samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Fortunately, though, once the next IMF review is complete, there will be no doubt about it. The foreign exchange reserves now total 1.7 billion euros, apart from shortterm obligations. In the next few months, they will expand by 453 million euros due to transactions related to Avens, 255 million euros from the sale of FIH bank in Denmark, and 620 million euros following the third IMF review. The reserves will then exceed 3 billion euros. In comparison, the next two years’ interest and instalments on two Treasury bond series total 1.5 billion euros, 400 million of which have already been bought back at a discount. The following two charts show clearly how much foreign liquidity will improve. They show that the foreign exchange reserves will grow as large as 4 billion euros if Iceland draws the full amount of the loan facilities available through the IMF programme, and that they will cover the Treasury’s instalments and interest payments through 2015. Of course, access to foreign credit markets will open up long before that time, and a part of the debt will be refinanced in the market. 4  BIS Review 130/2010  I know that all of you who are assembled here today are very interested in how the exchange rate will develop once the Icelandic economy rights itself, hopefully within a few quarters. The chart below shows the real exchange rate of the króna, which is currently about 20% below its historical average but dropped as far as 33% below that average during the crisis.

1 At the conference, Professors Carmen and Vincent Reinhart presented the results of a broad-based study of output growth and other economic variables during the ten years before and after economic crises (40–70 countries in connection with major global crises, and 16 individual country crises). 2 The findings are very clear: economic activity has a tendency to be much weaker in the decade after a financial crisis than in the decade beforehand. There are probably a number of explanations for this:  1  See http://www.kansascityfed.org/publications/research/escp/archive.cfm. 2  See Reinhart, Carmen M., and Vincent R. Reinhart (2010): After the Fall, http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2010/reinhart‐paper.pdf. BIS Review 130/2010  1    GDP growth is often abnormally strong and, to a degree, unsustainable in the prelude to a financial crisis.   Financial crises are preceded by debt accumulation and followed by a long process of deleveraging.   Risk appetite subsides after a financial crisis, and what Keynes called “animal spirits” are tempered for a prolonged period of time.   Production capacity is destroyed in a financial and economic crisis.   Finally, economic policy becomes more complex, and there is more risk of error. Of course, these developments are not inevitable, and the ultimate outcome depends also on policy choices. For example, it is clear that a number of mistakes played a key role in shaping the disaster that unfolded following the crash of 1929.
Against this background, the Banco de España has a tradition – one that I think it is comprehensively successful – of conferring high importance in its supervisory work to monitoring the rigour of financial information and of the models used to calculate riskweighted assets. Naturally, it is our wish that these elements, which crucially affect the supervisor’s capacity to properly measure banks’ solvency situation, should be part of the common model adopted by the SSM and applied uniformly to all banks. A third significant challenge concerns achieving a fruitful framework of interaction between the SSM and the Single Resolution Mechanism. The regulations have set in place a complex structure in Europe, which includes the creation of a resolution agency (the Single Resolution Board) separated institutionally from the supervisor. This agency has been granted wideranging powers both in respect of the definition of resolvability requirements – which include the determination of a minimum volume of instruments capable of absorbing losses – and of  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the activation of resolution procedures for non-viable banks, as well as the selection of the most suitable tools to implement them. Resolution actions have direct consequences for financial stability, which is a public good that the SSM seeks to protect, and they turn on the more vulnerable banks, which are precisely those that require greater attention from the prudential supervisor.

25 Đ Đ Reforms in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) have also awected the global investment research climate, with potential spill-on ewects on the liquidity and vibrancy of public markets. Research budgets are shrinking and small to mid-cap stocks are increasingly seeing a reduction in research coverage [14] . These factors could impact the liquidity of public markets, especially for thinly-traded smaller firms which may not receive suwicient investor attention despite having strong fundamentals. 26 Đ Đ Amidst these trends, there is a need to respond to changing funding needs and be flexible to accommodate these evolving business models. 27 Đ Đ In Singapore, we seek to support corporates’ financing capabilities and needs across the corporate lifecycle – from early stage financing to mature companies looking to tap on financing from public markets. As part of Singapore’s Financial Services Industry Transformation Map (ITM) to transform Singapore into a leading global financial centre that connects global markets and supports Asia’s development, MAS has introduced a number of initiatives to support enterprise financing in both private and public markets. • Venture capital and private equity managers are an essential element in the financing lifecycle, by providing smart capital and operational and business expertise to portfolio companies. • To facilitate activities of venture capitalists to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we have simplified and shortened the authorisation process for venture capital managers.
Inflation moved up primarily as a result of a slower decline in prices for imported consumer goods, but the depreciation of the krone since the beginning of 2003 has also contributed. In addition, the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services stabilised, and towards the end of 2004 there was a tendency towards a higher rise in prices for these goods and services. At the beginning of 2005, inflation measured by the CPI-ATE was lower than expected. Prices for imported consumer goods fell more than expected. It is uncertain whether this price decline was due to abnormal seasonal patterns or a fall in underlying inflation. The fall in prices may be related to an unusually warm winter, which has made it more difficult to sell winter clothing and sports equipment at ordinary prices. On the other hand, there are indications that prices for imported consumer goods in foreign currency may have fallen somewhat more than previously assumed. The wide variations in prices for some imported consumer goods, especially clothing and footwear, may entail wide monthly variations in consumer price figures. Excluding changes in prices for clothing and footwear, the year-on-year rise in the CPI-ATE was 1.3 per cent in February, up from 1.1 per cent in January. Changes in indirect taxes and particularly in VAT rates make it difficult to interpret the most recent price figures. The low level of inflation at the beginning of the year may be due to a lag in price adjustment following the indirect tax changes.

However, we assume that households will spread consumption over time so that the savings ratio will continue to fall in spite of an increase in interest rates. Growth in housing investment is expected to ease through 2005. However, the projection for housing starts is also very high for 2005. Such a high level of housing starts over several years probably means that more dwellings will be constructed than implied by underlying demand. As a result, housing investment is expected to decline after a period. Higher interest rates and weaker developments in the Norwegian economy may also lead to a fall in residential construction after a period. The upturn in mainland fixed investment is broadly based. Stronger profitability, higher capacity utilisation and solid export growth will contribute to continued investment growth in goods-producing industries. Demand for services is expected to continue to grow for a period ahead with an attendant  BIS Review 18/2005  5  increase in investment in service sectors. When growth in the economy gradually slows down, investment growth will probably slacken. Mainland exports of good and services from mainland Norway will also benefit from solid global growth this year. Later in the period, a continued loss of market shares as a result of high cost levels will dampen export growth. Unemployment is expected to decline this year and next. In subsequent years, growth in demand and output is expected to ease, and unemployment may edge up again when capacity utilisation approaches a more normal level.
This is available from 1997 and projected backwards using aggregate M4 growth before then. Chart 2: Broad money growth slowed significantly after the financial crisis, inflation still close to 2%  Page 5  Sources: ONS, Bank of England and Bank calculations. None of this means that at the margin (holding everything else fixed) QE doesn’t add to broad money or ultimately to the level of prices. Nor does it imply that the quantity measures are never useful or important. It would be as wrong categorically to ignore monetary aggregates as it would to assume that they’re the only thing you need to consider. As far as the theory’s concerned, people can’t always borrow and lend freely. In the presence of these and other “financial frictions” the availability of liquid assets can matter for spending, independently of interest rates. Besides, interest rates themselves matter only relative to some “neutral” rate that cannot be observed directly. So, in practice, monetary policymakers should always pay attention to other – indeed any – indicators of incipient inflationary pressure. And although changes in banks’ deposits have often been driven by shifts in demand there are times when they look more supply-led. Arguably, the surge in broad money in 2020 looks like one such episode. Supported by the furlough scheme, and because their spending was held back by the lockdowns, households accumulated significant deposits during the pandemic (Chart 3). While not literally a “helicopter drop” this came quite close to an exogenous increase in the stock of household (and aggregate) money.

Pay Power Speech given by  Andrew G Haldane Chief Economist Bank of England Acas “Future of Work” Conference Congress Centre, London 10 October 2018  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Will Abel, Shiv Chowla, Tomas Key, Brad Speigner and Ben Stokes for their help in preparing the text. I would like to thank Ben Broadbent, Clare Macallan, Becky Maule, Mette Nielsen, Silvana Tenreyro and Jan Vlieghe for their comments and contributions. This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is great pleasure to be here at the Acas Annual Conference whose theme this year is the “Future of Work”. It is a particular pleasure to have Brendan Barber as Chair. As a member of the Bank of England’s Court between 2003 and 2012, Brendan’s insights on the labour market and wider economy were crucial in helping the Bank steer a policy course through a period of first macroeconomic calm and then extra-ordinary macroeconomic storm following the global financial crisis. It is the labour market that I want to discuss today.
Such a scheme would be justified as one which reallocates resources from current to future consumption, and the reallocation would occur only during a time of relative prosperity. 5  See F. Holme-Hadulla, S. Hauptmeier and P. Rother, “The impact of numerical expenditure rules on budgetary discipline over the cycle”, ECB Working Paper Series No 1169, April 2010; see S. Hauptmeier, J. S. Fuentes and L. Schuknecht, “Towards expenditure rules and fiscal sanity in the euro area”, ECB Working Paper Series No 1266, November 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  While this on its own would not ensure the sustainability of the pension system, it would be an important component in the process of pension reform, and, as I have already mentioned, I would suggest that it would be appropriate for deliberation at the MCESD. The phenomenon of population ageing raises sustainability challenges also for the public provision of healthcare, which represents a significant share of government expenditure. It must be recognised that the extent of provision of free healthcare and other services by the State must ultimately be financed by the taxpayer. The earmarking of certain revenue measures or particular revenue streams for this purpose may also be an appropriate topic for consideration by the social partners. The sustainability of funding the government’s capital expenditure programme, particularly in relation to the infrastructure and the public utilities through fiscal resources may also have to be reviewed.

Thus, in terms of labour cost competitiveness, Malta has kept pace with the euro area average. However, to maintain competitiveness a further focus on the wage setting process may be appropriate. In particular the basic principle must be to emphasise that productivity improvements are at the basis of sustained wage increases, and that these are best negotiated at firm level, where improvements in productivity can be best gauged. Consequently, any cost of living adjustments should form part and parcel of the collective agreement and not be superimposed on collective agreements by legislation as happens today. Indeed, already a number of collective agreements incorporate the COLA increase, and I suggest that this should be the norm. Another important message that has emerged from the sovereign debt crisis is the need for fiscal prudence, which provides the space for countercyclical fiscal policy during a downturn. In the euro area, fiscal policy is the major macroeconomic management tool at the national level. Thus, in periods when economic activity is relatively strong, policy needs to be sufficiently prudent to build the necessary fiscal buffers that would be utilized during periods of weaker growth. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In the aftermath of one-off expenditure during 2008, the deficit ratio in Malta declined in 2009 despite the recession of that year and narrowed slightly further in 2010. The debt ratio generally declined until 2008, but then picked up in 2009, partly in response to the contraction in the economy.
Time and again, the ECB had to act to prevent an unduly sharp fall in  economic activity and head off the risk of deflation. Deflation, which is a widespread and ongoing fall in prices, may lead consumers to postpone spending and firms to slash 3  investment. Both factors lead to a reduction in aggregate demand, lower output, higher unemployment and further downward pressure on prices. This is arguably as dangerous a situation as spiralling inflation. In late 2008, the ECB faced a situation in which firms, households and governments were carrying excessive debt, at the same time as the banks had to reduce their own leverage. With the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the immediate problem was a shortage of liquidity and the breakdown of the money market. This threatened the health of the euro area economy as a whole, with declining output, rising unemployment and weaker inflationary pressures. In response, between October 2008 and May 2009, the Governing Council  lowered key interest rates by 275 basis points, bringing the rate on the main refinancing operations down to 1.0%. Many of these measures were taken in concert with the major central banks around the world. Under normal economic conditions, such a reduction in short-term interest rates is quickly transmitted to bank lending and deposit rates. In turn, lower interest rates encourage  households and firms to consume and invest more, supporting aggregate demand directly. Moreover, lower interest rates on euro-denominated assets lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate of the euro, stimulating exports.

Time and again, our policies have become even more liberalised than before, as we move forward to make the market more competitive, more transparent and more dynamic. Seven months ago, we took swift and pragmatic actions to implement foreign exchange market development measures to stabilise the foreign exchange market. I am pleased to report that these measures are successful, where the 1-month implied volatility has halved. Onshore foreign exchange have recovered to a stable daily average volume of USD10 billion, an increase of 1.25 times before the measures. Daily foreign exchange turnover remains 5 times higher than equity trades. Another policy that merits attention is the global phenomenon of rising inequality. Markets are not always the best arbitrator for the distribution of jobs, wealth and income. In the era of rapid globalisation, advancement in technology and consequently, the creation of a new economy, there are many winners and losers. As responsible policymakers, we need to reconcile the benefactors of the new economy with those who have been excluded or dislocated during this era of transformation. Cognisant of the urgent need to improve our social safety net, the minimum wage was implemented in 2013. Many have benefitted from this, including migrant workers. The B40 group was also given cash assistance to cope with the rising cost of living. In the near future, the protection and wellbeing of workers will be enhanced through the introduction of unemployment insurance. I urge businesses to take a broader view of these policies and not purely from a cost perspective.
We do not burden the banking system any more than is necessary for us to be able to steer short-term money market rates. Ladies and gentlemen, we monitor the impact of negative interest precisely, and we take the side-effects seriously. However, we remain convinced that the benefits it brings Switzerland as a whole clearly outweigh the costs. The negative interest rate and the willingness to intervene are currently the best instruments for ensuring appropriate monetary conditions and thus securing price stability and supporting the economy. Page 4/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Monetary policy outlook  Allow me to summarise the key messages with regard to our monetary policy. We anticipate that our economy has expanded by around 1% this year. We are expecting growth of between 1.5% and 2% next year. Inflation expectations are within the range consistent with price stability. The conditional inflation forecast for the coming quarters is slightly lower than in September, but it is essentially unchanged in the longer term. The Swiss franc remains highly valued, and the situation on the foreign exchange market is still fragile. Against this backdrop, our expansionary monetary policy remains appropriate. Monetary policy and climate change  This brings me now to the significance of climate change for the SNB. When it comes to this key issue, we are focused first and foremost on being able to properly assess the possible consequences for the functioning of economies and financial systems, both in Switzerland and worldwide.

In this way, the SNB stabilises price developments and supports economic activity. The new conditional inflation forecast for the coming quarters is slightly lower than in September. The longer-term forecast is virtually unchanged. For 2019 the forecast stands at  Page 1/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  0.4%, for 2020 at 0.1% and for 2021 at 0.5%. The conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate remains at –0.75% over the entire forecast horizon. Global economic outlook  International trade tensions and political uncertainty have weighed on the global economy in recent months. Accordingly, economic growth around the world was again slightly below average in the third quarter. The increase in manufacturing output was modest in many countries, this being accompanied by subdued capital spending and lacklustre global trade in goods. Against this backdrop, employment growth in the advanced economies was slower than a few quarters ago, and unemployment fell only slightly. However, it is already very low in many countries, and is thus lending support to consumer demand. Various central banks eased their monetary policy in the autumn in light of modest inflation and the economic risks. Moreover, they signalled that they would probably leave their policy rates at a low level for an extended period of time. The SNB is maintaining its existing baseline scenario for the global economy, and expects momentum to remain modest over the short term.