samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Unemployment continued to fall and the amount of excess supply was gradually, but meaningfully, reduced. These factors looked set to provide the momentum needed to bring domestic inflationary pressures back to up to a rate consistent with the inflation target. It was notable that wage growth was already showing signs of picking up. At this time, however, total CPI inflation had fallen to around zero. While below-target inflation partly reflected the drag from past spare capacity, the majority was due to falls in energy prices, muted growth in world prices and a recent appreciation of sterling.13 Measures of core inflation that attempt to strip out these external factors had fallen much less sharply, though were still below target-consistent rates. The MPC expected the effects of the external factors on inflation to be protracted, particularly the dampening influence of sterling, which was likely to still be affecting inflation in two years' time or what is viewed as the conventional policy horizon. The Committee had learnt from the experience of the post-crisis depreciation in sterling that the pass-through of changes in the exchange rate through supply chains into UK CPI inflation is slow, not swift, taking several years to complete. The Committee therefore continued to maintain Bank Rate at 0.5%, judging this was appropriate to ensure that waning drag on inflation from external price pressures would be balanced by further increases in domestic inflationary pressures brought about by eliminating the remaining margin of spare capacity in the economy.

In particular, we needed to bear in mind that the euro area’s financial system is predominantly bank-based. Take the structures of private credit outstanding as an example: recourse to banks makes up more than 70% of non-equity external finance in the euro area. By comparison, in the US the equivalent proportion is only around 30%. This reflects the fact that the US financial system is primarily market-based. In the euro area, guaranteeing steady access to credit for households and companies largely means preserving the viability of the banking system. Banks play such a dominant role in our economy that it was appropriate to focus our non-standard measures on the banking sector. This profound contrast in financial and economic structures explains the different responses by central banks to the crisis as exemplified by the approaches of the ECB and the Federal Reserve System of the US. We rely on different channels as regards the transmission of our policy action. But these variations do not reflect conflicting views on fundamental principles or objectives. On the contrary: given the different structures, the approaches need to be different to achieve the same objective. Thus, I would strongly argue that central banks around the world are united in purpose. As I indicated before, the remarks I just made on the ECB’s response to the crisis did not contain any message concerning future monetary policy, and should not be interpreted as containing any such message.
Allow me to recapitulate the consequences in a few words: various banks, stock brokerage firms and securities houses lost part or even all of their staff, their business premises, their backup facilities and their lines of communication. The markets remained closed on the following day, the equity markets even until the end of the week. From a systemic point of view, of even greater consequence than the closing of the equity market was the fact that the two markets for US government paper and for commercial paper, the main vehicles for short-term liquidity equalisation between market participants, had ceased to operate. Payment and settlement systems started to break down. Securities and credit balances totalling billions were thus blocked at some banks while lacking at others. Even though the terror attacks were concentrated on New York and Washington, in the beginning they not only paralysed Wall Street but they also threatened to undermine significant parts of the international financial system. It is much too soon, and this is not the proper place, to make an assessment of the profound human, social and political implications of the terror attacks. The resilience of the banks and the financial markets must be emphasised, however. A week after the attacks, business was almost back to usual again. In most cases, the banks and securities houses affected managed to solve their problems, some of which were immense. Neither a stock market crash nor a breakdown of parts of the financial system set in either in the United States or anywhere else.

In particular, the Fed communicated clearly from the very beginning that it would meet the increased requirements for dollar liquidity at any time. BIS Review 101/2001  1  Against this background it is not surprising that the terrorist attacks on the United States failed to seriously impair the functioning capacity of the financial markets either in Switzerland or in the rest of Europe. Even though the global financial system had been hit in its very core, the extensive transmission of problems that was theoretically possible did not take place. This is not least due to the fact that the institutions concerned on both sides of the Atlantic comported themselves in an appropriate manner, as did the central banks. The biggest immediate problem for some Swiss banks is likely to have been the inability to act of a major correspondence bank in New York that was hit by a simultaneous power failure in the main supply and the backup system. In such cases, liquidity requirements soar. The Fed's generous supply of USD liquidity to the market also benefited Swiss banks. We did not, however, observe a similarly higher demand for Swiss franc liquidity. Nevertheless, the Swiss National Bank was, of course, present in the CHF money market. (Cf. the remarks of Bruno Gehrig.) For the time being, I would sum up the situation as follows: 1. The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 did not succeed in destabilising either the US part of the international financial system or those of the rest of the world. 2.
We look at [HICP] stripped, super stripped, PCCI. There's a whole variety of the prices and the inflation that we look at, and we need to see that. We need to be confident that it is heading down. For the moment, we have some of those measurements declining a bit, some of those sort of stable and others still going strongly. The third component is the strength of transmission, which we measure at each and every step of the way from the market rates, bond prices, credit by banks, bank funding. And then to the economy, where we refer to the 4.4% and 3.4% [April bank lending rates to] corporate and households, because that's how it is transmitted. And ultimately to inflation. So, that's the path that we want to see delivering so that we head towards our target. That's what we have done, that's what we will do and we will stick to that methodology. I was wondering: how alarmed are you about the upward revision to the 2025 inflation outlook? Does it mean that the 3.75% terminal rate that was generally expected – at least until recently – isn't going to be enough? Then secondly: you've alluded to the strength of the labour market and the impact that wages are having on inflation. Do you think you can achieve the 2% inflation target with unemployment remaining as low as it is now? Or does it have to go up? So, your first question referred to the core inflation revision. We revised actually all three.

Dimitar Radev: Achieving the financial stability objective through macroprudential measures cannot be sustainable without understanding the financial cycle Opening remarks by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, at the Conference "The Current Global and European Financial Cycle: Where Do We Stand and How Do We Move Forward? ", jointly organized by the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank for International Settlements on the occasion of the 140th Anniversary of the Bulgarian National Bank, Sofia, 7-8 July 2019. * * * Dear colleagues, Distinguished guests, We are delighted to have you with us to participate and share in our joint BNB-BIS conference organized on the occasion of the 140th anniversary of the Bulgarian National Bank. I would like to extend my special thanks to the General Manager Agustín Carstens and the BIS for their support in organizing this event. This is only a latest example in decades of cooperation between our two institutions. The BNB is among the oldest central banks in the world, 13th by order of establishment1. Today’s conference, therefore, marks a long history of central banking in Bulgaria. Evolution of a central bank’s mandates A central bank is historically associated with the goal of keeping the national currency and prices stable. After the Great Depression of the 1930 s supervision has become a function entrusted to or taken away from central banks in cycles depending on crisis experiences. With respect to supervision as a central bank function, the 2007/2008 global crisis had two effects.
At the same time, we stated that we cannot specify an exact goal for employment because “the maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market” and that “change over time and may not be directly measurable.”7] In the aviary of monetary policy makers, I am considered a “hawk.” I respect the fact that the Congress of the United States has given the Federal Reserve a dual mandate of conducting monetary policy so as to have full employment and simultaneously maintain stable prices. I believe monetary policy is the principal determinant of long-term price stability. But I have long maintained that monetary policy is but one gear in the complicated gearbox that drives job creation. Education and other structural aspects of our economy condition the nation’s job-creating capacity; fiscal and regulatory policy, in turn, condition both the structure and dynamics of employment. I was delighted that the full committee recognized this and made it part of its official credo. In a world driven by rapid technological change and globalization, job-creating capital will flow not only to countries that conduct sound monetary policy but to places with the most welcoming, competitive tax and regulatory systems. This was underscored in a recent Harvard Business School (HBS) survey authored by Jan Rivkin and Michael Porter, two widely admired scholars on national competitiveness and economic development.

The citizens of Texas and the Eleventh Federal Reserve District operate under the same monetary policy as do the rest of our fellow Americans. We have the same mortgage rates, pay the same rate of interest on commercial and consumer loans, and earn returns and borrow at the same interest rates as do our brethren in the rest of the country. Which raises an important question: If monetary policy is the same here as everywhere else in the United States, why does Texas outperform the rest? The answer is no doubt complicated by the fact that we are blessed with a comparatively great amount of nature’s gifts, a high concentration of military installations and other “unfair” advantages. But one cannot avoid the conclusion that one of those “unfair” advantages is that we have a Legislature, based here in Austin, that under both Democrat and Republican governors has over time crafted laws and regulations that encourage business expansion and job creation. They have conducted the fiscal affairs of the state so as to maintain confidence in the future. One might draw two lessons here: first, that Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, is right when he says, “If you want more private demand, you have to take people’s angst away” by having responsible and disciplined fiscal policy;4 and second, that fiscal policy either complements monetary policy or retards its effectiveness as a propellant for job creation.
William C Dudley: Some lessons from the crisis Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Institute of International Bankers Membership Luncheon, New York, 13 October 2009. *  *  *  Thank you for having me here to speak today. It is a real pleasure to have this opportunity to discuss the challenges ahead in making our banking and financial system more resilient and robust. We have learned a great deal over the past two years about our financial system and its vulnerabilities. The challenge ahead is to put these lessons to good use. Regulators and market participants failed to fully appreciate the degree to which the various aspects of our financial system are interconnected, and to foresee what those tight linkages would mean for market function when even one reasonably large institution – let alone many – became distressed. We also did not fully appreciate the strength of the amplifying mechanisms that were built into our financial system; the consequence of which was to exacerbate the boom on the way up and worsen the bust on the way down. Contributing to these pro-cyclical dynamics were inadequate incentives for firms to curb their risk-taking and to more effectively manage the risks they did face.

What the world will look like in 2050 will be partly shaped by the future of Europe; and the future of Europe depends on the decisions we take now. Of course, we always face the risk of failure when conducting far-reaching reforms. Yet we cannot afford another missed opportunity and we have to act swiftly without losing a longer term view. For the Euro area, for its citizens, 2016–2017 is the decisive time to act. 4  4  Interview of Robert Mundell by Laura Wallace, « Ahead of his time », Finance and Development, IMF, September 2006, vol 43, n° 3. BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
The SRR gives four tools to the three Tripartite Authorities to cope with failing institutions: •  First, the transfer of all or part of a bank’s business to a private sector purchaser; something we have already seen used in the resolution of Bradford and Bingley and Kaupthing under the Special Provisions Act. •  Second, the transfer of the viable part of a bank’s business to a temporary bridge bank owned by the Bank of England. This would allow continuity of banking services  4  BIS Review 132/2008  for its customers whilst enabling due diligence by potential private sector purchasers and providing for the orderly wind down of the rump. •  Third, temporary public ownership which would give the treasury the power to transfer the shares of a failing bank to a nominee of the Treasury. This power would be used in cases where significant amounts of public sector funds are required to stabilise the failing bank or where long term restructuring of the bank is necessary. •  Fourth bank insolvency procedures – a last resort. This would look much like a standard company insolvency but with the important difference that the liquidator’s primary objective would be to assist the FSCS in protecting depositors. I can understand why there has been some nervousness among banks and investors about this regime and particularly about the powers to split failing banks into “good” and “bad” parts.

This would enable us to also seize opportunities to tackle these “twin challenges” in an integrated manner. It is my sincere hope that today’s event, along with the release of the report, will encourage broader dialogue and increase awareness around nature-related risks and opportunities, in turn paving the way for concrete action on this important front. I would like to thank the World Bank for this fruitful collaboration, and the esteemed speakers joining us today. I look forward to the engaging sessions ahead. Read Report: An Exploration of Nature-related Financial Risks in Malaysia See also: BNM’s Climate Change website 1  IPBES. 2019. “The global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services: summary for policymakers.” [Link to IPBES]  2 World Economic Forum New Nature Economy Series [Link to PDF] 3 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  3 UN Biodiversity page [Link] 4 SDG 8. 5 SDG 3. 6 "Life on land” is SDG 15, “Life below water” is SDG 14. 7 Network for Greening the Financial System. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
The initial participants number 11, instead of the 6 to 9 countries that seemed most probable to Calmfors. That by itself means a great deal. It is a matter of simple logic: if you belong to a club in which 6 out of the 15 members make a move, there is no cause to feel an outsider; matters are different when 11 members decide on a course of action and support it whole-heartedly, leaving only 4 on the sidelines. It is perfectly clear that EMU is a major project – perhaps the most important at present – in the process of European integration. A great deal is being invested in it and the EMU process also affects policies in other areas. But let us not exaggerate: experience differs from area to area and Sweden’s voice is naturally not shorn of all its weight just because we are outside the euro area. As regards economic policy – the only area of which I have direct experience – the pattern is clear. It surprised me how quickly the euro countries saw themselves as a single unit and the ways in which this altered the agenda for our committee meetings. In that the finance ministers of the euro countries have formed a separate group, Euro 11, to some extent Sweden is excluded from the interesting discussions. BIS Review 92/1999  4  The Community agenda is being constructed in the light of needs among the eleven members of the euro area.

On the contrary, we must convince the rest of the world that we have not refrained from adopting the euro so as to be able to devalue the krona if the going gets tough. The long-term positive effects of joining the monetary union should not be played down just because they are difficult to measure. The participating countries and markets are drawing closer to each other. This probably affects competition, investment flows and prices to a greater extent than traditional models are able to show. I believe that the costs of staying outside are particularly great at present and in the coming years, for instance as EMU generates far-reaching structural changes in the business sector. To this should be added the political arguments. Sweden has already lost influence in the area I am best able to assess, economic policy. This is particularly serious today as the global financial map is being redrawn and we need to assert our position as a small country in Europe. Others are better placed to pronounce on other areas but it seems logical that our positions there are also being weakened because we are not seen as a fully-fledged participant in EU cooperation. 5  BIS Review 92/1999  Finally it is a matter of weighing all these arguments against each other. The assessments involved, economic as well as political, are naturally difficult.
In previous public appearances I have warned that the sound fiscal results of the previous years had a component very closely linked to the expansion of the real estate sector, which would tend to disappear in lower growth phases. Unfortunately, the loss of momentum of tax revenue is proving acute. And combined with the significant revenuerelated impact of the expansionary measures taken this year, that means that the end-year figures for public finances in 2008 will be worse than projected only a few months ago, and that the general government balance at the end of the year will be in deficit. The weakness of activity in 2009 will give rise to a deficit-widening dynamic which, given the uncertainty facing us, will mean that that the deficit may be greater than forecast in the draft Budget. I must reiterate here the call for prudence in fiscal policy management, whereby budgetary policy should focus on allowing the automatic stabilisers to continue deploying their intended countercyclical effect, while preserving the bases for maintaining a sound position in the long term. Given the uncertainty surrounding the world growth scenario, it is important that fiscal policy should retain room for manoeuvre in the face of potential situations of greater weakness. Nothing could be worse than having to face fresh turmoil when the only option possible is that of having to reduce the deficit, as we have had to do in the past and as has happened recently in other developed countries.

Our efforts to promote high standards of corporate governance and sustainable business practices build on principles and guidelines developed by organisations such as the UN and the OECD. As a financial investor, the fund is affected by the regulation of financial markets. We engage with regulators and participate in consultations on new regulations. We support the development of harmonised rules across markets. We express our expectations towards the companies in our investment portfolio through published expectation documents and direct engagement. So far, we have established three focus areas: climate change, water management and children’s rights. The documents set out our expectations of how companies should manage risk in these areas. Chart: Responsible investment II The purpose of our interaction with investee companies is to support the companies in their creation of long-term value. One of the most important tools at our disposal for exercising ownership rights is voting. We vote at nearly every annual general meeting of the companies in our portfolio. As mentioned, equal treatment of shareholders, including minority shareholders, is of paramount importance to us. Shareholders should have the right to nominate and dismiss directors, file shareholder proposals at general meetings and approve significant changes to the capital structure of a company. Chart: Responsible investment III We seek to identify, assess and report on different kinds of risks to future returns by analysing environmental, social and governance issues. The aim is to gain greater insight into companies and portfolio risks.