samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And not only their quality, of course. Yesterday morning I spoke in Croatia about the need to improve the efficiency of the judicial system. It is fair to say that many reforms have already been undertaken across Europe and that many countries are now seeing the benefits of such policies. For the last couple of quarters, every new GDP data release by Eurostat has been a positive surprise, while forecasters have been raising their GDP forecast for the EA and the EU. However, while growth has resumed in all countries, medium-term growth potential in the region is insufficient to ensure pre-crisis pace of real convergence. Namely, for convergence to be sustainable, long-term potential per capita growth must be consistent with an expansion of demand. In other words, GDP growth that results from strong capital inflow, foreign demand shock, or fall in interest rates due to perhaps euro area enlargement process, could prove to be unsustainable. So, the question is, did we take convergence for granted? Was one of the great features of the European integration process only a temporary and unsustainable phenomenon related to the 2  initial 'low-hanging fruit' reforms that corrected vast resource misallocation problems, followed by a huge inflow of foreign capital before the crisis? Will convergence return back to a faster speed, will it continue at a slower speed, or maybe even stop or reverse? Is convergence still here and, even more importantly, is it here to stay?

We need to ensure broad support for the reform agenda especially since there might be some short-term costs of certain reforms. However, according to the EBRD data not only is the difference in the percentage of people who support market economy approximately twice lower in our region than in Germany, but it has actually declined in the last ten years, diverged, and the same applies to the support of democracy as a political system. This is where policy transparency and communication will play a tremendously important role. And clearly, not everything we do will always get full support from the broad public, especially in the case of 8  structural reforms with long-term gains and short-term costs, but boldness is often rewarded beyond our expectations. Thank you. 9
In the short term, many of the uncertainties obstructing the economic outlook – and especially the manufacturing sector – are man-made – and even one-man made. Contingencies that not so long ago appeared as tail risks, such as the possibility of an escalation of trade tensions or a disorderly Brexit, have become looming threats. But uncertainty also pertains to long-term structural trends. Over the past decade, the world economy has steadily recovered from the global financial  Page 2 sur 11 crisis. But it has not returned to its pre-crisis normal. Interest rates remain at historical lows, due to a historically low level of the natural rate of interest R* ii. In the short run, this analysis – uncertainty as the first trigger of the present slowdown – should guide our ranking of policy answers. Monetary policy plays its role, but it should not – less than ever – be the only game in town. It should not even be the first game in town. The first response would be for government-driven uncertainties to be addressed directly by governments, by removing the self-induced threats to world growth. Failing that, a second answer is for fiscal policy to step in. Fiscal stimulus from countries with fiscal space would both stimulate aggregate demand, and, with targeted, quality investment, increase long-term growth. iii Wage increases in countries that have long relied on wage moderation could also help in bolstering aggregate demand and inflation. And pro-growth reforms would raise R*. Monetary policy provides a third response.

Completing Europe’s capital markets union (CMU) will be key to financing the green and digital transitions. Equity investors tend to have a greater appetite than banks for high-risk, high-return projects and equity finance tends to increase green innovation. [12] But the full and swift implementation of the Commission’s ambitious CMU Action Plan will be crucial here. Some progress is being made. The Commission has recently put forward proposals on harmonising national insolvency laws and facilitating public listing. It is also tackling issues that have held back the growth of European capital markets, like putting equity financing on an equal tax-footing with debt financing. And Europe’s recent agreement on a minimum level of taxation for large corporates will support tax harmonisation within the EU, the absence of which has often been seen as a barrier to capital market integration. [13]  The third big challenge facing Europe is the high inflation environment. And this, of course, is the challenge that concerns me the most. Inflation in Europe is far too high, partly due to our vulnerability to the changing geopolitics of energy. Decoupling from Russia last year pushed up energy inflation in the euro area to extraordinary levels. But while energy inflation has recently been coming down, underlying inflation continues to rise. As a result, it is vital that inflation rates above the ECB’s 2% target do not become entrenched in the economy. We must bring inflation down. And we will deliver on this goal.
When the repo rate is negative, the banks pay interest to the Riksbank, as the banking system as a whole has a liquidity surplus that must be deposited in the Riksbank. The short-term interbank rates, that is interest on loans between the banks, and some government rates have followed the repo rate down below zero. However, the banks have not introduced negative deposit rates for households and most companies. Only a few economic agents, primarily other financial institutions, large companies and some municipalities, have experienced a negative deposit rate, and these can in some cases also borrow at a negative interest rate. Companies have been forced to expend a certain amount of resources on avoiding negative return on their funds, but they appear to have succeeded relatively well in this. Cutting the repo rate below zero has thus in total contributed to pushing down interest rates, but has not meant that interest rates have become negative for the general public. Good profitability among the banks and few signs of a decline in demand Another fear has been that negative interest rates reduce the banks’ profitability, which could lead to higher lending rates and a lower supply of credit. The reason for this is said to be that the banks’ deposit margin, that is, the difference between the interest on deposits and lending, would decline because it is difficult to cut the deposit rate below zero.

These problems can be mitigated if there is a certain underlying inflation rate in the economy. Underestimating the significance of monetary policy and exchange rate developments One problem when criticizing monetary policy with reference to the current economic situation is that one does not take into account the fact that the current strong Swedish economy is of course to a large degree due to the monetary policy that has been conducted. It is a little like taking medicine in connection with an illness and when cured drawing the conclusion that it was unnecessary to take the medicine. On this point I feel that the events of spring 2015 are a good illustration. The ECB had announced in January that it intended to buy securities over slightly more than a year to come for the equivalent of SEK 10,000 billion (around 2.5 times the size of Swedish GDP). This is indeed a very substantial monetary policy intervention. Within the course of just a few weeks the krona exchange rate appreciated significantly against the euro, from almost 9.65 krona per euro to just over 9.10. This was in itself a large appreciation of almost 6 per cent, but the real danger lay in the fact that it could have been much worse. During 2014 and up to spring 2015 the US dollar and the British pound sterling had appreciated by between 15 and 25 per cent against the euro.
Companies can obtain short-term liquidity via the sale of current assets such as receivables and inventories to financial institutions without increasing their indebtedness. The structuring of such solutions however, entails new sets of risks to financial institutions. In contrast to debt financing, the financier is exposed to risks beyond credit, such as inventory and market risk, which calls for additional safeguards for risk mitigation, different approaches to risk management, infrastructure and practices. Given the nature of the exposures, this warrants Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) to take an exploratory approach to new trade-based offerings. This allows for a better understanding of the risks and their dynamics thus enabling IFIs to put in place the appropriate framework and policies. As an example, four Islamic banks have commenced a pilot programme with four government ministries in March 2021 to provide liquidity facilities for SMEs via the purchase of outstanding invoices from Government vendors. This is an example where non-traditional Islamic trade finance solutions can help satisfy the financial needs of businesses. Another important thrust is for us and in particular Islamic finance to help businesses embrace sustainability and build resilience to climate change. The urgent need for an inclusive and greener recovery is undeniable. This is a point driven home by the recent publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report that spelt out code red for humanity. On the current trajectory, climate change is estimated to cost the world USD1.7 trillion a year by 2050, with potential escalation to approximately USD30 trillion by 20753.

“Carbon Dated: Multinational companies planning to cut suppliers by 2025 for failing to curb carbon emissions”. 5 Source: MITI (April 2021). “Investment Policy Reforms to be rooted in the National Investment Aspirations (NIA)”,  Media Release and MIDA (May, 2021). “Malaysia is shifting gears: National Investment Aspirations (NIA). eNewsletter. 6 Source: Musnad Ahmad, ar-Risalah issuance, page number: 502/ 28, hadith number 17265. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
It will be interesting to follow whether Swedish banks, card issuers and telecom operators will further develop this payment method, for example by means of real-time payments 9 initiated from a mobile phone. Real-time payments are already available in the UK. The British company VocaLink has introduced Faster Payments, a service that processes payments in real time. VocaLink has also been commissioned by the Swedish payment system BGC to take over the operation and development of its system. As part of this work, BGC and VocaLink have also examined the possibility of introducing Faster Payments in Sweden. The banks are already able to make larger payments in real time via the Riksbank’s RIX system, which is an RTGS 10 system. In order to enable real-time payments for smaller amounts, discussions are currently being held between the Riksbank and BGC concerning the provision of special BGC accounts in the RIX system, which can be used even when the system is closed. The advantage of this solution is that it would make real-time settlement in central bank money possible. This in turn would make it possible for private individuals and companies to make payments to be effected immediately around the clock, seven days a week, using the Internet banks and, perhaps within a few years, even their mobile phones.

We would like to request your good office, “Your Worship” to issue mandatory directives to all business houses in the country to complete construction sites within a stipulated period and to ensure that all buildings are properly maintained and where necessary repainted on a regular basis. In conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to commend the Bankers Association of Zambia and in particular the Project Committee for the effective and efficient manner in which this initiative has been implemented thus far. My hope is that the initiative will not only be confined to Cairo Road but to all areas of the country. Finally, I would like to urge all of us present here today to extend this initiative to our homes. Let us keep our homes, communities and the country clean as cleanliness is next to godliness. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 112/2009
The Special Liquidity Scheme was designed to provide that support on a one-off basis, in large size and for a long maturity. The form of the Scheme was an asset swap (effectively a collateral upgrade). For a fee, the commercial banks were lent nine-month Treasury bills against a broad set of eligible collateral. In practice the collateral received in the Scheme was dominated by own-name residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS and covered bonds). The banks could use the Treasury bills to raise liquidity in the market, at a time when the primary, secondary and repo markets for RMBS were all closed. These bills were also eligible in the Bank’s repo operations. The Scheme was limited to lending against collateral that was held on balance sheet at the end of 2007. The principle was that the Bank shouldn’t support the banks in issuing new securities for which there might not be a private market or to subsidise new lending. 12 The fact that the Special Liquidity Scheme was a form of asset swap meant that it had no impact on the supply of central bank money and thus no direct implications for monetary policy. Following standard accounting practice, it was not on the Bank’s balance sheet. 13 The Scheme will expire at the end of January 2012. It will not be extended or replaced. After three years of large-scale liquidity support the Bank expects each institution to be in a position to fund itself through normal market mechanisms.

In order to prevent a refinancing “cliff” at the end of 2011, the Bank has had bilateral discussions with the main users of the Scheme to ensure that there are credible funding plans in place to reduce their use of it in a smooth fashion. Of the £ of Treasury bills initially advanced, some £ has already been repaid. The Discount Window Facility Alongside the Operational Standing Facilities to cope with short-term frictional shocks, and Long-Term Repos to cope with system-wide liquidity shocks, the Bank’s Discount Window Facility offers large-scale liquidity support for idiosyncratic as well as system-wide shocks. The Discount Window was launched during the heart of the crisis in October 2008. It allows banks and building societies to borrow gilts against a wide range of collateral, at fees reflecting the type of that collateral and the size of the drawing relative to the size of the firm. Although similar in principle, the Discount Window is not intended to be a direct replacement for the Special Liquidity Scheme. It is both shorter-term and more expensive in steady-state, in line with the underlying principles for all the Bank of England’s permanent liquidity insurance operations: that commercial banks should be incentivised to manage their liquidity risk prudently in the market. The terms were also designed to protect the Bank against risk to its own balance sheet. Transactions under the Discount Window facility are intended to be for a maximum 30 days, although they can be rolled.
It also commended the authorities for the progress made in implementing structural reforms. However, the Fund noted that the main medium-term challenge remained that of creation of fiscal space for priority spending, enhancement of economic diversification and poverty reduction. 54. Total disbursed poverty reduction budget support (PRBS) in the fourth quarter of 2010 amounted to US $ million from; the African Development Bank (US $ million), European Union (US $ million), Sweden (US $ million) and Germany (US $ million). This brought the total disbursed PRBS to US $ million for the year against the projection of US $ million. The variance of about US $ million is largely attributed to exchange rate variations. 55. In addition, a total of US $ million mining tax revenue was received from First Quantum Mining Plc, for the benefit of Government, while Bank of Zambia foreign exchange purchases from the market amounted to US $ million during the period under review. The above receipts were against payments to PTA Bank (US $ million) for oil procurement and debt service payments (US $ million). Inflation outlook for the first quarter of 2011 56.

The volume of ATM transactions also increased by 5.1% to 6,654,992 (third quarter 2010: 6,333,073). Similarly, the value increased by 17.1% to K3,397.3 billion (third quarter 2010: K2,897.6 billion). 50. The total volume of cheques returned unpaid on account of insufficiently funded accounts increased by 5.4% to 4,428 (third quarter 2010: 4,202) cheques while the value decreased by 8% to K36.2 billion (third quarter 2010: K35.3 billion). The Bank would like to urge members of the public to always ensure that they fund their accounts sufficiently whenever they issue cheques. This will ensure that they do not face criminal charges under the National Payment Systems Act for bouncing cheques dishonestly or with intent to defraud. Economic programme 51. A follow-up International Monetary Fund (IMF) Mission visited the country from 28th October to 3rd November 2010 to conclude discussions for the 5th Review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement. The mission had fruitful discussions with the Zambian authorities and reached agreement on a set of macroeconomic policies and structural measures for the remainder of 2010 and 2011. 52. The IMF Executive Board meeting was held on 10th December 2010 and completed the fifth review of Zambia’s economic programme. This resulted in the immediate disbursement of an amount equivalent to SDR 18.395 million (about US $ million), bringing total disbursements under the ECF arrangement to SDR 201.7 million (about US $ million). 53. The IMF mission commended the authorities for Zambia’s economic prospects that have continued to improve as well as for having sound macroeconomic policies.
Andrew G Haldane: Managing global finance as a system Text of the Maxwell Fry Annual Global Finance Lecture, given by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at Birmingham University, Birmingham, 29 October 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Edd Denbee, Jeremy Franklin, Carsten Jung, Matt Roberts-Sklar, Stephanie Quiet and Benedict Roth for assistance in preparing the text. I would also like to thank to Rob Elder, Jeremy Harrison, Kristin Forbes, James Smith and Stacy Williams (HSBC FX Quantitative Strategy Team) for insights and comments. It is a great honour to be giving this year’s Maxwell Fry Global Finance Lecture. Max was a tremendous colleague, both during his time here at Birmingham University and as Director of the Centre for Central Banking Studies at the Bank of England. Max also had a rare gift. Through his exceptionally rich academic and public policy career, he was able to integrate the insights from disciplines which all too rarely communicated – monetary theory and central bank practice, advanced and emerging market experience, financial markets dynamics and mainstream macro-economics. The global financial crisis could not have provided a clearer demonstration of the benefits of combining these insights.

60  60  40  40  20  20  0  0 Will drop significantly  Will drop slightly  Will not change  Source: Business survey, Central Bank of Chile. 11  Will increase slightly  Figure 7 National unemployment rates and extended measures (2)  Total employment (1) (contribution to annual change, percentage points)  4  4  Self-employed  Salaried informal 3  Total employment  3 2  (percent)  20  10 Potential rate( 4)  18  2  Unemploy't rate (right axis)  16 1  1  0  0 Salaried formal  -1  -1  9  8  14  7  12  Labor pressure rate 6 (3)  Other -2  -2 10 18 Sep.  19 19  19 May  19 Sep.  20  5 14  15  16  17  18  19  20  (1) First quarter 2020 uses information up until the moving quarter ending in January. Salaried formal comprises dependent workers with access to social security, i.e. health-care and pension fund associated to their employment. Salaried informal are dependent workers with no simultaneous access to social security or is not guaranteed by the employer. Others correspond to employers, and non-remunerated family services or household help. (2) Considers information up to the moving quarter ending in February.
On the other hand, Swedish banks are doing very well in other areas. I already have mentioned the very strong position enjoyed by Swedish banks in the market for long-term saving, compared with many other European banks. Another well-known Swedish example is the high Internet use of both companies and households in their dealings with their banks. Swedish banks have also been relatively quick to expand abroad. In relative terms, the Swedish banking system is one of the most European banking markets, along with the Belgian and Dutch systems. However, that only applies to the Swedish banking system’s “outward” Europeanization – Swedish banks’ expansion outside Sweden. As regards the presence of European banks in the Swedish market, ”inward” Europeanization, the Swedish banking market is one of the least integrated, beaten even by a “closed” market like the Italian one. Assuming that Swedish authorities have not discriminated against foreign players, this pattern could perhaps also be taken as a sign of Swedish banks’ high competitiveness. So it is not all that easy to answer the question of how competitive Swedish banks are in an international or European perspective. Nevertheless, there is much to suggest that their competitiveness is fairly good. To all appearances the Swedish banking system is efficient in its use of resources and it does not seem that this is being achieved through a poorer range of financial services – with possibly the low number of ATMs as an unusual but striking exception.

Second, some EU bodies are obsessed with the “all EU countries must be same” approach. While there may be some point to this, why insist on it in the case of the single resolution system, for instance, if it has been negotiated that the SSM only applies to euro-area countries plus volunteers? One can hardly expect non-euro area countries not participating in the SSM to jump at the single resolution system if it means sharing the burden with those inside the banking union without the same treatment in the area of a fiscal back-stop. At the same time, would you join the SSM if you did not have a clue how the single resolution rules were going to work? The CNB’s position was: let’s discuss the whole thing (BU) in one shot as a one compact and coherent package where the balance between powers, duties, responsibilities and money always remains assured. And negotiate everything as a single animal, so that illogical inconsistencies are not being produced all along. Sure, that would take much more time, but the final outcome might look better and we would not build up the house from the roof down. We are debating the supervisory part first, while burden-sharing (money) is being left for the future. The sequence of steps should ideally be exactly the opposite one. Why? My observation is that the way the various bail-outs and the SSM have been negotiated so far shows that the readiness and willingness even among euro-area countries to share money is declining over time.