samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But if you wish to know who is at fault for hollowing out the welfare of middle-income workers and the American economy, kindly do not look at me or my colleagues at the Fed. When you go home tonight look at yourself in the mirror. We at the Fed are providing more than enough monetary  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  accommodation. You elect our fiscal and regulatory policymakers. It is time for them to do their job, to ally themselves with us to achieve a fully employed, prosperous America. Only you, as voters, have the power to insist that they craft policies that are needed to restore American prosperity. Please do so. Have a most pleasant evening! 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

If we want the overall labour force to grow and the share of foreign workers to be stable, then we have to allow net immigration. That’s the bottom right of the triangle. If we want zero net immigration and the foreign worker share to be stable, then we have to accept zero labour force growth. That’s the top of the triangle. The trilemma represents the constraints. I’ve put them in rather stark terms, to reflect vividly the trade-offs we face. Collectively, as a society, we have to decide which corner of the trilemma we want to be at, or which corner we want to be close to. I’ll argue later on that we may be able to soften these constraints and reach more balanced outcomes. But the fundamental constraints and choices implied by the trilemma are real. 5 / 17  BIS central bankers' speeches  Are there ways to escape the trilemma? Or at least soften its hard constraints? There are two solutions that have often been mentioned. First, an increase in fertility. Second, an increase in resident labour force participation rate. A recovery in Singapore’s TFR is the best and most lasting solution that we can have, but its positive effects on labour force will only occur in the very long run. So here’s another thought experiment: Assume our TFR rises steadily from the current level of 1.2 to 2.1 (replacement rate) over next 15 years. Obviously, it will have an immediate impact on resident population and its effect will cumulate over time.
A large number of Spanish firms have remained in operation and in profit as a result of having undertaken rapid adjustment, although unfortunately this has almost always been achieved through the only channel permitted by our obsolete and inefficient labour market: staff layoffs. Households, whose saving rate had fallen to 11%, reacted by swiftly raising it, which is enabling them to lower the rate in the present phase of the adjustment. At the same time we saw how non-energy inflation, which had been continuously far above that of our euro area partners since the creation of the single currency in 1999, fell substantially, to the extent that, in 2009 and 2010, its annual rate was under 1%, holding below that of the euro area. Finally,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  with regard to the banking sector, the rapid expansion of credit, which had reached a rate of 25% per annum and had been the most important source of excessive household and corporate indebtedness during the years of expansion, fell rapidly to stabilise at slightly negative levels over the past few years. Some might say that all this was inevitable, that ten years of imbalances required a correction, and that is partly true. But if we compare with the adjustment observed in other countries in a similar situation, the reaction of the Spanish private sector has been notably swift.

These banking reforms, like all the others now under way (on public spending, pensions and the labour market), should surely have been carried out during the years of expansion, when everything seemed to be going well and the problems that would eventually surface because of the imbalances that were building up were blithely ignored. Unquestionably, we would not now be facing the problems then being incubated and which have now emerged with the crisis. Regarding what has been done so far, it would be unfair not to mention the contribution of the EU authorities, since although there were initially some serious communication and coordination problems, the fact is that subsequently they took appropriate measures aimed at imposing greater economic discipline and improving confidence, such as the reform of economic governance and the Stability and Growth Pact and the recent “Pact for the Euro”. And, of course we cannot overlook the ECB’s contribution with its policy of providing unlimited liquidity and its programmes to purchase covered bonds and the government bonds of the countries hit hardest by the crisis. In short, at this stage it can now be said that both the authorities and private agents have made considerable efforts in the right direction and that, as a result, the process of adjustment of the banking sector and of the Spanish economy as a whole is progressing reasonably well.
In particular, that US growth would weaken and the European sovereign debt would propagate from the peripheral economies to other countries in the region. As months have gone by these risks have materialized. The crisis that broke out in 2008 has not finished. Although at first the policies applied around the world succeeded in averting immediate damage and an economic depression, there are still many issues that have yet to be resolved before it can be left behind. One such issue is the fragile financial situation of states, banks and households in several developed economies. In Chile, and in most emerging economies, we have been innocent witnesses of the crisis. It has posed new challenges to monetary and financial policy-makers to minimize the impact of external turbulences and allow our economies to continue along a path of sustainable growth. The experience of 2008–2009 taught us lessons for our policy conduct, but, more importantly, it left us the conviction, not only to policy makers but also to the general public, that we are able to mitigate the adversities coming from abroad. Avoiding them is impossible, but we can surely mitigate them. Chile’s macroeconomic policy framework leans on various pillars that must be tended to. To begin with, a fiscal policy that is serious and predictable. Keeping a budget rule based on the structural balance, which permits to shield public expenditure from economic fluctuations and also empower it to support domestic expenditure when needed, is highly beneficial. A second pillar is our high financial and commercial openness.

The risk of overheating and forex pressures Economic recovery continued over the course of 2010, but at the turn of 2011 we faced new macroeconomic challenges. Preoccupations again centered on world developments, due to tensions associated to the two-speed recovery. Emerging countries, with their output gaps narrowed or closed had to deal with their economies’ overheating and related inflationary pressures. Furthermore, they began having strong exchange rate pressures due to their better relative position in the world, capital inflows and the need for global imbalances to be resolved. Several economies’ exchange rates dropped to their lowest in the last decade (figure 9). Only very recently have we seen some reversal because of a terms-of-trade deterioration and increased risk aversion around the world. Chile has been no exception. Although in net terms capital inflows were not large, our currency also strengthened, not a surprise in a scenario of vigorous growth and very good terms of trade. The nominal exchange rate posted a significant appreciation toward the end of 2010, while the real exchange rate hit levels below the averages of the last 15 to 20 years (figure 10). The current exchange rate tensions originate in some long-lasting phenomena in the international economy. Global imbalances are still unresolved, and part of the solution requires that the countries that enjoy a better position today (i.e., emerging en commodityexporting economies) redirect part of their demand to those that are worse off – the developed economies.
Rachel Lomax: The state of the economy Speech by Ms Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Institute of Economic Affairs 25th Anniversary Conference, London, 26 February 2008. I am grateful to Gareth Ramsay for his help in preparing this speech, and to other colleagues at the Bank of England for helpful comments. *  *  *  When you met for this event a year ago, the UK economy had just posted its fastest rate of growth in nearly two years, buoyed by a strong world economy and ample global liquidity. Shoppers had been out in force over Christmas and the New Year, and the housing market was booming. The main concern was consumer price inflation, which had just picked up to 3%. Most forecasters were looking forward to another year of healthy demand growth, with the MPC’s central projection at the top end of the range. The consensus view was that the surge in inflation would be short-lived. And that, broadly, is what happened. CPI inflation fell back to around the 2% target by the second half of the year. Output growth for the year as a whole was in line with the MPC’s forecast. Short term interest rates now stand where they were a year ago – at 5.25% – after briefly touching 5.75% last summer. And yet the outlook for 2008 and beyond has changed dramatically. A year ago the prospect was for a modest decrease in growth, consistent with inflation staying around target.

However, over a long period of time these errors offset one another and on average good forecasts should therefore not over-estimate or under-estimate the actual events. For shorter periods it may be interesting to study individual forecasting errors in greater detail to try to analyse their causes. But even if such an analysis is valuable it cannot be used to draw general conclusions about the forecasting performance. While accuracy is very important, even more is required for a forecast to be good in a monetary policy context. A good forecast for inflation, for instance, should correspond with the forecasts for other variables. And the driving forces behind the forecasts should be explained in a comprehensible manner. Why does the forecast look the way it does? What are the mechanisms acting as a motor for this development? These qualities are also required for a forecast to function as part of the decision-making base for practical monetary policy. BIS Review 22/2008  3  Consideration to the real economy Another factor to take into account in an assessment of monetary policy is that there may sometimes be reason to deliberately deviate from the inflation target. Normally we focus our policy on attaining the inflation target within two years. This is partly due to it taking time before monetary policy has its full effect. But it also has to do with the Riksbank thereby being able to contribute to a more stable development in production and employment. However, it does assume that the inflation target is not threatened.
1 Based on those he expressed a view, which I share, that while the recent experience may have made us a bit more confident about detecting bubbles, it has not resolved the problem of doing so in a timely manner, nor has it shown that small-to-modest policy actions will reliably and materially dampen speculation. An extra policy reaction to changes in asset prices thus still remains questionable. The second frontier to be mentioned tonight is related to the monetary policy implementation, current situation on the money market and financial stability of the banking sector. For years the monetary policy implementation was not an issue and central banks were able to tighten the short-term money market interest rates such as for instance 3M PRIBOR closely to the key policy rate. Unfortunately, this changed in August 2007 for the US interest rates when the 3M LIBOR for the US dollar denominated funds started to deviate significantly from the Federal Reserve target for funds. A year later following the second round of the financial crises that peaked during the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers also the Czech short-term money market rates started to elevate well above our policy rate, the two week repo rate. 1  Quoted from speech of Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn: “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices Revisited” at the Cato’s Institute 26th Annual Monetary Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., on November 19, 2008.

The EU’s new Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), for example, is expected to bring about important changes and intensify competition in the European financial market. This development will also influence the future of financial market infrastructures in Switzerland. Against this background, it is certainly crucial for the Swiss financial market infrastructures to persistently foster their competitiveness. They have pursued this strategy so far, and will need to continue doing so in the future. BIS Review 87/2006  1
This means that banks can lend money at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case. They can thus boost the expansion of credit in the economy without taking any significant risks themselves. This is something that we have actually seen in recent years – lending to Swedish households has increased at a worryingly high rate. I believe that the introduction of a ceiling for how much the banks can lend without increasing their equity is a reasonable measure to prevent an excessive provision of credit. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  New standards for the banks’ liquidity management As I mentioned at the beginning, the financial crisis has also given us reasons to consider more direct and specific liquidity regulations. Consequently, the Basel Committee has drawn up entirely new standards for how banks should manage their liquidity. They have drawn up two quantitative measurements; the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio, and will also impose considerably stricter requirements on the banks to report their liquidity risks. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio focuses on the banks’ liquidity buffers. The banks must hold liquidity reserves that are sufficiently large and sufficiently liquid to cope with a 30-day stressed cash outflow. The rules for what constitutes liquid assets are strict. At least 60 per cent of the reserves must consist of government securities, the rest can be made up of highquality, liquid mortgage and corporate bonds. The second measurement, the Net Stable Funding Ratio, is a structural measurement focusing on the banks’ funding models.

Floating exchange rates: perception and experience Views on how floating currencies behave and what the implications of their implementation are have changed over the past 30 years, in the light of current experience. Early protagonists had fairly idealistic expectations with respect to floating. For example, Harry G. Johnson, one of the grand old men of international economics, when he stated hopefully 30 years ago: "a freely flexible exchange rate would tend to remain constant so long as underlying economic conditions (including government policies) remained constant: random deviations from the equilibrium level would be limited by the activities of private speculators…"1 This optimistic view was based on two convictions. For one, on the notion that exchange rate distortions are primarily triggered by inconsistent government policies oriented to short-term effects. In actual fact, the economic developments of the late sixties and of the seventies promoted the perception of a fundamental contrast between inherently stable private markets and a destabilising public policy sector. On the other hand, most economists were profoundly convinced that free exchange rate movements would be clearly dominated by inflation differentials with no lasting impact on real exchange rates. It must be borne in mind, however, that 30 years ago the play of global financial markets so forcefully driven by expectations was still in its infancy.
We must therefore ensure that we are prepared to embrace it. Hong Kong’s role as the Asian hub for sustainable finance 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  8. What role can Hong Kong play in this global effort? Most importantly, it is critical that we use our strengths as an international financial centre to contribute to this endeavour. 9. Hong Kong is already one of the major green finance hubs globally. Last year, green bonds arranged and issued in Hong Kong reached $ billion, up from $ billion in 2017. The issuers included multilateral development banks, such as the ADB and the European Investment Bank, as well as private sector participants from Hong Kong, Mainland China and abroad. 10. In fact, a green finance ecosystem is already taking shape in Hong Kong. Many international green advisory firms and external reviewers have a presence in Hong Kong. They combine onthe-ground knowledge of the Asian market with robust international standards. We also have a local Green Finance Certification Scheme developed by the Hong Kong Quality Assurance Agency (HKQAA) with reference to a number of widely recognised international and Mainland standards. 11. The Hong Kong Government is a strong supporter of green finance, and puts in place supportive policies to promote green finance, such as the Green Bond Grant Scheme, which subsidises the cost of obtaining certification under the HKQAA’s Green Finance Certification Scheme, as well as the Pilot Bond Grant Scheme, which covers issuance costs of eligible firsttime bond issuers in Hong Kong, including green bonds.

By going through the issuance process ourselves, along with the help of external parties, we have hopefully showcased to potential green bond issuers, both locally and overseas, that Hong Kong is a convenient platform for issuing green bonds, for three reasons:  3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  (i) Hong Kong has a strong presence of finance and legal professionals, who can advise on all aspects of the bond offering and assist in arranging, managing, co-ordinating and marketing the green bond certification and issuance; (ii) Hong Kong combines the best market practice from internationally renowned green reviewers and local agencies. For example, we obtained a Second Party Opinion from Vigeo Eiris for the Green Bond Framework and the inaugural transaction under the Framework has also received the “Green Finance Certificate” (Pre-issuance) from the HKQAA; and (iii) Hong Kong is home to leading international institutional investors, including many of the investors who have made strong commitments to green investments. 20. During the roadshow for the green bond, we were joined by our Environment Bureau colleagues to reach out to overseas investors in major cities such as London, New York, Paris, and Frankfurt, in order to demonstrate to the international community the HKSAR Government’s coordinated commitment to green finance and our broader objective to address climate change risks. We believe the exercise has gone a long way in asserting Hong Kong’s branding as the premier regional green finance hub to the leading institutional investors around the world.
Most had a financial sector characterised by poor risk management, low capital and liquidity, inadequate corporate governance, and weak supervision and regulation – diluted by many years of excessive optimism in the self-repairing power of markets. When the Lehman shock hit, banks exposed to toxic US assets ran into difficulties and some were bailed out by their governments. In the euro area, these banks were mostly located in Germany, France and the Netherlands. Bank bailouts took place on a staggering scale. In 2009, they totalled around 8% of GDP in Germany, 5% in France and 12% in the Netherlands. 1 These bailouts did not greatly affect sovereign borrowing costs, however, thanks largely to the relatively strong fiscal positions of the governments implementing them. In the second phase, the crisis spread to banks in Spain and Ireland that had similar weaknesses, but were instead overexposed to the collapsing domestic real estate market. Another wave of bank bailouts followed, and some signs of tensions in sovereign debt markets began to appear. Those tensions were compounded by the third phase, which began when the Greek crisis shattered the impression that public debt was risk-free, triggering a rapid repricing of sovereign risk. To those who saw the crisis as a consequence of moral hazard, this represented a required return of market discipline vis-à-vis sovereigns – a view that was reflected in the Deauville agreement in October 2010. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  These events spread contagion to all sovereigns now perceived as vulnerable by financial markets.

So our duty, as policymakers, is to return their trust and to address the areas of our union that we all know are incomplete. 1 Figures include recapitalisation measures, guarantees, asset relief interventions, and liquidity measures other  than guarantees. See Financial Crisis Aid amounts for a more detailed breakdown. 2 This calculation assumes all exposures had been subject to fair valuation, and applies to bonds of Cyprus,  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 3 Based on end-2010 Core Tier 1 capital. 4 A significant share of government bonds were held by banks at amortised cost. 5 In fact, internal ECB analysis finds that the relationship between sovereign and corporate CDSs in this period  was as strong as that between sovereign and bank CDSs. And banks that had larger sovereign exposures had a similar correlation with sovereign CDSs as banks with smaller exposures. 6 See Mundell, R. (1961), “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, American Economic Review, 51 (4), pp. 657– 7/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  665; McKinnon, R. (1963), “Optimum Currency Areas,” American Economic Review, 53, pp. 717–724; Kenen, P. (1969), “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View,” in Mundell, R.A. and Swoboda, A.K. (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy, Chicago University Press. 7 European Commission estimates. See Nikolov, P. (2016), “Cross-border risk sharing after asymmetric shocks:  evidence from the euro area and the United States”, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 15, No 2.