samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the state and local side, a rising economy should boost sales and income tax revenue, and help narrow near-term fiscal shortfalls. We also need to remain watchful for signs that low interest rates could foster a buildup of financial excesses or bubbles that might pose a medium-term risk to both full employment and price stability. Fortunately, current risk spreads on U.S. financial assets are not unduly compressed. This suggests that people are still being relatively cautious about taking on a lot of financial asset risk. On the inflation side of the ledger, there are some signs that core inflation is now stabilizing after falling for several years. At the Fed, we track core inflation (which excludes the volatile food and energy prices) because experience and research tell us that core inflation provides the best measure of whether overall inflationary pressures are building up or subsiding. Core inflation has proven quite reliable in predicting future total, or “headline” inflation rates. At the moment, both headline and core inflation remain below levels consistent with our dual mandate objectives – which most members of the FOMC consider to be 2 percent or a bit less on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) measure. Recent evidence shows that the large amount of slack in the economy has contributed to declining inflation over the past couple of years. I expect this slack to continue to dampen price pressures in the near term. Inflation expectations are well-anchored today and we intend to keep it that way.

For example, the share of household after-tax income that families owe for servicing debts and paying for housing (including property taxes, homeowners insurance and rents) has declined sharply over the past two years and is now back to levels last seen in the late 1990s. Households have cut the total amount of debt they owe. They are also refinancing outstanding debt to take advantage of the lowest mortgage interest rates since the mid 1950s. We expect the increased rate of mortgage refinancing now in place to continue over the near term. This represents another means by which households can free up income for other uses. Now, let’s consider the slow housing recovery. Housing market activity – both new construction and sales – remains depressed. On the construction side, total housing starts are running at just 600,000 units per year (seasonally-adjusted) in recent months. This is up from 530,000 units at the trough in the first quarter of 2009 but it is still extremely low by the standards of the last 50 years. In fact, the rate of new construction is so low that there is barely any net growth in the U.S. housing stock these days. One reason why so little housing is being built is that many existing homes stand vacant. We estimate that there are roughly 3 million vacant housing units more than usual. And more vacancies are added daily as the foreclosure process moves homes from families to mortgage lenders.
If not all regulations are aligned, some private actors could (re)locate their IT systems in less-demanding jurisdictions. This is the reason why we need homogeneity among international regulatory texts with the largest outreach. Who could lead this coordination role on cybersecurity regulation? The G7 expert group has been extremely successful in producing “Fundamental elements”, but this group has no standard-setting role and its texts can only guide regulators in their work. I believe the FSB is best placed to engage the dialogue with the various standard-setters to foster the alignment of their texts, as well as to conduct global outreach, and limit the proliferation of working groups. II. Information Cyber threats are increasing, but adequate and consistent measurement is challenging. I would like therefore to make two proposals: About incident reporting. Many reporting obligations on cyber incidents have emerged, requested by various authorities. But these incident reports give little  Page 4 sur 6 information to measure the intensity and sophistication of threats and their evolution. The indicators requested vary from one report to another and this limits the scope of diagnosis and comparisons. The institutions themselves can struggle to transmit information about their incidents in different formats and with different details to the various authorities in charge. FSB agreed on a “cyber lexicon”. 1 As we have done in the past for operational risk, I recommend that we work on a common categorization of cyber incidents to better measure the impacts of attacks, and better understand their evolution. About information sharing and threat intelligence.

A number of avenues need to be explored. • First, if this exercise is necessary per se, its full potential will be delivered only if all lessons are properly drawn. Some guiding key principles, or “Fundamental elements”, to be designed in the wake of the G7 exercise, will help achieve this objective. • Second, we must leverage on this G7 exercise: the regular practice of coordinated crisis management exercises should be encouraged in order to enhance the resilience of the financial system. • Third, an enlargement beyond the remit of G7 countries should be considered with some other jurisdictions and/or with BIS involvement, and possibly beyond the sole financial sector actors. In future exercises, the current format will require cooperation arrangements on a wider scale. ** Regulation and supervision, information, and preparation: these are the areas where we clearly need to improve our coordination. I would like to conclude with a last imperative: action. We all share the principles, but there was today in this conference a sense of urgency, of concrete urgency. This is where the French presidency of the G7 intends to be useful: • First, by giving greater visibility and support to the CEG work, which is going to deliver important papers on cross-sector coordination and on the assessment of vulnerabilities.
The path of consumption adjustment is occurring in a context where real wages continue to contract, job creation has slowed, and the liquidity remaining from the 2021 stimulus measures has been drying up. Between April and July, aggregate employment showed little increase. By categories, there was a drop in salaried workers, which contrasts with the increase in the number of employers and self-employed. By sectors, most new jobs were concentrated in activities related to services, construction and industry, offset by trade and 2  other economic activities. All in all, the unemployment rate remained below its averages of the last two decades, standing at 7.9% in July. The slowdown in job creation has occurred in a context of shrinking demand for workers. The Online Job Postings index calculated by the Central Bank has seen month-over-month declines since March, while business expectations (IMCE) regarding three-month employment have continued to deteriorate and are still in pessimistic territory. According to our Business Perceptions Survey (EPN) for August, 30% of firms expect that in twelve months' time their staff will be lower than at present, and only 15% expect it to increase. However, as can be seen from the results of the August IPN, the difficulty for firms to recruit workers has diminished, a fact in which the lower demand seems to play an important role. On the other hand, labor supply has paused its recovery (figure 5).

However, the reactivation of credit activity remains a challenging goal, which would require encouragement of the final demand and generation of business plans valid for bank financing, reduction of real and perceived risk in the economy, review of development strategies and commercial banks’ lending policies, as well as reduction of cost and non-cost elements in lending. All these factors are envisaged to gradually improve throughout the year; however, they will remain far from the pre-crisis levels. Bank of Albania’s monetary policy will continue to be prudent, chiefly oriented towards achievement of inflation target. The recent upward inflation trend might have been motivated by temporary-action and limited-intensity supply factors. The Bank of Albania has envisaged  BIS Review 28/2010  1  that the exceeding of 4 percent inflation rate will be for a short period of time and will not be followed by steady inflationary pressures. Our projections show that consumer price inflation will fall gradually towards the 3 percent targeted rate during 2010. However, we remain committed to taking all appropriate steps to ensure this performance and meet our legal mandate for price stability in the economy. 2  BIS Review 28/2010
As the Governor noted in providing the Bank’s endorsement of the ILG’s initiative in October 2000, past experience suggests that a collective approach by the major creditors to a debtor company in financial difficulties can help to preserve value, to the benefit of the creditors as a whole and of others with an interest in the company. Although I know there have been tricky issues to resolve in the negotiations – notably those relating to the standstill, debt trading and the provision of new money – in the end, the Principles seem broadly consistent with the London Approach, based as they are on the enlightened self-interest of all the creditors. Ultimately, although some debt providers may be able to gain in individual cases by striking out on their own, in the long run a co-operative approach will ensure greater recoveries for creditors, including bondholders, in aggregate. Just as greater international co-operation can produce net gains at the workout stage, so that needs to be backed up by greater co-ordination in cross-border corporate insolvencies. That is why we welcome the UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvencies, which, as most of you will know, has been implemented into UK insolvency law. The Model Law is consistent with the UK insolvency regime and contains many helpful provisions relating to co-operation between insolvency courts in different jurisdictions, and to the granting of recognition to foreign insolvency practitioners. We would therefore urge other countries to enact the UML.

In this context, we also welcome the ongoing work by international organisations, including the IMF and World Bank, on the design of efficient and effective insolvency regimes worldwide. It is, of course, difficult to establish international standards in this area, because the approaches adopted by different countries reflect not only different legal traditions but also different policy choices, most especially on the extent to which the system should favour debtors or creditors. Indeed, this is a debate that is live in several countries, including the UK where new measures were announced last month in the Queen’s Speech, and I am sure is occupying minds at this Congress. But the IMF work argues, rightly in my view, that any insolvency regime, whether debtor- or creditor-oriented, will enhance financial stability effectively only if it protects value for the benefit of all interested parties and the economy in general; and this requires the allocation of risk among market participants to be done in a way that is predictable, equitable and transparent. Financial sector restructurings Let me turn now to my second area: financial sector restructurings, and I would like to start by noting the importance of confidence in the smooth running of a financial system. Confidence is important in most industries, but it is at the heart of the financial industry. It is confidence that permits banks to operate, as a matter of course, with gearing many times capital, and with a maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities, often concentrated in short-term or sight deposits.
The far-sighted amongst you are anticipating broader global impacts on property, migration and political stability, as well as food and water security. 8 So why isn’t more being done to address it? A classic problem in environmental economics is the tragedy of the commons. The solution to it lies in property rights and supply management. 2  For instance, the IPCC has stated “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia”. See IPCC - Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014). 3  See www.metoffice.gov.uk/news/releases/archive/2015/Record-UK-temps-2014. 4  See IPCC (2014). 5  See IPCC (2014) which notes that the effects of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, together with other anthropogenic drivers are “extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of observed [global] warming since the mid-20th Century”. 6  See, for example, Otto et al (2015). 7  See Munich Re, NatCatSERVICE (2015). 8  The report “Risky Business – the economic risks of climate change in the United States” (2014) suggests that in the USA $ worth of coastal property could be below sea level by 2100. Research by Lloyd’s identifies climate change as an important supply-side issue for food security. See www.lloyds.com/~/media/lloyds/reports/emerging%20risk%20reports/food%20report.pdf. This is consistent with the views expressed by Lloyd’s market participants surveyed by the PRA for its report to Defra.

How to deal with systemic risk – the traditional approach While these arguments are not profoundly new, the policy consensus before the current crisis was dominated by a reluctance to address systemic risk issues directly. This consensus was based on two key arguments. First, it was largely assumed that securing the solidity of individual financial institutions would also grant system-wide stability and thus that regulation at the level of individual firms – micro-regulation – would suffice. The crisis has shown that this view is clearly questionable. As just described, risk in a financial system can arise quasi endogenously, even if individual financial institutions appear to be robust. 3  For more details, namely on ways to address TBTF issues, cf. Danthine (2011). 4  Bank of England (2011). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The second critical element of the pre-crisis policy consensus is known as the “Greenspan Doctrine”. This states that pricking an asset price bubble is in general more costly than cleaning up after the bubble has burst. The foundation of this doctrine is that it is simply too difficult to identify ex ante when a bubble is forming. Specifically, it is inherently difficult to disentangle situations where a credit or asset-price boom is justified by fundamentals from those where it is based on misplaced expectations and is thus a threat to financial stability.
At the same time, the level at which card payments become more efficient for society has probably fallen below SEK 70. But which of these figures has fallen furthest? This is something that we do not know. It is thus difficult to say whether consumers are still using more cash than is economically efficient. The Riksbank will follow up the previous studies to get a more exact picture of the use of cards and cash and of the economic costs of producing the different payments. Highlight the charges! It would not be so strange if consumers were to choose to make more cash payments than is economically efficient. In general, consumers have no idea of how much it costs to produce payments. Our survey shows that knowledge concerning what the different means of payment actually cost is limited. Some 20 per cent of the interviewees were unable to say whether it costs them more to use cards or cash. Some 45 per cent of interviewees believe that cash is most expensive for the retail sector and the banks. We already know that it is difficult to assess the costs of various types of payment. 5 They are never clearly disclosed. But the costs are there even if they are not apparent. The retail trade pays charges to the banks for cash and for card payment services, but does not usually price these services directly to its own customers.

In this respect, indicators of inflation expectations over the medium to longer term remain firmly anchored in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Risks to the outlook for inflation are broadly balanced. On the downside they relate, in particular, to the outlook for economic activity, while on the upside they relate to higher than expected commodity prices. Furthermore, increases in indirect taxation and administered prices may be stronger than currently expected owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years. Turning to the monetary analysis, the latest data confirm a continued deceleration in monetary dynamics. In May, the annual growth rate of M3 declined further to 3.7%, with that of loans to the private sector falling further to 1.8% – the lowest rates since the start of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union. This concurrent deceleration supports the assessment of a slower underlying pace of monetary expansion and low inflationary pressures over the medium term. In May, the outstanding amounts of most components of M3 showed a contraction, reflecting, to a large extent, the recent declines in interest rates paid on short-term deposits and marketable instruments and the increased allocation of funds to instruments outside M3 that these may have fostered. Following a substantial strengthening in April, the growth of M1, while having remained strong, also moderated in May. The short-term developments in M3 have been volatile over the past few months.
Holding flat the labour share may be too strong an assumption if the UK continues its cyclical rebound. Nonetheless, even the rise in wage growth seen through this year appears to have subsided somewhat over recent months. Shorter-term measures suggest annualised rates of pay growth of around 1 to 1.5% in Q3, down from 2.5 to 3% in Q2. Wage growth appears to be fizzling. And, of course, those are not the only potential downside risks facing the UK. World events have added to those downside skews over the past few months. There is now rather more convincing evidence of a gentle slowing in the UK and world economies since the summer. In the UK, this gentle slowing has been apparent since the middle of 2014. It leaves growth, in the UK and globally, little more than trend. Growth could accelerate in the period ahead, with the cost of credit at historically very low levels. Since the crisis, however, the pattern of UK output has been shaped less by the cost of credit today than by uncertainty about demand tomorrow. It was that uncertainty which cratered world demand in 2008. It was that uncertainty which flattened UK growth during the euro-area crisis of 2011–12. And it was the relief rally after that euro-area uncertainty abated which caused UK growth to bounce back during 2013–14. Uncertainty about demand is, once more, on the rise.

Shaw-Taylor, L, and Wrigely, E A (2014) “Occupational structure and population change”, in Floud, Humphries and Johnson (eds) The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 1 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014). Stanislaw, U (1958) ‘Tribute to John von Neumann’, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society. Ricardo, D (1821) “On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation”, Library of Economics and Liberty Online. Trade Union Congress (2014) “UK workers suffering the most severe squeeze in real earnings since Victorian times”, Labour Market and Economic report, available at: http://www.tuc.org.uk/economic-issues/labour-market-and-economic-reports/economicanalysis/britain-needs-pay-rise/uk. Wallis, P (2014) “Labour markets and training”, in Floud, Humphries and Johnson (eds) The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 1 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014). Woirol, G R (1996), “The technological unemployment and structural unemployment debates” (No. 173), Greenwood Publishing Group.
Rodrigo Vergara: The Monetary Policy Report and the Financial Stability Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, before the Finance Commission of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 3 December 2013. *  *  *  The Monetary Policy Report of December 2013 and the Financial Stability Report of the second half of 2013 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, Senator Andrés Zaldívar, senators members of this Commission, ladies and gentlemen. I am grateful for your invitation to present the vision of the Central Bank’s Board on the recent macroeconomic and financial developments, its Outlook and implications on monetary and financial policy. This vision is contained in detail in our December Monetary Policy Report and our second-half Financial Stability Report we are presenting now. The macroeconomic scenario has evolved along the trends described in the latest Monetary Policy Reports. In the external scenario, growth is more balanced between developed and emerging economies than it was before the subprime crisis hit. International financial conditions are steadily normalizing, while the terms of trade are declining and approaching their trend values. In this scenario, the Chilean economy will receive a milder boost from abroad than we saw in recent years. The less expansionary monetary policies in the developed world will be coupled with a rebound in developed economies that will favor not only these countries but the world economy at large.

A second firewall is related to public institutions such as the Superintendences and the Central Bank, which have complementary roles in the monitoring, supervision and regulation of the financial system. The continual improvement of regulations and laws, as well as the search for best practices at the global level is one objective that must always be present in our actions. Within this monitoring role, our Financial Stability Report plays a key role. In it we identify developments which, if intensified, might create risks, or where we believe there is room to reduce residual risks. I would like now to describe some of these developments as well as the main regulatory amendments that have been implemented during the last six months. In our Financial Stability Reports a couple of issues ago we warned about some developments in the real estate sector which, if intensified, could become a source of risk. We were particularly concerned about the combination of dynamic prices with a credit acceleration originating in this sector. In this context, one good element is that mortgage credit growth has remained stable, with no relaxation of lending standards for mortgage loans or credit to construction and real estate firms. However, housing price indexes are as dynamic as in previous periods, in a scenario of high demand and low inventories. Meanwhile, the expected supply of office space continues to rise and is in historically high levels.