samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We need a new regulatory structure that provides for comprehensive and consistent oversight of all elements of the financial system. This includes effective consolidated oversight of all our largest and interconnected financial institutions and oversight of payment and settlement systems. We must make sure that the people doing the regulation have the power and expertise to ferret out and bring to heel regulatory evasion as it occurs to prevent abuse and excess from building up in the financial system. In the end, the gaps, not the overlaps, have been the main shortcoming of our existing regulatory framework. A second fundamental point is that regulatory reform has to ensure that the financial system will be robust and resilient even when it comes under stress so that it will not fail in its critical role in supporting economic activity. No economy can prosper without a well-functioning financial system – one that efficiently channels savings to the businesses that can make the most productive use of those savings, and to consumers that need credit to buy a home and support a family. The fact that our financial system isn’t functioning well right now is part and parcel of our current economic difficulties. This critical link between the “real” and the “financial” is why we care so much about the systemic risks inherent in banking and finance. One critical element of systemic risk is what is known as the “too big to fail” problem.

As banking supervisors, we can leverage off the auditors’ significant experience in testing for the adequacy of an institution’s internal control environment, as we begin to implement this risk-based framework. Second, external audits help to ensure the accuracy of financial statements that are provided to the public, which in turn helps to promote market discipline and foster a safe and sound banking system. Ladies and Gentlemen, Now, I would like to present our experience with external auditors from both the regulatory and supervisory perspectives. First on the regulatory side, the value of this relationship was initially recognized in 1962 when the Commercial Banking Act provides the Bank of Thailand with the authority to accept or oppose the appointment of a bank’s external auditor. Based on this act, the framework for external auditor qualifications and reporting requirements to the Bank of Thailand was issued in 2000, after extensive consultations with the Institute of Certifed Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other relevant regulatory bodies. Let me provide some specifics on auditor qualifications with respect to our law. First, qualifed auditors must never have had their auditing license revoked or suspended by the auditing licensing body. Second, auditors that are not authorized to audit entities under the supervision of the SEC or other government agencies are not permitted to audit banks. Third, the Bank of Thailand prohibits any external auditors to consecutively serve a bank for more than fve years.
Why has the outlook deteriorated so quickly? The banking crisis dealt a severe blow to the availability of credit. Growth in secured lending to households fell to an annualised rate of 1.9% in the three months to August, its lowest level in more than a decade. The Bank of England’s survey of credit conditions suggests that the terms on which banks provide credit to companies have tightened even further. And, on some estimates, the supply of finance to the UK corporate sector has ground to a halt. This credit shock has come on top of a fall in real disposable incomes resulting from the rise in energy and food prices earlier in the year. So, taken together, the combination of a squeeze on real take-home pay and a decline in the availability of credit poses the risk of a sharp and prolonged slowdown in domestic demand. Indeed, it now seems likely that the UK economy is entering a recession. At the same time, consumer price inflation, our target measure, has risen from around the 2% target at the beginning of the year to a worryingly high rate of 5.2% in September. Oil and other commodity and food prices have all been rising very rapidly. In those circumstances, it was sensible to allow those price changes to be absorbed by movements in consumer prices. The alternative would have been an even sharper slowdown in the economy. Central banks in other countries also find themselves in a similar position.

Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox and the effective lower bound Welcome address by Mr Philip R Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the ECB Conference on Monetary Policy “bridging science and practice”, Frankfurt am Main, 11 October 2021. * * * It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2021 edition of the annual ECB Conference on Monetary Policy. As captured in the title of this year’s event, this conference series serves a vital role in bridging the science and practice of monetary policy. In particular, it is essential for the ECB to incorporate in our analytical framework the theoretical and empirical insights generated by the global academic community, and the conference format (albeit in webinar mode again this year) is very effective in providing us with a platform to discuss the latest developments. The breadth of academic research (in terms of both topics and research techniques) that is relevant for monetary policy is quite wide and this is reflected in the composition of the conference programme. The agenda includes research that exploits financial market data to examine the transmission of monetary policy, studies the impact of the pandemic on firms and banks using entity-level datasets, analyses the interactions between monetary policy and financial stability in a full-scale macroeconomic model, and explores the impact of monetary and fiscal policies on the formation of household expectations.
In democracies, that is rightly debated thoroughly to ensure that it has  3  This serious faultline in the international financial system was highlighted to the international community by a 2001 G10/Financial Stability Forum report explaining that officials did not then have the tools to manage the orderly wind down of a large and complex global financial institution (LCFI). 4  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (2012) require ‘the operational independence, accountability and governance of the supervisor [to be] prescribed in legislation and publicly disclosed, [with] no government or industry interference that compromises the operational independence of the supervisor.’  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  legitimacy and is subject to the right checks and balances.5 The key process is, of course, the vetting and passage of legislation. That process is well underway in the key jurisdictions. Establishing the statutory regime In November 2011, the G20 leaders endorsed the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes for Resolution as an ‘international standard’. That term of art means that all the jurisdictions of the G20 are committed to incorporate the Key Attributes (KAs) regime into their domestic legislation. The US has largely done so. The EU is very close to doing so, through its Recovery and Resolution Directive. Switzerland has largely done so. Between them, this will account for the home countries of 24 of the 28 globally systemic banks listed by the FSB and the Basel Supervisors Committee last year.

Following the creditor hierarchy that would apply in liquidation, the various layers – equity, subordinated debt, senior unsecured debt etc – are written down until the losses are covered. And then the last surviving layer(s) of debt are partially converted into equity to recapitalise the continuing parts of the business, which is thus under new ownership. This has given rise to nothing short of a revolution in thinking about possible resolution strategies for SIFIs. Resolution strategies Last November the FSB issued draft Guidance on resolution strategies. Big picture, there are two basic strategies – Single Point of Entry and Multiple Point of Entry. Single-Point-of-Entry Resolution Single-point-of-entry resolution involves working downwards from the top company (Topco) in the group in an exercise that resolves the group as a whole, wherever its problems began. Think of it this way. Losses in subsidiaries are first transferred within the group to the Topco. If Topco is bankrupt as a result, the group needs resolving. Bailin can then be applied to the Topco’s capital structure: writing off the equity and, most likely, subordinated debt; and writing down and partially converting into equity the senior (bonded) debt issued by Topco. Those bondholders become the new owners. If Topco is a pure holding company – its assets comprising only investments in its subsidiaries – a number of advantages follow. The creditors of the operating banks and dealers are left intact; what might be called the group’s ‘operating liabilities’ are protected relative to the ‘capital liabilities’ of Topco.
Paul Tucker: Shadow banking, financing markets and financial stability Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at a Bernie Gerald Cantor (BGC) Partners Seminar, London, 21 January 2010. *  *  *  Many thanks for input to Andrew Bailey, Michael Cross, Colin Miles, Victoria Saporta, and for earlier conversations with David Rule (now FSA) and Bill Winters. For background work to Michael Grady and for secretarial support to Sandra Bannister and Cheryl Feeney. This should be the crucial year in establishing a framework for a more resilient global financial system. Much of the authorities’ work is about how to do better in well-established areas of policy: bank capital requirements, liquidity requirements, supervision, and so on. But new areas are being debated, or revisited, too. Those debates are more profound. They include whether we can develop macroprudential instruments and regimes for “taking away the punchbowl” from future financial-system parties before they get out of control. Whether we can develop regimes for the resolution of banks and other key financial firms that can reinject market discipline into the financial system, while at the same time ensuring continuity of essential financial services to the economy in the event of severe distress at large, complex, cross-border firms. And whether the structure of the financial system needs to be constrained by the authorities. This evening I am going to focus on one part of the “structure” debate: shadow banking.

Roles of the Bank of Thailand in developing the bond market A High-level Domestic Bond Market Development Steering Committee was set up by the Government in January this year. The committee is chaired by the Finance Minister and comprises high-level representatives from both the public and private sectors, including the Bank of Thailand. The aim of the committee is to promote the development of the domestic bond market in five key areas, namely, (1) the primary market (2) the secondary market (3) taxes (4) market infrastructure and (5) market information. As for the Bank of Thailand, we have been tasked with the responsibility to develop an active secondary market. To meet this challenge, the Bank of Thailand has mapped out a multi-year strategy from which our work plan for bond market development this year will focus on six areas. First is the development of the private repo market. The repo market will provide bond market participants with the tools to hedge their bond position, as well as to manage liquidity more effectively. The private repo market will also provide an important link between the money market and the bond market, meaning that liquidity in the secondary bond market can be substantially improved once a well-functioning private repo market is in place. Second, the Bank of Thailand will coordinate with the Thailand Securities Depository to set up a "Bond Lending and Collateral Management Unit" to activate the bond lending business. This again will help facilitate the private repo market and enhance overall market liquidity.
An international economic crisis often heralds an inflow of domestic and foreign capital to the Swiss franc, which has acquired a reputation as a safe haven on account of its historical behaviour. In other words, in uncertain times, the franc is seen as an anchor of stability, and is therefore much in demand. The currency can thus experience a strong short-term appreciation as a result. At the same time, a weak global economy can put pressure on sales volumes for the Swiss export industry. This increases the risk that production capacities cannot be fully utilised, that unemployment will rise sharply, and that the Swiss economy as a whole will slide into crisis. If an appreciation threatens macroeconomic stability in Switzerland through these channels, this has consequences for monetary policy. When conventional instruments reach their limits, the SNB has to resort to other tools in order to fulfil its mandate (cf. chart 11). First and foremost among these are foreign exchange market interventions. Since 2009, the SNB has, as you know, used this tool in a number of ways, purchasing foreign currency amounting to nearly CHF 500 billion. Between September 2011 and January 2015, for example, the SNB used this tool to enforce a minimum exchange rate against the euro. In this regard, I feel it is important to stress that considerable risks accompany on such interventions. First, market interventions aimed at preventing an appreciation expand the SNB’s balance sheet.

When there is a fixed exchange rate target, one might even have to expect an uncontrolled expansion of the balance sheet. This is attached to a number of imponderables. 6 In addition to major financial risks, it should be noted that, as the balance sheet grows, it will become increasingly difficult to reduce excess liquidity during a subsequent normalisation of monetary policy, and to fulfil the monetary policy mandate – of ensuring price stability – sustainably. Second, it is important to bear the following in mind: pegging the franc partially or fully to another currency would mean that the SNB would have to adopt the monetary policy of the  6  4  Cf. also Danthine, J.-P. (2015): Swiss monetary policy facts ... and fiction, speech at the Swiss Finance Institute Evening Seminar, Geneva, 19 May 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  currency area concerned. However, it could no longer be guaranteed that this monetary policy would always be optimally tailored to the needs of the Swiss economy. Thus, the benefits of an active exchange rate policy need to be properly weighed against the costs for the economy as a whole. But there is no one-size-fits-all method of determining the need to intervene in the foreign exchange market, or the best way to do so. The points to consider will differ depending on the situation. Current SNB monetary policy In that regard, I would like to briefly describe the SNB’s current thinking.
We are surprised with the particular interest of universities related to the current issues and their impact on the Albanian economy, and the large number of projects, videos and drawings that pupils and high school students have presented at the Bank of Albania. Today, we will see and award some of them. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that the participation and engagement of all participants was impressive. Concluding, I would like to thank all participants and the collaborators of the Bank of Albania in its educational initiatives and programmes, particularly for the Global Money Week. We are grateful that in this week, as participants, you have become partner of the central bank, joining us in the work to face important challenges to the society. Also, we are aware that these themes, like prudential and proactive approach to the world of finances, are a precondition for a safe and prosperous future, and the ever increasing participation in such annual activities makes as optimistic for this new generation being aware and interested for acquiring a better education. The Bank of Albania, as the central institution in these fields as well, is ready and committed to collaborate with every institution aiming at bolstering the financial literacy and financial inclusion of the public. I avail this opportunity to extend may heartiest thank you for your contribution, wishing all participants success in everything they do! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Michelle Neal: Advances in digital currency experimentation Remarks by Ms Michelle Neal, Executive Vice President and Head of Markets of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Singapore FinTech Festival 2022, Singapore, 4 November 2022. ***  As prepared for delivery Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here with you at the Singapore Fintech Festival. It is exciting to be a part of this gathering of industry professionals, policy leaders, and investors to discuss key developments in the fintech industry. Digital innovation has the potential to benefit the financial system writ large by reducing transaction costs, increasing competition, and broadening access to a wider range of participants. However, harnessing the full potential of financial innovation and related technologies – especially regarding cross-border settlements and payments – will require collaboration across a range of international partners. In my remarks today I will discuss the landscape of digital assets and some of the ways that the Federal Reserve System is engaging in research and experimentation that support ongoing innovation. As always, the views I express today are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Digital Assets and the Federal Reserve We are all experiencing the incredible pace of growth and change within the digital asset domain, which encompasses a range of opportunities and risks.
A natural counterparty for the Swedish banks could be the Swedish life insurance and pension companies. These companies have long-term liabilities in kronor in the form of pension savings that they partly invest in assets abroad. At present, these companies are not active on the long-term currency swap markets to any great extent. The Swedish banks are therefore dependent on a tight circle of counterparties on the currency swap markets. A small and concentrated market means in turn that there is a considerable risk of disruptions and contagion effects. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Long-term assets and short-term funding in foreign currencies create risks Swedish banks have substantial assets in foreign currencies and also have a deposit deficit, that is they are dependent on market funding. As a large part of this market funding is short term, a liquidity risk in foreign currency also arises. The US dollar is a currency for which this risk is clear. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when the dollar market was practically closed for a while, the Riksbank needed to lend the equivalent of almost 250 billion kronor in US dollars to the banking system to prevent the liquidity risk spreading to the real economy. However, as the Riksbank cannot create liquidity in foreign currencies in the same way as it can in Swedish kronor, there are limits on the size of the liquidity risks the banks can take in foreign currencies without posing risks to financial stability.

This will be built up in good times, when credit growth is higher than normal, with the aim of creating airbags to protect the banking sector in troubled times. So far, this is the instrument on which international agreement has been reached in the field of macroprudential policy, that is a policy that comprises measures to prevent financial crises that are directed at the system as a whole. A leverage ratio requirement will also be introduced under which, irrespective of risk weights, a bank's assets may not exceed 33 times its own capital. A leverage ratio requirement represents an extra safety measure that also limits the banks’ possibilities to use internal risk models to actually keep risk weights down. Basel III also sets quantitative standards for the banks’ liquidity, a short-term (Liquidity Coverage Ratio, LCR) and a long-term (Net Stable Funding Ratio, NSFR). The short-term measure means that every bank should have sufficient liquid assets to survive for at least 30 days in a stressed scenario. The long-term measure, in principle, limits the gap between the maturity of a bank’s assets and the maturity of its liabilities. The standards stipulated in the Basel III Accord will be implemented in national legislation during the 2010s and should be implemented in their entirety by 2019, with several interim targets along the way. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Establishing better regulations on the banks’ capital and liquidity represents a major step forward.
The opportunity, primarily for banks and other financial institutions, is to find ways to leverage Zambians in the diaspora to use remittance services that will both be profitable for the banks and will also provide them and their families with greater financial access. I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 2/2010

This result was significantly influenced by the positive balance of trade, due to both higher exports and lower imports. In the services balance, reduced shipment costs and the temporary increase in imports of services stood out (figure 7). On the external front, until the beginning of March, there was an environment of higher growth and concern about inflation. On the one hand, the increase in global growth expected for this year was based on upward surprises in the performance of several important economies, such as the United States, China and the Eurozone. On the other hand, in developed world economies, core inflation indicators were high, despite the fall in total inflation. All this heightened the concerns about inflation and the need to raise interest rates by the main central banks. In this scenario, commodity prices rose and risk aversion Fell. In general, interest rates rose as a result of the higher inflation outlook (figure 8). The tone of the external scenario changed significantly in the last month, as doubts arose regarding the financial health of international banks. The problems of several banks in the United States and Europe opened a scenario of greater global uncertainty. This has generated volatility in financial markets, which reduced risk appetite and led to an appreciation of the dollar and a decrease in government bond yields, anticipating a slower pace of rate hikes by the main central banks. It is worth noting that the market anticipates a lower Fed funds rate path than the Federal Reserve itself has communicated.