samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As structured programs on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism activities are relatively new especially among many developing member countries, it remains a challenge for the financial industry and regulators alike to formulate adequate measures and mechanisms to counter these perpetrators. In this regard, compliance with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering help deter the Asia Pacific region from being targeted as a regional centre for money laundering and terrorism financing. In this regard, I am especially pleased to share with you that Malaysia has been ranked among the top 10 countries in terms of AML/CFT compliance in the recent Mutual Evaluation Report 2007 assessment exercise. Let me now turn to a subject close to us here in Malaysia, that is, Islamic insurance or better known as takaful. In recent years, takaful has grown significantly as the Islamic alternative to conventional insurance and has evolved from being a domestic operations to becoming a thriving global business. The global takaful market is expected to grow between 15 and 20 per cent per annum. Nevertheless, the market penetration level remains low, notably less than 5% in many Muslim countries and 6.8% here in Malaysia, thus providing significant market potential that remains untapped. Bank Negara Malaysia will continue to foster the continued growth of takaful business by providing a conducive business and regulatory environment. However, there is a clear need for the takaful industry to deliver innovative financial products and services, that can effectively compete with those offered by conventional insurers.

The National Authorities will conduct the exercise at the national level, on the basis of data requirements and centrally developed methodology, and may ask for the support of third parties if they deem it necessary. To ensure consistency in execution across banks and countries, quality assurance processes will be in place at every stage. It is in the interest of all that this exercise be rigorous and transparent, so as to fully restore confidence in the European banking sector. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusions We have in front of us a year “fully loaded” – to use the jargon we all use in connection with of the Regulatory Basel Framework. The European Union is trying to make a big step forward and we will need the intelligence and best cooperation of all for this great design to be carried out. Thanks again to the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum and to his Chairman, David Marsh, and to all the participants. I wish all of our visitors a very good stay in Madrid. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
13  Unlike methods based on the exclusion of individual items, the PCCI is constructed by filtering out the transient component of inflation using econometric techniques in order to retain the persistent component(s) that is(are) common to all items. 14 The PCCI is calculated using the monthly changes in each item. 16  Page 17 of 19  The inflation expectations of euro area households rose at the start of 2022; they have since stabilised but have not fallen to any significant extent: in December, the median three-year ahead expectation was 3% according to the ECB’s CES 15 survey. The survey also shows that households’ responses on future price changes continue to be more widely dispersed. Regarding businesses’ inflation expectations, the Banque de France – after Banca d’Italia – is a pioneer in this field, having launched its own dedicated survey two years ago. As in the case of households, this survey shows a rise in the median three to five-year ahead expectation, which reached 3% by mid-2022 and has merely stabilised since then. 15  Consumer Expectations Survey. 17  Page 18 of 19  We have thus avoided a significant “unanchoring” of households’ and businesses’ medium-term expectations; but we still need to ensure they become lastingly “reanchored” towards the 2% target. Conclusion Today I have given no dates or figures: doing so would be meaningless and would equate to coming back to unconditional and excessively binding guidance.

Remarks on the launch of the Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures Mark Carney Chair of the Financial Stability Board Governor of the Bank of England  Delivered at the Tate Modern 14 December 2016  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Welcome  It is my great pleasure to have been invited, in my capacity as Chair of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), to help launch the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures consultative report. 1  In late 2015, at the request of the G20 , the FSB established this private-sector, industry-led Task Force, under the leadership of Michael Bloomberg. Its mandate was to develop recommendations for voluntary, consistent, comparable, clear and reliable disclosures around climate-related financial risks for companies. The purpose was to provide the information that investors, lenders, insurers and other stakeholders need to manage these risks, and seize the associated opportunities. As those of you who’ve had an opportunity to read their report will have seen, the Task Force has achieved a great deal during the year. So on behalf of shareholders, creditors and citizens, I thank all of the Task Force members for their tremendous efforts, and your companies for making you available for this important work. If you want a job done well, give it to busy people. Public authorities – like the G20 and the FSB – could identify the problem, but we needed the private-sector to provide the solution. This is a solution for the market, by the market.
Once the latter regain their strength, their currencies will hopefully  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  follow suit. However, the transition may take long and therefore exceptional policies have been necessary to help mitigate these tensions. Like other emerging economies, early this year we decided to intervene the forex market, by launching a reserve hoarding program that would permit productive sectors to make orderly adjustments to what we foresaw as a protracted exchange rate stress situation. We announced that we would purchase 12 billion dollars over the course of this year, and so far we have purchased 10 billion. We have done this intervention in a non-discretional and sterilized way in order to preserve our policy-making capacities intact and avoid becoming ourselves a source of volatility. Importantly, this purchase of international reserves has been intended not only to reduce exchange rate tensions, but also to strengthen our international liquidity position. Evidence shows that a strong international reserves position helps shield the economy from the adverse effects of external financial shocks. The level of reserves we pursue with this program will put us on a good standing to deal with a more pronounced global decline. As I said, at the beginning of the year the macroeconomic scenario suffered major changes. The increase in commodity prices and the closing of output gaps stoked fears of a resurgence of inflation comparable to that of 2007–2008. Our communiqué of the future course of monetary policy changed significantly in just a few months.

Preliminary document, Central Bank of Chile, March. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 9 Nominal exchange rates in the world (index 01/Jan/00-18/Oct/11=100)  Average  U.S. (2)  U.K.  Mexico  India  Russia  South Korea  Hungary  Philippines  Peru  China  July (3)  South Africa  Range (1)  Poland  40 Israel  40 Eurozone  60 Malaysia  60 Chile  80  Sweden  80  Norway  100  Thailand  100  Colombia  120  Japan  120  Canada  140  Brazil  140  N. Zealand  160  Czech Republic  160  Australia  180  Switzerland  180  Spot October  (1) The range shows highest and lowest levels posted by domestic currency during indicated period. (2) Uses Broad index. (3) At 27 July 2011. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. Figure 10 Real exchange rate (index, 1986=100) 120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70 88  92  1991-2010 average  96  00  04  1996-2010 average  08 TCR  Spot (*)  (*) The observed exchange rate of 18 October 2011. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Because inflation expectations matter to the behaviour of households and firms, the critical aspect of monetary policy is how the decisions of the central bank influence those expectations. As Michael Woodford has put it, “not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current conditions, very little else matters”. Indeed, one can argue that the real influence of monetary policy is less the effect of any individual monthly decision on interest rates and more the ability of the framework of policy to condition inflation expectations. The precise “rule” which central banks follow is less important than their ability to condition expectations. That is a fundamental point on which my later argument will rest. It should be clear that, just as Maradona could not hope to score in every game by running towards goal in a straight line, so monetary policy cannot hope to meet the inflation target by leaving official interest rates unchanged indefinitely. Rates must always be set in a way that is consistent with the overall strategy of keeping inflation on track to meet the target; sometimes that will imply changes in rates, at other times not. Learning and its implication for monetary policy The academic literature on monetary policy rules has performed a great service in emphasising the importance of expectations. But there are two basic problems with the use of rules. The first is that the validity of any given rule depends upon the model of the economy that underlies it being true.

The story of monetary policy in Britain during the intervening period is told by the Mais Lectures. The first Mais Lecture was delivered by my predecessor, Lord Richardson, in 1978, at a point when monetary policy was emerging as the main tool to deal with inflation. Not before time, you might think, since only two years earlier inflation had reached 27%. In 1981 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, chose as the title of his Mais Lecture: “The Fight Against Inflation”. As he said then, with inflation still in double figures, "squeezing inflation out from an economy which has become accustomed to higher rates over a period of years cannot be an easy or painless task. … the inflationary mentality must be eradicated. … When we have done that we will find that low inflation or even price stability need not be painful". The conquest of inflation was to prove harder than expected. In the decade that followed Geoffrey Howe’s lecture, inflation averaged over 7% a year. Only since 1992 has inflation fallen to levels that could be described as price stability. In retrospect, two Mais Lectures seem to have been of particular significance: those by Nigel Lawson in 1984 and by Tony Blair, then Leader of the Opposition, ten years ago this month. Despite clear differences of view, what stand out from those two lectures are their similarities. Both emphasised the need for a medium-term framework for monetary and fiscal policy.
Recently, a number of global shocks − the coronavirus pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine1 and lock-downs in China − have contributed to pushing up inflation in Sweden and around the world, to levels we have not seen since the early 1990s. I think it is of the utmost importance that we defend the inflation target as anchor for price setting and wage formation in Sweden. Inflation is too high. It is painfully high for both households and companies.2 In addition to worrying about rising prices, households and companies are worried about higher interest rates. Will we go from 500 per cent to −0.5 per cent to –  *I would like to thank Mikael Apel for his work on this speech, Johan Almenberg, Emma Bylund, Charlotta Edler,  Petra Frid, Stefan Ingves, Jens Iversen, Ann-Leena Mikiver, Emelie Nilsson and Marianne Sterner for their valuable comments, Elizabeth Nilsson for translation into English and Daniel Höffker and Josefin Poellinger Östberg for data from the Riksbank's archives. I would also like to thank my upper-secondary school teachers at Platenskolan in Motala for their solid education and for always showing their pupils respect and trust. 1 See, for example, Ohlsson (2022) for a review of how war has affected inflation in the 20th century. 2 Inflation also has a varying impact on different types of households and companies; see Breman (2022) for a more detailed discussion. 1 [16]  well, what comes next?

In a final attempt to stop the currency outflow, the Riksbank first raised its policy rate to 75 per cent again on 16 September 1992 and then, at 15:20 on the same day, to 500 per cent. At the same time, the pound sterling and the Italian lira left the ERM and were allowed to float freely. In this situation, the government and the opposition managed to agree on a crisis package that was presented on 20 September, intended to strengthen the state budget by SEK 40-45 billion. The Riksbank then cut the rate to 50 per cent. After a second crisis package at the end of the month, the interest rate could be cut further, to 24 per cent. This calmed the market somewhat and the Riksbank was able to gradually lower the marginal rate to 11.5 percent in the late autumn. However, the calm was only temporary. In mid-November, the outflow of foreign currency began to accelerate again. Repeating the same manoeuvre with a substantial rate increase and further crisis packages was considered pointless – confidence had been exhausted. On 19 November 1992, the Riksbank abandoned the fixed exchange rate. When you go through the press cuttings from this period, it is not very difficult to see an image of how we were desperately using rate increases and hastily concocted fiscal policy agreements in an attempt to patch up and repair a house that was really so run down that it needed to be completely renovated.
And both loan-level data and aggregates like the Flow of Funds miss an important dimension of borrower behavior that became very important during the crisis and recovery – the relationship between different kinds of credit use by individual borrowers or households. The creation of the Consumer Credit Panel is an example of the use of pre-existing commercial data in an innovative way that had not previously been pursued. The panel is based on credit report data collected by Equifax (one of the three credit bureaus in the United States) and it contains information on all outstanding loans – including mortgages, auto and student loans, and credit card debt – at the individual consumer level. While credit records are primarily used by lenders to evaluate a potential borrower’s creditworthiness and ability to repay, they can also provide a comprehensive picture of outstanding balances and delinquencies and how they interact. Of course, all the data are completely anonymous – the dataset has been stripped of all personally identifiable information. The CCP was created by our research group using an innovative sampling procedure, based on the randomness of the last four digits of social security numbers. The resulting panel allows one to track individuals over time and across different locations within the nation, starting in the quarter in which they establish their credit report when taking out their first loan.

In addition, inflation expectations, which may affect wage and price setting, appear to be edging lower: We see this both in survey results and in the financial markets— through noticeable declines in “inflation compensation”, measured by the difference between the yields on Treasury bonds with and without inflation protection. A third factor is productivity growth. BIS Review 52/2005  1  There have been concerns that a structural productivity slowdown was in the offing, which could put upward pressure on inflation; the good news is that structural productivity growth apparently still remains above the levels reached during the second half of the 1990s, although it may have edged down just a bit over the last few years. A final factor impacting the inflation outlook is the degree of slack in the labor market. Right now, the unemployment rate is relatively low: at 5 percent it’s near most estimates of the so-called natural rate. But other measures—such as the employment-population ratio, a survey of job market perceptions, and industrial capacity utilization—suggest that some slack still remains. Risks to economic growth and employment Now let me turn to the real side of the economy—growth and employment—and highlight some of the risks that affect my optimistic baseline projection. Even though overall growth has been respectable, economic activity has been burdened by some major drags over the past year or so. Three major ones result from the oil price shock, the deterioration of the trade balance, and a still relatively low level of business investment spending.
The labour supply Because labour force participation varies so much in different age groups, the future age structure is highly significant for the labour supply and thereby also for growth. The Nordic countries have generally high activity rates, around 87 per cent in the age group 25-54, compared with the other European countries. In the oldest age group, participation has decreased over the last 10 years. One reason for this is that the retirement age has fallen. In Sweden today, the actual age of retirement is 62 years. The only group in which there has been a rise in the labour supply in recent years is elderly women, since those that live to a higher age today are better educated than their predecessors. The proportion of elderly in the population is growing larger throughout Europe, and the Nordic countries are no exception. At present, 16 per cent of the European population are 65 years or older. This percentage is forecast to increase to 18 percent by 2010. If we look instead at the number of people over 80 years in Europe, this will double over the next 15 years. According to Statistics Sweden, the proportion of people in Sweden that are 65 years or older will rise from 17 per cent today to 23 per cent in 2050. Meanwhile, the economically active proportion of the population, those between 20 and 64 years, will decline from 59 per cent in 2002 to 54 per cent in 2050.

The trend here has also been more closely correlated to the level of economic activity, with prices falling over the last three years. However, the price decline in Malmö [9 per cent] has been considerably gentler than in Stockholm [24 per cent] or Gothenburg [18 per cent]. These declines have been mainly caused by lower rents, which essentially have been a result of lower demand for office premises due to the subdued economic activity. It also makes sense that Malmö has been affected less than the other major cities given that the slowdown has not been as severe here. The rapid rise in prices and their subsequently rapid decline points to a trend not all that dissimilar from that experienced during the property crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, there are many differences between the two situations. There is no doubt that we experienced a bubble at the beginning of the 1990s, when prices largely lost their relationship to fundamentals and were instead underpinned by expectations of future price rises. For a period of time the direct yield on property was 8 percentage points lower than the yield on a government bond. So investors must have expected prices to increase a good deal more than 8 per cent in order to compensate them for the risk of investing in property rather than bonds. In this case, you can really say that expectations of price rises were high! This is not the situation today.
Relation Between Risk Premium and Credit Rating Credit Rating–CDS Rate  Maximum Change in CDS During Crisis*  (January 8, 2010)  95 0 85 0  Bulg aria  20 0  Indon esia  18 0 C DS R ate (bp)  R ate of Chan ge in CDS (bp)  Colombia  Rus sia  16 0  Turkey 14 0 S. Africa Me xico P eru P oland Braz il  12 0  T haila nd  10 0  S. KoreaMalay sia Czech Rep . 80  75 0 65 0 Hung ary 55 0  S.Korea  Mexi co S.A frica C olombia B ulgari a Peru T urkey Brazil Malay siaTha iland Polan d C zech Rep. Chi le  45 0 35 0 25 0  C hina  Çin  60 0  In dones ia  Ru ssia  H ung ary  22 0  2  4  6  8  10  S&P Credi t Rati ngs (A+:1 , BB-:9)  15 0 0  2  4  6  8  10  S&P Cred it Rat ings (A+:1, BB-:9 )  *The difference between the highest CDS spreads during and before the crisis. Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. BIS Review 68/2010  5  15.

These reforms, by promoting registered employment, will also help us overcome problems in our social security system. Unemployment Rates (Percent) 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 2004  2005 Unemployment Rat e  2006  2007  2008  2009  Non-Farm Unemployment Rate  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Distinguished Guests, 22. The impact of the global economic crisis on Turkey’s foreign trade has been evident, and the contraction in domestic and foreign demand and the slumps in commodity prices, especially in crude oil as well as iron and steel led imports and exports to shrink rapidly as of the last quarter of 2008. Significant declines have been observed throughout the year in imports and exports, which tended to recover as of the second quarter of 2009 as signs of revival in global economic activity appeared. Total exports of goods fell by 22.1 percent to 109.7 billion USD, while total imports of goods fell by 30.7 percent year-on-year to 134.4 billion USD in 2009. Consequently, the foreign trade deficit, which was 53 billion USD in 2008, dropped to 24.7 billion USD in 2009. 23. The adverse impact of the global crisis on tourism revenues was translated as a decrease in expenditures. In 2009, tourism revenues decreased by 3.2 percent. The said decline is mainly attributable to the fall in average tourism revenues. In fact, the number of visitors increased by 3.3 percent in 2009. Due to the recovery in other services items, the slowdown in the services surplus remained limited at 5.3 percent.