samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
“UK Monetary Policy – ‘Crossing the river by feeling the stones,” speech given at the Confederation of British Industry, Newcastle upon Tyne. Bank of England  Page 14  Pill, H. (2019), “Whatever it takes within our (new?) mandate” in R. Barwell and J. Chadha (eds.) Renewing our monetary vows: Open letters to the Governor of the Bank of England, pp. 37–54 (London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research). Pill, H. (2010). “Monetary policy in a low interest rate environment: A checklist,” NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 6(1), pp. 335-345. Tenreyro, S. (2022). “The economy and policy trade-offs,” Dow Lecture, National Institute of Economic and Social Research. Bank of England  Page 15  Endnotes 1  2  3 4  5 6 7 8  9  10 11  12  13  14  15 16 17 18 19  20  See: Vickers (2022). “The regulation of inflation: Reflections on 25 years of the MPC,” Beesley Lecture, 9 November 2022. The MPC’s communication following its 3 November 2022 meeting set out why both the market-implied path of future Bank Rate and the path where Bank Rate was maintained at a constant 3% level were seen as inappropriate given the prevailing economic circumstances. This is a form of guidance. But the preferred outlook for Bank Rate was left to be determined by the evolution of the data. See: Evans et al. (2015) for an articulation of this approach.

M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul: National Central Bank and building world peace  Speech by Mr M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the 27th International Conference on World Peace “Building a Culture of Peace in the New Millennium”, held in Bangkok on 1 December 2000. *  *  *  Members of the Professors World Peace Academy, Participants of the 27th International Conference on World Peace, Ladies and gentlemen. The history of central banking is normally agreed to have begun around four thousand years ago in the Greece, Roman and other empires up to the middle ages when banks were put up primarily for the purpose of getting finance for governments to wage war. So the first period of central banking cannot very well be said to have been in conformity with the topic I’ve been asked to talk about here today, which is entitled “National Central Bank and Building World Peace”. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and especially later on when industrialisation began in earnest, there were great needs for finance for the many various industries that sprang up around that time. Commercial banks and great finance houses became common but the limitations of the technology of that period of using precious metals as currency became quickly apparent. Commercial banks began issuing their own paper notes, for the amount of the valuable metals that they had in stock being much more transportable.
Employment rate and unemployment in Sweden and Europe (a) Employment rate  70  65  65  60  60  55  55  50  Euro area Sweden 05  07  09  11  13  15  (b) Unemployment  70 15  50  17  15  12  12  9  9  6  6  3 0  Nordic countries Germany Sweden 05  07  09  3  United Kingdom Euro area 11  13  15  0  17  Note. Per cent of population and labour force respectively, aged 15-74 years. Source: Eurostat  Figure 8. Unemployment in Sweden among those born in Sweden and those born abroad and unemployment among those born abroad in Sweden and Europe  20  (a) Unemployment in Sweden among Sweden born and those born abroad  (b) Unemployment among those born abroad in Sweden and in Europe  20 20  20  16  16 16  16  12  12 12  12  8  8  8  8  4  4  4  0  0  0  Swedish born Foreign born  05  07  09  11  13  15  17  Nordic countries Germany Sweden 05  07  09  4  United Kingdom Euro area 11  13  15  17  0  Note.

Erdem Başçi: Financial stability and Turkey’s achievements to date Welcome speech by Mr Erdem Başçi, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, for the 17th International Conference of Banking Supervisors, Istanbul, 13 September 2012. *  *  *  Distinguished Deputy Prime Minister, Esteemed Guests and Distinguished Members of the Media, Welcome to Istanbul and to the 17th International Conference of Banking Supervisors jointly hosted by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey. In my speech, I will try to summarize the importance we attach to financial stability and the achievements we have made up to date. Dear Guests, There are three essential factors that determine the growth potential of a country; these are price stability, financial stability and productivity. Any weakness in any of these three factors may cause considerable damage to growth. The history of economics is teeming with examples of this. The social costs of loss of price stability are now very well known by economists. Academic studies indicate that an inflation rate that is on average higher by 10 percentage points leads to a reduction in the GDP growth rate an average of a quarter point.1 Meanwhile, the loss of financial stability has deep and long-term impacts on growth and employment.2 The cost of preventing a financial crisis is much lower than the cost of the crisis itself. Turkey’s recent history is a very good example of this statement.
Before leaving the topic of crisis management and resolution in the case of the Icelandic banks, I would like to say a few words about deposit guarantees. Why did the Government give a verbal blanket guarantee only for domestic deposits and not the deposits in the banks’ foreign branches? After all, this distinction probably added fuel to the fire of the so-called Icesave dispute about the settlement of deposit guarantees in Landsbanki’s Dutch and British branches. The short answer is that such a guarantee would never have been credible. As a result, it would not have stopped the run on these deposits and, if attempted, might have bankrupted the Government. At the time, the Central Bank of Iceland’s FX reserves amounted to 2½ billion euros, while the foreign currency deposits in Landsbanki’s Dutch and British branches totalled 11½ billion euros and payment of the EU minimum deposit insurance would have required 4½ billion euros. In economic terms, given that these deposits were used to a significant degree to finance illiquid assets in these same countries, such a payment would have amounted to a net transfer of resources from Iceland to these countries at a time when Iceland was going through its deepest financial and economic crisis in the post-war period! That made no sense, and the only solution was for the governments concerned to pay out the insurance in their own currency with the aim of settling later with Iceland.

1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  More will be done if necessary, of course, but the diagnosis that was reached yesterday by the Governing Council is that a little less is necessary today because growth is stronger and Europe is doing better. And to make this quite clear, how much will the ECB disburse in, say, 2017? The decision that was taken yesterday is to extend our asset purchases for a further nine months by buying € billion per month of various financial instruments, which makes an additional € billion euro. That’s the decision: we will add € billion to the € billion per month planned for the first three months of 2017, making € billion, so for the whole of 2017 that comes to slightly less than € billion extra compared with what we are doing already. And since March 2015? Asset purchases today come to around € trillion in total, so if we add 1,500 and 800 it means that, at the end of next year, we’ll be at just over € trillion. Yes, and you realise that with this € trillion growth is good, average, but it’s not stronger. What would happen without this € trillion? Well, without it, if the ECB wasn’t doing what it’s doing, growth would be between 0% and 1%, inflation would be close to zero and unemployment wouldn’t be falling in the euro area. But as you know, unemployment is now falling fairly quickly in the euro area.
As discussed earlier, no issue is more important than a credible commitment for getting our fiscal house in order, but at a pace that does not forestall a sustained economic recovery. What is needed here is fiscal consolidation that begins slowly, builds over time to substantial magnitude, and is difficult to dismantle – i.e., it requires the commitment of both political parties. The decision of how big the U.S. government should be and what functions it should perform is a political decision that I leave to the voters and our legislators. However, as a nation we need to acknowledge that we must be willing to pay for whatever government services and transfers we want to have. We should not assume that an excess of global savings will always be available to easily finance our public deficits. 5  To be more precise, as of the first quarter of 2011 with statistical discrepancy of 1.2 percentage points attributed to private balance, the figures are as follows: government balance –9.5 percent + 6.3 percent private sector balance equals current account balance of –3.3 percent. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The choice of fiscal sustainability is not a political one, it is an economic one and if we do not act voluntarily and preemptively, the market will inevitably force the outcome later – most likely in a much more difficult and messy fashion.

As regards our asset purchases, we have to reduce their intensity in a pragmatic manner, as we already decided successfully in December 2016. I insist on the word “pragmatic” because, while keeping the current rules, we should on the one hand exploit the margins of flexibility of the programme and on the other hand hold in reserve an additional purchasing capacity – if needed. That said, monetary policy is not limited to QE, and QE is not limited to net asset purchases: we can keep a substantial degree of monetary accommodation even if we reduce our monthly flow of net purchases. 1/ On QE, the academic literature provides consistent evidence that the impact of asset purchase programmes on the yield curve and asset prices is primarily driven by the total stock of assets held by the central bank (the so called “stock effect”), rather than by the flow of transactions conducted over a given period (“flow effect”). In-house studies of the effects of the PSPP find that holding a stock of bonds equivalent to 10% of GDP lowers the 10-year yield by about 45 bps in the euro-area.5 By contrast, flows of purchases have no significant additional impact. These results imply that our current programme lowers the 10-year euro-area government bond yield by about 100 bps.
So too will our work simplifying rules about reporting. [19]  Growth and competition One of the benefits of tailoring rules to UK circumstances is that it helps to facilitate effective competition in markets we regulate. I see connections between that objective, which we already have, and our new competitiveness and growth objective. That’s because an efficient market is one that allocates resources to their best use, including by ensuring that there aren’t parts of the economy struggling to access finance that they should be able to secure. I don’t want to be too simplistic about it – but in general terms what is good for competition is broadly good for growth. [20] The importance of competition means that we need to act when rules that are proportionate for large firms are not proportionate for small ones. Doing so removes barriers to entry. That is why we have invested in the Strong and Simple project to create a simplified regime for small banks and building societies. Today we are publishing our first set of policy proposals for this simpler regime. These are set out in a Consultation Paper proposing simplifications to liquidity, reporting, and disclosure requirements for banks and building societies that are eligible for the simpler regime. [21] In addition, we are also publishing a Consultation Paper proposing simplifications to remuneration rules for smaller firms. [22] These are changes we could not have made whilst we were in the EU.

That, after all, is our job. We are getting on with it, and we look forward to being judged on our performance. This represents my personal views and not those of the Bank. Any errors are my own. Particular thanks for their contributions to the speech go to Austen Saunders, Faith Bannier, Max Weidlich and Michael Pinder. My thanks also to the following people for their input and comments: Ala Marar, Andrew Bailey, Andrew Bell, Anna Jernova, Ben Dubow, Ben Guerin, Bronagh Kealey, Charandeep Biling, Charlotte Gerken, David Bailey, Eleanor Beamond-Pepler, Gao Yu, Gareth Truran, George Speight, Harriet Gamper, Jon Newton, Jonathan Haynes, Julian Gray, Lanze Gardiner Vandvik, Mariana Gimpelewicz, Matthew Willison, Millie Rettie, Nick Lock, Nigel Fray, Olatunji Jayeola, Paul Hawkins, Phil Evans, Rebecca de Hoest, Renée Horrell, Robert Miller, Sadia Arif, Sarah Breeden, Sam Woods. 1. For a taxonomy of different definitions, see: Berger, Thomas (2008), ‘Concepts of National Competitiveness’, Journal of International Business and Economy, 9(1), pages 91-111. 2. For a comprehensive literature review, see: Levine, Ross (2021), ‘Finance, Growth, and Inequality’, IMF Working Paper No. 2021/164; and Popov, Alexander (2017), ‘Evidence on finance and economic growth’, ECB Working Paper 2115. 3. ‘Growth and competitiveness – speech by Sam Woods, Mansion House’, 27 October 2022. 4. The MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) and FPC (Financial Policy Committee) have already important secondary objectives in relation to economic growth and the Bank of England as a Financial Market Infrastructure regulator is likely to acquire a new secondary objective in relation to innovation.
In other words, central bankers seemed not to believe research results suggesting that the welfare benefits of macroeconomic stabilisation were small. 14 Caring passionately about the benefits of price stability is part of what makes us – a bunch of “conservative central bankers” 15 – suitable for the job. Environmental conditions for independence: institutions One might think that would be it; that independence would follow from a consensus being established around those ideas and values. Not at all, and for good reasons in the UK context. I recall 16 various arguments being advanced through the 1980s and into the 1990s against independence for the Bank. Mostly, they had their roots in the Bank comprising unelected officials, without a democratically elected minister as its head. Thus, the then Governor was told in the very early 1990s that if the Bank ever combined responsibility for bank supervision with monetary policy it would be “an overmighty citizen”. More important, a number of commentators argued that it was a real obstacle to independence that  12  O. Blanchard and S. Fisher in “Lectures on Macroeconomics”, MIT Press 1989, state that “money is said to be neutral if changes in the level of nominal money have no effect on the real equilibrium. It is said to be superneutral if changes in money growth have no effect on the real equilibrium.” (note 8, page 207).

My reluctance to go down that route stems from a concern that we would slip towards a degree of individualism where members were no longer listening to each other. It would not be possible for members to polish their statements after the meeting, as they would then be able to tweak their text, ever so slightly of course, in the light of the market reaction to our decision and so on. So highly polished statements would be brought to the meeting, with perhaps even a degree of competition in the depth of the analysis or the beauty of the prose. But the very point of a committee is that we 26 should listen to each other, and then make up our own minds. That includes trying to persuade one’s  unexpired parts of the terms of existing Committee members, but do not include the terms of Howard Davies and David Walton. 25  For example, Weber, A., 2007, “Monetary policy strategy and communication”, speech at the Deutsche Bundesbank/Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland conference on “Monetary policy strategy: old issues and new challenges”, Frankfurt, May 2007. 26  See section on “Does discussion help?” in Lombardelli, Proudman and Talbot, op. cit., page 199. 6  BIS Review 66/2007  colleagues. Over the years, 27 I have definitely seen occasions where individual members have altered their position during the course of a meeting.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Table 2: Size of central bank balance sheets UK  US  Japan  Euro area  Mar 2013 (% nominal GDP)  26  19  34  31  Increase since Dec 2007 (pp of nominal GDP)  20  12  13  18  Sources: Datastream, Bank of Japan. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Two factors are behind this development: the sharp appreciation of the Swiss franc following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange  2  4  According to World Bank data, the Swiss economy ranked 20th out of 194 countries in 2014. Switzerland’s export intensity is significantly above the OECD average. BIS central bankers’ speeches  rate and the pronounced fall in oil prices last year. These factors are transitory, and as such do not pose a threat to price stability over time in Switzerland. Exchange rate appreciation and the energy price decline are the results of international spillovers that affect consumer prices primarily by lowering import price inflation. 3 Chart 8 shows that most of the downward pressure on Swiss inflation is attributable to these international spillovers. However, as can be seen in the chart, domestic price components have shifted down as well. This harks back to the flexibility of Swiss companies, which I referred to earlier. In particular, those Swiss companies that compete in markets for imported goods have lowered their prices in order to maintain competitiveness in the wake of the exchange rate appreciation. Such price cuts play an important role in restoring the Swiss economy’s price competitiveness over the medium term. They are thus part of the adjustment process in response to the sudden exchange rate appreciation. That such a process can be painful for some of the companies directly involved goes without saying. For this year, we expect consumer price inflation to average about –1.2%.
The petroleum sector employs only a small part of the total labour force, but brings in substantial revenues. A main question for Norwegian economic policy is therefore how to stabilise the Norwegian economy in the face of high, fluctuating revenues from the petroleum sector. 3. The importance of the petroleum sector  Some figures will illustrate the importance of the petroleum sector in the Norwegian economy. Oil production started in the 1970s and has gradually increased. Given the current estimates for existing resources, production is expected to be at its maximum level between the years 2000 and 2010, and then decrease gradually as the remaining resources are reduced. The level of future oil production is highly uncertain. Employment in the petroleum sector and related industries is only around 4% of total employment. Investment in the petroleum sector has been substantial compared to investment in the rest of the economy, and as a share of GDP. Investment has an import share of about 1/3, which means that investment relating to the petroleum sector has had a substantial effect on industries in mainland Norway. The income from petroleum extraction is of substantial significance to the Norwegian economy and to the public sector in particular. In the 1990s the export value of oil has been around 1/3 of total exports excluding ships and oil rigs. The petroleum sector is an important source of revenues for the government, both through taxes and through direct government ownership. 1  BIS Review 121/1999  Petroleum production. In mill. Sm3 o.e.

These three sources of risk call for different policy actions. The first approach for dealing with asset price misalignments is for authorities to communicate their views on the extent of potential asset price distortions and their consequences for financial stability. These “verbal interventions” are relatively common regarding the exchange rate. I see no reason why we should not use them also for other assets such as bonds and equity, since they are relevant variables from the point of view of macroeconomic and financial stability. Indeed, recent experience has shown that central banks need to be more assertive and communicative about the conduct of financial systems. In our last Financial Stability Report we indicated that evidence pointed to some overvaluation of stock prices in Chile, but we also indicated that financial stability was not threatened by potential corrections, even sharp corrections, in these prices. Of course, making this assessment is not a trivial task – as modeling asset prices is complex – and it is not the role of central banks to communicate continuous assessments of asset prices. For this reason, this kind of communication must be done exceptionally, and in the context of discussing the potential implications of these price developments on current and future  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  financial stability. In addition, communication must be done in a timely manner, before vulnerabilities build up.
In April 2020, as the global economy was still reckoning with the many consequences of  Page 5  prolonged lockdowns, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil future contracts close to their expiry date went from positive to negative – people were willing to pay for you to take oil off their hands. Last year, in February 2021, the Great Texas Freeze hit as a result of several severe winter storms; we saw the coldest weather there for generations. This overwhelmed much of the state’s power infrastructure, leading to extraordinary spikes in natural gas and electricity prices – multiplied several hundred times in some markets. Earlier in March this year, the 3-month Nickel contract price rose $ per tonne in two days, and then rose a further $ per tonne in overnight trading, prompting the London Metal Exchange to suspend trading in nickel futures and cancel the overnight trades. These are absolutely extraordinary price moves – the previous historical record two-day increase was $ per tonne (September 2007). There are numerous lessons to be learned from this incident and we have announced an independent review into LME Clear’s governance and risk management framework. [9] CCP’s models and regulation are designed based on history. Initial margin covers price moves with at least 99 percent confidence. CCPs design stress scenarios to prepare for extreme but plausible events. We need more work on what to do about the implausible. [10]  (3) Ignore structural factors at your peril A basic lesson in science and ecology is that population structures matter.

During this period, the Albanian banking sector continued to increase its lending to the economy, albeit at lower paces. Difficulties added to the real sector of the economy and the exchange rate depreciation by about 12% in 2009 were followed by decreased credit quality and increased bank provisions to face the credit risk. Distinguished participants, The pre-crisis phenomena and those that occurred in 2008–2010, offer a valuable experience to economic actors and public authorities of each country in our region. Not to mention all, I would like to dwell only on some of them, which I consider important for enhancing the sustainability of our economy and of the financial system in the future. First, the region needs a better balance in the factors supporting the sustainable economic growth. I think that the public authorities should assign priority to increase in investments and implementation of stimulus policies for developing the competitive sectors. In this way, the country’s export capacity would grow by creating better conditions for a sustainable improvement of the external balance of our economy. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second, closely related to the first issue, I would highlight the need for undertaking and deepening the structural reforms. This strategic objective remains a constant priority for each of our economy.