samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In May 2008, the central bank entered into swap agreements with other Nordic central banks, in an effort to secure liquid foreign exchange should the need arise. In September, the government borrowed 300 million Euro to further boost reserves. At the same time, the central bank had been increasing liquidity provision, easing rules on eligible collateral (including by accepting uncovered bonds from banks) and reducing reserve requirements. But renewed global pressures in late September led to a swift loss of investor confidence in the Icelandic economy and financial system, and a massive depreciation of the króna. The three main banks could not secure payments for their due obligations, and the government decided to promptly intervene rather than to continue what was considered to be an eventually unsustainable process of supporting the three banks.“ As I have already mentioned, the Central Bank responded to developments and prospects in 2008 by monitoring the banks’ liquidity even more frequently and maintaining close contact with them. In addition, the Bank’s contingency committee had been mobilised and worked continuously from the fall of 2007 onward. The advisory committee from the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Business Affairs, Financial Supervisory Authority, and Central Bank met frequently and exchanged information. The committee prepared contingency plans and had a legislative bill drafted – the bill that later became the emergency legislation passed in early October. It is obvious that the banks had become too large in relation to the Icelandic economy.

The Icelandic banking sector experienced a dramatic expansion in just a few years, funded by cheap foreign financing, which allowed it to boost its assets from 100 to almost 900 percent of GDP between 2004 and end-2007. This expansion made the Icelandic banking system one of the largest in the world in relation to GDP. As global conditions deteriorated in early 2008, banks’ CDS spreads rose to unprecedented levels. In response, banks slowed lending growth, enhanced liquidity buffers, reduced costs, and started a process of downsizing non-core operations and laying off staff. But their ability to deleverage was limited by the global risk aversion. A recent FSAP update and Article IV Consultation conducted in June 2008 pointed to several risks that were mounting throughout 2008: (i) liquidity and funding risks, associated with the banks’ reliance on market funding and their large funding needs over the short run; (ii) credit and market risks, resulting from foreign currency, equity exposures, and high indebtedness of domestic borrowers, as well as collateralized lending, connected lending, and large exposures; (iii) operational risks, associated with the banks’ rapid expansion in recent years; and (iv) quality of capital risks, related to complex ownership structures. In this light, the Staff Report concluded that “if risks were to materialize in full, Iceland could face severe financial strains.” Despite the authorities’ attempts to prepare for contingencies earlier in the year, the crisis brought down the three main banks within a week.
Or how the advances in the functionality of the smartphone, as most recently seen during the pandemic, would transform daily lives. But while we cannot know with certainty how current trends in payments and technology will play out, it would be complacent to assume that developments in money and payments will end with the status quo. There are already in existence new digital technologies that are being applied to the digital representation, transfer and storing of money like obligations. These offer the prospect of new possibilities in the way money and payments can be configured to interact with digital processes. Programmable money, for example, could enable the development of smart contracts which carry out specific actions based on pre-defined actions and conditions[5]. Moreover, money and payments are no longer the exclusive province of banks. New, non-bank players have already been successful in providing innovative payment services. Looking forward a wide range of non-bank payment firms, including bigtechs and some players from the crypto universe, are becoming increasingly interested in the possibilities of these new technologies in money and payments. Our assessment that a digital pound is likely to be needed is grounded first in the view that further decline in cash use and further development in the digitalisation of money and payments is likely and second in the view that these developments raise important questions to which the Bank of England and the Government should respond.

This increase is believed to have been adequate to supply the demand of the economy for money under the conditions of an economic growth of 6 percent and of an inflation rate within the two-to-four percent targeted range. Money supply and the closest money aggregate (M1) have known faster growth rates during 2004 compared to year 2003. This is a consequence of a rising demand of the economy for monetary assets, reflected even in the invigoration process of lending to the economy throughout the year. Also, the controlled inflation level has rendered possible the maintenance of a real interest rate in positive terms, despite the ongoing reduction of nominal interest rates. The real positive interest rate has maintained the tendency of households to deposit their savings in the banking system, bringing about further reductions of the relative level of currency outside banks that circulates in the economy. The rising demand for monetary assets has been shaped mainly as the demand for monetary balances in Lek. The demand for Lek has been particularly evident in the summer time, being partially supplied even by means of liquidity injection through the Bank of Albania intermediations in the foreign exchange market. The annual growth rate of deposits in Lek was 12.9 percent, being a satisfactory growth compared to the average historical rate. It was adequate to cover Government demand for the financing of deficit and the economy demand for credits in Lek. Meanwhile, deposits in foreign currency grew by 17.1 percent during 2004.
Today, I can proudly say that an ever-growing number of financial institutions operate in the North and that these provide diverse financial services, whilst of course we would be the first to admit that a lot more needs to be done. My dear friends, the development and maintenance of essential public infrastructure is an important ingredient for sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. In particular, health, education, electricity, housing and efficient water and sanitation services help lay the groundwork for a productive and healthy population, capable of contributing to sustained economic growth. We all know that as a result of the long and bloody conflict, the infrastructure facilities in the North could not be developed as done in the other Provinces. It is due to that fact that, with a view to fast tracking the development in the North, the Government has now launched a well-planned, integrated, accelerated development program titled “Vadakkin Vasantham.” Under this program, the Government expects to invest approximately Rs. 295 billion $ 2.7 billion) during the next 3 years, towards rehabilitation and development activities. This program is expected to cover the rehabilitation of roads and other transportation infrastructure, the upgrading of electricity for domestic housing and industry, water supply, agriculture and irrigation infrastructure and the improvement of the manufacturing framework. The Government also intends to implement a special poverty reduction program and establish the required social safety net, quickly.

Andrew Bailey: Recovery and resolution plans Remarks by Mr Andrew Bailey, Executive Director for Banking Services and Chief Cashier of the Bank of England, at the Santander International Banking Conference, Madrid, 17 November 2009. I am grateful to Victoria Cleland, Chris Daniels, Iain De Weymarn, Andrew Hauser, Andrew Hewitt, Tony Lomas, Orla May, Maggie Mills, Sally Reid, Paul Tucker and Andrew Wardlow for their comments and advice. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to be in Madrid today, not least because finding time to reflect on the future of the banking system means that we are at some distance from the urgent fire-fighting that has characterised the past two autumns. But I would not wish thereby to downplay the importance and urgency of the rebuilding task. The past two autumns were in many ways taken up with doing what had to be done in crisis conditions. And what had to be done involved the use of public money on a scale that has been unprecedented and was previously unimaginable. There was nothing easy about that task, and from the perspective of resolving the problems of the system too often we have had to grit our teeth, accept that “we are where we are” and get on with the job in hand. Fire-fighters don’t get to choose the fires they fight, or even sometimes how they fight them. But fire prevention is better than fire-fighting.
These positive developments have been fostered and supported by the pass-through of the ECB’s monetary policy measures, which have significantly eased borrowing conditions for households and firms, notably also for small and medium-sized enterprises. Considering all of the monetary policy measures taken between mid-2014 and October 2017, the overall impact on euro area growth and inflation is estimated, in both cases, to be around 1.9 percentage points cumulatively for the period between 2016 and 2020. Our measures have put the euro area economy on a solid growth pathway, driven by endogenous domestic dynamics and thus more resistant to a potential slowdown in global demand. At the same time, inflation has yet to show more convincing signs of a sustained upward adjustment. After lingering at levels well below 1% for three years, with occasional dips into negative territory, euro area headline inflation has fluctuated between 1.3% and 1.5% since May last year. Annual inflation stood at 1.3% in January. The changes in headline inflation have been driven by movements in the more volatile components, namely energy prices and, to a lesser extent, food prices. Measures of underlying inflation – which we monitor for their information content concerning inflation dynamics – have remained subdued. Inflation excluding energy and food was 1% in January, and has ranged between 0.9% and 1.2% since April 2017. Let me now focus on the factors behind these moderate inflation developments from a longerterm perspective.

While these links are not new, they now warrant closer attention for two reasons. First, the financial system has come to rely more on central counterparties. The introduction of mandatory central clearing requirements in response to the crisis has made financial markets safer and more transparent. This is in large part thanks to the European Parliament’s push for stronger financial regulation, such as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). While this strengthening is of course welcome, it also means that CCPs have become more systemic. Second, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU means that, under the current legislative regime, several CCPs clearing significant volumes of euro-denominated business will be operating outside the framework of EU regulation and the safeguards this provides. In this context, the Commission’s EMIR II proposal, currently being discussed by this committee, is a welcome and necessary initiative. The existing regime was never intended to cope with large-scale euro-denominated clearing activities being carried out in a country outside the EU. The EMIR II proposal would enable EU authorities to directly supervise systemically important third-country CCPs on the basis of EU regulatory requirements using EU supervisory instruments. The proposal provides for an enhanced role for the central bank of issue in this context, reflecting the strong links between clearing and monetary policy. The indispensable corollary to the EMIR II proposal is the recommendation to amend Article 22 of our Statute, which was unanimously adopted by the ECB’s Governing Council last June.
Leeper, Eric M. (2021), “Shifting Policy Norms and Policy Interactions”, paper presented to the panel discussion “The Interaction of Fiscal and Monetary Policy” at “Macroeconomic Policy in an Uneven Economy”, an economic policy symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 8 September. Powell, Jerome H. (2020), “New Economic Challenges and the Fed’s Monetary Policy Review”, speech, 27 August 2020, Federal Reserve. Regling, Klaus (2021), interview in Der Spiegel, 15 October, European Stability mechanism, https://www.esm.europa.eu/interviews/klaus-regling-interview-derspiegel-germany Sims, Christopher A. (2016), “Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence”, lunch speech at “Designing Resilient Monetary Policy Frameworks for  14 [17]  the Future”, an economic policy symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 26 August. Svenska Dagbladet (2021), “Ändra det finanspolitiska ramverket snabbare” [Change the fiscal framework more quickly], article by Magdalena Andersson (S) and Aina Lindhagen (MP), 9 November (in Swedish). Svensson, Mattias (2021), ”Spendergalna politiker tjänar på att du förlorar” [Profligate politicians are profiting from your loss], editorial in Svenska Dagbladet, 18 November (in Swedish). Ubide, Ángel (2021), “An all-weather economic policy framework for the euro area”, column, VoxEU, 8 October, https://voxeu.org/article/all-weather-economic-policy-framework-euro-area  15 [17]  Figure 1.

These include: •  Stable macroeconomic environment as reflected in single digit inflation, reduction in lending interest rates and a stable exchange rates  •  Amendments/Harmonisation of financial sector legislation such as the Development Bank of Zambia (DBZ) Act, the National Savings and Credit Act (NSCA), the Pensions and Insurance Act, the Building Societies Act (BSA) and the Banking and Financial Services Act (BFSA) in 2005. •  Establishment of a credit reference bureau in 2006; and Promulgation of microfinance regulations in 2006. Honourable Minster – The production of market knowledge on the supply and demand for financial services in Zambia was identified as one of the priority areas under the FSDP. In this regard, FinMark Trust of South Africa was contracted by our cooperating partners the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) to undertake this important activity and subsequently, the FinScope Zambia 2005 Survey, a comprehensive demand-side survey of consumer interactions with financial markets in Zambia, was conducted in November 2005. The main objective of the survey was to measure access to and use of financial services, along with how people manage their finances and what drives their financial behaviour. Honourable Minister and Invited Guests - This morning we are here to share with you, the findings of the FinScope Zambia 2005 Survey. These findings are expected to play an important role in profiling demand for financial services in Zambia.
The US sub-prime mortgage market, while small compared to the entire global financial system, could deliver a large impact on the back of US housing concerns, credit crunch and global liquidity squeeze. It made for a bad prognosis especially as last year’s growth momentum relied heavily on net exports. When all is said and done, however, the Thai economy managed to grow at the rate of 5.7 per cent for the fourth quarter and 4.8 per cent for the whole year. Government pump-priming contributed to this favorable growth outcome. But most importantly, it turned out that net exports contributed to almost 60 per cent of the overall GDP growth. Indeed, exports grew at a remarkable rate of 18 per cent in US dollar terms in 2007. The robust expansion was due  BIS Review 33/2008  1  to the ability of exporters to adjust through quality improvement and search of new markets. But exceptional export performance was due no less to healthy global growth, which translated into strong trading partners’ demand. Another factor that contributed to the success of exports was our ability to preserve overall price competitiveness in the face of sharp dollar decline. I will come back to this point in a few minutes. I would like to turn briefly now to economic stability. Monetary policy has been accommodative to growth since the beginning of 2007 with an aim to shore up domestic demand while keeping inflation in check.

Taking into account the available information, the Bank of Albania deems that, with 90% probability, the consumer price inflation is expected to range between 0.8–3.8%, after 12 months. This assessment takes into account our projections for the continued negative output gap, low pressures from global market prices, and anchored expectations of economic agents. Concluding, the Bank of Albania expects the inflationary pressures to remain weak in the medium run. *** At the end of the discussions, the Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged at 3.75%. The Bank of Albania will continue to implement a stimulating monetary policy for as long as inflationary pressures will remain weak. Stimulating monetary conditions support aggregate demand growth and full utilisation of production capacities, creating, therefore, the premises for complying with the medium-term inflation target. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In strict inflation targeting, all policy actions are aimed at hitting an inflation target. In flexible targeting, policymakers balance deviations from both the unemployment and inflation targets. Usually, the policy prescriptions from the two targets are not in conflict. Above target unemployment is typically associated with muted inflationary pressures, and accommodative policies are appropriate to reduce both gaps from their respective targets. At times, however, conflicts can occur. When they do, a flexible targeter does not accept a large miss in one target in order to hit the other perfectly, but instead accepts moderate misses in both in order to minimize the total loss. A corollary is that any flexible inflation targeter has to accept the idea that optimal policy may involve inflation running for a time above the long-run target if that is a consequence of policies designed to bring unemployment more in line with its target rate. 3  For example, the economy may have experienced some permanent loss of potential output during the recession partly because of reduced capital deepening with lower rates of investment and partly because of other factors. In addition, extended unemployment insurance benefits and difficulties in matching workers with jobs may be temporarily pushing up the natural rate of unemployment. 4  See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011). 5  See Evans (2011).

Charles L Evans: The Fed’s dual mandate responsibilities – maintaining credibility during a time of immense economic challenges Speech by Charles L Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, at the Michigan Council on Economic Education, Michigan Economic Dinner, Detroit, Michigan, 17 October 2011. *  *  *  The enormity of the problem In the summer of 2009, the U.S. economy began to emerge from its deepest recession since the 1930s. But today, more than two years later, conditions still aren’t much different from an economy actually in recession. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth was barely positive in the first half of 2011. The unemployment rate is 9.1 percent, much higher than anything we had experienced for decades before the recession. And job gains over the past several months have been barely enough to keep pace with the natural growth in the labor force, so we’ve made virtually no progress in closing the “jobs gap”. With unemployment having lingered for so long at rates around 9 percent, it is perhaps natural that some would begin to think that nothing more can be done to improve upon this situation. However, I don’t agree. Before seriously contemplating doing nothing, it is important to realize just how enormous this economic problem really is. To put this in perspective, consider that prior to the recession, most analysts thought the long-run trend growth rate of GDP was about 2-1/2 percent per year.
Last year, the Bank of England subjected UK banks to a sharp slowdown in China, a fall in oil prices and intense market volatility, coupled with stressed estimates of redress costs for past misconduct. Across the system, banks in the test incurred losses of £ That’s over twice the losses of the system in the financial crisis. Back then, losses on that scale would have wiped out almost two thirds of the capital of the entire British banking system. With so much more capital today, the stress test showed those losses could be absorbed, even while the system continued to grow credit to the real economy. Far from sideswiping the real economy under stress, the test showed the banking system could continue to support it. 1 And yet, there is still, eight long years after the crisis, a lively debate in newspapers, blogs and academia, about whether the capital strength of the banking system should be built up further. 1  Available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/results011215.pdf. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  About whether authorities should abandon the conclusions of Basel III and of the UK’s post-crisis Independent Commission on Banking and compel banks to go further. A debate like that is all to the good; these are important questions for society. But it has to be balanced against the merits of clarity. Clarity you need to run your businesses effectively. Clarity investors need to allocate and price capital efficiently. Clarity the public, and Parliaments, need to hold policymakers and banks to account.

The most interesting thing I heard a senior policymaker say about the financial crisis, not a Bank of England policymaker, was that we spent far too long thinking about whether there was a housing bubble and not enough time thinking about what if there is a housing bubble. The consequences for banks will be informed by our annual stress test. With the stress scenario varying systematically with our assessment of the risks, the test will guide us as to how – given banks’ exposures – our judgement about the risks should be reflected in capital buffers. In addition, we’ll have a bias to acting early and gradually – to raising countercyclical capital buffers before the threat level is seen to be heightened. The Bank of England expects to be adding around 1% to the capital buffer on UK exposures of all banks, even before the overall threat of future losses looks high. That bias reflects the time lags in implementation and in the cost of time-varying buffers lagging behind the threats. As well, there is clear evidence that sudden, sharp increases in capital requirements can have a material effect on credit supply and economic activity. Acting earlier allows us to take smaller steps. With this approach, the UK’s systemic banks will, except in post-crisis repair, be required to run with capital buffers a little above our baseline standard. Leverage requirements will also be scaled up, with banks typically being required to fund no less than 4% of total assets with tier 1 capital.