samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
by Martin Feldstein, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 7 Rose (2007), A stable international monetary system emerges: Inflation targeting is Bretton Woods, reversed, Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 663-681, September. 8 See Chapter 3 of the October 2018 IMF World Economic Outlook. 9 Cesa-Bianchi et al (2015), Global Liquidity, House Prices, and the Macroeconomy: Evidence from Advanced and Emerging Economies, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, show that for AEs flexible exchange rates dampen the impact of push shocks, whereas for EMs they can amplify the impact of push shocks via a collateral valuation effect 10 See Chapter 2, IMF April 2016 World Economic Outlook. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6    An effective macroprudential policy toolkit to curtail the damaging extremes of domestic financial cycles. Macroprudential policy can guard against rapid credit growth, which is amongst the best early warning indicators of an impending downturn. 11 And higher domestic bank capital ratios reduce the sensitivity of capital inflows to changes in global volatility.12    And deep domestic capital markets to reduce the reliance on foreign investors and the need to issue in foreign currency, which dampens capital flow volatility (Chart 6).

The analysis focuses on the effect of push and pull shocks on capital flows in the  contemporaneous quarter and the subsequent two quarters. In a second specification the role of a set of additional factors (X) in affecting the sensitivity of capital flowsat-risk to global push shocks is considered. This is done by adding an interactive effect to equation (1): 37 KF@R = α + β 𝑃𝑢𝑠ℎ + γ 𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑙 + δ X + θ (𝑃𝑢𝑠ℎ ∗ X) + 𝑢  (2)  A series of factors is considered: in one specification the focus is on the share of foreign currencydenominated debt and a measure of reserve adequacy, while in another specification the role of macroprudential policy is analysed. 34  The FCI is the first principal component of the following series: long term government bond yields, term spreads, sovereign spreads, interbank spreads, corporate spreads, equity returns, equity volatility and financials market capitalisation (normalised by the broader market). These indices are based on those presented by the IMF in their April 2017 GFSR. 35 The main difference between this specification and the one proposed by the IMF in their October 2018 GFSR is that they consider capital flows in aggregate across EMs and, consequently, can only look at the effect of push factors. The choice to do this in a panel setting with country-specific series means pull factors can be incorporated into the analysis. The current analysis also broadens the scope from portfolio flows to different types of capital flows.
•  As one of you put it recently, the adjectives used by bankers to describe the MAS are “no-nonsense”, “business-friendly”, “pragmatic”. •  You will be forgiven to think that we are sometimes schizophrenic. •  In my meetings with foreign bank CEOs, I have sometimes, in the same breath, said we would like to see an improvement in the bank’s risk management and internal controls and then asked what we could do to encourage the bank to expand its operations in Singapore – safely of course! Let me explain why we are both “no-nonsense” and “business-friendly”. The financial services sector is one of the key pillars of the Singapore economy. •  It accounts for about 13% of GDP and has strong positive demand spillovers on the rest of the economy. •  The sector employs about 200,000 people, 84% of them are Singapore citizens and PRs. –  It creates good jobs. –  The median wage for Singaporeans in financial services is $ compared to the national median of $  Financial services will become even more important in the future economy. •  The sector grew by an average of 8.6% p.a. during the last five years (2011–2015), two times faster than the overall economy at 4.0%.

An additional result of dissemination of the DIT strategy is elaboration of standards of communication in conducting the monetary policy (announcements of decision-making authorities, inflation reports and published inflation projections), which facilitate contacts of the central bank with the external environment (the financial market and the general public). It may be speculated that these standards make the interpretation of the decisions made by the central bank easier for foreign investors, which should, under the huge cross-border capital flows, increase the effectiveness of the monetary policy in stabilising inflation. Re 6) As mentioned before, the process of globalisation is a serious challenge for central banks. Following the increase in human workforce relatively to the capital resource, the pay of the workforce has gone down, and so did the costs of manufacturing of many goods and services. Setting fuel prices apart, whose increase is also brought about by globalisation, inflation in many countries remains very low, whereas a strong increase in the global labour supply mitigates the possibility of occurrence of the second-round effects i.e. wage increases in response to a rise in current inflation. On the other hand, the global surplus of savings over investments causes the capital to chase the high yield opportunities, thus increasing asset prices in many countries. An exemplary case may be increases in stock exchange indices, bond prices or real property prices in Anglo-Saxon countries and e.g. in Spain.
This assessment has to be seen outside the narrow context of the banking sector. First, it shows that Bulgaria can be a successful and full participant in euro area institutions, given that the Banking Union is the first such institution in which the country has participated; and second, it is a good example of institutional development to be followed in an environment of still serious institutional deficits. In 2021, we also marked one year since the Bulgarian Lev joined the EU Exchange Rate Mechanism. This participation confirms and further proves the currency stability of the country. Another important strategic aspect is the consolidation process continuing in our banking sector. This process follows global trends of seeking to streamline the structure and efficiency of the banking sector in the light of increasing competition and the pressure by new providers of 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  financial services, as well as rising costs of complying with regulatory and legal norms. In spite of the difficult and complicated environment created by the pandemic, in 2021 we saw the biggest acquisition, in terms of size and price, in the Bulgarian banking sector. A deal like this i s the most accurate market evaluation of the condition of the banking sector and its attractiveness to strategic investors. Therefore, the sector stayed in very good shape and so far succeeded through the pandemic.

The dynamics of the political cycle in 2021 led to a pause in the institutions’ work in the process in the country. All the factors are now in place for its resumption through the continuation of the Coordination Council for Bulgaria’s preparations for euro area membership; and the institutionalisation of the Euro Adoption Plan. The draft of this plan, adopted by the Coordination Council on 30.06.2021, has already gone through the formal procedure of public consultation and inter-agency coordination, and has the support of our external partners. In spite of the delay in the formal process, the BNB remained the institution that continued to work actively in all areas related to the euro area accession, falling within the scope of our responsibilities. To this end, we established the necessary internal organisation of work and good operational communication with the European Central Bank. Specific individuals and channels for partnership were identified on both sides. In this sense, the central bank is ready to carry out the huge amount of technical work related to the adoption of the euro in a timely manner, notwithstanding the emerging tighter work schedule. In conclusion, 2022 is promising to be a year of challenges but also opportunities for the banking sector. The achievements of 2021 show that the sector is in a strong starting position to meet the challenges and make good use of the opportunities. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir: Unlocking opportunities Opening address by Mr Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 10th ASEAN Insurance Regulators Meeting and 33rd ASEAN Insurance Council Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 15 November 2007. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to be here today at the 10th ASEAN Insurance Regulators meeting and the 33rd ASEAN Insurance Council Meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Let me first extend a warm welcome and "Selamat Datang" to all the delegates from abroad as well as to fellow Malaysians here today. During this “˜Visit Malaysia Year” which is also the year of Malaysia's 50th Anniversary celebrations of our independence, I do hope that our foreign delegates will make time to enjoy Malaysia's diverse culture and the many unique sights, sounds and flavours. I am indeed honoured to be officiating the opening of the 10th ASEAN Insurance Regulators Meeting and the 33rd ASEAN Insurance Council Meeting. I understand that several fruitful meetings and exchange of ideas have already taken place yesterday, and several meetings have been outlined over the next two days to discuss various matters, revolving around the theme towards moving the ASEAN insurance industry forward. The ASEAN region has recorded significant growth with member countries growing at an average rate of 6% in 2006. ASEAN countries have grown stronger and our trade and cooperation have expanded further.

The changing priorities and lifestyles of this new generation, growing wealth and increasing proportion of middle income population will also support continued and further growth in demand for investment-linked and wealth management products. As a result, the insurance industry has, and will continue to, expand its role beyond merely providing protection products. Against this backdrop, prospects for increasing the insurance penetration rate in our economies are clearly positive. However, this will hinge on the ability of the industry to respond to these changing demographics and dynamics in the financial system. In 2006, the insurance premiums averaged 2.95% of GDP in South East Asia as compared with 8.8% in the U.S. or 16.5% in the U.K. Compared to the  BIS Review 134/2007  1  banking sector, the insurance industry remains relatively less developed and commands a significantly smaller percentage of the total financial assets of the region's financial system. To tap these opportunities, appropriate strategies, new thinking and approaches will be required. In this regard, a significant development has been the evolution of alternative distribution mechanisms for insurance products and services in the region, notably through bancassurance. Indeed, bancassurance has developed in a number of ASEAN markets into a viable alternative distribution approach to the traditional agency force. Perhaps, in those markets where the insurance distribution channels through agency force have yet to be firmly established, bancassurance could provide a quantum leap to allow insurers to rapidly widen their outreach by tapping into an established banking network and client base.
I will conclude by extending my appreciation to the organizing committee for extending me the invitation to this dinner. I wish you a very pleasant and enjoyable evening, and look forward to further strengthening the mutually beneficial relationship between Bank Negara Malaysia and the Persatuan. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 151/2010

I strongly urge each of you here today to challenge the industry associations in your countries to develop an aggressive Year 2000 program for the mutual benefit of all their members. In fact, a largely unprecedented amount of cooperation already is taking place with respect to Year 2000. For instance, the Joint Year 2000 Council brings together more regulators and supervisors in one organization than has ever been done before. In April of this year, the four sponsoring organizations realized that they needed to pool resources and bring together their respective experts to discuss the issue collectively and to develop a common dialogue with the global supervisory community. The efforts of the Council to date have been valuable in communicating Year 2000 information to this community, and I support the continuation and expansion of these efforts. BIS Review 85/1998  -3-  The Global 2000 Coordinating Group, which consists of internationally active financial institutions, is another example of an important effort to foster cooperation on the Year 2000 issue. The firms represented on Global 2000 are working together to tackle several different aspects of the problem, especially the international dimension. They have approached this collective effort with a high degree of transparency and I applaud their efforts at cooperation. Cooperation is also needed between the supervisory community and the private sector.
With a somewhat tighter labour market in the years ahead and rising inflation, wage growth may pick up. Over the past year, low consumer price inflation has probably contributed to keeping nominal wage increases lower than implied by labour market tightness in isolation. Low inflation has resulted in high growth in household purchasing power, even with moderate pay increases. With a path for the interest rate and the krone exchange rate in line with the baseline scenario in Inflation Report 1/05, inflation may increase gradually from less that 1 per cent today to close to 2 per cent in mid-2006. Under these assumptions, inflation may stabilise at around 2½ per cent at the threeyear horizon. However, continued shifts in trade patterns, with higher imports from Asia and intensified competition in retail trade, may prolong the period of low inflation. Developments in the krone exchange rate are uncertain. The real krone exchange rate measured by relative labour costs is strong. Historically, the real krone exchange rate has tended to return to an average measured over a longer period. Should this occur in today’s situation, through a depreciation of the nominal krone exchange rate, inflation will pick up somewhat faster than projected. If the krone appreciates, on the other hand, there is a risk that inflation will not move up as quickly as projected. Developments in line with the projections imply that the output gap will increase to about 1¼ per cent in 2006.

Given our highly open economy, we may have to accept somewhat wider variations in inflation than some other countries. The last time I was here, almost exactly a year ago, Norges Bank’s Executive Board had just decided to reduce the key rate by 0.25 percentage point to 1.75 per cent. Since then, the key rate has remained at this historically low level. Real interest rates are also low. From December 2002 to March 2004, the key rate was reduced by a total of 5.25 percentage points. The interest rate decline can be ascribed to a number of factors. In late autumn 2002, inflation started to fall. The inflation projections were also revised down. Gradually new information about the outlook for other countries and the Norwegian economy indicated that inflation might be very low. Short-term interest rates fell by close to 4 percentage points. It would seem that it is not only changes in the real interest rate that have an influence, but also the level of real interest rates. Between December 2002 and March 2004, the interest rate has moved from a high to a low level. The real interest rate is now lower than a neutral interest rate. A real interest rate that is lower than the neutral rate will stimulate activity even after the effects of the interest rate fall itself have been exhausted. Calculations seem to indicate that the neutral real interest rate for Norway is between 2½ and 3½ per cent, and it has probably fallen somewhat in recent years.
François Villeroy de Galhau: The euro – which way to go? Keynote speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the EconPol Europe (European Network for Economic and Fiscal Policy Research) Founding Conference and first Annual Meeting "The Euro - Which Way to Go? ", Brussels, 9 November 2017. * * * Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen,1 It is a pleasure to be in Brussels today, which doesn’t happen so often for a central banker… who has just arrived from Frankfurt. I welcome the fact that you at EconPol Europe have chosen the euro as the theme of your founding conference, and invited me to give this keynote speech. Since Maastricht 25 years ago, we have succeeded in building a Monetary Union. However we have not delivered on Economic Union. To avoid overburdening monetary policy, our Union must stand on two feet rather than just one: that is why it is legitimate that we, as central bankers, propose ideas on this subject, even if we are not those who legitimately make decisions. It is now urgent to make concrete progress on Economic Union, all the more so as the economic context is now favourable, as confirmed today by the European Commission. Euro area growth of 2.2% in 2017 should be the highest rate in 10 years, and as strong as in the United States.

A corporate sponsor of a defined-benefit pension scheme is, in effect, providing a guarantee or, broadly, writing a very complex option 4 : one on which the present value of the payoffs is related to, amongst other things, the future growth in earnings of its workforce, their longevity, and the yield on an equivalent-maturity risk-free bond. Apart from the design of the scheme itself and the associated balance of wages and pensions in employee remuneration, the sponsor makes two big choices: the level of contributions it makes to the fund, and the asset allocation of the fund. (It may seem odd to say that the sponsor makes a decision about fund asset allocation, because of course that is formally the responsibility of trustees. But as guarantors, those decisions affect the risk run by sponsors who, in principle, could make adjustments to their own balance sheet if they regarded trustee choices as suboptimal.) Past increases in life expectancy entail higher contributions and, other things being equal, add to the marginal cost of a firm’s labour force. An unavoidable source of uncertainty is future developments in longevity. 1  See footnote 18, Chapter IV ‘Awash with cash: why are corporate savings so high?’, World Economic Outlook, April 2006, page 151. 2  For the household sector, the effect has been that employer contributions more than account for total net savings. 3  A breakdown of contributions into ‘one-off’ and ‘regular’ is available only for self-administered schemes.
I must admit that, as a central banker charged with setting official interest rates, I have difficulties to accept this particular to my mind unfounded - belief, even if the authority in question was claimed to be Aristotle or the Bible, both of which I am quite happy to consult on other matters. 3. Credibility: the role of rules and institutions  The weight of historical experience, a large body of theoretical literature and of empirical evidence point to the importance of price stability as the foundation of a well-functioning market economy and as a precondition for durable growth and prosperity. Nevertheless history is littered with episodes of high inflation which imposed high economic and social costs on society. To be sure, at times the importance of the common and precious good of price stability may have been underrated or forgotten by society. At other times stability may have been purposefully compromised in the pursuit of other seemingly more pressing objectives. However, the main lesson that I would take away from history is this: when it comes to price stability, good faith and honest intentions are not enough. Fundamentally, money represents a promise. It requires trust by the users of money in the issuer of money to honour this promise. Money is built on trust, but in turn trust must be built on solid foundations. The promise must be made credible and this - at least in relatively modern times - is the job of central bankers. A promise always concerns the future.

If I may take the example of the Bundesbank, the borderline between trust and quasireligious faith, indeed, becomes very hard to make out. It was Jacques Delors who once famously remarked: “Not all Germans believe in God, but all believe in the Bundesbank”. Such a degree of faith is, of course, partly the result of the success that this central has had in maintaining its promise of stable money. However, one needs to remember that the Bundesbank (and its predecessor organisation, the “Bank Deutscher Länder”) started from almost zero after the catastrophes of tyranny, war and inflation, which had thoroughly destroyed faith and trust in public authority. In this regard the ECB, thankfully, is in a much more favourable position. The attitude of the German public towards their central bank is also the product of the high premium that was - and continues to be - placed on stability in Germany, as a consequence of the traumatic instabilities of war and inflation in the first half of the 20th century. This sort of “faith” thus can be explained in the case of Germany. Andre Glucksmann has used the term “currency religion” to describe the Germans’ devotion to monetary stability and to the Bundesbank as the guardian of the D-Mark. In my view such devotion, nevertheless, represents something of an anomaly. I am not sure that it is necessarily always helpful for an institution like a central bank to be held in such awe.