samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Naturally, as prudent supervisors, the members of the Committee know that it is easier to enforce a simple rule than a more complicated one. Wherever possible, the Committee has sought to provide simple alternatives that can be applied in many markets and settings. Consultations helped us to simplify or remove a good number of rules thought to be unnecessarily complicated. However, it’s important to recognize that we intend to apply the New Accord especially to large, internationally active banks, all of which are highly developed and complex institutions. One blanket won’t cover a mountain range. In fact, the New Accord’s complexity stems partly from the options it provides to address the wide range of risk profiles, strategies, and systems that banks maintain. Many options were created precisely because some banks felt disadvantaged under a proposed blanket rule. Yet each new option alters the balance between simplicity and complexity. I think the best example of finding that balance lies in the treatment we’ve proposed for exposures to small and medium-sized enterprises. Equating loans to small and medium-sized businesses with loans to large corporations ignores critical aspects of the risks associated with each type of lending; it also could lead to results that seem unfair to banks that lend primarily to smaller businesses. So the Committee developed a special capital treatment for exposures to small and medium-sized enterprises that recognizes the unique characteristics of that form of lending, but admittedly makes the rules more complicated, and perhaps a page or two longer.

As you know, since the Second Consultative Document’s release 21 months ago, the members of the Basel Committee have worked collaboratively and publicly with supervisors, banks, and others to revise the proposals so that they best serve the needs of modern banking. We’ve published and discussed thousands of pages of proposals and studies with the industry and the public. The size of – and depth of detail in – those volumes demonstrates how hard we’ve been working and how great the challenge is. Challenges the Committee is resolving Indeed, while our consultations over the years have reflected on some of the finest – and occasionally highly esoteric – points of contemporary banking, the Committee encountered a few central concerns expressed by the industry – and sometimes by supervisors as well. Some of the overarching issues include the complexity of the proposals and their potential to be "procyclical." Other respondents have weighed in on proposed charges against operational risk and other particular exposures. I’d like to share with you now the latest news on how we are resolving those challenges. BIS Review 52/2002  3  Complexity of the New Accord First, to the issue of complexity. Anyone who’s dared to download the proposals in their entirety from the BIS website may have been surprised to find out how much paper it requires to print them out. The New Accord is truly weighty, in all meanings of that adjective.
Last year our Agents – Adrian and Ian – drove 30,000 miles to talk faceto-face with you. The rugged scenery is, I suspect, less appealing to them as they wind their way – slowly – through the valleys and mountains. When you talk to them, you are speaking to the Monetary Policy Committee at only one remove before it sets interest rates. On this occasion, I am not in Wales to enjoy the scenery. I am here to listen to your views at first hand. But tonight I want to explain. Over the past year Bank Rate has risen four times to reach 5½%. A year ago, few expected that to happen – markets thought that by now Bank Rate would be only 4¾%. Market expectations of where Bank Rate will be at the end of this year have risen from 5% in the middle of last year to 6% now. So what has happened over the past twelve months? The right place to start is with inflation – that is, after all, the Bank of England’s target. A year ago inflation was bang on the 2% target. The latest figure – for April – is 2.8%. In recent months inflation has been volatile, rising to above 3% in March, when I had to write an open letter to the Chancellor, and subsequently falling back. The number for May, to be published tomorrow, is awaited with interest. Many column inches have been devoted to these short-run movements.

9) Formulation of monetary policy Norges Bank reduced its key rates by 0.5 percentage points effective from today. This decision came in response to developments in money and foreign exchange markets and the prospect of reduced pressures in the real economy. The outlook for the Norwegian economy has changed since Norges Bank raised its key rates in August. The forecasts for growth in the world economy have been revised downwards and persistently low oil prices have reduced demand in the oil sector. In addition, a tight government budget for 1999 and the high interest rate level are having a restraining effect on growth. At the same time, the krone has appreciated recently. This lays the foundation for slower price and wage inflation in the years ahead, as estimated by Norges Bank in its December Inflation Report. Developments in recent weeks have confirmed this picture, providing room for a slight reduction in interest rates. According to the Exchange Rate Regulation, “... in the event of significant changes in the exchange rate, monetary policy instruments shall be oriented with a view to returning the exchange rate over time to its initial range”. The guidelines provide considerable scope for discretion in the conduct of monetary policy. It is Norges Bank’s task to exercise this discretion. Interest rates are set with a view to returning the krone exchange rate over time to its initial range. Even with this interest rate reduction, the interest rate differential against European countries is substantial.
The uncertainty interval does not take into account the zero bound. BIS Review 56/2009  11  12  Source: The Riksbank  9

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Spanish banks’ attributed profits in 2014 increased by close to 34%, continuing the recovery initiated in 2013. Despite the backdrop of declining credit and low interest rates, net interest income rose by almost 5% owing to financing costs falling at a swifter pace than the return on financial products. Also, the containment of operating expenses and the decline in asset impairment losses have contributed to the improvement in results. However, the persistence of the environment of very low interest rates and the presence of a significant volume of non-productive assets will continue to bear down on the income statement. That will lead banks to reflect on a sustainable business model, involving the application of new technologies, new activities and an office and staffing structure better tailored to attaining this model. In December 2014, the top-quality common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio of our banks stood at 11.8%. This ratio rises to 13.6% for total capital. Both figures amply exceed the regulatory minimum levels. Even if the standards scheduled to be in force from 2018 – when Basel III becomes fully applicable – were to be applied, these percentages would remain above the minimum levels (9.9% and 12.1%, respectively). Moreover, the recourse by banks to Eurosystem funds continues to fall. Notwithstanding this positive assessment, Spanish banks must continue strengthening their capital and their loss-absorption capacity in order to withstand the new macroeconomic environment, heightened competition and the new, more demanding and complex regulatory framework.
I don’t need to remind you of the really miserable social as well as economic consequences - as right across the economy people lost their jobs, their businesses and their homes. More insidiously, repeated experience of boom and bust produced a pervasive short-termism in business behaviour which infected both industry and finance and - dare I say both employers and employees - however much we all like to blame everyone else. Everyone was tempted to grab what they could while the going was good. But we have learned from that experience. We’ve learned that in anything other than the short term there really is no trade-off between growth and inflation. What we are trying to do now through monetary policy is to keep overall demand in the economy growing continuously broadly in line with the capacity of the economy - as a whole - to meet that demand. Both the previous Government and the present one set a low inflation target as the immediate objective of monetary policy, not as an end in itself, but in effect as a measure of our success in keeping demand in line with supply. So the real aim is to achieve stability across the economy as a whole in this much wider sense. BIS Review 71/1998  -2-  Now, there is not a lot, frankly, that we can do directly through monetary policy to affect the supply side - the underlying rate of growth that can be sustained without causing inflation to rise.

On top of that, as we said in our press notice last Thursday - announcing that we had not changed interest rates - we recognise “that deterioration in the international economy could increase the risks of inflation falling below the target”. That is still not the most likely outcome in the eyes of most of us and given the real world uncertainties we can anyway never sensibly tie our hands. But there is no doubt in my mind that recent international developments have at least reduced the likelihood that we will need to tighten policy further. BIS Review 71/1998
The Administration may feel that there is a need for the existing arrangements to be replaced by a separate Ordinance establishing an institution called the HKMA, having its own board and clearly defined functions. This appears sensible and is at least consistent with arrangements in other jurisdictions. But it is my strong view that, should this be considered desirable for whatever reasons, the opportunity should be taken to achieve greater and not less autonomy for the HKMA. There should be more, and not fewer, safeguards against political interference in the work of the HKMA. The Administration has indicated that it will take the matter forward in due course and no doubt the Legislature will be consulted when the Administration has formulated more concrete proposals. My advice, for what it is worth, is to proceed cautiously and in quieter times when market conditions are less unsettled. 31. Thank you very much again for giving me the honour of delivering the Susan Yuen Memorial Lecture. BIS Review 87/1998

We need to better understand the degree to which any changes in the nature of liquidity reflect the evolving structure of financial markets, changes in regulatory policy or other factors. With respect to regulatory policy, an important objective should be to achieve the best balance between the benefits of increased safety and soundness versus any costs imposed by these regulatory changes on market function and liquidity. In my remarks today, I will focus on market liquidity rather than funding liquidity, although I recognize that the two are related in important ways. I will examine market liquidity in two important fixed-income markets – the U.S. Treasury market and the U.S. corporate bond market. The Treasury and corporate bond markets provide a useful contrast in evaluating liquidity conditions as they differ with respect to the homogeneity of their securities, how their securities are traded and how regulatory changes may have affected the incentives of dealers to make markets in these securities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The Treasury market is much more homogeneous and the average size of each issue is much larger. Trading volume and average trade sizes are much larger, and much of the trading activity for interdealer on-the-run securities is conducted electronically through the use of central limit order books (CLOB). In contrast, the corporate bond market is much more heterogeneous; there are many more distinct bonds available; and bond sizes are much smaller. As a result, corporate bond trading is fragmented across a large number of distinct outstanding bonds.
[…] In sum, achieving price stability is not only important in itself; it is also central to attaining the other mandated objectives of maximum 12 sustainable employment and moderate long-term interest rates.” The ECB, for its part, aims to maintain price stability in the “medium term”, thus minimising economic fluctuation in the short term. In other words, in line with its mandate as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB is not indifferent to short-term economic growth trends. 2.4  Empirical results  So, on balance, what have been the factors underlying the difference in approach between European and US monetary policy? From the empirical results we see that the overall persistence of inflation is basically alike in the euro area and in the United States, even though inflexibility is far more pronounced in the euro area. Secondly, the evidence suggests that monetary policy impacts on the process whereby inflation expectations in the euro area are shaped. These expectations have remained basically in line with the quantitative definition of price stability provided by the ECB for the best part of the last ten years, and have displayed low variability, as can be seen in Table 1. Recent studies have confirmed the importance of a clear definition of price stability. For instance, the response of long-term interest rates (which should respond better to the 13 anchoring of inflation expectations) to economic news has virtually disappeared.

We know that growth in December was heavily affected by the snowy weather but there are also concerns that the economy may have slowed for other reasons. We would have to wait until April for the next quarter’s GDP data, but even when this arrives it will be a very provisional estimate. So it makes sense to look at other data sources to gauge the pace of recovery – notably the employment figures and business survey information, which also have the benefit of being less subject to data revision. The employment data broadly support the view that the underlying momentum of growth has remained healthy despite the impact of December’s weather on activity levels. Unlike the early 1980s and the early 1990s, when unemployment continued to rise in the early phases of the recovery and the jobless rate rose to over 10%, we have seen a much earlier turnaround in employment in this recovery. Employment picked up in the first half of last year and has risen by nearly 300,000 since last winter.4 More recently, jobs growth has eased off with falling public sector employment offsetting increases in the private sector. But the official Labour Force Survey unemployment rate has remained at around 8% or just below since the recovery started in the second half of 2009. Indeed, the most recent figure we have for unemployment – the claimant count number for February – indicates the lowest jobless total on that measure for almost two years.
These tools would not be used against the regular flows that are a normal part of monetary policy transmission; instead, they would primarily be used when flows became too strong and there is the risk that monetary policy transmission along the interest rate channel would be weakened excessively In implementing monetary policy, the MPC takes into account the impact of monetary policy and its interactions with other aspects of economic and prudential policies, insofar as this is consistent with medium-term price stability. There will be reliable processes for exchange of information, discussion, and analysis of the interactions among these various factors. This will take place through consultations between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank; through the proposed macroeconomic council, where the interactions between economic policy and labour market decisions would be discussed; or in the Systemic Risk Committee and Financial Stability Council and joint meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee and the Systemic Risk Committee. The Central Bank plans to strengthen these processes still further by launching a new publication next year. The report, which will be issued at least once a year, will focus on the external position of the economy and its sustainability, the outlook for the balance of payments, and the exchange rate and signs of major deviations from the equilibrium exchange rate. Honoured guests: The revised monetary policy framework will be finalised in the next few months, before capital controls on residents are lifted.

•  Our banks, overall, remain profitable: over EUR 7 billion in the first half of the year. We ensure, contrary to certain rumours, that these earnings are reported using the strictest standards. In all probability, this trend – of lower but positive profits – should continue for the rest of this year. •  One reason for this profitability is that our banks have regular sources of income. They are universal banks. This sets them apart from banks in some other countries that depend exclusively, or for the most part, on financial markets. Our banks have a sound and recurrent source of future profits. This is a vital asset in periods when it is impossible to raise capital by issuing shares on the market. •  Lastly, the “manoeuvrability” of our banks remains excellent, as the recent takeover of Fortis’ assets by BNP Paribas shows. •  It should be recalled that almost all money-market mutual funds (SICAV de trésorerie) are offered by major banks. Everything that the President of the Republic has said and everything that I have just said about the soundness of our banks also applies to these funds. Credit developments are the subject of much focus in the current period. A cautious and balanced approach is required in their analysis and excessive optimism or pessimism should be avoided. The main facts can be resumed as follows: •  As a snapshot, credit growth remains strong (over 10% per year for companies and 9% for households).
As a working assumption we assume that the MPR will follow a trajectory similar to the one implied by financial asset prices during the ten days prior to this statistical closing of this Report. Thus, we assure that monetary policy will have responded swiftly to the changes in economic conditions and will remain expansionary through the whole projection horizon (figure 12). As always, the conduct of monetary policy and any possible adjustments to the MPR will be contingent on the effects of incoming information on the projected inflation dynamic. On the external front, there are some sources of uncertainty that may have significant effects but by their nature are very hard to quantify. For example, political and economic uncertainty surrounding European elections, worries about Brexit implementation and possible shifts towards protectionism in several developed economies. Other risks that have long lingered in the external scenario have varied in intensity. The US economy has evolved favorably, averting the risk of a new recession. The much awaited fiscal impulse could help to sustain somewhat higher growth in the years to come. However, it is also a source of risk, as its implementation may have problems or inflationary effects that might trigger a faster withdrawal of the monetary impulse, creating disruptions in financial markets. China continues to be a source of concern, especially its leverage, although its authorities have successfully weathered its gradual slowdown without causing disruptions, and this has been welcomed by markets.

13  Figure 3 GDP evolution (real annual change, percent)  3,5  3,5  3,0  Other  2,5 2,0  3,0 2,5 2,0  1,5  Total  1,5  1,0  1,0  0,5  0,5  0,0  0,0 14  15  16  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 4 Other sectors (real annual change, percent)  8  Personal services  6  8 6  Trade  4 2  Construction  0  4 2 0  Manufacturing  -2  -2 Business services  -4 14  15  -4  16  Source: Central Bank of Chile. 14  Figure 5 Consumption  GFCF  (real annual change, percent)  (real annual change, percent)  8 8  8  20  Construction and other works  Durable  Non-durable  4 4  10  0  0 0  0  -4  -4-4  -10  4  Machinery & equipment (right axis)  -8  -8-8 14  15  16  -20 14  15  16  Source: Central Bank of Chile.
We can distinguish between financial, political and administrative elements of accountability. The exercise of accountability requires a system of laws, regulations and codes of conduct. In addition, mechanisms should be established for monitoring compliance and deviations, and institution of corrective measures. Financial accountability, which tends to be the main focus in this context, pays special attention to budgetary processes. It is deemed a necessary condition for good governance; prudent management of public resources; reduced corruption; better delivery of services; and a support to efforts at poverty alleviation. Strengthening financial accountability requires reforms almost across the board, touching on the parliamentary, judicial and administrative structures and modalities of government, and could thus entail a far-reaching revamping of governance systems. Governance and development We may now wish to address some thoughts on the reasons for the recent emphasis on governance in the development discourse. We have already alluded to the relationship between changes in the development paradigm and the evolution of the governance concept. Specifically in the context of World Bank interventions to foster development in the third world, various strategies had been pursued since about the 1960s, but the effort had not yielded the expected results. In grappling with this problem, the perception gained ground that the institutions of the state were fundamental to the development process and the use of aid, hence the “institutions matter” perspective that eventually emerged. The 1989 “crisis of governance” in Sub-Saharan African report was a landmark in this evolution, which triggered the mainstreaming of governance in the Bank’s development work.

Collective financial assets as a proportion of total financial assets Per cent  60  60 All sectors Private sector  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0  1810  1830  1850  1870  1890  1910  1930  1950  1970  1990  2010  Source: Hasselberg and Ohlsson (2016)  With regard to the funded pension savings, the period with low interest rates has been a strain. Yield has been low and this has put pressure on the pension funds to meet the guarantees in their insurance plans. This has sometimes been raised as a negative effect of the expansionary monetary policy, but the problem – to the extent that it is a problem – is rather connected to the global falling trend in longterm real interest rates. 10 In light of this, economic agents need to adjust to interest rates probably not returning to the levels we previously considered normal. But at the same time, it is important to remember that interest rates in the long term will nevertheless be much higher than they are now. Price stability creates good conditions for economic growth and high employment If I am to summarise my presentation today, let me first say that I think it is a good thing that distributional effects are once again being discussed with regard to monetary policy.