samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They are a conduit for other forms of serious crimes. Almost all forms of serious crimes, such as human trafficking, drug trade and organised syndicates fund their activities through some form of financial crime. As such, financial crimes are inherently complex, and often will involve multiple enforcement agencies, sometimes even across borders. This reinforces the call for greater shared responsibility to shine a light on these 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  dark areas of the financial system. One of the key ways to exercise this responsibility is through the sharing of information. More effectively, this means putting in place an effective and mutually reinforcing ecosystem or platform where the relevant parties are able to partner together to report and investigate financial crime. In Malaysia, this is a burgeoning area that we are looking to deepen. We are encouraged by the early results that explores adapting the public-private partnership model of other countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia. So far, partnerships between the Royal Malaysian Police, selected financial institutions and money services businesses have resulted in 9 successful cases being prosecuted in the area of terrorism and terrorism financing. The idea behind these partnerships is to make intelligence sharing more meaningful and create an ecosystem where various pieces of the ‘jigsaw puzzle’ can be put together. Different parties will have different access to information and different comparative advantages. Fusing and complementing them will add to the number of cases that can be detected and prosecuted.

It is also important that we increase the transparency of shadow banking activities. In this respect, the entry into force of the European regulations EMIR2 and SFTR should be a considerable step forward. As I’ve been talking about macroprudential measures regarding large corporations, and our subject is financial stability, I’d like to bring you up to date on bank lending in France: lending to the private sector – to households and businesses – is growing rapidly in France, at a rate of close to 6% per year. At the next meeting of the High Council for Financial Stability (HCSF) in June, we shall look at whether we need to introduce additional measures. To sum up, we have not yet finished exploring the issue of non-bank finance and I am certain that today’s event will make a valuable contribution to the debate. I would like to pass the floor now to Aurélia End, who will host the round table, and wish you all an excellent morning. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
1 Speech by Andrea Enria, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the Banking Seminar organized by De  Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, 11 March 2019 2 16 supervisory agencies and 2 international financial organization were interviewed for the purpose of this  survey. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

I could talk about r-star at great length, but you may be relieved to hear that for the purpose of this speech, there’s just one point I want to make: r-star has fallen, not only in the U.S., but around the world. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Fundamental shifts have been occurring in the two main drivers of r-star over the past two decades: demographics and productivity growth. Lower fertility rates and aging populations, as well as slower productivity growth, have pushed down r-star by as much as two percentage points in a number of developed nations. These structural shifts are having fundamental effects on real interest rates, growth, and inflation. A number of advanced economies have inflation below desired levels and longer-term interest rates that are well below where they were a decade ago. There are, of course, a few outliers, but the commonalities between the world’s developed economies are becoming more and more apparent. There’s no doubt that the U.S. is experiencing first-hand the effects of the structural shifts in demographics and productivity growth. But the fact that these changes are a common experience for so many developed economies creates challenges to our economic prospects at home. Slowing Global Growth Which brings me to the second trend I highlighted: slowing global growth. This story—of low interest rates, low inflation, and slow growth—is showing up in the data. The latest numbers from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) follow the recent trend of steady downward revisions of growth estimates.
These two decisions proved to be among the most important in our economic history. Promoting exports and promoting foreign direct investments at a time when few other countries were doing the same gave Singapore a decisive advantage. But it was an advantage that Singapore had to work hard to realise. •  The government developed industrial land, put in place infrastructure facilities, reformed labour laws to promote industrial peace, and invested in basic education with emphasis on technical skills relevant to industrialisation. •  Sound fiscal and monetary policies ensured macroeconomic stability and underpinned investor confidence. The two strategies paid off handsomely. •  By 1975, Singapore had established a substantial industrial base, with manufacturing’s share in GDP climbing to 22% from 14% in 1965. •  The economy was at full employment and it was clear that Singapore had to move up the value chain towards more capital-intensive and skill-intensive activities. The compositional change within manufacturing was striking. •  Industrialisation began in the 1960s with factories producing items such as matches, fish hooks and mosquito coils. o  •  By the way, for those unfamiliar, mosquitoes used to spread life-threatening diseases in the tropics in those days until the disease-causing ones were eradicated in 2033 by genetic modification. In any case, these labour-intensive industries saw a steady decline through the 1970s. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, we saw the emergence of strong clusters in higher valueadded electronics, petrochemicals, component and precision engineering.

Like Kashmir, it is difficult to see a definitive solution to the North Korean problem. But this too can be managed. The six party talks have reduced the risk of accidental war. The key actors are rational and, despite their differences, share a common interest in a peaceful resolution of the issue. Kim Jong Il is a master of brinkmanship. But he too is rational and must know that war will lead to the outcome that he fears most, the disappearance of North Korea as a sovereign state. Therefore, while he may go to the very edge, unlike Saddam Hussein, Kim will not deliberately step over it. The North Korean issue is a strong incentive for the US and China to cooperate for their common interest. The risks of miscalculation are perhaps highest over Taiwan. The issue is extremely delicate because it engages the domestic politics of China, US and Taiwan. There is growing tension between economic forces that are integrating Taiwan with the Mainland and Taiwan’s desire for a separate identity. No PRC leadership can ever tolerate a bid for independence by Taiwan. If Taiwan pushes too far, the Chinese must react or be exposed as a ‘paper tiger’. The US stand, and perceptions of the US stand in China and Taiwan, are key to the problem. President Bush has said publicly that he does not support Taiwan’s independence. But the US may still be drawn into a Cross Straits conflict. If this happens, there will be serious consequences for the entire region.
This broader view of banking supervision, taking account of all its facets, translates into a number of provisions and notably introduces additional capital buffers (a capital conservation buffer, a countercyclical buffer and a buffer for systemically important financial institutions) in excess of the regulatory minimum. Basel III therefore represents a quantitative and also a qualitative leap. Given the magnitude of the changes to be made, Basel III has major repercussions on market participants, who must adapt to this new environment. These repercussions are both anticipated and desirable, but the potentially negative consequences of this reform must be kept to a minimum. In this respect, many associated risks were highlighted during its drafting and even more so recently, due to the current economic and financial difficulties. These included the risk of a rise in the cost of credit or of a credit crunch. Hence, the impact and stakes of Basel III must be carefully analysed and addressed. 2. The difficult economic environment stresses the importance of implementing Basel III in an appropriate manner but does not call into question the rationale of the reform  Without playing down the potential risks associated with the implementation of Basel III, to which the ACP pays close attention, I believe that this reform can be successfully implemented.

They may also, under a compromise text, render partly redundant and ineffective the responsibilities of supervisors of home and host countries, as well as those of micro-prudential and macro-prudential supervisors. In this context, I believe that the creation of a banking union is to be supported. It would be a major development for banking supervision in Europe, which would bring numerous benefits and would enable us to efficiently address the current difficulties. Such a development would most likely have very positive consequences in that it would be a step towards greater European harmonisation. Naturally, the benefits of such a reform would be more far-reaching but such questions go beyond the scope of today’s conference. Questions regarding the impact and stakes of Basel III will already give ample food for thought in the rich debates and discussions this morning. I wish you all a fruitful conference. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The reason for the repo rate cuts was to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis on the real economy, while ensuring that inflation stabilised around the target of two per cent. Although monetary policy cannot be used to resolve the financial problems, it can help to dampen the negative effects on the real economy, without jeopardising the inflation target. The Riksbank’s assessment is that the financial crisis aggravates the ongoing economic downturn resulting in weaker growth, a deterioration in the labour market and lower inflation. The repo rate therefore needs to be cut by a relatively large amount during a short period of time. In addition to the cuts already made, the assessment at the most recent meeting was that the repo rate needs to be cut by a further 0.50 percentage points, to 3.25 per cent, over the coming six months. The repo rate is currently less effective than normal as a tool for influencing the economy. The repo rate cuts in October did not lead to an immediate fall in interbank rates. The confidence crisis in the financial system has meant that the normal link between market rates and the repo rate has been broken. Although market rates also declined, there remains an unusually large gap between the repo rate and mortgage rates in particular. The gap between the 3-month lending rate to households and the repo rate has been around 100 basis points in less turbulent periods than that we are experiencing now. At present the gap is around 200 basis points.

Although the adjustment would ultimately be greater if it occurred slowly, a very rapid contraction would deliver such a jolt to the finances of many households and businesses that loan losses would result. It is likely that a range of risks will have to be faced, but efforts must be made to minimise the probability of a financial crisis that could harm potential output and living standards. In the final  2  BIS Review 41/2007  analysis, the critical factor is how strong and well equipped the financial system is to withstand shocks, i.e. its resilience. The crucial factor behind the Central Bank’s assessment that the financial system is now more resilient to shocks is the banks’ stronger liquidity and equity positions than a year ago. The major commercial banks have a diversified income base that extends to many countries. Another advantage is the somewhat different business models they have used in their expansion. Their diversified assets give less reason to fear the consequences of an unexpected strain on the financial system. Iceland’s strong fiscal position underpins the banks’ international credit ratings. Other important factors have been the strengthening of Iceland’s foreign reserves and the Central Bank’s capital. Both measures represent natural responses to changes caused in the Central Bank’s operating environment by the very rapid expansion of the commercial banks, especially abroad. Although the main function of a financial stability report is to highlight risks, factors conducive to strengthening the long-term economic outlook should also be duly noted.
William C Dudley: Opening remarks at the Evolution of Work Conference Opening remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Evolution of Work Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 17 November 2016. * * * Nora Fitzpatrick, Laura Pilossoph, Anika Pratt and Aysegul Sahin assisted in preparing these remarks. Good morning. I would like to welcome you to this conference on the Evolution of Work. Today, we will explore how the nature of work is evolving, including the role of technology, shifts in employee work arrangements and employer-employee relationships, and the effects of these changes on workforce development strategies. We are pleased to host this conference with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Freelancers Union. We welcome all the leaders from across academia, government, industry, labor and the nonprofit sector assembled here to explore the transformation of the workforce, and the impact this has had on communities and the economy more broadly. As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. As you know, the Federal Reserve monitors the labor market closely, given that maximum sustainable employment is one goal of the Fed’s dual mandate. The evolving nature of the workplace—and the speed with which it is changing—are therefore important developments that we must continue to monitor.

We believe the systemic importance of the payments infrastructure means that central banks and system participants have a common interest in acting together to address the evolving risks. Let me identify some of the major priorities we see in this area that require further collaboration. Higher standards for the core of the system During the past few years, central banks and securities commissioners have developed new standards for the design, operation, and oversight of payments and securities settlement systems. These new standards have been proposed for incorporation in the Federal Reserve’s Policy Statement on Payments System Risks. We are in the process of working, together with other U.S. supervisory and regulatory agencies, to assess the extent to which the affected U.S. systems meet these new standards. We feel that it is especially important for the entities that form the heart of payments and settlement systems to work toward higher standards for safety and soundness and operational resilience. Given the increased scale of activity handled by these entities, the greater concentration among the major participants, and the increased exposure to cross-border activity, these systems today need to meet a more exacting set of standards, and of course this is also true for entities that are less systemically important. More specifically, we would like to see a greater focus on strengthening risk management practices and ensuring that the financial resources of system operators are adequate to deal with the risks to which they are exposed.
The essence of Basel II is not just the set of rules and formulas to calculate regulatory capital, these are necessary and very important but, in my view, the heart of  6  BIS Review 12/2004  Basel II is the incentives for banks and risk management professionals to advance risk management and the recognition of this progress. Studying and understanding the drivers of credit, market, and operational risk, and probing the relationships between them, will help all of us to get a better sense of the risks and rewards we face today, and how well we are prepared to navigate changes in the landscape of opportunity and challenge tomorrow. Improving our understanding of risk, and strengthening our ability to manage it, offers the promise not just of better administered banks, but more importantly the promise of a more stable financial system one that is better able to serve as a source of credit and sustainable growth for businesses and consumers alike. Thank you again for welcoming me to this conference, and I offer my best wishes for an enjoyable and educational event. BIS Review 12/2004  7

Perhaps, from everyone’s point of view, the going was too good to obstruct; the expansion was too exciting to discourage; the resulting luxuries and wealth were too wonderful to hold back. No wonder therefore, that the financial world continued to happily tootle along this unrealistic path, at break-neck speed. Logically, the accident had to happen, and happen it did, and what an accident that was! A crash landing that was sudden and unbelievably disastrous, not only to the developed world, but to all economies of the globe! Mr. Chairman, the events of the recent past clearly suggest to us that the world’s financial and economic communities have, albeit unintentionally, placed the entire civilized world’s systems and structures at intense risk, and perhaps even endangered the gains of civilization built over several centuries. However, to the eternal credit of the world’s political and economic leaders, we could be relieved that we have been able to face that shock and  BIS Review 106/2009  1  emerge out of it, bruised and battered no doubt, but fortunately, with our systems still reasonably intact. Nevertheless, the major down-turn suffered by the world economy as a result of these shocks is yet to be fully overcome. The tight liquidity crunch that is suffocating our credit markets; the stubborn toxic assets that won’t go away; the suspicions with which banking and financial institutions view each other, are yet continuing, although there are signs of some abatement.
Lastly, when participating in non-sovereign markets for the first time, a central bank might need to learn more about the asset class and build or refine the internal systems needed to operate in that market.11 In all these cases, a central bank might choose to diversify across different asset classes to achieve its policy objective. With these considerations in mind, I now want to turn to a discussion of the large-scale asset purchase programs pursued by the Federal Reserve. My focus will be on the Fed’s agency MBS purchases—which provide the central bank with an additional policy transmission tool and significant additional capacity to provide policy accommodation. Although the purchase of U.S. Treasuries is not central to my remarks, it is important to note that the Federal Reserve is fortunate in having a sovereign debt market that is the deepest and most liquid in the world and is sufficiently large that there are no close capacity limits. The experience with the three LSAP programs and the Maturity Extension Program showed that the Federal Reserve was able to purchase Treasuries at a fast pace without affecting market functioning. Before continuing to the main part of my discussion, I would also note that my intention is to consider the practical and operational issues surrounding the implementation of LSAPs, rather than to debate the merits of LSAPs relative to other potential monetary policy tools. There are a number of important issues linked to the potential costs of LSAPs but unrelated to these implementation issues.

While this might appear to be a constraint for the Federal Reserve, purchases of non-sovereign debt by other central banks have been small—both in size and as a percentage of GDP— compared with the Federal Reserve’s purchases of agency MBS, which are guaranteed by federal agencies and can affect private borrowing rates.8 In expanding their balance sheets through asset purchases, central banks must consider how their choice of assets—for example, sovereign debt, corporate bonds, or federal agency debt— will affect the policy transmission mechanism. Central banks must also take into account any implementation challenges related to executing in a given market. There are many broad transmission channels through which an LSAP program can provide additional monetary accommodation: Increasing the monetary base and central bank liabilities—the QE channel Reinforcing that interest rates will remain low—the signaling channel9 Changing the quantity and mix of financial assets held by the private sector—the portfolio balance channel Taking interest rate risk out of the private sector—the duration channel Taking credit risk out of the private sector—the credit channel Taking prepayment risk out of the private sector—the prepayment channel Improving market function—the market function channel The purchases of different assets will have different degrees of impact across these channels. For example, sovereign assets will generally work primarily through the first four channels, while corporate bonds would also work through the credit channel and MBS would also work through the prepayment channel.