samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Ladies and gentlemen, over the years, we have witnessed a process of change that has allowed many financial organisations worldwide to adopt more flexible structures whereby they have established a wide range of subsidiaries and affiliates that are engaged in business lines different from the core business of the parent financial institution. We have seen banking activities, asset management or insurance activities that previously were conducted on a stand-alone basis now being provided within one financial group. This trend  BIS Review 132/2009  1  has steadily gained momentum in the Eastern and Southern African financial sector. Some of these financial groups operate businesses across borders. The main economic and financial benefit which encourages the formation of such groups is the enhanced ability to achieve economies of scale and capture synergies across complementary financial services business lines. These synergies result in improved operational efficiency and effectiveness due to lower costs, reduced prices, and improved innovation in products and services. At the same time the emergence of such groups has brought complex linkages and relationships among economic agents. Consequently, they have also necessitated a paradigm shift in supervisory approaches in order to identify, manage and monitor risks. It is evident in our various jurisdictions that current legislation and regulatory tools are not adequate to effectively address the potential risks that threaten the safety and soundness of our respective financial sectors posed by activities emanating from such financial groups. Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not want to dwell much on what should be addressed by this seminar.

I am glad that MEFMI and the FSI are conducting this seminar on Consolidated Supervision for the region at a time that our region is also exploring these topical issues. It is my hope that this seminar will equip participants with relevant skills as senior examiners to develop appropriate policies for their jurisdictions with respect to Consolidated Supervision as well as prepare them for the daunting challenge of actually implementing Consolidated Supervision in our various jurisdictions. It is also my expectation that you will leave this forum after three days, with a new mindset and a renewed commitment to practice what you will have learned so that you could contribute to improving supervisory frameworks in our various countries. I trust that the seminar will also provide you with an opportunity to network and establish durable and valuable professional contacts within the region. I wish to take this opportunity, on behalf of the MEFMI board and indeed on my own behalf, to thank the FSI for their continued support to MEFMI activities over the years. As our cooperating partners, they have always shown willingness to go an extra mile in providing the necessary expertise that helps to sharpen our skills and groom the MEFMI Fellows on gratis terms. I have looked at the programme planned over the next three days. It has a comprehensive list of topics, which I believe will enable you to broaden and deepen your knowledge and skills.
This is best illustrated by considering the relationship between macroprudential policy and monetary policy. Monetary policy instruments can affect financial stability Monetary policy instruments can have an effect on financial stability. Recently, it has been proposed that monetary policy can affect the build-up of risk in the financial system through the “risk-taking channel”, an independent and previously unrecognised part of the transmission mechanism. 8 There are a number of ways in which (loose) monetary policy is said to encourage risk-taking. Low interest rates can encourage investors to substitute lowyielding, safe assets for higher yielding, riskier assets – the “search for yield”. Investors (such as pension funds) may make this substitution in the hope of attaining returns that match their commitments. 8  The concept of a risk-taking channel was introduced by Claudio Borio and Haibin Zhu in “Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: a missing link in the transmission mechanism?” BIS Working Paper No.268, 2008. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Alternatively, investors may be encouraged to take greater risks if they perceive that monetary policy is being used asymmetrically – that is, that the policy rate is reduced aggressively in the event of a sharp fall in asset prices but the policy rate is not used to address sharp increases in asset prices. Another, more indirect channel, is formed by a feedback loop that amplifies asset price increases and causes banks to increase their holdings of risky assets.

This may be more difficult to achieve for international tools that require agreement between multiple national policy makers. Macroprudential policy needs to be operational soon It is therefore clear that vulnerabilities are emerging as countries recover from the crisis and it is important that national authorities are soon able to implement macroprudential policies to address those risks. Leading the development of formalised macroprudential policy arrangements are the European Systemic Risk Board, which will hold its inaugural meeting in just two days, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US, which held its first meeting in October 2010. But many other countries are thinking seriously about how to implement and conduct macroprudential policy in their jurisdictions. Governance arrangements for macroprudential policy A vital aspect of the macroprudential policy framework will be the design of the governance arrangements. They will determine how the different elements of the framework are brought together and will influence how macroprudential policy interacts with other policy areas. Governance arrangements should be effective in three broad areas; they must ensure that the macroprudential decision-maker (the “macroprudential agency”) has: (i) a clear mandate;  managed to avoid the fiscal consolidation currently seen in many other EU countries. One reason for Sweden’s robust public finances is that it had to implement a programme of fiscal consolidation in the mid1990s, following the Swedish banking crisis.
But even if we don't have enough experience or enough distance from the crisis to resolve these questions definitively, we know a lot more about these questions than we did a decade ago. I want to talk about two dimensions of this broad policy debate. How much progress has been made toward addressing the factors that made emerging market economies so vulnerable to crises in the past? What are the most important policy challenges ahead for those governments? These are my personal views. I should start by noting that your view on what constitutes progress is naturally shaped by your view of the factors that rendered emerging economies most vulnerable to crisis in the first place. While no broad characterization can do justice to the different conditions at play, I believe the available evidence supports the view that the crises were generally most acute where there was a large buildup in short-term external debt, encouraged by the presence a fixed exchange rate regime and perverse incentives in the capital account, tax, or supervisory regimes. In most cases, these balance sheet weaknesses left the economies concerned acutely vulnerable to adverse shifts in confidence and the inevitable break in exchange rate regimes, with little flexibility for macroeconomic policy to cushion the damage. As domestic and foreign investors rushed to reduce exposure to the country, the exchange rate fell further, increasing losses for the banks and corporations that had borrowed in dollars and magnifying fear of default.

Fiscal balances have improved, with the median deficit the lowest it has been in three decades, and the high public debt countries are running primary surpluses large enough to stabilize if not reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. Exchange rate regimes are more flexible, removing the implicit guarantee in a fixed regime and providing greater independence for monetary policy. Monetary policy frameworks have matured, with greater institutional independence for central banks. Better monetary policy, along with improvements in fiscal balances, have helped to bring about a dramatic reduction in inflation and the volatility of inflation rates in emerging economies. It is hard to look at this record and find support for the argument that the financial resources deployed by the IMF and the major economies in the crises produced a damaging degree of moral hazard moral hazard in the form either of governments more prone to profligacy or investors prone to excess risk-taking in lending to banks and sovereign in emerging markets because of the expectation of financial resources from the IMF. Of course, those interventions must have produced some increase in moral hazard, but the effect on incentives does not seem to have been powerful relative to the countervailing effect of the economic and financial losses incurred in the crises. These changes in policies, and the reduction in external vulnerability that they have brought about, make it less likely that financial market shocks will trigger the types of acute, broad-based crises we saw in the late 1990s.
Per Jansson: Perspectives on the Riksbank’s monetary policy Speech by Mr Per Jansson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Centre for Business and Policy Studies, Stockholm, 7 June 2013. * * * Nowadays one can hardly open a newspaper without seeing headlines about the Riksbank. Many have opinions about the monetary policy we have conducted in recent years, and the one we are conducting now. The opinions differ in nature. The Riksbank has conducted the monetary policy we consider best balanced to attain the inflation target and create conditions for long-run sustainable growth. However, some analysts have not shared the Riksbank's view of economic prospects and have therefore reached slightly different conclusions as to how monetary policy should have been designed. Of course, this type of difference of opinion is not particularly remarkable in a field such as monetary policy, where decisions necessarily have to be based on assessments. But there are also other objections that are more a matter of principle and aimed at the very way the Riksbank conducts its policy. Although it is not always stated explicitly, the message is that the Riksbank is conducting a policy other than the one it is intended to conduct – that, to put it drastically, the Riksbank has misunderstood its task and is "playing by its own rules". It has been claimed, for instance, that the Riksbank has a tendency to be over-zealous in combating inflation and to care too little about unemployment.

Since the CDFIs have the relationships with the small businesses, partnerships between banks and CDFIs that increase the lending capacity of the CDFIs could be helpful. Possible avenues to achieving this include partnerships between CDFIs and banks, as well as assisting CDFIs to better access funding from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system. I would like to touch on three additional issues that I think would assist small businesses to be successful: financial education, certification of community organizations that assist small businesses and greater transparency for small business lending. Establishing a thriving small business takes more than a good idea and hard work. While both of these are essential, there are many other factors that come into play. It is important that people starting businesses have access to financial information that will assist them in navigating the difficult way forward. This assistance can include how to develop a sound business plan, how to enhance their credit profile, how to avoid early pitfalls such as obtaining financing with punitive interest rates and how to cultivate a banking relationship. These will all increase the likelihood that the small business will have access to the credit it needs over time to grow and thrive. CDFIs have been an important source of this financial education to small businesses, and these efforts should be supported and expanded. It is critical that small businesses also know that the organizations they work with are reputable and knowledgeable.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Vision of Asia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) – “Vision of Asia Award Acceptance Speech”, London, 30 June 2010. *  *  *  It is my great honour to be here today to receive this Vision of Asia Award from the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF). I would like to thank Lord Desai, for his generous introduction and the advisory board of OMFIF for this recognition. As a policy maker from an emerging economy in Asia – for almost three decades – it has been both exhilarating and most rewarding. While being challenged to the limit, in particular, during the Asian financial crisis, the Asian economies have now emerged stronger and more resilient. This decade has seen a dramatic change in the nature of the globalisation process. As this process intensifies, Asian economies have demonstrated their flexibility to adjust and respond to the opportunities and challenges that have emerged. The initial wave of globalisation was in the form of trade. This was followed by the globalisation of corporations and more recently by the globalisation of financial flows. The recent global financial and economic crisis has called for the globalisation of policy given the limits for policy at the national level and the need to address cross border developments that have implications on the domestic financial system and hence the domestic economy.

Nina Stoyanova: The history of Bulgaria’s money Welcome address by Ms Nina Stoyanova, Deputy Governor (Banking Department) of the Bulgarian National Bank, at the opening of “The History of Money on the Bulgarian Lands” exhibition, jointly organised by Burgas Municipality and the Bulgarian National Bank, Burgas, 10 June 2016. *  *  *  Mayor Nickolov, Dear citizens and guests of Burgas, It is a great honour for me to welcome you at the opening of this exhibition entitled ‘The History of Money on the Bulgarian Lands’. Co-organisers of the exhibition are Burgas Municipality and the Bulgarian National Bank. This exhibition comprises coins and coin-like items minted and circulated on today’s Bulgarian lands from antiquity to the present day, and the major part of these comes from the BNB’s museum collection. Before we go back in time, I would like to mention that the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) is one of the oldest public institutions in Bulgaria. It was founded immediately after the reestablishment of the Bulgarian state, on 25 January 1879, and on 6 June of that same year the first banking transaction was carried out with the BNB’s involvement. Our central bank is also one of the oldest central banks in the world – the 13th oldest one by date of foundation. Today the BNB still is the independent issuing authority of Bulgaria.
As central bankers, we are not isolated from the reality surrounding us, and we are committed to play our role in this historical process, particularly with regard to the smooth integration of the central banks of accession countries into the European System of Central Banks and, later , into the Eurosystem. Through ongoing co-operation, the central banks of the accession countries are being given an opportunity to familiarise themselves with the Eurosystem's mode of operation, and the Eurosystem can gain a better understanding of how these central banks operate under their respective regimes. This exchange, and the resulting establishment of a common terminology and understanding of each other's environments, will facilitate the pursuit of a common objective in the future. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 84/2001  5

On the contrary, what is important to bear in mind is that by ensuring a stable price and financial environment, the central bank helps foster economic growth. I believe that no central bank can maintain price stability over the longer term without public support for the necessary policies. Only with the confidence of the public in their policies and their own lasting dedication to non-inflationary growth together with a well-functioning financial system can central banks succeed in achieving and maintaining price and financial stability. BIS Review 17/1997
Looking further into the future, a more comprehensive legal international framework, such as a treaty, may be useful to empower authorities to bring cyber criminals to justice. Concluding remarks Let me now conclude. The digitisation of the economy and the financial sector is a process that cannot be stopped and we need to embrace it to our benefit. As financial institutions grow bigger and have greater international presence, the nature and extent of cyber risks will continue to expand. Events like this summit help propel the cyber security agenda forward. It is my hope that the sharing of knowledge and experiences here will generate new ideas to stem threats to cyber security. With that, I wish you all a productive and fruitful experience for the next two days. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

A further principle of profit sharing and hence risk sharing also ensures a high degree of transparency and disclosure, thereby a greater shared responsibility on the viability of the products. The rapid expansion of Islamic finance is reflected in more than 600 Islamic financial institutions operating in more than 75 countries in centres that are now beyond Muslim jurisdictions. Indeed, Islamic finance is increasingly becoming part of the growth strategies of an increasing number of global financial institutions. New horizons are also fast emerging following legislative and regulatory changes in several non-traditional markets that have now emerged as the fastest growing segment in the international financial system. In fact, the Banker’s latest 2011 Top 500 Islamic Financial Institutions report being released at this Summit shows that the global Islamic finance industry continues to experience double digit growth of 21%, with the Shariah compliant assets now breaching the USD1 trillion mark. The rapid expansion of Islamic finance essentially reflects its ability to meet the changing requirements of the global financial community and its competitiveness. The elements of checks and balances in Islamic finance that promote accountability and transparency enhances its potential as a stable form of financial intermediation. There is also a growing recognition that the inherent tenets of Islamic finance are aligned with the sustainable dimensions of ethical finance and responsible financing. As the new financial landscape emerges, it has also been accompanied by the development of ancilliary support services that include legal, accounting, taxation and Shariah advisory.
The agreement primarily contained important rules on the system of negotiating, such as rules to reduce the risk of periods with no agreement and to reduce the risk of conflicts breaking out. Similar bargaining agreements were signed between the parties in the central government, local and regional government sectors and for white collar workers in commerce. These agreements stipulated that industry should lead the way in wage agreements in relation to other sectors of the economy, an idea that originated in the EFO model designed by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2 (SAF) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) at the end of the 1960s. There was also a development towards a more decentralised and individualised wage formation, which has had a subduing effect on wages. Many agreements gave the local social partners the freedom to determine and distribute the wage scope themselves. However, the local negotiating scope was often limited to some extent by block rules regarding the size of this scope and guarantees for a minimum wage increase for each individual. The 1998 bargaining rounds marked a break in trend with regard to the rate of wage increase. The annual nominal rate fell from approximately 8 per cent during the period 1970-1997 to around 3.5 per cent during the period 1998-2000. The outcome may be regarded as moderate taking into account the rapid recovery in the economy and the large increase in employment that took place during the period covered by the agreement.

In addition, we still believe in an appreciation of the krona during the forecast period due to fundamentals, which have subduing effect on imported inflation. It is therefore estimated that payroll expense could increase by an average of just over 4 per cent a year during the forecast period without any threat to the inflation target. However, 4 per cent is too high in the slightly longer term. There is a great risk that this figure will become established as a norm, as payroll expenses have increased by approximately 4 per cent a year over the past five years. If Sweden were to participate in Stage Three of EMU, we cannot have a rate of wage increase that deviates from the average in the euro countries. If the "norm" for payroll expense increases is 3.5 per cent, this means that nominal wage agreements must be signed at lower levels. This is because the scope must also cover wage drift and other wage costs, such as collective fees and reductions in working hours. Conclusion  In the October Inflation Report we foresaw a slightly more prolonged economic recovery than had earlier been expected. The weak development in the financial markets in the wake of bankruptcies and accounting scandals had contributed to the start of a decline in confidence from companies and households. In Sweden demand had been upheld relatively well, but it was estimated that fiscal policy needed to be tightened up to manage the expenditure ceiling. This means that growth may be more subdued in future.