samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So, 7 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  think of that as Bangladesh. That the messenger, who the person is who’s transmitting the payment, this is SWIFT, is secure. And the receiver. So in this case, the New York Fed is secure. That goes for anybody who is executing payments. It doesn’t have to be Bangladesh, through the SWIFT, to the New York Fed. It’s anybody executing a payment through any payment medium to any receiver. The thing that we’re trying to work on internationally is to try to make sure that everyone understands their responsibilities in that chain. So, it’s really important that the person executing the payment, that their facilities are secured. What seemed to be the case in the Bangladesh situation was their facilities were not secured, so someone executed a payment that looked completely authentic through the SWIFT pipes to the New York Fed. It was an authentic payment – it looked like an authentic payment when we executed on some of those payments – not all of those payments. So, we need to make sure that that first leg is buttoned up, and also we need to make sure that everyone understands their responsibility along that chain. So, this is something that we take very seriously. We’re working also with the institutions that we interact with.

This view is traditionally associated with the economic historian Charles P. Kindleberger. His 1973 book, The World in Depression 1929–1939, proved a catalyst for what eventually became known as hegemonic stability theory. For a brief discussion, see The Economist (2013), “Railroads and hegemons”, 10 October. 4. Georgieva, K. (2023), “Confronting Fragmentation Where It Matters Most: Trade, Debt, and Climate Action”, 16 January. See also Aiyar, S. et al. (2023), “Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism”, IMF Staff Discussion Notes, SDN/ 2023/001, 15 January. 5. The White House (2022), “Fact sheet: How the Inflation Reduction Act Will Help Small Businesses”, 12 September. 6. For example, one recent survey finds that the share of firms planning to regionalise their supply chain rose from 25% in April 2021 to 45% in April 2022. See McKinsey (2022), “Taking the pulse of shifting supply chains”, 26 August. 7. International Energy Agency (2022), “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, World Energy Outlook Special Report, Revised Version, March. 8. Macron, E. and Scholz, O. (2023), “Deutschland und Frankreich – Unser Europa für die nächste Generation gestalten”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 January. 9. European Commission, “EU position in world trade”. 10. European Commission (2021), “Strategy for Financing the Transition to a Sustainable Economy”, COM/2021/390 final, 6 July. 11. World Economic Forum (2022), “Digital solutions can reduce global emissions by up to 20%”, 23 May. 12. De Haas, R. and Popov, A. (2019), “Finance and carbon emissions”, Working Paper Series, No 2318, ECB, September; Popov, A.
At a more structural level, the BOT can also act as a catalyst to help enhance competitiveness and augment economic adaptability. One key avenue is through fostering financial sector development. Here, the main thrust of our policy focus will be to enhance the effectiveness of the financial sector in serving as intermediaries of capital through further liberalization. The aim is to achieve improvements in four key dimensions. They are: (1) greater financial innovation and expansion of available financial instruments; (2) broader choice of services to suit households and firms’ needs; (3) lower costs of such services; and (4) improvement in financial access. Starting with the banking sector, which plays the most prominent role in our financial system, we will be taking steps to enhance competition. In the spirit of progressive liberalization under the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), Thailand’s formula for the banking sector will be guided by the second Financial Sector Master Plan. This year, we enter the second phase of this plan, which would allow existing foreign bank branches and subsidiaries up to a maximum of 20 branches and 20 off-premise ATMs. New service providers may be allowed under a restricted license to close any remaining gaps in the system. In the final phase in 2014, additional new licenses may also be considered. Complementing this push will be efforts to boost financial market development through a more streamlined capital account and foreign exchange regulatory regime.

William C Dudley: The evolving structure of the US Treasury Market Conference – welcoming remarks Welcoming remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the evolving structure of the US treasury market conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 20 November 2015. *  *  *  Frank Keane, Michael McMorrow, Joseph Tracy and Nate Wuerffel assisted in preparing these remarks. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this conference on the evolving structure of the U.S. Treasury market. As you all know, the Treasury market plays a unique and crucial role in our economy, and in global financial markets more broadly. Treasury securities serve as a liquid investment and hedging vehicle for global investors, a ready source of collateral for many financial transactions and serve as a risk-free benchmark for other financial instruments. The Treasury market is important for the Federal Reserve’s implementation of monetary policy and also is a focus here at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in our statutory role as the Treasury’s fiscal agent. The Treasury market also helps to underpin the U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. And, of course, it is the primary means for borrowing to finance the U.S. federal government. 1 In recent years, the structure of the Treasury market has changed significantly. Trading has become increasingly electronic, and, in many cases, highly automated.
In 1911, the renowned Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter said: “...that the structure of modern industry could not be erected without finance, that it makes the individual to a certain extent independent of inherited possessions, that talent in economic life ‘rides to success on its debts’ even the most conservative orthodoxy of the theorists cannot well deny.” If you asked me why is financial education important, I would say it in these words: because it contributes to Albanians’ financial welfare. The more literate we are financially, the more capable we are to make decisions that contribute to our improved welfare. This is true for everyone, regardless of who we are or where we come from. As Friedman, the Nobel prize winner, says: “Economic freedom is an essential condition for political freedom”. Our exercising rights that result from economic freedom would be unavailing in absence of financial literacy and equality in the marketplace. This implies not only the same information at the same time, but also the capacity to use this information. Finances create an added value not only for the rich, but also for the entire society. It is necessary to create equal access for all citizens. Equal access to finances and equality before the law are the foundations of modern market economy. Finance and financial education walk side by side. While literacy may turn a poor man into a rich man, illiteracy, on the other hand, may conduct a rich man into misery. Finances are dangerous when you are not financially literate enough.

Subsequently, we have raised the deposit facility rate to 2%, a cumulative increase of 250 basis points (bp), the fastest in the euro's history. We have also created the new Transmission Protection Instrument to ensure the smooth transmission of monetary policy across the euro area. We have amended the conditions of the longer-term refinancing operations, with the specific aim of strengthening the transmission of interest rate increases. And we have announced our intention to stop reinvesting, from early March 2023, all the principal payments from maturing securities under our asset purchase programme, which will give rise to a gradual and predictable reduction in the size of the portfolio. Overall, this monetary policy normalisation process has already translated into a significant increase in market interest rates. But what can we expect in the future? At the last Governing Council meeting we stated that interest rates would still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that ensure that inflation will return to its target. As I mentioned earlier, the latest ECB projections forecast inflation of 2.3% (i.e. above the 2% target) in 2025. Those projections were based on the market expectations for the future path of interest rates when they were prepared. Deeming the projections valid, interest rates would therefore need to rise more than the markets expected when they were prepared in order for inflation to return to its target.
  The usual hand-off from inventory-led growth to private final demand is not yet fully established. Instead, we have ongoing sluggishness in two key sectors that have led past recoveries: consumer spending and housing. The slow recovery of consumer spending and housing in the face of very substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus reflects the painful unwinding of the dynamics at work during  BIS Review 137/2010  1  the expansion that preceded it. Beginning around 2003, underwriting standards for residential mortgages were significantly relaxed, leading to a sharp rise in household borrowing and in home prices. The rise in home prices helped to support additional demand for credit as households used the collateral represented by their homes to borrow large sums of money via home equity lines of credit and second mortgages. This also fueled a strong boom in home construction. But house price increases could not be sustained without limit. When home prices peaked and started to turn down, the dynamic linking house prices, credit and consumption went into reverse, forcing substantial adjustments on the part of the household sector and in the housing market itself. I’ve discussed in recent speeches the role monetary and regulatory policy can play in helping to support economic activity and in improving economic outcomes relative to what would otherwise be experienced in the absence of this support. These steps include critical reforms that make the financial system safer and accommodative monetary policy that make mortgages more affordable and make the investments that create jobs are more attractive.

This stock of vacant homes will shrink when fewer are foreclosed upon and more of these homes are sold or rented out. 2  BIS Review 137/2010  On the sales side, even though low mortgage interest rates and falling home prices have together boosted housing affordability to its highest level in 40 years, the current pace of sales is quite sluggish. Impediments to home sales include tight lending standards, a weak job market and continued uncertainty regarding the future path of home prices. The large decline in home prices that occurred between 2006 and 2008 is also important. This decline reduced the amount of equity that owners have in their homes, making it difficult for people to come up with the funds needed to “trade-up” and move into better homes. In addition, the steep decline in home prices put many families at risk of mortgage delinquency and, ultimately, losing their homes to foreclosure. With lower home prices, many families now owe more on their mortgage than their home is worth. This means that they cannot refinance or sell their homes easily if they experience a financial crisis, such as a job loss or a serious illness. Recent developments on foreclosures have been mixed. While RealtyTrac reports that foreclosure completions in the United States exceeded 100,000 for the first time in September, it is important to remember that foreclosure is a lengthy process in most states.
As CCPs are designed to be shock absorbers at the centre of the financial system, damage to a CCP presents risks to the system as a whole. In order to ensure that what has been designed as a shock absorber does not under stress become a shock transmitter, CCPs not only hold collateral from their members, they are required to hold additional default funds large enough to cover the default of their two largest members. This default fund includes the CCPs own capital. And they are able to call for further resources from their members under their recovery plans if these funds are exhausted. Notwithstanding the high level of resilience that has been achieved in this area, I think there are three important ‘prudential risk’ challenges for CCPs going forward. The first is to ensure that CCPs are prudent and require enough collateral, or ‘margin’, from their counterparties in good times to ensure they are protected in times of stress against movement in financial asset prices and in counterparty credit worthiness. CCPs use mathematical models to calculate, on the basis of past and potential market moves, the size of the risks they need to insure against. Posting margin to a CCP is a cost for a CCP counterparty and its clients. CCPs need strong internal systems and controls to ensure that over time, commercial pressures and competition from other CCPs do not lead to inadequate margining.

These central counterparties (known as CCPs), originally developed to manage the risks in agricultural commodity contracts, to act as intermediaries, taking and adjusting collateral from both sides to a financial contract so that if one party fails during the lifetime of the contract and cannot meet its obligations, the parties with whom they have traded are protected. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  But regulators and central banks however have had quite a hand in the making of these pipes and in mandating their use and terms of access – as a way of reducing risk in the system. The CLS international payment system, for example, was created by the FX industry, after much prodding from central banks, as a way of addressing regulatory concerns about the level of settlement risk in the system following the failure of Herstatt bank in the 1970s. Similarly, in response to regulatory demands post crisis, market participants have developed the role of CCPs to enable central clearing of a widening range of financial contracts. And, in line with their role in encouraging the creation and use of these systems, authorities internationally have long taken a close interest in their regulation and supervision. In 1990 the G10 Governors established the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), with a membership that was enlarged to include 25 central banks in subsequent years. In 2014, CPSS was renamed to become the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI).
Since our forecast of June 2001, the world economy has moved towards recession. Short-term inflationary pressures have subsided considerably. On the assumption that the three-month Libor rate will remain stable at 1.75% during the next three years, inflation should amount to 0.9% in 2002, move up to 1.3% in 2003 and reach 1.5% in 2004. The fluctuations in the anticipated 2002 inflation rate are due to basis effects that do not reflect the inflationary trend. Inflation is expected to remain within the range of price stability throughout the forecasting period. From mid-2002 on, however, it will follow a slight upward trend through the rest of the forecasting horizon. This slight rise in anticipated inflation is attributable to two factors. First, the world economy will recover in due course. Second, Swiss monetary policy at a constantly low interest rate - which is currently 1.5 percentage points lower than in the June 2001 forecast - will tend to have an increasingly expansive effect as time passes. These two factors combined will cause inflation to rise somewhat over time. Our forecast is based on the assumption that the US economy will remain in recession until mid-2002 and will subsequently gradually return to its potential growth path. In Europe, the economy will presumably stagnate until mid-2002 and pick up momentum afterwards. We expect the US dollar to remain roughly at its current level vis-à-vis the euro. The forecast assumes that today's relatively low oil prices will eventually climb back slightly.

Even if the ability to provide liquidity assistance is limited, like in case of currency board, central banks take – or are even supposed to take – a leading role in crisis resolution. Thirdly, central banks are often responsible for regulating the banking system. That is also the case in Estonia, even after the reorganisation of the supervisory function has been completed. Bank of Estonia is responsible for banking regulations while the Ministry of Finance will regulate insurance and securities market. From the central bank's point of view, the banking regulatory policy goes somewhat beyond the traditional micro-prudential approach that is basis for Basle capital accords. The equally important question for central banks is to what extent the banking policy depends on the general macroeconomic conditions or to put it simply, should regulatory changes take into account business cycles or should they be guided solely by concerns on micro level. III. Early warning systems and macroprudential analysis  Let me now touch upon these three broad categories in more detail. Estonian experiences and the regulatory questions lead me directly back to the first main task – efficient monitoring and analysis. For us, the harsh lessons from late nineties have underlined the need to better understand the key vulnerabilities in financial system. This task has become even more pressing now when Estonian banks have become an integral part of major Scandinavian financial groups.
Some observers consider that this performance represents a new economic era in which high economic growth and falling unemployment can be achieved without generating increased inflationary pressure. According to this view, potential output has risen in recent years, accompanied by a fall in equilibrium unemployment. Explanations for this could be, for example, improved productivity as a result of new technology and increased international competition. An alternative explanation is that transitory factors, such as the loss of global demand in connection with the crisis in Southeast Asia, have caused prices to fall or remain unchanged. In Sweden, too, economic growth since the mid-1990s has been comparatively good without inflationary pressure giving cause for concern. The monetary stance has been adjusted accordingly and  3  BIS Review 90/1999  the repo rate is currently 2.9%. It is too early, however, to say whether or not this is a sign of some farreaching change in the Swedish economy. The Riksbank will have to take a close look at the incoming statistics and endeavour to arrive at a conclusion. Conclusion There are many signs that the Swedish economy is growing more rapidly. It is only now that we are beginning to see growth rates above 3%. For the Riksbank – as well as for the economy in general – it is important that this trend does not again land us in a situation where inflation is high and variable. Provided the cards are played correctly, growth can be sustained and lead to a permanent increase in employment.

Concerning the involvement of the private sector in financial assistance for indebted countries, we welcome the reaffirmation that the decisions taken on 21 July and 26 and 27 October 2011 concerning Greek debt are unique and exceptional. To accompany fiscal consolidation, the Governing Council calls for the urgent implementation of bold and ambitious structural reforms. Going hand in hand, fiscal consolidation and structural reforms would strengthen confidence, growth prospects and job creation. Key reforms should be rapidly carried out to help the euro area countries to improve competitiveness, increase the flexibility of their economies and enhance their longer-term growth potential. Product market reforms should focus on fully opening up markets to increased competition. Labour market reforms should focus on removing rigidities and enhancing wage flexibility. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The figures I have just mentioned suggest that, overall, structural reforms in the labour market still need to be high on the agenda. This appears even more urgent if we consider that in the past Europe’s growth performance has been, and will be in the future (all else equal), increasingly constrained by its low population growth rate and population ageing. Indeed, since the mid 1990’s, population in the euro area has been growing at a yearly rate of just 0.4% compared to 1.1% in the US. However, what is worrisome is that at the same time, the gap in population growth has been even larger with regard to growth in the working age population. The working age population grew on average by 0.3% per year in the euro area over the period 1995-2007 compared to 1.2% in the US (1.1% in Spain). Finally, turning to labour productivity, while during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, hourly labour productivity in the euro area grew on average by 2.3%, it slowed down to 1.3% between 1995 and 2007. Similarly, over the same period hourly labour productivity growth in Spain decelerated very significantly from 2.5% to 0.5%. By contrast, US hourly labour productivity growth rose from 1.4% to 1.8%. The positive labour supply shock, reflected by the increase of employment particularly in the unskilled segment of the labour market experienced in the euro area as well as in Spain has,  2  Average to 2007Q3. 3  Source Eurostat.

An additional strength of the Chilean economy in the context of emerging countries, which I think is very important for the topic to be discussed during these days, is the relevance of institutional investors, particularly pension funds. Their role in financial stability has gone well beyond the development of derivatives markets. They have contributed to the deepening of capital markets, portfolio diversification, and the development of new financial products, among other features. Moreover, with their peso-denominated liabilities and large foreign position, which is around 35 percent of GDP in the case of pension funds, they have facilitated the conduct of monetary policy being an important source of liquidity in foreign currency when needed. Acknowledging this, the financial regulation has gradually expanded the scope of possible investments for institutional investors, including raising the limits for investments abroad. Let me finish by thanking the distinguished group of economists that have joined us to present and discuss issues concerning monetary policy and financial stability. I would like to thank also Alvaro Aguirre, Markus Brunnermeier, Diego Saravia and Catalina Larraín for putting together the program, and Paloma Navarro and Carola Besa for helping with the organization. 6