samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Gradually, unease increased because of security policy developments. The financial unease gradually infected the real economy; confidence among companies and consumers began to fall in several countries over the summer and it became increasingly clear that total demand had been negatively affected. This contributed to enabling the Riksbank to lower the repo rate twice during the autumn, measures that were in my assessment quite fitting under the circumstances. What we can observe today, compared with one year ago, is that the questions baffling forecasters are roughly the same and that they are dominated by the question of how far the adaptation process following from the stock market bubble has come. Today an additional factor making assessments more difficult is the threat of war in the Middle East. We do not know whether there will be a war or how it will all end. The crisis also creates uncertainty that makes it difficult to correctly interpret economic signals. In addition, the more prolonged the crisis is, the greater the risk that the actual uncertainty will have a negative effect on the real economy. I shall now turn towards the future and discuss developments over the coming 1-2 years. Right conditions for a recovery in the USA… One difference now compared with the situation one year ago is that the adaptation of the imbalances in the US economy has probably progressed further.

Price stability itself has coincided with – some would say produced – a prolonged period of strong growth and low output volatility, which, as you know, has been dubbed the “great moderation". One major disappointment however, has been that price stability has not led to financial stability. On the contrary, it seems that, over the last two decades, financial crises have become more frequent, with increasingly serious consequences for growth and welfare. To get a sense of this puzzle, it may be useful to look at the intrinsic dynamics of the financial system. Both in normal times and times of stress, amplification mechanisms are at work, which exacerbate the impact of any specific shock. These mechanisms act through changes in leverage, liquidity, and risk aversion. These three factors interact in a complex and sometimes unpredictable way. For instance, growth in leverage may be fuelled by an increase in risk appetite. In turn, larger balance sheets of financial intermediaries give rise to liquidity expansion and growing risk appetite. It is easy to see how these dynamics can create strong procyclicality in the evolution of asset prices and credit aggregates. It is also likely that procyclicality is partly created, or accentuated, by our accounting and prudential regimes. If financial procyclicality was a short-term, mean-reverting, phenomenon, there would be little cause for concern. Unfortunately, those same mechanisms allow for the progressive buildup, over a long period of time, of significant imbalances and deviations in asset prices. At some stage, the correction becomes unavoidable, and is generally abrupt.
In the run-up to the coming autumn Duma session we will come up with a package of amendments to legislation to allow the Bank of Russia to set up a special-purpose Banking Sector Consolidation Fund. This fund would be a participant in the equity of banks under resolution. Also, a dedicated management company would be created to provide operational management to a bank under resolution. In such a scheme, the central bank would oversee the bank turnaround programme. Capitalisation support would come in quickly, available immediately; where necessary, resolution would involve both reorganisation and merger. Either of these would be followed by sale of banks, recovered to a satisfactory financial condition. Thanks to the new model to migrate to, the processes of bank resolution are sure to become less inexpensive, faster, more manageable and overall more effective. We will see banks under resolution being reorganised so as to ensure that financial recovery yields maximum results and raises investment appeal of such banks. Concurrently, this will predetermine optimisation of the banking sector’s structure. Both commercial banks and private investors would be able to enjoy the outcomes as they acquire well performing banks and those with capital top-up. Apparently, the mechanism will be the subject for discussion with the bank community. Looking forward, I would like to tell you that we have looked into potential risks this approach involves. Here are our key findings. The risk of banking sector becoming nationalised. In our understanding, we are running no such risk, for two reasons.

Where the operations of a bank / financial holding company also include non-finance companies (industrial, construction, commercial), such holding would need to set up (or designate) a management company, which will consolidate the statements of the holding’s financial institutions and to which the powers to manage such companies would be assigned. A similar management company for bank and financial assets would need to be created by owners of parallel financial institutions, as well as by holdings and associations where the parent organisation is located overseas. It is important to us that this management company should be in the Russian jurisdiction. We envisage no need for any separate licensing of its activity, as long as it would be covered by the requirements for reporting consolidation, requirements for consolidation-based calculation of required ratios and their observance, as well as those for risk management systems, internal controls and the composition of management as are currently applicable for regulated financial institutions. The Bank of Russia should be authorised to take regulatory action against such parent organisation. We will detail our plans for regulation of banking and financial holding companies in a separate consultation report to be released shortly for public discussion. We will be ready to discuss the report in detail with all market participants. On a final note on the banking sector, I would like to announce another initiative, which is perhaps of a minor scale than those announced today, but still very topical.
They also pay little attention to the traumatic experience of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the natural inclination to build up ammunition, in the form of foreign currency reserves, ever since. After all, most of us are small, in terms of our economies and our political influence, and the reality of this world is that, when you are small, you are more likely to be tossed around. So we need to be more cautious in our finances. 6. We find ourselves being held, at least partly, responsible for the dilemma currently surrounding the global imbalance, which has been interestingly described as a "stable disequilibrium". The description begs the questions as to how long the disequilibrium will remain stable and whether the eventual adjustment path to equilibrium is likely to be an unstable one. The answers to these questions remain elusive. 7. This obviously is not a very comfortable position that we find ourselves in. One solution to this structural problem in Asian finance, at least to us in the HKMA, is greater Asian financial integration to promote the stability, integrity, diversity and efficiency of financial intermediation across jurisdictions in Asia. At the micro level, an obvious, non-controversial initiative that Asian jurisdictions support, although not necessarily for the same macro reasons that I have described, is the development of the domestic and the Asian bond markets, hence the EMEAP ABF initiative. BIS Review 79/2005  1  Asian Bond Fund 8.

The trust deed and prospectus of the PAIF, which comply with laws and regulations of Hong Kong and Singapore and are in line with international standards, served as a model for the drafting of fund documents for the ABF2 Single-Market Funds. This has helped to promote the adoption of international best practices among EMEAP economies. 2  BIS Review 79/2005  ABF and financial stability 15. Let me turn to the other question that I have been asked specifically to address, and this is how the ABF initiative can contribute to financial stability in the region. I must confess that, even though the central banks in the region have been enthusiastic in the development of the project, the benefits of ABF to financial stability in the region have not been clearly articulated in our deliberations. I can assure you, however, that this is not a reflection of any lack of brains on the part of Asian central bankers or because the objectives have not been clearly defined, although there may be a lack of a clear road map. But it should be all right, as Deng Xiaoping pointed out, to cross the river by feeling the stones. The lack of a clear linkage between ABF or indeed debt market development generally and financial stability is more a reflection of the difficulty of defining what financial stability is. 16.
Indeed, the current turmoil has underscored the importance of robust liquidity management by banks, as well as the need for supervisory approaches which keep pace with structural market developments. Many initiatives with a view to addressing issues and risks arising from the recent financial market turbulence that go into the right direction have already been launched, both at the international level, namely by the Financial Stability Forum, and at the EU level, with the ECOFIN agreeing to a roadmap for action by 2008, and also by the private sector. They must be pursued now with even stronger impetus. In this respect, co-ordination at the global level should be ensured. In closely interlinked financial markets, any policy measure should be agreed to and consistently applied at the international level. Fifth, in the same vein, there is a need to reflect carefully on the “originate-anddistribute” business model. The period ahead is likely to provide a first material test of changing banking business models and the increased reliance on secured funding. Although currently profitable and well capitalised, many banks will experience income and credit losses, which may trigger a re assessment by some of them of the suitability of the so-called originate-and-distribute business model. The current episode has also shown that the transfer of credit risk outside the banking sector may ultimately not be effective. This is related with reputational and other concerns, which induce banks to take credit risk back onto their balance sheets.

Some investors may also have misinterpreted the risk dimensions covered by a rating. Against this background there is probably scope to improve the information content of ratings and to make the monitoring process more transparent. It also needs to be investigated further to what extent conflicts of interest may have arisen for rating agencies in their credit risk assessment of structured credit instruments. Several international fora are currently looking at those issues. Fourth, the turmoil has revealed some challenges for the liquidity management of banks. BIS Review 137/2007  1  Banks, including those in continental Europe, have increasingly relied on secured funding, both via securitisation and off-balance sheet vehicles. This has rendered them more vulnerable to a sudden disruption of structured credit markets. Let me recall that the regulatory framework requires EU banks to have policies and procedures for the measurement and management of net funding positions on an ongoing and forward-looking basis and have in place contingency funding plans. In this context, recent events have demonstrated that banks need to further strengthen their liquidity risk stress-tests, encompassing for example scenarios such as a protracted closure of a broad range of securitisation markets and the drawing of contingent liquidity obligations by commercial paper programmes. Moreover, those elements should also be incorporated into their contingency funding plans. The ECB, together with the ESCB Banking Supervision Committee, is carrying out work on this important topic.
Transparency and disclosure are very important but we believed it was not sufficient. We have thus been working closely with the Vice-President on strengthening our banks’ solvency. A result of this has been the recently approved Royal Decree-Law, which we believe is a definitive step and a crucial quantitative and qualitative leap forward in restoring market confidence in Spanish banks. The aims of the new Royal Decree-Law are very clear. The first is to reinforce the solvency of all our banks, requiring them a level of core capital of 8% and because the doubts of investors over a small group of unlisted banks with some need to resort to the wholesale market, we are demanding of such banks 10% of core capital. We publicly announced yesterday which banks need capital to reach the 8–10% level, and how much capital they need. We have given them fifteen days to submit a recapitalisation plan. Those intending to tap the markets will have until end-September to attain the new level of capital. But we have made it very clear that if a bank believes it will be impossible to reach these solvency levels, it can apply to the FROB for these funds. The capital shortfall is for a maximum of € million, whereby the impact on public debt if the FROB has to be used would be relatively limited.

Recently, in fact, we have seen how our sovereign spread has been converging more towards the core euro area countries, distancing itself from those economies with bigger challenges outstanding. Our firm commitment to transparency, to the rigorous valuation of assets through a clear provisioning system and our significant increase in capital requirements should contribute to fully dispelling doubts about the current situation of Spanish banks and their medium-term prospects. Thank you for your patience. I am at your entire disposal to respond to your questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
That is only to be expected when the krona has fluctuated markedly, besides being clearly under-valued on the whole in recent years. Differences in inflation and growth could previously explain most things In a longer perspective there are explanations for a large part of the krona’s depreciation. In the past three decades the nominal exchange rate has weakened about 90 per cent. More than half of this deterioration can be attributed to the higher inflation in Sweden compared with the rest of the world in the 1970s and ’80s. Mostly of the remaining part of the real deprecation can be explained in terms of relative GDP growth and worsening terms of trade in the same period. But neither of these two factors is relevant to the period since 1992 with a flexible exchange rate: inflation, growth and terms of trade have been at least on a par with the rest of the world. Various flows may have played a part in the short run. Looking back, it is evident that export growth and rapidly rising Swedish share prices may have contributed to the high exchange rate with the euro twelve to eighteen months ago. During the past year the opposite has applied. Another factor has been large investments in foreign shares when earlier barriers to risk diversion were removed from the pension system. In September there was also general financial unrest. However, variables such as these have proved to be of little value for forecasting.

Judging from the various indicators of inflation BIS Review 89/2001  1  expectations, on the whole we seem to have been successful (Diagram 1). Although inflation has actually fluctuated markedly, for a number of years money market players, for example, have counted on future inflation being approximately 2 per cent. Neither have they been greatly mistaken. Since we began to target inflation, the rate measured by the CPI has averaged 1.3 per cent, while UND1X inflation has averaged 1.8 per cent. 1. Inflation expectations among money market players Per cent 5  5 Jan 95  4  4 Mar 00  3  3  Feb 96  Feb 97  Sep 01  2  2 CPI Feb 98  1  1  Sep 00  0  0  -1  -1 94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  Sources: Statistics Sweden and Prospera Research AB  If we have anything to reproach ourselves for, perhaps it is that, despite our efforts to the contrary, we seem to have induced many segments of society to believe that we can fulfil the target, if not always then almost so. That is evidently not the case. Inflation fluctuates, sometimes a lot. The same seems to apply in most other relatively small countries. Compare inflation in, for instance, the individual euro countries with the average rate in the European Union.
In the European Union region, small enterprises are defined as those having 50 workers and an activity volume of 10 million Euros, while medium ones are those with 250 workers and an annual activity volume of 50 million Euros. In the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund adopts the criterion of the annual sales for defining small and medium enterprises whose annual sales do not exceed Rls 20 million for financing purposes according to “Kafallah” program. The World Bank has distributed a questionnaire to commercial banks to determine a definition for small and medium enterprises. The result of the questionnaire has showed that there is difference in banks’ definitions. However, it may be concluded that small enterprises are those with annual sales ranging from Rls 100 thousand to Rls 5 million and workers from 2 to 49. Medium enterprises are those with annual sales from Rls 5 million to 50 million and workers from 50 to 200. Dear audience, SMEs are characterized by many features including, simplicity of their establishment due to the low value of the capital needed for their foundation and operation, simplicity of their establishment procedures, and low cost of their establishment and administration because of the simplicity of their administrative structure. Moreover, SMEs are featured by the independent management by their owners who seek as much success as possible.

Muhammad Al-Jasser: Small and medium enterprises Opening speech by His Excellency Dr Muhammad Al-Jasser, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), at the symposium on “Small and Medium Enterprises”, organized by the Institute of Banking in cooperation with the International Financing Corporation, Riyadh, 2 November 2010. *  *  *  Excellencies and honored audience, It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all in the headquarters of the Institute of Banking. I’m delighted to receive an invitation to deliver the opening speech for the symposium on “Small and Medium Enterprises” before this distinguished elite of participants and audience. I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to the colleagues at the Institute of Banking and International Finance Corporation (IFC) for organizing this symposium. I will try in this speech to shed light on some ideas related to the importance of the role of these enterprises in the national economy, challenges facing their growth, and provision of appropriate funding for them. Dear audience, The national economy consists of an integrated wide range of public and private enterprises which utilize available material and human factors of production for providing continuous flows of goods and services to meet the needs of the domestic society and part of external demand. As a matter of fact, the sizes of local firms vary according to the size of labour, capital, sales…etc. It is mistakenly believed that large-scale enterprises are the main impetus for economic activity.
Consequently, some solutions can only be applied at the international level. This is why the G20 has grown in significance since 2008. We need to make further progress in international cooperation, in particular to identify the sources of global financial imbalances and reduce them via the “framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth” and to improve international financial regulation. As regards the latter, we must always bear in mind our twofold objective: enhancing financial stability while ensuring the financing of the economy. I would now like to turn to the situation in the euro area. As you know, in 2011, the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area was particularly ferocious, spilling over to countries with sound economic fundamentals. The first three months of 2012 had shown a few signs of improvement, in particular thanks to the Eurosystem initiatives and positive political impulses: pressure on sovereign debt eased slightly, and bank financing and money markets recovered somewhat. But since April, sovereign debt and banking systems have come under renewed pressure. The two main driving factors behind this deterioration are the fiscal problems and difficulties in the banking sector in Spain – but the plan adopted over the weekend should respond effectively – and, above all, the major political uncertainty in Greece. Therefore, there is a tremendous amount of work to do on a number of fronts if Europe is to find a durable solution to the crisis.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Of directors and supply of talent Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of FIDE Forum Directors Register “Of Directors and Supply of Talent”, Kuala Lumpur, 1 April 2016. *  *  *  Today marks an important step forward for board talent management among financial institutions in Malaysia. The Directors Register will be launched this morning to address the financial sector’s need for a reliable supply of qualified individuals to meet the growing demand for high-calibre directors. Financial institutions play a critical role in the economy, intermediating funds to support the real economy. Because of the criticality of the role, financial institutions must be led by directors who possess the necessary skills, experience and integrity to spearhead financial institutions in a competent and effective manner. Identifying, developing and retaining directors of high calibre are no easy task. We need to design a solution to achieve it. The Directors Register is therefore a timely initiative as this acts as a solution to expand the pool of potential directors for boards of financial institutions. Demand imperatives Being a director of a financial institution is highly demanding. The last financial crisis has shown the failure of board oversight in managing the affairs of financial institutions. Unbridled risks-taking, misaligned, incentives structures and failures in overall governance were just a few of the shortcomings that almost brought the global financial system to a standstill.