samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview in The Wall Street Journal Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, in The Wall Street Journal, conducted by Messrs Brian Blackstone and Marcus Walker on 19 January 2011. *  *  *  WSJ: If 2008 and 2009 were years of crisis, and 2010 was a year of stabilization and recovery. How do you see 2011? What should Davos participants be focused on this year? TRICHET: Since the start of the recovery, in the third quarter of 2009, the real economy has surprised up on the upside. This is encouraging. I see 2011 as a year of continuous hard work, to make the financial sector more resilient and to improve the soundness of fiscal policies. The crisis, which started in 2007 and intensified in September 2008 revealed the fragility of the financial sector first and then the relative vulnerability of public finances in the advanced economies. WSJ: What worries you most? Trichet: To consider that because we managed to avoid a depression and are now experiencing the recovery, we could lose momentum in the reforms that are still urgently needed. That is the main danger. WSJ: This year austerity becomes pan-European. But a recent United Nations report said austerity risks a renewed economic downturn. Do you agree? TRICHET: No, we do not. I do not buy the very simple reasoning that would suggest that pursuing sounder fiscal policy would hamper growth.

WSJ: When you spoke of a quantum leap last year, you referred to quasi-automatic sanctions on excessive deficits. Governments so far haven’t come along. What makes you optimistic that you can still get your point of view adopted by governments? TRICHET: There are a number of elements that are important: the reinforcement of sanctions; the reinforcement of the independent diagnosis that would be made by Commission. It’s a set of quantum leaps, including the quasi-automaticity of the start of the corrective procedures and of the sanctions, which in our view is extremely important. Governance is now discussed by the European Council and the European Parliament. The Parliament has in the past always demonstrated a remarkable capacity to capture what is essential for Europe. So, the involvement of the Parliament is very important. WSJ: Last year, governments made a watery compromise on sanctions, weaker than the European Commission’s proposals. Should governments rethink that compromise? TRICHET: Even the initial proposals from the Commission seemed to us too timid. Our position has not changed. WSJ: You have called for maximum flexibility for the European Financial Stability Facility. There is discussion whether EFSF should take over all or part of the bond buying program from the ECB. If that were to happen, would you be relieved? 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  TRICHET: As I said, they have to improve the stabilization fund in both quality and quantity. By quality I mean having a tool that is as flexible as possible.
Liberalisation and integration into the EU have underpinned the rapid growth of the Maltese financial sector. The number of banks rose from 16 in 2004 to 23 in September this year. During the same period, the total assets of the banking system more than doubled to EUR45.1 billion. Nor was growth restricted to the banking sector. The number of local and foreign-based collective schemes climbed from around 70 in 2004 to nearly 400 today, partly reflecting legislative changes that spurred the formation of professional investor funds. Total assets under management have also increased exponentially to over EUR8 billion. More moderate growth was recorded in the insurance sector, though the captive insurance business is growing fast. These developments in Malta mirrored, to a certain extent, those abroad. Financial liberalisation, deregulation and the expansion of cross-border capital flows have driven the rapid growth of the financial sector globally. Indeed, until the start of the turmoil last year, the global financial system had benefited from a long period of economic expansion, relatively easy monetary conditions and innovation. As a result, the size of the financial industry relative to the economy increased considerably. In the United States it grew to a point where it represented nearly 25 per cent of the stock market capitalization, while financial assets in Britain in 2007 were equivalent to almost nine times the GDP. Such a favourable combination of circumstances could not last.

William C Dudley: "Remarks at the Economic Press Briefing on the Regional Economy" Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Press Briefing on the Regional Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 10 August 2017. * * * Good morning, and welcome to the New York Fed’s Regional Economic Press Briefing. Today, we will provide an update on economic conditions in the region, and then discuss the issue of regional wage inequality. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System.1  Current Economic Conditions The Federal Reserve has pursued an accommodative monetary policy since the Great Recession to facilitate achieving our dual mandate of maximum sustainable employment and price stability. This policy stance has provided support to the economy and helped lower the unemployment rate from 10 percent at the depths of the Great Recession to 4.3 percent currently. Measures of underemployment have also improved considerably and are near precrisis levels. Stronger labor market conditions are perhaps the best means to improve the economic wellbeing of most Americans, particularly those who have been struggling and are most vulnerable to economic downturns. Improved job opportunities have helped to support household income growth, consumption, and saving, as well as the housing market.
The anticipated strengthening in the global recovery will have a supportive effect. Negative interest rates I would now like to turn to negative interest rates. Following the interest rate reductions since the last monetary policy assessment, the reference interest rate is now negative for the first time in the history of the SNB. This situation is new, and has therefore been discussed in detail in the public arena. I would like to emphasise that lowering the interest on sight deposits at the SNB into negative territory is a necessary monetary policy measure. Negative interest makes holding investments in Swiss francs less attractive for Swiss and foreign investors. This creates incentives to reduce inflows to the franc, and reinvest Switzerland’s traditional current account surplus abroad. Negative interest thus contributes to a weakening of the Swiss franc. The interest rate reductions had a rapid effect. As expected, the negative interest rate imposed on banks by the SNB was transmitted to the entire spectrum of money and capital market interest rates. However, low or negative interest rates are not limited to Switzerland. Low interest rates are a global phenomenon and some other countries, especially in the euro area, also have negative rates. Switzerland cannot disassociate itself from such developments. With the interest rate reduction in Switzerland, the interest rate differential to the major currency areas, which had declined to virtually zero in recent years, has now increased again.

Thomas Jordan: The Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy decision and assessment of the economic situation Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 19 March 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this news conference. Following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate, we have decided to hold an extraordinary news conference at our quarterly assessment in March, in addition to the traditional six-monthly news conferences which will take place in June and December. In my presentation, I will explain the Governing Board’s monetary policy decision and outline our assessment of the economic situation. Afterwards, my colleagues and I will be at your disposal to answer questions. Monetary policy decision I will begin with our monetary policy decision. The SNB has decided to leave the target range for the three-month Libor unchanged at between –1.25% and –0.25%. Interest on sight deposits at the SNB remains at –0.75% and the exemption thresholds remain unchanged. Negative interest helps to make it less attractive to hold investments in Swiss francs. Overall, the Swiss franc is significantly overvalued and should continue to weaken over time. The SNB will continue to take account of the exchange rate situation, and its impact on inflation and economic developments, in formulating its monetary policy. It will therefore remain active in the foreign exchange market, as necessary, in order to influence monetary conditions.
In turn, job creation and growth are essential ingredients for progress on fiscal consolidation. Accordingly, economic policy-making should continue to be structured around two main goals: promoting competitiveness and growth, and restoring the sustainability of public finances. I shall briefly refer to these two major issues before analysing the Budget for 2013. Competitiveness and employment First, let us look at developments in employment and competitiveness, two closely interconnected problems. In terms of economy-wide unit labour costs, the cumulative loss to 2008 in respect of the 1998 level stood at 18%. In industry, and measuring competitiveness always in terms of unit labour costs, it was almost 30%. Naturally, labour costs are not the only explanation for the increase in unemployment, but they have undoubtedly been a major factor. That there were serious failings in the regulation of our labour market is something that practically all international economic organisations have been pointing out for years. The reform of our labour legislation was unavoidable. The changes made are essentially geared to increasing the flexibility of our labour market: the priority of firm-level agreements, limits on the so-called “ultra-activity” of agreements, new regulations governing dismissal for objective reasons and greater facilities for maintaining wage restraint at companies in difficulty are all elements of change aimed at preventing dismissals and higher unemployment from being the only option for many companies to stay in business.

The projected tax revenue for 2013 is subject to downside risks because it is based on the assumption that the revenue targets for 2012 will be achieved. However, on the information currently available, it cannot be ruled out that revenue performs worse than expected in 2012. If this risk materialises and is not countered by appropriate action in the remainder of the year, that would make it difficult to achieve the targets set for 2013, compounding the possible effects of a bigger decline in GDP than that assumed in the budgetary programming. Expenditure On the expenditure side, the weight of three items should first be underlined: Social Security system contributory pensions, unemployment benefits and the interest on government debt. In 2012, these three items are equivalent to 20% of GDP and will account for approximately 36% of total public spending. In 2013, these percentages will foreseeably increase significantly. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Noteworthy among the measures considered on the expenditure side are: the freezing of civil servants’ and public-sector employees’ salaries, although they will recover their December extra payroll, which, together with not filling vacancies, will result in a very low increase in personnel costs in relation to serving employees of around 0.1%. Real investments are reduced by 46%, whereas the interest burden increases by more than € billion. In the Social Security system, spending on contributory pensions, sickness and other benefits will grow by slightly more than 5%, factoring in the raising of pensions by 1%.
We are also considering what a layer of the framework for ‘mid-tier’ firms might look like, and are currently undertaking some engagement with relevant firms to understand where they see scope for simplification of the prudential regime. Other Priorities Before I close, I did want to note our ongoing focus on Diversity & Inclusion in the sector. This is an important area which helps enhance governance, decision-making and risk management in firms, as well as the services you provide your members. We plan a consultation paper later this year, building upon the joint 2021 PRA/FCA discussion paper18, setting out proposals to introduce a new regulatory framework on diversity, equity and inclusion in the financial sector. I strongly encourage you to engage with those proposals once they are published. In Conclusion Let me briefly sum up. I’ve stressed today the important role that mutuals play in providing your services to a diverse range of households and business right across the UK. It’s vital those services are 16 CP4/23 - The Strong and Simple Framework: Liquidity and Disclosure requirements for Simpler-  regime Firms | Bank of England 17 FS1/21 – ‘Responses to DP1/21 ‘A strong and simple prudential framework for non-systemic banks and building societies’ | Bank of England 18 DP2/21 – Diversity and inclusion in the financial sector – working together to drive change | Bank of England  Bank of England  Page 9  underpinned by resilient firms.

The new objective would require the PRA to act in a way which, in advancing our primary objective, and subject to aligning with relevant international standards, facilitates the international competitiveness of the UK economy and its growth in the medium to long term. In a recent speech14 my colleague, Vicky Saporta, set out how we plan to take forward that new objective, through an approach based on ‘responsible openness’. In short this means we will provide a predictable and stable regulatory environment that is grounded in international standards (for example those set out by the Basel Committee), and we will collaborate closely with overseas regulators to maintain their trust in what we do, as well as that of investors and firms. But importantly and against that backdrop of responsible openness, there is still space to tailor rules to UK circumstances when it is appropriate and when we can do so in ways that maintain trust across markets and with fellow regulators. And that last point about supporting the specific needs of the UK economy is of particular relevance to our discussions here. I see it as precisely where the mutual sector comes in, through providing high quality financial products and services to households and businesses right across the UK, including some who might not have access through any other routes.
No visits to the Treasury Select Committee may seem like a blessing, but we have to ensure that the accountability still holds water. On that point, frankly, I think there should have already been more accountability for how the processes of the European Union could have created such a vast cost for an industry for the implementation of a directive which has not even yet been finally agreed, and for which I cannot give you a date. Largely unseen in the banking crisis has been the shocking cost of Solvency II. The second challenge with the use of judgement in supervision is that elsewhere we have seen a preference to have many rules, but often ones which can then be gamed. Paul Volcker put it nicely in his evidence to the Parliamentary Banking Commission. He said that people ask for clear and simple rules so that they can tell when they are in abeyance, but they typically fail to add that they want to know how to get round the rule too, but that is part of the deal. At the PRA we will apply judgement rigorously; sometimes you will agree with us, and sometimes you won’t. We will be clear and transparent in our judgements, and we will be accountable. Finally on the issue of the PRA’s approach to supervision, I want to assure you that we will take supervision of insurers just as seriously as we do the other lot. It is not in our nature to do otherwise.

But the situation for SMEs in the euro area overall is more difficult. Many are reporting a deteriorating financing situation. The availability of bank loans for SMEs across countries has become increasingly divergent. These developments reflect the fact that the economic and financial situation in the euro area remains challenging. I would like to use my address today to discuss that situation and to share with you the ECB’s views. I will focus on two themes in particular. My first theme will be the important steps being taken by governments to put the euro area on the path back to stability. Individually, they are addressing their deep-rooted economic challenges. Collectively, they are working to strengthen the foundations of the euro area. My second theme will be the measures taken by the ECB to maintain price stability and to remove unfounded fears about the euro area. These measures are essential to ensure that our low interest rates are passed through to the real economy. The current economic situation Let me begin with the current situation in the euro area. Unemployment is deplorably high. Overall economic activity is weak and it is expected to remain weak in the near term. And the growth of money and credit are subdued. In this context, inflation is well contained. We expect it to fall below 2% next year. Germany has so far been largely insulated from some of the difficulties elsewhere in the euro area. But the latest data suggest that these developments are now starting to affect the German economy.
Cross-border retail payment services in the euro area  You may recall that in September 1999 the ECB published a report presenting the views of the Eurosystem on how to improve cross-border retail payment services and defining the objectives that the industry is expected to achieve by 1 January 2002. In September this year, the ECB published a progress report. This report concludes that, although most objectives have not yet been fulfilled, substantial progress has been made in preparing the ground for a more efficient handling of cross-border retail payments. Allow me to give you some examples: i. The banking sector has agreed on straight-through processing standards, which will allow the automated execution of cross-border payments;  ii. The Euro Banking Association has developed a payment system specifically designed for cross-border low-value payments, which commenced operations on 20 November 2000;  iii. As from 2002, cross-border payments below EUR 12,500 will no longer need to be reported for balance of payments purposes and hence statistical reporting will no longer constitute a justification for high customer fees. Insufficient progress has been made in the field of customer prices. In too many cases, the payee has been charged with some costs even though the payer had agreed to bear all costs. Two initiatives currently being developed by the European Credit Sector Associations are intended to address this situation. First, a multilateral interbank exchange fee is being developed, which, provided that the fee is low, could be acceptable and could indeed contribute to solving the problem of “double-charging”.

In the period from July to September 2000, the three-month average of M3 growth stood at 5.4%, above the reference value of 4½%. However, some indicators suggest that over recent months a moderation in monetary growth has been occurring. Let me now turn, within the second pillar, to the prospects for economic growth in the euro area, as these represent a key factor affecting the outlook for price stability in the medium term. The latest estimate by Eurostat for the second quarter of 2000 indicated a real increase in GDP of 0.8%. The pace of new job creation has remained high and the unemployment rate currently stands at 9.0%, a level not seen since mid-1992. Some monthly indicators suggest that some moderation in real GDP growth might have occurred in the second half of this year, mainly as a result of the negative impact of the recent increases in oil prices on domestic income. However, by contrast with previous periods of strong oil price rises, the euro area economy is now less dependent on oil. This should help to prevent any sustained negative effect on confidence. There are therefore good reasons to remain confident with regard to growth prospects. On the external side, euro area export growth should benefit further from the expansion of the global economy. Considering these factors together, the growth dynamic in the euro area can be expected to be maintained in the coming years.
The Federal Reserve responded to the slowing of the recovery in midyear 2010 by beginning a second round of large-scale asset purchase programs. Those purchases are resulting in a rough tripling of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet (Chart 42).   U.S. economic conditions are currently quite far away from levels consistent with the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate of the pursuit of the highest level of employment consistent with price stability. I’ve discussed the high unemployment and unused productive capacity in the United States. Let’s turn to inflation.   While trend inflation is quite low at the moment, we see it likely to be near the low point of this cycle. The rate of inflation for nonenergy services is beginning to increase, led by faster increases in apartment rents (Chart 36). A firming of demand along with a decline of the exchange value of the dollar should begin to put upward pressure on nonfood, nonenergy goods prices.   However, underlying inflation fundamentals suggest relatively low trend inflation for some time:      A substantial amount of slack in the economy, reflected in the sharp deceleration of core services prices – and the United States is a services economy (Chart 35).   Relatively wide profit margins, so that firms facing very competitive output markets are able to absorb changes in energy and commodity prices. Moreover, unit labor costs are still falling (Chart 37).   Inflation expectations remain well anchored (Chart 38).

The Bank finds itself in a position rather like that of a church whose congregation attends weddings and burials but ignores the sermons in between. Like the church, we cannot promise that bad things won’t happen to our flock – the prevention of all financial crises is in neither our nor anyone else’s power, as a study of history or human nature would reveal. And experience suggests that attempts to encourage a better life through the power of voice is not enough. Warnings are unlikely to be effective when people are being asked to change behaviour which seems to them highly profitable. So it is not entirely clear how the Bank will be able to discharge its new statutory responsibility if we can do no more than issue sermons or organise burials. Whatever the ultimate shape of the structure and regulation of the banking system – and, as many of you have said, we need to think carefully to get this right – change will be necessary. The costs of this crisis are not to be measured simply in terms of its impact on public finances, the destruction of wealth, and the number of jobs lost. They are also to be seen in the lost trust in the financial sector among other parts of our economy.