samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At least since the end of the 1990s, it seems that enterprises, households and employees have adapted to expectations of strong income growth. This may contribute both to the appreciation of the krone and to widening the cyclical divergence between Norway and other countries. If the increase in the use of petroleum revenues has already been priced into today's exchange rate, both the longterm trend in the real exchange rate and interest rate expectations suggest that the krone exchange rate will return to a more natural long-term range. In the short term, other factors may also influence the krone. Global equity markets have seen a sharp fall in prices over the past year. When there is a large degree of uncertainty in stock markets, many investors make portfolio shifts. Money and bond markets become good alternatives. The NOK market, where interest rates are relatively high, might seem attractive. These portfolio shifts result in an appreciation of the krone. This trend may be reversed by a turnaround in the stockmarket. Another factor that we have pointed to earlier is that the Norwegian krone may also be perceived as an attractive investment alternative - or a safe-haven currency - in a situation with tensions in the Persian Gulf, high oil prices and a global downturn. Potential gains may, however, be offset by the risk associated with investing in less liquid markets. This may limit capital inflows to the NOK market.

We would then have had to reduce the interest rate sharply this summer. This would have amplified the pressures in the Norwegian economy, which are so clearly reflected in wage developments and household credit demand. It is more than likely that this would have required substantial increases in the interest rate in a year to eighteen months. Strict inflation targeting of this type would thus have resulted in more pronounced fluctuations in the interest rate and in aggregate demand and production. Information obtained via the regional network established last autumn was used when preparing the October Inflation Report. We will have six rounds of talks each year with business and community representatives concerning financial developments in their enterprises and industries. There will be a total of about 200 visits in each round. We have divided the country into 7 regions and established links with regional research institutions in six of them. These institutions will hold meetings with the representatives on behalf of Norges Bank. The private service sector is by far the largest in the Central Norway region, accounting for over 40 percent of total employment in the region. The private service and retail sales sectors together account for over half of the number employed, while a good tenth are employed in manufacturing. The share of manufacturing industry that is exposed to international competition in Trøndelag is relatively limited. Companies in the Central Norway region report small changes in prices and costs, except for export companies.
The institutions that take part in the Riksbank's payment system can then pay by moving money, on behalf of themselves or their clients, between the participants’ accounts. When central bank money is used in a transaction, an asset with counterparty risk is converted into a safe and liquid claim on the central bank. Central bank money is safer than other money, as a central bank can always meet its obligations in domestic currency. It is important for financial institutions to be able to pay in central bank money, as they would otherwise be burdened with counterparty exposures when paying.2 Central bank money and the possibility to make safe payments are thus closely linked. The Riksbank needs to adapt its payment system so that the infrastructure remains safe and cost-efficient as technology develops and the payment market is changing. A growing trend both in Sweden and abroad is that households and companies expect to make payments at any time they like. The payment system we offer today therefore needs to be supplemented with a new system that is open 24 hours a day and adapted to the instant settlement of large volumes of payments. My assessment is that the best way for the Riksbank to attain this target is to make the Swedish krona available on the same technical platform as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Eurosystem use.3 By taking advantage of the economies of scale that arise here, the right conditions are created for cutting transaction costs for Swedish households and companies.

10 As far as monetary policy is concerned, it is only the participant’s net position with regard to the Riksbank that  is important. If a participant in RIX borrows, say, SEK 10 billion in RIXRTGS and invests the same amount in its account in RIXINST the net position with regard to the Riksbank and thus the participant’s interest expenditure, will be zero. 7 [8]  Using the same technical platforms as most of the rest of Europe will, I believe, make it easier for Swedish payment service providers to establish themselves in Europe. And in the same way it will become simpler for foreign companies to compete in Sweden. It is also probable that it will become easier to make instant cross-currency payments in the future if the central banks use the same technical platform to settle payments. What happens next? During the spring, my colleagues on the Executive Board and I have discussed the Riksbank's future role in the payment infrastructure. My baseline in these discussions was that Sweden – like most other countries – has long had a model where the banks have settled payments in risk-free accounts in the central bank. This has been important in preserving the stability and credibility of the payment system. Now that the payment market is moving towards larger, more numerous and more important payments outside of RIX normal opening hours, the Riksbank needs to modernise the services it offers so that central bank money remains the norm when financial institutions settle payments.
Presentation of the 2021 Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) Press conference, 31 May 2022  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France Chairman of the ACPR  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr). Page 1 of 8 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you to our presentation of the Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR – Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority), in the company of Jean-Paul Faugère, Vice-Chairman of the ACPR, Dominique Laboureix, Secretary General of the ACPR, and Alain Ménéménis, President of the Sanctions Committee. Last year was marked by a vigorous recovery of our economy, during which our financial sector proved particularly robust (I). 2022 should now see substantial advances on the regulatory front (II). However, the war in Ukraine is posing new risks to the financial sector, calling for heightened vigilance (III). In all these situations, the women and men of the ACPR have worked tirelessly to ensure that the French financial system remains resilient under all circumstances, providing adequate financing to the economy. I would like to extend my warm thanks to them. ** I. The strength of the French financial sector is more than ever an asset for our economy I shall start with just a short word on the situation for insurers, which Jean-Paul Faugère will go into in greater depth.

In practice what that would be likely to mean in our present situation is substantially lower interest rates: the intended effect would be to stimulate external demand, but it would inevitably also involve further stimulus to domestic demand. In effect, it implies that we should acquiesce in increasing overall demand pressure leading inevitably to faster inflation. That might conceivably even BIS Review 31/2000  2  provide some relief to the suffering sectors in the short term. But increasing demand pressure, including labour market pressure, and accelerating inflation would - as we’ve repeatedly seen in the past - ultimately need to be brought back under control, involving a more abrupt tightening of policy. That frankly would not do the suffering sectors themselves much good at least for very long - and it would have a potentially serious destabilising effect on the economy as a whole. That is precisely what we are trying to avoid. And there, I do rest the case for the defence - at least in relation to the principal charge of malice aforethought - or even malice as an after thought. Just as some of you would like to see the euro strengthen from your microeconomic standpoint, so too would I, from a macroeconomic perspective, because it would help to restore a better, more sustainable, balance within the economy.
BIS Review 131/2009  1  Some ground-breaking market studies that have helped characterise both the demand and supply side issues peculiar to the Zambian financial sector have been undertaken. Most of you will be aware of the 2005 FinScope study findings which showed that only 33% of Zambia’s adult population had access to any formal or informal financial service or product. Arising from this, Government in collaboration with cooperating partners developed a performance assessment framework, under which a target of at least 50% by end-2009 has been set for the level of financial access. The findings of the on-going follow up Survey, whose results are due to be finalized by the end of this year, will give us an indication of the direction and level of access today. Honourable Minister, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, before the end of FSDP Phase I, which ran from July 2004 to June 2009, it became quite apparent that a number of challenges and recommendations would arise which would not be possible to implement within the initial five year period approved by Cabinet in 2004. In addition, there were new developments, coupled with key recommendations from the second Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) of 2008, which required to be incorporated into the FSDP. Therefore, the second phase is envisaged to deal with longer-term issues pertaining to the overall strengthening of the legal framework for the financial system.

It is for this reason that we are gathered here today as stakeholders to share information on the progress to date and to adopt a strategic implementation framework for the work that remains to be done. Distinguished Guests, the tremendous support of the various stakeholders to the agenda of the FSDP cannot go unnoticed. The technical and financial support provided by a number of our development partners, including the Swedish Government, the World Bank, IMF, DFID, the United States Treasury and FIRST Initiative have gone a long way in slowly but surely making this vision a reality. The Bank of Zambia and the Government are, therefore, most indebted to our cooperating partners for helping us build capacity in our financial sector. Honourable Minister, the support of stakeholders from financial and other institutions on the various working groups has also been instrumental in facilitating the implementation of various FSDP activities. Further, the coordinating role of the FSDP Secretariat, anchored by the Bank of Zambia, has been key to the implementation of the FSDP. For this reason, we at the Bank of Zambia hope that the same level of technical, financial, material and morale support will be accorded to Phase II of the programme by all stakeholders. Ladies and Gentlemen, in recognising the critical role played by various stakeholders represented here, the work of the FSDP has, by design, taken a consultative approach in the identification of priority areas, formulation of strategies and the design of implementation frameworks.
This baseline scenario assumes a policy framework that the measures outlined in our exit strategy are completed by the end of the year, and that policy rates are kept constant at current levels for some time followed by limited increases starting from the last quarter of 2011, with policy rates staying at single digits throughout the forecast horizon (in other words, 3 years). In this respect, noninterest instruments will be actively used in order to address the risks on financial stability stemming from rapid credit expansion and deterioration in the current account balance. The European Central Bank reluctantly joined the ranks of the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and Bank of Japan that have engaged in monetary expansion due to fast-growing debt problems in Europe. As a result, materialization of the first scenario has become more likely, as illustrated in the right-hand part of the chart. In that case, the scenario described in our Inflation Report of October 2009 might come up on the agenda. According to this scenario, on account of the expansionary fiscal and monetary policy on a worldwide scale, coupled with rising risk appetites and the relative improvement of credit risk across emerging markets including Turkey, capital inflows to these countries will continue to hold strong. The low level of resource utilization as well as the strong tendency of cost shocks, which reduce the prices of imported inputs, to reflect upon consumer prices suggests downside risks on inflation in the short term.

Within Asia, the ASEAN-5 (Association of Southeast Asian Nations-5) countries3 are expected to expand by 5 to 6% this year and their external trade volume will reach around 60% that of China. ASEAN, which is a two-trillion-dollar economic grouping, is the fifth largest in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. ASEAN countries have been working steadily together towards greater economic integration and have committed to build the ASEAN Economic Community, a single market and production base, by 2015. 4. In 2010, MENA as a whole grew 3.8%, led principally by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies. Considering the uncertainty in parts of MENA, the IMF nevertheless still expects the GCC to grow by 7.8% this year, driven by the robust expansion of oil production and strong public spending. The medium-term outlook remains good as countries in the region lay the foundation for sustainable and diversified growth. 5. Asia will become increasingly important for the GCC as the patterns of trade, investment and consumption shift from the West to the East. To reap greater benefits from these highly dynamic and fast-expanding regions, we should press on towards the goal of growing connectivity and deepening economic cooperation between our two regions. We  1  Sources: Monetary Authority of Singapore, Consensus Economics Inc, weighted by shares in Singapore’s NODX. 2  IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific, April 2011. 3  ASEAN-5 comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore.
The recession of 1990-92 vividly illustrates the potential  BIS Review 60/2002  1  consequences of a single currency in regionally diverging economic situations. At that time, Britain and Italy withdrew from the European exchange rate mechanism and devalued their currencies. This measure permitted them to recover relatively quickly from the recession but they had to put up with higher inflation instead. Conversely, and at the same time, Germany had to contend with the inflationary effects of reunification. Therefore, the German Bundesbank had to raise interest rates to support price stability. What would have happened if the Monetary Union had already existed at the time and if Italy, Britain and Germany had been members of the Monetary Union? Italy and Britain would not have been able to devalue their currencies. The sole instrument would have been monetary policy. The European Central Bank (ECB), had it already existed then, might possibly not have increased interest rates out of consideration for Britain and Italy, or at least might not have permitted rates to rise to the extent that the Bundesbank considered necessary. This would not have served either Germany or Italy and Britain well. In the case of asymmetric shocks a uniform monetary policy is second best. Apart from this historical case in point, the general rule is that the costs of the loss of monetary independence will be progressively lower as the pace of economic adjustments increases.

A hedging strategy for Swiss entrepreneurs would consist in using the euros that they earn for settling suppliers' bills or, in theory, even for paying wages and salaries in Switzerland. In reality wage earners are likely to offer resistance to being made to bear the exchange rate risk. So-called natural hedging is a more obvious option. In this case, Swiss exporters use the euro amounts for paying for intermediate services, i.e. their suppliers from Euroland. Naturally, the Swiss financial centre, too, will not remain immune to the euro. The integration of the European financial markets propelled by the single currency will trigger waves of innovation and, in particular, of consolidation. As virt-x in London shows, financial markets are not tied to a specific location. A strengthening of locational competition on a global level represents a considerable but desirable challenge for the Swiss financial centre. Euro cash is also a welcome innovation that makes things easier. The introduction of the euro in its physical form has primarily affected the hotel and catering industry, retail trade and banks. In this connection, some observers have raised concerns that the euro might displace the Swiss franc as a means of payment. Obviously, the euro is now circulating in Switzerland. This will not lead to a new world, however. Numerous businesses and hotels, notably in border areas and in holiday resorts, have long-standing practical experience in accepting foreign currencies. But even though they provide a foreign-exchange service to their customers, this is definitely not where their comparative advantage lies.
Share prices have fallen by around 20% since their peak in March 2000; and technology stock prices have fallen even more, by 50%. Forecasts for economic growth in the United States for the coming year are still being revised down and are only one half of their levels of a few months ago. Equally, only a few months ago, some currency traders were openly deriding the euro. The euro reached a low of 0.82 to the dollar - the lowest level for the euro or its antecedents for over 15 years. Since then, however, the euro has recovered, and the euro economy itself appears to be relatively stable. In the other major industrialised part of the world economy, Japan, output has barely risen in recent years. Real GDP in Japan has grown by only just over 1% a year over the past decade, compared with over 4% a year over the previous ten years. Unexpected changes in the economic weather have also had a significant impact on the oil market. Oil prices rose from below $ a barrel (for Brent crude) in December 1998 to a recent peak of over $ last September, falling back to around $ in December only to rise again to around $ a barrel. The standard deviation of daily changes in oil prices rose by a factor of three from the first half of 1999 to the second half of last year: an indication of just how much volatility has risen. Moreover, volatility has not been confined to the industrialised world.

The past five years have seen a number of damaging financial crises that have afflicted emerging market economies. Sudden reversals of short-term capital flows to some of those economies resulted in crises that led not only to deep recessions and sometimes political crises, but also a renewed debate about the role of the IMF in providing bailouts to some of these countries. Despite this volatility in international economic conditions the British economy, to date, has experienced greater stability. At first sight, this is encouraging. The UK has weathered some of the recent international economic storms, and achieved a post-war record of uninterrupted economic growth, falling unemployment, and inflation lower and more stable than for a generation. But no two storms are ever the same. Do the clouds on the international economic horizon threaten our economic stability at home? We cannot know. Rest assured that the Monetary Policy Committee will always act to maintain stability by keeping inflation on track to meet the target of 2½%. But the recent stability of inflation owes a good deal to the fact that economic shocks from overseas have tended to offset rather than reinforce each other. It would be rash to assume that it will be at all easy to keep inflation over the next five years within the 2%-3% range within which it has largely moved over the past five years. What matters most, however, is that any such deviations from target are short-lived, and that inflation expectations generally are firmly anchored on the target.
This assessment derives from studies conducted by the Eurosystem but also from the reports published by “ECB Watchers”, with whom, incidentally, the ECB has regular contact, notably in the context of annual conferences. Figures 5 and 6 show for example that on average, the Eurosystem’s monetary policy decisions were anticipated by financial markets, whatever their orientation, at least two weeks in advance, and fully factored in at least a week before. A comparison with the Fed, moreover, does not reveal significant differences between the two institutions with regard to the ability of markets to anticipate the monetary policy decisions of the two institutions. This point to the transparency of the single monetary policy. In particular, the fact that the ECB has chosen channels other than the publication of minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council has not prevented it from reaching a high level of predictability. As regards the frequency, since the inception of the euro in 1999, the Eurosystem has changed its policy rates 16 times (8 cuts, 8 hikes), which is on average close to the usual average frequency of interest rate changes 1 However, compared to the Federal Reserve, in particular since 2001, the frequency of the changes is by far lower. Does this necessarily imply that the Eurosystem does not move enough or too low?

Benjamin Franklin is the very example of what was known at the time as an “honest man”. Benjamin Franklin showed a marked interest in Europe from a very early age. He started learning French, Italian and Spanish (in addition to Latin) in 1733. He journeyed abroad and lived both in France and England. I would like to stress his interest in France by pointing out that he was elected Associé Etranger of the French Academy in 1772 and became Plenipotentiary Minister in Paris in 1779. When referring to Benjamin Franklin, one often has in mind the great inventor, the philosopher, the essayist or the polemicist but one often forgets to mention that he also published a number of economic essays and studies. It is worth mentioning the book “Way to Wealth”, which some people consider as “the first American book on personal finance” or as “the best and the wisest money book ever written… ”. As you can probably imagine, Benjamin Franklin’s philosophy has crossed the Atlantic and still guides decision-makers today, including at the European Central Bank. In that regard, I would like to touch on a few ideas drawn from his autobiography. I need not remind you of his great fondness for quotations, especially in Poor Richard’s Almanack. In his autobiography, Benjamin Franklin defined a number of virtues that he believed to be cardinal. They included temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, etc. I find his interpretation of these terms interesting.