samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I fear that what I am  15  Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO on Trading of OTC Derivatives (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  saying will seem novel. In fact, this emphasis on their role as systemic risk managers was a clear lesson from the very few instances of clearing houses failing over past decades.16 If I may quote from the post-87 crash Report of the Hong Kong Securities Review Committee: “When everything else is stripped away, the most pressing issue is the management of risk. The focus of this is ......increasingly, the central clearing houses – indeed [their] prudent operation is perhaps the single most important objective for the market authorities and regulators.17” What does this mean in practice? My personal view is that, amongst other things, it means that CCPs should not outsource their core risk management functions; they should monitor the robustness of their clearing members; and they should monitor risks from the business that their clearing members are bringing to them as an indication of incipient fragility. Amongst other things, that means collecting and analysing information from clearing members on large positions taken by their customers. In 1987, it was the long positions of a trader that bankrupted the Hong Kong clearing house. Some elements of the clearing house regime are clearly for the authorities to determine.

As a contributor, we will share with others the climate solutions that we have developed and may be of relevance to them. Let me highlight three key themes at the Singapore Pavilion: decarbonisation technologies transition finance carbon markets  First, innovating decarbonisation technologies. The transition to net-zero will require us to transform how we live and work. It will transform how we power our homes and offices, travel, grow our food, and construct our cities. As a densely populated metropolis in the tropics, Singapore is a living lab to develop, testbed, and commercialise green solutions for urban living. Let me highlight two areas. One, decarbonising land transport. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In many cities, land transport accounts for a substantial portion of carbon emissions; in Singapore, it is about 15%. The solution lies in electrifying transportation. This is why, from 2030, Singapore will allow only registrations of cleaner-energy cars – namely, electric, hybrid or hydrogen fuel cell cars. Infrastructure solutions for charging electric vehicles on a massive scale will need to be developed and Singapore can be a good test bed for such solutions. Two, decarbonising power generation. Globally, while the growth in renewable energy has been spectacular, fossil fuels continue to account for more than 80% of global primary energy consumption. This is why the production, deployment and research into low-carbon hydrogen, as well as carbon capture, utilisation and storage solutions are so critical and why Singapore has focused heavily in these areas.
The unequivocal and certain conclusion based on very detailed data, studies and stress tests is that the housing market and credit granting do not at present entail any problem for financial stability. If such problems were to arise at some point in the future, Finansinspektionen has suitable instruments, in the form of regulations regarding leverage, amortisation and housing cost calculations. However, the repo rate is a very blunt and thus less suitable instrument for affecting potential risks of this sort. Consequently, there does not seem to be any reason to allow house prices and credit granting to affect the repo rate decision now. At the monetary policy meeting, a number of members of the Executive Board stated that a possible future fall in house prices may have a negative impact on consumption in the future. This would lead to a fall in aggregate demand, with negative consequences for future resource utilisation and inflation. However, if one believes this, it should also be considered in the assessment of the influence of alternative repo rate paths on the forecasts for inflation and resource utilisation, and it should only be allowed to affect monetary policy in such a case. These forecasts are mean forecasts, and some probability of a negative outcome has a negative impact on the mean. In this sense, the forecasts are “risk-adjusted”. As usual, it is necessary to filter all information through the forecasts to determine whether or not it should affect monetary policy.

It is therefore reasonable to calculate the alternative forecasts for inflation and the real economy on the basis of expected deviations from the main scenario. The effects of expected deviations are somewhat greater than the effects of unexpected deviations. Figures 2.13–2.15 in the Monetary Policy Report are calculated using unexpected deviations. 6  The effects of anticipated and unanticipated deviations are calculated using the methods presented in Laséen and Svensson (2009) and Leeper and Zha (2003), respectively. BIS Review 22/2010  5  Figure 3 The effects of expected and unexpected deviations from the repo rate path of 0.25 percentage points over four quarters.
But it is not just the significance of the banks in the payment system and as a source of credit that warrants their supervision. As The Economist wrote last spring, banks are “the most hazardous economic institutions known to man”. That may sound rather drastic but there is some truth to it. It is not that bankers are a tribe of irresponsible gamblers but that their much-needed function in the economy requires them to act in certain ways. Banking is essentially a matter of taking risks. A bank’s funds (its deposits or its loans from other banks) are liable to disappear at short notice, while realising assets takes longer. Moreover, problems in one bank are liable to spread to other banks. This systemic risk exists because the banks have liabilities with each other in the form of loans or securities transactions and because they participate in the payment system. The similarity of their operations also means that problems elsewhere may hit the banks as a group. Contagious effects may occur, moreover, simply because people suspect that the banks are inter-connected. To a growing extent, oversight of system stability calls for oversight of the financial infrastructure in the sense of the systems that are needed to effect payments and to trade in and deliver financial products. Bankgirocentralen is a case in point. If these systems function properly, there will be less risk of problems either spreading between the participants and from the financial markets, or arising because the system as such is disrupted.

Although they may amount to just a single krona or even less per transaction, the savings add up to a large amount because of all the payments that are required in a modern economy. Economies and greater efficiency have featured prominently in the banks’ activities in recent years. For the authorities it is always important to consider the conditions for competition and balance them against the forces for efficiency, such as economies of scale. It is also important to monitor developments to ensure that levels of risk do not rise again. Moreover, the Riksbank has been and is a major player in the payment system. We must also scrutinise this activity continuously to ensure that our approach does not impair economic efficiency in general. 6  BIS Review 53/2003  From what I have said about the future work it is hopefully clear that the financial markets are changing rapidly and present a development that is exciting in many ways. The Riksbank will continue to be a central player in this work. Talking about such issues feels natural at a university. Perhaps I have even succeeded in inspiring some of you to become involved in questions such as these and contribute to future developments. Thank you. BIS Review 53/2003  7
That is why I am also fundamentally optimistic about what computer and telecom technology can achieve in time for our country’s economic growth and prosperity. Technological breakthroughs, corporate profits and share prices Now let me consider the other question, namely the part that technological breakthroughs play for corporate profits and thereby for share prices. In the latter part of 1999 and early in 2000 shares were a feverish topic in Sweden — everyone talked about them and how much you could make by speculating in the stock market. The media were full of articles about “How to find the winners” and “How to become a day-trader”. Advisors at banks and stockbrokers waxed lyrical about share investment’s possibilities. Many people who had never owned a share or never even dreamed they would do so were tempted to speculate. Perhaps they needed a little extra money for the summer holiday, a new car or simply more cash for everyday things — why not make a little money easily and quickly, everyone was doing it, to judge from what people were telling each other at work and elsewhere. As though to confirm all this, share prices on the Stockholm bourse rose continuously to new all-time highs, as they did on many stock markets around the world. Shares did best for companies that were  BIS Review 90/2001  3  running at a loss and even needed to issue new shares to cover current operations.

On one hand, banks have been able to gain access to the ECB’s long-term financing under most advantageous conditions thanks to the purpose-built programmes introduced by the ECB. On the other, the public guarantees on loans to firms and the self-employed approved by the Government have contributed to lessening financial institutions’ potential reluctance to take new risks on board in such an uncertain setting. Analyses by the Banco de España based on the evidence available suggest that these guarantee facilities are, in particular, paving the way for the financing both of firms facing greater difficulty gaining access to credit and of small enterprises, marked by having been affected by the impact of the health crisis and for having a greater risk profile. Thanks to the guarantees, SMEs have been able to finance themselves in recent months under more favourable conditions in terms of the interest rate, the amount of credit and, above all, the maturity of the operation, which on average has stood at close to five years. The role of lending to companies in the current crisis is thus proving to be of great importance. It is contributing to reducing the risk of bankruptcy for firms that are viable but which face temporary liquidity problems, with the adverse consequences this would have in terms of job destruction and damage to the productive system, and, in sum, to the robustness and momentum of the economic recovery.
This has a direct bearing on ensuring financial stability. But because Basel II is developed from the current practice among banks in developed countries, some banks in emerging markets may have a large gap to fill. For example, in moving away from collateralbased to credit-based loan approval, banks must focus more on the ability to pay of customers and to make loan decisions in a forward looking manner. This requires a different set of expertise that focuses on risk assessment in the environment of changing economic cycle and asset quality. Next is the information system which is the most important foundation for achieving financial stability through capital adequacy. Whereas developed countries generally already have in place the necessary infrastructure in this regard, financial institutions in emerging countries have to build the system from the ground up, involving areas such as data collection, storage, analysis, and ways to effectively embed the information in the decision-making  8  BIS Review 98/2008  process. This step may take more time and effort because it involves building a knowledge base for quantitative analytical skills and ability to apply international best practices to the unique local settings of emerging markets. Another difficulty in Basel II implementation is that other players in the wider financial industry will be playing more active roles in the banking sector’s risk assessment.

(2007) Committee on Global Financial System’s “Report on Financial Stability and Local Currency Bond Markets”  10  BIS Review 98/2008  Borio, C., C. Furfine, and P. Lowe (2001), “Procyclicality of the Financial System and Financial Stability: Issues and Policy Options”, BIS Papers No. 1, March 2001. Calvo, G. and C. Reinhart (1999), “Capital Flow Reversals, the Exchange Rate Debate, and Dollarization”, Finance and Development, Vol. 36 (September), pp. 13-15. Cecchetti, S., A. Flores-Lagunes, and S. Krause (2006), “Financial Development, Consumption Smoothing, and the Reduced Volatility of Real Growth,” AEA 2007 Conference Papers. Ghosh, S. (2006) “East Asian Finance: The Road to Robust Markets” World Bank Conference Edition, Conference on “ East Asian Financial Markets: The Next Frontiers” June 2006, Hong Kong. International Monetary Fund (2005), Independent Evaluation Report of The IMF’s Approach to Capital Account Liberalization, Washington D.C. ______, (2004), World Economic Outlook, April 2004, Washington D.C. OECD (2007), Going for Growth 2007, OECD, Paris. Kose, M., E. Prasad, and M. Terrones (2006), “How do trade and financial integration affect the relationship between growth and volatility?” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 69 pp. 176-202. ______, (2005), “Growth and Volatility in an Era of Globalization”, IMF Staff Papers, vol:52, 31-63. Kose, M., E. Prasad, K. Rogoff , and S. Wei (2006), “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal”, IMF Working Paper 06/189, Washington D.C. Larrain, B. (2004), “Financial Development, Financial Constraints, and the Volatility of Industrial Output”, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Discussion Papers 04-06.
However, it would be stretching these powers too far to apply them to the "micro" region of individual consumer complaints about the cost or quality of banking services. We frequently receive complaints about fees and charges made by banks which appear unreasonable to the complainant - for example the imposition of charges on dormant or small deposit accounts. Our practice with such complaints is to refer them to the bank concerned and to ask it to reply direct to the complainant. As long as we are satisfied that the transparency standards in the Code of Banking Practice have been met, then we take the view that fees and charges are commercial decisions and we do not intervene. In handling complaints about bank services, the HKMA's role is limited to ensuring that the process by which the complaints are handled by AIs is fair and efficient. We have a very limited role in dispute  2  BIS Review 39/2002  resolution. Even if we wanted to intervene formally in such cases, it is difficult to see how, legally speaking, we could do so. The sanctions available in section 52 of the Ordinance - and the triggers specified for these sanctions - make it clear that intervention by the MA against an AI must be a response to issues affecting the health of the AI as a whole, or the interests of its depositors or creditors as a whole, or the broader public interest.

Less positively, a more difficult economic environment contributes to friction between banks and their customers, for example in the greater incidence of default on debt on the one hand and in the greater tendency among banks, in times of tighter margins, to go after that debt. Whether in good times or bad, a certain volume of complaints is a healthy phenomenon because it encourages improvements in service where complaints are upheld, and improvements in transparency where misunderstandings occur. On a subject so important as the way in which banks handle people's money, there will always be complaints, and we need to continue to develop our machinery for dealing with them. Let me deal quickly with the options identified by the HKMA in its survey last year which, if I read it correctly, the debate within the industry and the community is ruling out. The first option of these is the establishment of a separate banking ombudsman along the lines of the practice in some other jurisdictions. This is, in some senses, a Rolls Royce solution in that it would provide a separate agency, to process and resolve complaints, with powers to arbitrate in complaints and award compensation. It would, however, be a costly solution, and it would take a considerable time to implement. Under such a system, the process of handling complaints would probably also be quite resource-intensive, and it is by no means clear that it would be able to address the full range of complaints being made.
Cutting interest rates to manage economic slowdown, only to find that it worsens capital reversals, exchange rate depreciation, and potentially reignite financial imbalances that policymakers have tried so hard to tame. These are some amongst the many challenges to any policymaker, which brings me to my next point – the importance of policy pragmatism. The importance of policy pragmatism Our own experience suggests that in dealing with multifaceted challenges, a broad array of policy instruments is critical. The idea is that no single policy tool should be overburdened. The region’s experience theorises that despite great strides in achieving price stability and sustainable growth since the Asian Financial Crisis, an open economy with sizeable financial market invites volatile capital flows that adds layers of complexity in policy-making. We have expanded our policy toolkit to include micro and macroprudential as well as financial market stability measures. This additional arsenal of policy tools has helped to maintain the effectiveness of monetary policy and safeguard domestic financial and macro stability. But having a broad policy toolkit is not enough. It may be tempting for us to treat these challenges 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  as linear strings of events in order to cope with the complexity. But breaking the challenges into digestible fragments of their own and tackling them in isolation using our various policy tools seem a futile attempt. Given the closely interdependent and constantly evolving nature of the challenges, solving one part of them may amplify the risks in others.

With the right instruments and tools, and considerable agility, policy autonomy is not only attainable; it can be the perfect catalyst for powerful collaboration as we move forward. Let us collaborate rather than be restrained by collectivism. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
This is reflected by the fact that risk premiums on the interbank market, for example the TED and basis spreads, have fallen to levels close to those that applied before the outbreak of the  4  BIS Review 111/2009  financial crisis in both Sweden and abroad (see Figure 1). The stock market has also recovered strongly. Swedish companies have gradually found it easier to find funding on the international capital markets. But the situation is still strained. The interest rates offered to Swedish companies are high in comparison to the interest rates for government securities, that is the credit spreads are still high. In addition, corporate demand for export guarantees is much higher at present than has been the case previously. This indicates that the funding situation of the companies is still strained. International economic activity show signs of recovery Since the monetary policy meeting in July, signs have emerged of a slowdown in the economic downturn abroad. In some countries, there are now even signs of a recovery. This can be seen, for example, if we look at world trade, which has now begun to stabilise following the collapse at the start of the year (see Figure 2). Both outcomes and indicators of future economic growth have stabilised or shown an upturn in most regions. In Asia, in particular, growth has clearly picked up during the second quarter of this year (see Figure 3). This is because domestic demand in China has increased, which in turn stimulates exports in the Asian countries.

•  The published Allsopp analysis included a challenge from the major central banks to the major market participants to develop a new settlement mechanism. In short, find a solution or we will find one for you! I recount this history to highlight the magnitude of the achievement CLS represents. The establishment and growth of CLS is undoubtedly one of the most significant accomplishments in global financial markets in the post-war period and a major breakthrough in managing settlement risk in an over-the-counter market. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  The largest part of the achievement, of course, is the difficult job of making it happen. CLS was actually the third major concept for FX settlement. It succeeded because the industry collectively got firmly behind CLS and because of the hard work of the many people in the CLS organization, whose commitment and efforts continue to this day. Let me highlight three dimensions of CLS’s success. First, its growth and its scope. When it went live in 2002, CLS began settling FX transactions in just seven currencies with 39 settlement members. Today it settles in 17 currencies with 63 settlement members and 16,000 third party users. Volumes and values of transactions settled via CLS have also expanded significantly. Today CLS is settling average daily values of nearly $ trillion and average daily volumes of 1 million transactions. On its peak settlement value day, March 19, 2008, CLS settled over 10 trillion U.S. dollars equivalent. Second, adaptation to a rapidly changing foreign exchange market.
Considering the need for market development and the identification of the role of the Bank of Albania in these markets as the Lender of Last Resort as indispensable, we have prepared and will soon enough implement a complete package of regulations, whose purpose is to establish incentives and minimize risks in the Albanian financial market. Concretely, these changes consist in:  2  BIS Review 122/2007  The law on repurchase agreements. There is compiled the draft-law, which enables the risk-free conduct of repurchase agreements among commercial banks. It will guarantee the prevention of credit risk, which is cited by commercial banks as one of the primary causes for the existence of limits in the lending relations among banks. This law will also prevent the legal risk the banks are faced with when using repurchase contracts. Drafting of the regulatory framework and putting into application the custodian principle of delivery versus payment. In order to minimize the payment settlement risk and facilitate the intermediation in all types of transactions involving securities, such as collateralized loans, repurchase agreements, and outright purchase and sale of government papers, it is being worked on to put into practice the principle of delivery versus payment. Reducing the frequency of government treasury bill auctions. In collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, we have agreed on less frequent and increased size auction schedule of the government treasury bills.

It is also true that the movements of the exchange rate observed recently have surprised us to a certain extent. These surprises, however, should be taken as economic shocks that no economic relationship could have predicted. We central bankers are not very interested in short-term volatilities, but we should not miss breaks in the business cycle. For this task we need a relationship that has an economic grounding in the profitmaximising behaviour of the financial markets. And this is what the uncovered interest rate parity certainly has, and what the statistical models lack. Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to wish to all of us fewer exchange rate surprises and the best possible forecasts! 2  BIS Review 17/2007