samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is consistent with lower 12-month growth rates in the second half, which respond largely to a tighter comparison base. For 2019 and 2020, the forecast ranges are similar to those considered in June. Thus, GDP will grow between 3.25% and 4.25% next year, and between 2.75% and 3.75% in 2020 (Figure 4). The lower growth expected in 2020 stems from the economy closing the gaps somewhat faster than expected and, therefore, growing around potential. Moreover, the impulse from abroad will contribute somewhat less growth at that horizon. These projections represent a somewhat less favorable external scenario than in the previous Report, an MPR that will remain below its neutral level for several more quarters, investment outgrowing GDP, no major macroeconomic imbalances and the economy growing around its trend trajectory towards 2020. 3  Compared with June’s Report, the baseline scenario adjusts the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) of 2018 upwards but maintains the same gradual reduction in its expansion rates over the rest of the projection horizon. On the consumption side, we expect private consumption to grow at a similar pace as GDP during 2018, 2019 and 2020. This assumes that the durable component—largely its imported part—will decelerate from the first half of the year, affected by the depreciation of the peso. The support that household spending receives in the baseline scenario from the recovery of the labor market should help offset this effect (Figure 5).

Early on, the Monetary Policy Committee had to focus on stabilising the exchange rate in order to stop the collapse of asset prices and the automatic increase in private sector debt, most of which was either exchange rate-linked or indexed to the CPI. The scope to cut interest rates in order to stimulate demand was therefore limited, although it began to develop over the course of 2009. The capital controls that were introduced in late 2008 provided some room for manoeuvre and enabled the Central Bank to allow real interest rates to fall faster than would otherwise have been possible. Inflation, which had skyrocketed after the currency collapsed, began to subside gradually, but the inflation spike caused by contractual wage increases and excessively high inflation expectations cut into that room for manoeuvre from mid-2011 onwards. In order to understand the economic recovery in the face of these headwinds, two points are important. The first point centres on the nature of the recession. To some extent, the recession represented the inevitable adjustment of domestic demand to the fact that it was no longer possible to fund the country’s massive current account deficit and to the abrupt contraction of two sectors – financial services and construction – that had grown exponentially during the upswing. When the dust settled, the domestic economy still rested on other sturdy foundations, and the low real exchange rate stimulated some of Iceland’s tradable sectors.
But despite that progress, when the Bank was reunited with the PRA we knew that we still had to do much, much more. So three years ago we made Diverse and Talented a central pillar of our first strategic plan. We value diversity for at least three reasons. First, it is the right thing to do; a public institution should seek to reflect i  the public it serves. Second, it helps to build the trust we need to deliver our remits. Third, it is well established that diversity leads to more creative thinking and reduces the risks of groupthink and bias. It isn’t enough for us to reflect diversity, however; we need also to choose inclusiveness. Inclusiveness unlocks the true value of an organisation’s diversity; through inclusion people can realise their full potential. That’s why as we increase the diversity of the Bank, we are focussing on building a culture that values diverse ideas, encourages open debate, and empowers people at all levels to take initiative. Since these two ideals go hand in hand, today I will reflect on both diversity and inclusion: what they mean, why they matter, and how they are best delivered in a modern central bank. The what There are two main types of diversity – identity and cognitive. Gender, ethnicity, age, disability, sexual orientation, education are all identity factors, which can be ii  measured, targeted and their impact assessed. As I will discuss in a moment, we have introduced diversity targets for the first time.

Not everyone wants to be steeped in fan charts; modelling and stress testing. Yet the decisions we take impact every UK citizen. How can they rely on us – the dreaded experts? Of course, trust can be built through a track record, but it can also be grounded in familiarity. People trust vi  individuals, places and things that they know. Reflecting the diversity of the people we serve can reduce misperceptions that we are experts making esoteric decisions in an ivory tower for the benefit of others. Moreover, diverse decision-making bodies typically have greater political support and enjoy greater public trust. vii  They also tend to achieve better policy outcomes through better understanding of community needs  and more effective dialogue with the wider population. viii  Better decision making, innovation and adaptability  Homogenous groups that pay insufficient attention to minority views are vulnerable to biases, groupthink and over optimism. They are more likely to be influenced by the way information is presented (framing); and to stick with under-performing projects because of prior investments. ix  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  Diverse groups can overcome these ills as they are more inclined to consider novel ideas and challenge each other, enabling them to infer cause and effect and to solve problems better. Diverse teams are also better able to adapt to changes and are more resilient.
In the domestic arena, the parliamentary fragmentation that has characterised national politics in recent years also generates uncertainty over the course of some of the main economic policies, in relation both to the necessary process of budgetary consolidation and to the likewise much-needed adoption of new structural reforms enabling the economy’s growth potential to be increased. Moreover, a further rise in uncertainty, associated with the political situation in Catalonia, continues to pose an additional risk to economic stability, especially in the Catalonian region. Achievements and limits of the recovery The Spanish economy has completed a growth phase of five years. Specifically, since end2013, GDP has grown by 14% in cumulative terms, having exceeded since mid-2017 its pre-crisis level. Some of the structural reforms launched during the recession will have contributed to this recovery. These include, on the domestic front, the labour market reform, the restructuring and clean-up of credit institutions, pension system reforms and the headway in fiscal consolidation. And at the European level, we may mention the various measures approved in recent years, including most notably the start-up of the Banking Union. Yet a series of more transitory – though persistent – factors has also contributed decisively to the momentum of the recovery. These factors include the role played by the ECB’s monetary policy and the implementation of an expansionary fiscal policy in recent years, combined with the significant reduction in oil prices from mid-2014 to early 2016 and, subsequently, the improvements in external markets.

In this respect, the empirical evidence available on 9/14  the effects of increases in the minimum wage offers a wide variety of results, although in general, it tends to suggest that an increase in the minimum wage has a negative – although limited – effect on aggregate employment in the economy. Nonetheless, according to this same evidence, the impact on the probability of job loss is significant in the case of certain groups, such as lesser-skilled youths and elderly workers, whose unemployment rate is still very high and whose level of productivity is below the average. The level of the national minimum wage and its annual increases should therefore be designed bearing in mind the productivity of the workers affected and their level of employability if it is wished to avoid undesirable effects, in the form of job loss and increased inequality. To address the challenges of our labour market, economic policy should firstly move on evaluating active policies, especially among the lesser-skilled, in order to focus resources on those measures most effective with a view to increasing employability. Secondly, future changes in the labour market should serve to make progress in reducing temporary employment and excessive job turnover, without hindering job creation and, in particular, permanent job hires. Thirdly, mechanisms should be set in place to provide for a greater alignment of each firm’s wage conditions with their level of productivity.
I will leave this for the presentation by Kate Sweetman, the main author of this study. Broadly, the Asian Leadership Index demystifies that attributes leaders in Asia must develop if they are to engage the people they lead. The Asian Leadership Index does not propose a new leadership model. Rather, it identifies a number of areas for behavioural change that are needed based on the attributes that respondents indicated are currently missing in their leaders, reinforced with suggestions on how leaders might move forward with greater influence and impact. In conducting this research, it is hoped that it generates thinking on these leadership issues and contribute towards the development of the new generation of effective leaders in Asia. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1

As you know, at the French President’s instigation, huge efforts are made to think about what has been termed a “new Bretton Woods”. Beyond these ambitious words, I do believe it to be useful to take a fresh look at the existing financial regulation. As a contribution to this debate, I would like to make two final sets of remarks. One has to do with the fluctuations of financial systems. The other concerns financial supervision. Financial systems that operate in the context of a developed market economy are, by nature, subject to cyclical forces. Some are a consequence of the business cycle. Credit activity is an obvious example, as credit demand is heavily influenced by economic activity. Others are from within financial systems. For instance, financial institutions’ equity position moves in line with asset prices especially in a fair value world where fluctuations result in capital gains or losses. The challenge for the authorities is to assess whether and to what extent regulations reinforce these dynamics and impact the entire financial system. With these questions in mind, work is being undertaken to examine the impact of prudential standards. It is also on this basis that the accounting adjustments that I mentioned earlier have been made. The need to develop a “macro-prudential” policy is now under debate. The general principle is straightforward: it consists in ensuring that supervision manages to limit risks for the stability not only of a particular institution, but also of the entire financial system. Its implementation, however, is complex.
However, with greater awareness on the part of employers in the public sector and a low level of activity in some business sectors, the risk that wage growth will again pick up seems to have been reduced. Norges Bank has previously stated that a rapid and pronounced change in the interest rate would be appropriate if, for example, heightening turbulence in financial markets or a cost-push shock resulting from wage negotiations indicate that confidence in monetary policy is in jeopardy. Similarly, it would be appropriate to change the interest rate in larger steps if the outlook points to inflation that deviates substantially from the inflation target over a longer period. We have experienced a period of monetary policy easing. This period is not over. The next assessment of the interest rate will take place at Norges Bank’s Executive Board meeting on 25 June. Our next Inflation Report will be presented at the same time. 8  BIS Review 25/2003

Liquidity can be compared to the ability to pay one’s bills as they fall due. Even if you have large capital, you may not have good liquidity. This is particularly important for the banks. While they receive money from depositors and borrow on the market at fairly short horizons, their lending is usually long term – perhaps 30 years or more for a mortgage. This ability to transform short-term saving into long-term loans is the banks’ main function in society. It enables companies to invest and households to buy their homes. Normally, a shortage of liquidity does not present a problem. Withdrawals from bank accounts follow normal patterns and the banks are able to monitor this. If special needs arise, the banks can manage the situation by selling assets and thus acquire cash. Normally the banks have also been able to manage their short-term borrowing without problems. But during the crisis problems arose on many markets. In some cases there were quite simply no buyers at all and market funding ceased functioning. And as the banks had become dependent on short-term borrowing, there was little they could do when their financiers decided it was safest to demand their money back. Money the banks could not get hold of. In these situations there is not much a bank can do. The usual remedy is liquidity assistance from the central bank. But most central bank make tough demands regarding collateral for lending money to banks with liquidity shortages.
Europe is home to competitive and globally successful companies; it enjoys comparably efficient and effective public services; it boasts world-class infrastructure; it maintains advanced education systems and generates internationally competitive top technology. And, at the same time, the contours of what may be called the European Social Model have remained intact: a well-developed welfare system provides a safety net for the needy; income inequality is relatively contained, especially when compared to other parts of the world. Nevertheless, in a comparative perspective, in the light of the economic growth rates registered in the United States – not to speak of the spectacular growth dynamics in some emerging market economies – the performance of the euro area economy has been rather disappointing. What are the reasons? Taking a long-term perspective, and looking beyond the short-term fluctuations of the business cycle, we must examine the fundamental determinants of its potential or long-term economic growth: demographic trends, developments in labour utilisation and productivity and the variety of underlying factors that affect the ability of the European economy to achieve increased efficiency and to create more employment. In order to better understand and assess the relative contribution of these determining factors, it is useful to express, by employing a growth accounting framework, GDP growth in terms of the rates of change in productivity, labour utilisation and population. Table 1 shows the extent to which the rates of change in these three variables have contributed to real GDP growth in the euro area and in the United States over the period 1996-2005.

Caleb M Fundanga: The importance of cross border information exchange for Zambia Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the launch of the Alumniportal Deutschland, Lusaka, 25 November 2008. *  *  *  • Her Excellency the Ambassador of the Germany Embassy in Zambia • Management and staff from the Germany Embassy in Zambia • Fellow alumni • Members of the press • Distinguished invited guests • Ladies and gentlemen Guten Abend meine Damen und Herren. I am truly honoured to officiate at this important Launch of the Alumniportal Deutschland. I am informed that Africa has a rare honour of being the first continent to implement the Alumniportal Deutschland. I am certain that our implementation process will define the failure or success of the whole project. We thus have a huge challenge to ensure that we achieve success and provide a benchmark for others to emulate. However, looking at the many beaming faces present in this room, I have no doubt that we will provide more than just a benchmark for others to follow. I am glad to note that we are all optimistic on the success of this project in Zambia in particular and Africa in general. We have a duty to represent our continent and give it the honour that it so deserves. Your Excellency, the Launch of the Alumniportal could not have come at more opportune time when cross border information exchange has become cardinal in every aspects of life especially trade.
The euro has the potential to also be a complete strategic success in the future  1. The euro has the potential to become a major reserve currency as an alternative to the US dollar  The euro is already the second most widely-used international currency in the global monetary and financial system. But, 18 months after the introduction of the single currency, it is fair to say that while the euro has become the first financing/issuing currency in the world, it has not so far made the same progress as a reserve/investment currency. The low level of interest rates in continental Europe has fostered the international financing role of the euro (euro-denominated bonds accounted for some 45% of new issues in 1999 which, as I mentioned earlier, somewhat exceeds the market share of new USD-denominated bonds). Conversely, these relatively low remuneration rates have reduced the role of the euro as a reserve currency (in central bank portfolios) or, more generally, as an investment currency (in private investors’ portfolios). Since the launch of the single currency, the low level of interest rates in the euro area and the continuous depreciation of the euro have temporarily slowed down the emergence of the euro as a major reserve currency. This leads me to say a few words on the depreciation of the euro in the past 18 months. 2.

This Banque de France view is now widely shared by the central banking community  1. Concerning gold holdings:  The ECB’s decision in July 1998 to hold 15% of its reserves in gold, taken from the gold stocks of the national central banks, was generally seen as a positive signal in a market hitherto inhibited by fears that governments might decide upon new gold sales. This was evidence that gold remains an important element of global monetary reserves. 2. Concerning gold selling and gold lending:  The Banque de France and the Bundesbank have been a driving force behind the 1999 joint statement on gold, which is fully consistent with our traditional position. And I quote: –  “The undersigned institutions will not enter the market as sellers, with the exception of already decided sales. –  The gold sales already decided will be achieved through a concerted programme of sales over the next 5 years. Annual sales will not exceed approximately 400 tons and total sales over this period will not exceed 2,000 tons. –  The signatories of this agreement have agreed not to expand their gold lendings and the use of gold futures and options over the period.” (End quote.) The so-called “Washington Agreement” has clarified the intentions of the Eurosystem as well as of the Sveriges Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of England with respect to their gold holdings.
Recent developments in these indicators have been mixed. The labour market remains tight on traditional indicators, with employment growth expected to be more resilient and unemployment rates lower than expected a few months ago. But wage developments – particularly higher frequency indicators of current momentum – appear to be easing, even as services price inflation surprised to the upside, albeit largely on the back of components typically though to be erratic on a month-to-month basis. The mixed character of developments in these key indicators makes it all the more important to keep a structural framework in mind on which to form judgements about the overall implications for inflation persistence and monetary policy. For the reasons I have developed above, the evolution of energy prices plays a key role. Now that that terms of trade shock is being at least partly reversed by the large and rapid fall of  Page 11  wholesale gas prices – both in absolute terms and relative to the path of futures upon which the MPC’s February macroeconomic forecast was conditioned – developments are moving in a more favourable direction. Relative to where we were a few months ago, the difficult ‘trade-off’ facing monetary policy as a result of the adverse terms of trade shock – that is to say, rising inflation in concert with a squeeze on domestic real incomes and spending – has eased. The MPC should be cautious about ‘looking a gift horse in the mouth’ by viewing better prospects for activity as something inherently inflationary.

On top of that, as we said in our press notice last Thursday - announcing that we had not changed interest rates - we recognise “that deterioration in the international economy could increase the risks of inflation falling below the target”. That is still not the most likely outcome in the eyes of most of us and given the real world uncertainties we can anyway never sensibly tie our hands. But there is no doubt in my mind that recent international developments have at least reduced the likelihood that we will need to tighten policy further. BIS Review 71/1998