samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This problem was significantly mitigated with the FX swap lines that the US Fed negotiated with the ECB and other major central banks, especially after these became uncapped in some cases. But the problem was not confined to currency pairs involving the US dollar, and a similar kind of dynamic played out for smaller currencies in Europe vis-à-vis the euro, especially where banking systems had significant short-term foreign refinancing needs, or what can also be called rollover risk in terms of foreign currency. In some cases, FX swap lines were granted vis-à-vis the dollar, the euro and the yen, and in some cases not. Where swap lines were granted, it helped. And for some of the smaller players, it might not have mattered terribly much which of the major international currencies they hooked on to in this sense, especially after the uncapped swap lines had been established. What we observed during this peak of the crisis was thus a run on cross-border banking operations. We know how to solve such problems domestically by letting central banks lend to markets and/or institutions through their almost unlimited short-run capacity to expand their domestic balance sheet. However, when it comes to foreign currency, a central bank’s capacity to help banks to refinance the foreign liquidity denied them on the market is limited by the size of its reserves or the willingness of its big neighbours to help. This is what did the Icelandic banks in.

In their Consultancy Study, KPMG/Barents identified this as an important issue as the banking sector becomes more competitive and the level of risk possibly increases. They also considered that the current arrangements, which give priority to small depositors, did not appear to have sufficiently raised the crisis of confidence threshold to avoid bank runs. They therefore recommended that the issue of deposit protection should be looked at again. This we have done in the form of a new consultancy study by Arthur Andersen that was completed in July of this year. This has looked at various options for deposit protection, including maintenance of the status quo at one extreme and the introduction of an explicit scheme for deposit insurance at the other. Such schemes are increasingly being introduced around the world and are advocated by a number of international standard setting bodies. The drawbacks of deposit insurance are however well known, including the risk of increased systemic instability due to moral hazard. The costs of such a scheme would also need to be carefully considered. This is a controversial issue that will need to be fully debated. Subject to views of Exco, it is our intention to undertake a consultation on the various options for deposit protection at the beginning of October. If it is eventually decided to introduce one of these options, further consultation would then be required on the detailed arrangements. Risk-based supervision Of course, the best thing would be for the safety net not to be actually used.
After the crisis began, major central banks were soon forced to lower interest rates to the effective zero lower bound. Or so we thought at the time: some central banks are now testing the bound by bringing interest rates further and further below zero. Even so, it is clear that there must be some effective lower bound on interest rates. Furthermore, negative rates, if maintained over a significant period of time, may result in financial market distortions; for example by causing lasting damage to the money market fund business model. Central banks responded to this new challenge through a variety of unconventional measures which included what is known now as quantitative easing (or QE). However, there is still no full agreement about the effectiveness and the collateral effects of these unconventional policies. (I will speak about some of its side-effects a bit later). Even before the debate about the limits of IT frameworks at a zero-lower bound, many economists, particularly in academia, proposed innovative monetary policy regimes such as price-level or even nominal GDP targeting. These regimes were seen as more powerful in the zero lower bound because they would effectively require central banks to make up for periods of below-target inflation or nominal GDP growth by keeping rates lower than required under IT after the economy recovers.

There is still disagreement, however, on how to deal with flows, on who bears the burden of adjustment, and on the scope for global policy cooperation. However, there is perhaps a deeper lesson to be drawn from the global financial crisis. The crisis came largely as a surprise; not because we did not see the bubbles forming, but rather because the central banking community as a whole failed to fully take into account the vulnerabilities resulting from the growth of the shadow banking sector, the opacity of the novel financial instruments that helped fuel the bubble, and the complex domestic and international linkages between different financial sector intermediaries. A fundamental lesson to be drawn from the global financial crisis is the need to develop an integrated, forward-looking approach to central banking that brings together: •  Comprehensive, granular (and perhaps “real time”) financial sector surveillance that focuses on identifying systemic risk and develops adequate market infrastructure and reporting systems;  •  Market intelligence that captures short, medium and long-term trends in the financial system, including, for example, the potential impacts of the rapid evolution of electronic trading platforms and algorithmic investment strategies; and  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Research and analysis that spans monetary, exchange rate, and macroprudential policies. We have made some progress in this direction here at the Central Bank of Brazil, but we expect to continue to develop this integrated approach to central banking for some years to come.
Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus: Value based intermediation - beyond profit Keynote address by Ms Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Global Islamic Finance Forum 2018 (GIFF) "Value Based Intermediation - Beyond Profit", Kuala Lumpur, 3 October 2018. * * * Henry Ford, credited with revolutionising the American transportation industry in the 20th century, once remarked that “Business must be run at a profit, else it will die. But when anyone attempts to run a business solely for profit and thinks not at all of the service to the community, then also the business must die, for it no longer has a reason for existence”. Nearly a hundred years since, these words of wisdom remain true. Perhaps, even more so now than ever. Indeed, we have witnessed time and again, episodes of excessiveness, and the sole and unchecked pursuit of profits, that have led to global financial crises. The theme of this conference, “Value Based Intermediation – Beyond Profit”, is therefore a fitting reminder of the role of finance, and Islamic finance in particular, in helping build a more resilient and sustainable future. In the past half century, the world economy expanded sixfold, despite experiencing the worst and most expensive financial crisis. Average per capita income more than doubled to about USD11,000, compared to only about USD5,000 in 1967. People are living longer, with better quality of life, greater access to basic necessities, improved health and medical care, and better education.

It should be abundantly clear by now to any financial institution that is serious about VBI, that, the task of building the human and intellectual capital to achieve and sustain value-based business models cannot be left solely to the human resource departments. It requires nothing less than strategic direction and resourcing decisions at the highest levels of the organisation. Changing mindsets Einstein once said “The world as we have created is a process of our thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our thinking”. The world today continues to push the limits of social and environmental thresholds, that are posing increasingly serious threats to humanity. VBI is therefore, much more than a current and passing fad, but a deeper conviction of the critical need 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  to begin the process of changing mindsets in a lasting way. Financial institutions are a key, but not the only catalysts in this process. Customers and investors need to be supported with relevant information, along with the means and ability to compare such information, in order to better understand the value propositions of Islamic finance. The encouragement of pension and institutional funds with a sustainable investment orientation, particularly in markets where such funds remain largely underdeveloped, would be important to provide a stronger impetus for VBI. Credit rating agencies could also be important contributors to a new landscape, with stronger emphasis on economic, social and environmental sustainability in assessment frameworks and methods.
As a result, banks in Asia were not as prone to the problem of massive over-leveraging, undercapitalization, or under pricing of risk of complex derivatives. So from this perspective, the significant improvement of Basel III over Basel II is in addressing the problem of procyclicality and adoption of macroprudential approach in our policy framework. This is a major contribution of Basel III going forward. The key emphasis of Basel III is to strengthen capital base. While this is important, I regard this as only a second line of defense. The first line of defense is a good risk management system, and strong governance. Asia’s simpler banking model, and reforms to strengthen bank risk management and risk-based supervision, help to foster a strong first line of defense. But as I mentioned earlier, we would risk false sense of security if we believe we can depend just on our simpler banking model. With economic and financial liberalization, especially propelled by the regional economic integration such as ASEAN Economic Community or AEC, that simpler banking model is changing. I will return to this issue later. For now, let me return to Basel III and the potential side-effects for Asia? There are some concerns about unintended consequences from Basel III that bankers and regulators in Asia have voiced to the standard setters. I will, at this time, not comment on those issues which are not concluded such as liquidity rule.

The plan is to improve efficient and safe payments system in the region to facilitate trade and retail clients, as well as support payments and settlements of securities in our capital markets. The road for AEC goods and services to flow has been built, we are now making it better. Payments should be easier, cheaper, faster, safer, and embrace e-technology to do this. Banking sector integration will work towards allowing entry of ASEAN banks into other member countries. Currently we are discussing the prudential criteria for Qualified ASEAN Banks. We expect to reach conclusion by the end of this year, and for implementation to begin in 2014. So, given that the road is built, the financial intermediary or the carrier is set to operate cross-border services more widely. The capital account liberalization is also being speeded up with removal of capital control, that is equivalent of having less customs and immigration check-point at our borders. The capital market integration will act as catalyst to speed up the developments by expanding products and competition, and flow of financial assets. The AEC will also serve to better integrate ASEAN into the other regional economies and supply chain, that is to integrate ASEAN plus 6. Thailand is prepared for this, and our plans are being implemented on track. These are Financial Sector Master Plan phase II for banking sector, the capital market development plan, the Payment Road Map. Our capital account liberalization plan is undergoing industrial hearing.
Despite what has been an unusually accommodative monetary policy by historical standards, the economy has grown at only a 2.1 percent pace over the last four quarters and the Blue Chip consensus forecast only anticipates a modest acceleration to a 2.4 percent rate over the next four quarters. The headwinds retarding recovery are well known. Consumers have been deleveraging in response to the large losses in wealth generated in large part by the collapse in home prices. Housing activity remains depressed for many reasons. These include the large shadow inventory making its way through the foreclosure pipeline, tight underwriting standards for new mortgage origination, and the sharp slowdown in household formation. Although the corporate sector as a whole is now reasonably healthy, there still is a significant constraint on the availability of credit to small business. Fiscal policy has become restrictive as state and local governments have cut expenditures in response to revenue shortfalls; and the uncertainty about how Congress and the Administration will address the 2013 federal “fiscal cliff” is likely to inhibit hiring and investment by business. Global economic growth has slowed as European activity has stagnated and this is capping the demand for U.S. exports. On the brighter side, some of these headwinds appear to be subsiding. Employment growth has picked up somewhat, which should eventually lead to faster household formation and more demand for housing. U.S. banks are healthier so that credit conditions, while still tight, are gradually easing.

Furthermore, at the end of the workshop, participants should be able to: •  Better understand the linkages between macroeconomic programming and strategic planning;  •  Plan steps to be taken with respect to sustainable capacity development for macroeconomic modelling and strategic budgeting at various country levels; and  •  Strengthen the national ownership and leadership in MDG-based planning and implementation process. Mr Chairman, Central banks the world over have a critical role to play in a country’s economic development. As you may all be aware, central banks’ monetary and supervisory policies are implemented to ensure that there is price and financial system stability to promote macroeconomic development. In this regard, monetary policies or any other policy for that matter that are not consistent with the MDGs in the current macroeconomic dispensation should be considered irrelevant to the welfare of our countries. It is for this reason that, without exception, monetary policies in the developing countries have to be MDG-consistent. Price stability The primary objective of most central banks is price stability, which is achieved through the implementation of appropriate monetary policy. High inflation is a major source of concern to any country as it poses a threat to economic development. It is in this context that a central bank’s primary role is to reduce inflation to low and stable levels.
Another problem with the inflation statistics at present is that the actual consumption pattern that has arisen during the crisis does not tally with the weights for different goods and services in the consumer price index. Or, put differently, Swedes have bought more toilet paper and fewer trips abroad than the weights in the consumer price index imply. At present, we do not know whether the changes in consumption patterns are temporary or permanent. If they are temporary, the actual consumption pattern will gradually move towards the consumption pattern represented by the weights in the consumer price index. If the changes in consumption patterns are permanent, it will be the weights in the consumer price index that move towards the actual consumption pattern. In Sweden, the weights are revised once a year on the basis of the consumption pattern a year or so earlier. 4 5  For further information see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp/methodology. See Diewert & Fox (2020). 4 [6]  But regardless of whether the changes in the consumption pattern are temporary or not, the actual consumption pattern will deviate for a period of time from the consumption pattern represented by the weights in the consumer price index. This means that the development in the consumer price index will not agree for a period of time with the actual development in the cost of living. It is difficult to make predictions What do we actually know about the future? What can we use to say something about what will happen?

SPEECH DATE:  17 June 2020  SPEAKER:  Deputy Governor Henry Ohlsson  VENUE:  riksbank.se  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  Monetary policy during the economic crisis* The economic crisis the world economy is now experiencing is the deepest for many decades. Both demand and supply have declined substantially around the world. Economic policy faces major challenges. Sweden, which is a small open economy, has been severely affected by the reduced economic activity in the world around us. Naturally, we have also been affected by how international economic policy to deal with the crisis has been formulated. I will in this speech highlight three challenges that monetary policy has faced during the spring. These challenges have by no means disappeared, we will continue to deal with them. The first challenge has been that the financial markets function less smoothly during severe economic crises. This has been an important base for the Riksbank's monetary policy during the spring. Monetary policy aims to attain the inflation target. A second challenge at present is that the inflation statistics are difficult to interpret. For instance, there are no prices for many goods and services because there is quite simply no economic activity on these markets. Monetary policy must also be forward looking. Under normal circumstances this means that monetary policy is formulated according to forecasts of future economic developments.
José De Gregorio: Inflation targeting and financial crises Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the seminar on financial crises Seminario Internacional de Crisis Financieras, organized by Banco de la República de Colombia and the Fondo de Garantías de Instituciones Financieras de Colombia, Bogota, 28 May 2009. I thank the valuable comments and insights of Luis Felipe Céspedes, Pablo García, Luis Opazo and Enrique Orellana. *  *  *  Thank you so much for this invitation. It is an honor to return after so many years to speak at a conference organized by Banco de la República and FOGAFIN. The subject this time around, Financial Crises, is particularly timely, with the world struggling through a crisis whose effects are still difficult to predict and that has propagated through the world with unprecedented strength and synchrony (Figure 1). Macroeconomic policies face major challenges in trying to cushion the effects of a crisis. Its origin, magnitude and degree of propagation make stabilizing the economy a particularly complex task. High uncertainty and, in some cases, poor functioning of key aspects such as credit markets, have affected the monetary policy transmission channels in a number of countries. The current crisis is providing a unique opportunity to continue fostering the design of economic policy frameworks that permit us to react to different shocks in the best way possible while at the same time reducing the vulnerability of our economies.

Christian Noyer: “Towards Retail Payments 2.0: The New Security Challenges” Opening speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the conference “Towards Retail Payments 2.0: The New Security Challenges”, Paris, 22 October 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to open this conference today, dedicated to the work of the Secure Pay forum and to the new security challenges that lie ahead for retail payments. On behalf of the European Central Bank and of the Banque de France, I would like to welcome you all in Paris, and thank you for accepting our invitation to participate to this event. All the authorities that have an interest in the area of security at national and European level are represented today together with the major stakeholders of the private sector. I have no doubt that this will favor fruitful debates and a comprehensive overview of major challenges and issues regarding the security of retail payments. This conference organized here in Paris illustrates the continuous support that the Banque de France has been providing to the Secure Pay forum from the very beginning, in order to promote the best practices in the field of security for retail payments in Europe. This support has its roots in the Banque de France’s mandate which, since 2001, explicitly requires that we ensure the safety of cashless payments.
The background data for the May Business Perceptions Report also points to less dynamic employment in the months ahead, in line with business expectations as reported in the IMCE. This is consistent with declining real wages amid rising inflation. In any case, the unemployment rate remains below its historical averages, standing at 7.7% in the February-April quarter (figure 5). On the external front, global inflation has risen significantly in recent months, with core inflation accelerating in several economies. In the United States, in addition to high goods inflation, there has been higher records in services and volatile components of the basket, amid a still tight labor market and high house prices. In the Eurozone, while energy remains the main factor behind price increases, food inflation and core measures have accelerated lately. In the United Kingdom, in addition to higher goods and energy inflation, services have become more prevalent, amid upward wage pressures. In Latin America, energy and food prices have continued to drive inflation, which has also passed through to higher prices for some services (figure 6). The rise in inflation has occurred in a scenario of high cost pressures around the world. The continuing impact of the pandemic on global supply chains and commodity prices has been compounded by the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and recent confinements in China. Producer price indexes have risen to unprecedented levels and across countries in the last year, reflecting the higher costs of commodities and intermediate inputs.

On the one hand, it allows the economy a sufficiently long time span to accommodate significant changes in prices and monetary policy without entailing excessive costs in terms of lost activity or employment. The current environment is a good example of this. In the face of a shock such as the one we are dealing with, a shorter-term target would force a much more significant rise in the rate, thus increasing sharply the costs to the economy. On the other hand, a 24-month time horizon is a sufficient time limit for households and firms to avoid being affected by the uncertainty that could result from being unable to correctly anticipate how inflation will unfold. At a time when our economy is going through complex circumstances, reducing the spaces of uncertainty is greatly appreciated. Certainly, some of these spaces are beyond our ability to act, such as the war in Ukraine or monetary tightening in the world. But there are others where we do have the power to act. On our side, by assuring all those who live in Chile that the Central Bank will continue to do everything necessary to bring inflation down and return it to the defined target within the appropriate time frame. Maintaining and fulfilling this commitment is vital to help mitigate the costs that high inflation has on Chilean families.