samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Much of this credit was used to buy houses and property prices began to soar. …because of overly expansionary monetary policy? There is a debate as to the role of monetary policy in creating this situation. The debate has mainly concerned claims that the US central bank had held interest rates too low for a number of years prior to the crisis. But other central banks, such as the European Central Bank, also held interest rates low during this period. It is not entirely clear what role monetary policy played – and plays in general – for the development of property prices and for risk propensity among economic agents. This is a subject that will probably continue to be discussed. However, on the basis of the information available at the time, there was no obvious reason for conducting another monetary policy than the one that was actually conducted. In the United States, for example, there was justified concern that the country might suffer the same deflation problems as Japan, and many other countries also perceived the threat of deflation as something to be taken very seriously. …as a result of a global savings glut? But there was also another and probably more important factor contributing to the low interest rates. Since the end of the 1990s the emerging economies in Asia, particularly China, and in the Middle East had experienced large current account surpluses, particularly in relation to the United States, but also to other western countries.

Growth in the first quarter has been subdued as domestic spending, both private consumption and investment is weaker-than-expected. Part of this pullback may have been a natural reversion to a more normal pace of growth after an unusually strong expansion last  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  year. At the same time, on the external side, a drag on the overall Thailand’s trading partners’ growth continues to weigh on Thai exports. Going forward, however, many of the supporting factors remain in place. High level of employment and strong private sector confidence should provide an enabling environment for growth. Fiscal stimulus related to large-scale infrastructure investment should also begin to phase in from the latter part of this year. This would potentially generate a positive crowding-in effects on private spending. For this, I would expect the economy to return to its normal path in the third and fourth quarter of this year. Apart from slower growth, a potential threat to financial stability has increased, stemming from development in household indebtedness. Currently, household debt is rising to over 70 percent of GDP. International evidence suggests that a prolonged period of rapid credit growth could lead to a build-up of financial imbalances, worsen households’ debt servicing ability and loan quality, as well as sow a seed for asset price bubbles. The need for long-term focus Ladies and gentlemen, Having said all of the above, I may seem to paint the picture that the Thai economy is slowing down recently, largely as a result of weaker global growth.
Another hope expressed in connection with the creation of a sovereign wealth fund is better management of foreign exchange reserves. However, the SNB already manages its foreign exchange in a professional manner and is considered to be a leading central bank in asset management. We have also invested in a broad range of assets for a number of years now. Our portfolio is diversified over different currencies and asset classes, and we invest heavily in foreign shares and corporate bonds. Equity exposure is 20%, which is high for a central bank. On a long-term average, higher profits are only possible by taking higher risks. This would also apply to a sovereign wealth fund. However, higher risks also mean that profit fluctuations would be greater than before. Of course, a sovereign wealth fund could hedge against certain risks. Exchange rate risk represents the biggest risk for foreign currency investments. But it is precisely this risk that a sovereign wealth fund should not be allowed to hedge, as it would conflict with monetary policy. This is because hedging would result in upward pressure on the Swiss franc, which would run counter to our monetary policy. Incidentally, this is also the reason why a sovereign wealth fund should not be permitted to sell foreign currency. To sum up: a sovereign wealth fund would not make monetary policy easier but more difficult. Sovereign money The other initiative that I would like to talk about today is the sovereign money initiative submitted some time ago. This has two main elements.

We do not know to what extent the present course of events is affecting how households and firms appraise both their own and their country’s economy. A good many people and businesses will no doubt become more cautious about buying a car or making investments for the future, for example. Here we have a potentially larger effect that must be monitored very carefully. Some guidance is to be had from various countries’ survey data. A number of the results point to a fall in consumer confidence. Neither can one draw any precise conclusions about the magnitude of the effect that may come from increased prudence in banking around the world. The global unrest has left its mark. No one foresaw that Malaysia would introduce foreign exchange controls. Nor did any banker believe that Russia would go so far as to suspend payments on debt denominated in roubles. People BIS Review 83/1998  -3-  seem to be thinking that if such things could happen in Malaysia and Russia, perhaps they can happen elsewhere. The problems with the hedge fund Long-Term Capital is another matter that has made international bankers more wary. Although their loans to this fund were secured, the total stock of loans from all banks and the total amount of collateral were too large for direct disposal in the market; that would have caused prices to fall, leading to losses for the banks. Under such circumstances it is hardly surprising that international banks also review their lending commitments to other funds.
But it also reduces the costs of pursuing such strategies. In other words, liquidity unlocks the impatience gene. Investors whose judgement is wrong, but whose timing is right, can lock in immediate gains. Liquidity, too, can pollute the gene pool by allowing the impatient to prosper. Like information, liquidity can be too much of a good thing. 24 So we have pitchfork equilibrium: along one prong virtue, along the other vice. As in other social systems, these two financial equilibria have neurological roots and sociological branches. They yield, however, very different economic fruit. This dual-self world is structurally schizophrenic: financial innovation is both good and bad; information is both solution and problem; liquidity is both cure and curse; investors are both abstemious and addicts. 22  Chen (1995). 23  Bernholz (1997). 24  For example, Laibson (1997). BIS Review 114/2010  7  So which evolutionary gene is dominating finance in practice? Is bad money driving out good or the reverse? Is history repeating itself as the Yuan or the Ming dynasties? Patience in finance There is ample evidence, theoretical and empirical, of self-improving financial cycles. From the Medici banks in Italy in the 13th century to the joint stock banks of he 19th century to the explosion of capital market finance in the latter part of the 20th century. Today, China provides no better example of that self-improving cycle in motion. But can financial systems overshoot onto the impatient path, where too much liquidity and information unlock the impatience gene and its ugly progeny.

These dual equilibria make choosing the right pace and path of financial reform crucial. Some countries, like China, appear to be proceeding along the patient path. The choice is how to pace reform to prevent overshooting onto the impatient path. For countries which have already liberalised, the choice is how to promote patience while harnessing impatience. These are real public policy choices. Patience and impatience Patience, we are told, is a virtue. That has been the verdict of theologians, philosophers and authors for well over 700 years. Interestingly, it was also the verdict of the earliest economists. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith declares: “The qualities most useful to ourselves are, first of all, superior reasons and understanding, by which we are capable of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions; and, secondly, self-command, by which we are enabled to abstain from present pleasure or to endure present pain in order to obtain a greater pleasure in some future time”. BIS Review 114/2010  1  So for Smith, patience was both a distinctive and valuable human commodity. Subsequent research has shown he was right. Patience is peculiarly human. Our nearest evolutionary relatives, discount almost entirely outcomes more than one minute into the future. 1 It is not that animals are incapable of far-sighted behaviour – for example, squirrels collecting nuts or birds flying south for the winter. But these are not acts of spontaneous self-control, like saving or dieting. Rather, they are genetically pre-programmed.
In this case, waiting for the passive runoff of the additional assets alone may not be a viable interest rate implementation strategy. Depending on the details of the operating framework and money market structure, other tools might be needed – at least for some time – to control overnight interest rates above the zero bound while the size of the balance sheet remains elevated. What we learn about these tools through the period of normalization could prove useful when we think about our long-run framework. Central bankers around the world have been innovative in developing tools to address recent challenges and to prepare to normalize their operations, and overall, the set of implementation options at our disposal may be much broader than we thought before the crisis. So let’s fully explore the operational issues underlying these options. A deeper understanding will help inform the choices policymakers need to make in order to meet their goals. Now seems like a particularly good time to start such an effort, for several reasons. First, we need to digest the lessons from the recent crisis with respect to monetary policy implementation and money market functioning, and it is best to do so while the experience is still fresh in our minds.

Some differences in our practice as compared to international standards may not warrant any further action at all, for they reflect our conscious intention to adopt rules that best suit our own unique situation as well as rules that should be phased in gradually to comply with international standards only at an appropriate time. We welcome the opportunity to discuss and share this understanding with the FSAP assessors, who are drawn not only from IMF and World Bank staff but also from other countries’ central bankers, regulators, and international experts. Before I let you get on with the workshop, I would like to conclude by saying that, with or without the FSAP, the Bank of Thailand will continue to strive for a safe and sound financial system, both through efforts to restructure financial institutions under the Financial Sector Master Plan, and through continued strengthening of prudential standards and supervisory practice. Risk-based supervision approach has been adopted. Loan classification and provisioning requirements have been and will be tightened further. Good corporate governance has been enforced, including appropriate composition of the Board of Directors and, most recently, fit and proper criteria for the top management of commercial banks. We have come a long way since the 1997 crisis and we do not intend to look back. Yet, many formidable challenges lie ahead. On the international front, a lot of preparations and adjustments are needed in response to the introduction of IAS39 and the new Basel Capital Accord.
Audience Member: Greetings, good morning to – or good afternoon to you and your guest. Now while it would be interesting to speak of why the New York Fed and the Atlanta Fed are differing on their economic forecasts, that might be interesting, but I want to speak to something far more local. Far more local. This community, and communities like this, were devastated, were ravaged – and I could use a stronger word – during the financial crisis of 2008. We’ve never recovered from this. The black community lost approximately 50% of its wealth in four years. 50% of the wealth accumulated from slavery till today lost in four years. No one, of course, was ever jailed for these things, no one was ever – very little punishment, if anything, was done. I understand that while you may want to do or feel strongly it’s not the purview of the Federal Reserve – I understand that. Using your researchers at Liberty and other parts of your organization, I need to know what laws that I can put on the books to protect communities like this. We’re about to go back into another phase of exotic mortgage-lending, and I will humbly differ with you on Glass-Steagall, of course. We’re about to go into another phase of exotic lending. They call it exotic lending. We call it predatory lending, and we pay for it. We can expect that again.

My first question is how do we establish a better relationship with your organization in an effort to – we can get this information that you have and its resources on the grassroot level? And my second question is –  President Dudley: All you have to do is give me your card afterwards. Audience Member: Oh, okay. My second question is we’ve done an assessment of the economic state of Southeast Queens, Sen. Sanders’ office, and a majority of our residents here are considered banked and under-banked. My question to you is a lot of ... especially for – we have a huge population of Millennials, we’re looking to purchase homes in our area. A lot of us make under $ and probably have some problems with credit. But my question with the home buyers programs is there a way, or how can we have a conversation about increasing the matching funds because the highest that the rates for the federal home buyers program is 4:1. And we want to talk about how we can get that to 10:1 so it can help, it can match the demographics, economic demographics, of our community, so people can start receiving in tangible resources like purchasing a home with the resources that they have. President Dudley: I’m not an expert in the issue of how much money you need to match. I don’t think I can speak to that directly.
For this response to be effective, it must be accompanied by national economic policy responses befitting the European action and the challenges we face. This response calls for the following: to maintain the support of fiscal policy to the economy, on a temporary basis, focusing on the groups of firms, sectors and individuals most affected and with a design that allows for the structural adjustments needed; to convert the European funds into a fiscal impulse that accompanies and steers the recovery effort of our productive system; to urgently implement an ambitious, comprehensive, lasting and assessable strategy of reforms that tackles the structural challenges of our economy; and, finally, to design a medium-term fiscal consolidation programme, for gradual implementation once the economic crisis caused by the pandemic is behind us, that ensures the sustainability of our public finances and enables fiscal buffers to be built up for use in future recessionary episodes. The future well-being of our country depends on an economic policy strategy that combines these principles. Thus, as I have stressed on other occasions, there should in my opinion be a high degree of consensus among the various political, economic and social agents regarding the guiding principles of this strategy, so that the foundations on which our growth rests are predictable and lasting. Thank you. 12

Meanwhile, we expect underlying inflation to remain close to the target rate of 21/2% - though perhaps a little above that rate during the course of next year. Now no-one likes to see the economy slowing down, but some slowdown was necessary at this point in the economic cycle in order to avoid an inflationary upsurge. And if in fact it proves to be as mild as most of the forecasts - including our own - suggest, it will be a huge improvement on anything we have seen at this stage in the cycle for decades. BIS Review 98/1998  -4-  It is true of course that the economy may turn out to be weaker than in our central projection. That projection is the MPC’s very carefully considered view as to the most probable outcome, but there is considerable uncertainty around it; and the risks are somewhat more on the down than on the upside. We don’t have a crystal ball. And we don’t pretend to know at all precisely just how things will in fact turn out - that’s why we publish our forecasts in the form of a fan with a wide range of uncertainty around the central case. The people to watch out for in this field are those who do claim to know precisely.
As for activity and demand, in recent months their evolution has been in line with the forecasts in the March Report. According to National Accounts data for the first quarter, seasonally adjusted, domestic demand fell by 1.5% with respect to the previous quarter, with a drop of 8.0% in an annual comparison. Total GDP and non-mining GDP grew in their seasonally adjusted series, with increases of 0.8% and 1.2%, respectively. This was mainly due to a transitory accounting effect in the transportation sector, which we had already mentioned in the March Report. In annual variation, the two showed a drop of 0.6% (figure 4). By sectors, personal services, restaurants &hotels, and fishery performed well during the first quarter. In contrast, commerce has continued to adjust and construction continues to underperform. The largest downward difference was recorded in the mining sector. On the expenditure side, the main developments were concentrated in consumption. Seasonally adjusted, private consumption fell 2.5% quarter-on-quarter (q/q), a sharper than anticipated fall, mainly explained by the 18.8% q/q decline in durable consumption. Regular consumption continues on a downward trend in goods and an upward trend in services. Government consumption, on the other hand, grew more than we projected (figure 5). In any case, this evolution of private consumption is considered a preview of the decline expected during this year. This is in line with high-frequency information, such as imports of and spending on goods and services (figure 6).

Cards can be physically stolen or credit card numbers can be acquired by thieves over the phone, internet or website and then used illegally to rack up debts. Access Bank must therefore, develop adequate security measures that can protect it and its clients from the crimes which seem to pervade the electronic based payment platforms. To fight this crime, you will need to educate your customers on how to safely and securely conduct transaction using their cards. You will help prevent fraud by educating your customers on what to do when they lose their card or wallet, how to secure their card by, for instance, not giving out credit card information anyhow or on the website and the need to check statements closely. On their part, cardholders must also do their part as responsible  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  cardholders, including paying off balances on credit cards as required, not loaning credit cards to others or divulging credit card information to anyone not entitled to it. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me reiterate my words of commendation to Access Bank for introducing this product on the market. It is a great product which when used properly will benefit both the bank and its customers. This outcome is however, predicted on customers using the card wisely and responsibly and on the bank issuing cards to clients after a careful vetting and scrutiny and charging fair interest on the product. Failure to choose creditworthy customers will lead to defaults which may trigger excessive charges.
This has included convening topic-specific roundtables and seminars, supporting analytical and policy initiatives, and providing periodic updates on hot topics in the sector. What have we learned? Some tentative conclusions  The work undertaken by the Accelerator has been of significant value, both for the Bank and, we believe, for the broader FinTech community. For the Bank, we have gained first-hand experience of a range of new technologies, helping us to evaluate their application both to the Bank’s own functions and in the wider market. Our work on DLT has helped us start to think through how the financial networks of the future may be able to operate in safer and more efficient ways, and how we can ensure they can continue to benefit from access to central bank money. Our work on data analysis has thrown light on how we can manage ever larger data sets to monitor the economy and the financial system in real time and draw out patterns that might help us set better policy or spot the next crisis coming before it happens. And our work on machine learning has helped us take the first baby steps towards engaging with that data in a more interactive way, putting computers alongside our staff to help them form the judgments on which monetary and financial stability depend.

Since 2001, we have thus lowered interest rates more quickly and more decisively than the ECB. With inflation less than 1 percent, we enjoy price stability and our interest rates lie clearly below corresponding rates in the eurozone. A more homogeneous monetary system in Europe and a more stable international monetary order will help Switzerland to fully benefit from the present recovery of the world economy. 4  BIS Review 35/2004