samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A vibrant PE and VC ecosystem is critical for the ongoing technological and digital transformation of Singapore and ASEAN. Deep and diverse private markets offer investors an opportunity to tap on the returns potential of Asia’s growth companies. This is why MAS has made the growth of the private market ecosystem a key plank in its industry development agenda, and put in place various supporting initiatives. First, MAS has simplified the regulatory framework for VC managers. We have streamlined the admission criteria and business conduct requirements. This has facilitated faster time-to-market for VC managers, and increased access to financing for start-up and growth stage businesses. Second, MAS is working with industry players to establish private market platforms in Singapore to help match Asian growth companies with international investors. Last year, Capbridge Platform obtained MAS’ approval to operate its private securities exchange as a Recognised Market Operator in Singapore. Third, MAS launched in November last year a programme to allocate $ billion of its own funds as part of its investment portfolio into the private markets asset class. These funds will be placed for management with top global PE and Infrastructure fund managers who are committed to deepening their existing presence or establishing a new and significant presence in Singapore. There has been keen interest from PE and infrastructure managers, and MAS has already funded a few managers who have met our investment and developmental objectives. MAS’ total commitment to PE and infrastructure funds under this programme is currently just over $ million.

It is important that SIAS continues and builds upon the good work it has done to-date. As they grow in financial sophistication, more Singaporeans are taking to investing. At the same time, the investment landscape is becoming increasingly complex and challenging. The theme for today’s conference is timely – the future of investing. I will not try to predict that future or, worse still, offer tips on what to invest in. There are many experts that SIAS has gathered, who can do that better than I. Instead, I want to talk about how we might achieve wellness in investment, taking into account some broad trends and how MAS is working with the financial industry to create the investment ecosystem to make possible this wellness. As with achieving physical and mental well-being, may I suggest that achieving wellness in investment comprises three things: eating well; sleeping well; and feeling well. Eating well is about investing for good financial returns. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  While public markets will continue to be the mainstay of investing, the search for yield will inevitably take us to private markets. The rise of private markets has been a structural trend for about two decades now. Identifying opportunities in private markets while minimising risk will be a key theme in the future of investing. Sleeping well is about securing adequacy in retirement. Demographics is one of the few trends we can predict with a degree of certainty.
As I have just noted, this is also a feature of the recent strategy changes of the Federal Reserve and ECB. As a slight digression, it may be interesting to note that the tendency to see the inflation target as merely the Riksbank’s concern is not a new phenomenon. Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Riksbank 1994–2002, already pointed out this problem during the National Economic Association’s negotiations in February 1995: “I object to the title of today’s discussion, which is ‘The Riksbank’s inflation target’. Although it is natural for a central bank to strive for price stability, this endeavour must … permeate the entire economic policy.”20 At the time, the problem was the other way around, that is, more policy areas had to help keep inflation down. However, since the purpose of an inflation target is to anchor inflation at a certain level, rather than for it to be as low as possible, the argument is certainly valid even when inflation risks becoming persistently too low. Several good reasons for a more active fiscal policy In recent years, maintaining confidence in the inflation target has primarily been a matter of ensuring that monetary policy can continue to be used in the future to counteract recessions and increased unemployment – and thus provide support to fiscal policy in bad times.

The krona was put under strong pressure by investors who expected Sweden to devalue again soon and, in November 1992, the Riksbank was forced to give up its defence of the fixed exchange rate. New policy with emphasis on long-term anchors The consequences of the crisis emphasised, with all desired clarity, that the type of policy Sweden had pursued for a number of decades had reached the end of the road and needed to be fundamentally reshaped. Instead of defending a fixed exchange rate, the task of monetary policy from now on would be to keep inflation low and stable. For its part, fiscal policy would focus considerably more than previously on keeping public finances in good condition so as to maintain market confidence. Gradually, the new order was confirmed through changes in the fiscal and monetary policy frameworks. The price stability target, which, in practice, had been introduced in 1993 in the form of an inflation target, was written into law in 1999, at the same time as monetary policy decisions were delegated to an independent Executive Board. In fiscal policy, the budget process was changed so that it would be easier to gain control over expenditure developments, while public net lending would, on average, show a surplus. The purpose of the latter was, of course, largely to bring the rampant government debt under control and to restore confidence in public finances.
From a broader perspective, the introduction of the PEPP – and the June and December expansions, which increased the maximum volume of net purchases to € trillion – led to a period of gradual easing of financing conditions in the euro area, not only for sovereign debt, but also other market segments such as corporate debt. In addition, according to analysis by the Banco de España, the PEPP is having a markedly favourable impact on GDP growth and inflation in the euro area.1 This easing has been essential for providing fiscal authorities in all countries in all euro area countries with room for manoeuvre, which has allowed them to deploy the measures to support the income of households and firms that I have mentioned earlier. In addition to the PEPP, another key instrument in the monetary policy response during the crisis are the TLTROs. This programme affords banks funding under particularly advantageous conditions, provided they meet certain targets in terms of lending to firms and households (excluding, in the latter case, loans for house purchase). With the onset of the pandemic, this programme was modified to make it even more attractive to banks, enabling them to obtain funding at an interest rate that could temporarily be as low as -1%, on the condition that they do not reduce their volume of eligible lending in light of the pandemic crisis. This instrument has also proved very effective.

03.03.2021  The European Central Bank’s monetary policy: response to the pandemic crisis and future challenges* Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor of the Banco de España  *English translation of the Spanish original  Distinguished Rector, fellows, ladies and gentlemen, good morning: It is a great pleasure for me to be able to participate in this event organised by the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. First, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some thoughts on the role that the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policy has played in response to the COVID19 pandemic in the past year, helping to stave off some of the more serious consequences, at least from the economic standpoint, of the different waves of the disease in Europe. Second, I shall give a brief overview of current economic developments in the euro area and the role that monetary policy could play over the coming quarters. In the third part of my speech, I would also like to reflect on some of the medium and longterm challenges for monetary policy in advanced economies, which have prompted the main central banks, among them the ECB, to launch a review of their monetary policy strategy. ECB monetary policy measures in response to the pandemic The outbreak of COVID-19 in Europe in late February and early March 2020 triggered an unparalleled economic shock which required an urgent and decisive economic policy response to prevent the effects of the crisis from becoming permanent.
It is also obvious that the central bank must react to be able to carry out its tasks. So the way a central bank should react afterwards, once the bubble has burst, has not been debated as much as the question of how to act prior to this. Leaning against the wind – act sooner, not just later… This debate has previously been somewhat “polarised” between two stances – to “lean against the wind” or to “clean up afterwards”. The former stance involves the central bank raising its policy rate if property prices and lending increase at an alarming rate, even if an interest rate increase is not obviously justified on the basis of the forecasts for the real economy and inflation. One usually says that the central bank should “lean against the wind”. The basic idea is that keeping the policy rate higher than it would otherwise have been contributes to holding back the rise in property prices and ensuring that the fall in prices that comes sooner or later is much milder. A more balanced development in property prices also leads to more stable developments in the real economy and inflation. Although growth may be slightly lower in the upturn phase, there is on the other hand less risk that property prices will fall dramatically later on, which could contribute to a severe downturn. This is in some ways similar to an insurance policy: By accepting slightly weaker growth in the short term, one reduces the risk of much more negative developments further ahead.

Elements of “irrational behaviour” such as over-optimism and speculation are not just difficult to capture in models and other analyses during an upturn phase. They are also hard to capture during a downturn phase. The Swedish crisis in the 1990s is a very good example of a self-reinforcing downward spiral, the effects of which had unforeseen serious consequences – with a drastic fall in property prices, large loan losses that threatened the financial system and a deep recession. In the most recent crisis, too, confidence and mood played an important role in developments. We probably all underestimated the force in the mechanisms that were able to drag the world economy down into the worst recession since the 1930s. This has, of course, also had an impression on the debate on monetary policy and asset prices. It seems as though several advocates of the strategy of “cleaning up afterwards” have modified their view, primarily because the potential profits of limiting bubbles appear to be greater than they previously assumed. The well-known American professor Alan Blinder also notes in an article this year that it appears as though even the advocates of “cleaning up afterwards” are beginning to support the opinion that central banks should at least do something when they suspect that a loan-driven imbalance is building up. However, this does not necessarily mean raising the policy rate, even if there now appears to be greater acceptance for this, too, if it is supplemented with other measures.
The prerequisite for this confidence is price stability, which is the responsibility of the Eurosystem (the ECB and the 19 national central banks); we have successfully achieved this primary mission. In France, the inflation rate has more than halved: 1.4% per year on average between 2002 and 2021, compared to 3.4% between 1982 and 2001. This is not just a statistic, it is a very concrete reality, measurable by a few examples. The price of a kilo of bread was EUR 2.7 in December 2001 and EUR 3.6 in November 2021, i.e. an annual increase of 1.4%. The price of pasta has increased at a much slower rate, with an average increase of 0.1% per year. The euro has therefore helped to protect the purchasing power of French citizens, which has increased by 25% over the last twenty years. The temporary “inflation hump” that we have been seeing for the past few months, associated with an unprecedented economic rebound, does not change this observation, and I will return to this later. A forward-looking euro means new banknotes after 2024, with a new design, and even more secure – there are now only 17 counterfeits per million banknotes, making the euro one of the most secure currencies in the world. It is also a digital euro. The investigation phase for a “digital retail euro” was launched on 1 October last year, for a period of two years.

The aim would be to provide a kind of “digital banknote", which would combine the security of banknotes issued by the central bank with the ease of use and innovation of dematerialised means of payment. The ECB and the Banque de France are working on all the associated challenges, and we have already conducted 9 experiments in Paris on an “interbank” digital currency. They will be continued in 2022, focusing on improving cross-border payments. Indeed, the euro is also a global success: no continent before us had managed to create and introduce a new currency in this way. In this respect, the euro has a political dimension, to consolidate European sovereignty – like the dollar for the United States. Our currency has proven its role in protecting European economies from the turbulence of Covid, and has preserved favourable financing conditions for all economic players, households, SMEs and companies, and states. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  But for the trimaran of the euro to be fully operational, its central hull – the ECB and the single monetary policy – needs to be completed with two floats. A public float with a permanent common fiscal capacity (which does not mean that an additional annual budget is needed), to better cope with macroeconomic shocks. And a private float to promote a better allocation of capital in the euro area. The latter has abundant savings: the surplus of domestic savings over investment structurally exceeds EUR 300 billion.
In 2005, 4 commercial banks launched the E-switch facility to allow their customers to share their ATMs and other payment delivery channels, like point of sale terminals. These services were unheard of before the reforms and were supported by the international community. •  Commercial banks have also embarked on other initiatives including expansion programmes based on the community banking concept. This is consistent with the rural banking concept and is intended to provide financial services to those sectors of the community that are not currently serviced by the banking sector. BIS Review 72/2006  1  Your Excellency, to meet the challenges which come with an expanded banking sector and in our desire to continue modernising the overall financial sector, it has been imperative to strengthen the prudential and supervisory mandate of the Bank of Zambia. In this regard, the key initiatives that have been endorsed, with an ultimate goal of promoting safe, sound and efficient operations have included: •  The enactment and amendment of the Banking and Financial Services Acts in 1994 and 2000, respectively.

Caleb M Fundanga: Banking in Zambia and the Kwacha appreciation Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the German Ambassador’s working lunch, Lusaka, 7 June 2006. *  *  *  •  Your Excellency, the Germany Ambassador to Zambia, Dr. Ireen Hinrichsen;  •  Representatives of German Banks in South Africa;  •  The German Business Community;  •  Representatives of Local Banks;  •  Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen. On behalf of the Zambian people and indeed on my own behalf, it gives me great pleasure to welcome our German visitors to Zambia. I am deeply humbled to be invited for this business luncheon hosted by Your Excellency. This interaction, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, is very important to foster and enhance mutual co-operation between our two great nations. Your Excellency, with your permission, I will begin my address by discussing banking in Zambia and then proceed to give some highlights on the recent economic developments in the country. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, in the early 1990s, Zambia embarked on economic liberalisation, of which reforming the financial sector was a major part. Specific measures which were undertaken included, among others, the removal of all restrictions on interest rates and elimination of controls on foreign exchange rates. Interest and exchange rates are now market determined, principally based on demand and supply.
Years of subdued inflationary pressure and weak demand have already exhausted the conventional policy space across the industrialised world. And although central banks have successfully relaxed the constraints of the zero lower bound, the risks to financial stability and other side effects emerging from a protracted and intense usage of non-standard measures are likely to rise. For these reasons, central banks cannot just stand on the sidelines when it comes to climate change. And the COVID-19 pandemic has taught us that monetary and fiscal policies are most effective when they complement each other. This will also be true in the fight against climate change. I see three major avenues through which the ECB, and central banks more generally, can contribute. The first is through our involvement in defining rules and standards, and in promoting research for a better understanding of the implications of climate change for financial markets and monetary policy. [11] The ECB is a member of the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and has contributed actively to the development of the EU taxonomy of sustainable economic activities. These activities are at the same time instrumental for promoting capital markets union. The second way in which the ECB can contribute is by ensuring that we ourselves are an environmentally mindful and responsible investor. We are doing this already for our pension fund investments and are now exploring options for other non-monetary policy portfolios.

During this period, we need to find a way to mitigate the risks of “greenwashing” so as to channel funds to where they are most effective. Second, a green taxonomy needs to be complemented by a taxonomy for environmentally harmful activities so that investors can identify transition risks more easily and hence also price risk differentials more effectively. [8] And third, the taxonomy requires granular data for it to be useable. In the absence of corporate-level information, the taxonomy cannot be put into use and many metrics will prove useless. This is clearly visible when looking at environmental ratings for financial products: if available, they are often inconsistent, incomparable and at times unreliable – in many cases reflecting the absence of granular data or the large discretion in the construction of such indicators. Indicators from different sources often display a very low correlation (see figure 8). Figure 8 Financial market pricing of climate risk: correlations of bank environmental scores by Bloomberg and Refinitiv  Source: ECB Financial Stability Review, November 2019 based on Bloomberg, Refinitiv EIKON, S&P Global Market Intelligence and Dealogic. Notes: The Bloomberg and Refinitiv environmental scores give values between 0 and 100, whereby a higher value indicates a better performance in terms of environmental variables. The full unbalanced sample consists of 49 banks and 23 insurers in the EU and the United States.
This diversity of exchange rate regimes can be explained in terms of the progress made thus far by these countries in disinflating their economies; their degree of openness; the extent of capital account liberalisation; and the adequacy of their reserves. Generally speaking, during the early phase of transition when many accession countries were faced with the task of disinflating their economies and restoring the credibility of monetary policy, fixed exchange rate regimes were the norm. Then, a credible anchor in the form of the currency of a low-inflation trading partner was viewed as the best strategy for meeting these objectives. The rationale is not difficult to understand. The persistence of inflation differentials under a fixed exchange rate regime would lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, undermining a country’s external competitiveness. The mere adoption of a fixed exchange rate indeed signals the intention to subordinate monetary policy to exchange rate policy, adding to the credibility of anti-inflationary monetary decisions. As these countries progressed with disinflation and as the emphasis shifted towards integration with the EU, the continuation of structural reforms and attracting sufficient capital flows to enhance real convergence, a gradual move to more flexible regimes become feasible. At first sight, such a shift would also seem to be indicated for Malta, particularly as the capital liberalisation programme approaches full implementation.

The Central Bank of Malta has been collaborating with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Services in the preparation of the necessary documentation. To date, like all other accession countries, Malta has submitted two PEPs. Conclusion The road to EMU is clearly not an easy one as the tasks involved are both numerous and difficult. For a small central bank with limited resources they represent a formidable challenge. On a policy level,  BIS Review 70/2002  5  there are reasons to believe that the current fixed exchange arrangement should ideally be maintained until Malta adopts the euro. It should also be clear, however, that the Government’s commitment to contain the fiscal deficit and to pursue structural reforms is a vital prerequisite for the sustainability of the fixed exchange rate regime. The importance of fiscal discipline and of product and factor market flexibility will indeed increase as Malta progresses towards EMU. 6  BIS Review 70/2002