samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The challenge that we are having right  The country has a number of structural  now is to put in place policies that give  problems that have been amplified over  us sustained stabilisation of  the years by the large fiscal and trade  macroeconomic fundamentals in the  deficits, which are the core weaknesses  country, amidst uncertain global  of the Sri Lankan economy. Being a twin  conditions. deficit country increases vulnerability in  It is important to recognise that stabilising the economy after decades of  an uncertain and volatile global economic environment. fundamentally unstable macroeconomic  Unsustainable budget deficits boost  policies cannot be achieved without  excess and untenable demand in the  discipline. This will inevitably result in  economy. When there is excess demand,  some pain in the short-term. However,  it leads to inflationary pressures and  there is every possibility that a more  higher nominal interest rates in the  promising future can be realised  economy and there is also a higher  through the policies and programmes  propensity to import, given the  that are already in the pipeline. For this  limitations in domestic supply. That in  to happen, consensus must be built  turn, exerts pressure on the balance of  among politicians, policy makers and  payments and the exchange rate.

Banks’s enforcement powers for  As a priority, we expect to strengthen the regulatory framework pertaining to all financial institutions, including licensed banks, licensed finance  violations of the Act and the Directions issued under it. In this regard, we wish to seek views from the banking sector as well. companies (LFCs), specialised leasing  In line with these reforms, we intend to  companies (SLCs) and primary dealers. It  review all key regulations in the medium-  will further ensure the stability of the  term. In this regard, we will review key  financial sector by promoting the safety  Banking Act Directions, such as share  and soundness of those institutions to  ownership, foreign borrowings, and  face unforeseen challenges in the  corporate governance, and these will be  growing business environment. amended where necessary. In this regard, the Central Bank wishes to  In order to maintain financial stability in  implement the following policies in 2017  the country and in line with regulatory  and beyond. reforms, we have identified the need for  Since the last amendment to the existing Banking Act in 2006, the banking sector landscape has undergone a significant  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  further strengthening of the supervisory function of the Central Bank.
The practical preparations would include ensuring the production of new banknotes and coins, as well as the replacement of the old ones. The latter would entail a considerable logistical operation. For example, a couple of hundred large lorries would be required simply to deliver the necessary coins at the time of  BIS Review 29/2003  1  the introduction. But there is more to it than that. Computer systems would need to be converted, not least at the Riksbank, but also in many other areas of society. The Riksbank would also expend a lot of effort on providing information to the general public about the implications of a changeover. In addition, there would be a number of changes in our own operations, which I will return to later. Participation in ERM2 One important question that would become relevant during the preparatory phase is how best to ensure exchange rate stability against the euro within the scope of the exchange rate mechanism ERM2, the successor to the ERM system. In this regard, there may be reason to say something about history. The Riksbank has previously, mainly over the years 1995-1997, considered the issue of ERM participation and the possibilities for combining this with the inflation target policy that has been conducted for a number of years.

At the same time, it is necessary that the legal and practical adaptations that are a precondition for our participation be prepared and decided upon before the EU’s finance ministers within the scope of the ECOFIN Council take the final decision. If the referendum results in a “yes” vote, the Riksbank will be required to help ensure that entry into monetary union proceeds in a stable, smooth manner. Since the middle of the 1990s, the Riksbank has been collaborating with the financial sector via the SIFS group - Consultation and Information with the Financial Sector - with a view to ascertaining the adaptation measures necessary ahead of a potential Swedish changeover to the euro and how long these measures would take to implement. The aim has been to make the time between a Swedish Riksdag decision in favour of participation and entry itself as short as possible. The Swedish government has recommended that Sweden, in the event of a “yes” vote, should strive to enter monetary union on 1 January 2006, and that this should be carried out through a direct changeover or “big bang”. The switch-over of all electronic transactions in society would then be made simultaneously with the cash changeover. This proposal has been welcomed by the financial sector, and there are good chances therefore of a smooth, efficient changeover to the euro at the beginning of 2006. For the Riksbank, a changeover to the euro would of course be a major project.
SPEECH DATE:  7 April 2017  SPEAKER:  Deputy Governor Henry Ohlsson  VENUE:  Swedish Trade Union Confederation, Stockholm  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergst org 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn @ riks ban k.se www.riksb ank.s e  The distributional effects of monetary policy “Price stability is a prerequisite for sustained economic growth as well as full employment and it prevents an arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth.” This is how the Riksbank concluded its press release on 15 January 1993, when the inflation target was announced. The link between monetary policy, growth and employment has been very much in focus over the almost 25 years that have passed since then. The distributional effects of monetary policy, on the other hand, have been more or less overlooked, until the question came into the spotlight again in recent years. When the Riksbank decided in early 1993 to begin steering its policy towards an inflation target, it was starting from a period when the major problem had been a high rate of inflation and also a rate of inflation that fluctuated substantially from one year to the next. Having a high inflation rate is as we know a problem i n itself, but it also becomes more difficult for households and companies to make financial decisions, as the real value of savings, investments and debt is affected by large fluctuations in inflation.

Telecom stocks have fallen seriously out of favour, particularly in Europe as the companies embark upon what the Economist has just described as perhaps the “biggest gamble in business history”. This is the $ billion investment in 3G licenses and networks - a lot of money to spend when the return on the investment is uncertain to say the least. It remains to be seen – outside Japan at least - how consumers will take to the mobile internet concept. The lukewarm response to WAP phones is not a good omen, although admittedly the technology in this case is much cruder than what is being claimed for 3G. Let us just hope that 3G will live up to the expectations. Even with the traditional pc-based internet, the signals are mixed. Everyone can see the ability of the internet to transform communication, flows of information and business processes. But the means to turn this into revenues and more especially into profits have proved to be somewhat elusive, as the closure or consolidation of a number of e-tailers has shown. In a period of radical transformation such as we are going through at present there are bound to be a number of false starts and failures before the business models that can successfully exploit the new technology emerge. This period of uncertainty poses important strategic challenges and increased risks for the banks in their role both as major users of the technology and as providers of funds to the companies which are putting that technology in place.
Even though our inflation forecasts are in line with the target, but we act and communicate in a way that can make it unclear how important we consider the inflation target to be – and in the worst case do this on repeated occasions – economic agents will sooner or later start to doubt our intentions. If such doubt takes hold, inflation expectations in the economy may start to fall. Economic agents may start to expect lower inflation than 2 per cent even in the long term, and ultimately also begin to incorporate this into their economic decisions. In this case, a self-reinforcing process arises leading to average inflation “getting stuck” at too low a level. But would this really be so problematic? Yes, I think it would be. That I am such a committed advocate of the inflation target is not about me considering the 2-percent target to be “holy”, just for the sake of it. It is about it not only being important from an economic perspective that inflation does not rise too high, but also that it does not fall too low. I have often discussed the arguments for this, but they are worth repeating. There are above all two aspects that I think make it important to maintain confidence in the inflation target of 2 per cent and which indicate that the target should not be lower. One is that, when average inflation is too low, it becomes more difficult for wage formation to distribute the resources in the economy efficiently.

It is therefore my intention that, following a thorough and consistent review of firms’ applications, we make final decisions on all models for firms for which we are the home supervisor in early December, and communicate those decisions to firms simultaneously at that point. Firms that do not have an internal model will, of course, enter the regime on the standard formula. In conclusion, we will faithfully implement Solvency II here in the UK. We will be proportionate, and we will be robust in the pursuit of our objectives. And in doing this: •  we will not use Solvency II to increase capital requirements across the insurance sector;  •  we will not keep the ICAS regime alive; and  •  we will give firms plenty of time to adapt to the new regime. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
“Reflections on the TALF and the Federal Reserve’s Role as Liquidity Provider”. Remarks at the New York Association for Business Economists, June 6. 15  David Wessel. 2009. In Fed We Trust. New York: Crown Business. 8  BIS Review 92/2010  market, Treasury pledged to provide the capital. The SCAP program was successful in restoring a degree of confidence in financial markets and in enabling these financial firms to raise capital on their own. By the second half of 2009, the financial fever from the Panic of 2007 had finally broken with the 3-month LIBOR/OIS spread narrowing back to pre-crisis levels. 16 The economy began to grow again. Having served their purpose, the Fed’s special liquidity facilities have been wound down. The policy focus has shifted to regulatory reforms and how to prevent a future financial crisis. To be successful, these reforms must deal with the run dynamics in the shadow banking system, as well as devise ways to limit the leverage cycle that is an integral part of asset booms and busts that can trigger a panic. If the lessons from the panics of 1907 and 2007 are incorporated into the reforms, we may well avoid the Panic of 2107. 16  Recently the spread has widened with the onset of concerns over Greece. BIS Review 92/2010  9

8  The Archbishop offered these comments at an October 12, 2014 panel discussion that was part of the International Monetary Fund 2014 Annual Meetings. A video of that discussion is available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/5426/archbishop‐to‐take‐part‐in‐imfworld‐bank‐panel‐ onethics‐and‐finance. Notably, the Archbishop described his role at the conference as a “lion in a den of Daniels.”  9  Even the skeptics of cultural reform concede that there is “almost universal accord that remuneration structures contributed to excessive risk‐taking in financial institutions and that excessive bonuses paid on anticipated accounting profit at the time of deal origination distorted decision‐making and resulted in asymmetric riskholding.” Paradigm Risk Consulting, To boldly supervise . . . , February 2014. 10  See Dudley, Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry, supra n.4. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
It has been suggested by some that the effectiveness of monetary policy could be impaired as a consequence of the impact of globalisation on the structure and functioning of markets – product, labour and financial markets – which would affect – and in the extreme disrupt – important channels of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Various effects have been discussed and analysed, and a number of empirical studies have attempted to estimate their quantitative significance. Simply put, globalisation could undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy as a result of its impact on both domestic aggregate demand and aggregate supply. The channels through which monetary policy influences aggregate demand could be impaired if domestic interest rates and domestic aggregate demand are increasingly determined by  BIS Review 9/2008  1  global factors rather than domestic monetary policy. On the supply side, globalisation could affect inflation dynamics in various ways, notably by reducing the responsiveness of domestic inflation to domestic firms’ marginal cost increases, by making “global economic slack” rather than the domestic output gap an important determinant of domestic inflation pressure, and possibly by influencing the trend rate of change in the terms of trade. Effects of globalisation on aggregate demand With regard to the influence of globalisation on domestic aggregate demand, two arguments have been advanced.

8 Kenneth Rogoff has agued that inflation becomes more responsive to domestic excess demand if price rigidities are reduced and the economy becomes more flexible as a result of increased competitive pressure induced by globalisation. The proposition that a measure of “global economic slack” rather than the domestic output gap is a more important determinant of domestic inflation pressure has been discussed extensively. This hypothesis, if valid, would imply that the slope of the short-term Phillips curve, which depicts the responsiveness of inflation to domestic excess demand, becomes flatter. 9 Thus, in a globalised world – so it has been argued – a much stronger monetary policy response would be required, other things being equal, to preserve price stability over the medium term in the presence of adverse shocks. But also in this regard there exists no robust empirical evidence or solid and convincing theoretical foundation to support the claim that a structural change has taken place. 10 Empirical estimates for the euro area do not show a significant change in the slope of the short-term Phillips curve. Furthermore, it would be misleading to interpret the recently observed low correlation between domestic output gaps and domestic inflation in some countries as a structural change in the short-term Phillips  6  See Kroszner (2007). 7  See Bean (2006a and 2006b). 8  See Rogoff (2004, 2006). 9  See Borio and Filardo (2007). 10  See Ihrig et al. (2007). BIS Review 9/2008  3  curves.
However, such turnaround may lead to new concerns and challenges going forward. Today’s event thus provides an opportune occasion for us to deliberate and exchange views on this topical issue. 3. Although latest economic data point to stronger growth momentum and smaller tail risks, uncertainty and short-term threats still remain. For example, the situation in Europe can easily come back to take centre stage thus providing a reality check and a pointed reminder that structural problems take time to resolve. Besides, anti-austerity pressure could delay ongoing reform efforts. This may, from time to time, raise uncertainty and spark volatility in the market. Meanwhile, improving economic outlook in the US needs to be tempered with reality of the fiscal drag and the near-term risk from spending cuts which can come back to hit market sentiment. Thus, we should proceed with care since the market has somewhat overly priced in the global recovery story. 4. The challenges from the great rotation can be viewed in two dimensions. First, risk preference has shifted from safety to riskier assets with the improved global sentiment. Particularly, global stock markets have rallied far beyond the modest global recovery. This can be seen in the MSCI World Index which surged by almost 25% during the last 9 months while global growth remains at low level. 5. Rallies in stock prices on the back of over optimistic sentiment may sow the seeds of potential bubble.

Pongpen Ruengvirayudh: Challenges in the rotating world Keynote address by Ms Pongpen Ruengvirayudh, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Thomson Reuters FX Awards Ceremony 2013, Bangkok, 27 March 2013. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. It is an honour for me to join the Thomson Reuters 2013 FX Awards Ceremony today. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the winners of the FX awards this year and to thank all market participants, as well as Thomson Reuters, for your contribution to the development of the Thai foreign exchange market. For the winners of the awards this year, one is reminded that the awards are given not only for the outstanding achievement on business grounds, but also as recognition of the notable efforts in enhancing market efficiency. So a hearty congratulation for a job well done! 2. As you know, much has happened over the past few years, both at the global level and within the Thai economy. The global economy has shown signs of improvements, although in a measured pace, but reactions from the financial markets seem to run ahead of developments on the grounds. For many of us who have seen the global economy and financial markets over many business cycles, such euphoria and exuberance can be expected whenever global risk sentiments improve and investment strategy shifts toward more risk- taking. Today, a new theme or the so-called “The Great Rotation”, has taken the center stage.
MAS is involved in the discussions on both the capital and liquidity proposals and supports the broad thrust of these initiatives. As MAS’ regulatory framework has generally been regarded as conservative, we are in a good position to comfortably adopt these more stringent standards. However, we are aware that more regulation on its own is not a panacea. It would be undesirable for the regulatory pendulum to swing towards extreme conservatism and for over-prescriptive rules to severely restrict financial innovation. MAS will adopt a balanced approach and will work closely with and consult all stakeholders in implementing the new regulatory standards. Role of industry participants Supervision has to work in concert with effective risk governance in the financial institutions. The Boards and senior management of financial institutions must take ownership and responsibility to manage risks. A report issued by the Senior Supervisors Group 2 in March 2008, on observations on risk management practices highlighted many risk management practices that improved the resilience of financial institutions during a crisis. Let me highlight three areas. First, effective capital planning. Banks need to conduct a thorough and comprehensive assessment of their levels of capital. These have to be “forward-looking”, taking into account the nature and level of the bank’s risk, not only under “normal” business conditions, but also  2  The Senior Supervisors Group comprises senior financial supervisors from seven countries (United States, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom). It is chaired by William L. Rutledge from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Heng Swee Keat: Advances in risk management – theory and practice Opening address by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Symposium to mark the opening of RMI’s new facilities, Singapore, 2 October 2009. *  *  *  Prof Tan Chorh Chuan Prof Tan Eng Chye Prof Duan Jin-Chuan Distinguished speakers, guests, ladies and gentlemen Good morning Introduction It gives me great pleasure to join you today at the symposium which marks the opening of Risk Management Institute’s (RMI) new facilities. RMI is Singapore’s first full-fledged research centre dedicated to risk management. RMI was set up three years ago. The timing could not have been more appropriate. Given the spotlight in the current financial crisis on risk management, the shift of economic weight to Asia, and NUS’ standing as a global university in the heart of Asia, RMI has a major opportunity to play a prominent role in research and education on this critical topic. Emerging from the current crisis In recent weeks, confidence has returned to financial markets. More recent forecasts for global economic growth have been revised upwards, including that for Asia. There is palpable relief that the global economy has avoided the abyss. But some players seem to have forgotten that we have just gone through the worst financial crisis since the post-war period. The clean-up of the wreckages will take time.