samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Another recent factor that has served to ease inflationary pressures is that rapid growth in national expenditure  BIS Review 18/2004  5  has primarily been channelled into increased imports. It has therefore exerted less pressure on domestic factors of production than otherwise, but is reflected in a widening current account deficit, as I have discussed. In the long run, an excessive current account deficit could undermine the exchange rate and fuel inflation, although this does not appear to be much of a threat within the horizon of the latest forecast. The Bank’s macroeconomic forecast now assumes that the Norðurál aluminium smelter expansion will go ahead, which raises projected output growth to 3½% in 2004 and 4½% in 2005. The appreciation of the króna, strong increase in productivity in 2003 and large share of foreign labour employed on hydropower and aluminium projects will result in less pressure on domestic factors of production and prices than would otherwise be the case. As I mentioned earlier, it is likely that some of the appreciation of the króna in the first half of last year was connected with planned investments in aluminium and hydropower projects. Had these plans not materialised, it is almost certain that the Central Bank’s policy rate would be lower today. Due to the strengthening of the króna in 2003 and the proposed tightening of the fiscal stance implied by the budget for this year, the Central Bank’s policy interest rate has remained unchanged since February last year.

Thailand’s better performance this year, notwithstanding a lackluster global economy, has been supported by the strong momentum in both domestic demand and exports. Front-loaded fiscal measure sparked up the initial momentum in domestic demand, while private consumption and investment are now adding firmly to the growth process. As the regional economies began to recover in the last five months, export growth has also provided an additional impetus to the recovery. Along with this recovery, inflation remains subdued, credit growth has turned positive, and business profits are improving, encouraging firms to expand their capacities through new investment. These broad movements are indicative of a positive dynamic linked to the current recovery. The most significant improvement since the crisis, however, has been the strengthening of external stability. Continued current account surpluses have allowed external debt to run down in concomitant with a build-up of international reserves. The coverage ratio of reserve to short-term debt has risen to 290% in July 2002, four times the ratio at the end of 1997. Ladies and Gentlemen, Although I share the view that the worst may now be behind us, I believe Thailand still has some way to go. The key question is how can we make it last, especially now that the global economic recovery  BIS Review 62/2002  1  may be somewhat slower than earlier anticipated? The answer to this question probably lies in the answers to yet another important question: what have we learnt from the recent crisis?
In addition, the level of non-performing loans has been on the high side, and certainly higher than the EU average, even though it has recently started to decline. Here I should perhaps point out that in Malta we adopt a relatively conservative definition of non-performing loans. The expanded economic role of the banks has been accompanied by significant progress in creating an independent and effective regulatory framework in line with international standards. In 2002 the Malta Financial Services Centre was renamed the Malta Financial Services Authority, and took over from the Central bank the responsibility for supervising the banks and the Malta Stock Exchange to become the single supervisory and regulatory body. The division of responsibilities between the Authority and the Bank requires effective cooperation, and for this purpose a Memorandum of Understanding has been signed. At the same time, the Central Bank was given formal independence in the conduct of monetary policy, in overseeing payment systems and in safeguarding the overall stability of the financial system. The Bank uses a number of approaches to identify possible threats to the system. It analyses data from prudential returns submitted by the banks and other financial institutions. This, coupled with further analysis of the corporate sector in terms of leverage, profitability and liquidity, complements the monitoring of credit risk within the banking system. Stress testing is also carried out in order to identify potential losses resulting from abnormal market conditions.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Focus on human capital development in Malaysia Welcoming remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the INCEIF Strategic Partnership 2006, Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2006. *  *  *  Yang Berhormat, Dato' Mustapa Mohamed, Minister of Higher Education, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great pleasure and honour to welcome you to INCEIF Strategic Partnership in conjunction with the signing of Memorandum of Understanding between INCEIF and nine institutions of higher learning in Malaysia. This occasion is of particular significance as, on this day, with the grace of Allah, we are laying the foundation for the promotion of collaborative efforts in human capital development which will benefit the Islamic financial services industry. Against an environment of a rapidly evolving Islamic financial industry and the growing significance of Islamic financial institutions globally, human intellectual capital has become the defining factor in sustaining the performance and competitiveness of the Islamic financial industry. Indeed, the fast pace of innovation in global financial services in general and in the Islamic financial services sector in particular, demands new expertise and skills. In this environment, the creation of a substantial pool of talent is indispensable for the future growth of Islamic finance. In this regard, Malaysia has placed strong focus on human capital development through training and education.
Another and perhaps even greater problem is that this type of fiscal policy has historically tended to be used too generously and has therefore caused problems with the sustainability of public finances. 19 But there may be reasons to consider that the conditions today are somewhat different than they were a couple of decades ago. As I pointed out, one new circumstance is that central banks now have greater difficulty counteracting economic downturns by cutting the policy rate, because of the lower bound. Another change, especially in Sweden, is that public finances are now in much better condition than they were before. The fiscal policy regulations introduced after the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s have contributed, together with good growth, to the Swedish gross public debt declining from between 70 and 80 per cent of GDP in the mid-1990s to around 40 per cent today. Thus, the prospects for using fiscal policy to counteract an economic downturn are much better nowadays. However, it is not obvious what forms this would take. In the United Kingdom, it has been proposed that the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee should indicate when it is prevented by the lower bound from stimulating the economy as much as it considers appropriate. 20 It is proposed that in these situations the committee should state how much it would have wanted to cut the policy rate. The United Kingdom's Treasury are then invited to implement a fiscal policy measure of its choice as a replacement for the rate cut.

Developments in price level and inflation with a price level target and inflation target Price level  114  Price level target Price level with price level target  114  114  Price level  114  Price level target Price level with inflation target  112  112  112  110  110  110  110  108  108  108  108  106  106  106  106  104  104  104  104  102  102  102  102  100  100  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  112  100  0  12  24  36  48  60  Inflation  4  1  0  Inflation target Inflation with price level target 0  12  24  36  48  60  0  0  0  12  24  36  48  60  Inflation  100  4  1 Inflation target Inflation with inflation target 0  12  24  36  48  60  0  Note. Constructed example. Vertical axis measures index value (price level) and per cent (inflation). Horizontal axis measures number of months. Source: Andersson, B. and C. A. Claussen (2017), “Alternatives to inflation targeting”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 2017:1  Figure 8.
We look at how much consumers are borrowing, what they are borrowing for and if they are experiencing difficulties in making their payments. As I mentioned earlier, we are always eager to engage with students, and our commitment to the region includes a number of educational programs worth highlighting. First, Math x Economics, which encourages students attending schools serving lower-income families to consider a career in finance or economics. And, second, our yearly Fed Challenge competitions, in which teams of students from high schools and colleges in the District take on the roles of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and debate what the appropriate next step is for U.S. monetary policy. All in all, there is a lot to keep myself and my colleagues fully engaged with the communities we represent. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Let me now review recent developments in the national and regional economy, and at the end of my talk, I will be happy to answer questions you may have about the economic outlook. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee. National economic conditions Since the official end of the Great Recession more than five years ago, the U.S. economy has grown at a disappointing 2.2 percent compound annual rate. Several times over that period it looked as though growth was breaking out on the upside, but each time such hopes were dashed.

To harness the potential fully, genuine endeavours to develop and innovate Islamic financial instruments and activities that are able to fulfil the changing requirements of the economy and the emerging needs of the contemporary global marketplace need to be continuously pursued. Conferences such as this can contribute invaluable ideas to foster new initiatives towards the development of the Islamic financial system. With the acceleration of its global integration, it will provide the synergies and opportunities for the Islamic financial industry to evolve into an important component of the international financial system that can contribute to enhance prospects for balanced global growth and an enhanced shared prosperity. On that note, I wish you a successful Conference. Thank you. BIS Review 43/2003  3
The optimal mix depends on the level of development of the financial market, but a more active role has to be played by the authorities to achieve the public policy objectives of retail payment reforms. 4.3  Policy elements  4.3.1 Central banks to play a catalytic role: Central banks should be at the centre, take the leadership and coordinate the development process as other stakeholders tend to have vested interests. While it is important to enhance oversight and supervisory functions by the central banks and ensure that governance arrangements for infrastructure and service providers are in place, it is also necessary to ensure that such arrangements do not lead to unnecessary restrictions on competition and innovation. 4.3.2 Stakeholder participation: It is essential that central banks engage in effective participation and secure cooperation from all stakeholders in the payment systems, through establishing National Payment Councils (NPC) or National Payment Committees/Advisory Councils etc. India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and some others have already established NPCs and they are the highest level policy making authorities for development of national payment systems. Banks have a good opportunity to give their inputs at these meetings, especially on operational matters. 4.3.3 Declare public policy objectives of retail payment system development: The undeclared and unsaid public policy objectives have been a contributory factor for ad hoc retail payment system developments in the past.

Efforts are now being made by some countries such as the Philippines and Eastern European countries to involve governments in retail payment development by diverting revenue receipts from income tax, custom duties and other income sources through modern retail payment instruments. iv. Establish confidence in payments media: Either the service providers, the regulators or consumer protection authorities, or all of them jointly, should ensure that new products are safe and efficient and that they have public confidence in them. Pushing efficiency too far could adversely affect public confidence in payment instruments. For example, moving aggressively into credit cards, which are considered to be efficient and safe payment instruments, has also resulted in numerous frauds and risks, and this has begun to scare people. New technologies break physical distance barriers enabling efficient real time transactions, but the critical factor is network security, which should ensure access only to a person’s own funds. New delivery channels for retail payments such as the Internet, on-line personal payments, electronic bill presentments, telephone, e-cheques or e-invoices are becoming popular, although they do not always assure the same level of security as some of the other products. Tamperproof cards are generally considered to be safeguard against credit card frauds, but the relevant software appears to be expensive. Financial intermediaries are not keen to invest in such safeguards. Even if they do, they will pass on the costs to customers, which will defeat the affordability purpose.
Put simply, the mechanism according to which losses go into the profit and loss account applies to both the ECB and the national central banks. If a net loss remains even after taking into account all provisions and reserves, it could be recorded on the balance sheet as losses carried forward and be offset by any net income in the following years. It is important that it is understood from the principle of financial independence that a central bank needs to be adequately capitalised in the long term. But in no way does it follow from this that all losses carried forward would have to be offset immediately and in full by the capital holders or Member States. Conclusion To conclude, I would like to summarise my arguments. The announcement of OMTs was and is the necessary and appropriate step to eliminate the disruption in the transmission of monetary policy caused by concerns that there would be an unwanted break-up of the euro. The risks of not acting would have been greater. The ECB and its decision-makers are aware of the limits of its monetary policy mandate. Our measures are aimed at maintaining monetary policy transmission and preventing an unwanted break-up of the euro. It is not allowed to, is not able to and does not want to replace the actions of democratically elected governments. Quite the opposite. The OMT programme is therefore aimed at protecting the market mechanism so as to urge the Member States to make the necessary reforms.

Furthermore, the central banks of the Eurosystem observe the issuing behaviour of Member States, banks and market players for signs of collusion. If, for example, a country were to convert all its bond issues to a short maturity (of up to three years), we would react. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Possible consequences of the ECB’s measures for national budgets The rapporteur has also asked us to address the possible consequences of our measures for national budgets. Of course, conducting monetary policy will always be associated with risks. For this reason, central banks hold capital and set aside funds for provisions and reserves as a pre-caution. This adds to their financial independence. In view of the expansion in balance sheets in previous years and the added risks associated with this, the central banks of the Eurosystem have further strengthened their financial buffers. By the end of 2012, funds for provisions had increased to € billion and those for reserves to € billion. The Eurosystem is obliged to keep financial risks under control as best it can. The institutional framework for OMTs is therefore designed in such a way that risks for the Eurosystem are manageable and controllable, for example through the aforementioned orientation of the programme towards short-term maturities. The risks associated with OMTs would materialise only if a Member State operated un-sound policies and failed to service its debt.
I think it is the best plan for implementing Title II given the complexity and scope of large, global financial institutions and I also think it is well-suited to the U.S. bank holding company framework. By assigning losses to shareholders and unsecured creditors of the holding company and transferring sound operating subsidiaries to a new solvent entity, such a “top-down” resolution strategy will facilitate continuity for the critical services performed by the firm’s subsidiaries. This will reduce the costs associated with the failure of the parent company and reduce the degree of disruption to financial markets and financial stability. While the Title II single point of entry strategy holds tremendous promise, I think it is important not to declare victory prematurely. First, there are still significant issues about how the resolution of a large systemically complex firm would work in practice. Second, even assuming that our efforts to overcome these challenges are ultimately fully successful, resolution is still likely to represent a “second best” outcome compared to preventing a systemically important financial institution from failing in the first place. After first describing some of the current implementation challenges associated with Title II resolution, I will return to this second issue. Implementing the resolution regime on a cross-border basis remains one of the most significant challenges. U.S. authorities are working with authorities abroad on the issues that require international collaboration, but the financial industry also has a role to play in overcoming these challenges.

In addition, the central banks have, for example, taken steps to contribute liquidity to the financial system. The Riksbank will be presenting a new Inflation Report next week. As usual it will contain a main scenario and a spectrum of upside and downside risks. Considering the circumstances I have outlined earlier, the main scenario is inherently uncertain. The risk spectrum will therefore be particularly important to monitor in future as new information is obtained and events unfold. Which direction will cyclical activity take? How will the exchange rate develop? What are the underlying factors here? And how will inflation expectations move? These are critical questions for the Riksbank’s future action this autumn and winter. Unfortunately there are no clear answers. BIS Review 82/2001  5
In this context, it is important to recognise that balance sheet valuations and capital requirements play different roles in Solvency II and they are not substitutes for each other: The balance sheet valuation assesses whether the firm has sufficient assets to be able to meet the potential costs of transferring its business to a third party should the need arise. The Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) is intended to cover the impact of a 1 in 200 year stress on the balance sheet over the next year. The ability to transfer the business after a stress event provides a critical ‘bridge’ between the one-year Value at Risk methodology that underpins the SCR and the long-term risk profile of insurance business. Therefore, if Solvency II is truly to be a ‘going concern’ capital regime then it is essential that the calibration of the Fundamental Spread (FS) – the allowance for risks retained by firms in respect of their investments - be aligned with this. In particular the FS should sufficiently capture the retained risk for which a third party would seek compensation in any transfer price. Without this – the resilience of the Solvency II balance sheet is undermined and firms may struggle to de-risk in times of stress. The PRA is supportive of the MA as a concept that reflects the nature of the risks arising from a portfolio of well-matched, long-term illiquid assets and liabilities. However, it does not imply a departure from Solvency II’s near-term transfer value discipline.

More attention has been paid to the “time-series” dimension where there is now a clear international consensus among the members of the Financial Stability Forum and the Basel Committee that some form of counter-cyclical prudential supervision is required. The principle has been established. To correct these types of market failure will require a system of regulation that effectively marries the “top down” assessment of the risks to the system as a whole to the “bottom up” supervision of individual institutions. The present system has not delivered that. A lot of detailed work needs to be done to convert these general principles into concrete implementation. How would the interaction between the “cross-section” and “time-series” risks be taken into account? Would the framework take the form of an addition to capital requirements as a function of the degree of maturity mismatch, leverage or the rate at which the balance sheet was expanding? Or would there be a limit on leverage ratios? How would leverage and maturity mismatch embedded in the assets side of the balance sheet be taken into account? And how would the framework be implemented for banks whose assets and liabilities span jurisdictions? Can we define a group of institutions that are systemically significant? In the present crisis most institutions are deemed to be potentially systemic because of the impact of the failure of any of them on creditor confidence. If most banks appear systemic in a crisis won’t countries want to require foreign banks to be subsidiaries not branches?