samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We have now surpassed our previous peak employment levels. 1  For non-Texans, Sam Houston was the first and third president of the Republic of Texas (1836–38 and 1841–44); Mirabeau B. Lamar was the second president of the Republic of Texas (1838–41). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Only two other states can claim they surpassed previous peak employment levels: Alaska and North Dakota. I do not wish to denigrate the good people of Alaska and North Dakota, but note that their combined population roughly equals that of Travis County. Readers of this speech abroad – say, in New York – might think our growth last year came only from the burgeoning oil and gas patch. They would be right to describe it as burgeoning: 30,000 jobs were added in the oil and gas and related support sector last year, an increase of 15 percent. But other sectors outperformed oil and gas in the number of jobs created in Texas in 2011: 58,000 jobs were added in the professional and business services areas, nearly 46,000 in education and health services and over 41,000 in leisure and hospitality. All told, the private sector in Texas expanded by 266,400 jobs, while the public sector, driven primarily by fewer schoolteachers, contracted by 54,800 jobs. In sum, Texas payrolls grew 2 percent, significantly above the national rate of 1.3 percent. This performance is not unique to last year.

While this share was around 8 percent in the early 1980s, it is expected to increase to 30 percent in the middle of this decade. Although the above evidence has indicated that Asia is on the rise, whether or not this rise will be sustained will depend on a number of factors. To do so, Asia needs to become a global innovation hub, and rely significantly more on our own domestic and regional demand. Moreover, we also need to assess whether prosperity will spread to all of the regional economies. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, Against this hopeful background, we need to reflect on the positioning of Thailand. As longterm business partners in Thailand, I am certain that Japanese businesses have carefully assessed the prospects of Thai economy in comparison with our peers in the region. And, I think we share a common view that Thailand needs to climb up the value chain in order to benefit from the expansion of the regional production network. This is a very important challenge as competitiveness from low labor costs will evaporate, and there is a risk of being marginalized in the increasingly competitive environment. Recognizing that Thailand needs to come up with concrete plans and strategies to foster capacities and productivity, the Bank of Thailand has emphasized on various occasions that our economy needs to have a clear development strategy. In fact, several Asian countries have already announced goals ranging from becoming world leaders in science, technology or human resource development.
It will be constantly necessary to strike a difficult balance between appropriately signalling the commitment to budgetary stability and, at the same time, not curbing the path of economic recovery. Past experience shows that the success of fiscal consolidation strategies hinges largely on their composition, so that cuts in public spending, especially non-productive spending, play an essential role in reducing the deficit. Unproductive spending, both on consumption and investment, should therefore be particularly scrutinised and monitored. In any event, when structural distortions have become considerable, certain elements of the tax structure have inevitably to be revised. Here it is vital to fully preserve efficiency in agents' saving and investment decisions, so that long-term growth prospects are not compromised. Selecting tax measures is never easy, and less so when the tax base is being eroded; consequently, tax instruments that cause least distortion should be used. In any case, we should ensure that increases in tax revenue are actually earmarked to reducing the budget deficit and not to financing potential spending slippages. The government has announced its intention to resume deficit levels compatible with stability in 2012, in line with the horizon defined by the European authorities in the application of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. The State Budget for 2010, the first to be prepared under this general consolidation strategy, confirms this commitment.

Until August, public spending posted annual growth of 5.2% in annual terms, while revenues slowed down, growing only by 2.2%. Budget deficit was ALL 30.6 billion as at end-August. Foreign demand continues to support Albanians economic growth. Exports’ annual growth was 28.8% in July. On the other hand, imports continued their downturn trend that had  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  started in the second quarter of the year, increasing by 4.6% in annual terms. Export uptrend and import slowdown materialised in narrowed trade deficit in July, contracting by 6.0% yearon-year. However, the economy’s external position remains a structural weakness of the Albanian economy, which reflects the need for higher competitiveness of our products in global markets and conditions the effectiveness of stimulating macroeconomic policies. Indirect indicators analysis of private consumption reveals its moderate performance. Consumption continues to suffer from perceived uncertainty by Albanian families, leading to higher saving although aggregate revenues increased. Private investment slowed down in this period, but it retained positive growth rates. This is supported by good performance of foreign direct investments, up by 38% during the second quarter, and higher import of capital goods, which suggest higher private investment in the economy. Nonetheless, this hike is conditioned by the fact that many businesses are operating below their production capacities, limiting their needs for new investments. Monetary inflationary pressures remain controlled in the medium run. Annual growth of money supply, M3, which resulted 11.2% in July, retained the average rates recorded last year.
For example, ASEAN has concluded Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Australia, New Zealand, China, Korea, Japan, and India. The ASEAN-China FTA alone covers over 1.9 billion consumers and an estimated trade volume of $ trillion. As Asia grows and comes together economically, global companies that aim to have a share of the pie will have to develop strategies and production models that are customised for Asia. Singapore exists at the confluence of these emerging trade routes within Asia and as well as between Asia and other regions. We have positioned ourselves as Global-Asia hub to take advantage of Asia’s growth. Our strategic location and affinity with other Asian countries made us the location of choice for companies from the West to grow in Asia. In 2011, IBM Services set up an Integration hub here. GlaxoSmithKline too has set up their Emerging Markets & Asia Pacific HQ here to serve the Asian market. At the same time, Asian companies expanding globally often opt for Singapore as their international base. Tata Communications from India has its HQ in Singapore, as do many Chinese companies. To aid these efforts, Singapore has initiatives to attract and develop talent that can thrive globally. For example, in 2010 we set up the Human Capital Leadership Institute to bring talent together to interact with one another and to prepare for the future. Urbanisation and sustainability Second, sustainability challenges will loom larger as the growth of the global economy puts more stress on the environment.

Political processes are often protracted, but once a decision has been taken, results should be rapidly visible. to be available as soon as possible. By contrast, central bankers are able to take decisions very quickly, but the results of these decisions – whether good or bad – may not be evident until years later. It is precisely because this lag is often so long that the credibility of central bankers is essential. If central bankers are credible, economic entities will trust them. As a result, monetary policy is more effective. For instance, if inflation rises due to increasing commodity prices, employees will not immediately ask for higher wages because they are confident that the increase in inflation is only temporary. Thus independence is a necessary prerequisite for a central bank, in order to develop the credibility it requires for carrying out monetary policy. Mind you, independence is a necessary – but not a sufficient – prerequisite for successful monetary policy. Central bank independence in monetary policy is not a specifically Swiss achievement. In many countries it has helped to firmly establish inflation expectations in the long term. Consequently, monetary policy can react to shocks in the short-term, when necessary. However, with a view to certain characteristics of the Swiss economy, the independence of the SNB appears particularly valuable. Allow me to explain this briefly, using our experiences during the financial crisis as my example. When the extreme shock of the great financial crisis occurred in 2008–09, monetary policy was in a position to act rapidly.
Slides available here: http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/bank%20of%20england.pdf Bellini, E, Ottaviano, G, Pinelli, D and Prarolo, G (2013), “Cultural Diversity and Economic Performance: Evidence from European Regions”; in R. Crescenzi and R. Percoco, eds. : Geography, Institutions and Regional Economic Performance, Advances in Spatial Science, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer Verlag: 121–141. Brooks, D (2011), “The social animal: a story of how success happens”, ISBN 978-1907595448 Cardenas, J, Dreber, A, von Essen, E and Ranehill, E (2014), “Gender and Cooperation in Children: Experiments in Colombia and Sweden”, PLoS ONE 9(3): e90923. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090923 Charness, G and Gneezy, U (2012), “Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Risk Taking”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83 (2012) 50– 58 Coates, J (2012), “The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: Risk-taking, Gut Feelings and the Biology of Boom and Bust”, ISBN: 978-0007413515 Commission on Child Poverty and Social Mobility (2014), “Elitist Britain?”, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/347915/Elitist_ Britain_-_Final.pdf Davies, E (2015), “Improving the gender balance on British boards: five year summary”, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/482059/BIS15-585-women-on-boards-davies-review-5-year-summary-october-2015.pdf Deloitte University Press (2013), “Diversity’s http://dupress.com/articles/diversitys-new-frontier/  new  frontier”,  available  at:  Easterly, W and Levine, R (1997), “Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112(4), pages 1203–1250. Ertac, S and Gurdle, M (2011), “Deciding to decide: gender, leadership and risk-taking in groups”, Journal of Economic Behavior 83, 50–58.

The global economic recovery might also be delayed reaching the region, increasing the likelihood that the crisis may cause more persistent economic effects. Despite this difficult situation, remittances have proven pandemic-proof1 and have behaved countercyclically in most of the region’s countries, assuming a more important role as a source of external financing. This subject is crucial to Spain, since it is the second-ranked issuer country of remittances to Latin America. Some of the topics we will address today (such as the growing importance of digital money remittances, the role of fiscal stimulus measures in the resilience of remittances and the function of the informal economy) are key to understanding the behaviour of the flow of remittances in this crisis. Undoubtedly, today’s event will allow us to better understand these developments and – I hope – 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  to draw some useful conclusions on how to tackle them from the central bank standpoint. Thank you for your attention. Remittances barely fell by 1.6% in 2020, compared with their 4.8% decline during the 2008 financial crisis. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Temporary factors could still affect price developments for some months to come: health concerns related to meat consumption and the consequences of the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease could continue to affect unprocessed food prices. Furthermore, pass trough of past rises in oil prices and the depreciation of the euro are likely to affect price developments for some months. Let me now turn to the question of International Financial Architecture. Impressive progress has been achieved in the recent years to reinforce international financial stability and to enhance prevention. We must continue our efforts toward further progress as regards the reform of the financial architecture. I also think that fruitful lessons can be drawn from the assessment of the new characteristics of financial markets and their impact on financial stability. 1. We must pursue and reinforce our efforts towards a renewed international financial architecture. These efforts should tend to improve prevention and management of financial crises. 1.1  Strengthening prevention  Strengthening prevention calls for parallel efforts from all actors, international financial institutions, investors and public authorities. Prevention lays on appropriate surveillance and adequate macroeconomic policies. 1.1.1  As regards surveillance, much progress has already been achieved:  -  In the institutional field, important changes have recently occurred: let me mention the impressive work carried out by the Financial Stability Forum in 1999 (e.g. reports on Highly Leverage Institutions, Capital flows, Incentives to Foster Implementation of Standards). I could also quote the work of the G20 or the International Monetary and Financial Committee.

It would have been extremely foolish if the Eurosystem had not exploited the accumulated wisdom and experience gained from the long and distinguished history of these institutions and those of the other NCBs. As I have argued today, both the Eurosystem’s strategy and its operational framework have exploited this wisdom to the full, while recognising the new and different challenges faced by the single monetary policy in the euro area. Let me therefore finish by again congratulating the Bank on its bicentenary, by expressing my gratitude to all those who have dedicated their time and effort to the achievement of Monetary Union and, finally, by wishing the Bank another 200 successful years - and more - as an important and vital component of the Eurosystem. 5  BIS Review 44/2000
Fact three is that the productivity gap between the top- and bottom-performing companies is materially larger in the UK than in France, Germany or the US. In the services sector, the gap between the top- and bottom7  performing 10% of companies is 80% larger in the UK than in our international competitors (Chart 5). This productivity gap has also widened by far more since the crisis – around 2-3 times more – in the UK than elsewhere (Chart 6). 8  This third gap is interesting, in part, because it is striking and less well-known. But, more fundamentally, it is interesting because it can help in explaining the first two gaps. A long and lengthening tail of stationary companies explains why the UK has a one third productivity gap with its international competitors. And that same tail is also an important reason why the UK has a one fifth productivity gap relative to the past. To mix metaphors for a moment, the UK is in many respects a tale (tail) of two companies: a small set in the upper tail gazelling along the productivity high road and a much larger set in the lower tail snailing along the 5  For example, Tenreyro (2018), Swinney (2018), Remes et al (2018). An alternative strand of the literature considers the role of market power, for example De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017). There is also a strand that debates mismeasurement of GDP and productivity, for example, Mokyr (2014). 6 For example, Brennan, Haldane and Madouros (2010).

The changes happening in the technologies around money will have an impact on the business model of the retail banking system that has deposit accounts at its core and that has hitherto dominated the payment and settlement machinery. It is certainly not our job to protect or preserve any particular business model for the provision of financial services. But the banking system, operating within the framework of the Bank of England monetary policy to govern the unit of account and under the regulation and supervision of the Bank and the FCA, is at the centre of the creation and of the use of the majority of our money as a means of payment and as a store of value. 16  Over 90% of customers described themselves as satisfied with their bank according to a survey by GfK NOP commissioned by the Competition and Markets Authority for its investigation into the personal current account sector. 17 The unit is a joint initiative by the PRA and FCA to provide information and support for those thinking of setting up a new bank in the UK: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/new-bank-start-up-unit 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  Given this role of the banking system in our economy, we have to ensure that the banks and the system as a whole are robust and have the resilience to withstand very severe risks. Our framework of regulation and our annual stress test of the banking system is designed to give this assurance.
1  Moreover, the most indebted countries should, with a medium-term perspective, reinforce the sustainability of their public accounts. A particular difficulty when designing policy responses in the current context is the extraordinary uncertainty and volatility currently surrounding the global economy, which generates risks of policy miscalculation and disruption to financial markets, and requires policymakers to stand ready to adjust policies depending on how the situation evolves. This is clearly how monetary policy is currently being conducted, with data-dependent decisions being made on a meeting by meeting basis, but this may be more difficult to achieve in the case of fiscal policy, given the longer implementation lags involved. From a more global perspective, economic policy-making is facing the challenge of increasing geopolitical tension. If this trend ends up triggering a scenario of runaway fragmentation, the consequences in terms of trade and financial flows, productivity, inflationary pressures, and ultimately economic activity would be very severe. With this in mind, it is not difficult to conclude that, amid the increasing risk of fragmentation in the international sphere, strengthening supranational policies and institutions, which support international cooperation, is more important than ever. I firmly believe that our multilateral system, with the necessary reforms and adaptations to the new circumstances, remains pivotal to global progress, as has been the case over the last few decades. In this respect, I believe that forums like this one are an example of fruitful international cooperation, insofar as they enhance regional cooperation and dialogue.

At the end of the sales programme, the National Bank still held 1,290 tonnes of gold, corresponding to one third of the value of its currency reserves. Even though it has been demonetised, the yellow metal still plays an important role in our reserves. It is an asset category that traditionally affords good protection in times of crises in the international monetary system. It also allows us to hold part of our reserves on our own country, which is not possible with financial assets. Moreover, as expressly requested by Parliament, Article 99 of the Federal Constitution requires the National Bank to hold part of its currency reserves in gold. The Governing Board considers that the holdings of 1,290 tonnes are appropriate to the current international environment. It does not intend to proceed with further sales of gold. Distribution of profit This General Meeting of Shareholders will find a special place in the National Bank's annals, as you are going to decide on how the proceeds of the gold sales are to be distributed. This will close a chapter first opened in 1997, when a group of experts came to the conclusion that the SNB's currency reserves were larger than required for the execution of its mandate and that it could thus consider selling half its gold holdings, once the Swiss franc's gold parity was discontinued.
Chart 1: GDP just about back to pre-pandemic levels  Level of GDP, 2019 Q4 = 100 104  104  100  100  96  96  92  92  88  88  84  84  80  80  76 Dec 19  Jun 20  Dec 20  Jun 21  Dec 21  76 Jun 22  Source: ONS and Bank calculations. However, while the accounting equality of output and income is valid in nominal (i.e. cash) terms, and more generally in closed economies, it’s not always the case in real terms and for open economies. When we’re able to trade with other countries we no longer have to  Bank of England  Page 3  consume and produce the same things. This means output and consumer prices can diverge. And movements in that relative price will affect the real consumption value of what we collectively produce even if its quantity (GDP) doesn’t change. If you produce apples but consume oranges you’ll be better off when the price of oranges falls (relative to that of apples), worse off if the opposite happens. It’s not that domestic output and productivity don’t matter for income: obviously they do. But movements in relative prices matter too, and there are times when they matter a lot. In the real-world UK economy, one of the big differences in this respect involves energy and other physical goods. Collectively we consume a lot more of these things than we produce.

The exact timing and scale of the peak rate of retail energy price inflation will obviously depend (amongst others) on the nature and duration of government support. But in the absence of further (and equally steep) rises in wholesale gas prices, and even without any such support, inflation in retail energy bills is likely to be materially lower a couple of years from now than it is today. Inflation in the areas most affected by the pandemic seems already to have peaked. However, it’s also because we are relatively unfamiliar with the second-round effects of these things. They very clearly existed in the past, before inflation targeting was put in place in 1992. Economists long recognised that, in the presence of “real income resistance”, negative shocks – from, say, higher import prices or higher taxes – could generate inflation in wages and domestic prices. Estimates of these effects using the historical data, from before the 1990s, were reasonably sizeable. But they then began to decline, a phenomenon many attributed to greater flexibility in the labour market. So although there were occasions after 1992 when real incomes were squeezed – the big rise in import prices immediately after the financial crisis was one obvious case, so too perhaps the period of weak productivity growth that followed – there was very little sign of any second-round response of domestic inflation. Absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence.