samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The HKMA would do so at a level of defence, which would of course be close to 7.80, considered suitable by the HKMA in the light of prevailing market conditions. There is therefore an element of “constructive ambiguity”. This approach is arguably less transparent but I am not in favour of showing all my cards to speculators. Furthermore, it is very much in accordance with Hong Kong’s free market philosophy that the foreign exchange market be left very much alone. I therefore see no reason why our approach should be changed. 22 The HKMA also accepts certain high quality private sector debt securities as eligible securities for Repo under LAF. However, the interest rate charged by the HKMA on LAF Repo involving those private sector paper is set at 25 basis points above that for the Repo of Exchange Fund Bills and Notes. Private sector debt securities normally accounts for less than 10% of LAF Repo activities. 23 To improve market order and remove uncertainty towards the banks’ access to the LAF, the HKMA issued a circular to  banks on 12 November 1997 clarifying the definition of “repeated borrowers” upon which a penal rate may be charged on LAF borrowing. “repeated borrowers” are defined as those licensed banks which have borrowed through LAF on eight occasions in any period of 25 days or on four consecutive days in which LAF is open. BIS Review 19/1998  - 12 (d) The exercise of discretion 45.

On the other hand, the contagious nature of financial turmoil with globalized financial markets is such that the possibility of further attacks on our currency, unsuccessful as they inevitably would turn out to be, could not be dismissed. The banks have therefore been somewhat reluctant to lend longer term money in the interbank market since the October shock, even though they are flushed with liquidity, as reflected by the clearing balance of the banking system being at a high level. This perhaps reflects a lack of depth in the debt market which we have been separately trying to address. As a result, while the short term interest rates of the Hong Kong dollar, for example for overnight money, have fallen to quite low levels, significantly below corresponding US dollar interest rates, the yield curve has become sharply upward sloping, with one-month and longer term money commanding a significant premium over corresponding US dollar interest rates. 25. But I believe the Hong Kong dollar yield curve will in time flatten further, as it has done so after the sharp hike on 23 October 1997. There will, nevertheless, be occasional jumps, as sentiment continued to be affected by events in other economies in the region and possibly beyond.
•  The Basel Committee expects that we will achieve our goal of not raising in aggregate the capitalization required of the banking industry, though clearly and appropriately those banks that engage in higher risk businesses may see their requirements rise, and vice versa. G  2  To help ensure this, the Committee launched its third Quantitative Impact Study on October 1, 2002, involving, to date, 265 banks from nearly 50 countries. The banks will assess how the proposals will affect them and submit their findings by December 20, 2002. These results will allow us to ascertain the need for adjustments prior to the release of an updated proposal for public comment in the  BIS Review 61/2002  second quarter of 2003, followed by finalization of the New Accord in the fourth quarter of 2003, and implementation at year-end 2006. •  While much work clearly remains to be done over the next three years - including evaluating banks' readiness, training supervisory staff, and working towards consistent implementation across supervisors - in my view, both the journey and the ultimate destination of a New Accord will contribute substantially to a more resilient international financial system. •  Unfortunately, while there is a deepening consensus on key elements about how to promote resilience ex ante, there is no comparable degree of consensus on how best to handle international financial crises once they do erupt, or the proper roles of public institutions and the private sector in containing and resolving such crises.

§  6  Increases and decreases in financial flows - - and the fluctuations in pricing that naturally accompany positive or negative trends in policies and economic and financial performance - - are a reflection of, and act as a natural brake on, the development of imbalances. BIS Review 61/2002  §  G  But an assertion of control by the international community risks diverting attention from the policies of the local authorities. As a result, denial and delay, aggravating factors in almost every crisis, may well continue and be exacerbated. And then, as a practical matter, once market processes have been stopped, how and when do you get things started again, particularly if needed corrective policies still have not been convincingly and transparently implemented? To sum up, I believe the one-size-fits-all disposition inherent in a preemptive approach risks making situations much worse than they need to be. The only thing that strikes me as predictable under such an approach would be that market access would be harmed across the board. Just as bailouts risk encouraging too much risk taking, efforts to orchestrate preemptive bail-ins may encourage too little. •  Underlying the suggestions that I have made is a firm belief that the success of our approaches to crisis management needs to be viewed and assessed with a wide focus. Certainly, there is the question of efficacy in containing the crisis at hand, and the balance between this and the costs, actual and potential, to the public sector.
It would also mean that the Swedish payment infrastructure is to a greater extent harmonised with the rest of the EU, which can increase competition and the quality of the payment services offered to Swedish customers. RIX plays a central role in the Swedish payment system The payment system the Riksbank currently supplies to financial institutions is called RIX. Institutions wishing to become participants in RIX enter into an agreement with the Riksbank. The Riksbank is a public institution, which means that entry to the RIX system is given on competitively neutral terms to institutions meeting the conditions that are set. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of RIX for the Swedish economy. From the time that RIX opens at 0700 hours on a typical working day until it closes at 1700 hours, a good 20,000 payments are settled to a total value of more than  2 According to the international standards on financial infrastructure issued by the CPMI-IOSCO, systemically im-  portant infrastructures should settle in central bank money whenever it is practically possible. 3 The Eurosystem consists of the European Central Bank and the national central banks in the euro area. 2 [8]  SEK 600 billion.4 RIX is the hub of the Swedish payment system and it is therefore also logical that the functions and accessibility of RIX will be in focus when the Riksbank upgrades its capacity to meet the challenges of the future payment market. The Riksbank is not in any unique situation in this respect.

It is of course impossible to know how the payment market will look in 5-10 years’ time, but a qualified guess is that instant payments will become increasingly important. New payment products that are introduced can be settled immediately if the client so desires, for instance, through online banks, “point of sale” or e-commerce platforms. Many payments that are now cleared by batch clearing will probably move to instant settlement. For instance, since 2018 it has been possible to make payments by Swish to the Swedish Tax Agency. It is also conceivable that a mixture of batch-based and instant settlement may arise, where payments are settled individually but at predetermined points in time. In the long run, it is not improbable that some of the payments now made separately in RIX will move to other platforms that enable instant payments. It is clear at any rate that the taxonomy used for payments (large-value/retail, instant settlement/batch settlement and time-critical/not time-critical) will become more blurred. The Riksbank is standing at a crossroads here. Should the Riksbank continue to supply solely an infrastructure equivalent to RIX that is primarily suitable for largevalue, time-critical payments during office hours on weekdays and leave the other settlement of payments between financial institutions to the private sector? Or should the Riksbank also supply an infrastructure that enables settlement in central bank money in seconds 24/365? Or to put it a different way: Should the Riksbank's payment system be open all the time? Do we need a settlement service 24/365?
This could mean that demand for commodities will remain high in the future. One force that could hold back demand is if the price regulation applied by some of these countries begins to be perceived as too costly and is therefore abolished. If this happens, world market prices will have a greater impact on the domestic market. If this happens, it should dampen demand. The other explanatory factors – the weak dollar, the low interest rate, the increased interest in commodities as a form of investment and to some extent also the supply side restrictions – are reasonably of a more short-term, or cyclical, nature. In the shorter term, it is of course possible that commodity prices will slow down as a result of weaker international economic activity. But the emerging economies’ demand for commodities will probably remain as an underlying, long-term driving force that pushes up inflation. It is perhaps this international pressure on commodity prices and the risk of contagion effects on other prices and on wages that will be the first major test for the lowinflation policy. How should monetary policy react in general? What consequences will this have for monetary policy? One thing it is important to remember is that the rising commodity prices are examples of changes in relative prices. A relative price is the price of a particular product or group of products in relation to other prices.

Irma Rosenberg: Rising commodity prices Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at SEB, Stockholm, 9 May 2008. *  *  *  A challenge for the central banks What have we been able to read in the news in recent months? Let me give some examples. Mining companies have begun prospecting for ore in many parts of Sweden, particularly in the Norrland region. Municipalities which have long experienced problems with emigration, such as Pajala, are now facing a more positive situation. Optimism has increased. Increased trade barriers are being reported in some parts of the world. But this is not a question of what has been the usual case, where countries protect domestic industries by limiting certain exports. Instead they have introduced high charges to prevent exports of foods such as grain and rice. We have also been able to read about demonstrations and food riots in poor countries such as Haiti, Cameroon and Burkina Faso. The UN food organisation FAO has also warned of social and political unrest in several countries. Why am I taking up these examples? What have they got in common? Well, they are the result of one and the same phenomenon – that world market commodity prices have almost exploded in recent years. The high metal prices have made it profitable to search for ore and extract metals that earlier would have been left in the ground.
Since 1997 we have applied a simple policy rule in order to make our monetary policy even easier to understand: If the forecast shows that inflation will be above target level two years ahead, we usually raise the repo rate, and we lower it if the forecast is below target level. But, as I intend to argue here, the policy rule cannot be applied mechanically. It should instead be regarded as a rule that on average provides a good picture of the policy, but where departures from the rule can and should be made under certain circumstances. The first argument is connected with the time aspect. As there is a time lag before monetary policy has an effect – it takes around 1-2 years before interest rate adjustments achieve full impact on inflation – the Riksbank’s policy must look ahead. Our interest rate decisions are therefore based on forecasts of, for instance, the prospects for inflation and economic activity over the coming two years. It goes without saying that these forecasts, like other assessments of future events, are uncertain. Forecasting errors are often due to genuinely unexpected things, which we have not been able to assess in advance. At the beginning of 1999 the Riksbank made a decision to clarify the principles for monetary policy, as a complement to the simple policy rule. This clarification states that monetary policy is normally aimed at bringing inflation onto the targeted path one to two years ahead.

However, it also identifies two circumstances under which the Riksbank can depart from this aim; namely transient effects on inflation  BIS Review 37/2005  1  and large deviations from target. The main idea behind this is that we do not focus solely on inflation in every situation; we should also be able to regard developments in growth and employment when these do not conflict with the inflation target. Transient effects refers to certain determined factors which affect the inflation forecast one to two years ahead, but which will then subside without having any lasting effect on inflation trends. This was the case, for instance, in 2002-2003, when large fluctuations in oil prices had a significant effect on inflation. We made it clear then that monetary policy should disregard these transient effects. Large deviations from target refers to when inflation deviates so far from the target level that there may be justification for bringing it back to the target level over a longer period of time than the usual two-year horizon. A more rapid return to the target could cause undesirable fluctuations in, for instance, production and employment and thereby lead to large costs for the real economy. Since the decision on the clarification was taken in 1999, it has become increasingly evident, in my opinion, that there are a number of good reasons for allowing deviations from the inflation target during short or long periods of time.
As good corporate governance is part of Islamic values, Islamic banking institutions need only to adapt to the code of ethics of the corporate governance to their business. In the Malaysian context, the same good corporate governance practices are applied for both conventional and Islamic banking institutions. To enhance the standard of corporate governance in the banking sector Bank Negara Malaysia has introduce measures including among others, specific guidelines on the code of conduct for directors, officers and employees of the banking institutions and guidelines on the directorship and the prohibition of loans to directors, staff and their interested corporations. The main objective of these guidelines is to engender public confidence in banking institutions and to ensure that the management and board of directors exhibit integrity and professionalism in the running of the banking institutions. Banking institutions are prohibited from the extension of financing and credit facilities to related parties including its directors and staff as well as family members and interested corporations. Such prohibitions are aimed at preventing misconduct and irregular practices in provision of finance whilst ensuring fair and equitable treatment to the public. These governance are universal in nature and therefore, Islamic banking institutions would not be faced with any difficulty in adopting these values. Secondly, the objective is to prevent conflict of interests and accord responsibility on the banking institutions to provide complete and accurate information.

This Seminar is one of the platforms for regulators and financial institutions to come together to share views and experiences in regulatory issues particularly pertaining to accounting standards, financial framework and transparency in the Islamic banking operations. I also hope the participants would take the opportunity to acquire as much knowledge as possible during these two days from the invaluable insights presented by the distinguished speakers. On that note, I wish you a successful Seminar. Thank you. BIS Review 35/2002  3
The court’s adjudication role in Islamic finance is reinforced by the support from the SAC in its capacity as a consultative body to the Malaysian judiciary system. Under the law, the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 prevails, if a question concerning a Shariah matter arises in any proceedings relating to Islamic financial business, where the court or the arbitrator shall take into consideration any published rulings of the SAC or refer the matter to the SAC for its ruling. The SAC’s rulings are binding on the courts and arbitrators. This referral system preserves and enhances the sanctity of Shariah rulings and the consistency in the interpretation and application of Shariah principles in Islamic financial transactions. To complement the court system, specific arbitration rules for Islamic banking and financial services have also been developed, enabling disputes for both domestic and international cases to be dealt with by the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA). Such comprehensive legal infrastructure for Islamic finance is unique to Malaysia and essentially reflects the support and dedication by the legal fraternity in keeping abreast with the development of Islamic finance. Adding to the strength of the institutional and legal framework in Malaysia is our continuing emphasis on human capital development. Various measures have been implemented to ensure that our market players, including the judges and lawyers, are well-trained in Islamic finance.

Indeed, the Commission’s proposal allows for a faithful implementation of the final Basel 3 standards, as agreed at the international level, while taking into account EU specificities and avoiding material increase in capital requirements. As negociations are underway, at the ACPR we see merits in sticking to the following: First, the implementation of the Output floor at the European consolidated level, consistently with the Banking Union which is now almost complete. Second, that the few targeted  adjustments, on critical and strategic exposures for the financing of the EU economy which are transitional in nature, remain so. This concerns both the low-risk exposures on residential real estate and the exposures to unrated corporates. The transitional period is planned to end on 31 December 2032, which will give sufficient time for European banks to absorb the impact of the output floor, through organic capital generation, and for the market to ensure a larger coverage of ratings for EU companies. Another pragmatic measure proposed by the Commission that we strongly support at the ACPR is the introduction of a mechanism that would allow the Commission to adjust rapidly in reaction to international developments on the calendar or the content of key elements of the standard, in particular for market risk activities. This would provide some necessary flexibility for these activities exposed to international competition, as Europe continues to be a front-runner regarding the transposition of the final Basel 3 standards.
Yet we have also seen a strong and, thus far, persistent contraction in business investment, which may weigh on future productivity growth as such investment tends to raise the technology content of capital. A prolonged period of below-trend investment could also lead to an excess of savings over investment, and therefore a fall in the natural interest rate. Developments in labour supply have also been weak. One positive factor has been the increase in the labour participation rate in the euro area by around 1 pp during the crisis, whereas in the U.S. participation has fallen by more than 3 pp. However, this has to be set against an increase in euro area long-term unemployment from 3% to 6%, which creates a risk of workers’ skills being eroded and skill mismatches emerging. This is particularly  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  relevant because unemployment is concentrated among those with lower skills: around 20% of low skilled workers are unemployed, compared with only about 7% of high skilled workers. Total factor productivity – which principally captures long-term technological progress – has fallen only marginally during the crisis, most likely reflecting the underutilised capacity in the inputs to production. However, this is no cause for comfort as TFP was on a declining trend in the euro area well before the crisis, and has recovered less quickly than in the United States.1 These developments create two interrelated challenges for policymakers. The first is how to prevent the fall in observed growth from feeding back into potential growth.

The pre-crisis consensus was clearly that monetary policy could not affect the supply side of the economy – while it could help stabilise output around its trend, it could not affect that trend. However, there has been some discussion recently among central bankers as to whether monetary policy can have more lasting effects. For example, if an extended period of low demand is creating hysteresis effects, a more accommodative monetary policy that boosts the economy may prevent a permanent downward shift in productivity. That is, it can for a time prevent a cyclical fall in growth from becoming structural too quickly. The jury is still out on this discussion. It is clear that the supply capacity of the economy is determined by its structural features, and monetary policy cannot substitute for this. Nevertheless, some see that monetary policy can play a “defensive” role in a period of  1  “Potential output, economic slack and the link to nominal developments since the start of the crisis”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 2013. 2  Claudio Borio, Piti Disyatat and Mikael Juselius, “Rethinking potential output: Embedding information about the financial cycle”, BIS Working Papers, February 2013. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  economic weakness. In our case, by delivering our price stability mandate, while we cannot raise growth potential, we can perhaps limit or delay the degree to which it falls.