samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Government finances have also improved markedly since the effects of the acute crisis in the early 1990s were overcome. After rapid budget consolidation, a surplus of 1.6 per cent is forecast for 1998. Government debt has been reduced since 1995. Still, the restoration of confidence did take a long time. There were strong and persistent doubts about both the determination and the ability of the Government and the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) to carry out the proposed measures. Finally it is worth noting that the steps for reorienting economic policy on stability were taken with a consensus that was considerably broader than is sometimes suggested by the political debate. A good foundation for the years ahead has now been laid, although high unemployment is still a serious problem for Sweden’s economy. The positive picture is underpinned by institutional reforms to the budget process and the status of the Riksbank. 2. Three fields of importance for monetary policy Now I should like to turn to some issues or policy fields that are of major practical importance for monetary policy. They are: fiscal policy, the labour market, wage formation and competitive conditions in the Swedish economy. It is generally the case that the more price stability is supported by other policy fields, the greater the contribution monetary policy can make to other economic policy goals. Good fiscal foundation but storing up for lean years is advisable Fiscal policy is relevant for monetary policy in a number of ways.

Although the electronic platform being launched today will not be able to meet all of these, I still hope that it will prove to be the starting point for something new and contribute to an eagerly-awaited renaissance for Swedish fixed income trading. Good luck! BIS Review 37/2001  3
17.02.2022  The new ECB monetary policy strategy and its implications for the current high-inflation episode The Euro YearBook Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, good morning: It is a pleasure for me to be able to participate in this meeting organised by Fundación ICO, Instituto Español de Analistas Financieros and Fundación de Estudios Financieros. Here at this 2022 edition of the Euro Yearbook, I would like to deliver a few remarks regarding the main aspects of the review of the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank (ECB) that was concluded in the middle of last year. I would also like to emphasise why our new monetary policy strategy provides us, in the Eurosystem, with the appropriate framework and tools to handle the high-inflation episode that we are currently confronting. I will structure my remarks today into three parts. First, I will explain why, given the profound structural changes that the euro area has experienced in recent decades, it was appropriate for the ECB to undertake a comprehensive review of its monetary policy strategy. In particular, I will talk about the fall in the natural interest rate that has taken place over the last few decades – in the euro area and in most advanced economies – and how this secular process has imposed some limitations – through the interest rate lower bound – on the conduct of monetary policy.

Finally, an important dimension of flexibility in our monetary policy that we should not overlook is the focus on avoiding financial fragmentation in the euro area, in particular when the impact of the pandemic has been and remains very heterogeneous across countries and sectors. In December last year, we decided to retain this flexibility in the PEPP reinvestment phase, which was extended until the end of 2024. We should now use this  13  flexibility proactively and monitor whether it is sufficient to ensure our monetary policy is appropriately transmitted across the euro area. 4 Conclusions Let me conclude. I am convinced that the ECB’s new monetary policy strategy, which I have briefly sketched in this talk, constitutes a solid basis for the conduct of our monetary policy. This is so, not just looking ahead to the coming decades, but also for coping with the current high-inflation episode. In this respect, I believe that, in a highly uncertain environment, a careful assessment of the implications that current developments have on medium-term inflation expectations is key, and that the optionality and flexibility that we retain should be exercised gradually and predictably. The direction in which we need to head is clear, but we should not draw premature conclusions as to the time frame. The process will be both gradual and data-dependent. Thank you for your attention. 14  References Ajevskis, V. (2018), "The Natural Rate of Interest: Information Derived from a Shadow Rate Model," Working Papers 2018/02, Latvijas Banka.
28(1) and 28(3) of the Statute) and alternative methods for measuring monetary income (Art. 32(3)). Lastly, very few decisions are taken unanimously; they require the attendance of all members at the meeting. The Recommendation of the ECB addressed to the European Council for the amendment of Art. 10(2) of the Statute (assignment of voting rights and rotation system in the Governing Council of the ECB) was adopted unanimously. 3  General Council can be regarded as a “transitional body” which will continue to exist while there are EU Member States which have not adopted the euro. Its functions include the monitoring of progress achieved in convergence by EU Member States which have not yet adopted the euro, advice on the necessary preparations for irrevocably fixing their exchange rates, supervising the operation of Exchange Rate Mechanism II, acting as a forum for the coordination of EU exchange rate and monetary policies, and assisting with certain activities, such as the advisory functions of the ECB. 2 Single Supervisory Mechanism: distribution of responsibilities between the ECB and the national competent authorities and decision-making processes As from 4 November 2014, the prudential supervision of credit institutions in euro area countries was transferred to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which other EU countries that have not yet adopted the euro may also join.5 This mechanism is structured as an integrated system, led by the ECB and involving the national competent authorities (NCAs), i.e. the supervisors of the participating countries.

In this connection, the Governing Council of the Banco de España currently comprises, aside from the Deputy Governor and myself, six elected members and two ex officio members. The latter sit on the council by virtue of their position, namely: the Vice-Chair of the CNMV and the General Secretary of the Treasury and International Financing.11 It has traditionally been argued that the ex officio members allow for enhanced coordination across the country’s various economic and financial authorities. However, such coordination was boosted recently via the creation in 2019 of AMCESFI, the new macroprudential authority, in which the three sectoral supervisors and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation participate. Against this background, and in the interest of increasing the institution’s independence, it might be desirable for the ex officio members to attend the meetings of the Governing Council of the Banco de España in a non-voting capacity, and for the Banco de España representative at the CNMV to do likewise. 5 Financial supervision arrangements in Spain I would also like to underscore that, precisely after redressing a significant shortcoming detected in the Spanish financial supervisory system by creating a Spanish macroprudential authority, I believe that it is now time to start reflecting deeply on the financial supervisory model existing in Spain.12 This would serve to align it with international best practices and adapt it to the challenges we currently face.
Attitudes to change have varied, partly depending on what role one believes monetary policy played in the crisis. Was inflation targeting one of the perpetrators, contributing to interest rates being too low prior to the crisis; was it the bystander who could only look on in horror, or was it the saviour who ensured that inflation expectations nevertheless remained firmly anchored?6 Personally, I do not believe that the argument that the financial crisis stems from an overly expansionary monetary policy is particularly convincing. As I see it, it was primarily a combination of a lack of supervision and regulation of the financial markets.7 Two obvious lessons are that there was over-confidence in the ability of these markets to regulate themselves and that the distortions in incentives on the financial markets had been underestimated.8 Given the enormous socio-economic costs the financial crisis entailed, there is of course a strong will to correct what one perceived went wrong to ensure it cannot happen again – this applies in particular to the central banks, who had to deal with quite a few of the problems. There is thus an instinct to take on the task of ensuring that financial crises do not arise – not merely through advocating better supervision and regulation of the financial markets, but also through monetary policy. But there are a number of problems with this. Risks linked to household debt have held back monetary policy This leads me on to the situation in Sweden and how monetary policy has been conducted recently.

Caleb M Fundanga: Catering for the un-banked population in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of Stanbic Bank Limited’s Mazabuka branch, Mazabuka Town, 10 October 2006. *  *  *  •  The incoming Member of Parliament for Mazabuka, Honourable Gary Nkombo,  •  The Regional Managing Director of Stanbic Africa, Mr. Clive Tasker  •  The Town Clerk, Mr. Chingangu  •  The District Commissioner, Mr. Chinda  •  Traditional leaders here present; Chief Mwanachingwala, Chief Mwenda, Chief Hanjalika, Chief Nalwama, Chief Monze  •  The Chairman of Stanbic Bank (Zambia) and all Board members present  •  The Managing Director of Zambia Sugar Plc, and Managing Director of Stanbic Bank (Zambia) Ltd  •  Stanbic Bank Management and staff present  •  Distinguished invited guests, ladies and gentlemen  It is an honour and privilege to be invited to officiate at this important occasion. Today I join the Bank’s Board Chairman in thanking the people of Mazabuka for the effort and support that has been extended in establishing this Stanbic Branch, which I believe is the first in Southern Province. Distinguished Ladies and gentlemen, I have keenly followed the progress and growth of Stanbic Bank in the last few years and I must say that as Governor of the Central Bank, it has been very gratifying to witness the progressive strategies of a privately owned commercial bank.
Interest rates had been very low for more than a decade, and they are still lower than they were before the global financial crisis. The ECB has not been alone in how it has acted. Some central banks started to normalise their monetary policy even earlier, and the exit from the highly accommodative monetary policy has been swifter than was expected. Headline inflation started to come down towards the end of last year, mainly thanks to a decline in energy prices, and it fell to 8.5% in January. More worrying however is that  5/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  core inflation has remained persistently high at more than 5%, as the underlying price pressures are not yet receding. The ECB Governing Council consequently announced last month that it will continue to raise interest rates and keep them high enough to bring inflation back to its target of two per cent in the medium term. We also indicated that we intend to raise interest rates by another 50 basis points at our next monetary policy meeting in March. It is most likely this will not be the last rate rise in this cycle, and it is quite possible that interest rates will need to stay high for quite some time so that we can be sure that inflation will come back to, and remain at, close to two per cent.

Let me reiterate facets of the media namely, education and information to which the Bank of Zambia attaches a lot of importance, and forms the guiding principles for the formats of all media seminars Organized by the Bank. We in the Bank believe that an effective or indeed a well informed media is key in the country’s development efforts. It is in this regard that the Bank will continue to work towards the provision of quality information and/or education to the media as evidenced by the continued holding of such seminars coupled with quarterly media briefs. Such efforts as you may be aware are not for our own interests but the Zambian stakeholders. This is as it should be. Distinguished journalists; may I humbly urge you, to actively participate in the deliberations of this seminar. Let me hasten to mention, particularly to those of you that are participating for the first time that you may not be able to completely grasp the materials that will be presented during the seminar. This must not discourage you, as you are free to make followups with the respective departments (and indeed officers) at our offices in Lusaka and our Regional Office here in Ndola. Nevertheless, I am confident that the respective presenters will ensure clarity in their presentations and fully respond to any issues arising there-from. Ladies and gentlemen, allow me, at this point in time to brief you on the performance of the economy in 2006 and the period January – August 2007.
Even where we manage to limit the rise in global mean temperatures to 1.5 degrees, physical risks are likely to dominate the potential impacts of transition. And if instead we continue on our current trajectory, losses just from the impact on productivity could be as high as 13% of GDP.8  In addition, many of the leading studies, including those we used in the NGFS, start from past correlations and so find it hard to put an accurate number on the type of low-probability, high impact events that will become more common. As high levels of warming will be unprecedented, we don’t yet fully understand the delicate balance between the climate, living conditions, ecosystems and the economy - for example, the level at which ice melts might accelerate; or methane stores under permafrost might be unlocked. What is clear is that investment is needed now to help adapt to these inevitable changes. And that we should recognise the gaps in our understanding of how large changes to our climate might affect our economies. Challenges in applying scenarios  While these key themes are clear, I know from our own experience, and from the firms we supervise, that applying the scenarios in practice is not straightforward. The models, data and analytical frameworks are new, and the transmission channels are complex and subject to much uncertainty. The results can be sensitive to input assumptions and type of model used.

Either because temperatures continue to rise as the transition is eluded; or because we face a disorderly transition - a so-called climate Minsky moment – as a significant number of otherwise productive assets have to be abandoned; or as asset prices adjust whilst risk and return are repriced. To avoid such outcomes, financial firms need to manage these risks not as they materialise but instead by looking ahead over much longer time horizons than they are used to. And, as our supervisory expectations of banks and insurers make clear, they need to act strategically and pre-emptively, taking different decisions today, well before the consequences of inaction become clear.3  Climate scenario analysis  Climate scenario analysis provides us with the toolkit for doing just that. To look forwards not backwards, with a horizon of decades not years. In recognition of the uncertainty we face about what might happen to our planet and our economy, some scenarios show the most efficient pathway to net zero, while others highlight the risks of fragmented policies or insufficient action. They can all help guide actions today. 3  See PRA supervisory expectations on the financial risks from climate change. Plotting the transmission channels of climate risks into economic and financial risks is a fiendishly complicated task [figure 2]. The channels from climate to financial risk are numerous, with significant interdependencies. The data and methodologies to translate climate outcomes into macroeconomic and financial risks are incomplete and inadequate.
Indeed, by urging governments to aim for a fiscal position close to balance or in surplus in the medium term, the Pact enables them to let fiscal deficits increase during recessions without exceeding  5  BIS Review 81/1999  the 3% reference value. In short, it allows them to create a fiscal buffer during normal economic periods that can be drawn on, if an asymmetric shock occurs. í  The third condition is that all European countries must undertake structural reforms. Continental Europe is experiencing high levels of unemployment, despite the fact that the jobless rate has been declining slightly in most of its economics. According to the IMF, around 80% of this unemployment is structural, that is, generated by our burdensome rules and regulations. The Monetary Policy Council of the Banque de France agrees with this analysis. Just recently, some external observers were still blaming Europe for its focus on the euro, instead of what they considered the more urgent task, namely the implementation of structural reforms necessary for more dynamic job creation. These critics were wrong regarding the untimeliness of the euro, but their assessment of the problems of the European economy is obviously correct. The euro will be a stimulus to structural reforms. Most importantly, the single currency is decisively contributing to achieve the single market in the three markets of goods, services and capital within the euro zone.

One study finds that capital market risk-sharing in the US dropped by almost half in the crisis period.19 But this does not alter the conclusion that deepening private risk-sharing in the euro area would be beneficial for macroeconomic stability. So how can we achieve it? The experience of other monetary unions, and our own up to now, suggests that it does not happen by itself. Rather, private risk-sharing has to be enabled by public sector policies at both the national and union levels. In this sense, private risk-sharing cannot be seen as a substitute for the further development of EMU. It is a complement to it and follows from it. The policies we need fall into two main categories. 3. Creating a more stable financial sector First of all, we need policies that make the financial system more stable, both by increasing the resilience of banks and by completing the banking union and the capital markets union. The euro area has already made good progress on these fronts. The post-crisis regulatory reforms have significantly strengthened the banking sector. The Common Equity Tier 1 ratios of significant banks have risen from 8.7% in 2008 to 14.5% today. In the same period leverage ratios have risen from 3.7% to 5.8%.20 And banks have much more stable liquidity and funding. 4/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  The creation of European banking supervision has also brought about a more uniform approach to how banks are supervised.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Thailand’s economic conditions and prospects - a mid-year update Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at a luncheon organised by the Australian-Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 27 August 2004. *  *  *  Let me begin first by thanking the Australian-Thai Chamber of Commerce for the invitation to speak to you today. For the Australian-Thai Chamber, this is the first for me and I am very pleased to be here. Today, I plan to cover the evolving economic pictures both at home and abroad. For the global economy, a number of interesting new themes are now emerging and I will try to put these developments into the perspective as we understand it at the Bank of Thailand. As for the domestic economy, despite a number of risks and challenges, this year the economy has managed well under the circumstances. Growth momentum remains firm and economic stability remains intact. Today, I will not open up any new kind of inquiry on the Thai economy, but will simply update you on the recent economic outturn and explain the rationale behind this week's decision by the Monetary Policy Committee to increase the policy interest rate. This decision, which is the first increase in three years, has been expected by the market following signs of increased pressure on domestic prices and following our own assessment and communication to the market that low interest rates have become less necessary given the changed outlook on inflation.

For those of you who have not been home for a while, cleanskin wine is quality wine that is sold more cheaply because it is unlabeled. So, you are getting something good but you don’t know why because you don’t know what it is. Half an hour ago, the Thai economy this year to many of you was like cleanskin wine. You know the economy is doing better but you don’t know why. BIS Review 50/2004  3  In this brief space of time, I hope I have given you an adequate account of how we at the Bank of Thailand see the Thai economy evolving this year, and hopefully have helped improve your understandings of the economy. As with the cleanskin wine, I will definitely go back for more. I only hope you will do the same by continuing to have confidence in the Thai economy and remain a trusted friend and a dependable partner of Thailand for many many years to come. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 50/2004