samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But if you look at the facts, total deposits in Hong Kong’s banking system rose by almost 3% in 2019. They increased by another 7.8% in the first eight months of this year. In simple terms, the strength of the Hong Kong dollar and this expansion of the deposit base tell us that there is more money coming in than going out. 13. Our banking system continues to be robust. Hong Kong’s banks have among the highest capital adequacy and liquidity ratios in the world. And despite a difficult operating environment, our classified loan ratio is still low – around 0.8%. And that resilience provides room for our banks to continue lending and providing relief measures to customers during the COVID-19 outbreak. 14. And our capital markets are thriving. Hong Kong was the world’s leading IPO centre last year. Although global markets were tested by extreme volatility in the first quarter, our capital markets have continued to function without incident. As several large Chinese companies that had listed in the US seek secondary listings in Hong Kong this year, we should once again achieve a very high ranking in the global IPO league table. 15. None of this happened by luck or by chance. The resilience we see now is the result of sustained efforts over many years. It’s the result of building capital and liquidity buffers into the banking system; and prudently managing the reserves that support the Linked Exchange Rate System.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 11 Long-term real interest rate (percent) 9,5  9,5  7,5  7,5  5,5  5,5  3,5  3,5  1,5  1,5 92  94  96  PRC 8 years (1)  98  00  PRC 20 years (1)  02  04  06  BCU 10 years (2)  08  10  BCU 5 years (2)  (1) PRCs are CBC bonds in UF with six-monthly equal installments (except for the last one), which can involve both interest and principal payments. (2)The BCU is a bond issued in UF, an inflation-indexed unit of account. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 12 Banking loans to the private sector (y-o-y change, percent) Chile  Emerging economies 60  90  90  60  75  75  50  50  60  60  40  40  45  45  30  30  30  30  20  20  15  15  10  10  0  0  0  0  -15  -15  -10  -10  90  95 Housing  00 Consumer  05  10  Corporate (*)  06  Brazil China  07  08  Colombia Chile  09  10  Mexico  11  Peru  Turkey  (*) Sum of commercial and foreign trade credits.
Evidence from Subprime Loans,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming in Vol. 125, No. 1. Loutskina, E. and P. Strahan (2006), “Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Acceptance Rates,” mimeo, Darden Graduate School, University of Virginia. Figure 1 Countries experiencing drops in real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2008 (*) (percentage of total sample) 100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0  71  74  77  80  83  86  89  92  95  98  01  04  07  (*) Using the annualized quarterly GDP for a sample of 29 developed and emerging economies. Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS Review 68/2009  7  Figure 2 GDP (annual change, percent) 10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6  -6  70  75  80  Latin America (*)  85  90  95  World at PPP  00  05  10(f)  Developed ecoomies  (*) Simple average of annual GDP change in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. (f) Forecast.

Higher levels of capital will certainly have to be required in the future, particularly as banks gradually assume higher levels of risk. Such is the spirit of the Basel II standards, but this crisis has proved they do are not enough. It will be necessary to examine how capital requirements and accounting norms may have amplified the financial crisis, and what must be done to avoid the excessive procyclicality of the banking activity. Fortunately this has not been a problem in the financial systems of Colombia, Chile and the rest of the region, where regulatory schemes worked. Banks are adequately matched in terms of currencies, an aspect that used to be the Achilles heel of our banks. Central banks must strengthen and perfect the models with which they carry out their stress tests. They should take into account the interconnections within the financial system and detect vulnerabilities opportunely. We have seen how the U.S. investment banks, insurance companies and other non-banking agents of the financial system played a leading role in the origin and spread of the crisis, but were not at the heart of the banking supervision network. Of the many aspects that may be debated with respect of the financial system, there is one that should be singled out, especially to the extent that banking systems of emerging economies continue along the lines of financial innovation.
The question then arises: should there be an exchange rate target or an inflation target? The answer is not always straightforward. Other things being equal, an inflation target is more appropriate because it stands closer to the factors important to economic well-being, and it is easier to decide what an inflation target should be than to estimate the “right” exchange rate target. In other respects, the answer is determined by the structure and cyclical behaviour of the economy in question, the maturity of its markets, and whether cross-border movement of capital is largely unrestricted or not. The more open an economy is, the stronger the arguments for an exchange rate target because inflation is determined to a greater degree by the exchange rate. On the other hand, the less correlated shocks and cycles are with those in trading partner countries, the stronger the arguments for an inflation target and a floating exchange rate. Therefore, the two characteristics of small economies that I mentioned earlier  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  pull in opposite directions. This does not change the fact that, other things being equal, smaller economies are likelier than larger ones to have an exchange rate target. Underdeveloped financial markets can be obstacles to the pursuit of an inflation target and a floating exchange rate. An example of this is the conditions in Iceland before the 1990s, when we lacked a money market for krónur and an interbank foreign exchange market.

These tools would not be used against the regular flows that are a normal part of monetary policy transmission; instead, they would primarily be used when flows became too strong and there is the risk that monetary policy transmission along the interest rate channel would be weakened excessively In implementing monetary policy, the MPC takes into account the impact of monetary policy and its interactions with other aspects of economic and prudential policies, insofar as this is consistent with medium-term price stability. There will be reliable processes for exchange of information, discussion, and analysis of the interactions among these various factors. This will take place through consultations between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank; through the proposed macroeconomic council, where the interactions between economic policy and labour market decisions would be discussed; or in the Systemic Risk Committee and Financial Stability Council and joint meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee and the Systemic Risk Committee. The Central Bank plans to strengthen these processes still further by launching a new publication next year. The report, which will be issued at least once a year, will focus on the external position of the economy and its sustainability, the outlook for the balance of payments, and the exchange rate and signs of major deviations from the equilibrium exchange rate. Honoured guests: The revised monetary policy framework will be finalised in the next few months, before capital controls on residents are lifted.
This is more likely when the underlying risks are themselves fat-tailed. While complex approaches can appear to perform better 19  For example, DeMiguel et al (2007) find that, for a sample threshold of N = 25, complex rules outperform simple ones only for sample sizes of in excess of 3000 months (250 years) of data. 20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  20  in-sample, simpler approaches may be more robust to out-of-sample structural shifts and fat tails, the like of which we have seen in past financial crises, from railways in the 19th century to subprime mortgages in the 21st. This problem is not unique to banks. Stress tests can reduce reliance on banks’ own models. But they then still rely on regulators’ risk models, which may be vulnerable to similar issues, especially if they are formulated in an excessively granular manner (Hale et al (2015)). Liquidity and Funding  Historically, most banks failures are precipitated by insufficient liquidity. Due to maturity transformation, banks are vulnerable to a sudden withdrawal of funding due to bank-specific or market-wide losses of credibility. In such circumstances, banks will be more robust if they have a buffer of high-quality liquid assets allowing them to meet outflows, survive the first stages of a bank run and, if necessary, giving the authorities time to prepare for resolution. The Basel III LCR was designed and calibrated with these considerations in mind. But excessive maturity transformation can also create risks over longer horizons.

This applies to the 1997 convergence criteria themselves, of course. It also applies to performance against those criteria in later years. And, in our view, perhaps more controversially, it applies to other aspects of the real economies of applicant countries, particularly to the structures of their labour markets. In the case of the convergence criteria, our attitude is straightforward. They must be rigorously respected. And that applies to the substance, as well as the form. So it would be unwise for a country to seek to qualify in 1998 by massaging down its 1997 public sector deficit through artificial, unrepeatable devices, even if those devices are not technically disallowed. It would be unwise, because the deficit limit is not a one-off requirement. Continued discipline on individual member states’ budget positions is a crucial element of EMU in the future. Friday’s agreement at Dublin provides for such discipline, albeit with an element of political judgement over the way that discipline will be exercised in certain circumstances. But the general conclusion is clear. Member states will need to live with continued fiscal discipline. In our view, unless a country can show that its fiscal position is structurally sound - in other words that in mid-cycle, with the economy growing at trend on its potential growth path, the budget of the government would tend to be close to balance - then it may find the fiscal discipline of EMU difficult to sustain. That is both a long-term point, and one relevant to the transition period.
Our country posted a very successful and strong economic activity performance during the pandemic compared to other countries. As you know, economic activity in many countries declined in that period, and growth in many economies remained close to zero. However, the Turkish economy, which normalized rapidly in the succeeding period, ranked among the top economies in terms of high growth rates. Accordingly, our economy grew by 11% in 2021, posting a very strong growth performance compared to other countries. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine that started in the first quarter of 2022 aggravated the effects of ongoing negative supply shocks and increased the uncertainties. Nevertheless, domestic economic activity remained strong in a sustainable and uninterrupted framework despite negative supply shocks. Accordingly, the annual growth rate stood at 7.3% in the first quarter of 2022. We expect that growth will also be close to this rate in the second quarter. Net exports and machinery-equipment investments have a very remarkable share in this strong growth. On the expenditures side, net exports have contributed positively to growth for the last five consecutive quarters. Machinery-equipment investments have  1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  also made an uninterrupted positive contribution to growth in the post-pandemic period. On the production side, the services and industrial sectors continued to contribute to growth. We see that machinery-equipment investments continue in a sound and sustainable framework. Investments that support productive capacity, particularly machineryequipment investments that drive industrial output, point to a stable and strong growth.

But even this would probably cost quite a lot in terms of money and prestige (for example, it is easy to imagine the management being replaced), so, in general, this is probably not an alternative that a bank would wish to consider. Naturally, one way of reducing the risk would be, quite simply, to decrease lending in dollars and thus also the need for borrowing in dollars. In such a case, customers would have to be referred to other banks. Of course, at least major customers generally also have contact with US banks, which never encounter acute liquidity shortages, as they can turn directly to the Federal Reserve in the event of a crisis. So they have access to a lender of last resort which can create dollars. This is exactly what the Swedish banks lack. Now, naturally it hurts for a bank to refer good customers to a competitor, but if you don’t have any dollars, then you don’t have any dollars. It’s all a question of what risks the bank is willing to take. Another way of minimising the risk is for the Riksbank to maintain a foreign currency reserve that the banks can have access to in a crisis, as it does at present. The Riksbank has several reasons for maintaining a reserve in foreign currency, but one important argument for its current size is precisely the need to be ready to lend to the banks6. The Riksbank’s foreign exchange reserve is currently equivalent to about SEK 300 billion.
4 Stephanie Chaly, James Hennessy, Lev Menand, Kevin Stiroh, and Joseph Tracy, Misconduct Risk, Culture, and  Supervision, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December 2017. 5 Stiroh, Kevin J., The Complexity of Culture Reform in Finance, October 4, 2018. 6 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Board invites public comment on two  proposals; corporate governance and rating system for large financial institutions, August 3, 2017. 7 See Banking Standards Board. 8 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Board requests comment on proposed  guidance that would clarify Board’s supervisory expectations related to risk management for large financial institutions, January 4, 2018. 9 Dudley, William C., Strengthening Culture for the Long-Term, June 18, 2018. 10 Lois V. Brown, Psychology of Motivation, 2007. Coon D, Mitterer JO. Introduction to Psychology: Gateways to  Mind and Behavior With Concept Maps. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth; 2010. Oudeyer, P. and Kaplan, F. What is Intrinsic Motivation? A Typology of Computational Approaches. Front Neurorobotics, 2007. 11 See Banking Standards Board, Annual Review 2017/2018. 12 Department of Finance, Minister Donohoe Welcomes Banking Initiative That Aims to Rebuild Trust in the  Industry, December 31, 2017. 13 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Workshop on Culture Measurement and Assessment, June 21, 2017. 14 Financial Stability Board, Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk: A Toolkit for Firms  and Supervisors, April 20, 2018.

As all risk managers know, you can’t manage what you can’t measure. This is equally true in the area of misconduct risk. At the same time, while hard data is important, I don’t believe it is sufficient to convey all of the complexities of a firm’s culture or all of the ways it can impact business outcomes. In recent years, we have seen firms develop dashboards that seek to bring together various metrics from across their organization. This is an important and necessary step. Data sources that we’ve seen include internal quantitative information such as compliance and policy violations, completed trainings, audit results, and risk metrics like limit breaches, policy violations and external metrics like customer complaints, stakeholder perceptions, and client surveys. There also are qualitative data based on employee surveys. Some firms have begun to do more frequent pulse surveys with small cohorts of staff. Other firms have found that long-term trends are more insightful than short term changes. These types of data, while necessary, are not sufficient to make progress. Supplementing hard data with interviews, focus groups, dialogue, and external benchmarking can greatly enhance an organization’s ability to manage and strengthen its culture. Measurement and metrics are best used as a starting point to spur further analysis and probing as boards and senior management seek to identify trouble spots and build strong cultures.
Both of these examples result in an increased in measured deposits at banks, but neither presages more nominal spending. 9  G Ryle “The Concept of Mind” London (1949) Hutchinson. Ryle was criticising as incoherent a dualist view of mind and body in which the mind is instrumental in determining action but is wholly distinct from the physical realm. BIS Review 73/2007  5  We need to start as the Governor has said by trying to distinguish supply shocks from demand shocks. 10 Where growth in money is driven by the wish of consumers or companies to increase their holdings of money for a given level of spending, there need be no effect on nominal GDP or inflation. As I have discussed there is clear evidence of changes in demand of that sort in the financial sector. But that is not the whole story. So have there been increases in supply of money and if so how will they feed through into the economy? What does a supply shock look like? It is easiest to visualise in a closed economy in which the money supply is mainly notes issued by the monetary authorities. One can imagine then a direct increase in supply – a helicopter drop of extra notes. In that world people would really find themselves with extra cash in their pockets and would be expected to go out and spend some or all of it.

But we must obviously not turn a blind eye to the possibility that new disturbances may expose other weaknesses. Household behaviour in the housing market poses a considerable challenge to economic policy, particularly because demand for housing and residential mortgages is heavily subsidised via the tax system and because the very low level of equity capital required to extend a mortgage is reflected in the supply of loans. These challenges must be confronted at the source. Thank you for your attention. 8  BIS Review 119/2009  BIS Review 119/2009  9  10  BIS Review 119/2009  BIS Review 119/2009  11  12  BIS Review 119/2009  BIS Review 119/2009  13  14  BIS Review 119/2009  BIS Review 119/2009  15  16  BIS Review 119/2009  BIS Review 119/2009  17  18  BIS Review 119/2009
The other challenge to the City that I would draw attention to is the quite different challenge associated with growing social concerns and rising public expectations, which are probably heightened by the rapid pace of financial change associated with advancing technology. In part these concerns relate to perceptions of increased risk of financial instability. There has been, and I suspect will continue to be, increasing public emphasis - both domestically and internationally within the IMF, the new Financial Stability Forum and the BIS, for example, notably in the wake of the recent global financial turmoil - on reducing systemic financial risk and on how to handle systemic disturbances when they occur. But the social concerns go well beyond this sort of systemic issue. They include growing concerns about organised criminal abuse of the financial system, for example; they include an increasing emphasis on consumer protection - particularly protection of the less financially-sophisticated in an increasingly complex environment; and they include questions relating to the financial exclusion of disadvantaged sectors of the community. In all these respects, too, the concerns are not just domestic concerns but have close parallels internationally. It seems to me that in many instances the new technologies, appropriately deployed, actually improve the capacity of the financial system to address these concerns.

In this framework, we would also like to inform you that the Bank of Albania is working for considering, at the shortest time possible, the possibility of increasing the participation amount of individuals, through the Bank of Albania, in the primary treasury bill market, as well as the application of a commission on new operations they will carry out with it. The new level and commission will affect only the individuals that would like to use the Bank of Albania to participate in the primary market. Thanking you again for your attention, I would like to pass on to the discussions about the steps we deem to make. At the end of this meeting, I propose we come out with a concrete plan of actions for a successful implementation of this process. 2  BIS Review 24/2005
The sectoral structure of the Spanish economy, skewed more towards services such as wholesale and retail trade and the hospitality sector, only partially explains our country’s poor level of productivity, as measured in terms of output per hour worked. This output stands 14% below that of the euro area. If Spain had the sectoral structure of the euro area, this negative gap would still be 10%.2 1  Endogenous growth models show that knowledge is the only factor of production that generates positive externalities and economies of scale. Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). 2  This figure is a 2020 update on the figures set out in Cuadrado, Moral-Benito and Solera (2020). 2  Nor can lower productivity be attributed simply to the smaller size of Spain's business sector. When the registry data on firms from Spain, Germany, France and Italy are grouped together by size, Spanish firms are between 10% and 20% less productive than their European peers, regardless of size.3 In reality, this lacklustre productivity is symptomatic of an array of interconnected shortcomings. Today I will focus on five factors behind these shortcomings. The first factor concerns the very minor role played by innovation in our economy. To give one example: between 2020 and 2021 the ratio of research and development and innovation (R&D&I) expenditure to GDP stood on average at 1.2% in Spain, 0.8 pp below the euro area average.4 The private sector’s failings in this area are particularly striking.

19  Article 26 of the Law on Market Unity provides a specific administrative appeal proceeding for defence of the rights and interests of economic operators by competent authorities. It also provides a procedure for agents to request the National Commission on Markets and Competition to file an appeal for judicial review before the National High Court by means of a streamlined process. Finally, Article 28 allows consumers to inform the Market Unity Secretariat about obstacles and barriers and request a report. 20  Ferraz, Finan and Szerman (2021) and Hebous and Zimmermann (2021). 21  Ilzetzki (2023). 22  García et al. (2022). 6  Against this background, the long-term macroeconomic impact of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme will largely depend on how tenders are allocated among different firms. Moreover, this will provide an opportunity to assess the extent to which Spain has improved the level of competition in this area. The fourth factor relates to labour market regulations. The Spanish labour market has traditionally had a high incidence of temporary contracts (a cause of low labour productivity in themselves),23 a wage determination process that takes little account of each firms’ productivity and ineffective passive and active employment policies. Since the pandemic, regulatory changes such as the 2021 labour market reform have been introduced which have reduced the temporary employment ratio. However, a full assessment of these changes will need to consider many different aspects and a broader time frame.