samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As you can see, exchange rate movements are the main cause of changes in our foreign exchange reserves. Returns in local currency play only a secondary role. As I pointed out earlier, diversification is the only way for the SNB to mitigate the impact of foreign exchange fluctuations. Hedging would mean diluting the effectiveness of monetary policy, because purchasing protection against exchange rate movements would effectively cancel out the impact of monetary policy on the Swiss franc exchange rate. The challenges ahead To finish, I would now like talk about some of the challenges the SNB is always faced with in the management of foreign exchange reserves. First challenge: Ensuring that our resources, methods and structures guarantee the effective management of our portfolio. I have already emphasised that the complexity and risk associated with the management of our investments have recently increased significantly. This has required a corresponding increase in our management team headcount. I am confident that we now have enough staff for both the Asset Management and the Risk Management units to meet the challenge. We are also prepared to continue developing our structures should the need arise. As regards governance, we have ensured a strict separation between asset management and risk management, by transferring the Risk Management unit to another department of the SNB. Our asset managers’ performance is constantly benchmarked against the relevant markets. For some portfolios, performance is also benchmarked against that of our external asset managers. Second challenge: Achieving optimal portfolio diversification.

The Asset Management unit then implements this strategy, monitored by the Risk Management unit. Risk Management is also tasked with reporting regularly to the Governing Board and the Bank  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Council, which oversees the entire process. This multiplicity of players involved in foreign exchange reserve management, as well as the division of responsibilities, enable conflicts of interest to be reduced as far as possible, and allow effective control of the actual management of reserves. How do these guidelines translate into foreign exchange reserve allocation in practice? Last week, we published the data on the allocation of our foreign exchange reserves for the third quarter of 2012. I would like to take you through those data, and highlight the main areas which may have given rise to discussion. This is the breakdown of foreign exchange reserves by currency (cf. slide 3). As you can see, the euro is our principal investment currency, and its share in our investments has remained largely unchanged for the past number of years. If we take quarterly data as a basis, we can see that this share has fluctuated between 45% and 65%. These fluctuations come about because of the time it takes us to reallocate our portfolio following large inflows of new foreign exchange reserves. These amounts are then gradually diversified across other currencies in order to restore the original allocation.
However, the group chaired by Governor Liikanen has come out with the simplest proposal. The second element of the reform of the regulatory framework is that of macroprudential supervision. While microprudential supervision concerns itself with individually considered financial institutions, macroprudential supervision contributes to financial stability by identifying, monitoring and mitigating the risks that may affect the financial system as a whole. While such a concept may not be entirely novel, this crisis has underlined the absence of macroprudential authorities with well-defined mandates in this field and clearly defined intervention instruments. The main advanced economies have set up macroprudential authorities such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the United States and, in the United Kingdom, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee. I would just mention that at the Banco de España, too, we have begun work to accommodate our organisational structures to the needs of the macroprudential approach. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

The decline in oil prices partly reflects large oil supply surpluses and lower demand for oil in China and other emerging economies experiencing weaker growth. The effects of the fall in oil prices on the Norwegian economy gradually became evident through 2015 and were particularly pronounced in regions and sectors closely linked to the oil industry. Chart: Petroleum investment The most direct channel through which the fall in oil prices is transmitted to the economy is via the supply of intermediate goods and services to the petroleum industry. Oil companies have postponed or cancelled a number of development projects on the Norwegian continental shelf as a result of the decline in oil prices and have implemented a range of measures to reduce operating and maintenance costs. Total petroleum investment fell by 15 percent between 2014 and 2015. At the same time, lower demand from the global petroleum industry has led to a decline in Norwegian oil service exports. The decrease in activity in the oil industry is having spillover effects on the wider mainland economy. The effects are most pronounced in industries providing goods and services directly to oil companies, but are also clearly evident in a number of other industries. Mainland business investment also showed a fall in 2015, driven by a weaker growth outlook and uncertainty surrounding economic developments. Growth in household consumption has nonetheless remained fairly firm. House prices and housing investment have continued to rise, although the fall in oil prices has had a dampening effect in some areas of the country.
European governments have begun to take steps towards fiscal consolidation, and must convince markets that these steps are credible. Unfortunately, the private sector is not ready to take over the slack in public demand. Private sector debt-to-GDP ratios exceed 250% in the G3 economies. In the United States, where the household debt-to-disposable income ratio reached an unprecedented 135% in 2008, deleveraging is already underway with the recovery in private consumption well below historical rebounds. While Eurozone households are less leveraged than US households, disposable income is likely to grow more slowly in the Eurozone and hence be a bigger drag on consumption. A third source of deleveraging is the banking system. Banks in the Eurozone have to strengthen their capital adequacy position to meet new regulatory requirements as well as buffer against potential losses on their sovereign debt holdings. With uncertain prospects for raising fresh capital in equity markets and facing funding shortages in wholesale markets, some of them are looking to scale back their risk-weighted assets. The resultant crunch in credit could further exacerbate the slowdown in the economy. With governments, households, and banks all having to deleverage at the same time, we are looking at a prolonged period of sub-par growth in the advanced economies. In many advanced countries, debt-to-GDP ratios are not expected to stabilise until 2015 to 2020. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Asia: neither decoupled nor derailed What does deleveraging in the G3 mean for Asia? Asia is not immune to developments in America or Europe.

This challenge is not unique to Sri Lanka, but common to all countries which have opted to comply with Basel II requirements. To address this issue, banks in other countries have created a dedicated post in their institutions, i.e. Chief Risk Manager, who will not only look into the risks in the bank’s own portfolios, but also to the clients’ portfolios. The job of the Chief Risk Manager is to identify, evaluate risks and make recommendations to set out appropriate processes in managing the relevant risks. The processes should be acceptable to the senior management and the boards of the banks and also to the external auditors and the regulators. II. Appropriate risk evaluation techniques  Application of appropriate techniques for risk evaluation is an implementation issue. This is where the modeling comes into play. Modeling is used as a popular technique for identifying, quantifying and analyzing risks to enable the management of banking and financial institutions to decide on the allocation of capital. But one need not entirely depend on modeling and be out of reality as modeling will produce a statistical outcome depending on the data you feed into a set of equations or a simulation model. Modeling also involves issues such as focus on loss data, validation, calibration and issues on floors and ceilings. A practical issue on loss data is a different reporting system by banks, especially when it comes to large losses. Secondly, some institutions may not reveal large losses at all, but there are implications for operational risks. III.
Second, the Anglo-Saxon model, prevailing in the United Kingdom and Ireland: in this model, the welfare system provides a relatively limited safety net of social protection. Employment protection legislation is rather weak, recipients of benefits have to be actively searching for employment and flexibility in labour markets is considerable. Unionisation is low and there is a rather large dispersion in wages between very low pay and very high salaries. Overall, this model has a good record of generating growth and employment, but does not appear as equitable as other models. Third, in Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria, the Continental model prevails. Here, the welfare state essentially consists of insurance-based unemployment benefit and pensions systems, meaning transfers are seen as unconditional entitlements, which influence the propensity to actively seek work. Trade unions, despite a general weakening over the past years, are still influential, and income disparity is relatively low. The Continental model seems to insure people relatively well against poverty but it may do so with less efficiency and unsustainably: low levels of labour utilisation (in terms of the number of people employed and hours worked) and a relatively large public sector have put pressure on public finances. Fourth, the Mediterranean model, which can be identified in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Strict employment protection legislation and early retirement schemes keep employment levels below those of other models, because insiders are protected and incentives to take up work are not adequate.

In view of the harmful long-term effects of expansionary and stop-and-go fiscal policies, the degree of discretion of fiscal policy-makers had to be limited and clear yardsticks for responsible policy choices had to be provided (see Lucas, 1980). Europe’s solution was the Stability and Growth Pact, a rules-based fiscal policy framework binding all Member States and which is essential for the orientation and coordination of national fiscal policies towards sound and sustainable public finances. However, the notion of “the law as the guardian of economic wisdom” (Herdegen, 1998) is widespread: the fiscal responsibility laws in New Zealand, the constitutional obligations to produce balanced budgets in all US Federal States (except Vermont), or the “Golden Rule” of the German Basic Law which prohibits the government from borrowing more than it spends on investment, are all based on this reasoning. It is the same reasoning that led Odysseus to have himself tied to the mast of his ship in order to achieve his long-term primary objective to return home and effectively avoid the temptations of the sirens songs and the potential short-term benefits but also long-term risks they entailed. VII. Concluding remarks  I have covered a lot of ground and I should not further test your patience. But the topic of my presentation involved a variety of issues and policy dimensions. The relationships between economic performance, market structures, economic institutions and social values are complex and characterised by a multitude of direct and indirect interlinkages.
The key question is whether the international banks’ review of lending commitments will be extended to include other groups of customers. Perhaps their lending policies will become generally more restrictive. One sign of this is that the flow of loans to many countries which are regarded as emerging markets has virtually dried up. The interest rate differential between treasury securities issued by such countries and by the US, for instance, has widened dramatically this autumn. In turbulent times, moreover, banks have difficulty in fulfilling their function, which is highly important in a market system, of distinguishing sound borrowers from others. The result may be that their provision of credit is completely suspended. It is already evident that in their assessments, various players are tending to disregard more fundamental factors. An example of this is the weakening of the krona. Despite good economic fundamentals in Sweden, since the summer the krona has weakened sharply and last week this tendency accelerated. In a matter of days the exchange rate with the German mark declined by up to 5 per cent. In that situation the Riksbank decided to intervene in the foreign exchange market, which nowadays is unusual. We did so to demonstrate that we considered the krona’s fall was excessive in relation to the fundamental state of the economy and that the time had to come to pause and reconsider the situation.

Instances of “follow-the-leader” behaviour occur not just in bullish stockmarkets but also in the currency market when many countries with different conditions are lumped together in a general assessment. Market players must assess each country separately. Central bank interventions under certain circumstances are uncommon with a flexible exchange rate regime but they do occur. I cannot exclude the possibility of the Riksbank intervening again if this were to be called for. Growth in the industrialised countries may thus be affected by the real economic crisis which has hit the emerging markets and resulted in a sharp fall in output there. The magnitude of such an effect will be highly dependent on confidence - confidence among households and firms so that they are prone to consume and invest, confidence among banks so that they are prone to provide credit. The Riksbank’s appraisal In the Riksbank’s most recent Inflation Report we counted on an OECD area growth rate of around 2 per cent in the years ahead. It should be borne in mind that this figure represented the latest in a series of downward revisions over the past twelve months. Since the publication of the September Report, our assessment of tendencies in the rest of the world has not changed. Considering the mechanisms to which I have just referred, however, it is not surprising that our Report highlighted the risks associated with the external situation. This situation is unusually difficult to evaluate and has to be followed closely.
Caleb M Fundanga: The role of the banking sector in combating money laundering A paper presented by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at a seminar organised by the C and N Centre for Advanced International Studies, Lusaka, Zambia, 23 January 2003. *  *  *  Mr Chairman Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen Allow me first of all to thank you for inviting me to address you on this topic of great importance to the development of our financial system in Zambia – “the role of the banking sector in combating money laundering”. I have every reason to believe that your training in the last couple of days has provided an opportunity for you to share with the resource persons valuable insights on the subjects you have covered. Mr Chairman, the scourge of money laundering is not new to mankind. Despite money laundering being topical in policy discussions nowadays and on the minds of supervisors and regulators like the Bank of Zambia, the scourge itself has a long history and could be as old as the history of organised trade. Nonetheless, in spite of the fundamentals of the crime remaining, largely, the same as in the olden days, recent advances in technology and globalisation have offered and will continue to offer more sophisticated means to convert ill-gotten proceeds into legally acceptable financial assets. In recent times, money laundering has grown into real big business.

Ladies and gentlemen, As you know, financial inclusion has become an important factor in economic efficiency and social equity, and international organizations have, for nearly a decade, underlined its importance and the need for public authorities to adopt national strategies for financial inclusion. The World Bank considers financial inclusion as a key factor for poverty alleviation and has set itself the goal of achieving universal access to 2  financial services by 2020. Under this framework, it targets 25 priority countries, including Morocco. To this end, it launched in 2012 the Financial Inclusion Support Framework (FISF), aligned with the Maya Declaration, to support the implementation of country commitments. For its part, the G20 has made financial inclusion one of its working themes, and in 2009 established an expert group who drew up the nine Core Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion. In 2010, the G20 launched the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, including all G20 countries and interested non-G20 countries. This partnership helps strengthen coordination and collaboration between the various national and international stakeholders through its three key Implementing Partners: the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Certainly, all these organizations, to name but a few, and policy-makers are aware of the increasingly critical role of data and its impact on the efficiency of the decision-making process, from the design phase to monitoring and evaluation.
Margarita Delgado: Transparency in the banking sector Speech by Ms Margarita Delgado, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Banking Law Conference, organized by the Malaga Lawyers’ Association, 4 June 2021. * * * I should like to thank the Málaga Lawyers’ Association for their kind invitation to close this conference on banking transparency. I think this is the first time since March last year that I have set foot out of Madrid to attend an event. And I must admit that leaving my office for Málaga added allure to the invitation. The subject chosen for this conference is highly topical and relevant. Transparency is certainly needed for there to be effective competition between banks, and it is a central feature of the framework of conduct that should govern the relationship between banks and their customers. Clearly, too, banks’ massive dealings and business formalised through standard form contracts call for legal certainty to be ensured. Further, the necessary standardisation and speed of dealings must always be compatible with maintaining a high degree of protection for the end-customer, especially where individuals are concerned. Regulatory developments It may seem to us that transparency obligations go hand-in-hand with banking business. But the reality is that such obligations were introduced little more than three decades ago. Not so far back, a controlled system of fees and interest rates was in force. The 1946 Banking Act delegated the setting of bank charges to the Finance Ministry. This remained the case until charges were partially liberalised in 1981.

And it is founded on the belief that we can have a far greater impact by coming together, than we could acting alone. This is embodied in the National Strategy for Financial Literacy 2019 – 2023 which is a product of FEN. The National Strategy is centred around five Strategic Priorities that serve to anchor initiatives by FEN members to enhance the financial capability of Malaysians, thereby encouraging alignment and creating synergies. So what are these Strategic Priorities? First, nurturing values from young; Second, increasing access to financial management information, tools and resources; Third, inculcating positive behaviour among targeted groups, including the youth, selfemployed and those entering the workforce; Fourth, boosting long term financial and retirement planning; and Fifth, building and safeguarding wealth. Since the launch of the National Strategy in July 2019, FEN members and partners, working in collaboration with the government, business community and education sectors have undertaken over 400 education programmes and initiatives, covering a wide and diverse spectrum of the public that saw more than 47 million interactions with FEN’s various outreach programmes. A key achievement by FEN members working collaboratively has been the integration of financial education elements into all levels of the formal school curriculum, from pre-school right up to upper secondary levels. Financial education modules have also been introduced as electives in college programmes.
6 I would also like to mention that the deposit guarantee, which is managed by the Swedish National Debt Office,  is also important in avoiding bank runs. 7 See, for instance, Söderberg (2018). 4 [35]  One can say that the Riksbank functions as the hub of the Swedish financial system. We can also note that the financial system that has grown up around the world is based on countries or currency areas having state money and state control over the payment system. Quite simply, state institutions are needed to guarantee that the requirements in these points are met. 8  Payment markets are changing – motives for an e-krona Almost all economic activity is linked to some form of payment, so without functioning payment systems the economy would grind to a halt. It is therefore important that the central banks adapt to the technical innovations that are now rapidly changing the payment market. There must be transactional efficiency in Swedish and by that I mean that they should be cheap and easy to use for both domestic and international payments. This is also what households, quite rightly, expect in today’s digital society. By keeping apace with technological developments, we ensure that the safety net I mentioned earlier, which preserves the value of money and ensures it is easy and cheap to use, remains in place.

In other words, we are facing a gap between food demand and food supply. Prices have to adjust to restore equilibrium. Since the price elasticity of food demand is low as compared to,  2  BIS Review 109/2008  say, durable goods, there needs to be a drastic rise in food prices, which is what we are facing today. Dear Guests, Until recently, the common view among central banks of developed countries was to give priority to problems in financial markets, ignoring the signs of inflationary pressures. Certainly, there are structural reasons behind the recent run-up in food and energy prices, as I have just briefly discussed. However, it is also undeniable that there are significant demand-driven pressures over commodities. Loose monetary policies adopted at the turn of the century certainly played a key role, together with excess liquidity in the financial system. Fast-forwarding to the recent period, the central banks of developed countries still keep real interest rates negative in the face of financial risks may hamper a correction in commodity prices. The commonly accepted practice in inflation targeting regime is that monetary policy should not react to supply-driven shocks that are temporary in nature and should allow temporary increases in inflation in the short-term, unless they create deterioration in inflation expectations. Otherwise, undesired fluctuations might arise in economic activity and relative prices. The increase in commodity prices would trigger a self-correcting mechanism. By changing the relative prices, it would provide valuable information on how the resources of the economy should be distributed.