samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The purchasing managers index for manufacturing and the National Institute of Economic Research’s quarterly business tendency survey indicate, for instance, that manufacturing activity improved from the middle of 2005 and that this development continued during the first quarter of this year. Developments in the labour market have also been positive in recent months. Employment has developed in line with our forecast, while the labour force has increased more than expected. Business tendency data also indicate that the upturn in employment will continue during the second quarter. All in all, I believe that this indicates that the slowdown at the end of last year was temporary, and that economic activity in Sweden this year has developed largely in line with the assessment in the February Inflation Report. There has been turbulence in the financial markets recently, with a relatively large fall in share prices. Asset price changes can affect inflation indirectly in that they affect households’ wealth and thereby aggregate demand. Share prices can rise sharply over a long period of time and then recoil, without this being a sign of a more lasting decline. At present, it is not possible to draw any far-reaching conclusions from the recent stock market developments. As usual, the Riksbank is monitoring  2  BIS Review 44/2006  developments in asset prices and what they may mean for inflation and other macroeconomic developments. With regard to inflation, the outcome for both March and April was higher than we had estimated in the Inflation Report.

The forecasts indicated that household consumption would rise and investment would continue to increase, but at a slightly slower rate than last year. We also envisaged continuing strong exports as a result of the good international activity. With regard to the labour market, we could observe an apparent upturn in demand for labour and that there were many indications that employment in terms of both persons in employment and of hours worked would increase further. Economic resources were expected to become increasingly strained and the rate of wage increase to become gradually higher. However, we assumed nonetheless that the increase in cost pressures would be relatively moderate as a result of continuing good productivity growth over the coming years. All in all, inflation was expected to rise, although at a modest rate, as a result of dampening effects from the developments in productivity and import prices. Our forecast was that underlying inflation would rise gradually and approach the 2 per cent target a couple of years ahead. This was the picture of developments painted in the February Inflation Report. What has happened since February? The world economy appears to have developed slightly more strongly than we foresaw then. New and revised national accounts figures have been published for the United States, parts of Asia and the euro zone. With regard to the United States, the statistics show that the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006 were slightly stronger than we had assessed. For Asia the picture of a stronger development is even more evident.
Among the G20 measures of 2009 were the efforts to strengthen confidence in international financial institutions, the IMF in particular, to permit it to play an effective role in tackling the  4  The Unique Nature of the Responsibilities of the International Monetary Fund. IMF Pamphlet Series No. 46, 1992, footnote 54. 5  How Economics Managed To Make Amends, by Arvind Subramanian, Peterson Institute for International Economics. Op-ed in the Financial Times December 28, 2009. BIS Review 22/2010  3  crisis. Indeed, the G20 increasingly uses the IMF as an instrument of its policy implementation. The governance structures of the IMF have received considerable attention, as they are not deemed to adequately reflect recent important changes in the global economy. Misgivings about the legitimacy of these structures have played a role in prompting the G20 member countries to “…designate[d] the G20 to be the premier forum for our international economic cooperation” as agreed by the G20 leaders at their summit in Pittsburgh last September. With his presence at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos last month, the Chair of the G20 aimed to “drum up support for the idea of making the summit [in Korea later this year] a “premier forum” where all major discussions on worldwide economic cooperation will take place”. 6 Therefore, the current ambition of the G20 may not only be driven by the global crisis.

It engages the membership of the IMF directly and indirectly. It would lend legitimacy and integrity to the process of international economic and financial cooperation. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF confer upon it to “oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation.” 13 During the crisis, the IMF proved its ability to respond promptly and effectively to very challenging developments. I therefore submit that a statutory-based and representative global order should be one of the main objectives of the discussions on changes in the international financial architecture. Conclusion To conclude, I have presented my view on the prevailing international economic order which I find deficient in important respects. The G20 played a vital role in the response to the global crisis and the rest of the world depends on its successful cooperation. With the world recovering from crisis, the G20 should merge its activities with those of the IMF. That will give them both wider acceptance and legitimacy. At the outset, I described some characteristics of Norway and emphasised our history of active support of multilateral institutions and collaboration. Currently, we do not participate where decisive discussions take place on international economic and financial issues and cooperation, including changes in the governance of the IMF. Yet we are called upon to make relatively large contributions to efforts agreed by a non-statutory body. 11  IMF chief warns of reliance on exports; interview with the Financial Times January 30–31, 2010, p. 5.
I appeal for this decision to be made this week, if possible, for the sake of assuaging all concerns regarding BNB's governance. Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for the confidence I’ve been given. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 104/2009

One prospect is that ageold ideas that have shaped most of our history are revived, such that the prosperity of some cannot be achieved without the poverty of others; international and supranational organisations lose their relevance as places for negotiating and finding compromise solutions; the affirmation of 7 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  the self, of the identity, becomes the first requirement of every policy. In such a world, freedom and peace become accessories which can be dispensed with as needed. But if we want these values to remain essential, fundamental, the path is a different one: adjusting existing institutions to change. This process of adjustment has so far encountered resistance because the inevitable national political difficulties always seemed to be above such need. This reluctance has resulted in uncertainty about the capacity of institutions to respond to events and has strengthened the voice of those who want to pull down these institutions. There should be no doubt: this adjustment will have to be as deep as the phenomena that revealed the fragility of the existing order, and as vast as the dimensions of a geopolitical order that is changing in a way that is not favourable for Europe. The European Union wanted to create a sovereign where there was not one. It is not surprising that in a world where every point of contact between the great powers is increasingly a point of friction, the external challenges to the existence of the European Union become increasingly threatening.
In 2009, industrial employment contracted by 7 percent, whereas, employment in the construction sector and services sector increased by 0.6 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively. Employment by Sectors (Percent) 80  60  40  20  0 2004  2005  2006 Farm  2007  2008  2009  No n-Farm  Source: TURKSTAT. 19. Demographic changes in Turkey leads to an increase in the share of the working population in the overall population and this, in turn, results in the unemployment to persist. However, the recent upsurge in the unemployment rate is mainly attributable to cyclical rather than structural factors. The economic contraction in 2009 increased the labor force participation rate while significantly curbing the pace of employment growth; hence the unemployment rate increased rapidly. BIS Review 68/2010  7  20. The labor force is comprised of 23,8 million people in 2008 and rose to 24.7 million people in 2009 by an increase of 4 percentage points, whereas, employment increased by a mere 0.4 percent, from 21.2 million to 21.3 million people. In this period, the rapid increase in labor force participation while employment remained much the same, caused the unemployment rate to climb to 14 percent in 2009 from 11 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, the non-farm unemployment rate increased from 13.6 percent to 17.4 percent. 21. As I mentioned in my previous presentations, creating new employment opportunities for the growing labor supply in Turkey is contingent upon carrying out cost-reducing and resilience-enhancing reforms in labor markets.

Source: Ministry of Finance, Medium Term Program (2010-2012). 28. The determined implementation of fiscal discipline in Turkey since 2002 has helped cut the ratios of government budget deficit and debt to GDP, to a level well below the average of both advanced and emerging economies. Although Turkey’s budget deficit expanded at a faster pace than in many other emerging economies in 2009, according to the MTP projections, government debt stock is likely to remain below the average of other emerging economies in the upcoming years. 10  BIS Review 68/2010  General Government Budget Deficit and Debt Ratio Average Values in Advanced Countries and Turkey  Average Values in Emerging Countries and Turkey  (Percent of GDP)  (Percent of GDP)  100  Aver age of A dvan ced Cou ntrie s**  80 2 008 70 2 003  2003  60 50  20 12  40 2 008  2003  2 003  60 55 2012 50 2 008  45  2012  40  Tur key  Tu rkey  2008  30  35  -2  0  2  4  6  8  10  Budg et D eficit  *Dashed lines indicate forecasts. **Includes USA, UK, Germany, France, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, Japan, Portugal, Israel, Greece, Italy, Austria, New Zealand and South Korea. Source: IMF. Turkish data is taken from the Ministry of Finance, Undersecreteriat of Treasury, Medium Term Program (2010-2012) and Program for 2009. 29.
All in all, if, as we are often emphasizing during this crisis, the post-crisis reforms have mitigated the risks to the sector’s financial stability, the implementation of the resolution framework has contributed to strengthening the banking sector in a crucial manner. Identifying gaps for a more robust resolution framework in the EU Accepting that we have made great advances in this field, we have to acknowledge also that there is still some way to go before we can truly assert our journey is over. First of all, it is important to recall that the European resolution framework is one of the three pillars of the Banking Union and it is essential to develop the third one – the much needed European Deposit Insurance framework – to ensure the resilience and well-functioning of this Banking Union. As this matter goes beyond the scope of this conference, I will rather concentrate on the second pillar of the Banking Union. So, entering into this resolution pillar, there are certain areas on which both policymakers and practitioners should concentrate, and it is precisely some of these gaps that I want to discuss today, namely: -  liquidity in resolution, the resolution approach to small and mid-sized institutions, avoidance of unlevelled playing fields, and the adequate treatment of systemic situations. The first issue to be addressed, as it affects all institutions alike, is the provision of liquidity to a bank in resolution.

Therefore, I would like to insist that a new European approach to smaller institutions is paramount. Now, having regard to the European nature of supervision and resolution, the Eurozone should move swiftly to sort out this unlevelled playing field. And, let me be clear on this, I would urge consistency in finalising the Banking Union, covering EDIS and smaller institutions. The disconnection between truly pan-European supervision and what still is, largely, a national burden is untenable. Finally, the coronavirus has, as I mentioned, fundamentally changed our lives within a short period. The current situation reveals our limited ability to deal with systemic risks. The pandemic will inevitably trigger widespread economic problems, and the health of the financial system will unavoidably be affected. The reforms made during the past decade seem to have increased the resilience of the financial system, which, helped by other 2  policies given the size of the shock, has continued to provide financing to the real economy. Obviously, lessons will emerge. This kind of shock is to some extent new, as it has not been generated by the financial system itself, and that will help us improve regulation. In this respect, several academics think that the current resolution framework is not wellequipped to deal with systemic crisis. And several elements could be adjusted in order to make resolution more efficient in these very specific circumstances.
That regional network has grown out of the Bank’s branches that were established in 1826 to deal with problems caused by the failure of local banknote-issuing banks. (The nearest branch to North Wales would have been in Liverpool, and like several of the sixteen branches which the Bank opened at that time it was located on land previously occupied by licensed premises - the old Queen’s Arms in Castle Street. Indeed the guiding principle seems to have been “If it works as a pub it will work as a bank”. The Licensed Victuallers Association has taken its revenge in recent decades, as old banks have been turned into pubs). Within the branches, the Bank appointed an Agent to liaise with local industry and commerce, and since 1930 they have been sending regular reports on their economies to Threadneedle Street. During the 1980s and 1990s, most of the branches were closed as different schemes for guaranteeing the supply of bank notes were established. But the Agents remained, and the network was extended to its current line-up of twelve - including a new Welsh Agency located in Cardiff, now run by Adrian Piper. Between them, the Agents are in regular contact with some 8000 firms. This provides the basis for the Agents’ monthly reports and presentations to the MPC; the Committee also commissions special surveys and asks for Agents’ help in understanding puzzles in the data. This information is currently published in summary form each quarter, alongside the Inflation Report.

The origins of the present approach go back to 1992, when the Conservative government adopted an inflation target as the centrepiece of a package of reforms designed to rebuild credibility with financial markets in the wake of sterling’s abrupt departure from the ERM. This approach - which came to include the popular “Ken and Eddie show” - proved successful in establishing a track record of low and stable inflation. In 1997, the incoming Labour Government “entrenched” this success by handing the operation of monetary policy over to the Bank of England and setting out a detailed institutional and legal framework for the conduct of monetary policy. The result was to depoliticise interest rate decisions, within a framework of accountability that left the Government clearly in charge of setting objectives for inflation. Taking operational monetary policy decisions out of the hands of politicians was a decisive step. The touchstone of a successful monetary policy framework is its credibility. If people believe policy makers will always act to keep inflation low, this expectation will itself put a brake on inflationary wage and price increases. Economists long argued that it was difficult for politicians to make a fully credible commitment to low inflation. And perceptions are what matter: even if a government has no intention of manipulating  BIS Review 71/2004  1  monetary policy for political ends, as long as firms, workers and financial markets entertain that as a possibility, the job of keeping inflation low will be that much harder.
Jon Cunliffe: The UK economy post crisis – a series of unfortunate events? Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England, at the Centre for International Business Studies, London South Bank University, London, 24 February 2016. *  *  *  There is a well-known myth – much loved in management schools – that if you put a frog in boiling water it will jump out; but if you put it in cold water and bring the water very slowly to the boil, its nervous system will not register the temperature change and it will be boiled. I am assured by zoologist friends that it is indeed a myth. Frogs sense gradually changing temperatures like the rest of us. But it is an instructive parable. Sometimes when you focus on incremental changes you can forget the big picture until the water has become very hot – or very cold. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets every month. We assess a very wide range of changing data – for the world and the economy is constantly changing. The past usually becomes clearer but the future is always uncertain. So as a policymaker occasionally it is worth standing a long way back and asking “What did I expect to happen last year and the year before? And what can I learn from what actually happened?”. And, crucially, “Have I been lulled by the ever turning kaleidoscope of data and missed a change in the big picture?”.

The risk here is that when the current external disinflationary pressures subside, domestic cost growth pressures will have built up and will push inflation above target before monetary policy can restrain it. I would not discount this risk. The labour market has clearly become much tighter. And if pay is being held down by cyclical or scarring effects, these could change quickly. And there has been a substantial depreciation in sterling in the past three months which will push up on inflation, possibly more quickly than the usual prolonged lag between changes in the exchange rate and inflation. But with interest rates near the effective lower bound, with powerful disinflationary forces from abroad likely to persist for the next year, with low growth in unit labour costs and with an economy growing at around 2%, I think this is the lesser risk. Second, there is the concern that continued low interest rates lead to the build-up of financial stability risks through an acceleration of credit growth, increase in bank leverage and household indebtedness. The financial system has only recently come back to life with economy-wide credit now growing in the UK at around the rate of GDP. While there are some elements of credit that are growing more strongly, such as buy to let mortgages and unsecured debt, I think we are now emerging from the post-crisis phase and in a more standard stage of the credit cycle and we now have macroprudential tools to manage risks as they build up.
As a background to my comments on the topic of this panel, “Where do central banks go from here?”, let me note that, as the world economy recovers from the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed, a debate is underway regarding the causes of the crisis and how to reduce the risk of future crises. The role of monetary policy and its relation to financial stability are also under debate. Some blame the Federal Reserve, saying that its monetary policy was too expansionary after 2001 and that this laid the foundations for the crisis. The lesson to be drawn, they argue is that there is a need to modify the framework of flexible inflation targeting and give a greater role to financial-stability considerations. In my view, the crisis was largely caused by factors that had very little to do with monetary policy. Instead, it was mainly caused by regulatory and supervisory failures in combination with some special circumstances, such as low real interest rates around the world and housing policy in the United States. Neither do I share the view that there is a need to fundamentally modify the framework of flexible inflation targeting. Ultimately, my main conclusion for monetary policy is that flexible inflation targeting – applied in the right way and in particular using all the information about financial conditions that is relevant for the forecast of inflation and resource utilisation at any horizon – remains the best-practice monetary policy before, during, and after the financial crisis.

Benoît Cœuré: Policy coordination in a multipolar world Remarks by Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the 5th annual Cusco conference organised by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru and the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee: “70 years after Bretton Woods: Managing the interconnectedness of the world economy”, Cusco, 22 July 2014 *  *  *  I would like to thank Michele Ca’ Zorzi and G. Georgiadis for contributing to these remarks. I remain solely responsible for the opinions expressed herein. Dear Governor Velarde, dear Marc Uzan, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the organisers for giving me the opportunity to share some thoughts with you on the changes in the international monetary system (IMS) and the role of monetary policy coordination. History casts a long shadow over the IMS. Over the past three decades, however, the global economy has changed in decisive ways. Three aspects are particularly striking. First, financial factors have become an increasingly relevant source of cross-country interlinkages, with some evidence of cross-country de-linkages since the global financial crisis. Second, emerging economies have raised their clout, as reflected by the impact of their business cycles on global growth and the growing use of their currencies: the global economy has become multipolar. And third, monetary policy in advanced economies has – more recently – entered new territory by resorting to unconventional measures.