samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Coupled with a sizeable fiscal impulse, both types of actions were successful in delivering the stimulus needed to counteract the shortfall in aggregate demand, stabilise output and initiate the economic recovery. Unemployment in both jurisdictions, which had spiked in the early phase of the crisis, levelled off and began to decrease. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  At this point, however, the euro area entered the second phase of the crisis, causing its growth trajectory to diverge substantially from that of the United States. It experienced a sovereign debt crisis in 2011–12 which was unique among advanced economies. Fears about the sustainability of the sovereign debt of some euro area Member States triggered a sharp widening of sovereign spreads and introduced the fear of redenomination risk: that some countries would revert to national currencies, invariably weaker ones, and thus leave the euro area. Moreover, banks in some countries came under intense scrutiny over their domestic sovereign holdings and some national banking systems completely lost access to wholesale funding markets. Private investment contracted as the cost of capital rose and uncertainty spiked. The fiscal stance in the euro area shifted from expansionary to contractionary as governments acted to restore market confidence. The euro area entered a renewed recession. The second phase: unique institutional challenges The ECB responded to the sovereign debt crisis with various new monetary policy measures, such as our long-term lending operations, and even began purchasing sovereign bonds under the Securities Markets Programme.

That said, private sector actors do not need to wait for public authorities to do everything before starting to think about consolidation strategies. Lastly, we also need to ensure that institutions are treated equally under international regulations. If we are to reach an agreement, two conditions must be met. The transposition of Basel III must be reasonable and take into account the application of the “output floor” at  Page 4 of 5  the highest level of consolidation. Above all, the transposition must be fair and applied to the letter in all jurisdictions, including in the United States. Let me be clear about one thing, however: the solution to our banking challenges is not deregulation but rather innovation; not a step backwards – towards the financial crisis – but a leap forwards. III. We need to remain fully mobilised with regard to two deadly risks: ALM/CTF and cyber-security  The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (ALM/CTF) calls for unwavering commitment. The 23 inspections carried out by the ACPR revealed major failings in supervised entities’ compliance with their AML/CTF and asset-freezing obligations. In 2018, the Sanctions Committee imposed nine sanctions, one of which amounted to EUR 50 million. In parallel with the Financial Action Task Force’s assessment of France in 2020, the ACPR will be closely involved in the implementation of a robust and renewed AML/CTF system at the European level.
Maiava Atalina Ainuu Enari: Educating individuals to manage their personal finances Opening remarks by Ms Maiava Atalina Ainuu Enari, Governor of the Central Bank of Samoa, at the MoneyPACIFIC “Money Guide” launch, Apia, 2 April 2014. *  *  *  Members of the Diplomatic Community Youth and Education Directors of the Church denominations present today Our MoneyPACIFIC partners – Kim Hailwood and Becky de Beer-Lamont Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen It is indeed an honour for me to address this gathering today, at this important milestone in the partnership of the MoneyPACIFIC project and the Central Bank of Samoa. The MoneyPACIFIC Project was established in 2007 under the umbrella of the NZ-Pacific Remittances’ Project which stands to help reduce costs of sending money within the Pacific Region, and has concurrently worked hard to lift Pacific Communities awareness of the need to prudently manage their personal finances. We have worked closely with the MoneyPACIFIC programme over the recent years and we consider them a great ally in the promotion of financial inclusion and financial literacy here in Samoa. In a moment Kim and Becky will elaborate more on the MoneyPACIFIC initiative and its latest resource but before that I would like to take a few moments to talk a little bit more on why financial literacy is important to the Central Bank of Samoa.

It was compiled using your perspective as a school student, as an elder of the village, as a hard working stay at home mother and as a danceloving-father when he gets his paycheck without his wife knowing; or to put simply, as an everyday Samoan citizen. MoneyPACIFIC has produced the Guide and made it easy to understand, and made it accessible to everyone so that you can plan, measure, prioritise or just to be aware of how  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  much you are spending for everyday necessities. Again the intension is not to dictate how much your wallet is crying but to ensure that your wallet is happy to deliver a well sought out purpose for you and your families. To round up my remarks, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the New Zealand and Australian Governments for the support afforded to the MoneyPACIFIC iniative as we have benefitted greatly from the work it carries out for the Pacific communities. I would like to thank each and every one of you for making the time to attend today’s MoneyPACIFIC Money Guide launch.
Structural reforms of this sort have been decided upon by national governments within the framework of the agreements made in Lisbon and we should not forget that the ultimate objective is to increase the pace of economic growth in order to ensure more prosperity and provide more jobs for everyone, which is fundamental for the weakest and the poorest. Rather than finding a compromise between the various members of our society, between those that have costs and those that reap the benefits, I see it more as a compromise between the present and future. It is a forwardlooking investment and a better future for the weakest part of the population which entails costs at the beginning. And in any case let us not forget that we cannot ask our children and grandchildren to pay our bills! In Europe, the population is shrinking to the point that by 2020, according to different studies, there will be 20 million people available for work. In the United States, it is on the rise. How is this? Perhaps this is because the United States is a population with entire generations of immigrants in which the birth rate is higher. And then there is the cultural aspect, they are more optimistic than us. Why? This involves philosophical and cultural aspects and I am not convinced that they are structural.

I saw further confirmation of the great potential of Italy and of the Italian corporate sector, but I also found unanimous agreement that one of the most important problems facing Italy is the insufficient labour productivity and consequently the rise of unit labour costs. It is a European problem, and not only an Italian problem, but in Italy it is particularly visible: we have to do all that we can to implement the Lisbon agenda aiming at accelerating productivity growth. But the Italian industrial structure is weak nowadays. What should be done? Research carried out in Italy and in Europe, more generally, has concluded that we are not benefiting sufficiently from productivity gains in sectors that use new technology (and not only in the sectors that produce the technology themselves) and this seems to be due to overly rigid labour, goods and services and financial markets. Structural reforms that would allow the economy to be made more flexible are the primary tools for achieving a leap in productivity. In the United States this was made possible in the mid-1990s. And, consequently? One should never underestimate the importance of investment in research and development, which are today insufficient both in Italy and in the euro area as a whole. You have mentioned structural reforms, which are currently at the heart of the Italian political debate on developments in the finance laws. Let us begin with the deficit-to–GDP ratio, which is well above the 3% limit. Is the situation in Italy a cause for concern for you?
The economy has proved remarkably resilient to the effects of Covid, and the impact on the supply side has so far been smaller than we might have feared at the aggregate level. That partly reflects, however, the fact that most of the government support schemes for businesses, in particular the furlough scheme, remain in place. As those schemes come to an end it is likely that at least some businesses turn out no longer to be viable, and there is a risk of more substantial impacts. If the effect is unbalanced across sectors then there may also be more substantial labour market hysteresis than assumed in our central May forecast. In addition to any Covid effect, the long run effects of Brexit on the supply side of the economy, in particular on productivity, are largely yet to come through;  One additional supply uncertainty that has emerged has been the question of whether temporarily inactive workers will resume their search for jobs – if inactivity remains at a persistently higher level that would reduce the supply of labour and could contribute to wage pressures. Again it is likely that we will not know the answer to this for some time. But it is the balance of demand and supply that will ultimately determine the medium term inflation impact – my third consideration. Inflation expectations  One final risk that I will be monitoring closely is the risk that the expected transitory increase in inflation and wages generates expectations of a more sustained rise in inflation.

Other policy makers have faced similar challenges, and have found highly innovative and effective ways to overcome them, such as the Treasury’s furlough scheme. And of course the intellectual challenges faced by economic policy makers have been tiny compared with the very substantial challenges faced by the healthcare and other key workers who have had to tackle the Covid pandemic itself, as well as those who have suffered from the disease. My previous Strand Group lecture, “The First 50 years of the Government Economic Service”, touched on some of that earlier experience. 2 My MPC colleague Silvana Tenreyro made a similar observation in her 2018 speech on models in macroeconomics. 3 Or to give the quote from Korzybski (1933) more fully: “A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness”. 4 It’s not for nothing that the Bank of England’s central forecasting model is known as COMPASS. 1  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  Figure 1: The MPC’s approach to its forecasts has evolved during the pandemic  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  An evolving approach to the outlook  The MPC, supported by the efforts of Bank of England staff, has continued to make use of forecasts throughout the Covid period.
And our vision for Thai commercial banking and financial services – if it is to be useful – must consist of two parts within a single integrated framework: one for our main banking activities and the other for those in rural areas. As we look at cross-country experiences on commercial banking and financial system inquiries, we were drawn toward the experiences of Australia, Canada, and South African. The South African’s Standard Bank has been quite innovative in using new technologies to reduce cost of providing banking services to the urban poor who were formerly thought of as un-bankable. Similarly, the Canadian Financial Services Taskforce put much emphasis on “ensuring highest standard of quality and services to consumers, regardless of their income, and regardless of where they live; urban or rural, and also to individual businesses, whether they are large or small”. On the other hand, the emphasis of the Australian Financial System Inquiry on “the facilitation of financial conglomerates to realize economies of scale and scope as well as streamlined regulatory structure base on functional not institutional distinction” will become more and more relevant in the future as consolidation and diversification within our financial system lead to similar types of business model. Coming up with a broad vision is comparatively a simple task; the real challenge is to work out the details of how we plan to modernize of our financial system. Here, we have to articulate our vision and implementation strategies together from both practitioners’ and regulators‘ point of view.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Glossary CESEE – Countries of Eastern and South-East Europe; SSM – Single Supervisory Mechanism (EU) ESRB – European Systemic Risk Board (EU) FSOC – Financial Supervision Oversight Council (USA) ECB – European Central Bank EBA – European Banking Authority FSB – Financial Stability Board PRA – Prudential Regulatory Authority (UK) FPC – Financial Policy Committee; BRRD – Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (EU)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
The optimal monetary response to a rise in credit spreads in their model strictly involves a less-than-full compensatory reduction in the policy rate, but is likely to be close to Taylor’s recommendation for reasonable calibrations of the interest-elasticities of saving and borrowing. 5  Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2001) also discuss other, more exotic, approaches. BIS Review 111/2010  9  substitutability to exploit, purchases by the central bank can push up asset values, which in turn boosts aggregate demand and encourages increased issuance of the assets whose prices have risen. This rationale for asset purchases – that relative asset supplies affect asset prices and returns – dates back to Tobin (1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1972). The mechanism is, however, absent from the canonical New Keynesian/New Classical macroeconomic model. That is because of a property akin to Ricardian equivalence: private agents internalise the budgetary implications of the public sector’s asset acquisitions, so that any change in the risk to which the private sector is exposed through its asset holdings is exactly offset by a compensating change in the risk borne by the public sector and thus ultimately the taxpayer through the public sector budget constraint (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). While this is a striking result, it is relatively easy to think of reasons why it might not hold in practice: any of credit market imperfections, limited asset-market participation or plain myopia is potentially sufficient.

Opening remarks for the 13th edition of the Regional Seminar on Financial Stability Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania Bucharest, September 12, 2019  Ladies and gentlemen, good morning and welcome! This is the thirteenth edition of our international seminar on financial stability organized by the National Bank of Romania together with the International Monetary Fund. We would like to express our gratitude for the IMF’s constant involvement and support in the successful outcome of this international seminar. Traditionally, the seminar takes place at the NBR training center in Sinaia, an enchanting place at the foot of the mountains, where the effects of autumn on the vegetation can be admired. This year we have decided that the seminar is to be held in Bucharest, because these days Bucharest is the host of the International George Enescu Music Festival, which you will attend tonight. We are happy to welcome representatives from central banks in the region, from our Dutch-Belgian IMF Constituency, as well as academia and think tanks. Last year’s edition was about the lessons we drew after the global financial crisis from a macroprudential perspective, but throughout time, various topics have been addressed, as well, like: - resolution and financial intermediation; - macrostability and systemic risks; - macroprudential instruments and policy framework. Ladies and gentlemen, 1  The seminar makes every effort to put forward challenging topics and I hope this year’s edition is no exception.
Projections The central scenario projections contain limited changes with respect to the March Report. Inflation is expected to continue to fall and will converge to the target within the second half of 2024. For December of this year, the annual variation of total CPI is foreseen at 4.2%, compared with the March estimate of 4.6%. Core inflation will end 2023 at 6.5%, which compares with the 6.9% projected in March. Both indicators will converge to 3% during 2024 and will remain in the neighborhood until the end of the policy horizon, that is, the second quarter of 2025 (figure 16). Core inflation will decline more noticeably towards the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, as anticipated in the March Report. The projections reiterate that, in the short term, the monthly variation of services inflation will continue to exceed its historical averages. This incorporates the greater rigidities that these prices normally present and the impact of the still-high inflation on the usual repricing mechanisms. Goods inflation, meanwhile, will benefit from a lower than expected trajectory of the real exchange rate (RER) in March. This is consistent with the nominal appreciation of the peso in recent months, in a context where, as I mentioned, local uncertainty has diminished. Looking ahead, the effect of tight external financial conditions continues to be considered. Compared to March, activity projections show minor changes, mainly associated with the mining industry. This year, the annual variation of GDP will be between a 0.5% fall and a 0.25% rise.

(2) Red diamonds correspond to forecasts in the central scenario of June 2023 MP Report for each year in 2023-2025 period. (3) For oil: WTI-Brent average price per barrel. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg, and FAO. 18  Figure 20  MPR corridor (*)  (quarterly average, percent)  25.II  25.I  24.IV  24.III  24.II  24.I  23.IV  23.III  23.II  23.I  22.IV  22.III  22.II  22.I  21.IV  21.III  21.I  21.II  Jun.23 corridor FTS EES Mar.23 corridor MPR  13.0 12.0 11.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0  (*) The corridor is built with the methodology described in box V.1 in March 2020 MP Report and box V.3 in March 2022 MP Report. For details, see methodological note in figure II.10, June 2023 MP Report. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 19
The interest rate was raised by 0.50 percentage point towards the end of the year with a view to maintaining inflation at 2.5 per cent over time. New information suggests that the recovery in the Norwegian economy is continuing, but that capacity utilisation is probably somewhat lower than anticipated in autumn 2009. Combined with lower interest rates abroad, a stronger krone and lower wage growth suggest that the interest rate forecast should be revised down somewhat in relation to the October Report. Interest rates in Norway are low. The effect on private consumption of the substantial interest rate cuts in 2008 and 2009 has probably not been exhausted and high consumption growth is expected to continue in 2010. House prices have risen. The new guidelines for prudent residential mortgage lending issued by Finanstilsynet (the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) may curb household debt accumulation. Over time, household borrowing may nevertheless increase considerably and saving may fall. The aim of guarding against the risk  4  BIS Review 38/2010  of future imbalances, which may disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead, suggests that the interest rate should be gradually brought closer to a more normal level. On the other hand, a marked interest rate increase in Norway and a wider interest rate differential between Norway and other countries may entail a risk of a considerably strongerthan-projected krone, resulting in inflation that is too low. This will make it difficult to bring inflation up to target within a reasonable time horizon.

A strong krone may also lead to lower activity in exposed industries and thereby lower capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy. This suggests that the interest rate should not be raised too rapidly. Monetary policy cannot fine-tune developments in the economy, but it can mitigate the most severe effects when the economy is exposed to shocks. Overall, the outlook and the balance of risks suggest that the key rate should be gradually increased ahead, although somewhat later than we envisaged in October 2009. On 24 March, the Executive Board decided that the key policy rate should be in the interval 1½–2½ per cent in the period to the publication of the next Report on 23 June 2010 unless the Norwegian economy is exposed to new major shocks. The interest rate was kept unchanged at this meeting. This is based on the assessment that inflation and capacity utilisation may for a period be slightly lower than previously projected and that the interest rate should be increased somewhat later than expected in autumn 2009.
Because your industry has taken a lead in learning from the past, in leading the changes needed and in having a sense of your responsibility to the wider economy. Yours is a model of engagement for others to emulate. And I look forward to continuing to work together. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Although Zambia did not experience bank failures during the current global crisis, work on the establishment of the deposit protection scheme is currently in progress. Quick bank resolution is also an essential element that inspires confidence in the financial system. In Zambia, for instance, work on liquidations has been going on for some time in some cases. The establishment of an effective depositor protection scheme should assist in early bank resolutions while providing protection to the most vulnerable depositors. Chairperson, although the Bank of Zambia has exercised the function of lender of last resort (LOLR) in the past during the banking crisis in the 1990s, there was no clear LOLR policy framework in place. There has been renewed concern that the economic slowdown, if prolonged, could create liquidity pressures in the banking system in Zambia. Past  BIS Review 63/2010  3  experiences and current global slowdown build a strong case for a clearly designed LOLR framework in which the central bank can exercise this function. The challenge in the regulatory and supervisory arrangements is that of operationalising the lender of last resort. Lender of last resort should be seen in light of its role in promoting wider public good and systemic financial stability and ultimately, the wider economic stability. It plays an important role in the economy to avoid the social cost of a bank failure. Some bank failures may lead to contagion effect on other banks which has the potential to transmit to the entire economy.