samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 8 Sweden’s net external position and accumulated current accounts Percentage of GDP  80  80 Accumulated current accounts Net external position  60  60 Nominal net external position  40  40  20  20  0  0  -20  -20  -40  -40  -60  -60 75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  If it is the case that Sweden has no particularly large net claim internationally then this will have some significance for the prospects for the real exchange rate. In theory, countries with a strong external position should in the long term experience appreciating real exchange rates, and vice versa. There is also empirical support for the link between the net position and real exchange rates when studying different countries. 24 With a net claim close to zero one would not necessarily expect any strengthening of the real exchange rate despite a large current account surplus. The fact that Sweden’s external position appears to be close to zero suggests that there is no need for the real exchange rate for the krona to move in any particular direction for this reason. Other factors also affect the real exchange rate, for example relative GDP growth, relative inflation and the terms of trade.

5  The current account mainly consists of the difference between exports and imports of goods and services. Net capital income and various charges paid to and received from abroad are also included, but these components usually account for a much smaller part of the total than net exports. 6  For a more detailed discussion, see Lane, 2010. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1 Current accounts, private net capital and GDP in eastern and central Europe Percentage of GDP and annual percentage change 15  15 GDP Current account Private capital  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10 80  82  84  86  89  91  93  95  97  99  01  04  06  08  10  Note. Private capital is made up of direct private investment (net), private portfolio flows (net) and other private capital (net flows), expressed here as a share of GDP. Source: The IMF  Global imbalances have increased since the deregulation of the capital markets at the end of the 1980s. One of the reasons for this is that countries with surpluses, such as China, have grown more rapidly than other countries. The higher rate of growth means that China’s savings surplus (the difference between saving and investment) has increased as a percentage of global GDP.
Taken together, the new information that we have received about the Swedish economy also indicates a development well in line with our forecast in the Inflation Report in October. Inflation and monetary policy Inflation in the Swedish economy has been low since the end of 2003. According to the most recent data, for September, annual inflation in terms of the CPI and UND1X stood at 0.6 per cent and 1.0 per cent, respectively.3 As we observed in the Inflation Report, the low inflation can be explained in large measure by favourable supply conditions – strong competition and fast productivity growth – and relatively low resource utilisation. At the same time, imported inflation has been restrained because the share of imports coming from low-cost countries has risen. Imported inflation has also been held back by the previous strengthening of the krona. Developments in the krona exchange rate are one of all the factors that we have to consider when we forecast inflation. It is also one of the few areas where the performance since October has deviated considerably from what we expected at the time. Allow me therefore to comment briefly on the krona exchange rate. For a succession of years the Riksbank has been predicting that the krona will  3  CPI data for October will be released today, 11 November. 5/6  strengthen. This forecast has been very accurate up to the beginning of this year even though there have been some large short-term deviations on the way (see Figure 2).

A final word on central counterparties (CCP): I would like to acknowledge the valuable proposals recently made by the European Commission to insist that those CCPs whose activities are “super-systemic” for the EU market establish themselves in the European Union. They are a step in the right direction and represent the only viable mechanism to guarantee that European authorities and national central banks in particular, can control and manage the risks that CCPs are likely to pose to the financial stability of the European Union. Once the provisions on the resolution of CCPs have been finalised, the compensation framework within the EU will have been improved considerably. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  * * * Let me conclude with a general remark that concerns the economy: we need a system to assess, ex post, the economic effects of the reforms. France fully supports the work of the FSB to develop a structured analytical framework, which Germany has rightly included in its priorities for its G20 presidency. Europe, and Germany and France in particular, now has a special duty to protect financial regulation – a regulation that is sensitive to risk, balanced in its treatment of banks and nonbanks and binds the entire international community. Generally, that is what we’ve been doing well since 2009, and it is what continues to inspire us. Thank you for your attention and I wish you an excellent conference. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Thailand is somewhat in an awkward position currently, being left behind by the NICs, and being caught up by countries like China and Vietnam, to name a few. It is therefore important to extend efforts beyond market diversification to promoting higher value along the production chain, a task that both the private sector and the Government have a role to play. Especially with the rising FTAs as well as other regional integration and cooperation, notably among ASEAN, we must work to make sure that Thai producers and exporters can fully utilize the benefits from these arrangements. Fourth, prudent policy has obviously shielded us from the contagion of external developments so far. In addition to the importance of fiscal discipline and debt sustainability which I have already highlighted, I would like to stress that monetary policy has not and should not be used as an instrument to boost short-term growth. However, it can help cushion the economy against growth contraction in the short run, while ensuring stability in the long run. In this past crisis, the adverse effect led us to a series of aggressive rate cuts during December 2008 to April 2009 in order to help shore up the economy. The rate cuts were timely and turned out to be effective, in view of the momentum of economic recovery achieved. Regarding the framework of monetary policy, I should stress that the Bank of Thailand’s policy framework has always emphasized, not only monetary stability, but also financial stability.

The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England, the FPC, has the task of identifying, monitoring and taking action to remove or reduce risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the financial system in the UK. These risks at the level of the system can include those arising from structural features of financial markets, from the distribution of risk within the financial system, and from unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth. The emphasis here is very clearly on ensuring the resilience of the financial system. But our objective is not to achieve resilience at any cost – our actions must not have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term. Moreover, and here you will recognise the symmetry with the objectives of the MPC, the legislation provides that, subject to achieving our primary objective for financial stability – resilience – the FPC must also support “the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment”. The reforms have also created the new Prudential Regulation Authority as part of the Bank of England. Here, the statutory objective of the microprudential regulator is the safety and soundness of the firms which we prudentially regulate – banks, insurers and major investment firms. Moreover, our objective of safety and soundness sits in the context of the stability of the financial system. What does that mean?
John C Williams: A time for bold action Remarks (delivered via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 16 April 2020. * * * As prepared for delivery  Introduction Thank you for the kind introduction. Hello, from my apartment in Manhattan. It’s a pleasure to be able to join you today, even under these extraordinary circumstances. I hope that wherever you are watching, you and your loved ones are safe and well. The outbreak of the coronavirus and the global pandemic have created an unprecedented situation. Today, I want to talk about what that means for the economy and financial markets, and how the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Federal Reserve System as a whole, are responding to the challenges before us. My colleagues and I are dedicated to doing everything within our power to support the functioning of financial markets and help put the economy on a strong footing once this crisis is behind us. Before I continue, let me give the Fed disclaimer that the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. The coronavirus pandemic has created circumstances we have never experienced before in our lifetimes. There’s hardly a community in the world that remains unaffected.

This may require you to take the higher ground, to set aside the temptation to promote such risky investment or insurance products that can earn you high commissions. While this may dampen your earnings prospects in the short term, you stand to gain the trust, confidence and loyalty of your clients over the long term. I have faith that all of you – who have taken the time to participate in this conference – will rise to this challenge and contribute to the building of a financial intermediation industry that is both profitable and ethical. I began with Shakespeare, now let me end with Confucius, the ancient Chinese philosopher. He once said: “I used to take on trust a man’s deeds, after having listened to his words. Now, having listened to a man’s words, I go on to observe his deeds”. To put this in context, it is not enough for financial institutions and practitioners to publish client charters that claim the customer is king and that their interests will always be prioritised. Given the pace and pervasiveness of social media platforms, if your actions do not match your words, you will soon be called out very publicly by your own dissatisfied customers. On the other hand, if you successfully build a reputation of high professionalism and integrity, this will ensure the longevity and growth of your business and consumer base. 1  The FEN is an inter-agency platform comprising of institutions and agencies committed to improving the financial literacy of Malaysians.
The Riksbank is also involved when the candidate countries present their "Pre-accession Economic Programmes" (PEP) for the EU countries. These PEP programmes are exercises where the countries attempt to analyse and present their economic challenges in the way they will in future, as  BIS Review 9/2002  5  EU members, present stability and convergence programmes and consult on economic policy within the framework of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. Hopefully, the Riksbank will be able to contribute with analysis of economic activity and structural issues in these countries, not merely for our own forecasts but also in relation to the EU and ECB. What we can learn from the candidate countries Before I finish, I would like to go from speaking of what the candidate countries can learn from us to pointing out what we can learn from them. Several of the former planned economies are now in some areas better adapted to the EMU than today's EU countries. Several of them have, for instance, a flexible labour market and wage formation. This appears to have contributed to enabling the Baltic states to cope with the Russia crisis and the breakdown of the Russian market, without their reform efforts and growth coming to a standstill. This flexibility also makes them extremely well suited in this respect for a monetary union like the EMU. The preparedness to implement structural reforms also appears greater.

The Fund would support the proliferation on the buy side for the issuance of sukuk out of Malaysia, besides providing a platform for the Islamic fund management industry, including start-ups to build their track record in managing foreign currencies fund denominated. Complementary to this initiative is the creation of a Malaysian-based sukuk index for foreign currency and also an extension of our domestic settlement capabilities to include foreign currency securities. This is the moment when we need the cooperation from the private sector in support of government’s measures to generate business and to stimulate the economic growth. There are enormous opportunities for the industry to benefit from these initiatives. The strengthening and the transformation of the financial sector contributed by financial deregulation, opening of markets and integration have created a more competitive environment. In aligning to the rapidly changing and increasingly challenging global environment with significant growth in world trade and enhanced international linkages with global economies, the foreign exchange administration (FEA) rules have been progressively liberalized to promote flexibility and competitiveness of the economy while safeguarding monetary and financial stability. The philosophy on the liberalisation of the foreign exchange administration rules takes into account the readiness of the economy which includes sound macroeconomic fundamentals and prudent fiscal policy, a well diversified financial market with sound and stable financial system that is able to withstand external shocks, liquid and efficient capital market and healthy balance of payments position that is supported by an effective and well functioning surveillance mechanism.
The ECB’s conjunctural measures are of no use, however, in resolving the central problem revealed by the crisis: the need for mechanisms that help counter the risks arising from the fact that countries with heterogeneous structural features share a common currency and that, therefore, they can no longer resort to their own monetary and exchange rate policies as macroeconomic stabilisation instruments. At the various summit meetings held in recent years, the euro area Heads of State or Government have reaffirmed their unequivocal political commitment to keeping the EMU project on track and to completing monetary union and moving towards greater economic integration. Evidently, though, in this process it will be necessary to share substantial sovereignty in sensitive areas such as fiscal policy or banking system oversight, and to set in train mechanisms allowing some degree of risk mutualisation, without this potentially discouraging economic discipline in the various countries. The steps taken so far are along the right lines. But without wishing to speak out of turn, there is notable room for improvement in the pace at which decisions are being taken. On the fiscal front, reforms to date have translated into a significant strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact. Key factors in this reinforcement have been the greater attention to debt ceilings and the establishment of greater automaticity in the procedures to evaluate potential non-compliance and to activate the necessary corrective mechanisms, along with the requirement to revise national legal frameworks.

People with a foreign background in Sweden have found it difficult to get a foot-hold in the labour market. Employment among people with a foreign background is around 30 per cent lower on average than among native Swedes. Were the employment rate for this group to be as high as the average for Sweden's population, employment would rise by 96,000 people. Finally, the decisive factor for the labour supply is how many hours we work. The number of hours worked has fallen recently for several reasons: overtime has declined, part-time work has increased and absence to care for own children has also risen. But the single biggest reason and consequently the most serious problem in Sweden is sick leave. Both the number and length of absences due to sickness have risen sharply in recent years, thus entailing a reduction in working hours per employee. Three years ago the number of hours worked increased by 2.7 per cent. Last year the number decreased by 1.2 per cent. Larger proportion of elderly entails increased demands The age composition will place great demands on welfare services, increasing further the need for labour. In Sweden the number of people that are judged to require extensive care, i.e. those that are 85 years or older, will double up to 2035.1 This is expected to result in greater pressure on the public finances since the costs for care rise steeply in line with increasing age.
4 And the Thatcher government, elected shortly afterwards, failed to command broad-based support for a medium-term framework for reducing inflation explicitly founded on “monetarism”, which became a loaded term, widely perceived across UK society as part of an ideology. In other words, sound money or price stability was not viewed as an objective that could be shared across the democratic political spectrum. 5  1  See Chapter 2 in Blinder, A. S., 2004, The Quiet Revolution: Central Banking Goes Modern, Yale University Press. 2  Lombardelli, C., J. Proudman and J. Talbot (2005), “Committees versus individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision making”, International Journal of Central Banking, May 2005. 3  “The operation of monetary policy since the Radcliffe report: text of paper presented at a conference “Radcliffe – ten years after”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, volume 9, number 4, 1969. 4  Burk, K. & and A. Cairncross, 1992, "Goodbye, Great Britain": the 1976 IMF crisis, Yale University Press. 5  I say democratic, because enemies of democracy have seen debauching the currency as a means to their ends. For example, “The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to debauch the currency” is attributed to V. I. Lenin by J. M. Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1920, p. 235. BIS Review 66/2007  1  This was, perhaps, apparent in the famous 1981 letter of the 364 economists which stressed that “the time has come to reject monetarist policies”.

As a further gloss on that piece of history, I should perhaps disclose that, working to Eddie, Mervyn and the then DG , Howard Davies, I was the Bank official who “held the pen” during that work. 21  As stated in Balls, E and G. O’Donnell, 2002, Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy, “The role of the Chancellor in appointing the four outsiders was part of the delicate constitutional balance that was struck in a move towards a legitimate model of central bank independence consistent with British-style accountability to Parliament.” (page 99)  4  BIS Review 66/2007  This is what I have been leading up to: an “individualistic” committee was a necessary condition for operational independence in the UK. In terms of solving the time-consistency problem and establishing credibility, the UK system does not rely on handing monetary policy, lock, stock and barrel, to a group of “conservative central bankers”; in terms of the literature familiar to this conference, the system is as much Walsh as Rogoff. 22 The regime is based on combining an objective set by democratically elected politicians, with clear accountability mechanisms. One of those mechanisms was triggered for the first time recently when CPI inflation rose to 3.1% in March, requiring the Governor, on behalf of the Committee, to write an open letter to the Chancellor about what we thought was going on and what we planned to do to get inflation back to our target of 2%.
Firms as a whole still strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees, and that they should reduce their debts to restore financial soundness. Nevertheless, the number of firms that take positive action, such as increasing the amount of fixed investment, is increasing gradually, especially in high-growth sectors. Regarding employment conditions, although the decrease in the number of employees and in wages is slowing, efforts by firms to reduce personnel expenses have prolonged the severity of households’ income conditions. As for the outlook, public investment is likely to increase for some time. This, along with the favorable financial environment created partly by the Bank’s monetary easing, is expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, net exports are likely to follow an upward trend reflecting the recovery of overseas economies, and it is also highly probable that business fixed investment will increase gradually with an improvement in corporate profits and sentiment. However, housing investment is expected to continue declining moderately, and there seems to be no substantial change in firms’ stance to reduce personnel expenses. Hence, it may take some time for households’ income conditions to improve and, in turn, for private consumption to recover. In addition, since firms’ prospects for sales remain modest, careful monitoring is still required to determine whether the recovery in business fixed investment is sustainable and whether it is likely to spread to a wider range of industries.

It is difficult to say in advance what characterises a financial imbalance. A simplified way of describing a financial imbalance is that households, businesses and for that matter also the state base their decisions on increased indebtedness on expectations of the development of wealth and coming real incomes which are then not realised. When this becomes evident, major sacrifices must be made to be able to pay debts. The macroeconomic costs can be high when households are forced to reduce their consumption and businesses their investments to be able to adapt their balance sheets to new expectations. If the problems are so extensive that certain groups quite simply cannot pay their loans, the crisis can spread to the bank system and the macroeconomic costs in the form of unemployment and low growth rise further. These are questions that are discussed frequently and at length with regard to the US economy. There, demand by households and businesses for consumption and investment goods are to a great extent financed on the capital market. Strong growth in wealth and expectations of continued high production growth have driven forward development and this has also been reflected in share prices. A large part of demand has leaked out in imports and there have been continual large American current account deficits. This has been able to happen without inflation speeding up which has to some extent been due to the strong development of the US dollar.