samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There has also been increasing recognition of the need for macro-prudential policy in dealing with the problem of systemic risk as well as coordination between monetary policy and financial system policy, given that such measures could likely have a macroeconomic impact. The idea is not new to us as you may recall our prior uses of loan-to-value ratios and tightening of credit card rule to prevent the build-up of vulnerabilities in the real estate and household sectors. Ladies and gentlemen, When all things considered, though regulatory weakness was partly to be blamed for the recent global financial crisis, it is not that the tenet of risk-based supervision is flawed, but rather failures occurred where there was complacency in overestimating the ability to understand and manage such risks. Therefore, I believe one of the key lessons to be drawn from this global crisis is that we must put great focus and vigilance on supervisory process, rather than just redrafting the written regulation. Finally, there is pressing call for stronger international cooperation and dialogue among supervisors. This is so because the complexity and cross-border linkages of financial systems will continue to increase and while we are still grappling with the appropriate supervisory structure to handle cross-border issues, information flows, at this time, continue to be limited. Thus, without effective communication and cooperation, it will be difficult to prevent or contain future financial crisis spillovers effectively.

It is now over a year since the Occupy movement commenced its journey and entered the collective conscience of the public and policymakers. One year on, what has it achieved? Some have suggested rather little, that Occupy’s voice has been loud but vague, long on problems, short on solutions. Others have argued that the fault-lines in the global financial system, which chasmed during the crisis, are essentially unaltered, that reform has failed. I wish to argue tonight that both are wrong – that Occupy’s voice has been both loud and persuasive and that policymakers have listened and are acting in ways which will close those fault-lines. In fact, I want to argue that we are in the early stages of a reformation of finance, a reformation which Occupy has helped stir. Let me start with the contribution of the Occupy movement itself. Occupy has been successful in its efforts to popularise the problems of the global financial system for one very simple reason: they are right. By this I do not just mean right in a moral sense. For sure, Occupy have touched a moral nerve in pointing to growing inequities in the allocation of wealth and incomes globally. The 99% certainly agrees. But so, more interestingly, do a high and rising share of the 1%. Yet it is the analytical, every bit as much as the moral, ground that Occupy has taken. For the hard-headed facts suggest that, at the heart of the global financial crisis, were and are problems of deep and rising inequality.
It is now high time that these other aspects of banking union are also completed. Otherwise, we would make the same mistake that was made when the euro was introduced. Back then the consequences of having a single currency were not fully reflected in the Union’s institutional design. Internal inconsistencies made our union much more vulnerable than it needed to be when an external shock hit it. If the SSM is of great importance to the singleness of money, it is also greatly important to the singleness of the market. The single market is, as the euro, a central and irrevocable creation of the European Union. But, as is the case for the euro, its irrevocability, to remain unquestionable, needs being buttressed by appropriate and credible institutions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The SSM is one such institution. And that is why it was – and remains – open to participation by countries which are not in the euro area. Before the crisis, the free passporting of banking services across borders relied on the principle of home supervision, host recognition. This principle, however, requires equal standards of supervision across borders, and mutual trust in the quality of supervision. That trust did not always stand the test of the crisis. A single supervisor, applying homogenous methodology across institutions, internalises mutual trust. Its establishment was thus one answer, and certainly an effective answer to this challenge.

A single supervisor builds trust not only between supervisors, but also with shareholders and other stakeholders, including the fiscal authorities that, in the past, were too often assumed to be the shareholders of last resort of their national financial system. The importance of the SSM to uphold the single market serves as a reminder that the objective of having a robust supervisor is not just to make banks safe. The objective is to make banks safe so that they can safely access resources and use them to fund innovation, investment, and growth. Similarly, creating a single supervisor was not an objective per se. But it was necessary so that the integrity of the single banking market is not questioned. What I have said of banking can be extrapolated to other areas of finance, which is one reason why, alongside Banking Union, the Capital Markets Union, championed by Commissioner Hill, also needs to be implemented fully and as quickly as practical. I am not saying “as quickly as practical” for no reason. If we want to restore in Europe the stability that is the premise for a return to prosperity, we need to consider the economic costs entailed by recurrent uncertainty over the operating environment of European firms. Not only does it cause a loss of growth today, but by impeding investment, it may also weaken our potential in a more lasting way.
The broad adoption of financial technology or fintech could dramatically lower the cost of banking services. Not only will this enhance financial inclusion, it could potentially also help mobilise untapped savings, enable more efficient financial transactions, and make credit more readily available and affordable to small businesses. Emerging Asia fares poorly in financial inclusion even among emerging markets. •  Less than 15% of Asian SMEs have bank credit lines, compared to 24% in Latin America and 28% in Eastern Europe. •  In Indonesia, for example, only about one out of every three persons aged 15 and above has an account with a financial institution. Ironically, Emerging Asia’s relative under-development could turn out to be an advantage. The innovative adoption of digital technology by the financial industry is enabling these economies to leapfrog into more advanced channels for providing banking services. •  A growing number of Asian customers, especially in countries like China and India with rapidly developing technology infrastructure, are using mobile banking apps for payments and funds transfers, even before customers in more advanced economies. •  In India, bank accounts can be linked to biometric identity cards issued under the national Aadhaar initiative, enabling millions who otherwise lack the formal documents required to open a bank account to have access to basic banking services. Of course, technological innovations pose threats as well as opportunities to Asian banks. As in the US, a number of fintech entities in Asia are making inroads as lower-cost alternatives to banks.

When the crisis struck Asia in 2008, there were fears of a drying up of trade finance as European banks started deleveraging and cutting back from the region. As it turned out, Asian banks stepped in decisively and trade finance volumes recovered strongly. •  Between 2008 and 2013, trade finance volumes at Chinese and Hong Kong banks have more than doubled while those at Indian banks rose more than half over the same period. •  Eurozone banks have since recovered some of their market share, but the Asian banks remain significant players. This afternoon I would like to discuss three key forces that will shape the course of banking and finance in Emerging Asia over the medium term: •  economic growth;  •  financial regulation; and  •  technological innovation. Economic growth Let me begin with growth. The near term economic outlook for Emerging Asia will be shaped by two themes: the ongoing recovery in the G3 economies and the slowdown in the Chinese economy. •  The underlying growth momentum in the US appears intact despite a disappointing start to the year. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  The Eurozone is recovering from a double dip recession and financial stresses have abated. •  In Japan, domestic demand is strengthening, following the negative consumption tax shock of last April. •  However, China, which had been supporting global demand in recent years, is experiencing a deceleration in growth amid a property downturn and softer exports.
In this regard, the Eurosystem’s initial objective is to have a Single Euro Payments Area – a SEPA – for citizens and enterprises in the euro area from 1 January 2008 onwards. According to the Commission’s regulation, the price charged by banks for a cross-border transfer must be the same as that of a transfer within the same country. While prices to the end-customer have been homogenised through legislation, the level of service cannot be influenced by legislation. What is lacking is the possibility of using national instruments for pan-European business as well. A real SEPA will only be achieved when payments can be made throughout the whole area from a single bank account, using a single set of payment instruments, as easily and safely as in the national context today. The ECB’s second objective is to have a SEPA for the infrastructure by the end of 2010. Once national instruments, services and standards have been gradually phased out and replaced by pan-European ones, national infrastructures will be abolished or transformed into pan-European ones. Consequently, decisions related to the next generation of national systems should be made from a pan-European perspective to ensure compliance with the SEPA. To encourage national implementation, the respective national banking communities should translate the SEPA objectives into national transformation plans, allowing each bank and infrastructure provider to tailor its strategies and solutions towards a SEPA. The ECB intends to monitor this progress with the assistance of the European Payments Council (EPC).

Although the way in which they steer their individual money markets differs, ultimately they provide just the amount of liquidity that is necessary to maintain the key monetary policy rate at the targeted level. The SNB reacted rapidly, and was the very first central bank to provide additional liquidity, which it did on 9 August, by means of fine-tuning measures. In the course of the following days, we continued to provide the banking system with generous supplies of funds as part of our regular auction procedure. In this way, we succeeded in rapidly defusing tensions on the call money market. Since then, we have carrying out fine-tuning measures on a consistent basis, in order to dampen sharp fluctuations in the call money rate in either direction. This has allowed us to stabilise the very short-term Swiss franc money market. However, we were unable to prevent risk premiums in interbank business from rising, since this is largely independent of our measures. As can be seen in graph 2, the three-month Swiss franc Libor had risen to 2.90% by mid-September 2007, which was substantially above the level targeted by us. By international standards, however, the increase in Libor was minimal. Our monetary policy decision of 13 September was aimed at further calming the Swiss franc money market, by bringing the three-month Libor back down to around 2.75%. With this in mind, we made funds available to banks for a term of three months. We did this from the day of the monetary policy assessment onwards.
So we have had a limited supply of insurance coverage, that has itself led to higher cost of protection, which in turn discourages demand for insurance against catastrophe risks. 38. But we can solve this problem. We can overcome the fragmentation of data in Asia, pool data so as to facilitate more efficient underwriting of catastrophe risks. Here too, we have an initiative in Singapore called the Natural Catastrophe Data Analytics Exchange (Nat Cat DAX). •  Nat Cat DAX is a public-private partnership, involving several leading global insurers, the public sector and our research institutes;  •  It is using high resolution data obtained through remote sensing technologies – from satellites, drones and UAVs – and combining that with industry data to much richer database on natural disasters;  •  We welcome more in the industry to join the founding members in this initiative. Cyber insurance 39. The third major, emerging opportunity is in cyber insurance. The good news is that Asia is the most rapidly growing digital market globally. But it also means increasing costs of cyber attacks. This is a global problem, and we face it here in Asia. The frequency, sophistication  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  and the sheer audacity of cyber-attacks is growing. It will pose huge costs to our economies, and to corporate and personal privacy. 40.

We will be having another round of public consultation at the end of this month on our risk-based capital framework for insurers (or “RBC 2”). The aim is to finalise our proposals for providing capital relief for long-term assets which match the cash flows of the liabilities. We will also be raising questions, as part of this review, on the merit of having a different set of risk charges for infrastructure in particular. Catastrophe insurance 36. The second major opportunity is in catastrophe insurance. The economic cost of natural disasters is growing. It’s certainly growing here in Asia, a consequence partly of economic growth itself, a consequence of urbanisation and the growing concentration of wealth in cities in Asia, and a consequence of a higher incidence of natural disasters. •  Lloyd’s has estimated that even a modest an increase in penetration rates for catastrophe will allow for a large reduction in the economic costs that are being borne by governments and local communities in Asia. 37. So far the take-up of catastrophe insurance in Asia has been woefully low. Part of the reason has to do with a lack of insurance awareness among businesses around the region. But it also has to do with data gaps – the industry needs good data on the frequency, location and economic impact of natural disasters, so that insurers and reinsurers can price risks adequately.
Exchange rate certainty within Europe - even though it is nominal certainty rather than real exchange rate certainty - would potentially enhance the benefits to be derived from the European Single Market. The euro’s second very powerful advantage is the possibility it opens up for much broader and more liquid financial markets. It will mean a progressive narrowing of spreads between borrowers and lenders - and that will be good news too for financial intermediaries as a group, because it will lead to higher volumes of financial activity - though not every individual intermediary will benefit, of course, in the more competitive environment. The City of London is already making an important contribution to this process of financial euro-market integration. So there are potentially powerful advantages. What then are the risks - the possible arguments against our joining the euro? Essentially the potential downside can be summed up as the risk that the single - one-size-fits-all – short-term interest rate within the Eurozone - which is the inevitable consequence of a single currency - will not in the event prove to be appropriate to the domestic monetary policy needs of all the participating countries. Countries may have divergent cyclical positions. They may face divergent fiscal positions which would affect their appropriate fiscal/monetary policy mix in different directions - though this should be contained by the Growth and Stability pact.

Why did we overestimate inflation in our forecasts for those years? To what extent is the fact that inflation has undershot the target due to incorrectly formulated monetary policy, and what effects could this have on unemployment? BIS Review 52/2007  3  Why has inflation undershot the target? Between 1995 and 2006 CPI inflation was on average 1.3 per cent. Measured in terms of UND1X, which is what we normally base our monetary policy on, inflation amounted to an average of 1.7 per cent during the same period. 1 One reason why CPI inflation has been lower than UND1X inflation is that the repo rate has been regularly cut during this period. Regardless of what measure is used, the legal objective of price stability has been achieved. However, inflation has on average undershot the target the Riksbank itself has set. During 2004-2005 inflation deviated substantially from the Riksbank’s target. Some debaters have, as I mentioned at the beginning, claimed that this has to a large degree contributed to the high unemployment in recent years. Of course, it is true that incorrectly formulated monetary policy could lead to unnecessarily high unemployment. But to be able to assess monetary policy in this regard, it is important to first find out why inflation has undershot the target. It is also important to examine what consequences these factors may have had for unemployment, in addition to the effects related to the formulation of monetary policy.
Gent Sejko: New normal - challenges and opportunities Keynote speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Conference on “New normal: Challenges & Opportunities”, European University of Tirana, Tirana, 30 April 2021. * * * Honourable Professor Gjuraj, Honourable Professor Xhepa, Dear students and participants, It is a great pleasure for me to greet the proceedings of this Conference on the “New normal”. This topic is both an emergent and unresolved issue of the current economic debate. We altogether: policy makers; academics; and operators in the private sector, are aware that a new reality lies ahead in the post-pandemic world. “What would be the contours of this new reality?”; “What challenges and opportunities lie ahead of the private sector?” and “Which will be the objectives and instruments of the monetary policy”. These questions still lack a thoroughly answer. For this reason, I would like to thank the European University of Tirana, for selecting this topic of an utmost importance. The European University of Tirana is a hearth of knowledge which has succeeded in positioning at the centre of: education; academic discussion; and innovation enhancement. Today, it manifests a consolidated profile in the academic debate. While trying to summarise the Bank of Albania’s opinion on the selected topic, following, I will address in my speech three specific issues: First, I will show briefly the impact of the pandemic on the Albanian economy and the measures taken by the Bank of Albania to minimise its effects.

In order to achieve a harmonized application of legislation at European level and to support payment initiation and account information service providers, the European Banking Authority (EBA) adopted an opinion on obstacles in early June 2020. within the meaning of Art. 32 (3) of the regulatory technical standards for in-depth identification of the customer and common and secure standards of communication1. The opinion highlights a number of technical or organizational obstacles that payment service providers, which maintain accounts, pose to the new services and which should be removed. Examples of such obstacles include the unavailability of all procedures for performing in-depth identification of the customer when using the new services, requiring manual entry of the IBAN on the payment account from which payment is initiated or requesting account information, repeated in-depth establishing the identity when initiating payment, the need to provide prior consent to the client to use the new services, etc. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Improving the security of electronic payments is the second major aspect of PSD2. In September 2019, the requirements for payment service providers to apply a procedure for indepth identification of the customer when the payer accesses his payment account online, initiates an electronic payment transaction or performs another remote action that could occur risk of payment fraud. These requirements have started to apply to credit transfers made through the Internet and mobile banking platforms.
Therefore, in the present exercise MAS will allow the principal shareholders to continue owning indirect stakes in the banking groups through the non-financial entities that they control. MAS will review this arrangement later. Management To avoid conflicts of interest, the management of the financial entities should be separate from the management of its non-financial affiliates. There should be no sharing of executive directors and management staff, such as the chief financial officer and chief operating officer. On the board of directors of a regulated financial entity, a majority of the directors should not be holding directorships on the boards of the non-financial affiliates as well. Name-sharing Mixed conglomerates usually leverage on common brand building. Many of the non-financial affiliates of local banks share the name of their parent banks. Financial and non-financial entities alike have built up goodwill in the brand name over the years. But reputational and contagion risks can result from sharing of names and corporate badges between the bank and its non-bank affiliates. Where an unregulated entity sharing a name fails or falls into disrepute, the public may attribute its problems to the bank, causing a bank run. MAS will therefore disallow the sharing of names and logos between the financial and non-financial entities. We are considering amending the Banking Act, to prevent the use of names or acronyms by companies that may confuse the public, or give the impression that a company is related to or associated with any Singapore-incorporated bank.

Jean-Claude Trichet: Global capital – surrender of national policies? Lessons from the recent events in credit markets Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the 17th Frankfurt European Banking Congress “Global Capital – Threat or Salvation?”, Frankfurt am Main, 23 November 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me start off with one general remark: The present significant market correction with episodes of turbulences should not come as a surprise to us. The ECB, as well as the other central banks, has issued warnings in the past on the global phenomenon of under-pricing of risks. In many respects the present episode can be interpreted as bringing to the forefront anomalies and structural deficiencies which we have identified earlier. While it is too early to make a full assessment, I believe there are some first provisional lessons which can already be drawn at the current stage. A lesson that can be drawn is that the growing complexity of instruments has to be monitored very closely. Structured credit markets are exposed to valuation problems, which make the market very vulnerable to a shift in investor sentiment. In the absence of reliable market prices, instruments need to be valued by models. But estimates which the models produce are highly sensitive to underlying assumptions.