samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We can learn valuable lessons from the practices of great Muslim thinkers of the past such as Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina who drew strong influences from the writings of Greek philosophers such as Aristotle, but revolutionised and updated the knowledge into the context of Islam and their contemporary times. The benefits are immense. It allows knowledge to thrive and develop further as it becomes more applicable and easier to grasp. It is therefore wise for us to widen our "peripheral vision" to encompass business considerations in interpreting and applying the principles of Shariah. This is essential, if we aspire to break away from a compliance-based mentality into an outcome-based worldview. The mental shift would position Shariah scholars as not merely the leaders in Shariah knowledge, but also as the catalyst for business innovations. It is in this spirit that Bank Negara Malaysia is enhancing the Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic financial institutions. The new framework calls upon the Shariah Committees to integrate relevant business and risk considerations in Shariah decisions. Our aim is to position these committees as an enabler and catalyst in supporting the board and senior management. One that drives innovation by providing practical, actionable and impactful Shariah advice. By capturing multifaceted challenges faced by the industry, this framework ensures an ongoing support to Shariah advice amid the fast-changing business environment. Second is the pursuit of lifelong learning. It is through the relentless quest for knowledge that the great scholars of the past have left a lasting impact on our world.

It is this intellectual and cultural freedom that has characterised the long line of great Islamic traditions throughout history; from Ibn Battutta who traveled the world and eventually produced his famous work the “Rihlah”, to Ibn Khaldun who challenged the existing traditions and wrote the acclaimed “Muqaddimah”. Hundreds of years after they were written, these works are still revered and widely used as a reference today. Speaking of freedom allowed in Islam, I am reminded of a famous episode in the early days of Islam during the Battle of Khandak. It was during the eve of the battle when the Prophet received a suggestion from one of his companions1 to employ a novel battle strategy – one that is, as 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  many of you know, based on digging trenches around the city. This new strategy, generally unheard of among the Muslims and Arabs at the time, was in fact, borrowed and imitated from the Persians2. Regardless, the Prophet agreed to and pushed for the unconventional strategy and as a result, secured an emphatic victory. In line with the significant flexibility afforded in Islam, I believe that Shariah must not be confined to a rigid framework. The way I see it, Shariah should not and cannot, be applied in a vacuum. Rather, it has to be contextualised and applied into business realities.
The results demonstrate that the leverage ratio does appear to weaken incentives of clearing members to provide client clearing services. The research illustrates the benefits of evaluation exercises in providing evidence on whether or not the post-crisis reforms are achieving their desired  15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  aims, including whether the ways reforms interact are generating problems. How could analysis like this inform a decision whether to make a dynamic adjustment to offset the effect of initial margin held on behalf of clients on the leverage ratio denominator? What are financial stability benefits and costs that would need to be taken into account in making a decision? One benefit would be reversing the impact on client clearing discussed above. Another benefit would be that the adjustment could make the provision of client clearing more resilient should a large client clearing service provider withdraw or fail. If providing client clearing is less constrained by the leverage ratio, providers will have greater capacity to take on trades of clients of a withdrawn or failed clearing member; a process called ‘porting’. If porting was not possible, client trades would have to be closed out, potentially at a loss. The benefit of this greater resilience is trade continuity for clients and the avoidance of these potential losses.

Chile)  3.2 2.2 1.5 10,0 5.6 2.7  2.6 2.1 1.7 10.5 5.1 3.6  -2.6 -4,0 -5.2 9.1 0.1 -2.2  2.7 1.6 3.5 10.1 7.1 6.0  2.3 0.8 0.8 8.5 4.2 3.7  3.3 1.4 1.9 8.8 5.1 4.3  20  44  62  79  89  89  101  156  234  340  330  320  WTI oil price $ LME copper price $ (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on investment banks, Consensus Forecasts and International Monetary Fund. Figure 5 Contribution to annual GDP growth (variación real anual, puntos porcentuales) Economic activity  Aggregate demand  8  8  25  25  6  6  20  20  4  4  15  15  2  2  10  10  0  0  5  5  -2  -2  0  0  -4  -4  -5  -5  -6  -6 -10  -10  07  08  09  10  Financial and entrepreneurial services (1) EGA Mining & fishing Manufacturing Construction Communication & transport Retail Residual (2) GDP  -15  07  08  09  10  -15  GFCF Change in inventories Government consumption Private consumption Exports GDP  (1) Includes financial services, insurances, housing leases and services provided to firms. (2) Includes agriculturalforestry, housing property, public administration and personal services (i.e., education, health-care and other services).
This uncertainty arises, on the one hand, as described above, from the fact that the depth and duration of the crisis are unknown and, therefore, also the extent to which it will be necessary to use fiscal policy. On the other hand, the structural balance is not an observable variable; its magnitude depends on the calculation of aggregate potential output, and the usual difficulties determining the level of the latter have been multiplied as a consequence of the crisis. That said, an approximate calculation of the magnitude of the structural deficit post-crisis can be made based on its estimated level in 2019 (3.1% of GDP). To this amount would need to be added certain structural spending introduced in recent months, such as spending on the health system, some of which is likely to have a structural component, and on the minimum income scheme, as well as the extra interest burden arising from the higher level of debt. In addition, according to the estimates available, around 1 pp of GDP would need to be added in each of the next three decades for the increase in pension spending as a consequence of the decision to return to consumer price indexation. The result is a structural deficit of not less than 5% of GDP, although as I have said this figure is surrounded by high levels of uncertainty, given the lack of precision with which the effects of the crisis on potential output can currently be measured.

These include a broad range of tax rate reductions, exemptions and deductions that, ultimately, reduce revenues significantly and introduce distortions that contravene the principles of efficiency and fairness. 3.4  Population ageing and pension system reform  One factor that makes it all the more necessary to reduce the vulnerability of public finances in Spain is the challenge of population ageing. The large projected increase in the dependency ratio over the next 30 years will give rise to a very significant increase in public spending on pensions, health and long-term care. Consequently, a crucial aspect of the medium and long-term budget plans is the sustainability of spending in these areas. 32  In the specific case of the pension system, recurrent deficits have been recorded in recent years. In its recent recommendations, the Toledo Pact Commission emphasises that the social security system currently bears burdens for which it should not be responsible and therefore it proposes transferring them to the State. In addition, the AIReF has proposed transferring some of the social contributions currently allocated to the National Public Employment Service to the social security system. These measures seek to significantly reduce the social security system’s deficit, at the expense of the State deficit.
In addition to surveys, international organizations have mobilized to develop a range of indicators to assess the different dimensions of financial inclusion. Since the Cannes Summit in 2011, the G20 has focused on developing financial inclusion indicators, including indicators on access to and use of financial services, financial literacy, and the quality of financial service provisioning and consumption, as part of a continuous reflection process integrating new international trends in this field, notably the development of new distribution models and the emergence of digital financial services. The AFI also published a set of basic indicators on access to and use of financial services in 2013 and on quality in 2016 with the aim of harmonizing data among its members by providing them with a common tool to ensure comparability and foster peer learning. Ladies and gentlemen, In Morocco, since 2007 both the Ministry of Finance and Bank AlMaghrib have considered financial inclusion as a major instrument to develop a comprehensive strategy of the financial sector by 2020 which aims to deepen the national banking market, develop capital markets and position our country as a regional financial hub. Through our commitment to the Maya Declaration in 2013, we announced our pledge to promote access to and use of quality financial services based on sound and solid foundations. That same pledge was 4  reaffirmed in 2016 as part of the roadmap of aligning the Moroccan financial sector to sustainable development goals at the COP 22 held last year in Marrakech.

The findings and recommendations of this report, which will be debated at length today, reveal that it is of paramount importance to improve data in a much more concerted and shared framework for a better international coordination. Ladies and gentlemen, Our one-day high-level meeting will cover a number of themes that are challenging to all of us: Is financial inclusion a challenge for national financial stability? How does it affect monetary policy transmission? What measure should central banks take to safeguard the objectives of financial stability and monetary stability while improving access to financial markets? 6  I remain convinced that making this gathering an annual tradition will enable us to provide the most appropriate responses to meet these challenges. I wish full success to this seminar and wish you a pleasant stay in Morocco. 7
However, a monetary policy that aims in all situations to keep inflation at 2% can lead to large fluctuations in output. If monetary policy was to counteract price increases in CPI which are deemed to be temporary and not a consequence of excess demand, interest rates must be kept sufficiently high to hold down demand in the economy. Output would then be under the long-term trend level. Correspondingly, with the target of achieving 2% inflation, monetary policy must stimulate demand and press output up above the long-term trend level if inflation was held down by factors that temporarily dampen prices. There are therefore reasons for modifying the monetary policy rule of conduct to make it possible to achieve balance between variations in inflation and in growth. Excessively large fluctuations in output can entail high economic costs. Fundamentally, after all, the reason for monetary policy being given the task of maintaining stable prices is that this is the way in which it is considered to make the best contribution to creating the prerequisites for high, stable growth. If inflation is affected by temporary factors or if the economy is affected by such extensive disturbances that it can be difficult to bring inflation back on target within one to two years, there may therefore be reasons to bring inflation back to target more slowly than usually. However, we should give reasons for doing this.

Whereas in previous years it barely registered as a risk, now close to a third of global CEOs are ‘extremely concerned’ about the threat climate change poses to their organisation’s growth prospects. 4  A transition in action So how far is this transition in thinking translating into action? First, governments. In reaching agreement in Paris, global leaders took political action to mitigate the catastrophic impact of climate change. They committed to curbing carbon emissions to limit the rise in global average temperatures relative to those in the pre-industrial world to 2°C, and to pursue additional efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. Governments are taking some of the necessary policy actions. For example, in the UK, the Government published its Clean Growth Strategy last year, including policies to make homes, businesses and transport more energy efficient, and to lower the carbon intensity of the UK’s energy supply. EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) reforms agreed last year, and due to come into effect from 2021, have driven carbon prices above € per tonne for the first time in six years. Even so, the national determined contributions towards meeting the Paris goals, summed to no more than 2.7°C, making it clear climate policy will need to tighten further if the Paris commitments are to be achieved. 3  It also sees $ trillion of investment in clean energy technologies and energy efficiency – and the share of oil and coal in power generation falls to 6%, which is burned with accompanying carbon capture and storage technology.
The Bretton Woods System became unsustainable as the US began to allow money supply to grow well beyond the gold reserves held by the US Government. When the System collapsed in 1972, the world’s monetary system was converted to a fiat money regime in which major international currencies freely floated against each other. The post-Bretton Woods era represented a new era in which governments would be given more or less a free hand to pursue their national interests and domestic policy agenda without the rigid constraints imposed by a Gold Exchange Standard. Unfortunately, the initial experience under the new regime was far from satisfactory. In my view, financial and macroeconomic stability cannot exist without an effective monetary anchor. For many centuries, the linkage to the precious metals had provided an external monetary anchor. Of course, the Gold Standard or Silver Standard had many shortcomings but it nevertheless provided an externally imposed discipline against monetary expansion. However, under the fiat money and floating rate regime, financial and macroeconomic stability can only be achieved if we have “3 Ds”! What does “3Ds” stand for? The first D stands for “Monetary Discipline”, the second “Fiscal Discipline” and the third “Market Discipline”. Conceptually, the removal of the external monetary anchor in the form of backing by precious metals must be replaced by these three types of discipline. If any of these three disciplines breaks down, then serious consequences or even a financial crisis may occur. Let me address these three disciplines in turn.

Of course financial innovation and the creation of highly opaque and leveraged financial derivative products, such as CDOs, also helped amplify the severity of the problem and transmit the shockwaves across the global financial system. The result: the global financial system nearly collapsed. Fiscal discipline More often than not monetary discipline breaks down because of the lack of fiscal discipline. One major reason why the US had to abandon the Bretton Woods system was the huge fiscal burden of financing the war in Vietnam, which also led to a sharp deterioration of the current account position of the US. There have been many examples of Government spending beyond their means resulting in the piling up of government or public debt. In the case of Argentina, the lack of fiscal discipline eventually brought down the Currency Board System that had served as an anchor of monetary stability for Argentina since 1991. In the case of Europe, the sovereign debt crisis that we are seeing now has been the consequence of a breakdown of the fiscal prudence and discipline over many years. Very few people would now doubt that macroeconomic and financial stability could be achieved in the longer run in the absence of fiscal discipline. Market discipline This is probably the most complex if not intriguing dimension of the three disciplines needed to maintain financial and macroeconomic stability. Traditionally, we all believe that market forces would be the last guard when national authorities failed to exercise monetary or fiscal discipline or both.
Sources: Swedish National Financial Management Authority, Swedish National Debt Office, Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  16 [17]  Figure 3. Swedish public debt ratio low from an international perspective Public debt as percentage of GDP, 2020 300  300  250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0  0  Note. Maastricht debt for countries within the EU. Sources: Eurostat, IMF and the Riksbank  17 [17]

Moreover, within the euro area there would no longer be a host or a home supervisor, and this arrangement should ensure that cross-border allocation of capital and liquidity would be primarily driven by business considerations. Banks’ funding costs should start to indicate again their individual creditworthiness, without the premia that reflect their sovereign’s fiscal position or redenomination risk. A common resolution fund would decrease the too-big-to-fail problem and thus reduce moral hazard; furthermore, it would spread the burden of resolution rather than saddling any single sovereign with it. Finally, depositors would not need to consider shifting their funds across the continent in search of a safe haven, as all banks would offer the same insurance coverage. Of course, as with all structural changes and new institutional constructions, setting up a fully-fledged banking union will take some time. The most urgent component of the banking union is in my view the SSM, which should enter into force as early as possible in 2013 to allow the ECB to prepare for its new tasks, with full accountability and a governance structure that strictly separates monetary policy from supervisory decisions. I won’t go into the details of the current proposal put forward by the European Commission. For this, since we are at a research-oriented conference, I would refer you to the report 2 on the European Commission’s banking union proposals which has just been published by the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board.
The OECD estimates that potential GDP in the OECD area will decline by around 4 per cent as a result of the crisis. All in all, this means that public finances in the OECD area require a structural strengthening of around 5–6 per cent of GDP over the coming years. At the same time, several factors indicate that interest rates will rise, which will lead to increased interest expenditure and thus put even greater pressure on public finances. Monetary policy is expected to become less expansionary in the years immediately ahead, which means that short-term interest rates will rise. The large general government deficits and thus rising borrowing requirements will probably lead to higher government bond rates. In addition, there is the premium that the market participants require as compensation for the risk that the debt may become unsustainable. Meanwhile, stricter financial regulations will probably also lead to higher interest rates. In the past, there have been periods when the debts of the public sector as a percentage of GDP have been reduced as a result of high inflation. But as experiences of the harmful effects of inflation have led to more or less explicit inflation targets for central bank activities  2  2  See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). BIS Review 56/2010  and as interest rates tend to adapt very quickly to inflation expectations, it is not probable that higher inflation will reduce public-sector debt as a percentage of GDP.

The chart illustrates developments in the labour force and the number of pensioners in the period up to 2050. The blue line shows that the labour force is projected to increase by about 150 000 from 2000 to 2030. Old-age and disability pensioners will increase by some 500 000, shown by the grey line. This means that the number of persons in the labour force relative to the number of pensioners will fall from 2.6 to 1.8. These rough estimates are among other things based on the assumption that labour immigration remains at the present level. The increase in the number of pensioners will result in a sharp increase in the obligations of old-age and disability pension funds. Expenditure on old-age and disability pensions is expected to more than double as a share of total GDP in the course of the next 30 years. The increase in the number of elderly, especially those over the age of 80, will in time require an increase in resources for nursing and care services. Welfare reforms that have been adopted will also contribute to increasing the need for resources in the public service sector in the years ahead. BIS Review 13/2003  1  With an ageing population and strong growth in expenditure on pensions and nursing and care services, our petroleum wealth will be a welcome source of revenues. This is why it is particularly important that it is managed in a sound manner. Petroleum activities are a substantial component of the Norwegian economy.