samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Swiss economic outlook  I now turn to the economic outlook for Switzerland. GDP stagnated in the fourth quarter. For 2022 as a whole, GDP grew by 2.1%. The labour market remained robust, and overall production capacity has been well utilised. Page 3/6  Zurich, 23 March 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Despite the slight upturn in economic activity in recent months, growth is likely to remain modest for the rest of the year. Subdued demand from abroad and the loss of purchasing power due to inflation are having a dampening effect. Overall, Swiss GDP is likely to increase by around 1% this year. The forecast for Switzerland, as for the global economy, is subject to high uncertainty. In the short term, the main risks are an economic downturn abroad and adverse effects of the turmoil in the global financial sector. Monetary policy outlook  Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to return to our monetary policy. Inflation is currently higher than we had expected in December, and inflationary pressure has risen again also due to second-round effects. The renewed increase in our policy rate is therefore necessary to ensure that inflation returns to the range consistent with price stability over the medium term. It cannot be ruled out that a further tightening of monetary policy will be necessary to ensure price stability.

9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  Figure 1B: Improvement in performance after adding Governance scores  Figure 1A naturally led us to ask whether there are other measures which can better anticipate problems at smaller banks and building societies. We know that the quality of governance is vitally important, so we repeated our experiment, adding PRA supervisors’ judgements about the quality of a firm’s governance. We found that adding judgements about governance reduced our false alarm rates more often – and by more – for small firms than for large. This of course doesn’t mean governance isn’t important at larger firms – the opposite is true in our view. But it does suggest that supervising governance can be even more important for small firms. Source: Bank of England and Bank calculations. Notes: Balance sheet data as of July 2007, taken from historical regulatory returns (see Sebastian J A de-Ramon, William B Francis and Kristoffer Milonas, ‘An overview of the UK banking sector since the Basel Accord: insights from a new regulatory database’, BoE Staff Working Paper No. 652 (2017)). Supervisors’ scores for Governance from historic FSA records (see Joel Suss and Henry Treitel, ‘Predicting bank distress in the UK with machine learning’, BoE Staff Working Paper No. 831 (2019)). To test the robustness of our findings to definitional choices, results are shown for two different definitions of “Large” and six different definitions of distress.
Paul Tucker: Solving too big to fail – where do things stand on resolution? Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Authority Board, at the Institute of International Finance 2013 Annual Membership meeting, Washington DC, 12 October 2013. *  *  *  By way of setting the scene for this morning’s discussion, I shall make five broad and big points about where the international community has got to on addressing the Too Big To Fail problem through planning for orderly resolution. Before continuing, I should stress that these are my views and do not necessarily represent the views of any of the UK and international bodies of which I have been a member. (1)  The US authorities could resolve most US SIFIs right now  First, I repeat what I said in London recently. I cannot see how the US Administration could persuade Congress to provide taxpayer solvency support to – ie bailout – some of the biggest US banks and dealers. In short, the US authorities have the technology – via Title II of Dodd Frank; and, just as important, most US bank and dealer groups are, through an accident of history,1 organised in way that lends them to top-down resolution on a group-wide basis.

In the case of insured deposits, that means Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) suffering losses, as they would in Purchase & Assumption-style resolutions of an operating bank. But, due to less destruction of value, those losses under bailin would be smaller (and never greater) than the losses the DGS would have suffered in a liquidation. Insured deposits themselves do not get haircut under any resolution techniques; the losses of the DGS get picked up by the rest of the industry standing behind it. Bailin is no different from other resolution tools in that respect. The point I have been labouring about all creditors being exposed to loss needs to be distinguished from the quite separate issue of whether the authorities should mandate a specified amount of bonded debt to act as required layer of gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity (GCLAC). That may be issued from a holding company, or it might be subordinated debt issued by an operating company. through such requirements, the authorities would in effect be determining part of the creditor hierarchy – the order in which creditor classes take losses – in order to reduce spillovers into the wider financial system when a distressed financial group is resolved. The G20 Leaders’ Summit have asked the FSB to develop such a regime over the coming year. (4)  Some impediments to smooth cross-border resolution need to be removed  I said earlier that the resolution process will become smoother over time. A range of impediments have been identified.6 Some of them require steps by policymakers.
Luis M Linde: New challenges for a new era Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the 8th Santander International Banking Conference, Madrid, 26 November 2015. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Good morning. First, I would like to thank Banco Santander for inviting me to participate in this new edition of your International Banking Conference. The first edition took place in the autumn of 2008, right after the fall of Lehman Brothers and just before the G20 leaders agreed to launch the financial regulatory reform in an unprecedented globally coordinated action. The objective was clear and so was the mandate given to the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: to build a stronger and more resilient financial system. Since then, the main pillars of the reform have been put in place. The list of new measures implemented is long and, I would say, impressive. I will not review the list, which is very clearly and well explained in the latest progress reports published by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee. I will focus my remarks on three different aspects of the global post-crisis reform that I find particularly relevant for the topic of this Conference:   First of all, the finalisation, next year, of the Basel III framework.   Second, the new total-loss-absorbing-capacity (TLAC) standard, developed by the Financial Stability Board and recently endorsed by the G20 leaders.

The credit cycle and monetary policy The knock on effects of defaults in the US sub prime market and the impact of big investors on asset prices are factors we need to assess not just in trying to understand the financial sector and the stresses it faces but in gauging the state of the economy more widely. The story of the sub prime market illustrates a wider point. In traditional banking markets in the past there has been an observable tendency for banks to overshoot both in offering credit at the top of the cycle and retrenching afterwards. That feeds through into asset prices and can have an impact on the wider economy. Despite the sophistication of the new capital markets, a very traditional cycle seems to have been alive and kicking in sub prime. 3  The definition of the official sector in the US Treasury survey also includes public bodies such as oil stabilisation funds. 4  See ‘International capital flows and US interest rates’, NBER working paper 12560, October 2006. 6  BIS Review 84/2007  A similar story could be told about the credit card and other unsecured lending over the last few years. The growth rate rose in the late 90s until defaults began to build up over the last 2 years and the banks and other lenders tightened up terms and conditions sharply (Chart 13). The path of commercial property prices in recent years suggests the same has been happening there (Chart 14).
German inflation has been lower under the aegis of the ECB in the past 20 years than in the two preceding decades: 2.9% on average from 1979 to 1998 compared with 1.4% since 1999. The permanent stability of exchange rates between our economies is an undeniable advantage for German exporters: in 2018, 36% of German exports were to euro area countries. The low level of interest rates is itself partly a reflection of Germany’s large savings surplus. And Switzerland, another country that is in surplus but that is not part of the euro area, has to apply interest rates that are even more negative! Let us be in no doubt: the euro is an asset and not a burden for Germany. This brings me finally to the fourth cliché: the ECB’s monetary policy has betrayed its mandate. This idea was propagated in a recent “memorandum” by a number of former central bankers. I have every respect for them as people,  Page 4 sur 7 but I disagree with their argument. They unfortunately chose to ignore the positive results of non-standard monetary policies. Jean-Claude Trichet himself, who can hardly be accused of laxity, underlined these benefits, and I would just like to remind you of them: estimates of the effectiveness of the ECB’s policies put the impact on growth at around 2.5 percentage points and the impact on inflation at between 1 and 1.5 percentage point for the period 2014-18. What is more, since 2013 the euro area has created 11 million jobs.

While such a divergence of opinions in Islamic financial transactions is not a new phenomenon, it has now prompted increased international dialogue among the Shariah scholars from the different parts of the world. It is the closer linkages between the global Islamic financial markets and the increased platforms for greater engagement on Shariah issues that will contribute towards promoting an increased common understanding and mutual acceptance on the rules, standards and Shariah views, and for convergence to occur. This would evolve global Shariah standards for the Islamic financial industry. As Islamic finance continues internationalise with expanding scale, there will be greater financial intermediation linkages among the East Asian, West Asian, and the Middle East regions – creating the "New Silk Road". While this New Silk Road of financial flows is enhancing connectivity between Asia and the Middle East, both regions have, as in the case of the old Silk Road, extended the New Silk Road to the rest of the world. Global investors and the international financial community have already drawn benefits from the increased diversification of investment activity to the two regions. The expansion of the interlinkages of  4  BIS Review 136/2008  intermediation to and among these regions would in turn contribute towards a more efficient allocation of capital in the global financial system. Closing remarks Against a backdrop of an increasingly uncertain global environment, Islamic finance, as a form of financial intermediation in the international financial system, has continued to be viable and competitive.
It means being ready temporarily to raise regulatory requirements above their minimum level when risks from the economic and financial environment exceed anything remotely calibrated into the standards that apply in broadly normal conditions. And it means promptly relaxing those extra requirements once the risk to stability has passed. This is a massive step. No one is pretending that the policy community knows how to cast it in terms of a numerical target or a uniquely useful set of indicators, against which society can monitor us. And that underlines the importance of Parliament itself approving the instruments granted to the FPC, and of our being sufficiently transparent to enable public scrutiny of and debate about our analysis and policy decisions. The Bank/FSA Discussion Paper on macroprudential instruments published last December was a contribution to that.25 Back to current account imbalances: they do matter But that is not all that we, policymakers, should be modest about. If, as I believe, macroprudential policy can prospectively fill a gap, we must not pretend that it can be a cure for everything. Even if we had avoided the worst consequences of seriously suboptimal gross capital flows – a badly overlevered banking system dependent on flighty wholesale funding – there would still have been the problem of unsustainable global current account imbalances. Whether the eventual adjustment would have been disorderly and how costly is hard to tell.

15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  15  Annex 1: Charts Chart 1: The Great Moderation in the United Kingdom  Chart 2: G7 debt increased before the financial crisis  Source: IMF data and Bank calculations  16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  16  Chart 3: Risk of holding mortgage-backed securities perceived to be low; until it wasn’t  Source: UK AAA-rated residential mortgage-backed securities – 5 years spread to swap  Chart 4: Shadow banking has transformed into resilient market-based finance  Source: FSB Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report * FSB asset management recommendations and MMF reforms (notably EU, US) ** Securitisation reforms, Market intermediation reforms  17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  17  Chart 5: China’s credit boom in a historical context  Source: BIS data and Bank of England calculations  Chart 6: Markets no longer rely on government support  Source: Moodys and Bank calculations  18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  18  Chart 7: Our 2017 stress test showed that UK banks could withstand severe UK and world recessions and a market crash  19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  19
Given your vast experience in the area of takaful, both domestically and globally, we believe that the industry players will provide valuable contribution towards the formulation of the IFSB international takaful standards. Your experience and inputs on issues are relevant to or have impact on the regulation and supervision of the takaful industry. Malaysia as takaful & retakaful hub Let me now turn to the final part of my address by sharing Malaysia's latest initiatives to strengthen its position as a takaful and retakaful centre. I.  MIFC initiatives  Malaysia aims at enhancing its inter-linkages with the global Islamic financial markets. Among these are its continuous efforts to not only develop the financial infrastructure of the takaful industry but to also implement measures and initiatives that will strengthen our position as an international takaful and retakaful centre. Besides allowing up to 49% of foreign equity participation in domestic takaful operators, the Malaysian Government has also launched an initiative known as the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre or MIFC. The MIFC initiatives are specifically undertaken by the collective efforts of the country's financial and market regulators, including Bank Negara Malaysia , the Securities Commission, the Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority and Bursa Malaysia, together with the participation of representatives of the banking, takaful and capital market sectors. It is aimed at building greater intermediation linkages between East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East which will, in turn, further expand inter-regional trade and cross border investment flows.

Stefan Ingves: Policy rate setting and the monetary policy steering system Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Handelsbanken, Stockholm, 28 April 2008. *  *  *  During the autumn and spring the international financial markets have been marked by considerable uncertainty and turmoil. The situation has caused several central banks to take extraordinary measures, while for instance the Riksbank has not seen any reason to do so. One reason why central banks have acted differently is that the financial crisis has affected different countries to differing degrees. In Sweden we have not observed any major problems as a result of the financial crisis. This is linked to the fact that Swedish banks have not been exposed to the US subprime market to any great extent. Nor has there been any distrust of Swedish banks, which have a good capacity to deal with unexpected negative events. Ultimately, it is a question of a broad view that Swedish banks do not have problems. Another reason why central banks have acted differently is the differences in monetary policy steering systems between countries. It is therefore important to create an understanding of how the Swedish monetary policy steering system works. In my speech today I will talk about monetary policy from the production of the background material for making a decision until the decision has been implemented. I will focus on how an interest rate decision is put into practice.
But the analysis of the euro area will be undertaken centrally to a large extent and the level of interest rates will be decided by the ECB Governing Council, which consists of the members of the ECB’s Executive Board and the NCB Governors of the, initially eleven, participating countries. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has been given a highly independent status so as to be in a position to conduct a monetary policy for price stability without short-run political considerations. But its independence does not relieve the ECB of the duty to inform and communicate. On the contrary, it accentuates the need for a dialogue and exchange of information. The European Parliament has displayed a high profile in these matters and worked to establish a basis for discussing and monitoring monetary policy continuously. The ECB will be obliged to make difficult decisions in various matters. One problem may arise from cyclical disparities between euro area countries. While these disparities may diminish over time, they are unlikely to disappear completely. Meanwhile, the ECB has to set a single instrumental rate for the whole monetary union. The common interest rate will normally not be ideal in relation to the economic situation in every country. The national financial structures also differ considerably, which means that, for instance, interest rate sensitivity varies.

For instance, it confirmed the rather worrisome result that financial knowledge amongst young persons of age 18-29 years in general is rather low. In particular, they score 4.4 out of 7 compared to 5.3 out of 7 for the 40-49 age group. Econometric evidence also shows they are 3.2 times less likely to achieve the minimum score of 5 out 7 in knowledge questions than the 40-49 age group. According to the international literature, it is crucial for policymakers to intervene and ensure that financial literacy is taught as a course in the school curriculum early on when children are active, keen learners and more willing to get educated about new concepts. Therefore, schools as an environment conducive to learning, play an essential, if not the most important role, in the formulation of a National Strategy in order to address the problem of financial illiteracy early on in an individual's life. Further to the analysis undertaken by CBC staff in support of the work of the Committee, online meetings and regular contacts have taken place between the Committee and a team of distinguished scientific collaborators, who have specialised and international expertise in the field. Namely, Dr Adele Atkinson (Atkinson Financial Research and Policy, formerly from the OECD), Dr Maria Demertzis (Deputy Director at Bruegel), Prof. Michalis Haliassos (Goethe University Frankfurt), Prof. Alexandros Michaelides (Imperial College London), and Prof. Dennis Philip (University of Durham) whom I have already mentioned.
Under this framework and, as I have said earlier, in a setting in which inflationary risks have tended to increase over the last few months, in March we discontinued net purchases under our pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) and we agreed to gradually reduce net purchases under our asset purchase programme (APP). In June we decided that as the three conditions established by our forward guidance for raising interest rates had been met,5 net purchases under the APP would end on 1 July, and we informed of our intention to raise policy rates in July and again at our September meeting.6 In July, we decided to raise all three ECB policy rates by 50 basis points (bp), taking the deposit facility rate to 0%, thus moving out of negative territory for the first time since 2014. This was a larger increase than signalled at the previous meeting, for two reasons. First, the updated assessment of the risks to inflation, which included the materialisation of certain upside risks in the short term relative to the June projections. Second, we took into account the reinforced support for the effective transmission of monetary policy provided by the new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), which was approved at that same meeting. Subject to fulfilling established criteria, the TPI will enable the Eurosystem to make secondary market purchases of securities issued in jurisdictions experiencing a deterioration in financing conditions not warranted by country-specific fundamentals, to counter risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism to the extent necessary.

Indeed, from 2008 to 2014 the Banco de España prepared a considerable number of releases, articles and reports on the crisis and the measures adopted, which were available in print or on our website no sooner were they drafted. That is to say, the Bank had already prepared and published extensive information on and various analyses of the crisis; but what was missing was an orderly overview, in terms of both the timeline and the different themes, addressing the key macroeconomic, financial, regulatory and supervisory aspects. The imbalances built up in the Spanish economy in the expansion prior to 2008 Allow me first to refer to the build-up of macroeconomic and financial imbalances in the expansion years prior to the crisis, linked most significantly to private-sector debt. In its opening chapter, the Report indicates that an intense process of indebtedness unfolded in Spain from 2001 up to 2007, as reflected in Table 1.1 (p. 66). The figures for the period 2001-2007 are as follows: set against nominal GDP growth of 67%, credit to the private sector increased by 221%, concentrated especially in the real estate sector, where growth of 250% in house purchase loans and of 513% in the case of credit to construction and real estate services companies was recorded. Peak growth in credit was in 2005 and 2006. In those two years, credit to the private sector grew by 60%, that earmarked for house purchases by 65% and that to construction and real estate services firms by almost 100%, i.e.