samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
By contrast, the inflation outlook has improved appreciably. This has increased the SNB’s room for manoeuvre. Finally, there is a risk that the financial crisis will cause a deterioration in financing conditions for the economy as a whole. These are the considerations that have prompted today’s decision to cut the three-month Libor target range by another 50 basis points. Given the expected deterioration in the Swiss economy and the imponderables linked to the long and variable monetary policy transmission lags, a further rate cut appears appropriate. With this action we are reducing, to the extent possible, the risk of an even more pronounced economic downturn. Inflation forecast chart How has our inflation forecast been revised? The dashed red curve on the chart represents the new forecast. It covers the period from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2011, and maps the future development of inflation on the assumption that the three-month Libor remains unchanged at 0.5% over the forecasting period. For purposes of comparison, the dash-dotted green curve shows the inflation forecast of the September monetary assessment, based on a three-month Libor of 2.75%. The new forecast shows a rapid fall in inflation over the next few quarters. It drops back below the 2% mark as from the fourth quarter of this year.

As I stated in my introduction, such an assessment is very useful for us, and we will take the committee's recommendations on board in our work going forward. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Figure 20: Risk Premium Indicators 2008 yılının Ağustos Ayına Göre Ülkelerin 5 Yıllık CDS Değişim Oranları (29.08.2008 değeri, 1 olarak alınmıştır) 5.5  Turkey Türkiye Brazil Brezilya S. Africa G.Afrika Macaristan Hungary G.Kore S. Korea  4.5 3.5  900 800  EMBI+ Türkiye  700  EMBI+  EMBI+  600 500 400  2.5  300 1.5  EMBI+ Turkey  200  0609  0109  0808  1007  0308  100  0809  0609  0409  0209  1208  1008  0808  0.5  Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. In the third quarter of 2009, in line with the improvement in global risk perceptions, capital inflows towards emerging markets through portfolio movements increased and currencies of the said countries began to appreciate (Figure 21). Turkey was no exception to this development. This development prevented the hikes in commodity prices in the third quarter to translate into domestic unit costs. Figure 21: Exchange Rate Developments  Brazil Brezilya Chile Şili Czech Rep. Çek Cumh.

I will then discuss the other side of global economic integration, namely the interdependencies between countries and markets. At the end of my remarks, I will offer some thoughts on what is likely to change with regard to monetary policy if global economic integration were to decrease again as a result of the war. Monetary policy in an integrated global economy The world has become increasingly interconnected economically over the past decades. Until a short while ago, we thought these ties would continue to become closer. The US-China trade dispute of recent times had already cast some doubt on the durability of global integration. The coronavirus pandemic has restricted mobility and strained global supply chains. However, the geopolitical confrontation we see today has an entirely different dimension. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reopened old rifts in many respects. We therefore have to ask what the consequences would be if the economic fragmentation already caused by the war were to persist, or even increase further? To assess this, I would first like to look briefly at the process of globalisation over the past thirty years or so. At the beginning of the 1990s, the erstwhile closed-off states of the Eastern bloc gradually began to open up, and so too did China and other Asian countries. Since then, economic integration worldwide has been considerable. Today, the value of goods and services traded internationally is three and a half times higher than it was then. Average real per capita income worldwide has increased by two thirds.
This question is one that the Central Bank and the Monetary Policy Committee must grapple with at all times. In the recent term, monetary policy has been conditioned by the private sector debt crisis, which stems from years of overheating and the subsequent financial crisis. As the debt situation improves and the slack in the economy diminishes, it will become more important to tackle inflation aggressively. Historical and international experience shows that this cannot be done without temporary sacrifices in economic activity and employment levels. We must therefore hope that inflation subsides as forecast in the near future. Lifting the restrictions on capital outflows is one of the most complex tasks facing the Icelandic authorities at present. The controls probably prevented further depreciation of the króna after the banks collapsed, although no one knows how long the depreciation would have persisted. The controls therefore provided shelter for restructuring of private sector debt and the financial system as a whole and afforded monetary policy the room to concentrate more on domestic economic conditions than would otherwise have been possible. The benefits of the capital controls are most pronounced during the resolution of the balance of payments problems proceeding from the collapse of the financial system. If all nonresidents’ so-called impatient claims on residents were paid in a short period of time, Iceland would pay down foreign debt much more rapidly than is desirable. If worse comes to worst, the deleveraging could amount to roughly half Iceland’s GDP in relatively few years.

Banks and investors will not necessarily take into account the overall risk in the financial system. The consequences came into clear evidence during the financial crisis: banks had inadequate equity capital, excessive short-term wholesale funding and insufficient buffers of highly liquid assets. A new and tighter international regulatory framework is intended to remedy this situation. Stricter capital adequacy and liquidity coverage standards are in the offing. The authorities will also be able to tailor banks’ capital requirements to the overall risk in the financial system. During upturns, these requirements can be raised, so that banks will have to hold more capital for their loans. This will smooth out lending growth and better equip banks to bear losses during downturns. It will ease the impact of the marching steps on the bridge. There will be a need for higher capital buffers when economic growth is solid and debt builds up. This may restrain the build-up of imbalances. But when there are no clouds on the horizon, it is easy to lose sight of more long-term considerations. The government authorities should therefore provide a clear mandate that ensures independence and delegates the responsibility for determining capital buffers. In this regard, we can build on the experience with the framework for monetary policy. And any change in capital requirements must be made on the basis of an assessment of the overall risk in the financial system – not only in a single institution.
The sampling approach generates the same entry and exit behavior as present in the population, with young individuals and immigrants entering the sample and deceased individuals and emigrants leaving the sample each quarter at the same rate as in the U.S. population. As a result, for each quarter starting in 1999, the panel constitutes a representative cross-section of the population of borrowers. Moreover, once the random sample of individuals is identified, we then include the credit records of all individuals living at the same address, so the panel can be used to analyze new loan originations, balances, and delinquencies at the household level. Consumer debt traditionally has been measured at the individual level, but most economic decision making is done at the household level. In fact, consumer income and assets are commonly measured and analyzed at the household level. For studying household economic behavior, and in particular for understanding life-cycle household finance, it would similarly be more useful to examine debt and credit aggregated at the household level. It may also be important to consider the distribution of debt within households. Beyond the ability to link individual consumer and household-level loans over time, the panel improves on typical loan-level datasets by linking multiple loans to the same consumer. Thus, at each point in time, one can see whether the individual holds multiple first mortgages or a combination of first and second mortgages while at the same time holding various types of non-mortgage debt.

In addition to providing a measure of individual forecast uncertainty, these density forecasts yield richer information about how expectations vary across people and over time than do single-value forecasts, or “point predictions.” The SCE is the outcome of a five-year collaborative research project involving economists, psychologists, and survey design experts. During this period, we conducted a large number of experimental surveys to assess the information elicited with existing survey questions and to develop new questions, including those for measuring forecast uncertainty. This preliminary work and the probabilistic format of the new survey questions represent an important innovation that builds on academic work over the past 20 years by economist Charles Manski, as well as some early pioneering survey work conducted by the Bank of Italy. Creating the CCP and SCE has yielded some important lessons. First, data innovation requires an ability to think outside the box, and it benefits from the collaboration of people with diverse skills and backgrounds – academic economists, but also representatives of other academic disciplines and individuals with business and public policy experience. Skills in identifying valuable but underutilized data, the creation of data linkages, the development of appropriate sampling procedures, and survey methodology and questionnaire design experience are all particularly valuable. In this respect, our experiences mirror those at the many new interdisciplinary data and social research centers and numerous “Big Data” university centers being created across the country.
In parallel, given the elevated uncertainties across financial markets - which faced an increase in interest rates for the first time in more than a decade – we have intensified communication with markets and the public, to clarify our strategy of monetary policy. This strategy is based on three important principles:  First, normalisation of monetary policy stance was and remains necessary for inflation to return to the target in a steady manner. The purpose of this normalisation was to curb the pass-through of rising international prices to the general, steady surge in prices in the Albanian economy. In this context, this normalisation was in line with the reaction undertaken by all other central banks in the course of 2022, and in the current year. Second, the speed and intensity of normalisation has followed a gradual and prudential process, led by new information and in harmony with the direction of fiscal policy, as well as with developments in the financial market. In this view, I would like to highlight that our monetary policy stance has been - on the one hand  2/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  - consistent with the return of inflation to the target, and - on the other hand – prudential, in order to have the least possible effect on both economic activity and financial stability.

In particular, wages in the private sector rose by an average rate of 12.2% in 2022. Lastly, allow me to point out that progress was also recorded in 2022 in terms of improvement in the stability of both foreign and public sector's balance sheets. In more concrete terms, Albanian exports grew by 42% in 2022, driven by a growth in tourism income, which opened the way for the reduction in both the trade deficit and the current account deficit of the country. The latter dropped to 6% of GDP in 2022 from 7.8% of GDP in 2021. Along with the rapid increase in foreign direct investments and the stability of domestic financial markets, they paved the way for a strengthening of the lek exchange rate over the year. Also, the budget deficit of Albania, according to fiscal data, dropped to 3.7% of GDP in 2022 from 4.6% of GDP in 2021. Public debt was reduced to 64.6% of GDP in 2022 from 74.5% in 2021, while public debt was reduced to 64.6% of GDP from 74.5%. This improvement reflected both an increased effect of the nominal base of revenues and the fiscal consolidating stance implemented throughout 2022. Honourable Members of Parliament, The Bank of Albania is confident that the normalisation of monetary policy is the right monetary policy stance, in compliance with our legal obligations and for the purposes of safeguarding the macroeconomic balances of Albania and for the sustainable and longterm growth of society's welfare.
The amendments also authorise the Ministry of Finance to issue regulations on the use of other macroprudential instruments. Preferably, such instruments should focus directly on the sources of systemic risk. This is the principle that is applied when taxes are imposed directly on environmentally hazardous products. However, in practice, this is difficult to accomplish in the financial system. Systemic risk can be difficult to identify and has numerous sources. The financial system and its interaction with the real economy is complex, and problems spread across borders. The financial crisis was a clear reminder of this. We have experienced on previous occasions that some financial sector operators find ways to evade regulations. New sources and forms of systemic risk may also arise. It is difficult to imagine instruments that can fully prevent financial crises from developing. Yet it is still appropriate to increase banks’ resilience to losses when systemic risk increases. This is the primary purpose of the countercyclical capital buffer. Countercyclical capital buffer The new framework contains a number of new capital adequacy requirements. There are new buffer requirements in addition to the minimum Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  ratio requirement. Banks that do not meet the buffer requirements will face restrictions on distributing dividend and paying out bonuses. The capital conservation buffer is permanent and independent of systemic risk. The systemic risk buffer is designed to act as a buffer against more persistent systemic risk and will apply to all Norwegian banks.

Libor: Entering the Endgame  Speech given by Andrew Bailey Governor of the Bank of England  Bloomberg Webinar, London and New York 13 July 2020  I am grateful to Alastair Hughes for his assistance in drafting these remarks and Paul Brione, Andrew Hauser, Thomas Horn, Will Parry and Edwin Schooling Latter for their input. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Introduction “‘The passing of summer,’ I thought. ‘There can be no summer in this land without cricket.’” So wrote the journalist and author Neville Cardus.1 Covid has deprived us of many aspects of our communal lives this year. It has meant no cricket for us until last week, and in the US still no baseball. And to prove that we share an obsession with summer pastimes, a former colleague from many years ago when I was seconded to the New York Fed gave me a book to read called ‘How Life Imitates the World Series’. Sadly, my speech cannot match that for importance. But a more recent summer tradition has been speaking on Libor, a now annual event for the past few years – but one I do not expect to be a permanent fixture. The time is fast approaching to draw stumps on the Libor benchmark, or for those to whom cricket is a mystery – after all not everyone appreciates a sport that can last five days and still end in a draw – we will soon be at the bottom of the ninth for Libor.
Distinguished clients and invited guests Private investment is a critical source of long-term capital for spurring sustained economic growth and diversification while promoting innovation by supporting the micro, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs). Chairperson In order for the financial sector to fully satisfy the credit demands of the productive sector in Zambia, commercial banks must not be overly conservative in terms of their risk appetite for 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  MSMEs. Rather, Banks should seek to better understand the risks associated with lending to these enterprises. Further, it is important that banks better understand the risk associated with lending to specialized and growth sectors such as agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and mining by deliberately developing relevant human resource skills in these sectors. Ladies and gentlemen In its quest to see the financial sector take up an active role in financing the productive sector and facilitating the flow of investment into the economy, the Bank of Zambia continues to undertake a number of policy and structural reforms. Among these reforms is the new increase in the minimum capital requirement for banks to K520 million and K104 million for foreign and local banks respectively. These capital levels are expected among other things to: i. Make the banking system strong enough to withstand shocks and instability in the economy should they occur;  ii. Enable banks to underwrite big ticket transactions;  iii. Make banks contribute more to the growth of the economy; and  iv.

Improve access to loanable funds among local entrepreneurs and thereby enable them to partner with foreign investors. This should enhance their economic inclusiveness or participation in the development of the country. Ladies and gentlemen As I conclude, allow me to remind you of the plight of so many of our people living in rural districts. Despite the high economic and business potential in these areas, financial services are non-existant. This means that income earning citizens in the informal sector such as fishermen, bee-keepers, handcraft makers and farmers cannot deposit their earnings in a safe savings account due to the absence of bank branches. In addition, those with good business ideas cannot access loans to actualize their projects and create wealth. These people have to devise unconventional means of keeping their money such as hiding it in their homes, burying or indeed moving with the money where ever they go. Furthermore, civil servants and other citizens in formal employment have to travel long distances and in some instances for a number of days before they can access their salaries. A number of them end up losing their hard earned income in thefts and other calamities. This has to change, and banks working in partnership with the Government can make this happen. I therefore, wish to challenge Commercial banks including First commercial Bank (Z) Ltd to consider opening branches, in the unbanked districts.
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: One size fits all? Speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the 16th Annual Conference of the German-British Forum “The European Central Bank in a global perspective – central banking and the challenge of rising inflation”, London, 26 May 2011. *  *  *  I wish to thank Huw Pill and Oreste Tristani for their contributions to the speech. I remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to speak at this German British Forum on the important issue of “The European Central Bank in a global perspective – The challenge of rising inflation”. I would like to address an issue which is raised time and again, namely, can the monetary policy implemented by the ECB fit different underlying economic performances in the Member States of the euro area? And in the current situation, the question is often asked whether the ECB’s monetary policy doesn’t risk hampering the recovery in the euro area periphery and jeopardising the implementation of the adjustment programmes. As I said, the issue is not new, but it is certainly topical. I am sometimes tempted to answer that this is not the right question, or at least that the question comes too late, given that we now have had a monetary union for more than 11 years and there are no alternatives in sight.

But, at the same time, I do not think that cross-country differences in Monetary Union, which raise the potential for persistent divergence of economic performance, can or should be ignored. Looking forward, the financial crisis and its impact on the functioning of financial markets in some countries has led to a situation in which cross-country heterogeneity owing to differences in monetary policy transmission may be more pronounced than before the crisis – at least if effective remedial measures are not taken. This new environment has posed, and will continue to pose, challenges to the single monetary policy. How is the ECB dealing with these challenges? Since the start of the financial crisis, the ECB has implemented a set of non-standard measures, taking advantage of the range of instruments available within the Eurosystem’s framework for the implementation of monetary policy. Foremost among these measures has been the adoption of a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment in the ECB’s monetary policy operations. In conjunction with the flexible nature of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework, these measures allow banks to obtain funding even in the face of market dislocation.5 This has avoided a disorderly deleveraging of bank balance sheets and the associated potential for a fire sale-driven, vicious downward spiral in asset prices and bank capital. In the face of the sovereign debt crisis these non-standard measures, supplemented by targeted asset purchases under the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme, have addressed and contained the country-specific impediments to monetary policy transmission.