samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In plain language, this means that the bank needs to have sufficient resources at its disposal to be able to carry out its tasks without being governed by subventions from the government. When the Riksbank carries out its tasks, this usually has consequences for the Riksbank’s balance sheet. Most of the instruments the Riksbank uses to steer the interest rate are also items on the balance sheet. The Riksbank currently steers the interest rate through its monopoly on supplying a payment system for transferring money between the banks (including the Riksbank) and above all by determining the conditions for this. It is mainly the conditions for the banks’ deposits and loans with the Riksbank that are used as an instrument to steer interest rates in the economy. Prior to the financial crisis, the transactions in the Riksbank’s different instruments were relatively small, but this changed during the financial crisis. Then we used our balance sheet to supply the banks with liquidity. Up to autumn 2008, the Riksbank’s balance sheet was around SEK 200 billion, but it increased dramatically during the crisis to at most SEK 763 billion in July 2009. The reason the balance sheet more than tripled was that the Riksbank began lending large amounts in US dollars and Swedish krona to the Swedish banks from October 2008. The dollar loans were largely funded by the Riksbank in its turn borrowing dollars from the Federal Reserve.

It allows the intermediation process to proceed uninterrupted when the banks are temporarily in difficulty. But more importantly, it helps with liquidity management. In the case of Thailand, the government throughout the 1980’s had been very disciplined in their fiscal policy. They maintained balanced budgets in most years. As a result, no new government bond was issued, as old ones were being retired. Without a deep and liquid government bond market, growth of corporate bond was also slow. When the crisis erupted, financial institutions that could not seek liquidity from the inter bank market were stuck without liquid instruments in hand. Some of them might have survived had the bond market been more active. After the crisis, the government had to issue massive amount of bonds to cover losses in the financial system. Today, the Thai bond market is therefore much larger, at 38 % of the GDP. We have a much more active market. What does an active bond market mean to monetary policy? I will highlight three points. First is the implication on transmission mechanism. When the central bank wants to change stance in monetary policy, it changes interest rate up or down. But it does not directly change the interest rates along the whole spectrum of the yield curve. It only affects the key policy rate, which in the case of Thailand is the very short-term 14 day rate in the repurchase market.
How we can support LGBT+ colleagues  The question we have been considering is what might this mean for LGBT+ colleagues given the challenges they face - some of which are unique, while others are common to many minority groups. Being open with colleagues is an example of a particular concern within the LGBT+ community. Individuals can find revealing their sexual orientation and gender identity or expression difficult or even distressing in a workplace setting. And it is a process they may need to repeat endlessly given these characteristics are not always visible. According to a report by Stonewall6, more than a third of LGBT+ colleagues had hidden or disguised the fact that they were LGBT+ at work in the prior year because they were afraid of discrimination. 3  https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/0mefw998rr/YG-Archive-SexualityScaleInternal-240519.pdf https://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Full-Fawcett-Tables-FM-Cover-1-12.pdf https://www.cipd.co.uk/Images/diversity-and-inclusion-at-work_2018-facing-up-to-the-business-case-technical-report_tcm18-47062.pdf 6 https://www.stonewall.org.uk/LGBT+-britain-work-report 4 5  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  This needs to be addressed head on. We must make sure that colleagues feel they can be open at work without any fear of discrimination or judgement. LGBT+ colleagues are also disproportionately subject to bullying and harassment. The Stonewall report found that almost one in five LGBT+ colleagues have been the target of negative comments or conduct from work colleagues in the last year because they were LGBT+. Also worryingly, the survey found that one in eight lesbian, gay and bi people would not feel confident reporting any homophobic or biphobic bullying to their employer.

And to offer a very practical suggestion as to how each of you might be able to do more in your organisations too. Why diversity and inclusion matters The Bank’s approach is to consider all aspects of diversity as part of a broad strategy to deliver an inclusive working environment for all our colleagues. And I can tell you from speaking with senior leaders throughout the City that diversity and inclusion are no longer seen as HR buzzwords, but as critical ingredients to running a successful organisation. A workforce that lacks diversity will never be as effective as it could be. That should be obvious. If we look the same, think the same, and come from the same backgrounds, then we are bound to make the same mistakes. Strangely enough, I have found an analogy to this issue in my day job as the supervisor of UK banks. If a bank has substantial exposures in one sector or geography, it is running significant risk. On the other hand, a bank with a diversified portfolio is less exposed to something going wrong in any one area, and so will likely find itself better positioned, in most states of the world, to weather bad times. Launched in 2011, “The Network of Networks” (TNON) serves as both a forum for sharing best practice and a support community for the leaders of employee networks.
The diversity and independence of its membership have always inspired ELEC to ask the appropriate questions and formulate coherent opinions, constantly having in mind the European interest. This year’s ELEC conference promises to be equally interesting as it concentrates on “Convergence towards euro enlargement” and I am honoured to be one of the keynote speakers. I salute the close cooperation between government officials in the region with high European officials, as well as with the private sector and prestigious organisations such as ELEC. We should never allow ourselves to lose sight of the fact that these discussions aim to help us on a journey made for the benefit of all. And it is a journey that can only be made through constant and diverse dialogue. Allow me to greet our renowned foreign guests: Baron Bernard Snoy, President of ELEC International, Wim Boonstra, President of ELEC Monetary Commission, Mr. Servaas Deroose, Deputy Director-General, ECFIN, as well as the distinguished speakers and panelists. Ladies and gentlemen, The same as the topics discussed in the previous reunions, “Convergence towards euro enlargement” is highly important and is worth debating at length. Let me start from the fact that euro adoption by the New Member States is a matter of when, not if, because they do not have an opt-out clause. The commitment to join the euro area is undeniable, yet how the complex process of ensuring the prerequisite economic convergence is conducted remains largely at the discretion of the authorities in candidate countries.

We had to manoeuvre through uncharted waters and we may not yet have arrived in the Promised Land”. It is obvious that for a smooth economic catch-up it is important to maintain a long-term perspective and to implement coherent policies and reforms. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Past achievements in nominal and real convergence, while significant, do not guarantee future success (for instance, joining other countries in the middle-income trap is a real danger). A realistic and balanced approach to euro adoption implies that it should be steered taking into consideration absolutely all relevant elements for the sustainability of economic convergence. It is the only way we can safely sail to the port of destination… Thank you for your attention and I wish you lively, yet equally fruitful debates! 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Social progress is one of the key objectives of the European integration process: “The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress … It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child”. (Article I–3 of the draft European Constitution). Welfare is not only a remedy for the failure of insurance markets, but also a tool to promote inclusion, solidarity and a sense of fairness. In the three post-war decades (the so-called “Golden Age”), which especially in Europe were marked by high growth rates, use of advanced technologies, high growth employment, stable lifetime employment, welfare started to emerge, at different times and on different scales depending on the country, as an integrated system that protects its citizens from significant risks. The European model redistributes many more resources for social purposes than the US and Japanese systems: on the eve of the crisis, the total expenditure on pensions, unemployment benefit, for children and families was, in relation to GDP, more than twice that of the US and Japan. This can take different forms as regards the composition of social policies and the degree of labour protection.

If the compliance regime—inclusive of policies, procedures, testing, monitoring, etc.—is geared toward shielding the compliance function itself from blame or responsibility, then it has failed to serve the institution. It also risks becoming irrelevant. Compliance has to resist adopting a “check the box” mentality—slavishly adhering to formal rules while ignoring standards of suitability, integrity, and fairness. Compliance personnel are professionals. As such, they are entrusted to exercise judgment. They are expected to make conscious choices, not merely to rely on the outcome of a particular process.6 Lawyers are not immune from a similar criticism: permitting the avoidance of legal risk to become a goal in itself, rather than a tool for advancing the purposes of the organization. When an acutely litigious mindset prevents a company from launching a cross-organizational review, or 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  writing a self-critical report, the near-term goal of managing discovery has overrun the broader interests of the company in honest self-assessment and improvement. A legal group should not automatically veer toward shutting down self-reflection for the sake of being able to rest easy about litigation. Similarly, compliance cannot rest easy when its processes succeed in building a paper trail, but do little to uncover and resolve problematic behavior. In short, some risks are worth taking. Thank you for listening to my remarks today. I am happy to take any questions. 1 See generally Donald Langevoort, “Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance,” in Research Handbook on  Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing (Jennifer Arlen, ed.) (2016).
I would like to emphasise that the performance of the French economy was above the averages for the euro area as a whole, where 2.4% growth was recorded, and the large countries of the European Union. In parallel to this strong recovery in activity, the current account surplus remained high, with France having the second largest in the world. In 1999, as in 1998, the good competitiveness of the productive sector thus remained one of the main pillars supporting French economic growth. The acceleration in economic growth during 1999 enabled the creation of 375,000 dependent jobs in market services. The number of jobseekers fell by 11.4% and the unemployment rate decreased from 11.5% of the labour force in December 1998 to 10.6% at the end of 1999, the lowest level recorded since 1992. Inflation quickened somewhat, especially at the year-end, whilst remaining within limits compatible with the objective of stability (namely less than 2%) assigned to monetary policy. According to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which is the measure of inflation adopted for the countries of the European Union, the rise in prices in France reached a twelve-month rate of 1.4% in December 1999, as against 0.3% a year earlier. This increase can mainly be explained by the sharp 20.6% annual rise in oil product prices.

In fact, with the measures adopted last year and specific factors cleared out, the money market’s interest rates have shifted toward levels in line with the current and forecast levels of the policy rate (figure 1). Beyond the recent measures, the Bank has at its disposal a toolkit it can use when the need arises. On one hand, in the years 2008 and 2009 we devised new ways to provide domestic and foreign currency liquidity which can be activated quickly but which in the present conjuncture have not been thought necessary. In case of a worsening of external financial conditions, the Central Bank has to possibility of alleviating its effects by using a number of guaranteed financing instruments, such as swaps, long-term REPOs and collateral extension, among others. Moreover, there are reserves available of close to 40 billion dollars, augmented with the reserve hoarding plan we carried out in 2011 and which has helped to strengthen the liquidity position of the Chilean economy. It is worth noting that these measures are an alternative for providing subsidiary support, whose adoption is warranted only in the presence of major distortions in monetary and financial markets. In this complex environment, agents, banks, financial intermediaries and firms need to carefully evaluate the associated risks and take prudent action to properly manage their liquidity and financial risks. Any hasty behavior of the authority may mistakenly signal bad conditions to a market that is operating normally.
From a micro analysis point of view that was reflected on unsustainable financial position of enterprises and households balance sheets, lead by persistent fighting for market share in products and services in the banking system. It is for that reason that hard gained achievements attained during the last 15 years in eastern Europe, got reversed within one week. Today, one year after the eruption of the financial crisis, I have to affirm that all the measures undertaken by central banks of countries in the region resemble one another. Generally speaking, in my opinion the measures adopted during this period are of an extreme nature; they are unusual and go against the “constitution” of the modern central bank with regard to liquidity, money market and monetary policy transmission channels. However, we have embraced the philosophy that “the end justifies the means”. Nevertheless, I think the central bank has become more vulnerable in terms of independence and monetary policy efficiency. Providing liquidity in any case, in any quantity, with any maturity and accepting any kind of collateral would definitely damage the monetary policy, with potential second round effects on financial stability. If central banks in the short run shift their focus from the primary objective to supporting economic growth at any cost, it would indirectly create premises for long rung economic imbalances. The current polices pursued by both monetary and fiscal authorities should not be considered as a new normality.

But one of the roles of, and indeed justifications for, regulation is to ensure that firms also take sufficient account of the interests of others who would be adversely affected by their failure: their own borrowers and depositors, for example, but also the customers of other banks that would suffer losses if a particular bank were to get into difficulties. In other words, one purpose of regulation is to align private choices with public welfare maximisation. Hitherto, public authorities have placed much emphasis on capital requirements as a way of achieving this reconciliation. Indeed, one reason for imposing capital requirements is to limit the risk of liquidity problems, by giving the market a level of assurance over the solvency of a firm. But this emphasis on capital has perhaps overshadowed the importance of direct liquidity requirements. Analytically, liquidity is a more difficult area. But arguably the case for prudential liquidity requirements in some form is just as strong as for capital. Liquidity cushions are a first line of defence: in times of stress they can buy time, and where organisations are solvent they can help to prevent liquidity problems turning into solvency ones. I will return to this later. But besides regulation, the public authorities—specifically central banks—have a crucial role as the ultimate providers of liquidity. They therefore need to ensure that they are properly equipped to carry out this function.
Banks also need to prepare themselves for new business opportunities, especially e-banking. MAS will track the progress of the banking liberalisation programme. We will review the status next year, and decide on further steps to open up the sector. Local banks will come under increasing pressure, not from MAS, but from the rapid changes in technology and the market. The banks will have to continually reassess their competitive positions and strategies, and adapt themselves as conditions change. MAS will continue discussing with the local banks ways to increase bank transparency further, for example by disclosing more information on remuneration and incentive structures, related party transactions, the banks’ risk profiles and their risk management processes. Greater disclosure will reinforce corporate governance. Singapore banks are ahead of most of their Asian counterparts in these two areas, but they are still some way from the best international practices. We are reviewing the current Minimum Liquid Assets and Minimum Cash Balance requirements imposed on banks, and the capital requirements for financial holding companies and banking groups. This is part of the shift from regulation to supervision, replacing “one-size-fits-all” requirements with a more “tailored” approach. We should not unnecessarily disadvantage Singapore banks vis-à-vis foreign competitors. We are reviewing bank involvement in non-financial activities, and the cross-holding structures typical of Singapore banking groups. An appropriate separation between financial and non-financial activities is important to minimise the risk of contagion and ensure that management is focussed on the core business of banking.

Beyond the theoretical considerations, it is important that financial regulation, in all its forms, should contribute to maintaining financial system diversity. Thus, attempting to measure all assets and liabilities at fair value has some drawbacks – and even entails risks – that need to be taken into account if lessons are to be drawn from the financial crisis for accounting rules. To conclude, I would like to stress an important point regarding the new financial regulatory framework. It would be unrealistic to believe that financial regulation is the answer, and, above all, that it is capable of protecting us from the risk of financial instability. Indeed, the crisis can largely be attributed to financial institutions’ inadequate risk management, which stems from an irrational trust in quantitative tools. Financial regulation should be an incentive for financial system participants to develop a sound and efficient management framework. It is no substitute. 2  BIS Review 161/2008
Business’ demand for loans persists to be the sole lending increase source, whereas loan to households continues to shrink in annual terms, for the fifth consecutive month. During this period there are transmitted also the first signals on an easing of lending standards from banks, but this step is applied only on large-sized business. Fiscal stimuli developed at more controlled paces in the first 4-month period of year, providing a lower contribution on the economic activity during this period. Fiscal policy has  BIS Review 77/2010  1  maintained an encouraging character, but at a lower rate relative to the same period of previous year. Budget deficit amounted to ALL 5.3 billion, contracted by 47 percent in annual terms. The low economic activity is reflected on the low growth by about 3 percent of budged revenues during the first 4-month period of year. On the other side, budget expense recorded a reduction by about 2 percent from the rate recorded in the previous year. Bank of Albania continues to draw the attention that, notwithstanding the short-term positive effects the fiscal stimuli may generate; the long-term stability of public sector should remain the main leader of fiscal policy. The lesson from the current problematic situation involving many European Union countries, is the indispensability for consolidation of public finances and for that purpose the implementation of important correcting measures at quickest time, is a target of strategic importance.

Ardian Fullani: Economy and key interest rate in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the press conference on monetary policy decision-making of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 26 May 2010. *  *  *  The Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania on its meeting of 26 May, 2010 reviewed and approved the Monetary Policy Monthly Report. Taking into account all the latest economic and financial development at home and their projections on the future, at the conclusion of discussions, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to leave the key interest rate unchanged, at 5.25 percent. *** The improvement of the world economic activity, as shown by the sharp growth of the emerging countries’ economies and by the moderate rise of the major part of developed countries’ economies, has characterised the early months of 2010. Economic recovery is accompanied by the increase of trade activity, in the meantime central banks and fiscal authorities have pursued to support the aggregate demand through easing policies. Notwithstanding the climbing trend of commodities prices, the inflationary pressures continue to be still low owing to the negative gap of production. However, the events occurring in the last weeks have revealed that both euro area and world economies are characterised by high uncertainties as regard the future. The economic and political discussions are particularly focused on the fiscal situation.