samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Although the economy continues to expand, we must grow faster if we are to put all of our jobless workers and idle businesses back to work. Meanwhile, price increases are likely to be at or slightly below our 2 percent longer-run objective over the next few years. Many parts of our region were showing a stronger pace of growth than the country as a whole before the storms hit – and I am hopeful that Sandy will not have pushed us off this trajectory for long. The recovery of housing markets are important part of this renewed growth, although certain communities are still weighed down by lingering high rates of delinquencies and foreclosures and some others have suffered appalling damage from Sandy. Going forward, let me reiterate that the Fed will promote maximum employment and price stability to the greatest extent our tools permit, and we will stay the course. When we achieve a stronger recovery in the context of price stability, I’ll view it as consistent with our goals and not a reason to pull back on our policies prematurely. If you’re trying to get a car moving that is stuck in the mud, you don’t stop pushing the moment the wheels start turning – you keep pushing until the car is rolling and is clearly free. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Jean-Pierre Roth: Switzerland - a platform for global business Keynote address by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Consulate General of Switzerland / Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, New York, 1 June 2006. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure for me to be with you today and I would like to thank my dear friend, Ambassador Loretan, for hosting this lunch of the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce. Swiss people always feel at home, here, in this fascinating city. New York is a unique place, not only because of its size, its beautiful skyline, its location, but foremost because of its openness to the world and its multiculturalism. Compared to New York, is Switzerland anything more than just a small village located in the heart of Europe, a country of watchmakers and chocolate producers? Is there anything to see other than the Matterhorn and the water fountain on Lake Geneva? It is interesting to note that, despite the strong presence of Swiss multinationals abroad and, of course, the very well-known Swiss flag – thanks to the Red Cross flag – Switzerland is largely ignored in international surveys and is almost non-existent in European statistics. “To live happily, live out of sight!” (pour vivre heureux vivons cachés) is a well-known proverb. This may well be true, but it serves to fuel many clichés; and misconceptions are generally counterproductive.
Islamic finance by its very nature has synergies with climate finance in that it seeks to avoid investing in socially detrimental activities.4 The ESG-linked sukuk market, though currently small – only 2.6% of global outstanding sukuk – is fast-growing, and expected to increase to around 5% of the sukuk market in the next 5 years.5 Global annual sukuk issuance itself is estimated to grow at a rate of nearly 7% per year over the next five years, reaching $ in 2027.6 The growth of green and sustainability sukuk over the coming years presents an opportunity for the world to accelerate sustainable investment. The Bank of England's role in supporting the transition to net zero The Bank of England is supporting the transition to net-zero in three main ways. First, through policy advocacy. The Bank of England supports the global objectives of mobilising finance flows consistent with the Paris Agreement and supporting climate-  2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  resilient development. For example, during the Indonesian G20 presidency, the Bank has worked to ensure consistency and comparability in climate disclosure frameworks in its support for the IFRS's ISSB and its draft standards. For the global financial sector to mobilise finance efficiently to support the transition to net zero, we need a transition finance infrastructure to be put in-place. This includes common definitions, climate disclosures, broader government policy and transition plans from across the economy.

Svein Gjedrem: The economic situation in Norway Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to invited foreign embassy representatives, Norges Bank, 21 March 2002. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen  The economic outlook  The world economy has been experiencing a slowdown. Economic growth stagnated in the US and the euro area in the last three quarters of 2001. Growth remained somewhat firmer in the UK, but was moderate towards the end of the year. GDP has fallen in Japan. In most countries, public and private consumption fuelled growth in demand, while a fall in capital formation and inventories has exerted downward pressure. Growth in the US economy came to a halt last spring. Overinvestment, particularly in IT and telecom equipment led to low returns on capital and reduced corporate earnings. The stock market declined when growth prospects were revised. The unemployment rate rose. Terrorism and war added to the uncertainty. The US economy is flexible and seldom remains in recession for a long period. There are some signs of an early recovery. Monetary policy and fiscal easing have supported continued growth in private consumption. Equity prices, commodity prices and long-term interest rates have picked up since the sharp decline following the events of September 11. Oil prices plunged by around 40 per cent between autumn 2000 and the end of 2001.
The remaining challenge then is whether the authorities will have the nerve to follow through and carry out a resolution. This is the charge that comes from opponents, namely that it will be “bottled”. I don’t see this as likely to be an issue, because if resolution is a credible route to take, as it will be, why would the authorities want to put the cost somewhere else? 3  John Kay “Should we have ‘Narrow Banking’?” The Future of Finance, LSE Report, 2010  4  Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig: “The Bankers New Clothes: What’s wrong with Banking and what to do about it”. P271  5  Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig: “The Bankers New Clothes: What’s wrong with Banking and what to do about it”. P74–78  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Now for supervision and whether it too can function effectively. Make no mistake, in many countries supervision failed badly in the run-up to the crisis. Prudential supervision of banks is all about understanding the risks firms take, the effectiveness of the controls in risk management, using the framework of rules and regulations to create the right incentives to control risks appropriately, and where necessary intervening directly to require actions to be taken that would otherwise lead the firm to a potentially unsafe or unusual position.

If you invest in either of these, you are not promised all of your investment back, though of course you expect to make a positive return. Such an investor ordinarily expects the full return of their investment, but this is not assured. Investment in debt and equity can of course be managed on a collective basis, as asset management. You may remember the Woody Allen quote that a stockbroker is someone “who invests your money until it’s all gone”. Cruel I know, but it illustrates the difference between deposits, other forms of debt and equity. A distinguishing feature of banks is that by providing deposit contracts, far more of their liabilities take the form of value certain contracts. This alone makes capital and solvency critical for banks. In contrast, for asset managers, the contract does not promise such value certainty. Two particular conditions need to be met in my view to make asset management effective and robust to wider economic conditions. First, that there is no lack of clarity of the nature of the assets held under management. Second, that there is no illusion give to investors about  1  Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig: “The Bankers New Clothes: What’s wrong with Banking and what to do about it”. P38–40  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  liquidity of their assets. It follows therefore that capital and solvency matter much more for bank supervision, and market liquidity conditions matter more for asset management supervision. So bank capital matters a lot.
There are structural vulnerabilities in the financial system caused by both of these problems in the non-bank world. And the dash for cash episode was the sort of stress event that nearly caused the problems to crystallise in a big way, and arguably would have done so but for the rapid intervention on a substantial scale by the authorities. Lessons from the March 2020 “dash for cash” episode Let me put this into the context of the role of money market funds and what happened during the dash for cash. I will describe the events using evidence from sterling money markets, and then draw on some broader evidence (the UK story is very well described and assessed in Hauser (2020)). The dash for cash was, of course, a broader financial system – and indeed economy wide – phenomenon, driven by the underlying health shock and its economic implications. Nonetheless, money market funds are an important part of the dash for cash story because they seek to bridge between the desire of investors for immediate liquidity (in other words a cash or depositlike desire) and the desire of the banks, in which they invest a sizeable part of the funds, for term funding in the form of commercial paper or certificates of deposit. They are therefore carrying out a form of maturity transformation which in times of stress can become prone to runs.

I will set out each of them, and then discuss the issues that arise from them. First, we should remove the adverse incentives introduced by the liquidity thresholds related to the use of suspensions, gates and redemption fees. Second, we should simplify the landscape to make clearer the critical distinction between cash-like funds and investment funds. We should remove the ambiguity of intermediate descriptions such as low volatility funds. Third, and to support removing the ambiguity, it will be important to define in an accounting and substantive sense more explicitly what constitutes cash-like. Current guidance leaves a lot of judgement to managers and auditors to make these decisions on a fund by fund basis1. Money-market funds are a cash management instrument, so it may seem odd that the meaning of cash-like as a term has not been well defined. The resultant ambiguity may have seemed convenient as a means to stretch the boundary of the definition to allow less liquid instruments in, but when a stress event like the dash for cash happens, the flaw is badly exposed and financial stability is in jeopardy. The authorities then have to intervene in scale to restore well-functioning markets, but that should not be the accepted way to run the system. 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  That said, the definition of cash-like therefore needs to be clear and appropriate rather than overprescriptive. For many purposes it does need to provide near instant access to cash – i.e.
Aikman et al (2014) discuss where the classification of failure departs from Laeven and Valencia (2010). 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  23  instrument if policymakers have a low tolerance for failure. That matters if, for example, the costs of higher capital requirements increase non-linearly (Greenwood et al (2017)). These points are also evident if we assess individually the performance of the RWCR and NSFR. Chart 18 and Table 3 below show that hit rates of 80 or 90% can only be achieved with high false alarm rates and stringent calibrations of these metrics. Overall, each metric individually does somewhat worse than the leverage ratio in balancing hit and false alarm rates. And similar results hold when the loan to deposit (LTD) ratio is considered instead of the NSFR in the wider sample (Chart 19).

We define the ‘hit rate’ as the number of banks which had a leverage ratio below 3% at the end of 2006 and subsequently failed during the crisis, relative to the total number of banks that failed. And we define the ‘false alarm rate’ as the number of banks with a leverage ratio below 3% which survived, relative to the total number of banks that survived. If a 3% leverage ratio could perfectly discriminate, its hit rate would be 100% and false alarm rate 0%. Now suppose that we have flexibility over the cut-off threshold necessary to achieve a particular hit rate, x. At the same time, we wish to minimise false alarms. As the leverage ratio cut-off increases, the hit rate and false alarm rate must both go up. The key question is by how much each goes up – the relative balance of marginal benefits and marginal costs of hits and false alarms – as the leverage ratio cut-off increases. Charts 17 and 18 plot this for the 76-bank sample. Chart 17 plots the settings of the leverage ratio needed to achieve particular target hit rates. Chart 18, meanwhile, plots what is referred to as the ‘receiver operating characteristic’ (ROC) curve. Using the sequence of cut-off thresholds for the leverage ratio from Chart 17, this plots the sequence of associated hit rates and corresponding false alarm rates at different settings of the leverage ratio, alongside the 45 degree line which corresponds to the performance of a completely uninformative metric.
In combination with transparent processes, including recurrent evaluations by national parliaments or in other arenas, this could put pressure on politicians to act. Is the Stability and Growth Pact not sufficient in itself? After all, it is designed to ensure fiscal discipline in the member countries. The answer here is clear; it could have been had the Pact only been followed. But now the situation is different. As the Pact has not been followed by the larger euro countries, there is a risk that the newcomers will take the same attitude. However, this could be a dangerous conclusion. It would be wiser to look at the issue the other way round. Both Germany and France attained the 3 per cent mark for the public deficit criterion by the narrowest of margins despite what was a global upturn. But they clearly did not do enough afterwards in terms of consolidation, despite intense pressure from many of the smaller countries. Today, this is a significant problem not only for the euro area as a whole; the countries themselves are also paying the price in terms of a deeper and longer downturn. This, if anything, is a warning to new euro adopters. Conclusions Having raised these complex issues, let me be very clear about my sentiments. I do not wish to see any new obstacles or separate rules for the new member states; equal treatment is essential.

This has been possible thanks to a high degree of wage flexibility as well as serious efforts to achieve fiscal consolidation. There is more reason for concern over some of the presently floating regimes as they move towards ERM II. Substantial fiscal slippages have occurred in some of these countries, bringing them far from the 3 per cent deficit requirement. In most cases the deterioration has not been a consequence of additional costs related to accession; neither has it mainly been the result of automatic stabilisers these are considerably smaller in acceding countries than in present EU members. Instead, the large cyclically adjusted - deficits reflect increases in public wages and so-called mandatory social spending, combined with a lack of expenditure cuts in other fields. Consolidation is planned to take place mainly in the medium to long term, and deficits are only set to be reduced to levels compatible with the convergence criteria towards the end of the decade (Fig. 1). Some of my central bank colleagues from the new member states argue that rapid entry into ERM II and the target of an early euro adoption is precisely what will force politicians in their respective countries to improve fiscal policy. In the words of one of my most eminent colleagues: “delay in entry equals delay in reforms”. Of course, I can understand this argument, and in the end it hinges on the political economy of each country. But using ERM II as a straightjacket is a risky strategy.
While we were initially less optimistic about buy-side adoption relative to the sell-side, our outreach efforts have indicated that once the buy-side sees the benefits the Code brings, they become enthusiastic adopters. The third reason why this Code will be different, is that it was developed by an unprecedented public-private partnership, and will be kept relevant over time. The development process for the Code was an intense and inclusive one, involving the participation of a wide range of market participants. Hence, we expect strong buy-in from market participants. This partnership also recognises the importance of keeping the Code relevant over time. Moving forward, the Code will be collectively owned and maintained by the local Foreign Exchange Committees (or FXCs), through the Global Foreign Exchange Committee (or the GFXC). The GFXC was launched in May this year, together with the publication of the Code. The GFXC, comprising members from key central banks and private sector market participants, will assess regularly if there are new market developments that should be included into the Code. It will also oversee a comprehensive review of the Code on a less frequent basis, keeping the Code relevant over time. Fourth, extensive outreach to market participants has been done and will continue. Over the past two years, extensive outreach was undertaken to more than 120 sell-side and buy-side industry associations, and key market infrastructure globally. The response has been positive. These efforts by the GFXC, central banks and local FXCs, to raise awareness and encourage adherence to the Code, will continue.

Jacqueline Loh: Implementation of the FX Global Code Keynote speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 13th FX Week Asian Conference, Singapore, 23 August 2017. * * * Eva Szalay, Editor, FX Week, Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Thank you for inviting me to join you at the 13th FX Week Asia Conference. I am very happy to join you today. The foreign exchange or FX market – which all of you are participants in – is the largest and most liquid of financial markets globally. It has grown remarkably over the past few decades. Between 1995 and 2016, a 21-year period, global FX turnover rose from $ trillion to $ trillion per day, according to the BIS Triennial FX Survey, representing a compound annual growth rate of more than 7%1. Its importance extends beyond financial markets and participants, and is reflected in how it supports the real economy, forming the backbone of international trade, and cross-border investments. Looking back, while we have seen healthy growth in volumes, the same cannot be said of conduct. The misconduct that has come to light in recent years, has eroded trust in the FX market. Looking ahead, for the FX market to continue to grow in a sustainable manner to support economic growth, guiding behaviour in the FX market and anchoring strong culture within firms through good market practice will be key.
The Migration of credit transfers and direct debits under the SEPA requirements, will not resolve all payment-related issues which will be on the agenda of the Euro Retail Payments Board. Because of that, the Board is expected to  1  2  Hasan, I., Renzis, D. T. & Schmiedel, H. (2013) Retail Payments and the Real Economy. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 1572. BIS central bankers’ speeches  intensify its efforts for further integration in the field of card payments, innovations and security. Seventh, during the course of this conference we will also discuss virtual currencies, taking into account the public interest about the effects that these currencies have on the payments. Although these currencies are not economically significant and therefore, do not pose a risk to the price and financial stability, they do however pose significant risks to the individual users of the currencies. These risks, however, could impair the reputation of central banks given the fact that virtual currency schemes operate as retail payment systems, but are not regulated and monitored. Please allow me to briefly conclude that this conference on payment and security settlement systems has grown into a platform of active cooperation between the central banks, both in our region and beyond, in Europe, and we hope to continue hosting it in the future to assure faster and complete integration in the European Union.

Ever since the single currency was introduced, the integration of financial markets has advanced much faster in terms of integration in the field of payments. However, the crisis has conditioned a segmentation of the European financial markets, while the convergence of payment habits has been an ongoing process supported in large by the European SEPA project. The implementation of SEPA project has inspired new integration processes in the European Union, which proved to be necessary in times of economic and financial instability, such as building the banking union by establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism for banks and the unique rules regulating the deposit insurance schemes. Therefore, the integration in many fields is a consequence of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  monetary integration in the European Union, which was timely foreseen in the field of payments where we have gradual and continued integration. However, the ultimate goal of SEPA is not to make the users of payment services behave uniformly, but to harmonize principles, business practices, and rules and technical standards for conducting payments. In that respect, recently, the main focus was the migration of credit transfers and direct debts under the SEPA standards, with the deadline for the members of the euro area being August 2014. In the period ahead, the efforts within the SEPA project are expected to aim towards harmonization of card payments.