samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Recently, a raft of measures has been approved to help the business sector and the selfemployed, which may prove a useful tool precisely for reducing this risk. In this connection, its swift and consistent implementation is crucial. And the distribution mechanisms must selectively target the assistance on firms that are viable but have solvency problems. Flexibility is also needed in the volume and use of committed funds, so as to adapt to the course the pandemic takes and to the potential materialisation of risks. 5  In parallel, we must promptly identify the structural transformations caused by the pandemic. There may be firms that have ceased to be viable and it would be counterproductive for them to be sustained indefinitely by budgetary policy. For these firms, it would be desirable to make insolvency procedures more flexible. The proper functioning of the flexibility mechanisms available to firms must also be ensured. Their role is crucial for allowing potential structural adjustments derived from the crisis. And, of course, there should be an emphasis on active employment and training policies to smooth the reallocation of workers to sectors with a future. All these actions would help, jointly and complementarily, to prevent the crisis from taking on an additional financial component. The banking sector could thus continue to be part of the solution to the crisis by granting credit to households and firms, and contributing to the recovery of the economy.

This intensification of concerns has raised the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  threat of contagion from these countries, and the consequent financial market developments that have affected several other European countries have added to the risk of a spill-over to the largest European banking systems, including our own. So far, the threat has been limited. An important reason for this is that banks have done the right things over the last two years, namely to focus on their resilience by refinancing debt at longer maturities and raising their buffers of capital. It is hard work in an environment that is still affected by the crisis, but there is no doubting that it is the right thing to have done and continue to do. Sound banking is about having a strong capital base and a funding profile in terms of maturity that can withstand the sorts of shocks in the world that will happen from time to time. It is not about expanding your bank rapidly and funding the growth in the overnight money market. This need for adjustment also explains why at the Bank we are sticking firmly to the plan to allow the Special Liquidity Scheme to run-off on time a year from now. Over the last twelve months, banks have taken the necessary steps to move towards that goal.
The consequences for Swedish monetary policy right now What do the rising commodity prices mean for the interest rate decision we made a couple of weeks ago? What will it entail for future monetary policy if these price rises continue? Well, it is of course largely the balancing act I recently described. We Executive Board members must currently take into account in our deliberations the forces pulling the economy in  4  BIS Review 57/2008  different directions. In Sweden economic activity is still fairly strong, but there are signs of a slowdown. We are also seeing weaker international developments and financial turmoil. In contrast, inflation and inflation expectations remain high. One can thus say that commodity prices are in a way in both scales of the balance. They are to some extent both behind the slowdown in economic activity and behind the high inflation and inflation expectations. The way my Executive Board colleagues and I weighed together the various factors at the most recent monetary policy meeting resulted in our holding the repo rate unchanged at 4.25 per cent. We are also currently assuming that the interest rate will need to be held at this level in 2008 to manage the inflation target a couple of years ahead. Of course, commodity prices were important in our assessments. So let me therefore conclude by describing how I myself reasoned in connection with the interest rate decision.

Safeguarding monetary and financial stability of Albania is the best service we provide to the Albanian economy. On the other hand, the growth of production potential of the economy, the strengthening of its resilience against shocks, and the increase of society's welfare requires to further continuing and strengthening the structural reforms. Thank you for your attention! 5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
It is clear that in order for the young population to be an advantage for us, a very well designed and planned education strategy is a must. Indeed, the education level of the overall population in Turkey is getting better and Turkey is catching up with several of the new EU members. In the 25-34 age group, 11 percent of population has high level of education, which corresponds to the same level with Slovakia and nearly the same level with the Czech Republic.21 Hence, as the older generation leaves the market for the younger generation and the educational reforms are put into practice during the accession process, the education level of the Turkish labour force will increase and both the EU and the Turkish economy will benefit from it. Ladies and Gentlemen, Having touched briefly on the advantages of the EU from Turkey s membership, what I d like to talk about next is the other side of the coin; that is the advantages of Turkey from the accession process and the ultimate membership. As I mentioned in the early part of my speech, the performance of the Turkish economy for the last four years clearly indicates that Turkey successfully continues the process of economic restructuring. However, in our view, all the achievements so far now belong to the past. Nowadays, we have to start viewing developments with a longer-term and broader perspective in the context of the adjustment process for the EU membership.

In ten weeks representatives of 196 countries will gather in Paris at the COP21 summit to consider the world’s response to climate change. It is governments who must choose whether, and how, to pursue that 2 degree world. And the role of finance? Earlier this year, G20 Finance Ministers asked the Financial Stability Board to consider how the financial sector could take account of the risks climate change poses to our financial system. As Chair of the FSB I hosted a meeting last week where the private and public sectors discussed the current and prospective financial stability risks from climate change and what might be done to mitigate them. I want to share some thoughts on the way forward after providing some context beginning with lessons from the insurance sector. 9  Few business leaders list climate change as a near-term pressing risk. See, for instance, PWC’s annual survey of CEOs (www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-agenda/ceo-survey.html) and the Bank of England’s Systemic Risk Survey (www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/srs/srs2015h1.pdf). 10  Even credit ratings typically only look out to 3-5 years. 11  For instance, IPCC (2014) Conclusion SPM 2.1 notes that “cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond”. The Stern review observes that “many greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, stay in the atmosphere for more than a century” (See The Stern Review of the Economic Effects of Climate Change (2006)). 12  The Cancun Agreement in 2010 committed governments to “hold the increase in global average temperature below two degrees”.
The Central Bank has been implementing a monetary tightening to offset the secondary effects of supply shocks. Since domestic demand is growing at a moderate pace at the moment, it has been curbing the pass through from cost-push factors. As a matter of fact, the prices of products that do not use food or energy as main inputs have been rather well behaved compared to the prices of products that have food or energy as inputs. However, the fact that first round effects of the supply side shocks have reached unprecedented levels has been affecting inflation expectations adversely. Monetary policy cannot remain indifferent in case of a deterioration in the overall pricing behavior. If supply side shocks last long, their effects will spill over to the other sectors in the economy. A tighter stance is a must in order to control the expectations and to prevent the mutation of supply side shocks into demand shocks. If monetary policy does not react to the disruption in inflation dynamics, supply side price hikes may, after a certain point, easily evolve into a selffeeding vicious circle. Dear Guests, Why did the Central Bank not repeat the strong monetary tightening policy that it had implemented in 2006, but instead opted for a measured and gradual increase in interest rates in 2008? The current conditions differ from the May 2006 fluctuation.

Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 10 November 2011. *  *  *  Clouds have gathered recently in the form of the financial unease and the debt crisis in Europe. As Sweden is a small, open economy we are affected in many ways by developments abroad. Nevertheless, we must of course do what we can to ensure stable economic development in Sweden. In the face of turbulence abroad we must make sure that we maintain order in the Swedish economy. The economic-policy framework in Sweden has worked well. We have learned from the mistakes we made in the past and are now in a much more favourable position than many other countries. This is something that we must build on, and monetary policy is trying to play its part in this. Today I will begin with an international tour before returning to Sweden. When the tour is complete, I hope that I will have shed some light on the following questions:   What is happening abroad and how is it affecting us?   How can we ourselves facilitate developments in Sweden – particularly with the help of monetary policy? What is happening abroad? Drama on the financial markets of the world There have been dramatic developments on the financial markets since the summer. Stock markets have plummeted (see Figure 1).
4  Conclusions  I wish to conclude simply by emphasising that although the Spanish economy is now entering its sixth consecutive year of real GDP growth, and that this growth pattern is expected to continue, albeit at a progressively slower pace, the risks to the prolongation of the expansionary phase have increased somewhat, especially in the international sphere. Thus protectionist measures, Brexit and the persistence of certain focal points of political and economic uncertainty within the euro area partially explain the slowdown in the global economy in 2018, but further adverse effects cannot be ruled out in coming quarters. In any event, the world economy is now at an advanced stage of the cycle, and the Spanish economy is not immune to developments in the international arena, in particular in the euro area, especially in view of the continuing high level of both external and public debt in Spain. For this reason, efforts to continue to improve the budgetary position of the different tiers of Spanish general government and to bring in reforms to shore up confidence in the various economic agents and boost growth potential should not be delayed. These two conditions are essential to redress the existing imbalances and ensure continued economic growth and job creation. Thank you for your attention. BANCO DE ESPAÑA  16	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019

22 Of course, it is crucial to evaluate policy and require it to be effective, whether the policy is state contingent or time contingent. 23 My impression is that the issue of whether fiscal policy should play a more active role and whether the fiscal frameworks should be reviewed is starting to be raised more and more in the economic policy debate: see, for example, Calmfors (2021) for Sweden and Ubide (2021) and Lane (2021) for the euro area. This is also underlined by the fact that the ESO, the Expert Group for Public Economics, is planning a study in this field; see https://eso.expertgrupp.se/pagaende-projekt/. However, it should be pointed out that this study will only refer to the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy in times of crisis, which I do not think is sufficient. A month ago, representatives of the government parties also argued, in a newspaper article, that the review of the fiscal policy framework planned for 2025 should be brought forward (Svenska Dagbladet, 2021). In the Statement of Government Policy on 30 November, Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson argued that Swedish public finances are so strong that shifting from a surplus target to a balance target is justified. There are also, of course,  12 [17]  To be even more concrete, one idea could be to give the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, or some other body, the task of continuously evaluating whether fiscal policy is keeping to the announced plan and delivering the expected results.
Federal and State funding of subsidized higher education is heavily reliant on tax revenues and competes with other forms of public spending, and within education budgets competes with pre-school, elementary and secondary education spending. During the recession we saw severe revenue declines at the federal and state levels. Being highly credit constrained, with university subsidies being part of operating budgets which must be funded with current tax revenues, many states cut planned education funding while allowing public universities to increase tuition levels. This in turn contributed to a significant shift of education cost to students and parents. In research conducted at the New York Fed, we found that since 2007 those states with the largest funding cuts also had the highest tuition increases, with an average annual tuition growth rate of 3.4 percent. As shown in Chart 2, this compares to an annual average tuition growth rate of 1.7 percent during the 2007–2010 period for all other states combined. That is, we observe an economically meaningful relationship between public funding and public institution tuition changes since 2007. Higher tuition has forced many students to take on larger student loans. Student debt and tuition increases were not limited to public institutions. Research conducted at the NYFed found that over the same period there was even larger tuition and student loan growth at forprofit institutions. [Chart 3] Despite larger average support through Pell grants, with tuition  1  National Center for Educational Statistics, 2012. “Digest of Education Statistics”. 2  College Board, 2013.

Another way to look at borrower difficulty in loan repayment is to consider the state of repayment by the end of 2014 for all student loan borrowers we observe finishing their new loan accumulation, between 2005 and 2010. High rates of delinquency and default, and the high prevalence of participation in repayment-delaying programs such as deferments, forbearances and income based repayment, lead to a lower rate of balance reduction in the years after student loan borrowers leave school. In order to understand the magnitude of this delay, we investigate the extent of student loan repayment that recent school-leaving cohorts have achieved by 2014. For the blog series, we calculated the outstanding balance of each of the 2005–2010 schoolleaving cohorts as of the second quarter of the school-leaving year. For each cohort, we then recorded the share of the original student loan balance that remained as of the end of 2014. For example, for the 2010 cohort 91 percent of the original balance remained unpaid four and a half years later, at year-end 2014. This is typical of all the cohorts we examine, from 2005 forward. So what accounts for the high default rates and low repayment rates of recent cohorts? Undoubtedly the weak labor market conditions for entering college graduates played an important role in explaining defaults and low loan repayment rates. As the youth unemployment rate continues to improve, we would expect repayment rates to gradually improve.
There were fundamental inconsistencies between rapidlyliberalised capital accounts, still under-developed financial systems, and pegged exchange rates. This led to excessive investment through financial intermediaries, and the accumulation of a great deal of foreign-currency debt, much of which was un-hedged. When the full extent of this vulnerability became apparent, there were full-blown currency and financial sector crises. Second, are different countries’ policy frameworks consistent with one another? If different members’ policy frameworks are inconsistent, this could inhibit external adjustment, and pose a potential threat to external stability. So the key area for multilateral surveillance would be to identify where different countries’ policy frameworks might conflict with one another and to propose remedies before this threatened the stability of the international monetary system. You can argue that inconsistent policy frameworks lay at the root of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992. German monetary policy successfully targeted domestic price stability. The UK was pegging its exchange rate to the DM in order to import this stability. But when the Germans  BIS Review 103/2006  5  adopted a new approach to fiscal policy, running a structural deficit to finance infrastructure investment in the east – essentially adopting a new fiscal policy framework - German interest rates had to rise to keep domestic inflation in check. But keeping UK interest rates high enough to maintain the exchange rate would have been very contractionary. Arguably, the UK and German policy frameworks had become incompatible. Something had to give – in this case sterling’s membership of the ERM.

References International Monetary Fund, "The Managing Director’s Report on Implementing the Fund’s MediumTerm Strategy", April 2006, Washington DC, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/040506.pdf Mervyn King, "Reform of the International Monetary Fund", speech at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations in New Delhi, India, February 2006, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2006/speech267.pdf Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF, "An Evaluation of the IMF's Multilateral Surveillance", February 2006, Washington DC, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2006/ms/eng/pdf/report.pdf International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook”, September 2006 and others, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/index.htm  8  BIS Review 103/2006
Rosati, A G, Stevens, J R, Hare, B and Hauser, M D (2007), “The Evolutionary Origins of Human Patience: Temporal Preferences in Chimpanzees, Bonobos, and Human Adults”, Current Biology 17, pp 1663–1668. 20  BIS Review 114/2010  Schultz, W, Preuschoff, K, Camerer, C, Hsu, M, Fiorillo, C D, Tobler, P N and Bossarts, P (2010), “Explicit Neural Signals Reflecting Reward Uncertainty”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 363, 3801–3811. Securities and Exchange Commission (2010), Facilitating Shareholder Nominations, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf  Director  Shiller, R J (1981), “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?”, American Economic Review 71(5), pp 421–436. Skinner, D J (2008), “The Evolving Relation Between Earnings, Dividends, and Stock Repurchases”, Journal of Financial Economics 87(3), pp 582–609. Smith, A (1759), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, London: A. Millar. Stevens, J R, Hallinan, E V, and Hauser, M D (2005), “The Ecology and Evolution of Patience in Two New World Monkeys”, Biological Letters, 1, 223–226. Stiglitz, J (1974), “On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy”, American Economic Review 64(6), pp. 851–866. Thaler, R H and Benartzi, S (2004), “Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioural Economics to Increase Employee Saving”, Journal of Political Economy 112(1), pp S164–187. Thaler, R H and Shefrin, H M (1981), “An Economic Theory of Self Control”, Journal of Political Economy 89(2), pp 392–406. Thaler, R H and C R Sunstein (2009), Nudge: Improving Decisions about Wealth, Health and Happiness, Yale University Press.

Furthermore, after rising in the second half of 2018, credit default swap premia are now back at roughly the same level as in mid-2018. In the area of resolution, the Swiss big banks have improved their gone-concern lossabsorbing capacity since last year’s Financial Stability Report. Credit Suisse and UBS already meet all look-through requirements on a consolidated basis. Page 1/3  Berne, 13 June 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  In addition to those at group level, the Federal Council has drawn up requirements on big banks’ loss-absorbing capacity at the level of individual group entities, and in early April initiated a consultation on a corresponding amendment to the Capital Adequacy Ordinance. These requirements are intended to ensure that not only the group as a whole, but also material group entities have sufficient loss-absorbing capital in the event of a crisis. The SNB supports the proposed amendments to the Capital Adequacy Ordinance. Work is also underway with regard to liquidity in a crisis, known as ‘funding in resolution’. It is aimed at ensuring that the big banks have sufficient liquidity during preparations for and in the phase immediately after resolution. For this purpose, FINMA is drawing up resolution funding plans in line with international standards. In cooperation with the SNB and the two banks concerned, it is currently assessing the big banks’ liquidity needs under possible crisis scenarios.
6  BIS Review 52/2004

How the U.S. outlook evolves in the future is fundamentally tied to the fortunes of the economies around the world. As I look ahead, I’m keeping a keen eye on all the data, both domestic and global, and the implications for our economy. With an uncertain outlook, vigilance and flexibility are essential for achieving our dual mandate goals of maximum employment and price stability. Persistently low inflation, heightened uncertainty, and global cross-currents make this a particularly challenging time for monetary policy, and my laser focus is on doing the best we can to support a strong economy and achieve our 2 percent inflation goal. Thank you. 1 Jerome H. Powell, Challenges for Monetary Policy, speech delivered at the “Challenges for Monetary Policy”  symposium, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 23, 2019. 2 See the FOMC’s Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, as amended effective January  29, 2019. 3 International Monetary Fund. 2019. World Economic Outlook Update: Still Sluggish Global Growth. Washington,  D.C., July. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches