samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the same time, it is our understanding that there is a need of additional calculations related to inflation, and especially to the core inflation rate, on which the State Statistical Office has not been publishing data so far. Inflation index weight structure is of utmost importance for detailed and quality analysis of the movement of inflation and determining the main generators of inflation. In other countries, weights are publicly available and are published on the statistical offices' web sites, while in our country, they are still treated as confidential data, which restricts the analytical possibilities. The Central Bank needs improved statistics in the area of employment, id est, unemployment, as well as in the area of construction. As a result of lack of more detailed data, so far the Central Bank had to make its own additional calculations for the analyses, and to create its own databases, which in the other countries are products of the official statistical offices. We understand that the State Statistical Office has been working on the improvement of the statistics in these sectors also, and we are very eager to see the results. Within the scope of its activities, NBRM participates in the preparation of the official macroeconomic projections. Due to the need for improvement of the analyses and the projections and for following the contemporary trends in central banks' operations, the National Bank has started to conduct surveys.

Certainly, once more aimed at more successful financial risk management. •  Fourth, the European Union membership requires methodological harmonization of the statistics with the requirements and standards of the European Union, which is not easy. This is particularly important for the Republic of Macedonia, as a future European Union member-state, and requires immediate actions for improving and adjusting of the statistics to the European Union requirements and standards. Besides the need of holding relevant statistical data, the National Bank pays special attention to the reporting costs incurred by those who reports. For that purpose, activities for rationalization and reduction of the reporting encumbrance are underway, by simplifying the reporting forms, careful selection of requested data, etc. Certainly, such rationalization takes into account the need of providing and holding data necessary for preparation of the macroeconomic statistics in line with the international requirements and recommendations. 2  BIS Review 100/2006  Cooperation with other institutions The National Bank, same as other central banks worldwide, is an institution that permanently conducts numerous macroeconomic researches and analyses, for successful performance of its core functions and tasks. Therefore, apart from the development of own statistics, the National Bank plays the role of a large user of statistical information from other institutions. In this light, I would like to emphasize the cooperation of the National Bank with both domestic and foreign institutions in the exchange of statistical information.
As you can see, the vast majority of reserves are invested in bonds (issued by governments, public sector entities, foreign companies and supranational organisations) or placed with other central banks. This represents around 88% of investments, which further underlines the prime importance of security and liquidity in the management of our assets. The proportion of equities has varied over the years. Currently, they amount to 12%, the highest level since 2004, when investment in equities was first allowed following a change in the legal framework governing SNB investments. For bonds, the SNB uses a combination of major bond indices as benchmarks. The SNB’s portfolio can deviate from these indices for tactical reasons, but always within a clearly defined range. Using such deviations, the SNB’s portfolio managers can exploit market inefficiencies in order to improve returns. Moreover, this bond management method allows the SNB’s portfolio managers to retain a direct link with the main market players – a link which is essential for gathering first-hand market intelligence that might be of use for the SNB’s activities. At present, 96% of our bond investments are in assets rated AAA or AA, or are placed with other central banks and international organisations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Since 2004, the SNB has also invested in foreign equities. This asset class allows us to increase the return on our foreign exchange reserves. Equities are managed entirely passively. Our asset managers ensure that our equities portfolio corresponds to that of the main international benchmarks.

Fritz Zurbrügg: Challenges posed by the growth in the SNB’s foreign exchange reserves Speech by Mr Fritz Zurbrügg, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event, Geneva, 8 November 2012. *  *  *  I would like to thank Pierre Monnin for his support in the preparation of this presentation. I am also indebted to Erich Gmür, Marco Huwiler, Peter Kuster and Sandro Streit for their insightful comments. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to welcome you here today at our traditional Money Market Event, which takes place every year here in Geneva. This occasion is particularly important for me, as it is the first time that I have the opportunity to meet you in such a setting. Since our previous Money Market Event last November, the situation on financial markets has continued to be a cause for concern to the Swiss National Bank (SNB). To mention but a few of the main factors: financial market uncertainty is still high, the global economic outlook has worsened considerably, and the situation on bond markets in peripheral Europe is still highly uncertain. Against this background, central banks have adopted a number of measures to address the challenges they face. These measures have increased the size of their balance sheets significantly. In Switzerland, the SNB has seen its foreign exchange reserves grow substantially. Managing these reserves is currently a major challenge, and has become the subject of much scrutiny by both the media and SNB watchers.
Most often these included: •  the management and board of directors of the bank were replaced  •  the existing share capital was written down to cover losses to the fullest extent possible  •  the bank’s operating costs were reduced and some of its activities downsized  •  measures were taken to restrain growth in the bank’s total assets. An example of the conditions that were imposed can be found in chart 8. These conditions were of course rather unattractive to bank managers, board members and shareholders. And that was part of the objective; the management of a troubled bank should have a strong incentive to try other solutions before approaching the GBIF. For those that had to resort to the GBIF, an important aim was to force them onto a sounder track of business. Curbing the activities of banks receiving capital from the GBIF also implied that there was no competitive advantage for these banks over rival banks that were not receiving this kind of support. In addition, the value of the existing share capital in the bank would be written down according to the bank’s losses. In cases where the losses exceeded the existing share capital, the entire capital would be written down to zero. Such decisions would normally have to be made by the banks’ General Meetings. In order to avoid a stalemate if a majority at the meeting objected to the decision, the Storting had one month earlier made an amendment to the Commercial Bank Act.

Membership in the funds is mandatory and the funds are financed ex ante by fees from the member banks. These funds had a wider mandate than just paying out depositors at the closure of a failed bank. If liquidating the failed bank and paying out the depositors was considered a more costly alternative than recapitalizing the bank or providing guarantees or financial support to facilitate a take-over, the funds were free to do so. However, by the end of 1990, bank-owned funds had effectively depleted almost all of their capital and it became apparent that the larger banks might also face problems. To make sure that there would still be a safety net present, the government established the Government Bank Insurance Fund - or GBIF in early 1991. At the same time it was made clear that it was through this fund only that public money might be injected into failing banks. The central bank might provide liquidity support only once solvency was assured. The GBIF was given a specific grant by the Storting (parliament). The new fund could lend money to the banks’ own guarantee funds to enable them to recapitalize failing banks. Later, as the crisis escalated, the GBIF was permitted to recapitalize the banks directly. In both cases, strict conditions were attached.
The region remains heavily reliant on bank lending, and capital markets are not deep enough. •  According to McKinsey, bank loans were more than a third of Asian banking and capital markets, compared to just 10% in the US. •  Debt capital markets are particularly under-represented, contributing only 20–30% of financing in Asia, compared to 65% in the US and 55% in Europe. A “new normal” in global finance? How will the global financial landscape change in response to these three driving forces? It will be hard to say but let me hazard some guesses. First, if the reforms are well implemented, we should see a material reduction of risk in the financial sector and improved financial stability. I do not think we will see an end to financial crises as such, but financial systems should become more resilient. This, in and of itself, will enhance economic welfare substantially. Second, financial institutions will be forced to rationalise their business models and streamline their operations to better optimise capital, reduce compliance costs, and enhance efficiency. Third, global financial institutions will expand their Asian footprint. They will establish more Asia-focused teams and functions. Many of these firms will make a second home in Asia. But Asia is a diverse and non-homogenous market. Global financial institutions will hub in more than one location. The structure of global banks is likely to change significantly. Banks’ profits and return on equity will come under pressure. The risk-return profiles of virtually all banking products will be re-ordered.

•  Final details of the regulatory capital framework will be announced by June this year. Diverse ecosystem The second pillar: Singapore has a diverse financial ecosystem. The various parts of the financial sector not only serve important functions in their own right, but are mutually reinforcing. •  The World Economic Forum has ranked Singapore 2nd worldwide for financial market development – a testament to the depth and breadth of Singapore’s financial sector. A full-fledged financial centre Singapore provides a broad and integrated suite of financial services. We are an important regional funding centre. •  The Asian Dollar Market, with its total asset size of more than 1 trillion US dollars, has played a key role in serving the financing and treasury needs of individuals, corporates, and institutions in Singapore and the region. We are the premier asset management centre in Asia, acting as gateway to the world for Asian investors and for the world to tap Asian investments. •  Assets under management by Singapore-based managers have more than quadrupled over the last decade to reach 1 trillion US dollars in 2011. We are the leading insurance centre in Asia. •  Singapore plays host to about 190 insurance institutions meeting the protection needs of the economy and society across the region. •  The industry has built up expertise in complex and specialist risks – including marine, energy, aviation and credit and political risks. We have one of the most developed bond markets in Asia.
On the other hand, trade diversion can lead to increased competition within Thailand as excess supplies of goods from China are diverted to the Thai market and priced at discount to compete with local products. Besides, prolonged uncertainties surrounding trade measures had led to unusual front-loading of exports in 2018 and will weigh on export growth in 2019—just when the global demand has begun to moderate. It can also impair business sentiments, preventing firms from taking on new investment projects. Ultimately, as the US-China trade disputes remain unresolved and the US’s inclination for further trade  1 Both products make up less than 1 percent of Thailand’s total exports  3/9  protectionism remains, such as potential US auto tariff measure, trade disputes will certainly be the key concern for all authorities. (2) Slowdown in the Chinese economy is another concern. While the slowdown may be in line with the Chinese authorities’ goal of restructuring the economy towards a long-run sustained growth model, in the short-term it can have significant impact on the Thai economy. This is because of high degree of linkages in terms of supply chain and production networks, tourism, and property investment. For instance, China is Thailand’s second largest export partner following the ASEAN region, making up about 12 percent of our exports in term of value while the Chinese tourists represent nearly 30 percent of total foreign tourists.

Private consumption strengthened, supported by improvements in employment in major sectors as well as government measures to support low income groups, such as the state welfare card project. In addition, private investment expanded with increased investments in machinery and equipment along with greater construction activities as the overall growth became more broad-based. We have seen markedly increasing interest from foreign investors, especially in the EEC area. Consequently, in 2018 the Thai economy expanded on a solid footing, with growth of 4.8 percent in the first half, before moderating in the second half due to slowing global demand. This weaker global demand was largely a result of slower economic growth in a number of major trading partners; a number of country-specific transitory factors; and uncertainties surrounding trade tensions between the US and China. Nevertheless, thanks to more balanced growth engines, the Thai economy grew 4.1 percent in 2018, an improvement from 4.0 percent growth in 2017. It was also the first time in a decade that the Thai economy registered consecutive annual growth of 4 percent. Looking ahead, the Thai economy is projected to continue to expand around its potential, with growth this year will slightly moderate to 3.8 percent as slower growth of major trading partners weighs on the export sector. Domestic demand would remain the key growth driver, as  2/9  private consumption continues to be supported by government welfare measures and underpinning factors, such as employment and consumer confidence, remain strong.
This, in turn, has reduced the risk of lending out liquidity in the money market and thereby lowered the liquidity risk premia. 2 In crisis times, banks the world over learnt what Japanese banks learnt back in the 1990s: that they could manage their liquidity requirements – perhaps more comfortably and at lower cost – through central bank intermediation rather than via their traditional money market activities. Central banks – for their part – have seen that their collateralised lending has made them key market makers at a time when markets were disappearing. 3. The role of central banks in money markets  In light of all these developments we may well ask whether the new market-making role of central banks will continue. If central banks intermediate large volumes in normal times, they may not need to change their operational framework substantially when a liquidity crisis suddenly hits. Larger intermediation could anchor expectations and make market dynamics less subject to threshold effects. Does this suggest a new steady state – beyond the setbacks and progress of the current crisis – in which central banks will become a larger counterparty to the financial system as a whole? It is too early to say. Nevertheless, let me share with you some preliminary thoughts on the future role of central bank intermediation. Let me say up front that central bank intermediation involves subtle trade-offs. Let me list some of them.

If we want central bank control over leverage to be stronger in the future, shadow banks need to be part of what we consider “banks” tout court. In fact, by 2007 the size of the official and shadow banking systems, measured by the total amount of assets, had become essentially the same. 3 But there is also an issue of quality – or, if you prefer, of composition – of finance. Due to the increased risk aversion resulting from the financial crisis, collateralised lending is bound to increase in the future, even in markets where traditionally unsecured lending was the most important source of finance (e.g., the euro area interbank market). As a consequence, the demand for securitised assets – of the type that shadow banks have learned to create in the past – is set to increase further in the future, as institutions demand such types of debt to use as collateral. To put it in a nutshell, we will continue to need the functions, the financial products and the expertise that the shadow banks have been offering. But, we need to make sure that these activities are performed in a non-disruptive way. The new financial landscape can also reinforce the effectiveness of monetary policy. I already mentioned that most of the funding of financial institutions – whether banks, brokerdealers, hedge funds or shadow banks – is short-term. In other words, a key function of the financial system is maturity transformation.
This is why our focus should be on the Eurozone economic governance and coordination. We know there is deep political resistance to sharing fiscal resources and sovereignty, as well as a rising Euroscepticism. This is why we need to make the economic case. This discussion is not about “more Brussels”, but it is very concretely about more growth and jobs in Europe. The euro crisis has revealed how unprepared we were. The absence of coordination has indeed a genuine economic cost. Several approaches point to a significant cost of noncoordination, in the order of 2 to 5 % of GDP since the crisis, and therefore millions of jobs. To bring the debate forward, some principled choices have to be made. First: making parallel progress on both domestic reforms and, [not “or”], European coordination. This is the cornerstone of, for instance, any French-German agreement: to be fair, the French call for Germany to support coordination, and the German doubt about French reforms, have been and are still well-founded. This requires overcoming distrust between countries and bringing together both aspects under the same umbrella, namely a common institution. Second, we must recognize that institutions with a mandate are superior to rules without institutions, as underlined by Mario Draghi while discussing the fundamental difference between a monetary policy institution and fiscal rules. To bolster policy consistency and coordination, we admittedly need simpler rules. But they should be supported by strong institutions with discretionary powers.

Building an efficient financing and investment union for tomorrow  We need to improve investment financing in the EU. Our efforts should be directed towards financing growth and innovation, and towards finding the right mix between debt and equity financing, while still preserving financial stability and consumer protection. In the EU, the European Commission has launched the Investment Plan – so called Juncker Plan – and the Capital Markets Union (CMU). Until now, these initiatives have shown results, but they are not enough. A more ambitious approach would bring together the CMU, the Banking Union and the Juncker Plan. This is why I suggest to think of a Financing and Investment Union. It is essential to clarify two objectives: (i) the diversification of financing for firms, and (ii) the strengthening of the euro area. As we argued in our joint article with Jens Weidmann in February, this Financing and Investment Union – including more equity financing – seems to be the best way to match the abundance of savings and the lack of appropriate investment financing. First, let’s focus on the diversification of financing. The starting point should be firms’ needs. New financing of business investment, which is one of the keys to innovation, must be enabled. There should be above all, more equity financing. •  It is an essential fact that the equity share of corporate financing in Europe is half as large as in the United States: 52% of GDP in the EA, vs. 121% in the US.
One reason for Iceland’s limited success in keeping inflation in check has been precisely that the impact of the Central Bank’s policy rate hikes has not been transmitted in full to the mortgage loan market. In particular this is because one of the players there, the HFF, enjoys Treasury guarantees on its borrowing, enabling it to meet its funding requirement by issuing bonds at very long maturities with lower yields than on shorter issues, so that it can avoid raising interest rates on its new lending, which under normal circumstances would have been warranted and called for by the Central Bank’s monetary stance. Since autumn 2005, market yields on indexed bonds have risen in the range ½ to 2 percentage points, depending upon the issues involved. At the same time, HFF interest rates have gone up by half a percentage point. So it cannot be said that Iceland faces the same conundrum as the US about why long-term interest rates have not risen in the wake of policy hikes. House prices began to increase significantly again last spring, in the teeth of general expectations, and have been the main driver of the CPI in recent months. It is not unlikely that the latest wave of price rises in the housing market is at least partly due to decisions by  2  BIS Review 111/2007  the government and HFF last winter to raise the loan-to-value ratio and mortgage ceilings and to lower interest rates on new lending.

Christian Noyer: Publication of Bank of France’s Financial Stability Review “The future of financial regulation” Remarks by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the publication of Bank of France’s Financial Stability Review “The future of financial regulation”, London, 4 September 2009. *  *  *  It's a pleasure to welcome you here, in London, on the eve of a very important G20 Ministerial meeting and to introduce the latest issue of our Financial Stability Review. It is also a privilege to have such a distinguished panel for this introduction and I want to express my gratitude to all. The Review is about the Future of Financial Regulation. Our hope was to help and contribute to the international discussions and the publication of this Review could not be timelier. The financial crisis has taught us some very hard lessons. While there are many causes to the crisis, including, maybe, macro economic policies, it is also clear that it forces us to reconsider the way we regulate and supervise the financial system. That is what we are doing, and this will take a significant part in tomorrow's discussions between G20 Ministers and Central Bank Governors. At stake is the scope of financial regulation, its nature, and its objectives. The scope of financial regulation We entered this crisis with many unregulated entities playing a major role in the financial system.