samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus not only does the price of gilts rise as a consequence of the Asset Purchase Facility’s initial purchases, but also the prices of a whole spectrum of other assets. That in turn lowers the cost of non-bank finance and encourages increased corporate issuance. Also the rise in asset prices increases wealth and improves balance sheets. In this way, Quantitative Easing helps to work around the blockage created by a banking system that is still undergoing a process of balance sheet repair. That is exactly what we have seen since the Monetary Policy Committee started its asset purchase program. Gilt yields fell sharply, though they have subsequently risen and fallen again (Chart 2). But gilt yields can move for a variety of reasons, including changing expectations of future interest rates. If we control for that by comparing gilt yields with a measure of market expectations of the future level of Bank Rate (Overnight Indexed Swap rates for an equivalent maturity), we find that this spread has fallen by around ¾ percentage point (Chart 3). Moreover, no such movement is observed in either the United States or euro  1  That is in contrast to the related policy conducted by the Bank of Japan in the early part of this decade, which was instead directed at purchases of Japanese government debt held by the banking sector. 2  BIS Review 126/2009  area, which strongly suggests that the movement may be related to our gilt purchases 2 .

No matter how rapidly or how slowly the economy is growing, or how fast or slow the money is circulating, the aggregate amount of reserves will be exactly the same. So it should be clear that the quantity of central bank reserves held by the commercial banks is useless as an indicator of the effectiveness of Quantitative Easing. Now obviously we would prefer that the money circulates more rapidly and that this is done through increased bank lending and deposit taking. In other words, we would like to see a further expansion of credit and broad money. Since the banks collectively are now awash with reserves, they should not be prevented from making additional loans because of any liquidity concerns. Banks are, though, constrained by a lack of capital and are looking to reduce leverage rather than increase it. Fortunately, increased bank lending is not necessary for Quantitative Easing to work. Indeed, it was precisely because the Monetary Policy Committee expected the additional monetary injection not to stimulate bank lending directly at the current juncture, that the Asset Purchase Facility’s purchases were targeted at assets held primarily by the non-bank private sector 1 . So if the Asset Purchase Facility buys gilts from pension funds or asset managers, they will then have to look for another home for their money. As it is not very rewarding just to hold it on deposit, they are likely to look to put their money into other assets, including equities and corporate bonds.
Time lag of the reaction of the banking sector to the change of the Bank of Russia key rate remains large though, according to our estimates, gradually shrinking. This refers to deposit rates as well. As lags shrink, the effectiveness of the interest rate channel of the Bank of Russia monetary transmission mechanism will improve. As for the foreign exchange transmission channel, its impact is complicated due to the high volatility in the foreign exchange market which resulted, inter alia, from the restricted access of Russian banks and companies to external markets. In order to normalise the situation with foreign exchange liquidity, the Bank of Russia has introduced reverse transactions to provide it. Interest rates on these transactions have been decreased to the level of LIBOR rates plus 0.5 pp. The volume of foreign exchange liquidity provision is determined by the demand estimates based on the balance of payments forecast. The next one-year repo auction of 15 December will accept Eurobonds and provide for the possibility of early deal termination by borrowers. In the near future the Bank of Russia also intends to consider the introduction of foreign exchange lending secured by non-marketable assets. Foreign exchange loans, extended by banks to companies with stable income in foreign currency, are supposed to be eligible as collateral. Bank of Russia forecast The current situation requires updating the forecasts and adjusting the policy to ensure financial and price stability enabling the economy to adjust to the new conditions and start developing as quickly as possible.

The remaining 55% of debts subject to redemption which make about $ billion can be covered from the current account balance and reduction of international reserves. According to our calculations, operations to close the gap of the balance of payments will require about $ billion next year. The Bank of Russia will carry out transactions aimed at maintaining stability of the balance of payments, i.e. the financial stability, in the stipulated volumes. We believe that the international reserves are sufficient to carry out foreign exchange transactions in such volume. Meanwhile, in the next three years, the reserves level will be significantly above the generally accepted adequacy indicators. There definitely will be no deficit of foreign exchange liquidity given these parameters of the balance of payments and the volume of our operations. We indent to conduct the aforementioned FX repos, extend foreign currency loans and carry out occasional direct FX buy/sell transactions, inter alia, to accumulate and use Government reserve funds. It should be noted that under this scenario the ruble should appreciate considerably next year due to both the compensation of the currently observed exchange rate overshoot or, in other words, excessive depreciation, and the oil price growth stipulated by the scenario. Let me remind you that according to the scenario oil price will be $ This is our baseline scenario. At the same time we are aware of the pessimistic sentiments in the market due to the dynamics of oil contract quotations observed over the last months.
The high quality of the speakers and the guests and the diversity of their background make me an optimist that we will have a fruitful Conference, which will broaden our knowledge with new experiences. I wish you a successful work in the Conference and to the representatives from abroad I wish a very pleasant stay in Macedonia. Thank you for your attention! BIS Review 74/2008  7

About a year and a half ago I stopped carrying a wallet with room for cash– all I needed on a daily basis was a debit card and my phone. I am not alone. And is this shift is not exclusive to London – from 2017 to 2019 the number of people using cash just once a month or less in the UK more than doubled to 7.4 million.1 The result has been a marked increase in digital payments, particularly card payments, and a steady decline in the use of cash for retail transactions. In mid-2016 cards overtook cash for the first time as the most frequently-used payment in the UK. And the trend hasn’t looked back. This doesn’t mean that cash is not still important for some. There are important inclusion implications that I won’t do justice to here but that deserve a mention – while UK Finance estimates that 98 percent of people in the UK had a debit card in 2019, there are still groups that continue to rely on cash, with this reliance relating  1  See UK Finance Press Release: Cards used for half of payments for first time last year. https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/press/pressreleases/cards-used-half-payments-first-time-last-year 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  to factors spanning age, income, disability and geography. The UK government has said that the UK is committed to ensuring that those who rely on cash will continue to be able to access it, and the Bank of England supports this important agenda.
In spite of the differences between the Nordic countries, our central banks cooperate closely with each other. The central bank governors meet regularly for discussions, and once a year there is a big meeting between the central banks' Executive Boards and a number of experts, depending on the themes that are up for discussion. Together with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the Nordic countries are jointly represented in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This has partly resulted in close cooperation between the countries' respective central banks on all issues related to the IMF. Furthermore, a memorandum of understanding was recently signed by the Nordic central banks regarding the management of financial crises. There is also a continuous exchange of expertise between the Nordic central banks. The Riksbank expects moderate inflation The Riksbank's monetary policy remit is to adjust interest rates with a view to influencing price developments so that inflation is 2 per cent one to two years ahead. As a basis for our decisions, we carry out regular forecasts of inflation and economic activity in Sweden. Thus, at our monetary policy meetings, we in the Executive Board must decide whether inflation is forecast to be above target,  BIS Review 46/2003  1  which usually implies raising the repo rate, or whether it will be below target, thereby resulting in a repo rate cut.

Zamani Abdul Ghani: Riding out of the global financial crisis – banking reforms and revival Closing remarks by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 13th Malaysian Banking Summit 2009 "Riding Out of the Global Financial Crisis – Banking Reforms & Revival", Kuala Lumpur, 12 May 2009. *  *  *  On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia , I would like to thank ASLI for the opportunity to make the closing address for the 13 th Malaysian Banking Summit. Indeed the theme chosen is highly appropriate and timely as we are currently facing a period that is most challenging. The current global economic slowdown, as many are aware, has been compared to the Great Depression of the late 1920s. It began with the stock market crash in October 1929, otherwise known as “Black Tuesday”. As to whether the current global slowdown reach such proportions, it remains anyone's guess. But as events unfold and with lessons of hindsight gaining clarity, we have seen how institutions failed to fully understand or underestimated the complexity of products, and were unable to adequately measure tail risks as well, the procyclical impact of fair value accounting. While these may have merits in sharing the blame, others like the high levels of risk concentration and gearing together with the failure to manage maturity mismatches, are also equally apparent, if not fundamental, in contributing to the financial crisis. Comforting, however, is that none of our Malaysian institutions undertook complex derivative transactions.
Bank of England research finds that tightening prudential policy in EMEs dampens the spillover from US monetary policy by around a quarter.29  Moderating Push Factors and Fixing the Pipes in Advanced Economies At the same time, it is in the interests of advanced economies to moderate push factors, including risks in their markets and institutions. Their local financial stability are global public goods. For example, as Chair Powell noted in his speech ‘Monetary Policy in the Post-Crisis Era’ (July 2019), “since the crisis policymakers are even more keenly aware of the relevance of global factors to our policies. The global nature of the financial crisis and the channels through which it spread sharply highlight the interconnectedness of our economic, financial, and policy environments. U.S. economic developments affect the rest of the world, and the reverse is also true.” The Federal Reserve’s recent Conference on Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools and Communications Practices devoted a session to the global dimension of US monetary policy. 29 Coman, A, and Lloyd, S (forthcoming), ‘In the Face of Spillovers: Prudential Policies in Emerging Economies’. 28  11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  11  Consider a modern example of the Connally dictum: investment fund flows to EMEs. These flows now account for around one third of total portfolio flows to EMEs, compared to around one tenth pre-crisis.

An incomplete banking union is a key vulnerability for the EU banking sector and hampers progress towards greater financial system integration. Furthermore, as firms broaden their funding sources and diversify away from bank loans, there needs to be a greater focus on financing through marketable debt securities and equity instruments. This lies at the heart of the capital markets union (CMU) project. Implications for the capital markets union Completing the CMU is essential for three reasons. First, the CMU strengthens the resilience of the euro area economy through private risk-sharing. Deep and integrated capital markets provide opportunities for effective risk-sharing. This is essential for financing the real economy and limiting fluctuations in economic activity. However, recent ECB analysis  shows that, while euro area capital market integration has improved over the last 20 years, it remains rather modest. [4] We must also consider the challenges posed by climate change in the coming years. Enhancing the risksharing potential of capital markets will help to further improve the ability of the EU financial system to sustain investment flows during climate-related shocks. This will bolster the EU’s overall resilience to increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, which typically hit regions asymmetrically. Second, further developing EU capital markets boosts innovation, supports long-term growth and enables continued financing of the green transition. This is of paramount importance as the EU navigates rapid technological change and is faced with an increasingly challenging geopolitical environment.
Private sector credit growth has averaged less than 3% in the UK, US and the euro area over the past decade, generally less than nominal GDP growth. Aggregate debt servicing ratios are below historic averages, in part due to low equilibrium interest rates. Although there are pockets of risk, heat maps that mechanically bring together several credit measures remain relatively cool overall (Chart 7) – though aggregates can hide important pockets of risk that can amplify negative shocks, and, as I’ll discuss, it is a different picture for China. See Reinhart, C, Rogoff, K, (2010), Growth in a Time of Debt, American Economic Review. For example, see Bridges, J, Jackson, C, McGregor, D (2017) Down in the slumps: the role of credit in five decades of recessions, Bank of England Staff Working Paper N. 659; Borio, C, Drehmann, M, Xia, D (2018) The financial cycle and recession risk, BIS quarterly review; Taylor, A, Schularick, M (2012) Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008, American Economic Review; Aikman, D, Bridges, J, Kashyap, A, Siegart, C (2018) Would macroprudential regulation have prevented the last crisis?, Bank of England Staff Working Paper N. 747. 15 There are various definitions of a credit boom in the empirical literature – for a brief summary see Gorton, G, Ordoñez, G (2019), Good Booms, Bad Booms, forthcoming in the Journal of the European Economic Association.

Pablo Hernández de Cos: Closing ceremony of the academic year 2022-2023 Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Center for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) , Santander, 30 June 2023. *** Good afternoon dear colleagues and friends. And good afternoon class of 2023. It is a pleasure for me to participate in this graduation ceremony, together with Rafael Repullo, long-standing Director of CEMFI, and Nezih Guner, who is due to take over from him in September. As such, this graduation ceremony is special. Indeed, very special. Because it will be the last one with Rafael Repullo as Director. After 36 years of service, he is going to step down, to be replaced by Nezih Guner. At the same time, the Deputy Directors Manuel Arellano and Samuel Bentolila will also step down, to be replaced by Mónica Martínez-Bravo. I would like to thank Rafael, Manuel and Samuel for "Making a Miracle" to use the title of a famous paper published in 1993 by the Nobel laureate Robert Lucas. While Lucas was referring to episodes of very rapid income growth in Asian countries, I would like to draw attention to the miracle of their transformation of a small venture at the Banco de España's Training Centre into one of the top European graduate schools for economics and finance. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Nezih and Mónica for accepting the challenge of taking this great institution forward.
Rather we see our evidence as suggesting that the way we as society finance those degrees – with an increasing reliance on debt held by the students – has costs to both borrowers and lenders that are only now becoming clear. Given the social benefits of an educated population, we see a strong case for some public role in financing college. Nonetheless, there are many private benefits, including higher lifetime earnings to be had by the successful college graduate. Therefore it is likely that the best system of finance also includes a tuition payment by the student. Because many prospective students are credit and liquidity constrained, and because of the limited enforceability of debt, we outlined the case for a government-supported student loan program to support the payment of tuition. However, we see a case for stronger underwriting standards that would assess the likely quality and outcome of the education match between a prospective student and the educational institution, which would better deliver resources to high potential educational matches, and avoid encouraging poor ones. We’ve learned a lot over the past several years about how student loans are affecting individual borrowers, the taxpayers and the aggregate economy. We’ve by no means answered all the relevant questions, and with over a trillion dollars in outstanding debt and the future of our workforce at stake, I consider these issues to be of first-order importance to the nation.

One reason for this is that our data allow a more comprehensive description of student debt delinquency and repayment rates than was previously possible. Our data come from consumer credit reports 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  for a 5 percent random sample of the population – that is for 12 million individuals aged 18 and older. Instead, existing knowledge of student federal loan defaults is based mainly on the three-year cohort default rates computed and released by the Department of Education each year. An institution’s cohort default rate is calculated as the percentage of borrowers in a cohort who default before the end of the second fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the borrowers entered repayment. In research that will be released later this month in a series of blog postings on our Liberty Street Economics blog, we use our data and a slightly different definition to compute comparable 3-year cohort default rates. Importantly, we find that three years out, we haven’t seen the full picture of borrowers who will default. Our calculations indicate that the 3-year default rate for the 2009 cohort rises by more than a third by year 5. This is also true of earlier cohorts. The 2005 cohort had a 3-year default rate at 13 percent – but this is only half of the defaults that we see nine years out. Taken together, these findings indicate that the student loan delinquency problem is much worse than currently understood.
Figure 1 GDP and real disposable income Index, 2007 =100 115  115 Real disposable income GDP  110  110  105  105  100  100  95  95  90  90 07  08  09  10  11  12  Source: Statistics Sweden  Figure 2 Housing prices Index, January 2005 = 100, seasonally-adjusted data 200  200 HOX Sweden (Single-family houses) HOX Sweden (Tenant-owned apartment) HOX Sweden  180  180  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100 05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Sources: Valueguard and the Riksbank  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3 Lending to households and companies Index, 2007 =100 160  160 Companies Households  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80 07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Source: Statistics Sweden  Figure 4 Exports, investment and consumption Index 2007 = 100, seasonally adjusted data 110  110 Private consumption Gross fixed capital formation Export  100  100  90  90  80  80 07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Source: Statistics Sweden  The division in the economy is a problem for monetary policy.

Increased risk aversion has led to sizeable capital outflows from emerging markets in the last two months, resulting in an overall depreciation of domestic currencies. As you may already know, following the 2001 financial crisis, Turkey adopted an ambitious reform agenda to strengthen the financial sector and banking system. Thanks to these measures, resilience of the Turkish economy to external shocks has been improved significantly and the banking system in Turkey has been relatively prepared for the current crisis, as witnessed during current financial turmoil. Since securitized products are rarely used in the Turkish banking sector, the ongoing financial turmoil has not put a marked pressure on local banks through that channel. In addition, there are no liquidity problems in the system. Deposits have been stable and banks have adequate level of collateral in the form of government securities that can be used in the open market operations. However, considering the severity of the current crisis and Turkey’s integration into the global economy, it won’t be surprising that the crisis has some effects on Turkish banking sector. The general framework of the Central Bank’s liquidity management is fairly flexible and wellstructured to fulfill its lender-of-last resort role and meet both New Turkish Lira and foreign exchange liquidity requirement of the banking system effectively. We have acted promptly to contain the adverse effects of the global financial turmoil on the domestic economy.