samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this context, the conflicting schools of thought, for example, the Keynesian and monetarists, serve no purpose. Those who did not understand the crisis were those who, in some way or another, were trapped in simplified models without understanding that these models are the starting and not the finishing points of an analytical path aimed at understanding reality. On the one hand, those who have made the neo-Keynesian models extreme, excluding money and the financial markets, have made the search for model elegance an end in itself, without understanding that it does not actually help to explain reality. This may seem absurd nowadays, but at a conference organised by the European Central Bank, in the autumn of 2006, to explain its own monetary policy strategy – a strategy in which money and the financial markets play an important role – the majority of academics, above all on the other side of the Atlantic, played down the usefulness of taking money and financial markets into account in economic models. In the more sophisticated neo-Keynesian models, they managed to completely get rid of money! Consequently, monetary policy could also get rid of money, and focus only on the interest rate as the variable representative of the equilibrium on the money and financial markets. With such models, it was sufficient to align the interest rate with the equilibrium level, or the so-called “neutral” level, in order to ensure a monetary policy in line with the general equilibrium.

Benoît Cœuré: Cyber resilience for pan-European financial market infrastructures Introductory remarks by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the High-Level Meeting on Cyber Resilience, Frankfurt am Main, 19 June 2017. * * *  Introduction It is a pleasure to welcome you here today to this strategic high-level meeting on cyber resilience for pan-European financial market infrastructures. The aim of bringing together high-level representatives from large European market infrastructures, critical service providers and public authorities is threefold: First we would like to gain a deeper understanding of the cyber threat landscape in Europe. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) will make a presentation on the cyber threat landscape and its relevance for the financial sector. Second, we will share with you the Eurosystem’s cyber strategy for financial market infrastructures and also explain ECB Banking Supervision’s approach to the issue of bank cyber resilience. Third, we would like to hear your views on how we can all collaborate in a trusted environment to enhance the cyber resilience of financial market infrastructures. More specifically, we would like to assess with you how much interest there is in creating a highlevel cyber resilience forum for pan-European financial market infrastructures, critical service providers and competent authorities. Before we start, let me briefly set the scene.
House sales totalled NOK 44 billion, twice the total for the previous year. Syndication companies and property funds account for almost half of total sales. In Sweden, the share of foreign investors has been relatively high, and rising, for several years. In comparison, foreign ownership in the Norwegian property market is modest, but probably increasing. For example, the German property fund DIFA purchased parts of the Norwegian School of Management’s college premises in Nydalen in Oslo, and the Scottish Kenmore Property Group has purchased commercial property in Norway for more than NOK 1.4 billion. In a comparison of property markets conducted in 2004, Norway was classified as “highly transparent”. 1 Increased liquidity and transparency promote foreign interest in Norwegian property. 1  2  Jones Lang LaSalle, Global Real Estate Transparency Index 2004. BIS Review 41/2006  The economic situation The mainland economy expanded by 3.7 per cent in 2005. Growth in private services, construction and electricity production was strong. So far, a substantial share of output growth has been attributable to a sharp rise in person-hours worked. The fall in sickness absence in 2004 provided an additional supply of labour to enterprises, but sickness absence increased through 2005. Wage developments reflect and influence business cycles. Strong employment growth in the 1990s resulted in a rise in labour costs, which in turn had a dampening impact on growth. Moderate wage growth in recent years is being accompanied by a strong cyclical upturn. The labour market continues to tighten.

This supports the interpretation of the first price peak as a property price bubble. The value of office property increased in 2005, from a historically low level. In relation to historical levels, the rise in the value of commercial property seems to be moderate, compared with the rise in capacity utilisation. One possible reason for this may be that employment growth was for a long period relatively low in this upturn compared with the upturns in the 1980s and 1990s. This has now changed. In addition, signals from market participants indicate that the rise in value for 2005 as a whole will be sharper than the chart estimate, which was calculated as of July 2005. Developments in real house prices also tracked developments in capacity utilisation from 1985 to 1998. In the period since then, however, house prices have increased further at a steady pace, even when business cycles have fluctuated. This sharp rise, combined with similarly strong growth in household debt, may be viewed to some extent as a delayed adaptation to the deregulation of the housing and credit markets in the 1980s, after many households burned their fingers immediately after deregulation. In recent years, household income growth has been solid, household confidence regarding the future has been strong and households probably perceive higher income levels as permanent. This may have resulted in a further rise in house prices and debt. In addition, low real interest rates are currently making a contribution. Sales in the commercial property market reached a very high level in 2005.
This procedure would simply be too slow, and would not take into account the need to keep the operations running in order to maintain the functioning of the financial system. With creditors insulated against losses by the guarantee, and with the formal insolvency regime assessed to be inappropriate, we needed to find another way to ensure that losses  BIS Review 62/2008  3  for which the shareholders were responsible would not fall on the tax-payers. In order to secure this, we needed to take control of the banks concerned before capital was completely eroded. Needless to say, we found ourselves in a rather poor bargaining position against the shareholders. Fortunately, a Bank Support Act, laying out the principles for the possible actions, could be implemented quite swiftly. A special crisis management authority was also set up. Inspired by the US model, where the authorities can take control of a bank when capital falls below a certain level, this temporary crisis legislation gave the government the right to take over the shares in undercapitalised banks. The Bank Support Act also made it possible to tie conditions to the actual use of the guarantee. Thus, the main rule was that any financial support given directly to a bank would result in a proportional dilution of the original shareholders’ holdings. The Bank Support Act also laid the basis for arranging private takeovers where possible. And, not least, for the orderly winding up of unviable banks.

At the same time, unemployment in the euro area remains high, and the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and the private sector will continue to weigh on economic activity. This assessment is also reflected in the December 2013 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP declining by 0.4% in 2013 before increasing by 1.1% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015. Compared with the September 2013 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the projection for real GDP growth for 2013 has remained unchanged and it has been revised upwards by 0.1 percentage point for 2014. The risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area are assessed to be on the downside. Developments in global money and financial market conditions and related uncertainties may have the potential to negatively affect economic conditions. Other downside risks include higher commodity prices, weaker than expected domestic demand and export growth, and slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation increased in November 2013 to 0.9%, from 0.7% in October. The increase was broadly as expected and reflected, in particular, an upward base effect in energy prices and higher services price inflation. On the basis of prevailing futures prices for energy, annual inflation rates are expected to remain at around current levels in the coming months. Over the medium term, underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued.
Just imagine a company that has no long-term strategy and experiences management reshuffles every few years, including board members, department directors and often unit heads. Every department within this company has its own budget, sets its own priorities and pursues its own often obscure goals (so as to maximize the available budget), which are frequently inconsistent with the overall purpose of the company. Can such a company compete in the global economy against companies with clear and consistent vision and strategy, companies where all departments’ activities are subject to this vision? This is a rhetorical question, as after using up all simple reserves of growth, such company would be doomed to bankruptcy unless it changed. The same applies to entire countries. While others continue to paint and fulfil daring visions, for example 11 iN2015 (Intelligent Nation 2015) in Singapore, we are still unable to join our efforts and are stuck in a business model where each department silos keeps pursuing its own goals. The ability to capitalize on knowledge will be crucial to Poland’s success in the 21st century. The country’s economic strength will be built with the power of mind, not muscle or machinery. For the time being, we have lost a million of minds that have increased the growth potential of other  9  A Venables, Shifts in economic geography and their causes, paper presented at an annual symposium of Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Jackson Hole on 25 August 2006.

In many countries, including some European and in particular Asian states, we can observe an effective pursuit of a vision leading to success in the global economy and determination of the public administration to develop a country’s ability to drive innovation, that is to develop a factor determining the country’s success in the global economy of the 21st century. Examples may be found in a recent edition of The Economist, where the article entitled The Search for Talent names a number of activities pursued by public administration in many countries in order to attract well-educated foreigners. Ladies and Gentlemen, the 21st century has witnessed not only ‘the death of distance’ but also ‘the death of time’. Innovation is driven, efficiency is improving and value is created by companies for clients and by public administration for citizens at a significantly faster pace. In order to win in an increasingly competitive economy, it is not only necessary to move ahead, but to move ahead increasingly faster. And in the two areas I discussed, that is lack of vision and leadership and backwardness in e-government, we have to run, as the race has already begun, and we are still pondering whether we should start moving the left or right leg first. Poles are hardworking, talented and have entrepreneurial spirit. We are sufficiently predisposed to achieve success in the global economy.
Accordingly, it is clearly important that credit institutions should actively pursue the work they have done so far. In this respect, I think it is safe to say that French banks operating in the international arena are making every effort to ready themselves for 2006. 3.3  New accounting standards should foster international harmonisation and promote greater financial transparency  The introduction of new accounting standards is a major undertaking for companies in general and for credit institutions in particular. The aim of this project is highly ambitious, namely to arrive at worldwide standards that can improve financial security and accounting transparency. This is necessary to restore confidence in financial markets. At the internal level, credit institutions must quickly adapt their information systems to these new requirements. However, there are in-depth discussions at present about the draft standards applicable to financial instruments. We have taken part in these discussions and advocated caution, in particular, in view of the strong temptation to give precedence to the markto-market and mark-to-model approaches, which are more sensitive to calculation parameters than to the actual situation of the reporting entity, with the result that earnings and equity likely to become abnormally volatile. I hope that the outcome of these discussions will lead to accounting procedures that take into consideration the realities of credit institutions’ operations and business practices. BIS Review 32/2003  3  As you are aware, the quality of the accounting rules applicable by banks is of fundamental importance for supervisors.

Jean-Claude Trichet: Economic and financial review in France Presentation of the 2002 Annual Report of the French Banking Commission (Commission Bancaire) by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the French Banking Commission, Paris, 2 June 2003. * 1. *  *  2002 showed that French credit institutions were capable of withstanding a less favourable economic and financial environment  Measured on a parent-company basis, the aggregate net income of French credit institutions in 2002 was similar to 2001’s figure of nearly 18 billion euro. This result is all the more remarkable because it was achieved despite negative cyclical developments. Once again, domestic retail banking was the mainstay of profitability. 1.1  Slower economic growth and high equity market volatility formed the backdrop for 2002  Although the world economy picked up slightly in 2002, expanding by 3.0 per cent compared with 2.3 per cent in 2001, it was much more sluggish than in 2000, when growth came in at 4.7 per cent. Furthermore, in the euro area, GDP growth continued to slow, decelerating from 3.4 per cent in 2000 to 1.4 per cent in 2001 and 0.8 per cent in 2002. As in 2001, France’s economy grew slightly faster than average, with 1.2 per cent. Sector-related problems fostered a climate of uncertainty that affected growth. They resulted chiefly from the bursting of the Internet bubble, developments in telecommunications, transport and energy, and entrenched geopolitical tensions in Latin America and the Middle East.
Kerstin af Jochnick: My thoughts on monetary policy and financial stability Speech by Ms Kerstin af Jochnick, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a meeting at SEB, Stockholm, 4 May 2012. *  *  *  As this is my first public speech as a member of the Executive Board of the Riksbank I would like to take this opportunity – from the starting point of my previous background – to point out a number of factors that are important to my view of monetary policy and financial stability. First: Sweden has become increasingly dependent on what happens abroad. How the debt crisis in Europe is managed is the most important factor for economic activity and monetary policy in the period ahead. Second: There are links between monetary policy and financial stability. We must be aware that imbalances and risks to financial stability can arise if interest rates remain low for too long. Third: One of the most important lessons of the financial crisis is the need to adopt a broader perspective on financial stability – as in the new policy area macroprudential policy. The Riksbank should play a major role in the work with macroprudential policy. How my background has shaped my view of the Riksbank’s work As most of you know I am a new member of the Executive Board of the Riksbank, which I joined at the turn of the year.

The MPC process, however, involves no pressure to reach agreement. We are each accountable for our views; full minutes are taken and published; our individual vote is publicly recorded. This is counter-intuitive for anyone from a PLC background. It is impossible to believe that a split in the Board of a major corporation, certainly a split that was aired in the press, could exist for any length of time. Either the split would need to heal rapidly, or more likely some high-profile departures from the Board would ensue. But in the MPC a system which permits different views to surface publicly is both refreshing and appropriate. Since economic analysis involves a great deal of peering into the future, it is not surprising that there should be disagreement. There is, of course, the old joke of putting nine  BIS Review 102/2000  2  Economists into one room and getting ten views. But it is better to be open about the disagreements than try to forge a false sense of consensus. Of course, alongside this transparency and open voting system goes a degree of personalisation within the Press. An industry has grown up geared to guessing our personal habits, psychoanalysing our personalities and classifying us into different species of the aviary. And alongside this has gone a demand for even greater transparency which falls only a little short of having TV cameras in the Committee Room.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Economic developments and the financial sector – a Spanish perspective Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the 2008 International Monetary Conference – Central Bankers Panel, Barcelona, 3 June 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank the International Monetary Conference for inviting me to participate in today’s Panel. We meet at a moment when we are confronted with particularly difficult challenges, in the wake of substantial economic shocks. I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to comment on these challenges from the Spanish perspective. I will first focus on economic developments, and then turn to the financial sector. The Spanish economy began to show some signs of a slowdown in early-2007, after more than a decade of robust expansion. The slowdown preceded the recent financial turmoil. The deceleration in domestic demand arose as a result of the gradual tightening of monetary policy since 2005, and of a moderation in house prices. The residential investment sector has suffered a particularly intense slowdown, entering into a period of adjustment after a protracted boom. The containment of domestic demand has been more pronounced since mid-2007, when the turmoil emerged. The slowdown has eroded consumer and business confidence. It is already having an impact on the spending decisions of households and firms. We are seeing signs that credit conditions are tightening, as a consequence of the reappraisal of risks and changes in macroeconomic and sectoral expectations.

We need to see increased dynamism, particularly in those sectors which are not as directly affected by the current slowdown. Other measures are also necessary, such as liberalisation and deregulation policies, to improve competitiveness. Policies aimed at improving the human capital of our workers and increasing labour mobility should also be encouraged. Finally, a comment on fiscal policy. The current fiscal situation in Spain is sound, having ending 2007 with a budget surplus and reduced public debt. Indeed, let me recall that our public debt to GDP ratio, at 35%, is the lowest among the big EU countries. It is important to maintain this stance in the face of the current slowdown. Expansionary demand policies could prove counterproductive. We should avoid a deterioration of the budgetary situation beyond that implied by automatic stabilisers. Let me turn now to the financial sector. So far, the impact of the recent turbulence on financial stability in Spain has been limited. This is largely thanks to the actions of the banks themselves, who have not entered into the kinds of business that have been most directly affected. Spanish banks have demonstrated that you do not need to turn to the originate-todistribute model to become an efficient and profitable banking business. Plain vanilla, traditional business can be compatible with high returns on equity and efficiency. It also has the added value of implying greater stability. But I think that the Bank of Spain’s approach to supervision has also had a positive effect. Let me emphasise two key characteristics in this respect.
In spite of needing more flexible markets with its single currency, Europe faced stronger nominal rigidities than East Asia in labour and product markets.11 This limited the ability of euro area countries to adjust to asymmetric shocks, especially as cross-border labour mobility was low and public debt levels were already high. And finally, no mutual insurance mechanism was in place. But, and here comes the good news, unlike emerging Asia in the late 1990s, Europe had a well-established regional political framework to address its crisis. The framework of integration and cooperation among EU members is old and dense, building on the experience gained with the European Monetary System12. This made it possible to create the necessary instruments (the EFSF and ESM) for financial support for domestic adjustment programmes to come mainly from within the Union, with the IMF focusing on monitoring conditionality. 8  See Kochpar, K., P. Loungani and M. Stone (1998): “The East Asian Crisis: Macroeconomic Developments and Policy Lessons”, IMF Working Paper 98/128. 9  See Cavallo E.A. and J. A. Frankel (2008). “Does Openness to Trade Make Countries More Vulnerable to Sudden Stops, Or Less? Using Gravity to Establish Causality”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Volume 27, Issue 8, pp. 1430–1452. 10  See Loong, L.S. (2000). “Post crisis Asia – The way forward”, BIS William Taylor Memorial Lecture, 21 September 2000. 11  See Heinz, F.F. and D. Rusinova (2011): “How flexible are real wages in EU countries? A Panel Investigation”, ECB Working Paper No 1360.

Abdulrahman A Al-Hamidy: Compliance and anti-money laundering Speech by His Excellency Dr Abdulrahman A Al-Hamidy, Vice Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) ,to the Fifth Annual Gathering on “Compliance and anti-money laundering”, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Institute of Banking, Riyadh, 26–27 March 2013. *  *  *  Dear Audience, It gives me pleasure to welcome you all, and I would like to thank those who have participated in the preparation for this gathering. I also would like to extend my thanks to the colleagues at the Institute of Banking and the speakers to this gathering. Dear Audience, The continued holding of this gathering for the fifth year confirms the firm conviction held by all of us of the risks that the crime of money laundering poses to the global economy. It also reflects the Kingdom’s commitment to combat money laundering, and its support of the measures taken against it, and the implementation of the best international practices in this field. The discussion of this gathering derives its importance from the increasing trend towards globalization, easing restrictions on international cross-border movement of commodities and services and the revolution of communication and information technology. Dear Audience, Money laundering operations have witnessed a quantum leap at the global level over the last years. This was reflected in the various and diversified methods used in their implementation, expanding the volume this type of crime. Developed and developing countries suffer from this crime.