samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Additionally, it provides for a new resolution procedure for large financial companies, a creation of a new agency responsible for implementing and enforcing compliance with consumer financial laws, introduces more rigorous regulatory capital requirements, affects significant changes in the regulation of OTC derivatives, includes reform of the regulation of credit rating agencies, implements changes to corporate governance and executive compensation practices, incorporates the Volcker Rule, requires registration of advisers to certain private funds, and affects significant changes in the securitization market. In the EU, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive MiFID is an important step in the biggest overhaul of financial markets regulation in the EU for a decade. However, the new regulatory framework consists of Directive (MiFID 2) and Regulation on markets in financial instruments (MiFIR). It is an integral part of the EU’s strategy to address the effects of the financial crisis, but at the same time aims to bring greater transparency to markets and to strengthen investor protection. These changes are a key for restoring the trust in the EU financial markets. In reaction to the global financial crisis, the EU has also introduced the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) that initiates a reporting obligation for OTC derivatives, a clearing obligation for eligible OTC derivatives, measures to reduce counterparty credit risk and operational risk for bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives, common rules for central counterparties (CCPs) and trade repositories (TRs), and rules on the establishment of interoperability between CCPs.

Examples include: • A more demanding framework for the capital, leverage, and liquidity of banks, prepared by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and known as the Basel III Accord since its initial exposition in 2010;  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  • Special regulatory treatment of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), such as additional capital (or in the Basel jargon, “loss absorbency”) requirements; and • Additional disclosure obligations for banks. On the other hand, entities or activities that until 2008 were mostly outside of the scope of regulators were made subject to a comprehensive regulatory framework: • Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, • Executive compensation, • Credit rating agencies, • Hedge funds, “shadow banking” (i.e. entities and activities that are not regulated as banks, but present bank-like systemic risk profiles) and, more recently, • Financial benchmarks (following the detecting of fraud in the setting of LIBOR, the London Interbank Offered Rate, and other similar reference rates). All those initiatives that were envisaged by the G20 are translated into regulatory changes in US and Europe. In the US, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (or known as Dodd-Frank Act) implements changes that, among other things, affect the oversight and supervision of financial institutions. The Dodd-Frank Act creates the Financial Stability Oversight Council to oversee financial institutions.
loans to households foreign-currency-denominated loans lei-denominated loans 26.8  40 35 30  19.6  22.7  20.7  20  16.6  15.4  12.7  13.3 11.3  15  5  35.9  18.6 19.5  25  10  39.3  11.8 10.2  4.8  6.3  7.4  9.4  11.4  14.1  17.3 16.4  2006  2007  19.7  16.6  0 2004  2005  2008  Source: National Bank of Romania, National Institute of Statistics  Government credit hovered around relatively low levels during the period under review (Chart 5). 8  BIS Review 5/2010  Chart 5 Government credit percent of GDP  4.0 3.4  3.5 3.0 2.3  2.5 2.0 1.5  1.2  1.1  1.0  2004  2005  2006  1.0 0.5 0.0 2007  2008  Source: National Bank of Romania, National Institute of Statistics  Banks came to rely heavily on external financing, while the mismatch between foreign currency-denominated assets and forex liabilities of both companies and households widened. In 2004, the difference between forex-denominated deposits and loans in the corporate sector stood at around lei –5 billion, increasing sevenfold by March 2009, i.e. lei –34 billion. As for households, the differences stood at lei +5 billion and lei –28 billion respectively (Chart 6).

Figure II CZECH REPUBLIC nominal exchange rate vs the euro  effective exchange rate (+) appreciation / (-) depreciation  CZK/EUR  40  index, Dec. 2005=100  40  daily exchange rate  38  140  nominal  38  annual average 36  36  34  34  32  32  30  30  28  28  26  26  24  24  22  22  130  real  120 110 100  80  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  70 1999  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  90  HUNGARY effective exchange rate  nominal exchange rate vs the euro  (+) appreciation / (-) depreciation  index, Dec. 2005=100  HUF/EUR  120  320  2009  70 2008  220  80  2007  220  90  2006  230  100  2005  230  110  2004  240  2009  240  2008  250  2007  250  2006  260  2005  260  2004  270  2003  270  2002  280  2001  280  2000  290  1999  290  2003  300  2002  300  2001  310  annual average  nominal real  2000  310  daily exchange rate  1999  320  Source: ECB, BIS  14  BIS Review 5/2010  Figure II (continued) POLAND nominal exchange rate vs the euro  effective exchange rate (+) appreciation / (-) depreciation  index, Dec. 2005=100  PLN/EUR  5  4.8  130  nominal  4.8  125  4.6  real 4.6  120  4.4  4.4  115  4.2  4.2  110  4 4  105 3.8  3.8  100 3.6  3.6  95  3.4  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  1999  2003  80 2002  85  3 2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  2004  annual average  3  90  3.2  2001  daily exchange rate  3.2  2000  3.4  ROMANIA effective exchange rate  nominal exchange rate vs the euro  (+) appreciation / (-) depreciation  index, Dec. 2005=100  RON/EUR 4.6  125  4.6  daily exchange rate 4.4  nominal  4.4  annual average  120  real 115  4.2  4.2  4.0  4.0  3.8  3.8  3.6  3.6  3.4  3.4  3.2  3.2  85  3.0  3.0  80  110 105 100  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  90  2003  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  95  Source: ECB, BIS  The credibility import from the EU and the IMF prevented some private financings from diminishing or at least made them diminish less.
Lars Nyberg: Monetary policy and house prices Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedish Investment Fund Association, Stockholm, 19 May 2010. *  *  *  I would guess that all of us here have at least two things in common. One is that our professional life in recent years has largely revolved around dealing with the effects of a global financial crisis. The other is that we would rather not do it again. Most of you represent the investment fund branch or unit trust investors in one way or another. And a reasonable guess is that recent years have been turbulent for many of you. It is fairly natural that the Riksbank should have been in the eye of the storm during the crisis. Our main tasks are to safeguard financial stability and to keep inflation low and stable, at the same time as contributing to stabilising production and employment. Managing the effects of the crisis and carrying out our statutory tasks in the best possible way has required a number of creative and unusual solutions. And it is not all over yet. The financial markets have recently been shaken up once again. Now the problem is mainly due to Greece, but to some extent also other EU countries such as Spain and Portugal, having serious problems with their government finances. The Swedish banks are not directly exposed to the countries in southern Europe to any great extent.

It is also obvious that the central bank must react to be able to carry out its tasks. So the way a central bank should react afterwards, once the bubble has burst, has not been debated as much as the question of how to act prior to this. Leaning against the wind – act sooner, not just later… This debate has previously been somewhat “polarised” between two stances – to “lean against the wind” or to “clean up afterwards”. The former stance involves the central bank raising its policy rate if property prices and lending increase at an alarming rate, even if an interest rate increase is not obviously justified on the basis of the forecasts for the real economy and inflation. One usually says that the central bank should “lean against the wind”. The basic idea is that keeping the policy rate higher than it would otherwise have been contributes to holding back the rise in property prices and ensuring that the fall in prices that comes sooner or later is much milder. A more balanced development in property prices also leads to more stable developments in the real economy and inflation. Although growth may be slightly lower in the upturn phase, there is on the other hand less risk that property prices will fall dramatically later on, which could contribute to a severe downturn. This is in some ways similar to an insurance policy: By accepting slightly weaker growth in the short term, one reduces the risk of much more negative developments further ahead.
This issue examines the same external risk scenarios I just described. From the financial stability standpoint, we conclude that the risks coming from the U.S. and the Eurozone have subsided, shifting the focus to the Chinese economy as the primary source of risk. The Report also stresses that if these scenarios come true they may have consequences in Chile, given the domestic economic slowdown. Locally, corporate indebtedness has increased in GDP terms. Companies reporting to the Superintendence of Securities and Insurance (SVS) are posting relatively high debt levels by historic standards and profitability is shrinking. Although these tendencies are consistent with corporate patterns observed in other economies, they do signal a reduction in the sector’s resilience to possible sharp adjustments in the economy’s dynamic. Finally, in the past year, the figures of banking commercial credit repayment have deteriorated somewhat in some of the more pro-cyclical sectors, but on aggregate they are still on the favorable side. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The real-estate market dynamic has not changed much from earlier IEFs. New home sales are still strong and inventories are low. In this context, various indicators show that housing prices continued to rise in 2013 (figure 9). Although the upward trend is generalized across geographic zones, some are increasing faster than others (figure 10). The office space market has increased the vacancy rate, and is expected to increase further as new projects enter the market.

One consistent source of strength for the city has been immigration. Over this period, New York City benefited from a sizable influx of immigrants, which more than offset out-migration in many neighborhoods. To illustrate this, let’s take a look at one such neighborhood in Brooklyn, Sunset Park, that was losing residents to the suburbs in the 1960s and 1970s. As property values fell, new migrants from Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and Central America moved in. By 1990, Hispanics comprised about half of all Sunset Park residents. These new residents developed a thriving community, which boosted property values. There was also an influx of Chinese residents, and part of Sunset Park has come to be known as Brooklyn’s Chinatown. There are many other examples where immigrants revitalized whole neighborhoods: Russian and Ukrainian immigrants in Brighton Beach; Chinese and Korean immigrants in Flushing; and Indian immigrants in Jackson Heights, just to name a few. So, has it been all good news for New York City in recent years? Certainly not. Many challenges remain. One by-product of a strong economy and real estate market has been a decline in housing affordability, and an increase in homelessness. It is estimated that there are over 60,000 homeless people in New York City today—almost double the number from 10 years ago and more than four times as high as in the early 1980s. Moreover, poverty rates remain high in many parts of the city, and the education system can certainly be improved.
They must decide whether the new species of players are fish or fowl, in order to regulate them appropriately. In the borderless internet world, cross-border provision of services will be harder to police and regulate. Supervisors will have to cooperate much more closely, sharing information and coordinating responsibilities. WTO Trade liberalisation at the WTO, particularly liberalisation of trade in services, will gradually open up financial markets. This will increase competition in our domestic market, but it will also give us better access to foreign markets, and protect our rights in case of disputes. On balance Singapore will benefit, and so should our institutions, provided they prepare themselves. The General Agreement on Trades in Services (GATS) under WTO is already exerting an important effect, giving us meaningful protection. For example, it was a decisive factor in our favour in the CLOB dispute. 3  BIS Review 30/2000  We finally settled CLOB on acceptable terms without actually going to the WTO. But our rights at the WTO were a major factor which helped bring about this outcome. This measure of protection afforded by WTO’s multilateral framework gives us additional strategic reason to pursue the liberalisation of financial markets, ours as well as other countries’. Free trade agreements But we need a fall-back position in case WTO runs into trouble. After the fiasco of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting, such a scenario has become less unlikely. This is why we are pursuing free trade agreements (FTAs) with several potential partners.

BIS Review 30/2000  2  We have a chance to succeed as a hub, as Asian countries gradually open up protected national markets to foreign players. It will not be easy. It will take time for countries and governments to accept the logic of liberalisation. Too sudden a change, however, will provoke a nationalist reaction. This is happening in Thailand. The Nation reported that a group of nationalistic academics and businessmen, calling themselves the Nation Rescue Club, has attacked the government for selling off the country on the cheap. Its spokesman, a university professor, called on the Thai government to publicise details of the sale of Radanasin Bank to UOB, and Nakornthon Bank to Standard Chartered Bank. The group accused the government of striking acquisition deals which allowed foreign banks to take on virtually no risk since any future losses would be borne by Thai taxpayers’ money. But over time, if the globalisation wave persists in the financial industry, countries will eventually decide that the cost of closing themselves off is too great. They may then change their position, just as over the last two decades they have done in manufacturing, opening up to reduce import barriers, and promote MNC investments and exports. Malaysia’s Governor of Bank Negara has said that Malaysia may open up its banking sector to greater foreign participation, though only after 10 years [BT 30 Mar]. So liberalisation will happen, although to varying degrees in different countries. The internet The internet is having a major impact on financial services.
The Riksbank's policy rate and average lending rates from monetary financial institutions to households and companies, new agreements, all interest-fixation periods. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. Unclear whether the Riksbank's purchases contributed to the krona remaining weak One of the motives behind the Riksbank's acquisition of assets was to avoid the krona strengthening in a situation where inflation was already too low. In that case, inflation would have been pushed down by lower import prices and the demand for Swedish export products would have fallen. This would have brought down economic activity, which would have further dampened inflationary pressures. Since other central banks also had large purchase programmes, the Riksbank's intention was precisely to avoid the krona becoming too strong, not to weaken it.16 It is hardly possible to say with precision how the Riksbank's acquisition of assets affected the exchange rate. The analysis is complicated by, among other things, the fact that the Riksbank published decisions on the asset purchases at the same time as decisions on the policy rate.17 One indication that the purchases had the intended effect is that the krona did not strengthen but weakened, despite the fact that the ECB's monetary policy became increasingly expansionary through both interest rate cuts and extensive asset purchases. However, it is difficult to see any clear evidence that the effect arose as a result of the Riksbank's purchases, for example by foreign investments being crowded out of the Swedish market during this period.

Their study suggests that the American  purchases of government securities did not affect the term structure and did not press down rates on other securities. 10 This interpretation is also in line with the Riksbank's communicated assessment that it would be possible to cut the policy rate to lower levels (see, for example, the Riksbank, 2016). 5 [30]  market, and the even lower rate on short government securities, which also led to a fall in the rate on longer-term government securities. Figure 3. Government bonds and covered bonds against expected policy rate Basis points  Note. Differential between rate on each bond and expected policy rate. Refers to bonds with a maturity of 5 years and an expected policy rate of 5 years ahead. Footnote 7 explains how the expected policy rate is calculated. Sources: Bloomberg, Macrobond, Refinitiv and the Riksbank. A relevant question is whether the Riksbank could have achieved the same effect by cutting the policy rate to −0.80 per cent instead of buying government bonds. I am unsure of the answer, but suspect that the effects would then have been different. Perhaps a lower policy rate had more clearly affected lending rates and also pressured the banks' profitability, but had similar effects on the exchange rate, something I will come back to in a moment.11 I also suspect that the Riksbank would have found it more difficult to communicate an even more negative policy rate.
Over the past three years, we have made considerable efforts in preparing this competition and seeing it through to its successful conclusion last week. This process has involved not only our own experts, but also external consultants. We would like to take this opportunity to thank all of them for the quality of their work and their genuine commitment to this project. We also very much appreciated the good working relations with the City of Frankfurt authorities, which were of great assistance, and we look forward to continuing this excellent cooperation. We would also like to thank again all the architects who took part in the competition and submitted such a great variety of design proposals. We are especially grateful to the three prize-winning architectural offices which participated in the revision phase of the competition. Over the past 11 months, they have gone into substantial depth to elaborate the details of their design proposals. The high quality and professionalism of the work done in the revision phase was very much appreciated by the Governing Council. The Governing Council’s decision on the design of the ECB’s premises was reached after extensive discussion and careful evaluation of the prize-winning designs. As a public institution, we are committed to performing our tasks effectively and to using our financial resources prudently. Therefore, it was essential to have a thorough and comprehensive assessment - even if that prolonged the process somewhat - so as to make the right decision on a matter of such symbolic and financial importance.

The final decision on the design concept to be implemented was made on the basis of the revised concepts and the criteria laid down in the Competition Rules. In the Revision Phase each of the three teams has gone into depth of research and development, reaching a level of design for a new premises which would be suitable for the ECB and could be realistically constructed. I would like to thank them for their work and have great respect for what they have created. Each design proposal is unique in its own way. As we will, of course, only build one design, we, my colleagues from the Governing Council and myself, had then the difficult/challenging task to choose one of the revised design proposals. BIS Review 5/2005  1  We had then great pleasure to confirm the Jury’s proposal and to announce Coop Himmelb(l)au as the winning architect of the international urban planning and architectural design competition for the new ECB premises. I would like to ask now Mr. Papademos, as he was also the Chairperson of the international jury of the competition, to present the main elements of the Governing Council decision for the chosen design of Coop Himmelb(l)au.. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, The Governing Council’s decision on the winning design concluded the international urban planning and architectural design competition for the ECB’s new premises. This means that a major step towards building a new, permanent home for the ECB here in Frankfurt has been completed.
of Agencies 1  Raiffeisen Bank  37  46  2  National Commercial Bank  22  9  3  United Bank of Albania  3  1  4  Italian Albanian Bank  5  Italian Development Bank (former Dardania)  1  6  Tirana Bank  31  4  7  National Bank of Greece (Tirana Branch)  4  8  8  International Commercial Bank  5  9  Alpha Bank (Tirana Branch)  9  1  10  American Bank of Albania  10  11  11  ProCredit Bank  20  1  12  First Investment Branch)  1  1  13  Emporiki Bank  3  4  14  Credit Bank of Albania  1  1  15  Credins Bank  10  4  16  Banka Popullore  29  17  Union Bank  1  3  TOTAL  187  100  1  6  Bank  (Tirana  According to INSTAT, the population of Albania totalled 3,102,777 inhabitants in 2003, 3,119,543 in 2004 and 3,134,982 in 2005. BIS Review 101/2006  3  5.

In addressing these threats, it is important to operate under the assumption that it is not a matter of “if” but rather “when” these threats will occur, and focusing solely on “protection” and “detection” is no longer sufficient. In other words, cybersecurity alone is not enough, but we also need to proactively think about cyber resilience: how do we not only prepare, but also withstand and recover from disruptions. In the short time I have today, I’d like to highlight three key drivers for effective cyber resilience. First, cyber resilience is not only the responsibility of a company’s IT department, but rather an important, organization-wide agenda. The board of directors and senior management must understand and endeavor to prioritize cyber risk management frameworks into the organization’s operation. This includes making sure that cyber resilience policies put in place are applied effectively, setting a clear organizational structure that includes the roles and responsibilities of staff across all levels, establishing a risk management process according to international practices, and ensuring that employees are always vigilant on cyber security issues. The Bank of Thailand, for example, requires financial institutions to have at least one member with IT knowledge or IT-related experiences to be on the board of directors. We also organize regular capacity-building courses for board members and high-level executives from Thai financial institutions to provide them with the knowledge and 2  understanding of how to address cyber threats.