samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
10 With this range of motivating factors and the impact they have on the culture in mind, a number of firms have integrated “how” factors into an employee’s performance evaluations by assessing the methods used to achieve a performance goal alongside the “what” components such as contributing to their group’s financial performance. Industry Benchmarking Another perspective is from the industry as a whole. I think we can gain important insights by looking across the financial industry, identifying best practices, and understanding what approaches are most effective in positively influencing conduct and culture. Conferences and workshops like those hosted regularly by the New York Fed and others can help. In addition, standardized metrics and indicators can provide insights when assessing changes over time and across firms. The BSB, for example, provides one lens on assessing culture change for a broad cross-section of financial services firms operating in the U.K.11 Each firm participating in the survey has the ability to see its outcomes relative to others and the industry average. This type of industry-wide assessment gives firms insight into areas they can individually focus on, as well as areas they may want to address as an industry. The U.K. is not alone in this approach.

Bank analysis suggests that such reductions in the spread over the risk-free rate played an important role in raising credit growth relative to GDP during both of the surges in the credit to GDP ratio since 1980.8 The spread over the risk free rate appears to have fallen due to three main factors – improvements in “intermediation technology”, greater risk appetite by banks, and greater access by banks to wholesale funding.9 How long should we expect these factors to exert downward pressure on the spread over the risk-free rate? Reductions in the business cost of intermediation pushed down on rates and up on credit growth relative to GDP during the financial liberalisation of the 1980s. They continued to have an effect, though to a lesser extent, during the 2000s. Such reductions will almost certainly be long lasting. The underlying drivers such as technological innovation in information gathering and rising competition are unlikely to go into reverse. Indeed, we might expect technology and competition to drive intermediation costs down further. The other factors that pushed down the spread over the risk-free rate in the upswing have proved to be much less sustainable. The increase in banks’ willingness to take risks and in investors’ willingness to provide wholesale funding both unwound sharply in the crisis. This is likely to have been one factor behind the fall in credit to GDP. Following the post-crisis repair phase, banks’ risk taking and lending spreads now appear to be at a more standard level.
In fact nominal interest rates have been as low as most of us can ever remember; the overall economy has grown consistently for 40 successive quarters without interruption at an average annual rate of some 2¾%, which is comfortably above its long-term trend; and the number of people in employment has risen fairly steadily to close to an all-time high, while the rate of unemployment has fallen to a more than 25-year low. The overall picture is much the same for the West Midlands region. I don't have regional data for real economic growth, but using the deflator for the UK economy, your region grew from 1992 to 1999, at an annual average rate of 2.7% - very close to the rate for the UK as a whole. The number of people in employment in the region has also increased, with the employment rate now close to a 10 year high and in line with - in fact marginally above - the average for the UK of 74.6%. And the rate of unemployment - on the claimant count basis - at 3.5% is very close to its 25 year low. That's still a bit above the UK average rate, of 3.1% but it's very much better than the 10% rate of a decade ago.

The business opinion survey conducted here in the West Midlands earlier this year by the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the IOD - which had over 85% of respondents agreeing that red tape and bureaucracy are stifling business - suggests that some of you have noticed! But for the most part such regulation doesn't tell us what activities we can and cannot undertake, rather it sets the criteria we must meet and the standards we must observe in doing whatever it is we choose to do. It leaves more room for both consumer and producer choice, and more room, and more incentive, therefore for competition and innovation. Our experience in the UK is, of course, just part of a very much broader and continuing evolution internationally - often associated with increasing political democracy - from varying degree of centralised administration to an increasingly open, market-based, approach in all parts of the world reflected also in increasingly free international trade and investment. At the macro-economic level the economic advantages of freer market competition are familiar. No one could claim that it's perfect - especially in the light of the current volatility! But profitability is the best means that we have so far discovered for directing resources - whether human or material or financial resources - into those activities in which they can be most productively employed.
Excessive money creation leads to accelerating inflation and ultimately the collapse of the currency. The role of the Bank of England is to create the right amount of money, neither too much, nor too little, to support sustainable growth at the target rate of inflation. We are not doing it at the behest of the Government to help finance its spending. It is the independence of the Bank that allows us to create money without raising doubts about our motives. But just as it is crucial that governments do not control the printing of money, so too the unelected central bank must not determine the levels of taxes and public spending. Fiscal policy is a matter for elected governments. There has been some talk about the possibility that money created by the Bank could be used directly to finance additional government spending, or even that money could be given away. Abstracting from the colourful metaphor of “helicopter money”, such operations would combine monetary and fiscal policies. There is no need to combine them because, as now, once the Bank has decided how much money should be created to meet the inflation target, the case for the Government to increase spending or cut taxes to counter a downturn stands or falls on its own merits.

The usual role of a central bank is to limit this rate of money creation, so that an excessive expansion of money spending does not lead to inflation. But a damaged banking system means that today banks aren’t creating enough money. We have to do it for them. And as private sector balance sheets contract, public sector (government and central bank) balance sheets have to take the strain. The way in which the Bank of England expands the money supply is to purchase government gilts from the non-bank private sector and credit the bank accounts of people from whom the gilts are purchased. Please note that we are not giving money away. What is the effect of these purchases? They push up the price of gilts thus lowering yields. As the sellers of gilts use the proceeds to buy other assets, the price of those assets also tends to rise. Increases in asset prices boost wealth, and at the same time reduce the cost of borrowing for companies and households, which helps to stimulate spending and hence output. The size of these effects is of course uncertain. But there can be no doubt that our economy would have followed an even more painful path over the past few years in the absence of asset purchases. Some question the scope for further purchases, or their likely effectiveness. I do not have any concerns on the first point.
It is difficult to say exactly what an appropriate policy mix should look like, as we are on relatively uncharted ground here. There will be a lot of “learning by doing”. New research will contribute to the learning, but bearing in mind the risks, we will also have to increase the pace at which the reforms are implemented. There will not be so much learning if we do not add a little more doing. The measures needed will probably have tangibly negative effects on private consumption and growth in the short term, but are necessary to reduce the risks of an even worse outcome further ahead. References Aikman, David, Haldane, Andrew G. and Nelson, Benjamin (2011), Curbing the Credit Cycle. Paper presented at the Columbia University Center on Capitalism and Society Annual Conference “Microfoundations for Macroeconomics”, New York. Altunbas, Y., L. Gambacorta and D. Marques-Ibanez (2014), Does Monetary Policy Affect Bank Risk? International Journal of Central Banking, March 2014. Bayoumi, Tamin, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Karl Habermeier, Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Fabián Valencia and an IMF Staff Team (2014), Monetary Policy in the New Normal, IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/3, International Monetary Fund. Bryant, Ralph C., Dale W. Henderson and Torbjörn Becker (2012), Maintaining Financial Stability in an Open Economy. SNS Förlag. Borio, Claudio (2012), The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics: What Have We Learnt? BIS Working Papers No. 395. Carney, Mark (2013), Monetary Policy After the Fall. Speech at the University of Alberta 1 May 2013. Bank of Canada. Caruana, Jaime (2012), Policy Making in an Interconnected World.

For instance, the Riksbank’s analysis of the financial sector became more structured and systematised, and from 1997 we began to present our analysis in the form of Financial Stability Reports. This financial stability work was, however, far from fully-developed when a new financial crisis broke out just over six years ago, this time on a global scale. For instance, we still lacked a system for crisis management. We also failed to prevent a too rapid credit boom in the Baltic region, at the same time as Swedish banks proved to have liquidity problems when the dollar market froze. As the new crisis was deeper and affected a much larger number of countries than the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, it also acted as a stronger and more worldwide signal that major efforts were needed to avoid financial imbalances causing problems in the economy as  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  a whole. The most concrete expression of this opinion was the emergence of the policy area that came to be known as macroprudential policy, which aims to take the overall view of the financial system as a whole that was lacking prior to the crisis. In this context, it is worth pointing out that in Sweden the boundary between macroprudential policy and supervision of individual banks, microprudential policy, is not particularly distinct because of the market structure we have, with four dominant major banks.
However, one disadvantage of using different inflation measures in different situations is that it can create uncertainty as to how the inflation measure is defined, even when you try to be clear as to why a particular measure has been emphasised at a particular time. The Riksbank has some experiences of this, which have given us reason to consider ways of reducing the need for different underlying inflation measures. One possibility could be to make forecasts covering longer periods. For the Riksbank the need to emphasise alternative measures of inflation has declined since we, a while back, started to  2  A description of the Riksbank’s goal and strategy for monetary policy can be found in the document “Monetary Policy in Sweden”, which can be downloaded from the Riksbank’s website www.riksbank.com, or ordered as a booklet. BIS Review 111/2006  3  publish forecasts of developments three years ahead instead of two years ahead. With a longer forecast horizon it is possible to illustrate more clearly when various shocks have effects that are temporary and how they dissipate over time without having any lasting impact on inflation. This makes it easier to explain whether the interest rate needs to be changed or not 3 . The target horizon and real stability When the inflation target was announced in January 1993, the Riksbank also formulated a tolerated deviation interval of plus/minus 1 percentage point.

The idea behind the fixed exchange rate policy was to ensure that inflation in Sweden would be in line with our most important trading partners’ inflation rates and that the fixed exchange rate would function as a nominal anchor. Instead, price and wage developments repeatedly came on a collision course with the fixed exchange rate and Sweden suffered cost crises. To rectify this situation, the krona was  BIS Review 111/2006  1  devalued a total of five times during a period of seven years. However, the trend increase in domestic prices and wages continued to rise, so the fundamental problem was still there in the background. The result was modest economic growth, poor productivity growth and more or less stagnant real wages. This performance was markedly weak both compared with earlier periods and in relation to other countries. During the crisis years at the beginning of the 1990s the situation deteriorated even further. Unemployment increased fourfold in the course of a few years and the central government finances deteriorated dramatically. Long-term interest rates rose and the interest rate differential vis-àvis Germany, for example, occasionally came to several percentage points. The fixed exchange rate lost credibility and had to finally be abandoned in November 1992, following large currency outflows and extreme interest rate hikes in an attempt to defend the krona. The nominal anchor that was to hold down inflation and inflation expectations in the economy had loosened. To pin it down again and bring the Swedish economy onto a better track required drastic measures.
This is natural since structured finance is a combination of manifold features such as different asset types, a variety of interest rate products with diverse maturity profiles and structures, and a variety of legal regimes and market arrangements. Thus, restoring the securitisation markets requires a combination of initiatives, both from the private and the public sector. The Eurosystem is contributing, first of all, by accepting structured finance assets as collateral. This proved and still proves a great support to this market segment during the crisis, as it helped and continues to help to avoid a sudden and disruptive unavailability of funding to originators of ABS. Second, as mentioned earlier, by introducing a loan level data requirement to our set of eligibility criteria, we may contribute to increasing the disclosure standards for the market at large. However, more needs to be done, as many of those required steps, for example enhancing secondary market liquidity, go beyond the scope for direct action by the Eurosystem. Looking ahead, a self-sustained revival of the ABS market requires fundamental changes. It is high time to raise to the challenges of transparency, standardisation and product simplicity. This is where the industry has to step up its efforts in order to help decisively in restoring confidence in the securitisation markets. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 84/2010

As the pandemic unfolds, many people are starting to ask questions about our economic future: What will the recovery look like? When will it begin? And how will it be affected by the virus? It's easiest to start with the last of these questions first. The virus will continue to be at center stage throughout the economic recovery. We are traveling down a narrow path, balancing a return of economic activity with effective containment of COVID-19. The overall unemployment rate reached nearly 15 percent in April, and around 20 million Americans have lost their jobs—numbers I hoped I would never see in my lifetime. These figures understate the full extent of the pandemic's toll on the economy. The pandemic and the ensuing economic downturn have done disproportionate harm to communities of color. Black and Hispanic families, as well as lower-wage workers, have suffered the most.2 Those who least can afford it have been hardest hit, making a strong and full economic recovery of paramount importance. As the recent surge in cases in some states demonstrates, much is still unknown about how the pandemic will play out in the months ahead. That said, there have been signs that we may be past the worst of the extreme economic distress, and early indications of a recovery have started to emerge. As states began to open up and people returned to eating in restaurants and shopping in stores we've seen sizable increases in consumer spending. We've also seen increases in building permits, signaling a turnaround in the construction industry.
Norman T L Chan: Cybersecurity developments for Hong Kong’s banking sector Keynote address by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Cyber Security Summit 2016, Hong Kong, 18 May 2016. *  *  *  Good morning Mr. M.Y. Wong, Frank, Carrie, Chung Sir, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honour to be invited to speak at today’s Cyber Security Summit. Importance of cybersecurity 1. It is hard for us to imagine how quickly the digital and internet technology has transformed the way in which we live our lives. Twenty years ago many of us were wondering whether internet banking would become widely accepted as a preferred and trusted channel for conducting banking businesses. Now it would be hard to contemplate how a retail bank can survive a single day if the internet or digital banking services are down for whatever reasons. There are very good reasons why internet banking has gained such high popularity as a channel of service delivery in the banking and other financial sectors. In the cyber world, the usual constraints imposed by the physical world no longer exist. Information, messages and transaction instructions can be communicated between banks and their customers easily and almost instantaneously regardless of the location of the parties concerned. The cyber world offers the convenience and speed in accessing banking and financial services that were unthinkable 10 to 15 years ago.

The advance in digital technology meets the needs of the rapidly growing client base with ever increasing demand for a wide diversity of services. However, very often people tend to focus on the ease and low cost of access in digital banking and do not pay too much attention on the security of the cyber world, at least until they are hit by cyber attacks. 2. Given the virtual nature and interconnectedness of the cyber world, clearly the security of the cyber world would require different approach and tools from those used in the physical world. In the real world, you would protect your home and property by installing a safe door with a strong lock. You may want to buy a safe deposit box to store your cash and valuables at home. Some may even subscribe to an anti-burglary system. For those who take their home security even more seriously, they may hire on-site security guards, just like the kings and queens who build heavily guarded forts to protect them and their families from the attacks by their enemies. Well, one thing for sure, all these security or safety measures do not come cheaply but it is the price that people know that they have to pay for the protection of their physical properties. 3. In the cyber world, just like the real world, there are plenty of risks and dangers.
In the original concept, the defining characteristic of inflation targeting and the MPC was the scope it offered for exercising constrained discretion. We need to hang on to that big idea. 7  I would have a similar concern if people came to believe that the MPC could keep output growing steadily, quarter by quarter, irrespective of wider economic circumstances. BIS Review 20/2007  7

Therefore, the Basle Committee has quite rightly advised that regulators and banks should approach it with caution even with regard to the simplest approach to Basel II. We commenced our journey one year ago, together with the industry, and we will move slowly, but steadily, towards full implementation of the basic approach, hopefully in 2008. We will, however commence our test runs in parallel with Basle I in 2006, fine tuning our systems for full compliance as we go along. This would be in line with the widely accepted policy that countries should adopt the options and approaches that are most appropriate for the state of their markets, their banking systems, and their supervisory structures. In Sri Lanka, as in most countries, the banking sector enjoys predominance in our financial system. As is to be expected, the financial environment, domestically, is becoming more innovative and competitive to meet the sophistication of peer foreign banks and the needs of investors and consumers. This naturally increases their risk profile. Increasingly, therefore, our remit as regulators is to ensure an efficient risk management framework and the adequacy of resources to mitigate risk. Against this background, therefore, Basle II is synonymous with good risk management, not only of the core risk of credit default, but of a wider range of risks such as market risk and operational risk in Pillar I .
Understanding the Riksbank’s actions first requires understanding why we think the inflation target is so important. We introduced inflation targeting in Sweden in 1993 after we were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime. We used academic research to support this decision, along with the good example provided by forerunners such as Canada and New Zealand.1 A well-implemented inflationary targeting policy benefits economic development by making inflation lower, more stable and more predictable. Sweden’s experiences in the decades before and after the introduction of the inflation target provide a rough idea of the significance of inflation targeting for the development of prices and wages – severe fluctuations in the 1970s and 1980s were followed by very stable development after the introduction of inflation targeting (see Figure 1). It has benefited economic development in Sweden. This is because more predictable price developments make borrowers and savers feel more secure in how inflation will develop and create good conditions for economic decisions. This lowers borrowing costs and thereby benefits investments. Investments and new recruitments are facilitated by companies’ ability to make a reasonably good prediction of price and wage cost increases over the lifetime of an investment. The less uncertainty there is over future price developments, the easier it also becomes to agree on conditions for various contracts, not least the wage agreements negotiated by the labour market parties.

MFIs’ lending to households for housing purposes and to non-financial companies, new loans and agreements, refers to monthly data. Repo rate refers to daily data and date of implementation. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 3. Inflation expectations  Note. Per cent. Money market agents. Source: TNS Sifo Prospera  Figure 4. The development of the repo rate  Note. Per cent. Outcomes are daily rates and the forecasts refer to quarterly averages. Source: The Riksbank  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5. Bond purchases 240  240 200  200  65  160  200  160  135 120  45  45  50  50  120  80–90 80  80 40  40  40  30  30  30  30  10  10  10  10  10  February  March  April Policy meeting  July  October  10 0  40–50  0  Note. SEK billion. Government bond purchases will continue until the end of June 2016. Source: The Riksbank  Figure 6. Development of interest rates under a negative repo rate  Note. Per cent. Interest rate to households, lending rate refers to loans for housing purposes. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 7.