samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, two areas are emphasised: First, some of the systems have a deficient framework for monitoring and managing risk. Such a framework is necessary for assessing risk and measures in aggregate. Otherwise, one cannot be certain whether the measures implemented are appropriate. The framework should cover all aspects of operations, also the parts outsourced to other providers. This is an essential tool for controlling the overall risk in the system. It is not sufficient to indicate that an operating services provider has a separate risk management framework in place. The board of the owner company has ultimate responsibility. Second, it is not always clear how operational risk is managed and controlled. If operational risk is not managed appropriately, there is a risk that operations are disrupted – and in the worst case come to a halt. A failure in the delivery of electronic communications is an example of an operational risk that may have serious consequences. System owners must ensure that the various operational risks are identified and analysed. The system owner must implement the necessary measures on that basis. The assessment is now being followed up. System owners have drawn up plans for measures. The NICS Operations Office has responded to Norges Bank that work relating to the principles concerning the risk management framework and operational risk will be completed by the turn of the year. Norges Bank will ensure that progress and measures are satisfactory.

The bill states that banks will have an obligation to accept cash from customers and make deposits available to customers in the form of cash. This is a further specification of banks’ responsibility for cash handling. The bill also gives banks the freedom to choose how services are to be organised, as long as they are able to meet customer demand. Conclusion Let me sum up: The Norwegian payment system is efficient and up-to-date. It gives the nation a competitive advantage over many other countries. The owners must have management systems that enable them to have sound control of operations. The owners’ responsibility also includes backup solutions. This responsibility does not change if all or parts of operations are managed by others. Payments can become cheaper, faster and more user-friendly than they are at present. Banks should price payments so that they achieve acceptable earnings and promote profitable investments. This will also serve the interest of customers. It is of benefit to us, as a society, that banks and other operators are now investing in secure and forward-looking solutions. The aim must be to remain at the forefront of international developments. There is growing urgency to put in place new solutions. In this respect, the system owners – the banks – have collective interests that go beyond pure private financial considerations of the individual bank. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Carney, Mark (2018), From protectionism to prosperity, speech given at the Northern Powerhouse Business Summit, Gateshead, 5 July. Carstens, Agustín (2018), Global market structures and the high price of protectionism, speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 42nd Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25 August. Frankel, Jeffrey and David Romer (1999), Does trade cause growth?, American Economic Review, 89 (3), pp. 379–399. International Monetary Fund (2006), World Economic Outlook, April. International Monetary Fund (July 2018), G-20 Surveillance Note, G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meetings, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 21/22 July. International Monetary Fund (October 2018), World Economic Outlook, October. OECD (2016), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2016, Issue 2. Ricardo, David (1817), On the principles of political economy and taxation, London: John Murray. Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner (1995), Economic reform and the process of global integration, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995 (1), pp. 1–118. World Trade Organization (2017), World Trade Report.

Under bankruptcy laws or out-of-court settlement guidelines, such as the London Rules, the Jakarta Initiatives or the Hong Kong Guidelines, when a corporate is facing financing difficulties, the responsibility is passed to the debtor and creditors to arrange debt settlements among themselves. Indebted companies can reorganise and restructure their operations to return to profitability. In turn, creditors agree to reschedule loans or accept the conversion of debt into equity. While the basic principles of private creditor participation in resolving the debtor’s dilemma are uncontroversial, the application of these principles to sovereign debt is much more complex. Debt workouts in the corporate and public sectors are quite different. First, assessing the solvency of a country is different from that of a company. The former requires not only an analysis of the cash flow, the balance sheet and the assets and liabilities but also an evaluation of the political will to implement the measures needed to ensure that the country remains solvent. The capacity to service debt requires both a willingness and an ability to implement policies that will generate the necessary resources. To quote the example of Greece: it has a gross debt of around € billion and marketable assets worth up to € billion, so the country is solvent to the extent that it is willing to sell off some of these assets.
Having said that, while these gains have so far been based mainly on the moderation of labour and financial costs, in the future they will have to come increasingly from genuine increases in productivity. Long-term growth of the Spanish economy: the challenge of productivity The productivity challenge  The timid gains in productivity seen in the past recession and subsequent recovery proved to be insufficient to close the gap separating us from the core European countries. The limited headway in productivity by the Spanish economy should be a cause for great concern, since productivity gains are the only mechanism which can generate sustained, stable growth of per capita income in the long term. The consensus in this respect in economic circles is practically unanimous, and the repute of the studies in this area is attested to by the Nobel prizes in economics awarded to Robert Solow and Paul Romer in 1987 and 2018, respectively, for their contributions in the fields of productivity and longterm economic growth. A few figures will suffice to illustrate how improvements in a community’s standard of living over the long term depend almost entirely on productivity gains. Thus, for example, 80% of the increase in US per capita income since 1948 can be attributed to the growth of total factor productivity (TFP).2 In other words, increases in TFP of around 2% per year have allowed the average US citizen to enjoy inflation-adjusted annual income which in 2015 was about $ 30,000 higher than in 1948.

However, there is evidence that older workers have fewer of the skills required to use new technologies because of their lesser human capital endowment, which moreover becomes depleted over time. Hence an older population may also pose difficulties for productivity growth because the digital technologies tend to complement each other better with less technologically challenged workers, who are usually younger.15 Moving on to the impact of ageing on the conduct of economic policy, it should be noted that, in the monetary policy arena, the central banks face a scenario which some have called “the new normal”, characterised by low interest rates and balance sheet expansion. Although part of this situation is unquestionably a legacy of the financial crisis, there are other longer-term causes which prompt the persistence of a low interest rate environment. Key among these are demographic factors acting through the associated increase in the saving rate. This scenario reduces the ability of conventional monetary policy to react to future crises and poses the advisability of a wide-ranging discussion on the most appropriate strategy for the conduct of monetary policy in the future. Fiscal policy, or, to be more specific, its government revenue side, is also affected by population ageing. There is evidence that the composition of income or the consumption basket change over the life cycle of individuals, so a change in the composition of tax bases could give rise to substantial variations in tax revenue.
Reform headway is particularly slow as regards the elimination of obstacles in the provision of professional services and in the network industries, and improving the business environment by reducing the administrative burdens that hinder new start-ups. Greater efforts should be a priority in at least two areas. First, we must improve human capital and active employment policies to promote the rapid reallocation of workers towards the growth industries. Second, public and private spending on innovation must increase to create new business opportunities. Europe cannot stand on the sidelines as new  15  See P. Hernández de Cos (2019), “A framework for the Countercyclical Capital Buffer”, opening address at the Second Financial Stability Conference, Banco de España/CEMFI. 16 The reason for this is that supply-side expansionary policies tend to be deflationary. This limits their expansionary effects in a setting such as the present one in which the capacity of monetary policy to accommodate these inflationary pressures by means of further interest rate cuts is relatively limited. See Ó Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2016), “Policy Spillovers and Synergies in a Monetary Union”, International Journal of Central Banking, 12(3), September, pp. 219-277. In addition, structural reforms may be particularly effective in the euro area economies where the private sector remains immersed in a deleveraging process; see J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2017), “Structural Reforms in a Debt Overhang”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 88, pp. 15-34. 13/16  technologies are developed and as the United States and China battle for technological supremacy.

Whereas in the United States more than 40% of economic shocks are absorbed by the capital markets (through the crossownership of equity), in Europe this percentage is almost five times smaller. Less-developed capital markets in Europe hamper business start-ups. It is difficult for them to obtain financing in the initial stages of operating, particularly at those more innovative companies with a higher level of risk, where research and the business concept are pivotal. These intangible assets are difficult to collateralise in a bank loan: therefore, the resort to capital markets is crucial. Thus, the number of high-growth business start-ups in Europe is almost 10 times less than in the United States and four times less than in China. And nor does the fragmentation of capital markets encourage the savings in some countries to be routed towards profitable investment projects in others. The financing of European firms would also benefit from the completion of the Banking Union before a hypothetical crisis arises. 17  See P. Hernández de Cos (2019), “The need for deepening euro area integration”, speech at City Week 2019: The International Financial Services Forum, and P. Hernández de Cos (2019), “Monetary Union: the dangers of a work in progress”, Euro Yearbook 2018. pp. 45-64. 14/16  This is a far-reaching project of the utmost importance for European construction, which is why it is vital it should not be left incomplete.
For these reasons, I think the United States is unlikely to evolve in the direction of those countries that have pulled bank supervision out of the central bank and placed it with a consolidated supervisor of bank and non-bank financial institutions. A second distinguishing feature of the U.S. central bank relates to our monetary policy regime – our dual mandate for price stability and sustainable growth and how we define our price stability objective. In comparison with the growing number of central banks that have adopted formal inflation targeting regimes, the Congress has preserved the broader mandate – for employment and price stability – legislated in 1978. And the Fed has consciously chosen not to describe in quantitative terms how it defines price stability nor to set an explicit quantitative target for inflation over the medium term. And yet the actions of the Fed over the last 25 years have helped to produce a sustained period of low inflation, less variability in inflation, more stable inflation expectations, and a substantial reduction in output volatility. These are the best measures of credibility, and they look very good against the record of other central banks that now occupy the spectrum between the soft and flexible and pure and harder inflation targeters. This choice of regime is fundamentally a choice about how to achieve and sustain appropriate policy outcomes and how to preserve the capacity to make sensible monetary policy decisions in the face of shocks and uncertainty about structural shifts in the economy without compromising credibility.

There is a risk however that this would detract from the role of the lead bank and the financial advisers and reduce the impact of the contribution that the HKMA can make familiarity can breed contempt. The HKMA has been involved in about 10 cases since the HKAB Guidelines were issued. Typically these will involve situations where a small minority of banks, sometimes only one, are refusing to sign a restructuring agreement or are threatening to take action, such as realize security, which would cause the workout to collapse. Our practice in such cases is to listen to both sides and to understand their respective positions. Where a small number of banks are holding out against the majority view, we will ask them to explain their position and to weigh the costs of their behaviour against the potential benefits. Where the position of the minority banks seems to lack sound justification, we will usually try to persuade them to accept the majority view or at least make every effort to work towards a compromise. At the very least, we would request the banks to reach decisions on restructuring proposals within a reasonable period of time and try to adhere to the deadlines which are set for these decisions. The HKMA’s role in the workout process is, I believe, consistent with the Monetary Authority’s principal function under the Banking Ordinance, which is to “promote the general stability and effective working of the banking system”.
To bring back the discipline of the market and end reliance on public funds, FSB members agreed standards to ensure that globally systemic banks (G-SIBs) can fail safely in the future.39 These banks have had to make themselves easier to resolve. They must now hold sufficient debt such that, in the event one fails, its successor can be recapitalised to support the continued operation of its most important activities. The powers and tools authorities need to deal with failing banks have been fully implemented in the UK. Our major banks have ring-fenced their domestic activities. They already hold total loss-absorbing resources (or TLAC) of 25% of their risk-weighted assets, well within sight of their 2022 requirement of 28%.40 As a consequence, market discipline is back, with the public subsidy enjoyed by the UK’s largest banks having fallen by 90% (Chart 6). 38  Both as a proportion of the exposures of the 30 banks identified by the FSB as being G-SIBs. FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions. Across the G20 as a whole more than 80% of all G-SIBs already hold TLAC which meets the 2019 requirement of 16% and 60% already meet the 2022 requirement of 18% of risk-weighted assets (excluding capital buffers).

That means building institutional frameworks that make it easier to resist as the lies regain their seductive power. If we can, we will build True Finance, an enduring platform for strong, sustainable and balanced growth. Over the past decade, great strides have been made. Let me begin with the global reforms that have addressed the third lie that “markets are moral”. In the cycle of scandal, response, integrity, drift, and new scandal, potential solutions have oscillated between the extremes of Light Touch Regulation and Total Regulation. There are problems with each. By undervaluing the importance of hard and soft infrastructure to the functioning of real markets, light touch regulation led directly to the financial crisis.19  18  The scale of misconduct impaired banks’ ability to function fairly and effectively. Global banks’ misconduct costs have exceeded $ billion, capital that could otherwise have supported around $ trillion of lending to households and businesses. More worrying still, in a system where trust is fundamental, it ought to be of grave concern that only 20% of UK citizens now think that banks are well run, compared to 90% in the 1980s. 19 “Hard infrastructure” refers to the way in which markets are organised. “Soft infrastructure” refers to the standards and norms, including regulation, market standards and codes, by which markets operate. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  6  Market standards were poorly understood, often ignored and always lacked teeth.
It wants to explain better why it is aiming for an inflation rate of 3%. The communication strategy of the Bank of Albania is to explain the working of the monetary policy issues and its own tasks, to you all. The understanding of the public is needed for a good conduct of Inflation Targeting. Credibility has to be gained. As said before, a solid statistical framework is also indispensable. Reliable statistics can tell us about the past and the present. On the basis of this, the Bank of Albania can use its econometric models to forecast the future. The Bank of Albania can conduct monetary policy, and can target inflation better, in case of better forecasts. We can stress the preconditions. But the fulfillment of all preconditions for Inflation Targeting depends also on others in the Albanian economy. Under Inflation Targeting, the monetary policy aims at a precise inflation target in the medium term. The Bank of Albania can only reach this target in case the interest rate setting affects the deposits, credits, private consumption and business investment, GDP, like in a developed market economy. Only in this case can monetary policy be effective. Therefore, some preconditions for putting full fletched Inflation Targeting in place can not be met ONLY by the Bank of Albania. They depend upon the development of the Albanian economy, they depend upon the provision of statistics by INSTAT and others, they depend upon the understanding of the public.

It has built a macro-econometric model with all these channels that transmit monetary policy in the Albanian economy. The main purpose of the model is to analyze the reaction of prices, private consumption and business investment and so on, in reaction to changes that may take place. We call these changes in analytical terms “shocks” to the economy. Our macro-econometric model is promising. Very promising. But for building econometric models we need statistics. Albania has statistics, but we need better statistics. For the year to come, the Bank of Albania wants to improve the statistical framework. The Bank of Albania needs better statistics, I said. With “better” statistics I mean here “more” statistics, “reliable” statistics and “user-friendly” statistics. We need to measure all macro-economic developments in the economy better. And we need to keep track of these developments. Our Albanian history is still short. We only have time series for about 15 years. In time we will logically have longer time series. Our time series need to become timely available and they should be fully understandable. Inside the Bank of Albania we can work more on statistics. In the year 2007 the Bank of Albania will improve its own database on monetary and financial statistics, and on the balance of payment  BIS Review 121/2006  1  statistics. But, for other statistics we depend upon our national statistical office, INSTAT. We also depend on other institutions for providing us with relevant information.
Yet the most notable thing is that, despite these difficulties, we have succeeded in keeping the Libor around the middle of the target band. This is, after all, what counts for the implementation of monetary policy. So neither the current criticisms levelled at the Libor nor the actual movements in the Libor are an immediate reason to dispense with this rate as the operational target of the SNB. Conclusion Let me briefly conclude. Despite clear signs of a return to calm, the money market has not yet gone back to “business as usual”. The Libor/TOIS differentials continue to indicate a certain degree of tension. The various waves of turbulence also show how difficult it is to predict what will happen next. Central bank actions have helped to defuse the situation. Nevertheless, they can only treat the symptoms of the malaise, or fever. An effective cure and the restoration of confidence between market participants are primarily a matter for the banks themselves. The SNB’s tools – its medicine cabinet – have so far proved their worth during the turbulence. Yet the crisis provides a reason to review and where necessary adapt them. For central banks, it is important to consider, not just the immediate effect of an instrument, but also the longer-term repercussions. Thanks to their monopoly in issuing currency, central banks can engage in almost unlimited short-term intervention when markets and market participants are threatened with collapse. However, such extreme measures carry high risks for the longer term.

This means that movements in the Libor that are not in line with the SNB’s monetary policy objectives have to be countered with a change in repo rates. Thus, over the course of the turbulence, we consistently offset changes in Libor risk premia with changes in the repo rate, as shown in chart 4. For this reason, the Libor remained in the middle of the target band during the whole episode. The Swiss franc Libor was much more stable during the turmoil than the Libor for other currencies. This simply means that we were able to protect the Swiss economy from part of the crisis-induced increase in risk premia. Libor criticised Recently, some market observers have questioned the information value of the Libor. The Libor for all major currencies is fixed daily in London by the British Bankers Association  2  BIS Review 80/2008  (BBA) on the basis of a survey of top-rated international banks. Critics argued that some banks would report unduly low Libor rates, in an effort to talk up their creditworthiness. Others claimed that the rates were too high because the panel of reporting banks was not sufficiently representative. These criticisms almost exclusively concerned the dollar Libor. The BBA has found no evidence of a systematic distortion of the Libor, and has announced that it is leaving the fixing method for the Libor unchanged. However, it will strengthen governance of the Libor fixing process, especially the monitoring of individual banks’ reports.