samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I welcome the proposal to strengthen the role of CBIs. It would reinforce coordinated supervision, while reflecting the responsibilities of the ECB – as a CBI – within the supervisory framework. The role of the central bank of issue Background and rationale for the ECB recommendation However, although EU legislators can incorporate a role for CBIs into the processes for supervising CCPs, the regulation cannot go so far as to confer on the ECB the sort of binding instruments this enhanced role requires, which the ECB thought it had until challenged in court by the United Kingdom. In 2015, the General Court held that the ECB does not have the competence to regulate the activity of securities clearing systems, including CCPs. Moreover, the Court stated that the ECB would need to request an amendment to Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, which already enables the ECB to make regulations for clearing and payment systems, if it considers this necessary for the proper performance of its tasks under the Treaties2. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  The ECB’s Governing Council therefore unanimously adopted a recommendation to amend Article 223 to extend it to cover derivatives, give legal effect to the ECB’s role under EMIR, and give the ECB the flexibility and autonomy to act outside EMIR where clearing would pose a severe threat to the stability of the euro. Amending Article 22 of the Statute – procedure Let me briefly explain the procedure for amending the Statute.

4  Note that this only requires consumers to wish to smooth their spending over time, not that they internalise the implications for future taxes of more government borrowing (so-called “Ricardian equivalence”).
The latest (2004) estimate is that growth was actually 4% a long way above trend. As Robin Leigh-Pemberton, then Governor of the Bank of England, said “we put the brakes on when the speedometer indicated we were doing 60mph. Some time later it was revealed we were doing 55. When the tachograph was opened, however, it revealed that we had actually been doing 70, when the speedometer read 60… more brake pressure was therefore entirely appropriate.” This episode marked a low point for the UK’s GDP statistics in recent times. Since then, a number of methodological changes have been introduced, and data sources have been improved. Analysis both by the ONS and the Statistics Commission indicates a dramatic reduction in the average size of revisions over the past fifteen years. Even so, measuring the economy remains a complex task, and data uncertainty is a fact of life. So what does the MPC do to ensure its judgements are as firmly grounded in reality as possible? We have a four pronged approach: •  We monitor a very wide range of data  •  We pay careful attention to data quality  •  We talk to business people around the country  BIS Review 71/2004  3  •  We are working closely with ONS to transform the quality of official statistics  Monitoring a wide array of indicators First, we critically review an enormous quantity of data.

To that end, I welcome the Government's 2023 Green Finance StrategyOpens in a new window. It includes a huge number of measures, but I was especially pleased to see commitments that will create the required cross-economy infrastructure for financing – including sector investment plans, an industry-led Transition Finance Market Review, and a Net Zero Business and Investment Group to advise government on the needs of the private sector to mobilise capital. Turning aspiration into action The reason I have spent some time on these four areas is not just because a lot has happened. It is because it is important to recognise the progress we have seen. 3/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  But have we reached a tipping point where firms' capabilities and understanding of the opportunities and risks from transition are driving strategic decision-making? Well here is the reality check. The shift I had hoped to see in stronger linkages between climate change and strategic decision making across the economy have proved harder to deliver in practice. Why is that? Undoubtedly, those headwinds of the last three years and for which we have no recent precedent have reduced our collective ability to take action. This is undeniably unfortunate – but it is a legitimate rationale. Indeed, against this backdrop we have perhaps seen more progress than might have been expected. But we cannot get away from the fact that regardless of this legitimacy, climate risks continue to build and still need to be addressed.
Steps were taken in order to remove distortions in the Turkish economy, to renew the financial system and to change the dynamics of the economy with the purpose of achieving price stability, sustainable public finances and sustainable growth in the long run. First of all, right after the 2001 crisis, economic policies aimed, in the short run, at maintaining financial stability and convincing market participants that sound macroeconomic policies would be put into practice with determination in order to solve the problems of the economy. In my opinion, the most critical change that came after the 2001 crisis was the amendment to the Central Bank Law. The Central Bank of Turkey has been given independence after a period of 30 years of high and chronic inflation. The primary objective of the Bank is now defined as achieving and maintaining price stability. It was a turning point in the economy and highly contributed to the changing dynamics in the Turkish financial system. In addition, it is now explicitly indicated in its law that financial stability is the Central Bank’s auxiliary objective, and the Bank gives utmost importance to maintain it. In the fourth article of the Law, the Bank’s responsibility of financial stability is defined within the framework of the functions of central banks that I mentioned before.

At the same time, productivity in Sweden has not increased as quickly as in other countries. The development of unit labour costs reflects the difference between wage increases and growth in productivity. Unit labour costs, measured in the respective currencies, are shown in the column on the far right of the table. Sweden is here on the same level as Germany, but higher than the euro area as a whole and also higher than the OECD aggregate. Inflation towards the target – in an orderly manner Let me round off. One main purpose of my speech is to show how important the inflation target has been as a benchmark for price-setting and wage formation in Sweden. It is an important task for the Riksbank to create confidence in the inflation target. This is why we are worried over the current low inflation rate. The Riksbank wishes to safeguard the inflation target. We can do this by formulating monetary policy so that the current low inflation rate rises towards the target. During the spring we have therefore cut the policy rate further on two occasions and moreover decided to buy government bonds. We are prepared to do more than this if it proves necessary. At the same time, it is important that the journey back towards the inflation target is a smooth one and does not pose any threat to production and employment. We are now on the verge of very extensive wage bargaining rounds.
For 2012, the inflation rate will amount to –0.7%. For 2013, we expect inflation of –0.1% and for 2014, 0.4%. In the foreseeable future, therefore, there is no risk of inflation in Switzerland. The third quarter of 2012 saw weak growth and a decline in trading activity worldwide. Although growth in the US economy and some of the emerging economies picked up, a mild recession persisted in the euro area. In Switzerland, real GDP in the third quarter increased again following a temporary downturn. For the fourth quarter, however, we expect significant weakening in growth. Consequently, economic growth in Switzerland for the year 2012 is likely to remain unchanged at around 1.0%. For 2013, we expect growth of 1.0–1.5%. The downside risks for the Swiss economy remain considerable. Although the measures announced by the European Central Bank (ECB) have significantly reduced the probability of extreme developments in the monetary union, there is still substantial uncertainty in connection with the management of the debt crisis in the euro area. It also remains to be seen how far the upcoming budget consolidation in the US will hamper growth. This question is weighing on the sentiment in the financial markets and the real economy. Moreover, momentum in the Swiss residential mortgage and real estate markets remains strong, and has led to a further increase in risks for financial stability. Global economic outlook I would now like to outline the outlook for the global economy and Switzerland in more detail.

The Fed’s changed operating framework In recent years, like many other central banks around the world in the face of the Great Recession and the prolonged economic recovery that has followed, the Fed adopted unconventional measures to provide monetary policy accommodation in pursuit of its macroeconomic policy objectives. This is reflected in changes in the Fed’s operating framework and the FOMC’s operating objective for OMOs. For many decades prior to the crisis, the operating objective for OMOs was expressed as a target for the federal funds rate – an overnight, unsecured rate in the market for reserve balances. The target rate was achieved through permanent and temporary OMOs that sought to adjust the supply of reserve balances in the banking system to a level that was expected to equal the estimated level of demand for reserve balances at the FOMC’s target rate. The Desk’s permanent additions to the supply of reserve balances were designed to fall somewhat short of the total demand, creating a “structural deficiency” in the supply of reserves. The Desk then conducted daily fine-tuning operations to temporarily add reserve balances to get to the desired level. These daily operations represented a marginal adjustment to the aggregate supply of reserves, largely in response to the exogenous impact of transitory changes in other Fed liabilities such as currency in circulation and the level of the U.S. Treasury’s account balance at the Fed.
This was evident from Sweden’s history of uncertainty about government finances and high inflation were Sweden to choose the outsider alternative on the grounds of the insurance argument, this could be perceived as a signal that Sweden’s economic policy would again become accommodating. This risk was also mentioned in the report. The Riksbank fully agreed, on the other hand, that unemployment is a serious problem in the Swedish economy. But we did not consider that this problem could be resolved by remaining outside the monetary union. As the report had indeed pointed out, other measures were needed to improve the workings of the labour market and wage formation. The Riksbank underscored that the necessary structural measures for the labour market would be easier to implement if we had established the credibility of an economic policy for sustainable growth. Does the stronger economy warrant different conclusions? In the light of all that has happened in the past two or three years, the assessments presented in the report and by the Riksbank should perhaps be modulated. The case for an insurance policy and freedom of action was argued at a time when public finances were weak and unemployment was still at a record level. The measures of economic policy had admittedly begun to build up public confidence in a more stable future after the profound crisis in the early 1990s but the outlook was still uncertain. Today the situation is better, with a central government budget surplus and high ambitions for fiscal policy.

Successful organizations depend on "open doors" to maintain transparency and build trust. But what will "open doors" mean to people in future digital work environments? How will the culture of a workplace change if we don't see each other face-to-face as often? In particular, how will we effectively train and mentor junior employees? Finally, current events demand that we be honest about the times we have not lived up to our own standards of equal justice under law and equal opportunity in our economy. Each of us needs to question our role in allowing systemic racism to persist. Our colleagues, stakeholders, and the public in general will ask how we will do better in the near term and the long term—and then they will hold us to it. Thank you for your kind attention, and thank you again to the Union of Arab Banks for hosting this discussion. 1 Lisa Kraidin, Thomas M. Noone, Sean O'Malley, and summer intern Gabe Rosen contributed to the preparation of these remarks. 2 Board of Governors, "Federal Reserve announces extensive new measures to support the economy," Press release (Mar. 23, 2020). 3 Federal Open Market Committee Statement (Mar. 15, 2020). 4 See supra n.2. See also Nicola Cetorelli, Linda S. Goldberg, and Fabiola Ravazzolo, "How Fed Swap Lines Supported U.S. Corporate Credit Market amid COVID-19 Strains,"  Liberty Street Economics (June 12, 2020). 5 "Agencies encourage financial institutions to meet financial needs of customers and members affected by coronavirus," Joint press release (Mar. 9, 2020).
However, we now have new data on which to base our decisions and new opportunities for communicating them. Conclusion Let me try to summarise my message here. I believe that most people agree that inflation-targeting has worked well on the whole. We know that since inflation-targeting was introduced, Sweden has gone from being a high-inflation economy to an economy with low inflation and stable wage increases. The lower inflation rate has not led to weaker output growth; GDP growth has on average been higher under the new regime. It also appears that, if anything, the real stability of the economy has improved. Nevertheless, there is always good reason to consider how monetary policy can be developed and improved. To this end, I have discussed how the Riksbank’s monetary policy work can be developed. This has included what could be termed technical improvements; for instance, greater use of other assumptions than an unchanged repo rate and an extended forecast horizon when producing and presenting data. The advantage of using, for example, implied forward rates as a basis is that they can often be a more realistic assumption than an unchanged interest rate. This can in turn allow more and better alternative scenarios, which can illustrate different aspects of monetary policy including the consequences for inflation and resource utilisation over a longer time horizon. It has also included the Riksbank’s communication. Working with a longer time horizon provides a better overview of the effects of temporary influences on inflation.

If we start with the date that was set in the original decision – the beginning of 1995 – CPI inflation up to today has averaged 1.4 per cent. If we instead go back to January 1993, when the new policy was announced, the same figure is 1.7 per cent. If we focus on UND1X, the underlying measure that guided policy especially in recent years but also during a large part of the period 1996-1999, the corresponding figures are 1.8 and 2.0 per cent, respectively (see Figure 1). 2  BIS Review 11/2005  Whether this constitutes a good result or not is open to discussion, of course. Allow me here to simply say that when the target was adopted, and as an observer outside the Bank, I thought like many others that it would be very difficult to bring inflation down sustainably to a level around 2 per cent. What is particularly interesting in this context is that it has proved possible to establish a regime with a low inflation rate, close to the target, and to combine it with firm economic growth, which over these years has averaged almost 3 per cent a year, compared with about 2 per cent during the two previous decades. If anything, economic growth also appears to have become more stable since the inflation target was introduced.2 Another way to assess policy is to study whether we have acted in the way that we say we will, i.e. followed our policy rule.
Ardian Fullani: The development of the financial market and money market in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the General Assembly of the Dealers Association, Tirana, 25 October 2007. *  *  *  Mr. Chairman Distinguished Guests, It is a great pleasure to be here amongst old and new friends and colleagues. I have dearly welcomed the reorganization and reactivation of the Albanian Association of Dealers, and the attempts made by its new board to affiliate ACI-Financial Market Association. I am confident that this reactivation will promote, above all, the market development, education and professional training of new members. I deem that the meetings of the Dealers Association is a good opportunity to share with you some thoughts and concerns regarding the development of the Albanian financial market in general and the money market in particular. I would like to emphasize that the interbank money market is the starting point to the transmission mechanism, driven by base interest rate change. Currently it is the most important channel of transmitting monetary policy decisions to the economy. I have to remind you that where you realize the profit, the Bank of Albania implements the monetary policy, whose efficiency depends directly on your capability to maximize profit in this market. This policy is based on the assumption that market participants are rational and their primary purpose is profit maximization under the conditions of a competitive environment.

One specific concern that some have expressed about Basel II’s applicability in emerging markets is that banks with more basic risk management systems will rely on external credit ratings issued by rating agencies under Basel II’s standardised approach to credit risk. In some emerging markets, there may still be few, if any, rated companies. The Committee has been mindful of this concern. If supervisors are uncomfortable with the use of external ratings in their countries, they may opt to weight all corporate claims at 100%, while sovereigns and banks can be risk weighted according to the risk scores of export credit agencies. This eliminates the dependence on ratings issued by external credit agencies. Indeed, our discussions with colleagues and counterparts from countries outside the Committee, including India, as I mentioned, have been instrumental in addressing other concerns in the capital framework. Thanks to our consultations, we have endeavoured to address several other broad issues in the new framework, including the document’s apparent complexity and the consistency of its application internationally, which I will set out now. Complexity One inevitable by-product of designing a comprehensive three-pillar framework with a range of options for different circumstances is increased complexity. The members of the Basel Committee certainly recognise that it is far easier to enforce a simple rule than a complicated one.
In banking, and given the crucial role this sector has still to play, we supervisory authorities have continued to stress that the use of capital buffers by banks is appropriate for recognising credit impairment and to continue providing solvent credit to households and firms. Banks will have sufficient time to comply once more with their capital requirements, and the start of the process will never be before the main effects of the pandemic have dissipated. In parallel, given the uncertainty still in place, and the fact that the impact of the pandemic has not been fully manifest on bank balance sheets and that they continue to benefit from various public support measures, we have recommended that banks act with extreme prudence in dividend distribution policies. In tandem, banks must pursue a policy of early recognition of impairment losses, ensuring that this is appropriate and timely, as stipulated in supervisory guidelines. Fiscal policy support in this phase should focus on the firms and population groups most affected. One particularly important aspect is the support to viable firms which, in light of the scale and duration of the crisis, have seen their solvency worsen. Should such solvency problems materialise, they would not only prompt destruction of the productive system and employment, in firms that could be viable in the post-pandemic scenario; they might also ultimately affect the financial position of the banking sector, which might respond with lending restrictions that would feed back negatively into the prospect of recovery and economic growth in the medium term.

29.03.2021  The Spanish economy and the COVID-19 crisis: assessment, outlook and challenges Europa Press informative breakfast Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  *English translation of the original speech in Spanish  Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to thank the organisers of this event for their kind invitation. I shall begin with a brief assessment of the period since the COVID-19 crisis broke. I shall then set out the Banco de España’s view on the outlook for the Spanish economy. Finally, I shall describe the medium-term economic policy challenges at the national and European level. Taking stock of a year of pandemic: an unprecedented, persistent and uneven impact COVID-19 has caused a global economic recession of an intensity which, in most geographical areas, is unprecedented. The crisis is, moreover, proving very persistent: as of today the pre-pandemic levels of activity have not yet resumed in most countries. Indeed, the successive waves of the pandemic have checked the recovery, particularly in the sectors most exposed to the restrictions. In Spain, this impact is particularly marked. GDP declined by 10.8% in 2020 as a whole, a slump appreciably greater than that in the euro area (-6.8%). At end-2020, Spanish GDP was still 8.9% below its pre-pandemic level, while this gap was 4.9 percentage points (pp) in the euro area. Several reasons account for this more pronounced impact in our country. One was the greater intensity of the pandemic initially, which led to harsher containment measures in spring last year.