samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Taking a euro area perspective, these results are interesting in at least two respects. First, the level of US interest rates are an essential feature of the world economy and the economic and financial environment of the euro area. Second, the experience of other major central banks is a natural benchmark for the design and the monitoring of our own policies, on which I would like to share with you a few thoughts. The predominant objective of our first wave of unconventional measures, which we have labelled the “fixed rate full allotment” supply of liquidity, was to ensure that liquidity shortages do not escalate into defaults, especially in the financial sector. This has mainly consisted in ensuring the correct provision of liquidity to the banking sector against the backdrop of a major confidence crisis. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Yet, by the end of 2010 the crisis had taken on a new form. The fiscal constraint became binding in a number of periphery countries. Investors started to price in sovereign credit risks. By 2011, it appeared clear that investors were also factoring in the risk of a euro area break-up. This, in turn, entailed an increased degree of market fragmentation within the euro area, with borrowers facing different credit conditions depending on their country of origin. Our Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme was specifically designed to reaffirm the irreversibility of the euro. The OMT allowed investors to discard a specific form of systemic risk.

Another observation is that the Executive Board as a collective is now more involved in the forecasting process than it was a few years ago. This is largely because we have chosen to publish our forecast for the repo rate. I shall return to this shortly. A third observation concerns the logic of the process. We try to deal with that which is independent of our own monetary policy at an early stage. Sweden is a small, open economy, so the international forecasts can be settled without taking into account what may later crystallise into a well-balanced Swedish monetary policy. The current situation in the Swedish economy is also largely independent of what the Executive Board determines at the next meeting, in that it takes time before monetary policy has an effect on the economy and inflation. But please note that we have a relatively broad definition of the "current situation”. The National Accounts are published with a lag of almost one quarter. They are our most important source of statistics regarding the real economy. This means that we often do not know at the start what the outcome was for the economy during the previous quarter. This means that an assessment must be made for both the previous quarter and the current quarter. We use various indicators that are published on a monthly basis to make this assessment. So what is the actual process for making the forecasts? It usually starts around eight weeks before the monetary policy meeting (see Figure 1).
This was intended to prevent the Bank’s holdings becoming unduly concentrated in any particular segment of the market and had the  2  For a summary of the evidence, including references to related studies, see Michael Joyce, Matthew Tong and Robert Woods (2011), “The United Kingdom’s Quantitative Easing Policy: Design, Operation and Impact” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 51(3), 200–212. 3  Specifically, investment-grade yields fell by around 70 basis points, while sub-investment grade yields fell by around 150 basis points. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  consequence of shifting them more towards shorter durations. The subsequent response of yields at different maturities was broadly in line with what would have been expected on the basis of our first round of purchases (see Chart 3). The approach is also less suited to analysing the impact on the prices of assets which are less immediate substitutes, such as equities. These are likely to take longer to adjust, as it probably takes a while for portfolio managers to decide how they want to rebalance their portfolios. But, as Chart 2 shows, equity prices rose substantially once QE was actually under way – by around 50% during QE1 and around 10% during QE2. In both cases, the switch from decline to growth coincides with the commencement of asset purchases. It seems unlikely that all of the recovery in equity prices during these periods was down to our QE.

It is an elaborate conceit to think anybody can be that precise in an economy as large as that of the United States, operating as it does within the context of an even larger, very dynamic, global economy. This is true for Fed economists as well as academics and those who sell their forecasts for a living. This is not to say that we will cease and desist from making “point” forecasts. But what matters most to me is the direction in which the numbers are headed and the general sense of momentum. At this juncture, I think it sufficient to say that, assuming the people we elect to tax us and spend our money and create the rules and regulations that govern our economic behavior can at long last get their act together, confront their own denial of most rudimentary budgetary discipline, learn to shoot straight and remove the Damocles Sword of uncertainty that they have for too long unwittingly wielded over our job-creating private sector, there is plenty of potential for the economy to move forward at an accelerating clip. This is especially the case now that the Fed has reliquified the economy. I expect that economic activity will accelerate in the second half of this year, with real GDP likely to rise at an average annual rate of between 3 and 4 percent.
Our new Open Forum and Future Forum events do this on a large scale by bringing together thousands of people from the community to discuss the economy, the financial system and the Bank’s role in promoting the good of the people of the United Kingdom. We listen to the views and concerns of local business leaders, technology developers, representatives from the voluntary and education sectors, unions and the wider public and explore how the Bank can maintain stability and reduce uncertainty. Inclusive communications also requires more tailored content. Our visual summaries of our Inflation and the Financial Stability Reports, explain how developments in the global economy and financial system affect the outlook for inflation and financial stability without the need for dense text. Deploying social media, including Facebook and YouTube, can make our messages available directly to a broader audience. New digital products, such as KnowledgeBank, use accessible language and engaging visuals to help us tell a story about what the Bank does. Our strategy is working, with major progress over the past five years. For example, female representation in senior roles at the Bank has increased from 17% in 2013 to 31% today, and is on track for our target of 35% by the end of 2020.1 BAME representation below senior management is 19%, up from 13% in 2013. In 2018 we were one of the first organisations to conduct a special Cognitive Diversity Survey. Our results indicate colleagues are generally positive about inclusiveness at the Bank on every metric measured.

Research on central bank committee design shows that diverse decision‐making bodies benefit from:   Having a clearly defined policy objective;    Having relatively small policy committees, with external members;    Publishing policy decisions, and;    Allowing for external scrutiny. How the Bank of England is becoming more diverse Five years ago we made Diverse and Talented one of four pillars of our strategic plan. Our aim was not just to increase diversity; but also to choose inclusion. Inclusion unlocks the true value of an organisation’s diversity. Only through inclusion can people realise their full potential. That’s why the Bank is focussing on building a culture that values diverse ideas, encourages open debate, and empowers people at all levels to take initiative. Our strategy has three elements:   Inclusive recruitment,    Inclusive culture, and    Inclusive communications. First, inclusive recruitment We are fishing from a larger pond. In recent years our graduates have come from 40 different universities, a six-fold increase in the past decade. Of our 2019 intake, due to join us in September, 46% of graduates are female and 39% are declared BAME students. This compares to a BAME share of 20% five years ago. To support diverse recruitment at all levels our managers are now required to undertake unconscious bias training. We use anonymous CVs for internal and external recruitment and strive for balanced shortlists and interview panels.
One Car, Two Car, Red Car, Blue Car Speech given by Andrew G Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of England  Materials Processing Institute, Redcar 2 December 2016  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Mauricio Armellini, Sandra Batten, David Bradnum, Ben Broadbent, Angelina Carvalho, Fergus Cumming, Jeremy Franklin, Alex Haberis, Andrew Hebden, Gabor Pinter, Alice Pugh, Tom Smith, Gertjan Vlieghe, Matt Waldron and Chris Yeates for comments and contributions. The title draws its inspiration from “One Fish, Two Fish, Red Fish, Blue Fish” by Dr Seuss, a children’s book first published in 1960, whose use of simple language contains an important lesson for economists like me. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  As someone whose family hails from the North-East, and who themselves was born in the North-East, it is wonderful to be here in Redcar. Regional visits like this are crucial for the Bank of England. They enable us to take the temperature of the local economy by speaking to a broad cross-section of businesses, charities, social enterprises, schools, further and higher education institutions and trade unions. Here in the North-East, it is clear the temperature of the local economy is not as high as either you or I would wish. Despite having come down rapidly over recent years, the unemployment rate, at over 6%, is still higher than for any other region in the UK.

Finally, let me also take this opportunity to urge the other commercial banks operating in Zambia to emulate Stanbic Bank Zambia by establishing community banking branches. As your regulator and supervisor, we take a lot of pride in seeing commercial banks coming up with innovative and progressive financial services, such as community banking. I believe that it is through the provision of such tailor-made banking services that banks would meaningfully fulfil their role as financial intermediaries in our economy. With these few remarks, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the Stanbic Bank Matero Branch officially open. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 13/2005
A number of banks, for instance in China, have already started testing digital currencies. We may talk of a global technological revolution in central banks which will create a new form of money. What are the differences between a digital ruble and the currently existing cash and non-cash money forms? Firstly, a digital ruble is an obligation of the Central Bank, and not of commercial banks, which makes it similar to cash rubles. For those holding digital rubles, this implies that they will preserve this money, whatever happens to their banks. Secondly, a digital ruble enables faster and more reliable payments and settlements. We are currently exploring several models to design a digital ruble which organise the interaction between customers, the Central Bank and commercial banks differently, but all the models have these advantages. These are faster, reliable and secure payments. To a certain extent, a digital ruble also blurs the distinction between cash and non-cash payments. We are studying the option of launching offline payments with digital rubles via special-purpose wallets, but this is a challenging issue. This will enable people to pay with digital rubles even where there is no internet connection and they do not have cash. For companies operating in such localities, in remote areas, this option will reduce cash turnover costs. Of course, a digital ruble may also create new risks, and we are closely exploring them.

We do understand that it is rather difficult for small businesses to receive financing even in normal conditions, and in challenging times small and medium-sized enterprises are those who are affected the most. It is hard for small businesses to achieve favourable terms and protect their interests in the course of negotiations with banks. In addition, small, just as medium-sized enterprises are certainly on a budget and they need to have access to both loans and daily financial transactions. Normally, we closely monitor SME lending trends. This year, we also put a special focus on loan restructuring since it became highly requested when many companies really lost their revenues and customers. Not all companies had safety cushions; and even large corporates do not always have them. Moreover, it is rather hard for small and medium-sized businesses to maintain safety cushions for challenging times. I should stress that this period still differs from the 2014–2015 crisis, for instance. SME lending plummeted in 2014–2015, while this year the trend is generally positive. Of course, it may not fully offset all the hardships small and medium-sized enterprises have to face. Nonetheless, the loan portfolio has expanded by nearly 15%, specifically 14.7%, since the beginning of the year. The number of borrowers has increased by 63.6% since early 2020, to exceed 450,000 companies.
The first is to make the size of the arrangement larger and more meaningful with respect to possible needs of members. The second is the simplicity of the activation process, especially for the first tranche. This is important for giving assurance to participating members that liquidity will be made available in a timely manner. And the third is the objective of turning CMI into a multilateral facility at a later stage. This last feature, if realized, will provide the region with its own financial arrangement that can help expand the region’s capability in safeguarding financial stability. lt goes without saying that a move to emphasize greater resource commitment by members will entail substantial strengthening in the current regional surveillance process. This is a development that we all should welcome. Strengthening the surveillance process should in fact be a key prior condition for expanding the CMI because it will help make the CMI process credible while reducing the risk of moral hazard. CMI is currently under review. I hope some of the points I have touched upon will be further explored. But whatever the outcome of the review may be, I am confident that it will signify another important step forward for regional financial cooperation. My second thought is on the region’s bond market. Economists in the region have long made known their views that Asia is a region with surplus savings, but the financial surplus of Asia has not been effectively utilize for the benefits of the economies in Asia. This is clearly a missed opportunity.

This is to say that although the economies of East Asia have recovered and are on the path of sustained growth, regional financial cooperation needs to continue and should substantially move forward. The rationale for this is clear: First, financial cooperation will lead to a faster pace and a more comprehensive development of the region’s financial markets. Such development is crucial for sustaining the momentum of intra-regional trade and investment, a factor that has been instrumental for the region’s recent economic success. Going forward, this momentum of intra regional trade and investment has a potential to become a major source of growth for the region, through the promotion the region’s domestic demand. Second, with the globalized flows of finance and capital, maintaining financial markets stability is a key condition for preserving macroeconomic stability. To achieve this, in addition to the pursuance of sound economic and financial policies, the Asian region also needs to have its own financial arrangement. Such an arrangement will help ensure an orderly and stable financial environment such that any emerging vulnerabilities would not pose serious risks to the region’s financial markets and  1/3  economies. Important in this context, I believe, is for the region to have its own financing facility that draws on the region’s own financial strength and resources. With such a facility, there would be greater confidence amongst policy makers in the region that we do have the capability and the capacity to look after our markets and economies if there were to be a major financial distress.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Die Zeit Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, and Die Zeit conducted by Mr Marc Brost and Mr Robert von Heusinger, 23 July 2007. *  *  *  DIE ZEIT: Monsieur le President, fifty years ago the German Bundestag created the Bundesbank, one of Germany's best-known brands in the world. What is its legacy? Trichet: Monetary stability. Independence. Credibility. These principles are very favourable for sustained growth and job creation. Today it's globally recognized that this is the right way for monetary policy to deliver price stability and, by way of consequence, sustainable growth. DIE ZEIT: What do you admire most in the history of the Bundesbank? Trichet: One of the most impressive episodes has been the open conflict with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who wanted the Bundesbank to decrease interest rates. But the Bank refused. It proved to be really independent. DIE ZEIT: That was 1956. Long ago. Trichet: Yes, but at the beginning of 2004 shortly after I became President of the ECB, three heads of member states asked publicly to lower rates: The Bundeskanzler of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, the President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac and the Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi. The ECB demonstrated its independence. We did not comply. DIE ZEIT: Which personal episode with the Bundesbank do you cherish? Trichet: For me the whole history of the euro has an important personal touch with German friends in the administration and in the Bundesbank.

In the time of the preparation of the Treaty I worked with many German friends, for example the Bundesbank Presidents KarlOtto Pöhl, Helmut Schlesinger and Hans Tietmeyer. One of the most inspiring phases was the wording of the Treaty with Hans Tietmeyer, Horst Köhler and Jürgen Stark in particular. It was due to them that the Maastricht Treaty was well constructed and worked. Here you saw the will to unite Europe and the influence of this particular friendship between us. DIE ZEIT: You mentioned independence as the legacy of the Bundesbank. Do you have an absolute independence in mind? An independence that forbids even critique from the political side? Trichet: It is simpler than that: I refer to Article 108 of the Maastricht Treaty. It says the executive branches in particular should not try to influence our decisions. It is a very clear wording. So it's not the ECB who defines its independence, it is the Treaty, which was approved by the people of the member states, by the people of all our democracies. Everybody is welcome to criticise our policy - the media, the analysts, the academics. And we are, as an independent institution, as a last resort, accountable to the people of Europe. By the way it is not known that I go more often to the European Parliament than our friends from the American Federal Reserve go to the US Congress.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Rethinking procyclicality – what is it now and what can be done? Presentation by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Bank for International Settlements/Financial Stability Institute-Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (BIS/FSI-EMEAP) High Level Meeting on “Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis – An International and Asian Perspective”, Tokyo, 30 November 2009. *  *  *  First, let me thank FSI and the EMEAP Working Group on Banking Supervision for the invitation, and also a special thanks to our host, the Bank of Japan and the Financial Services Agency, for the excellent arrangement. The topic of this session is procyclicality and macroprudential supervision. As the first speaker, I have been asked to give an overview of the issue. A good starting point to discuss the issue is to remind ourselves that the issue of procyclicality, especially procyclicality of the financial system, is not new. Discussion about interactions between the financial system and the real economy, especially the idea that the financial sector can amplify economic activities and business cycles, has been well documented by economists, for example, in the financial accelerator model. Here in Asia, the issue of procyclicality had been brought to the fore during the Asian financial crisis, after which the issue was extensively discussed. Two important conclusions emerged from those early discussions.

Providing these poor people a dignified standard of living would require doubling their rate of energy consumption. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the energy transition to achieve netzero is doable but difficult. First, even when the world achieves net-zero emissions, fossil fuels will be with u s . Energy demand in Asia is expected to double by 2030 on the back of strong economic growth, rising affluence, and urbanisation. Even if overall global energy use falls in the net zero scenario, it will increase in many of the poorest countries. Fossil fuels will continue to play an important role in meeting the energy demands of Asia and Africa. Coal is unlikely to have a role in a net zero world but oil and gas will. The IEA has projected that if the world reached net zero by 4/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  2050, it would still be using nearly half as much natural gas as today and about one-quarter as much oil. Second, solar and wind power will need to be the largest energy source. The cost of solar and wind energy has fallen dramatically over the past decade and the amount of power generated through these renewables is rapidly catching up to that generated by coal. The IEA has projected photovoltaic capacity jumping twenty-fold between now and mid-century. This is no mean task – it implies by 2030 installing every day the generation capacity of what is currently the world’s biggest solar farm.