samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Duffie, Darrell and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2016) “Passthrough efficiency in the Fed’s new policy setting”, Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Flodén, Martin (2015), contribution at the monetary policy meeting in February 2015, in Sveriges Riksbank (2015), Minutes of the monetary policy meeting, February 2015 Flodén, Martin (2016), “The Riksbank’s bond purchases affect government finances”, speech, 9 November, Sveriges Riksbank Goodfriend, Marvin (2011), “Central banking in the credit turmoil: an assessment of Federal Reserve practice”, Journal of Monetary Economics 58, 1-12. Greenwood, Robin, Samuel Hanson and Jeremy Stein (2016), “The Federal Reserves balance sheet as a financial-stability tool”, Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Holston, Kathryn, Thomas Laubach and John Williams (2017), “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International trends and determinants”, Journal of International Economics, 108, pp 59-75 af Jochnick, Kerstin (2015), “Does the Riksbank have to make a profit?”, speech, 23 January, Sveriges Riksbank Krishnamurthy, Arvind (2018), “The size of the Fed’s balance sheet”, in M. Bordo, J. Cochrane, and A. Seru: The Structural Foundations of Monetary Policy, Hoover Institution Nessén, Marianne, Sellin, Peter and Åsberg Sommar, Per, (2011), “The framework for the implementation of monetary policy, the Riksbank’s balance sheet and the financial crisis”, , Economic Commentary No. 1, Sveriges Riksbank.

Therefore, legislative action in targeted areas is warranted. While bold action towards the completion of the single rulebook for capital markets will be beneficial, a gradual approach to harmonization could be envisaged in those areas where political sensitivities prevent action at EU level in the short term. 4. Sufficient attention should be devoted to safeguarding financial stability, such as in the area of shadow banking. 5. A single rulebook for EU capital markets needs to be complemented with strengthened supervisory convergence, delivering a common implementation and enforcement of rules. 6. Further reducing still existing fragmentation in financial market infrastructures should be at the core of CMU. It needs to be recognized that banks will continue to play an important role for the financing of the real economy and in providing access to capital markets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
It may convey information about our reaction function. But such a commitment is not easy to design. If too general, it will not add anything to our existing – and over-riding – commitment to do whatever it takes to hit the inflation target. If too precise, it will not capture the myriad of factors that affect the outlook for inflation. The array of judgements underlying the Committee’s policy decisions are not easily summarised by reference to one or two economic variables. The Committee’s preferred approach is to describe its assessment of the outlook for output and inflation, and allow the public and markets to make their own assessment of the likely future path of interest rates. In the most recent Inflation Report published in May, the  2  BIS Review 86/2009  Committee judged it was more likely than not that CPI inflation would be below the 2% inflation target in two or three years time if interest rates followed a path implied by market yields and the stock of purchased assets increased to £ Market participants subsequently revised down their view about the pace at which Bank Rate was likely to rise. 2. Strengthening the policy framework  I remain firmly convinced that an inflation targeting framework should continue to be central to the design of macroeconomic policy in the UK. The benefits of low and stable inflation are clear and well understood.

I do not think it is coincidence that arguably the two most significant monetary policy decisions taken over the past year – the decision to reduce Bank Rate by 1.5 percentage points in November and the announcement in February that the Committee had sought approval to use the Asset Purchase Facility to conduct large scale asset purchases – occurred in months when the Inflation Report was published. The quarterly forecast round provides an opportunity for the Committee to reassess thoroughly its view of the economic outlook. This view is then explained and communicated via the Inflation Report and in particular through the projections for GDP growth and inflation contained in the Report. In both November and February, the judgement of the Committee was that, without further substantial easing in monetary policy, there was a significant risk of a large and persistent undershoot of the inflation target. Given the transparency of these judgements and the clarity of the target, it would have been courageous not to have taken the decisions we did. The inflation target is symmetric. Likewise, the discipline it imposes on the MPC is symmetric. The inflation target has been instrumental in ensuring that monetary policy has responded boldly and decisively to the events that have unfolded since the autumn. And, when the time comes, the clarity and transparency of the inflation targeting framework will ensure that the Committee takes the right decisions on the way back up, however courageous or unpopular those decisions might appear.
Some people here on the Continent who share this concern are inclined to argue that if a euro-participating country were to find itself in this situation - and given that it would have no macro-economic way out, for example, through exchange rate adjustment, or monetary relaxation, or fiscal stimulus beyond the limits of the Stability Pact - it would then have an overwhelming incentive to take the sort of supply-side measures which have proved so difficult to implement hitherto. I am not sure that you can necessarily rely upon that making life very much easier. But what I think this discussion points up, is the broader conclusion that if the euro is to go ahead in current conditions, as I assume that it will, then supply-side flexibility will become more crucially important that ever across the whole euro area. The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced last October that the United Kingdom would exercise its opt-out and not participate in the first wave of euro membership. That was a disappointment to some of our European partners. But it was a considerable relief to others, because UK participation from the outset would certainly have complicated the project - not least because of the substantial cyclical divergence between ourselves and the major countries on the Continent.

William C Dudley: Opening remarks for the Transatlantic Economic Interdependence and Policy Challenges Conference Opening remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), at the Transatlantic Economic Interdependence and Policy Challenges Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 22 April 2013. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to welcome you to today’s conference on transatlantic economic interdependence and policy challenges. We have a great program today with many distinguished speakers from academia, and the private and public sectors. In particular, I would highlight the keynote speech following lunch by Olli Rehn, the vice president of the European Commission. We live in a global economy with a global financial system, yet macroeconomic policy and regulation and supervision have a decidedly national orientation. This creates a challenge for all of us as we seek to balance our domestic needs against the benefits from having a harmonized and integrated global system. We can do better through international cooperation and coordination both on macro policy and on regulation and supervision, rather than trying to “go it alone.” As the two largest economies in the world, the United States and the European Union have a shared stake in the vitality of the global economy. Without growth in both our regions, the global economy will not prosper and we will not be able to satisfy the aspirations of our citizens.
While conditions in the world economy have improved, the growth prospects going forward is expected to remain modest for an extended period of time. Several important lessons have emerged from this recent global financial crisis. The first relates to the exponential expansion of the financial system which did not commensurate with the expansion in economic activity. This resulted in a significant disconnect between the financial sector and its role in serving the economy. A number of factors contributed to the weakening of the link between financial intermediation and productive economic activity. Deregulation had opened up new opportunities for financial institutions to expand the scope of their activities. Increased competition, reinforced by advances in technology intensified the pace of innovation. And, the extended period of low interest rates in an environment of low inflation also prompted greater risk taking which in turn contributed to the significant build up of financial imbalances. The role of leverage in the global financial crisis, both in the public and private sectors, was also a particularly important contributing factor. It has also become a factor that is now holding back growth. At the height of the global financial crisis, the total leverage in the major industrial economies increased significantly. In the US, private sector leverage alone had reached over 200 percent of GDP in 2008. Other reports place the average debt level to GDP of major advanced economies at over 300 percent in 2010.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Islamic finance – financial stability, economic growth and development Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Prize Lecture on “Islamic finance – financial stability, economic growth and development”, Jeddah, 27 November 2013. *  *  *  It is my honour to be invited to deliver this lecture on Islamic Finance: Financial Stability, Economic Growth and Development, here in Jeddah. I wish to thank the Islamic Development Bank for the invitation. The Islamic Development Bank has been pioneering and instrumental in the development of Islamic finance and has been an inspiration in driving its progress and evolution. It is indeed a privilege for me to be part of this journey, and to have witnessed the increasing dynamism of the Islamic financial industry amidst a highly challenging economic and financial international environment. Global financial and economic adjustments My remarks today will focus on the relevance of Islamic finance in modern market economies, taking into account the knowledge that we have today about the vulnerabilities of finance, its causes and its wider economic ramifications. Five years on after the global financial crisis erupted, the most pressing challenge confronting the world economy continues to be securing financial stability and generating growth and employment. While regulatory reforms both at the global and national levels have been extensive to strengthen financial systems, there has been less progress on the recovery in growth.
This approach, known in the literature as risk-based supervision, is the one that has been recommended in the light of the recent crisis. On several occasions, supervision has ventured into what is today termed macroprudence. At the end of the 1990s, the SBIF issued recommendations urging that due attention be paid to the concentration of risks in the real estate sector, beyond what each institution might have on its books. Applying this same logic, it also issued instructions for the treatment of lending to individuals, particularly consumer loans, in the context of the rapid growth of these operations. Then, in the early 2000s, it instructed supervised institutions to carefully assess their clients’ exchange-rate risk, regardless of whether their own positions were well hedged. When mergers and acquisitions intensified a few years ago, it also took the initiative of introducing stricter regulation for banks of a larger relative size so as to guard against systemic risks. Although a factor of a different nature, the development of Chile’s capital market has also contributed to financial stability. The creation of a private pension system brought with it the appearance of institutional investors as well as new sources of medium and long-term financing. At the end of 2008, when international markets became tense, Chilean companies were able to replace external financing with placements on the domestic market on convenient terms and conditions. 3. Remarks in the light of recent experience  The paramount objective of central banks has been and will continue to be price stability.

They make threats, even though Member States have taken strong and positive decisions. Rating agencies behave as if nothing had happened. It may seem that agencies are no longer a useful guide for investors. Would you say that their judgments are based on political criteria? Indeed, in the arguments they develop, there are more political arguments than economic ones. Credit agencies have downgraded the ratings of three large French banks. Are our banks undercapitalised? No, they are very well capitalised, in particular compared to their European and US counterparts. The importance of this downgrade should not be overstated especially since rating agencies have recently downgraded most large banks in developed countries. There is no doubt that the capital buffers of our banks are largely adequate in relation to levels in the global banking system. It is true that we are asking them to enhance their soundness in order to meet the new regulatory requirements that have been agreed at the European and global level. Banks are doing this through their own resources and needless to say without State aid. That is why I have no concerns about the French banking system. Should banks’ customers, companies and individuals, fear a credit crunch? No, and the figures bear it out. French banks’ lending activities remain very robust: up 8% for mortgage lending, up 5.6% for corporate lending and up 5.1% for lending to SMEs. It is precisely their retail banking business that makes them sound and profitable.
For the United States, see: Joseph Gagnon, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache and Brian Sack (2011), “The Financial Market Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases”, International Journal of Central Banking, 7(1), pp.3–43. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  though the MPC would be unlikely to initiate such a programme until Bank Rate was high enough that it could be cut to maintain demand if conditions deteriorated. Such a programme of sales could be expected to put upward pressure on yields, though by much less than the purchases pushed down on yields because markets would be functioning more normally. In addition, both heightened risk aversion and regulatory changes mean that banks will want to hold significantly more high-quality liquid assets than in the past; Chart 6 shows these holdings had shrunk to less than 1% of bank assets pre-crisis. That means an additional source of demand for gilts and other highly liquid assets that can be easily sold or repo’d. That should also attenuate the upward pressure on yields from running down the portfolio. In case this all sounds rather sanguine, I should say that I do not expect central banks’ collective management of the exit from the present exceptionally stimulatory monetary stance will be easy. The bumpiness of the incoming data, allied to a state-contingent reaction function, means that market interest rates are bound to become more volatile along the exit path, however well central banks communicate their intentions.

Such a view ran counter to that espoused by many central bankers, most notably Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who questioned the feasibility of addressing such financial imbalances with preemptive monetary policy; in his view, monetary policy should instead focus on minimising the fallout from any subsequent correction – the so-called “cleaning” approach. 4 While the logic of leaning against the wind is sound in principle, the key question is whether a monetary tightening of plausible magnitude is likely to be effective in attenuating an established credit boom. Even if policy rates may appear with hindsight to have been held too low for too long in the years preceding the crisis, particularly in the United States, the empirical evidence suggests that they would need to have been significantly higher to have had a meaningful impact on the rate of credit expansion. 5 It is a brave central banker who would deliberately induce a recession in order to head off the mere risk of a future financial correction. 3  For instance, William White (2006), “Is price stability enough?”, Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 205. 4  Alan Greenspan (2002), “Opening Remarks” in Rethinking Stabilization Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas. 5  Charles Bean, Matthias Paustian, Adrian Penalver and Tim Taylor (2010), “Monetary Policy after the Fall” in Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas.
[7]  https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2021/pushing-ahead-with-sor-sora-transition-in-2021  3/7  12/02/2021  "Pushing Ahead with SOR-SORA Transition in 2021" - Keynote Speech by Mr Leong Sing Chiong, Deputy Managing Director (Markets …  In addition, the Committee is considering the need to set a clear timeline, possibly sometime in 2H 2021, to cease the use of SOR in new derivatives transactions, except where strictly necessary for risk management and unwinding of legacy SOR exposures. This timeline will support a more coordinated shi to SORA among key derivatives market participants. This will also align our market with similar timelines being contemplated for stopping new LIBOR transactions in other key jurisdictions. SC-STS expects to share its guidance in the coming months a er incorporating feedback from market participants. Related to this, the Committee had previously announced in December 2020 [8] , that it plans to set out guidance on timelines to cease the use of SIBOR in new loan contracts in 2021. This will likewise be finalised in the coming months. 15 Taken together, we expect SOR, SIBOR and LIBOR activities to wind down towards the end of this year. This in turn, will generate a growing critical mass in new SORA-based cash market activity, and spur greater market eﬀiciency and liquidity. Developing a robust SORA curve 16 Third, the Committee and MAS will take further steps to develop a robust SORA curve, to reinforce the shi to a SORA-centered regime. We will do so by undertaking several key initiatives in the first half of 2021.

Michael Gondwe: Islamic commerce and finance Opening remarks by Dr Michael Gondwe, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the workshop on “Islamic commerce and finance”, Lusaka, 24 March 2013. *  *  *  The Guest Speakers, Mufti Shafiq Jakhura and Maulana Bilal Jakhura; Distinguished invited guests; Participants; Ladies and gentlemen; On behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to you all to this important workshop on Islamic Commerce and Finance. To our Guest Speakers, Mufti Shafiq Jakhura and Maulana Bilal Jakhura, I wish to extend a special welcome to you to Zambia and in particular to Lusaka. Ladies and gentlemen, the Bank of Zambia is honoured and delighted to be invited to give a keynote address at this workshop. This Workshop on Islamic Commerce and Finance could not have come at a more opportune time than now, when the Bank of Zambia has embraced financial inclusion on its policy agenda as a way of increasing access to appropriate financial products and services to all segments of society in Zambia. Ladies and gentlemen, Islamic commerce and finance have expanded significantly in the last few decades globally both in terms of size and the number of players. For Instance, Islamic finance is currently practiced in more than 50 countries worldwide. In many countries, Islamic finance co-exists with conventional finance and is not limited to Muslim countries.
But it has got harder. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 1: UK inflation and output gap variances 3  Inflation variance  1958-1992  2  1  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  Chart 2: The UK’s pre-crisis trade-off? 3  Inflation variance  Stylised ‘Taylor frontier’  1958-1992  2  1  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 3: The ‘Great Stability’ and crisis periods 3  Inflation variance  1958-1992  2  1 2008-2012  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  Chart 4: The true trade-off for the UK over 20 years? 3  Inflation variance  1958-1992  2  1 1993-2012  2008-2012  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5: A preferable outcome? 3  Inflation variance  1958-1992  2  1  P  1993-2012  2008-2012  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  Table 1: Monetary base  Data are month averages for UK, US, Japan and end month for the euro area. Sources: Bank of England, Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, ECB.

Payments and monetary and financial stability  13 To ensure that its liabilities continue to be perceived of higher quality than those of any other issuer, the institution at the apex of the payment system – typically the central bank – has an incentive to exercise close control over the terms on which they are made available to the banking system. 14 That translates into the traditional monetary stability objective: preservation of the role of the ultimate settlement asset as a store of value and unit of account. It also gives the central bank a strong interest in the stability of the financial system. And within that a reliable and resilient infrastructure for distributing the ultimate settlement asset is a key condition of stability (and of implementing monetary policy effectively). 15 In an advanced monetary economy, of course, bank deposits constitute by far the largest component of “money”; in the UK they make up some 96% of the broad monetary aggregate, M4. Agents rely on interbank payment systems to facilitate the direct transfer of deposits between banks and thereby also preserve their role as a medium of exchange. And as the sophistication of securities and other markets has grown, the core payment systems have become intertwined with the settlement and clearing systems for the key markets. Together they have become a critical part of the infrastructure not just for the financial system but for the economy more widely.