samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I therefore think it is all the more important to stress that the ECB’s recent decisions, in the face of the crisis, have aimed to preserve the effective transmission of monetary policy via the bank channel: the conditions for TLTRO-IIIs, these targeted longer-term refinancing operations, have been significantly eased (up to 50 percentage points lower than the deposit facility rate if the target for lending during the “Covid period” is reached, or currently –1%). This radical innovation represents a reduction of several billion euros in annual costs for the European banking system. New operations have also been announced (bridge LTROs, PELTROs or Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations). Since the implementation of these measures, the outstanding amount of refinancing provided by the Eurosystem to euro area banks has increased sharply, to more than EUR 1,000 billion, even before the June TLTRO. The easing of the collateral framework, for its part, has significantly increased the amount of assets eligible for operations, and supported the supply of credit to the private sector. First, by expanding the use of credit claims (bank loans) as collateral. But also by temporarily lowering the haircut applied to collateral by 20 percentage points for all assets (and by an additional 20 percentage points for credit claims), or by increasing from 2.5% to 10% the maximum share of unsecured bank debt securities in a credit institution’s 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  collateral pool.

Ask not what the economy can do for insurers – ask what insurers can do for the economy Speech given by Anna Sweeney, Executive Director, Insurance Supervision Division Delivered at the Bank of America 25th European Financials CEO Conference 22 September 2020  I am grateful to Alan Sheppard, Megan Bell and Zachary Morris-Dyer for their assistance preparing this speech. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Good morning and thank you to Bank of America for inviting me to speak here today. In a normal year, I would use these remarks to run through our regulatory agenda. But this year it is inevitable that my remarks will focus on the effects of Covid-19: a human tragedy for millions, the worst economic crisis in the UK for several centuries and an unparalleled global challenge. Our economy and the actors within it are continuing to face numerous challenges and a great deal of uncertainty. The aim of the Bank of England – along with colleagues from other public sector institutions – has been to build a bridge across the economic disruption caused by the pandemic. And insurers – as providers of protection, as guarantors of retirement income and as institutional investors - have an important role to play in the recovery from that crisis.
The fiscal policy stance can affect the growth capacity of the economy. Government regulation and various features of the tax system can influence corporate decisions with regard to localisation, investment and technology. Other measures can affect the labour force and the functioning of the labour market. Over time, real wages must move in line with productivity and real wages. The social partners determine wage growth. We have seen in previous periods that they pull in the right direction when that is needed. The alternative could be a more painful adjustment with higher unemployment. The objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation over time, while at the same time smoothing fluctuations in output and employment. As long as inflation is low and stable, the krone can act as a buffer during periods of adjustment. We cannot, however, rely on a depreciation of the krone to ensure Norway’s competitiveness in the longer run. Monetary policy cannot influence the long-term growth capacity of the economy. The challenges associated with low growth and changes in business structure must be addressed using other policy measures. Chart: Low growth results in low interest rates Monetary policy easing and low interest rates do not lead to longer term higher growth. The inverse is true: prospects for persistently weak growth result in low interest rates for a sustained period. In order to prevent deflation and recession, the central banks of major advanced countries have implemented extraordinary measures to keep both short- and long-term interest rates low. The medicine has worked.

2  BIS Review 69/2007  The chart on the left of slide 6 introduces a composite indicator of financial market liquidity in the euro area equity, bond, foreign exchange and credit markets. It is constructed to gauge three different dimensions of market liquidity. The first dimension is tightness , that is the magnitude of risk premiums required by market-makers for holding inventories of securities, and it is measured by the bid-ask spread. The second dimension is depth and resiliency , that is the degree to which the volume of transactions impacts on asset prices, and it is measured by using ratios of asset price movements to transactions. The third dimension relates to liquidity risk premia, that is, the compensation required by investors for the risk that attempts to unwind positions could be challenged by uncertain market conditions in the future. This is measured using yield spreads between securities which are known to have varying degrees of liquidity. The evolution of this indicator over time confirms that financial market liquidity has increased significantly since 2001. It rose sharply in 2003 and 2004 and markets have remained very liquid since then. The increase in market liquidity may reflect structural changes in financial markets; for example, the liberalisation of international flows of capital, the securitisation of loans, the development of new financial instruments, and the rapidly growing market presence of highly active financial market participants, such as hedge funds.
9  The average cost of liabilities is the ratio of net interest expense to financial liabilities. 10  The risk-free interest rate benchmark. 10  (CoCos). A more diverse set of banks made such issuances last year, giving rise to greater cost dispersion.11 There was also a significant increase in unsecured debt issuances in 2021, in this case at a slightly higher cost than in 2020. Meanwhile, deposits at Spanish banks continued to grow in recent quarters, albeit at slower rates than a year earlier.12 After falling in 2020, the cost of capital rose in the first ten months of 2021,13 but then fell back again, to 8.1% at December 2021. This is below the sector return on equity (ROE) (10.5%), even without taking into account extraordinary items (9%).14 In the initial months of 2022, the cost of capital continued the downward pattern of late 2021 to stand at 6.8% at May, likewise below the ROE for 2022 Q1 of listed Spanish banks (11.7%). In terms of solvency, the common equity tier 1 ratio (CET1) of Spanish banks held relatively stable in 2021, after increasing in 2020.15 The CET1 ratios of the main European countries’ banks were also relatively stable, meaning that the Spanish banking industry, on average, remains in last place in terms of this solvency indicator. This difference owes largely to Spanish banks’ higher asset density, influenced by structural factors such as the more widespread use of the standardised approach to calculate asset risk weightings.

I do not wish to prescribe what you should talk about throughout this workshop, but I am hopeful that what I have mentioned above can form some discussion points in the deliberations of this workshop. It is also my desire that as you travel back to your respective countries, you would have learnt something you can implement to improve our respective financial systems. In conclusion, as financial markets become increasingly globalised, supervisory co-operation and harmonisation become increasingly important. Organisations such as MEFMI play an important role in developing capacity in the identified areas of macroeconomic and financial sector management. Ladies and gentlemen, Allow me to commend MEFMI which has been in the fore front of building sustainable capacity in financial supervision in the sub-region. It has shown the cause for fostering best practices, raising awareness and helping us to improve our processes especially in this area of financial stability in the region in general. Finally, I hope that you will find this workshop stimulating and that you will enjoy your stay in Zambia. With these remarks, I declare this workshop officially open. I Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy’s role and contribution  Address by Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank, at the Norwegian Savings Banks Association’s Conference Society and Economics 2000 held in Oslo on 13 October 2000. *  *  *  The long-term task of monetary policy is to provide the economy with a nominal anchor. Economic agents must be relatively certain of the future value of money. Agreements relating to purchases and sales, loans and interest rates are concluded in nominal terms. The decentralisation of decisions both in the public and business sector is based on nominal budget limits. The tax system is in nominal rates. When prices fluctuate widely, it is impossible to foresee the content of such agreements and budgets in real terms. Unexpected price variations could thus easily result in undesired fluctuations in the real economy.1 A credible and consistent monetary policy provides enterprises, households and institutions with the confidence that the value of the krone will be stable over time. This confidence is the best contribution monetary policy can make to employment, economic growth and welfare. This also prevents monetary policy from having arbitrary distributional effects. We thereby avoid high and varying inflation and boom periods that are followed by recessions. Norges Bank’s main monetary policy instrument is the interest rate. This instrument must be oriented towards the long-term objective of nominal stability in the economy. 1  See Rødseth (1987).

If fiscal policy lacks a long-term anchor, the interplay in economic policy will not function and the result will be a more unstable krone exchange rate and wider cyclical fluctuations. This will also result in poorer use of our resources, partly because strong fluctuations in domestic activity and long-term interest rates and the exchange rate will prompt investment decisions that are made on a very uncertain basis. BIS Review 92/2000  10  Concluding remarks Allow me to conclude where I began. I would like to highlight two points. First, the main function of monetary policy is to contribute to nominal stability. This is the best contribution monetary policy can make to a sound distribution policy, to employment, to economic growth and to welfare. Second, history has shown that monetary policy can be effective. If we set interest rates at a level that is too low, we may trigger strong forces in the credit market, as witnessed in other countries and as we experienced in Norway in the mid-1980s. If we allow imbalances to develop in the domestic economy, this could also lead to sizeable capital movements, accompanied by wide fluctuations in the exchange rate and long-term rates. These are strong latent forces that are far too easily forgotten. References Akram, Q F (2000): “PPP despite real shocks: An empirical analysis of the Norwegian real exchange rate”. Working Paper 2000/7, Norges Bank, Oslo. Bernhardsen, Tom and Øistein Roisland (2000): “Which factors influence the krone exchange rate?”, Economic Bulletin 2000/4 (to be published).
However, the moderate growth in the M3 monetary aggregate indicates that this situation has not changed since the last monetary policy assessment. Thus, the monetary analysis shows that we can continue pursuing our expansionary monetary policy for the time being, without incurring additional risks. Since the first quarter of 2003, the year-on-year growth rate for mortgage loans has exceeded 5%. Mortgage loans to households slowed slightly at the end of 2004, but since then their rate of growth has accelerated to a level higher than that recorded in recent years. Mortgage loans to companies, which had declined over the past five years, have also risen again since the beginning of the year. Prices continue to increase in the real estate market, a development to which, in our view, the low mortgage rates have contributed. Well aware that our monetary policy is still expansionary, we are keeping a close eye on developments in the real estate sector. In view of the above-mentioned developments, we have decided to leave the target range for the three-month Libor rate unchanged at 0.25-1.25%. What were the most important factors that led to this decision? There were three of them. First of all, we needed to downgrade our expectations with respect to the development of the economy. However, there are no signs of any cyclical downturn and the economy continues to recover, even if this recovery is somewhat delayed and muted. Second, the lacklustre economic activity is being accompanied by an improvement in the medium-term outlook for inflation.

Firstly, there are the roles relating to supervision of firms and markets where financial instability could arise. Secondly, there is the oversight of the financial system as a whole - the systemic issues which could impinge on society. And thirdly there is the fiscal underpinning which may exceptionally be required to restore confidence in the event of failure. The fiscal underpinning is a role for Ministries of Finance. The other roles can either be combined institutionally or separated. I am sure each model is represented here today. In the UK, HMT has responsibility for the fiscal underpinning, FSA for the supervision of firms and market regulation, and the Bank of England for the stability of the system as a whole. ii)  The “Must Dos” for the Bank of England  The roles as such are set out with slightly more precision in the MoU, and it is from there that we start on our quest to decide what initiatives we – the Bank of England – should undertake, and how far we go with each. The MoU highlights three “must dos” for the Bank. I expect that these are similar in many central banks. They really define our mandate. a)  Assessment of Threats to Financial Stability  Firstly we need to assess the threats to the financial system. We need to be in a position to inform ourselves and to advise HMT at all times on the implications for UK financial stability of developments in both the domestic and international market places.
For example, when discussing lender of last resort in crisis management and burden sharing in crisis resolution we now talk about home and host central banks and finance ministries, respectively. This is natural, since legally the financial liabilities for a group are ultimately carried by the parent bank. Of course, a parent can choose to default a subsidiary, but it will then have to bear the capital loss. Subsequently, in practice, the ultimate public responsibility over a group rests with the home country. … comes under strain… At first glance, the home country principle seems very neat. But take a closer look and you will see signs that this set-up was not designed for a fully integrated market. Essentially, there is a gap between, on the one hand, legal powers and mandates and, on the other hand, de facto abilities and responsibilities. Home countries are given powers over branches and subsidiaries but might be unable or unwilling to use them, while host countries are losing powers that they have been willing to use. 4  BIS Review 35/2005  This gap becomes a problem once you have a banking group or bank that is systemically relevant in a host country (see table 1). Even if there are not so many of these cases yet, I am convinced that the number will increase. The potential conflicts of interest and coordination problems are of many kinds.

In particular, the pace of growth in industrial production appears to have declined somewhat and some survey data have also indicated that there has been a certain degree of moderation. However, survey data remain at high levels and should be underpinned further by positive factors such as high employment growth. There is thus good reason to remain confident that strong growth will be sustained in the euro area. This picture is broadly supported by bond yields in the euro area. These have changed little over recent weeks. They continue to be compatible with market expectations of strong economic growth in the euro area in the medium term and with developments in consumer price inflation, which are in line with the ECB’s definition of price stability. We trust that this assessment will also increasingly be reflected in exchange rates. These have clearly lost touch with economic fundamentals and this is posing risks to the world economy. For the euro area in particular the continued undervaluation of the euro vis-à-vis other major currencies is putting upward pressure on import prices. We shall, therefore, monitor exchange rate developments closely. 1  BIS Review 97/2000  As regards developments in consumer prices, no additional euro area-wide data on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) have become available since our last meeting. In September 2000 inflation rose to 2.8%, mainly as a result of higher energy prices.
Specifically, the ASEAN Roadmap on Capital Account Liberalization, launched in 2003, aims to gradually achieve a freer flow of capital over the medium-term. Malaysia has since progressively further liberalised its rules for foreign exchange transactions culminating in the removal of most of the rules in April 2005. Strengthened regional financial cooperation During the 1997/1998 crisis, Asia did not come together to collaboratively and cumulatively act to contain the crisis and subsequently to facilitate its resolution. Perhaps, it was due to the nature of the crisis, its severity on the financial markets and the economies. Domestic stability had to be first restored before time could be taken to formulate a holistic crisis management solution. The instability in the currency markets lasted for about one and a half years. There was also no entity in the region during that period that provided any authoritative assessment on whether the programmes that were subsequently being implemented would in fact produce the desired outcomes. While efforts to strengthen the domestic economies and the financial systems will continue, this has now being reinforced by the improved regional surveillance including on cross border financial flows, and by institutional arrangements that would contribute towards crisis containment and management. The regional cooperative efforts going forward will continue to gain momentum. These efforts should not be seen as attempting to substitute but rather as efforts to complement the existing international arrangements.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: ASEAN – a dynamic region with diverse strengths Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the International Symposium “Ten Years After the Asian Currency Crisis: Future Challenges for the Asian Economies and Financial Markets”, hosted by the Center for Monetary Cooperation in Asia (CeMCoA), Bank of Japan, Tokyo, 22 January 2007. *  *  *  Ten years after the crisis, ASEAN stands out as a dynamic region with diverse strengths. With a growing population of over 550 million, ASEAN remains one of the fastest growing regions in the world (2005: 5.6%; world: 4.9%). The combined GDP of the ASEAN economies is expected to exceed USD 1 trillion in 2007. This growth has been extensive and includes all the developing economies in the group. The ASEAN economies have always been highly open economies, with total trade accounting for more than 130 percent of GDP and the value of trade flows now exceeding USD 1 trillion. In view of this high degree of openness, ASEAN has also always been vulnerable to external developments. The ASEAN economies have however demonstrated, time and again, their capacity to rebound from adverse shocks, and to do so within a short period of time. While the 1997 – 1998 crisis was devastating, most ASEAN economies were able to restore stability and resume growth just after a year. ASEAN has also continued to weather other both regional and international shocks that have since occurred.
La conclusion était que l’euro ne se ferait jamais ! Ces critiques ont été démenties par les faits. Mais elles conservent toute leur utilité lorsqu’il s’agit de répondre à la question des conditions à remplir pour une pleine réussite de l’euro. On peut en souligner quatre : - En premier lieu, celle de la crédibilité de la politique monétaire garantie par l’indépendance de la Banque centrale européenne, scellée dans le traité de Maastricht et fondée sur l’indépendance de chacune des banques centrales nationales. Pour être une monnaie crédible, l’euro doit inspirer confiance aussi bien aux 290 millions d’Européens de la zone euro qu’aux non-Européens avec lesquels nous faisons des affaires. Cette confiance ne peut être gagnée qu’en résistant à toute forme de pression, notamment politique, sur le mode de gestion de la nouvelle monnaie. Le fonctionnement harmonieux de l’équipe monétaire européenne composée de la BCE et des banques centrales nationales des onze pays fondateurs facilitera la réalisation de cette première condition. - En deuxième lieu, le respect des dispositions du Traité et des orientations du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance en matière de politique budgétaire. La coordination étroite des politiques budgétaires et la surveillance vigilante des “ pairs ” au sein du conseil informel des onze États membres participants — ” l’Euro 11 ” — et du Conseil Ecofin qui réunit les ministres des Finances des 15 sont indispensables pour assurer un “ policy mix ” équilibré dans toute la zone euro.

According to one theory, similar mechanisms could emerge in response to an asymmetrical policy vis-à-vis asset prices. If central banks took action to stop asset prices falling below a certain level, the players in financial markets might attach less importance to a rigorous analysis of economic fundamentals. The strategy of waiting for bubbles to burst by themselves might then establish a climate that actually encouraged bubbles. This must of course be regarded as an unproven but interesting theory, and it certainly calls for a great deal more careful thought. Conclusion In my speech today I have dealt with some issues that at the moment are being debated particularly in the USA. This is not due to a special interest in developments in the USA but because the conditions 5  BIS Review 128/1999  under which monetary policy is pursued in the USA and Sweden are quite similar. Many of the problems and issues that are being addressed there are also of interest here, or may be so in the future. Therefore I feel that we have something to learn from them. As I see it, one important lesson is that monetary policy, at least today, should take a greater interest in the “long boom” than the “new economy”.