samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So it is in Singapore, where the vision of e-administration development has been based on three basic areas and each of them contains elements related to 25 safety, privacy and confidence. 1. Networked Government as the basis for development. This administration network is to put into practice the motto: “Many offices, one administration.” It must also be effective, efficient, safe and adequate to the needs. 2. Delighted Customers as a manifestation of the focus on satisfying customers’ needs. Within this area, public e-services must be convenient and easy to use, they must go beyond the borders of organization and respect customers’ privacy. 3. Connected Citizens is an area that supports active attitudes demonstrated by the citizens. The area is best summarized by the following catchwords: Citizens as stakeholders, creation of communities and greater confidence and security. 20  Ibidem. 21  Top of the Web. User Satisfaction and Usage Survey of eGovernment services,” December 2004. 22  “Public Sector Technology & Management,” Vol. 2.2, March/April 2005, p. 14. 23  “Top of the Web – User Satisfaction and Usage Survey of eGovernment Services,” December 2004. 24  The research conducted by IBM Corporation, more information can be found, for instance, in “Paperless Trading:” Benefits to APEC”, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 2001. 25  www.egov.gov.sg.

Krzysztof Rybiński: Easier, faster and more economical! Things we have never done before Address by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Vice-President of the National Bank of Poland, at the Congress of e-Economy, Warsaw, 21 March 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, The first Congress of e-Economy in Poland is held in the period where the enormous progress in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT), accompanied by a decline in transport costs and reduced commercial barriers, has resulted in a radical acceleration of the globalization process. Some of us go even further and define the process straightforwardly as the third industrial revolution 1 , creating the vision of remote medical services such as, for instance, x-ray pictures taken in the United States and interpreted by a physician in India or Australia. New technologies go beyond borders and reach further than the human imagination. Nearly half a million of Americans have their tax returns completed by tax consultants in India 2 the voice coming from the microphone in some McDonald’s drivethroughs belongs to a person sitting a few thousand miles away, table bookings in certain restaurants are also made in this way. This phenomenon, called outsourcing and offshoring, has radically increased labour efficiency, improved the quality of products and services, and reduced prices. Even consumer satisfaction surveys in the United States are often conducted by call centres located in India.
It had shown an increase of 3.7% in December 1997. Financing raised on the domestic markets progressed vigorously, with the year-on-year advance standing at 9.2% in December 1998, after 6.6% a year earlier. Against a background marked by uncertainty surrounding the international environment and by prospects of a euro area-wide slowdown in activity, on 3 December 1998 the Monetary Policy Council of the Banque de France, in close dialogue with the other members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), decided to cut its main key rate, which had been set at 3.30% since October 1997, to 3.0%. This decision was inspired by three considerations: – – –  the need to ensure the cohesion of the euro area in the best possible conditions; the need to organize the convergence of short-term rates towards the lowest rates in the area, i.e. in particular French rates; the need to choose the level of key rates that was most appropriate at the time of entry into the euro. This decision constituted a further stage in the process leading to the transfer of responsibility for monetary policy to the European System of Central Banks as of 1 January 1999. In fact, the rate applying to the first main refinancing operations of the ESCB was set at 3% on 22 December 1998 by the Governing Council of the ECB.

We should then gradually move towards compulsory transparency based on a “comply or explain” principle. Article 173 of the French Energy Transition Law – as it sets the Environmental Social Governance (ESG)-Climate approach as a new market standard – could usefully serve as a reference studied at the European level. 2/ Beyond the "snapshot of risks", the NGFS is working on a "video of risks", with long-term forward-looking stress tests to assess the dynamic effects of climate change on the economy and financial stability. The NGFS is currently developing economic scenarios based on climate change that could be used to conduct stress tests. Meanwhile, the ACPR has conducted a survey on banks and insurance companies to evaluate how they integrate physical and transition risks in their risk management. The results will be published by early 2019. They will be a good point to assess the progress made so far by the industry towards taking both risk factors into account. I would at this stage suggest caution on some NGOs’ analyses concluding that French banks have a “fossil energy bias”. Their large exposures to the oil and gas sector have indeed decreased between 2015 and 2017. This survey will also be valuable as inputs in designing the new framework needed to perform stress-test exercises and assess climate risk across the French financial system as a whole. III. Financing transition opportunities Like any good pilot, we want our plane to “gain some altitude”.
However, when copper prices began to fall, there was a wave of loan defaults leading to a run on the trusts that could not be stopped by the clearinghouse system. The resulting credit contraction sent the economy into recession, transmitting the problems to the banking sector. In the end, more than 240 banks failed even though the problem started outside of the banking sector. The basic mechanics of a bank run have remained the same over time. Due to the maturity mismatch involved in credit intermediation, banks in particular and financial institutions in general must rely on trust by their “depositors” that the institution’s assets will provide the ability to pay back the depositors. The fundamental connection between liquidity and trust was well described by Walter Bagehot in 1873: “Every banker knows that if he has to prove that he is worthy of credit, however good may be his arguments, in fact his credit is gone.” 2 There are two problems that depositors face. The first is that they typically know very little about a particular bank’s investments. This reflects both the lack of transparency in how banks are investing their funds, and a lack of incentive by individual borrowers to expend effort to try and learn this information – what economists call a public goods problem. The second problem is that a depositor does not know what other depositors think about the solvency of the bank.

Jaime Caruana: Reform of the international standard for bank capital Notes for the testimony by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Parliament, Brussels, 18 January 2005. * 1. *  *  Introduction  I am honoured to appear before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs today to discuss the reform of the international standard for bank capital. In past years, members of the European Parliament have kindly welcomed Bill McDonough, the prior Chairman of the Basel Committee, as well as other Basel Committee representatives. I would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to contribute to the debate and to support your important work in considering the proposed directive on capital adequacy requirements for banks and investment firms. These hearings are extremely valuable and represent a vital stage in the European legislative process, where the European Parliament has a crucial role. I will be speaking today in my capacity as Chair of the Basel Committee. But I hope you will allow me to digress on one or two occasions to supplement my remarks with my perspectives as Governor of the Banco de España. The Banco de España is a central bank and banking supervisory authority within the European Union; it will therefore be a direct subject of the legislation that is enacted on capital adequacy.
To avoid ending up in a such a dilemma in future, we can decide to take into account inflation developments after the target horizon. From what I have said until now, it is evident that our monetary policy decisions are normally based on the main rule that says that we should aim at keeping CPI inflation at two per cent 1-2 years in the future. However, on every occasion when decisions are made, we must consider how to relate to the guidance provided by this simple decision-making rule. This assessment is based on the extent to which the main rule leads to unacceptable macroeconomic costs in the form of fluctuations in employment and output. However, departures from the rule must not damage credibility in the inflation target or lead to inflation expectations being affected. As we have gained experience and increased our knowledge, we have clarified how we intend to apply our decision-making rule. We will in all probability, continue to obtain new insights and be confronted by unexpected events. This means that we must continuously evaluate and review our strategies. Independence requires openness A very important part of our strategy, which I have not taken up before, is openness and transparency as to how monetary policy is conducted. This part can hardly be reconsidered. The Riksbank’s independence creates good conditions for achieving and maintaining credibility for the price stability target.

It may well be in the interest of the candidate countries to make this period as short as possible. Sixth, it is true that any country entering the EMU need to fix the exchange rate. One should not take for granted, however, that the longer the period of the intermediate regime the better, as it is not always true that longer wait produces more information about the proper rate of exchange. It may produce just more noise. Seventh, both further efficient disinflation and strengthening long-term economic growth require completion of certain structural reforms in the candidate countries. There is no way around it. In case of Poland, the liberalization of the labour market and increased participation rate is badly needed. Fiscal reforms must concentrate on rationalising the spending and not just increasing taxes. Privatisation needs to be completed and it should include the banking sector. We have to strengthen competition in fuel and energy sectors. Legal framework needs to be adjusted to be more efficient. The earlier deadline of the entry to the EU could act as a powerful motivating device to complete those reforms. I am a great believer in the deadlines and I think they help to achieve success. Delaying the entry could do more harm then good, as it could weaken the incentive to complete the necessary and often politically costly reforms. Eighth, flexibility of the rate of exchange is a poor substitute for structural reforms.
ASEAN regulators have taken on a number of initiatives to reduce costs of businesses through the support of greater connectivity, mutual recognition agreements and greater cohesiveness of rules and regulations. Additionally, usage of local currencies as a means of payment and settlement will facilitate our intra-region trade and investment. Common infrastructures for cross border payment and settlement such as through the Asian Payment Network are important to increasing efficiency of doing businesses and reducing costs of remittances and transfers. If we all work together in our various capacities we can together strengthen our region and improve ASEAN people’s standards of living. Ladies and Gentlemen, To sum up, I strongly believe that bankers play a critical role in the future of ASEAN economies and people’s lives. ASEAN banks, given their large scale and power of intellectual and capital resources, must be the force that drives our region forward and improve people’s quality of lives. During this period of VUCA world and changes in economic environment with technology disrupting business landscapes, we must focus on longer term goals. Working together, ASEAN banks must commit to strengthening our regional growth and to ensuring 5  sustainable development. Instilling proper behaviours and cultures into the organization and practicing sustainable banking will strengthen us from within. Looking at today’s agenda, I am delighted that ASEAN bankers will engage and work together to find ways to meaningfully impact our region on issues ranging from digital and fintech to sustainable finance.

Compared to ten years ago, global growth has been relatively subdued, with no significant pickup in sight. The latest IMF economic forecast puts global growth next year at 3.4 percent, a slight improvement from a disappointing 3.1 percent this year. Slow growth momentum is most pronounced in the core advanced economies, with 1.8 percent forecast for 2017. Yet, while this state of the “new mediocre” is more often associated with the advanced economies, there is risk that some emerging countries including ASEAN countries will sooner or later experience it as well due to spill-over effects and domestic structural constraints. The spill-over effects of the "new mediocre" go beyond the growth dimension, but well into the realm of financial stability. Given the low-interest rate and low-yield in advanced economies, investors have shifted their portfolios to many emerging economies including ASEAN in search of higher yielding financial assets. This “search-for-yield” behaviours with capital inflows, rise in asset prices, and higher debt ratio have already resulted in pockets of financial vulnerabilities in many countries. Yet the “new mediocre” is not only impacting the stability of the financial system and economic growth, but is also catalysing social tensions and geo-political changes. As Christine Lagarde said at this year's IMF annual meeting, global economic growth has been “too low, for too long, and benefiting too few.” 1  Across a spectrum of countries not only is the growth low, but it is also not inclusive, particularly for people at the lower end.
I am convinced that a flexible mix between monetary and fiscal policies, plus the diversified structure of production and exports, did allow the economy to avoid contraction and build on greater external stability. With the improved environment for growth that I have just noted, I am more comfortable today than last year to talk about an economic recovery. My optimism, however, remains guarded. Because on this road to recovery, there are still many risks. Such risks, if not managed well, could undermine the sustainability of the recovery process. Let me first talk about the macroeconomy and our view for 2002. Then I will describe the challenges ahead as well as our thoughts on how to manage them. First, the economic recovery. What do the recent economic numbers tell us? In January, the economy showed signs of continued expansion despite the sluggish global conditions, thanks largely to the momentum in domestic demand. A number of indicators suggested that the economic conditions had improved somewhat from the recent months. For instance, –  Consumption and investment continued to improve in January. In particular, the Private Investment Index (PII) continued to increase. A significant expansion was seen in construction, following the spur in housing demand and construction activities. BIS Review 16/2002  1  –  It looks like this good news on the domestic demand front warrants a significant increase in the January Business Sentiment Index (BSI) and the index looking 3 months ahead.

6 On the other hand, a more developed and efficient financial system can contribute to a more effective and smooth transmission of monetary policy. 7 At the root of the problems that led to the current financial turmoil is precisely this growing segment of the financial industry. As valuations of asset-backed securities and other assets declined rapidly, and, in fact, the whole securitisation model was shaken, the outstanding amount of structured products decreased significantly. Obviously, this affects bank credit: according to the latest bank lending survey conducted in the euro area, more than 80% of banks judged that difficulties in raising funds via securitisation have had a negative impact on bank lending. 8 Overall, the financial turmoil may have affected the efficient working of the banking sector and might have an impact on the supply of credit to the non-financial sector. In light of the fact that bank lending remains strong (the annual rate of growth of loans to non-financial corporations in August 2008 was a still robust 12.6 per cent), it is too early to quantify the extent to which the turmoil may influence the provision of loans. Needless to say, the Eurosystem, and undoubtedly other central banks, will continue to closely monitor the situation. 2  See Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1995): “Inside the black box: the credit channel of monetary policy transmission”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, pp. 27-48. For the euro area, see contributions collected in Angeloni, I., A. Kashyap and B. Mojon (eds.
Ardian Fullani: Past and future banking reforms in Albania and the region Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at The Fifth International Banking Forum, Athens, Greece, 6 December 2006. *  *  *  Honorable Dr. Margret Doyle, Dear Mr. Chairman, Distinguished participants, Before starting my speech I would like to briefly address the perennial question that stands at the heart of our quest: “Are the prosperous times ahead of us?” It comes to my assistance an old saying of one of your ancient philosophers, Eupides: “Prosperity is full of friends”. As we are gathered here as friends, I believe we have a positive answer to this question. I would like to thank “The Economist Conferences” for inviting the Bank of Albania in this very important forum. It is a great pleasure to be here today. The topic of my speech will be economic reforms. I will take this opportunity to express my views on past and future banking and financial reforms in Albania and the region. The topic is not new of course. However, reforms and their implementation are a dynamic process that must reflect changes and expectations for future developments in both domestic and global markets. Therefore, it will always be an open discussion in need for new ideas and solutions. Central banks are important contributors to the economic reforms and their implementation. They not only welcome and support but also generate reforms in the capital, labor, and product markets.

Currently, the activities of financial institutions and commercial banks have a limited scope; however, we are starting to see the signs of financial conglomeration. We have no doubt that this trend will grow and continue in the future. It will bring innovation, new financial instruments and products in the market. Along with this, rapid growth of credit and debit cards as well as other systems of payments will continue to grow. While these instruments might not subside or even reduce the use of cash, this trend must be taken into account. Transition economies of the region are lucrative markets. They are growing substantially faster than traditional European markets and offer impressive prospects for high profits and significant growth. To give you an example, return on banking activity in Albania during the last two years has been around 20 percent. These positive prospects and the eagerness to compete quickly and beyond rational limits for profits and market share may create potential risks. If managers were to lose sight of the entire picture, and financial constrains, such competition might result in mismanagement, nonperforming loans, and other banking problems. Therefore, there is no room for sloppy managerial attitude. It is very important that managerial staff must be up to the challenges which, if materialized, could be more complex than in the self-regulated developed markets. It is important to act enbloc and engage in regional projects of infrastructure including here the financial ones.
On the nominal side, UK inflation had fallen from a peak of 5.2% in September 2011 to 2.9% in June 2013 (Chart 2a), as upward pressures from the past exchange rate depreciation (and higher energy prices) eased. Domestic inflationary pressures were subdued, with annual pay growth running around 1% (Chart 2b) – far below its pre-crisis average rate of 4%. Chart 2: Headline CPI inflation elevated but domestic inflationary pressures subdued a) CPI inflation Percentage changes on a year earlier 6 5  Headline CPI  4 3 2 2% target 1  Core CPI  0 2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  b) Whole economy regular pay growth Percent 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  With output only having just returned to its pre-crisis peak and unemployment still several percentage points above any reasonable estimates of its equilibrium rate, the MPC judged that there was a large amount of spare capacity in the UK economy, and significant scope for aggregate demand to increase consistent with inflation returning sustainably to the 2% target. But the exact extent of slack was more uncertain than usual. Productivity had fallen alongside activity during the recession, and its reported growth had been anaemic since, averaging around half its pre-crisis rate (Chart 3).

In the extreme, this risks undermining trust in monetary policy makers and the constituency for operational independence. Again, it bears remembering that distributional considerations are rightly the responsibility of governments not of independent technocratic monetary policy committees that are narrowly mandated to achieve price stability. In the event, Bank of England research shows that income and wealth inequality has been stable in the UK since the early 1990s, and fell in the years after the crisis when the MPC used unconventional policies. Those who gained least from the higher asset prices that resulted from the MPC’s asset purchases gained more from its broader effects supporting jobs and activity. 38 Simulations using the Bank’s main forecasting model suggest that the Bank’s monetary policy easing in response to the crisis measures raised the level of GDP by around 8% relative to trend and lowered unemployment by 4 percentage points at their peak. Without this action, real wages would have been 8% lower, or around £ per worker per year, and 1.5 million more people would have been out of work.39  See ‘Renewal of the Inflation-Control Target: Background Information – October 2016’, Bank of Canada. See Bunn, P, Pugh, A and Yeates, C (2018) ‘The distributional impact of monetary policy easing in the UK between 2008 and 2014’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 720. 39 See ‘The Spectre of Monetarism’, Roscoe Lecture given by Mark Carney at Liverpool John Moores University, 5 December 2016.