samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A key challenge confronting macroeconomic policy in Thailand is to safeguard the pace of recovery while maintaining macroeconomic stability and financial discipline, and at the same time continuing with the essential reforms. Past records Before moving on to discuss the challenges facing Thai monetary policy, I would like to review some of the notable progress of the last few years. There have been gains that should further be expanded. Macroeconomic and financial stability has been restored. Inflation remains low and stable. Thailand’s international reserve position is healthy. Surpluses in the external current account of these few years have been matched almost entirely by falls in external debt, especially short-term debt. Such reversed flows have been instrumental in avoiding a real currency appreciation and loss of competitiveness. BIS Review 70/2001  1  The surplus on the external current account is expected to continue this year, although at a somewhat lower level. This would allow the debt stock to fall further as scheduled repayments are made. About 50 percent of the existing non-bank private debt stock represents debt contracted after the crisis, including some rollovers which were done under new contract. This means that private sector in Thailand currently has no difficulties in gaining access to the international financial markets. Reflecting this, the spreads of Thai Government bond yields over US Treasuries have narrowed while Thailand’s sovereignty credit ratings remain stable. The financial system has now stabilized, but much work still lies ahead.

Further innovations are needed if the sector is to come to terms with the new business models that Andrew Bailey and others have mentioned today. For example, innovations in the way banks are organised that are consistent with orderly resolutions. Separately, and as noted in a number of panels today, asset managers also need to innovate to adapt to the new realities of market liquidity. The increase in the scale of the asset management sector since the crisis has been notable, as has been the emergence of investment funds that offer daily liquidity while investing in securities that only appear liquid. The Bank, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Financial Stability Board are keenly aware of these risks, and we are working to resolve them in an orderly manner. The area of market liquidity is one place where there may be duplicative regulations and scope for adjustment. Market participants should rest assured we have made adjustments in the past where we have gotten things wrong. We adjusted the liquidity coverage ratio. President Draghi noted the joint work between the Bank and the European Central Bank to change securitisation – an example of fixing something we had not gotten exactly right. We will continue to adjust our market operations. Let me move towards the conclusion of my conclusion. The point about reform and review being a continual effort came through in spades. David Kynaston noted that there have been four big bursts of reform in the last 150 years.
Specifically, France has recently lengthened the period  BIS Review 51/2009  3  for calculating the pension entitlement from 10 to 25 years, while Austria has extended it from 15 to 40 years and a significant number of countries (Finland, Poland, Portugal and Sweden) have extended it to cover the entire working life. This reform would be in line with the recommendations of the Toledo Pact and would increase the system’s proportionality, i.e. the relationship between pensions received and contributions made. Connected to this issue, there would be a possibility in Spain of furthering the reforms in recent years aimed at bringing the different Social Security schemes onto a more equal footing, so as to ensure that the contributions made under the different schemes are similar. Thirdly, some countries have lowered the income replacement rate, defined as the net pension divided by net income prior to retirement, by reducing the percentage of the regulatory base received after having contributed for the minimum period (currently set at 50%), by extending this minimum period or by reducing the rates with which this initial percentage increases for each additional year of contributions. A more novel alternative has involved linking pensions to life expectancy. Insofar as part of the problem arises as a result of the rise in life expectancy, adjusting pension amounts more or less automatically to these increases would be conducive to the sustainability of the system. Currently, this type of measure has been proposed or applied, to differing degrees, in almost half the OECD countries.

On the one hand, this appreciation put Switzerland’s price competitiveness under severe pressure in the short term, and I’m sure I don’t need to go into detail on the practical repercussions for individual companies in a forum such as this. The impact is still being felt at many of your organisations, although Swiss firms have once again proved impressively flexible and resilient. On the other hand, the decision last January was absolutely necessary, given that the euro lost considerable ground against all major currencies as a result of the changed international environment. Waiting any longer would have put the minimum exchange rate under permanent pressure. The minimum exchange rate had become unsustainable. The costs associated with continuing such a policy would thus no longer have been justified. Moreover, had we discontinued the minimum exchange rate at a later date, the impact on the Swiss economy would have been even greater. I am therefore convinced that the SNB’s decision came at the right time. Without this difficult step, we would have compromised our ability to fulfil our mandate of ensuring price stability in the medium and long term. It is precisely by fulfilling this mandate that the SNB contributes indirectly to Swiss competitiveness in the long term. In my remarks today, I will first go into more detail about this contribution. I will then discuss the difference between the short and long-term effects of a strong currency on competitiveness. Finally, I will examine the role of the Swiss franc exchange rate in our monetary policy deliberations.
Our challenge is to embed processes that will be relevant for crises into our everyday interactions: co-ordination is likely to be much easier amongst colleagues who are already familiar with each other and with each other’s views and approach, than with someone who is simply a name on a contact list. This is one positive feature of discussing these issues, just as some of the value of MoUs lies in the process of negotiation and the relationships that fosters. Second: information-sharing in a crisis. Interest groups would be a good forum to discuss in advance what information it might be appropriate to share on specific firms, and to ensure that it would in practice be readily available. And in doing so, we will better understand the information and therefore be able to assess it more quickly and more confidently in-crisis. Third: in-crisis systemic impact assessment. A key first step in deciding how to handle a crisis is in understanding the likely cost of not intervening in it – the likely systemic impact of it. The impact of a particular problem or failure of a particular firm will of course depend on the characteristics of that specific problem – and importantly on the resilience of the financial system, and the interlinkages amongst different elements of it at the time. However, there are common channels through which shocks propagate. And some of those channels will be more relevant for particular firms than others.

Nevertheless, crises create opportunities for fixing policies and addressing structural issues. Policy makers have an opportunity to enact all the necessary reforms in order to lay the foundations of a more stable and prosperous future in the presence of today's overlapping crises. 5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Admittedly, we are seeing a sharp rise in the doubtful assets ratio; however, this is not linked to this type of complex product, rather it is linked to developments in the real economy and therefore what may be called a classic banking cycle problem. Accordingly, on the left-hand side of the balance sheet there is still a lot right in Spain. BIS Review 133/2008  5  Spanish banks’ assets, even taking into account the rise in doubtful assets, are largely of good quality. The fact that Spanish banks’ assets are mostly high-quality and that they have a liabilities structure in line with the activity they finance, in terms of maturities and the degree of permanence, is related to their business model. In contrast to the originate-to-distribute model, the activity of Spanish banks is based mainly on attracting savings to lend to businesses and households and, in the process, maintaining close and lasting links with their customers. This business model has normally been known as "traditional" banking, and many analysts prior to the summer of 2007 equated the concept of traditional with “antiquated”. True, just as the originate-to-distribute model has limitations, which have been laid bare, so too does traditional banking, insofar as it may indeed be antiquated in its management strategies and risk and cost control procedures.

perform an assessment based on the information available to the decision makers, or what can be called an assessment ex ante. The question that should then be answered is whether the analysis and the interest rate decision were reasonable given the information and the forecasts available at the time. Did the Riksbank, for example, arrive at a reasonable balance between stabilising inflation and stabilising resource utilisation? An assessment based on the information available to the decision maker also has the great advantage that it can be conducted in real time immediately after the publication of the monetary policy decision and the information and analysis on which the decision is based. One does not thus need to wait for a couple years to see what the outcomes for inflation and the real economy will be. The decisions of the Riksbank can therefore be assessed and debated on an ongoing basis. An important part of the assessment of a flexible inflation targeting policy is to assess how credible the inflation target is, measured in terms of the extent to which various economic agents’ inflation expectations correspond to the inflation target. If inflation expectations are stable close to the inflation target then the target is credible and it will therefore be easier for the Riksbank to stabilise both inflation and resource utilisation. As I have already said, it takes time for monetary policy to have an impact on inflation and the real economy. Monetary policy is therefore governed by forecasts.
It is from this perspective that an incentive package is being considered by the Bank to subsidize the costs related to minimum professional qualifications for FAs. We hope that it will entice more agents to consider upgrading themselves to become successful FAs. Growing demand for independent financial advisory services As our economy continues its track towards high income nation status, and as our society becomes more affluent and discerning, we envisage an increasing demand and preference for high-quality, independent and personalized advisory services among financially-savvy consumers. Apart from rising levels of disposable income and financial sophistication, Malaysians are expected to live longer now than ever before. It is projected that by 2040, 17% of the Malaysian population will live beyond the age of 60 years old compared to about only 8% of the total population in 2010. This creates the need for more effective long-term financial planning on the part of consumers to ensure they have sufficient funds to see them through their golden years. In this respect, as part of the Government’s initiative to encourage savings among Malaysians to better prepare for their retirement, the Government had announced a tax relief of RM3,000 for individuals who have bought an annuity plan for the next 10 years commencing in 2012. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  An increased competition within the financial sector and evolving demographic structures has also led to the introduction of new and more complex financial products offered by financial service providers.

6 The US Bankruptcy Code refers to Title 11 of the United States Code, as amended. 7 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 6 (2010) (“The Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority, under section  13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, in the past allowed the Federal Reserve to make loans to individual entities like AIG. While such lending played an important role in ending the recent financial crisis, it also created potential moral hazard.”). 8 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203 (2010). 9 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5365 & 5383. 10 See 12 U.S.C. § 5384; H.R. Rep. No. 111–517, at 865 (2010) (Conf. Rep.) (“When the authority is used, the FDIC  is appointed receiver and must liquidate the company in a manner that mitigates significant risks to financial stability and minimizes moral hazard.”). 11 See Joint Report to Congress: Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, 82 Fed. Reg. 15900 (March 30, 2017). 12 See Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant to the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction  Act of 1996, 82 Fed. Reg. 49984 (proposed Oct. 27, 2017). 13 See H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, June 8, 2017); H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. (as passed by House,  Apr, 5, 2017). 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
For example, we will not entertain attempts at fishing for banking information and other spurious requests. As with all major international financial centres, customer confidentiality is a cardinal principle of our financial sector. It will only be lifted by a Singapore court order and only if the safeguards set out in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act are met. These provisions do not shield criminal activities. Singapore will continue to participate actively in the fight against crime, money laundering and terrorist financing. Going forward, we will work to deepen the sharing of knowledge and practices with jurisdictions that approach us for assistance through training programmes. We believe that we can make contributions on economic and financial issues, particularly those pertaining to the region. For instance, our unique monetary policy framework has proved to be sufficiently robust and flexible to cope with shocks in the external environment. We are keen to share our experience through research papers, policy dialogues and seminars with developing countries which are experimenting with intermediate exchange rate regimes. IV. Conclusion  Let me conclude. I have outlined our priorities for the next five years. Our emphasis is on action. We must translate the seminar findings and conclusions into a set of practical initiatives and implement them. We must be prepared to take calculated risks and adapt as we go along. This will require not just hard work and dedication, but also a spirit of openness, inquiry and enterprise. I am confident that together we can achieve our goals for MAS and Singapore.

Some firms have established their regional headquarters here. These companies have helped to broaden the range of products here beyond plain vanilla equity mutual fund products and develop more sophisticated skills and expertise. MAS has decided to place out an additional $ billion to external fund managers. The funds will be invested in Asian equity and fixed income markets. This recognises the investment opportunities in Asia and will also help to anchor and grow specialist skills in Asian investments in our financial centre. This will be on top of what GIC recently announced it will place out for external management. Liquidity and depth in Singapore’s treasury and capital markets is another critical success factor for our financial centre. Singapore can serve global issuers and investors as the gateway to ASEAN markets. We want to promote the ASEAN region as an asset class for capital markets investments. We will work with key players, including the Singapore Exchange (SGX), to forge regional exchange linkages, integrate market infrastructure, harmonise regulatory frameworks and promote regional electronic bond trading. SGX already has a link with the Australian Stock Exchange and is in discussions with Bursa Malaysia and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The ASEAN Finance Ministers agreed at their meeting in April to explore alliances and linkages among ASEAN securities markets to facilitate access to these less mature markets by international investors. A Linkages Task Force, chaired by MAS, will make its recommendations next year.
Thus, in order to satisfy the banking sector’s demand for liquidity buffers on particular days and for fulfilling reserve requirements earlier in the maintenance period, the ECB has (1) occasionally provided liquidity to the market through exceptional operations, 2 and (2) it has changed the time patterns of liquidity provision within the reserve maintenance period. In addition, from the start of the market turmoil the ECB has intensified its communications with market participants so as to indicate its alertness and readiness to act in order to reduce the volatility of the very short term interest rates around the target rate and to contribute to the smooth functioning of the money market. For instance, last Friday we published a press release pointing out that the ECB’s Governing Council has noted that market participants are concerned about conditions in the euro money market in connection with the upcoming end of the year; and announcing the decision to lengthen the maturity of the main refinancing operation settling on 19 December 2007 to two weeks so that it matures on 4 January 2008. In this refinancing operation, we will aim to satisfy the banking sector’s liquidity needs for the entire two week period, covering both the Christmas holidays and the end of the year. This example provides a good illustration of the importance that the ECB has attached in recent months to intervene in money markets through a combination of flexible liquidity management operations and regular communications.

Labour market policies must seek to facilitate the shift of workers from domestically-oriented sectors facing weak demand to export-oriented sectors, and from depressed regions to resurgent ones. And wages must become more flexible, so that firms can ride out cyclical downturns without losing competitiveness. 47. Next, tax reform. The debate needs to shift from the rate of taxation to the structure of the tax system. The US could do with a broader tax base, simpler tax codes, and less exemptions. In Europe, similarly, there are opportunities to increase the efficiency of the VAT system including in broadening its base. 48. Lastly, pension reform. Government spending in many advanced economies needs to be overhauled in the face of impending demographic challenges. Effective pension reform requires a judicious combination of increases in the statutory retirement age and reductions in the generosity of benefits, with the balance varying from country to country. Emerging Asia: domestic demand, financial deepening, productivity 49. In Emerging Asia, the key structural reforms are in the areas of boosting domestic demand, deepening financial markets, and raising efficiency and productivity. 50. Boosting domestic demand is perhaps the most important medium-term imperative for Emerging Asia. Public and private sector deleveraging in the advanced economies has at least dented, if not extinguished, the export-powered growth model that has been largely responsible for the “Asian Miracle”. Reforms are needed to stimulate private consumption in some Asian economies, and investment in others. 51. In China, the issue is consumption, not investment.
Lars Heikensten: The Riksbank and the euro Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the SEB's EMU seminar, Cirkus, Stockholm, 4 September 2003. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking the organisers for inviting me to speak at this event. The past few months have certainly been hectic for those of us working at the Riksbank. We are undoubtedly in the eye of the storm and feature almost daily in the EMU debate. Moreover, we are affected more directly and tangibly by the result of the referendum than most people. I can take my own diary as an example; if the result is a “yes” vote, I will be in Frankfurt for a day or two at least every other week, while if the result is a “no”, the visits will be reduced to a few hours four times a year. Given this, the temptation to jump into the debate head first has been strong at times. However, we have decided not to participate in any campaigns. The Riksbank as an institution took a stand in favour of EMU membership in the form of submission responses in both 1994 and 1997. However, the Executive Board has now decided to refrain from taking a stand in connection with the referendum. The personal views of the various members of the Executive Board have nevertheless been known for some time. Five of us are in favour, one against.

Starting from the fact that the role of central banking in the development of the economy is best seen in the development of the institution itself, please allow me to draw your attention to some of the more significant moments of that development. At the very beginning, the Bank was conducting only a few central banking operations: distribution od cash, payment operations, control, i.e. in today's language, supervision of banks. Its first manager was Dr. Todor Mirovski, at that time manager of Makedonska Stopanska Banka, while from the beginning of 1947 until June 1950, Aleksandar Bogoev. From a functional viewpoint, the central banking in the past 60 years may be conditionally divided into three periods. We could call the first period pre-institutional (1946-1970), the second was a period of formal institutionalization (1971-1991), and the third was a period of monetary independence (1992-2006). We denote the first period as pre-institutional since there was an institution established only on a federal level - central bank. And, as you are well aware, the main feature of post-war life in all spheres, including banking as a whole, was centralization. Consequently, all communal banks immediately  BIS Review 100/2006  1  became branches of the National Bank of, at that time, Federal Yugoslavia - Head Office of NRM, engaged in attracting funds, extending credits in the amount of the funds attracted, performing limited activities in the international payment operations, performing vault activities for executing the budgets of the local units, etc. The Head Office, i.e.