samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Where, then, does the exchange rate come in? Apart from its short-run effects via import prices, the exchange rate features in our inflation assessments in two respects. One is that exchange rate movements affect demand in the internationally oriented sector and thereby in time the development of the output gap and ultimately inflation, too. The other is the information which the exchange rate may provide about the development of inflation expectations. While temporary exchange rate fluctuations hardly affect forecasts of inflation one to two years ahead, more lasting tendencies have an overall impact on demand and thereby on the output gap and consequently on the inflation forecast. Adjustment after the inflation era Sweden is one example of the numerous countries that in the 1970s and 1980s systematically aimed for higher growth and employment with the aid of expansionary economic policies, with less regard for the effects on long-term price stability. The outcome was very different from what had been intended. Compared with countries more devoted to stability, for example the Netherlands, Austria and Germany, macroeconomic development in Sweden was poorer in many respects. BIS Review 8/1997  -4-  Inflation in Sweden moved up substantially from the late 1960s onwards, trend growth weakened and the period ended in the early 1990s with a dramatic fall in production, a sharp increase in unemployment and a serious crisis in the financial system. The tendencies in the latter part of the 1980s were not sustainable.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: New opportunities for growth and development in Islamic financial markets Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the official ceremony for the completion of the Share Subscription Agreement between BIMB Holdings Berhad, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Dubai Financial LLC & Lembaga Tabung Haji, Kuala Lumpur, 16 October 2006. *  *  *  This occasion marks the successful completion of the share subscription agreement between BIMB Holdings Berhad, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Dubai Financial Limited Liability Company (LLC) and Lembaga Tabung Haji. It also sets a new chapter in Bank Islam's drive to chart its future direction in meeting new challenges and in exploiting the new opportunities for growth and development in the Islamic financial markets, both in the domestic and global market place. The participation of such key foreign and local institutions in the new share issuance by Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad signifies an important turning point in the history of Bank Islam which has been the pioneer Islamic bank in Malaysia. The partnership between BIMB Holdings Berhad, Dubai Financial LLC and Lembaga Tabung Haji is significant in several important ways. Firstly, it reflects the confidence and trust that international and domestic investors have in the investment and business climate in Malaysia, and in the Malaysian Islamic financial sector in particular.
To open this webinar, I would like to share with you some thoughts on this ambivalence of cryptoassets from the point of view of a central banker and a supervisor: First, the challenges and opportunities of crypto-assets development. Second, what we are doing at the Banque de France to address these challenges. 1. Challenges and opportunities The world of the blockchain and crypto-assets is still an immature ecosystem: it is difficult to predict in which direction and in which scale it will develop, but the emergence of many use cases related to decentralised finance, the creativity of the ecosystem, point to many opportunities. In particular, one can imagine that the innovations being developed will improve our payment systems, especially for cross-border transactions, or also securities issuance and settlement mechanisms... The main challenge is therefore to ensure that the emergence of crypto-assets and, more generally, decentralised finance contribute to the effectiveness and security of our financial system. Because this nascent ecosystem is also a source of many risks. The international work of public authorities highlighted these issues from the risk of money laundering to the risk of the consumer or investor. I would like to highlight one of them: the risk related to the network effect. This risk was mentioned when some Bigtechs considered creating supra-national “currencies": by offering to an extremely large customer base, these projects raised questions about monetary sovereignty of the states, as well as serious questions about the functioning of competition.

While the economy was tentatively getting back on its feet, inflation in the euro area dipped below 2% at the end of 2013 and continued to fall from there. At the beginning of 2015, it slid into negative territory, giving rise to concerns about whether inflation expectations were well anchored (cf. chart 13). In June 2014, the ECB lowered its main refinancing rate to 0.15% and its deposit rate to below zero. Today, they are at 0.05% and –0.3% respectively. In lowering the interest rate into negative territory, the ECB followed the example of Danmarks Nationalbank, which had already introduced negative deposit rates for banks in 2012. The primary goal of the ECB was, however, not the same as that of Denmark (which was to reduce capital inflows); instead, it sought to increase inflation by stimulating lending.6 From mid-2014, the ECB sent ever clearer signals that it would be substantially easing its monetary policy. At the same time, there were increasing signs that the US Federal Reserve would be exiting its zero interest rate policy. Against this backdrop, the euro began to depreciate considerably not only against the US dollar, but also against the pound sterling. Between mid-2014 and the beginning of 2015, the euro lost almost 15% against the pound and more than 20% against the US dollar (cf. chart 14). A phase of general euro weakness set in.
Andrew G Haldane: Ambidexterity Remarks by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, at the American Economic Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 3 January 2014. *  *  *  For most of the post-war period, central banks have executed macro-economic policy with, at most, one hand – the monetary policy hand. It is generally felt that their dexterity improved steadily over that period. This culminated in a long period of low and stable rates of inflation and a steadily growing economy between the mid-1990s and 2007 – the “Great Moderation” [Goodfriend, 2007]. Central banks had becalmed both inflation and the business cycle – and had done so single-handedly. Or so it appeared. But even while the economies of major advanced countries were an ocean of pre-crisis calm, a storm was brewing out in the credit market seas. When this storm hit in 2008, it caused a contraction in global output only rivalled by the Great Depression. Great Moderation turned abruptly to Great Recession. In response, questions began to be asked about whether monetary policy, while necessary, was sufficient to stabilise simultaneously the macroeconomy and the financial system [Bank of England, 2009]. Unlike the Great Depression, central banks’ response to the Great Recession was swift and sizable. Central bank interest rates in most advanced economies quickly fell to close to their floor, while central bank balance sheets rose to new heights.

This is mainly due to a slightly more positive assessment of developments in the United States and Asia, but also to more favourable developments in Latin America, and central and eastern Europe. On the other hand, developments in the euro area, particularly in the larger countries - Germany, France and Italy - have been more subdued than expected and a slightly weaker development is foreseen in the near future than was previously assessed. Although international demand has developed largely as we expected, the same cannot be said for prices. The subdued international price trend in recent years has probably been linked to the earlier economic slowdown. However, there are also other explanatory factors. One possible cause of the weak price pressure is the globalisation of trade and production patterns that has followed in the wake of deregulation and the spread of information technology. Many new markets are being integrated into the global economy, including countries in central and eastern Europe and Asia. We are now seeing weak international price trends for manufactured goods, while there is a sharp rise in commodity prices. This could also be at least partly due to changed international patterns in production and trade. The best example of this is China, with its huge size and rapid industrialisation. The country is now one of the world’s largest commodity importers, particularly crude oil, copper and certain agricultural products.
Philipp M Hildebrand: SNB gold sales - lessons and experiences Speech by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 5 May 2005. * I. *  *  Introduction  I am pleased to be in Washington today and would like to thank Fred Bergsten and his colleagues at the Institute for International Economics for providing me with this opportunity to talk about the recently completed gold sales of the Swiss National Bank (SNB). In June 1999, the Governing Board of the SNB decided that half of its then gold reserves of 2590 tonnes were no longer required for monetary purposes and that it would inform the market and the public accordingly. This decision contributed to the process that eventually led to the first central bank agreement on gold sales. This so called Washington Agreement provided the framework for the subsequent gold sales of the Swiss National Bank, the ECB and thirteen European national central banks. Under this agreement, the SNB’s realized sales of 1170 tonnes which represented the bulk of the total sales of 2000 tonnes for all participating central banks. The SNB completed its gold selling program on March 30, 2005 after selling a residual 130 tonnes under the second central bank agreement on gold sales.

Between May 2000 and March 2001, the BIS sold 220 tonnes on behalf of the SNB. For the first 120 tonnes, the SNB paid the BIS a fixed commission while the performance risk resided with the SNB. For the next 100 tonnes, the BIS agreed to pay the average price of the AM and PM London gold fixing plus a small fixed premium. In April 2001, the Governing Board decided that there was no reason to continue to sell through the BIS. The SNB now had the necessary professionals, know-how, trading resources and contacts to the international gold market to trade directly. Two types of selling operations were subsequently pursued: spot sales in the market and sales programs with price caps. Over the next three and a half years, 730 tonnes were sold directly in the spot market. For these sales, the SNB used 25 counterparties in four different continents. In an effort to receive consistently competitive pricing, the Governing Board allowed the SNB traders to become two-way participants in the market. In other words, traders were allowed to buy gold on an intra-day basis up to two thirds of the daily allocated sales volume. Overall, the sales had to be conducted within a clearly defined corridor which was structured around daily sales volumes of approximately one tonne (Figure 5). Typically, the Bank of England was used for the physical settlement of these operations. Apart from spot operations, 350 tonnes were sold through option programs.
The Bounce Back Loan Scheme 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  guarantees 100% of loans of up to £ to small businesses. Banks are taking little risk with their own funds when they lend now. With the space to lend, the funding to lend, and the credit guarantees to lend, banks have every assistance to help businesses finance cash-flow deficits. And unlike in the financial crisis, the banking system has the strength to lean into this crisis, to refinance existing loans and meet the demand for new ones. Banks will face losses in coming months on loans made in the past as some businesses and households struggle to meet repayments. Due to the reforms of the past decade, banks have the buffers of their own shareholders’ capital to absorb those losses on existing loans without cutting back on support for new lending.6  The final element of the support for bank lending has been to allow banks to use their buffers of capital without fear of regulatory actions. Buffers of capital are there to be used in stress to absorb losses while continuing to lend. We expect them to be used as needed.7 In fact, with government guarantees and funding in place, the prudent thing for banks – collectively – to do is lend. Failure to help the corporate sector finance its cash-flow deficit will result business failures and unemployment that create greater losses for banks on their existing loans.

Indeed, in recent months the markets have lowered their expectations in terms of the growth of European banks’ profits. Low or negative interest rates restrict the unit interest margin banks can obtain. However, from a general equilibrium perspective, they also increase credit, reduce bad debts and raise the value of the financial and real assets banks hold on their balance sheets. As a result, the net aggregate effect on bank profitability in general has so far been positive overall. That said, this effect will foreseeably diminish insofar as the situation of negative interest rates is prolonged over time. Indeed, a positive note regarding the most recent developments in profitability is that net interest income has increased following years of stagnation at low levels. In any event, the decisions adopted by the ECB Governing Council at its meeting on 12 September, including the 10 bp reduction in the deposit facility rate to -0.5%, the resumption of net purchases under its asset purchase programme and the strengthening of forward guidance, have been accompanied by mitigating measures. These include the application of a two-tier system for reserve remuneration, designed precisely to ensure the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission through the bank channel. There is also theoretical and empirical evidence that low interest rates transmit the monetary impulse by encouraging banks and other financial intermediaries to take risks. Fortunately, we currently have various macroprudential policy instruments, which I shall refer to later, designed to mitigate the potential build-up of risks that may affect financial stability through this channel.
And in the banking sector, long-standing challenges associated with weak profitability and overcapacity may limit some banks’ ability to invest to stay competitive in a more digitalised future. International crisis response Global cooperation has been instrumental in our response to the pandemic so far, and this cooperation should continue. Preserving trade openness and ensuring universal access to vaccines and treatments remains of key importance for a durable global economic recovery. Support for the most vulnerable countries needs to remain high on the international agenda, also in view of the divergence in vaccination rates and limited policy space in emerging markets and low-income countries. In this context, the ECB welcomes the crisis response measures taken by the IMF as well as the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and the Common Framework for debt treatments beyond the DSSI. This support was further strengthened in August by the general allocation by the IMF of special drawing rights (SDRs) of a historical magnitude, which is a strong signal of constructive multilateral cooperation helping the global recovery. We call for additional IMF members to sign voluntary SDR trading arrangements to facilitate SDR exchanges and ensure the burden is adequately shared across a wider set of countries. We take note of the discussions on channelling SDRs to vulnerable countries. National central banks of EU Member States may only lend their SDRs to the IMF if this is compatible with the monetary financing prohibition included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Euro area activity rebounded strongly in the second quarter of this year and looks set to also have been strong in the third quarter, supported by a marked recovery in domestic demand on the back of the success of vaccination campaigns and substantial monetary and fiscal policy support. While there is still uncertainty about how the pandemic will develop from here, we see the risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook as being broadly balanced over the medium term. The downside risks are related both to the pandemic and supply bottlenecks becoming more persistent than is currently expected. However, upside risks could also materialise from higher confidence effects and further spending by consumers. Inflation has increased markedly since the beginning of this year and we expect it to rise further this autumn. We continue to view this upswing as being largely driven by temporary factors, especially the strong recovery in oil prices from the sharp drop in spring 2020, the reversal of the temporary VAT reduction in Germany, and cost pressures arising from temporary shortages of materials and equipment. The impact of these factors should fade out of annual rates of price changes in the course of next year, dampening annual inflation. Our baseline scenario foresees inflation gradually increasing thereafter, but remaining below our 2% target over the medium term. Inflation could prove weaker than foreseen if a renewed tightening of pandemic-related restrictions were to affect economic activity.
Within the scope of this platform, the CBT became one of the fifteen members of the National Strategy on Financial Education subgroup, which was established in 2009. Similarly, the CBT applied to join the studies of the Financial Inclusion subgroup under this platform (established in February 2011) and also for membership in the Task Force on Financial Consumer Protection that was established at the OECD. The Central Bank of Turkey also contributes, via data collection and surveys, to international studies on financial access. Within this framework, the CBT supports studies carried out by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) conducted in collaboration with the World Bank. Moreover, the CBT – along with other related public institutions – contributes to the efforts of the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) initiated by the G-20 to enhance the exchange of information and cooperation regarding financial access. Having said these, I believe that the CBT study entitled “Access to Financial Services and Financial Education in Turkey and Around the World” will become an important reference regarding this issue. The booklet is now accessible on the CBT website as well as in the Conference CD and is will be in print soon. In the last part of my speech, I would like to mention some specific points regarding financial education within the framework of this Conference. In the first session, we will discuss the relationship between financial education and financial stability and contribution of financial education to the functioning of the financial system.

In order to get the expected benefit from financial education programs, individuals’ financial education needs that arise in different phases of their lives should be well identified. It is of great importance that financial education programs are devised in a way to meet these needs; and the effects of these education programs are assessed in order to reshape future needs accordingly. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Due to the relationship between financial stability and financial education I have just mentioned, the Central Bank of Turkey attaches special importance to the issue of financial education as other central banks do. As you all know, the CBT Law lays down the primary objective of the Central Bank of Turkey as maintaining price stability; whereas taking measures to ensure stability in the financial system are stated among the main duties. In this respect, the CBT considers financial education from the viewpoint of financial stability. With our biannual Financial Stability Report and other studies and announcements that we share with the public, we strive to raise awareness as regards the financial risks borne by households. Meanwhile, we have recently accelerated our efforts on the international platform regarding this issue. The CBT is a member of the International Network on Financial Education (INFE) established under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), one of the leading organizations for financial education.
Thanks to the reforms in the 1990s, it is now easier than it was 30 years ago to deal with high inflation. Firstly, monetary policy now has a different mandate and a constitutional independence that enables us to act decisively to counteract high inflation. Still, the monetary policy assessments are not easy. The high level of indebtedness is likely to mean that interest rate sensitivity in the economy is greater than before, and different – public finances are less affected, but households and companies are more affected. This composition makes it likely that a given interest rate increase will have a greater effect on demand and thus on inflation. Secondly, the period of inflation targeting has led to long-term inflation expectations now being much better anchored. In the early 1990s, high inflation had been  13 [16]  built into the expectations of economic agents in a completely different way. If prices and wages rose too much in relation to the rest of the world, it was expected that problems with cost crises and rising unemployment would be solved by writing down the value of the krona, that is, through devaluation. Thirdly, strong public finances are now a major advantage. This has increased the market's confidence in Sweden’s ability to keep public finances in order and fiscal policy is not feared in the same way as in the 1970s and 1980s to be a contributing factor in itself to sustained high inflation.

But it was now nevertheless clear that it was a total renovation that was needed. 4 [16]  In the Swedish paper Dagens Nyheter on 20 November – the day after the defence of the fixed exchange rate was abandoned – it was announced that an expert group had been appointed with Professor Assar Lindbeck as chairman. The aim was to tackle the long-term economic problems and, in Assar's words, to try to answer the question: “What is it about the Swedish economy that makes it run out of control like this?”6 The group, which came to be called the Lindbeck Commission, was to present proposals for how to tackle problems, which Assar described as “the low growth rate, the exploding public expenditure, the budget deficits, the constant trends towards cost inflation and the slow productivity growth”. Necessary changes in the framework… Unfortunately, it often seems that a crisis is needed to bring about real and profound changes. The major changes in the economic policy frameworks that we made as a result of the crisis in the early 1990s are well known so I will only mention them briefly here. The inflation target Instead of defending a fixed exchange rate, the task of monetary policy from now on would be to keep inflation low and stable. In January 1993, the Riksbank announced that an inflation target of 2 per cent would enter into force with effect from 1 January 1995. Gradually, changes in the monetary policy framework confirmed the new order.