samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Banking Law that was enacted by Parliament in the summer of 1999, and the amendments made during the last month, were aimed at giving the banking system the necessary efficiency and soundness. In conclusion, let me summarise recent history. We have been working on this program for the past two years. Its technical excellence accurately reflects well the effort that has gone into it. I do not hesitate to say that the program is “comprehensive”, “strong”, “ambitious”, “bold” and “imaginative”, and most of all “achievable”. The willingness of the political authorities to execute this program is clear from the way they have taken the necessary but politically difficult economic decisions: quickly, without hesitation or second thoughts. The IMF and the World Bank have strongly endorsed the program, the former by approving for Turkey a three-year standby arrangement, and the latter by extending project credit. The prospect of membership negotiations with the European Union pursuant to the Helsinki decision provides an additional strong incentive to implement the program forcefully. There is a strong autonomous ownership of the program. The Government, the Parliament, policymakers, and the social partners all understand the great rewards, particularly in terms of reduced interest costs and stable growth, that will follow the program’s successful implementation. The markets’ reactions to the program have also been very positive. Interest rate declined from 100% last October to the 30s recently.

Mr Erçel reviews the monetary side of Turkey’s ambitious three-year disinflation program  Speech given by Mr Gazi Erçel, Governor of the Central Bank of Turkey, at the Merchant Taylor’s Hall, in London on 25 January 2000. *  *  *  Turkey’s disinflation program: what we are doing and why Starting this year, Turkey has embarked on an ambitious three-year program to disinflate its economy. I call it ambitious because Turkey has suffered from a high and persistent inflation for the past quarter of a century, and any program that hopes to correct such a long-standing problem needs to be ambitious. I will begin by reviewing this new program, especially the monetary side of it. But first I will give you some snapshots, from the past, of the Turkish economy, which I think will give a clear idea why this was the right time to take action. The history of Turkish inflation shows that for the last quarter century inflation has been gradually increasing, never falling below two digits. The average inflation rate for the whole period was 55%. During the last decade inflation has averaged 72%. Reflecting the uncertainties inflicted on the economy by this chronic inflation, growth has been volatile and at the low end of the range of comparable emerging market economies. Turkey’s average growth rate over the last two decades was 4.2%. Average growth for the emerging markets of Asia, where inflation is not a problem, has been much higher.
The purpose was to get the countries to cooperate in analysing and solving problems and to clarify the distribution of roles and responsibilities. When the crisis moved into an acute phase in Latvia in December 2008 and large amounts of capital left the country, a loan agreement was signed at very short notice with the Riksbank and Danmarks Nationalbank on the one side and the Latvian central bank on the other side. The agreement totalled EUR 500 million, around SEK 5 billion. The main purpose of the agreement was to support Latvia’s foreign currency reserve up to the point when the first payments from the IMF and EU became available. One condition was that Latvia should sign an agreement with the IMF, as the Riksbank neither can nor should become involved in assessing whether or not the country is making the necessary economic adjustments. The Riksbank’s assessment was that if Latvia had not received extensive financial support from abroad at this stage it could have led to uncontrolled exchange rate depreciation and very large currency outflows. In February 2009 the Riksbank offered an arrangement to the Estonian central bank for short-term currency support. This arrangement was never used. Its purpose was to give the central bank the possibility to provide emergency liquidity support in the event of an acute crisis in local currency to the Swedish subsidiaries. It thus had a different purpose than the agreement with Latvia.

In order to prepare our region to be as competitive as possible, policy makers, firms and workers need to accurately gauge which industries and jobs will grow fastest. Given the trend over the past few decades, it is no surprise that the new jobs being created across the region and nation are most likely to be in industries with a high share of workers with a college education. Thus, education and worker training is likely to continue to be very important in maintaining the economic vitality of our region going forward. Conclusion In summary, the recovery in our region continued at a slow pace during the second quarter of 2011. While overall job growth has been sluggish through the recovery, we find that there has been a great deal of job churning below the surface throughout our region. So far, this job churning is about evenly balanced between old and new job creation. The evidence to date is pretty clear that these new jobs, on balance, are in industries that employ workers with higher levels of skills and education. I will now ask Jaison Abel to provide additional details on the regional economy. 1  Groshen, Erica L. and Simon Potter. 2003. “Has Structural Change Contributed to a Jobless Recovery?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance 9, no. 8. Groshen, Erica L., Potter, Simon, and Rebecca J. Sale. 2004. “Economic Restructuring in New York State.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance 10, no. 7.
In light of this forecast, at the same time as Monetary Bulletin was published the Central Bank decided to raise its policy interest rate by 0.25 percentage points, which is a somewhat lower hike than market agents had predicted and also less than the Bank’s other recent policy rate rises. The policy rate is therefore currently 9%. Among other things, the decision to take a relatively modest step now is based on the fact that the tightening implied by the recent policy rate hikes and the significant appreciation of the króna have yet to be transmitted in full. Nonetheless, further tightening may be necessary over the next few months. Comparisons with previous forecasts and various indicators suggest that since December the Central Bank’s policy rate hikes have by and large delivered a tighter stance. The Central Bank’s monetary policy is very much debated in society at large at the moment, which is natural given the great interests at stake. Obviously I have closely followed discussions of monetary policy for a fairly long time and must admit that the debate in recent times has been more mature and bears witness to a deeper understanding of economic principles than before. It is normal for opinions to be divided over the Central Bank’s measures during tight stances such as the present. The Central Bank welcomes public debate and is ready to take part in it. I would like to use this opportunity to address a few points that have been raised in this debate recently.

The current account of Ireland has moved from a deficit of 6.6% of GDP to a surplus of almost 6% today. 19  In this regard it is impressive that some suggest centralised oversight and influence over such decisions. See Draghi (op. cit.) and Trichet, J C (2011), “Building Europe, building institutions”, on receiving the Karlspreis 2011 in Aachen, 2 June 2011. 20  Real incomes should eventually rise if structural reforms generate a productivity dividend. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  weakness of nominal income growth that is so harmful in dealing with a debt overhang and creates the tail risk of stagnation. So if increased flexibility is not sufficient, what else is required? The answer is to build the risk sharing institutions that are present in any successful currency union. This means financial integration and common fiscal arrangements. In other words, both private and public risk sharing. It is not realistic to expect the private sector to do everything the public sector will not. Before the crisis, the European financial system appeared in many respects to be highly integrated with cross-border bank loans amounting to more than a third of total bank lending. However, most of this was interbank loans, implicitly backed by the state. With many of the recipients being judged too big to fail during the crisis, creditors weren’t exposed to loss for fear of systemic damage.
In their own interest too, banks should be mindful of the uncertainties they create in the forex market which is not conducive to its smooth operations and, therefore, the perception by international markets and investors. As you are aware, worker remittance has financed around 69% of Sri Lanka’s trade deficit. There has been an increase in worker remittances in the recent past responding to active promotional campaign launched by CBSL with the support of the Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Bureau, overseas job agencies, foreign missions and the banks. Recently, the number of professionals and skilled worker categories were encouraged to take up foreign employment, which is catching up fast. Banks should make extra efforts to mobilize their remittances, as this will add to their fee-based income through enhanced financial services. The increase in remittances will have a beneficial impact in reducing the current account deficit and creating a greater stability in the foreign exchange market. Govt. securities market Commercial banks and a few non-banks are the primary dealers who buy and sell Govt. securities and create secondary transactions in this market. The Govt., tends to borrow from the debt securities market which is non inflationary. It appears that there are market collusion and cartel type operations which tend to drive returns on treasury bills and bonds to levels which are not in line with the current and expected movements in key macro variables. Often, CBSL has to reject bids because of the very high bidding rates quoted by primary dealers.

That means when there is excess liquidity in the system, borrowing from CBSL would add to enhancement of reserve money which will have multiple effects in expanding money supply and liquidity in the economy. Banks should make concerted efforts to adjust their funding sources to meet credit demands by mobilizing deposits and enhancing revenue through feebased activities. For emergencies, they should establish credit lines within their peers. Mobilization of deposits does not depend solely on high interest rates, but also on improved customer services and justifiable fees and charges. Similarly, banks should diversify business operations beyond core business of lending and that will help to reduce high credit risks. Improvements in efficiency to reduce intermediation costs Banks need to improve operational efficiency and reduce interest spreads and margins thereby reducing transaction costs to customers. High spreads and margins and related profits of banks and financial institutions will raise transaction costs to borrowers and investors who will pass such costs to customers through high prices of goods and services. This is inflationary. Compared to most countries in the region, banking and financial services in Sri Lanka are provided at very high margins. For example, India’s interest margin is 2.6% and Bangladesh is 2.5%. In Sri Lanka, it is 4%. In fact, even the big investors have begun to feel the impact of high transaction costs although many of them have the bargaining power to obtain funds at prime rates. The medium to small enterprises have no choice or access to finance.
So there is clearly still lots of work to do, and I hope to see more research dedicated to this subject in the future. Intangibles and Productivity I can now come full circle and consider the implications of the findings so far for another important equilibrium concept: potential output. As intangibles seem to be important for the puzzling weakness of investment, can they also help us rationalise recent developments in productivity and hence the implications for potential output? Page 14  Since the global financial crisis we have observed a substantial productivity puzzle. Average labour productivity growth in the United Kingdom has been around 1.3 percentage points lower since the crisis. While intangibles help to explain the missing investment puzzle, their effect on productivity is mixed as, if anything, there is evidence that they might be driving this productivity slowdown. Chart 9 shows that intangible-intensive industries have experienced the strongest slowdowns in labour productivity growth since the global financial crisis, consistent with a recent study by my colleague Jonathan Haskel. [23]  Chart 9: Productivity slowdown is stronger in intangible-intensive industries  Note: The y-axis shows the change in average labour productivity growth over 2008-2018 with respect to the 2000-2007 period. The x-axis covers the average share of intangible assets in total capital. Each ‘bubble’ represents an industry, with the area of the bubbles reflecting its share in total employment within each country, thereby measuring the industry’s contribution to aggregate labour productivity growth. EU4 consists of Germany, Spain, France and Italy. Source: Source.

In the Minutes of that meeting, the MPC emphasised that it will take the actions necessary to return inflation to the 2% target sustainably in the medium term, in line with its remit. The scale, pace and timing of any further increases in Bank Rate will reflect the Committee’s assessment of the economic outlook and inflationary pressures. The Committee will be particularly alert to indications of more persistent inflationary pressures, and will if necessary act forcefully in response. Bringing inflation back down to the 2% target sustainably is our job, no ifs or buts. Tonight I will step back from the current situation and consider some of the longer-term forces affecting our economy, and shaping the economic landscape in which monetary policy is conducted. Assessing the policy landscape Monetary policymakers are typically focused on cyclical movements in the economy, since monetary policy is often thought to have its most powerful effect on inflation 18-24 months ahead. As cyclical shocks hit the economy, monetary policymakers must analyse incoming data to identify the underlying causes and form a view on their implications for the outlook for GDP and inflation. Page 3  Adjusting policy in response to the cyclical shocks in the foreground of the macroeconomic picture is therefore a core part of our role.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Recent challenges and the way forward Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Japanese Chamber of Commerce Dinner Talk, Bangkok, 22 March 2012. *  *  *  Good evening, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank the Japanese Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to speak again at this special annual event. Each of these years has brought us yet more economic surprises and challenges. In 2010, the world economy grew surprisingly fast and the Thai economy promptly rode on the wave of global recovery. Then last year, the European sovereign debt problem erupted and depressed the global economic environment, while at home both of our economies were badly hit by devastating natural disasters that took a heavy human and economic toll. In Thailand, the damage from the floods was indeed severe. Output loss was estimated to be around 3.2 percent of GDP and economic activity contracted sharply by 9 percent year-on-year in the last quarter of 2011. Manufacturing and agricultural outputs as well as exports were severely dented. The automobile industry, which was just recovering from the supply chain disruptions following the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, was hit especially hard. But as you are well aware, shocks from natural disasters are temporary in nature. They tend to be followed by rapid resumption of economic activity as things get back on track, as was the case with Japan in the aftermath of the earthquake.

Almost $ billion of bonds were issued in the first three quarters of this year, establishing a new high when compared to the previous record of about $ billion over the same period in 20114. Over the longer term, emerging Asia’s bond markets are expected to grow 18-fold from $ trillion in 2009 to $ trillion in 20305. 7. There is therefore great scope for financial intermediaries in Asia to play a key role in financing Asia’s future growth, channelling surpluses to meet the region’s needs, and facilitating closer integration of trade and financial markets in the region. DBS, with its extensive network in Asia, is well-poised to be at the forefront of these trends. DBS has done well in this respect - for instance, DBS ranks amongst the top 5 mandated arrangers of Asia Pacific syndicated loans (ex-Australia and Japan). In Singapore, DBS is also part of a bank consortium led by Temasek Holdings to provide long-tenor financing to Singaporebased corporates in infrastructure projects in Asia Pacific. Role of local banks in Singapore’s financial system 8. Even as our local banks like DBS expand into the region to ride on Asia’s growth, it is important that they remain deeply rooted in Singapore, their home market. They have been and will continue to be a crucial part of Singapore’s financial system. Local banks have an important role to play in safeguarding Singapore’s financial stability, particularly in times of crisis.
During late 2009 and through 2010, a recovery of sorts appeared to be taking hold and, by the beginning of last year, some of us were starting to think that the time to begin withdrawing some of the monetary stimulus might be starting to draw near. As the year wore on, though, it became increasingly clear that the underlying growth rate was moderating. To begin with, that reflected a continuing squeeze on household real incomes, and thus on spending, resulting from the increase in the standard rate of VAT in January and the impact of higher energy and import prices. In fact, real household income declined a total of 2½% in the two years after output troughed, whereas in normal conditions it might have been expected to rise about 5% in that time. But since last August, the deterioration also seems to have reflected heightened concerns about the prospects for the euro area. That was reflected in much tighter funding conditions for European banks, including those in the United Kingdom, and increased caution on the part of businesses both in regards to hiring and capital spending. Output is reported to have contracted by 0.2% in the final quarter, though some of the business surveys at the start of this year suggest that the economy may again be expanding. It was that deterioration in the outlook that led us to restart our asset purchases in October.

In that context, the Treasury’s announcement of a clear timetable for the clarification of its new fiscal rules, as well as its preparedness to submit its policy plans to the independent, external scrutiny of the Office for Budget Responsibility is to be welcomed. These considerations also point to the importance of distinguishing between the Bank’s financial stability operation implemented yesterday, and the Bank’s conduct of monetary policy by the MPC. I sought to emphasise that distinction earlier. So to conclude, let me sum up by describing where we stand. I speak here as an individual. I do not represent the views of the MPC as a whole. And, of course, my assessment this evening is conditional on the situation as it stands today. We live in rapidly moving times. As events unfold, assessments need to be updated. But, at present, on the basis of the fiscal easing announced last week, the macroeconomic policy environment looks set to rebalance. Taken in conjunction with the macroeconomic impact of ensuing market developments, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the fiscal easing announced last week will prompt a significant and necessary monetary policy response in November. The views expressed in this speech are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would particularly like to thank Saba Alam, Bob Hills and Jack Meaning for their help in preparing this speech.
Perhaps more relevant, given the theme of this conference is international ramifications of domestic policies, this research suggests that reciprocity of those policies can further reduce the likelihood of a crisis by more than if countries act alone. Of course the countercyclical capital buffer is just one tool, and its application is limited to banks. So I would like to use the second part of this speech to talk about the financial stability implications of the growth in market based finance in recent years. This growth is welcome, not least because it reduces the reliance of both savers and borrowers on the banking system. But it is not without risks, partly because macroprudential policy for market-based finance is less well developed than that for banks. I will argue that those risks can be 1 2  As quoted in Bush (2012); for ’ole read hole, a handy place to hide one’s money (Grote and Marauhn 2006). IMF-FSB-BIS (2016). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  2  reduced by the development of strong institutions and deep domestic capital markets by the recipients of global capital flows, and by measures to reduce the risk of sudden stops such as those recently proposed by the FSB to address structural vulnerabilities from asset management activities. There are two themes that recur throughout these remarks.

The only exception is that the steady state three-year growth rate of real credit is set to 15% (𝜙0 = 0.15) in order to reflect the fact that global credit growth has been slower and less volatile than that of the UK in the data. For simplicity, 𝜁 is set to 0. The two country model also has additional variables capturing the effect of foreign banks’ lending in the domestic economy, and the effect of global credit growth on the domestic crisis probability. The effect of global credit growth on the domestic crisis probability is set equal to that of home credit growth ℎ𝐵∗ =ℎ𝐵 , broadly consistent with the result in appendix 1 that a 1 standard deviation change in either has a similar effect. The constant term is also adjusted so that, at steady state rates of credit growth, it is equal to the same value as in appendix 2. In the model variant with full reciprocity, 𝜙𝑠𝐹 = 𝜙𝑠𝐻 = −6, implying that there is no leakage of credit growth when the CCyB is tightened, so that it is equally effective at tempering credit extended domestically by home or foreign banks. In addition, 𝑘1 = 𝑘1𝐻 = 𝑘1𝐹 , so that the effective setting of the CCyB is equal to the setting that the national policymaker chooses (𝑘1𝐻 ). In this case the value of 𝑓 has no bearing on financial stability.