samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, first one must remember that changes in the repo rate have an effect one to two years ahead. Secondly, there is no antagonism between growth and price stability in the long term; it is potential growth that sets the limits for how fast the economy can grow. Stable prices actually create the best conditions for sustainable growth. The Riksbank cannot affect potential growth. Other operators can do this - trade and industry primarily through investments and the government and parliament, which decide over the regulatory system, education and the infrastructure, etc. This is probably the most important contribution to both good growth and stable prices. Thank you! 8  BIS Review 25/2002

In December-January, we reduced rates on these instruments, introduced new types of operations, and increased the frequency and allotment amount of foreign currency provision. In late 2014, the allotment amount of foreign exchange liquidity provision was about 20 billion US dollars and currently exceeds 30 billion US dollars. In January 2015, despite persistently low oil prices, complicated geopolitical situation, and Russia’s downgraded sovereign rating, the exchange rate volatility decreased and inflation expectations showed the first signs of stabilisation. This means that the result we expected when raising the key rate has been largely achieved. At the same time, the leading indicators started to show the beginning of considerable fall in aggregated demand and cyclical economic slowdown. Therefore, as opposed to 2014, the economic situation in 2015 started to exercise additional anti-inflationary pressure. This enabled the Bank of Russia to reduce the interest rates from 17% to 15 %. The consequently published data for January 2015 confirmed out estimates. In January 2015, the economic activity started to slow down. Temporary surge in consumer demand in December 2014 changed into a drop. Decline in investments intensified. Both consumer and producer sentiments deteriorated. Inflation accelerated sharply, but this dynamics is largely explained by the accelerated pass-through effect of the exchange rate on prices. Therefore, monthly inflation started to decline in February. We base our monetary policy decisions not only on the information about existing economic trends, but primarily on the forecasts of economic situation. Detailed and revised forecast will be published tonight as part of the Monetary Policy Report.
•  First, introduce a great degree of selectivity in terms of public spending. Since France is the country in the euro area with by far, as a percentage of GDP, the highest level of public spending, it should give priority to forward-looking spending that supports reforms. From this point of view, a review is necessary in particular of the “defensive” cuts in social contributions that offset the constraints, obstacles and costs facing our companies. These cuts now exceed the equivalent of France’s spending on higher education. More generally, the effectiveness of subsidised contracts in the long term is questionable: they are useful, or even essential, when they allow those deprived of equal opportunities to integrate into the labour force; they are more dubious when, conversely, they financially compensate the effects of rigidities in hiring decisions and the functioning of the labour market. It would be extremely useful to conduct a thorough review of these measures on the basis of this simple distinction. •  Second, reduce structural expenditure. France has a high quality civil service, which is a crucial asset. Current demographic trends and the needs of a modern economy require adjustments to be made. France must have a great civil service in terms of quality but a less bloated one in terms of quantity. The reforms implemented over the past decades are not necessarily consistent with this imperative: of all developed countries, France has recorded the greatest growth in public sector jobs.

BIS Review 92/2007  7
Most noteworthy to me is the fact that the regulatory regime that was in place in 2008 and 2009 was associated with an episode of the most illiquid market conditions since at least the Great Depression. A return to such a regime could lead to a higher cost for liquidity over the long-run. I think we are in a much better place today. We have a financial system that is much more resilient, and the available evidence suggests that this transformation has not resulted in any significant erosion in market liquidity. What future work is needed? There is a tendency to compress a complex world into a sound bite – such as, “tougher regulation is increasing the cost of liquidity and driving up liquidity risk.” Policy needs to be based on evidence and the available evidence supporting this claim is mixed, at best. Most importantly, I think it ignores the complex nature of the changes underway in financial markets. The methods of intermediation are changing and will likely continue to evolve. There are new players with different objectives and goals, and technology is evolving rapidly. These factors strike me as just as important as the increase in regulatory requirements for the large dealers. The recent work analyzing the October 15 Treasury market flash rally illuminates the complexity of today’s market structure.

The Programme gives investors the option of buying Icelandic krónur at the auction exchange rate (near the offshore rate) in order to invest in the domestic economy, provided they sell a corresponding amount of foreign currency in the domestic foreign exchange market. The Investment Programme, which was introduced in detail on 18 November, has been described elsewhere; therefore, I will not go into the fine print here. It is designed to be neutral vis-à-vis the foreign exchange reserves in the short term and positive in the long run. This is achieved by requiring that half of the currency used for the investment be converted in 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the domestic FX market and by stipulating a minimum holding period of five years for the investment. It is hoped that this will tie up a sizeable share of the most volatile offshore krónur. How large a share that is will depend primarily on the scope of the investment projects on offer and the actual amount of volatile krónur, both of which are quite uncertain. It is hoped that the Investment Programme will attract significant foreign investment. It is a misunderstanding, however, to assume that the Programme aims at releasing almost the entire stock of offshore krónur through foreign investment. This would require an investment that it is unrealistic to plan on in the next two years. On the other hand, it is realistic to expect to release the most volatile krónur in this way.
Due to domestic economic turmoil and financial crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it took time before the idea of a fund was turned into actual savings. The first allocation – some USD 400 million – was not made until 1996. Since then, the Fund has grown rapidly in size. As you have already seen, the Fund’s assets are currently valued at around USD 350 billion. The Fund is expected to grow further in coming years, and may double in 5-10 years. The Fund was established as a tool to support prudent management of Norway’s petroleum wealth. One purpose is to shield the non-oil economy from price fluctuations. The Fund is also a long-term savings instrument. It will help to cope with future financial commitments linked to an ageing population. Accumulation of capital in the Fund reflects the depletion of a non-renewable resource, which is exchanged for financial assets through the Fund’s investments. By setting up the Fund, it became possible to establish a path for  2  BIS Review 58/2009  production of oil and gas that is independent of the profile for petroleum revenue spending. The alternative to a fund would have been to directly regulate production by putting a conservative upper limit on annual extraction. Furthermore, to effectively shield the non-oil economy, and to make sure that private sector investment decisions could be made independently of the public sector’s saving of petroleum wealth, the Fund is only invested abroad.

Jan F Qvigstad: The global economic crisis and its impact on Sovereign Wealth Funds – the example of Norway Speech by Mr Jan F Qvigstad, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a meeting for financial sector representatives in Geneva hosted by the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Geneva, 11 May 2009. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Introduction Ambassador, Ladies and Gentlemen First, let me thank you for inviting me to this seminar for a discussion on the impact of the global economic crisis on sovereign wealth funds. Since I am the deputy governor of a central bank that manages one of the large sovereign wealth funds, I will use the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global as an example in my presentation. The financial and economic crisis What we are experiencing at this time is the deepest downturn in the world economy in the postwar period. The global economy will contract in 2009 for the first time in over 60 years. What is happening now is more than a normal fluctuation in the business cycle. The world is facing a crisis of confidence, with faltering faith in the future and a loss of confidence in banks, counterparties and contractual partners. The first signs of an emerging crisis in financial markets came into evidence already in early 2007, when several financial institutions in the US came under stress.
Of course, last year the fall in the oil prices was also beneficial for the trade balance. On the financing side, the financial flows were large enough to cover the current account deficit and to provide additional reserve accumulation. It is important to note that FDI inflows continued to flow in the economy, with their ratio to GDP being kept stable at 3.3% of GDP. Yet, the largest part of the financing flows came through the government borrowing at the international market, at rather favorable terms, pinpointing the perception of the investors for sound fundamentals and rather prudent policies in the Macedonian economy. Observing the inflation path, it more or less resembled the inflation pattern elsewhere, with the falling food and energy prices pushing prices down. The average headline rate for 2014 was mildly negative (–0.3%), while the core inflation albeit slowing down, on average remained positive. The inflation adjustment is perceived as temporary, driven by supply-side factors, and without any risks to become entrenched in the inflation expectations and to jeopardize the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  economic recovery. The fact that the negative output gap has been narrowing and the fall of the prices has been significantly slowing down in the first months of this year, just support the former notion. Domestic financing through the banking sector significantly increased in 2014, with credit market recovering much faster compared to the previous years.

NATSAVE was set up to administer savings and to provide credit facilities in urban, periurban and rural areas to individuals and small business enterprises. Its business strategy is to target the low and medium income earners through the establishment of a sustainable network of outlets and by offering sustainable financial services. The Bank has continued to be a leading public vehicle in ensuring financial inclusion to all citizens across the country through the vast branch network. Currently, NATSAVE has 27 branches (including Lukulu branch), spread across the country. 4. Honourable Ministers and Distinguished invited guests, a key element in the strategy of poverty reduction is the provision of financial services to the majority of our people, the small and micro enterprises who have traditionally been neglected by the formal banking sector. NATSAVE’s expansion program therefore has the potential to improve access to financial services and enhance competition in the financial sector. This improves financial services delivery to the Zambian people and brings more of the financially excluded population to the financial institutions. The Bank of Zambia views this development positively, particularly as recent trends indicate that many institutions in the financial sector are extending their branch networks. 5. However, it is important for financial service providers to complement branch expansion with increased product innovation. The ability to offer a broad range of products and services is the hallmark of financial sector deepening, as different types of products appeal to a wider range of clients, leading to enhanced access to financial services.
Stakeholders have rated MAS favourably in most areas. For example, MAS' role in supervising financial institutions and bringing about a stable financial system in Singapore received positive feedback. I am heartened by this. More importantly, the industry also noted areas for improvement. Stakeholders, for instance, felt that MAS officers could be more attuned to commercial reality when formulating policies and decisions. MAS could improve the timeliness of its decision-making. MAS has taken note of the feedback and will work to improve its performance in these areas. 32. MAS' regular dialogue and consultation with the industry has worked well. We will now take this a step further by involving the industry at the early stages of policy formulation. This will give industry players the opportunity to shape policies. MAS will also be more open to suggestions of alternatives that achieve the same objectives. But for this new approach to produce results, both MAS and the industry must work together to build a high level of trust between them. Leveraging and building on our reputation 33. Looking ahead, we must continue to build and deepen relationships with the industry and our foreign counterparts. 34. To showcase Asia to the international community, the centrepiece for next year is the 2006 IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings. In partnership with the private sector and relevant agencies, we are organising a host of seminars and events. Collectively, they are known as Singapore 2006 or S2006. S2006 is intended to create intellectual buzz and profile the dynamism and optimism in Asia. 35.

Christian Noyer: No moral hazard – the banks are doing their job Comment by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, in the Financial Times, 18 September 2007. *  *  *  In recent weeks, Central Banks in Europe and the US have acted repeatedly to provide liquidity to interbank money markets. These interventions have raised some questions. Concerns were expressed that monetary authorities were bailing out speculators, thus creating the same kind of moral hazard that may have led to excesses in the past. There were also concerns as to whether the integrity of monetary policy would be compromised. These are valid questions. On numerous occasions, in the past, we pointed out the potential dangers that mispricing of credit risk posed for financial stability. We may be now seeing some of the consequences. Excessive risks were taken, and losses will have to be accepted. It is important that monetary and financial authorities take no action that would prevent this process from running its course, let alone be seeing to be condoning past or future excesses. However, the logic behind recent interventions is different. Put very simply, financial turbulence and uncertainty have suddenly triggered an upward shift in the demand for Central Bank money. Faced with such a shift, whose direction is apparent but amplitude uncertain, the choice, for monetary authorities, is clear: either accommodate, and provide temporary liquidity; or not, in which case, interest rates would have to rise to restore balance in the interbank market.
In a nutshell: “few, well, till the end”, or in Spanish if I may, “poco, bién, hasta el final”. There are of course non-economic areas: to name a few, defence and border protection; climate change; or youth education and training – an Erasmus Pro programme should be a priority for the unskilled and unemployed youth, which is our common tragedy in France, Spain and Italy. But in the economic field, much remains to be done as well. Although we have succeeded with monetary union, we must make progress towards economic union – so that monetary policy does not remain the only game in town. Page 5 sur 8 1. The first economic priority is to address the root causes of Europe’s continuing subdued growth; and a major one is what I call the “investment crunch”. (Slide 4) Many, following Ben Bernanke’s speech of March 2005, have rightly talked about the “global saving glut” that was putting pressure on the world’s economies. At present, saving remains high, due to the combination of emerging market economies’ surplus and advanced countries’ aging populations. However, (slide 5) what has dramatically changed since the 200708 crisis is investment, which has dropped sharply as a share of GDP in advanced economies. In the euro area, the total investment to GDP ratio has dropped by around 3 points since the 2007 peak and has only slightly recovered since.

While pursuing our primary objectives of safety and soundness and policyholder protection, we also have regard to a number of important considerations, including the competitiveness of the sector and the contribution it can make to long-term economic growth. We are also mindful that as part of its review of the Future Regulatory Framework, the Government has proposed to give the PRA a new secondary objective to promote long-term economic growth and international competitiveness, alongside our existing secondary competition objective. With all of those factors in mind, we think we can deal with the risks we are worried about while also supporting the government’s wider objectives. Specifically, some in the insurance industry have the impression that we are opposed to any release of capital requirements for insurers. I want to be very clear that that is not the PRA’s position – indeed, following a lot of work and examination of the evidence over the last year or so we think that a substantial capital release should be possible while continuing to protect policyholders adequately.
In consequence, to meet their remaining liquidity needs, firms sought new funding. The result has been an increase in the demand for credit, in a setting in which lenders’ risk perception has increased. According to the results of microsimulations made by the Banco de España, 68% of Spanish firms will record liquidity shortfalls3 in 2020, almost 10 pp more than under a counterfactual non-pandemic scenario.4  3  The definition used here considers that a firm has a liquidity shortfall when its cash inflows, deriving essentially from sales of products or services, are lower than the payments relating to its activity (supplies, rentals, financial expenses and personnel costs) and those resulting from its investment in fixed assets and its debt repayments. 4 See R. Blanco, S. Mayordomo, A. Menéndez and M. Mulino (2020), Spanish non-financial corporations’ liquidity needs and solvency after the COVID-19 shock; Occasional Paper No 2020, Banco de España. 2  It is estimated that between 2020 Q2 and Q4, the total liquidity shortfall of the business sector will amount to some € billion, € billion more than under the counterfactual nonpandemic scenario if no account is taken of the liquidity needs associated with investment in fixed assets. Firms’ liquid assets and undrawn credit lines would be insufficient to cover more than half these liquidity needs. These simulations also show that a large part of firms’ total liquidity needs would arise at low-credit-quality firms.

This is a reason why the central bank should act with foresight and be alert to the development of inflation expectations. BIS Review 8/1997  -2-  The potential for influencing fluctuations in activity around the trend is dependent on people’s appraisal of the central bank’s determination and ability to maintain price stability. Central bankers talk of the importance of credibility, by which is meant the extent to which people expect inflation to be in line with its targeted rate. The degree of credibility is conditioned by, for example, the historical record of inflation and the existence of government financial deficits. Weak credibility calls for caution in monetary policy, just as higher credibility confers more room in which to manoeuvre. Experience has shown, moreover, that even in the shorter run, the possibility of influencing employment and unemployment via monetary policy is very limited. Limited fluctuations around the growth trend are by no means sufficient condition for a smooth development of employment and low unemployment. Comparisons between countries and regions reveal that a similar growth pattern, even over a considerable period, can involve markedly divergent effects on employment and unemployment. This highlights the function of the labour market. It is there that measures must be taken in order to tackle problems with employment and unemployment. I want to underscore some conclusions from this discussion. Monetary policy cannot have growth as the primary objective because it is not capable of influencing growth in the longer run.
We need strong institutions with clear responsibilities and which offer a framework for dialogue and formal agreement. This is all the more important at the global level. The scope of international cooperation is broadening significantly as our economies become increasingly connected. This is reflected in current efforts to strengthen the mandates and governance structures of existing  BIS Review 97/2010  1  international institutions. At the same time, existing informal fora are being adjusted and new fora developed. Examples are manifold. The G-20 has emerged as the prime group for global economic governance. The Global Economy Meeting of central bankers acts as the main forum for central bank cooperation. And the Financial Stability Board now represents all systemically important emerging market economies, and its mandate has been enhanced to strengthen the international financial architecture. These are encouraging developments and we must continue to pursue this path. The second area at the core of our efforts concerns reforms of the financial sector. This is also an area where further progress is needed. The extent of the financial crisis leaves no doubt that tighter regulations and supervision are required to overhaul the financial system. We know that the crisis originated mainly in institutions that had moved away from traditional banking and which increasingly relied on non-interest sources of income and nondeposit-funding. Reforms should be designed in a way that internalises the social responsibility that financial institutions bear for savers and society as a whole. How can this be achieved?

We have a great deal of work to do on these three issues in the months ahead, and I am confident that when bold reforms in these areas are undertaken, we will have achieved the necessary quantum leap in euro area governance. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 97/2010