samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Once a month, immediately after the meeting of the Governing Council, the President of the ECB holds a press conference- which starts with a precise exposition of the diagnosis of the Governing Council which is immediately made available in real time on the ECB website. This will be the case when we will meet next Wednesday in Frankfurt. It is extremely important to stress that the Eurosystem was the first in the world to introduce, on the 1st January 1999, the concept of regular, frequent, real-time transparency in the domain of monetary policy. This illustrates the extent to which some criticisms are profoundly unjust! It is especially noteworthy, in this regard, that soon after we had embarked upon this new concept of real-time transparency, other important central banks decided to go along the same path. Being accountable for an independent institution in a modern democracy or, as it is the case for the Eurosystem, in a subtle set of democracies like the European Union, means being accountable to public opinion at large. In this respect, the public speeches and testimonies of the President of the ECB for the benefit of both European institutions and public opinion, the public speeches and testimonies of the Governors of the National Central Banks to national institutions and public opinion, are crucial. Explaining tirelessly the reasons and the reasoning that underpin the decisions of the Governing Council is a key part of our  2  BIS Review 28/2001  collective duty.

Indeed, by urging governments to aim at a fiscal position “close to balance or in surplus” in the medium term, the pact enables them to let fiscal deficits increase during recessions without exceeding the 3% reference value. In short, it allows them to create a fiscal buffer during normal economic periods that can be drawn on to counter economic divergences or asymmetric shocks. To summarise that overall issue, the “Optimal Currency Area” theory has frequently been called upon by economists who criticized EMU and expressed concerns about giving up the exchange-rate policy instrument as a response to asymmetric shocks - in particular to asymmetric shocks within a monetary union. I would like to point out, first, that one of the most remarkable effect of the European integration has been the increasing symmetry of shocks. Second, Professor Mundell himself, in support of EMU, made an interesting clarification at the beginning of 1998: in the event of a shift in demand from one member country to another, creating unemployment in the first and inflationary pressure in the second, flexible exchange rates would not be able to solve the problem. I quote: “If the argument for devaluation were valid, it could be applied to every state or sub-region in any country, with a proliferation of new currencies, so they could be devalued!”.
You can take a look at our first example of this – the November Inflation Report –online, at www.inflationreport.co.uk. This afternoon’s event will showcase a selection of the materials we are planning to run alongside these changes in our communications to help explain to people about the Bank’s work. To bring that to life, the first session will kick off with three of my colleagues – Ben, Sam and Jon –explaining to you what the Bank is doing on some topical issues, things that are influencing the Bank’s policies and the role we play in the economy right now. The questions they will answer are:   Why did the Bank change interest rates earlier this month?   What we are doing to keep banks safe? ; and    What are we doing in response to the vote to leave the EU to ensure the Brexit process is as smooth as possible? Through our dialogue with you today, we will enrich our understanding of how we can meet our objective more effectively, and we hope you will gain a better understanding of what the Bank does and how it is going about it. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Before handing back to Ranvir, I’d like to thank Speakers for Schools, We Are Futures, Economy.org and Rethinking Economics – the key stakeholders that have helped us with this morning’s events and who have been working with us to develop our educational resources.

Bank of England Future Forum 2017 Opening remarks given by Mark Carney Governor, Bank of England  St. George’s Hall, Liverpool 16 November 2017  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Good afternoon. Welcome to the Bank of England’s Future Forum to everyone here in beautiful St George’s Hall, and to those viewing on our webcast. My colleagues and I are delighted to be here in Merseyside. It’s been three decades since I first visited. Back then, I discovered my favourite band the Lightning Seeds, who would later pen England’s football anthem. We’ll learn next year whether the Three Lions can end what’s become fifty years of hurt. 1987 was the Life of Riley for local football. Everton and Liverpool were top of the tables, with the Toffees beating the Reds to win the Championship – sadly their most recent of their 9 titles. How things change. It’s not pure and simple all the time. Just like footballing fortunes, economic conditions in Liverpool have waxed and waned. The de-industrialisation of the 1970s and 80s affected the region particularly badly, with unemployment ultimately rising to above 20%. With the 1990s came revival and regeneration, with particular emphasis on the city’s rich cultural and economic history – a heritage rightly celebrated when city centre riverfront was designated a World Heritage Site in 2004 and when Liverpool became European Capital for Culture in 2008.
The Great Stability appeared to be a permanent break from earlier periods – periods when monetary policy exhibited more unpredictable behaviour and left the economy to the north-east of the Taylor frontier (Chart 2). And in one important sense it was – the dark days of double-digit inflation were consigned to the past. 1  The inflation measure used is the quarterly rate of increase of the GDP deflator, defined as the ratio of nominal GDP to real GDP. The output gap is estimated as the difference between the log of real GDP and the trend path of log GDP, derived using the HP-filter. Source: ONS and Bank of England calculations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  But the Great Stability was not representative of a new normal. The variance of the output gap – though not inflation – has been much higher over the past five years as the financial crisis generated a deep recession (Chart 3). So what have we learned? The banking and broader economic crisis has demonstrated that macroeconomic policy can face an additional trade-off between ensuring the soundness of the financial system in the medium term, and keeping output in line with potential output and inflation on target in the near term. Such a trade-off arises because financial vulnerabilities can build even while output is growing steadily and inflation is low and stable. Let me give three examples of the sort of underlying mechanisms at play.

The MPC remains committed to achieving its 2% inflation target but subject to that, and to continuing financial stability, Bank Rate will not be raised until we have seen unemployment fall to at least 7% so we can explore just how much spare capacity there is in the economy. Meanwhile the Funding for Lending Scheme continues to support the supply of credit in the UK and has become more focussed on encouraging lending to SMEs. The outlook – as always – remains very uncertain. But it is certainly a brighter picture than it was a year ago, and with policy set to be supportive, there are good reasons for expecting that improvement to continue. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In a similar vein, the sharp deterioration of the fiscal positions of many governments has also led to a re-assessment of sovereign risks. About 10 years ago, investors were concerned that the strong budget surplus of the US Federal Government might lead to a severe reduction in the supply of US Treasuries. Today, bond vigilantes are focusing attention on not just the short term fiscal health of governments, but on the impact of demographic changes, large entitlement benefits and unfunded pension liabilities on the longer-term fiscal health of these governments. 7. My third observation is the speed of structural changes in emerging economies and transformation in the patterns of global trade and investment. As these are superimposed on cyclical changes, it is often difficult to disentangle the two. Emerging markets, especially Asia, have weathered the crisis relatively well, and recovered quickly. This year, the IMF expects emerging Asia to grow by nearly 7%, almost double the rate forecast for the global economy as a whole. Many analysts expect the differential in growth rate to persist in the coming decade. The global economy went through stagflation in the 1970s, disinflation in the 1980s, and a roaring decade in the 1990s. In 2000s, we had the dotcom bubble, and a severe financial crisis. How the coming decade will turn out, especially for emerging economies, will change many of the risks and return assumptions on a wide range of asset classes. Dealing with the implications 8.

Several years ago, most major investors were investing in Asia but based thousands of miles away. Today, many investors are realising that a ground presence in this time zone is necessary. The rapid structural changes of economies in Asia, the differences in the stages of economic development, in political systems, regulatory regimes and corporate governance standards mean that investors must not only understand the differences within Asia, but they have to be able to respond to swift changes in outlook, and to take into account ongoing structural changes in their assessments. In short, the ability to distinguish noise from trend is essential. Having the right risk mindset 14. Apart from responding to policy reforms and initiatives, investors and financial institutions will do well to continuously rethink and challenge the fundamental tenets of their investment and risk management tools and methodologies. To do so, it is imperative for investors to have the right risk mindset. 15. We should put once-neglected risks, such as counterparty credit risk, model risk, liquidity risk and technology risks, at the forefront of risk considerations. We have to be  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  mindful that falling back on historical experience may not necessarily provide the guidance especially when developments are unprecedented. In this regard, boards of financial institutions play a vital role in driving the level of risk consciousness in their institutions and exercising effective risk management oversight.
Chile)  2.4 0.9 -0.1 7.3 7.3 4.0 1.0  2.5 1.5 1.0 6.9 7.5 4.2 0.2  2.4 1.5 1.0 6.7 7.5 3.7 -0.1  2.4 1.5 0.6 6.9 7.5 3.4 -0.6  2.9 2.0 1.4 6.5 7.8 4.5 1.8  2.8 1.9 1.4 6.4 7.8 4.0 1.0  2.6 1.7 1.2 6.4 7.8 3.7 0.4  2.8 1.9 0.5 6.1 7.5 4.2 1.4  2.8 1.8 0.5 6.1 7.5 4.0 1.5  LME copper price $ Oil price (Brent y WTI avg) $  311 96  280 60  255 52  (levels) 249 51  290 67  245 53  220 44  250 58  230 50  Terms of trade  -1.4  1.3  -3.0  -1.0  -3.8  -0.4  1.7  (annual change, percent) -4.2  -0.2  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, based on a sample of investment banks, Bloomberg, Consensus Forecasts, the IMF and statistics bureaus of respective countries.

Caleb M Fundanga: Winning with leasing Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the “Winning with Leasing” seminar, Lusaka, 21-23 February 2007. *  *  *  • Mr Chairman • Chief Executives and representatives of Banks and Leasing Companies • Representatives of businesses organizations; • Distinguished ladies and gentlemen Let me first express my sincere gratitude for being invited to officiate at this important regional Leasing Seminar. It is my hope that this interaction will give us a better understanding and appreciation of the important contributions that the Leasing sector has made and continues to make to the economic growth of this country. As the title of the seminar “Winning with Leasing” suggests, it is only by winning in all our efforts that we will provide meaningful contributions to the development of this country. Mr Chairman, before I talk about your role in the growth of the economy, allow me to first give a brief account of the macroeconomic developments in Zambia in the recent past. I know that many of you have been following the economic developments in the country. The economy has performed relatively well in recent years, with positive real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and inflation as well as interest rates coming down. During the period 2001-2005, growth in real GDP averaged around 5% per annum. More recently, in 2006, it is estimated that the economy grew by close to 6%, marking the eighth consecutive year of positive real growth in output.
AMSE | Aix-Marseille School of Economics Marseille, 11 December 2018  Speech by Denis Beau First Deputy Governor  “Trends in financial intermediation and implications for the regulation and supervision of the European financial sector”  1/9  Ladies and Gentlemen, dear students, It’s a pleasure to be at the Aix-Marseille School of Economics today to discuss the trends affecting a key channel of the financing of the real economy: financial intermediation. This topic is well chosen the year of the tenth anniversary of both Lehman bankruptcy and Nakamoto’s paper underlying the Bitcoin. This is not just a coincidence. For crypto-assets’ proponents, the “old world” of bank-centric financial intermediation failed in 2008 and had to be replaced by disintermediated peer-to-peer systems like Bitcoin. Where do we stand now? Central bankers, regulators and supervisors have worked to strengthen the traditional bank centric model of intermediation, and the highly intensive finalisation of Basel III has concluded ten years of regulatory efforts in that field. Banks are stronger and more resilient than before 2008. At the same time, quite ironically, the Bitcoin itself has generated the biggest bubble ever, which is now bursting. So, in 2018, are there new developments in financial intermediation? Yes, indeed. A number of factors contribute to push the European bank-centric model towards a more diversified, unbundled financial intermediation model. Hence, I will focus the first part of my presentation on those drivers and their impact on financial intermediation (I).

Prior to the most recent informal meeting of the finance ministers and central bank governors in the EU, which took place in Oviedo in Spain, a working group had studied the conditions for speeding up financial integration. This group made a review of the important welfare functions of the financial system and referred to the profits that an efficient financial sector can generate. They also illustrated some of the obstacles that remain within  3  the EU and which I have just mentioned. On the basis of its analysis, the group drew conclusions on what measures from the public sector could contribute to realising the political ambitions within the EU. The finance ministers and central bank governors of the EU member states endorsed the group’s conclusions. They thus emphasise once again that the 42 measures in the financial services action plan must indeed be implemented in the member states no later than 2005, in a way that opens up markets but does not create new obstacles to integration. Public supervision of financial activities needs to become more uniform within the EU, to enable operators with financial activities in several countries to be covered by similar conditions and to facilitate co-operation between the national supervisory authorities. Competition within the financial sector should be intensified, and in particular different financial operators should be afforded equal access to clearing and settlement systems. Furthermore, existing elements of tax discrimination should be identified and removed.
In addition, cross-country debt holdings and linkages between financial institutions led to contagion and the spread of systemic risk. Moving on to the macroeconomic dimension, it can be observed that in various countries, governments with large fiscal imbalances have now resorted to the narrowing of such imbalances, through the application of inevitable fiscal consolidation measures. These corrections have often met strong social dissatisfaction and political resistance. And yet, the budgetary restraint has not always been viewed as adequate from the point of view of the financial markets that seem to have limited patience for the measures to have a discernible impact on fiscal imbalances. For many governments, bond spreads remain wide. This fiscal restraint has also slowed down economic growth and this in turn has aggravated the budgetary deficit. Chart 5 shows the deficit as per cent of GDP for the euro area as a whole, along with the corresponding cyclically adjusted ratio. The light blue line in the chart shows where the deficit would have been without the economic 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  slowdown that was caused in part by fiscal consolidation. The gap between the two lines illustrates the inevitable contribution of the economic slowdown to the deficit ratio. Still, the relatively small size of this gap post 2009 indicates that there is a strong structural element in the fiscal deficit. This explains why structural adjustments are so necessary. In response, the ECB has taken policy rates lower than any time during its history (as can be seen in Chart 6).

Although the level of activity on the money market remains persistently low, they continue to be available to the market as a basis for interest rate transactions in Swiss francs. However, the Libor retains its position as the most important interest rate benchmark in the money and capital markets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
28  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  28  Chart 9: Mean and median UK-listed firms’ mark-ups Mark-up (e.g.

I must therefore, commend APEC for this initiative in bringing together bank supervisors across countries within the Asia and the Pacific region to learn and to share views and wisdom on this very important topic. It is my hope that all of you would take this opportunity to learn as much as possible from our highly experienced and knowledgeable speakers as well as from one another on the key issues relating to credit risks, but most importantly to reinforce supervision standards in order to enhance financial stability under your jurisdiction. Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to declare open the APEC Financial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Program on Credit Risk Analysis. I wish you every success and a pleasant stay in Bangkok. Thank you. BIS Review 50/2002  1
The ECB has only one instrument at its disposal – short-term official interest rates - and can therefore only aim at one objective. This has been defined by the Governing Council as “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%”. The objective of price stability “is to be maintained over the medium term”, emphasising that monetary policy needs to be forward-looking. But this definition also stresses the fact that the focus of the ECB is on price developments “in the euro area”. In reaching its decisions on monetary policy, the Governing Council is concerned with economic conditions in the euro area as a whole, rather than specific regional or national developments. It is sometimes said that while the single monetary policy may be “right” for the euro area as a whole, it is “wrong” for many individual countries within the area. I disagree with this view. First, it overlooks the fact that within a single currency area adjustment can occur via prices and wages. Second, it infers a very narrow perspective on the costs and benefits of a single monetary policy, in isolation from the broader arguments. These broader considerations can be assessed in my view, as being very clearly positive in the medium to long term for growth as well as employment. Nevertheless, an analysis of the causes of and policy responses to the differences across countries is useful.

Analysis of data for price developments in various US cities over the past suggests not only that significant inflation differences occur within a monetary union, but also that they are at least as great as those currently prevailing between euro area countries. Thus, recent divergences in the euro area are by no means unusual. A further feature of the US data is that the observed divergences in inflation rates among these cities, although persistent, are not permanent. There is a tendency for price levels in individual cities to converge back towards their initial levels relative to the national average. It can be assumed that similar adjustment processes would also operate in the euro area. The role of other economic policies Differences in economic developments between countries within the euro area do not, therefore, always warrant an economic policy response. Action may, however, be necessary. For instance, when developments diverging from those in other countries threaten to trigger painful adjustment processes in the form of increasing unemployment. This can be avoided. If action is required it must be taken through other, national economic policies, in particular wage developments and fiscal policy. As said before, “Frankfurt” has no role to play in this area. As regards labour and product market developments, it is important, also for this reason, to reduce as far as possible existing rigidities, so as to allow wages and prices to adjust.