samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the 15th century, Charles VIII of France paid up to 100% on war loans to Italian banks, which were at the same time charging Italian merchants 5-10%. 2 The Bank of England’s first loan to government carried an interest rate of 8% – double the rate at which the Bank discounted trade bills. For the past two centuries, the tables have progressively turned. The state has instead become the last-resort financier of the banks. As with the state, banks’ needs have typically been greatest at times of financial crisis. And like the state, last-resort financing has not always been repaid in full and on time. The Great Depression marked a regime-shift in state support to the banking system. The credit crisis of the past two years may well mark another. Table 1 provides a snap-shot of the scale of intervention to support the banks in the UK, US and the euro-area during the current crisis. This totals over $ trillion or almost a quarter of global GDP. It dwarfs any previous state support of the banking system. These interventions have been as imaginative as they have large, including liquidity and capital injections, debt guarantees, deposit insurance and asset purchase. The costs of this intervention are already being felt. As in the Middle Ages, perceived risks from lending to the state are larger than to some corporations. The price of default insurance is higher for some G7 governments than for McDonalds or the Campbell Soup Company.

This is why I have spoken of the danger of fragmentation in payments akin to the Middle Age, with so-called “cryptocurrencies” having limited constituencies and acceptance. 3. But do we agree about the solutions? In principle yes: in order to avoid repeating past mistakes, we would need a collective momentum towards a stable and market oriented multipolar International Financial System. A more multipolar IFS would help deal with the modern version of the Triffin dilemma: the supply of USD global safe assets is limited by the fiscal capacity of the US, while demand for them is bound to  Page 4 sur 7 increase. It could also offer more monetary policy independence to Emerging Markets, by reducing the influence of US financial and real cycles spillovers. That said, the political conditions for such a major shift are not very favourable, to say the least: imagining the US, China and other major emerging economies converging today on a new IFS, while they didn’t for decades, could appear as utopian. Let me be more positive: we need to keep this concept of a more balanced multipolar system on the horizon, at least as a “creative frontier”. And we Europeans need to be active and committed on what depends on us. To move towards a more resilient global system, the euro should play a more important international role. It is a currency in a jurisdiction with solid democratic and stable institutions, including independent central banks and the rule of law.
Indeed, the Commission’s proposal allows for a faithful implementation of the final Basel 3 standards, as agreed at the international level, while taking into account EU specificities and avoiding material increase in capital requirements. As negociations are underway, at the ACPR we see merits in sticking to the following: First, the implementation of the Output floor at the European consolidated level, consistently with the Banking Union which is now almost complete. Second, that the few targeted  adjustments, on critical and strategic exposures for the financing of the EU economy which are transitional in nature, remain so. This concerns both the low-risk exposures on residential real estate and the exposures to unrated corporates. The transitional period is planned to end on 31 December 2032, which will give sufficient time for European banks to absorb the impact of the output floor, through organic capital generation, and for the market to ensure a larger coverage of ratings for EU companies. Another pragmatic measure proposed by the Commission that we strongly support at the ACPR is the introduction of a mechanism that would allow the Commission to adjust rapidly in reaction to international developments on the calendar or the content of key elements of the standard, in particular for market risk activities. This would provide some necessary flexibility for these activities exposed to international competition, as Europe continues to be a front-runner regarding the transposition of the final Basel 3 standards.

Among these are: •  The transition from a long period of exceptionally low short-term nominal and real interest rates in the major economies and in many emerging market economies as well. Real  short-term interest rates in much of the world, as in the United States, are still some distance below the band of estimates of equilibrium. •  The approaching demographic pressures on fiscal resources, which will hit most major economies at a time when underlying fiscal positions are still likely to be in substantial deficit. •  The inevitable evolution in the exchange rate regimes of China, and the substantial number of countries that have been actively targeting their nominal exchange rate against the dollar, to a system where there is more variability in their bilateral and real effective exchange rates. •  The disposition of the global imbalances reflected most conspicuously in the U.S. current account deficit. These are all types of disequilibria. They can be sustained for a time, but not indefinitely. They could be diffused gradually and smoothly. But the transitions to a more sustainable equilibrium could also bring a risk of greater volatility in asset prices, less stability in macroeconomic outcomes, and more uncertainty. This could mean a less benign future environment for U.S. monetary policy. The potential uncertainties posed by these challenges may be more troubling because of confidence engendered by the stability and resilience of the U.S. economy over the past decade.
In general, the main sources of money supply growth include money issued in the form of credits granted by banks to both households and enterprises in domestic currency, the conversion of foreign exchange inflows into domestic currency (net foreign assets), net credit to the government and the net position of the National Property Fund and the residual called “other items net” (mainly own capital and bank reserves). Developments in the period 1993-1996 reveal some interesting features: Credits to enterprises and households in domestic currency, which are quite naturally the main source of money supply, exhibited a relatively slower growth up to the end of 1995, followed by a relatively quicker growth in 1996 when these credits became the main impetus of money supply growth. The most remarkable feature was the growing share of net foreign assets up to December 1995 which resulted especially in 1993-1995 in the deviations of the dynamics of M2 out of the corridor laid down by monetary policy and which gave rise to the sterilisation efforts of the CNB. The influence of net credit to the government plus the net position of the National Property Fund was negligible in the period under analysis, and in some periods it even dampened money supply growth. This fact is probably unique in the transforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe and reflects the prudent fiscal stance of Czech macroeconomic policy.

Even with microeconomic restructuring going on, unemployment is not expected to exceed a 4 % level in the near future. Monetary policy tools In a command type economy, monetary policy reflected state plans expressed mainly in physical terms. Planned direct credit allocation was linked to the planned growth of national income. Credits to enterprises were directly allocated, with little attention paid to the creditworthiness of the borrowing enterprise. Risk was socialised due to the existence of a unitary banking system. The introduction of a new Central Bank Act and a new banking law in late 1989 marked the beginning of the development of a market-oriented banking system. The Act laid the basis for establishing a two-tier banking system through the separation of the central bank and commercial banking functions and provided the central bank with the means for conducting monetary policy and with regulatory authority over banks. The latter established the legal basis for a universal banking system. The separation of central banking from commercial banking was put into effect on January 1, 1990. The dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation into two independent republics on January 1, 1993, meant the creation of the Czech National Bank (CNB). According to the Act, the CNB is independent of any instructions given by the government. The CNB is obliged to submit to the Parliament a report on monetary development at least two times a year and to inform the general public on monetary development at least once every three months.
Companies and importers may have preferred to observe changes in the exchange rate over time before changing their selling prices. After several expensive wage settlements and a short period of a strong krone had weakened profitability in the Norwegian business sector, the depreciation of the krone contributed to curbing the decline in activity and employment. The downturn was short-lived. Together with private consumption and fixed investment in the petroleum sector, traditional exports were an important factor underlying growth in the early stages of the recovery that started in the first half of 2003. Prices for many of our main export goods have risen as a result of strong growth in new markets. However, growth in Norway’s total exports excluding oil and gas is lower than import growth among our trading partners. Mainland fixed investment has gradually become an important driving force in the upturn. Investment has picked up in most industries and growth was stronger than expected towards the end of 2004. Norges Bank’s regional network has registered rising investment in all industries. Petroleum investment in particular appears to be growing at a faster pace than projected. This may continue to boost mainland output. In the last few years, household demand has been underpinned by low interest rates, high real wage growth and higher asset prices. According to preliminary national accounts figures, private consumption expanded by 4.3 per cent last year. House price inflation has slowed somewhat, but remains high. In 2004, housing starts were the highest in several years.

In the construction industry, the labour market is tight and enterprises are making use of foreign labour to some extent. The supply of skilled labour is, however, a constraint on growth potential. Signals from service industries also indicate that the supply of labour is becoming more limited. The general level of investment in this region is relatively stable. Investment activity in the public sector appears to be somewhat lower in 2005 than in 2004. In manufacturing and services, there are signs of increased investment activity. Tender prices are rising slightly in the building and construction industry as a result of increased costs and a higher level of activity throughout the country. Prices have risen slightly in manufacturing and service industries. In retail trade, prices have changed little or remained unchanged. Profitability is improving due to increased activity, but there are no major changes for small and medium-sized enterprises. In the approved budget for 2005, the structural, non-oil deficit increases compared with 2004. It therefore appears that fiscal policy will provide some stimulus to growth this year. In the National Budget for 2005, underlying spending growth over the central government budget was estimated at 5.2 per cent, which is somewhat lower than the previous year and somewhat lower than estimated nominal growth in mainland GDP. As from 2006, it is assumed that nominal growth in central government expenditure will be approximately the same as nominal growth in central government revenues and that the real tax level will remain unchanged.
The recent course of consumer prices in Spain has once more been greatly influenced by the behaviour of oil prices. These fell strongly in the closing months of 2018 and account for the decline in the year-on-year rate of change in the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) to 1.2% in December. Relative to expectations, moreover, the latest November and December figures were a surprise on the downside, largely – but not exclusively – due to the behaviour of energy prices (see Chart 6). Conversely, core inflation, which excludes the more volatile elements such as energy and fresh food, continues to stand at around 1%, but it is expected to begin to rise in 2019 as GDP growth rates remain above potential. The opposing trajectories of the energy and core components will determine how prices trend in the coming years. In terms of the overall indicator, prices will slow in 2019 (see Table 2). BANCO DE ESPAÑA  4	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  FORECASTS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY: CYCLICAL POSITION  CHART 3  SPANISH ECONOMY'S OUTPUT GAP % of potential GDP  6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 1995  2001  2007  2013  2019  SOURCE: Banco de ESpaña.

Bandid Nijathaworn: “Implementation of Basel II and IAS” from a regulator’s perspective Keynote address by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at a meeting hosted by the Thai Bankers’ Association and organized by the Bankers Association of the Philippines and ASEAN Bankers Association, Bangkok, 4 October 2007. *  *  *  Distinguished Participants, Let me first thank the Thai Bankers’ Association for the invitation to give today’s keynote address, on the “Implementation of Basel II and IAS” from a regulator’s perspective. Looking at the agenda, the meeting in the next two days will dwell into a number of important regulatory issues. Therefore, to help set the stage for the discussion to follow, I would like to take this opportunity to speak on the Bank of Thailand’s perspective on the implementation of Basel II and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), looking in particular at the benefits from such adoption, the progress we have made on implementing the two standards, and the challenge and adjustments that need to be made for a successful implementation. Ladies and Gentlemen, Recognizing that today’s global financial system has become increasingly complex and interdependent, a number of organizations around the world have been working on improving international standards to ensure sound risk management and disclosure by financial institutions. Among these, Basel II and IFRS are undoubtedly the most important recent efforts. As an international framework for capital adequacy, Basel II is designed to ensure soundness and stability of the global banking system.
External observers sometimes criticise the complexity of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy and argue in particular that the monetary pillar or analysis does not provide any useful information for our monetary policy decision. It is considered by some as superfluous, confusing if not as an obstacle to transparency. To give money an important role in its monetary policy analysis and strategy is however quite a natural thing for a central bank geared towards price stability to do, as inflation is “ultimately always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”, to quote again Milton Friedman. It is worth mentioning that, in our set-up, with a clear medium-term focus, the Eurosystem does not need or have to react mechanically to short-term deviations of monetary growth from the reference value. Instead, monetary developments, i.e. both the developments of the components of M3 and of its counterparts, are analysed very carefully in order to examine and extract their information content for future inflation. *  *  *  PART 2: The achievements of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy What preliminary assessment can we make of the first six years of the single monetary policy? I would like to underline the following points, considering successively price stability, macroeconomic stability and convergence, monetary stance and predictability. 1.

Mr Latter gives an overview of the current monetary policy stance of Hong Kong Address by Mr Tony Latter, a Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the CLSA Investors’ Forum in Hong Kong on 17 May 1999. I should like to say a few words about the present stance of monetary policy in Hong Kong and its relation to the broader state of the economy. Hong Kong has a fixed exchange rate against the US dollar. The pros and cons continue to be a focus of debate in some quarters, but I don’t intend to dig over that ground yet again today. Suffice it to say that over the past fifteen years Hong Kong has enjoyed, on balance, remarkable prosperity. I happen to think that the visible and trusted monetary discipline of the exchange rate link has been a decisive contributory factor to that prosperity. Of course, one cannot deny that there is some association between the strength of the exchange rate and the level of interest rates on the one hand, and the current recession on the other, but I would caution against adopting too short-term a horizon when drawing conclusions, and I would also suggest that some of the adjustment which we have experienced - for example in property prices - was both necessary and somewhat overdue.
The asset purchase programs have helped to keep longer-term private interest rates relatively low, and the expansion of liquidity facilities has helped to restore more normal market function. However, this does not mean that the Federal Reserve balance-sheet expansion and Treasury purchase program are cost free, only that the benefits of these programs, individually and collectively, are seen as exceeding the potential costs. Nevertheless, there are three issues on the cost side that deserve note. First, policymakers need to take seriously any concerns that the Fed’s actions might conceivably lead to an inflation problem. After all, inflation is driven mainly by two variables – inflation expectations and the degree of pressure on resources. It would be potentially very damaging if any of the Fed’s programs were to unhinge inflation expectations. One risk with embarking on the Treasury purchase program was that it had the potential to create the misperception that the Fed was providing the fiscal authorities with the means to fund a more stimulative fiscal policy than they would otherwise have been able to finance. This misperception around the intent and purpose of the program could have undermined the Fed’s credibility and triggered a damaging rise in inflation expectations. Indeed, one of my primary goals for this speech is to make it clear that we have not compromised our ability or our commitment to keep inflation in check. Keeping inflation and inflation expectations well anchored around a low level is essential.

It is almost impossible for those who are not undertaking full-time studies on the subject to keep pace with these developments. Yet, all of us who are interested in systems that stimulate business and keep the wheels of economies moving at a rapid space, would continue to have a strong interest in the subject. I am also hopeful that, the banking and financial community will continue to promote and foster these studies and practices since these provide the lubrication for the smooth functioning of our complicated financial systems in our ever-changing corporate regimes. We also know that a large portion of global business is in the banking sector. In addition, all business entities, maintain direct relationships with banks and financial institutions. In that context, the preeminent position that is applicable to the banks and enjoyed by them cannot be over-emphasized or under-estimated. Therefore, our efforts to enhance the governance capabilities and capacities within banks and financial institutions have to be at the forefront of our agendas. The trend in the world of targeting governance practices in the banking and financial sector to be at the cutting edge of prevailing practices worldwide is a significant step in the right direction and should continue to be so in the future as well. Let us therefore together and collectively dedicate ourselves to promote and apply good Corporate Governance principles and practices in our respective banking and financial sectors.
In particular, we announce a plan around the middle of each month for the purchase operations to take place through the middle of the following month, once we know the principal repayments that will be received over that period. 5 We are running at a pace of $ billion in purchases this month, and we expect that pace to bump up to around $ billion for the next several months. Looking further ahead, we currently project that the cumulative amount of principal payments on agency debt and agency MBS through 2011 will be somewhat higher than the estimates provided at the August FOMC meeting. I should note that the directive to the Desk is expressed in terms of the overall size of the portfolio. However, under the portfolio balance model described above, the effect on markets will be tied to the amount of duration risk that such purchases encompass. Thus, the composition of purchases across maturities will be quite important in governing the effects on financial conditions. The strategy that the Desk has employed for the reinvestment program is to follow the pattern of purchases that was implemented in the earlier Treasury purchase program. The purchases will be concentrated in nominal Treasury securities with remaining maturities  4  Most of the prepayments of MBS in the Federal Reserve’s portfolio are associated with refinancing activity that will result in the production of new MBS that have to be purchased by other market participants.

Before that time, the Federal Reserve maintained a relatively simple portfolio of between $ billion and $ billion of Treasury securities – an amount largely determined by the volume of dollar currency that was in circulation. In late November 2008, in the face of tightening financial conditions and a deep downturn in economic activity, the Federal Reserve announced that it would purchase up to $ billion of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In March 2009, it expanded the program to include cumulative purchases of up to $ trillion of agency debt, agency  BIS Review 128/2010  1  MBS, and longer-term Treasury securities. The use of the balance sheet in this manner was spurred in part by the inability to ease further using the traditional policy instrument, as the federal funds rate effectively reached the zero lower bound in late 2008. The asset purchases were carried out from December 2008 through March 2010 by the Trading Desk (the Desk) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, resulting in a significant expansion of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio. As the settlement of those purchases progressed, the amount of domestic securities held in the System Open Market Account (SOMA) reached a peak of $ trillion in June 2010. From that point, the portfolio began to shrink because the agency debt and agency MBS held in the SOMA were being allowed to run off without reinvestment as they matured or were prepaid.