samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Since many of those rates are unobservable by the MPC, money, credit and asset prices may contain valuable information about the likely outlook for spending.15 As chart 10 shows, there are times when monetary developments have represented shocks that have affected the supply of money and proved a warning sign of inflationary risks. At other times, its movements have been dominated by changes in the demand for money. In 1973, for example, broad money growth had picked up sharply but inflation was subdued. Yields on gilts provided no indication that a rise in inflation was expected by financial markets. But the rise in money growth, which looked at first to be another instance of a change in the demand for money, was in fact an increase in supply and led to faster expansion of spending in the economy and, by 1975, higher inflation. The 1980s illustrate shocks to both money demand and supply. The first part of the decade was a period of large structural change in financial markets. The demand for money rose sharply relative to spending in the economy so, for a time, broad money growth was rapid and inflation was falling. That structural change probably continued into the second half of the decade. But it now seems that there was also some unwarranted expansion of the supply of money. For a time, that shock was disguised as further structural change in the demand for money but, in 1988, inflation began to rise. It is easy to be wise after the event.

Also, developing stress-testing frameworks remains a collective challenge about which central banks and supervisors should strengthen their works. At our level, the next stage of our works is to organize work streams with banks in order to specify together the best practices of the sector in terms of governance and to reflect on scenarios and metrics to best assess the vulnerability of banks, liaising with the work carried out with the NGFS. At the end, the release of these surveys and their follow-up signal the willingness of the ACPR / Banque de France to gradually “mainstream” climate changerelated risks. This willingness is also growing among European Institutions as attested by the recent move from the SSM to launch its own internal network combined with an NCA Climate contact group. The ambition is to contribute to European and international fora as well as be in the position to adopt resulting guidelines or requirements (in the EBA case). Nevertheless, at a moment where networks or work streams are burgeoning, especially within European institutions, we should be very careful about the good coordination of these different initiatives to avoid redundancy and duplication. It is also important that the NFGS, which remains a club of the willing, ensure some minimal degree of cooperation and harmonization by issuing high-level recommendations.
  While we currently plan to start operating the new service with the existing hours for CHAPS, the new service will have near 24x7 capability, and so when there is clear demand we expect, in consultation with industry, to extend operating hours. This flexibility means we can respond quickly to changing demands and an increasingly globalised economy.   We will also provide Application Programming Interface (API) access to users to enable read and write of payments data. The Bank has committed to providing an exposed API to allow external participants to develop sophisticated and automated real-time tools for accessing RTGS transactional and liquidity data. We plan to announce in a few months our initial thoughts on the approach and implementation. And with a visionary new system, we want more participants to be able to benefit from it. In 2018 we expanded direct access to non-bank payment service providers, making it possible for a broader set of firms to compete with banks. Five non-bank payment service providers currently hold accounts in RTGS and many more firms are exploring the possibility of joining. In addition, the renewed RTGS service will further reduce barriers to entry for new players – for example on-boarding will be quicker and testing will be streamlined making joining speedy and efficient. For CHAPS, we expect to be able to meet demand from dozens of new participants a year, rather than a handful as currently. There are two clear benefits from expanding access.

We all know that stable conditions make it easier to arrive at wise economic decisions. When wages and prices chase each other in an unpredictable way, and both interest rates and the exchange rate fluctuate widely as a result of this, with a certain amount of luck or smartness it is sometimes possible to do good business. But most people surely realise that this is not the best setting for either long-term investment or for those who have to live on an earned income or a pension. The head of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, has formulated his view of what monetary policy’s objective should be in roughly these words: inflation should be so low that economic agents do not have to worry about it. Limited room for employment policy Why, then, are there those who still argue that higher inflation would be a good thing? I believe this is mainly because they perceive a conflict between price stability and low unemployment. This perception in turn has its roots in a short-run, cyclical perspective. When economic activity is rising or falling on account of transitory demand fluctuations around a long-term trend, this negative relationship does exist. Rising demand for goods and services generates increased demand for labour and lower unemployment; this tends to be accompanied by rising wages and higher inflation. The opposite also applies. But this does not mean that higher inflation results in permanently higher employment and lastingly lower unemployment.
We will need to know what issues to pay attention to, how those issues affect your business and find a common language to discuss them in a meaningful way. To this end, the Bank and Securities Commission Malaysia, are collaborating with the World Bank to develop a principles-based taxonomy to enable financial institutions in Malaysia to classify green assets consistently. This framework aims to support informed decisions and analysis of exposures to climate risk in fund raising, lending and investment activities. The Bank expects to issue the first draft of the taxonomy by the end of this year for industry feedback prior to its adoption. Second, we need to develop a more complete understanding of the impact of climaterelated risks to the Malaysian financial system and economy. In this regard, the Bank is actively involved in working together with the Central Banks and Supervisors Network of Greening the Financial System (NGFS) to develop an analytical framework to assess such risks. This entails sizing the impact of climate change on our financial system and economy, both in the central case and tail-end scenarios. This exercise also aims to estimate the relevant time frames in which these risks may materialise. To do so, we would need to better understand the transmission channels of climate-related risks, taking into consideration potential second-round effects and feedback loops.

Public authorities – at least in Europe – have tended to come to the aid of weak institutions, thus confirming the existence of an implicit guarantee for banks’ liabilities. This guarantee distorts the incentive system for the managers of banks and for their creditors, generating considerable costs for the public finances of the countries concerned. A key factor in encouraging the suitable risk perception of each liability instrument, and thus in minimising the cost for taxpayers, is bail-ins. These establish a clear order for the incurring of losses by shareholders and creditors, and provision is made for this arrangement to be activated prior to any injection of public funds. In Europe, given the political agreement reached on the Recovery and Resolution Directive, a set of common rules will be adopted in the near future establishing a clear and homogeneous order of seniority of liabilities in the event of bank resolution, and it will ensure the administrative power to impose losses on the holders of each instrument. That will notably minimise the cost to taxpayers of bank bail-outs. But common rules are not enough. The only way to ensure the possible homogeneous application of these rules is through the creation of a common resolution authority for all countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Similarly, it is important to have a common resolution fund in place which ensures, under similar conditions, that there is the necessary financial support for those institutions which might need it, irrespective of the budgetary situation of the State concerned.
More than 60 years ago, Jean Monnet, one  1  Standard Eurobarometer 84, November 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  of the founding fathers of the European Union, said: “Our countries have become too small for today’s world, at the level of modern techniques, at the measure of America and Russia today, China and India tomorrow”. The idea is therefore ingenious and the will of the people is clear. Together, this represents an appeal to policymakers to straighten out what is crooked, to reinforce the foundations of monetary union and once again reconcile the reality of the euro with the idea of the euro. The consequences of the recent financial and economic crisis show what is needed to achieve this from an economic perspective. What we certainly need is a European crisis tool – a mechanism that works quickly, effectively and efficiently in an acute crisis. A first step was taken with the creation of the European Stability Mechanism. But what’s necessary above all are structural reforms at national level, including reforms of social security schemes, labour and goods markets and insolvency laws. Reforms which ensure that the community of 19 countries grow together economically and move closer to the highest international standards. Such a convergence is important, not only to keep monetary union stable in the medium and long term, but also to safeguard economic growth and prosperity.

For that, structural reforms are necessary – at national and European level. At the same time, structural problems are making monetary policy less effective in the euro area. In this context, it seems very odd to me that politicians are now criticising the European Central Bank. This endangers our independence and undermines trust. I would like to see a political class that has the courage to lead public opinion. Politicians who have the confidence to explain to voters that a fully fledged European monetary union is not without an alternative, but that it is worthwhile – even if it’s proving difficult to get there. But once the idea and the reality of the euro are back in harmony, then Eurosceptic voices will not find many listeners. I am convinced of this. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Moreover, growth in the world economy is expected to remain relatively resilient, benefiting mainly from sustained growth in emerging economies. This should support external demand for euro area goods and services and thereby investment. This outlook is also reflected in the September 2008 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. The exercise projects average annual real GDP growth in a range between 1.1% and 1.7% in 2008, and between 0.6% and 1.8% in 2009. In comparison with the June Eurosystem staff projections, real GDP growth figures for 2008 and 2009 are lower. In the view of the Governing Council, the uncertainty surrounding this outlook for economic activity is particularly high at the current juncture and, generally, downside risks prevail. Risks stem particularly from renewed increases in energy and food prices, which could dampen consumption and investment. Moreover, downside risks continue to relate to the  BIS Review 105/2008  1  potential for the financial market tensions to affect the real economy more adversely than currently foreseen. The possibility of disorderly developments owing to global imbalances also implies downside risks to the outlook for economic activity, as do concerns about rising protectionist pressures. With regard to price developments, annual HICP inflation has remained considerably above the level consistent with price stability since last autumn, standing at 3.8% in August according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 4.0% in June and July 2008.

Therefore, looking through temporary factors, we assess that economic activity has expanded at a moderate pace during the final quarter of 2016 (Figure 4). We expect that the recovery will continue to be mild and gradual throughout 2017, which will leave the output gap at the negative territory. Main drivers of growth this year will be public investment expenditures and exports. Figure 3. Figure 4. Industrial Production  Industrial Production  (QoQ, Seasonally Adjusted)  (YoY)  5  3,9  8  4 6  3 2  4 2,0  1 2  0 -1  0  -2 -2  -3 -2,9  -4  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2012  2013  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. 2014  2015  2016  -3,1  -4  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. On the external side, I would like to note that the Turkish economy has been undergoing a persistent rebalancing process in recent years. Current account deficit has come down from a peak of 9 percent to less than 4 percent recently (Figure 5). Although improvement was partly reversed after mid-2016 due to sharp 3  fall in tourism revenues, we expect the deficit to continue to shrink gradually throughout 2017.
This also entailed the building up of expertise in our own country, which would secure a full order book for many years ahead – not only off our own shore. The activities on the Norwegian continental shelf would provide a boost to other industries in Norway. 1  Alexander Kielland (1880): Garman & Worse (Translation by W.W. Kettlewell). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Developing a new industry and spending the associated revenues also entailed challenges. The challenges were discussed in a white paper in 1974, Report no. 25 to the Storting, entitled “The role of the petroleum industry in Norwegian society”. If room was to be provided for supplying the oil sector and for increased consumption of goods and services, other industries would have to give way. The mechanisms described in the white paper are well known. I quote: “A transfer of production and jobs between firms and industries can occur via increased domestic cost pressures.” “Labour market pressures provide increased opportunities (...) for wage earners to find higher paid jobs.” “Firms in export- or import-competing industries (...) may be forced to downscale (...).” The country was indeed braced for structural changes and the attendant costs. But the white paper made it clear that restructuring was a necessary precondition for reaping the benefits of economic growth. We now know, more than 40 years later, that the structural changes did indeed come to pass. The industry structure of our economy has changed.

In the initial years under the fiscal rule, petroleum revenue spending rose approximately in pace with the GPFG’s capital. The fiscal rule, based on a real return of 4 percent, thereby provided an effective constraint on petroleum revenue spending over the fiscal budget. In recent years, high oil prices and solid returns have resulted in strong growth in the value of the GPFG. This has provided scope for substantial increases in petroleum revenue spending, although spending has been around 3 percent of the GPFG’s value in recent years. In a period of low unemployment and solid economic growth, it has been appropriate to set aside a greater share of the revenues. Recent years have been characterised by wide fluctuations in returns, with extreme variability during the financial crisis. Volatility on the world’s stock exchanges and in financial markets impacts the market value of the GPFG and thereby the anchor for fiscal policy. Although the depreciation of the krone has increased the GPFG’s current value in krone terms, this veils the fact that its international purchasing power is unaffected by changes in the krone’s value. Such volatility has become more difficult to manage as the GPFG has grown in size. Oil prices have fallen sharply over the past six months. Even if prices edge up again, we have been reminded of the uncertainty associated with future revenues. Lower oil prices imply slower growth in the GPFG than previously estimated.
These factors include the extraordinary level of liquidity that’s been provided, access to IOER that is limited to depository institutions, and a number of international and domestic regulatory reforms. International regulatory reforms include the liquidity coverage ratio, leverage ratio, and net stable funding ratio. In the U.S., changes in deposit insurance premium calculations, rules governing money market mutual funds, and the potential for a capital surcharge based in part on short-term wholesale funding may also affect certain market participants. Many of the changes in regulation – along with changes in market structure, technology, and other factors – may affect market participants’ activity and relationships in money markets. On net, their balance sheet costs may be higher, which may prompt money market participants to require higher returns to engage in competition to arbitrage wedges in money market rates and to alter their participation in central bank operations and facilities. This outcome may affect the transmission of monetary policy or require central banks to adapt their operations to accommodate these realities. Conclusion In conclusion, I’d like to note that the framework for implementing monetary policy and the landscape in which we operate have seen important changes in the years since the crisis,  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and they continue to evolve. The Desk plays an important role in this process, carrying out open market operations at the direction of the FOMC, in pursuit of the operating objectives the FOMC deems appropriate to achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability.

Despite fair growth prospects and subdued vulnerabilities, medium-term growth potential in the region seems insufficient to ensure pre-crisis pace of real convergence. The most recent data shows that the convergence is still there, but it has markedly slowed down. At the current pace, many countries in the region would need decades to reach German, Austrian or Swedish levels of income, countries that we like to use as benchmarks. The last crisis also showed that there can be events that will hold back growth and convergence for a protracted period of time and even work in an opposite direction, leading to divergence. We know that when it comes to living standards, in the long-run it is all about labour productivity, which can be decomposed into growth of capital per worker and growth of total factor productivity (TFP). While we can expect an investments to continue growing, it is not likely that the rates that we have witnessed in 2000s, with strong inflow of FDIs and related transfers of technology and know-how, will be seen again in the near future. That is why the TFP will ultimately prove to be the major determinant of longterm convergence. For us as policy makers, understanding the determinants of technology adoption, the TFP growth, is the key, as this gives us the channel to act through. There is an increasing number of theories and empirical papers linking development and the adoption of technologies to the role of institutions defined in a very broad way.
30  Consistent with this, those on the MPC most worried about the high level of the exchange rate advocated lower, not higher, interest rates in order to bring about a depreciation, at the risk of making the imbalances more acute. 31  The strategy of not raising, and for some lowering, Bank Rate appealed to those who saw signs of an improvement in the supply performance of the economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Was there a better alternative to a strategy of higher interest rates? The natural first line of defence against financial crises is macro-prudential policy. In principle, such policies can shift the Minsky-Taylor curve closer to the original Taylor curve. With hindsight, before 2007 there should have been a cap on the leverage of banks (see Chart 9). And the cap should have tightened as asset prices increased and the likely exposure to losses increased. That is why we now have a macro-prudential policy regime in the UK. It will be overseen by the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee, which will have the power to direct, and make recommendations to, regulators about capital and leverage in the UK financial system. In my judgement, the big challenge to monetary policy before the crisis was a serious mis-pricing in long-term interest and exchange rates, and the imbalances that resulted. Much of this was outside the control of UK policy-makers and reflected developments in the world economy.

Financial crimes will occur whenever there is money to be made and for sure criminals and hackers alike will use their best endeavours to penetrate the defence of the cyber world to rob or steal. The strength of the cyber world also lies its main weakness. Hackers can choose to attack customers and financial firms any time and anywhere because the virtual world is highly interconnected. Cyber attacks can take many different forms. A frequently used method is to make phishing attempts to trick customers into divulging their account information and passwords, or to plant malwares into customers’ computers and mobile phones to steal their access credentials. Then the hackers transfer moneys from the victims’ accounts. Sometimes the hackers would do something unusual, such as the recent example in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Hong Kong in which some customers’ bank accounts had been used by hackers to conduct unauthorized stock trading without stealing money from the victims’ accounts. At the bank level, the usual form of attacks would be Distributed Denial of Services (DdoS), whether they are motivated by blackmail, revenge or activism of some sort. There is a worrying trend that this form of attacks is rising very fast in recent years. Cybersecurity fortification initiative 4. Rather than harbouring the hope that you are lucky enough not to be targeted, it is more prudent and productive to take the necessary pre-emptive steps to protect yourself or your customers from cyber attacks.