samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The lack of a functioning government early this year also curtailed public finance capability, subjecting infrastructure investment to further delay and putting 2015 fiscal budget at risk. Tourism, a shining sector in 2013, was increasingly weighed by security concerns. A tepid recovery in exports offers only a partial offset to softening growth, and could not prevent the overall economy from contracting in the first quarter. It is under this backdrop that the end to political stalemate in May provided some cause for short-term optimism. The first relief comes from a resumption of government spending. The presence of a fully functioning government ensures that the budget for 2015 fiscal year could be prepared on time, eliminating the risk of a Thai-style “fiscal cliff”. An acceleration of public disbursement in the short-term is also providing a welcomed boost to the economy. Plan for public investment in infrastructure is now back on track, and there have been renewed efforts to maximize the efficiency of these projects. A resumption of effective fiscal policy, in turn, lends support to domestic demand recovery. Repayment of overdue debt to farmers, approvals of backlog projects by the BOI, and fresh loans to the SMEs provided quick relief in and of themselves, but the combined multiplier effects could also be meaningful. By shoring up income and improving overall sentiments, these measures constitute an important effort to revive private spending. Fast indicators already suggest that private consumption and investment are stabilizing, and private confidence improving.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Managing the economy at a crossroads Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand (FCCT), Bangkok, 3 July 2014. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to be here once again, to address the oldest press club in Southeast Asia. I congratulate you for the outstanding works in Thailand over these years. Journalism is indeed a special profession, one whose status is sometimes hailed as “the fourth pillar of the state” alongside the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Such privilege comes with a somber weight of commitment to accurate reporting and balanced viewpoints. These qualities are needed more than ever today, as there is much public demand to understand the implications of the recent political development. I will share with you today my early assessment from a policymaker’s standpoint, regarding the latest economic outlook and key challenges to public policy lying ahead. Current economic assessments First, let me give you a brief summary of where we are. The buildup of political tension late last year came at an unfortunate time for the economy. The economic activity was already hampered by weak domestic demand amid high household debt and a lackluster global economy. As the political uncertainties persisted, the repercussion on consumer and business confidence grew, denting private consumption and investment.
Durmuş Yilmaz: Dollarization – consequences and policy options Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at a Conference on “Dollarization”, Istanbul, 14 December 2006. *  *  *  Distinguished Governors, Academicians and Guests, I would like to welcome you all to the conference entitled “Dollarization: Consequences and Policy Options”. I would also like to thank you for sharing your precious knowledge and experiences with us. As this conference is one of the activities organized in the context of the 75th anniversary of the Central Bank of Turkey, it gives me an honor to give the start for it. Before continuing with my speech, I would like to comment on the motives that lie behind the topic of this conference. Although we have never had hyperinflation, we, in Turkey, experienced high and chronic inflation for the past almost 30 years before 2001. Living long years with chronic inflation led to huge losses in the credibility of our national currency, which is important for us as an institution responsible for issuing banknotes and maintaining stability of the money. In this sense, it will be appropriate indeed to discuss dollarization in depth, I believe. Given the wide range of issues related to dollarization and the limited time available, I will make some brief remarks on the concept of dollarization in general and touch upon the Turkish experience in particular. Dear Guests, Dollarization has evolved as one of the noteworthy features of globalization during the last two decades.

In such a case, the policy makers are left in a big trade off between monetary policy independence and balance sheet mismatches 7 . Obviously, there is not one single commonly accepted solution for all countries. Nevertheless, country experiences in recent years have shown us that there is a tendency in choosing more flexible exchange rate regimes under the assumption that vulnerabilities regarding mismatch problems are accurately hedged. Subsequently, dollarization affects monetary policy through the increased volatility of money demand. Thus, the traditional transmission of monetary policy would not work properly as central banks have no direct control over foreign currency assets. Accordingly, as Kevin Cowan and his colleague 8 mentioned in their study, dollarization limits the capacity of central banks to conduct stabilizing monetary policy in the short run and to a large extent limits the ability of monetary authority gain credibility in the long run. Distinguished Guests, Having given a brief introduction into the notion of dollarization, now I would like to talk about the Turkish case. As in the evidence of the other countries, the dollarization in Turkey also took its roots from macroeconomic instability with fixed or predictable exchange rate regimes, inefficient market regulations and the lack of credibility of economic policies. In order to comprehend the dollarization in Turkey better, it would be reasonable to look at the macroeconomic instability and examine the evolution of dollarization in a historical perspective.
It is clear that monetary union does entail a higher degree of joint decision-making. But economic integration and political integration can develop in parallel. Where necessary, sovereignty in selected economic policy fields can and should be pooled and democratic legitimation deepened. How far should this go? We do not need a centralisation of all economic policies. Instead, we can answer this question pragmatically: by calmly asking ourselves which are the minimum requirements to complete economic and monetary union. And in doing so, we will find that all the necessary measures are firmly within our reach. For fiscal policies, we need true oversight over national budgets. The consequences of misguided fiscal policies in a monetary union are too severe to remain self-policed. For  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  broader economic policies, we need to guarantee competitiveness. Countries must be able to generate sustainable growth and high employment without excessive imbalances. The euro area is not a nation-state where persistent cross-regional subsidies have sufficient popular support. Therefore, we cannot afford a situation where some regions run permanently large deficits vis-à-vis others. For financial policies, there need to be powers at the centre to limit excessive risk-taking by banks and regulatory capture by supervisors. This is the best way to protect euro area taxpayers. There also needs to be a framework for bank resolution that safeguards public finances, as we see in other federations.

Mario Draghi: The future of the euro – stability through change Contribution from Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, published in “Die Zeit”, 29 August 2012. *  *  *  Across Europe, a fundamental debate is taking place about the future of the euro. Many citizens are concerned about where Europe is heading. Yet the solutions presented appear to them unsatisfactory. This is because these solutions offer binary choices: either we must go back to the past, or we must move to a United States of Europe. My answer to the question is: to have a stable euro we do not need to choose between extremes. The reason this debate is taking place is not the euro as a currency. The objectives of the single currency remain as relevant today as they were when the single currency was agreed. To spread price stability and sustainable growth to all European citizens. To reap the gains of the world’s largest single market and make the historic process of European unification irreversible. To raise Europe’s standing – not only economically but also politically – in a globalised world. The debate is taking place because the euro area has not yet fully succeeded as a polity. Currencies ultimately depend on the institutions that stand behind them. When the euro was first proposed, there were those who said it would have to be preceded by a long process of political integration. This was because sharing a currency would imply a high degree of joint decision-making.
The reliance on retail deposits has been a major source of funding for the domestic banks. These remained stable during the period of financial turmoil. In other countries, banks that relied heavily on wholesale funding sources came under severe stress as interbank markets dried up and the cost of funding increased significantly. As I mentioned earlier the Eurosystem has stepped in with ample liquidity, and the Central Bank of Malta, as an active member of the system, stands ready to fulfil its intermediation role within the local banking system. Nevertheless, it is firmly my view that domestic banks should continue to operate along the lines of their traditional business model. This method of doing business has certainly protected them from the vagaries of the wholesale funding market. In this context, I would like to emphasise once again that the Central Bank will not be supportive of banking institutions that operate in Malta and seek central bank liquidity as their primary source of funding their loan and investment activities. When a banking institution funds its purchase of high yielding assets from short term sources, it is not only exposing itself to losses on the asset side but also to adverse changes in its funding costs, particularly at a time when historically low interest rates are in effect. For this reason, the Central Bank expects such institutions to look primarily to the markets for their funding requirements. I am pleased to note as well that the domestic banking system continues to be characterised by relatively high liquidity levels.

On the one hand, it needed to rapidly address the immediate financing needs of distressed countries, but at the same time it also recognised that the origins of the crisis had to be tackled through a comprehensive reform in economic governance in the Euro area. When Greece signalled that it needed financial support from its Euro area partners, the first financial programme for this country took the form of a bilateral loan agreement with its euro area partners, supplemented by aid from the IMF. It was clear at the outset that there was a need to establish a framework that could swiftly and efficiently respond to possible requests from other Member States. Thus, in May 2010 the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was set up with a lending capacity backed by guarantees from the Member States of the euro area. As from July 2013, the EFSF will be replaced by a permanent framework, in the form of the European Stability Mechanism. 2  See I. Sarmas, “The Greek Financial Crisis from an Auditor’s Point of View”, World Class Performance Symposium 2011: Trust and accountability in public financial management, London, 17 March 2011. 3  See J. M. Gonzalez-Paramo, “The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: an assessment”, Conference on “New Perspectives on Fiscal Sustainability”, Frankfurt, 13 October 2005.
In this decade, we have been able to tighten the collateral requirements somewhat, most recently in 2005, when we among other things restricted access to using bank securities as collateral. At that time, we announced that we would later go a step further. This promise remains intact. Central bank measures have curbed the fluctuations in interbank interest rates, but only for loans with short maturities. For longer maturities, premiums have continued to rise, and the premium on 12-month money market rates is now more than one percentage point. The turbulence has particularly affected banks with low deposits and considerable money market loans. Both Roskilde Bank, recently taken over by Denmark's Nationalbank, and Northern Rock, which had to be bailed out by the Bank of England last year, had fairly low deposit-to-loan ratios. Combined with large exposures in the property and construction sectors, this made them vulnerable. Norwegian banks generally have higher deposit-to-loan ratios, although there are differences. Banks and investors, both in Norway and abroad, are now charging higher premiums and higher prices for providing capital for acquisitions, restructuring and investment, and highly leveraged enterprises must pay high risk premiums when they borrow. It has become more difficult to obtain funding. Norges Bank’s survey of bank lending indicates that banks are gradually tightening their lending standards. Household debt growth has recently edged down. At the same time, consumption growth has slowed, but consumption is still higher than disposable income. Corporate credit growth remains high, at least for the time being.

The debate will be moderated by Mr. Valentin Lazea, the National Bank of Romania Chief Economist. Thank you for attending this conference, which I do hope will turn out to be a very successful one. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Caleb M Fundanga: Strengthening Zambia’s financial and private health sector Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Second Private Health Sector Trade Fair, Lusaka, 5 June 2009. *  *  *  The Chairperson, Banking on Health; Representatives from the Medical Council of Zambia; Representatives from The General Nursing Council; Representatives from the Zambia Medical Association; Members of the Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation; Members of the Zambia Alliance of Private Health Providers; Representatives from the Pharmaceuticals Society of Zambia; Distinguished invited guests; Ladies and Gentlemen. *  *  *  It is with great joy and gratitude that I stand to address you at this important Second Private Health Sector Trade Fair. This occasion brings together many of our esteemed medical providers from the private sector and other important stakeholders in the delivery of medical services in Zambia like financial institutions, pharmaceutical distributors, and other commercial suppliers who support the medical industry. The Bank of Zambia as regulator of the financial system is committed to strengthening the financial sector and position it so that it is relevant to the country development agenda by providing finance to sectors like health and qualified private health providers. I believe this will lead to the improved quality of medical services provision in Zambia and contribute to the country’s economic growth. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank of Zambia, recognizes the important role that the private sector continues to play in providing health services to much of Zambia’s population.

The Bank of Zambia is also committed to ensuring the availability of finance to viable businesses including qualified health businesses. Doing so will help create a foundation for greater investment in the health of the nation. We appreciate the partnership and initiatives such as the “Banking on Health” in extending health services in Zambia and look forward to greater investment in the health sector of Zambia. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 73/2009
Thus, for example, compared with the figures budgeted in 2019, real investment by the State is expected to rise by 47% in 2021 (equivalent to 0.2 pp of GDP), expenditure on civil research, development and innovation by 70% (0.4 pp of GDP) and expenditure on infrastructures by 52% (0.3 pp of GDP), while expenditure on education would increase by 80% (0.2 pp of GDP) and health expenditure by 71% (0.3 pp of GDP). As I have indicated, given the magnitude of these increases and the possible delays in the process, there is a risk that they may not materialise in full. In any event, independently of the volume of the European funds mobilised in 2021, I wish to insist on the importance of the quality of management of these funds. As I have said, it is essential they be assigned to new public investment projects with a high multiplier effect on economic growth potential. In addition, considering the temporary nature of these European funds, they should not be used to defray permanent increases in expenditure, as this would simply drive up our already high structural deficit. 19  These will clearly be the key aspects to be assessed in the coming quarters, as more details of the specific projects to benefit from the NGEU programme become known. My second comments refer to the forecasts contained in the Draft Budget for certain expenditure items that have been severely hit by the management of the pandemic in 2020.

I am well aware that it raises substantial questions, for banks themselves – for their governance, their brands, their relationships with customers – as well as for deposit guarantee schemes. On this latter issue, the current legislative framework needs to be revised in order to remove the strict limitations on the transfer of past contributions to the new DGS in the case of a branchification. These questions are all the more reasons to seriously investigate this option with the banking industry, as soon as possible. 2. Finding alternatives to EDIS.On the “third pillar” of the Banking Union, we must acknowledge the intractable oppositions to a fully-fledged EDIS, and adopt a more realistic 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  approach. By changing the name and the content, perhaps we could regain momentum and willingness to make progress together. We could call it the “Common deposit mechanism”. It would combine a well-known idea with a new one: (i) the well-known idea of a liquidity support system between national DGSs, – and obviously ensuring that each of them is funded as expected – combined with (ii) a renewed approach, in which foreign subsidiaries would be affiliated to the home DGS. The first leg of this new tool would already provide increased funding possibilities. The second leg would provide a serious safeguard to host countries, as they would not bear the cost in the event of an idiosyncratic crisis. 3. Completing the resolution framework. The third pillar – deposits – has been excessively polarising discussions for years.
It is hard to see that there are any major advantages for the Swedish households of a significant part of their incomes being used to fund investments abroad, which in reality is what this means. To me, this is another sign that demand is too low in Sweden. Low demand is restraining consumption so that saving is high, and is also restraining investment. My interpretation of developments regarding the labour market, inflation and the current account is thus that demand in the Swedish economy has been far too low since Sweden was hit by the fall in demand in the autumn of 2008. Although both monetary policy and fiscal policy have been used to counteract the fall in demand, this has not compensated in full for weak economic development abroad and for the weakening optimism of the households and companies. The fact that unemployment was relatively high in Sweden already prior to the financial crisis (as can be seen in Figure 2, unemployment has averaged just over 7 per cent since 1999) and that the current account surplus has been substantial since the second half of the 1990s, raises the question of whether aggregate demand has been weak in an even longer perspective.

I am mindful of the fact that Zanaco’s base rate is one of the lowest in the country but would like to urge Zanaco to live by its slogan, “big, strong & reliable” by being proactive and set an example of supporting our efforts in developing the economy. At the central bank, we have continued to do our best, in support of government’s effort of reducing inflation, stabilising the currency and implementing sound monetary policies. With inflation of 8.4%, the lowest in the last 30 years in the history of our country and other positive developments, we surely would not be asking for the impossible for commercial banks to respond favourably and reduce their lending interest rates further. BIS Review 72/2006  1  At this point, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to declare the Zanaco bill muster officially launched. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 72/2006
When making decisions about monetary policy in March, we were considering the possibility of continuing to reduce the key rate in the second quarter, if the economic situation develops in accordance with our forecasts. In March inflation went down to 4.3%, and according to assessments on 17 April inflation has already fallen year-on-year to 4.1%, which is very close to target. The rate of inflation going down more quickly gives us room to reduce the key rate as early as April. I would even suggest that at the next Board of Directors’ meeting, set to take place in a week, there may be discussion about lowering the rate from between 25 to 50 basis points. In general, when carrying out monetary policy, we will be sticking to a careful and considered approach, taking into account risks and uncertainties, including movement in the behaviour of oil prices, and we will be keeping monetary policy moderately tight in order to keep the rate of inflation at around 4%, and to foster the reduction in inflation expectations. The strategy of fiscal consolidation elected by the Ministry of Finance, along with the planned reduction in the budget deficit, will enable stabilisation of state finances. From the point of view of monetary policy, for us it is important that the elected strategy limits inflation risks arising from fiscal policy. Fiscal policy impacts on monetary policy and vice versa, therefore it is important for us to have a regimen of ongoing consultation on this issue.

The decline, as a percentage of GDP, in government consumption, social transfers and the interest burden is particularly noteworthy. As a result of the interplay between these fiscal targets and the macroeconomic setting described above, the budgetary policy stance can be described as practically neutral, if the estimations of the change in the primary structural balance included in the 2016 Budget Plan are taken into consideration. Clearly, if any of the risks to growth I mentioned earlier were to materialise, or financing costs were to increase, it would be more difficult to meet the government deficit commitments, and this must continue to be the main aim of Spanish budgetary policy. The enhanced credibility of Spanish economic policy in recent years is a result of the achievements in the area of fiscal consolidation; to maintain this credibility we need to continue and complete the process of correcting the fiscal imbalances. Conclusions The Spanish economy has made visible progress in the correction of the external imbalance, the deleveraging of households and firms, the redressing of fiscal balances towards levels more compatible with the sustainability of public finances and the restructuring and consolidation of the banking sector. Unemployment has also begun to decrease significantly. The reforms undertaken within Spain, along with the headway made in furthering economic and monetary union and the ECB’s highly expansionary monetary policy, have proven key to restoring confidence. However, the legacy of the crisis, eight years after its onset, is still burdensome as shown by the high levels of unemployment and foreign debt.