samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, we will evaluate its possible extension and changes in access parameters to facilitate their use to respond to the needs of the economy at this stage. As always, the CBC will remain on the alert for financial stability risks, acting promptly and decisively with the instruments at its disposal whenever required. For the time being, the entry into force of the law that allowed a second withdrawal of pension savings will involve a significant liquidation of assets by the administrators of these funds. An orderly liquidation is crucial to preserve the stability of the financial markets and the efficiency of the price formation process, which is why we have established several measures. Among them are the reopening of the special programs of CC-VP and Term Deposit Purchase Program. These measures have preset caps and a limited duration, the same that were used for the first withdrawal. The macroeconomic scenario continues to show more uncertainty than usual, so projections are highly conditional on the evolution of the pandemic and its effects on the income of businesses and individuals. There are scenarios where the evolution of the national economy could deviate from our forecasts. The risk Page 5 of 19  of a significant increase in infections remains fully valid and could have important economic effects if it becomes necessary to re-impose stricter sanitary measures. In the medium term, this scenario is not as severe, given the advances in the development of a vaccine.

Allow me to recapitulate the consequences in a few words: various banks, stock brokerage firms and securities houses lost part or even all of their staff, their business premises, their backup facilities and their lines of communication. The markets remained closed on the following day, the equity markets even until the end of the week. From a systemic point of view, of even greater consequence than the closing of the equity market was the fact that the two markets for US government paper and for commercial paper, the main vehicles for short-term liquidity equalisation between market participants, had ceased to operate. Payment and settlement systems started to break down. Securities and credit balances totalling billions were thus blocked at some banks while lacking at others. Even though the terror attacks were concentrated on New York and Washington, in the beginning they not only paralysed Wall Street but they also threatened to undermine significant parts of the international financial system. It is much too soon, and this is not the proper place, to make an assessment of the profound human, social and political implications of the terror attacks. The resilience of the banks and the financial markets must be emphasised, however. A week after the attacks, business was almost back to usual again. In most cases, the banks and securities houses affected managed to solve their problems, some of which were immense. Neither a stock market crash nor a breakdown of parts of the financial system set in either in the United States or anywhere else.
And the country most severely affected is the United States where the Federal Reserve today cut interest rates by 75 basis points – the largest reduction since August 1982 – to mitigate “increasing downside risks to growth”. The contraction in the US housing market has deepened and unemployment there is rising. I want tonight to explain the nature of the challenges facing us and why many of them originate outside our shores. Exactly five hundred years before the Bank of England was given its independence, an Italian migrant who had made his home in Bristol, Giovanni Caboto, or John Cabot as he was known, set sail from this great city in May 1497 and became the first European to land on the North American mainland since the Vikings. A seafaring voyage like Cabot’s is a good analogy for the challenges facing the British economy, which will have to navigate some distinctly choppy waters in 2008. The challenge to the Monetary Policy Committee’s ability to navigate our way through the next year reflects two strong economic winds; one from the west and one from the east. They correspond to what economists call demand and supply shocks. The former is the credit crunch which has blown across the Atlantic, and threatens a sharp slowing in output growth. The latter is the rise in energy and food prices, reflecting continued strong growth in Asia, that, together with rising import prices, threaten to lift inflation noticeably above target in the coming months.

Jon Nicolaisen: Responsible investment and active ownership Speech by Mr Jon Nicolaisen, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at Norges Bank, Oslo, 19 November 2019. * * * The graphs can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. Introduction In 1990, visionary politicians decided to establish the Government Petroleum Fund, later renamed the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). On Tuesday of this week, the value of the fund passed NOK 11 000 billion – or over 3½ times Norwegian mainland GDP. The fund is now among the largest shareholders in many of the world’s listed companies. Chart: From natural resources to financial wealth What started as oil wealth in the ground has been transformed into savings and financial wealth abroad. Under the fiscal rule, we should only spend the expected real return on the fund. As long as we only spend the return, we ensure that the fund will benefit future generations. In 2020, withdrawals from the fund accounted for more than one krone in five in the central government budget. This means that the fund indirectly finances tens of thousands of public sector employees and ensures that taxes are lower than they would otherwise be. We might say that Norway has moved from being an oil nation to being an investment fund nation. The assets in the fund belong to the Norwegian people. The most important decisions, such the choice of the fund’s equity share, are anchored in the Storting (Norwegian parliament).
Thomas Jordan: Switzerland – developments and challenges in 2012 from a monetary policy perspective Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 26 April 2013. *  *  *  Mr President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests Once again, the European financial and debt crisis has dominated events of the past year. And, once again, the Swiss National Bank has been faced with considerable challenges in the conduct of its monetary policy. The crisis in Europe intensified in spring and summer and triggered strong upward pressure on the Swiss franc. This was pressure we had to withstand. In an already fraught global economic environment, an appreciation of the Swiss franc would have caused an inappropriate tightening in monetary conditions for Switzerland. This in turn would have compromised price stability and had potentially serious consequences for the Swiss economy. The SNB therefore enforced the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro with the utmost determination. This called, at times, for a high level of activity on the foreign exchange market on the part of the SNB. The extensive purchases of foreign currency were reflected on our balance sheet. In my remarks today, I would like to start by addressing the key developments and challenges in 2012 from a monetary policy perspective and, at the same time, present you with our assessment of the current year.

The purchase programme alone cannot solve the crisis. However, it has significantly reduced tail risks, such as the exit of one or several countries from the monetary union, and it buys governments more time to implement fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. The affected countries have already made some concrete progress in this regard. However, it is clearly too early to relax our guard. The global economic situation is still fragile and the way out of the crisis in Europe is long and arduous. In many countries – not just in Europe – there are still a number of unanswered questions with regard to the medium-term growth outlook and the sustainability of public finances. And while we expect the global economy to recover gradually this year and the Swiss economy to grow by 1–1.5%, considerable uncertainties remain. The Swiss franc is still high, even at today’s level. In view of the fragile international environment, the downside risks for the Swiss economy remain substantial. In particular, the threat that the franc could suddenly come under upward pressure again has not been averted. The minimum exchange rate is an important instrument in helping to prevent an undesirable tightening in monetary conditions. The SNB will therefore continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination and, if required, is  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities for this purpose. It stands ready to take further measures at any time.
22.11.2019  Reflections on the Past and Future of Central Bank Independence Seminar on The Relevance of Central Bank Independence: Challenges and Outlook/Banco de México Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good morning. It is my pleasure to participate in this conference on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the autonomy of the Banco de México. I take the opportunity to congratulate you on this landmark. Events such as this contribute to highlighting the relevance of the independence of monetary authorities, and my words today will be along these lines. In my address I shall first briefly refer to the independence of the Banco de España, both as a national central bank in itself but also as a member of the European System of Central Banks. Then, I would like to share with you some more general thoughts about current challenges to central banking from the perspective of their independence. The independence of the Banco de España The Banco de España was granted institutional independence in July 1994. So this year, as is also the case for the Banco de México, marks the 25th anniversary of our Law of Autonomy. The independence of the Banco de España came about as part of the European economic integration process. Following the requirements laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, central banks in the European Union were meant to pursue the primary objective of price stability and be vested with a large degree of independence, both political and operational.

As such, from the start, the Maastricht convergence criteria went beyond inflation to also include targets in terms of fiscal discipline.12 The Spanish experience in the effort to comply with these criteria illustrates and reinforces the critical importance of other policies, such as fiscal consolidation or liberalisation reforms. This is an important lesson not to be forgotten: central bank credibility is an essential element for the effectiveness of monetary policy, but monetary policy is more efficient when 11  The CRD IV/CRR regulatory package makes available a set of macroprudential instruments that national competent authorities can resort to with a view to preventing the emergence of cyclical systemic risks or mitigating structural systemic risks, such as: a) the capital conservation buffer; b) the countercyclical capital buffer; c) the buffer for other systemically important institutions; d) the systemic risk buffer. Regulating capital buffers aimed to (i) ensure a level playing field between EU Member States, as an essential pre-requisite for the functioning of the internal market, (ii) prevent regulatory arbitrage, (iii) ensure maximum harmonisation, and (iv) enhance transparency and predictability in the macroprudential field. See articles 130, 131,133, 134,135-140 of CRD IV. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0036&from=EN https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN 12  See Hernández de Cos: El reto de la unión fiscal europea (2014): In response to the euro area sovereign debt crisis, there has been a deep reform of fiscal governance in the European Union.
However, as our economy grows and current agreement ends at 2009, we will soon get full ownership of our economic policies with a reduced role of IMF under article 4 of the Agreement. The Bank of Albania has a proven track record of competence, credibility and professionalism in the service of our economy. These three elements provide necessary conditions to support and guarantee achievement of economic goal of stable prices and boost credibility in Albanian economy; but, we can not be hold responsible for the behavior of the other players. I am convinced that we need to find and implement clear domestic and foreign anchors to preserve the credibility of our reforms in the future. For the way ahead we are focusing our efforts in the identification and utilization of key elements of the state, politics, markets, institutions and general public that could efficiently play the role of domestic anchors. As part of this preemptive action, the Bank of Albania is carefully considering the possibility  BIS Review 121/2006  3  to launch a fully fledged inflation targeting regime of monetary policy in the midterm. This will be a conditional decision based upon results of current ongoing research, evaluation of the preconditions and building up of capacities. Other possible anchors such as a memorandum of understanding with ministry of finance and public education are considered as well. On the foreign side we see numerous prestigious partners which understand our concerns and appreciate the value of fiscal discipline.

We have great confidence in the ability of the banking system to promote the best banking and cautionary practices; however, I believe that preemptive action is needed to ensure that latest observed trends do not hamper financial stability. Therefore, we cannot neglect improving our legislative, regulatory and prudential measures as a major element of financial sector reforms in Albania. 2  BIS Review 121/2006  In this regard, a new Draft Banking Law is prepared by Bank of Albania; likewise, a new Law on Securities will be introduced shortly. In addition, efforts are underway to revise legislation on Pension and Investment Funds, and draft a Law on the Payments Systems, which will substitute several sublegal acts issued by the Bank of Albania until now. This process aims at gradual harmonization of the banking legislation with that of the Acquis Communnautaire. To address issues of increased competition, poor managerial practices and safeguard stability, the Bank of Albania is working toward establishing a Credit Registry, revising regulatory framework on capital adequacy ratio and credit risk management, increasing on-site supervision, and improving its stress-testing models. Following Financial Stability and Assessment Program (FSAP) recommendations, a separate entity “The Authority of Financial Supervision”, has been established recently to supervise the securities, insurance and pension funds markets. Last but not the least, I would like to address the implementation of the Basel II accord. While it will shape the financial market, I believe it will pose challenges to our banking system and to us at the moment.
22 It is hard to say for certain when SORA liquidity will exceed SOR liquidity. But based on our planning parameters, it is likely that the ‘sweet spot’ for active transition could be between mid 2021 to early part of 2022, when SORA markets would have deepened suﬀiciently while SOR derivative liquidity still exists before declining subsequently. This period of trading will provide the most robust SOR-to-SORA pricing references for transition of legacy contracts. 23 One final word, pertaining to retail loans. Retail customers that are on SOR packages will need to transition as well. The SC-STS will be embarking on a media campaign in 2Q 2021 to educate the wider public of this important shi . Retail investors with SOR exposures should be hearing from their banks over the course of this year and next, on the options regarding their loan packages. Conclusion 24 In conclusion, as we enter into 2021, I am glad that we are starting the year with some good news – that with the IBA consultation, we are likely to have more time to manage legacy transition. Nevertheless, it is important to use this extra time wisely, and sequence our legacy transition activities deliberately and purposefully. 25 From SC-STS’ point of view, we have made much progress last year in laying the foundations for the transition. For this year, we want to maintain our strong momentum, and achieve good depth and liquidity for SORA markets by the middle of the year.

The new rules contain sufficient flexibility to deal with exceptional situations where public money may be required to ensure financial stability. Second, public risk sharing. A certain level of public risk sharing is necessary to create confidence in the overall financial system. Even wellcapitalised banks can fall victim to runs and contagion. This is why central banks act as lender of last resort and fiscal backstops should be in place to ensure trust in the stability of the financial sector. In the Banking Union, both supervisory responsibility and the fiscal backstop need to be at European level, to underpin durably confidence in the area-wide financial system. Just as necessary is the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance System (EDIS). The current situation, where supervision is common, but the consequences of potential bank failures are still predominantly national, should not last. In such an incomplete framework, national considerations inevitably continue to affect supervisory decisions. This is not without consequences for the incentives for banks to become more European. Concrete examples include a lack of fungibility of liquidity or capital. The fact that the euro area is not considered as a single jurisdiction may result in applying higher capital buffers to euro area G-SIBs. While the institutional underpinnings of the Banking Union do not yet meet the requirements of a genuine single financial market, the creation of the SSM has been a leap forward in the establishment of a coherent regulatory framework.
The second review of the economic programme with the IMF, and the disbursement of the second tranche of the loan facility, was delayed because of the Icesave dispute. The capital controls had sequestered an overhang of offshore krónur amounting to some 40% of GDP, and it was not yet known how big a balance of payments problem lurked in the failed banks’ estates, as the split between the new and old banks had not been completed. The new banks had not yet been capitalised sufficiently, and non-performing loans represented a major problem. As a result, it was highly uncertain how the new banks would fare. Would efforts to put public sector finances on a sustainable footing be successful? In short, all three of the key objectives of the IMF programme were still up in the air: exchange rate stability, fiscal sustainability, and financial system reconstruction. We know now that the turnaround was just around the corner. The economic contraction, of course, was a consequence of the financial crisis, but it also stemmed from the inevitable adjustment of unsustainable economic imbalances and from the contraction of bloated sectors such as construction and financial services. The adjustment showed most clearly in the current account balance, which flipped from a double-digit deficit before the crisis to a sizeable surplus as early as 2009. Such a swift and sizeable turnaround is a rarity in international context and has drawn considerable attention.

The drop in the real exchange rate by 45% from the pre-crisis peak played a role in this adjustment, although it overshot, initially causing severe side effects because of the large stock of foreign-denominated debt owed by resident borrowers without any natural hedging in the form of foreign income or assets. As a result, strong emphasis was placed on halting the collapse of the króna. This was achieved in H2/2009. Closing loopholes for capital outflows and adopting measures that allowed the capital controls to work as intended made a big difference in this regard. The economic recovery began once the exchange rate had been stabilised and the inevitable adjustment of domestic demand to a new economic reality was more or less complete. The economy gained resilience through the underlying strength of the sectors that had not been part of the bubble economy — conventional export sectors in particular. Firms in the tradable sector took advantage of the low real exchange rate. The economic upswing began in Q2/2010, when GDP began to grow once again. GDP has grown more or less without interruption since, and in terms of GDP per capita this is Iceland’s longest economic upswing since the end of World War 2  II. Early on, growth was weak in comparison with previous upswings, as it was driven mainly by closing the slack in the economy, as investment was relatively weak at the outset. That changed in 2015, when tourism began to grow at an unprecedented pace, terms of trade improved, and investment picked up.
Technology will reshape financial services in the next 10 years, much more profoundly than it has in the last 5 years. Sustainability will become an increasingly central focus for financial services as the world strives towards a low-carbon future. Jobs in financial services will transform, with growing skills requirements across multiple domains. Technology, Sustainability, and Jobs are three areas that MAS has focused on intensely in recent years, working closely with the financial industry. Over the last two years, MAS has put out about 70 reports, speeches, and media statements on just these three subjects. Together with our industry partners, MAS facilitates discussions and provides updates, on Technology through the Green Shoots series, and on Jobs through the Growing Timber series. And just three weeks ago, we issued our inaugural Sustainability Report which covered not only the Green Finance Action Plan for the financial industry but also MAS’ efforts to reduce its own carbon footprint and to make the Official Foreign Reserves more climate-resilient. So, important as these three areas are, I will not touch on them today. There will continue to be ample opportunities to talk about them in future. MAS’ FINANCIAL POSITION Before I wrap up, let me provide an update on MAS’ financial performance. The investment return from the Official Foreign Reserves was $ billion in FY2020/21. This comprised: Investment gains of $ billion, mainly from interest income and realised capital gains.

The future output sub-index of the global composite PMI recorded 67.1 in May, signalling strong expansion going forward. Asian businesses expect to share in the global recovery in the second half of the year. The corresponding reading for the Asia ex-Japan economies 4 stood at 60.3 in May, well above last year’s average of 53.2. The expected strengthening in momentum is due to two main factors: substantial policy stimulus in the US and brisk deployment of vaccines in the US and Europe. The strength of the rebound in the advanced economies should in turn provide a powerful tailwind for Asian economies, particularly those that are more actively engaged in global supply chains. Overall, the global economy is expected to expand by 5.8% 5 in 2021, after last year’s 3.0% contraction. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  The global economy has probably already regained its pre-pandemic level of output. In fact, the global economy could potentially surprise on the upside. One, vaccination rates are rising in many advanced economies, allowing them to re-open earlier and more fully. Some of them may effectively suppress domestic transmission by the end of Q3 2021. Two, even if there are mobility restrictions on account of new outbreaks of the virus, businesses and households have become better at adapting to such restrictions. A review of the evidence by MAS 6 has found that economic activity has become less responsive to movement restrictions over time.