samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Sizeable interest rate cuts have been accompanied by large fiscal stimuli. But it does look as though this year’s GDP growth will have to be revised downwards. The outlook for 2002 is more uncertain but a downward revision is  2  BIS Review 82/2001  most probable. An illustration of the current uncertainty is the unusually wide spread between assessments of the American economy in recent years. Some forecasts envisage a very rapid recovery, with GDP growth already up at between 3 and 4 per cent next year in the United States; others foresee falling GDP. The picture in Sweden The Swedish economy is characterised by a relatively sharp slowdown and an appreciable depreciation of the krona in the past year. Another feature is that inflation is currently above 3 per cent and thus outside the upper tolerance limit for the Riksbank’s 2 per cent target. The high inflation at present is mainly, though not exclusively, a consequence of price increases that can be regarded as fairly transitory. The causes include foot-and-mouth disease, higher electricity prices and certain changes in the method for measuring electricity prices. Supply shocks of this kind normally do not have lasting effects on the rate of inflation. There is therefore reason to believe that when the increased price levels drop out of the twelve-month change figures between now and next spring, the figures will fall back from the relatively high rates at present.

This presupposes that inflation expectations are not affected and that other factors, for example cyclical activity and the exchange rate, do not pull in the other direction. The picture of inflation does, however, include other features that probably have to do with the high resource utilisation during the latest upward phase. During the past year underlying inflation has gradually moved up. But meanwhile, economic activity — here as well as in the rest of the world — has been slowing markedly. If one is to believe Statistics Sweden’s latest figures for the national accounts, GDP growth this year will hardly exceed 1.5 per cent. This will probably tend to dampen any price pressure — as long as nothing unforeseen has happened to our economy’s long-term growth potential. Before the terrorist attacks there were some signs that manufacturing activity was stabilising, not least because the weak exchange rate has lowered relative costs. During the late summer it looked in general as though the inflow of manufacturing orders was falling less steeply than before. In the past, this has usually been the first sign of a stabilisation. However, the picture varies between industries. Orders have already turned upwards in some and in others the decline has slowed, while for telecom products, for example, orders are still falling sharply. That the krona’s relatively large depreciation has not yet led to an upturn for total exports is largely explained by the export product mix and market conditions in certain key industries, for example the decline in tele- and data-communication.
People know that we never have hesitated to do whatever was necessary to restore the proper functioning of the monetary market and the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. We have been sometimes criticized but the results are there. WSJ: Do you think the euro zone’s bailout fund – the European Financial Stability Facility – should be expanded? Noyer: The European response has been an ambitious response to the present crisis and the fund has been a remarkable success. We would clearly favor the fund to be enhanced both quantitatively and qualitatively. I think increasing it quantitatively is probably the intention of governments. The fund’s firepower is limited by a number of technical constraints to get a triple-A rating. How to move closer to the original intention in terms of firepower is clearly up to the reflection of governments. It is appropriate to think about [enlarging the size of the fund] even if there is no immediate need. As far as the qualitative aspect of the fund is concerned, it seems to me that having the capacity for instance to intervene in secondary markets could probably be an interesting feature in some cases, if only to facilitate access to the market. This of course raises for governments the question of conditionality of the support … but probably they can find answers to that. Another possibility would be that of precautionary programs [such as credit lines], like what the IMF is doing.

Christian Noyer: Inflation, Europe’s response to the debt crisis, emerging-market economies and priorities for the G-20 – interview in The Wall Street Journal Interview with Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, in The Wall Street Journal, Paris, conducted by Mr Brian Blackstone and Ms Nathalie Boschat on 24 January 2011 and published on 26 January 2011. *  *  *  WSJ: The European Central Bank recently toughened its stance on inflation. How concerned are you about the risks of inflation taking hold in the euro zone? Noyer: The uptick in inflation is mostly due to the rise in oil and commodity prices. Core inflation has remained relatively subdued. By nature, that [the rise in inflation] should be temporary. Our projections show that the inflation rate should come back to a zone perfectly in line with our definition of price stability during the course of 2011. As a central bank, we are very attentive to the only risks that exist in such a situation, which is that there might be second-round effects – an acceleration of inflation due to other causes – wages and other dynamics of internal costs. This is why we are vigilant about all those evolutions. I am quite confident that we will be able to keep inflation at bay. That includes sending the message that we will never tolerate that inflation could become entrenched.
I think this is a good thing, even though in my view repo-rate increases are already justified for other reasons and this is not a necessary justification. Unfortunately, our models are not very good at determining the significance of financial imbalances for fluctuations in economic activity. A lot of exciting development work remains to be done in this respect. The fact that the effects of financial imbalances on the macro economy may lie beyond the forecast horizons that we work with in monetary policy must not mean that we ignore them. We must monitor the development of housing prices and household indebtedness carefully and to the best of our ability analyse any indications that threatening financial imbalances are building up and take these into account in our monetary policy considerations. What characterises a well-balanced monetary policy? Ultimately, a monetary policymaker is forced to take a stance on different courses of action for monetary policy on the basis of difficult assessments of economic trends. Are there then any guidelines that can be of help? And what is it really that characterises a well-balanced monetary policy? It is normally a question of finding an appropriate balance between stabilising inflation around the inflation target and stabilising the real economy. It is difficult to translate what can be considered a well-balanced monetary policy in any given situation into precise and practical monetary policy. The intention behind stabilising inflation is relatively easy to understand, but the significance of stabilising the real economy is not so clear.

Mugur Isărescu: Policy support and the emerging “new normal”how well-positioned are Romanian firms? Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the European Investment Bank (EIB) webinar “Investment and Investment Finance in Romania”, 23 February 2022. * * * Vice President Thomsen, Distinguished audience, Ladies and gentlemen, Welcome to this year’s webinar organized by the European Investment Bank in partnership with the National Bank of Romania, titled „Policy support and the emerging “new normal”: How well-positioned are Romanian firms?”. I am delighted that so many of you could join us virtually this morning. Today, as we are shifting to a new phase of the global pandemic (and hopefully the last one), we will discuss the latest developments in investment and investment finance in Romania. We will try to provide an overview of what is needed in order to use the economic recovery as a springboard for change and transition to a more digital and greener economy. Please allow me to extend a warm welcome to Vice-President Christian Kettel Thomsen and his colleagues from the European Investment Bank, including Chief Economist Debora Revoltella and Ms. Lara Tasan Zanin, the Head of the EIB office in Bucharest. I would also like to express our appreciation for the EIB’s continuous involvement and support in engaging with stakeholders in Romania through this valuable series of events. Romania and the European Investment Bank share a long and fruitful partnership that has favored investments in important sectors of our economy.
Even if it is the case, we cannot entirely count on one single rising star. The growth rate of relatively high-income Asian economies needs also to be sustained at a reasonably high level if the prosperity of the regional economy as a whole is to be maintained. I believe there are three traps which we must avoid falling into if we are to sustain economic growth in Asia. Despite the heterogeneity which we have observed, these three traps are relevant to many countries in the region, albeit to varying degrees, depending on the circumstances. The first trap is the “middle-income trap.” 6 History shows that many economies have faced difficulties in advancing beyond the status of a middle-income economy once they have  4  See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups. In my presentation, I loosely follow their definitions by using thresholds of 12,000 U.S. dollars and 1,000 U.S. dollars of per capita GDP. 5  David N. Weil, Economic Growth, Third Edition, Pearson Education Limited, 2013. The darkness of North Korea is noteworthy, as is often pointed out in the literature, including Charles I. Jones, “The Facts of Economic Growth,” NBER Working Paper 21142, 2015. 6  The middle-income trap is discussed extensively in Asian Development Bank, Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century, 2011. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  exploited the growth opportunities provided by imported technology and abundant labor force from rural areas. Such an inflection point is known as the Lewisian Turning Point.

Likewise, in the modern world, higher productivity enables an economy to grow even with a smaller working-age population, and hence to avoid the demographic trap. If a country can maintain a decent productivity growth even after it has exploited imported technology and an underutilized labor force, that country is likely to succeed in growing its way out of the middle-income trap. Discussion of the myth of Asian miracles also highlights the importance of total factor productivity. Well before the Asian currency crisis of 1997–1998, Paul Krugman argued that the rapid growth of the NIEs or Asian tigers was not sustainable because their high growth was not sufficiently supported by total factor productivity. 8 History vindicated his assessment: the Asian currency crisis was in part an inevitable transition toward more sustainable and balanced growth. Let me confirm this point using data, with the usual disclaimer regarding the large uncertainty associated with estimates of total factor productivity. In graph 6, the vertical axis is per capita GDP growth, while the horizontal axis is total factor productivity growth. In the left panel, which describes the period preceding the Asian currency crisis, the dots representing high growth Asian economies are generally located well above the regression line. This means that their economic growth could be explained relatively more by expansion of inputs, such as demographic bonus and investment boom, than by total factor productivity growth.
The Bank of Thailand is rolling out a new measure in the second half of this year with a view to giving banks a nudge to deal with NPLs head on. For NPLs that have long been pending without proper restructuring or legal actions, financial institutions will be required to set aside provisions for the collateral at an increasing rate, depending on the overdue period. Essentially, banks will be required to  2  BIS Review 43/2004  make provision in full, regardless of the collateral value, for loans that have been non-performing for over four years. Also, the Asset Management Corporation, set up exclusively to buy NPLs from the finance companies that were closed down during the crisis, will be enabled to buy NPLs of banks. We are now in the process of amending the Corporation’s charter. On risk-based supervision, the Bank of Thailand has issued a Market Risk Supervision Policy framework at the end of last year - a timely move given a possible upward trend of interest rates. This measure will ensure that financial institutions instill mechanism to manage market risk commensurate with their risk-taking activities, especially in the trading book. Recognizing the need for financial institutions to adjust, the Bank of Thailand will implement the measure in transitional phases. By June 2005, banks will be required, for the first time, to maintain capital fund against market risk.

(ii) Data disclosure and stress test methodologies, in order to measure more and more precisely and credibly climate-related risks of financial institutions. It is a prerequisite before possibly deciding about additional capital requirements. For these tasks, believe me: we in NGFS are ready to “roll up our sleeves”, and still have the enthusiasm of the pioneers. ** In conclusion, acceleration has been the name of the game since 2017. Still, we should further accelerate in 2021. We have an exceptional political alignment, with major international milestones: the COP26 of course, but also a G7 summit in June, a G20 conference in July in Venice, and a G20 summit in October in Rome. It is time for all policy makers – us included – to be up to Hans Jonas requirement, for the future wholeness of Man. Thank you for your attention. i  Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Responsible Investment Report of the Banque de France 2019, June 2020. iii “Progress report on bridging data gaps”, NGFS Report, 26 May 2021. iv “The role of central banks in the greening of the economy”, Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, 11 February 2021 v “Adapting central bank operations to a hotter world: Reviewing some options”, NGFS Report, 24 March 2021. ii
These advocates say that this would make it easier for the central bank to implement an efficient monetary policy with a negative interest rate. 10 This reasoning is based on the central bank being prevented from setting a negative interest rate to the extent considered necessary to stimulate economic activity. Personally, I am not convinced that this problem would arise in Sweden and I would once again like to say that the Riksbank has a statutory requirement to issue banknotes and coins. I see e-krona primarily as a complement to cash. 10 The idea is as follows. If the central bank introduces a negative interest rate, economic agents will choose to  hold cash, which does not have an interest rate, instead of deposits with the banks. This means that the central bank's policy loses impact at the level where the agents begin to prefer cash. This is often referred to in academic research as the “zero lower bound” problem. 8 [10]  The issuing of e-krona together with a positive interest rate on e-krona could affect financial stability in the banking sector. Today, the banking sector functions as a system of communicating vessels. If a consumer or a company withdraws money from a bank, this money comes into another bank, either as a deposit or as payment for a product or service.

That in turn could result in unnecessary economic and financial instability. If, on the other hand, IMF assistance were too readily forthcoming, both the member countries, and their creditors, might be encouraged to take excessive risks in the belief that the IMF would in the end bail them out. This is a particular form of the familiar problem of moral hazard. It, too, could result in unnecessary economic and financial instability. What does seem clear is that, given the scale of private international capital flows today, the IMF’s resources are certain to be limited in relation to the problems that could emerge. At some point therefore - depending on just where the balance is struck - the onus for resolving the situation has to fall back on the borrowing country and on its creditors, who cannot avoid taking ultimate responsibility for their own lending decisions. So there is a link between the review of the IMF’s facilities and what has come to be called - in the jargon - PSI, or private sector involvement in crisis resolution. And that link remains to be clarified. Just how these issues are resolved will have an important bearing upon global economic and financial stability, and in turn, upon the safety of our national banking systems. Somewhat similar considerations apply in the narrower national context.
Silicon Valley Bank was the 20th largest bank in the United States.8 Although the bank was large by Swedish standards – about 70 per cent of Swedbank’s size – it was small in the US market. I see the importance of small and medium-sized banks as a clear lesson from the crisis. As an authority with a financial stability mandate, we cannot ignore such banks. Even if the problems occur in relatively quiet periods, they can have unwanted spillover effects. When the problems became acute in Silicon Valley Bank, the concern spread quickly to other similar banks. The reason was probably that they had similar business models, risk profiles and so on. This led to a loss of confidence in these banks, too. The contagion risks became obvious. One lesson is that we should not only look at the size of individual banks, but also whether certain groups of banks are similar and thus exposed to similar risks. This means that even smaller banks as a group can become important for financial stability.9  8 In terms of total assets, see FDIC https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-suite/financialreporting. 9 The global standards only apply to larger internationally active banks. The regulations applicable to smaller do-  mestic banks vary from country to country. In the EU, by and large the same regulations apply to all banks, but this is not the case in the United States, for example.

So we would act as the point of contact on operational and liquidity issues which might affect participants. Meanwhile, the role of the FSA is naturally to monitor the health of the institutions which fall within its supervisory remit, and consequently any concerns or questions in this area will naturally be addressed to them. And the Treasury will ensure that Ministers are kept up to date so that government is able to act promptly. It also undertakes to ensure coherence between the financial sector and the operation of public sector continuity arrangements more generally. A current example of such co-operation between the three authorities and the private sector is the Taskforce, on Major Operational Disruptions, of which I am the Chair. The Taskforce was asked by Treasury Ministers to assess whether we need more statutory powers in this field, and it so what they should be. Our findings will be published in the next few weeks: so please watch this space! I thought in closing that you might also be interested in a few observations on several issues which confront us today. These range from very high level issues such as leverage, to much more specific questions such as complex financial instruments. So firstly, leverage. Leverage is not itself a threat to financial stability: indeed banking practice relies on leverage. But leverage can become a vulnerability once it ceases to be sustainable. And here we need to assess the global picture at several levels: not just that of the UK.
This involves collaboration between the banking industry, Regtech solution providers, industry associations, and the regulators. 19. I therefore strongly urge you to become an active participant in the Regtech ecosystem here. Your participation in today’s event is an important step in promoting such momentum. Through continuous collaboration and knowledge-sharing, we can enlarge and enrich our Regtech ecosystem and, in the longer run, turn Hong Kong into a global leading Regtech hub. 20. I also hope very much that this event has been helpful for the participants in either kick3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  starting or accelerating your own Regtech adoption journey. As more resources are put into this effort and Regtech awareness grows, I am sure we will soon see the fruits of our joint efforts. Closing 21. To conclude on behalf of the HKMA, I would like to say how very grateful we are to the speakers, moderators, and other guests for their generous sharing of experience. I hope that everyone here, like me, has found these sharing insightful, and that you have all gained a better understanding of the potential of Regtech and how to implement it in your respective institutions. I also sincerely hope that Hong Kong will advance as a global Regtech hub, leading the way with a new approach to risk management and regulatory compliance. With that, I will now officially close this event but I would once again invite you to join us on the next stage of our exciting Regtech journey.

The deficits are currently large in all of the vulnerable countries, but while Ireland and Spain have been able to show a balance or surplus during the years prior to the crisis, Italy and Portugal have shown a deficit throughout. (Slide: General government net lending in Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain). A common precondition for the ability of these countries to renew their loans at a manageable cost is the credibility of their fiscal policy consolidation plans. The example of Ireland points to a credible consolidation plan with concrete decisions on large cuts in public expenditure being able to reverse an upward trend in interest rates, while the greatest pressure is currently on Portugal, where the ten-year rate rose last week. (Slide: Government bond rates of Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain, compared with those of Germany). The more favourable the conditions for the development of domestic and foreign demand, the greater are the chances that good GDP growth will be able to reduce the problems in public finances. Those countries that have not had large falls in asset prices, including Italy, do not risk suppressed domestic demand in the same way as, for instance, Spain and Ireland, where property prices have fallen substantially. With regard to demand from abroad, the problems are made more severe by wages and prices having grown faster in these countries than in the euro area as a whole since the euro was introduced.