samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That is why we are treading a fine line between stimulus to demand in the short run, and a rebalancing away from private and public consumption towards exports and import substitution in the longer run. Without monetary stimulus – low interest rates and large asset purchases – there is a risk that growth will stall and inflation fall below our symmetric 2% target. But easy monetary policy, by bringing forward spending from the future to the present, means that the ultimate adjustment of borrowing and spending will be even greater. That is our dilemma, and that of other deficit countries. The best way to escape this dilemma would be higher spending by the surplus countries – to make possible rebalancing by the deficit countries – and supply-side reforms in the deficit countries – to raise expected future incomes and ease the burden of debt repayments. Each country can put itself in a position to rebalance, as we have done in the UK. But in the absence of rebalancing, globally and especially in the euro area, we could be facing a recovery that is not merely reluctant but recalcitrant. Just as St. George’s Hall was reconstructed to meet the needs of Liverpool in the twenty-first century, so the international financial system must be reconstructed to ensure a return to prosperity. We can be optimistic – the fundamentals of the UK economy are strong. But without a rebalancing of spending in the world economy, a struggle between debtor and creditor countries will inflict economic pain on everyone.

As a country, we are trying to rebalance our economy at a time when a global slowdown, and concerns about the solvency of European banks and sovereigns, threaten recovery here in the United Kingdom. Two weeks ago, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) decided to resume its asset purchase programme and create new money. Before I set out the reasons for that decision, I want to explain why the global nature of the crisis means that monetary and fiscal policy in the United Kingdom can only do so much. Our fate rests to a considerable extent on the policies pursued by our trading partners. That is why the Chancellor and I put such weight on this interdependence among the major economies at last weekend’s G20 Meetings in Paris. Countries have responsibilities to each other, and we need to work with our partners overseas to find a solution to present problems. Four years into the crisis it is surely time to accept that the underlying problem is one of solvency not liquidity – solvency of banks and solvency of countries. Of course, the provision of additional liquidity support to countries or institutions in trouble can buy valuable time. But that time will prove valuable only if it is used to tackle the underlying problem.
3- Indeed, it is quite clear that crypto-assets undergoing technical and economic trials bring  about not only opportunities to improve our payment systems but also material risks which on the contrary might weaken them if unaddressed, both from an efficiency perspective and a safety perspective through the introduction of new sources of fragmentation, instability and fraud. As many central bankers have pointed out, today’s crypto-assets do not satisfactorily offer  the qualities expected from a settlement asset to be used interchangeably with commercial bank money and central bank money, let alone to displace central bank money as the central reference of value, as the privileged settlement asset for wholesale transactions and as the last recourse settlement asset given its legal tender status. The reasons for this assessment are well known and documented and boil down to stressing that there are misnamed as « currencies » for three reasons: First, their value fluctuates enormously, preventing them from being used as units of account. For instance, the value of Bitcoin (not however representative of all crypto-assets) went up to more than 19 300 euros in December 2017 and has since fallen down to 7400 euros in September this year. And stablecoins represent an imperfect improvement in this field: their value aims to be relatively stable based on backed assets, but in fact fluctuates, in particular if they are not backed on safe assets.

These principles on corporate governance are largely part of those adopted in 1999 and subsequently revised by the OECD in 2004. They include equal rights and a level-playing field for shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and board accountability. Corporate governance has direct implications on the behaviour of the organisation towards its employees, shareholders, customers, partners, banks included. Poor governance reduces the potential and, worse though, can lead to financial distress and even fraud, while well-governed companies will usually be more competitive than their rivals and will be able to bring in investors who will invest their money in the companies’ future growth. I will also add that no matter how relevant formal rules are to the proper functioning of an economy, it is essential to trust in business partners’ word given and their honesty. Whenever this is missing, not only dealings in goods and services, but also financial transactions are hit hard. Given that integrity, confidence and reputation weigh heavily on the economy, everyone pins his hopes on the business sector. Future wealth depends now more than ever on how this issue is dealt with. This is why we can assert that, in extenso, good corporate governance underpins the integrity and efficiency of financial markets. Moreover, for the banking field, in light of recent developments, I truly believe that increased ethics is to be welcomed. Thus, good practices in corporate governance are an essential ingredient of wealth and sustainable growth.
Suppose one would have claimed at that time that inflation from 1995 and seventeen years onwards would be on average just below 2 per cent and much more stable, and that growth during this period would not be lower than before, but on the contrary somewhat higher. I am pretty sure that one would have been met with considerable scepticism. And very few would probably have characterised a monetary policy that contributed to this as unsuccessful. This is a rather different picture than the one on which the criticism of tens of thousands of “lost jobs” is based. The latter instead appears to view the relatively limited undershooting of the target as a major failure, without any real mitigating circumstances. It also appears to assume that the Riksbank for some reason has intentionally and systematically aimed to attain a lower inflation rate than the 2 per cent it has itself set as the target. It is difficult to see the logic in such behaviour. And it is definitely not something that I recognise after working at the Riksbank at various times over the past fifteen years. Wages not necessarily based on incorrect expectations There are also other objections to the criticism that monetary policy should have cost tens of thousands of jobs. One reason claimed for the unnecessarily high unemployment is that real wages, that is, wages adjusted for inflation, have been higher than they would otherwise have been if inflation had been on target.

The savings tax example also shows that even a small country like Luxembourg can, through its membership in the  22  Guinea-Bissau, for example, has a GNP per capita of only $ whereas countries such as Brunei, Cyprus, Malta and Qatar have a GNP per capita of more than $  23  These include Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. The US is trying to resist the move. In July 2002 the Treasury Department in fact withdrew a draft law which would have made it compulsory for American financial bodies to provide extensive information on savings income invested in the United States by non-residents and replaced it with a less onerous law that limits the extent of information and the number of countries to which it would apply. 6  BIS Review 69/2002  EU, succeed in getting a larger country to give up some of the competitive edge it enjoys in a particular sector. It is to be expected that similar manoeuvres will become more frequent in an enlarged EU. Having a voice in setting the rules would then assume paramount importance, especially since the other new members, who are Malta’s competitors in several areas, would themselves be seeking to advance their own interests. This, in turn, also casts doubt on whether Malta would be able to obtain transitional arrangements and derogations comparable to those it has obtained thus far if it had to negotiate with the EU when Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have become members. This leads to my third conclusion.
Ex post it would always seem attractive to create surprise inflation. More recently, research by Lars Svensson (1997), Michael Woodford (2003) and others has shown that even when  2  Strictly speaking, it is not clear that the Riksbank was what we would today recognise to be a central bank until considerably later. 2  BIS Review 5/2004  there is no inflation bias there can be a “stabilisation bias” from the exercise of discretionary monetary policy: one that would lead to a suboptimal combination of output and inflation variability. Those results have prompted a large volume of research exploring different ways in which the commitment to price stability could be made credible. And central banks themselves have devoted no less energy to establishing the importance of their credibility. Two very different approaches to the time-consistency problem have been discussed in the literature. One examines contractual relationships between the public and monetary decision-makers that reduce or eliminate the degree of inflation and stabilization biases resulting from discretionary policy. Examples include formal adoption of monetary policy rules, a contract between government and central bank instructing the latter to target price stability, the delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central banker, and investment in a reputation by current decision-makers. But those answers from the literature on rules versus discretion are not really solutions.

On the other hand, on May 26, the European Commission proposed the Member States to establish national funds, financed from taxes imposed on the financial sector, in order to assist in closing or reorganizing the unsuccessful banks. The macroprudent tools mentioned so far, do not by any means exhaust the list of suggestions. Exploring adequate instruments continues, and we are all waiting to see what will be delivered both in the form of ideas and in the form of operational tools. III. The crisis has proved that the price stability is not sufficient to achieve financial stability. 6  BIS Review 90/2010  Basically, with small exceptions that have no impact on the adoption of political decisions, the dangerous influence of the growing imbalances in the financial system was not conceived. The central banks were happy for registering low inflation rates, so it seemed to sidetrack the rapid credit growth; the lower risk aversion; the increase in asset prices, and consequently, the mounting vulnerability on the financial market. That is why, O. Blanchard and others, (2010) say that: “the crisis has made clear that policymakers have to watch many targets, including the composition of output, the behavior of asset prices, and the leverage of different agents. It has also made clear that they have potentially many more instruments at their disposal than they used before the crisis.
Chart 3: Credit growth coming back into line with GDP growth in the latest data Credit growth relative to GDP growth Credit growth relative to GDP growth (3-year trailling average)  15 10  1969 1971 1973 1974 1976 1977 1979 1981 1982 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1992 1993 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2003 2004 2006 2007 2009 2011 2012 2014  0 -5  Percentage points  5  -10 -15 -20 Source: Bank of England. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  That said, increased vigilance is merited given the softness in nominal GDP growth, the stillelevated levels of household debt relative to income, the large current account deficit and pockets of more buoyant activity in areas such as Buy-to-Let mortgages, unsecured consumer credit and commercial real estate. More fundamentally, it doesn’t take a genius to recognise that a prolonged period of low and relatively predictable interest rates could encourage the build-up of excessive risks. That’s why the Bank is monitoring risks closely and has taken action where appropriate.

10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  Chart 9: Unemployment on a solid downward trend, and short-term unemployment now below pre-crisis average 5 6 months or less between 6 and 12 months over 12 months  4.5 4  3 2.5 2  Per cent  3.5  1.5 1 0.5 2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  0  Notes: Dotted lines show averages computed over 2000–5. Source: ONS and Bank calculations. In the wake of the crisis, one reason that headline unemployment has not been a sufficient summary statistic for slack in the labour market is because of underemployment of those in work. Employees wanted to work more – perhaps to make up for lost income. This gap between actual and desired hours widened significantly (Chart 10). Since the start of 2013, it has been closing and most recently, rather sharply so. As overall employment growth remains strong (Chart 11), this may reflect a normalisation of working patterns, with desired average hours returning to their pre-crisis level, rather than an unwelcome decline in labour demand. An additional source of labour supply is net migration, which has recently been running above past averages.
Our ongoing focus on international standard setting and policymaking, including in relation to climate change  The final aspect of competitiveness I would like to discuss today is the future role of the PRA and  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  6  UK in shaping policy and engaging with other regulators at an international level. Even prior to withdrawal from the EU this was an area in which the PRA invested considerable time and effort, and post-departure this assumes even greater importance – now more than ever, it is important that the UK view and experiences are captured as part of international standard setting process. We are well positioned here given that Vicky Saporta, our Executive Director of Prudential Policy, also serves as Chair of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). Why is this important to UK competitiveness? International standards aim to create a common language for the supervision of internationally active insurance groups; to level the playing field internationally for insurers; and to simplify regulation for large international groups. To this end, the implementation of common international standards should serve to reduce barriers to cross border insurance activity globally, allowing for new international activity and removing friction where this is already taking place. Ensuring that the UK views are reflected properly in any international standards that are created reduces the risk that UK insurers are faced by regulatory regimes that are not wholly compatible with their business models and lines of business.

We are also taking steps to rationalise the requirements that branches are subject to, including consideration of the removal of branch capital requirements as part of the Solvency II review, with the aim of limiting regulatory requirements to those required to deliver our objectives. We are, however, also conscious of the need to ensure a level playing field among all insurers operating in the UK – there can be no question of insurance branches being held to lower standards than insurers that are based here, which would distort competition and potentially increase the risks to PRA objectives. All insurers will be supervised proportionately based on their possible impact on safety and soundness and policyholder protection. We will assess our ability to rely on home state supervisory authorities, considering both their supervisory equivalence and level of co-operation with us, on an ongoing basis, and will take action as needed if we judge that we are unable to supervise a branch effectively. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  We have also been clear that some overseas insurers have UK liabilities that that represent too great a risk to PRA objectives, including the impact of branch failure on policyholders and Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) levy payers, to rely on branch supervision with its inherent limitations, even with strong co-operation from home state regulators.
The wealth effect tends to be symmetric, in the sense that economic activity is stimulated by rising asset prices to much the same extent as it is checked when asset prices fall. Neither are wealth effects usually all that great. Problems arise when they coincide with an expansion of credit. The effects may then be asymmetric in that they are more extensive when asset prices fall. The balance-sheet effects lead to loan losses and, in more serious cases, to the suspension of payments. In the worst case there will be a financial crisis. The situation today does not resemble what happened in the second half of the 1980s, as can be seen from Diagram 1. Asset prices have indeed risen strongly in recent years but credit has not grown to the same extent. It seems that at least to date in the present upswing, Swedish banks and their customers have had another approach to the provision of credit and to borrowing. A pause may be called for here to take a look at monetary policy’s attitude in principle to asset markets compared with markets for goods and services. The inflation targeting policy that has been introduced in Sweden and other countries in the past decade has in many cases had the purpose of mastering recurrent overheating in product and labour markets. It might be said, somewhat improperly, that the policy aims to avoid the “bubbles” that have tended to arise in these markets from time to time.

Bank of France reports industrial output continued to make progress in June 1997 BANK OF FRANCE, MONTHLY BUSINESS REVIEW, June 1997. According to the business leaders surveyed by the Banque de France, industrial output continued to make progress in June. Output of consumer and intermediate goods advanced significantly, with a more moderate increase for capital goods, whereas it levelled out in the food-processing industry and slightly dipped in the automobile industry. Capacity utilization rates recovered. Overall demand strengthened both in France and abroad. Export sales grew considerably, in particular to Great Britain, Italy and the United States. Domestic demand rose, stimulated to some extent by inventory replenishment. Order books seem generally satisfactory. While they have emptied out somewhat in the food processing industry, they remain on the full side in the capital goods sector. Inventories are only just above desired levels, despite an increase in the consumer goods sector, and above all in the automobile and food processing industries. In the coming months, activity is likely to intensify across the board, except for the automobile sector which is expected to stabilize. Overall, raw material and finished goods prices changed little. The cost of supplies climbed in certain branches of the intermediate goods sector, mainly due to the rise in the dollar, although these increases were not passed on to sales prices. Business managers continued to take a cautious stance on investment. The little capital expenditure there was primarily concerned the modernisation of equipment and bringing it into line with standards.
Today, financial firms with around $ trillion assets under management have committed to harmonised reporting using the Task-Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) template.16 This has encouraged wider scrutiny of, and actions to mitigate, the risks to companies’ profits and balance sheets posed by climate change. Pay gap disclosure could have a similarly profound behavioural effect on companies. Fourth, there is also a strong case for improving the sets of data available publicly to monitor progress towards equality of pay and opportunity in the workplace. One example of useful additional data would be longitudinal data tracking individuals from school into employment, perhaps using administrative data or new surveys. This would help to understand the key determinants, and obstacles, to career and pay progression. Fifth and finally, published pay gap data are imperfect and can sometimes give a misleading impression of diversity patterns. We have demonstrated how raw pay gap data can sometimes give rise to puzzles. We 15  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/business-population-estimates-2019/business-population-estimates-for-the-uk-andregions-2019-statistical-release-html 16 TCFD (2019). 34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  34  have also demonstrated, however, that a careful consideration of various compositional factors can resolve these puzzles and provide a clearer picture of underlying patterns. There is no reason why companies could not use these techniques when interpreting their own results.

Taking into account the favorable developments in the credit markets and the moderate recovery in economic activity in the last quarter of 2009, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) slowed the pace of rate cuts, and finally decided to keep rates unchanged at the last two meetings. However, it was also noted that lingering problems across the global economy were still a concern and that uncertainties regarding the strength and durability of the recovery remain. Considering these factors, the MPC reiterated that it would be necessary to keep policy rates at low levels for a long period of time. At its January meeting, the MPC indicated that tax adjustments and base effects would cause inflation to rise significantly in the first two months of 2010 and afterwards remain above the target for some time. Noting that the underlying trend implied by core inflation indicators would remain at levels consistent with medium-term targets, the Committee emphasized that, given the levels of resource utilization, the state of labor markets, and global economic conditions, general pricing behavior would not be affected adversely by the temporary rise in inflation, and therefore, inflation would display a declining trend once the transitory factors taper off. Market yields have been broadly shaped by the monetary policy stance during the last quarter of 2009. This is particularly important as it demonstrates the increased effectiveness of monetary policy. Market interest rates slightly increased in October with rising perceptions that the policy rate cut cycle is coming to an end.