samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It endorsed the account I have read from the Approach Document, but added one important further condition, namely that we do not wish to see non-EEA branches undertaking critical retail banking functions (like taking deposits) beyond de minimis levels unless there is some good reason and importantly there is a very high level of assurance on resolution. In particular, we think that new non-EEA branches should stick to straightforward wholesale banking, of the type that supports world trade and capital flows. Resolution will be a key deciding factor in the PRA’s judgements, and it is thus where we will place emphasis when forming a view on our risk appetite towards branches operating in the UK. We will therefore expect assurance from the home state regulator over the recovery and resolution plans and assess if the plans adequately cover the UK branch’s activities. For banks with small UK activities we will expect to gain a level of assurance that is relative to the scale of the UK activities. The PRA’s policy towards branches is part of our general approach set out in the light of the experience of the crisis. It places emphasis on recovery and resolution, and we will expect very clear and credible assurances from the parents of banks wishing to operate as branches and from the home state authorities.

During 2004, Albania’s balance of payments recorded a flow of financial assets and capitals of about 1.5 times higher than the previous year. The rise of inflows in the financial account and the non-deepening of current deficit brought about the increase of foreign reserves by about USD 290 million over 2004. Albania’s foreign reserve is sufficient to cover about 5.2 months of imports of goods and services. 4  Government debt including other sectors debt guaranteed by Government. BIS Review 38/2005  3  Notwithstanding the positive developments of the recent years, the economic growth and the macroeconomic stability of the country are two parameters, which, according to our consideration, cannot and should be considered as issues already accomplished. The high trade deficit requires the ability to find stable long-term coverage resources, especially to promote foreign direct investments, which will raise the productive capacities of the Albanian economy. A major interest should be given particularly to the sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Fiscal policy must continue to conserve its positive contribution in the consolidation of the macroeconomic stability, a contribution being expressed in the reduction of budget deficit, in the increase of income and in the establishment of priorities according to the National Strategy for the Socio-economic Development, in the performance of budget expenses.
Both are likely to have day to day information which is relevant in a crisis, and both will also have control of tools which can be used to handle the problem. At the same time, the number of participants would probably need to be smaller than in a regulatory college if these group are to be effective. To remain focused, the core group might perhaps need to be limited to authorities from two or three countries each, rather than wider groups. And selectivity, flexibility and pragmatism would be absolutely key. I am not advocating, for example, that we form a group for every firm that includes all authorities in every jurisdiction where that firm has a presence. Instead, that we use a risk-based approach to concentrate on those authorities with a mutual interest, identify the specific firms and capital markets that that mutual interest might cover, and bring together those relevant authorities to discuss those firms and the capital markets they interact in. Indeed, some countries’ authorities have already met bilaterally or in small groups to discuss crisis management topics of particular mutual interest. There are a number of practical aspects of crisis management that these interest groups could enhance. First, co-ordination in a crisis. This, alongside information-sharing, is the area that has received most generic attention at the cross-border level.

Meanwhile, in the words of the Socrates, the Greek philosopher, “all wars are fought for money”. We heard some good examples that illustrate this relation in last year’s conference. We heard from Prof. Picard about King Monunius, who is known thanks to the respective coin. He had it minted for the sole purpose of raising a strong army, convinced that his might rested with the army. From Prof. Egro, we learned that Mahmut Pashë Bushatlliu and Ali Pashë Tepelena tried to introduce their coins and banknotes, independently from the Ottoman Empire, not for financial purposes but as a token of rebellion or an attempt to break away from the Empire. Later on, in WW1, we see the banknotes of the Republic of Korça, which are a rare phenomenon not only in terms of numismatics, but also a materialisation of the early issues as a result of the war, after the formation of the Albanian state. During WW2, the Albanian currency underwent radical changes. On its obverse and reverse we no longer see King Zog. Instead, Victor Emanuel III is featured and the most significant change is that the Albanian franc was officially pegged to the fate of the Italian lira. We will have the opportunity to hear, during the day, other interesting and important examples in the monetary and economic history of Albania.
When the new regime with a floating exchange rate and inflation target was introduced in the beginning of the 1990s, it entailed new macroeconomic conditions for collective bargaining agreements. During the 1970 and 1980s, inflation averaged around 8 per cent and real wage growth was almost non-existent. The slowdown in inflation coupled with a relatively stable rate of increase in nominal wages meant that real wages rose sharply between 1995 and 2004, see Table 1.3 Not since the 1960s has there been such a long period of regular real wage increases. In 2004, around 450 collective bargaining agreements were concluded for some 2 million employees, most of them spanning three years. This year, approximately 70 collective bargaining agreements will be signed for just over 1.3 million employees. Municipalities and county councils account for 1.1 million of these, and an agreement covering just over two years has already been concluded for them. Recently, agreements have been signed for some 75 000 workers in the construction sector and about 60 000 employees in banking and insurance. The latter group received more than what has become the norm in the current agreement period. Worth noting is that almost the entire economy has an agreement period that runs up to some time in the middle of 2007.

Moreover, our current account surplus essentially means that we are exporting capital on a large scale; in somewhat more extreme terms, you could say that the jobs being created by our growth are largely ending up outside Sweden's borders. So the low employment growth does not appear primarily to be a result of weak demand. Instead, the explanation must be sought among longer-term structural factors. This is reflected in particular by the fact that the employment rate, in spite of historically high economic growth, has not completely recovered since its sharp fall in connection with the crisis in the early 1990s. Moreover, the fact that open unemployment did not drop more during the economic upswing in the 1990s suggests that the labour market is not functioning satisfactorily. One example of rigidities in the labour market is that unemployment has remained around 8 per cent in the construction sector,  6  BIS Review 84/2005  even though it is one of the few sectors where activity has risen and labour shortages have begun to appear. Another sign that the unemployment problems are structural in nature is the large differences across regions and occupational categories. In spite of a single monetary policy for the whole of the Swedish economy, unemployment figures in some regions are twice as high as in others, while the proportion of people receiving benefit from their unemployment fund is twice as high in some occupational categories as in others.
This combination of measures has contributed to a stabilisation in the financial environment and an improvement in the transmission of our monetary policy. We need to carefully monitor further developments. It is also important to keep in mind that all our non-standard monetary policy measures are temporary in nature and that all the necessary tools are available to address upside risks to medium-term price stability in a firm and timely manner. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Real GDP contracted by 0.3% in the euro area in the fourth quarter of 2011. Survey data confirm a stabilisation in economic activity at a low level in early 2012. We continue to expect the euro area economy to recover gradually in the course of the year. The outlook for economic activity should be supported by foreign demand, the very low short-term interest rates in the euro area, and all the measures taken to foster the proper functioning of the euro area economy. However, the remaining tensions in euro area sovereign debt markets and their impact on credit conditions, as well as the process of balance sheet adjustment in the financial and non-financial sectors and high unemployment in parts of the euro area, are expected to continue to dampen the underlying growth momentum. Downside risks to the economic outlook prevail. They relate in particular to a renewed intensification of tensions in euro area debt markets and their potential spillover to the euro area real economy.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  7. Here, it is worth noting that the three prerequisites for sustainable and equitable growth should be properly addressed. They are (1) social inclusion, (2) ecology and, (3) the stability of financial system. Any kind of disruption in any of these fundamentals can jeopardize sustainable and equitable growth. Thus, today, lessons that will be drawn from the development experiences of Thailand shall be focused on these three fundamentals. 8. Firstly, with regard to social inclusion, one obvious consideration is how to create opportunities for everyone to contribute to and benefit from economic growth. Therefore, we need to take into account the principle of equality of opportunity when planning and implementing the process of economic development. 9. To follow the principle of equality of opportunity, we need to ensure unbiased governance and regulatory environment for businesses and people. This is to remove or reduce arbitrary restrictions and to create “competitive neutrality”. A level playing field is the first and foremost step for the prevention of income inequality. 10. Although a fair playing field is important, it is, in itself, not enough to uphold the principle of equality of opportunity. By realizing that everyone is endowed with different capacity as well as is in different social and economic contexts, supportive policy adapted for each social group is needed. For instance, as in the case of Thailand, researches indicate that broadening financial access and promoting financial literacy has significantly raised the country’s growth rate.
This approach has proven to be successful and critical in instilling public confidence in the Shariah integrity of the industry. Whilst enacting a separate governing law avoids the trap of confining the scope and operation of Islamic finance within the mould of conventional finance, this approach has proven in Malaysia to be the most efficient way possible to regulate Islamic finance. Recently, Malaysia has undertaken the initiative to establish a Law Harmonisation Committee with the main objectives to review existing Malaysian laws which are applicable to Islamic financial transactions and to propose necessary amendments to give legal recognition to Islamic financial transactions under the law. The mandate of the Committee extends beyond those that are regulatory in nature to include all laws relevant to execute the whole chain of Islamic finance practices. The desired outcome of the Committee’s work is the creation of laws that are facilitative, contemporary, and easily enforceable. Another objective is to provide facilitative legal framework for the Islamic finance industry and develop Malaysian laws as the law of choice for international Islamic financial transactions. This initiative is consistent with our continuous effort to foster an efficient, innovative and competitive Islamic financial system, given the more globalised and liberal operating environment within which Islamic finance will operate. The consideration for evolving the legal framework in Islamic finance would not be complete without extending due regard to the robustness of Shariah governance framework. This is inevitable given that Islamic finance has its roots in Shariah.

In the long run, monetary policy can deliver price stability, and in the short run it can also mitigate the effects of shocks and reduce fluctuations in output and employment. But monetary policy cannot have a long-term impact on the real exchange rate. As such, it can do little to mitigate the crowding-out effect of strong growth in a new export sector. If it tried to, the effect would be only temporary, and it would come at the expense of sacrificing the objectives with which monetary policy has been entrusted – objectives that it can achieve. Industrial and fiscal policies can have such a real impact over the long term, however, and it is to them that concerned parties should turn. 9  But it is possible to choose from among various options on the spectrum between a rigid peg and a free-floating exchange rate. And it is possible to adopt another currency, either unilaterally or in bilateral or multilateral cooperation. These were the options explored in the Central Bank’s 2012 report. 4 The conclusion was that a unilateral peg with unrestricted capital flows could run aground, as it did in so many economies after capital movements were liberalised further in the 1980s and 1990s. A firmer peg such as a currency board could pose risks to financial stability, and the same was considered true of unilateral adoption of another currency. It was deemed highly uncertain – and actually unlikely – that bilateral adoption of another currency would be on offer anywhere.
Of equal importance is also to integrate the domestic Islamic financial system with the international financial system. For more than two decades, we have witnessed the success of the development of each of these respective components that has contributed to the rapid expansion in Malaysia's Islamic financial services industry. Indeed, we have seen the development of a comprehensive Islamic financial system. This has placed the Malaysian Islamic financial system at the forefront of the global Islamic financial system. Notwithstanding this, there have been imbalances in the pace of the growth of the components of the financial system. While Islamic banking, being the core component, has recorded significant progress, more efforts need to be directed to promote the growth of takaful and the financial markets. My remarks today will focus on measures to accelerate the growth of the Islamic financial markets by strengthening its required linkages. Of most importance is the development of a wider range of Islamic financial instruments, developing the relevant indicators to support benchmarking and an efficient pricing mechanism as well as to actively promote the role of the market players. Development of a wider range of Islamic financial instruments For Islamic financial institutions to effectively manage its funds, there is a need to have diversity in the type and the maturity of the Islamic financial instruments. This is one area in Islamic finance that offers formidable challenges and opportunities to market participants in Malaysia. A broader range of products and services is vital in this fast changing global financial landscape.

In today's marketplace, there are only a number of Islamic financial instruments that have been developed to cater for this need which for the most part constitutes straight private and government Islamic papers. In a bid to deepen and broaden the Islamic bond market, the government has been regularly issuing Islamic and conventional securities with different maturities, enabling the creation of a benchmark yield curve. This was further enhanced with the introduction of an Auction Calender in the year 2000. In the 2000, Government Investment Issues or GIIs were introduced, followed by Islamic negotiable notes, private debt securities, Treasury Bills and sukuk. Furthermore, following the amendment to the Government Investment Act in year 2005, the Government has started issuing shorter-term Islamic Treasury Bills and longer-term sukuk or Islamic bonds with a maturity of 10 years in order to further diversify the Islamic financial instruments available for investors. Under the Act, the Government is able to issue Islamic instruments under various Shariah principles and for different tenures; short and long term, to  BIS Review 49/2005  1  meet the varying needs of investors. Islamic private debt securities (PDS) too have been fast growing in importance and size, accounting for 50% of the total PDS market in 2004. Despite these developments, there has been an inadequate supply of short-term Islamic instruments thereby providing less flexibility to the institutions in managing their asset and liability profiles.
What will be traded in an EMU environment? How much will be traded? And where will the new instruments be traded? Let me take these points in turn. What will be traded when the euro makes its debut? BIS Review 67/1997  -4-  Looking first at on-exchange markets, it seems likely that, in EMU, there will be room for only one three-month euro short-term interest rate futures contract, although the greater depth of the new euro market may allow other products at the short end of the yield curve, such as a one-month euro contract, to co-exist with the three-month benchmark product. In the bond markets, one - and perhaps the most likely outcome - is that a particular government’s bonds will become the benchmark for the new euro bond market. We may all speculate idly on which that country might be. These issues would then anchor the euro yield curve and futures contracts would follow naturally. The greater depth of the new euro bond market may well mean that it can support a greater range of futures contracts further along its yield curve, as is the case now in the US. Five and two-year contracts, which do already exist in the Bund market, may develop further. The exchanges themselves recognise this point and are seeking to fill in the yield curve in their various markets before the start of EMU. Other national bond markets will be keen to run alongside the main market and futures contracts on those markets may also exist.

2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
The features of the new logo, which are orange - representing passion for people and the drive for excellence, white - representing commitment to integrity and professionalism, and the squares - representing stability and dependability, are all symbols of the bank’s commitment to growth, prudent and efficient service delivery to our country, as well as customer care. Mr Chairman, since the Guaranty Trust Bank (SL) Limited commenced operations in January 2002 after the successful take over of the First Merchant Bank PLC Nigeria, it has consistently improved its performance and expanded its operations in the country; notably with the establishment of three branches. As at 31st May 2006, Guaranty Trust Bank’s total assets amounted to Le47.05 billion and shareholders’ funds stood at Le5.84 billion. Loans granted to various sectors of the economy have also gone up to Le9.16 billion. All of these are significant and commendable achievements in a short time. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, over the last couple of years, the bank has committed itself to the provision of efficient banking services to the people of Sierra Leone. It has introduced among other things, money gram money transfer, which is one of the fastest means of transferring money into and out of Sierra Leone, and has also introduced mobile banking services. This last development has given its customers the opportunity to access and initiate transactions on their accounts from anywhere and at any time of the day.

Of course the three regulators, BoZ, PIA, and SEC have also done their bit by seconding personnel to the FSDP Secretariat and taking responsibility for the financial obligations entailed. I want to thank all of them for their commitment and dedication. It is now my singular honour and privilege to call upon the Deputy Minister of Finance, Honourable Miles Sampa, MP to formally launch the National Strategy on Financial Education for Zambia. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
For instance, as late as last summer it became possible in Germany to shop after 6 p.m. on weekdays and on Saturday afternoons. However, it is still almost impossible to find a shopping centre in Berlin or Frankfurt that is open on Sundays, a day that ought to be very suitable for retail trade since customers are usually not at work then. So a continued modernisation of working-hour laws could contribute to further improving efficiency in the German economy. Another area is the costs associated with downsizing. European firms are in many cases obliged to pay for laid-off employees a long time after their employment has finished. This may make the labour market less efficient in downturns, as firms often try to retain existing staff instead of implementing costly cutbacks. The situation can become particularly serious if the downturn turns out be longer or deeper than firms initially fear, since cutbacks during the economic downturn risk aggravating the decline. In this respect, the euro area and Sweden are at a disadvantage compared with the UK and the US, where the labour market responds much quicker to changes in economic conditions. Labour market legislation can therefore also be significant for the economic cycle. Firms that are forced to retain a larger workforce than they have use for during a downturn will not be as financially well prepared to meet a future upswing. We can see signs today of how this is having an adverse effect on the European economic recovery.

International standards explicitly call on payment systems to settle in central bank money when possible and where that’s not possible, to settle in commercial bank money and to strictly limit any credit and liquidity risk of the instrument being transferred and settled. However stablecoin arrangements propose to transfer new instruments that they will create themselves – and to settle most of their transactions across their own books. With the right regulation, stablecoins may be safe for use in systemic payments chains. But the protections these stablecoins would offer are currently big question marks. Some major stablecoin proposals offer no legal claim for holders. None. This is significantly different from how we currently pay: When my parents pay for their groceries using their debit card, the shop ultimately receives an electronic deposit in the shop’s bank account - a promise from the shop’s bank to redeem the amount deposited in local currency on demand. When – pre-COVID – my parents paid in cash, the shop got banknotes with a central bank promise to “pay the bearer.” Were they to pay in the future with some proposed stablecoins, the shop would just get a bunch of stablecoins. If the shop can’t sell the stablecoin to get local currency or other goods in an amount equivalent to the price of the grocery order, tough luck. Additionally many stablecoins propose backing in instruments that may have market and liquidity risk. While these risks might be acceptable for speculative investment purposes, payments are different.