samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is thus not only import prices, but also domestic price pressure that has increased more slowly. This could be connected with the higher productivity I mentioned. In this case, it would mean that the economy could grow at a slightly faster rate without inflation accelerating. Particularly as inflation expectations have also declined slightly. Inflation picture and monetary policy When we look ahead somewhat, we can conclude that the temporary fluctuations in energy prices, which have had a strong effect on inflation since the end of 2002 and pushed it down significantly in recent months, are expected to have abated by mid-2005. As Swedish and international economic activity improve, price pressure is also expected to increase. However, in the main scenario inflation is expected to be below the Riksbank’s target both one and two years ahead, mainly due to lower wage cost increases and improved productivity growth. During 2004 UND1X inflation is expected to amount to an average of 0.6 per cent, which is 0.5 percentage points lower than the December forecast. The corresponding figure for 2005 is 1.2 per cent, which entails a revision of 0.4 percentage points for the year. At the end of the two-year period that comprises the main focus of the forecasts, inflation according to UND1X is expected to be 1.6 per cent, on the assumption of an unchanged repo rate. So what are the risks that might upset the picture I have just presented?

This is mainly due to a slightly more positive assessment of developments in the United States and Asia, but also to more favourable developments in Latin America, and central and eastern Europe. On the other hand, developments in the euro area, particularly in the larger countries - Germany, France and Italy - have been more subdued than expected and a slightly weaker development is foreseen in the near future than was previously assessed. Although international demand has developed largely as we expected, the same cannot be said for prices. The subdued international price trend in recent years has probably been linked to the earlier economic slowdown. However, there are also other explanatory factors. One possible cause of the weak price pressure is the globalisation of trade and production patterns that has followed in the wake of deregulation and the spread of information technology. Many new markets are being integrated into the global economy, including countries in central and eastern Europe and Asia. We are now seeing weak international price trends for manufactured goods, while there is a sharp rise in commodity prices. This could also be at least partly due to changed international patterns in production and trade. The best example of this is China, with its huge size and rapid industrialisation. The country is now one of the world’s largest commodity importers, particularly crude oil, copper and certain agricultural products.
One of the most notable advances in risk management across all three financial services sectors is the growing emphasis on developing a firm-wide assessment of risk. This constitutes the first trend in the Joint Forum’s report. Improvements in technology and telecommunications have made it easier for firms to gather, collect, and analyse large amounts of data on their exposures and business activities efficiently and increasingly in near “real time.” To make the best use of firm-wide data, some organisations have established a dedicated risk management function to foster more highly integrated and systematic approaches to risk measurement and management. The risk management function typically promotes the use of common risk measures across business lines. It can then report the firm-wide risk data to senior management. Reports may range from daily updates on “value-at-risk” trading positions to regular, if less frequent, compilations of the results of stress testing. The broader use of shared definitions to guide the comprehensive reporting of risk across the firm enables the integrated risk management function to identify concentrations of risk. Concentrations matter particularly when various business lines within the firm have different kinds of exposures to the same counterparty. Comprehensive and consistent reporting helps, moreover, to ensure that the firm is aware of the wide range of risks to which it is exposed; that it understands the relative importance of various risks and how they may interact; and that the firm is less likely to ignore material sources of risk.

Extraordinary growth in practices such as securitisation and in the use of sophisticated derivative products allowed banks to transfer credit risk in ways that the 1988 Accord does not capture. In addition, some banks began to manage their exposures to operational risk separately and as a comprehensive practice comparable to the management of credit or market risk. By the late 1990s, it became increasingly clear to leading banks and their supervisors that the original Accord no longer provided meaningful measures of risk for the most sophisticated banking organisations. As a result, the Basel Committee and others began to discuss ways to revise the existing capital rules to account for these advances. Supervisors sought more than a simple revision of the existing framework. We wanted to align our capital requirements more closely with the best measures of economic risks that banks actually face. We sought furthermore to fortify the stability of the banking sector so that banks could continue to serve as a source of credit through good years and bad. In our view, promoting financial stability will benefit not just banks, but also other businesses and consumers as well. To incorporate the latest advances in risk management, and to develop a more forward-looking approach to supervision, the Committee embraced a “three-pillar” approach to capital requirements. Rather than simply setting out a static minimum requirement for capital levels, the new capital framework will rely on three mutually reinforcing policy approaches.
I would like here to outline how the Swiss National Bank can help to ensure more efficient and more reliable financial market infrastructures through its oversight of payment and securities settlement systems. I would, however, like to make one key point right away: state intervention in, or regulation of, financial market infrastructures is justified only if it must be assumed that the private sector will not necessarily perform these functions of its own accord in a manner that is best for the economy. In reality, when designing a system its operators and participants will probably consider the direct costs that they would bear themselves in the event of a system failure or the withdrawal of a participant. However, the remaining costs that are not borne directly by the parties involved in the event of a system crisis tend to be forgotten in management calculations. It cannot be ruled out, then, that operators and participants take less account of the security of a system than would be necessary from the perspective of the broader economy. It is a classic problem of market failure. The sense and purpose of overseeing payment and securities settlement systems is to give due consideration to the externalities that would be neglected by the private sector and to ensure that financial market infrastructures provide the optimum degree of reliability from the point of view of the national economy.

Structures must be in place to prevent weaknesses in the financial system, such as payment or delivery difficulties on the part of a system participant, spreading in an uncontrolled fashion to other participants. In this context, the focus is, for example, on requirements relating to the payment instruments used, the irrevocability of transactions that have already been settled (finality), and on instruments and procedures to limit credit and liquidity risks. 2  BIS Review 58/2003  Collaboration with other authorities The National Bank is not the only institution which actively endeavours to secure the stability of the financial system. There is also contact with other authorities. One of these points of contact arises from the fact that, for example, the operator of SECOM (SIS Sega Intersettle AG) holds a bank licence and is therefore subject to supervision by the FBC. The FBC will still be the regulatory body responsible for the institution itself, while the National Bank will handle the oversight of the system operated by this institution. A parallel situation exists in the case of x-clear, which is operated by SIS x-clear AG - also regulated, as a bank, by the FBC. The FBC and the National Bank coordinate their activities and avoid overlaps. A further point of contact with other authorities exists in the case of financial market infrastructures that are of systemic importance to Switzerland but are operated abroad and thus cannot be overseen directly by the National Bank.
On the other, the weakening of the euro has put Swiss producers in a bind versus their European competitors and presented problems for Switzerland’s monetary policymakers. Stability and instability in relation to European currencies Over the course of several decades, the Swiss franc has appreciated against all European currencies. This applies not just to the nominal, but also to the real exchange rate (i.e. the exchange rate adjusted for the inflation differential between the Swiss franc and the relevant foreign currency), which is an important determinant of Switzerland’s international competitiveness. So, while the appreciation we have witnessed in recent years is certainly very pronounced, it is not entirely new. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Our currency has frequently experienced upward surges – often in conjunction with shortterm increases in exchange rate volatility. In the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, the Swiss franc appreciated substantially against all European currencies amid major fluctuations. The exchange rate to the German mark – which remained relatively stable – was an exception. This was due to structural similarities between the two countries’ economies and to the fact that both the German Bundesbank and the SNB operated according to comparable monetary policy principles at the time. Both institutions were focused on money supply targets and pursued a policy geared towards maintaining price stability. In the 1990s, monetary policy in most of the EU countries was dominated by preparations for the launch of the European single currency.

Thomas Jordan: The euro and Swiss monetary policy Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Europa Forum Lucerne, Lucerne, 2 May 2016. *  *  *  The speaker would like to thank Tobias Cwik and Mathias Zurlinden for their valuable support in preparing this speech. He also extends his thanks to Petra Gerlach and Carlos Lenz, as well as to Communications and Language Services at the SNB. When the euro was created almost two decades ago, there was considerable uncertainty about how the currency would impact Switzerland. My predecessors on the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank regularly commented on subsequent euro developments in speeches and frequently voiced their expectations and concerns. Things ran fairly smoothly in the first few years; but the financial and debt crisis rocked the currency union and put the euro under pressure. The SNB has responded with a flexible and pragmatic monetary policy. As the difficulties have not yet been overcome, it is too early to draw definite conclusions. One thing is clear, however: getting to grips with the challenges we face has been – and remains – harder than the cartoon character in the picture suggests (cf. chart 1). From the SNB’s point of view, the experiences of recent years have once again highlighted the importance and value of monetary sovereignty. Monetary sovereignty has its price, of course, but it remains true that the interests of our country are best served by retaining this independence.
European DORA regulation published at the end of 2022, whose implementing decrees are currently being drafted, will allow for a better management of cyber risk, which has been particularly significant in recent months. Page 8 of 9  France was ranked first in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing by the FATF in its May 2022 assessment report. We must pursue our efforts to remain exemplary and play a leading role at international and European level, in particular in connection with the French bid to host the new European authority (AMLA) in in this area. As regards climate risk, despite major advances in terms of transparency and disclosure standards, the first dedicated stress tests - including the one pioneered by the ACPR - showed that preparation for physical and transitional risks could still be improved. As regards the insurance sector, EIOPA has conducted a first stress test on European supplementary occupational pension schemes. The ACPR has continued its work with insurers to prepare for the next exercise, which will take place in 2023 and whose results will be published in the first half of 2024. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, as a number of recent episodes of market volatility have shown, non-bank finance poses an increasingly important systemic risk and needs to be better regulated, both at the microprudential and macroprudential levels, in order to control leverage and contain liquidity risk.

In addition, under the EBA's Interest Rate Risk of the Banking Book (IRRBB) guidelines - as part of the rigorous application of the Pillar 2 provisions - published in 2018 and enhanced in 2022, European banks are required to conduct regular prudential stress tests to measure the impact of interest rate changes on their interest margins and the economic value of their capital; US regional banks such as SVB are not subject to this requirement. As regards the regulations of insurers, the general approach adopted in June 2022 by the European Council on amendments to the Solvency II Directive is in line with several of the ACPR's objectives: overall neutrality of quantitative requirements on the French market, support for long-term investment with more stringent requirements in terms of sustainable finance, better rules for crossborder transactions and better application of the principle of proportionality. It is now very important that the European Parliament adopt this directive as soon as possible, so that it can be implemented quickly and without being diluted. III. Areas to be enhanced in the short and medium term Resolution is another cornerstone of the Banking Union. However, the fact that the Swiss authorities opted for a merger in the case of Credit Suisse raised new questions about how to make resolution more operational and reliable. Let me share just two thoughts at this point. The first concerns the resolution of large or even systemically important banks.
Page 1  UK monetary policy outlook − speech by Huw Pill Given at the Money Market Association of New York University (Money Marketeers) Event, New York  Page 2  Published on 09 January 2023  Speech Good evening everyone. Before I turn to the body of my remarks, I thought it would be useful to start the New Year with a few important reminders. Inflation in the United Kingdom is currently too high. Returning UK inflation to its 2% target on a lasting and sustainable basis is essential. Price stability must prevail if we are to create the environment in which firms and households can take the longer-term investment decisions that build the human and physical capital, which ultimately drives the dynamism, innovation, productivity and growth upon which prosperity and improving living standards rest. It is the job of monetary policy to return inflation to target. That is what we on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) are mandated to do within the UK’s institutional framework for macroeconomic policy. In the face of inflationary shocks over the past eighteen months, the MPC has tightened monetary policy significantly. The Committee will continue to act as necessary to ensure the inflation target is achieved on a lasting basis over the medium term, remaining alert to new economic shocks that might create further inflation disturbances. There should be no question about what the MPC is seeking to achieve or whether it is prepared to take the necessary actions to do so.

All the more so when each layer has its own, distinctive characteristics: some drivers of inflation being more secular in nature, others more cyclical; some consistent with the ‘divine coincidence’ of efforts to stabilise demand and price developments, others implying management of difficult trade-offs between activity and inflation. But the challenges for monetary policy are greater when the factors not only cumulate, but also interact with one another in possibly divisive and often unhelpful ways as regards the pursuit of price stability. In other words, when the various underlying drivers of policy decisions are not only additive as regards their implications for inflation, but also potentially multiplicative. To give the most straightforward but also immediately relevant example: the scope for energy price rises to trigger the infamous second round effects in price, wage and cost dynamics – the dynamics that threaten to create persistence in inflation even after the original external stimulus abates – is greater when the corporate sector enjoys pricing power, and the labour market is tight. Beyond the implications of the individual risks themselves, the combination of and interaction among those risks can create additional challenges for monetary policy. This is something to which I will return in discussing the outlook for UK monetary policy. Factors underlying monetary policy decisions But let me start by reviewing the three underlying drivers of policy decisions that I just listed.
It is always easy to know how one should have acted afterwards, when the result is a fact. The interesting part of an assessment is whether our decisions are understandable in the light of the picture available at the time the decision was made. When we analyse this question, we can conclude that we have acted consistently on the basis of the inflation forecasts we made, much as we usually do. A further question is how good we are at making forecasts. The accuracy of the forecasts for price trends as a whole in 2003, which were made during the two preceding years, appears relatively good. However, the general assessment hides a number of large forecast errors for individual components. For instance, domestic inflation was underestimated, while international prices and imported inflation were overestimated. We thus have some work left to do to achieve better precision in the individual components that are important to the total assessment. Despite this, I can observe that our inflation forecasts for 2003 were slightly better than the average of other forecasters. Some concluding reflections Let me now, in conclusion, emphasise a couple of issues connected with the present decision-making situation. As I have already mentioned, economic activity has essentially followed the paths we have been anticipating since early last autumn. On the other hand, new information has been received, which indicates lower price and cost pressure. This information concerns international prices, productivity in Sweden, the labour market situation and wage costs as well as inflation outcomes and expectations.

Denny H Kalyalya: Expansion of Zambia’s banking sector Remarks by Dr Denny H Kalyalya, Deputy Governor-Operations of the Bank of Zambia; at the official opening of Bank of China’s new premises, Lusaka, 9 December 2008. *  *  *  • Honourable Minister of Finance and National Planning, Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane, MP; • His Excellency – the Chinese Ambassador to the Republic of Zambia; Mr. Li Qiangmin; • Managing Director of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited; Mr Du Qiang; • Distinguished Invited Guests; • Ladies and Gentlemen. I am greatly honoured for having been invited to speak on the occasion of the official opening ceremony of Bank of China’s new premises. Ladies and Gentlemen As part of the on-going Zambia-Chinese relationship, the Bank of China was established in 1997. Since then the Bank has recorded tremendous progress. Distinguished Invited Guests During the past 8 years, the overall financial performance and condition of the banking sector has been satisfactory. The sector has continued to expand and we anticipate increased economic and investment activity in the period ahead. Banks are expected to continue to provide the required level of finance to consolidate the economic gains registered so far. The Bank has achieved tremendous growth since its inception in 1997. During the last eleven years, total assets have increased by 325% to K507.9 billion in October 2008 from K13.8 billion in December 1997. Regulatory capital increased by about 1,000% to K41.9 billion in October 2008 from K3.8 billion December 1997.
They also enable countries to maintain a fixed exchange rate while retaining some flexibility in domestic interest rates. And they might limit the movement of capital to lower taxed jurisdictions, thus slowing the inexorable decline of capital income taxation resulting from the development of a world capital market. But it is difficult to distinguish between controls on capital flows and flows related to trade. The growth of trade in services has highlighted the difficulty of separating currency trade-related flows from those representing investment. Thus, to be effective, capital controls are likely to impede trade flows. This would be a heavy price to pay and few countries have chosen to pay it. Permanent capital controls have other disadvantages. They forsake all the economic benefits of a free capital market. And controls are never implemented by wise, or even merely clever, economists. They attract rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour in both official and private sectors. And they undermine the cause of market liberalisation. There is no shortage of protectionist tendencies that seek to limit trade and investment. We should not add to them. So neither purist solution is likely to appeal – the one because there is insufficient political and financial support for an ILOLR, and the other because permanent controls go against the grain of promoting market reforms and good governance. But the present system is not sustainable. The danger is that we have the worst of both worlds.

Heng Swee Keat: Singapore’s commitment to the development of Islamic finance Opening remarks by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore Sukuk Signing Ceremony, Singapore, 19 January 2009. *  *  *  Your Excellency Abdulla Hasan Saif, Chairman, The Islamic Bank of Asia, Mr Viswanathan Shankar, Group Management Committee Member, Standard Chartered Bank, Mr Lucien Wong, Managing Partner of Allen and Gledhill, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to welcome you this afternoon to the MAS and to our overseas guests, a warm welcome to Singapore. Singapore is committed to the development of Islamic finance. The financial industry has encouraged us to develop Shariah compliant financial services, by building on our existing strengths in banking, trade finance, capital markets and asset management. MAS is an integrated regulator – we oversee all forms of financial services. In performing this role, we adopt a basic principle that financial products and activities with similar underlying risks are given similar regulatory treatment. However, there are distinctive features of Islamic finance that put it at a disadvantage, if we were to just apply the conventional regulatory framework. We are committed to a level playing field, by ensuring that Islamic financial activities with the same underlying economic essence are accorded the same regulatory treatment as those in conventional finance.