samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These developments reveal that our trading partners have seen their revenues increase, translating into an improved external demand outlook for Turkey. This is conducive to the increase in our exports. During the pandemic, countries have propped up their economies with direct public expenditures, other financial aid, and incentives. Some countries have used direct public expenditures more extensively depending on the fiscal room available, while others have introduced capital, credit and other liquidity incentives. Advanced economies announced public assistance programs amounting to more than 20% of their national income. For example, in the United States, the economy has been buoyed by government spending, at a rate of 25% of GDP, and forgone revenue. In some countries such as Italy and Germany, financial assistance has comprised capital, credit and other liquidity incentives as well as fiscal policy. Developing countries have supported their economies through various measures, albeit less vigorously than developed countries. In addition to following supportive monetary, fiscal and financial policies, Turkey is among the economies that have made great progress in vaccination and proved  3  more successful in containing the pandemic, which had positive implications for Turkey’s production, investment and employment. Here, I think we can have a better understanding of each country’s economic and public health policies if we review some basic macroeconomic variables. Compared with other developing economies, Turkey’s economy has room for improvement in terms of inflation, reserves and risk premium.

Øystein Olsen: Management of the Government Pension Fund Global Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting, Oslo, 2 May 2017. * * * In 2016, it was 20 years since the Ministry of Finance made the first capital transfer to the Government Petroleum Fund, as the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) was aptly named at the time. This transfer marked the start of a transformation of petroleum wealth in the form of oil and gas in the ground into financial assets invested outside Norway. Since the first capital transfer was made, the GPFG has grown considerably, to more than 2.5 times the size of GDP. The year 2016 also saw the first net withdrawal from the GPFG. Ahead, the value of the GPFG will therefore, to a greater extent than previously, depend on the return on the fund’s investments. The period of steady growth in the GPFG as a share of the economy is now probably over. The key variables determining the GPFG’s long-term performance have been specified by the Ministry of Finance and approved by the Storting. For its part, Norges Bank has developed its management assignment in accordance with the fund’s growth and in line with the owner’s mandate. At the same time, Norges Bank has focused on its role as advisor in the further development of the fund’s investment strategy.
Growth in the first quarter has been subdued as domestic spending, both private consumption and investment is weaker-than-expected. Part of this pullback may have been a natural reversion to a more normal pace of growth after an unusually strong expansion last  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  year. At the same time, on the external side, a drag on the overall Thailand’s trading partners’ growth continues to weigh on Thai exports. Going forward, however, many of the supporting factors remain in place. High level of employment and strong private sector confidence should provide an enabling environment for growth. Fiscal stimulus related to large-scale infrastructure investment should also begin to phase in from the latter part of this year. This would potentially generate a positive crowding-in effects on private spending. For this, I would expect the economy to return to its normal path in the third and fourth quarter of this year. Apart from slower growth, a potential threat to financial stability has increased, stemming from development in household indebtedness. Currently, household debt is rising to over 70 percent of GDP. International evidence suggests that a prolonged period of rapid credit growth could lead to a build-up of financial imbalances, worsen households’ debt servicing ability and loan quality, as well as sow a seed for asset price bubbles. The need for long-term focus Ladies and gentlemen, Having said all of the above, I may seem to paint the picture that the Thai economy is slowing down recently, largely as a result of weaker global growth.

Since the banks themselves have massive investments in this market, they were obliged to make writedowns which, in some cases, were hefty. There is still uncertainty about the volume of additional bank writedowns that will be needed, so that the situation on the international money markets remains tense. In this crisis, central banks have reacted fast and flexibly in order to secure the supply of liquidity to banks and counter distortions on the money market. By means of various measures, the Swiss National Bank was able to stabilise the three-month Libor within the target range, thereby keeping fluctuations in the relative restrictiveness of monetary policy low by comparison with other countries. However, it is not possible to solve the fundamental problems in the banking sector through the flexible deployment of an expanded range of monetary policy instruments; neither can they be resolved by means of coordinated actions on the part of central banks alone. The banks themselves must make a substantial contribution to solving the problems which triggered the current crisis. In this respect, the most urgent matters are transparency with regard to endangered positions and their valuation, increasing the capital base, and improving risk management and control systems. BIS Review 37/2008  1
By end-2007, consumer inflation had reached 8.4 percent, exceeding the 4-percent target. However, the fall of core inflation (which excludes items beyond the control of monetary policy such as food and energy) to 4.8 percent confirmed that the monetary tightening implemented in 2006 was the right policy choice. During this period, domestic demand and capacity conditions also continued to support the disinflation process. In early 2008 the supply side shocks in food and energy prices started to exert significant inflationary pressures, as they reached unprecedented levels above and beyond expectations. For instance, October 2007 Inflation Report, based on forecasts of international agencies, had foreseen oil prices around USD 70 per barrel in 2008 and a gradual correction in food prices. In other words, it was assumed that supply side shocks would be temporary and that they would lose impact after a while. These forecasts were in line with pricing in forward and futures markets. However, these expectations did not materialize. Both crude oil prices and agricultural commodity prices continued to rise. The adverse impacts of supply shocks reached unprecedented levels during the first half of 2008. 4  BIS Review 82/2008  Under normal circumstances, supply shocks are expected to have a temporary impact on relative prices, not changing the course of medium-term inflation. Nevertheless, the emergence of multiple shocks at the same time and their persistence for a considerable period aggravated the risks on pricing behavior.

The Central Bank has been implementing a monetary tightening to offset the secondary effects of supply shocks. Since domestic demand is growing at a moderate pace at the moment, it has been curbing the pass through from cost-push factors. As a matter of fact, the prices of products that do not use food or energy as main inputs have been rather well behaved compared to the prices of products that have food or energy as inputs. However, the fact that first round effects of the supply side shocks have reached unprecedented levels has been affecting inflation expectations adversely. Monetary policy cannot remain indifferent in case of a deterioration in the overall pricing behavior. If supply side shocks last long, their effects will spill over to the other sectors in the economy. A tighter stance is a must in order to control the expectations and to prevent the mutation of supply side shocks into demand shocks. If monetary policy does not react to the disruption in inflation dynamics, supply side price hikes may, after a certain point, easily evolve into a selffeeding vicious circle. Dear Guests, Why did the Central Bank not repeat the strong monetary tightening policy that it had implemented in 2006, but instead opted for a measured and gradual increase in interest rates in 2008? The current conditions differ from the May 2006 fluctuation.
History tells us that such imbalances can persist for some time, but increase in risk as they widen. History also tells us that current account imbalances eventually require macroeconomic adjustment - adjustment that is smoother and more orderly the earlier and more coordinated the policy response. While I am not one to second-guess the markets, I also believe that we in the United States must ask ourselves whether the surge in the stock market over the past several years will continue to be accompanied by commensurate growth in output and earnings. To date, consumer spending increases spurred by the growth in the stock market have not been exceptional compared with the growth in wealth, but the growth in wealth has certainly been astonishing. Let me turn now to some of the longer-term trends driving the US economy in recent years. It is these trends that have led many to question whether the structure of the US economy has changed and to ask whether, in fact, the United States is a “new economy” today. BIS Review 29/2000  2  While the bottom line is that there is not a consensus on this issue, no one disagrees that the performance of the US economy has changed dramatically in recent years. Annual real GDP growth over the past four years is higher than it has been in decades, averaging 4% a year in comparison with average annual GDP growth rates of roughly 3% in the 1970s and 1980s.

Moreover, I am firmly convinced that growth in an economy is what ultimately underpins a healthy society. It is simply not possible to have a strong society with a permanent underclass. No society - not our own nor any other - can hope to flourish if its youth are left unemployed and a large segment of its population remains poorly educated and inadequately housed. Nor can an economy grow without a basic infrastructure that enshrines the rule of law and the accountability of the government to its people. As I survey the world economy today, I am pleased that there seems to be broad-based recognition of these fundamental precepts. World economic conditions are considerably more benign than they have been in years as we begin the new millennium. How do things look outside the United States? Let’s start with Japan. When we look at Japan’s growth in the 1990s, we really see two patterns. One is the sluggish growth since 1992, the other is the steep recession in 1998. The 1998 recession stemmed from the financial crisis in a number of other countries in Asia, leading to a collapse in corporate profits and business fixed investment, and essentially a credit crunch as financial restructuring got under way. Japan today is in the difficult phase of restructuring, with high unemployment as balance sheets are being cleaned up in the corporate and banking sectors. Moreover, business investment was slow up to the fourth quarter of 1999 and consumers have been restrained in their spending.
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  raise GDP per capita by about 11% after ten years for the average EU country. In the US, which starts from a more favourable position, the benefit would be under 5%. 10 And it is not difficult to understand why the benefits of reform could be so high in the euro area. High levels of structural unemployment, compounded by high numbers of underemployed and discouraged workers, imply a latent potential in our economies for a major positive shock to labour supply (Chart 5). We also have scope for a large catching-up in terms of productivity growth. TFP has increased by only 1.5% between 2000 and 2014 in the euro area, far below the 10.9% increase in the US over the same period (Chart 6). The type of policies that could release this upward shock to potential growth are not just those focused on price flexibility. They include, on the labour supply side, policies aimed at providing job search support for the long-term unemployed and requalification for the low skilled. And on the TFP side, policies that encourage the reallocation of resources – which could be powerful in the euro area given the wide and skewed distribution between the least and most productive firms 11 (Chart 7) – and policies that accelerate the diffusion of new technology, where the euro area on the whole lags some way behind the US (Chart 8). There are many other examples one could give.

Again I am happy to inform you that the central bank in partnership with the Bankers Association of Zambia are in the process of developing credit reference bureau guidelines and will in the near future issue licences to deserving companies. Lastly, but not the least, the issue of lack of an effective secondary financial market in Zambia is being addressed with Commencement of work on the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP). Let me join the Honourable Minister of Finance in wishing Barclays Bank Zambia PLC the very best of success with the launch of the Home Loan product. I thank you!! BIS Review 6/2006  1
In fact, in 2016 the Spanish economy recorded a current account surplus of close to 2% of GDP and the external balance is expected to perform positively over the medium term, although probably less so than during the last two years. 3/8  The normalisation of financial conditions The recovery in economic activity and competitiveness is also related to the decline in financing costs. Since the most acute phases of financial stress in the second half of 2011 and in the first half of 2012, there has been a gradual normalisation of the financing costs of firms and households, with less divergence from the interest rates paid by economic agents in other Eurosystem countries. The decline in the cost of financing has stimulated business investment and helped to enhance household spending possibilities, with a positive impact on economic activity. The normalisation of financial conditions has also extended to the level of household and business debt, which has fallen significantly in recent years, in relative terms. In keeping with this reduction in private sector debt, aggregate bank lending continues to decline, although at increasingly slower rates. This is the case, in particular, of lending to households and non-financial corporations that do not belong to the construction and property development sector.

In other words, fulfilling the convergence criteria in a sustainable way ensures that the country can integrate smoothly into the monetary union, without a risk of disruption for the Member State itself or the euro area as a whole. The convergence process and the fulfillment of the criteria are therefore •  not used to exclude countries by putting up extra hurdles for them to pass;  •  they are used to ensure that their inclusion occurs smoothly and to the mutual benefit of the country in question and the euro area as a whole. IV  Once a country is able to fulfil these legal and economic criteria in a sustainable manner, it joins the euro area. However, the adoption of the euro is not the end of the story. It is merely the end of the beginning. Indeed, joining the euro is not in itself a recipe for success. Countries need to pursue the right policies in order to thrive in the euro area. Joining the EMU removes the national instrument of nominal exchange rate adjustment. This implies increased flexibility of national economies and increased responsibilities for the co-ordination of the national economic policies of the member states, because they have to compensate for the elimination of this adjustment channel.
Ladies and Gentlemen, looking at the more medium-term prospects, I am convinced that the underlying fundamentals that have been attracting international investors to Thailand over the years are still in place. The country’s overall macroeconomic fundamentals remain  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  sound against the back-drop of a healthy banking system, low and well-anchored inflation, and the government’s relatively strong financial position. A flexible exchange rate and our strong position in terms of international reserves provide ample cushioning for the central bank to be able to manage capital flow volatility. These solid fundamentals command trust from investors and credit rating agencies. Recently, Moody reaffirmed Thailand’s stable credit outlook citing that “in many respects, Thailand’s credit metrics remain well positioned compared with its immediate rating peers”. 6. Having said this, we cannot take things for granted. In fact, many problems point toward a need for structural reform. The MPC, in its last meeting, expressed concern over a number of structural issues, which, if not addressed, could restrain the country’s potential growth in the long run. These problems include fiscal sustainability, inequality in terms of both income distribution and access to education and health care, as well as supply bottlenecks such as a labor shortage. These problems cannot be solved by monetary policy, but require a concerted effort from all stakeholders. 7. In addition, as we are all aware, the prospect of the Thai economy is largely clouded by political uncertainty, which continues to impair the ability of the government to steer the economy forward.

And UK GDP has now risen for 38 consecutive quarters (albeit in the case of 2001 Q4, only just! ), the longest continuous expansion since post-war records began. Achieving low and stable inflation is the best contribution that monetary policy can make to the wider economic goals of sustainable growth and employment. Having an inflation target certainly does not mean that we ignore  BIS Review 18/2002  1  real activity. We have discretion over how rapidly we try to bring inflation back to target when and if it diverges from 2½%. And we regularly publish our best estimate about the likely future path of growth up to a two year horizon. But the aim of policy is clear - we do what is necessary to keep inflation on target. As you know, there are nine of us on the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee, and we meet once a month to make our interest rate decision. This is a rigorous process, and rightly so. But, of course, agreement on process need not, and does not, imply universal agreement on the appropriate stance of policy, as our minutes show. Indeed, an industry has grown up geared to guessing MPC members' personal habits, psychoanalysing our personalities and classifying us into different species of the aviary. But it is important to recognise, I think, that disagreements are evidence of the strength of the system, not its weakness.
The distrust characterising interbank relations encouraged certain institutions to stockpile capital. This trend was reinforced by the fact that numerous banks were unable to make a reliable estimate of their own liquidity requirements, particularly in view of the soaring demand for cash on the part of the public. At the end of last year, the total value of banknotes in circulation had risen by 11% and banks had three times as much money on their SNB sight deposit accounts as at the end of 2007. To satisfy this extraordinary demand, the SNB was obliged to expand its repo operations in terms of volume and maturity, and to inject liquidity into the market through a new channel – that of swap transactions. Over the past few years, repos have become the standard tool with which we implement our monetary policy. They involve loans to banks denominated in Swiss francs and backed by securities. As a rule, these loans are granted for a term of one week. However, in response to the special needs of the market in 2008, we had to lengthen the term of our loans on several occasions, extending maturity to as much as twelve months. Unlike other central banks, however, we saw no need to expand the range of eligible securities, since we already apply a very liberal policy, accepting top-rated securities denominated not only in Swiss francs, but also in euros, pounds sterling, US dollars and other currencies. In 2008, the average amount of our repos rose by 53% against the year before.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our country needs professionals with high levels of social and moral awareness so that all of us are aware of the moral obligations and potential impact of our thinking, decisions and actions. We need to be good role models for others in behaviour, attitude and relationships. Let us endeavour to act in a way that is professional and that retains the confidence of the public at all times. I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 159/2009
Let me set out the key dimensions of the financial sector jobs and skills agenda that we will cover over the next few months under the Growing Timber series: Job opportunities – what are the new jobs being created and how to access these jobs; Job readiness – how can we prepare our tertiary students so that they are job-ready when they embark on a career in the financial sector; Job retention – keeping our mid-career workers employed through upskilling amid new skills demands; Job redeployment – reskilling mid-career workers in jobs that are being transformed by technology and pivoting them to new careers; Job specialisation – deepening skills and capabilities in highly specialised areas in strong demand; and Job leadership – grooming promising Singaporeans for leadership roles at diﬀerent levels. Today, I will cover the first three dimensions of the jobs and skills agenda – namely, job opportunities, job readiness, and job retention. JOB OPPORTUNITIES  https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/gearing-up-for-new-and-evolving-jobs-in-financial-services  4/18  04/12/2020  "Gearing up for New and Evolving Jobs in Financial Services" - Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authorit…  The financial sector provides good job opportunities. Financial services employs a workforce of 170,000. It is the most productive workforce in the economy, accounting for 4.5% of Singapore’s total workforce but 13.3% of our GDP. During 2015-2019, the financial sector created 22,000 net jobs. 70% of these jobs went to Singapore Citizens, in line with the overall proportion of Singaporeans in the financial sector workforce, also at 70%.

Conclusion I will now place my observations on monetary policy in a broader context and formulate three key messages. But before doing so, I would like to point out that the decision to adopt an independent monetary policy is not a purely economic one. Central banks act within the framework that is laid down for them by the legislature and, ultimately, the sovereign power. The culture and history of a country play an important role in selecting the national monetary order. And now I come to my three key messages. My first message is that it is possible for small open economies bordering a large currency area to pursue an independent monetary policy. It allows the central bank to react to disruptions specific to its own country and to ensure price stability in the medium term. For example, following the onset of the financial crisis, central banks in Europe lowered their  10  The first central bank outside Europe to introduce negative interest rates was the Bank of Japan, at the end of January 2016. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  interest rates at different points in time and to varying degrees to cushion the effects of the demand slump. Both conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures helped to absorb the shocks of the euro crisis and the ECB’s substantial monetary policy easing from March 2014. My second message is that in times of crisis, monetary policy’s usual room for manoeuvre can be quickly exhausted, making unconventional measures necessary.