samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Certain central banks – those of Singapore and Hong Kong, for example – are now focusing on this, as are private initiatives. Should the anticipated advantages materialise, the attendant efficiency gains would be substantial. That said, for both of these potential applications there are high barriers that have to be overcome in order for new solutions to be implemented in practice and find their place in the market. The current ecosystem comprises a large number of stakeholders, who would have to adapt their systems and processes. The high level of investment this entails is curbing the pace of developments, as are the technical and legal questions still to be resolved. Tried-and-tested division of roles between banks and central banks What is the SNB’s take on these developments? We welcome innovations that enhance the efficiency of processes. But while the initial experiments have been promising, there is still a long way to go before market-ready DLT solutions become a reality in the FMI. DLT has still to prove that the hoped-for efficiency gains can actually be delivered in practice. Furthermore, simply enhancing efficiency alone is not enough. Such gains must not come at the expense of the availability and resilience of the systems or the integrity of the data. This applies especially to those parts of the FMI that are systemically important. Here we set the highest of standards when it comes to stability and security. Page 4/8  The secure settlement of large-value payments is a prerequisite for the stability of the financial system.

They are more of a speculative investment instrument than a means of payment capable of retaining its value. The chart on the right-hand side of the slide illustrates this. Compared with exchange rates, commodities and equities, cryptocurrencies are subject to very high volatility, and investors must be aware of the financial risks they are taking on when buying them. Cryptocurrencies therefore do not meet the requirements of a currency. However, this does not mean we can simply dismiss them out of hand, for behind all of the hype there is an array of technological innovations. Particularly important among these is the distributed ledger technology, known as DLT for short and often also referred to as blockchain. In other words: it is important to make a clear distinction between cryptocurrencies as assets, and the underlying technology, which does indeed have potential. DLT could facilitate solutions in various areas of the economy that would enhance the safety  Page 2/8  and efficiency of digital information flows. A distributed ledger is essentially a decentralised and synchronised database that allows participants to read, write and save information. DLT makes it possible to unequivocally define ownership structures within a computer network, without the need for a central third party. These facets also give rise to interesting possibilities for the financial sector, and DLT is therefore regarded as one of the biggest innovations in the fintech area.
Less than a decade ago, we did not even have the statistical requirements for the Monetary Union, let alone the statistics themselves for the euro area. Today, euro area statistics compare favourably with those of other major countries in many respects. A concrete example is the monthly balance of payments for the euro area and the availability of a timely, flash estimate of the euro area Harmonised  2  BIS Review 67/2004  Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Moreover, the ECB compiles an elaborate and timely set of monthly statistics on monetary developments in the euro area and interest rates. Statistical preparations had to start early, due to the long lead times involved. On average, it takes around 18 months from inception to delivery of a new set of statistics that involves the collection of additional information from economic agents. While there is still room for improvement, which I will explain later on, I feel confident that the ECB has now at its disposal a solid set of statistics of sufficient quality for the conduct of monetary policy. Let me share with you some of the success factors and ‘lessons to learn’ from this development process. First and foremost, the achievements have been possible thanks to the intensive and fruitful cooperation and coordination with other statistical agencies.

At the same time, just as a good meal not only requires high-quality ingredients but also an excellent cook and recipe, high-quality monetary policy analysis also requires excellent staff and an appropriate analytical framework. The importance of the latter can hardly be overstated. While central bankers around the world are “data fiends” in their heroic attempts to minimise errors of inference and to make robust decisions amidst uncertainty about the true structure of the economy, the availability of a vast wealth of raw data from diverse sources may mean that policy-makers become constantly bombarded by conflicting signals. Amidst such a flood of information, policy runs the risk of losing its bearings and of over-reacting to the latest indicator. It is against this background that the ECB decided to adopt an analytical framework within which all possible sources of information - statistical as well as judgemental - can be brought together in a coherent fashion while at the same time allowing for alternative and diverse models and perspectives of the workings of the economy. In our view, this framework enables a wealth of information to be “digested” routinely without compromising the ultimate objective: to maintain a clear sense of direction. In order to give a structure to the diverse sources of information, a structure that is consistent with our view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, we have organised our analytical framework into “two pillars”. These consist of two complementary perspectives on the determination of price developments.
According to one possible interpretation, this trend is a reflection of two consecutive shocks: from 2000 to 2004, a temporary "demand" shock, mainly reflecting portfolio shifts; and, since 2004, a "supply" shock i.e. an increase in liquid assets triggered by the fall in the opportunity cost of holding money in a context of historically low interest rates. But the fact that this situation has now lasted since 2001 may suggest another explanation: that the apparent break in trend velocity that took place at that time is of a structural nature. On-going econometric research carried out at the Banque de France confirms this intuition. The sharp decrease in interest rates, of course has played a role. Nevertheless, econometrics seems to show that this only accounts for a very small part in the break in the trend visible since 2001. So we might be facing a permanent increase in the demand for money. Consistent with this hypothesis is the fact that money holdings by corporates and financial institutions have grown much faster, in recent years, than those of households. Money and credit growth could then be related to a common cause: financial development and the increasing weight of financial assets in our economies. A lot of work, however, remains to be done to fully understand the changes we are facing. This, in my view, is the beauty of our monetary analysis. It invites us - indeed it forces us – to face the complexity of our world and the ever changing nature of our environment and our behaviour.

Before the pandemic broke, Banco de España estimates had placed the Spanish economy’s growth potential slightly above 1% per annum. It is too soon to accurately assess the scale of the damage the current crisis will cause to this potential growth. But, unquestionably, the impact will be negative and, therefore, our growth capacity looking ahead might be lower than that estimated before the crisis. The main factor behind the Spanish economy’s modest potential growth is, undoubtedly, the low structural growth of total factor productivity. These differences should not be underestimated, since productivity gains are a fundamental ingredient for achieving a 9  sustainable increase in a country’s economic well-being. Indeed, the greater these gains are, the greater the possibilities of raising wage levels and the quality of the jobs created, along with increasing the resources for funding public policies. It is thus necessary to address the various structural aspects which, across the board, restrict productivity gains. In this connection, we must improve the quantity and quality of public and private investment in human and technological capital, revise our educational model and promote business growth and dynamism. Elsewhere, labour market duality, a very high structural unemployment rate and high longterm unemployment not only restrict our growth capacity but also contribute to increasing inequality. In fact, since 1980 the unemployment rate in Spain has averaged almost 17%, a figure far higher than that observed in other European countries.
From all the above it is clear that the Central Bank of Iceland has undertaken the major responsibility of ensuring price stability, which in the sense used in the joint declaration by the Government and Central Bank means a twelve-month rise in the CPI of 2½%. It is not the Central Bank’s role to ensure a specific rate of growth or level of employment, since its instruments are incapable of having any impact on them in the long run. However, it is acknowledged that ensuring price stability creates vital preconditions for economic growth and prosperity. Inflation increased substantially this year and in June it passed outside the tolerance limits as defined in the March declaration. According to the Central Bank’s inflation forecast published in early August, the outlook that inflation would rapidly decelerate towards the end of this year and the beginning of the next, then would move inside the tolerance limits in the middle of next year, and the 2½% target would be reached in mid-2003. The forecast was based on the main assumptions of an unchanged exchange rate from the forecast day, a cooling of the economy and no wage rises in excess of agreements that had already been negotiated. The Central Bank will publish its next inflation forecast on November 8. Tight monetary stance The Central Bank has applied a tight monetary stance for some time now, as reflected in its high policy interest rate.

Under the new monetary framework, the Central Bank of Iceland has been  4  BIS Review 95/2001  provided with the same mechanisms as central banks in most industrialised countries for creating such an environment. The Central Bank takes this role seriously and will strive to fulfil the conditions laid down by the new legislation and in the joint declaration which it issued with the Government on March 27. The global economic climate has been dramatically transformed in recent years and is still changing in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11. It is quite obvious that we in Iceland do not carry much weight in global economic terms. However, the situation in our immediate environment, especially among our main trading partner countries, is crucial to us. At the moment we are having a somewhat stormy ride. In this new environment, the role of everyone involved in economic policy-making in Iceland will be to act in a disciplined and responsible fashion. Doing so will be the main way to contribute to economic growth and prosperity in Iceland. BIS Review 95/2001  5
They are the ways we contribute to an economy that works for everyone, above and beyond the high-level levers of interest rates and asset purchases. Conclusion I’ll conclude where I began. As a policymaker I’m constantly weighing up the dual mandate, thinking about how we keep the economy on track, and balance maximum employment with low, stable inflation. But these decisions don’t affect the kinds of jobs that are created or who benefits from growth. The type of growth we have, where it manifests, and who benefits from it play a huge role in shaping both the fabric of society and the lives of New Yorkers. That’s why our community and outreach programs are so important to me. I’d like to close by reemphasizing my gratitude for your commitment to this city. Community development work is complex, challenging, and never done. But it’s essential for building healthy communities that support everyone to reach their full economic potential. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 1 See Economic Press Briefing on Wage Inequality in the Region, August 10, 2017. 2 See Community Reinvestment Fund, USA and U.S. Bank Partner to Expand Access to Credit for Small  Businesses, Business Wire, January 8, 2018. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

The Bank of Japan (BoJ) responded by reducing overnight interest rates from a peak of more than 8 percent in early 1991 to ½ a percent by the fall of 1995.2 Most studies of this period suggest that policy was generally appropriate given economic forecasts at the time, but too tight relative to the actual outcomes.3 Economic forecasts for Japan – both by the official community and by private sector agents – were consistently more optimistic than the actual outturns. It is noteworthy that as late as January 1995 – on the eve of deflation – 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yields were still at 4.7 percent. With the benefit of hindsight, we now understand that the disinflationary consequences of the asset price bust and financial stress where vastly more powerful than was widely realized at the time. As we later saw in the U.S., the forces of contraction and disinflation operated through many different channels – not just directly on household wealth, for example, but also through the impact of the asset price bust on the health of financial intermediaries and the supply of credit to households and businesses. Over time, the Japanese banking system came under mounting stress. This was a slowmotion crisis, as the assets were mainly loans that were not marked-to-market. Accounting practices and regulatory forbearance allowed banks to delay charging off bad loans and recapitalizing at the cost of impairing the availability of credit to new potential borrowers. A full-blown banking crisis finally materialized in 1997.
There is, however, still progress to be made; our monetary and economic union needs to be completed. Our European economic institutions are like a trimaran. Our vessel already has a robust central hull in the form of the ECB and the Eurosystem, with its credible single monetary policy. This boat must be completed with two floaters. On one side, we need a public float with a standing common fiscal capacity to better cope with macroeconomic shocks. This need not mean increasing permanently our yearly budget; rather we should construct a fiscal facility that could be activated in moments of crisis or recession. In this respect, the EUR 750 billion Next Generation EU programme – agreed in 2020 and now actively implemented – has been a major step forward. On the other side, we need a private float to foster a better capital allocation, which is just as important. The  Page 5 sur 9 Banking Union and Capital Markets Union, though somewhat “boring” and technical, should be absolute political priorities to enhance the free circulation of capital across the EU and build what I suggest to rebrand a “Financing Union for Investment and Innovation”. In the U.S., private capital flows are a major financial shock absorber between states. We can achieve the same in Europe, and make better use of the world’s largest pool of savings, including by fostering venture capital which is still underdeveloped.

It accounted for one third of international issuance of green and sustainable bonds in Asia. In 2022, we continued to see strong momentum, in particular in the area of green and sustainable loans. The vibrant green bond market is in part a result of the many breakthroughs made by the Government Green Bond programme. Since 2019, the HKMA has assisted the Government in issuing nearly $ billion worth of green bonds targeting both institutional and retail investors. We made use of each issuance to innovate and expand the suite of green bond products in terms of currencies, tenors and distribution channels, thus laying the foundation for other public and private sector issuers in the region. These issuances kept pushing the boundaries. Just over the last few years, we made the world's largest retail green bond issuance, Asia's largest ESG bond issuance, and issued the world's first tokenised government green bond. We will continue to seek new breakthroughs. In the coming five years, planned annual issuance of Government Green Bonds will increase from $ billion to $ billion. The mandate of this programme will be expanded to cover sustainable bonds as well. We will also consider how best to incorporate green and sustainability elements into a new infrastructure bond programme we are developing for the Government.
(L.A.) Volume (L.A.) PX50 (R.A.)  440  420 100 000 400  0  380  1994  1995  1996  1997  Number of Traded Shares  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 22 1024 1698 1628 300 283 181 142 100 79  In bond trading, the situation is slightly more optimistic. The volume traded is approximately eight times the size of share trading and there is much higher liquidity. Continuous increase in volume is mainly due to the issuance of new public debt. PSEPSE- Basic Data (Bonds) 2 000 000  1400  1 800 000  1350  1 600 000  1300  1 400 000  1250  1 200 000  1200  1 000 000  1150  800 000  1100  600 000  1050  400 000  1000  200 000  950  Marcet Cap. (L.A.) Volume (L.A.) PXD  900  0 1994  1995  1996  1997  Number of Traded Bonds  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 23 27 48 80 92 98 95 94 82 72  What will the future bring to capital markets? It is evident that with limited share trading, there is not a very rosy future ahead. There are discussions about merging the markets in the region and possibly joining some European Stock Exchange.

The majority of financial sectors are in foreign hands, well capitalized and well managed. Institutions from the EU are governing the largest financial institutions in the new member states. Introduction of the Single Passport policy will mean a change only de iure, not de facto. Foreign institutions that wanted to provide their services in the new member states are already present there. I do not expect any rush of new players to the new countries of the European Union. It is more probable that with increasing living standards of the population, the space for new financial products’ penetration will increase as well. I expect to see increased competition in this area, as already established institutions compete for new clients. It is unlikely that many new financial institutions will enter the market, because the market is already saturated, and players who had a strategic interest in Central Europe have already established themselves. Authorities from the new countries are already participating in committees and working groups established by the European Commission and European Central Bank, so that rules, as well as the policy thinking are being coordinated and harmonized. Challenges from the EU accession will therefore not represent any major risk.
The plus and minus signs show the extent to which Norges Bank has signalled upside or downside risks. As a reference for the extent of the effect, the lines around the time axis show the average daily absolute change in the three-month money market rate. As from the monetary policy meeting on 21 July 1999, the date of the meetings have been made public in advance. We see that changes in the money market rate are modest in connection with most monetary policy meetings. The money market rate changed by more than 0.20 percentage point in connection with only four of the nearly 30 meetings included in the chart. We have also made similar estimates for a number of other countries in order to have a basis for comparison. The next charts show changes in connection with monetary policy meetings in the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and Sweden’s Riksbank. BIS Review 7/2002  7  The effect is not systematically different from the effects in other countries. If interest rate decisions are largely anticipated, adjustment costs will decline. This is an advantage. What we must be measured against primarily is whether we are setting the interest rate correctly in relation to the inflation target. Guidelines for fiscal policy The fiscal policy stance is a key factor for developments in domestic demand. Towards the end of the 1990s politicians were facing new challenges in the formulation of economic policy.

We have systematised our judgement so that it is possible for others to determine whether the bank’s assessments seem reasonable. The assessment of risk is linked to six factors that are important for 4 price inflation. Our assessment of risk associated with each of these factors is formulated as a probability distribution around the projection for the variable in question. The assessment of risk associated with the actual inflation projection emerges as a weighted average of these six distributions. The weighting of each factor reflects its significance to developments in price inflation as this emerges in our model. Weighting is heaviest and approximately the same for domestic private demand, wage growth, growth in public expenditure and developments in the global economy. The weighting for exchange rate and oil price is somewhat lower. The chart shows our assessment of the balance of risks associated with estimated wage growth as it was presented in the Inflation Report 3/2001. We estimated 5 per cent wage growth in 2003. At the same time, we said that the probability that wage growth would be higher than projected was greater than the probability that it would be lower. We could present similar charts for the other five factors. The ”fan” for the inflation projection is a topographical map of the overall assessment of the balance of risk. 4  The risk model is discussed further in “Box: Assessment of risk to the inflation projection”, Inflation Report 2/2001, Norges Bank.