samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Under the so-called Solidarity Alternative, or wage moderation policy, the social partners were to ensure moderate wage growth and competitiveness. The authorities promised to deliver a stable krone. Structural reforms were implemented to increase growth capacity. Confidence in monetary policy gained a firm footing and inflation and the real interest rate declined. But the regulatory pendulum that swings back and forth was still in motion. In the period up to the turn of the millennium, petroleum revenues were on the rise and fiscal policy came under pressure. The fixed exchange rate regime amplified fluctuations in the economy and the social partners were no longer able to rein in cost growth. The Solidarity Alternative had played its role. Unexpected growth in petroleum revenues also highlighted the importance of designing a long-term government savings plan. We needed a new anchor for both fiscal policy and monetary policy. Chart 5: Inflation. Moving 10-year average and variation in CPI. Per cent. 1980 – 2010 Report No. 29 from 2001 sets out long-term guidelines for economic policy. The division of responsibility was further clarified. Norges Bank was given a clear responsibility for keeping inflation low and stable. The government and the Storting can build on Norges Bank’s response pattern when drawing up annual budgets. They can also take into account that increasing spending via government budgets may trigger an appreciation of the krone.

Pre-crisis, monetary policy in the advanced economies was essentially defined by inflation targets and a key instrument, the interest rate. In parallel, the goal of financial stability was chiefly addressed with microprudential regulation and supervision. This framework was broadly consistent with the goal of economic growth, given that the control of inflation was 3/7  estimated to be the best means for ensuring the economy drew closer to its potential growth. The crisis showed that this framework was no longer valid. The control of inflation, though it remains a necessary condition, is not sufficient to ensure growth; and microprudential regulation was no longer effective, in or of itself, for guaranteeing financial stability. As a result, central banks have adapted their policies, which are now more complex in terms of objectives and instruments. Monetary policy has had to face up to the problem of what is known as the “zero bound” on interest rates. Basically, this is the situation that Keynes coined the “liquidity trap”: interest rates close to zero cease to be an effective monetary policy instrument. This has led to the development of new instruments, so-called “unconventional monetary policy”, which mainly includes quantitative easing, private and public-sector financial asset purchases, and the explanation and signalling of the monetary policy to be applied in the future, namely “forward guidance”. The outcome has been a large increase – four- or fivefold – in the balance sheet of the main economies’ central banks.
And the rate of unemployment fell from a peak of over 10½% on the LFS measure to around 5% last summer; on the claimant count measure it fell from some 10% to just over 3%, which meant that the number of people claiming unemployment benefit, at under 950,000, was the lowest for 26 years. Short-term interest rates are at a 38-year low. All of that it seems to me gives the lie to a view that was quite widespread a decade ago, that sustained low inflation would inevitably mean continuous suppression of the real economy. I'd go further myself and suggest that it provides considerable positive support for the central bankers' credo. Now some of you - given what's been happening to your own businesses, to certain particular business sectors, and in regions of the country where those sectors are particularly heavily concentrated - may think that I've been living on a different planet. The problem is - and it is a real problem - that with the best will in the world macro-economic stability, the stability of the economy as a whole, cannot guarantee stability at the more micro-economic level: it can not guarantee the prosperity of every individual business or even of whole business sectors or geographic regions.

But whatever the explanation the resulting strength of sterling against the euro has contributed to the pressure on the internationally - exposed sectors of our economy, and a stronger euro would, from my perspective, help us towards better balanced growth in this country. It would also incidentally facilitate debate about sterling's possible entry into the single currency, in the sense that the undoubted attraction of nominal exchange rate certainty vis à vis our European trading partners, which is a major potential advantage of our adopting the euro, must depend to some degree on the likely exchange rate at which we might join. These then are the monetary challenges that we have faced over the recent period. The question now, of course, is where do we go from here? There has recently been encouraging evidence - in the US data particularly but also for example in many of the more forward-looking indicators of European economic activity - that we are now in the early stages of global recovery. We cannot be sure that the early momentum will be maintained; nor do we know just how strong the expansion will prove to be or how long it will last; but the signs are promising, and indeed far more positive than any of us would have dared to hope just six months or so ago in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.
2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  1 Source: Unlocking SDG Financing: Findings from Early Adopters 2 Source: AIBIM, Value-based Intermediation (VBI) Preview Report 2017-2020 3 Source: World Economic Forum, Shaping the Future of Digital Economy and Value Creation  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

In that regard, the recent announcement by the European Central Bank of its determination to conduct unlimited intervention in the sovereign secondary markets, provided effective conditionality is fulfilled, constitutes a significant step towards the normalisation of market conditions in the euro area. Yet, the return to a smoothly operating monetary union cannot be completely achieved by simply relying on ad-hoc reactions by policy-makers. Institutional arrangements must be reviewed in order to restore adequate incentives for domestic authorities to prevent the reemergence of destabilising imbalances and to ensure that any residual risks arising in specific jurisdictions that could affect the area as a whole would be addressed by integrated mechanisms operating at the euro area level. The recent changes introduced in the European Union to strengthen the requirements and the mechanism for the surveillance of domestic fiscal policies and structural reforms, together with the creation of the EFSF and the ESM – which we now know will be soon be launched – are good examples of the required institutional reforms. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  At the same time, a specific source of risks for the smooth functioning of monetary union that needs to be addressed directly is the financial instability experienced in specific jurisdictions.
Main macroeconomic indicators1 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Real economy indicators (in point percentage) GDP growth  7.8  6.5  4.5 - 5  6.0  6.0  Annual CPI (average)  0.0  3.1  5.2  2.3  3.0  Nominal GDP (Lek billion)  539.2  590.2  678  745  823  -8.2  -6.9  -5.8  -4.8  10.6  Fiscal indicators (in percentage versus the GDP) Fiscal deficit  -8.9  Monetary indicators (in percentage point) M 3 Growth  12  19.9  7.0  9.5  3m TB Interest rate  7.8  8.0  10.6  7.6  2.1  Inflation and monetary policy in 2004  The monetary policy of the Bank of Albania during 2003 was characterized by easing trends of the monetary conditions, in compliance with the lessening the inflationary pressures and improving the monetary indicators. The Bank of Albania took up the implementation of an easing monetary policy since April 2003 reducing the core interest rate by 0.5 percentage point. In July and October 2003, there were two other reductions by 0.5 percentage point each, bringing the core interest rate at the level it was at the beginning of the previous year. At the end of November 2003, the core interest rate was 7.0 percent; the annual inflation rate for that month was 3.4 percent, whereas the average annual inflation by the end of October was just 2.24 percent.

In these last three years, it was within the interval of 2-4 percent, as targeted by the Bank of Albania. 2. Monetary program of 2004  Pursuant to drafting and implementing the monetary policy, the Bank of Albania designs each year the monetary program, which is a financial plan aiming at disciplining the funds circulation in economy, in conformity with the development objectives of the country. The main objective is meeting the needs of the economy for monetary assets, without influencing the balance of demand-supply for monetary assets, generating thus inflation or shrinking the economy. The monetary program of 2004 has also been set up on the same premises. Its not a secret the fact that in the coming year as well, as in the previous ones, the two main decision-making institutions of the country in the field of economics and finances, the Albanian Government and the Bank of Albania, have agreed upon the general objectives of the country’s development, including also the so called harmonized cohabitation between the fiscal and monetary policies. This process, albeit all, was part of a constructive consultation with institutions such as IFM and the WB, enabling thus a new financial agreement between these two institutions for 2004. BIS Review 8/2004  3  Table 2.
The preliminary model was further refined in a Validation Seminar attended by visionary and prominent leaders with proven track record of business performance excellence from both the private and public sectors. The Model forms the foundation to guide the philosophy and drive the design and delivery of ICLIF’s leadership development programmes. I wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the industry luminaries who have given so much of their time in participating in the validation seminar for the ICLIF Leadership Competency Model. Let me share with you some of the interesting findings of the consultants in assessing our leaders based on the competencies identified in the Model. Among the positive findings of the exercise was the observation by the consultants that many of the leaders interviewed exhibited strong competencies in the area of focus, drive, execution, negotiations (and deal making) and entrepreneurial drive. These are all competencies resulting from high achievement needs and high achievement values. There is also a high sense of national pride and desire to enable Malaysia to meet the challenges of 2020. Participants also displayed a strong sense of performance drive for excellence. There are areas of competencies that, however, require further development. The review detected some degree of performance complacency by some respondents, as reflected by a lack of drive to achieve and the lack of desire to benchmark against the global best. Participants seemed quite satisfied with what they had personally achieved.

While this implies that a one-size-fits-all level of transparency is unlikely to exist, a number of economic forces are omnipresent and therefore allow us to draw some conclusions from the academic literature on post-trade transparency. In those market segments that the MiFID II review aims to address, liquidity providers play a central role as they intermediate between end investors and thereby help to secure a wellfunctioning marketplace. Yet an efficient and resilient market requires a sufficient level of competition. Several studies6 show that a lack of transparency can be a serious threat to a level playing field because intermediaries may use their private knowledge of customer order flow as an informational advantage that allows them to exert market power. Therefore,  3  See opinion of the ECB of 25 January 2012 on a proposal for a Directive on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and a proposal for a Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2012/5). 4  In particular the Money Market Contact Group, the newly established Bond Market Contact Group, the Foreign Exchange Contact Group and the Operations Managers Contact Group (see the ECB website for more information on these groups).
Shifts in consumption patterns, such as the growth of e-commerce, are fueling a steady decline in the use of cash in transactions, while the use of electronic payment instruments and systems is increasing, rooted in the current surge in global digitalization, along with the development of internet-based technologies and multifunctional technological devices. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  However, the decline of cash payments needs to be put into context because, if the downwards trend is undisputable – the volume of banknotes returned by the public to cash processing firms fell by over 10% between 2012 and 2017, -banknotes still dominate face-to-face transactionsparticularly small-value ones. Banknotes remain the main payment instrument in Europe by number of transactions, accounting for 79% of the latter in the euro area and 68% in France (54% and 28% respectively in value). The increase in the use of electronic payment instruments and systems is developing along four different pathways. First, the sophistication of internet technologies and devices for transactions: the number of channels used to initiate and accept payments has increased significantly. Contactless payments and mobile payments are some examples. Second, the availability of payment services at any time: payment services are becoming more available, ignoring physical borders and time constraints to satisfy customer demand for instant, continuous and uniform payment services, as economic agents become ever more mobile. Instant payments in Europe are for example designed to be executed in less than 15 seconds compared to the duration of 24H to 48H for traditional payment orders.

Namely: - the coexistence and competition of central bank money and private money (mainly so far commercial bank money) as settlement assets - the anchor role of central bank money My answer to this question would be to reaffirm and therefore preserve those core features  which have served well the public interest of financial and monetary stability. But this does not mean that we should aim for the status quo both in terms of regulatory and oversight frameworks and in terms of services that central banks should offer in providing central bank money as a settlement asset in payment systems. 2 - A number of risks to which crypto-assets payment arrangements are exposed are  familiar and in this respect, existing regulatory and oversight frameworks only require to be adapted to address them. To that end, three key issues to be considered are the legal qualification of crypto- assets, venues used to exchange them and the conditions under which a crypto-asset can be exchanged into another one, in commercial bank money or in central bank money. France has already moved into that direction with the adoption of a regulatory regime for 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  blockchains, tokens and ICOs. After a Blockchain Ordinance authorizing some specific security tokens to be seen as securities when they are not registered in a central security depository, France adopted in May this year a legislation on crypto-assets, referred to as the PACTE bill.
In this respect, on a more personal note, allow me to comment on what I read with surprise in some British newspapers last July: I personally never met with the City’s Special Representative to the EU, Mr Browne, and the Banque de France has never wished for Brexit to be detrimental to the City of London, and we have friendly and frequent contact with the City of London Corporation. But, besides savings from the rest of the world, the savings of the EU-27 Member States will be increasingly handled within the single market, given its significant size and the safety of its  Page 5 sur 5  rules. This means that we will move towards some degree of “Europeanisation” for wholesale banks, insurers and asset managers. It is symmetrically the duty of Europe and its member countries to be business-friendly and attractive to the financial industry. We should not achieve this by lowering the bar for our common regulations: the SSM, EIOPA and ESMA are duly mobilised to prevent certain entities that keep their resources outside the EU from setting up empty shell corporations in the EU, mere company name plates, to benefit from passporting rights. We should rather be attractive by offering a stable and favourable framework for investors, including infrastructures, labour skills and labour laws, and taxes. There is some fair but positive emulation in this regard.

The need for active multilateralism to face our global challenges. Let me now turn to my second point: the need for active multilateralism to face our global challenges. In the current context, international cooperation between countries is maybe more important than ever. Beyond the EU’s borders, and with all our partners, we have to strive to maintain the collective rules of the game in order to preserve the improvement in the global economic environment. The global recovery has indeed been gathering pace since 2016: according to the latest IMF forecast, global growth should stand at 3.6% in 2017, after 3.2% in 2016. However, there are two major risks threatening growth: first, financial instability, with the continued rise in global public and private debt since the start of the 2000s – from 190% of global GDP in 2001 to 230% in 2016. The 2008 crisis stemmed from this, but this trend has unfortunately not slowed down since; the private debt in emerging countries (namely corporate debt) has risen particularly rapidly. Any temptation to dilute the financial regulations implemented in the wake of the 2008 crisis would be all the more worrying.
As both demand for premises and rent levels have remained relatively unchanged, it is therefore likely that the price upturns in recent years are due more to a decline in investors’ required rate of return. The required rate of return depends partly on the yields on long-term government bonds, as these function as a risk-free alternative to investment in property. The required rate of return also depends on how much investors demand in compensation for investing in higher risk assets, such as property, that is, what risk premium they demand. Interest on government bonds rose in total during the first quarter of the year. All other things being equal, t his should raise the required rate of return. However, over the past year the required rate of return has fallen. This could either be due to investors expecting rents to rise in future, or that they have demanded a lower risk premium. A lower risk premium is in itself not surprising. The risk premiums on a number of different assets have fallen around the world in recent years. But as for a number of other markets, there may be reason to wonder whether the low risk premium on office premises is reasonable. However, one must remember that property companies have had very strong profit growth in recent years. Unlike the crisis years, property companies currently have much better margins to manage some dampening of prices. I therefore do not believe at present that developments in the commercial property market comprise any threat to financial stability.

Øystein Olsen: Financial economics and the challenges in managing Norway’s Government Pension Fund Introductory remarks by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the NBIM (Norges Bank Investment Management) Financial Research Conference, Oslo, 30 August 2011. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure for me to welcome each of you to the first NBIM Financial Research Conference. The objective of today’s conference is to present and discuss a set of papers at the forefront of academic research on financial economics. This event is also part of Norges Bank’s efforts to strengthen ties with the academic community. In addition to some of the best researchers in financial economics, we have in this room some of the top investment professionals in Norway. The opportunities for interesting discussions should be good. At the outset, the intention of this conference was to present leading academic research, without placing weight on its direct relevance to NBIM. However, as this conference will show, there is considerable common ground between the research frontier of financial economics and our challenges in managing the Government Pension Fund. Over the last three decades, researchers have moved a long way from the Capital Asset Pricing Model. One important result of empirical financial research is that expected returns on traded assets vary much more over time and across assets, than was previously thought and implicitly assumed by the CAPM.
This guidance was grounded in an early exposition of why r* was low and not expected to recover soon.7 Secular drivers that had pushed down the equilibrium rate prior to the crisis – including slower potential growth, demographic forces, changes in income distribution and excess saving in emerging markets – were likely to persist. The MPC judged there is a further wedge pushing r* in the UK below global r* because of fiscal drag and heightened uncertainty.8 The MPC clearly signalled that the policy path was likely to be very different from during past recoveries. It observed that the appropriate path of interest rate increases to eliminate slack and keep inflation close to the target was expected to be gradual and, even once spare capacity had been absorbed, the appropriate level of Bank Rate was expected to be materially below the pre-crisis average of 5%. This may be obvious now, but it wasn’t then when it mattered most. Importantly, the interest rate expectations of UK households and businesses have remained well anchored both as the recovery has progressed and even as policy was tightened in November 2017 and August 2018 (Chart 5). See Carney, M (2013), “The spirit of the season” at The Economic Club of New York; and the box on page 42 of the August 2014 Inflation Report. 8 See the box on page 39 of the August 2018 Inflation Report.

For similar reasons to the ECB, we moved from twelve to eight meetings per year, and we began publishing a statement every time we met and releasing Minutes, Inflation Reports and Monetary Policy Summaries simultaneously on the logic that one decision should merit only one news event. The MPC now provides much more detailed information on the assumptions that underlie our forecasts and regularly assesses them versus actual outturns. We release our key judgements for the global economy, domestic demand and the pace of demand relative to supply capacity, and we publish paths for variables that we and others can monitor to see whether the forecast is on track. We also now publish annual stock takes of the supply side of the economy and of the forecast errors we have made over the past year. Last year, the MPC introduced layered communication to reach the broadest possible audience. In addition to the Inflation Report we now publish a visual summary, or top layer, which distils the document down to its main messages with a few accompanying diagrams. It is intended for a non-technical audience. Following  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  the changes, we have seen web traffic to Inflation Report pages increase by a third and research suggests that public understanding has increased by a quarter.4 The biggest innovation in communication has been the introduction of forward guidance as a tool to influence short-term interest rates once policy rates hit the effective lower bound.