samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Figure 12 IPEC  IMCE  (diffusion index)  (diffusion index)  Trade Construction Manufacturing IMCE without mining  IPEC (1) 80 IPEC: inflation (2) IPEC: unemployment (3)  80  Political and economic uncertainty (Depuc) (4)  60 60  (index, 1 January 2012 = 100)  500 400 300  40  40  200  20  20  0  0 18  19  20  21  22  100 0 18  19  20  21  22  18  19  20  21  22  (1) A value above (below) 50 indicates optimism (pessimism). (2) Percent of respondents who believe that prices will increase "a lot" in the next 12 months. (3) A higher (lower) value indicates more (less) unemployment. (4) Moving 30-day average. As from December 2021, the index includes an update to the dictionary of words used for its construction, as a way of incorporating new elements that influence the local scenario. Sources: Gfk/Adimark, Icare/Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, and Central Bank of Chile based on Becerra and Sagner (2020).

16  Figure 13 MPR Corridor (*) (promedio trimestral, porcentaje)  24.II  24.I  23.IV  23.III  23.II  22.IV  23.I  12.0 11.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0  22.III  22.II  22.I  21.IV  21.II  21.I  21.III  Corredor Jun.22 FTS EES Mar.22 corridor MPR Forward MPR Jun.22 MP meeting  12.0 11.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0  (*) The corridor is constructed following the methodology in boxes V.1 of March 2020 MP Report and V.3 of March 2022 MP Report. It includes the May Economic Expectations Survey (EES) and the June Financial Traders Survey (FTS) previous to the MP meeting, plus the average smoothed forward curve for the quarter ended on 1 June. This is calculated by extracting the implicit MPR considering the forward curve over the overnight swap curve of up to 2 years, discounting the fixed rates of each maturity to the simple accrual of the overnight index swap (OIS). For the current quarter, the surveys and the forward curve consider the average of daily effective data and are completed with the respective sources  Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Bond yields reversed their movements from the early part of the pandemic, with 10 year US treasury yields rising by 65 bps in this period and 10 year gilt yields moving 64 bps higher. Bid-offer spreads on US treasuries widened by a factor of 10. The gold price fell by 12%. Investors suddenly looked to redeem from money market funds (MMFs). Sterling MMFs saw outflows of 11% in just over a week. Similar outflows were seen in the US prime MMFs. This self-reinforcing dynamic was broken by massive central bank intervention. On 19 March, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) announced the stock of asset purchases would increase by £ of gilts. We also launched special repo operations (the Contingent Term Repo Facility), a 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  credit scheme (the Covid Corporate Financing Facility), extended term credit to banks (the Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs) and joined other major central banks in activating the swaplines. In the US, amongst other actions, the Federal Reserve announced a $ asset purchase program, quintupled its repo operations (from $ to $ and established a temporary repo facility for international authorities with a view to support treasury market functioning. In Europe, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme was put in place to purchases eligible assets up to € As a result, order returned to financial markets and subsequently the growing realisation that governments would step in to limit economic damage further restored confidence. What lesson should we learn from that episode?

Much of the Basel Committee’s work on big “ideas” that respond to the shortcomings in the regulatory framework identified by the financial crisis is reaching the end stage. The capital rules are set (and, in an increasing number of jurisdictions, coming into force), and the revisions to the LCR have recently been agreed. In 2013, we will seek to set out the specification of the backstop leverage ratio, and the NSFR will be refined between now and the end of 2014. Clearly, we still have work to do, but increasingly it is about getting the technical details correct rather than new far-reaching ideas. Even when the Committee’s policy response to the crisis is complete, much more work will still be needed. Implementation needs to be seen as an integral part of the reform agenda, not a sideline activity. As we examine this issue to a depth that it has not previously been examined, we will inevitably find things that need improvement. Turning a blind eye to these, as may have occurred in the past, is not an option – we need to persevere and find those areas where additional modifications to the regulatory framework are needed to ensure it is effective. If we do not work to improve implementation, we will not embed the reforms into domestic banking systems in the full, timely and consistent manner that is in everyone’s interests. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
The prospects of Hong Kong rest on whether we can ride on this trend, developing and introducing the right products and modern services for the Mainland market; whether we can attract more Mainland companies to use Hong Kong as the springboard to go global, and anchoring in Hong Kong their operating and treasury centres for overseas expansion. 13. I have always been optimistic about Hong Kong’s future. Yet my optimism rests on the very presumption that Hong Kong people would continue to make the right choice for our future. Indeed it is our choice: what’s the way forward? Where will it lead us? We could well choose to indulge in past success and languish in self-pity, fretting that our monopoly access to the Mainland market would chip away as reform and liberalisation continues to take hold. We could choose to squander our time and opportunities resting on our laurels. Alternatively, we can choose to maintain a healthy and positive interactive relationship with the Mainland on the basis of “One Country, Two Systems”. We can cherish the hard-earned success made possible by the concerted efforts of generations of Hong Kong people and pass on our “cando” spirit. We can also capitalise on our strategic position to leveraging the Mainland while engaging the world. I trust and remain hopeful that we would make the right choice that promotes Hong Kong’s prosperity, maintains our stability and leads us to a bright future. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

There is a tendency to try to re-invent the wheel and overlook past experience, but by taking a step back and learning from one another, we can have a much greater positive impact in our communities. Roadshow Workforce Experience Sustainable economic growth and thus broad-based prosperity is dependent on a healthy job market, one in which employers can find the skills they need and workers find jobs that allow them to grow and move up the economic ladder. The challenge is developing a system that encompasses both and is accessible to all those seeking a job. Our workforce development initiative aims to promote dialogue and a greater understanding of promising policies and programs that allow workers, especially those in low and moderate-income communities, to develop in-demand skills and connect them with employers. We can achieve this by connecting with workforce stakeholders through policy forums, roundtable discussion sessions, and examining areas through our research and outreach. One of the best aspects of my job is the opportunity to visit communities across our Second District. The skills gap and the uneven economic recovery among different communities are consistent themes I hear, not just in the Second District but also in my previous job on the West Coast. I also have heard about a variety of policies and programs that seem to be making an impact and could have broader potential that are worth sharing.
In doing so, I shall reference the popular initiative “Save our Swiss gold” (also known as the “gold initiative”), on which the Swiss electorate will be voting on 30 November. After I have spoken to you, Sébastien Kraenzlin will outline some of the latest money market developments. The SNB’s currency reserves – an overview The SNB’s currency reserves currently stand at more than CHF 500 billion – 80% of gross domestic product (Switzerland’s annual economic output). With a share of some CHF 460 billion, foreign exchange makes up around 90% of our currency reserves. Since autumn 2012, the size of the SNB’s currency reserves has principally been determined by financial market valuations and by interest and dividend income. Given how large our portfolio of currency reserves is, fluctuations in value have a much greater impact today than they did in the past, as has once again become clear this year. The SNB reported a profit of CHF 28.5 billion for the first three quarters of this year. I should emphasise at this stage that our investment policy is always subordinated to monetary policy; it can only be understood in this context. Since September 2011, our monetary policy has been dominated by the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 against the euro. With interest rates close to zero, the minimum exchange rate is the key instrument we are deploying to avoid an undesirable tightening of monetary conditions. The SNB will continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination.

As I already said, we have the whole day to discuss these tricky issues thanks to our speakers who are not only prominent but also open and humble; I noticed and appreciated these qualities in their recent speeches exploring the new territory we are in. Instead, let me conclude on the limits of the scope for action by CBs. Indeed, I prefer to stress that central banks cannot be the only game in town and, more precisely, that monetary and macro-prudential policies are not conducted in a vacuum. Structural problems require structural answers; in particular, only structural reforms can raise potential growth; aggregate demand policies cannot provide a substitute. What they can do –and it’s precious— is to help better manage time. Speaking of managing time, I think mine is up now and I shall give the floor to Christian who can give us all the benefit of his experience and wisdom. Short bibliography: R. Baldwin, C. Teulings, 2014: Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures, CEPR Press; in particular, Chapter 8 by O. Blanchard et al., Chapter 9 by R. Caballero and E. Farhi, Chapter 11 by R. Koo. BIS Annual Report, 2014: “Debt and Financial Cycle” (Chapter IV). O. Blanchard, E. Cerutti and L. Summers, 2015:“Inflation and Activity – Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications”, IMF Working Paper No 15/230.
At a conceptual level, three arguments could be used to justify such a multi-pronged approach. First, banks are subject to multiple sources of risk or balance sheet fault-line. Historical experience suggests they fail for a variety of different reasons. To misquote Tolstoy, while sound banks tend all to be alike, unsound banks tend to be unsound in their own way. At least in principle, this could point to the need for 17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  different types of regulatory constraint to counter different balance sheet fault-lines: one instrument for each market failure. This is, if you like, the Tinbergen Rule as it applies to financial regulation (Tinbergen (1952)). Second, uncertainty as well as risk is pervasive in the financial system. These Knightian (1921) uncertainties have multiple sources - measurement of the risks banks face, how contagion propagates across the financial system and how regulatory actions affects behaviour, to name but three. A portfolio of regulatory tools can be seen as a means of offering insurance against these uncertainties. This is, if you like, the Brainard Rule as it applies to financial regulation (Brainard (1967)). Third, any individual regulatory constraint creates incentives for banks to respond in ways which may seek to avoid or arbitrage the rules. In the next section, we discuss how having multiple regulatory constraints might mitigate this risk. In this section, we discuss the conceptual case for multiple regulatory constraints before presenting some new empirical evidence. Table 2 summarises some of the key arguments.

In closing, given the limited amount of time today, I could only briefly touch on two key themes in the broader opening up of China's capital markets. At the HKMA, we are continuously working with Mainland authorities and the industry towards new policy breakthroughs to better serve global investors and support the development of onshore markets. I warmly welcome your views and ideas on ways to further strengthen the connectivity between China's and Hong Kong's financial markets. Thank you, and I wish today's conference a great success. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Finally, the aforementioned improvements in EMEs are likely to constrain the deterioration in business and consumer expectations. This is also a crucial development as the lessons learned from the past financial turmoils and crises revealed that the most distinguishing feature of an emerging market economy is the significant adverse effects on the real economy through the expectations channel. Among many advances in EMEs, rich policy frameworks have played an important role in improving economic agents’ confidence in EMEs. In addition, EMEs ability and policy conduct to accumulate policy spaces have made significant contributions to solidifying gains in confidence. It is worth noting that in addition to conventional macroeconomic policies EMEs have also extensively used macro- and micro-prudential policies, serving as buffers for shocks (Figure 8). Since the EM financial crises EMEs have continued to use a number of macro-prudential measures when conventional policies, such as rate hikes to manage aggregate demand, were realized to be ineffective and/or insufficient. Such macro-prudential tools have not only maintained low levels of leverage but also accumulated buffers that can serve as policy spaces in cases of economic downturn. Additionally, macro-prudential policy helped monetary authorities implement monetary policy exclusively to achieve price stability. Finally, EMEs learned macro-prudential policy is more appropriate to limit and repair maturity and currency mismatch problems. In addition to the macro-prudential policy, EMEs implemented rigorously micro-prudential policies rigorously in order to make their financial firms, especially banks, more resilient and safer against financial stresses.

François Villeroy de Galhau: France and Germany facing European challenges in the crisis Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Bundesbank conference “Banking and Payments in the digital world”, Berlin, 11 September 2020. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen,  1. To this day, the coexistence and complementarity of central bank and commercial bank money as settlement assets has structured the payment landscape and preserved the stability of the monetary system. Yet this structure is increasingly being questioned. • Our payment landscape is based on the coexistence and complementarities of central bank money and commercial bank money as settlement assets. Their respective roles are clearly assigned: central bank money ensures the stability of the financial system while the multiplicity of issuers of commercial bank money preserves competition and innovation in the provision of financial services. Their interplay and their interchangeability at par value ensures the safety and efficiency of the financial system. • However, the balance between these two forms of money cannot be fixed once for all, as it depends on changes in payment habits, the evolution of the financial ecosystem and the emergence of new technologies. • In the retail space, the digitalisation of the economy and the development of cheap, highly effective digital payment solutions displaying innovative features (e.g.
The Governing Council today also decided on the modalities for reducing the Eurosystem's holdings of securities under the asset purchase programme (APP). As communicated in December, the APP portfolio will decline by € billion per month on average from the beginning of March until the end of June 2023, and the subsequent pace of portfolio reduction will be determined over time. Partial reinvestments will be conducted broadly in line with current practice. In particular, the remaining reinvestment amounts will be allocated proportionally to the share of redemptions across each constituent programme of the APP and, under the public sector purchase programme (PSPP), to the share of redemptions of each jurisdiction and across national and supranational issuers. For our corporate bond purchases, the remaining reinvestments will be tilted more strongly towards issuers with a better climate performance. Without prejudice to our price stability objective, this approach will support the gradual decarbonisation of the Eurosystem's corporate bond holdings, in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. The decisions taken today are set out in a press release available on our website. The detailed modalities for reducing the APP holdings are described in a separate press release to be published at 15:45 CET. I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions.

Risk assessment The risks to the outlook for economic growth have become more balanced. Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine and its people continues to be a significant downside risk to the economy and could again push up the costs of energy and food. There could also be an additional drag on euro area growth if the world economy weakened more sharply than we expect. Moreover, the recovery would face obstacles if the pandemic were to re-intensify and cause renewed supply disruptions. However, the energy shock could fade away faster than anticipated and euro area companies could adapt more quickly to the challenging international environment. This would support higher growth than currently expected. The risks to the inflation outlook have also become more balanced, especially in the near term. On the upside, existing pipeline pressures could still send retail prices higher in the near term. Moreover, a stronger than expected economic rebound in China could give a fresh boost to commodity prices and foreign demand. Domestic factors such as a persistent rise in inflation expectations above our target or higher than anticipated wage rises could drive inflation higher, also over the medium term. On the downside, the recent fall in energy prices, if it persists, may slow inflation more rapidly than expected. This downward pressure in the energy component could then also translate into weaker dynamics for underlying inflation. A further weakening of demand would also contribute to lower price pressures than currently anticipated, especially over the medium term.
Still, this is an important risk for inflation, particularly because of the potential propagation effects it might cause, and it calls for close monitoring and follow-up. The CPI will end this year with a variation of 2.8% (table 3). Going forward, the absorption of output gaps and increased food prices suggest that annual inflation will stay near the target until the end of the projection horizon, this time the fourth quarter of 2012. The path of normalization of the CPIX and the CPIX1 will be slower. They are forecast to converge to the target only towards the end of next year, to stay there for the remaining part of the projection horizon. Market inflation expectations, in line with this scenario, remain at 3% in the medium term. However, for the near future reduced inflation figures are foreseen (figure 9). In addition to the already mentioned assumptions about output gaps and higher prices of foods and commodities, imported inflationary pressures are assumed to be well contained. Also, nominal wages are expected to be adjusted in accordance with the economy’s stage of the business cycle and inflation dynamics. As I said last Tuesday in my visit to the full Senate, the Chilean peso has been gaining value against the dollar since our latest IPoM, although not as strongly as it did between June and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  September.

On the one hand, the recovery of developed economies goes on, but only moderately and insufficiently to reduce the high rates of unemployment (figure 1). Risks are substantial. In fact, the intensity and velocity of the events we saw in Europe in early November are proof of the fragility of the world economy. On the other hand, growth prospects in emerging markets are still positive; commodity prices are still high, with copper standing out recently at record highs, and external financing conditions are good. The sustainability of this imbalanced scenario for the global economy is one of the primary risk factors for next year. Some of the questions we must try to answer and monitor closely are: How fast can emerging economies grow if the advanced economies are further weakened? How can advanced economies grow without incurring in unsustainable current-account deficits? How will the financial tensions in Europe be resolved? Is it possible for expenditure in Chile to grow excessively while ignoring the risks coming from abroad? In this context, the Board has continued to gradually normalize the monetary policy interest rate (MPR), setting it at 3.25% in its December meeting. In the most likely scenario, it will continue to gradually withdraw the monetary stimulus, which will depend on the unfolding of internal and external macroeconomic conditions. Let me now take a closer look at the scenario we believe is the most likely for the next two years and its implications for inflation and monetary policy. Macroeconomic scenario I will begin with the world economy.