samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The theme for the 2008 national budget is “unlocking resources for economic empowerment and wealth creation”. I believe the economic empowerment is for both men and women. Furthermore, in order to achieve our vision to be a prosperous middle income country by 2030, both women and men must be empowered equally. Women must not be left behind in the drive to this vision. I recognize the creation of the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development, as a deliberate effort by the Government to ensure that the needs of women are addressed. Let me also take this opportunity to appreciate the efforts by our cooperating partners in the financing of activities promoting gender equality. This is evident by the number of non governmental organizations looking at women’s issues, some of whom are represented here today. Ladies and Gentlemen, when we talk about financing, we must focus on the institutions through which most of this financing is channeled namely, financial service providers, most of whom are participating in this exhibition. No matter what kind of financing, be it government, donor or private financing, it is channeled through our financial institutions. As earlier stated, the main reason this exhibition is being held is to showcase how our financial institutions are contributing to financing for gender equality. I also hope that the exhibition will encourage increased access to financial services by not only women but also men from all walks of life.

In this regard, the Bank of Zambia and the financial service providers under its regulation and supervision are pleased to be part of the celebrations for International Women’s Day 2008 Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, our country has made great economic strides in the past few years. We have had positive economic growth averaging 5% in the last five years. The macroeconomic environment has stabilised with the achievement of single digit inflation as well as reduced interest rates. In addition we have seen increased investments in the mining and other productive sectors. This improved environment presents great opportunities  BIS Review 29/2008  1  for our country for both men and women. As you all know, women have from time immemorial taken centre stage in the running of small and medium enterprises ranging from agriculture, mining, and tourism, to manufacturing as well as cross border trading. All these economic activities need financing in order to grow and contribute to our country’s Gross Domestic Product. Ladies and Gentlemen, this brings me to the theme of International Women’s day for this year and that is “Financing for Gender Equality”. At the international level, commitments have been made on financing for gender equality and the empowerment of women by governments all over the world. A large number of governments have taken initiatives to integrate gender perspectives into their national budgets in order to reflect the differentiated needs of women and men. At a national level, Zambia is committed to financing for gender equality.
Such influences can be changes in indirect taxes and subsidies or the price of oil. To the extent that such changes only have an initial direct effect on the price level but are not deemed to influence the future rate of inflation, they should not precipitate interest rate adjustments. A special case of the temporary effects is what happens when the Riksbank changes its policy and raises or lowers the instrumental rates. This affects the interest costs of housing, thereby influencing the CPI. Hence, interest rate changes can make it more difficult to reach the price stability objective in the short run. The CPI has varied significantly more than the various measures of underlying inflation that the Riksbank produces (Figure 5). One example is 1996, when interest rates were reduced rapidly. The CPI then fell much more than the underlying inflation, which was due to a reduction of the interest costs for housing. In this way, annual inflation ended up somewhat below the one per cent lower limit of the tolerance interval. At the same time, all indicators of underlying inflation show that it has edged downwards and has recently kept relatively stable in the interval of 1-1.5 per cent. The problem of temporary influences can be managed in different ways: 1. One possibility is to clearly specify in advance which deviations from the CPI are acceptable. This is the method used in New Zealand. It could lead to greater transparency.

When inflation expectations are taken into account, the outcome of an inflationary policy is normally worse rather than better economic development . BIS Review 56/1997  -2-  The best contribution that monetary policy can make to good growth in the long term is to see to it that an environment with stable prices is created and maintained. Within these bounds a central bank can support economic development in general. In the short term the possibility may exist to influence the economy’s activity level with monetary policy instruments. For that to be possible, monetary policy objectives would need to be completely credible. A central bank should have as its primary objective price stability. Given the time lags that exist in monetary policy, it takes from one to two years before the effects of an interest rate change make themselves fully felt on inflation. Therefore policy must be be guided by the forecasted inflation, not by the inflation existing in the present situation. If an inflation forecast for the coming two years shows that there is a risk that the inflation target may be missed, the instrumental rate should be changed so that inflation is driven back in line with the target. If inflation is expected to be lower than the target, there is room in practice for monetary policy to take the activity level into consideration. The Riksbank can then lower the interest rate and in such a manner stimulate production and employment temporarily.
The macroeconomic effects of a transfer of resources from debtor to creditor 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  countries is an old issue, going back to the debate between Keynes and Ohlin about Germany’s international obligations after World War I. In recent decades, Maury Obstfeld and Ken Rogoff 4 have pointed out in a series of papers that the basic mechanism of the adjustment results in a transfer of real resources from debtor countries to surplus countries, regardless of the drivers of global rebalancing. In the debtor country, there is a clear macroeconomic cost related to a drop in domestic spending and welfare, leading to large negative output gaps and high unemployment rates, and in turn putting strong downward pressures on wages. This is typically what we saw in the euro area, where the adjustment contributed to the very different dynamics of unit labour costs across countries [Slide 5], and therefore led to relative price adjustments. In cumulative terms since 2007, Germany has seen real exchange rate appreciation of about 8% relative to France, and 20% relative to Spain, although we should take into account in these dynamics the large gains in German competitiveness before the crisis. The adjustment relied mainly on nominal adjustment in deficit countries. The link between the current account and the real exchange rate is still subject to considerable debate among academics.

CMU would help significantly to foster private risk-sharing by: First, providing incentives for cross-border investments – preferably in equity – through the harmonisation of accounting, taxes and insolvency laws; Second, developing pan-European savings products more oriented towards long-term investment. This could be done through a variety of savings vehicles, starting with the creation of European venture capital funds; Third, completing the Banking Union. * * * To conclude, global imbalances are not inevitable and we always need fresh ideas to improve the functioning of our globalised economies. In this respect, I would like to quote George Bernard Shaw, the famous Irish writer, who said once “You see things; and you say ‘Why?’. But I dream things that never were; and I say ‘Why not?’” Thank you for your attention. 1 Milesi Ferretti, G.-M. and A. Razin (1998). Current account reversals and currency crises: Empirical regularities,  NBER WP No. 6620. 2 Lane, P. and G.-M. Milesi-Ferretti (2012). External adjustment and the global crisis, Journal of International  Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 252–265. 3 Gourinchas, P.O. and M. Obstfeld (2012). Stories of the Twentieth Century for the Twenty-First, American  Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 226–265. 4 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  4 Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff (2001). The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common  Cause? in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, ed. by Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, Vol. 15, NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.: MIT Press, pp. 339–412.
37 An additional mechanism that creates amplification is that if and when these risks do materialise, market participants begin to doubt the solvency of even banks that are resilient. This is a form of what economists call ‘Knightian’ uncertainty (Knight, 1921); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) present a model based on this concept. 38 In his classic paper on policymaking under uncertainty, Brainard (1967) argues that it will generally be optimal to use all instruments available when pursuing particular targets. This result holds provided the tools have less-than-perfectly correlated impacts on the target. In these circumstances, while any given tool may prove ineffective, it is less likely that their combined use will be. There is, therefore, an insurance benefit to using multiple tools in moderation. 39 Under the Bank of England Act 1998, as amended by the Financial Services Act 2012, the Bank of England has a statutory objective to protect and enhance the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom. Subject to achieving this primary objective, the FPC must also support ‘the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment’ (Section 9C(1) of the Bank of England Act 1998). 40 The first signs of that can be seen in the work being conducted internationally and domestically to study and address risks around asset management, market liquidity and derivatives. For example, the FSB published a policy recommendation in January that funds’ investment strategies should be consistent with their redemption terms, see Financial Stability Board (2017).

34 Constancio (2014) argues that “It seems unacceptable that macro-prudential authorities would passively watch the development of a bubble in housing prices and other asset prices, comforted by the idea that the banking sector is prepared to weather the storm and that the central bank would deal with the painful aftermath. The crisis showed that the amount of risk endogenously generated by a financial cycle spinning ‘out-of-control’ dwarfs the ‘mopping up’ ability of fiscal and monetary policy due to fiscal capacity limits and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. In matters of financial instability, prevention is always better than cure”. 35 The FPC recommendation on the loan-to-income (LTI) flow limit is that the PRA and the FCA should ensure that mortgage lenders do not extend more than 15% of their total number of new residential mortgages at LTI ratios at or greater than 4.5. The FPC recommendation regarding mortgage affordability is that when assessing affordability, mortgage lenders should apply an interest rate stress test that assesses whether borrowers could still afford their mortgages if, at any point over the first five years of the loan, Bank Rate were to be 3 percentage points higher than the prevailing rate at origination. For further detail, see for instance Bank of England (2014) for a documentation of the Bank of England’s 2014 housing market measures. 36 See Bank of England (2016).
Nor can it be ruled out that the external scenario will see a reduction in global cost pressures and inflation easing in most 6  economies, including Chile. In this case, the Fed's monetary policy response would be less restrictive than in the central scenario, which would give way to better financial conditions, a less appreciated dollar globally, and lower external inflationary pressures (figure 14). The central scenario projects that the pace of price increases will decrease in the coming months and that annual inflation will begin to decline. However, the risk of a much more persistent inflationary phenomenon is a concern for the Board. If materialized, it could lead to further monetary tightening, outside the upper limit of the MPR corridor. This risk is especially important in a context where inflation has been unexpectedly high for several quarters and inflationary expectations remain above 3% in the two-year horizon. Quickly recovering macroeconomic balances will help reduce this risk, while allowing the Chilean economy to appropriately address a further deterioration of the external scenario. Final remarks Our country is facing many important challenges. One of the most relevant macroeconomically is to reduce inflation, a problem that is putting a heavy burden on all of us. For more than two decades, inflation was not a matter of public concern and there were generations to whom it may have seemed an unknown issue. But in recent quarters it has become a complex issue, which is at the heart of our responsibility as an institution.

13  Figure 8 a) Growth forecast at 2022 (1) (percent)  U.S. Eurozone LatAm China (right axis)  5  4  U.S. 100 Eurozone 6,0 LatAm 80 China (right axis)  7 3,0  6  3  c) Probability of a recession within 12 months in developed countries (percent)  b) Growth forecast at 2023 (1) (percent)  2,5  5,7 60  2,0  5,4  1,5  5,1  1,0  4,8  20  4,5  0  5  2  4  1 3 0,5 Jan.21 Jul.21 Jan.22 Jul.22 Jan.22 Apr.22 Jul.22  40  12 14 16 18 20 22  (1) Latin America considers Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. PPP-weighted growth, shares of each economy according to WEO (IMF). (2) Includes the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Japan. Calculated as the average of survey responses for aforementioned countries. Sources: Consensus Forecast, IMF, and Bloomberg. Figure 9 Global supply chain pressure index (1)  Commodity prices  (standard deviations)  (index, 2010-2022 average =100)  5  250  4  200  Oil (2)  Metal index (3)  Wheat (4)  Copper  3 150  2 1  100  0 50  -1 -2  0  10  12  14  16  18  20  22  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  (1) Standard deviations with respect to historical average.
However, during the period of turmoil since last summer it has proved toxic, here and overseas, for banks to access liquidity on those terms from central banks unless in broad and quality company. That has created uncertainty about the access of banks to the central banks in practice, and has required innovation and clear assurances from the central banking community. This alone will require reforms to the way in which central banks use their balance sheets, and money creating power, to sustain financial stability. Banks will also need to adapt. It seems that at not a few firms, the discipline of risk management somehow got separated from that of balance sheet management (or funding). It was effectively assumed that financing markets would remain open come what may. There is a question of whether treasury management should somehow be insulated from the pressures of a profit centre. Separately, assumptions were made about relationships between asset prices that have proved groundless. One such is the spread between term money market rates and expected central bank policy rates. So long as the so-called LIBOR/Overnight Index Swap spread was narrow at all maturities, few market participants cared about whether they hedged against a LIBOR-based instrument when in fact sometimes they really needed a hedge relative to a risk-free rate. We sense that some international fixed-income asset managers would like there to be OIS-based contracts alongside LIBOR-based financial contracts, so that they can tailor their hedges more precisely.

In the near term, CPI inflation is very likely to rise to materially above our 2% target. The question is whether that unavoidable temporary rise will remain just that, temporary; or whether it will feed into medium-term expectations of inflation, and so get reflected in wages and prices going forward and, thus, in domestically-generated inflation. Given this unusual combination of significant downside and upside risks to the medium-term inflation outlook, the broad policy strategy is to offset some but not all of the adverse shock to demand from tighter credit conditions. And to do so by changing Bank Rate gradually and with transparency about that broad strategy. To be clear, this approach probably means allowing a degree of slack to develop in the economy, in the interests of avoiding taking risks with inflation on the upside. Only by underpinning the credibility of the nominal anchor provided by the MPC’s commitment to the inflation target will we maintain scope to cushion the real economy from the effects of the stresses in the international financial system. If we implement this strategy successfully, we will be able to provide more durable support for demand and activity. If, by contrast, we were to adopt a course that let the inflation genie out of the bottle, we would find ourselves needing to tighten policy, exacerbating the slowdown in activity. That broad strategy is not a recipe for inaction.
For the region as a whole, the population in this age group will increase by 314 % from 207 million in 2000 to 857 million in 2050. Many nations are finding it increasingly difficult to provide adequately for the needs of their aged through state-provided social security. Faced with such prospects, planning for retirement has become more important, both for individuals as well as public policy to ensure sustainable financing and management of retirement and healthcare needs in the long term. In this context, the development of deep financial markets among ASEAN countries is critical. One of the significant challenges currently facing the insurance industry in this region has been the shortage of long term assets that match the duration of insurance liabilities. While the bond markets in several ASEAN economies have been extensively developed over the last decade, longer-dated papers remain scarce in most countries. This has been a key impediment to the development of private pension products needed to meet the increasing demand for channels through which the population can save for retirement. While there are significant efforts being made to further develop the longer end of the bond market, the engagement between the industry, regulators and Government needs to be maintained and intensified further to take this agenda forward. This is critical both for the management of risks in the industry, and to support sustainable growth in the longer term.

One key driver is the rapid development of Fintech. While the HKMA has done a great deal in the past few years in promoting Fintech, there is still room to further apply new technology in finance in the coming years. This includes, for example, fostering a better ecosystem for Regulatory Technology (or RegTech) and Supervisory Technology (or SupTech). We are also aware that any new risks associated with the increasing use of technology have to be managed. These include for example cyber and data security. We will work with the industry to address these risks. 6. We are also committed to promoting market development opportunities, especially in strengthening the role of Hong Kong as the gateway to the Mainland’s capital markets, in the Greater Bay Area development, and also in green finance. 7. These are rough times. But my colleagues and I will continue to discharge our duties in a professional manner and do our best to serve the people of Hong Kong. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
We are, I think, just starting to see examples in the UK where cash is not accepted and only electronic payment can be used. It is not clear how far and how fast that trend will go. The Bank is responsible for producing cash people can use with confidence and facilitating its use/distribution and collection by the private wholesale sector. We are working with the cash industry to ensure that changes in the way wholesale cash is distributed are sustainable and effective whilst maintaining or enhancing access to cash services. Beyond that, other authorities have more direct responsibilities and powers with regard to the public’s direct access to cash. The Treasury has established the Joint Authorities Cash Strategy Group to co-ordinate all the authorities with responsibilities for cash.10  Improving the current system  The declining use of cash, of course, is a result of changes in the way we live and transact with each other in a digitalised economy made possible by changes in technology. Technology has made electronic payment in commercial bank money cheaper and faster. In the UK the Faster Payments Service, launched in 2008 now processes around £ trillion a year. Regulatory change, such as the EU Payment Services Directives, the UK Open Banking reforms and the creation in the UK of an economic regulator for payments, the Payment Systems Regulator, has opened the payments industry up to more competition.

The report of the CGFS Working Group on "FDI in the financial sector of EMEs" highlighted that a lasting benefit of these FDI was their effects on the financial sector efficiency, thanks to the generally associated technology transfers and innovations in products and processes. In addition to their lower volatility, this is one more reason why attracting long-term capital flows, such as FDIs, seems preferable to catching short-term flows, although the lessons from the Chilean experience versus some Asian misadventures suggest there is no unique model for all. But I saw that the size of FDIs in India which had been hitherto rather low is rising significantly (16 billions USD in 2006-07) which is good sign of its attractiveness. In France also we pay a lot of attention to inflows of FDIs (above 60 billions in 2006) as they matter as well in a more mature economy. So when setting the pace of internal versus external liberalisation, the authorities have to strike the right balance and rhythm between the two sides. In this respect, let me evoke briefly the way we managed this process in France in the 1980s. Financial liberalisation started with the domestic side by: •  Modernising the money market;  •  Deepening the bond markets, using the public sector as a benchmark (in order to price risks through a full yield curve for risk-free assets);  •  Broadening the basis of the equity markets (including privatisations);  •  Last but not least, creating new financial markets (futures, options…).