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This is also emphasised in the preparations to the law, where it states that ... the processing of licence applications does not mean that the authorities are responsible for the properties of the system’s operation, etc. It terms of the licensing process itself, Norges Bank has initiated preparations and we will be ready to receive licence applications when the law enters into force. At the same time, we are aware that the formulation of these applications will take some time, not to mention that any changes in agreements or routines (which become necessary based on legal requirements) may take even more time. However, we will endeavour to facilitate this process. We have already had informal contact with the banking associations concerning this matter and we are prepared to provide counsel and guidance in the further progress of this process. 4.3. The responsibility of the banks  The primary responsibility for the development of the payment system must, as mentioned, lie with the banks. This is in line with the approach of self-regulation. Further development of the common infrastructure, agreements and new payment services must come from the industry itself. In this process, it is important that banks provide more information on risk in the systems, so that an explicit division of responsibilities can be established - both for the individual systems operator and for the participants in the payment systems. However, the banks’ ability to develop efficient and stable payment services is influenced by the regulatory framework established by the authorities.