samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Today, with a mobile penetration rate of 145%, internet transactions are becoming more prevalent. Last year, Malaysians spent 23% more on online shopping platforms compared to 2015. This is consistent with what is happening around the globe. The number and value of non-cash transactions have increased steadily in recent years. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Balance between paper and digital However, despite these observations, central banks around the globe expect cash to stay necessary and never go away. There are several reasons for this but ultimately they boil down to having a good mix of both. Think about the printed book. There are some things that an e-book simply cannot offer. You can’t turn down a corner, leaf through the pages, or crack a spine. However conversely, reading off a tablet or Kindle saves you the hassle of lugging around heavy books or lengthy academic articles – especially when you do not need to read them from cover to cover. As a policy maker, I would think that there are three elements, or the ‘3S’, that we should consider in determining an optimal balance of paper and digital, cash and cashless. Security The first consideration is security. Counterfeiting is as old as money itself. However, cash has become more secure in recent years. In Malaysia, the amount of counterfeits discovered reduced by 25% in the past year. The currency industry is continuing to make good progress in enhancing security features.

Encik Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Optimal balance of paper and digital, cash and cashless; and next page for physical currency Welcoming address by Mr Encik Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Currency Conference 2017, Kuala Lumpur, 15 May 2017. * * * Mr Richard Haycock, Chairman, Currency Research, Fellow central bankers, Distinguished participants. A very good morning and a warm Selamat Datang to Malaysia. Paper lives on A lot has changed in the past 10 years. In May 2007, there was no such thing as a smartphone. Tablets did not exist, and the human race had not discovered the fast-expanding universe of mobile apps. Back then, we read the news by leafing through the pages of a large newspaper. We listened to music with CDs, and bought or rented DVDs to watch movies. Today, most of these are streamed through internet devices. When e-book sales increased by over 1,000% in the two years leading up to 2010, many questioned the future of the printed book. The bankruptcy of Borders in the United States the following year solidified these fears. Similarly, there has been much hype about the end of cash. This has been sparked by the rising use of e-payments and the recent proliferation of digital currencies in an increasingly virtual world. However, just as physical books continue to enjoy increasing sales, we have seen cash in circulation rise in many countries, quicker than their GDP growth for some.
The participants are evaluated to a greater extent against other market participants. This increases the incentives to do the same as everyone else, so that one at least does not report poorer results than the average. Information on other participants’ behaviour has also become more easily accessible, which can further increase the risk of herd behaviour. This increases the risks of liquidity problems, particularly in the event of financial crises, when an increasing number want to sell similar assets at the same time. Moreover, market participants’ tendency to take risks has probably increased as they are evaluated in an increasingly short-term perspective. 31 It has become simpler to choose investments in securities with a specific liquidity, maturity and risk through so-called securitisation. What this means is that credit institutions, often banks, with a portfolio of for instance mortgages, sells this portfolio as a package to another credit institution. The buyer then converts the package into new securities with specific risks and interest terms – this is what comprises the actual securitisation – and sells the package on to new investors. These new packages are attractive investment objects as they often provide a good return in relation to the risk. Securitisation can increase the efficiency of the financial system, but it also entails risks, which was showed by the global financial crisis 2008-2009. One reason for the risks possibly increasing is if securitisation affects the banks’ capital requirements.

I would like to discuss the changes in the financial environment and how they affect our different areas of operation, but before I do so I shall talk about the Riksbank's main role in the financial system, namely to provide the Swedish economy with safe money that is easy and efficient to use. The Riksbank provides the economy with money that safe and simple to use Money is needed so that we can buy and sell goods and services. If we are to have confidence in money, and want to use it, it needs to be both safe and easy to use. This requires in turn financial stability, price stability and smoothly-functioning payment systems. Let me describe how the Riksbank tries to create the right conditions. If we start with money being safe, this means that one can rely on money representing a particular value in goods and services, and that it will retain this value until the day one wants to redeem it for goods and services. The pieces of paper that we issue have no value in themselves, but function as a form of evidence that someone has produced something of value. 2 In the academic literature there is, for instance, a branch known as ‘monetary economics’ or in its modern form, ‘new monetarist economics’ 3, which looks into why money arises and under what conditions it retains its value.
At the other end of the spectrum, there is an important question of whether the macroprudential authorities should be able to require changes in initial margin levels in the face of market exuberance. In the UK, there will be a debate about whether the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee should have that power. The Basel Committee of the Global Financial System has already produced a report on it.1 In a different dimension, there is an important question about whether clearing houses should adopt what is called Gross Margining rather than Net Margining. What this means is that a clearing member – ie a dealer – could not net off positions of their various customers and their own house position when the amount of margin they have to hold with the clearing house is determined. That would affect the incentives of clearing members to collect minimum margin amounts from their customers. And, more generally, it would probably reduce the amount of leverage in the system and simplify the chain of credit. In terms of public policy objectives, this is, therefore, about more than investor protection through the segregation of client moneys, and so needs to be debated against the goal of preserving stability without impairing efficiency. The resolution of CCPs If CCPs can do a lot of good by simplifying the network of counterparty exposures and imposing standard valuations and margin requirements, conversely it is an understatement that it would be a disaster if a clearing house failed.

A pre-programmed allocation of losses would be akin to the old “Down To The Last Drop” rule that used to be employed by a Chicago clearing house, under which surviving clearing members ultimately had collectively to absorb all losses: mutualisation. (It was dropped because, as banks became futures-exchange clearing members, bank supervisors didn’t like the unlimited exposure of CMs who were banks. An example of unjoined-up thinking.) That’s the option around propping up the clearing house to keep it going. The other option is some kind of wind down of the Clearing House’s book. That involves a combination of closing out part of the book in the market, and doing something with any residue that can’t be dealt in the market. One obvious thing to do with the residue is to put it back, pro rata, to the surviving (and fit) clearing members. But that is also a variant of the DTTLD rule, but “in kind” rather than cash. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Maybe I’ve got this wrong but, in summary, it seems to me that questions about orderly resolution of a failed CCP have to involve clarity around the extent to which surviving clearing members pick up the pieces. Summary The design, management and oversight of CCPs is something that we are going to come back to again and again in the years ahead.
Fiscal multipliers were large at the start of the adjustment process, as the IMF has shown.9 But analytical work also shows that an increase in the estimated short-term fiscal multiplier can be triggered by an impaired credit channel, high spreads and a non-credible fiscal policy.10 Moreover, increased political uncertainties and a lack of implementation of structural reforms can lead to a loss of confidence, undermining demand and investment. The related output losses should not be attributed to fiscal consolidation. Let me elaborate further on the credibility issue. The improvement in structural fiscal balances that I talked about earlier needs to continue so as to ensure that the debt dynamics remain sustainable. This is part of the fight against the loss of market confidence. Progress in fiscal adjustment has already boosted market confidence, as successful bond issuance by Portugal and Ireland indicates. There is no credible alternative to this, as imbalances need to be unwound, access to market restored, and debt made sustainable in order to return to robust and sustainable growth in the medium term. High debt is bad for growth.11 The output losses we have seen in recent years are also caused by excessive public and private debt accumulated until 2009. Let me turn to the credit channel now. We have evidence of a further significant fragmentation of the credit supply since mid-2010; this has been shown by the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey as well as its biannual survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the euro area (SAFE).

Still, we are working with the same timetable.” A storm of criticism from banks, academics and politicians in recent months has strengthened expectations that the final draft will not be completed until some time in early 2004, instead of end-2003 as planned. Critics blast the rules as fearsomely complex, too prescriptive and incurring costs far greater than the potential benefits. Some areas require more work, such as risks posed by highly diversified banks and on credit derivatives. Regulators were prepared to adapt the accord as they gained a better understanding of new risk modelling techniques, said Caruana. “Certainly there will be issues that will be important that we cannot manage now,” he said. “We have recognised that the Basel II process is an evolutionary approach.”  2  BIS Review 39/2003  The Basel II accord, so named because it will replace the 1988 Basel Accord, would update existing rules on how much capital large international banks must hold to remain sound and reflect changes in financial services over the last 15 years. Due for implementation in 2006, it would set standards for how bank capital is supervised and what type of financial disclosure institutions must make. Experts say that a delay in publishing the final draft of even several months could throw the target implementation date back by a full year if it means domestic rule-making and legislative deadlines in Europe cannot be met.
The deliberative model has not been tried and tested in anger for the full gamut of societal decisions. As put, that is true. Yet there is at least one domain of public policy where this model has been tried and tested (both literally and metaphorically) for a wide range of societal decisions over many centuries: the judicial system. Many judicial systems draw on both expert (judges) and non-expert (juries) opinion, like the Athenians. Non-experts are drawn randomly from the population, as in Athens. There is a clear process for deliberation among participants, as in the boule. This system is the nerve-centre of decision-making on a defined set of issues, as in Ancient Greece. The English judicial system has already lasted for almost 1,000 years, more than twice as long as the Greek Empire. The Next Revolution  Against this backdrop, what concrete steps might central banks take to build an improved infrastructure for engagement with the general public? Can it build on others’ experience in engaging wider society, in ways which improve the public’s and policymakers’ understanding of the economy? Let me offer some suggestions, which are motivated by recent initiatives at the Bank of England aimed at doing just that. 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  19  (a)  Minding Your Language  Historically, the language of central banks has often been pitched at a level which has made it difficult for most non-experts to understand. This has contributed to the public’s understanding and trust deficits.

The sample period is relatively short so our conclusions need to be cautious. And forecast accuracy is not the same as policy acumen. Nonetheless, Chart 3 suggests that, in a complex forecasting task, there is little to choose between experts and 37  non-experts. Tetlock’s second key point, which qualifies his first, is that not everyone can be a super-forecaster. A randomly-chosen panel of non-experts cannot by itself be expected to outperform the experts. Chart 3 demonstrates that. Super-forecasting is not simply a law of large numbers. Tetlock shows that non-expert super-forecasters have particular characteristics, including inquisitiveness and independence of mind. Only those with these characteristics consistently outperform the experts. We do not have a clean test of this hypothesis for our inflation forecasts. But just imagine the Bank had been able to identify in advance one “super-forecaster” among the pool of outside forecasters. How much would that have improved its forecasts over the sample period? The gap in two year-ahead forecast errors between the MPC and the best external forecaster in the panel of outside forecasters is around ¼ percentage point. 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing, but this gives some measure of the scope for forecast improvement. 38  If we take Tetlock’s points together, they suggest that there is real value in seeking the views of non-experts to help inform difficult decisions. But there are limits to these benefits. It is unrealistic to expect everyone to become a super-forecaster.
In the first nine months of the year, the fall in Gross Value Added has eased across virtually all the productive sectors, with the principal exception of energy. Leaving this sector aside, Gross Value Added is expected to have declined by 2.2%, thereby breaking the trend towards increasingly bigger contractions in this aggregate. This turnaround in Gross Value Added is closely related to the momentum of exports and reflects the fact that sales abroad, and, especially, those targeted on countries outside the European Union, have increased their relative weight in net turnover. On the figures to September, Net Profit rose to account for almost 12% of the sector’s Gross Value Added. In short, the Central Balance Sheet Data Office results published today corroborate the turnaround in the Spanish economy suggested by other macroeconomic indicators, although they also confirm that the momentum of expansion is still weak; accordingly, we must persevere with the reforms and policies that have enhanced our competitiveness, the main engine of the improvement witnessed these past months. I shall now very briefly comment on three important projects for our financial system. The first is part of the process of reform of securities clearance, settlement and registration in Spain. I refer to the introduction of a central counterparty (CCP) for stock market operations. The use of an entity of this type has been habitual in the derivatives markets and also, more recently, in bond markets.

So far, 24 European central securities depositories, accounting for practically all euro area markets, have committed themselves to taking part. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The second European initiative I would like to mention is SEPA, the Single Euro Payments Area. The goal of the SEPA Project is to make electronic payments as easy, convenient and straightforward for the residents of any euro area member country to carry out as are their cash payments in other countries in the union. The initial aim is to eliminate the differences between making a national payment and a cross-border one, although the benefits extend also to payments made in the national arena. What is involved is a further step in the ongoing integration of financial services in Europe. To achieve this, we must adapt to a new set of rules and uniform standards in Europe. But we have very little time remaining: Community legislation envisages SEPA being in place as from 1 February next year. It is a far-reaching project, necessitating changes in the relationship between paymentservices users and providers. That involves efforts and investment on the part of financial institutions, but also affects users, irrespective of their size. It is important that banks should strive to make the transition by their customers easier. In this connection, communications and advice to customers must be stepped up, informing them of the new circumstances ahead and offering them the necessary support in their migration to the new payments scenario.
The Green Swan explores three dimensions of this coordination: ‐ firstly, the interactions between monetary and prudential policies with fiscal policies; 14  See for instance the call for action issued by Nobel Prize Laureates and other experts: Agre et al. (2021). Our Planet, Our Future: An Urgent Call for Action. Accessible at: https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2021/04/nobel‐prize‐laureates‐and‐other‐experts‐issue‐urgent‐call‐for‐ action‐after‐our‐planet‐our‐future‐summit  5  ‐ ‐  secondly, how central banks can facilitate the international monetary and financial coordination needed on climate change; and, lastly, how central banks can contribute to promoting values and behaviours that are particularly important for the low‐carbon transition, such as long‐termism. For example, climate change is now at the agenda of the G7 and the G20 finance Tracks where representatives of finance ministries and central banks work together. New forms of cooperation between the public and the private sector have emerged as well, such as on the very important topic of disclosure: ‐ The TCFD for climate‐related disclosure; tasked by the FSB (finance ministries and CB) but private led; the work of the TCFD is now taken into account by public authorities and standard‐setting bodies at the global level (IFRS) as well as in the EU (EU Commission / EFRAG) ‐ The TNFD, a private‐led initiative that brings together industry, NGOs, international organisations and public authorities, aiming to develop a nature‐related disclosure. As Mark Carney stressed yesterday, disclosure should be a priority and his goal for the Cop 26 is to make the TCFD framework mandatory.

See ‘Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney at the London School of Economics, 16 January 2017. 16 Each observation shows the central projection for spare capacity or excess demand at the end of the second year of the forecast period (the 'Year 2' point) on the horizontal axis against the central projection for four-quarter CPI inflation at Year 2 on the vertical axis from successive Inflation Reports. The left-most observation (labelled "Aug. 2016 no stimulus") is a counterfactual version of the August 2016 Inflation Report forecasts with the effect of the MPC's Bank Rate cut, Term Funding Scheme and Asset Purchases removed. See ’Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney at the London School of Economics, 16h January 2017, for further details and discussion. 17 See Table 4.C in the May 2018 Inflation Report, available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/inflation-report/2018/may-2018. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  Chart 7: Trade-off in successive Inflation Report projections at Year 3 3.0  Inflation (%)  August 2016 2.5  November 2016  February 2017 August 2017  May 2017 November 2017 February 2018  2.0 -1.0  August 2016, no stimulus  -0.5  May 2018  Excess demand (%)  0.5  1.0  0.0  Preferred trade-off if λ=0.1  1.5  Preferred trade-off if λ=1 1.0 A Guidance Stocktake As the UK enters the most critical phase of the Brexit negotiations, it is useful to take stock of forward guidance and its potential role during the upcoming period.
To be sure, the highest level of policy integration would logically involve building a genuine fiscal union, as well as completing the Single Market; but that would surely require more ex ante convergence and resolution of legacies from the past. My view is that we should leave the door open to further integration for countries that are willing and ready to consider it. I will come back to it, but first I would like to highlight what I consider to be the most urgently needed part of EMU reform, namely. 8  Peter Kenen, Currency unions and policy domains, Princeton University, November 2000. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  II. How to set up a strong institution to fully coordinate national fiscal and structural policies. This institution is what would enable us to achieve the second level of integration, i.e. full coordination of national policies. In economic terms it would help internalise negative externalities (e.g. demand spillovers, or financial contagion) from asymmetric economic shocks across jurisdictions, as well as optimize positive externalities between fiscal and structural policies. In political terms it would help make the Euro area more than the sum of its parts. Jean Monnet famously declared that “nothing is possible without men, but nothing lasts without institutions”. I am convinced that establishing a strong institution led by a euro area Finance Minister would contribute to cement further integration of economic policy.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Europe at a crossroads – how to achieve efficient economic governance in the euro area? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, recorded for the event at Bruegel, Brussels, 22 March 2016. *  *  *  Summary There is a growing perception of the need to rethink the economic governance of the euro area. Compelling ideas have been put forward to that effect; yet their implementation is tricky, especially in the present climate of Euroscepticism. Shifting from ideas to action has become urgent if monetary policy is not to remain the only game in town. Clearly, the single monetary policy cannot be a substitute for the coordination of national economic policies or the lack of reforms. To be sure, the debate over EMU reform is politically loaded; but for euro area citizens the poor coordination of national policies involves a high cost in terms of growth, of several points of GDP. The economic case therefore needs to be made: this discussion is not about “more Brussels”, it is about more growth and jobs in Europe. In addition, it is not a choice between domestic reforms or European coordination; we need both. Between complete integration – of the monetary-policy type – and monitored national policies, as currently conducted, the missing link is “full coordination” of fiscal and structural policies. This is clearly shown in a matrix crossing these three degrees of integration and the four policy dimensions (monetary, financial, fiscal and structural).