samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Given the balancing of above stated developments, the accelerated growth of exports has provided a positive contribution on the total demand and on the economic growth. Exports climbed by 45.1 percent in annual terms, during the first quarter of 2010, whereas imports recorded an annual drop by about 2.3 percent. Accelerated upsurge of exports and the fall of imports at more moderate paces led to the contraction by about 17.1 percent of trade deficit, pursuing the trend observed even during the second half of 2009. The ratio of imports covering from exports pointed to 35.4 percent, about 11.6 percentage points higher than in the previous year. The above stated developments in the foreign economy sector have established a more sustained balance of the supply and demand for foreign currency, thereby providing a higher stability of the domestic currency value during the last months of year. It is needed this momentum adopts a stability over the medium term, through the accelerated implementation of facilitating supporting policies. Economic background and monetary developments have established an environment with moderate inflationary pressures. Annual Inflation in April pointed to 3.5 percent, thereby recording a drop of 0.4 percentage points relative to March 2010. The return of inflation within the target of the Bank of Albania was an expected development, forecasted previously. Consumer price inflation in Albania, during the last months, owes to a greater extend, to the increase of administered prices, the uprising trend of prices in the world conjuncture and by the subsequent effects of exchange rate depreciation on inflation.

Business’ demand for loans persists to be the sole lending increase source, whereas loan to households continues to shrink in annual terms, for the fifth consecutive month. During this period there are transmitted also the first signals on an easing of lending standards from banks, but this step is applied only on large-sized business. Fiscal stimuli developed at more controlled paces in the first 4-month period of year, providing a lower contribution on the economic activity during this period. Fiscal policy has  BIS Review 77/2010  1  maintained an encouraging character, but at a lower rate relative to the same period of previous year. Budget deficit amounted to ALL 5.3 billion, contracted by 47 percent in annual terms. The low economic activity is reflected on the low growth by about 3 percent of budged revenues during the first 4-month period of year. On the other side, budget expense recorded a reduction by about 2 percent from the rate recorded in the previous year. Bank of Albania continues to draw the attention that, notwithstanding the short-term positive effects the fiscal stimuli may generate; the long-term stability of public sector should remain the main leader of fiscal policy. The lesson from the current problematic situation involving many European Union countries, is the indispensability for consolidation of public finances and for that purpose the implementation of important correcting measures at quickest time, is a target of strategic importance.
It takes time before an increased use of resources has an effect on price and pay increases! In the same way as it takes time to adjust inflation expectations downwards, there is inertia in shifting them upwards. This would mean that even if demand and production are higher than what is sustainable in the long-term, that this is not marked in price development before the use of resources has come under great strain. In the second place deregulations and increased competition can lead to consumer prices being dampened as a result of excess profits being forced down in previously sheltered industries. Initially, increased competition will perhaps primarily lead to redistribution of real incomes. In the somewhat longer term, productivity will also be improved. However, it is uncertain how quickly and to what extent potential growth will increase as a result of increased competition. If monetary policy assessments are based on an overoptimistic view of growth prospects and developments in consumer prices do not give any signals about this, this can lead to considerable imbalances being built up. Sooner or later, however, inflation will accelerate. When the scope for reduced profit margins as a result of deregulations and increased competition begins to be exhausted and demand pressure finally begins to be expressed in rising prices, there is a risk that price increases will be large and come quickly. Expectations of future growth prospects can then be abruptly interrupted. The consequences can be that demand drops if companies and households are then too highly indebted.

The current unusual circumstances are one of the main drivers for the prolonged boom in the local property sector. The risk of over-heating in the property sector to financial stability in Hong Kong is no smaller than that seen in 1997. We should note in particular that while mortgage rates were generally over 10% in 1997, after the burst of the property bubble, US interest rates have fallen, and mortgage rates in Hong Kong have spiralled down reaching about 2% in 2004. The situation we faced now is just the opposite. Mortgage rates are around 2%. And, even if the low interest rate environment were to remain until 2015 as anticipated by the US Federal Reserve, the US interest rates are bound to head back to more normal levels. Will mortgage borrowers in Hong Kong then be able to withstand the impact of interest rate hikes and property price falls? For example, under a 30-year mortgage, even though the borrower will be able to enjoy a low interest rate in the first two years, the repayment burden could become much heavier as a result of interest rate hikes in the years that follow. This could have serious consequences for the well-being of those families in the coming years. Therefore, I hope that the public will be cautious and should not underestimate the risks that rising interest rate could have on repayment ability, asset prices and the overall economy in Hong Kong. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Finalising design When I look at the remaining agenda of post-crisis reforms to be agreed, it is striking that they are not about capital levels in the same way that we saw immediately post-crisis. True, there is work in Basel but that is much more about refining the framework than a step change in capital requirements. As part of this there is work to agree and implement the leverage ratio internationally, and to improve the use of models to estimate capital requirements so that they are used only for asset classes that lend themselves to modelling of this sort and we have an acceptable degree of consistency across banks. There are two important points I want to draw out which are by no means uncontroversial. First, it is sometimes said that the banking system still needs markedly more capital, and that a focus on other issues is a distraction from tackling a system that is still over-leveraged. The second, closely-related, point is that we should focus much more exclusively on non-risk based measures of capital requirements. I don’t agree with either of these positions, and nor would I say do most supervisors I know. I have been and remain a strong supporter of the reforms to date and the higher levels of capital put in place, and I am a strong supporter of having the leverage ratio in our toolkit and that for some assets it is the “biting” approach and therefore it is not just a backstop.

Admittedly, the political agreement on the single resolution mechanism has some limitations, insofar as it does not entail per se the full lifting of national borders in respect of the management and resolution of banking crises. Unquestionably, though, the agreement marks decisive progress towards cross-country uniformity in the treatment of different bank liabilities in the event of viability problems and, in turn, it minimises the vulnerability of national public finances to bank crises, by ensuring that investors, and not taxpayers, will bear the brunt of the costs of these crises. In doing so, it does in fact successfully defuse many of the factors that have destabilised the monetary union over the past four years. At the same time, the creation of a single resolution mechanism is a vital complement to the single supervisory mechanism. It resolves the problems of legitimacy and compatibility of incentives that would have been generated by the relinquishing of sovereignty over the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  surveillance of the banking sector and crisis-prevention without concurrently having a common mechanism for managing and covering the ensuing consequences. Accordingly, the political agreements reached are added motivation for all those involved – the ECB, national supervisory authorities and banks themselves – in the intense preparations for the single supervisory mechanism.
This was the first, and I daresay the last, time that MPC members were likened to an elite sportsman. )[2]  Chart 2: Forward interest rates and economic activity also co-moved closely before the financial crisis, less so afterwards  Six-month rolling averages. Combined IHS Markit/CIPS and CBI distributive trades lagged one month. Six-month change in one-year forward one-year LIBOR rate, spliced onto one-year, one-year OIS rate in 2022. Sources: ONS, IHS Markit/CIPS, CBI, Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. So if financial markets are able to react this way, without any explicit hints from the policy maker, why has there since been more communication from central banks about future policy – and more expectation of it in financial markets? What is the rationale for “forward guidance”? At least in theory there are two distinct types of guidance. The reasons for both, I think, are connected with changes in the economy in recent years. But they are quite distinct and it’s important to understand how. The first – sometimes described in the economics literature (somewhat grandiosely) as “Delphic” guidance – seeks in general to convey what is sometimes referred to as “private information” held by the central bank. This makes it sound more exciting than it really is. More often than not it means making clear to the outside world the policy maker’s view of how the economy might evolve over the future – its forecasts – and to clarify the so-called “reaction function” (how monetary policy might respond to possible future events).

This micro transformation involves three elements: first, solving locally-nominated and defined problems; second, employing nudges or smart incentives to induce desired behavior; and third, experimenting on specific markets, groups or products before a broad roll-out. I must admit that these are hardly unfamiliar concepts in business. Yet few businesses have gone further to integrate these elements within broader transformation strategies. This has increasingly been the approach taken by the Bank, in facilitating initiatives such as the FinTech innovations in the financial sector. The Regulatory Sandbox introduced last year allows for the experimentation of potentially beneficial FinTech innovations that may seem inherently risky at inception, but properly harnessed could be a game changer. By providing a “safe” or “contained” space for testing, the risk effects can be comfortably observed, controlled and calibrated. Wider applications of this approach by institutions will go a long way to cultivate a balanced banking culture of innovation and resilience. Such applications are also not confined to the area of technology. It can span across a bank’s decision to enter a new market, reform incentive structures, disrupt outdated internal processes and provoke changes in management paradigms. The possibilities are limited only by our attitude to change, our ability to adapt, and our willingness to pursue creative solutions within acceptable risk limits. Banks that will remain relevant in the future are those that have a deep understanding of the shifts in the economy and the consumer.
They too are predominantly retail, not wholesale banks, operating a very traditional business model, one that has largely shielded them from the problems of the international financial turmoil of these last years. They take deposits from (mainly) small local savers and make loans to (mainly) small or medium-sized local businesses and help people buy their houses by providing mortgages. Their officers, like those of the cooperative banks elsewhere, belong to the community in which they operate and generally know their customers and the local environment. In addition, one of them is involved in the European Investment Fund’s Jeremie programme, a programme designed specifically to help small and medium sized enterprises. The bank in question has committed over EUR 5 million over a period of three years to some 280 local SME beneficiaries under the programme. Indeed, one could say that it is mainly in their ownership structure that the local commercial banks, which are joint stock (or “shareholder value”) banks, differ from cooperative banks. In all other respects they are not very different. So that leaves us with the question: is there or is there not scope for setting up a cooperative bank in Malta? Is there or isn’t there space for such an institution? Or is the local market too small, while our community is being adequately served by the banks already operating here? I think it is not for me to answer these questions.

In addition, there is limited information on regional consumer prices and how much variation there is in regional inflation rates. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  8  Here in the UK, interest rates were lowered from 5% to 0.5% between September 2008 and March 2009 by the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). This took interest rates to their lowest levels in the Bank of England’s over 300-year history. This was augmented with £ of asset purchases between 2009 and 2012, almost exclusively in government securities. In interest-rate equivalent terms, this amounted to a monetary stimulus worth around 7 percentage points. 16  Exceptional times called for exceptional measures. What impact have these exceptional measures had? One simple way to begin to answer that question is to look at how aggregate activity has evolved in the period since. Chart 11a looks at the growth in inflation-adjusted GDP per head across the UK regions since the MPC’s monetary stimulus was put in place. All regions have experienced a rise in nominal GDP per head over that period, averaging 12%. Not all regions have experienced an inflation-adjusted increase, with growth strongest in London (a rise of 6.6%) and weakest in Northern Ireland (a contraction of 4.6%). Unemployment rates rose sharply during the financial crisis. But they have since fallen across every region in the UK since 2011 and by roughly similar amounts, on average 3 percentage points (Chart 12a).
We have a long history of working together and reaching remarkable useful consensus on critical issues when it matters most, this time will be no different. Honourable Ministers and Governors I am sure we have all had a very hectic day on discussing all these issues and look forward to a very relaxed evening. For those that have not had time to look around this beautiful and historic city I implore you to find time to explore our beautiful beaches and various historic sites. BIS Review 115/2010  1  I wish you fruitful deliberations and hope that Freetown would forever be remembered as the venue where key decisions affecting the African continent would be made. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 115/2010

I hope that at this new stage, the economic recovery stage, banks will be full participants in the economic recovery process, expand lending, create new services, and, in fact, add new value for their customers by responding to the needs of the people and business. I wish you all every success. Thank you for your attention. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
This is a clear example of how we are harnessing the advances made by the leading institutions within the industry. Furthermore, to encourage those institutions which are not at the leading edge in this field to make enhancements in their internal controls and risk management processes, the New Accord will offer explicit economic incentives to adopt - over time - more accurate measures of risk and more sophisticated means for controlling their exposures to such risks. However, the Basel Committee recognised that relying on uniform rules alone would have introduced certain drawbacks. Rules tend to be inflexible and therefore might preclude or ignore innovation. Applying uniform rules may also fail to account for a bank’s unusual businesses or risk profiles. Consequently, our second pillar, supervisory review, addresses some of those drawbacks. It introduces judgement into the policy mix. Banks and supervisors will exercise discretion in determining capital needs relevant to their particular businesses and risk profiles. That degree of discretion makes the supervisory framework more flexible and better able to adapt to change and innovation. Finally, the third pillar, market discipline, adds greater transparency to the process. When a bank discloses information that offers meaningful insight into its risk positions and exposures, marketplace participants are better able to assess its financial health. Counterparties, investors, rating agencies, and even customers can reward banks that manage their risks properly and penalise those that hold unrealistically low amounts of capital for their risk.

V.  Conclusion  This morning, I have shared some of my views on the need for risk management and supervision to evolve together and to reinforce each other. All of us recognise that both areas must keep pace with changes in accounting practices, and I think you would agree that the work we have to undertake in all three areas - risk management, supervision, and accounting - is quite demanding. To develop new ways of thinking about risk and about the techniques for measuring it, we will require hard research and significant resources. We must gather and pour over large amounts of data to sharpen our understanding of various risks and their relationships to each other. We must dedicate our talent, staff, and indeed funds to undertake this work. I would argue that is equally demanding to develop a supervisory structure that capitalises on and further encourages those advances, especially when we are trying to implement a shared framework across many jurisdictions. But the benefits are many. On a microeconomic level, the virtuous circle I have described should help individual firms to improve the quality of their controls in the short run and strengthen their competitiveness in the long run. Yet supervisors are especially motivated by the benefits we expect at the macro level. We believe that, when all financial institutions have the right incentives to pursue profits responsibly, the financial services sector becomes better managed, more resilient, and better able to serve as a source for sustainable growth for the economy.
Access to credit, economic output, and employment outcomes are intimately connected, and it was imperative that the Fed step in to prevent a negative spiral and provide a bridge to the recovery. As Chair Powell has noted, the Federal Reserve remains committed to using its full range of tools to support the economy for as long as is needed, to ensure that the recovery will be as strong as possible. Thank you. 1 I am grateful to Jordan Pollinger, Josh Frost, and Anna Kovner for their assistance in preparing these remarks, and colleagues in the Federal Reserve System for valuable  comments and suggestions. 2 Emin Dinlersoz, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Henry Hyatt, and Veronika Penciakova (2018), Leverage over the Life Cycle and Implications for Firm Growth and Shock  Responsiveness, NBER Working Paper Series 25226 (Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, November; revised September 2019). 3 Anna M. Costello (2020), Credit Market Disruptions and Liquidity Spillover Effects in the Supply Chain, University of Michigan. 4 Large companies drew down credit lines of approximately $ billion during the first quarter of 2020. Note that large firms are defined here as having $ million or  more in assets. Source: Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Olivier Darmouni, Stephan Luck, and Matthew Plosser (2020), Bank Liquidity Provision across the Firm Size Distribution, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 942, October 2020. 5 Distressed is defined as a credit spread to Treasuries greater than 1000 basis points.

For one thing, credit creation by the banks is continuing to be slow-moving. For another, the growth of the money stocks is considerably influenced by portfolio shifts, which are likely to be reversed once economic activity accelerates and interest rates begin to rise. We shall, however, continue to keep a careful eye on this development. As already stated, there are still certain risks that the economic development will not be sustained. The upswing in Switzerland should not be jeopardised by a premature changeover to a more restrictive monetary policy. We shall therefore continue our expansionary monetary policy and in this way further bolster the economic recovery. We are convinced that we shall have sufficient time to keep inflation within the bounds of price stability by tightening monetary policy at a later point in time. Should a possible marked appreciation of the Swiss franc vis-à-vis the euro threaten to cause an undesirable tightening of monetary conditions, we would again take decisive action. 2  BIS Review 58/2003  Inflation Forecast December 2003 with Libor at 0.25%  2003  2004  2005  2006  Annual average inflation in %  0.6  0.4  1.0  2.3  Inflation forecast of December 2003  New National Bank Law in the making On 3 October, the two Federal Chambers passed the new National Bank Law. We are very happy with the course of the parliamentary debate: only minor amendments were made to the draft of the Federal Council. The deadline for a referendum is 22 January 2004.