samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But I will say that no one involved in those workshops has suggested that they provide a reason to delay moving away from LIBOR on the timetable that we’re now all too familiar with. I want to be clear—as the ARRC and the Fed have been from the beginning—that no one is requiring that everyone use SOFR for all purposes or for any specific purpose. There are other alternatives out there, and nothing prevents you from using any rate that’s robust, appropriate for your institution, and fit for the use you’re putting it to. What is most important is that you move off of LIBOR and do it now. But in deciding what to move to, remember that SOFR is the foundation for the transition from U.S. dollar LIBOR because it meets very high standards. The ARRC went through an extensive review and consultation process and got input from a wide range of market participants. It evaluated a number of alternative rates for benchmark quality, methodological quality, accountability, governance, and ease of implementation. SOFR was the clear first choice. It’s produced by the New York Fed and is based on about a trillion dollars’ worth of daily transactions in a broad and liquid market that a wide array of firms of all types have access to. The New York Fed has provided detailed public information about every aspect of SOFR, including historical data and a point-by-point description of how it complies with the benchmark principles set out by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).

In this regard, I would like to point out that the inclusion of information technology developments in financial services is increasingly drawing the attention of central banks, regulatory and supervisory authorities worldwide. Both international and domestic practices show that a comprehensive approach through collaboration considerably supports the achievement of 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  effective and optimal results. A concrete example of aligned efforts in this regard is exactly the one in the field of payments. In this field, the measures undertaken by the Government of Albania for the digitalisation of government services and recently for the draft-law “on billing and monitoring system of circulation”, which aims at increasing and strengthening the fiscalisation of the Albanian economy, appear to fully harmonise with the initiatives undertaken by the Bank of Albania, through the National Payment System Committee, for modernising the payment market and increasing financial inclusion. The Bank of Albania has worked on drafting a new legal and regulatory framework, which aims at promoting digitalisation in the area of payment services. The compilation of the draft-law “On payment services” is considered as the first and crucial step in the framework of reforming and digitalising the small-value payments. In concrete terms, this draft-law is seen to considerably encourage the competition in the market, by providing a crucial contribution to the establishment of low cost services and easily accessible by the large public.
The recent fall in oil prices will ease the pressure on firms’ input costs allowing them to restore profit margins without an increase in output prices. Nevertheless, according to surveys, businesses are more likely to raise prices than during the NICE decade. And in their own survey, the Bank’s Agents found that half of those (largely manufacturing) firms which had experienced some erosion of margins were now intending to raise prices. 2  2  Not so bad: not of the same order but also desirable. Speech at the Eden Project, Cornwall, October 2004. BIS Review 94/2006  A change in oil prices does not in itself tell us where overall inflation is headed in the medium term. For that, we need to look at the balance between money spending and potential supply. The growth of total money spending in the economy has picked up in recent quarters – nominal domestic demand rose by 6% in the year to Q2. And the growth rate of broad money and credit in the economy is now higher than at any point since 1990. There is, however, great uncertainty about potential supply. The possibility of continuing migration from the new member countries of the European Union and elsewhere is likely to increase the potential labour force available to UK employers. And it appears that more people of pensionable age are choosing to continue to work.

Norges Bank has no set target for the level of the exchange rate. Nevertheless, developments in the krone are of considerable importance to interest-rate setting because the exchange rate has an impact on inflation and output. An important channel for monetary policy is the foreign exchange market and the krone exchange rate. Although the krone fluctuates, the krone exchange rate is not particularly unstable compared with other countries’ currencies. The krone exchange rate is the price of our currency measured in a foreign currency. Developments in other countries are just as important for the krone as developments in the Norwegian economy. Capital flows freely and flows can change rapidly. This can spill over to exchange rates and interest rates as well as output and employment. There is a cost involved for businesses in hedging against fluctuations in the krone. A krone that is stable - but too strong - also entails social costs in the form of low activity. Similarly, a krone that is stable - but too weak - is a source of high inflation. From spring 1999 to December 2002, the interest rate in Norway was fairly stable at between 5.5 per cent and 7 per cent. In other countries, the interest rate fell in 2000 and 2001 when the ICT and equity bubbles burst. The interest rate differential between Norway and other countries widened due to cyclical divergence. The period of high capacity utilisation continued for a longer period in Norway, with strong wage and cost inflation.
Jacqueline Loh: Singapore - the gateway to Asia's bond market Opening address by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Global Borrowers &amp; Investors Forum - Asia, Singapore, 21 September 2017. * * * Toby Fildes, Global Managing Editor, GlobalCapital Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. 1. Thank you very much for inviting me to the Global Borrowers & Investors Forum – Asia. I am delighted that Euromoney has chosen Singapore to anchor the Asian edition of your flagship Global Borrowers & Bond Investors Forum. The Forum started over 20 years 2.  ago in London, and consistently attracts over 700 issuers, investors and financial intermediaries from around the world to exchange views on key issues facing global bond markets, to network and importantly, to close deals. Asia is the natural next franchise for the Forum. In 2016, Asia’s debt issuance at USD 1.3 trillion made up about one-fifth of global debt issuance, but at 20% y-o-y, grew twice as quickly. A focused Asian edition will help to make the Forum more accessible to issuers, 3.  investors and intermediaries based in Asia. Today’s programme is very topical, covering the deepening of Asia’s bond markets, financing Asia’s infrastructure and the rise of Asia’s green bond market, and features distinguished speakers like Governor Agus of Bank Indonesia and Sir Robert Stheeman, Chief Executive of the UK Debt Management Office. I will touch on these themes briefly. Asian bonds are a mainstream asset class .

Mr. Heikenstein discusses the Swedish financial crisis of the early 1990s Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Lars Heikenstein, at a seminar arranged by the Swedish embassy held in Seoul, Korea on 15/7/98. Let me begin with a thank you to the organisers of this seminar. I am honoured to have the opportunity to share with you some experiences from the Swedish financial crisis in the early 1990s. 1. Introduction An IMF study from 1996 showed that in the past fifteen years, 132 of the Fund’s 182 member countries had experienced macroeconomic and/or financial crises. Today the figure is even higher. Crises are a recurring phenomenon. In spite of every effort to prevent them, I fear that crises will continue to occur. We should therefore use the opportunities to learn from each other, both in order to avoid making the same mistakes and to find the appropriate correctives sooner. Needless to say, there are no single “best solutions”. Crisis situations are always specific in some respects, not least with regard to their structural and political environment. Had they not been specific, they would probably never have occurred because they would have been “spotted” in advance. Having said this, however, there are a number of globally accepted “truths” about what constitutes a good response to crises. Discussions around crisis situations are usually divided into two parts: crisis prevention and crisis management. In this presentation I will be focusing on the latter.
28 March 2019  Speech Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank delivered at the 58th Annual Meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland, 28 March 2019  Prime Minister, other ministers, Chairman of the Economic Affairs and Trade Committee and other members of Parliament, bank directors, foreign ambassadors, other honoured guests! This is the last speech I will give at the Annual Meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland, as I will step down as Governor this August, as is provided for by law, after ten years in the position. I would therefore like to focus on matters other than current tasks relating to monetary policy, financial stability, and other Central Bank functions, but it is unavoidable to make an assessment of the most recent events. I will focus on two main areas. First of all, I would like to take a backward glance at developments in the Icelandic economy and financial system over the past ten years. In this context, I will give my assessment of how successfully the Central Bank has achieved its objectives. The published and printed versions of this speech will include selected charts that illustrate economic developments over the period. Second, I will take a look at the future and discuss several challenges in connection with the Central Bank’s tasks and objectives. Let us now cast our minds back to mid-2009. At that time, Iceland was in the midst of its severest economic contraction since World War I, a century ago.

As national financial sectors become increasingly integrated and interdependent, another top priority for us must be to strengthen our understanding of the factors that drive global capital asset allocation, and the reasons for capital flows across sectors and national borders. Early identification and assessment of capital flows will help us evaluate vulnerabilities in a timely manner, as well as enhance  BIS Review 43/2005  3  countries’ ability to address them. The effectiveness of our bilateral and multilateral surveillance activities will also be strengthened as a result. For members who wish to access international capital markets and integrate their economies more fully into the global financial system, we can provide advice on the appropriate sequencing of measures, such as how to strengthen their financial sectors and reduce their vulnerability to shocks as preparatory steps. Third, IMF financing and lending. The Fund’s traditional role of providing financing to help smooth the adjustment of temporary current-account imbalances remains vital for many countries. For others, our main task is to help prevent, or mitigate, capital account crises and their cross-border contagion effects. To succeed in these roles, the IMF must be able to exercise selectivity in supporting only those adjustment programs that will put the relevant members firmly on the path to external viability. The existence of robust domestic institutional frameworks, and strong national ownership of programs, would be key.
SMEs’ contribution to the U.S.A’s GDP is more than 50 percent. The insignificant contribution of SMEs to the Kingdom’s GDP may be due to the Oil and Governmental sector which represent the major impetus of economic activity. Dear Brothers and Sisters, SMEs are facing clear challenges in gaining the necessary funding for meeting their expansion needs due to various reasons including poor management, and lack of adequate guarantees and, subsequently, the difficulty of obtaining the necessary funding. In order to overcome this problem in the Kingdom, the Ministry of Finance, in collaboration with Saudi banks, established a guarantee program (Kafalah) for financing SMEs. The program, with a capital of Rls 200 million, is managed by Saudi Industrial Development Fund to cover a proportion of the risk of the financing entity in case of the failure of the guaranteed activity in repaying the finance or part thereof. The program also aims at encouraging banks to finance SMEs that have the constituents for success, but at the same time, they cannot present the necessary guarantees or accounting records to prove their eligibility for funding. The program has recorded good performance since its inception in 2006 until 1-Oct-2010, as the number of guarantees approved by the Ministry of Finance during that period reached 1,668 with a total value of Rls 644 million, while loans granted by banks under the umbrella of the program amounted to Rls 1.6 billion, benefiting about 1,113 SMEs.

Securitization markets developed where loans could be funded through the market by investors. In addition, money market mutual funds, securities lenders, institutional investors and businesses needed a safe way to deposit funds where they would earn interest but retain ready access to their funds. Repurchase agreements or “repos” developed to serve this need. A repo is a short-term collateralized loan that shares many characteristics with a demand deposit except that repos are not guaranteed. At the same time, large firms increasingly raised funds by issuing commercial paper in the market rather than relying on bank loans – with the money market mutual funds being large investors in this paper. Large banks, as well, came to rely at the margin on non-deposit funding through the interbank funding market. The Fed acted as the lender of last resort for this market. This system of market-based credit intermediation has been called the “shadow banking system”. The shadow banking system grew at a very fast rate over the past several decades. Chart 1 shows that by 1990, mortgage originations in the shadow banking system equaled originations in the banking system, and grew to more than double the level in the banking system by 2008. Chart 2 highlights the growth in securitization across many different asset categories besides residential mortgages, such as commercial real estate loans, auto loans, credit card loans and student loans.
In other words we are trying to maintain overall, macroeconomic, stability in a much broader sense, in the medium- and longer- term and not just the shortterm; and the Government's inflation target is the criterion against which our success, or otherwise, in achieving that broader macro-economic stability is to be measured. Our problem is that we don't know with any great precision or confidence exactly what is happening on the supply-side:- we don't know that's to say precisely what rate of growth we can hope to sustain. We don't know precisely either what is currently happening, or what is likely to happen looking forward over the next couple of years or so, to overall, aggregate, demand. And nor do we know precisely what the full impact of a change in interest rates will be on aggregate demand, or how long it will take before the full impact is felt. Ours is not a precise science. In fact it's more of an art than a science. And, although we bring as much economic and statistical science to bear as we can, we know that our forecasts, and indeed our policy judgements, are subject to a range of error. They can't be accurate to every last digit. So, we can't expect to hit the inflation target all the time, but by consistently aiming to do so we can hope to get reasonably close to the target on average over time.

The MPC will be able to make its own assessment of the impact on demand and inflation of the Growth Plan during its next forecast round leading up to its next decision meeting on 2 November. Based on what we know so far, these impacts are likely to be material for the economic outlook over the next three years, which is also the horizon relevant for monetary policy. The final shock I want to talk about is the recent turbulence in financial markets. The MPC’s forecasts are conditioned on assumptions for the outlook for various asset prices and so these movements could have a significant direct effect on the November forecasts and for the Committee’s broader assessment of financial conditions. Financial markets globally have been volatile over recent months, with notable rises in government bond yields, large moves in exchange rates and falls in risky asset prices. Overall the adjustment in market prices has been consistent with tighter monetary policy globally and the deterioration in the economic outlook. These trends were more marked for the UK through August and up to the September MPC meeting. But the UK began to really stand out over the last fortnight, which has seen significant moves in the pricing of UK financial assets. Part of that re-pricing continues to reflect broader global developments. But there is undoubtedly a UK-specific component.
Real growth in public spending Revised National Budget 2002 2002 Growth in central government expenditure - Rise in prices for expenditure  7.0%  = Real spending growth  2.5%  4.4%  Distributed as follows: Real growth, transfers  2¾%  Real growth, investment  6¾%  Real growth, consumption  1½%  SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  Growth in public spending between 2001 and 2002 is estimated at 7 per cent. This is considerably higher than growth in private sector mainland GDP, which is estimated at around 4 per cent. The fiscal guideline is then closely adhered to. Real growth in public consumption is estimated at 1½ per cent. In other words, growth in production of public services will be moderate, even though public spending is rising sharply in nominal krone terms. This is because the cost of producing public services is rising sharply, reflecting high wage growth in the public sector. There have also been substantial increases in transfers to the household sector through social security schemes. The bulk of the high growth in central government allocations therefore translates into strong growth in household income and  BIS Review 48/2002  3  consumption. This tends to be the result when wage and costs pressure are already at such a high level. If the central government were to compensate public sector entities for the high wage increases, the result could easily be a new round up the wage spiral.

Monetary policy must reduce the possibility of passing on these costs in order to keep inflation at bay. This is done partly by keeping growth in demand for goods and services under control. In addition, a strong krone may boost imports of goods and services previously reserved for domestic producers. In rural areas and towns, where local government employment is an alternative to working in agriculture, fisheries, local services or small-scale industry, the public sector with its nationwide agreements can be a wage trend-setter. Wage growth in the public sector can therefore be an important source of higher inflation. In the public sector, higher labour costs due to costly income settlements can only be passed on to customers to a limited extent. On the other hand, the rise in costs can intensify pressures to increase government allocations. Most likely, the central government will be expected to pick up the bill when labour costs rise sharply. In the business sector – with its profitability requirements – higher labour costs must be matched by an increase in productivity. In principle, the central government will apply the same requirements to government agencies. How these requirements will be met in practice will have a decisive impact on developments in central government expenditure and, consequently, on interest rates and the krone exchange rate.
Being a modern bank, it conducts business principally on the Internet. IIB has a series of quite attractive Internet pages where its products are offered. These pages spell out the products, deposit terms and interest rates, and loan terms and interest rates. All agreements are governed by the law of Atlantis. All deposits are deemed received over IIB’s “counters” in Atlantis, and all loans are paid out of Atlantis. Atlantis has an enjoyable ambiance even exceeding that of Nice and Saint Paul de Vence; therefore, I see no need to leave the island. I do receive and entertain customers when they visit Atlantis. I do place telephone calls to customers who have responded to my Internet page, but I do not make cold calls to customers. Communications with customers over the Internet are state-of-the-art secure. Customers receive account statements over the Internet, issue payment instruments to IIB over the Internet, and request loans over the Internet. All payments to and from accounts are made by wire transfer to IIB’s correspondent account maintained on the books of Atlantis Bank, the only bank chartered under Atlantis law authorized to engage in banking transactions with Atlantis residents. Customers may instruct IIB to make payments for their account. These too are consummated by means of payments out of IIB’s account at Atlantis Bank. Loans are disbursed and paid the same way. The question presented is whether IIB is violating the law of the countries in which its customers are located.

The key questions here are related to amount and velocity -- that is, (1) how would digital bills or notes, or digital coins, be represented on the books of a bank or depository institution; and (2) how many times would this electronic coin or bill circulate in the general economy without somehow being processed and recorded by a bank? In this regard, the October 1996 Bank for International Settlements report “Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Electronic Money” states “E-money could lead to shifts in the velocity of money which might temporarily reduce the usefulness of the monetary aggregates, especially narrower ones, for countries that rely on them as targets or indicators.” In a June 1996 speech before a cyber-payments conference, Governor Edward Kelley of the Board of Governors stated that, with respect to a bank’s liabilities incurred through issuing stored-value cards, such liabilities should be included in the statistical reports that banks must currently submit to the Board of Governors.3 It is difficult to argue that bank liabilities resulting from the issuance of electronic “coins” or electronic “bills and notes” should be reported any differently. A more problematic question arises when considering the matter of nonbank issuance of electronic coins or bills. Currently, the largest nonbank issuers of travelers checks are not required, but do volunteer to the Fed, the outstanding balances of their travelers checks, so that this information can be statistically recorded and reported in United States monetary aggregates by the Fed.