samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Christian Noyer: “Towards Retail Payments 2.0: The New Security Challenges” Opening speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the conference “Towards Retail Payments 2.0: The New Security Challenges”, Paris, 22 October 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to open this conference today, dedicated to the work of the Secure Pay forum and to the new security challenges that lie ahead for retail payments. On behalf of the European Central Bank and of the Banque de France, I would like to welcome you all in Paris, and thank you for accepting our invitation to participate to this event. All the authorities that have an interest in the area of security at national and European level are represented today together with the major stakeholders of the private sector. I have no doubt that this will favor fruitful debates and a comprehensive overview of major challenges and issues regarding the security of retail payments. This conference organized here in Paris illustrates the continuous support that the Banque de France has been providing to the Secure Pay forum from the very beginning, in order to promote the best practices in the field of security for retail payments in Europe. This support has its roots in the Banque de France’s mandate which, since 2001, explicitly requires that we ensure the safety of cashless payments.

Øystein Børsum: Ownership and climate risk in the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) – on the tools for addressing climate risk in the fund Speech by Mr Øystein Børsum, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), Oslo, 21 December 2021. * * * Accompanying presentation:www.bis.org/review/r212312d_presentation.pdf Actual presentation may depart from the published text  Introduction Climate change is an issue that matters. Chart: Emissions must come down The global economy as it stands today is not sustainable. But it needs to be, and so emissions must come down. This is an issue for everyone – and not least the fund. With our broadly diversified, global portfolio and long-term horizon, in many ways we stand or fall with the global economy. Norges Bank is a financial investor. Our mission as the manager of the fund is to build and safeguard financial wealth for future generations. But the way we manage the fund can also have an impact beyond the purely financial, such as on the transition to a low-carbon economy. What our role should be – and what our work should involve – is what I will be discussing today. Back in the summer, an expert group delivered its report to the Ministry of Finance with recommendations for how climate risk should be addressed at the fund. Norges Bank has spent the autumn assessing these recommendations and how they might be implemented. This week, the Executive Board submitted its response to the Ministry.
Instead, it is claimed, it should have remained until now – and probably even longer – at the 0.25 per cent to which it was cut in July 2009. This assumption has then been used to calculate how much lower unemployment might have been if the Riksbank had not raised the repo rate.2 Of course, we can never know for certain what would have happened if we had acted differently. But what this argument appears to disregard is that when the Riksbank began to raise the repo rate in the middle of 2010, the situation was such that the Swedish economy had recovered surprisingly quickly from the crisis (see Figure 5). Growth was very fast, around 6 per cent for the first quarter when calculated as an annual rate, with a final outcome of more than 6 per cent for the year as a whole. Almost all indicators of economic activity were pointing upwards and the inflation rate was almost 2 per cent, in terms of the CPIF. The traditional reasons alone, without taking into account risks linked to household debt, gave a strong indication that it was time to begin increasing the repo rate. In addition, although lending to households had declined from double digits prior to the crisis, it was still increasing by 9 per cent, which was much faster than disposable incomes.

The Governing Council’s wide-ranging decisions of last week are geared towards this aim. They were based on the assessment that, in the current fragile market environment, the PEPP remains the best, and most effective, instrument to respond to the dual risks of a shortfall of inflation from our medium-term aim and of fragmentation in the euro area, which threatens the singleness of our monetary policy. The PEPP’s anatomy provides the flexibility – across time, jurisdictions and market segments – that is needed to effectively counter the specific challenges that COVID-19 poses. This flexibility is a key element of PEPP and will be maintained throughout its lifetime. Thank you. 1 See, for example, Autor, D. et al. (2017), “The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms”, NBER  Working Paper Series, National Bureau of Economic Research, No 23396, May; and Gutiérrez, G. and Philippon, T. (2017), “Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S.”, NBER Working Paper Series, No 23583, National Bureau of Economic Research, July. 2 See Ari, A., Chen, S. and Ratnovski, L. (2020), “The dynamics of non-performing loans during banking crises: a  new database”, Working Paper Series, No. 2395, ECB. 3 See, for example, Vayanos, D. and J.-Luc Vila (2009), “A Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term Structure of Interest  Rates”, NBER Working Paper No. 15487. See also Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011, 2013) and D’Amico and King (2013). 4 Announcement effects are event-specific and may change over time.
Particularly economic independence of central banks – the freedom of taking policy decisions independently of political interference – places Chile well above the average level of independence of both emerging and developed economies in 2003. Chile has shown a responsible fiscal policy, which has contributed significantly to successful monetary policy. During the 1990s, the fiscal balance averaged a surplus of 1.5% of GDP. The above-mentioned structural fiscal surplus rule stabilizes government spending over time, by linking it explicitly to permanent government revenue. Therefore fiscal dominance of monetary policy is ruled out in Chile, as a result of central bank autonomy and Chile’s sound fiscal policy. Public debt has shown a substantial decline since the 1990s, as a result of prudent fiscal policy. The share of consolidated gross public debt has been reduced from 76% of GDP in 1990 to 20% of GDP in 2006, whereas the consolidated net public debt position turned from 34% of GDP in 1990 to -6% in 2006 (figure 3). The successful performance of the fiscal position has been enhanced by the fiscal balance rule applied since 2001 (figure 4). Chile’s good growth performance, complemented by a market-based incentive structure, appropriate regulation and sound supervision of the financial system, has resulted in a safe and sound financial system and deep capital markets. As a result of the major banking crisis that came with the deep 1982-1983 recession, the 1986 Banking Law enhanced regulation and supervision of the financial system.

Under the strategy plan for 2020-2022, the Executive Board will continue to use external managers in markets and market segments where local knowledge is particularly relevant. After the Storting had discussed the white paper on the GPFG in 2019, the Ministry gave Norges Bank permission to invest in unlisted infrastructure for renewable energy. This is reflected in the strategy for the next three years adopted by the Executive Board. The Bank will assess each investment in relation to risk and return. The management of the GPFG is required to be cost-effective. Norges Bank aims to keep total 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  internal management costs in the period 2020-2022 below 0.05 percent of assets under management. In recent years, the number of Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) employees has been reduced and administrative support functions across the Bank are being streamlined. The Executive Board will continue to monitor costs closely. In the course of 2020, the Executive Board has strengthened the Bank's work as advisor to the Ministry, in accordance with our new mandate. In this year's white paper, the Ministry proposes changes in the composition of the equity benchmark index. The equity allocation to Europe will be reduced somewhat over time, and the allocation to North America will be correspondingly increased. This is in line with Norges Bank's advice. Norges Bank works systematically to set principles, exercise ownership rights and invest responsibly. Our work on responsible investment underpins the objective of the highest possible return.
Low price and wage inflation Not everyone benefits from a more closely integrated global economy and new technology. In many countries, the competition for low-skilled jobs has intensified, depressing wages for these workers. On the other hand, technological advances have pushed up demand for high-skilled labour for which there is a wage premium. The result is wider wage gaps. The income distribution between labour and capital has also changed. It had long been a widely-held view among economists that the labour share of GDP would remain fairly constant over time. Keynes described the stability of the labour share as “one of the most surprising, yet best-established, facts in the whole range of economic statistics”.6 Yet since 1980, corporate profits have risen faster than wages (Chart 6). 6 Keynes, J.M (1939): "Relative Movements of Real Wages and Output", The Economic Journal 49 (193), pp 34–51. 6  Norges Bank  Chart 6 Labour share. Labour costs as a share of GDP. 1) Selected advanced economies. Percent 55  55  54  54  53  53  52  52  51  51  50 1978  1983  1988  1993  1998  2003  2008  2013  Economic perspectives 15 february 2018  50 2018  1) Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (data for West Germany before 1992), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. GDP−weighted average.

1990 = 100 350  350  300  300  250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  Finance and insurance Mainland Norway  50 1990  50 1994  1998  2002  2006  2010  2014  Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  In parallel, banks’ branch networks have changed. In 1987, there were almost 200 bank branches in Oslo, while today there are fewer than 40. This has cut costs substantially for both banks and the general public. Our payment system is now among the world’s most modern and cost-efficient. 4 Salvanes, K.G. (2017): “Omstillingsevnen i norsk økonomi under finanskrisen” [The adaptability of the Norwegian economy during the financial crisis], Arbeidsnotat 2017/7, Ministry of Finance (Norwegian only). 4  The payment system is facing an era of change. Use of cash is on the decline, while deposit money is becoming available in ever newer forms. The next innovation is instant settlement, which will make it possible to transfer funds from one account to another immediately, regardless of amount. Maybe your car purchase can be paid by pressing “send” on your mobile phone and, at the very same instant, the seller can safely hand you the keys. Norges Bank Economic perspectives 15 february 2018  Banks continue to play a dominant role in the payment system, but there are clear signs that their position can be challenged. New regulations and technology are making it easier for new participants to take market share.
At the same time, banks are required to build additional capital buffers, which further constrain their pay-out ratio. So dividend prospects are doubly affected and that explains why share prices are reacting to negative news on growth. This movement has been more pronounced for French banks which are suffering from two specific vulnerabilities, one real, one exaggerated. The real vulnerability is their dependence on dollar funding, due to the scale of their international activities, which they may have been initially too slow to address effectively. It is currently being dealt with through a combination of deleveraging and consolidation. In the meantime, in order to ease this transition, the Eurosystem, together with other central banks across the world, has decided to conduct US dollar liquidity-providing operations with a maturity of three months. A more exaggerated concern about French banks is their exposure to sovereign risk. Let me just point out some facts: total exposure of major French banks to the sovereign risk of socalled “peripheral countries” amounts to € To take an extreme – and from my view point – totally unrealistic scenario – a 50% haircut on Greece and 25% haircut on Italy and Spain would result in a 12% loss of core Tier One capital. In terms of liquidity, the Eurosystem refinancing policy provides for an unlimited provision on an extended period and the collateral held by French banks in eligible assets is much above their present needs.

Jean-Paul Redouin: A French and central banker point of view of the current situation Speech by Mr Jean-Paul Redouin, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the first anniversary of Bank of France’s reserve management facility, New York, 11 October 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, It is a great pleasure to welcome you in this fascinating place. We were gathered here one year ago, for the opening of BANQUE DE FRANCE premises in New York.   BANQUE DE FRANCE has a long history of being present in New York, and deploying a reserve management desk within our own office is a logical conclusion of this lasting presence. In the context of the present turmoil this new organization helps us manage our portfolios efficiently and improves our understanding of market developments. I would like here to thank our team for its dedication and skill in this challenging responsibility. It gives me also the opportunity to share with you my understanding of the Eurozone and the way it works.   The first anniversary of our reserve management facility in New York happens to coincide also with the end of my tenure as Deputy Governor of BANQUE DE FRANCE, in a few months. For me both events are closely associated: I happen to be among the “happy few” that have been offered the opportunity to spend a year In New York representing BANQUE DE FRANCE at the Fed and vis a vis the financial community thirty years ago.
of Agencies 1  Raiffeisen Bank  37  46  2  National Commercial Bank  22  9  3  United Bank of Albania  3  1  4  Italian Albanian Bank  5  Italian Development Bank (former Dardania)  1  6  Tirana Bank  31  4  7  National Bank of Greece (Tirana Branch)  4  8  8  International Commercial Bank  5  9  Alpha Bank (Tirana Branch)  9  1  10  American Bank of Albania  10  11  11  ProCredit Bank  20  1  12  First Investment Branch)  1  1  13  Emporiki Bank  3  4  14  Credit Bank of Albania  1  1  15  Credins Bank  10  4  16  Banka Popullore  29  17  Union Bank  1  3  TOTAL  187  100  1  6  Bank  (Tirana  According to INSTAT, the population of Albania totalled 3,102,777 inhabitants in 2003, 3,119,543 in 2004 and 3,134,982 in 2005. BIS Review 101/2006  3  5.

The increase in the number of banks, branches and their agencies, as well as the growing number of bank employees have caused the coverage of the population to improve significantly. Thus, the number of inhabitants per bank, banking unit and per bank employee has decreased considerably. 2  BIS Review 101/2006  Table 2: Coverage with banking services 2003  2004  2005  2,236  2,816  3,479  161  188  250  149  176  217  13.9  15  13.9  bank  206,851  194,971  184,410  banking unit  20,815  16,593  12,539  bank employee  1,388  1,108  901  Number of employees Number of branches, agencies Number of employees per: bank banking unit 1  Number of inhabitants per :  Table 3: The expansion of the banks’ network by the end of the 9-month period of 2006Banks Nof No. Banks No. of Branches No.
In particular, more effort is required to ensure that domestic inputs are priced competitively, and hence the need for continued wage moderation; to raise productivity levels; and to ensure faster progress towards key Lisbon Agenda objectives such as educational attainment and innovation. Measures aimed at strengthening the economy’s physical infrastructure and the quality of its human capital, a more efficient delivery of support services by the public and private sectors, and enhanced competition both in product and resource markets are crucial in this regard. This is the only way to increase the economy’s capacity to  2  BIS Review 77/2007  respond flexibly and competitively to new challenges and opportunities, and thus derive the full benefits of EMU. A high level of economic convergence and flexibility, however, are not sufficient for a successful transition to the euro. This also requires both careful logistical planning and public acceptance of the single currency. As for the former, the necessary structures have been in place for two years and they seem to be working well. At the apex stands the National Euro Changeover Committee (NECC), which has drawn up a national Master Plan. The Central Bank of Malta is represented on the Steering Committee which oversees the work of the NECC, it participates in the financial sector committee of the NECC and it is also present on a task force responsible for co-ordinating national training activities related to the euro.

Tail risks with counterparty risk correlation The first category of contracts falls under the broad headline of “wrong-way” risk in tail events, and is purely statistical in nature. The particular issue is focussed on contracts that can be perceived of as providing insurance yet, in a stress scenario, when the contract is sufficiently in the money to be worth calling, there is a significant conditional probability that the insurance provider is no longer in business to pay out. In what follows, we look how such problems arise using practical examples and consider what lessons should be drawn. 1  For example, the Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, July 2009, “Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Exchanges”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  When investor “A” decides to buy protection from bank “B” on exposure to a third company “X,” she may or may not explicitly take into account that in the event of default by X, B may in fact also be in trouble. Whether or not she does so would depend on the reason for the trade. If A wants default protection then that default correlation certainly should be taken into account2. But if, for example, the goal is just to reduce the price volatility of holdings of a certain corporate bond issued by X, this default correlation may not be seen as that relevant. As a practical example, take the case of a pension fund managing its corporate bond portfolio.
In a possible downturn, authorities can release the CCyB, as many did during the pandemic, freeing up capital that banks can use either to absorb losses or to lend to the real economy. This mitigates the likelihood of a downward spiral of emergency credit  2  At the end of 2020, total banking sector assets stood at roughly CHF 3,800 billion. This is equivalent to around 500% of Swiss GDP – a high ratio by international standards. tightening. Finally, the activation of a CCyB could increase lending costs and reduce credit growth, thereby dampening the build-up of vulnerabilities. In theory, the range of feasible instruments is broad. In practice, the design and character of macroprudential instruments are typically adapted to country-specific circumstances in order to increase their acceptance and effectiveness. Let me explain how we have achieved this in Switzerland. In Switzerland, three agencies share a mandate to contribute to financial stability: the SNB, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), and the Federal Council and administration. These authorities have directly involved banks in the design of macroprudential instruments. In fact, the borrower-based instruments implemented in 2012 build on a pre-existing tradition of qualitative self-regulation guidelines of the Swiss Bankers Association concerning mortgage lending. Authorities and banks have worked together to complement these qualitative guidelines with quantitative requirements concerning the degree and speed of amortisation and the necessary down payments by borrowers. These quantitative guidelines serve now as minimum standard requirements.

In doing so, it has blurred the information content of many important variables or indicators relevant for the monetary policy maker, making monetary policy probably more complex in a context of increased uncertainty. Economic theory usually distinguishes between parameter and model uncertainty. In the presence of parameter uncertainty, i.e. when the policy maker is uncertain about the impact a policy instrument has on the economy, economic theory suggests that it is optimal to respond more cautiously than would be the case in the absence of uncertainty (this is the well-known Brainard conservative principle). By contrast, model uncertainty would require more active monetary policy, the idea being to insure oneself against particularly bad outcomes. I will leave it to your wisdom to guess in the present circumstances which of these two approaches would be preferable. Thank you for your attention. 5  Bordes, C., Clerc L. and Marimoutou V. (2007): “Is there a break in equilibrium velocity in the euro area?”, Banque de France, Notes d’Etudes et de Recherche n° 165, February. 4  BIS Review 103/2007