samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Yet, when jobs are tallied, the contribution of oil and gas accounts for only 2 percent of the Texas workforce. Indeed, if you peruse our website, you will see that since the National Bureau of Economic Research proclaimed the recovery’s start in June 2009, education and health services, which employs 13.5 percent of Texas’ workers, and professional and business services, which employs another 12.5 percent, have gained 173,000 jobs during the recovery – nearly 60 percent of all the jobs added in Texas. The Texas workforce consists of more than just roustabouts and cowboys, though we are certainly proud of that heritage. Those of you who are here for the first time have no doubt already noticed this as you have wandered around Dallas and have seen nary an oil rig nor a cow. While you are looking at the research material on our site, you might also look over the Texas Manufacturing Outlook Survey, which we refer to by the acronym TMOS. Since 2004, TMOS has had the highest correlation of all Fed bank surveys with the Institute for Supply Management’s national manufacturing index. And you might find of interest our monthly service sector and retail outlook surveys. Mine might brief you on the most recent results of these during your session with her this afternoon. Policy background Enough about Texas per se. I am, however, going to put up on the screen behind me a slide that bridges developments in the Texas economy and the nation’s economic predicament.

Now, we’ve all become very familiar with breathless reports on China’s “economic miracle,” so I won’t go over this at length. Still, the startling pace of growth does warrant underlining. In a little over a decade since the year 2000, the Mainland’s nominal GDP increased sixfold from 1.2 to 7.2 trillion US dollars; and its external trade expanded more than sevenfold, from less than 500 billion to over 3.6 trillion US dollars. At the same time, its cross-border direct investments rose fourfold, from just over 40 billion to approaching 180 billion US dollars. These are all impressive indicators of the vast amount of business opportunities present. It is perhaps even more astonishing that, by 2016, the Mainland is expected to contribute over a third of total world economic growth, according to the projections of the International Monetary Fund. Change in the international financial system Such shifts in the global economy have inevitably foreshadowed a change in the international financial system. As the Mainland economy has grown, its currency and financial sector have moved increasingly centre-stage. Over the last decade or so, policymakers, investors and others have shown more interest in using a greater mix of currencies for international trade and financial transactions. This trend has been accelerated by the recent Global Financial Crisis, as the need to reduce reliance on just one or two global currencies has grown. Taken together, these trends imply a greater role for the RMB in the Mainland’s trade and investment with the rest of the world.
But even with this substantial source of income, only a share of future pension payments – which basically are financed by current income – will be matched by revenues from the Pension Fund. Estimates show that the capital in the Fund will only cover some 50-60 per cent of public pension expenditure in the future. One key element of the Fund Management Model is accountability. The role of the political authorities as well as of Norges Bank as manager is clearly defined. Another key feature is transparency and disclosure of information. The management of the Fund is based on two ethical commitments. 16  BIS Review 37/2008  First, there is the consideration relating to future generations. The Fund must ensure high capital returns at a moderate risk, by means of professional management with effective control of operational risk. Since 1997, the average annual net real return has been a little above the expected 4 per cent, partly due to excess return attributable to Norges Bank’s management. Second, the Fund must respect the fundamental rights of those affected by the companies in which the Fund has invested. The instruments used here are the exclusion of companies from the Fund’s investment universe and the active exercise of ownership rights. The Ministry of Finance excludes companies that produce certain types of weapons. They also exclude companies when they identify an unacceptable risk of contributing to gross corruption, severe environmental degradation, and serious violations of human rights and of fundamental ethical norms.

Norges Bank exercises its ownership rights by voting at general meetings and through direct contact with companies. Moreover, priority is given to combating child labour and we look critically at how companies influence the authorities in environmental issues. The combination of accountability and transparency has contributed to building trust in the Pension Fund, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, a high level of confidence is vital in maintaining motivation among Norwegians for saving rather than spending the petroleum wealth. Furthermore, the transparency of the Fund is also viewed in a favourable light by those countries in which we invest, and it obviously exerts a certain disciplinary pressure on the management that improves its quality. Thank you for your attention! BIS Review 37/2008  17
This was made possible only in the case of Korea which has helped the country recover from the crisis and was able to bring down interest rate much faster than other crisis countries. The case of Indonesia further led the IMF to reform towards more careful and focused policy prescription. The abrupt close-down of Indonesian commercial banks under the IMF program added to a sense of panic, which led to a broad-based bank run. Moreover, the conditionalities did not focus on the more critical macroeconomic adjustments which were directly related to the problems of the crisis but also included unrelated changes such as requirement to abolish import restrictions on all new and used ships. Secondly, policymakers must be ready to take away the punch bowl. In the past we used to talk about monetary policy being on the alert to take away the punch bowl. This crisis has proven that public policy in general need to observe this principle as well. Fiscal policy must guard against falling into the populist trap. Financial supervisors also need to be vigilant and watch out for signs of excessive credit creation, and act pre-emptively for the cost of cleaning up the crisis far outweigh the brief euphoria and exuberance of the moment. Central bank must maintain independence and credibility in order to voice and conduct appropriate policies that may not be favored politically.

Pablo Hernández de Cos: Graduation Ceremony - Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Class 2020/2021 graduation ceremony, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI), 1 July 2021. * * * Good afternoon class of 2021. Good afternoon dear colleagues and friends. It is a pleasure for me to participate in this graduation ceremony together with Juan José Fernández Muñoz, Coordinator of Studies and Programs of Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, Samuel Bentolila, Director of the Master’s Programme, and Rafael Repullo, Director of CEMFI. I would especially like to thank Juan José Fernández Muñoz for being here today. The partnership with Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, dating back to 2006, has been instrumental in improving our ability to attract excellent students and the quality of our graduate programme, and I am very grateful for this. The Master’s programme of the class graduating today was severely disrupted by the COVID19 pandemic. In early March 2020, just before the end of the second term of the programme, all teaching activities were moved online. During the summer of 2020 CEMFI made all the necessary investments and established a set of safety protocols to be able to go back to onsite teaching. These efforts paid off handsomely. Most courses this year were taught on-site, with a minimal incidence of COVID-19 and, fortunately, no serious cases at all.
39  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  39  Appendix – estimation of firm-level mark-ups  To estimate firm-level mark-ups, we follow De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017, 2018) and Díez et al (2018), all of which are based on the original methodology proposed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Theory  Consider a firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 that produces output with a production function whose arguments are variable inputs, capital, and technology. Assume firms are cost-minimizers. Then, the Lagrangian associated with the cost minimisation problem (subject to the production function) leads to the following first-order condition for any variable input 𝑉 (free of adjustment costs):  𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑉 = 𝜆𝑖𝑡 (  𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑡 (⋅) ) 𝜕𝑉𝑖𝑡  (𝐴1)  where 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑉 is the input price of variable input 𝑉 faced by firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝜆𝑖𝑡 denotes the marginal cost of production, and (  𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑡 (⋅) 𝜕𝑉𝑖𝑡  to marginal cost, 𝜇𝑖𝑡 ≡  ) denotes the marginal product of this input. Defining the mark-up as the ratio of price 𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝜆𝑖𝑡  , we have that the above equation can be rearranged to give  𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑡 (⋅) ( ) 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑉 𝜕𝑉𝑖𝑡  (𝐴2)  We can rewrite this as  𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑄𝑖𝑡 𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑡 (⋅) 𝑉𝑖𝑡 ( ) = (𝛼𝑖𝑡𝑉 )−1 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑉 𝜕𝑉𝑖𝑡 𝑄𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑉 𝑉𝑖𝑡  (𝐴3)  where 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝑉 denotes the share of expenditures on input 𝑉𝑖𝑡 in total sales (𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑄𝑖𝑡 ), and 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑉 denotes the output elasticity of input 𝑉.

Money issued by central banks (monetary base) in Sweden, the euro area, USA, UK and Japan Per cent of GDP 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0  01  05  09  The Riksbank ECB Federal Reserve  13  17  Bank of England Bank of Japan  Note. Monetary base here refers to the banknotes and coins held by the general public and banks’ assets with the central banks. Sources: The Bank of England, the IMF and Macrobond  35 [35]
In particular, because even though expectations have improved in general, they have done so by anticipating a better future economic performance rather than by current results. In this context, we have held the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 2.5% since May and we expect that, if the baseline scenario comes true, we will keep the monetary impulse near its current levels, to begin withdrawing it only once the economy begins to close the activity gap. Anyway, it is important to carefully monitor any downward deviations of inflation in the short term, because in the context of a weak economy, low inflation and some measures of medium-term inflation expectations remaining somewhat below 3%, the convergence of inflation could be affected, in which case it would be necessary to make the already expansionary monetary policy more so. The financial conditions have helped to shape the macroeconomic scenario described above. Borrowing remains accessible and inexpensive, in line with the orientation of monetary policy. The local financial market has seen no major disruptive events and the internal and external payment systems have functioned normally. Non-financial companies maintain their levels of profitability and indebtedness, while the increase in household debt is concentrated in mortgage credit, which covers long periods, at fixed rates and with a prudent loan-to-value ratio, which keeps the financial burden fairly constant. For its part, in the residential real estate sector, sales of new homes stabilized and prices continued to rise, albeit modestly. Nonetheless, some financial risks identified in past reports are still important.

But if this is the case, then there can be no cherry-picking, no “Europe a la carte”, no “Rosinenpickerei”. It has been nearly ten years since the global financial and economic crisis. We have come sa long way, but there are still challenges ahead of us for the ten years to come. Yet the challenges for the financial industry are gradually changing in nature: they could shift from adapting to the regulatory or monetary policy environment to reflecting on new business model strategies. In this regard, the expected strengthening of the economic recovery will hopefully make the path smoother. Austerity – or rigour – will remain necessary, but innovation will be the game changer. Thank you for your attention. 4/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Slide 2  5/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Slide 3  6/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Slide 4  7/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Slide 5  8/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Slide 6  9/9  BIS central bankers' speeches
The Riksbank's former scientific adviser Eric Leeper said in a report that an excessively tight fiscal policy may have contributed to the Riksbank's problems in bringing up inflation after the global financial crisis.40 I think this shows that some form of information exchange between monetary and fiscal policy may be desirable in certain situations. I also note that the conclusions of the recent review of the Reserve Bank of Australia go in this direction.41  Scope for exchange of information In a speech to the Swedish Economic Association a few years ago, my predecessor Stefan Ingves raised the issue of exchange of information in cases where monetary policy's room for manoeuvre is limited by the policy rate being close to the lower bound.42 He gave two examples of how the exchange of information could take place. The Riksbank could publish scenarios in the Monetary Policy Report that illustrate both the limitations of monetary policy and the effects on inflation of a more expansionary fiscal policy. The Ministry of Finance can then decide to what extent they want to take the information into account. The Riksbank could also directly inform the Ministry of Finance if it considers that a more expansionary fiscal policy is needed to fulfil the inflation target without the need to take overly drastic monetary policy measures. The Riksbank conducts monetary policy independently to achieve low and stable inflation. This is important for maintaining confidence in the inflation target.

Purchases of private assets and assets other than government securities are primarily relevant when markets that are important to the financial system are threatened, and we risk an acute financial crisis, such as at the start of the pandemic. Under the new Sveriges Riksbank Act, the Riksbank can – under certain conditions – buy and sell Swedish securities issued by the government and private actors. Our monetary policy toolbox in this respect remains the same as before. However, the new act has a more restrictive view of when it may be relevant to purchase private securities. The Riksbank may only buy and sell such securities if there are exceptional reasons. This means in practice that, from a monetary policy perspective, we can only buy and sell private securities when we cannot achieve the desired effect on the economy by using other measures. The new act also gives the Riksbank a more explicit mandate than before to trade in securities, also within the scope of our task of contributing to a stable and efficient financial system. To counter serious disruptions in the financial system, the Riksbank may if there are exceptional reasons buy and sell financial instruments at predetermined prices to temporarily support the functioning of systemically important financial markets. An important task for the Riksbank is to be the lender of last resort for important credit institutions that have problems, but also, under certain conditions, to act to keep markets that are critical to the financial system going.
2 According to this theory, the pass-through of changes in monetary policy interest rates to the real sector of the economy is influenced by banks’ ability to provide credit to firms. This applies, in particular, to banks with less liquid balance sheets, often the smaller banks. 3 With a bank lending channel, the effects of monetary tightening on the supply of credit becomes more pronounced. The European banking sector has undergone a phase of some structural changes over the past years. In particular, as in other parts of the world, the European market for structured financial products, such as asset-backed securities or Collateralized Debt Obligations, has grown rapidly over the last decade. For instance, the quarterly issuance of euro-denominated asset-backed securities increased from just under € billion at the beginning of the present decade to above € billion in the second quarter of this year. 4 These developments potentially influence banks’ ability to grant credit. 5 Such changes are important for the conduct of monetary policy because, first, they affect monetary analysis (one of the pillars of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy), and second, because they are likely to affect the monetary transmission mechanism. On the one hand, increased securitisation is expected to weaken the effects of the bank lending channel by dampening the effect of monetary tightening on the supply of credit. Indeed, some evidence points to the fact that the supply of loans is positively affected by securitisation.

Affordability risks of new mortgages financing residential investment property are high and have risen further. These developments have taken place against a background of persistent imbalances in the mortgage and real estate markets. Both mortgage-lending volume and prices for single-family houses and apartments continued to rise at a moderate rate in 2019. Although prices of residential investment property have stagnated of late, there is still a risk of a price correction in this segment in particular. On the one hand, this is due to the sharp price increases in previous years. On the other, larger numbers of vacant dwellings suggest that brisk construction activity in rental apartments may have led to an oversupply. Despite banks’ high risk appetite and the persistent imbalances in the markets, SNB stress tests suggest that the resilience of the domestically focused banks remains adequate overall. Thanks to robust capitalisation, most of these banks would be able to absorb the losses incurred in adverse scenarios. Given the risks I just mentioned, this is positive. It is crucial for the stability of the financial system that banks continue to hold sufficient capital to be able to cover the risks on their books. Ongoing pressure on margins means that the incentive for domestically focused banks to take on risks remains high. This applies to mortgage lending in particular. The revised selfregulation rules for banks in the residential investment property segment, which come into force at the beginning of 2020, should help to prevent a further build-up of risks in this segment.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  The core inputs to the analysis are firm-level measures of dividends and equity prices. The average dividend-price ratio in each industry segment is shown in Table 3. The mean dividend-price ratio across the panel is 2.6%. But there is a fairly significant degree of crosssectoral and time-series dispersion. For example, dividend-price ratios are almost twice as high in the energy and utilities sector as the health and pharmaceuticals sector. And mean dividend-price ratios were two thirds third higher in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. Table 3 Mean dividend-price ratio for firms in each industry segment Consumer  Energy & Utilities  Financials  Health  IT  Industrials  Materials  S&P  1.94  2.82  3.19  1.87  1.69  2.55  2.22  FTSE  4.12  3.96  2.63  1.38  2.92  3.81  3.16  To estimate (9), we require a selection of quantitative inputs. Taking these in turn: (a)  Company-specific risk premium  Following Miles (1993), the company risk premium is modelled based on firm-specific characteristics, in particular the company beta and the level of gearing: (10)  where .21 Betas are estimated using daily return data for firms listed on the S&P 500 and FTSE, together with daily data for the indices themselves.22 Mean estimated betas are shown in Table 4. These average below one for both UK and US firms.

More formally, the expected return can be written as the sum of the risk free rate and a companyspecific risk premium for company j:18 (3)  The actual return on an investment is the sum of the capital gain and the dividend yield: (4)  Assuming an efficient market, actual returns differ only from expected returns due to a forecast error which is uncorrelated with expected returns.19 Using this assumption, we can substitute (4) into (3) to give an equation for the equity price. 17  The return is $ – $ = $ divided by the cost of investment. 18  This is the case with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Lintner (1965), Sharpe (1964)) and arbitrage pricing theory (Ross (1976)). Under the CAPM, for example, the company specific risk premium is equal to the company specific beta multiplied by the market risk premium  . This means  . 19  That is, we assume that  BIS central bankers’ speeches  . 5  (5)  So the price of the security is simply the expected price and dividend in the next period, discounted by the sum of the risk-free rate and the company-specific risk premium.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy in 2003 Introductory statement by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Forum Institut für Management, Frankfurt, 2 December 2002. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and Gentlemen, It is for me a great pleasure to participate in this “International Forum on interest rates” and to exchange views with an audience of prominent players on financial markets. I welcome the initiative of the Forum Institut für Management. In promoting discussions on challenging issues between market practitioners and economists, this contributes to the attractiveness and spirit of financial markets in the euro area. I would like to open these discussions with some remarks on structural issues that one should keep in mind when examining the prospects for financial markets in Europe. Indeed, by achieving its primary objective of pursuing price stability in a medium-term perspective, the monetary policy defined by the Governing Council of the ECB lays the foundations of the success of euro. But these foundations are also embedded in a far-reaching structural dynamic involving notably three components: –  financial integration;  –  financial stability;  –  and the prospects of European Union enlargement. I would like to make a few remarks on the challenges and opportunities arising from these three interrelated - topics. 1. Financial integration  1.1  As regards financial integration, the European monetary union has in many respects modified the way in which financial institutions organise their daily business in the euro area.

This contribution is bound to further increase given these countries’ considerable potential for growth. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 2/2003  9