samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, two members of the Executive Board remained responsible for tabling proposals for decision in issues of monetary policy and financial stability. This was also changed later, so that these two were no longer responsible for tabling proposals for decision, but only acted as spokespersons. When Irma Rosenberg left, the role of spokesperson for monetary policy disappeared, and when Lars Nyberg leaves at the end of this year, the role of spokesperson for financial stability will also probably disappear. The Executive Board has also decided to assign the Governor to assume managerial responsibility for the Heads of Department and to monitor the Riksbank’s activities within the scope of the fixed budget and operational plan. However, this will not solve the problem of the Governor not being head of the Riksbank in the same way as a Director General is head of an authority. The Riksdag Committee on Finance has stated its intention to review the Sveriges Riksbank Act once other issues it has been assigned by the government to investigate have been cleared up. My suggestion is that the role of the Governor of the Riksbank also be reviewed and strengthened at the same time. There are many ways in which this could be done, and different countries have taken different approaches. One possibility that I think might work well would be to have a Governor who is head of the authority and two Deputy Governors who, under the Governor, each take responsibility for their part of operations.

In the region as a whole, the US plays a vital, constructive role, moderating tensions and keeping potential flash points from boiling over. “Can Asia make it?” A year ago, many analysts and investors would have said no. The Asian miracle appeared to have been an illusion, built on flimsy foundations. Today, in light of the rapid economic rebound, the rank of the sceptics is thinning rapidly. My own view has been an unequivocal “yes”. Asia will recover its former dynamism. Not automatically, and not all at once; but as countries rebuild and put things right, recovery will come. The fundamentals which supported two decades of high growth in Asia have not disappeared – a sturdy work ethic and high savings rates, skilled and disciplined workforces, and an entrepreneurial culture. In time, these strengths will enable the countries to grow and progress again. The recovery will create new investment opportunities. Asian governments have recognised the need for foreign equity, and relaxed restrictions on foreign investments. Prices are down, and fundamentally  BIS Review 117/1999  4  sound companies facing difficulties are looking for strategic alliances. Investors should keep their eyes open, invest discriminately, and ride on the region as it picks up. At the height of the crisis, I asked one European banker what his bank would do. He said that the bank had been in Asia for over a century. It had seen far worse upheavals. It would take the latest problems in its stride, and wait the storm out.
Therefore, we suspend fraudulent market players, limit the risks that the public 10 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  take on themselves, and delve into specific situations related to public complaints. But it is not enough. We need instruments to prevent practices that may be formally legal but are designed to deceive the client, sell the wrong product, at the wrong price, with unspecified risks. We are preparing to establish a second vertical supervision framework for financial institutions – the so-called behavioural supervision. Our next steps will be: - introducing rules about selling financial products and services to various categories of consumers, in particular about providing the information about the product that is being sold; - reinforcing the role of self-regulating organisations that should develop basic standards about providing services and monitoring their implementation. We would be glad to see law passed regarding a financial ombudsman. Discussion thereof has already been very drawn out. We propose developing this new mechanism on a step-by-step basis: First, introduce OSAGO to the ombudsman’s remit, then microfinance products, then banks and other institutions. Certainly, it is impossible to create a system that effectively protects consumer rights without improving financial literacy, reducing the number of “unforced errors” that members of the public make when choosing financial services and vendors. Therefore, we will particularly focus on financial literacy. We have already launched a number of programmes, ranging from educating schoolchildren and students to creating a specialised website.

The Riksbank monitors the financial sector with a systemic perspective. If we hadn’t realised it before, one clear lesson from the crisis of 2008–2009 was that monitoring individual institutions is not enough. We and other authorities around the world learnt that we have to keep our eyes on the connections between the banks and how they are affected, as a whole, by developments on the markets. Among other means, the Riksbank influences financial market participants through the analyses we make and the recommendations we issue in the Financial Stability Reports. Another important role for the Riksbank is being the country’s representative in several forums that set the standards for the financial sector, primarily the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS). At the same time, it is worth pointing out that, at present, the Riksbank does not have any sharper tools than words in the preventive work or macro-prudential supervision. We can warn and recommend, but when it comes to real measures, other authorities currently hold responsibility. It is a difficult task. Always raising a warning when everything seems to be going well seldom makes you popular. Financial stability policy is of great importance for Swedish households Preventing future crises is an important task – as is being able to manage them if they break out anyway. I hope that this speech has clarified why Swedish households are dependent on financial stability.
10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  Chart 9a: UK business investment underperformed compared with previous recoveries… Indices: peak in GDP = 100 180 160 140 Range of previous recessions  120 100 EU Referendum Act  2008  80 60  0  5  10  15 20 25 30 Quarters since pre-recession peak in GDP  35  40  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Notes: Chained‑volume measure. Recessions are defined as at least two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth. Previous recessions include those beginning in 1973, 1975, 1980 and 1990. A recovery ends if a second recession occurs in the period shown. Chart 9b: …and international experience Percentage changes on a year earlier (%) 20  G7 excluding the UK  UK  15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 Range across the G7 excluding the UK  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  -20 -25  2018  Sources: Eikon from Refinitiv, Japanese Cabinet Office, OECD, ONS, Oxford Economics, Statistics Canada, US Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bank calculations. Notes: Chained‑volume measure. Business investment is not an internationally recognised concept. This swathe includes similar series derived from other countries’ National Accounts. Private sector business investment for Italy. Business investment minus residential structures for Canada. Non‑residential private investment for Japan and the US. Non‑government investment minus dwellings investment for France and Germany.

Certainly the portents are worrying. The storm that the modern Prospero has conjured is having an impact. Over the past year, the global economy has shifted from a robust, broad-based expansion to a widespread slowdown, with the proportion of the global economy growing above trend falling from four fifths to one sixth. In its May Inflation Report, the MPC projected that global growth would soon stabilise before recovering to around its potential rate by the middle of next year. This reflected: i)  the relative absence of fundamental imbalances in the global economy that would by themselves be expected to derail the expansion;  ii)  a considerable degree of expected policy support to the expansion; and  iii)  some positive momentum in trade discussions. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  On 5 May, with the ink on the MPC’s Report barely dry, President Trump announced further increases in tariffs on imports from China and China retaliated. Later that month, the US additionally threatened new tariffs on Mexico despite having only recently agreed a revised NAFTA accord. The US threat to increase tariffs on auto imports from Europe remains. The latest actions raise the possibility that trade tensions could be far more pervasive, persistent and damaging than previously expected. The rationales for action are broadening.
The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, 34(1), pp. 139-235. Fiorentini, G., A. Galesi, G. Pérez-Quirós and E. Sentana (2018). The rise and fall of the natural interest rate, Working Paper No 1822, Banco de España. Galesi, A., G. Nuño and C. Thomas (2017). “The natural interest rate: concept, determinants and implications for monetary policy”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin 1/2017, Banco de España. García-Posada, M., S. Mayordomo and S. Ongena (2018). Holston, K., T. Laubach and J. Williams (2017). “Measuring the natural rate of interest: international trends and determinants”, Journal of International Economics, No 108, pp. 59-75. 18

Foreign exchange market intervention and capital controls, followed by the special reserve requirement on capital inflows into the bond market and high-yielding deposits, insulated the exchange rate from the effects of volatile capital movements, allowing it to develop relatively unhindered and in line with underlying economic conditions. The advantages of a flexible exchange rate therefore prevailed, while the disadvantages were mitigated. This did not make for an uneventful journey, however, because even though the equilibrium exchange rate had clearly risen, it is always subject to considerable uncertainty at any given time, and the risk of overshooting was genuine. This risk may have materialised to some degree, but had the above-mentioned policy instruments not been applied, it would have materialised much more strongly,  1  with the associated risk of an abrupt correction later on, which could have had adverse consequences for economic and financial stability. This economic turning point stems from a turnaround in some of the factors that contributed to the upswing. The global economic situation is not as favourable to us. Terms of trade are deteriorating and not improving. The rise in tourist visits to Iceland has slowed markedly. Therefore, as compared with the last three years, growth in export revenues will ease considerably this year and in the years to come. GDP growth will be lower, as will the rise in our real income as a nation, no matter what we may decide about nominal pay increases in wage negotiations or about how we distribute such increases.
All of these help the public to understand our assessment of economic conditions through the lenses of these different types of forecasts. When asked about the trajectory for the monetary policy stance, I always point out that it is data dependent. The FOMC calibrates the stance of monetary policy to best achieve our twin objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable employment, taking into account our forecast for how the economy is evolving. This forecast reflects the ongoing flow of the data. Data releases that are close to our expectations have little additional impact on the forecast, while data releases that deviate significantly from our expectations can lead to more significant revisions of the forecast. It is, therefore, important for market participants and households to be able to follow the data along with the FOMC and to understand how we are likely to interpret and react to incoming data. While market analysts readily have access to economic and financial data, this access is not widely available to everyone. To help fill this information gap, for the past year we have been  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  making available on our website a monthly publication called U.S. Economy in a Snapshot. This publication contains a set of key data charts as well as commentary by our staff economists. The purpose is to provide interested readers easy access to clear and concise presentations of important economic information. The associated commentary provides some pertinent observations one might draw from the data.

After all, information is a  2  BIS Review 2/2008  public good and rating agencies are the providers of this good. But the case for further regulation has not as yet been compelling. First and foremost, we should consider the contents of possible improvements. I would pinpoint three areas, among others, for consideration: first, greater transparency of rating methods and the overall role of rating agencies in the securitisation process. Second, a marked difference in the metric used for rating bonds and structured products, which would restore confidence in ratings. This could be done in two ways, which could also be combined: either by adopting another rating scale for structured products (with another symbol for example); or by including an additional measure in the credit rating, in particular on its volatility in times of market or liquidity stress. Third, a specific rating for liquidity risk. I am aware that rating agencies are considering this, despite the difficulties of such an exercise. We must hope that the discussions currently underway in international fora, such as the FSF and groups of central bankers in which the Banque de France is actively involved, will restore the integrity of the ratings system, given its prominent role in the development of modern financial markets. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 2/2008  3
If we use a real discount rate of 2.5% a year, the present value of a permanent fall in output of 3% is in excess of 100% of current annual GDP. This is at the high end of estimates of the cost of higher capital requirements. Recent analysis by economists from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), commissioned by the FSA, puts the present value of the costs of permanently raising capital requirements by 1% at approximately 2.7% of current GDP 3. And illustrative estimates in the most recent Bank of England Financial Stability Report (FSR) indicate, under certain conservative assumptions, that the long run costs could amount to 4% of current annual  2  “Interim Report on the Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of Proposed Changes in Banking Regulatory Framework”, Institute for International Finance, 2010. The report assumes: a three-fold increase in the risk weights assigned to trading book assets; a 2pp increase in the minimum Tier 1 and overall regulatory capital ratios, to 6% and 10%, respectively, to take place at the end of 2012; capital redefinition effects including exclusion of minority interest from Tier 1; higher holdings of liquid assets as a result of the minimum Liquidity Coverage Ratio being increased; a greater reliance on longer-term over short-term wholesale funding, as a result of the Net Stable Funding Ratio at 100%.

The alarm bells ring for us when we are told that the CEO or other Senior Executives are very sensitive to challenge;  3.  so we as supervisors depend on Non-Executives, under the leadership of the Chair, to challenge the Executive in all aspects of the firm’s strategy, which includes the viability and sustainability of the business model and the establishment, maintenance and use of the risk appetite and management framework. We also of course rely on the Non-Executives to mentor and coach the Executives and balancing this with the essential ability to challenge is a vital component of an effective Board. In the terms of the Senior Managers Regime, this frames the responsibility of Boards. But, as many Board members have said to me, if only it was that simple, but you have made it so fiendishly complicated. Well, actually we didn’t make it fiendishly complicated, finance has become that way itself – we didn’t invent exotic derivatives. There are those who think the answer is to make finance less complicated, but in the real world there are benefits to innovation if risk management is effective. So, how do we square the responsibilities with the complexity? Not by drowning in complexity, or by doing a Canute and trying to tell it to go away. For Boards it means having a certain level of understanding, not at the level of the maths of a Copula.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Strengthening of regional integration in Asia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the KoreaMalaysia Business Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 8 April 2010. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to be here this afternoon to speak at the “Korea-Malaysia Business Forum”, in conjunction with the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Korea and Malaysia. The global economy is now on the path of recovery after the worst financial crisis in decades. This recovery is however uneven. Several of the advanced economies are still being confronted with unresolved crisis-related issues, in addition to structural factors that will constrain their growth performance in the years to come. Emerging economies, in particular Asia, is leading the global recovery. The region is fast becoming the anchor of growth and stability in the world economy. New growth dynamics are already at work to reinforce the strength of Asia over the next decade. Increased intra-regional economic and financial integration and other structural factors are supporting this trend. While this trend will intensify, the future global environment is going to be fundamentally different. Asia will be confronted with new challenges in this changed environment. Asia, therefore, needs to be well positioned to effectively manage these fundamental new global trends to ensure sustainability of our economic advancement. The business community and policymakers need to rise to the new challenges and build on our existing relationships.

In 2008, the Export-Import Bank of Korea and Industrial Bank of Korea successfully raised a total of RM2 billion via bond issuance in the Malaysian bond market. Moving forward, the sukuk market represents an important channel to reinforce regional financial integration. It presents an opportunity for Korean corporations to raise financing and issue sukuks out of Malaysia. In addition, Korean investors can also participate in the wide range of Islamic financial instruments in the Malaysian financial markets, including from more than 150 Islamic unit trusts, Islamic REITs, wholesale mutual fund products and other Islamic structured products. In addition to robust economic ties and potential financial links, Korea and Malaysia enjoy a growing mobility of talents. With the rise in Korean investment in Malaysia, this has led to an increase in Korean expatriates. Koreans are also coming to Malaysia as students and to participate in our Malaysia My Second Home programme. In addition, the Korean Wave, which spread to Malaysia in early 2000s, has contributed to make our country more aware of the Korean culture and traditions, thus promoting a better understanding between these two countries. Prospects for the Malaysian economy Malaysia is an economy that is transitioning into a new phase of development. In the current environment, our economy is now firmly on the recovery path. This year, the Malaysian economy is projected to grow in the region of 5% with further upside potential.
In sum, in times of stress, "enough" capital or liquidity is never enough. Even explicit contracyclical requirements may provide little or no relief. One possible solution is to offer – or impose – ex ante liquidity and capital insurance. Over the last two centuries liquidity insurance in times of stress has been provided through the lender of last resort. Proposals have been made to explicitly price that insurance which would better internalize its cost. Capital insurance, has also been suggested, among others, by Kashyap, Rajan and Stein and can be seen as a new – and potentially powerful – way to provide contingent support. •  Looking beyond individual institutions, the robustness of the system as a whole depends on the solidity of some of its key components (the "nodes" in the language of networks). This is to day perfectly understood and it is widely expected that "systematically important institutions" will, in the future, be subject to more stringent regulatory requirements and closer supervision. This may, or not, be related to their size. "Too big to fail" certainly warrants special treatment. But, the position and role of even smaller or medium size actors may also put them in a situation to have a strong influence on the system's dynamics. •  Ultimately, however, robustness in complex financial systems may be best addressed by shaping the structure itself of those systems.

The exchange rate has, in fact, tended gradually to soften since last spring when the decision to go ahead with the euro was finally confirmed; but increasingly since the autumn the internationally-exposed sectors of the economy have been dealt a further massive blow as a result of global economic turbulence. This started, in fact, with the financial disturbances in Asia in the latter half of 1997, but even as late as the beginning of last summer it seemed as if it might have only limited impact on the overall world economy. The IMF, for example, was then still projecting 3-3¾% world growth in 1998 and 1999 respectively, which was certainly a setback compared with their forecast of over 4% just six months before, but it was hardly catastrophic. Since last summer it has become increasingly clear that things are likely to be significantly worse than that. The financial collapse in Russia, deepening recession in Japan, the long battle – then sudden defeat – in Brazil to hold its exchange rate, and fluctuating fears of possible knock-on effects on the major countries’ financial markets, all contributed to an increased sense of financial fragility, which has not been easy to contain, though I am now hopeful that we will be able to stop the financial rot.