samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The average deposit rate on households and corporate deposits for the region equals 1.4% and 0.9% in 2016, compared to around 5% and 4%, respectively in 2007.5 The correction is in line with the policy rate and lending rates adjustment, and reflects the natural response of the banks for preserving their profitability at acceptable levels. Yet, it seems that deposit interest rates in some of the countries in the region, in the members of the Euro Area in particular, are approaching the lower bounds. Albeit saving alternatives for the private sector in the region are limited, further drop in deposit rates might act as a constraint for further deposit growth. The falling opportunity costs can increase the propensity to hold cash or short-term funds in the banking system, thus eroding the quality of the financing sources and banks’ ability to provide more credit. Still, given that recent bank profitability indicators point to a gradual improvement in profitability, profitability concern will probably weigh less on the deposit interest rates. Nevertheless, in few of the countries (Croatia, Hungary, and Bosnia) profitability indicators are still worrisome. In addition, further decline of the ECB rates, for some of the countries might also pose challenges in this regard. 5  Interest rate data for Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia available since 2011, or 2012. Hence the 2007 figures do not include these countries, and Albania as well, for which sector by sector data is not available.

The European Central Bank In this respect, judging by past experience, I am confident that if and when institutional or political changes do become necessary, the EU is and will be able to rise to this challenge. The introduction of the euro and the creation of a new institution, the ECB, which is responsible for the single monetary policy, provide clear evidence that this is already the case. Let me briefly discuss some features of the ECB, which has a clear mandate to focus on maintaining price stability in the euro area as a whole. In fact, in the euro area, monetary policy cannot be tailored to the specific needs of a country or region. The single monetary policy is governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB. These are the Governing Council and the Executive Board. They may be considered broadly comparable with the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Like the FOMC, the Governing Council of the ECB is responsible for taking key monetary policy decisions, including the setting of official interest rates. Whereas the FOMC is composed of the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and four Reserve Bank presidents, the Governing Council is composed of the members of the Executive Board of the ECB and the Governors of the national central banks of the euro area. The Governors naturally bring with them their own country-specific expertise and experience.
This should be coupled with easier access to credit for productive enterprises - especially micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) – and reforms to foster technological change and productive diversification in line with the changing structure of the global economy. In the above recognition and its continued quest to contribute to unleashing the potential of local MSMEs, the Bank of Zambia hosted a strategic forum on the role of finance in this area, in June this year. As a follow-up, the Government is working closely with stakeholders and the cooperating partners in improving availability of financial resources to MSMEs. Further, some provision has been included in the 2013 Budget. Distinguished participants MSMEs could play an important role in creating employment and spurring growth. However, their competitiveness is undermined by inadequate infrastructure, limited access to financial and business services. Stakeholders can help small firms to integrate in, and reap more benefits from local and international value chains, by facilitating the provision of business services, among which continuous skills development is paramount. An important policy question is how to address the constraints which affect the capacity to grow and generate earnings of MSMEs, very often informal that operate in traditional sectors and account for the bulk of jobs in our country. This feat, ladies and gentlemen, can only be achieved gradually, as the drivers of informality are usually multiple and deeply rooted in long-standing development gaps and weaknesses.

The ECB’s asset purchases are being expanded in terms of both size and composition: the monthly purchase volume has been increased from € billion to € billion and the universe of eligible assets now includes non-bank corporate bonds. Purchases are intended to run until the end of March 2017 – or beyond, if necessary – , and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation to levels close to 2% over the medium term. Taking into account the current outlook for price stability, the Governing Council expects the ECB’s key policy rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, well past the horizon of the net asset purchases. We are confident that the very accommodative monetary policy stance will provide further support to the euro area recovery and will accelerate the return of inflation to levels that we consider to be consistent with our objective. The Governing Council has done and, within its mandate, will continue to do whatever is needed to pursue its price stability objective. Our very accommodative monetary policy stance has provided considerable support for the euro area recovery. By supporting growth prospects, our actions have also been beneficial for financial stability.
4 T. Padoa-Schioppa, “Capital Mobility: Why is the Treaty Not Implemented?”, Address to the Second Symposium  of European Banks, Milan, June 1982. 5 Pietro Catte, The Reform of the International Monetary System, Background note prepared for Conference in  Memory of Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Rome, 2011. 6 T. Padoa-Schioppa, “The European Monetary System: A Long-Term View”, in F. Giavazzi, S. Micossi, M. Miller,  The European Monetary System, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 7 Banque de France, « Coût des carences de coordination des politiques économiques dans la zone euro »,  Bulletin de la Banque de France, n° 211, Mai-juin 2017. English version: “Cost of the lack of coordination of economic policies in the euro area”, Quartely Selection of Articles no. 46 (Banque de France Bulletin), to be published in Summer 2017. 8 T. Padoa-Schioppa, “Capital Mobility: Why is the Treaty Not Implemented?”, Address to the Second Symposium  of European Banks, Milan, June 1982. 9 7/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  9 See for instance: speech at Bruegel in Brussels on 22nd March 2016 or speech before the Committee on  Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament on 28 September 2016. 10 W. Churchill addressing the crowd on place Kléber in Strasbourg on 12th August 1949, day of the First Session  of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 8/8  BIS central bankers' speeches

Chea Chanto: Opening remarks at the BIS Advanced Reserve Management workshop Opening remarks by H.E. Chea Chanto, Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia, at the Advanced Reserve Management Workshop, Siem Reap, 21 April 2009. *  *  *  -  Mr. Eli Remolona, Chief Representative, BIS Asian Office,  -  Mrs. Miranda Tam, Deputy Chief Representative, BIS Asian Office,  -  Mr. Jean-Pierre Matt, Head of Financial Analysis of BIS Head Office,  -  Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,  Good morning! Today, I have the great pleasure and honor to be invited to deliver some opening remarks for the BIS workshop on Advanced Reserve Management. This is the first time that the BIS organize such a workshop in Cambodia and I hope there will be more opportunities to join together in the future. Taking this opportunity, I would like to express my warmest welcome to the BIS resource speakers from BIS Head Office and BIS Asian Office and central bank participants from the Asia and Pacific region to this workshop as well as to Cambodia. I sincerely appreciate the BIS for their selection of the ancient capital city of Angkor in Siem Reap province as the site for this workshop. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Let me share with you a brief outline of Cambodia’s economic development in recent years.
The solution involves settlement of a large portion of the claims that the Central Bank received as compensation for deposits transferred to it, in accordance with the decision of the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) on the disposal of assets and liabilities of Sparisjóðabanki Íslands hf. (SPB) in March 2009. The settlement of the compensation has not been finalised, however, and the matter is still being considered by the Financial Supervisory Authority. The Central Bank has concluded agreements with eight savings banks concerning the settlement of claims, and the agreements will be finalised soon after the Financial Supervisory Authority and other creditors have confirmed them. I realise that it is painful for guarantee capital owners and creditors to lose these assets, which were deemed quite valuable before the crash and were perhaps purchased recently with borrowed money. Nonetheless, it is necessary to face facts and try to salvage the value that remains. I have always viewed the savings banks as an important part of a healthy financial system, as they have a certain advantage in assessing local opportunities and risks and are generally trusted in their home communities. But this makes it important that the savings banks limit their activities to the areas where they can compete, and not extend into risky investment banking operations. With the financial restructuring currently underway, it will be possible to strengthen the foundations of important savings banks.

First, a multilateral interbank exchange fee is being developed, which should solve the problem of “double charging” and, second, a “basic” service will be defined which should provide a level of guaranteed service and ensure transparent and attractive price conditions. In a progress report published this month, the Eurosystem has made several recommendations to achieve further improvements in the price level and quality of the cross-border payment services for both corporate and private customers. Without a doubt, we shall continue to monitor this process very closely in order to ensure further cost and efficiency benefits for euro area corporations and citizens. Conclusions I have outlined the factors that are the main determinants underlying the changing structure of the financial system in general and the banking sector in particular. Overall, the various elements of the banking sector show that it is likely that a number of banking activities will be affected by this change. The foreseen structural changes require the need for adjustment to be taken seriously by all participants in the financial system. This adjustment appears to have intensified in recent years, as there has been an increase in merger activity, an establishment of alliances and an introduction of new  5  BIS Review 83/2000  products and services, often based on modern information technology. The process of structural change embodies an element of risk, but if these risks are identified early and analysed carefully, then they can be duly taken into account.
Regional economic conditions The financial crisis underscored the fact that the world is a complicated place and that the insights of professional economists and financial experts must be supplemented with a broader set of perspectives from households and businesses. Today’s visit is in that spirit – I want to talk about what we are seeing in the economy but also to hear from you firsthand about your assessment of economic conditions. So what do we see? Let me start with basic economic characteristics. While Staten Island is the city’s least populous borough, its population has grown steadily and rapidly, more than doubling in the last half-century to close to one-half million residents. On its own, Staten Island is larger than all other cities in the entire New York–New Jersey region, with the obvious exception of New York City. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In many ways – homeownership, educational attainment, income, and demographics – Staten Island more closely resembles the nation than the rest of New York City. For example, the homeownership rate on Staten Island is almost 70 percent, well above the 30 percent average homeownership rate citywide. Still, with a sizable proportion of the borough’s workers commuting to Manhattan (about ¼ of the island’s workers or more than 50,000 people) Staten Island’s economy is closely tied to the rest of the city’s economy, as well as to northern New Jersey’s. Thus, when Manhattan sees brisk job growth, the residents of Staten Island have better opportunities.

It is still not wholly clear - to me at least - quite why the storm struck suddenly when it did. Most crises of this sort have their origins in some evident macro-economic policy failure. At least in hindsight there are usually fairly clear tell-tale signs of expanding fiscal deficits and/or lax monetary policies, classically accompanied by evidence of imbalance in the form of accelerating inflation or a rapidly deteriorating balance of payments. There were such signs, perhaps most notably in Thailand; but they were not for the most part particularly pronounced in Asia. Some of you perhaps understand better than I do why the initial infection proved to be so contagious. It was after all your money! In fact through the first half of the 1990’s, and in some cases for much longer, the countries in question had been remarkably successful. They attracted, by their very success, huge inflows of capital from the rest of the world, where yields had fallen, in the hope of achieving higher returns. There is no question that this capital inflow made a very big contribution to the remarkable economic expansion in Asia and hence to the global economy; but with the benefit of hindsight, the accelerating scale of the inflow, and particularly the forms that it took, became an important part of the problem. It was not all in the end productively employed.
Investment cycle is expected to be further strengthened by the continuation of the productive fiscal investments. As the external demand is envisaged to recover further, additional stimuli is expected through this channel. The above mentioned growth factors are expected to strengthen further the labor market and the disposable income of the households, hence boosting the private consumption as well. The growth expectations provide room for additional rise of the deposit potential in the banking system, which accompanied with the rise in the credit demand and the willingness of the banks to lend, should enable credit growth at a rate of 9–10% in the period to come. The inflation is expected to be influenced mainly by the global prices of primary commodities and the consumers prices of our main trading partners. An average inflation of 0.5% is expected for 2015, with the current forecast indicating its reversal to 2% in 2016, reflecting the rise in the demand and in the import prices. The structural improvements in the export sector are expected to continue in 2015, which along with the overall external recovery and the much lower oil prices, are envisaged to bring about a moderate current  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  account deficit of bellow 1.6% of GDP. In the following year, widening to 3% is expected, reflecting the fall in private transfers and import pressures from the new investment.

Under the influence of changes in banking practices, customers may be able to have access to a wider range of financial products and services. Furthermore, efficiency gains will allow products to be offered at lower prices. In the euro area, electronic finance thus compounds the effects of the creation of the single currency, adding impetus to progress towards integrated financial markets at an area-wide level. Monetary policy needs to take account of these developments. In particular, it is important to monitor the resulting modifications to the financial structure of the economy so as to be able to track changes in investor behaviour, not least in order to assess the transmission channels of monetary policy. Moreover, in this context the possibility of excessive risk taking in the banking sector should not be neglected. Faced with eroding margins in "old businesses", banks may develop their activities in heretofore unexplored fields, by geographical expansion or by product development. In such circumstances, some banks may misjudge the risks inherent in the new activities, as a result of a lack of information, knowledge or skill. In such a situation, the prudential supervision of banks can help by assessing whether the capital buffers of banks remain sufficient for the banking sector as a whole. In financial markets, the issues are broadly similar. It is widely recognised that financial markets have been significantly transformed by the emergence of on-line brokers and electronic trading systems over recent years. In general, these developments have the potential to improve the functioning of financial markets.
Conversely, unprofitable banks are a potential source of instability. •  Poor profitability and low retained earnings will inhibit banks in building up their capital buffers. •  Without sufficient capital buffers, banks may be less willing to lend, which may constrain the availability of financing to the economy. The Basel Committee is working hard at finetuning the Basel III capital rules: •  to reduce the variability in risk weighted assets applied by banks;  •  to revise the standardised approaches for credit and operational risk; and  •  to implement the leverage ratio. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  But in the course of adjusting the capital rules to better achieve these outcomes, it is important that the overall capital requirements on banks are not significantly increased. There is a real risk that overall capital requirements on banks could indeed increase significantly if we are not careful: •  if internal modelling for certain portfolios are completely removed; and  •  if risk weights and credit conversion factors under the revised standardised approach are calibrated too conservatively. We need to take a holistic perspective in this final stage of the Basel III capital reforms. •  In trying to get the design right, we must not end up making the overall level of capital requirements too high. •  In trying to get the micro calibrations right, we must not end up getting the macro settings wrong.

jurisdictions’  •  The United States and a number of Asian countries – including Singapore, Hong Kong, China and Japan were assessed to be compliant or largely compliant in their implementation of the Basel III capital standards. •  The European Union was, however, found to be materially non-compliant. •  As home to several of the largest global banks as well as important international financial centres, it is crucial that the EU shows leadership in ensuring more complete and consistent implementation of global banking rules. Regulatory reforms have generally been effective The regulatory reforms have been largely effective in meeting their intended outcomes. First, banks have become stronger. •  Banks are holding more and better quality capital. − Between 2009 and 2014, large, internationally active banks have doubled their average CET1 ratio from just under 6% to more than 11%. •  2  Banks are holding more liquid assets and have reduced leverage levels. BIS central bankers’ speeches  − Since the crisis, the average liquidity coverage ratio for large, internationally active banks has risen from about 80% to more than 120%. − Leverage has fallen from around 22 times of equity to about 16 times. Second, banks have become more resilient. •  Banking business faces serious challenges on several fronts. − The prolonged low growth, low interest rate environment has pressured net interest income. − Bouts of financial market volatility amidst a general contraction in market liquidity has increased the risks facing banks.
Rodrigo Vergara: The role of macroprudential policy and monetary policy in safeguarding financial stability Speech by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the First Conference “Banking Development, Stability and Sustainability”, organised by the Chilean Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions and the Diego Portales University, Santiago, 5 November 2015. *  *  *  I thank Claudio Raddatz y Rodrigo Cifuentes for helping me in the preparation of this note. Good Morning. Before I get to the substance, I want to thank the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions, in particular the Superintendent, Eric Parrado, for inviting me to this conference. On this occasion, I will focus my discussion on macroprudential and monetary policies and their role in safeguarding financial stability. I think that it is from this perspective that I can, as a representative of the Central Bank of Chile, offer a different and complementary view from that of the various representatives of the supervisory institutions gathered here today. I will begin with a brief review of the definition of macroprudential policies and how these policies differ from monetary policy. Then I will discuss the tools and their effectiveness, plus some ongoing debates, particularly about the convenience of using monetary policy for macroprudential purposes, and the institutional organization of the macroprudential objective. Last but not least, I will touch on the Chilean experience with these policies. 1. What is a macroprudential policy?

Figure 7 Foreign credit flows to residents (billions of dollars) 3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.5  -1.0  -1.0  -1.5  -1.5  -2.0 Jan.07  Jul.07  Jan.08  New credits to banks  Jul.08  Jan.09  -2.0 Jul.09  New credits to non-banks  Net flow (*) (*) Discounting bank and non-bank amortizations from total new credits. Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS Review 145/2009  9  Figure 8 World growth (1) (annual change, percentage) 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12  80  84  88  92  96  00  04  World at market exchange rate  15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12  08  Chile (2)  (1) Gray area shows projections as from 2009. (2) Figures for growth in 2009 and 2010 stand for the midpoint of the range of projections shown in the Monetary Policy Report. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, International Monetary Fund and World Bank.