samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  Annex  Chart 1: Advanced economy volatility of growth and inflation Standard deviation of inflation 3.5 3.0 1980 - 1998 2.5 2.0 1.5 2009 - 2018  1.0  1999 - 2008  0.5 0.0 0.5  1.0  1.5  2.0  Standard deviation of GDP growth Sources: IMF and Bank calculations. Notes: Calculations use April 2018 IMF World Economic Outlook, with data at annual frequency. 2018 assumed to be data. Figure 1: Word cloud for terms associated with ‘uncertainty’ in Agents’ reports  Sources: Bank of England Notes: Refers to Agents’ reports compiled between 1 January and late-August 2018. 28  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  28  Chart 2: Frequency of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘Brexit’ appearing in Agents’ reports Share of paragraphs in Agency visit write-ups referencing term (per cent)  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Uncertainty  Brexit/referendum  Sources: Bank of England. Chart 3: Inflation forecast errors of different groups since 2008 (RMSE) pp 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0  1yr  2yr  3yr**  Sources: Bank of England/TNS Inflation Attitudes Survey, Barclays Basix, YouGov/CitiGroup, HMT, CBI and Bank calculations. Notes: Forecast errors since 2008Q2. Some measures start a few quarters later than 2008Q2, or have missing observations. Individual measures are included when there are no more than three missing observations.

How do you ensure as wide, diverse and representative a set of citizens as possible? How do you engage citizens who might not understand or trust the Bank? How much time needs to be set aside to enable the deliberative process to be fruitful? And how many people should you engage to get the balance right between diversity and deliberation? We are working with a range of partners, including the RSA, to come up with answers. The plan would be to set up one citizen panel for each of the Bank’s 12 regional agencies. With roughly 25 citizens per panel, this would give us a non-expert panel of around 300 people. This is edging up towards the mid-point of the Wagner/Vinaimont range and just shy of the Athenian boule. By using digital technology, we would aim to connect these citizen panels to allow national, as well as regional, deliberation. This is deliberative democracy in practice. As with the judicial system, it will involve a blend of expert and non-experts. As with juries and judges, there will be a structured process for deliberation. As in the legal system, the role of the non-experts (citizen panels) is to help establish the facts and of the experts (MPC) to set policy. What’s good enough for decisions on incarceration is good enough for decisions on inflation. Conclusion  Central banks, like all public institutions, were created by the public to serve the public.
References Albagli, E. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2004), “By How Much and Why do Inflation Targeters Miss Their Targets?”, Mimeo, Central Bank of Chile. Céspedes, L. and C. Soto (2005), “Credibility and Inflation Targeting in an Emerging Market: Lessons from the Chilean Experience”, International Finance 8 (3): 545-75. Gürkaynak R., A. Levin, A. Marder and E. Swanson (2007), “Inflation Targeting and the Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Western Hemisphere,” in Monetary Policy Under Inflation Targeting,  BIS Review 68/2007  5  Series on Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Vol. XI, edited by K. Schmidt-Hebbel and F. Mishkin, Central Bank of Chile. Institute for Management Development (2006), World Competitiveness Yearbook, several years. International Monetary Fund (2007), International Financial Statistics. Data on CD-ROM, April. Mishkin, Frederic S. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), “Does Inflation Targeting Make a Difference?” in Monetary Policy Under Inflation Targeting, Series on Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Vol. XI, edited by K. Schmidt-Hebbel and F. Mishkin, Central Bank of Chile. Moody’s Investors Service (2006), “Monthly Ratings List. Bank Credit Research”. Ramos-Francia, M., D. Chiquiar, and A. Noriega (2007), “A Time Series Approach to Test a Change in Inflation Persistence: The Mexican Experience”, Working Paper N° 2007-01, Banco de México. World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators 2007. April.

Christian Noyer: Monetary policy, the French economy and its outlook Introductory letter by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, to the Bank of France’s Annual Report 2006, submitted to the President of the French Republic, the President of the Senate, and the President of the National Assembly, 1 August 2007. *  *  *  I have the honour of submitting to you, as required by law, the report on the operations of the Banque de France, monetary policy and its outlook. The year 2006 was marked by robust and more balanced growth in global economic activity across virtually all regions. Thanks to this favourable international environment, the French economy saw a return to dynamic growth conducive to employment and the reduction of government deficits. This cyclical upturn should not, however, mask the structural difficulties facing the French economy, which is performing less well in all these areas than its main trading partners and which, moreover, is witnessing a further widening of its external deficit. Against this backdrop, I should like to outline a number of analyses of the growth environment, monetary policy, the state of the French economy and the main challenges that it needs to rise to in order to take advantage of globalisation and make structural improvements to growth and employment. In 2006, the European economy entered a period of sustained and balanced growth Growth in the euro area is sustained: after 2.9% in 2006, it could stand at 2.6% in 2007.
The increasing relevance of China in the world economy and in world trade following its accession into the WTO, generated a booming effect in commodity markets and world demand that more than compensated the negative effect of increases in world interest rates, giving important support for the balance of payment, fiscal accounts and the investment outlook in emerging economies. We are now at the early stages of a new and historical tightening cycle in the United States. It is reasonable to ask ourselves how comparable the current situation is relative to previous experiences. I want to make a few points here. We expect the Fed to move more gradually than on previous occasions  Why? First, the Fed prefers to err on the side of moving slowly, and markets expect so. In part, as seen in Figure 3, inflation measured as the PCE core is still low compared to its level on previous hiking cycles. Also, neutral rates are estimated to be very low this time, so the Fed considers that monetary policy is not as expansionary as the headline Fed Funds Rate suggests.  Besides, the Federal Reserve is very much aware of the financial stability risks of abrupt changes in rates. The term premium implicit in long term yields is very low, and the taper Tandrum episode of 2013 shows that it can change fast if markets misinterpret the Fed communication.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is in this regard that the Bank of Zambia and Professor Collier with the support of the UK Department for International Development partnered to hold this international symposium whose objectives include: (i)  enhancing understanding of advantages of central bank independence among central bankers, Government, banks, non-bank financial institutions, the business community, academics and other stakeholders;  (ii)  drawing lessons and sharing experiences of central bank independence in developed, emerging and developing countries;  (iii)  appreciating the political, economic and legal aspects of operationalising greater independence for central banks; and  (iv)  exploring ways of enhancing fiscal and monetary coordination. Ladies and Gentlemen, the selection of papers to be presented and discussed at this Symposium will provide a platform for sharing ideas required for practical solutions aimed at improving the Bank’s service delivery. As we tackle issues of inflation, exchange rates, and other key macroeconomic indicators, let us use this forum to outline some of the past developments and challenges that lie ahead of us as we aim to taking Zambia’s financial sector to higher heights. Lastly, let me say that while we can all learn from what other central banks have done, each country should establish the legal framework for its central bank, and allow for its evolution, in ways which best fit that country’s own history and institutions. I have no doubt that the symposium will be thought-provoking and highly participatory.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Global challenges, global solutions – IMFC issues Statement by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) Twenty-Third Meeting, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 16 April 2011. * * * On behalf of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Lao P.D.R., Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga and Vietnam. Introduction 1. We thank Mr. Youssef Boutros-Ghali for his contributions to the IMFC, especially his leadership in completing the 2010 Quota and Governance reform. We congratulate Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam on his appointment as the new Chairman. With his rich experience in understanding the interests of advanced and emerging market countries, we have full confidence that Minister Tharman will be able to make significant progress in fostering a global consensus on many challenging policy issues. 2. Although the global recovery has gained strength since the last IMFC meeting, its prospect remains fragile as several downside risks continue to prevail. Having been successful in coordinating policies to contain the catastrophic damage from the global financial crisis, policymakers are now facing a more difficult task in forging a consensus on multilateral commitments for countries to take into account the impact of their policies on other members and the international monetary system (IMS). Such an agreement will not be easy to reach against the current backdrop of a multi-speed recovery and asymmetry in domestic policy requirements.

Given their sometimes rapid and dynamic nature and the difficulty in differentiating between temporary and structural flows, it is difficult to envisage a determinate response path at the outset. Hence, the policy toolkit ought to entail a range of measures, not precluding any one option ex ante, with the flexibility to make adjustments over time. Recent experiences of emerging market economies – including several members of our region – attest to the capacity for policymakers to respond in a pragmatic and timely rather than strictly rules-based and sequential manner. 6. In this connection, the Fund’s framework for managing inflows should serve only as an empirical study on country experiences in using capital flow management measures. It should not become an obligation for member countries as was the case with the 2007 Decision on exchange rate surveillance; otherwise the Fund will risk straining its relations with the membership. We also note that the above framework is part of a broader reform agenda on capital flows, which would entail examining both push and pull factors, as well as both source and recipient dimensions of flows. Moreover, the longer-term solution to managing capital inflows lies in developing deeper and broader financial markets, which would enhance absorptive capacity and facilitate efficient use of capital. We therefore call on the Fund to further study this aspect to help members develop their capital markets. 7.
In summary on our financial institutions’ developments, they are going ahead very fast and they will have good rules to perform to, but I must admit we are coming from way off, and have a long way to go before we are competitive in our own country let alone abroad. Ladies and gentlemen, So far I have talked at some length about the macroeconomy, good governance and developments in our financial institutions. Even if all the things I have outlined about Thailand were to happen, many people think that the economy would still be prone to instability unless the central bank is also revitalized. I am inclined to agree with them. For some reasons not yet identifiable, and that worries me because a good change normally only can happen when the problems have been clearly identified. But in any case, there were signs that the Bank of Thailand somehow has been sidetracked into the crony capitalism of the rest of the economy, a development whose job it is of the central bank to try and prevent. It was obvious therefore that the Bank of Thailand had to be restructured into an organization that would be effective and neutral. Extensive work was therefore done employing re-engineering concepts using consultants as necessary. The six management levels have now been reduced to two, with people of different capabilities at the second tier depending on the importance of their work. At the operating level, there are also only two levels.

Yves Mersch: The European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve – an ocean apart? Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, 12 October 2016. * * * Interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic seem to be trapped near zero. At first glance, looking only at the short term policy rates, one might think that both the Federal Reserve (Fed) and European Central Bank (ECB) are facing very similar circumstances and challenges. Below the surface, however, the differences are pronounced. In the euro area monetary policy continues to be highly accommodative, aiming to steer inflation back to levels in line with our definition of price stability. In the US, which is at a different stage of the business cycle, interest rate normalisation has so far been slower than expected. It is worth taking a closer look at the details to understand the unprecedented actions of central bank on either sides of the ocean in recent years. To do so, it is useful to divide the crisis into three separate phases. The first phase was the global financial crisis after the collapse of Lehman Brothers just over eight years ago. Central banks worldwide faced a largely common challenge to avert a collapse in aggregate demand. The second phase centred on sovereign debt, a problem which only affected the euro area. In the third phase, which is still in place today, stubbornly low global inflation and anaemic growth are compounding domestic challenges.
That reflects both lower inflation expectations and smaller risk premia to compensate for future inflation uncertainty. The total inflation premium - the sum of expected inflation and the inflation risk premium - is measured by the difference between yields on conventional and index-linked government securities. Chart 2 shows that the total inflation premium fell significantly on the announcement of Bank of England independence and the creation of the MPC. It is highly suggestive of a fall not just in expected inflation but also in the inflation risk premium. In principle, the behaviour of businesses and households depends on real interest rates - nominal interest rates less 2 the expected increase in prices. To the extent that the inflation risk premium falls, then so too does the level of real interest rates. The evidence in Chart 2 suggests that real rates have fallen too, although by less than nominal rates. Chart 1 Annual inflation in the UK  Note: Four-quarter growth rate of the quarterly retail price index (RPI) until 1974, and four-quarter growth rate of the quarterly retail price index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX) after 1974. Note that the RPI methodology before 1974 did not include mortgage interest payments, so the RPI series before 1974 is equivalent to RPIX in that sense. Data up to 2002 Q3. Source: ONS. 1  The conclusion reflects statistical tests including first-order auto correlations of consumer price inflation over ten-year rolling windows, and estimated spectral densities for inflation from a random coefficient AR (4) and GARCH (1,1) model.

Such effects can be amplified if spending - consumption or investment - depends on the value of the assets that are used as collateral for loans. A fall in prices can produce a vicious circle in which the initial fall in demand lowers asset prices, reducing the value of collateral, which in turn leads borrowers to repay debt, exacerbating the original decline in aggregate demand. This “debt deflation” was first formulated clearly by Irving Fisher in the 1930s, and has recently been revived in a more sophisticated form by Nobu Kiyotaki and John Moore, here at the London School of Economics. Because deflations are, fortunately, few and far between, there is a lack of hard empirical evidence on the quantitative significance of debt deflation. In 1993, I argued that the depth of the recession in the UK and the US in the early 1990s was the result of debt deflation. Consumption fell more sharply than would have been expected given movements in incomes and interest rates, reflecting an unexpected fall in inflation and asset prices. The effects on consumption of negative equity in housing were particularly severe. The experience of Japan may add to our knowledge in this area, although, as shown in Chart 6, despite a stagnant economy over the past decade, deflation of consumer prices has not been especially large. And I am confident that all central banks will do their best to prevent the sample size of countries suffering from serious deflation from increasing. 5  See for example Pindyck and Solimano (1993).
[15] It follows that the sharing of confidential data for statistical purposes within the ESCB/ESS should be made easier. This can be achieved by creating an improved legal basis, by narrowing the rather broad definition of confidentiality and by replacing some enabling clauses with mandatory ones. Fourth, it is important for European statistics compilers to have better access for statistical purposes to privately held data which are of public interest. This is in line with the European strategy for data, and the forthcoming Data Act aims to support business-to-business data sharing and facilitate access to data held by private sector entities, if these data are of public interest. Fifth, given the importance of MNEs and the measurement challenges I mentioned before, establishing a centralised collection of data on MNEs would make a vital contribution to the availability and quality of European data. [16] By way of comparison, for the financial sector data are already collected for the 115 significant and around 2,400 less significant banks within the framework of banking supervision. Collecting such data for MNEs could focus on the 500 largest MNEs operating in the EU and be made accessible to the relevant statistical authorities. This has the potential to eliminate information gaps and overlaps across countries and ensure a more timely, complete and consistent cross-country recording of the activities of MNEs. It would also help to improve our understanding of global value chains, for example with regard to information on concentration and bottlenecks.

BIS Review 10/2007  13  In this example, we have been able to reconstruct (approximately) the reference path in Inflation Report 3/06 by minimising a loss function under commitment in a timeless perspective. To reconstruct the reference path, the weight on the output gap in the loss function, lambda, has been set at 0.3. We also had to place a weight on changes in the interest rate in the loss function. This weight, which penalises large changes in the interest rate, can be defended based on considerations regarding robustness and financial stability. What is the outcome if we depart from our established response pattern? 14  BIS Review 10/2007  The chart illustrates what might happen if the central bank reoptimises today, but promise never to do so again. In the model, this will result in a marked rise in interest rates today. But such an approach has been criticised in the literature. If the central bank departs from its response pattern today, it is easy to believe that it will do the same in the future. It may therefore be difficult to gain credibility for such a policy. Even if it may feel tempting, it is important to be aware of the costs associated with departing from an established response pattern. It will then be more demanding to influence private-sector expectations. Frequent reoptimisations will in practice undermine the benefit of commitment and lead to a discretionary policy. The benefit of commitment hinges on the credibility of the central bank’s actions and communication.
32  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  32  Chart 10: Trust in institutions in the UK NGOs Business Government Media  Chart 11: Trust in professions in the UK Net percentage balances  Per cent -100 60  -50  0  50  100  Nurses Doctors  50  Your own GP Historians  40  Scientists 30  Sports commentators Weather forecasters  20  Nutritionists Civil servants  10  Economists Your local MP  0 2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017 Q1  Source: 2017 Q1 Edelman Trust Barometer. Politicians  Source: YouGov, February 2017. Notes: Years refer to the date on which survey fieldwork commenced. Chart 12: Trust/confidence/satisfaction with central banks US Federal Reserve Bank of England ECB Bank of Japan  Net percentage balances 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Sources: Bank of England, Eurobarometer, Gallup, Bank of Japan Notes: The US Federal Reserve line shows a Gallup poll of confidence in the economic leadership of the US, the ECB line shows a Eurobarometer measure of trust in the ECB, the BoJ line shows an opinion survey of confidence in the Bank of Japan and the BoE line shows TNS Survey results on satisfaction with the Bank’s performance.

33  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  33  Chart 13: How Americans of different ages got their news in 2016  Age Group 18-29  30-49  50-64  65+  5  10  23  28  29  24  29  20  Newspaper Radio  27  14  Online  49  50  TV  27 Per cent  85  72  45  Per cent  Per cent  Per cent  Source: Pew Research Centre (Barthel et al, 2016).