samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
4 Put differently, there are around the same number of FTE volunteers in the UK as there are paid employees in the manufacturing, construction and real estate sectors combined. Indeed, the only industrial sectors with a larger UK workforce are wholesale and retail services, education, health and social work. And it does not end there. It is estimated that another 170 million hours a year are volunteered by people less than once a month. 5 And to this estimate of formal volunteering should be added measures of informal volunteering. According to calculations recently released by the ONS, informal volunteers provide anywhere between 1.7 and 2.1 billion hours of extra help each year. 6 So, all in, volunteering in the UK might amount to as much as 4.4 billion hours per year. That is 1.7 hours per week for every UK adult aged over 16. It is not far off 10% of the total hours worked by all UK paid employees. That is quite an army. 4  Bank and Pro Bono Economics calculations using ONS Household Satellite Account hours. 5  Bank and Pro Bono Economics calculations using ONS Household Satellite Account hours. 6  See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/business-transparency/freedom-of-information/what-can-irequest/published-ad-hoc-data/econ/august-2014/hhsa-consistent-estimates-of-the-value-of-informalvoluntary-activity-in-2012-13.xls for further details. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Second, volunteering also appears to be big internationally. A group of academics at John Hopkins University have been pioneers in this field and have published cross-country comparisons. 7 They calculated that, in 2005, around 970m people in the world were engaged in voluntary activity.

So the Oxera team sought to capture the benefits of reducing homelessness in getting young people into employment or training, preventing them from re-offending, treating their mental health issues and reducing their substance misuse. These are a subset, albeit an important subset, of the social costs of homelessness. The results of this study, which was published by PBE last year, are outlined in Figure 12. To cut a long story short, the study suggested that, for every £ spent by Centrepoint, there was a societal benefit of at least £ Or, put differently, Centrepoint delivered a social return on investment of 140% over a five year period. This was very much a lower bound estimate. Let me give you a second example of a PBE social impact study, this time on an even grittier issue – child sexual exploitation. In 2012, a PBE team from the Bank of England did a piece of work for Barnardo’s to judge the impact of their interventions to help exploited children. 26 They looked at the reduced incidence of missing person calls to the police, the reduced probability of becoming classified as Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET), reductions in substance misuse and the benefits from secure accommodation. These benefits are outlined in Figure 13. They suggest a higher social welfare multiplier, perhaps as large as six to twelve. This is not miles away from estimates from a recent City of London study.
Lars Nyberg: Developments in the property market Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Fastighetsvärlden (Swedish newspaper), Stockholm, 30 May 2007. *  *  *  I would like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here to Fastighetsvärlden and talk about the Riksbank’s view on the property market. The property market is a subject that arouses considerable interest and is discussed frequently in many different forums, both in Sweden and abroad. I have on several occasions held speeches on the subject of the property market and I see good reasons for returning to this field to give the Riksbank’s views on current developments. In recent months the US mortgage market has come under focus, mainly because of developments in the subprime market. An increasing number of US households have experienced problems in paying their loan costs and some US mortgage institutions have gone bankrupt in recent months. This has given rise to some concern that we might see a similar development in Sweden. However, I believe there is very little likelihood of this. I will explain why a little later on. Today I intend to speak mainly about how we at the Riksbank view the recent developments in the property market. In many respects, I am basing my answer on the reasoning put forward by the Riksbank in the Financial Stability Report published last week.

At the same time, this change means that both borrowers and lenders become more sensitive to developments in house prices. All other things being equal, higher loan-to-value ratios should increase the risk of loan losses for the banks. However, while the banks are allowing a higher loan-to-value ratio, they appear to have compensated for this in recent years by tightening some of the requirements for granting loans. It has also become increasingly common that mortgage institutions offer interest-only loans. This also increases the borrowers’ and lenders’ sensitivity to developments in house prices. The fact that households are choosing not to amortize their loans to the same extent may be related to the rising house prices. House-owners have been able to see their loan-to-value ratio fall even without amortization payments. Amortization is also a form of saving, but it is not self-evident that it is the best thing for a household to have its entire savings in its own housing. If they choose not to amortize the loan, they may perhaps have some other form of saving that can be used if their incomes unexpectedly decline or costs increase. To summarise, I do not see any serious risks, from a stability perspective, in households’ growing indebtedness and in rising property prices – not at present. However, the current developments cannot continue indefinitely.
The slow and uneven vaccine rollout, even in some advanced economies, and its very limited availability in the LICs are matters of serious concern. Enabling global access to effective and affordable vaccines is a global responsibility, and an ethical and moral issue. We support the Managing Director’s Global Policy Agenda (GPA) and its wellplaced focus on creating conditions for a safe exit from the crisis followed by a sustained, strong and inclusive global economic recovery. We welcome the GPA’s recognition of difficult challenges facing many developing countries in pursuing their development and social objectives, while facing severe financing constraint and high debt. We further welcome the increasing IMF emphasis on middleincome countries as many face stalled growth and large financing needs in tighter market conditions. Our constituency is a heterogeneous group of countries and a mix of fragile and conflict-affected states, middle-income and frontier economies, and oil exporting countries. The crisis has severely impacted all countries of our constituency. Our authorities reacted swiftly to the crisis and implemented measures to alleviate its impact on lives and livelihoods, with some of our members benefitting from Fund emergency and/or Upper Credit Tranche (UCT) facilities. The economic recovery is gradually taking shape in our constituency, but at varying pace and degrees. The rebound of international oil prices provided welcome relief to oil exporters in our constituency, but financing pressures continue to persist, and economic diversification challenges remain.

Trading business mainly consists of purchasing and selling securities on behalf of clients or for the bank’s own account. The current low interest rate environment can affect these three pillars in different ways. On the one hand, lower interest rates could plausibly benefit commission and trading business. Customers might be inclined to shift their portfolios into riskier investments, which would be conducive to earnings in these business areas. At the same time, a decline in interest rates leads to one-off valuation gains on securities in the balance sheet. On the other hand, it is likely that exceptionally low interest rates negatively impact banks’ interest rate margins. Put simply, the interest rate margin is the difference between banks’ interest income and interest expense, shown as a percentage of banks’ assets. To better understand the relationship between the interest rate level and interest rate margin, it is worth looking at the composition of the latter. The interest rate margin can be divided into three components, namely the asset, structural and liability margins (slide 4). The asset margin is the difference between the interest rate charged on loans and a market interest rate of equal maturity. The liability margin is the difference between a short-term market interest rate and the interest paid on deposits and other sources of financing. And finally, the structural margin is the difference between longer and short-term market interest rates – essentially the compensation the bank receives for maturity transformation.
We also give emphasis to predictability and transparency. Normally, the interest rate is set with a view to achieving inflation of 2½ per cent at the two-year horizon. This time horizon usually provides a reasonable balance between stabilising inflation on the one hand and smoothing fluctuations in output and employment on the other. 1  See Akram, Farooq Q. (2003): “Reell likevektsvalutakurs for Norge” (Real equilibrium exchange rate for Norway), in Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift 118, pp. 89-112. 2  BIS Review 25/2004  If demand for goods and services is high and there is a shortage of labour, there will normally be prospects of higher inflation. When the interest rate is raised, demand is dampened and inflation is kept in check. If demand is low and unemployment rises, there will be prospects of lower inflation. The interest rate will then be lowered. The inflation target thus represents a framework, not an obstacle, for monetary policy to contribute to stability in output and employment. Section 1 of the Regulation on Monetary Policy states that in addition to sustaining the level of inflation at approximately 2½ per cent over time, monetary policy shall also contribute to stable developments in output and employment. The mandate therefore establishes a flexible inflation target for monetary policy where variations in output and employment are also given emphasis.

Consumers may attach more importance instead to the inherent qualities of goods and services and to their price in relation to these qualities. That would more likely lead to stronger competition and increased downward pressure on prices and profit margins. The new technology would then turn out to benefit consumers rather than shareholders. Diagram 5:  Real return on equity 1900-98 1000 100 Trend 7% per year  10 1 0,1 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Sources: Frennberg & Hansson, Affärsvärlden and Riksbank calculations  BIS Review 90/2001  5  Returning to the comparison with the United States at the turn of the nineteenth century, we find that the profits of electricity producers were not higher than normal. The increased competition pushed prices and profit margins down. All this means that there are many reasons for supposing that even in the future the long-term real annual return on equity will probably continue to be in the vicinity of the historical trend of around 7 per cent, though it is liable to vary. That has been the case in Sweden throughout the twentieth century (Diagram 5) and in the United States for virtually two hundred years. Major technological breakthroughs occurred in this period. This long historical perspective shows that over considerable periods the real return on equity has been fairly constant. Conclusion In conclusion it can be said that my argument basically points to a positive finding.
A one standard deviation increase in ‘excess credit’ results in real GDP per capita being 1.5% lower five years after a normal recession.23 Bunn and Rostom (2015) find that more highly indebted groups of households made larger cuts in spending following the financial crisis. And Bailey et al (forthcoming) exploit Facebook data to identify how social interactions can drive contagious risk-taking in the US housing market. In summary, the market failures associated with fire-sale externalities and behavioural tendencies which can drive short-termism provide a strong case for a macroprudential regulator with an objective of preserving the dynamic resilience of the financial system, both among banks and, prospectively, among non-banks. No less compelling, however, is the evidence, both micro and macro, linking credit booms to aggregate demand externalities. That, in turn, provides a rationale for pre-emptive macroprudential interventions to avoid excessive inflation of credit and asset prices in the first place. Instruments of Macroprudential Policy The Bank of England’s second public foray into the macroprudential policy debate was a 2011 discussion paper on elements of the macroprudential toolkit (Bank of England (2011)). That paper described 12 distinct macroprudential tools (see also CGFS (2010, 2012), Hanson et al (2011) and ESRB (2015) for discussions of macroprudential instruments). The majority of these targeted different aspects of banks’ balance sheets including: the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB); sectoral capital requirements (SCRs); leverage ratio buffers; dynamic provisions; and liquidity buffers.

As well as lending to households and businesses, banks lent to other banks which bought ever more exotic instruments created by the financial system itself. The effect was to replicate the original risky loans many times over. Over the past five years, the balance sheets of many of the world’s largest banks more than doubled. From the early 1990s to the start of the financial turmoil in 2007, total debt in the UK relative to GDP almost doubled. Around two-thirds of the increase in total debt was accounted for by lending to the financial sector. A marked expansion in debt of the financial sector also occurred in the United States and the euro area. The Bank did not stand idly by during this period. The Monetary Policy Committee set Bank Rate to achieve the inflation target. Monetary policy – here and in our major partners – was successful in controlling inflation and maintaining economic stability. From the early 1990s until the onset of financial turmoil in 2007, output growth, both here and in the industrialised world in general, was close to its long-run average. Moreover, through our regular publications and speeches on financial stability the Bank highlighted the dangers posed by the growth in the size and complexity of the financial sector. Nevertheless, it is clear that policy did not succeed in preventing the development of an unsustainable position.
Norman T L Chan: How to get rid of banking supervisors Keynote speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Lion Rock Institute Freedom Dinner, Hong Kong, 22 November 2017. * * * Nick (Sallnow-Smith), founders, directors and members of the Lion Rock Institute, Daniel (Hannan), ladies and gentlemen, 1. It gives me great pleasure in joining you today. 2. After accepting the Institute’s invitation conveyed by Peter Wong, I thought hard about what to talk about in front of such a learned and distinguished audience that support and cherish economic freedom. I was also mindful that I should come up with an inviting title that helps sell the tables. I hope I have achieved this, at least by attracting a few more senior bankers to help foot the dinner bill. 3. Nowadays a common theme that bankers often talk about when they meet each other is how their lives have become so much tougher, thanks to ever more stringent standards demanded by regulators and supervisors. Not only are banks required to hold a lot more capital as well as liquidity to meet unexpected contingencies, there is constantly increasing demand by the supervisors to deal with conduct risks. Everyone is familiar with the escalating compliance burden and pressure on banks in tackling anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing, international sanctions, mis-selling, etc., not to mention the hefty financial penalties slapped on banks for violations or breaches.

The private sector of the economy should continue to heal, while the amount of fiscal drag should subside. I also expect that, despite the near-term concerns, growth prospects among our major trading partners will improve next year. And this combination of events is likely to create an environment in which business investment spending will strengthen. However, the notion that the economy will grow more swiftly remains a forecast rather than a reality at this point. Turning to the inflation outlook, total inflation, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator, has fluctuated recently with short-term movements in energy prices, but it continues to run below the FOMC’s expressed goal of 2 percent. Core inflation, that is, excluding food and energy, slowed in late 2012 and early 2013 to well below 2 percent, although it has shown signs of stabilizing in the last couple of months. A decomposition of core inflation reveals that the most recent slowing of inflation has been largely confined to core goods, whereas the rate of increase of core services has been relatively steady. Such was not the case in 2010 – the previous instance of a significant slowing of inflation. In addition, inflation expectations so far have remained relatively stable at levels somewhat above the current inflation rate. This should help prevent an undesirable further drop in inflation relative to our 2 percent objective. Thus, I anticipate that inflation will firm further in the months ahead and move toward the FOMC’s longer-run objective.
Firstly, the better economic prospects for recovery in Asia, and the expectations that Asia will lead in the emergence from the global recession could draw large capital inflows into the region. Such flows would not only lead to more volatile exchange rates, but also to increases in asset prices. Increases in commodity prices could also potentially feed into inflation and affect the economic recovery process. Most economies in Asia, including the policy makers, the financial industry and the private sector, have however, the capacity to manage these challenges. Stronger financial positions, low levels of leverage and buffers built during the good times have rendered the potential to manage the more challenging environment. The role of the financial sector is particularly important in ensuring the flow of  financing to productive economic activity is not disrupted, while exercising prudential restraint in an environment of excess liquidity. Towards the medium term, significant uncertainties remain for the outlook of the global economy. Overall global growth is expected to remain weak over the medium term with structural weaknesses in the advanced economies weighing down the overall economic growth in these economies. Being highly integrated with the global economy, the continued weakness of the advanced economies could present a challenge for overall economic growth for most emerging economies in the medium term. Therefore, it is crucial for the external sector of Malaysia to evolve into a more diversified structure to increase resilience and rely less on the traditional markets for growth. It is encouraging to note that this is already happening.

Boards must be relentless in pursuing the effective governance of risk, continuously develop their capacity to do so, and insist on strengthening processes, systems and structures as appropriate to effectively monitor and control risk. Conclusion Let me conclude my remarks. We need to prepare ourselves for a future in which we can prosper. We have every potential to do so. The authorities have great determination to provide the enabling environment for this to happen. Financial institutions need to decide on their own strategy and the business model to not only perform but also survive in this more challenging environment. The demands are for world class service and real value added to the economy. For the Central Bank, as the supervisory authority, our role will be to push the frontier of the financial infrastructure with its international inter-linkages, while not losing sight of ensuring overall financial stability. On that note, I look forward to productive discussions during these next two days on the key issues confronting the financial sector.
Cautious optimism does not entail a naïve expectation that the “land of milk and honey” is just around the corner. Historical experience teaches us that the cocktail of an economic  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  downturn and a financial crisis is usually associated with a prolonged recession and losses of jobs and welfare. Most structural reforms take time to generate positive effects, and some of the countries in distress are still saddled with rigidities in the markets for goods, services and labour. High nominal rigidities, for example, induce a pattern of adjustment to shocks that falls disproportionately on employment and production volumes. Countries must progress with a deep-seated structural reform agenda to address the existing rigidities, reduce costs to firms, and to increase competitiveness. To prevent – and indeed reverse – job losses, the downward adjustment of both prices and wages need to be stronger in those areas where unemployment is still high, and where this adjustment has not taken place due to structural or institutional factors. If this goes hand in hand with a continued consolidation of public sector budgets, then the cautious optimists will be vindicated through a chain of reduced uncertainty, renewed investor and consumer confidence, better access to funding and a return to robust and sustainable growth. Reforms at the European level  Domestic reforms are important, but we also have work to do at the level of the euro area and the European Union.

Second, the perception that the central bank will always “pick up the pieces” might give incentives to excessive risk-taking and high leverage. Even in good times that perception could discourage sound fiscal policies and prudent financial behaviour. In the design of non-standard measures and in its communication, the ECB has taken great care not to give such adverse incentives to either banks or governments. The following elements, among others, serve as proof:   The non-standard measures are temporary in nature. Some of them will expire automatically, if not renewed. On top of that, we have all the necessary instruments to reverse the current situation of abundant liquidity provision.   The mandate of the ECB as stipulated by the Treaty has an unambiguous focus on price stability. In combination with the ECB’s monetary policy strategy it provides a clear guidepost and has proved effective in anchoring inflation expectations over time.   The monetary policy strategy gives a prominent role to the monetary analysis which captures money and credit developments and ensures a symmetric reaction to financial forces.   The design of the tool called Outright Monetary Transactions creates the right incentives for governments to improve their performance with respect to fiscal prudence and structural reforms. I will expand a bit further on this fourth point. OMTs will only be activated in cases where the benefiting country has signed up to strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme.