samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, I would like to use this opportunity today to highlight key areas which require attention and leadership of top policy makers at supervisory agencies as well as banks, to ensure not only soundness of individual banks, but also guard against systemic risk as a whole. Let me now turn to the first part of my talk: Key Features of New Paradigm What is driving the changing global financial landscape? The failure of several financial giants, and with many still in retrenchment, led to market space being taken up by surviving global banks, some have become state-owned via rescue programme. Their systemic importance has risen further along with their market power, and regulation must rise up to the challenge. The interdependence of the financial sustainability of these financial giants and sovereign risks have become increasingly linked, while perception of state guaranty of such institutions may distort local or even global markets, creating un-level playing-field. The demand for accountability for public bail-out money puts pressure on managing such banks, which have now become “public institutions”. Thus, the intervening authorities face a strong risk of having to micro-manage the institutions, and with this the associated risks, not least reputational and legal. Timely exit is important for the reason cited. Exit policy however could also be complicated, for example if recovery value of bailed-out fund is under pressure from weak market conditions. Most importantly, it is important to observe that, the precedence set by the actions regulators took in such intervention could have a long-term implication.

Clearly in principle the colder the external frost, the higher we need the internal temperature: the danger is that we overload the domestic boiler, with households becoming reluctant to take on more debt, or pay higher house prices, so that consumer spending growth moderates regardless of the outside temperature. Earlier this year in fact things seemed to be moving in the right direction: global demand appeared to be picking up quite well, and there appeared to be a reasonable prospect that consumption growth would moderate largely of its own accord. There was at that time a question of whether that moderation might need to be encouraged by higher interest rates. With the downward revision - over the summer - to the expected pace of global demand growth, the emphasis of our policy debate has shifted. The questions now are how far we need to try to sustain domestic demand growth by lowering interest rates, in order to maintain overall stability; and how far we can sensibly do so without excessive risk of overloading the domestic boiler. The best outcome for us of course would be if the external frost would continue to melt, with the global economy maintaining its gradual recovery and the euro continuing to strengthen in foreign exchange markets. And that is in fact in my view the most probable outcome. But until things become clearer we are very much on the spot. And perhaps, I thought, 'on the spot' was not a bad answer to the opera's third riddle.
For instance, such systems would render the reconciliation of transaction and balance data between banks and a third-party system obsolete. The paradigm seems to have been turned on its head: decentralisation – not centralisation – now appears to promise the greatest efficiency gains. I do not, however, believe that decentralisation will become the ‘new normal’ in all financial market functions and infrastructures. Many existing financial market infrastructures are already highly competitive, and barriers to entry for new technology are correspondingly high. The conventional, centralised model they are built on is already low-cost and meets high safety standards. And improvements are being made all the time. Distributed ledger technology, meanwhile, has yet to prove it can outperform the existing set-up with respect to safety and efficiency. Having said this, there may be some scope for deploying distributed ledgers in certain complex financial market functions or infrastructures. The settlement and safekeeping of securities is one example. In the end, we may well see conventional and new technologies coexisting or blending. Staying with the securities example: it is conceivable that we will see a hybrid scenario. This could entail security-specific information being settled via a distributed ledger, while the payment leg could continue to be effected via a traditional, centralised payment system. 4 5  6  7  Cf. Diana Chan, Florence Fontan, Simonetta Rosati and Daniela Russo, ‘The Securities Custody Industry’, European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series, No. 68, August 2007.

Looking ahead, we expected that positive fundamental factors – notably strong global demand and robust earnings in the euro area – would contribute to a certain pick up and a broadening of economic activity. The latest data and indicators have not changed this assessment. According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, real GDP grew at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.3% in the second quarter of this year, compared with 0.4% in the first quarter of 2005, confirming that the underlying growth dynamics remained subdued in the first half of 2005. At the same time, the most recent survey indicators have, on balance, supported the view that economic growth could improve in the second half of this year. Looking further ahead, conditions continue to be in place for positive fundamental factors to influence the outlook and for economic activity to pick up beyond the short term. On the external side, ongoing growth in global demand and improvements in euro area price competitiveness should support euro area exports. On the domestic side, investment should benefit from the exceptionally low level of both nominal and real market interest rates prevailing across the entire maturity spectrum, as well as from the robust growth of corporate earnings and ongoing improvements in corporate efficiency. Consumption growth should gradually rise, broadly in line with expected developments in disposable income. This picture is consistent with the most recent ECB staff projections, which envisage euro area real GDP growing at rates of between 1.0% and 1.6% in 2005 and between 1.3% and 2.3% in 2006.
Along with the growth of the economy, the volume of business of Saudi banks has grown at a phenomenal rate during 1997-2006, with their assets growing by about 125.5 percent, deposits by 313.5 percent and capital and reserves by 83.7 percent. Their average risk-weighted capital to asset ratio, during this period, has generally exceeded 20 percent which is considerably higher than the minimum of 8 percent recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In recent year, Saudi banks have become increasingly involved in the domestic economy. During 1997-2006, they liquidated a part of their net foreign assets to meet higher domestic credit demand, thereby raising the share of domestic credit from 39.1 percent of total assets to 57.73 percent, or from 24.1 percent to 38.6 percent of GDP at current prices. Nearly 95.8 percent of domestic credit represented banks' claims on the domestic private sector which went up by 233.1 percent over this period. During this period, there was a sharp increase in the consumer loans which grew from a miniscule 6 percent in 1997 to 36.4 percent of total bank credit by 2006 reflecting the needs of a youthful population and changing risk environment. Saudi banks have also been investing in government securities, thereby contributing to the development effort of the government. However, these investments as a percentage of total assets have declined from 21.8 percent in 1997 to 14.3 percent in 2006 due to the government's recent policy of retiring some of its debt.

With more than 2,500 Indian companies, 2,300 Chinese companies, and 2,000 Australian and New Zealand companies in Singapore, corporates have made Singapore their location of choice to tap into this growth. However, Singapore’s value transcends our physical proximity to the fastest growing regions of the world. Indeed, Daiwa’s extensive commitments and new activities in Singapore is the best testament of our successful efforts to create the best possible business environment. It highlights recognition of our stable and trusted environment, supported by reliable infrastructure, highly educated workforce and consistent and transparent government policies. To further enlarge the market, Singapore has forged important linkages to the rest of the world. We have built up a network of Free Trade Agreements with many of our key trading partners such as Japan, the US, India and Korea. Discussions are ongoing with the Gulf region and China for greater market access for Singapore-based entities. A Connectivity Agreement between Singapore and Vietnam will amongst others, deepen collaboration in financial services, and promises greater opportunities for businesses from both countries. Conclusion On this note, I would like to convey my heartiest congratulations to Daiwa Securities Group on your 35th anniversary in Singapore. The future of the region continues to shine bright and I encourage all to leverage on Singapore to tap into the region’s growth. I wish everyone a wonderful evening ahead. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 72/2007
Their efforts, together with those of commercial banking institutions and government mandated micro-financing agencies, have resulted in a significant expansion of micro-financing. Micro-financing has increased from RM151 million in 2000 to RM1.7 billion in 2008, representing an annual average growth rate of 35%. Early this year, Bank Negara Malaysia celebrated its 50th anniversary. The Bank has taken the opportunity to review our existing legislation; the Central Bank Act to take into account the dramatically changed domestic and international economic and financial environment. The work on this proposed new legislation has spanned two years. In articulating with greater clarity the mandate of the Bank, the objective of financial inclusion, not explicitly mentioned in our existing Act, but undertaken in practice is now explicitly articulated in the proposed Act. This is to ensure that going forward, the future generation of central bankers at Bank Negara Malaysia will continue with the unwavering commitment to the building of an inclusive financial system. Conclusion Let me conclude my remarks. In this current environment of great uncertainty, financial intermediation has a vital role in supporting an economic recovery. As regulators, the focus is placed on ensuring the soundness and stability of the financial system, and thereby provides the platform on which the role of the banking sector in the economy can be enhanced. It is the continued functioning of the financial system that will be a vital element in the economic growth and development process.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Policy and regulation of financial inclusion Welcoming remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the UNAG Asia Regional Forum on Policy and Regulation of Financial Inclusion, Kuala Lumpur, 6 May 2009. *  *  *  Introduction It is my pleasure to welcome you to the United Nations Advisers Group Asia Regional Forum on Policy and Regulation of Financial Inclusion. This conference takes place at a time when the world is confronted with addressing many issues that have emerged from the current global financial and economic crisis. Whilst significant attention and efforts are being channelled to resolving the financial crisis and creating an enabling environment for the resumption of growth and job creation, we must not lose sight of the financial inclusion agenda. Financial inclusion is vital for creating balanced sustainable economic growth. It provides the opportunity for all members of society to benefit from economic progress. It allows for a shared prosperity, an aspiration that is encapsulated in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. The Central Bank of Malaysia is most honoured to be given the opportunity to host this forum which is being held in Asia for the first time. We are most honoured to have Governor Nout Wellink, President, of the Central Bank of Netherlands. We are also pleased to have present Mr. Jacques Toureille, UNAG Advisor, who will be delivering the keynote address by Her Royal Highness Princess Maxima on her behalf.
This “recovery” has been much weaker than previous cyclical upswings – and according to the recently published May Inflation Report projections, output is more likely than not to remain below its pre-crisis level for another year or so. There has recently been a lot of discussion about whether the UK has suffered a double-dip recession or not. But to focus on whether growth is a bit negative or a bit positive is to use the wrong reference point. Trend growth should be more like 0.6% a quarter and we have only had five quarters of growth at that rate or higher in the 21 quarters since the start of 2008. There had been no such weak period in the UK since quarterly GDP data were first published in 1955. Even compared with previous examples of financial crisis – whether at home or abroad – the UK economy has been puzzlingly weak for a long time. I want to take the opportunity today to offer a possible explanation that at least fits some of the data. Much of what follows has been used as a narrative in recent Inflation Reports. It is as if the different groups within our society – households, businesses, banks and the Government – have all decided that their future financial positions, on average, will be worse than they thought before the crisis. As economists, we would say “a reduction in estimated permanent income”. I will come back to reasons why, but, given that premise, we can explain much of what is happening.

But banks and building societies need to be seen as safe and sound to fund themselves and to secure other business. When banks are under-capitalised, raising capital can improve the market’s perception of their creditworthiness and so make it easier for them to borrow more cheaply. If we are to have a set of banks fit to provide credit and offer payments services to the UK economy, they must be better capitalised and less leveraged than they have been in the past. I want to make one point about this debate which bears repeating: if a bank becomes better capitalised that need not be at the expense of lending to the real economy – capital is actually a source of funding which supports lending. And an improved capital position, for most of the large lenders, need not come about by reducing real economy lending but by a number of actions such as restricting distributions (salaries, bonuses or dividends), by raising new capital or by running down other parts of their balance  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  sheets. The FPC has always been explicit that banks should not meet the need for more capital by reducing lending to the real economy. The new FPC is one of a small number of macroprudential committees in existence. Few other advanced economies have delegated such macroprudential powers to a technical committee. Will it work to make the UK financial system more robust? I hope so.
7  The main measures with a direct budgetary impact include the € State-funded discount available to all citizens on every litre of fuel purchased (from 18 April to 30 June), the existing discounts on energy taxes being extended to 30 June, the offsetting measures and direct support for the transport sector and electricity-intensive industries (amounting to € billion) and the plan to take in refugees (with a budget of € billion). Need for an incomes agreement There is an additional dimension to the response to the current situation, one that is highly specific to the present shock and of the utmost importance. Specifically, as I have explained, the attack on Ukraine has exacerbated the geopolitical tensions that were already driving steep price rises in energy commodities, the bulk of which we import from abroad. This increase in the price of imported energy amounts to a loss of income for the Spanish economy. And as I have reiterated on a number of occasions, lower income for the economy as a whole inevitably entails a reduction in its agents’ income. Against this background, these agents (essentially firms and households, but also general government) would be well-advised to internalise this reduction in national income and reach a burden-sharing agreement, so as to avoid triggering a price-cost feedback loop.

If one claims this, one is also implying that central banks and governments do not have the possibility to choose the level of the inflation target, but that this is something determined by structural conditions in the economy. Ultimately, one thus also says that inflation is not a monetary phenomenon, which does not concur with what is widely accepted today. Important to maintain confidence in the target A slightly milder interpretation is that one did not literally mean that the inflation target should be lowered, but that the Riksbank, and all other participants in the Swedish economy should accept that inflation will continue to undershoot the target over a long time to come – despite the fact that it has already been below the target for several years. The main reason would be that the expansionary monetary policy required to bring inflation up to the target would also contribute to a further increase in house prices and household debt. I have some understanding for these thoughts, but I consider that they disregard a number of important circumstances as well. I believe that above all, one underestimates the importance of maintaining confidence in the inflation target and the problems that can arise if this confidence is lost. We have lived with an inflation target of 2 per cent for more than twenty years and few would claim anything other than that it has been a good system with good results for the Swedish economy.
My speech will endeavour to outline the arguments that support the opt-in decision for Romania, but I believe that, despite the slightly different circumstances, the reasoning also holds true for other non-euro area countries – such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or Bulgaria. General remarks Before dealing with the arguments underpinning our position regarding the Banking Union, let me give you a short account of Romania’s recent economic history that should enable all of you to better understand our particular circumstances. No doubt the crisis has taken its toll on Romania’s economy, given the large imbalances which had been steadily accumulating during the boom years. Whether the crisis has ended or not on the European level is still a matter of debate. What may be said for certain is that Romania undertook the necessary adjustments during the 2009–2012 period and the preconditions for sustainable growth are now in place. Indeed, the outcome of these adjustments may already be seen in the 2013 economic performance, which hopefully marks a turnaround in Romania’s economic development: •  rapid (judged by the current standards in the European Union) economic growth, namely 3.5 percent,  •  sizeable adjustment of the current account deficit, from the double-digit area (between 2006 and 2008) to 1.1 percent,  •  historically low inflation (1.55 percent at the end of the year),  •  fiscal deficit well below 3 percent.

Despite the structural nature of the excess liquidity since 2002, growth of credit to the economy has been relatively moderate (14% in 2008). For a better contribution to the diversification of the economy, banks are expected to enhance their efforts in financing the development of SMEs while further improving credit and operational risk management. BIS Review 21/2009  1  The role of banks in investment financing is crucial given the limited development of the financial markets. The 2009 government budget provides for appropriations to strengthen public banks’ capital base. Government financial support to the public banks (bailing out of public banks’ portfolios and strengthening of their capital assets) averaged 2.6% of GDP for the period 1991-2002 and 1.7% for the period 2005-2006. The Bank of Algeria will continue to pay due attention to potential risks arising from the deepening international financial and economic crisis, particularly risks to the banking sector. In this respect, particular attention will be attached to the flexible use of available monetary policy instruments and to maintaining a flexible exchange rate policy to reflect the economy’s fundamentals. At the same time, banking supervision will continue to be strengthened, in accordance with the ongoing initiatives of the Basel Committee. Following the modernization and consolidation of banks’ reporting system and the recent increase in required minimum capital, sustained efforts are being devoted to strengthen the operational and regulatory frameworks of the banking sector over the first half of 2009 (conformity of bank assets, liquidity and credit risks management, …), in accordance with international standards.
This, in turn, introduces uncertainty over the behaviour of the incomes of these agents, which means they tend to postpone their consumption and investment decisions. The sharp decline in the consumer confidence indicator in March (the largest decrease in the historic time series, which goes back to July 1986) gives an indication of the magnitude of these effects. This fall suggests that the increase in uncertainty may have begun to adversely affect household spending decisions. The results of the latest edition of the Banco de España Business Activity Survey (EBAE) suggest that the war has begun to worsen the expectations of non-financial corporations regarding their turnover and also the duration of the global supply chain problems, which is now estimated to be longer. Third, the invasion of Ukraine will affect the Spanish economy through the trade channel, the direct impact of which is assumed to be moderate, as bilateral trade flows with the countries at war are relatively limited. In 2019, the last year before the pandemic, Spanish goods exports to Russia and Ukraine represented only 1.6% and 0.3% of the total, 2  respectively. Russian tourism, meanwhile, accounted for 2.2% of total spending by foreign tourists. However, the indirect effects on Spanish trade flows may be significant. The war will particularly affect central and eastern European countries, which are more exposed to Ukraine and Russia, and, therefore, the growth of Spanish export markets.

The current economic situation Before the war, the world economy was on a path of gradual recovery, following the most acute phase of the pandemic, although the recovery was already flagging from the second half of 2021 owing to global bottlenecks and the increase in inflationary pressures. The gradual path of recovery in activity prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was, in any case, highly uneven across geographical areas and sectors of activity. Thus, while some economies had already regained or even surpassed their pre-crisis levels of activity, others had not. Spain, despite having one of the highest levels of vaccination in the world, was among the latter. At the end of 2021, Spain’s output was still 3.8 percentage points (pp) below its pre-pandemic levels, while in the euro area as a whole this gap had already closed. One factor that would explain the difference in progress is the sectoral composition of activity. In particular, the recovery tends to be more delayed in those countries, like Spain, in which services that are highly dependent on personal interaction, such as those linked to tourism, account for a large share of the economy. Economic developments in Spain, and in the rest of the world, have been affected by upward inflation surprises since the second half of 2021, driven in particular by energy and food, although there has also been a slight rise in underlying inflation. Between December 2020 and March 2022, the annual increase in consumer prices rose from -0.6% to 9.8%.