samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If productivity picks up strongly as the recovery gathers pace - as the more optimistic reading of the evidence would imply – this means that we are likely to have a relatively prolonged  policy is not being set with particular reference to the unemployment rate; rather the threshold simply provides a convenient point at which to reassess the stance of policy. Monetary policy continues to be set on the basis of a wide range of variables affecting the outlook for growth and inflation. 3  See, for example, Miles (2012 and 2013) and McCafferty (2103). 4  See, for example, Broadbent (2011, 2012, 2013). 5  My fellow MPC member Paul Tucker recently referred to this as a “probing strategy” (Tucker 2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  period of strong growth, and a relatively prolonged period of low interest rates, before unemployment reaches the 7% threshold. But if, even as the recovery gathers pace, productivity growth remains relatively muted, unemployment will likely fall more quickly and the Committee will need to raise rates sooner. A threshold defined in terms of the unemployment rate is particularly well suited to dealing with this uncertainty. As demand picks up, those companies that can use their existing workforces more intensely or can shift employees to more productive activities are likely to do so before hiring additional staff. This suggests that to the extent that productivity picks up in response to increasing demand it should largely do so before unemployment falls materially.

In Chairman Clayton’s view, “tokens and offerings that incorporate features and marketing efforts that emphasize the potential for profits based on the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others continue to contain the hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.”22 In 2018, SEC staff published guidance to clarify that exchanges, investment vehicles, investment advisers, and dealers doing business in digital currencies that are digital asset securities would be subjected to securities laws.23 The guidance makes clear that digital currencies that function as securities will be subject to U.S. securities law, but where we draw this line may not always be clear. Products that blur the boundaries between money and securities are not new. Take, for instance, certificates of deposit. In 1982, the United States Supreme Court analyzed whether a certificate of deposit was a security for purposes of certain U.S. anti-fraud laws. The Court concluded that it was not. In doing so, the Court recognized that the most important distinction between a certificate of deposit issued by a bank—money—and other long-term debt was the comprehensive regulation of the banking system. 24 The Court’s conclusion was a sensible one more than a century after the “wildcat” banking era: Lawmakers could not  have intended to treat money in the banking system like it was something else because there was no need to do so. At least for now, the case does not appear to be as strong for digital currencies.
But just as changing from Fahrenheit to Centigrade has not proved easy for those who had become used to the old measure, so it will take time for us all to adjust to the new inflation measure. Unfortunately, there is an additional complication. Unlike the translation between Fahrenheit and Centigrade, the difference between RPIX and CPI inflation does vary with the economic temperature. That is because the “formula” effect is not the only difference between the two measures. RPIX includes both house prices and Council Tax. Those items are omitted from the basket of goods and services used to construct the CPI. So when house prices are rising faster than prices in general, as has been the case in recent years, RPIX exceeds CPI inflation by more than the half a percentage point represented by the “formula” effect. Over the past 15 years, when data have been collected on both measures, RPIX has exceeded CPI inflation by about three quarters of a percentage point. It is possible to argue, therefore, that moving from a target of 2.5% for RPIX inflation to one of 2% for CPI inflation represents a small increase in the long-run effective target. But no reasonable person could describe a symmetric target of 2% as inconsistent with price stability, defined as a state of affairs in which inflation does not materially affect economic decisions by families and businesses.

Rich countries can and will adjust more smoothly to these challenges, but it will be the poor in the developing world who are going to have to bear the heaviest burden. Naturally, changes in energy production and consumption as well as in energy markets structure have a special contribution to global action for coping with climate change. Second, surging energy demand worldwide makes us see the issues of energy security from a new perspective. A frantic search for energy sources by Asia's emerging economies, and the increasing concentration of production in the hands of sometimes unpredictable regimes, has deep ramifications for energy security in the advanced world, including and most notably in the European Union. Here, a forceful united approach is called for, based on integrated and well-functioning markets and European solidarity. Third, high and volatile energy prices constitute a challenge for macroeconomic management. Energy price developments have pushed up inflation in the advanced world with adverse effect on private demand and growth. On the other hand, windfall due to high energy prices poses challenges to fiscal, monetary and exchange rate management in the countries exporting energy. I am happy that the excellent list of speakers allows us to touch upon all these key challenges today. Ladies and gentlemen, before giving the floor to Mr. David Kotok from the Global Interdependence Center, the co-organizer of today's event, I would like to speak briefly about our cooperation with the Global Interdependence Center.
According to the Bank’s forecast, the near-term outlook is positive. GDP growth is projected to measure just under 3% this year and then rise to about 3½% in 2015 before tapering off again to 3% in 2016. This level of growth is expected to exceed that of potential output with the effect that a positive output gap might emerge, particularly in 2015. Other things being equal, this will contribute to higher inflation. GDP growth in 2014–2016 will be driven by domestic demand, both private consumption and investment, and the contribution from net trade will be negative for the entire period. As a consequence, the sizeable current account surplus we have seen in the recent term will shrink rapidly next year and give way to a small deficit in 2016. This is cause for concern in and of itself, and we hope that the forecast will not materialise, as Iceland needs to maintain a current account surplus in the next several years as it focuses on putting its external debt onto a stronger footing and building up domestically financed foreign reserves. Economic policy and economic incentives would then have to take into account the task of of improving the outlook for the current account balance. Inflation has been below the inflation target for nine consecutive months. This is the secondlongest such period since the inflation target was adopted in March 2001, the longest being a twelve-month period from November 2002 through October 2003.

Már Guðmundsson: Economic outlook, monetary policy, and credit ratings Speech by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the Chamber of Commerce Monetary Policy Meeting, Reykjavik, 6 November 2014. *  *  *  Madame Chairman, honoured guests, The Iceland Chamber of Commerce has a long-standing tradition of holding a meeting like this one on economic developments and prospects and monetary policy. The meeting is held following the publication of the Central Bank’s autumn forecast and, in latter years, the Monetary Policy Committee’s interest rate decision. It often has an additional specific topic, and on this occasion, our hosts have expressed an interest in the outlook for credit ratings. I will touch on that towards the end of my talk today, but as I usually do, I will focus mainly on monetary policy and the current and future economic situation. The big picture regarding the economy is this: the recovery that began in Q2/2010 is now well enough advanced that the slack in the economy is almost fully absorbed. The domestic economy has seldom been as well balanced as it is now. There is internal equilibrium, in that inflation has been at or below target for nine months and output is close to capacity. And there is external equilibrium, in that we have had a sizeable current account surplus that covers net capital outflows with room to spare, as the Central Bank has bought foreign currency for a total of 95 b.kr., or 5% of GDP, so far this year.
Our monetary policy is oriented at controlling inflation. The exchange rate floats to absorb international shocks without causing major disruptions in domestic activity. The fiscal policy is based on a rule that implies saving transitory incomes and today enjoys the benefits of prudence. Fiscal savings, combined with the Central Bank’s international liquidity position, provide a reserve of resources that permits us to accommodate external financing shocks even worse than those we are seeing now. Our financial system has been prudent and has the necessary levels of capitalization to play its credit intermediating role properly. Prudence, both of the private sector and of the macroeconomic policies, can now yield their fruits in the worst financial episode the world has had to suffer in many decades. Thank you. References Berger, H. and E. Stavrev (2008). “The Information Content of Money in Forecasting Euro Area Inflation”. IMF Working Paper WP/08/166. Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (2001). “Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?” The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 91(2): 253-257. Blinder, A. and R. Reis (2005). “Understanding the Greenspan Standard.” In The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future, Proceedings of the Jackson Hole Symposium 2005, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 11-96. Borio, C. (2008). “The Financial Turmoil of 2007-?”: A Preliminary Assessment and Some Policy Considerations.” BIS Working Paper No. 251. Christiano, L., R. Motto, and M. Rostagno (2007). “Two Reasons Why Money and Credit May Be Useful in Monetary Policy”.

In fact, this strategy is known as the Greenspan put, in reference to interest rate reductions in the aftermaths of severe financial turmoil, such as the stock exchange downfall of 1987, the collapse of LTCM in 1998, or the technological stocks in the early 2000s. 7 In fact, from the standpoint of liquidity provision and potential downward pressures on inflation, a reduction in interest rates is generally recommended. The problem is that this response provides an incentive to adopting more risk-prone behavior, since investors perceive that they will have the put option available later. Therefore, it is advisable to not only provide the liquidity, but also carefully monitor the market’s operation to prevent overexposure to these risks in the future. Indeed it can be argued that bubbles are difficult to identify. For example, Gürkaynak (2005) finds that, for every work identifying a bubble, there is another one finding the opposite. At the same time, it is not so clear how much of a given bubble can be affected by raising the interest rate and the necessary magnitude of the adjustment in order to make any difference, because, by definition, a bubble is determined by “non-fundamental” price movements. Thus, although after seeing the critical situation that developed financial markets have been enduring, a more proactive monetary policy strategy might have been advisable, but it is hard to believe that such a strategy could have averted this crisis by itself.
Putting the aforementioned laws into practice will change Thailand’s business and financial landscape regardless of which political party steps into power after the next election. They will contribute to better governance and equality, higher productivity, and long-term sustainability of the country. However, I should point out that, as for all reform initiatives, effectiveness in execution will be the bottom line of their success. Ladies and gentlemen, As for the Bank of Thailand, we also play an important role in upgrading Thailand’s financial infrastructure and regulatory reform within our responsibility. In the pursuit of the digital economy, the government aims to involve all stakeholders to transform Thailand to a lesscash society under the National e-Payment master plan. In conjunction with the Ministry of Finance and the Thai Bankers’ Association, we have recently launched the PromptPay system, which is an electronic faster payment system. It helps facilitate payment transactions and save costs for businesses and consumers. This morning I also witnessed the signing of an agreement with two banks; consortium to roll out EDC machines to 560,000 shops and government agencies all over the country to promote the use of debit cards on a nation-wide basis. 5  The Bank of Thailand also aims to promote competition, innovation, and digital financial services among financial service providers (including FinTech). This move will benefit financial institutions, businesses as well as Thai citizens. In addition, we will encourage niche players to help narrow gaps in access to financial services.

The public debt to GDP ratio currently at 43 percent is projected to stand well below the sustainability ceiling under the ongoing fiscal reform. In coordination with the expansionary fiscal policy, monetary policy remains accommodative to reinforce the economic recovery. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has decided to keep the policy interest rate on hold at a low level since April 2015. Yet the MPC deems that monetary conditions should remain conducive until the economic recovery becomes more broad-based and more robust. For the future, the MPC’s decision on monetary policy will be carefully balanced between accommodating economic recovery and avoiding financial stability risks that could result from an extended period of low interest rates. Ladies and gentlemen, To wrap things up before I move to the second part of my talk, the Thai economic recovery has become more broad-based with a firmer momentum compared with last year while our economy has relatively strong buffers compared to emerging-market peers in the region. Now let me turn to the way forward for the Thai economy. With the short-term trajectory of the Thai economy holding up well thanks to the first two ‘arrows’ as in the Abenomics terms, namely fiscal stimulus and monetary easing, Thailand’s long-term future depends critically on the success of the third arrow of ‘structural reforms’. This brings me to the second part of my talk tonight on the way forward for the Thai economy, and how we and our partners like Japanese businesses may work together towards sustainable economic prosperity.
Conclusion In closing, let me congratulate the AFA on its second annual conference and the progress that has been made in bringing the industry together under an organized platform to further advance and develop the industry. I come back to my opening comments and look forward to working with the Association to deliver the objectives that were originally set out for the industry, that is to improve the quality of advice and enhance its role in supporting the broader financial management strategies of Malaysian households and individuals to grow their savings, manage risk and meet their financial goals. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

There are already some examples of voluntary debt-for-equity exchanges among companies. For example, Chelsea Football Club recently announced a large-scale swap, which accounts for their plummit down the debt league table. In principle, mortgage contracts could also be adapted to lessen the burden on over-indebted households by allowing lenders to convert their loan into an equity stake, as suggested, for example, by the charity Shelter. 16 Preventing tomorrow’s debt hangover Once today’s debt hangover is solved, how is tomorrow’s to be prevented? As debt crises have been with us for a millennium, it is fanciful to think they could be eliminated. But could the party be moderated in frequency and scale? In seeking new ways to tackle this old problem, two possible avenues would be the re-orientation of regulatory policy on the one hand and better designed debt contracts on the other. First, regulatory policy. Since at least the 1970s, public policy has not sought actively to moderate fluctuations in the credit cycle in most G7 economies. Moderating the business cycle was believed sufficient to hold credit in check. The experience of the past decade, in the UK and elsewhere, has called that into question. In the UK, credit grew at three times the rate of money spending over that period, sowing the seeds of the credit crisis, while inflation and growth remained remarkably stable. In tackling this problem, one option is a re-orientation of regulatory policy towards curbing the cycle in credit supply.
9  In the sterling corporate bond market yields fell by even more, with spreads to gilt yields narrowing by around 20 basis points. Little comparable movement was observed in equivalent US dollar or euro-area markets (Chart 5), suggesting this was largely attributable to the Bank’s actions. And while only investment grade bonds are eligible for purchase in the APF, spreads on sterling non-investment grade bonds fell by a similar amount (Chart 6). Turning to the corporate bond auctions themselves, participation has been widespread, with nearly 90% of eligible counterparties typically participating and making multiple offers in each auction. This depth of participation has helped ensure competitive allocations, with the Bank accepting only the most attractive offers received. More tentatively, we think there is evidence that our auctions have provided a boost to secondary market liquidity for sterling corporate bonds more generally. Our contacts, as well as some proprietary data, suggest that the operations provide a liquidity point for the market that can catalyse trading activity. And there is some evidence that the scheme has dampened the volatility of corporate spreads relative to comparable equity and government bonds markets, with corporate bond spreads having remained stable during broader market volatility toward the end of last year. Turning to the primary market, there was a sharp increase in sterling issuance after the scheme was launched, with total issuance by investment grade UK corporates of almost £ billion between August and November – considerably higher than the same period in previous years (Charts 7 & 8).

(2021) estimates that $ of the $ of economic damage caused by Hurricane Sandy (New York, 2012) was attributable to climate change driven rises in sea-levels 7 See Chapter 6 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2020Opens in a new window 8 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate ChangeOpens in a new window (2006) 9 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  9 See Government announcement of climate considerations being embedded across UK principal financial  regulatorsOpens in a new window 10 Dietrich, Müller, and Schoenle (2021) – ‘The Expectations Channel of Climate Change: Implications for Monetary  Policy’ 11 Monetary policy in the intangible economy - speech by Jonathan Haskel, University of Nottingham, February  2020 12 See ‘It’s not easy being green – but that shouldn’t stop us: how central banks can use their monetary policy  portfolios to support orderly transition to net zero’ speech by Andrew Hauser and Options for greening the Bank of England’s Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme discussion paper  5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
And hence the commitment I reaffirm today to bring inflation back towards 2% by 2025, is consistent with the full transmission of the monetary tightening at work until summer 2023. b. Against this backdrop of significant transmission "in the pipe" and still to come in real economy, a deceleration in the size of the policy steps (from 50bp to 25 bp) was wise and cautious. We obviously keep our hands free, but we add the capacity of observing and monitoring the pass-through of our massive past hikes. Persistence is now more important than speed; the duration for which we will maintain rates is now more important than the precise terminal level we will reach. Or in other words, for interest rates as with ballistics, "longer" is becoming more significant than "higher". c. Hence, our next rate decisions should not focus such attention; we already have completed most of our rate-hiking journey, and we are clearly in restrictive territory. That said, as I said already last January, I expect today that we will be at the terminal rate not later than by summer, which starts in June and ends in September. Hence we have three possible Governing Councils either to hike or to pause; but don't deduce a guidance from this or a preference for a given terminal rate. We will remain data driven, looking meeting by meeting at the outlook for headline as well as for underlying inflation. Monetary policy is at work and rest assured, we'll do the job: we'll bring inflation back towards 2%.

We'll do it with the necessary patience – looking at the 2025 horizon for full transmission, with persistence – maintaining restrictive interest rates for long enough, and pragmatism – monitoring actual economic data. But once more, monetary policy cannot be the only game in town. Fiscal policies should adjust and consolidate, first and foremost scrapping energy subsidies as the European Commission rightly advocated yesterday ; wage negotiations and mark-up decisions by firms should incorporate the expected decrease in inflation; and still more, structural reforms are needed more than ever to increase the supply-side capacity and flexibility in Europe and in France.3 And  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  this is where Capital Markets Union would greatly help to finance investment and innovation, and hence reduce inflation. Let us acknowledge it: if we are lagging behind today in Europe, it's in this domain of supply transformations, and not in monetary policy. 1 Smets and Wouters (2005); see also ECB NAWM model presented in P. Lane's  lecture on 16/02/2023, "The euro area hiking cycle: an interim assessment". 2 Badinger and Schiman (2023), Measuring Monetary Policy in the Euro Area Using  SVARs with Residual Restrictions American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2023, 15(2): 279–305, or; see also ECB-BASE model. 3 François Villeroy de Galhau, Letter to the President of the Republic, « How France  and Europe will defeat inflation », April 2023. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches