samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So even if inflation is now high, people can trust inflation to come back down to target. As a result, savers have come to demand a lower premium to compensate for expected inflation. But it is not just nominal interest rates that have fallen. If we adjust nominal interest rates for inflation and look at real interest rates, we can see that they have fallen too. Chart 2 shows the UK ten-year real interest rate, measured directly from index-linked bond prices. It is clear that the real interest rate is quite responsive to cyclical events, and that it has risen sharply over the past year. But beneath the volatility, there appears to have been a fairly steady downward trend from the 1990s at least up until the onset of the Covid pandemic. Bank of England  Page 6  Chart 2: The UK ten-year real rate has fallen over recent decades Ten-year zero coupon yield (spot interest rate) from UK index-linked gilts (a) Per cent 6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4 1985  -4 1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  (a) Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P, Tradeweb and Bank calculations. Much has been said about this trend in risk-free interest rates.

They are entirely institutionally, operationally and financially independent. 2  BIS Review 4/2006  1.2. Transparency and accountability are also essential for gaining credibility Naturally, the independence of these institutions requires transparency in their decision-making processes and accountability vis-à-vis the general public and their representatives. As regards new institutions such as the ECB, transparency is even more important for gaining credibility and building up economic agents’ confidence in the new currency. In order to establish this credibility and gain the confidence of agents, it is imperative to be understood, which in turn calls for transparency. For the sake of transparency, the Governing Council has specified and quantified its definition of price stability (inflation below but close to 2% over the medium-term). Second, the ECB has gone beyond the accountability requirements laid down by the Treaty by instituting regular testimonies by the President of the ECB before the European Parliament and regular informal meetings with the Eurogroup of Finance ministers. Another channel for transparency is constituted by the regular publication of reports on economic developments and Central Bank analysis, of the Eurosystem’s and ECB’s staff projections exercises, most prominently in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. Finally and most importantly, following monetary policy decisions, the President and Vice-President of the ECB hold a press conference followed by an open discussion with journalists, the transcript of which is published on the ECB’s website.
As the Prime Minister rightly declared recently, "the time has come for proof on the ground, rather than legislative cathedral building". xii I am well aware of the risk of appearing to give easy or excessively theoretical lessons, but I speak here with the conviction of the practitioner and even - if you will allow me in this last part of my speech with the passion of the public servant. Public management is not necessarily an easy task, but it is possible. Calling for the transformation of public services today means refusing to become resigned to a public service that is seen as outdated and unable to cope. I believe in the public service as a national asset: throughout our long history, from Bonaparte to Charles de Gaulle, public services have frequently been a catalyst for unity, modernity and even productivity. Transforming public services can and must serve to boost France’s competitiveness. xiii Pious hopes? No! There are perfectly good examples of modernisation of public services here in France, even in the very recent past. We could talk about our army, but I'll start with the current Public Accounts Directorate (Direction Générale des Finances Publiques), formed from the merger of the National Tax Office and the National Public Accounts Office (Direction générale des impôts and Direction générale de la comptabilité publique).

Overall, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. Inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The firm anchoring of inflation expectations remains of the essence. Monetary policy will do all that is needed to maintain price stability in the euro area over the medium term. This is the necessary and central contribution that monetary policy makes to fostering sustainable economic growth, job creation and financial stability. All the nonstandard measures taken during the period of strong financial market tensions, referred to as “enhanced credit support” and the Securities Markets Programme, are fully consistent with our mandate and, by construction, temporary in nature. We remain firmly committed to price stability over the medium to longer term, and the monetary policy stance and the overall provision of liquidity will be adjusted as appropriate. Accordingly, the Governing Council will continue to monitor all developments over the period ahead very closely. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. After a period of sharp decline, euro area economic activity has been expanding since mid2009. According to Eurostat’s first estimate, euro area real GDP increased, on a quarterly basis, by 0.2% in the first quarter of 2010. While adverse weather conditions, in particular, dampened growth in the early part of the year, the latest economic indicators suggest that a rebound took place during the spring.
As a result, they have been, and probably still are, able to increase production to a fairly large extent without any substantial increase in real capital and employment. There are prospects of solid growth in productivity in 2004. Nevertheless, our regional network reports that companies in a number of industries are now considering an increase in employment. After rising sharply for several quarters, economic growth in the US slowed in the second quarter and employment growth appears to have stalled this summer. Economic growth has picked up from a low level in the euro area. Economic growth has also gained momentum in Sweden and the UK. Strong growth in the US and China exerted upward pressure on commodity prices in 2003 and the beginning of 2004. Since then, price inflation has been dampened. Oil prices have risen considerably during the summer. Interest rate expectations indicate interest rate increases in a number of countries. The effects of oil price developments on the Norwegian economy are mixed. Persistently higher oil prices may eventually contribute to higher petroleum investment and increased activity in sectors affected by petroleum activities. A sharp rise in oil prices, however, restrains global economic growth and affects demand for our other export products. The analyses in Norges Bank’s last Inflation Report in July 2004 are based on the technical assumption that interest rates will move in line with forward interest rates.

On the basis of these analyses, a strong real krone exchange rate and weak competitiveness will apply to a period from the beginning of the 1970s in which the petroleum industry is expanding and we are reaping the largest economic benefits. Main features of the economic situation Inflation is low. The rise in prices is being curbed by the appreciation of the krone in 2002, the fall in prices for imported consumer goods in foreign currency and strong competition in many industries in Norway. Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards returning inflation to target. The sight deposit rate has been lowered to 1.75 per cent. Low interest rates and the global upturn are stimulating activity in the Norwegian economy. The output level will be somewhat lower than implied by the trend level. This means that the output gap is projected to approach zero, but will continue to be marginally negative in 2004. Growth in the Norwegian economy is projected to pick up markedly this year and remain relatively high next year. The most important contribution comes from private consumption, fuelled by low interest rates and high real wage growth. The global upturn will probably have a positive effect on the internationally exposed sector. Petroleum investment will continue to expand in the next couple of years. Mainland business investment is also expected to pick up gradually. In recent years, many enterprises have rationalised operations.
Financial System Resilience: Lessons from a real stress  Speech given by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Committee  Investment Association Webinar, London Tuesday 9 June 2020  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  The COVID 19 natural disaster has been the toughest test of the financial system since the global financial crisis 10 years ago. As the implications of the spread of the virus and the policy measures to contain it became apparent, over a few short weeks, we saw an abrupt and savage pricing down of economic prospects and economic assets across the globe. Investors, corporates, banks and households went into a defensive crouch, shunning risk, searching for safer havens, and stockpiling liquidity. Many of the resultant moves were unprecedented. Bank lending surged as corporates drew down on their liquidity facilities. In March, UK banks’ net lending to corporates shot up to £ billion, around 30 times the average monthly lending seen last year. The jump was even more striking in the US, where growth in the stock of corporate lending rose by over $ billion in the first four months of the year, compared to an increase of less than $ billion for 2019 as a whole. In financial markets, the FTSE All-Share index fell over 10% on 12 March, the largest one-day fall since 1987.

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In the latest issue of its report “Wage Formation in Sweden”, the National Institute of Economic Research assesses this rate to be around 7 per cent at present, but that it will fall to around 6 per cent in the years immediately ahead (see Wage Formation in Sweden 2012, National Institute of Economic Research). According to a calculation by Lars Svensson of how the deviation between the actual inflation rate and the inflation target affects unemployment, the mid-point of the Riksbank’s estimated interval is at 5.5 per cent (see “Correction of the Riksbank’s estimate of the long-run sustainable unemployment rate”, Appendix 2, minutes of the monetary policy meeting, July 2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  have levelled out. This differs from the situation in Norway where prices continue to increase, and in Denmark, where there has been a significant fall in prices. Figure 8. Real house prices Index, 1995=100 300  300 Norway Finland  270  270  Denmark Sweden  240  240  210  210  180  180  150  150  120  120  90  90 95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  11  Sources: Statistics Sweden and national sources. Figure 9.

Karolina Ekholm: Monetary policy, business cycle stabilisation and macroprudential policy Speech by Ms Karolina Ekholm, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to a meeting at the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, Stockholm, 13 March 2013. *  *  *  The views expressed in this speech are my own and are not necessarily shared by the other members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank. I would like to thank Kerstin Hallsten, Kerstin af Jochnick, Cecilia RoosIsaksson, Lars E. O. Svensson, Anders Vredin and Barbro Wickman-Parak for their comments and Magnus Wiberg for help with drafting the speech. As I am sure most of you know, I have in recent years advocated a more expansionary monetary policy than the policy that has actually been conducted. That I have done so recently, when the growth of the Swedish economy has been relatively weak, is perhaps not so surprising. On the other hand, it may be more difficult to understand the reasons for my stance in 2010, when the Swedish economy had growth rates of over 5 per cent. However, as I intend to explain today, I believe that demand has been too low in Sweden ever since the global financial crisis seriously affected the Swedish economy in the autumn of 2008. The low level of demand is ultimately the result of weak economic development around the world, which is subduing the demand for Swedish exports and making households and companies more pessimistic.
I will then turn to financial stability, which is essential for the effectiveness of monetary policy (by preserving its transmission channels). Finally, I will talk about economic stability and the way monetary policy, in combination with fiscal policy, can smooth the business cycle and foster a robust and sustainable recovery from the covid crisis. Clearly, these different aspects are closely intertwined: monetary policy, while pursuing its primary objective of price stability, can affect financial stability; fiscal and monetary policy closely interact with each other, as do monetary and macroprudential policy. But for the sake of clarity I will tackle each concept in turn. I. Price stability To achieve the ECB inflation objective, we are determined to maintain, as long as necessary, a very accommodative monetary stance. We continue to stand ready to adjust all of our instruments, as appropriate, including possibly a lowering of the DFR if needed. And to guarantee the full transmission of this accomodative stance, we pay particular attention to ensuring that both bank and market financing conditions remain favourable for all agents (governments, firms and households). This leads us to monitor a large set of indicators, with a multifaceted and holistic approach. Let me add some comments about the recent increase we have seen in long-term rates, following although to a lesser extent the move in the US. This increase has different causes, and hence calls for different reactions and instruments.

Financial stability Lessons have to be fully drawn from the past experiences about the obvious costs of financial crises. History has shown that price stability is not a sufficient condition to ensure financial stability. Furthermore, low-for-long interest rates, in a context of a decreasing natural rate of interest, can contribute to the build-up of systemic risk and financial vulnerabilities, by encouraging excessive risk-taking and financial misalignments.2This matters for monetary policy. Of course, macroprudential policy is the first and main line of defence, and the toolkit has been considerably enhanced in recent years.3 However, it appears that macroprudential tools, although necessary, are not completely sufficient to address the whole range of financial stability concerns. It is my view that central banks should take financial stability into account while setting the course of monetary policy. There is a need to overcome the strict separation principle between monetary and macroprudential policies, and adopt a coordination principle. What does this mean in practice? Let me first dispel two misunderstandings and say what it is not about. It does not mean that financial stability may become a monetary policy objective in itself. The aim here would be to identify vulnerabilities that represent a threat to the price stability objective, either directly or indirectly by impairing the effective transmission of monetary policy in the medium-long term. Also, it does not imply a systematic (mechanical) reaction to financial stability indicators, and it is very different from the “leaning against the wind” strategy.
12 We are working to build up the skills and competencies in needed in the new world of finance, starting with the curriculum in our tertiary educational institutions, work placement programmes, and extending through to mid-career retraining and life-long learning. 13 First, getting our students to be ready for FinTech. 14 MAS is working with the five local polytechnics to review and enhance their curricula, for example to develop skillsets in agile software development, mobile application development, cloud application deployment, and data analytics. 15 We are also working with the polytechnics to increase the number of FinTech internships and joint projects with the FinTech community so that students can apply their skills and gain hands-on experience. In October, we embarked on the “PolyFinTech 100” initiative to secure 100 FinTech mentors and 100 FinTech internships for 2017. I am pleased to announce that we have secured these targets in the short span of a month. More than 2,500 students in the banking and IT-related courses in the polytechnics each year are expected to benefit from these initiatives. 16 MAS is also partnering with the universities and polytechnics to expose students to perspectives from industry practitioners 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Next year, we will launch the MAS Tech Talks, a series of talks by FinTech professionals to share about their experiences in the industry. This will give students to better understand job opportunities available in FinTech and define their career aspirations.

First, it requires the active involvement of many different stakeholders, in particular Government agencies and very often a variety of NGOs, as well as financial institutions with specialized skills and knowledge. Second, the state of economic and social development of a society is an  BIS Review 88/2010  1  important determinant on the level and quality of financial inclusion. Third, what constitutes acceptable level of inclusion, in terms of access to finance, protection of personal rights and liberties, or assurance of retirement and healthcare benefits varies from one jurisdiction to another. For the reasons that I mentioned, there is no uniform global benchmark that can be used as a successful model for financial inclusion programs. Success stories and experiences are dispersed and often go unrecorded and to further the cause we need to reveals this situation. The financial inclusion agenda requires a systematic and internationally-recognized set of financial inclusion indicators that is meaningful and capable of assisting us in formulating developmental policies. Furthermore, enormous efficiency gains from the availability of such indicators can both reduce the cost of research and implementation as well as increase the effectiveness of the delivery and execution of the policies. Lessons learned in using financial inclusion data in the Malaysian context Let me to briefly share some of the lessons we have learnt in terms of using data to improve the policy formulation process, and develop a more efficient and inclusive financial sector.
I do see the enhancement of international cooperation as a seed towards success in policy preparation for our region. I believe that, in the middle of a dark tunnel, with each of us holding a torch focusing in the same direction, we could see better along the way and can be sure that it is the right way out. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the need for such a consensus is as great as before, since the reliance on accommodative policies of advanced countries has reduced their urgency for structural reforms and complicated the conduct of policies in emerging market economies. If the current stalemate were allowed to continue, there is a risk that the global recovery would not be sustained and the functioning of the IMS could become disorderly. In this context, the theme for this year’s IMFC Plenary, “Global Challenges, Global Solutions” holds special significance. Fund surveillance 3. We look forward to the upcoming 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review (TSR). To avoid duplication, an independent opinion of the gaps in the Fund’s surveillance framework can already be found in the IEO report on the Fund’s performance in the run-up to the crisis. The IEO has identified several weaknesses in the Fund’s culture that impedes effective oversight, such as a silo mentality amongst departments, fear of reprisals that inhibit candid views, and a lack of evenhandedness in the treatment of members. Instead of searching for a new legal framework for surveillance, the Fund should concentrate its efforts on how best to implement the IEO recommendations. While the IEO report focuses on dealing with risks in the financial sector, we wish to highlight that surveillance should also focus on fiscal and/or debt sustainability problems, from which the next crisis could emanate.