samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We experienced, however, that having a forecasting round every quarter leaves very little time for the staff to digest new information and conduct thorough analyses before the next Report had to be written. This is why we  4  Geraats, P.M., 2002. Central bank transparency, Economic Journal 112 (483), F532–F565. 5  Eijffinger, Sylvester and Petra Geraats (2006) "How Transparent Are Central Banks?" European Journal of Political Economy 22(1), March, pp. 1-21. 6  Dincer, N. Nergiz and Barry Eichengreen (2007) "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research. 7  I thank Negriz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen for providing the sub-indexes for Norway, which were not reported in their paper. BIS Review 132/2008  5  started publishing three Reports a year instead of four. The Riksbank has come to the same conclusion and reduced the number of reports from four to three per year in 2006. I do not regret that Norges Bank made this move, and if I have to choose between good analyses and a high score on the Eijffinger-Geraats index, I know what I will choose. The third reason why we lost points on the Eijffinger-Geraats index is that we do not publish minutes and voting records. It is true that we do not publish voting records. This is because we have a collegial, and not individualistic, monetary policy committee, where the members of the Executive Boards stand unified behind the decision.

The exact specification of the shocks in the illustrations can differ somewhat from one Report to another, but the shifts in the interest rate, and the corresponding scenarios for inflation and the output gap give an indication of how the Bank responds. The shifts are specified such that, if shocks of the same type and size should occur, the alternative interest rate path is the Bank’s best estimate of how the interest rate would be set in such a situation. In addition to presenting policy reactions to new developments, the Monetary Policy Report includes an account of the disturbances that have lead to a change in the interest rate  2  BIS Review 132/2008  forecast from the previous Report. For example, we see from Chart 3 that our interest rate forecast was revised upwards in Monetary Policy Report 2/08 published in June. The shocks contributing to this revision are illustrated in Chart 4. The black line is the difference between the current interest rate path and the path in the previous Report. The “interest rate account” is a technical model-based illustration of how the change in the interest rate forecast from the previous Report can be decomposed by different exogenous shocks to the model. The illustration shows how changes in the assessment of international and domestic economic variables as well as changes in shock processes have affected the interest rate path, and is based on our core forecasting model.
Common to the central bank’s different measures regarding efficiency and stability in the payment system and the financial system is that they involve ensuring that the supply of liquidity is functioning – that there is sufficient means of payment and short-term credit for the economy to grow at a good pace without severe fluctuations in interest rates or other disruptions. One might wonder whether the financial system might not be able to function entirely without central banks and other state intervention. Would not a large private bank or other large and stable company be able to guarantee that there were sufficient means of payment and credit in normal situations, and also to act as lender of last resort in a crisis situation? Historical experiences show that it has been difficult to create sufficient security in the payment and credit systems with private central banks. One such example is that the state was forced to take over Stockholms Banco when there was a bank run on it, which led to the establishment of the Riksbank 350 years ago. But in those days there were no other banks and the financial system was largely undeveloped. As the private banking system grew, it was common at first that the private banks funded themselves by issuing banknotes, in Sweden and in other countries. 3 However, during the 19th century the view emerged that this was not a sufficiently stable financial system and central banks run by the state began to be established.

The Ministry of Finance decides how the fund is to be managed and lays down guidelines in a mandate for Norges Bank. The Bank is tasked with making investment decisions and exercising the fund’s ownership rights. Norges Bank’s Executive Board sets the limits for the Bank’s asset management within the guidelines in the mandate. Operational management and investment decisions linked to individual companies are the responsibility of the Bank’s investment management organisation – Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM). Chart: Management objectives Central to the mandate is the benchmark index. It is set by the Ministry of Finance and is constructed on the basis of sub-indexes from external index providers. The benchmark index divides the funds’ assets into global investments in equities and bonds. On the equities side, the benchmark index comprises 8 000 companies in 47 countries. The Ministry also sets risk limits for the Bank’s asset management. The objective of the management of the fund is to achieve the highest possible return net of costs within the limits set in the mandate. Chart: Enhanced indexing The fund’s investment strategy reflects the mandate’s requirement to track the benchmark index fairly closely. Since the fund is subject to an index-tracking requirement, the fund’s return largely follows the return on the benchmark index. Moreover, fluctuations in the benchmark index provide a good proxy for the risk in the fund. But this does not mean that asset management is unimportant. On the contrary. Even minor deviations from the benchmark portfolio can have a large impact over time.
While the issues would not be exhaustion but I will attempt to give a different dimension on the matters raised. Development of Islamic finance Islamic finance is now the fastest growing segment in the global financial industry. Notwithstanding the global financial crisis, Islamic finance has shown strong growth. The size of assets under management may very well exceeded USD1 trillion. Islamic finance has maintained an average growth rate of 15–20% per annum. New areas of business continue to show encouraging progress. Islamic Mutual Funds is growing at average of 23% per annum. The Takaful industry is growing at 13% per annum. Islamic finance has attracted a lot of attention. It is no more peripheral to the conventional banking system but has grown from being a novelty to be a viable and attractive alternative to the conventional banking system. Giant banking and insurance groups are now very much interested in Islamic finance as a way to growth their business. Five years from now, the data that I am showing you could very well change in terms of numbers and structures. Interest in Islamic finance is no longer limited to Muslim nations and Muslim communities. The world realizes the economic clout of 1.5 billion people is a market that cannot be ignored. The Islamic finance market offers an enormous potential for future growth. Long established financial centers such as London, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore have already begun the first steps to enhance their respective centers into vibrant Islamic financial centers.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Contemporary issues in Islamic finance and equity-based financing Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Conference on Contemporary Issues in Islamic Home, Personal and Auto Financing, jointly organised by the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance (IIiBF), the Bar Council Syariah Law Committee (SLC) and the Consumers Association of Penang (CAP), Kuala Lumpur, 2 April 2010. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to this seminar and for giving me the opportunity to speak on contemporary issues in Islamic finance. I shall attempt to touch on some issues that, to my mind is important. I will also touch on the subject of equity-based financing, a topic that has attracted a lot of discussion lately. But I must remind you that I’m not a scholar, nor am I an expert on Islamic finance. What I will offer is my experience in dealing with the promotion and development of Islamic finance in Malaysia over the last 10 years and the general experience of over 25 years with the conventional financial system. Therefore, my focus and emphasis would be purely from a practitioner point of view, experience that comes from the need for pragmatism in translating shariah principles and rulings into public policy, development initiatives and formulation of framework on regulation and supervision for the Islamic finance industry. I would try to provoke some questions on some issues that have attracted attention lately.
At the same time, households adjust their consumption, not least of capital goods, to a more realistic assessment of income’s long-term trend. Seen in the context of innovations, there is no ready-made pattern for either the occurrence of a cyclical downturn or how quickly it can be reversed. A third basic insight from the Austrian school concerns economic policy’s limitations. If a leap forward in technology leads to a period of unsustainable growth of investment and consumption, there is bound to be a recoil. As argued in the 1970s not least by Fredrich Hayek, perhaps the foremost of the Austrians and a Nobel prize-winner, the necessary adjustment after a supply shock cannot be avoided by trying to bridge the trough with measures of economic policy. As an adjustment to more realistic expectations must come, a bridging policy will simply postpone it and presumably make it more difficult when it eventually happens. But history also teaches us that after a period of what I would call growing pains, optimism about the new technology’s potential will be restored in a more orderly and realistic form. Neither the sudden downturn in the global economy nor the terrorist attacks on 11 September should have changed the grounds for a positive appraisal of the new technology in the somewhat longer run. Signs in the summer of stabilisation in the United States During the summer there were signs that economic activity in the rest of the world was becoming more stable.

If we can succeed in implementing the reforms that are still outstanding, there is a chance that economic growth can be propelled to a level beyond the current economic upswing. BIS Review 100/2006  1
In time we hope this will help contain the rate credit union failures, which is currently disproportionately high amongst these smaller firms; and  ∙  simplify the regime by eliminating other capital requirements thresholds linked to non-asset metrics such as membership numbers and variety of business lines. The effect of these changes should be to reduce overall capital requirements for the credit union sector by roughly one quarter, and encourage the growth of successful credit unions by removing several cliff-edges present in our current regime. Conclusion We at the Bank have been clear that we have no appetite to weaken the level of resilience in the financial system. But this does not mean that we should stand still, particularly when we have opportunities to advance safety and soundness and competition at the same time. The changes we are proposing today are an example of what we can do when we bring a bit of fresh thinking, supported by our emerging army of regulatory robots, to the question of barriers to growth. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  11

•  After the change in our legislation in 2016, which established the finality of payment irrevocability on a legal level, we felt it was timely to resume previous conversations with CLS. Our legislation now should fully meet all the high standards and requirements for the Peso to operate in CLS. •  After demonstrating our interest to CLS, I met personally with the Vice-Governor of the Federal Reserve Board to express our interest. The Federal Reserve Board and the New York Fed are respectively in charge of the regulation and supervision of CLS, hence the importance of their opinion about the benefits and performance of the system. Besides, the Fed presides the oversight committee along with 23 central banks representing the 18 currencies that settle in CLS. Then, it was important for us to show our commitment with the process in order to be part of this committee once the Peso is incorporated. •  We subsequently moved on to the due diligence stage last July 2019, when together with CLS we held the first workshop at the CBC for the private sector. III. Benefits of the CLS for Chile  •  Since the beginning of the process, the CBC has publicly stated on several occasions the benefits of CLS and its intention to incorporate the Peso to the system. •  CLS mitigates the settlement risk, through a multicurrency Payment versus Payment (PvP) system with legal certainty, meaning the payments are final and irrevocable.
In Figure 6, we can also see that the sum of squares for the output-gap forecast is much smaller than for the inflation-gap forecast. A higher repo rate path should have been able to push down both the inflation forecast and the forecast for resource utilisation. This would have reduced the sum of squares for the inflation-gap forecast but not increased the sum of squares for the output-gap forecast by very much. This would move the point for February 2008 in Figure 6 to the left and somewhat upwards. Unless the iso-loss line for the forecast loss function is very flat, that is unless the weight given to the stabilisation of resource utilisation is very high, this should give rise to a lower loss and thus to a more well-balanced monetary policy. The main scenario in February 2008 would thus be an example of a monetary policy that was not well balanced. However, in February 2008 the Riksbank  8  This can be done using the methods developed in Adolfson, Malin, Stefan Laséen, Jesper Lindé and Lars E.O. Svensson (2008), "Optimal Monetary Policy in an Operational Medium-Sized DSGE Model", www.larseosvensson.net. BIS Review 29/2009  9  attached more importance to the CPIX forecast than to the CPI forecast. The CPIX forecast gives rise to much smaller deviations from the target than the CPI forecast; see Figure 7. With regard to the CPIX forecast, monetary policy in February 2008 was better balanced.

These include factors like: an appropriate institutional, legal and policy framework, and regulatory clarity; a robust climate information architecture for investment and performance risk assessment, comprising reliable and comparable climate data, internationally interoperable taxonomies, and climate disclosures; and some form of common finance reporting standards that can be used to measure, monitor, verify, and assess impact. Third, identify demonstrative projects that showcase good mechanisms available to scale blended finance. Our scan of such projects has surfaced some preliminary observations on the key mechanisms to scale blended finance; standardised documentation to streamline due diligence and project preparation processes and to lower origination costs; effective currency hedging solutions to address local currency risks; pooling of investors at the fund or facility level and taking a portfolio rather than individual project approach; and leveraging on the significant catalytic effect of grants in the upstream project preparation phase. We will study these observations further and present them in detail in the Handbook. We must take an ecosystem approach to resolve the climate crisis. Getting to netzero requires the real economy and the financial sector to move in lockstep. This requires applying the collective knowledge and resources of governments, central banks, and financial regulators and financial institutions, corporates and individuals. In a small way, this third edition of the Green Swan Conference contributes to this collective effort. Let us harness our strengths and coordinate our action across the ecosystem. Thank you, and I wish you all a fruitful conference. 5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
When no trading takes place, no updated prices are quoted. This represents a challenge for institutions, auditors and regulators trying to mark assets and liabilities to the market. This has amplified the impact on the financial sector of the defaults on subprime mortgages. In the absence of pricing, the balance sheets of financial institutions holding such instruments became opaque. Uncertainty about the potential loss of other banks and about their own future liquidity needs has made banks reluctant to lend to each other. To the surprise and dismay of many, the extremely efficient and well-functioning money market ground to halt. Central banks had to step in and provide liquidity to the banking system. When money markets go into gridlock, it is appropriate for central banks to ease banks’ liquidity problems, but they should do so at a price that maintains the incentive to restore the smooth functioning of the market. Losses and evaporating liquidity then hit the capital base of many financial institutions. So far, the most severe problems have been local or national, like the British bank Northern Rock and the Norwegian brokerage house Terra Securities. These problems were resolved by means of national remedies. But with increased integration and the emergence of crossborder banks, sooner or later we are bound to encounter a problem in a bank or financial institution that may be systemically important in several countries (but not necessarily in the home country).

This increases the possibility that some investors – and issuers, for that matter – misunderstand the riskiness of an instrument. As a consequence, expected return may not appropriately reflect the true risk. When the true risk of an instrument starts to reveal itself, sharp corrections in the market may follow. The recent subprime crisis is one example of how new and complex instruments can give rise to global financial turmoil. Problems stemming from over-optimistic price expectations for the US housing market have spread to investors and financial institutions all over the world. The wide dispersion of the financial turmoil took many of us by surprise. Not to mention where problems turned up; in German Landesbanken, in large investment banks and in Norwegian hydro-electricity-rich municipalities, to name but a few. 1  Ben S. Bernanke (2006): ”Opening remarks” at ”The new economic geography: Effects and policy implications”, A symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 2  Alan Greenspan (2007): ”The age of turbulence”, The Penguin Press, New York. 2  BIS Review 14/2008  One lesson from the current financial turmoil is that the expected advantages of securitisation have been somewhat exaggerated. Securitisation was believed to make markets deeper and more liquid and – most importantly – to provide continuous pricing. Recent events have shown that this is not necessarily true for all markets at all times. In times of distress and uncertainty, some financial market segments can cease to function.
In other words, the financial sector as a time-transforming sector is especially sensitive to the movement of real rates and to discrepancies between the actual real rate and the natural rate. To make all this even more complicated, try to imagine that the equilibrium or natural real rate of interest is not constant, but is itself moving in one direction. Then, as a central banker, you have to go down even more than you thought conceivable. This is exactly what we believe has been happening in the developed world for quite some time now (Chart 2). Here are some famous estimates made by John Williams at the San Francisco Fed, but you can find similar estimates elsewhere. Chart 2: Real equilibrium rates in the developed world have been falling steadily (Holston et al., 2016)  Why is that? Nobody knows for sure. But I tend to explain it using a famous quote from the French poet Paul Valéry – “The future is not what it used to be”. Probably due to factors such as demography, we are tending to look differently at the future. We have a different “discount factor”, if you will, which is leading us on average to prefer future consumption to current consumption (on average, of course, not individually). This basically changes everything for monetary policy, which is a policy based on the relationship between real interest rates and demand.

Most of all, they are stoking fears of a fall in the purchasing power of money, paradoxically at a time when inflation (the key measure of the purchasing power) in developed countries is lower on average than it has been for years! Put simply, we have been warning about the risk of flooding for so long that we are now unable to explain that drought can be just as big a problem and that at times of drought you have to water the garden, not keep draining it dry. If the hosepipes are blocked, moreover, you have to use other means to supply the plants with water. If we do not succeed here, we central bankers will have great difficulty being credible in the future. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Literature: Holston, K., Laubach, T., & Williams, John C. (2016): “Measuring the natural rate of interest: International trends and determinants,” Working Paper Series 2016–11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches