samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This crisis could generally be described as a dramatic end to almost twenty years of stabilisation policy problems. The Swedish economy had been characterised by an unsustainable rise in costs, which had originated in price and wage increases that constantly came on a collision course with the fixed exchange rate. The result was repeated devaluations, modest economic growth, poor productivity growth and more or less stagnant growth in real wages. The performance was markedly weak both compared with earlier periods and in relation to other countries. During the crisis years the situation was aggravated further. Unemployment increased fourfold in the course of a few years and the central government finances deteriorated dramatically. Interest rates rose unchecked and the interest rate differential vis-à-vis Germany occasionally came to several percentage points. Favourable results Today, a little more than ten years after the crisis, the situation is completely different. The new focus of stabilisation policy – which involved crucial changes in the framework for both fiscal and monetary policy – has meant that inflation now remains relatively stable around the target of two per cent (Figure 1). The lower inflation rate has not been associated with weaker growth in output, rather the opposite. GDP growth has averaged roughly half a percentage point higher a year in the past decade than in the two previous decades, and the fluctuations in the real economy also appear to have lessened (Figure 2).

In theory, Pillar 2 requires banks to have a formal process for allocating internal capital against the wide range of risks that are not explicitly part of Pillar 1. This formal process is sometimes referred to as the Capital Allocation Assessment Process or "CAAP". However, it has to be acknowledged that very few banks currently have such a process in place, and only the largest and most sophisticated institutions have been able to devote the resources necessary to building these types of formal capital allocation systems. Consequently, as a regulator, we do not plan to require all banks to develop internal capital allocation models, at least initially. The need for such models must be commensurate with each institution's scale and sophistication. In place of requiring all AIs to develop these models, the HKMA has developed its own internal Supervisory Review Process, or "SRP". As you may know, the HKMA has for a long time set capital ratios on a bank-by-bank basis. This has been with the aim of trying to ensure that the capital ratio reflects the risk profile of an individual AI, taking into account the full range of risks to which it is potentially exposed. We intend to use the SRP to bring greater rigour into the process of setting AI-specific minimum capital ratios. In effect, the SRP is our own credit scoring system. It takes a large number of variables, each carefully chosen to reflect a different aspect of risk, and combines them to produce a single overall "score" for each AI.
Benoît Cœuré: Why the euro needs a banking union Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the conference “Bank funding – markets, instruments and implications for corporate lending and the real economy”, Frankfurt am Main, 8 October 2012. *  *  *  I would like to thank Carmelo Salleo for his contribution to the speech. I remain solely responsible for the opinions expressed herein. Introduction Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to be here with you this evening as part of this conference. I firmly believe that good research underpins policy choices and, as you know, the European Central Bank (ECB) is very committed to carefully conducted, high-quality analysis as the bedrock of its decision-making. Bank funding has been the focus of policy-makers’ concerns for the past few years, ever since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which brutally reminded us all of the systemic dimension of liquidity and funding risk. Such a cataclysmic event elicited a host of responses, ranging from central bank interventions to prevent a meltdown of the financial system to the design of new regulations to limit risk-taking by financial institutions. The shock was global – and the response has been global. However, much work still needs to be done, so I welcome opportunities such as this conference to gain a better understanding of the dynamics and determinants of bank funding and of their implications for the financial system and the real economy.

The Emergency Financial Control Board was empowered to review all fiscal decisions of local officials and demand changes to the city’s budgets. Part of the city’s tax base was dedicated to bond repayment—essentially handing it over to the city’s creditors. For 10 years, the city could not access the debt markets without support from the state. The economic pain was also very real. More than 70,000 city government workers were cut from the payrolls in 1975 and 1976. City residents faced dramatic service reductions—fire houses closed, schools and police precincts had fewer resources, and crime continued to rise for many years. It is also important to note that New York isn’t the only U.S. city that has been through a major fiscal crisis. Cleveland, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C. and, most recently, Detroit have all struggled to manage their budgets, and all ultimately reached a point when they were unable to pay their bills. As a result, these cities lost their fiscal autonomy to one degree or another. In the case of New York City, this turned out relatively well, as the short-run loss of decision-making power led to a strong economic rebound that eventually restored the city’s ability to finance its own choices. So, is New York City’s experience really all that instructive for Puerto Rico? With the advantage of hindsight, it now seems almost obvious that New York City’s fiscal crisis was only going to be a detour. The city’s economy had many fundamental strengths, so it only needed some assistance to get back on track.
It provides a powerful incentive to increasing economic efficiency - and the higher sustainable growth rate that we need to satisfy our aspirations for improving living standards - by encouraging the concentration of production on those businesses, or regions, or countries, which have, or are able to develop, a comparative advantage in particular products or services. That's not necessarily how it seems at the micro-economic level. Individual businesses and their employees, or regions, or even countries at the international level, tend to think of competition and market-driven resource allocation as a zero-sum game: if one side wins the other necessarily loses. So it's not surprising that existing producers are tempted to resist the opening of their markets to  BIS Review 53/2002  1  greater competition and look for protection where they can. But attempting to stem the tide by acquiescing in protection would be to ignore the benefits which increased competition, and more efficient and innovative production would bring to society at large, including consumers, as well as potentially more efficient producers and their prospective employees, wherever they are located. It is those benefits which make market competition a positive-sum game at the macro-economic level. I don't at all underestimate the pressures on businesses, and their employees and surrounding communities, that struggle to retain their comparative advantage in a market economy. But standing still is not an option in today's world - nor will it be going forward.

And I find increasingly as I travel around the country that local businesses and their representative organisations - including both commercial and industrial sectors and the professional services sectors - are working together, with the local academic community, and with the regional and local authorities, to identify - on the basis of their local knowledge - the particular obstacles, and the particular opportunities, they face, recognising that there is a great deal that they themselves can do through partnership - including public-private partnership - to help create a more positive supply-side environment at the regional and local level. That partnership typically embraces not only issues facing the mainstream economy but extends to direct involvement in activities designed to draw into the mainstream economy communities which for one reason or another are liable to be left on the sidelines, but which, if they are given the right opportunities, clearly can contribute to both the economic prosperity and the social cohesion of the region. And I find that positive approach here too in the West Midlands. It's very much the purpose of this conference - organised by AWM - Advantage West Midlands - alongside the IOD and the ICA. It's the purpose, too, for example, of the West Midlands Regional Finance Forum organised by AWM and bringing together the banks and accountants, representatives of the ethnic minorities and community finance organisations - including Aston Reinvestment Trust, as well as academics and the Small Business Service, with the aim of improving access to finance for business at all levels.
I have covered 250 years of labour market developments in 40 minutes. Perhaps a robot could have done it in half that time or twice as well. Perhaps “Peak Andy” has been reached. Either way, these are issues I know the TUC will want to take seriously in its words and actions over the next 150 years, as it has over the past 150 years. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  References Acemoglu, D (2008), “Introduction to modern economic growth.”, Princeton University Press. Aikman, D, Haldane, A G, and Nelson, B D, (2014) “Curbing the credit cycle.” The Economic Journal. Allen, R C (2001) “The great divergence in European wages and prices from the middle ages to the First World War”, Explorations in Economic History 38, 411–47. Allen, R (2009) “Engels’ pause: technical change, capital accumulation, and inequality in the British industrial revolution”, Explorations in Economic History 46, 418–35. Atkinson, A B, and Stiglitz, J E, (2015) “Lectures on public economics”, Princeton University Press. Autor, D H (2003) “Outsourcing at will: The contribution of unjust dismissal doctrine to the growth of employment outsourcing.” Journal of labor economics, Vol21(1), pages 1–42. Autor, D H (2015) “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol29(3): pages 3–30. Barro, R J, and Lee, J (2015) “Education Matters: Global Schooling Gains from the 19th to the 21st Century”, Oxford University Press. BIS (2014) ‘Inflation: domestic and global drivers’, BIS 84th Annual Report page 49 onwards.

Industrial revolution and “hollowing-out” Or is it? Looking more closely at past phases of rapid technological change paints a more nuanced picture. Each phase has eventually resulted in a growing tree of rising skills, wages and productivity. But they have also been associated with a “hollowing out” of this tree. Indeed, this hollowing-out has widened and deepened with each new technological wave. Economic historians tend to partition the growth timeline into three distinct phases: the first Industrial Revolution, the era of steam engines and spinning jennies, commencing in the middle of the 18th century; the second, the era of mass industrialisation, commencing in the second half of the 19th century; and the third, the era of information technology, commencing in the second half of the 20th century (Haldane (2014)). These industrial revolutions each brought about a remarkable re-shaping of the jobs landscape (Chart 17). The employment share of agriculture and other primary activities has fallen from around 50% in 1700 to around 1% today. Secondary activities, notably manufacturing, rose to 45% of employment at the end of the 19th century, before falling to around 10% today. Meanwhile, the employment share of services has roughly doubled each century since 1700, to reach around 80% today. These dramatic shifts are even more striking at an occupational level. Chart 18 plots employment in four occupations since 1870: agricultural labourers, telephonists, accountants and hairdressers (Deloitte (2015a)).
As other countries have found, the scale and scope created by a Development Bank is necessary to reach SME start-ups and scale-ups across all sectors and all regions. The best time to have put in place a UK Development Bank would have been 1929. The second best time is now. Until recently one of the great financial puzzles was that, despite waves of innovation, there was little evidence of its effects in measures of the efficiency of financial intermediation. At the macro level, the work of Thomas Phillippon suggests measures of banking efficiency in the UK and US have flat-lined.27 At the micro level, this lack of progress was well captured by the late, great Paul Volcker in 2009 when we suggested the only useful piece of financial innovation over the preceding 20 years had been the ATM. 26 27  Stamp (1931). Phillippon (2015). 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  16  Today, the winds of technological change are blowing a gale through finance, led by payments. New technological barbarians are appearing at the gates, transferring monies cheaper, faster and easier than ever. Many private sector initiatives are underway currently to develop so-called “stablecoins” – digital currencies backed by pools of safe assets.

But, for me, the case for independence is at least as strong as for monetary policy.23 If anything, decisions on withdrawing the punchbowl are harder, and even more important, during raucous credit parties. Thirty years on, the transformation in the policy-making structures and technologies for financial stability are every bit as great as those for monetary policy. An entirely new system of macro-prudential regulation is now in place, fusing together the micro and macro, the economic and the financial. Through the FPC and PRC, the Bank’s brain and hands are now synchronous. Beer and wine now mix just fine and the jumper-with-tweed-jacket combination is the height of policymaking fashion. In 2012, the Queen and Prince Philip visited the Bank. My colleague Sujit Kapadia used the opportunity to answer the Queen’s question soon after the crisis – “Why hadn’t anyone seen it coming?” Sujit set out the reform steps taken to avoid a repetition. The Royal couple took, I hope, a degree of reassurance. On the way out, the late Prince Philip turned and said: “Oh, just one last thing – don’t do it again”. I think the institutional framework now in place gives us a realistic hope of making good on his request. More than a decade on from the crisis, the financial system is a fundamentally different animal - leverage far lower, liquidity far higher.24 The UK’s largest banks’ activities are protected, additionally, by a ring-fence and systemic surcharges.
In this scenario, energy and food commodity prices are assumed to increase substantially due to severe supply disruptions associated with an intensification of the war in Ukraine, combined with other negative shocks to the European economy.5 The result would be an inflation rate of 6.9% in 2023 and 2.7% in 2024. Let me emphasise, however, that despite all the recent developments regarding gas supply through the Nord stream pipeline, one cannot assume that we are already in the downside scenario. This is because the other shocks assumed in this downside scenario have not materialised yet. Indeed, several key commodity prices – including energy prices - are currently below the ECB baseline scenario (and more so in comparison to the downside scenario), which may reflect lower than expected demand. 4  For a discussion of second round effects in the euro area, see Battistini, N. , H. Grapow, E. Hahn and M. Soudan “Wage share dynamics and second-round effects on inflation after energy price surges in the 1970s and today”, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 5/2022 5 See Box 3 of the September ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area,  2  Finally, an additional element of uncertainty is related to the synchronised tightening of monetary policy across countries and its impact on activity – including global spill-overs – and inflation.6 Framing our monetary policy response: the ECB’s monetary policy strategy As I said before, it is the ECB’s responsibility to preserve price stability in the euro area.

In order to achieve a harmonized application of legislation at European level and to support payment initiation and account information service providers, the European Banking Authority (EBA) adopted an opinion on obstacles in early June 2020. within the meaning of Art. 32 (3) of the regulatory technical standards for in-depth identification of the customer and common and secure standards of communication1. The opinion highlights a number of technical or organizational obstacles that payment service providers, which maintain accounts, pose to the new services and which should be removed. Examples of such obstacles include the unavailability of all procedures for performing in-depth identification of the customer when using the new services, requiring manual entry of the IBAN on the payment account from which payment is initiated or requesting account information, repeated in-depth establishing the identity when initiating payment, the need to provide prior consent to the client to use the new services, etc. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Improving the security of electronic payments is the second major aspect of PSD2. In September 2019, the requirements for payment service providers to apply a procedure for indepth identification of the customer when the payer accesses his payment account online, initiates an electronic payment transaction or performs another remote action that could occur risk of payment fraud. These requirements have started to apply to credit transfers made through the Internet and mobile banking platforms.
However, it was difficult to make any well-founded forecasts of the effect on the krona exchange rate, inter alia because the companies' strategy with regard to hedging of export income and equity are not strictly applied. So what has happened? It doesn't seem as though very much has happened. Companies can keep their accounts in euro now, if they wish. Some companies, mostly smaller ones, have chosen to do so. The changes with regard to investments of liquid funds that some believe they have observed are thus not based on a change in accounting currency. The fact that perceptions of the existence and degree of changes in behaviour differ may indicate that strategies differ between companies and over time. To summarise, there are many reasons why the euro will still only have a minor effect on the role of the krona in the Swedish economy after 1 January 2002. BIS Review 85/2001  5

Let me mention just four: 1.  to preserve peace;  2.  to improve economic prospects;  3.  to defend our values; and  4.  to increase personal options continent-wide. The founding fathers of the EU were willing to make political sacrifices to end bloodshed in Europe, following two devastating wars just decades apart. Let us not forget that we are here in a former prison in which every respected Luxembourg family had relatives who stood up for these values. After 70 years of peace in western Europe it is easy to be complacent that war will not happen again. Yet the current situation in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine and that of the Balkans in the 1990s shows that peace is vulnerable, even on our doorstep. But defence and security have to be understood as a common endeavour. The economic benefits of the Union are well documented: free trade, the removal of non-tariff barriers, the elimination of transactions costs of foreign exchange payments and the introduction of a single yield curve across the euro area to name but a few. These measures have reduced costs for businesses and households, and in turn generated higher income and created jobs. Looking ahead, also the recovery is on track to overcome the crisis. Europeans, for all our differences, have many values that we share more closely than even close allies such as the United States. Our social model ensures adequate healthcare and workers’ rights that are absent elsewhere.
Only the public sector, retail trade and other services are planning to invest somewhat more compared with last autumn. Employment in Northern Norway does not seem to be on the rise in the private or public sectors, with the exception of the construction industry. Firms generally report that they have considerable idle capacity and that they are continuing to rationalise operations. At the same time, selling prices are rising moderately in the export industry and services, but falling slightly in manufacturing for the domestic market. Strong competitive pressures provide limited scope for price adjustments. This applies for example to transport and logistics firms, which are expecting further pressure on prices when the EU enlargement on 1 May makes it easier for foreign competitors to enter the market. Some equipment suppliers, however, announced substantial price rises for some intermediate goods. Profitability is increasing moderately in all sectors except manufacturing. One third of the labour force in Norway is employed in the public sector. In Northern Norway, this proportion is closer to 45 per cent. The primary industries are important for the counties in Northern Norway, especially because of the abundant fish resources in coastal areas. A large part of the fishing industry is export-oriented and is increasingly competing with low-cost countries. These industries will be vulnerable when the rise in domestic costs is high. There are wide regional variations in unemployment. At end-February, an average of 4.5 per cent of the labour force in the three northernmost counties was registered as unemployed.

Economic developments There are clear signs that the global economy has passed the trough. However, while the outlook is brighter, price inflation is still low and interest rates are being kept unusually low. Economic growth is high again in the US. After a surprisingly long period of weak labour market developments, the latest employment figures indicate that the situation may now have been reversed, although there is still excess production capacity and very low inflation. It may take some time before interest rates are increased substantially in the US. Growth in Asia is solid, but a global rise in interest rates is unlikely to start there. Inflation is higher in the euro area than in the US and approximately in line with the objective defined by the European Central Bank. In the euro area, however, capacity utilisation is very low, unemployment high and the outlook for growth is weaker. Recently, there have also been signs that inflationary pressures are moderating. Against this background, it will probably take time before interest rates rise markedly in the euro area. Interest rate expectations were continuously revised downwards up to March this year, and an increase towards a more normal level was postponed in the US and the euro area. Interest rates abroad have been unusually low for 2½ years, and are likely to remain low for some time to come, despite the above-mentioned signs of a somewhat swifter rise. This has been the greatest challenge for our monetary policy.