samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are also establishing stricter requirements for financial standing of turnaround managers. However, stricter control does not remove systemic deficiencies of financial resolution, namely: –  longtime presence in the market of undercapitalised banks under resolution (up to 10 years);  –  high cost: the current lending scheme provides for allocation of 1.6-fold more resources than acquiring a share in the capital, that also has indirect implications and aggravates structural liquidity surplus;  –  consolidation of banks under resolution is impossible as they have different turnaround managers appointed under bankruptcy proceedings;  –  insufficiency of financially sound turnaround managers;  –  higher DIA debt burden;  –  long loan maturities;  –  and the last one is the above-mentioned use of banks under resolution as a ‘bad asset depot’ by turnaround managers. Also, all of these are indeed systemic shortcomings of our mechanism, the one that has been around for many years. This resolution mechanism has seen no change since the time it was set up. It is still grounded in long-term soft credits extended in large amounts to entities wishing to take part in a financial turnaround. It is time for us to make the next step – the one to enable us to overcome these problems. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  The Bank of Russia stands ready to assume broad responsibility for the impact of bank resolutions, acting, in addition to its role of the main funding source, as a central enabling facilitator to this process.

The August 2020 Financial Stability Report (FSR) showed that the cumulative loss of UK economic output associated with the outbreak of Covid-19 would need to be around twice as big as the Monetary Policy Committee’s central projection. 21  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  12  The post-crisis capital framework has proved resilient so far and we need to wait out the Covid stress before we can complete our evaluation. In the meantime, it is imperative that Basel jurisdictions implement the last part of the post-crisis reforms – what in the UK we call Basel 3.1 and elsewhere is sometimes referred to as ‘endgame Basel 3’. These reforms have nothing to do with the design of regulatory buffers and the overall Basel 3 capital resource framework built in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, which was in large part all about the numerator of the capital ratio. By contrast, Basel 3.1 is about how to ensure risk weights, especially internally-modelled risk weights, are measured robustly – it’s about the robustness of measuring the denominator of the capital ratio. We should be getting on to implementing these measures consistent with the agreements we made when sitting around the Basel table. At the same time, we should not ignore the evidence that points towards issues with the original Basel 3 vision on buffer usability.
It is possible, and indeed desirable, to introduce the concept of co-payment by beneficiaries at the widest possible level without compromising the satisfaction of genuine needs. Fourth, there must be acceptance of the need for everyone to contribute to the development of the economy, including through the payment of taxes due. It is highly probable that unless these community values are inculcated in to-day’s rising generations, the economy’s growth prospects will not improve because the resources necessary to undertake the required investments will simply not be available. Fifth, there must be a more effective and focused approach through which Government and its entities support existing export industries and the establishment of new foreign direct investment in Malta. The provision of business advisory and support services must be improved and bureaucratic procedures reduced to a minimum so as to make the most of the opportunities available in a more difficult international trading environment. This new approach would also require a more active participation by Malta in international trade fora at an EU level. It also calls for better co-ordination on these matters within the public administration, and also between Government and the constituted bodies representing the exporting community, whether in industry, tourism or financial and other services. Conclusion Malta’s accession to the European Union has opened up undoubted scope for economic and social advancement. The potential for Malta to successfully exploit this opportunity has been given a clear endorsement by the EU Member States and institutions with this week’s entry of the Maltese lira in ERM II.

These are:   a better access for exports to EU Member States and to other countries with whom the EU has negotiated trade agreements;    heightened competition in the domestic market due to the removal of protectionist measures;    the free flow of factors of production, including labour and capital, between Malta and other EU Member States;    a greater availability of external financial resources; and    an enhanced degree of policy co-ordination between Malta and the other EU Member States, especially in the area of macroeconomic stabilisation, the promotion of economic growth and trade policy. Of these, the free flow of goods, services and capital are the factors that are most likely to have an impact in the short term. They have, indeed, already left their mark on the Maltese economy over the past year. The freedom of movement of labour, together with funding programmes and policy co-ordination are more likely to have medium- to long-term impacts. I shall therefore focus initially on the main opportunities and threats attendant upon the first set of factors. The longer-term consequences of EU accession will be dealt with in the context of the proposed policy orientations.
In the first case, we have good tools with which to respond. As the economy moved closer to full employment, we could raise short-term interest rates and subsequently sell assets from our portfolio. By doing this, we would tighten financial conditions, slow the economy and ensure it remained on a path consistent with our dual mandate objectives. The losses to society from this scenario should not be very large, provided we act in a manner that keeps medium-term inflation expectations in check. But the losses to society may be very high in the second case. That is because – as Japan has discovered over the past two decades – once in a liquidity trap it is not easy to return to full employment and price stability. Pinned at the lower bound, we don’t have as good a set of tools as we would ordinarily have to push the economy back toward our dual mandate objectives. As a result of this asymmetry, we should give somewhat more weight to avoiding the liquidity trap outcome. Embedded within the traditional Taylor Rule formulations is the implicit return path back to full employment and price stability that the FOMC achieved in the past when faced with shocks that pushed economic activity below its potential level.14  14  Obviously, there is a cost to those who are unemployed longer than necessary with no offsetting gain in terms of greater price stability. But there also is another potential long-run cost.

The interest rate is a blunt and unsuitable instrument for achieving financial stability and it thus makes little sense to assign the objective of financial stability to monetary policy. However, it may make sense to assign the objective of financial stability to the central bank, if the central bank is given control of the appropriate supervisory and regulatory instruments. The fact that financial-stability policy and monetary policy are different does not mean that there is no interaction between them. Similarly, monetary policy and fiscal policy are distinct policies but both have an impact on inflation and resource utilisation. The interaction between monetary policy and financial-stability policy has to be considered. Monetary policy affects asset prices and balance sheets and can thereby affect financial stability. Financial-stability  being smaller after the crisis. In Europe, Canada and the Nordic countries, commercial banks dominate the financial sector. 4  BIS Review 118/2010  policy directly affects financial conditions, which affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This motivates more research on how to incorporate financial conditions into the standard models of the transmission mechanism used by central banks. The outcome might very well be that financial conditions are considered to play a larger role in the transmission mechanism and as indicators of future inflation and resource utilisation. If so, central banks would end up responding more to financial indicators, in the sense of adjusting the policy rate and policy-rate path more to a given change in a financial indicator.
I only allow for a partial offset relative to what the Modigliani Miller theorem implies – in fact I assume the offset is only 30% as great, which means that the weighted average cost of cost of capital rises by 70% of the baseline 10. Making this adjustment reduces the estimated present value of the cost of permanently higher bank capital by about 1% of annual GDP – from just over 4% to 3%. The major part of this remaining cost reflects that fact that we assume that all interest paid by banks on debt they raise is tax deductible at the corporation tax rate (of 28%) while equity capital has to earn the required rate of return out of post tax profits. But in thinking about the wider economic impact of a switch to less tax sheltered funding for banks we need to take account of the extra revenue generated for the government. The government could use the extra tax revenue it gets from banks to shelter the users of bank loans from any knock on impact on their cost of raising finance. This seems a natural assumption to make. And it would mean that we should reduce the estimated negative impact on economic activity.

Competition-weighted exchange rate, TCW index Index, 1992-11-18 = 100 150  150  145  145  140  140  135  135  130  130  125  125  120  120 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Note: Outcomes are current rates to 081201 and the forecasts are quarterly averages. Broken line is the Riksbank’s forecast. Source: The Riksbank  14  BIS Review 154/2008  Figure 13. Labour costs, labour productivity and CPI in Sweden and the euro area Average of annual percentage change 2000-2008 4,0  4,0  3,5  3,5 Sweden  Euro area  3,0  3,0  2,5  2,5  2,0  2,0  1,5  1,5  1,0  1,0  0,5  0,5 0,0  0,0 Labour cost index  Productivity  CPI  Source: Eurostat  BIS Review 154/2008  15
It means that we should move beyond the north-south divide which has too often shaped past discussions on EMU. Economic fragmentation is receding on our continent, thanks to a broad cyclical recovery, the ECB’s actions and the bold reforms initiated in several countries. We should be careful not to allow 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  political fragmentation to jeopardise these achievements. Ultimately, what matters is that we strike the right balance between solidarity and responsibility and that we embrace a vision which secures the integrity and resilience of the euro area. We all know that this is not easy. But failure to do so would leave the ECB alone at the forefront of macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area. This is a risk not worth taking. Thank you. 1 See Cœuré, B. (2018), “The euro area’s three lines of defence”, speech at the conference “Deepening of EMU”,  Ljubljana, 2 February. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

So, as well as delivering the highest levels of resilience, we need to make sure we take this once in a generation opportunity to facilitate innovation for many years to come by expanding the functionality of the renewed service. Whether that is ensuring that the new RTGS can interact with Distributed Ledger Technology, or developing hooks to allow third party operators to synch the movement of funds on the RTGS ledger with movements across other ledgers, we expect to deliver a platform that enables the future generation of financial services. Across all of these services, the data that are used, and the way that they are formatted and presented to users, is vital. And because the standards we are implementing are used internationally, there is a critical need to ensure we implement them well. 5  See previous footnote. For numerous examples, see Haldane, A (2018), “Will Big Data Keep Its Promise?”, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/speech/2018/will-big-data-keep-its-promise-speech-by-andy-haldane.pdf 7 The Real-Time Gross Settlement service is the infrastructure that holds accounts for banks, building societies and other institutions. The balances in these accounts can be used to move money in real time between these account holders, this delivers final and risk-free settlement. 8 As set out in Carney, M. (2018), “New Economy, New Finance, New Bank”, Mansion House Speech 2018, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2018/new-economy-new-finance-new-bank-speech-by-mark-carney.pdf.
The up-to-now data indicate that credit to the economy has increased by about 3-4 percentage points of GDP, giving clear signals for a promissory excitement of the economy financing in the future. Till August 2005, compared to last year’s end, the system assets increased further by 14.5 per cent, while there was augmentation of banking products as well as extension of their network. Compared to yearend of 2004, the banking system has attained an increasing profit level, at ALL 4.65 per cent. Return on equity (ROE) has resulted 24.8 per cent, while credit quality expressed as a ratio between (net) bad credit and total credit portfolio is only 2.39 per cent, from 4.2 per cent it was at the end of 2004. However, there is no room to be excited by figure euphoria, because credits are still new and their quality will have to carefully be examined. Another significant development of the banking system relates to the client’s service, which through the electronic terminals is being obviously accompanied by the increased number of electronic cards in circulation. Banks already provide debit and credit cards in cooperation with international companies such as Visa Card, MasterCard and Diners Club. Six banks provide the ATM service and ATMs  1/4  reached the number of 180 by the end of August 2005, while points of sale reached the number of 391. Of course, an important aspect remains also the further expansion and consolidation of the banking system.

The contribution of bank crediting to the production investments is still low and furthermore, considering the high share the credit takes in supporting trade activity, we can come out with the conclusion that the major part of credit is going for the financing of imports. Likewise, the degree of using the banking system is not within the required parameters of the time and, furthermore, the degree of cash use continues to be high. In addition, the financial markets continue to remain superficial and subject of speculations. The restricted alternatives of investing free funds are indeed a reason to this situation. The financing of budget deficit continues to be still as the best alternative. However, the banking system should think seriously of enriching the market with other instruments rather than of using at maximum this riskless investment. To be more concrete, I will highlight further on some directions, which, I think, in the medium-term perspective are of priority to further stimulate and activate the bank credit in the economy, as the main instrument through which the banking system promotes the economic development of a market economy. Beginning with the Bank of Albania contribution, it relates first to the duty of meeting the legal obligations to achieve the overall macroeconomic stability with a special emphasis on inflation control. We remain determined in our position that inflation under control is a valuable contribution to achieve the objectives of the country’s economic growth, the enhancement of employment and of the living standard in general.
Lars Heikensten: The IMF - mandate, means and governance in a changing world Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Joint IMF-Bundesbank Symposium “The IMF in a changing world”, Frankfurt, 8 June 2005. *  *  *  The question posed to this panel is "The IMF – a panacea for every illness?". That it is being asked at all indicates that confidence in the IMF is strong today. I agree with those that have great confidence in the IMF. Nevertheless, my answer to the question is no: The IMF is not – and should not be - a panacea for every illness. Allow me to raise a number of issues against this background. Focus on the core functions The IMF has a unique mandate – to promote global macroeconomic and financial stability. This is the fundamental basis of sound economic performance. The IMF’s mission is certainly not less significant today than it was before. It was no coincidence that when the IMF was founded, in Bretton Woods in 1944, it was accompanied by the creation of the World Bank and (later) the WTO – with explicit areas of responsibility. It is important to adhere to these in order for each of the organisations to be able to work effectively and efficiently. A stable economic development is the basis of other international organisations' work. So it is vital that the IMF continues to focus on its core functions – and to do it well.

Fintech is transforming the relation with customers, the means of payment, as well as the modes of financing and transfers. On this particular last point, the potential gains are enormous for developing countries receiving large flows of their nationals abroad. In 2018, according to the World Bank, these transfers may have totaled 689 billion dollars, more than three-quarters of which were intended to developing countries. Traditional business models of banks are now challenged by the new financing methods, thus putting more pressure on their profitability and pushing them, in some cases, to greater risk-taking, which would eventually impact financial stability. 5  In emerging and developing countries, with internet and mobile telecommunications  penetration,  Fintech  now  offers  tremendous  opportunities to strengthen financial inclusion and economic and social development. According to a statement issued last November by the United Nations Secretary General, within a period of six years, 1.2 billion people have accessed financial services through technology. In a report issued in 2016, the Mckinsey Institute estimated the potential of Fintech in emerging economies by 2025 to an additional 6 percent of GDP, i.e. 3.7 trillion Dollars, and 95 million new jobs. The same report also revealed that two billion people and 200 million of very small, small and medium enterprises in emerging countries do not have access to credit, while those who have are still facing high costs.
I will concentrate my comments on four main aspects: the NGEU programme, the expenditure items most directly linked to management of the pandemic, certain specific discretionary measures, and the main items whose future development is primarily shaped by the assumptions included in the macroeconomic forecast. First, the NGEU programme to which I referred earlier. This programme is, without a doubt, on account of its magnitude, the factor that most distinguishes this Draft Budget from any other presented in Spain in recent decades. In particular, in 2021 the Government expects to receive € billion in European funds from this programme. This is in addition to a further € billion under the REACT-EU programme which is not included in the Draft Budget and will go directly to Spain’s regional governments. These funds are distributed broadly across the expenditure headings, although they are allocated especially to spending on industry and energy (21.1% of the total funds), civil research and development and innovation (17.8%), infrastructures (17.6%), health (11.1%), education (6.8%), and housing policy (6.2%). On the basis of these funds, increases have been budgeted in certain expenditure items that, in terms of historical performance, entail unprecedented annual rates of growth.

But clearly getting people the resources so that they can become homeowners in a prudent way is a good thing. And what we saw in the financial crisis, in the run-up to the financial crisis, is that we were giving credit to people in an imprudent way. I think as long as it can be done in a prudent way, where people understand the responsibilities, have the income to pay on their mortgages, I think it’s something that we definitely want to encourage. 12 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  So, what I would suggest is give me your card, and I’ll give it to the right people in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and we’ll have a conversation and see what we can do. This is not something that we could probably be involved in directly, as a funding provider. Legally, we don’t have the authority. The Federal Reserve is pretty powerful in terms of monetary policy. But our mandate is also pretty narrow in terms of what we’re allowed to do. I remember during the financial crisis, people were coming in and saying, “you should do this, you should do that, you should do that.” And most of the things that they were suggesting that we do were some things that were not actually allowed by the Federal Reserve Act that was passed back in 1913. Come talk to us and we will see what we can do.