samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For reasons already explained, progress towards the attainment of a balanced budget over the medium term must at the same time also be a priority. Financing  8  Report entitled The 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU27 Member States (2008-2060), published by the European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee. BIS Review 60/2009  5  the necessary investment, therefore, represents a complex task. This is because some 65% of budgetary revenues come from cyclically-sensitive sources, essentially direct and indirect taxes, and current projections show that the recovery in Malta’s export markets, and therefore also in the domestic economy, is likely to be very slow. This means that the tax base will expand only moderately. As a result, the need to allocate more public funds to investment while at the same time reducing the deficit can only be satisfied if a major effort is made on the expenditure side. Here too, however, the task is complicated. This is mainly because about 69% of total budgetary outlays are in the shape of fixed commitments such as wages and salaries, interest on the public debt and welfare payments. Since increased taxation must be ruled out as an option, the solution must be centered on efficiency improvements in the use of budgetary resources and a reordering of spending priorities. In this context it should be noted that beyond 2013 Malta is unlikely to be eligible for EU funds to the same extent as at present.

In the services sector, the importance of tourism, which rebounded in 2007 following the introduction of low-cost airlines and growth in cruise ship business, has been complemented by growth in a broad range of new activities, including financial services, aircraft maintenance and repair, online gaming, ICT, call centres and back office operations. The more diversified supply of services and the shift towards higher value-added manufacturing helped to cushion the negative impact on traditional manufacturing activities of the competitive pressures from low-cost countries. The changed structure of the economy, which is now service oriented to the extent of 77% of gross value added, led to an improvement in the balance of trade in goods and services and to gains in the terms of trade. The deficit on the former fell from more than 10% of GDP in 2000 to 3.7% of GDP in 2008, while the terms of trade went up by almost 2% during this period, driven by a strong increase in the services sector, which outweighed the steady deterioration in merchandise trade. Gains in the terms of trade can result either from higher export prices or from lower import prices, or a combination of both. Achieving favourable terms of trade is vital for an open economy where real income depends not only on the volume of output produced, but also on the value of that output in international markets. 3 Positive changes in non-cost competitiveness were complemented by a favourable trend in cost competitiveness.
Law enforcement agencies have also stepped up capacity and efforts to curb laundering of illegal proceeds. Three main law enforcement agencies for the AMLATFA investigations, i.e., the Royal Malaysian Police, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission and the Royal Customs Malaysia have established dedicated AML/CFT units to give focus to ML/TF investigations and expedite overall enforcement actions. Other related enforcement agencies have also geared up to achieve the same progress. For Bank Negara Malaysia, we will remain vigilant on the level of compliance of the financial institutions with the AML/CFT rules and measures. Thematic examination will continue to be carried out on AML/CFT compliance of the financial institutions, and other reporting institutions, when the need arises. Non-compliance incidences will be dealt with based on the seriousness of the issue. We will not compromise on serious matters, such as tipping-off, as those are the foundation of the AML/CFT framework. Apart from that, we are fully aware of the concern of not to cause the “overshooting” of AML/CFT implementation so as to affect the financial inclusion agenda. For this, Malaysia will be involved, under the umbrella of the APG and jointly with the FATF on initiative related to financial inclusion, in particular to look at best practices to ensure that implementation of the AML/CFT measures is not a barrier to financial inclusion. In Malaysia, the subject of financial inclusion is actually embedded in the National agenda and implemented with the full participation of the financial sector.

Monetary policy normally operates by lowering key rates to reduce the real interest rate when expected inflation and market risk premiums are stable in the short term. When the key rate moves close to its lower bound, the real interest rate can still be influenced through key rate expectations, influencing risk premiums and anchoring inflation expectations. The expectations channel will be particularly important if the current key rate cannot be further reduced. For Norges Bank, the expectations channel is an established part of monetary policy in that we provide forecasts for the key policy rate. To sum up, it is useful to decompose the factors behind the change in the interest rate path since 17 December 2008. The interest rate forecast in the Monetary Policy Report is lower than the forecast published in December last year. The outlook for global growth has deteriorated further. The slowdown in the Norwegian economy appears to be more pronounced than expected in December. Lower global and domestic demand would suggest a lower key policy rate than projected in December. Our inflation forecast, along with the stronger krone and lower key rate expectations abroad also suggests a lower key policy rate than projected at that time. 14  BIS Review 37/2009  Let me conclude. Monetary policy cannot fine-tune developments in the economy, but it can mitigate the largest effects when the economy is exposed to shocks. Overall, the outlook and the balance of risks suggest that the key rate should be gradually reduced further.
Inadequate pricing of emissions is one of the culprits. An international emissions trading system covering all countries could, in principle, provide for equal pricing of emissions. In practice, this has proved difficult to establish. Getting developing countries to sign on to such an agreement is understandably difficult. It is hard to demand that the polluter pays in countries where much of the population is still below the poverty line. The transition to low-carbon technologies in emerging markets is, however, essential for reaching global emissions targets. The pricing of emissions also encounters opposition in rich nations. Some would argue that higher emissions taxes will simply cause emitters to move elsewhere. This argument may be relevant for some sectors. But there is also opposition from groups who consider themselves better served by financial support to make changes rather than having to bear the costs themselves. For the political authorities, subsidies may therefore appear a more attractive option. The result is a more costly and less effective climate policy. Chart: Price of emissions Norway was among the first countries to introduce a carbon tax. In addition, several industries are covered by the EU emissions trading system. But a glance at the cost of carbon emissions in Norway shows that even here we have a long way to go before the principle of equal pricing of emissions is realised. Some sources of pollution are completely exempt.

LNG capacity start-ups in Australia and North America which will boost new LNG supplies amidst stagnating demand will put more pressure on LNG prices, hence further disrupting the LNG market. Due to low oil and LNG prices, the profitability of oil majors and National Oil Companies (NOCs) has been severely eroded. The impact has been pronounced. More than 300,000 oil and gas workers have been laid off globally since mid-2014; some USD 380 billion of global oil and gas projects have been deferred or cancelled; and more than USD 150 billion worth of assets have been planned for disposal or divestment. Given Malaysia’s openness and high financial and trade integration with the rest of the world, the Malaysian economy is not isolated from these developments. On the external front, lower global demand continues to weigh down on Malaysia’s export performance. Investment activities especially in the upstream oil and gas sector, contracted for the first time since the global financial crisis in 2015, after expanding by an average of 16% from 2010 to 2014. However, investment activity in the manufacturing and services sectors remained  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  resilient, and is expected to underpin investment growth moving forward. Private consumption remained relatively resilient and anchored domestic growth, especially during the first half of the year, driven by sustained income and employment levels. Going forward, domestic demand is expected to remain a key driver of economic growth in Malaysia. We should expect Malaysian economic growth to range between 4.0 to 4.5 % for 2016.
The first one of these transactions is the daily foreign exchange purchasing auctions that are implemented transparently and under methods in accordance with certain rules to serve the Bank’s purpose of reserve accumulation. The Central Bank purchases foreign exchange from the market via  4  BIS Review 28/2007  these auctions when the supply of foreign exchange is abundant under a moderate reserve-increasing strategy. The second situation in which the Bank undertakes transactions is the direct interventions in order to prevent existing or possible excessive volatilities in the foreign exchange rates. These interventions are neither mechanic nor symmetric. The Bank evaluates all the changes occurring in the foreign exchange rates with regard to its own conditions and takes the decision for intervention accordingly. As a result of the foreign exchange purchasing auctions and the direct interventions implemented within the scope of the foreign exchange policy, net purchase of 44.8 billion USD from the market has been made in a period of five years as of 9 January 2007. Following the foreign exchange purchases embarked on as of April 2002, reserves of the Bank increased by 199 percent and reached 60.8 billion USD on 29 December 2006. Dear Guests, Now I would like to mention the growth performance of the Turkish economy and the things to be done in this respect. The Turkish economy has been growing consecutively for the last 19 quarters.

Considering from the viewpoint of fiscal policies, we should note that one of the factors ensuring the maintenance of the downward trend of inflation in the medium-term is the sustainability of fiscal discipline and the revenues policy consistent with the targets without hesitations. Within this context, we closely monitor the effects of the adjustments in the revenues policy and the primary public expenditures on inflation and inflation expectations. The achievements in structural reforms support the increase in efficiency via the improvements in competition and investment environments, contributing to the downward trend of inflation. The structural reform process has a determining effect also on the expectations. Unceasing maintenance of the steps in this area are important for the permanency of the downward trend in inflation. Even if a considerable improvement is observed today in comparison with the first half of the year, medium-term inflation expectations that are higher than targets are the other risk factors regarding the inflation outlook. This is due to the possibility of these expectations to bring about deteriorations in the pricing behaviors. Dear Guests, Although some political developments regarding the negotiations with the European Union may come to the forefront, and some interruptions and delays may occur, this process itself does mean  BIS Review 28/2007  3  convergence to the developed economies in economic terms. Together with the IMF, it also functions as an important anchor for the domestic and foreign economic units. This perspective, which is very influential on expectations, should be preserved.
As in Australia and Canada, by law the political authorities have the right to issue instructions to the central bank in matters of special importance. However, this right has never been exercised. The Norges Bank Act requires Norges Bank to inform the ministry when, in the opinion of the Bank, there is a need for measures to be taken by others than the Bank in the field of monetary, credit or foreign exchange policy. For example, in a scenario with a sharp and prolonged fall in oil prices, the krone exchange rate may remain outside the initial range for an extended period. If Norges Bank responds by raising interest rates in order to force the krone back to its initial range, monetary policy could trigger a recession of a type that will undermine confidence in the krone. Similarly, after an appreciation a situation may arise in which interest rates must be set at such a low level to return the krone exchange rate to the initial range that this results in higher inflation. The basis for exchange rate stability is weakened in both cases. Hence, Norges Bank cannot with open eyes orient policy instruments in such a way that they fuel inflation or lead to a deflationary recession.

It will open in July, with a staff of seven. The Singapore office will concern itself only with trading; settlement will continue to take place in Zurich. The branch office is completely subordinate to existing SNB oversight and control. Swiss franc money market and reference interest rates The continuing high level of Swiss franc liquidity has had the desired effect of keeping money market interest rates at close to zero. The three-month Libor has been at around two basis points since mid-January. Interest rate expectations, based on Libor future contracts, are also close to zero for the foreseeable future, but not negative, as was the case over much of last year. As a result of the very low money market interest rates and high liquidity in the banking sector, money market turnover has dropped substantially in recent years. This is illustrated in chart 2, which shows the total of banks’ sight deposits at the SNB, as well as turnover in the area of secured and unsecured call money. The small number of transactions on the money market is a problem for generating representative reference interest rates. In addition, the selection and setting of reference interest rates has come under the scrutiny of market participants and the public, as a consequence of the Libor manipulation. As regards the problems surrounding the Libor, efforts at reform are underway on an international level. To ensure the continuation of the Libor, a raft of measures have already been initiated.
In many economies where central banks are not yet independent, there is substantial support for independence and tangible progress toward making that happen. Alongside this evolution, central banks have become more transparent about their objectives and about the framework they use to conduct policy. Despite the substantial degree of convergence in the prevailing model of a modern central bank, the Fed still is different in a number of respects from the institutional arrangements produced by the latest wave of reforms in central bank arrangements in many of the major economies. Two things in particular distinguish the Fed in this respect: the first relates to the scope of the responsibilities we have for financial stability and the second to our monetary policy regime. The central bank of the United States, unlike the model now prevalent in the other major economies, integrates in one institution responsibility for the principal instruments relevant to financial stability – monetary policy, the lender of last resort responsibility, supervision of the major bank-centered financial institutions, and oversight of the payment system. This was true at the inception of the Fed. Then, as now, the rationale for this model rests on two important judgments. One is that monetary policy decisions will be wiser and the conduct of monetary policy more effective if informed by the direct knowledge of the financial system and the economy that comes from responsibility for bank supervision and market and payment system oversight.

Therefore, striking the right balance in terms of the interest rate differential is of the essence – after the substantial tightening undertaken so far, translating into money market rates increases by almost 200 bps (a normal development given the size of the inflation differential), it is probably wise to proceed more cautiously from now on. As such, the future action of the NBR is likely to depend on how the process of monetary policy normalisation will be unfolding in Europe. Policy normalisation is a question of “when”, not “if”. It will eventually gain momentum and the impact of major central banks’ policy reversals on emerging economies should not be underestimated. When the tide eventually hits, the extent of the damage depends on how vulnerable emerging economies are to external financing. A contained current account deficit, a long average maturity on public and private foreign currency debt and a proper policy mix will help limit the negative externalities. Summing up, keeping internal and external imbalances in check is the only way our economies will be able to cope with the strong volatility headwinds ahead of us. Indeed, it would be a shame if the necessary reforms were not undertaken now, while there is a window of opportunity. 14 May 2018, Bodrum, Turkey  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Otherwise, 5  households and firms would simply withdraw money from the banking system and hold cash. This ‘zero lower bound’ is another constraint on monetary policy and one that had not been envisaged when the monetary policy framework for the euro area was designed. In response, the ECB embarked upon a range of non-standard measures. First, following the example of several other central banks, the Governing Council pushed the overnight deposit rate into negative territory and the rate on the main refinancing operations down to zero. Second, the ECB launched, and then extended, an asset purchase programme, pushing down long-term sovereign bond yields and lowering borrowing costs for the private sector as well. Third, the ECB began offering banks a series of targeted long-term  refinancing operations on favourable terms, aimed at prompting them to lend to the private sector. These measures were aimed at stimulating economic activity, staving off the threat of deflation and pushing inflation back up towards its target of below, but close to, 2%. These unconventional policy measures have been instrumental to provide additional accommodation to the economy and prevent a self-sustaining fall in inflation. However, although economic activity has firmed, inflation still has not converged with the ECB’s objective. Underlying inflation pressures remain subdued. The Governing Council continues to hold that such an accommodative monetary policy stance must remain in place until a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation has been achieved. Until now, we do not have sufficient evidence that we have reached this critical point.

Economic activity began to recover in mid-2013. Since then, real GDP in the euro area has expanded steadily, if moderately, until by the second half of 2015 it had reached its pre-crisis level. However, the unemployment rate in the euro area remains relatively high, though it has fallen from a peak of above 12% in 2013 to below 10% today. Against the backdrop of a tentative recovery, and with euro area banks having to clean up their balance sheets and restrict lending, inflation in the euro area began a prolonged downward trend. Inflation in the euro area fell to 0.4% in 2014, zero in 2015 and just 0.2% last year. At these rates, inflation was considerably below the ECB target. Indeed, by mid2014 disinflationary pressures in the euro area were clear. The concern was that Inflation expectations, which were firmly anchored until then, could lose their moorings. This would lead to a self-sustained deflationary spiral that would further weaken the euro area economy. At this stage, the conduct of monetary policy ran into another constraint. As we have seen, by May 2009 the Governing Council had cut the main refinancing rate to 1.0%. The main refinancing rate was lowered to 0.25% in November 2013, while the rate on the ECB’s overnight deposit facility was reduced to zero. The Governing Council now faced a dilemma: although the economic situation demanded further monetary stimulus, official interest rates could not fall much further. Nominal interest rates cannot fall far below zero.
In this regard, given our track record and assuming a strong national commitment to the convergence process, our strategy should also benefit from the added credibility which the prospect of support by the ECB and other NCBs would confer on it. On the basis of similar considerations, a leading credit rating agency has concluded that ERM II participation can be a rating strength. While we believe this to be a viable approach to euro area membership, it is clear that new, and possibly uncomfortable situations cannot be ruled out. International capital movements, for example, may well present a challenge for monetary policy during the ERM II phase. While econometric evidence and recent experience since the liberalization of capital controls suggest that the Maltese economy has already coped successfully with significant capital outflows, it must nevertheless be clear that monetary policy will have to stand ready to neutralise any pressures on the exchange rate should these develop. Higher interest rates, of course, would not be helpful for economic activity; and they could compromise progress towards the achievement of the convergence criteria. Successfully managing the exchange rate will thus be a major challenge. And it is not the only one. There are others at the broader, macroeconomic policy level and which arise because the tools available for economic adjustment are limited compared to the many reforms that need to be undertaken. Many of the tasks to be accomplished, moreover, are subject to tight deadlines.

This also means that the main cost of joining the euro area - the loss of monetary policy independence has already been largely incurred as the euro carries a 70% weight in the currency basket and the progressive lifting of exchange controls has reduced the central bank’s ability to set interest rates independently of world markets. Second, the Maltese economy is already closely integrated with the euro area. This is borne out not only by trade patterns, but also by the similarity of Malta’s sectoral distribution of value added and employment. Our business cycle, too, has become increasingly correlated with that of the euro area. BIS Review 16/2004  1  This synchronization is likely to grow further as exchange rate volatility declines and transactions costs fall and, if the correlation between business cycles is indeed endogenous in a monetary union, as our trade with the euro area intensifies. In addition, differences in productivity levels between Malta and the euro area in the traded goods sector appear to be minor, which suggests that the BalassaSamuelson effect is unlikely to be strong. Similarities are also to be found in the financial system. For example, the degree of financial intermediation in Malta is comparable to that of the euro area, and the long-term interest rate is well within the Maastricht reference value. Further evidence that the economy seems well prepared to join a monetary union is the fact that nominal wages have been sufficiently flexible to carry the burden of adjustment implicit in a fixed exchange rate regime.