samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
My view has been that the further appreciation of the Swedish krona has risked leading to impaired target fulfilment, and this has been the motivation behind my stance in favour of a lower repo rate path than that decided upon. Am I not concerned that a lower repo rate path would lead to excessive inflation, considering how inflation has increased recently due to higher energy and commodity prices? It remains to be seen how permanent these increases will be. In our most recent forecast, which assumed the stabilisation of these prices, underlying inflation, even in the main scenario, was estimated at less than 2 per cent for most of the forecast period (see Figure 2). On the basis of this forecast, there is thus scope for a more expansionary monetary policy. One matter that I intend to address at the next monetary policy decision is the wide gap between CPI inflation and CPIF inflation that we saw in January and February. This gap is partly due to a detail, related to mortgage costs, in the calculation method used, which also results in higher CPI inflation over the rest of the year than was forecast in the monetary policy report in February. However, in my opinion, the underlying inflationary pressure in the economy is still low, which, for example, is reflected by the low outcome for CPIF inflation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Monetary policy has to be forward-looking, as its influence on the economy is subject to a time-lag.

The difference in outcome between the two repo rate paths is partially due to the different development of the exchange rate, but it is, of course, also largely due to the divergence of the interest rates influencing investments and saving. 14  In the figure, foreign policy rates are obtained from adjusted implied forward rates at the date of the Monetary Policy Report. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The exchange rate effects of choosing another repo rate path are naturally uncertain. However, the fact that the exchange rate in general is associated with great uncertainty does not mean that it can be disregarded when decisions are taken on the repo rate path. And, in my opinion, neither does the fact that market interest rates do not fully incorporate the repo rate path – possibly because they are influenced by foreign interest rates to a large degree – form a strong argument for disregarding the potential exchange rate effects of increased interest rate differentials. As a matter of principle, I consider that monetary policy should be a matter of choosing the repo rate path that gives the forecast for inflation and resource utilisation with the best target fulfilment when fully incorporated into expectations. Another principle is that high uncertainty is not an argument for refraining from using the best forecast as a basis for decisions.
The shortage of nurses is expected to intensify in the near future and AMS' short range forecast has nurses on top of the list of immediate shortages. Although there is considerable interest in nursing training - the number of applicants with this as their first choice amounted to 3.2 per place on a course 10 for the previous academic year - the number of course places is insufficient. Teachers have also succeeded in raising their wages in recent years. Last year wages for upper secondary school teachers increased by an average of 6 per cent. The baby boom of the 1990s means that the shortage of teachers will increase and peak in 2005, when there will be a shortage of 11 23 000 teachers - the greatest need is for upper secondary school teachers. There may be a need for relative wage changes to encourage more people to train as teachers and to remain in the profession. If we take the example of a teacher in science subjects, such as mathematics and general science, this person would probably also be capable of attaining a Master of Engineering degree. The wage difference between these professions is very large. The highest paid upper secondary school teachers in mathematics and science earn approximately SEK 25 000 kronor a month, while a 12 competent graduate engineer can earn many times this amount.

So the problem of global imbalances is hardly new. It was behind many of the currency crises in the post-war period and exercised the participants at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. And for the past decade it was a regular item on the agenda of international meetings of finance officials at the IMF, G7 and elsewhere. But the incompatibility of different countries’ policy frameworks has proved difficult to resolve. At the Bretton Woods Conference, the British economist John Maynard Keynes identified the asymmetry of the obligations placed on surplus and deficit countries as the main source of the problem. He had argued that, “the process of adjustment is compulsory for the debtor and voluntary for the creditor. If the creditor does not choose to make, or allow, his share of the adjustment, he suffers no inconvenience. For whilst a country’s reserve cannot fall below zero, there is no ceiling which sets an upper limit.” Both the British and the Americans put forward proposals for a system with more symmetric obligations – but without success. For most of the post-war period, the obligations on debtor countries, asymmetric though they may have been, prevented the imbalances from becoming too big. More recently, the fact that the largest deficit country, the United States, was the issuer of the world’s reserve currency allowed the imbalances to continue for a long period, inducing a sense of complacency and threatening the stability of the global economy.
Welfare increases in that there is greater variety in the supply offered to consumers and companies can benefit  6  Persson, M. and M. Radetzki, "China, Sweden and globalisation”, Ekonomisk Debatt 1, 2006. 7  Bigsten, A. and B. Holmlund, ”Exaggerated fears of the threat from China”, Ekonomisk Debatt 2, 2006  BIS Review 35/2006  3  from economies of scale in their production. There are many indications that the trade with China and the other rapidly-growing economies are developing in this direction. How will Sweden meet the challenges? So far, it appears as though Sweden has managed the structural transformation well, although some groups and regions may experience negative effects during a transitional period. The Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS) demonstrates in a study that Swedish-owned industrial companies which increased the number of their employees in low-wage countries during the 1990s at the same time showed an increased demand for labour force with higher education back home in Sweden. This is in line with the development that has taken place in the United States and the United Kingdom. According to the Swedish Labour Market Administration’s figures on redundancy notification and ITPS’s media monitoring, few jobs moved abroad as a result of companies transferring their operations abroad during 2005. In total, the number of jobs was 2,000-4,000, of which 1,500 involved a move to another EU country.

This should increase understanding among the population for implementing necessary measures and put pressure on governments to do so. Every other year, a special Globalisation report will be produced. This will contain a more in-depth version of the annual analyses of global financial and economic stability. One very important question for the Fund’s legitimacy and ability to act is how it is governed. Today the governance of the IMF to a large extent reflects the distribution of power in the world when the IMF was established. The question of influence and governance has gained a new explosive force through the economic developments in a number of large growth economies such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico, who now demand greater influence. If nothing is done to reform the IMF’s forms of governance, there is a risk that the organisation will lose legitimacy and relevance. It will most likely take time before a sustainable solution has been drawn up. Personally, I regard the regional principle as the most democratic and efficient in the long term. This would mean that the large regions – which are currently more or less well-organised - the United States, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, etc. - reinforcing there regional platforms in order to shoulder global responsibility together. Thank you! 8  BIS Review 35/2006
Moreover, the second option might also endanger the strong economies. So, once again, without one form of debt reduction or another, it will be really hard to move forward. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1

The connections between activities carried out within the firm matter also. Lending, brokering, providing an exchange platform, clearing and settlement perform different economic functions that carry different risks. For financial market infrastructure firms, such as a central counterparty or an exchange or custody of assets (both/all of which activities FTX sought to undertake, the regulatory system and international standards in place aim to stop these important pieces of financial market infrastructure from taking on credit / liquidity / market risk beyond what is absolutely necessary to discharge their core functions. Where they happen within one group, regulation requires separate, independent governance, to ensure the risks inherent in each is properly managed. [1] FTX, along with a number of other centralised crypto trading platforms, appear to operate as conglomerates, bundling products and functions within one firm. In conventional finance these functions are either separated into different entities or managed with tight controls and ringfences. It is worth noting that this bundling appears to have been primarily organisational rather than technological – that is to say, the functions were offered by different parts of the FTX group but were not bundled in the sense of being run as one single piece of code performing multiple functions. I will return to the question of integration of functions in smart contracts later on. I have mentioned some familiar regulation issues around the organisation and governance of conventional financial firms. There appear, in the FTX case, also to be familiar issues around the financial instruments involved.
And quite a bit of the high-frequency variation in the CPI arises from things that don’t directly affect nominal pay – taxes and import prices, for example – but do affect its real value. When taxes or import prices go down, real incomes rise (and viceversa). This produces a negative near-term correlation between inflation and real income growth; controlling for nominal pay, there is also a clear negative correlation between surveyed inflation expectations and household optimism (Chart 11). Chart 10 Consumer confidence has strengthened in US, Euro area  Source: European Commission, Conference Board  Chart 11 Surveyed household inflation expectations, optimism negatively correlated  Source: ONS, Gfk/EC, Barclays Capital. Note: * after controlling for current wage growth. These results might give one pause about whether the “delayed consumption” channel really is that important, or whether the surveys of inflation expectations are really telling you about what matters. The link between consumption and real interest rates is not an empirically strong one 13. Other measures of inflation expectations – for example from financial markets – are less depressed (Chart 9). A recent study using US data found that, even controlling for nominal income, there was no correlation across individuals between their reported expectations of inflation and spending 14. At the very least, the results are a reminder not to consider current inflation or survey measures of household inflation expectations on their own, but in the context of what’s happening to incomes and interest rates.

Of the 24 instances in which prices have fallen for more than one year, all but four – two in Japan, two in Bahrain – have occurred in developing countries with pegged exchange rates. In fact, there’s a general tendency for changes in inflation to be more persistent when the exchange rate is fixed. At least when policy has a degree of credibility, deviations of inflation tend to peter out relatively rapidly in countries with independent monetary policies. In part this may reflect precisely the freedom to ease policy that, if it’s not ruled out by an exchange rate peg, may nonetheless be compromised by the zero lower bound. At least until it began to conduct QE, almost a decade after the economy began to turn down, Japan was clearly in this position. But I suspect it’s also because, when there’s an independent and credible policy, the risk that inflation expectations become “de-anchored” from any target is lower to begin with. As I say, for us that target is 2%, not zero. Even if the current undershoot is due mostly to the effect on the level of the CPI of the sharp drop in commodity prices, and should therefore have only passing effects on its rate of growth, our central expectation is that inflation will still be below target in a year’s time.
It has also provided ample liquidity to the banking system, as shown in Chart 7, in which the red lines represent the rise in the monetary base (which consists mainly of central bank provision of bank reserves). However, as I have noted on previous occasions, a large part of this liquidity has been deposited back with the ECB, as reflected in considerably slower growth in loans (the blue lines). This is an indication of the hesitancy on the part of the banks to buy securities, or to extend loans, whether to other banks or to the non-financial sector. Some concern has been expressed about the size of the build-up of liquidity across various economies that could be mobilized by the banks in the eventual post-crisis expansion of loans. However, it must also be noted that the excess liquidity can be eventually reabsorbed by the central banks. In any case, it should also be noted that the provision of additional liquidity by the ECB (as shown by the red lines in Chart 7) has been somewhat more moderate than is true for other major central banks such as the Federal Reserve, as shown in the chart. The ECB has now gone a step further by announcing an Outright Monetary Transactions programme, designed to repair the link between policy rate cuts and ample liquidity provision, on the one hand, and lower borrowing costs, on the other.

The quality of human capital has to evolve to meet the changing needs of both the domestic and export markets, and for that purpose the educational system must provide the required skills and qualifications profiles. For productivity to maintain its upward trend there must be a continuous upgrading of current investment and a stream of new investment to maintain the necessary structural change to higher value added activities. As I have emphasised in various parts of this presentation, the financial sector plays a crucial role in maintaining the momentum of change in the economy and meeting the financing needs of an evolving economy. In addition it is also a sector of expansion in itself, with its own dimension to the contribution of further growth. Current financial stresses in the euro area will also require updating banking business models and ensuring that new regulatory requirements are met. Prudent banking practices remain a cornerstone of our present stability in a period of heightened international financial stresses and strains. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 7  Chart 7 (cont)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  16  BIS central bankers’ speeches
First, to the Heads of State or of Government, who did me the honour of putting their faith in me in appointing me President of the EMI. Second, to the Finance Ministers, who resigned themselves gracefully to the existence of an institution which would be independent of the executive and who played their part, with consummate political skill, in establishing the good working atmosphere between the ECOFIN and the EMI, in the mutual respect of our respective competencies. I hope that this will be an enduring legacy. Thanks go, too, to the European Commission, with which we have been able after a little trial and error, and with both sides demonstrating good will and a certain ability to listen - to draw up the rules of the game for the indispensable cooperation which is needed to enable the project of Economic and Monetary Union to go ahead. The European Parliament - and several national parliaments - have given me the opportunity to report on the work of the EMI, in an atmosphere of constructive dialogue. Their questions and concerns, as well as those of the media and of the large number of associations from both the banking and financial sphere as well as society at large, have given me valuable insights into the expectations and concerns of our fellow citizens.

Going forward, these phenomena are expected to be reversed by a further adjustment of consumption and investment, under the assumption that the policies that spurred the sharp fall in national savings will not be repeated. As I will show you shortly, over the next two years today's current-account deficit will be substantially reduced. On the external front, global inflation continues to be high, although with some moderation in some countries. Inflationary pressures are mainly concentrated in the core part of inflation, which in several economies has been driven by the strength of the services sector (figure 9). As described in one of the boxes in the Report, the U.S. labor market remains tight and under high wage pressures. To varying degrees, this situation is also present in other developed economies and poses a risk to the decline in inflation in these countries. In fact, it is one of the factors behind the tighter global monetary policy outlook considered in the central scenario of this Report. Thus, the monetary policy implemented by central banks in the rest of the world has reinforced their contractionary stance. This has been particularly visible in developed economies, where monetary tightening processes began later. Both the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, along with significant hikes in their benchmark rates, have signaled a more protracted tightening than was expected some time ago. In Latin America, most central banks have continued to raise their interest rates, with the exceptions of Chile and Brazil.
Key challenges and prospect for the world and domestic economy We meet today at the time when the international economic and financial environment has become immensely more challenging. To a large extent, this has been due to the significantly higher degree of uncertainty that has prevailed on several fronts in the world today. Firstly, is the uncertainty about the prospects for global growth in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. The persistence of this uncertainty is now having its implication on sentiment and confidence. Secondly, are the conditions in the commodity and financial markets that have become more volatile. The massive shifts in global liquidity are precipitating volatile capital flows with its immense implications on the asset and foreign exchange markets. Thirdly, is the increased uncertainty prevailing in the policy environment in the global economy in terms of the extent and timing of policy changes. In particular, is the uncertainty with respect to the timing of the exit from the highly accommodative policies and the implications of the divergent monetary policy stance that are being pursued in the major economies. Fourthly, is the uncertainty related to the implementation of the structural reforms to address the structural rigidities and deficiencies that surfaced during the Global Financial Crisis. Fifth and finally, are also considerable geopolitical uncertainties prevailing in the world today. Cumulatively, these developments have compounded the uncertainties surrounding the global economy. In this environment of great uncertainty, a more moderate recovery of the global economy has been projected for 2015.

ASB is envisioned to be a premier business school that develops transformative and principled leaders that will contribute to a better future and the advancement of the emerging world. Conclusion Let me conclude my remarks. We are now experiencing a phase of modest growth in the global economy, in an environment that is characterised by heightened uncertainty and volatile financial markets. The Malaysian economy has withstood these challenging times, supported by our strong initial conditions and early and comprehensive policy responses. The intrinsic strength of the economy, reinforced with policies to encourage greater investments that would serve to ensure greater economic sustainability for the future. Finally, active regionalisation is an important strategy for Asia to enhance regional economic prosperity. Malaysia actively participates in the efforts to strengthen linkages within the ASEAN community and to creating opportunities to foster greater economic integration. These efforts will place ASEAN on a path to realising its economic potential and enable the region to collectively prosper. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
While banks have also suffered capital shortfalls as this crisis progressed, at least in its early stages liquidity was at its core. As our capital markets and the trading activities of our banks expanded, the risk-management paradigm was that the liquidity of markets would be resilient. It is surprising that some big banks, not all, ran such truly massive maturity mismatches. And it is similarly surprising that many medium-sized banks in this country had liquidity portfolios comprising largely floating rate notes issued by other banks. Yes, it does of course cost more to hold gilts and other highly liquid assets; but an illusory liquidity portfolio just transfers the risk to the central bank or the government. Some banks and building societies have not looked distress in the eye over the past year and in earlier years endeavoured to run their business safely, foregoing some of the profits of the boom. But I would urge even them to recognise that their relatively calm passage through the crisis to date owes a lot to government standing behind their peers. The banking Social Contract That support cannot go on forever, which underlines why the Social Contract for banks must be redrawn. It must be redrawn to reflect the lessons from the crisis. And also to mark a credible shift in regime so that, as an industry, you can re-establish trust and stand on your own feet. Traditionally, there have been three elements to the Social Contract for banking.

If we have faith in the operation of the market economy, the answer to the question whether we should worry is "No, we shouldn't ". What we are witnessing is no more than the inexorable playout of the process of comparative advantage - perhaps one of the most proven laws of economics. Comparative advantage hinges on relative factor endowments and their productivity. Some of these characteristics are, in large measure, static. Thus, for example, relative to other locations Hong Kong has an abundance of deep water but a dearth of flat land. This, very obviously, yields us a strength in port facilities over agriculture. Other characteristics evolve dynamically, such as our relatively well educated and qualified labour force; when this is set against the shortage of space, it is hardly surprising that Hong Kong should specialise more in providing high value-added services than in labour-intensive or space-hungry manufacturing. As regards absolute cost levels, it is the high value added by members of the workforce in particular sectors which generates and justifies their high pay. The fact that Hong Kong appears to be, overall, a rather expensive place, relative to the majority of neighbouring economies, is a consequence and symptom of its success. As anyone can see by just looking around, this doesn't mean that we can no longer win any business. But we can only afford to pay ourselves what we are worth.