samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Good quality financial statements typically contain comparable and reliable information, which depends in turn on the accounting standards being used. In this respect, IFRS can help ensure that financial reporting is prepared under accepted principles that convey a true and fair view of the financial position. BIS Review 114/2007  1  For the banking sector, the most important accounting standard is the IAS 39 because it deals specifically with financial instruments. The standard assures that financial instruments are correctly recognized and measured in the financial statements, to reflect the true financial position and performance, as well as the related risk exposure. Under IAS 39, there is important change to the accounting for derivative transactions, in which banks need to markto-market and record all derivatives on their balance sheets, as well as classify them as held for trading, unless they are used as hedging instruments. Previously, all derivative transactions are kept off the balance sheet, and hence from the recognition of external stakeholders or even bank management. IAS 39, therefore, brings off-balance sheet items into the spotlight. Apart from IAS 39, commercial banks also need to comply with the accounting standards concerning financial instrument’s presentation (IAS 32) and disclosure (IFRS 7), which require banks to present their financial statements in an appropriate format, and to disclose information sufficiently regarding financial instruments and risk. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Bank of Thailand has taken a careful timing to implement both standards in Thailand.

4  Immediate concerns and inherent vulnerabilities Against this prospect of net long-term benefits, and indeed if the NMS are to maximize the benefits of euro adoption, they will have to continue making substantial reforms to their economic, financial and social systems. While such changes are in themselves necessary to ensure a smooth adoption of the euro, they will continue to be endogenously engendered once these countries become members of the euro area. In the meantime, however, these reforms are posing major challenges to a number of NMS and are exposing vulnerabilities which, if not addressed, could threaten their successful participation in the euro area. In the course of this seminar first-hand accounts of such challenges, and of the policy responses to deal with them, will no doubt reveal the rich diversity of country situations within an enlarged EU. Some challenges, however, will be common to most new NMS. One such is the need to catch up in terms of per capita income levels with euro area countries. In several NMS this catching-up process is taking place in good part due to the relatively low wage levels and high rates of return on capital in these countries relative to euro area economies. These characteristics of the real sector are creating challenges from a nominal convergence viewpoint. Chief among them are the issues of real exchange rate appreciation and the need to cope with large, and potentially volatile capital inflows.
When inflation expectations are firmly anchored, monetary policy serves as the first line of defence when the economy turns down. Over time, monetary policy can only influence inflation. Monetary policy cannot take primary responsibility for delivering the necessary structural changes in the Norwegian economy. But monetary policy can help facilitate the necessary restructuring process via the exchange rate channel. As long as there is confidence that inflation will remain low and stable over time, a pronounced depreciation of the krone can go hand in hand with a low key policy rate. The krone has depreciated markedly since last September and is now about 10 percent weaker than the average for the first half of 2014. Developments in the krone exchange rate must be seen in the context of lower oil prices and weaker growth prospects for the Norwegian economy. The depreciation of the krone underpins inflation and softens the impact of lower oil prices on the Norwegian economy. As seen in the diagram a weaker krone boosts competitiveness for Norwegian firms facing competition from abroad. At the same time, wage growth has moderated to some extent. There are prospects that real wage growth this year will be at its lowest for nearly 20 years. With improved competitiveness, export firms are in a better position to maintain market shares. As growth picks up abroad, demand for Norwegian goods and services may also increase.

As a result of keen competition for loan customers, excessive optimism and problems in distinguishing between sound and unsound projects, risk may be underestimated during upturns. The labour market has few available resources. Registered unemployment has remained steady at about 2½ per cent since the beginning of 1998. Long-term unemployment is low, and spells of unemployment are generally brief. Unemployment has edged up in the last few months, primarily in Eastern Norway, while employment growth has been limited. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on 11 September last year, the aviation and travel industries reported job cuts. Cutbacks have also been announced in the process industry. The guidelines for fiscal policy will stimulate activity because petroleum revenues will now be phased into the economy. According to the Government’s estimate, the guidelines imply an average increase in the use of petroleum revenues in the central government budget of about 0.4 per cent of mainland GDP each year from 2002 to 2010. The government budget that was approved for 2002 implies that the use of petroleum revenues will increase by 0.6 per cent of mainland GDP from 2001 to 2002. The guidelines for fiscal policy imply a substantial stimulus each year. The expansionary impetus varies considerably, and is greatest in the first few years. However, an unpredictable and more expansionary fiscal policy than that implied by the guidelines would have resulted in greater uncertainty. The guidelines provide a stable framework that contributes to reducing some of the uncertainty.
Our monetary policy concept, which we adopted in 2000, defines price stability, and I quote again, as "a rise in the national consumer price index of less than 2% per annum". Let me draw your attention to three subtleties here. First, our mandate is to ensure price stability, but we do tolerate some inflation! For both the ECB and the SNB, prices should slightly increase or potentially stagnate, but not decrease over time. Rising prices may not correspond to your idea of price stability, and you may think that even low inflation should be avoided since inflation causes inefficiency. The reason why central bankers think that price stability is achieved even when there is in fact some inflation, is that the better quality of new products and the improvement of existing ones can justify non-inflationary price adjustments. A second detail is that we do not name one figure as the desirable inflation rate. Rather, we say that we think of price stability as inflation somewhere between 0 and 2%. The reason for this is that uncertainties about the extent of product innovations make it difficult to define a certain inflation rate as optimal. Moreover, given the importance of trade in our GDP, our inflation rate may react rapidly to changes in foreign prices, which should not necessarily trigger a monetary policy reaction. A target band gives us more flexibility in the implementation of monetary policy.

They were hosted at Saint Catherine monastery. Once returned, they established a convent quite here, in the heavily forested area, at the bottom of the Carpathians. The new monastery was called Sinaia, in the memory of their journey to the Sinai Peninsula. A century later, the first King of Romania, Carol I fell in love with the place and built Peles Castle, his summer residence. Following the establishment of the Peles Castle a railroad connecting the capital to the king’s new summer residence was built. Little by little, Sinaia became popular among the members of the high society: they started building summer residences as well as hotels, villas. You can visit the Peles Castle and the Sinaia monastery on Friday. And now about this seminar. The topic of this seminar is integrated supervision to ensure financial stability. It relies on several conceptual layers. First of all, to understand that the frontiers among financial activities have been blurred by financial innovation and the formation of conglomerates. Secondly, effective Regulation and Supervision involves a working together of regulators and supervisors, who oversee various financial markets. And thirdly, macro prudential concerns are increasingly on the radar screen of Regulation and Supervision. Above all one needs to understand the functioning of overall finance. The program of our seminar is quite rich.
These conditions are currently met in a number of euro area countries, especially Germany. Page 3 sur 7 Allow me to add a paradox that is not sufficiently well known: to get out of the current low rate environment, we should not turn instinctively solely to monetary policy – as many do. In advanced economies, the natural rate of interest – the level that equates savings with investment over the long run – has fallen by around 2 percentage points in the last 20 years, and monetary policy has a very limited impact on this rate. Instead, what we need is to change the underlying economic factors driving the decline in the natural interest rate. Changing these factors means spending on investment and on the future, including on training and education, the energy transition and of course new technologies, with the aim of lifting long-term economic growth. If we want higher interest rates in the future, we must not be afraid to rapidly put in place targeted fiscal and structural policies. This brings us to the third cliché: other countries have gained more from the euro than we have. Unfortunately, this cliché is repeated everywhere, including in Germany.ii It is also paradoxical given that support for the single currency is currently at an all-time high in the euro area – 76% of European citizens support the euro, and the figure is even 81% for Germany. In reality, the euro has benefited all countries, including – and especially – Germany.

In this respect, your central body DZ Bank seems to me to be a good example of a grouping which ensures a geographical and functional complementarity of activities. I welcome the current debates on how to consolidate networks of cooperative and mutual banks in Europe; the German sector has the means of significantly contributing to these debates. Page 7 sur 7 ** Thanks to you, I have discovered Raiffeisen’s beautiful phrase: "Several persons have the ability to do what is impossible for one individual.” iv This phrase perfectly describes the ambition of mutual banks. But it is also, I believe, a model of thought for Europe. In this uncertain world, shaken by the rivalry between the United States and China, Germany and France must, more than ever, overcome their differences. The entry into office of the new European Commission, around Ursula von der Leyen, must be an opportunity to move forward together. It's now, or never. Europeans expect no less. Thank you for your attention. References: i  “Shock Resistant”, France’s Attractiveness Survey, EY, June 2019.  ii  Laurent Abraham, Jean-Baptiste Gossé, “The euro: is the grass always greener on the other side?”, Banque de France blog, May 2019. iii  EBA source and sample. iv  "Was dem Einzelnen nicht möglich ist, das vermögen viele."
French banks were affected through several channels: •  First, through their direct exposures to American households in the subprime category or through indirect exposures in portfolios of structured financial instruments, such as residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) that are in turn exposed to subprime risks. As was the case for the rest of the banking system in Europe, indirect exposures accounted for much greater amounts than direct exposures and therefore for the  BIS Review 82/2008  1  bulk of the losses; the lessons that this situation holds for more refined risk management need to be learned quickly. •  Secondly, through exposures to securitisation vehicles (conduits or structured investment vehicles) and particularly through liquidity lines, which need to be managed more rigorously going forward. •  Thirdly, through exposures to assets taken back from securitisation vehicles, or even collective investment schemes, that ran into liquidity problems; this type of reintermediation needs to be given more consideration in terms of capital requirements. •  Fourthly, through their exposures to monoline insurers, which insured some products and were themselves hard-hit by the crisis and thus epitomise “wrong-way” counterparty risks, which need to be assessed more carefully. •  Finally, though exposures to leveraged buy-outs, or more generally by credit-riskrelated costs on the most vulnerable companies, which are starting to rise. Consequently, French banks have not escaped the overall slowdown in net banking income growth affecting major international banking groups.

A review of how refinancing risk could arise across all of a bank’s business lines is a priority; as is an analysis of how refinancing risk interacts with market risk, credit risk and concentration risk. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors and the Basel Committee, at the global level, are currently reviewing the principles governing liquidity risk management. On a final note, I would like to add that the crisis has highlighted the need to enhance internal control systems and to improve the circulation of information about risks, especially for senior managers. The exceptional case of fraud affecting Société Générale has strengthened our resolve in this matter. In France, this should lead to the amendment of Regulation 97.02 on internal control, with provisions on managing operating risk, along with specific efforts to fight fraud. This reform is connected to moves to ensure greater involvement of banks’ highest governance bodies in monitoring their internal control systems. All these initiatives draw on the lessons learned from the past, but they are also forward-looking. Their purpose is to establish the principles of risk management. These principles do not eliminate all risks, but they enhance the resilience of the system when tensions do emerge. This is the objective of the reforms, which I am sure will contribute to greater financial stability in the long run.
Let me again make some observations from my home country:  Norway had a severe banking crisis around 1990. Three of the four largest banks failed and the direct capital injections required were alone more than 3½ per cent of GDP. Just to put this figure into perspective, the 106 billion euros the European banks need for recapitalisation now is less than 1 per cent of GDP in the euro area. Ever since the Norwegian banking crisis in the early 1990s, our banking industry has been regulated more strictly than banks in comparable countries.   For instance, bank capital definitions have been tighter and the financial supervisor has been more actively restricting banking activities.   Another example is that packaging loans into complex financial instruments was in practice not permitted until 2007 when new regulations provided for the issuance of covered bonds. The complex instruments central in the creation of the subprime crisis were never introduced, and Norwegian banks did not invest in them. Our GDP growth rates have still been high during the years up to 2008, also outside the petroleum sector. And the downturn we experienced in 2009 was modest in relation to comparable countries. At the early stage of the banking crisis in the1990s, the Norwegian central bank provided a large liquidity loan to a savings bank. It soon became clear that the loan would not be paid  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  back. A liquidity problem turned into a problem of solvency.

In conclusion, allow me to reiterate the importance of the effective participation of all stakeholders involved in each stage of claims management to ensure high claims service standards and fair treatment of customers. Both insurers and loss adjusters must play their respective roles in value-adding to the claims management process for the effective functioning and positive image of the insurance industry in the long term. 2  BIS Review 53/2010
The Fund can provide a useful voice and a forum for advising the major economies to pursue policies that can contribute better to global economic expansion and financial stability. The Fund can play an important role in considering, from a global or systemic perspective, the exchange rate policies of its members. And the Fund plays a vital role in providing the macroeconomic policy framework that is the critical to sustaining better growth outcomes and the effectiveness of the global development assistance effort for the poorest, low-income countries. I think the Fund is reasonably close to the frontier, the sensible or achievable frontier, in these areas. Some may wish it were more effective in persuading the G-3 to avoid policies that create the risk of abrupt changes in financial market conditions or exchange rates, but it will never be decisive in this arena. And it might do more to further improve the design of macroeconomic policies and institutions in the poorest developing countries. But outside those areas, the challenges to sustained growth in per capita income lie largely in areas beyond the core competence of the IMF. In the emerging market context, in contrast, there is greater distance between the Fund of today and the achievable frontier. This is a timely and critical issue, because of the magnitude of the challenges that still confront many emerging market economies. Let me start with a broad review of the progress made over the past decade across emerging markets in reducing their vulnerability to financial crisis.

These aggregate improvements mask substantial differences across countries and a number of areas of lingering vulnerability. Let me highlight some, and then suggest some implications for how the Fund might better position itself to deal with the challenges they present. •  Some of the most daunting challenges are in the fiscal and public debt area, where a number of emerging market economies across different regions face very high, and in some cases still growing public sector debt levels. Average public debt burdens in the emerging world have risen to about 70 percent of GDP, and among countries rated single B and below, the mean rises above 80 percent. •  The challenge of managing debt burdens of this size is magnified by the fact that the debt structures in a number of countries are still quite vulnerable to foreign currency, liquidity, and interest rate risk. The substantial share of public debt denominated in foreign currency - 70 percent on average for the lowest rated group of borrowers - and the relatively short maturity of the debt stock mean that a relatively modest shock can produce a substantial increase in debt burdens, raising the amount of fiscal effort needed to keep the debt stock on a stable or declining path, and increasing the economy’s vulnerability to a crisis. •  In some countries, the fiscal trajectory is too weak to place the debt-to-GDP ratio on a sustainable path.
Mark Carney: Regulatory work underway and lessons learned Remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the 29th Annual G30 International Banking Seminar, Washington DC, 12 October 2014. *  *  *  Six years ago when the financial crisis was in full force, the G7 met here in Washington. We backstopped our entire financial systems. The G20 then committed to its fundamental reform. The first objective was to fix the deep and varied fault lines that caused the crisis. We are now in prospect of substantially completing that job at the Brisbane Summit. Core financial institutions are more resilient. Effective bank capital requirements have increased seven-fold. Major banks are on track to meet these requirements five years in advance. And for the first time liquidity standards have been established. There have been fundamental changes to banks’ relative incentives to engage in proprietary trading, market-making and lending, as well as restrictions on contingent exposures to off balance sheet vehicles, such as SIVs. Shadow banking is being transformed into resilient market-based financing. Minimum margin requirements have just been agreed for the repo market, and a variety of shadow banking institutions, including money market funds, have been reformed. Derivative markets are safer. Trading is now simpler and more transparent. Central clearing and trade reporting requirements are coming on-stream, backed up in over half of FSB jurisdictions by capital requirements and, from December 2015, margining requirements. Half of interest rates swap transactions are now centrally cleared.

But as we move to the next phase of post-crisis regulation, many commentators find it tempting to succumb to world-weary arguments. That any reform will be arbitraged That any insurance will promote risk taking That there is a trade-off between stability and growth  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  And that there will always be financial crises. We were right to reject such fatalism when we embarked on reform and we are right to reject it now. While all recognise that future crises cannot be ruled out, the steps taken in the past six years have certainly reduced the likely frequency and severity of such crises. Where banking systems have raised capital and restored trust in their creditworthiness, access to credit has returned. This central lesson from the US and the UK recoveries could not be clearer. Publicly provided insurance is being removed from the system as the Too Big to Fail problem is addressed and the public subsidy for globally systemic banks is eliminated. Market forces are being restored. The system is more transparent. It is clear who bears risk. And the scope for arbitraging new regulation has been reduced through a global approach to reform that has established common standards and encompassed shadow banking. In short, any serious look at the experience of post-crisis reform shows that reform and regulation support – not damage – long-term prosperity. As I said in Washington three years ago: in no other aspect of human endeavour do men and women not strive to learn and improve.