samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There are various ways of doing this, but in the scenario described, it seems logical to think of retaining more profits, without forgetting capital increases, or the issuance of non-voting equity stock by savings banks. Allow me to conclude by repeating what I have already said on previous occasions. Governments, which have proven themselves resolute and decisive in the search for solutions to resolve the impact of the financial crisis on the economy, must also take action on the policies that directly affect the real economy. 8  BIS Review 133/2008  In a country such as ours, integrated into the single monetary area and with its attendant competitiveness difficulties, decisive action is essential on structural reforms that liberalise product and factor markets, increasing competition and favouring a more efficient allocation of the available resources. Allow me to mention some of them, because it would be remiss of me to fail to speak today about what is most important for facing up to the crisis. First, and given that the residential sector is subject to an especially intense degree of adjustment in the present situation, measures are needed that help to satisfy the demand for rented housing and that will also reactivate the demand for housing that is most closely linked to the investment motive. Liberalising the market for rented accommodation and giving legal certainty to owners would be one of the timeliest structural reforms. Second, there are still a large number of sectors and market segments that should be liberalised in order to boost competitiveness.

Caleb M Fundanga: Corporate social responsibility - challenges that the private sector in Zambia should overcome Key note address by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Mufulira District Advisory Committee’s 2006 Business Forum, Mufulira, 18 March 2006. *  *  *  CHAIRPERSON, YOUR HONOUR THE MAYOR OF MUFULIRA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER, THE TOWN CLERK, DISTINGUISHED INVITED PARTICIPANTS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN On behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, allow me to thank you for this invitation to Mufulira. It is an honour to be invited to this important Forum to share a few words with the business community on the issue of Good Corporate Citizenship. In view of the growing role of the private sector as a partner in economic development in Zambia, this topic could not have come at a better time than now. In fact, when I was invited to come here by the Municipal Council, I took a bit of time to reflect on the challenges good corporate citizens face. On the outset, it is imperative to realise that despite the moral ethics that come with being a responsible and good corporate citizen, advantages can also be exploited by strengthening the synergies between private sector growth on the one hand and social, economic and environmental development on the other. In view of this, I prepared my address within the context of the underlying theme “Corporate Social Responsibility: Challenges that the Private Sector in Zambia Should Overcome”.
Also on the 18th, one of the firms that had been working with Long-Term to raise new capital asked the Long-Term Capital partners if the firm could share the information it had with us. The partners at Long-Term Capital responded that they would prefer to present the information themselves and called me to arrange such a presentation. After conferring with Chairman Greenspan and Secretary Rubin, we agreed that a visit to Long-Term Capital’s offices was needed. A team from the New York Fed, led by Peter Fisher, the head of our Markets Group, and joined by Treasury Assistant Secretary Gary Gensler, met with the Long-Term Capital partners at their offices on Sunday, September 20. During this meeting, we learned the broad outlines of Long-Term Capital’s major positions in credit and equity markets, the difficulties they were having in trying to reduce these positions in thin market conditions, their deteriorating funding positions and an estimate of their largest counterparty exposures. The team also came to understand the impact which Long-Term Capital’s positions were already having on markets around the world and that the size of these positions was much greater than market participants imagined. BIS Review 78/1998  -3-  The New York Fed’s Judgements Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to my second point, and focus explicitly on the question of our judgment that the abrupt and disorderly close-out of Long-Term Capital’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the American economy.

Because of this, during the first two weeks of September, concern about LongTerm Capital was a widespread topic of conversation in financial markets. It is a traditional and essential role for the President and senior officers of the New York Fed to be talking to, and receiving calls from, market participants regarding significant developments and potential dislocations. In fact, the partners at Long-Term Capital called me early in September to notify me of their difficulties and their discussion with investment houses about plans to raise new capital. By Friday, September 18, with the efforts to raise new capital still unsuccessful and with an increasing number of people now aware of Long-Term’s plight because of the efforts to bring in new investors - events seemed to come to a head. With market conditions particularly unsettled that day, I made a series of calls to senior Wall Street officials to discuss overall market conditions. Let me take a moment to put those calls in context. One important objective of the Federal Reserve is to assure financial stability. Particularly in times of stress, it is essential that the Federal Reserve continue to take the pulse of the market. One way to do that is through candid and open communication with key market participants. Everyone I spoke to that day volunteered concern about the serious effect the deteriorating situation of Long-Term could have on world markets.
Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox and the effective lower bound Welcome address by Mr Philip R Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the ECB Conference on Monetary Policy “bridging science and practice”, Frankfurt am Main, 11 October 2021. * * * It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2021 edition of the annual ECB Conference on Monetary Policy. As captured in the title of this year’s event, this conference series serves a vital role in bridging the science and practice of monetary policy. In particular, it is essential for the ECB to incorporate in our analytical framework the theoretical and empirical insights generated by the global academic community, and the conference format (albeit in webinar mode again this year) is very effective in providing us with a platform to discuss the latest developments. The breadth of academic research (in terms of both topics and research techniques) that is relevant for monetary policy is quite wide and this is reflected in the composition of the conference programme. The agenda includes research that exploits financial market data to examine the transmission of monetary policy, studies the impact of the pandemic on firms and banks using entity-level datasets, analyses the interactions between monetary policy and financial stability in a full-scale macroeconomic model, and explores the impact of monetary and fiscal policies on the formation of household expectations.

It is not only an attractive book, but is also a very valuable working tool. A special feature of this history of the Swiss currency is that it was not written by a historian, but from the perspective of a monetary theorist. Nevertheless, the author is not only an outstanding monetary theorist and academic teacher, he also has rich practical experience  1  Hans von Keler, *1925, German theologist. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  as an economic policy advisor. The SNB’s Governing Board would like to thank Ernst Baltensperger for having made such a significant contribution to the understanding of the Swiss franc. We would also like to thank the publishing house, NZZ Libro, and all the individuals participating in this project for their careful handling and publishing of this book. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to Hans-Peter Thür. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Under these circumstances it will be exceedingly important to make a thorough scrutiny of the social security system’s design; this is a question that has been on something of a back burner, what with the crisis for stabilisation policy in the 1990s and the achievement of a more lasting solution to the issue of pensions. In such a discussion about social security systems that are effective and sustainable in the long term there is a place for the issue of cyclical stabilisation. Systems that are fully or partly funded, publicly or privately, can function well as stabilisers. Thus, it is mainly in this context that I would like to place the discussion that has taken place about various types of buffer fund. But the need to reform the social security system is primarily connected, not with stabilisation policy but with being able to guarantee a high quality of publicly financed services without raising the tax take. Measures for influencing the business cycle Finally there are the questions of whether a more active, discretionary fiscal policy would be advisable and whether, to function better in the future, it may need to be supported by new institutional arrangements. First, let me stress that, for reasons I mentioned earlier, I do not have much faith in fine tuning. Of course that does not rule out trying not to accentuate fluctuations as far as possible when measures are taken primarily for other reasons.

The main thing to do to prevent new crises for stabilisation policy is to develop and possibly reinforce the framework for budget policy that has applied in recent years. Government debt can then be run  BIS Review 6/2002  5  down more quickly and reserves can be built up so that the automatic stabilisers can be left to do their work. An important issue in this context is the construction of the social security system. Changes will be needed and there may well be reasons for increasing the element of funding. It may be asked whether some institutional changes are also needed to facilitate a discretionary fiscal policy. This is certainly not a minor question but it has taken up too much of the discussion about economic policy. The possibility of implementing a discretionary fiscal policy in a meaningful way is limited. The discussion should therefore concentrate on what can be done to manage situations when more serious shocks are likely to occur. The problem here has been a lack of knowledge, plus the difficulties in mobilising sufficient support for a restrictive policy when the economy is overheating. There are presumably some things that can be done to improve our knowledge, though it is mostly a matter of trimming an existing structure. But that must be done in the light of the limited competence for empirical economic analysis in Sweden and the numerous challenges that lie ahead in other respects than stabilisation policy.
Resilience with a reason. That reason is the ultimate objective that unifies the Bank of England’s monetary and financial functions – the meaning of the central banker’s life which can be found in the opening sentence of our 1694 Charter – “to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom”. It has been my honour to do so. 34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  34

For example, establish a shared infrastructure that enables more efficient tracking and monitoring of the performance and impact of the programme on the target segments. This would also enable financial institutions to better intermediate social impact funds to deliver the SDGs. Conclusion Achieving the SDGs is a collective effort – one that requires a whole-of-nation approach. Each of us, be it the financial institutions, the customers, the regulators, the government and funds providers play an important role in creating a better, safer and sustainable future. Indeed, such collective effort is equally warranted across geographical borders and governments. In Malaysia, we recognise this. Therefore, I welcome individuals or organisations that are passionate about SDG to collaborate with Malaysia and partner with global organisations such as UNDP to codevelop the areas mentioned by leveraging on Malaysia’s strengths to achieve SDG goals together. In addition, I would also like to invite such individuals and organisations to take part in the Royal Award for Islamic Finance Impact Challenge Prize 2022. This new initiative by Malaysia aims to reward innovative creations and solutions that strengthen the economic and social resilience of financially impacted communities globally through the application of Shariah principles. Applications are open until 25 March 2022. To end my speech, I wish you every success with today’s conference and I trust the event will generate interesting conclusions and concrete actions. Thank you.
Another aspect making a big difference is the performance of emerging economies. Latin America, excluding Chile, posted an average annual fall of 4.2% between 1930 and 1932, while Chile, where the crisis compounded with the downfall of the nitrate industry, fell an average of 17.6%. For the three-year period 2009-2011, private forecasts indicate that Latin America will grow by an average of 1.2%, while Chile will grow by 2.1%. These are just projections, not definitive figures, but data released so far this year indicates that the effects of the crisis, although far from negligible, are much milder than they were in the 1930s. This is an encouraging fact. Usually, whenever developed countries go into a recession, its effects are amplified into our region. That has not been the case this time; on the contrary, our region today is outperforming the developed economies. That the current crisis did not turn into a Great Depression proves that lessons have been learned. Economies are much stronger, and also the policies applied have gone in the proper direction of mitigating the tremendous financial shock of last year. For one thing, the task of stabilizing the financial system was assumed decisively, which prevented its collapse. Uncertainties remain, but are more focused and less dramatic than at the end of last year.

After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in October 2008, the turmoil mutated into a full-blown financial “crisis” and many market segments seized up. The “Great Moderation” gave way to the “Great Recession”, characterised by a massive fall in industrial output and trade. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Policy interventions were made by central banks and other public authorities to restore and secure the orderly functioning of markets and economies. I like to think of the interventions by public authorities as “lines of defence” against the crisis. They proved successful in guaranteeing those authorities’ ability to continue delivering macroeconomic and financial stability against the crisis. Let me recall briefly the three main lines of defence: central banks increased their provision of liquidity and financial intermediation services; monetary and fiscal authorities adjusted their policies in order to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of the crisis; and governments implemented a variety of measures in support of the financial sector. The government measures adopted in response to the economic crisis – both those related to fiscal policy and those in support of the banking sector – did not come cheap. This is true not only in the euro area, but – more generally – in all advanced economies. Together with the impact on government budgets of the massive economic contraction recorded during the crisis, they led to a significant deterioration in the public finances of a number of economies in the euro area.
In China, the constancy in high household saving rates masks two striking, but broadly offsetting, factors: a 10 percentage point fall in household’s income share; and a 10 percentage point rise in household’s saving propensity (Ma and Yi (2010)). Much of the rise in saving propensities appears to be precautionary. Facing “three mountains” in the future – education, pensions and health care – Chinese consumers have taken the high (saving) road. In the US, the fall in the household financial balance correlates strongly with the path of household net worth (McKelvey (2010), Chart 13). This correlation emerged strongly during the 1980s, with the simultaneous rise in net wealth and fall in saving. This correlation has remained strong as net worth has reversed recently due to falling house and equity prices. What lies behind these movements? Lax monetary policy has been suggested by some (Taylor (2007)). Financial liberalisation is a second plausible candidate. This had the effect of loosening constraints on the supply of housing credit and thereby boosting housing demand and prices in the US. It also enabled households to mobilise and withdraw the accrued equity in their property to finance spending. Estimates of housing equity withdrawal for spending rose from under 2% of personal disposable income in 2000 to around 4% at the peak in 2005 (Greenspan and Kennedy (2007), Chart 14). Micro-level data support this story.

But capital flows may also demonstrate an imbalance between demand and output in an economy, which must eventually correct if debt and wealth stocks are not to become unsustainable. Sharp corrections in rates of domestic absorption and/or capital flows could then result, with attendant output costs. In that sense, global imbalances may also be bad cholesterol. 1 So which are capital flows today? Historical evidence is illuminating. Chart 1 plots (the absolute value of) current account balances in thirteen countries, as a % of GDP, since 1880. Other than in wartime, global imbalances are at their highest in well over a century. They have surpassed levels which prevailed during the classical Gold Standard and are more than twice levels during the Bretton Woods period (Chart 2). For some individual countries, these capital flows look larger still, both absolutely and relative to historical norms (Chart 3). It is not just the size of these global flows that is unusual. So too is their direction. Contrary to theory, capital is flowing from developing countries with a low capital stock, towards developed countries with a high capital stock (Lucas (1990)). In other words, capital is flowing “uphill”, away from countries where the marginal product of capital should be high and towards countries where it should be low. This makes the pattern of global capital flows doubly perplexing. 1  Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) discuss the causes of “good” and “bad” imbalances. BIS Review 174/2010  1  Perplexing need not mean bad.
According to the Satellite Accounts, were they included they would increase GDP by around 80%. In an ideal world, we would observe the output of volunteers – the goods and services they produce – and work out what they could fetch in the market, just as with GDP. But there is no market for services in which no monetary transaction is involved. What the ILO recommends instead – and what the ONS does in practice – is to capture the value of the labour input used in producing these services, as a proxy for their market value. Specifically, the ONS identifies particular voluntary activities from household surveys and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  then maps those to paid occupations. Taking the median hourly wage for those occupations, and multiplying by the number of hours volunteers provide, gives an estimate of the volunteering sector’s output on a replacement cost basis. Using this method, the ONS calculates that frequent, formal volunteering produced just short of £ billion of economic output in 2012. This would be equivalent to 1.5% of GDP. That is sizable. It would make volunteering one of the most important industrial sectors in the UK, producing twice as much value as the agriculture sector and about the same amount as the telecoms or the insurance and pension fund sectors. Of course, any estimate relies on certain assumptions. Let me highlight three important ones. First, these estimates consider only formal and frequent volunteering.

8  BIS Review 113/2007  turmoil. It is all the more important to acknowledge these achievements since it was said in some quarters that the euro would never see the light of day or that it would create severe economic disruptions. Those scenarios have not materialised. In the post-war European adventure, the euro represents a major milestone. That said, and whatever its own merits, a currency is not an end in itself, even though the new EU members are keen on adopting it as soon as possible. Entry into Monetary Union must be founded on a sustainable convergence process. Enlargement of the euro area also gives renewed impetus to addressing the challenges ahead as it makes it more pressing for policy-makers to tackle long-ignored weaknesses. This is a crucial contribution to building a stronger EU, in which I strongly believe. All in all, let me express my confidence in the future of the euro and of the single monetary policy of a large Euro zone. BIS Review 113/2007  9  10  BIS Review 113/2007  BIS Review 113/2007  11  12  BIS Review 113/2007  BIS Review 113/2007  13
Thus, I would like to use this opportunity today to highlight key areas which require attention and leadership of top policy makers at supervisory agencies as well as banks, to ensure not only soundness of individual banks, but also guard against systemic risk as a whole. Let me now turn to the first part of my talk: Key Features of New Paradigm What is driving the changing global financial landscape? The failure of several financial giants, and with many still in retrenchment, led to market space being taken up by surviving global banks, some have become state-owned via rescue programme. Their systemic importance has risen further along with their market power, and regulation must rise up to the challenge. The interdependence of the financial sustainability of these financial giants and sovereign risks have become increasingly linked, while perception of state guaranty of such institutions may distort local or even global markets, creating un-level playing-field. The demand for accountability for public bail-out money puts pressure on managing such banks, which have now become “public institutions”. Thus, the intervening authorities face a strong risk of having to micro-manage the institutions, and with this the associated risks, not least reputational and legal. Timely exit is important for the reason cited. Exit policy however could also be complicated, for example if recovery value of bailed-out fund is under pressure from weak market conditions. Most importantly, it is important to observe that, the precedence set by the actions regulators took in such intervention could have a long-term implication.

The principle of so-called “insignificant host”, as viewed from home supervisor’s perspective, may contradict with the agreed principle of the need for the host to oversee systemically important institutions. Thus, a host supervisor should receive better information and even be included in supervisory colleges by home supervisor, if the global bank branch operations are systemically important to the host economy. Colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, This is a challenging time, with new paradigm, and therefore leadership by all of us is required to ensure that we set a balanced agenda in our reforms going forward. I believe SEANZA forum would become all the more valuable in the future in cementing our network and friendship. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 146/2009