samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The other polar view is that a more stringent regulation will not have any negative impact on growth because it would essentially reduce the frequency of crisis, hence improving the long term performance of the economy. Both views are well-informed and of interest. They come from fairly different constituencies and have very different underpinnings. Having studied carefully all the arguments made during the last months, let me give you my personal sense, at this stage, on the good regulatory equilibrium. First, some consequences of the new regulations are difficult to predict and should be carefully observed. Quantifying precisely the effect of the reforms on the economy is not an easy task. The phasing-in period of Basel 3 has been specifically designed to be consistent with the economic recovery and, more generally, to minimize potential adverse consequences on banks and the macro-economy. Second, we all know also that any regulation may have unintended consequences. One of those, of course, is to create incentives for regulatory arbitrage. It is therefore crucial that the reforms be applied fully and consistently across jurisdictions. It is also important to make sure that a significant part of financial intermediation does not shift to the unregulated (shadow) financing sector, as this would not help reduce the likelihood of disruptive financial crises. Finally, increasing robustness is a necessary but not sufficient condition to get safer financial systems. Another important element is to ensure that risk remains at acceptable levels and carefully managed.

Christian Noyer: The G20’s current challenges – combining new regulations and economic growth Introductory remarks by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Paris EUROPLACE Conference “The G20’s current challenges: combining new regulations and economic growth”, Paris, 5–6 July 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great pleasure to take part in this Paris-Europlace conference and I warmly thank the organizers for their kind invitation. I am very glad to introduce this roundtable dedicated to a major challenge, regulators and policy makers are facing at the current juncture, that is ensuring a smooth combination between new regulations and economic growth. The crisis has taught us that market economies may be intrinsically unstable. And the costs of this instability are considerable. Whether we look at unemployment, or public debts, it will take many years to deal with the legacy of those few months where the global financial system was on the verge of collapse. Long term consequences still need to be assessed, and, as you know, there are questions about whether the crisis has – or not – permanently affected the growth potential of advanced economies. Therefore, curbing the tendency of our economies to alternate phases of booms and busts and reducing the procyclicality of our financial systems, are legitimate public policy priorities.
Impact de la non compensation (netting) des opérations sur les dérivés sur le total bilan et les leviers des banques US  Augmentation du total bilan si non compensation des opérations sur dérivés (hors repos)  Impact du netting sur les ratios de levier des banques  Source : Risk.net (d’après Credit Suisse et Fitch)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Svein Gjedrem: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 23 May 2005. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The statement is based, among other things, on Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2004, Inflation Report 1/2005 and the assessments published after the monetary policy meeting of the Executive Board on 20 April. *  *  *  I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Storting for again inviting me to appear before this Committee on behalf of Norges Bank in order to report and answer questions on monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s Credit Report. The introductory statement is based on the Bank’s Annual Report, but is also updated based on the Executive Board’s assessments for the period to the preceding monetary policy meeting. Flexible inflation targeting Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards low and stable inflation. This is the most important contribution monetary policy can make to sound economic developments in the long term. The inflation target provides enterprises and households with an anchor for future inflation expectations. When there is confidence in the inflation target, monetary policy can contribute to stabilising developments in output and employment.
Apart from the fact that this would reduce the risk of a new international crisis, it would mean that a larger part of global demand would come from those countries that currently have a surplus, for example China, and a smaller part from the United States. It is difficult to know, however, what impact this would have on the demand for Swedish export goods. To the extent that Chinese households and companies demand different types of goods than households and companies in the United States, this largely depends on whether Swedish companies are flexible enough to adapt their production to meet changes in the pattern of demand. The Asian countries that have surpluses are a long way from Sweden and geo-graphical distance is a factor that has a clear negative link to the propensity of countries to trade with each other. 26 However, there are countries with substantial surpluses that are close to Sweden, for example Germany. It is therefore not obvious what the overall impact would be on the demand for Swedish exports if there was a general reduction in current account surpluses and deficits. It is also conceivable that the United States would import more investment goods if its current account deficit decreased, as this would probably entail an expansion of the export-oriented industrial sector at the expense of the more domestically-oriented service sector. This in turn would entail an increased demand for the type of industrial goods that Sweden exports quite a lot of.

The effective exchange rate index measures how the currency relates to a basket of other currencies that are weighted in terms of their relative importance to trade. The real index is also adjusted for relative differences in the CPI. A downward movement in the figure entails a strengthening of the exchange rate. Source: Reuters EcoWin  This put some emerging economies with a floating exchange rate in an awkward position as they did not want to lose too much competitiveness in relation to China while at the same time large capital inflows tended to strengthen their exchange rates. The G20 has now agreed that in certain situations it may be justified to introduce temporary capital regulations to protect against volatile capital flows. The view is that in normal cases a country should use monetary or fiscal policy, or tools for macro prudential supervision, but that in exceptional cases it may be appropriate to introduce measures to control capital. Work is underway to set up common guidelines. 15 Why does Sweden have such a large current account surplus? Prior to the crisis of the 1990s, it was usual for Sweden to have current account deficits for long periods of time (see Figure 4). After the crisis the krona weakened substantially at the same time as the deficit became a surplus. Since then, Sweden has not only had a surplus, it has had a very substantial and, to a certain extent, a growing surplus.
In the same period, we have reduced cheque usage by more than 40% to 119 million cheques. We have almost doubled the number of point-of-sale (POS) terminals to over 407,000 units. Debit card transactions have also increased by more than six times to 162 million transactions in 2017. All these are achievements that we should be proud of as a collective industry. The progress that we have achieved so far is only possible with the collective contribution of all in the industry. This annual award ceremony recognises the achievements of those who have contributed to the progress, modernisation and enhancement of our payment systems. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  While we celebrate our achievements, we need to forge ahead with greater vigour and perseverance, especially to displace cash. Cash remains prevalent in most retail transactions in Malaysia. Managing cash is expensive. This is most evident among lower tier merchants, who continue to prefer transacting in cash. It is more costly to use cash, as you know, and much cheaper, efficient and secure to adopt e-payments. It is a cost effective solution that makes business sense. Based on a study by the Royal Bank of Scotland and Natwest in 2014, a customer who uses mobile and online banking instead of going to a physical bank branch stands to enjoy about 24 hours of time saved and about 10 kilometers of travelling distance saved per year.

The Bank more than welcomes a more competitive payment landscape. We desire new entrees. We are not in the business of protecting the incumbents. We also do not pick winners and losers. The market will decide those who will prosper. Existing players were given this notice long time ago. Banks especially, will have to reinvent themselves or risk being disrupted. What matters most, from the public policy perspective, is that Malaysian businesses and consumers will benefit from a more vibrant, competitive and efficient ecosystem. We should expect 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  enhanced competition to spur innovation in the products and services that are being offered. Globally, we have seen collaborative strategies emerging as a response to the changing market dynamics. From Scandinavia to Asia, banks in some countries are increasingly competing on a united front. This includes industry partnerships with the payment system operator and fintech firms. In these markets, collaboration on common mobile applications seeks to enable banks to develop more innovative use cases by leveraging on pooled R&D resources, and facilitate mass adoption through common awareness and promotion campaigns. Collaborative efforts enable greater economies of scale through the pooling of resources. Establishing a common platform among banks defrays the cost of testing out new technologies and new ways of doing business. This can go a long way in fostering a culture of experimentation. Collaborative strategies will enhance the probability of success. This is the essence of the merger between MEPS and MyClear. Maintaining the status quo is simply not an option.
Denis Beau: Opportunities and challenges of the tokenisation of finance Introductory statement by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the European and American Chamber of Commerce event, New York City, 17 January 2023. *** Digitalisation is far from being new in the financial sector, but tokenisation based on DLTs may be a new turn. In my initial remarks I would like to explain why, at the Banque de France and the ACPR, from the standpoint of our financial stability mandate, we have a strong interest in the development of tokenised finance, and how it impacts the policy tools we use to fulfil our mandate. I/ The tokenisation of finance is of prime interest for two main reasons: 1/ It is part of the significant transformation drivers of our financial landscape Indeed, digital technologies are profoundly transforming finance, ushering in a wave of new players at the crossroads of IT and finance, digital assets in new, tokenised form-usually referred to as crypto-assets, for investment and settlement, and new exchange and settlement infrastructures. Their combination is translating in activities and services that first swept into the payment sector and are now spreading more broadly. Among them, so-called decentralised finance, DeFi, is emerging as a crypto-based alternative to traditional finance where the provision of services is disintermediated and their governance decentralised, and is enabled notably by permissionless blockchains, smart contracts and decentralised applications (Dapps).

The new European DLT pilot regime, which will come into force in March this year, will allow us to continue our experiments within the boundaries of a simplified regulatory framework. At the same time, the Banque de France is contributing to the reflection on the possibility of a retail CBDC: this is currently what Eurosystem central banks have embarked on, under the ECB aegis, with the ongoing investigation phase for a digital euro. The evolution of the payment landscape leads us to reflect on the ways in which citizens can have access to central bank money, also in the digital world. Let me conclude in saying that tokenization can be a blessing or a curse for the functioning of the financial system. It is my belief that we can collectively make the best of it if we ensure its expansion within a framework of confidence in which good regulation has an important role to play. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
The potential costs of the support measures taken – capital injection, asset purchases, and guarantees of bank debt – in the G7 countries together with Australia, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland amount to about twenty per cent of GDP in these economies. 1 Moreover, the consequences of the crisis in terms of job, output and wealth losses, unprecedented increases in public spending and declines in public revenues are enormous. In the end, the citizens of the individual countries involved will have to foot the bill, one way or another. Arguably the most important intangible cost, however, is the fact that governments had to issue an explicit guarantee for systemically relevant institutions, in effect executing a partial government take over of the financial system. 2 Going forward, the world of finance will not be the same anymore. It should therefore come as no surprise that at the national and international level intensive efforts are underway to increase the resilience of the financial system. In recent months, these international reform efforts have included the presentation of many reports and recommendations. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has published two comprehensive sets of recommendations to improve financial regulation. 3 Both have been endorsed by the G20 leaders. The public sector has not been alone in issuing  1  The outlays totalled eight per cent of GDP. These figures relate to government support measures introduced between September 2008 and June 2009. Source: “An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes”, BIS paper No 48, July 2009.

Dimitar Bogov: Challenges of countries from South-Eastern Europe in the current economic and financial turbulence in the euro area Opening speech by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the NBRM conference on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the monetary independence of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 27 April 2012. *  *  *  Dear Deputy Prime Minister, dear ministers, distinguished Governors, Your Excellences, dear guests, colleagues and friends It is an honor to greet you and wish you welcome to this conference, which is a part of the activities for marking the 20th anniversary of the monetary independence of the Republic of Macedonia. The last two decades of monetary independence, the Republic of Macedonia has faced, and in our opinion, successfully addressed many challenges. Our twentieth anniversary takes place in exceptionally turbulent developments of global economy, particularly marked by events triggered by the euro area debt crisis. This means that as the other central banks from the region, we face a new challenge. Taking into account the timing of the conference, its topic came quite spontaneously, and therefore we consider that it will raise interesting discussion of current issues of the central banks of the South-Eastern Europe and beyond.
Moving the role of ‘Chief Economist’ towards the director of the ‘Economic Department’, and letting him be more independent of any particular body member (making him responsible to the decision-making body as a whole), can help to solve this problem of information filtering. Openness is a consequence of ‘staff independence’. Allowing staff to be more independent at the same time requires the decision-making body members to take an active approach towards the analysis produced by the staff. Since a perfect understanding of the message contained in the ‘policy documents’ is a prerequisite for proper policy conduct, interaction between the decision-making body members and the staff should be assured at different levels. And finally, a need to deal with uncertainty properly arises as a consequence of the uncertainty surrounding monetary policy practice. Therefore, it is highly desirable to discuss the implied risks at different levels: (i)  First, the risks should be discussed by the staff. (ii)  Second, an evaluation of the risks should be performed interactively by the decision-making body members and the staff (alternative scenarios can be produced on the basis of these discussions). (iii)  Third, the risk and the alternative scenarios should be discussed by the decision-making body members during the policy meeting. It is clear that all the above-mentioned properties can be satisfied when either a Bank Board or a Policy Committee are making the decisions. Over the years it has been proven that both systems can work well.

Zdeněk Tůma: Monetary policy governance - comments on the institutional set-up of inflation targeting in Albania Speech by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Bank of Albania Open Forum on "Preconditions for launching inflation targeting in Albania", Tirana, 1-2 December 2005. *  *  *  Monetary policy is without any doubt one of the most powerful tools for macroeconomic management. While the theoretical background for target-setting is well established, the task of making practical arrangements for conducting policy in order to achieve targets in an efficient way is certainly a very difficult one. Designing a well-functioning system for decision making is thus at the very top of the agenda for any central bank striving to establish a sound monetary policy framework. It is therefore highly commendable that the Bank of Albania is addressing the related issues well in advance. Today, I would like to make several comments on the issues where I feel the Czech National Bank can pass on some observations and know-how based on its almost eight-year experience with decision making under an inflation targeting regime. The discussion about the proposed institutional set-up in Albania provokes a more general debate about the properties of the ‘ideal’ monetary policy decision-making system. Such a discussion of this general issue could reveal some practical implications for the Bank of Albania.
William C Dudley: More lessons from the crisis Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Center for Economic Policy Studies (CEPS) Symposium, Princeton, New Jersey, 13 November 2009. *  *  *  Thank you for having me here to speak today. It is a real pleasure to have this opportunity to speak at CEPS again – this is a great forum to talk about policy issues. Tonight I want to discuss some of the challenges we face in making our financial system more robust. We have learned a great deal over the past two years about our financial system and its vulnerabilities. The task ahead is to put these lessons to good use. Our goal must be to make the financial system more resilient to shocks. If we can do that successfully, we should be able to reduce the risk of financial crises. In assessing the causes of this crisis, one clear culprit was the failure of regulators and market participants alike to fully appreciate the strength of the amplifying mechanisms that were built into our financial system. These mechanics exacerbated the boom on the way up and the bust on the way down. Only by better understanding the sources of these damaging dynamics can we construct solutions that will strengthen our financial system and make it more robust. Today, I am going to focus mainly on the extraordinary liquidity events that played out during this crisis.

For example, the Federal Reserve introduced the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to reduce rollover risk in the commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve and other central banks’ massively expanded the ability of banks to obtain dollar funding through the TAF and associated foreign exchange swap programs; the Treasury guaranteed money market mutual fund assets; and the FDIC increased deposit insurance limits and set up the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLPG) to backstop bank and bank holding company debt issuance. Having described “what” happened on the liquidity front during the crisis, I next want to examine, in a bit more detail, “why” it happened. To do this, I will lay out a simple conceptual framework that I will then use to assess what can be done to mitigate the risk of such runs occurring in the future. As a starting point, I will talk about how unsecured lenders react in a crisis, and then I will consider the behavior of secured lenders. Unsecured liquidity providers run for two basic reasons. First, they run because there is a risk that the company they are lending funds to is insolvent. In other words, there is a risk that the assets will be worth less than the liabilities, creating the potential for loss to the creditor. The second reason that unsecured creditors run is the risk that they will not be repaid in a timely way.
News conference  15 December 2022, 10.00 am  Introductory remarks by Andréa M. Maechler In my remarks, I will talk in more detail about the implementation of today’s monetary policy decision, which Thomas Jordan has already touched on. I will start, however, by giving you an overview of how we have steered interest rates since the switch to a positive SNB policy rate in September. The switch from a negative to a positive SNB policy rate required us to make an adjustment to the implementation of our monetary policy in the money market. The new approach comprises two elements: reserve tiering – that is, tiered remuneration of the sight deposits that banks and other financial market participants hold at the SNB – and reserve absorption. This approach has proved successful. Following our monetary policy decision on 22 September, secured short-term Swiss franc money market rates moved quickly towards the new SNB policy rate (cf. chart 1). We are also continuing to see solid activity among participants in the money market, which ensures a robust basis for the calculation of SARON. From the outset, the market responded favourably to the deployment of our monetary policy instruments to absorb liquidity. On the very day of the monetary policy assessment in September, we started conducting repo transactions on a daily basis and issuing SNB bills on a weekly basis (cf. chart 2). In this way, we were able to reduce the liquidity supply in the money market sufficiently to allow us to steer interest rates effectively.

Let’s hope that trends that now appear to be leading us in the wrong direction can change course. Thank you for your attention. 1 Based on GDP at market rates. 2 Nordhaus, W. D. (2018): Speech delivered at the Nobel Banquet in Stockholm, 10 December 2018. 3 Blomgren, A. et al (2015) “Industribyggerne 2015” . IRIS Report 2015/031 (Norwegian only). 4 World Bank “Ease of doing business index”. data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ  6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches