samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Progressive economic growth will continue in this case. Any delay would require us to raise the key rate more significantly in the future, or even to pursue tight monetary policy. After today’s increase in the key rate, we have approached the threshold between accommodative and neutral policy. Taking into account the time lag effects of policy, monetary conditions will generally stay accommodative for a while longer. We will be closely monitoring how the market will be adjusting to our decisions. I would now dwell on the factors of our today’s decision. I will start out with inflation. Today, the acceleration of price growth is absolutely obvious across a wide range of products and services. This is caused not only by one-off factors and the pass-through of higher production costs, but also by the stronger impact of the steady component of price dynamics to an increasingly greater extent. In our opinion, this growth reflects the monetary nature of inflation. It is the fast rebound of aggregate demand exceeding the capacity to expand supply that has sped up price growth. As demand is high, this enables producers to pass through their increased costs to end-user prices. Production costs have really risen. Specifically, the growth of world prices for raw products (primarily, for wheat, steel, oil, and timber) has boosted production costs of many goods and services in the consumer basket. For instance, global steel prices have surged by 50–70% over six months.

We proceed from the fact that the global economy will be bouncing back faster than we expected in February. This will be driven by a large-scale fiscal stimulus in advanced economies and the mass vaccination of people worldwide. The growth of the global economy will boost the demand for Russian exports. Taking into account this factor and the slower recovery of oil production under the OPEC+ agreements, we have raised our forecast for oil prices from 50 to 60 US dollars per barrel this year and to 55 US dollars per barrel next year. The forecast for 2023 remains unchanged at 50 US dollars per barrel. Accordingly, we have also increased the forecasts for exports and the trade surplus. As domestic demand has been expanding, we have revised the imports forecast upwards. The current account surplus will grow to 56 billion US dollars this year from 34 billion US dollars last year. Now, I would like to discuss in detail risks that are beyond our baseline forecast. Proinflationary risks are primarily associated with increased inflation expectations. As inflationary pressure is stronger and supply-side factors exert additional influence on price growth, inflation expectations may stay elevated for longer time. Consequently, the saving ratio may decline faster, with consumer activity rising above expectations. As always, there are risks related to the external sector, including changes in the geopolitical environment. We have always taken them into account.
This may be more difficult to achieve for international tools that require agreement between multiple national policy makers. Macroprudential policy needs to be operational soon It is therefore clear that vulnerabilities are emerging as countries recover from the crisis and it is important that national authorities are soon able to implement macroprudential policies to address those risks. Leading the development of formalised macroprudential policy arrangements are the European Systemic Risk Board, which will hold its inaugural meeting in just two days, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US, which held its first meeting in October 2010. But many other countries are thinking seriously about how to implement and conduct macroprudential policy in their jurisdictions. Governance arrangements for macroprudential policy A vital aspect of the macroprudential policy framework will be the design of the governance arrangements. They will determine how the different elements of the framework are brought together and will influence how macroprudential policy interacts with other policy areas. Governance arrangements should be effective in three broad areas; they must ensure that the macroprudential decision-maker (the “macroprudential agency”) has: (i) a clear mandate;  managed to avoid the fiscal consolidation currently seen in many other EU countries. One reason for Sweden’s robust public finances is that it had to implement a programme of fiscal consolidation in the mid1990s, following the Swedish banking crisis.

However, this seems to reinforce their conviction that regional cooperation is necessary to achieve stable and non-inflationary growth and to overcome latent economic conflicts with their trading partners. As in the case of the regional process of integration in Europe, it may well be that the final objective of the Mercosur regional agreement goes beyond that of trade cooperation. The international community should support regional cooperation efforts among countries that have strong trade relationships and are willing to achieve progress in economic convergence. These efforts have significant positive externalities and could contribute to greater effectiveness of multilateral and bilateral surveillance. The exchange rate of the euro To complete the picture of the international role of the euro, let me finally refer to the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis other major currencies, namely the US dollar and the Japanese yen. I should like to take the opportunity to reaffirm that the ECB does not pursue any exchange rate target in its stability-oriented monetary policy strategy. Our objective is to maintain stable prices in the euro area and not a specific level of the euro’s exchange rate. According to our strategy, the exchange rate of the euro is the outcome of current and expected economic policies pursued in the euro area, and economic developments in both the euro area and abroad. Conclusions To summarise, the new institutional monetary setting in Europe has consequential implications for international capital markets and international policy cooperation.
Similarly European resolution authorities setting MREL in the EU will need to consider how to go from MREL in current liability structures to an MREL that ultimately meets the BRRD objectives. The RTS allows transitional MREL to be set until 2020. Work needs to be done to clean up existing liability structures to make them consistent with requirements. This is firm level work which will be addressed as part of the resolution planning process. Let me give you some examples of what I have in mind. •  My first is structured notes. Some respondents to the FSB consultation suggested the blanket exclusion of structured notes from TLAC should be relaxed. We are reflecting on that. But the current situation is that in many cases structured notes have been issued to meet the needs of often quite small pockets of investors. The result is that some firms have many thousands or even tens of thousands of notes outstanding each with different structures and embedded derivatives. Trying to value all these instruments and bail them in would be a barrier to making resolution work. And as such will need to be addressed as part of the resolution planning process for a particular firm. •  My second example is non-equity capital instruments issued out of operating companies. As I described earlier, SPE strategies are built around putting only the top company in a group into resolution and avoiding legal risk and the potential dislocation of systemic functions by keeping operating subsidiaries outside resolution.

It is now clear that rating agencies’ models failed in the recent past as a result of wrongly basing their ratings on the correlations observed during good times. In my opinion, the recent methodological changes, imposing stricter rating caps (above the rating of the sovereign), in particular for EMU countries, amount to treating crisis times as structural changes making the new methodologies based again on extreme assumptions. Thus, the error is the same, this time in the opposite direction. Policy-makers timely acknowledged the fragilities in the design of the EMU, identifying the most crucial reforms needed. These will increase the robustness of the euro area economies against adverse shocks. Rating agencies do not fully recognize the ongoing process. Instead, they decide to change their procedures exactly at the moment in which the institutional framework of the EMU is responding to the very same conditions that motivated such move. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that EMU countries are about to be equipped with a banking union, which will contribute towards breaking the link between sovereigns and the banking/financial system. Further relevant institutional changes include the creation of the European stability mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, the new role of the ECB in eliminating runs on sovereign debt (through the Outright Monetary Transactions programme) and a comprehensive set of EU regulations aimed at avoiding fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances. Therefore, rating agencies are moving countercyclically with the EU institutional advances and risk becoming irrelevant.
Proposals to reinvigorate the Fund’s oversight of the international monetary system – surveillance – lie at the heart of the Medium Term Strategy endorsed at this year’s Spring Meeting of the IMF. Together with the more widely publicised, and politically charged, commitment to reform the Fund’s governance, by rebalancing the quotas that determine member countries’ voting rights, they represent a serious attempt, in the words of the Fund’s Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato, to ‘meet the challenges posed by globalisation.’ The main purpose of my lecture tonight will be to explain the role which a refocused Fund could and should be playing in promoting international monetary stability, and to outline some steps to build on the agreements reached at the Fund’s Annual meetings in Singapore in September. The next six months will be critical. It is important that we use them to think hard about what the Fund does, as well as to push forward the second stage of the governance agenda. The changing role of the IMF The IMF was originally set up at the end of the Second World War ‘to promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems’. The collapse of the system of pegged exchange rates in the early 1970s precipitated a lengthy debate between those, led by the French, who favoured a return to managed exchange rates, and others, led by the Americans, who favoured floating exchange rates.

Allow me to also extend a word of gratitude to Radu Deac, the Chairman of ELEC Romania since its establishment, for his steady contribution to promote Romania in Europe and Europe in Romania. It is not that the Eurozone does not have its own problems, yet the strengthening of its governance framework is what one may call “work in progress”. It is our duty, I think, to keep believing in the European project, as the only valid one for securing peace and prosperity on our continent. As I have previously stated, whenever obstacles emerge, I cannot help recalling the words of Jean Monnet, one of the EU founding fathers: “Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”. I trust that this Conference, which has a lot of outstanding panellists, will address those problems as well. Among the speakers, I am particularly pleased to see Jeffrey Franks, another old friend of Romania, with whom we had a fruitful co-operation in the past. On this note, allow me to finish and wish every success to the works of this conference. Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
On many issues, we share common interests and positions. In 2010, MAS and Bundesbank established a cross-border collateral arrangement to enhance liquidity provision by widening the pool of eligible collateral for banks. MAS has a Supervisory Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with BaFin that provides for mutual assistance and sharing of supervisory information in banking and insurance. MAS also participates in the annual Deutsche Bank Supervisory College for non-EU regulators and we are pleased to have hosted the most recent one last November. Given that financial activities are often cross-border in nature, such international co-operation will be of increasing importance, including to facilitate innovative services as well as to mitigate the risks that some these may present. It is also in this spirit that I congratulate the establishment of this partnership forum. It is an excellent example of a co-operation platform that allows our industry players to engage one another in open discussions, to identify common challenges and working opportunities. This forum also provides for perspectives from government, central bank, regulator and academia. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Future of banking Allow me now to share some thoughts on the conference theme around the future of banking. This is clearly a topical subject in the face of the ongoing Technology Revolution around us. Many of us will probably have heard of the famous quote by Bill Gates, that “people do not need banks, they need banking”.

The EU has started on this journey by making payment and data interconnectivity between banks and non-banks mandatory, through the Payment Services Directive 2. Australia has also announced that it will legislate a national Consumer Data Right in 2018, allowing consumers open access to all their data including banking-related ones. While these hold a lot of promise by promoting consumer interests and welfare, there are other details to consider. For example, what primary data rightfully belongs to the customer, and what about secondary data about the customer that a bank had made sense of? How should a customer’s data be packaged for onward sharing? How do we develop technical standards to share this information efficiently and securely? Who should pay for these? In Singapore, we subscribe to the notion of banks sharing their data openly as a larger good. Some of the operational details have to be worked out. In MAS’ engagement with the banking industry, there is broad consensus as to the benefits of open banking. What we see is an opening up of customer data as a ground-up process led by the banks themselves. We believe this is a constructive development, that industry players themselves see the value in doing so. Role of financial regulators In my remarks so far, it should be obvious that financial regulators will have active roles in the business and technology transformation in the banking industry. Regulators need to have a sharp understanding of emerging technologies and new business models, and to be alert to potential risks.
That points, I think, to keeping things as straightforward as possible, without glossing over uncertainties and risks. The two threads are intertwined. We have a better chance of keeping inflation expectations anchored to the target if the target is simple to communicate; and if we do not over elaborate, or slip in to being overly ambitious about, our conduct of cyclical policy. BIS Review 46/2006  11

Annuity writers should be cautious in changing their longevity assumptions. For example, the annual data can be volatile because of factors such as the failure of flu vaccines. Moreover, the slowdown in the rate of improvement in life expectancy appears less marked amongst wealthier people, who are represented disproportionately in annuity portfolios. Nonetheless, we have concluded that we should make some changes to our quantitative indicators in the light of recent longevity experience. These indicators are used by supervisors as one input into our review of whether insurers’ models meet Solvency II tests and standards. Third, we will soon complete the first full cycle of Solvency II reporting. Later this year, I plan to hold roundtables with insurers, investors and analysts to discuss Solvency and Financial Condition Reports (SFCRs). We are also reviewing whether an ongoing requirement for audit of every year’s SFCR is proportionate for the smallest insurers. It would be unhelpful for the PRA to be too prescriptive about the depth of content of SFCRs. But it strikes me that some areas could be made more consistent. For example, changes in Solvency Capital Requirement coverage could be broken down to show what is attributable to changes in capital, to changes in modelling and to changes in risk assumptions. Insurers need to explain fully to policyholders, investors and others what lies behind their Solvency II ratios. This is particularly true in more complex areas like internal models and the matching adjustment.
In addition, the ECB has the following high-priority requirements concerning the euro area statistics compiled by Eurostat and the NSIs: 1.  more comprehensive and timely statistics on services, labour markets and housing markets;  2.  better use of available data through the compilation of regular euro area supply and use tables and the integration of labour accounts into the national accounts, which  10  See “Recent developments in consumers’ inflation perceptions and expectations in the euro area” in the November 2007 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. 4  BIS Review 50/2008  are needed both for productivity and growth analysis and for updating the EUKLEMS data; and 3.  closer coordination of national statistics with regard to seasonal and working day adjustments, revision policies and release calendars. As regards the process innovations, the Governing Council of the ECB last year endorsed a long term vision for statistics produced by the Eurosystem: •  concerning input, the same data should be collected only once;  •  concerning data processing, the Eurosystem’s statistical function should operate as an efficient production network; and  •  concerning output, the fitness for use of Eurosystem statistics and statistical communications should be further enhanced.

At the same time, the number of households, whose deposits are guaranteed by the deposit insurance scheme, has increased six fold, to 2.4 million. In parallel with quantitative indicators, the Albanian banking sector has developed, has become more cutting-edge, and has marked significant progress in the range of bank products and payment instruments that it provides. Lastly, and equally important to the development indicators, this sector has proven resilient to shocks and – unlike many other experiences in regional countries – it did not need to use public funds. While highlighting, on the one hand, the progress made insofar, I would like to point out that the banking sector development – and of the financial system in general – has not been a linear one: it has constantly faced challenges of different forms and types. These challenges have required prudence as well as active, intelligent and courageous decision-making. I am confident that our combined experience may and will help us in future decisions. Therefore, I consider this conference as an excellent opportunity to reflect on certain challenges that we may face in the period ahead. First, let me present a brief overview of the economic and financial situation and development perspective for Albania. As we have repeatedly said, the Bank of Albania deems that the Albanian economy is set on a steady path of improvement of its cyclical position.
Marzunisham Omar: Globalisation - contents and discontents Welcoming remarks by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the World Bank International Conference "Globalisation: Contents and Discontents", Kuala Lumpur, 15 January 2019. * * * Globalisation has contributed to the world’s unprecedented economic growth and prosperity. Global output has increased more than six-fold in the past 50 years. A billion people have been lifted from abject poverty in just one generation. Although the gains from globalisation are vast and widely-acknowledged, its fruits have not been equitably shared by all. The growing sense of discontent and injustice among the marginalised have led to a retreat from globalisation in the recent period. This reminds me of what the late Kofi Annan once said: “Globalisation is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its fragility”. Globalisation has, and will always, exist in a tension. The challenge is finding the right balance between various, and often contrary, objectives. The retreat from global integration and multilateralism today serves as a wake-up call for us to reflect on the realities of globalisation, to re-examine our policy choices and to recalibrate our way forward. With rapid technological advancements becoming an increasingly polarising force, the sociopolitical and economic issues at hand are more pressing than ever. It is my great pleasure to welcome you today to the World Bank International Conference on ‘Globalisation: Contents and Discontents’. Thank you to the World Bank for giving me the opportunity to say a few words.

All in all, the banks’ capital position will be strengthened considerably compared with previous regulations, contributing to the boosting of confidence, both in the individual banks and in the system as a whole. …and carry out clear measures for liquidity In the light of the crisis of the autumn of 2008, the Basel Committee has decided, for the first time, on quantitative requirements for liquidity in the banks. Basel III works with two liquidity measures – one short-term and one long-term. The short-term measure is based on, in principle, every bank having sufficient liquid assets to survive for at least 30 days. It is difficult to consider such a requirement as unreasonable. The long-term measure, in principle, limits the gap between the maturity of a bank’s assets and the maturity of its debts. So this limits the duration risk of the bank. In the end, Basel III will be implemented as national legislation The regulations I have just sketched will eventually enter national legislation. They are to be fully implemented by 2019, with several sub-targets on the way. In the EU, Basel III will be implemented through what is referred to as the CRR/CRD IV.11 Those of you who have followed the ongoing negotiations know that both countries and EU institutions have different views about how implementation should take place in the EU. An important dividing line has been to what extent countries should be able to stipulate higher requirements nationally than those formulated in the common EU regulations.