samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is not reasonable to believe that we and the market participants will always reach the same conclusions. Inflation expectations are well-anchored around the target, which is the most important indication that the market has confidence in monetary policy. Why publish our own repo rate forecast? To put it plainly: a forecast for growth and inflation requires an assumption about the interest rate. The inflation target was introduced in 1995, and it was then assumed in the forecasts that the repo rate would be unchanged during the forecast period. This had an advantage in terms of clarification; if the forecast for inflation was that it would overshoot the target (be higher than 2 per cent) a couple of years ahead, then the repo rate would be raised, and vice versa. However, an unchanged repo rate throughout the forecast period was an unrealistic assumption. The realisation came gradually that the forecasts needed to be based on a more realistic view of the future repo rate. It was decided that the Bank would use market expectations, as reflected in implied forward rates, as a base. 1 From autumn 2005 the Riksbank began working with this new assumption in its forecasts. Once this “second step” had been introduced, a further question arose. Although a future repo rate being in line with forward rates was a more realistic assumption than a constant repo rate, situations could arise where the forward rate path did not agree with what the Riksbank considered to be the “best” forecast for the repo rate.

The Riksbank’s forecast indicated that the repo rate would remain at this low level until the second half of 2010. The forward rates prior to the publication of the repo rate path indicated that the repo rate would not be cut to 0.25 per cent and that increases in the repo rate would begin as early as the end of 2009. Surveys carried out by Prospera indicated that expectations were in line with the forward rates. Although the forward rates were adjusted down after the publication of the repo rate path, the pricing still showed that expectations were set at a first repo rate increase at the end of 2009. Where the Riksbank’s forecast indicated a first repo rate increase, the forward rate was already up at around 1.5 per cent. This large deviation caused considerable discussion, partly concerning the current situation and monetary policy, and partly more general as to whether it is a problem if market expectations deviate from the Riksbank’s forecast. As shown in Figure 2, however, market expectations were lower than the Riksbank’s repo rate forecast at the end of the forecast period. Seen across the entire forecast period, therefore, the average deviation is not so great. With hindsight, we can also note that in summer 2009 market expectations deviated considerably from the repo rate outcome we can see so far. Figure 2 The repo rate path and market expectations in July 2009 Per cent  Note. Market expectations are based on forward rates.
(3) INE denotes salaried formal employment; AFP measures number of dependent contributors, salaried public workers, and household help whose employer made normal payments to the individual pension fund capitalization account; AFC refers to number of dependent contributors (salaried private workers) whose employer made normal payments to unemployment insurance. Sources: Pontifical Catholic University Survey Center, INE, Superintendency of Pensions, and University of Chile. Figure 4 Employment by skill level (1)(2) (difference with respect to March 2020; millions of persons) 0.5  High skilled  Medium skill  Low skilled  Total employed  0.0  -0.5  -1.0  -1.5  -2.0 Jan-18  Apr-18  Jul-18  Oct-18  Jan-19  Apr-19  Jul-19  Oct-19  Jan-20  Apr-20  Jul-20  Oct-20  Jan-21  Apr-21  (1) According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), the skill level is measured by considering the following aspects: (i) nature of work performed in relation with characteristic tasks and duties (ii) formal education level necessary for competent performance of the job; and (iii) amount of informal training on the job and/or previous experience in related occupation that is required for competent performance of the job (2) Data in quarterly moving averages. Sources: National Statistics Institute (INE) and ILO.

Daleep Singh: Implementing the Fed’s facilities - moving at maximum speed with maximum care Remarks (via audio webinar) by Mr Daleep Singh, Executive Vice President and Head of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Money Marketeers of New York University, 17 April 2020. * * * As prepared for delivery Good morning everyone. Thanks for being here, and let me begin by offering best wishes for everyone’s health under these difficult circumstances. I should also make clear at the outset that the views I express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. In my remarks today I’d like to review the context in which the Federal Reserve launched an unprecedented set of policy actions, and I will then describe our approach to standing up emergency facilities at maximum speed with maximum care as we execute our mission. Context in Mid-March As you will no doubt recall, financial markets in mid-March were seized by the uncertainty caused by virus outbreak, both in terms of the speed and scale of impact on the economic outlook, and for society as a whole. Extreme uncertainty triggered unprecedented market volatility across asset classes, escalating into a system-wide deleveraging event that appeared to overwhelm the capacity of financial intermediaries to absorb and transfer risk in an orderly manner.
This applies, I can say now, to most of their suggestions. I will then also take up a couple of points on which I do not entirely agree with the conclusions drawn by the authors. One of the recommendations given is that the Riksbank should make it clear in its Inflation Report that the flexibility of our inflation-targeting policy means that we attempt to subdue fluctuations in both inflation and the real economy. This is a point I agree with, but in my opinion we have actually already done so. With effect from the second Inflation Report this year, we have a special box explaining how the Riksbank has scope when setting interest rates to give consideration to developments in both inflation and the real economy. The box is an extract from a document entitled “Monetary policy in Sweden”, which we published in May this year. The fact that inflation targeting gives consideration to the stability of both inflation and the real economy is moreover something we have long emphasised in speeches and other forms of communication. However, it is probably fair to say that we have gradually become clearer on this point, as we have learnt more about how inflation-targeting policy should be conducted. BIS Review 117/2006  1  Another recommendation in the evaluation is that the Riksbank should base its forecasts on its own assessment of which repo rate path is appropriate; that is, that we should take a step further compared to our current method.

Stefan Ingves: Comments on “An evaluation of Swedish monetary policy 1995-2005” Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 30 November 2006. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here! I would like to begin by thanking the authors, Professor Giavazzi and Professor Mishkin, for an interesting and comprehensive report. As we at the Riksbank have said earlier, we consider it a very good initiative by the Committee on Finance to commission two highly qualified external experts to make an evaluation of the monetary policy conducted over the past decade. As the Riksbank has an independent position, it is important that monetary policy should be regularly examined and evaluated. The Committee on Finance makes its own evaluation of monetary policy every year, but I nevertheless think it is a good idea to occasionally supplement these evaluations with reports made by external experts. It is a particular advantage that two foreign academics have carried out the examination. This gives an outside perspective on Swedish developments, which can be very valuable. As you can see, the report is fairly comprehensive and it is therefore impossible for me to mention all of the aspects that are covered. Let me just say as an overall comment that I feel the report has been very pleasant reading. Although the authors express criticism on some points, it is clear that their overall impression of Swedish monetary policy is very positive.
During the upturn, Norwegian firms fared well in spite of high costs, thanks to efficiency gains, high turnover volumes and price increases. Despite the high cost of Norwegian labour, there has been virtually full employment. Markets will be more demanding ahead. Despite the floating exchange rate, our cost level cannot be expected to fall to any great extent as economic conditions are weaker in other European countries than here. The industrial structure in Norway’s relatively small economy is different from that of other advanced economies. The emergence of new Asian market economies is beneficial for Norway owing to its sizeable commodity exports and freight transport. This is also reflected in Norway’s equity market. The value of Norwegian listed companies correlates closely with the value of companies in emerging market economies. Norway is vulnerable to a slowdown in growth in Asia. In such a scenario, commodity prices might fall and the terms of trade deteriorate. Norway’s high cost level could at the same time make it difficult for the business sector to shift to new markets. Petroleum revenue spending Government petroleum revenue spending influences Norway’s cost level and trade conditions in international markets. BIS Review 44/2010  5  According to the fiscal policy guidelines, petroleum revenues should be phased gradually into the economy, approximately in pace with the expected real return on the Government Pension Fund Global, which is estimated at 4 per cent per annum.

Today the benchmark portfolio is more diversified and includes a large number of countries globally. 8  BIS Review 44/2010  In 2008 it was decided to increase the share of emerging market assets in the Fund’s benchmark portfolio. Thus, investments in these markets have grown. The government has stated that the expected annual return on the Fund will be close to 4 per cent over time. Since its establishment, the average return has been 2.7 per cent. It was only a little more than a year ago that we witnessed the steepest fall in global capital markets in our time. By maintaining the Fund’s risk profile it is fairly probable that the average return will gradually approach 4 per cent again. Last year was the best in the Fund’s history. Gains in international equity and fixed income markets led to a record annual return of 25.6 per cent in 2009. 3 However, developments in  3  Government Pension Fund Global – Annual Report 2009. BIS Review 44/2010  9  2009 must to a large extent be viewed in light of the financial crisis and are mainly due to a reversal of the negative results in 2007 and 2008. Multilateral approach to global challenges Finally, let me turn to the international economic order and developments in multilateral institutions over the past few years.
The Committee as a whole needs to explain its view of where the economy is heading. The Inflation Report has been the main vehicle for expressing the collective view of the Committee. Together with the minutes of the monthly meetings, it provides an explanation of past actions which should enable others to understand how we are likely to behave in the future. At the same time, the voting records of individual members of the MPC are in the public domain. That disclosure improves the quality of decisions, as well as the accountability of Committee members, because there is no better incentive to cast one’s vote for the policy most likely to hit the inflation target than the prospect of having to defend that voting record in public. Of course, all members of the MPC are well aware that there is no certainty about the precise level of interest rates which is desirable in any given month. That is why we discuss with each other at great length the appropriate course of action before each member makes up his or her own mind. For such a system to work it is crucial that MPC members give their best judgment and do not try to reach an artificial consensus. How, then, should we balance the need to give a clear view about how the Committee sees economic developments and the requirement of individual accountability? There have been two main criticisms of the MPC in this respect. First, that the MPC has been too open about differences within it.

As part of my revision, I studied the inflation rates since the Second World War for several different measures of inflation. They were all at or very close to 3% a year. No-one in Cambridge at that time – and certainly not the students that were to become part of the inflation generation – heeded the late Richard Kahn’s warning that creeping inflation was about to accelerate. The rest, as they say, is monetary history. I would like those of you revising for your final exams this month to be able to look back in thirty years time and recall that the year in which you graduated was when we finally laid to rest the idea that the UK was an inflation-prone economy. Inflation was the norm for most of my adult life. It should not be in yours. BIS Review 63/1999  8  Why then, you may ask, do we need to build a constituency for low inflation? There are two reasons. First, it is important that support for low inflation not wane as the experience of high and unstable inflation of the past recedes. It would be a counsel of despair to believe that the inflationary excesses of the recent past would have to be repeated in order to retain support for low inflation. Yet, in a recent survey of households in Germany, Robert Shiller2 found that support for stability was much higher among those who had experienced hyperinflation.
Prices for domestically produced goods and services rose by 2.1 per cent in the twelve months to July this year. Higher capacity utilisation is providing the basis for higher margins in some industries. Service prices, which showed little rise last year, have increased again this year. In many industries, including the airline industry, where price competition is strong, low profitability has led to an increase in prices. High oil prices have also resulted in price increases, for example in the transport industry. On the basis of the pay increases agreed upon in this year’s wage settlement, combined with the estimates for wage drift and wage carry-over, annual wage growth is projected at around 3½ per cent this year. Lower-than-projected wage growth may be related to the fact that there were few signs of improvement in labour market conditions prior to this year’s wage settlement. Lower-than-projected consumer price inflation last year may also have contributed to restraining wage demands this year. Low wage growth will contribute to dampening the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. Information from Norges Bank’s regional network is important for Norges Bank’s analysis of the Norwegian economy. Information about the state of the Norwegian economy is available earlier than information provided by official statistics, and it is informative to have closer contact with the labour market and business and industry. The situation in Region North, as in the rest of the country, is favourable. In the May round of interviews, all sectors in the region reported continued growth.

Higher demand can thereby be met by non-OPEC oil producers operating at full capacity while OPEC passively satisfies any remaining demand by increasing its production capacity. Alternatively, OPEC can take a more active position and push up oil prices even further by restraining production. Not many years ago, it was normal to assume that the long-term price of oil was around USD 20 to USD 25 (in real value) per barrel. Analyses such as the one presented by the IMF suggest that the long-term oil price level may be considerably higher than this. 1  An average of USD 45 per barrel in 2005 and falling to USD 34 per barrel in 2010 and the years following. As a result of persistently high oil prices and expectations that oil prices will remain high, investment in the petroleum sector may reach record levels this year. The investment intentions survey for the petroleum sector points to very high growth. The level is expected to remain high throughout the projection period. Activity in the petroleum sector will have spillover effects on the mainland economy, initially on the shipbuilding industry and the building and construction sector. The scale of petroleum investment and its spillover effects are highly uncertain. The last time petroleum investment showed a sharp increase, in 1997/1998, growth was substantially stronger than had been assumed. At the same time, the rest of the Norwegian economy was experiencing an upturn. The unexpected increase in petroleum investment contributed to an economic upturn that was substantially stronger than projected.
Let me at this stage turn to more open questions and give more personal reflections on how to increase this optionality: 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  The first option we’ll have to consider – at our March meeting – is the calendar of net asset purchases. Keeping them open ended from October would not be appropriate, as (i) as a principle, it ties our hands for too long: I said earlier that calendar based guidance shouldn’t go beyond some months in the prevailing uncertainty (ii) in substance, there is now much less reason to continue pressing the gas pedal while increasing our asset stock, as inflation is converging towards our 2 % target “from above”. I still believe it’s useful to have some transition between the end of net PEPP purchases in March and the end of net APP purchases: but this reduction could follow a bimonthly or monthly pace instead of a quarterly one, and APP purchases could therefore end in Q3, at some point to be discussed. In parallel, another way to enhance optionality could be to remove the word “shortly” from the forward guidance on asset purchases. This would be a possibility to break the quasi automatic temporal link between the two instruments whilst retaining the sequencing. Optionality would mean that the lift-off could possibly take more time, if warranted. This temporal decoupling could give more scope for fine-tuning, which is an advantage in uncertain times.

These include critical thinking and analysis, problem-solving, and skills in self-management such as active learning, resilience, stress tolerance and flexibility. For any organisation to grow and sustain change, strong, wellrounded leadership is critical. Not all these aspects can be gained through formal learning alone. It has to be reinforced through robust on-the-job mentoring and organisational-wide coaching culture. Finally, culture is at the heart of any organisation’s ability to transform and remain relevant. Ron Kaufman once said that when you “convince people, you will win their minds. Inspire people and you will win their hearts”. For organisations seeking to transform and become more adaptive and innovative, culture change is often the most challenging part of the journey. Any attempt to drive transformation is unlikely to succeed if there is resistance to the call for action. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  As an organisation, Bank Negara Malaysia has also had to assess and reflect on how we work, and consider better ways to instil the desired norms and corporate culture. What we have consciously nurtured over time has been a strong collaborative culture. What we want to keep getting better at is to be open to experimenting more, learning from mistakes quicker, and deepening our coaching and feedback culture. Our policy mandates are stress-tested internally by a work culture where colleagues are encouraged to speak up and challenge one another so that we reduce blind spots.
In particular, attention should be paid to what could be done to capitalize on the recent stabilization in house prices to improve access to mortgage credit and to foster competition in mortgage origination to ensure a more complete pass-through of low secondary mortgage rates to households. Indeed, if balance sheet dynamics are more important and frictions around housing more powerful than we initially understood, then there should be strong payoff to policies that ease them. At the same time, Congress and the White House should take steps that reduce the short-term and long-term uncertainty over fiscal policy. Currently, households and businesses face elevated short-term uncertainty as to what will happen to tax and spending policies in 2013 and how this will affect the economic outlook. I believe this is restraining hiring and investment today. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  But families and businesses also face long-term uncertainty about how the country’s fiscal challenges will be addressed. Providing greater clarity about the scope and terms of Social Security and Medicare must be helpful, especially in correcting those expectations that are unduly pessimistic. On this score, Social Security is particularly noteworthy.

Interest rates remain low among several of our trading partners, even though they have been raised so far this year in a number of countries as a result of rising energy prices and higher consumer price inflation. In the US, there are now expectations that the interest rate has peaked, and that it will be lowered in the course of summer 2007. A rise in key rates is expected over the next year in the euro area, Sweden, the UK, Australia, Japan and Switzerland. One risk factor is that inflation in the US and the euro area may be higher than expected. In the event, interest rates internationally are likely to rise more than the current outlook would imply and curb growth among our trading partners. In the past two years, oil prices have doubled, measured in USD. With little spare production capacity, even minor disruptions in supply or demand can have a relatively strong impact on prices. It is likely that global growth will remain buoyant. This may contribute to keeping oil prices at a high level. Recently, oil prices have been around USD 70 per barrel. Brent Blend futures prices have also climbed and indicate that oil prices will remain high for several years to come. Prices for a number of other commodities – including natural gas and some metals – have also risen sharply in recent years. So far, high oil prices have not led to slower growth in the world economy.