samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The alternative is, of course, a fixed exchange rate, which in Sweden's case would be synonymous to adopting the euro. In the short term we have managed perfectly well outside of EMU, with lower interest rates and inflation and a higher growth rate than the euro area. However, in a longer term perspective, periods of a wrongly valued krona and major fluctuations in the exchange rate – and we will probably have to live with these – may be a high price to pay. For a small economy with a large foreign trade like Sweden this is a development worth considering. Some conclusions Let me finish where I began, namely by concluding that the economic situation still appears uncertain in essential areas. The main clue is that the American economy will show an upturn, but take a more prolonged path than the V shape. However, there are imbalances that could cause a much less favourable development. In addition, the inflation rate has begun to rise more than expected. There is no sign of improvement in Japan; on the other hand there is a risk of a "cooling down" in the finance sector really taking hold, following an incubation period of ten years. In the longer-term perspective, this may be necessary to put right the underlying problems, but in the short term it may have undesirable effects on the global economy. In Sweden we can see continuing sings of a slowdown.

This slowdown is partly counteracted by a continued weak krona and by the Swedish repo rate being low in relation to the corresponding interest rates in most other industrial nations. At the same time, we can see signs of a high level of resource utilisation and price rises in certain industries. The collective wage negotiations are not yet complete, either. The question of how the threatening international slowdown will affect the Swedish economy in greater detail is still open. It is in this light that one should regard the Riksbank's decision last Thursday, 26 April, to hold the repo rate unchanged. On 15 May the minutes of the monetary policy meeting will be published, enabling a view of the detailed reasoning behind the decision. It will be time for the next monetary policy meeting  4  BIS Review 34/2001  on 30 May. A lot can happen before then and perhaps the economic picture will have become a little clearer by then. BIS Review 34/2001  5
Chart 10 – Monetary policy, the global economy and inflation Impact of monetary policy Cost of imports Exchange rate  Global economy  Demand  Domestic demand  UK inflation  Expectations and credibility Pricing climate  In the future, we may not be able to achieve the high degree of stability for growth and inflation that we saw in the MPC’s first decade. But our experience also suggests that we are not powerless to act in the face of significant global economic changes either. Chart 10 illustrates the main channels through which monetary policy can stabilise an open economy like the UK in the face of fluctuations in global demand or prices. The stabilising role of  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  monetary policy operates through three main channels – the exchange rate, demand conditions and by influencing inflation expectations and enhancing the credibility of the monetary framework. And even though monetary policy will affect the growth of the economy in the short-term, the overall objective for UK monetary policy is and should remain price stability. That is because stable prices provide the best climate for growth, investment and business success in the longer term. The price stability objective provides the ultimate benchmark to guide how policy should respond to changes in the economic climate.

And if developments turn out as we expect, inflation will return to target with little rise in unemployment. We project some rise in unemployment, but from a very low level, and a slightly smaller rise than we anticipated in December. Wage growth is expected to slow from next year, but lower inflation will probably result in firm growth in purchasing power in the years ahead. Let me emphasise that the forecasts are precisely that – forecasts – and not a promise. If the krone proves weaker than projected, or pressures in the economy persist, a higher policy rate than currently projected may be needed to bring inflation down to target. If inflation falls faster or unemployment rises more than projected, the policy rate may be lower than projected. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
As part of the improved disclosure of policies and intentions, timely and comprehensive dissemination of the public sector’s balance sheet and income statement clearly is necessary if market turbulence is to be reduced. Such disclosure helps identify pressures or problems that might otherwise be allowed to fester. For example, more timely, continuous and comprehensive release of data on foreign exchange reserves may encourage earlier and appropriate policy action in the face of large-scale speculative pressures. Transparency is most effective when it is an established element in a clearly articulated, goal-oriented process. Sensitivity to the changing needs of the marketplace for information - both statistical and qualitative - can be developed only through an ongoing dialogue with market participants. Experience suggests that in today’s 24-hour trading environment with instantaneous access to information everywhere, authorities are well-advised to speed up their disclosure and explanation of their actions and intentions. Conclusion In closing, the recovery in Asia, and particularly Korea, is remarkable indeed, and owes much to the energy and hard work of its people, enlightened political leadership, and the substantial and focused efforts of policymakers to implement sound macroeconomic and financial policy. But the recovery is not yet complete and much remains to be done. Moreover, the rapidity and severity of the developments of the last several years, indicative of the transformation of the international financial landscape, underscore the importance to crisis prevention of ongoing vigilance and robust institutional structures, and the awareness that we can never let our guard down.

I have a background in resolving banks, and I regard having the capacity to resolve failed large banks – including the largest – as the Holy Grail of resolution. Unlike the legendary Holy Grail, I think there is a good reason to believe that the objective of being able to resolve large banks that fail can be within our grasp. But the challenge of resolving PRA-regulated firms goes beyond banks. Insurers raise exactly the same issue of continuity of provision of critical financial services. Moreover, in a line of business such as with-profits life, the business model involves pooling many vintages of long-term contracts in a single fund for the benefit of policyholders. A typical resolution involves run-off over a long period, which remains a sensible approach. But the public policy interest is reasonably directed towards ensuring a process of resolution, which is fair to those various vintages and more broadly which allows more rapid payout to policyholders, since the current arrangements can involve long delays and pressure for policyholders to accept lower payouts in return for greater speed. This is a different, but nonetheless important, public policy interest in orderly resolution. I am very clear that when firms mess up, they should be allowed to fail, and by doing so they are putting at risk the money of their shareholders and if necessary after that, those who provide debt funding according to levels of seniority.
Thus, while each policy must act on the basis of its individual objectives, the consequences each has for the other should be taken into account. Macroprudential policy in practice identification and monitoring of systemic risk Timely activation of macroprudential tools calls for indicators that enable the risks arising in the financial system to be monitored and which, in parallel, allow the use of the instruments and their effects to be calibrated. 12  In particular, these indicators should be capable of capturing the financial cycle. The literature has identified various indicators that can play this role. For example, Terrones et al. (2011) consider three main variables on the basis of which these indicators can be calculated: credit to the non-financial private sector, house prices and stock market prices. Thus, in the case of the CCyB, current regulations give a special role to the credit-to-GDP gap (also known as the “Basel gap”). This indicator measures the difference between financing received by the non-financial private sector as a percentage of GDP and its longrun equilibrium trend, estimated using statistical procedures. Positive credit-to-GDP gap values would indicate that we are in the expansionary phase of the financial cycle, since the volume of credit, once the economy’s level of income is taken into account, stands above its equilibrium level. Consequently, activating the CCyB or increasing it might be considered. Negative values would denote a contractionary phase in the financial cycle, whereby the CCyB should be deactivated under normal conditions.

You really didn’t think that meeting people from BNP Paribas on the very same day that the Governing Council took a major monetary policy decision would arouse suspicions about your independence? Do you really think there’s a risk there? Our independence towards banks is well known. The person in question was passing through Frankfurt that day and I can assure you that we didn’t discuss monetary policy. To be clear: in such meetings we never divulge sensitive information or indications about the future direction of monetary policy. That is against our rules. Publishing your meeting calendars may not be enough. Why not implement a “quiet period” like the Bank of England, during which no meetings are allowed? If we need to tighten our rules because the public has a negative perception of how we conduct ourselves, then we will tighten them. Central banks are public institutions and people’s perception of what we do is important. But we’re not going to stop talking to the market. Communicating with market players is a key part of monetary policy, and is all the more important given that the ECB is implementing new, unconventional monetary policy instruments. The financial markets seem to think that the ECB will boost its very accommodative monetary policy of purchasing assets, or “quantitative easing”, from December… Are they right? The decision has not been taken. The debate is ongoing.
What this entails is the need for leaders to cultivate a transformative mindset that puts positive impact first in every aspect of the financial institution, including strategy development and operations. One area that is prime for disruption is data. Shared data infrastructure can help minimise reporting costs, especially in sectors where data is scarce – a dilemma that constantly plagues SDG financiers. Having better access to data means we can develop better metrics to track things that matter, eliminating the threat of impact washing. Towards this end, the Bank is working with industry players to explore enabling digital infrastructure for open data and to enhance impact-based disclosures. Thirdly, Islamic financial institutions should nurture the mindset of partnership. Having a supportive ecosystem as well as a wide network of trusted partners is key to bolster the effectiveness of value delivery. The iTEKAD programme is a good example. It is a blended financing programme which we piloted with the Islamic financial institutions since 2020 that fuses social finance funds with microfinancing and structured education and training provided by a group of implementation partners such as the State Islamic Religious Councils, government agencies, and NGOs, to empower low-income micro entrepreneurs. Over the next few years, the Bank intends to upscale the outreach and impact of iTEKAD as we mainstream social finance within the Malaysian financial system. I see merit to even scale this model at a global level to address financial inclusion matters at a larger scale, facilitated by complementary technologies.

For example, establish a shared infrastructure that enables more efficient tracking and monitoring of the performance and impact of the programme on the target segments. This would also enable financial institutions to better intermediate social impact funds to deliver the SDGs. Conclusion Achieving the SDGs is a collective effort – one that requires a whole-of-nation approach. Each of us, be it the financial institutions, the customers, the regulators, the government and funds providers play an important role in creating a better, safer and sustainable future. Indeed, such collective effort is equally warranted across geographical borders and governments. In Malaysia, we recognise this. Therefore, I welcome individuals or organisations that are passionate about SDG to collaborate with Malaysia and partner with global organisations such as UNDP to codevelop the areas mentioned by leveraging on Malaysia’s strengths to achieve SDG goals together. In addition, I would also like to invite such individuals and organisations to take part in the Royal Award for Islamic Finance Impact Challenge Prize 2022. This new initiative by Malaysia aims to reward innovative creations and solutions that strengthen the economic and social resilience of financially impacted communities globally through the application of Shariah principles. Applications are open until 25 March 2022. To end my speech, I wish you every success with today’s conference and I trust the event will generate interesting conclusions and concrete actions. Thank you.
Furthermore, the ability for investors to choose the amount of inflation risk they hold may result in a more optimal allocation of risk among investors with different tolerances. 5 How much is this worth? Is the value of this completely captured in the relative interest costs of TIPS? Probably not, because the relative interest costs between TIPS and nominal Treasuries are set at the margin. We think there is some value in having a high-quality hedge to inflation risk, especially one that is available to less sophisticated investors. Improved monetary policy The second noteworthy benefit from the TIPS program is that it helps improve the conduct of monetary policy. Foremost, the program provides up-to-date information about the evolution of inflation expectations and real interest rates. Because keeping inflation expectations wellanchored is so important in keeping inflation itself in check, real-time measures of inflation expectations may lead to better monetary policymaking. This, in turn, should improve macroeconomic performance. Although this is very difficult to quantify in terms of value, I think it is safe to say that in a $ trillion economy, even a modest improvement in performance generates large dollar benefits. U.S. policymakers focus on a variety of inflation expectation measures, including private surveys of inflation expectations and market based measures, such as TIPS breakeven inflation rates.

Has the program been a good development from the perspective of the U.S. Treasury? What about from the public’s perspective? A good starting point for answering these questions is to account for the costs and benefits of the program relative to an appropriate counterfactual. For example, we might start by comparing the difference in funding costs to the Treasury of TIPS versus a program of comparable duration nominal Treasuries. But we should also be careful not to ignore other potential benefits of the TIPS program. As we see it, these potential benefits include:  BIS Review 14/2009  1  •  the provision of a virtually risk-free investment that provides value to risk-averse investors,  •  access to a market-determined measure of inflation expectations that can help inform the conduct of monetary policy,  •  greater diversification of the Treasury’s funding sources, which presumably has favorable implications for the Treasury’s overall funding costs, and  •  the potential for TIPS issuance to reduce the variability of the U.S. government’s net financial position and provide an explicit incentive for the fiscal authorities to conduct policy with an eye toward the consequences of inflation. Although it is difficult to quantify these benefits, we argue that they are meaningful and should not be ignored in evaluating the benefits of the TIPS program.
Bangalore has transformed itself from a provincial capital into a world class centre for the global IT industry. Mumbai is a thriving commercial centre. MNCs are outsourcing backroom functions and call centres to India, attracted by India’s highly skilled, English speaking, and cost competitive professionals. In manufacturing, India is doing well in automobile, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. The recent BJP victory in state elections is widely seen as the Indian people reaffirming their support for reforms. The current thaw in relations with Pakistan is another positive sign. Worldwide, people are becoming persuaded that the momentum for economic liberalization that has built up is irreversible. A subcontinent is on the move. Nowhere is this more evident than in the self-confidence of Indian companies. As one consultant commented, 5-10 years ago his assignments in India were about how to withstand the competitive threat. But today the question is how to grow the companies beyond India. Therein lies an opportunity for India and Singapore to work together. Responding to globalisation Both India and ASEAN are opening up, reforming their economies, and pursuing the path of globalisation. The rapidly changing and highly competitive environment requires countries to make many changes in policies and strategies, and to cooperate more closely with others, especially in the region, for mutual benefit. Internal restructuring Singapore, being such a small and open economy, feels the need to remain competitive, adapt and upgrade most acutely. We are getting used to the fact that there is no more life-time employment or iron rice-bowl anywhere in the world.

These enduring traits are embedded into our geography and culture, and will serve us well for many years. India since the early 90’s India too has been opening up since the early 1990s, although not at a uniform pace. Since independence, India had adopted an economic model that emphasised self-sufficiency, strong central planning, and the state controlling the commanding heights of the economy. By the late 1980s this model had run into difficulties. In 1991 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao started to deregulate and open up the Indian economy. Countries in Asia watched with close interest successive budgets of Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, as decisions that had hitherto been made centrally were devolved to the private sector, the Rupee was devalued, subsidies were reduced, state-owned enterprises were privatized, and industries opened up to competition and foreign participation. They looked forward to a dynamic, prosperous India, participating fully in the regional economy. But the political situation in India changed after several years, and the pace of reform slowed down, or so it seemed to those watching India from afar. However, in the last few years under the BJP government led by Prime Minister Vajpayee, not only have the reforms resumed, but a new spirit and vigour have manifested themselves across the country. Last week’s mini-budget announcements show the resolve of the government to press on with the reforms. 2  BIS Review 3/2004  India is now a fast growing economy.
BIS Review 40/2010  15  Annex Table 1 Present value of output losses (% of 2009 GDP) Fraction of initial output loss which is permanent 25% 50% 100% UK  130  260  520  World  90  170  350  Source: Bank calculations  Table 2 Average ratings difference for a sample of banks and building societies 2007 1.56 1.68 1.63  UK Global Average  2008 1.94 2.36 2.21  2009 4.00 2.89 3.24  Average (2007–09) 2.50 2.31 2.36  1. All figures are year-end 2. The UK sample contains 16 banks and building societies in 2007 and 2008 and 13 in 2009. The global sample contains a sample of 26 banks across a range of sizes and countries for 2007 and 28 banks in 2008 and 2009. Source: Moody’s and Bank calculations.

In conclusion, as we embark on financial reforms, we have to be forward looking, to ensure that we do not just have a resilient global financial system, but also one that can support sustainable economic growth. We need better regulations, better appreciation of the macro-financial linkages, and firmer supervision. Globally coordinated efforts and strong cross border cooperation in some areas, as well as local efforts that are context-specific are both needed to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes. 29. Singapore is honoured to host the 16th ICBS on our common supervisory journey. I wish you a meaningful and fruitful discussion, as well as a pleasant and memorable stay here in Singapore. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 121/2010
Pre-crisis, monetary policy in the advanced economies was essentially defined by inflation targets and a key instrument, the interest rate. In parallel, the goal of financial stability was chiefly addressed with microprudential regulation and supervision. This framework was broadly consistent with the goal of economic growth, given that the control of inflation was 3/7  estimated to be the best means for ensuring the economy drew closer to its potential growth. The crisis showed that this framework was no longer valid. The control of inflation, though it remains a necessary condition, is not sufficient to ensure growth; and microprudential regulation was no longer effective, in or of itself, for guaranteeing financial stability. As a result, central banks have adapted their policies, which are now more complex in terms of objectives and instruments. Monetary policy has had to face up to the problem of what is known as the “zero bound” on interest rates. Basically, this is the situation that Keynes coined the “liquidity trap”: interest rates close to zero cease to be an effective monetary policy instrument. This has led to the development of new instruments, so-called “unconventional monetary policy”, which mainly includes quantitative easing, private and public-sector financial asset purchases, and the explanation and signalling of the monetary policy to be applied in the future, namely “forward guidance”. The outcome has been a large increase – four- or fivefold – in the balance sheet of the main economies’ central banks.

But, above all, I feel a great responsibility at having inherited the enormous legacy of an institution with the history, functions and position in the Spanish economy of the Banco de España. I wish to begin this new stage thanking those people who have steered my career over the years. I have learnt from all of them and their teachings have been a source of wealth for me. My sincere thanks to all of them. Thanks, of course, to José Luis Malo de Molina, under whose leadership of the Research Department I have pursued most of my career, and, among others, Eloísa Ortega and José María Bonilla. They were most forthcoming with their trust and have, at different times, been a major source of guidance and support for me. Thanks also to Fernando Restoy, above all for being a point of reference in terms of competence and dedication to public service. Thanks especially to José Manuel González Páramo, who oversaw my Ph.D. and took me to Frankfurt. That experience gave me, early on, a first-hand view of the work of the European Central Bank and of the Banco España’s potential as a member of the Eurosystem. Naturally, my greatest gratitude is to Governor Luis María Linde for naming me Director General for Economics, Statistics and Research almost two and a half years ago. That was, unquestionably, the necessary step for taking me to where I am today. 3/5  Thank you, Governor, for your constant support over this period.