samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There are countries where a large proportion of borrowing is arranged at a variable interest rate; the national tax systems differ, for example as regards tax relief for interest expenditure; and the time required for bank interest rate adjustments varies. All this means that the impact of a change in the monetary union’s interest rate will differ from country to country. In Italy, for instance, lending to households is arranged at variable interest rates to a greater extent than in Germany and the Netherlands. EMU will probably speed up the ongoing integration in these respects, too, so the ECB’s problems may be greatest initially. Many matters to do with the ECB’s working procedures have already been decided. The broad structure is in place. But in many respects, the way in which the ECB and the ESCB will operate and develop in practice is still an open question. Some observers are concerned that national interests will be excessively influential at the expense of a union-wide perspective. They point out, for example, that the NCB Governors make up a larger proportion of the Governing Council than is the case with the regional FED Governors in the United States. Another argument is that the ECB has a limited staff at its disposal. Personally, I do not find this particularly convincing.

The performance of a clearly defined task - maintaining price stability in a way that is good for the union as a whole will be a heavy responsibility for each member of the Governing Council; in this sense they are all in the same boat. There are also many signs that power will gradually shift towards the centre and this in turn will affect recruitment. My guess is that the ECB will be able to attract personnel who are qualified, which in contexts like this is more important than their number. Fiscal policy Fiscal policy is a national concern but the national room to manoeuvre is conditioned by various EU regulations. The Treaty has general provisions to the effect that economic policy is to contribute to the achievement of Community objectives in accordance with BIS Review 50/1998  -4-  the principle of an open market economy with free competition. The Member States are to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and are explicitly required to coordinate them but the decisions are to be made on a national level. Then there are more specific agreements on matters like the scale of rates for value-added tax, government subsidies and rules for public procurement. These agreements, which are a limited constraint on the construction of taxes and public spending, have been concluded mainly for purposes other than stabilisation policy - to promote competition and establish a single market for capital, goods, services and labour.
If inflation two years ahead was expected to be lower than two per cent, this was a signal that the interest rate needed to be cut, and if it was expected to be higher, the rate needed to be raised. Of course, this rule could not capture all of the nuances in the monetary policy considerations, but it provided a rough explanation of the monetary policy decisions. However, there were also disadvantages. In normal cases it is not, for instance, particularly realistic that the policy rate would remain unchanged a couple of years ahead. The fact that the forecasts were based on this assumption made it difficult to assess our forecasts and to compare them with those of other forecasters. Nor was it easy to implement the assumption of a constant rate in a consistent manner in the forecasting process. These problems would have been aggravated when we extended our forecast horizon. The transition to the new interest rate assumption at the same time meant that the simple policy rule used to explain monetary policy had to be abandoned. This rule was easy to understand and was therefore a good educational tool: if the forecast of a constant repo rate showed inflation close to target the interest rate would be held unchanged. However, it gradually became clear that this rule could sometimes form an obstacle in our communication. It created an exaggerated focus on the current interest rate decision and on the inflation forecast exactly two years ahead.

In addition, to inject greater impetus for market participants to shift from SOR to SORA, MAS, together with the SC-STS, will outline guidance by October this year, on specific deadlines to cease the usage of SOR in new financial products. It is important to provide forward guidance on this matter, so that banks and endcustomers can move in a concerted way towards achieving a smooth transition. This ensures our financial system is well-prepared ahead of end-2021. The forward guidance also matters from a risk management point of view. With the end-2021 deadline approaching, it is not prudent for banks and end-customers to enter into new SOR contracts that mature beyond end-2021. Doing so only compounds the problem that banks and customers will eventually have to deal with. 19 Third, is the need to build a bridge of clear and effective communication between  banks and end-customers. MAS expects banks to engage customers in a clear, timely and transparent manner. This includes raising customer awareness and providing clear explanations on: the global move towards using overnight near risk-free rates, the shift to SORA in the SGD interest rate market, how this benchmark transition will impact them, and how customer spreads over the loan reference rate may have to be adjusted to account for the economic differences between SOR and SORA, given that SORA is an overnight rate that lacks a term and credit risk premium. 20 When engaging customers on benchmark transition, banks should take into account MAS’ Fair Dealing Guidelines.
They are modified now and again, often in the wake of different types of crisis or when new economic policy experience has been gained in other ways. The most recent financial crisis and the discussions now underway around the world on central bank mandates may lead to reforms that change the political influence over central banks. In Sweden’s case, our scope for amending the Sveriges Riksbank Act is limited by Sweden’s membership of the EU, which obliges the country to 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  follow the regulations laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. But I do not think this should hamper an intellectually and analytically based discussion on the benefits and drawbacks of the way we have designed monetary policy and financial stability in Sweden. In all likelihood, there is plenty to learn both from economic research and from what works well and not so well in other countries. It is a matter here of not throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Experience of increased autonomy have generally speaking been good, so I do not believe major changes to the regulatory frameworks to be justified in this respect. But I would nevertheless like to highlight some issues that are under discussion and that affect the autonomy of central banks.

It is why the international community responded to the crisis in Asia by promptly offering very large amounts of official assistance - $ billion in the case of Thailand, $ billion for Indonesia and $ billion for South Korea. This kind of official assistance of course is essentially for the international financial institutions and for governments - though central banks are often the channel for bilateral financing, as the Bank of England is, for example, in the case of the UK’s contribution to the bilateral support for Korea. But such official financial help cannot be unlimited and it cannot be provided without strings. It, too, has real dangers. If it were too readily forthcoming it could encourage “moral BIS Review 49/1998  -3-  hazard”, especially by encouraging commercial lenders - particularly foreign currency creditors - in the belief that they will be bailed out if things go wrong. That would be likely to add to the problem of potentially volatile capital inflows next time around. Not surprisingly, too, there is strong political resistance in many countries, including notably the United States, to the idea that public - taxpayers’money should be used to bail out private creditors, especially foreign creditors. External financing need not come solely from the public sector. Private finance would serve the same purpose, and in many situations market price adjustments may be sufficient to stem the capital outflow.
European Central Bank: Press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the press conference, held in Frankfurt am Main on 1 February 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome you to our first press conference of 2001. The Vice-President and I are here to report, as we have done for more than two years now, on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB, which was also attended by the Eurogroup President, Minister Reynders, as well as by Commissioner Solbes. Let me also take this opportunity to again welcome Greece as the twelfth country to join the euro area. Mr. Papademos, the Governor of the Bank of Greece, has been participating in our meetings as a member of the Governing Council since 1 January 2001. The Governing Council conducted its regular examination of monetary and economic developments and their implications for the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. The decision to keep interest rates unchanged reflects the Governing Council's assessment that the risks to price stability in the medium term now appear more balanced than at the end of last year. Factors which might pose upward risks to price stability in the medium term are still present and as such will be subject to ongoing close monitoring. Let me elaborate on this assessment.

It is equally important that further progress be achieved in the area of fiscal policy reform, with continuing progress in fiscal consolidation through limits in public spending growth, allowing both a reduction in remaining budget deficits and an alleviation of the fiscal burden on corporations and households without threatening or slowing the progress in fiscal consolidation. Overall, the existence of the euro and the single monetary policy has provided the euro area with an institutional setting which leaves it significantly less exposed to external influences. Within the euro area the maintenance of price stability over the medium term, together with further progress on structural reforms, will provide an important contribution to the achievement of sustained noninflationary economic growth and will thereby also support a further solid and sustainable expansion of the world economy. Let me now give the floor to the Vice-President, who will inform you about other issues decided by the Governing Council. The Governing Council has adopted a set of standards, recently endorsed by the G10 Governors, as the minimum standards of the Eurosystem's common oversight policy on payment systems. The Eurosystem will assess all systemically important payment systems in the euro area against these "Core Principles" and will make the results of its assessments available to the public. Concerning issues relating to euro banknotes and coins, I should also like to provide you with the following information. First, the Governing Council adopted an ECB Guideline on the 2002 cash changeover.
Mr. Lamfalussy looks at the progress achieved by the Hungarian economy in recent years Address by the President of the European Monetary Institute, Mr. Alexandre Lamfalussy, at a conference organised by the Hungarian Banking Association on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the new Hungarian banking system and held in Budapest on 7/2/97. For at least three reasons, I have accepted with pleasure the invitation to share some thoughts with you on the occasion of these tenth anniversary celebrations. First, for obvious personal reasons, I enjoy spending some time in Hungary - even if it is only for less than a day. Second, I am absolutely convinced that an efficient financial system in general, and an efficient banking system in particular, together comprise an indispensable precondition for the proper functioning of a market economy and, indeed, for economic growth. Not a sufficient condition, but a necessary one. Third, I note that Hungary has made substantial progress in this direction in four key areas. The larger part of the Hungarian banking system is now in genuinely private hands; the financial health of most banks (which, not so long ago, was - to put it mildly - precarious) has improved; the legal, accounting and regulatory framework has been consolidated, and, last but not least, there is now an interbank payment system in place which can no longer be qualified as prehistoric.

Some of this deficit was covered by direct foreign investment, but the greater part of it was financed by borrowing, as a result of which by the end of 1994 the net external debt had reached 46% of GDP and the exceptionally high level of more than 160% of exports of goods and services and unrequited transfers. 2. I have not yet seen the full 1996 figures, but estimates based on the first eleven months suggest a current account deficit of around (or even less than) $ billion. This looks much more reasonable, not only because it was more than covered by foreign direct investment but also because of what lies behind this improvement. The $ billion drop in the current BIS Review 16/1997  -2-  account deficit between 1994 and 1996 was made possible (a) by a 35% increase in exports, accompanied by a modest increase in imports of about 14%, and (b) by the steady and rapid increase in services income, mainly (but not exclusively) derived from tourism. 3. Since there was also a sizable inflow of foreign direct investment in 1995 and 1996, the country’s net external debt dropped from $ billion at end-1994 to about $ billion at end-1996. Net external debt declined to 31.2 expressed as a percentage of GDP, and to 71.6 as a percentage of exports of goods, services and unrequited transfers.
•  Millers’ average purchase price for maize rose by about 7% to K35,967.0 per 50kg bag in February 2004 from K33,599.50 per 50kg bag in January 2004, mainly due to seasonal movements, as the 2003/2004 consumption period is about to come to an end. Mining2 •  Total copper production declined by 4.8% to 31,764.00 mt in January 2004 from 33,369 mt in December 2003. Copper output fell as a result of reduced production at all major mines arising from seasonal factors in the rainy season. •  Similarly, cobalt output declined by 6.8% to 171.50 mt from 184.00 mt in the previous month. There was no cobalt production at one of the major mines during the period under review on account of higher processing charges, given low quantities of cobalt that were available for processing. The downward movement in production was a result of seasonal considerations as the mines become waterlogged during the rainy season. Tourism34 International passenger movement •  During February 2004, the country’s four international airports5 recorded reduced international passenger movements. International arrivals at these airports declined by 3.0% to17,733 from 18,279 in January 2004. At 18,637, departures were 2.9% above the 18,104 recorded in the previous month. •  Of the total international arrivals, Livingstone and Mfuwe Airports, which are the major tourist destinations, accounted for 3,530 and 102, respectively. This was an improvement from the 3,110 and 36 recorded the previous month, respectively.

In fact, Newton has left us with more than one insight. Newton surmised that once inertia is overcome, an object achieves momentum and acceleration, but not without force being applied first. In a similar way, the same areas of corporate inertia today can be harnessed to drive the momentum of tomorrow. But only through a combined force of action and leadership can we truly achieve this. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Malaysia’s fast-changing financial landscape Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 26th Annual Dinner 2005 of The Association of Merchant Banks, Kuala Lumpur, 3 December 2005. *  *  *  I am pleased to be here tonight on this special occasion of the 26th Annual Dinner of the Association of Merchant Banks in Malaysia. The year 2005 is a particularly significant year for the merchant banking industry in particular and for the financial sector more generally. While this decade has seen significant changes taking place in our financial landscape that followed from the restructuring, consolidation, greater investment in technology, deregulation, liberalisation and changes in the regulatory environment, the year 2005 has seen an intensification of the pace of change in the financial sector. Let me take this opportunity to discuss the macroeconomic environment which these changes are occurring, and discuss further some of the more recent changes that are taking place in the financial system. Our economy has been able to continue to benefit from the favourable external environment as the global economy demonstrates its robustness in an environment of high oil prices and rising global interest rates. On the domestic front, our overall performance was further reinforced with the expanding domestic demand. Latest indicators suggest that the growth momentum remains firmly on track, with an improved growth of 5.3% in the third quarter.

In this year in particular, we are seeing a strengthening of the international dimension of our financial sector. This essentially serves to strengthen our economic and financial inter-linkages with the global economy. Some notable developments in this direction include the liberalisation of the foreign exchange administration rules earlier this year to allow for greater flexibility and efficiency in foreign exchange transactions as well as to increase foreign participation in issuing ringgit papers in our bond market and thus contribute to contribute toward enhancing the depth of the market. Another major development this year was the move to a managed float exchange rate regime for the ringgit. This is essentially to better position the nation to respond and benefit from the structural changes occurring in the region and the global economy. Other further developments to strengthen our international integration include the increase in foreign participation in our domestic financial system. This includes the issuance of new licences for foreign Islamic banks to operate in Malaysia, the issuance of new stock-broking licences to foreign players as well as increases in the permitted foreign interest in our Islamic subsidiaries and investment banks. All this will serve to enhance the international integration of the domestic financial system. The launch of the ABF Malaysian Bond Index Fund is also aimed at promoting greater integration among the regional bond markets. On the domestic front, the year 2005 marks a significant milestone for the merchant banking industry.
As for the inflation forecast used in this Report’s baseline scenario, a large part of the change responds to the direct impact of the fuel price increase. In the case of non-perishable foodstuffs, actual inflation data for the last few months show an increase that reflects December’s projections. The baseline scenario assumes that it will continue to rise at annual rates in the order of 4 to 5 percent during 2011 (figure 10). Thus, the Board foresees that annual CPI variation will return to the tolerance range during the second quarter of 2012 and will stay at 3 percent until the end of the year. This forecast assumes that the propagation of price increases in foodstuffs and oil will follow historic experiences. It also assumes that the economy will grow at a pace consistent with its capacity, limiting the propagation of these shocks to other prices and to labor cost pressures. Private inflation expectations are similar to those described in the baseline scenario. March’s Economic Expectations Survey (EES) shows an inflation rate at December of this year of 4.4 percent. The Financial Operators Survey for the second half of March shows inflation one year ahead at 4.4 percent. These two figures are slightly higher than they were in December 2010. For the medium term, expectations also rise and the EES of March foresees inflation two years ahead at 3.2 percent (figure 11). With respect to end-of 2010, breakeven inflation figures derived from financial asset prices have also increased for all the different terms.

New statistics for the manufacturing sector, where employment has developed very weakly since the start of the crisis, also show that employment is increasing and that companies are planning for further new recruitment. We expect employment to continue to grow relatively strongly over the coming years (see Figure 7). Unemployment is now decreasing rapidly. It has fallen by over one percentage point over the last year. Our assessment is that unemployment will continue to decrease towards just over 6 per cent by 2013 (see Figure 8). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  CPI inflation is presently unusually high. This is primarily connected with the circumstance that we are now in a phase in which interest rates are being increased. Mortgage rates are included in the CPI and they are increasing at the same rate as the Riksbank raises the repo rate – or, recently, even slightly faster. We expect CPI inflation to remain high in the years ahead (see Figure 9).2 CPIF inflation (the CPI with a fixed interest rate) provides a better view of underlying inflationary pressures and shows that inflation is currently low. The effect of rising energy prices on inflation has so far been counteracted by the strengthening of the krona. However, the main reason for the low rate of inflation is the weak development of unit labour costs. Productivity has increased rapidly at the same time as the rate of increase in hourly wages has been low.