samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This supports the interpretation of the first price peak as a property price bubble. The value of office property increased in 2005, from a historically low level. In relation to historical levels, the rise in the value of commercial property seems to be moderate, compared with the rise in capacity utilisation. One possible reason for this may be that employment growth was for a long period relatively low in this upturn compared with the upturns in the 1980s and 1990s. This has now changed. In addition, signals from market participants indicate that the rise in value for 2005 as a whole will be sharper than the chart estimate, which was calculated as of July 2005. Developments in real house prices also tracked developments in capacity utilisation from 1985 to 1998. In the period since then, however, house prices have increased further at a steady pace, even when business cycles have fluctuated. This sharp rise, combined with similarly strong growth in household debt, may be viewed to some extent as a delayed adaptation to the deregulation of the housing and credit markets in the 1980s, after many households burned their fingers immediately after deregulation. In recent years, household income growth has been solid, household confidence regarding the future has been strong and households probably perceive higher income levels as permanent. This may have resulted in a further rise in house prices and debt. In addition, low real interest rates are currently making a contribution. Sales in the commercial property market reached a very high level in 2005.

In the next 10 years, gas production could rise to at least the same level as oil production, measured by energy content. High oil prices have led to a strong increase in activity on the Norwegian continental shelf. Many projects have been launched to increase recovery from fields in operation. A number of companies have revised up the long-term oil prices that are used as a basis for investment decisions, but they are still moderate compared with futures prices. Further out in the projection period, developments in petroleum-related investment become highly uncertain. It is assumed that overall activity will decline somewhat when the Snøhvit and Ormen Lange projects are completed, but high oil prices are expected to contribute to maintaining investment at a relatively high level throughout the projection period. The Government Pension Fund – Global, previously called the Government Petroleum Fund, will increase substantially in the years ahead. The fiscal rule entails a gradual phasing-in of petroleum revenues into the economy, approximately in pace with the expected real return on the Fund, which is estimated at 4 per cent. On the basis of our assumption in the March Inflation Report for developments in oil prices (oil futures prices), the fiscal rule allows for an increase in petroleum revenue spending of more than NOK 30 billion from 2006 to 2009. If the Norwegian economy continues to exhibit solid growth, it will nevertheless be in line with the fiscal guidelines specifying that petroleum revenue spending is lower than the expected real return for a few years.
Consequently, our optimism can only be conditional upon the continuation of the reforms. Finally, we must be patiently optimistic not only with the reforms, which need to be accelerated as much as possible, but also with their results. 2011 will continue to be another year of adjustment and it will even be one of the hardest years for the banking system. It is said that some marathon runners hit a “wall” in the final miles of the race. Even though they have completed most of the race, the finishing line seems far off to them and they need great mental fortitude not to give up. We, too, should ensure that the adjustment process and reform of the Spanish economy does not hit any “walls”. During the recession to date there has been a highly substantial correction in the real economy and in the banking sector, but now we need patience and perseverance to successfully conclude this process. Thank you very much  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

It is our sincere hope that this global forum will be rewarding and may the collective wisdom derived from the deliberations lead to more collective actions that will be to our increased mutual benefits. Let me once again express our appreciation to Yang Amat Berhormat Dato' Seri Abdullah Badawi for his presence here this afternoon and for accepting to deliver the keynote address at our Forum today. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 30/2007
As much of these efforts will involve interface with other parts of the public sector, it has been my experience that the participation of the Central Bank in many of these agendas will require careful boundary management and a signing off when it is completed so that it does not remain permanently with the Central Bank. Of great importance in this process is also to carefully safeguard the independence of the Central Bank. In conclusion, let me express my deep gratitude and appreciation to my fellow governors for all the cooperation and support that has been extended to me and to Bank Negara Malaysia. For the friendship and for the collaboration, it has truly been enriching for me. And to the BIS, thank you for this privilege to be part of the Central Bank community. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Buffers to withstand shocks are strong – be it central banks’ reserves or banks’ capital adequacy. Second, ASEAN policymakers have demonstrated that they are able and willing to adjust policies to deal with external and internal stresses. They have raised interest rates pre-emptively. They have allowed their exchange rates to depreciate in an orderly manner, intervening in the FX markets only to moderate excessive movements. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  And they have room to use fiscal policy to support growth, as debt positions are generally healthy. Take Indonesia for example. The currency has come under some pressure but the macroeconomic fundamentals are essentially sound. The economy is growing at a respectable 5%. Inflation is under control, at about 3.5% – an achievement compared to the past. The fiscal deficit has come down and is now about 2% of GDP – not an alarming number. Total debt-to-GDP ratio is 30% – a respectable number by any international comparison. The current account deficit has slipped somewhat but, at 3% of GDP, is not unduly large. And it is not unusual for a developing country to run a current account deficit to finance investment for future growth. And Indonesia’s policy responses to-date have demonstrated a willingness to take tough measures to build up resilience The central bank has hiked interest rates. The government has been re-evaluating import-intensive infrastructure spending. Markets can sometimes over-react and investors sell down EME assets in a general knee-jerk risk-off mood.
7/9  Steps towards a more integrated financial system at European level have already been taken since the crisis, with the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union projects. These projects need to be further developed and implemented. The Banking Union, which was set up to put an end to the link between sovereign risk and banking risk, is now operational. What remains to be done in order to finalise it includes completing the resolution pillar by implementing a backstop and adopting a common framework to enhance the provision of liquidity and putting in place a European deposit insurance scheme. Finalising the Banking Union is of prime importance for the development of pan-European banks, and will make it possible to achieve a better balance of risks, economies of scale, a better allocation of savings towards productive investments and increased competitiveness of European banks at the international level. The other major initiative at the European level to strengthen financial integration is the Capital Markets Union project which aims to boost investment in the EU. Speeding up this Union will not only foster growth but will also enhance risk-sharing across European countries and mitigate the procyclicality of bank financing. We, at the Banque of France, support in particular three initiatives which should have a decisive impact on cross-border investment: First, the harmonisation of the insolvency procedures framework and its implementation by companies to promote investment in equity across Europe.

We have to find a middle way in regulation. Market participants should also be given adequate information to protect themselves from any problems related to new products, markets, or institutions and how to mitigate risks. This is a task for policy makers and regulators. More importantly, in finding a middle path, regulators also have to trust markets and institutions, but ensure that the innovations do not result in undue stress to the financial system. A more practical way to regulate financial conglomerates is the closer coordination among regulatory authorities. Another area that is difficult to be brought under regulation is the derivative trading by financial institutions. Fortunately, this trade has not expanded yet in Sri Lanka, but we may have to be mindful of their emergence, sometime in the future. The essence of financial regulations, therefore, is to encourage financial intermediaries to identify and manage risks without causing instability in their own institutions which can have riffle effects on the entire financial system which is heavily dependant on public confidence. A systemically important financial intermediary can cause serious threats to the wider financial system. Financial regulator helps to build that public confidence through regulation and supervision. That’s why regulators try to promote financial intermediaries to hedge against possible risks and prevent over exposure. In keeping with the world trends, the Central Bank as well as the other regulatory authorities will try to be proactive and avoid over-regulation, but at the same time take necessary steps to ensure system-wide stability. Let me sum up.
Gilt yields fell sharply following the announcement of the asset purchase programme and our initial purchases of gilts. Yields have subsequently drifted back up, but this reflects a range of other factors and it is likely that yields are lower than they would otherwise have  4  BIS Review 86/2009  been. Borrowing costs within the commercial paper market appear to have fallen as a result of our operations. And in the corporate bond market, spreads have narrowed sharply in recent months and issuance levels have been at record highs. However, this has coincided with a global rally in corporate bond markets and so it is difficult to isolate the incremental impact of our purchases. Despite these encouraging signs, there have been some questions raised about the design and effectiveness of our operations, and I thought I would take this opportunity to address three particular criticisms that have been levelled against the asset purchase programme. The first is that the asset purchases have been too heavily skewed towards gilts and that we should have purchased a greater proportion of private sector debt. The aim of our purchases of corporate debt is to improve the functioning of corporate credit markets. This is in line with the remit specified by the Chancellor when establishing the Asset Purchase Facility. It is important not to judge the economic significance of these purchases by their scale. Even relatively small purchases of debt, if appropriately targeted, can improve liquidity and lower the cost of finance to businesses.

Despite those unprecedented falls in activity, there are some signs that the British economy is beginning to stabilise, and financial markets have improved markedly. There are three solid reasons for thinking that a recovery in activity was likely to occur at some point this year. The first I call the “Honda effect” – many firms, as Honda did last year at its plant in Swindon, cut back production and met demand from stock, resuming production this year once inventories had been reduced. The second factor is the level of sterling which, despite its recent rally, is still some 20% lower than in the summer of 2007. That will encourage a switch in spending, at home and abroad, towards goods and services produced in the UK. Finally, and perhaps most important, is the enormous policy stimulus that has been injected into the economy. Bank Rate was cut by four percentage points in four months. But the Monetary Policy Committee judged that even that was insufficient to prevent inflation falling below our 2% target, and so it embarked on a programme of asset purchases designed to increase the money supply and improve conditions in non-bank corporate credit markets. The programme will shortly be extended to working capital finance, which should be of particular help to smaller companies. But the Bank must not become the arbiter of the allocation of public credit to individual companies or sectors – such decisions are rightly and necessarily the province of government.
The policy rates of many of Norway's main trading partners are now at their highest levels since the 2008 financial crisis. Chart 6: Policy rates have been raised more abroad than in Norway Since last spring, foreign interest rates have risen more than Norwegian interest rates. Combined with the turmoil in financial markets, this has likely contributed to the krone depreciation. Norges Bank is mandated by the Ministry of Finance to carry out the foreign exchange transactions necessary under the petroleum fund mechanism. In the current period, Norges Bank's krone sales reflect the sizeable foreign currency revenues earned by oil and gas companies owing to high gas prices. The companies have converted large amounts of foreign currency into NOK for tax payment purposes. Norges Bank, on behalf of the government, will convert the portion of government petroleum revenues in NOK that is not spent via the central government budget back into foreign currency, which is then deposited in the Government Pension Fund Global. The transactions are planned and smoothed over the year and are announced ahead of each month. These currency conversions are not an element of monetary policy. Chart 7: The krone has depreciated Norway has a floating exchange rate. This means that the policy rate can be set at the level appropriate for the outlook for the Norwegian economy, and we have room to practice flexible inflation targeting, which also enables monetary policy to give weight to the aim of maintaining high employment.

Along with the ongoing monetary policy normalization in the US economy, the new US fiscal package and its impacts on the economy also absorbs attention. In the EU, as already clearly announced, the accommodative monetary policy, although with lower amount of assets purchase, is expected to apply by September this year or beyond and interest rate changes to take place later. However, the positive global outlook has still been surrounded by various risks, including the still pending outcome of Brexit negotiations, geo-political risks and the possible protectionism measures by the US administration. However, besides the sound and wide spread recovery, an important feature of the global environment is the generally subdued inflation, not always in line with the model-based forecasts and standard empirical findings. In this view, the flattening of the Phillips curve based on current economic data, points to possible altering of the standard relation between the economic cycle and inflation, raising discussion on one of the basic empirical findings in the macroeconomics in the academic and central banking community. The subdued inflation nowadays is mainly due to global factors that are not exclusively related to the commodity prices fluctuations, but also to the impacts of the globalization of production and digitalization of trade worldwide, both having impact on competition and prices in each economy. In such surrounding of prolonged lower inflation, the re-assessment of the time lag in affecting the inflation as well as the inflation measurement, the outlook of inflation expectations and their possible de-anchoring are to be considered.
Both the Riksbank and the market have often made substantial overestimates of the repo rate in their forecasts (see Figure 5). 12 Although the market's forecasts were better than the Riksbank's during the period 2011–2013, the pattern is essentially the same – substantial overestimates and inaccurate forecasts. A brief remark is in order here. Sometimes one gets the impression from the debate that it is only the Riksbank that has produced inaccurate repo rate forecasts, while most analysts, including the market, have been quite successful. Apparently, this is not the case. One may perhaps object that the market may not produce forecasts of its own, but merely assumes that the Riksbank will follow its reporate path. But the experiences of the period 2011–2013 indicate that this is not really the case. I think this is a useful picture to bear in mind. If one wants to implement a makeup strategy in a situation where the repo rate is at the lower bound, it is probably necessary to use a more convincing approach than Delphic forward guidance. The alternative to Delphic forward guidance is called Odyssean forward guidance. This name is also taken from Greek mythology and refers to Odysseus, who had his men tie him to the mast so he would not be tempted by the song of the Sirens and steer his ship towards the cliffs.

It may not be so much a question of purely economic aspects, but rather what is feasible according to social conventions and possible to create understanding for. During the period we have had a negative repo rate, individuals have not faced negative interest rates and thus not needed to pay for having money in the bank. 6 I assume here that –0.5 per cent, that is, the lowest level to which the Riksbank has ever cut the repo rate, is a  lower bound for how much the rate can be cut. This assumption can of course be discussed, and I shall return to this shortly. 4 [24]  But if the repo rate becomes sufficiently negative, this may happen. On a theoretical level, one can argue that the policy would then be more powerful and have a greater effect on the economy – that the so-called monetary policy transmission mechanism would function better. But this also risks leading to various types of problem. As I see it, the biggest problem is not the economic arguments usually raised, such as the general public wanting to empty their bank accounts and hold cash instead. Holding savings in cash is, when it comes down to it, troublesome and costly and given that most people in Sweden are getting used to living without cash it would not be a natural thing to do. The threshold would probably be relatively high here. The main problem, as I see it, is another one.
I’ll also go into some detail about the outlook for inflation. Finally, I’ll discuss what this means for monetary policy and the road ahead. Before I continue, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System. Economic Outlook I’ll start by saying that the headline of our economic story is good news: the recovery continues to show solid momentum. But the subheading is that we’ll need to be patient. Even with the strong pace of growth we experienced much of this year, a full recovery from the pandemic will take time to complete. The adjustment to rapidly changing circumstances, along with a resurgence in COVID-19 cases, is affecting consumer spending and jobs, sustaining supply bottlenecks in sectors such as autos, and delaying a full reopening of the service sector. So, to continue with the news analogy, here’s the lede: I expect gross domestic product, or GDP, to increase around 5 ½ to 6 percent this year. My current forecast accounts for strong growth in the first half of 2021, but also balances some slowing of growth in the remainder of the year relative to the first half. Now I’ll turn to employment, something I know many of you as business leaders watch closely. Job gains by and large have been strong in recent months.

John C Williams: Business more like usual Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Club of New York, 27 September 2021. * * * As prepared for delivery Thank you for that kind introduction. It’s a great honor for me to be addressing members of the Economic Club of New York today, the first time I’m doing so since becoming the Club’s Chair. Today’s event was scheduled to take place in person, and we were really looking forward to the opportunity to come together. But predicting the future is nearly impossible, and here we are meeting virtually. I say it’s “nearly” impossible to predict the future because I plan to share my outlook for the U.S. economy with you all over the next few minutes! We’re not the only ones that expected business to be “more like usual” at this point in time. But the direct and indirect effects of the virus continue to shape the way we live our lives, do our work, and come together with others. On top of that, signs of the Delta variant’s impact are showing up in the incoming data, contributing to more uncertainty about the future. Business, in fact, is unusual in many ways, and continues to reflect the extraordinary nature of the pandemic. In my remarks today I’ll share more about how these effects relate to the economic outlook for the nation and right here in New York.