samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This consists of three parts: an expenditure ceiling entailing that the Riksbank annually sets up an upper limit for nominal government expenditure for the next three years, a surplus target requiring public finances to have a surplus of one per cent of GDP over an economic cycle1 and a stipulation that municipal and county council budgets may not have deficits. This framework has worked well. Unlike many other countries, Sweden was able to enter the most recent financial crisis with a large public finance surplus. Secondly, the monetary policy regime has been changed. Instead of a fixed exchange rate, we now have a floating exchange rate and an inflation target. After the fixed exchange rate was abandoned in November 1992, the Riksbank decided in January 1993 on a new “nominal anchor” in the form of an inflation target of 2 per cent, to apply from 1995. The new monetary policy regime has worked significantly better than the old one with the fixed exchange rate. Inflation has decreased considerably since the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 3). In addition, this has not been at the cost of lower average GDP growth than previously. On the contrary, since the mid-1990s, GDP growth has been higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Thirdly, and perhaps not as widely-known, wage formation has improved since the mid1990s. The changes had already started by the early 1990s.

Our assessment was that there is a need to continue to raise the repo rate in order to stabilise inflation at a level close to the inflation target of 2 per cent and to avoid too high a level of resource utilisation in the future (see Figure 11). However, as usual, we would like to add that uncertainty concerning the future is great and the interest rate path we have calculated is a forecast, not a promise. Wage formation will probably continue to work well in the years ahead The conditions are good for wage formation to continue to work well in the years ahead, just as it has since the mid-1990s. This is also the assumption made in the Riksbank’s forecasts from April. The rapid improvement of the labour market means that the central agreements concluded in the autumn and next year are expected to reach higher levels than the agreements concluded last year. Wage increases over and above the central agreements (“wage drift”) are also expected to contribute towards slightly faster wage increases. The Riksbank’s assessment is that overall hourly wages will increase by about 3.5 per cent per year in 2012–2013, which is compatible with a CPIF inflation rate (inflation excluding interest rate changes) of close to 2 per cent at the end of the forecast period.3 But all forecasts are uncertain. This also applies to wage forecasts. It is normally easier to make good forecasts for the development of wages than it is for inflation.
What are the major causes of the current world imbalances? c.  Do imbalances impede world growth? d.  What are the best (domestic/global) policies to mitigate the imbalances? Are there any chances for (efficient) international cooperation? Who should do what? e.  How are the current changes in regulatory and supervisory frameworks influencing EU-wide imbalances? Are they mitigating them or deepening them? f.  Can creditor countries (such as China or Germany) act as “locomotives of growth” given that the juan is quasi-fixed against the US dollar and the “German currency” is fixed against the “currencies” of many trading partners in the eurozone? And what proportion of the potential fiscal impulse will merely benefit those mainly Asian countries whose products are becoming more and more competitive on EU markets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

The conduct of monetary policy in Norway, as in many other countries, is delegated to the central bank with an objective of low and stable inflation. The inflation target can be seen as an answer to the problems raised by Kydland and Prescott. However, inflation targeting probably places greater demands on our understanding of the way the economy functions than earlier. Macroeconomic models are useful tools that can combine our empirical and theoretical insights. But models cannot provide definitive answers to all the questions that we as decision-makers face on a daily basis. Nor can they reduce the uncertainty surrounding economic developments. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the economy from different angles. We must also look out the window, we must be pragmatic and we must exercise discretion. BIS Review 4/2005  7
Eddie Yue: What’s next in our fintech journey Keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority at the Hong Kong FinTech Week 2020, Hong Kong, 2 November 2020. * * * Good morning everyone. Welcome to Hong Kong FinTech Week. 1. I’ve always wanted to speak to you from a virtual stage, especially given the nature of this event. 2. This year, thousands of you are joining virtually from around the world. This surely reflects the extraordinary energy in Hong Kong’s fintech sector. 3. The rise of fintech has led some people to ask whether it will replace banks one day. I tend to think about it a bit differently: I’d like to know how technology can make banking better. Technology won’t replace banking; it will make it better. 4. There are three core principles that will always be the bedrock of good banking. These hold true for tech companies coming into finance and for traditional banks embracing technology. I’m talking about good service, customer trust, and efficient capital management. These principles have endured through the eras of the abacus, the ledger, and the first computers. They are timeless. 5. We can compare this to food – one of our favourite subjects in Hong Kong. You can eat in a Michelin-starred restaurant or a dai pai dong. You can buy food in the market and cook it yourself. You can order a take-out and have it delivered. You can eat a thousand different ways.

Limit the build-up of debt despite the need to stimulate the economy I would also like to say something about the interplay between current monetary policy and measures to mitigate the risk factors I have mentioned. Is it really justified to introduce measures that may dampen household consumption or activity on the housing market when the Riksbank is at the same time trying to stimulate the economy in order to increase  3  Several studies based on household data from the financial crisis of recent years show that highly-indebted households reduced their consumption more than households with low debts (see for example Dynan 2012, Mian et al. 2013, and Andersen et al. 2014). Studies that compare developments in different countries also indicate that high or growing indebtedness in the household sector entails higher risks to the real economy, even if the households also have substantial assets (see for example IMF 2012, Jorda et al. 2013, and Flodén 2014). 4  See Riksbank (2014b). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  inflation? This question is particularly relevant given that the repo rate is at zero and cannot be cut much more. I think that the question, at least in principle, should nevertheless be answered in the affirmative. It must be possible to meet financial risks with targeted measures even if this makes it more difficult for monetary policy to attain the inflation target.
José De Gregorio: Workshop on financial markets and monetary policy Opening remarks by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Workshop on Financial Markets and Monetary Policy, Santiago, 6 August 2010. *  *  *  On behalf of the Central Bank of Chile I would like to welcome you all to this workshop on the interactions between financial markets and monetary policy. We have put together a very interesting group of papers that are surely at the forefront of research in this area. The episodes that started to unfold during the second half of 2008 reminded us once more of the central importance of financial markets for the functioning of the economy. As the crisis progressed and policy makers tried to mount a response that could mitigate the effects on the real economy, understanding which actions would have the bigger impact at the smallest possible cost become a key priority. At the same time, gauging how the traditional policy actions would affect the economy in a scenario of deep disarray of financial markets also become an important priority in Central Banks and Treasury Departments around the world. The collection of papers that will be presented here today try to illuminate different features of the policy dilemmas I just mentioned. They are then a very welcome contribution. To some extent economists lacked a clear theoretical framework to understand the role of financial markets as both an originator and propagator of shocks when the crisis started.

On the supervision side – or better known to you as the examiners that come and pay you a visit every now and then – a new department known as the Financial Conglomerates Supervision Department has also been established to facilitate the integrated supervision of financial service groups that include both banks and insurance companies under their umbrella. The new cross-sector regulatory structure allows us to modernise the regulatory framework for both the insurance and banking sectors at a more equal pace. The increased synergies created will enable the Bank to apply the best regulatory practices in the banking sector to the insurance sector, and vice versa. Regulations in the area of market conduct, for example, are more advanced in the insurance sector than they are on the banking sector. On the other hand, the regulatory framework for risk management and capital adequacy is generally more developed on the banking side. Under the new structure, the Bank is able to leverage on the more advanced developments in either sector to enhance the regulatory framework for both sectors simultaneously if possible. This, in turn will promote a more consistent and comparable regulatory regime for the banking and insurance sectors. Substantial resources have already been allocated to this effort, particularly in the areas of corporate governance, product regulation and financial reporting which have an important bearing on banks and insurers that are within the same group.
This expansion has also been noted in the microfinance sector which is growing to fill the supply gap for finance that arose from the closure of banks  4  BIS Review 99/2008  and branches in rural and peri-urban areas earlier on. With the microfinance regulations issued in 2006, the number of microfinance institutions licensed by BoZ, for instance, has grown from 3 in 2006 to 15 as at June 30, 2008, with several other applications currently under consideration. This change in strategy is partly due to the strengthened fiscal position of the Government and the significant fall in annual inflation to single digit levels in 2006 for the first time in three decades. These developments have resulted in reduced returns on investment in Treasury bills and Government bonds thus compelling banks and NBFIs to actively seek other investment avenues. To this end, domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP has increased from 18.7 percent at the end of 2005 to 43.0 percent at end of 2007. In the same period, the proportion of national savings increased from 18.1 percent to 21.6 percent. 4 These statistics are good indicators of improving access to financial services. 4.1.2  Government  The Government is encouraging the state-owned NBFIs, that already deal with the lowincome market to deepen and broaden their services. Some of these already have an increasing presence country wide and have developed strategic development plans, aimed at extending financial services to the low income population.

Their many initiatives include “Women of the Year” programmes to recognise female employees for outstanding success, as well as their Women’s Initiative Network (WIN) which provides a supportive platform for sharing and engagement among Barclays employees worldwide. 24. Amongst us, there are many women leaders who have blazed the trail in the industry. The moderator for today’s panel discussion, Deborah Ho, has had an illustrious career with financial institutions in Asia and New York and is an IBF Fellow. Deborah serves on the committees of Barclays’ Global Investment Bank Diversity Council and Women’s Initiative Network. She is also Barclays’ representative on BoardAgender. 25. The list goes on and thank you each and every one of you, for inspiring in your own way and for being a role model. Closing remarks 26. It is critical for us to diversify our workforce, especially since it has been shown over and over again that the best performing organisations are those who tap on all of their employees’ talents, both men and women alike. In fact, according to another McKinsey report, gender-diverse companies are 15% more likely to outperform their non-diverse counterparts. 2 27. We must do more in our own capacity to promote and encourage talent development in the financial sector, being an inspiration in our own way. Not simply for the benefit of employers, but to allow every individual an equal opportunity to pursue their goals and dreams, and strive for their best.
We should also describe the uncertainty in comparisons of different repo-rate paths. Monetary policy is a more or less continuous process. We normally make decisions on the repo rate and renew our assessment of the repo-rate path every second month. There is always considerable uncertainty over economic developments, particularly in the longer run. But that does not matter so much. We gradually adapt our monetary policy to new information and new forecasts to be able to keep inflation close to the target and resource utilisation at a sustainable level. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figures Figure 1. GDP calculations in the long-term surveys GDP at fixed prices, index 1970=100 160  160  150  150  140  140  130  130 Outcome LU70  120  120  LU75 LU78  110  LU80  110  LU84  100  LU87 B  100  LU87 R  90  90 70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  Note. R refers to the reference alternative and B to the balance alternative. Sources: Ministry of Finance and Statistics Sweden  Figure 2.

William J McDonough: Implementing the New Basel Accord Remarks by Mr William J McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Global Association of Risk Professionals, New York, 11 February 2003. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Thank you for that kind introduction. It’s a pleasure for me to be here today in my capacity as Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The topics to be discussed at this conference certainly are timely. One need not look any further than recent news headlines to understand why the work of a risk management professional matters so much. Current events remind us that when companies lack the commitment to manage their risks prudently, they will quickly fail to uphold their responsibilities to their shareholders, to their employees, and, ultimately, to the public at large. Those failures are felt not just as a loss of jobs, or investments, or savings, but also as the loss of public confidence in the soundness of our economy. Sound corporate governance only comes about when there is a genuine commitment to do the right thing and to manage risks in whatever form they arise. Risk managers must provide timely, objective and accurate information to their senior management. In turn, senior management and a bank’s board of directors need to ensure that there is an atmosphere of transparency within the firm - one that promotes healthy, disciplined risk taking.
The crisis affecting the Chilean economy since March 2020 has had a strong and rapid impact on the labor market, with a disproportionate impact on women, who lost more than 930,000 jobs between February and July 2020. Women’s jobs were affected in a greater proportion than men’s, which points to an unequal distribution of the consequences of the crisis. b. This phenomenon can be partly explained on the labor demand side, since the shock generated by Covid19 and related sanitary restrictions had a stronger impact on sectors (personal services, trade, and restaurants and hotels) and types of work (self-employment, household help) where employment is more intensive in hiring women. c. However, just as important as the demand side is the supply side. This is largely reflected in the fact that the crisis brought not only an increase in unemployment, but especially a drop in the labor force, but mostly concentrated in women. Thus, between February and July, the female participation rate fell from 53 to 41 percent, standing at 46 percent in the last measurement (February-April 2021).

When the Referendum was being held, the global economy was emerging from a long period of financial repair and lacklustre growth. Over the subsequent two years, a widespread and increasingly vigorous global expansion took hold. For the first time since the financial crisis, business investment and foreign trade grew strongly across all major regions. Economic uncertainty diminished, and consumer and business confidence firmed. In economies close to full employment, real wages finally began to grow. A new beginning seemed possible. In the past few quarters, however, these trends have largely reversed. After peaking a year ago around 4%, global momentum is now weakening in all major regions and downside risks have intensified. The proportion of the global economy growing above trend has fallen from four-fifths to one-third. Trade growth has slowed and the export outlook has dimmed. Capital goods orders are stagnating, investment growth has become more tepid, and business confidence is diminished (Chart 1). Chart 1: Global momentum is weakening Index, amplitude adjusted, Long-term average=100 102  Percentage change, 3 months on 12 months ago 20 15  OECD Business confidence 101  10  World trade in goods  5 100  0  US & EA capital goods orders 99 2010  -5 -10  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  Sources: ECB, Conference Board, CPB, OECD, and Markit Economics and Bank calculations.
I will argue that those phenomenons can all be ascribed to two common causes: a worldwide based shift in the primary distribution of income; and asymmetries in financial development among countries. Together, they combine to produce (1) excess saving in emerging economies (2) strong capital inflows to the US (3) an increasing frequency in financial booms and busts and asset price bubbles in both advanced and emerging economies. Let’s look first at income distribution. In China, the share of wages in GDP has declined from 55% in 1992 to 48% in 2008. In the US, the median real wage has been stagnant over the last fifteen years despite the fact that real GDP has grown annually by above 3% over the same period. These are deep changes mostly driven by technology and demographics, in proportions which are hotly debated, and partly unexplained. In contrast to wage developments, consumption trends have been widely divergent. In China, the share of consumption has gone down by more than 10 % of GDP over the last decade. In the US, consumption kept growing (both in absolute and in GDP share) fueling the demand for imports. Households in the US could consume more and save less because they felt richer. And they felt richer because the value of their houses and financial assets was rising at a quick pace and that trend was expected to persist. Broadly speaking, the worldwide equilibrium between demand and supply of goods was based on a continuing asset price bubble in the United States.

There are good arguments to create international instruments providing a reliable store of value. There are also conceptual and political difficulties. A choice would have to be made as to the true nature of the “super reserve currency”. Would it be a basket of existing monies such as the SDR today? Or would it be a new “fiat” currency? More fundamentally, a new reserve currency would, in fact, grant a collective guarantee against exchange risk. This guarantee would benefit surplus countries and would be given by deficit countries. When the substitution account was discussed more than 25 years ago, it became clear, at the time that it would have to be part of a package encompassing explicit, binding and symmetric rules on balance of payment adjustments. Most likely, the same questions would be raised again today and the creation of a new reserve currency would have to be part of a broader framework. That may take time, as our Chinese colleagues are fond of reminding us when we discuss those issues. 4  BIS Review 170/2010  In the meantime, financial development in emerging economies can go a long way towards expanding the range of safe and liquid financial assets available to domestic and international investors. Capital markets in local currencies have developed significantly over the last decade as fiscal positions in emerging countries have dramatically improved. There seems to be considerable scope for regional financial and monetary arrangements to prosper in the future.
These included the stress testing and recapitalisation of troubled banks; the identification of troubled real estate assets and their transfer to SAREB (Spain’s “bad bank”); and the reform of the savings banks. At the same time, actions and reforms at European level, including monetary policy (longer-term refinancing operations, LTROs, asset purchase programme, APP) and the move towards banking union, have ensured liquidity and strengthened confidence in Europe’s monetary and financial system. Financial reforms were accompanied by a series of reforms to labour and product markets and to the public sector. The 2012 labour market reform gave priority to collective bargaining agreements at firm level over those at sectoral or regional level. Reforms to product markets, including the law on market unity, have sought to reduce regulatory obstacles to firms’ growth, although implementation has been challenging. The Spanish economy has rebalanced as far as “flow” variables are concerned, while “stock” imbalances are gradually correcting. Banks’ asset quality and solvency has substantially improved, as reflected in higher capital ratios and a steadily declining ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs). The NPL ratio of Spanish banks has more than halved from 13.6% in 2013 to 6.4% now and continues to fall steadily. The banking sector has been able to finance growth with new loans while steadily deleveraging as legacy loans mature. Private sector debt has fallen considerably. Deleveraging of firms and households is well under way, with debt having declined by almost one-third since 2012.

Since the beginning of the recovery, the number of people employed in the euro area has risen by 9.2 million. Euro area unemployment declined to 8.1% in August, its lowest level in almost ten years. Consumer spending is being driven by steady growth in households’ real disposable income. Strong labour markets – with increasing job creation and rising wages – boost household income and, in turn, consumer spending. The investment outlook remains solid on the back of robust demand, improving profitability and favourable financing conditions. Since the end of 2014, bank lending rates in the euro area have declined significantly, by around 130 basis points for non-financial corporations and by around 110 basis points for households. Lending rates on very small loans, which can be used as a proxy for loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), have fallen by more than 210 basis points. This is encouraging, as SMEs provide two-thirds of total private sector employment in the euro area. Overall, the underlying strength of domestic activity in the euro area continues to support a sustained adjustment in inflation. According to the flash estimates, HICP inflation increased to 2.1% in September, from 2.0% in August. On the basis of the latest oil futures prices, headline inflation is expected to hover around the current level for the rest of the year. Our most recent projections foresee annual headline inflation at 1.7% in 2018 and in each of the two subsequent years.