samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to the surveys conducted in 2006, approximately half of the interviewees used cards as the means of payment for at least 80 per cent of all purchases. 2 Today, almost twothirds of the interviewees use cards as the means of payment for all purchases. The great majority of the interviewees in the autumn survey, 95 per cent, had a debit card. A much smaller percentage, 40 per cent, had a credit card. Debit cards were used in 96 per cent of all card payments. This is an increase since the survey in 2006, when debit cards were used for 80 per cent of all card payments. Credit cards thus seem to have become relatively less important – at least in terms of the number of payments. Despite the fact that card payments predominate in terms of both the number and value of payments, the Swedish public still prefers cash to cards for purchases of less than SEK 100. Our survey shows that as many as 22 per cent choose cash for purchases between SEK 100 and SEK 500. For amounts under SEK 100, cash is preferred by 63 per cent. There are no fully-comparable figures from any of the surveys carried out in 2006, but in 2006 the “average consumer” 3 did not choose to pay by card until the purchase sum exceeded SEK 123. 4 So what governs the choice between cash and cards? The most important factor, according to our survey, is that the means of payment is perceived as being convenient.

A final word on central counterparties (CCP): I would like to acknowledge the valuable proposals recently made by the European Commission to insist that those CCPs whose activities are “super-systemic” for the EU market establish themselves in the European Union. They are a step in the right direction and represent the only viable mechanism to guarantee that European authorities and national central banks in particular, can control and manage the risks that CCPs are likely to pose to the financial stability of the European Union. Once the provisions on the resolution of CCPs have been finalised, the compensation framework within the EU will have been improved considerably. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  * * * Let me conclude with a general remark that concerns the economy: we need a system to assess, ex post, the economic effects of the reforms. France fully supports the work of the FSB to develop a structured analytical framework, which Germany has rightly included in its priorities for its G20 presidency. Europe, and Germany and France in particular, now has a special duty to protect financial regulation – a regulation that is sensitive to risk, balanced in its treatment of banks and nonbanks and binds the entire international community. Generally, that is what we’ve been doing well since 2009, and it is what continues to inspire us. Thank you for your attention and I wish you an excellent conference. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Information from the regional network is a useful supplement when assessing the current economic situation. Region South reports high growth in activity in all industries. The market outlook is positive and more broadly based than previously. Growth in the export industry and the construction sector is expected to remain solid, although somewhat weaker than earlier. On the other hand, there is now more optimism in the retail trade and service sectors. Capacity utilisation varies across industries. There is little excess capacity in the construction sector. Skilled labour in particular is in short supply. There is some excess manufacturing capacity, while considerable excess capacity is reported in retail trade and services. The export industry is expecting a slower rise in prices for export products next year, while in general a stable rise in prices is expected in other industries. Profitability is increasing, particularly in manufacturing for the domestic market, the construction sector and service industries. Developments in employment show a mixed picture. Manufacturing employment is rising at a solid pace, while the level of employment is stable in the other sectors. Growth in the global economy will have an impact on developments in the Norwegian economy in the period ahead. Global growth is expected to moderate somewhat this year and stabilise in the years ahead. In the US, growth seems to have remained solid in the first quarter. Heightened uncertainty with regard to developments in the US economy and weaker results for some large companies have resulted in falling prices on world stock exchanges.

So far this year, the price of Brent Blend oil has largely moved between USD 45 and 55 per barrel. In the past few weeks, it has hovered around USD 50 per barrel. Oil futures have also increased. Little excess production capacity in OPEC countries, combined with the prospect of lower production in non-OPEC countries, has probably influenced oil prices. At the same time, there are prospects of continued strong demand growth in important oil-importing countries, such as China and some other emerging economies. The IMF has analysed supply and demand in the oil market for the period ahead in the latest issue of "World Economic Outlook": With price expectations at around the current level and global GDP growth at approximately 3 per cent, demand for oil is expected to increase by around 2 per cent per year over the coming decades up to 2030. The rise primarily reflects higher demand for fuel for motor vehicles, particularly in non-OECD countries. An increase in per capita income in China will in particular lead to a sharp increase in car use. Output in non-OPEC countries will peak soon – in 5 years, according to IMF estimates. Higher demand will thus require higher output in OPEC countries. These countries have substantial oil resources, but are currently producing close to capacity. Production capacity must therefore be increased. Higher demand can thereby be met by non-OPEC oil producers operating at full capacity while OPEC passively accommodates any remaining demand by increasing its production capacity.
The transition to a netzero economy can only be achieved with a committed and concerted effort across the public and private sector. I wish all of you a fruitful discussion ahead. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

The uncertainty about how markets respond in conditions of acute stress - uncertainty in terms of how correlations behave, how much liquidity will be available, the risk profile of counterparties, etc., combined with the inherent uncertainty about the probability of a seemingly remote event, and the scale of losses associated with such an event, all argue for a more prudent cushion against risk than would be necessary in a less complex and more certain state of the world. Third, our approach to financial stability relies a lot on market discipline and, as a result, depends significantly on the quality of accounting and public disclosure. We see some progress in the extent to which firms provide a clear picture of their underlying risk profiles, but there is room for improvement. Accounting standards have notably struggled with the challenges of incorporating innovations in financial instruments, especially when those instruments are used to offset the risks inherent in more traditional activities whose fluctuations in value have not typically been recorded in earnings or in balance sheet valuations. It is hard to see how we can be comfortable that we have achieved a reasonable resting place on these issues. In the long run, it is critical for the cause of market discipline that accounting and disclosure of financial instruments be consistent with the ongoing direction of innovation in risk management. And finally, the broad changes in market structure place a much higher premium on cooperation among supervisors, market regulators, and central banks, both nationally and internationally.
A discussion of these kinds of central considerations is typically missing from the criticism put forward. In the international discussion, the central banks’ policy rates are currently seen as quite blunt tools when it comes to curbing the rise in household debt and housing prices. The reason for this is that the interest rate cannot be targeted at the problem area in question, but has a much broader impact on the economy, such as companies’ investments and, via exchange rate effects, their export opportunities. 11 It does not come as much of a surprise therefore that no central bank has so far used the interest rate weapon to any great extent for this purpose. There is currently a relatively high level of agreement that macroprudential policy and well-designed financial regulation should be the first line of defence in preventing financial imbalances from accumulating. 12 The tolerance band was not a target range As I mentioned, one proposal has been that the tolerance band for the inflation target should be reintroduced, as it is assumed this would make it easier for the Riksbank to raise the repo  11  The broad impact of the interest rate is occasionally highlighted as an advantage, however. Unlike macroprudential policy measures which can sometimes be circumvented, “the interest rate gets into all the cracks” (Stein, 2013). 12  See IMF (2015). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  rate. It could be helpful to remind ourselves here why there was previously a band surrounding the inflation target.

As a starting point I think it is worth taking a step back and reminding ourselves why the Riksbank and many other central banks in general have developed inflation targets. 1 The advantages of an inflation target Money as we know it in modern times has no natural, intrinsic value. Historically, coins were minted using valuable metals and central banks promised to redeem banknotes in exchange for a certain quantity of such metals. However, since the early 1970s every trace of this kind of link to valuable metals has disappeared. The reason why banknotes and coins nevertheless have a stable value is based on expectations and confidence – expectations that the money will continue to be valuable in the future and confidence that the central bank will pursue a monetary policy consistent with price stability. There are several ways to build expectations of price stability. It has often been attempted to develop some form of nominal anchor for the economy. The anchor could, for example, be a fixed exchange rate, a target for the development of money supply or an inflation target. When it is credible, an inflation target acts as a benchmark and guides expectations in the economy. When economic agents have a common picture of how prices will develop in the future, it becomes easier to plan for the long term. The inflation target therefore lays the foundations for efficient price and wage formation.
The financial institutions are committed to engage in social responsibility related work as well, or to reach out to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, of which women occupy an important place. Despite the advancement of the financial sector and the resilience of the system as a whole, we are still unable to appreciate or criticize its commitment towards financial inclusion of and access to finance by women, due to lack of disaggregated data from banks and financial institutions. This, I believe, is the biggest drawback in initiating policy responses to remedy the deficiencies in financial inclusion of women. The absence of balanced regional or provincial growth is another important drawback in enhancing financial inclusion of women. GDP growth has been uneven throughout the post independent period. Growth in the Western Province has been around 50%, while all other provinces accounted for the balance. This uneven growth has resulted in a skewed income distribution, varying degree of poverty, marginalization and unemployment issues, as well as financial exclusion in the other regions of the country. However, the significant growth in the Western Province has resulted in notable enhancement in access to finance and financial inclusion. 2  BIS Review 40/2008  Table 1 Banking Density as at 31.12.2007 (Provisional)  District  No.

Ranee Jayamaha: Access to finance and financial inclusion for women Speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Centre for Women's Research (CENWOR), Colombo, 4 April 2008. *  *  *  Let me start by giving a general definition for access to finance and financial inclusion before assessing the status of women in these two areas, and then discuss the areas of focus in enhancing financial inclusion for women. What is access to finance? In simple terms, this means to provide an environment in which people, in general, have accesses to the formal financial system, through the use of different financial products at affordable prices. The access could be to any formal financial institution, market, and payment system or to a financial instrument, including savings, loans, remittances and insurance services. What is financial inclusion? This means the process of facilitating those sectors and segments of the population that are outside, to become a part of the formal financial system and enrolling individuals or groups into the formal financial sector.
Therefore, inflation has not spread as broadly, and the likelihood of seeing second-round effects to date remains relatively low partly because of the softness of our labor market. That is the current state of the economy and the outlook, and so, what is the way forward a bit further? Page 4 of 8  Part 2: The Way Forward Immediate policy challenge is to keep the recovery intact. “No cliff” Looking a bit further, the immediate policy challenge is to ensure that the recovery is intact. We have to make sure that there are “no cliffs” or things that will interrupt our recovery path. What kinds of things would cause this? Firstly, we do not want financial conditions tightening too early because that would hurt the ongoing recovery path. In this case, we must do what is necessary to ensure that the banking sector still provides credit facilitation to the economy and help keep the recovery going. We also do not want to see an adverse impact on the Thai financial markets from the tightening in global financial markets due to the Fed or the ECB policy normalizations. However, we are well-placed to withstand the tightening, given our low external vulnerability. The other thing that would constitute a cliff is the deteriorating financial conditions. For example, a sudden and sharp uptick in non-performing loans could interrupt the banking sector and the credit intermediation channel.

The third open is open data because we realize that data will become an important asset. We have recently launched the D-Statement program that allows people to use the information at one bank to apply for financial services at another bank to improve access to services and competition. The other key element in the new financial landscape is sustainability which comprises two key components. One is the sustainability of the household debt. We have recognized that the household debt is very high in Thailand at about 90 percent of GDP, and hence it is crucial to design measures that attempt to put the household debt burden on a more sustainable basis. There is also another aspect of sustainability which is on the green and environmental issues. We are putting in place key building blocks that will be an essential part of the sustainability landscape. They include the green taxonomy and better disclosure to measure progress in the sustainability area. The last part of our financial landscape paper is about a more flexible regulatory framework. I think that this paper is important because it lays out where we see things evolving in the financial sector, and we would welcome your input. The paper is available on our website in both Thai and English. And if we look beyond the financial sector? I have talked about our policy responses to Covid-19 and then some of the longer-term issues we are addressing on the financial front through the financial landscape paper.
Thomas Jordan: The various waves of money market turbulence and the measures taken by central banks Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Geneva, 19 June 2008. *  *  *  The money markets are the lifeblood of the international financial system. Properly functioning money markets are absolutely essential for the solvency of banks, as well as for the effective implementation of monetary policy. Hence, events on the money markets since the onset of the financial turmoil have been a particular focus of central banks’ attention. So far, there have been three waves of turbulence. At the time of the last news conference, we were almost at the height of the second wave. In the meantime we have experienced a third wave, which peaked in April. An appropriate barometer of the health of the money market is the difference between the three-month Libor and the three-month (T)OIS rate (tom-next/overnight indexed swap). This difference reflects the credit and liquidity premium on unsecured money market trades compared to purely derivative business with virtually no counterparty risk. With the help of chart 1, which can be regarded as a “fever curve”, I would now like to look back at how events unfolded, and comment on the measures which the central banks took in response. The first wave peaked in September 2007.

Others used price-based measures, such as swing pricing and redemption fees, to ensure trading costs were borne by redeeming investors. [19] However, if applied systematically in a stress scenario, such measures could even further limit the ability of firms and other financial institutions to raise liquidity. For instance, if MMFs had broadly suspended redemptions, some insurance corporations and pension funds may have found themselves unable to meet margin calls on their derivative exposures. Widespread suspensions may also have had adverse effects on the confidence in the wider financial sector, possibly amplifying risk-off behaviour. The role of monetary policy in stabilising financial markets Forceful monetary policy action, on both sides of the Atlantic, ultimately filled the void that was left by asset managers and regulators having limited liquidity management tools to curb systemic stress. The fast rise of the non-bank sector, however, meant that traditional monetary policy tools, such as increasing the money supply to banks and accepting broader collateral, were not sufficient. A frozen money market impaired the intermediation of liquidity from banks to non-banks. [20] In such disrupted conditions, central banks face two broad options. They either provide liquidity directly to non-banks – that is, they expand their role as lender of last resort – or they purchase large quantities of illiquid assets. A priori, there are no fundamental reasons to dismiss either of the two options.
1 Transferring this additional duration risk to the Federal Reserve’s portfolio, and hence out of the portfolios of market participants, was one channel through which the asset purchase program was intended to have its effect on financial conditions. This “portfolio balance” channel has been discussed by Chairman Bernanke on several occasions. 2 This view associates the amount of policy stimulus with the stock of assets, or more precisely with the amount of duration risk, that the Federal Reserve takes onto its balance sheet. Policy achievements of LSAP2 The purpose of the asset purchase program was to help the Federal Reserve achieve the economic objectives of full employment and stable prices that it was given by Congress. I believe that the program delivered what could have been expected from it. In particular, let me highlight its success along two dimensions. First, the LSAP2 program made broad financial conditions more accommodative. This conclusion can be drawn from the behavior of financial markets from late August 2010 to the program’s implementation date in November 2010 – a period during which market participants moved from seeing such a program as a remote possibility to expecting it with near certainty. 3 Asset price movements over this period included a decline in real interest rates, a narrowing of risks spreads, an increase in equity prices, and a decline in the dollar – exactly the pattern that one would expect to be generated from additional monetary policy accommodation.

These changes likely supported economic growth and the creation of employment relative to what would have been realized in the absence of the program. 4 Second, the LSAP2 program appears to have raised inflation expectations from unusually low levels and reduced the threat of deflation. The downside risks to inflation had become quite threatening by last summer. Breakeven inflation rates had moved to levels that were well below those consistent with the FOMC’s mandate, even for forward measures covering periods beginning several years ahead. In addition, the pricing of deflation risk, as computed by looking at Treasury inflation-protected securities with different amounts of accrued inflation, reflecting fairly substantial odds of deflation over the next several years. 5 Since that  1  Estimates of the contribution of additional risk coming from the increased size of the portfolio range from 60 percent to 80 percent, while estimates of the impact of its longer duration range from 20 percent to 40 percent. 2  See, for example, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (2010), “The Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy”, remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 27. 3  One would expect market prices to incorporate nearly all of the effects of the programs in advance rather than during the actual implementation of the program. Thus, the period before the November implementation is the most relevant period for assessing the program’s effects.