samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, to the credit of Exter, many safeguards, checks and balances were added to the law establishing the central  2  BIS Review 92/2007  bank to prevent such undisciplined monetary management by the new central bank. The absence of even a single episode of hyper-inflation or crises of monetary nature during the past 57 years of existence of the central bank is testimony to the efficacy of these measures added to the law. The role of the new central bank The mandate given to Exter was, inter alia, to “report on the organization and functions of a Reserve Bank with a view to ensuring, within the limits of monetary action, full employment of the economic resources of the country, and, if need be, on the promotion of supplemental credit institutions in furtherance of this policy…”. The mandate itself had recognized that the central bank should facilitate economic development “within the limits of monetary action”. This meant that, though short-term economic stimuli could be provided by raising money and credit, the bank should not do that, since it leads to the abandonment of price stability. Any stimulus to be provided by the central bank should, therefore, be practised cautiously and with due regard to its impact on price stability. While emphasizing on the importance of money and credit on an economy, Exter referred to this as “stable money which is essential to performance under contracts and to the equitable liquidation of debt”.

He justified his limitation arguing that “many central banks and national economies have come to grief because governments have had too easy access to central bank credit”. Hence, he argued that it would be wise to limit such credit just to meet only the very short term cash requirements of the government arising from seasonal requirements of funds. This wisdom of Exter was not followed and, as a result, provisional advances which were meant to be short term credit facilities for six months became permanent credit. As a result, the level continued to increase to a new high level in each successive year with increased estimates of government revenue. It has, therefore, provided permanent free funding to the government, almost similar to the annual profit transfer which the Central Bank makes to the government. 2. The Central Bank has been authorized to acquire Treasury bills from the primary issues and it, therefore, constitutes another form of lending to the government. The Bank has been prohibited to subscribe to primary issues of or, underwrite, the other types of government securities, viz., Rupee securities or Treasury bonds. Exter justified this prohibition on the ground of the obvious possibilities of abuse by governments. Even the purpose of investing in Treasury bills was not to finance the government but to acquire the necessary liquidity for conducting smooth open market operations. This was explained by Exter as an injunction familiar to central bankers and commercial bankers alike that a bank should look to the liquidity of its portfolio.
Of this growth, card payments were the strongest driver.4 In the European Union, card payments reached a total of over 29 billion transactions in 2008, also growing at a rate of almost 9%.5 This shows the immense potential of this means of payment to generate revenue for the financial industry through growth, even at a time when interchange fees are under pressure. In my view, SEPA offers tremendous opportunities for further harmonisation of the use of cards, making them an even more attractive means of payment. But, besides the harmonization of card standards, more competition in the European cards market can bring additional benefits to consumers. Therefore, the Eurosystem remains convinced that an additional European card scheme is needed. Three initiatives are under way: PAYFAIR, EAPS and “Monnet”. The Eurosystem has maintained close contacts with all these initiatives to create an additional European card scheme. We are pleased to see that one of the initiatives has recently started a pilot with a large merchant, and that another initiative is operational among some of its constituent schemes, especially for ATM withdrawals. We are hopeful that these initiatives, whether separately or jointly, will come to fruition in the near future. In essence, for SEPA for Cards to become a success, card payments need to be positioned as a real alternative to cash: efficient, fast and guaranteed. This could and should be delivered by the already existing card schemes and the foreseen additional ones. However, this will not be enough.

A successful SEPA for Cards also needs the harmonisation of technical standards, basic business rules and certification practices across schemes. Only this will bring an integrated cards market into effect. SEPA by its nature of harmonizing the retail payments market will promote more competition and hence will be a key driver of innovation in the market. New developments have already taken off in the field of eSEPA. eSEPA means the provision of various retail payment services by means of electronic channels – such as internet – in order to offer benefits to payment service users in the form of easier access, better functionality and a more attractive user experience. More and more companies and consumers operate online. Hence, the market needs to create European e-payment – or online – solutions, which will bring even more efficient and transparent trading at the retail level. For example, an “e-payment” is an internet banking payment. The web-merchant receives a payment guarantee confirmation in real-time and the goods can be released immediately. In addition, they have a security advantage, insofar as the merchant does not have to handle and store his clients’ confidential banking details. We welcome that the EPC is currently developing a framework for the interoperability of such online payment schemes. The Eurosystem strongly encourages the EPC to finalise the e-Payments framework in the near future. Moreover, we encourage the EPC to consider establishing a European e-payments scheme or to taking over one of the existing schemes.
And, so that the growth fostered in this way can create many jobs, structural policies will have to assume the principal role, while the role of monetary policy will then dwindle and fade away - alas - to nothing. BIS Review 67/1997

The complex task facing advanced economies of enhancing productivity and promoting employment growth as populations age is clearly beyond the power of monetary policy. Other policy action is needed to address this task. Boosting potential output growth is a key priority in itself, and higher potential growth would also help to raise the neutral interest rate and reduce the risk of overburdening monetary policy. An inflation targeting regime is a constant reminder that controlling inflation is the central bank’s main monetary policy objective. At the same time, monetary policy cannot be strictly rule-based – it must be flexible and robust. Economic models are useful and necessary tools for constructing an appropriate interest path. But no model is capable of fully capturing the complexity of the trade offs. Moreover, given the uncertainty associated with the functioning of the economy, it is neither possible nor desirable to fine-tune economic developments. Because even the most advanced models cannot reproduce the complexity of economic mechanisms or of the trade-offs facing central banks, interest rate decisions must also be based on sound judgment. Thank you for your attention.
The Chancellor recognised that - barring some fundamental and unforeseen change in economic circumstances - it was unrealistic to think that a decision could be made during the lifetime of the present Parliament and that could extend to May 2002. But he stressed that in the meantime the United Kingdom should prepare - both for the euro’s introduction on the Continent on 1 January 1999 and for our own eventual participation. This statement was the first by a British Government to accept the principle of monetary union. It implied that the United Kingdom is to be regarded effectively as a “Pre-In”. It recognised that the single currency will affect us whether we are in or out of it, and that it is clearly in our national interest to do all that we can to help ensure that the euro is successful. This, in my view, provides a solid foundation for a continuing, positive and constructive relationship between the United Kingdom and other EU member states, including those participating in the first wave of the euro. And that must be in the interest of both sides: just as we benefit from a stable and prosperous Europe, so too the Continental European interest lies in a stable and prosperous Britain - and that mutual interest above all is the thing we must all hold on to. To allow the euro to become a divisive factor in the broader relationship between European Union member states would be to cut off our collective nose to spite our collective face!

A well-functioning Capital Markets Union will have major ramifications as it will attract institutional investors, improving the allocation of resources and strengthening the international role of the euro. Crucially, it will help reshape capital markets in Europe after Brexit. I believe that this project is essential for the Single Market, for the Economic and Monetary Union and a resilient euro, and, ultimately, for the EU’s global competitiveness. I am certain that these and other matters will be raised and discussed during the following panel of this conference. The case for a fiscal stabilisation capacity But, even if developments in European financial markets were complete, private risksharing would still be inefficiently low. This is because private investors do not yet internalise the positive macroeconomic stabilisation externalities of their portfolio choices. In this context, the other area that urgently needs addressing is enhancing the stabilisation capacity of the euro area through fiscal instruments. Moreover, the efficiency case for fiscal risk-sharing ultimately hinges on the relevance of idiosyncratic shocks and the capacity of national fiscal policy to face these shocks. The efficiency argument meets the responsibility argument in the case of fiscal liabilities stemming from inadequate Euro-wide policies, as is now the case of financial supervision and resolution. True, some evidence suggests that national business cycles have now become more synchronised. But it is clear from economic developments over the last decade that the mere sum of national fiscal buffers may not be enough to accommodate severe common shocks.
Nevertheless, having in mind the potential implications from the credit growth, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of the banks to assess adequately the credit risk, as well as to monitor the quality of the credit portfolio through the NBRM's banking supervision. 3. Danger of real appreciation of the currency, encouraged by: potential capital inflows, expected productivity increase in the sector of tradables in the process of approaching the developed economies (appearance of the Balassa Samuelson effect also in the Macedonian economy) as well as completion of the process of price deregulation. Real depreciation of the exchange rate registered so far distinguishes the Republic of Macedonia as a specific example in comparison to almost all the countries in transition. To a high extent such performances are due to the improved competitiveness of the Macedonian economy as a result of the relatively lower rate of inflation compared to the trading partners, given the higher productivity achieved in the non-tradables sector, and the higher new value added that was significantly influenced by the relatively lower number of employed persons. In 2005, this trend experienced a change (which was expected) shown by achieving higher growth rate of productivity in the sector of tradables compared to the sector of non-tradable products. Such changes indicated the beginning of the process of exchange rate appreciation that is actually recorded in the course of 2006 (primarily caused by the higher domestic prices, mainly because of the higher additional duties on tobacco.

Consistent macroeconomic policies, confidence in the Denar and increased competition in the banking system had to cause easing of the monetary policy and lower interest rates in the economy. The expectations for maintaining the current direction of the Macedonian economy, the firm stance of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia for continuation and intensification of the structural reforms, the realistic expectations for achieving faster growth and the expectations for setting a date for the Republic of Macedonia to start negotiations for getting the status of a member of the European Union, then, intensification of the process of liberalization of the capital flows in 2008, as well as the larger financial integration of the European capital markets through issuance of Eurobonds, definitely build a foundation of realistic expectations for much higher capital inflows in the forthcoming period. 3  BIS Working Party on Monetary Policy in Central and Eastern Europe, 21-22 February 2005, Sinaia, Romania. 4  Buiter W.H. and Grafe C., "Anchor, Float, or Abandon Ship: Exchange rate regimes for the Accession Countries", European Investment Bank Papers, 7 (2), 2001. 2  BIS Review 100/2006  These expectations are supported also by the positive interest differential and attractiveness of the securities that are listed on the domestic securities market. Under such circumstances, key challenges of the monetary policy, in the context of the capital account liberalization and potential risks for deepening of the current account deficit in the Republic of Macedonia, are the following: 1.
Although the US foreign liabilities exceed the assets by over USD 2.5 trillion, the current account income balance of the US in 2005 was positive. This has led  1  As presented by A. Blinder and R. Reis in „Understanding the Greenspan Standard”, presented at the Fed conference in Kansas City in August 2005. (Economic Performance in the Greenspan Era: The Evolution of Events and Ideas). An example of such delays in the possibility of recognising a certain phenomenon is the rapid acceleration of the growth trend in labour productivity in the USA in mid-90s. The former Federal Reserve President Alan Greenspan formulated a thesis that such an acceleration took place in 1995, whereas econometric models where capable to show it only after five years from its occurrence. BIS Review 19/2006  1  to creation of a new hypothesis, according to which the USA exports “dark matter” 2 . It claims that, since the US revenues on foreign assets are higher than the costs of servicing of foreign liabilities, some “other assets” must exist which, being measured incorrectly in the statistics, affect the “real” international investment position of the USA, which is not negative. In such a case, the US current account deficits observed in the recent years would be a statistical illusion. The aforementioned concept has stirred a very lively debate and has been forcefully criticised by many economists, including Willem Buiter 3 , a former EBRD chief economist.

Public and private partners are involved in this undertaking — they formed a consortium composed of the Rzeszow University of Technology, other technical universities, a group of aviation industry enterprises called “The Aviation Valley” and the Polish Aviation Institute”. Globalisation influences the perspectives of the world’s major economies. In the USA, the discussion on relocation of jobs to the Asian countries became a lively element of political debate during the last presidential elections. Similarly, in Europe a debate is underway concerning the future of the single services market. There is no doubt, however, that any solutions of regulatory or protectionist nature may hinder all these changes only temporarily, as they are inevitable. The countries, whose politicians will understand the mechanisms of the global economy and will implement necessary reforms to improve the investment climate, will benefit the most from the globalisation processes. Entrepreneurs should also keep a sharp lookout on the globalisation processes currently underway, in order to respond to the emerging threats in a timely manner, but - first of all - in order to benefit from the great opportunities that they create. Thank you very much for your attention. 8  BIS Review 19/2006
In the interval between a meeting and the publication of the minutes, members have to refrain from commenting on what happened at the meeting and may not express an opinion that differs from the majority view of the forward-looking monetary policy. That is why we made it clear from the start that we aimed to shorten this interval, as we have now begun to do. My impression is that this system has worked quite well. There are no indications that the market as a whole misinterprets the Riksbank more than before. What we do see is a greater personification of the monetary policy debate; but that was predictable. It tallies with the media tendency, particularly in broadcasting, to dramatise events by presenting conflicting opinions. Today, different points of view can be clearly attached to particular individuals. One feature of this discussion is the classification of Board members as doves or hawks. It so happens that when I joined the Riksbank, one of the largest business journals actually described me as a dove-hawk (the literal translation of the Swedish for goshawk). I wonder whether the writer was aware that the goshawk is the most murderous of all the hawks and preys mostly on doves. With a central bank that clearly targets inflation, however, this way of classifying board members is not particularly apt. A member who consistently strives for an unduly low interest rate will find, if he or she gets their way, that sooner or later the inflation target is exceeded.

I also hope that the European Commission will soon formulate its view on interchange fees, so that uncertainties in this field are removed. Before I conclude, I would like to concentrate on an important additional issue: innovation. Innovation As I stressed at the beginning of my speech, SEPA is all about harmonisation, modernisation and innovation. The SEPA project has come a long way, but the process is far from being completed. More modernisation and innovation is needed. The information and communication technology is continuously evolving and we cannot lean back and watch. SEPA must evolve, and the SEPA products should be complemented with value-added services allowing customers to make payments, fast, easy and secure and, most importantly, as much as possible paper-free. I am here talking about initiation and confirmation services. Combining these services with the SEPA payments will make the payment process fully electronic. End-users will spend less time on payments – and less time also means less money! We refer to this perspective as the next stage of the SEPA project: eSEPA. eSEPA promises significant financial benefits for banks and customers via: •  Cost savings  •  Added revenue  •  Customer retention through value-added differentiation. Let me quickly run through three examples: 1. SEPA online payments  The European Payments Council (EPC) has worked on a project that enables online merchants to offer their customers a convenient, well-know payment solution.
We have seen an unexpectedly rapid and broad weakening in economic activity and it is clear that this will continue to be weak in the coming period. Despite global and forceful measures to resolve the financial crisis and to alleviate its effects, it is still difficult and expensive to borrow, both for households and companies. The oil price and other commodity prices have continued to fall, which leads to lower cost pressures. Inflation will fall quickly and undershoot the target next year. We considered that a much lower repo rate was necessary to attain the inflation target a couple of years ahead and at the same time contribute to ensuring economic developments are not too weak. Another reason why such a large cut was necessary is that the interest rates paid by the general public recently as a result of the financial crisis have been higher than normal in relation to the level of the repo rate, which in itself has a constraining effect. The financial crisis makes demands on us to be flexible, to act quickly and forcefully. We have tried to work in this way so far, not least by means of new solutions and measures we would not normally use. The fact that we are giving the banks the possibility to borrow in Swedish krona from the Riksbank at longer maturities than normal and that we have supplied loans in US dollars are examples of this.

Finally, let me once again welcome our guests, the experts from the Czech Republic, who will pass on the Czech experience in the realization of the decade-long EU project – the establishment of the Single European Payment Area – SEPA. I believe that today’s panel discussions will encourage all stakeholders in the national payment system of Macedonia in creating realistically achievable integration initiatives in the area of cross-border payments in euros, which would open new opportunities for Macedonian companies and citizens for effective and cheap payments in the economic exchanges with the European Union. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1