samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
[20]Padoa-Schioppa, T. “  An institutional glossary of the Eurosystem” presented at the conference on "The Constitution of the Eurosystem: the Views of the EP and the ECB", 8 March 2000, and “  Transparency in the monetary policy of the European Central Bank”, ECB Monthly Bulletin November 2002. [21]In particular, these are: the requirement to submit reports to the European Parliament, the EU Council and the Commission on an annual and quarterly basis (Article 284(3) TFEU and Article 15.1 of the Statute of the ESCB); the presentation of the annual report by the President of the ECB to the Council and the European Parliament which may hold a debate on the basis of it (Article 284(3) TFEU); and the publication of weekly financial statements (Article 15.2 of the Statute of the ESCB). Furthermore, at the request of the European Parliament, or at its own initiative, the President of the ECB and other members of the Executive Board may be heard by the competent parliamentary committees (Article 284(3) TFEU). The President of the ECB must also be invited to participate in Council meetings when the Council is discussing matters related to the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem (Article 284(2) TFEU). The President of the ECB also answers a significant number of queries by members of the European Parliament.

The international dimension I have discussed the interaction of the UK’s macroprudential regime with our domestic arrangements for microsupervision and for monetary policy. But the third set of interactions will be with our counterparts in other countries. This is especially important to the UK. London hosts what is probably the world’s most international financial centre. Crucially for us, it is not an entrepot. It is more than an important source of jobs and tax revenues. Many of the overseas firms active in the City are also active in providing services to parts of the UK’s real economy. We therefore have a double stake in their safety and soundness. If they get into distress, there are spillovers to UK financial firms through wholesale markets, but also at least a temporary reduction in the financial services available to UK firms and households. For all these reasons, the UK has a special stake in the adequacy of international standards for financial firms and markets. And, hosting many subsidiaries of major global firms, our supervisors need to play a special role in the collective consolidated supervision of internationally Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). This extends into the macroprudential arena. At a global level, we are active participants in the Financial Stability Board. And, regionally, the UK authorities will be engaged in the European Supervisory Authorities. Our Governor is first Vice Chairman of the European Systemic Risk Board (on which I and Adair Turner, Chairman of the FSA, also sit).
In that context of extended need for cooperation and coordination among regulators and supervisors, my last comment is related to the levers at hand to promote trust and reliance on foreign supervisors to prevent the development of a trend towards ring fencing and the risk of market fragmentation. Let me say first that I don’t think that promoting mutual trust and reliance among supervisors can move us to a world free of ring fencing. This is because it has its root and it is the result of the trade-off each regulator and supervisor has to face, in normal time and during crisis, between the need to preserve the stability of financial intermediaries or the financial system as a whole for which it is accountable and the need to preserve their competitiveness through their integration to the global financial system. For instance, for banks with cross-border activities, regulators and supervisors need to balance requirements for pre-positioning of capital and liquidity in their jurisdiction and the need to leave to those banks enough flexibility in the management of those resources at group level. And this without mentioning the development of idiosyncratic financial stability risk which might call for macroprudential approach and specific additional capital requirements at a country level, and might add to the complexity to maintain this delicate balance.

Denis Beau: Financial supervisory and coordination - new issues and challenges  regulatory  policy  Contribution to the panel discussion by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Salzburg Global Finance Forum, 22 June 2021. * * * Regulatory policy and Supervisory coordination has always been fraught with challenges. I remember panel discussions with market participants about this very topic at the BIS twenty years ago. No surprise for me that it is still a topic today, because there is a deeply rooted reason for it: the inevitable tension between market forces on the one hand, which push for a borderless financial system in many of its layers, despite step backwards, as we have seen since the Global financial crisis, and on the other hand the jurisdictions in which regulators and supervisors operate, are accountable and must discharge their obligations, which at best are regional for some and most often are national. This observation does not mean that we have not made progress in addressing this tension over the last decades. Nevertheless, I would differentiate between coordination issues to manage large-scale crisis and to prevent those crisis. Regarding the former, I think it is fair to say that the Covid-19 pandemic acted as a test of the resilience of our global coordination framework, which has improved with a strong G20 dimension after the GFC.
4  BIS Review 121/2008  unease has also more tangibly spread to European banks and government agencies in several countries have felt obliged to intervene. We have tried to take into account the effects of the financial crisis in our forecasts. But it is of course difficult to know to what extent we could have captured all the effects the crisis may have had so far on the real economy. Moreover, we cannot know how the financial crisis will develop in future and how long it will last. Falling house prices have affected not just the United States, but many other countries. We have not been affected by this, although there appears to be a cooling in the housing market here, too. Another shock that has occurred during this downturn is that energy and commodity prices have risen substantially. Last summer the oil price reached new top levels and inflation rose around the world. However, since then prices have fallen. Seen in a longer-term perspective, rising commodity prices are not an uncommon feature prior to a turnaround in the economic cycle. This was the case, for instance, in the 1970s. As a consequence of the rising inflation, central banks around the world have been faced with a difficult situation, where the risk of contagion effects on other prices and wages must be assessed in an uncertain economic situation with receding growth. Another common cyclical pattern that is now repeating itself is that labour productivity is low, which is significant for cost pressures.

But while we are at the bottom of the business cycle, it is appropriate that real interest rates should be well below long-term levels. Nonetheless, it is clear that, as interest rates fall, there will be less scope for further rate cuts. At present, however, I think we have not reached the bottom of the interest rate cycle. Let us turn now to the capital controls. When we begin to lift controls on capital outflows, sometime after March 2011, the exchange rate will lose the support the controls have provided. If all of the capital controls were lifted today, the exchange rate would probably fall sharply. But no such plan is in the offing. On the contrary: work will be done to create the conditions for removal of the controls without necessarily causing a marked drop in the exchange rate. The liberalisation strategy publicised in August 2009 specified three conditions for removal of the controls: 1) macroeconomic stability, including credible measures to ensure fiscal sustainability and declining inflation; 2) a sound financial system; 3) sufficient foreign exchange reserves. The financial system soundness requirement has not yet been met, but the other two are relatively well in place. But why were these conditions chosen? They were chosen because they are essential if risk premia on Icelandic financial assets are to fall to any significant degree.
Mr. Duisenberg’s opening statement at the meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank Introductory statement by the President of the European Central Bank, Dr. W. F. Duisenberg, at the press conference held in Frankfurt on 11/9/98. Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are here today to report not only on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, but also - as you are already aware - on the outcome of the meetings of the Governing Council and the General Council that took place on 1 September 1998. It was in view of the short time span between the two sets of meetings that we decided that it would be more efficient to hold only one press conference to provide you with a summary of our deliberations. It is my intention to continue this practice for the remaining meetings of this year. In this regard, the Governing Council will meet, not only as scheduled on 13 October, 3 November and 1 December 1998, but there will also be an additional meeting on Tuesday, 22 December 1998. By this time, the bulk of nearly five years of preparatory work - including the “EMI years” - will be behind us and I envisage that the Governing Council’s final meeting before the start of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will be devoted to fine-tuning its last-minute preparations. You will recall that monetary policy decisions remain a national competence until 31 December 1998.

To enhance risk management of banks, the HKMA has just issued a set of guidelines to banks, requiring them to tighten the underwriting criteria for mortgages where borrowers already have one or more properties under mortgage. 4. Under these new measures, when handling new applications for mortgage loans for residential, industrial or commercial properties from borrowers who already have one or more properties under mortgage, banks must adopt the following three requirements: First: for mortgage loans assessed based on the debt servicing ability of a mortgage applicant, the maximum debt servicing ratio (DSR) shall be lowered from the current 50% by 10 percentage points to 40%. Accordingly, the maximum stressed DSR shall also be lowered correspondingly from the current 60% by 10 percentage points to 50%. However, an applicant with just one property with outstanding mortgage loan will not be affected by this new measure if the new mortgage loan is for self-occupied purpose, or for the replacement of an existing property. Second: for mortgage loans assessed based on the net worth of a mortgage applicant, the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio shall be lowered from the current 40% by 10 percentage points to 30%. Third: for mortgage applicants whose principal income is derived from outside Hong Kong, the applicable maximum LTV ratio shall be lowered by 20 percentage points, instead of the current 10 percentage points. 5. Based on the experience in Hong Kong, borrowers with multiple outstanding mortgage loans have higher level of indebtedness and leverage.
Not only do Europe’s governments have far higher revenue as a percentage of their GDP, they also show a broader quota of social security contributions in respect of direct and indirect taxation (15% of GDP in the euro area, as against 7% in the United States), which tends to make the system more gradual. Fourthly, redistributive policies are also expressed in other ways than through government expenditure, for instance through the regulation of labour markets. On the basis of a series of indicators such as minimum wages, the legal safeguards protecting those in employment and the unemployment benefit replacement rate, the United States is at a lower level than the 20 average level for the EU. One way of measuring the magnitude of automatic stabilisers is the budget’s overall sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations in the economy, which can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of the primary budget balance (as a percentage of GDP) in relation to the output 21 gap, in other words the gap between real revenue and its potential level. If budget policy is anti-cyclical, the coefficient should be positive (in other words, it increases in a phase of expansion and decreases in a recession). An OECD study gives us a correlation of 0.48 for 22 the euro area and 0.34 for the United States. The lower overall budget responsiveness to the economic cycle in the United States can be ascribed both to lower current expenditure elasticity and to low tax responsiveness compared with most of the countries in the euro area.

And this is despite the fact that we have encountered adverse shocks in that period, not least the slowdown in emerging market economies and renewed tensions in the euro area banking sector. So what accounts for this improved resilience of the euro area economy? Certainly the recovery cannot be explained by “endogenous” or underlying growth forces, which were unusually weak in its early phase. Nor can several of the “exogenous” factors that have supported previous euro area recoveries provide an answer. First, in the past euro area growth has been closely interdependent with world trade, with external demand playing a central role in supporting the recoveries after the dotcom crash and the Lehman bankruptcy. Since mid-2014, however, world trade has weakened considerably and last 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  year grew at the slowest pace since the financial crisis. Yet the correlation with euro area output has more or less broken down. Growth has accelerated even as world trade has fallen back. Second, though fiscal policy has stopped being a headwind – as it was during the 2011–13 period – it has not been much of a tailwind to the recovery either. With governments still undertaking a necessary process of balance sheet repair, fiscal policy between 2013 and 2015 was basically neutral and provided only a mildly positive contribution to growth last year. This contrasts with both the post-Lehman and post-dotcom recoveries where the fiscal stance was more expansionary.1 Third, the contribution of the supply side to the recovery has so far been limited.
A wholesale CBDC may have several benefits  • Cross-border use of a CBDC may be explored as a more efficient alternative for remittances • Remittances using a structure of correspondent institutions are expensive and usually take time to settle. On the other hand, crypto-based alternative may be more efficient, but they are unregulated and have risks. • The cross-border use of CBDC would reap the benefits of crypto-based methods, without their risks. It certainly would require coordination between the central banks involved. On the other hand, some concerns have still not been fully addressed: a. Development and management costs of a CBDC, specially a retail CBDC that is available for a large number of people, can be substantial. Technical capacity is still not mature enough, and risks of cyberattacks are exacerbated. b. The level of anonymity that the CBDC should have is still a matter of discussion. In digital networks it can be easy to identify anonymous users due to their links to non-anonymous nodes, such as large companies. The public is already frightened by how much sensitive individual information is stored (NSA, Uber, Google, Facebook…), it is possible that a CBDC could create anonymity concerns. Page 8 of 11  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  c. Some of these concerns end up in a discussion about which is the optimum design features: anonymous or pseudo-anonymous? Interest bearing? Guaranteed convertibility of bank deposits into CBDCs?

d. Finally, there are some additional risks to take into account: Reputational risk if CBDC is not widely adopted by the public, or if privately issued currencies gain more traction; Financial exclusion of the “nontech” persons? Even though many CBDC experiences are from developed economies such as Canada and Sweden, there are also some experiments in developing economies such as China, Colombia and Uruguay. For emerging economies, where persons tend to be financially underserved, is CBDC the most efficient way to solve this problem? Other alternatives, such as fast payments solutions, can be evaluated. Page 9 of 11  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  In conclusion: a. Blockchain technology implies opportunities and concerns that should be carefully addressed: Which is the goal of technology adoption? b. This is especially important in the case of CDBC: financial inclusion, response to new forms of e-money, facilitate wholesale payments, faster payments, cross-border payments? c. CDBC does not necessarily need blockchain. Our understanding is that DLT or Blockchain technologies are more useful when several participants of a given system need to have access to a ledger of information and/or when participants do not necessarily trust each other (and therefore proof of work requirements make the register almost immutable). However, when a Central Bank issues its currency -- either in physical or digital format -- trust should be a given. Also is far from obvious that all market participants should have access to sensitive information such as all transactions in which the CBDC was used.
It also leads naturally to a discussion of why those gaps have emerged between the best and the rest of UK companies and what might be done to close them. Can ways be found to accelerate the rate of technological diffusion to the long tail? I will argue an improved diffusion infrastructure, using as a base existing institutions and the UK’s innovation strengths, could help to close those productivity gaps. The “Hub-No-Spokes” Model My diagnosis of the UK’s productivity problem starts with three simple stylised facts about productivity gaps. The first two gaps are well-known, the third much less so. Fact one is that UK productivity has flat-lined for a decade. This means UK productivity is running almost 20% below its level had it continued along its precrisis trend (Chart 3). This is a big productivity gap, even if you believed the pre-crisis productivity trend may 6  have been somewhat over-inflated. It is a gap it is unclear will ever be closed. Fact two is that there is a second gap – perhaps as much as a third – between levels of productivity in the UK and in our main competitors, the US, Germany and France (Chart 4). This is an even-larger gap, even if you believed productivity was differently (mis-)measured across countries. It is the source of the oft-quoted quip that the average French worker achieves by Thursday lunchtime what the average British worker achieves only by close of business on a Friday.

20  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  openness is that it can serve as a vehicle for the transmission and diffusion of new technologies across borders. 26  Globalisation would tend to accelerate catch-up between countries operating at the technological  frontier and those operating inside. 27  The evidence appears to support the first leg of this hypothesis: increased openness, across its various dimensions, does appear to be associated with higher levels of productivity as innovation diffuses. To illustrate, Charts 8-11 show some indices of external openness (for goods and services, capital, people and a summary of all three) plotted against levels of productivity in a selection of 32 countries. 28  The relationship between them is positively sloped and statistically significant: countries with greater external openness - whether trade, capital or people – tend to have higher levels of productivity. It would be brave to claim causality. But it is consistent with openness of factor flows being an important cross-border conduit for ideas and innovation, as indeed other studies have found. 29  Adding weight to that, what is true across countries appears also to be true within countries. Charts 12 and 13 plot the productivity distribution of UK companies sliced in two different ways. Chart 12 distinguishes companies according to whether or not they export. Exported-oriented companies have average levels of productivity one-third higher than their non-exporting counterparts. Chart 13 looks at a different dimension of external openness, namely whether a company is foreign-owned.
This could lead to higher risk premia and structurally higher levels of precautionary saving by households. Understanding and monitoring these channels is an important task for central banks going forward. This is why assessing climate change is not a dilettante matter for central banks. With regard to the increasing importance of intangible capital, the new results I reported earlier have shown that this has important implications, not only for how we measure capital, but also for the prospects for potential output and productivity. The inclusion of intangibles would lead to an upward revision to the level of GDP (this happened in 2010 with the inclusion of R&D). The impact on GDP growth going forwards is more ambiguous, and would vary by time period – it will depend on the relative growth of intangible investment. Changing the measurement of intangibles would in principle affect both the measurement of output and potential output. So, it is not the case that the output gap, and hence the stance of monetary policy, would differ. Similarly, what matters for the trend real rate, R*, is how intangibles affect productivity growth in the long run, which is less about data revisions and more about the long-run impact of intangibles. Page 17  We have just scratched the surface though: indeed, the findings of our recent research have left us with as many new questions as answers. Are there more factors, beyond intangibles, responsible for the puzzlingly low level of investment?

Payment systems  In 2015, the Bank of Albania undertook a series of measures to improve the regulatory framework and oversight procedures for the payment systems. The approval of the Regulation “On licensing, regulation, and oversight of payment systems and clearing houses” is one of the main steps that will promote private initiatives for the clearing and settlement of payments. In October 2015, the National Committee of Payment Systems met for the first time. The Committee will serve as a forum for discussing issues related to payment systems and instruments, to support the decision-making process by the relevant institutions. Another development in the area of payments is related to the methodology “On the reporting of electronic money instruments by electronic money institutions”, which preceded the licencing of two electronic money institutions in 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  ii. Currency issue  In the framework of its unique function as the issuer of the national currency, the Bank of Albania continued to fulfil the needs of the economy for banknotes and coins, in accordance with contemporary standards for their quality and security features. Compared to 2014, the structure of the currency in circulation has changed. Thus, the number of higher denominations, ALL 2000 and ALL 5000 increased. Also the use of coins increased, as their value rose by 8.2%. iii. Foreign-exchange reserve management  The reserve management continued to be conducted in accordance with the regulatory framework in force. The primary objective of the reserve management is the principle of liquidity and security.