samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the ratio of total credit to nonhydrocarbon GDP remained stable, whereas credit to the private sector/nonhydrocarbon GDP increased somewhat in 2013 to reach 23.45% (21.35% in 2011). In 2013, while pursuing their provisioning efforts, banks consolidated their financial soundness indicators. Solvency ratios remain high, much higher than required under the prevailing regulation and in line with the recommended level under Basel III. The banking sector soundness is anchored to high capital adequacy ratios and high profitability and liquidity. The solvency ratios are in line with those of comparable emerging market economies. In 2013, an assessment of the banking sector carried out by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has helped define further directions in deepening banking sector reforms and strengthening banking system stability in Algeria. Effective implementation has started in the first quarter of 2014 with the enactment by the Council on Money and Credit of three regulations related to the solvency ratios, large exposures and participations, and loans classification and provisioning. The minimum Tier 1 capital ratio has now been set at 9.5%, higher than recommended by the Basel Committee, and the regulatory capital ratio has been set at 12%. Moreover, as regards the strengthening of the capacity in assessing the banking sector risk, Bank of Algeria will rely, as of the beginning of 2015, on the effective use of the new stress test model, and on the generalization of the bank rating system.

Banking sector reform: efforts made prior to the strengthening of the legal framework in 2010  Within the broad framework of the economic reforms undertaken in the late 1980s (overall reform of the economic regulation, including that of price systems), the banking reform has been implemented since 1990, following the enactment of the law on money and credit (1990) establishing a two-tier banking system. This major monetary reform reemphasized the role of money and monetary policy- through indirect tools- in macro-financial regulation, thereby enabling a gradual shift from the “financial repression” paradigm. Since the year 1990, and after assessing the vulnerabilities of the Algerian public banking system, a number of reforms have been undertaken to improve the functioning of public banks, reinforce the banking activity operating framework- especially through the opening of the sector to private investors- and promote the development of non-bank financial institutions. Based on institutional audits, action plans aiming at improving public banks functions have been launched during the first half of the 1990s and pursued during the 2000s. In order to improve their governance, performance contracts between the public banks’ managers and the State as the owner, took effect in the beginning of 2007. At the same time, and on the basis of their financial statements audits undertaken by international firms, cleaning up operations of the public banks’ balance sheet started in the beginning of 1991 with the repurchase of non- performing loans (NPLs) and capital increases.
Through this program, several opportunities for collaboration on training have been identified, particularly in the context of existing plans for human resource development at the central bank, the CBM’s strategic plan for onsite and offsite supervision, and a future CBM training institute. And today, with the opening of this Maybank branch, marks another milestone in the relationship between Myanmar and Malaysia. The granting of a banking license to Maybank provides Malaysia with yet another avenue to participate and contribute towards the economic development of Myanmar. Being a responsible corporate citizen It is in the interest of financial institutions to be a responsible corporate citizen and contribute to the flourishing and wellbeing of society. Financial institutions must adapt to their domestic environment and be mindful of the needs of the community in which they operate in. Access to financial services for all segments of society is important for inclusive and sustainable growth for an economy. The low and moderate income households must be served as they represent the future. There are at least two dimensions to being a responsible corporate citizen. The first dimension is to design and grow business responsibly, by providing ethical and sustainable financial products and services to all segments of society. Part of this essential component is promoting greater levels of financial literacy and understanding of financial products among the local community. Banks need to strive to deliver the highest standards of service to all. The second dimension is the act itself of giving back to the community.

And, the banking system has become more fragmented or “balkanised”, with a preference for banks to subsidiarise in countries beyond their home state, and for regulators to wish for – and achieve – the location of more capital and larger pools of liquid assets in their jurisdictions. We should not be surprised by this, but nor should we accept that it is inevitably with us as a permanent feature. The reasons why we have seen these changes are not hard to explain. Major concerns about sovereign creditworthiness undermine stable banking activity across borders, another important lesson of history. Combined with that, as authorities we have had bad experiences in trying to deal with and resolve failed banks headquartered in other countries. It is not surprising that the natural reaction is to make sure in future we have “got the money”. Moreover, no one country is particularly responsible for this trend – the honest thing is to say that many of us have contributed to it because the alternative available at the time looked worse. And, writing rules to say that such actions should not be taken, irrespective of the underlying reasons for them, is not likely to be a success. This amounts to contradicting basic human nature. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  But, and this is the important point, we should not design the world as if fragmentation and balkanisation are inevitably always likely to be with us.
The prospects for the world economy are now even weaker than we anticipated at the end of 2008. International trade is contracting markedly, and it will take time before growth rebounds. Our projections for growth among our trading partners have been revised down to -3 per cent in 2009 and ¾ per cent in 2010. Moreover, the Norwegian economy seems to be contracting more sharply than projected around the monetary policy meeting in December. BIS Review 37/2009  1  A wide range of instruments is being used in Norway to counteract the effects of the financial crisis. In order to curb the fall in activity, government expenditure will be increased by over 10 per cent this year. Norges Bank’s bank lending survey shows that banks have been tightening credit standards substantially, particularly for corporate loans. To boost the credit market a separate 1 government fund will buy private bonds. The government has also provided loans and guarantees for exports and expanded lending limits for the Norwegian State Housing Bank and other special vehicles for government 2 financing. Norwegian Banks’ equity capital makes up only 6 per cent of their assets, which is low from a 3 historic perspective, but not low compared with banks in other countries. At present, our banks are financially sound, but they need to strengthen their core capital in order to be able to supply credit as normal. The authorities offer risk capital to the banks, including core Tier 1 capital without voting right through a newly established State Finance Fund.

The operations will be conducted as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment. The rate for the first of these operations, to be announced on 23 June 2009, will be the rate on the main refinancing operations at that time. Subsequently, the fixed rate may include a premium to the rate on the main refinancing operations, depending on the circumstances at the time. The Governing Council has decided in principle that the Eurosystem will purchase eurodenominated covered bonds issued in the euro area. The detailed modalities will be announced after the Governing Council meeting of 4 June 2009. Furthermore, the Governing Council has decided that the European Investment Bank will become an eligible counterparty in the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations with effect from 8 July 2009 and under the same conditions as any other counterparty. These decisions have been taken to promote the ongoing decline in money market term rates, to encourage banks to maintain and expand their lending to clients, to help to improve market liquidity in important segments of the private debt security market, and to ease funding conditions for banks and enterprises. Today’s decisions take into account the expectation that price developments will continue to be dampened by the substantial past fall in commodity prices and the marked weakening of economic activity in the euro area and globally. The latest economic data and survey information suggest tentative signs of a stabilisation at very low levels, after a first quarter which was significantly weaker than expected.
General government budget deficit percent of GDP  General government budget balance, cash (national methodology) General government budget balance (ESA 2010) General government primary balance** General government structural balance***  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017* 2018*  -6.3  -4.2  -2.5  -2.5  -1.7  -1.4  -2.4  -3.0  -3.0  -6.9  -5.4  -3.7  -2.1  -1.4  -0.8  -3.0  -3.0  -3.9  -5.4  -3.8  -1.9  -0.4  0.3  0.9  -1.5  -1.6  -2.3  -5.6  -2.9  -2.4  -0.9  -0.4  -0.3  -2.2  -3.3  -4.3  *) projections for 2017 and 2018 were produced by the Ministry of Public Finance (cash deficit) and the European Commission (AMECO) **) the primary balance is the general government balance (ESA 2010) excluding interest payable ***) the structural balance is the general government balance adjusted for the cyclical component (estimated based on potential output) Source: MPF, European Commission  17  Figure 24. Current account deficit and non-debt-creating capital flows 0  5  -1  0  -2  -5  -3  -10  -4 -5  Source: NBR, NIS  -7 -8 -9 2017f  2016  2015  2014  2012  2011  -10 2010  *) mostly EU structural and investment funds **) direct investment, equity (incl.

Determinants of GDP dynamics 8  contributions, percentage points  percent 8  6  6  4  4  60  percent  50  40 2  2 30  -4  10  actual final consumption net exports of goods and services change in inventories gross fixed capital formation real GDP, annual change (rhs) Source: NIS  2017 H1  -4 2016  20  2015  -2  2014  -2  2013  0  2012  0  0 Intermediate Primary commodities goods January-July 2016  Capital goods  Consumption goods  January-July 2017  Source: NBR 16  Figure 23.
15  For a description of Ramses, see Adolfson et al. (2013). 16  A corresponding analysis of the expected consequences of holding the repo rate unchanged at 0.25 per cent since July 2010 is presented in Svensson (2013b). According to this analysis, CPIF inflation would have been around one percentage point higher than it actually was at the beginning of 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 5. Alternative scenario for CPIF inflation and unemployment Annual percentage change and percentage of labour force, seasonally-adjusted data 3  9  CPIF, lower repo rate 2013, (left scale) CPIF, main scenario, (left scale) Unemployment, lower repo rate 2013, (right scale) Unemployment, main scenario, (right scale)  2  8  1  7  0  6 12  13  14  15  16  17  Note. The experiment with a lower repo rate in 2013 assumes a repo rate cut from 1 per cent to 0.75 per cent at the monetary policy meeting in February 2013 and a repo-rate path that from December 2013 follows the path published in December 2013 and again in February 2014. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  The analysis can also be applied to unemployment. We see then that a repo rate 0.25 percentage points lower would have entailed somewhat lower unemployment now. The effect on unemployment is a clear economic cost of a monetary policy that leans against the wind.

Unemployment has been close to a low historical average. Although it is of course difficult to compare and assess different central banks’ deliberations, the repo-rate decisions in Sweden during most of 2013 would appear to be one of the clearest examples of a monetary policy that leaned against the wind. When the prospects for inflation fell, the repo rate was held unchanged with explicit reference to household debt. This makes it interesting both for us in Sweden and for central banks in other countries to assess how successful the policy has been. It is far too early to make a complete assessment. But as there is a substantial need to manage financial imbalances in some countries, and there is a discussion on the role of monetary policy in this context, it may nevertheless be useful to make a preliminary assessment of the policy. Swedish inflation moving further from the target CPIF inflation was around 2 per cent in 2010, when the increases in the repo rate began after the record-high cuts in connection with the global financial crisis. But since then inflation has fallen and CPIF inflation has been around 1 per cent for a couple of years. Last autumn, inflation fell further. It is now very low; in February CPI inflation was –0.2 per cent and CPIF inflation was +0.4 per cent.
In the case of annuity firms, the reforms are reliant on our confidence in the level of MA benefit taken – and hence on the fundamental spread being appropriately calculated. More broadly, in addition to the use of safeguards where appropriate, the reforms are contingent on the continued effectiveness of a central pillar of the Solvency II regime, the quality of firms’ own risk management. That will remain at the core of firm-to-supervisor dialogue and engagement. Our overall work on potential Solvency II reform has already benefited from the effective engagement as part of the pre-consultation phase of the review. Following the publication of our DP at the end of April, we are requesting more information from firms and I am looking forward to our next series of meetings in order to hear the views of firms, their investors and other stakeholders. Thank you. I am grateful to Saoirse Carberry, Craig Turnbull, Alan Sheppard, Avni Gangadia and Miranda Hewkin Smith for their assistance in helping me prepare this speech. 1. Review of Solvency II: Call for Evidence | HM Treasury 2. Brave new world - speech by Sam Woods | Bank of England. 3. Four Rs: Creating the conditions for long-term sustainable growth in the life annuity sector – speech by Charlotte Gerken | Bank of England 4. The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to insurance supervision | Bank of England Section 1 explains the PRA’s objectives. 5. At YE21 ‘Investment and cash excluding participations’ - Insurance aggregate data report | Bank of England, 6.

Once the existing distribution reserve has been depleted, we will most likely have to reduce our profit distributions significantly. Cosa initiative The people’s initiative “National Bank profits for the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Fund (AHV/AVS)” – better known as the Cosa initiative – proposes allocating the SNB’s profits which remain after deducting the CHF 1 billion for the cantons to the Old Age and Survivors’ Insurance Fund (AHV/AVS). An obligation of this kind would impact on the National Bank’s independence, putting it under political pressure to distribute higher profits, which in turn would only be possible were the SNB to expand the money supply, reduce the currency reserves or take greater risks. This would undermine the SNB’s credibility and freedom of action as well as compromise the stability of the Swiss franc. The National Bank’s most important task is to conduct monetary policy geared towards price stability. In order to do this, we have to be able to take monetary policy decisions – even in difficult situations – without political pressure or the obligation to generate a return. 2  BIS Review 86/2005  BIS Review 86/2005  3
While there have been other un-guaranteed MBS transactions in Hong Kong, today's issue sponsored by the HKMC is the largest un-guaranteed Hong Kong dollar MBS in Hong Kong. Moreover, it is the first-ever un-guaranteed Hong Kong dollar MBS that carries a triple-A rating. I believe that the HKMC's introduction of triple-A-rated MBS through credit tranching will become a benchmark for other MBS issuers in Hong Kong. With today's MBS issue, the HKMC now accounts for about a quarter of the total securitisation transactions in Hong Kong in the past ten years and is the largest issuer of asset-backed securities in Hong Kong. For the future, the Corporation has plans to expand the scope of its business to cover non-mortgage assets and selected overseas markets – as always, in a prudent commercial manner. These new business initiatives will help to further broaden the local debt market, and strengthen Hong Kong's role as an international financial centre and funding hub in the region. We are grateful for the enthusiastic response of the banks joining the management group for this issue and find it very encouraging. We are also very pleased to learn that a diverse group of investors including retirement funds, insurance companies, banks and other institutional investors have shown a keen interest in the issue. BIS Review 116/2006  1  Let me conclude by thanking HSBC, the sole arranger and lead manager, for their highly professional work to make this issue a great success.

Peter Pang: Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation mortgage-backed securities issues Speech by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Executive Director of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited, at the signing ceremony for the $ billion mortgage-backed securities issue drawn under the $ billion Mortgage-Backed Securitisation Programme Bauhinia MBS Limited, Hong Kong, 27 November 2006. *  *  *  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, Let me first extend to all of you a very warm welcome to today's signing ceremony. Today's issue of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) under the Bauhinia Mortgage-Backed Securitisation Programme of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC) is unique in two ways. First, this is the first time the HKMC has sponsored an MBS issue as a triple-A rated institution. On 30 October, Moody's announced the upgrade of the HKMC's domestic currency rating to Aaa and the HKMC's foreign currency rating to Aa1. The HKMC has therefore made history as the first entity in Hong Kong, and so far the only one, to have a triple-A rating. The upgrade in credit ratings reflects the financial strength of the HKMC and the strong support of the Hong Kong SAR Government for the Corporation. With this strong credit rating, the HKMC is well positioned to play a more active and strategic role in promoting the development of the debt and securitisation markets in Hong Kong. Secondly, today's issue of two billion dollars marks the launch of the first-ever partially un-guaranteed MBS sponsored by the HKMC.
True, as the recovery gains momentum, and provided this translates into a sustained adjustment by inflation towards its target, the need for monetary policy to support the economy will tend to diminish. The US Federal Reserve has already begun to reduce its balance sheet at a gradual and predictable pace, and the ECB has slowed the pace of increase of its own balance sheet. This reduction in stimuli will extend the monetary policy headroom for acting effectively in the face of possible future crises. The monetary policy normalisation strategy can but be slow and will tend to be applied predictably, with close scrutiny of its impact both on economic growth and inflation and on financial stability. It is worth recalling that, in 2013, the markets rather hastily interpreted some statements by the Federal Reserve, the clarification or correction of which gave rise to a bout of turbulence, owing to the different forecasts as to the speed at which expansionary monetary policy would be abandoned or softened. That episode provided a lesson for all central banks that have applied unconventional policies, in two respects: monetary policy should be corrected very slowly, and the correction should be predictable to the markets. In sum, predictability and a clear communication strategy will be important in preventing adverse market reactions. Financial regulation and supervision The second area I would like to mention concerns the challenges in financial regulation and supervision.

Traditional banks are taking the new technologies on board, occasionally through strategic alliances with new technology firms. New companies are also being incorporated into the sector, ranging from small start-ups to large firms. The new firms must, however, win the confidence of consumers and investors,  6/7  something that traditional financial institutions have secured over a long period of time, anchored by strong regulation and financial supervision. From the standpoint of the regulators, the fintech challenge affects both prudential and consumer protection policies. From the prudential perspective, regulators must strike a balance between catalysing innovation and the efficiency that new technologies can provide, and maintaining a sound regulatory framework. The guiding principle should be to apply the same regulation for the same type of financial services. In this respect, as the presence of fintech increases, it might be useful to put greater emphasis on the regulation of services, instead of placing it on the institutions that provide these services. Turning to consumer protection policies, it is vital that investors and consumers should understand how the new services function and the attendant risks, including, for example, credit, cyber-security and privacy-protection risks. Here we should strengthen our information and financial education policies. We are mindful at the Banco de España of the need to step up our efforts in this area.