samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They give me a feel of how Singapore is viewed. One of the top bankers told me that he saw Singapore emerging as one of the top financial centres in Asia in the longer term. Our strong fundamentals will enable us to play a role in Asia's transformation. Another CEO told me that his bank found skill levels and costs in Singapore competitive enough for them to outsource processing work, including operations and IT development from Europe to Singapore. 24. In 2004, our treasury and capital markets grew strongly. For instance, the Singapore debt market grew by 20% to $ billion. Our fund management industry has continued to flourish, with assets under management (AUM) rising to almost $ billion. On the Singapore Exchange, the structured warrants market has seen tremendous growth. 25. A vibrant and dynamic financial centre depends on a vibrant and dynamic talent pool. In today's competitive environment, knowledge and talent are what will set businesses and even countries apart. In fact, one of the critical factors limiting the quick expansion of Singapore's financial industry is the availability of talent. 26. We seek to build up this talent pool in three broad ways. First, at the pre-employment stage, we ensure that the curriculum at our universities and polytechnics prepare their graduates well for entry into the industry. This is imperative if our graduates are to be relevant in a fast and ever-changing financial industry. MAS and the Institute of Banking and Finance have been facilitating closer interactions between various stakeholders to achieve this. 27.

A key event is the Raffles Seminar, organised by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. It will gather leading thinkers to debate the issues and challenges countries face in achieving and sustaining good governance. 36. S2006 will require close collaboration between MAS, other government agencies and the private sector, in particular, our banks. Some of you are already working with the organising committee. I would like to thank you for your support. Together, we can make S2006 a success for Singapore. Conclusion 37. Let me conclude. Winston Churchill said: "The optimist sees opportunity in every danger. The pessimist sees danger in every opportunity." We should be shrewd optimists - bold but not reckless, cautious but not timid. 38. For we are living in exciting times in Asia. The economic centre of gravity is shifting from West to East. This could be Asia's Century. No doubt there are serious challenges. But I believe if we are innovative, realistic and skilful, we can overcome them. And together ride the Asian wave to prosperity. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 83/2005
The interest rate reductions and the fall in the krone exchange rate imply that inflation will gradually increase and will be considerably higher than the current level as early as next spring. After such a period of very low inflation as we have now witnessed, it is appropriate to be particularly vigilant in monetary policy in the event that inflation does not increase as projected. 2  These estimates are uncertain and must therefore be interpreted with caution. The analysis of developments in the exchange rate from May 2000 to January 2003 is discussed in more detail in Bjørn Naug (2003): “Faktorer bak utviklingen i kronekursen – en empirisk analyse” (Factors underlying developments in the krone exchange rate – an empirical analysis), in Norges Bank’s Occasional Papers, no. 31 (Norwegian only). 3  These projections are discussed in more detail in Norges Bank’s Inflation Report 3/2003. The analyses are based on the technical assumption that the interest rate will move in line with expectations in financial and foreign exchange markets, implying that the interest rate will remain at the current level well into 2004. Thereafter, the interest rate in Norway is assumed to rise gradually in pace with interest rates in other countries. The forward exchange rate implies a moderate depreciation of the krone through the projection period. 4  BIS Review 53/2003  Share of employment back at trend As mentioned earlier, developments in the output gap are a measure of output stability.

2 Bank research (Franklin, Rostom and Thwaites, 2016), finds that the reduction in bank credit supply had an economically and statistically significant effect on companies: a 10% fall in the amount a firm could borrow is estimated to have reduced capital per worker by around 5-6%, labour productivity by 5-8% and wages by 7-9%, and increased the probability of bankruptcy by around 60%. 3 See page 52 of the Bank for International Settlements 87th Annual Report, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2017e.htm. Zombie firms are defined as those with a ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expenses below one, with the firm aged 10 years or more. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  4  Increased uncertainty has undoubtedly contributed to weak investment. Confirming the adage that bad things come in threes, companies have faced uncertainty about the economy, geopolitics, and economic 5  policy, all of which are likely to have clouded the outlook for how investments will perform (Chart 7). Greater uncertainty about returns means that fewer investment projects will be seen as worthwhile. This could help explain the “puzzle” of why hurdle rates in business investment have remained stubbornly high despite the weaker secular outlook for growth implied, for example, by long-term bond yields. The answer may be that the expected volatility of earnings growth has increased.
It should be evident that insurers can and must leverage data and digitisation to strengthen your value proposition to the customer. As one FinTech firm tells me, the battle is won by whoever can provide a more delightful customer experience. At the same time, we should not forget to ‘mind the gap’, or gaps. As insurers delve deeper into the realm of smart tools powered by complex algorithms, artificial intelligence and machine learning, there is also a need to identify and address potential pitfalls of such capabilities. For instance, one particular concern in deep learning models is that the “learning” by the machine is a black box, which could lead to biased “data truths”. This in turn may produce decisions or outcomes that are unexplainable, non- transparent or even unfair. Also, while Big Data enables finer segregation of risk, the concept of insurance is always premised on risk pooling. A careful balance has to be struck between segmentation versus the sharing of risk among policyholders, for insurance to retain its long term societal relevance. We should guard against automatic or blanket financial exclusion or embedded selection bias. There is also a need to safeguard individuals’ right to privacy in the use of personal data. Therefore, an emerging area of focus for MAS will concern the ethical use of data by financial institutions. We will look to provide more guidance on the issues of fairness, ethics, accountability and transparency amidst this technology revolution. Insurers are custodians of very large data sets, including personal information.

1 The Global Insurance Protection Gap, The Geneva Association, 2014 2 2012 Protection Gap Study – Singapore, Life Insurance Association of Singapore, 2012 3 Spotlight on Distribution in Asia, Swiss Re – LIMRA, 2015 4 Insurance and Technology: Evolution and Revolution in a Digital World, Morgan Stanley and BCG, 2014  5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Technological advancements, while also reducing distribution costs, can limit firms’ pricing power by facilitating price discovery by customers. For example, the advent of online retail platforms has greatly increased price transparency among consumers as the share of people searching for information online has risen continuously in the euro area. The downward pressure on mark-ups and, hence, prices associated with the spread of e-commerce is consistent with an erosion of euro area firms’ profit margins, which did not return to their pre-crisis levels until late 2014. Empirical analysis does not, however, find robust evidence that mark-up shocks have been a particularly dominant determinant of disinflationary tendencies since the crisis. In any case, these forces are only temporary: they can move inflation away from its long-run trend, even for a protracted period of time, but cannot affect trend inflation itself, unless they infiltrate inflation expectations. It is through inflation expectations that shocks to the inflation formation process which would otherwise have no relevance for a central bank can become a monetary policy problem. This brings me to the third element in the Phillips curve – its intercept – which is determined by inflation expectations. Inflation expectations In normal conditions, longer-term inflation expectations should be unaffected by transitory shocks, which typically dissipate over the medium term. However, recurrent shocks leading to a protracted period of low inflation can be misinterpreted as a lasting decline in trend inflation, and could jeopardise public faith in the central bank’s commitment or ability to deliver on its objective.

With fiscal consolidation beginning next year when the economy firmly recovers, the scheme sets a limit of fiscal burden at approximately 60% of the GPD which is still quite a manageable limit. The environment is therefore becoming more optimistic, the business prospects are becoming bright, and one should now plan for growth. What then, ladies and gentlemen, are the issues that we should pay attention to when we plan for growth? Preparing for rapid growth For emerging markets like ours, I think we have to address issues both at macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the authority has to ensure that there is adequate infrastructure to handle high volume of transactions safely and efficiently. The need here covers not only that of the point of sale hardware and communication technology. The problem is that these things become obsolete quickly and one has to ensure that the domestic system in use is compatible with the international system, as well as the level of security required. But far more important is the financial and legal infrastructure. I will highlight a few, starting with First, the need to clearly define the rights and obligations of card issuers, card users and other parties involved in the transactions particularly in case of frauds. In Thailand, we have now drafted the Credit Card Act to set this framework but its enactment is still pending. Secondly, the need to set up a good credit information system to help card issuers in their risk management.
So what followed was an era of ultra-cheap credit globally – the Heineken era, in which credit reached the parts of society it previously had not reached. Levels of debt, in particular among households, rose pretty much exactly in line with levels of inequality. Rising credit meant expanding bank balance sheets. To maintain this expansion, banks began to manufacture new financial products, slicing and dicing loans to meet investor demand for high yield. The acronyms we have now come to know and loathe – the CDOs, the ABSs and the CDOs of ABSs – emerged to meet this demand. Manufacturing high-tech loans was a lucrative business. Returns to banking rose to their highest levels since the roaring ‘20s. Those designing and selling these new financial gadgets saw their salaries sky rocket. In 1980, an investment banker was paid roughly the same as a similarly-skilled professional in any other industry. By 2007, they were earning nearly four times as much.1 Those salary differences were particularly pronounced at the top of the pyramid. In 1989, the CEOs of the largest US banks earned 100 times the median US household income. That is quite a gap. Yet by 2007, that multiple had risen to 500.2 A similar gap emerged for UK and European bank CEOs. These widening discrepancies within banks compounded the widening discrepancies between banking and other industries. Banks, especially the top of banks, became first among unequals.

The main reason for the growing deficits of recent years is not the ageing of the population, but early retirement. The pension system deficit has been growing rapidly since 1992, when the minimum retirement age requirement was abolished. A new bill to correct this situation has already been approved by parliament. As regards privatization, public enterprises still play a central role in Turkey. We all know that a stronger privatization program would reduce the state’s involvement in commercial and industrial activities, and that this in turn would reduce the budgetary burden of subsidies and deepen the capital markets by encouraging wider ownership of shares. Since privatization has come to be seen as a key element of policies aimed at improving resource allocation, it will be essential to modernize Turkey’s legal and institutional framework for privatization and to bring it more in line with EU norms and the norms now prevailing in some of the region’s more successful transition economies. An adequate legal foundation will be the key element of such reforms. Important steps have recently been taken in this direction, and the constitution has been amended to reduce the legal obstacles obstructing the privatization process. And in order to attract foreign investors who could be interested in privatization, long awaited amendments to the constitution concerning international arbitration have also been approved by parliament. The agricultural sector is especially important in Turkey. It still contributes around 15% of GDP and accounts for about 42% of all employment.
Andrew Bailey: Taking our second chance to make MMFs more resilient Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, at the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 35th Annual General Meeting, 12 May 2021. * * *  Introduction Thank you for inviting me to speak today. I want to start by thanking ISDA for the important work you do, and in recent times particularly Scott O’Malia and his colleagues for working with central banks and regulators to manage the transition away from Libor. Your support on this complex transition has been hugely important. You may be relieved to hear that I am not going to talk about Libor today. I did speak on the subject yesterday, it’s on the Bank of England’s website if you are interested (Bailey, 2021). Instead, I am going to speak about another important part of our current work and a priority for the global Financial Stability Board (FSB), namely Money Market Funds (MMFs). The FSB analysed last March’s so-called “dash for cash” in their Holistic Review published at the end of last year, highlighting a number of vulnerabilities in non-bank finance and setting out some considerations for reforms required to tackle the issues we saw in that episode (FSB, 2020). MMFs were one of the issues at the top of that list. MMFs also played a role in amplifying the stress we saw during the Global Financial Crisis, so this is the second time they have proven not to be sufficiently resilient.

It is worth spending a moment on this point because it has an important parallel in the issues concerning money market funds. Banks are primarily funded by deposits, where the contract is understood to be to return the full value of the deposit plus whatever the interest rate is – usually “on demand” and without delay. Banks are held to high standards by regulators – including through liquidity and capital requirements, and regular stress tests – to ensure that they are well placed to be able to honour depositors’ demands. Central bank liquidity operations, resolution arrangements and deposit insurance further reinforce confidence in this promise to return the deposit. Thanks to the post financial crisis reforms, bank deposits are therefore cash or moneylike in most states of the world. At the other end of this spectrum are investment funds of many sorts. Most are not meant to be cash-like, in the sense that the promise is to return the fruits of the investment strategy, which may be more or less than the amount invested. Cash-like certainty of value is not part of the contract. If only it was that simple. There are at least two problems which are evident in how this system operates – or possibly two variants of the same problem. First, there are instruments which at least in some of their existing forms are neither one thing nor the other – neither properly cashlike nor properly investment-like. Second, there are instruments which are meant to be investment-like but which become regarded as cash-like.
Contributing factors to the current situation in repo market Let me now review some medium to long-term trends contributing to the current situation in the repo market, affecting both the supply and demand of collateral. It should first be noted that the repo market has seen a reduction in its role for funding, also due to the excess liquidity injected and the securities absorption implied by APP. On the supply side, the availability of high-quality collateral is inevitably pro-cyclical. From a pure economic view point, the financial crisis, its length, rising debt levels and rating downgrades to sovereigns reduced the amount of available assets that are considered ‘safe’, particularly for non-banks (although regulators treat all sovereigns as risk-free). This is most easily visible in the current clustering of GC collateral rates by country of issuer, which was largely absent prior to the crisis. On the demand side, the evolution of prudential regulation has affected the repo market. A number of features, which have in principle been known since the reform of Basel III in 2010, are still being phased in and directly affect banks’ participation in the repo markets, particularly the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). A third measure – the leverage ratio – is now subject to reporting requirements, but there is not as yet an agreed international regulatory standard. The LCR requires banks to hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to cover projected net cash outflows.

Given the higher relative penalty given to holding sovereign bonds under the leverage ratio as opposed to the capital ratio, it is expected to increase the cost of banks’ repo, and reduce incentives for money market arbitrage and market making.2 Reduced incentives for arbitrage and market making in turn affect market liquidity and can lead to greater periods of uncertainty. Furthermore, since European banks are required to report average month-end positions, there are increasing signs of market stress at month-end dates. The leverage ratio contains provisions for netting of offsetting cash positions when they are with the same counterparty and settled through the same system. This has resulted in a much greater use of central counterparties (CCPs). The use of CCPs has been strongly supported by authorities and brings benefits in terms of smooth market functioning, as well as for individual institutions. Eurosystem contacts report a wide difference in the pricing of trades cleared bilaterally and those cleared through CCPs – sometimes in the tens of basis points. CCPs, however, are also important for repo markets for a different reason. The increased volume of derivative trades centrally cleared at CCPs due to new regulations such as EMIR, as well as sporadic bouts of volatility, means that those institutions tend to hold significant quantities of cash. Placing that cash as unsecured deposits would represent wrong-way risk for CCPs as the collapse of a significant financial institution would create significant market volatility at the same time as potentially the loss of some of the unsecured deposits.
32  An expression equivalent to the IS curve above can then be used to define  the natural interest rate, 𝑟𝑡∗ , which is the interest rate that would prevail in the absence of any nominal rigidities: ∗ 𝑦𝑡∗ = 𝐸𝑡 𝑦𝑡+1 −  1 ∗ 𝑟 𝜎 𝑡  Using this, the IS curve can be re-written in output gap form, using the output gap definition 𝑥𝑡 ≡ 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗ and the definition of the natural interest rate to give:  (2)  1 𝜎  𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 𝑥𝑡+1 − [(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 ) − 𝑟𝑡∗ ]  31  In other words, the simple model here abstracts from all channels of monetary transmission other than the inter-temporal substitution channel. Of course, building in addition frictions and model features, like borrowing constraints and open economy features, can restore the roles of the other channels. 32 In particular, in the simple model, one can show that 𝑦𝑡∗ = 𝜓𝑎𝑡 , where 𝑎𝑡 is the log-level of TFP, assumed to follow an exogenous process. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  18  This says that the output gap is negatively related to the sequence of “real rate gaps” (𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 ) − 𝑟𝑡∗ delivered by monetary policy. For example, when monetary policy delivers real interest rates equal to the natural rate, so 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑡∗ , the output gap is zero at all times.

In other words, some trade-off between inflation and output has become possible and lambda has become relevant. As I mentioned earlier, the period of inflation targeting can be divided into pre- and post-crisis periods. During the Great Moderation, the economy’s supply capacity grew at a steady pace, and, for the most part, 15  In New Keynesian models, the slope of the Phillips Curve is related to the deep parameters governing the frequency with which firms are assumed to be able to re-optimise their prices, following the formalisation of Calvo (1983). See Calvo, G (1983), “Staggered prices in a utility-maximising framework”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  9  deviations of inflation from target reflected temporary disturbances to demand that were expected to drive output and inflation in the same direction (Chart 1). 16  Generally, monetary policy faced few trade-offs; divine  coincidence largely ruled. The crisis brought shocks both to demand and supply, higher inflation and large shortfalls in output and employment. The era of divine coincidence was over and the MPC had to balance a series of challenging trade-offs (Chart 2). What can be learned about lambda from this era? Taking these trade-offs at face value suggests a value of lambda of between 0.1 and 0.2 for the inflation targeting period as a whole, on the basis of data outturns 17  (Chart 6) and on the basis of MPC forecasts (Chart 7).