samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
19 For loan markets, SC-STS will publish by April 2021 market guidance on the transition of bilateral corporate and retail loans, and set out further guidance on market mechanisms for converting legacy syndicated and hedged loans by the third quarter of this year. This is expected to rely on active SOR to SORA transition in the derivatives market to establish relevant pricing references for the transition of syndicated and hedged loans, where coordination across lenders and borrowers is essential. 20 The key message is this: Banks should actively engage their corporate customers to pro-actively undertake legacy transition wherever possible by end 2021. While some customers may be inclined to adopt a wait and see approach, particularly since LIBOR and SOR discontinuation could be extended to mid 2023, it is important to bear in mind that SOR derivatives liquidity will start to decline in 2021. 21  There are two reasons for this: Liquidity in derivatives will start shi ing to SORA, particularly from April onwards, given the stop to new SOR cash products, and as all hedges on new cash product shi to SORA. Likewise, with SC-STS considering a cessation timeline for new SOR derivatives, likely before end-2021, market participants should expect SOR liquidity to decline further as  https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2021/pushing-ahead-with-sor-sora-transition-in-2021  5/7  12/02/2021  "Pushing Ahead with SOR-SORA Transition in 2021" - Keynote Speech by Mr Leong Sing Chiong, Deputy Managing Director (Markets …  key banks will not be able to undertake new SOR derivatives transactions.

12/02/2021  "Pushing Ahead with SOR-SORA Transition in 2021" - Keynote Speech by Mr Leong Sing Chiong, Deputy Managing Director (Markets …  Speeches  Published Date: 02 February 2021  "Pushing Ahead with SOR-SORA Transition in 2021" - Keynote Speech by Mr Leong Sing Chiong, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development), Monetary Authority of Singapore, at ASIFMA Virtual Event: Singapore IBOR Transition on 2 February 2021 1 Good morning everyone. First, let me take this opportunity to wish everyone a Happy New Year! Let me also thank the Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association (ASIFMA) and the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) for organising this webinar and inviting me to speak on the important issue of Singapore’s interest rate benchmark transition. 2 In the next 20 mins or so, I will do a brief recap of the key objectives and milestones that we had set out last year. I will then touch on some recent developments in the US and UK that have a bearing on our transition timelines, and I will finally outline what our priorities are for this year in the transition to Singapore Overnight Rate Average (SORA). Recap 3 Back in 2019, the financial industry in Singapore, represented by the ABS and the Singapore Foreign Exchange Market Committee (SFEMC) [1] , assessed that given the eventual discontinuation of USD London Interbank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) and SGD Swap Oﬀer Rate (SOR), the most sustainable and sensible path was to transition aﬀected SOR markets to SORA.
At the beginning of the decade, we learned that it can be demanding to strike a balance between different monetary policy considerations in a small, open economy. When the key policy rate is raised to restrain a pronounced rise in domestic cost inflation, it can have a strong impact on the krone exchange rate, as observed in 2002–2003. This influences both the real economy and the inflation outlook. Midway through the decade, inflation rapidly declined. China’s entry into world trade and increased imports to Norway from Asia led to a persistent fall in prices for many goods. The combination of low inflation and strong economic growth posed a challenge to the conduct of monetary policy. Interest rates – both at home and abroad – were set at low levels. At the same time, this amplified the cyclical upturn in Norway. Towards the end of the decade, during the financial crisis, the interest rate was reduced sharply and to record-low levels. The decision to lower interest rates was undoubtedly not a difficult decision to make at the time. A persistently low interest rate, on the other hand, can pose a challenge to financial stability in an economy where there is a strong willingness to borrow and property prices are rising. Despite challenges met over the past decade, inflation has been fairly stable and close to the target, which shows that monetary policy has been effective. Compared with the 1980s, for example, inflation has been considerably lower and growth in the mainland economy has been markedly higher.

In this way, the guidelines reconcile the need for a flexible approach  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  to macroeconomic management with the gains brought by a commitment to more long-term operational objectives. Lessons from the financial crisis Even though Norway has fared well through the financial crisis, helped by a sound economic policy framework, some concerns related to financial stability remain. In particular, there is one area in which Norway differs from other countries in a manner we perhaps do not like: Norwegian households are among the most heavily indebted in Europe. As activity in the Norwegian economy is gathering momentum, pressures are mounting in the housing market. Consumer confidence has improved and house prices have risen in recent months. Housing starts are moving up, although from moderate levels. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  So far, the low interest rate level has not led to a pronounced increase in household borrowing. However, the household debt burden is at a historically high level and is expected to increase further. Rising debt and property prices are mutually reinforcing phenomena. Higher asset prices lead to higher collateral values for loans and increased borrowing opportunities for buyers. This increases the overall risk of the financial system. While monetary policy and fiscal policy have been anchored within a long-term, operational framework over the past ten years, there has been no coherent regulatory system for financial markets. Requirements are currently imposed on individual banks, but without adequate regard to overall risk in the financial system.
However, in order to uphold confidence in, and support for, monetary policy it is important to give a detailed report of when such factors are taken into account. This is a strategy the Riksbank follows. So far, the Riksbank has not found reason to take account of what happens beyond the normal forecast horizon when formulating its monetary policy, although it does normally produce surveys of the economy for longer periods. However, I have argued on several occasions in 1999 and 2000 that there was reason to raise the instrumental rate, taking into account the effects in a longer term perspective. BIS Review 43/2002  3  Nevertheless, asset prices should not be included in the formulation of monetary policy targets. There is otherwise a risk that the central bank would counteract adjustments that were fundamentally motivated. This would reduce the efficiency of the resource allocation and probably subdue growth. Other measures In addition to price stability, most central banks have a responsibility for financial stability. According to a narrow definition, financial stability is equal to a lack of crises in systemically-important banks. The banks have important functions with regard to the payment system and the supply of capital. It is easy to see that without an efficient payment system and capital supply the economy would be unable to function. Monetary policy would have no effect in this situation.

This is because, in our view, money can directly influence output and inflation in particular due to monetary and financial frictions existing in the economy and also some stickiness in the price determination process. Those facts underpin the two pillar approach of the Eurosystem As you know, the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy is grounded on two pillars: economic analysis, on the one hand, and monetary analysis, on the other. A wide set of short-term indicators (economic analysis) are complemented by the longer-term determinants of inflation (monetary analysis). This setup is based on a premise and has one important implication. The premise is that even if money has no systematic and immediate influence on prices, it can provide valuable and specific information on future inflation, at time horizons stretching beyond those usually adopted for the construction of central bank inflation projections. Because of the long-term relation between money growth and inflation, money has leading-indicator properties on future price  BIS Review 108/2006  1  developments. One could make the case that this is only an "empirical argument". But, in Central Banking, empirical realities do matter much. One could also argue that other strategies - such as targeting the price level or an average level of inflation over the long run - would have the same stabilizing properties as looking at money growth. I do not disagree in theory. But it is not clear to me that those strategies would be easier to implement or have the same anchoring effect on inflation expectations.
One explanation is that holding cash is associated with cost and inconvenience and there is therefore a willingness to accept a certain cost to avoid doing so. But an e-krona would change the prerequisites. In contrast to physical cash, the e-krona would not require agents to invest in ways of storing, transporting and insuring. This means that the lower bound for the policy rate would increase, probably to zero, that is, where it was previously assumed to be. In this sense, the e-krona could restrict monetary policy and make it less effective. The situation would be entirely different if the e-krona was to be interest-bearing. The zero bound would then no longer constitute a restriction as the yield of the ekrona itself could be negative. Furthermore, if physical cash were to be entirely phased out, the policy rate could instead be taken much further into negative territory than today. 26 Potentially, therefore, monetary policy would become more effective, even though it would probably be met by significant resistance from economic agents. This resistance is already substantial to what are currently more modest negative interest rate levels. But with an interest-bearing e-krona, we would also be in a completely different world. The interest rate on the e-krona, for example, would become a new regular monetary policy instrument. Potentially, therefore, it would involve a change on many different levels. However, with the current legislation, it is not clear whether it is even possible for the Riksbank to introduce an interest-bearing ekrona.

In this environment, the foundations for the sustainability for Islamic finance as a competitive form of financial intermediation will need to continue to be strengthened. Efforts are therefore being focussed on the further development of Islamic financial markets, the financial infrastructure, research and development to support innovation, and enhancing the legal, regulatory and supervisory framework. In addition, the adoption of the relevant advances in technology and the development of human capital are also key to support the development of Islamic finance. The ongoing efforts in these areas are aimed towards enhancing further the resilience of Islamic finance which would in turn enhance its potential to contribute towards global financial stability and the prospects for global growth. Indeed, the topic of the INCEIF's Public Lecture today, “Paradigm Change in Shaping the Future of Islamic Finance” is timely for us to deliberate and reflect on the issues confronting Islamic finance moving forward. We are indeed honoured today to have Dr Abbas Mirakhor. Dr Abbas joins INCEIF following a long and distinguished career as an economist and academician with considerable contribution in the field of Islamic economics, finance and banking. Dr Abbas started his academic career in 1968 with University of Alabama, in the United States of America as a Professor of Economics and later at the Florida Institute of Technology. In 1984, he joined the IMF in Washington DC as an economist before serving as the organisation's Executive Director and Dean of its Executive Board. He completed his term at the IMF in 2008.
In effect, MAS front-loaded policy adjustment in Jan so that further adjustment was not necessary in Apr 27. Shift in monetary policy stance in Jan was measured: continuing to keep $ band on gradual and modest appreciation path to ensure price stability over medium term. Important to keep a medium-term orientation with regard to setting monetary policy 28. If MAS reacted to every short-term fluctuation in output and prices, it would risk introducing even more volatility to markets and economy. This is because: •  4  External shocks that could hit small open economy like ours can be very frequent  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  There are considerable lags in monetary policy transmission. Off-cycle policy shift therefore highly atypical and only sparingly used. 29. Current policy stance remains appropriate for ensuring medium-term price stability  •  Economy estimated to be close to its potential for 2015. •  Labour market expected to remain at full employment  •  Core inflation, most relevant indicator for MAS’ monetary policy, expected to strengthen. Next monetary policy review is as scheduled in Oct. MAS’ financial performance 30. MAS’ P/L was almost in balance in FY2014/15, recording a small profit of $ billion. •  In FY2013/14, we recorded a profit of $ billion. •  Prior to that in FY2012/2013, recorded a loss of $ billion. 31. Why so volatile? Fluctuations in MAS’ profit figures from year to year is almost entirely due to currency translation effects, i.e.

This may have limited the demand for new labour. This trend has now been reversed. Employment growth measured by number employed is strong. Our regional network reports that there are labour shortages in many sectors. The wage settlements concluded so far indicate that wage growth may, as expected, be somewhat stronger this year than in 2005. Historically, it has proven difficult in both local and central negotiations to keep down cost growth when unemployment is low. There is thus a risk of even higher wage growth further ahead. On the other hand, the threat of relocation of jobs, increased labour inflows and higher imports of services from low-cost countries will probably contribute to restraining wage growth. In the period 1998-2002, businesses and employees experienced that high wage growth resulted in high interest rates and wide fluctuations in the krone exchange rate. This insight is perhaps still marking wage negotiations. The phase with ample labour supply may be in the process of tapering off. The decline in sickness absence has been reversed, and is now increasing. As was the case earlier, the number of persons on disability benefits is rising. The supply of labour from other countries is important for many industries, but on the whole is no longer offsetting increased flows into benefit schemes. There is competition for highly skilled labour in the new EU accession countries. Labour flows into the UK and Ireland have been particularly high and labour barriers may be more restrictive in Norway than in the UK and Ireland.
The logic there was that at that level failure of the material entity might trigger resolution of the group as a whole; problems for smaller entities, even those that might house functions that are critical to the host jurisdiction, should be more of a recovery matter. -  by including a provision that internal MREL for subgroups should be scaled in single point of entry (SPE) groups to 75-90% of the requirement that would apply to the subgroup on a standalone basis. The logic was that given the interdependence in the business models of SPE firms, prepositioning in this range would be sufficient to secure cooperation and deter hosts from ring-fencing, and home authorities from cutting off, foreign subsidiaries. Prepositioning of resources in this way will provide concrete underpinning for cooperation that goes beyond the paper commitments to cooperate in Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs), honoured in the breach in previous cross-border failures. Even with these restrictions there may still be a sum of the parts problem in which the sum of TLAC requirements at solo level pushes up external requirements. If internal TLAC requirements are high they are also likely to stand in the way of holding a surplus at the top of the group that could provide flexibility in covering losses if they are concentrated in a particular part of a group. Thus in our internal MREL policy our intention is first to consider setting internal MREL generally for the firm at the bottom of the 75-90% range.

A workshop held by the Committee on the Global Financial System earlier this year in Hong Kong also noted this difficulty. Appropriate calibration of macroprudential tools is difficult because of the lack of data and information about how the transmission process works―that is, what impact the tool will have on the targeted sector. Even assessing the impact ex post  1  Tobias Adrian, Meg McConnell and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  is challenging because it is difficult to predict how the macroeconomy and financial system would have evolved if the macroprudential tool had not been in place. Second, in the U.S., even if such a framework existed, there would still be a problem in terms of timely implementation. The U.S. regulatory structure is fragmented, so that in most cases, no single regulator is able to implement macroprudential tools in a comprehensive manner. As a result, imposing macroprudential tools in the United States would almost certainly leave significant gaps in coverage. Such coverage gaps would likely lead to distortions within the financial sector, as the tool would have differential impacts across financial intermediaries inside versus outside a particular regulatory boundary. Also, activity would migrate toward those areas outside the scope of the macroprudential tools that had been implemented. It is important to note the regulatory mandates of the numerous federal and state regulatory authorities differ considerably. Some simply may not view financial stability as an important part of their mandate.
But, as I showed you, the protection of financial privacy is not an obstacle to an efficient fight against money laundering or the financing of terrorism, nor does it hamper fair tax competition with our neighbours if a withholding tax is implemented along the line of the EU directive. Both the disclosure of certain informations relating to bank clients and the protection of privacy in the financial sphere arise from fundamental ethical convictions that are worth protecting. I am confident that with a frank dialogue and mutual effort to understand each other’s position, the common values of the Swiss and British financial centres will again come to the forefront. In particular, it is our predominant joint interest to see the very demanding standards that we have set for our own financial industry become the world-wide accepted rules. The long history of our financial centres and the large experience of our banking industry should give us a natural leadership role in this respect. BIS Review 13/2002  7

MAS as central bank, integrated supervisor, and financial sector promoter Those of you who have visited Singapore might have come across one of the highlights of our architectural heritage – the black and white colonial bungalows. Combining British aesthetic sensibilities with local adaptations to a tropical climate, these former colonial residences exude stately elegance while offering cool, airy comfort come monsoon rain or equatorial shine. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) itself operates out of a decidedly functional office block. Thankfully, the work that the MAS does is rather more interesting. •  MAS houses under one roof central banking, financial surveillance, and integrated supervision. •  MAS is also responsible for developing a sound and progressive financial centre. MAS’ single agency model sets us apart from other financial regulators. Many jurisdictions operate on what is commonly known as the twin peaks model of regulation. Under this model, separate agencies have responsibilities for prudential oversight and market conduct respectively. Prudential oversight is concerned principally with the safety and soundness of institutions while market conduct is focused on effective functioning of markets and consumer protection. Australia, Canada, and the UK are among the leading jurisdictions with twin peaks regulators. Like the black and white bungalows, MAS’ unique mandate of central bank, integrated supervisor, and promoter of financial sector development, was born partly out of circumstance.
Ardian Fullani: Macrofinancial stability in EU candidate countries and potential candidate countries – lessons to be learned Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the High-level Policy Workshop on Macro-prudential Policy, Frankfurt am Main, 14 December 2010. *  *  *  Dear colleagues, It is a pleasure to discuss with you our experience with the crisis and share some thoughts on the relevant lessons for the future. My perspective on this issue will focus on the case of Albania; an emerging market economy which imported the crisis through financial market channels and interconnectedness. The challenges posed to eastern European economies and decision makers were mostly the same in nature, while their policy response differed according to economic structures, institutional differences and degrees of freedom enjoyed by them. Let me briefly preview the three main messages of my speech. The first one is that there is no conflict between price stability and financial system stability in the long run – instead, they do mutually re-enforce each other and the resilience of the economy to external and internal shocks. From a central bank’s point of view, a corollary to this is that any macro-prudential measure taken to enhance financial stability is an investment in medium and long term price stability. I believe this conclusion is amply borne from Albania’s recent experience. My second message is that global or even regional financial markets require global or at least regional supervision and crisis resolution mechanisms.

We have seen that the links to the central banks work best when the staff at the Swedish embassies in the respective countries are actively involved and regularly follow up what is happening in the respective banks. At the beginning of this year, Sida commissioned an evaluation of the Riksbank’s cooperation so far with Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The evaluation showed that the Riksbank’s efforts in these central banks had been both successful and appreciated by the recipients. The very fact that we are colleagues, that we do the same things, have the same responsibility, was one of the key factors. There are many  BIS Review 123/2006  1  consultants; colleagues are harder to find. The long-term thinking behind the cooperation is also an important factor. We do not merely make an analysis, write a report and disappear. We are still here and can continue the discussion whenever necessary. The problems that were indicated in the evaluation were more of an administrative nature. For instance, it is difficult to find a place in a foreign aid context for low-cost projects like this, as they do not really follow the set patterns for other aid efforts. Finally, I can mention that the Riksbank has allocated resources in our internal business plan for next year to extend our cooperation with some of the central banks in Sida’s cooperating countries.