samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If the bank system instead has a deficit, as was the case just over a year ago, then the Riksbank will implement what are known as repos every week with a week’s maturity. This means that the Riksbank buys securities from the banks with a simultaneous agreement that a repurchase will be made one week later and where the interest rate is the repo rate that has been decided. Secondly, the Riksbank carries out what are known as fine-tuning transactions every day to smooth the daily fluctuations in the bank system’s regular payments. The banks can invest money in the Riksbank overnight at an interest rate of 10 basis points below the repo rate, that is, at present 0.15 per cent. This also assumes that the bank system as a whole has a surplus towards the Riksbank at the end of the day. If they instead have a deficit, the banks can borrow money from the Riksbank overnight at a rate that is 10 basis points above the repo rate. The fine-tuning is normally very small, but during the crisis it has grown to entail very large amounts. Thirdly, there are so-called standing facilities. The banks have the right to borrow from the Riksbank overnight at a lending rate that is 50 basis points higher than the repo rate, and the right to invest surplus in the Riksbank at a deposit rate that is 50 basis points lower than the repo rate.

Some business costs, such as insurance, will rise, but that should be at least partially offset by the sharp fall in oil prices. RPIX inflation rose briefly above target in August, but fell back to 2.3% in September. We are just starting to put our next formal inflation forecast together, and you will be able to see the results of that exercise in the November Inflation Report. At this point, I know you would wish a crisp conclusion and some indication of where I think rates should move in the future. Some of you may even think you have detected clues in what I have said as to where I think rates should go. If you have, though, that would be an over-interpretation. There are, I think, clear downside risks. The world economy may slow further if adverse confidence effects persist. Spending which is currently delayed may be cancelled. And the labour market may begin turning more decisively in the UK. But for the moment these risks need to be weighed against the continued strength of domestic demand. Of course, if we are to meet our inflation target, a strong domestic economy will be needed to offset the weakening influence of overseas markets. We have cut interest rates by 150 basis points since the start of the year in part to achieve this, and the full effect of these reductions have still to come through.
Still, even in times of sound economic growth, some SMEs will always be unsuccessful in obtaining the financing they have applied for, for reasons such as insufficient business plans. However, there seems to be a clear relationship between the size and age of a firm and its success in applying for a loan. The larger and older the firms were, the more successful they were in obtaining a loan. Indeed, about twice as many applications for bank loans by SMEs as those by large firms were rejected. Availability of external financing Firms that had an external financing need and therefore had applied for a loan in the first half of 2009 were rather sceptical in their assessment of the availability of external financing (see Chart 9). Large firms were somewhat more negative in their assessment than SMEs. This is in line with the evidence from the bank lending survey that the tightening of credit standards was more pronounced for large firms than for SMEs. As already mentioned, this may come as a surprise, as SMEs are generally perceived to be affected more than large firms by a deterioration in access to finance. BIS Review 129/2009  5  The availability of bank loans tends to be related to the general economic situation, which affects the financial situation of the individual firm.

From this perspective, the standardisation of data and the draft Non-Financial Reporting Directive - which will be discussed this year - for adoption hopefully next year, under the French Presidency - will be the battle to be fought in 2021. And it would be unacceptable - at a time when progress on climate change is moving in the right direction and Europe has won the first round of climate-related values - for Europe to lose the second round, i.e. that of measuring these values using standards and published data. 2.3 Incorporate climate risk, into order to reduce it in all of our operations and in the economy The third part of our triptych, the very core of our activity, and the most powerful: reducing our climate risk in concrete terms, through our asset purchase and  Page 6 sur 8 collateral policies. This ambition requires great dexterity; but it is rooted in a conviction: we have in our hands the tools to move forward, concretely, strongly. I propose to start decarbonising the ECB's balance sheet in a pragmatic, gradual and targeted manner for all corporate assets, whether they are held on the central bank's balance sheet (purchases) or taken as collateral, without including government securities. There are at least two arguments for such a priority: 1/ it is very difficult to differentiate between the climate policies of the euro area countries. 2/ Conversely, non-financial corporations are clearly identified as players whose activities are the most carbon intensive.
2 See, for example, the concepts of Safety I and Safety II in Eric Hollnagel, Jorg Leonhard, Tony Licu, and Steven Shorrock, 2015, "From Safety I to Safety II: A Whitepaper,"  Eurocontrol. 3 Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, 1993, Princeton University Press. 4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Principles for Operational Resilience,” March 2021. Joshua Rosenberg, "Thrive in any Environment: Strengthening Resilience  through Risk Management," November 2019. 5 Quote Investigator, “Culture Eats Strategy for Breakfast,” May 2017. 6 Financial Stability Board, “Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture: A Framework for Assessing Risk Culture,” 2014. The Institute of  Risk Management, “Risk Culture Resources for Practitioners,” 2012. 7 These are adapted from safety culture concepts in, 1997, Ashgate Publishing. See also, GAIN Working Group E, "A Roadmap to a Just Culture: Enhancing the Safety  Environment," September 2004. 8 Risks highlighted include information and cyber security risks, physical and psychological health risks, technology risks and dependencies. See, Consultative Group on Risk  Management, Bank for International Settlements Representative Office of the Americas, “Business Continuity Planning at Central Banks During and After the Pandemic,” April 2022. 9 Chair Jerome H. Powell, “Coronavirus and CARES Act,” Federal Reserve Board of Governors, June 2020. 10 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Special Issue: Policy Actions in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, June 2022. 11 Daleep Singh, “The Fed’s Emergency Facilities: Usage, Impact, and Early Lessons,” July 2020.

Without going into detail, we've mitigated this risk, and successfully worked remotely through subsequent severe weather events. Our business continuity planning and testing helped us navigate the early days of the pandemic, but this event was far more extreme than anything we had practiced, and we learned many lessons. I highly recommend a recent paper by the Consultative Group on Risk Management that brings together insights from central bank experiences managing business continuity risks during the pandemic.8 At the New York Fed, as we were changing where and how we worked, the pandemic's impacts spread to the economy and financial markets. From March to May 2020, gross domestic product in the United States fell by nearly one third (on an annualized basis) and employment dropped by 22 million. Equity markets sold off, and credit spreads surged to levels not seen since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Financial market functioning deteriorated with significant declines in liquidity; and, in the municipal bond market, underwriters cancelled new deals and municipal borrowing stopped.
This is in line with EBRD Strategy of Graduation and the graduation of EU 8 countries from EBRD operations can be envisaged. The Czech Government has already given approval that discussions with the Bank's management on the graduation of the Czech Republic from EBRD operations can begin. We believe that October 2007 - which would be the date of the regular consideration of EBRD Strategy for the Czech Republic could be considered an appropriate for this debate. This time-frame should be sufficient for the Bank, the Czech authorities and investors to make the necessary arrangements. We understand that the Bank's management will make their decisions regarding the supervision of its portfolio in the Czech Republic, including decisions concerning the future of the Bank‘s representative office in Prague. The mandate of the EBRD in the Czech Republic is thus approaching its conclusion, and I would like to express our gratitude and appreciation to the Bank for its support during the ups-and-downs of the transition process in my country. Our sincere thanks go to the Management and all those numerous members of staff who for years and sometime in difficult circumstances brought many successful projects to the Czech Republic. We wish the Bank much good fortune for fulfilling its mandate. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 44/2006  1

The Chinese government was not willing to allow its currency to float freely and the exchange rate against the US dollar was managed. This disabled an important stabiliser and contributed increasing world trade imbalances. Long-term interest rates remained low in spite of substantial monetary policy tightening in the US between 2004 and 2006. International organisations such as the BIS, OECD, IMF and others noted on more than one occasion that growing imbalances in the world economy were a source of concern. But economic policy decisions are the prerogative of national governments. Given the policy pursued by China, there were probably limits to what monetary policy in Western countries could in reality achieve in terms of rolling back these forces. Increased private saving in the US and other deficit countries would probably have required monetary policy tightening sufficient to push up long-term interest rates. Alternatively, a substantial increase in public sector saving would have been necessary. Both alternatives would probably have led to an economic policy driven downturn. It is demanding to pursue such a policy based on the proposition that a crisis might occur in the future. Improved financial regulation would probably have reduced the severity of the financial crisis. Regulation and insurance have similar features: in most cases an annual premium must be paid in the form of slightly lower growth. This occurs because capital is not allowed to flow entirely freely to the highest yielding vehicles. In return, regulation can counter the build-up of financial imbalances.
A series of home-made disasters have also rocked the sector. The UBS “rogue trader”, the losses at JP Morgan’s Chief Investment Office, LIBOR manipulation at Barclays (with others under investigation) and the mis-selling of PPI. These scandals have not so far been institution-threatening, but coming on top of the financial and macroeconomic crisis to date, they have helped to suck confidence from the financial sector just when it might otherwise have been recovering. Chart 3 shows a “heat map” of markets generated by colleagues in the Financial Stability area of the Bank. This chart uses indicators such as issuance amounts and bid-ask spreads to monitor market conditions. Red indicates a non-functioning market. The process of “healing” since 2008/09 that I referred to a year ago is clear. But then the improvement plateaus and starts to reverse in mid-2011. A year ago it looked like conditions were starting to revert to those of late 2008. As the managers of the UK’s foreign exchange reserves we experienced some of these deteriorating conditions at first hand. (It is a neglected point that the Bank of England is a significant participant in the market on behalf of HM Treasury through reserves management operations, as well as being the monetary authority for sterling markets.)

After the end of our net asset purchases, the primary instrument to steer our monetary policy stance is again our key interest rates. And as far as their path is concerned, we continue to expect them to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. This rotation of instruments from net purchases to the rate path has been implemented in such a way as to preserve our accommodative monetary policy stance. We have thus not tightened our monetary policy. Moreover, we have made it clear that, in any event, we stand ready to adjust all of our instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation continues to move towards our inflation aim in a sustained manner. President Mario Draghi always stresses that the toolbox is full. But with interest rates at or even below zero and the asset purchase programme at its self-imposed limits, what else is really left? If there is a problem, there needs to be a careful assessment to establish the cause. A financial shock, for instance, is something different from a slowdown in growth for fundamental reasons. In the case of an economic slowdown, interest rates are generally the instrument of choice. If the euro area economy were to slow more sharply, we could adapt our forward guidance on interest rates and this could be complemented by other measures.
Later in 2013 economic activity should gradually recover, as global demand strengthens and our accommodative monetary policy stance and significantly improved financial market confidence work their way through to the economy. In order to sustain confidence, it is essential for governments to reduce further both fiscal and structural imbalances and to proceed with financial sector restructuring. Today, we have also decided to continue conducting our main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of the sixth maintenance period of 2013 on 9 July 2013. This procedure will also remain in use for the Eurosystem’s special-term refinancing operations with a maturity of one maintenance period, which will continue to be conducted for as long as needed, and at least until the end of the second quarter of 2013. The fixed rate in these special-term refinancing operations will be the same as the MRO rate prevailing at the time. The rates in the three-month longer-term refinancing operations, to be allotted until June 2013, will be fixed at the average rate of the MROs over the life of the respective longer-term refinancing operation. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Following a contraction of 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the second quarter of 2012, euro area real GDP declined by 0.1% in the third quarter.

This applies both to the European and the domestic spheres. The surveillance framework operating at the European level was mostly focused on the fulfilment of the fiscal targets embodied in the Stability and Growth Pact. However, this framework revealed itself insufficient and ultimately ineffective, both because it relied on nominal deficit thresholds – which masked fiscal vulnerabilities under the umbrella of a large cyclical increase in revenues- and because it was loosely applied. In several Euro area countries, Spain among them, the structural policies that could have set the basis for a more lasting and sustainable growth path were timid in a period when the economy was supported by a favourable environment. This is not, by the way, a European peculiarity: as we all know, structural policies tend to be implemented out of necessity, that is, not in the good, but in the difficult times. However, the narrative of the financial crisis in Spain somewhat differs from other developed countries. Our financial system was not exposed to the complex structured assets which were at the root of the financial crisis in 2007-2008. But, while we did not hold this kind of toxic assets, we have suffered the toxification of the housing sector assets as the crisis deepened. The freezing of the global financing markets that started in mid-2007 also disrupted our financing patterns (heavily dependent, as I have said, on external funds directed towards the housing sector).
2/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Meanwhile, the high levels of government debt following the pandemic, alongside the tightening of financial conditions, represent a vulnerability and limit the space to adopt fiscal expansion measures. This setting is also subject to an extremely high level of uncertainty, stemming, above all, from the course of the war in Ukraine and its economic repercussions, which are hard to predict. However, inflationary pressures also pose a genuine risk. Whether they increase further depends not only on the course of the war, but also on internal factors, such as a possible persistent rise in inflation expectations, or higher-thanexpected increases in wages or mark-ups. More persistent inflation would require a sharper tightening of monetary policy, which would render those public or private agents in a less sound economic and financial position more vulnerable. This could have a greater-than-expected impact on their spending levels. 1. The economic policy response Against this backdrop, I would like to share my opinion on how economic policy should respond. First, I would like to underscore that the current situation is far different from that triggered by the pandemic. We then faced a temporary but highly adverse shock, in a setting free of inflationary pressures. That environment warranted a forceful monetary policy response, in order to create conditions that were conducive to an equally extraordinary fiscal expansion which would guarantee the income of households and firms and thus minimise the crisis-induced structural damage to employment, productive capacity and growth.

The current level of security is not adequate for large-value payments. Some Internet-based payment products are becoming more secure, but only after the creators of these products have spent a great deal of time, effort and resources making their products secure. Consistent fast transmission and processing are also essential for large-value payments. The Internet today has no authorized, universal means of prioritizing specific electronic messages from other messages. Faster and better hardware helps, certainly, but offers no guarantee. One of my responsibilities is to serve as the Product Director of the Wholesale Payments Product Office of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. This includes the Fedwire transfer of funds, transfers of securities against payment, and net settlement. In providing these payment services, the Reserve Banks must charge a fee designed to cover their costs, plus what we refer to as a “private sector adjustment factor,” a proxy for the capital, taxes, and other costs incurred by private-sector service providers. Thus, I am keenly interested in the next stage of the Internet. If messages sent across the Internet could be made timely, become much more secure at reasonable cost, and, if a widely-accepted prioritization scheme for electronic messages BIS Review 17/1997  -7-  could be implemented so that large-value payment messages could move instantaneously, it is not inconceivable that the effect on existing large-value payments transfer systems could be substantial.
Hopefully, that will prevent the situation from spinning out of control and igniting a wider financial crisis in Europe. In addition to the actions of European political leaders, central banks have been actively supplying liquidity to the European banking system. The Fed set up temporary currency  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  swap lines with several foreign central banks last November. These lines allow those central banks to borrow dollars and, in turn, lend those dollars to banks in their countries. In addition, the European Central Bank has provided hundreds of billions of euros in three-year loans to European banks. These actions have defused concerns about the ability of European banks to renew credit when their debts come due. In this way, Europe has avoided what could have been a massive credit crunch as banks pulled back lending sharply. I don’t need to remind you that, in today’s interconnected world, financial turmoil in Europe would definitely hurt our economy as well. Even if the European crisis doesn’t flare up again, growth is slowing in many parts of the world. Many European countries already appear to be in recession, and there is a danger that this situation could worsen significantly as governments put in place austerity measures. Turning to Asia, growth in China has also slowed as that country has tightened monetary and credit policies to reduce inflation. Indeed, the list of countries that are still experiencing solid growth is getting shorter all the time.

Between 1999 and 2006, housing debt more than doubled.3 So it’s not so surprising that we got an anemic rebound. The financial crisis unleashed powerful forces that have damped spending and sapped the recovery of its vigor. I’ll mention three. First, it destroyed a huge amount of household wealth. Second, it flattened the housing market. Third, it made it hard for businesses and households to get credit. Let’s look at each of these. First, when house prices collapsed, the wealth of American households plunged by about six-and-a-half trillion dollars. That equals more than 40 percent of the total size of the U.S. economy. Many people went from feeling rich to feeling poor, with neither the means nor the will to spend. Instead, they became intent on repairing their finances by increasing their saving and trimming their debt. In other words, they deleveraged. During the recession, the household saving rate climbed to about 6 percent of income from about 1 percent. It’s still about 4-1/2 percent. In the long run, higher saving is healthy. But, in the near term, it puts a brake on spending and slows growth. Second, the depressed housing market has been a drag on growth. Home construction plays an important role in the economy, of course. When you add in items that often go with a new home – things such as furniture, carpets, and appliances – you’re talking about a significant fraction of overall economic activity.4 Today, there are still millions of homes in foreclosure, and millions more on the verge.