samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But neither of these are the right answer which is that 23 years is the age difference between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank of England. In case there is any doubt, George is the younger. This age difference is highly desirable because the appropriate incentives are to allocate the responsibility of determining monetary policy to the older generation, which has a real interest in preserving the value of money, and the responsibility for fiscal policy to the younger generation, on whom falls the burden of excessive debt. If we are tempted to leave a large burden of debt for the next generation to pay back, what better incentive mechanism than to have as Chancellor someone who has a longer life expectancy than any previous Chancellor on record? Given those incentives, Chancellor, I look forward to a harmonious coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. Lord Mayor, as we prepare to toast the Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, all of us here tonight would like to pay tribute to your charitable work since you became Lord Mayor. This year the Lord Mayor’s charity “Pitch Perfect” is focussed on two educational charities in which I have a special personal interest – the educational work of the London Symphony Orchestra and Chance to shine, the campaign to regenerate cricket in state schools which, in five years, has already brought the opportunity to play competitive matches to more than one million children, over 40% of whom are girls.

The Bank of England cannot effectively perform its role as lender of last resort without first-hand knowledge of the health of the banks to which it might provide support. In peacetime, regulation can be conducted outside the central bank. But in a crisis, decisions must be made quickly and decisively and the central bank, working with government which is always responsible for any use of public money, needs to be in charge. That was one of our painful lessons. In approaching our new responsibilities we shall build on the real improvements to its regime of prudential regulation made over the past three years by FSA. But the Bank will bring its own central banking culture. The focus of regulation needs to be on maintaining stability of the banking system as a whole. We shall be looking not just at those aspects of a bank that make it look unsafe in comparison with other institutions, but even more so at whether there are common features that threaten the stability of the system, such as the dangerously high leverage prior to 2007. We shall aim to avoid an overly legalistic culture with its associated compliance-driven style of regulation. That is an important reason for the separation of consumer protection and market conduct from prudential regulation. We will need to exercise discretion when setting capital and liquidity ratios for individual banks. And to do that properly will require changes to the current legislation and rule book. We must reverse the seemingly inexorable trend towards more regulation and more regulators.
15 16  In particular, the range of the terminal rate estimated with our models is between 1.75% and 3%. See the September ECB Survey of Monetary Analysts. 17  See, for instance, Costain, J., G. Nuño, and C. Thomas, “The Term Structure on Interest Rates in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union", Banco de España Working Paper 2223, 2022. 7  longer maturities, causing a tightening in overall financing conditions over and above that implied by our policy rate path. Therefore, to achieve the same degree of tightening withour overall policy toolkit, short-term rates would not need to increase by so much. Similarly, the run-off of the outstanding TLTRO-III operations in the next two years will entail a significant reduction in the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet, which may also contribute to the normalisation of our monetary policy stance. In this case, however, markets are probably already expecting this automatic reduction in the size of the balance sheet stemming from TLTRO-III. These considerations point to the need to reflect upon the right combination of interest rate increases and quantitative tightening in the coming quarters. Conclusion Let me conclude. There are a few key takeaways from today’s talk that I would like to emphasise. First, euro area inflation has risen mainly due to energy (and food) shocks outside of our control. This does not mean that we at the ECB Governing Council should remain idle. We should continue normalising our monetary policy in order to avoid the emergence of secondround effects and a de-anchoring of inflation expectations.

Although the international money markets have now calmed somewhat, we have not yet seen the end of the turmoil on the financial markets – neither for the financial institutions involved nor for the international economy. After four years of strong growth and low inflation, this means more difficult times ahead for the Swiss economy. Due to the turbulence on the financial markets, the economic outlook has become more uncertain while, at the same time, inflationary pressure has heightened over the past few months – not such a comfortable position for a central bank. A positive element remains the achievements of the past few years, which have laid the foundations for a higher long-term growth trend. These need to be further improved in order to retain Switzerland as a dynamic business location. BIS Review 21/2008  1
Indeed, where the PRA judges it is necessary to intervene, we will seek to do so at an early stage. Firms should be open and straightforward in their dealings with the PRA and we in turn will take a risk-based and proportionate approach. This is being put into practice. For example, enhanced communication is particularly pertinent as we transition to the Solvency II world. From April, firms will be able to make formal applications and we don’t need a crystal ball to predict a very busy year for both regulator and regulated. The PRA has had an extensive on-going dialogue with firms, giving detailed feedback on, for example, their internal model developments or their matching adjustment applications. Just over a week ago we issued guidance on how equity release mortgages might be structured for use in the matching adjustment. Right now, the PRA is aiming to provide both general and individual firm feedback, recognising the importance of timely communication allowing firms to prepare thoroughly. As a consequence of the financial crisis, financial regulation in all its forms has been through a major transition. In the UK we have seen the split of prudential and conduct regulation, the establishment of a single Insurance Directorate at the PRA with an insurance specific secondary objective, and we have moved forward in our application of “judgement-based regulation”. The next few years will be about embedding this new approach through Solvency II.

Actually, about a third of the PRA’s authorised firms are in run-off. But that is in part a testament to the successful regulatory regime that the UK has been running for the insurance sector. And, whatever the regime, we cannot be certain this will be the case in every conceivable circumstance. For this reason, the PRA continues to place the resolution arrangements for insurers on both the domestic and international agendas. The banking crisis further taught us all that we need to be looking at potential storms ahead and not to be misled by periods of fair weather. For the PRA this means it will assess firms not just against current risks, but also against those that could plausibly arise in the future, carrying out increased business model analysis. For insurers, this involves monitoring emerging risks and taking preparatory steps to deal with what may result, with firms holding capital commensurate to their evolving risk profile. This approach is embedded as part of Solvency II, for example with the requirement for each undertaking to conduct a forward looking assessment of its own risk and solvency needs. The fallout from the global financial crisis has accentuated the need for an open, two-way dialogue between regulator and regulated. This is especially true in times of change or stress. To ensure policyholder protection, regulators need to be alert to emerging risks and this is best achieved through a “cards on the table” approach.
Caleb M Fundanga: Review of Zambia’s economy Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Zambia Association of Manufacturer’s Annual General Meeting, Lusaka, 16 April 2010. *  *  *  The President of ZAM – Mr Chance Kabaghe The Vice Presidents (North and South) – Mr Sebastian Kopulande and Mr Eugen Appel The ZAM Executive Committee Captains of Industry Ladies and Gentlemen I feel greatly honoured to officiate at this Annual General Meeting for the Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM). The Bank of Zambia and the Zambia Association of Manufacturers have a long standing relationship which is intertwined in more ways than one. I am sure that without making appropriate policies to support key sectors such as manufacturing, we would be robbing the country of the development that it deserves. I am reliably informed that ZAM has been going through restructuring in the last two years and has achieved a lot in terms of the establishment and making itself relevant not only to its members but to the Government and other stakeholders. It therefore gives me pleasure to stand before you to discuss issues that are pertinent to manufacturing. I am hopeful we will be able to understand the challenges and identify plausible ways of overcoming them for the sector to forge ahead and make a meaningful contribution to the economy. Mr President, the performance of the Zambian economy in 2009 was favourable.

There is also firm evidence that the inflation targeting regime has earned credibility in the markets and the community. The monetary regime will be further tested in the period ahead, which will among other things be characterised by an exceptional level of foreign direct investment in the aluminium industry and associated publicly owned and debt financed power plants. Our experience is a strong indication that inflation targeting is a policy which can be pursued in a very small and open economy as in a large economy with very deep financial markets. This policy is resource-demanding and imposes by necessity a very strong discipline on the respective central bank. In our view the increased focus on financial stability in the Central Bank Act of 2001 was natural and well within the accepted framework of central bank activities. The Bank was responsible for banking supervision until the end of 1998 when that function was merged with the Insurance Supervisory Authority in a new and unified Financial Supervisory Authority, with which the Central Bank cooperates quite closely on financial stability issues. While the Central Bank had responsibility for banking supervision, its attention was necessarily focused on individual institutions and overseeing that their operations complied with existing laws and regulations. Before banking supervision was transferred elsewhere, the Central Bank had also begun to focus its attention on broader financial stability issues along the lines that many other central banks were doing at that time.
Has the program been a good development from the perspective of the U.S. Treasury? What about from the public’s perspective? A good starting point for answering these questions is to account for the costs and benefits of the program relative to an appropriate counterfactual. For example, we might start by comparing the difference in funding costs to the Treasury of TIPS versus a program of comparable duration nominal Treasuries. But we should also be careful not to ignore other potential benefits of the TIPS program. As we see it, these potential benefits include:  BIS Review 14/2009  1  •  the provision of a virtually risk-free investment that provides value to risk-averse investors,  •  access to a market-determined measure of inflation expectations that can help inform the conduct of monetary policy,  •  greater diversification of the Treasury’s funding sources, which presumably has favorable implications for the Treasury’s overall funding costs, and  •  the potential for TIPS issuance to reduce the variability of the U.S. government’s net financial position and provide an explicit incentive for the fiscal authorities to conduct policy with an eye toward the consequences of inflation. Although it is difficult to quantify these benefits, we argue that they are meaningful and should not be ignored in evaluating the benefits of the TIPS program.

In Europe, the ECB’s deposit facility rate was already set at -0.5% before the COVID-19 crisis.6 In our statements, we have stressed that this rate could be further lowered in the future. Yet in any event, looking back it seems clear that conventional monetary policy — i.e. that based on controlling the short-term interest rate — has less scope for action than, for example, a few decades ago. The lower bound on interest rates generates asymmetry in monetary policy conduct. As I commented earlier, if inflation rises above its target, central banks may increase interest rates as much as necessary in order to “cool” the economy. However, in the face of deflationary shocks driving inflation below its target and leading the central bank to cut its interest rates, these may ultimately “collide” with their lower bound. This asymmetry makes monetary policy potentially very effective for combating inflation, but less so for combating deflation or even persistently low inflation. The latter may lead to a dangerous vicious circle. Against a backdrop where central banks’ hands are expected to be frequently tied by the lower bound on interest rates, economic agents will expect any inflation overshooting to be corrected swiftly. However, this is not the case for undershooting. Therefore, average expected inflation over a long period will tend to run below target.
6 The outflows of deposits and central bank money generated by account holders’ payment transactions are – just like the inflows – spread over time and normally represent only a fraction of total deposits. Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor legally required that a bank hold one franc in central bank money for each franc it holds in customer deposits. A part of the inflows of central bank money can be used for the granting of loans. This is what is known as a fractional reserve system, as only a fraction of customer deposits have to be covered by central bank money. The Swiss sovereign money initiative, which I will speak about later, aims to abolish this fractional reserve system. What limits the banking system’s credit and money creation? As we have seen, the banking system can increase the volume of customer deposits by granting loans. This certainly does not mean that banks are free to create unlimited amounts of credit and money, however. The reasons are to be found in the banks’ risk/return calculations and the SNB’s monetary policy. 6  There are a number of other transactions that change the volume of customer deposits at banks. When a bank purchases securities from a customer, the customer’s deposits at this bank increase. Customer deposits also rise whenever the SNB acquires foreign exchange or Swiss franc denominated securities from a non-bank seller.

And by keeping inflation on track to meet the 2% target, the MPC will be making its contribution to future prosperity, both in the Trafford Centre and the country as a whole. BIS Review 4/2005  3
Instead, use of the pool has increased because over time the constraints imposed on customers’ ability to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  vary the size of their investments have been removed, the supply of balance sheet offered by the private sector to foreign central banks appears to have declined, and some central banks desire to maintain robust dollar liquidity buffers. Open questions Compared with the relative calm of the pre-crisis period, money markets have recently gone through a sustained period of substantial change. Some of these changes are the result of regulations to improve the safety and soundness of the financial system, others relate to business model enhancements, and, of course, some relate to Federal Reserve activity. The Federal Reserve continues to collect data on the structure of money markets to determine whether any changes are needed in its operating framework to ensure that its objectives continue to be met. We are continuing to watch developments as business models adapt to the numerous changes in bank regulation introduced over the past few years. We are interested in the extent to which these business model changes impact the structure of money markets and thereby affect the form of monetary policy implementation. For example, we are monitoring developments in bank behavior that could have implications for the transmission of monetary policy into market rates. Thus, we are paying close attention to the behavior of foreign banks on financial statement reporting dates.

Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at a hearing before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 19 December 2011. *  *  *  Dear Madam Chair, Dear Honourable Members, È per me un estremo piacere partecipare per la prima volta come Presidente della Banca Centrale Europea a questa riunione. Il dialogo monetario trimestrale con l’ECON rappresenta un’opportunità fondamentale e la pietra angolare per un rapporto costruttivo tra le nostre due istituzioni. Cet échange a lieu quelques semaines seulement après que d’importantes décisions ont été prises à la fois par le Conseil des Gouverneurs de la BCE et par les Chefs d’Etats et de Gouvernements. Dans ce contexte, notre discussion promet d’être particulièrement riche et fructueuse. Zur Einführung werde ich zunächst auf die aktuellen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen im Eurogebiet eingehen. Anschließend werde ich mich den von Ihnen gewünschten Themen zuwenden, nämlich dem Instrumentarium zur Krisenbewältigung einerseits, sowie den Rating-Agenturen andererseits. I. Economic and monetary developments  Since the last regular hearing in October with former President Trichet, the ECB has taken a number of steps to ensure that it will continue to deliver price stability in the medium term in an environment that remains challenging. These steps relate both to changes in our interest rates and to non-standard measures.
Øystein Olsen: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 9 May 2019. * * * Accompanying slides of the speech. Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. Thank you for this opportunity to report on the conduct of monetary policy. My introduction here today is based on Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2018 and our monetary policy assessments up to the monetary policy meeting yesterday. Since 2001, the main objective of monetary policy in Norway has been low and stable inflation. In March 2018, a new Monetary Policy Regulation was laid down. The inflation target was lowered from 2.5 to 2 percent. At the same time, the Regulation specified that inflation targeting shall be forward-looking and flexible so that it can contribute to high and stable output and employment and to counteracting the build-up of financial imbalances. When I stood here about a year ago, I concluded that the outlook for the Norwegian economy was bright. We were emerging from the downturn that followed in the wake of the oil price decline in 2014. Growth was again on a firm footing and unemployment had declined. There were prospects that the policy rate would shortly be raised. I emphasised that this was a good sign.

Policy configuration will need to be pragmatic and premised on the risk that is being managed. Indeed, macroprudential policies have been found to be effective in managing financial cycles and associated risks, such as excessive credit growth and asset price inflation. Nevertheless, sizeable shifts in capital flows could cause disorderly financial market conditions and excessive exchange rate movements. In pursuit of preserving stability, policymakers must therefore be able to avail ourselves to a broad range of policy toolkit. Globalisation of Human Capital Lastly, I will briefly touch on what globalisation means for the average person in today’s economy. Being skilled alone is no longer a guarantee of employment. With offshoring of jobs, workers are now competing in a fluid workplace, against a global workforce. A job that is available locally today can be effortlessly transferred to a different country tomorrow. Essentially, the increasingly dynamic nature of work underscores the importance for workers to constantly adapt, re-skill and up-skill. A global workforce also means that borders no longer limit the search for preferred jobs. In fact, globally, 258 million people, almost the size of Indonesia’s entire population, are living in a country that is not of their origin. Another aspect is the intensification of globalisation of information. Technology has brought the world into the palm of our hands. Last year, 3 in every 4 persons were active on a social media platform. In fact, if Facebook were a country, with 1.5 billion active users, it would be the largest country in the world today.