samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And it means we have to understand the dynamics and interrelationships of markets; how new products work; and the possible behaviour patterns of intermediaries, investors, and borrowers. Above all we need to be focused on where major risks are most likely to emerge and the market dynamics if those risks start to crystallise. And we need to distinguish those which are systemic from a myriad of fascinating developments, many of which are just “noise” but which could otherwise distract us. b)  Risk Reduction: Oversight of Payment Systems  The second area where we, and typically other central banks, are required to perform is oversight of payment systems. Payment systems facilitate economic transactions of goods, services and financial assets and are an essential component of a well functioning financial system. So reduction of risks in these systems, for example through the introduction of our Real Time Gross Settlement system, is clearly a priority from a systemic perspective. c)  Provision of Liquidity and Preparation for a Financial Crisis  And thirdly the MoU stipulates that we need to be in a position to inject liquidity at all times. This means that we must be able to provide liquidity in normal times, as well as in times of stress or crisis. This puts an increased onus on well developed and tested crisis management plans, and a particular focus on ensuring that we are able to undertake a range of official financial operations in exceptional circumstances. 4.

Már Guðmundsson: Managing capital flows in a financially integrated area – lessons from the Icelandic financial crisis Remarks by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a conference organised by the International Monetary Fund, Bank of Estonia and Sveriges Riksbank on Nordic-Baltic financial linkages and challenges, Tallinn, 13 December 2013. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. I would like to thank Eesti Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, and the IMF for inviting me to speak at this most interesting event. In my remarks, I will focus on those aspects of the Icelandic financial crisis that are most closely associated with the topic of this session, which is financial integration. I will draw out some salient features of that story and then link them to several lessons that might be of more general relevance. In the autumn of 2008, two separate but interrelated sub-stories of the recent Icelandic financial and economic saga converged in a tragic grand finale. These are: 1. Iceland’s boom-bust cycle and problems with macroeconomic management in small, open, and financially integrated economies. This is a story that has played out many times around the globe, and many of its elements have been seen before in Iceland. 2. The rise and fall of three cross-border banks operating on the basis of EU legislation (the European “passport”).
Such risk results from the maturity transformation process mentioned above – that is to say, from the fact that loans extended by banks are typically tied up for longer than customer deposits. Banks can increase interest rate risk exposure by, for instance, extending repricing maturities. 7 This chart illustrates how the banks’ appetite for interest rate risk has increased since the beginning of the low interest rate period (slide 9). It shows the net present value loss which the domestically focused banks would incur on average if the interest rate level were to rise by 200 basis points. This loss is considered in relation to the banks’ equity capital. The chart underlines that this loss potential has been very high for several years. It also makes clear that these banks have taken on additional interest rate risk since the introduction of negative interest. 5 6  7  In the case of mortgages, the affordability assessment typically also includes assumptions on maintenance costs. Cf. SNB (2016): Financial Stability Report 2016, www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/stabrep_2016/source/stabrep_2016.en.pdf. In a supplementary survey on the mortgage market which the SNB has been conducting since 2011, the 25 largest banks with a cumulative share of the domestic mortgage market of over 80% are asked to provide information about loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios for new mortgages in the following segments: owner-occupied residential real estate, and residential investment property held by commercial borrowers and private individuals.

Tongurai Limpiti: Future of Thai banking system – the road towards AEC 2015 Keynote address by Ms Tongurai Limpiti, Deputy Governor for Corporate Support Services and Banknote Management of the Bank of Thailand, at the IDC Financial Insights, Thailand Financial Services Summit 2012, Bangkok, 8 November 2012. *  *  *  Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to join all of you today and I would like to thank the IDC Financial Insights for inviting me to deliver a keynote address at this event. The title of my remark today is about “Future of Thai Banking System: the Road towards AEC 2015”. I think that this issue is appropriate and timely as we are now approaching a new face of regional economic integration, or the ASEAN Economic Community, which will come into effect in 2015. To be aware of its impacts and to identify company positions and strategy in responding to its impacts would be of a great benefit. I hope that this event will provide a very good opportunity for us to share experiences and views on the way to move forward. With the given time, I will use this opportunity to touch on three topics which are current situation of Thai banking system and the new challenges from AEC, the impacts of AEC on financial institutions, and the role of central bank.
There has been a political agreement with the Parliament on two other files (Cross Border Distribution of Funds and European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) Refit). And I understand they have reached a general approach on the European system of financial supervision (ESFS) file, at the Council level. I am sure we will keep up the good work and efforts on every side will have a positive outcome. The future might be uncertain, but we can surely try to better prepare for it. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

This requires effective cooperation with foreign authorities in a crisis, for which, in turn, the global resolution plans are an important prerequisite. As regards emergency plans, both Swiss big banks have introduced significant measures by setting up Swiss subsidiaries which combine systemically important functions in one entity. The key point here is that the Swiss units must be sufficiently independent from the rest of the bank, both operationally and financially. Both big banks have to implement their emergency plans by end-2019 at the latest. FINMA is responsible for the definitive assessment on whether the plans allow systemically important functions to be maintained in practice. Domestically focused banks  I would now like to turn to the domestically focused banks. For these banks, the mortgage and real estate markets still represent the greatest source of risk. Growth on these markets has remained fairly constant over the last six months, and at a relatively low level. At the same time, imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets have fallen slightly overall, owing to developments in fundamentals. Despite this most recent development, the risks that have been building in the Swiss banking sector since the beginning of the low interest rate period in 2008 remain considerable. Thus, imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets are still approximately as high as they were in 2014, when the sectoral countercyclical capital buffer was set at 2%.
To coincide with the release of the new Bank data sets, we want to see what novel insights they can yield. The visualisation could be a static description of an interesting pattern or relationship in the data or the creation of an interactive app. Entrants are free to focus on whatever they like, as long as it employs some of the newly available data in some way. The second competition is for the best research paper – the “One Bank research” competition. We are particularly keen to engage early career researchers across the academic world. For our inaugural competition, the paper should be on some aspect of “The interaction between microprudential, macroprudential, and/or monetary policy”. The winners of each competition will be decided by separate judging panels of Bank staff and external academics. The prize for both competitions will be £ Further details on how to apply are now live on our website. Conclusion Economies are complex, dynamic and constantly evolving systems, underpinned by social interactions and behavioural change; shaped by fundamental forces like technology and globalisation; and supported – or at times disrupted – by finance. Policymakers need research to help understand these phenomena and to craft our responses to them. And research can make some of its most effective contributions by addressing the priorities of policymakers.

Another variant of an asymmetrical disturbance is that asset prices – the property market and stock exchange – due to a too strong economic development are forced up for a short while. However, in situations such as this, the required tightening can usually be managed with the help of fiscal policy. Naturally, stabilisation policy via the budget has its limitations since it only works with delay and is dependent on many other long-term considerations. In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact, which Sweden is included in whether or not a member of the EMU, provides a limitation on increased government expenses. The most important “shock absorber” even if we do not join the EMU, but especially if we do, is that wages can adapt to changes in the competition situation, i.e. that there is a high degree of flexibility and pliability in wage formation. It would thus be possible to avoid an increase in unemployment during an adaptation period. Naturally, it can be more difficult, politically, to achieve this than to adapt an exchange rate. A single monetary policy therefore requires greater discipline from labour market parties since the connection between wage costs/inflation and monetary policy will be less obvious than is the case today. The krona The reasoning I have pursued so far has assumed that the exchange rate actually functions as a shock absorber: that the floating exchange rate adapts to competitiveness and the business climate, i.e.
Just as a k-percent rule requires a stable relationship between a monetary aggregate and nominal GDP (i.e., stable money velocity), a Taylor Rule needs a stable relationship between the policy rate and financial conditions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

In that sense, the SCAP was very much a “lean into the wind” macroprudential exercise. In the current environment, I’d argue that the goals of the supervisory stress testing regime are more diffuse. There are clearly microprudential “safety and soundness” objectives related to sound capital planning, risk identification and capital adequacy at each of the firms participating in the exercise. These are critically important objectives. The focus on the largest, most systemically important banks also seems consistent with the structural macroprudential channel 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  —by reducing the risk that these most systemic firms become distressed, we reduce the risk of the externalities that such distress places on other financial institutions and, most important, on consumers and businesses. What is less clear to me is what role cyclical macroprudential concerns play in the evolving stress testing regime. Clearly, the design of the stress test scenarios, which embed a number of counter-cyclical features, is an important channel for “lean against the wind” or “lean into the wind” efforts. However, narrowing the set of firms subject to DFAST supervisory stress testing potentially pushes away from the broader cyclical perspective. Less of the banking industry will be covered by the stress tests and assessments of the strength of the industry will be based on a smaller part of the whole. In pointing out these implications, I am not making any judgments about whether the focus on microprudential and structural macroprudential goals is optimal from a public policy perspective.
The average sovereign debt in the euro area increased from 79.7 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 85.8 per cent in 2010, and is expected to increase to 88.6 per cent in 2011. Table 1 Budget deficit and sovereign debt in the euro area (Percentage of GDP)  Budget deficit  Sovereign debt  2009  6.4  79.7  2010  6  85.8  2011  4.4  88.6  Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor  The budget deficit in the United States is expected to reach 10.8 per cent of GDP this year, while the United States’ gross debt currently exceeds 100 per cent of GDP. In the summer, this situation, in combination with what appeared to be a political inability to deal with the problem of public finances, led the credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s to reduce the credit rating of the United States for the first time in 70 years. The main reason for the increase in the level of debt is that GDP growth decreased and unemployment increased in connection with the crisis in 2008–2009. Public finances are automatically weakened when GDP growth is low in developed countries as tax revenues then decrease and expenditure for transfers increases. Some countries, such as the United States and Ireland, also implemented extensive and costly government measures to support the financial sector.

In my view, the task could be easier achieved if the focus of EWE is narrowed down to the really important systemic issues i.e, the issues that have high-global impact but are beyond the capabilities of market and individual economies to monitor and make assessment. For example, instead of trying to spot vulnerabilities in all the possible key risk, in all markets, and in all economies, EWE should narrow its focus instead on the systemically-important issues, especially the known-unknowns. This include the robustness of the key global financial markets and infrastructure, risk relating to the systemically-important large economies and the operations of the internationally-important financial institutions. Such focus will make the whole EWE process more valuable and complements well with the surveillance that are done elsewhere at the country or regional level. With regards to the nature of future crises, a few realities have emerged from the current global financial turmoil. First, it is clear from recent experience that nobody is above crisis. Crisis can happen in any economy regardless of whether it is large or small, developed or emerging, with or without a sophisticated financial system, and regardless of whether the country adopts a fixed or flexible exchange rate system. And once happens, the impact is large because of the  BIS Review 19/2010  1  globalized nature of markets that drives the spillover or contagion. For emerging markets, this means the risk of future crises are wide-ranging and can be both externally and internally induced.
As part of this essential restructuring, all institutions, according to their individual characteristics and circumstances, must strengthen their solvency, resizing and improving their efficiency in the medium term. In short, the challenge consists in adapting to the new reality in which the financial sector will have to operate in the future. The Spanish banking system is generally in a sound position from which to approach this restructuring process. But the present situation is complicated. On the one hand, the need for loan loss provisions will continue to dent profit and loss accounts, as defaults persist against a continuing weak economic backdrop. And on the other, the competition to secure retail funding pushes up the cost of borrowing and drives down margins. Strains in the wholesale funding markets add further pressure. They also entail higher risk premia and, if they persist and intensify, could make access to the wholesale markets more difficult. BIS Review 86/2010  7  Moreover, the sector must absorb the internal imbalances that built up in the years of strong growth in the economy and in banking activity. These imbalances, which are greater in some Spanish deposit institutions than in others, are essentially threefold. The first imbalance derives from their over-reliance on wholesale market funding. Although the term structure of Spain’s financial institutions’ debt is mostly medium and long-term, the severity of the crisis and investor flight in view of a widespread loss in confidence put pressure on institutions, which responded by stepping up their efforts to attract deposits.

This reflects the growing relevance of Islamic banking and is testimony to its acceptance as the embodiment of ethical banking and finance. Other threats to the financial system Financial institutions also face increasing challenges from other non-financial risks associated with the extensive use of technology and the potential outbreak of epidemics. Therefore it is vital then that the state of preparedness of BCP/BCM contingency measures is constantly ready to address any possibilities and not be blind sided by financial risks alone. Closing It is neither by accident nor coincidence that the Malaysian financial system is currently at a position of considerable strength, depth and resilience. Rather it is through the combined efforts of both industry players and the regulator as well as the support of all our  2  BIS Review 58/2009  stakeholders. I believe that this spirit of cooperation and mutual respect is entrenched and will serve us once again as we look forward to safely ride out the impact of the current global financial crisis. BIS Review 58/2009  3
For its part, the Banco de España, in keeping with its remit, considers that this review must not succumb to the temptation of indiscriminately stepping up the level of regulation of the sector. The initiatives along these lines have to be thought out in depth and have to be justified by the existence of a market failure the resolution of which, through public intervention, gives rise to greater benefits than costs. Lastly, in regard to the direct powers of the Banco de España, I would remind you of something that often seems to be overlooked: the institution I represent is part of the Eurosystem. In view of that fact it will continue working to ensure that monetary policy implementation is compatible with holding inflation within the bounds set by the central bank and, at the same time, will help guarantee that adequate liquidity is provided so that money markets function properly. The social partners also have an important task: to co-operate so that, while the inevitable adjustment is taking place in the residential construction sector and in related activities, the rest of the economy, i.e. industry and services, becomes more dynamic. And for this to happen a moderation in private sector margins and in unit labour costs through wage moderation and/or productivity increases is fundamental. It should be quite clear for all that if the inevitable rise in unemployment in construction is not offset by greater dynamism in the rest of the private sector of the economy, employment may perform more negatively than expected.

More specifically, the energy component is the largest contributor to the surging trend of domestic headline inflation (with around 45% share of HICP). We expect that our domestic short-term inflation outlook will continue to remain, overall, at very elevated levels, similar to the euro area inflation developments, amid the ongoing significant uncertainty and volatility resulting from the war. More specifically, Cyprus HICP inflation for 2022 has been revised upwards in our most recent projections, now reaching 8,4 percent compared with 7,0 percent in the CBC June 2022 projections. Banking sector n this ever changing and uncertain economic environment, the Cyprus Banking Sector is proving resilient, exhibiting a solid and healthy financial standing. The solvency position, as measured by the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio was edging up to 17,5 percent in the second quarter of 2022, a level higher than the respective European average of 15,2 percent. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio, indicating the availability of liquid funds against deposit outflows over a 30 day stressed period, stood at the level of 320 percent in July 2022 which is more than 3 times higher than the minimum requirement of 100 percent, placing Cyprus amongst the most liquid banking sectors in the Union, where the average LCR amounts to 168 percent.
In London, an additional source of demand has come from foreign investors looking for alternative sources of return amid a global environment of low interest rates. The government’s help to buy scheme may have also played a role though it is early days. Transactions are still quite low. How much pent up demand exists and how quickly it will come through, is of course unknowable. But it is not at all implausible that it could add significantly to pressure on the market for the next few years. Use of the government’s help-to-buy scheme continues to expand. All of this paints a picture of further pressure on transactions that could take us quickly to pre-crisis rates. Despite the dip in March, housing transactions are still up 30% on their level a year earlier. Were transactions to grow at that pace from here on, we would go past the 97–2007 average level of around 120,000 per month before the end of this year; and be back at 2007 levels by the first half of next year. Nor can we look to increased supply to help to quickly relieve some of this pressure. Housing starts, insufficient to meet demand before the crisis, dropped from around 230,000 to an average of a little over 120,000 between 2008–12. They have begun to recover – indeed, dwellings investment has been a major part of the recovery in economic growth over the past 12 months. But the increase in housing starts seen over the past few years has lagged behind growth in transactions.

The current financial turmoil is here to remind us that financial innovation is not a smooth process. An appropriate knowledge of the mechanisms through which monetary policy affects the economy is of crucial importance for central banks. Financial innovation affects these mechanisms by altering the channels through which monetary policy operates. Drawing on some lessons from the current turmoil, I would like to make four points. First, securitisation has created new uncertainties in the transmission channels of monetary policy. It may have weakened some channels and strengthened some others. At least in normal times, financial innovation significantly weakens the bank-lending channel. Securitisation gives firms broader access to capital markets and, as such, makes them less dependent on bank funding. Similarly, banks may be more able to issue debt securities and less dependent on the constraint of funding themselves with secured deposits. At the same time, however, securitisation strengthens the “direct” transmission channel through which interest rates operate, since a great number of financial intermediaries are more dependent on liquidity and on its price. Second, financial innovation – to the extent that it makes it easier to take risks and encourages the “search for yield” – may have increased the impact of monetary policy because, in such an environment, risk premia are highly procyclical and move in tandem with interest rates. Third, this same procyclicality of “risk taking” can lead to booms and busts, when investors’ appetite for risk changes.