samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, measures of underlying inflation also remain elevated and well above our 2 percent longer-run goal. For example, after declining earlier in 2022, the New York Fed's Multivariate Core Trend has been hovering around 3-3/4 percent for the past few months.1 Similarly, both the Dallas Fed's trimmed-mean PCE inflation rate and core inflation that excludes food and energy prices averaged around 3-3/4 percent over the past six months. So, our work is not yet done. Inflation is still well above our 2 percent target, and it is critically important that we reach that goal. Supply and Demand Misalignment To help illustrate how tighter monetary policy is working to reduce inflation, I like to use an analogy inspired by a mechanism that consists of different gears.2 In this case, I'll hearken back to a time before rechargeable batteries, and even before quartz, to the age of the mechanical watch. Our watch represents the economy, and its gears are different sectors. Some gears spin quickly; others turn slowly. They need to turn at the right speed to keep time accurately-or, in this example, to maintain balance in the economy. The gears are propelled by supply and demand, which act as the mainspring of our watch. But they have been misaligned since the onset of the pandemic. At first, when people were home and factories were shuttered, demand shifted strongly from services to goods, which were scarce due to supply-chain bottlenecks.

In addition, the severe supply-chain bottlenecks that initially affected this category began to improve last year, which likely contributed to the easing of prices for some durable goods in recent months. However, there are factors that may throw sand in this gear going forward. The economic resiliency of Europe and a rebound in growth in China following the end of COVID restrictions will likely increase global demand for goods. And further improvement in global supply-chain disruptions has stalled over the past few months. For example, the New York Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressure Index remains elevated relative to pre-pandemic levels. The slowest gear to turn is the one that represents non-energy services. It's influenced by the balance of overall supply and demand, and it will take the longest to rotate at the right pace for low and stable inflation. One area where we are seeing signs of this gear turning is in shelter costs. After a sharp rise, we have seen a steep decline in the rate of increase in new lease rents. Assuming this trend continues, we should see a slowing of overall rent inflation during this year. That said, we have yet to see the gears turn for inflation of non-energy services excluding housing, which is still quite elevated, averaging 3-3/4 percent over the most recent six months. Tightening Monetary Policy Taking into account the different speeds the gears are moving, it is clear that overall demand remains well in excess of supply, and inflation is running far above our 2 percent target.
The credit risk capability, both at the point of origination in terms of know-yourcustomer (KYC) and customer due diligence and for ongoing monitoring, must be enhanced to cater for the rapid growth of this new line of business. Naturally the HKMA has accorded high priority in our ongoing supervision of banks to ensure that the underwriting standards are upheld all the time. I am pleased to report that the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, which is a key indicator to assess the credit quality of the Mainland-related lending, has remained at a healthy level of around 0.7%, which is just slightly above the overall NPL ratio of 0.56% for all bank loans. Wealth Management 11. Given the rapid growth and accumulation of wealth in Hong Kong and the Mainland, there is a strong demand for wealth management services. The asset-under-management of private banking in Hong Kong now amounts to roughly $ trillion. Again, risk management is the key to the sustainable development of the private banking industry. There are two key aspects of risk management in the private wealth business. First, the banks must conduct proper KYC processes, especially on the source of funds and ongoing monitoring of suspicious fund flows for anti-money laundering / counter-terrorist financing purposes. Second, the private banks must understand the risk appetite/tolerance level of their clients on the one hand and conduct proper product due diligence before marketing them to clients.

Excessive risk taking or overly aggressive expansion usually lead to rather unhappy endings, as the financial history is littered with so many such failure cases. As for the regulators, they should stay true to the risk-based approach with the right sense of proportionality and should adopt an open mind on how the risk can be addressed. The regulators should stand ready to discuss with the industry to see if (c) there can be alternative ways of dealing with the risks identified. The industry is always closer to the markets and the clients they serve and should therefore have a better sense of how to get things done in a way that would cause less disruption or inconvenience. The regulators must not fall into the trap of complacency, and should constantly stay on alert and maintain a sense of unease even in good or peaceful times. Banking and (d) financial crises can never be avoided all together, but we can at least build sufficient buffers to lower their chance of occurrence or when they happen, the damage can be reduced or contained. The industry should stand ready to challenge the regulators if the severity of the risk is overstated or there are better alternatives than what has been put on the table. On the (e) other hand, the industry must avoid over-interpreting or gold plating the regulators’ requirements in such a way that is safe from the compliance point of view but would create bad customer experience without enhancing the underlying risk management outcomes. 16.
I will then turn to the national level and illustrate these principles with reference to the French situation (II). I. Improving Europe’s future fiscal rules The EU and its member states have reacted vigorously in 2020. The ECB’s balance sheet is now double the size of the Fed’s as a percentage of GDP. And active fiscal policy was of the essence. In 2020, Covid-related discretionary measures were stronger in the United States than in the main euro area countries. However thanks to our social model and its higher automatic stabilizers, the overall 2020 fiscal stimulus in the euro area was almost as strong as in the United States:  Having said that, what can explain the larger loss of GDP in 2020 in the euro area compared to the United States? According to the Banque de France’s work, much [80%] of the difference in losses is due to something other than public support. In southern Europe, about 40% is explained through effective constraints on economic activity, and 40% through sectorial specialisation – the higher dependence of European countries on tourism, and the technological lead of the United States (development of teleworking before the crisis, weight of new information technology, share of e-commerce…). Three major crises in the past ten years – 2008-2009, 2011, 2020 – have nevertheless shown the need to complete the Economic Union in addition to the successful Monetary Union, starting with a permanent fiscal capacity.

Thank you for your attention. Les notes du Conseil d’analyse économique, Pour une refonte du cadre budgétaire européen, Avril 2021 Abiad A., Furceri D., Topalova P., The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment: Evidence from Advanced Economies, IMF Working Paper, May 2015. iii The American Crisis (circa 1776) i  ii
Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Rheinische Post Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Rheinische Post, conducted by Ms Birgit Marschall and Mr Georg Winters and published on 13 February 2016. *  *  *  Share prices are sharply down on the world’s stock markets. Why? There are several compounding factors, each calling for different answers. First, it’s a global phenomenon. Investors are generally anxious about a slowdown in growth worldwide, especially in the emerging markets, and above all in China. Second, there’s great uncertainty about the global effects of the low oil price. Initially, it was thought the low price would be good for global growth, but now some negative effects can be seen, particularly in emerging markets. Third, market participants are questioning how profitable banks are and whether they have successful business models for the future. How affected are Europe’s banks? They are in a much better position today than they were at the height of the debt crisis in 2011 and 2012. Thanks to the banking union they are now much more resilient. They have very significantly built up their capital and liquidity. One challenge they face is their low profitability, which is also related to the current level of economic growth. Also, some banks have a high level of non-performing loans on their books, as a legacy of the crisis.

The dashed red curve represents the new forecast which covers the period from the second quarter of 2007 to the first quarter 2010. It shows the inflation outlook after today's increase in the Libor under the assumption that the level of 2.50% will be kept constant during the forecasting period. For purposes of comparison, the dash-dotted green curve shows the inflation forecast of the March monetary assessment which was based on a Libor of 2.25%. The combined effect of higher oil prices, economic developments that were better than expected and a weaker franc leads to a deterioration in the inflation forecast for the coming months. Today's interest rate rise will stabilise the rate of inflation at a slightly higher level from mid-2008 onwards than that established last March. Inflation will subsequently continue to rise and approach the 2% mark towards the end of the forecasting period. *** In lifting the three-month Libor by 25 basis points today, deterioration in the inflation prospects over the past months will be offset. Any forecast and any decision are obviously fraught with uncertainty and risk. Should economic momentum remain unchanged or should movements in the Swiss franc result in a further relaxation in monetary conditions, further increases in the interest rate are likely in the months ahead. BIS Review 67/2007  3  4  BIS Review 67/2007
We estimate the GDP growth rate that can be sustained without pushing up inflation – potential GDP growth – at between 1.5% and 2%. This is lower than the growth rate we have observed since 2006. Measuring the output gap is tricky, however, because certain favourable factors, such as the influx of skilled labour, the deregulation of certain domestic markets and increased global competition might have pushed up potential GDP growth. Having said this, however, we should not overlook those factors which have the opposite effect. For instance, equipment investment has receded, which has a dampening effect on potential growth. Moreover, even if capacity utilisation as a whole is not excessive, bottlenecks might occur in certain sectors of the economy. And, above all, experience has shown that the output gap is often underestimated during phases of growth. Consequently, the risk of underestimating the output gap may now be greater than that of overestimating it. The third risk is associated with the future development of the Swiss franc. As its exchange rate is determined by the market, it is subject to fluctuations. Movements in the export-weighted Swiss franc index alter the degree of restrictiveness of our monetary policy. Normally, during periods of rising  2  BIS Review 67/2007  interest rates, this index tends to increase, thereby amplifying the effects of monetary policy by mitigating price increases in imported products and slowing the expansion in economic activity. This reaction pattern was not observed during the past two years, which could put pressure on interest rates.

The National Bank started such activities in 2014 when it created foreign investment securities statistics, which was then supplemented with data on domestic securities. In addition, the crisis has shown that the risks can increase largely not only in the banking system, but also in shadow banking. Therefore, there is a need for upgrading the statistics with data not only for depository institutions, but also for all other financial institutions. Following these trends in 2012, we started with the preparation of the statistics of the most important non-bank financial institutions, which enabled us to 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  constantly monitor their activities and the potential risks. We recently fully complied this statistics with the latest IMF’s Guide on monetary and financial statistics. The second segment is the improvement of databases on cross-border financial systems. The consequences of the global crisis have clearly emphasized the risk of international financial integration, in particular the global connection of systemically important institutions. Such a context has had major consequences on the requirements for increasing the volume and structure of statistical data that will give a better picture of these global connections with a special emphasis on international investment position statistics, as well as more detailed portfolio investment and direct investment statistics. The National Bank already prepares all these surveys on a regular basis, although there is room for further improvement in the area of international position.
As importantly, they have typically involved fiscal and monetary policies acting in tandem to cushion the effects of the crisis on jobs and incomes. The first line of defence against the crisis has come from fiscal policy. Fiscal tools act directly on the source of the problems caused by the Covid crisis – cash-flow shortfalls for companies and jobs risks for workers. 18  For example, Barro, Ursúa and Weng (2020). 17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  To those ends, a wide variety of fiscal measures have been put in place over recent months, including job support schemes, tax rebates and holidays, grants to certain sectors and loan guarantee programmes.19  For the major economies, these programmes has been as large as any since the Great Depression, often double-digit percentages of GDP (Chart 15). Additional support will come from the automatic stabilisers built into tax and spending rules. All in, the IMF estimate that announced fiscal stimulus measures from the Covid crisis are near $ trillion globally, equivalent to around 8% of world GDP in 2019.

There are no secrets to the strategies, because the factors for success are not unique to Singapore. The challenge is in their execution and implementation. Here are five things that we have set out to do in order to excel as a financial centre in the New Economy. Enhance business environment First, we are seeking to further enhance our conducive pro-business environment. Economic and political stability, an efficient and impartial legal system, comprehensive and up-to-date market infrastructure, and fiscal discipline that allows low taxes are key preconditions, more important than special incentives for the financial sector. Singapore has established a reputation for delivering these preconditions, which we will maintain and improve upon in future. Build talent pool Second, we are building up our talent pool. In a knowledge-intensive industry like financial services, Singapore will not get anywhere without world-class talent. We are making a concerted effort to attract foreign talent who can make a contribution to Singapore, and to integrate them into our economy and society. We are also nurturing home talent to its full potential through a good education system for the young and ongoing training opportunities for those in the workforce. As Asian companies begin to use more complex strategies and products, our financial institutions need the expertise to advise on these sophisticated techniques. From time to time they will fly out experts from London or New York to service clients, but we must also build up our own indigenous capabilities.
I have had the opportunity to discuss these issues in previous appearances before you,6 but on this occasion I should like to focus precisely on those factors that constrain the possibilities for sustained economic growth, since the negative impact of the pandemic has made the need for action to raise potential growth all the more important. First, however, I should like to focus on a very important development that was not assessed in the Bank’s Annual Report as it has occurred since the report was prepared. I am referring to the approval by the European Council, in July, of the European recovery fund (Next Generation EU). Its importance in this context lies in its nature as an instrument for providing a powerful boost to the potential growth of the Spanish economy, although its success will depend on knowing how to make appropriate use of it. As I have already mentioned, the economic policies that we are implementing in response to the crisis need to find a balance between supporting the recovery and spurring economic adjustment to the scenario that will emerge after the pandemic. In this setting, supranational support at European level appears to be fundamental to achieve this twofold objective. The degree of economic and financial interdependence within this geographical area is very high.

We also hope that they will do so only when they are ready. And when they are ready, we believe that they should adopt the options and approaches that are most appropriate for the state of their markets, their banking systems, and their supervisory structures. Is Basel II appropriate for banks in emerging markets? A second question I hear frequently is whether Basel II is even appropriate for banking systems in emerging markets, which I would like to address now. In my view, the principles and vision of supervision in Basel II are valuable for supervisors and banks in all markets. The great level of diversity in markets and in financial systems worldwide makes it difficult - and perhaps even counterproductive - to try to specify a single rule that could be applied to all banks in all countries. Fortunately, Basel II’s menu approach provides supervisors and banks with options that make its basic standards more readily available to many kinds of organisations and economic circumstances. As I mentioned earlier as well, Basel II’s three-pillar approach provides an “efficient frontier” of policy objectives that are relevant to banks in any country by emphasising the need for banks to assess their risks; the need for supervisors to evaluate those assessments; and the need for transparency to promote greater marketplace discipline.
Available at: https://www.creditsuisse.com/corporate/en/media/news/articles/media-releases/2012/07/en/42035.html 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  The Bank of England values diversity for three reasons. First, it is the right thing to do; a public institution should reflect the people it serves. Second, diversity can build the trust required to deliver our remits, as people are more likely to trust people they recognise, reducing misperceptions that we are experts making esoteric decisions in ivory towers for the benefit of others.5 Third, diversity leads to better decision-making, more creative thinking and reduces the risks of groupthink and bias.6 This last point is critical. Almost all decisions in finance are taken under uncertainty, making it especially important that decision makers are exposed to a range of views, and engage in open debates with people whose perspectives challenge the prevailing wisdom. Articulating why diversity and inclusion are important has helped the Bank move the dial. When I joined the Bank, only 17% of senior managers were women, so we set an ambitious target to reach 35% by 2020. The Bank is on track to achieve this: today, 32% of senior management are female, considerably above the 14% industry average. Our pipeline of future leaders also looks healthy: 46% of colleagues below senior management are women. This didn’t just happen. Reaching this point has required a deliberate, concentrated effort throughout the organisation. The power of organisations like the WIBF is that they help such approaches permeate through the industry.

Finance by all, for all Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England Remarks at Women in Banking and Finance 22nd Annual Awards, London Friday 14 June 2019  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth for her assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Jenny Pye, Katie Williamson and Paul Wright for their help with background research and analysis. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  It is an honour to join you today to celebrate this special occasion. The Women In Banking and Finance (WIBF) network is a place to connect with colleagues, share knowledge and like today, celebrate success. In that spirit we have already connected at the reception and will conclude by celebrating your success, so let me take up a bit of the middle to share some knowledge that the Bank has gained as it seeks to improve diversity and inclusion at the heart of finance. Let me start by reflecting on the state of the UK financial services industry. Over two million people across the UK work in the sector. It makes up over 10% of the economy and runs a trade surplus of £ billion, greater than all other exporting industries combined. Financial services contribute enough taxes to fund the NHS.1 Most fundamentally, finance serves households and businesses at home and abroad. Last year, the UK financial system channelled £ billion in finance to UK businesses and helped 700,000 households to purchase homes.