samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is difficult to say in advance what characterises a financial imbalance. A simplified way of describing a financial imbalance is that households, businesses and for that matter also the state base their decisions on increased indebtedness on expectations of the development of wealth and coming real incomes which are then not realised. When this becomes evident, major sacrifices must be made to be able to pay debts. The macroeconomic costs can be high when households are forced to reduce their consumption and businesses their investments to be able to adapt their balance sheets to new expectations. If the problems are so extensive that certain groups quite simply cannot pay their loans, the crisis can spread to the bank system and the macroeconomic costs in the form of unemployment and low growth rise further. These are questions that are discussed frequently and at length with regard to the US economy. There, demand by households and businesses for consumption and investment goods are to a great extent financed on the capital market. Strong growth in wealth and expectations of continued high production growth have driven forward development and this has also been reflected in share prices. A large part of demand has leaked out in imports and there have been continual large American current account deficits. This has been able to happen without inflation speeding up which has to some extent been due to the strong development of the US dollar.

And for the new challenges to be met and the new opportunities to be exploited, there is often the need for new approaches and new initiatives, at both the national and international levels. There is a view, for example, that trade integration in the region has not been adequately served by financial integration, given restrictive controls on capital mobility still being practised in selected jurisdictions. As a result there is some doubt as to whether the long term development potential of the region has been maximised and whether the rapid economic growth the region is experiencing is sustainable. There is further concern from the point of view of the maintenance of monetary and financial stability. New approaches and new initiatives are indeed necessary to promote greater financial integration in the region. I am sure there are many other areas concerning development of the region in which new approaches and new initiatives may be desirable. Being a regional financial institution of strategic importance, it is obvious that the ADB has a significant role to play. I would argue that this should be a role of increasing significance, or even a pivotal role, given the increasing interdependence among jurisdictions within the region and therefore the greater need for regional co-operation. The ADB has the right institutional framework for promoting such co-operation, and I am glad to see that under the leadership of the President there has been increasing involvement of the ADB in regional financial cooperation recently.
the Chinese in the US, Jews in different countries or the Portuguese in France). A diaspora is characterized by an internal need to integrate, act together, help one another and to share one vision of the future. This internal motivation has been recognized as a fundamental factor behind the success of a community. It has been observed that talks, discussions and attempts to convince one another will never lead to the level of involvement and commitment present in diasporas, where participation and activities are voluntary. ‘Death of distance’ causes diasporas to be increasingly extensive. One example is the Mexican diaspora where the distance between two members was “up to two phone calls” already 20 years ago. This means that a person in need who has called up the diaspora for help had to wait only two phone calls to find somebody who would be able to help. As a matter of fact, this very topic is already known to us, Poles. I am quite sure that you are familiar with the articles in the Polish press in the period from Poland's accession to the EU to the mid-2006. These articles lamented the fact that during this period more than a million people, mainly young Poles from the so-called PLN 1,200-gross-pay-generation, left Poland for other EU countries in search for work.

This is possible thanks to the communicator he keeps wearing, which is equipped with a video camera. One of their common passions is building a wooden boat in which they hope to go to the lake. They spend most of their time working on details and learning the wood processing technology by chatting through their communicators with other amateur boat builders from England, Canada and China, among other countries. Sailing is one of Global’s favourite sports, but not the only one he does. Global takes care of his health, which is under constant surveillance of an e-doctor. Global rarely falls ill, because he takes preventive measures displayed on his communicator in accordance with his preferences twice a month. Today, he got a text message reminding him that two months had elapsed since he last took his blood pressure. He confirms his willingness to be re-examined, and his watch takes his blood pressure and sends the result to the communicator, which automatically transmits the data to his edoctor. Everything is OK, but Global does not even notice this, because he is already engrossed in working on another issue – reducing the costs of building a city that 25 years ago was referred to as the knowledge city or intelligent city. It is simply a city that is comfortable for its citizens, a city where beauty and functionality go hand in hand, where life is easier and architecture fosters social life, a city where innovations are born and a city that attracts visitors.
While GDP growth this year is forecast to be moderate, around 1.5 per cent, growth in both 2004 and 2005 is expected to be appreciably higher, approximately 2.5 per cent. So growth in coming years is anticipated to be somewhat higher than the potential growth we had forecast for Sweden in recent years. If Swedish economic activity is to rise as forecast, there will need to be a pick-up in investment. This began to fall as early as 2001 in manufacturing, and the following year it declined in the whole economy. Like many other forecasters we viewed the decline in investment as more transitory than it later proved to be. A year ago, our forecasts pointed to a turnaround at the beginning of 2003 (see Chart 3). In the June Inflation Report, it was forecast that investment would be delayed and begin to rise at the beginning of 2004. During the second quarter this year, gross capital formation fell by approximately 2 per cent according to the National Accounts. And in its latest forecast from August, the National Institute for Economic Research expects an increase in investment to be delayed further. The situation is clearly uncertain, even if the fundamental conditions for a rise in investment are good, with low interest rates, stable equity market growth and expectations of a recovery in the international economy. Another source of concern is connected with Swedish household consumption.

And it is this trend that determines our welfare! So we must now shift our focus in the public debate from monetary policy and stabilisation policy to issues that determine Sweden's ability to create growth and welfare. In fact, this has been important for a long time since Sweden suffered a considerable decline in welfare terms relative to almost all other countries, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. But it is particularly significant now in the light of the challenges facing us in the near future, particularly as a result of our ageing population. Essentially, economic growth is determined by how much we work and how productive we are. Nothing can change this. The number of hours worked is affected by a large number of factors; e.g. the number of people of working age, the number of these that are employed, absenteeism, etc. Labour productivity, measured as GDP per hour worked, is partly dependent on technological advances (e.g. more modern machinery) or on real capital being supplied (a long-term expansion of the means of production). In addition to this are changes in productivity that result from the movement of labour from less productive to more productive sectors. The number of hours worked grew relatively favourably for a number of years after the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. But it was essentially demand-driven. There were many people of working age who were unemployed after the crisis years and then found employment.
Under these circumstances, public authorities undertook a series of actions to support the banking sector, in particular the following:   Approval of a law which increased the insured amount of public deposits;    Decisions of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania to limit bank exposure against their foreign bank owner groups and suspend the distribution of dividend for banks during 2008 and 2009;    Implementation of a number of other decisions taken by the Bank of Albania in relation to the establishment of more easing conditions to provide liquidity in the inter-bank market; and    Further improvement of the regulatory supervisory framework, aiming at maintaining banking activity stability. Overall, during this stage, the Bank of Albania has played an essential role for the identification of short-term problems of the banking sector and their immediate addressing. This process was necessary to identify later longer-term implications on the banking activity performance and further alignment of the supervisory framework. Banking activity performance over the past two years, has shown that these measures proved to be effective and the Albanian banking system overcame with success the global crisis effects. The withdrawal of publics deposits from the banking sector was staunched at the end of 2009 Q1 and, from that moment, their return to the banks continues consistently. The current financial situation continues to be stable, overall, compared with previous periods, with a firm public confidence and satisfactory condition of liquidity and capitalisation.

The debate preceding the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 was protracted and intense. Early drafts of reform proposals were careful not to even mention a “central bank” – the 75-year-old scars from the Second Bank’s failed reauthorization battle had still not fully healed. Although there was a strong recognition that the country needed a central bank to forestall and mitigate financial panics, there was considerable disagreement about how it should be structured. Important considerations included what role should be played by  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  private bankers versus government officials, how centralized the new bank should be and the extent of its powers. 1 During this period, the U.S. economy was susceptible to financial panics. Lacking a central bank, the country had no reliable lender of last resort that could provide currency and credit on demand against high-quality assets. Banks had to self-insure against bank runs by holding a high fraction of deposits as cash, and by entering into private liquidity agreements with other banks. Self-insurance was not only expensive relative to the cost of a public backstop provided by a central bank, but it was also limited in its effectiveness. When the business cycle turned down and financial stress intensified, bank runs often ensued as bank customers rushed to convert their deposits into cash. Without a true lender of last resort, cash that banks individually and collectively kept in reserve often proved inadequate to meet demand.
5  The current account mainly consists of the difference between exports and imports of goods and services. Net capital income and various charges paid to and received from abroad are also included, but these components usually account for a much smaller part of the total than net exports. 6  For a more detailed discussion, see Lane, 2010. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1 Current accounts, private net capital and GDP in eastern and central Europe Percentage of GDP and annual percentage change 15  15 GDP Current account Private capital  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10 80  82  84  86  89  91  93  95  97  99  01  04  06  08  10  Note. Private capital is made up of direct private investment (net), private portfolio flows (net) and other private capital (net flows), expressed here as a share of GDP. Source: The IMF  Global imbalances have increased since the deregulation of the capital markets at the end of the 1980s. One of the reasons for this is that countries with surpluses, such as China, have grown more rapidly than other countries. The higher rate of growth means that China’s savings surplus (the difference between saving and investment) has increased as a percentage of global GDP.

What advice would you give to euro area governments on how to deal with the economic impact of this pandemic? We need to be aware that this will lead to a significant drop in business revenues and the public sector will need to fill this gap. The main factor in terms of ensuring the economy starts to recover when the health situation improves is to try to “vaccinate”, as best we can, the business ecosystem of each country. What we need to do is try to keep the business system alive, as much as possible, and to come through this period. That is what my advice would be. Keeping this ecosystem going is also important in terms of safeguarding jobs and reducing the social impact. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
It had lowered its DFR all the way to zero and had even begun to reduce it further, reaching an annual interest rate of -0.2% in late 2014. But even at these very low interest rates, the economy remained sluggish, and inflation stayed persistently below the ECB’s target (at the time, an inflation rate below, but close to, 2%), even falling occasionally into negative territory. In these circumstances, the ECB had to reach for new, “unconventional” tools to meet its inflation target. In particular, the ECB initiated a rapid expansion of its balance sheet, both  4  By way o f illustratio n, in the latest SMA, the median respo ndent anticipated that the DFR wo uld reach 2.5% in the seco nd quarter o f 2023. 5  While the central bank can set any interbank interest rate abo ve zero , it canno t set that rate far belo w this thresho ld, because then ho useholds would simply hold o nto cash – thereby receiving a 0% interest rate – rather than save at negative rates, and banks wo uld start co nverting their electro nic reserves – yielding a negative return – into currency. Banks can o ffer depo sits at zero rates to avo id this risk of ‘financial disintermediation’, thus absorbing the adverse impact o f negative interbank rates themselves. In the lo ng run, this may reduce banks’ pro fitability, which may h amper the bank mo netary po licy transmissio n channel.

An important aspect of the recent developments to strengthen Islamic financial services industry is that this is being undertaken during the stable and good times. This will position Islamic finance to deal with future challenges. A clear indication of that is the growing relevance and importance of the sukuk market. This event in Kuala Lumpur is commemorating the talent, expertise and the successes of the Islamic financial community. BIS Review 95/2010  3
The Riksbank rejects issuers with a large climate footprint I believe it is better to instead focus on the issuers, and to make an overall assessment of how they work to promote a sustainable climate. Indicators of this could be, for instance, their greenhouse gas emissions. This is how we are now beginning to give consideration to sustainability in our new risk and investment policy. We will not invest in assets issued by issuers with a large climate footprint when we are choosing other assets than those best corresponding to our policy need. This has some consequences for the holdings in our foreign exchange reserves. The Riksbank has invested around 8 per cent of the foreign exchange reserves in Australian and Canadian central and federal government bonds, as they give relatively high yield and a good diversification of risk, at the same time as being traded on liquid markets. But Australia and Canada are countries that are not known for good climate work. Greenhouse gas emissions per capita are among the highest in the world, but vary considerably between the different states. For instance, greenhouse gas intensity is more than three times higher in production in Alberta than in Ontario and Quebec. As a result of the new investment policy, we sold our holdings of bonds issued by Alberta in the spring. For the same reason, we have recently sold our holdings in bonds issued by the Australian states of Queensland and Western Australia.

As a first step, we will disclose the Weighted Average Carbon Intensity (WACI) of our equities portfolio relative to market benchmarks. Carbon intensity measures the carbon emissions per unit of revenue of the company. The WACI is derived from the carbon intensity of revenues of each of the companies in the portfolio, weighted by the relative size of the investments in those companies. MAS’ equities portfolio has a lower carbon intensity than its market benchmarks. As at end-March 2021, the WACI for MAS’ Emerging Markets equities portfolio was 30% lower than its benchmark while the WACI for MAS’ Developed Markets equities portfolio was 3% lower than benchmark. We will continue to monitor MAS’ portfolio WACI over time and seek to understand the impact of our portfolio actions on WACI levels. A SUSTAINABLE ORGANISATION Finally, as a corporate citizen, MAS is accountable for reducing and reporting its own carbon footprint. We aim to build a sustainable organisation and have advanced on two fronts: measuring our carbon footprint; and developing strategies to reduce our footprint. MAS has substantially established its carbon profile across Scope 1, Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions. Scope 1 emissions, namely from sources controlled or owned by MAS, are negligible. Scope 2 emissions, namely from purchased electricity to power our office premises, have been on a downward trend. Scope 3 emissions, namely from corporate activities such as air travel, currency operations, and waste incineration, account for most of our carbon profile.
However, as I have repeatedly said, labour reform, accompanied by liberalisation processes to foster a more competitive environment, is the only way within the context of monetary union of achieving an internal devaluation within a relatively short space of time. This reform will not have immediate effects, but that only makes it all the more pressing. Without this reform, the recovery in competitiveness could only be achieved through an extremely slow and very painful, with unacceptable suffering for many Spaniards and negative consequences beyond the purely economic ones. Turning to budgetary policy, lowering the deficit is absolutely necessary given the stance of the markets, whose distrust of the sovereign debt of the euro area countries has been increasing in recent weeks. Admittedly, tough decisions have already been taken in Spain, such as the reform of pensions, which have served to reduce the deficit not only in the short run, but also in the medium and long term. However, there is still a long way to go merely to comply in 2012 with the 4.4% budget deficit commitment, whatever the final figure for 2011. Finally, some very significant progress has been made in Spain in recent years in financial restructuring.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Mechanisms to prevent and manage banking crises in the future Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the presentation of the report entitled “Mecanismos de prevención y gestión de futures crisis bancarias”, Fundación de Estudios Financieros, Madrid, 1 December 2011. *  *  *  The crisis still with us has seen the adoption of a broad package of financial measures at the global, European and national levels. The global response has had political backing at the highest level of the G-20. In the implementation of this response, a key role has been played by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which has coordinated the work of numerous international institutions and committees. In Europe, in addition to the implementation of these global agreements on the continent, other worthwhile initiatives have been adopted. These include most notably changes in the supranational supervisory architecture. Finally, with regard to Spain, both the Banco de España and the Finance Ministry have contributed long and hard to implementing these global and European initiatives. But, to highlight a singular facet of the Spanish response, I should like to mention the restructuring of our financial system. I shall spare you my assessment of the numerous and substantial changes stemming from various fora that have marked progress in recent years. The authors of the book give a good account of this and, were I to repeat what they say, they might not be read.
2 Those included -  Parliament, in legislation, enshrining the goal of price stability, and requiring the Bank to publish a quarterly report on the outlook for stability  -  the executive arm of government deciding the definition of price stability (2% CPI inflation target) and setting out requirements for the Bank to explain publicly what is going on if the target is missed on either side by more than 1pp  -  the Committee comprising four ‘external’ members as well as five internal (or ‘executive’) members. The external members were necessary to legitimise giving such an important function to the Bank. ‘One person/one vote’, with transparency, was a mechanism for attracting high-quality ‘externals’ and for ensuring that the introduction of ‘new blood’ made a difference – that it did let in ‘fresh air’ and bring useful expertise to the table. And, of course, the system of individual voting had to carry across to the ‘internals’ too. Indeed, as most studies show, there is no difference between internal and external members in our decision-taking. The burden of that rehearsal of some UK institutional history is this: that, in comparing central bank practices, we should not think of our various decision-taking structures solely as technical solutions to the shared technical problem of deciding a path for rates. Rather, our varying structures are efforts to solve that shared technical problem in the context of varying histories and social and political structures.

This means that, in addition to clarifying our own thoughts, we are up to a point in the business of persuasion. Ours is not a system of postal voting. It is a system of listening to and learning from each other. Second, with qualifications, some of the MPC’s communications are relatively more collective. In particular, our communications on a broadly shared ‘model’ of how the economy works, and our forecasts of the outlook for growth and inflation. In 1998, the (then) Committee published a paper on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism; and, in a 2007 paper to the Treasury Select Committee of Parliament, we described our view of material changes in the workings of the economy during the Committee’s first ten years. Both were agreed, collegiate-like documents, while not committing every member to every proposition. Much the same can be said of our quarterly forecasts and Inflation Reports, which play a central role in the MPC’s system. Our forecasts are the projections of the policymakers not the supporting analytical staff. It is striking that the ‘individualistic’ MPC publishes a common forecast, whereas the somewhat more-collegial FOMC has long published information (the central tendency and range) about the forecasts of its individual members (without the names). The FOMC’s approach allows the range of central projections to be transparent. It is  3  See Tucker, P M W, ‘Reflections on operating inflation targeting’, speech at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, July 2006, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q2 2006, pp 212-224.