samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Mugur Isărescu: Enhancing the role of governance in international business Address by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the 37th EIBA Annual Conference, Palace of Parliament, Bucharest, 8 December 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Distinguished audience, It is an honour and, at the same time, a great pleasure to address the 37th edition of the Annual Conference of the European Academy of International Business. Allow me to join the organisers in addressing all participants a warm welcome. I am delighted that Bucharest is hosting today such a momentous event attended by so many guests from among world-famous professionals. I am also glad to welcome you this evening to the reception offered by the National Bank of Romania. Throughout its 131 years of existence, the NBR, established in 1880 as the 16th central bank in the world, has constantly supported and developed strong ties with the academic community, hosting numerous conferences, encouraging debates and building partnerships aimed at enhancing financial education. In this context, we are happy to contribute these days to the annual gathering of your organisation. Today’s theme – governance – is quite a vast topic, and was clearly brought to the spotlight by the recent global economic and financial crisis. When talking about governance, one cannot ignore the times we live and the major economic and financial uncertainties we all are grappling with.

That regional network has grown out of the Bank’s branches that were established in 1826 to deal with problems caused by the failure of local banknote-issuing banks. (The nearest branch to North Wales would have been in Liverpool, and like several of the sixteen branches which the Bank opened at that time it was located on land previously occupied by licensed premises - the old Queen’s Arms in Castle Street. Indeed the guiding principle seems to have been “If it works as a pub it will work as a bank”. The Licensed Victuallers Association has taken its revenge in recent decades, as old banks have been turned into pubs). Within the branches, the Bank appointed an Agent to liaise with local industry and commerce, and since 1930 they have been sending regular reports on their economies to Threadneedle Street. During the 1980s and 1990s, most of the branches were closed as different schemes for guaranteeing the supply of bank notes were established. But the Agents remained, and the network was extended to its current line-up of twelve - including a new Welsh Agency located in Cardiff, now run by Adrian Piper. Between them, the Agents are in regular contact with some 8000 firms. This provides the basis for the Agents’ monthly reports and presentations to the MPC; the Committee also commissions special surveys and asks for Agents’ help in understanding puzzles in the data. This information is currently published in summary form each quarter, alongside the Inflation Report.
Mario Draghi: IMFC Statement Statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at the thirty-third meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Washington DC, 15 April 2016. *  *  *  The euro area economy is continuing on a path of gradual recovery, notwithstanding an external environment characterised by some further deceleration in economic growth and occasional bouts of financial volatility. But the outlook for euro area growth remains faced with uncertainty, mainly as a result of downside risks to growth prospects in emerging market economies, a clouded outlook for oil prices and their economic implications, and also geopolitical risks. Given the new risks to the outlook for inflation, as well as the materialisation of some of the existing ones, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank has adopted a comprehensive package of monetary policy measures to further ease financing conditions in the euro area, stimulate bank lending and thereby reinforce the momentum of the euro area’s economic recovery and accelerate the return of inflation to levels below, but close to, 2%. In order to reap the full benefits of these monetary policy measures, decisive implementation of structural reforms and greater progress towards sustainable and more growth-friendly public finances is necessary. Such a combination of policy actions will not only lead to higher sustainable growth but will also make the euro area more resilient to global shocks.

Effectively implementing the enhanced governance framework, completing the banking union, and building a capital markets union to reduce risk and to allow for more private risk-sharing while establishing additional public risk- sharing mechanisms in parallel are some of the key near-term requirements in this regard. In the longer run, a more perfect EMU will form the basis for a stable, flourishing euro area economy that will not only enable the euro area to tackle challenges in other policy areas, but that will also be to the benefit of global economic and financial stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: Risk management - Challenge for the Thai financial institutions and regulator Opening remark by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Market Risk Management Techniques for the BIS Capital Regime Seminar, held in Bangkok, 12 October 2001. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to personally extend a warm welcome and to express our deep appreciation to all of our distinguished speakers and panelists who have agreed to come to Bangkok at this difficult time. I would also like to thank our co-host, the World Bank, in the efforts and interest which they have shown to make this important seminar possible. It is also important to convey my appreciation to the members of the financial industry for your interest and enthusiastic participation in this seminar. As we all know, the New Accord Proposal is scheduled to be finalized early next year, with its implementation scheduled for 2005. Countries that have not yet implemented the consolidated supervision will have until 2008 to comply with the New Accord. Thailand is in this second category since we have yet to be empowered by law to carry out consolidated supervision. The new Banking Act with such a provision is expected to take effect next year. Even with such a relatively long grace period toward compliance, Thai financial institutions have already taken the first step of the journey toward that direction.

We have recently conducted a survey of the financial institutions to check their readiness to conform to the credit risk guidelines under the New Accord. I have been reported that many plan to be ready for the standardized approach, while others are working towards the IRB approach, this is a welcome news. More importantly, financial institutions have all started the effort to strengthen risk management in their respective institutions with some notable progress so far, and we look forward to more progress to come. I would like to take this opportunity to commend all of you for such efforts. After all, the BIS capital requirement only serves as a cushion of losses or failure of an institution whereas it is the risk management that reduces the chance of failure. The significant progress you have made in the area of risk management deserves our full support and commendation, particularly so as this is a very difficult time for the financial industries. Ladies and gentlemen, Coming back to the issue of preparation for the New Accord, one can see that significant challenges remain ahead. I will now turn to these challenges. First, the technical and infrastructure aspects. It is important to build up a deep understanding of the technicality of approaches and methodology underlying the New Accord. Moreover, it is critical to achieve in-depth knowledge of risk management and the impact of such developments on business model of the financial institution. Therefore the task ahead is very challenging, far beyond just acquiring software that would crank out numbers.
If wages are slow to adjust, higher productivity growth lowers unit labour costs and thereby reduces price inflation. Here again there are important questions for policymakers. Should this effect be allowed to result in a temporary reduction of price inflation or unemployment? Third, an increase in the trend rate of productivity growth could also result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate, when the output gap is closed, in order to balance saving and investment. Fiscal policy and the development of public financial balances could at least partly offset this effect, as could the economy’s degree of openness. All this implies that monetary policymakers could face quite a few challenges. One of them is to identify structural changes and distinguish these from cyclical variations. Another challenge is to detect the magnitude of the effects. Furthermore, looking ahead in monetary policy is hard when the economy is going through major changes that make it difficult to forecast the future path of the economy and inflation. 5  BIS Review 65/2000  It is quite clear that this demands a great deal of forecasters as well as of those who construct macro models. The forecasts concern inflation one to two years ahead, which calls, for instance, for reasonable precision in the measurement of the output gap and the relationship between the output gap and inflation. It is already evident, for example, that inflation forecasts were frequently on the high side in many countries in the 1990s.

The participation of banks in the debt guarantee schemes is voluntary, and the very limited use of these guarantees may reflect a decline in the demand for credit and/or the desire of the banks to continue deleveraging their balance sheets. It is, however, important to ensure that other constraining factors are addressed, for example that the disincentives associated with the provision or pricing of these debt guarantees are promptly addressed, so as to help banks finance additional lending to the private sector. Possible further measures A relevant question is whether the tight financing conditions and the continuing stresses on the banking system require further measures by governments and central banks in order to help revive the extension of bank credit to the economy. The answer regarding the need and the nature of potential further measures depends on the causes or determinants of the prevailing financing conditions and on the structure of the financial system. To the extent that (i) financial market stresses, (ii) the deleveraging process, (iii) uncertainty about the economic outlook and about potential further bank losses, and (iv) low confidence impair the functioning of the credit and bank funding markets and the transmission of the effects of monetary policy, “non-standard” measures aimed at reducing funding uncertainty and enhancing the functioning of the credit market and, consequently, the monetary policy transmission mechanism, may represent possible courses of action.
If these two sectors cannot take up all the slack created by necessary fiscal retrenchment in the years ahead – as seems likely – then the U.S. trade balance will need to improve as well. This implies that EMEs will no longer be able to rely on expanding U.S. demand as a key driver of their own economic growth. Of course, this is not just an issue of U.S. and EME adjustment. Adjustments will be required in other industrialized countries, too – and not just the deficit countries. There has to be recognition on all sides that global rebalancing in terms of the composition of activity and growth and in terms of global capital flows is necessary. Fortunately, this is not a zero-sum game: it is in the interests of all sides. However, it is still very difficult to accomplish because it is not in the short-term interests of some interest groups in many nations. This means that there are likely to be considerable political obstacles to adjustment in many parts of the global economy. In this process, the United States needs to show leadership in contributing to a smooth adjustment. In this regard, I think there are a number of actions that the United States can take – unilaterally and in its own interest – that will make this rebalancing process easier and less prone to disruption.

Lars E O Svensson: Monetary policy after the financial crisis Speech by Mr Lars E O Svensson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Second International Journal of Central Banking (IJCB) Fall Conference, Tokyo, 17 September 2010. *  *  *  I thank Claes Berg, Marianne Nessén, Staffan Viotti and Barbro Wickman-Parak for comments on this speech. The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of other members of the Riks-bank’s Executive Board or of the Riksbank’s staff. Gabriela Guibourg of the Riksbank’s staff has contrib-uted to this speech. As the world economy recovers from the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed, a debate is going on regarding the causes behind the crisis and how to reduce the risk of future crises. The role of monetary policy and its relation to financial stability are also under debate and some argue that there is a need to modify the framework of flexible inflation targeting and give a greater role to financial-stability considerations. Some blame too expansionary monetary policy by the Federal Reserve after 2001 for laying the foundation for the crisis. My view is that the crisis was largely caused by factors that had very little to do with monetary policy.
Current account imbalances are no more than the arithmetic difference between gross capital inflows and outflows. As these gross flows increase as a result of financial liberalisation, it is natural to expect the difference between them to become more volatile (Obstfeld (2010)). As Chart 4 shows, the growth of gross capital flows in the  2  BIS Review 174/2010  years preceding the crisis was dramatic. At the start of the 1980s, gross capital flows were around 5% of world GDP. By 2007, they had risen to 7 times that. This growth in capital flows and imbalances has been mirrored in the path of the external balance sheets of the major economies. These, too, have adjusted rapidly. In 1985, the US was a net external creditor. By 2009, it had become a net external debtor to the tune of around 20% of GDP. In 1999, China was a net external debtor. By 2008, it had become a net external creditor of around one third of GDP. An interesting perspective on the drivers of imbalances is provided by looking at the gross saving and investment behaviour of surplus and deficit countries over this period. Chart 5 looks at these patterns. It suggests a couple of striking patterns. First, the correlation between saving and investment rates appears to have weakened significantly over the past two decades, for both surplus and deficit countries. This is consistent with increasing capital mobility. Historically, there has been a high correlation between national saving and investment rates – the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) puzzle.

And monetary policy was well positioned to support the economic expansion and the achievement of the Fed’s goals of maximum employment and price stability. Risks to the Economy However, during the past month the outbreak and subsequent spread of the coronavirus has brought with it new risks to the economic outlook. This is first and foremost a human tragedy, and my deepest sympathies are with those who have lost loved ones. The virus and the necessary scale of the response to address the public health challenge will have near-term effects on the global economy. These repercussions have been especially strong in the hardest-hit countries, including China, South Korea, Japan, Italy, and Iran. We are now also hearing reports that some businesses here in the United States are being affected by supply disruptions and weakening demand. As people take precautions, we’re seeing concerns around the tourism and travel sectors, in particular. Disease outbreaks require a multifaceted approach, and the coronavirus is no different. This is primarily a public health issue, which will be fought on the front lines by doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals. Governments will also need to step in to support the healthcare response, and, if needed, to provide targeted relief to affected industries and workers through fiscal measures. Monetary Policy Central banks like the Federal Reserve also have an important role to play in addressing the economic effects of the coronavirus, ensuring that financial markets function effectively and providing support to the economy.
Mervyn King: Banking – from Bagehot to Basel, and back again Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Second Bagehot Lecture, Buttonwood Gathering, New York, 25 October 2010. *  *  *  I am indebted to Stephen Burgess, Philip Evans, Andy Haldane, Andrew Hauser, Vicky Saporta, Jenny Scott, Paul Tucker and especially to Iain de Weymarn for their useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. 1. Introduction  Walter Bagehot was a brilliant observer and writer on contemporary economic and financial matters. In his remarkable book Lombard Street, Bagehot brought together his own observations with the analysis of earlier thinkers such as Henry Thornton to provide a critique of central banking as practised by the Bank of England and a manifesto for how central banks could handle financial crises in future by acting as a lender of last resort. The present financial crisis dwarfs any of those witnessed by Bagehot. What lessons can we draw from recent and current experience to update Bagehot’s vision of finance and central banking? Surely the most important lesson from the financial crisis is the importance of a resilient and robust banking system. The countries most affected by the banking crisis have experienced the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. Output is somewhere between 5% and 10% below where it would have been had there not been a crisis.

By affecting the transmission mechanism, financial innovation is also a challenge for the conduct of monetary policy  A good knowledge of the mechanisms through which monetary policy affects the economy is of crucial importance for central banks. Financial innovation affects these mechanisms both by altering the channels through which monetary policy operates and by changing the overall impact of monetary policy decisions. But the magnitude of the changes and the precise effect due to financial innovation at a time when other factors such as globalisation are at work are not well known. At the present juncture research shows that financial innovation tends to strengthen the interest and exchange rate channels whereas it appears to weaken the credit channel. -  Financial innovation certainly contributes to stronger wealth effects and thus probably also to strengthen interest rate channel 7 . This can be explained as follows : •  Financial innovation fosters faster dissemination of information and its more rapid incorporation into financial market prices. This is of course particularly true for monetary policy decisions and can therefore increase the effectiveness of monetary policy, particularly via the interest rate channel 8 . •  Financial innovation contributes to an increased holding of financial assets by lowering transaction costs and facilitating arbitrage, hedging, funding and investment strategies. •  Financial innovation often relies on stronger leverage, increasing the effect of interest rate change by the central bank.
And any support we provide will be on terms that are as penal as we can make them, without precipitating the collapse we are trying to avoid ……… We look for a clean exit. The company may be required to run down or restructure its operations, under our surveillance, to the point where it can do without our support. We aim to protect the system, not to keep in being unviable banking capacity …...” And, paraphrasing Mervyn King in 2007: “if the [authorities] underwrite any [risk] that threatens to damage the economy as a whole, it encourages the view that as long as a bank takes the same sort of risks that other banks are taking then it is more likely that their problems will be insured ex post.” That provides a useful context for the debate about whether the cost of bailouts can somehow be recovered from the industry. Compared with a year ago, a number of ideas are now in circulation. One possibility is to establish a fund in advance. Another is to raise a levy on the surviving banks. An argument in favour of the former is that it would raise contributions from risky banks before they fail. And it would allow the levies to be related to the size of their uninsured creditors, as some in the US have suggested. 10 But I do just wonder whether it would be realistic to raise, and over the decades sustain, a sufficiently large fund.

And the trigger for conversion from debt into equity could be at a margin of comfort away from true catastrophe; say, a percentage point or so above the minimum regulatory capital ratio. Of course, this would entail a structural shift over time in investment portfolios. But the system might be able to manage that adjustment. After all, it managed the all together less desirable adjustment to the development of the existing hybrid capital markets. But demand for contingent capital is, inevitably, uncertain at this stage. As are the terms on which it will be provided. We welcome the growing private sector focus on this. 4  King Mervyn A. (2009), “Speech by Mervyn King, Governor” to Scottish Business Organisations, Edinburgh, October 2009. See also Tucker P M W (2009a), “Remarks by Paul Tucker”, Panel session at the Turner Review Conference, London, March 2009 (pp. 5) and Tucker P M W (2009b), “The repertoire of official sector interventions in the financial system: last resort lending, market-making, and capital”, Bank of Japan’s 2009 International Conference, Tokyo, May 2009 (pp. 19). In the academic community, the idea was aired in “An Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities”, Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, April 2009, Council on Foreign Relations. Dudley, William C. (2009) “Remarks by William Dudley” at the Institute of International Bankers Membership Luncheon, New York City, October 2009.