samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And though the euro area unemployment rate is declining – down almost 1.5 percentage points from its 2013 peak – a great deal of slack still remains in the labour market. Indeed, if unemployment continues to decline at its current pace, it may take years before the euro area returns to its pre-crisis unemployment rates. And as we have seen in the UK and the US, even at that point – when the so-called “NAIRU” is reached – there may still be a substantial time lag before a tight labour market translates into higher wages. This suggests that, for services inflation to rise over the medium-term, we will need to see a faster closing of the output gap in the euro area and a quicker return towards full employment. 2  “Understanding Inflation Dynamics and Monetary”, Policy Panel remarks by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 29 August 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The ECB’s monetary policy response So putting the picture together, we have seen two factors that could endanger medium-term price stability in the euro area and warrant a monetary policy response: a global environment of volatile oil and commodity prices that could feed into expectations; and a domestic environment where persistent slack continues to constrain price pressures. But as we have shown, even with interest rates at zero, we have an array of conventional and unconventional measures to deliver that response.

At the European summit of 26/27 October 2011 governments announced further steps to enhance fiscal governance, notably a strengthened surveillance of countries under the excessive deficit procedure and the implementation of balanced budget rules in all euro area Member States. Important steps have also been taken to strengthen the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The EFSF has been ratified by all 17 Member States of the euro area and agreement has also been reached on leveraging existing EFSF resources in order to increase the overall “firepower” of the fund without extending the guarantees underpinning it. Conclusion Looking ahead, the identification of the necessary reforms has to start from being clear about what the ultimate objective is: the need to establish institutional arrangements which provide credible incentives for sound fiscal and macroeconomic policies in a monetary union. In my view, a more fundamental deepening of fiscal and economic policy surveillance is necessary in the long run. This would involve a transfer of sovereignty to the European level of decision  11  See, for example, R. Morris, H. Ongena and L. Schuknecht (2006), “The reform and implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”, ECB Occasional Paper, no. 47, June (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ scpops/ecbocp47.pdf), or M. Catenaro and R. Morris (2008), “Fiscal policy and implementation in EMU: From Maastricht to the SGP reform and beyond”, F. Farina and R. Tamborini (eds. ), Economic Policy in the European Monetary Union: From the Old to the New Stability and Growth Pact and Beyond, Routledge.
Towards this end, the upcoming inaugural Islamic Finance Innovation Symposium aims to build the necessary linkage for a stronger partnership between industry and academia, of which may be of interest to IRTI. The symposium seeks to promote applied research that would spark industry innovation and act as a testbed for breakthrough ideas. Another designed takeaway from the symposium is the creation of a network for more effective business matching between the industry and academia to explore and implement specific innovative ideas. As Islamic finance has gained a strong foundation, competitive pressure would demand us to further strategise and refine the offerings of Islamic finance to ensure that the products and services needed by the customers are met and deliver the unique value propositions of Islamic finance. As we look ahead, future Islamic banking growth will be very much driven by the industry’s ability to continuously tap the opportunities to finance the activities of the real economy. Judging by the data to date there is positive indication that we are on track to meet the 40 percent target of total financing by the year 2020. Futhermore, our continuous efforts to initiate cross-border dialogues and interactions between regulators and industry, as well as between regulators and international bodies would further expand cross-border activities given a steady and strong regulatory and supervisory framework already put in place. The launch of The Islamic Finance Country Report for Malaysia 2015 is a much welcomed initiative.

These indications show that businesses are seeing the economic and business merit of Shariah-compliant products and services and that its appeal extend beyond the traditional captive market. However, growth of the magnitude that Islamic finance experienced over the last decade would increasingly become more difficult if the industry does not continue to be nimble and agile in its approach. Innovation is therefore a key priority for Islamic finance players to keep expanding and gain market share. As indicated by the results of the retail consumer banking and insurance survey in the country report, the demand for Islamic banking by survey respondents far exceeds that for its conventional counterpart. This should be an encouragement for Islamic banks to boost its innovativeness in meeting customers’ needs. The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 is already paving the way for the development of Islamic banking solutions that are differentiated from conventional products by allowing funds to be mobilised either through deposits or investment accounts. This classification brings greater options for the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  public and reflects an enhanced risk-sharing approach to Islamic banking. It also gives the industry additional options to create creative solutions for its customers. Greater engagement and collaboration between industry and academia would also ensure mutually-reinforcing efforts in driving innovation through the development and implementation of new research findings and breakthroughs.
All in all, this gave us reason to expect a continued low but gradually rising inflation rate for a large part of the forecast period, and an inflation rate in line with the target towards the end of the period. The information received about the Swedish economy since the publication of the Inflation Report points to a stable upswing in economic activity with an increased contribution from domestic demand. However, the foreign trade statistics and the National Institute of Economic Research’s most recent business tendency survey suggest that manufacturing activity may have begun to slow and that the expansion in the export industry may have been dampened somewhat faster than expected. Meanwhile, the same survey points to increasingly strong domestic demand in sectors such as construction, trade and private services. Retail sales have grown in line with what we assumed in our forecasts and Swedish households have become more optimistic about the future. Recently, however, the oil price has returned to a very high level and some indicators in the euro area have been weak. Nevertheless, on the whole the developments appear to be broadly in line with the economic outlook we presented in the previous Inflation Report. BIS Review 25/2005  5  Concluding remarks Allow me to conclude by reiterating that we expect inflation to be lower than target for a large part of the forecast period.

Thus, having fallen for a period, product prices for industrial goods also began to rise towards the end of 2003 although the rate of increase stopped at 1 per cent in 2004. Since the latter half of the 1990s labour costs per hour in the Swedish manufacturing sector have risen at a somewhat diminishing rate. Coupled with high productivity growth, this has resulted in sharply falling unit labour costs (Chart 6). That contributed to a slight rise on average in profit margins in the manufacturing sector last year as well, despite the fact that the increase in intermediate goods prices did not completely pass through to product prices. BIS Review 25/2005  3  Stiffer competition, partly due to low prices of imported goods, increased import penetration, i.e. a higher share of imported goods in total consumption, and new foreign players in the Swedish market may have contributed to the high productivity growth and the low producer price inflation for domestically produced goods. Producer prices for imported goods Import prices for consumer goods have fallen since the end of 2002 (Chart 4). Import prices in Swedish kronor are determined by the price developments and price level in the countries from which we import, how large a share we import from each country and developments in the exchange rate. The krona has strengthened more or less continuously from its weak level at the end of 2001, and this of course has contributed to the fall in import prices in recent years (Chart 7).
However, in the intervening period, they have continued to play this role. This state of affairs is not without risks. Ultimately, monetary policy alone cannot remedy all economic ills, especially those of a structural nature. It is therefore important that all the powers involved play their part in solving the problems we face. Ladies and gentlemen, today’s topic focused on the challenges for Swiss monetary policy with regard to the euro. Anything that affects the EU or the euro also affects our country. Consequently, it is very much in our interest that solutions for the structural problems in the EU be found and that economic recovery continue. Having said this, Switzerland should not simply stand idly by and rely on Europe. As a small open economy, we must ‘do our homework’ and adapt to a changing landscape. It is important for companies to continue operating with a high degree of flexibility, and for economic policymakers in all fields – in this country, too – to ensure good business conditions. The SNB will continue to make the most of the latitude afforded by its monetary sovereignty to respond pragmatically to the challenges ahead.

This situation was compounded by weak economic data in the first half of 2011, which pointed to the risk of another global recession. Swiss franc appreciation accelerated in response to these developments, with the currency reaching historic highs against the euro and the US dollar and threatening to plunge Switzerland into a deep recession (cf. chart 3). The discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate in January 2015 The minimum exchange rate – which was to remain in place for almost three and a half years – halted the appreciation of the Swiss franc and helped to ease tensions. When we discontinued the measure in January 2015, the decision was criticised in some quarters. This is understandable, as the scale of the minimum exchange rate’s negative side effects was not yet fully apparent. However, the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate was  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  unavoidable; conditions had changed and an analysis of the risks clearly favoured the decision to remove the floor. The overall situation had improved significantly since the introduction of the minimum exchange rate. The economy had regained momentum, confidence in the US dollar had been restored and uncertainty had decreased considerably. Then there was the issue of divergence: the monetary policies of the US Federal Reserve and the ECB were moving in opposite directions. As the markets were expecting the Americans to tighten and the Europeans to substantially loosen monetary policy, the euro had been weakening against the US dollar since mid-2014.
The bears may have seen their bargain flat pack furniture in a different light when they discovered how easily the chairs were broken by a little girl. Similarly, financial services supplied by undercapitalized firms are poor value as they cannot be relied on. And if policyholders cannot reliably distinguish the sound firms from the others, the whole sector is tainted – to the cost of us all as economic activity that relies on being able to lay off unsupportable risks is depressed. On the other hand, if prices are unnecessarily high that can also reduce or prevent risk transfer, and this can have a knock-on effect on economic activity and long-term investment. There is a balance to be struck. As I said in my opening remarks, I do not believe that we have that balance badly wrong at the moment. I hope that I have convinced you that, like Goldilocks in the more familiar version of the story, regulators do want to get it just right: we aren’t continually hankering after the largest chair, the softest bed, or the hottest porridge. And we are as open to evidence about what constitutes ‘just right’ as we are to how best to correct the distortions introduced by the current design and calibration of specific measures in the regime.

Goldilocks and the three pillars: how much capital is just right? - speech by Anna Sweeney i  Speech given at the Westminster Business Forum  Goldilocks and the three pillars: how much capital is just right? ‐ speech by Anna Sweeney | Bank of England  Page 1  Published on 10 February 2021  Overview Anna Sweeney says regulators must strike the right balance when they decide how much capital insurers need to hold. The three pillars she refers to are the different ways we regulate insurers. They are: the capital an insurer holds its risk management policies its disclosure of risks  Speech We are all familiar with the story of Goldilocks and the three bears. When preparing this speech I was surprised, and a little disturbed, to discover that in the first recorded version of the story, it is not a pretty young girl who enters the forest home of three bears, but a badly-behaved old woman, an outcast from her family. After wreaking havoc in the bears’ house she jumps out of the window, and is never seen again. (Let’s hope that the bears had good contents insurance.) In this earlier telling of the story, the visitor to the bears’ house is a caricature, and not a sympathetic one: I really don’t want to repeat some of the adjectives applied to her.
For instance, a central bank cannot prevent oil prices rising in the wake of the concern over a possible war in the Middle East. On the other hand, a central bank could of course try to quickly tighten demand in the country to push down prices in other areas and thus ensure the average rate of price increase remains in line with the target level. The focus on inflation 1-2 years ahead, entails monetary policy being conducted gradually, little by little, rather than a constant acceleration and braking, which would risk creating unnecessary variations in demand and which could in turn have a negative effect on production and employment. The focus on the coming 1-2 year period thus means that temporary rises or falls in the inflation rate can be tolerated. However, it is important that the Riksbank is clear in its communication of whether it considers the rise to be temporary and when it expects it to subside. One-off shifts in price levels can have a more lasting effect on future inflation if, for instance, those involved do not believe that the rise is temporary, assessing that it will be lasting and thus wishing to compensate for the upturn. If this occurs, monetary policy must be used to intervene, even if the economic situation in itself does not provide cause for concern with regard to inflation, to prevent inflation taking a hold through expectations.

The reason for this is quite simply that it is more costly in terms of reduced production and employment to force down inflation expectations once they have become established at a higher level rather than to prevent them rising. Parallels between the current situation and 2001 plus 2002 Let us take a look at the current situation and begin with the price rises. Now, as in spring 2001, inflation has risen as a result of temporary factors pulling up the general level of prices. During 2001 mad-cow disease and foot-and-mouth disease pushed up meat prices and poor harvests led to soaring prices on fruit and vegetables. Then as now there was also a water shortage in the hydroelectric power companies’ reservoirs, which pushed up electricity prices. At the moment, it is electricity and oil prices that are soaring and have pushed up inflation figures above the target level in January. This becomes particularly clear if one separates energy prices from the inflation figures for January (Diagram 1). The Riksbank’s assessment is that the upturn in inflation is temporary, as it was in 2001, and we can expect to see lower inflation as early as the late spring and summer. However, our assessment is based on the assumption that those setting prices will not try to compensate themselves for the temporary price increase. If this occurs, there is a risk of inducing tendencies towards an inflation spiral, which the Riksbank could not stand by and witness in silence.
Marzunisham Omar: Digital ID/e-KYC and Financing and Facilitation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters Welcoming remarks by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 22nd Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering Typologies Workshop, virtual, 2 February 2021. * * * It is my pleasure to welcome all of you to the first virtual APG Annual Typologies Workshop this week. It is rather unfortunate that I cannot personally host you in Kuala Lumpur for this event. I have recently assumed the role of APG Co-Chair, representing Malaysia. Malaysia is indeed very honoured to co-chair the APG and we are committed to working together with all members in delivering the APG’s mandates during this unprecedented and challenging times. It is my wish that during my tenure as Co-Chair, we would be able to further strengthen the strategic partnership amongst APG members and foster better collaboration in implementing the APG initiatives and agenda. Together with the APG Secretariat, we will continue to provide platforms for members to raise any issues affecting individual members as well as collectively as a group. For this purpose, together with Co-Chair Ian, we have identified several focus areas as the CoChairs’ Priorities, one of which is to host the Annual Typologies Workshop. Despite the pandemic and after a two-year hiatus, we are glad to be able to conduct the APG Typologies Workshop although in a virtual setting.

So far, 21 APG Typologies Workshops have been held since the APG’s formation in 1997, where the last Workshop was held in 2018, jointly with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) in Russia. These Workshops have contributed to a better comprehension of prevalent money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) threats in the region, by allowing members to understand latest trends, identify key red flags as well as sharing of information on possible counter-measures to respond to the threats. This has assisted members to take the hard decisions to prioritise, apply resources and put in place systems to effectively tackle financial crimes. With so much benefits, the APG is committed to continue holding the Annual Typologies Workshop so that members could keep abreast with the latest ML/TF trends and typologies. As you can see in the agenda, this year’s Workshop aims to discuss two key areas that were approved by the membership earlier. These two topics namely, Digital ID/e-KYC and Financing and Facilitation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, are timely given the current development in our region. Allow me to touch briefly on these two topics. Digital ID/e-KYC The rapid technology advancement in the last decade has led to significant innovations in the financial sector. Then came the COVID-19 pandemic, which has accelerated the need for financial institutions around the world to shift their operations onto the digitalised platforms. Digital ID/e-KYC is one such innovation and the authorities have responded accordingly.
The NGFS will not stop there and next year will publish its first comprehensive report, which will provide – on a voluntary basis only – policy recommendations for central banks and supervisors. This will take place at the upcoming NGFS Conference, at the Banque de France in Paris, on 17 April 2019: you are all most welcome! To prevent the airplane from crashing, we can help by shedding light on climate risks in order to take accurate and timely decisions, and by seizing opportunities while aligning incentives and mobilising capital. II. Anticipating climate-related risks 1/ Our first priority should be the disclosure of existing exposures in the financial sector, what I call “the snapshot of risks”. The recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), chaired by Mr. Bloomberg with sponsorship from the Financial Stability Board (FSB), have been groundbreaking as they provide a practical framework allowing companies to disclose their climate-related financial risks. However, an accurate and consistent vision of the risks requires a wider implementation of the TCFD’s recommendations. Significant room for progress remains in this area. To enable markets to price risks, we need comparable metrics – thanks to a common taxonomy – and better access to higher quality and more consistent data. I therefore fully  Page 3 sur 6 support the work of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance of the European Commission which is concretely developing a taxonomy; our first NGFS workstream is also working in this field.

In addition, from an operational perspective, if evidence shows that transition and physical risks have an impact on the risk profile of certain assets, central banks should draw a logical conclusion and incorporate these financial risks in their collateral framework. **  Page 6 sur 6 I would like to conclude with the message that Paul Romer gave during his Nobel Prize speech: “Humans are capable of amazing accomplishments if we set our minds to it.” On climate-related risks, in less than one year, central banks and supervisors have accomplished concrete steps to mainstream green finance in all their activities. Notwithstanding the political progress we would all wish for at international level, we are determined to follow our “flight plan” as financial authorities. Thank you for your attention. i  Banco de Mexico, Bank of England, Banque de France/Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution, De Nederlandsche Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, Monetary Authority of Singapore, People’s Bank of China, Swedish Finansinspektionen. ii BaFin, Banco de España, Bank al Maghrib, Bank Negara Malaysia, Bank of Finland, Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL), Banque nationale de Belgique (BNB), EBA, European Central Bank (ECB), Japan FSA, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), Reserve Bank of Australia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand. iii Bank for International Settlements (BIS), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), OECD, Sustainable Insurance Forum (SIF), World Bank (Group) + World Bank (IFC/SBN).