samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is an impressive outcome, made possible only by commitment, enthusiasm and exceptional cooperation that has been shown by the project team and all our partners who are here today throughout these last two years. I am well aware of the numerous logistical and communication challenges that had to be overcome by the team and the industry, and the persistence that it took to break long-held perceptions before we were able to build momentum in our outreach efforts to deliver these results. So let me on behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, join Faris in extending my congratulations to all who contributed to this important initiative. We are especially grateful to the World Bank for working with us to bring the Greenback Project to Johor Bahru – the first champion city in Asia, and for providing technical support in the project’s design and implementation strategies. It goes without saying that we could not have done this without the exceptional support of Yang Berhormat Datuk Bandar and your team at Majlis Bandaraya Johor Bahru. The city of Johor Bahru has been an exemplary host for the first Greenback Project in Malaysia. Johor Bahru can be proud of serving as a role model for promoting transparent, efficient and affordable remittance services that are contributing to more inclusive financial services for all individuals and businesses.

Increasing this share can lower costs associated with cash handling for both businesses and the economy, creating a virtuous cycle for affordable remittance services. Project Greenback Kota Kinabalu As one chapter comes to an end, another begins. In continuation of our efforts to encourage ongoing positive developments in the remittance market, Bank Negara Malaysia and the World Bank are pleased to take the Project Greenback partnership to Malaysia’s second remittance champion city – the city of Kota Kinabalu. On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia let me thank Y Bhg. Datuk Juanis Solidau for his presence here today to mark the handover, and to Dewan Bandaraya Kota Kinabalu for agreeing to host the project. We are very excited about the prospect of bringing the project to Kota Kinabalu, which will offer the opportunity to apply successful lessons from Johor Bahru, and also new and different experiences to build on. This will include a focus on supporting e-remittances given the large number of migrant workers staying in remote areas. Conclusion As the Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu famously said “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.” We are extremely grateful to the city of Johor Bahru for enabling us to take the first step in this Greenback experience. We now look forward to the next step on this journey which 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  will take us to Kota Kinabalu.
With these conditions met, we can achieve better automatic stabilisation of future economic shocks, as the participants in the economy will understand how monetary policy will act going forward and be able to adjust their expectations accordingly. If the private sector instead perceives the scope for monetary policy as being limited or the policy as being hard to grasp, credibility for the inflation target may be jeopardised, particularly in a situation in which these limits are perceived as longterm. Proposals for tools that could be used to provide better possibilities for counteracting a recession include: • • • • • • •  Raised inflation target Make up strategies for better automatic stabilisation of the economy after shocks Quantitative easing used systematically in the implementation of monetary policy Forward guidance Coordination with fiscal policy under special circumstances Fiscal policy stimulation measures funded with central bank money, socalled helicopter money Acceptance of low inflation  We shall now examine the arguments behind these proposals. Raised inflation target Firstly, it must be said that the proponents of this idea do not usually mean raising the inflation target in the current situation. Rather, if the inflation target is to be raised, this should be from a normal level, when inflation has been close to the target for some time and monetary policy has become somewhat normalised.

But the data and conditions have not progressed enough for the FOMC to shift its monetary policy stance of strong support for the economic recovery. Specifically, the FOMC decided last week to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at zero to ¼ percent and made no changes to its program of asset purchases. In thinking about adjusting its stance in the future, the FOMC has defined conditions and measures that will inform its decision-making. In terms of the federal funds rate, the FOMC said it expects it will be appropriate to maintain this target range until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the FOMC’s assessments of maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time. The FOMC also said it will maintain its current asset purchase pace until substantial further progress has been made toward its employment and inflation goals.5  Conclusion I hope you remember the “things we said today,” but if not, here’s my final message. The sun is shining, both literally and figuratively. Progress on vaccinations and the economy is very welcome news, and I look forward to a full and complete recovery, accompanied by inflation that averages 2 percent over time. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the outlook for the Norwegian economy Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Norges Bank, at a meeting of Sparebanken Nord-Norge, Tromsø, 25 September 2001. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation Summary and charts. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 19 September. *  *  *  Norway’s economic policy is based on new guidelines for fiscal and monetary policy. The new guidelines were published by the Government on 29 March 2001 in connection with the presentation of the Government’s Long-Term Programme. The inflation target for monetary policy came into force immediately. The guidelines for fiscal policy were discussed in the Storting in June and were approved by a majority. Monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. The inflation target is set at 2½ per cent. In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account. In the 1990s, monetary policy gradually moved further away from the fixed-exchange-rate regime which was practiced from 1986 to 1992. Low and stable inflation is the best contribution monetary policy can make to growth, prosperity and income distribution. In the long term, monetary policy has little effect on the real economy. Low and stable inflation can, however, provide fertile ground for stability and growth.

In a scenario when we see oil prices slump from the current relatively high levels, both business and household expectations are set to be negatively affected for a time. However, we expect no reversal in the current positive economic trend. We cannot rule out a certain slowdown in the paces of growth between late this year and early next year; yet subsequently, the economic 2 / 14  BIS central bankers' speeches  trends of today will prevail. Businesses will be gradually building up investment as they capitalise on their profits accumulated in prior years. The real sector’s ability to borrow will also improve over time. Alongside with softer monetary conditions, this will give extra impetus to growth in investment. Consumer demand will recover gradually on the back of growing revenues and improving expectations. This process is expected to be smooth and create no inflation risks. The recent strengthening in the ruble is set to bring about increased demand for imports in the first half of 2017. Moving forward, however, this growth is on course to become slower; in this way, exports are set to grow at moderate paces. In 2017–2018, economic growth will total about 1-1.5%, with acceleration to 1.5-2% envisaged as early as 2019. Still, potential economic growth will be invariably constrained by structural factors. Following this recovery period, paces of GDP growth are expected to be equal or less than 1.52%. The current account balance is expected to rise in 2017, prompted by higher oil prices.
In historical terms, the real exchange rate has only remained so high for short periods. The Central Bank thus openly stated its view that the exchange rate was unsustainably high and must weaken. However, the timing and pace of the depreciation was unknown. BIS Review 60/2007  1  Following the privatisation programme that was completed in 2003, the Icelandic banks expanded very rapidly. Privatisation unleashed an enterprising spirit and the resolve and ambition to enter new territory. The banks sharply stepped up their activities outside Iceland by acquiring foreign financial companies and establishing branches. These radical changes are reflected in the growth of the three largest Icelandic banks’ total assets from the equivalent of 96% of GDP at the end of 2000 to roughly eightfold GDP at the end of 2006. A distinctive feature of Iceland’s financial sector is that no foreign banks operate directly in the country. However, the domestic banks have become less Icelandic, so to speak. The greater part of their operations are now in other countries. The bulk of their revenues and profits are generated abroad, in the other Nordic countries, the UK, Luxembourg and elsewhere in Europe. As a result, their revenue base is significantly broader and they are less exposed to cyclical fluctuations in the Icelandic economy than before. All the same, if the Icelandic economy were to weaken significantly, reports about it could affect the banks’ potential for securing foreign financing.

3  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/2015/jul.aspx. 4  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/fsc/Pages/cbest.aspx. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  2. Recovery capabilities  3. Effective governance  1. Defensive capabilities  Yesterday’s Financial Stability Report (FSR) describes defensive capabilities as capabilities that “enable firms to identify and withstand attack.” This is important from a financial stability point of view not only for those firms that, as part of the cyber programme, we have identified as ‘core’ to the sector, but also relevant to their suppliers and other firms they trade with. It implies a level of resilience that goes beyond basic cyber hygiene but aims instead to ensure that firms are in a position to manage Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). While not wanting to go into too much detail on the cyber work programme 5, three key themes are relevant here. •  The first is that cyber is not just about technology. People matter. More often than not attackers may seek to exploit potential weaknesses in personnel, to establish a bridgehead for attacks. It is therefore essential that firms have the right arrangements in place so that all staff understand cyber risk and their responsibilities for information assurance. •  The second is that cyber requires investment. In people and in systems. Underinvestment in cyber defences may mean that firms are behind the game in terms of their ability to respond to crystallised threats. For example, they could risk misdiagnosing a cyber attack as an internal IT failure rather than a deliberate attack.
With this, the MPR is between 150 and 200 bp below its levels considered neutral. The speed with which we have made this reduction responds to our conviction that the medium-term inflation outlook was revealing a scenario that jeopardized the fulfillment of the policy goal. All this, because of the implications that the evolution of the macro scenario, in particular weak activity, had on them. Considering the cuts already made, we believe that monetary policy is now highly expansionary and consistent with inflation at 3% over the projection horizon. Within this horizon we will see in the coming months that annual inflation will fall again, approaching 2%. We will also see months of poor activity, as shown by the latest Imacec. But the improvement in external conditions, the disappearance of specific factors that have affected activity and prices, and the monetary impulse itself, will allow the economy to regain more growth in the second half of this year and in 2018, with capacity gaps that will begin to close in the course of 2018 at the same time that inflation will converge to the policy target. This, by the way, does not mean that the MPR will not be adjusted again, but that in the most likely scenario no new changes are needed, and that the most important thing will be to let the monetary impulse permeate the economy for as long as necessary in order that, combined with the other mentioned factors, it will generate a visible convergence to the policy target.

Our track record of the last year and a half provides a good example of how flexible our monetary policy is to respond to significant changes in economic conditions. In hindsight, monetary policy remained expansionary with a stable MPR between October 2014 and September 2015, despite the increase in inflation resulting from a sharp exchange rate depreciation, rightly interpreting that it was a transitory phenomenon derived from supply-side pressures on prices. Towards the end of 2015, a normalization process began, sustained on a scenario where growth was projected to equal potential, and with bounded capacity gaps. This adjustment, however, occurred gradually and prudently, with an increase of 25 basis points in the MPR in October and December 2015. This prudence, accompanied by a vision focused on the future prospects of the economy, allowed the monetary policy orientation to be adjusted quickly when the macro scenario began to change. Indeed, the exchange rate appreciation and signs of weakening in the first half of 2016 led the Bank to revise its inflation and growth projections. As these adjustments revealed a new macroeconomic scenario, characterized by weak economic activity, greater exchange rate stability and a faster deceleration of inflation, the Bank successively adjusted its monetary policy options and bias, culminating in four 25-bp cuts in the policy rate in the last five months. Thus, in response to changes in the medium-term macroeconomic scenario, the MPR has accumulated a decline of 100 bp since January of this year, to 2.5%.
Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s latest monetary and economic developments and outlook Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 30 May 2014. *  *  *  Today, on 30 May 2014, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania reviewed and approved the monthly Monetary Policy Report. After discussing the recent economic and monetary developments and their outlook, the Supervisory Council decided to lower the key interest rate by 0.25 percentage point, to 2.50%. The key rate decrease aims at creating more favourable conditions for inflation to return to our target in the medium term. The decision reflects our assessment and projections for low inflationary pressures in the quarters ahead, in response to the weak aggregate demand and the downward trend of inflation in Albania’s trading partners. This move contributes to boosting domestic consumption and investments, aiming at a fuller utilization of production capacities and a faster return of inflation to our target. (Let me now proceed with an overview of economic developments and key issues that were discussed at today’s meeting.) *** Annual inflation rate was 1.7% in April, slightly down from the average rate recorded in the first quarter of 2014. In the last months, the dynamics of inflation have been largely determined by the performance of food prices.

Figures differ across countries – with the lowest numbers in the Czech Republic (around 20 percent) and the highest in Romania (above 50 percent) – but the tendency is the same. Referring to the benefits of euro adoption, one of the prominent ones, namely the lower financing costs, is no longer obvious. The incomplete institutional setup of the European project in general and the European Monetary Union in particular – weak fiscal rules and the lack of any transnational instruments that would have enabled monitoring cross-border private capital flows – gave rise to a number of vulnerabilities which the recent crisis has exposed. To be more specific, what sets the European Union apart from the other industrialized economies is precisely the fact that the initial banking crisis which hit everybody here gave birth to fears of sovereign default, which reinforced banking system vulnerability and sapped investor confidence further, thus deepening the recession. The consequence of all that was the financial fragmentation issue, which is precisely the reason why the lower financing cost benefit of euro adoption, seems to have vanished. Another unfortunate consequence was that the benefits brought about by commercial integration were significantly diminished by lack of growth in the euro area. The fixes proposed to the institutional architecture of the European Monetary Union, such as the setup of the European Stability Mechanism and even that of the Banking Union, brought 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  about direct costs of adopting the euro.
Another risk is the ongoing discussion in the United States to ward off a sharp fiscal adjustment in 2013. Failure to reach an agreement could significantly hamper growth and increase market volatility. And central banks of developed economies have continued to boost, and even intensify, very expansionary monetary policies, which can bring consequences on capital flows, asset prices, currency parities, commodity prices and credit growth in the other economies, including Chile. So far the domestic effects of these policies have been limited, but they are certainly a source of concern. Finally, in the emerging world, the biggest risk continues to be the pace of economic activity. Incoming data indicate that China has resumed strong growth, but the weakening of Europe and pending discussions in the United States could affect the Chinese economy, and through it the emerging world. Chile would be especially affected because of its incidence in the determination of the copper price. In addition, the recent drop in world trade growth figures is cause for concern. In Chile, despite particularly low inflation, medium-term inflationary risks remain present. The sustained dynamism of Chile’s economic activity has intensified the use of installed capacity, and a strengthening of domestic demand could trigger inflationary pressures incompatible with the inflation target. So far, inflation has remained bounded and has even decreased. Our evaluation is that the recent drop is a transitory event that will be gradually reversed within the next few quarters to return to levels around the Central Bank’s target.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The baseline scenario reflects those events that are believed to be the most likely with the information at hand at the closing of this Report. There are risk scenarios, however, which if materialized, may reshape the macroeconomic environment – in some cases, significantly – and therefore, may alter the course of monetary policy. On this opportunity, having evaluated the alternative scenarios, the Board estimates that the risk balance is unbiased for both output and inflation. In the world economy, the main risk continues to be the situation in the Eurozone. On one hand are the difficulties in implementing agreements. On the other, like I said, as time has passed, the economic situation of the most affected countries has complicated further, while core European economies seem to be taking a turn for the worse. A sharper deceleration in Germany or France could aggravate the problems in the region and amplify pass-through channels to other economies. Neither can this analysis rule out episodes of volatility in the financial markets that could be more severe than the ones considered in the baseline scenario. However, the potential effects on Chilean banks of a deepening of the crisis in the Eurozone are still bounded. While banks’ profitability and solvency indicators have dropped most recently, stress tests show that the banking system’s level of capital is appropriate to absorb the losses caused by a risk scenario of this kind.
The three institutions also get together at least monthly, in what we refer to as the 'tripartite Standing Committee', to exchange information and discuss current threats to financial stability. As you might expect, we have met more frequently in recent weeks. If the events of 11 September have had an important effect on monetary policy, they had huge potential implication for financial stability as well. In the immediate aftermath, a key priority was to make sure that markets had adequate liquidity to continue and settle their business. In addition to its extensive operations in the US market, the US Federal Reserve entered into swap arrangements with the ECB, the Bank of England and other central banks to ensure a continued supply of dollar liquidity in other key markets. And the main payment systems extended their opening hours in the US, enabling the huge daily volume of dollar payments to be made. I must say that I was particularly impressed by the speed with which most of the big firms affected in New York were able to switch their operations to their contingency sites. Some of those sites were in New Jersey, but others put increased volumes through their London offices. There are of course a number of lessons which firms based in the UK and elsewhere will want to take from the disaster. But, overall, I salute the US firms and the US authorities for their actions, achieved at a time which for many involved was one of acute personal anxiety.

However, for online card payment transactions, due to the necessary significant technical changes, both for payment service providers and merchants operating e-shops, However, the delayed application of security requirements for online card transactions should not adversely affect customers. During the transitional period, payment service providers should recover the value of all unauthorized card payment transactions on the Internet for which no indepth identification of the customer has been applied, and the BNB monitors compliance with this requirement. Although the pandemic has led to some delays in the implementation of migration plans, according to available data, we expect Bulgaria to successfully complete migration by the end of the year within the projected pan-European deadline. Along with the work on the implementation of the current legal framework, many efforts are focused on its further improvement with a view to the emergence of innovative market participants, new technologies, changing business models. In September, the European Commission published the Digital Finance Package, part of which is the “EU Strategy for Retail Payments” and the “Strategy for the Digitalisation of EU Financial Services". The aim of both strategies is to outline the medium-term guidelines and priorities for the development of digitalization in the financial sector. Central to the payment strategy is immediate payments, executed within seconds, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, called the “new rule” in the strategy. Bulgaria is not lagging behind these trends.