samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Ekholm, Karolina (2009), Some lessons for monetary policy from the financial crisis. Speech on 4 December 2009, Sveriges Riksbank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Giannone, Domenico, Reichlin, Lucrezia and Lenza, Michele (2008), Explaining the great moderation: It is not the shocks, Journal of European Economic Association, 6(2–3), pp. 621–633. Jakobsson, Ulf (1997), Den svenska devalveringscykeln. (the Swedish devaluation cycle) Ekonomisk debatt, 25 (3), pp. 141–154. Jonung, Lars (1999), Med backspegeln som kompass – om stabiliseringspolitiken som läroprocess. (with hindsight as compass – stabilisation policy as a learning process) Ds 1999:9, Swedish Ministry of Finance. Reichlin, Lucrezia and Baldwin, Richard (2013), Introduction. In Reichlin and Baldwin (eds) Is Inflation Targeting Dead? Central Banking After the Crisis. CEPR/VoxEU e-book. CEPR. Summers, Peter M. (2005), What Caused The Great Moderation? Some Cross-Country Evidence. Economic Review, third quarter 2005. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2013), The Possible Unemployment Cost of Average Inflation below a Credible Target, NBER Working Paper No. 19442, National Bureau of Economic Research. Sveriges Riksbank (2011), The Riksbank’s inquiry into the risks on the Swedish housing market. Sveriges Riksbank (2013), Financial imbalances in the monetary policy assessment. Article in Monetary Policy Report, July 2013. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1. The CPIF Annual percentage change 4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 07  09  13  11  15  Note.

Also, the improvement of domestic consumption and investment are slow due to a cautious private sector’s confidence. Externally, Thai economy is affected by the current uneven recovery of global economy which hinders Thai export growth. However, Thai economy is expected to recover up to 3.8% GDP growth this year from a mere 0.8% last year. Private consumption and the government expenditures will play key roles for 2015 outlook. 4. On the bright side, Thailand has been riding on the back of China’s economic prosperity. In other words, the regional prospect has pinned on improvement in intraregional trades of goods and services. China’s economic figures may be somewhat lower than its historical average, as a result of the sluggish recovery of the global demand and the continued structural reform in China. However, China growth rate is still at a satisfactorily high level. And China has yet remained an important engine in support of the growth of the Thai export sector. For the past few years, Thailand has become one of the most popular destinations among Chinese tourists, thanks to popularity of the ‘Lost in Thailand’ movie. Each week, hundreds of flights between Thailand and China have been landed to accommodate the increasing interest of Chinese visitors. We value this considerably as it not only helps boost the tourism and services sector of the Thai economy, but also tightens our cultural connections. 5. As we all know, Chinese economy has become a necessary ingredient for our secret recipe for the past decade.
To give you a brief background on the central bank legislation, since its inception in 1964 the Bank has operated under 3 different Bank of Zambia Acts; the BoZ Act of 1965, the BoZ Act of 1985 and the current BoZ Act of 1996. Each of these Acts has responded to the era of its time. For example, the Acts of 1965 and 1985 were characterised by high Government involvement in the operations of the Bank. The Bank administered exchange control regulations. It also determined and regulated the frequency and rates of fees, commissions and interest rates etc charged by financial institutions. The economic reforms that swept the country in the 1990’s saw the ushering in of the current BoZ Act of 1996 which supported the Government’s free market policies. The Bank’s mandate was made clearer, exchange control regulations were suspended and the Bank’s regulation of interest rates etc was removed. There was also improved transparency and accountability. Since the enactment of the BoZ Act of 1996 two issues have precipitated the need to have the Act reviewed again; 1. In 2002, the IMF and the World Bank conducted a joint assessment of Zambia’s financial sector under the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP). The result of this assessment raised awareness of various weaknesses in our financial system which needed to be addressed. For this purposes, the Government approved the establishment of the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) in 2004 to address these weaknesses and implement recommendations.

But there are also potential indirect benefits for their national economies: establishing a ‘green risk free curve’ for private issuers to use as a benchmark for green pricing; setting conventions for issuance, including definitions of acceptably green projects or climate goals; providing assets for hedging and collateralising borrowing; and encouraging the development of climate finance expertise in the local financial services community, driving wider product innovation. The issuance of corporate green bonds in the Netherlands, for example, picked up materially after the Dutch government issued a SGB in 2018 (Chart 13). Building block 3: asset allocation strategies However rapid the progress in climate-related disclosures and financing vehicles on the issuer side of the equation, it has been totally eclipsed by the explosion in interest on the investor side. Gripped by an increasing awareness of the scale of the climate challenge, and the impact of past and expected future policy change, investors are demanding, ever more loudly, that those in charge of their savings demonstrate that they can measure, and direct, their investments in ways that are sensitive to the climate impact of those flows. Asset managers have launched an ever-increasing range of ‘climate aware’ funds in recent years (Chart 14), and invested heavily in internal expertise, building systems, and hiring in specialists (or buying their firms outright).36 The consequent shift in assets under management towards funds with higher sustainability ratings, and away from those with lower ratings, is striking (Chart 15).
Our projections suggest inflation will reach the target in 2024, driven by the stability of prices in global markets and the effects of monetary policy stance normalisation. A gradual increase in the key interest rate towards a neutral level will drive both demand and supply in the economy to a more sound balance. In parallel, economic growth is expected to maintain stable growth rates in the medium term, despite the short-term volatilities which are expected in the current year and in the next one. From its side, the  7/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Bank of Albania will continue to adapt its monetary policy stance to the new economic reality. We will make sure that this stance is prudential, – on the one hand - consistent with the price stability target and, on the other hand, - coordinated with the fiscal policy direction and development in financial markets. In parallel, the latest episodes of stress in the US and Swiss banking systems have returned focus to the importance of a regulated and well-supervised financial system. In this view, allow me to point out again that the Albanian banking system appears liquid, profitable, well capitalised, and able to carry out its primary function of financial intermediation and of preserving the value of Albanian households' savings. Nevertheless, the Bank of Albania will carefully monitor the situation, and will continue attentive supervision and regulation of this system, in addition to taking care of regulatory and supervisory framework alignment with the acquis communautaire.

In particular, the rapid surge in prices over the last year, has been brought under control and inflation has been declining in recent months, through easing the pressures on household' budgets and reducing uncertainties for enterprises. At the same time, the banking sector appears sound, indicators on the stability of both public and external debt have been improving, the financial environment is calm, and enterprises and households' balance sheets remain solid. These achievements are not a result of chance. They reflect, among other things, adequate and coordinated monetary, financial and fiscal policies and the results of continuous structural reforms which we have undertaken in the financial sector. The proportional and timely reaction of these policies has minimised the immediate consequences of shocks and has safeguarded the production capacity of Albania. In parallel, continuous structural reforms have strengthened the flexibility and resilience of the Albanian economy, by helping both the monetary and financial stability of Albania. 1/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In my remarks today, I will provide an overview on the main directions of the Bank of Albania's work throughout 2022 and its results. I would then like to share a brief summary of our expectations and highlight some of our primary objectives for 2023. ***  1. The outlook for the economy, price stability and the Bank of Albania's monetary policy The global geopolitical and economic environment experienced upheaval in a radical and unexpected manner at the outset of 2022, due to the Russian unjustified invasion of Ukraine.
We’ve seen it popularized by the Bank of Canada and Bank of England, and it figured prominently in the statement recently released by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve after our meeting of March 18–19 and again during the post-meeting press conference of the Fed Chair, Janet Yellen. It is front and center on the agenda of the FOMC. To understand forward guidance and its prominence in current discussions within monetary policy circles, it helps to retrace recent history. Adieu quantitative easing To encourage economic recovery from the debacle of the financial crisis of 2007–09, the FOMC cut interest rates to near zero. The Fed introduced an array of special lending facilities during the most panicked stage of the crisis. These credit and liquidity programs were largely self-liquidating as market functioning improved. But still being “zero bound,” we embarked upon a program of massively expanding the Fed’s balance sheet, referred to internally as “large-scale asset purchases” and popularly known as quantitative easing (QE). By buying copious quantities of longer-term U.S. Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), our balance sheet has grown from slightly under $ billion prior to the crisis to $ trillion at present. When the Fed buys a Treasury note or bond or an MBS, we pay for it, putting money out into the economy with the expectation that the money will be used by banks and other creditors and investors to finance job-creating investment, the purchase of homes and other expansive economic activity.

Spiegel online on 26th September 2007 described a research led by the Nobel-price winning chemist Paul Crutzen which had found that biofuels emit even 70 percent more greenhouse gases than fossil fuels. In effect, global warming may accelerate and lead to further increase in frequency of disasters such as floods, droughts, and unexpected weather changes that may have negative  1  Views presented today are my own and do not necessarily represent the official position of the National Bank of Poland and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority. 2  Rybinski K. (2007) “The Role of the EURO for the Future of Poland”, speech by Krzysztof Rybinski, Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Poland, 15 June 2007, http://www.nbp.pl/publikacje/wyklady/rybinskiadesti.pdf  BIS Review 138/2007  1  effects on crops. Secondly, food prices will be lifted up by an increasing demand for agriculture products in the emerging markets, especially in Asia, as the catching-up process progresses. It is worth keeping in mind that the share of food in the CPI basket is some 10 pp. higher in Poland than in the eurozone, so agflation, if it materializes, will lead to inflation divergence. 2. One cannot exclude a possibility that other commodities prices may continue to rise as well. Demand for commodities has already substantially risen in recent years. The “problem” lies again in the emerging markets. Fast growing economies create still growing demand for all sorts of commodities, especially metals and fuels (for example: oil consumption in China has doubled within last 10 years).
The primary responsibility of understanding the risks run by the bank and ensuring that such risks are appropriately controlled and are within the risk parameters of the Bank, i.e. its risk appetite, is vested with the Board of Directors. It is now a widely accepted principle of good corporate governance that bank management understands new banking products and businesses of the Bank. Without proper understanding of the risks associated with such new products the management should not give their assent to the introduction of such products. It is the responsibility, therefore, of the Board of Directors to set the parameters for risk taking beyond which banking business should not be permitted. What then are the essential pre-requisites for good and effective risk management? Timely and reliable information is the foundation upon which good risk management is built. Lots of questions come to my mind here - do those responsible for credit decisions have a knowledge of the industry they are lending to? Why do banks depend so much on collateral when we all know it is the last resort? This is where information plays an important part. If you do not have knowledge of the industry or sector to which you are lending, your credit decision is seriously flawed and sooner or later will translate itself into NPA. Why do we have high levels of NPA? Is the information necessary for evaluation of creditworthiness of a borrower available to the banks?

Thank you for your attention. Les notes du Conseil d’analyse économique, Pour une refonte du cadre budgétaire européen, Avril 2021 Abiad A., Furceri D., Topalova P., The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment: Evidence from Advanced Economies, IMF Working Paper, May 2015. iii The American Crisis (circa 1776) i  ii
But it seems safest at present to count on a potential annual GDP growth rate of between 2 and 2.5%. Growth can be temporarily higher When the labour force is not being fully utilised, the increase in employment can exceed the trend rate of about 0.5%. In a transitional period the economy can then grow faster than its potential rate in the longer run. Unemployment in Sweden is still historically high. That might suggest that the labour market has plenty of unutilised resources at its disposal. Some bottleneck problems are already showing up,  1  See LU 1999/2000 Bilaga 1 (Medium Term Survey 1999/2000, Annex 1, Population, labour force and employment), Ministry of Finance. BIS Review 13/2000  2  however, and are an indication that there is only a limited number of persons with the appropriate training and occupational experience for the jobs that are available. Moreover, statistics from the National Labour Market Board show that the number of unfilled vacancies at employment offices has risen to the highest level since 1990 and business tendency data from the National Institute of Economic Research reveal that certain sectors are now finding it difficult to recruit labour with the required training and occupational experience. The problems are accentuated by the fact that a large part of the increased production and hence the expansion of employment is concentrated to the metropolitan regions and other university cities. This means that bottleneck problems are starting to impede the growth of production and employment.

Effectively, this would mean that an insurer or takaful operator cannot refuse to show an adviser its range of products which has been a strategy used by some companies to protect their investments in the training of their own agents and discourage them from abandoning exclusive arrangements with the company. Of course, having access to the broadest range of products would not mean very much if advisers do not build the capacity to understand their features and effectively compare and contrast them against the specific needs of a client. This requires greater investments by financial advisers in the training of your representatives, information systems and in building relationships with a broader network of product providers. Let me now touch for a moment on some observations from our recently concluded fieldwork which examined the effectiveness of current mandatory disclosures in providing financial consumers with the information that they need to make financial decisions. The study which we conducted focused on the Product Disclosure Sheet (or PDS) which financial service providers are required to provide to all consumers before they enter into a financial contract, and covered life insurance and investment-linked products, structured investments and mortgages. We surveyed over 400 respondents and found that while the PDS provided by financial service providers is covering the type of information that consumers believe are important for making informed decisions, key product information is obscured in lengthy narratives, excessive information and technical or legal jargon that is difficult to understand.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Chart 1: UK and Scottish onshore GDP per capita UK Scotland  Percentage changes on a year earlier 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6  1964  1972  1980  1988  1996  2004  -8 2012  Source: Bank calculations; Scottish Government GDP statistical bulletin (2010Q1 and 2013Q3); ONS UK real GVA ex oil and gas extraction (KLS2 & UIZY); ONS mid-year population estimates; General Register Office Scotland; OECD. Chart 2: Unit wage costs in the UK and Scotland UK Scotland  Indices: 2000 = 100  150 140 130 120 110 100 90  1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012  80  Sources: Bank calculations; ONS Gross weekly earnings by region (EARN05); ONS real GDP (ABMI); Scottish Government GDP statistical bulletin 2013Q3; Labour Force Survey. Gross weekly earnings seasonally adjusted in-house. Notes: Unit wage costs calculated as gross weekly earnings divided by real output per worker for the UK and Scotland. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3: Unit labour costs in the Euro area Indices: 2000Q1 = 100  Euro area Belgium Germany Estonia Ireland Spain France Italy Cyprus Latvia Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal Slovenia Slovakia Finland Greece  240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100  2000Q1  2003Q1  2006Q1  2009Q1  2012Q1  (a)  80  Sources: DataStream, Eurostat and Bank Calculations. Notes: Greek data seasonally adjusted by Bank of England.

Weighted using shares in 2012 nominal GDP. Chart 8: Euro area core/periphery output growth Periphery Core  Percentage changes on a year earlier 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6  1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012  -8  Sources: Eurostat and Bank calculations. Notes: Based on data for Vulnerable Euro Area Periphery economies (VEAPS) (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy) and core (all other EA countries excluding Malta). Data up to 2013Q3. 16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 9: Scottish mortgage loans as a share of the UK total 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2%  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  0%  Source CML. Note: Number of Scottish regulated mortgage loans as a share of the UK total. Table 4: Banking sector size as multiple of GDP(a)  2012 Scotland  12.5  rUK  4.3 2007  Ireland  7.1 (b)  Iceland  7.4  Cyprus  6.6  Spain  3.2  UK(c)  5.1  (d)  1.2  US  Sources: Bank of England, ECB, Central Bank of Iceland, Datastream, Federal Reserve and Bank of England calculations. (a) Banking assets of euro area countries are recorded in the country where the parent entity is domiciled and includes all EU assets. Assets reflect gross derivative positions. (b) Iceland data reflects net derivative positions and includes resident banks’ domestic and foreign assets. (c) 2012 UK data taken from the HMT’s 'Scotland analysis: Financial services and banking', for methodology see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/206166/banking_assets_vs_gdp_explanatio n.pdf.
If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. This orientation of monetary policy will normally also contribute to stabilising output and employment. A time horizon of two years when setting interest rates allows monetary policy to contribute to stabilising production. This horizon prevents monetary policy in itself from causing unnecessary fluctuations in the economy. A relevant example is the outlook for the next two years. Against the background of the recent years’ appreciation of the krone, consumer price inflation is projected to be lower than the inflation target over the next year and then move up towards 2½ per cent in two years. As an alternative, we could have sought to achieve the inflation target of 2½ per cent using a time horizon of six months to one year. We would then have had to reduce the interest rate sharply this summer. This would have amplified the pressures in the Norwegian economy that are so clearly reflected in wage developments and household credit demand. In all likelihood, this would have required marked interest rate increases one to one and a half years ahead. Strict inflation targeting of this type would thus have resulted in more pronounced fluctuations in the interest rate and in aggregate demand and employment.

But when monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation, this will contribute to a stable krone exchange rate over time. Interest rates influence inflation through their impact on domestic demand and on the market for NOK. When interest rates rise, it is more profitable to save and more costly to borrow. This dampens consumption and investment and hence aggregate demand. Lower demand in turn curbs the rise in prices and wages. Higher interest rates make it more attractive to take krone positions and borrow in foreign currency. As a result, higher interest rates normally lead to an appreciation of the krone. This reduces prices for imported goods. In addition, a strong krone reduces activity and profitability in the internationally exposed sector. It is important to be aware of the relationships between employment, output and inflation. If there is a shortage of labour and other economic resources, a tight monetary policy stance will reduce inflation by affecting aggregate demand. Conversely, when unemployment is high, low interest rates stimulate demand, which will contribute to stable wages and prices. A monetary policy stance that is aimed at stabilising inflation will thus also contribute to stabilising aggregate output and employment. But there is little monetary policy can do to prevent an increase in unemployment that is driven by high cost inflation. The mandate implies that the interest rate must be adapted to the outlook for the Norwegian economy.