samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Second, the Federal Reserve’s balance-sheet expansion does have a consequence for the balance sheet of the banking system. The increase in the amount of excess reserves has to be held by banks. Excess reserves are a risk-free asset that they may not wish to hold. More important, to the extent that the banks worry about their overall leverage ratios, it is possible that a large increase in excess reserves could conceivably diminish the willingness of banks to lend. At present, these balance-sheet issues do not appear to be having a meaningful effect on bank behavior. In fact, the excess reserves serve as a liquidity buffer that many banks find attractive in the current environment. But that does not mean we can ignore this issue. We need to keep this issue in mind as we contemplate how much balance-sheet expansion might be appropriate. Third, the Federal Reserve is taking on some interest-rate risk in terms of its balance sheet. The excess reserves have an overnight maturity. These liabilities are being used to purchase longer-term assets. In principle, if short-term interest rates were to move up very sharply, the  6  BIS Review 94/2009  cost of funding could eventually exceed the return on the Fed’s assets. The bigger our balance sheet, the greater the amount of interest-rate risk we are assuming. We have examined this issue in detail.

The depreciation of the euro has also contributed to easing financing conditions. At its meeting on 3 September 2015, the Governing Council of the ECB expressed its readiness and ability, if required, to allow for more accommodation in its monetary policy stance. To this end, it could – if considered necessary – use the flexibility already embedded in the purchase programme to increase its size and extend its duration or modify its composition. The Spanish economy To conclude, I would like to briefly discuss the Spanish economy and its outlook. During 2015 the Spanish economy has been in what we could call a “virtuous triangle”, by simultaneously meeting three conditions: robust inflation-free growth, job creation and an external surplus. In 2015 we are going to achieve GDP growth of more than 3%, a negative average annual inflation rate, a current account surplus of more than 1 pp of GDP, and growth in employment and social security registrations, prompting expectations of an unemployment rate of less than 20% of the labour force by end-2016. However, the degree of uncertainty in economic projections has widened notably in recent months and the risks of slippage have risen owing to the downturn in the outlook for global growth. However, the Spanish economy is in a position to meet these challenges. The reforms implemented to date promote economic recovery and contribute to increasing Spain’s resilience in the face of exogenous shocks.
16 It becomes difficult to attract labour to the major cities when it is impossible to find a home for a reasonable price. 17 I am concerned about this social development, as it is creating problems for economic growth and economic distribution, and is increasing the likelihood of financial crises. It is of great importance that reforms are carried out to slow this development down. Measures affecting all mortgage borrowers are absent Like the Riksbank, Finansinspektionen has drawn attention to households’ high indebtedness and has taken measures to reduce the risks and increase resilience among households. This has also contributed towards slowing down price growth for housing, although this was not the primary purpose of the measures. 18 However, these macroprudential policy measures, such as a loan-to-value limit and amortisation requirements, are only aimed at new borrowers. Consequently, they mainly affect the conditions for the people I refer to as outsiders and, to some extent, could make it more difficult for them to enter the housing market. 19 On the other hand, there are few measures affecting the stock of already existing loans, which means that the new rules affect insiders and outsiders differently. In a study, the Riksbank has demonstrated that an amortisation requirement aimed at all borrowers could reduce household debt over the long run and that this would also mean a redistribution of resources from lenders to borrowers.

To reduce the lock-in effects and increase mobility in the housing stock, a review is needed of capital gains taxation when homes are sold, of property taxation and of the current tax relief on interest expenditure. Housing policy: The fundamental causes of increasing indebtedness need to be addressed. The fact that the housing market is functioning poorly, among other reasons due to the construction of new homes not corresponding to the demand, is an important cause of the indebtedness. It is therefore necessary to introduce measures that create a better balance between supply and demand for housing. Another reason why the housing market is functioning poorly is that the rent-setting system creates housing supply limits and lock-in effects that make it particularly difficult to find housing, particularly for young people and for people who are not yet established on the housing market. More rented accommodation would probably improve the balance of supply and demand. In addition, it is important to have measures that lead to the existing housing stock being used more efficiently. Suggestions in the area are not lacking either. See, for example, the recently published special study on more flexible rent-setting and uniform taxation from Finanspolitiska rådet (the Swedish fiscal policy council). 28 If such reforms are adopted, complaints over the amortisation requirements will also decrease. 28 Finanspolitiska rådet (2019). 10 [13]  “My vision” As you see, I have a strong desire for the housing market to change from the way it is today.
Several countries have already gone down this route, including China in 2013 and Russia in 2017. A third option, and the one that has so far been the preferred  response in Europe and France to innovations with the potential to change the payment services market, is to establish appropriate regulations that make it possible to reconcile two key imperatives: 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  First, address the risks that I mentioned, notably with a view to ensuring an adequate level of protection for participants, whether they be investors or consumers. Second, preserve the potential for technological innovation offered by crypto-assets. These two imperatives are mutually beneficial. Adopting a framework that protects  participants in the real economy will help to increase their confidence in the mechanisms associated with crypto-assets, thereby promoting growth in the new assets. 1. If we opt for creating a regulatory framework, what should go into it? That is precisely the topic of a number of debates currently being conducted around France’s new PACTE Bill. The proposed legislation includes an approach to crypto-assets based on two pillars. The first specifically addresses the question of ICOs, proposing an optional labelling system. Under this system, a company planning an ICO would be able to ask the AMF to label the offering. This optional label would give the offering greater credibility and reassure potential token buyers about the serious nature of the project and the associated financing arrangements. The second pillar concerns providers of crypto-asset services.

The reason is that a crisis in a bank can very quickly spread to the rest of the financial system, which can in turn have very costly consequences for the economy as a whole. I shall explain how this comes about. The banks’ traditional business model is to function as an intermediary between, on the one hand households and companies needing credit to buy homes or to get business projects started, and on the other hand households and companies wanting to hold money in accounts for transactions or savings. The banks thus help to transform savings into investment in the economy and contribute to more efficient mediation of payments. This is of course beneficial to the economy as a whole. At the same time, this business model entails significant risks. To put it simply, this is because the bank's assets consist of long-term loans that cannot be quickly and easily converted into cash, while the bank's funding is largely shortterm and volatile. Normally, this does not entail any problems, but if for some reason doubts were to arise with regard to the bank’s ability to pay, the funding could be withdrawn very quickly, and the bank could be forced to default on its payments. Problems in one bank can have serious domino effects As the banks are often interlinked with one another and often have similar types of exposure, problems in one bank can very quickly have serious domino effects in the rest of the financial system.
Compare the worldwide costs for taxpayers stemming from the absence of public intervention to rescue Lehman Brothers, with the zero cost for taxpayers following the US TARP 700 billion dollars injection into US banks in 2008 which have by now been totally repaid by the banks. In other words, financial instability can have a meaningful cost to taxpayers even if it is not visible in the very short term – a notion that all policy makers should keep in mind. The new European legislation does allow, as a last resort, for interventions that can safeguard financial stability in a Member State or in the area as a whole. I trust that this legislation will be applied by the competent authorities with rigour, wisdom and a sense of proportion in the aftermath of our Comprehensive Assessment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  SRM as a necessary complement to the SSM My remarks about the SRM – as a mechanism less relevant than the BRRD rules for the severing of the bank-sovereign nexus – do not aim to belittle the crucial importance of the SRM for Banking Union. To begin with, the implementation of the BRRD bail-in rules will be done by the SRM at the European level. The credibility of the SSM as supervisor is also dependent on the existence of a credible mechanism to proceed swiftly, orderly and efficiently in the resolution of banks that have attained the point of non-viability.

I know I will fall short in fully acknowledging all the hardship that our fellow citizens have endured – including devastating losses of loved ones, homes, communities and livelihoods – as well as widespread misery caused by flooding and disruptions to power, fuel, food, transportation and other services across the region. Nor will I be able to fully commend the ways in which family members, neighbors, co-workers and strangers have helped those in need. I am deeply moved by the evidence of people reaching out and pulling together across the region. At the New York Fed we are committed to supporting the recovery process. In addition to our economic analysis, we are convening our advisory groups and other regional contacts to receive first-hand accounts of the impact on communities, families and businesses and to assess other ways in which we may help. For example, we are holding a clinic in Staten Island to help people obtain information about different types of financial support that is available. We’re also encouraging banks to show appropriate flexibility when dealing with small business and other borrowers impacted by the storm. After my remarks, I’ll be happy to answer any questions you have about what the Fed does and why, and about the economic outlook. But I won’t comment specifically on the upcoming FOMC meeting next month. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee, also known as the FOMC.
Christian Noyer: Central banks in the financial crisis Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at Paris Europlace, Paris, 3 July 2009. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and gentlemen, It’s a great pleasure for me to address such a distinguished audience. From the outset, central banks have been major actors in fighting the financial crisis. Overall, their actions have been broadly applauded. In the period to come, however, steering the economy in an environment of high uncertainty will prove particularly challenging. It is therefore timely to reflect upon the past, present and future course of central banks' actions. Today, I would like to address three questions: Is monetary policy responsible for the crisis? How to assess the policy response from the central banks up to now? And, finally, to which extent does the crisis change our vision of their role in the future? Is monetary policy responsible for the crisis? To those who think it is the case, the standard argument goes as follows: in the aftermath of the equity bubble that burst in 2000, interest rates have been kept too low for too long. This created, for investors, both an incentive and a possibility to take excessive risk. The incentive came from the low level of interest rate where the "search for yield" could only be satisfied by moving to riskier assets and increasing leverage. The possibility was created by ample liquidity and the availability of cheap financing.

The pressure on interest rate margins will remain strong as long as interest rates remain exceptionally low. Thus, there will be strong incentives for banks to take on more risk. In the short term, an increase in affordability risk or interest rate risk may help to prevent a further decline in profitability. However, it would make banks more vulnerable to a large upward interest rate shock and to a correction on the mortgage and real estate markets. Greater risk-taking in lending could also lead to a renewed increase in momentum on the mortgage and real estate markets. This applies particularly to residential investment property, where upward pressure on prices could remain strong. If interest rates rise, there is the risk of a substantial price correction. This could result in credit losses at the banks that provide funding for such investors. This highlights the importance of the capital surpluses currently held by the domestically focused banks. Going forward, banks should set their risk appetite and their capital planning so as to ensure that they can absorb the losses that would arise under highly unfavourable but possible scenarios. Even under such scenarios, the banks must be able to perform their economically important functions – especially that of providing credit to the economy. The SNB will continue to monitor developments on the mortgage and real estate markets closely, paying particular attention to the residential investment property segment as well as to banks’ risk-taking in mortgage lending.
William C Dudley: Regional economy and manufacturing update Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Quarterly Regional Economic Press Briefing, New York City, 22 July 2010. *  *  *  Good morning and welcome to the New York Fed’s July 2010 Regional Economic Press Briefing. I value this opportunity to talk with the journalists covering our region – and through you, to the people in our District. My goal this morning is to share how I see regional economic conditions, with particular focus on the manufacturing sector in the Second Federal Reserve District. My colleagues will follow me and provide more detail on the patterns that I’ll describe. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. I. National economic conditions  To provide some context, I’ll begin with a few words about national economic conditions. U.S. economic activity has expanded for four consecutive quarters, but at rates that can only be described as modest when compared with early stages of past recoveries. The June payroll numbers tell the story of this sluggish recovery in employment. The economy gained only 83,000 private-sector jobs, following a downwardly revised gain of only 33,000 in May.

Despite this, we expect manufacturing output to continue to expand because of improving domestic demand and foreign demand for U.S. manufactured exports. Yet, if this recovery follows the typical pattern for past recoveries, the prospect for growth in factory jobs will likely be weaker here than the rest of the nation. Longer term, the sector’s prospects are likely to be governed by a continuation of the trends I mentioned before in international trade, technology and consumption patterns. This means that output and wages will likely continue to rise, both nationally and regionally. However, the sector is unlikely to be a major source of job growth. Beyond the national trends that work against an expansion of factory jobs, the New York-New Jersey region faces ongoing competitive pressures as a location for manufacturing production. That competition comes from other regions of the country, as well as from abroad. One key to meeting these competitive challenges will be for the region to ensure that it develops and attracts a highly skilled workforce that can meet the needs of innovative and rapidly changing firms. IV. The Empire State Manufacturing Survey  In order to monitor conditions in the region, the New York Fed conducts a monthly survey of manufacturing firms in New York State, our Empire State Manufacturing Survey. Let me tell you a little about the survey and then review recent patterns. The survey is sent to a pool of about 200 manufacturing executives in a wide variety of industries across the state. About 100 responses are usually received.
13.12.2017  “The relationship with bank customers” Opening Session of the 13th Banking Industry Meeting “Competitive Banking in a New Society”, IESE (Madrid) Javier Alonso Deputy Governor  Good morning. It is a pleasure to open this 13th edition of the Banking Industry Meeting and I thank the organisers, and IESE in particular, for their kind invitation to join this eminent gathering today. The information disseminated by the organisers states, by way of introduction to the programme for today’s conference, that “following an intense shake-up of the industry, the banking sector must address challenges and problems that place its operations at a critical juncture.” This has, indeed, been the central tenet of my public addresses throughout the year. In previous speeches I have stressed that the banking business is facing far-reaching changes whose implications are still difficult to foresee. And I have paid particular attention to what I consider are the main challenges the industry must address. I have shared my thoughts on the challenges posed to banking at the current juncture as regards: (i) maintaining appropriate profitability levels to ensure the viability of banks in the medium and long term; (ii) adapting to new and demanding regulations in response to the financial crisis; (iii) technological developments and the so-called fintech firms; and (iv) restoring the customer’s confidence.

In addition, the level of non-performing loans has been on the high side, and certainly higher than the EU average, even though it has recently started to decline. Here I should perhaps point out that in Malta we adopt a relatively conservative definition of non-performing loans. The expanded economic role of the banks has been accompanied by significant progress in creating an independent and effective regulatory framework in line with international standards. In 2002 the Malta Financial Services Centre was renamed the Malta Financial Services Authority, and took over from the Central bank the responsibility for supervising the banks and the Malta Stock Exchange to become the single supervisory and regulatory body. The division of responsibilities between the Authority and the Bank requires effective cooperation, and for this purpose a Memorandum of Understanding has been signed. At the same time, the Central Bank was given formal independence in the conduct of monetary policy, in overseeing payment systems and in safeguarding the overall stability of the financial system. The Bank uses a number of approaches to identify possible threats to the system. It analyses data from prudential returns submitted by the banks and other financial institutions. This, coupled with further analysis of the corporate sector in terms of leverage, profitability and liquidity, complements the monitoring of credit risk within the banking system. Stress testing is also carried out in order to identify potential losses resulting from abnormal market conditions.
Emerging countries continue to record high growth rates, but this momentum is weakening and in 2014 this weakness may become more pronounced. In the euro area in a scenario of weak economic growth and despite the improvement since summer 2012, monetary and financial markets remain fragmented and the uncertainty about monetary union and governance of the European Union has not been completely dispelled. In Spain, we have made significant progress in correcting the imbalances affecting our capacity to grow and I think we are on the right path to achieving a recovery of activity and the creation of employment on a sound basis. However, it will be essential not to abandon the policy of reforms aimed at increasing the flexibility of our economy and at boosting competitiveness. The fundamental task outstanding for the Banco de España is, with the help and close cooperation of the Government and the resolute support of the banking sector, to complete the balance sheet clean-up of our banking system, affording it the utmost solvency, efficiency and transparency. This target, to bring about a system that fulfils its key function to intermediate between savers and investors and which enjoys the full trust of customers and depositors, will, with hard work and rigour, be within our reach. But we will need something more: to restore economic growth, revive investment, create jobs and overcome the banking and financial crisis, we require legal security. I take this opportunity to request that you work resolutely to safeguard and strengthen it. Thank you for your attention.

In any  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  event, as it takes a long time for any drive of this nature to mature, it is also in everybody’s interest to set about studying and putting in place the necessary arrangements as soon as possible. Progress in correcting the external imbalance It is in the external sector where the swiftest and sharpest correction of imbalances is being made. The adjustment in the external sector continued in 2012 and, as a result, after posting a surplus in the second half of the year (an unprecedented development since the launch of EMU), the current account was practically in balance, with a deficit of only 0.2% of GDP for the year as a whole. Current forecasts point to surpluses on the current account for 2013, 2014 and successive years. In addition to the contraction in imports attributable to the fall-off in domestic spending, this performance reflects the restoring of the competitiveness lost by the Spanish economy during the expansion that ended in 2008. By late 2012, two-thirds of the gap built up since 2000 between Spanish unit labour costs and those for the euro area on average had already been corrected. These gains in competitiveness have been accompanied, in the most recent period, by notable growth in the number of exporting firms and by greater geographical diversification of our exports, with an ever-increasing weight of those targeted on emerging markets.