samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
You should be the flag bearers of Excellence and a source of inspiration to your colleagues. In addition to congratulating you the awardees, I want to congratulate the parents and schools that have contributed to the excellent results which qualified our awardees for the awards today. I speak especially about the parents of Ms. Rashidatu Caulker and Mr. Bobson Sesay and the Annie Walsh Memorial Secondary School, and the St. Augustine Secondary School Lungi, the proud producers of our awardees. To all the students present here this afternoon, , we implore you to have confidence in your abilities, and know that what Rashidatu and Bobson have achieved today you can also achieve. Please note that the Bank of Sierra Leone Charity Trust Fund was established to support any of you who can demonstrate proven ability. Let this therefore be a challenge to all of you to excel in your studies. Who knows, you might one day be a proud beneficiary!! Mr Chairman, Distinguished Ladies, Gentlemen and students, let me assure you that the Bank of Sierra Leone has a long term commitment to providing support, especially in building capacity nation-wide through education. Be assured that we will continue to uphold the objectives and tenets of the Bank of Sierra Leone Charity Trust Fund on a sustainable basis. All we ask for is your continued support. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 32/2008  3

Page 1  Message received and understood − speech by Dave Ramsden Given remotely at a conference by the Lietuvos bankas and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) on the “Future of Central Banking”  Page 2  Published on 29 September 2022  Speech Introduction Thank you very much for the invitation to join this panel today and I am very sorry I can’t be with you in Vilnius. Real-time market developments kept me here in London, but I’m grateful to the organisers from the Central Bank of Lithuania and from the BIS for allowing me to contribute virtually to the Bank’s 100th birthday conference. I really welcome the focus of this panel on data since having access to fast, accurate, appropriately structured data is critical in equipping central banks with the knowledge they need to function in order to meet their objectives. The Bank of England’s mission to deliver monetary and financial stability is a broad and deep one. We need a similarly broad pool of data of varying depths to fulfil our mission. In 15 minutes I cannot hope to do justice to the variety of data we need to get a clear picture of the economy, the financial system as a whole and the firms we regulate in order to frame action. Last year the Bank and PRA published our data strategy, joint with the FSA, setting out how we will transform our collection and use of data to fulfil our responsibilities as a supervisor and regulator[1].
To provide a starting point in answering this question, I would like to share with you tonight some of our views on the current state of the Thai economy, where we are, where are we heading, and most importantly, what we see as the key ingredients for sustaining Thailand’s economic growth. Ladies and Gentlemen, At the height of the Thai crisis, Thailand’s nominal per capita GDP in dollar term fell by more than 30% according to a World Bank estimate while financial restructuring costs have exceeded 30% of GDP, and capital flows reversals surpassed the 60% of GDP mark. Given such a depth and breadth of the crisis, the current momentum of recovery does suggest that Thailand has indeed come a long way. This view is increasingly shared by the market, including major credit rating agencies, with some analysts concluding that perhaps Thailand has more or less turned the corner. The extent to which Thailand has elevated from the crisis of 1997 is probably best illustrated by the latest macroeconomic performance and data. Thailand’s GDP growth in the first half of this year is a testament to the strength in the current recovery. The economy expanded by 5.1% in the second quarter after a robust 3.9% in the first quarter. In level terms, real GDP has now exceeded its pre-crisis level. And according to the latest incoming data, the economy in the third quarter looks to remain quite robust as well.

I’ll discuss how the development of new risks associated with climate change is beginning to change the practice of risk management at financial institutions in terms of governance, risk identification and management, scenario analysis and transparency. I’ll also say a few words on why I believe it is appropriate, even critical, for supervisors to focus on this particular risk. Before proceeding, I will emphasize that I am speaking for myself and my views do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Climate Change and Risk Management The discussion of climate change and risk management has introduced a new lexicon for risk discussions. Physical risk is the potential for losses as climate-related changes disrupt business operations, destroy capital and interrupt economic activity. Transition risk is the potential for loss resulting from a shift toward a lower-carbon economy as policy, consumer sentiment and technological innovations impact the value of certain assets and liabilities. These effects will be felt across business sectors and asset classes, on strategies and operations, and through the balance sheets and income statements of financial firms. At a practical level, risk managers at financial institutions need to develop the appropriate tools to identify, monitor and manage these risks. From one perspective, climate-related risks may manifest as realizations of familiar risks such as credit, market, operational, legal and reputational risk. The tools risk managers use, however, will need to change to reflect new data, changing relationships, and evolving interconnections.
On the other hand, it is probable that monetary policy can indirectly, by contributing to a more stable economic development, create better conditions for good growth in the long term. Reliable assessments of the potential growth capacity of the Swedish economy are very important for successful conducting monetary policy. Given this, it is perhaps not so surprising that we have spent a significant amount of our time in recent years making analyses of issues related to economic growth. This is demonstrated in our working report series, which contains a relatively large number of studies on this subject. A complicating factor with regard to studies of potential growth is that they entail a quantity that cannot be directly observed and measured, but has to be estimated indirectly with the aid of another method. There are a number of statistical methods for this, each of which has both advantages and disadvantages. The estimated results have proved to be relatively sensitive to the method applied. This in turn means that there is good reason not to fasten on one individual method, but to use several methods and thereby increase the reliability of the estimates. At the Riksbank we apply three different methods for calculating the production gap and we regularly show and discuss the results of these in our Inflation Reports (Figure 2).

By contrast, the risk premia for bonds of particularly burdened euro economies – namely those of Greece, Ireland and Portugal – continued to rise. Overall, the risk premia of certain European sovereign borrowers remain very high, and latent threats of contagion continue to exist. In the global equity and commodity markets, the mood during recent quarters was cautiously positive. In the equity markets, the gratifying corporate results had a strongly supportive effect. In the US, for example, around two-thirds of the most important corporations reported better results than were expected by the market. In the commodity markets, healthy economic conditions – especially in the emerging countries – assisted a continuation of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  upward movement, although here, too, price volatility remained high. However, there were also factors weighing on the markets, like the political unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, the catastrophe in Japan and, finally, the indications of a global economic slowdown in the markets. To summarise, the situation in the international financial markets presents a mixed picture, despite the fact that economic developments are relatively favourable. This reflects the fact that the burden inherited from the economic and financial crisis continues to be very significant. Implementation of monetary policy The financial crisis was characterised not least by turbulence on the money market. While uncertainties in the international financial markets persist, the situation in the Swiss franc money market eased last year, and has been very relaxed since the beginning of 2011.
It is often too late to take recovery action when a firm drops below minimum standards. And because firms approaching the minimum often have to deleverage sharply which can have a very adverse impact on the real economy. So we have created incentives for firms to run with a substantial buffer of capital above the hard minimum. Where common equity capital is less than 7% of risk-weighted assets, firms now face restrictions on bonuses and dividends. For systemically important banks, the required buffers are higher still. These buffers should give banks more room to use their capital to absorb losses rather than hitting the brakes on lending. On the other side of the equation, some action has been taken to tighten up the calculation of firms’ risk-weighted assets. And work is also underway to examine whether we can improve the “standardised approach” to risk-weighting – an approach in which banks use a riskweight prescribed by the regulators. As a result, the amount of capital in the system has increased substantially. Globally, the large banks now hold some $ of additional equity capital. Major UK banks have raised their equity capital by £ Their leverage has broadly halved. On average, the Major UK banks are now running with an end-point Basel 3 common equity capital ratio of 10%. Roughly speaking, that is more than double the equivalent pre-crisis ratio.

However, while the risk-weighted approach has been through wholesale reform, it still depends on mathematical models – and for the largest firms, their own models to determine  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  riskiness. So the risk-weighted approach is itself subject to what in the trade is called “model risk”. This may sound like some arcane technical curiosity. It is not. It is a fundamental weakness of the risk based approach. Mathematical modelling is a hugely useful tool. Models are probably the best way we have of forecasting what will happen. But in the end, a model – as the Bank of England economic forecasters will tell you with a wry smile – is only a crude and simplified representation of the real world. Models have to be built and calibrated on past experience. When events occur that have no clear historical precedent – such as large falls in house prices across US states – models based on past data will struggle to accurately predict what may follow. In the early days of the crisis, an investment bank CFO is reported to have said, following hitherto unprecedented moves in market prices: “We were seeing things that were 25 standard deviation moves, several days in a row”. Well, a 25 standard deviation event would not be expected to occur more than once in the history of the universe let alone several days in a row – the lesson was that the models that the bank was using were simply wrong.
(iii)  Inclusive  Inclusiveness is at the heart of the SDGs, and it must be at the heart of financial reform. However, recent years have seen a worrying decline in correspondent banking services, with local banks and money service businesses in numerous regions losing access to the global banking system. 12 The impact, in terms of unfulfilled economic potential, lost access to finance, and the break on sustainable development, is more than financial. Financial abandonment also has social, economic and security consequences. Communities that become financially excluded become vulnerable, particularly where lost banking services cut off income flows from remittances. Our shared challenge is to combat money laundering and terrorist financing while reversing financial abandonment. These aims are entirely compatible. Keeping flows inside the financial system, and subject to stringent due diligence against clearly articulated standards, rather than forcing them underground is the way to ensure that the financial sector continues to serve real economies around the world. To this end, the FSB, the World Bank and the IMF are implementing the four-point action plan endorsed by G20 Leaders. It is: (1)  Assessing the dimensions and implications of the issue;  (2)  Clarifying regulatory expectations by working with the FATF and relevant countries;  (3)  Expanding capacity through technical assistance in those jurisdictions whose firms have lost correspondent banking services; and  (4)  Strengthening tools for due diligence by correspondent banks.

They have been defensive when it comes to granting technical access to new and innovative payment service providers, which will limit European fintech companies’ ability to provide competitive solutions. Indeed, I fear that global giants from outside Europe will use their network power to increase their presence further. In other sectors, European companies have succeeded in achieving global reach. In the car industry, for example, European vehicles set the standard when it comes to quality and reliability. There is no reason why this success cannot be replicated in the area of payment services – or financial services in general. The way we pay in Europe is changing. Significant numbers of consumers are moving to online payment channels, with retail payments increasingly being carried out via mobile phones. At the same time, virtual currencies have long been a topic of debate – and not only among experts, either. European citizens demand pan-European services that are safe and efficient. Consequently, there is a need to look carefully at the governance and regulation of payment solutions. Many payment channels are provided by non-European companies. Although those companies comply with our legislation and use our payment infrastructure, they are, for the most part, not domiciled in Europe. This increases our dependence on third countries. In particular, we have to be mindful of the fact that extraterritorial jurisdiction could, in a worst case scenario, affect the operation of those companies and disrupt payments between European counterparties.
One conceivable explanation is that, having waited longer than other countries, the road back to price stability was more difficult for us. There were also a number of exceptional events along the way. What was perhaps the worst bank crisis of the century erupted in the wake of the 1980s’ bubble economy. Exchange rate turmoil was such that, during some dramatic days, the instrumental rate was hiked to 500 per cent. In the early 1990s the budget deficit grew to be the largest in the industrialised world. There are many similarities, as well as some differences, between the financial crisis in Sweden and those in Mexico and Southeast Asia. In recent years the situation in Sweden has become more stable and, with a resolute economic policy, developments have taken a positive turn. The bank crisis has been resolved, the economy is in an expansionary phase and inflation expectations are low. Step by step, the credibility of the new regime is being established. Experience in other countries clearly shows that the consolidation of a changeover to a low-inflation regime takes many years. Inflation target’s historical roots and advantages The idea of focusing monetary policy on price stability goes back, as I mentioned earlier, at least to Wiksell’s arguments a century ago. It seems to me that Wiksell’s emphasis on deflation being as important to avoid as inflation has much to do with the acceptance of this policy today.

One thing is clear: the sounder the theoretical foundation for monetary policy, the easier is the life of a central bank governor. Sweden on the way to establishing price stability There has been something paradoxical about Swedish economic policy. After the period of generally high inflation that started with OPEC 1, Sweden was one of the last of the industrialised countries to re-focus economic policy on price stability. The notion that a trade-off exists between inflation and unemployment lived on in Sweden for longer than in other countries. It took rather a long time for the drawbacks of a level of inflation that was relatively high, for an industrialised country, to be widely recognised. At the same time, Sweden has a long tradition in the field of central banking. The Riksbank, founded in 1668, is the world’s oldest, still-functioning central bank. This gives us three hundred and thirty years experience. It was in Sweden, too, that the first banknotes—in Europe at least—were introduced in the seventeenth century. A monetary policy focus on price stability, which is one of the themes for our forthcoming discussions, has always been an important item on the central bank policy agenda. A well-known Swedish economist, Knut Wiksell, was a clear exponent of the idea in the late nineteenth century. As it happens, he addressed an audience on the subject here in Stockholm a hundred years ago almost to the day, namely on 14 April 1898.
Within our Economic and Monetary Union, more integrated capital markets can also help to cushion shocks to parts of the euro area, thereby enhancing the resilience of the euro area as a whole.2 From the companies’ point of view, cross-border ownership would mean that they have a wider pool of investors and potentially more stable sources of capital available for their investments. From the side of investors, diversified portfolios would help them hedge against country-specific risks. Cross-border capital markets and banks would thus provide the level of private risk-sharing we need to ensure the long-term resilience of the euro area. In my remarks today I will argue: First, that financial markets are playing an increasingly important role in funding the economy, but more needs to be done to foster sustainable cross-border financial integration and risk-sharing; Second, that a revamped CMU agenda should be geared towards addressing the challenges facing Europe, such as Brexit, and ensuring that capital markets growth does not endanger financial stability; And finally, I will highlight the important synergies that exist between the capital markets and banking union projects. How far away is a European capital markets union? First, the good news: we are seeing a change in the structure of financial markets. The non-bank sector continues to grow. It is playing an increasing role in providing a stable source of funding to the European economy.

This is largely connected to the substantial changes in the repo rate in our forecast. Our inflation target is formulated in terms of the change in the CPI, and I would therefore like to pause and develop this a little further. CPI inflation has fallen rapidly in recent months and we are assuming that this will continue during 2009. The annual change in the CPI is expected to be at its lowest in September this year, when it will be -1.6 per cent. This fall is largely due to the rapid interest rate cuts we have made during the autumn and now in February having an impact on the part of the CPI that reflects housing costs. It is also due to the fall in energy prices. However, if one disregards the cost of mortgage rates the picture is quite different. Inflation measured in terms of the CPIF, which disregards changes in mortgage rates, is around 1.6 per cent on average in 2009. And if one moreover disregards the change in energy costs from the CPIF the forecast is even higher. According to our assessment, the CPIF excluding energy will increase on average by just over 2.2 per cent a year. There are several reasons why underlying inflation trend is being held up. Unit labour costs have increased fairly rapidly over the past two years and resource utilisation has been high. In addition, the krona has been weaker, which contributes to higher import prices.
Barbro Wickman-Parak: The Riksbank and the property market Speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Fastighetsdagen 2008, Stockholm, 14 May 2008. *  *  *  Subprime loans in the United States were the origins of the deep-seated tensions in the international financial markets, which have not yet relinquished their grip after almost a year. The problems in the subprime market are an important reason behind the collapse in housing construction and the falling house prices, which have made a profound impression on the real economy in the United States. In some other countries, too, the earlier sharp rises in property prices have slowed down and been replaced by falling prices. Here in Sweden we have so far been spared these events. How does the Riksbank view future developments in the property market and what stance does the Bank's monetary policy take in relation to asset prices? Today I will address these questions. I will also briefly comment on the recent developments in the financial markets. Several countries have experienced rapidly rising house prices, for instance the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as Denmark, Ireland and Spain. Recently there has been a slowdown in the rate of increase and in some of these countries house prices are now falling. In the United States house prices have fallen by around 10 per cent since the peak in 2006 (see figure 1). In Sweden, too, house prices have risen rapidly, even more so than in the United States.

Indeed, it is worth noting that in 1994,  12  This lack of spare capacity in firms is hard to reconcile with the relatively sharp drop in GDP in the recession and the resilience of employment. However, it is possible that future data revisions may change the profile of GDP during the recession. It is also possible that underlying productivity growth trends were overestimated during the long expansion of the 1990s and 2000s, and that the economy was further above capacity in 2006/7 than was appreciated at the time. 10  BIS Review 158/2010  when the early 90s fiscal consolidation began, the UK economy grew by over 4%, which is still the strongest rate of GDP growth we have seen in any calendar year since the late 1980s. The strength of growth surprised forecasters, who had greatly underestimated the momentum of growth which would be generated by a rebound in private sector demand, a strong world economy and a competitive exchange rate. 13 There is a risk that we are making the same mistake again because of the preoccupation with downside risks following the financial crisis. The second key argument is that higher interest rates should help to exert a brake on abovetarget inflation and keep inflation expectations anchored around the 2% target. There are significant upside risks to the forecast recently published in the Bank’s Inflation Report which could sustain the period of above-target inflation into 2012 and 2013.