samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What ought to matter more is whether efforts are being stepped up to achieve sustained growth over the medium-term – by reducing vulnerabilities in the system and implementing structural reforms. Second, markets seem to be under-estimating the pace of monetary policy normalisation, particularly by the US Fed. The Fed’s guidance suggests one more rate hike in 2017, and three each in 2018 and 2019. But markets are pricing in less than three hikes in total for the rest of this year through 2019. Granted – with lower oil prices and muted wage growth, the risk of inflation surprising on the upside is low. But what if that risk materialises, especially if the labour market tightens further? Unemployment is already around its natural rate. Past experience suggests that the pass-through from labour market tightness to inflation tends to accelerate as unemployment falls below the natural rate. That could well lead to a faster pace of monetary policy normalisation than the market currently anticipates. Finally, there is a conundrum between volatility and uncertainty. Why is volatility so low in financial markets when uncertainty is high on the policy front? Perhaps it is because uncertainty about economic growth is lower. - The size and number of revisions to global growth forecasts have clearly come down. But surely, political uncertainty is at elevated levels? And when politics is uncertain, can the economics remain unaffected? A disorderly Brexit could lead to increased market turmoil and trigger sharp asset price corrections.

Asia’s imports of consumer goods as well as modern services, such as telecommunications, information, and financial services, have risen sharply over the past decade. Second, sustained investments to build up physical and human capital. China’s fixed asset investment in education and infrastructure has expanded rapidly, growing by about 20% annually since 2009. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have ramped up development spending to address infrastructure deficits. Vietnam has been making heavy investments in education, at almost 20% of total public expenditure. This is beginning to show results in its global ranking in PISA – the Programme for International Student Assessments. Third, growing economic integration within the region. Asia already has extensive cross-border production networks, particularly in the electronics and automobile industries. China’s Belt and Road Initiative will facilitate not just infrastructure investment in the region but, more importantly, strengthen connectivity. As new projects gain traction, there will be increased regional flows of trade, capital, and people in the next five to ten years. Finally, I want to touch on a new source of untapped potential – the CLMV countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. They are increasingly plugged into the global economy and regional supply chains, participating as downstream manufacturers in regional production networks. In Vietnam, manufacturing now makes up a third of the economy. - Vietnam has developed into one of the world’s top electronics exporters, with Samsung producing about 40% of its phones there.
Due to the rising costs, advanced economies have generally lost their historical advantages in producing goods and services, replacing the absent income with debt, which now they have to pay off. Why are these developments important to the Albanian economy?   First, it is necessary to understand that these advanced economies are our major trading partners. They are the main users of our exports and, at the same time, the source of imported consumer goods and fuels.   Second, these economies are the major investors in the Albanian economy and the financial system.   Third, these countries are hosting the Albanian migrants.   Fourth, we believe that another effect relates to the psychological factor, which emerges in the form of consumers’ and firms’ hesitation to consume and invest. Subsequently, the difficulties facing our neighbouring partners are converted into difficulties for the Albanian economy. Any cuts in consumer and investment spending, be it private or public, will later yield cuts in these countries’ investments in Albania, lower demand for exports, lower remittances; in short, the fall in all aggregate demand components in Albania. This would generate the fall in output, the creation of spare capacities, the deterioration of firms’ and consumers’ balance sheets, and a number of other adverse phenomena. At present, the Albanian economy generates nearly as much as half of its potential growth. This gap, which in our terminology is known as “output gap”, is partly explained by the difficulties facing our trading partners.

These are specialized institutions and they are very well-acquainted with the emerging economies and the relevant sectors. In addition to providing financing, they are equipped with and offer technical and financial expertise to enhance the efficiency, transparency and management, and increase employment in the sectors they support; to boost domestic production; to increase employment and, ultimately, stimulate the balancing of external sector’s deficits. Re-orienting the free labour force, capital and the private and public interest towards these advantages offers a simultaneous solution to a number of concerns facing the Albanian economy. This re-orientation is the essence of the economic growth model and it should be the main objective of economic policies and stimulus at a local-level as well. The economic activity of Fier region is a perfect example proving the success of the orientation towards the traded sector. Fier has generally recorded growth above the average of the Albanian economy, and it is ranked the second (after Tirana prefecture) in terms of its contribution to real GDP growth and share in total GDP. At the same time, its current employment rate is about 4% higher than the average employment in the Albanian economy. These economic indicators provide evidence for the direct outcome of the competitive advantages that Fier region offers compared to the other economic regions in Albania. This performance is grounded on a number of characteristics that guarantee the diversity in industry-level production at high tradability.
W A Wijewardena: Central banking nearly six decades after John Exter Speech by Mr W A Wijewardena, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 20 August 2007. *  *  *  Nearly six decades have elapsed since John Exter, founding Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (then, Ceylon), enunciated his wisdom on and philosophy of central banking. He did so in a report titled “Report on the Establishment of a Central Bank for Ceylon” which he completed in 1949 as one-man commission on the request of the Government of Ceylon. His ideas on central banking could also be found in his speeches and press conferences during the formative years of the Central Bank. The Report, also known as the Exter Report was published by the Government as a Sessional Paper in November, 1949. The case for a central bank for Sri Lanka has been presented succinctly and cogently in this report. As a mark of appreciation of his work and in recognition of the need for placing a competent skipper on the newly formed organization, Exter was invited by the Government to form the new central bank as its first Governor. Exter is reported to have accepted this offer only for a limited period. True to his word, he resigned from the post of Governor in 1953 and returned to the States. The Exter Report consists of two parts. Part I presents a lucid summary of the significance of a central banking system for Ceylon.

Inappropriate reserve maintenance: A currency board has to maintain its reserves in sterling or in Indian rupee because of the long economic relationship with those countries or economic dependence on them. But, both currencies at that time were not convertible, due to exchange controls imposed in the UK and India in the postwar period. 3. Adjustment for the future: Ceylon had at that time applied for the membership of the IMF and one of the requirements to be met once the country gained the membership was to express the value of currency in gold or in a gold-convertible currency. Both sterling and Indian rupee were not gold-convertible. 4. Limited activities of a currency board: Currency boards do only the issue of currency. Hence, they cannot supervise banks or take action for the development or the stability of the financial system. 5. Inability to cope with a wider definition of money: Demand deposits have become an important part of money supply. Currency boards do not have any instrument to control demand deposits, while a central bank could do so through statutory reserve systems. 6. Meeting the needs of financial institutions: Financial institutions need liquidity, reserves and clearing and settlement facilities. Currency boards cannot meet them. 7. Inability to tackle crisis situations: Currency boards are “fair-weather” systems and not geared to tackle serious domestic or international crises. For instance, if a crisis demands an expansion of liquidity as its solution, currency boards cannot act in such situations. 8.
I will explore how the dramatic increase in international competition during the last twenty years has affected price levels. I will then return closer to home and attempt to illustrate how important segments of the Swiss economy have remained sheltered from international competition through a web of regulatory hurdles. I will make the case that freeing up these sectors would not only raise economic growth – something that is urgently needed in the effort to alleviate the growing stress on our social programs – but also render monetary policy more effective and provide it with more flexibility to focus not only on maintaining price stability but also on output stabilization. Finally, I will conclude with a brief economic and monetary policy outlook for the United States and Switzerland. 1. Great Inflation to Great Moderation  In the United States, the modern era of central banking began on October 6, 1979 when the Federal Reserve, under the leadership of its newly appointed Chairman Paul Volcker announced its adoption of monetary targets. Headline CPI inflation peaked at 15% at the beginning of 1980. Chairman Volcker slowed the growth of money dramatically. Interest rates rose sharply with the banks’ prime interest rate exceeding 20%. The U.S. economy fell into a deep recession. Inflation began to recede steadily. Remarkably, despite the vigorous recovery that followed after 1983, inflation remained relatively subdued at 4%. It reached a temporary floor of 2.5% by mid-1992.

11  For a detailed analysis see Aymo Brunetti (2003): „Hat die Schweiz ein langfristiges Wachstumsproblem?” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 31.5./1.6.2003, p.29. 4  BIS Review 44/2003  effective but also more flexible in its ability to focus its efforts beyond the primary mandate of maintaining price stability. 6. Economic and Monetary Policy Outlook  Let me now turn to a brief assessment of current economic conditions in the United States as well as here in Switzerland and conclude with a few comments regarding the outlook for Swiss monetary policy. Recent U.S. economic data confirms that GDP growth has accelerated rapidly in the second half of 2003. Third quarter U.S. GDP growth will be close to 6%. For the fourth quarter, most market participants expect GDP growth to slow to a still robust 4%. This would imply a U.S. growth rate of approximately 3.5% for 2003. Substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus as well as strengthening financial conditions has supported the growth dynamic in the second half of 2003 in the United States. Expectations of moderating growth going forward are linked to the fact that stimulus from fiscal policy is set to shrink. The contribution to consumer spending from this year’s tax cuts is set to decline gradually during 2004. In addition, further substantial increases in the defence budget are unlikely in the coming year, thus dampening the relative contribution to GDP from defence spending during 2004.
This did not happen in Thailand, despite timely and vigorous warnings. On the contrary, policymakers attacked the symptom of the crisis, the pressure on the baht, accumulating large reserve losses and forward foreign exchange liabilities in the process. This, together with delays in addressing Thailand’s severe financial sector problems and lingering political uncertainties, clearly contributed to a deepening of the crisis and its spread to other economies in the region. The second lesson is that other countries can find that their vulnerability to crises in other markets is greater than economic fundamentals would suggest. Consequently, they need to take pre-emptive actions to strengthen their policies. Where might such action be needed? Several suggestions come to mind: •  one, maintaining an appropriate exchange rate and exchange rate regime. Clearly, there is no single “right” choice, but more flexible exchange rates can help provide early and visible signals of the need for policy adjustments and are less likely to invite reckless behavior on the part of borrowers and lenders.

Mr. Camdessus considers the lessons from Southeast Asia Remarks by the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, M. Michel Camdessus, at a press briefing in Singapore, on 13/11/97. How could events in Southeast Asia unfold as they did, after so many years of outstanding performance? We have a fairly clear analysis of what happened in Thailand. The more difficult question is how the crisis spread so quickly to other economies in the region. I’m not sure we have the full picture yet, but let me give you my perspective on the causes of the crisis and where we go from here. I. How could it happen? Certainly, the Thai crisis did not strike out of the clear blue sky. On the contrary, there were numerous signs of a gathering storm. Macroeconomic indicators pointed to substantial imbalances: substantial real exchange rate appreciation; a marked slowdown in export growth; a persistently large current account deficit financed increasingly by portfolio inflows, including a substantial amount of short-term capital; and rising external debt. These problems, in turn, exposed other weaknesses in the Thai economy, including substantial, unhedged foreign currency-denominated borrowing by the private sector, an inflated domestic property market, and a weak and over-exposed banking system. Markets issued their own warnings in the form of declining equity prices and mounting exchange rate pressure, as doubts about the sustainability of policies grew. And as you know, the Fund also stressed these problems and pressed for urgent measures in a continuous dialogue with the Thai authorities.
Our estimates show that a 400 bp increase in market interest rates, similar to that observed in the 3-month EURIBOR since December 2021,16 could drive up non-financial corporations’ median gross interest burden by between 2.9 pp and 6.8 pp,17 and the percentage of corporate debt held by corporations under high financial pressure18 by between 6.5 pp and 8.9 pp, compared with end-2021 levels. For households, a 450 bp increase, in line with that observed in the 12-month EURIBOR19 since end-2021, would raise the percentage of households with a high net interest burden20 by 3.9 pp. This effect would tend to be more marked among lower-income indebted households, which are also being harder hit by rising inflation. In this regard, the reform in late 2022 of the Code of Good Banking Practice (CGP) focuses precisely on providing for orderly debt restructuring for household segments with a high degree of socio-economic vulnerability. How different banks and financial systems are positioned against these risks will determine their level of resilience. In this respect, amid such high uncertainty, including that surrounding the degree of monetary policy tightening, Spanish banks must implement a prudent provisioning and capital planning policy. A policy that earmarks part of the higher profits obtained in the short term to bolster banks’ resilience would mean they would be better placed to absorb any potential losses should the worst risk scenarios materialise. From a European standpoint, a smoother-functioning euro area with improved governance would contribute hugely to making the European financial system less vulnerable.

Agreements signed in 2023 – affecting around 1.5 million workers – provide for an average wage rise of 4.3%. 2  See the results of the Banco de España Business Activity Survey. 3  Indeed, while Eurosystem financing amounted to 10% of Spanish banks’ consolidated liabilities in 2020-2021 (3% in 2007), that figure fell by nearly 5 pp in 2022. 3  an increase in deposits.4 However, these fell in 2023 Q1 by nearly 2.5%, especially among firms.5 In 2022, the average interest expense on bank liabilities increased by nearly 60 bp compared with the 2020-2021 average, to stand at 1.1%, still slightly below pre-pandemic levels. This change highlights the fact that the rise in the 12-month EURIBOR has only partially passed through to deposit costs, far less than in previous monetary tightening cycles.6 Banks’ comfortable liquidity position helps to explain this. Similarly, the fall in the cost of equity – by 2 pp between December 2021 and May 2023, when it reached 6.6% – has cushioned the rise in the cost of borrowing from banks.7 The cost of equity rose during February and March 2023, mainly owing to the higher equity market risk premium, although the increases have been moderate. The liquidity coverage ratio stood at 173% at March 2023, much higher than the required minimum threshold and likewise above pre-pandemic levels8. Meanwhile, the net stable funding ratio stood at 130% at December 2022, again above the minimum requirement of 100%.
But a simpler regime, perhaps borrowing from the philosophy of recent moves in Switzerland and the US, could make small firms stronger and more competitive at the same time. This is an area where we may have more room to manoeuvre following Brexit. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  Action I’m worried that this may all sound rather theoretical to some of you, and some distance from the front line of providing banking services. So let’s come right back down to ground level and look at credit unions. Credit unions provide a vital service for their members, often acting as a backstop by allowing those members to access services they might find more difficult to get from banks and building societies. The sector plays an important role in many communities – particularly in Northern Ireland. Now credit unions, including those in Northern Ireland, may be relieved to hear that the hard-working PRA competition robot is not about to be unleashed upon them. As an aside, they may not know that they have been living with another of our robots for some time. A few years back some of our economists from the wider Bank of England teamed up with our credit union supervisors and found out that by using some different analytical techniques to study regulatory returns we could do a better job of predicting which credit unions would get into trouble next.9 This is highly relevant given we oversee around 440 credit unions with a team of 9 staff.

Third, 20 of the thresholds result from EU regulations and/or Basel definitions. The other 33 are things we have done ourselves here in the UK. Fourth, if we crudely translate non-asset thresholds into an asset equivalent in order to be able to map all thresholds on one scale, then most are concentrated in the area below a size corresponding to £ in assets or deposits. 3 This bears out the prediction made last year by former PRA Executive Director James Proudman that the PRA would soon develop a form of ‘cyborg supervision’ involving humans and machines working closely together. 4 To identify thresholds, the robot ran a series of textual searches on the dataset. The search combined quantitative values £ € expressions related to thresholds (eg. less/more than, greater/smaller than, up to); and typical metrics used for thresholds (eg. assets, balance sheet, deposits, accounts). It also included thresholds, such those on executive pay and exposures, that are only indirectly linked with size. The results were then cross-checked and cleaned by subject matter specialists. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  One could make various observations about these findings. But one obvious question to ask is whether or not this is too complicated a picture. While it is a good thing for small firms that we exempt them from various bits of regulation, is there a case for making the gradient a bit easier to discern and climb as they grow? Should we rationalise and harmonise any of these thresholds?
Via the programme, we are offering banks loans of up to SEK 500 billion, on condition that the banks in turn lend the money to Swedish companies. To strengthen the programme and ensure that the money reaches companies, the Riksbank has also made it possible temporarily for more banks and credit institutions to gain access to our money. We are doing this because many small companies around the country are customers at smaller, local banks rather than at the major banks. Something else that often happen in times of crisis is that the demand for safe and liquid assets increases as agents try to dispose of riskier assets. The safest and most liquid asset on the financial markets is central bank money, money created by the central bank. The Riksbank has therefore taken measures to make it easier for banks to gain access to central bank money without having to sell their assets to a great extent. We have eased the requirements regarding the collateral banks can pledge when they borrow from the Riksbank. We have, for example, given banks generous opportunities to use a greater proportion of mortgage bonds and other covered bonds as collateral. More generous collateral requirements also strengthen the programme of corporate lending and simultaneously help to keep the large Swedish mortgage bond market running. We have also cut the lending rate for Riksbank loans overnight to banks from 0.75 to 0.20 per cent.

Many senior managers and specialists view their student days as a pivotal time in their lives, so the quality of teaching has a major impact on both economy and administration. Universities make a direct contribution to a country's prosperity by maintaining the necessary capabilities and developing and imparting knowledge that is useful for the economy and society. But their indirect contribution is just as important: Universities must enable their graduates to understand and appreciate the significance of the Swiss model for success. This model is based on the pillars of direct democracy, the rule of law, federalism and an awareness of the value of stable institutions. The terms 'markets' and 'competition' are key to understanding basic economic relationships, and are fundamental to ensuring prosperity, as well as to acquiring and applying new scientific knowledge. One of the tasks of a university is to provide its graduates and the general public with a realistic picture of the functioning and importance of markets and competition. Only in this way can the Swiss model for success endure in a world of constant change. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches