samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But let us not only write reports and elaborate ever more sophisticated thoughts, let us act, starting with comprehensive and effective regulation in the US, as has been done in Europe, and as the UK is on its way to doing with its proposed new set of rules that would bring a broad range of cryptoasset activities into the scope of financial services regulation. This is obviously good news, as long as this proposal ensures consistency with existing legislation, notably in Europe. To that end, I suggest the FSB to monitor closely the implementation of its own recommendations on cryptos, as the Basel Committee does on banking regulations. More broadly, big techs did not make the breakthrough in traditional banking activities that many had expected: why is that? Regulatory constraints certainly stand as a first explanation, especially since they were tightened following the great financial crisis. Both lending and deposit-taking are highly regulated in most advanced economies, and big techs tend to set up partnerships with banks in these countries rather than create a fully-owned subsidiary for instance. In addition, the low-rate environment that prevailed until recently may have been unfavourable to new banks – as their business model relies strongly on the value of sight deposits –, and an ageing population in advanced economies may have preserved loyalty to incumbent banks and insurance companies which benefit from high public trust.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Big techs in finance - a bildungsroman that is far from over Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the highlevel BIS conference "Big techs in finance – implications for public policy", Basel, 9 February 2023. *** Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to introduce the second day of this BIS high-level conference on big techs in finance. While it is a pity to do so from a distance, perhaps that is fitting for a conference on the changes in our working lives brought by digital innovation. Very early on, big techs saw finance as a natural complement – and booster – to their core businesses, launching a technological revolution that might bring many benefits to consumers, across different fields such as payments and stablecoin issuance. Big techs have met with success on some of these roads, and less so on others. Interestingly, some of these developments do not exactly match what we could have expected even four years ago. We can therefore consider big techs' entry into finance as a bildungsroman – a sort of coming of age story – with promising early years and somewhat disappointing learning years partly behind usi. Building on this already significant experience, the maturity years may be ahead of us – but that will only be possible under consistent conditionsii. I. Big techs and finance: a bildungsroman unfolding under our eyes A.
Source: Bloomberg  Panel B: 10‐year ggovernment bond term premium (bassis points) 200  94-01  150  2004  2015 5  100 50 0 -50 -100 -150 -200 -250 24 -2  -12  0  12  24  36 6  48  60  72  Source: Bloomberg  obal Spread, basis b points Panel C: EMBI Glo  Source: Bloomberg and JJP Morgan  6  Panel D: Commodityy Prices (GSCI, Index t0=100) 200 94-01  180  2004  160  2015  140 120 100 80 60 -24 4  -12  0  12  24  36  48  60  72  Source: Bloomberg  Panel E: US Dollar B Broad (Index t0=100, increasse means apprreciation)  Source: Bloomberg  Figuree 3 PCE Co ore (percent, aannual changee) 3.5  94-01  2004  2015 5  3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 -24 4  -12  0  12  24  36  48  60  72  Source: Bloomberg  7

We know that recoveries from financial crises tend to be slow; it takes on average about eight years to reach the pre-crisis level of real per capita income following financial crises. 3 Distorted and damaged financial sectors don’t allocate resources effectively. We may not pay the price for a number of years as the boom builds up. But in the end the price we pay is large when a financial system misallocates resources in the boom and in the following bust. Real GDP per head – the best measure of our aggregate living standard – remains 1% below its pre-crisis peak. This high cost to the economy and to society is why we need not only robust regulation of financial institutions but also of the financial system as a whole. Financial stability and sustainable growth are complements. They are not alternatives. Turning back to the reallocation mechanism, there are now some positive signs. The financial sector is well into its recovery. Bank lending growth to non-financial businesses was positive in 2015 Q1 for the first time since the crisis. Beyond the banking system, the Bank’s agents are reporting private equity firms purchasing debt-laden companies and restructuring their funding. The creation of new firms, a sign of vibrancy and reallocation in the economy, increased by 30% in 2013. And labour market ‘churn’, the movement of workers between firms is almost back to its pre-crisis average having fallen sharply in the crisis. In addition, we have seen a return of business investment over the past two years.
Such claims could arise well into the future, as the science and evidence of climate change hardens, though some are already taking action against companies on the grounds of failure to disclose the risks posed to their business models by climate change. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4    Dependency on short-term actions given that the size of future impacts will, at least in part, be determined by the actions taken today; and    Uncertain time horizon which may stretch beyond traditional business planning cycles. The nature of these risks means that the biggest challenge in climate risk management is in assessing the resilience of firms’ strategies to transition risks. Part of the genius of the private sector-led TCFD is its recognition that disclosure needs to go beyond the static to the strategic. Markets need information to assess which companies can seize the opportunities in a low carbon economy and which are strategically resilient to the physical and transition risks associated with climate change. The Bank of England has also become increasingly active in such assessments, consistent with our financial stability and prudential mandates. As the supervisor of the world’s fourth largest insurance industry, we know that general insurers and reinsurers are on the front line of managing the physical risks from climate change.

Indeed, the PRA has found that despite the sophistication of insurers in modelling climate risks, there are still gaps in their own risk management. The PRA is increasingly focused on cognitive dissonance in some insurers whose careful management of climate risks on the liability side of their balance sheets is not always matched by similar considerations on the asset side. And the PRA’s banking survey last September found that, although almost three quarters of banks recognised the risks of climate change, only one in ten were taking a long term, strategic approach to them. With that in mind, we expect firms to consider scenario analysis as part of their assessments of the impact of climate risks on their balance sheet and broader business strategy. An important question is the form these scenarios should take. Climate scenarios aren’t forecasts, but datadriven narratives that help companies think through different possible futures. The scenarios should be comprehensive, rigorous and challenging. The assumptions and methodologies in the models – such as the assumed global temperature rise, the energy mix, or whether the transition happens smoothly or abruptly – should be sufficiently transparent to allow for comparisons and external challenge. And finally, scenarios should be implemented consistently across the business, linking identification of risks and opportunities to both strategy and disclosure. To do this, firms will need either to develop their own transition scenarios or build on commonly available models.
Nonetheless, much work remains. First, MAS must build up its expertise in integrated supervision. Boundaries between financial activities are blurring. Supervision of institutions and activities on a silo basis increasingly needs to be complemented by integrated supervision. We must further harmonise rules across similar financial activities, align supervisory approaches across financial industries, and supervise financial groups on an integrated basis. This will help reduce the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, and also shrink the gaps in the coverage of our supervisory radar. Second, we need to facilitate the implementation of risk-based capital frameworks for our financial institutions. The New Basel 2 Capital Accord will be a major priority for MAS and the local banks. The New Accord will allow banks to better align their capital with underlying risks, but it will require banks to put in place elaborate systems, databases, and processes to assess the riskiness of their assets. MAS will continue to work closely with the local banks to effect a successful transition into Basel 2. Corporate governance In corporate governance, we have raised the bar for the financial sector significantly, and especially for the local banks. The local banks have set up Nominating Committees chaired by independent directors, to ensure that competent individuals are appointed to the Board and key management positions. The local banks will rotate their auditors every 5 years. The local banking groups are also preparing to separate their financial and non-financial activities and unwind cross-shareholdings.

More recently, the region has woken up to the reality of extremist groups linked to Al Qaeda, using terror to undermine countries and bring about an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile China surged ahead, largely unaffected by the crisis. South Korea launched vigorous reforms, cleaning up its banks and restructuring its chaebols. For a few years, the US economy, with its insatiable appetite for imports, was the world’s solo engine of growth. This helped the region to begin recovering from the blow it had suffered. But then the dot-com bubble burst, and far from the V-shaped recovery confidently predicted by many experts, the US economy has shown persistent weakness, weighed down by high levels of household and corporate debt. These upheavals have taken their toll on the global financial industry. After the dot-com bubble and the crash in global equity prices, finance is no longer a hot industry on the go. Profits have fallen, and bad assets have had to be written off. Deals have dried up, and investment banks are slashing payrolls. The excesses of the boom years are now manifesting as corporate scandals, putting the industry on the defensive, both with the public and with regulators. Singapore’s financial sector has been affected by all these developments. Despite all our efforts to liberalise and grow the financial sector, it only grew by an anaemic 1.1% per annum from 1998 to 2001. Many jobs have been lost. However, these disappointing numbers do not tell the whole story.
Simon M Potter: The implementation of current asset purchases Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Annual Meeting with Primary Dealers, New York City, 1 March 2013. *  *  *  Thank you all for attending today’s annual primary dealer meeting. Primary dealers play an important role in financial markets and an integral role as counterparties for operations to implement monetary policy. You are also an important source of market intelligence for the Desk, providing insight into market developments, structure, and functioning dynamics. A meeting like this provides a valuable opportunity to communicate our counterparty expectations, as well as strengthen our ongoing relationship. Given your important role in the implementation of monetary policy, I thought I would take this opportunity to discuss the Federal Reserve’s ongoing purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). As you are well aware, at the September 2012 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, the FOMC decided to increase policy accommodation by purchasing $ billion per month of agency MBS and continue the Maturity Extension Program (MEP). Then at its December meeting, the Committee chose to continue buying $ billion per month in longerterm Treasury securities following the completion of the MEP.

As has been widely discussed in the academic literature, one of the most important channels is the portfolio balance channel.5 This theory relies on the premise that financial assets are imperfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios, and, as a result, a rise in the demand for a particular financial asset relative to its supply – reflecting the Federal Reserve’s asset purchase programs, for example – will increase its price and reduce its yield. After selling that asset to the Federal Reserve, investors may rebalance their portfolios by investing in other assets, raising the prices of those assets, lowering their yields, and easing overall financial conditions. The Federal Reserve’s asset purchase programs were designed to remove risk from the portfolios of private investors. For example, Treasury and agency MBS purchases remove duration risk, thereby lowering longer-term interest rates and reducing private sector borrowing costs. Furthermore, agency MBS purchases also remove prepayment risk in the market. Since homeowners can prepay their mortgage at any time, MBS investors do not know when they will receive their cash flows. Investors generally demand an extra return to bear this risk, which is incorporated into MBS yields and in part passed along to borrowers. The removal of a considerable amount of this risk by the Fed’s purchases would be expected to lower MBS rates by lowering this extra return, thereby reducing primary mortgage rates, stimulating demand for housing and prompting increased refinancing activity.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA  10	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  The third source of risk for projected revenues that I wish to highlight relates to the fact that the estimation of the revenue impact of the new taxes is subject to a high degree of uncertainty, given the absence of any data on how they have functioned in the past. Finally, caution should be exercised in relation to the potential delay in the entry into force of the measures accompanying the Draft Budget, which adds a further risk for expected revenues in 2019. 2.3  The government deficit target and the fiscal policy stance in 2019  Having discussed the spending policies and revenues of the Draft Budget separately I will now consider them together, in order to assess the uncertainty surrounding achievement of the deficit target of 1.3%. For this purpose, economists at the Banco de España have conducted a preliminary updating of the December projections, which I have already considered in detail. In particular, the impact on these projections of the revenue and spending measures that have been included in the Draft Budget since then is estimated, resulting in a general government deficit of around 2% of GDP in 2019, as compared with the Banco de España’s December projection of 2.4%. Moreover, the economic growth forecast would be revised down slightly, mainly as a result of incorporation of the impact of the tax measures.

Many senior managers and specialists view their student days as a pivotal time in their lives, so the quality of teaching has a major impact on both economy and administration. Universities make a direct contribution to a country's prosperity by maintaining the necessary capabilities and developing and imparting knowledge that is useful for the economy and society. But their indirect contribution is just as important: Universities must enable their graduates to understand and appreciate the significance of the Swiss model for success. This model is based on the pillars of direct democracy, the rule of law, federalism and an awareness of the value of stable institutions. The terms 'markets' and 'competition' are key to understanding basic economic relationships, and are fundamental to ensuring prosperity, as well as to acquiring and applying new scientific knowledge. One of the tasks of a university is to provide its graduates and the general public with a realistic picture of the functioning and importance of markets and competition. Only in this way can the Swiss model for success endure in a world of constant change. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
Mario Draghi: Keynote speech at the Eurofi Financial Forum Keynote speech by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at the Eurofi Financial Forum, Milan, 11 September 2014. *  *  *  Summary We are facing a set of conditions – low growth and low inflation, high debt and high unemployment – that can only be addressed by concerted action on both the demand and supply sides of the economy. This requires that all actors – both at national and European levels – play their parts in line with their respective mandate as laid down in the EU Treaties. No monetary or fiscal stimulus can be successful if not accompanied by the right structural policies – policies that foster potential growth and instil confidence. Investment has been one of the great casualties of the crisis. From peak to trough business investment in the euro area decreased by around 20% since 2008, against 15% in the 1992 recession. We will not see a sustainable recovery unless this changes. A decisive rise in investment is essential to bring inflation where we would want to see it, to kick-start the economy and to bring down unemployment. There are two key areas where national and European level government action can help revive investment. First, the regulatory environment should be made more favourable to economic growth. Second, companies need to have access to more diversified sources of financing: the launch of a capital markets union could contribute to achieving this.

Øystein Olsen: Navigating normalisation Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Bank of Thailand – OMFIF High-level Seminar, Bangkok, 9 October 2018. * * * First, let me thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I am very happy to visit the Bank of Thailand and to participate on this panel. The financial crisis demanded powerful economic policy measures. Monetary policy had to take on substantial responsibility, in Norway as in many other countries. As we are hopefully heading for more normal times, it is important to evaluate our policy framework. Our experience is that a flexible inflation targeting regime has helped dampen the impact on the real economy. In recent years, output and employment volatility has been relatively limited despite large shocks to the Norwegian economy. The exchange rate has played an important role as a shock absorber, especially during the financial crisis and in periods when oil prices have fallen. At the same time, the interest rate level abroad places limitations on the room for manoeuvre in monetary policy in a small open economy like Norway. Our economy and economic policy Before I elaborate on this, I would like to give you some background on my country. Norway is a small country with a little more than five million inhabitants. The economy is open; total imports and exports make up about 2/3 of GDP.
Monetary policy’s role is to ensure low and stable inflation. Experience shows that we cannot reduce unemployment over time by simply accepting somewhat higher inflation. In many countries, including Norway, confidence that inflation will be held at bay has increased because interest rate setting has been delegated to the central bank. We are now in a period where petroleum wealth is being invested in foreign financial assets via the Government Petroleum Fund. The government is to gradually phase in petroleum revenues into the domestic economy by using approximately the expected real return on the Fund. The fiscal rule was established in 2001. Growth in public spending started to accelerate in 1997 from its low level in the mid-1990s. Spending growth has also been fairly strong in recent years, but perhaps somewhat slower than earlier. The fiscal rule for the budget implies that the government can use 4 per cent of the Fund over time. This year, a little more than 6 per cent is being used. The deviation partly reflects an unexpected shortfall in tax revenues in recent years. The government budget deficit is the difference between total revenues and total spending. They each account for about half of total GDP in Norway. Even small deviations from spending and revenue projections can have a major impact on the deficit. Exchange rate changes will also lead to fluctuations in the value of the Petroleum Fund.

Correlations between forecasts and outcomes for the different variables Annual rates of change 1,0  0,8  0,8  0,6  0,6  0,4  0,4  0,2  0,2  Per cent  1,0  0,0  0,0 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  -0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,8  -0,2  GDP Employed CPIX CPI GDP per employed  -1,0  -0,4 -0,6 -0,8 -1,0  Forecast horizon (quarterly)  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 138/2007  11  Figure 10. Mean error for forecasts, an annual rate Percentage points 0,80  0,80  0,60  0,60  0,40  0,40  0,20  0,20  0,00  0,00  -0,20  -0,20  -0,40  -0,40  -0,60  -0,60  -0,80  -0,80 0  1  2  3  4  GDP  Employment  CPIX  5 CPI  6  7  8  GDP/ empolyment  Forecast horizon (quarterly)  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 11. Ranking for GDP following year Per cent Note. The Y-axis shows how large a percentage of times analysts have been better than the percentage of analysts as illustrated in the X-axis. In order to see how large a proportion of times the Riksbank has been better than 50 per cent of other analysts, see 50 on the X-axis, then study the red column on the Y-axis.