samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the wage demands that have been presented are higher than before the previous round of negotiations. Wage outcome, wage expectations Nov-00 and unfilled job vacancies Per cent and thousands, respectively 8  45  7  40  6  35 30  5  25 4 20 3  15  2 1 0 1994  10 Wafe outcome (left scale) Faktisk lön (vänster skala) Arbetsmarknadens nov-00 (vänster skala) Wage expectations (leftförväntningar scale) Kvarstående lediga platser Unfilled vacancies (right scale) (höger skala)  5 0  1996  1998  2000  2002  Sources: Prospera Research AB and Statistics Sweden  5  BIS Review 107/2000  When it comes to judging future inflationary pressure, the degree of resource utilisation is the crucial concept, at least as long as inflation expectations are parked around the 2% target. The next chart is instructive here (Chart 4). As you know, we estimate total resource utilisation econometrically in terms of the output gap. If we take the October estimates as a starting point and project them with the accompanying GDP forecast, we find that for the first time in a number of years we look like having full or more than full resource utilisation in the years ahead. Perhaps the picture exaggerates the risk of future inflationary tensions. The cyclical position, for example, may be somewhat calmer than we counted on in October.

The same is true for your Study group: you are about to release a seemingly very attractive study on “net worth at risk” which aims at describing the ability of companies to face an external financial shock, with a focus on recent years: it will certainly attract a lot of attention when you publish this work. As it is time to conclude, I would like first to confirm that BDF, a founding member of the ECCSBO, is still very dedicated in all that is related with corporate analysis. Your presence here today is certainly the expression of a commitment similar to our own one; it is a good augur for your future works and an encouragement for our joint efforts to be pursued. Finally, I would like to thank personally President Manuel Ortega because I know all what you do to keep the dynamics of this Committee. Many thanks also to all of you for being here today, for your support and your participation in this meeting, because I have  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  no doubt that you will have fruitful debates. If I may, I would add a special thanks for my colleagues from the Companies Directorate and for the protocol office, who deployed a lot of efforts in organising this event for the better: without their help we wouldn’t have been able to meet at this venue. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Faced with this situation, the digital euro could be a vehicle for retaining the option whereby citizens have access to the central bank’s safe money and avoiding the risks that would arise from total dependence on private means of payment. However, before launching a digital euro we must resolve many questions. Only thus will we be in a position to respond to the challenges and react swiftly where necessary. For one thing, we have to acquire practical experience regarding the possibilities technology offers for the operational design of this digital euro. Within the Eurosystem we must consider, among other matters, what the most appropriate technology would be, how we should shape it to ensure maximum resilience and how we would have to involve the private sector in the provision of the digital euro. Purely technical issues aside, we must further analyse the macroeconomic and financial consequences of a digital euro in the different scenarios identified, as there are basic aspects regarding the potential impact of the digital euro on the economy that would have to be clarified before taking a decision on issuing it. By way of example, I would highlight the need to minimise the adverse impact that potential banking disintermediation would have on financial stability, or the possible effects of the digital euro on situations of financial instability. These aspects probably require an additional analytical push to ensure that these unwanted secondary effects can be avoided.

UK authorities have used their convening powers to encourage market participants to establish standards of market practice that are well understood, widely followed and, crucially, that keep pace with market developments. This is what the Banking Standards Board is doing by promoting higher standards of conduct and competence across the UK banking system. It’s why the global FICC Market Standards Board (FMSB) is establishing readily understood standards for their markets. And it’s why the FX Committees will launch in May the first globally consistent code of conduct for FX markets. But codes are of little use if nobody reads, follows, or enforces them. This is where the UK’s Senior Managers Regime comes in. Senior Managers Regime The SMR addresses the common refrain of senior management that they weren’t aware that misconduct was taking place in their firms. The SMR sets a series of requirements for the most senior decision-makers of banks, building societies and major investment firms. The SMR re-establishes the link between seniority and accountability. Senior Managers are now held accountable if they fail to take reasonable steps (including training or proper oversight) to prevent or stop regulatory breaches in their areas of responsibility. 8  And the SMR prescribes responsibilities – typically to the Chair and CEO respectively – for developing and embedding a firm’s culture. Under the related Certification Regime, firms must also annually assess and certify the fitness and propriety of a wide range of risk-taking employees.
During the past four years, we have conducted stress-testing, both top-down and bottom-up by requiring local banks to do the same, for risk management and capital planning purposes. Currently, stress-testing has become an integral part of our supervisory process. From the experience so far, we find stress-testing to be an extremely useful process and dialogue for identifying potential weaknesses of banks in a forward-looking manner, as well as in alerting bank management to take the necessary corrective actions. As a result of the macro-prudential framework implemented and the emphasis of supervision that has been placed on improving risk management of banks, Thai financial institutions, so far, have remained resilient to impact of the global financial turmoil. I believe this is a common experience here in SEACEN. Ladies and gentlemen. Looking ahead, once the global economic and financial system recovers, many important issues will require answers on how to move forward from the point of view of regulatory guidance. On this, the key issues that will be most relevant to our region in my view will include: first, large capital inflows and their implications for risk management capacity of the financial system; second, the issue of procyclicality and how to deal with it effectively in the context of bank regulation and supervision, and third, managing the cross-border spillover effects that potentially can be a source of systemic risk. First, on the issue of capital flows.

The issues now range from the choice between the use of rule versus discretion on bank capital, to the use of leverage ratio, and to the implementation issue that includes how to exercise the measures effectively in the context of a financial system that is non-complex, as is the case of the SEACEN economies. On this, I have a view that vigorous stress-testing by supervisors and banks can help keep the effects of procyclicality manageable. I hope this conference will further discuss this issue. Finally, the complexity and cross-border linkages of financial systems will continue to increase, not decrease, following this crisis. On the other hand, the right and effective global regulatory and supervisory structures to handle cross-border implications are still evolving, while information flows and cooperation among regulators and supervisors, at this time, continue to be limited. It is clear that without significant improvements in both information flows and cooperation among supervisors, it will be difficult to prevent or contain future financial crisis spillovers effectively. Ladies and Gentlemen, this eleventh SEACEN conference provides us with an excellent opportunity to discuss these current and important issues. Our challenges are similar, and through our coordinated views and collaborated efforts, the SEACEN economies collectively will be in a stronger position to address these challenges. I wish all of you a successful conference with a fruitful exchange of ideas and a wonderful collaboration.
Moreover, costs could outweigh the potential benefits. If agents consider the downturn not only to be ineffective but also to compromise the achievement of the inflation target, a much less expansionary monetary policy could be necessary to realign inflation expectations. Thus, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on our ability to timely diagnose the state of the economy and its implications on inflation, to respond consistently in setting the policy rate, giving it sufficient persistence to operate and generate the necessary credibility for markets to respond in accordance with the expected results of these interventions. At the Central Bank we are committed to ensuring these conditions. With this, monetary policy will continue to contribute to the country's welfare by maintaining low and stable inflation, cushioning the volatility of the business cycle. Likewise, although the Central Bank does not have the instruments to directly influence the growth potential of the country, it can indirectly contribute by preventing the loss of welfare that results from economic volatility; reducing uncertainty to encourage investment, production, employment and consumption decisions, and contributing to make the financial sector safer and more efficient for the benefit of the entire population. Thank you.

Source: National Satistics Institute (INE),  15  Table 1 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent)  2015  2016 Dec.16 Report  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national savings (% of GDP) Nominal gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  2.3 2.0 1.7 -0.8 2.4 -1.8 -2.7 -2.0 21.4 23.6  1.5 1.1 2.0 -0.6 2.8 0.1 -1.4 -1.7 19.3 22.2  2017 (f) Mar.17 Report 1.6 1.1 2.0 -0.8 2.8 -0.1 -1.6 -1.4 20.2 23.2  Dec.16 Report 1.5-2.5 2.6 2.0 0.7 2.4 2.0 4.1 -1.9 19.2 21.7  2018 (f) Mar.17 Report 1.0-2.0 2.3 1.9 0.2 2.5 1.6 4.3 -0.9 20.3 22.5  Mar.17 Report 2.25-3.25 4.1 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7 7.2 -2.1 20.5 22.6  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 7 Real lending by type of credit (*) (annual change, percent)  25  25  Consumer  20  20 Housing  15  Commercial  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5 02  05  08  11  14  17  (*) Horizontal dashed lines show last 15-year average for each series. Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF data.
Residential construction is consistent with the high level of lending for housing and with interest rates that are still low when compared to historical levels. Overall, the strength in gross fixed capital formation is consistent with the evolution of business perspectives. Although these expectations experienced a setback in 2011, they were never in the pessimistic range. They have rebounded during 2012, across different economic sectors. I do not want to skip mentioning the new National Accounts data that we will be releasing shortly, as result of the recently published 2008 Reference Compilation. Besides the update of the reference year from 2003 to 2008, the new national accounts volume measures will be compiled using chained moving bases, instead of the traditional fixed base measures. Thus, these statistics are set in a level that can be compared with that of other OECD member countries. As I stated recently, various indicators point out that activity and domestic demand will decelerate in the coming months. Nevertheless, we believe that it will do so at a slower pace than we expected a few months ago. In our December Monetary Policy Report we projected a baseline scenario where growth ranged between 3.75 and 4.75%. Some of the risk factors that in December we envisaged could reduce growth during this year – accounting for the downward bias that we announced then – have had a better evolution than forecast at the time.

Additionally, we are confronting new risks, in the face of international tensions related to Iran’s nuclear situation and its impact on the oil market. These sources of uncertainty are beyond our control. Therefore, our role as policymakers in emerging countries is to preserve flexibility and space for policies that will enable us to respond to and buffer the financial and real effects that those risks pose on our economies. Over the last years we have gained credibility, flexibility and space to implement a macroeconomic and financial policy framework that will help us smooth out the economic cycle. This framework rests on four pillars. First, monetary policy management is based on a flexible inflation-targeting regime, conducted by an autonomous central bank and supported by a floating exchange rate system. Second, a fiscal policy that is accountable and predictable thanks to a structural balance rule. The significant amount of savings accumulated during the run-up of copper prices was a crucial factor in bolstering the resilience of the Chilean economy and in providing a countercyclical fiscal boost. Third, a high degree of commercial and financial integration with the rest of the world. Finally, a sound financial system, with globally integrated, well capitalized, and adequately-regulated banks. These elements allowed us to be less affected by the Great Recession than by previous episodes. In Chile, the effects of the world slowdown of the second half of 2011 and the financial turbulences coming from Europe have so far been limited.
The fact that the Swedish economy has been strong has also led to a resilient Swedish labour market, and the number of those employed has continued to increase somewhat during the year. However, the supply of labour has also increased, so that the fall in unemployment we have seen since the start of 2010 was interrupted at the end of 2011. Unemployment in Sweden is now just below 8 per cent per cent (see Figure 9). …but high household indebtedness constitutes a risk Another reason why the Swedish economy has coped so well is that we have not suffered a crash on the housing market or in other areas of the financial sector. Nevertheless, developments in Sweden have given cause for concern. Housing prices have risen significantly in Sweden over the last 15 years in both an international and historical perspective (see Figure 5). The same applies to household indebtedness (see Figure 6). It is not surprising that there is a link between these factors as a large proportion of the banks’ lending to households has been used to buy housing. I and several of my previous colleagues on the Executive Board warned about the risks associated with household indebtedness and housing prices in Sweden long before the financial crisis. One could say that the crisis has given these issues renewed and increased currency.

However, we also need to take into account the risks associated with household indebtedness in our repo rate decisions. Our balancing act in October resulted in an unchanged repo rate, but a downward adjustment of the forecast for the repo rate (see Figure 18). Such a monetary policy means that we can, on the one hand, attain the inflation target and stabilise employment in the long term and, on the other hand, take the risks associated with financial imbalances into account. However, monetary policy alone cannot eliminate the risks associated with household indebtedness that I have discussed today. It is important to have a wide-ranging discussion among several authorities in Sweden on the need for additional measures. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figures Figure 1. Repo rate Per cent, daily data 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Source: The Riksbank  Figure 2. GDP growth in Sweden and the world Annual percentage change, calendar-adjusted data 8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  Sweden The world  -6  -6 80  85  90  95  00  05  10  15  Note. The broken line and bars refer to the Riksbank’s forecast in MPR October 2012.
A credible central bank, where inflation expectations are anchored, will experience a smaller pass-through coefficient from the exchange rate to inflation. This allows the central bank to respond with more flexibility to shocks requiring a real exchange rate depreciation. To summarize, if there is confidence in the central bank’s anti-inflationary commitment, the central bank can react more flexibly to various shocks and, in this way, minimize deviations of output from its potential level. The central bank can smooth the business cycle while preserving price stability. The key element in this strategy is the credibility of the central bank’s commitment to price stability, for which communication and transparency are crucial. Autonomy and transparency Autonomy means that the State delegates to the central bank the administration of monetary policy, such that it be applied using technical criteria and with a medium-term horizon. Here is the first reason why central banks must be transparent: to preserve the legitimacy that an autonomous institution must have in a democratic regime, particularly one whose decisions have important implications on the nation’s well-being. Autonomous institutions must properly inform the country of their actions. In Chile, the delivery of information is determined in the Basic Constitutional Act, which establishes that, once a year, the Bank must inform the President of the Republic and the Senate about the general policies and regulations it dictates in exercising its mandate.

Our efforts should not be just about coping with short-term fluctuations, but also about laying long-term foundation for Thailand’s future. That requires a forward-looking plan of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  action by all stakeholders. The Bank of Thailand, for our part, will continue to ensure a stable financial and economic environment, so that businesses can continue to thrive and individuals can enjoy better standards of living on a sustainable basis. Thank you and wish you all an enjoyable evening. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Some MoUs focus primarily on supervision, whereas others involve crisis management as well. Notably, they are not legally binding and give the national authorities considerable scope for discretion. Although the emergence of these MoUs is very positive, they are no guarantee for efficient crisis management. Probably, these MoUs will work well under normal conditions. And they will also be most helpful in facilitating coordination in some financial crises. However, in a more wide-spread crisis involving a large cross-border bank, MoUs alone will probably be insufficient. Take, for example, the issue of assessments. We have in Europe in principle agreed to share each other’s views and assessments in the event of a distress scenario. However, to be able to act decisively in a crisis situation involving a large cross-border bank, you would preferably need a joint assessment between the countries involved. I don’t think it would be too speculative to think that each country in an acute situation would be prone to present an assessment that supports its national interests as part of a negotiation strategy. Arriving at a joint assessment may therefore prove difficult, and above all take valuable time away from crisis management. To be able to act efficiently in a crisis situation, it is instrumental that conflicts of interests, as far as possible, are taken care of in advance. For that you need something more than the MoUs we have seen so far.

The governments, in  8  BIS Review 39/2006  turn, rely on their ability to raise tax. Such a system would of course demand very strict and well thought-out rules governing what actions the fund should be allowed to take in the case of a bank failure. These rules could be inspired, for example, by the US FDIC’s very strict mandate to always choose the least cost solution. Among other things, this would in some cases mean allowing shareholders as well as uninsured depositors and debt holders to lose their money. One would of course also have to think hard about what formula to use for burden sharing. In my opinion, I think a fixed key would probably be the most practical choice. I might mention that there does, in fact, already exist one type of burden sharing arrangement in the EU today, and that is for topping up the national deposit guarantee schemes for foreign branches. Although the potential sums involved in these topping-up schemes are insignificant in comparison to the potential costs of a large cross-border bank failure, one could perhaps draw some inspiration and build on such an existing arrangement. Another source of inspiration, where an ex ante determined key for obligations to provide liquidity is used, are the IMF financing system and its second line defence in the form of General Agreements to Borrow and New Agreements to Borrow. These burden sharing arrangements have been successfully in use for half a century.