samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And it was placed in doubt partly because banks in those countries spared a  16  See “Global Liquidity”, M Carney (2011), at the Canada-United Kingdom Chamber of Commerce. 17  Both play a role in, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009), “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes”  18  See “Reforming finance: are we being radical enough” Clare distinguished lecture in Economics and Public Policy, Turner (2011) and Discussion by Tucker (2011). 19  See Cochrane (2011) “Discount rates”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 66, pages 1,047–109. 20  For example, Justiniano et al (2011) decompose the drivers of US macroeconomic fluctuations using two different technology shocks: to the relative price of investment and to the transformation of savings into future capital input. They find that the latter shock is the most important driver of US business cycle fluctuations and is almost identical to the observed spread between high-yield (non-investment grade) and AAA-rated corporate bond yields. This echoes work a generation ago by Ben Friedman and Ken Kuttner (1994), “Indicator Properties of the Paper-Bill spread. Lessons from recent experience.”  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  property boom had, directly or indirectly, financed property bubbles or over-indebted governments elsewhere around the euro area. In the US, as elsewhere, a supposed business model of “Originate & Distribute” – ie capital market intermediation – morphed into “Originate & Warehouse the large pieces that cannot be distributed, or at least tuck them away in shadow banks we can fund”.

These include the following assumptions:   that a diversified portfolio of US real estate had little risk of falling in value;    that Triple-A rated securities based on mortgages were so well protected by the structure of the securitization that they posed little risk even if real estate prices did fall;    that the evolution of many financial institutions to an “originate to distribute” model of lending and securitization meant there was little risk exposure to declining real estate prices; and,    that there was little risk of a “run” on organizations like investment banks that relied on short-term, collateralized borrowing. 1  Of course, the views I express today are my own, not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee (the FOMC). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Then to conclude I’d like to briefly mention what we can and must do to reduce the risks resulting from these sorts of financial myths, going forward. I believe that financial stability will, in the future, be better served as we implement some of the protections afforded by the Dodd-Frank Act; but I also suspect that doing better at protecting against various financial myths ultimately requires a cultural change. As a discipline, risk management has been too willing to accept that historical statistical relationships will be stable.
John C Williams: Welcoming remarks - Investing in America's Workforce Book Launch Event Welcoming remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Investing in America's Workforce Book Launch Event, New York City, 9 November 2018. * * * As prepared for delivery  Welcome Good morning. I am very pleased to welcome you all to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for the launch of Investing in America’s Workforce: Improving Outcomes for Workers and Employers. I would like to thank our colleagues across the Federal Reserve System, the Heldrich Center for Workforce Development at Rutgers University, the Ray Marshall Center at the University of Texas at Austin, and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research for collaborating with us on this initiative. My colleagues and I are proud to co-sponsor this event today and appreciate everyone who contributed their time and effort to making the Investing in America’s Workforce publication a reality. With over 100 contributors, pulling this together was not an easy feat. I recognize the value of sharing knowledge and resources and am pleased that we can help facilitate this effort. I congratulate my colleagues and our partners for this accomplishment and believe this is just the beginning of our work to support the workforce field.

There is a tendency to try to re-invent the wheel and overlook past experience, but by taking a step back and learning from one another, we can have a much greater positive impact in our communities. Roadshow Workforce Experience Sustainable economic growth and thus broad-based prosperity is dependent on a healthy job market, one in which employers can find the skills they need and workers find jobs that allow them to grow and move up the economic ladder. The challenge is developing a system that encompasses both and is accessible to all those seeking a job. Our workforce development initiative aims to promote dialogue and a greater understanding of promising policies and programs that allow workers, especially those in low and moderate-income communities, to develop in-demand skills and connect them with employers. We can achieve this by connecting with workforce stakeholders through policy forums, roundtable discussion sessions, and examining areas through our research and outreach. One of the best aspects of my job is the opportunity to visit communities across our Second District. The skills gap and the uneven economic recovery among different communities are consistent themes I hear, not just in the Second District but also in my previous job on the West Coast. I also have heard about a variety of policies and programs that seem to be making an impact and could have broader potential that are worth sharing.
In recent years, however, this sort of consideration has not played such a prominent role. There are several interrelated explanations for this. Monetary policy thus far has been aimed to a great extent at establishing a regime of low inflation and engendering understanding for it. In practice, the scope is also limited for monetary policy decisions of a fine-tuning character by the uncertainty that prevails, inter alia, about future developments and by the degree of credibility for the low inflation policy. 2. Uncertainty and Credibility There are various kinds of uncertainty that in practice play an important part in monetary policy and are also important for the speed and scale with which changes in interest rates are made: - One type of uncertainty has to do with the economy’s basic mechanisms.. Which model of the economy shall we use for our analysis? A major problem here in recent years has been that the shift to low inflation and a flexible exchange rate by itself can change the relationships in the model. - A second type of uncertainty concerns the interpretation of new information that is constantly coming in. It is important in this connection to assess what effects an interference or a shock have, which, inter alia, is linked with whether it is permanent or temporary. - Finally there is uncertainty about the effect of the measures that the Riksbank can take--in practice, changes in the instrumental interest rates.

The Riksbank has emphasized that one should see the price stability objective in an annual perspective—nothing more precise than that. As to the width of the band, we have started from an interval of +1 per cent, which is fairly normal among countries with an inflation target. Summary The policy with an inflation target has functioned well in Sweden and in other countries that have chosen to work with an inflation target. Inflation has become low. In addition an increased understanding of a policy directed at price stability has been created in Sweden as well as in other countries with an inflation target. This is especially notew orthy because many of the countries which now work with an inflation target are the very same countries that earlier had problems with inflation. When monetary policy is conducted with an inflation target, production and employment are normally stabilised too. For example, increased demand usually implies an increased rate of inflation. When inflation forecasts indicate that a risk for inflation will exceed the target, raising the instrumental rate is warranted, thereby also slowing down demand growth. In practice the room for an active stabilisation policy is circumscribed by the uncertainty about future inflation. Another important complication relates to how credible the policy is. Increased credibility of monetary policy creates more room for both rapidly shifting BIS Review 56/1997  - 10 -  policy in a more expansionary direction in situations of weakening demand and deferring interest rate hikes.
Jean-Claude Trichet: The Euro and the monetary union Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Banque de France, at the Society of Business Economists Annual Dinner, London, 12 February 2002 *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and an honour to be with you today, in the occasion of the Annual Dinner of the Society of Business Economists, in front of such a distinguished audience. I am particularly pleased to express my views on the euro and its prospects following the successful launch st of the notes and coins on 1 January 2002. I am happy to have an opportunity to present my views on the successful set-up of the euro, on the economic and financial integration of Europe and on the challenges that the euro-zone has to cope with. The Euro: built on a successful set-up Set-up of the Eurosystem The single monetary policy is formulated and implemented within a sound institutional framework, the Eurosystem, comprising the European Central Bank and the twelve national central banks of the euro area. Three principles are shaping up the Eurosystem: independence, transparency and decentralisation. The independence of the European Central Bank and national central banks is enshrined in the Treaty. When exercising their powers and carrying out their tasks and duties, neither the central banks of the Eurosystem nor any member of its decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions, from any government of a Member State or from any other body.

Most of the barriers to trade in services appear to be due to national regulations and should be abolished or alleviated. While the Eurosystem acts mainly as a stimulus in the process of structural reforms, it does play a leading part in ensuring financial stability. This brings me to the second challenge that EMU will have to take up. Financial stability Like every modern and independent central bank, the Eurosystem and its individual components, the national central banks of the euro area, have to fulfil two main functions: firstly, ensuring price stability, a key condition for sustained growth, and secondly, preserving financial stability, a growing challenge in a context of globalisation of the world economy, of amplification of financial and economic cycles, of instant access to information. I insist on the highly complementary nature of these two objectives: price stability is the bedrock on which financial stability is built. The adequacy of European institutional arrangements for financial stability The adequacy of European institutional arrangements for financial stability has been reviewed in depth at the EU level. In two reports, in April 2000 and April 2001, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) took stock of the supervisory and regulatory mechanisms in the EU and examined the issue of financial crisis management. It concluded that the current arrangements provided a coherent and flexible basis for safeguarding financial stability and recommended a further strengthening of cross-border and cross-sector co-operation.
In this regard, the ECB supports both private-sector and European Commission initiatives to encourage further integration, such as the follow-up to the report of the Commission’s Forum Group on Mortgage Credit. Infrastructure Integration of financial markets cannot take place without an integrated payment, clearing and settlement infrastructure. This brings me to the third component of the financial system, the financial infrastructure, which also gives me the opportunity to illustrate some cases of where the ECB has taken direct action. TARGET is one such example. Had TARGET not been operational from the first day of Monetary Union, there would have been no means of transferring liquidity from a country with a liquidity surplus to a country with a liquidity deficit. Consequently, we would not have had a single but several money markets, which would have made monetary policy far more difficult to implement. Over time, TARGET has continuously increased its market share in large value payments in euro. TARGET's market share is now around 90% of the total traffic value compared to 70% at the moment when the euro was launched. At the same time, the domestic component has remained at roughly three quarters of the total traffic value. However, our ambitions did not stop in 1999. We are currently building TARGET2, which is due to go live in 2007 and will replace the current decentralised system with a single technical platform.

Second, a well integrated financial system helps to make the euro area economy more efficient through the reduction of financing costs and an improved allocation of financial resources. This is likely to be conducive to higher and more sustainable non-inflationary growth. A study sponsored by the European Commission concluded in 2002 that further integration in the European Union might generate additional gains of 1% in the overall level of real GDP over a decade or so. Third, European financial integration is a priority that has been reiterated by the European Council on several occasions. The ECB’s support for European financial integration is therefore in accordance with Article 105 of the Treaty, which states that “the ESCB [– European System of Central Banks –] shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community”. Finally, there is the interconnection between financial integration and financial stability. As deeper financial integration may, to some extent, change the interplay of vulnerabilities, the potential impact of these on financial stability – which is of natural interest to central banks – has to be taken into account. The ECB uses all available channels in its efforts to foster European financial integration. We try to raise awareness of the need for integration and the means of achieving it. We also advise on the shaping of the legal framework. Furthermore, the ECB can act as a catalyst for collective initiatives from the private sector.
Øystein Olsen: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 21 May 2013. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. I would like to thank the Chairman of the Committee and thank you for this opportunity to report on the conduct of monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s Financial Markets Report. My statement here today is based on the Bank’s Annual Report, but also on the Executive Board’s assessments for the period to the most recent monetary policy meeting and new information. When I was here last year, the key policy rate had been reduced by 0.25 percentage point to 1.5 percent in March. The key policy rate has since been kept unchanged. The key policy rate is low because inflation is low and because external interest rates are at very low levels. The year 2012 was characterised by weak growth among Norway’s trading partners and turbulence in financial markets. Uncertainty about global economic developments, particularly in Europe, was high. Key rates in many countries were close to zero, and both the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve announced that key rates would be kept low for a long period. Economic developments in many advanced economies remained weak into 2013.

The aim is to ensure that the analytical basis is consistent with the formulation of monetary policy. The objectives of the countercyclical capital buffer and the key policy rate are different. The objective of the buffer is to strengthen banks’ resilience to losses in an economic downturn, while the objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation over time. The inflation target is weighed against the aim of smoothing fluctuations in output and employment. The new instrument will be taken into account in monetary policy. Both the key policy rate and the buffer work through banks’ responses. The buffer will be set on the basis of an assessment of the risk that financial imbalances may trigger or amplify an economic downturn. Capital adequacy requirements, and their effect on bank lending rates, will be one of many factors underlying the monetary policy analysis and interest rate setting. The countercyclical capital buffer will strengthen the resilience of the banking sector during an upturn. It may also, to some extent, counteract the build-up of financial imbalances. But the effect on bank behaviour is uncertain. Thus, Norges Bank cannot disregard financial imbalances when setting the key policy rate. The criteria for the conduct of monetary policy remain firm also after the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer. When assessing the various considerations, monetary policy must pursue its primary objective – low and stable inflation. We cannot overburden monetary policy. Other economic objectives must be pursued using policy tools such as financial regulation, the tax system and fiscal policy.
Every one of you is welcome to the Central Bank to discuss any issues as long as this is in the interest of the stability of our country, and the banking system in particular. Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, finally and in the context of everything said by me and by the speakers before me during this debate, I believe that now the most important thing as regards the country’ macroeconomic and financial policy is preserving stability and ensuring predictability; predictability, because the global financial and economic crisis has shown that countries, which follow stability-oriented and consistent macroeconomic policies are going less painfully through this difficult for all countries period. The BNB’s role is to secure the country’s price and financial stability and the soundness of our strictly regulated banking system. Over the next six years the focus of my work will be on preserving and maintaining the macroeconomic stability in the country by keeping the fixed exchange rate and the currency board arrangement. The currency board will continue as the foundations underlying the stability and economic growth in Bulgaria. Second comes preserving and maintaining the stability of the banking system. Over the last two years, we have been witnessing globally the catastrophic consequences of poorly regulated and supervised banking and financial institutions. Bulgaria too was affected, but unlike some other countries it stayed outside the centre of the storm due to the consistently implemented conservative model of licensing policy, supervision and regulation of the banking sector.

Ivan Iskrov: Bulgarian National Bank – independence, predictability and transparency Speech by Mr Ivan Iskrov, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, before the 41st National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria on the occasion of his election for a second term of office, Sofia, 26 August 2009. *  *  *  Ms. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen MPs, Allow me first and foremost to thank you for the enormous trust and the strong support you just now gave to the Central Bank and its Governor, Ivan Iskrov. I don’t know of any head of any public institution that has so far enjoyed such a vast parliamentary vote of confidence with the support of 195 MPs. This result exceeds the 165 votes in support of my nomination in the previous 40th National Assembly. When a week ago I shared with the person closest to me that I had decided to use the parliamentary case of Mr. Nenovsky to submit myself to a confidence vote by the 41st National Assembly, I heard the following: “Isn't this step rather too risky, besides the Prime Minister publicly announced that he did not approve of the procedure but he respects the BNB as an institution, and highly values you as a governor and wishes you to continue on the post?" I replied that no one could predict the possible deliberations and how the 240 MPs would vote, but that I was nonetheless obliged to ask for their confidence. Or else on 9th October this year I leave!
And yet, as I have said on countless occasions, drawing on former Dallas Fed board Chairman Herb Kelleher’s love for bourbon, once we had QE3 in place, I considered it unwise to go directly from Wild Turkey to cold turkey for fear of getting the financial equivalent of delirium tremens; indeed, we saw that with the “taper tantrum” the markets threw in May of 2013. So I was an eager proponent of the tapering program the FOMC initiated in January of this year. I want to be clear here. Especially at the beginning of QE3, when the nonsense term “QE infinity” was being broadcast by otherwise responsible analysts, journalists and pundits, rates dipped to lows that helped creditworthy businesses bolster their balance sheets and strengthen their wherewithal for future expansion. Again, even if you were living under a rock, you know that this gift of near-cost-free debt as measured in inflation- and tax-adjusted terms has thus far been used primarily to finance stock buybacks, increase dividends and fatten cash reserves, and recently, finance mergers by the most creditworthy companies. For those with access to capital, it was a gift of free money to speculate with. (One wag – I believe it was me – quipped that there was, indeed, a “positive wealth effect… the wealthy were affected most positively.”) We know that monetary policy acts with long and variable lags.

This has contributed to the development of a deeper and more liquid, efficient, transparent and effective sukuk market. Challenges in the development of the global Islamic capital market While much has been achieved, much remain to be done. Let me turn to some of the challenges and initiatives taken to address them. A vital ingredient for the development of capital markets, including the Islamic capital market, is the creation of a secondary trading platform for the capital market instruments. This will provide investors with the flexibility in managing their liquidity requirements. In this respect, more needs to be done in terms of the creation of a continuous supply of Islamic papers and instruments that would promote the secondary trading of instruments and add greater depth to the market. There also needs to be greater diversity in the type and maturity of the sukuks in the market for Islamic financial institutions and portfolio managers to manage their funds effectively. As part of the efforts to address these issues, the Malaysian government regularly issues sukuk with different maturities in order to create a benchmark yield curve. Since the year 2000, the government has developed an  BIS Review 74/2007  3  auction calendar for both the conventional and sukuk government issues. In 2005, the government commenced issuing shorter term Islamic treasury bills and longer-dated sukuk, with a maturity of 10 years, to further diversify the instruments available to investors.