samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(An effect of this sort was clearly at work in the last Inflation Report forecast: weaker equity prices led the Committee to revise down its forecast of domestic investment, partly offsetting the effect of a shallower yield curve on the projection for GDP growth.) But the impact of such swings seems to be larger on market yields than on actual forecasts of interest rates. The red line in Chart 6 plots the gap, in months, between the date of the first UK rate rise implied by the sterling yield curve and that expected by professional forecasters. When the line goes up, markets are pushing out this “lift-off” date further than analysts. And you can see this tends to happen when risky assets do poorly (the blue line is an estimate of the risk premium). Conversely, the gap narrows when risk appetite improves. This pattern suggests that market interest rates might be influenced by more than the expected path of interest rates 6. To be clear, the MPC produces its forecasts on the yield curve as it is, not what it believes the market’s true expectation of future interest rates to be. So the fact that the two might differ does not, in and of itself, invalidate the sort of inferences we’ve been talking about. But it should, at the least, make one a little careful about describing the yield curve as “the market’s expectation of future interest rates”.

In spite of the fact that there has long been a significant surplus of liquidity in the Czech money market, this lack of confidence caused a deterioration of the proper functioning of the market. The Czech National Bank launched the liquidity-supplying facility in October 2008. Czech government bonds were made eligible as collateral in these operations. This technical measure was aimed at limiting the potential spreading of problems from foreign financial markets to the Czech financial sector. The situation calmed down at the end of 2008. Overall, the financial crisis itself has had only a limited primary impact on the Czech financial market due to its low exposure to toxic assets and focus on domestic business in local currency. Nevertheless, the country was affected by an increase in risk aversion to the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, due mainly to the problems of some countries which needed financing from abroad. The Czech Republic is among the countries that provide loans to some of them or participate in lending schemes organised by international institutions. The financial crisis has led to a significant decrease in global economic activity. As the Czech economy is very open and export-oriented, the loss of demand from major trading partners was reflected in weaker domestic economic activity and therefore banks became more cautious in providing credit to the business sector and subsequently to households. Weak foreign demand is thus probably the most severe factor stemming from the global financial crisis that is affecting the Czech economy.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  But there are exceptions, and the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate – a measure that was directly linked to the foreign exchange market – is one such exception. An announcement, or even the slightest hint of an imminent decision to dispense with the minimum exchange rate, would have triggered massive speculation against the SNB. We would then have been forced to, as it was, subsidise this speculation via foreign currency purchases. Incidentally, these same arguments also explain why a gradual exit from the minimum exchange rate or a “gentle” transition to a policy involving some other form of explicit exchange rate linkage (e.g. pegging the Swiss franc to a basket of currencies) was impractical. Such a policy would likewise have opened the floodgates to speculators. There was thus no reasonable alternative to exiting the minimum exchange rate suddenly and completely. We discussed when would be the best time to communicate the decision. Our choice of the morning of 15 January was designed to allow market participants to start from a level playing field when adapting to this undoubtedly challenging new situation. By discontinuing the minimum exchange rate on a weekday when market participation was high, we minimised the risk of some banks and their customers being put at a disadvantage, or of individual participants gaining an advantage.

A structural dynamic factor approach applied to Swiss data”, SNB Working Papers No. 9, 2013, or Drechsel, D. et al. (2015): “How are firms affected by exchange rate shocks? Evidence from survey based impulse responses”, KOF Working Papers No. 371, January 2015. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We have revised our forecast downwards for the current year, from –0.1% to –1.1%. Inflation is expected to reach its low point in the third quarter of 2015, at –1.2%. We anticipate inflation of –0.5% for 2016. As you can see from chart 7, inflation will move back into positive territory only at the start of 2017. These forecasts assume that the three-month Libor remains at –0.75% over the entire forecast horizon, and that the Swiss franc weakens. Our forecasts show that the period of negative inflation is temporary. The SNB’s monetary policy strategy provides for positive inflation rates of below 2% in the medium term. So as long as the inflation rate returns to this range in the medium term, price stability will not be threatened. The important thing is that medium-term inflation expectations remain within a range that is compatible with price stability. While these inflation expectations have declined substantially, they are still in positive territory. This is confirmed in regular surveys by thirdparty providers, as well as in conversations between the SNB’s delegates for regional economic relations and company representatives from all sectors of the economy.
Therefore, professional status is an implied social contract to provide a service over and above normal duties. In this regard, a professional is viewed as one who carries additional moral responsibility and is honest, objective, impartial and with high integrity. Mr Chairman, the importance of a professional civil service in Zambia cannot be overemphasised. If we are to succeed economically as well as socially, we need to demonstrate appropriate levels of professionalism. A professional is open to views of others and are objective and their decisions are made in the best interest of the country. As professional in Zambia we need to evaluate our performance and aim to constantly improve. We need to see ourselves as part of the solution rather than the problem. Further, it is important to realise that civil service is a key component of Government as it supports the formulation and implementation of government policies and service delivery to the public. A professional civil service also ensures that government objectives and goals are achieved in an effective and efficient manner thus assuring confidence to the public. In order to carry out their duties, professionals need to be guided by a code of conduct which stipulates the core values and responsibilities of the profession. The code of conduct is usually developed by the profession to guide and to prevent exploitative behaviour and to preserve the integrity of the profession. The code sets a framework for meeting standards and provides disciplinary guidelines for unprofessional behaviour.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our country needs professionals with high levels of social and moral awareness so that all of us are aware of the moral obligations and potential impact of our thinking, decisions and actions. We need to be good role models for others in behaviour, attitude and relationships. Let us endeavour to act in a way that is professional and that retains the confidence of the public at all times. I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 159/2009
[7] Changes in the structure of the financial sector – both secular trends and the consequences of regulatory changes introduced following the crisis – have shifted activity away from banks to nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) (what we used to call ‘shadow banks’). The NBFI sector has become a more important part of the financial sector and, as a result, a more important channel of monetary policy transmission. For monetary policy makers, understanding transmission via the asset markets where NBFIs operate has therefore become more important. How money flows within the financial sector – among banks, among NBFIs, and between banks and NBFIs – influence asset prices are becoming more central relative to the more traditional analysis of how financial flows between banks, on the one hand, and households and firms, on the other, influence spending and pricing decisions in the real economy. This has important implications not just for the character of the analysis but also the definition of the relevant measures of money upon which focus is required. While this shift has been evident for some time, the so-called ‘dash-for-cash’ episode at outset of the Covid-19 pandemic brought home the potential magnitude of these effects. As the label itself  Page 5  suggests, the conventional explanation of this event suggests a lack of safe and liquid monetary assets fed market dislocation. This is an episode to which I will return later in the talk.

This convergence was also evident in the academic literature, as reflected in the similarity of approaches adopted by Goodfriend and King (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), despite the former coming from a classical / monetarist starting point and the latter from a New Keynesian perspective. 11. See Busetto, et al. (2022), which builds on Haldane et al. (2016) and Bailey, et al. (2020). 12. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 13. See Hatzius, et al. (2010) for a discussion. 14. See Giese et al. (2021) and Czech, et al. (2021) for examples of this form of analysis. 15. See Joyce, et al. (2011) for the starting point of this analysis in the UK. 16. The ‘toy model’ outlined in the Annex is a highly stylised version of parts of the much richer empirical model presented in Cloyne, et al. (2015), which has been used to undertake analysis at the Bank of England. 17. See Bank of England Monetary Policy Report, August 2021, Box A.
John C Williams: Banking culture - the path ahead Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the conference "Building Cultural Capital in the Financial Services Industry: Emerging Practices, Risks and Opportunities", Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 4 June 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery Good morning, everyone. I’d like to begin by welcoming you to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and to the fifth conference on culture in financial services that we’ve hosted. Before I launch into my remarks, it’s time I remind everyone that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System. When I took on the role as President of the New York Fed last year it so happened that my first day coincided with this conference. In my remarks that day, I emphasized that culture is a longterm project, a constantly evolving one, which is never done. The trouble with long-term projects with no distinct finish line is that they can lack a sense of urgency. The pressure to make real progress is often missing, especially when there are so many other priorities competing for our time. Headlines in the financial news illustrate the lack of progress. In the year since our last conference, stories of money laundering and fraud have been an all-too-frequent feature.

Mr. Erçel speaks on lessons for Turkish policy-makers from the East Asian crisis Address by the Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Gazi Erçel, at the Euromoney Conference: Investing In The Future, in Istanbul, on 3/6/98. It is a pleasure to address you at this new Euromoney Conference being held in Turkey. I wish to thank Euromoney and its staff for arranging this conference, which has helped us reach a better understanding of the Turkish economy and the macroeconomic policies pursued by the authorities. I would like to speak today about “Lessons from the East Asian crisis for Turkish policy-makers”. The financial crisis in the East Asian countries has had strong effects on the economies of the world, on industrial and emerging market countries alike. Some of these effects have made themselves felt very quickly, while others will not run their course for another two or three years. I may say that these effects are strong but not dangerous. One area of particular concern is capital flows to emerging market economies, which may increase spreads and bring about a capital market retrenchment. According to a study conducted by the Institute of International Finance, net private capital flows to major emerging market economies have slowed only slightly below their 1997 level of $ billion, but are well below their 1996 level of $ billion.
Accordingly, on the ECB Governing Council we have reiterated that we will closely monitor the exchange rate. 8  In short, the fragility of the recovery in the euro area, a medium-term inflation forecast far below our objective and a nominal effective exchange rate that has in recent months countered much of our stimulus all lead to the conclusion that there is no room for complacency. We should retain a significant monetary stimulus until we have a sound recovery in place. Moreover, we stand ready to recalibrate the foregoing measures, or to introduce new ones were it necessary, to fulfil our price stability mandate, understandably always in a symmetrical manner. It is also crucial to retain flexibility in the application of our asset purchase programmes to head off potential financial fragmentation problems. The other national and European economic authorities must appreciate that, given the uncertainty over the future course of the pandemic and, therefore, over the soundness of the economic recovery, it is essential they maintain their stimulus measures, now in a more selective and targeted fashion. An early withdrawal of these measures would harm the euro area productive system and, potentially, our financial system. The extent of such harm would exceed the potential medium-term costs of retaining the measures over time. And depending on how the pandemic and its economic impact evolve, it cannot be ruled out that such measures may need to be expanded.

This is particularly true for European policy, in the context, for example, of the recently approved European recovery fund (Next Generation EU).14 The spending and investment arising from the use of this fund for projects capable of transforming our economies and for financing reforms to raise their sustainable growth capacity, will be fundamental to consolidate the economic recovery and reduce the potentially permanent consequences of the crisis. More in the medium term, it is crucial that this fund be converted into a permanent, common fiscal stabilisation instrument for the euro area. This would allow a joint fiscal response to macroeconomic shocks and provide a larger 12  See Box 2 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy", Economic Bulletin, 3/2020, Banco de España, for a description of this announcement, and an assessment of its effects on the financial markets. 13 In this respect, see P. Hernández de Cos (2019); “the European economic policy response to a scenario of lower growth and inflation", the Governor’s closing address for the La Granda courses. 14 For an analysis of the impact on the financial markets of the various milestones linked to the EU recovery fund, see Box 5 of the "Quarterly report on the Spanish economy", Economic Bulletin, 3/2020, Banco de España. See also Arce et al. (2020) and Box 3.4 of the 2019 Annual Report of the Banco de España for a discussion of the role of fiscal policy coordinated at European and international level in the current context.
We have gone through a long period where inflation has been low and central banks around the world have struggled to bring inflation back up to their respective target levels. One might therefore think that the question of monetary policy’s distributional effects has become topical because inflation has been higher than expected, which has benefitted some groups at the cost of others. But this is not actually the main reason; instead it is the efforts the central banks have made to increase activity in the economy and to bring up inflation. Low interest rates have contributed to a rapid rise in prices of shares and other assets, both financial assets and real assets. This effect in itself should be inconspicuous. Asset prices normally rise when interest rates fall, which occurs in periods when monetary policy stimulates the economy. However, recent years have been special in many ways. Apart from policy rates being low for an unusually long time, the Riksbank and other central banks have also used other methods to further push down the general interest rate level, for instance purchases of government bonds. The monetary policy measures have affected asset prices in a more direct and visible manner than the conventional policy of interest-rate cuts. This has contributed to more discussion of the distributional effects of monetary policy.

Waldenström, Daniel (2016), The National Wealth of Sweden, 1810–2014, Scandinavian Economic History Review 64(1), pp. 36–54,  14 [14]
In fact, since 2000 real GDP growth in NMS was on average more than double that registered in the euro area member countries. These considerations acquire greater significance when viewed in the context of fiscal developments. On the basis of 2005 data, among the NMS participating in ERM II only Malta failed to satisfy the relevant criterion, with a fiscal deficit to GDP ratio of 3.3%. Malta, however, expects to be within the reference value by the end of this year. This represents a considerable fiscal consolidation effort, especially when viewed in the context of an average ratio of 6.7% during the first five years of this decade. This progress is expected to prove durable, as it has been based not only on tax measures, but also on the restructuring of public sector entities, spending cuts and efficiency improvements. Challenges to fiscal sustainability in NMS remain, nevertheless, mainly arising out of the future dynamics of the welfare system combined with population ageing, but these are hardly different from those being faced by euro area members. It is furthermore interesting to note that on average the NMS participating in ERM II recorded lower deficit to GDP ratios compared to the present euro area member countries in 2005, among whom five posted deficits in excess of 3%. The positive fiscal performance of these NMS is further underscored, with some individual exceptions, by their lower levels of public debt, which as a percentage of GDP average around one half of those of the current euro area member countries.

It is, therefore, important that in the examination that follows a country’s request for a convergence report due consideration be given to the policy consistency and credibility of the applicant country. A comprehensive economic analysis that is not only quantitative but also qualitative, and which recognizes the difficultly of simultaneously satisfying all the Maastricht criteria in the current world environment would encourage EMU candidate countries to persist in their efforts to achieve even closer nominal and real convergence. It would also provide further evidence that the euro project is credible, that it is both feasible and realizable in a near-term perspective. Let me conclude by thanking you again for being here to contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges ahead. I also wish you a pleasant stay in our country. BIS Review 53/2006  5
In that regard, it is worth noting that, even as the  14  The weighted average coupon rate is closer to 4 percent. However, to get to the reported income stream on these assets, we have to adjust for the amortization of any premium that we paid at our operations. I am referring to this adjusted measure as the average coupon yield. 15  Factors other than currency held also affect the amount of reserves in the financial system, as reported in the Federal Reserve’s H.4.1 Statistical Release. 16  Indeed, the SOMA portfolio has already produced a large flow of income for the Federal Reserve for these same reasons. Over 2009 and 2010, the SOMA portfolio produced $ billion and $ billion of interest income, respectively, while the interest expense on reserve balances was $ billion and $ billion, respectively, in those years. Over the preceding 10 years, the average SOMA income was about $ billion. The excess income in recent years has already been remitted to the Treasury. 17  In the most extreme case, the Federal Reserve would have to cease remittances to the Treasury for a time. Of course, one might also want to take into consideration the additional tax revenue to the government that could be generated by the more robust economic recovery supported by the asset purchase programs. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Federal Reserve has been expanding its balance sheet, it has not lost any momentum in the preparation of its exit tools.

Small wonder that I delighted when President Clinton asked me to become deputy U.S. trade representative and help implement NAFTA – even if it meant matching wits with formidable negotiators like Luis de la Calle and Herminio Blanco! Small wonder that as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, I have delighted in working closely with Guillermo Ortiz and Agustín Carstens. Small wonder that at meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee or in U.S. banking circles, I have often argued Mexico’s case. Or taken sheer pleasure in pointing out to U.S. congressmen and senators, and in speeches and media interviews, that the Mexican government – unlike my own government – actually can agree on a budget, keep deficits under control, bring about structural change and resist interfering with the workings of an independent central bank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I am full of pride for Mexico. I am full of pride that this country, the country of my happiest childhood years, would now choose to honor me with the Order of the Aztec Eagle. The citation for this honor speaks of my being a fierce defender of price stability. In the parlance of central banking, I am referred to as a “hawk.” Well, it may not surprise you to learn that taxonomists place the eagle and the hawk in the same bird family.