investments a year for decades – twice the rate at present.11 By 2050 we will need nearly 95% of electricity supply to be low carbon, 70% of new cars electric, retrofitting of the entire building stock, and an 80% fall in the CO2 intensity of the building sector.12 With an estimated $ trillion of infrastructure investment expected between 2015 and 2030, smart decisions now can make sure that investment is both financially sound and environmentally sustainable.13 Investing in more sustainable agriculture could deliver an estimated $ trillion in economic benefits per year and generate millions of jobs, while also improving food security and reducing GHG emissions.14 Reducing air pollution could not only prevent millions of premature deaths per year, but avoid over  11  See IEA (2017), ’Perspectives for the Energy Transition - Investment Needs for a Low-Carbon Energy System.’ Ibid. 13 New Climate Economy (2018), ‘The 2018 Report of the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate.’ 12  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7  $ billion in lost productivity and health impacts.15 Getting climate disclosure right will mean that investment flows to firms which are managing the risks and seizing the opportunities. Ensuring our banks and insurers are resilient to climate-related risks will reinforce this process while keeping the financial system open for UK households and businesses in all types of weather.
The UK has begun the process of redefining its relationship with its largest trade and investment partner. To be clear, the intention is not to turn inwards but rather to increase openness over time. In particular, the UK government’s objective is a “comprehensive, bold and ambitious free trade agreement with the European Union.” Leaving the EU is intended to enhance the UK’s ability to strike trade and investment agreements with a wide range of countries beyond those covered by virtue of its membership of the EU. But Brexit is an example of reculer pour mieux sauter. 44  That’s because any reduction in openness with the  EU is unlikely to be immediately compensated by new ties of a similar magnitude with other trade partners. And even if new agreements with other partners could be struck instantaneously, the reorientation of business relationships will take some time. This makes Brexit, relative to the experience of the past half century, unique. It will be, at least for a period of time, an example of de-globalisation not globalisation. It will proceed rapidly not slowly. Its effects will not build by stealth but can be anticipated. Let me turn to those effects. The first is the obvious disinflationary impact of Brexit given that the EU takes 44% of UK exports.

Durmuş Yılmaz: Current issues in economic governance Opening remarks by Mr Durmuş Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Conference on Current Issues in Economic Governance, organised by Bilkent University, Ankara, 2 April 2008. *  *  *  Ministers, Academicians, Bureaucrats and Guests, Thank you all for accepting the invitation. It is a great pleasure to address such a distinguished audience. I would like to thank Bilkent University for organizing this conference at this juncture. In fact, the timing could not be any better. The recent global financial turbulence has put good governance principles at the center of public debate. I hope, the conference will strengthen our understanding of the subject by building on the lessons derived from the conference last year. Let me start with reviewing the recent developments in financial markets. You may have heard about a proverb attributed to the Chinese: “May you live in interesting times!” Here, "interesting" means dangerous or turbulent; therefore, the whole phrase is something of a curse. It turned out that the phrase was not of Chinese origin, but ascribed to them to make it sound wiser. Whatever the origin, it is certain that we are experiencing such a spell right now. We have been witnessing a global financial turbulence since mid-2007. Its magnitude, measured by the volatility index (VIX), is larger than that of the turbulence in 2006. It was triggered by the falling house prices and subsequent problems in the sub-prime mortgage market and mortgage based securities.
Thus, even with a return in equity and fixed income markets of minus 19 percent measured in NOK, the capital in the GPFG only fell by approximately NOK 5 billion in 2002.4 In 2008, the sum of the negative return, the change in the krone exchange rate and transfers of petroleum revenues was positive, and the value of the GPFG therefore increased between 2007 and 2008. The next time equity prices fall, the figures will be different. As the government’s oil and gas revenues decline and the size of the GPFG increases, the cushioning impact of petroleum revenues on any falls in the fund’s value will gradually decrease, making the fund’s value even more dependent on the return. In years of negative equity market returns, large absolute falls in the GPFG’s value must be expected. A second lesson is that stock market crashes do not necessarily reverse quickly. The examples I have referred to, the financial crisis in the US, the dotcom crash, and Japan in the 1990s, show that the crises we have observed in the past can vary in depth and duration. The path of the recovery since the dotcom crash has been somewhat U-shaped. Although the fall in market values was not as steep as in 2008, the recovery was slower. Developments in Japan have been more L-shaped: the fall was rapid and the recovery has been slow. Developments since the financial crisis have been V-shaped: a steep fall and a rapid recovery. All these crisis scenarios could occur again.

The independent Banque de France has over the last six years shown great determination in helping to ensure that the euro inherited as much confidence as possible at its birth. This legacy of confidence is in good hands. Fiscal policy In the field of European fiscal policy, the Monetary Policy Council draws attention to the following three points. –  First, it remains essential that the mutual surveillance by euro area governments of national fiscal policies, within the framework of strict compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, function smoothly. The European Union does not have a significant federal budget for economic policy— the European budget only represents 1.27% of Union GDP. Therefore, all the national budgets of the Member States combined function as the Union’ s budget. The preservation of confidence in the euro, and consequently the prosperity, growth and creation of jobs in the euro area, will depend on the quality of fiscal surveillance throughout the area. –  Second, by adopting the Stability and Growth Pact each individual European country, and not just the European Union, set itself the medium-term objective of achieving public finances “close to balance or in surplus”. The Monetary Policy Council emphasizes this point, which is essential for the stability of the single currency and is necessary to favour growth, job creation and the fight against unemployment. One of the difficulties encountered by Europe, as by France, is that public opinion is not yet entirely convinced.
This reflects the growing relevance of Islamic banking and is testimony to its acceptance as the embodiment of ethical banking and finance. Other threats to the financial system Financial institutions also face increasing challenges from other non-financial risks associated with the extensive use of technology and the potential outbreak of epidemics. Therefore it is vital then that the state of preparedness of BCP/BCM contingency measures is constantly ready to address any possibilities and not be blind sided by financial risks alone. Closing It is neither by accident nor coincidence that the Malaysian financial system is currently at a position of considerable strength, depth and resilience. Rather it is through the combined efforts of both industry players and the regulator as well as the support of all our  2  BIS Review 58/2009  stakeholders. I believe that this spirit of cooperation and mutual respect is entrenched and will serve us once again as we look forward to safely ride out the impact of the current global financial crisis. BIS Review 58/2009  3

But if the new currency offers superior user-friendliness without excessive exchange rate fluctuations, such disadvantages may not carry sufficient weight. In the near term, it is perhaps easier to envisage that new currencies may be attractive for certain types of transactions, for instance, cross-border payments. They could of course take market shares from existing payment solutions, but would not entail a fundamental transformation of the financial system. What about credit and saving in a world where the private sector has abandoned the Norwegian krone? If bank money is replaced by a cryptocurrency whose quantity increases through “mining” and remains constant in the long run, no credit institution will be able create money by extending loans. Some consider this a guarantee against instability and crises. Yet, without banks to assume liquidity risk, credit may become more expensive. In order to raise a long-term loan, someone will have to be found who is willing to tie up their savings for just as long. A possible solution is the emergence of new institutions that take on the risk by making long-term loans and raising short-term funding in cryptocurrency. But they will be left standing without the backing of a central bank that can relieve some of the risk and intervene in a crisis. Perhaps the attributes of today’s credit market can be imitated if a cryptocurrency functions as a means of settlement between credit institutions, as central bank reserves do today. In that case, the cryptocurrency will replace the central bank’s settlement system.
In particular, the risks from continuing global price pressures and the effects of the prolonged period of above target inflation meant that the level of demand consistent with achieving the inflation target had probably fallen. Nasty reasons rather than nice ones.15 I should stress that I’m not at all certain that this will turn out to have been the right policy decision. A key lesson I learnt from the financial crisis is that economists know a lot less about the economy and how the economy works than many would like to believe. Policymakers need to approach their task with humility and pragmatism. If growth turns out to be materially weaker than I anticipate or other medium-term pressures on inflation ease unexpectedly, I will reverse my decision. But with growth expected to be around its average historical rate, inflation likely to remain above 4% for the rest of this year and Bank Rate at record low levels, some withdrawal of policy stimulus seems sensible. The juxtaposition of high inflation and loose monetary policy means that there is an onus on the MPC to explain its actions. The case for the defence needs to be made. And we have a good story to tell. We can explain why inflation has been above target for much of the past few years. We think we understand – albeit with the benefit of hindsight – why we have been surprised by the strength of inflation. And we have learnt from those episodes.

Nor can it mean that we set interest rates simply by reference to those prevailing elsewhere. It is naïve to complain that our interest rates are twice those in Europe without recognising that we are operating closer to capacity than is the case in the Eurozone as a whole – or that unemployment there is running at twice the rate in this country even if – and I agree – much of that difference is to be explained by structural, supply-side, rigidities rather than simply cyclical divergence. No-one, Mr Chairman, is more conscious of the limits to what we can hope to achieve through monetary policy than I am. But operating within those limits, we have been able to achieve greater macro-economic stability, reflected in the rate of inflation, than we have seen for a generation. And that stability, together with the improved supply-side flexibility of the economy, has delivered a rate of unemployment in the economy as a whole that, despite the recent modest upturn, is still close to the lowest rate we have seen in almost 20 years. And what is true for the UK as a whole is true for most of the individual regions of the economy. That includes the West Midlands, where, on a claimant count basis, unemployment at 4.8% is actually only marginally above the national average and still just about the lowest it has been since 1980. Macro-economic stability cannot solve all our problems.
The European banking sector is particularly affected, as investors fear losses from write-downs on government bonds. The ensuing loss of confidence in the banking system is resulting once again in a sharp fall in activity on the interbank market, which in turn is leading to higher refinancing costs and liquidity bottlenecks. Meanwhile, the European banks themselves are holding back economic activity with their restrictive lending practices. Weak economic activity is further hampering efforts by the affected nations to restructure their budgets. All of these developments have caused a steep rise in credit risk premia in financial markets. In response to this serious situation, euro area countries have adopted additional measures to strengthen fiscal discipline in a sustainable way and to restore confidence in the European banking sector and the financial markets. The actual implementation of these measures is essential if the financial markets are to be convinced in the long term. On the whole, we expect that the international environment will probably remain fraught with considerable uncertainty for some time to come; the risks to financial stability will remain correspondingly high. Situation of Swiss big banks The deterioration in the global economic environment has not left the Swiss big banks unscathed. In the second half of 2011, their profitability suffered from the volatile financial market situation as well as from low customer activity levels. Against this backdrop and given the enhanced regulatory requirements, UBS and Credit Suisse have announced that they will be significantly reducing their risk exposure for the next few years.

I have developed a few simple rules for selecting variables to keep an eye on:  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Over time, governments cannot run an increasing deficit. To prevent the debt level from exploding, the deficit must be kept in line with nominal GDP growth. That figure is around 4 per cent annually, for most Western countries. A fiscal balance can hide important imbalances. If one sector in the economy is far too large, the taxes from this sector can contribute significantly to the fiscal budget. An example is the construction sector in some European countries in the years leading up to the crisis. In normal times, this sector is around 3–5 per cent of GDP in most countries. In Spain, housing construction was 9 per cent in 2006. In Ireland, the contribution was 11 per cent. When problems arose, construction activity decreased and tax income was reduced significantly. Therefore, one should also look at the current account. Inflation above 4 per cent might indicate that price stability is not firmly anchored. If unemployment is above 4 per cent of the labour force, it might signal a labour market out of order. Finally, the risk of running into a crisis seems to increase if the total assets of the banking sector constitute more than 4 times GDP. This table illustrates the 4 per cent rule. Many countries had negative fiscal balances through the last decade despite moderate to high economic growth.