samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Ce rôle est souligné par l’annonce d’une valeur de référence quantifiée pour la croissance d’un agrégat monétaire large, à savoir M3. La valeur de référence pour 1999 a été fixée à un taux annuel de 4,5 %. Il convient de noter que le concept de valeur de référence n’implique pas l’engagement pour le SEBC de corriger de façon automatique les écarts susceptibles d’apparaître à court terme entre la croissance monétaire et la valeur de référence. Mais la valeur de référence pour M3 est compatible avec le maintien de la stabilité des prix à moyen terme et permettra de réaliser cet objectif. - le second pilier de la stratégie de politique monétaire est une évaluation d’ensemble des perspectives d’évolution des prix dans la zone euro considérée dans sa totalité. Il est dès lors important de suivre une large gamme de variables économiques et financières comme indicateurs de l’évolution future des prix. La décision coordonnée, prise en décembre, de ramener les taux d’intérêt à 3 % a permis à la BCE d’annoncer que le nouveau niveau des taux d’intérêt prévaudrait “ dans un avenir prévisible ”. La politique monétaire unique ne peut à elle seule assurer la stabilité des prix si elle n’est pas accompagnée d’une discipline budgétaire appropriée dans l’ensemble de l’Union économique et monétaire. Pour ma part, je citerais trois justifications économiques aux dispositions du traité qui ont donné naissance au Pacte de stabilité et de croissance.

In early December, OPEC and other oil exporters agreed to cut production in 2019. However, the developments of this year demonstrate that producers can rapidly ramp up shale oil production when prices are high. Another considerable external factor is geopolitical risks affecting both Russia and other 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  countries and regions. As far as internal factors are concerned, here we have persistent uncertainty over the price response to the VAT rate hike, the effect of this year’s weakening in the ruble on inflation, and its effect on inflation expectations. It means that the uncertainty over price movements is associated with both an estimated direct effect of proinflationary factors and the scale of secondary effects dependent on inflation expectations. Thus, our baseline scenario assumes that the VAT rise will contribute approx. 1 pp to inflation. However, the possible estimates of this contribution range between 0.6 and 1.5 pp. The scale of secondary effects is still harder to estimate. Even a temporary acceleration of price growth raises inflation expectations of both households and businesses. We saw it from the surge in petrol prices registered in May-June this year. Petrol prices have been stable in the second half of the year. However, surveys suggest that Russians are highly concerned about the rise in petrol prices. Inflation expectations remain unanchored. This means that they are highly likely to go up in response to price growth following the VAT rate hike. Therefore, we cannot consider the VAT rate revision as a purely one-off factor.
exporters  -15  -9,9  -2,4  0  -0,9  U.K.  10  25 20  16,8  GDP growh in 2011-2015: 6.7%  U.S.  15  Eurozone  20  22,1  (*) Regional aggregates reflect simple averages. Sources: BIS and IMF. 7  Figure 3 Terms of trade (index, 2000=100) 200  200  180  180  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  80  85  90  95  00  05  10(f)  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 4 Net international investment position (percentage of GDP) (1) 100  100  75  75  50  50  25  25  0  0  -25  -25  -50  -50  -75  -75  -100  -100 97  01  05  Institutional Banks Companies and households (1) GDP at constant exchange rate (index, September 2010 =100). (2) Net international investment position. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Philipp Hildebrand: The virtues of flexible financial markets - a central banking perspective Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the CFA Institute Annual Conference, Zurich, 22 May 2006. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  *  *  *  Summary Rapid technological change and market liberalization have been the driving forces behind the remarkable evolution of global financial markets over the past three decades. The consequences of this development include a geographic rearrangement of global capital markets, a fast pace of product innovation and changes in the nature and composition of financial market participants. The benefits associated with today’s flexible financial markets are manifold. Financial markets have become much more efficient in allocating capital. New products enable a better distribution of risks and the liquefaction of previously illiquid assets. They have also increased market transparency. As a result, modern financial markets facilitated innovation and likely enhanced economic growth. Moreover, they have contributed to make economies more resilient to shocks. These extensive benefits notwithstanding, modern financial market also entails new risks. These risks tend to elicit calls for increasingly far-reaching regulation. While some regulation may indeed be required to guarantee the integrity of financial markets, the threshold for such regulation should be set high.
It could also similarly arise from a determination that there is no realistic prospect of a successful auction to return to a matched book or that the CCP’s own rules to allocate losses or tear up contracts are either not yet available to it or will undermine financial stability or the objective of continuity through full tear-up and closure of the service. So – in line with the Key Attributes – it needs to be possible to place the CCP into resolution before its loss allocation rules are exhausted. These are all examples of entry into resolution caused by clearing member default. But nondefault losses could also bring a CCP down and it is certainly possible that a breach of a CCP’s regulatory requirements with no reasonable likelihood of replenishing its capital would present a trigger point for intervention. I have mentioned the incompatibility of full-tear up with the objective of continuity. But an intervention by a resolution authority cannot by itself guarantee a successful auction. To do so, may still require partial tear-up and forced allocation and these would seem to be necessary tools in any resolution toolkit for a CCP. How losses are then allocated upon tear-up again  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  goes to the question of the timing of intervention and whether the tear-up takes place before the resources available to a CCP have been exhausted or after it.

Loss absorbing capacity for CCP resolution Let me start by discussing the loss-absorbing capacity needed for CCP resolution. The use of a bail-in tool on a bank unlocks the loss absorbing capacity of the non-equity part of its balance sheet, the part that would otherwise only bear loss in insolvency or in a voluntary restructuring. Applying this concept of going and gone concern resources to CCPs is a less straightforward task. Unlike a bank, a CCP’s own loss absorbing resources sit both on its balance sheet as margin and default fund and off it in the form of contingent claims on its members. Consistent with the PFMIs, these arrangements are intended to be comprehensive at least insofar as they cover losses that could arise from clearing member default. That begs a question as to what additional loss absorbency the resolution of a CCP can currently unlock that recovery cannot unlock already. The question of loss absorbency is one that the FSB is looking at. Do we need additional resources in the waterfall beyond existing funded and unfunded resources? If additional resources are required, should the initial margin held by a CCP be made available if it would have suffered losses in insolvency? Or should CCPs hold other resolution resources instead? BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I will not prejudge that debate here. However, I do think there is value in clarifying what is meant by the expression “TLAC for CCPs”. Total loss absorbing capacity is not simply shorthand for subordinated debt.
Improvement in opportunities for change but … A similar gloss can be applied to the realignment of economic policy from the second half of the 1980s to the middle of the 1990s. There have been a number of reforms aimed at creating stability and opportunities. The credit and currency markets have been deregulated, components of the social security system have been reformed, a tax reform has been implemented, targets have been established for government finances, price stability is enshrined in law and the Riksbank has been given an independent status. All this represents good possibilities of the Swedish economy facing a stable future as we step over the threshold to a new millennium. The question is, however, whether the new information technology will be implemented in the far-reaching ways that are necessary in order to reap the really large benefits. Let us look at another period in Sweden’s economic history when things did not go quite as well. After World War II, when activity in the industrialised countries recovered and competition grew, partly because trade barriers were lowered, it became necessary to realign production in Sweden. The need for change resembled what we are beginning to discern on the horizon today. For much of this post-war period, however, wage costs rose at a rapid rate. Profitability in Swedish business was accordingly under pressure from two fronts: growing competition from the rest of the world and rising wage costs.

Activities in Islamic Finance are growing with the entry of new players, and MAS is honoured to host the 6th Islamic Financial Services Board Summit in May next year. 25. The asset management industry in particular has shown robust growth in 2007. Our latest Asset Management survey shows that the industry has continued its strong doubledigit growth for the seventh year, with a 32% increase in assets under management (AUM), reaching almost $ trillion for the year 2007. In tandem with this growth, the number of investment professionals rose by about 22% to close to 2,200. 26. Reflecting Singapore’s role as an international financial centre, the sources of assets managed in Singapore as well as their investment destination remains diversified. The AsiaPacific region continues to be a key driver of growth for the industry. More than 80% of the total AUM was sourced from outside Singapore with Asia-Pacific accounting for 44% of the total. Almost 60% of the funds managed in Singapore are invested in the Asia-Pacific region. 27. The asset management industry has also seen a greater diversity in terms of players, strategies and products. Large traditional managers continue to expand and anchor their investment capabilities here. Singapore has also grown in importance as a centre for alternative investments such as hedge funds, private equity and real estate. The strong growth of the asset management industry has in turn drawn in several ancillary service providers such as fund administrators and prime brokers.
This means focusing on what is heard rather than what is said: we cannot merely “publish and go”. As Tiff Macklem, my Canadian colleague, says “Public communications should be in plain language and free of jargon. We should speak as public servants and peers, not as oracles delivering messages from an ivory tower.”x And effective speaking also requires active listening. At the start of next year, consistent with the ECB endeavours, we will host a number of “Banque de France listens” events in all regions to hear what French citizens and SMEs think about inflation and monetary policy. We will then adjust our communication depending on what we hear. Let me elaborate on the economic stakes of this communication. Our inflation targeting policy will be significantly more efficient if economic agents, be they households or businesses, do actually understand it, accept it and believe it. Hence it should be seen as clear, legitimate and credible. I insisted earlier on clarification (question 2), let me now conclude with legitimacy and credibility. One of the most difficult challenges for a central bank with a price stability mandate is how to explain a positive inflation objective. The general public often does not understand why a central bank would deliberately try to increase inflation. We need to explain better that although our price stability objective is  Page 9 sur 10  defined in terms of HICP inflation, we are actually seeking a general average increase in all nominal variables, including wages and nominal GDP.

Such an exercise is essentially identical to the common practice of constructing Taylor rules for monetary policy, as in Chart 2. Chart 4 draws the macro-prudential policy-implied path of US bank capital ratios. In deference to the architect of modern theories of credit-induced instability, let us call this the “Minsky rule” [Minsky, 1986]. The path of the Minsky rule is, in many respects, the mirrorimage of the Taylor rule. It suggests that hypothetical US banks’ capital ratios would have been systemically and significantly tighter than their actual path between 2000 and 2009. In  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  other words, a tight macro-prudential stance would have counteracted the effects of a loose monetary policy stance. Although it is impossible to know for certain, it seems plausible that having this extra degree of policy freedom would have helped stabilise the US economy and financial system. A tighter bank capital regime would have tended to slow pre-crisis credit growth, thus constraining the boom. And more capital in the US banking system would have helped protect the wider economy from the credit crunch that followed the bust. In short, the boombust cycles in US credit and GDP would have plausibly been somewhat less severe had US policy been ambidextrous. The euro-zone crisis As a second historical example, consider the behaviour of some euro-zone crisis countries. In the run-up to monetary union, monetary policy was loosened significantly in a number of the peripheral European countries whose interest rates converged on core euro-area countries.
Since the global financial crisis, Mainland China has taken steps to allow a greater use of RMB outside the Mainland. The rationale behind this policy move is easily understandable. At present, much of the cross-border trade and investment between the Mainland and other jurisdictions are conducted in US dollars. As the Mainland continues to expand its international trade and investment, and becomes more economically integrated with the rest of the world, Chinese traders, investors and financial institutions will face growing foreign exchange risk if they continue to rely on the US dollar. Thus, it is a natural development for Mainland China to allow a wider use of RMB in its cross-border trade and investment. 17. From Hong Kong’s perspective, this policy move presents unprecedented opportunities to us, as we can leverage on our strengths as an IFC and our unique position as a gateway between China and the world to provide a premier testing ground for offshore RMB activities. 18. Offshore RMB business has been conducted in Hong Kong since 2004. While the scope of RMB business was limited to retail banking initially, it has been expanded substantially to cover bond issuance, trade settlement and further to wealth management this year. These developments have built a solid foundation for developing Hong Kong into a RMB financing centre, RMB trade settlement centre and RMB wealth management centre. I will briefly cover these three dimensions. 19. The first dimension is RMB financing.

Of course that leverage needs to be well managed. The rise in yields in late September – 130 basis points in the 30-year nominal yield in just a few days – caused a significant fall in the net asset value of these leveraged LDI funds, meaning their leverage increased significantly. And that created a need urgently to delever to prevent insolvency and to meet increasing margin calls. The funds held liquidity buffers for this purpose. But as those liquidity buffers were exhausted, the funds needed either to sell gilts into an illiquid market or to ask their DB pension scheme investors to provide additional cash to rebalance the fund. Since persistently higher interest rates would in fact boost the funding position of DB pension schemes[1], they generally had the incentive to provide funds. But their resources could take time to mobilise. The issue was particularly acute for one small corner of the LDI industry – pooled funds. In these funds, which make up around 10-15% of the LDI market, a pot of assets is managed for a large number of pension fund clients who have limited liability in the face of losses. The speed and scale of the moves in yields far outpaced the ability of the large number of pooled funds’ smaller investors to provide new funds who were typically given a week, in some cases two, to rebalance their positions. Limited liability also meant that these pooled fund investors might choose not to provide support.
A second point in connection with this is that; it is inevitable that in time, together with healthier price signals, the resources of our economy will shift to firms and sectors with higher productivity, as was the case in other countries. The firms and sectors that had benefited from the consumption and pricing habits of the inflationary environment, but could not work efficiently, will be leaving their places, in this process, to more competitive firms and sectors with higher productivity. Dear audience, At this point, I wish to mention an issue, regarding the changes in the pricing policy of producers, extremely significant in terms of its effect on the future course of inflation. This is the process of exchange rate affecting inflation, known also as the pass-through effect. The effect of exchange rate on inflation in Turkey is weakening day-by-day, due to the changing pricing patterns of producers as a result of the decline in inflation. As observed especially in the recent period, the impact of the movements in exchange rate on inflation began to materialize less than expected, and also at a lower level and in a more lagged fashion compared to the past chronic inflation period.

Meanwhile, our own South East Asian region and that of North Asia and the Middle East countries continue to have high surplus savings seeking opportunities for investment and new asset-classes for greater risk diversification and improved returns on their investments. Hundreds of years ago, the ports of Nusantara were destinations for the spice trade to Europe via India and the Middle East . In this context, Islamic finance can serve as a bridge that links the Nusantara region to the capital surplus economies. Already, our financial institutions are venturing to have a presence in the Middle East and we welcome their presence in our financial system. This has now in fact resulted in the cross-pollination of talents and resources, giving rise to innovative products and services, creating depth and breadth to the respective financial markets. Just as the Straits of Malacca served as an important maritime conduit for the Nusantara region, Malaysia and Indonesia has the potential to serve as an important intermediary for mobilising capital to meet the requirements of the Nusantara region, and to be a distribution centre for shariah compliant  2  BIS Review 73/2007  securities and to extend the regional Islamic capital markets to other parts of the world. Of importance will be our joint efforts to promote the standardisation of the Islamic regulatory and compliance matters. In relation to this, Malaysia and Indonesia is already working jointly to promote research capabilities and the pool of talent and technical expertise in Islamic finance.
That is why I consider this conference as highly important. The Bank of Albania has devoted constant attention to financial education. Our education agenda is integral and comprehensive both in terms of geography and age groups, full of interactive elements and modern communication methodology. Furthermore, I would like to refer to some of the elements that constitute the philosophical grounds of our educational work. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  First, I would like to recall that financial welfare is inextricably related with the country’s economic progress. It has been already proven that individual’s welfare is proportionate to economic activity and prices of financial assets. The cause-effect relation is true on both directions. Our economy and financial institutions are strong when revenues and wealth grow. Financially healthy individuals are inclined to increase their consumption and, therefore, boost their spending, consequently pushing the economy forward. Moreover, financially successful people boost lending potential by channelling their savings into deposits. Therefore, they are in a position to have access in crediting by the banking system, giving life to new businesses which, in turn, provide higher employment and welfare. To most of the people, having a job and a salary or estate is essential to personal financial welfare. However, the fact that you may have a job, or a salary does not imply that you automatically have the capacity to make wise decisions on effective money utilisation. This is the point where our relation with financial education is subjected to the test of the truth. Is this test passed?

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches