samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The measure is designed to prevent banks from having to increase their capital and restrict their lending activities during a downturn, thereby exacerbating cyclical fluctuations. The FSB ranks Credit Suisse Group AG and UBS AG as global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). In Switzerland, the Banking Act gives the SNB the authority to designate banks as being systemically important for the Swiss market, following consultation with FINMA. Banks are deemed to be systemically important if they perform functions in the domestic lending and deposit-taking business, as well as in the payment transactions area, which are essential to the Swiss economy and cannot be substituted at short notice. In addition to Credit Suisse Group AG and UBS AG, the SNB has designated Zürcher Kantonalbank, the Raiffeisen Group and PostFinance Ltd as systemically important. These are referred to as gone-concern requirements. A fundamental distinction is drawn between going-concern and gone-concern requirements. The former address the ongoing business activities of a bank, whereas the latter relate to the event of a bank having to be restructured or wound down. The fact is that banks typically get into difficulty precisely when they no longer have sufficient capital available. The regulations therefore allow for debt to be written off or converted into equity in such instances. Such instruments, which are designed to absorb losses in the event of a resolution, are referred to as bail-in instruments. Page 5/8  Banking regulation in Switzerland  With these two packages of measures, the international bodies have defined global minimum standards.

Switzerland refrains from actively intervening in the business models or organisational structures of the banks, and no distinction is drawn between desirable and undesirable banking practices. Our regulation focuses on the essentials, specifically on ensuring that banks can themselves absorb any losses resulting from the risks they take on, without destabilising other parts of the financial system or damaging the economy. Taking stock  What have we achieved with the measures that have been put in place? Is the Swiss banking system more resilient to crises today? Please allow me to give you our take on this. I will first look at those banks with a domestic focus before moving on to the big banks. Switzerland’s domestically focused banks were not at the centre of the financial crisis, and all in all the new regulations are also likely to have little effect on them; their liquidity and capital buffers are mostly well above the regulatory minimum requirements. The stress tests that the SNB regularly conducts to assess risks also show that the banking system is largely well capitalised. Notwithstanding this, the risk appetite of domestically focused banks has increased again in recent years, not least due to the low interest rate environment. There are also imbalances on  Page 6/8  the mortgage and real estate markets. It is therefore important that the domestically focused banks are aware of the risks they have assumed and ensure that they remain well capitalised in the future. And what about the two big banks?
In 2016, Shariah-compliant trade finance accounted for 24.1% of total trade finance provided by the Malaysian banking sector. However, our Islamic finance industry only financed about 5% of total exports in Malaysia, again, signifying an untapped growth area with large potential. Increasing bank financing for SMEs would also encourage more market based solutions to meet the funding needs of the halal sector participants, which are now largely reliant on government initiatives. There are however a number of challenges that may impede trade finance facilitation by Islamic finance players. I would like to highlight two. First is – “process inefficiencies” – that can contribute to higher operational risks such as fraud. This can be mitigated through use of technology that reduces reliance on traditionally document-intensive and multi-tiered manual processes. In Malaysia, I am happy to note that six Islamic banks have embarked on digitalisation of trade finance processes – through an integrated web-based platform that offers trade finance and working capital management solutions. The second challenge is, – the need to improve connectivity between the Islamic finance industry and the international trade community – to facilitate effective intermediation of trade finance needs. Again, the use of technology can ease the application and submission of trade-related information and documents which can expedite the whole process. If these challenges are not addressed, industry players are at risk of becoming irrelevant in the trade finance space.

This approach necessitates greater empathy, which can pave the way for Islamic banks to develop more tailor made financial solutions. Assessment of financial applications would also be based on potential value creation and not on credit scores alone – thus opening up exposure to larger segment of potentially viable businesses. This is central in uncovering new markets, such as within the presently unserved and underserved segment of society. A VBI-driven financial institution – would actively seek out opportunities to assist aspiring entrepreneurs that may be struggling to obtain funds, but have business models that, despite being untested, are more socially responsible or green in nature. VBI therefore considers a broader spectrum of criteria as opposed to the traditional method that places emphasis on credit history and availability of collaterals. VBI also promotes more holistic offerings for entrepreneurs and I would like to suggest several examples to illustrate – how Islamic banks can extend its scope of business to benefit SMEs. In providing infrastructure support, an example is through provision of physical premises that can be rented by SMEs to conduct their businesses at lower rentals. There is an example of a product in the market today, where factory spaces are provided for SMEs to rent at affordable rates, equipped with amenities to cater to the needs of the entrepreneurs. In addition, entrepreneurship training and consulting services are also offered to them. This can particularly assist in increasing entrepreneurial involvement in the manufacturing industry.
Without their support, it would have been very difficult to complete this phase of the Survey. Distinguished Guests, As you are aware, the Zambian economy has recorded significant positive developments in the recent past, owing to the wide-ranging economic reforms the Government has been implementing since 1992. The reforms, which are aimed at stabilising the economy and supporting economic recovery for the purpose of reducing poverty among our people, have facilitated increased investment in various sectors of the economy, such as, agriculture, tourism, construction and manufacturing. As you may also be aware, the mining sector has attracted unprecedented amounts of investment in the recent past. Government’s economic reforms since the early 1990s have contributed immensely to the boosting both local and foreign investors’ confidence in the Zambian economy, which is an important pre-requisite for attracting capital flows. The survey findings that we are disseminating today indicate that Foreign Private Capital flows to Zambia in 2007 rose to US $ million from the US $ million recorded in 2001. The 2007 inflows were largely in form of foreign direct investment, borrowing from nonaffiliates (Loans and Trade Credits) and portfolio investment. We believe that the introduction of economic reforms led to a substantial increase in private capital flows, which regrettably, we have not been able to capture on a regular basis due to budgetary constraints. Mr. Chairman, History has taught us that high volatility in private capital flows, if not properly monitored and managed, can induce financial and macro-economic instability in the domestic economy.

Luis M Linde: International financial integration and fragmentation. Drivers and policy responses Opening remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Conference on “International financial integration and fragmentation. Drivers and policy responses”, organized by the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee and the Bank of Spain, Madrid, 12 March 2013. *  *  *  Good morning to all. Buenos dias a todos y bienvenidos a Madrid: It is for me a pleasure to welcome you to Banco de España and to this Seminar on international financial integration. I would like to start by thanking Marc Uzan and the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee for their fruitful cooperation in organizing an agenda that is indeed very promising. More than five years into the crisis, it is still hard to grasp the real magnitude of the changes that our financial systems are undergoing. In fact, we are still trying to restore the financial channels to support the growth of internal and external demand. While we perform such, so to say, “fire-fighter task”, it is not easy to take a step back and look at how the contours of our economic and financial landscape are evolving. But we can already distinguish some of the characteristics of the new scenario that is taking shape, and that will be our habitat as central bankers, regulators, financial intermediaries or analysts in the years to come.
With all these measures in place, we expect further progress in the resolution of the NPL problem next year. With regard to the intervened banks, two have been sold to new investors. The remaining two are in the process of identifying new potential partners which are most likely to be finalised next year. As for the existing Thai banks, the policy framework emphasised by the government is to encourage mergers, such as in the case of Bank Thai, which will help to preserve Thai-owned financial institutions. In this regard, in the case of those banks which have already been sold, the authorities have imposed the condition that they remain listed in the local stock market. And even in the case of the financial institutions which have switched to foreign investors, and for which permission for exiting the local stock market has been granted, the move to exit the stock market has been halted. As for the financial obligation of the FIDF, there is now a clear solution to the problem. The Ministry of Finance will provide a guarantee for the FIDF bonds to the amount equivalent to the loss incurred by FIDF in the first year and for the estimated losses in the following years. The preliminary amount of the  2  BIS Review 6/2001  losses is currently estimated at B880 billion, with the first lot of government guaranteed FIDF bonds expected to be issued in the first quarter of next year.

The decision-making process now evolves around decision-making by a committee rather than relying on individuals as in the past. In some of the committees, well-qualified individuals from outside the Bank of Thailand have been invited to be members. Between each committee, emphasis has been put on the ability to communicate and exchange information. The change in this decision making process has resulted in the implementation of policies based on collective decision-making, accuracy and up to date information, most importantly, the co-ordination between the committees has helped reduce policy inconsistency. On monetary policy, following the change to a floating exchange rate system, there was a need for a new monetary policy framework. On this issue, the Bank of Thailand believes that the Inflation Targeting framework, which is being used today, is very appropriate to the present conditions and is well suited for Thai economic and monetary structures. Keeping inflation at a low level is an important pre-condition in maintaining economic stability of the country in the long run. Most importantly, under this framework, the Bank of Thailand must set clear monetary policy targets, be transparent in its decision-making, and accountable for its policies. The Bank of Thailand Monetary Policy Board announces its decision every six weeks, and so far has published two Inflation Reports. At present, the new monetary policy framework has been accepted at a certain level. More importantly, for it to be highly successful and efficient, the Bank of Thailand must be independent in implementing its policies.
In 2017, insurers and takaful operators issued 1.5 million cheques while 5.7 million were collected from customers. This is a huge number. Cheques are very costly, inefficient and obsolete. If the industry does not respond to these challenges, then others will. Over the past year, the Bank has allowed financial product aggregators to offer insurance and takaful products on a nonadvisory basis under the Regulatory Sandbox. These platforms allow consumers to easily compare and assess product offerings, thus increasing the visibility of insurance and takaful products and supporting our objective of digitalising insurance and takaful distribution. The Bank is close to finalising changes to the regulatory framework that will enable online product aggregators to operate with broad access to the insurance and takaful market by the end of this year. This is a game-changing initiative that will pave the way for a more contestable insurance and takaful market going forward, ultimately improving access and choice for consumers. For the industry, it offers the potential to open up new market segments that were previously untapped, particularly younger millennials, and lower the cost of bringing new products to the market. Third, the takaful industry has to have the right people with the right competence. Strong leadership and quality talent are needed to steer the industry forward to reach greater heights. Let us start from the top with each company’s leadership – shareholders, the board and senior management. For the industry to really break new ground, we need to consider a total reimagination of the takaful model.

The high demand for labour brought unemployment down to 4–5 per cent of trade union membership. In the period from 1917 to 1920 the annual rate of wage increases averaged about 25 per cent. In 1919 and 1920 the balance of trade showed massive deficits of about 5–6 per cent of GDP. Sweden’s inflationary economy elicited mounting criticism. Knut Wicksell, one of our best-known political economists, took an active part in pointing to the grave injustices that rising inflation caused by skewing contracts that had been concluded earlier. Something ought to be done, he said, but no serious efforts to stabilise the economy were actually made. The subsequent adjustment occurred suddenly and unexpectedly. When the international boom came to an end, demand slumped. From 1920 to 1922, manufacturing output in Sweden dropped about 1 40 per cent and GDP about 35 per cent. Unemployment shot up to 25 per cent. The Swedish economy went into a deflationary spiral. The price level fell about 35 per cent from 1920 to 1922. Wages also plummeted; for an industrial worker, for instance, the wage level fell more than 35 per cent in the course of about 18 months. Firms were caught in a vice, squeezed on all sides by steeply falling prices. As always, the firms that suffered most were those with inflated profits, over-valued assets and large misplaced investments. The abrupt plunge into a depression was followed by an equally sudden recovery.
The threat of relocation of jobs to other countries, increased inward labour migration and increased imports of goods and services may contribute to somewhat more moderate wage growth during this upturn. It is also possible that the experience of the period 1998-2002, with high wage growth and sharp fluctuations in the krone exchange rate and interest rates, is still marking wage settlements. At the same time, the situation with an ample labour supply may also be reversing. Sickness absence is now on the increase, and the number of persons on disability benefit is still rising steadily. Other countries still provide us with a source of labour, but the supply is not sufficient to offset the considerable flows into benefit schemes when viewing the economy as a whole. As expected, it appears that wage growth will be somewhat higher in 2006 than in 2005. Historical experience shows that it is difficult for the social partners at the local and centralised levels to restrain wage growth when unemployment is low. A characteristic of the wage formation process in Norway has been that fairly long periods of moderate nominal pay increases and rising employment have culminated in a sharp rise in cost inflation – often as a result of working hour reforms – and a decline in employment. Developments in labour costs and the wage settlements in 1974 and 1975, 1986 and 1987 and in the period between 1998 and 2002 triggered a subsequent decline in output and employment.

Monetary policy must then be oriented towards bringing inflation back to target over time while avoiding wide variations in output and employment. It takes time for interest rate changes to feed through to real economic variables, and it takes even somewhat longer for the changes to have a clear impact on inflation. How long it takes to reach the inflation target – and not least – the time deemed desirable for reaching the inflation target will depend on the nature of the disturbances to which economy is exposed. It may be appropriate to differentiate between supply-side disturbances and demand-side disturbances. If the economy is marked by weak demand, with low growth and low inflation, monetary policy should quite clearly be expansionary. This will stimulate both the level of activity and push up inflation. Inflation will then move towards the target and output will move towards potential output. By the same token, if there are pressures in the economy and inflation is high, a tighter monetary stance will restrain both activity and inflationary pressures. In such situations, it may be desirable to bring inflation back to target quickly. There is no conflict of objectives. Low inflation in Norway is not the result of declining demand, activity or employment, but is rather a result of favourable developments on the supply side both in the Norwegian and international economy.
If this is confirmed, as I think probable, the overall picture is of an economy expanding around or a little above its potential rate of growth. The combination of lower rates of productivity and labour force growth mean that potential is growing at around 1.5% about a percentage point below its pre-crisis rate. 9  Trying to make very precise forecasts of the output gap is a fool’s errand but the balance of evidence is there appears to be little slack left in the labour market and little spare capacity in firms. Unemployment is at 4.2% – pretty much the MPC’s revised estimate of the natural rate. Underemployment is low. 10  Non-price measures – for example, surveys of recruitment difficulties and measures of churn in the  labour market – have been signalling increasing labour market tightness for a number of years. 11  Whole economy regular pay growth reached 2.5% in December and has stayed above that level through the first few months of 2018 though there has been a slight slowing in the latest – April – data (from 2.9% in March to 2.8% in April). The higher frequency measure of pay growth, 3 month on 3 month growth, has been above 2.5% for 11 months between last May and March this year – the longest run of such consistent wage growth since the crisis (Chart 7).

This development has been supported by the development of the derivatives market, in which Pension Funds have been key counterparts as well. Banking regulation, in turn, have result in limited currency mismatches at the bank level, which have made the introduction of new regulation to deal with FX risk unnecessary, as we have observed in many emerging market economies after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). While may be true that other emerging economies have been increasingly active in the implementation of CBM in their banking systems, in Chile, we have followed a different approach to deal with FX risk at the banking level. This approach has been mainly characterized by limiting banks’ direct FX-currency exposure (limited currency mismatches) as part of our overall capital requirements for market risk purposes. Also, by acknowledging the potential indirect FX risk through the credit provisioning requirements. In fact, in Chile, the main regulatory changes introduced has been the recent modification of the General Banking Law (GBL), which constitutes a major step forward for the local banking industry, in that it will contribute to reducing the gap with international regulatory standards established under Basel III. The new regulatory  Page 2 of 12  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  framework raises important challenges for the industry in terms of compliance with the new, more demanding solvency requirements, especially for entities with a smaller capital cushion. High-level Policy Seminar on Integration or Fragmentation?
The regulation should allow for a wide range of banks and other financial institutions conducting their activities on a level playing field. The degree of regulation and supervision should be commensurate to the size, nature and complexity of their activities. I wish you luck in your endeavours to reform your banking and financial services industry. As you know, you may call on the IMF to assist you with advice or TA for capacity building or for other purposes. BIS Review 104/2006  7

Likewise, some of our new instruments could be more efficient to address financial stability concerns. For instance, under some dimensions, balancesheet policies differ markedly from interest-rate policies. By providing valuable safe assets to banks – central bank reserves – a high level of central bank reserves can support their smooth functioning. Even more importantly, it can mitigate the risk that banks will try to supply the demand for safe assets by engineering them themselves. Privately issued safe assets are poor substitutes for public safe assets. xiv b/ Keeping the purchase of private assets to a minimum In any case – and this is my second remark – the purchase of private assets by the central bank should be kept to a minimum. Indeed, the asset-side of the balance-sheet – what assets the central bank buys with the reserves it issues – matters a lot. Buying an excessive amount of private assets such as corporate bonds could run the risk of distorting the signal that asset prices convey on the assets’ riskiness. The present compression of risk premia and credit spreads might already increase risks to financial stability. **  Page 9 sur 11 Conclusion I have restricted my remarks on financial stability to the policies that fall, at least in part, within the realm of a central bank. However, as I have emphasized earlier, monetary and prudential policies are not the only policies available.