samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The new technologies are making lending more efficient, for example by enhancing the way in which information on consumer behaviour  3/4  and requirements is managed, facilitating new data management processes, or by applying automation processes to loan origination, thus speeding up its management. As these new firms make their entry, a new map will be drawn for this financial sector. The most recent trends highlight the importance of collaboration and strategic agreements between new and established firms, to harness the competitive advantages of each: the new technologies of the new firms and the sector experience and knowledge of the established ones. And here I conclude. It is now time for a toast to celebrate your 60th anniversary, in the hope that the National Association of Specialised Lending Institutions will continue its fruitful work for many years to come. I now pass the floor back to your president, who has the pleasurable task of proposing the toast. 4/4

But an appreciably weaker development of consumption, which was a prominent component of one of the alternative scenarios, seems to have become somewhat less probable. Exchange rate The Riksbank does not target the exchange rate. The monetary policy target is price stability. But the exchange rate does feature as one important factor in the Riksbank’s assessment of inflation in the coming two years. The exchange rate conditions demand in the economy, particularly in the export sector, and also affects inflation directly in the form of import prices. The latter, more immediate effect is, however, transitory and of secondary interest provided it does not influence inflation expectations and thereby price and wage setting behaviour. An assessment of future inflation therefore requires a forecast or judgement of the exchange rate in the coming two years, yet this is a variable that is notoriously difficult to predict and has fluctuated widely for Sweden since 1992. A natural starting point for this is the current exchange rate together with an estimate of what a reasonable long-term level might be in relation to competitiveness, financial saving, etc. The past six months provides an example of how the argument might go. Since October 1996 the krona’s effective exchange rate has weakened by about 7 per cent. Most of this change stems from the appreciation of sterling and the US dollar against currencies in continental Europe (Diagram 6).
In doing so, we must define robustly the boundary between going and gone concern loss absorbency ;  -  second, a framework for capital which comprises minimum capital requirements and capital buffers, with the buffers varying in size depending on a bank’s size and the nature of its activity and risk, and varying through the cycle;  -  third, using a combination of different approaches to assessing capital adequacy – risk-based approaches, stress tests, and a leverage ratio;  -  fourth, within the risk-based approach, striking a balance which recognises the potential benefits of firms’ internal models while guarding against their weaknesses and the incentive problems they create. A major principle of the new framework is that there is no single “right” approach to assessing capital adequacy. The very important role that is now given to stress tests illustrates the point. This year the PRA and FPC are running their first concurrent stress tests for the major UK banks, building on the past development by the FSA and then PRA of sequential firm-by-firm stress tests. This is a key device to examine and mitigate tail risks,  5  http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1309e.prf. 6  http://www.bis.org/publ/work357.htm. 7  https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13102.pdf. 8  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2014/wp486.pdf. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and like all good forecasting exercises, the stress test is designed to probe important issues rather than just provide a single answer.

Our challenge was to free up this industry so that it could continue to develop and grow, without compromising stability and soundness in a changing landscape. Strong and wellmanaged local banks, with a significant share of the home market, were and are critical to the resilience and stability of our financial system. However, we could no longer maintain this by restricting access to the domestic market. We needed to permit more competition, but in phases, to allow the local banks to adjust and compete effectively. 2  BIS Review 39/2004  MAS therefore introduced a five-year programme to liberalise access to Singapore’s domestic banking market. We made the first moves in 1999. As we lightened our regulatory touch, we also worked with banks to set guidelines for best practices and give banks greater room for enterprise and innovation. Stronger banking industry Today, Singapore’s banking sector is more open and dynamic. This has come about without sacrificing strength and stability. Individual banks and the industry as a whole have risen to the challenge. Existing players have upgraded and strengthened themselves. Banks have maintained high prudential standards, become more efficient and improved their service quality and product ranges. The foreign banks have contributed to the vibrancy of the Singapore banking scene. Competition has led to the development of a rich array of innovative products and more discriminating pricing models. Customer service as a whole has improved.
One obvious wildcard is the situation in Ukraine and relations with Russia. How this will evolve is difficult to predict. The big risk is that conditions deteriorate and the ultimate outcome is a disruption to energy supplies from Russia. When all these cross-currents are considered, the impetus to growth from abroad appears little changed from last year. Now a reasonable question would be: If the outlook is improving, then how does one explain the sharp slowdown in growth in the first quarter? My own view is that the principal factors behind the slowdown were transitory so we should not be overly concerned at this point. Some slowing in the first quarter was nearly inevitable. Foreign trade and inventories provided unsustainably large contributions to growth over the second half of last year and payback for those large gains was expected in the first quarter of this year. Also, the expiration of extended unemployment compensation benefits and bonus depreciation at the end of the year was likely to take some of the starch out of consumer spending and business fixed investment. Beyond these anticipated factors, we had unusually harsh winter weather, which likely depressed housing activity, manufacturing production and some aspects of household spending such as motor vehicle purchases. With the fundamentals of the economy improving and fiscal drag abating, I expect the economy to get back on to a roughly 3 percent growth trajectory over the remainder of this year, with some further strengthening likely in 2015.

Also, with an exceptionally large balance sheet there will be considerable attention on the methods that the FOMC will likely use in order to exert control over the level of short-term rates. I can’t tell you yet how we will do it, but I am fully confident that we have the necessary tools to control the level of short-term rates and the credit creation process, and I will share with you some of my own thoughts on the subject. As always, what I have to say here today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve System. Turning first to economic activity, the trajectory of economic growth continues to disappoint. Since the downturn ended in mid-2009, real GDP growth has averaged only 2.2 percent per year despite a very accommodative monetary policy. This performance reflects three major factors – the significant headwinds resulting from the bursting of the housing bubble, the shift of fiscal policy from expansion toward restraint, especially in 2012 and 2013, and a series of shocks from abroad – most notably the European crisis. The good news is that all three of these factors have abated. With respect to the headwinds resulting from the financial crisis, they are gradually becoming less severe. In particular, the sharp decline in household wealth due to the decline in housing prices and the weakness in equity prices has been largely reversed.
It might perhaps have been possible to avoid the house price bubble if tighter monetary policy had been conducted at the beginning of the 2000s, but the price in terms of deflation and low growth could have been unreasonably high. Given the situation at the time the decision was made, the chosen policy appears well-motivated. Should central banks try to prevent financial bubbles from arising? Despite the fact that central banks perhaps cannot be blamed for the crisis arising, I think there is reason – given what has happened recently and the research carried out in recent years – to further consider what role they can and should play with regard to these issues. One often tries to distinguish between pure monetary policy, which is conducted with the policy rate as the primary instrument, and measures that are first and foremost aimed at promoting financial stability. However, this crisis has shown that it can sometimes be difficult to make this distinction. Without the measures to reduce the turbulence on the financial markets, the low interest rate policy conducted to counteract the recession would hardly have had any great impact. At the same time, it may be important to make this distinction as monetary policy is something for which the central bank has sole responsibility, while promoting financial stability is a task shared with other public authorities. There is currently important work being done on designing better methods for promoting financial stability, both nationally and internationally.

A study by the ECB 9 presented a model that can identify just over 80 per cent of the cases in OECD countries where excesses have later led to costly downward adjustments in the economy. In the IMF’s most recent “World Economic Outlook” 10 the conclusion is more cautious. It is claimed in this study that it is possible at best to identify around half of the excesses (including the most recent crisis) that have later led to significant corrections in developed economies. Both of the studies conclude that (global) credit growth is the best individual indicator of overheating. A study by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 2004 11 also concluded that although it is difficult to find relevant bubble indicators, it is not impossible. The study claims that there are signs of asymmetry as some central banks have a tendency to stimulate the economy when the stock market falls, but not to tighten their policy when stock market bubbles are building up. The conclusions of these studies are that central banks should try in various ways to take into account, for instance, an overly rapid growth in credit that risks leading to a severe downward adjustment in the economy later on. However, it is emphasised in many studies that further research in this field is required to be able to draw more definite conclusions for future monetary policy. The development of this type of indicator is now high on the agenda both nationally and in the international economic policy cooperation.
Safe and efficient clearing and settlement have been in demand as banks’ trust in each other has weakened. In Norway, our systems have had to handle major problems in two Icelandic banks operating in our country. These problems have been handled smoothly. Times of crisis can also be a turning point, providing the opportunity for change. During the Norwegian banking crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Norges Bank and other public authorities put pressure on banks to increase their income from bank charges, including payment services. I believe that as banks have to focus even more on running a costefficient business, the incentives for developing the payment system further will be strong in times to come. For this conference we have received a large number of high-quality papers. I know that the selected conference speakers represent some of the best researchers in this field. We are especially pleased to have as keynote speakers two of the leading scholars in the economics of payments systems: David Humphrey from Florida State University and Jean-Charles Rochet from Toulouse School of Economics. Let me also extend my thanks to the three other members of the programme committee: Gabriela Guibourg from Sveriges Riksbank, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and Bent Vale from Norges Bank. As I mentioned earlier, I visit Nice in the South of France quite often. And from my direct observations, I notice that France has developed very fancy methods of processing cheques.

Estimates from our recent survey indicate a sharp drop in the use of cash over the last 15 years. Estimates of the exact level of cash use vary according to data sources and methodology. However, it is fair to say that cash is still an important means of payment. Notes and coins will also remain important as symbols of money. I believe that there have been two very important factors behind the rapid transition to electronic payment services in Norway. Banks have cooperated on standards and payments infrastructure while competing on the supply of services, and banks have charged for the use of payment services. Prices that reflect relative differences in production costs encourage users to choose the most cost-effective services. Research (by Humphrey, Kim and Vale) has shown that a  BIS Review 140/2008  1  relatively high price per transaction for paper-based payment services and a low price for electronic payment services have accelerated the trend towards an increasing share of electronic transactions. Without incentives for consumers or merchants to move to more efficient instruments, banks and other payment service providers will more likely be left trying to improve on old solutions. Payment systems are networks for the exchange of values between payers on the one hand and beneficiaries on the other. In two-sided markets like this, the benefit to existing users increases when new users join up.
Sweden had built up large surpluses in both its public finances and on its current account prior to the start of the crisis (see Figure 21) and the public sector’s indebtedness is low. This has provided a greater degree of freedom with regard to managing the crisis. Public finances will deteriorate substantially this year and next year as a result of expansionary fiscal policy combined with a decline in public income and an increase in expenditure related to unemployment, etc. as a result of the economic downturn. Our assessment is that the public sector financial balance will fall from +4 per cent of GDP in the peak year 2007 to a trough of -4 per cent of GDP in 2010. But this is a much better situation than in many other countries, such as the United Kingdom, where public finances have also deteriorated substantially, but where they had a deficit to start with. The ambition in Sweden for public finances to show a surplus when regarded over an economic cycle has made it possible to dampen the economic downturn with an active fiscal policy without this leading to an unmanageably large deficit. 8  Labour Force Survey (AKU) June 2008, Statistics Sweden, 3 August 2009. 9  Consumer Price Index (CPI) July 2009, Statistics Sweden, 11 August 2009. BIS Review 98/2009  5  The current account is also showing large surpluses.

We are expecting employment to fall by around 300,000 persons from the peak in 2008 to a trough in 2011 and that unemployment will continue to rise to around 11 per cent (see Figures 15 and 16)  5  See the OECD’s Composite Leading Indicators, 7 August, 2009, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/9/43453886.pdf. 6  Economic Tendency Survey, July 2009, National Institute of Economic Research, 30 July 2009. 7  Institute for Supply Management (SILF) and Swedbank, 3 August 2009. 4  BIS Review 98/2009  After the recent monetary policy meeting new information was received from the Labour Force Surveys, which was roughly in line with our assessment. Employment fell by 1.7 per cent in June compared with the same month in the previous year and unemployment increased to 9.8 per cent. This was respectively two-tenths and one-tenth of a percentage point better than we had forecast. 8 Underlying inflation is in line with the inflation target of 2 per cent Inflation has fallen rapidly in recent months and is expected to become negative for a large part of the year. However, CPI inflation is strongly affected by interest rate changes and by changes in energy prices. It is therefore better to study the underlying inflation rate. Underlying inflation measured as the CPIF, where mortgage rates are held constant, is expected to be close to 2 per cent throughout the forecast period (see Figure 17). New inflation figures published after the most recent monetary policy meeting have also been roughly in line with our assessments.
As we move up the ladder, we increase the degree of citizen engagement in decisions that affect them. The RSA stop short of recommending the top rung, but do propose various initiatives to increase citizen involvement and collaboration. Armed with this framework, I have been thinking about how far the Bank of England has so far climbed the citizen engagement ladder. Truth be told, I suspect for the first 300 years of its life, the Bank of England scarcely had its foot on the first rung. It saw little need even to inform the wider public about the economy and policy. Trust among the public was anonymised, institutionalised and given. When tempted to step up a rung, the Bank quickly contracted an acute form of vertigo. Over the past 25 years the Bank has taken significant steps up the engagement ladder, in part in response to the public’s trust shift, in part reflecting the Bank’s wider policy responsibilities. These steps have 7  transformed how the Bank “informs” and “consults” the public on its views and policies. One simple diagnostic is the rise in the Bank’s publication count. Seventy years ago, the Bank published precisely one speech a year. Today, rarely a day passes without multiple publications. Then, the Bank uttered publically fewer than 5,000 words per year. Last year, it uttered in excess of 4 ½ million. Over the past two decades, it would not be an exaggeration to say there has been a genuine revolution in central bank communications.

Enhancing the framework set out in the Medium Term Program (MTP) through further structural adjustments to strengthen fiscal discipline will support the relative improvement of Turkey’s sovereign risk. Should the goals set out in the MTP are achieved we consider that it may be possible to keep policy rates in single digits throughout the forecast horizon. Increasing budget deficits worldwide continue to pose upside risks to inflation expectations and thus to global market interest rates in the long term. Our medium-term inflation and monetary policy outlook envisage that recovery in global economic activity follows a slow and protracted course, while saving rates keep rising and global interest rates remain at low levels for an extended period. However, huge budget deficits particularly in developed countries, which are triggered by fiscal stimulus packages adopted in the face of the global financial crisis, besides the lack of a clear exit strategy from these policies, create upside risks regarding medium-term global interest rates. Countries with relatively sounder banking systems and prudent fiscal policies would be more resilient against these risks. In this context, I would like to once more underline the significance of fiscal discipline in the current conjuncture. The course of oil and other commodity prices still constitutes another important risk. Shortterm ample liquidity driven by countercyclical policies on a global scale exposes not only the emerging market currencies, but also commodity prices to speculative actions. Therefore, oil and other commodity price developments warrant caution, even in a scenario of a gradual global economic recovery.
The taxpayers of some of the most developed countries of the world have been called on to support global banks headquartered in their countries. Indeed, after the Lehman bankruptcy, it is fair to say that the entire global financial system was put at risk by the difficulties of some banks operating worldwide. It quickly became clear that an unprecedented and unacceptable level of systemic risk had built up over the “boom” years. And that a significant amount of taxpayer’s money had been put at risk as a result. This prompted a forceful, and understandable, reaction from all sides. The public, bank investors, regulators, supervisors and politicians alike all agreed that we needed a profound overhaul of the treatment of systemic risk. I believe that the reactions to this challenge from the G-20, at the highest political level, as well as from the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS), have been proportionate to the size of the problems and risks we have encountered since the outbreak of the crisis. The costs have been huge and there is widespread agreement that we cannot allow this to happen again. Nevertheless, we should also recognize that a number of global banks have managed to navigate these rough and unchartered waters without capsizing, Indeed, if you allow me to extend the metaphor, some have even been able to help to calm the waters.

Ardian Fullani: A brief look at the Albanian banking system Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Black Sea Business Day, Yerevan, Armenia, 6 June 2005. *  *  *  Distinguished Ladies and gentlemen, Dear participants, It’s a great pleasure for me having the opportunity to participate in this regional meeting of Black Sea countries. I have always appreciated this initiative as a special opportunity for all the countries being involved in. In my long career, I have realized that the success of this business consists generally in the ability it has to gain public confidence. Nevertheless, the overall economic, political and social environment of the country is playing also an important role. During my career, I have been witness of many events which directly or indirectly have damaged the banking system. The monetary collapse of the banking system at the end of the communist era, the flourishing and degenerating of the fraudulent investment schemes, as well as many other social, political and economic problems that have associated the Albanian transition, made the banking system “suffer” for a long time. However the reputation of the Albanian Banking system is in place recently. It’s enough if I just refer to the latest problematic episode occurred in Albania, in early spring of 2002, when due to the lack of public information and to political speculation with the introduction of the deposit guarantee scheme, the confidence of households was traumatized, leading to a considerable deposit run from the banking system.