samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And that, of course, is exactly what we do in fact do - using the vast array of official economic statistics and financial market data, all the publicly available and some private surveys and commentaries, as well as a wealth of anecdotal and structured survey evidence that we collect BIS Review 71/1998  -3-  ourselves, through our 16 non-executive directors, through the frequent visits which MPC members make around the country, and through meetings in London, and through our network of 12 regional, information-gathering and disseminating, agencies with their 7000 industrial contacts throughout the United Kingdom. And we openly display the facts as they are available to us, as well as our analysis and our conclusions, regularly through the publication of the minutes of our monthly meeting and in the quarterly Inflation Report. So when people say to me that the economy is headed for recession, I’m interested in comparing the evidence on which they base their views with our own evidence, and I want to know whether or not they are also saying that they expect us to undershoot the Government’s inflation target. Let’s just for a moment turn down the noise and look at some of the relevant facts as they relate to the economy as a whole. Since the economy started to recover from recession in the spring of 1992 - some 6½ years ago - overall output has grown at an average rate of about 3%.

That can be influenced by the whole raft of Government policies, ranging from education and health to taxation and social security, and it depends ultimately on the ingenuity, the productivity, and the flexibility, of the economy. Employers and employees, working together, clearly have a crucial role to play in this context, and I recognise the constructive and forward-looking role that many of you are now playing to improve the supply-side capacity of the economy. Monetary policy operates on the demand side. And the best help that we can give is to keep overall demand consistently in line with that supply-side capacity - not letting it run above capacity but not letting it fall below capacity either - as reflected in consistently low inflation. That way we can moderate rather than aggravate the unavoidable ups and downs of the business cycle, enabling steadier growth, high levels of employment and rising living standards to be sustained into the medium and longer-term. And if we can do that, then we will contribute indirectly to the supply side by creating an environment which encourages more rational, longer-term, decision-making throughout the economy. I would hope, Chairman, that on this basis we could all agree at least on what it is we are trying to do. The debate is not about the ends it is about the means. We are every bit as concerned with growth and employment as you are - as anyone in their right mind must be.
Eva Srejber: Inflation targeting and bubbles Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at the Adam Smith seminars, Paris, 9 July 2002. *  *  *  Since the mid-1990s, inflation has stabilised at very low levels in the industrial nations. From an average inflation rate of 6 per cent during the period 1975 to 1994, the rate of price increase has been slightly below 2 per cent over the past 6 years. This entails a return to the same low inflation rate as prior to 1970. Inflation has also been reduced considerably in most other countries in, for instance, Asia and Latin America. There are many factors that have contributed to this. Firstly, price stability has become an explicit objective for monetary policy in many countries. An increasing number of central banks are orienting their monetary policy towards a fixed inflation target. This includes the Riksbank, which, after the fixed exchange rate was abandoned in November 1992, established an inflation target of 2 per cent with a deviation interval of plus/minus one percentage point. The orientation of monetary policy has in many countries been supported by a fiscal policy aimed at budget consolidation. Independence for the central banks in Europe, convergence criteria for EMU membership, the stability pact in Europe and the ban on financing budget deficits through printing new banknotes are all examples of measures that have helped increase confidence in the price stability target. Increased competition in the wake of globalisation has probably also subdued inflation temporarily.

However, first and foremost I would like to point out that monetary policy aimed at stabilising the inflation rate should basically reduce the risk of over-valued asset prices leading to an exaggerated real demand. Fluctuations in the level of resource utilisation and in the output gap are traditionally assumed to be reflected in the inflation rate. If inflated asset prices stimulate demand in the economy, without a corresponding increase in the potential growth rate, inflation will rise. If the central bank anticipates this, monetary policy will normally be tightened to ensure that demand is compatible with long-term sustainable growth. And as long as demand in the economy increases at a rate compatible with long-term growth, there is less risk of exaggerated indebtedness. Inflation targeting should thus, at least in theory, reduce the risk of extensive financial imbalances accumulating. However, even with an otherwise successful inflation target policy, real and financial imbalances created by exaggerated asset prices can build up. If there are exaggerated expectations regarding growth in productivity and profits in a particular country, this can lead to a strong inflow of capital and strengthening of the currency. The increase in real demand, which is caused by exaggerated increases in asset prices, can thus be partly met by increased imports, while the currency strengthens and domestic inflationary pressure is reduced.
This helped knit the country’s commerce together better and ensured that checks would be payable at par rather than discounted by differing amounts depending on how far one was from the bank of issue and how little one knew about a particular bank’s financial condition and viability. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The view was generally held that centralization of banking would inevitably result in one of two alternatives: either complete governmental control, which meant politics in banking, or control by “Wall Street,” which meant banking in politics. 4 Importantly, the Federal Reserve was designed to have budgetary independence from the federal government. The System funds itself through its business operations, and not through Congressional appropriations. 5 This formed an important foundation in ensuring that the conduct of monetary policy would be independent from political influence. A wide range of research has shown that central banks achieve better outcomes with respect to employment and inflation when they are insulated from short-term political pressures in their conduct of monetary policy. 6 The Federal Reserve System was soon tested, first by the Depression of 1920–21, and then by the Great Depression. The searing experience of the Great Depression, including the 1933 Banking Holiday and thousands of bank failures, revealed significant shortcomings. This led to the Banking Act of 1935, which made two important changes – establishing a federal deposit insurance system and making the Federal Reserve System more centralized.

The Dodd-Frank Act left intact the decentralized structure of the original federated Federal Reserve System – the twelve Reserve Banks and the Board of Governors in Washington. Each Reserve Bank continues to operate as a separately capitalized corporation with its own Board of Directors. 14 But, to limit the role of bankers on the Federal Reserve Bank boards, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibited the bankers on each board from participating in the selection of its Reserve Bank president. 15 Even prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, it is important to emphasize that the directors played no significant role in setting policy. 16 Instead, their role has been to advise the Reserve Bank  12  Several other conditions had to be satisfied as well. 13  Although considerable progress has been made in ending TBTF, I think it is premature to declare victory. Some banks still have work to do to make their resolution plans credible, and there needs to be more work on cross-border issues to ensure that such a resolution would proceed smoothly. 14  Each Board is made up of nine members divided evenly into Class A, B, and C directors. The Class A directors represent the banks of the District that are Federal Reserve member banks, the Class B and C directors represent the broader public interest. Only eligible Class B and Class C directors can participate in the process for selecting Reserve Bank presidents.
Such trends can namely also depend on the fact that the real exchange rate, that is, the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative price levels between Sweden and other countries, is not necessarily constant. If price devel-  7 [21]  opments are approximately the same as abroad, the adjustment of the real exchange rate will occur via trends in the nominal exchange rate. Importantly though, trends in the real exchange rate are determined by structural factors, such as differences in productivity growth among countries. Challenges in communication This is how the debate has been framed. One observation is that the monetary policy conducted by the Riksbank has been the subject of lively discussion, despite its sole purpose having been to fulfil the remit the bank has from the Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag. Furthermore, in recent years the Riksbank has managed its remit well, from a purely objective perspective. I draw two conclusions from this. First, the debate seems to be about the remit itself, even if this is not always apparent. It seems people want the Riksbank to do something other than what it has been tasked to do. Second, maybe we at the Riksbank have not managed to communicate well enough why we have the remit we have, why we need to conduct the policy we have conducted and what the benefits are of having an inflation target of 2 per cent compared with other monetary policy objectives. The fact that the communication has faced challenges is in a way natural.

The second piece examines the high child poverty rate in Puerto Rico and its impact on the long-term economic sustainability of the island and its ability to recover from Hurricane Maria. The island’s child poverty rate is almost three times higher than that of mainland, and has remained stagnant even during times of economic growth, suggesting the issue is not just rooted in labor demand. This chapter discusses the dual programmatic and policy strategy of the Boys and Girls Club of Puerto Rico and its sister organization the Youth Development Institute. Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to provide a quick overview of today’s sessions. First, my colleague Patrick Harker, President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, will discuss key shifts in perspective needed to see workforce development as an investment. Then there will be three panel sessions, each dedicated to the overarching focus of a volume in the publication – investing in workers, investing in work, and investing in systems. The day will then end with a luncheon panel discussion where speakers from various sectors will discuss what needs to happen to realize the goal of seeing workforce development as an investment in inclusive economic growth that benefits workers, employers, and communities. I am thrilled that we can bring together national and regional leaders representing the private, public, and nonprofit sectors to engage in a dialogue that can inform workforce development programming across the country and learn from one another about the opportunities for investing in America’s workforce.
Of particular interest is that Indian actors are providing fresh interpretations of Ibsen’s work, both in India and in Norway. The topic of my speech today is Norwegian experiences in balancing economic development with macroeconomic stability from a historical perspective. As a background for the subject, let me start with a brief characteristic of Norway today from an economic perspective. First, Norway is a small, mountainous country with a population of only 4½ million people scattered across a land area that is one tenth of the size of India. Second, Norway’s economic growth has been favourable for many years, and the per capita income is among the highest in the world. An abundance of natural resources, not least oil and gas, and openness to trade and capital movements are important reasons for this. The petroleum sector’s share of GDP was approximately 24 per cent in 2005. Over the last 10 years, the government has earned higher petroleum revenues than it has spent. Today we have a sizeable Government Pension Fund, which invests all its funds globally. Globalisation and cyclical developments have been kind to the Norwegian economy. Prices for our imported goods are falling in relation to prices for goods we export. Norway’s terms of trade are improving. The impact of the rise in oil and gas prices is particularly strong, but the terms-of-trade gains for the mainland economy have also been high. One aspect of this is that trade in services with India is increasing.

In the process of finalisation of Basel III, the Committee has also stated its intention to improve the standardised approaches for credit and operational risk. Broadly speaking, the aim is also to make them more risk-sensitive. The standardised approaches are important per se, since they are used by a great number of banks worldwide; but as restrictions on the use of internal models are introduced they will become even more important. Thus, discontinuing the use of internal models to measure operational risk would mean that all institutions, irrespective of size, business model or type of business, would have to use the same standardised approach to measure operational risk. Measuring such a heterogeneous risk using a standardised approach clearly presents considerable difficulties. 6/7  The proposal published for public consultation by the Basel Committee has a series of limitations that must be remedied before it is approved. Regarding the use of the standardised approach to measure credit risk, the Committee is striving to make it more risk-sensitive and, at the same time, to reduce its excessively automatic reliance on external credit ratings. This is no easy task either, and the final outcome may possibly be less ambitious than was initially intended. It is important, however, that the approach be robust and correctly calibrated. The impact assessments being performed by the Basel Committee will provide more information in this respect. In accordance with the guidelines we all subscribe to, as I mentioned earlier, this package of reforms should not produce a significant widespread increase in capital requirements.
However, the Basel Committee goes further and describes the role of supervisors in Corporate Governance by adding new parameters as well. These are: •  Supervisors should provide guidance to banks on sound Corporate Governance and the proactive practices that should be in place. •  Supervisors should consider Corporate Governance as one element of depositor protection. •  Supervisors should determine whether the bank has adopted and effectively implemented sound Corporate Governance policies and practices. •  Supervisors should assess the quality of banks’ audit and control functions. •  Supervisors should evaluate the effects of the bank’s group structure. •  Supervisors should bring to the board of directors’ and management’s attention, problems that they detect through their supervisory efforts. According to Basel recommendations, Corporate Governance should be promoted by other stakeholders as well.

Some of these risks, singularly or collectively, can lead to potential insolvency and financial instability. In more recent times, the regulators world over have introduced prudential norms on single borrower exposures, group exposures and concentration of credit risks. The underlying principles of such norms indicate some degree of compulsion on the observance of CG principles. To further augment such prudential norms, regulators may even consider introducing mandatory disclosures by banks and financial institutions. Where does good governance fit in this scenario? Obviously, Corporate Governance is now identified and acknowledged as a powerful tool to generate trust and confidence in an institution. In that context, good Corporate Governance is essentially important for banks, because such institutions (a) deal with funds raised from the public; (b) are likely to encounter greater risks including frauds and failure; and (c) if such frauds or failures occur in such institutions, it may pose issues relating to public confidence in the financial system stability itself. All these reasons have led to Banks tending to depend upon risk management practices based on principles of prudence rather than complying with only minimum requirements. It is also as a result of such realization that many stakeholders and regulators are now consciously looking towards good Corporate Governance, as one of the prime instruments in its overall effort to maintain financial system stability. In Sri Lanka, the CBSL has already issued a voluntary code of best practice on Corporate Governance to banks.
As students at the ESSEC business school and as future economists, bankers, start-upers and researchers, you will have a big role to play to ensure that, irrespective of the big changes to come in tomorrow’s financial intermediation, our compass continues to point toward the common good of financial stability. Thank you for your attention. 1 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  1 Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, 3rd European Alternative Finance Industry Benchmarking Report,  2018. 2 Baromètre 2018 du crowdfunding – KPMG/FPF (January 2019). 3 The Road ahead, 1995. 4 Madre. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

Among the foreign institutions, I would like to highlight the successful cooperation with the Bank for International Settlement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, EUROSTAT, etc. in the area of exchange of statistical information. I would particularly like to note that this year, the National Bank officially became a member of the Irving Fisher Committee on central bank statistics that operates within the International Statistical Institute, and represents a forum of central bank economists and statisticians. This is a good opportunity to improve the statistics of the National Bank, since the primary objective of the Committee is to promote an exchange of viewpoints between the economists, statisticians and central bank policy makers, on all relevant statistical issues of interest for the central banks. The State Statistical Office, as an institution responsible for the official state statistics, that produces data covering various sectors in the economy, is an indispensable source of data for the needs of our analyses. So far, we have a successful cooperation with the State Statistical Office, underpinned by the Agreement on Mutual Cooperation and Exchange of Data. Our macroeconomic analysis mainly make use of the data covering the real sector of the economy, such as data on prices, economic activity, employment, wages, etc., as well as data on the foreign trade sector.
True, it is far from clear that anytime soon a full-fledged digital currency (be it blockchain based or not) will be created by a central bank (some of you may be following the debate in the Riksbank in Sweden), but the last three years have seen an explosion of research on this idea in many central banks. Bitcoin must be credited for this powerful intellectual stimulus. When so many professors at the most esteemed universities of the developed world are not thinking about potential reforms of the current monetary order, we have received a stimulus from the libertarian IT guys instead. Fine. To be sure, a hypothetical digital currency issued by a central bank may have very little in common with the cryptocurrencies that currently exist. These two things are mixed up quite often in the public space. Cryptocurrency is in fact a different concept than a digital currency of a central bank and yet a different concept than electronic money such as pre-paid cards. They are all digital in one way or another, but they are conceptually separate. Central bank digital money does not have to be based ultimately on a blockchain at all, but, to enable price stability, it will certainly be linked to the value of conventional elastic currency. To keep the current system of elastic money working, even the concept of central bank digital currency will have to allow the amount of money to change, not to be fixed or constant over time.

May I conclude by extending my warmest congratulations to all of those involved in taking forward this important project. I hope that this project will prove to be a success and I look forward to further cooperation in the future with all who have an interest in developing the debt market in Hong Kong and in the region as a whole. BIS Review 84/1999  2
The result in many cases has been substantial changes in retail banking services: for example, the selling off of business units, the closing down of branches, the expansion into fee-based business, such as MPF and insurance services, the development of more cost-effective modes of service delivery, such as the ATM network and the Internet, and the imposition of specific fees and charges on services that did not incur fees and charges in the past. Consumers also need to react to the changing environment – for example, through making use of delivery channels such as ATMs, telephone banking or the internet that reduce the cost of using banking services. Cost minimisation also provides the incentive for consumers to shop around, and new technology in the form of the Internet enhances the means of doing so. With the shopping around comes awareness of what else is on offer, and greater expectations on the part of the consumer. Less positively, there has been disruption and anxiety, which has been reflected in the steadily growing number of complaints and protests, and in the greater political attention being paid to this subject. What is the stance of the HKMA? We do not, as I have already said, regulate fees and charges. But we seek to ensure that there is transparency in the provision of services, particularly in the setting out of fees and charges.

It was with the intention of clarifying some of the issues surrounding banking consumer protection that we recently undertook a comparative study of the practices in the UK, Australia and Hong Kong. The report on this study has been presented to the LegCo Panel on Financial Affairs and has been made available to the general public, and, of course, to the banking sector. The study examines the different approaches to this subject in Australia and the UK, but it notes that, in contrast to Hong Kong, the regulators in both places have been given a specific mandate in relation to the protection of consumers of financial and banking services. Two further major differences between Hong Kong and the overseas regimes are highlighted: first, in the setting, monitoring and enforcement of standards of business practice; and, secondly, in the investigation, resolution, and arbitration of customer complaints. With regard to the former, Australia and the UK both, like Hong Kong, have a non-statutory Code of Banking Practice, which sets the standards. But both Australia and the UK take this a stage further, with the formal monitoring of compliance by a specialist agency, which, in the UK case at least, has the power to impose sanctions against institutions that breach the Code. For the resolution of customer complaints, both the UK and Australia have a formalised Ombudsman scheme, with powers to arbitrate in disputes.